- NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

[Senate Hearing 110-370]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 110-370

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
FIRST SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOMINATIONS OF

LTG DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN; GEN GEORGE W.
CASEY, JR., USA; ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN; LT. GEN. VICTOR E.
RENUART, JR., USAF; LTG ROBERT L. VAN ANTWERP, USA; CLAUDE M.
KICKLIGHTER; JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., S. WARD CASSCELLS, M.D., WILLIAM C.
OSTENDORFF; LTG DOUGLAS E. LUTE, USA; MICHAEL G. VICKERS; VADM ERIC T.
OLSON, USN; HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO; HON. PRESTON M. GEREN; ADM
MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN; GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC; ADM GARY
ROUGHEAD, USN; GEN WILLIAM E. WARD, USA; GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF;
LT. GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC; HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., HON. DOUGLAS A
BROOK; MAJ. GEN. ROBERT L. SMOLEN, USAF; MARY BETH LONG; JAMES SHINN;
CRAIG W. DUEHRING; AND JOHN H. GIBSON

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JANUARY 23, 30; FEBRUARY 1, 6, 27; MARCH 8, 27; JUNE 7, 12, 19; JULY
31; SEPTEMBER 27; OCTOBER 4; NOVEMBER 15; DECEMBER 18, 2007

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
110TH CONGRESS

S. Hrg. 110-370

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
FIRST SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOMINATIONS OF

__________

JANUARY 23, 30; FEBRUARY 1, 6, 27; MARCH 8, 27; JUNE 7, 12, 19; JULY
31; SEPTEMBER 27; OCTOBER 4; NOVEMBER 15; DECEMBER 18, 2007

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

(from January 12, 2007-July 17, 2007)

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN CORNYN, Texas
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

______

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

(from July 18, 2007-December 31, 2007)

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi

Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director

(ii)
?

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Page

january 23, 2007

Nomination of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA, to be General and
Commander, Multinational Forces-Iraq........................... 1

Statement of:

Petraeus, LTG David H., USA, to be General and Commander,
Multinational Forces-Iraq...................................... 4

january 30, 2007

Nomination of ADM William J. Fallon, USN, for Reappointment to
the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, United States Central
Command........................................................ 111

Statement of:

Fallon, ADM William J., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and to be Commander, United States Central Command..... 124

february 1, 2007

Nomination of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, United States
Army........................................................... 191

Statement of:

Casey, GEN George W., Jr., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Chief of Staff, United States Army........... 195

february 6, 2007

To Consider the Nominations of ADM William J. Fallon, USN, for
Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, U.S.
Central Command; GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, for
Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff
of the Army; and to Vote on Pending Military Nominations....... 301

february 27, 2007

To Consider Certain Pending Military Nominations................. 305

march 8, 2007

Nominations of ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN, for Reappointment to
the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, United States Pacific
Command; Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF, for Appointment
to be General and to be Commander, United States Northern
Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command;
and LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp, USA, for Reappointment to the
Grade of Lieutenant General and to be Chief of Engineers/
Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers...... 309

(iii)

Statements of:

Keating, ADM Timothy J., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and to be Commander, United States Pacific Command..... 313
Renuart, Lt. Gen. Victor E., Jr., USAF, for Appointment to be
General and to be Commander, United States Northern Command/
Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command............ 314
Van Antwerp, LTG Robert L., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade
of Lieutenant General and to be Chief of Engineers/Commanding
General, United States Army Corps of Engineers................. 315

march 27, 2007

Nominations of Claude M. Kicklighter to be Inspector General,
Department of Defense; James R. Clapper, Jr., to be Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; S. Ward Casscells, M.D.,
to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; and
William C. Ostendorff to be Principal Deputy Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration....................... 403

Statements of:

Hutchison, Hon. Kay Bailey, U.S. Senator from the State of Texas. 405
Cornyn, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Texas.......... 406
Everett, Hon. Terry, U.S. Representative from the State of
Alabama........................................................ 407
Kicklighter, LTG Claude M., USA, (Ret.), to be Inspector General,
Department of Defense.......................................... 414
Clapper, Lt. Gen. James R., Jr., USAF, (Ret.), to be Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.......................... 415
Casscells, S. Ward, M.D., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Health Affairs............................................. 416
Ostendorff, William C., to be Principal Deputy Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration....................... 416

june 7, 2007

Nomination of LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA, to be Assistant to the
President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and
Afghanistan.................................................... 543

Statement of:

Lute, LTG Douglas E., USA, to be Assistant to the President and
Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan...... 552

june 12, 2007

Nominations of Michael G. Vickers to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; VADM
Eric T. Olson, USN, for Appointment to the Grade of Admiral and
to be Commander, United States Special Operations Command; and
Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino to be Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security, Department of Energy, and Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration....................... 603

Statements of:

Vickers, Michael G., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.................. 608
Olson, VADM Eric T., USN, for Appointment to the Grade of Admiral
and to be Commander, United States Special Operations Command.. 609
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., to be Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security, Department of Energy, and Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration....................... 610

june 19, 2007

Nomination of Hon. Preston M. Geren to be Secretary of the Army.. 701

Statements of:

Hutchison, Hon. Kay Bailey, U.S. Senator from the State of Texas. 702
Geren, Hon. Preston M., to be Secretary of the Army.............. 709

july 31, 2007

Nominations of ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, for Reappointment to
the Grade of Admiral and to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; and Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff................................................ 809

Statements of:

Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff........ 815
Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, for Reappointment to the Grade
of General and to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 817

july 31, 2007

To Consider Certain Pending Military Nominations................. 941

september 27, 2007

Nominations of ADM Gary Roughead, USN, for Reappointment to the
Grade of Admiral and to be Chief of Naval Operations; GEN
William E. Ward, USA, for Appointment to the Grade of General
and to be Commander, United States Africa Command; Gen. Kevin
P. Chilton, USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and
to be Commander, United States Strategic Command; and Lt. Gen.
James N. Mattis, USMC, to be General and to be Commander,
United States Joint Forces Command and Supreme Allied Commander
for Transformation............................................. 945

Statements of:

Roughead, ADM Gary, USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and to be Chief of Naval Operations.................... 951
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from the State of Hawaii.... 952
Ward, GEN William E., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, United States Africa Command...... 953
Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, United States Strategic Command... 955
Mattis, Lt. Gen. James N., USMC, to be General and to be
Commander, United States Joint Forces Command and Supreme
Allied Commander for Transformation............................ 956

october 4, 2007

Nominations of Hon. John J. Young, Jr., to be Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Hon.
Douglas A. Brook to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management and Comptroller; and Maj. Gen. Robert L.
Smolen, USAF, (Ret.) to be Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration............. 1085

Statements of:

Stevens, Hon. Ted, U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska......... 1089
Young, Hon. John J., Jr., to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics......................... 1092
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from the State of Hawaii.... 1092
Smolen, Maj. Gen. Robert L., USAF, (Ret.), to be Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security
Administration................................................. 1094
Brook, Hon. Douglas A., to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management and Comptroller........................... 1095

november 15, 2007

To Consider Certain Pending Civilian and Military Nominations.... 1191

december 18, 2007

Nominations of Mary Beth Long to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs; James Shinn to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs; Craig W. Duehring to be Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; and John H. Gibson to
be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial
Management..................................................... 1195

Statements of:

Long, Mary Beth, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs................................. 1198
Shinn, James, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Security Affairs....................................... 1199
Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from the State of Minnesota..... 1199
Duehring, Craig W., to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Manpower and Reserve Affairs............................... 1200
Gibson, John H., to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Financial Management........................................... 1201

APPENDIX......................................................... 1289

NOMINATION OF LTG DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER,
MULTINATIONAL FORCES-IRAQ

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TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor, Webb,
McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins,
Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn, Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, chief counsel; Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member;
Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morriss,
minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff
member; Bryan D. Parker, minority investigative counsel;
Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Jill L. Simodejka, research
assistant; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Diana
G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Fletcher L.
Cork, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Joseph Axelrad and
Sharon L. Waxman, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M.
Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator
Bill Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Lauren
Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson and
Michael Sozan, assistants to Senator Webb; Nichole M.
Distefano, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Richard H. Fontaine,
Jr., assistant to Senator McCain; Sandra Luff, assistant to
Senator Warner; Jeremy Shull, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Arch
Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark Winter,
assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham;
Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson,
assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C. Mallory and Bob Taylor,
assistants to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to
Senator Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. The hearing will come to order.
General Petraeus' nomination to become the Commander of
Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) may be the single most
important command in the Nation's defense establishment. The
Nation will entrust him with the operational command and
welfare of over 130,000 American servicemembers, many of whom
will be deployed in Baghdad in the middle of a protracted and
bloody sectarian battle over the future of Iraq. He will take
over from General George Casey, who has served in this position
since 2004.
General Petraeus is well known to this committee. In July
2004 and again in June 2005, General Petraeus provided the
committee valuable insights from his experiences as an infantry
division commander during and immediately after the invasion of
Iraq and from his tenure as the commander of early U.S. efforts
to train and equip Iraqi security forces, experiences that he
no doubt will draw heavily upon in the days ahead.
General Petraeus is well-qualified for this command, widely
recognized for the depth and the breadth of his education,
training, and operational experience. Noteworthy is his recent
leadership of the team that wrote the new counterinsurgency
manual for the Army and Marine Corps. In addition to our
interest in his assessment of current conditions and
operations, many of our questions this morning will probe the
theory and practice of counterinsurgency and their application
in today's Iraq, which is not experiencing a traditional
insurgency, but rather a mixture of sectarian violence and an
emerging civil war, as well as an insurgency against the
government.
Prime Minister Maliki has acknowledged that the crisis in
Iraq is a political crisis. President Bush says this troop
surge and other increased U.S. commitments are based upon the
Iraqi political leaders keeping their pledges to meet
benchmarks on the military, political, and economic front. He
says this even though Iraqi political leaders have not followed
through on their pledges in the past.
Secretary Gates on January 12 described four categories of
benchmarks that we would be monitoring. In the first are the
military benchmarks, including deployment of effective Iraqi
forces into Baghdad and access to all neighborhoods without
political interference. In the second category of Secretary
Gates are those benchmarks relating to the whole part of the
strategy on how effectively Iraqi forces control an area once
it is cleared. In the third are benchmarks relating to the
economic recovery of a controlled area. In the fourth are
benchmarks relating to the Iraqis reaching political
compromises on outstanding issues, including provincial
elections, power-sharing, and the distribution of oil revenues.
This morning we will probe General Petraeus' assessment of
the current situation in Iraq. We will want to understand his
views on the importance of the Iraqis meeting their commitments
and what pressure are we willing to place on the Iraqi
leadership to meet the benchmarks that they have agreed to. We
will ask for his assessment of the readiness of U.S. forces in
and on their way to Iraq for counterinsurgency operations. We
will want to hear how he intends to employ forces that are now
surging into Iraq. We will want to know what timeline he has in
mind to measure the pace and scope of Iraqi security forces'
assumption of the counterinsurgency fight.
We all appreciate General Petraeus' service and his
willingness to lead our forces at this critical and dangerous
time.
Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
want to thank you for your rapid consideration of this
nomination. You and your staff have made this possible and I
appreciate it very much. I hope we can, at the completion of
the testimony today, move quickly forward to the vote on
General Petraeus' nomination. But again, I want to thank you
for the rapid consideration of this important nomination.
General Petraeus, I join Chairman Levin in welcoming you
here today and congratulating you. It is hard to imagine a more
important military nomination than that of General David
Petraeus. General, you know better than others the stakes in
this war, the benefits of success, and the potential
catastrophic consequences of failure. You, having literally
written the book on counterinsurgency, understand the strategy
and tactics that must guide the President's increase in U.S.
force levels. You, General, will have great responsibility for
the course of future American actions in Iraq.
But to state the obvious, your job will be very difficult.
We have made many mistakes in this war. From the initial
invasion, we had too few troops in Iraq and we never redressed
this deficiency. We played whack-a-mole instead of clearing and
holding. We adopted an inadequate and unrealistic light
footprint coalition strategy that focused on turning over to
Iraqis missions that they were plainly unable to complete.
Administration officials frequently and repeatedly issued
unjustifiably optimistic assessments and predictions about the
situation in Iraq. We responded ineffectively to the hostile
actions of Sunni, Shia, and foreign fighters alike and the
vagaries of the Iraqi government.
Somewhat dismaying that only now, after nearly 4 years at
war in Iraq, is the United States moving toward a traditional
counterinsurgency strategy aimed first at the protection of the
Iraqi population and supported by troop levels appropriate to
their mission.
Whether the projected surge is sufficient to accomplish all
that our leaders will ask of our troops remains an open
question in my mind and I look forward, General, to your
testimony on this score. But I believe that the fundamental
components of the new strategy are needed in Iraq, and that
they have been necessary for a long time. By quelling the
violence in Baghdad and with your leadership, improving our
training and reinforcement efforts, we will allow the economic
and political process to move forward and create a situation
which will permit confidence and optimism.
While I believe that this will present a solid chance of
success, I would note again that the new plan does not on its
own guarantee success. Bringing down the violence in Iraq will
help give Prime Minister Maliki and others the political space
they need to pursue reconciliation. But it is up to the Iraqis
to make these tough decisions. It is absolutely imperative that
they seize this opportunity. It may well be their last.
We have needed a new military leadership in Iraq for some
time and there is no one in the U.S. military better suited to
implement the President's new strategy than General Petraeus. I
am confident that you will receive broad support in the Senate,
as will Admiral Fallon, who has been nominated as the next head
of Central Command. It is absolutely essential that the Senate
act promptly on your nomination. I hope that following Senate
action the President will direct you to take the next flight to
Iraq and assume command. Your role is that important.
If confirmed, this will be your third assignment in Iraq
since the war began in March 2003. You led the 101st Airborne
Division with great distinction in northern Iraq in 2003. You
were later recognized for making significant improvements in
the training of the Iraqi security forces after a slow start
and missteps during the early months of the Coalition
Provisional Authority.
Most recently, as Commander of the U.S. Army's Combined
Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, you led the development of the
Army's doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency
environment. This revised doctrine is designed to merge
traditional approaches to counterinsurgency operations with the
realities of the 21st century.
Mr. Chairman, in the foreword to the new field manual
General Petraeus wrote, ``Conducting a successful
counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force
led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders.'' I
believe that this committee has just such a leader before it
today and that he is someone we can look to for leadership in
this, America's final chance to prevail in Iraq.
General, I thank you and your family for the sacrifices you
have made and your career of selfless service to our Nation. I
look forward to your testimony today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
General Petraeus.

STATEMENT OF LTG DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, TO BE GENERAL AND
COMMANDER, MULTINATIONAL FORCES-IRAQ

General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of
the committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I would
like to begin this morning by briefly reviewing the situation
in Iraq, explaining the change in focus of the new strategy,
and discussing the way ahead. This statement is a bit longer
than usual, but, as I discussed with you last week, Mr.
Chairman, I believe it is important that the committee hear it
and I appreciate the opportunity to present it.
The situation in Iraq has deteriorated significantly since
the bombing this past February of the al-Askari Mosque in
Samarra, the third holiest Shia Islamic shrine. The increase in
the level of violence since then, fueled by the insurgent and
sectarian fighting that spiraled in the wake of the bombing,
has made progress in Iraq very difficult and created
particularly challenging dynamics in the capital city of
Baghdad.
Indeed, many Iraqis in Baghdad today confront life or
death, stay or leave decisions on a daily basis. They take
risks incalculable to us just to get to work, to educate their
children, and to feed their families.
In this environment, Iraq's new government, fourth in 3\1/
2\ years, has found it difficult to gain traction. Though
disappointing, this should not be a surprise. We should recall
that after the liberation of Iraq in 2003 every governmental
institution in the country collapsed. A society already
traumatized by decades of Saddam's brutal rule was thrown into
complete turmoil and the effects are still evident throughout
the country and in Iraqi society.
Iraq and its new government have been challenged by
insurgents, international terrorists, sectarian militias,
regional meddling, violent criminals, governmental dysfunction,
and corruption. Iraq's security forces and new governmental
institutions have struggled in this increasingly threatening
environment and the elections that gave us such hope actually
intensified sectarian divisions in the population at the
expense of the sense of Iraqi identity.
In this exceedingly difficult situation, it has proven very
hard for the new government to develop capacity and to address
the issues that must be resolved to enable progress.
The escalation of violence in 2006 undermined the coalition
strategy and raised the prospect of a failed Iraqi state, an
outcome that would be in no group's interest save that of
certain extremist organizations and perhaps states in the
region that wish Iraq and the United States ill. In truth, no
one can predict the impact of a failed Iraq on regional
stability, the international economy, the global war on terror,
America's standing in the world, and the lives of the Iraqi
people.
In response to the deterioration of the situation in Iraq,
a new way ahead was developed and announced earlier this month.
With implementation of this approach, the mission of MNF-I will
be modified, making security of the population, particularly in
Baghdad, and in partnership with Iraqi forces, the focus of the
military effort. For a military commander, the term ``secure''
is a clearly defined doctrinal task, meaning to gain control of
an area or terrain feature and to protect it from the enemy.
Thus, the task will be clear-cut, though difficult. Certainly,
upcoming operations will be carried out in full partnership
with Iraqi forces, with them in the lead whenever possible and
with arm's length when that is not possible.
Transition of Iraqi forces in provinces to Iraqi control
will continue to feature prominently in the coalition plan and,
as recommended by the Iraqi Study Group, the advisor effort
will be substantially reinforced.
The primacy of population security in the capital will mean
a greater focus on that task, particularly in the most
threatened neighborhoods. This will, of course, require that
our unit commanders and their Iraqi counterparts develop a
detailed appreciation of the areas in which they will operate,
recognizing that they may face a combination of Sunni
insurgents, international terrorists, sectarian militias, and
violent criminals.
Together with Iraqi forces, a persistent presence in these
neighborhoods will be essential. Different approaches will be
required in different locations. Whatever the approach, though,
the objective will be to achieve sufficient security to provide
the space and time for the Iraqi government to come to grips
with the tough decisions its members must make to enable Iraq
to move forward. In short, it is not just that there will be
additional forces in Baghdad. It is what they will do and how
they will do it that is important.
Some of the members of this committee have observed that
there is no military solution to the problems of Iraq. They are
correct. Ultimate success in Iraq will be determined by actions
in the Iraqi political and economic arenas on such central
issues as governance, the amount of power devolved to the
provinces and possibly regions, the distribution of oil
revenues, national reconciliation, resolution of sectarian
differences, and so on.
Success will also depend on improvements in the capacity of
Iraq's ministry, in the provision of basic services, in the
establishment of the rule of law, and in economic development.
It is, however, exceedingly difficult for the Iraqi government
to come to grips with the toughest issues it must resolve while
survival is the primary concern of so many in Iraq's capital.
For this reason, military action to improve security, while not
wholly sufficient to solve Iraq's problems, is certainly
necessary, and that is why additional U.S. and Iraqi forces are
moving to Baghdad.
The way ahead is designed to be a comprehensive approach.
Indeed, the objectives of helping Iraqis increase the capacity
of their governmental institutions, putting Iraq's unemployed
to work, and improving the lot in life of Iraqi citizens
require additional resources, many of which will be Iraqi. In
carrying out the non-kinetic elements of the strategy, however,
our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians downrange
must get all the help they can from all the agencies of our
Government.
There is a plan to increase that assistance and it is
hugely important. This clearly is the time for the leaders of
all our governmental departments to ask how their agencies can
contribute to the endeavor in Iraq and to provide all the
assistance that they can. Our military is making an enormous
commitment in Iraq. We need the rest of the departments to do
likewise, to help the Iraqi government get the country and its
citizens working and to use Iraq's substantial oil revenues for
the benefit of all the Iraqi people.
Having described the general approach, I would like to
offer a word on expectations. It will take time for the
additional forces to flow to Iraq, time for them to gain an
understanding of the areas in which they will operate, time to
plan with and get to know their Iraqi partners, time to set
conditions for the successful conduct of security operations,
and of course time to conduct those operations and then to
build on what they achieve.
None of this will be rapid. In fact, the way ahead will be
neither quick nor easy, and there undoubtedly will be tough
days. We face a determined, adaptable, barbaric enemy. He will
try to wait us out. In fact, any such endeavor is a test of
wills and there are no guarantees. The only assurance I can
give you is that, if confirmed, I will provide MNF-I the best
leadership and direction I can muster, I will work to ensure
unity of effort with the ambassador and our Iraqi and coalition
partners, and I will provide my bosses and you with forthright
professional military advice with respect to the missions given
to MNF-I and the situation on the ground in Iraq.
In that regard, I would welcome opportunities to provide
periodic updates to this body. Beyond that, I want to assure
you that should I determine that the new strategy cannot
succeed, I will provide such an assessment.
If confirmed, this assignment will be my fourth year or
longer deployment since the summer of 2001, three of those to
Iraq. My family and I understand what our country has asked of
its men and women in uniform and of their families since
September 11. In fact, I would like to take this opportunity to
thank the American people for their wonderful support in recent
years of our men and women in uniform.
Tom Brokaw observed to me one day in northern Iraq that
those who have served our Nation since September 11 comprise
the new greatest generation. I agree strongly with that
observation and I know the members of this committee do, too.
Over the past 15 months I have been privileged to oversee
the organizations that educate our Army's leaders, draft our
doctrine, capture lessons learned, and help our units prepare
for deployment. This assignment has provided me a keen
awareness of what we have asked of our soldiers and of their
families. In view of that, I applaud the recent announcement to
expand our country's ground forces. Our ongoing endeavors in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere are people-intensive and it is
heartening to know that there will be more soldiers and marines
to shoulder the load.
I recognize that deploying more forces to Iraq runs counter
to efforts to increase the time at home for our troops between
deployments. I share concerns about that. However, if we are to
carry out the MNF-I mission in accordance with the new
strategy, the additional forces that have been directed to move
to Iraq will be essential, as will again greatly increased
support by our Government's other agencies, additional
resources for reconstruction and economic initiatives, and a
number of other actions critical to what must be a broad,
comprehensive, multifaceted approach to the challenges in Iraq.
Many of the emails I have received in recent weeks have had
as their subject line ``Congratulations, I think.'' I
understand the message they are conveying. I know how heavy a
rucksack I will have to shoulder in Iraq, if confirmed. I am
willing to take on the position for which I have been nominated
because I believe in serving one's Nation when asked, because I
regard it as a distinct honor to be able to soldier again with
those who are part of the brotherhood of the close fight, and
because I feel an obligation to help the ``Shabil Iraq,'' the
vast majority of whom have the same desires of people the world
over: security for themselves and their loved ones,
satisfaction of their basic needs, and an opportunity to better
their lot in life.
In closing, the situation in Iraq is dire. The stakes are
high. There are no easy choices. The way ahead will be very
hard. Progress will require determination and difficult U.S.
and Iraqi actions especially the latter, as ultimately the
outcome will be determined by the Iraqis. But hard is not
hopeless. If confirmed, I pledge to do my utmost to lead our
wonderful men and women in uniform and those of our coalition
partners in Iraq as we endeavor to help the Iraqis make the
most of the opportunity our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines have given to them.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General. Again, we thank you for
your service. We thank you for your very eloquent testimony.
Thank your family as well for us, if you would.
There are standard questions which we ask of nominees which
we will put to you right now. Have you adhered to applicable
laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views
when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views
differ from the administration in power?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We will have an 8-minute round to begin with.
General Petraeus, General Casey says that, ``the longer
that U.S. forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq's
security it lengthens the time that the Government of Iraq has
to take the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing
with the militias.'' General Abizaid said recently, ``I believe
that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from taking more
responsibility for their own future.''
Do you agree with those two generals?
General Petraeus. Sir, my mission will be different than
the mission that they had, if confirmed. In fact, I talked to
General Abizaid and General Casey both in the past week and
they both support the increase in U.S. forces as a way of
helping the Iraqi government get the time and space that it
needs to be able to come to grips with the difficult decisions
that they in fact identified.
Chairman Levin. We will ask General Casey when he is before
us as to whether or not he still stands with the statement
which he has made and which General Abizaid has also made,
along the line that the more American forces that we provide
the less likely it is that the Iraqis will take responsibility
for their own future.
On the question of benchmarks, General, President Bush says
that the Iraqis have agreed to meet certain political,
economic, and military benchmarks. Are you familiar with the
President's statement?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you seen those benchmarks?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have not seen lists of them. I am
familiar with his statement and of course with the benchmarks
that you outlined that Secretary Gates mentioned earlier.
Chairman Levin. Have you seen the actual benchmarks that
the President referred to?
General Petraeus. If you are talking about the slides and
the briefing, sir? I am not sure which you are actually
referring to.
Chairman Levin. The President has referred to benchmarks.
He has said that the Iraqis have agreed to benchmarks and that
we will hold the Iraqis to those benchmarks. Have you seen the
benchmarks the President referred to?
General Petraeus. Yes, that is correct. I know what you are
talking about sir, in terms of what they have agreed to provide
in terms of the military forces in Iraq, money for the
reconstruction, money for foreign military sales, and so forth,
yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you see to it that we get a copy of
those benchmarks?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

The requested benchmarks have been provided to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense which is coordinating turnover of this
information.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree that we will hold the Iraqi
government to the benchmarks that it has announced?
General Petraeus. We certainly will to the very best of our
ability, sir.
Chairman Levin. How are we going to do that? What is the
leverage on them?
General Petraeus. Sir, there are a number of different ways
of leverage. Among them are providing assistance or withholding
assistance in various forms of the lines of operation that are
pursued in Iraq.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that the success of the
strategy is dependent upon the Iraqis carrying out their
commitments?
General Petraeus. I do, sir.
Chairman Levin. Over the last several weeks, we have heard
about rhetorical off-ramps that are built into the flow of
21,000 additional troops, which implies that the U.S.
commitment is conditional. Secretary Gates said that there is
plenty of opportunity before many of the 21,000 additional
troops arrive to evaluate, ``whether the Iraqis are fulfilling
their commitments to us.''
Now, a story in this morning's Washington Post indicates
that you do not intend to use off-ramps to slow or cancel the
deployment of additional U.S. forces to Iraq even if the Iraqis
fail to meet their commitments. Is that story true?
General Petraeus. No, sir, it is not. I think that was, ``a
source close to General Petraeus'' or something like that. What
I would do in the event that the Iraqi benchmarks are not met
is obviously discuss that with my boss at Central Command, with
the Secretary of Defense, and then, frankly, determine what it
is that we are going to do.
Chairman Levin. So as of this time, do you know whether the
flow of additional forces is conditional upon the Iraqis
keeping their political, economic, and military commitments?
General Petraeus. Sir, I do not believe that there are
specific conditions that are established. I know again that
there is certainly a keen awareness of the Iraqis and what it
is that they are supposed to do. In fact, General Odierno has
reported to me that three to four of the battalions, of the
Iraqi commitment, actually are already in Baghdad, and that
they came in at something like the 80 percent figure. That
includes their leave numbers, however.
Chairman Levin. Do you believe that it is important that
the Iraqis understand that they need to reach the political
settlements which are essential to resolve the sectarian
violence and to defeat the hard-core insurgents?
General Petraeus. It is very important, sir.
Chairman Levin. What forms would that pressure take?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think everything from moral
suasion in meetings to again either giving additional or
withholding assistance.
Chairman Levin. Could that also mean providing or not
providing parts of the 21,000 troops?
General Petraeus. Sir, it could.
Chairman Levin. Now, we understand from columnist David
Broder and from what you said here this morning that you are
willing to provide a regular report every couple weeks on Iraqi
progress on meeting the agreed upon benchmarks. Is that
accurate?
General Petraeus. Sir, I would be happy to provide updates
to this body on whatever basis. I would like to make sure it is
long enough to make sure it is meaningful and yet certainly
short enough so you can keep track of what is going on.
Chairman Levin. We appreciate that, and we also want you to
not be bogged down with reports. We like them regularly, but we
do not want you to be focusing on reporting to us. You have
other duties to perform.
General Petraeus. Right, sir.
Chairman Levin. But we would then expect those regular
reports, because for some of us and I think many of us it is
critically important that that pressure be felt by the Iraqi
government. They have not complied with previous commitments
that they have made. I am very doubtful as one Senator that it
is likely they are going to carry out the other commitments
that they have made. I just think history should make us very
dubious about the likelihood that they are going to carry out
these critically important commitments in the political area as
well as the military and economic area.
But those reports, to the extent that you will make those
regularly, will be valuable to us in determining whether or not
the Iraqi government is doing what only they can do, which is
to work out the settlement of differences and to carry out
their commitments.
Reports do not constitute pressure by themselves. They are
useful, but simply reporting that Iraqis have failed to achieve
a benchmark does not mean much if there are no consequences to
that failure. As I said, they have consistently failed to meet
their commitments to increase forces in Baghdad, to stay on
schedule for the drafting of their constitution, to hold a
national reconciliation conference, or disarm the sectarian
militias. So consequences need to be clear, real, significant,
and used if pressure is going to make a difference in terms of
Iraqi behavior. Would you agree with that?
General Petraeus. I would, sir.
Chairman Levin. General, will U.S. forces have unfettered
access and complete freedom of action in all neighborhoods,
without Iraqi political interference?
General Petraeus. I am told they already do, sir, but it is
something I will certainly confirm, if confirmed.
Chairman Levin. Who will have the operational and tactical
control of U.S. battalions that are partnered with the nine
Iraqi brigades in the nine sectors of Baghdad?
General Petraeus. U.S. commanders, sir.
Chairman Levin. Who will have operational and tactical
control of the nine Iraqi brigades themselves?
General Petraeus. I believe it is Iraqi commanders, sir,
and to ensure unity of effort what General Odierno is already
working on in fact is linkages at each of the levels of
command, co-located command posts, terms of reference, and so
forth.
Chairman Levin. What about the U.S. adviser teams that are
embedded with Iraqi units that are operating in Baghdad? Who
will have operational and tactical control of those teams?
General Petraeus. U.S. units, sir.
Chairman Levin. Who will be responsible for the force
protection of U.S. adviser teams with Iraqi units?
General Petraeus. The unit in whose area they are located,
sir.
Chairman Levin. The U.S. unit?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
My time has expired. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, in your view, since you have been
intimately involved in Iraq from the beginning, suppose we
announce tomorrow that we would withdraw within 4 to 6 months.
What are the results there in Iraq and in the region?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think that sectarian groups would
obviously begin to stake out their turf, try to expand their
turf. They would do that by greatly increased ethnic cleansing.
There is the very real possibility of involvement of countries
from elsewhere in the region around Iraq entering Iraq to take
sides with one or the other groups.
There is the possibility certainly of an international
terrorist organization truly getting a grip on some substantial
piece of Iraq. There is the possibility of problems in the
global economy should in fact this cause a disruption to the
flow of oil and a number of other potential outcomes, none of
which are positive.
Senator McCain. Eventually there is every likelihood of a
scenario of chaos?
General Petraeus. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Suppose we send you over to your new job,
General, only we tell you that you cannot have any additional
troops. Can you get your job done?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Senator McCain. Suppose that we send you additional troops
and we tell those troops that, we support you, but we are
convinced that you cannot accomplish your mission and we do not
support the mission we are sending you on. What effect does
that have on the morale of your troops?
General Petraeus. It would not be a beneficial effect, sir.
Obviously, a commander would like to go forward with as much
flexibility as he can achieve. I was assured yesterday by the
Secretary of Defense, by the way, that if we need additional
assets, my job is to ask for them. If they are not provided in
some case, my job is to tell my boss the risk involved in
accomplishing the mission without the assets that are required.
At some point, of course, you may have to go back and say that
you cannot accomplish the mission because of the assets that
have not been provided.
Senator McCain. You are fairly familiar with the Iraqi
leadership. You have known these individuals. Based on your
experience with them, how effective do you think threats of
withdrawal of U.S. troops are in achieving real progress in
Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, there are certain elements in the
government that might actually welcome withdrawal. There are
others certainly that would fear it greatly. It certainly
depends on which side of these various divides they're on. I do
not think that the responsible members of that government right
now certainly want us to withdraw, and if it is levers that we
are after, again withdrawing support from a specific
organization or perhaps institution in my experience was more
effective in trying to get a desired outcome.
Senator McCain. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its
state of readiness, how long do you believe the increased troop
levels and tempo of operations can be sustained?
General Petraeus. Sir, my understanding is that there are
contingency plans being developed to sustain the surge, the
increased force levels, if that is required. Having said that,
as I mentioned in my opening statement, I am keenly aware of
the strain on our soldiers and marines in particular, and on
our families, certainly the other members of the military who
are in positions that have been deploying, and it is for that
reason that, as I mentioned, I applaud the increase in our
ground forces in particular.
Senator McCain. You were a young officer following our
defeat in the Vietnam War. Would you contemplate the effects of
defeat in Iraq as compared with an additional, very difficult
strain on our men and women in the military who are having to
serve more than we would want them to?
General Petraeus. Sir, obviously what our men and women in
the military want to do, I think, is to accomplish their
mission and then to come home.
Senator McCain. I am saying it took us a long time to
recover from losing the war, did it not?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Do you understand the command and control
relationships between the American and Iraqi forces in this new
plan? I am very concerned about unity of command.
General Petraeus. Sir, I share your concern. Again, on the
one hand, though, we have pushed Iraqis to do more, to take
charge in many cases, and so we have in fact almost a good
news, bad news story. The good news is that the Iraqis are
willing to take command in many cases. The bad news is that
makes us have to achieve unity of effort rather than unity of
command, and that is why we would have to have those
relationships all the way up and down, with command posts co-
located and so forth to assure that.
Senator McCain. We need to get that sorted out, General.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. I know of no successful military operation
where you have dual command.
In your judgment, what is a reasonable estimate of the time
needed to demonstrate whether such efforts, these efforts, are
having success?
General Petraeus. Sir, under the current plan as I
understand it, the final brigade would be operational in Iraq
at the end of May, giving them time to get established, to
understand the situation on the ground. Other forces will have
already certainly been moving into their areas of operation. I
would think that we would have indicators at the least during
the late summer of the ability to clear and hold and then build
in the Baghdad area and to secure that population.
Senator McCain. Will all five brigades be massed
simultaneously or is there some other plan to have all five
brigades move more slowly into Baghdad?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have not----
Senator McCain. In other words, are you confident that they
are getting them over there as quickly as possible?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have asked that those forces be
moved as rapidly as possible, if I am confirmed.
Senator McCain. Are you confident that they will be?
General Petraeus. Sir, the Secretary and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs said yesterday that they are in fact scrubbing
that, if you will, to determine how quickly they can in fact
move those forces there.
Senator McCain. You were in Haiti and Bosnia and you are
familiar with Kosovo. It took an overwhelming number of
military boots on the ground in Kosovo and Bosnia in order to
bring about the end of what was basically sectarian violence,
Serbs killing Muslims, Muslims or in the case of Kosovo,
Albanians, right?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Yet your numbers, by any estimate or
formula that you use, you are receiving are either inadequate
or bare minimum. Does that concern you?
General Petraeus. It does, sir. If you look at the
counterinsurgency manual, for example, and you have the 1-to-50
ratio of counterinsurgents to citizens, you would say that,
well, for Baghdad's population you should have somewhere around
120,000 security forces. If you add all of the U.S. forces that
will be on the ground when we have the full increase in forces,
including Special Operations Forces, all the Iraqi forces,
military and police, you get to about 85,000. Not all of those
are as effective as we might want them to be, particularly in
the police side. However, there are tens of thousands of
contract security forces and ministerial security forces that
do in fact guard facilities and secure institutions and so
forth that our forces, coalition or Iraqi forces, would
otherwise have to guard and secure, and so that does give me
reason to believe that we can accomplish the mission in Baghdad
with the additional forces.
Senator McCain. How is the morale?
General Petraeus. Sir, the morale is good. Troops in the
field take it one day at a time, sometimes one foot in front of
the other foot, and continue to move forward to accomplish
their mission.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome,
General Petraeus.
General Petraeus, I have concerns about this policy, but I
have every intention of voting for you. I think you are an
outstanding military officer. Our soldiers really deserve the
best and I think they are getting it with your service, even
though we have some real reservations, I do, just generally on
the policy.
I think Americans really are looking and asking about this
timeline, these benchmarks which you referred to and responded
to the chairman and also Senator McCain. They are really
wondering now, with the announcement by the President about
these additional kind of forces, what are the benchmarks and
whether they can be met. I know this is an old issue, an old
question, and it will be older before I am sure the end of the
hearing. But you have talked about late summer in terms of the
military aspect. With regard to the security, the President has
even indicated in his speech that he believed that all the
provinces, he thought, would be secured by the fall.
To establish its authenticity, the Iraqi government plans
to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces
by November. That is security. We are talking about the
political decisions that have been reached earlier. What are
really the benchmarks that you have established yourself, that
they will have to be realized to really know whether we are
making progress?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have general benchmarks in my
mind. Obviously, until I can go over to Iraq, if confirmed, and
sit down with the staff over there and work through the
specific timing of which battalions and brigade headquarters
arrive when, when they expect to get certain decisions to see
what Iraqi resources are committed, and so forth, and what
timeline.
Senator Kennedy. I am thinking now in terms of the non-
military, I mean of the oil revenue law, the provincial
elections, and the demilitarization of the militias. Do you
have these benchmarks established now? I think Americans want
to know when we are going to expect we can measure some
progress. You have been very frank in indicating you would come
back to the committee. You have been very frank in indicating
that if this does not work as an operation you do not rule out
moving in another direction.
But what is the best you can tell the American people as to
what would be the benchmarks? You have given it to us with
regard to security. Is there any additional information you can
give us with regards to reaching the benchmarks on these other
items which are so essential, obviously, in terms of the new
direction of Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, I cannot give you dates at this
point in time. Again, I can tell you, however, that I have in
fact discussed some of this already just in passing with Deputy
Prime Minister of Iraq Barham Salih and with others who have
called to congratulate me on the nomination.
Senator Kennedy. You were kind enough to drop off a nice
book when you were good enough to visit and I have gotten
through a good part of it during the past few days and over the
weekend. In that were these words, effectively: ``Sometimes,
the more force is used the less effective it is. Any use of
force produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen.
The more force applied, the greater the chance of collateral
damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases the
opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military
activities as brutal.''
The manual talks about the importance of the decisive
battle for the people's minds. Many have argued that the
overwhelming military force presence in Iraq actually will
inflame the insurgency. What is your view on that?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think that at this point in
Baghdad the population just wants to be secure and, truthfully,
they do not care who does it. They would like it to be
legitimate Iraqi security forces that are fair and impartial. I
heard, for example, early feedback that a Kurdish unit that has
moved into a mixed area in Baghdad was actually received well
because in fact they provided some additional security that did
not exist before.
Again, if confirmed, that is something I obviously have to
see for myself on the ground, to walk the streets, to talk to
the people, and to get a sense of that for myself. But that is
my personal view right now from afar.
Senator Kennedy. Some have said, if you have 140,000 troops
over there who are not able to gain security, why do you
believe an additional 22,000 are likely to gain it?
General Petraeus. Sir, to some degree it has to do with how
they are used. Again, if the mission is as it is now under the
new approach, to focus on the security of the population, then
forces must locate with and live with that population,
certainly again link arms with Iraqi forces in this particular
case, coordinating with all the others that might be in an area
as well.
Senator Kennedy. The idea of tens of thousands of American
troops in combat in downtown Baghdad, what is your reaction to
whether that really helps win the hearts and minds of the
people or whether it is perceived as increasing hostility by
American soldiers? How do you measure that? This is also
referred to in the book.
General Petraeus. Sir, obviously it depends literally on
how those forces conduct themselves, how they carry out their
missions, if they are both respectful and firm as required.
Certainly there will be a need to kill or capture those bad
elements that I talked about. On the other hand, what we want
to do, of course, is to clear areas as quickly as possible to
provide security for them of a persistent nature and then to
enable the holding and the building piece that is the real key
to achieving the support of the population.
Senator Kennedy. You have in your manual ``Long-term
success depends on the people taking charge of their own
affairs, consenting to the government's rule.'' What is the
time? The number of soldiers now that are being sent over
there, how long are those soldiers going to be sent over there?
We have heard words about escalation, we have words of surge.
Is this going to be permanent? Is it temporary? What is the
time limitation that you can tell us about?
General Petraeus. Sir, I do not know what the time
limitation is at this point.
Senator Kennedy. At this point therefore we should assume
that they will remain over there until we hear further from
you?
General Petraeus. As they are needed for that particular
mission, yes, sir. Senator, if I could, I think it is important
to remember that this particular government, the Prime Minister
Maliki government, has only been in office 8 months. They are
the fourth Iraqi government in 3\1/2\ years and, given the
situation in Baghdad, I think it is not wholly surprising that
they have had a tough time getting their feet on the ground.
In fact, there are some signs certainly literally in recent
days and weeks that there is a stiffer approach.
Senator Kennedy. I thank you, General. I think many of us
are concerned that we have had surges in the past at Najaf,
Fallujah, Baghdad, and after the Samarra temple, and they have
not been successful, and there is concern, which I share, about
the surge at the present time, whether this can really achieve
the objectives which you have outlined. But in any event, I
appreciate your service. Thank you for your willingness to
lead.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, I think I do not recall anyone being so
praised by all sides as you have been. I honestly believe you
are the right person for this very difficult task before us. I
have enjoyed being with you on three different occasions in
Iraq and we got the very strong impression that you had a
handle on things, and I appreciate what you are about to get
into.
Let me voice a concern that I have, and I think that I am
not going to ask you to respond to a question unless there is
time at the end of my questioning. That is on the justice
system that we hear so much about. I know there are several
attorneys that will probably be addressing this in questions
after I am completed.
But any time a top lieutenant to al-Sadr, one who has been
involved in torture, assassinations, and then is just turned
loose at the request of the Prime Minister, it is something
that bothers me a great deal. I have heard Senator Sessions
talk about analogies between Alabama incarcerations and what is
happening over there. In Texas, some 170,000 people are
incarcerated, while only 28,000 are in Iraq. We know it is a
problem that needs to be addressed and if there is time I will
ask you a question on that.
But I wanted to first, before doing that, get into the
success story of Somalia. The train and equip program there--I
had occasion to be in Ethiopia on numerous occasions while they
were going through this program, and when they were called upon
to go with us into Somalia it was a huge success.
I am wondering if there is anything you can draw on from
that success that might have application to what your mission
is going to be in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, I will certainly look at it. I must
be candid and say I have not seen something that is directly
transportable so far. Certainly there are ways that the
assistance has been provided there that has been unique and
useful, I think, but that is something I will certainly look
at.
Senator Inhofe. This authorization committee has been very
straightforward in coming up with funds for train and equip,
but also for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP).
I heard you say in your opening statement, you talked about
more resources in the neighborhoods, things that you can do in
the neighborhoods. I know that I have talked to General
Chiarelli and you about CERP.
Tell us a little bit about how more effective it would be
if you have more capability to respond to some of these needs
immediately than going through the system that we are more
accustomed to?
General Petraeus. Sir, in the counterinsurgency field
manual there is actually a line in there that says ``Money is
ammunition,'' and at certain points money can be the most
important ammunition. There are certainly points when real
ammunition is the best ammunition, but there are times
certainly, once you have done the clear and hold, where you are
trying to build, where the most important asset is that ability
to help get streets cleaner, connect sewage lines, make small
improvements in the lives of people that are very meaningful
right off the bat. That has been aided enormously by CERP.
I would like to add, though, that as I have thought about
the prospect of going back to Iraq, I have thought that our
effort--and in fact there is an effort by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Paul Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary for
Business Transformation, to pursue this, to either reestablish
or build sustainable, self-sustaining small businesses and
industries in Iraq as being hugely important. Iraq does enjoy
some enormous comparative advantages when it comes to the
production of certain types of materials, among them asphalt,
fertilizer, of course a variety of petroleum products and so
forth, some agricultural products, and I think that we have to
look very hard and fund those opportunities that are self-
sustained vice those that are just of a Works Progress
Administration (WPA)-type nature.
Senator Inhofe. On the WPA-type of deal, it was either you
or General Chiarelli who told me about the fact that you had
lines into Baghdad neighborhoods, but no grid to bring them in.
General Petraeus. That is correct, yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. So they are climbing up with wire and
electrocuting themselves trying to bring it in. This is the
type of thing that can be done in my opinion immediately, and I
would hope that you would tell us as we develop next year's
legislation if you think we need to have more attention to that
program, to CERP.
General Petraeus. Sir, I certainly will, and I can assure
the committee that I also intend to encourage the Iraqi
government to use the substantial resources that it has. I have
in fact also been in communication with the minister of
finance, who is a former colleague there, through an
interpreter, to encourage them very strongly to spend the oil
revenues that they have. There are reports of as much as $10 to
$12 billion that is available on the Iraqi side. I think it is
very important that they use that and that they use it on the
behalf of all Iraqis and not just in one area or another.
Senator Inhofe. That is good.
Senator McCain mentioned the experience in Bosnia. I can
remember being up in Tuzla when they said that in terms of the
ethnic violence that it would never be resolved, this was early
on, and yet it was, as Senator McCain pointed out. So I think
it showed in a very difficult area, that is a different
culture--I understand that. But if it was resolved there, do
you think it can ultimately be resolved in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, that is certainly my hope. I must
tell you that in my first year, really throughout the first
2\1/2\ years in Iraq, my sense was that this was a country in
which the divides were actually less than those in Bosnia. Real
ethnic hatred is what you find when you read Evo Andrich's
book, ``The Bridge Over the Drina,'' and some of the
unspeakable acts that were inflicted upon each other in the
centuries of ethnic violence in the fault lines in the Balkans.
There is great intermarriage in Iraq, particularly in
Baghdad. Unfortunately, in the wake of the Samarra mosque
bombing the ethnic divides have grown, and I think it is very
important to secure the population, so that we can stop that
kind of violence before it spirals farther and so that we do
not have to do what happened in Bosnia, which is wait for the
civil war to take place and then to come in.
Senator Inhofe. That is an excellent answer.
Senator McCain also talked about the morale, how is the
morale. Your answer was fairly short, but I know from my
experience over there that the morale is very good. Is this not
reflected in the reenlistment numbers?
General Petraeus. Sir, the reenlistment numbers continue to
be very substantial, and particularly by those who are in units
serving in theater. They continually way outpace the goals for
reenlistment. I am really talking on the Army. I believe it is
the same situation in the Marine Corps, and that is actually a
real heartening, continuing heartening development.
Senator Inhofe. It is. That is something I observed.
With just 1 minute left, let me just mention, in The Early
Bird this morning they mentioned four things attributed to your
statements: inadequate planning for the liberation, failing to
recognize the emerging insurgency, not having enough troops in
certain areas, and holding elections in such a way that it was
divisive instead of unifying. Are there any one of these four
areas that you would like to elaborate on?
General Petraeus. The fourth one is not correct, actually.
If you look at the advance policy question, what I stated
really was something that many other people have recognized and
that was merely that the elections had to some degree the
opposite effect of what we had hoped for, and that was that
because of the voting along sectarian divides that they did not
unify the country as much as we had hoped. It had nothing to do
with the conduct of the elections. Frankly, I thought the
conduct of the elections was admirable in each case and frankly
quite heroic by the Iraqis who pulled that off.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, General. I look
forward to working with you in this new capacity.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Petraeus. Thank you for your willingness
to serve. Your testimony this morning and your answers to our
questions have been excellent. You have been candid and
confident at the same time. You have been candid about the
mistakes that have been made and about the challenges we face,
but you have been confident about the way in which we can do
better, and I appreciate that.
I also appreciate the fact that you have been to Iraq, that
you understand not only its history but its present. There is a
temptation, a danger that people just following the news of the
suicide bombings and sectarian death squads will assume that
everybody in Iraq is involved in sectarian violence or
terrorists or the insurgency. You know that is not true. You
have testified that it is not, that most of the people of Iraq,
the overwhelming majority, as you have said, quite naturally
want to live a better and freer life, and the question is
whether we can help their government help them do that.
I want to ask you a series of questions which in some sense
summarize what you have said, because I think it has been very
compelling. General Petraeus, you have said this morning that
serious mistakes have been made in the conduct of the war in
Iraq since Saddam was overthrown in 2003. Is that right?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir. I did provide a
description of those in the advance policy questions.
Senator Lieberman. You have also said that you understand
and appreciate the disappointment of the American people and
their representatives here in Congress about the lack of
progress in the war in Iraq today.
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lieberman. You have also said that you fear that
there would be disastrous consequences for Iraq, for the
region, for the world economy, and for the United States in the
war on terrorism if we exit Iraq prematurely.
General Petraeus. Correct, sir.
Senator Lieberman. You have said that you believe this new
way ahead for Iraq that has been presented, with military,
economic, and political components, is in fact a new and
different strategy for Iraq than what has been tried thus far;
is that correct?
General Petraeus. I believe it is, yes, sir. There are
cases in Iraq where this has actually been conducted in the
past. Fallujah, which remains to this day since it was
liberated and has become one of the better gated communities in
that region, is an example of that. Tal Afar is another
example, although again we have to continue to watch the hold
and build piece on that.
Senator Lieberman. Based on those examples that you have
cited and your own expertise in counterinsurgency, am I correct
to conclude that you believe that this new way ahead, this new
plan for Iraq, can in fact work?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lieberman. When you say work, I mean diminish the
violence being carried out by the enemies of stability and
progress in Iraq, so that the Iraqis can achieve a political
and economic solution themselves; is that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. You have said, General, in response to
questions from Senator Levin, I believe, that you would agree
to report regularly, perhaps by video conference, to Members of
Congress about the progress or lack of said that you are
seeing.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. In fact, you have said that you would
tell us quite directly whether we are succeeding or failing as
your mission goes forward; is that correct?
General Petraeus. Correct, sir.
Senator Lieberman. You also said, in response to a question
from Senator McCain, that adoption of a resolution of
disapproval, which is contemplated by our colleagues and
probably will be on the Senate floor, disapproval of the new
way ahead in Iraq, would not, if I remember your words, have a
beneficial effect on our troops in Iraq.
But I want to ask you, what effect would Senate passage of
a resolution of disapproval of this new way ahead that you
embrace have on our enemies in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, as I stated in my opening statement,
this is a test of wills at the end of the day, and in that
regard, speaking purely as a military commander, if confirmed,
albeit one who frankly does understand enormously and treasures
the value of free and open debate, free speech, who has put
himself in harm's way to protect those great features of our
democracy, nonetheless, having said that, a commander in such
an endeavor would obviously like the enemy to feel that there
is no hope.
Senator Lieberman. A Senate-passed resolution of
disapproval for this new strategy in Iraq would give the enemy
some encouragement, some clear expression that the American
people were divided?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Based on the answers that you have given
and on your extraordinary record of service to our country and
your expertise in counterinsurgency, that you have literally
written the book, and your belief that this new way ahead is in
fact different from what we are trying right now, with the
exception of the few cities that you cited where it worked, and
your testimony that passage of resolutions of disapproval would
not have a beneficial effect on our troops and on the enemy, I
want to make a plea to my colleagues in the Senate. I
understand that the trains are on the legislative track and
they are heading toward a collision. But I want to urge my
colleagues to consider your testimony this morning and to put
the brakes on.
You will, in my opinion, receive unanimous or near-
unanimous support, and you should. You deserve it, from this
committee and from the Senate. But I fear that a resolution of
disapproval will send you over there with us saying you are a
good and great general, but we do not agree with what you
believe we need to do in Iraq.
So I want to appeal to my colleagues to consider with
regard to the resolutions of disapproval or the caps on troops
or the cutoff of funds to step back for a moment and give you a
chance and the 160,000 American soldiers you will be commanding
a chance, perhaps a last chance, to succeed in Iraq. If, God
forbid, you are unable to succeed, then there will be plenty of
time for the resolutions of disapproval or the other
alternatives that have been contemplated.
General Petraeus, I think you are being sent into one of
the most challenging and important circumstances that a general
in our history has been sent into. I was thinking it may be
comparable to when President Truman sent General Matthew
Ridgway to Korea to replace General MacArthur when things were
bleak, and General Ridgway succeeded.
I pray that you will succeed similarly in Iraq. I believe
you can and will succeed similarly in Iraq. I appeal to my
colleagues today to give you this chance, again perhaps the
last chance, to succeed and avoid the disaster that failure
will bring.
All of my colleagues here--and we have different opinions
on this question--no one is embracing failure. No one is
suggesting defeat. We have different ways that we believe we
can do better. I believe you deserve the opportunity as the
general we are going to send over to lead our effort, to carry
out this way that you believe can and will succeed.
Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Sessions is next. Thank you.
[Audience interruption.]
Chairman Levin. We would appreciate, madam, if you would
please sit down. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Petraeus, for your service, the years
that you have spent away from your family serving your country,
the efforts that you have expended in Iraq on two different
tours. I visited you both when you were with the 101st in Mosul
and commanding that unit also in Baghdad when you were training
and working toward training those troops.
I do not think there is anyone more experienced on the
ground than you. Thank you for being willing to go back again
at this critical juncture in our Nation's history.
I would just like to thank Senator Lieberman for his
comments. Senator Lieberman voted for this war, as over three-
fourths of our Senate did, and he has worked hard to help us be
successful. We want you to be successful. I think the comment I
would make to my colleagues is that if a resolution is not
going to help you be successful, why do we need it? I would
just make that comment at this point.
General Petraeus, I would like to ask a few brief
questions. A critical part of all of this for the American
people is uncertainty about how things are going. I asked
Secretary Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Pace if things
got to the point where we could not be successful would they
tell us so. You have indicated, I think, in your opening
statement that you would. But I would like you to say that, so
the American people would know that a person who knows that
country, who has written a manual on counterinsurgency, if you
believe it cannot be successful you will tell us so we can take
a new action?
General Petraeus. Sir, I firmly believe that I have an
obligation to the great young men and women of our country that
are putting themselves in harm's way and certainly to all
Americans to tell my boss if I believe that the strategy cannot
succeed at some point.
Senator Sessions. You would not be going if you did not
think there was a realistic opportunity to succeed; is that
correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, you talked about
walking the streets. You used that phrase. I know you used it
when we were in Mosul and visited with you. Do you think it is
important for a commander and will you take every effort to
determine what is actually happening on the streets and how the
Iraqi people are responding to the conditions there, and do you
consider that a critical part of your leadership?
General Petraeus. I do, sir.
Senator Sessions. You have written the counterinsurgency
manual and it requires a number of steps and coordinated
efforts to occur, but is it not true that a number of things
that are necessary for success are required to be done by
agencies other than the Department of Defense?
General Petraeus. It is, sir, and to perform them with a
unity of effort.
Senator Sessions. There is a courtesy by departments, that
we do not want to be critical of one another and agencies do
not do that. But I hope that you will not hesitate to insist
that you obtain in a prompt timeframe the resources, the
support, whether it be electricity or water or police or jails,
that you will ask for even if it means other agencies may take
it critically.
General Petraeus. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Sessions. I think we are in a critical time. I
believe the Defense Department fully understands it because
their soldiers are at risk every single day. It is a matter of
life and death to them, and we have to raise the level of
support I think from other agencies and departments of this
government.
Now, you have been there. I remember when you explained to
us some difficulties, problems, errors that occurred. You
talked about the de-Baathification program going so far as to
have every professor at the Mosul University be terminated,
causing an uproar at the whole university. You also talked
about the need for more CERP money, that is the money that a
commander could utilize immediately to fix a problem that is
needed to be fixed, also gaining credibility for that
commander.
Do you think, now that you are going back to command this
operation, that you can help eliminate those problems based on
your experience, and will you have the support necessary to do
so?
General Petraeus. Sir, I will certainly do my very best.
Just for accuracy's sake, Ambassador Bremer, in fact, gave me
the authorization to perform a reconciliation process for Mosul
University. There were actually about 120 professors that were
affected in that case and we did, in fact, conduct a
reconciliation process--no Baath Party members on the
committee, judicial oversight, and so forth from the Iraqi
side. Unfortunately, and contrary to what he wanted as well,
because it was not just de-Baathification, it was also
reconciliation that was planned, that was not able to be
consummated when we delivered all the paperwork to Baghdad, it
was never acted upon.
Senator Sessions. You used that word ``reconciliation.''
You used it when we were introduced to the city council that
had been established in Mosul of Kurds, Christians, Shias, and
Sunnis, as I recall. Tell us, is reconciliation possible in
Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, it has to be possible for the goals
to be achieved in Iraq as they are right now certainly, and we
saw examples of that throughout time. We have also seen
examples of the hardening of the ethnic differences and
sectarian differences, certainly in the wake again of the
Samarra bombing throughout the latter part of 2006.
Senator Sessions. Senator Inhofe mentioned my concern over
the prisons and lack of ability to detain persons that have
been arrested there. There is an article in the January-
February Military Review that is consistent with the point I
have been making for some months. It notes that added together,
1 in 17 Iraqis are in jail. That is two to three times less
than the percentage of people in jail in the United States. Yet
the chances of a civilian being killed in Iraq are 20 times
greater.
It goes on to note that if you cannot identify the
insurgent and you cannot imprison him when you do arrest him,
you are not going to prevail. That is a military reality, not
an economic or a political one.
I feel strongly that this coordinating among agencies has
not occurred sufficiently to get us a justice system that
works. Do you share that concern, and if you need additional
resources for prisons or courts, will you ask for that?
General Petraeus. Sir, I will, and I do believe they are
needed. I believe the rule of law has three pillars: police,
judicial, and detentions. We have put a great deal of effort
into the police. The results have not always been what we have
wanted. We need to put considerably additional effort into the
judicial side and into the detention side.
As Senator Inhofe mentioned, I think the prison capacity in
Iraq is one-sixth that of the State of Texas, and they are not
fighting an insurgency.
Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, thank you for your
leadership. I believe we do have a realistic chance of success
in Iraq. I believe changes in our policy were necessary to
achieve that. I hope that you will utilize the leadership
opportunity you have to insist that you get the support from
the various agencies that are necessary to create a
comprehensive and successful effort in Iraq.
I would just say to my friend, the President of the United
States, whose heart I know is broken by the losses we have
suffered, but who believes in the justness of this cause, that
more than he would like it will be necessary for him to focus
on the other agencies and departments of this government to
ensure that they respond immediately to the requirements that
you have to be successful. I believe he will do that, but it is
going to take more of his personal time than he would like, I
am sure his advisers would like him to give. But bureaucracies
are not easy to move and in war, speed and decisiveness are key
ingredients, and we need that.
Thank you.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Petraeus. In response to the questions
that Senator Sessions raised about coordination and also in
your own testimony, which is a plea for further support, it is
your opinion that the Secretary of State and the Department of
State have failed to adequately support military operations in
Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, it is my belief that the overall
interagency effort needs to be substantially more robust than
it is.
Senator Reed. Do you have any indication it will?
General Petraeus. Sir, that was part of the plan that was
laid out by the President. I have talked with some of the
individuals involved in establishing that. There is a doubling
of the Province Reconstruction Team (PRT) members as one of
those areas, and it is certainly something that I will pursue
because, as I mentioned, governmental capacity-building in Iraq
is hugely important to the comprehensive effort.
Senator Reed. General, you served extensively in Iraq. We
have all on this committee had the occasion to visit there. But
we have heard repeated stories about building up the PRTs
without any significant progress in that regard. This seems to
me another one of these plans that never seem to get effected.
I think I agree with you. I agree with Senator Sessions.
The Department of Defense, military officers, enlisted men and
women, have been carrying the burden here without adequate
support, and I do not see anything in this plan really that
will augment your efforts, which I think undercuts your ability
to perform your mission.
Let me go back to the heart of what you are engaged in.
Under the counterinsurgency manual which you prepared and you
have indicated, 120,000 troops is the doctrinal force size
structure. There is about 85,000 troops total, you have
indicated. Probably the 50,000 Iraqi forces, if there are
10,000 reliable troops, that is more than I think we can
reasonably expect. So I am guessing or speculating you have
40,000 effective troops for a mission that requires 120,000.
So it is your best military advice that this increment of
20,000 American forces is adequate to do this job?
General Petraeus. Senator, I believe again that the
additional forces, these tens of thousands of contract security
forces and ministerial security forces, actually do relieve us
of substantial burdens that otherwise coalition or Iraqi forces
would have to bear.
Senator Reed. General, as I was out there I was shocked.
Even Prime Minister Maliki told me that some of these
ministerial forces are worse than the insurgents.
General Petraeus. Some indeed, yes.
Senator Reed. They are disreputable, they are involved with
the sectarian killings. I do not know, but does Blackwater work
for you now?
General Petraeus. Blackwater does not work for me, although
they are under contract certainly to a number of organizations.
But as you have seen on your trips, for example, the U.S.
embassy is guarded by contract guards. My personal security on
my last tour was actually contracted out to I think it was a
British security firm so that we could free up the military
police to secure my own officers who did not have security
provided for them.
So again, that frees up our forces and it does that in
numerous different places.
Senator Reed. General, that situation has existed before
this surge. I find it hard to believe that you would give as
your best advice to this committee that the differential,
probably 40,000 troops in terms of doctrine, is going to be
made up by ministerial forces of Iraq that are generally
unreliable and by private American contractors or other
contractors. Is that the differential that is being made up?
General Petraeus. Sir, again the additional U.S. forces
will double the number of U.S. forces in Baghdad. The second,
of course, is how they are used. Again, to secure the
population those forces have to be in the population and that
will be critical.
Senator Reed. Let us talk about how they are used. First,
as alluded to in other questioning, there is a real question of
unity of command. You have a bifurcated command structure. It
is the nature of this operation. You have a sovereign state. In
any other counterinsurgencies, in Belfast, in Algeria, there
was no lack of unity of command. It was essentially part of the
country. So that is a problem.
Also, I would like to ask about enablers. One of the
problems in any military operation is not so often ground
combat forces, it is translators, civil affairs officers,
people with the cultural sensitivities you talked about so
eloquently. Do you have adequate enablers to do this new
mission?
General Petraeus. Sir, that I do not know. Again, if
confirmed, that is high on my list, to determine if we have not
just those enablers, but also all the combat support and combat
service support elements that you will recall from your own
service are so critical to enabling the soldier who is on
point.
Senator Reed. We are presenting this strategy as a new
forward with a new plan, and a key element as you indicate that
you are not quite sure we have those forces in place or can
generate those forces.
General Petraeus. Sir, I have talked to General Odierno
about this. Not to be presumptive, but in fact when people
consulted me, in my current position, during the development of
the strategy General Odierno assured me that they had been
looking very hard at the enablers and that they think that they
are going to be okay generally in the combat service support
arena.
But again, that is something I have to confirm for myself,
if confirmed, and once I get on the ground.
Senator Reed. Let me also ask, because this new tactical
approach, this new strategic approach, has potential benefits,
but it also has inherent difficulties. You will disperse
American forces to small groups. You will have to supply those
forces. The most significant attack against our forces are
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against convoys, which
means you will be multiplying the convoys in Baghdad, exposing
more of them to attack. Is that a fair estimate of the risks?
General Petraeus. There is certainly risk. Obviously, as we
disperse soldiers you always want to make sure that they are
capable over anything that they could confront out there. But
certainly there will be soldiers literally on the road. There
will be soldiers on the streets and so forth.
Senator Reed. The other issue, General, that has come up, I
was out last fall. I talked to General Miegs, U.S. Army
(Retired), and I talked to many other commanders on the ground,
and they said in 6 months this situation will resolve itself
one way or the other. Your timeframe for deployment takes you,
as you indicate, to May when you will get your troops in
country. You have a lot of work to do to prepare the battle
space, to move the troops in.
We seem to be pushing quite close to that 6-month window,
for what it is worth, before you will actually start taking
concerted effective action on the ground. Just in terms of
timing, is that accurate?
General Petraeus. Sir, again, I really need to get into the
plan with Lieutenant General Odierno and to see how the forces
will be employed. I think you have to wait until you have a
certain critical mass of forces on the ground to take action so
that you do not do the whack-a-mole and all we do is go into
this neighborhood and then go into that neighborhood. So that
you want to start with a certain degree of critical mass. I do
not know that that degree is all five brigades having to be
there and completely set before you begin operations.
Senator Reed. In response to Senator McCain's question
about what happens if we announce some type of withdrawal, you
indicated that sectarian groups have been staking out turf. Are
they doing that now?
General Petraeus. In some cases they certainly are, yes,
sir. Certainly along the fault lines in threatened
neighborhoods that has been taking place.
Senator Reed. That is likely to accelerate or decelerate,
regardless of what we do?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think if we secure the
neighborhoods that that will decelerate.
Senator Reed. But at this point it seems to you to be
progressing rapidly?
General Petraeus. No, sir, I am not so sure. Again, it is
hard from this distance to get the real granularity of what is
going on. There clearly is additional ethnic displacement, soft
ethnic cleansing, whatever term you want to use. How prevalent
that is is hard again for me at this distance.
Senator Reed. You mentioned ethnic cleansing. That I think
is happening and the description of whether it is deliberate,
part of a plan, or just spontaneous is something you will, I
presume, determine when you get out there on the ground.
The other issue you raised is the involvement of other
countries. There is a significant involvement of the regional
countries there now, and one of the things that seems
perplexing to me is that there are leading figures in this
government that have close, long-time ties to Iran. I think
that will continue regardless of what you are able to do on the
ground, I presume.
General Petraeus. It certainly presents challenges if in
fact it manifests itself in resisting actions against those who
are helping the enemies of the new Iraq, not just of the
coalition forces but the enemies of the new Iraq, in Iraq. As
you are well aware, there have been actions against Iranian
elements in Iraq, and again that will be one of the challenges
that we will have to come to grips with, and those ties clearly
complicate matters.
Senator Reed. One final point. One of the consequences of
what you do, regardless of the ultimate level of success--and I
wish you success because the lives of a lot of young Americans
are in your hands and you know that, and you will perform I
think magnificently taking care of those troops. But we could
unwittingly be entrenching a government in Baghdad that has
close and continuing ties with Iran. That is a distinct
possibility.
General Petraeus. Sir, I would have to do literally a
leadership profile of that to make a reasonable assessment of
that. My understanding is that Prime Minister Maliki certainly
is under pressure in respects with that, but that he has also
pushed back as well. So again, once I get on the ground, if
confirmed, and can sort out these various dynamics and
influences and how firm they are, then we can move forward.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, first let me echo the sentiments of
everyone here, that I am so grateful that you have agreed to
undertake this enormous challenge. I have great confidence in
you personally and I hope that you succeed.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Collins. I have read a very interesting article
that you wrote on counterinsurgency that was published a year
ago in the Military Review. You offered 14 observations based
on your previous tours of duty. As I look at those
observations, observations that I think are insightful and that
I agree with, I conclude that they are not consistent with the
new strategy that we are about to embark on.
Your first observation, you quote Lieutenant Colonel T.E.
Lawrence, British Army (1888-1935)--also known as ``Lawrence of
Arabia'' in August 1917 and you say: ``Do not try to do too
much with your own hands.'' You talk about the need for the
Iraqis to step up to the plate. I worry that the strategy that
we are about to pursue in this country relieves pressure on the
Iraqis to do what must be done and that we are making the
mistake that you caution against.
There is a big question here of what comes first. Do you
need to provide the additional troops and the security in order
to give Maliki and other Iraqi leaders the space to do the
political moves that need to be undertaken, or in fact are you
lessening the possibility they are going to do that? If Iraqi
leaders had more fully integrated the Sunni minority into the
government, if they had passed an oil distribution law that
distributed the revenues more equitably, if they had amended
the constitution, if they had held provincial elections, would
we be where we are today?
General Petraeus. We would not, Senator. What you described
really has been truly an intellectual tension, frankly, about
the mission in Iraq all along. You do have in the back of your
mind always the wisdom of Lawrence of Arabia about not trying
to do too much with your own hands. We used to say what we want
to do is we want to help the Iraqis get up on their feet, we
want to be near them, we want to back them up. But there are
times when they start to wobble and the question is when do you
move back in and provide assistance.
In the wake of the bombing of the Samarra mosque and the
violence that escalated throughout the latter part of 2006, I
think we have arrived at a point where in fact we do need to
help them a bit more in providing security in particular, with
arm's linked, with them in forward, in front, wherever we can,
for the Baghdad population in particular.
Again, this of course is the fourth government in 3\1/2\
years and I think at times we probably have had expectations
that were greater than they might have been, given the
challenges. But I remember living through each of these
transitions, and you would get a new government in and it
seemed as if they were already facing an election for the next
government or the next constitutional referendum or what have
you. It has been very difficult for them.
They do now have the permanent government, the elected
government. It has only been in office for 8 months. It has
been a very violent 8 months in a period of enormous pressure
on the leadership of Iraq. They do now have, according to
Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, the oil law nearing
completion. There has been progress, incremental progress to be
sure.
So again, I think you very accurately captured truthfully
the intellectual tension between the fear that our presence
retards progress, holds it back, or that our presence can help.
I do believe at this point that our presence can help and is
needed.
Senator Collins. Your second observation is that: ``A
liberating force must act quickly because every army of
liberation has a half-life beyond which it turns into an army
of occupation.'' Again, this insight seems right on the money
to me.
When I was in Iraq with several of my colleagues last
month, we had a very interesting presentation by one of the
British commanders in Basra. He described a declining consent
line. He said originally when the coalition forces arrived that
they were welcomed, but over time their presence has become
resented and less and less tolerated.
You talk about this being a race against the clock, but I
wonder if the clock has already run out, if we are already
perceived by the vast majority of Iraqis not as liberators any
more, but as occupiers.
General Petraeus. That is another great question, Senator.
First, I would start by saying that every area of Iraq is
different and unique, and that in some areas, interestingly,
areas where we came to be seen as an army of occupation, we
might now once again be seen as an army of liberation because
we help provide the degree of security that has been lacking in
their lives.
So I think it is important again to put your finger on the
pulse of that neighborhood, of that muhallah, that district,
that province, and then to act in accordance with that. The
area in which the British are located, of course, is a much
more cohesive area. It is a very predominantly Shia Iraqi area,
and it is an area where, although there are certainly all kinds
of internal differences and challenges, the Iraqis generally
feel like they can get on without us over time, and that is why
of course the British contingent has gradually been drawing
down in Basra and the other southern, southeastern provinces.
Senator Collins. But that is why the British commander's
observations were so interesting to me. That is not an area
where you have Sunni versus Shiite. It is a Shia area. Yet,
despite that, we are seeing less and less tolerance for the
presence of foreign forces, and that concerns me.
General Petraeus. I think that is understandable, Senator,
if I may, because if you think about again any country that has
another army on its soil, again at some point tires of that.
That is really the essence of what that lesson was. In truth,
what it was really getting at is that when you get into one of
these things you have to know exactly what your transition
plans are. You have to have the stability and reconstruction
organizations, resources, concepts, and principles already in
your back pocket as you go downrange.
Senator Collins. Finally, I have to comment on your answer
to my very dear friend, Senator Lieberman, about the impact of
the passage of a resolution and whether that would, I believe
the words were, demonstrate to the enemy that the American
people are divided. General, the American people are not
divided in support of our troops. The American people are not
divided in wishing you all the success in the world despite our
disagreement with the strategy.
I must say that the resolution that I have been working on
with Senator Ben Nelson and Senator Warner is very clear in
expressing support for our troops. I do not think it is going
to come as any surprise to the enemy that the American people
are in fact deeply divided over this strategy, but nothing
divides us in our common support of the brave men and women who
are fighting in Iraq, and nothing divides us in our common
support, that we hope we are wrong and that this strategy is a
success, and we wish you well as you undertake this very
dangerous and difficult mission.
General Petraeus. Thank you very much, Senator.
If I could just add, I very much appreciate Congress'
critical oversight responsibilities, I truly do, and I
understand those very much as a student and as a one-time
political science professor.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. I think that point of view is very
important, Senator Collins, to get across, because the way the
questions were framed before would cast some doubt on those of
us who would support Senator Warner's resolution. Certainly we
hope and pray for success, but obviously the American people
are divided about the conduct of this war. Is it any wonder? We
were not told the truth about weapons of mass destruction, nor
about troop strengths, nor about the cost of the war, nor about
the sectarian violence. So is it any wonder that there is a
huge division of opinion about the conduct of this war? That is
the point that we are trying to get at here.
Now, you are going to be confirmed. Your reputation
obviously precedes you and we hope and pray for your leadership
being a success. There is a lot at stake for this country. I
appreciate what you shared with me in our private visit.
I want to ask four questions for the record. When you come
to testify before us again with the civilian leadership at your
side, will you be silent if your civilian leaders provide false
or misleading information?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you for that.
In 2004, you wrote an optimistic article about the progress
of the Iraqi troop training. You praised their progress and how
you were expecting their performance in the field. Well, those
expectations were not fulfilled. For example, you cited in this
article 100,000 Iraqi police and soldiers as trained and
equipped, with tens of thousands more in the pipeline. It is
2\1/2\ years later. How many Iraqi soldiers and police are
trained and equipped today, General?
General Petraeus. Sir, my understanding from the latest
report of the Multinational Security Transition Commander-Iraq
is that there are 325,000 or so that have completed the
training, that met the requirement to be called trained, and
have the basic equipment that we agreed upon as the metric to
be called equipped.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are they reliable?
General Petraeus. They are not all reliable, sir. Again,
and in fairness, if I could, in that article I also qualified
it and pointed out the many challenges that were being faced in
that mission as well. I tried to be quite realistic while also
giving an accurate assessment again of those particular metrics
which we subsequently developed into the more rigorous
assessment, transitional readiness assessment and so forth.
Senator Bill Nelson. Can you put a percentage on it that
are reliable?
General Petraeus. Sir, I cannot from this divide. I
literally have only that particular report that was sent to me.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me tell you about a conversation I
had with our Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey. They both
said--this was back before Christmas--that they would not
support a surge unless there is a specific plan for success,
and the ambassador even said, and I quote, that he did not want
more American kids wasting their lives unless he had ``a high
degree of confidence in the plan.''
Do you have a high degree of confidence in this plan?
General Petraeus. Sir, I believe this plan can succeed if
in fact all of those enablers and all the rest of the
assistance is in fact provided. As I have mentioned several
times here today, I am determined to make sure that people know
that we have that. Again, in my periodic updates to this body I
will be happy to report whether that has been forthcoming or
not.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you for that.
My last question is, earlier in your testimony you stated
that morale of our troops is high, something to that effect.
You may have said good.
General Petraeus. I think ``good'' is actually the
statement, yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. We had a surge earlier this past
summer and I am quoting from a Washington Post story on July
27. Army Staff Sergeant Jose Sistos said, ``Think of what you
hate most about your job, then think of doing what you hate
most for 5 straight hours every single day, sometimes twice a
day, in 120 degree heat. Then ask how morale is.''
Another member of that team, Specialist Tim Ivy, as quoted
in the Washington Post said: ``Honestly, it just feels like we
are driving around waiting to get blown up. That is the most
honest answer that I could give you,'' said the specialist.
General Petraeus. Sir, I remember that story.
Senator Bill Nelson. How do you respond?
General Petraeus. I would like to respond to that. First of
all, there is nothing easy about wearing body armor and kevlar
in harm's way in 125 degree temperatures. It is hard
physically, it is hard mentally. It is a grind and it becomes a
``Groundhog Day'' existence. In fact, there were some units
that had groundhog coins that they handed out as unit coins to
commemorate that type of existence.
On the other hand, the reenlistment rates, particularly in
theater, continue to remain so far above the requirements that
clearly there is some sense among those soldiers that serving
their country is something that they want to continue to do.
They want to continue to serve in units with the individuals on
their right and left that they have soldiered with.
So again, nothing easy about it. By the way, the driving
around waiting to get blown up is something that, certainly
there is driving around in a population protection strategy.
There has to be. But there needs to be a purpose to the
presence of those soldiers in those neighborhoods and it is to
secure those neighborhoods and that should be the objective, as
opposed to perhaps living outside the neighborhood and entering
it a couple of times a day with a vehicular patrol, in which
case a soldier could feel that he is doing what that soldier
told the reporter.
Senator Bill Nelson. Godspeed, General.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, is it fair to say that one of the reasons that we
have the highest rate of reenlistment among those who have
served in Iraq is that they believe it is part of the global
struggle, the war on terror?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think again there are a lot of
reasons why someone raises his or her hand again and again. I
mentioned a couple of them, a sense that you are serving a
cause that is larger than self, serving one's country. I
personally have always felt that the reason that I stayed in
and many others have stayed in is because we like the people we
do what we do with. We feel privileged to be around those who
have these same concepts of selfless service, the Army values
that we embrace--the other services have the same--and that is
in fact a hugely important reason.
I would add certainly that the improvements that have been
made in quality of life--you are never going to get rich
wearing the uniform, but this body and our Congress and various
administrations have over the years certainly made it so that
at least it is a reasonable quality of life for our soldiers
and for their families. We should never forget that we enlist
the soldier, but it is the family that we often reenlist.
Senator Graham. You are going back for the third time or
the fourth time? Third time?
General Petraeus. Sir, it is the third time to Iraq. It is
the fourth year or longer deployment since 2001. The first one
of those was in Bosnia from 2001 to 2002.
Senator Graham. Do you believe that Iraq affects the
overall war on terror or not?
General Petraeus. I do, sir. Clearly there are elements of
the greater al-Qaeda network of international extremists that
want something very different than the Iraq that most Iraqis
want and want something very different in that region and in
the world.
Senator Graham. Who bombed the Golden Mosque?
General Petraeus. Sir, I believe that it was from this
extremist group. It may again have been insurgent elements, but
certainly those who obviously did not want the new Iraq to
succeed and wanted to ignite sectarian violence. If I could
add, I think that there is some of that going on right now. I
think they see the increases in forces. I think they see
perhaps the Iraqi government showing some toughness. I think
that they want to derail that before it gets any momentum.
Senator Graham. That was part of Zarqawi's hope before he
was killed, to create a sectarian war; is that correct?
General Petraeus. Sir, that is correct.
Senator Graham. Now, when it comes to trying to evaluate
what to do and why we are doing whatever course we chart, I
just want to associate myself with Senator Lieberman. No matter
how well-intentioned, a resolution being opposed to this new
strategy is a vote of no confidence in you. No matter how well-
intentioned, the enemy will see it as a weakened resolve. No
matter how well-intentioned, those people going to fight this
war are going to say, well, I am going, but Congress says good
luck but you are going to lose.
I just hope we understand that. I think it is the global
struggle, and if you think it is Vietnam, if you really believe
we are in Vietnam, you should cut off funding. Not one other
person should die in this cause. Not one American should lose a
limb. No one should get hurt and we should come home tomorrow.
General, is this Vietnam?
General Petraeus. Sir, Vietnam was Vietnam. As a student of
lessons of history and someone who did a dissertation that
focused on those, every case is unique, and Iraq is Iraq. It
has lots of problems. There are a few of them that are
certainly related or similar to those in Vietnam. There are a
lot that are very different. I truly think that we have to be
sensitive to the uniqueness of each situation.
Senator Graham. Let me ask you this. The consequences of
losing in Vietnam compared to a failed state in Iraq, how would
you compare the two in terms of our overall national security?
General Petraeus. I think there is really no telling what
could happen if Iraq fails. I explained some of the potential
consequences of that, in a region that is hugely important to
the rest of the world, on a fault line really between perhaps
moderates and extremists, not just between different faiths
within Islam and different ethnic groups, in a very volatile
region.
Senator Graham. Who is the biggest winner? Name some
winners of a failed state in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Certainly al Qaeda, the greater al Qaeda
network, states that embrace extremist ideologies, those states
who wish the United States and perhaps the western world ill.
Senator Graham. Would Iran be a big winner if you had a
failed state in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, it certainly could be. There are
some who say that Iran could. I think perhaps they are torn,
actually, because it could actually cause some real
consequences for their own population.
Senator Graham. Does Iran want a democracy in Iraq?
General Petraeus. I do not believe they do. Certainly, if I
could add to the previous one, I do not mean to imply that Iran
has not been meddling in Iraq, nor that it has not been
providing training, sophisticated improvised explosives and
other devices that have created casualties and huge problems in
Iraq.
Senator Graham. I am going to make a statement and see if
you agree with it: One of the biggest nightmares of the
dictatorship in Syria and the theocracy in Iran is to have a
functioning democracy in Iraq. It threatens their regimes.
General Petraeus. I think that is true, sir. It would
obviously depend on what that----
Senator Graham. Do you believe it is remotely possible to
have a democracy with this level of violence in Iraq?
General Petraeus. I think it is very challenging, sir.
Senator Graham. Some resolutions say that we go to Anbar
but we leave Baghdad alone, that we do not put any troops in
Baghdad. On my last trip to Iraq we met with a citizens group
made up of Sunnis, Shias, I think a Kurdish person was there--I
cannot remember--but they were all Baghdad residents. The one
thing they told every member of our delegation is, if you leave
there will be a bloodbath in Baghdad. Do you agree with that?
General Petraeus. I do, sir.
Senator Graham. So if there is a bloodbath in Baghdad, are
we going to sit on the sidelines and watch it happen? Is that
in our national interest?
General Petraeus. Sir, that is not our strategy at this
time.
Senator Graham. Can you have a functioning democracy where
the capital itself is not secure?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Senator Graham. General, when it comes time to do what you
are going to be required to do, one of those things you are
going to have to do unfortunately is tell some loved ones that
their family member was killed as part of this surge. What are
you going to tell them?
General Petraeus. Sir, I am going to tell them that they
served their country admirably in a mission that I believe is
honorable. I have had to do this before, obviously, and it is
the toughest duty of any leader.
Senator Graham. IEDs, that is the biggest threat to our
troops. 70 percent of our casualties are from IEDs, is that
correct?
General Petraeus. I believe that is correct, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Let me if I can very quickly explain how
the new surge may affect that. One group of people involved in
the IEDs are people without a job and they do it for the money;
is that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Graham. So if you could improve the economy and
have jobs available to people other than being in the IED
business, hopefully that over time would help. That is part of
the surge, right, create a better economy?
General Petraeus. That is correct, and it also could reduce
the militias.
Senator Graham. Second, there is another component to this.
If the person down the street who was caught putting an IED in
the ground to kill Iraqi troops and American troops, if they
went to jail for 30 years or got executed that might deter
IEDs; is that correct?
General Petraeus. Correct.
Senator Graham. That is part of the surge.
Would you consider suggesting to your Iraqi counterparts to
create a military tribunal to handle these type crimes?
General Petraeus. I would, sir.
Senator Graham. Finally, an increased double capacity, a
military surge doubling the combat capability to hold areas
cleared, the hope would be to put pressure on the IED makers
militarily, economically, and under the rule of law, to go
after them, so you are not driving around waiting to get blown
up.
When we go, are the gloves off? Are we going to go wherever
we need to go and get wherever we need to get to fight and win
this war?
General Petraeus. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for your lifetime of service and taking
on this very difficult assignment. I want to begin by
associating my remarks with those of Senator Collins. We are in
a dire situation, using your adjective, in part because
Congress was supine under the Republican majority, failing to
conduct oversight and demanding accountability, and because the
President and his team, particularly the former Secretary of
Defense, refused to adapt to the changing circumstances on the
ground.
If this hearing were being held 3 years ago, I would have a
much higher degree of optimism. It has nothing to do with the
loyalty, the warrior skills, and the leadership of our men and
women in uniform. It has everything to do with the years of
lost opportunities and the failures of the Iraqis to step up
and take responsibility for their own future.
It appears also, General, that the strategy that is being
put forward inspires skepticism for good reason. Your manual,
the Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual, as we have
already discussed, not only suggests a minimum force level of
approximately 120,000, but the manual places great importance
on building up internal institutions and training to provide
security.
This escalation, despite the rhetoric about other goals,
places primary emphasis on American military involvement, not
Iraqi institutions. The manual makes clear the interconnections
of political and military progress, that one cannot be achieved
without the other.
I have been quite gratified to hear all the positive
references to Bosnia in this hearing. I can remember very well
in 2001 and 2002 hearing nothing but derision about nation-
building and about peacekeeping and about sufficient levels of
force going in to back up whatever the political objectives
might be.
You will take on a difficult role in Iraq at a time of
peril, based on your leadership and expertise. But what those
of us who are issuing resolutions and statements of disapproval
fear is that you are being sent to administer a policy that
frankly does not reflect your experience or advice or the
experience and advice of our most recent example in dealing
with ethnic violence, namely Bosnia.
You wrote the book, General, but the policy is not by the
book. You are being asked to square the circle, to find a
military solution to a political crisis. I among others on this
committee have put forward ideas about disapproving the
escalation, not because we in any way embrace failure or
defeat, but because we are trying to get the attention of our
government and the Government of Iraq.
On my recent trip to Iraq along with Senator Bayh, our
interaction with the Prime Minister and his team did not
inspire confidence. What I, speaking for myself, am attempting
to do is to send a very clear message to the Iraqi government
that they cannot rely on the blood and treasure of America any
longer, that we are not going to go into Baghdad and embed our
young men and women in very dangerous neighborhoods where we
cannot possibly provide force protection because they will not
step up and do what everyone knows they must do for themselves.
I very sincerely but wholeheartedly disagree with those who
are trying to once again up the rhetoric about our position in
Iraq instead of taking a hard look about what will actually on
the ground change the behavior and actions of this Iraqi
government.
In the absence of the kind of political full-court press
that we put on in Bosnia--when I landed in Tuzla, I was briefed
by Russians, French, Germans, and Americans. We had an
international force, an international commitment. We had
brought people to the point where they understood that success
there was essential to their national security. I see nothing
coming from this administration that it is willing to pursue
such a policy now. They will not talk to bad people and it is
bad people you talk to in order to try to further political
goals, not your friends. They will not put the kind of pressure
on a consistent basis on the government that is required in
order to change their behavior.
I have said that I would never cut money for our troops
when they are in harm's way, but I sure would threaten to cut
money for the Iraqi troops and for the security for the Iraqi
leadership. I do not know how else to get their attention.
But one thing I am particularly concerned about is the
failure of security for our troops. The incident in Kharbala
over the weekend is scary. It raises questions that we do not
have answers to.
So let me, beyond my statement of joining in the comments
with Senator Collins and rejecting those of our other friends
on the panel who think that statements of disapproval are
somehow going to undermine our effort when I think they will
send the clearest message--we know this policy is going
forward. We know the troops are moving. We know that we are not
likely to stop this escalation. But we are going to do
everything we can to send a message to our government and the
Iraqi government that they had better change, because the enemy
we are confronting is adaptable, it is intelligent, it learns.
It got a hold of our military uniforms, went through those
gates after having cleared all those police checkpoints, killed
five of our soldiers in a meeting talking about security in
Iraq.
I do not believe that we are playing with a team on the
other side that understands the stakes as we described them. So
one thing I would ask, General, is please do everything you can
to get additional security. The Humvees are turning into
deathtraps, as we see the sophistication of the IEDs. We do not
have enough of the mine protection vehicles, we have not even
ordered enough, and we have not put them into the theater.
If we are going to put these soldiers and marines into
these very exposed positions, which this strategy calls for,
please come to us, ask for whatever you need to try to provide
maximum protection. I disapprove of the policy. I think it is a
dead end. It continues the blank check. But if we are going to
do it, then let us make sure we have every possible piece of
equipment and resource necessary to protect these young men and
women that we are asking to go out and put this policy forward,
when we are not doing the political side of the equation that
is necessary to maximize the chance for their safety and
success.
General Petraeus. I will do that, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, you obviously have a great challenge in front of
you. Having visited with you on the ground in Iraq on a couple
of different occasions, watching you in action as you train the
Iraqi troops and the Iraqi security police, I have all the
confidence in the world that you are the right general at the
right time to be going on this mission. Had you personally
attracted the attention of the enemy and had this change in
direction not attracted the attention of the enemy, I do not
think we would have seen the statements coming out of al Qaeda
that we have seen in the last couple of days. So I think the
challenge is there, but, as I say, I am very confident that you
are going to be up to it.
One comment I have made about this change in strategy from
day 1 is that my support of the change would be only if the
additional troops had a specific mission and at the time that
mission is completed that those troops are redeployed. Now, I
asked that question to Secretary Gates and General Pace a
couple of weeks ago, if that is in fact the mission. Is it your
understanding that those are the directions which you have
relative to the increase in the troops?
General Petraeus. Sir, in my discussion with the Secretary
of Defense yesterday he made it very clear that I should ask
for what we need to accomplish any mission that is given to us,
and of course you want to redeploy forces when they are no
longer needed for a mission. That is about as good as I can
answer that particular question.
Senator Chambliss. This plan that is described as a change
in strategy actually was in part developed by the Iraqi
leadership, is that not correct?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have not been in on the planning
in Baghdad and I am not in a position to comment on that. I
have talked to General Odierno about aspects of the plan, but I
did not ask him specifically the level of Iraqi involvement in
it. I do know that the Iraqi headquarters for the Baghdad
security operation is relatively new. The commander, as I think
you know, was just appointed a few weeks ago. So I am not sure
how much specific input that particular headquarters has had in
this plan to date.
But again, obviously once I get on the ground, if
confirmed, that is something I would have to dig into.
Senator Chambliss. I say that because Secretary Gates
responded affirmatively to that question the other day. The
reason I start with that is that I have some real concerns
about the leadership in Iraq and their capability of carrying
out their plans. While I disagree with my distinguished
colleague from New York that this is going to require purely a
political resolution, you are not a political person; you are a
military person, and it is going to require a political
resolution and a military resolution. Otherwise we do not need
to send you over there.
I think we have to have confidence that the Iraqi
leadership politically as well as militarily is going to be
able to do what they say they are going to be able to do.
Now, I want to ask you two questions about that. First of
all, knowing what you know about the political leadership in
Iraq, do you have confidence that they are willing to make the
commitment that they have said they are going to make to make
sure that we can accomplish this mission that you have been
given?
Second, you have been on the ground training Iraqi troops.
You have been living amongst them, so to speak, for two
different 12-month deployments. Do you have confidence that the
Iraqi military can step up and do finally what we have been
anticipating and hoping that they would do for the entire
period of time that we have been inside of Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, in response to those questions,
having not been in Iraq for some 16 months, and although I do
know and have worked with a number of the Iraqi leaders in this
government, I do not know Prime Minister Maliki personally, and
I will have to determine for myself. We will obviously have to
have a number of close meetings and develop a relationship.
That support from the Iraqi government is absolutely
critical. As you mentioned, military force is necessary but not
sufficient. The sufficient piece is the additional political
component, and again that is something that I will have to
determine the presence of as I get on the ground.
The same, frankly, with the Iraqi security forces. Again,
having been out of Iraq for 16 months, one of the tasks I will
have to undertake is in fact to assess their state at this
point in time. The fact is that they have received reasonable
training and they have received reasonable equipping. Both of
those can always be improved and the equipment does need to get
more robust over time, although they have received thousands of
up-armored Humvees to my understanding, as an example.
But what I will have to do again is to determine the will
component of this. Military forces, to be effective have skill
and will, and what we will have to determine is the presence of
both. But the will component will be the most important.
Senator Chambliss. One issue that I have had relative to
this ongoing conflict is the fact that I have been disappointed
that from an intelligence-gathering standpoint we have not in
my opinion achieved the results that we should have been
achieving at this point in time. I am pleased to see that you
have already been down to Fort Gordon in the last few days to
see what we are doing there relative to supporting the war in
Iraq, and we are doing some great things.
But in comparing the level of intelligence that the 101st
Airborne Division received in Mosul during your tenure as
commander versus the level of intelligence that Task Force
Olympia received after you departed, you noted that the lack of
intelligence Task Force Olympia received played a significant
role in the decreasing security situation in Mosul. I would
appreciate your elaborating on why intelligence decreased under
Task Force Olympia, what lessons MNF-I learned in this
situation, and how these lessons are being incorporated in the
current operations and intelligence activities.
General Petraeus. Sir, the 101st Airborne Division had its
habitual division military intelligence battalion at that time,
which is a very robust structure. We were fortunate to have
partners from all of the intelligence agencies in our
government and to have special mission unit elements working
with us as well.
We were also fortunate to have a number of individuals who
had served in Bosnia, where we created a joint interagency task
force for counterterrorism, and that is really what you are
doing when you are conducting targeted operations in a
counterinsurgency environment. Putting all of that together
when the insurgents did make a push in the area, and once we
were able to get a grip on that push, our analysts were able to
provide actionable intelligence that was very good. In one
night alone, for example, simultaneously we took down 35
different sites at 2 o'clock in the morning in Mosul. Another
time, we did 25 sites simultaneously, just in that one city,
and in many cases there were others outside the city that we
did simultaneously as well.
The night we did the 35, we got 23 of the individuals that
we were after, with one shot fired. Most of those were knocks
on the door rather than blowing the door down. That was the
level of the refinement of both the process and the resourcing
that we had at that time.
Task Force Olympia was not an existing organization. It was
taken out of the I Corps headquarters at Fort Lewis,
Washington, the tactical command post of that corps
headquarters, and they did not have the normal robust military
intelligence battalion that we had supporting them. We did
anticipate problems with this, frankly, and did raise concerns
about that. It took months for those to materialize, but in the
wake of the assassination of the governor some 5 or 6 months
after we left in a very fractious political process that
resulted in Sunni Arabs, many of them, walking away from the
province council table, the insurgents were able to start
putting roots down again.
As that happened, the intelligence elements of Task Force
Olympia were not able to generate the same amount of actionable
intelligence. You then enter into a spiral where, because there
is more insurgent presence, there is greater intimidation of
local security forces and your intelligence agents, your human
intelligence agents, which means less intelligence, which means
less effective raids, which means more bad guys, and you can
see it spirals downward until in fact it did implode in
November during the operation in Fallujah the enemy opened up a
new front up in Mosul, building on the infrastructure that they
had been able to establish there and also building on the fact
that they had been able over time to intimidate very severely
the police in Mosul in particular and their leadership.
That is really what I was getting at with that particular
case. So it was both a substantially reduced amount of the
intelligence analysis capability that was so important when we
were conducting our operations and to some degree there was
less of the joint interagency task force capability as well
because that headquarters was not as robust as a division
headquarters either.
I did feel at the time that they took over that they could
maintain the security situation because of actually tens of
thousands of Iraqi forces that were trained during our time. In
fact, these forces did prove themselves in April 2004 when the
rest of the country really experienced very substantial
difficulties. But over time, as that spiral began, particularly
in the late summer of 2004, it became increasingly difficult to
keep pulling the roots out as fast as the bad guys were putting
the roots down.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, General. As you accept this
challenge, obviously our best wishes go to you for a huge
success. Thank you.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, I want to say on the front end that I
support your nomination very enthusiastically.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Senator Pryor. I think you are the right person for this. I
have concerns, as we have discussed previously, about the surge
or the augmentation, whatever you want to call it. Basically, I
have three basic concerns. We have talked about these before,
but first is the practicalities, and that is where you get into
the thousand questions about where do our troops come from, how
does it impact the National Guard component, and training and
equipment. There is literally a thousand questions there that I
have concerns about.
Second is, I am concerned that our best U.S. military minds
are divided on this surge strategy. Again, I am basing that on
press reports and just reading a lot of retired people mostly
and their thoughts and their impressions of what the best next
step is.
The third concern I have is I am very concerned that there
is insufficient Iraqi buy-in. My sense is that this is not
worth doing unless the Iraqis buy into this strategy because I
think fundamentally that is what we are talking about here, is
the Iraqi government, the leadership, military police, et
cetera. They have to take over and take responsibility for
their country, and we need to over time give that
responsibility to them. I think most Americans would like us to
do that sooner rather than later.
You have mentioned in some of your comments and just what
you have said in the past several days that your perception is
basically there is now a changed mission in Iraq. Is that fair?
General Petraeus. It certainly is, a change in mission
where the focus will be on the security of the population as
the foremost objective and transition is not foremost. Really,
throughout much of 2006 transition has of course been foremost
and frankly, I thought for a very long time myself that that
was the right approach to take as well. It was in the wake of
the violence, of course, of the fall of this last year and the
winter that has proven to be undermined as the way ahead.
Senator Pryor. Let me follow up on one of Senator Kennedy's
questions a few moments ago when he asked about benchmarks. You
said you had a set of general benchmarks in your mind, but it
would take time to develop more specific and more particular
benchmarks. I think that is a fair understanding of what you
said.
My follow-up question on that is, it seems to me that the
circumstances in Iraq have changed considerably over the last
year, and as you are coming up with your set of firm benchmarks
that we can measure success or failure using your benchmarks,
what happens if the circumstances are continually changing and
how much time do you need to get to the benchmarks so we can
measure how successful we are being there?
General Petraeus. Senator, some of the benchmarks I think
perhaps will exist on my arrival, if confirmed. Among those
might be schedules of Iraqi troop deployments and the like.
Some of those I think are fairly straightforward. I think it is
more difficult when you get into some of the very difficult
issues that the Iraqi government will have to come to grips
with in determining what is the level of process toward
decisions on some of these very challenging issues that
obviously have to be resolved for Iraq to move forward in the
direction that everyone hopes it will move.
Senator Pryor. That is one reason I have confidence in you,
because I know that you are very focused on that and you are
going to do your dead level best to make sure that you have a
handle on the progress we are making, if we are making
progress, and where we are not, trying to take steps to fix
that.
In the manual that has been talked about today, the
counterinsurgency manual, in fact the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette
editorial page quoted a section of that today or several
sections, and it said that: ``Victory is achieved when the
populace consents to the government's legitimacy and stops
actively and passively supporting the insurgency.'' I think
clearly that is a good definition of victory.
But what I would ask you to do, this is about keeping
Congress more informed than in years past. If you can help us
measure how we are moving toward victory, if you can give us
objective criteria that we can look at where we can measure if
we are actually progressing the way we want to progress.
So whatever those metrics are, whatever those statistics
are, you are going to have to help us do that, because one of
the frustrations I think I have had is that it has been very
difficult for me to gauge whether we are moving forward or
whether we are losing ground in Iraq.
Also in your counterinsurgency manual, you give an equation
there that says there should be one counterinsurgent for every
50 inhabitants. I am wondering about the numbers in Baghdad. I
believe Baghdad is about 6 million. Are we at that number, that
1 to 50 ratio? Are we there? Will we be there with the surge?
General Petraeus. Senator, we will. If you lump together
all of the existing U.S. forces and forces to deploy, existing
Iraqi forces and forces to deploy, you get to about 85,000.
Certainly not all those are equal. Some are much better than
others.
You then should add in tens of thousands of additional
forces that are over there that provide, of all things,
contract security for our embassy. Myself, I was secured by
contract security in my last tour there, and that frees up
uniformed forces to perform other missions and those have to be
factored in as well. The same with the ministerial security
forces, acknowledging certainly that some of those ministerial
security forces are part of the problem instead of part of the
solution. But they do in fact secure, again, facilities and
infrastructure that would otherwise have to be secured by U.S.
or Iraqi forces.
Senator Pryor. Just for the sake of clarity, when you talk
about a counterinsurgent are you talking about anybody that is
on our side? I mean, it could be the Iraqi police, obviously
the Iraqi army, obviously other Iraqi security forces?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Pryor. But it could also be contractors?
General Petraeus. If they are performing security
functions, yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. So it is whoever it may be, just as long as
they are performing security functions?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir. Again, if you will, that is
sort of a modern evolution of counterinsurgency strategy, if
you will, because certainly in Malaya and other places there
were not contract security elements in those days, although
they certainly counted their governmental security elements
like the ministerial security forces.
Senator Pryor. What happens if you get in there and the
Iraqi forces, whether they be a police unit or a brigade,
whatever size it may be, what if they just fail to meet the
obligations that they have? What if they either just do not
show up or they just do not perform well? My suspicion is you
will find them performing unevenly from area to area.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. What do you do when they do not meet the
standard?
General Petraeus. There will be some of that, there is no
question. In those cases we will have to go to their bosses and
demand corrective action. That is easier said than done. But it
is something that we will have to do.
In my last tour in Iraq, on one occasion I went to the
minister of interior and told him that we had withdrawn all
logistical, funding, and equipment support for a particular
element in the Baghdad police force and that would remain
withdrawn until certain individuals who we caught mistreating
detainees were apprehended and dealt with, and those
individuals were apprehended and dealt with.
Senator Pryor. I just had one follow-up question to what
Senator Bill Nelson asked a few moments ago. I think his
question--I wrote it down; I think I have it right--Will you be
silent if your civilian leaders provide false or misleading
information? I think that is what he said, and you said, no,
you would not remain silent, which is the right answer.
But if you find yourself in that situation where you have
civilian leadership in this country that is not providing
accurate and true information, what will you do?
General Petraeus. Sir, I will provide accurate and true
information. I think the committee ought to know that. I would
be very happy to stay on the banks of the Missouri River at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, instead of going back to the banks of
the Euphrates River, and I am doing this out of a sense of
service, again to those great young men and women who are over
there, and because this is what the military does.
But this is not about being beholden to anyone. This is not
about, again, being aligned with any party or anyone else. I
will give you my best professional military advice, and if
people do not like it, then they can find someone else to give
better professional military advice.
Senator Pryor. I think that is why you are the right guy
for the job.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Pryor.
Before we call on Senator Thune, let me just follow up on
something that Senator Pryor said and give the Defense
Department notice of a request that we are going to insist be
complied with. It has to do with the benchmarks issue or the
measurements which Senator Pryor made reference to. Back in
November when the question of benchmarks came up, we asked both
Secretaries of Defense and State, for copies of the benchmarks
that were referred to by the President. The President has said
specifically that we will hold the Iraqi government to the
benchmarks it has announced.
We asked again. When we did not get those benchmarks, we
asked the Secretary of Defense. We got a letter back from the
Secretary of Defense on December 4th saying that the request
for the benchmarks would be referred to the State Department.
We have written the State Department again, Secretary Rice,
saying we want the benchmarks. This was a January 16th letter.
Now, we are determined that we are going to get the
benchmarks which the President says that the Iraqi government
has announced it will follow. We are determined we are going to
get those. I do not want to hold up your nomination. Nobody
does. We are going to speed your nomination as quickly as we
can because we think that it should be speeded up, for all the
reasons you have heard here today.
But there must be representatives here of the Defense
Department and the State Department. Whether there are or not,
we are going to make it clear that we are going to find a way
to get copies of those benchmarks that you say you saw on
slides. Now, I made reference in the letters just to political
benchmarks, but we are going to insist--and I use the word
``insist'' and I think this will be a bipartisan insistence;
this is not a partisan issue. This is information this
committee is entitled to, that Congress is entitled to. I am
looking at you, but I am talking to the people at the Defense
Department and the State Department who are within earshot
here.
We are going to insist that we get copies of the benchmarks
on the political, economic, and military aspects that have been
agreed to by the Iraqi government, which the President has said
he is going to insist that they comply with.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here today. Thank you for your
extraordinary service to our country and for your willingness
to undertake a very challenging and difficult task.
I want to follow up. You answered in response to a question
Senator McCain asked earlier today about what would happen if
the United States were to leave Iraq now or follow the advice
of some up here and that is to begin withdrawing. You mentioned
some of the things, ethnic cleansing, other countries
interferring, terrorist groups moving in, disruptions in the
flow of oil, a whole lot of consequences of that step or that
action.
What I would like to have you do if you could is expand a
little bit on that answer in terms of what it would mean to the
United States and to our security interests, because I think
too often people here in this country do not understand or make
the connection between what is happening over there and what
that means to national security here at home for the United
States. Could you just expand on that answer a little bit and
what the implications could be for people here at home and why
this fight is so important, not just to that region but to U.S.
interests?
General Petraeus. Sir, there is a number of broad
categories, if you will, that I think deserve mention. One of
those certainly is the potential--and all of these are
potentials. As I said in my opening statement, no one really
knows the consequences of a failed Iraqi state. But certainly
regional instability could be a result of that if surrounding
countries felt that they had to enter Iraq for some reason or
other to safeguard one ethnic group or another.
Were some portion of Iraq to become truly a terrorist
training camp, and the potential certainly exists for that in
places like Anbar Province and other areas that are under more
of the insurgent control, obviously that is a much shorter trip
to countries of friends in that region, to other western
countries, and to the United States than from other possible
camps, say in the Afghan-Pakistan border regions or something
like that.
I think you do have to consider U.S. standing in the world,
if you will. I think that is an important factor. I think, as
you mentioned the international economy, one does not know if
the oil flow would be disrupted, but certainly were that to
happen, were there again to be regional instability that
erupted, again there is the potential that that could erupt--
that could degrade the availability of the energy resources in
that area, the oil and natural gas.
Again, no one really knows what these consequences truly
would be. They are all potential, and they all are certainly
worrisome.
Senator Thune. Let me ask you, if I could, a follow-up
question that has been posed a couple of times this morning, I
think first by Senator Lieberman and a couple of others on the
panel. It has to do with these resolutions that get put on the
Senate floor, that I think in many cases are designed to
respond to political conditions here at home rather than to
conditions on the ground in Iraq. If thought were being given
to the effect on the troops and the conditions on the ground in
Iraq, I do not think you would probably see as many of these
resolutions floating around here on Capitol Hill, and I know
that they do not have the force of law when you are talking
about a non-binding resolution. I think the real opportunity
here for Congress to have a say in this, if they wanted to,
would be with respect to the purse and the power that we have
in terms of appropriations. At least nobody evidently wants to
take that step.
But these resolutions are symbolic, in that I think they
send a signal and a message to our troops. They obviously are
perceived around the world as having some meaning. I do not
happen to believe that our troops make the distinction between
support for them and a lack of support for their mission. Would
you comment on that as well, just as a follow-up to the
questions that have been asked earlier?
General Petraeus. Sir, again, I am not a politician. I am a
guy who wears a uniform and has for 32 years plus. I am,
however, very sensitive, as I mentioned before, to Congress'
responsibilities in terms of oversight, accountability, and so
forth. I understand also very much the frustration of the
American people, of Congress, frankly of all of us, with the
situation in Iraq.
I think, however, putting on the uniform and as a
prospective commander, if confirmed, that the question has to
be, I guess at least that I would ask myself, what message will
the enemy take from this, what message will the soldiers and I
take from it?
If I could, I would just really like to leave it at that,
because, candidly, there are a number of resolutions out there,
without actually getting into details, which I would just as
soon avoid anyway, frankly, learning that mine fields are best
avoided and gone around rather than walked through on some
occasions. I would like to leave that one there, Senator.
Senator Thune. A very diplomatic answer. But I come back to
that point because I think that the questions that have been
asked earlier--what is most important in the debate that is
occurring up here right now, in my view at least, is the impact
that it has on the men and women who are wearing the uniform.
You are a career military officer, someone who works day in and
day out with the troops. Those of us who are up here obviously
have constituencies back home that we respond to and clearly
many of these messages or resolutions are directed or targeted
at some of those constituencies, who have a sense of
frustration about this war.
But it seems to me that the bottom line concern that we
have to have is that our troops understand that we are
committed to them and support them and want to make sure that
they have every opportunity to be victorious, to complete the
mission. That is what soldiers do. I am very concerned about
the mixed messages that are sent by statements that are made
here, not so much again as they are directed to constituencies
back in the States, but more importantly what impact that has
on the men and women who are carrying out this responsibility
in the theater where they could be in harm's way.
What about the issue of the borders? There has been a lot
made about Syria, Iran, troops coming in, foreign fighters.
What steps are we taking to cut that off and what more can we
do?
General Petraeus. Sir, that is not a subject that I have
discussed in any detail at all, again, with General Odierno.
Again, I was truly trying to avoid any kind of presumptive
behavior, although at one point when I was being asked about--
during the development of the strategy I thought that I did
have to talk to our operational commander on the ground and
confirm that his troops-to-task analysis did require all five
of the brigades and the two additional battalions in Anbar
Province, which he said that it did.
I do know that he shares the concern over the borders. We
have very briefly discussed it in passing. But I do not know at
this point in time what the plans are to strengthen the
defenses, the security, along the Iranian border and along the
Syrian border in particular.
Senator Thune. I see, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I am sorry I missed a good amount of your question
and answer period. I was here for your testimony. I had two
other hearings I had to go to.
I want you to know I appreciate your diplomacy as it
regards my colleague Senator Thune's question. The issue of the
attitudes of people who are serving is in my view not wholly
appropriate to the political debate. You and I had a discussion
about that when you visited me. I think there are a number of
polls out there. There was a poll last year during the campaign
that showed more than 70 percent of the troops in Iraq believe
we should be out within a year. There is a poll in the Service
Times fairly recently that showed a majority of the people in
the military no longer support the approach of this
administration in terms of how the war should be fought. I
think we up here and the senior military are the fiduciaries of
the goodwill and the service of those people, and it is not
always appropriate to be bringing them so directly into the
process.
I also would like to say for the record that so many of
these predictions that are being bandied about regarding the
implications of a withdrawal, first of all, I think play to the
worst case scenario of a precipitous withdrawal. The others,
for instance an increase in terrorist activity, decrease in the
United States standing around the world, and effect on the
United States economy, the empowerment of Iran, are the exact
conditions that many of us who were warning against going into
Iraq were making, which would occur as a result, and in some
cases have. I just think that is something that should be said
for the record.
In your testimony, when you talked about your measures of
success you mentioned the rule of law, and one of the strongest
feelings that I have is that law and order is the first
stepping-stone toward some sort of success here, but we have to
go toward a point where law and order is being administered by
the Iraqis, through the Iraqis, on behalf of the Iraqis.
Otherwise you get a situation similar to Northern Ireland years
ago, and just the notion of a British soldier on the street was
enough to inflame the emotions of a lot of people over there.
That goes to one of the concerns that I have about the way
that this strategy is being articulated. It is one thing to
talk about the measurements of success, but I think what we
really need to hear is a clear articulation of end point. My
belief is that in terms of our national strategy with Iraq the
successful end point would be a time when there are no longer
United States combat forces on the streets of Iraq. Would you
agree with that objective?
General Petraeus. Senator, I would. I think the condition
the rest of the country is in would obviously pertain as well.
If you achieved no more troops in Iraq but the whole thing just
came apart at the seams, then I am not sure that that would be
the objective that you would want to strive for.
Senator Webb. The removal of combat troops from the streets
of Iraq?
General Petraeus. Certainly, over time that is where you
want to be, yes, sir, again assuming that there is security on
those streets in Iraq and that we have enabled and helped the
Iraqis to get to that.
Senator Webb. Right, but that would be a doable
articulation of where we want to end up?
General Petraeus. That is certainly where we want to end up
militarily, yes, sir.
Senator Webb. I have another question regarding the
training of Iraqi forces, and this is just a question from
having participated in the Vietnam War and watching some very
fine South Vietnamese soldiers get in many cases culturally
conflicted by the type of training that the United States was
bringing to them, and having spent time in Lebanon as a
journalist and watching the difficulty that they had trying to
build up a Lebanese army with all the difficult factions very
similar to Iraq.
General Petraeus. Right.
Senator Webb. The question that I have is really asking for
your observation, having done this. To what extent are these
Iraqi forces less capable because of the training that they
have not received from the Americans and to what extent are
they less capable because of a lack of motivation, for instance
a fear of affiliating with the central government that is so
weak, or cultural issues, those sorts of things?
General Petraeus. I think it is probably more the latter
than the former, in truth. I think that over time we did build
a respectable training and equipping program. It was relatively
comparable to what we do for our own soldiers. Over time we
have built institutions--military academy, staff colleges,
basic training academies, branch schools, and all the rest--and
again, this really does come back to the heart of the issue, as
I mentioned in my opening statement, that there is not a
military solution, there is a political solution. Military
force is, again, necessary but not sufficient, and getting to
that will component of this equation, what you talk about, who
are we fighting for, what are we fighting for, is crucially
important in this case, and that is again the ultimate kind of
resolution of the problems in Iraq.
Senator Webb. Do you see that there is any sort of stigma
associated to Iraqi units that are directly affiliating with
Americans in different parts of the Iraqi society?
General Petraeus. Sir, again I would have to march my way
around the country, but I do not really think that is the case.
We have very small, relatively small, embedded teams,
partnership programs, throughout the country with the military.
I am not sure the same can be said of the police, which is a
wholly different issue because they obviously are local. They
come from the local neighborhood, and if you have a situation
in which intimidation sets in over time, of course, then there
can be a problem of affiliation between them and what can be
seen, again, in some of those areas as occupiers.
You have seen it, I know, in Anbar Province, where it has
gone back and forth, and right now there appears to be a trend
in the positive direction where sheiks are stepping up and they
do want to be affiliated with and supported by the U.S. Marines
and Army forces who are in Anbar Province. That was not the
case as little as perhaps 6 months ago or certainly before
that.
So again, I think you really have to look around the
country, and I think we have to be very sensitive and, frankly,
nuanced in how we operate in those different areas.
Senator Webb. I wish you well and I look forward to hearing
your observations after you hit the ground.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I would like to state unequivocally that I have
great admiration personally for you and your professional
accomplishments, and I express my thanks to you for leaving the
banks of the Missouri and be willing to return, and do so out
of a sense of deep patriotism and love for this Nation and the
forces that you will eventually command.
If you succeed, and I hope you do, fervently I hope you do,
you will have earned rightfully the gratitude of the people of
this country, and indeed the people of much of the world,
because hopefully that would bring stability to this government
and allow it to exercise the full range of sovereignty.
But I have to tell you, and this is personal, I go back 35,
36, 37 years, when as Secretary of the Navy, I sat at that very
table where you are in this very room on a number of occasions
and in other rooms of this Congress, trying to explain, since I
was a part of the civilian structure, governmental structure
directing that war. I heard the crossfire in the questions and
in the debates, and this hearing today brought it all back.
There is no real parallel to the conflicts as such that we
are experiencing today, but there is this situation of the
Nation pulling back. How well I remember, with my friend Jim
Webb here and John McCain bravely in uniform in those days, how
they came back home to a public that did not greet them with
the warmth, the respect, and the thanks that they deserved.
But today it is quite different. This whole Nation is in
support of the men and women of the Armed Forces. I say to you
I think every member of this committee--and I know every one of
them well, on that side of the aisle, on this side of the
aisle, having had the privilege of occupying that chair for
some 6 years--we are not a division here today of patriots who
support the troops and those who are making statements and
working on resolutions that could be translated as aiding and
abetting the enemy.
We are trying to exercise the fundamental responsibilities
of our democracy and how this Nation has two coequal branches
of the government, each bearing its own responsibilities.
I hope that this colloquy has not entrapped you into some
responses that you might later regret. I wonder if you would
just give me the assurance that you will go back and examine
this transcript as to what you replied with respect to certain
of these questions and review it, because we want you to
succeed and I am not sure just how the reporting will come out
of this hearing, nor at this moment am I fully able to judge
how the people across this land seeing this hearing through the
lens of that camera will interpret it.
But in defense of those colleagues--and I am one and I
accept full responsibility for what I did yesterday in leading
an effort with my distinguished colleagues, Senators Collins
and Ben Nelson of this committee, in putting forth a
resolution. But we did so in response to the President's
comments to the Nation on the 10th of this month, and I read
from his transcript:

``In the days ahead, my national security team will
fully brief Congress on the new strategy. If members
have improvements that can be made, we will make them.
If circumstances change, we will adjust. Honorable
people have different views and they will voice their
criticisms. It is fair to hold our views up to the
scrutiny of all involved and have a responsibility to
explain how the path they propose would be more likely
to succeed.''

Since we just put in our resolution late yesterday--and we
did so not to have a confrontation with the President, but
following his advice we had some recommendations, which he may
or may not accept. They were expressed by heartfelt beliefs
held by the three of us and we think other members of the
Senate.
I feel that we have performed our duty as we see it and
that time will tell. We purposely did not file it. I am getting
technical here. We put it in the record, but it is not filed
before the Senate, and we will withhold any further action on
our resolution until the Foreign Relations Committee, which has
primary jurisdiction, reviews certain resolutions before it and
responsible to the floor of the Senate. Then and at that time
will we consider whether or not we should make any changes and
whether we submit it as a resolution as a substitute for that
promulgated by the Foreign Relations Committee.
I just urge you to go back and look at that, because I am
very proud of this committee and I do not want an impression,
certainly among the Armed Forces, that we are not all steadfast
behind them, and that sort of a misimpression could create the
very forces that I witnessed when I was in that chair and saw
America pull back and eventually the funding problem, which I
hope we never experience here as a means by which to exercise
the authority of our equal branch, Congress.
Now, let us proceed to my point here. This resolution we
put in looked at options that the President might consider
using a force level somewhat less than the 20,500. We fully
support, inferentially, the force levels the President wants to
send to Anbar. There we are directly in combat with al Qaeda,
which is so fundamental to this whole war on terrorism
throughout the globe. But we looked at also the means by which
the benchmarks could be made very clear to the American public
most important and to Congress, and as you direct the
operation, which will be sequenced, the first section of
Baghdad that you begin to work the plan on, let us see if the
Iraqis indeed reported for duty in full force, as the plan
envisions, indeed took the lead, as they say, in the fight,
which is primarily sectarian violence, and that the political
structure will not try and abrogate the decisions made by the
field commanders, both U.S. and Iraqi, as they move forward
with the plan. Those are very critical to the success.
In my understanding--and you have been very forthright--you
have not helped develop this plan. It has been entrusted to
those commanders in country, understandably. But you in a
sense, if confirmed, and in the written letter that you advised
the President, you are accepting the responsibility to
implement that plan. So I take my comments to my colleagues a
step further and say, if there comes a time when you feel there
should be a change to the plan and hopefully, as we recommend
to the President, a lesser force level of U.S. forces is
possible, you will address that to your superiors, the
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and
hopefully implement that.
Am I correct in that?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. Now, finally this question of the sectarian
violence which concerns me greatly. The root causes of that
violence are almost incomprehensible. Here we have through
great sacrifice of life and limb and an enormous sum of funds,
not only the United States but coalition forces, given this
nation its sovereignty, and all we ask in return is it take the
full reins of sovereignty and exercise it.
My concern is why do we need to put such a heavy emphasis
of U.S. forces into Baghdad when we have trained 188,000 Iraqi
military? Why should they not take the preponderance of the
responsibility to cope with the sectarian violence? They can
understand the language. They have some comprehension of the
root causes why a Sunni and a Shia who have lived side by side
for many years are now at each other's throats and seek only to
kill and destroy one another.
Why could not our forces be redeployed into areas where
those 188,000 Iraqis are geographically in other regions and
withdraw the Iraqi forces from those regions and put them into
Baghdad to carry forward this mission, which is important, very
important, to bring down, hopefully, lower that level, so that
the people of Baghdad have some quality of life, so that the
government has some sense of personal security and governmental
security, so they can carry out the functions of sovereignty?
Those are the issues that we bring to you. Do you have a
thought on that? Why could we not simply utilize the Iraqis to
fight this sectarian violence and not the American GIs?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir. Sir, first of all, I think that
the effort in Iraq, in Baghdad, will be predominantly Iraqi. I
think that as we total up numbers of forces and various
contributions that they will far outnumber U.S. forces in the
Baghdad security plan. They are in fact moving forces from
other places in the country where the troops-to-task situation
allow that to happen. I happened to meet last night with the
Iraqi chief of defense staff, their chairman of the joint
chiefs of staff, General Babakar Zabbari, who is a long-time
comrade starting up in northern Iraq, where he commanded the
Pesh Merga that helped us liberate northern Iraq. He then
eventually was elevated to be his country's senior military
officer.
He stated that they are training additional forces--I
believe it was in the order of 25,000 or 30,000 additional
military forces--that will also be used to augment the elements
that are going to Baghdad. Again, he also echoed what I
mentioned earlier, that the initial battalions are actually in
Baghdad, according to General Odierno as well, and are starting
to get set again to contribute to that operation.
Senator Warner. If they fail to live up to their
commitments--and I hope they do not--if they fail to meet the
benchmarks of the initial phases of the Baghdad operation, are
you prepared to come back to your superiors, indeed the
President and the Secretary of Defense and others, and say, we
should not go forward until somehow we get not only the
assurance but the actuality of their participating in
successive phases of this Baghdad operation?
General Petraeus. I am prepared to do that, Senator.
Senator Warner. I thank you. I wish you good luck and I
wish you have success.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to begin by saying, Senator Warner, how
appropriate and moving I thought your opening comments were.
There has been a lot of commentary at this hearing this
morning about the morale of the troops and about the need to
defeat our adversaries. I think the best thing we can do to
support the morale of our troops and defeat our adversaries is
to have a policy that maximizes our chances for success. It
would be ironic indeed if we remain silent in furtherance of a
false unity, in deference to a policy unlikely to succeed. I do
not see what that would do for either the morale of our troops
or to defeat our adversaries. So, particularly from your side
of the aisle, I thought your comments were absolutely
appropriate and indeed moving.
Senator Warner. I thank the Senator.
Senator Bayh. General, I would like to follow up on that
for a moment. I think Senator Webb was also right, being a
military man, not to want to drag those of you in uniform into
political debates. So I am not going to ask you about specific
resolutions or all that kind of thing. But the issue of troop
morale is something that you are an expert on and that has been
raised here today. So I would like to ask you very plainly:
Does a hearing like this, with the diversity of opinion that
has been expressed here, undermine the morale of our troops?
General Petraeus. Senator, I seriously doubt that our
troops are sitting watching C-SPAN 3 in Iraq right now.
Senator Bayh. Further testimony to the intelligence of our
military men and women. [Laughter.]
General Petraeus. Sir, I do not know how much attention
they are paying to this debate.
Senator Bayh. Well, the issue has been raised. It is a
philosophical question, not a political one, but it is
important because every American, as Senator Warner was saying,
cares about the morale of our troops. So does diversity of
opinion in our society about the right thing to do in Iraq,
that maximizes our chances for success, does a healthy debate
about the right course that maximizes our chance of this
turning out well, does the freedom inherent to a democracy,
does that make us weak?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think I stated earlier how
important I think free and open debate and the marketplace of
ideas and all the other great qualities that our country has
achieved are in fact to our country. I think some of the
soldiers will be out there saying, yeah, go get them. Some will
be saying, what is that all about. Some will just keep their
head down and go about their mission.
Senator Bayh. So what you are saying, General, is that our
men and women who wear the uniform really are a lot like
Americans back at home? They have diverse opinions, too.
General Petraeus. Sir, that is where they come from.
Senator Bayh. They are probably sophisticated enough to
take all this in and accept it for whatever it is worth.
General Petraeus. Sir, I think that is an accurate
statement.
Senator Bayh. I thought so and I am glad to hear you say
that.
What is behind a lot of this--and you heard some of this
also, I have heard there are concerns about micromanaging, and
I think the Vice President said the other day you cannot run a
war by committee. But there is a lot of history here--I think
you have alluded to some of it--a history of mistakes by the
civilian leadership, a history of the Iraqis, who you quite
accurately indicated and it was universally the opinion that
Senator Clinton and I heard when we were in Iraq that the
Iraqis are essential to the success of this mission and yet
they have been too often unable or unwilling to step up and do
their part. There is that history we bring to this.
So to deal with both the mismanagement of this on our
civilian side here and the lack of resolve on the part of the
Iraqis there, many of us feel that it is our responsibility now
to step up and to provide better direction to this whole thing.
That is what you hear going on.
So with that by way of background, you said a couple of
interesting things that I think were both accurate, but I would
like to combine them in a little bit different way. At one
point in your testimony you said you thought that at the bottom
of all this at its essence it was a test of wills; is that
correct?
General Petraeus. Sir, that is correct. I think any such
endeavor is a test of wills at some point with the enemy. Now,
there are many factors in the test.
Senator Bayh. This is what I would like to get to. I think
that statement is correct, but I want to combine it with
another statement that you have made and I hear repeatedly from
our military men and women, which is, look, no matter how long
we stay or how hard we fight or how much we spend or how many
of us die, it is ultimately up to them.
I think what you were about to say is it is not only a test
of our will, that is a part of it, but it is also fundamentally
a test of the Iraqis' intentions, whether they are willing and
able to do what it takes ultimately to make this successful. Is
that not also true?
General Petraeus. It is, and I have made that point, of
course, several times today. This is at the end of the day up
to the Iraqis.
Senator Bayh. I would like to ask a couple questions about
that, because my strong impression is that the American people
are willing to be constant and strong in support of a policy
they believe is likely to work, but they can also understand
when things are not working too well and when a change of
course is in order, and that is when they begin to hesitate and
withdraw their support.
So the questions I would like to ask today get to the heart
of what do the Iraqis intend, why should we have confidence in
them, and what steps can we take to maximize the chances that
they will do what is in their own interests and maximize the
chances that our efforts there will succeed in helping them.
I would like to get to what Senator Levin mentioned to you
a couple of times. You have spoken about consequences. We have
talked about benchmarks and timelines, but ultimately there
have to be consequences. Otherwise I am afraid the Iraqis will
not take us seriously and the American people will conclude
without consequences this really is more of the same.
You spoke generally about, if things are not going so well
we will have to look at what we can do for them and what we
might withhold from them. That is a pretty general statement.
Can you be more specific than that, because I am afraid without
more specifics----
General Petraeus. Certainly, yes, sir. I can give examples
of in fact what I did in the past. As the Multinational
Security Transition Command-Iraq commander, the train and equip
program commander, there was a case toward the end of my time
in command where leaders of the major crimes unit in Baghdad
were found mistreating detainees. So I went to the minister of
defense with the evidence of this and announced that we were
withdrawing all financial, logistical, adviser, and equipment
support for that element until he arrested and tried those
individuals. He did do that, and we then over time resumed the
assistance that we were providing to them. That is an example
of that.
There are positive reinforcements, if you will. The Iraqi
special operations force brigade is arguably the best special
operations unit in the entire region. They are among the most
experienced. They are the ones in many cases who have been
conducting the operations in recent weeks and months to go
after some of the senior leaders of the Jaysh al-Mahdi, Moqtada
al-Sadr's militia, and they have done so well that we
continually reinforce that with increasingly better, more
capable equipment, better facilities, better quality of life, a
special operations bonus, and so forth.
So again, there are two ways of going at that and those are
examples of those.
Senator Bayh. Those are the kind of specific consequences
we are looking for, but that deals with the military side of
things and a lot of this is going to depend on the Iraqi
political leadership.
General Petraeus. Correct.
Senator Bayh. Which, when Senator Clinton and I met with
the Prime Minister last week, he said to us what I understand
is essentially what he said to the President last November,
which is: Look, we do not want your brave soldiers dying here,
either; I want you to leave Baghdad. Just give us heavier
weapons, you guys withdraw to the periphery, and let us do what
we need to do.
Now we have adopted a policy diametrically opposite to
that. Why does he have such a different opinion about what
needs to be done to secure Baghdad?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have not had a chance to talk to
Prime Minister Maliki. I do not know what his view on this is.
I had actually been told that he had supported it after
conversations with the President.
I do not know. I will have to determine, if confirmed, once
I get on the ground.
Senator Bayh. I think when you do talk to him, General, you
will find that he will. When I pressed him and I said, ``well,
do you then think that our policy of adding more troops is the
wrong one?'' He started backing up and he said, ``well, that is
not exactly''--but you could tell what he really meant. If he
had first choice, he would be doing things differently there.
The reason that is important to me is that I am looking for
some insight into is he willing to do what needs to be done
here. How can we ask them to make different political decisions
in support of a policy they may not really embrace?
Let me give you a couple of other examples just quickly. We
arrest people affiliated with Iran, Iranian agents, sometimes
we think implicated in the explosive devices that are killing
Americans. The message from the Iranian government is that we
have to let them go. He has publicly resisted the setting of
benchmarks and yet he endorses the steps that need to be
undertaken. Well, if you really endorse the steps that need to
be undertaken, why would you resist being held publicly
accountable?
All that leads me to wonder, do they really have it in them
to make the hard decisions that need to be done? So my question
to you is, with the situation about the Iranians, his
resistance to benchmarks, and all that kind of thing, what
leads you to be confident of these people?
General Petraeus. There have been some reasonably positive
developments in recent weeks actually where they have hung
tough, have not released one of the very senior Moqtada al-Sadr
affiliates, where their forces have reported, where there are
developments in Anbar Province and so forth. But again, I am
with you in the fact that only time will tell, Senator. If
confirmed, I need to get back to a country that I have not been
to in 16 months and determine what the will is.
As I mentioned earlier, if I detect that they do not want
it as much as we want it, I will report that to my boss.
Senator Bayh. That is why Senator Levin and I and others
keep getting back to the notion of consequences, because all
too often in the past they have said the right things, but they
have not done the right things, what has led us to question the
strategy of constantly reassuring them to try and build up
their confidence so that they will have the security to do the
difficult things. It has led some of us to conclude that
perhaps a different approach to encouraging them to do the
difficult things is in order.
So my time has expired, but my last question to you is, you
said that, I think the words that you used were, ``that the
responsible elements among the Iraqis did not want us to
leave.'' I think that is what I heard you say, ``the
responsible elements did not want us to leave.''
General Petraeus. There are thousands, actually tens of
thousands, of Iraqis who have died actually defending their
country, far more than our soldiers, each of which is a tragedy
for that family.
Senator Bayh. Here is my parting question, and again it is
by way of trying to figure out: What can we do to get them to
do what is in their own best interests here, what needs to be
done? So if you are telling me that the responsible Iraqis do
not want us to leave precipitously, but at the same time you
then said that if we talk about redeployment that would have an
adverse consequence on them, so my question to you is: If they
want us to stay, but then we say, look, if you do not do the
right things we may not be able to stay, why would that not
lead them to do the things necessary to getting us to do what
you are telling us they want us to do, which is to remain long
enough for them to make a go of it?
How can we hold those two thoughts at the same time? They
want something, but when we tell them we may take it away it
does not have an impact on their thinking.
General Petraeus. Their challenge right now, Senator, I
believe is that they are in a capital city that is insecure, in
which citizens make life or death decisions on a daily basis,
just trying to get to work, get their kids to school, get some
food. You cannot come to grips with the tough decisions that a
government has to resolve in a situation like that. Their
security forces have not been able to deal with the rise in
violence in the wake of the bombing of the mosque in Samarra,
which unleashed a tremendous amount of tit for tat and back and
forth violence. The objective is to get a grip on that, to
provide improved security, to give the Iraqi government the
space and the time to come to grips with these political
decisions that will ultimately carry them forward.
Senator Bayh. General, I support your nomination and I wish
you well.
General Petraeus. Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
Now, after Senators Martinez and McCaskill there will be a
second round. The amount of time will not be as long as 8
minutes, but we will work through lunch. Do you have a problem
with that?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Or do you need a break for other purposes?
General Petraeus. No; ready to go, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Good morning, General. Congratulations on
your nomination and thank you for your distinguished service
and your willingness to undertake this very difficult
assignment. I know I echo what all others have said, but I have
never heard such unanimous praise here today and in other
quarters of your service, your capacity, and your capability.
So I thank you for your service and for your willingness to
undertake this very difficult task.
Chairman Levin. Senator Martinez, forgive me for
interrupting. But while we have as many folks with us as
possible, I just want to inform all of us that the committee
will be conducting a hearing next Tuesday, January 30, to
consider the nomination of Admiral William Fallon to be
Commander, U.S. Central Command, and will be conducting a
hearing on Thursday, February 1, to consider the nomination of
General George Casey to be Chief of Staff of the Army. I did
talk about these dates with Senator McCain, so he knew those
two dates would be used.
Forgive the interruption, but I wanted to get that out.
Senator Martinez. Getting back to the topic at hand,
obviously the new plan for Iraq comes after months and months
of political commentary and debate, much as has been discussed
here today in the open democracy that we are, for there to be a
different plan, a change in Iraqi policy. Now we do have a new
plan for Iraq.
My understanding of the plan is that it is not just an
increase in the number of troops, which I might point out when
accomplished will not put us at a level of troops in Iraq which
is even equal to the highest number we have had in the course
of this effort; is that correct? I mean, our troop levels in
Iraq have gone up and down.
General Petraeus. They have. I believe that there have been
periods when we have had more than we will have at the end of
this particular increase.
Senator Martinez. The focus has been on the troop levels,
but there actually are more issues related to this new plan
than just an increase in troops. To be clear now, the troops
that are going into Baghdad are not going as American forces at
the front end. My understanding from the President's
explanation of this new plan is that the Iraqis will be at the
front and that they will not be taking a back seat; they will
be in the front and center.
My understanding further is that troops have already begun
to move into Baghdad and that the Maliki government has carried
out the first benchmark, which is will the Iraqi troops report,
and they have begun to report; is that correct?
General Petraeus. The initial elements, yes, sir. Again, I
want to be clear that not all, but their schedule is not for
all of them to be there by any stretch of the imagination
either.
Senator Martinez. But they have begun to be there?
General Petraeus. They have indeed, yes, sir.
Senator Martinez. Second, that there are political as well
as economic development, reconstruction elements to this plan.
General Petraeus. That is correct.
Senator Martinez. Those are equally important and in fact
you have emphasized, as I would emphasize, the fact that there
needs to be a political settlement among the Iraqis the
distribution of the oil revenues, amendments to the
constitution. Those are important things.
General Petraeus. Correct, sir.
Senator Martinez. So when some here might say that in fact
we need a political settlement, we are all in agreement that
there needs to be a political solution to the problems in Iraq.
The question really is, can these political solutions take
place in the midst of chaos, killing, and everyday violence at
levels that are really unsustainable and unimaginable. So it
seems to me that it is logical to suggest that we have to
dampen down the violence so that we can give an opportunity for
there to be a political settlement and an environment conducive
to a political settlement. Secondarily, it would seem to me to
be fairly difficult to be involved in the business of
reconstruction, water, sewer, electricity, garbage pickup, et
cetera, when you in fact have a chaotic and disruptive
situation. So it seems to me, frankly, no different than it
would be in an American city if all of a sudden we had
lawlessness and a breakdown in the rule of law. It would be
rather difficult to have economic development programs in a
neighborhood.
General Petraeus. Correct.
Senator Martinez. One of the issues that has troubled me
since I was in Baghdad in October was the fact that I saw a
serious political division among those who are attempting to
run the Iraqi government. Particularly, I was troubled by the
fact that some ministries seem to be under the political
control of Moqtada al-Sadr and that those ministries,
particularly the ministry of health, are not only not
cooperative, but would not even meet with Americans, would not
even discuss the issues of the day with Americans.
Is there any sign or any indication that you have or do you
share my concern that it would be impossible for us to see a
united Iraqi government until issues like that are resolved?
General Petraeus. I share your concern, Senator.
Senator Martinez. I have heard it repeatedly said by other
distinguished Members of the Senate that the generals do not
support this plan. Again, when the President was explaining
this plan to me and others, he mentioned that General Casey has
had a hand in the development of this plan. My understanding is
clearly that you do support this plan and believe it has a
reasonable chance of success.
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Martinez. So when some would say that generals do
not support it, I suppose one can find generals who might not
support it, particularly maybe a retired general. But those of
you in charge with carrying out the mission do believe that it
has a reasonable chance of success?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Martinez. General--and I will conclude with this,
Mr. Chairman--I have heard the importance of the Senate debate,
that the Senate is a democratic institution where we all have a
high degree of responsibility, and also I think sometimes an
elevated self-importance. But I also have heard something that
I find disturbing here today, which is the suggestion that
civilian leaders of our Department of Defense at a time of war
would either give knowingly false or misleading testimony to
this Congress. I find that request of the General to stand up
and speak to that issue to be frankly unnecessary. Just like I
do not besmirch the opinions of those in the Senate who might
differ with this current plan or question their patriotism, I
also think it is unnecessary to question the veracity or the
seriousness of purpose, the integrity or the honor of the
people that we have confirmed to be the civilian leadership in
the Department of Defense. I just found that troubling and not
in keeping with the level of discourse that the colleague from
Virginia was expressing about the issues of the day.
I too believe that if someone disapproves of this plan and
believes it is a dead end that they too then have a
responsibility to seek to stop the action and not just send a
message. I think it calls for further and stronger action than
just a message.
General, I wish you well. I believe, like you do, that this
is a plan that has a reasonable chance of success. I agree and
believe, like you do, that the consequences of failure in Iraq
are serious and would do great harm to our Nation. So my best
hopes and I know those of this Nation go with you in your new
mission, and look forward to working with you to help you
succeed as we all try to succeed in this very difficult
struggle, but one which I think is inextricably tied to the
overall global war on terror. I thank you for your patience
today.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I first have to comment on the irony of those who are
critical of any resolutions that are being brought forward
concerning this latest plan in Iraq. We are ostensibly spending
hundreds of billions of dollars and sacrificing the most
precious lives imaginable in this cause, to build a democracy.
In November, I think something much stronger than a resolution
came forth from this country. It was not a Senate resolution.
It was an election, and that election confirmed the strong
foundation we have in this country for the democratic process.
I think expressing our opinions through resolutions is
exactly what keeps this institution and the people we represent
living in a wonderful country because of the democratic
institutions. I think it is ironic that we would criticize
those resolutions in light of the fact that they merely reflect
what the elections did in this country, and that was say to the
government: We think what you are doing is not working and it
is not what we think this country should be doing. So I wanted
to comment on that irony.
I also wanted to talk to you a little bit, General. First
of all, you and I had a chance to visit, and we will miss you
on the banks of the Missouri.
General Petraeus. Even if it is on the wrong bank?
[Laughter.]
Senator McCaskill. Even though you are on the Kansas side.
We will not go into that. We certainly claim Leavenworth in the
greater Kansas City area and know the kind of work you have
done at Leavenworth. I noticed your wife in the paper the other
day working on the task force over in Topeka on the payday loan
issue; please, thank her for that work with Governor Sebelius.
General Petraeus. I will, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. I read in the paper this morning about
Company C of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, that is
in Gazaliyah and they have begun this work and there are 105 of
them there, and this article talked about that they had a
firefight the other night and, instead of moving on to another
patrol, they stayed because they are there defending what is
now their home. They have set up base there and they will be
operating out of this neighborhood, a very dangerous
neighborhood, where there is the fighting between the Sunnis
and the Shia.
This article was very troubling to me for several reasons.
I think one, it was on a human level where it discussed one of
your observations of soldiering in Iraq in the Military Review
article that Senator Collins referred to, I also read, and one
of it was that you cannot do too much with your own hands. This
article points out that right now our American military find
themselves as jailers, doctors, construction workers, garbage
men, guardians, and detectives. It points out with specificity
that there is a young 4-year-old girl that was brought into the
base and the reason she was brought there, she was terribly
ill, was because her parents did not want her taken to the
nearby hospital because it was Shiite and they feared that
their entire family would be killed while their daughter's life
was being saved in this hospital. So as a result, our medic,
our military medic, was caring for this 4-year-old girl.
Now, I think that brings home in a way that we cannot talk
about in terms of military protocol the incredible, huge
nature, the enormity in every sense of the word, of this
problem. I think the part of the article that was most
troubling to me was when they talked about ``the soldiers also
got their first glimpse of the green Iraqi forces who will
share their mission and eventually, they hope, take it over.
The soldiers talked about them with a mixture of bemusement,
disdain, and mistrust.''
`` `You could talk about partnership, but you would be
lying,' said one soldier who asked that his name not be used
for fear of punishment by his superiors.''
When I read your article on counterinsurgency and your
observations, no fewer than 6 of the 14 lessons learned deal
directly with what we have talked about primarily in this
hearing this morning, and that is what else is working over
there besides the excellent work of the American military? What
I would ask of you is your willingness to be very aggressive to
report back on these six requirements that you state that are
necessary to effectively fight counterinsurgency. I am going to
briefly go through those six for the record:
``One, do not try to do too much with your own hands.''
``Two, increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to
success.''
Number seven, the third one, ``Everyone must do nation-
building.''
``Help build institutions, not just units.''
Another one: ``Success in a counterinsurgency requires more
than just military operations.''
Finally: ``Ultimate success depends on local leaders.''
That one really kind of sticks in my craw because that is where
the rubber is going to meet the road in this plan. It is
terribly unfair what you are being asked to do and what our
military is being asked to do, because basically we are asking
you to succeed basically ignoring six of your own lessons
because they are not there now. We do not have the local
leaders there. If we did we would not be getting the mixed
signals we are getting from Maliki and we would see more
confidence that our military would have in the green forces
that ostensibly are going to be leading this.
I would like you to comment on what this soldier said and
the fear I have that what we are going to hear in Washington is
never going to match what really is happening on the ground in
Iraq.
General Petraeus. First of all, in that case--again, you
were reading an article. I did read that article this morning.
It does not strike me as the application of, if you will, the
objective plan when it is fully developed and when we have
substantially more forces on the ground, in a case where you
learn about the area in which you are going to operate, plan
with the Iraqi forces with whom you will partner, determine how
it is that you are going to secure that area, go in, do clear
it, again understand the businesses, the local leaders,
whatever else it is, the sectarian tensions and so forth, and
then in fact ensure the security of that area so that you can
do the hold and the build phases.
Certainly those subset of the observations from my own time
soldiering in Iraq are observations that inform me as I
contemplate going back over there, if confirmed. There are
others actually that are also important in this. Again, the way
we carry this out is hugely important so that you do not have
just a company that is an outpost in an area that does not have
perhaps adequate security, although it sounds to me as if the
one thing they did do was certainly prepare their force
protection for 3 days before they occupied that location.
So that is the first observation that I would offer. The
second is, again as I have pledged several times already today,
if I think that they do not want it as much as we do, at some
point I will tell my boss that and I will tell you that if it
happens to come in one of our updates or something.
Senator McCaskill. I do not have any time left, but let me
briefly also talk a little bit about the money, the CERP. I
discussed this with Secretary Gates and General Pace when they
were here. The CERP I think is important, but the problem I
have with it, it is a little bit good money after bad. We have
spent so much money trying to build and so much of what we have
spent--I will not even get into the incredible problems of
contracting and no accountability. I will not even put on the
auditor's hat here.
I am just talking about how much that we have actually done
that has been destroyed after we did it and the fact that if
the Iraqi military is going to stand on its own and be lead in
this that they should be the ones distributing CERP funds, not
the American military.
Are you aware of any plans to train the green forces, the
Iraqi forces, to begin to distribute some of the $10 billion in
surpluses that the Iraqi government has to begin winning the
hearts and minds of the people especially in these mixed
neighborhoods, that they can look to the Iraqi military as a
fair place to try to build neighborhoods regardless of what
area of town they are in?
General Petraeus. I have actually heard that discussed. I
do not know of plans to do that, though. Again, my discussions
with folks over there have really been limited to just getting
that amount of information that I needed to provide input when
I was consulted during the development of the new strategy.
I think it is something that is very worthy of
consideration. I think that certainly again they have to spend
their money. One of the reasons we have to have a comprehensive
effort is to help them build the capacity to spend their money,
because they have not been able to spend all that they have on
behalf of the Iraqi people.
If I could, with respect to CERP, CERP is great for the WPA
types of programs, but we will also look very hard for self-
sustaining types of businesses and industries and so forth that
we can either help revive or build as well. I think those are
very important in this endeavor, so that you do not just pay to
have the streets cleaned again, which is a notable
accomplishment, but again 6 months from now if you do not
achieve what you need to achieve with the ministry of public
works you will be back where you were before.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you and we all wish you, not just
Godspeed, but success and health.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
General, I think everybody in Congress and every American
wants us to succeed, wants to maximize the chances of success.
The question is how best do we do that. There is no difference,
however, between people on that issue. So it seems to me for
you or others to say how important it is for us to succeed,
that is the point, which is that the course that we have been
on is a course towards failure. The question is how do you
change course. The importance of changing course, how do you
maximize the chances of success. Are you with me so far?
General Petraeus. I am, Senator.
Chairman Levin. The next question then is how do you change
course once you decide that the course you are on is not
working, despite those claims of the Vice President that the
insurgency was in its last throes--that was a couple years
ago--despite the claim of the President just a few months ago
that we are absolutely winning in Iraq, when it is clear now
that even he acknowledges we are not winning in Iraq.
So for folks who talk about just we cannot fail, as though
somehow or other that automatically means that we follow the
President, it seems to me there is a totally illogical
conclusion. We have been following the President's course. It
has been a course that has led us towards failure and the
President did not recognize that apparently until after the
American people told him that.
So success is our goal and the question is how. There are
two different approaches towards that. One is increased
military commitment, that somehow or other giving the Iraqis
more breathing space will make it more likely that they will
reach a political settlement. The other approach is, no, they
have had plenty of breathing space, 3\1/2\ years; they need
pressure. They need to be told that it is not an open-ended
commitment, as the President finally said, at least
rhetorically, that it is not an open-ended commitment, that
they must reach a political settlement if this thing is going
to be resolved.
Now, does additional military presence contribute to the
Iraqis reaching a political settlement or does embedding our
troops in neighborhoods, number one, create a lot more targets,
and does it take the Iraqis off the hook? Does it tell the
Iraqis that we are going to increase our military presence,
does that tell the Iraqis that somehow or other their future is
in our hands rather than their own? That is an honest debate,
it seems to me, which is the heart of the matter here.
So far would you agree with that?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. So it is not a disagreement over whether it
is important to succeed. It is not a disagreement over whether
failure is going to hurt in a whole host of ways. The question
is what are the Iraqis going to read into increased American
presence in their neighborhoods? What will they take from that?
Now, my understanding is the Prime Minister of Iraq went to
Jordan and proposed to our President that the Iraqis take over
the security of Baghdad. Is that your understanding?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have heard press reports of that.
I do not have firsthand knowledge of that.
Chairman Levin. Have the Iraqis asked us for more American
troops? I know they are supporting the President.
General Petraeus. Sir, I do not know.
Chairman Levin. You do not know if they have asked us for
more?
General Petraeus. I do not, no, sir.
Chairman Levin. All right. One of the many things that our
troops deserve, it seems to me, beside all the equipment, all
the training, everything we can give them to succeed, support
for their families, it seems to me that one of the things that
our troops deserve is our honest assessments, and that they
make a distinction between supporting them and supporting the
policies of the administration. Would you agree with that?
General Petraeus. Yes.
Chairman Levin. They make a distinction, because I have met
with the troops I do not know how many times now in Iraq and I
tell them, look, I have been a critic going in, I have been a
critic of the way this thing has been run, but, folks, you have
the support of every Member of Congress. We are not cutting
your funding. We are going to support you as long as you are
there. The question is how do we succeed so you can come home.
That is the question.
General Petraeus. Right.
Chairman Levin. They welcome an honest debate. I have
gotten so many letters and comments from troops saying, this is
worthy of your debate, you are making an honest assessment,
keep at it. So many of our troops have said that, and you have
heard about public opinion polls so far.
I just want to make sure that you are not intending to be
interpreted as supporting a resolution or opposing a
resolution, number one, by your testimony. Is that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Levin. Number two, that you acknowledge that the
goal of those who want to put pressure on the Iraqi leadership
to step up and reach political settlements, is it the same goal
that you have, which is that political settlement and political
settlement alone by the Iraqis is our ultimate way of providing
security and success in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Correct, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Can we have a functioning democracy
in Iraq without political leaders in Iraq making the
compromises that they need to make?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. You made a reference to the fact that there
has been incremental progress recently, that there has been
apparently a draft of a----
General Petraeus. A couple of encouraging signs, I think
would be a way to characterize it, sir.
Chairman Levin. That would be on the political front in
terms of reaching apparently a draft on the oil revenue?
General Petraeus. A draft on the oil revenues, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. So that they have been able to make at
least that incremental progress without a surge; is that
correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Levin. President Talabani of Iraq has said that
American troops are going to be there as long as the Iraqis
want us there. Is that accurate? Should that be our decision,
not their decision, as to how long?
General Petraeus. I wonder if he--yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Are you familiar with that?
General Petraeus. I am not, sir.
Chairman Levin. All right. Is it our goal to pacify the
militias or just to disarm them? Not ``just''; let me restate
that because it is not just to disarm. Is it our goal to pacify
Baghdad or to disarm the militias, or both?
General Petraeus. Sir, the security in Baghdad can only be
achieved by any extralegal individuals being off the streets.
So it does not matter if they are international extremists,
insurgents, Sunni Arab insurgents, violent criminals, militia
members, or what have you. They all are those who violate the
idea that the Iraqi government has the legitimate use of force.
Chairman Levin. If the militias merely reduce their
visibility in Baghdad or move their operations to areas where
Iraqi and U.S. forces are not present in strength, does that
accomplish our goal?
General Petraeus. No, sir. In fact, there has been
substantial discussion about the follow-on, the disarmament,
the demobilization, and the reintegration (DDR) of various
militia elements.
Chairman Levin. Prime Minister Maliki has asserted that
U.S. refusal to provide the Iraqi security forces with weapons
and equipment hurt their ability to secure Baghdad. Do you
agree with that?
General Petraeus. Sir, I need to look at that. I did
actually look over the weekend at the list of weapons and
equipment that has been provided by the U.S. and bought with
Iraqi money as well. It is actually quite substantial at this
point. There is certainly the need for more and as they do in
fact train more obviously there will be an additional
requirement for equipment.
There is a requirement for more robust and additional armor
protection and heavier weaponry for some of their elements. But
we have actually provided quite substantial weaponry so far.
Chairman Levin. Would you let us know about your assessment
on that?
General Petraeus. I will, sir.
Chairman Levin. Because that is quite a statement, when we
have the Prime Minister of Iraq saying that the problem is that
we have not given them the equipment so that they could secure
Baghdad. That is quite an allegation.
General Petraeus. Sir, they have actually committed $1.5
billion to foreign military sales actually with the U.S., for
what that is worth, and that should enable them also. This, I
am told, will be the first year in which they spend more in
their defense budget than we spend in our train and equip
budget.
Chairman Levin. Are you going to plan for the redeployment
from Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the surge as just part of the
planning process?
General Petraeus. Sir, obviously you have to have
contingencies. You are always looking at what you are doing. So
the answer to that would obviously be yes.
Chairman Levin. With that qualification and understanding.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Finally, I want you to go back in time. We
have spent I think all of this morning pretty much talking
about where we are at and where we are going, the differences
that exist on that issue or those issues. I want you to go back
to the time when Ambassador Bremer decided to disband the Iraqi
army and to also deBaathify to the extent that he did.
Did you agree, if you can put yourself back in time, with
those decisions?
General Petraeus. Sir, I would like to qualify it. I will
say no, but I would like to qualify it, because there is really
some nuance to this. Ambassador Bremer is actually correct when
he says, first of all, they had already disestablished
themselves by and large. They had not done what in fact one of
the assumptions, or at least you would hope that a number of
them would remain in their own barracks, safeguard their
equipment, turn the turrets or their tanks over to the rear,
and just wait to be partners with us. That did not materialize
and unfortunately a lot of their stuff was looted as they went
out the door.
So there was really not a formally constituted military at
that time, although it certainly could reassemble. It did
reassemble. The challenge--and beyond that, it had vast numbers
of very high-ranking officers. Arguably, it was to some degree
Saddam's jobs program for very senior officers. In Nineveh
Province alone, there were 1,100 brigadier generals and above,
for example, although there was only one army corps.
Having said that, the challenge was of course with this
army that Iraq perhaps did not need in the long-term was now
unemployed. It was really the issue of how long it took to
announce the stipends, the follow-on opportunities for them,
how they would be able to feed their families, and again what
their future held, and to some degree a degree of disrespect,
frankly, for an institution that in the Iraqis' eyes was
perhaps the one institution that had been the least corrupted.
I am talking about the military now, not the Special Republican
Guards or some of these other organizations.
That period between the announcement of the
disestablishment and the announcement of stipends, was roughly
5 weeks or so. That was a difficult period in Iraq. All of the
military commanders in Iraq at that time registered their
concerns, because in fact the former Iraqi military did
assemble and it made their views very clearly known, and
eventually those turned into riots and eventually some were
actually killed outside the Green Zone and so forth before the
stipends were announced.
Crowds are a very big challenge when you are in an endeavor
like that and you really do not like to see crowds because
someone can shoot out of a crowd and then you have a real force
protection issue on your hands, and that did in fact
materialize during that time, and arguably that may have been
where some of the initial elements of the insurgency began to
gain strength.
With respect to the deBaathification policy, clearly Iraq
had to have a deBaathification policy. There is no question
about that. Ambassador Bremer did intend for there to be not
just deBaathification, but in fact exceptions to that policy in
substantial numbers that would amount to reconciliation.
In fact, when I had a conversation with him in Mosul in the
summer of 2003 he gave the 101st the authority to allow the
Iraqis to conduct a reconciliation process, for which we did
provide judicial oversight. That was conducted initially for
Mosul University and then some of the others. The key there was
to get the paperwork down to Baghdad to the deBaathification
committee, and unfortunately a process that had a fair degree
of rigor to it--I think it was less than 60 percent would have
been fully ``reconciled,'' and none of them would have gone to
leadership positions. I had already personally fired the higher
level Baath official who was the head of the university. But
for these individuals, say 120 or so professors, many of whom
were educated in western universities, which is one reason they
had to be Baath Party members, to go overseas.
So that was a real challenge, and all the military
commanders did register their concerns during that time,
because it was a period when obviously many of those affected
were Sunni Arab, perhaps most, although there were Shia in the
fold as well. But in the areas where most of the U.S.
commanders were, that affected Sunni Arabs, and that obviously
caused significant challenges for us.
Chairman Levin. Our commanders then registered their
concerns about that policy?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. In the way you have discussed?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Petraeus. Again, to be fair, there was an intent to
do reconciliation. Ambassador Bremer himself has on several
occasions noted that he had intended to do that, wanted to do
that, and was just not able to get it done because of the
committee.
Chairman Levin. Of what?
General Petraeus. The deBaathification committee of the
Iraqi Governing Council.
Chairman Levin. Who was head of that committee?
General Petraeus. I think it was Ahmed Chalabi, sir.
Chairman Levin. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Petraeus. Your testimony has been very
impressive. I must say that I was particularly impressed when,
after 4 hours in the chair, Senator Levin offered you a chance
for a personal break and you said it was not necessary. That is
impressive. I am going to try to be brief.
I do want to first generally respond to something Senator
Levin said and agree with him, in case there is any
misimpression. The two of us have disagreed on some of the
policies we have followed in Iraq, and we disagree today. But
one thing we agree on is that both of us are looking for a way
to succeed in Iraq. We just have different paths that we think
will work better. I would say that is true of all the members
of this committee, and I would add that insofar as some
sensitivity was expressed earlier I am sure all the members of
the committee support our troops who are there and would not do
anything to oppose them.
Having said that, what I did earlier was two things. One is
that, in response to questions Senator McCain and I asked about
the possible impact of a Senate resolution of disapproval, I
thought you were clear, which is that you really did not say
much about the impact on the morale of the troops. You said in
the negative almost, that you could not imagine there would be
a beneficial effect. You did not say anything about a negative
effect.
With regard to the impact of a resolution of disapproval on
our enemies, you, I thought, expressed concern that in a war
like this, which is in good part a test of wills, that it might
give them hope. Clearly that is not the intention of the
sponsors in the Senate of such a resolution, but that is part
of what we have to ask ourselves, what are the consequences.
I made a different kind of plea to my colleagues here, and
I repeat it, which is now at the end of this hearing everyone
has expressed great respect for you, appreciation that you are
taking on this mission, and as far as I could hear everyone on
this committee is going to support your nomination. Yet, one
question that I do remember--I did not ask it--you were asked
whether you thought you could be successful in your new command
without the additional troops provided and the additional
economic and interagency support, political support, that the
plan offers, and you said no.
So I worry that we are both going to confirm you and yet we
are going to pass a resolution that says we are not in favor of
what you need to succeed. Of course, the resolution will not
cut off that aid, so that in a way is the reassuring part of
it.
That is why I ask my colleagues again to think about
holding back a while on such resolutions, to give you a chance
to implement what you have said, and I believe most would
agree, is a different policy, a new approach, in the dire
circumstances that you will find in Iraq, because, as I think
all of us agree on this committee certainly, the consequences
of failure really I believe will be, some would say could be,
disastrous for the United States, for Iraq, for the Middle
East, for the war on terrorism, and for the world economy.
I want to just ask you two or three brief questions. The
first is, I do want to thank you for resisting the temptation
that some of my colleagues offered to you to offer pledges
based on time. We will know by X date. I think the more honest
and really responsive answer you gave was that you will report
to us regularly and you will tell us regularly how it is going
and what is working and what is not, and then we will make the
judgments accordingly.
Two brief questions about what you will find. The
deployment plan envisions the early deployment of three Army
brigades and the alert of three more Army brigades to follow.
Some have asked, why not all six at once? I am not going to ask
you that question. I am just going to ask you if when you get
there you find that you need more than the three brigades more
quickly, is it fair to assume that you will request that
expedited deployment of those troops?
General Petraeus. Sir, actually I have told the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense that we should
flow all five brigades and the two battalions for Anbar
Province as quickly as we can.
Senator Lieberman. That is great. Thank you.
The second question is similar. Obviously, you know that
there was great concern here in Congress and among the American
people about what was seen in the earlier stages of the
conflict in Iraq as inadequate troop protection equipment. As
we send in these additional 21,000 American troops, I assume we
can count on you to let us know and your superiors know
immediately whether enough equipment is coming along with them,
including, of course, troop protection equipment?
General Petraeus. Sir, I will.
Chairman Levin. A final question. I wish that this was not
just on C-SPAN 3, but on evening television, for the American
people to see more broadly, because I do think, while your
testimony is before this committee, you have answered today for
members of the committee a lot of the questions that are in the
minds of the American people. Look, they are disappointed with
what they see. We are all disappointed. You are disappointed.
So the question that I think they would ask you: Is it
worth it to now send 21,000 more troops? Is it possible to
succeed? But the more specific question I want to ask, because
I hear this all the time: the Shia and Sunni Muslims have been
fighting each other for more than a millennium. Why do we think
we can possibly end this fighting? Why would we send more of
our troops now, according to this new way forward, into the
middle of that kind of violence, which is now called sectarian
violence?
General Petraeus. First of all, there are countries in that
region where there are one or the other majority. Iraq itself
does have a history of actual substantial intermarriage, not
just getting along well together. Unfortunately, some of the
violence, some of the developments, again in particular in the
wake of the bombing of the Askari mosque in February of this
past year, in a sense magnified the sectarian divides that in
some cases were nowhere near as large. That does give me hope
that in fact Sunni, Shia, Kurd, Yizzidi, Shabback, Turkoman,
Christian, and all of the other elements of Iraq can, in fact,
get along together. It will not be easy, but if we could get
them to where they are shouting instead of shooting that would
be a very substantial improvement.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much. Godspeed.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. General, just to clarify the issue of the
pace of the 21,000 troop deployment.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. The National Security Adviser, Mr. Hadley,
suggested that the pace will depend a lot on the Iraqis
performing. Secretary Gates said there will be plenty of
opportunity before many of the 21,000 additional troops arrive
to evaluate, ``whether the Iraqis are fulfilling their
commitments to us.''
I believe it was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who
talked about off-ramps, in other words turning off the 21,000
flow somewhere in the middle, suggesting that that would depend
upon whether the Iraqis come through with their commitments.
You seem to take a very different approach. Do you differ
from Secretary Gates when he says that there is going to be
plenty of opportunity, which is a plus, before many of the
21,000 additional troops arrive to evaluate, ``whether the
Iraqis are fulfilling their commitments to us''?
General Petraeus. No, sir, I do not. What I stated was that
as the military commander who is given a mission, that is a
different mission, to improve security in Baghdad for the
population, what I have told the Chairman and the Secretary is
that I would like to get those forces on the ground as quickly
as possible. That is not, I do not think, contradictory with
anything that they have said that is a force generation process
issue.
Whether I come back to them at some point and somehow have
so much of a sense that perhaps they are not living up to their
side of the bargain, that we want to call a time out, I think
that is a different issue actually from what you have to plan,
what you have to assume when you are planning, and also what a
commander asks for to try to improve the chances of success.
Chairman Levin. On that question of a time out, that is a
time out that you might consider calling for under the
circumstances? Is that right, given what you said this morning?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I am not saying you are going to call for a
time out.
General Petraeus. Right, sure.
Chairman Levin. I am saying you will consider calling for a
time out. You want to leave that possibility open depending on
whether the Iraqis carry out their commitments?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Levin. All of which points to the value of
pressure on the Iraqis; would you agree with that?
General Petraeus. I would, sir.
Chairman Levin. I welcome Senator Lieberman's comments, by
the way. The only thing I think, it is right when you get to
the end of your suggestion about what you need to succeed, and
those of us who disagree that a deeper military involvement is
not what you need to succeed, it is not because we do not want
the Iraqis to succeed or us to succeed. It is because we
believe it is up to the Iraqis to reach a political settlement
and only then can there be a chance of success in Iraq.
That represents the issue, whether or not more military
presence and involvement promote that goal of Iraqis achieving
political settlement or not. That is where the difference is
and, although you I think there is value in additional troops,
that basically is a mission which has been given to you, is
that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. You have not decided that is the right
policy. You agree with the policy, but the policy decision was
not yours; is that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. The letters that I referred to before
asking for the benchmarks, the series of letters, we will make
part of the record at this time. I want to clarify two things:
one, that we talked about both benchmarks and timelines,
because apparently the Iraqis have agreed on both. But whether
that is true, whether it is just the benchmarks and not the
timelines, whatever the Iraqis have agreed to in that regard we
want to see.
Two, it is not just, as the letters refer to, the
benchmarks for a political process; it is also benchmarks which
they have agreed to on military commitments of theirs, on
economic, financial commitments of theirs, as well as on
political commitments that they have not yet carried out.
[The information referred to follows:]

Chairman Levin. General, you have been very strong,
steadfast in staying with us this morning. I am sure there
would have been moments when you would have liked to have a few
minutes off, not because the questions were too difficult for
you to handle, but for other, more personal reasons. But in any
event, we thank you for your sticking with us here so we could
conclude this hearing in good order.
We will now stand adjourned and we will do our very best to
get your nomination to a vote of this committee just as quickly
as we possibly can. We thank you again and we now stand
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:36 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG David H. Petraeus,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-
Nichols Act has been a success. Our military forces are more
interoperable today than they ever have been in our Nation's history.
This achievement has been remarkable. The next step is to ensure the
ability of the military and civilian departments to work closely
together. Counterinsurgency warfare requires a total commitment of the
government--both military and civilian agencies--and unity of effort is
crucial to success.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. One of the most pressing needs is for the creation of
interagency doctrine for the prosecution of counterinsurgency and
stability operations. The State Department Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs has taken initial steps toward this end. During a conference
hosted jointly by State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I
proposed several actions that could help foster greater interagency
capacity, and I recently seconded two majors from Fort Leavenworth
(awaiting the start of the next School of Advanced Military Studies
course) to the State Department to work this issue. Beyond development
of doctrine in this area, there is discussion on creating an
interagency Center for Complex Operations, which would be an
intellectual clearinghouse for ideas and best practices in the many
facets of irregular warfare. This appears to be a low-cost, but high-
payoff, action that the committee should consider supporting.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I)?
Answer. The Commanding General (CG) of MNF-I commands forces within
Iraq and is the senior military representative to the U.S. Chief of
Mission. MNF-I is a Combined Joint Task Force under Operational Control
(OPCON) to the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). MNF-I
conducts operations in support of the Government of Iraq, U.S. Mission
and other international organizations. The CG exercises Tactical
Control (TACON) of non-U.S. Coalition Forces and OPCON of the
Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) and the Multinational Security
Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). This is a strategic level command.
Question. What are the differences between the duties and functions
of the Commander, MNF-I and the Commander, MNC-I?
Answer. The Commanding General of MNC-I is the senior operational
level commander in Iraq. He directly commands forces conducting
operations to restore order and security in Iraq.
The commander of the MNF-I has a wider responsibility which covers
strategic issues and the political/military interface, working with the
U.S. Ambassador and Government of Iraq to integrate all aspects of the
campaign such as security, governance, economic development,
communication, and transition.
Question. What background and experience, including joint duty
assignments, do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform
these duties?
Answer. I believe that I have a good background for the duties of
MNF-I CG, if confirmed. First, I have, of course, served in Iraq for
some 2\1/3\ years and have a good understanding of the country, its
government, and many of its leaders from all factions. Second, I have
had a number of joint assignments at relatively high level--as a
temporary duty Special Assistant to Commander in Chief, Allied Forces
Southern Europe (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)), as
Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Command, Europe (NATO), as
Operations Chief of the United Nations (UN) Force in Haiti, as
Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as
Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations of SFOR in Bosnia, and, of course,
as the Commander of MNSTC-I and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq.
Third, I believe I have a reasonably solid academic/intellectual
background, having studied, as well as served in, major combat
operations, counterinsurgency operations, peacekeeping operations, and
peace enforcement operations. Most recently, in my current position, I
oversaw the development of the new Army/Marine Corps manual on
counterinsurgency and also oversaw changes to other Army doctrinal
manuals, our leader development programs, our combat training centers,
and a variety of other activities that support the preparation of our
leaders and units for deployment to Iraq. Finally, I believe I
understand the requirements of strategic-level leadership, which is
what, after all, MNF-I is all about.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander,
MNF-I?
Answer. Yes, and I will complete them before deploying, if
confirmed. In particular, I need to establish initial personal
relationships with the members of the JCS I don't know (I have done
this with the Vice CJCS and CJCS and key Joint Staff members already);
get briefings on the interagency's support for the important ``non-
kinetic'' aspects of the new way ahead; meet again with the Secretary
of Defense and President--and certain interagency leaders; and discuss
Iraq with several leaders of the intelligence community with whom I
have not yet been able to meet. The most important, frankly, is getting
an understanding of the level of interagency support that will be
forthcoming. That will obviously be key to the comprehensive approach
that is essential in Iraq.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander, MNF-I?
Answer. There are many challenges in Iraq, but I would point out
four of particular concern. The top challenge is providing the security
necessary to reduce the cycle of violence in Iraq today. This will be a
difficult mission and time is not on our side. We must focus on
population security, particularly in Baghdad, to give the Iraqi
government the breathing space it needs to become more effective. The
second challenge is continuing the development of capable Iraqi
security forces (ISFs), relatively free of ethnic and sectarian bias.
The Iraqi Army has made much progress, but is uneven, and the police
remain a challenge. The third challenge is the integration of the
interagency effort to ensure that progress is made along all lines of
operation--not just security, but economic, governance, and the rule of
law as well. That is related to the fourth challenge, and that is the
lack of capacity of the Iraqi government. Iraq has enormous natural
resources and potential wealth. However, to take advantage of its
blessings, not only must security be improved, but critical national
issues must be resolved by the Iraqis, on issues such as national
reconciliation, the devolution of power below Baghdad, the distribution
of oil wealth, and so on. Only through unity of effort of all--
coalition and Iraqi, military and civilian--can we bring the full
weight of our effort to bear on the difficult situation in Iraq.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. Population security is the top priority. We must clear and
hold the neighborhoods of Baghdad to break the cycle of violence that
is preventing political progress in Iraq. We can only do this by
establishing persistent presence--coalition, as well as Iraqi--in Iraqi
neighborhoods. I plan to ensure that some of our forces locate in the
neighborhoods they protect and that they fight closely linked with
their Iraqi counterparts--with the Iraqis in the lead whenever
possible--to secure the population.
I will also work to improve the capability of the ISFs by
augmenting the size and capabilities of the embedded transition teams
that advise these forces. Beyond this, I will enhance the partnership
between U.S. units and Iraqi units, which increases the operating
capabilities of both forces. The Iraqi units have greater cultural
awareness and linguistic capabilities, while U.S. forces bring greater
military capabilities to the battlefield. Iraqi and U.S. elements are
more effective at population security and preparing for gradual
transition when working together.
To improve interagency cooperation, I applaud the recent efforts to
embed the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in the Brigade Combat
Team (BCT) headquarters (HQs) for those provinces in which BCTs are the
senior HQs, or in the division headquarters in areas where they are the
senior HQs in a province. This will provide a synergy that will
significantly enhance our ability to conduct stability and
reconstruction operations in Iraq.
I will do all that I can, in partnership with the Ambassador, to
ensure that our interagency is doing all possible to help develop
capacity in the Iraqi government and to enable it to come to grips with
the tough issues it must resolve.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Commander, MNF-I?
Answer. As the military commander, my broad priorities would
support the development of an Iraqi state that is a stable, reasonably
representative democracy that respects the rights of all Iraqis and can
provide for its own security, with Iraqi security institutions that act
professionally and according to the interests of all Iraqi people. My
more immediate priorities would address the challenges that MNF-I faces
today--security of the population to enable political progress,
enhancement of ISFs capabilities to provide the Iraqi government a
monopoly on the use of force, support for effective interagency
cooperation to bring the full weight of our national resources to bear
on the problem, and assistance to interagency elements as they work to
help the Iraqi government build capacity and resolve the tough issues
it confronts. Other priorities would include countering the threats
posed by Iranian and Syrian meddling in Iraq, and the continued mission
of dismantling terrorist networks and killing or capturing those who
refuse to accept a unified, stable Iraq.

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What were the major lessons you learned in your previous
Iraq tours, both leading a division and leading the effort to
establish, train, and equip security forces, that are the most
applicable to the duties you are about to assume?
Answer. Perhaps the best way to answer this is to attach an article
I wrote upon returning from Iraq after my last tour there. In it, I
laid out the lessons I learned in the form of 14 observations, noted
below; they are still valid, though they obviously require nuanced
application depending on the specific situation in each case (which is
explained in the article). The article attached explains them in
detail.

1. ``Do not try to do too much with your own hands.''
2. Act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-
life.
3. Money is ammunition.
4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to
success.
5. Analyze ``costs and benefits'' before each operation.
6. Intelligence is the key to success.
7. Everyone must do nation-building.
8. Help build institutions, not just units.
9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier.
10. Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just
military operations.
11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders.
12. Remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants.
13. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders.
14. A leader's most important task is to set the right tone.

Question. During your prior combat tours of duty in Iraq, were
there any incidents of which you were aware within your command of
alleged detainee abuse or abuse of civilians?
Answer. There was one specific case of alleged detainee abuse in
the 101st Airborne that was brought to my level. It was a few months
into our time in Mosul (and prompted us to establish clear standards
relatively early on), and did not involve death or serious injury. I
took action in that case, which included a general officer letter of
reprimand and relief of the senior individual involved and lesser
action against others. We very quickly then issued clear instructions
to all elements in the 101st Airborne Division Task Force that all
detainees would be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention,
ensured refresher education in what that meant, began a process of
inspecting all detention facilities in the Division at least weekly,
and started a process of having the Red Cross representative in the
area and Ninevah Province Council members (including an Imam) visit our
facilities on a regular basis, as well.
There was also at least one case of mistreatment of a civilian that
I recall--in which a small element improperly confiscated a vehicle
from a local citizen who was stopped at a checkpoint, with the element
leader then not being forthright about the incident during subsequent
inquiries. (The civilian was not physically mistreated.) We formally
investigated, took nonjudicial action under UCMJ against those
involved, and compensated the citizen.
There were numerous other cases of damage incidental to operations
for which we compensated the citizens affected.
As the MSNTC-I Commander, we did not operate detention facilities;
however, some of the Iraqi units we advised did do that, and we had
serious challenges in a few of those in the summer of 2005 before I
left Iraq. In each case, we documented possible cases of mistreatment,
shared the evidence with the Minister of Interior and MNF-I HQs, helped
the Minister and respective Iraqi units conduct remedial training, and,
in at least one case, withdrew all financial/equipment/advisor support
for an element (in that case due to actions by several leaders of the
Baghdad Major Crimes unit) until individuals were removed and/or
disciplined.
Question. If so, please explain the circumstances and describe the
actions that you took in response to these incidents?
Answer. Answered above.

U.S. MISTAKES

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes
the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?
Answer. First, there were a number of assumptions and assessments
that did not bear out. Prominent among them was the assumption that
Iraqis would remain in their barracks and ministry facilities and
resume their functions as soon as interim governmental structures were
in place. That obviously did not transpire. The assessment of the Iraqi
infrastructure did not capture how fragile and abysmally maintained it
was (and this challenge, of course, was compounded by looting).
Additionally, although most Iraqis did, in fact, greet us as liberators
(and that was true even in most Sunni Arab areas), there was an
underestimation of the degree of resistance that would develop as,
inevitably, a Shiite majority government began to emerge and the Sunni
Arabs, especially, the Saddamists, realized that the days of their
dominating Iraq were over. Sunni Arab resistance was also fueled by
other actions noted below.
Beyond that, as noted recently by President Bush, there were a
number of situations that did not develop as was envisioned:

There was the feeling that elections would enhance the
Iraqi sense of nationalism. Instead, the elections hardened
sectarian positions as Iraqis voted largely based on ethnic and
sectarian group identity.
There was an underestimation of the security
challenges in Iraq, particularly in 2006 in the wake of the
bombing of the mosque in Samara, coupled with an over-
estimation of our ability to create new security institutions
following the disbandment of the ISFs--which was not helped by
the planning issues described below.
It repeatedly took us time to recognize changes in the
security environment and to react to them. What began as an
insurgency has morphed into a conflict that includes insurgent
attacks, terrorism, sectarian violence, and violent crime. Our
responses have had to continue to evolve in response, but that
has not always been easy.

A number of mistakes were made by both political and military
leaders during the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom:

The very slow (if that) execution of the
reconciliation component of de-Baathification left tens of
thousands of former Baath Party members (many of them Sunni
Arabs, but also some Shiite) feeling that they had no future
opportunities in, or reason to support, the new Iraq. To be
fair to CPA, Ambassador Bremer intended to execute
reconciliation (or exceptions to the de-Baathification order)
and gave me permission, e.g., to do so on a trial basis in
Ninevah Province; however, when we submitted the results of the
reconciliation commission conducted for Mosul University and
subsequent requests for exception generated by Iraqi processes
with judicial oversight, no action was taken on them by the de-
Baathification committee in Baghdad. As realization set in
among those affected that there was to be no reconciliation, we
could feel support for the new Iraq ebbing in Sunni Arab
majority areas.
Disbanding the Iraqi army (which was, to be sure, an
army that Iraq did not need in the long-term as it had vastly
more senior officers than were remotely required and was more
of a jobs program than a competent military force) without
simultaneously announcing a stipend and pension program for
those in the Army, the future plan for Iraq's defense forces,
and provisions for joining those forces undoubtedly created
tens of thousands of former soldiers and officers who were
angry, feeling disrespected, and worried about how they would
feed their families. (The stipend plan was eventually announced
some 5 weeks after the disestablishment was announced, but it
did not cover senior officers, who remained, therefore,
influential critics of the new Iraq.) This action likely
fueled, at least in part, the early growth of the insurgency
and anti-coalition feeling.
We took too long to recognize the growing insurgency
and to take steps to counter it, though we did eventually come
to grips with it.
We took too long to develop the concepts and
structures needed to build effective ISFs to assist in
providing security to the Iraqi people.
Misconduct at Abu Gharyb and in other less
sensational, but still damaging cases, inflamed the insurgency
and damaged the credibility of coalition forces in Iraq, in the
region, and around the world.
We obviously had inadequate plans, concepts,
organizations, resources, and policies for the conduct of Phase
IV (stability and reconstruction) operations; consequently, we
were slow to move into Phase IV operations.
We had, for the first 15 months or more in Iraq, an
inadequate military structure. With hindsight, it is clear that
it took too long to transform V Corps HQs into Commander, Joint
Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) HQs, and that even when we had CJTF-7
HQs, it was not capable of looking both up and down (i.e.
performing both political-military/strategic functions and
serving as the senior operational headquarters for
counterinsurgency and stability operations). Moreover, it is
clear that we should have built what eventually became MNSTC-I
HQs and the TF-34 HQs (which oversees detainee/interrogation
operations) much sooner, along with the other organizations
that were eventually established (e.g., the Gulf Region Corps
of Engineer HQs).
Although not a problem in the 101st Airborne Division
area of responsibility (AOR) during my time as 101st commander,
it is clear that in certain other AORs there were more tasks
than troops--especially in Anbar Province for at least the
first year and likely in other areas as well.
Finally, the strategy pursued in the wake of the
bombing of the Al Askariya Mosque in Samarra in February 2006
was unable to arrest the spiraling violence and rise of harmful
sectarian activities. Repeated operations in Baghdad, in
particular, to clear, hold, and build did not prove durable due
to lack of sufficient Iraqi and coalition forces for the hold
phase of the operations.

Question. Which of these mistakes, if any, are still having an
impact, with which you will have to deal, if confirmed?
Answer. We continue to feel the effects of many of the issues
stated above. If confirmed, I intend to work with the U.S. Ambassador
to gain traction on a number of levels--security for the Iraqi people,
establishment of effective local governance and economic development
that will create stakeholders in the new Iraq, reconciliation, the
continued establishment of effective ISFs, and establishment of rule of
law to ensure effective justice to all Iraqis.

MOSUL

Question. When you commanded your division in Mosul in 2003 the
city appeared to be relatively quiet and stable. That changed
considerably in 2004 and later.
Why do you believe that happened?
Answer. The situation in Mosul deteriorated significantly about 9
months after the 101st Airborne Division departed from Iraq. There were
several reasons for this development. First, the insurgents made a
concerted effort to open a new front as it became clear that the
Coalition was going to conduct operations to clear Fallujah in the fall
of 2004. Second, the Sunni Arab governor of Ninevah Province was
assassinated in late June 2004 (the night of the transition of
sovereignty, while on the road to Baghdad, south of Ninevah Province).
In the fractious political process that followed, many of the Sunni
Arabs left the provincial council in protest over the way the
replacement governor was selected. This left a Sunni Arab majority
province without adequate Sunni Arab representation in the provincial
council. Undoubtedly, this led to some of them and their followers no
longer supporting the new Iraq and some others likely tacitly or
actively supporting the insurgents as they sought to put roots down in
Ninevah and began a concerted campaign of intimidation of Sunni Arabs
who supported the new Iraq. Third, many level-4 Baath Party members
lost hope over time that they would ever have a role in the new Iraq
due to stalling over reconciliation in Baghdad, despite the special
exemption given to the 101st Airborne Division by Ambassador Bremer in
the late summer of 2003 to conduct a special reconciliation process in
Ninevah Province and Ambassador Bremer's encouragement to all to use
the exception process in the CPA order. Finally, the forces that
replaced the 101st Airborne Division--called Task Force Olympia--were
only a little over one-third the size of the 101st Airborne (though
they started out about half our size), had many fewer helicopters and
other enablers, and one of their battalions was subsequently taken
frequently to be used as the CJTF-7 Reserve. At the time TF Olympia
replaced us in late January/early February, I believed its forces would
be sufficient to secure Ninevah Province due to the presence of the
tens of thousands of ISFs we had recruited, trained, and equipped, and
with whom we operated closely on a daily basis. That was borne out by
the Iraqis' performance during the uprisings in April 2004 when Mosul
was one of the few places in Iraq where Iraqi forces did well. Over
time, however, the Iraqi forces slowly deteriorated following the
Governor's assassination, as the insurgents mounted a brutal campaign
of intimidation. Ultimately, that degraded their effectiveness and
began a spiral downward that didn't end until during the Fallujah
operation in November 2004, during which a concerted attack in Mosul
revealed the police to be completely intimidated and ineffective, and
overwhelmed many of the Iraqi Army elements, as well. (Regretably,
although both BG Ham and I repeatedly requested replacement of the
once-aggressive Police Chief in the fall of 2004, the Minister of
Interior was never willing to take that action, despite clear signs
that the Chief and his family had been severely attacked and
intimidated.) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Task Force
Olympia's HQs lacked the same robust intelligence structure that the
101st Airborne Division possessed, which proved a serious shortfall in
the intelligence-intensive business of counterinsurgency warfare. Where
the 101st Airborne had largely been able to generate the precise
intelligence that helped us tear out the ``roots'' of the insurgents
almost as fast as they were established, this proved more challenging,
particularly over time, for Task Force Olympia.

ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW IRAQ STRATEGY

Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the
new Iraq strategy recently announced by the President?
Answer. I met with the Secretary of Defense a couple of days after
he took office and before he left for his first trip to Iraq, and we
discussed the situation there during that meeting. We subsequently
talked after his trip, as well. I also talked to the CJCS several times
during this period, noting that a population security emphasis, in
Baghdad in particular, was necessary to help the Iraqis gain the time/
space for the tough decisions they faced and discussing the general
force levels that were likely to be required. As the strategy was
refined, I talked on several occasions to LTG Ray Odierno to confirm
that his troop-to-task analysis required the force levels that are part
of the new strategy, and I relayed my support for those levels to the
CJCS and the Secretary. I also supported the additional emphasis on the
advisory effort and the additional resources for the reconstruction
effort (both in terms of funding and personnel for PRTs and
governmental ministry capacity development).

IRAQI ARMY REINFORCEMENTS

Question. The Iraqi government has agreed to send an additional
three Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad, two of which will apparently be
predominately Kurdish.
Do you know why Kurdish units were selected?
Answer. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) and MNC-I made the
decision to deploy the two predominantly Kurdish battalions to support
the Baghdad Security Plan primarily based upon the low threat levels in
their original assigned areas of responsibility, the readiness levels
of the units involved during their time as elements of the IGFC, and
the desire to involve these relatively well-trained units in the effort
to establish security in the capital city.
Question. Do you believe that Kurdish units will be more effective
than other units in enhancing security in Baghdad? Why?
Answer. I have confidence in the expected performance of these
units, though there are likely to be challenges due to language issues
(few of their enlisted soldiers speak Arabic) and, possibly, due to
operating away from predominantly Kurdish areas for the first time
(though some of the battalions did serve in mixed-ethnic areas in the
vicinity of Mosul). In considering other factors, there has been little
in the way of corruption or other sectarian issues reported in these
units. Additionally, because of their combat experience and
predominantly Kurdish soldiers, there tends to be a higher level of
unit cohesion in these formations. Because of their home locations,
there is a lower likelihood these units will have issues with
infiltration by anti-governmental entities. Finally, commanders
involved in training these units, as well as their coalition advisors,
assess that they are unlikely to be biased when conducting operations
in the locations to which they are being assigned.
Question. How do you believe Sunni or Shiite Arabs will react to
Kurdish troops in their neighborhoods?
Answer. I believe that in the end all parties will accept the
presence of these forces in an effort to secure Baghdad. Initial
feedback from a Lieutenant Colonel on the ground with whom I correspond
is that one of the first battalions to arrive has been welcomed as it
has brought improved security--though it is obviously still very early
on in this effort.
MNF-I considered several aspects prior to making the decision to
use these Kurdish-based forces. For example, MNF-I studied whether both
the Sunni and Shiite leaders would consider this an attempt by Kurdish
entities to expand their influence. While there have been some
statements by radical Shiite leaders and some reservations offered by
Sunnis, the assessment is that the people of Baghdad will adopt a wait-
and-see position. In the end, if security is enhanced, all parties will
benefit and likely will be grateful.
Question. How do you believe the Mahdi Army will react to Kurdish
troops entering Sadr City?
Answer. I believe the reaction in Sadr City to any security forces,
not just Kurdish ones (and it is not clear that Kurdish forces will
operate in Sadr City), will vary depending upon the perception of the
mission, size, and composition of forces, duration of operations, and
response of key Shiite leaders.
This is, however, a very dynamic period, and actions taken in Sadr
City will have to be carefully considered. While it is possible Muqtada
al-Sadr will respond with harsh rhetoric that could escalate into
violence, there is also the possibility that political engagement by
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will result in a tense, but calm entry
of Iraqi forces into Sadr City. As a leader within the Shiite
community, Muqtada al-Sadr must demonstrate the willingness to act
constitutionally, responsibly, and within the rule of law, regardless
of what kind of ISFs are involved. Having said this, again, any actions
involving Sadr City will be very sensitive and will require
considerable thought and preparation.
Question. What is your understanding of how Iraqi brigades which
are predominantly Sunni or Shiite will be deployed--i.e., among their
own sect or the other?
Answer. ISFs will be assigned areas of operations throughout
Baghdad without regard to sectarian composition of the units. Brigades
of the 6th and 9th Iraqi Divisions, each of which have a mix of Shiite
and Sunni personnel (though predominantly Shiite in their makeup) will
be employed in all nine administrative districts of the city. It is
true that some districts in the city are predominantly Shiite, while
others are predominantly Sunni. However, U.S. Army battalions will be
partnered with these Iraqi brigades to reinforce the practice that all
security forces operate in a professional, disciplined, and ethical
manner, and in accordance with the rule of law, international
humanitarian norms, and recognized international standards for
enforcement and protection of human rights.
Question. What are the implications either way?
Answer. It is important to ensure no particular sect feels
persecuted by the deployment of any ISF in their neighborhood. The
partnering of a U.S. battalion with each ISF brigade will ensure that
sectarian divisions and mistrust are kept to a minimum.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Question. What do you understand to be the command and control
relationships between American and Iraqi forces in the new Baghdad
security plan?
Answer. This is an exceedingly important issue. Getting the
relationship between our forces and the ISFs right is critical to
operating together. At its simplest, U.S. commanders will command and
retain OPCON of U.S. forces; Iraqi commanders will command Iraqi forces
and exercise OPCON over them once transitioned from the tactical
control of U.S. forces (this has taken place for the 6th Division and
in the case of many other Iraqi units in recent months). If confirmed,
I intend to ensure that there is very close cooperation between U.S.
and Iraqi headquarters to ensure unity of effort, careful coordination
of operations, and clear knowledge of what each force is doing. Of
necessity, this will include Iraqi and U.S. Special Operations Forces
and Police Forces as well. As I understand it, the Baghdad plan is to
be an Iraqi Plan, devised by the Iraqis in consultation with, and
supported by, MNF-I and MNC-I, and U.S. forces, under the command of
U.S. commanders, will act in support of the Iraqi effort to establish
security in Baghdad.
Question. Do you have any concerns?
Answer. Yes. MNF-I and MNC-I will need to carefully work out
liaison arrangements, colocation of command posts, terms of reference
that delineate respective responsibilities for various combat, combat
support, and combat service support activities, communications to
support all of this, and so forth. Having said this, coalition forces
have been working with ISFs for some time and have developed an
understanding of the relationships involved, and they will use that
experience to inform the actions to be taken in this case.

CONFRONTING THE MILITIAS

Question. Based on your knowledge, is the Iraqi government taking
the steps it must to confront and control the militias?
Answer. Militias and armed groups are a challenge with which MNF-I
and the Iraqi government must contend. One reason the Iraqi government
has not confronted militias in a meaningful way is that, regrettably,
they fill a security need. Another reason is that some political
parties derive their political strength from their militias, which
provide both security and allow for the provision of basic services to
the people.
Article 9 of the Iraqi Constitution prohibits militias and
stipulates that ``the Iraqi armed forces and security services will be
composed of the components of the Iraqi people with due consideration
given to their balance and representation without discrimination or
exclusion. They shall be subject to the control of the civilian
authority, shall defend Iraq, shall not be used as an instrument to
oppress the Iraqi people, shall not interfere in political affairs, and
shall have no role in the transfer of authority.'' In short, the
security forces of Iraq must be professional and apolitical, and they
must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
Once ISFs, backed by coalition forces, gain control of Baghdad and
provide security to the people, the need for militias to protect local
areas will cease to provide a justification for their existence. The
Iraqi government can then work to execute a comprehensive disarmament,
disbandment, and reintegration (DDR) program. Recent reports indicate
that Prime Minister Maliki understands the need to deal with the
militias.
Question. What role would you expect to play on this issue, if
confirmed?
Answer. Iraqi government intermediaries, coalition leaders, and
U.S. Embassy Baghdad personnel are involved in discussions to provide
opportunities for militia groups to enter into a DDR process. If
confirmed, I would support and be involved in these efforts.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, would you recommend
that American troops enter Sadr City?
Answer. American troops enter Sadr City regularly in response to
operational needs. These operations are likely to continue. As the ISFs
transition into a leading role, I would expect to see a more prominent
ISF presence in Sadr City and, as part of that, it is likely American
troops will also be present, but principally in a supporting role and
to ensure full situational awareness of the actions of the Iraqi
forces.
Question. In your judgment, how effective will the addition of more
U.S. troops be in securing Baghdad if Prime Minister Maliki continues
to allow militias to exist and operate?
Answer. Prime Minister Maliki has indicated a willingness to deal
with militias and this effort will be of central importance in securing
Baghdad. Additional U.S. troops will be important in the overall effort
by providing the necessary capacity to continue with clearing insurgent
forces from contested areas while also partnering with Iraqi Army and
Iraqi Police in order to bolster their capability to prevent sectarian
violence, whether on the part of militias, terrorists, or insurgent
groups.

COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

Question. According to the new counterinsurgency manual, ``20
(soldiers or police forces) per 1,000 residents'' is often considered
the minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency
operations. Baghdad alone, according to doctrine, requires a force of
120,000-130,000 personnel to meet the minimum requirement. However,
when the planned increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces is complete, Baghdad
would only have about 80,000 security forces.
Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops is sufficient and
if so, why? What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of
the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation
from doctrine?
Answer. Forces currently in or moving to Baghdad should be
sufficient to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations given the
anticipated political-military situation and planned phased operations.
Answer. The recommended force ratio is a ``rule of thumb,''
distilled for simplicity's sake from numerous complex cases of
counterinsurgency operations. These cases may differ significantly in
terms of geography, urbanization, or enemy strength.
The counterinsurgency doctrine clearly states that host nation
police and army forces are a key part of the equation, as are special
operating forces and other security elements. Baghdad is a city of
roughly 6 million people, so a 1:50 ratio of security forces to
population would be equal to roughly 120,000 counterinsurgents. Iraqi
Army, Police, and Special Operations Forces, together with the U.S.
forces currently on the ground or deploying to Baghdad in the months
ahead, total approximately 85,000--though, to be sure, not all of those
are of the same levels of effectiveness, and some of the police
undoubtedly are of limited effectiveness. However, we do not
necessarily have to secure every part of Baghdad at once--this can be
done in stages--and will have to be done that way given the way the
forces are expected to flow into Iraq. Beyond that, tens of thousands
of ministry security forces and tens of thousands of civilian (often
third country) contracted guard forces protect key sites in Baghdad
(including, for example, the U.S. Embassy, MNSTC-I HQs, the Ministry of
Oil, etc.) that MNF-I and the Iraqi government would otherwise have to
detail soldiers or police to protect. These forces, again, number in
the tens of thousands--and although by no means all are of high
capability and some are undoubtedly compromised, they do secure
hundreds of sites that otherwise would require coalition or Iraqi
military or police forces. Thus, with the addition of all five U.S.
brigades under orders to reinforce Baghdad and the ISFs either in
Baghdad or headed to the city, there should be sufficient military
forces available to achieve our objective of securing Baghdad.

LENGTH OF IRAQI INSURGENCY

Question. General Casey has said that 20th century
counterinsurgency efforts typically lasted 9 years.
Do you believe the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq could last as
long as 9 years, or even longer?
Answer. I agree with General Casey that the counterinsurgency
campaign in Iraq will continue for some time, but its duration will
depend on a variety of factors that about which it is very difficult to
make judgments. What I am clear about, however, is that the Government
of Iraq must ultimately win this fight, with coalition forces in a
supporting role. Thus, while it is possible that the counterinsurgency
campaign in Iraq could, indeed, last 9 years or more, that should not
be taken to imply that U.S. forces would be involved in substantial
numbers for the duration of that period.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Question. With the expected increase of U.S. troop levels in Iraq
by over 20,000, do you believe there is sufficient combat service
support in place or will that have to be augmented as well?
Answer. Generally, BCTs have their own combat service support units
to sustain their soldiers and equipment; however, I am sure that one of
the tasks being undertaken by MNC-I in recent weeks has been
determination of requirements for any additional combat service support
elements above brigade level. This will be an area on which I will
focus following arrival in Iraq, if I am confirmed. Should additional
so-called enablers be needed, I will request them.
Question. If so, by how much?
Answer. MNF-I reports that it has a mature theater base in place
and does not anticipate a large requirement for augmentation of combat
service support capabilities.
Question. Do you see any problems with the extent of reliance of
U.S. forces in Iraq on contractor support?
Answer. No. The Army has always benefited from contracted non-
military support in one form or another, though that reliance has grown
substantially in recent years. Contractors allow the military a great
deal of flexibility to meet sustainment and life support requirements;
they also help with security in some cases. They must be well-
integrated, but over time MNF-I has developed mechanisms to ensure
synchronization of contractor support and military activities.

SUSTAINMENT

Question. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of
readiness, how long do you believe the increased troop levels and
operations tempo can be sustained?
Answer. My personal sense is that the Army is stretched and is
straining; however, the Army is making plans to sustain increased troop
levels should that be required. Nonetheless, the strain on the Active
and Reserve components is clear. Soldiers in some units are returning
to Iraq in a year or less, and that is obviously difficult for them and
their families, and it makes preparation of units challenging as well.
My own family is well-acquainted with this challenge, as my return to
Iraq, if confirmed, will be my fourth year-or-longer deployment since
2001. Reset of equipment is also a challenge--though additional funds
received recently should help the Army considerably to meet the demand,
though it is likely to take some time to ramp up the depots fully.
Having said that, as MNF-I commander, it would be beyond my brief to
determine the overall health of the Army and Marine Corps--though it
would be something about which I would be concerned. It would be my job
to determine the troops and resources required to accomplish the
mission in Iraq, and to inform the CENTCOM commander and Secretary of
Defense of those requirements. It is more appropriate for the Joint
Staff and the Services to determine how long we can sustain a surge. I
am encouraged, however, by Secretary of Defense Gates' announcement
that the end strength of our Army and Marine Corps will be increased.
Clearly, the conflict in Iraq has been hard on our ground forces, and I
support the Secretary's efforts to ensure we have the forces needed we
need for what are frequently very people-intensive operations.

STATE OF TRAINING AND EQUIPPING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. What is your understanding of the state of training and
equipping of ISFs?
Answer. My understanding is that, with some exceptions, the Iraqi
Objective Counterinsurgency (COIN) Force and Iraqi Objective Civil
Security Force (totaling approximately 325,000 personnel) were issued
100 percent of their pacing items of equipment (i.e. their most
important items) and that 100 percent of their personnel were trained.
The exceptions are for the remaining portions of the Navy and the Air
Force and approximately 2,000 support troops, all of which have
significantly longer training timelines and specialized training
requirements. The Objective COIN Force units do, however, face
challenges in sufficient fill of leaders, who take a long time to
develop, and in development of higher-level staff skills and
intelligence elements, which also take time to develop. The Iraqi
government is addressing these shortfalls through a combination of
former commissioned and noncommissioned officer (NCO) recalls and
prospective policies to accelerate promotion to corporal and sergeant
for recruits with requisite levels of civilian education. The ISFs have
also experienced attrition due to combat losses and absences over the
last 18 months. To address this attrition, MNSTC-I and the Iraqi
government are generating some 30,000 replacements, 18,000 of which
will address the attrition that has occurred over the last year and
half, and another 12,000 to bring these units to 110 percent to address
the effects of Iraqi leave policies and to provide some personnel
flexibility to unit commanders. Over 6,500 of these soldiers have
graduated and joined the force and the second cycle of almost 8,000
will graduate shortly.
Question. What concerns do you have about the ability of those
units to participate in the implementation of the new Baghdad security
plan?
Answer. Iraqi units, at all levels, continue to perform well when
partnered with coalition forces. An immature logistics system, a
shortage of mid-grade leadership, and the ultimate loyalty of select
units/leaders remain my primary concerns. These concerns are currently
being addressed through continued development of the ISF logistical
structure, coalition force emergency logistical support, partner
relationships between Iraqi and coalition force units (which are being
strengthened), embedding of Transition (Advisor) Teams in Iraqi units
down to at least the battalion level, and a variety of actions to
foster loyalty and professionalism like a soldier's creed, oaths of
office, a Center for Ethics and Leadership, the Iraqi Military Academy,
the Staff Colleges, and so on.

FORCE PROTECTION

Question. The new Baghdad security plan apparently envisions
American units being colocated with Iraqi units spread out over
approximately 30 mini-bases throughout Baghdad.
In general, how could you, as Commander, MNF-I, accommodate and
protect those forces and the forces which would have to resupply them
on a daily basis?
Answer. As explained to me, under the Baghdad Security Plan,
coalition forces will establish Joint Security Stations (JSSs) with the
Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi National Police. The stations
will be strategically positioned throughout the city to accommodate
dispersed, joint patrols, and to provide CENTCOM and control hubs that
ultimately feed back into the Baghdad Security Command. The
establishment of JSSs will include enhancing force protection and
developing essential sustainment and life support. Many of the JSSs are
located at existing Iraqi Police Stations, but will require
vulnerability assessments prior to occupation by coalition forces.
Based on these assessments the necessary force protection enhancements
will be completed to mitigate the risks of attack. Force protection
enhancements will include improvements such as entry control points,
external barriers to redirect traffic flows and/or reinforce
perimeters, increased protection from indirect fires, and guard posts/
towers where required. Additionally, robust Quick Reaction Forces, as
well as redundant and secure communications with parent Forward
Operating Bases and with coalition patrols operating in the area, will
enhance the force protection posture of each JSS.
Sustainment of our forces will be just as critical as their
protection. Coalition forces patrolling from JSSs will have adequate
levels of food, fuel, water, medical supplies, and ammunition on hand
to preserve their combat capability. The JSSs will be resupplied as the
forces rotate into and out of the primary Forward Operating Bases
(FBOs), rather than through daily resupply convoys. Essentially, the
forces operating out of a JSS will be self-sustaining for their period
of operations, with replacements arriving with their own requisite
supplies as forces rotate. The basic, enduring life support packages at
each JSS might include tents, generators, and environmental control
units which will be positioned within the site's perimeter.
Question. What is your understanding of whether the security plan
requires the contracting of additional U.S. bases and facilities?
Answer. Current planning does not anticipate the requirement to
reopen previously transferred FOBs or the creation of new ones. MNF-I
is using space on existing FOBs that have the capacity for the first
three reinforcing BCTs, with basing requirements for the remaining two
currently under development.

MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS

Question. Do you believe that the size, structure, number, and
operating procedures for U.S. Military and Police Transition Teams
embedded with ISFs need to be changed in any way?
Answer. Yes. There is unquestionable linkage between ISF
progression and the embedded transition team program. Despite the
success achieved by the embedding of transition teams, the current
Military Transition Team (MTT) size is insufficient to meet all
operational requirements and permit an optimum level of support. The
commander of MNC-I has initiated a plan to enhance MTTs to increase
their effectiveness. Based on conditions within each multinational
division (MND) area of responsibility, primarily relating to levels of
violence and ISF capacity for independent operations, MTTs are being
augmented by assets controlled by the respective MND Commanders. U.S.
BCTs are the primary resource providers for these enhancements.
Enhanced MTTs have the ability to advise ISF units down to company
level.
The current size, structure, and number of Police Transition Teams
(PTT) is appropriate for the missions they are assigned. There are
three different types of PTTs: station, district, and provincial. The
nucleus of all PTTs is a military police squad with additional U.S.
Army personnel added at the district and provincial level. Because of
the mission and scope of responsibility of an Iraqi Police provincial
directorate, the typical PTT working at that level is larger and
includes additional military and civilian members who possess other
specialties and expertise such as operations, personnel, logistics, and
maintenance management. The other two key and essential components of
all PTTs are interpreters and International Police Liaison Officers
(IPLOs). Multinational Corps-Iraq is currently providing PTTs at a
ratio of one for every three police stations, one for every two police
districts, and one for every one provincial police directorate. The
current operating procedures have resulted in clear visibility on the
effectiveness and capabilities of Iraqi Police, from station through
provincial level, and helped improve the Iraqi Police ability to
conduct basic law and order missions. Upon arrival in Iraq, if
confirmed, I will assess this again to see if augmentation is required.
Question. What do you recommend?
Answer. Throughout Iraq, the enhancement of the baseline MTTs will
continue based on an assessment of the security situation in each MND
area of responsibility. The estimate provided to me by the MNF-I staff
is that it will take 6-12 months to move to enhanced MTTs throughout
Iraq. Continuing and expanding the transition team program over time
will energize ISF progression and eventually facilitate a change in
relationship as the embedded transition teams move more toward the
advising role and less toward mentoring or even, to a degree, leading.
The current ratio of PTTs at the station, district, and provincial
levels is adequate, but we also need to relocate some PTTs from
provinces that have moved to Provincial Iraqi Control to provinces that
have not achieved Provincial Iraqi Control. IPLOs and interpreters are
absolutely essential to successful PTT operations. MNC-I continues to
have difficulty recruiting and fielding new interpreters; additional
emphasis and incentives need to be established to retain the qualified
interpreters we currently employ. Additionally, if the IPLO program is
ended too soon, the lack of this law enforcement expertise and
experience would have a significant and adverse impact. A
recommendation for making the IPLO program even better is to recruit
law enforcement experts from other Middle Eastern nations (such as
Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc.) into the program.
Question. What is your understanding of how the Army and Marine
Corps are ensuring that U.S. troops are properly trained for this duty,
to include dissemination of ``lessons learned'' to incoming teams?
Answer. Only qualified officers and NCOs are chosen to fill these
critical positions, based upon their grade, skill, and experience
match, balanced with dwell time. To facilitate and synchronize this
effort, Army, Air Force, and Navy ``external'' transition team training
was consolidated and is now conducted at Fort Riley, Kansas by the 1st
Infantry Division. The two-star commander there, his staff, and a BCT
now execute the full spectrum of tasks required to man, train, and
equip external transition teams. The Marines are running a similar
program at Twentynine Palms, CA. Transition team training is based on
seven core competencies--combat skills, force protection, team support
processes, technical and tactical training, advisor skills,
counterinsurgency operations, and understanding the culture (which
alone encompasses about 50 hours of training to empower the teams'
abilities to forge a positive relationship with their Iraqi
counterpart). The lessons learned process is critical and is integrated
before, during, and after a team embeds with an ISF unit. Throughout
training, team members are in communication with the team they will
replace so they may exchange information, pass back these lessons, and
learn about their Iraqi unit prior to deployment. Additionally,
programs like Fort Riley (60 days), Camp Buehring (Kuwait, 6 days), and
the Phoenix Academy (Taji, Iraq, 8 days) undergo continuous review so
that the training can remain relevant by adapting the training model as
necessary based on input from the field and changing conditions in
theater. Once in theater, teams execute a 60-day assessment of the
training they received in preparation for their assignment as advisors,
complete a formal end of tour assessment to codify lessons learned, and
an assessment of the transition between their team and the follow-on
team. The Iraq Assistance Group (IAG) has also compiled transition team
lessons learned on the IAG website for all transition teams to utilize.
The Combat Studies Institute and Center for Army Lessons Learned have
captured lessons on transition team operations and techniques and
published them as well.
The Military Police Brigade fully sources the PTTs and provides
RSOI, implementation, execution, and mission oversight of the PTT
Program. The brigade brings a cohesive and organic element to training,
resourcing, and equipping PTTs which are actually military police
squads already trained for law enforcement skills. These MP units are
trained at home station to perform this mission. These teams are
embedded with IPLOs who are trained, hired, and managed by the State
Department. Host nation police building and training is a doctrinal
military police mission. Experiences and lessons learned at Panama,
Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo all contribute to continued mission
development and application. Lessons learned and up-to-date TTPs are
disseminated back to the deploying units through direct contact with
units on the ground, Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS), Mission
Readiness Exercise (MRX), and then Relief-In-Place (RIP) Program during
which the MP Brigade conducts a PTT certification. Additionally,
lessons learned are disseminated through the Center for Army Lessons
Learned Website, Senior Leader forums (many virtual), the Battle
Command Training Program COIN Seminars, combat training center mission
rehearsal exercises, the Joint Center for International Security Force
Assistance, and doctrine development efforts.
Question. If confirmed, what would you recommend in this regard?
Answer. First, it is necessary to retain the core transition team
and ensure it continues to receive the best possible training in
preparation for its mission of mentoring and advising the ISF unit.
This core structure is the expertise upon which additional enhancement
is placed. They are the subject matter experts within the transition
team. Second, as conditions on the ground permit, I would expedite the
enhancement of transition teams to capitalize on their contributions
toward ISF development. This must be done in a manner that also
balances other operational requirements, which will lessen as the
levels of violence become more manageable for the ISF. Furthermore,
leaders should direct the widest dissemination of lessons learned by
our teams. The team in training as well as any team in theater must be
alerted to newly developed tactics, techniques, and procedures that are
proving successful in application. This is done through the Center for
Army Lessons Learned, the Combat Studies Institute, and the Joint
Center for International Security Force Assistance at Fort Leavenworth,
among other agencies.

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
2006 memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention?
Answer. Yes. The standards outlined in Common Article 3 should be
the standard for U.S. and coalition forces to adhere to in regards to
the handling of detainees at all levels. In fact, as I noted in
responding to one of the earlier questions, after an early case of
detainee mistreatment, I directed that detainees in the 101st Airborne
Division area of responsibility would be handled in accordance with the
Geneva Convention, as those were the standards our soldiers understood.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes. I believe having one interrogation standard outlined
in one document adds clarity. The new FM clearly articulates what is
and what is not authorized and effectively identifies methods to ensure
accountability.
Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that
standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of
reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that
the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact
on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are
treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes.
Question. You oversaw the issuance of a new Army doctrine on
counterinsurgency operations. Do you believe it is consistent with
effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully
with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention?
Answer. Yes. We can conduct effective interrogation and detention
in wartime in a counterinsurgency environment and comply with the
requirements outlined in Common Article 3; in fact, we had
international human rights organizations participate in the COIN
Seminar we hosted to discuss a very early draft of the manual. That
conference, in fact, was co-hosted by Harvard's Carr Center for Human
Rights.

IRAQ STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

Question. What is your understanding of the status of Department of
Defense efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to
increase employment in Iraq?
Answer. When the Task Force to Improve Business and Stability
Operations-Iraq (TF BSO) arrived in Iraq, it expected to find a Soviet-
style, aging State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) industrial base that was
grossly uncompetitive. First-hand evaluations, however, reveal that
some of these factories possess modern--even automated--equipment, and
are capable of producing materials and manufactured goods that would be
competitive in both Iraqi and world markets. Some facilities have
deteriorated or suffered from a lack of recapitalization, and require
varying amounts of refurbishment. Other SOEs are simply obsolete,
either because they produce materials or finished goods for which there
is little or no demand, or because they require cost-prohibitive
investment prior to restarting operations. SOEs traditionally employ
large numbers of Iraqis. Their closure still requires that the
Government of Iraq address manpower costs, principally through
retraining programs and job placement assistance. TF BSO is not
advocating U.S. Government investment in Iraqi factories, and is
committed to the long-term policy of economic privatization.
Beyond this, having helped Iraqi industries reestablish cement
plants, small refineries, and asphalt plants, among others, while
commanding the 101st Airborne Division, my view is that there are
numerous industries that could be reestablished--ideally with Iraqi
funds--and could be self-sustaining, as they enjoy a comparative
advantage in some factor of production (e.g., Iraq has vast sulfur
reserves, reportedly the largest in the world, which would be used to
refine high-grade sulfur for industrial purposes and production of
fertilizer; Iraq also has large deposits of ``sour crude'' that are
ideal for asphalt production). I strongly support encouraging such
initiatives.
Question. If so, what is your view of these efforts?
Answer. I strongly support the efforts of this task force. TF BSO
is assessing Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM) SOEs as well as
private factories. MIM is responsible for approximately 56 of the 190
or so SOEs nationwide. These 56 SOEs have approximately 200 factories.
Within the 56 MIM SOEs, TF BSO has assessed 25 of these and is working
closely with Deputy Prime Minister Salih and the MIM to revitalize the
existing Iraqi industry base. Where competitive industrial capacity
exists, TF BSO and DOD will do everything they can to support the
ministries, the factories, and provincial leadership to restart
operations, re-employing as many current workers as circumstances
permit. Several of the SOEs visited are in relatively good shape and
can be restarted with minimal investment in power restoration. Initial
efforts identified 10 large factories, from Baghdad through Al Anbar
Province, where $6 million provided by the Iraqi government can restart
operations and reemploy 11,000 workers. The products that these
facilities generate will help to meet local and DOD demands, and have
the potential to serve broader U.S. and global markets.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction
(SIGIR) conducts comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations
which are valuable to Congress.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to support the audits,
inspections, and investigations conducted by the SIGIR?
Question. The SIGIR reports provide valuable insight to the Force
Commander, the Ambassador, and officials in Washington. I supported the
activities of the SIGIR as MNSTC-I Commander and, if confirmed, I will
support them as the commander of MNF-I. I should note that I also
supported the activities of the Government Accountability Office during
my time in Iraq and following return to the U.S., and I also invited
the Army Audit Agency to audit activities of the 101st Airborne and
MNSTC-I on two or three occasions while I was in Iraq.

MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS IN THEATER

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

IRAN AND SYRIA

1. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, during the
President's address to the Nation, he asserted that succeeding in Iraq
also required defending its territorial integrity. He stated that Iran
was providing material support for attacks on our troops, that we will
interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria, and that we will
seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and
training to our enemies in Iraq. I am concerned about how this will be
done, and what potential it creates for a regional escalation. In
particular, I want to make sure we have adequately planned for
protecting our troops in the event of a regional escalation. I note
that the recent deployment of another carrier strike group to the
Persian Gulf area and the nomination of a Navy Admiral to head U.S.
Central Command which seems to indicate an expansion of military focus
beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. What do you believe is the potential for
our efforts to interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria to
cause an escalation to a regional conflict?
General Petraeus. One of our broad priorities in Iraq will include
countering the threats posed by Iranian and Syrian support to
extremists in Iraq, along with the continued mission of dismantling
terrorist networks in the country.
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) works closely with the developing
Iraqi border security forces to interdict the trafficking of foreign
fighters, weapons, explosives, and other contraband across the borders
of Iraq. I will work closely with the Ambassador as he and the
diplomatic community pursue actions to disrupt influence from external
sources, while simultaneously working to prevent potential escalation.
MNF-I continues to take measures to ensure our troops' protection
from all identified threats, and we are keeping a close eye on evolving
threats, both from within Iraq and from neighboring countries.

2. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, in your opinion,
does the lack of diplomatic engagement with Iran and Syria increase the
risk of an escalation?
General Petraeus. With respect, the conduct of diplomatic
engagement with Iran and Syria is beyond my purview, though I have
discussed ongoing and contemplated actions with various members of the
State Department, and I know that they are carefully weighing the pros
and cons of various initiatives.

3. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, have specific plans
been developed to protect our troops if it does escalate?
General Petraeus. As I noted earlier, we constantly assess how to
improve the force protection posture of our troops, while
simultaneously working to ensure mission accomplishment. We have
examined and continue to examine potential threats from all quarters,
including greater outside involvement in Iraq, and we take appropriate
measures in response--including constant upgrading of personal
protective equipment, addition of surveillance assets, improvements to
vehicular protection, improved weaponry, and so on.

NEW STRATEGY

4. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, it is my
understanding that you are one of the Army's leading authorities on
counterinsurgency. As such, I'm interested in your evaluation of the
new strategy for the surge. Specifically, would you suggest any
additional actions that were excluded from the new strategy (e.g., seek
additional troops or other forms of assistance from our allies,
coalition partners, or Iraq's neighboring nations)?
General Petraeus. The Army's new counterinsurgency manual makes
clear that security of the population must be the priority in a
situation like that in Iraq--and it will be our priority as we conduct
the surge. We must, together with our Iraqi partners, clear, control,
and retain the neighborhoods of Baghdad to break the cycle of violence
that is preventing political progress in Iraq. We can only do this by
establishing persistent presence--coalition, as well as Iraqi--in Iraqi
neighborhoods. I plan to ensure that a portion of our forces locate in
the neighborhoods they protect and that they carry out operations
closely linked with their Iraqi counterparts--with the Iraqis in the
lead whenever possible--to secure the population.
The enemies we face are adaptive and as requirements change, I will
request additional support (the accelerated arrival of the 3d Infantry
Division Headquarters is a result of this), if needed, and clearly
outline the various risks to our strategy. We will also work closely
with our interagency, coalition, and Iraqi partners to set the
conditions for success in Iraq.

5. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, would you suggest
improvements to any of the tactics that are included in the new
strategy?
General Petraeus. I am pleased with the changes our military is
making in training, manning, and equipping the force to fight this kind
of conflict. Two big changes are being asked of our forces under this
new strategy--the expanded use of enhanced and embedded transition
teams and the renewed emphasis on positioning forces in the
neighborhoods among the people. Our military has done a good job with
the collection and dissemination of lessons learned and the practice of
the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures in our training centers
as troops prepare to deploy. Our troops and leaders are prepared for
the implementation of the new strategy, though we undoubtedly will
continue to learn as we carry out the new operations--and we plan to
share lessons throughout the force as we do.

6. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, you recently were
interviewed by Spiegel magazine, a German periodical. During the
interview, you stated that much of counterinsurgency operations is
counter-intuitive. You further called counterinsurgency operations
``war at the graduate level'' and ``thinking man's warfare.'' You also
said that we want our young officers to think, not memorize, because
they cannot kill their way out of an insurgency. You indicated that you
have to take out the elements that will never reconcile with the new
government, or with the system, but then try to win over the rest of
the population. This part is not done with tanks and rifles. How well-
trained are the junior officers and troops in the counterinsurgency
doctrine?
General Petraeus. Over the past 15 months, I have been privileged
to oversee the organizations that educate our Army's leaders, draft our
doctrine, capture lessons learned, and help our units prepare for
deployment.
Our small unit leaders are increasingly well-trained for
counterinsurgency warfare. The Army and Marine Corps' professional
military educational institutions have institutionalized the new
counterinsurgency doctrine recently published in Field Manual 3-24
(that process began well before the manual was finally published, based
on articles and lessons learned). Furthermore, our combat training
centers now focus on counterinsurgency operations during unit mission
rehearsal exercises. Leaders are further honed by counterinsurgency
seminars and training conducted in the United States, Kuwait, and at
the Taji Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence in Iraq. This training
has made our junior leaders and soldiers better prepared for
counterinsurgency warfare and more adaptive to the situations they will
face in Iraq. Learning continues, however, and the Center for Army
Lessons Learned, Asymmetric Warfare Group, and other elements
facilitate the collection and distribution of lessons that we continue
to capture.

7. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, how prepared are
they to implement the President's new strategy for the surge?
General Petraeus. Our officers and troops are well-trained, well-
equipped, and ready for the tactics asked of them in this new
strategy--though it will represent a change in operating style for some
units, and we will continue to learn new lessons as we carry out the
surge.

8. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, how well-trained are
the Iraqi security forces (ISFs) in counterinsurgency doctrine?
General Petraeus. The ISFs have made solid gains in professionalism
and capability over the past 3 years, though they still have a long way
to go in certain elements. They are especially effective when operating
in concert with coalition forces at population security. The Iraqi
units obviously have greater cultural awareness and linguistic
capabilities, while U.S. forces bring greater military capabilities to
the battlefield.

9. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, given that the new
strategy for the surge is heavily reliant on the Iraqis leading the
security efforts, how can we be sure that they have correctly
identified ``the elements that will never reconcile with the new
government'' and will not just be utilizing their position to eliminate
dissenters?
General Petraeus. In fact, there is work to be done in this area,
and I have discussed it with the Prime Minister and the Ministers of
Defense and Interior. Actions have already been taken against a number
of leaders and units shown to be using their positions for sectarian
purposes, and more will be taken--increasingly by Iraqi officials and
elements. While we are generally encouraged by the slow growth in
professionalism of the ISFs, we believe that a very robust partnering
of coalition forces with the Iraqi Army and National Police elements
will prevent any such sectarian bias in their application of force as
we help the Iraqi government identify elements and leaders who need to
be removed and, in some cases, brought to justice.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nelson

PRESIDENT'S NEW PLAN

10. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, obviously, a
drop in violence is a benchmark, but that can be temporary as we have
seen in Iraq. What should policymakers specifically be looking to see
on the ground in Baghdad over the next 6 months with the President's
new plan?
General Petraeus. A reduction in violence as part of improving
security for the people clearly is the top indicator. Over time, that
is one that must be seen. But it will take time. We may or may not see
a significant drop in violence at the beginning of the operation, but
the key is the long-term improvement of security, public confidence,
basic services, economic development, and government capacity. We will
not eliminate violence from the streets of Baghdad on our watch, but we
must help the Iraqis reduce the level of violence, intimidation of the
populations of various neighborhoods, and so on. I believe that over a
period of months there will be a reduction of violence, although it
will be uneven and will differ from area to area. This achievement is
nonetheless critical to allowing the other elements of national power
to come to bear on the problem in Baghdad and Iraq as a whole, and for
Iraq to resolve the political issues that are the true solution to its
long-term problems.

11. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, how long will
it be before the committee can be notified of the results of the plan?
General Petraeus. It will take several months at the least. That
allows for the time for the additional forces to flow to Iraq, time for
them to gain an understanding of the areas in which they will operate,
time to plan with and get to know their Iraqi partners, time to set
conditions for the successful conduct of security operations, and, of
course, time to conduct those operations and then to build on what they
achieve. Success, again, will occur over a period of months, not weeks
or days.
None of this, in fact, will be rapid. The way ahead will be neither
quick nor easy, and there undoubtedly will be tough days. We face a
determined, adaptable, and barbaric enemy. MNF-I will work closely with
our Iraqi ISF partners to secure the population and help to facilitate
the enhancement of quality of life for the citizens, and I do believe
we can do that. I will provide periodic updates when requested.

12. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, if the plan is
tried, attempted, and is not successful, will you come back to Congress
and explain what happened and why?
General Petraeus. I will provide you with forthright, professional
military advice with respect to the missions given to MNF-I and the
situation on the ground in Iraq. Should I determine that new strategy
cannot succeed, I will provide such an assessment.

MILITIAS

13. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, in my opinion,
Iraq will not long survive as a nation with armed militias roaming the
streets of Baghdad. We know the profound impact armed militias have had
in Israel and Lebanon. I am, to say the least, skeptical about the
Prime Minister's desire to take on Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi army. Does
Prime Minister Maliki have the will to engage Shia militias?
General Petraeus. I have already begun, together with the
Ambassador, developing a relationship with Prime Minister Maliki. My
early impression is that he is genuinely concerned with the future of
Iraq and not just the interests of his sect or political coalition. He
does appear to want to be Prime Minister for all Iraqis and has taken
steps that confirm this. That is critical, as the Iraqi government
dealing fairly with all sects and ethnic groups is critical for long-
term political and military success. I will work closely with the Prime
Minister and his commanders to help them enforce the law and secure the
population. Prime Minister Maliki has already taken steps in this
direction by ensuring that there are no safe havens in Iraq, and
insurgents, terrorists, and criminals will be dealt with in accordance
with the law regardless of sect or ethnicity.

14. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, if a decision
is made not to engage Sadr at this time, what could that mean when
American forces leave?
General Petraeus. I will work with the Iraqi government to engage
all organizations within Iraqi society who are genuinely amenable to
political negotiation and accommodation. A lasting peace can only be
secured by the creation of a political compact that encompasses all
parties willing to join such an enterprise. Those organizations that
refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the government of Iraq will be
neutralized to the extent that they will be unable to interfere with
the governance of the country.

15. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, is it a good
idea to leave an armed militia in Iraq's capital?
General Petraeus. No. We want to see an Iraq in which the
government, through its established and regulated police and army,
maintains a monopoly on the possession and use of organized armed
force.

16. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, could you see
a scenario where the military and al-Sadr's militia work together to
further cleanse Baghdad of their Sunni presence?
General Petraeus. That is obviously one of the scenarios the surge
is intended to prevent.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

17. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, in your
estimation, how many troops do ISFs have that are trained and capable
of undertaking the President's new plan?
General Petraeus. Iraqi Army, Police, and Special Operations
Forces, together with the U.S. forces currently on the ground or
deploying to Baghdad (and this is Baghdad-centric) in the months ahead,
will total some 85,000--though, to be sure, not all of those are of the
same levels of effectiveness. I have emphasized to the Iraqi government
the necessity of ensuring that these forces deploy at 100 percent
strength, and the Ministry of Defense is taking action to ensure that
this happens. It did not, with some of the earlier deployers. With the
addition of all five U.S. brigades under orders to reinforce Baghdad
and the ISFs either in Baghdad or headed to the city, there should be
sufficient military forces available to achieve our objective of
securing Baghdad, which will improve security and set the conditions
for U.S. Government and Iraqi government advances in the decisive areas
of governance, economic development, and Rule of Law.

18. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, what
confidence do you have in the capacity of these troops to both
``clear'' and ``hold''?
General Petraeus. I believe this plan can succeed. We have to
change the longstanding paradigm of clearing a neighborhood and then
moving on in favor of a constant and active presence among the people.
This will be a change for both coalition and Iraqi forces, but I am
confident that they will adapt and perform admirably.
The ISFs have received reasonable training and they've received
reasonable equipping. Leadership on the ground with the soldiers and
policemen will make the difference and we are seeing an increase in the
professionalism, confidence, and capability of Iraqi leaders.

19. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, do you believe
the Iraqis have accepted this plan as their own and not simply an
American plan?
General Petraeus. Yes.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Webb

ACCOUNTABILITY

20. Senator Webb. Lieutenant General Petraeus, you have stated that
``money is ammunition'' in Iraq; do you agree that immediate, full
accountability is essential for money already appropriated and spent?
General Petraeus. Depending on the situation, money can be more
important than ammunition in the counterinsurgency fight. Once money is
available, the challenge is to spend it effectively and quickly to
rapidly achieve measurable results. Money needs to be provided as soon
as possible to the organizations that have the capability and capacity
to spend it in such a manner. At the same time, the American public
rightfully deserves to know that its funds are spent carefully and
transparently. I believe that we have the processes in place to use
money for its intended purposes without compromising the trust and
confidence of the United States taxpayer. In the past, I personally
requested assistance from teams of auditors from the Army Audit Agency.
I also supported the activities of the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Department of Defense Inspector General
(DOD IG), and Government Accountability Office (GAO), and overseen
corrective measures when areas needing improvement have been
identified. I met with the SIGIR and DOD IG in Washington, in fact, and
pledged continued support to them.

21. Senator Webb. Lieutenant General Petraeus, if so, how will you
assist this committee in providing such accountability and in assuring
transparency in ongoing projects?
General Petraeus. We have fiscal oversight processes in place now
in MNF-I. For example, the SIGIR reports provide valuable insight to
the Force Commander, the Ambassador, and officials in Washington.
Again, I supported the activities of the SIGIR as Multnational Security
Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Commander and I will support them as
the Commander of MNF-I. I should note that I also supported the
activities of the GAO during my time in Iraq and following return to
the U.S., and I also invited the Army Audit Agency to audit activities
of the 101st Airborne and MNSTC-I on two or three occasions while I was
in Iraq. It is important that Congress and the American people have
confidence that we are diligently expending funds allocated to us.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole

COOPERATION

22. Senator Dole. Lieutenant General Petraeus, one of your
predecessors, LTG Peter Chiarelli, has stressed the need for unity of
command. Would you explain your views on the issue, first at it relates
to the need for greater cooperation between the U.S. Ambassador and the
Commander of the MNF-Is, than was the case with your predecessors, and
then link those thoughts with the need for greater unity of effort both
between U.S. organizations, primarily DOD and the State Department, and
then with the Iraqi government.
General Petraeus. Only through unity of effort of all--coalition
and Iraqi, military and civilian--can we bring the full weight of our
effort to bear on the difficult situation in Iraq. You have my
commitment that I will work closely with the Ambassador to fully
coordinate our actions in Iraq. Only through the full application of
all elements of national power, through the various agencies, will we
have the chance to achieve success.
Our military is making an enormous commitment in Iraq. The
integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has
been a success. Our military forces are more interoperable today than
they ever have been in our Nation's history. This achievement is
impressive. Over time, we need the rest of the departments to do
likewise, to help the Iraqi government get the country and its citizens
working, and to use Iraq's substantial oil revenues for the benefit of
all the Iraqi people.
The next step is to ensure the ability of the military and civilian
departments to work closely together. Counterinsurgency warfare
requires a total commitment of the government--both military and
civilian agencies--and unity of effort is crucial to success.
Integration of the interagency effort to ensure that progress is made
along all lines-of-operation--not just security, but economic,
governance, and the rule of law as well--is a significant challenge. I
applaud the recent efforts to embed the Provincial Reconstruction Teams
in the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) headquarters for those provinces in
which BCTs are the senior headquarters, or in the division headquarters
in areas where they are the senior headquarters in a province. This
will provide a synergy that will significantly enhance our ability to
conduct stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq.
I will do all that I can, in partnership with the Ambassador, to
ensure that our interagency is doing all possible to help develop
capacity in the Iraqi government and to enable it to come to grips with
the tough issues it must resolve.

SUNNI/SHIITE RELATIONS

23. Senator Dole. Lieutenant General Petraeus, do you agree with
the testimony of General Keane, U.S. Army (Retired), on January 25 that
the catalyst that drives sectarian violence in Iraq is Sunni violence
against the Shiite population?
General Petraeus. This is a very complicated situation. Sunni
violence against Shia is just one aspect of violence in Iraq. There is
also the continuing al Qaeda terrorism. Shia violence against Sunnis
plays a part, as does Shia on Shia violence. Organized criminal
violence is also an unsettling factor. To place full responsibility on
the Sunnis misrepresents the complex threat environment in Iraq, though
some of the catalysts for sectarian violence (such as the Samarra
mosque bombing) were earned out by Sunni extremists.

24. Senator Dole. Lieutenant General Petraeus, what is your plan
for the deployment of forces across targeted neighborhoods in Baghdad
so as to avoid, to the fullest extent possible, any appearance of bias
toward either Sunnis or Shiites?
General Petraeus. ISFs will be assigned areas of operations
throughout Baghdad without regard to sectarian composition of the
units. Brigades of the 6th and 9th Iraqi Divisions, each of which have
a mix of Shia and Sunni personnel (though predominantly Shia in their
makeup) will be employed in all nine administrative districts of the
city. It is true that some districts in the city are predominantly
Shia, while others are predominantly Sunni. However, U.S. Army
battalions will be partnered with these Iraqi brigades to reinforce the
practice that all security forces operate in a professional,
disciplined, and ethical manner, and in accordance with the rule of
law, international humanitarian norms, and recognized international
standards for enforcement and protection of human rights.
It is important to ensure no particular sect feels persecuted by
the deployment of any ISF in their neighborhood. The partnering of a
U.S. battalion with each ISF brigade will ensure that sectarian
divisions and mistrust are kept to a minimum.
______

[The nomination reference of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 16, 2007.
Ordered, that the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General.

LTG David H. Petraeus, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Resume of Service Career of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended:
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses,
Armor Officer Advanced Course,
United States Army Command and General Staff College,
Senior Service College Fellowship--Georgetown University.

Educational degrees:
United States Military Academy--BS--No Major.
Princeton University--MPA--International Relations.
Princeton University--PHD--International Relations.

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 5 Jun 74
1LT....................................... 5 Jun 76
CPT....................................... 8 Aug 78
MAJ....................................... 1 Aug 85
LTC....................................... 1 Apr 91
COL....................................... 1 Sep 95
BG........................................ 1 Jan 00
MG........................................ 1 Jan 03
LTG....................................... 18 May 04
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
May 75.......................... Jan 79............ Platoon Leader, C
Company, later S-
4 (Logistics),
later S-1
(Personnel),
509th Airborne
Battalion Combat
Team, Vicenza,
Italy.
Jan 79.......................... Jul 79 Assistant S-3
(Operations), 2d
Brigade, 24th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA.
Jul 79 May 81............ Commander, A
Company, later S-
3 (Operations),
2d Battalion,
19th Infantry,
24th Infantry
Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA.
May 81.......................... May 82............ Aide-de-Camp to
the Division
Commander, 24th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA.
May 82.......................... Jun 83............ Student, Command
and General Staff
Officer Course,
Fort Leavenworth,
KS.
Jun 83.......................... Jun 85............ Student, Princeton
University,
Princeton, NJ.
Jul 85 Jun 87............ Instructor, later
Assistant
Professor,
Department of
Social Sciences,
United States
Military Academy,
West Point, NY.
Jun 87.......................... Jun 88............ Military Assistant
to the Supreme
Allied Commander
Europe, Supreme
Headquarters,
Allied Powers
Europe, Belgium.
Jun 88.......................... Aug 89............ S-3 (Operations),
2d Battalion,
30th Infantry,
later 1st
Brigade, 3d
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
United States
Army Europe,
Germany.
Aug 89.......................... Aug 91............ Aide/Assistant
Executive Officer
to the Chief of
Staff, United
States Army,
Washington, DC.
Aug 91.......................... Jul 93 Commander, 3d
Battalion, 187th
Infantry, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault),
Fort Campbell,
KY.
Jul 93 Jul 94 G-3 (Operations)/
Director of
Plans, Training,
and Mobilization,
101st Airborne
Division (Air
Assault), Fort
Campbell, KY.
Aug 94.......................... Jan 95............ Senior Service
College Fellow,
Georgetown
University,
Washington, DC.
Jan 95.......................... Jun 95............ Chief Operations
Officer, U.N.
Mission in Haiti,
Operation Uphold
Democracy, Haiti.
Jun 95.......................... Jun 97............ Commander, 1st
Brigade, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Jun 97.......................... Sep 97............ Executive
Assistant to the
Director of the
Joint Staff, The
Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Oct 97.......................... Aug 99............ Executive
Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
Office of the
Joint Chiefs of
Staff,
Washington, DC.
Aug 99.......................... Jul 00 Assistant Division
Commander
(Operations), 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina and
Commanding
General, Combined
Joint Task Force-
Kuwait, Operation
Desert Spring,
Kuwait.
Jul 00 Aug 00............ Acting Commanding
General, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Aug 00.......................... Jun 01............ Chief of Staff,
XVIII Airborne
Corps, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Jun 01.......................... Jun 02............ Assistant Chief of
Staff for
Operations, SFOR
and Deputy
Commander, United
States Joint
Interagency
Counterterrorism
Task Force,
Operation Joint
Forge, Sarajevo,
Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Jul 02 May 04............ Commanding
General, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault) and
Fort Campbell,
Fort Campbell,
KY, and Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
May 04.......................... Sep 05............ Commander,
Multinational
Security
Transition
Command-Iraq/
Commander, NATO
Training Mission-
Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Assistant to the Supreme Jun 87-Jun 88 Major
Allied Commander Europe, Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Powers
Europe, Belgium (Cumulative
Joint Credit).
Chief Operations Officer, U.N. Jan 95-Jun 95 Lieutenant Colonel
Mission in Haiti, Operation
Uphold Democracy, Haiti (No
Joint Credit).
Executive Assistant to the Jun 97-Aug 99 Colonel
Director, The Joint Staff, later
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC.
Commanding General, Combined Aug 99-Sep 99 Colonel
Joint Task Force-Kuwait,
Operation Desert Spring, Kuwait
(No Joint Credit).
Assistant Chief of Staff for Jun 01-Jun 02 Brigadier General
Operations, SFOR and Deputy
Commander, United States Joint
Interagency Counter-Terrorism
Task Force, Operation Joint
Forge, Sarajevo, Bosnia-
Herzegovina (No joint credit).
Commander, Multinational Security May 04-Sep 05 Lieutenant General
Transition Command-Iraq/
Commander, NATO Training Mission-
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal with ``V'' Device
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Combat Action Badge
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Air Assault Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG David H.
Petraeus, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
David H. Petraeus.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom.

3. Date of nomination:
16 Jan. 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
7 November 1952; Cornwall on Hudson, New York.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Hollister Knowlton Petraeus.

7. Names and ages of children:
Anne, 24; Stephen, 20.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Council on Foreign Relations.
Association of the United States Army.
Association of Graduates, United States Military Academy.
82d Airborne Division Assosciation.
101st Airborne Division Association.
504th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.
Static Line Association.
555th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.
187th Infantry Regiment Association.
SHAPE Alumni Association.
7th Armored Division Association.
Princeton Alumni Association.
United States Parachute Association.
Command and General Staff Foundation.

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
None.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------

Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
David H. Petraeus.
This 16th day of January, 2007.

[The nomination of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on January 24, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on January 26, 2007.]

NOMINATION OF ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

----------

TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Webb,
McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins,
Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; and Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel, Evelyn
N. Farkas, professional staff member; Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine,
general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J.
Noblet, research assistant; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member;
Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer,
professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member;
Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer,
professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff
member; and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins and Fletcher L.
Cork.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Darcie Tokioka, assistant to Senator Akaka; Caroline Tess,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Benjamin Rinaker, assistant
to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator
Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Gordon I.
Peterson and Michael L. Sozan, assistants to Senator Webb;
Nichole M. Distefano, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Vince
Piperni and Jeremy Shull, assistants to Senator Inhofe, Mark J.
Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to
Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Stuart
C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh,
assistant to Senator Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Today, we welcome Admiral William J. Fallon, USN, the
President's nominee for Commander, U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM). Admiral Fallon has distinguished himself in service
to our country for over 39 years in a number of challenging and
important assignments, including 24 years in naval aviation,
logging over 4,800 flight hours, and then a succession of staff
and command positions, culminating as the current Commander,
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).
We're particularly grateful for Admiral Fallon's
willingness to take on another, and probably the most
challenging assignment of all as the CENTCOM Commander,
following in the footsteps of General John Abizaid. One of the
critical attributes that any geographic combatant commander
must have is an ability to understand the geopolitical context
of the region, as well as the political dynamics internal to
the countries that comprise the region.
In his current assignment as Commander of the U.S. PACOM,
Admiral Fallon has exhibited a keen understanding of political
dynamics, successfully building renewed military-to-military
relationships with China and Indonesia, two of the most
important countries in the Pacific. His demonstrated ability in
this regard will serve this Nation well when dealing with the
complex politics of the Persian Gulf and understanding the
interactions between the use of force and political dynamics in
Iraq.
While the situation in Iraq will no doubt demand a large
degree of his attention and time, the challenges in the CENTCOM
area of responsibility (AOR) are diverse, difficult, and, at
times, seemingly intractable. They're also of immense
importance to the security of this Nation. The U.S. CENTCOM is
the U.S. military's most challenging combatant command. The
threats the U.S. faces in the CENTCOM AOR go far beyond Iraq
and Afghanistan. Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Somalia, and the Horn of
Africa, among other locations, also pose significant potential
threats to the United States. As the top military commander in
this unstable region of the world, Congress and the President
will be relying heavily on Admiral Fallon's advice.
The challenges in the CENTCOM AOR are complex and
interrelated. As the Iraq Study Group stated, Iraq cannot be
addressed effectively in isolation from other major regional
issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. His predecessor in
the position to which Admiral Fallon has been nominated,
General Abizaid, testified to this committee on August 3, 2006,
saying, ``Iraq sits at the center of the broader regional
problem.'' General Abizaid made a similar point in December,
when he said, ``You have to internationalize the problem. You
have to attack it diplomatically, geostrategically. You can't
just apply a microscope on a particular problem in downtown
Baghdad and a particular problem in downtown Kabul and say
that, somehow or another, if you throw enough military forces
at it, then you're going to solve the broader issues in the
region of extremism.''
This broader struggle against violent extremism extending
throughout the region poses a significant challenge for the
next Commander of U.S. CENTCOM. Ambassador John Negroponte, the
Director of the National Intelligence (DNI), testified before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that al Qaeda
remains the greatest terrorist threat to our security interests
and those of our allies. He said that al Qaeda is operating
from secure hideouts in Pakistan, developing stronger
operational relationships that radiate throughout the Middle
East, Northern Africa, and Europe. Ambassador Negroponte has
also warned of the growing shadow of Iranian influence in the
Middle East region. Iranian support for Shia militias in Iraq,
their backing of Hezbollah in Lebanon, possible Iranian
influence with Shiites in western Afghanistan, and Iran's
ongoing pursuit of a nuclear capability all pose risks to
regional security and to international security. The next
CENTCOM Commander will need to provide straightforward,
independent advice on the most effective course of action for
deterring Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons and to
dominate its neighbors, and the likely consequences of
escalating tensions with Iran.
Syria also poses a challenge to security in the region.
Recently renewed violence in Lebanon is yet another example of
the negative impact that Syria, as well as Iran, appears to be
having on stability in the region.
Over the last month, the CENTCOM footprint in Djibouti has
gone from largely unknown to the newest public front in the
global war on terror. Two recent air strikes by AC-130 gunships
in southern Somalia have highlighted a depth of U.S. concern
for the potential impact of threats emanating from a highly
unstable failed state. DNI Negroponte, in fact, in testimony
before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, said that al
Qaeda remains determined to exploit the turmoil in Somalia.
But, of course, the two great threats, Afghanistan and
Iraq, are what we'll probably spend most of our time on this
morning and what Admiral Fallon will be spending, no doubt,
most of his time on. The rising threat of a resurgent Taliban
and al Qaeda in Afghanistan: over the past year, there's been a
dramatic rise in violence, particularly in the southern and
eastern regions of the country, and military experts anticipate
a spring offensive by the Taliban that is likely to be even
more violent. International efforts to combat opium production,
a major source of insurgent funding, are failing, with opium
production in Afghanistan at record levels. U.S. and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commanders in Afghanistan
have indicated that additional troops are needed for the
mission; and yet, the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) remains about 15 percent short of the
troop and equipment levels that NATO leaders have agreed to
provide. In addition, ISAF operations are hindered by national
caveats imposed by some NATO members on the movement or use of
their troops in theater. The next CENTCOM Commander will have
to work to overcome these challenges, and others, to ensure
success in Afghanistan.
The most daunting challenge will be Iraq. Admiral Fallon
will be called upon to execute the President's new strategy in
Iraq. President Bush's new approach is predominantly a military
strategy, although Prime Minister Maliki himself has said that
the only solution is a political solution, and that's a
sentiment that was expressed, as well, by our current top
commanders, General George Casey and General Abizaid.
Admiral Fallon will have to determine how to pressure Iraqi
political leaders to make the political compromises essential
to a political solution. It will be most interesting hearing
whether he intends to do so; and, if so, how. The Iraqi leaders
made commitments about modifications to their constitution,
taking over responsibility for security, only to break those
commitments; and, so far, without consequences.
Admiral, we again thank you for your tremendous devotion to
this Nation, and your service to our Nation. We thank your
family, as well, for their support.
I now call upon Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I join the chairman in congratulating you, Admiral Fallon,
on your nomination in this very important responsibility and in
these very difficult times. You bring nearly 4 decades of
military experiences to the challenge America faces, and
obviously your performance at PACOM is the reason why you are
here before us today and taking on these new responsibilities.
I think the chairman has covered the challenges that we
face, and, while I would just like to re-emphasize, in
Afghanistan, General Karl Eikenberry said, on January 16,
``It's going to be a violent spring, and we're going to have
violence into this summer.'' Obviously our attention is focused
on Iraq, but I think that it's very clear that there's going to
be a very difficult time in Afghanistan very soon. One of the
areas that you are going to need to work on is to get our
allies to participate, not only in numbers, but also in terms
of mission. Many of our allies who are there in Afghanistan are
so restricted in their activities that they are far from as
useful as they can be.
On January 10, the President proposed a new strategy for
Iraq that has economic, diplomatic, and military components. We
all have a new team of Secretary of Defense, senior military
commanders, and a new Ambassador in Iraq. These are positive
developments in a situation that can best be described as dire.
This war has been mishandled. No one doubts that mistakes have
been made in Iraq, and no one disagrees that the consequences
of a failed state there are potentially catastrophic.
Admiral Fallon, the chairman will ask you one of the
routine questions that we ask nominees to positions of higher
command, and that is, ``If asked your personal opinion, you
will give a candid assessment.'' I have to tell you, this
committee did not get candid assessments in the past. I view
that with deep regret, because I think the American people and
their representatives deserved better.
I want you to emphatically assure Chairman Levin when he
asks you that question, that you will, indeed, give us your
candid and best assessment of the situation. Too often,
administration officials came before this committee and the
American people and painted a rosy scenario, when it was not
there. Yesterday, you and I, and Senator Clinton, were in San
Antonio, and one of the most moving experiences of my life was
to watch these young, brave soldiers who have been so badly
injured and made such enormous sacrifice before us in that
audience. We owe them more and better leadership and a better
strategy than we have provided them with in the past, Admiral.
This is probably our last opportunity, this change in
strategy, to salvage a very difficult situation. I hope you
know, and will tell this committee, how difficult and arduous
this task will be because of the hole that we have dug for
ourselves, to a very large degree.
I, again, congratulate you. We look forward to working with
you. I don't think we can have a better person to fill this
position of enormous responsibility.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Chairman Levin. Admiral Fallon, welcome again and please
proceed.

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL
COMMAND

Admiral Fallon. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, Senator
Warner, Senator Kennedy, and distinguished members of the
committee, good morning, and thank you for this opportunity to
appear before you.
I'm honored by the confidence of the President and the
Secretary of Defense in nominating me for this position, but I
am under no illusion regarding the magnitude of the tasks and
the challenges we face in this region of the world. From Beirut
to Kashmir, conflict and areas of instability abound; yet, as
you well know, this region, with some 630 million people, the
cradle of Western Civilization, is of critical importance to
our Nation and the world.
Last week, General David Petraeus provided a detailed
evaluation of the situation in Iraq. I concur in his
assessment, and I recognize this as the top priority for
CENTCOM attention. The situation in Iraq is serious and clearly
in need of new and different actions.
Earlier this month, President Bush outlined a new way
forward for the United States in Iraq. General Petraeus
described refocusing on the Iraqi population as the center of
attention for security.
The situation in Iraq will not be resolved solely through
military means. Security is but one aspect of what must be a
comprehensive effort to address not only this issue, but
economic development and a reinvigorated participatory
political process in Iraq by Iraqis. In developing these new
initiatives, we will need major and sustained assistance from
other government agencies, and I would welcome volunteers,
particularly in the areas of political and economic
development.
The situation in Afghanistan, although much improved from
the days of Taliban rule, is fragile. The Government of
Afghanistan, with ISAF support, has made significant progress,
but faces a resurgence of Taliban activity, particularly in the
southern part of the country. Other security challenges include
Lebanon, the Horn of Africa, with several nations facing
internal unrest and insurgent activity. Iranian support for
terrorism and sectarian violence beyond its borders and its
pursuit of nuclear capability is destabilizing and troubling.
In addressing these and other challenges in the region, I
would, if confirmed, solicit the opinions and suggestions of
our allies and partners in the region and the world. There is
no doubt that other nations in the region could be helpful with
this situation in Iraq.
I truly believe that most people in Afghanistan and Iraq
seek peace and an opportunity to enjoy a decent life for
themselves and their families. It has been my experience in the
Asia-Pacific region that progress in advancing the aspirations
and desires of people require stability and security. American
military forces and their civilian counterparts have been
performing superbly in their efforts to provide these essential
needs in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. I am humbled by
their service, dedication, courage, and sacrifice. It would be
my high honor to serve in CENTCOM with these great Americans
and our coalition partners.
I believe the situation in Iraq can be turned around. But
time is short. There are no guarantees, but you can depend on
me for my best effort. I pray for God's help, and I draw
confidence in the indomitable spirit and skilled dedication of
our service men and women.
Thank you for your support.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you.
Now, the standard questions which Senator McCain has
referred to.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Admiral Fallon. I have not.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record and hearings?
Admiral Fallon. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Admiral Fallon. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Admiral Fallon. They will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
Admiral Fallon. I do.
Chairman Levin. This is the question which Senator McCain
referred to; it means a great deal to us. We're deadly serious
about it. We are about all the questions, but this one really
becomes more and more important as we look at the recent
history. Do you agree to give your personal views, when asked
before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from
the administration in power?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, I do.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral. For starters, we'll do
a 6-minute round of questions on an early-bird basis.
Admiral, there is not just a question of 21,000 troops that
are going to go to Iraq under the President's new policy, but
there's also a different strategy for those troops. They will
be holding Baghdad neighborhoods, not just inserted, not just
clearing, but then remaining and holding neighborhoods in that
city, presumably with Iraqi units, if they do what they've not
done so far, which is to carry out their commitments to move
into neighborhoods. They will be operating under 30-or-so mini
bases in platoon- or company-sized units.
How do you foresee preventing incidences such as recently
happened in Karbala, where five American soldiers were abducted
and then killed while in a meeting with Iraqi security forces
in a supposedly secure compound? In other words, our troops are
going to be inserted into the most difficult areas imaginable,
right into the neighborhoods, right in the face of the Iraqis.
How are we going to avoid the increased risks that are created
by that kind of face-to-face presence?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, there's clearly going to be an
increased risk in this area. I've spoken with General Petraeus.
I have a lot to learn, much research to do, and a lot of
dialogue yet to go on so that I have a better understanding of
the detail of his intentions. I believe that he's going to need
some time, when he gets on the ground out there, to sort this
out.
But it seems pretty obvious to me that what we have been
doing has not been working. We have not been getting the
results that we desire, and we clearly have to do something
different. There is a significant body of evidence that
indicates that approaching an insurgency such as we are facing
now--and that wasn't the case several years ago in Iraq, but
it's clearly the case now--there's a body of evidence that
indicates that to be successful in this endeavor, historically
you've had to get in amongst the population to convince them
that you really care about them and that you are able to
provide security on-scene rather than just passing through an
area.
I can give you my experience in the Asia-Pacific region. We
have some ongoing insurgencies in Southeast Asia, as you're
well aware. In the Philippines, there's been significant
progress, particularly recently. Our approach to action in the
Philippines to combat the insurgencies that are ongoing there
has been multipronged; in fact, very similar to what has been
outlined for us to pursue in Iraq. It involves being down with
the armed forces with whom we're working. In the Pacific, it's
with the Philippine armed forces. In Iraq, we're going to have
to get with theirs. It involves getting our people in front of
the population so that they can see that they're engaged and
give them confidence.
Chairman Levin. Didn't we intentionally keep our people
out, away from the smaller units?
Admiral Fallon. In the Philippines, we have kept our people
away from those small units going into combat, but an essential
part of the security desire down there was to, in fact, engage
with the population in a broad base of humanitarian engineering
activities, so they actually see our people regularly.
Chairman Levin. Was there an interface as directly, as
intimately, in the Philippines with the population, as it true
in Baghdad?
Admiral Fallon. The situation is not nearly as dangerous,
obviously, in Sulu as it is in Baghdad.
Chairman Levin. General Abizaid testified in November that
he has talked with all the divisional commanders, with General
Casey and General Martin Dempsey. They all talked together. He
asked them whether or not, if we brought in more American
troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve
success in Iraq? They all said no. He went on to explain--and
this is General Abizaid, just a few months ago--``It's easy for
the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more
American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking
more responsibility for their own future.''
Have you spoken with General Abizaid?
Admiral Fallon. I've spoken with General Abizaid, but not
on this subject.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree with his testimony on that
subject?
Admiral Fallon. I don't know, Senator, but I'll give you my
opinion and assessment. What we've been doing is not working,
and we need to be doing, it seems to me, something different.
General Petraeus has outlined, in extensive detail before you,
a proposal to try to enhance stability and security in Baghdad
and the rest of Iraq, and I would be anxious, if confirmed, to
work with him to try and implement this. General Petraeus has,
in our discussions, made very clear to me that this will
require more troops. I don't know how many troops. Frankly, I
aim to find out and have my own opinions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. One of the issues on the number
of troops was the testimony that we've received about off-
ramps, that, as these brigades move in, perhaps one a month, or
whatever the rate turns out to be, that there are off-ramps,
that we don't have to continue that flow, if the Iraqis do not
carry out their commitments.
Stephen Hadley, the National Security Advisor, said U.S.
force increases will be ``pay-as-you-go, depending a lot on the
Iraqis performing.''
Secretary Gates said there's plenty of opportunity before
many of the 21,000 additional troops arrive to evaluate,
``whether the Iraqis are fulfilling their commitments to us.''
General Pace told us the Iraqis must ``put action behind
their words. Our flow of forces will allow us to modify what we
do next.''
Now, what is the policy, do you know, in terms of off-
ramps? Is this policy subject to change, as our brigades go in,
if the Iraqis are not carrying out their commitments, as we've
been assured before this committee? Even General Petraeus, when
he was here, said that he wanted all five brigades in Iraq as
quickly as possible. He did say that. But then, he said their
flow, not ``would be,'' could be tied to Iraqi military,
political, or economic progress. What do you understand the
policy to be? Could this flow change? Could it be slowed down,
stopped, if the Iraqis do not carry out the commitment? My
operative word there is, ``could it'' be slowed down?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I have not gotten into the details
of these plans. I have a full-time job in PACOM, and I've tried
to stay away from the details of CENTCOM until such time as I
might be confirmed; then I intend to dive into it.
General Petraeus, in our meeting before he left, indicated
that he thought he needed these additional troops. I do not
know the details of how he plans to use them. I'm sure he's
going to have to consult with his generals on the ground once
he gets into position, and then figure it out. I'd be happy to
take that question and come back to you, if it's appropriate,
at a later time.
Chairman Levin. If you would let us know, for the record,
what is your understanding specifically on that issue, we would
appreciate it.
[The information referred to follows:]

There is no policy on troop deployment and redeployment in
correlation to Iraqi military, political, and economic progress/
failure. Troop deployments and redeployments are based upon missions
(requirements, needs, and conditions), the situation, the enemy,
commander recommendations, and requests.

Chairman Levin. I'm surprised that you don't have that
understanding going in, frankly. This is a policy issue which
has been decided, presumably, by the policymakers.
Admiral Fallon. Yes, but I'm----
Chairman Levin. Nonetheless, if you say you don't know the
policy in that regard, we have to take that as your answer.
Admiral Fallon. If I could, just a comment. I'm not sure
that you can have a policy plan ahead of time that would
dictate the intricacies of what forces move into what areas for
what tasks.
Chairman Levin. I'm sure that's not true, either, but you
could have a policy which says that we can modify this as these
brigades show up if the Iraqis have not carried out their
commitments. Could modify.
Admiral Fallon. Sure.
Chairman Levin. That's certainly, it seems to me, a
credible policy.
Admiral Fallon. Seems pretty reasonable to me, sir.
Obviously, as we're making modifications to what we've been
doing in Iraq now, I would expect we'd do the same thing in the
future.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go back to Afghanistan for a second. We have
plans to increase our troop strength there by some 2,500. Have
you gotten into this issue enough to have a handle on how
serious this spring is going to be and what's going to be
required?
Admiral Fallon. No, Senator, I've been watching from a
distance, just reading news reports. I have not talked with
General Eikenberry about this, although I've asked to have him
come back through the Pacific, on his way back home, to get a
better insight.
Senator McCain. What is your degree of confidence that the
Iraqi Government and military are up to the task that we are
now embarking on in this new strategy?
Admiral Fallon. Critical question, particularly in the
political arena, and I don't have an assessment of that. I have
not personally met any of the civilian political leadership in
Iraq. I do have some knowledge of the Iraqi military, albeit
just a slice, from a couple of visits to PACOM base forces that
are serving in Iraq. I was out there last month to see some of
them. My initial assessment is that there are some good troops
and some that need a lot of work. There are some leaders that
have impressed me as people that understood and ``got it,'' and
were effective, and others that are probably less so. I would
speculate--a danger here--that that's not a dissimilar
situation throughout the country.
The challenge I see is identifying those leaders that are
going to be effective, those units that are trained, or can be
trained, to do what needs to be done and to encourage them to
pick up the load. If this is not successful, then we're going
to have problems.
But all of this is a backdrop to the kind of political
backbone and tough decisionmaking that I believe is required of
the leadership in Baghdad.
I think, to be fair to them, they have a tough row to hoe.
This is not like, as you know much better than I, our country.
In my reading, going back to 2003, we have hundreds of good
ideas of things that we would like to see in Iraq that are more
reflective of the kind of society and process that we enjoy
here. It seems to me that we probably erred in our assessment
of the ability of these people to take on all of these tasks at
the same time. It seems to me that one of the things in the
back of my mind that I'd like to get answered is to meet with
the people that have been working this issue, particularly our
ambassadors, our diplomats, to get an assessment of what's
realistic and what's practical. Maybe we ought to redefine the
goals here a bit and do something that's more realistic, in
terms of getting some progress, and then maybe take on the
other things later.
Senator McCain. Again, we would like a realistic assessment
of the situation. On numerous occasions in the past, witnesses
have told us that the training and equipping of the Iraqi
military was going just fine.
Admiral Fallon. One of the challenges--and this is not
unique to the situation in Iraq; I think we face it in all
aspects of our lives--we tend to assess things in ways that
are--you used the comment, or I think Senator Levin used the
``rosy'' word before--in terms that will not hurt people's
feelings, that will--whatever. The fact of the matter is, of
all places, we need candid assessments, and you'll get them
from me.
Senator McCain. I believe, Admiral, that it will be
difficult, in the short-term, to determine the progress of the
military side of this equation. I think it's going to be
difficult. It has taken us 3\1/2\ years, at least, to get into
the dire situation that we are in today. But I do agree with
Senator Levin that there are certain benchmarks that we could
expect the Iraqi Government to comply with, such as disarming
individual militias, the number of Iraqi military that will
actually be deployed in Baghdad alongside ours. As you may
remember, in the past they promised six brigades, and only two
battalions showed up. Also legislation to ensure that the oil
resources benefit the Sunni, as well as the Shia. In other
words, I think that we could know fairly soon whether we are
going to have an Iraqi government that is truly committed to
this overall process. Would you agree with that?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think there's an obvious need to
have actions taken by the Government of Iraq to get on their--
shouldn't use the word ``timeline,'' because I've never
actually seen a timeline, but they have stated a number of
these objectives; you've enumerated a couple of these now--and
it's pretty clear to me that they have to take these steps or
we're not going to be effective in the security business. It
seems to me that, again, from my glancing visit through that
country last month, there is a lack of confidence among the
other sects--other than the Shia--within this country, of the
desire of the government to actually address issues in the
entire country. So, it seems to me--again, from a distance; and
this is politics--that an essential foundation to making
progress in this country is for that government to step up and
start making some of these tough decisions. I recognize it's
difficult. There's a lot of baggage in the legacy, which you're
well aware of. But unless this begins to happen, I doubt that
we're going to be effective in the military arena.
Senator McCain. I read, with some interest, the remarks of
the Iranian Ambassador, the last few days, and there are many
who think we ought to begin ``a dialogue'' with the Iranians.
Do you have any view on that issue?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think that Iranian activity,
particularly regarding Iraq, has not been helpful, to date. I
would welcome steps by the Iraqi government that would indicate
that they are interested in long-term----
Senator McCain. You mean the Iranian Government.
Admiral Fallon. I'm sorry, Iranian Government--that would
indicate they really are interested in helping the situation.
To date, I haven't seen that. I think we need to see some of
those kinds of steps, again, then over to the political and
diplomatic arena to see what can be done.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Next would be Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Admiral, and welcome to your family. We are very
pleased to have you before this committee, and I thank you for
your years of distinguished service to our country.
I know that you are in the process of confirmation, and
that it may be difficult to give specific answers to some of
these questions, because you're not yet confirmed, and you
haven't had the opportunity to really get a firsthand view for
yourself. But, if I could, Admiral, one of the issues that
concerns me, and, I think, other members of this committee,
regards the lack of unity of command for the Iraqi and U.S.
forces that will be operating in and around Baghdad. In fact,
we've heard, from retired General Jack Keane and General
Petraeus, their concerns about what this means. I'm having
trouble getting to the bottom of this, because General Petraeus
sounded somewhat surprised about it and reflected some of his
concerns, and General Keane, who apparently was very active in
helping to devise the plan the President has put forth, also
said that it was very dangerous and frustrating not to have
unity of command.
Can you shed any light on this decision for our committee?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, not yet, but this is clearly a
very significant, critical item. We have to know exactly who's
reporting to whom, for what purposes. I would expect that
General Petraeus will have this at the top of his list when he
gets out there. There are ways to do this but we have to make
sure that the lines are straight if we're going to be
effective.
Senator Clinton. I would appreciate that. I welcome the
openness that both you and General Petraeus have exhibited to
the committee, and I hope that we could hear from both of you
in short order about this. I hope we can hear that it has been
fixed, because some of these stories coming out of the fighting
on Haifa Street, the recent large engagement near Najaf, have
certainly raised serious questions about the Iraqi military's
capacity to take actions which we thought they were capable of.
Certainly, we don't want to put our young men and women into
harm's way with that level of confusion.
Second, Admiral, I asked General Petraeus--this was really
more of a plea; some have characterized it as a prayer--that we
not send our new troops into Baghdad without being fully
equipped and ready. There have been a number of articles in the
last week, and there is one today in the Washington Post, about
how equipment for the added troops is lacking. We are short
thousands of vehicles, armor kits, and other equipment. We do
not have the capacity to quickly turn around that equipment. In
fact, Lieutenant General Speakes has said that we're going to
have to be, pretty much improvising, trying to share equipment,
which I find deeply troubling. I'm also concerned that the
United States has agreed to sell 600 up-armored Humvees to Iraq
this year for its security forces, and, again, quoting General
Speakes, saying that ``such sales better not be at the expense
of the American soldier or marine.'' Again, Admiral, do you
know anything yet about whether or not we're going to have the
equipment for these additional combat brigades?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I do not know the details of that.
I can tell you that, in PACOM, there's been a request made for
us to look at the equipment that we have in this region and to
send some of it to the Middle East, equipment that might be
appropriate to soldiers and marines that are headed in that
direction.
I know, from my experience, that the units are not all
equipped in the same manner, particularly the Army units, which
have a diverse background. Some are light infantry, some are
heavier, and they have different types and varieties of
vehicles.
I found it interesting, from a professional side, when I
was in Iraq, as I traveled around the country recently, to note
the differences between the units. The thought occurred to me
that it would be interesting--and I'd like to find out the
answers of just how one goes about using these different
equipment sets in different situations--as we rotate troops
from one area to another, how effective they are, and so forth.
So, I have it in the back of my mind, and would like to take
this up with General Petraeus to do an assessment of what
essential things are necessary to put our people in the best
possible position. We'll do that as soon as we get there.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate that, Admiral, and I would
hope, perhaps, that the committee would send a very clear
message to Secretary Gates and the Pentagon that we want that
assessment done as quickly as possible, and that whatever
actions need to be taken in order to provide the necessary
equipment be done so. I know every one of us doesn't want to
hear stories about continuing lack of equipment costing
American lives and injuries such as those we saw yesterday when
we were both at San Antonio.
Finally, Admiral, this question about the diplomatic aspect
of this assignment that you've undertaken is one that I'm very
interested in, because we all know there's no military
solution. There's no military solution in Iraq, and there's no
military solution in Afghanistan. How do you see your role, and
what tools do we have at our disposal, on the one hand, to try
to assess and rein in Iranian influence in the region, and, on
the other end of your AOR, to create better relations and
working conditions between Pakistan and Afghanistan? Could you
just briefly respond to those, please?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, very interesting area, I wouldn't
presume to dive too deeply into this pool yet, because I don't
know enough detail. But a couple of observations from the
outside:
There's a lot that isn't being done. In fact, I see an
awful lot of sitting, watching, by the neighborhood, and it's
high time that changed. I would be very anxious to try to
engage, and intend to engage, with our Department of State,
Secretary Rice and her folks, to have a full understanding of
this, and then maybe we can figure out, collectively, how to
proceed.
Regarding Pakistan/Afghanistan, having been operating on
the other side of the boundary, if you would, between theaters,
I've had a chance to watch the Indian/Pakistan dynamic now for
a couple of years. I see change, and it's for the better. I
believe that this change could potentially be very helpful to
the situation in Afghanistan, and perhaps even in Iraq, as
Pakistan and India slowly are taking steps to reduce tension
along the border in Kashmir.
By the way, it's pretty fascinating, and a shame for the
world, I believe, to note that there are almost 1.5 million
troops facing each other along this border. But steps are being
taken in the right direction, and I think the potential to have
tensions continue to ease ought to give us some opportunities
to perhaps have the Paks do even more than they're doing.
They've done a phenomenal amount in this war on terror, but I
think things could be done that would be additionally helpful
in Afghanistan. The Indian ties to Iran and their energy needs,
and ties in other places in the region, I think, could
potentially be exploited. I'll be anxious to talk with our
State Department colleagues and to see what might be done in
this area.
Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton, and thank you,
also, for raising the equipment issue. I just talked to Senator
McCain, we will be sending a letter to the Secretary of Defense
this afternoon the matter that you raise and some of the other
equipment studies, the shortfall studies which have been
forthcoming. So, thank you for raising that.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, if I could put a p.s. on the
equipment thing, there's a reality today that this is a fast-
moving issue, in that the enemy that we face, particularly in
Iraq, is very adaptive, very skilled at observing and changing
their tactics and procedures. So, equipment that was, we
thought, pretty effective in protecting our troops just a
matter of months ago is now being, in fact, challenged by some
of the techniques and devices over there. I'm learning, as we
go in, that this is a fast-moving ball game and we'll have to
be adaptable to try to stay ahead of it. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. That's fine, but I think the equipment that
Senator Clinton's talking is equipment that we know is needed
by the troops that are going in.
Admiral Fallon. I understand.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral. Nice to meet with you again. I've had
the privilege of working with you and knowing you for many
years. I thank your family for joining you on this arduous task
ahead of you.
I'd like to say just a word about General Abizaid. He
served 3\1/2\ years in this position, came before this
committee many times. There's been some suggestions that
perhaps we have not, as a committee, received candid
assessments from some our witnesses, and I concur in that. But
I think, in General Abizaid's case, he has been very
forthcoming. I think he deserves a lot of credit--and his
family--for that contribution that he made in this most
difficult situation for these many years.
Clearly, in your testimony today and that of General
Petraeus, each of you have distanced yourself from the plan, as
announced by the President on January 20. That's
understandable, because both of you had your respective jobs--
you, in the Pacific; he, here in the United States--and the
plan was largely drawn up by those individuals--from General
Abizaid, General Casey, and others--in the current positions
that they hold. Juxtaposed against that is your own comment to
the effect that you see there's clear requirement for new and
different actions.
Now, the team that put the plan together are now moving
out, and you're moving in and being handed this plan. I just
hope that you will exercise your authority and responsibility
to the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to point out those areas in this plan which you feel needs
flexibility, options that can be pursued other than the
rigidity of just 20,000 new troops right into the face of
sectarian violence. Some of us here on this committee, and
others--a group of 10, bipartisan--have tried to respond to the
President's request for suggestions, and we have provided those
suggestions in the form of saying, ``Mr. President, look at all
options by which you may not need that full complement, and,
Mr. President, look carefully at the rules of engagement, such
that we minimize the injection of the U.S. GI right into the
crossfire of sectarian violence.''
We are reading about a successful operation, north of
Najaf, where the Iraqi forces clearly, I think, took the lead
and eliminated a substantial enemy. That's the good news. The
bad news is that fight was precipitated by religious quarrels
between Iraqis, Sunni and Shia and others, that go back over a
thousand years. Our group of 10, in making recommendations,
simply say that the Iraqi forces, by virtue of their knowledge
of the language, their knowledge of the culture, are far better
qualified to try and go in and resolve that type of sectarian
violence. I hope that you will take our suggestions in the
spirit of not trying to embolden the enemy, but to
conscientiously point out where we can take actions to save
lives, and particularly those of our American GIs.
In no way do we try to cut forces, withdraw, set
timetables. It's simply, ``Look at the options.'' In there, we
point out, also, the questions about the chain of command which
was raised here by our colleague. I urge you to go back and
look at the colloquy that I had with General Keane in this room
last Friday in which we explored that very carefully. He, the
former Vice Chief of the Army, clearly pointed out grave
concerns that he and others have. I asked him, could he show
any precedent whereby the United States forces, which always
operated on a unified chain of command under American
officers--have we ever tried to go into this joint operation,
where there's going to be Iraqi commander and American
commander at the top and all the way down to the company level?
We do not want fingerpointing if a action goes wrong between
the American and the Iraqi, saying whose fault it was. That has
to be clarified.
Finally, I point out, I think you have unique abilities to
go into this very sensitive and equally important, if not
greater important area, with regard to Iran. I support the
President in his statements, of recent, of firmness of
commitment to resolve that situation. But I say to you, drawn
on the experience of how we maintained a ring of deterrence
around the Soviet Union in the Cold War. I think the use of
force in that situation is a very last resort. Should we not
engage other countries in performing a ring of deterrence?
Initially, that ring could be the age-old doctrine of seapower,
what we call battleship diplomacy, the presence of our two
carriers. Why should not the European nations send a ship or
two to also add to the strength of the signal we're trying to
send to that country that we're not going to permit them to go
forward with nuclear power? I urge you to look at the history
of NATO, its success in curtailing the Cold War, and use that
as the initial steps to the extent that any military action
should be used, because we have to curtail it. Does that have
any interest or appeal to you, that concept?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, the whole idea is most appealing,
because we have plenty to do right now with active combat
operations ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's clear to me
that, to date, the Iranians have not been playing a
constructive role in addressing any of these, and, in fact, are
challenging us in other areas. I'll be very anxious to work
with our allies, friends, and colleagues around the world, and
open to any and every idea in how we might approach this
situation.
Senator Warner. I think it's important. I draw your
attention to a New York Times article, of January 30, in which
they say, ``The administration says that European governments
provided $18 billion in loan guarantees for Iran in 2005.''
It's to their interest, as well as it is to the United States
interest, to contain that country with regard to its
aggressiveness and potentiality in building nuclear weapons.
My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner. As to the
references made to benchmarks, I'm going to put in the record
at this time a letter that Senator McCain and I wrote to
Secretary Rice last week insisting that the benchmarks that the
President referred to in his January 10 address to the Nation
and that the Iraqi Government has agreed to be provided. If
these benchmarks are not received by the end of today, Senator
McCain and I will be consulting on what will be the next step
to obtain these benchmarks. This is not something that you,
Admiral, are going to be able to deal with. This isn't an
assignment for you. I'm just saying publicly that these
benchmarks now have been requested three times and have not
been received. The letter, as well as earlier letters of mine,
will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Chairman Levin. I will call next on Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Admiral. Good luck as you engage in some very
serious and responsible challenges in CENTCOM.
When you look at the plan that you're about to implement
with General Petraeus, on paper it could be made to work if you
have the right assumptions. One of those assumptions is that
you're going to get all the support you need from the State
Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Justice
Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(AID). I don't think that's a very good assumption, since we
have never gotten that, in the last 3 years. How many real
extra bodies are going out to accompany these 20,000 extra
troops and civilian agencies?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I don't know. I am aware----
Senator Reed. Isn't that important for you to know, sir?
Admiral Fallon. I intend to find out. It's clear that we
will have to have agreement between the interagency on
formulating the appropriate human resources to go address this
problem. I do not have that kind of detail. I've not engaged in
that conversation.
Senator Reed. Admiral, I appreciate that, but the new
strategy sounds a lot like the old strategy to me. We were
going to clear, hold, and build. The President was talking
about that 2 years ago. We had examples of this in Tal Afar and
other places, and we were clearing. The question was, could we
hold? Maybe we can hold now, but the build part never seemed to
arrive.
Admiral Fallon. Absolutely critical. If we're going to be
successful, we have to have the follow-up economic activity and
development to enable these people to stand on their own feet.
It doesn't happen, then it's not going to work.
Senator Reed. Again, General--Admiral--excuse me, forgive
me my background. [Laughter.]
I'm projecting. Forgive me.
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. We've gone down this road so many times.
We've heard--and I don't think this is a question of lack of
candor, this is a question of people saying, ``If I get all I
need, I can do this.'' We never get what we need on the
nonkinetic side of the equation.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, if I could, a couple of thoughts.
One, in my experience, we're always asking for more than we'll
usually get, and we'll have to figure out how to do the best we
can. But I think that the situation here is that clearly the
President recognizes the need for change in this situation in
Iraq. He's made some decisions. Some of those decisions involve
military forces and leadership positions. He's asked, through
the Secretary, for me to be considered for this position.
General Petraeus has already been here. These are part of the
resources being applied. I think we need--General Petraeus,
myself, if I'm confirmed--to sit down with our colleagues in
the interagencies and to figure out the details of these plans,
which I am not aware, but very anxious to get into, because it
seems to me that if I'm supposed to be the CENTCOM Commander,
we clearly have to have an understanding and be joined at the
hip in what we agree is the way to go forward. We are not there
yet. We are going to need some time to figure out the steps and
to lay this out in the kind of detail that's going to actually
give us some results.
Senator Reed. Let me also suggest some other areas that are
more directly within your purview. This strategy implies a
significant increase of translators, a significant increase of
civil affairs officers. What we've heard, in terms of this
surge, is 20,000 combat brigades. The question is, where are
these translators coming from? If you're going to send--and I'd
go back to Senator Levin's comments--you're sending a platoon
of young Americans into the middle of the neighborhood, from
all over this country, and they cannot speak to their
neighbors, you're just asking for trouble. How many
translators? Again, Admiral, out of the last 3 years, whenever
you talked to a senior commander out there, and you ask him,
``What do you need?''--it was never, ``Give me some more combat
brigades.'' It's ``Give me translators, give me AID people,
give me agriculture people.'' It was ``gimme, gimme,'' but
nothing ever happened.
Admiral Fallon. I'll be at the head of that list, because,
unlike General Abizaid, I am not fluent in Arabic, and so, I'm
going to need some help, as well. I recognize this is a big
challenge.
Senator Reed. As I look at this proposal, there are some
obvious shortcomings that we know about right now and we
haven't reconciled. Yet, we're touting this as the last best
chance that this will work, ``We wargamed it on the ground, we
have everything we need.'' I don't think we have everything we
need. The issue that Senator Warner raised about unity of
command, and General Keane, who spoke to that it is a grave
concern. It's an obvious flaw, or an obvious shortcoming in
this plan, we know of right now, and yet, we're embarking into
this situation.
I was trying to think--you might be able to help me--is
there an applicable example of a significant urban insurgency
that was successfully defeated with a divided command? I can't
think--Algeria, with the French? Belfast, the British were in
charge. I can't think of any other significant urban
insurgencies.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, you, better than most, understand
the necessity for having clean and clearly recognizable chain
of command, and if you could allow us some time to figure out
the details of this plan, there's a lot of talk about ``the
plan, the plan.'' In my mind, we have a plan when we have the
details for each level in the chain of command to carry out the
specific functions that are going to be necessary to achieve
success. I have not even begun to see a significant outline of
that, so I need to do some work. If confirmed, it'll be a prime
order of business.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Reed. Admiral, your patriotism serving the Nation
is remarkable. You are well qualified to assume a very daunting
task. I would associate myself with Senator Warner's comments
about General Abizaid. I think he, also, gave himself to the
last measure to serve this country.
The final point I'd make is, you need time, but time is
quickly running out. It's not what we're doing, it's what the
American people are doing. They have listened for 3 years, and
they have formed very strong conclusions, which don't allow you
much time at all.
Admiral Fallon. I understand, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Fallon, everyone's been blowing smoke at you.
You've had a great career. You and I have fought together, for
3 years, what I called the Battle of Vieques, and you were
there at the time. I do believe that resulted in a lack of
unified training that we weren't able to keep that live range
open. I just wanted to publicly thank you for the leadership
you showed. You had the Pace-Fallon report, and you stayed in
there and did everything you could. I enjoyed those 3 years of
battling on your side.
As we look from this point forward, I think it might be
worthwhile--no one has asked you this--you'll be working with
General Petraeus, and you could take a number of different
approaches. You could take the 30,000-foot view and largely
defer to General Petraeus on Iraqi matters, or would you
anticipate having more of a hands-on approach? How do you think
you'll work with General Petraeus?
Admiral Fallon. I look forward to working with General
Petraeus. We have not had an extensive history together, but
I've been anxious to work with him. I have followed his career.
I've read some of his work. I think he basically has a very
firm understanding of what's required, plus he has this
extensive experience.
We have different jobs and different responsibilities,
Senator. General Petraeus is going to be our commander of the
multinational forces on the ground for Iraq. I view my
responsibilities as much wider than that. I have a strong
obligation to support him and his work, and will do that to the
maximum extent possible. But it seems to me that there's an
expectation that I be working outside the borders of Iraq to
try to get the neighborhood, for example, to help us, and to
continue to work these other issues, like Afghanistan.
I'd be looking to work in a complementary manner, but, I'll
tell you, I'd love to stay up here, but I'm not going to
hesitate to dive down and to ask the tough questions--love to
stay up here, but I'm not going to hesitate to ask the tough
questions if I don't think we're getting results, and that's
the key thing that's missing in this entire program, of late,
is the results that are absolutely necessary if we're going to
be able to wrap this up and get our troops back.
Senator Inhofe. Since we have shorter rounds than we
normally have, for the record I'd like to have you look into
the successes. We've been real big on the train-and-equip
program here, and it's been very successful. I think probably
the best model for that would have been us with the Ethiopians
and how they came along to Somalia in a very successful
operation. I'd like to have you think about that and maybe, for
the record, respond as to what lessons we have learned there
that might be worth getting into.
[The information referred to follows:]

The United States military has provided training and equipment to
Ethiopia and other countries in the Horn of Africa (HOA) that have been
integral partners in the global war on terrorism. While difficult to
quantify, this security cooperation and the resulting strong bilateral
relationship contributed positively to Ethiopia's operations in its
recent military intervention in Somalia. However, it is the close
Ethiopian-U.S. military relationship which substantiates the potential
benefit of regional security cooperation programs (e.g. International
Military Education and Training and Foreign Military Financing with
Ethiopia, Kenya, and other HOA partners. The United States should
continue to train and equip forces partnering with the U.S. in order to
further their military's training professionalism and capabilities,
while supporting the global war on terrorism. U.S. theater security
cooperation programs require increased priority, emphasis, and support
in order to promote similar successful cooperation stories, and further
U.S. national security interests in the HOA.

Senator Inhofe. I would also say, even though this would be
more General Petraeus than you, but on the CERP program,
there's been a consistency of the combatant commanders and
everyone, from the bottom to the top, that that is a program
where we can get a lot more for our money if we give greater
authority in the field to use that program.
General Keane, when he was here last week, he talked about
the same thing, on the troop levels in Afghanistan. It's kind
of interesting to me, because I've been over there 12 times--my
last trip was with General Jones in Afghanistan. It was my
clear view, at that time, that the military part of that was
pretty near over, and now it's the rebuilding and assisting in
that type of thing. Have you had a chance to look into where we
are right now and to assess whether or not we do need to have--
that you would agree with General Keane that we need to have
enhancement of the troop level in Afghanistan?
Admiral Fallon. I don't have a fair enough assessment to
give you an honest answer. I can give you impressions from my
last visit. I saw things that were really good. I saw security
in some areas that looked like it had the situation under
control. I saw political activity. I saw functioning
governments in some areas. But everything that I've heard from
reports that I've read indicates that we need a pretty
significant push now on the economic side to move this country
along.
Senator Inhofe. I think some of the questions asked of you
might not be totally fair, in that you've been in PACOM. This
is new to you. You don't have all the answers. On the other
hand, there could be an advantage to that. You don't go in with
a prejudiced perspective. I know when I was there, and talked
to people like Abdul Jazim, Dr. Rubaie, and Prime Minister
Maliki.
Do you have any outside impression as to whether you think
that the Prime Minister is going to change his behavior from
the past?
Admiral Fallon. I don't know, Senator. I haven't met him. I
look forward to it.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Senator Clinton brought up this
thing about the up-armor. You mentioned something about PACOM
might have equipment that could be used over there. The fact
that you recognize this is a moving target, it's a changing
game, and what was appropriate 6 months ago may not be
appropriate now. I think it's very important that you do take
an assessment of what is in the other commands that can be
transferred there, and also try to evaluate what is going to be
needed there. I think you have indicated you will be doing
that.
Finally, Admiral Fallon, I was critical, back during the
Clinton administration, when I expected that the North Koreans
had a lot greater delivery capability for missiles than
everybody else did, and I asked--in writing, in a letter--and
I'm going from memory now--I think it was August 20, 1998, as
to, when would it be that the North Koreans would have the
capability of reaching the United States with a multistage
rocket? The answer came back: between 5 and 10 years. Seven
days later, on August 28, 1998, they fired one that had that
capability. Now, this morning, in the Early Bird, it says that
North Korea and Iran are cooperating in developing long-range
weapons, and it says Iran is likely to develop capability of
reaching the United States before 2015. To me, that's not very
well informed, and it wouldn't be that long.
How concerned are you over this relationship between North
Korea and Iran and their potential capability, in terms of
having long-range weapons that could reach the United States?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'd note that, although the North
Koreans tried that launch in 1998, they also tried another one
last year, still unsuccessful, which is some measure of
consolation, I'd expect, although they appear to be pushing
very hard to achieve this capability. There's no doubt that
there's been an interaction between North Korea and Iran, in
exchanging technology.
It seems to me that the scrutiny of the world has greatly
intensified on North Korea, particularly in this past year, and
so, we're all watching very carefully to try to mitigate any
attempt to proliferate technology that they may have. I don't
know what the timelines are. I haven't studied the Iranian
situation to the extent that I have the North Korean. The North
Koreans are clearly threatening in their capabilities to their
neighbors, not yet to us. We're going to have to watch it, and
I'll be anxious to learn more about the Iranians.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral. My time is expired. But
I have every confidence that the team of Fallon and Petraeus
will be very successful.
Thank you.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Fallon, aloha and welcome to the Hill and to the
U.S. Senate. I also want to add my aloha and welcome to Mary
and the family here, gathered and to tell you folks that you've
been a great family for Hawaii and for our Nation. Admiral,
you've served us so well as PACOM Commander, and I look forward
to your confirmation here.
I think that it is fitting, on this day, the 145th
anniversary of the launching of the Navy's first ironclad
warship, the U.S.S. Monitor--that, if confirmed by the Senate,
Admiral, you will be the first Navy admiral to command the
United States Central Command. This speaks well of your
leadership in the Pacific and Asia and of your accomplishments
as an officer in our Nation's military. I thank you for your
nearly 40 years of dedicated service already to our country. I
also want to say thank you to Mary, too, because without her
support, it would have been very difficult for you and for us.
Admiral, I have some questions that I want to ask you.
CENTCOM has never been commanded by a Navy flag officer in its
entire history. Your nomination by the administration is, I
guess you can look at it, somewhat unique. It raises the
question of, why now, in the war on terror, during a time when
we have two ground conflicts ongoing simultaneously in the
CENTCOM AOR, is a Navy admiral the best choice to head CENTCOM?
So, my question, Admiral Fallon, to you is, did Secretary Gates
or any other administration officer explain to you the
reasoning behind their decision to nominate you to be the next
Commander of CENTCOM? If so, what was their basis? If not, why
do you believe that you are the best choice for the job, given
the current operational environment in the CENTCOM AOR?
Admiral?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, in my conversation with Secretary
Gates, the color of my uniform wasn't the issue. I believe that
what they're looking for is someone with experience, which I
have been fortunate to have acquired in these 40 years, and
someone who is already familiar with the workings of a regional
command and the requirements of that position. We have very
highly-qualified ground officers, Army officers, that are
designated to lead our forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and
I believe that the administration is looking for someone with
experience and a willingness to work with these people.
I've found, in the Pacific, that the opportunity to engage
with nations throughout the region was beneficial to moving us
forward in the areas of security and stability, and I look
forward to doing the same thing in CENTCOM.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
From what you've done in the Pacific--for me, there's no
question, I'm proud of you and what you've done, and know that
you can deal with the situations that are ahead of us.
Admiral, the New York Times published an article on Sunday
describing an ambitious plan outlined by the Iranian Ambassador
to Baghdad. Specifically, Iran plans to greatly expand its
economic and military ties with Iraq, including an Iranian
National Bank branch in the heart of the capital. News reports
yesterday described the President's response. Specifically, he
was quoted as saying that, ``We will respond firmly.'' If
Tehran escalates its military actions in Iraq and threatens
American forces or Iraqi citizens, I'm concerned about the
possibility of the Iraq conflict as escalating to a regional
conflict. I am particularly concerned, because the
administration is not engaging the Iranians in diplomatic
discussions, which may limit our ``firm'' response to military
options only. In this January 10 speech regarding the surge,
the President stated that we will, ``interrupt the flow of
support from Iran and Syrian,'' and that we will seek out and
destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training
to our enemies in Iraq. It is clear, from this committee's
discussion with Secretary Gates and General Petraeus, that the
U.S. does not have sufficient troop levels in Iraq to secure
the borders from Iran and Syria while maintaining our
counterinsurgency activities in Baghdad and Anbar.
Admiral, do you believe that we can interrupt Iranian and
Syrian support from within the borders of Iraq? What options do
you believe our military has to provide the firm response to
Iran indicated by the President without causing an escalation
to a regional conflict?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, as I stated earlier, I believe
that the Iranians have yet to play a really constructive role
in the Iraqi situation. There's a lot of history here. You're
certainly aware of the Shia relationship in southern Iraq with
the Iranians. Yet, from what I've read and been led to believe,
this is not a totally onesided issue, that, in fact, there are
many people that have historically recognized Iraq as a
separate entity than Iran, and so forth.
Regarding the insurgency, if we're going to be effective in
quelling the violence and establishing some sense of stability,
we're going to have to move to isolate these insurgents and the
militias from their supplies of weapons and other materials.
How we're going to do that remains to be seen, to me. I'm going
to have to work with General Petraeus and our commanders to
figure out how to make an effective strategy, and then
implement this to get the results we want on the ground.
But it seems to me, in the entire approach to Iran, that
we'll be looking for help from the region, and to look at the
full range of options that are open to us diplomatically and
every other way.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Admiral. My time is
expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Admiral Fallon, let me once again welcome you
to this committee, and your family, as well, and thank you for
your outstanding service to our country. I look forward to
working with you in the months and years ahead.
What do you believe are Iran's military and political
intentions in the region, particularly regarding the Persian
Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz? Do you believe that one of
Iran's long-term objectives is to control the flow of oil
through the strait?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, it's difficult for me to ascertain
what's in the minds of the leadership in Tehran in this regard.
We can only make judgments, I believe, based on the behavior
that we've seen to date. They have not been helpful in Iraq,
and it seems to me that, in the region, as they grow their
military capabilities, we're going to have to pay close
attention to what they do and what they may bring to the table.
Now, the U.S. has been, as you well know, playing a
significant role in this part of the world for many decades. I
believe it's in our interest to remain engaged in this region.
My historical discussions with our allies and cooperating
nations in this region indicate a longstanding concern about
Iranian intentions and their influence in the Gulf. It seems to
me that, based on my read of their military hardware
acquisitions and development of tactics and so forth, that they
are posturing themselves with the capability to attempt to deny
us the ability to operate in this vicinity.
But I would note that this is not a one-sided situation, in
that Iran is, I believe, critically dependent on its exports of
petroleum products for its economic vitality, and those
exports, of course, go through the same Strait of Hormuz that
they would potentially seek to deny us access to.
So, it seems to me that there are lots of issues here,
there are many things that ought to be considered as we
approach our engagement in the region. I'll be very anxious to,
particularly, consult with the Gulf-region nations to see
what's new, what's learned, because it's been a number of years
since I actually engaged in this area.
Senator Dole. What do you consider to be the implications
for the United States, for our allies in the region, if the
President's latest deployment fails, if Iraq descends into
civil war? Could you also reflect on implications for Lebanon,
Israel, Jordan, the Gulf states, Afghanistan, and Pakistan?
Admiral Fallon. You've given me a long list of challenges
here to deal with.
Senator Dole. Right. It's a broad question.
Admiral Fallon. I believe there are relationships between
many of these, in a number of areas. I don't know exactly what
the timelines are, but I believe that we have a real challenge
and very little time to start effecting results on the ground.
But it's been my experience that if one can actually see
results in an effort, that people tend to key in on those
results and take heart and move forward. Nowhere has this been
more apparent to me than recently in the southern Philippines,
where the longtime engagement of the U.S. in helping the
Philippine Government and the Armed Forces in trying to build
their capabilities and in working with the population, has been
slowly but surely gaining success, and now, with the recent
military successes of the Philippine army, you can almost see
this thing start to really gain momentum.
The key thing, in my mind, is to arrest this continuing
spiral of violence, to start making some steps in a positive
direction, and then we'll have to assess, on a regular basis--
honestly assess where we are and see how we move forward. I
don't think there's any magic here. I don't have any idea what
the timelines may be, how many months or weeks it's going to
take, but it's very clear that we have to do something
different. We have a prescription for a number of capabilities
that we're going to bring together, and hopefully we'll come up
with the right recipe here to start making progress.
Senator Dole. Let me ask you, in Afghanistan, about the
opium trade, the profiting that's occurring, immensely
profitable, for the Taliban, at this point, actively engaged in
this area. Eradication, obviously, is the necessary first step,
but it has to be complemented by other programs so that Afghan
farmers can make a living, so that they have sufficient long-
term security to ensure that they're not terrorized into
replanting these drug-producing crops.
The President's proposal calls for about $10.6 billion. Is
this sufficient to both cover the increased security issue, as
well as the necessity of the alternative crop programs? Could
you just comment on how you see this situation?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, to be honest, I don't have the
details. I will tell you that, from my most recent visit there,
I got a sense, at least in the eastern part of the country,
that there was a governing structure, an Afghan governing
structure, that was in place. It was young. It was immature.
They were keen to develop themselves in economic ways that were
not reliant upon the drug trade. I believe this is a real
challenge with lots of issues. There's a tradition here that
goes back many centuries for this kind of activity. I'll be
very curious to see what options we may have available. It
seems to me that there's a reasonable degree of security in
most areas, except the south, and if that's the case, then a
strong economic injection of realistic activities would be
what's really needed here. But I'll be happy to get back to you
after I get a better assessment of the situation.
Senator Dole. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Dole.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Thank you, Admiral Fallon, for your service.
Mr. Chairman, I'd appreciate being included on the letter
about the equipment for those that are going to be deployed
abroad.
Chairman Levin. We'd be happy to do that.
Senator Kennedy. Admiral, as has been mentioned during the
course of the questioning, Iran has become an increasingly more
powerful player in the Middle East, but its nuclear ambitions
and support for international terrorism are a threat to the
regional stability and to our national security, and the
question is what to do about it. Senator Akaka mentioned the
President said, on January 10, that Iran is providing material
support for attacks on American troops and that we'd disrupt
the attacks, destroy the networks providing weapons and
training to our enemies, and the next day we raided the Iranian
Government office in Iraq. Last week, President Bush authorized
U.S. forces in Iraq to kill or capture Iranian operatives
inside Iraq. Yesterday, the President further raised the
temperature by saying if Iran escalates its military actions in
Iraq to the detriment of our troops and/or innocent Iraqi
people, we'll respond firmly.
Some have suggested that your nomination, because you'd be
the first naval officer to hold this command, plus the fact
that the U.S. recently sent an additional aircraft carrier
battle group to the Gulf, might be a sign the administration is
preparing for military action against Iran. I certainly hope
this is not the case. Obviously, Congress must be involved in
any decision to broaden war to Iran.
Have you been asked to update war plans for Iran?
Admiral Fallon. No, sir. In fact, I'm not familiar with any
of the CENTCOM plans.
Senator Kennedy. You'd brief the committee, the chair or
the ranking member, if you were asked to do so?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'd be happy to come back and
answer questions you might have.
Senator Kennedy. Okay.
You were well known, during the years in PACOM, for
dialogue with countries in the region. As Pacific Commander,
you gave a speech in Beijing, where you talked about the need
to increase our interactions with China. You said, ``If we're
open with one another, if we share information and ideas, I
think my experience has been, the tendency is to reduce
anxiety, to reduce the fears of the unknown and the suspicions
that come from lack of knowledge and doubt.'' Do you see merit
to that approach in CENTCOM?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, Senator. To the extent that we
can understand better the thoughts and actions of others
reduces substantially, in my experience, the danger of
miscalculation. So, I strongly endorse that approach.
Senator Kennedy. Would you include Iran in that, as well?
Admiral Fallon. I think that in the Iranian situation, I
have to get a better assessment of exactly where we stand.
Senator Kennedy. But you don't exclude that possibility.
Admiral Fallon. I wouldn't exclude that.
Senator Kennedy. Yes.
Admiral Fallon. I'd note that, in China, for example, we
had extensive interaction in almost every other area, aside
from mil-to-mil, so we had a strong foundation. I'm not quite
sure where we stand with Iran and those other areas.
Senator Kennedy. Has the President told you not to talk to
the Iranians?
Admiral Fallon. He has not.
Senator Kennedy. I think, as you point out, there's no
dialogue--exchange of information that would seem to--we would
lack the opportunity, I think, to get the true motivations.
Can you tell us what is your assessment of the Iranian
naval capabilities, and how the U.S. would neutralize these
capabilities?
Admiral Fallon. My understanding of their capabilities is
that they are trying to grow an anti-access force that I
believe would be intended to try to deny us access to the Gulf,
if a situation arose that they might feel compelled to do that.
We are well aware of their capability.
Senator Kennedy. Could you elaborate a little bit on the
anti-access? What does that mean in layman's terms?
Admiral Fallon. They are well aware that the United States
Navy, all of our forces--and, in fact, we operate jointly, as
you well know, in all of our endeavors today. We have very
strong capabilities in many areas. My read of Iranian
investment and training activities tells me that they are aware
of our strike capabilities, for example, they're aware of our
aircraft carrier and submarine strengths, and that they would
try to come up with ways to neutralize us, or keep us as far
away as they could from the scene of action.
Senator Kennedy. Do you believe that they have the ability
to close the Straits of Hormuz?
Admiral Fallon. I would be happy to take that one for the
record. Maybe we could have that in a closed hearing.
Senator Kennedy. Okay.
[The information referred to follows:]

Iran continues to spend a significant portion of its defense budget
on naval forces. Iran's strategy in part centers on their ability to
control and/or close the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, Iran maintains
the capability to interdict sea lanes of communication throughout the
Arabian Gulf and selectively target one or more Gulf countries' off-
shore infrastructure, commercial transit lanes, and anchorages
throughout the region.
Iran maintains a large inventory of naval mines, an expanding
coastal defense force equipped with a mix of Chinese manufactured anti-
ship cruise missile launchers, an extensive mix of high speed fast
attack craft equipped with torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles and
at least 3,000 smaller patrol boats equipped with a mix of heavy
machine guns, rocket propelled grenade launchers, shoulder launched
surface-to-air missile launchers, and anti-tank guided missiles.
Iranian leaders likely realize their naval forces cannot win a
conventional force-on-force naval engagement with U.S. naval forces,
and have therefore developed a strategy that uses their geographic
advantage to put into play a layered defense strategy that relies on
waves of near-simultaneous attacks against maritime targets to
overwhelm the defenses of the target.
Given Iran's current naval forces capability, Iran could attempt to
temporarily close the Strait of Hormuz for a short period, principally
using naval mines and coastal defense forces.
By regional standards, Iran has a well-equipped and professional
navy. Diplomacy and deterrence are our primary means of maintaining
access through the Strait of Hormuz. Should our relationship with Iran
deteriorate to the point of hostilities, we are capable of neutralizing
the military threat to U.S. naval vessels and preserving access through
the strait for commercial traffic.

Senator Kennedy. Finally, Admiral, there was a reference to
an earlier question that was about benchmarks and reaching a
timeframe for benchmarks. Could you comment on that? Do you
think it's necessary to have measurable benchmarks and
timetables set, and, if those benchmarks are not met, that they
have consequences? Or do you believe that this should be open-
ended in terms of reaching benchmarks?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, clearly, not open-ended. I'm not
sure that's the right term. I've heard this now for the last
week, since I've been in town.
Senator Kennedy. Okay.
Admiral Fallon. We have to see progress. We're going to
have to assess the steps. For example, the Iraqi Government has
a significant list of actions that they have stated their
intention to implement. I'd sure like to see some of these
occur.
Senator Kennedy. Okay. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy.
I believe Senator Thune is next.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you for a lifetime of service to your
country, and thank you, as well, for undertaking what is yet
another challenging task so vital to the security interests of
the United States.
During the first Gulf war, you commanded a carrier air wing
on the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt. Since you've previously
commanded combat operations in the Gulf region, can you comment
on how you believe the CENTCOM AOR has changed since Operation
Desert Storm?
Admiral Fallon. First of all, Senator, the boundaries have
changed. There are other nations now in the CENTCOM area that
were not part of the AOR before, so it's a broader domain,
probably more challenges, certainly more active issues ongoing
now than were the focus of attention at that time. I will be
very interested to getting, now, to the next couple of layers
down to see exactly what people are thinking about and why
they're thinking in those matters, as I get out there. But lots
of changes, of course. There are still lots of historical
issues that remain, from my understanding, and I'll be anxious
to get into these and see what we can do to improve,
collectively, the security of this area.
Senator Thune. Do you think that an increased naval
presence in the region will act as a force multiplier to our
ground forces there?
Admiral Fallon. That'll be something I'll be interested to
find out. My understanding today is that the majority of the
activities and the capabilities that are being used are ground.
But I would note that I've seen news reports, have not seen any
intelligence reports this last couple of days, but it's my
understanding, at least from the news media assessments, that
air support was used. The extent to which this is the case and
what's necessary, I just don't know. I'll have to wait until I
get there.
Senator Thune. Do you think that the Navy can maintain a
two-carrier presence in the region indefinitely without
overstretching the Navy?
Admiral Fallon. I don't know. I think I'd go back and have
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) field that question. I can
tell you that I'm an advocate of the flexibility of our forces,
particularly our maritime and air forces, that we ought to use
these in ways to achieve multiple goals, not just deterrence,
which is clearly one of the objectives here, but to engage in
the regions in which we operate, to help support our alliances
and our relationships with people. At the same time, we gain
valuable experience for our own people in training in different
areas. So I think I would let the CNO handle that one, as far
as an internal Navy issue goes.
Senator Thune. One of the things that you had said in your
answer to the advance policy questions regarding your
assessment of the current situation facing the United States in
Iraq, you stated that, ``Sectarian-motivated violence now
inhibits political progress, effective governance, and economic
development. Many other factors, including poor infrastructure,
corruption, and lack of experience at governance, have
exacerbated widespread mistrust between sectarian groups within
Iraq.''
Do you believe that the situation, as you've described it,
can improve if the current security situation in Iraq remains
as it is?
Admiral Fallon. Unlikely.
Senator Thune. If confirmed as CENTCOM Commander, do you
believe that the Iraqi security forces will benefit from an
increased U.S. troop presence, thereby helping them to secure
Baghdad and lay the foundation for a proper withdrawal of
American troops from Iraq?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think that's a really complex
equation, and what I am very interested in finding out is the
extent to which these Iraqi troops are really capable and are
willing, and have the leadership, to stand up and actually do
the things that we would like to have them do. Numbers are
interesting, but it's what they get for results that matter.
So, I'll be very curious--part of the proposal, as I understand
it, is to also substantially ramp up the number of U.S. embeds
in training for these forces. I'm anxious, if confirmed, to
have my own assessment of how we really stand with these
forces. I suspect we're going to see a wide range of capability
and competence. Clearly, the intention is to raise that level
of competency to the maximum extent possible so that we can do
what we really desire to do here.
Senator Thune. It's been stated that America's commitment
is not open-ended. What do you think the consequences should be
if the Iraqi Government fails to step up and follow through on
its promises?
Admiral Fallon. I think those are questions that are
probably best left to the political and diplomatic levels, but
I will make a couple of observations.
I am anxious to see the kind of demonstrated leadership
that I believe is essential for the Iraqi Government to make
progress with its people, but I'm also sensitive to the fact
that this is a very challenging situation to put someone in, to
have a nation newly emerging from decades of totalitarian
abuse, if you would, from a leadership that was corrupt and
very damaging to individuals and organizations.
There is--my understanding--little in the way of tradition.
There's very little in the history here that lends itself to
the kinds of expectations we would like to have from a
pluralistic democratic society. I am not a particularly patient
man. You could probably get some verification of that from my
staff and from my family. But I believe that in this situation,
we're going to have to have some degree of willingness to give
them some time. Nonetheless, we have to see some action, we
have to get some results.
Senator Thune. We are anxious, Admiral, to get you
confirmed and over there so you can begin to make those
assessments and undertake this very important responsibility.
Thank you, again, for your service, and we look forward to
moving you through the process.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I want to congratulate you and your family for all
the sacrifices that you've made and for this new assignment,
and also express my condolences that you will soon be
relocating from Hawaii, which probably the best command that
anyone can have.
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Senator Webb. You have a remarkable diversity of
experiences you are bringing to the table here. You have a lot
of operational experience, you have time in the other building
over there, you have a lot of experience working with Congress,
and, most importantly, you have high-level command experience.
I want you to know at the outset that I've been really
impressed with the depth and the quality of your answers. I
intend to support you fully.
I have a couple of questions that I would like to put to
you.
First, you've spent a good bit of your career operationally
deployed as a naval aviator. You know the costs of deployment
on family life and just the wear and tear on individuals. There
are people who are calling this situation a new strategy. I've
said, a number of times, I don't believe that. I can't see a
new strategy here, in terms of national strategy. What I see is
a sort of an operational adjustment. The possibility here is
that we're going to end up with continued deployment cycles
until the situation can be figured out. We're working from a
pretty fixed baseline, particularly of soldiers and marines, of
people that are available, and units that are available, for
these tasks. On the one hand, the increase of our troop levels,
in the short term, is going to put additional strain on the
Army and the Marine Corps force structure; in the mid-term,
particularly, it is going to place a hardship on the rotational
cycles of units, possibly even further down the line. I couple
that with a concern that's been stated many times on the
Foreign Relations Committee and in this committee as we've had
these hearings over the last month, that was also stated in the
Iraq Study Group Report, that adding more American troops
``could conceivably worsen those aspects of the security
problem that are fed by the view that the United States
presence is intended to be a long-term occupation.'' So, on the
one hand, we have the wear and tear on the troops, and on the
other, we have the perceptions in Iraq that might actually
cause this to be a countervailing influence. I'm wondering if
you have any comments about that.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I certainly share your concerns,
particularly regarding the impact on our forces. I've watched
this very carefully from my current position, because we, as
you well know, have been rotating Pacific-based forces,
particularly Marine and Army forces, into the CENTCOM region.
So, I stay very close to our commanders, and then make my own
assessments, as well. While the Army and Marine Corps have
different constructs in the way they approach their combat
units and their people, there is a common denominator here, and
that is the mid-level leadership, both enlisted and officer, is
in the mode now of repetitive visits to Iraq and Afghanistan.
There is certainly some tremendously good experience being
gained, but I am highly sensitive to the wear and tear on them,
and their families, in particular.
Clearly, this is not going to be something that we would
like to continue for an extended period of time. I will tell
you that I'm going to watch it very closely. Again, I believe
that the potential for success in Iraq--and I truly believe
that we can be successful, or I wouldn't take this job--a lot
of this depends on our ability to actually use the resources in
an effective manner. The numbers, again, interesting, but
doesn't really tell the tale.
What are we really going to do with these people, and how
are we going to measure the results, seems to me to be the real
issue here.
Senator Webb. You have earned a reputation, and you've
increased that reputation over the past hour or so, as someone
who is willing to pursue diplomatic approaches, not in the
sense of backing away from military issues, such as deterrence,
but as someone who's willing to work to develop the right kind
of harmonious relationships, or at least reduce the level of
hostility in relationships. You've done that with China, you've
done that, to a certain extent, with North Korea. I would like
to point out, we did engage Iran, as everyone knows, after the
initial invasion of Afghanistan. We brought them into the
formula when we were looking at the formation of the Karzai
government. It also should be pointed out that the Iraqi
Government itself is engaging Iran. You've made a few
statements in the recent past about wanting to encourage Iran
to play a constructive role.
An overwhelming percentage of the people who have testified
in the Foreign Relations Committee, and a good percentage of
the people who have testified here, the experts on the region,
say that, in terms of a true national strategy here, unless we
have a robust diplomatic effort of some sort that goes hand in
hand with what we're doing, we're not going to reach a solution
to this problem that will increase the stability of the region
and do the other things that we want to do.
How are you looking at that, in terms of Syria and Iran?
Admiral Fallon. Philosophically, I believe in having all
the cards available to put on the table, as the potential might
exist to play them. My approach to PACOM was to go and ask
questions and listen extensively to every voice that I could
find that I thought had the experience and wisdom to provide me
some good advice before I set out on a project to try to help
us engage in a manner that might be useful on security and
stability. I'd like to pursue the same thing in the Middle
East. I have a lot to learn. It seems to me that we make
progress when we are willing to be open and to use every means
at our disposal to try to achieve the ends. But this, of
course, requires reciprocal actions from the other parties. I
don't know the extent to which those endeavors have been
undertaken in the Middle East, but I am very anxious to find
out and to try to play a constructive role in that.
Obviously, we have a Department of State that is the lead
entity for diplomatic engagement with nations. We're seeing
that play out in the Pacific, with Korea, for example. But
there are roles that we, as military commanders, can play, as
well, and I'll be anxious to have a conversation with the
Secretary of State and her principals in this matter so we can
see what the right way ahead is.
Senator Webb. I appreciate your answers, and wish you good
luck.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Good morning, Admiral. I thought I might differ with my
colleague from Virginia on something or another, but I never
thought I would differ more deeply than to suggest that you now
have a hardship assignment, being stationed in Tampa, Florida.
I want to welcome you and your family to our State, and I know,
on behalf of Governor Charlie Crist, we're delighted that
you'll be coming, upon your confirmation. I do trust and hope
that, during your time there, if there's anything we can do to
make your stay better, or your mission easier to accomplish,
that you will not hesitate to call on us. We consider Tampa to
be a welcoming and friendly place. I know you know our State.
You've been in Jacksonville before, and we look forward to
having you.
Recently, I had the opportunity to speak to a high-ranking
official of the Iraqi Government, in fact, a couple of days
ago--and one of the things that he stressed with me was the
regret of the lack of, and the need for, a security agreement
with the United States Government, between the Iraqi and the
U.S. Governments. Apparently, to his way of thinking, it is
essential for there to be such an agreement in place, for the
Government of Iraq to then fully be able to carry out the type
of things that we anticipate that they should be doing in this
new way forward. Are you aware of the status of that? If not,
would you address that issue, upon taking your command?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I don't have any knowledge of it,
but I'd be happy to take a look at it, if confirmed.
Senator Martinez. Perhaps you and General Petraeus could
look at that. I did not realize that this was an issue, but I--
--
Admiral Fallon. It's probably not surprising, since we're
basically starting from the ground floor and building a defense
and security structure in that country.
Senator Martinez. I think the concern was the lack of
flexibility for them to be able to act and direct their own
forces, and things of that nature.
Admiral, turning us to Afghanistan, and, of course, to
Iraq, as well--the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) seems
to be a key part of our strategy of reconstruction and
rebuilding, which I think is so essential to political
acquiescence, and, I think, particularly in southern
Afghanistan, this is of great importance. I was wondering
whether you have faith in these PRTs and this approach, and
what you might do to enhance their success?
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator. I'll be anxious to get
more detailed understanding of what they've been able to
accomplish. It seems to me that it's a great idea. It looks
terrific on paper. I've actually visited with a couple of these
PRT entities in Iraq and Afghanistan. It seems to me that this
is an issue, in fact, that I'd like to discuss with General
Petraeus, because I think that the effectiveness of these PRTs
is going to be significantly related to the degree of security
of the environment in which they operate. If you were able to
maximize the capabilities of the individuals that are assigned
to these teams, then we need to ensure that they're actually
being able to engage in the population issues that are desired.
So, I don't have enough detail yet. I'm favorably inclined
to this kind of a construct, and look forward to finding out
how we're really doing.
Senator Martinez. One of the issues in Afghanistan, of
course, under NATO command, is the commitment of our NATO
partners to doing all that is necessary. I know the chairman,
in his opening remarks, touched upon the limitations upon the
use of some of our allies forces. How will you be addressing
that issue?
Admiral Fallon. That's one area in which I do have
significant experience, having worked with NATO and been a
commander in NATO before, and spent a couple of years in the
policy shop, working in and out of Brussels. There's some
phenomenal goodness that's come out of the NATO alliance, and
I'll tell you frankly that I've learned a lot from our NATO
allies. But it is challenging to have an operational construct
in which you have a long list of caveats that our commanders
have to deal with. I don't know enough yet to really be making
any public statements on it. I'll be interested to consult with
our folks in Afghanistan. I think there's a tremendous amount
of goodness in having the NATO nations step up and to be a part
of the solution in Afghanistan. Exactly how we figure out how
to optimize this contribution is probably a challenge that we
need to undertake. But I do have familiarity with the process
and a pretty good understanding of the background and how
nations work together in this alliance, so I'll look forward to
working with them.
Senator Martinez. On the issue of Iran, I understand that
there's been some concern raised by the President's comments;
however, I find them to be consistent with the responsibilities
of the Commander in Chief. I think what he said was that if
Iran operatives are causing harm and death to our troops, that
we will deal with them forcefully and that we will come after
them and arrest them or otherwise deal with them. Do you find
anything troubling about that policy? Does it immediately
suggest some more aggressive actions against Iran, other than
dealing with their incursions into Iraq and creating conditions
that will cause harm to our troops?
Admiral Fallon. Seems to me we need to take every step
that's reasonable in the circumstances to try to provide this
atmosphere of security and stability. The Iranian international
behavior has drawn the attention and response from the
international community. This isn't, I believe, just the
President seeing a problem with this country's behavior, the
leadership in this country's behavior. These are issues that
I'm anxious to get a better understanding of, particularly as
it pertains to activity inside of Iraq, and to work, to the
maximum extent possible, to try and find the right solutions.
Senator Martinez. Admiral, my time is expired, but I want
to thank you for your service, your family's sacrifice, and
your willingness to undertake this difficult assignment, and
wish you well.
Thank you.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Fallon, thank you. It's great to be able to listen
to you today. I must say--you couldn't see this, because you
were looking at the committee--when you said that you're not a
patient man, I would describe the response of your family as a
benign smile, which is to say, I think they agreed with that,
but, nonetheless, continue to love you. [Laughter.]
That's a good way to go off to this assignment. We're going
to need your impatience here, as well as the thoughtfulness
that you've shown the committee this morning.
Earlier, in response to a question from one of my
colleagues, you, I think, gave an interesting and important
answer about the extent to which, as I heard it--and I want you
to confirm whether I heard it right--you would be involved in
what might be called the day-to-day command of Multi-National
Forces in Iraq. I thought I heard you say--and, of course,
that's General Petraeus's job; obviously, you'd be watching
what's happening, asking questions, as presumably you would
with General McNeill, when he takes over the NATO forces and
American forces, because you have a lot else to do in that AOR.
Did I hear you right?
Admiral Fallon. I believe you did, from your description of
my comments. I have a regional responsibility, and will be
working hard in those lanes. I will rely on our commanders in
the field, the subordinate commanders, to carry out their jobs.
But I believe that's the responsibility of command to make sure
that I understand what they're doing and how they're doing it.
The key issue for me and for this Nation in Iraq is to be
getting results. So, those are the kinds of questions I'm going
to be asking and the expectations that I'll have for General
Petraeus and other commanders are that they have a plan, they
understand what we're trying to do, and they can show me--the
term ``benchmarks'' has been used here--I'd like to see a plan
of action and milestones to actually get somewhere, and I will
be tracking those results. To the extent that I have to be
engaged with them on a day-to-day level, I will, to assure me,
give me the confidence so that I can come back and assure the
leadership of this Nation that we're actually making progress
in the endeavors we've undertaken.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that answer. Personally, I
believe it's the right one. We have good commanders on the
ground that we've sent there. Obviously, you have broad
responsibilities in the region. It seems to me--and I think no
matter how we feel, particularly about what's happening in Iraq
now here on this panel, and what we think should happen, that
most everybody agrees that what's happening in Iraq has
regional implications and, I would say, is part of a larger
regional conflict playing out. So, to the extent that you have
time to deal with that regionally throughout CENTCOM, the
Middle East generally, which, as you've said, has always been
an area of priority concern for American foreign policy
interested in stability, both politically and because of the
economic importance to our country, of oil, and now facing an
enemy of the larger war against Islamist extremism and
terrorism, an enemy which has, generally speaking, emerged from
that region, I think it's critically important that you have
the time to help our Nation make progress on those larger
concerns.
I want to ask this question. It has struck me, at various
times when I've traveled around to meet our commanders on
different commands, that, in a way that most people don't
appreciate, PACOM from which you've come, but also CENTCOM to
which you're going--the military leader that we put in charge
there is, in my ways, the most prominent American
representative in the region. Sometimes people call for a
special representative to the Middle East. I think you're going
to be the special representative to the Middle East. I
appreciated, before, what you said, in response to another
colleague's question, that you would be consulting with the
State Department and the Secretary of State, because I think--
and I base this with appreciation on the good work, military-
to-military, but also military-to-governmental leaders in the
region that you've done in PACOM--that you have the potential
to help us make progress, not only in our military relations,
but in our diplomatic relations, with our allies and others in
the region. I just wanted to ask you whether, as you go off,
you consider that to be one of your priorities.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, thank you for your confidence.
I'll be happy to play any role that would be constructive in
this area. In the Pacific, the far Pacific and Asia are, of
course, a long way from Washington, D.C., and so, we have the
opportunity to engage, to a greater extent, probably than might
be the case in other areas that are closer to the U.S.
There's also a longstanding tradition of good work by many
of my predecessors out there who have established relationships
and expectations with these nations that continue to this day.
So, it was a real joy to actually get out and visit these
countries, and not just the military people, but their
political, diplomatic leaders, as well, and to get folks to
engage on issues of common concern. It's worked out there, and
I've seen it work in other areas. I'll be anxious to do
whatever I can, and to play as helpful a role as possible here
in this region, as well.
Senator Lieberman. I think there is an enormous role that
you can play. The fact is that in many parts of the world where
people on the ground may not have friendly thoughts toward us,
generally, today, unfortunately, they continue to have a lot of
respect and appreciation for the American military. Your
ability to build on that in your relations with the indigenous
militaries in the region, but also with the political
leadership, I think can be very important at this critical
moment in our relations with the command you're about to take.
I thank you very much, and wish you all the blessings as
you go forward with your family.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, we do all wish you well. Just the 30,000-foot view
of things--and if you've been asked these questions before, I
apologize--but from the big things, in terms of this new
command that you're taking on, General Petraeus said that he
believed that Iraq was part of the overall war on terror, that
it was a central battlefront. Do you concur in that?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, I certainly do.
Senator Graham. So, the outcome in Iraq would affect the
overall war on terror positively or negatively. It's not a
neutral event. You agree?
Admiral Fallon. Absolutely not.
Senator Graham. Okay. There's a debate here on the role of
Congress as to what we should do and how we should do it, and
that's part of democracy. General Petraeus said that a
resolution passed by Congress disapproving of the mission that
he's about to embark on, in his opinion, would be detrimental
to morale. What's your opinion?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think these issues are being
discussed in the political realm, and I'd prefer to keep them
there. I'll be honest with you, I haven't even looked at the
wording of any of these proposals. I have a very significant
military task to do, if confirmed, and I'd much prefer to focus
on that activity to try to effect some results that we could
all be happy with.
Senator Graham. Is Iraq winnable, militarily?
Admiral Fallon. Not militarily. But could this situation in
Iraq be turned around? I firmly believe it can, if we have the
engagement of the capabilities that are necessary to help----
Senator Graham. I agree, we're not seeking a military
victory in Iraq, we're trying to turn around the situation, in
terms of security. That's the goal, right?
Admiral Fallon. Security and stability, so that the
government has a chance to stand up on its own. But this is not
a ``do this, and then maybe you can do this.''
Senator Graham. What would be ``winning'' in Iraq?
Admiral Fallon. I don't know what ``winning'' is. This is
one of the things that I'd be working with the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of State to lay out, with our
subordinate commanders. But it seems to me that what we're
trying to do here is to give this young government an
opportunity to be representative of its people and to govern
this country in a manner that people could be happy.
Senator Graham. Can I suggest what ``winning'' might be?
That you have a stable, functioning democracy in Iraq out of
the ashes of a dictatorship that's an ally in the war on
terror, where women have a robust role in society? Would that
be a good definition of ``winning''?
Admiral Fallon. I think there are a lot of aspects there
that would be pretty positive, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. Could you envision a democracy
emerging in Iraq with this level of violence at the current
state?
Admiral Fallon. I would have two comments. One, clearly not
much in the way of progress is going to occur with the current
levels of violence and instability, but I think that we would
probably be wise to temper our expectations here, that the
likelihood that Iraq is suddenly going to turn into something
that looks close to what we enjoy here in this country is going
to be a long time coming. But, first things first. Get some
stability and security for the people and then----
Senator Graham. Well, that's the question. What is the
first thing first? Is the first thing for us to start
withdrawing, so the Iraqis will step up to the plate and do
more? Or is the first thing to help the Iraqis get control of
the violence so they can solve their problems politically?
What's your view of the first thing?
Admiral Fallon. My view is that there are several first
things, but there's a fundamental understanding of----
Senator Graham. Well, what's the first of the first things?
Admiral Fallon. We have help to increase security and
stability in that country.
Senator Graham. That's going to take, partially, military
involvement.
Admiral Fallon. Sure.
Senator Graham. Let's walk through the whole idea of the
surge. It's on more than one front. The 21,500 troops are
designed to help provide a better security environment
militarily, is that correct?
Admiral Fallon. The troops that are going in are to try to
enable us to effect a different operational construct on the
ground. As General Petraeus outlined in his visit here last
week, the idea is to try----
Senator Graham. What does that mean? We're trying to send
more troops to help the Iraqis control the violence, with them
out front. We're having a better ability to hold. Is that
correct?
Admiral Fallon. Some of the Iraqis have demonstrated an
ability to be effective, and some have not. It's a work in
progress.
Senator Graham. The problem we're trying to send troops to
correct is the ability to hold once we clear. Is that correct?
Admiral Fallon. If we are to be effective, we have to be
able to secure some of these neighborhoods and some of these
areas in the country so that the processes of democracy have a
chance to succeed.
Senator Graham. Do you think troops being sent in can help
accomplish that goal?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. The other thing that we're trying to
surge is economic ability of the country. Unemployment in
Baghdad is at almost 40 percent in some regions. Part of the
strategy is to create jobs so people will not be tempted to
take money from militias to attack our troops. Is that correct?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. Another part of the strategy is to
have a rule of law so that any group, regardless of background,
if they engage in actions against our troops or to topple the
government, they will pay a heavy price. Is that correct?
Admiral Fallon. My understanding is that aspect of society,
government in Iraq, is very poorly developed.
Senator Graham. So, we need to develop along three fronts:
a better rule of law, a better economy, and a better security
environment. That's the plan of the surge, right, on three
fronts?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think there are many tasks in
Iraq, and the biggest challenge right now is to get the level
of violence down, to establish baseline security that will
enable us to move forward on some of these other areas.
Senator Graham. You would support sending more troops to
accomplish that goal?
Admiral Fallon. I don't know how many troops are going to
be necessary to effect the outcome that we want, but General
Petraeus, in my conversations with him, communicated that he
believes he needs these troops now to get moving----
Senator Graham. If he said he needed more, you would
support him?
Admiral Fallon. I don't know, sir. I haven't been there
yet, and I'm not in a position to make that judgment.
Senator Graham. Well, is his judgment about 21,500--does it
make sense to you?
Admiral Fallon. I will better be able to give you an
informed answer when I understand the situation better.
Senator Graham. From the Iranian point of view, if you were
informed, early on in your tenure here, that there was a
sanctuary being provided by the Iranian Government for
terrorists who are killing American soldiers and military
personnel in Iraq, is that in our National interest to allow
that sanctuary to continue?
Admiral Fallon. That doesn't sound like a good idea to me.
It's one of the things that I'll be interested in learning if I
get the opportunity to get the intel briefs from CENTCOM.
Senator Graham. Finally, last question, from the Iranian
point of view, do you consider, based on what you know now,
that the Iranian involvement in Iraq is counterproductive to
developing a democracy in Iraq?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'm not sure what the Iranian
viewpoint is here, but it seems to me that, from my
observations from the outside, that we have not seen a
constructive role in Iraq from Iran. I would be interested to
find out if, in fact, this is the case or not.
Senator Graham. Good luck, Admiral.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, you can tell by the comments
that have been made that there is a difference of opinion on
this committee as to the effectiveness of the President's
decision on an additional 21,000 troops. Senator Warner
mentioned that there are 10 Senators that have joined him. I am
one of the 10. It is my personal feeling that the 21,000
troops, most of which are to go into Baghdad, will not help in
the middle of the situation of sectarian violence that we find,
which Senator Warner correctly noted, goes back a thousand
years. It actually goes back almost 1,500 years, right after
the death of Mohammed, when his son-in-law split off, and that
became the Shiite sect, born of rebellion and revenge. It's
been going on ever since. It's going on there right now.
I want you to know how much I appreciate your candor and
your openmindedness in approaching this, because good
intentioned, well-informed Senators at this table have a
different opinion about this. Personally, I think that
additional troops in Anbar province would help. The Marine
generals there convinced me that it would help. But not in
Baghdad, and certainly not 20,000. Maybe 200,000, maybe 300,000
in Baghdad, but not 20,000.
So, I approach my comments and my questions with that as a
background. I also want to say that this Senator, along with
several others, including numbers that have mentioned it here
today, appreciate the candor with which General Abizaid has
come to that table over and over again. Personally, I hate to
see him step down. But he has given his full measure in a very
difficult situation. As I said to General Petraeus, I would say
to you, Godspeed, Admiral, as you embark on this enormously
important duty, taking over, with the goal of stabilizing Iraq.
I appreciate the fact that you took a risk stepping out,
with regard to China. What can we expect with regard to Iran?
What kind of reach-out? I know you can't answer it, but just,
kind of, give me a flavor of your attitude as we approach this
difficult thing and in that Baker-Hamilton Report--and, by the
way, they are testifying this afternoon to our Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. They said an aggressive diplomatic effort
in the entire region, including Syria and Iran.
But give me the state of your mind, if you would.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I will be very anxious to consult
with colleagues in the Department of State and in the region to
gain a better appreciation than I have of the situation in
Iraq. But I believe that there are some significant
differences, just right off the bat, in the situation I
encountered in China. First and foremost, I believe, is the
extent to which the relationship between the U.S. and China had
developed on many fronts prior to my arrival. In fact, there
were things that we were able to do in our engagement that had
been done by some predecessors. My understanding, from this
vantage point, of the situation in Iran is that we are not at
that level at all. There is activity that's occurred on the
part of the Iranian government that has been seen by the
international community as not only not helpful in the region,
but in the world, and particularly in regard to the potential
to develop nuclear weapons.
So, I believe we have to be cautious and careful in our
approaches to this country, but I am quite anxious to find out,
to the best of my ability, the lay of the land, and then work
with colleagues at State to see what the best way forward is.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you for your comments, and thank
you for your openmindedness.
I want to ask you about the training and equipping of Iraqi
troops. I don't want to concentrate on just the number of Iraqi
troops trained, but, rather, your assessment of how reliable
they are. The reason I want to raise this issue with you is
that I raised this with General Petraeus. The number, 325,000
had been thrown out in an answer to my question from General
Petraeus. I asked, ``Are they reliable?'' He said, ``They are
not all reliable, sir,'' and then went on to modify and qualify
that. Then I said, ``Well, can you put a percentage on it of
how many of them are reliable?'' He says, ``Sir, I cannot, from
this divide.'' Can you give us any sense of what you think that
we would have some greater degree of comfort with regard to a
plan that the President has of going into Baghdad, on a dual
command structure in the operation of ``clear'' and then
``hold,'' before you ever get to ``build,'' having the Iraqi
army and the U.S. military side by side?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'd go back, first, to a comment
on dual command structure. I have no idea what the structure is
that the ground commanders over there have in mind, but
whatever it is, it has to be one in which we can effectively
employ our forces and we have the confidence that we can
safeguard their well-being.
I cannot tell you, with any degree of accuracy, what
percentage of troops, or what the numbers are, that are
effective. I believe that this is pretty judgmental, it's
pretty subjective, in my opinion, my experience, and it's one
that I am very anxious to gain an appreciation for from our
ground commanders.
I've always been someone who felt more comfortable in
smaller numbers of very effective capabilities than a large
number of whatever is decorating the landscape. So, I will be
very interested in trying to find out where we really stand
with these forces.
Because we're going to depend on them to carry the water.
This is the objective here, is to turn this over to them so
they can effectively safeguard their country.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I want to make one other
comment.
It's hard for me to understand how we can come to the table
and support a surge that is predicated on the fact of the
reliability of the Iraqi army, when nobody can answer if, in
fact, the Iraqi army is reliable, and that we're asking 20,000
more Americans to go in there to fight alongside Iraqi troops,
when we, in fact, don't know. Nobody has been able to answer.
These are questions that Senator Warner, Senator Levin, and I
and others have been asking.
I'll just finish, Mr. Chairman. How would you go about
measuring the reliability of the Iraqi troops?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, from my experience, we observe
them training. This is how we measure and conduct our
assessments of our own troops. We watch them in their training,
and then we put them in situations in which we can actually see
them perform, and then we make an assessment of their ability
to measure up to the expectations that we have. I would expect
to have our commanders doing the exact same thing with the
Iraqi forces, with an understanding that, first and foremost,
these are Iraqi forces working for an Iraqi command structure
and Iraqi Government. I think this is an issue in which we have
to be a little careful, here, about putting pretty heavy
fingerprints. Certainly, we have to have confidence that the
security structure in Iraq is going to be able to carry its end
of the bargain up, or clearly we're not going to be successful.
Senator Bill Nelson. In the spirit of candor, you will come
back to us and report on your measurement of whether or not
they're reliable.
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, welcome to the committee today, and thank you for
being the great soldier that you are. We appreciate your
service to our country and your taking on this very daunting
challenge which you have ahead of you at CENTCOM. But knowing
that you spent--although it be a very brief time at Glenco, we
know that you're well trained to take on this task ahead of
you.
Admiral Fallon. Five years in ``Albenny,'' too, sir.
Senator Chambliss. ``Albenny,'' huh? I can tell you were,
when you say it that way.
First of all, let me just say that I think you're going to
be working with another truly great American in General
Petraeus, and this is going to be the first time in a while
that we've had a Navy CENTCOM Commander and an Army general in
theater. Any dynamics there that you think are advantageous to
us, from the standpoint of having two branches represented?
Admiral Fallon. I think you have tremendous potential for
synergy. General Petraeus, widely respected for his expertise
and thoughtful approach to land warfare, and I've been
operating in a different environment, but anxious to
collaborate in any way we can.
Senator Chambliss. Good.
I just have one question for you, and it really relates to
Afghanistan. Last week, I had the privilege of meeting with the
Assistant Minister of Defense for Afghanistan, Mr. Mohibullah.
While he discussed the progress of the Afghan national army is
making in growing and training their forces, he reiterated to
me the importance of a strong and continuous commitment by the
United States to the security of Afghanistan. At the same time,
one of his priorities is to train and equip Afghan forces in
order to lessen the Afghanis' reliance on U.S. forces.
I believe that this is an extremely important priority,
since, in the end, it's the Afghan forces who can best defend
and secure Afghanistan, and because U.S. forces are
increasingly stretched thin due to commitments in Iraq, as well
as elsewhere. I'd appreciate you discussing, a little bit, how
the United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan are partnering
with the Afghan army to facilitate this training and equipping,
and explain what you will do to ensure that this training
proceeds as quickly and efficiently as possible.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I am also anxious to get into this
and find out the details. I don't have the appreciation I'd
like for this. I'm told that the Afghan national army is making
progress, and not just in numbers, but in competence. The
anecdotals that I hear from our people are pretty favorable. We
have more work to do with the police, but I think I can
understand that.
So, I'll be anxious to see just how we're doing, and I'd be
happy to report back to you when I have an assessment of that.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Like others, I want to thank you for your service, and
thank your family.
I am very aware, as I think many Americans are at this
point, of the serious problems that we have in the area of
acquisition and contracting in Iraq. Frankly, I sat in on a
hearing last week in a subcommittee of this committee, where I
realized that this problem is not limited to the conflict in
Iraq, that there are serious and significant issues with the
way the Department of Defense is purchasing and contracting for
services.
Who should be held accountable within the military when
there is serious problems with the way money is being misspent
or in cases of actual fraud and bribery?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'm not familiar with the details
of this issue. We hold commanders accountable. In my
experience, the responsible individuals measure up to our
expectations, and particularly the applicable laws and
regulations, and, if they don't, then they pay the consequence.
Senator McCaskill. I guess what I'm trying to get at is
we're not in a moneymaking operation in the Government. There
is no bottom-line pressure. We don't need to worry about
whether we're making a profit. So, the only way we have of
controlling the way money is spent is who's held accountable.
I'm beginning to get information that is just, frankly, mind-
numbing about the lack of accountability within the Department
of Defense as it relates to problems with acquisition and
purchasing. An example of the Inspector General's (IG) warning
that they are violating the Antideficiency Act, and then they
did it a hundred more times, after warned by the IG that what
they were doing, in terms of the way they were purchasing
things, was violating the law. I understand the rub between
urgent and compelling, and you want to go quickly and get
necessary equipment. I think what I'm worried about is that I
noticed, over the weekend, somebody was found guilty of
bribery, the person who was in charge of comptroller on the
ground with the Provisional Reconstruction Authority in Iraq,
and evidently, a couple of Reserve officers were co-
conspirators. But when does it move up the food chain? I took
the seat of an American figure in history that had a favorite
saying about ``The buck stops here.'' Where does the buck stop
for these problems? Who, within the military command, takes
responsibility for the problems beneath their command as it
relates to acquisition and contracts?
Admiral Fallon. Ma'am, my experience, if I'm the
responsible commander, I'll take responsibility for it. I don't
know any detail of the accusations or of the issues. I'll be
happy to try to find out. I believe that it's a key component
of our responsibility, as leaders, to be accountable, to be
efficient, as well as effective, with the resources that the
American people, the taxpayers of this country, give to us. I
think there should be little doubt in the minds of our
commanders that they're going to be held accountable for that,
and I'd be happy to look into it, if you'd give me some
specifics.
Senator McCaskill. Are you aware of any time under your
command while you've been serving your country--so well, by the
way, in many different capacities--are you ever aware of anyone
under your command being found either administratively or
legally liable under the Antideficiency Act?
Admiral Fallon. I don't think I can answer that question
honestly without a little bit of research.
Senator McCaskill. Okay. As it relates to the rub, when it
comes to that--and that is, equipment for the men and women who
are serving us--I want to briefly tell you a true story.
Last February, there was an article in the Monett, MO,
newspaper about this community coming together because a young
National Guard member who was serving in Iraq had written home
and asked his mom to go down to the local tool and die shop. He
said, ``Mom, we've gotten the armor for vehicles over here in
our unit, but we don't have any tools to put them on. Would you
see if the man that owns the local tool and die shop would send
us the tools we need to put the armor on our vehicles?'' After
that was published a lot of people at Monett were really proud
of what they had done, because, of course, they sent them the
tools to put the armor on their vehicles. My sister and I went
down to the basement and dug out the letters from my dad, who
served in World War II in Europe, and he wrote home for peanut
brittle and for new socks. He didn't write home for tools to
put the armor on his vehicle.
With the National Guard being stretched as they are, and
with all the stories we've read of equipment they're leaving
behind that is no longer operable, how are we taking steps to
make sure that we don't have these young men and women having
to write home for the tools to put the armor on their vehicle?
Admiral Fallon. Ma'am, all I can tell you is that, if I'm
confirmed, I'll do everything in my power to ensure that our
forces are the best-equipped, best-trained, and best-prepared
to conduct the operations we ask them to do.
Senator McCaskill. In terms of before a Guard or Reserve
unit is sent over, is there some internal process that would
help me understand that someone has to check off that all the
equipment they need is ready and available before they're sent?
Or is it, you send them and then try to figure it out later?
Admiral Fallon. No, that's certainly not the way it is.
There are all kinds of processes that are in place to try to
make sure that we have the appropriate equipment and so forth.
But I think a reality of life is that there are going to be
many issues and many cases of desires for things, and the
ability of the system, if you would, be it the Army or the
other Services or the Guard, to meet those demands is something
that has to be worked and negotiated. I think, my experience,
one of the challenges of command is to try to determine what
the appropriate balance is between the desire and the need. I
can tell you from my experience, there's an endless desire. If
I listened to all the demands that were asked of me, there's
not enough money in the world to cover these things.
Senator McCaskill. Sure.
Admiral Fallon. So, you, I would hope, would rely on the
judgment and experience of those in command to try to make the
best determination as to where we are with these things.
I can tell you that, if I get out into this command, I'll
certainly be happy to be take a look at it, and would make it a
priority, to the best of my ability, to make sure that our
folks are as well prepared as we can make them for whatever we
ask them to do.
Senator McCaskill. I would appreciate it if you would try
to follow up with the committee and with my office about the
question I asked about violations of the Antideficiency Act and
what accountability there is.
[The information referred to follows:]

While reporting and remedial action of Antideficiency Act (ADA)
violations are the purview of the Services under title 10, I am
committed to ensuring component commanders meet their fiscal
responsibilities. Also, understand this committee requested ADA
violation data from the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller
during her February 6, 2006, testimony, thus defer to her response on
the number of violations.

Senator McCaskill. Second, I didn't have time for this, but
I would like to know, and, once again, this could be in a
follow-up later. Is there a plan for what happens if this
doesn't work, if the Iraqi brigades don't show up, if the
police personnel don't stand up, if this is not successful--is
there a plan, going forward?
[The information referred to follows:]

Adjustments to our force posture and strategy are conditioned
based. As we identify changes to both the friendly and enemy situation,
modifications and adaptations to our tactical plans will be made and
should be expected. As the Iraqi's deploy forces to the Baghdad area,
we will be able to evaluate their effectiveness and progress.
Simultaneously, we will continually evaluate our effectiveness on the
ground. Our contingency planning for the way forward will be based on
such assessments and we will adjust our plans accordingly.

Senator McCaskill. I think you've been very candid today. I
think we all value that highly. Thank you. I think you've done
a great job today, and I wish you the very best and safety.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Chairman Levin.
Admiral Fallon, you've had, by all accounts, an excellent
tenure in the Pacific. You've been out on that blue water, and
now you have some brown sand to spend your time on. It'll be
quite a change, I think. But your abilities are well
recognized. You're known as a strong leader, a person who's
willing to stand up, say what he believes, and insist that
things happen that ought to happen, and when they should
happen.
I know the equipment situation is not perfect, but I don't
believe any military has ever been better equipped, better
supplied than this one has. In this very distant theater, and
very hostile, and remote areas, I'm sure there have been some
times when equipment and things were not what we needed.
They're entitled to the best equipment, the best strategy--
that's important, a good strategy--and execution of that
strategy. My former Deputy Attorney General in Alabama, General
Richard Allen, a retired Army Reserve general, used to quote
Patton as saying--I think it was like this--``A poor plan
violently executed today is better than a good plan tomorrow.''
What I want to tell you is that there is an intense
interest in this area. We do not have a lot of time. When
General Petraeus says, ``I need this kind of equipment, I need
the State Department to do this, I need improvement on
electricity, or I need more this or that,'' I mean, somebody
has to get it. The time is short. This is a matter of high
national importance, important for the national security of
this country, our foreign policy, our credibility as a Nation,
and our safety, that we be successful in Iraq. I still believe
firmly that is a realistic possibility that we can achieve. But
we don't have much time, and we don't need to wait around a lot
of time.
First let me ask you--I know you've talked with General
Petraeus, and he spoke to me, and I asked him about you, and he
was very complimentary of you. Since he's going back now for
his third tour, he has helped train the Iraqi army. He knows, I
assume, almost all of their leaders personally. Do you think
you have the kind of relationship that can be effective? How
can you help him be effective in Iraq?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'll look forward to working with
General Petraeus. We have only recently met and had several
conversations, not nearly enough to be where we want to be,
but, hopefully, in due course, that'll occur.
I think we're tremendously advantaged having his experience
on the ground. His successive tours over there, although
clearly very demanding on himself, and, particularly, his
family, should give him the insight to be able to pretty
quickly assess where we are, because he's seen this now from
several years back, the year before last, and now today. I
would think this would be immensely valuable as we try to
really find out where we are.
I hope to be of assistance to him, using my experience in
other areas and in this region of the world, as well, to try to
put his work in Iraq in the perspective of the region. I think
that, while he's going to be hard at work inside the country,
working those details, I might be of benefit to him around the
periphery to try to set the conditions that might be favorable
for him to execute his actions inside the country.
Senator Sessions. I think that's a good answer, and it has
potential to be a good relationship, and I hope that you will
work on that.
Senator Reed and, I think, a number of Senators on both
sides of the aisle, have been concerned about the interagency
process. In one of our briefings, I asked, about the State
Department, who's in charge of economic development, and the
answer is the State Department. Who's in charge of
infrastructure improvement? The answer, fundamentally, is the
State Department. Who's in charge of intergovernmental
relations? The answer is the State Department. Who's in charge
of building a court system? Justice and State. Who's in charge
of a lot of these things? Other departments and agencies. All
of those matters I just mentioned, would you not agree, are
critical to a stable and peaceful Iraq--improvement in those
areas?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, of course. We need to make
progress in each of these areas. I can tell you, from my
experience in the Pacific, we had what I consider a terrific
working relationship with the Department of State--with our
Ambassadors in the region, with Secretary Christopher Hill, the
East Asia Pacific Assistant Secretary. We worked issues every
day, from a regional perspective, individual ambassadors
working within the countries, to try to work with each other to
set the conditions to enable us to be successful. I could
probably spend half an hour on that.
Senator Sessions. I'm not demeaning the State Department.
I'm just talking about this problem. You're going in an
area, and we need things done now. We don't need to be waiting
for months and months to get negotiations and go through some
bureaucratic process to get a power plant in some area of Iraq
that's critical to gaining stability for the local mayor, who
wants to be on our side, and we have to ask it, and it goes
around, and, a year later, it occurs. I'm pretty worried about
that. Frankly, the State and the other departments, who also
need to contribute more, are having a hard time getting people
to come. They're not as willing to go out in dangerous areas as
the military is. So, I think some of the matters need to be
turned over to the military, more than perhaps in the past, and
that the other agencies of our Government need to be more
responsive to the legitimate needs of our soldiers, who are
placing their lives at risk.
Are you willing to use the courage and determination that
you're famous for to stand up for our soldiers there, to make
sure this whole interagency process works, and, if need be,
call the President of the United States? He's in charge of this
thing. He's the one that can direct any agency to do anything
to make these things happen.
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, and I believe he's anxious to do
whatever is necessary to enable us to achieve success. We're
going to work this, hard. Recognize the need to have these
folks, but also recognize that the military is an expeditionary
organization, we're geared to working overseas and at long
distances. The Department of State certainly is not, except in
their ambassadors. But I recognize the issue. We're going to do
everything we can.
Senator Sessions. It's something to work on. But, for
example, if you conclude that we need 2 to 3 times the number
of prison bed spaces as I believe we do in the immediate
future, and probably 5 to 10 times in the long term, will you
push the bureaucracy to get moving on it? Because, truthfully,
we have a catch-and-release policy there now, catching
dangerous people and releasing them, because there's no way to
get them housed. Are you willing to take an aggressive action
on that if need be?
Admiral Fallon. You bet, sir.
Senator Sessions. You've also confronted the question of
missile defense in the Pacific with North Korea. Now we see the
danger with the Iranians, who move that up. I think you've said
that our defenses for missile defense capabilities should keep
pace with the threat. It seems that the threat is stepping up
its pace. Do you think that we need to keep pace with that as
we develop our defense budgets?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, Senator. I believe we need to
stay ahead of the power curve, and I believe we've made
substantial progress in this country, in the past year, in
missile defense. We might want to discuss that in a different
setting. But there's been a lot of progress made, and a lot of
lessons that we've learned in the Pacific, that I think would
be applicable here, in other regions of the world, as well.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
We'll have a 3-minute second round.
Admiral, in the advance policy questions, you were asked,
``What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to
make the political compromises necessary for a political
solution?'' What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?
Your answer, ``Current levels of suffering experienced by the
Iraqi population should motivate the political leaders to make
progress.''
Admiral, that hasn't happened. They've had 3\1/2\ years-
plus of suffering. It hasn't motivated the Iraqi political
leaders to make the compromises, which everybody says are
essential to be made if there's going to be an end to the
violence. I don't know of anybody, no matter what side of this
issue they are, or who does not say there must be a political
solution if there's going to be an end to the violence. The
Iraqis have not reached those political compromises. It seems
to me what pressure will be put on them and will make them
reach those compromises is the issue which divides so many of
us. But I don't think your answer, frankly, is satisfactory,
``The suffering experienced by the Iraqi population should
motivate the leaders.'' Of course it should, but it hasn't. So,
my question is, what other leverage, since that hasn't worked,
does the U.S. have in this regard?
Admiral Fallon. Senator Levin, you're aware that the Iraqi
Government has outlined a series of steps that have been called
benchmarks in some quarters----
Chairman Levin. Most of which they've not taken.
Admiral Fallon. --and they need to take these steps.
Chairman Levin. But what's the leverage?
Admiral Fallon. We need to hold them accountable.
Chairman Levin. How?
Admiral Fallon. By, I believe, having a very firm dialogue
with the leadership. Some of that, I believe, has already
occurred. We have given them some time----
Chairman Levin. What are the consequences if they fail
again?
Admiral Fallon. If there's no progress, then I don't
believe we're going to be successful in the military actions.
There has to be a commensurate movement forward in political
background that's going to give these people the confidence
that they can actually effectively move forward as a country.
Chairman Levin. How important, Admiral, are clear, real,
significant consequences on the Iraqi politicians if they fail
to keep these military commitments, political commitments, and
economic commitments? Must there be clear, real, significant
consequences that they understand will follow, if they continue
to fail to keep their commitments?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I believe that there will have to
be a firm understanding that we are not in an open-ended
situation where we're just going to sit around and wait forever
for things to happen. But I also believe that it's not going to
be particularly constructive right now to tape an edict of a
number of actions and give deadlines. I believe in giving them
some time. How much time? I don't know. But time is running
out. Clearly, I think there's a pretty broad understanding,
certainly in my mind and others that I've talked to, that they
are going to need to take actions.
Chairman Levin. Let me just ask if you agree with General
Richard Zilmer, who's the commanding general of our Multi-
National Force-West in Iraq--a Marine general, and head of the
1st Marine Expeditionary Force. He responded to a question the
other day about the impact on morale of discussions of various
resolutions in the U.S. Senate. I'm not asking you to comment
on the resolutions. You've indicated, I think, very properly,
may I say, that you're not going to get involved in the
political side of the debate. You're going to focus on the
military missions. Here's what he said, though, about morale,
which is very much a matter within your concern. He was asked,
``Is there an impact on morale about these--all these debates
that are going on?'' ``Well,'' he said, ``between television
and all the rest, and the Internet--marines, sailors, and
soldiers, they know what's going on, not only in the United
States, but around the world, so they have an opportunity to
see and view the news, as anyone else does.'' He said that,
``Yes, we understand there's a debate back home about the
direction of the war and where it's going.'' He says, ``But the
morale remains very high out here. Our marines understand what
their mission is. We watch what happens back home, but I'm not
concerned about losing sight of the focus.'' Then he said,
``I'm very comfortable that, despite the debate that goes on
back there, our folks over here are staying true to the
mission.''
Have you heard anything to the contrary?
Admiral Fallon. I'm not familiar with that statement. I can
only tell you, Senator, what I observe from my interaction with
our forces there. As General Zilmer is said to have indicated,
they are very focused on their mission. I think the things that
affect their morale most directly are their confidence in one
another, in the training they've received, and, most
importantly, their ability to be successful in their mission.
If they feel that they're actually making progress, then their
morale is going to be good. If they feel that they are being
given necessary tools to accomplish their mission and--be they
equipment and otherwise--if they feel that they're being led by
competent, responsible leaders, then their morale is going to
be good. So, my observation was that, in most of the places
that I visited, my assessment was that our people were feeling
that they had the tools and that they were working hard. I
think it's our responsibility, as leaders, to give them these
necessary capabilities so that they can be successful.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I looked at your distinguished biography and the
sentence in here, ``Admiral Fallon began his naval aviation
service flying in an RA-5C Vigilante with a combat deployment
to Vietnam.'' That was about the time that I was in the
Pentagon, as you recall, and you were a young lieutenant JG
about that time?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Both of us remember very clearly the tragic
circumstances here at home of the American public pulling back
of giving the support of the people to the men and women of the
Armed Forces. I think it was misfortune. A lot of your
generation, when they got back home, having served courageously
and at enormous sacrifice, did not return to the welcome arms
that they were entitled to. Today, it's quite different. I find
the American people are solidly behind our uniformed members
and their families, the greatest respect and the heartfelt
feelings for the losses and the sacrifices, and the respect the
families have for what their servicepersons are doing. So, it's
a changed situation. But I think it's essential that we
continue to work with the American public so that they better
understand what are our goals, and are they realistic, and how
those young people are going to be employed in the new
strategy.
Today, I have to say, with the greatest respect--I've been
privileged here, with my dear friend Carl Levin, 29 years on
this committee, with many officers coming before us in
engagements of our forces overseas and the problems associated,
and when I add that to my own years in the Pentagon, having
been associated with fine persons like yourself, it's a
continuing learning experience for me. I learn greatly from
each day of the association with the men and women in uniform.
My sincere respect and affection for them is just there, and
always will be. But the point I wish to make is that I think
you've handled yourself today with a seasoned wisdom that
you've gained through these many years, and you very carefully
stuck to the role of a military professional, and, no matter
the questions that were put to you, no matter the political
differences we have--and I respect my colleagues on both sides
of the arguments--you steadfastly did not let yourself get
entrapped into that political discussion. You clearly impressed
upon this committee, and, indeed, the Senate, and, I think, the
public that have followed this hearing, you're going out to
this job with the experience we need for that new CENTCOM
Commander, with an open mind and a willingness to look at all
aspects of it and to recognize that the buck stops on your
desk, no matter how many fine subordinate commanders you have--
the buck stops on your desk. You've shown the flexibility, the
openness of mind, to look at the plan as it now is, and to
decide what is best to achieve the mission.
As I say, my concern is on this question of the unified
chain of command, not departing from time-tested tradition. My
concern rests with the American GIs being injected into these
situations which go back, as we say, 1,400 years in
disagreements. I have no disrespect for the Muslim religion,
but it is hard to understand and follow, and how, today, Muslim
is falling upon Muslim with the animosity and the bitterness
that leads to the killing and the instability.
I wish General Petraeus the very best. I'm reassured by
your coming as the overall boss, that you will infuse into your
command that seasoned wisdom that you have, and that, together,
collectively, you can work on this plan and try and make it
work, but make it work in such a way as more and more
responsibility goes to the Iraqis, as recommended by the Baker-
Hamilton Commission. I do hope that you've had an opportunity
to look through this. Their reports, and what they're done, and
how you assess particularly their recommendations with regard
to the diplomatic offensive that we have to take in that
region, bring those countries of that region together, because
the adverse effects--and I totally agree with the President--a
loss of this situation will implode that region into such
strife that it will impact not only the region, but the entire
world, and peace, stability, and the ability of the free
nations to do what we can to eliminate this terrorism, which is
on the growth, unfortunately, and spreading.
I wish you well, but I would just want to remind people
that you bring to this office--and I commend the President for
selecting you--the depth of wisdom that you've exhibited here
today, and you will work with your commanders to get the
violence down, but hopefully to do it in such a way that more
and more of the Iraqis take the lead--that's a phrase we
haven't heard in this debate--take the lead, which means
getting out there in front. They understand the language, they
understand the culture. Our youngsters are doing the best to
support them to take that lead. To that extent, I hope we could
lower the level of Americans involved directly in that Baghdad
situation. There are 6 to 7 million people, and there's only so
much a military force of an additional 20,000, if we have to
put the whole complement in there, can do together with the
Iraqis, unless the Iraqis step up and continue to augment their
participation.
We have trained, over a period of 2\1/2\ years, at an
enormous expense to this country, upwards of 200,000 of these
individuals. What perplexes me, why they can't take over the
principal responsibility, and that our rules of engagement can
be drawn up in such a way as if they're charged with the
sectarian violence. In al Anbar, our resolution says, ``Mr.
President, you're correct, full force,'' because there we're
engaged with al Qaeda, the very organization that precipitated
the problems that we're experiencing in that region today.
I thank you very much, but, Mr. Chairman, I believe this is
an opportunity for our committee to get on record your concerns
about a very important development in our overall national
security, and that is now the recognized capability of China to
interdict satellites above. We have a tremendous dependence on
the use of our satellites for a variety of reasons, and now
there's concrete evidence that they have the capability, from a
ground station to that high altitude, to bring down and
incapacitate those missiles. Those hearing devices that we have
up there, the platforms that are so essential to our overall
security--can you just give us a general assessment of that
situation and how best we are going to cope with it in the
future?
Chairman Levin. I wonder, Senator Warner, if he could do
that for the record, because we are at the tail end of a vote
here now, and I want to give Senator Sessions a few minutes.
Senator Warner. Well, I guess you're right.
[The information referred to follows:]

As you are no doubt aware, China's action evoked strong protests
from other countries with space-based assets, and rightfully so. This
event is being perceived as a major setback for international space
cooperation which over the years has yielded enormous benefit to the
world in the commercial and scientific arenas. Unfortunately, this
event is reminiscent of the ``Cold War'' thinking that fueled the arms
races of that period of history and is counterproductive to future
cooperation programs and objectives. How we should react to this
development must be decided upon after intense national-level study and
in collaboration with the international community.

Senator Warner. Could I impose, Mr. Chairman, by suggesting
that your letter that you received from the Secretary of State
on the matter of benchmarks--I'm all in favor of benchmarks,
but if we try, here in Congress, to legislate too many
benchmarks, really beyond the assessment of the Secretary of
State, who has the principal responsibility, we could force
this Government to go tilt, and we'd better know what's going
to take their place if it goes tilt, because I'm not one to
sign on to this as the last step, this augmentation in Baghdad,
the last chance. I come back to the President's phrase, ``We
cannot let this region implode.'' So, if, for some reason, this
program in Baghdad is not successful, we have to press on with
some other program, and I hope that we don't gravitate--
Congress--to such a detailed outline of benchmarks and the
consequences--there should be consequences for failure, but I
don't want those consequences so heavy that they could
literally topple this government, because we don't know what
might come along and replace it.
Chairman Levin. We'll have more to say about the Secretary
of State's letter later.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Admiral Fallon, as I understand the difficulty we have in
Iraq in achieving a political settlement which ultimately what
we need and will be essential, as Senator Levin has so ably and
often pointed out, but sometimes it's hard to reach an
agreement if one side or the other feels like they're winning
or making progress through violence and military action.
General Keane suggested that some intelligence indicated that
the Sunnis thought they were prevailing, that they were
winning. Then it's hard to negotiate, is it not, with them?
That to really achieve a negotiated political settlement in
which this new government participates in an effective way, we
have to have a certain level of security and stability for that
to occur in. Is that sort of the challenge we have here?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, you know certainly better than I
that the business of politics is about compromise. The level of
violence, particularly recently, in Iraq, I can't believe that
this is encouraging any one of the factions to think that
they're winning, because clearly people are losing lives and an
awful lot of blood and treasure along with it.
If this endeavor of a pluralistic democratic entity in
Baghdad is going to survive, it's going to require political
courage and leadership, I believe, to stand up and make
decisions that can be helpful to people. It's going to be
tough, because they all have baggage. The degree to which any
of them believes they're winning now is pretty much of a
stretch.
Senator Sessions. It's obvious, from our perspective,
they're all losing, the whole country and the region is losing,
and it's sad, beyond belief. But insurgencies oftentimes are
willing to persist for years, as long as they think they are
making some progress toward goals. All I'm saying to you is,
you have to have somebody to negotiate with, you have to have
somebody to have agreements with, and if they're now prepared
to sit down with you and negotiate effectively, I'm not sure we
need to blame it all on the existing government and the Shia
majority, when they are being consistently attacked by the
Sunni/al Qaeda/Baathist group. That's why my understanding is
that we have to maintain a military presence now to try to
stabilize the area so these negotiations can occur.
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir. There's lots of bad and lots of
blame to spread around. My suggestion would be--if I were in a
position to have a discussion with the leaders in Iraq--would
be to do their best to leave as much of the past behind and
just focus on the potential and the consequences if they fail
to take this opportunity and step forward.
Senator Sessions. I think that's correct. Of course, I
believe, in Colombia, for example, it became pretty clear that
oppressing the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
aggressively with military force was the only way that it was
going to reach some sort of peaceful settlement in Colombia. I
think they've made progress by increasing their military
effort. We wish that wouldn't happen, we wish we could talk our
way out of all of these things, but sometimes people are so
determined that it takes military force, unfortunately.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Admiral, thank you. We wish you all the best. We thank you
and your family. We will hope, now, that we'll be able to
report this nomination quickly and get this to the floor.
You're well qualified. I think all have expressed our support
of you. Your candor and your objectivity is important to us.
We're going to continue to rely and count on that. We just wish
you the best of luck.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Levin. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM William J. Fallon,
USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

RELATIONSHIPS

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. If confirmed, you will be entering this important
position at a critical time for the U.S. CENTCOM.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have benefited from a broad range of assignments during
my nearly 40 years in uniform, from tactical to operational command,
and have considerable experience with joint and coalition operations,
including combat operations. I was privileged to command Carrier Air
Wing Eight in U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt in 1991 during Operation Desert
Storm. In 1995, as a flag officer, I served as Commander, Carrier Group
Eight and Commander, Battle Force, U.S. Sixth Fleet during North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation Deliberate Force in
Bosnia. During these operations, I worked closely with joint U.S. and
combined forces in planning, coordinating, and executing sustained
combat operations. I also served as Deputy Director for Operations,
Joint Task Force Southwest Asia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, directing air
operations in the Iraqi No-Fly Zones. I have additional experience in
joint and combined planning and operations at both the operational and
strategic levels through assignments as Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans
and Policy, for the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and as
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff for the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and the
former U.S. Atlantic Command, the predecessor to U.S. Joint Forces
Command. For nearly 3 years, I served as Commander, U.S. Second Fleet
and NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic, working directly with all U.S. armed
services as well as those of our NATO allies in training and in
developing and testing joint and combined tactics for the entire
spectrum of combat operations. As Vice Chief of Naval Operations from
2000 to 2003, I worked in close cooperation with OSD, the Joint Staff,
and the other armed services developing transformational strategies and
joint requirements. As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and U.S.
Atlantic Fleet from October 2003 to February 2005, I served as Naval
Component Commander to U.S. Joint Forces Command, and supported U.S.
Northern Command and U.S. Strategic Command. In my current assignment
as Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), I have gained extensive
experience in the largest combatant command AOR, with more than 60
percent of the world's population and four of the five largest economic
GDPs. This area has presented several challenges, including the
maintenance of sensitive alliances, insurgencies in southeast Asia, the
situation in North Korea, and the U.S. relationship with the People's
Republic of China. The widely varied opportunities I have had during my
career have given me a deep appreciation of, and experience with, all
branches of our Armed Forces, the interagency, and many of our allies
and partners.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Commander, U.S. CENTCOM?
Answer.

Combatting the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan
and directing the restoration of security and stability in
these nations.
Countering the extremist threat which destabilizes
governments in the region, commits attacks on the U.S. and
numerous other nations, and continues to threaten the U.S.
Homeland.
The relationship with Iran and its support to
insurgents and destabilizing activities in regional nations.
Protecting vital lines of commerce in the region.
Continuing instability and humanitarian crises in
Africa.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Specifically, I intend to:

Support U.S. national interests and policies.
Work closely with our ambassadors and military
commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to address the critical need
for security and stability in these countries.
Work in close consultation with U.S. agencies and
military commanders, and with our friends in the region to
develop a clear understanding and appreciation of U.S. national
interests and the issues facing the Nations in the U.S. CENTCOM
region.
Signal the strong resolve of the United States to
protect its national interests and to enhance regional
stability.
Posture U.S. forces to deploy and respond rapidly to
regional security concerns.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of Commander, U.S. CENTCOM?
Answer. Clearly, the most serious problems are the ongoing combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Question. What management actions and timelines would you establish
to address these problems?
Answer. My intention is to gain a full appreciation of the
situation in the region as quickly as possible and then to provide
appropriate direction and guidance to our military forces.
iraq
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing
the United States in Iraq?
Answer. Significant progress has been made in developing Iraqi
security forces and governing institutions since the collapse of the
Saddam Hussein regime. The Iraqi people have approved a new
constitution and elected a permanent, multi-party government. The Iraqi
government has recognized the requirement for security and has
identified steps to improve the prospects for political reconciliation
and economic growth.
However, the insurgent bombing of the Al Askariya Mosque in
February 2006 reversed the momentum that followed the successful Iraqi
elections. Sectarian-motivated violence now inhibits political
progress, effective governance, and economic development. Many other
factors, including poor infrastructure, corruption, and lack of
experience at governance have exacerbated widespread mistrust between
sectarian groups within Iraq.
Levels of violence perpetuated by al Qaeda terrorists, insurgents
aligned with the previous regime and competing sectarian death squads
have increased steadily during the past year. Al Qaeda operatives and
their allies target U.S. and Iraqi security forces and innocent
civilians in an effort to discredit the U.S. and Iraqi governments and
incite sectarian violence wherever possible. Their goal is instability
and chaos. Other insurgents and sectarian entities are pursuing their
own murderous agendas, receiving support from within Iran and Syria.
Although growing in number and confidence, much of the Iraqi
security force has not yet demonstrated an ability to stand on its own
in the face of multiple onslaughts to stability. U.S. military strategy
of having the Iraqi security forces lead most of the security effort
has not been as successful as anticipated.
Question. From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned
from our experience in Iraq?
Answer. U.S. forces in Iraq remain disciplined, spirited, and
adaptable in the face of difficult battlefield conditions. Our forces
have been training and have partnered with Iraqi security forces to
establish a secure environment for the newly elected government of
Iraq. This endeavor has proven more challenging than expected with many
assumptions either incorrectly drawn or unfulfilled. Securing the
stability of the country has been more difficult than anticipated. Our
ability to correctly assess the political, economic, and security
situation in Iraq has been lacking. While successful in clearing areas
of insurgent and terrorist activity, we have relearned the need to hold
these areas secure until Iraqi security forces and local political and
economic activity have provided essential confidence to the population.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes
the U.S. has made to date in Iraq? Which of these do you believe are
still having an impact?
Answer. President Bush, in his 10 January address to the Nation,
highlighted the key mistakes:

Miscalculating that initial elections would bring
Iraqis together;
Believing that as we trained Iraqi security forces, we
could accomplish our mission with fewer U.S. troops;
Underestimating the ability of al Qaeda and Sunni
insurgents to provoke sectarian conflict; and
Failing to anticipate the extent of the response of
radical Shia elements and death squads.

The issues cited here are still effecting the situation but actions
are underway by the Iraqi and U.S. Governments to address them.
Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the
United States needs to take in Iraq?
Answer. The most important step we need to take in Iraq is to work
with the Iraqi government to improve security. We also need to
facilitate economic and infrastructure development while helping the
Iraqis establish and maintain a viable representative political
process.
Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the
new Iraq strategy recently announced by the President?
Answer. In my position as Commander U.S. PACOM, I have not directly
participated in the development of the new Iraq strategy.
Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution
in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?
Answer. Although the military effort is critical to progress, a
successful Iraq strategy will require coordinated economic, diplomatic,
and political as well as security development.
Question. Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi
political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?
Answer. A successful political process requires compromise. The
three principal factions in Iraq must find a way to cooperate on
essential issues.
Question. Do you believe that quelling the current level of
violence is a necessary condition for a political solution?
Answer. Substantially reducing the level of sectarian violence is
essential to facilitate improved political process.
Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders
to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution?
What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?
Answer. Current levels of suffering experienced by the Iraqi
population should motivate the political leaders to make progress.
President Bush has clearly stated the need for a partnership between
Prime Minister Maliki, Iraqi moderates, and the United States where all
parties are clear on expectations and responsibilities. The Iraqi
government has cited a number of actions it considers essential to
national political progress. We should carefully monitor and assess the
progress in these actions.
Question. What do you see as a reasonable estimate of the time it
will take to demonstrate success in securing Baghdad?
Answer. I would not speculate on the amount of time or levels of
success which might be possible from my current position. But the
urgent need to make progress is obvious.
Question. In the fiscal year 2007 Defense Authorization and
Appropriation Acts Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek
permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq.
Do you agree that it is not and should not be the policy of the
United States to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to
exercise control over Iraq's oil resources?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If you agree, what are your views on the construction of
any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?
Answer. Operational commanders may request construction of
temporary sites to facilitate necessary operations, and I would give
appropriate consideration to such requests.
Question. For the past several years, the Army and Marine Corps
have had separate areas of responsibility in Iraq, with Marine forces
assigned to the Anbar province. The two services have different
logistics systems, and the Combined Forces Land Component Command
(CFLCC) appears to now focus almost exclusively on Army requirements.
Do you believe the Army and Marine Corps forces operating in Iraq
have an appropriate degree of jointness?
Answer. From observation during my visits to Iraq and through
discussion with various commanders, I believe the Army and Marine Corps
forces operating in Iraq have demonstrated an adequate degree of Joint
cooperation, both operationally and logistically. The 3rd Army
Headquarters serves both as the CFLCC and as the Army Forces (ARFOR)
command with title 10 logistics responsibilities. As the ARFOR
Commander, 3rd Army conducts joint and combined logistics operations,
including support for Marine Expeditionary Unit rotations. At the
tactical level, an Army Brigade Combat Team is deployed with the Marine
Expeditionary Force operating in Anbar Province. An Army Corps Support
Group, also deployed to Anbar Province, integrates logistic support for
Marine units within the Theater Logistics Architecture. If confirmed, I
will assess all aspects of jointness and ensure collaboration on
operational and logistic matters between the Services.
Question. Do you see any problems with the extent of reliance of
U.S. forces in Iraq on contractor support?
Answer. I do not have sufficient knowledge to address this
question.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. More than 4 years after securing a military victory
against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, that nation remains a
place with areas of unrest.
What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan?
Answer. Much progress has been achieved in Afghanistan. The
expansion of the International Security and Assistance Force and
transition of the counterinsurgency mission to NATO command are
positive steps. The resurgence of the Taliban in some areas of the
country is a concern and must be addressed if political progress and
economic development are to be sustained.
Question. What is the status of efforts to develop and field an
effective Afghan Army and national police force?
Answer. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is becoming more
professional and growing in confidence. As of this month, approximately
32,000 of the 70,000 planned ANA soldiers have received training and
equipment and now routinely engage the enemy alongside U.S. and
coalition forces.
More than 60,000 of the planned 82,000 Ministry of the Interior
police officers have received training and equipment. Although they are
not as professional or capable as the ANA, improvement has been noted.
Continued focus on Afghan Police training and education will be
critical to the future of Afghanistan, and close attention must be paid
to ensure progress is being made in the effectiveness of the force.
Question. In your view, what additional military or other
assistance is required to ensure the transition of Afghanistan to a
stable, democratic, and economically viable nation?
Answer. Continued military assistance to expand security will be
the critical enabler of success. Support to the ANA and police must
continue as well as economic assistance and expanding good governance
throughout Afghanistan.
Question. In October 2006, British LTG Richards, Commander of the
NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in
Afghanistan, warned that coalition forces may be running out of time to
show measurable progress in Afghanistan. He stated that if there is no
progress in improving conditions for the Afghani people, they may
choose ``the rotten future offered by the Taliban'' over the hopeful
future which coalition forces have taken too long to deliver.
Do you agree with LTG Richards' assessment that coalition forces
have a limited window of opportunity in which to show improvements in
the lives of the Afghani people?
Answer. I would not speculate on the resilience of the Afghan
people, although I would note they have endured the trauma of war for
almost 30 years.
Question. What steps do you believe coalition forces can take to
improve the lives of the Afghani people in the near term?
Answer. We should strive to provide enhanced security in areas
where the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and international aid
agencies are assisting reconstruction efforts. We should look for
economic development opportunities to offset the opium production.
We should support ISAF Afghan Development Zone (ADZ) initiatives,
with security efforts in key regions setting conditions for
reconstruction and governance. ADZs complement the Afghan Government's
National Development Strategy for security, governance, rule of law,
and human rights, and economic and social development. This overarching
strategy deserves our support.
Question. Military intelligence officials have stated that Taliban
and al Qaeda attacks across the Afghan-Pakistan border have increased
fourfold since September when the Pakistan Government signed an
agreement with tribal elders in the border region ceding control over
some border areas in western Pakistan.
What more can be done to prevent cross border incursions by the
Taliban and al Qaeda from Pakistan into Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to study the situation in
Afghanistan and consult with the military leadership there to determine
the best way to address this issue.
Question. In your view, should the Pakistan Government be doing
more to prevent these cross-border incursions?
Answer. Yes. I believe that more could be done, and I will focus
attention on this issue to determine what recommendations I will
forward in this regard.
Question. What role do you believe U.S. forces should play?
Answer. We can enhance the capacity of Pakistan's Frontier Corps
through our security assistance program. We will continue to provide
intelligence support as well.
Question. Afghanistan is in the CENTCOM's area of responsibility
(AOR). U.S. European Command (EUCOM) oversees the NATO ISAF force in
Afghanistan.
In your view, does this ``seam'' present any problems for the
coordination and effectiveness of the ISAF and Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) missions in Afghanistan?
Answer. I do not foresee any issues with the CENTCOM-SHAPE
Relationship. NATO involvement in Afghanistan has been closely
coordinated with CENTCOM. Throughout the process, measures to ensure
synergy, maintenance of momentum, and reliable deconfliction of
operations were painstakingly considered. I have extensive personal
experience with the NATO military and political processes, which should
facilitate my interaction and effectiveness with the NATO-CENTCOM
relationship.

PAKISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current status of U.S.-
Pakistan military cooperation?
Answer. U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation has progressively
improved since 11 September 2001. We coordinate military activities
through a U.S. liaison team in Islamabad and the Pakistani military
presence in Tampa, Bahrain, and Afghanistan.
Question. What is your assessment of the level of cooperation we
have received from Pakistan in the war on terrorism?
Answer. Pakistan is an effective and vital partner in the war on
terror. Pakistan has captured or killed more suspected AQ and Taliban
than any other coalition member.
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation with
regard to Pakistani-Indian relations?
Answer. Relations between India and Pakistan have improved through
confidence building measures and dialogue during the past 2 years.
Kashmir remains the core issue, but progress is being realized through
incremental steps.

FORMER SOVIET UNION STATES

Question. Several former Soviet states have played roles in
supporting the U.S. and coalition forces in the global war on
terrorism.
What is your assessment of current U.S. military relationships with
these nations, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan?
Answer. Contributions from former Soviet states in Central Asia
have been significant and helpful. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan have provided basing and overflight from the beginning of
the global war on terror. Other former Soviet states including Latvia,
Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Georgia, and Estonia have provided
troops in support of the coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The U.S. military relationship with many of the former Soviet
states continues to develop incrementally. Much of our interaction is
focused on building the capacity of these nations to ensure regional
stability and security.
Question. What security challenges do you see in this portion of
the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. The security challenges in the Central Asian states are of
concern because of the impact of extremism and criminal activity on
economic development and the fragility of the governments.
Additionally, the harsh environmental legacy of Soviet weapons and
industrial programs, combined with severely restricted supplies of
fresh water, further hobble legitimate economic growth.

IRAN

Question. Ambassador John Negroponte, Director of National
Intelligence, recently testified before the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee about Iran's growing influence in the Persian Gulf region. He
stated, ``Under the Ahmadinejad government, Iran is enhancing its
ability to project its military power, primarily with ballistic
missiles and naval power--with the goal of dominating the Gulf region
and deterring potential adversaries.''
Do you agree with Ambassador Negroponte's assessment to the Senate
Select Intelligence Committee regarding Iran's goals in the region?
Answer. Yes. In addition to these conventional means, Iran is
attempting to enhance its power through asymmetric means, such as
support to international terrorism and the pursuit of a nuclear weapons
capability.
Question. What options do you believe are available to the United
States to counter Iran's growing influence in the region?
Answer. We should continue to work through the United Nations
Security Council to enjoin the Iranian regime to halt its enrichment of
uranium and its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
We should continue to develop a regional security framework with
our partners in the Gulf to deter Iranian aggression and protect our
common interests. This framework can include security assistance,
missile defense, joint exercises, and information sharing.
Question. What is the view of U.S. allies in the region with regard
to the threat posed by Iran?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to speak with our allies in the
region about this issue. From my perspective as PACOM commander, I
sense that our allies in the region are more concerned about the
potential threat posed by Iran now than at any time since the Iran-Iraq
War.
Question. What is your assessment of the prospects for political
reform in Iran?
Answer. Iran's political system is slowly changing as its people
increasingly participate in representative processes. However, the
unelected institutions of the Iranian regime are well entrenched, hold
the preponderance of political power in Iran, and control of Iran's
military forces and intelligence services.
Question. Do you believe that a protracted deployment of U.S.
troops in Iraq, if the situation on the ground in Iraq does not
improve, could strengthen Iran's influence in the region?
Answer. The protracted deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq would not
necessarily strengthen Iran's influence in the region.

IRAQI REFUGEES

Question. The United Nations estimates that approximately 2.3
million Iraqis have fled the violence in their country; 1.8 million
have fled to surrounding countries, while some 500,000 have vacated
their homes for safer areas within Iraq.
What is your assessment of the refugee crisis in Iraq?
Answer. There are some refugee problems inside Iraq, and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is currently working the
situation in the Northern Kurdistan Region. A greater refugee challenge
exists in neighboring countries, which are dealing with the situation
with their own resources and the support of the International
Community. Once Iraq is stable and secure, I believe that a majority
will return. The larger problem in Iraq is Internally Displaced Persons
who affect regional demographics and pose a potential threat to long-
term security and stability.
Question. Beyond working to improve the security environment in
Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in
addressing this crisis?
Answer. The U.S. military's role in providing humanitarian relief
for these persons will depend on the needs of the mission in Iraq and
the availability of U.S. forces.

HORN OF AFRICA

Question. One of CENTCOM's significant sub-regions is the Horn of
Africa (HOA). Until a new African Command is stood up, CENTCOM will
continue to be responsible for this region, which will likely
experience continued instability and humanitarian crisis as
demonstrated by recent events in Somalia.
What is the strategic importance of this region to the United
States?
Answer. HOA sits astride one of the most critical sea lines of
communication in the world. It is imperative that we maintain freedom
of navigation to ensure strategic maritime access to the CENTCOM AOR
and freedom of movement of ocean-borne commerce. We must remain engaged
in HOA to deny terrorist organizations the ability to operate freely by
building host nation capacities and governance capability to reduce
ungoverned spaces. Commander, Joint Task Force-HOA has been engaged
with key partner countries in the area, conducting humanitarian and
civil military operations, as well as building host nation
capabilities.
Question. Over the last few weeks, the U.S. military has had a very
public presence in Somalia.
What is your understanding of the U.S. Government's policy for
Somalia and how U.S. military action there supports that policy?
Answer. The U.S. has three principal goals in Somalia: 1) support
the establishment of a stable government based on genuine national
reconciliation; 2) promote security and stability on the ground; and 3)
respond to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.

AFRICA COMMAND

Question. Over the last year or so, the U.S. Government has
mobilized more of its resources to focus on the strategic importance of
Africa. The Department of Defense has played an important role through
two Combatant Commands--EUCOM via the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism
Program and CENTCOM via the creation of the Combined Joint Task Force--
HOA. There are 53 countries in Africa--42 are in the EUCOM AOR and 11
are in the CENTCOM AOR.
Do you support the proposal to create a new unified command for
Africa and to transfer responsibility for operations in the HOA to that
new command?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed as Commander, USCENTCOM, I will support
the standup of AFRICOM by doing whatever we can to implement this new
command.
Question. What impact would such a transfer have on the conduct of
antiterrorism and other operations in that region?
Answer. I would not anticipate any degradation in our antiterrorism
efforts.
Question. What will you do to ensure a smooth transition and to
manage the seams between CENTCOM and the new African Command?
Answer. To ensure a smooth transition, AFRICOM will be established
incrementally with the support of EUCOM, which is responsible for
military operations in most of Africa. This phased approach should
minimize turnover concerns as mission sets are transferred from EUCOM,
CENTCOM, and PACOM to AFRICOM.
With respect to seams between CENTCOM and AFRICOM, we will manage
these situations through direct coordination between commands, just as
we have done previously with EUCOM and continue to do with PACOM.

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
2006 memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that
standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of
reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that
the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact
on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are
treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
Answer. I believe that we should pay careful attention to ensuring
that standards for detainee treatment comply fully with the law and
reflect American values. We also should be aware of the risk that the
manner in which we treat our own detainees may have an effect on the
manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are treated
should they be captured in future conflicts. U.S. Armed Forces policy
is to treat all detainees, no matter their status, humanely and in
accordance with the law of war. However, as you well know, the enemy we
are currently fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq have repeatedly
demonstrated their absolute disregard for the law of war, including the
provisions of Common Article 3.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective
counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. How will you ensure that U.S. forces in the CENTCOM AOR
comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive,
and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding
detention and interrogation operations?
Answer. I will continue to emphasize law of war training and
specific training for those involved in interrogation. I will also
ensure U.S. operational commanders comply with all applicable
regulations and law, including the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.

SCIENTIFIC ADVISORS FOR COMBATANT COMMANDERS

Question. Scientific advisors to combatant commanders have been
effectively utilized as a means of technology transition and providing
operators' solutions to warfighter challenges.
If confirmed, how would your command make use of the technical
expertise available in the Services and their laboratories in order to
provide scientific and technical advice to the warfighters?
Answer. If confirmed, I will task the Science Advisor to work
closely with the broader scientific community--particularly the Service
laboratories and the Office of the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering--to ensure that U.S. CENTCOM benefits from the best
technical advice our Nation has to offer. Routine interaction with
these organizations would also help U.S. CENTCOM shape the Department's
research and development effort to match up with command requirements.

BANDWIDTH ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Question. Unmanned assets, such as persistent unmanned aerial
vehicles, require tremendous bandwidth capacity. Command and control,
blue force tracking and movement of intelligence products also use
significant amounts of bandwidth.
What challenges do you anticipate in fully utilizing these
important assets with the limited bandwidth currently available to the
warfighter?
Answer. The chief challenge is efficiently managing the bandwidth
to achieve maximum impact from intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities.
Question. What is your assessment of the bandwidth available during
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)?
Answer. My initial assessment is that bandwidth is sufficient for
intelligence product dissemination and situational awareness. However,
as the requirement for additional full-motion video ISR assets and
other bandwidth intensive systems come online, the current bandwidth
could become a limiting factor, but I would push hard for increased
efficiency of utilization.

MISSILE AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREATS

Question. Iran continues to develop short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles and could develop ballistic missiles capable of
reaching the United States in the relatively near-term. The
Intelligence Community assesses that Iran could test such a missile
later this decade and will ``likely'' pose an ICBM threat to the United
States by 2015. Iran also has a significant naval presence in the
Persian Gulf, and shore-based antiship cruise missiles. The
Intelligence Community also assesses that Iran is actively pursuing
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and could have nuclear weapons
within the decade.
How do you evaluate Iran's current capability to use ballistic
missiles and WMD against U.S. forces, allies and friends, and what is
your projection of Iran's future capabilities?
Answer. Iran can employ ballistic missiles up to 1,300 km with
little/no advance warning and with greater accuracy and effectiveness
than Iraq demonstrated in 1991 and 2003. Iran has expanded ballistic
missile forces and capabilities, but remains dependent on foreign
technical support. Tehran can employ CW via missile, artillery, and
aerial weapons, although it is unclear if a standing CW stockpile
exists. Iran is unlikely to produce enough fissile material for a
nuclear weapon until mid-next decade.
Question. How do you evaluate Iran's cruise missile capabilities,
and Iran's ability to threaten U.S. naval forces and commercial
shipping in the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Arabian
Sea?
Answer. Iran can threaten undefended commercial shipping and create
a tactically challenging environment for naval forces in constrained
waters of the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf region. However, Iran also
has operational and tactical weaknesses that can be effectively
exploited by U.S. forces.
Question. If confirmed, how would you protect the troops and allies
under your command from these threats?
Answer. After consulting with select nations in the CENTCOM AOR and
confirming their support, I would use a combination of U.S. and
Coalition Ballistic Missile Defense and Early Warning (EW) capabilities
to protect both U.S. and Coalition critical military and geopolitical
assets.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. CENTCOM, you will be
responsible for ensuring compliance with DOD policies on prevention of
and response to sexual assaults throughout the CENTCOM AOR.
What lessons did you learn in implementation of sexual assault
training, reporting protocols and command awareness during your tour as
Commander, U.S. PACOM, that can be applied in the U.S. CENTCOM?
Answer. As PACOM Commander, I observed that training--both pre-
deployment and response personnel training--is essential in preventing
and effectively responding to allegations and incidents of sexual
assault. Additionally, I believe that the Department of Defense Sexual
Assault Prevention Program has provided commanders clear, proactive
sexual assault response protocols.
Question. What are the unique issues that you believe need to be
addressed to ensure that policies on prevention, reporting, medical
treatment and victim support are available in the operational
environments of Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. We should maintain sexual assault awareness in the
operational environment by conducting recurring in-theater training. We
should also continue to ensure that supplies, trained personnel, and
transportation resources are readily accessible and available to
deployed personnel.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the current adequacy
of such resources in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that CENTCOM sexual assault
policy and practice align with current Department of Defense polices as
prescribed in DODD 6495 and DODI 6495. I would maintain command
emphasis on these policies and the Sexual Assault Prevention Program.

MENTAL HEALTH IN THEATER

Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made
three separate assessments over the past several years detailing the
immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S.
soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT III, found that
multiple deployers reported experiencing higher levels of acute stress,
and that overall levels of combat stressors are increasing. These types
of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of troops
are returning from duty in Iraq with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,
depression, and other mental health issues.
Please summarize for the committee your understanding of the key
findings of each of the previous mental health assessments, actions
taken to address key findings in each, and the effect of such actions.
Answer. I understand these studies concluded that multiple or long
deployments can lead to increased incidents of mental health issues.
The level of combat and quality of noncommissioned officer leadership
directly affect servicemembers' mental health. The Military Services
have established an array of assessment, prevention, and treatment
programs that provide mental health support before, during, and after
deployments.
I understand that CENTCOM policy requires pre- and post-deployment
mental health assessments and reassessments. MNF-I has created an
expert working group to assess the status of mental health in the AOR.
CENTCOM has also redistributed mental health staff to provide better
coverage for deployed personnel.
Question. If confirmed, would you support continuous mental health
assessments of the U.S. forces in Iraq, to include naval forces on the
ground?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you have any thoughts on how we can best address the
mental health needs of our troops and their families, in terms of both
prevention and treatment?
Answer. We must continue to re-examine whether we are doing all we
should to meet the mental health needs of deployed personnel. Where
possible, I will work with the Service Chiefs to ensure they have
adequate programs and support systems at their respective installations
to support servicemembers and their families back home.
Question. If confirmed, will you request additional behavioral
health resources from all three Services, if needed, to meet the needs
of current and future units deployed to Iraq?
Answer. Yes. If additional Mental Health Forces are requested in
support of OIF/OEF and global war on terrorism, I will work with the
Joint Staff and the Global Force Manager, Joint Forces Command, for
additional mental health resources.
Question. The DOD Mental Health Task Force recently received
testimony that the U.S. military does not have enough adequately
trained mental health professionals to meet the growing needs for
mental health support in the military.
Do you share this concern about the adequacy of mental health
professionals to support members of the Armed Forces, especially those
in deployed and operational environments, and their families?
Answer. I am always concerned about the welfare of our
servicemembers, our DOD civilians, and their families. If confirmed, I
would expect commanders to leverage all resources--morale, welfare,
religious support, and family support programs as well as health
professionals--to meet the mental health needs of our servicemembers
and their families. I believe that if additional capabilities were
needed in the CENTCOM AOR, the Services would provide them.
Question. As commander of the U.S. PACOM, what steps have you taken
to ensure adequate mental health support for deployed military members
and their families?
Answer. As PACOM Commander, I have worked with my subordinate
commanders to regularly assess our mental health requirements and the
adequacy of available mental health resources.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure the
adequacy of mental health support and resources in the CENTCOM AOR both
in general, and specifically in combat zones?
Answer. The mental health of deployed forces in theater is a major
responsibility of the leadership of the Armed Forces. It is a
responsibility to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine,
to the fighting force as a whole, to their families, and to the Nation.
The military Services have in place a broad array of assessment,
prevention, and treatment programs. Medical conditions that may limit
or disqualify deployed servicemembers are continually assessed, while
screening, assessment, and educational programs take place across the
entire deployment cycle. A spectrum of prevention, stress control, and
mental health care is available in theater. Pre- and post-deployment
health assessments are conducted. Each branch of Service has specific
combat stress and deployment mental health support programs available
before, during, and after the deployment cycle. These provide support
tailored to the Service's mission and risk factors their personnel
might face. In addition, cross-functional planning teams bring together
subject matter experts from across the Services, the Joint Staff, and
DOD.
I support a very robust program of mental health prevention,
assessment, and treatment. I have not had an opportunity to be briefed
on the Army's MHAT assessments, nor to develop a specific action plan
to address any needed strengthening of the current program. If I am
confirmed, I will look to both our health care professionals and
command leadership to help me assess the needs, and will seek support
from the military and civilian leadership of the Department. If I am
confirmed and if I determine additional mental health professionals are
needed in theater, I will ask for them.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

LEVERAGE ON IRAQI LEADERS

1. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, Iraqi political leaders have
demonstrated little progress in decreasing the increased levels of
sectarian violence over the past year. On page 9, of responses provided
to the advance policy questions, specifically ``What do you believe
will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises
necessary for a political solution? What leverage does the U.S. have in
this regard?'' The answer provided stated, ``Current levels of
suffering experienced by the Iraqi population should motivate the
political leaders to make progress.'' Does the U.S. have any other
leverage over the Iraqi political leaders?
Admiral Fallon. There are a number of economic, political, and
military options that could offer a degree of leverage. General
Petraeus is working directly with officials in the Government of Iraq
to ascertain the best combination of U.S. policies to expedite national
reconciliation.

2. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, many of us believe that
beginning a phased redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq will force the
Iraqis to make the tough political compromises to make progress. Do you
think adjustments in our force levels offer potential leverage with the
Iraqis?
Admiral Fallon. The Government of Iraq is under tremendous pressure
from the U.S. Government and the Iraqi people to produce tangible
results. Decreasing our troop levels at this time would weaken Prime
Minister Maliki and embolden the insurgents.
Although our support for the Government of Iraq is not open ended,
it is imperative that we provide Prime Minister Maliki and his
government time and space to establish the institutions of governance,
after decades of totalitarian rule.

PRIVATE CONTRACTORS

3. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, many of us on the Committee
have been concerned about the extent to which we have relied on private
contractors in Iraq. On page 10, of responses provided to the advance
policy questions, specifically ``Do you see any problems with the
extent of reliance of U.S. forces in Iraq on contractor support?'' The
answer provided stated, ``I do not have sufficient knowledge to address
this question." Will you look into this issue once you are confirmed?
Admiral Fallon. Yes.

IRAQI GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY

4. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, a main tenet of
counterinsurgency doctrine is that victory is achieved when the
populace consents to the government's legitimacy and stops their active
and passive support to the insurgency. Do you believe that the current
government in Baghdad is currently governing in a way that enhances its
legitimacy?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, the current government is focused on quickly
restoring basic services to increase populace support. Establishing
reasonable security is of primary importance in this endeavor.

5. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, is the fighting in Baghdad the
result of an insurgency or a sectarian civil war?
Admiral Fallon. Iraqi society's growing polarization, the
persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general,
and all sides' ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an
increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism.
Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress
during the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security
situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the
latter part of 2006.
Extremists--most notably the Sunni jihadist group al Qaeda in Iraq
and Shia oppositionist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)--continue to act as very
effective accelerators for what has become a self-sustaining inter-
sectarian struggle between Shia and Sunnis.
The Intelligence Community judges that the term ``civil war'' does
not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which
includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al Qaeda and Sunni insurgent
attacks on coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated
violence. Nonetheless, the term ``civil war'' accurately describes key
elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-
sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence,
ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements.''

6. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, how will you tailor the best
practices of counterinsurgency to quell the continued sectarian blood
letting?
Admiral Fallon. I will provide General Petraeus the strategic
guidance and resources he needs to execute an effective
counterinsurgency campaign. General Petraeus and I will continuously
assess the progress and adjust as required to ensure success.
Additionally, I will work in concert with the State Department to
remove outside support for insurgents and militias in Iraq.

IRAN'S STRATEGIC POSITION

7. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, the Washington Post published
an article on January 30, 2007 about Iran's ascendance titled ``With
Iran Ascendant, U.S. is Seen at Fault: Arab Allies in Region Feeling
Pressure.'' It points out that prior to our invasion of Iraq, Iran was
bordered by two unfriendly countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, but now
seems to be ascendant in the region. What is your evaluation of Iran's
strategic position in the region since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in
2002?
Admiral Fallon. Iran is actively seeking to expand influence in the
region. Coincidentally, the fall of the Taliban and Saddam regimes
removed a strategic counterweight to Iranian influence. However,
regional nations with U.S. support are working together diplomatically
to reduce this influence. Additionally, the security and stability
provided by the U.S. military presence serves to counter balance Iran's
military power.

8. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, do you have an opinion as to
the desirability of the U.S. engaging in a dialogue with Iran about
their activities in Iraq? About the Iranian nuclear program?
Admiral Fallon. Engaging Iran is a policy decision. President Bush
and Secretary of State Rice have offered to hold talks with Iran's
leaders on Iraq, regional security, and nuclear issues, after they
suspend uranium enrichment. Engagement and dialog with Iran to discuss
Iraq would be desirable if Iran demonstrates a willingness to support
international efforts to stabilize Iraq.
In regards to the Iranian nuclear program, the international
community, with the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737,
clearly agreed that the world does not want a nuclear-armed Iran. U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) continues to engage with regional partners to
facilitate counterproliferation activities and enhancement of regional
security.
______

Question Submitted by Senator John McCain

SEA-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

9. Senator McCain. Admiral Fallon, as U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
Commander, you are aware that the Department of Defense plans to equip
18 Pacific Fleet Aegis-class destroyers and cruisers by 2010 with a
sea-based ballistic missile defense capability to defend against the
ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea. In your response to an
advance policy question, you write: ``Iran can employ ballistic
missiles up to 1,300 kilometers with little/no advance warning and with
greater accuracy and effectiveness than Iraq demonstrated in 1991 and
2003.'' Given your recognition of the ballistic missile threat posed by
Iran, would it not make strategic sense to accelerate efforts to
similarly equip our Aegis ships in and near the CENTCOM area of
responsibility with a ballistic missile defense capability?
Admiral Fallon. Yes.
______

[The nomination reference of ADM William J. Fallon, USN,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 16, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Navy to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be Admiral

ADM William J. Fallon, 0000.
______

Transcript of Naval Service for ADM William Joseph Fallon, USN
30 December 1944 - Born in East Orange, New Jersey.
16 September 1963 - Midshipman, U.S. Naval Reserve, Naval Reserve
Officers Training Corps.
15 May 1967 - Ensign to rank from 7 June 1967.
01 July 1968 - Lieutenant (junior grade).
01 July 1970 - Lieutenant.
01 July 1976 - Lieutenant Commander.
01 April 1982 - Commander.
01 September 1988 - Captain.
23 August 1993 - Designated Rear Admiral (lower half) while serving
in billets commensurate with that grade.
01 October 1994 - Rear Admiral (lower half).
01 January 1997 - Rear Admiral.
20 September 1996 - Vice Admiral.
06 October 2000 - Designated Admiral while serving in billets
commensurate with that grade.
01 November 2000 - Admiral, service continuous to date.

Assignments and Duties:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Air Basic Training Command, U.S. Naval Air May 1967 Nov. 1967
Station, Pensacola, FL (DUINS).................
U.S. Naval Air Technical Center, Glynco, GA Nov. 1967 Dec. 1967
(DUINS)........................................
U.S. Naval Station, New York, NY................ Dec. 1967 Jan. 1968
Reconnaissance Attack Squadron THREE (DUINS).... Jan. 1968 Dec. 1968
Naval Justice School (DUINS).................... Dec. 1968 Feb. 1969
Reconnaissance Attack Squadron FIVE, Feb. 1969 Oct. 1970
(Reconnaissance Attack Navigator)..............
Commander, Reconnaissance Attack Wing ONE, Oct. 1970 July 1972
(Administrative Officer).......................
Staff, Commander Fleet Air, Jacksonville, FL July 1972 July 1973
(Flag Lieutenant/Flag Secretary)...............
DEP COMNA V AIRLANTTACAIR (Aide/Administrative July 1973 June 1974
Officer).......................................
Attack Squadron FOUR TWO (DUINS)................ June 1974 Dec. 1974
Attack Squadron SEVEN FIVE (Avionics/Armament Dec. 1974 July 1977
Officer/Training Officer)......................
Naval War College (DUlNS)....................... July 1977 July 1978
Attack Squadron FOUR TWO (DUINS)................ July 1978 Oct. 1978
Attack Squadron SIX FIVE (Operations Officer/ Oct. 1978 Feb. 1981
Executive Assistant)...........................
Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force Feb. 1981 July 1982
(Operational Test Coordinator of Attack Weapons
Systems).......................................
Attack Squadron FOUR TWO (DUINS)................ July 1982 Nov. 1982
XO, Attack Squadron SIX FIVE.................... Nov. 1982 May 1984
CO, Attack Squadron SIX FIVE.................... May 1984 Sep. 1985
Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet Sep. 1985 Dec. 1985
(DUlNS)........................................
Carrier Air Wing EIGHT (Deputy Air Wing Jan. 1986 July 1987
Commander).....................................
Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet July 1987 Jan. 1989
(Air Wing Training and Readiness Officer)......
Commander, Medium Attack Wing ONE............... Jan. 1989 Feb. 1990
Commander, Carrier Air Wing EIGHT............... Mar. 1990 Aug. 1991
National Defense University (DUINS)............. Aug. 1991 June 1992
Office of the CNO (Deputy Director, Aviation July 1992 Sep. 1993
Plans and Requirements Branch) (N880B).........
Commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia Aug. 1992 Nov. 1992
(Deputy Staff Operations Officer, J-3).........
SACLANT (Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Sep. 1993 June 1995
Policy)........................................
Commander, Carrier Group EIGHT.................. June 1995 Feb. 1996
COMLANTFLT (Deputy and Chief of Staff).......... Feb. 1996 Sep. 1996
U.S. Atlantic Command (Deputy Commander in Chief Sep. 1996 Nov. 1997
and Chief of Staff)............................
Commander, SECOND Fleet/Commander, Striking Nov. 1997 Oct. 2000
Fleet Atlantic.................................
Vice Chief of Naval Operations.................. Oct. 2000 Oct. 2003
Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Oct. 2003 Feb. 2005
Fleet Forces Command...........................
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command................. Feb. 2005 To date
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Medals and awards:
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with three Gold Stars
Bronze Star Medal with Combat ``V''
Meritorious Service Medal with two Gold Stars
Air Medal with Bronze Numeral ``6'', Gold Star, and Combat ``V''
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one Gold Star, and
Combat ``V''
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Navy Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
Meritorious Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star
Navy ``E'' Ribbon with two Es
Navy Expeditionary Medal with one Bronze Star
National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two Bronze Stars
Vietnam Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Southwest Asia Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star
NATO Medal
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross Unit Citation
Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal with Device
Kuwait Liberation Medal with Device (Saudi Arabia)
Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kuwait)

Special qualifications:
BA (Social Science) Villanova University, 1967
MA (International Studies) Old Dominion University, 1982
Graduate of Naval War College, 1978
Graduate of National War College, 1992
Designated Naval Flight Officer, 1967
Designated Joint Specialty Officer, 1995
Language Qualifications: French (Knowledge)

Personal data:
Wife: Mary Elizabeth Trapp of Scarsdale, New York
Children: Susan K. Fallon (Daughter), Born: 1 March 1971.
Barbara L. Fallon (Daughter), Born: 21 November 1973.
William P. Fallon (Son), Born: 31 July 1976.
Christina A. Fallon (Daughter), Born: 4 March 1983.

Summary of joint duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Commander, Carrier Air Wing EIGHT.... Jan. 91-Apr. 91 Capt.
SACLANT (Assistant Chief of Staff for Sep. 93-June 1995 RDML
Plans and Policy)....................
USCINCLANT (Deputy Commander in Chief Sep. 96-Nov. 97 VADM
and Chief of Staff)..................
Commander, SECOND Fleet/Commander, Nov. 97-Oct. 00 VADM
Striking Fleet Atlantic..............
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command....... Feb. 05-to date ADM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Desert Storm

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM William J.
Fallon, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
William J. Fallon.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, United States Central Command.

3. Date of nomination:
16 January 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
30 December 1944; East Orange, New Jersey.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Mary E. Trapp Fallon.

7. Names and ages of children:
Susan K. Fallon, 35; Barbara L. Fallon, 33; William P. Fallon, 30;
and Christina A. Fallon, 23.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
Occidental College Golbal Affairs Advisory Board.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
American Automobile Association
American Meteorological Society
Army & Navy Club
Association of Naval Aviation
Deer Run Condominium Owners Association Board (Big Sky, MT)
Bishopsgate (Virginia Beach, VA) Civic League
Hampton Roads World Affairs Council
Knights of Columbus
Mercedes Benz Club of America
National Geographic Society
National War College Alumni Association
Navy Federal Credit Union
Old Dominion University Alumni Association
Smithsonian Institute
Our Lady Star of the Sea (VA Beach, VA) Catholic School Board
Tailhook Association
U.S. Naval Institute
Veterans of Foreign Affairs
Villanova University Alumni Association
Villanova University Varsity Club
Villanova University Wildcat Club.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
Villanova University Alumni Loyalty Award
Old Dominion University Distinguished Alumnus Award
Naval War College Distinguished Alumnus Award
Camden Catholic High School Distinguished Alumnus Award
Business Executives for National Security Eisenhower Award
USO of Philadelphia/South Jersey Liberty Award.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of ADM William J. Fallon, USN, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on February 6, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on February 7, 2007.]

NOMINATION OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

----------

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor, Webb,
McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins,
Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Michael J.
Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel;
Peter K. Levine, chief counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional
staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
research assistant; Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff
member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member;
Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer,
minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul,
professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Diana G.
Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Micah H. Harris and Jessica L.
Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Joseph Axelrad,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to
Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton;
Lauren Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson
and Michael Sozan, assistants to Senator Webb; Nichole M.
Distefano, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Richard H. Fontaine,
Jr., assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell and Jeremy
Shull, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Arch Galloway II,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark Winter, assistant to
Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey
Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson,
assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C. Mallory and Bob Taylor,
assistants to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to
Senator Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning. Today we welcome General
George Casey, the President's nominee to replace General Peter
Schoomaker as the Chief of Staff of the United States Army. We
are also pleased to welcome General Casey's family, who we will
ask him to introduce in a moment, and we all know just how
vitally important families are to the men and women who serve
in the military and we thank them for their service as well as
you for your service, General.
General Casey is well known to members of this committee
and to the American people as Commanding General, Multi-
National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), in which capacity he has served
for over 2\1/2\ years. Prior to that command he was Vice Chief
of Staff of the Army, which was preceded by an assignment as
Director of the Joint Staff, and before that as Director of
Strategy, Plans and Policy, J5, on the Joint Staff.
General Casey is an infantryman, having commanded at all
levels up to and including division command. As an assistant
division commander he served in Bosnia and earlier in his
career he served in Cairo as an United Nations (U.N.) military
observer with the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization. He also
served a tour of duty as a congressional liaison officer.
As commander in Iraq, General Casey is of course identified
with the administration's Iraq strategy. His focus was on
training and equipping Iraqi security forces to bring them as
quickly as possible to a level where they could relieve
American forces from the burden of providing the security that
Iraqis should be providing for themselves.
In this strategy, he was joined by his boss, U.S. Central
Command Commander General John Abizaid, and his subordinate,
the corps commander, Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli.
General Casey put it this way, ``The longer we in the United
States forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq's
security, it lengthens the time that the Government of Iraq has
to take the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing
with the militias. The other thing is that they can continue to
blame us for all of Iraq's problems, which are at base their
problems.''
General Casey and other commanders had to deal with the
consequences of the myriad of flawed policies, including having
insufficient forces at the outset of the operation, failing to
properly plan for the postwar stability operations, disbanding
the Iraqi army, and an overly extensive de-Baathification
program, to name but a few. How well he carried out his
responsibilities will be one of the topics this morning.
We also need to understand what role he played in the
development of the new strategy and his expectations for the
new approach, what has changed that he now apparently believes
that more U.S. troops will help reduce sectarian violence when
he did not seem to believe that before, how would he deal with
the sectarian militias if they are going underground and hiding
weapons instead of directly confronting coalition forces in the
short term; what are their future goals; how long is it
expected that they will stay underground; should coalition
forces seek to disarm the Mahdi Army so they cannot come out
from underground at a later time; what are his concerns about
the lack of unity of command between U.S. and Iraqi forces;
what should be done about it; who will really be taking the
lead down at the small unit level in the neighborhoods; and how
will the U.S. platoons and companies living with and operating
with the Iraqi security forces in these small neighborhood
minibases not become involved in violent interface with Iraqis;
what benchmarks would he be looking for the determine whether
Iraqi commitments are being kept; if the Iraqi government fails
to deploy the additional units to Baghdad according to the
benchmarks to which it has agreed, what does he believe should
be the consequences; what progress has there been on Iraqi
leaders meeting the political commitments they have made; and
does he believe there should be consequences for failures to
meet those commitments?
We also need to inquire as to how long General Casey
believes the increased troop level can be sustained by an army
whose non-deployed units are suffering from significant
readiness problems, as has been testified to by the current
Chief of Staff, as well as to what he considers to be his
greatest challenges should he be confirmed as the next Army
Chief of Staff.
Again, we welcome you, General. We look forward to your
testimony.
I now call upon Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Casey, welcome. I am grateful for your
extraordinary service and personal sacrifice throughout your
career. In addition, I would like to express my appreciation to
your family for their support of your service, as well as the
support they have provided to the men and women in uniform and
their families.
You have been nominated to be the 37th Chief of Staff of
the Army. The ranks of previous Army chiefs of staff are filled
with such distinguished officers as General of the Armies John
J. Pershing, George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Omar
N. Bradley, as well as General J. Lawton Collins, Matthew B.
Ridgway, and Maxwell D. Taylor. This nomination is a great
honor and an even greater responsibility.
While I do not in any way question your honor, your
patriotism, or your service to our country, I do question some
of the decisions and judgments you have made over the past 2\1/
2\ years as Commander of MNF-I. During that time things have
gotten markedly and progressively worse and the situation in
Iraq can now best be described as dire and deteriorating. I
regret that our window of opportunity to reverse momentum may
be closing.
The bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra last February
sparked sectarian violence throughout Iraq and Baghdad in
particular. Yet in the face of this dramatic change in the
Iraqi security environment, our military strategy remained
essentially unchanged. Instead of conducting a traditional
counterinsurgency campaign, our troops focused on training and
equipping Iraqis, hoping in vain that they could do the job.
After repeated elections and political events demonstrated
that the democratic process would not on its own bring down the
level of violence, our troops did not begin focusing on
protecting the population. Instead, coalition and Iraqi forces
launched Operation Together Forward in June 2006. This
operation, aimed at securing Baghdad, failed. Yet the coalition
launched Operation Together Forward 2 in August in a very
similar fashion. The result, predictably, was a similar
failure.
The result of these and other missteps have been
unprecedented levels of violence in Iraq and a pervasive lack
of security that inhibits political and economic activity. In
the 3\1/2\ years after the initial invasion, we finally turn
toward a strategy that implements all three elements of the
clear, hold, and build approach, focuses on protecting the
population, and is carried out by, I hope, a sufficient number
of additional U.S. forces.
I am not certain five additional brigades in Baghdad and
one more in Anbar Province are sufficient to do the job. I am
certain, however, that the job cannot be done with just two
additional brigades, as you, General Casey, had advocated.
General Casey, you were one of the individuals who has been
the architects of U.S. military strategy in Iraq over the last
2 years. While there are very pressing questions about the
future of the Army, you will of course in this hearing be asked
to review the mistakes in American strategy in Iraq during your
command, how the previous Iraq strategy was formulated, why it
failed, why there were not changes sooner, and the lessons that
were learned. You will also be asked to comment on progress in
training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, to include
your previous statements about their readiness. In addition,
you will be asked to respond to questions about the President's
new strategy, to include the troop increase and the command and
control of American forces in Baghdad.
You should expect questions about your role in planning and
execution of the initial invasion of Iraq and post-Saddam Iraq,
while you were assigned to key positions on the Joint Staff in
the Pentagon from 2002 to 2004. You will need to explain why
your assessment of the situation in Iraq has differed so
radically from that of most observers and why your predictions
of future success have been so unrealistically rosy.
During my trip to Iraq in early 2005, you predicted a
significant decline in violence over the remainder of the year
as the democratic process took hold and as more Iraqi troops
were trained. One year later during another visit to Iraq, I
heard nearly the same predictions, with the time line simply
pushed back by a year. In December during a trip that several
other Senators and I made to Iraq, you stated that we were
winning in Iraq and that every day we are making progress
toward meeting our strategic objectives.
Just this month, you predicted publicly that there would be
progress, ``gradually over the next 60 to 80 days,'' and that
people in Baghdad would probably feel safe in their
neighborhoods by the summer.
In light of these remarks and decisions, I have expressed
serious concerns about your nomination as Chief of Staff of the
Army. My strong reservations persist. I look forward to your
testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
General Casey, would you please proceed with your opening
statement.

STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES
ARMY

General Casey. I will, Senator. Thank you very much.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished
Senators. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today on my nomination to serve as the Army Chief of Staff. I
am honored that the President nominated me to this important
post and I thank you for considering the nomination.
I also want to thank the members of the committee for the
support they have provided to America's Army over the past
years. We could not do what we are doing around the globe today
without your support, so thank you for that.
Let me begin by paying tribute to our troops and their
families, the real heroes of the war on terror and the campaign
in Iraq. The American people should be tremendously proud and
grateful of the magnificent job the men and women of their
Armed Forces are doing in a tough and demanding environment in
Iraq. Over 3,000 men and women have given their lives to build
a new Iraq, to bring liberty and democracy to 27 million
Iraqis, and to ensure security for the United States of
America. They will not be forgotten.
I also want to acknowledge the families who make tremendous
sacrifices on behalf of their loved ones a half a world away.
They shoulder a heavy burden and we are blessed with their
unwavering support. Courage is not reserved for the
battlefield.
I especially want to thank my bride of 36 years, Sheila,
for her courage, grace, and support over the last 2\1/2\ years.
She, like all our families of our deployed men and women,
epitomizes the core values of duty and selfless service. So let
me just say thank you, dear. My wife Sheila. [Applause.]
My son, Ryan, and his wife, Laura; my son, Sean; and my
brother-in-law, Dick O'Brien. That is the family.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to assure you that I have
thought hard about what it means to be the Chief of Staff of
the Army and want to assure you that I am aware of the
tremendous responsibilities associated with this office. I
firmly believe in the Army's vision to remain the world's
preeminent land power, relevant and ready to meet the
challenges of the 21st century.
In Iraq I have been in the unique position to watch a
transformed Army deal with the challenges of 21st century
warfare and I would like to share with you just three
preliminary thoughts. First, the quality of the men and women
of the U.S. Army are the best that I have seen in 36 years in
service. They blend intellect, drive, compassion, courage, and
commitment to succeed daily in a very difficult environment.
Our soldiers and families are our most precious resource and
they will be my top priority.
Second, I see the power of the Army's transformation on the
streets of Iraq every day. The enhanced capabilities of the
modular units allow them to handle the complexities of the
Iraqi environment. If I am confirmed you should expect to see
continuity in the transformation initiatives that General Peter
Schoomaker has put into action.
Third, the men and women of the Army National Guard and the
Army Reserve have been indispensable to our efforts in Iraq and
we must contemplate and implement policies and procedures that
recognize two facts: one, that we are approaching a point where
about half of our Guard and Reserve soldiers will be combat
veterans; and two, we require the continued participation of
the Guard and Reserve in our operations around the world. While
I know the Army has been aggressively working these issues,
Guard and Reserve issues will have my full attention.
I have seen our Army at war in the 21st century and believe
my experience in that regard will be valuable to the Army. I am
also conscious that Iraq is not the only future and as Chief of
Staff of the Army, I will take a broader view.
Next, Mr. Chairman, I would like just to say a few words
about Iraq. Just 2\1/2\ years ago, Iraq was totally dependent
on coalition forces for security. Today Iraqis are poised to
assume responsibility for their own security by the end of
2007, still with some level of support from us. The path that
brought us to this point has not been easy, but it has been
part of a concerted effort to build an Iraq that can secure,
sustain, and govern itself.
Sectarian violence is the greatest threat to Iraq's ability
to accomplish this objective and to move forward. Since
February with the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra,
the sectarian violence in Iraq has greatly complicated our
ability to accomplish our strategic objectives. It makes it
harder for the population, traumatized by 3 decades under
Saddam Hussein, to make the compromises necessary to equitably
resolve what is the fundamental conflict in Iraq, the division
of political and economic power among Iraqis.
This is a challenge we can help them address, but one they
must ultimately resolve themselves. I continue to firmly
believe that enduring strategic success in Iraq must be
achieved by Iraqis.
I know there are questions in people's minds about where I
stand on troop levels, particularly with respect to the most
recent deployment of troops to Baghdad. There are no questions
in my mind. I can tell you that I have been doing what I told
you I would do 2\1/2\ years ago at my confirmation hearing. I
told you I would ask for the troops I believed I required to
accomplish the mission and I believe I have.
Over the course of the mission I have asked for and
received more troops at least six times: in support of the
operation in Fallujah in late 2004; in support of the January
2005 elections; to implement the transition team, the embed
concept, in the spring of 2005; to support the October
referendum and December elections in 2005; to support the
Baghdad security plan in 2006; and again in December 2006 to
reinforce Iraqi efforts in Baghdad. I have also sent troops
home once, following the December 2005 elections as a result of
improvements in the Iraqi security forces over the course of
the year.
Now, with respect to my most recent request for forces, the
planning began in November shortly after we changed out the
Baghdad division. There was a normal rotation of divisions in
Baghdad in the middle of November. The corps commander and I at
that time sat down with the new commander and gave him our
intent and told him to take a blank sheet of paper and tell us
what it would take to help the Iraqis restore stability in
their capital.
This is part of a continuous assessment process that we
have ongoing there. We are constantly looking at how we are
doing, what we should be doing differently.
Around the same time, the Iraqis came forward with their
own approach, and together we developed the coordinated plan
that we are now implementing. My commanders told me that they
needed two brigades to implement this plan and I asked for
those forces. At the same time we worked with the Iraqi prime
minister to ensure that there was political commitment to the
Baghdad effort.
In a series of addresses following his meeting with the
President in Amman and continuing through his Army Day address
on January 6, Prime Minister Maliki announced the political
commitments that we were looking for. We will continue to
monitor the delivery on these commitments, but so far the
results have been heartening.
Now, some will ask, why cannot the Iraqi security forces do
this by themselves? The Iraqi security forces are 2\1/2\ years
into a 3\1/2\-year developmental process. They are not quite
ready to assume security responsibility in Baghdad or Iraq. But
they are increasingly ready and willing the take the lead in
these security operations with our support.
They are also challenged by sectarian tensions and actions
that have shaken the confidence of some of their populations in
their security forces. For the Iraqis to successfully assume
and sustain the security responsibility, their security forces
must emerge as the dominant security force in the country. To
do this, political and militia influence over the security
forces must be eliminated and levels of sectarian violence,
particularly in the capital, must be brought down
substantially, brought down to the point where the people in
Baghdad can feel safe in their neighborhoods.
This is what we are working toward in Baghdad. It will take
time and the Iraqis do need our help.
What we and the Iraqis are doing in Iraq is a hard, tough
business. Fighting this type of campaign while rebuilding a
dilapidated infrastructure, building a representative
government where none existed before, and reconciling ethnic
and sectarian differences makes it even more difficult and
complex. The struggle in Iraq is winnable, but it will, as I
have said before this committee, take patience and will.
Mr. Chairman, in closing I would like to go back to the
Army. I am a soldier. My roots are in the Army and I know the
pride of wearing this uniform. You can say I have been part of
the Army all my life. I was born in an Army hospital in Japan
where my father was a member of the occupation forces. I am an
Army brat that went to four high schools in three countries.
Sheila and the boys grew up in the Army and my youngest son
joined the Army Reserve as a private at age 34 because he too
wanted to serve.
I have devoted my life to the Army. I took hard jobs around
the world because they were important to our country. I must
admit I am amazed when I hear comments to the effect that I am
being nominated as a reward. Mr. Chairman, the members of the
committee know full well the challenges and the multitude of
challenges facing the Army over the next 4 years. Service as
Army Chief of Staff is not a reward; it is a duty. It is about
service and it is about personal commitment to the men and
women of the United States Army.
If confirmed, I acknowledge the hard work ahead to maintain
our position as the greatest army on the planet. I will need
and ask for your help, and I pledge to work in partnership with
you, Mr. Chairman, and the rest of the members of the committee
and to consult with you frequently and candidly.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to taking your
questions.
Chairman Levin. General, thank you.
We have a series of standard questions which we ask of all
nominees. First, have you adhered to applicable laws and
regulations governing conflicts of interest?
General Casey. I have.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Casey. I have not.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
General Casey. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Casey. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Casey. They will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree if confirmed to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
General Casey. I will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views
when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views
differ from the administration?
General Casey. I will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
General Casey. I will.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We will have a 6-minute first round of questions.
General, we understand you support the President's
strategy, the new strategy which involves a surge of troops
into Iraq. You were asked for your recommendation and you
apparently recommended two brigades, as you just testified to,
based on your commander's recommendations to you?
General Casey. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. We asked General Abizaid back in November
of last year when he appeared before this committee whether we
needed more troops or he supported more troops going to Iraq.
He said that he met with every divisional commander, General
Casey, the Corps Commander, General Dempsey, ``We all talked
together and I said, in your professional opinion if you were
to bring in more American troops now does it add considerably
to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? They all said no,
and the reason is because we want Iraqis to do more. It is easy
for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that
more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from
taking more responsibility for their own future.''
General Abizaid said that he spoke to you and that his
opinion reflected your opinion and that of all the other
commanders. Was that true when he said it?
General Casey. I am not exactly sure when in November it
was, but it was.
Chairman Levin. So you have changed your view since
November?
General Casey. As I described in my opening testimony,
Senator, in mid-November was when the reevaluation of the plan
was taking place. I suspect John and I talked before that. That
does reflect my general view on additional U.S. forces in Iraq.
Chairman Levin. It reflects a general view, but then there
was some kind of a reevaluation which took place in mid-
November?
General Casey. That is right, Senator. We are constantly
reevaluating how we are doing and what we need.
Chairman Levin. But that position that General Abizaid
stated was your position when you spoke to him in early
November presumably still remains your general view?
General Casey. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. If that is your general view, what has
changed? Why are you modifying your general view for this
surge?
General Casey. What has changed, Senator, is several
things. One, the development of a plan, a new plan that was
conceived by the Iraqis and worked in concert with us. So there
is a plan that laid out requirements for those forces. So just
to say do you need more forces is one thing. To say do you need
more forces to execute this plan is quite another. We do need
two additional brigades to implement that plan.
Chairman Levin. The Iraqis came in with a plan that said
they did not want any additional American forces inside of
Baghdad; is that not true? That was their plan that was
presented to the President in Amman?
General Casey. I think that is a misunderstanding. I have
read those newspaper reports. That was not the case. I was in
Amman and that issue was never raised.
Chairman Levin. So the Iraqis did not say that they did not
seek American forces in Amman?
General Casey. They did not.
Chairman Levin. Did they seek American forces in Baghdad?
General Casey. There was not a large, long discussion about
the plan that they presented. They basically passed it across
the table and there was actually quite a short discussion.
Chairman Levin. Did the plan that they passed across the
table include additional American troops?
General Casey. It broadly identified the requirement for
additional troops. I do not believe that it specified Iraqi or
coalition. Now, for Prime Minister Maliki, he would generally
rather not have additional coalition forces. That is his
position. But he has listened to recommendations from his
commander and from me about the need for these forces and he is
accepting those forces on an as-needed basis.
Chairman Levin. Basically he felt that more security forces
were needed inside Baghdad? He did not specify that any
coalition forces would be needed as part of that, but it came
from you and others that if there are going to be additional
forces inside of Baghdad that coalition forces would be needed
to provide some supplementary support; is that fair?
General Casey. That is fair, Senator.
Chairman Levin. There is an article in this morning's Miami
Herald which says the following: Jafari, when he was prime
minister, recollected some meetings with U.S. officials and he
said that in the meetings held twice a week he urged coalition
forces to take action against the militias. In attendance, he
said, were Army General George Casey, then the top U.S.
commander in Iraq, the U.S. ambassador, the British ambassador,
and a British general.
Jafari said he asked the officials to force police and army
recruits to pledge loyalty to the government and to consider a
military strike against the militias while they were still
isolated from the public. ``They were not cooperating with
us,'' Jafari said.
A former Jafari aide said he believed U.S. officials did
not take action because they did not want to get involved in a
political dispute between Jafari's Dawa Party and the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Iraq's largest
Shiite political party.
Was that request made of you by Jafari when he was prime
minister and is it true that we rejected that request, and if
so for what reason?
General Casey. I just want to make sure I have the specific
request right. Could you please repeat what he said?
Chairman Levin. He asked officials--that is you; you are
the only named one by name; he mentioned the ambassador and so
forth. But by name he said that he asked you and the others to,
``force''--this is not a quote. This is the article that says
this: that Jafari asked you to force police and army recruits
to pledge loyalty to the government and to consider a military
strike against the militias while they were still isolated from
the public. Jafari then is quoted as saying ``They''--you--
``were not cooperating with us.''
Could you comment on that?
General Casey. I have not seen the article, Senator, but
there is some strongly revisionist history going on there by
the former prime minister.
Chairman Levin. Strongly? I am sorry?
General Casey. Revisionist history going on there by the
former prime minister.
I do not recall the request to force the police and army to
pledge, but we have done that several times over the course of
the last year both in the army and in the police, where the
soldiers and the police have taken a loyalty pledge to the
government. But I do not remember getting that request from the
prime minister.
Quite the contrary to him asking me to make a military
strike, which I do not ever recall him asking me to take any
action, particularly a military strike against militia, that
government was an impediment to our action against the militia.
He was working very hard on the political side of things to
keep the Sadrists under control. But frankly, I went to him
with a group several times to get him to take action and allow
us to take military action against the militia, and was denied.
We had difficulty getting him to even issue a statement on
a weapons ban that his police and army officers wanted so that
they could enforce the weapons ban on the streets of Iraq. He
dragged his feet on that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. General Casey, I was interested in your
opening statement, which continues to be optimistic. In recent
days the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and General Abizaid's designated successor Admiral
Fallon have all stated we are not winning and we had a failed
strategy. Now, those are clearcut statements for the record.
Do you agree with that assessment?
General Casey. Do I agree that we have a failed strategy?
Senator McCain. We had a failed policy and we are not
winning.
General Casey. Senator, I do not agree that we have a
failed policy. I believe the President's new strategy will
enhance the policy that we have.
Senator McCain. So you view this change in strategy as just
an enhancement of the previous policy?
General Casey. It is a significant shift, but I believe it
will be an enhancement over the current policy. The policy of
training and equipping Iraqi security forces and gradually
passing security responsibility to them as they are ready is
still an important element of the current strategy and it is
part of the Amman agreement.
Senator McCain. So you disagree with the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral
Fallon that we had a failed policy?
General Casey. I do, Senator. I do not believe that the
current policy has failed.
Senator McCain. I would like to give you a quote. There are
many quotes, but one I would be interested in your response to.
A Pentagon press conference on December 16, 2004, ``My view of
winning is that we are broadly on track to accomplishing our
objectives, with Iraqi security forces that are capable of
maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq as a safe haven for
terror, I believe we are on track to get there by December
2005.''
Was that statement accurate that you made in 2004?
General Casey. I do not recall the specifics of--
Senator McCain. I have given you a direct quote from your
statement.
General Casey. It said that what would be ready by the end
of 2005?
Senator McCain. ``My view of winning is that we are broadly
on track to accomplishing our objectives. With Iraqi security
forces that are capable of maintaining domestic order and
denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror, and I believe we are
on track to get there by December 2005.''
You made that statement in December 2004.
General Casey. That obviously has not panned out. We have
projections that we work on with the development of the
security forces. Again, I do not remember the context of that,
but the institutional aspects of building these security forces
has always been programmed to take longer than that. So I am
not quite sure what I was focusing on there. But it obviously
has not panned out, Senator.
Senator McCain. I do not want to belabor it, but there is a
series of quotes. As short a time ago as October 11, 2006, ``
`The idea that the country is aflame in sectarian violence is
just not right,' Casey said. `I do not subscribe to the civil
war idea.' ''
September 30, 2005: ``We have a strategy and a plan for
success in Iraq and we are broadly on track in achieving our
goals.''
General Casey, almost everybody that I know that has
testified before this committee and talked to, has said we had
a failed policy, we are not winning; those are the judgments,
and ``serious mistakes were made.'' That is in the comments
made by the President of the United States.
Last year, in the month of December, we had the third
highest number of American servicemen deaths in Iraq, as you
well know.
Do you believe that this job, this change in strategy or,
as you call it the new job, can be done with less than five
brigades that General Petraeus says he needs?
General Casey. I believe that the job in Baghdad as it is
designed now can be done with less than that. But having the
flexibility to have the other three brigades on a deployment
cycle gives General Petraeus great flexibility. It allows him
to make assessments on whether the plan is working or not and
to either reinforce success, maintain momentum, or put more
forces in a place where the plans are not working.
I believe that this five brigade plan gives great
flexibility to General Petraeus at a very important time in the
mission.
Senator McCain. This is a time when almost all of our major
concerns and military experts' major concern is whether five
brigades are enough, and a very short time ago you simply asked
for two brigades. We just have a fundamental disagreement,
General Casey, with facts on the ground and with what has
happened in Iraq over now one of the longest wars in our
history and where we are today.
I believe it is abundantly clear that we are at a point in
Iraq where we are going to have to succeed within in the coming
months or we are going to have to experience catastrophic
consequences associated with it. It took us a long time to get
where we are today. I do not believe that from the beginning
when General Shinseki's testimony before this committee was
repudiated and he was removed from his job because he said we
needed a sufficient number of troops that would have done the
job, throughout we have paid a very heavy price in American
blood and treasure in what the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the new Commander of
Central Command (CENTCOM) say is a ``failed policy.''
I regret that we were not given better and more accurate
information as these past years unfolded.
I could ask you to respond to an abundance of quotes I have
here in front of me that painted a very optimistic and rosy
scenario, which did not comport in the view of many of us with
the actual conditions on the ground and that many of us who
greatly feared that we would be in the critical situation that
we are in today.
So General, as I say, I do not question your honorable
service. I have the most respect for you, your family, and
their service to our Nation. I question seriously the judgment
that was employed in your execution of your responsibilities in
Iraq. We have paid a very heavy price in American blood and
treasure because of what is now agreed to by literally everyone
is a failed policy.
I would be very happy to hear your response, General.
General Casey. Senator, I do not think there is any
question that the situation in the center of the country,
particularly in the capital, is bad, and we are working very
hard to rectify that. As I mentioned in my opening statement,
the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in February added a
completely new dimension to our challenges in Iraq, and dealing
with the sectarian violence and helping the Iraqis deal with
sectarian violence has been a very significant challenge.
As I also mentioned, the country will not be able to move
forward with their security forces and it will not be able to
move forward politically or economically until they come to
grips with that situation.
I recognize we have a fundamental disagreement and in my
mind the question has always been should we do it or should
they do it. ``It'' being restore security. What I have tried to
do in my time there is strike the right balance that allowed
the Iraqi security forces and the government to keep moving
forward, but at the same time having enough coalition presence
there so that we could get the job done.
The situation in the capital, as you point out, is not
good. It requires additional forces and I believe the flow plan
to support that puts the forces in the right position and gives
General Petraeus great flexibility.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Casey, good morning. Let me pick up on something
you said to Senator McCain, which is that you do not agree that
our policy in Iraq has been a failure. I want to ask you why
you think it has not been a failure.
General Casey. The policy that I have been following has
always been designed to do two things: to bring the insurgents
and terrorists, the levels of violence, down to levels that
could be contained by increasingly capable Iraqi security
forces. That is happening in the better part of the country. It
is not happening in Baghdad. It is not happening in Anbar. It
is not happening in Diyala Province.
Senator Lieberman. So you would say--and do not let me put
words in your mouth--that while there have been failures,
disappointments, in Baghdad as of today, that the policy that
you followed has succeeded in other parts of Iraq?
General Casey. There are three provinces in southern Iraq
that are already under provincial Iraqi control. The fight that
took place earlier this week in Najaf Province took place in a
province that was under Iraqi control.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Casey. It worked just like we had laid out in the
memorandums of understanding. The police found it. It was too
much for them. They called the Iraqi army. The Iraqi army came,
it was too much for them, they called us. But the Iraqis dealt
with it with our support.
There are three provinces in the north, the Kurdish
provinces, that once they resolve some disagreements with the
government over budget they will also fall under Iraqi control,
and other provinces are projected over the course of the rest
of this year to assume responsibility for their own security.
That process is working. It is working slowly, but it is
working.
Senator Lieberman. So if you were asked a different kind of
question, which is whether you believe the situation in Iraq is
deteriorating, is it fair to say that you would say it is not
deteriorating in most of the country, but is in Baghdad?
General Casey. I would say the situation is definitely
deteriorating in Baghdad, in the center of the country. It is
not necessarily deteriorating across Iraq. I want to say 14 of
the 18 provinces have 10 or less incidents of violence a day.
Baghdad has 30 or 40 incidents a day, to give you some
comparison.
The levels of violence in the capital are significant. Now,
it is the capital of the country and we should not discount the
impact that not being able to control their capital has on the
government and has on the rest of the country. That is really
our challenge.
Senator Lieberman. Am I correct to conclude from what you
have said earlier this morning that you support the new
military, economic, and political plan for Iraq as the
President has announced it?
General Casey. I do, Senator, and I was consulted on that.
I participated in the development of the strategy.
Senator Lieberman. Do you believe that it will succeed?
General Casey. I believe that it can work.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Casey. As I have said, in war there are no
guarantees. But this plan, I believe it is the appropriate
strategy and it has the appropriate levels of resources
attached to it. So I believe the plan can work.
Senator Lieberman. I presume you are saying that you
believe it has a higher probability of working than any other
plan you have heard described?
General Casey. That is a fair statement, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. One of the other alternatives being
discussed by some of our colleagues is to mandate the beginning
of a withdrawal within a set period of months. How would you
evaluate that as an alternative path to success in Iraq?
General Casey. As the commander, I would resist any type of
mandated timetables that would limit my flexibility to deal
with the situation on the ground.
Senator Lieberman. Do you fear that if we in fact began to
withdraw that the situation in Iraq would deteriorate even
further, in other words withdraw on a deadline as opposed to
based on improved conditions there?
General Casey. As I said, I do not believe that a mandated
timetable not tied to conditions on the ground would be
helpful. My sense is people on the ground would take advantage
of that.
Senator Lieberman. Understood.
Let me ask you a few questions actually about the job for
which you are being nominated, Chief of Staff of the Army.
Would you say, based on the Army's involvement in Iraq and
other circumstances, that the U.S. Army today is broken?
General Casey. No, Senator, I would not. I came in the Army
36 years ago and I saw a broken Army. The first platoon I
walked into as a lieutenant in my first assignment in Germany
had nine people in it and four of those people were pending
discharge. We did not have money to train, we did not have
money to fix our vehicles.
I can remember guys painting over bumper numbers, the
vehicle identification number on a vehicle, because they only
had one that worked and when they had an inspection they
changed the number and take that vehicle up because it was the
only one that worked. It was broken badly.
Senator Lieberman. But it is not now?
General Casey. I see in Iraq every day a splendid Army.
Now, I know that General Schoomaker has problems with the
forces yet to deploy and some of the strategic elements that
will deploy later, but from what I see in Iraq, Senator, the
Army is far from broken.
Senator Lieberman. I agree with you, of course. It is the
best in the world, and I believe the best we have ever had.
I want to ask you a final question about the increase in
end strength that the President and Secretary Gates are
recommending to take the Army up to 540,000. Is that adequate?
General Casey. Senator, in the short time I have been back
and plugged into Army issues, I am being told by the Army Staff
that that is in fact adequate now. However, they have an
analysis process that they repeatedly run and they will
continue to look at whether it is sufficient to meet their
needs over time. But right now I am being told it is
sufficient.
Senator Lieberman. My time is up. Thank you, General Casey.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. General Casey, thank you for reciting your
commitment personally and that of your family to the United
States Army. You did not make reference to your father and the
fact that he was a very brave soldier. He was a two-star
general commanding the First Infantry Division in Vietnam and
lost his life in the line of duty. I think it is important that
we look at the total of the individual that is before us today
and that is an important factor, because you have to inspire.
One of your major responsibilities as the Chief of Staff of the
Army is to inspire your people, to set the example to continue
on so that America can enjoy the finest Army of any in the
world.
I want to go back to your comments just now about your
participation in this new plan and particularly the comments of
my colleagues, which are accurate, about the ever-widening
circle of individuals talking about a failed policy, certainly
during calendar year 2006. Having served in the Pentagon myself
as a part of the civilian team, I know full well how under our
Constitution ever since George Washington civilians are in
charge of our military. They devise the policy, they issue the
orders, and our military individuals carry out those orders, or
at times I have seen senior officers respectfully disagree and,
frankly, resign rather than carry out a policy which they feel
is wrong.
I judge that the policy and the orders that you carried out
were consistent with those traditions and that you were given
orders, and in this instance we should bear in mind that you
were subordinate to CENTCOM Commander, General John Abizaid,
whom I have a great deal of confidence in as a military
commander. Is that not correct?
General Casey. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. That he in turn received his orders from
the President, transmitted in some respects through the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; is that not correct?
General Casey. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. Now, did you feel free at any time to reach
out and question the orders that you were given to carry out?
General Casey. I did, Senator. In fact, there was a strong
dialogue about the policy between both our civilian leadership
and General Abizaid and myself. I believe in the policy that I
am implementing, Senator Warner. Did I not believe in it, I
would have taken other actions, as you suggested.
Senator Warner. It seems to me that as we assess the
accountability for the past that where--and I think you today
indicated you accept your share of the responsibility----
General Casey. I do.
Senator Warner.--an equal if not a greater share falls upon
the civilians that devised the policy and issued the orders.
Now, we come down to this very critical point you made
here, and I copied it down pretty carefully. You said that when
you were working on the new strategy, the plan enunciated by
the President on January 10, that you felt two brigades; I
expect you changed that to ``brigades''--were sufficient to
carry it out, with an augmentation of the marines of a
battalion or two in Anbar; is that correct?
General Casey. That is correct. I do not want to put too
fine a point on this, but what you are talking about, are
requirements for the Baghdad security plan.
Senator Warner. That is correct.
General Casey. I would differentiate that from the
President's strategy. But the Baghdad plan is part of that
strategy.
Senator Warner. At what point did you say to someone that
you need two more brigades and an additional battalion in
Anbar? Was it not a part of the planning phases of the January
10 plan or was it separate?
General Casey. Around right before Christmas is when I
asked for the additional forces.
Senator Warner. Was it to implement the plan that the
President announced or a plan that you were devising with
regard to increasing the level of security in Baghdad?
General Casey. The latter, Senator. It was asked for
because of the Baghdad security plan.
Senator Warner. I see. So it was a part of your input into
the thinking for a new plan to raise the level of security in
Baghdad?
General Casey. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. Then you say: ``well, I recognize that if
you give the higher figure which is in the plan now, 20,500,
that would give the new commander more flexibility.'' Had you
remained as the commander would not you have wanted the
additional flexibility of the additional increments of two more
brigades?
General Casey. I would have welcomed the flexibility of
having access to three more brigades if I remained there.
Senator Warner. But why did you not ask for the full
complement of the four to five brigades, rather than just the
two? Could it have been because of your concern and that of
General Abizaid that the bringing on of additional troops was
going into the face of a rising resentment among the Iraqi
people for more and more troops?
General Casey. Senator, my general belief is I did not want
to bring one more American soldier into Iraq than was necessary
to accomplish the mission. So what I asked for was the two
brigades and the ability to maintain a reserve in Kuwait in
case I needed additional flexibility.
Senator Warner. All right. Let me go to the question of the
extent we can use the trained Iraqi forces--and that training
was done largely during your 2\1/2\ years--or turn in and bring
in more U.S. forces, it is a constant balance. That is where,
speaking for myself and I think some others who have associated
with me on a resolution, we urge the President to look at all
options to charge the Iraqis with a greater and greater degree
of the new plan in Baghdad.
They understand the language. They understand the culture
and are better able to cope with this sectarian violence, which
is so difficult to comprehend, and the killing. Why are we not
putting greater emphasis on the utilization of Iraqi forces and
less on the U.S. GI being put into that cauldron of terror
generated by mistrust between the Iraqis and the Sunnis that
goes back 1,400 years?
General Casey. I would say, Senator, that we are relying
more on the Iraqis and forcing the Iraqis to take a more
leading role in resolving the situation in Baghdad. They came
up with the plan. They will lead the plan. I agree with you,
they are much better at understanding what is going on on the
streets of their own country than our soldiers are.
One of the challenges we have, though, I mentioned in my
opening statement. It is the confidence of all the population
in the different elements of their security forces. Largely,
the Sunni population of Baghdad do not trust the police. So one
of the schemes that will be used as part of this plan is joint
manning with police, army, and coalition forces to do that.
That is where the coalition comes in, because when they see us
operating with the Iraqi police particularly the population has
a greater level of confidence that the forces will treat them
properly.
Senator Warner. My time is up. My hope and my prayers are
this plan succeeds, but it succeeds by a greater and greater
reliance on the Iraqi forces and we will not have to use the
full 20,500 Americans to implement this. Let the Iraqis step
forward. We have trained them for 2\1/2\ years, invested a lot
of time and money, and they should be the ones that carry the
burden in Baghdad.
General Casey. They are willing to do that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Casey, thank you for your many years of service and
your family's service to our Nation.
Over the last 2 years I have been advocating benchmarks,
measurable goals, to measure progress in Iraq. I know you have
heard me say this previously. What benchmarks does General
Petraeus need now to measure the military progress that we hope
to be made in Iraq? What goals and how will we measure that?
You have your own view about whether we have been
successful in Iraq and you have stated that. You have General
Jack Keane saying something different and others also saying it
is a failed policy. How can we get something clear going in
with a new plan, would that be benchmarks? How would we measure
them and how could we tell whether they are a success and to
what degree a success?
General Casey. That is something that we have been working
already in Baghdad here and I will just run down a few points.
These are the things that we are thinking about as important
elements to measure so that we can get some sense of progress.
First of all, pretty simply a reduction in the lawlessness
and the level of sectarian killings. We track that over time
and I will say that over the last 5 or 6 weeks we actually have
seen a gradual downturn in sectarian incidents. Now, there has
been an upturn in the high profile attacks, the car bombs and
suicide attacks. But in general there has been a downturn over
the last 5 or 6 weeks.
Second, we set as a goal, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, we want to continue to work the security situation
in Baghdad with the Iraqis until the people of Baghdad can feel
safe in their neighborhood. We are seeing a systematic effort,
primarily by the Shia militia, to move Sunni population out of
mixed neighborhoods. We see it to a smaller scale in the Sunni
neighborhoods. We have to help the Iraqis reverse that.
Third, we believe that the Iraqi security forces have to
emerge as the dominant security force with the confidence of
the people of Baghdad. We measure that by polls over time and
by our observations.
Fourth, we think there needs to be improvement in the basic
needs in Baghdad, we and the Iraqis are supporting economic
plans to raise the level of services.
Fifth, we think it is important to turn the population
against violence in general, and we measure that, their
feelings on that, through polls.
Finally, we think it is important that political and
religious leaders actively engage in efforts to lessen the
tensions, and so we would measure that by the active engagement
of the leaders.
So those are some of the metrics that we are thinking
about, using, and will use to measure progress in Baghdad.
Senator Ben Nelson. With this plan, this looks like these
are now conditions for staying. I have been advocating
conditions for staying as opposed to dates for withdrawal or
mandated troop reductions or other programs of that kind. If we
measure against these benchmarks that you just identified and
we are not succeeding, are there consequences or is it just the
opportunity to now change plans and come with a new plan?
Are these benchmarks conditions for staying or are they
just benchmarks for evaluating a plan?
General Casey. Senator, I am sorry. I am not quite sure
what you mean about conditions for staying.
Senator Ben Nelson. If these benchmarks all end up with a
failing grade do we just change the plan or do we begin to say,
these are conditions now for leaving. In other words, I
understand you have to modify plans along the way. Are we just
modifying the plan along the way or are there true consequences
if the Iraqis do not step forward, if they do not stand up
their forces, if they cannot quell the violence in their
neighborhoods, if they cannot take the lead? Do we consider
that just the consequences that mean we will have to change the
plan or does it mean we begin to think about withdrawing?
General Casey. I understand now, Senator. The metrics I
described to you are metrics to measure progress in the plan.
They are not anything beyond that. Now, you ask are there
consequences of the plan not progressing or the Iraqis not
meeting their commitments. That is a political judgment that we
would work with the government.
We review these metrics. We review these metrics with the
government and tell them what they are doing or not doing as a
means of continuing to move the plan forward.
Senator Ben Nelson. We understand the problem that any
democracy or attempted democracy has with militias involved in
their military or in their government. If the Iraqis are
unwilling to move forward in Sadr City against Moqutada al-Sadr
and the Mahdi Army, would that be a pretty good indication that
the plan is not succeeding or would that be a reason to believe
that maybe our commitment to Iraq should be reevaluated?
General Casey. It is a hypothetical, Senator, but if we
were denied access to Sadr City, I would consider that a
significant breach in the commitments that the prime minister
has already made and we would have to have serious discussions
with the government.
Senator Ben Nelson. But have we not already been denied
access to certain political leaders? Have we not already been
denied access to take certain actions against the militias or
other instances where they have told us no for political
reasons or for other reasons?
General Casey. In the past they have, Senator. But I will
tell you, in the past probably 2 months we have not been denied
access to any target and the prime minister is doing what he
said he was going to do. He was going to target everyone who is
breaking the law.
Senator Ben Nelson. Have we asked for access to the Mahdi
Army and al-Sadr?
General Casey. We are actively working our plans for Sadr
City with the Iraqis.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first say how difficult this is because it seems as
if each time I have been in the area of responsibility (AOR),
which has been 12 times, I have come back with great success
stories. I can remember when General Madhi Hashim took over in
Fallujah. He, at one time, was Saddam Hussein's brigade
commander and became really very close and enamored with our
Marines up there, and they have done a great job. In fact, he
later on was moved down to Baghdad to perform security there. I
can remember a trip shortly after that where this general was
in charge of, I believe, the entire eastern one-third of
Baghdad. We did not have any of our boots on the ground. The
security was all provided by the Iraqis. Yet, after that it
changed.
I agree with Senator Warner, as everyone agrees, that we
want to get to the point where these guys can take care of
their own security.
We have seen it moving around. But I want to spend my time
on a couple of the real serious problems we have in the new
job, if you are confirmed, that you will be facing. First one--
and you cannot wait until the change of command on this one
because it is critical today and I think the most critical
thing that you better be thinking about. I know that General
Peter Schoomaker is. I had dinner with him a couple nights ago.
He is most concerned about that, and that is the required
implementation of the base realignment and closure (BRAC) that
we passed.
It is interesting for me to bring this up because I was one
of those who was opposed to having this BRAC round. The reason,
General Casey, is because I said on the Senate floor: Yes, it
may be true that this BRAC round will save $20 billion, but
that is not going to be immediate. It is going to cost us money
in the mean time.
Now, the Continuing Resolution (CR) that the majority has,
and hopefully the Democrats will massage this a little bit and
correct this problem, shorts the account for military
construction under the BRAC by $3.1 billion. Now, in the event
that that is not done, can you explain the implementation or
the problems that we are going to be facing if we do not
properly fund that BRAC account in terms of our troops'
rotation and the things that will not be done as a result of
that shortage of $3.1 billion?
General Casey. I could not talk about the specifics of
that, but as you suggest a cut of that magnitude would have a
huge impact on our ability to manage the installations across
the Army, at a time when we are rotating soldiers back and
forth to combat zones. But I have not been into the specifics
on that.
Senator Inhofe. I think it is time that you are. What I
would like to ask you is by tomorrow, have for the record an
outline of the problems that you will be facing in your new
job, if you are confirmed, if we do not adequately fund that
BRAC account. I do not know how you are going to do it. How can
you plan in the future?
Right now we have come up with good plans to start rotating
troops and bringing them back. We have very carefully designed
this as to what the housing is going to be, and how we are
going to implement that. That is going to be a serious problem.
So I would like to have that--after you have consulted with
General Schoomaker and other people--so I can be talking about
this.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Inhofe. Now, of all the jobs, the tough jobs, I
know you had the toughest job in the world over there, but for
right now I would like to have you forget about that and think
about the job that you would be facing as the Chief. You have
title 10 responsibilities as the Chief to provide the required
troops and equipment. You have the BRAC problem that we are
talking about now.
If I wanted to discourage you, I would remind you that the
Army is facing equipment hurdles in bringing the troop surge to
Iraq. It needs 1,500 more up-armored trucks. The Army is going
to have to draw on prepositioned stocks and it will take
months, probably the summer, to outfit the new vehicles. I had
some conversations with General Schoomaker recently.
I want to read something from his testimony before this
committee. He said: ``To meet combatant commanders' immediate
needs, we pulled equipment from across the force to equip the
soldiers deploying in harm's way. This practice, which we are
continuing today, increases risk of our next-to-deploy units.
It limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic
contingencies.''
The Army National Guard right now has only 40 percent of
their required equipment. Then we have the Future Combat System
(FCS), and every time we need money we move that FCS to the
right and delay its implementation. Until we finish that, we
are sending our kids out to battle in equipment that is not as
good as our potential adversaries could have.
These are huge problems. I am not going to ask you to solve
the problems this morning, but I would just like to have you
address: What background and unique characteristics do you have
to meet these, these really critical problems that you will be
facing?
General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
These are the basic resource modernization challenges and
tradeoffs that I think that I faced as the Vice Chief of Staff
of the Army when we were working on the FCS system back then.
Senator Inhofe. You have always been a real strong
supporter of that. I am talking about from this point forward
with these new competitions for funds; how are we going to do
this and you have already said, in the previous position that
you held you did face these problems.
General Casey. Right. It is standard operational
requirements: strategy, modernization, and resources. One of my
jobs as the Chief of Staff of the Army will be to strike the
appropriate balance between current demands and current
readiness and our ability, as you suggest, to field the type of
force that we are going to need in the next decade. That I
think in a nutshell is what I will be doing as the Chief of
Staff of the Army.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. So if you would for the
record bring back what I was asking for tomorrow, that would be
very helpful to me and to many of us on this panel, bringing to
the surface the serious problem that is there.
I would say, in response to that last question that I asked
you, that it is going to be a real tough job and I think you
are the man for the job. Thank you for your service.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to
you, General Casey, for your years of service, and thanks also
to your family because they have served along with you, and we
are grateful to all of you.
I want to follow up on the line of questioning Senator
Inhofe was pursuing because I have been concerned about the
readiness level of units being deployed to Iraq, and in last
year's National Defense Authorization Bill, I authored an
amendment that was included in the final act, that would
require the Government Accountability Office to conduct a
comprehensive assessment of the readiness of our ground forces
within the Army and Marine Corps no later than June 1 of this
year.
But even before that report is completed, there have been a
series of disturbing reports that our troops do not have the
equipment they need as they are being deployed to Iraq. At a
January 23, House Armed Services Committee hearing, General
Schoomaker stated, ``We are in a dangerous, uncertain, and
unpredictable time,'' and reiterated his concerns about the
readiness levels of non-deployed combat units.
Five combat brigade teams are deploying to Iraq to support
the proposed escalation of U.S. forces there. These units are
part of the pool of nondeployed combat units. General, I want
to ask a series of questions that follow up on our conversation
yesterday in my office, because I know this is a grave concern
to you and to all of us.
Are you at this point able to assert with a 100-percent
level of confidence to this committee that every soldier being
deployed to Iraq as part of this escalation will have all the
necessary personal equipment?
General Casey. Senator, that is my goal and I know that is
General Pete Schoomaker's goal, and we work very hard to ensure
that that happens.
Senator Clinton. Can you similarly assure us that every
soldier being deployed as part of this escalation will receive
all the necessary training for this dangerous assignment?
General Casey. Again, that is the objective that both
General Schoomaker and I have stated to our organizations.
Senator Clinton. Finally, will each and every soldier being
deployed as part of this escalation have all the necessary
force protection available to them to perform their mission?
General Casey. As I mentioned to you yesterday, I gave that
guidance several weeks ago, that that would in fact be the
case.
Senator Clinton. Now, according to yesterday's Business
Week summary of a new Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector
General (IG) report, the IG is concerned that the U.S. military
has failed to adequately equip soldiers in Iraq and
Afghanistan, especially for nontraditional duties such as
training Iraqi security forces and handling detainees.
The equipment shortages were attributed to basic management
failures among military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.
U.S. CENTCOM lacks standard policies for requesting and
tracking equipment requirements for units to perform their
duties.
General, have you seen this IG's report?
General Casey. I have not, Senator.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that the
committee request a copy of the IG's report that was referred
to in the Business Week story and that it be made available to
the committee as soon as possible.
Chairman Levin. It will be requested and will be shared
with everybody.
Senator Clinton. General, as commander of U.S. forces in
Iraq were you aware of the IG's investigation?
General Casey. This is the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction's (SIGIR) report?
Senator Clinton. Yes.
General Casey. I am aware of a continuing IG process going
on. I was not aware of this specific investigation. I know they
are out there all the time doing a range of investigations.
Senator Clinton. Do you know if any member of your command
cooperated with this particular report?
General Casey. I do not, but I assume they do because they
routinely work with the SIGIRs in doing that reports.
Senator Clinton. Could you report back to the committee
what your find about the level of cooperation with this report,
please?
General Casey. I will, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]

The information requested was provided by General Casey on February
16, 2007, in the attached letter.

Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Are you aware of the problems that are apparently cited in
this report, as set forth in press accounts of it?
General Casey. I am not. I am actually a little surprised.
I think you said it was the equipping of transition teams, I
spend a lot of personal time making sure that these teams have
the best equipment because they operate relatively
independently, and we have gone to great lengths to make sure
they have the equipment. I go up and talk to each group as they
come through and I have not heard any mention of the transition
teams being shortchanged on equipment.
Chairman Levin. Senator Clinton, if I could just interrupt.
We did receive that IG report that you referred to, apparently
last night, and it is now in our files. It is classified
Secret, so when you read it if there are parts of it that you
feel should be declassified we will make those requests.
Sorry for the interruption.
Senator Clinton. No. I would appreciate that, Mr. Chairman,
because earlier this week I questioned Admiral Fallon about an
article in the Washington Post titled ``Equipment for Added
Troops Is Lacking, New Iraq Forces Must Make Do, Officials
Say.'' Mr. Chairman, I would like that article to become a part
of the record of this hearing as well.
Chairman Levin. It will be part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Clinton. After the hearing, the chairman and
ranking member sent a letter to Secretary Gates asking about
the readiness of our troops. In that article were very specific
and disturbing questions from Lieutenant General Stephen
Speakes and others about the lack of equipment, the lack of
readiness. Among the concerns were the proper level of armor
for vehicles, prepositioned sets issued in Kuwait are the add-
on armor type and do not provide adequate protection,
insufficient add-on armor kits for logistics trucks and prime
movers, insufficient and incomplete electronic countermeasure
devices designed to defeat improvised explosive devices,
insufficient force protection materials for the outposts we are
building in Baghdad and throughout Anbar Province, insufficient
training sets of equipment and vehicles at home station for
units to train on in preparation for deployments.
I am very concerned that we are pursuing a policy that,
regardless of what one thinks about it or how one evaluates its
chances for success, certainly raises the fears that so many of
our young men and women are going to be put into very dangerous
situations in neighborhoods in Baghdad, dependent upon their
Iraqi counterparts who may or may not be reliable. Mr.
Chairman, I believe that because of these disturbing reports
about equipment shortages we should as we begin to debate the
Warner-Levin proposal include provisions that require that
adequate equipment and training be mandated so that we do not
send any young American into this dangerous mission without
knowing that they are as well-prepared, as ready and equipped
as they deserve to be to try to fulfill this mission.
General Casey. I do not think anyone feels stronger about
that than I do, Senator.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Senator Chambliss, going according to the list that I have
is always a little bit awkward, but we have an early bird rule
and I just follow what our clerk tells me, is the earliest
birds get the worm.
Senator Chambliss. I do think Senator Sessions was here
before I was, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to go, but he was here.
Senator Sessions. I was here when you gaveled this hearing.
Chairman Levin. I am going to call on Senator Sessions. If
you would share this with Senator Sessions. Unhappily, you are
not even listed on here. Our clerk is going to get a raise--get
a rise out of me. [Laughter.]
Thank you, and I appreciate that very much, Senator
Chambliss.
Senator Sessions, forgive the error.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. You are
very gracious as always.
Let me just ask you this, General Casey. You have been
leading men in combat for some time now. As Chief of Staff of
the Army, will you take every effort and utilize every power
you have to ensure those soldiers when they hit the ground in
Iraq are properly equipped and supported?
General Casey. And trained, I will.
Senator Sessions. With regard to the soldiers that are
going there, they are fully equipped with their $17,000-plus
worth of equipment and all that goes for each soldier; is that
right?
General Casey. Yes.
Senator Sessions. We had testimony the other day that two
or three of the brigades would be ready to go fully equipped
and a couple of brigades may lack some uparmored vehicles or
transport vehicles and that they were working on that. But if
you can confirm you will utilize every power you have to make
sure those brigades are fully equipped?
General Casey. I will, Senator. In fact, I gave
instructions several weeks ago in Iraq that we would not bring
anybody in who was not prepared.
Senator Sessions. So if they do not send them to you
properly equipped you are not going to put them on the street?
General Casey. Right.
Senator Sessions. General Casey, thank you for your
leadership and service to our Nation for 37 years. You were
born in an Army hospital in occupied Japan, son of an Army man.
I do not know if he was an officer or not. My father served in
occupied Japan and I guess one of the great things in the
history of the world is MacArthur and our military's efforts to
create a prosperous, free Japan today. It is one of the great
things that happened in our world. We have invested a lot of
effort now in trying to bring Iraq to some such level as that.
That would be our dream.
You now have a son in the military. So I know that many of
us are frustrated about troop levels and strategies and plans.
I would just say this. I liked it a while ago when you said you
did not want to ask for one more soldier to be sent to Iraq
than you believed was absolutely needed. I think that is where
most of the American people are. That is where the people are
who are dubious of this war. That is where the people are who
support our efforts, like I do.
I do not want to send a single person there that is not
necessary. I want to add this in as part of my thanks to you.
You were Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army. They
asked you to go to Iraq for 18 months to deal with the
challenges there. You accepted that responsibility. You went
and you have stayed now 30 months away from your family, giving
your every waking moment to a successful policy there. I thank
you for that.
I cannot see how that can do anything but help you be a
more effective, sensitive, knowledgeable Chief of Staff of the
Army. So I think I wanted to say that.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sessions. I think it was a general in the German
army that said few strategies exist beyond the first shot of
the war. Things change. They really change rapidly, do they
not, in an asymmetrical insurgency type situation we are facing
in Iraq?
General Casey. They do, Senator. It is interesting, the
threat has changed three times in the 2\1/2\ years I have been
there at my level, and at the tactical level it changes faster
than that.
Senator Sessions. General Petraeus wrote the
counterinsurgency manual. It is filled with so many subtleties
and demands on the military to alter and change tactics,
strategies, and initiatives constantly in a struggle like this,
would it not?
General Casey. It is. In fact, in the summer of 2005 I was
getting a sense that our soldiers were not really effectively
applying what counterinsurgency doctrine that we have, and I
sent a team out to check. What they came back and said is, they
generally understand it, but not everybody has all the tools,
and if the commander gets it, the unit gets it. So we
established a counterinsurgency academy in Iraq where every
brigade commander brings his battalion and company commanders
through a week-long course to work on the subtleties and the
nuances of counterinsurgency operations inside Iraq. It has
proved very effective. Over 5,000 leaders have actually been
through that course already and we are expanding it now to
bring Iraqis in so that they can pick up the counterinsurgency
operations.
Senator Sessions. General Abizaid in a private conversation
several years ago in Iraq on a C-130 when only the two of us
could hear one another, and hardly that, explained to me his
personal belief as to why we ought not to bring in more troops
than necessary to do the job. There is a real tension there and
you have touched it. I do not know, maybe Senator McCain is
right. I do not know.
But I have always adhered to his view, and I think you
share it, that we want to keep the pressure on the Iraqis to
step up their capability so it is their country and their
nation that they are defending. If you bring in too much
support it could erode or lessen the pressure on them to assume
responsibility.
Is that part of your analysis?
General Casey. That is exactly right. I saw this in Bosnia
myself as a brigadier general. I remember watching myself going
out and trying to solve the problems of Bosnia and as a result
my sense was that they became dependent on us and they did
less.
Senator Sessions. What about the Lawrence of Arabia quote?
What is that? Can you recall that for us?
General Casey. ``Better they do it imperfectly with their
own hands than you do it perfectly with yours.'' I use that
quote with each of the classes in the counterinsurgency
academy.
Senator Sessions. He was expert in the Arab culture, and
that is I think good advice.
It has been a struggle and it has been tough, and we are
disappointed that it has not gone smoother. We all wish it had.
But war requires leadership. Leaders make hard decisions. They
accept responsibility for their decisions and we live with
those decisions. You have made some tough decisions. I think
you have done a good job. But whether or not we agree or
disagree with every decision you have made, I believe we can
all agree that your career as Vice Chief of the Army and this
experience now, 30 months extended tour in Iraq, will help you
to be even more effective as Chief of Staff of the Army, and I
intend to support you.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sessions. My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions, and I again
apologize for the mistake here.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
having had to step out. I am trying to be in two places at once
this morning. We had a Foreign Relations Committee hearing as
well.
General, I want to express my best wishes to you and to
your family. My congratulations to you and my appreciation for
the service that you have given. I would like in several
different ways to associate myself with the comments that my
fellow Senator from Virginia made. I do not think it is a
consequence of the honor of representing Virginia so much as
the fact that we both served in the Marine Corps, we both had
the privilege of serving in that Pentagon as Secretary of the
Navy, and I think it brings a little bit different focus on
some of the questions that have been asked of you this morning.
I think that a few of the questions that have been asked of
you--I am not going to ask you to comment on this, but I think
it bears saying--are evidence that your situation this morning
represents the classic conundrum of military service at the
highest level. In this administration it has not been unheard
of for officers who spoke too loudly very often to have lost
their jobs, and at the same time to speak too softly often
causes the military leader in historical situations rather than
the civilian boss to be blamed when things go wrong.
I believe strongly that military leaders should be held
accountable, but certainly in this situation today from a lot
of people's perspectives, including my own, the consequences of
what I believe has been a failed strategy should be shared at a
far higher level.
I have a question with respect to your assumption of your
new responsibilities that I would like to ask of you, and it
relates to the fact that we currently have an estimated 100,000
civilian contractors working in Iraq. On the one hand, I have
heard comments from many senior military leaders that clearly
we could not do it without them--I hear this over and over
again--because of force structure deficiencies that have been
built into the end strength levels, particularly in the Army.
At the same time, I have a concern about the cost of these
people and also the accountability that pertains to this
concept of, for lack of a better phrase, renting an army. This
is a rent-an-army out there. The costs in many ways are
obvious, particularly in the short-term. There are so many
stories of individuals leaving Active Duty who are making maybe
$20,000 and they can go over and work for five to nine times
that and doing quasi-military work in the same country, pretty
much doing the same kinds of things.
The notion of accountability is deeply troubling. I am not
aware of any cases where misconduct--and I am not talking about
the contracting situation, which we are trying to get our arms
around, but human misconduct--shooting Iraqis out in the
villages, these sorts of things. I am not aware of any incident
where that sort of misconduct has been brought to proper
justice. There may be. There may be one or two, but I am not
aware of it.
So my question really is, would it not be better for this
country if those tasks, particularly the quasi-military gun-
fighting task, were being performed by Active-Duty military
soldiers, in terms of cost and accountability?
General Casey. In terms of cost, I am not sure, Senator. We
talked yesterday on this, the notion of what is the long-term
cost to take a soldier, bring him in, train him to do this
logistical task, and take care of his family, when you compare
that to the cost of the logistics contract. I have not seen the
figures on the cost-benefit on that.
Senator Webb. I would be interested in having those as you
assume your new job. I think it is something worthy of
discussion on the costs.
General Casey. I think the other part of this, though, it
is important that these contractors are used for logistics type
skills and not necessarily the combat skills I think you
mentioned there earlier. We have I want to say about 20,000
armed security contractors there that we have worked with and
coordinate with. Those are the ones that we have to watch very
carefully.
Senator Webb. Another factor in this, and it does go into
the way that our force structure levels have oscillated and the
way that they are going to now, is the disruption of the
rotational cycles and the hardship that puts on planning, on
morale, particularly in the mid-term, of the Army and the
Marine Corps to continue operating in Iraq. Do you have a
comment on that?
General Casey. By disruption in the rotation cycles, you
mean extensions?
Senator Webb. Extensions and accelerating deployments. We
ideally want a two for one, let us say, cycle and we have been
operating on one for ones, and I know the new Commandant has
mentioned he very much wants to get back to a two to one for a
lot of reasons, including morale.
General Casey. I think it is clear that those extensions
and accelerations place additional stress on the force. I do
not think there is any question about that. I believe that is
exactly what this increase in Army end strength is designed to
alleviate. That will not happen overnight. It takes a while to
build those forces.
But I think it is interesting. I have already seen a
brigade, one of these transformed brigades, that did not exist
when I was the Vice Chief of the Army, has already been to Iraq
and left. So it is not a long-term process, but it does take
some time.
Senator Webb. I am certainly hopeful that we can reduce the
force structure so that we can have a different discussion
regarding the end strength numbers that have been proposed. But
certainly in the short-term we have a real problem here.
If I may--my time has expired--I would just like to say one
other thing. I would like again to associate myself with
something that Senator Warner said and express my gratitude to
your father for the service that he gave our country and for
all of us to remember that he did give his life in service to
our country.
I grew up in the military as well. When you were sitting
there talking about your schools, I counted. I put on a piece
of paper, I went to nine schools in 5 years at one point
traveling around in the career military. I know what that does
to a family, and you and your family have my gratitude. Thank
you very much.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
I think Senators Warner and Webb speak for all of us in
referring to your father for his service and the way in which
you have continued that tradition. It is important that we all
recognize that legacy and that gift which he gave to his
country.
General Casey. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As Mr. Webb was saying, he spent 5 years and went to nine
schools. Senator Graham said he spent 9 years in the fifth
grade. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. Do you want equal time, Senator Graham? You
can have equal time if you need that. [Laughter.]
Senator Graham. I cannot rebut it. [Laughter.]
Senator Chambliss. General Casey, first of all let me just
echo the sentiments of all of us in thanking you and your
family for the terrific commitment that you have all made to
the service to our country and to tell you how much we
appreciate that commitment. I know it is a family commitment,
too. It is not just you. You are correct, without the support
of your wife and your sons you would not be where you are
today. So we do appreciate that.
General, what is the role of the Army Chief of Staff in the
decisionmaking process concerning the war in Iraq today?
General Casey. As the Army Chief of Staff, I would sit as a
member of the Joint Chiefs and have a direct role in
formulating military advice to the Secretary of Defense and to
the President.
Senator Chambliss. So is there a difference in what you
would do as Chief of Staff relative to the war inside of Iraq
and outside of Iraq?
General Casey. If I think I understand the direction here,
Senator, inside Iraq I would be looking primarily inside Iraq
and looking at the appropriate strategies to apply in Iraq. As
a member of the Joint Chiefs, I believe I would be looking at a
broader context and how the war in Iraq fit broadly into our
overall security strategies of the United States.
Senator Chambliss. You have been Commander of the MNF-I for
2\1/2\ years. We cannot say that it has been a successful 2\1/
2\ years. The situation over there is very dire right now. What
do you bring to the table as potentially the next Chief of
Staff of the Army that you did not bring to the table as
Commander of the MNF-I?
General Casey. That is a good question, Senator. I agree
with you, the situation in Iraq is certainly not where I
thought it would be when I was going out the door, and I am no
more comfortable with the situation in Iraq than you or anybody
else is.
I will tell you that the experience I have gained in 2\1/2\
years in a very difficult environment has seasoned me in ways I
probably do not even fully understand now. I have had to deal
at the highest levels of our Government. I have mentored three
Iraqi prime ministers in political-military interactions. I
have dealt with three different ambassadors, four coalition
corps commanders.
I have learned an awful lot about strategic leadership and
I believe that will help me greatly as the Chief of Staff of
the Army. I mentioned some of the more narrow insights that I
received in terms of people, transformation, and Guard and
Reserve matters. But I think the big thing that I will bring
back from Iraq is the seasoning and strategic leadership skills
that I gained over 2\1/2\ years.
Senator Chambliss. General, you and I have had a couple of
private conversations about troop strength in Iraq, and
obviously you did not think we needed additional troops early
on and you have now come to the realization that you think we
do. At a press conference in October 2006 when you were asked
if more troops are needed, ``Maybe, and, as I have said all
along, if we do I will ask for the troops that I need, both
coalition and Iraqis.''
Now, some time after October 2006 into November-December,
apparently you concurred in the fact that an additional two
brigades originally were needed. The President has made a
decision to send an additional four brigades into Iraq and you
concur in that decision. Take me through that process. What
changed your mind? How do you decide now that you concur, that
in October we did not need troops, November we need two
brigades, now you agree we need four brigades?
General Casey. I laid a little bit of that out in my
opening testimony, Senator, but let me just review the bidding.
We are constantly looking at the situation in Baghdad, looking
for ways to improve it. In the middle of November, the Baghdad
division changed and we had a new commander in there, so it was
an opportunity for us to take a fresh look at the situation
with a new set of eyes.
I sat down with him and the corps commander and said: Take
a blank piece of paper and look at this hard and tell us what
you need to help the Iraqis stabilize their capital. At the
same time, the Iraqis came forward with their plan, and this is
the plan for nine districts with an Iraqi brigade and a
coalition battalion in each district. We worked that with the
Iraqis and have continued to develop that over time.
As my commanders and the Iraqis worked that plan, they came
back and said: We are two brigades short; we need two
additional coalition brigades and three Iraqi brigades to make
this plan work. That evolution went from about the middle of
November until the latter part of December, and right before
Christmas I asked for the additional two brigades.
Now, there were three other brigades that were offered and
they were flowing on a time line that allowed us to make
assessments on whether or not they would be needed. As I said,
my bias is that I do not want to bring one more soldier in
there than we need. I was okay with having those forces
basically in reserve to be called forward if necessary. Now
that I am leaving, having those forces in reserve and prepared
to come I think gives General Petraeus, the new commander
there, great flexibility to do what he thinks he needs to do.
He will probably look at things differently than I do.
That is how my thinking has evolved. But I always again go
back to my base case, which is I do not want to bring one more
American soldier or marine in there than I think we need to do
the job.
Senator Chambliss. If General Petraeus comes to you as the
Army Chief of Staff and said, I need additional assets,
including additional troops, if we are truly going to
successful in this operation, are you going to give them to
him?
General Casey. I will, Senator. In fact, I will tell him
the same thing that Pete Schoomaker told me when I went to Iraq
2\1/2\ years ago, and that was: Ask for what you need; we will
figure it out.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We are now aware that about $38 billion of taxpayer money
has been spent on what was proposed to be a reconstruction
effort in Iraq. I think it would be kind to say that most
analyses of those expenditures would indicate that all or most
of it appears to not have been effectively used, since if you
look at the measures of electricity produced and oil and the
stocks of gasoline, are at all-time low levels.
Since you were there, General Casey, I am frustrated by
what I have learned from the IG's report in terms of
contracting processes at DOD. I am even more frustrated at the
idea that we have spent $38 billion while the Iraqis are
sitting with surpluses that they ``are unable to spend
appropriately.''
Can you give us a ground view of how we could have made
this large a mistake in terms of the moneys that have been
spent and ended up with the kind of failure we have had in
terms of meaningful reconstruction?
General Casey. I have not seen the report that you are
mentioning here, Senator. The reconstruction effort has, no
question, been challenging and we worked very hard with the
Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, the ambassador, and our
engineers to ensure that the money that was allocated for the
reconstruction of Iraq was appropriately spent. That, as you
suggest, has not always been the case.
The other issue that you mentioned is a challenge, and that
is the Iraqis' ability to spend their own money. It is a
combination of poor or nonexistent contracting procedures and
fear of corruption. The result has been that we have to do some
fairly significant work with them, particularly on the security
side, to get them, to help them, spend their money. The work
that Lieutenant General Robert Dempsey has done getting a
foreign military sales program going for them allows us to
spend their money and it lessens some of the burden on that.
When I got there there were less than 250 of the Iraq
Reconstruction Fund projects started. We have now started over
3,000 of the 3,400 projects as part of that. But I think
probably about 75 percent of those things are done and the rest
of them will be done here over time.
It is a tough environment both in terms of contracting and
in terms of getting the appropriate materials for the projects
to be done and then to secure the sites.
Senator McCaskill. Perhaps we are just getting all the bad
news and we are not getting any of the good news on
reconstruction. But I think it would be important for this
committee to know your view of what successes there have been.
I am frustrated that the person who is supposed to help Iraq
spend their $10 billion they have made supposedly a commitment
to spend under this new strategy, that that person was selected
the day before the plan was announced by the State Department.
It is a little unfair for me to be questioning you in this
regard because I think the military has done an incredible job.
But I keep hearing that it is the economic infrastructure and
the political infrastructure that is going to make the
difference in terms of long-term success in this country, and
it appears to me that we are so focused on what we are doing
militarily that we are--and I hate to be flippant, but from
what I have read I am not sure we are the right people to
advise the Iraqis on how to spend their money, if we spent $38
billion and we cannot point to any success in terms of
improvement of the infrastructure.
I would like your input on that as you take your new
position because we know there is going to be more money asked
of the American people in this regard, and I think we need to
be able to explain to them how that many billions of dollars
could have been spent with some real horror stories, and how we
can possibly chase that money with more money until we have
more assurances that there is going to be meaningful progress
made. I would really appreciate your input on that as you take
this position.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator. Your point that the
progress on the economic and political fronts must accompany
military and security progress is exactly right. They all must
go forward together, as you point out.
Senator McCaskill. The other area I wanted to ask you about
briefly before my time expires is about recruitment. We have
another incident that has occurred in St. Louis that I believe
will be made public in the coming weeks, about inappropriate
things being said by recruitment officers to potential recruits
about the potential danger and other things. I know there has
been some national stories in this regard.
Could you address the pressures that the Army feels about
recruitment and what you think you can do to make sure that
there are not any abuses occurring in the recruitment process?
General Casey. I am not aware of the specific incident that
you are talking about. My sense is we are doing fairly well in
all three components in recruiting. Everyone met their December
objectives. The Army and the National Guard are ahead for the
fiscal year in terms of recruiting and the Reserves are about
90 percent of where they need to be for the year.
Recruiting is always a tough challenge and there are always
pressures there. You raise a good point. I am sure that the
Army has quality control measures to ensure that those
pressures do not cause people to overstep their bounds, as you
suggest has happened in St. Louis.
Senator McCaskill. I think you are going to see this around
the country, unfortunately, General, or fortunately, depending
on your perspective, that these news outlets are going to be
sending hidden cameras in to record recruitment conversations,
and when there are things said that are inappropriate, I think
they are going to become very high profile.
I support the President's call for a larger active military
and I understand that is going to mean there is a great deal of
recruitment pressure, hopefully, as far as the eye can see. I
think as we face those pressures to increase the size of our
military, I think it is really important that you get a handle
on what is being said person to person in these recruitment
appointments and make sure that there are not any young men or
women that are being misled.
Thank you very much.
General Casey. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General, my compliments to you and your family for a very
long career of distinguished service. But this is about a war
that cannot be lost, and it is almost like I am hearing two
different wars being described here. When you hear General
Petraeus testify and Admiral Fallon, there is a general
belief--let me just put it this way. General Petraeus said:
``Senator Graham, this is not double down; this is all in.'' Do
you agree with that?
General Casey. It is not double down, it is all in?
Senator Graham. All in. This new policy is all in. This is
our last best chance to get this right.
General Casey. I agree with that. As I described in my
opening testimony, the Iraqis are in a position to assume
responsibility for their security by the end of the year if we
can get the sectarian situation in the capital under control.
Senator Graham. The point I am trying to make has nothing
to do with the Iraqis. To all of my colleagues who believe we
cannot lose in Iraq, this is our last chance. The public is
going to break against us big time.
The Army is broken. You have asked for more troops to clean
out Fallujah and Fallujah got reoccupied. There has never been
a willingness on your part during your time as commander in
Iraq to accept the idea that maybe General Eric Shinseki was
right. Was General Shinseki right?
General Casey. My boss, General Abizaid, has said he agrees
with that, and he was there on the ground----
Senator Graham. For 2\1/2\ years everybody that has come
before us has fought the idea that General Shinseki was right.
Everybody that has come before in the last 2\1/2\ years,
including General Abizaid, says the Army is doing fine, and
December 14, 2006, General Schoomaker went to the House and
said the Army is broken.
This is the last best chance and the question is, the last
hand to be played, should you play it? Have you been fighting
for the last 2\1/2\ years a counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq?
General Casey. We have, Senator. In fact, in August 2004
when we first came in, Ambassador John Negroponte and I----
Senator Graham. Have you had the troop levels consistent
with a counterinsurgency program as described by General
Petraeus for the last 2\1/2\ years?
General Casey. We have. It varies with the security
situation around the country, and we have had the ratios that
we needed when we needed them. Fallujah is a good example. I
guess I question your----
Senator Graham. Could I go to Fallujah tomorrow? Could I go
downtown to Fallujah tomorrow as a Senator?
General Casey. You could.
Senator Graham. I asked to go and they would not let me.
General Casey. I actually took Senator Robb down there. If
you had asked me I would have----
Senator Graham. I asked to go to Ramadi and they would not
let me.
General Casey. Ramadi is a little tougher, Senator.
Senator Graham. The point I am trying to make is it is
clear to me that we have never had the force levels to be
claiming we have been fighting a counterinsurgency.
What percentage of the population is contained in the four
provinces that are out of control in Iraq?
General Casey. I would not characterize the provinces as
out of control in Iraq. Baghdad and Anbar are very difficult.
Diyalah and Sal-a-Din are not out of control.
Senator Graham. What percentage of the country would it be
impossible for an American to walk down the street without
being afraid of getting shot at or killed?
General Casey. Probably, about half actually, Senator.
Senator Graham. Well, here we are 2\1/2\ years later. Half
the country, no American can walk down the street. We are
talking about sending 21,500 more as our last best chance. I
asked why 21,500. I have been told that is all we have, that if
we wanted to send 50,000 we could not get them. Is that true?
General Casey. I do not know that to be true, Senator. I
have not heard that.
Senator Graham. That is something we need to know from the
Chief of Staff of the Army. I believe that is all we have. The
reason we are not sending 31,500 is we just cannot get them.
I share Senator Warner's view, I do not know if this is
going to work or not. But I know now we are in a mess and this
is the last best chance. The question I have is, the advice you
have given--I mean, you are saying we need more troops because
the Iraqis have changed their plan. I have never been told by
an Iraqi prime ministerial official that they want 21,500 more
troops. Have you?
General Casey. No, I have not, Senator.
Senator Graham. No further questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Graham, no one would say that
General Shinseki was right because Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld was not going to let them say that. You and I come to
the same conclusion, that there is nothing magic about the
21,000, it ought to be a lot more. I suspect what you have just
said is correct, that we do not have the ability to produce a
lot more.
But the question for me is will this 21,000, 17,000 of
which will go into Baghdad, will it do any good? I personally
believe that the troops going into Anbar will do some good, and
I was convinced by the Marine generals there that was the case.
But it is a sad commentary, and I did not plan to say this,
but you certainly laid the groundwork, that when we have a
career 35-year general as the head of the Army and he gives an
honest and straightforward answer to Senator Levin in front of
this committee, to occupy how many troops and how long do you
need, he said ``Several hundred thousand for several years.''
Of course, I think what is concerning Senator Graham is the
fact over the last several years that nobody in the uniformed
military would challenge the Secretary of Defense.
General, you have my admiration for your career and as I
look at your little family back there they have sacrificed, and
yet it is an honor also for them in this public service that
people give in the service to their country.
I wanted to ask, since so much of the success of this plan
is predicated on the fact that the Iraqi army is going to be
reliable, I have asked and other Senators have asked all of the
witnesses that have come here--Secretary Gates, General
Petraeus, Admiral Fallon--is the Iraqi army reliable and how
much? No one has given a straight answer and, as you and I
talked in my office, I indicated that I was going to ask you
that question.
Would you share for us what you think about the
reliability?
General Casey. As I said yesterday, Senator, it is a mixed
bag and there are good units that are fairly reliable and there
are other units that are less reliable. About a couple of
months ago I directed that we add a reliability index to the
normal monthly readiness report. For some time now we have been
doing a readiness report with the Iraqis on their units--the
people, equipment, training, those standard things. What we
were not getting was your point. We were not getting at the
reliability.
What we were finding is you could have all your people, you
can have all your weapons, your vehicles can all work, but if
we cannot depend on you it is a different problem. I have yet
to get my first report back on that, Senator. But I think your
point is exactly right.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me run this by you then. I have
checked and I have it in writing that what I am about to state
is unclassified. A senior officer on the Joint Staff with
significant military experience has testified to the Senate
that, of the 325,000 Iraqi army and police, that about 130,000
are actually army trained and equipped, and of that 130,000
half of them approximately are geographically located and half
of them, or about 65,000, are nationally recruited and more
reliable; and that of that 65,000, they are expecting, of the
Iraqi army, 30,000 to be in Baghdad.
That same senior officer, when I asked the question how
many are reliable, gave an astoundingly high percentage of 80
percent of that 30,000 in Baghdad.
Your comments?
General Casey. 80 percent in Baghdad reliable of those
forces, that does not strike me as an unrealistically high
number. Knowing the units that we have in Baghdad on the army
side, that is probably about right.
Just on the point on geographically located units versus
nationally recruited, what we have, I think people know, that 5
of the 10 Iraqi divisions are the former National Guard units
that were recruited locally, and they are fairly reliable in
their local areas. But what we have found, when we wanted to
move them someplace else we have had challenges with them. The
Iraqis have put in a deployability scheme where they work their
way through this, and we have actually seen that that has made
a difference.
The other ones, the nationally recruited ones, as you say
or as you suggest, they are more mobile, but I guess what I am
going to say is it is not a reliability issue just because the
one happens to be geographic and one happens not to be.
Senator Bill Nelson. You can understand the concern that we
have when we ask over and over on a plan that is predicated on
the reliability of the Iraqi forces, putting more of our men
and women in Baghdad in a combat situation, where in the
doctrine of clear, hold, and build that you are going to clear
with the Iraqi forces and it is going to be more Iraqi forces
than American forces that will go in and clear an area. So
naturally we as the Senate Armed Services Committee need to
know what is the professional military's judgment of what is
the reliability of those forces that are going in.
Yet we cannot get anybody to give us a consistent or even
an answer. Would you please do that when you have taken over
the reins as Chief of Staff?
General Casey. I will actually do it before that. I will
give you some feedback from the reliability assessment that I
have asked for from my units.
Senator Bill Nelson. Twenty percent unreliable, if those
statements by this senior officer are correct. Then report back
to us, why is it that they are unreliable? Do they not show up?
Are they criminals? Have they been infiltrated by the militia?
Of course, that is a high number and would certainly undermine
the mission of the Iraqi army in Baghdad.
General Casey. I would not get fixed on 80 percent. I do
not know where he got that number. I said it did not strike me
as artificially high. The reasons you mentioned why people
would be unreliable are exactly right, and if you add poor
leadership to that you would have about the four or five things
that make these units unreliable.
The fact of the matter is, and one of the reasons we are
partnering these coalition units with the Iraqi units, is they
fight better when they are with us. We have demonstrated that
time and time again. So we put a little steel in their spine
when they are standing next to an American soldier or an
American marine.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, over and over this committee
we have been told by the Secretary of Defense that he had
hundreds of thousands that were trained and equipped Iraqi army
that were reliable. That was incorrect information, and that
leads us to this point. What we want is the truth and we will
look forward to receiving that from you.
[The information referred to follows:]

The information requested was provided by General Casey on February
16, 2007, in the attached letter.

General Casey. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. General Casey, let me also thank you and your
family for your outstanding service to our country, and I look
forward to our continued work together in the future.
The Congressional Budget Office in its most recent long-
term assessment of the DOD budget estimates that the shortfall
between anticipated funding levels and what is required is a
minimum of an additional $52 billion per year across the Future
Years Defense Program and well out into the future. My
understanding of the fiscal year 2008 budget request at this
point is that the top-line figure keeps pace with inflation,
but there is no real growth.
Given the cost of the war, the cost of reset, the cost of
increasing active duty end strength, the cost of developing and
procuring FCSs, it is apparent that there is an appreciable
risk, measure of risk, in the budget. What areas of the Army
budget give you the greatest reason for concern as we look out
over the next few years?
General Casey. I will rapidly expend my knowledge on this,
so I will give you just a couple of thoughts, Senator. I think
my greatest concern is our ability to equip, provide the
soldiers that are deploying with the best equipment in time for
their training, so that they can be successful in whatever
combat mission they are going on.
I think the second main concern I have is the reset, the
recapitalization of the force as it comes back out of Iraq. We
need to ensure that we have an appropriate level of funding so
that we can fix what we have that is broken.
Then, as Senator Inhofe was talking about earlier, we
cannot take our eye off modernization and the FCSs. So I will
balance the challenges of near-term readiness with long-term
modernization over time. But those are the three things I think
that come to mind.
I will add one more and that is having enough money to
ensure that we provide the soldiers and families of the Army
who are going through this very difficult and stressful period
with a quality of life befitting them.
Senator Dole. I am a strong proponent of increasing the
Active Duty Army's end strength. This increase is necessary to
have the forces to respond to major regional threats, to meet
critical homeland security, defense, and peacekeeping needs,
and to accommodate the increasing number of long-term
deployments connected with the war on terror.
Every brigade in the North Carolina-based 82nd Airborne
Division has deployed three times since the fall of 2001. In
short, today's high operational tempo is driving home the point
that end strength is too low. The next Army Chief of Staff will
confront difficult budgetary pressures. Give me your assurance
that you will not jettison the proposal to increase Army end
strength in pursuit of funds to pay for other pressing needs.
General Casey. I will certainly work to sustain the new end
strength addition here. I guess never say never, Senator, but I
agree with you that we need to increase that end strength and
we need to build the forces that will come from that end
strength for exactly the reasons that you suggest.
Senator Dole. North Carolina is home to the Joint Special
Operations Command, the Army Special Operations Command, and
the new Marine Special Operations Command. I as much as anyone
want our special forces to grow, but we need to grow the forces
in a manner that does not sacrifice quality in pursuit of
quantity. Would you share with us your thoughts regarding the
expansion of the special operations community over the next
several years and particularly the pace of that expansion?
General Casey. I could not comment on the specifics of the
plan, Senator. But I can tell you that working with the special
forces in the past 2\1/2\ years in Iraq and watching the value
that they bring to these types of counterinsurgency missions
that we will be facing here in the 21st century, I am a big
proponent of special forces myself.
We have been working on this for a while and, again as you
suggest, increasing the size of these forces without impacting
their quality and the experience that they have is critical.
But I could not tell you now what the specifics of the Army's
plan are for growing the special forces.
Senator Dole. Let me ask one other question. The United
States has enormous resources and expertise in a number of non-
DOD departments and agencies that could be better utilized to
help us achieve our national security objectives in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It is fair to say that today most,
if not all, national security objectives pursued by the United
States are fundamentally interagency in nature. Do you believe
it is time for Congress to consider Goldwater-Nichols II type
legislation to improve interagency coordination?
General Casey. I think it is something that ought to be
looked at. You are exactly right. I have watched this now in
Bosnia, I have watched it in Kosovo, and I have watched it in
Iraq, and it really is an area where we keep relearning the
same lessons again. I think some type of program that would
leverage the skills from across all of the interagency in a
sustained way I think would be very helpful to us all.
Every time we have done it we have said we will never do
this again and so we forget the lessons, and then we do it
again. I think your notion is exactly right.
Senator Dole. Thank you, General Casey. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. General Casey, Senator Levin has
indicated I am the next in order.
First, let me thank you for your devoted service to the
Army and the Nation and that of your family. We appreciate it
and respect it. You are someone who has inspired a lot of
soldiers with your dedication and I thank you for that.
You assumed command in Iraq in 2005, is that correct?
General Casey. July 1, 2004.
Senator Reed. 2004, excuse me. At that time, I think you
could properly say that you were assigned to manage some of the
consequences of failure: insufficient forces--many of my
colleagues have spoken about that--despite General Shinseki's
prescient comments to this committee; a de-Baathification
policy that alienated the Sunnis; an Abu Ghraib incident which
further endangered our status in that region and in that
country; emerging sectarian violence, which was already evident
when you took command.
I think the record should show that as you assumed this
command there were significant and serious failures already
with our approach and endeavor in Iraq. The policy and the
strategy that I understood that you were pursuing based upon
the President's comments was described as clear, hold, and
build; is that an accurate description?
General Casey. It is, Senator.
Senator Reed. Let us try to take that apart. Clearing was
done on numerous occasions by American forces, operating
sometimes with Iraq security forces. But there has been
criticism lately that the Iraqi security forces were incapable
of holding terrain and we had insufficient forces to do that.
Is that a valid criticism of the strategy?
General Casey. Not necessarily. In Baghdad it is probably a
valid criticism. The August Baghdad plan where we went in and
cleared focus areas, as we called them, specific areas of
Baghdad where the sectarian strife was the greatest, we went in
and cleared those, established basically a perimeter around
them, and then gradually backed ourselves out as the Iraqi
security forces were more able to take charge.
By and large, they did not prove capable of holding onto
those areas without continued support from us.
Senator Reed. Did you inform the Secretary of Defense and
the President that aspect of the strategy was not working at
that time?
General Casey. I told them that the holding on the focus
areas was not working. In fact, now that you are asking me
about it, I recall specifically saying that we were having
challenges with the reliability of the Iraqi security forces in
the focus areas. So yes, I did.
Senator Reed. Did they direct in any way or did you request
an increase in forces, American forces? How were you preparing
to compensate for this noted deficiency?
General Casey. As we looked at the sectarian violence over
time, we asked for more forces in the June time period as we
saw a spike in the sectarian violence, and that is when the
Stryker Brigade was extended and we basically put two more
brigades into Baghdad.
What we did not get when we put those forces in was the
political commitment from the Iraqis to target anyone who is
breaking the law, not to have any safe havens, not to have
political influence on the security forces, the commitments
that Maliki has since made and is delivering on. That was the
difference, and I was reluctant throughout the fall to ask for
additional forces when I knew I did not have the political
commitment of the Iraqis to let us do our jobs.
Senator Reed. What you seem to be saying, General, is that
in terms of the decisive factor it is not the size of our
forces there, but the political commitment of the Iraqi
government, and that with adequate political commitment our
forces are either adequate or do not require significant
increase; is that fair?
General Casey. I think that is a fair statement. In
counterinsurgency operations, the political and the military
have to go forward together.
Senator Reed. Let me take on the third leg of this
strategy, build. I would note, as you probably might be aware,
that yesterday the SIGIR essentially examined the Iraqi
government and said all the ministries are dysfunctional, with
some exceptions. You are responsible for two of these
ministries, interior and defense. My experience is that they
are probably more capable than the others.
But the other responsibilities are borne by the Department
of State. Have you communicated at all to the President the
inability of other government agencies to complement this
policy?
General Casey. We talk about that regularly. I think one of
the things that has caused us problems is the fact that the
government has changed three times in 2 years, and so we are on
our third set of ministers right now and third set of
ministries. So the growth of the ministries has not been
straight line. As a matter of fact, it has been sporadic.
Senator Reed. What I find puzzling is that if the strategy
is clear, hold, and build and it has been evident, not only
yesterday but ever since we have been there, that the Iraqi
government is dysfunctional, our complementary agencies--Agency
for International Development, Departments of State, Justice,
Agriculture, and Treasury--have not provided the resources
necessary, why did this not--and you communicated it to the
President--why did this not cause a reevaluation of our
strategy by the President and the Secretary of Defense?
General Casey. I think what you are seeing in the
President's----
Senator Reed. We are seeing it after an election. We are
not seeing it a year ago or 2 years ago, when in fact on the
ground this was evident.
General Casey. One of the other things I have seen with the
three governments is it takes everybody about 6 months to get
their legs under them and start governing. These folks are not
experienced ministers. They have not served in government
before. So it takes them a while to understand and develop
their governing skills.
Maliki's government did not take over until about May 20
and he did not get his defense ministers until early June. Now
we are talking maybe 8 months that he has been in charge. They
make, what I have seen, in most of the ministries gradual
progress. There are others that are just so corrupt they are
not going to make any progress.
Senator Reed. My time has expired, but I understand, and I
think you feel the same way, is--and we say it repeatedly, but
the question is do we mean it--that a military strategy alone
without a functional Iraqi government and without the support
of non-DOD agencies cannot effectively prevail in Iraq. Is that
accurate?
General Casey. That is accurate.
Senator Reed. I have not seen a lot of commitment outside
of DOD to succeeding in Iraq. This government is still
dysfunctional and, as you point out, some of these problems are
beyond the next 6 months or a year because it is corruption, it
is political advantage, it is the existential struggle between
Shia and Sunnis, that are not resolved by a consultant from
McKinsey.
I just wonder again--I do not wonder now, after this
dialogue--but that clear, hold, and build never was a strategy
that was working because we were not building, and this
strategy of a surge I think is probably compromised by the same
factors.
General Casey. The clear, hold, and build has worked for us
locally, in Fallujah for example. The build phase takes a long
time because of the inefficiencies within the different
ministries, but it has worked for us locally.
Senator Reed. My time is up. One point if I may. I have
traveled out, as you have, to Fallujah a number of times, and
the times I have been there there has been one State Department
officer out there trying to make this happen, a 36, 37-year-
old, brave, courageous State Department official.
General Casey. Dale Weston.
Senator Reed. Dale.
General Casey. He is a fine young man, yes.
Senator Reed. He has needed help for 2 or 3 years and it
has not arrived.
Thank you.
General Casey. There is actually a Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) out in Anbar that is part of that
effort.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. General, let me echo what has been said
repeatedly here and express my appreciation for your service to
your country under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, and
also to your family. I recall running into your wife at a
function almost 2 years ago and at that time she was anxiously
awaiting your arrival back here, and then it was extended. So I
know there is a tremendous sacrifice on the part of your family
as well, and we appreciate what your commitment and dedication
to this country and its national security entails for your
family as well.
Chairman Levin. Senator Thune, I hate to interrupt you. The
roll call vote has begun. I think you will have time to finish
your questions.
Senator Thune. Right.
Chairman Levin. Are you going to be able to stay? If you
could turn this then over to Senator Bayh after your time is
up, and then I will be back by the time you are done. Thank you
and sorry for the interruption.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
I agree with some of what my colleague from Rhode Island
just said. I think a critical component in the clear, hold, and
build strategy is the build part of it, and my impression is,
having visited Iraq several times, that is a component that has
been very deficient in terms of our strategy. I believe the
same thing has been true to some degree in Afghanistan, having
visited there.
I have been over to Iraq several times. I have visited with
you there in theater, as well as when you have been in front of
this committee. One of the things that we often hear in front
of this committee is about the Sunni and Shia extremists. I
mentioned this to you in a private meeting, that it seems to me
at least that a lot of times people forget when we talk about
the duration of this fight how things have changed and how we
have had to adapt to the changes on the ground.
There was a lot of talk a little over a year ago about
being able to transition out and start pulling our troops out,
and then the Samarra mosque was bombed in February 2006 and
everything changed. The paradigm changed entirely and the
sectarian piece of this puzzle began to really rage and has
ever since.
I think oftentimes we forget that we would like to see
progress. I think we were seeing some progress up to that
point. But the scenario has changed entirely.
There has been a lot of focus on Sunni and Shia extremists.
Based on your last 2\1/2\ years in Iraq, is there a growing
concern among the moderate population of Baghdad and Iraq, both
Sunni and Shia, that time is not on their side and that it is
in their best interest to secure the future before it descends
further? Do you see a sense of urgency among the moderate
elements in the country?
General Casey. Senator, there is no question that the
moderate elements would like to see the country move forward.
But what we are seeing is--and Baghdad is a great example of
this--you have the extremists on both sides attacking each
other's populations, and that creates fear and intimidation
among the moderates, that makes them unwilling to compromise
until they see that they have some chance of surviving this.
That is why it is so important now to bring security, to
help the Iraqis bring security to Baghdad, so that we can get
on with the rest of the progress.
Senator Thune. You have probably spent more time with the
prime minister than anybody else in the military, or DOD for
that matter. What is your assessment of his reliability and do
you believe that, despite these sectarian differences, he has
the commitment level now to see this through?
My impression at least in the last visit over there is that
they are getting it, they understand that the clock is working
against them, that public support in the States, that our
willingness to continue to provide military support to their
effort is on the wane. What is your sense about his level of
commitment?
General Casey. I think the prime minister is committed to
bringing stability to Baghdad and to the rest of the country.
As we agreed on the Baghdad security plan and agreed on the
Iraqi commander for that, there was no question in my mind that
he did not understand that this was the last best chance to
succeed.
So I put him in the very-committed-to-this column. As I
mentioned earlier, he made a range of commitments in several
speeches and he is delivering so far on those commitments.
Senator Thune. So much of what this strategy, its success,
depends upon his commitment as well as the commitment of the
military there. It seems to me at least that they are stepping
up. So far what we are seeing, I am encouraged by that, as you
are as well. But the real focus, of course, is security in
Baghdad and the willingness of the Iraqi military and the Iraqi
political leadership to take on these militias and do what
needs to be done to bring that kind of security.
Do you think--and I know this question has been batted
around a lot here this morning and for the past several weeks--
that with the force, the additional troop strength that we are
bringing into Baghdad, that we can get this done? The question
is could you use 30,000 or 50,000? I know you have had a lot of
input in the formulation of this current plan.
I guess I just want to hear you say that, your assessment
of whether we can get it done with this number.
General Casey. I believe we can, Senator. I believe that
the commitment, the political commitment of the Iraqi
government to the success of this plan, is probably more
important right now than the additional troops. But I believe
that with the troops that are in the pipeline this plan can
work.
Senator Thune. I am out of time Mr. Chairman, I have a
question which I will submit for the record, and I know that
Senator Bayh probably wants to get in here before the vote.
I appreciate your answers. Our hopes and prayers are with
our troops and our efforts, and with your leadership. The other
challenge that we face is the Army transitions, both in
doctrine and equipment, from a Cold War posture to a more
lethal and agile force, which this current conflict has
certainly shown a light on the need for. I will submit those
for the record and I thank you again for your service.
I yield back my time.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Bayh [presiding]. General, thank you for being here
today. I am going to have to run to make this vote. I just have
three quick questions. I will just move through them very
rapidly.
I think what you have heard here today is everyone
expressed their admiration for you as an individual and for
your family and for your family's service. The problem that we
face, the dilemma in some of our minds, is that the policy in
Iraq has gone terribly wrong and there needs to be some
accountability for that, and who is responsible. That is the
question that many are asking. Are you responsible or are
others responsible for some of the mistakes that have been
made?
So my first question to you is, were you given everything
by the civilian leadership that you requested to make this
policy that you devised a success?
General Casey. I was, Senator. All of the requests that I
talked about earlier in my opening statement were filled by the
Department. I would just like to say, you are exactly right. I
am responsible for the military aspects of this campaign and to
the extent that people have problems with the way that has been
conducted I am the one who is responsible.
Senator Bayh. Were you in a position of actually authoring
the policy or implementing a policy derived in large part by
others, specifically the Secretary of Defense?
General Casey. We shaped the policy in Iraq and worked it
up and presented it to the chain of command. The Secretary of
Defense and the President discussed it and it was then given
back to us.
Senator Bayh. Was it altered in material part by the
civilian leadership or did they adopt your policy pretty much
as you presented it to them?
General Casey. I would not say it was adopted pretty much
as presented, but it was hard questions asked, adjustments
made. I would not say it was rubber stamped, if that is where
you are going.
Senator Bayh. Well, but they did not put constraints upon
your policy that prevented you from doing what you thought
needed to be done? It was your policy?
General Casey. It was in fact my strategy.
Senator Bayh. Your strategy.
General Casey. My strategy, better word.
As I said to Senator Warner earlier, if I disagreed with
that I would have done something completely different.
Senator Bayh. I think Senator Warner asked questions about
that.
Here is part of the dilemma that we face as well, General.
Many have felt that the civilian leadership has made some
tragic errors in judgment. Under our system we cannot replace
some of those civilians, particularly the Vice President and
the President of the United States. So we have to ensure that
those under the civilian leadership are competent, wise, and
are willing to differ with the civilian leadership when that is
in the best interests of the United States.
So my final question to you, and then just one brief
comment before I have to go, is can you give us an example of
where you differed with the civilian leadership and were
willing to speak out and say, look, this just is not right, you
need to take a different course here? I know in the military
chain of command it is a difficult thing because you have
obligations to follow orders and that kind of thing. But I
guess what I am looking for here is some sense of independence,
of your willingness to speak your own mind and not just take
direction from on high, given the fact that many of us have
concluded that the civilian leadership has not pursued a very
wise course here.
General Casey. An example of, as you said, differing with
civilian leadership was on the PRTs. General Abizaid and I felt
very strongly that these things were necessary if we were going
to build the capacity at the provincial level so that the
provinces could succeed. Others in the Department disagreed
with that and did not want to go forward with that. But General
Abizaid and I continued to work through the Department and with
the ambassador and the Department of State and we ultimately
prevailed and gained the PRTs.
I will say I was heard, Senator. I do not feel like I was
constrained in any way from expressing my opinion, and I did.
The strategy that I articulated here today is my strategy and I
believe in it. It may not have produced the results on the
timelines that people expected or wanted, but I do believe that
it has laid the foundation for our ultimate success in Iraq.
But it was mine.
Senator Bayh. I appreciate your candor in that regard. It
is not uncommon around this town that people try and deny
responsibility or shift responsibility, so I appreciate your
willingness to accept responsibility.
My final comment has to do with something that Senator
Clinton mentioned, and it is not a question so much as it is
just an observation. One of the most shameless things that has
happened in the course of this undertaking was that incident
in--I cannot remember whether it was Kuwait or Baghdad; maybe
it was Kuwait--involving the hillbilly armor, where the
soldiers had to stand up and say, look, we have to find scrap
metal to weld onto the side of our vehicles. So some of these
reports that she alluded to and some others were, it looks like
there may be a shortage of uparmored Humvees and other things.
We just cannot allow this to happen again. I personally,
since I have taken an interest in the Humvees, have asked the
Pentagon over and over again, do we have enough, are we doing
enough. Frankly, they were just dropping the ball on this. Now,
it is understandable, although lamentable, maybe once. But it
is not acceptable when it happens over and over and over again.
So I really encourage you to get to the bottom of this.
Then there is just one last observation. There is a report
that says, ``Adding to the crunch, the U.S. Government has
agreed to sell 600 uparmored Humvees to Iraq this year for its
security forces. Such sales `better not be at the expense of
the American soldier or marine,' Speakes''--you know who I am
referring to--`` `told defense reporters recently.' ''
Look, if there is a shortage our guys have to come first,
right?
General Casey. They do. They do. But the flip side of that
coin is the Iraqi security forces are out there on the street
fighting themselves.
Senator Bayh. You have to be candid and aggressive in
telling us what you need. Frankly, the Pentagon, for reasons
that just mystify me, was saying they had enough when it was
pretty clear they did not have enough. So let us know what is
really necessary and we will provide it.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator. I will.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, General.
Senator Warner [presiding]. Senator, you have about a
minute to make the vote. I am going to miss it because I think
staying here is more important than the vote.
I listened carefully over the last few days about comments
made by a number of colleagues with respect to the very serious
questions that are facing us today. On a weekend talk show a
colleague said the following: ``I say this is the last chance
for the Iraqis to step up and do their part.'' This morning a
colleague said this is the ``last best chance.''
In the resolution that I put before the Senate I drew on
the President's comments. This is paraphrasing what I believed
he said and something I firmly believe and support the
President in this conclusion. The resolution says ``The Senate
believes a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to
regional and world peace and the long-term security interests
of the United States are best served by an Iraq that can
sustain, govern, and defend itself and serve as an ally in the
war against extremism.''
I said clearly in here I support the President. I find
those statements clash. I am hopeful that General Petraeus can
carry forward with the plan. I think the plan could be modified
to employ fewer than 21,500 troops and place greater emphasis
on the Iraqis carrying the burden of elevating the security,
improving it in Baghdad, that security being the consequence of
ever-increasing sectarian violence. I have already made that
speech.
If that plan for some reason does not measure up to the
goals of success, I have to believe that prudent military
commanders such as yourself have a follow-on situation to
support the President's goal as I enunciated. Can you advise
the committee as to the state of that planning and to the
extent you can such elements of such a plan that you can share
without violating any classification?
General Casey. The contingency planning that is going on
now is for the employment of the last three brigades, and so
the planners are actively looking at what happens if we do not
get security in this district of Baghdad and so they are
working through that right now.
Senator Warner. Can you speak up a little louder?
General Casey. They are working through those things right
now at the tactical level.
What I said earlier was that the political commitment of
the Iraqis is more important here than the additional troops.
So that has to come and it has to be sustained. So one of the
things that I will be working with the ambassador on and I know
he is already working on is to not only sustain the level of
political commitment we have, but to move forward with
reconciliation efforts so that we gradually bring the different
ethnic and sectarian groups together and get on with building a
representative government that respects all of their rights.
Senator Warner. But do you agree with the President with
regard to we have to have a measure of success, we cannot let
this government fail?
General Casey. I do. We definitely need to support this
government.
Senator Warner. Fine.
General Casey. They have to bring something to the table as
well, and they are doing that.
Senator Warner. I understand the contingencies. I fully
appreciate the importance of the Iraqi government living up to
its commitments in benchmarks and in other ways. I do not
question that. I draw on Senator Reed's point, and I brought
this up in earlier hearings of this committee this past week. A
chain is no stronger than its weakest link and you have three,
I think really four--it is the political commitments of the
Iraqi government to be fulfilled; it is the other departments
and agencies of our Government that have to fulfill; it is the
military plan; and it is the diplomatic plan.
So it is all four links and really the failure of one could
bring down the total. Would that not be correct?
General Casey. I agree with that, Senator. All four of
those things need to go forward together.
Senator Warner. Then I come back. You can assure the
committee that there is some fallback if this Baghdad surge
concept in nine areas does not meet whatever goals that you as
the commander have set, and that this would not be the last
chance, this campaign in Baghdad?
General Casey. I think that is a fair way to put it. I do
not think it is the absolute last chance, but it certainly is
the best chance right now that we have.
Senator Warner. Then you and I are in concurrence that we
cannot portray to our brave forces that have made these
enormous sacrifices that in any way our will is going to waver
to carry forward as best we can to achieve that measure of
success that the President has set forth here.
I come to another issue that has caused this Senator great
concern. It has been my privilege to have had some long
association with the U.S. military. My own career in uniform is
very modest and of little consequence, but I have had the
benefit of learning through these years of my association with
the military. I am concerned about this concept of the dual
command structure for, let us call it, the Baghdad plan as
announced by the President.
In his announcement he made reference to the Iraqis will
have a commander, a senior commander, in each of the nine
provinces, and presumably a commander above each of the nine
Iraqi commanders; that the United States will likewise have a
chain of command in each province. As I understand it you will
have a battalion level force assigned with, working in support
of, the Iraqi forces, which hopefully will be on the point, and
they have their reporting chain of command.
My concern is when you have this duality, dual concept,
that you come down to the company level and the Iraqi company
commander or platoon commander in all probability is saying
that this mission we have before us, we have to maneuver to the
left, the American platoon commander says, oh no, my
calculations, we have to maneuver to the right. If whichever
they follow does not succeed then you precipitate a finger-
pointing right down at the tactical level between two
commanders who exercised their best judgment.
Is that a potential that could occur under this plan and
what assurances do we have that that will not happen?
General Casey. Senator, if you put two military guys in a
room they are going to disagree on tactics. So I do not think
there is any question that, what you are describing could
happen.
But let me take you back to the beginning on this thing.
There is a parallel chain of command and, as you know better
than anyone, U.S. forces operate under U.S. command and that
will happen. Now, the command structure for the Iraqis is a
significant improvement over what we have been working on with
them in the past iterations of the Baghdad security plan. It
finally gets unity of effort of the Iraqi army and the Iraqi
police and the national police under a single commander.
The way they have set it up is there is a Baghdad
commander, there are two commanders, one for each side of the
river, and then there are nine district commanders. In that
district, each district, will be an Iraqi brigadier. All of the
Iraqi security forces, the local police, the national police,
and army, will report to that one commander. That is a big
difference.
It is not a natural thing, I think, for police and the
military to work together. There has always been friction in
that with the Iraqis. This is a great step forward. I have been
working for some months here and I have told my subordinate
commanders, I want to be able to put my finger on a map of
Baghdad and I want you to be able to tell me who, what Iraqi,
is responsible for security in that area. We can do that now
and that is important.
Now, your concerns are correct ones. They come from the,
okay, how do the Americans and the Iraqis work together. At
each level from General Ray Odierno, the Baghdad commander, to
General Fill with the two district commanders, to the brigade
commander and the battalion commander in each of the districts,
they are partnered at every level and they work very closely
together. We still have our transition teams working with these
Iraqis.
Senator Warner. The embedded, the embedded.
General Casey. I am sorry, the embedded.
Senator Warner. Correct.
General Casey. So they are linked and have close liaison at
every level. I just talked to General Odierno this morning. He
was out visiting with each of his commanders and they are
comfortable with the arrangements that are being worked out.
Senator Warner. Heretofore we have had a unified command of
the American structure and you are assuring me that has not
been changed?
General Casey. No, it absolutely has not changed.
Senator Warner. The American GI is accountable for the
orders he gets from the American chain of command right up to
your successor; is that correct?
General Casey. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. Now, therefore that has been the way we
have operated in Iraq and more or less we have devised the plan
by which the joint operations to the extent we have had them
with the Iraqi forces have been carried out.
General Casey. That started to change in September as we
gradually returned Iraqi forces from my operational control to
Iraqi operational control. In September, you may recall we
stood up the ground force command, that headquarters is now
directing Iraqi operations.
Senator Warner. In our meeting in my office here a day or
so ago, I urged that you look at the testimony of General
Keane, former Vice Chief of the United States Army, now
retired, a very valued and knowledgeable individual. He had
concern with this plan. Did you read that testimony?
General Casey. I did.
Senator Warner. You read the colloquy that I had with him?
General Casey. Yes.
Senator Warner. He concluded that he is going to urge
General Petraeus once he takes over to get this thing
straightened out. Now, can you translate for us what that means
and what you hope to achieve, because I also asked General
Keane, did he know of any precedent where our forces operating
with others have had the type of command structure that this
new strategy plan of the President as announced on the 10th
envisions. He said he did not know of a precedent.
General Casey. My sense is--and I probably need to talk to
Jack, but my sense was from reading that is Jack did not have
all the details of how this was going to actually be
implemented. It is a non-standard arrangement.
Senator Warner. You are breaking new ground.
General Casey. We have been. Actually, we have been
operating in smaller operations like this around Iraq for some
time. As we are transitioning to Iraqi security force lead,
there are non-standard arrangements as we go through the
transition period, and that is really kind of what is happening
now.
Senator Warner. Is there not an element of risk now that is
somewhat greater for our forces operating with the Iraqis?
Unfortunately, we continue to get more factual evidence that
the Iraqi forces, some components are not ready to do certain
things. Yet we are going forward in reliance on their
professional capability. I am just wondering, does this chain
of command increase in any way the risk of the American GI
participating in these operations?
General Casey. I do not think so. As I said, General
Odierno was out. He has visited all the brigade commanders in
Baghdad and had the conversation with them, and he reported to
me this morning that he is comfortable with this arrangement.
Now, is it as good as having everybody lined up and working
for us? No. There will be more friction than that. But I do not
think that it significantly increases the risk to our forces.
Senator Warner. My time is up. Colleague, why do you not
just take charge?
Senator Cornyn [presiding]. General Casey, thank you very
much----
General Casey. If we all leave before they come back, I
will buy you both coffee. [Laughter.]
Senator Cornyn. I appreciate your patience, but more than
that I appreciate your service to our country. As I told you in
my office, as a military brat myself I understand the impact of
the service by the uniformed member on families, and I
appreciate your family being here with you today and the
support they have given you in allowing you to perform so well
in the service of your country.
I want to ask you about the Iraqis. One of the earliest
signs we will see if the Iraqis are living up to their
commitment is whether they are providing additional forces as
promised. What has been the experience? Have they followed
through on their promises or have they been lacking in follow-
through?
General Casey. They are in the process of following through
on those promises. They are actually pretty close to being on
schedule, pretty close to being on schedule with the deployment
of the brigades to Baghdad. I think we are now, with two of the
three brigade headquarters and four of the seven battalions
have moved to Baghdad.
Now, they are coming in with the range of 55 to 65 percent
strength because of people they left back. We are working with
them to increase the strength of the forces that they have in
Baghdad. But they are delivering so far on what they said they
would do.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Senator Cornyn, forgive the
interruption, but I understand there is a second vote on now,
if I am correct. Is that correct? I would ask you, when you are
done would you recess, because we will come back into session.
There are more questions to be asked.
Senator Cornyn. Certainly.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I believe you said earlier when it came to the prime
minister's commitment to take on lawbreakers without regard to
ethnicity or religious affiliation that for the last 2 months
at least you have seen a commitment by the Iraqi government to
take on all lawbreakers and those who are exacting violence
against the population. Did I hear that correctly?
General Casey. You heard that correctly, Senator.
Senator Cornyn. I read with some interest an article in
this morning's Washington Post. It was excerpted from your
written comments, but the headline of it said ``General: Shiite
Militia Leaders Leaving Baghdad Strongholds.'' From what this
article suggests--and I would like for you to confirm it or
explain it--it is the threat even of our building our forces
and not only clearing but actually holding areas that are
currently occupied by militias and others seeking to generate
chaos there, it is even the threat of force is causing the
Shiite militias to actually leave some of these areas, and it
is having an impact.
Could you explain how that is possible or what your
understanding is?
General Casey. This is a phenomenon that we saw in August
as well. Just the announcement of the extension of the Stryker
Brigade had a dampening effect on the levels of sectarian
violence. The same thing is happening again. Actually, it has
been a combination of things this time. As we have announced
the deployment of the additional troops, we have seen, as I
said, in about 5 or 6 weeks a downward trend in ethnosectarian
incidents.
The other thing that has been happening, though, is we have
been putting strong military pressure on the death squads and
the death squads' leadership, and we have in fact picked up
five or six of their key leaders here in the last several
weeks. So that has had a big impact on them.
The newspaper I think is reporting on reports from us that
we are actually seeing some of these senior leaders move out of
Sadr City and into safer places. That is good news, bad news.
We will continue to target them wherever they might go within
Iraq.
Senator Cornyn. The bad news portion would be if they would
simply lay low somewhere else and then come back once perhaps
the forces were not deployed there to hold the area and come
back and do the same old thing again?
General Casey. Right. That has been one of the challenges
with the militia. They blend away. They do not stand and fight.
They see us coming, they just blend into the background.
Senator Cornyn. General Casey, I do not want to embroil you
in the political debates here in Congress and I promise you I
will not do that. But I will ask your professional military
judgment if in fact in this test of wills, as General Petraeus
has called it, the enemy sees us lacking in will or believes we
will not follow through on our commitments to not only clear
areas in Baghdad but hold them, to allow the building to go
forward, what sort of consequences, practical consequences,
does that have to a commander on the ground?
General Casey. If the enemy sees that we are not following
through on our commitments?
Senator Cornyn. If the enemy believes that, notwithstanding
our statements, that we ultimately, that Washington, that the
political leadership, says we do not believe we can win, so we
are not going to follow through, what kind of consequences does
that have as a practical matter on the ground?
General Casey. It certainly strengthens the enemy and with
the particular enemy that we are dealing with, I think they
would use it with their information campaigns as a recruiting
tool. I have already seen it starting to come out, that the
Americans are beaten, they are defeated, come to Iraq now if
you want to be involved in beating the Americans.
Senator Cornyn. You have seen that, used that for their own
propaganda pieces?
General Casey. I have seen it in the al Qaeda propaganda.
Senator Cornyn. Some have suggested that we continue to
fight the insurgency in al Anbar, but not send reinforcements
to deal with the Shia militias in Baghdad. What would be your
military assessment of the impact of such a plan?
General Casey. As I have said throughout the course of the
hearing today, Senator, we have to help the Iraqis secure
Baghdad if the country is going to go forward and if they are
going to credibly assume responsibility for their security this
year. We have to lower the levels of sectarian violence in
their capital. We have to help them do that. So that is, in my
view, a much higher priority than what is going on in Anbar.
Now, Anbar is important because al Qaeda is trying to
establish a safe haven there from which they can export terror,
and we have enough forces to keep the pressure on both in
Baghdad and in Anbar.
Senator Cornyn. If we fail to send additional
reinforcements to deal with the Shia militia and the ethnic
violence, is it your military judgment that our chances of
success would be markedly diminished?
General Casey. Absolutely. In Baghdad it is not just Shia
militia. It is both Sunni and Shia extremists, and we have to
deal with both and we need the forces in both Baghdad and
Anbar.
Senator Cornyn. Let me ask you just a last question, about
the consequences of our leaving Iraq before the Iraqis are able
to sustain, govern, and defend themselves. Some have suggested
that regional conflict would almost surely ensue, with Iranian
Shia taking advantage of the opportunity to support the Shia in
Iraq to the detriment of the Sunnis, perhaps engage in even
greater ethnic cleansing against the Sunnis, perhaps then
precipitating an entry by the Saudis and other Sunni-majority
countries to come in and protect the Sunnis.
That is one of the suggestions that I have heard. The other
is that Iraq could well become another failed state and thus a
platform for terrorist organizations like al Qaeda to train,
recruit, and launch future terrorist attacks.
In your view are either one or both of those plausible
outcomes if in fact we leave Iraq before it is able to sustain,
govern, and defend itself?
General Casey. I think both are entirely plausible.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Senator Collins [presiding]. Thank you.
General Casey, first let me explain that I ran into
Chairman Levin, who told me to go ahead and proceed with my
questions. So for the next 10 minutes I get to be chairman of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, a position I have always
coveted. [Laughter.]
General Casey. I will make you the same offer I made
Senator Cornyn. If we both leave now before they come back, I
will buy you coffee. [Laughter.]
Senator Collins. No such luck. [Laughter.]
Let me, however, start with my very sincere appreciation
for your dedicated service to your country and to the United
States Army.
I want to bring up three issues with you today. The first
is the impact of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan on our
National Guard and reservists. Just last week former Secretary
of Defense William Perry testified before this committee that
the agreement with our citizen-soldiers had been shattered.
Similarly, the adjutant general of the Maine National Guard has
expressed to me grave concern about the impact of the recent
change in policy that says that National Guard forces may now
be involuntarily mobilized more often than once every 5 years.
He has stated that if the 24-month, total month policy changes
and Maine National Guard troops are involuntarily called up for
a second time or in a few cases a third time in support of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, that the Maine National
Guard will not be able to sustain its current force structure,
and he is very worried about the impact on recruitment and
retention.
General Casey, I have had two members of my own staff
called up, so I know personally the impact this has on
employers, on families, and on the citizen-soldiers themselves.
Are we not asking too much of our National Guard? That is
my first question to you, and a related question: Are you
concerned about the long-term impact on retention and
recruitment of our National Guard members that this policy will
have?
General Casey. It is certainly something that warrants all
of our attention, Senator. I would agree with you on that. The
numbers on recruiting and retention for the Guard seem to be
right now okay, but we certainly keep our eyes on the impacts
of this change in policy.
As I mentioned in my opening testimony, one of the three
things I would make a priority as the Chief of Staff of the
Army is the Guard and Reserve. I know the Army is working on
it, but as the Vice Chief we were working on building a system
that would get the Guard units more predictability in what they
were doing and to leverage the fact that almost half of them
now are going to be combat veterans and they do not need to
have 90 to 120 of post-mobilization training. We have to be
smarter about how we treat them and how we use them so that
when we do have to call them up, we have maximum time on
mission and minimum time on preparation, so there is less time
away from their families.
Lots to do here, and I very much agree with your base point
that we need to watch the impact of this policy change here on
recruiting and retention.
Senator Collins. Should we also be looking at improving the
benefits for National Guard and reservists? For example, I am
thinking of the educational benefits under the Montgomery GI
Bill. Should we try to more thoroughly align the benefits for
Guard members to make them more parallel with Active Duty,
given the increased demands that we are making on them?
General Casey. I definitely think that is something to be
looked at, but I think you know the resource tradeoffs of
those. But I think that is exactly right. Benefits as
incentives to continued service in the Guard, I think that
needs to be looked at.
Senator Collins. General, the second issue that I want to
bring up to you is one that we discussed in my office
yesterday. That is my tremendous concern about reports that we
will be sending troops into Iraq without adequate protection
and equipment. I want to follow up on the line of questioning
that some of our members have already raised with you.
It actually was not a report by the Special Inspector
General on current troops' equipment. It was the unclassified
executive summary of an audit done by DOD's own IG. It is dated
January 25 of this year, so it is a very new report. It is
titled ``Equipment Status of Deployed Forces Within U.S.
Central Command.''
The findings of this audit trouble me greatly. The IG
performed the audit to determine whether units deployed to Iraq
and Afghanistan were equipped in accordance with mission
requirements. The IG's office received responses from
approximately 1,100 servicemembers, so this was a significant
sample, and its report states that these individuals,
``experienced shortages of force protection equipment such as
up-armored vehicles, electronic countermeasure devices, crew-
served weapons, and communications equipment.'' As a result,
servicemembers were not always equipped to effectively complete
their missions.
This troubles me terribly. I think it is simply wrong for
us to send troops into harm's way without fully equipping them,
without giving them uparmored vehicles. I understand why in the
early days of the war this was a problem and many of us worked
very hard to increase funding for up-armored Humvees, for
example. But I do not understand why this is still a problem,
according to the DOD IG, and I am extremely concerned that if
it is a problem for some troops serving now that we are not
prepared to fully equip the troops that will soon be on their
way.
General Casey. I agree with you, Senator. I have not seen
the report, but I am concerned about what you just read to me.
When I get back tomorrow I will take a hard look at that and
find out what the heck is going on, because I have not heard in
my visits to the units complaints about equipment shortages, in
fact quite the contrary. So it needs some looking into.
Senator Collins. It does. You and I discussed the equipment
for troops on their way to Iraq or who will soon be on their
way to Iraq, and I was pleased for your assurances that this is
a high priority for you and that you have already in fact
issued a directive to ensure that the troops do not go if they
are not equipped.
But here is a report from DOD's own IG that says that
current troops do not have what they need. So I would ask you
to look at this report and to report back to the committee on
your findings, because this really is troubling. It is such an
obligation.
General Casey. I have a long airplane ride.
Senator Collins. So you have plenty of time to look into
it.
[The information referred to follows:]

The information requested was provided by General Casey on February
16, 2007, in the attached letter.

Senator Collins. Finally, General, you have said many times
that you do not want to send one more American soldier to Iraq
than is necessary to perform the mission. You have also very
candidly testified that when you looked at the Baghdad security
plan you asked for two brigades and that is what you felt was
adequate. You have also, however, said today that you support
the President's plan for five brigades. Does that not violate
your principle, based on your earlier assessment that only two
brigades are needed, that you should not send one more American
soldier to Iraq than is necessary?
General Casey. Not really, because, as I said, in my mind
the other three brigades should be called forward after an
assessment has been made of the situation on the ground and
whether or not there has been success in the mission in the
Baghdad area. So it is one thing to say all five brigades are
going into Baghdad. It is another to say you have two, we have
a decision point here for the third; we will assess to see what
is going on, if we need it we will bring it in, if not we will
not. The same thing for the fourth, the same thing for the
fifth.
So I think the way the force flow is arranged gives the new
commander lots of flexibility to either use the forces based on
his assessment of the need or not use the forces.
Senator Collins. I understand your deferring to the new
commander, to General Petraeus's view. But I need to ask you
outright, if you were still in Iraq would you be happy with
just two brigades?
General Casey. I would still want a reserve that I could
call forward if things did not work out the way we had hoped or
to take advantage of an opportunity that presented itself.
Senator Collins. But you would start out with two brigades?
That assessment has not changed?
General Casey. That is where we are, that is right.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Warner had to cut short his questions because of
the vote, so I am going to call on Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
have received information that the National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE), which was in some large part generated by
members of this committee, will soon be released in a
classified form and made available to the committee. For those
following the hearings, that is the evaluation of a subject by
our entire Intelligence Community. This particular one is to be
focused on Iraq.
General, were you asked to make a contribution to that NIE?
I am just going to talk process.
General Casey. I have seen the executive summary and
offered comments.
Senator Warner. That is fine. All I want to know is that
you were a part of the process and you had an opportunity to
get your evaluation in before it went into final print, I
presume?
General Casey. I did.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, because that is an
important document. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that it be put in
S-407 of the Capitol where traditionally we--or whereever--and
we urge members to read that, because in the context of this
very important broad issue before the Senate today and
certainly into the next week, I think it would be valuable to
get the assessment of the Intelligence Community about their
own evaluation of the situation in Iraq today and most
particularly Baghdad.
Now, General, the Congress of the United States over many
years has funded the National War College, the Navy War
College, and Carlisle Barracks. We also have this new command
now that studies the overall operations of our forces, that is
located down in Virginia, the one that Admiral Edmund
Giambastiani put together.
Do you have any knowledge of the traditional practice of
wargaming plans having been done in those various forums,
wargaming being, for those that are following the hearing,
where you establish an A team, a B team, or a blue team, a red
team, and they try to assess the likelihood of success of the
plan or what modifications should be made to the plan? In other
words, it is a professional good exchange. It is very important
we do it in many situations.
Do you have knowledge of it having been done in the
preparation of this plan as enunciated by the President on 10
January?
General Casey. I do not have any knowledge one way or the
other, Senator.
Senator Warner. All right. I have to tell you, there is
testimony in the record by other witnesses before this
committee that teams were sent to your AOR for the purposes of
conducting such an evaluation. I accept your answer you do not
have knowledge, which means you certainly did not see any work
product. But I would ask that the record be left open so that
you can go back into your command and see what, if any, type of
wargaming might have been done.
General Casey. Oh, I thought you were speaking of war
colleges and Joint Forces Command.
Senator Warner. In other words, Congress funds a whole
number of military institutions for the purpose of doing
wargaming, to make assessments of the likelihood of success of
a plan or how a plan should be modified.
General Casey. We routinely do it in our planning process.
I would be surprised if that was not done in Iraq.
Senator Warner. Well then, was it done within your command?
Did you have a sort of a structure that looked at the plan as
it was unfolding and presumably just before the President
announced it to determine on a professional basis between young
men and women officers looking at it and giving their best
judgment as to the strength of the plan, the likelihood of
success, or the likelihood it would not succeed unless certain
corrections are made?
General Casey. The actual wargaming of the Baghdad plan
would have been done at the corps level. You are asking me
whether we wargamed the overall strategy. No, we did not.
Senator Warner. All right. So it would have to be done up
at corps level and that would be General Abizaid?
General Casey. General Odierno.
Senator Warner. Odierno.
General Casey. It is a tactical level plan.
Senator Warner. He is a subordinate commander to you, is
he?
General Casey. Right.
Senator Warner. So you do not know whether he did it and
what the results?
General Casey. I cannot tell you conclusively he did it. I
tell you that we do wargaming as part of all of our planning. I
would be surprised if some level of wargaming was not done, but
I cannot tell you conclusively that it was.
Senator Warner. All right. Could you then supply that for
the record?
General Casey. I will.
[The information referred to follows:]

During my testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 1
February 2007 you asked if we had done any wargaming as part of the
formal planning process used to develop the current Baghdad security
plan. I replied that during operational planning we routinely conduct
such wargaming and that I would confirm for you that we had.
The Multi-National Corp-Iraq conducted a detailed wargame from 22-
24 December 2006 to examine several courses of action. They followed
that up on 24 December with a course of action brief to the commander
that included the results of the wargaming. The commander used the
results of that wargaming as he developed his operations order.
On behalf of all our servicemembers and coalition partners, thank
you and the committee for your continued steadfast support to our
mission in Iraq.

Senator Warner. In September 2006--and Chairman Levin, it
was just before you and I made that trip together in the region
in October, and we visited the Marines, you will recall. While
it was classified, I think I can make reference to in September
2006 the Washington Post reported that ``The chief of
intelligence of the Marine Corps in Iraq filed a report
concluding that the prospects for securing Anbar Province are
dim.''
That report was classified, so I will not ask you to
comment on it. But we actually had the opportunity to have a
colloquy with that colonel and his commanding officer and
others. I then asked questions about al Anbar.
What is the state today of the power of the al Qaeda
elements of this insurgency? Is it growing? Is it
strengthening? Do we have sufficient forces in your judgment to
repress that organization?
General Casey. I would say that the strength of al Qaeda in
Anbar Province is diminishing. I talked to General Zumer, the
commander in Anbar, right before I left. He told me that for
the first time since the war there are Iraqi police in every
district in Anbar Province. That is a big step. They have had
very good success recruiting police. They have trained over
9,000 police, on their way to about 14,000 police.
So that is a big success. The real major success has come
on the political level with a group of tribal leaders who
banded together and started to take on al Qaeda on their own,
and then, with the assistance of Prime Minister Maliki, they
were able to merge some of these leaders into the provincial
council run by the governor. So when this report, the
intelligence report you spoke of, there was not a political
track in Anbar. There is now. There were not many police in
Anbar. There are now.
Senator Warner. But as a part of your plan, that is the
January 10 plan which you worked on, you do recommend
additional forces in al Anbar?
General Casey. I did.
Senator Warner. Was that for the purpose of further
diminishing the influence of al Qaeda?
General Casey. Absolutely, it was to maintain the momentum
that they already had. I actually went out there in October. I
was getting a briefing from the commander in Ramadi and he was
describing what was happening. I said: ``It looks like you have
an opportunity here; what could you do with another
battalion?'' He said: ``I could clean out Ramadi.'' So we asked
for the Marine Expeditionary Unit and brought it in in
November, and he has used that. These other units now are to
backfill that Marine Expeditionary Unit so that we maintain
pressure on these guys throughout Anbar Province.
Senator Warner. My final question. You in the earlier
responses described really the enormity of your task as the
Multi-National Commander. Among it was dealing with, I think
you said, three successive prime ministers; is that correct?
General Casey. It is, Senator.
Senator Warner. We have an ambassador there. I am trying to
determine the degree of responsibility that you have with
respect to the political side. Remember we said this new plan
has four components. One of them is dealing with the Iraqi
government.
Is under the new plan there to be more State Department
officials, more emphasis put on the ambassadorial role to deal
with that? Or is your successor to continue to have to find
time apart from his military responsibilities to handle much of
the intergovernmental relationships?
General Casey. Ambassador Zol Kollazaid handles the
political business with the prime minister. What I work with
him is the political-military aspects: what type of commitments
do I need from the prime minister to support the military plan?
What do I need from the government in terms of economic support
for the plan? Those are the types of interactions that I have.
I do not get involved in the strictly political stuff. Zol
takes care of that.
Senator Warner. So if, for example, in the forthcoming
Baghdad surge campaign, the Iraqis fail to keep their
commitments, benchmarks as we call them, and the most specific
one and the one which I have included in my resolution, and you
have alluded to it today, it is that commitment that no longer
will the political structure of the prime minister and his
subordinates be reaching out and telling tactical commanders,
this is what you will have to do, and then calling up and
saying, what you have already done on your own initiative, undo
it and pull back.
Whose responsibility will it be to make sure and certain
that the Iraqis are living up to that and other benchmarks? Is
it the United States ambassador, now filled by another
individual, a very able person--I have dealt with him through
the years--and his team, or is it back on the commanding
officer of the MNF-I, your successor?
General Casey. I would look after the military aspects. For
example, if we had a call to a unit to undo something that was
done, I would get that report back up to my chain and Zol and I
would go see the prime minister.
Senator Warner. He is now to be succeeded by another
individual?
General Casey. Right.
So basically, Senator, I would deal with the military
commitments, and I have a system already set up for monitoring
those. Zol would deal with the political commitments.
Senator Warner. Then if that fails it is part of your
responsibility and the failure of those commitments by the
Iraqi political structure then would fall in other words, the
buck stops on your desk and not the State Department?
General Casey. For example, if they did not deliver on a
commitment to pass the electoral law or to pass the oil law,
that is Zol's business.
Senator Warner. Correct.
General Casey. If they are not delivering on their
commitment not to allow safe havens and are restricting our
operations in an area, that is on me. So we work it together.
Senator Warner. Now, that last phrase is important, you
``work it together.'' So you are really working in partnership
with the U.S. ambassador?
General Casey. Oh, absolutely.
Senator Warner. I see. I would think that primary
responsibility for the enforcement of those benchmarks should
be primarily with the Secretary of State and her ambassadors. I
think you should think through and have some clarification.
General Casey. The benchmarks absolutely fall under Zol's
purview. Again, it is the military-related commitments that I
keep an eye on.
Senator Warner. There I think you would be in the role of
an expert adviser to the United States ambassador, rather than
one that----
General Casey. What happens is we go over together.
Senator Warner. All right. All I am saying is there could
be a subsequent assessment of what went right and what went
wrong here, and I think that having again unified commands with
various responsibilities, whether it is on the diplomatic side
or it is on the military side, would be beneficial.
I thank the chair.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
General, the Iraqis have agreed to benchmarks before, is
that not correct?
General Casey. They did.
Chairman Levin. Did they not agree in October to
benchmarks?
General Casey. September-October, I think you are right.
Chairman Levin. Did they live up to those benchmarks?
General Casey. Not in all cases.
Chairman Levin. How about in most cases?
General Casey. They did, they made progress on some things.
Chairman Levin. Did they deny that they had agreed to
benchmarks? Let me read----
General Casey. I think there was some discussion by the
prime minister that he----
Chairman Levin. Some discussion? He flat out--according to
the Washington Post on October 25, ``Maliki lashed out today at
the United States, saying his popularly elected government
would not bend to U.S.-imposed benchmarks,'' and denied that he
had agreed to the benchmarks. Were you aware of that?
General Casey. I am aware of that----
Chairman Levin. No, but is it true that he denied that he
agreed to them?
General Casey. It is.
Chairman Levin. Does that not make you nervous, when he did
agree to them and then a day later or 2 days later denies that
he agreed to them?
General Casey. I do not know that he did agree with them.
Other members of the presidency council--they have this policy
council for national security and that was the group that it
was discussed with. I do not know whether the prime minister
was actually there or not.
Chairman Levin. I see. So when Khalilzad said ``Iraqi
leaders have agreed to a time line for making the hard
decisions needed to resolve these issues''--that is his quote--
you are not sure that Maliki was involved among the Iraqi
leaders that had agreed?
General Casey. I am not, but Zol would know that.
Chairman Levin. All right, so you are not sure that Maliki
ever agreed to the ones that everybody else says he agreed to?
General Casey. I am not.
Chairman Levin. Okay, that is fair. That is a straight
answer.
We have talked a little bit about what General Shinseki
said here about needing more troops and about the way he was
treated. Do you have any feelings about the way he was treated
after he spoke honestly about his opinion?
General Casey. I do not think he was treated well.
Chairman Levin. You have indicated on a number of occasions
that your efforts were thwarted by Iraqi leaders.
By the way, I could not agree with you more relative to
Shinseki. I think he was treated miserably and that message I
think was an insult to everybody in uniform. But I will leave
it at that. You gave me an answer which is perfectly consistent
with what I just said, although perhaps not as purple in its
prose.
General, you have indicated this morning that you raised a
number of problems when, a number of times you were thwarted,
more accurately when Prime Minister Jafari objected to
something you were trying to get done and Prime Minister Maliki
I believe did not insist that his troops act without political
interference, indeed involved himself. He would not allow
certain things to happen.
You objected to that because you were trying to make things
happen. Did you tell your chain of command? Did you take that
to the higher level in those cases and tell either General
Abizaid or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or whoever you
would have been reporting to, probably General Abizaid, that
you were having those problems?
General Casey. Yes. I would not write a report or
something, but in my discussions with them, which were
frequent, I would highlight the difficulties I was having. But
I will tell you, Senator, I have watched Prime Minister Maliki
grow over the last 8 months and over the last several months
there have been no restrictions on what we are doing. That has
changed over time and I think changed for the positive.
Chairman Levin. You were asked in your prehearing questions
what were the most significant mistakes the United States has
made to date in Iraq, and you had quite a long list of
mistakes. You did not list among those mistakes some of the
most commonly agreed to mistakes. I will not say that everyone
has agreed to these, but these have been noted and they are
significant.
General Casey. I kind of stuck to the things on my watch.
Chairman Levin. I see.
General Casey. I tried not to go back to the beginning.
Chairman Levin. One of the things which has affected you
was the disbandment of the Iraqi army. That was before your
watch, but nonetheless, do you have any feelings about that
action as to whether that was a wise course, to not bring the
Iraqi army back from their homes? Not the top level officers,
but most of the people who were in the army. Was that a mistake
in your judgment?
General Casey. Looking back, the Iraqi army was suspect to
80 percent of the country, the Kurds and the Shia.
Chairman Levin. Even though the Shia made up most of the
army?
General Casey. Right, but it was the leadership.
Chairman Levin. The leadership was suspect. I am talking
about 80 percent of the army, not the leaders.
General Casey. Right.
Chairman Levin. The people who were thrown out of work with
guns and no pay.
General Casey. I understand.
Chairman Levin. Was that a mistake?
General Casey. I cannot talk to the timing of how it was
done, but my sense is something would have had to have been
done with that Iraqi army that was the instrument of repression
by the Saddam Hussein regime. The other thing I will tell you--
--
Chairman Levin. Would the removal of the top leadership
have sent the right signal?
General Casey. It certainly could have.
Chairman Levin. What about the de-Baathification program?
Did it go too far?
General Casey. It did. It still is.
Chairman Levin. What about the failure to adequately plan
for the occupation, looking at a worst case scenario or a more
complex occupation? Was that a mistake?
General Casey. It certainly was, and it was compounded by
the execution.
Chairman Levin. Now, what the President himself said is
that he had a choice to make--he just said this a couple weeks
ago--``to do what we were doing, and one could define that
maybe a slow failure, or change what we were doing.'' So the
President has described what was happening before he made his
change of strategy--regardless of whether we think it was a
significant change or not; that is not the point at the
moment--he defined what was happening as, ``maybe a slow
failure,'' and that we needed to change strategy.
Do you agree with that description of what was happening?
General Casey. Slow failure? Do I agree that Iraq was
moving toward a slow failure?
Chairman Levin. That maybe what was happening--I am using
the President's exact words because he did not say it was. He
said maybe was a slow failure. You have said that you did not
think it was a failure. I am asking you, since the President
described what was happening as ``maybe a slow failure,'' do
you----
General Casey. It is not lost on me that the Commander in
Chief was not satisfied with what was going on.
Chairman Levin. But his description--even he came to the
point after all these years of not having what everybody
wanted, which is success in Iraq, he finally described mistakes
were made, and then he said, yes, one could define that, doing
what we are doing, as ``maybe a slow failure.''
I am just wondering whether you would agree with that.
General Casey. I actually do not see it as slow failure. I
actually see it as slow progress.
Chairman Levin. All right. My time is up and I think
Senator Sessions is next. Senator Sessions, we did not pass
over you this time.
Senator Warner. Senator, would you yield just for a moment?
Senator Sessions. I would be pleased to.
Senator Warner. I want to catch this last vote.
General, I have been here throughout this hearing and it
has been a good tough one and a thorough one. But your
testimony today has reinforced my earlier opinion when I
arrived here at the beginning this morning that you are the
President's choice for Chief of Staff of the Army. The
institution of the Army is really involved in this, that
wonderful institutional tradition of the Army, and you will
have my support.
General Casey. Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. General Casey, I am not comfortable with
this insistence on trying to work the word ``failure'' into
what is happening. I think we are all uneasy. I think the
American people are uneasy. They are troubled. Things have not
gone as well as we would like, and you have said that several
times. But ``failure'' suggests a doomed event, and you have
been through that now 30 months. You have worked with the Iraqi
government and I am sure have been frustrated many times on the
difference of cultural responses and the different leaderships
they have had there and all.
Do you feel like under the plan that has been proposed and
we intend to carry out that we can be successful in Iraq?
General Casey. I do. I believe, as I said in my testimony,
the situation in Iraq is winnable. It is very winnable. It is
hard, though.
Senator Sessions. It is hard and it is slow, and there are
good days and bad days, good months and bad months. Would you
say it that way?
General Casey. There are.
Senator Sessions. Senators Levin and Warner and I, and I
believe Mark Pryor, were in Ramadi. We were briefed by the
Marine colonel, intelligence officer in the command, and we
were troubled by the reports that we got at that time. I had
the opportunity to talk with General Peter Pace, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, last night for a good while and I asked
him about that. He said that same briefer briefed him several
months later and had seen some significant steps for progress
being made. You seem to be saying the same thing.
So in this kind of counterinsurgency operation that we are
in, is it not a mistake to go into any one particular area of
the country at a given day, whether it is up or down, and try
to express a total evaluation of our entire effort?
General Casey. Absolutely. One of the things that I do that
most people do not is I look at the whole country and I travel
about the whole country. I have been to every province, visit
the units there. I get assessments from the guys and gals that
are out there on the ground dealing with the Iraqis every day.
A lot of what comes out of Iraq is Baghdad-centric and it
comes out of the Green Zone, and you really have to get out and
around Iraq to get a full appreciation of what is going on
there. Again, I am not sugar-coating the situation in Baghdad.
It is bad.
Senator Sessions. You do agree that since such a large
percentage of the population is there and it is the capital,
that Baghdad must be secured? That is a critical event for us
right now?
General Casey. It is, Senator.
Senator Sessions. We have around 23,000 troops in
Afghanistan. They have almost the same population as Iraq. I
think a lot of us hoped that we could keep the numbers down.
But Iraq has turned out to be more complex and difficult and
more violent and it has required us to maintain troops longer
than I would have liked. Hopefully, this will be a surge that
can lead to progress and we can get back on the path that you
tried to get us on, which is a downward drawing of our troops
and continuing to push up the Iraqi troops.
I am concerned, General Casey, about our prison and law
enforcement system there. To follow up on Senator Warner's
comment first, if we need more prison beds to place people who
have been convicted and arrested by Iraqi forces, is that the
U.S. military or is that the State Department ambassador's role
to find the money for that?
General Casey. That is the State Department.
Senator Sessions. If we need to create a new trial system,
which I strongly think should be a military trial system,
because we are in such a state of disorder, and try those
people who are threats against the state in an Iraqi military
court system, would that be the State Department's
responsibility to get such a court system up or the military?
General Casey. The State Department is responsible for the
rule of law and for assisting the Iraqis in developing the rule
of law institutions.
Senator Sessions. They bring in the Department of Justice
and others?
General Casey. Yes.
Senator Sessions. I just want to tell you, I am not happy
with that. I do not think we have gotten nearly far enough
along. As I have noted, we have one-ninth as many bed spaces
and prisoners in custody in Iraq per capita as we have in
Alabama. I saw another military writer in a military journal
write that on a per capita basis there was about six times as
many in prison in Vietnam during that conflict.
It just indicates, objectively looked at, that we have a
lot of dangerous people out there, and if they are not
arrested, apprehended, and removed, then you cannot have
credibility in a city like Baghdad. They need to know that when
somebody bad is caught they are gone, it is not a revolving
door.
Are you aware of the complaints in that regard and will you
take steps as Chief of Staff to support efforts to improve the
law enforcement system there?
General Casey. In Iraq?
Senator Sessions. Yes.
General Casey. We work closely with the embassy on the rule
of law program. As you suggest, it is something that needs an
awful lot more work.
Senator Sessions. General Casey, that is what we hear over
and over again. But it is your soldiers that are out there day
after day being shot at, sometimes by the same people that were
caught and released. I am glad you say it is the State
Department's responsibility, but really it is the United
States' responsibility. It is our soldiers there, our policy
that we need to execute.
I guess I want you to say that you will break some china if
need be to get this thing moving, if we have to get on the
State Department or have it transferred to the military to get
it done.
General Casey. I will.
Senator Sessions. That is good.
General Casey. Can I just say, though, that we also have
our own detention system where we have about 15,000 Iraqis, and
that does not operate in a catch and release program, and we
are actually expanding our capacity by another 4,000 or 5,000
so that we can continue to hold the Iraqi security detainees
and not have to put them back out on the street. So we work
that and watch that very closely.
Senator Sessions. One final brief question. Prime Minister
Maliki is elected. He is a politician like we are. He has
constituencies. His people have pride and he has some pride.
Would you say we want him to assume responsibility, we want him
to declare it is his responsibility to run Iraq, and we ought
to be somewhat sympathetic and understanding if he takes the
position he does not need help and his people can do it?
You express that better than I. But I sense a tension there
between his desire to be a strong leader for his country and to
create an independent Iraq that is not run by the United
States, at the same time they are just not able to do
everything there.
General Casey. I would say that that is an accurate
description of his desires. He does want to be in charge, not
only of the government but of his security forces, and we are
working with him to enable him to do that. But that is a good
thing. That is a good thing.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions, thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General. It has been a long
morning, but I have a couple of points I would like to raise
with you.
In your written submission you suggest that, in response to
our operations in Baghdad, that the Shia militias would likely
lie low, perhaps at the behest of their colleagues in the
government, who have been urging them to do that, but that the
Sunnis would tend to hunker down in the neighborhoods because
they are connected to the neighborhoods, which raises I think
in my mind at least the question that the effect of our
operations or the perception of our operations at least
initially would be that we are conducting generally attacks
against Sunni forces at the behest of the Shia government,
which could be exploited and, frankly, the opposition has been
much more adroit than we have in the information warfare, as a
way of showing us that we have thrown our lot in with the Shia,
we are attacking the Sunnis.
That I think will harden the resistance in the Sunni
community to reconciliation and it certainly will create a
regional dynamic where Sunni governments, sympathizers in the
region might be compelled to, if not enter, at least to provide
increased support.
Is that a concern of yours?
General Casey. It is a concern and it is something that
both we and the Iraqis are concerned about. That is part of the
prime minister's commitment, is evenhanded enforcement of the
law against anyone who breaks it. So we are working with the
Iraqi planners to ensure that the operations that are conducted
are conducted in a balanced fashion.
Senator Reed. But it seems again, and I tend to agree with
your assessment of the likely at least initial reaction, that
the Shia militia are deliberately avoiding contact with us. If
the Sunnis are in such position where they can--and you and I
have both had conversations with the prime minister and when
you talk about the insurgency it is a Sunni insurgency. The
sectarian violence is something that does not register as
forcefully in his mind as it does in ours. It is a Sunni
insurgency, and we are going after that Sunni insurgency. Those
are literally his words to me.
I think this is potentially a very serious consequence of
this operation. But let me ask you an additional question. Let
us assume there is a period of remission, but the cancer still
exists. The cancer is militias, both Sunni and Shia, with the
capacity to quickly assume the battle. The other part of the
cancer I think is a dysfunctional Iraqi government, not just
its security services but its whole governmental apparatus.
If we do have this period of remission, what do we do? Is
that a justification to withdraw forces, or do we have to
continue to stay there at a very substantial force level
because these capacities still exist? The bottom line is, how
long do you think we will be keeping roughly 140,000 troops in
Iraq, but more precisely 20,000-plus, 30,000 American forces in
Baghdad, maneuver forces? I am not talking about anything but
maneuver forces.
General Casey. I mentioned the metrics earlier about we
have some ways of trying to figure out are we making progress
in Baghdad or are we not. There certainly is a chance that
people will leave town, lie low. What I said in my opening
testimony is for this to be successful the Iraqi security
forces have to emerge as the dominant security force. So in
addition to the security operations, in addition to
establishing these bases that will maintain, allow them to
maintain security force presence in these areas to prevent a
return, it also needs to be worked on the political side to
remove political support from the militia.
So that takes time. Now, my sense is, as I have said
publicly, we will start seeing an impact in 60 days or so, I
think. One way or the other, we will start seeing an impact.
Assuming things continue to progress positively, it will
probably be the end of the summer before Baghdad is at a level
of security that people are more inclined to feel comfortable
with.
What happens with respect to our forces after that, it is
up to somebody else to figure out. But I would look at the
results on the ground and decide what I needed and what I did
not need.
Senator Reed. Just a final comment. One of the unfortunate
aspects of this whole operation is what progress we have made
has been reversed in some cases. I think, as you suggested,
before the Samarra bombing we thought we had made real
progress, that things were going our way, and then it was
quickly and suddenly reversed. That is a concern I have going
forward, that we might get a remission, but unless we make
fundamental changes--and I think what you also suggested is
that--and this goes I think to the focus of the difference
between your approach and those who have criticized you, is
that, at what point will the Iraqi forces be capable of taking
a lead and sustaining that leadership.
In the past you have thought they were and it turned out
that they did not have that capacity, or at least that is the
perception. I think going forward that is going to be one of
the critical issues that we all have to address. You will not
be doing that job. You will be Chief of Staff of the Army. But
I think we will be still considering that issue.
I do not know if you have a final comment, but I thank you
for your patience and your testimony.
General Casey. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. General, I think you have said that a
political settlement is essential if there is going to be an
end to the violence in Iraq; is that fair? Does that represent
your view?
General Casey. Political reconciliation, yes.
Chairman Levin. Right. That is going to require an
agreement on power sharing, resource sharing, autonomy issues,
on the political side.
General Casey. Right.
Chairman Levin. Is that correct?
General Casey. That is where those benchmarks come from.
Chairman Levin. Right.
General Casey. Those benchmarks are the key political
agreements they have to happen.
Chairman Levin. Those are benchmarks, those promises have
been made long ago. There was supposed to be a commission which
would look at proposed changes to the constitution that was
supposed to come into existence 90 days after the assembly took
office; is that not correct?
General Casey. They formed the commission. The commission
is meeting, I am told.
Chairman Levin. Have they followed their benchmark for
reporting to the assembly, do you know?
General Casey. I think my recollection is there is a
benchmark coming up here in January.
Chairman Levin. For reporting to the assembly?
General Casey. I believe so. I think they have 4 months to
come back.
Chairman Levin. I think the original law of Iraq was that
90 days after they took office they were supposed to report
back in 4 months, 120 days after, that they were supposed to
report back. That was not met, is that accurate? They did not
do that in 120 days?
General Casey. They are reporting back I think about 4
months after they formed the commission.
Chairman Levin. But not 4 months after the assembly was
created; is that correct?
General Casey. I think that is right.
Chairman Levin. You have talked about the training and you
made a couple references here, one to the length of time it was
supposed to take to train the Iraqi security forces. You said
this was a 3-year program at one point, but that does not mean
that for each of the troops in the Iraqi security forces it
would be a 3-year training program. It is like a 6-week
training program.
General Casey. Exactly. I am speaking about the
institutions of the military and police forces.
Chairman Levin. All right. But in terms of the numbers that
have been trained and equipped to take the lead, that number is
now at?
General Casey. Over 300,000.
Chairman Levin. 300,000.
General Casey. About 330,000.
Chairman Levin. About half of those are army?
General Casey. 135,000 army, 190,000 police.
Chairman Levin. So 135,000 army are now trained and
equipped and 190,000 police are now trained and equipped?
General Casey. We have trained 135,000 army soldiers and
equipped them. Okay, now, of that group--both army and police,
there have been 26,000 Iraqi security forces that we have
trained that are killed or wounded to the point where they
cannot work.
Chairman Levin. So there is 130,000 roughly army that have
been----
General Casey. Been through the country.
Chairman Levin. Through our program.
General Casey. Right.
Chairman Levin. Trained, equipped, and ready to take the
lead, theoretically?
General Casey. No.
Chairman Levin. No?
General Casey. Three steps. Trained and equipped: they are
formed, they are given their uniforms, they are organized into
units, and they have had some basic level of training, step
one. Step two, in the lead: They begin to function with our
transition teams and they grow as units so that they get to the
point where they can do counterinsurgency operations with our
support. Step three: independence.
Chairman Levin. Now, step two; how many of the 135,000 have
finished step two?
General Casey. We look at units.
Chairman Levin. How many units?
General Casey. Right now, 8 out of 10 divisions are in the
lead. I want to say 30 out of 36 brigades, and probably 90 or
so of the 112 battalions are in the lead.
Chairman Levin. So now translate that into people? Roughly
how many of the 135,000 are in those units you just described
that are in the lead, roughly?
General Casey. Right. What I will do is I will take off the
air force and the navy, and so I would say probably around
120,000.
Chairman Levin. 120,000, okay.
General Casey. That is a SWAG, but----
Chairman Levin. No, that is fine.
You have indicated that the piece of paper which was
delivered by Mr. Maliki to our President in Amman probably did
not say that they needed American troops; they probably would
have said they needed additional or they needed troops; is that
correct?
General Casey. That is my recollection.
Chairman Levin. Why would he not have used those troops
that you just referred to that were trained and equipped to do
the Baghdad job? Or did he, or do you not know?
General Casey. No, he did. But the rest of the country
still requires security forces, and we are drawing----
Chairman Levin. But the rest of the country is pacified
more. You said the big problem is Baghdad. Why would he not
move enough troops to Baghdad to do what needs to be done in
Baghdad since the rest of the country is calmer?
General Casey. He is doing that, and he has moved two
brigades, moving another brigade from the west, from the north,
into Baghdad.
Chairman Levin. So how many troops of his would then be in
Baghdad after he makes the move?
General Casey. Of his?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
General Casey. Total I would say somewhere between 60,000
and 70,000.
Chairman Levin. Which leaves about another how many, 60,000
that are trained and equipped and able to take the lead?
General Casey. Armed forces throughout the rest of the
country?
Chairman Levin. Right.
General Casey. Ballpark.
Chairman Levin. What we are going to do is request the
White House to tell us what apparently you are not sure of,
which is whether Maliki was more specific as to whether he
wanted or did not want American troops to be part of the
Baghdad operation. You said you think he just said troops in
that piece of paper that he dropped----
General Casey. But I think I also said that he leans toward
not wanting to have to bring in more coalition forces, and when
we have gone to him in this particular case with his commanders
and the ministers and said, this is what we need for this
mission, he has said okay.
Chairman Levin. This is what we need.
General Casey. Right.
Chairman Levin. This is what we need. What America needs?
General Casey. We collectively, Iraqis and coalition
forces, three Iraqi, two coalition.
Chairman Levin. Then he accepted that?
General Casey. He accepted that.
Chairman Levin. But that was our proposal?
General Casey. That was a joint proposal from the Iraqi
ministers and us.
Chairman Levin. You got together with the Iraqi ministers
and then went to the prime minister and made a statement to him
that, we believe this mission requires coalition forces?
General Casey. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. Would you say the Iraqi military that were
involved in the statement to the prime minister were persuaded
of that? Did they initiate the idea or did we initiate the
idea?
General Casey. It came out of our planning, but they
accepted and even endorsed the idea.
Chairman Levin. So it came out of our--I will not repeat
what you said. I think that addresses the question in an
adequate way.
My time is up. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. No, thank you.
Chairman Levin. I think the only other question that I
have----
General Casey. Do I have Dan Cox to thank for all these
questions? [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. No. No, he shares the load. [Laughter.]
Senator Sessions. While you are looking----
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Senator Sessions. To follow up now on our soldiers and what
they have there, you have issued orders--I believe it is you--
that Humvees and vehicles should not be outside protected areas
that are not up-armored to specifications; is that correct?
General Casey. That is correct, sir.
Senator Sessions. Is any soldier being sent out on patrol
or duty without kevlar, the vests that they have, the equipment
that they are authorized and expected to have?
General Casey. I hope not.
Senator Sessions. That would be against policy and
procedure?
General Casey. Absolutely.
Senator Sessions. You believe you have in theater
sufficient equipment and that day after day when they are out
there doing their duty they have the specified equipment,
protective gear, and that kind of thing? I guess I want to say
to American mothers and fathers and family members, we keep
hearing this talk about shortage of equipment. Can you tell us,
are they not pretty well-equipped?
General Casey. They are very well-equipped. The discussion
today about this report about a lack of equipment is not
something that I have heard as I have gone out and visited the
soldiers, and I rarely if ever get comments from soldiers about
things they do not have, and I ask.
Senator Sessions. If you become Chief of Staff, do you
understand it is your responsibility to make sure that
equipment--ultimately it is your responsibility to see that
equipment gets to the soldier in the field so that General
Petraeus or whoever is commanding them can have it if they need
it?
General Casey. I do.
Senator Sessions. You will accept that responsibility?
General Casey. I go after it hard.
Senator Sessions. I know we have shortages here and there,
but I do believe that when I have been there that the equipment
is there and we have done a pretty darn good job of doing it in
a very distant, difficult land.
General Casey. I think so, too.
Chairman Levin. This is a question which Senator Reed
raised and I want to just press you a little bit harder on it.
That has to do with the militias going underground, which
apparently they are going to do, and taking their arms with
them. Is that troubling for you?
General Casey. It is something we have to watch. As I said,
before we go the militias are going to have to be dealt with,
and we need to deal with them in a security way and in a
political way. But at the end of the day the Iraqi security
forces have to be the dominant force in Iraq, and right now
they are not, without our help.
Chairman Levin. Can they be dealt with without dealing with
the political issues which are there?
General Casey. No. They can, but it would be much more
violent.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that there is usefulness to
political pressure being placed on the Iraqi leaders to reach
settlements?
General Casey. Absolutely. But if I could comment on that,
it is not just Prime Minister Maliki that people need to
pressure. There is a political base in the United Alliance that
is very responsible for the policies that he is following. So
pressure along a range of leaders from Iraq is in my view much
more productive than just squeezing the prime minister.
Chairman Levin. No, I agree. That is why I always say Iraqi
political leaders, not just the prime minister. But that is a
necessary ingredient if there is going to be a solution in your
opinion?
General Casey. It is. The other thing that I think it was
useful in pushing Iraqi leaders toward a reconciliation, is the
discussion about accountability. Saddam Hussein was just hung
for his crimes against the people of Iraq. But thousands of
Iraqis have died over the past year at the hands of death
squads. There has to be an accountability for that, too, and I
think the Iraqi political leaders need to understand that.
Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions, I think, has focused on
what is essential if there is going to be accountability, which
is that there not be a catch and release program. We thank him
for his leadership in this area. He has really focused on
something that is important in terms of accountability and
justice being dispensed in Iraq.
General, unless there are additional questions, we will
stand adjourned. We thank you for your stamina. I know it is
nothing probably in terms of your experience wearing that
uniform; this stamina is probably pretty mild, at least in
terms of how much time you sat there. But in any event, we
thank you for your service and we thank again your family.
General Casey. Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:34 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN George W. Casey, Jr.,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follows:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chief of Staff
of the Army to the following offices:
Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as the head of DOD and the
principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to DOD,
issues guidance and direction to the military departments. If
confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense and his
Deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the
Army in accordance with such directives. As a member of the JCS, I will
serve as a military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, as
appropriate. I will cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense to
ensure that the Army properly implements the policies established by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In coordination with the
Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Secretary of Defense
in articulating the views of the Army.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under
Secretaries perform responsibilities that require them, from time to
time, to issue guidance--and in the case of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direction--to the
military departments. If confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary
of the Army, I will communicate with the Under Secretaries in
articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with them to
ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance
and direction issued by OSD.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense have functional
responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of
guidance to the military departments. If confirmed, I will, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Army, communicate with the
Assistant Secretaries of Defense in articulating the views of the Army.
I will cooperate fully with them to ensure that the Army is
administered in accordance with guidance promulgated by OSD.
Question. The Chairman of JCS.
Answer. The Chairman of JCS is the principal military adviser to
the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of
Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman plans the
strategic direction and contingency operations of the Armed Forces;
advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets
identified by the commanders of the combatant commands; develops
doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; reports on
assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces;
provides for representation of the United States on the Military Staff
Committee of the United Nations; and performs such other duties as may
be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.
In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the
Chief of Staff of the Army assists the Chairman in providing military
advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, as a member of JCS, it would be my
duty to provide frank and timely advice and opinions to the Chairman to
assist him in his performance of these responsibilities. If confirmed,
in addition, upon request, I will as a member of JCS provide my
individual military advice to the President, the National Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense. As appropriate, I will provide
advice in addition to or in disagreement with that of the Chairman. I
will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with
the Chairman and will communicate directly and openly with him on
policy matters involving the Army and the Armed Forces as a whole.
Question. The Vice Chairman of JCS.
Answer. The Vice Chairman of JCS assists the Chairman in providing
military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. If
confirmed as a member of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, it would be my
duty to ensure that the Vice Chairman is provided my frank views and
opinions to assist him in his performance of his responsibilities.
Question. The Secretary of the Army.
Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the
Army would be close, direct, and supportive. My responsibilities would
also involve communicating the Army Staff's plans to the Secretary of
the Army and supervising the implementation of the Secretary's
decisions through the Army Staff and Army commands and agencies. In
this capacity, my actions would be subject to the authority, direction,
and control of the Secretary of the Army. In my capacity as a member of
JCS, I would also be responsible for appropriately informing the
Secretary of the Army about conclusions reached by JCS and about
significant military operations, to the extent such action does not
impair independence in the performance of duties as member of JCS. I
anticipate that I would at all times work closely and in concert with
the Secretary of the Army to establish the best policies for the Army
in light of national interests.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Army.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's
principal civilian assistant and performs such duties and exercises
such powers as the Secretary of the Army prescribes. His
responsibilities require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and
direction to the Army Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the
Secretary of the Army, and to the Under Secretary through the Secretary
of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such
directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary of the Army
to ensure that the policies established by the Office of the Secretary
of the Army are properly implemented. I will communicate openly and
directly with the Under Secretary of the Army in articulating the views
of the Army Staff, Army commands, and Army agencies.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional
responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of
guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I
will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each
of the Assistant Secretaries to foster an environment of cooperative
teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we deal
together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning
requirements facing the Army.
Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the
Department of the Army. His duties include coordinating legal and
policy advice to all members of the Department regarding matters of
interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the
Army on any legal questions or procedures other than military justice
matters assigned to The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I will
establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the
General Counsel to assist him in the performance of these important
duties.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General serves as the Chief of Staff's
principal legal advisor. He provides legal advice concerning the
organization, powers, duties, functions and administrative procedures
of the Army. The Judge Advocate General also advises the Chief of Staff
on military justice matters, environmental law, international law
issues arising from deployment of U.S. forces overseas and
implementation of the DOD Law of War Program. The Chief of Staff does
not appoint The Judge Advocate General, and does not have the personal
authority to remove him. This enables the The Judge Advocate General to
provide independent legal advice to the Chief of Staff.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the other Services.
Answer. If confirmed, as a member of JCS, it would be my duty to
engage in frank and timely exchanges of advice and opinions with my
fellow Service Chiefs in their roles as members of JCS. I look forward
to developing strong working relationships with these colleagues, many
of whom I know from previous service.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant
commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary of Defense, and are directly responsible to
the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of their commands to
carry out missions assigned to them. As directed by the Secretary of
Defense, the military department secretaries assign all forces under
their jurisdiction, except those forces necessary to perform the
missions of the military departments, to the combatant commands to
perform missions assigned to those commands. In addition, subject to
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and
the authority of combatant commanders under title 10, U.C.S., section
164(c), the military department secretaries are responsible for
administering and supporting the forces that they assign to a combatant
command. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the combatant
commanders in performing these administrative and support
responsibilities. I will establish close, professional relationships
with the combatant commanders and communicate directly and openly with
them on matters involving the Department of the Army and Army forces
and personnel assigned to or supporting these commands.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have a fundamental grounding and practical experience in
Army, joint, and coalition organizations from the tactical through the
strategic level. I spent 21 years in the Army learning my craft in
tactical organizations or tactically-focused schooling including one-
third of that time in command of soldiers and numerous training and
operational deployments. I served in a variety of command and staff
positions where I gained experience in strategic and combined
operations including a tour as a military observer in the United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem, a tour of duty in
the Army's Office of Legislative Liaison, service on Army, Joint Forces
Command, and the Joint Staffs, and as Commander of the Multinational
Force Iraq deployed in Iraq for the last 30 months. I also served as
the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, and I believe this has provided me broad
knowledge, experience, and insight into the business of running the
Army in support of the requirements of the national security strategy.
In particular my tour of duty in Iraq has caused me to recognize the
quality of our service men and women and the need to focus on them and
their families if we are to sustain the magnificent force we have
today.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. Growing the Army by 65,000 over 5 years in a manner that
balances current warfighting requirements, responsible allocation of
resources, and future strategic needs.

Recruiting and retaining quality soldiers, civilians,
and families.
Resetting units, equipment, and personnel following
deployment so they can respond to strategic requirements as
rapidly as possible.
Maintaining readiness appropriate to mission
requirements while continuing to fight a war on terror.
Balancing future investment strategies with resource
realities.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, my first priority will be to get out and
assess the situation first-hand by talking to soldiers, civilians, and
families as well as the combatant commanders they serve.
My second priority will be to develop effective plans to maintain
our position as the finest Army in the world in a manner consistent
with future requirements and resources. I intend to work closely with
appropriate agencies in both executive and legislative branches to
develop and execute these plans.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. Management of an Army at war while preparing that Army for
the long-term challenges of the global war on terror, as well as for
as-yet unforeseen requirements in service to the Nation in the future.
Question. What management actions and time lines would you
establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Joint
Chiefs, the Secretary of the Army and, through him, the Secretary of
Defense to quickly develop balanced and realistic approaches to solving
these problems.

VISION FOR THE FUTURE

Question. What is your vision for the Army of the future?
Answer. The current Army Vision is well-accepted and relevant. If
confirmed, I intend to assess the current state of the Army and its
expected operating environment in the future; identify major issues,
challenges, and opportunities; assess existing plans and programs; and
confirm if current initiatives conform to the proper strategic
direction. Where I believe change is warranted, I will, in consultation
with the Secretary of the Army, propose refinement and/or resource
reallocation.
Question. What roles do you believe the Army should play in
contingency, humanitarian, and peace operations?
Answer. The Army provides relevant and ready forces to the
combatant commanders and it develops soldiers, leaders, equipment, and
organizations for the future. To do this the Army must be resourced
appropriately to accomplish these tasks consistent with the strategic
direction of the Nation's civilian leadership.
Question. Do you see any unnecessary redundancy between Army and
Marine Corps ground combat forces, particularly between Army light
divisions and Marine Corps divisions?
Answer. No. The entire DOD force structure must be looked at in
terms of combatant commander requirements. Infantry Brigade Combat
Teams (IBCTs) provide capabilities as unique to the Army as U.S. Marine
Corps formations do for the Marines. Some IBCTs are specially trained
in airborne operations, others through habitual association with
assault helicopter organizations, are specially trained for air assault
operations. At the same time, U.S. Marine Corps forces are specially
trained for amphibious operations.

ARMY ROLE IN THE JOINT FORCE

Question. The U.S. military fights as a joint force and strives to
achieve realistic training for military operations. The Army provides
trained and equipped forces for joint military operations.
How do you believe the Army can best contribute to improved joint
military capabilities while preserving its service unique capabilities
and culture?
Answer. The Army exists to serve the American people, to protect
vital national interests, and to fulfill national military obligations.
The Army's title 10 responsibility to the Nation is to provide
responsive and ready land power--the best manned, trained, equipped,
and led forces this Nation can produce--to combatant commanders in
support of national strategies. It is also charged with providing
combat enabling capabilities and support to facilitate the other
Services to accomplish their missions. The Army brings to the fight
several capabilities to improve joint warfighting effectiveness.
First and foremost, the Army deploys and employs Army soldiers--
boots-on-the-ground (BOG)--a clear demonstration of our Nation's
resolve to protect and defend its national interests and protect the
interests of our allies. Over the past 4 years, the Army has become
more expeditionary, changing from its traditional divisional structure
to a modular brigade-based force. This change has been extraordinary;
particularly given the global force demand and the fact that we have
essentially been developing and institutionalizing these capabilities
while we are at war. This change is producing a rapidly deployable,
power projection Army that is part of a joint team. It is of
unprecedented campaign quality, with agile and adaptive leaders that
are comfortable executing throughout the entire spectrum of conflict.
The Army is able to achieve decisive outcomes across the full spectrum
of operations. It is characterized by strategic agility, mobility,
speed, survivability, lethality, sustainability, and network enabled
situation awareness and connectivity. Recent operations validate that
the Army either possesses the right capabilities, or is developing the
right capabilities and capacities, to complement and balance the joint
force. The Army is forward looking--a ``learning'' and adaptive
organization that is focused on producing future capabilities to
support Joint Force Commanders. Army capabilities ensure tactical and
operational networked interoperability with the U.S. Marine Corps, as
well as the interdependence on seamless air and naval fires and joint
close air support. Army logistics systems have and will continue to
provide superb campaign quality support to multiple services. Our
future force combat systems are being designed to maximize
interdependencies and interoperability requirements based on lessons
learned and future operating concepts developed by the Joint Planning
Community. Army systems and capabilities will enable us to seamlessly
integrate with other Services to address traditional, irregular,
catastrophic, and disruptive threats to our Nation and achieve desired
outcomes.
Our modular formations provide the joint force with the right mix
of light, medium and heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) as well as the
key enabling forces. The Army will also continue to invest heavily in
Special Forces, and is aggressively providing these forces today to
joint commanders for worldwide employment. Army transformation improves
the capabilities of soldiers engaged in the long war against terrorism
and improves the capability of the joint force to defend the homeland,
deter conflict in critical regions, respond promptly to small-scale
contingencies, and swiftly defeat the enemy in major combat
operations--all designed to support the needs of the combatant
commanders and our Nation.

JOINT EXPERIMENTATION

Question. The Army has conducted a wide range of experiments to
identify the path forward toward a digitized force, but has done much
less with regard to transformation to the Objective Force. In the arena
of joint experimentation, while the Army has participated in a few
joint experimentation activities over the last couple years, it is
clear that more joint experimentation is necessary to meet future
operational challenges.
What is your view of the need for joint experimentation and how do
you see the Army participating in future joint experimentation
activities as we move further into the 21st century?
Answer. There is no question as to the need for joint
experimentation; our National Security Strategy clearly establishes our
method of employing coherently joint forces to achieve our security
objectives. The Army fully engages with the U.S. Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM) in the planning, development, execution, and assessment of
experiments--examples include the cosponsored Unified Quest wargame as
well as the Urban Resolve series of experiments. In the latter case,
the Army recently embedded our major annual concept development
experiment--Omni Fusion--within JFCOM's Urban Resolve experiment. We
also devote significant effort to conduct even our smaller scale
experiments with a robust joint context. The Army also partners with
JFCOM in the area of interagency and multinational experimentation. In
support of the latter, we have developed or are developing project
arrangements with our key multinational partners to enable full
participation in our experimentation programs.
Question. Do you believe that Army experimentation has been
sufficient in support of transformation to the Objective Force?
Answer. Yes, the Army has conducted a great deal of experimentation
over the last several years. These include: technical prototype
experiments such as the C\4\ISR On the Move Test Bed annual experiments
and a vast array of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations; field
experiments such as the Air Assault Expeditionary Force and those
conducted by the Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab; large scale live,
virtual, and constructive experiments, specifically, the annual OMNI
Fusion experiments. The Army continues to increase its experimentation
capabilities as we stand up our latest experimentation asset, the Army
Evaluation Task Force, which will be available for conducting future
FCS experiments.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. Do you consider missile defense to be one of the Army's
core missions?
Answer. Yes, I consider missile defense to be one of the Army's
core missions and competencies--as it has been for 51 years. As the
world's preeminent land power, providing land-based missile defense to
the homeland, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies is an
essential core capability the Army provides our Nation. It supports the
President's direction in NSPD-23. The Army presently operates two
ballistic missile defense capabilities--the Patriot Advance Capability-
3 system and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system--and we will
continue to expand our role as additional capabilities are deployed
such as the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system.
Question. What is your view of the proper relationship between the
Army and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)?
Answer. I view the relationship between the Army and the MDA as a
critical partnership in a unique mission area in the defense of our
Nation. The Army, through our Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Army Service
Component Command, and in coordination with STRATCOM, plays a key role
in representing the warfighters' missile defense required capabilities
to the MDA. This input helps to define and frame the missile defense
capabilities that the defense of our homeland, our deployed forces, our
friends, and allies require. In general, the MDA should be a supporting
agency to each of the Services.
Question. What do you think the Army's responsibilities are or
should be with respect to development, procurement, and operation of
missile defense systems?
Answer. The Army provides land warfighting capabilities, including
force and asset protection, to the combatant commanders. These enduring
responsibilities result in the Army serving as a principal contributor
to the development, procurement, doctrine, operational integration,
execution, and assessment of land-based missile defense capabilities.
The Army has a strong history over the past half century of assisting
in the development of missile defense technologies and systems
including the current Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) used as the
interceptor on the currently fielded Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs)
and the Multiple-Kill Vehicle that will replace the EKV on the GBIs
when fielded.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes
the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?
Answer. As articulated by the President of the United States, there
are a number of areas that did not turn out as envisioned.
Question. There was the feeling that Iraqi elections would bring a
sense of nationalism for all of the population and would bring the
Iraqi's together. Unfortunately, the results seem to have promoted
increased sectarian divisions within the country instead.
We underestimated the ability of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Sunni
insurgents to provoke sectarian conflict and failed to preempt the
attack against the Golden Mosque in Samarra.
We thought that as more Iraqi security forces (ISFs) were trained
and equipped, we would be able to gradually shift ever increasing
security responsibilities to them and thus reduce our forces
proportionately. This is occurring slower than we originally projected.
We were slow to anticipate the extent of the radical Shia death
squads.
We did not have enough Iraqi and coalition forces to continue to
secure neighborhoods that had been previously cleared of terrorists and
insurgents.
We allowed too many restrictions to be placed upon our forces.
Which are still having an impact?
Answer. The impact focused efforts by both Shia death squads and
AQI and Sunni insurgents to provoke sectarian violence is still being
felt in the greater Baghdad area. The Prime Minister's recent
commitments to provide additional ISFs, enforce the law against all
violators, not to allow safe havens, and to eliminate political
interference should ensure the conditions exist to successfully provide
security for the capital while reducing sectarian violence.
Question. You have said that 20th century counterinsurgency efforts
typically lasted 9 years.
Do you believe the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq could last as
long as 9 years? Could it last even longer?
Answer. Counterinsurgency is an extremely complex form of warfare
that, at its core, is a struggle for the support of the population.
Progress is measured by effects, not time. I agree that the
counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq will continue for some time.

``SURGE'' OF U.S. TROOPS IN IRAQ

Question. What is your best estimate of how much the surge in
troops the President has proposed is going to cost the Army during
fiscal year 2007?
Answer. I understand that Army commands and supporting agencies are
working now to refine initial estimates. Several major factors are
still in play, including additional equipment requirements and final
determination of the support force mix, that may be needed to support
additional combat brigades. It will also be necessary to augment
theater support capabilities to provide for the increased Army and
Marine Corps presence.
Question. Can the Army deploy an additional five brigades to Iraq
with only about 21,000 additional people, or will additional military,
civilian, or contractor support personnel be required on top of the
direct increase of 21,000 military personnel?
Answer. BCTs are designed to deploy and join an existing command
and control structure already established for employment in a theater
of war. This is the case with the five BCTs committed for the force
increase in Iraq. However, given the nature of the counterinsurgency
mission, there are certain additional combat support and combat service
support capabilities required to enable fully the commitment of the
additional brigades. These capabilities include logistical enablers,
intelligence assets, military police, and a command/control node. Based
on the current mature base of support already in theater, additional
civilian and contractor personnel required should be minimal.
Question. Given the Army's state of readiness, how long do you
believe the increased troop levels and operations tempo can be
sustained?
Answer. Over the past 4 years the troop levels in Iraq have varied
based on conditions on the ground, and we have experienced surge
periods before. In December 2004, 20 BCTs provided enhanced security
for national elections and again in November 2005, when 19 BCTs enabled
the final round of national elections. The current effort to provide
five additional BCTs and enablers from the Army represents an
additional conditions-based force increase. This effort cannot be
indefinitely sustained without increased resources and policy support.
Question. Have you done any planning for the redeployment from Iraq
of U.S. forces beyond the surge?
Answer. I believe the Army can sustain the increased force levels
in Iraq through the remainder of this fiscal year. We've extended
several units in Iraq beyond their scheduled rotation dates and we've
returned units to Iraq with less than 12 months at home station in
order to meet the requirements on the ground. However, this pace exacts
a toll on the force--on equipment, on soldiers, and on their families.
As the President announced, an end strength increase will help; we'll
be able to field additional BCTs over time. Additionally, we'll
continually review and adjust our force generation model to ensure no
soldier deploys without the proper training and equipment. The Reserve
component (RC) is invaluable as a part of the total force, and I
believe recent policy changes on mobilization timelines will also
enhance overall readiness.
Question. What are the stages you would envision in such a
redeployment?
Answer. When conditions permit and requirements call for fewer
BCTs, we would adjust the force flow to redeploy those units whose
tours had been extended, while meeting BOG durations (of 1 year) for
other deployed units. We would also support dwell times (of 1 year) for
units available to deploy from continental United States (CONUS) back
into Iraq. I would additionally make a priority of either keeping a
brigade in a Reserve status in Kuwait or keeping a brigade in a
heightened alert status, prepared to deploy from CONUS, which would
give the commander the flexibility needed to address an unexpected
escalation of violence. If the requirement for fewer brigades came to
pass, we would redeploy forces, or hold forces in CONUS, until we
achieved the required number of brigades needed in Iraq. We would also
reduce in an appropriate manner combat support, combat service support,
headquarters strengths, and contractors. We would shrink our basing
footprint to meet the needs of the operational commander. All of this
would be a deliberate process synchronized with the transfer of
security responsibility to the Iraqis.
Question. In testimony on January 23, Lieutenant General David
Petraeus, nominated to become Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq,
said that he would prefer to accelerate the flow of the five additional
combat brigades to Iraq as quickly as possible. The current plan calls
for the deployment of roughly one brigade per month through May.
Do you believe that this acceleration of the flow is practicable?
By how much can it reasonably be accelerated?
Answer. The Army has rotated forces into the Central Command
(CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) for the past 5 years.
Infrastructure and procedures in the AOR, enhanced over time, enable
the timely deployment of forces. The Army continuously plans force
rotation and prepares next to deploy forces. As such, the BCTs
designated to deploy this spring have been preparing for the past 8 to
10 months and are approaching full mission readiness. Accelerating the
deployment of these BCTs decreases preparation and training time by 45
to 60 days. As we accelerate, we will not send soldiers without proper
training and the best equipment possible. Even with the short timeframe
to execute this mission, the Army will be able to execute this
reinforcement; and all of the BCTs will receive required training and
equipment prior to employment in theater. Further, no accelerated BCT
will fall below a 1:1 deployment to dwell ratio. The current schedule
of accelerated deployments is feasible and the Army today is on track
to meet the required arrival dates established by the theater commander
for all four remaining BCTs. The theater commander will decide on any
new requirement to further accelerate the force flow. The current plan
of deployments represents the most practicable acceleration. The lead
time required to provide each BCT with an appropriate mission rehearsal
exercise (MRE) precludes deploying faster without increasing risk. U.S.
Army Forces Command continues to refine training and equipping
schedules to maximize unit readiness for deployment and
counterinsurgency operations.
Question. What are the most acute manning, training, equipping, and
transportation problems that you see in trying to accelerate the
deployment of all five brigades?
Answer. All five BCTs will deploy manned, trained, and equipped to
perform their mission. The Army will not deploy any BCTs that are not
ready for combat. The Army will deploy all five brigades fully manned.
All five BCTs will be trained to perform their assigned mission. The
greatest training challenge is available training time prior to
deployment. The Army is accelerating the execution of some of the MREs.
The Army will use a combination of organic unit equipment, TPE, APS
stocks, and cross-leveling to equip the deploying BCTs. All will be
equipped to perform their mission before they enter Iraq. The most
acute equipping challenge is add-on armor for medium and heavy tactical
wheeled vehicles. Units will cross-level as an interim solution until
new production can fill the complete requirement. If I am confirmed, I
will work to ensure that no soldier deploys to Iraq without adequate
force protection equipment. The increased demand for operational
equipment will have a longer-term impact on the Army's equipment
retrograde and reset program.
Question. In your view, could accelerating the ``surge'' of forces
reduce our leverage with the Iraqi leaders to keep their military,
political, and economic commitments?
Answer. No, it should not. The Government of Iraq is eager to
assume greater security responsibility from the coalition and
understands the need to make military, political, and economic gains
during this period to maintain positive momentum and continue the
decrease in violence. The increased flexibility to support Iraqi led
stability operations provided by the increased force level of U.S.
forces can help establish the conditions necessary for the political
process to go forward.
Question. Do you believe that quelling the current level of
violence is a necessary condition for a political solution in Iraq?
Answer. Reducing the levels of sectarian violence in the capital is
key to our efforts to stabilize Iraq. The central challenge facing us
is how we can best apply all of the elements of power to break the
cycle of sectarian violence; this must be resolved for us to succeed.
Reduction in violence will set the conditions for reconciliation to
occur which will, in turn, set the stage for transition of security
responsibility to the Government of Iraq and the adaptation of
coalition presence within the country.
Question. Do you believe that it is feasible for current and
projected U.S. forces in Iraq, in conjunction with available Iraqi
forces, to achieve this objective?
Answer. I believe this plan can work. I believe the ISFs, in
conjunction with U.S forces assistance, can achieve stability in Iraq.
The increase in U.S. forces is a key piece of our new strategy to
secure Baghdad. These additional forces will work alongside the ISF to
help the Iraqis secure neighborhoods, protect the local population, and
ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the
security that Baghdad needs for recovery and reconciliation.
Additionally, Prime Minister Maliki has given us his pledge that
political or sectarian interference will not limit Iraqi and American
forces in pursuing all those who break the law.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. For more than 2 years, you have served as Commander,
Multi-National Forces-Iraq. Prime Minister Maliki asserted that U.S.
refusal to provide the ISFs with weapons and equipment hurt their
ability to secure Baghdad.
Do you agree with the Prime Minister's assertion?
Answer. No, and we have recently briefed him on the status of
equipping his forces. We've entered into an agreement on the size,
equipment, and capabilities of the ISF with each of Iraq's three
governments and met the obligations consistent with those agreements.
We have adequately trained and equipped a 325,000-man security force
which I believe will become capable of defending Iraq from internal
threats.
Question. What is your view of the state of training and equipping
of ISFs and whether they have what they need to meet the military
commitments of the Iraqi leaders?
Answer. The objective counterinsurgency and civil security forces
are adequately sized, balanced, and equipped to counter Iraq's internal
threat with our support. With continued training and experience they
will be capable of independent counterinsurgency operations.
Question. What concerns, if any, do you have about the ability of
those units to participate in the execution of the new Baghdad security
plan?
Answer. The ISF have demonstrated their increasing capability at
the tactical level; however, the synchronization of unit movements, the
application of enablers such as aviation and intelligence systems, and
the ability to work the full spectrum required to include civil-
military operations require additional training. I remain concerned
about the reliability of some of the local and national police. We will
watch them carefully.
Question. The Iraqi government has agreed to send an additional
three Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad, two of which will apparently be
predominately Kurdish.
What is your understanding of why Kurdish units were selected?
Answer. The forces assigned to each/any operational area, including
Baghdad, are determined by a deliberate planning/estimate process. The
level of forces currently identified for operations in Baghdad are
assessed as being what is required for the tasks, when balanced,
militarily and politically, against the need for forces elsewhere
within Iraq. This decision is made by the Prime Minister (and Commander
in Chief) informed by his principal advisors; both Iraqi and coalition.
Question. Do you believe that these units have a greater loyalty to
the central government than other units?
Answer. I believe these units are loyal to the central government.
Question. How do you believe Sunni or Shia Arabs are likely to
react to Kurdish troops in their neighborhoods?
Answer. All parties will accept the use of Kurdish forces. In the
end, if stability is enhanced, the central government will be seen as
providing a secure environment, and this is what all sides desire.
Question. How do you believe the Mahdi Army is likely to react to
Kurdish troops entering Sadr City?
Answer. It is not clear Kurdish units will enter Sadr City as part
of the Baghdad security plan. If they were to do so, the reaction in
Sadr City would likely vary, depending upon the perception of the
mission, size and composition of forces used, duration of operations,
and reaction to the political situation of the moment.
Question. What is your understanding of where Iraqi brigades that
are predominantly Sunni or Shia are likely to be deployed--among their
own sect or the other? What do you see as the implications either way?
Answer. The forces that will be employed in Baghdad are a mixture
of ethnic groups and religious sects. It is one of the tenets of the
Baghdad security plan that ISF in general must gain the trust and
confidence of the Iraqi people. Therefore, it is the intention of
Lieutenant Aboud to intermingle all components of the ISF so that
together they can be seen as a positive force in providing security.
Question. The performance of the Iraqi government has been uneven.
The new way forward calls for the ISFs to do more, especially in
Baghdad.
Are you personally confident that the ISFs can meet this challenge?
Answer. I believe the ISF can meet this challenge with our support.
Question. Do you believe Prime Minister Maliki can achieve the
benchmarks that the President has discussed? Have you seen those
benchmarks? If so, please describe them for the committee?
Answer. I believe that Prime Minister Maliki will sincerely and
aggressively try to achieve the benchmarks. He has also made
commitments to ensure the ISF and coalition have the freedoms of action
and authority to accomplish their mission.

1. Military commander given all authorities to execute his
plan.
2. No political interference in security.
3. No militia controlling local security.
4. Even handed enforcement of the law.
5. No safe havens.

Question. In October 2006, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi
Reconstruction released three reports. One found that nearly one of
every 25 weapons the U.S. military bought for ISFs was missing. A
second report found that ``significant challenges remain that put at
risk'' the U.S. military's goal of transferring all logistics
operations to the Iraqi defense ministry by the end of 2007.
Are you familiar with these reports?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What actions if any have you taken in response to their
findings?
Answer. We have had a very positive and productive relationship
with many organizations that have helped us assess the status of the
train and equip mission to include the Government Accountability
Office, SIGIR, and DOD Inspector General. In every case, the
recommendations of these groups have been acted upon, and
accountability continues to improve. We believe that it is both our
aspiration and the aspiration of the MoD and MoI to be largely self-
reliant in logistics by the end of 2007 and the 2007 ISF budget is
adequate to the task; however, our ability to achieve that is assessed
monthly and adapted as necessary.

U.S. OPERATIONS WITH ISFS

Question. What is your understanding of the command and control
relationships between American and Iraqi forces in the new Baghdad
security plan?
Answer. U.S. forces will operate under U.S. command and support ISF
operations in each of the nine districts of Baghdad. They will work
closely with the sector brigade commander who will have command of all
ISFs in that sector.
Question. Do you have any concerns about these relationships?
Answer. I believe these relationships are adequate but will require
close coordination and liaison. The fact that the majority of forces
operating in Baghdad have been working together for sometime should
assist these relationships. In order to mitigate against potential
problems close liaison will be required at all levels of command.
Question. The new Baghdad security plan apparently envisions
American units being co-located with Iraqi units spread out over
approximately 30 mini-bases throughout Baghdad.
What is your understanding of how those forces and the forces which
will have to resupply them on a daily basis will be protected?
Answer. Under the Baghdad security plan, coalition forces will
establish Joint Security Stations with the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police,
and the Iraqi National Police. The stations are strategically
positioned throughout the city to accommodate dispersed, joint patrols,
and to provide a CENTCOM and control hub. The establishment of Joint
Security Stations includes enhancing force protection and developing
essential sustainment and life support packages at each Joint Security
Station. Many of the Joint Security Stations are located at existing
Iraqi Police Stations. Force protection enhancements will include
improvements such as entry control points, external barriers to
redirect traffic flows and/or reinforce perimeters, increased
protection from indirect fires, and guard posts/towers where required.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend in the size,
structure, number, or operating procedures for U.S. forces embedded
with ISFs?
Answer. There is unquestionable linkage between ISF progression and
the embedded Transition Team program. The current Transition Team size
is insufficient to permit an optimum level of advisement to their
respective ISF unit. In recognition of this, Multi-National Forces-Iraq
has initiated the enhancement of transition teams to increase their
effectiveness while balancing other operational requirements. Based on
conditions within each MND's AOR, primarily relating to the levels of
violence and ISF capacity for independent operations, transition teams
are undergoing enhancement.

THE MILITIAS AND THE INSURGENTS

Question. What are your views on how the Iraqi government should
confront the militias?
Answer. There are numerous militias in Iraq; each has its own goals
and motivations. The Iraqi government must make clear that armed groups
operating outside the law will not be tolerated. As some militia
members will not be interested in reconciling with the Iraqi
government, the ISFs will have to deal with them militarily or treat
them as criminal elements. In order to deal effectively with these
illegal armed groups, the Iraqi government should also engage in
substantive dialogue with militia leaders in order to identify their
motivations and concerns. The Iraqi government must also provide for
militia members in order that they might support their families while
being fully reintegrated into civil society.
Question. Do you believe that the Iraqi government is likely to do
so in a timely manner?
Answer. The Iraqi government is already confronting militias in
order to curtail sectarian violence. As ISFs gain strength and
confidence, their ability to confront the militias will improve as
well. Success against one group could have a cascading positive effect,
and place additional pressure on other illegal armed groups to
terminate hostilities. However, success against militias will not be
achieved on our timetable, but on Iraq's.
Question. How effective do you believe the addition of more U.S.
troops will be in securing Baghdad if the Iraqi government fails to
take effective, timely action to confront the militias?
Answer. Absent a concerted effort by the Iraqi government to
curtail militia activity, an increase in U.S. troop strength may reduce
sectarian violence in the short-term, but at the cost of increased
attacks against coalition forces and reduced confidence in the
capabilities and trustworthiness of the ISFs.
Question. There have been some recent news reports that the Shiite
political elite are advising Moqtada al Sadr to ``lay low''--much as
was done after confrontations with the U.S. military in Najaf in 2004,
and that he and his militia are heeding that call. The fear is that
they will simply re-emerge after the so-called surge of U.S. troops is
over.
Do you believe this is a real concern, and if so, what should be
done about it?
Answer. Shia political and religious leaders are advising Muqtada
al-Sadr to rein in his militia and play a constructive role in the
political process. These warnings are coming from individuals Sadr
respects--and who themselves have concluded past mistakes should not be
repeated. Furthermore, we have seen what we assess to be a qualitative
difference in the Iraqi government's willingness to take on extremist
elements--including al-Sadr's militia.
A situation where al-Sadr's militia attempted to resurge after
``laying low'' would clearly present a challenge the Iraqi government
would need to confront, which is why our current operations must focus
on having the ISF emerge as the dominant security force in he country.
Question. What are your views on whether American troops should
enter Sadr City, and if so, under what circumstances?
Answer. If we are to provide security for the people of Iraq it is
important that we do not allow safe havens for militias or terrorists.
As a result American troops already regularly enter Sadr City when
operational needs dictate it. I expect this to continue in the future
and anticipate that, as further progress is made, American troops will
be stationed in Sadr City alongside Iraqi Army and Iraqi NP units.
Question. How do you believe the Madhi Army or the Iraqi residents
of Sadr City would react to American troops entering Sadr City and
staying there?
Answer. American troops already enter Sadr City regularly in
response to operational needs, which is likely to continue. The Mahdi
Army largely follows Muqtada al-Sadr's current public directives to
refrain from directly engaging coalition forces entering Sadr City or
other predominately Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad. Though we are still
assessing the sincerity of recent statements by Sadr City leaders
supporting the Baghdad security plan, it is a positive sign residents
are willing to work with the Iraqi government to improve their
security.
Question. Do you expect to see Sunni insurgents and Shia militia
members leaving Baghdad as a result of increased U.S. and Iraqi troop
presence?
Answer. We are already seeing it. Sunni extremists such as AQI will
likely replicate their response to previous security operations. Their
leadership is likely to relocate outside the immediate area of Baghdad
to areas northwest and south of Baghdad, leaving lower level fighters
in the city to continue high-profile attacks when and where possible
against civilians, Shia militias, ISFs, and coalition forces. Sunni
resistance fighters are locally based and will attempt to go to ground
within their general areas, preparing for future operations following
coalition forces departure. We have seen numerous indications Shia
militia leaders will leave, or have already left, Sadr City to avoid
capture by Iraqi and coalition security forces. The effectiveness of
recent detainment operations is likely causing these actions.
Question. If so, do you believe that this could this result in a
higher level of violence in the rest of the country?
Answer. Robust security operations in Baghdad and a resulting
movement of antagonists and weapons into the Baghdad belt areas could
result in heightened levels of confrontation in these urban belts. It
is unlikely the limited displacement of insurgents and Shia militia
from Baghdad will cause a significant increase in violence in other
areas of Iraq. Baghdad is the center of gravity. The movement of
fighters to foment violence in other areas would diminish capabilities
focused on the central struggle. However, to mitigate pressure on
militias and extremists in Baghdad and the surrounding areas, other
elements within these organizations may increase attacks along the
southern lines of communications.
Question. What are your views on how we should address that
possibility?
Answer. This is an operational consideration that is addressed in
contingency planning prior to commencing operations. Since any
significant increase in violence is unlikely to spread beyond the areas
surrounding Baghdad, the key is to control lines of communications into
and out of Baghdad and as well as to secure the main supply routes,
especially those to the south. Increased use of Iraqi Army and national
police to protect the lines of communications and establishment of
regional reaction forces to respond to threats external to Baghdad are
prudent measures to implement. A number of other options could be used
to counter the dispersion of violence to areas surrounding the city.
These include exerting positive control over entry-exit points and
increased patrolling and intelligence collection in areas of concern.

STRATEGIC RISK

Question. Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create higher levels of strategic
risk for the United States based on the availability of trained and
ready forces for other contingencies?
Answer. A fundamental challenge impacting Army readiness and
strategic depth is the need to establish a proper balance between
strategy and resources. Current demands exceed the strategy outlined in
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and exceed the resources provided
to execute the QDR-based strategy. While the U.S. Army can still meet
its commitments in support of approved contingency plans, our concern
is with our capacity to provide sufficient next to deploy forces
capable of surging to meet other contingency requirements as they arise
and to deter potential aggressors. The immediate challenge lies in the
readiness of these currently non-deployed, next to deploy forces. The
Army's requirements, particularly to reset, recapitalize, and replace
damaged equipment must be fully funded to restore the strategic depth
of our Army necessary to respond decisively to potential strategic
contingencies. Full, timely, and predictable funding is critical for
the Army to sustain the growing global commitments of our force. The
recent decision to grow our ground forces and to assure access to the
Reserve component will increase the strategic depth to sustain the high
levels of demand for Army forces. The size of our Army has a deterrent
effect on potential enemies.
If so, how would you characterize the increase in strategic risk in
terms of the Army's ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ a force for
a new contingency? In your view, is this level of risk acceptable?
Answer. The current pace of operations has reduced the time between
deployments, exacerbated equipment shortfalls that impact nondeployed
forces and pre-positioned stocks, and degraded training for full
spectrum operations. Currently, Army units focus their training on
preparing for counterinsurgency operations. To meet combatant
commander's immediate wartime needs, the Army is pooling equipment from
across the force to equip soldiers deploying into harm's way. This
practice continues today, increasing risk to our next to deploy forces
and limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic contingencies.
The Army continues efforts to operationalize the Reserve component,
which includes a large portion of the Army's key enabling capabilities,
to improve our ability to respond to new contingencies. Fully and
continuously integrating the Reserve and National Guard balanced
capabilities into ongoing operations is critical to our effectiveness
and enhances the readiness of non-deployed forces by allowing more time
to reset, re-equip, and conduct full spectrum training in order to be
prepared for contingency operations at home and abroad. The Department
is updating Reserve governance and employment policies in accordance
with the Secretary of Defense's new mobilization policy, to allow for
greater access to these forces. These policy goals include managing
mobilization on a unit, instead of an individual, basis. The recently
completed Chairman's Risk Assessment provides specific detail to the
strategic risk of the military in meeting the National Military
Strategy and risk mitigation efforts.
Question. What is the impact of the decision to increase Army
forces committed to Iraq on our ability to meet our security
obligations in other parts of the world?
Answer. Increasing force commitment to Iraq does have an impact on
our capabilities. However, that the Army still has combat capability
and will meet its obligations, clearly, we must plan for and address
future challenges in this dangerous and uncertain time. I agree with
General Schoomaker's concern about our strategic depth and assessment
against many of our contingency plans--it could take longer to execute
some of those plans in terms of the timelines that are expected. In
such cases, joint capabilities will mitigate those ground force
capabilities delayed by the force generation timelines. The approved
increase in Army end strength, though not a near-term solution, will
help restore this capacity and provide us with a deterrent capability.
It should also be noted that the enemies that we face are not ours
alone, they threaten many others as well. As such, the Army and the DOD
are working hard to build the security capacity of willing partners,
through its security cooperation efforts, which in the long-term should
enable regional deterrence and greater self defense.
Question. How and over what period of time, in your view, will
increases to Army end strength reduce or mitigate this risk?
Answer. I would refer you to the Chairman's Risk Assessment for the
specifics which are classified. However, as has been publicly
announced, the recent decisions by the President and Secretary of
Defense to grow our ground forces and to assure access to all
components of our force will help to establish the balanced inventory
required to meet and sustain demand for Army forces. It will require
time and resources to man, train, and equip this force. We must
continue to leverage through building partnership capacity and security
cooperation efforts, the development of the security capacity of our
global partners. The current plan calls for increasing the size of the
Active Army. The complete benefit of this growth will not be realized
until the 2012 timeframe. The Army plans to increase both BCTs and key
enabling units in our Active component (AC), Army National Guard, and
Army Reserve. This growth will expand our rotational pool to 76 BCTs
and more than 200 enabling organizations in the operational force of
the total Army. Our goal is to provide a continuous supply of BCTs to
meet approved global commitments. Our immediate challenge lies in the
readiness of the next to deploy and surge forces. Generating whole,
cohesive units that are fully manned, trained, and equipped will ensure
that they are fully ready for the strategic and operational demands of
the combatant commander. This will require a national commitment to
sustain predictable resourcing over time and to build our force in a
balanced, coordinated fashion while providing adequately for the needs
of our All-Volunteer soldiers and their families.
Question. What additional actions, in your view, are necessary to
reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?
Answer. Congressional support for increased total obligation
authority for the Army and timely wartime supplemental funding remain
key elements of reducing strategic risk. Expansion of the Army,
continued transformation, assured access to the Reserve components,
recapitalization, and increased funding are some of the key means
essential to reducing overall strategic risk. We must be able to
harness the other elements of national power to shape the strategic
environment and reduce the likelihood of crisis. Fully resourcing our
security cooperation activities, increasing the security capacity of
strategic partners, strengthening our unity of effort within our
interagency, and improving and increasing our Nation's expeditionary
advisory and assistance capabilities are also essential to mitigate
strategic risk.

ROTATION CYCLES/SCHEDULES

Question. The Active Army's ratio of time spent deployed to time at
home station is already approaching 1:1--that is for each year deployed
a soldier spends 1 year at home station. The Active Army objective is
1:2 where soldiers can expect to be home for 2 years for each year
deployed. The Reserve component objective is 1.5 where soldiers can
expect to be home for 5 years for each year deployed. Despite the
desired deployed to ``dwell'' ratio, the increase in forces committed
to Iraq is likely to drive this ratio even higher.
What impact do you expect the proposed troop surge in Iraq to have
on the so-called ``dwell time'' of Army soldiers? Is it possible that
this surge could drive the Army past the 1:1 level?
Answer. Over the past 5 years very few units have not met the 1:1
ratio between rotations, though the Army minimum goal for Active
component units at surge is a 1:2 ratio and objective steady state goal
it is a 1:3 ratio. Currently, most Active component BCTs as well as
combat support and combat service support are averaging about 1:1.
Reserve component units have mostly been mobilized only once, so Army
National Guard and for Army Reserve rotation goals have not been
exceeded. Ultimately, the decision rests with the theater commander to
determine his requirements. I understand that the Army is finalizing
the force rotation set for the rest of this year and for 2008 in order
to ensure that we continue to provide the required capabilities to the
combatant commanders. No units in the plus-up will break the 1:1
rotation level. For the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) force rotations for fiscal years 2007-2009, the
recent change in mobilization policy for the Reserve component begins
to provide to the Army predictable access to required capabilities.
During the implementation to resume proportional contributions to the
theater some units, particularly Active component BCTs, certain Active
component enabling capabilities (military police, engineers, and
others) and Reserve component military police and engineers, will be
asked to rotate at a ratio that exceeds policy goals. The Army will
identify these units as soon as possible in order to maximize time for
their training, manning, and equipping. The Army will deploy only
trained and ready units.
Question. How do you think a deployed to dwell ratio of 1:1 is
likely to impact the readiness of deployed and non-deployed units?
Answer. When units redeploy from Iraq and Afghanistan, their reset
periods at home station are truncated due to the short time before they
redeploy next. It increases the challenge to ensure units are reset and
trained for their next deployment equipment and people. Stress is
increased on soldiers and families.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact of the decision to
increase Army end strength on the rotation schedule and how long will
it take for this impact to make a difference?
Answer. The decision puts us on a path to enhance the depth and
breadth of capabilities, yet will require several years, considerable
resources, and a sustained national commitment to bring it to fruition.
Although it will not immediately alleviate strategic risk as we assess
it today, it will better posture us to meet sustained levels of force
deployment for the long war. If we grow the Army to 547,000 Active/
358,000 ARNG/206,000 USAR; have recurrent, assured access to the
Reserve component, rotate at surge with the Active component at 1:2 and
the Reserve component at 1:4 with a 12-month Reserve component
mobilization (9-month BOG), the Army will be able to generate about the
same capacity as with today's programmed force by fiscal year 2013.
Question. How will the proposed surge impact the ability of the
Army National Guard to respond to homeland security and other disaster
response missions?
Answer. It is my belief that the surge will not materially impact
on the ability of the Army National Guard to respond to missions here
at home. The surge is composed primarily of Active component units. One
National Guard BCT (1-34th MNARNG) already deployed in theater was
extended 120 days as part of the surge but will return home this
August. The Guard will continue to be able to support the Southwest
Border Mission. The Chief, National Guard Bureau, together with the
Army leadership, has committed to the goal of having at least 50
percent of a Governor's National Guard forces available to respond to
State missions.

EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

Question. Both deploying and non-deploying Active component and
Reserve component Army units are training without all their required
equipment. Deploying units do not receive some of their equipment until
late in their pre-deployment training cycle or as they arrive in
theater.
In your view, is deploying additional brigades to Iraq likely to
increase the strain on maintenance systems and further reduce equipment
availability for training?
Answer. I would agree that additional brigades will increase
workload, but we have demonstrated we have the depth of capacity to
meet requirements. With adequate funding and lead time, we can leverage
our organic capability, public and private partnerships, and contracts
to meet these requirements
Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to
fully support the pre-deployment training and operations of surging
units?
Answer. The Army's number one priority, and one that I would
maintain if I am confirmed, is to ensure soldiers going into the
warfight have the equipment they need. Units will use a combination of
organic unit equipment, theater provided equipment, Army prepositioned
stocks, and cross-leveling to equip the deploying BCTs.
Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for
training and operations?
Answer. Due to theater requirements, some equipment is unavailable
for units to train with prior to deployment. The most common shortfall
occurs with force protection equipment, where equipping solutions are
developed to meet specific theater threats, and production of these
items go straight into theater to meet demand.
Question. In terms of shortfalls for training items, some key
pieces of equipment include uparmored HMMWVs, engineer route clearing
equipment, and counter rocket artillery and mortar fire system. In
terms of shortfalls for operations, all units are fully equipped to
meet operational demands.
What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these
shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and
operate?
Answer. The most important element of ensuring units have what they
need is ensuring sufficient, predictable, stable funding. Stable and
predictable budgets that are enacted early with distribution of both
base and bridge supplemental funding within 30 days of the start of the
fiscal year allow us to deliver the right equipment, on-time.

EQUIPMENT REPAIR/RESET

Question. Congress provided the Army with $17 billion in fiscal
year 2007 to help with the reset of non-deployed forces and accelerate
the repair and replacement of equipment.
What impact do you expect the increased funding to have on the
readiness of our ground forces, and how soon do you expect to see this
impact?
Answer. Based on what I know now, I believe equipping the force
will take time. We must fill the historical holes in our force,
transform the Army, and modernize. The $17.1 billion has a minor impact
on equipment on hand quantities, and the procurement dollars provided
pay back the Reserve component for equipment left in theater and to
replace battle losses. The $17.1 billion has the greatest impact on the
equipment serviceability status which is realized when depot and field
level reset is completed during the 180 day reset window for
redeploying units.
Further, as the $17.1 billion for reset was available at the
beginning of the fiscal year, the Army was able to synchronize
resources, people, and materiel to align with the flow of equipment
from returning units into the reset process. For instance, timely
funding has allowed depots to order parts in advance of equipment
arrival, thus speeding the reset process.
Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are
operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for
reset?
Answer. Executing the $17.1 billion reset program does not exceed
the maximum capacity of our depots. I understand that the Army's depots
have the capacity and are on track to execute all funding associated
with the reset dollars.
As the $17.1 billion for reset was available at the beginning of
the fiscal year, the Army was able to synchronize resources, people,
and materiel to align with the flow of equipment from returning units
into the reset process. For instance, timely funding has allowed depots
to order parts in advance of equipment arrival, thus speeding the reset
process.
The Army's organic depots have steadily increased their capability
while simultaneously increasing efficiencies. For example, Red River
Army Depot, will see work increase from 400 items a month in October
2006 to 700 a month in September 2007. The Anniston Army Depot will
increase from 1,000 items a month in October 2006 to 3,000 per month in
September 2007.
Question. What additional steps do you believe could be taken to
increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it available
for operations and training?
Answer. As I indicated previously, I believe that the most
important element of ensuring units have what they need is ensuring we
have sufficient, predictable, stable, funding. Stable and predictable
budgets that are enacted early with distribution of both base and
bridge supplemental funding within 30 days of the start of the fiscal
year allow us to deliver the right equipment, on-time. The Army needs
continued congressional help in passing the 2007 main supplemental
funding early this spring to properly sustain the Army.
Question. What impact do you believe the President's proposal to
send an additional five brigades to Iraq is likely to have on the pool
of equipment available for non-deployed units to train with at home?
Answer. The additional brigades will increase the need for
equipment as units intensify training for deployment. Some of the
deploying units will take equipment with them which will require the
Army to realign available equipment for nondeploying units to train
with. The Army will need to better manage the equipment to ensure
proper distribution.
Question. What impact is it likely to have on the ability of Army
National Guard units to respond to homeland security and disaster
relief missions?
Answer. This increase in deployed forces could only affect the Army
National Guard's ability to respond to homeland security and disaster
relief missions to the degree that we deploy Army National Guard units.
I understand that the Army does not plan to transfer any Army National
Guard equipment to other components. However, as demonstrated with last
season's hurricane preparedness, the Army can provide necessary
disaster support through mutual aid compacts, equipment loans, and
forces from the Active component and Army Reserve components.

RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION

LOW DENSITY/HIGH DEMAND FORCES

Question. In your professional judgment, how would you address the
Army's management of low density units such as military police, civil
affairs, and others which are in extremely high demand in this new
strategic environment?
Answer. The Army is aggressively rebalancing its formations to
reduce structure we do not need, mitigate high-demand/low-density
shortfalls, and redistributing soldiers to increase the size of the
operating force by reducing the Institutional Army. We've identified
well over 100,000 of capabilities to rebalance and have already
rebalanced over 57,000 of that. I understand that the Army plans to
reduce the Institutional Army from over 104,000 in fiscal year 2003 to
80,000 by fiscal year 2013. The Army must, however, maintain
Institutional capacity to generate and sustain the force growth. As a
result, we've reduced armor, field artillery, and headquarters to grow
the capabilities that you've identified: infantry, special forces,
civil affairs, psyops, MPs, MI, engineers. Just as importantly, the
Army is changing the way it develops leaders and trains soldiers. The
Army is building pentatheletes who can operate in an ambiguous
environment and perform a broader range of tasks in addition to their
core competencies. They are much more culturally aware, the Army has
emphasized language proficiency, moreover broadening our leader's
experience through advanced civilian schooling. The cumulative effects
of this are leaders equally adept at non-kinetic solutions.
Question. Are there functional changes among the Active components
and Reserve components that you believe should be made?
Answer. The Army must continue to balance the force across all
three components and maintain recurrent, assured access to the
Reserves. Our Reserve components are now an integral part of our
operational force. They are organized in modular formations and will be
manned, trained, and equipped to deploy. I believe our Army is better
integrated today than we have been for a long time. The Army will
continue to grow the modular force across all three components to build
strategic depth; provide rotational capability for steady state levels;
and bring a campaign quality to our Army that will meet the global
strategic demands of the long war.

ARMY READINESS

Question. On January 23, General Schoomaker testified before the
House Armed Services Committee that Army readiness was even worse now
than it was last June. He said: ``I testified in June that I had
concerns about the strategic depth of the Army. That was about 7 months
ago. Since that time, we have increased stress on the Army. We are
using the supplemental funding to reset the Army as fast as we can but,
there's latency in delivery. We have it moving very quickly, but the
delivery is yet to be taken. So my concerns are increased over what
they were in June, in terms of what the pressure is on our force, both
in terms of dwell time, in terms of equippage, in terms of time
available to train and all the rest of it.''
Do you share General Schoomaker's assessment that Army readiness
has declined over the past 6 months?
Answer. Yes, I do. The forces in theater are the best trained, best
led, and best equipped before crossing the berm to execute the combat
missions which they have been assigned. However, ensuring units in
theater are properly resourced and trained has come at the expense of
those units that are not deployed. To meet the combatant commander's
immediate needs we have pooled equipment from across the force.
Although absolutely necessary to support soldiers deploying into harm's
way, this practice has increased the un-readiness in our next-to-deploy
forces and limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic
contingencies. The 2007 supplemental will arrest the decline of the
readiness in the force that General Schoomaker described. However,
since that time operational demand has obviously increased and only
serves to accentuate the fact that operational demand still exceeds
strategy, which still exceeds resources.
Question. To what degree would the proposed surge exacerbate the
readiness problems identified by General Schoomaker?
Answer. Intuitively, this increase in demand will exacerbate the
stress on soldiers, leaders, families, and equipment. Any shortfalls
for units which are deploying will be met using our ``pooling concept''
to ensure these units can meet their operational missions. More
importantly, to actually achieve the surge force levels we must not
only accelerate the deployment of five BCTs, but must also extend five
BCTs already in Iraq. Finally, the Army must pull forward the
deployment of five future BCTs to replace the BCTs that were
accelerated in the rotation plans.
Question. Do you believe the current state of Army readiness is
acceptable?
Answer. I am concerned that the operational demand continues to
exceed the QDR strategy and available resources. America's Army remains
at war and we will be fighting this war for the foreseeable future.
Question. How do you see the war in Iraq and operations in
Afghanistan impacting the readiness of Army forces that may be called
upon to respond to an attack or other incident or disaster inside the
United States?
Answer. It is my understanding that the National Guard Bureau,
working with the Governors and State Adjutants General, have identified
the baseline equipment requirements so each State's units are capable
of meeting their homeland defense and homeland security requirements.
Additionally, the Army leadership has request $20 billion over the
program to ensure the Army National Guard is properly equipped to
respond to an attack or other incident or disaster inside the United
States.

PERMANENT BASES IN IRAQ

Question. Last year's defense authorization and appropriation acts
prohibited the use of funds to establish permanent bases in Iraq.
Do you agree with that prohibition, or do you think the United
States should reserve the right to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces
in Iraq?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the Iraq basing prohibition on permanent
facilities.
Question. If you agree, what are your views on the construction of
any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?
Answer. All current U.S. funded facilities and infrastructure for
coalition forces in Iraq are of temporary construction, as directed by
CENTCOM policy. It is built to a ``good enough'' standard which I have
consistently instructed all OIF commands and construction agents to
implement. The plus up of forces may require the construction of
additional facilities. If necessary, these will be temporary in nature
and built to the same ``good enough'' standard.

JOINTNESS OF ARMY-MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS

Question. For the past several years, the Army and Marine Corps
have had separate areas of responsibility in Iraq, with Marine forces
assigned to the Anbar province.
Do you believe the Army and Marine Corps forces operating in Iraq
have an appropriate degree of jointness?
Answer. Unequivocally yes, U.S. and coalition forces are planning
and conducting joint operations everyday spanning from the platoon to
MNF-I level throughout Iraq. Fundamental to all military operations is
a clear delineation of three dimensional boundaries. While the land
boundaries of MND-W may appear to specify a Marine only operation, I
assure you they operate jointly incorporating multiple USA BCTs, USAF
CAS and multiple Service and Interagency Special Operations Forces and
Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets.

END STRENGTH INCREASES

Question. The President recently announced the administration's
intent to increase the Army's end strength by 65,000 soldiers. First,
the administration intends to make permanent the 30,000 temporary
increase in end strength now in effect. Second, the administration
intends to add 35,000 new soldiers over the next 5 years, including an
additional 6,000 new soldiers in 2007; 7,000 additional new soldiers
per year through 2011; and 1,000 additional new soldiers in 2012.
What is your understanding of why the Department is now proposing a
permanent increase in end strength that it has resisted in the recent
past?
Answer. General Schoomaker asked for permission to grow by 30,000
and Congress supported it. The Army has taken advantage of that
temporary authority given in National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
for Fiscal Year 2005 to grow its Active Force by 30,000--we are
currently at 505.4k and are now on a ramp toward 518,000 by the end of
fiscal year 2007. The Army has received considerable support to execute
current operations, to reset our forces, to rebalance our components,
and to build a modular Army. However, the demand has exceeded both the
``supply'' posited in the strategy, and the resources provided. We will
need continued support to close the gap between requirements and
resources, particularly as we maintain an extraordinarily high
operational pace while growing the Army. The decision by the President
and the Secretary of Defense to grow the ground forces will build the
strategic depth and capacity necessary to meet the global demands of
the long war.
Question. In your view, are the administration's proposed end
strength increases achievable in the timeframe stated?
Answer. Yes. The Army will get to 518,000 in the Active component
by the end of fiscal year 2007. I understand that the Army will be able
to meet a recruiting goal of 80,000, and the additional Military
Occupation Skill goal of over 3,000. The Army will grow by at least
7,000 each year over the next 5 years on a ramp to achieve an end
strength of 547,400 by fiscal year 2012.
Question. Is it your understanding that these increases are
consistent with the Army's requests?
Answer. Yes, this end strength increase is consistent with the
Army's request, particularly with respect to growth in its operating
force.
Question. To what extent do you believe the Army will have to rely
on stop loss to achieve the increases in end strength?
Answer. The Army does not rely on stop loss to achieve the strength
increase. We use targeted stop loss to ensure unit cohesiveness in
combat zones. Approximately 1 percent of the total force is affected by
stop loss and only for a finite time period. It is my judgment that
we'll need to rely on targeted stop loss at least in the near-term. I
understand the Army is currently reviewing its use of stop loss at the
request of Secretary Gates. The Department's initial assessment is that
accessions of 1,500 per year will be needed if targeted stop loss is
terminated.
Question. Has the Army conducted a comprehensive and forward-
looking assessment of its end strength requirements? If so, please
describe the assessment, its assumptions, and its conclusions.
Answer. I am confident that the Army has been and will continue to
be forward looking in determining its force structure. We have a mature
analytical process that's based on strategic direction from the
National Military Strategy, from OSD, and the Joint Staff. It builds
toward future requirements at the end of the program and beyond. The
process is adaptive, however, to rebalance capabilities to meet
operational demands. The underlying assumption was the requirement to
fight two major combat operations, nearly simultaneously with one a
win--decisively; and the other a swiftly defeat the effort. During QDR
it was determined that a force designed to support 70 BCTs was
sufficient. This enabled the Army to provide 18-19 BCTs per rotation to
meet global demands.
The recent assessment by the Joint Staff that the Army's enduring
requirement to provide up to 23 BCTs to meet strategic, global demand
requires continued growth to 76 BCTs and the growth of requisite
combat, combat support, and combat service support units to provide
operational and strategic flexibility. This capacity is needed to
sustain the long war.
Question. What is your understanding of the estimated steady-state
annual costs of increasing the Army's end strength to 547,400 as
proposed by the administration?
Answer. My best estimate is $8.2 billion, which includes both the
increased cost to military pay and operations and maintenance.
Question. Historically, increasing operating and personnel costs
often crowd out spending for modernization programs.
If confirmed as Chief of Staff, would you be prepared to recommend
curtailing or cancelling modernization programs to pay for this
increase in end strength?
Answer. If I am confirmed, my role as Chief of Staff will be to
provide ready forces to combatant commanders. Those forces must be
ready today and in the future. My commitment is to apply my judgment to
maintain that balance and provide ready forces consistent with
resources provided.
Question. If not, where do you anticipate the additional resources
would come from?
Answer. If confirmed, my role as Chief of Staff is to provide ready
forces to combatant commanders. Those forces must be ready today and in
the future. My commitment is to apply my judgment to maintain that
balance and provide ready forces consistent with resources provided.
Question. Do you believe that this end strength increase would
continue to be needed even if our deployment of troops to Iraq ends or
is significantly reduced, or do you believe that this increase is
driven in significant measure by our troop requirements in Iraq?
Answer. I believe that the end strength increase must continue. The
future security environment is dangerous and uncertain and the Nation
must continue support to the long war; increase commitment to security
cooperation; increase deterrence in key areas of the world; reduce the
deployment stress on the force; and to fully prepare for future
challenges. Both the superior capabilities and the size of the force
combine to enable sustained global engagement, deterrence, and response
in order to fully protect national interests, prevent aggression, and
prevail when called upon. The Army Campaign plan to develop and field
capable units and systems is producing the optimum mix of land
capabilities for the joint force; it is both affordable and essential
for the Nation in order to win the war today and prepare for an
uncertain future. Joint ground forces are proving to be the primary
military instrument for creating favorable and enduring security
conditions in many crisis regions around the world. Presence, or BOG,
sends a message of commitment and intent to our potential adversaries.
Since 1989, the Army has supported 43 joint operations, many of which
require a continuous rotation of forces to support our allies and
attain the desired national strategic effects.
The Army is on a very much needed acceleration plan to grow six new
BCTs and enabling organizations in our Active component and other key
enabling organizations in our Army National Guard and Army Reserve.
This will expand our rotational pool to 76 BCTs and more than 200
enabling organizations in the operational force of the total Army. Our
goal is to provide a continuous supply of BCTs and key enabling
capabilities to meet approved global commitments. Today, the Nation has
over 258,000 American soldiers deployed in 89 countries engaged in
deterrence operations, theater security cooperation, and joint and
multi-national operations in support of national strategic objectives.
Joint ground forces bear the heaviest burden fighting simultaneous
campaigns, primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. Over 740,000 Active and
Reserve soldiers have served overseas in support of the Nation's war on
terrorism. Active component BCTs deploy to combat at a rate of 1 year
deployed for 1 year training at home station. This accelerated pace of
deployment is 1 full year faster than the Army's surge goal of 1 year
deployed for 2 years training at home station and 2 years faster than
our sustainable steady state rate. We must reduce this stress on the
force by building our strategic depth. The end strength increase,
coupled with assured Reserve component access is critical to achieve a
steady state that affords predictability and sustainable deployment
effort for our soldiers. Completion of the 76 BCT and 200 plus enabling
units will provide a sustainable supply of military capabilities that
meet the requirements of worldwide Joint Force Commanders now and in
the future.

RECRUITING

Question. The ability of the Army to recruit highly qualified young
men and women is influenced by many factors and is critical to the
success of the All-Volunteer Force.
What do you consider to be the most important elements of
successful recruiting for the Army?
Answer. The most important elements for recruiting success are the
support of the Nation's citizens and Congress in providing the soldiers
and resources required to maintain our ability to guard our freedom
against those who desire otherwise. Successful recruiting for the Army
requires us to recruit qualified men and women in the numbers required
to man our units.
Question. What are the Army's recruiting goals for fiscal years
2007 and 2008? Have these goals been adjusted in light of the increased
end strength?
Answer. The recruiting missions for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 will
remain 80,000. In fiscal year 2007, we have an additional requirement
to support the acceleration of two BCTs. We anticipate this MOS
precision requirement will result in a mission over-achievement of
3,000 to 4,000. Given the current planning assumptions and manpower
models, these recruiting goals support the increased end strength goal
for 2012.
Question. What is your assessment of the Army's ability to reach
its Active-Duty recruiting goal in fiscal years 2007 and 2008?
Answer. Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force will continue to be a
challenge due to high employment rates, the improving economy, the
decreasing qualified market, and the war. Given continued congressional
support and funding, however, the Army can achieve the mission.
Question. Is it your understanding that the Army will have to
change its enlistment standards to achieve these recruiting goals?
Answer. The ability to meet and maintain the DOD quality marks (90
percent HSDG/60 percent Mental Category I-IIIA/<4 percent Category IV)
in the current and future recruiting market will be the greater
challenge. The Army has and will continue to implement measures to
reduce this challenge through programs and policies that lower
attrition rates, increase the potential market, and utilize creative
incentives. However, the Army will only enlist soldiers who are
qualified and volunteer to serve this Nation.
Question. What is your view about the appropriate assignment and
overall numbers, if any, of ``Category IV'' recruits in the Army, i.e.,
those individuals who score below the 31st percentile on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test?
Answer. As with all recruits, the Army assigns ``Category IV''
recruits to military occupational specialties that they are qualified
to fill. The Category IV issue is a question of ``trainability''. The
Army has and will continue to implement measures to reduce this
challenge and prepare all soldiers for future combat and duty
requirements. These soldiers, when properly trained and led, are fully
capable of supporting and defending the Nation. I do not see the Army
exceeding the current DOD standard of 4 percent even though the
congressional limit is 20 percent.
Question. What is your understanding of trends in the Army with
respect to incidents of recruiter sexual misconduct with potential
recruits?
Answer. Any recruiter misconduct is unacceptable. Recruiters are
the first to contact this country's most sacred and precious resource--
the men and women who volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces of this
great country. Sexual misconduct, with or without consent, is not and
never has been acceptable. We will continue to take the appropriate
action against those few who believe that they can use their position
for personal gain. We have zero tolerance for this type of conduct. The
recruiting leadership reviews reports of recruiter conduct and
establishes polices to prevent this and other forms of misconduct
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to
prevent such incidents?
Answer. Sexual misconduct in the recruiting process or in the Army
is unacceptable--as it is in the rest of American society. For the
Army, the consequences can be far more damaging to unit effectiveness;
commanders at all levels through values based education and corrective
action to enforce the standards. If I am confirmed, I will act to
implement policies that decrease the possibilities of this type of
misconduct. I support the use of all processes, administrative and
judicial, against those who willing choose to commit these acts of
misconduct.

MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most
sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems have been
identified in the past in the planning and procedures for mobilization
and demobilization, including inadequate health screening and medical
readiness monitoring, antiquated pay systems, limited transitional
assistance programs upon demobilization, and medical holdovers.
What is your assessment of advances made in improving mobilization
and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems still
exist?
Answer. Mobilization processes are vastly improved since 2001. The
Army has automated its mobilization request process. These efforts are
responsible for alerts/notifications that are occurring 90-180 days in
advance of mobilization and ensure that individual orders are in the
hands of soldiers at least 45 days prior to their mobilization date.
The objective of the Army in ARFORGEN FOC is that units will be alerted
1 year in advance of possible mobilization. The recent change in
Reserve component mobilization policy will enable unit versus
individual mobilization and enhance cohesion. There are now significant
efforts that are underway to move a great deal of training from a post-
mobilization timeframe to the left of the mobilization date. This will
require additional training and resources to be made available to
Reserve component units in the year prior to a potential mobilization.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
changes to the organization and policies affecting the Reserve
components aimed at ensuring their readiness for future mobilization
requirements?
Answer. A key to success for ensuring our Reserve components are
ready for future mobilizations is to provide sufficient equipment and
resources, especially in the year prior to mobilization. With Congress'
continued assistance, the Army can provide Reserve component forces
that are in a higher state of readiness upon mobilization to execute
missions around the world.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE RECALL POLICY

Question. A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the Army revitalize its
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program by culling existing IRR
databases and ensuring that the Army has valid contact information on
IRR members who may be recalled to serve.
What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that
applies to both officer and enlisted members of the IRR?
Answer. The Army's concept plan for increased IRR readiness centers
on the IRR Transformation Plan which was approved for execution in
November 2005 by the Secretary of the Army. Programmed initiatives are:

Changing the culture of the IRR,
Managing individual expectations, and
Improving readiness reporting.

Additionally, the execution of a DOD IRR Decision Point Policy
mandates the removal, within 2 years, of IRR officers who have
fulfilled their Military Service Obligation (MSO) unless they
positively elect to remain in the IRR. To date approximately 4,000 or
more soldiers have been transferred to the inactive status list and
ultimately separated. Culling these programmed initiatives and aligning
the IRR with the Army Force Generation Model--Reset/Train; Ready;
Available, adds more predictability in mobilization rotations. These
model enforces positive contact, refresher training as individual
skills degrade, and ensures the deployable readiness of the IW.
Question. What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization
database?
Answer. The Army has two primary transformation initiatives which
are data reconciliation and establishing a control IRR population.
These initiatives address methods to reset the force by conducting a
systematic screening of all data records; determine disposition of
individuals; and process for final resolution those soldiers who no
longer have further potential for useful military service if mobilized
by a recommendation for separation. The Human Resources Command
processed over 17,000 existing bad addresses through a credit bureau
agency to provide last known addresses of soldiers. Additionally, the
Human Resources Command has identified non-mobilization assets that
includes soldiers passed over for promotion, with security violations,
physical disqualifications, documented hardship, and adverse
characterizations of service. Where appropriate, these soldiers are
being separated. Through these efforts the current IRR population of
82,000 has been reduced by 25 percent and could potentially be reduced
down to approximately 60,000 soldiers.

SUPPORT FOR SEVERELY WOUNDED SOLDIERS

Question. Improved body armor and combat casualty care have enabled
many thousands of soldiers to survive wounds received in OIF and OEF.
As a result far more soldiers survive with injuries which, in previous
conflicts, would have resulted in death.
What are your views on the Army's commitment and responsibility for
severely injured members and their families?
Answer. Our Army is committed to and accepts the responsibility for
our severely wounded warriors and their families. In April 2004, the
Army established the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) program. AW2's
guiding principle is part of our Army's Warrior Ethos, ``I Will Never
Leave a Fallen Comrade''.
Wounded warriors who are not part of the AW2 program have access to
robust resources and an array of support, from our hospitals, the Army
Career and Alumni Program, Army Emergency Relief, Veterans Affairs, and
a myriad of community support programs. These great American heroes
will also benefit from the recently opened Center for the Intrepid at
Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, TX.
Our Army is committed, and I am personally committed, to caring for
our severely wounded warriors and their families who have sacrificed
selflessly for our Army and our Nation.
Question. What suggestions do you have for improving the Army's
support for severely wounded soldiers?
Answer. The AW2 program has grown and will continue to expand as
needed to accommodate our wounded warriors, placing more soldier Family
Management Specialists in Military Medical Treatment Facilities and
Veterans Affairs Medical Centers as the need arises. I believe that the
Army must continue to make this a high priority and if I am confirmed,
I will work to ensure it is resourced appropriately.
The AW2 program began with 2 soldier family management specialists
and now currently has 43 on board. The AW2 program has a soldier family
management specialist at 16 Veterans Affairs Medical Centers and at 8
military medical treatment facilities. Two more soldiers family
management specialists are planned at other military medical treatment
facilities and five more are planned at additional Veterans Affairs
Medical Center.
Question. Section 588 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 contains a
provision intended to ensure that other than appropriate medical review
and physical disability evaluation, there should be no barrier in
policy or law to an opportunity for a highly motivated member to return
to Active-Duty following rehabilitation from injuries incurred in
military service.
How would you assess the Army's compliance with this provision to
date?
Answer. Our Army supports the provisions of NDAA 2005 regarding
allowing our highly motivated wounded warriors to return to serve on
Active-Duty.
We recognize the value of keeping the expertise and experience of
our severely wounded warriors in our Army. We have made business
process and regulatory changes to assist these highly motivated
warriors to stay in the fight. The first priority for our severely
wounded warriors and their families is their recovery and
rehabilitation. After treatment, our warriors are afforded the
opportunity to remain on Active-Duty, should they so desire.
The Army develops a 5-year plan that encompasses all aspects of the
severely wounded warrior's life and career such as: location of
assignment, professional schools, duties, and health care access for
their particular needs--focused on a professionally and personally
fulfilling career.
Question. If confirmed, would you continue to support the efforts
of members who wish to return to Active-Duty following recovery and
rehabilitation from injuries received in military service?
Answer. Support for our wounded warriors is and would remain a top
priority. We take care of our wounded heroes. The AW2 program's vision
is that our wounded warriors and their families become self sufficient,
contributing members of our communities; living and espousing the
Warrior Ethos, knowing our Army and Nation remembers.

MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS IN IRAQ

Question. The Army's mental health assessment teams have completed
three comprehensive assessments of the immediate effects of combat on
mental health conditions of U.S. soldiers in the Iraq theater. The most
recent study, MHAT III, found that overall levels of combat stressors
are increasing. In sum, increasing numbers of troops are returning with
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and other mental
health issues. According to the Army's MHAT III report, the Armed
Forces Medical Examiner also reported 22 suicides by Army soldiers in
Iraq in calendar year 2005--a rate nearly twice that reported for the
previous year.
What do you see as the greatest challenges being faced by the Army
in terms of identifying and meeting mental health needs of soldiers and
their families?
Answer. I understand that the Army has implemented most of the
recommendations of the MHAT reports, including the further
redistribution of mental health staff to provide uniform coverage and
the further development of suicide prevention efforts in theater.
However several challenges remain. We need to ensure access to care,
and reduce stigma associated with behavioral health treatment.
Availability of mental health professionals remains a national problem
and this shortage effects the Army's ability to recruit and retain
these professionals and it effects TRICARE's ability to expand networks
of civilian mental health providers. Training our soldiers, leaders,
and families on the long-term signs of stress-related behavioral
disorders is the best way to combat stigma and ensure that soldiers who
need help seek help. If confirmed, I would fully support the
development of innovative training programs for soldiers, families, and
leaders that address this important issue.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
ensure the adequacy of mental health resources both in the theater and
in CONUS for U.S. soldiers and their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support the existing
programs developed by the Army and DOD. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel (DCSPER) and The Army Surgeon General (TSG) share
responsibility for the prevention and screening for PTSD for both
Active component and Reserve component soldiers. The DCSPER manages the
Deployment Cycle Support Program aimed at soldiers and family members
and TSG has policy oversight of the Combat and Operational Stress
Control program aimed at soldiers serving in the global war on terror.
TSG also has command responsibility for behavioral health services at
Army medical treatment facilities around the world providing treatment
for all Army beneficiaries. I also will continue to support the
continued development and expansion of new programs such as Battlemind
training and the Respect.MIL program. Battlemind provides scenario-
based training for soldiers and families in all phases of the
deployment cycle. Respect.MIL trains primary care providers to diagnose
PTSD and other combat stress problems and manage treatment of those
disorders in the primary care clinic, improving access and further
reducing the stigma associated with seeking behavioral health care.
Question. According to the MHAT III study, fewer soldiers report
that they received sufficient training to identify other soldiers at
risk for suicide.
If confirmed, what actions will you take to reassess the adequacy
of suicide prevention programs within the Army?
Answer. An updated suicide prevention program has already been
implemented, which has numerous initiatives. The DCSPER is revising
suicide prevention training and planning in direct response to this
MHAT finding. There will be specific education provided during initial
entry training and throughout the soldier's tenure in the Army. If
confirmed, I will continue to support these initiatives. One of the
major emphases of the revised training is the importance of taking care
of one's buddies. Small unit leaders must encourage help-seeking
behaviors, recognize warning signs of suicidal behavior, and refer for
care if needed. The most common motives for suicide in our soldiers are
difficulties in intimate relationships, and occupational/legal/
financial difficulties. Leaders must consider a referral to the
chaplains, combat stress control teams or other behavioral health
specialists anytime they see a soldier struggling with these problems.
Question. Based on your experience in theater, what additional
resources do you think are necessary to prevent suicides in the Army?
Answer. The Army's senior leaders are already behind the push to
decrease stigma and improve access to behavioral health care. However,
there is no simple solution to decreasing the suicide rate. Army's
behavioral health providers are very busy, but they rely on soldiers
seeking help or the soldier's buddies or chain of command recognizing
symptoms and intervening to get the soldier help. Our health care
providers are supplemented by chaplains, counselors, and TRICARE
network providers. The Army needs to keep doing everything possible to
recruit and retain military behavioral healthcare providers and seeking
additional authorities to enhance retention when necessary. If
confirmed, I would also encourage civilian providers to join the
TRICARE network to demonstrate their support for the sacrifices our
soldiers and families make on behalf of the Nation.

OFFICER SHORTAGES

Question. A report issued by the Congressional Research Service
(CRS) in July 2006 found that the Army projects an officer shortage of
nearly 3,000 in fiscal year 2007, with the most acute shortfalls in the
grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years of service. Unless
corrective action is taken, CRS found that shortages will persist
through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention improves.
What is your understanding of the reasons for the current
shortfall, and what steps is the Army taking to meet this mid-career
officer shortfall?
Answer. The current shortfall of officers is a result of the rapid
increase in force structure (modularity and end strength increases).
Since 2002, the Army has grown over 8,000 officer positions; roughly 88
percent of this growth is in the ranks of senior captain and major.
Since it takes 10 years to grow/develop a major, to grow the officer
force we need to retain more of our ``best and brightest'' officers and
increase our officer accessions.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure
adequate numbers of highly qualified captains and majors are serving on
Active-Duty over the next 10 years?
Answer. The Army is continuing to explore other options for
retaining more of our best officers. Some of these options include
offering captains who are completing their initial Active-Duty service
an officer critical skills retention bonus of $20,000 in exchange of 4-
years of Active-Duty service. The Army is also preparing policy to
implement provisions in existing law that will enable lieutenant
colonels and colonels to serve an additional 5-years past their
Mandatory Retirement Date (MRD) as long as they haven't reach age 62.
The Army expects this policy to be published within the next couple of
months and is confident that it will be able to meet future manning
needs.

MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The Army is facing significant shortages in critically
needed medical personnel in both Active components and Reserve
components. The committee is concerned that growing medical support
requirements, caused by the stand-up of BCTs, potential growth of the
Army, and surge requirements in theater, will compound the already
serious challenges faced in recruitment and retention of medical,
dental, nurse, and behavioral health personnel. Moreover, the committee
understands that the Army continues to direct conversion of military
medical billets to civilian or contractor billets.
Will you assure the committee that, if confirmed, you will
undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements
for the Army, incorporating all new requirements for 2008 and beyond?
Answer. I fully support a quality medical force that can meet the
Army's medical readiness requirements and can maintain our commitment
of quality health care for Army families and retirees. If confirmed, I
will support a comprehensive assessment of current Army manpower
strategies on medical military/civilian conversion to ensure these
plans remain relevant to bolstering Army operational readiness, and
further, are in sync with plans to grow Army end strength.
Question. What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think
are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill
medical support requirements as its mission and end-strength grow?
Answer. Critical to our success are adequate and appropriate
funding for necessary recruitment programs such as Active and Reserve
Health Professions Loan Repayment Program, Health Professions
Scholarship Program, Specialized Training Assistance Program, Medical
and Dental School Stipend Program, and the other Accession Bonus
programs all of which we have current legislative authority. As we
develop Army wide initiatives to retain our quality and battle hardened
soldiers, we must ensure that the Army Medical Department requirements
are met. Elimination or modification of the 8-year MSO, replaced with a
more flexible MSO scale, will assist us in the recruiting efforts of
qualified medical professionals. We need a comprehensive review of the
Medical Special Pays and should consider restructuring our current
system to include all health care providers. This will be fundamental
toward eliminating the shortages experienced in our Dental and Nurse
Corps. Legislative initiatives which provide greater flexibility to
transfer between Army components must be explored and enhanced. This is
especially true with regard to the currently required scrolling
process. The current process has created impediments to the rapid
accession of health care professionals into all components of our
force. Our civilian workforce has become increasingly important as the
medical force is reshaped. Adequate and appropriate funding is needed
to support the backfill of converted military billets.

NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM

Question. Congress enacted broad changes in the DOD civilian
personnel system in 2004 to provide the Department with more flexible
tools for the management of its civilian workforce in support of our
national security. Although the Department is presently enjoined from
implementation of a new labor-relations system, the Department is
planning to move ahead in the implementation of a new pay-for-
performance system for its non-union employees.
Based on your experience, what are the critical factors for
successful implementation of a total transformation of workforce
policies and rules, including performance-based pay?
Answer. Among the factors I consider critical are leadership
commitment and support and an educated and knowledgeable workforce. The
Army must focus on a pay for performance system that is consistent,
fair, equitable, and recognizes our top performers. The Army has
successfully completed the first performance management payout which
has demonstrated a clear linkage between employee performance and
organizational goals. The Army's approach includes an incremental
deployment schedule that allows supervisors and employees to be
adequately trained and the application of lessons learned from earlier
workforce conversions. If I am confirmed, I am committed to ensuring
that the Army workforce is trained and ready for this new system.
Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor the acceptance of the
National Security Personnel System (NSPS) and what role would you
expect to play in managing the NSPS implementation in the Army?
Answer. I strongly support the need for transformation in civilian
management--particularly pay for performance--and will set that tone
for the leadership in the Army as we implement NSPS. The Army has
established an NSPS Program Management Office that recommends Army NSPS
policy, provides guidance, monitors implementation, and will keep me
informed of progress and any issues that require my attention. In
addition to the inclusion of NSPS-specific questions in Army's annual
workforce survey, on-site evaluations to assess program effectiveness
are being performed which will provide additional implementation
feedback and lessons learned. Finally, Army is leading the way in the
monitoring of NSPS DOD-wide. Our Civilian Personnel Evaluation Agency
has been designated by DOD to evaluate the NSPS performance management
system for deployment to the entire Department.

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. On February 25, 2004, the Senate Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Personnel conducted a hearing on policies and programs
of the DOD for preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault
in the Armed Forces at which the Service Vice Chiefs endorsed a ``zero
tolerance'' standard. Subsequently, in response to congressional
direction, the Department developed a comprehensive set of policies and
procedures aimed at improving prevention of and response to incidents
of sexual assaults, including appropriate resources and care for
victims of sexual assault.
What is your understanding of the practices currently in use in the
Army to ensure awareness of and tracking of the disposition of reported
sexual assaults?
Answer. Since 2004, the Army has implemented a comprehensive Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Program. A key element of this program
is the awareness training developed and taught at every level of the
Army's institutional training--from initial entry to the Army War
College. Additionally, unit refresher training is an annual requirement
for all Army units. Also, as part of this program, the Army collects
and analyzes selected sexual assault incident data, which is provided
for quarterly and annual reports to DOD for consolidation into the
Secretary of Defense annual report to Congress.
Question. What progress has been made in ensuring that adequate
numbers of sexual assault victim advocates are available in Army units
worldwide?
Answer. The Army has taken significant steps to improve the
assistance to victims of all sexual assaults, with enhanced recognition
of the special circumstances that apply to deployments. A key element
of the Army's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program is the
victim advocacy component which is led by Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators (SARCs) at every Army installation. These SARCs are
supported by a cadre of full-time, professional Victim Advocates or
appointed Unit Victim Advocates (UVA) who interact directly with
victims of sexual assault.
Additionally, Deployable SARCs (DSARCs) and UVA provide advocacy
services in a deployed environment. DSARCs are soldiers trained and
responsible for coordinating the sexual assault prevention and response
program (as a collateral duty) in a specified area of a deployed
theater. Army policy requires one deployable SARC at each brigade level
unit and higher echelon. UVA are soldiers trained to provide victim
advocacy as a collateral duty while deployed. Army policy requires two
UVA for each battalion sized unit.
Question. If confirmed, what oversight role would you expect to
play?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure compliance with established
policies and procedures at all levels of command, including those in
the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves.

RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE ARMY

Question. What is your assessment of policies within the Army aimed
at ensuring religious tolerance and respect?
Answer. I believe that Army regulations provide commanders and
other leaders ample guidance regarding the free exercise of religion,
religious tolerance, and respect in the Army. AR 600-20, Army Command
policy; AR 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army; and
DOD directive 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the
Military Services, provide detailed guidance on the important
responsibilities of commanders and leaders in this regard. It is my
understanding that these policies are consistent with the Constitution
and I believe they foster religious tolerance and respect within our
Army.

WOMEN IN COMBAT

Question. Section 541 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 required the
Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on his review of the current
and future implementation of the policy regarding assignment of women
in combat. In conducting the review, the Secretary of Defense is
directed to closely examine Army unit modularization efforts and
associated personnel assignment policies to ensure their compliance
with the DOD policy on women in combat that has been in effect since
1994.
What is your view of the appropriate combat role for female
soldiers on the modern battlefield?
Answer. The study requested by Congress and underway within the DOD
will help the Department understand the implications for, and
feasibility of, current policies regarding women in combat,
particularly in view of the Army's transformation to a modular force
and the irregular, non-linear nature of battlefields associated with
today's conflicts.
It is my understanding that the Army's transformation to modular
units is expected to be based on the current policy concerning the
assignment of women. Women have and will continue to be an integral
part of our Army team, performing exceptionally well in all specialties
and positions open to them. Women make up about 14 percent of the
Active Army, 23 percent of the Army Reserve, and 13 percent of the Army
National Guard. Approximately 10 percent of the forces deployed in
support of the global war on terrorism are women soldiers. Today,
almost 13,000 women soldiers--10 percent of the force--are serving in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
These women, like their male counterparts and the Army's civilians,
are serving honorably, selflessly, and courageously. If confirmed, I
would ensure that the Army complies with laws and regulations in this
matter.
Question. In your opinion, is the current and planned future Army
personnel assignment policy for women consistent with the DOD ground
combat exclusion policy in effect since October 1994?
Answer. The Army completed a thorough review of our policy late in
2005. The Secretary of the Army determined that our policy is
consistent with that of DOD. I agree with the Secretary's assessment.
Question. How do you anticipate you will participate in the review
of the policy required by section 541?
Answer. The OSD has undertaken to complete the comprehensive review
requests by this committee and Congress. It is an important study of
complex issues critical to the Department. The Army will support the
OSD to complete this review. The Army, DOD, and Congress must work
closely together on this issue. If confirmed, I will endeavor to
provide the Secretary with cogent advice regarding implementation of
this policy. If in the future the Army determines that there is a need
to seek a change to the policy, I will, if confirmed, comply fully with
all notification requirements in title 10, U.S.C.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. In May 2004 the Department published its first
Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which articulated a compact with
military families on key quality of life factors, such as family
support, child care, education, health care, and morale, welfare, and
recreation services.
How do you perceive the relationship between quality of life and
your own top priorities for recruitment, retention, and readiness of
Army personnel?
Answer. Strengthening the mental, physical, spiritual, and material
condition of our soldiers, civilians, and their families enables them
to achieve their individual goals while balancing the demanding
institutional needs of today's expeditionary Army. The well-being of
our people and their quality of life are my top priorities.
Army Well-Being and Quality of Life programs are extensive. They
range from pay and compensation, medical, and morale, welfare, and
recreation (MWR) to housing and family readiness programs. Our
recruiting efforts must be competitive with private industry. Our
ability to reach out and gain access to our young men and women is
critical. The retention of each soldier is directly related to the
value of their achievements and maintaining the vital support of their
families. As we bring our soldiers and their units to their peak
readiness, we must enable the readiness of our Army families.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to assess the
adequacy of family support programs for both the Active components and
Reserve components?
Answer. The adequacy of family support programs is assessed
annually by Installation Status Report Services rating. In addition,
the Active component accreditation program ensures that Active
component centers worldwide maintain the level of quality performance
specified in the MWR program standards set by the MWR Board of
Directors. The family support programs are also assessed using customer
feedback at the installation level and through the MWR Needs and
Leisure Survey.
The Multi-Component Family Support Network, a seamless array of
family support services accessed by the soldier and family--Active,
Guard, and Reserve, regardless of their geographical location, will
also be significant means of collecting customer feedback and improving
support programs.
In addition, each year, the Active Army, Army National Guard, and
Army Reserve will assess requirements for global war on terror funding
and request the additional funds as necessary.
Question. What actions do you think are necessary in order to
support best practices for support of family members of deployed
forces, and would you attempt to replicate such practices throughout
the Army?
Answer. There are many programs and support systems that I
categorize as best practices. Deployment Cycle Support (DCS) is a
comprehensive process that ensures soldiers, DA civilians, and their
families are better prepared and sustained through the deployment
cycle. It provides a means to identify soldiers, DA civilians, and
families who may need assistance with the challenges inherent with
extended deployments. The goal of the DCS process is to facilitate
soldier, DA civilian, and family well-being throughout the deployment
cycle. Services for DA civilians and families are integrated in every
stage of the process, and they are highly encouraged to take advantage
of resources provided.
The Army Information Line is an integrated system consisting of a
toll-free phone service, a dynamic Web presence, and on-line
publications. This system provides accurate information, useful
resources, and problem resolution tailored for Army soldiers and their
families to include the extended families of our soldiers. This service
includes a Web presence (Our Survivors) uniquely configured to support
the survivors of our fallen soldiers. An experienced staff answers the
Army information line and provides responses to inquiries received
through the Army Families Online Web site (www.armyfamiliesonline.org).
A great example is the Strong Bonds Program administered by our
chaplains. The Chaplain Corps gives our soldiers and families the
skills needed to thrive in Army life by conducting a series of marriage
strengthening retreats and training events. Recognizing that even our
single soldiers are in or are beginning relationships, in fiscal year
2005 this program was expanded to provide training to single soldiers
in how to build life-long relationships. In fiscal year 2006 the
chaplains led over 600 of these events attended by nearly 25,000
soldiers and family members in all Army components. This and other
family support programs represent a solid network that allows our
soldiers to build great lives and effectively serve their country
through full careers.
Question. In your view, what progress has been made, and what
actions need to be taken in the Army to provide increased employment
opportunities for military spouses?
Answer. The Army continues to work with the Nation's business
community to support spouse employment opportunities. Since 2003, the
Army has signed statements of support with 18 Fortune 500 companies.
These firms pledged their best efforts to increase employment
opportunities for our spouses by connecting them to new and existing
jobs, portable jobs, and other methods of pursuing lifetime career
goals. During the past 2 years, these companies have employed over
11,000 Army spouses.

RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND ACQUISITION PROCESSES

Question. Are you familiar with the Army's resource allocation and
acquisition processes?
Answer. Yes, I have familiarity with and played a role in the PPBE
process during my tenure as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving
those processes?
Answer. QDR 06 continued us on the path of linking resources to
joint capabilities. The Army provides a variety of capabilities to
joint forces, and I look forward to working with OSD and the Joint
Staff to continue improvement of management by capability portfolio as
noted in the QDR 2006 report.
Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role played by
the Army Chief of Staff in the resource allocation and acquisition
processes?
Answer. If I am confirmed, my role as CSA is to recommend balanced
allocation of resources to provide ready forces today and for future
challenges. While specific processes within OSD continue to evolve, my
role in focusing on readiness of forces remains constant.

ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. The Army invests in science and technology (S&T) programs
to develop advanced capabilities to support current operations and
future Army systems. The Army's budget request has included a declining
level of investment in S&T programs over each of the last 4 fiscal
years.
What do you see as the role that Army S&T programs will play in
continuing to develop capabilities for current and future Army systems?
Answer. The Army's S&T program is the investment that the Army
makes in our future soldiers. This program must be adaptable and
responsive to our soldiers in the field. The Army's S&T strategy should
be to pursue technologies that will enable the future force while
simultaneously seizing opportunities to enhance the current force.
Question. Do you believe that the Army should increase its level of
investment in S&T programs?
Answer. The Army's planned S&T investments will mature and
demonstrate the key technologies needed to give our soldiers the best
possible equipment now and in the future. Given the current environment
and priorities, I believe our level of investment is appropriate.
Question. What metrics will you use to judge the value of Army S&T
programs?
Answer. The real value of S&T programs is measured in the increased
capability of the force achieved when new technologies are inserted
into systems and equipment. While programs are still in S&T, we use the
standard Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) to determine when
technologies are mature enough to transition.
Question. What role should Army laboratories play in supporting
current operations and in developing new capabilities to support Army
missions?
Answer. From my vantage point, I believe that the S&T community can
support current operations in three ways. First, soldiers are
benefiting today from technologies that emerged from past investments.
Second, the Army should exploit transition opportunities by
accelerating mature technologies from ongoing S&T efforts. Third, we
should also seek to leverage the expertise of our scientists and
engineers to develop solutions to unforeseen problems encountered
during current operations. To enhance the current force, Army S&T
should provide limited quantities of advanced technology prototypes to
our soldiers deployed to the current fight.
Question. How will you ensure that weapon systems and other
technologies that are fielded by the Army are adequately operationally
tested?
Answer. The Army should not field systems that are not safety-
certified nor rigorously tested in an operational environment. Current
systems undergo an operational evaluation conducted by an independent
organization that reports to the Army Chief of Staff. These evaluations
ensure first that every system fielded to our soldiers is safe to use,
and then provide an assessment of system effectiveness, suitability,
and survivability. If I am confirmed, I would work with the Army
testing community to ensure vigorous compliance with applicable testing
standards, including those set forth in Army Regulation, AR 70-1, Army
Acquisition Policy, and DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition
System. I would also work closely with the Army acquisition workforce,
to ensure weapons systems are tested and determined to be suitable,
feasible, safe, and validated to meet the current threat.
Question. Are you satisfied with the acquisition community's
ability to address the operational needs of deployed forces?
Answer. Yes, from my experience it takes more than the acquisition
community to quickly respond to our soldiers' needs in a wartime
environment. The Army is addressing those needs through a process of
requirements validation, funding allocation, and acquisition
activities. The Army has streamlined the acquisition process by
reducing the time required to validate requirements, approve funds, and
develop solutions to meet those requirements. This change in culture
has required all facets of the acquisition process--requirements,
resources, development, test, production, and fieldings--to reduce the
time necessary to complete their tasks. For example, the Army has
addressed our soldiers' need for better Individual Body Armor
capability. It was quickly validated as a requirement and prioritized
for funding to ensure successful systems development and procurement.
To date, the Army has fielded seven versions of the Individual Body
Armor Suite, each better than the last.
Question. What recommendations would you have to speed the ability
for the Army to provide operational forces with the specific systems
and other capabilities that they request?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will continuously monitor the process
from requirements generation, funding, and through the acquisition
process, to provide the soldiers what they need as quickly as we can in
a safe, feasible, suitable, manner within acceptable risk tolerance.
The Army needs to closely examine the emerging threats and operational
requirements of soldiers in theater. I would continue the Army's
commitment to providing our troops the best equipment possible and work
with industry partners to pursue research development and procurement
of the most advanced capabilities available. Finally, I would ensure
that the Army does not purchase or field any system that is not proven,
tested, and validated as operationally ready and safe.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

CONTRACT SECURITY FORCES

1. Senator Akaka. General Casey, if confirmed as the Army Chief of
Staff, one of your responsibilities will be to provide independent
military advice to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and
Congress. As such, I am interested in your views regarding reliance on
contractor security forces in Baghdad. When General Petraeus testified
before this committee last week, he indicated that he thought the surge
troop levels would be sufficient even though they are significantly
less than the levels recommended by the Army's counterinsurgency
doctrine. General Petraeus reasoned that because there are tens of
thousands of civilian contract security forces protecting key sites in
Baghdad, the Multi-National Force-Iraq and the Iraqi government would
not have to detail resources to protect these sites. Thus, the addition
of all five U.S. brigades under orders to reinforce Baghdad and the
Iraqi Security Forces either in Baghdad or headed to the city should
provide sufficient military forces to achieve our objective of securing
Baghdad. Since you are the General who is probably most familiar with
the current situation in Baghdad, can you tell us your assessment of
how much we can rely on contract security forces to support our new
mission of making Baghdad more secure? In your answer, please address
the level of operational and tactical control we have on these
contractors, as well as how well-equipped and well-trained they are.
General Casey. We rely on coalition forces and Iraqi security
forces to make Baghdad more secure. They are the ones patrolling the
neighborhoods, interacting with the population, manning the
checkpoints, and responding to crises. Contract security personnel
support this effort by protecting certain fixed sites and key
personnel. Their service is important in the overall effort. They are
trained and equipped by the respective contractor firms. Control is
exercised by their supervisory structure which is guided by the tenets
of the agreed upon contract. My impression has been that they are
prepared for their tasks and that they perform well.

2. Senator Akaka. General Casey, what are the rules of engagement
for the contract security forces relative to insurgents?
General Casey. [Deleted.]

3. Senator Akaka. General Casey, how likely are these contract
security forces to become primary targets for the insurgency as we
implement the President's strategy?
General Casey. I do not believe it is likely that, as we implement
the President's strategy, contract security forces will become primary
targets for the insurgency. Ongoing counterinsurgency operations in
Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq are designed to reduce levels of
violence. Over time, I would anticipate that we will see gradually
improving conditions with reductions in sectarian violence and attacks
on coalition forces. Contract security personnel accept certain risks
inherent in their responsibilities but they are no greater than those
run by members of the coalition forces or the Iraqi security forces.
They are trained and equipped for their missions where they apply risk
mitigation based on their experience and their understanding of the
complex environment. I believe they will continue to face dangerous
situations and periodic attacks, but I do not see them becoming the
primary target of the insurgents.
______

[The nomination reference of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 16, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of Staff,
United States Army, and appointment to the grade indicated while
assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
U.S.C., sections 3033 and 601:

To be General

George W. Casey, Jr., 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Resume of Service Career of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA
Source of commissioned service: ROTC.

Military schools attended:
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Course
Armed Forces Staff College
Senior Service College Fellowship--The Atlantic Council

Educational degrees:
Georgetown University--BS--International Relations
University of Denver--MA--International Relations

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates of
Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT................................................. 21 Oct. 70
1LT................................................. 21 Oct. 71
CPT................................................. 21 Oct. 74
MAJ................................................. 6 Sep. 80
LTC................................................. 1 Aug. 85
COL................................................. 1 May 91
BG.................................................. 1 Jul. 96
MG.................................................. 1 Sep. 99
LTG................................................. 31 Oct. 01
GEN................................................. 1 Dec. 03
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Apr. 71......................... Sep. 72........... Mortar Platoon
Leader, later
Liaison Officer,
Headquarters and
Headquarters
Company, 2d
Battalion, 509th
Infantry
(Airborne), 8th
Infantry
Division, United
States Army
Europe, Germany.
Sep. 72......................... Jun. 73........... Platoon Leader, A
Company, 2d
Battalion 509th
Infantry
(Airborne), 8th
Infantry
Division, United
States Army
Europe, Germany.
Jun. 73......................... Oct. 74........... Mortar Platoon
Leader, later
Executive
Officer, A
Company, 1st
Battalion, 509th
Infantry
(Airborne),
United States
Army Southern
European Task
Force, Italy.
Oct. 74......................... Dec. 75........... Student, Ranger
School and
Infantry Officer
Advanced Course,
United States
Army Infantry
School, Fort
Benning, GA.
Dec. 75......................... Apr. 77........... Assistant S-4
(Logistics),
later S-4, 1st
Battalion, 11th
Infantry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO.
Apr. 77......................... Apr. 78........... Commander, C
Company, 1st
Battalion, 11th
Infantry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO.
Apr. 78......................... Dec. 78........... Commander, Combat
Support Company,
1st Battalion,
11th Infantry
Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO.
Dec. 78......................... May 80............ Student,
International
Studies,
University of
Denver, Denver,
CO.
Jun. 80......................... Jan. 81........... Student, Armed
Forces Staff
College, Norfolk,
VA.
Feb. 81......................... Feb. 82........... Department of
Defense Military
Observer, United
States Military
Observer Group,
United Nations
Truce Supervision
Organization,
Jerusalem.
Feb. 82......................... Feb. 84........... S-3 (Operations),
later Executive
Officer, 1st
Battalion, 10th
Infantry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO.
Feb. 84......................... May 85............ Secretary of the
General Staff,
4th Infantry
Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO.
Jul. 85......................... Jul. 87........... Commander, 1st
Battalion, 10th
Infantry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO.
Aug. 87......................... Jul. 88........... Student, United
States Army
Senior Service
College
Fellowship, The
Atlantic Council,
Washington, DC.
Jul. 88......................... Dec. 89........... Congressional
Program
Coordinator,
Office of the
Chief of
Legislative
Liaison,
Washington, DC.
Dec. 89......................... Jun. 91........... Special Assistant
to the Chief of
Staff, Army,
Washington, DC.
Aug. 91......................... May 93............ Chief of Staff,
1st Cavalry
Division, Fort
Hood, TX.
May 93.......................... Mar. 95........... Commander, 3d
Brigade, 1st
Cavalry Division,
Fort Hood, TX.
Mar. 95......................... Jul. 96........... Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-3
(Operations),
later Chief of
Staff, V Corps,
United States
Army, Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany and
Operation Joint
Endeavor,
Hungary.
Jul. 96......................... Aug. 97........... Assistant Division
Commander
(Maneuver), later
Assistant
Division
Commander
(Support), 1st
Armored Division,
United States
Army, Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany and Task
Force Eagle,
Operation Joint
Endeavor Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Aug. 97......................... Jun. 99........... Deputy Director
for Politico-
Military Affairs,
J-5, The Joint
Staff,
Washington, DC.
Jul. 99......................... Jul. 01........... Commanding
General, 1st
Armored Division,
United States
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany.
Jul. 01......................... Oct. 01........... Commander, Joint
Warfighting
Center/Director,
Joint Training, J-
7, United States
Joint Forces
Command, Suffolk,
VA.
Oct. 01......................... Oct. 03........... Director,
Strategic Plans
and Policy, J-5,
later Director,
The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Oct. 03......................... Jun. 04........... Vice Chief of
Staff, United
States Army,
Washington, DC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Defense Military Feb. 81-Feb. 82... Major
Observer, United States
Military Observer Group, United
Nations Truce Supervision
Organization, Jerusalem (no
joint credit)
Deputy Director for Politico- Aug. 97-Jun. 99... Brigadier General
Military Affairs J-5, The Joint
Staff, Washington, DC
Commander, Joint Warfighting Jul. 01-Oct. 01... Major General
Center/Director Joint Training,
J-7, United States Joint Forces
Command, Suffolk, VA (no joint
credit)
Director, Strategic Plans and Oct. 01-Jan. 03... Lieutenant General
Policy, J-5, The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
Director, The Joint Staff, Jan. 03-Oct. 03... Lieutenant General
Washington, DC
Commander, Multi-National Force- Jul. 04-Present... General
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN George W.
Casey, Jr., USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
George W. Casey, Jr.

2. Position to which nominated:
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

3. Date of nomination:
January 16, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
22/07/48, Sendai, Japan.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Sheila Lynch Casey.

7. Names and ages of children:
Sean Patrick Casey, 35; Ryan Michael Casey, 34.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
There are no positions other than those listed in the service
record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Association of the United States Army.

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
There are no honors or awards other than those listed on the
service record extract provided to the committee by the executive
branch.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
I do.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
I do.
______

[The nomination of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on February 6, 2007,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on February 8, 2007.]

TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATIONS OF ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN, FOR
REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND; GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE
OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY; AND TO VOTE ON PENDING
MILITARY NOMINATIONS

----------

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m. in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Byrd,
Reed, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, McCain, Warner,
Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Chambliss, Dole, Thune, and
Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearing clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, minority
counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn
N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
Derek J. Maurer, professional staff member; David M. Morriss,
minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff
member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F.
Rusten, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley,
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Fletcher L.
Cork, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce
and Benjamin Rinaker, assistants to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd
Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant
to Senator Clinton; Lauren Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Nichole M.
Distefano, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Warner; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins;
D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Clyde A. Taylor
IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to
Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole;
Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; and Stuart
C. Mallory and Bob Taylor, assistants to Senator Thune.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. We have a quorum, and I ask the committee
now--and we've all been notified--to consider the nominations
of 2 general officer nominations and a list of 37 pending
military nominations.
First, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of
Admiral William Fallon for reappointment to the grade of
admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Central Command. Admiral
Fallon testified before the committee on his nomination last
Tuesday.
Is there a motion to favorably report Admiral Fallon's
nomination?
Senator Kennedy. So move.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator McCain. Second.
Chairman Levin. The Clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Kennedy?
Senator Kennedy. Aye.
The Clerk Mr. Byrd?
Senator Byrd. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Lieberman? [No response.]
Mr. Reed?
Senator Reed. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Akaka? [No response.]
Mr. Nelson of Florida? [No response.]
Mr. Nelson of Nebraska?
Senator Ben Nelson. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Bayh? [No response.]
Mrs. Clinton? [No response.]
Mr. Pryor? [No response.]
Mr. Webb?
Senator Webb. Aye.
The Clerk. Mrs. McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. McCain?
Senator McCain. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Warner?
Senator Warner. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Inhofe? [No response.]
Mr. Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Collins?
Senator Collins. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Ensign?
Senator Ensign. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chambliss?
Senator Chambliss. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Graham? [No response.]
Mrs. Dole?
Senator Dole. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Cornyn? [No response.]
Mr. Thune?
Senator Thune. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Martinez?
Senator Martinez. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Aye.
The Clerk. Sixteen ayes, no nays.
Chairman Levin. The motion carries, 16 to 0, and the record
will be kept open for the others. The motion carries.
Next, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of
General George Casey for reappointment to the grade of general
and to be Chief of Staff of the Army.
Is there a motion to favorably report General Casey's
nomination to the Senate?
Senator Kennedy. So move.
Chairman Levin. Second?
Senator Collins. Second.
Chairman Levin. Clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Kennedy?
Senator Kennedy. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Byrd?
Senator Byrd. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Lieberman? [No response.]
Mr. Reed?
Senator Reed. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Akaka? [No response.]
Mr. Nelson of Florida? [No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Nelson of Nebraska?
Senator Ben Nelson. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Bayh? [No response.]
Mrs. Clinton? [No response.]
Mr. Pryor? [No response.]
Mr. Webb?
Senator Webb. Aye.
The Clerk. Mrs. McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. McCain?
Senator McCain. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Warner?
Senator Warner. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Inhofe? [No response.]
Mr. Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Collins?
Senator Collins. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Ensign?
Senator Ensign. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chambliss?
Senator Chambliss. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Graham? [No response.]
Mrs. Dole?
Senator Dole. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Cornyn? [No response.]
Mr. Thune?
Senator Thune. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Martinez?
Senator Martinez. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Lieberman?
Senator Lieberman. Aye.
The Clerk. Fourteen ayes, three nays.
Chairman Levin. Fourteen ayes, three nays, the motion
carries. The record will be kept open for those who are
missing. The motion will be favorably reported.
Finally, I ask the committee to consider a list of 37
pending military nominations.
Is there a motion to favorably report those 37 nominations?
Senator Kennedy. So move.
Chairman Levin. Second?
Senator Warner. Second.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Warner. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, no. [No response.]
The ayes have it, the motion carries.
Thank you all.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on February 6,
2007.
1. GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, to be general and Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army (Reference No. 177).
2. ADM William J. Fallon, USN, to be admiral and Commander, U.S.
Central Command (Reference No. 181).
3. LTG James M. Dubik, USA, to be lieutenant general and Commander,
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq and Commander, NATO
Training Mission-Iraq, U.S. Central Command (Reference No. 179).
4. BG Thomas W. Travis, USAF, to be major general (Reference No
195).
5. Col. David H. Cyr, USAF, to be brigadier general (Reference No.
196).
6. Col. Douglas J. Robb, USAF, to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 197).
7. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 16 appointments to the grade
of major general and below (list begins with Frank J. Casserino)
(Reference No. 198).
8. In the Air Force, there are six appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Michael D. Jacobson)
(Reference No. 200).
9. In the Air Force, there are 11 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Stuart C. Calle)
(Reference No. 201).

Total: 39.

[Whereupon, at 10:15 a.m., the executive session
adjourned.]

TO CONSIDER CERTAIN PENDING MILITARY NOMINATIONS

----------

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:54 a.m. in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, Bayh, Pryor, Webb, Warner, Inhofe,
Sessions, Collins, Graham, Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell,
professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and
Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M.
Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Micah H.
Harris, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Joseph Axelrad and
Sharon L. Waxman, assistants to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Richard Kessler and Darcie Tokioka, assistants to Senator
Akaka; Sherry Davich and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator
Bill Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew
Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Lauren Henry, assistant
to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator
Webb; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Arch
Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter,
assistant to Senator Collins; Adam G. Brake, assistant to
Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Stuart
C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh,
assistant to Senator Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. We now have a quorum, so I would ask my
colleagues to consider a list of 1,281 pending military
nominations. They have all been before the committee the
required length of time. We know of no objection to any of
them. Is there a motion to favorably report these 1,281
military nominations to the Senate?
Senator Thune. So moved.
Chairman Levin. A second?
Senator Inhofe. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, no? [No response.]
The ayes have it. The motion carries.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on February 27,
2007.
1. In the Marine Corps there are 11 appointments to be brigadier
general (list begins with David H. Berger) (Reference No. 189).
2. In the Air Force Reserve there are 30 appointments to the grade
of major general and below (list begins with Shelby G. Bryant)
(Reference No. 210).
3. Col. Tracy L. Garrett, USMCR to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 214).
4. In the Air Force there are 14 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Gino L. Auteri) (Reference No. 216).
5. In the Air Force there are 15 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Brian E. Bergeron) (Reference No. 217).
6. In the Air Force there are 35 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Brian D. Affleck) (Reference No. 218).
7. In the Air Force there are 24 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with William R. Baez) (Reference No.
219).
8. In the Air Force there are 151 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Kent D. Abbott) (Reference No.
220).
9. In the Air Force there are four appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Anthony J. Pacenta)
(Reference No. 221).
10. In the Air Force there are 51 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Tansel Acar) (Reference No. 222).
11. In the Air Force there are 287 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Brian G. Accola) (Reference No. 223).
12. In the Army Reserve there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Todd A. Plimpton) (Reference No. 224).
13. In the Army Reserve there are two appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Perry L. Hagaman) (Reference No. 225).
14. In the Army there are 84 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with David W. Admire) (Reference No. 226).
15. In the Army there are 129 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with James A. Adamec) (Reference No. 227).
16. In the Army there are 26 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Dennis R. Bell) (Reference No. 228).
17. In the Army there are 157 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Ronald J. Aquino) (Reference No. 229).
18. MG Benjamin C. Freakley, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, U.S. Army Accessions Command/Deputy Commanding
General for Initial Military Training, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (Reference No. 254).
19. In the Air Force there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Jeffrey M. Klosky)
(Reference No. 256).
20. In the Army Reserve there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Miyako N. Schanley) (Reference No. 257).
21. In the Army there are 72 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Anthony C. Adolph) (Reference No. 258).
22. In the Army Reserve there are 26 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Andrew W. Aquino) (Reference No. 259).
23. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Donald E. Evans, Jr.) (Reference
No. 261).
24. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Jorge L. Medina) (Reference No. 262).
25. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Douglas M. Finn) (Reference No.
263).
26. In the Marine Corps there are three appointments to the grade
of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Charles E. Brown) (Reference
No. 264).
27. In the Marine Corps there are four appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Steven P. Couture) (Reference No.
265).
28. In the Marine Corps there are 94 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Jonathan G. Allen) (Reference No. 266).
29. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of commander
(Mark A. Gladue) (Reference No. 268).
30. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of captain
(Terry L. Rucker) (Reference No. 270).
31. In the Army there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Susan M. Osovitzoien) (Reference No. 273).
32. In the Army there is one appointment to the grade of major (Tom
K. Stanton) (Reference No. 274).
33. In the Army there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Evan F. Tillman) (Reference No. 275).
34. In the Army there are three appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Michael A. Clark) (Reference No. 276).
35. In the Army there are seven appointments to the grade of
colonel and below (list begins with Edward W. Trudo) (Reference No.
277).
36. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Charles E. Daniels) (Reference No. 278).
37. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Brian T. Thompson) (Reference No. 279).
38. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Michael R. Cirillo) (Reference No. 280).
39. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Vernon L. Dariso) (Reference No. 281).
40. In the Marine Corps there are four appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Leonard R. Domitrovits) (Reference No. 282).
41. In the Marine Corps there are nine appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Samson P. Avenetti) (Reference No. 283).
42. In the Marine Corps there are seven appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Jason B. Davis) (Reference No. 284).
43. In the Marine Corps there are six appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Darren L. Ducoing) (Reference No. 285).
44. In the Marine Corps there are four appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Robert T. Charlton) (Reference No. 286).

Total: 1,281

[Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the business meeting adjourned
and the committee proceeded to other business.]

NOMINATIONS OF ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND;
LT. GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, FOR APPOINTMENT TO BE GENERAL
AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH
AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND; AND LTG ROBERT L. VAN ANTWERP, USA,
FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF
ENGINEERS/COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Bill Nelson,
Pryor, Webb, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, and Thune.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan,
professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Peter
K. Levine, general counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul,
professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Sean G.
Stackley, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler,
professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork and Kevin A.
Cronin.
Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Christopher Caple, Sherry
Davich, and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson;
Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Jennifer Park,
Gordon I. Peterson, and Michael Sozan, assistants to Senator
Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Jeremy Shull,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Mark J. Winter, assistant to
Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; and Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today, the
committee considers the nominations of three distinguished
senior military officers: Admiral Timothy Keating, the nominee
for Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM); General Victor
Renuart, the nominee for Commander, U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD); and General Robert Van Antwerp, the nominee
for Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers. We welcome each of you, congratulate you,
and we also welcome your families, who we will ask you--those
of you who have family members with you--to introduce them
later on because we know that the long hours and the hard work
that is put in by our senior military officials requires
commitment and sacrifice not only from those officials and from
our nominees, but also from their family members, and we
greatly appreciate their willingness to bear and share your
burden and responsibility.
Each of our nominees has served his country in the military
for more than 30 years. Admiral Keating has served as Commander
of the Fifth Fleet, Director of the Joint Staff, and Commander
of U.S. NORTHCOM. General Renuart has flown more than 60 combat
missions, has served as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy
on the Joint Staff, and Senior Military Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense. General Van Antwerp has served as
Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army for Installation
Management and Commandant of the U.S. Army Engineers School at
Fort Leonard Wood. He has an even higher qualification,
however. He is a native Michigander who grew up in Benton
Harbor and St. Joseph and received his master's degree in
engineering from the University of Michigan.
If confirmed, each of our nominees will be responsible for
helping the Department of Defense (DOD) face critical
challenges. Admiral Keating, if confirmed, will take command of
U.S. PACOM, the command which encompasses nearly 60 percent of
the world's population and over half of the Earth's surface and
includes six of the largest military forces, several of the
biggest economies, and the two largest Muslim and democratic
countries. This assignment comes at a time when we face complex
challenges from China and North Korea as well as the continuing
threat of terrorism in Indonesia, the Philippines, and
elsewhere in the region.
General Renuart, if confirmed, will take over U.S.
NORTHCOM, the command which was established after September 11,
2001, to provide for the defense of the United States and, when
directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, for
providing military support to civil authorities. The mission of
this command includes responding to natural disasters like
Hurricane Katrina and manmade disasters such as incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction here at home.
Finally, General Van Antwerp will assume command of the
Army Corps of Engineers. This command is responsible for both
military works, including contracting for Iraq reconstruction,
and civil works, such as repairing levees that have been
damaged, destroyed, or unacceptably maintained in New Orleans
and elsewhere.
I know that our nominees are up to these challenges. They
look forward to assuming these challenges and we look forward
to having them answer some of our questions and then hopefully
a prompt confirmation by the United States Senate.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I agree that
these are men of extraordinary ability. It is impressive,
frankly, to see the educational level and the talent level we
have throughout our military. I do not think it has ever been
higher, but particularly in our general officers. They have had
extraordinary experiences and education.
So I welcome you here. I'm glad to see my former chairman,
Senator Warner. I would be pleased to defer to him, but look
forward to a few questions, Mr. Chairman. I think all of us are
impressed with these nominees and we appreciate your leadership
for America.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, would you like to add
anything?
Senator Warner. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know all
these gentlemen quite well and we are fortunate as a Nation to
have them and their families make this continued contribution
to public service.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Before I call on you for any opening
statement that you each might have and to introduce your
families, let me ask you the standard questions which we ask of
all nominees.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes.
General Van Antwerp. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Admiral Keating. No, sir.
General Renuart. No, sir.
General Van Antwerp. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views
when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views
differ from the administration in power?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now, Admiral Keating, let me call on you for an opening
statement and introductions.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, could I ask that a statement
by the distinguished ranking member, Senator McCain, be placed
in the record following yours?
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain

Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in welcoming Admiral Keating,
Lieutenant General Renuart, and Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, and
their family members, and congratulating them on their nominations.
Admiral Keating, you have had a distinguished career as a naval
aviator, on the Joint Staff, and culminating in your assignment as
Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Your nomination to be
Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) comes at a time of great
challenge and opportunity in the Pacific area of responsibility. North
Korea's nuclear and missile programs continue to pose a threat to its
neighbors and to America's interests in East Asia.
Last week's agreement might be a first step on the path to a
denuclearized Korean peninsula, but that is far from certain. It is
unclear whether North Korea is now truly committed to real
verification, a full accounting of all nuclear materials and
facilities, both plutonium- and uranium-based, and the full
denuclearization that must be the essence of any lasting agreement. As
we observe in the weeks ahead whether Pyongyang is taking initial steps
toward disarmament and sealing its Yongbyon reactor, let us proceed
cautiously. In the meantime, PACOM plays a vital role in providing
stability and deterrence in support of this diplomatic effort.
It also plays a critical role in sustaining and expanding the U.S.-
Japan strategic alliance, the cornerstone of our security umbrella in
northeast Asia. PACOM and the Commander of U.S. Forces Japan must keep
up the robust level of dialogue and ensure elements of our
relationship, such as the Defense Policy Reform Initiative, are on
track. There are a number of ideas circulating about the ways in which
we can strengthen our already robust bilateral ties with Japan, and I'd
note that the ``Armitage II'' report, which was recently released,
addresses this in some detail.
With respect to China, if confirmed, you will have the important
task of taking the measure of a rapidly modernizing military. Cross-
strait relations are relatively calm at the moment, but history
suggests that this delicate relationship, which remains at the core of
U.S. interests in the region requires our close attention. Beijing's
regional and global aspirations are growing, and properly managing this
relationship is vital.
Fortunately, the United States does not face these challenges
alone. One of the vital responsibilities of the PACOM Commander is to
work closely with our key allies in the region--Japan, South Korea,
Australia, to name a few--to strengthen bilateral relations and to
develop multilateral approaches and responses to the challenges and
opportunities that we face in the U.S. PACOM.
General Renuart, you have had an impressive career in the Air Force
and in joint assignments, and I congratulate you on your nomination.
U.S. NORTHCOM is now looked to as the military command that will defend
against another attack on United States soil. If confirmed as Commander
of U.S. NORTHCOM, you will be responsible for defending the Nation
against attacks by hostile forces and for providing critical support to
civil authorities in responding to domestic emergencies, terrorist
attacks, and for designated law enforcement activities.
As our Armed Forces contend with a rigorous tempo of operations
abroad, the Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM must ensure that the command has
the capability to perform its important homeland defense and civil
support missions.
General Van Antwerp, the Corps of Engineers is faced with an
unprecedented level of interest and pressure from Congress and all
Americans in the range of activities this Nation will ask you to carry
out over the next 5 years.
In reviewing your answers to this committee in preparation for this
hearing, I am struck by the magnitude of your mission--providing
emergency repairs to our national levee and dam systems which have
suffered from years of neglect; responding to the engineering needs of
our military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan; and providing the
facilities and infrastructure required for the United States Army to
transform and grow its forces. I trust you will be a Chief of Engineers
who will be able to accomplish all this while ensuring a transparent,
competitive contracting environment provides our taxpayers with the
best value in construction and services.
I thank each of our nominees for their service and look forward to
their testimony today.

Chairman Levin. Admiral Keating.

STATEMENT OF ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES PACIFIC
COMMAND

Admiral Keating. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
committee: It is a great honor to be nominated by the President
to command the United States Pacific Command and I am grateful
for his confidence and I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you this morning.
With me this morning is a woman who brings so much joy to
all of our lives, my wife Wanda Lee Keating. Who cannot be with
us this morning, our son Daniel, who is an F-18 pilot,
lieutenant commander in the Navy down at Virginia Beach, VA.
With us, our daughter Julie and her husband, Commander Paul
Camardella, he too is an F-18 pilot in Virginia Beach, and
their daughter, our granddaughter, Lauren Joy Camardella. My
brother Danby Keating is also with us.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask our senior enlisted
adviser, Sergeant Major Scott Frye, United States Marine Corps,
to stand if I could Mr. Chairman, if it pleases you, I would
like to recognize Sergeant Major Frye, who will retire at the
end of this month, with 32 years of service to his Corps, our
command, and our country.
Thank you, Sergeant Major Frye.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Sergeant Major.
Admiral Keating. In my current role, Mr. Chairman, as
Commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM, I would also like to express
my appreciation to your committee for your abiding support of
our men and women in uniform. During my career I have enjoyed
many deployments on our aircraft carriers to the western
Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Wanda Lee and I lived in Hawaii
during an earlier assignment at PACOM headquarters, and we
lived in Japan for over 2 years while I had the privilege of
commanding our forward deployed carrier battle group.
During those years I have developed a keen appreciation for
the vibrancy and complexity of this vast region. Today the
healthy alliances, positive economic trends, and potential for
U.S.-led regional cooperation make it clear to all of us that
opportunity is abundant in the Pacific.
Japan is a good example of a key United States alliance
that benefits our Nation and the region. The U.S.-Japan
relationship continues to mature and agreements such as the
Defense Policy Review Initiative illustrate the progress we are
making.
PACOM's emphasis on the war on terror, on security
cooperation with allies and partners, on the readiness and
posture of our forward deployed forces, and on our operational
plans seems appropriate to me. If confirmed, I intend to use
these principles as the foundation during my tenure. I am
committed to ensuring the men and women of the command are
ready and are resourced to sustain peace and stability in the
region and to contribute appropriately to U.S. global
commitments.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, if confirmed as Commander of U.S.
Pacific Command, I will seek the counsel and insights of our
allies, partners, and Members of Congress. I will collaborate
with our ambassadors in the region to execute and advance
United States policy goals throughout the Asia Pacific theater.
Mr. Chairman, thank you and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you. I know how much of her
middle name your granddaughter brings to the family. Lauren
Joy's middle name I am sure is very appropriate and we are
delighted to have your granddaughter and her mother and her
grandmother, as well as her grandfather--I never want to leave
out grandfathers--here with us this morning.
Admiral Keating. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. General Renuart.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, FOR
APPOINTMENT TO BE GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
COMMAND

General Renuart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of
the committee. I too am honored to be here today as the
President's nominee to become Commander, NORAD, and Commander,
U.S. NORTHCOM. If confirmed, I look forward to serving in these
key critical roles.
I appear before you knowing that the missions of both of
these commands are demanding and that challenges are great.
Having the homeland as the mission of NORTHCOM and NORAD is
truly a sacred honor and it dictates adherence to the highest
standards of vigilance, service, and integrity, and it is
expected to be such by all of our citizens all of the time.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to recognize the superb
leadership of my good friend, Admiral Tim Keating, NORTHCOM's
current commander. He has forged a really great team and leaves
a legacy as he completes his tour and, I might add, big shoes
to fill.
But I look forward, if confirmed by the committee, to this
challenge. My service on the Joint Staff and in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense has reinforced the value of close
working relationships among the combatant commands, the
military Services, defense agencies, the interagency community,
this committee, and Members of Congress, and, importantly in
this job, the Governors and Adjutants General of the States
across our country.
If confirmed, I will join the men and women of NORAD and
NORTHCOM in dedicating ourselves to the defense of the
homeland. We will continue to work collaboratively with the
other combatant commands. We will work closely with our Federal
and State partners, our interagency partners, the National
Guard, and the countries of Canada and Mexico, with whom we
maintain a close relationship. We will continue to train hard
to execute our mission and we will work hard to ensure that we
never let the country down.
Given the guidance of the President and the Secretary of
Defense, it is a very challenging road ahead, but I look
forward to the opportunity to travel that road.
Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not publicly
recognize my wife, Jill, present here today, for her nearly 36
years of service to our Nation as a military spouse. We are the
proud parents of two sons. Our oldest is a three-tour combat
veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq, a combat rescue helicopter
crew member; and our younger son has served the Nation for 27
months in the Peace Corps and is currently a medical student at
the University of Pennsylvania.
Our military families bear a heavy burden during these
difficult times and it is important always that we honor that
commitment at every opportunity we have.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
opportunity to appear here today and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
General Van Antwerp.

STATEMENT OF LTG ROBERT L. VAN ANTWERP, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF
ENGINEERS/COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS

General Van Antwerp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee. I, too, am honored to appear before you today as
the President's nominee for the Chief of Engineers and the
Commanding General of the Corps of Engineers.
This summer, I will have served 35 years as a soldier and
as an engineer, 34 of those have been with my wife, Paula. She
is not here today because she is with my granddaughter down in
Florida. We have five children: two beautiful daughters, Julia
and Catherine, and three sons. My oldest son, Jeff, is a major
in the Army at West Point. He is an infantry guy. My next son
is Luke and he is a Special Forces captain. Both of them just
came out of Iraq recently for combat tours. My youngest son,
Rob, is a Purple Heart recipient for what he sustained in
combat in Iraq. He is doing well and he is settling near the
Fort Campbell area.
I am a registered professional engineer. I commanded an
engineer battalion in combat, commanded the Los Angeles
District during the Northridge earthquakes and the floods in
Arizona, and commanded the South Atlantic Division of the Corps
of Engineers. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, I was the
installation manager for the Army and then I went and commanded
one of those installations, so I got to grade my own paper.
Finally, right now I am the Commanding General of Accessions
Command, so I am responsible for recruiting and initial
military training for the Army.
The Nation looks to the Corps to meet the engineering needs
of today and have the capability to meet those needs tomorrow.
The Corps is deeply engaged, as you are all aware, now
rebuilding the vital infrastructure in Iraq and Afghanistan and
also in the reconstruction and renovation of the Gulf Coast.
The integrity and professionalism of the Corps is essential
to the confidence of the American people. If I am confirmed as
Chief of Engineers, I will work closely with the
administration, stakeholders, and Congress as I discharge my
leadership responsibilities. I look forward to working closely
with this committee and with other committees that have
oversight in addressing the missions and challenges ahead. If
confirmed, I pledge to provide strong and decisive leadership
for the Corps in its important civil works and military
missions.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement.
Chairman Levin. I thank each of you and again your
families, particularly those in your family who carry on the
military service that you have so nobly and professionally
followed in your own lives.
Admiral Keating, let me begin with you. The Quadrennial
Defense Review identifies China as a likely competitor. Is it a
foregone conclusion that China and the United States would be
at odds over security in the Pacific?
Admiral Keating. I do not think it is a foregone
conclusion, Senator.
Chairman Levin. How do you believe we could minimize that
possible outcome that nobody would like to see?
Admiral Keating. If confirmed, I would intend to pursue a
series of robust engagements with principally the People's
Liberation Army of China, not just in terms of frequency but in
terms of complexity. We would engage in exercises of some
sophistication and frequency and we would pay close attention
to the development of their weapons systems and their
capabilities, with a weather eye on whether they intend to use
those against Taiwan.
Chairman Levin. Given the possibility of political or
military miscalculation between China and Taiwan, what role do
you think the United States military can play in trying to
reduce cross-strait tensions?
Admiral Keating. It goes to the heart of transparency, Mr.
Chairman. I would say that if we deal with some frequency at
several levels with the Chinese, if we exercise with them, all
Services, if we ensure they are aware of our capabilities and
our intent, I think we will go a long way to defusing potential
strife across the Straits of Taiwan.
Chairman Levin. Relative to the Philippines, Admiral, our
military mission in the southern Philippines since 2001 has
been aimed at helping the Philippine military to defeat the Abu
Sayyaf group and to deal with other terrorist groups. Your
predecessors have assured this committee that, ``U.S.
participants will not engage in combat,'' in the Philippines,
without prejudice, of course, to their right of self-defense.
Are you committed to continuing that policy?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I have one other question on that relative
to the Philippines. During hearings before this committee,
General Myers, Admiral Fargo, and Admiral Fallon stated that
U.S. troops would conduct training at the battalion level and
assured us that if there were a decision for U.S. teams to work
at the company level that this committee would be notified, and
they have kept their word. Is that your intent as well?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Relative to Korea, Admiral, give us your assessment, if you
can, from your perspective of the agreement that we apparently
reached with North Korea last month?
Admiral Keating. From what I know, Mr. Chairman, it is
positive and beneficial. We need to have the access to verify
North Korea is upholding their side of the agreement, if you
will. But it appears to be a positive step toward
denuclearization of the peninsula, and that would lead to
stability and peace on the peninsula and that is a worthwhile
goal.
Chairman Levin. General Renuart, NORTHCOM has operational
responsibility for the ballistic missile defense of the United
States. One of the concerns that we have is that deployed
ground-based midcourse defense systems show that they are
operationally effective and reliable. Do you agree, first of
all, that it is essential that any ground-based system be
operationally effective and reliable?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, yes, sir, I do.
Chairman Levin. If you are confirmed and you learn or
believe that this system is not operationally effective and
reliable, will you take prompt steps to inform the committee?
General Renuart. Yes, sir, I will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that it is important that we
use operationally realistic flight tests to demonstrate the
operational capability of the ground-based system?
General Renuart. Yes, sir, I do.
Chairman Levin. If confirmed, will you work with the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to understand his
view of the operational capability and any limitations on the
ground-based midcourse system?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, I will do that.
Chairman Levin. One of the problems, General Renuart, that
we had before the September 11 terrorist attacks was a lack of
information-sharing among relevant Government agencies.
Congress addressed this problem in our intelligence reform
legislation in 2004 and we want to ensure that information is
being shared as needed to protect our Nation against
terrorists.
Now, I understand that NORTHCOM withdrew its representative
to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) last year
because NORTHCOM and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
found that it was just too hard to get information and
cooperation from the NCTC. It sounds like an unacceptable
situation and it is a problem that would need to be fixed.
If confirmed, how do you plan to address this problem and
to ensure that there is good information-sharing and
cooperation between NORTHCOM and the NCTC?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question
because it is critically important that we have the right
amount and level of intelligence sharing among all the relevant
agencies. I am aware of the move a few months ago to withdraw a
portion of the intelligence elements that were assigned from
NORTHCOM and the DIA. I am aware also that General Maples, the
Director of the DIA, has undertaken now a process to put that
back in place, and if confirmed, I will continue to press hard
for that because I believe that is critically important. The
NCTC really is one of those opportunities we have for
transparency among the Intelligence Community.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
My time has expired.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Keating, thank you for your
service. You were NORTHCOM Commander, which General Renuart
will soon be taking over. In that capacity, you had the
responsibility to manage and launch, if need be, our ground-
based missile defense system; is that correct?
Admiral Keating. That is correct, sir.
Senator Sessions. On July 4, the North Koreans announced or
we identified their launch and saw their launches occur, which
ended up not to threaten the United States. In your opinion,
were we capable of executing a launch of our missile defense
system that, had they had a missile that could have reached the
United States, we could have knocked that down?
Admiral Keating. We were capable. We had exercised and we
were ready that day, Senator.
Senator Sessions. So you were actually prepared to launch,
if need be, and had confidence that, even though we were early
in the process, had a missile threatened the United States, it
could have been knocked down?
Admiral Keating. It is a small point, Senator. The short
answer is yes, sir. I would not have been the authorizing
official that day. The Secretary of Defense was on the line
with us, so I am confident it would have been his decision. But
we were prepared to launch if he had given us the direction.
Senator Sessions. Do you think that experience will be
valuable to you as you, in the Pacific, deal with the theater
missile defense systems that we have on so many of our ships
and other areas?
Admiral Keating. Most assuredly, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. General Renuart, you made a comment about
our testing of last year, September I believe, the last major
test that we had. It was a successful operational test. How
would you evaluate the complexity of that test and its validity
as to establishing that we have a system that will actually
work?
General Renuart. Senator, I am far from an expert on the
technical aspects, but I was able to observe from my position
within the Joint Staff. It is my view that the capabilities of
the system evident in that test would allow us, as Admiral
Keating mentioned, to be effective against a North Korean type
threat.
I think it is important to ensure that if we are going to
fully field the system that we ensure that it has the
capability to be effective against some variety of threats.
Clearly it is not an umbrella and I, if confirmed, will
continue to work for an active operational test process as we
continue to field the system.
Senator Sessions. I agree. I think for a lot of people,
they may not have realized just how much good work has been
done for quite a number of years that would bring us to the
point of being able to knock down an incoming missile. It is
hard for most of us to believe that is possible, but once again
you say it is. We have seen the tests that have been
successful. This last test was a very realistic, whole entire
system test. I think that is important.
General Renuart, as NORTHCOM Commander, you explained to me
as we chatted about your belief that you need to relate
effectively with the National Guard. Would you explain your
mission with regard to homeland security and how you envision
your relationship with the Guard and Reserve?
General Renuart. Thank you, Senator. I think it is
important to understand that in NORTHCOM--its mission
principally is to provide support initially to State and
Federal agencies as they respond to disasters that might occur
throughout the country. But when directed by the President or
the Secretary, we could assume a more active role. So it is
important to ensure that on a day-to-day basis NORTHCOM has
good visibility as the principal combatant command on the
readiness of potential forces that could come to it from both
the Active and the Reserve component, the command must also
understand carefully how the individual States view their
capabilities to respond to a disaster or an emergency; and
given that information, then maintain a close relationship with
the States, the Guard, and the Active component to ensure that
we do have the tools to connect, communicate, and be effective.
Senator Sessions. Thank you and I look forward to your
service and working with you in that regard.
General Van Antwerp, the Corps is an important part of our
Nation's defense and really civil strength. You have a
tremendous background and I know you are going to be successful
in that office. I appreciate the opportunity to chat with you
recently. I am glad to know that you do not feel you have a
legal mandate to write any new manual at this point and that
you understand the sensitivity of the water situation between
the three States in the southeast. Our Governors are working
hard to get an agreement that would be wonderful, and I believe
they can do that and I think it is important that the Corps of
Engineers be a neutral but supportive agency in that process.
Would you agree with that?
General Van Antwerp. I agree, Senator.
Senator Sessions. General Van Antwerp, tell me about,
briefly if you would, how much the Corps has contributed to
Iraq and Afghanistan? I have a very positive impression of
their effectiveness. I believe they responded, maybe because of
their military association and background, in great ways in
those countries, and wonder if there is a possibility in the
years to come that we might expand the Corps in a way that
could help us in these kind of rebuilding efforts, these
nation-building efforts or stability operations that might
occur around the world.
Have you had any thoughts about that?
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir, I do agree. I think the
Corps has contributed greatly. We have the Gulf Region Division
with four different elements of it. We have the northern,
central, and southern divisions, and there is an Afghani
district. They have done wonderful things. What I know is, of
the 4,500 projects in Iraq totaling about $8 billion, that the
Corps has executed 3,400 of those already. Another 900 are in
construction and 200 are in planning and design, so moving well
on their way to completing those. So the Corps has contributed
very much.
To your second part----
Senator Sessions. How much of that do you utilize Iraqi or
Afghani contractors or workers that you supervise, rather than
just do the work yourselves?
General Van Antwerp. That is an excellent question. Today
about 75 percent of the contracts I am told are with Iraqi
contractors and their employees. So the supervision over it is
by the Corps of Engineers, but many of the contractors, the
majority, are Iraqi contractors today.
Senator Sessions. I interrupted you, I think.
General Van Antwerp. Senator, I was just going to address
the second issue of how do we prepare for this for the future,
how do you make sure there are enough emergency management
people and people that could respond quickly. I think it means
you have to keep the expertise in the Corps to do that, and
then you have to have some ability to have people that are
tracking and watching that could deploy without degrading the
rest of your work that you are doing elsewhere.
I think it is something that we need to look at in the
future, for other contingencies how do we have that group of
young people that can get there quickly and get it moving on
the ground.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, we have always known that the military families
are the ones that provide so many of the young men and women
who continue to follow your careers in the military. But I
cannot recall, Mr. Chairman, when we have had three before us
with more outstanding contributions than each of you men in
that. So I again join the chairman and others in commending you
and your respective spouses for providing much-needed quality
talent for our Armed Forces.
Admiral, it is just a pleasure to see you advance to this
position. I think it is no secret for those of us who have had
associations with the United States Navy, it is a tossup
between every officer's desire to be in the position to which
you have been nominated by the President or Chief of Naval
Operations. I will not ask you which you prefer because you are
going to get this one. [Laughter.]
Admiral Keating. My wife has what is called the peanut
butter theory, Mr. Secretary. She says: Put peanut butter in
your mouth, put your tongue against the peanut butter, and do
not talk.
Senator Warner. That is correct. Good advice.
The chairman asked you some questions on North Korea. I
would like to follow up. Apparently the President of South
Korea most recently said that the two nations, if this current
detente with North Korea goes forward and we are able to
achieve the goals that the Six-Party Talks laid down, I mean
all the goals, would like to see the exploration of a peace
treaty to replace the armistice which has been in effect since
1953. It is hard to believe that for over a half century we
have not been able to forge a treaty to once and for all put to
rest that conflict.
Have you had an opportunity to explore that, and do you
have any initial thoughts on the advisability and how it would
impact on the need to continue certain security relationships
with South Korea even if a peace treaty were put in place?
Admiral Keating. Senator, I have not gone into that in any
detail with either Admiral Fallon, his staff, or General Bell
and his staff. If confirmed, that would be something we would
clearly devote considerable interest to if our State Department
were able to table the issue. I am hardly opposed to it, but,
as you say, we have been in an armistice situation for half a
century and it would take some very prudent discussions within
our Government and with our allies in South Korea to go forward
with such a consideration.
Senator Warner. I'm going to let Senator Inhofe go ahead of
me.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Warner, I appreciate it very much.
I just received a notice I have to go to another committee.
There are a couple of things real briefly if I could just
mention----
Senator Warner. Go ahead, take your time.
Senator Inhofe. First of all, General Renuart, Senator
Sessions was talking before we came in, so I do not know how
far you got into this. I have talked to you about this,
personally I think one of the greatest responsibilities you are
going to have is the ballistic missile defense. I just guess I
would ask you if you believe that we are adequately at a level
that is a comfort level for you in terms of threats from North
Korea, China, Russia, or wherever they might come from?
General Renuart. Senator, I would be careful to say at a
comfort level because I am still really just learning all of
the breadth of the capability. If confirmed, I would really
dive into that in much greater detail. But my initial
impression is that, and based on the capabilities that we saw
over the July 4 weekend when we had the intention to defend, I
think we have a very good capability for the threat we see
today, but I think that threat is growing and it is important
to continue the testing to ensure that the system when fielded
is capable of meeting all the goals.
Senator Inhofe. What I would like, and I know Senator
Sessions and maybe some other members of this committee, have
always been very interested in this. When you are entrenched,
when you get in there and have a chance for a total evaluation,
just come forth, be very honest with us as to what resources
you need, because I think that is one of the greatest threats
that we have out there.
By the way, Senator Warner and I were talking about all
three of you having kids in there and you, General Van Antwerp,
with three, and one was injured. We are just very proud of you.
To me, I look at the three of you and I think of that as being
kind of an American tradition that goes from generation to
generation. We are very proud.
With the 92,000 or so increases that are going to be coming
in the new combat units, you are going to have to have new
support. Are you satisfied with the resources and of being able
to accommodate that?
General Renuart. I am sorry, Senator? For me?
Senator Inhofe. No, I am talking about General Van Antwerp
right now.
General Van Antwerp. Accommodate?
Senator Inhofe. The new responsibilities that come with the
increased number of combat units that are going to come with
the 92,000 increase.
General Van Antwerp. Right. The Army's portion of that is
65,000, and part of that is in our restationing plan. Of course
you have to have the facilities and everything that goes with
this, and it is very much linked with base realignment and
closure as far as movement of people. But we do have a plan for
the stationing of all those units and the building of those
units through 2012.
Senator Inhofe. I want you to repeat the numbers that you
used in response to Senator Sessions' question. I was kind of
impressed with that when you talked about the number of
projects and the amount of money and where you are with that.
General Van Antwerp. This is in Iraq. The Corps was
assigned 4,500 projects for the tune of about $8 billion. Thus
far they have completed 3,400 of those projects. Then the rest
of them, there are 900 projects that are under construction and
another 200 projects that are in some stage of planning and
design.
Senator Inhofe. Using the Iraqis for a lot of this work?
General Van Antwerp. Right, for about three-quarters of it.
Senator Inhofe. The only other thing I wanted to--and I
told General Keating I would do this--we have been very active
in both the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program and the section 1206 and 1207 train and equip
programs. The IMET program at one time had the restriction on
it, which we have now lifted, because we were assuming that the
international officers were the ones who were benefiting from
such a program. It appears to me as I see people coming over
here in droves for training that is the best money that we can
spend, particularly in your new area of responsibility.
I would like to know your level of interest with the IMET
program and also the train and equip program, because that will
continue to be a discussion of this committee.
Admiral Keating. Senator, we are vitally interested in the
IMET program. Since our discussion, we went back and there are
over 20 heads of service or chiefs of defense who are in
position or who have recently retired in foreign militaries who
have attended just the National War College. That is a dramatic
dividend on a relatively small investment. The understanding of
tactics, techniques, and capabilities that is developed as
those officers attend our school is profound.
As far as train and equip, you have given PACOM the
authority, in collaboration with the State Department, to
expend money in a fairly short timeline to countries in the
particular area of maritime security, Malaysia and Sri Lanka.
The benefits of that investment can perhaps be measured by
Lloyd's of London reducing premiums for ships transitting the
Straits of Malacca from wartime premiums to something below
that. We think that is a direct reflection of the investment we
have made under section 1206.
Senator Inhofe. I can only say, and I say this also to my
friends on the committee, that if we do not really utilize the
advantages that come with an IMET program, China is doing it.
Admiral Keating. Right.
Senator Inhofe. They have an exhaustive program right now
that--I would just like to beat them to the punch.
Senator Warner, thank you for allowing me to infringe upon
your time.
Senator Warner. No, not at all. I am going to be here
throughout the hearing.
I want to associate myself with my distinguished
colleague's support for the IMET program. All of us who have
had many years on this committee--and the three here have been
here for a couple of decades--recognize as we travel and visit
other nations, which is our responsibility, particularly on the
Armed Services Committee, how proud some of these foreign
officers are to step up and say: I am a product of America's
IMET educational system. It is a sense of confidence that we
have in that officer and his ability to hopefully strengthen
the ties between his nation or her as the case may be, and the
United States.
Senator Inhofe. I would say particularly now also in
Africa, they are so proud to be a product. It is a great
program.
Senator Warner. Senator, there is no one here that has
logged more time traveling in those distressed areas of Africa
than you.
Mr. Chairman, I think I will pick up if I may. One of your
colleagues appeared, but then disappeared.
Chairman Levin. Please.
Senator Warner. Admiral Keating, your predecessor worked
very closely with the committee through the years and we
anticipate no less on your part. But one of the things that I
always admired was his initiatives to do the proactive approach
to advancing U.S.-Chinese military-to-military relations. This
is extremely important, particularly as China now is, in a very
strong and forceful way, increasing its military capabilities
and spreading its influence throughout the world.
I look back on the days when we were dealing in the Cold
War and we always had the feeling that the senior military and
the Soviet Union at that time were individuals that would
carefully think through all options for initiating certain
actions, most particularly anything related to the strategic
use of those assets. I just hope that you will carry on in that
context.
Do you feel there is an opportunity to pick up where he
left off and expand?
Admiral Keating. You bet, Senator. A huge potential here
and, if confirmed, we will do our best to capitalize on that
opportunity.
Senator Warner. In the most intense chapters of the Cold
War, there was always a sense of confidence in the quality, the
ability, and the judgment of the senior military. We simply, at
least from my perspective, I do not know that we have that
insight into China. There seems to me such a veil of secrecy
and withdrawal that it is going to take some forceful
initiatives on your part.
Which brings me to, when you and I visited most recently we
talked about the history of the Incidents at Sea, the agreement
that we have between, in this case, the Navy of the United
States and the navy of the former Soviet Union. Currently that
agreement is still in effect, because there was a tragic event
when we had the clash of the aircraft and that confrontation.
Had that framework been in place, I think we would have been
able to work our way through that situation more expeditiously,
and indeed we may well have prevented it, because that concept
of agreement is to recognize the potential and the requirement
of both militaries, to do surveillance, but do it in a way that
those assets, be they ships or aircraft, are not likely to have
actual contact and confrontation.
Will you continue to take a look at that?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. If confirmed, we will undertake
an aggressive, but measured and reasonable, approach as we can
to the senior military leadership, and not just the senior
military leaders, but at as many levels as we can with the
Chinese military, and it goes to IMET, so as to develop
relationships, an understanding, and a common bond and to
continue the exercises that PACOM has underway. They have done
two search and rescue exercises within the past couple years.
As you say, Senator, those would likely have led to a different
outcome of the EP-3 incident if it were to occur now, and it is
unlikely that it would occur.
Senator Warner. General Renuart, this committee had a great
deal to do with the establishment of the legislation which
created the 55 Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams
to ensure that each State and territory of the United States
has at least one team. Some of the larger States have more than
one. To date 47 of these teams have been certified by DOD as
mission capable. States will also depend on the National Guard,
the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear high yield
explosive (CBRNE) enhanced weapons response force package, and
the CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package teams available to
each in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) areas.
You are going to pick up from Admiral Keating and we are
fortunate today that he is present, because we know full well
of the achievements that he had. But I do hope that you
continue to provide strong support for these concepts.
For those following this hearing, all these acronyms are
confusing, but these are teams that can come in and work with
the local community with regard to the first response on an
incident which is hard to ascertain exactly how it imperils the
local citizens and the first responders, particularly chemical,
biological incidents. It is just not possible for each of the
States to have all the complex equipment that can go in, and
can go in on the spot and make the necessary analysis.
So I do hope that is one of your high priorities as you
proceed.
General Renuart. Yes, Senator, it will be, and if
confirmed, we will continue to pursue the funding and the
training and equipping of all of those units.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I will return in a second
round.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
By the way, Admiral Keating, I think you are probably aware
of this fact, that Senator Warner is an expert on literally
negotiating agreements and treaties on incidents at sea or
otherwise to deconflict or avoid conflict with countries with
whom we are truly adversaries. He personally negotiated the
Incidents at Sea Treaty with the Soviet Union. I believe he was
Secretary of the Navy at that time. It is one of the many proud
moments in his career. But if you want some advice as to the
wisdom and the methods of such discussions, you are looking at
an expert right here.
Admiral Keating. We are aware, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Warner. I thank the chair. Days long past.
Admiral Keating. The agreement is still in place.
Chairman Levin. It was a great moment, and I have been in
his office and there is, as I remember, a picture or a plaque
on the wall about that event.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Generals and Admiral, I enjoyed my visit privately with
each one of you and would only reemphasize here in open session
some of the things that I had discussed with you when we
visited earlier. General Renuart, you know the concerns that we
have with regard to the National Guard when there is a major
natural disaster such as a hurricane. I can tell you that our
Florida Guard is experienced and they know what to do, and
NORTHCOM should not be coming in there and telling them what to
do, which is part of the problem that we got into over in
Louisiana with Hurricane Katrina.
You were very receptive to those ideas about letting the
experts make decisions instead of somebody coming in and
telling the experts how they should do it and then getting all
balled up.
Admiral Keating, you clearly have quite a challenge in your
area of responsibility with North Korea, and hopefully the
first little step of progress that we have seen is going to
bear more fruit. If China will concentrate more, instead of
putting a bunch of space debris through their anti-satellites,
threatening everybody's satellites, everybody's in the world,
and instead concentrate more on using their friendly persuasion
with North Korea to at the end of the day do what China wants,
which it does not want a nuclearized Korean peninsula, then
that is all to the good for the entire world. That is in your
bailiwick.
General Van Antwerp, congratulations on your success in
recruiting. I hope under these difficult circumstances it is
going to continue. Now, of course, you and I visited about the
Everglades restoration, which is so critical, not only to
Florida but to the delicate environmental balance throughout
the world.
I would just point out one other thing that I did not get
to point out in our personal conversation. It is particularly
acute in Florida, where in the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, they have a permitting process. It is
almost exactly a mirror image of the same permitting process of
the Army Corps of Engineers. As a result, what you get is a
great deal of frustration by someone seeking a permit, that
they go through all of this and then they go and do the very
same thing with you, and where the two of you administratively
can combine the efforts, since at the end of the day what we
are trying to do is protect the environment, but make that
administrative process an easier one, not a more relaxed one,
just a more administratively smooth one.
It is going to take somebody like you making sure that the
folks down the line are doing it. Now, your new colonel down
there in Florida, Colonel Grosskrueger, is sensitive to this
and if you would give some signals from up high on Mount
Olympus I think that would be very much appreciated.
The other problem that we have in a growth State like
Florida--and by the way, all my colleagues just could not
believe it when I told them. I said, ``do you know what the
number of new registered voters between the two presidential
elections are in Florida, between 2000 and 2007?'' My
colleagues in the Senate could not believe me when I told them
it was 3.9 million new registered voters within a 4-year
period.
That is the kind of growth that we have going on, and that
is just reflective in registered voters. We are getting a net
growth of close to 400,000 per year. In 2012, Florida will
overtake New York and become the third largest State.
General, you do not have enough people in the Jacksonville
District to handle this growth, and as a result there are
delays and frustrations. Your people are working just as hard
as they can work. They are great public servants. They just
need some more in a growth State that is highly environmentally
sensitive like Florida.
Mr. Chairman, I had a wonderful visit with all three of
them and that would be my additional exclamation point. Thank
you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
General Van Antwerp. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
distinguished panel for your service to our country and for
your continued service and I look forward very much to getting
you into these new posts and positions and to the good work
that you will do there. Let me just add a couple questions.
Admiral Keating, I would like to follow up on--and this
line of questioning maybe has already been pursued this
morning, but with regard to China. China is investing a vast
amount of resources into its naval capabilities and I am
interested in knowing, if confirmed as PACOM commander, what
steps you will take to ensure that U.S. forces in the Pacific
region can meet these threats, particularly the threat from
China's growing submarine fleet.
Admiral Keating. Sir, if confirmed, we will continue
PACOM's current policy of paying very close attention to
China's development. In gross numbers it is impressive; in
percentage of their budget, if reports are fairly accurate.
They are well behind us technologically. We enjoy significant
advantages across the spectrum of defensive and offensive
systems.
In particular, undersea warfare is an area of concern. We
will pay close attention to it, if confirmed. I have had the
pleasure of cruising throughout those waters on considerable
regularity in my earlier career, Senator, and I can assure you
that we are not unfamiliar with the challenges and we have
significant advantages now and we are not going to yield those
advantages.
Senator Thune. A question for General Van Antwerp and this
has to do with, there are two divisions dedicated to the war
effort. One is the Gulf Region Division, which is focused on
rebuilding operations in Iraq, and that was activated in
January 2004; and the other is the Afghanistan Engineer
District, which was activated in March 2004. One of the many
projects the Corps is involved in is the award of several
contracts for repair of Iraq's oil infrastructure.
How has that contract that was awarded in 2004 improved the
production of oil in Iraq?
General Van Antwerp. Senator, I am going to have to study
that. That is a great question. I am familiar with the
contracts in that, but as far as the improvement that they have
made, I will have to take that and get back to you. But I
certainly would study that and, if confirmed, that would be a
priority, to get into those contracts and what their production
is, because in the end game that is what it is all about.
Senator Thune. I appreciate that and if you could answer it
for the record it would be great, because that is such an
important part of our success there, making sure that the oil
infrastructure is intact, they are able to produce, and then to
divide oil revenues in a way that enables each of the various
sections of the country to prosper. That clearly is a focus of
our strategy there at the current time and I am just curious to
know to what extent the work that has been done there may have
aided in moving that process along.
[The information referred to follows:]

The purpose of the oil infrastructure program in Iraq was to
restore production capability existing prior to Operation Iraqi
Freedom. At the beginning of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
(IRRF) Oil program, a goal of 3 million barrels per day (MBPD)
production capacity was set and projects were selected that would
support achievement of that goal. Key projects included providing
materials for 20 Gas Oil Separation Plants, refurbishment of an
offshore export terminal, and an oil well logging and work-over
program. This investment of capital, while minimal in terms of what is
needed on an annual basis to maintain consistent oil production, has
allowed the production of oil and associated gas to be maintained at a
reasonable level until Iraq can execute the level of investment
required to increase its annual output of crude oil and associated gas.
As the Gulf Region Division Oil Sector Reconstruction program
concludes in May 2007, it is my understanding that the 3 MBPD capacity
objective will be achieved. However, I also understand that this
capacity is not yet reflected in actual crude oil production volume,
which is currently in the range of 2.1 MBPD. This is due primarily to
the interdiction of a crude oil stabilization plant in the north and
repeated interdiction of the Iraq-Turkey export pipeline by insurgents.
Even though the capability to produce 3 MBPD is expected to be
achieved, actual production will only reach this level when the
Government of Iraq is successful in curtailing the insurgent activity
that affects the transport of the crude oil out of Iraq.

Senator Thune. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your
service. I look forward to getting you confirmed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Thune.
Let me pick up now on a second round of questions. First,
General Renuart, one of the lessons from Hurricane Katrina was
the need for better planning, coordination, and integration
among NORTHCOM, the National Guard, and the Federal and State
emergency response agencies in the event of a domestic
disaster. We saw delays and confusion among State and Federal
officials that made a horrible situation even worse.
How would you have NORTHCOM improve the planning and
coordination among the various Federal and State response
entities in the event of a domestic disaster, so we do not have
a repeat of the post-Katrina problems?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, in the aftermath of all that
there was a great deal of effort put to the lessons learned
process to try to determine where there were seams and gaps
among all the participants. I know Admiral Keating had in
preparation for last year's hurricane season put in place a
very detailed review, a process of creating pre-scripted
mission orders, if you will, for all of the responding
agencies, prepositioning equipment in key areas in the
southeast such that they can be used on short notice and
brought to bear.
I think all those efforts are critically important. I know
NORTHCOM has just completed a similar preparation process for
this hurricane season and, if confirmed, I am completely
committed to continuing that effort, with a special effort on
the command and control communications such that they are
interoperable, not just among the Guard and the Active Force,
but among the various Federal agencies who would respond. I do
know that there has been some effort in that regard already and
we would continue to do that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Van Antwerp, the Army Corps' handling of a large
contract with Halliburton for the reconstruction of the Iraqi
oil industry has been widely criticized. Before the war,
Halliburton was given the assignment to study the Iraqi oil
industry without competition under an existing contract. The
Army Corps then awarded Halliburton a sole source contract with
a value of up to $7 billion over a period of up to 5 years.
The senior contracting official for the Army Corps was so
disturbed by that contract award that she wrote a note on the
approval document itself cautioning against extending the
contract beyond a 1-year period.
Now, in your responses to pre-hearing questions you agreed
that ``competition is the very foundation of government
contracting and in general the term of a contract awarded under
the urgent and compelling exception to competition should not
ordinarily exceed the time reasonably required to award a
follow-on contract.''
A 5-year contract--does that not exceed the ``time
reasonably required to award a follow-on contract''? Would you
make every effort, if confirmed, to ensure that the Corps
avoids awarding sole source contracts of comparable duration in
the future?
General Van Antwerp. Senator, those are great points. As I
stated in my response there, I do believe in competition. I
think it is what gives you best value. I think there are times
when you need a bridging contract, an early one, but I agree in
concept with the timelines established there.
Chairman Levin. Established where?
General Van Antwerp. Established that it should be a short
duration and then as soon as possible and practicable you ought
to go and do a competitive bid.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
You stated, General Van Antwerp, in response to the pre-
hearing questions, that you were not aware of major failures of
the Army Corps contracting for reconstruction and relief in the
wake of major hurricanes in 2005. I recognize you are not
personally responsible for the particular contracting I am
going to ask you about. But there were press reports that
described several cases in which work was passed down from the
Army Corps to a prime contractor, then to a subcontractor, and
then to another subcontractor, with each company charging the
government for overhead and profit, before finally reaching the
company that would actually do the work.
In one such case the Army Corps reportedly paid a prime
contractor $1.75 per square foot to nail plastic tarps onto
damaged roofs in Louisiana. That is $1.75 a square foot. The
prime contractor paid another company, a subcontractor, 75
cents to do that same work, per square foot that is. The
subcontractor then paid a third company 35 cents per square
foot to do the work, and that subcontractor reportedly paid yet
another company 10 cents per square foot to do the work.
In a second such case, the Corps reportedly paid prime
contractors up to $30 a cubic yard to remove debris and the
companies that actually performed the work were paid from $6 to
$10 a cubic yard.
So would you agree that it would be a contracting failure
if the Corps paid $1.75 per square foot for work that cost only
10 cents per square foot to perform?
General Van Antwerp. Sir, I would agree in concept with
your supposition there. I also believe that if there is proper
competition that it will eliminate a lot of that tiering. So
again, it goes back to that competition is very important.
Chairman Levin. Would you take strong action, if confirmed,
to ensure that the Corps does not pay such excessive pass-
through charges in the future?
General Van Antwerp. I will, sir.
Chairman Levin. I just have one additional question and
then I will be done. I do not want to go over my time, Senator
Warner.
Senator Warner. Why don't you go ahead?
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much. One of the great
challenges in the Great Lakes for the Corps is the dredging
that is done in the Great Lakes and the significant backlog of
dredging that exists. The Corps estimates a backlog of 16
million cubic yards at commercial harbors that need to be
dredged and that backlog is expected to cost about $192
million. It has had real impacts on our shipping. Several
freighters have gotten stuck in Great Lakes channels. Ships
have had to carry reduced loads and many shipments have just
simply ceased altogether.
The dock in Buena Vista Township reported a reduction of 25
percent in ship tonnage. Tugboats have been needed to turn
boats around because channels have not been dredged, at a cost
of $15,000 to $20,000 each week. In one case, a freighter ran
aground at Saginaw last year and the ship's rudder was torn
off.
This problem stems in part from the way the Corps' budget
is prepared using metrics such as cargo tonnage and ship miles.
But the performance metrics treat the Great Lakes like a river
system, which results in funding inequities. The Corps spent
about 5 cents per ton of cargo carried in the Great Lakes. That
should be 52 cents per ton, 52 cents per ton of cargo carried
in the Great Lakes, but the Missouri River received about $15
per ton of cargo carried. So that is about 30 times as much per
ton for the Missouri River as was the case for tonnage that was
carried in the Great Lakes.
Will you take a look at those budgeting guidelines if you
are confirmed, to assure equitable funding allocations for the
Nation's shipping infrastructure?
General Van Antwerp. Yes, Senator, I will.
Chairman Levin. I have a couple more questions. Senator
Warner, let me turn to you.
Senator Warner. Why do you not go ahead? I am going to be
here for a while.
Chairman Levin. Let me try to wind this up. I thought I
only had one more, but there were two additional questions I
did not realize I had.
The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee's investigation of Hurricane Katrina found that the
problems with the New Orleans hurricane protection system could
be attributed in part to ``infrastructure elements being
designed and maintained by multiple authorities.'' The team
leader of the National Science Foundation's Katrina
investigation testified before that committee and stated that
``No one is in charge. You have multiple agencies, multiple
organizations, some of whom are not on speaking terms with each
other, sharing responsibilities for public safety. There is a
need to coordinate these things.''
General, as Chief of the Engineers, how would you improve
the Corps' operation, maintenance, and inspection activities in
order to avoid that kind of multiplicity and in order to better
protect our people and our investments?
General Van Antwerp. Mr. Chairman, I believe firmly in
communication. It starts there, and then there needs to be a
very fixed responsibility for the asset, and there needs to be
joint inspections, so that when you go through and you
determine what needs to be done and then you fix responsibility
for that and then there is a procedure to determine how it is
paid for and what the cost-sharing ratios are.
But a lot more joint work, as you alluded to, and much
better communications. I think it will be something that I will
definitely get into early on as a priority.
Chairman Levin. We have major problems in the Great Lakes
and in the Mississippi River watershed from the spread of
invasive species. Congress authorized a dispersal barrier
demonstration project in the National Invasive Species Act of
1996. It is not the permanent barrier that we need,
particularly against a species called the Asian carp, and so we
need to have a permanent protection from that particular
invasive species, because it poses huge threats to our
fisheries and our ecosystems, and we just have to have a
permanent barrier, not just a demonstration barrier.
The health and the economic vitality of the Great Lakes
depends on a lot of stakeholders. It is a huge issue for those
of us who are in Great Lakes States. The Army Corps plays an
essential role in that protection and in that health and
economic vitality. I just want to point it out to you. I know
that you are sensitive to it because of your background and
where you were born and raised. But I just want to just keep
that front and center if you would.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Finally, my last question has to do with a
fund called the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. It has a $3
billion surplus and it is growing every year. Yet there are
waterways and small harbors, including harbors of refuge in
Michigan, that are silting due to the lack of sufficient funds
for dredging, as I have mentioned before. Will you take a look
at these budgets and will you make sure that the Office of
Management and Budget is aware both of the Harbor Maintenance
Trust Fund and of the dredging needs of the Great Lakes when
they develop the administration's future budget requests?
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Senator Webb, you are next, but should I
call on Senator Warner?
Senator Webb. If you would, Mr. Chairman. I will be right
with you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Keating, in your response to the committee's
advance questions you very forthrightly, and I stress
``forthrightly,'' addressed a continuing challenge for those
who have preceded you and for you, and that is, and I quote
your own language, ``influencing cross-strait relations between
China and Taiwan.''
How do you propose to carry on Admiral Fallon's very adroit
and skillful handling of that issue, and what would you hope to
add to it? Certainly here in Congress at the present time there
is complete respect and adherence to the framework of laws we
have there and our policy towards the two Chinas, so to speak.
But I would like to have for the record your own perspective on
this challenge and how you propose to deal with it, because I
am, speaking for myself here, very concerned from time to time
at some of the rhetoric that emanates from sources that are
well known to you and the inflammatory nature of that rhetoric.
I would hate to see it spark a conflict.
Admiral Keating. Senator, if confirmed, those relations and
sustaining the calm that appears the pervade today across the
Straits of Taiwan will be a principal goal of ours at PACOM. I
know you are very familiar with the Taiwan Relations Act. We
understand that act.
Senator Warner. Yes, that is what I was referring to.
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. In dealing with the People's
Republic of China and with the Government of Taiwan, we would
emphasize that China has to be very careful in the development
of offensive weapons. We want to sustain Taiwan's notion of a
defensive front from their military capabilities. We would
encourage increased dialogue between those two countries on an
informal basis, and we are not unaware of the burgeoning
economic engine that is trade across the Straits of Taiwan. So
we would encourage all those positive signs. We would do our
best to make sure that both sides were aware of our close
observation of developments, and we would do our best to
sustain the harmony that does appear to be the situation across
the Straits of Taiwan today.
Senator Warner. I thank you. I wish you support in that
endeavor.
Admiral Keating. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. General Van Antwerp, I have had the
privilege of working with many of your predecessors during the
years, and I say this part in humor, but part in reality. You
probably have one of the most political appointments to be
found in DOD. Looking over your background, which has been a
magnificent accomplishment of a professional military man, I
suggest you begin to take a tutorial, if you have not already
done so, as to how to deal with this.
I have found through the years one of the core problems
that arises between Congress, which understandably has a need
to be very closely advised with regard to the work that you do,
given that so much of that work impacts our States--but you
stated in your advance questions--and I always go through these
rather carefully. You said as follows: ``The integrity of the
Corps of Engineers rests on the objectivity, transparency, and
scientific validity of its analytical processes.''
Let us focus on the word ``transparency.'' It means a
sharing with the public, with Congress, and others the nature
of your challenges and how you best think you can address it.
General Van Antwerp. Senator, I agree with that word. I
believe that should be in the communications strategy. We need
to let America know of the risks as we are working for the
public safety. The problem always is where you identify the
risks, until the studies have been finished you do not know the
full extent. But I believe in going with as much transparency
as you can. In the Army we call it ``go ugly early,'' so you
get it out there and get the discussions going. That helps
frame a lot of times the solution. So I believe in that
transparency.
Senator Warner. I thank you.
I would like to take a cue from my distinguished
colleague's line of questioning here about the Great Lakes. I
would like to return to a very simple matter in my State, since
we are going to deal with our States here for a little bit. I
have been on this committee 29 years and I think about 20 of
those years I have been trying to work with the Corps on
building a much-needed dam in Virginia. You and I discussed it
yesterday, but I would like to put a little bit on the record--
which through the years, given the growing nature of that
geographic area of Virginia, namely the Newport News area, is
absolutely essential to maintain the health and safety of the
people of that community, all the people, not just those that
live right in particular areas, but a lot of the Indian tribes
that we are very proud to have in our State are co-located
there, understandably, and I respect greatly their desire to
preserve their heritage. But we still have some lingering
problems related to that, which I hope we can resolve.
You have studied a little bit on it and without getting
into too many specifics for the future, do you think that
project can go forward? Because I think we have in 20 years
gotten it to the point where all of the basic steps to be
performed by the Corps have been done and done carefully. The
environmental steps have been taken care of. Do you project
that project can now go forward in the near future?
General Van Antwerp. Senator, I believe it can go forward.
I think we have to have this engagement strategy with our
Indian tribes to make sure we have dealt with their objections
and looked for possible mitigations. But I believe everything
else is in place, from what I have read, to move forward.
Senator Warner. Coming back to Admiral Keating and General
Renuart, let us talk about the fact that how our law, with
regard to the security of our Nation, puts a great deal of
emphasis on how in the aftermath of a calamitous terrorist
attack or other national catastrophe that the Department of
Homeland Security and other State and local agencies have the
primary initial responsibility, and NORTHCOM's mission is to
provide support to civil authorities when directed by the
President or the Secretary of Defense, which means you have to
keep a constant assessment of what you have available in the
Active and Reserve components of our military to meet these
unanticipated and often very quick demands.
As you pass these authorities over to the General, Admiral,
fortunately on your watch you have not had a major situation,
but we have to always plan for it. Given the extraordinary
contribution of the Guard and Reserve in the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq, I think it is generally recognized that
the Guard and Reserve require some very special consideration
in the coming years to first resupply their equipment and
second to work on their rotations so that they can continue to
be a civilian as well as a military guardsman or reservist.
It has gotten to a critical situation, this Guard and
Reserve. As you pass off, perhaps you can address your concept
of the criticality. Maybe you are aware of the Commission on
the Guard and Reserve and their report. Why do you not start
with their report, which seemed to indicate that perhaps as you
pass this challenge over to your successor you will have to
answer that report.
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. I was given the privilege of
testifying before Chairman Punaro's committee and I am aware of
the report. I have seen the executive summary. I have not read
the report in its entirety.
Senator Warner. Let me read the one sentence here which I
find somewhat troubling. The report by the Commission on the
roles and missions of the National Guard and Reserve finds that
the Commander of NORTHCOM ``does not sufficiently advocate for
the full range of civil support requirements affecting the
National Guard and Reserves.''
Why do you not pick up from that?
Admiral Keating. I disagree with that assessment, Senator.
We have on two occasions in the 2 years that I have had the
privilege of being at NORTHCOM gone forward with an official
submission to DOD, an integrated priority list and a program
objective memorandum input for the fiscal year 2008 budget in
which we recommended specifically advocacy for certain Guard
programs, including their civil support teams and joint
headquarters in each State.
So I disagree with that assessment and so testified in my
original testimony before Chairman Punaro's committee. We have,
as you may know, Senator, a full-time Active-Duty title 10 two-
star Air Guardsman as our chief of staff. That billet has
always at NORTHCOM been filled by a National Guard or Air
Guardsman. We have 5 other flag or general officers who are
assigned to our staff and we have over 100 Guardsmen or Air
Guardsmen who serve full-time on our staff. I think we are
adequately represented and, more importantly, we are critically
aware of the importance of a firm understanding of National
Guard capabilities and their essential role in executing our
military mission of providing support to civil authorities. We
are very conscious of it and we support the Guard in many ways
on the record and in conversations with the Guard Bureau.
Senator Warner. I wanted to give you this opportunity to
put that in the record.
Admiral Keating. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. As you pass over these responsibilities, I
think we all agree that the criticality of the Guard and
Reserve at this time as a consequence of their very courageous
and forthcoming contribution to procuring the goals both in
Iraq and Afghanistan have left it in some rather unusual
circumstances. I am not suggesting it cannot continue to carry
out its missions, but it needs help. Given the fact that it
needs help, it seems to me that impacts you, General Renuart,
as you pick up this responsibility. I hope that one of your
first priorities is to fully acquaint yourself with the status
of the Guard and Reserve, its ability to respond to orders that
you will get from the President and/or Secretary of Defense as
a consequence of a catastrophe that the local authorities,
State authorities, and the Department of Homeland Security
simply cannot deal with and therefore has to look to the
resources of DOD. You are the coordinator on that.
Do you have any view?
General Renuart. Senator, thank you for that, and I want to
underline the work that Admiral Keating and the staff at
NORTHCOM have done advocating for the Guard. If you look at the
current supplemental request that is being worked as well as
the fiscal year 2008 budget, there is a substantial portion of
the budget put in to re-equip some of these shortfalls in the
Guard and Reserve.
If confirmed in this position, it will be one of my
principal priorities to not only establish a better
understanding on my behalf of the requirements for the Guard
and Reserve, but to continue to be the strong advocate in the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council process for those
requirements and to work towards getting them funded and
resupplied.
Senator Warner. One last question, Mr. Chairman. It relates
to a subject that I have followed very closely. I will never
forget, on September 11, Chairman Levin and I went over to the
Pentagon. You remember that day?
Chairman Levin. I do indeed.
Senator Warner. We went down with the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs into the tank and
periodically with the Secretary of Defense we went back to the
scene and watched the various elements of first responders
dealing with a situation I will never forget as long as I live.
Extraordinary bravery and courage.
But we also saw the failure of interoperability between
segments of those first responders and other important areas
where they were receiving information and instructions. That
seems to continue to be somewhat of a problem; is that correct,
Admiral, as you step down?
Admiral Keating. There is work to be done, yes, sir.
Senator Warner. There is work to be done. Have the two of
you had a chance to carefully outline your perspectives on the
volume and the nature of that work that has to be done?
Admiral Keating. We have.
General Renuart. Yes, sir, we have.
Senator Warner. I find that reassuring, that you will do
that, because that has to be the highest priority. The next
time you appear before this committee, God willing, if I am
back up in this chair that is the first question I am going to
ask you, General Renuart: What is the status of that
interoperability of communications?
General Renuart. Senator, thank you, and I, if confirmed,
look forward to the chance to speak with you further about it.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Webb, I just want to thank Senator Pryor. He
technically, a technicality, he was next. I bypassed Senator
Webb once and I appreciate Senator Pryor allowing me to call on
Senator Webb at this time.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Also I would like to
thank my colleague for allowing me a few minutes here.
I would like to first apologize to the witnesses. This is
one of these situations, I am on four committees and all four
of them called hearings this morning, plus the Leader called a
meeting of the new Senators on the budget issue. So I literally
had to be five different places at the same time.
I wanted to come by and first of all pay my respects to all
of you for the service you have given and to your families for
the contributions that you have made. I had the opportunity to
have pretty extensive one-on-one visits with Admiral Keating
and with General Renuart and most of the questions that concern
me were asked in that forum. I am not going to repeat them
here. I do not think there is any real necessity to put
anything into the record, but I think we all know where the
issues are. I have great confidence in both of you in terms of
the operational experience that you are bringing to the
positions, which I think is vital in terms of how the American
military works.
Admiral Keating, as I said when I met with you, I think you
have the position that historically is probably the most
revered position for any naval officer. It is not only a
position of great historical esteem; also right now it is I
think one of the most important positions that anyone could
have regarding the future of our country.
One of the things that I have been greatly concerned about
as the national attention has become so focused on the Iraqi
involvement and the way that we have approached that issue is
that we are taking our eye off the ball in terms of where our
long-term strategic challenges are. Those are heavily in your
region. I have long experience in that region as a military
person, as a journalist, as a businessman, and in the
Government. I am looking forward to working with you on those
issues as a member of this committee and also as a member of
the Foreign Relations Committee.
General, I wish you well.
General Van Antwerp, I did not get a chance to visit with
you personally. I have examined your credentials and I am
obviously going to support you. I have one issue that I would
like to address for today to hear your views on, but also as
something that I want to mark for the future. I have a great
deal of concern about what happened at Hurricane Katrina. When
I examine that tragedy, it had three different components to
it. One is the potential that we had with proper planning to
actually have prevented the failure of the levee system and so
much of the catastrophic effect from when the levees broke. The
second was the management of the crisis itself. The third is
the aftermath, in which I think the Corps of Engineers has done
a really marvelous job.
But with respect to planning and also with respect to the
next evolution of attempting to prevent a similar situation, I
do have some concerns. Maybe you can clarify something for me.
I have read in a number of places that the Corps of Engineers
was recommending funding levels at far higher levels than
actually were put into place with respect to--I do not know
what the right engineering term would be, but revitalizing the
levee systems. I cannot say repairing them because from what I
am reading they were sort of flattening out; but that there was
an estimate done by the Corps of Engineers saying that these
levee systems needed to be dramatically invigorated. I can
choose the word. You see what I mean.
But is that not so, that the Corps of Engineers was warning
before this incident that there should be funding for a
different sort of approach to the levee system?
General Van Antwerp. My understanding, Senator, is that
there is a number of design things that were looked at and one
of the solutions is what they call a T-wall. You have basically
two things you can do. You can spread it out over a larger
piece of ground and shape it differently and make it higher, or
you can have internal parts of that structure. So I believe you
are correct in that. I do not know all the budget figures, but
if confirmed I would certainly get into that and look at what
we are doing on those repairs.
Senator Webb. What I would like is to have a better
understanding of that. I do not think this is simply
retroactive. If you could provide for us what the
recommendations were from the Corps of Engineers with respect
to the health of the levee systems in, say, the 6 or 7 years
before this incident, because I would like to be able to either
validate what I read or understand that it was not true,
because what I have been reading is that the Corps of Engineers
was specifically warning that a certain level of funding would
be necessary in order to preclude what exactly happened.
Just anecdotally, I can tell you--my wife is from New
Orleans. We were down there a little less than a year ago. I
went down into one of these areas that had been wiped out,
where the levee had broken. Everyone has their stories, but it
was kind of illuminating to me. I was just trying to find
somebody to talk to. Everyone is gone. You had the little
trailers out front. I did not want to just impose myself on
somebody walking along the street, but I was driving along one
of these burned-out areas and I saw a Marine Corps flag in
somebody's back yard and I figured, well, that person I could
at least open up a discussion with.
There was a gentleman there who had lived in the same house
for 51 years and lost everything, gone completely. I asked him
during the course of a conversation what his thoughts were
about the prevention of this. He told me he had been on one of
the commissions for 20 years before this happened and that they
had been saying over and over again that these levees were
flattening out. So maybe it is this T system you are talking
about, but they could measurably see that they were flattening
out, and as a result it would be much easier for the water to
broach them than they would have been perhaps even at the same
height if they were straight, just the angle of flow and this
sort of thing.
I really would like to know: (A) what the Corps of
Engineers was saying about this. I think this is important for
the historical record, and then (B) what are the
recommendations now? Because one thing that we have been seeing
in terms of the debate is to what extent are these levees going
to be rebuilt, to what level of the next hurricane are they
going to be able to withstand?
I cannot think of any more important function that you
would be doing in your job than helping us make sure we get
that right. I would appreciate your thoughts on both of those
in as timely a manner as you could provide them for us.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Corps recognized the urgency to complete construction of the
ongoing levee projects, as well as the design and approval for new
levee projects for the Greater New Orleans Area. The Corps' annual
budget request included funding for the ongoing hurricane protection
projects. The West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project was
budgeted annually at a funding level to complete the first level of
protection as quickly as possible. The ongoing study to evaluate higher
levels of protection in several parishes in southeastern Louisiana was
proceeding to the feasibility phase. Several areas were identified for
evaluation for raising current levee systems, construction of barriers
that may prevent storm surges from moving inland, and wetlands
construction and restoration.
The Corps of Engineers is committed to designing and constructing
the best hurricane protection system for people and the environment
within the resources provided and remains focused on restoring levees
and floodwalls to the authorized heights and completing all planned
projects in conjunction with the ultimate goal of providing 100-year
protection for the system, as directed by Public Law 109-234.
Additionally, several measures to provide higher levels of protection
are now being reviewed under the Louisiana Coastal Protection and
Restoration Act evaluation requested by Congress following Hurricane
Katrina. This evaluation includes nonstructural measures and coastal
restoration as a way to provide comprehensive hurricane protection.

Senator Webb. I have run out of time and I wish all of you
gentlemen the best in your new positions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
having to be in two places at once, not five places at once
like some people here. But anyway, I have had to come and go,
and I have not had a chance to listen to all the nominees'
answers. But I really appreciate the panel being here today.
General Van Antwerp, let me start with you and follow up on
a conversation we had in my office a few days ago. We hear a
lot of comments in my office from communities on the Arkansas
border riverways about the levee system. Apparently FEMA has
come out with this in order to modernize their flood insurance
rate maps, they feel like we need to inspect all our levee
systems, et cetera, et cetera. This has a huge impact on the
cost of that and who bears that cost, and the cities, et
cetera, are very concerned about that; and second, on insurance
rates for people living in those areas.
Do I understand it correctly that the Corps of Engineers'
role in this is to conduct these certifications?
General Van Antwerp. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Pryor. Do you pay for that or do you require the
owners of the levees to pay for that?
General Van Antwerp. Senator, I am not sure of the answer
to that question. It is possible that it could be cost-shared,
but I believe it is borne by the Corps. But I will have to
reply to you on that.
[The information referred to follows:]

In accordance with Corps of Engineers guidance issued in August
2006 and FEMA regulations, in general, the levee owner is responsible
for certifying the levee and paying the associated costs. In this
particular instance however, these levees in Arkansas are owned and
operated by the Corps of Engineers as part of the Mississippi Rivers
and Tributaries project. Therefore, the Corps of Engineers is
responsible for certifying and paying the costs, provided that funds
are appropriated for this work.

Senator Pryor. In terms of the evaluation of these levees
and also repairing the levees if they need to be repaired,
obviously that is very important. It is going to be very
difficult the smaller the entity is for them to bear that cost.
I am not picking on anybody, but St. Louis probably has a
better budget to handle that than, say, Little Rock. Little
Rock is going to have a better budget than, say, Russellville,
AR, and Russellville is going to have a better budget than just
a levee district probably will, all things being equal.
That is something that is very important to us. So as you
take this post, I would just encourage you to remember the
practical ramifications of this and work with Congress and work
with local people on cost-sharing and spreading that cost and
making that as painless as possible. Please do that.
The other thing about our transportation needs in this
country, when you look out over the future we know right now
already that we have a lot of rail corridors that are clogged,
overused, and there is a lot of congestion. We also know that
our highways are congested with big trucks. By the way, those
numbers are fairly alarming, about how many more big trucks
will be on the road over the next 20 years. We have seen some
statistics on that in the Senate Commerce Committee and it is
something that we obviously need to invest in infrastructure
there.
We also need to invest in our river infrastructure. This is
very important, not just for a State like mine, but really
States all over the Union. In fact, Mr. Chairman, you might be
interested to know that a few years ago I went to one of our
steel mills. We have some steel mills in Arkansas. Most of
them, not all but most of them, are on the Mississippi River.
What they do is they recycle steel. A few years ago, it was
cheaper for them to go to Europe and buy the steel, ship it,
barge it up the Mississippi River, and get it to us in Arkansas
than it was to pay the freight via rail through Chicago.
It was cheaper to come from Europe on the water than it was
rail from Chicago. Obviously, they have a lot of scrap metal in
Chicago that we could be using, but they look at the cost.
So having good waterways and that good infrastructure on
water, they are very important to the economy of this country.
I just wanted to make sure you understood that.
General Van Antwerp. I agree. The statistics I have seen is
for large growth, both in the navigable waterways, but also in
our ports and harbors.
Senator Pryor. Yes. To me it just seems that we cannot
forget about our waterways as we look at infrastructure needs.
A lot of the locks and dams are old. They were engineered and
built a long time ago. Do you have any sort of plan to
modernize those or upgrade those, or are we just going to do
that as needed?
General Van Antwerp. I understand there has been a
comprehensive look and we know what the risks are out there. Of
course, in many cases it is a matter of authorization and
dollars. But I am told that the Corps has a good understanding
of what needs to be repaired and those surveys have been done.
Senator Pryor. There was plenty of blame to go around after
Hurricane Katrina happened and everybody probably shares a
little bit of the blame and deserves a little bit of the blame.
But one of the groups that was singled out specifically for a
lot of blame was the Corps of Engineers and how they designed
and did some of their work down in New Orleans and down in the
southern Louisiana area.
Do you think that criticism is justified?
General Van Antwerp. Senator, I agree, I think, as you take
a look back, there is always a lot of contributing factors. In
many cases it is projects that were done years and years ago
with the best of intentions, things that impacted wetlands or
the outlets into the Gulf. Certainly the levees are an integral
part. I believe it has to work as a system and so you have to
look at all aspects.
It is also a fairly difficult area to construct and there
was some settling, from the reports I have read, of some of the
levees, which meant that they did not have the height to be
able to take the storm as it came, so they really did not
provide the 100-year protection. I think we all have a
responsibility in that.
Senator Pryor. The last question I have is, I know you have
a huge commitment in Iraq. Given the relatively new commitment
for you in Iraq, do you have the resources necessary to meet
your domestic obligations?
General Van Antwerp. Since we had our discussion in your
office, I have looked into that some. Right now we are doing
fine as far as I understand it. Actually, there is still good
competition for positions that take critical skills. The longer
we go here, there will be impact. We have almost 400 people in
Iraq and 160 in Afghanistan, civilians. That is not counting
about the 100 military that are there.
That is something we really have to keep our eye on and
whether there is another source of those critical skills. You
cannot just take anybody and have them supervise a project.
They have to know what they are doing. So, if confirmed, I
would take a close look at what those skills are and what is in
the pipeline to keep those.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Pryor, do you have any
additional questions?
Senator Pryor. I do not. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
I have no additional questions. Again we commend you all
and we thank you and your families for your service.
We will stand adjourned and hope that we can promptly get
to your confirmations.
[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM Timothy J. Keating,
USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)?
Answer. The Commander, U.S. PACOM is responsible for deterring
attacks against the United States and its territories, possessions, and
bases, to protect Americans and American interests and, in the event
that deterrence fails, to fight and win. The Commander is also
responsible for expanding security cooperation with our allies,
partners, and friends across the Asia-Pacific region.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. Thirty-six years of military training and experience, to
include previous combatant command of the North American Aerospace
Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), have prepared me
for assuming command of the U.S. PACOM. During Operation Iraqi Freedom,
as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, I planned and executed
coalition and joint warfighting missions. As Director of the Joint
Staff, I have gained invaluable insights into the conduct of joint
operations, the duties of a combatant commander, and interagency
cooperation. In addition, I gained regional experience as Commander of
Carrier Group Five in Yokosuka, Japan and, additionally, on several
operational deployments to the Pacific theater.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
U.S. PACOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to take every opportunity to enhance
my knowledge of our relationships with our allies and partners across
the Pacific. I look forward to engaging with senior leaders within the
Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State, and military and
civilian leaders throughout the Asia-Pacific region in order to improve
my understanding of U.S. interests in the region.

RELATIONSHIPS

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander, U.S. PACOM?
Answer. Traditional security challenges include ensuring peace and
stability on the Korean Peninsula and influencing cross-strait
relations between China and Taiwan. We must also address other security
issues, especially the threat of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) proliferation, and transnational crime such as narcotics and
human trafficking and piracy.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will posture our military forces to
dissuade, deter, or defeat any potential adversary. I will work with
other DOD organizations, agencies of the U.S. Government, and our many
friends and allies to assure the region of our strong resolve and
lasting commitment to stability, security, and prosperity throughout
Asia and the Pacific.

HOMELAND DEFENSE

Question. What is your understanding of the role and responsibility
of U.S. PACOM in homeland defense?
Answer. U.S. PACOM's responsibility is to deter attacks against the
Homeland as early and as far away as possible, defend the U.S. PACOM
domestic area of responsibility (AOR), and work with and provide
support to civil authorities when requested. Additionally, U.S. PACOM's
homeland defense plan complements and is integrated with planning for
the ongoing global war on terrorism, combating WMD, homeland security,
and other relevant activities.
Question. What is your understanding of how U.S. PACOM and U.S.
NORTHCOM work to ensure that their overlapping missions in this area do
not create ``seams'' that might be exploited by our adversaries and how
this process might be improved?
Answer. In October 2003, Commander, U.S. PACOM and Commander, U.S.
NORTHCOM signed a Command Arrangement Agreement, to ``establish
procedures and delineate responsibilities'' between the two commands.
This agreement also prescribes employment of U.S. PACOM forces in
support of U.S. NORTHCOM missions and the control of forces operating
in NORTHCOM's AOR. In my experience, the agreement between combatant
commands has been highly effective. If confirmed, I intend to continue
the close working relationship between the two commands.
Question. What is your assessment of the Regional Maritime Security
Initiative, and what steps should be taken to improve upon it?
Answer. The Regional Maritime Security Initiative was developed to
foster coordination among participating states to address transnational
threats collectively. The themes and goals of the initiative continue
to gain momentum in the Asia-Pacific region as the ``Global Maritime
Partnership.'' Its effectiveness can be increased through better
information sharing and investing the time and effort to improve
understanding of the challenges and needs of the partner nations. U.S.
PACOM should continue to encourage multilateral and interagency
approaches to the challenges.
Question. How could U.S. PACOM forces and expertise contribute to
more effective homeland defense capabilities?
Answer. U.S. PACOM's military and intelligence activities in the
western approaches to the continental United States contribute to the
Nation's active, layered defense and enhance situational awareness.
Improving our capabilities in this regard will require continued
efforts to collect actionable intelligence, exercise and train our
forces, and engage actively with nations of the Asia-Pacific.

GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE REVIEW

Question. Perhaps more than in any other combatant command,
military exigencies in the U.S. PACOM are subject to the ``tyranny of
distance'' in getting forces to points of conflict.
In your view, how important is the forward basing strategy to the
ability of U.S. PACOM to execute its operational contingencies, and did
the Global Posture Review appropriately take this into account?
Answer. Forward basing is essential to the U.S. PACOM shaping and
warfighting strategy. Forward presence in the AOR assures friends and
allies and dissuades potential adversaries. Because posture changes
resulting from Global Posture Review shift forces away from a garrison
orientation and toward a more flexible force, I believe U.S. PACOM is
well-positioned to respond with necessary military forces in the event
of crises or contingency.
Question. What do you see as the implications of the proposed
global force structure changes with respect to U.S. PACOM's AOR,
particularly in Korea and Japan?
Answer. I support alliance transformations currently underway in
Japan and the Republic of Korea. In general, I see the changes as
effective from a mission perspective and an example of the healthy
state of our alliance with both nations.
Question. What impact, if any, do you expect the proposed changes
in posture will have on our ability to defend South Korea and Japan,
and to react to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait?
Answer. I do not anticipate any reduction in the command's ability
to meet commitments to our allies.
Question. The Army is proposing to add 65,000 personnel to its
permanent force structure over the course of the Future Years Defense
Program, including the creation of six additional active-duty combat
brigades. The Marine Corps is proposing to add 27,000 personnel over
the same period.
Do you believe that any of these additional personnel and units
should be assigned to commands located in the U.S. PACOM's AOR in order
to meet PACOM's your requirements?
Answer. The proposals to expand the Army and Marine Corps allow us
to reexamine our basing options and ensure that we have the optimum mix
of forces to execute the National Military Strategy. If confirmed, I
intend to study where force increases in the Pacific theater might be
appropriate to enhance mission accomplishment and to share our analysis
with DOD.
Question. If so, to what extent do you believe these additional
forces should be forward-deployed, as in Korea or Japan, or deployed in
the United States, such as Hawaii or Alaska?
Answer. If confirmed, I will study the options and consider the
evolving situation in the Pacific, as these expanded forces are brought
online. Once I have formed my assessment, I will provide my views to
the Secretary of Defense.

NORTH KOREA

Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near-term
threats to U.S. national security interests in Asia.
What is your assessment of the current security situation on the
Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to
verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?
Answer. The missile launches and nuclear test conducted last year
underscore the gravity of the North Korean threat. If confirmed, I will
support diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to dismantle its
nuclear weapons program. I am encouraged by the progress made at the
Six-Party Talks in Beijing last month. I believe one of the key roles
of U.S. PACOM is to work closely with the countries in the region to
facilitate the ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing the
threat, while maintaining a credible deterrent posture.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United
States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD
capabilities and the export of those capabilities?
Answer. North Korea's development of WMD and ballistic missile
capabilities and potential proliferation pose a serious threat to the
U.S. and our allies.
Question. In your view, what, if anything, should be done to
strengthen deterrence on the Korean peninsula?
Answer. If confirmed, my focus will be on preserving the strength
and resolve of our alliances. We must leverage relationships with other
nations in the region to shape the strategic environment aimed at
deterring aggression in Northeast Asia.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH KOREA (ROK)

Question. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-ROK alliance has
been a key pillar of security in the Asia-Pacific region. This
relationship is currently undergoing significant change.
What is your understanding of the current U.S. security
relationship with South Korea?
Answer. The U.S.-ROK security relationship is an enduring
partnership that has been the key to deterrence for over 50 years. Our
alliance has evolved to become a global partnership with the ROK
military's contributions to the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and the upcoming deployment of ROK troops in support of the U.N.
mission in Lebanon.
Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take, in
conjunction with the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea/Combined Forces
Command, to improve the U.S.-South Korean security relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander of
United States Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command to ensure there is
no degradation in readiness or deterrence. I will ensure that U.S.
PACOM supports the ongoing U.S. Forces Korea transformation initiatives
that are vital to enhancing the capabilities of our combined forces and
facilitating the eventual transition of wartime operational control to
the ROK military.
Question. Do you support expanding the number of personnel assigned
to Korea for 2 or 3 years of duty and the number of military and
civilian personnel authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for
these longer tours of duty?
Answer. I have not yet studied the proposal in detail, particularly
with respect to affordability. However, in general, I believe longer
tours and more troops having their families accompany them are in the
best interests of our alliance and our readiness on the Korean
peninsula.

CHINA

Question. Many observers believe that one of the key national
security challenges of this century is how to manage China's emergence
as a major regional and global economic and military power.
How would you characterize the U.S. security relationship with
China?
Answer. From my vantage at NORTHCOM, I was encouraged by China's
role in facilitating North Korean return to the Six-Party Talks. I see
this as constructive and responsible. I also am aware of the lack of
transparency regarding Chinese military modernization, which is a
concern.
Question. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-
China military-to-military relations, and do you favor increased
military-to-military contacts with China?
Answer. Our military-to-mililtary relationship is improving in
terms of quality and quantity of events. If confirmed, I intend to
advocate for an engagement program involving numerous events with
measured but increased levels of sophistication. I believe this
approach would help us learn more about the People's Liberation Army
(PLA), break down barriers to understanding, and reduce potential for
conflict.
Question. How do you assess the current cross-Strait relationship,
and how can we help to prevent miscalculation by either side?
Answer. I assess the situation as stable. However, I am also
mindful miscalculation is possible. If confirmed, I will remain
particularly attentive to any military quantitative and qualitative gap
between China and Taiwan.
Question. China's economy is growing by as much as 10 percent per
year, and China is using that economic growth to fund a substantial
military modernization.
In your view, what is China's intent in pursuing such a rapid
military modernization?
Answer. I believe it is clear China is seeking capabilities beyond
those needed for a Taiwan situation, but the lack of transparency makes
intent difficult to discern. If confirmed, I would seek to continue
improvements with U.S.-PLA military-to-military interaction to better
understand Chinese intentions.
Question. On April 1, 2001, a Chinese jet collided in mid-air with
a U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft endangering the U.S. personnel and resulting
in the death of the Chinese pilot.
Describe the steps that have been taken to prevent incidents of
this nature in the future. What additional efforts, if any, do you
believe may be necessary?
Answer. I understand that under Admiral Fallon's watch, PACOM
conducted the first two Search and Rescue Exercises with People's
Republic of China (PRC) forces. Such events--which stress language
independent protocols, fixed wing maritime patrol craft, and ``free
play''--increase safety of all sailors and airmen. I recognize this
will be a long-term educational process. If confirmed, I would continue
similar efforts in the future to expose as many PLA sailors and airmen
as possible to these fundamental and inherently stabilizing procedures.
Question. In your view, is there the potential for similar
dangerous incidents with China to occur at sea or elsewhere?
Answer. There is always potential, however, I believe it is less
likely than in the past.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
prevent incidents?
Answer. If confirmed, I would consider an international agreement
similar to the ``Incidents At Sea'' protocols we developed with the
Soviet Union.
Question. On January 11, 2007, China used a ground-based missile to
hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test
creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the
international community.
What is your view of China's purpose in conducting this test?
Answer. I do not know China's purpose. However, the test was
unfortunate and inconsistent with their stated peaceful policy. Chinese
actions endangered international satellites, which support the world's
economy, and created considerable debris that increase the risk to
human spaceflight.
Question. What do you see as the implications of this test for the
U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in
space?
Answer. The foremost implication is confirmation that Chinese anti-
satellite capabilities can be a threat to international space assets.
Question. What are your views regarding the potential weaponization
of space?
Answer. Consistent with U.S. policy and international
understandings, I support the rights of states to have unhindered
passage through, and operations in space without interference. I also
support our ability to defend and protect our space systems.

TAIWAN

Question. What are the priorities, in your view, for U.S. military
assistance to Taiwan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will remain fully committed to the U.S.
obligation to provide Taiwan with the necessary capabilities for its
defense. I would continue to focus on efforts to modernize Taiwan's
defensive capability and improve the joint operating capacity of the
Taiwan armed forces.
Question. What is your view of the relationship between the type of
assistance we offer Taiwan and regional stability?
Answer. PACOM should focus on Taiwan's capability to defend itself
and avoid characterizing the Taiwan military's modernization as
offensive. A Taiwan that can defend itself enhances regional stability.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippine
military-to-military relations?
Answer. Our relationship is good, and our long and consistent
military engagement with the Philippines is bearing fruit in the form
of Philippine counterterrorism performance and success in the field.
Question. What is your view of the effectiveness of the Special
Operation Forces assistance being provided to the Philippine military
in its fight against terrorist groups?
Answer. My initial assessment, based on recent successes on the
island of Jolo, is the advice and assistance of Special Operations
Forces have been effective in helping Philippine Security Forces (PSF)
fight local and international terrorist groups over sustained periods
in harsh environments.
Question. What measures or guidelines will you employ, if
confirmed, to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in
combat in the Republic of the Philippines?
Answer. U.S. Forces are not authorized by either the U.S. or the
Republic of the Philippines to conduct combat operations in the
Republic of the Philippines nor to accompany PSF to locations where
contact with the enemy by U.S. forces is anticipated. If confirmed, I
will continue to ensure current restrictions prohibiting a combat role
for U.S. forces are well understood by our personnel at all levels. I
will confirm in place procedures are sufficiently rigorous.

INDONESIA

INDIA

Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India
military-to-military relationship?
Answer. President Bush has emphasized the U.S. partnership with
India as among the most important in the region. If confirmed, I would
seek to complement strategic initiatives with a military-to-military
program characterized by increased dialogue and more frequent and
sophisticated exchange and exercises.
Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you
establish for this relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, my priorities for the U.S.-India military-to-
military relationship will be increasing the scope of exercises and
exploring opportunities for expanded cooperation in peacekeeping,
disaster response, and maritime security. Our militaries need to
continue to build trust and confidence and become more interoperable.
We should establish agreements and procedures that will allow us to
build shared doctrine and communications architectures.
Question. What relationship, if any, do you believe exists between
the armed groups conducting terrorist attacks in India, and the armed
groups conducting attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan?
Answer. There are reported organizational relationships between
armed groups conducting attacks in India and Afghanistan, specifically
among Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT/LeT), al Qaeda, and the
Taliban. However, I have not sufficiently studied the situation to
determine relationships between the groups.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. What is your understanding of the current relationship
between U.S. PACOM, U.S. NORTHCOM, and U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) with respect to ballistic missile defense deployment and
operations?
Answer. Commander, U.S. PACOM supports Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM for
defense of the homeland. Commander, U.S. PACOM is also responsible for
providing regional missile defense for U.S. forces forward deployed in
the U.S. PACOM AOR. Commander, U.S. STRATCOM has overarching
responsibility for planning, integrating, and coordinating global
ballistic missile defense. U.S. PACOM coordinates with U.S. NORTHCOM
and U.S. STRATCOM in the performance of both the regional and global
missile defense mission.
Question. What is your understanding of the arrangement whereby
Aegis-class destroyers and cruisers of the U.S. Pacific Fleet will be
made available, or dedicated, to ballistic missile defense missions,
and what impact will this arrangement have on the capability of U.S.
PACOM and U.S. Pacific Fleet to fulfill their other missions involving
Aegis-class ships?
Commander U.S. PACOM and Commander U.S. NORTHCOM have established
clear command relationships regarding Aegis support to the Ballistic
Missile Defense mission. Using a system of readiness conditions, both
Commanders ensure the Aegis ship requirement is properly managed to
support both the missile defense mission and other missions in the
Pacific theater.
Over the past year, these relationships have been tested in several
challenging real world and exercise scenarios involving regional and
homeland missile defense missions.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to strike an
appropriate balance between missile defense and non-missile defense
missions for ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT)?
Answer. Missile defense is one of many missions tasked to the
Commander, PACFLT. If confirmed, I will solicit recommendations from
Commander, PACFLT, to posture the U.S. PACFLT to execute the missions
we expect the Fleet to perform. Additionally, I will continue U.S.
PACOM efforts to integrate Patriot Advance Capabilities-3 (PAC-3),
Forward Based X-Band Radar Transportable (FBX-T), and Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to improve theater-wide capability and
reduce the reliance on Aegis platforms.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. What is your understanding of the requirements for
coordination and cooperation between Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
teams working to fulfill the global terrorism mission, U.S. PACOM, and
the Ambassadors in the relevant countries?
Answer. Coordination and cooperation between U.S. PACOM,
Ambassadors, and SOCOM teams remains essential to success in the global
war on terror. Commander, U.S. PACOM, assumes Operational Control
(OPCON) of Special Operations Forces once those forces enter the AOR.
In all cases, Ambassadors remain responsible for activities in their
respective country, to include Theater Security Cooperation activities
involving Special Operations Forces. As a result, the military
commander exercising OPCON is required to coordinate activities with
the respective Ambassador.
Additionally, coordination with U.S. SOCOM and Country Ambassadors
continues even after OPCON has been assumed by Commander, U.S. PACOM.
In certain circumstances, U.S. SOCOM may retain OPCON of forces
conducting specialized missions or crossing geographic combatant
commander boundaries.
Question. If confirmed, would you seek to change any aspects of
these requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I do not foresee recommending changes in the
current command and support relationships.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the assignment and
OPCON of Special Operations within the SOCOM area of operations?
Answer. The Commander, U.S. SOCOM developed and the Secretary of
Defense recently approved the Global Special Operations Forces Posture
initiative, which significantly changes assignment and OPCON of current
regionally based Special Operations Forces to a continental United
States-based, forward rotational presence model. Commander, U.S. SOCOM,
assesses this will provide geographic combatant commanders with better
trained Special Operations Forces while maintaining their regional
expertise and reducing the current high personnel tempo. At this time,
it would be premature for me to recommend changes.

TECHNOLOGY PRIORITIES

Question. U.S. PACOM has been active in the Advanced Concept
Technology Development process and currently has several projects on
the transition list, including the future tactical truck system and
theater effects-based operations.
If confirmed, what steps would you expect to take to make your
requirements known to the department's science and technology (S&T)
community to ensure the availability of needed equipment and
capabilities in the long-term?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support efforts to strengthen the
relationship between the command and the S&T community. In so doing,
PACOM would help researchers better understand operational problems and
the command would gain better insight into solutions maturing through
Service efforts. I plan to use the Integrated Priority List as the
foundation for these discussions.
JCTDs will continue to be an important part of meeting S&T
requirements but I plan to expand the approach. In particular, I will
explore new relationships with S&T programs worldwide to meet
requirements. I expect these efforts will include cooperative
technology development with countries in our AOR; participation of
Services S&T personnel in U.S. PACOM exercises; seminars with
laboratories and warfighting centers for direct engagement with
planners.

EXERCISES AND TRAINING

Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. PACOM
training and exercise program, including those designed to train
personnel for peace and stability operations?
Answer. My initial impression is the U.S. PACOM exercise program
has been highly effective as evidenced by successful disaster relief
operations, responsive support to war on terror operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and the improvements in the quality and capacity of
regional peace support operations forces through the Global Peace
Operations Initiative.
I recognize the importance of a rigorous training and exercise
program. In U.S. PACOM, training and exercises will continue to receive
emphasis because of their value in maturing U.S. readiness and
capabilities and improving our ability to operate with allies and
partners in the region.
Question. Do you believe that the PACOM's training and exercise
program currently has adequate funding and personnel resources?
Answer. I do not yet have a full appreciation of the funding and
resource status of the U.S. PACOM training and exercise program. If
confirmed, I will ensure resources are effectively used and advocate
for additional resources, when necessary.
Question. What are your views on how the PACOM, in concert with the
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), could improve its training and exercise
program, including training and exercises for peace and stability
operations?
Answer. I view collaboration with U.S. JFCOM and the continuous
assessment such interaction fosters as central to improving the
command's training program. I also anticipate the new Pacific
Warfighting Center, when integrated into JFCOM's global grid of
warfighting centers, will allow PACOM and JFCOM to continue to
cooperatively develop transformational training concepts for
traditional warfighting as well as peace and stability operations.

PRISONER OF WAR (POW)/MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) ACCOUNTING EFFORTS

Question. The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), U.S. PACOM,
is critical to the recovery and identification of remains of missing
military members. Recovery of remains of U.S. servicemembers from World
War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War continue to be a very high
priority.
What is your understanding of the responsibilities of JPAC, U.S.
PACOM, and its relationship to the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing
Personnel Office?
Answer. JPAC conducts operations to support accounting of personnel
unaccounted for as a result of hostile acts. U.S. PACOM provides higher
headquarters support and direction, and interface between JPAC and the
Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Defense POW/
Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) exercises policy, control, and
oversight within DOD. DPMO and JPAC coordinate directly on routine POW/
MIA issues.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the AOR of the U.S. PACOM?
Answer. JPAC resources and accounting efforts are focused not only
in the PACOM region, but throughout the world. If confirmed, I will
encourage full cooperation by the host nations where we conduct POW/MIA
activities and continue to reinforce U.S. Government priorities and
commitment in our accounting and recovery efforts with leaders of these
countries and respective U.S. Ambassadors.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take, if any, to
assess the adequacy of resources available for this work?
Answer. If confirmed, I will provide JPAC the full support of the
U.S. PACOM in the conduct of their mission, and continuously assess the
adequacy of resources in the performance of this critical and important
mission. I will also ensure existing resources maximize mission
accomplishment.
Question. What is your understanding of the status of the report
due March 1, 2007, relating to the JPAC, pursuant to Senate Report 109-
254?
Answer. I understand the report has been drafted and is currently
being staffed. If confirmed, I will review the draft document and will
be prepared to provide comment.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. Combatant commanders are responsible for establishing and
sustaining a high quality of life for military personnel and their
families assigned within their AOR.
If confirmed, how would you define and ensure appropriate resources
are available for quality of life programs for military members and
their families within the U.S. PACOM?
Answer. Quality of life (QoL)/Quality of service (QoS) for our men
and women is one of my top priorities.
QoS means providing high quality operating facilities, tools, and
information technology necessary for our personnel to execute their
missions and achieve their goals. Achieving and sustaining QoL,
however, will require both QoS initiatives and a continuous assessment
of our facilities and our programs--housing, schools, commissary and
exchange services, medical/dental facilities, Morale, Welfare, and
Recreation programs/facilities, pay and entitlement programs, and
family and childcare programs. If such assessments identify QoS/QoL
conditions that are less than our people deserve, I will work with DOD
to solicit support and garner required resources to rectify the
deficiencies.
Question. What is your view of the challenges associated with
global rebasing on the quality of life of members and their families in
the U.S. PACOM AOR (including adequate health care services and DOD
schools)?
Answer. The biggest challenge will be preserving the QoS/QoL for
our servicemembers and their families while we realign our forces in
theater.
Throughout the transition process, we should focus our efforts on
maintaining quality housing, DOD schools, commissary and exchange
services, medical/dental facilities, higher education, work life, and
family and community support programs for our people. We should sustain
current levels of service during the transformation `out' phase and
ensure these systems are in place before families arrive in the area.
Question. What steps do you believe need to be taken in Guam to
ensure that adequate services are available to U.S. personnel and their
dependents?
Answer. As we plan for increased military development in Guam, we
must ensure that organizations and agencies that provide services to
U.S. personnel and their dependents are included in the planning
process, and adequate funding for expansion of these services is
provided. The Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO), established by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense and tasked with executing this
comprehensive redevelopment effort, is leading the planning process and
is engaging DOD components and other stakeholders to program and budget
for adequate services for U.S. personnel and their dependents in Guam.
If confirmed, I will ensure JGPO is fully informed of U.S. PACOM QoS/
QoL requirements on Guam.

POLICIES REGARDING SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. As a result of deficiencies in DOD and Service policies
regarding sexual assault in the Armed Forces, the Department and the
individual Services are required under section 577 of the Ronald W.
Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 to
develop comprehensive policies aimed at preventing and responding to
sexual assaults involving members of the Armed Forces and ensuring,
among other things, appropriate law enforcement, medical, and legal
responses, integration of databases to report and track sexual
assaults, and development of victim treatment and assistance
capabilities.
Question. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. PACOM, what steps would
you take to ensure the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces
under your command are appropriately implementing policies aimed at
preventing sexual assaults and appropriately responding to victims of
sexual assault?
Answer. I am strongly committed to ensuring we make every effort to
protect our people from assault and offer direct, consistent, and
appropriate responses to victims of sexual assault. If confirmed, I
will ensure commanders at all levels continue to implement
comprehensive measures to prevent sexual assault, provide responsive
care and treatment for victims of sexual assault, and hold accountable
those who commit the crime of sexual assault.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

HAWAIIAN SECURITY NEEDS

1. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, the relationship between Pacific
Command (PACOM) and Northern Command is somewhat unique when it comes
to homeland security. Now that you are nominated to replace Admiral
Fallon to be the next Commander of PACOM, what assurances are you able
to give me that Hawaii's needs will be met in an emergency situation?
Admiral Keating. I have designated Joint Task Force Homeland
Defense, under the leadership of United States Army Pacific Commander,
with responsibility for support of Hawaiian civil authorities. Over the
last 18 months the U.S. PACOM plan for support of Hawaiian civil
authorities has been exercised three times. Positive feedback from
these interactions coupled with the expectation for regular exercises
in the future give me confidence our plans for defense support of civil
authorities are both current and credible.

2. Senator Akaka. Admiral Keating, in addition, what plans do you
have to ensure that these lines of communications remain open and
visible in the future?
Admiral Keating. Joint Task Force Homeland Defense will continue to
conduct monthly meetings to ensure plans and coordination channels are
effective. Meeting participants include representatives from the
military Services and Federal, State, and local governments.
______

[The nomination reference of ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 7, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Navy to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be Admiral.

ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
resume of career service of vadm timothy j. keating, usn
Date and place of birth: November 16, 1948; Dayton, Ohio.

Promotions:

Midshipman, U.S. Naval Academy..................... 28 Jun. 1967
Ensign, U.S. Navy.................................. 09 Jun. 1971
Lieutenant (junior grade).......................... 09 Dec. 1972
Lieutenant......................................... 01 Jul. 1975
Lieutenant Commander............................... 01 Jun. 1980
Commander.......................................... 01 Jun. 1986
Captain............................................ 01 Sep. 1992
Rear Admiral (lower half).......................... 01 Jul. 1997
Designated Rear Admiral while serving in billets Mar. 1999
commensurate with that grade......................
Rear Admiral....................................... 01 Aug. 2000
Designated Vice Admiral while serving in billets 06 Oct. 2000
commensurate with that grade......................
Vice Admiral....................................... 01 Nov. 2000
Designated Admiral while serving in billets 21 Oct. 2004
commensurate with that grade......................
Admiral, service continuous to date................ 01 Jan. 2005

Assignments and duties:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S.S. Leonard F. Mason (DD 852) Jun. 1971......... Jun. 1971
(Assistant Navigator).
Naval Aviation Schools Command, Jan. 1972......... May 1972
Naval Air Station, Pensacola,
FL (DUINS).
Training Squadron ONE NINE Jun. 1972......... Sep. 1972
(DUINS).
Training Squadron TWO TWO Sep. 1972......... Aug. 1973
(DUINS).
Training Squadron TWO TWO Aug. 1973......... Sep. 1974
(Assistant Schedules/Advanced
Jet Flight Instructor).
Training Wing TWO, NAS Sep. 1974......... Jul. 1975
Kingsville, TX (Staff Training
Records/Stats Officer).
Attack Squadron ONE SEVEN FOUR Aug. 1975......... Mar. 1976
(Ready Replacement Officer).
Attack Squadron EIGHT TWO Mar. 1976......... Sep. 1978
(Assistant Aircraft Officer).
Attack Squadron ONE TWO TWO Sep. 1978......... May 1980
(Landing Signal Officer/
Navigation Phase Instructor).
Commander, Carrier Air Wing ONE May 1980.......... May 1982
FIVE (Landing Signal Officer/
Assistant Safety Officer).
Attack Squadron NINE FOUR May 1982.......... Jul. 1984
(Administrative/Operations/
Maintenance Officer).
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Aug. 1984......... Aug. 1985
(Flag Lieutenant).
Attack Squadron ONE SEVEN FOUR Aug. 1985......... Nov. 1985
(Replacement Pilot).
XO, Strike Fighter Squadron Nov. 1985......... May 1987
EIGHT SEVEN.
CO, Strike Fighter Squadron May 1987.......... Jan. 1989
EIGHT SEVEN.
Commander, Naval Military Feb. 1989......... Sep. 1990
Personnel Command (Head
Aviation LCDR/JO Assignment
Branch).
Commander, Carrier Air Wing ONE Jan. 1991......... Jul. 1991
SEVEN (Deputy (Air Wing
Commander).
Strategic Studies Group Fellow.. Aug. 1991......... Jun. 1992
CJTF-SWA (Deputy Director of Oct. 1992......... Dec. 1992
Operations).
Commander, Carrier Air Wing NINE Dec. 1992......... Nov. 1994
CO, Strike Warfare Center, Nov. 1994......... Sep. 1995
Fallon, NV.
Bureau of Naval Personnel Sep. 1995......... Aug. 1996
(Director, Aviation Officer
Distribution Division (PERS-
43)).
Joint Staff (Deputy Director for Aug. 1996......... Jun. 1998
Operations (Current
Operations)) (J-33).
Commander, Carrier Group FIVE... Jun. 1998......... Oct. 2000
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Oct. 2000......... Jan. 2002
(Plans, Policy and Operations)
(N3/N5).
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Feb. 2002......... Oct. 2003
Central Command/Commander,
FIFTH Fleet.
Joint Staff (Director).......... Oct. 2003......... Nov. 2004
Commander, Northern Command/ Nov. 2004......... To Date
Commander, North American
Aerospace Defense Command.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Medals and awards:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters
Distinguished Service Medal and one Gold Star
Legion of Merit with three Gold Stars
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with one Gold Star
Air Medal with Second and Third Strike/Flight Awards
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation with Combat ``V'' and two Gold
Stars
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal with one Silver Star
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Navy Unit Commendation
Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
Navy ``E'' Ribbon with two ``E's''
Navy Expeditionary Medal
National Defense Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Vietnam Service Medal with three Bronze Stars
Southwest Asia Service Medal with three Bronze Stars
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Armed Forces Service Medal
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star and two Bronze
Stars
Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal
Kuwait Liberation Medal
Pistol Marksmanship Medal with Silver ``E''

Special qualifications:
BA (Physics) U.S. Naval Academy, 1971.
Designated Naval Aviator, 3 August 1973.
Designated Joint Specialty Officer, 1988.

Personal data:
Wife:
Wanda Lee Keating of Alexandria, VA.

Children:
Daniel Patrick Martin (Stepson); Born: 6 February 1969.
Julie Cathryn Martin Camardella (Stepdaughter); Born: 7 December
1972.

Summary of joint duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (Flag Aug. 1984-Aug. 1985.... LCDR
Lieutenant).
Joint Staff (Deputy Director for Aug. 1996-Jun. 1998.... RDML
Operations (Current Operations)) (J-
33).
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Feb. 2002-Oct. 2003.... VADM
Command/Commander, Fifth Fleet.
Joint Staff (Director)............... Oct. 2003-Oct. 2004.... VADM
Commander, Northern Command/ Nov. 2004-To Date...... ADM
Commander, North American Aerospace
Defense Command.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM Timothy J.
Keating, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Timothy John Keating.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, United States Pacific Command.

3. Date of nomination:
7 February 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
16 November 1948; Dayton, Ohio.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Wanda Lee Doerksen Keating.

7. Names and ages of children:
Stepson: Daniel Pratt Martin, 38.
Stepdaughter: Julie Cathyn Camardella, 34.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational or other institution.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Association of Naval Aviation.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------

[The nomination of ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2007,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 19, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Lt. Gen. Victor E.
Renuart, USAF, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with
answers supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)?
Answer. The Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, is responsible for conducting
operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed
at the United States, its territories and interests within the assigned
area of responsibility. As directed by the President or Secretary of
Defense, the Command is also responsible for providing defense support
of civil authorities, including consequence management operations.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. More than 3\1/2\ decades of experience including
operational combat service in Operations Desert Storm, Deny Flight,
both Southern and Northern Watch, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom;
command of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization support group, two
fighter wings, Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and 9th Air and Space
Expeditionary Task Force-Southwest Asia; service as the U.S. Central
Command Director of Operations; and Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces
provide a solid foundation for assuming command of U.S. NORTHCOM.
Additionally, my previous assignment as the Director of Strategic Plans
and Policy for the Joint Staff has reinforced the value of teamwork and
having a close working relationship with other combatant commands, the
military Services, National Guard Bureau (NGB), defense agencies, other
U.S. Government organizations, and international organizations.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
U.S. NORTHCOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continuously seek to further a better
understanding of and effective information exchange with the other
combatant commands and our international, Federal, State, and
interagency partners to increase our ability to work collaboratively
together in the areas of homeland defense and civil support.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S.
NORTHCOM, to the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, is responsible to deter,
prevent, and defeat threats to the United States as directed by the
Secretary of Defense and the President. Under the authority and control
of the Secretary and as directed by the Secretary, the Commander is
also responsible for defense support of civil authorities. The
Commander is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the
ability of the Command to carry out its missions. While serving as the
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, I have
participated in frequent and cooperative interactions between the
Secretary of Defense and the Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM. If confirmed,
I intend to continue the close working relationship between U.S.
NORTHCOM and the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is delegated full power and
authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to exercise the
powers of the Secretary on any and all matters for which the Secretary
is authorized to act pursuant to law. The Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM,
ensures the Deputy has the information and support he requires.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy duties include
formulating defense planning guidance and forces policy, Department of
Defense (DOD) relations with foreign countries, and DOD's role in
interagency policymaking. The Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, works closely
with the Under Secretary coordinating and exchanging information on
strategic policy issues involving homeland defense and defense support
of civil authority issues.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the
Secretary's principal advisor on intelligence matters. Commander, U.S.
NORTHCOM, works closely with the Under Secretary in order to provide
predictive and actionable threat estimates and timely warning of
worldwide threats against North America using fused, all-source
intelligence and law enforcement information that characterizes the
threat and provides strategic warning to support informed
decisionmaking.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Answer. Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, works routinely with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) on homeland defense and defense support
of civil authorities issues.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman serves as the principal military advisor to
the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security
Council. The role of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in
the chain of command of the combatant commands is threefold:
communications, oversight, and spokesman. Communications between the
President, Secretary of Defense, and the combatant commanders may pass
through the CJCS. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986
permits the President to place the Chairman in the communications chain
and the President has in fact directed that such communications pass
through the Chairman. Oversight of the activities of combatant commands
may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense to CJCS. Finally, CJCS is
the spokesman for the combatant commanders on the operational
requirements of their commands. Having been a Director on the Joint
Staff, I have first-hand knowledge of communications between the CJCS
and the Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM.
Question. The secretaries of the military departments.
Answer. Each military department is separately organized under its
own Secretary and functions under the authority, direction, and control
of the Secretary of Defense. The military departments are responsible
for organizing, training, and equipping forces for assignment to the
Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, and other combatant commanders. Commander,
U.S. NORTHCOM, works closely with the Secretaries to ensure homeland
defense and civil support requirements are met.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Chiefs of Staff are responsible for organizing,
training, and equipping forces for assignment to combatant commands.
The Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, is responsible for communicating the
needs of U.S. NORTHCOM to the Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. The other combatant commanders exercise command authority
over forces assigned to them as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
Having served in U.S. Central Command, the Joint Staff, and also for
the Secretary of Defense, I helped facilitate the multiple and valuable
interactions that occur between combatant commanders. If confirmed, I
intend to maintain open lines of communication with the other combatant
commanders, and to provide support and mutual cooperation whenever
possible.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The relationship with the Chief of the NGB is integral to
the success of U.S. NORTHCOM. U.S. NORTHCOM has regular dialogue on
issues of the utmost importance to the Nation. There are 43 Army
National Guard and Air National Guard Title 10 National Guardsmen
assigned to U.S. NORTHCOM as permanent party. There are also 23 of 30
authorized Army National Guard personnel that are assigned to U.S.
NORTHCOM as ``drilling guardsmen.'' Last month, I had the opportunity
to attend The Adjutants General Conference in Washington, DC, and if
confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Chief of the NGB.
Question. If confirmed, in carrying out your duties, how would you
work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Homeland
Security Council, and other Federal agencies, as well as State and
local authorities and representatives from the private sector?
Answer. In fulfilling its civil support role, the military is an
active member of the Federal response community. However, throughout
any crisis or consequence management scenario, civilian authorities
remain in charge and U.S. NORTHCOM's participation is almost always in
support of a designated primary agency. If confirmed, I will ensure
U.S. NORTHCOM continues to coordinate and conduct military efforts to
provide support to save lives, reduce suffering, and restore critical
infrastructure, while respecting the individual liberties and human
freedoms guaranteed to all Americans by our Constitution.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM?
Answer. Our enemies continue to seek new means of achieving their
goals and attacking our homeland. Countering asymmetric attacks and
being prepared to respond to the possible use of a weapon of mass
destruction on American soil, should our deterrence and prevention
efforts fail, will continue to be major challenges in the future.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that U.S. NORTHCOM continually
reviews and evaluates its plans and operations to effectively address
the dynamic nature of the threats aimed at its area of responsibility.
U.S. NORTHCOM will continue to expand a robust exercise and information
sharing program with its DOD, National Guard, interagency, Federal,
State, tribal, and local partners to ensure the command is able to
collectively meet any challenges that arise.
mission of u.s. northcom
Question. What is the mission of U.S. NORTHCOM?
Answer. Two missions:

Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat
threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its
territories, and interests within the assigned area of
responsibility.
Provide defense support of civil authorities including
consequence management operations, as directed by the President
or Secretary of Defense.

Question. How does U.S. NORTHCOM's mission relate to DHS's mission?
Answer. DHS has overall responsibility for the concerted, national
effort to prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and
respond to threats and hazards to the Nation. U.S. NORTHCOM's primary
mission is to deter, prevent, and defeat threats to the homeland and
provide defense support of civil authorities when directed by the
Secretary of Defense or President. Conducting both missions requires
close collaboration throughout planning and exercise phases, and of
course, during real-world operations to include pre-incident, crisis,
and post-incident stages. Ultimately, the capabilities of DHS and U.S.
NORTHCOM are complementary, focusing on ``unity of effort.''
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, would you anticipate
U.S. NORTHCOM would have the lead role in responding to a terrorist
incident?
Answer. In accordance with the Maritime Operational Threat Response
for The National Strategy for Maritime Security, U.S. NORTHCOM will
assume the lead role for DOD to interdict vessels at sea as part of the
U.S. Government's active, layered defense of the United States. In
addition, U.S. NORTHCOM will be responsible for responding to an attack
on a DOD installation within its area of responsibility. U.S. NORTHCOM
has a family of plans that detail its support to primary agencies, as
well as additional plans that direct action in the event that DOD and
U.S. NORTHCOM takes the lead for the response inside the United States.
Question. What responsibility, if any, does U.S. NORTHCOM have with
respect to the Critical Asset Assurance Program?
Answer. The DOD Critical Asset Assurance Program (DOD Directive
5160.54) has been superseded by the Defense Critical Infrastructure
Program (DCIP) (DOD Directive 3020.40). Under the DCIP, U.S. NORTHCOM
is responsible for establishing a command program for matters
pertaining to the identification, prioritization, and protection of
Defense Critical Infrastructure. In coordination with the military
departments, the defense agencies, DOD field activities, and defense
sector leads, U.S. NORTHCOM is working to identify and assess critical
assets and associated infrastructure interdependencies within its area
of responsibility. Under the DCIP, U.S. NORTHCOM is additionally
charged with acting to prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation of
DOD-owned critical assets within its area of responsibility. The
Command will only take action to prevent or mitigate the loss or
degradation of non-DOD-owned critical assets at the direction of the
Secretary of Defense or President.

ORGANIZATION AND AUTHORITY

Question. U.S. NORTHCOM has been assigned responsibility for force
protection and antiterrorism within its area of responsibility.
What actions would you take, if confirmed, to mitigate force
protection vulnerabilities, and what force protection challenges do you
anticipate you would face within U.S. NORTHCOM's area of
responsibility?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to place emphasis on
executing a synchronized and coordinated antiterrorism program and
force protection mission throughout the area of responsibility. I will
focus actions on efficient employment of resources for vulnerability
mitigation and promote procedural steps that enhance antiterrorism
programs and improve security postures for installations and
facilities. One challenge will be harnessing new technologies.
Question. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
efficiency in the use of funding for force protection and to prevent
unnecessary duplication of efforts between U.S. NORTHCOM, the military
Services, and the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue enhancements of the Core
Vulnerability Management Program to eliminate redundancies by mandating
force protection vulnerabilities be entered into a single database. In
addition, I will be actively involved in the ASD(HD&ASA) DCIP, which is
focused on ensuring availability of networked assets essential to
project, support, and sustain military forces protecting against and
mitigating the effects of attacks on critical infrastructure and key
resources.
Question. What specific forces, if any, have been assigned to U.S.
NORTHCOM?
Answer. Day-to-day operations are conducted by four subordinate
commands:

Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region is
located at Fort McNair in Washington DC and is responsible for
land-based homeland defense, civil support, and incident
management in the National Capital Region.
Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) is located at
Fort Monroe, VA, and commands and controls DOD forces that
respond to catastrophic chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) events.
Joint Task Force Alaska is located at Elmendorf Air
Force Base, AK. Military forces in Alaska are under U.S.
Pacific Command for normal operations. If Alaska-based forces
are needed for homeland defense, consequence management, or
civil support operations in Alaska, U.S. NORTHCOM will command
and control the forces through Joint Task Force Alaska.
Joint Task Force North is located at Fort Bliss, TX.
They support law enforcement agencies in counterdrug,
counterterrorism, and border patrol operations along the United
States-Canada and southwestern U.S. border.

U.S. NORTHCOM has few permanently assigned forces. Whenever mission
requirements dictate, U.S. NORTHCOM requests additional forces from the
Secretary of Defense, and if approved, receives them from the following
DOD force providers: U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Pacific
Command.
Additionally, the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps have
established Service components for U.S. NORTHCOM. These commands are:

U.S. Army North, located at Fort Sam Houston, TX.
U.S. Air Forces Northern located at Tyndall Air Force
Base, FL.
U.S. Marine Forces North located in New Orleans, LA.

The Commander Fleet Forces Command, located at Naval Station
Norfolk, VA, is designated as the Navy's supporting commander to U.S.
NORTHCOM.
Question. How has the assignment of forces to U.S. NORTHCOM changed
since U.S. NORTHCOM was established on October 1, 2002?
Answer. Since 1 October 2002, U.S. NORTHCOM deactivated Joint Force
Headquarters Homeland Security and activated Joint Force Headquarters
National Capital Region and Standing Joint Force Headquarters North. In
addition, temporary forces have been apportioned many times for defense
support of civil authorities missions, such as for hurricane support.

NORAD

Question. What is the mission of the North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD)?
Answer. NORAD's missions are aerospace warning, aerospace control,
and maritime warning. Aerospace warning consists of detection,
validation, and warning of an attack against North America and
aerospace control consists of air sovereignty, air enforcement, and air
defense of United States and Canadian airspace. Maritime warning is a
new mission, which consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating
maritime intelligence and information, and warning of maritime threats
to, or attacks against North America.
Question. How has NORAD's mission evolved since the creation of
U.S. NORTHCOM?
Answer. Since the creation of U.S. NORTHCOM, the NORAD mission set
has expanded to include maritime warning, which in turn enables the
U.S. NORTHCOM maritime defense mission. With respect to ballistic
missile defense, NORAD now provides ballistic missile warning to U.S.
NORTHCOM to support its ballistic missile defense mission. To support
these changes, NORAD has improved its sensor input, command and control
systems, and ability to respond quickly.
Question. How does NORAD's mission relate to U.S. NORTHCOM's
mission?
Answer. NORAD conducts the aerospace warning, aerospace control,
and maritime warning missions. The warning provided by NORAD enables
U.S. NORTHCOM to respond with regard to ballistic missile defense and
maritime defense.
Question. How does NORAD's mission relate to the mission of the
DHS?
Answer. NORAD supports the DHS by providing aerospace warning and
maritime warning of threats in the approaches to North America and
supporting enforcement when called upon by civilian agencies.
Question. Do you believe that NORAD should have a separate
operations and planning staff from U.S. NORTHCOM? Why or why not?
Answer. I am aware of the current initiatives at Headquarters NORAD
and Headquarters U.S. NORTHCOM to achieve efficiencies through staff
reorganization. If confirmed, I will analyze and structure the commands
to achieve these efficiencies in accordance with the law and guidance
from senior authorities.

NORTHCOM JOINT TASK FORCES

Question. Since the establishment of U.S. NORTHCOM, several multi-
service task forces, e.g., JTF-CS, Joint Task Force-North (JTF-North),
have been placed under its authority.
What is the current status of the Joint Task Force organizations
under U.S. NORTHCOM in terms of organization, planning, personnel
allocation, and capability?
Answer. Multi-service units with task force capability under U.S.
NORTHCOM's authority are Joint Task Force Alaska, JTF-CS, Joint Task
Force North, Standing Joint Force Headquarters North, and Joint Force
Headquarters National Capital Region. These task forces are currently
working with U.S. NORTHCOM on further plans development and refinement
to enhance execution of existing and emergent homeland defense and
civil support missions.

NORTHCOM COUNTERDRUG RESPONSIBILITIES

Question. What role does U.S. NORTHCOM play in the Defense
Department's overall counterdrug mission and organization?
Answer. U.S. NORTHCOM has execution authority for DOD's priority
counterdrug activities throughout its area of responsibility. Specific
tasking is in three broad categories: providing support to civilian law
enforcement, creating a shared network of intelligence and information
support, and leveraging theater security cooperation activities,
specifically with Mexico, to reduce the impact of illicit narcotics
trafficking on the homeland.
Question. How are counterdrug operations coordinated across
combatant command boundaries, particularly with U.S. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command?
Answer. Per the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Memorandum dated 21 August 2003,
Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) will execute
counterdrug detection and monitoring missions in a Joint Operations
Area (JOA) covering operationally significant portions of the U.S.
NORTHCOM and U.S. Pacific Command areas of responsibility. JIATF-South
coordinates counterdrug operations throughout its JOA with forces under
the operational control of U.S. SOUTHCOM. A Memorandum of Understanding
between Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, and Commander, U.S. SOUTHCOM,
delineates procedures to further coordinate counterdrug-related
intelligence, information, and operations.
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004 included a provision (section 1022) that authorizes forces
providing support to law enforcement agencies conducting counterdrug
activities to also provide, subject to all applicable laws and
regulations, support to law enforcement agencies conducting counter-
terrorism activities.
How has this authority been implemented, and what financial
resources do these task forces have to conduct counterterrorism
missions?
Answer. Joint Task Forces under U.S. NORTHCOM have been granted
authority to make incidental use of counternarcotics resources,
capabilities, and structures to detect and interdict terrorists through
a 26 April 2006 Deputy Secretary of Defense policy memorandum, titled
``Use of Counternarcotics Funding for Counterterrorism.'' Further, with
prior Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics
approval, Joint Task Forces can make non-incidental use of this
authority. I understand U.S. NORTHCOM appreciates the inherent
flexibility provided by section 1022 authority, but has not yet
encountered the need to implement the authority through its primary
counternarcotics task force, Joint Task Force North.

SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH MEXICO

Question. The U.S. NORTHCOM area of responsibility includes the
land areas of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The bi-national
NORAD Command ensures close cooperation between the United States and
Canada on security and homeland defense matters.
Do you believe it is important to improve our security cooperation
with Mexico?
Answer. Yes. Increased security cooperation among U.S. NORTHCOM,
SEMAR (Mexican Navy) and SEDENA (Mexican Army) would significantly
improve national security.
Question. If so, what would be your goals as Commander of U.S.
NORTHCOM for such improved relations with Mexico, and how would you
plan to achieve them?
Answer. If confirmed, improved relationships with Mexico will be a
priority. In fact, I hope to visit Mexico by the end of April. I will
emphasize mutual security interests addressing counterdrug,
counternarcoterrorism, and border issues through training and
equipping. Combined exercises to expand cooperative opportunities in
support of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America are
critical.
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives

RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

Question. U.S. NORTHCOM has Homeland Defense and Defense Support to
Civil Authorities missions, including preparation for and response to
an incident or attack involving CBRNE materials or weapons, in the U.S.
NORTHCOM area of responsibility.
If confirmed, how would you approach the challenge of ensuring
adequate forces, capabilities, and plans to respond to such incidents
in support of civil authorities?
Answer. There is nothing more important than defending the
homeland. If confirmed, I will ensure U.S. NORTHCOM continues to
coordinate closely with the DOD, the military Services, and the force
providers to identify military capabilities needed to respond to both
homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities missions.
Through a rigorous, realistic program that exercises all facets of the
National Response Plan, U.S. NORTHCOM will continue to refine processes
and plans in support of its mission sets.
Question. There are currently a variety of organizations and units
intended for CBRNE response and consequence management, including JTF-
CS, the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force, the U.S. Marine
Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), National
Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), and
National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package teams.
If confirmed, how would you plan to manage this mix of capabilities
to ensure the best possible response force in the event of a CBRNE
incident, and to avoid unnecessary duplication?
Answer. Many of the capabilities referenced in fact work together
under current concepts of operation. The National Guard capabilities
are designed to respond to local and regional incidents that may be for
smaller CBRNE incidents and/or ahead of a Federal response. If
confirmed, I will take a close look at all of the military capabilities
to ensure we have the appropriate capabilities, in the appropriate
numbers, in the right locations and States to provide the necessary
flexibility, agility, and depth of the military response.
Question. The U.S. Marine Corps CBIRF has not had regular or stable
funding programmed or budgeted since its creation.
Do you believe this unit should have regular and stable funding to
ensure its ability to accomplish its assigned missions?
Answer. Yes. The United States Marine Corps CBIRF is a unique
capability for Federal response in the event of a CBRNE incident.

NORTHCOM-STATE RELATIONS

Question. U.S. NORTHCOM has the primary military responsibility to
provide defense support to civil authorities when directed by the
President and the Secretary of Defense, including consequence
management operations. Such military assistance would often support
State and local emergency response units.
Do you believe it is important for NORTHCOM to understand the
emergency response capabilities and plans of the various States before
a crisis arises, in order to optimize U.S. NORTHCOM's consequence
management support?
Answer. Yes. As directed, U.S. NORTHCOM will provide support in an
emergency when the requirements are beyond the capabilities of civil
authorities in accordance with the National Response Plan.
Understanding the capabilities and plans of the States is imperative in
order to optimize U.S. NORTHCOM planning and operations. State plans
enhance U.S. NORTHCOM's situational awareness and expedite response to
incidents.
Question. If so, how would you plan to ensure that U.S. NORTHCOM
has sufficient knowledge of State emergency response capabilities,
including capabilities of National Guard units, and a good working
relationship with State emergency response leaders?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure U.S. NORTHCOM continues to work
with its interagency partners to strengthen the overall Federal
response to a State emergency or disaster. In response to the February
2006 White House report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina,
Lessons Learned, which recommended DOD better integrate its
capabilities with the State National Guard and the overall Federal
response plan, U.S. NORTHCOM has taken the initiative to get a more in-
depth understanding of State response capabilities. This past year,
U.S. NORTHCOM, through its Army Service component, U.S. Army North,
assigned and embedded Defense Coordinating Officers with each of the 10
Federal Emergency Management Agency regions. Their full-time mission is
to build relationships and understand the capabilities of both the
emergency response communities and National Guard of the States in
their regions. Every day, U.S. NORTHCOM is linked to the National,
State, and National Guard operations centers to synchronize planning
and execution of the military contribution to response efforts.

FORCE PROVISION FOR U.S. NORTHCOM

Question. U.S. NORTHCOM has the mission of conducting military
operations for homeland defense and, when directed by the President or
Secretary of Defense, for providing military assistance to civil
authorities, including consequence management for natural disasters and
CBRNE incidents. Yet U.S. NORTHCOM has relatively fewer military forces
assigned to it on a permanent basis.
What is your understanding of how forces are planned to be
allocated to U.S. NORTHCOM for its full range of mission requirements,
and what role U.S. Joint Forces Command plays in that process?
Answer. U.S. NORTHCOM possesses detailed and flexible plans to
respond and conduct military operations in the homeland, provide
assistance to primary agencies, or to lead the effort. These plans
provide comprehensive troop and capability lists to source the plans as
the Command prepares for an event or response to a no-notice incident.
U.S. NORTHCOM is closely partnered with U.S. Joint Forces Command, and
other force providers, at all levels, to ensure the capabilities listed
in U.S. NORTHCOM's plans are trained and ready to respond.
Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to ensure that U.S.
NORTHCOM will have sufficient forces available to it, properly trained
and equipped, to accomplish its assigned missions, including its Quick
Reaction Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to continue U.S. NORTHCOM's
excellent working relationship with U.S. Joint Forces Command and other
force providers. These relationships are synergized as the Command
works through the challenges of Global Force Management (GFM). I will
ensure through refinement of plans and requirements, as well as
participation in the monthly GFM process, homeland defense and defense
support of civil authorities mission sets are appropriately
prioritized, sourced, and sourced forces are trained and prepared to
respond as described in U.S. NORTHCOM plans.
Question. If confirmed, how will you monitor the personnel,
equipment, and training readiness of U.S. military forces (Active and
Reserve) for homeland defense mission-essential tasks in support of
U.S. NORTHCOM's contingency plans?
Answer. It is the responsibility of the Services to provide trained
and ready forces for combatant commands. If confirmed, I will continue
to ensure trained and ready forces are incorporated into the U.S.
NORTHCOM exercise program.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. One of U.S. NORTHCOM's missions is the ballistic missile
defense of the United States. You were Director of Operations for U.S.
Central Command during the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
during which the Patriot missile defense system demonstrated it was
operationally effective in combat against ballistic missiles.
Do you agree that it is essential that our deployed ballistic
missile defense systems are operationally effective?
Answer. Yes. An operationally effective ballistic missile defense
system, employed in a layered defense approach, is essential to
defeating threats ranging from short-range ballistic missiles using
Patriots and the U.S. Navy's Standard Missile Block 3s to long-range
ballistic missile threats using the currently deployed Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system operated by U.S. NORTHCOM.
Question. Do you agree that it is important to conduct
operationally realistic flight tests to demonstrate operational
capability and reliability of the GMD system?
Answer. Yes. It is important to conduct operationally realistic
flight tests to demonstrate and verify the operational capability and
reliability of the GMD system. The successful GMD flight test of
September 1, 2006, FTG-02, was the most operationally realistic, end-
to-end flight test performed to date.

U.S. NORTHCOM-DHS RELATIONSHIP

Question. DHS is still a relatively new Federal agency, and is
continuing to improve its ability to meet its homeland security
missions.
As DHS improves and matures its homeland security capabilities, do
you expect that will reduce the requirements on U.S. NORTHCOM to
provide defense support to civil authorities?
Answer. As U.S. NORTHCOM continues to improve coordination with
DHS, the Command may capitalize upon efficiencies in order to reduce
defense support of civil authorities. If confirmed, this is an area I
will monitor closely.
Question. What do you consider to be DOD and U.S. NORTHCOM's
appropriate role vis-a-vis DHS and State authorities in identifying and
validating the equipment and other requirements associated with
homeland security missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe DOD and U.S. NORTHCOM should work
toward a full integration of capabilities and coordinate acquisition
efforts with all mission partners to ensure unity of effort.
Identification of equipment and other requirements should be
synchronized to enhance interoperability and reduce duplication of
effort.

NATIONAL GUARD

Question. There is still considerable debate about the role the
National Guard should play in defending the homeland.
Do you believe that defending the homeland should become the
National Guard's primary mission?
Answer. I believe defending the homeland is the most important
mission for the military, regardless of component status: Active,
Guard, or Reserves.
Question. What is the current status of the working relationship
between U.S. NORTHCOM, the NGB, and individual State National Guard
headquarters?
Answer. My understanding is that the working relationship between
U.S. NORTHCOM, the NGB, and individual State National Guard
headquarters is strong and growing stronger. U.S. NORTHCOM routinely
hosts visits by NGB leadership and conducts conferences that bring
together The Adjutants General (TAGs) of many States for planning,
exercising, and training exchanges. Additionally, the current commander
visits TAGs and State leadership during his travels around the country.
If confirmed, I intend to continue to work closely and personally with
the TAGs and Governors and strengthen current relationships.
Question. If confirmed, what type of liaison relationships for
planning and operational purposes would you advocate between U.S.
NORTHCOM, DHS, Federal, State, and local first responders, and National
Guard units under State authority?
Answer. Throughout U.S. NORTHCOM's history, the Command has worked
closely and continually with DHS, Federal, State, and local first
responders, and National Guard units under State authority in
capacities ranging from planning and exercising to conducting and
collaborating on real-world operations. Recent progress in such
relationships has been exponential and if confirmed, I intend to ensure
this momentum continues.
Question. Recent changes to the Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. section
333, included in section 1076 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 clarified the President's
authority to call up the National Guard to perform Federal service
under circumstances resulting in the inability of State government's to
maintain public order.
What is your view of these changes?
Answer. I have reviewed the changes to the former Insurrection Act.
From my perspective at the execution level, if confirmed, I will carry
out the orders of the President, just as I would have done under the
previous authority.
Question. Do you think that the foregoing changes have enhanced the
ability of Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM to respond to emergency situations?
If so, how?
Answer. Please see the above answer.
Question. Do you believe that changes to the ``posse comitatus''
doctrine under section 1385 of title 10, U.S.C., and implementing DOD
and Service regulations, are needed for U.S. NORTHCOM to accomplish its
mission?
Answer. No, I do not believe that the Posse Comitatus Act is an
obstacle to the performance of any U.S. NORTHCOM mission. The various
statutory exceptions to this act provide sufficient authority for the
command's support to civil authority, as directed by the President and
Secretary of Defense.
Question. The National Guard is presently assisting DHS on the
southern U.S. border in a mission known as Operation Jump Start. The
administration proposed last year that up to 6,000 members of the
National Guard would be deployed on a temporary basis until DHS could
add additional personnel.
Do you believe that border security is primarily the responsibility
of DOD or DHS?
Answer. Border security is the primary responsibility of DHS.
Question. In your view, is border security an appropriate mission
for the National Guard or other DOD forces?
Answer. I support the President's determination, in consultation
and coordination with Governors, that it is appropriate for the
National Guard under command and control of the Governors to conduct
this mission in support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Would you support the deployment of National Guard personnel for
this mission beyond the 2-year period currently proposed, to include
the rotation of National Guard personnel to support this mission on an
enduring basis?
Answer. Since these National Guard forces remain under the commands
of their respective Governors, I defer to Governors on this issue.
weapons of mass destruction-civil support teams (wmd-csts)
Question. In recent years, legislation has been enacted to
establish additional WMD-CSTs with the goal of ensuring that all 54
States and territories have a WMD-CSTs within their borders. To date,
47 of the 55 planned WMD-CSTs have been certified by the DOD to be
mission capable.
Question. Do you believe the WMD-CSTs are appropriately organized,
sized, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions?
Answer. Yes. WMD-CSTs are a critical resource to the State response
and offer the State leadership great flexibility when responding to an
incident within their areas of responsibility. If confirmed, I will
ensure U.S. NORTHCOM, through U.S. Army North, continues to validate
and certify these unique capabilities.
Question. If not, what changes do you believe are needed?
Answer. Not applicable.
Question. What is your view about proposals that the Commander,
U.S. NORTHCOM, or the Deputy Commander, by law must be a National Guard
officer?
Answer. I believe the process to hire the Commander and Deputy
Commander should allow for the best-qualified officers to compete for
each of these positions. There are already two National Guard general
officers serving in U.S. NORTHCOM in positions that are not mandated by
law to be filled by National Guard officers. Specifically, there is a
two-star Air National Guard officer serving as the Commander of U.S.
NORTHCOM's Air Forces Northern in a position that is not mandated by
law to be a National Guard officer. Similarly, there is a two-star Army
National Guard officer serving in U.S. NORTHCOM's Army North as the
Operational Command Post Commander. Manning these positions has been
done without a legal mandate and selection of each individual was made
based on each officer being best qualified for the job.
In addition, the two-star Chief of Staff position in U.S.
NORTHCOM's headquarters is filled by a two-star Air National Guard
officer; this billet is a ``Chairman's 10'' position, designated to be
filled by an officer in the Reserve component, in accordance with 10
U.S.C. 526 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000.
Thus, given that the Chief of Staff position (one of the top three
positions in U.S. NORTHCOM) already is filled by a member of the
Reserve component, as well as U.S. NORTHCOM's success in hiring the
best-qualified officers from the Active and Reserve component, I
believe the U.S. NORTHCOM Commander and Deputy Commander positions
should not be mandated by law to be filled by National Guard officers.
I also believe that the officer development process for both the
Guard and the Reserve Forces needs to be reviewed. We must ensure that
select Reserve component officers receive appropriate joint and
operational exposure earlier in their career such that, at the
appropriate points in their career, there would be a pool of senior
leaders that could compete on a best-qualified basis.

INFORMATION SHARING

Question. On June 9, 2004, an incident involving a private aircraft
entering the National Capital Region airspace led to the evacuation of
the U.S. Capitol. The emergency apparently resulted from shortfalls in
the ability of various Federal Government agencies, including the
Federal Aviation Administration, DHS, and DOD to share information. The
mission of U.S. NORTHCOM requires rapid, secure, and effective
communication with a variety of Federal, State, and local entities.
What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that rapid
communication is ensured with other Federal agencies and with State
entities?
Answer. The information-sharing capabilities and protocols
practiced by U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD have improved significantly over
the last few years. Plans, exercises, and continual information-sharing
exchanges have all helped to identify weaknesses and refine operations.
Additionally, U.S. NORTHCOM has procured state-of-the-art
communications equipment to best effect communications and
interoperability with partners during a crisis.
Question. Are there any legal impediments that exist that slow or
prevent the rapid dissemination of information gained by military
components with other Federal, State, or local entities, or the private
sector?
Answer. I am unaware of any legal impediments that slow or prevent
the rapid dissemination of information to external agencies.
intelligence sharing/national counterterrorism center (nctc)
Question. What is the U.S. NORTHCOM's role and involvement in
developing intelligence assessments regarding terrorist threats?
Answer. U.S. NORTHCOM draws upon foreign intelligence, intelligence
derived from law enforcement agencies, and open source information to
assess the foreign terrorist threat to the area of responsibility. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency,
National Security Agency (NSA), and DHS are the primary sources of
intelligence and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), NCTC/Interagency
Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, DHS and FBI-finished threat
assessments are furnished to U.S. NORTHCOM elements as appropriate.
Threat assessments are provided to the Commander and senior staff, as
well as U.S. NORTHCOM component commands.
Question. What intelligence agencies are involved in providing
input to U.S. NORTHCOM's staff for the development of intelligence
assessments?
Answer. U.S. NORTHCOM terrorism analysts rely on a broad
collaborative network of counterterrorism organizations when developing
terrorist threat assessments. Terrorism analysts from NCTC, FBI, DIA,
DHS, and its components (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Coast Guard), NSA, and the
other combatant commands all provide inputs to the threat assessment
process.
Question. What is the current nature of the relationship between
U.S. NORTHCOM and the NCTC, and what will that relationship be in the
future?
Answer. U.S. NORTHCOM receives NCTC-finished intelligence and the
U.S. NORTHCOM Operational Intelligence Watch participates in a daily
NCTC Operations Center video teleconference regarding new terrorism
reporting. U.S. NORTHCOM is participating jointly with U.S. Central
Command and DIA in an NCTC process improvement initiative to optimize
the information-sharing environment. In addition, the NCTC plays a
critical role in supporting NORAD's aerospace control mission. For
Operation Noble Eagle responses, the NCTC participates in Noble Eagle
Conferences and provides real-time intelligence as applicable. If
confirmed, I will continue to support a strong relationship with NCTC.
Question. Does U.S. NORTHCOM have representatives located at the
NCTC on a daily basis? If so, what are their functions and
responsibilities? If not, why not?
Answer. U.S. NORTHCOM has a billet for a representative to NCTC.
The individual assigned is currently working at DIA. I understand he
will return to NCTC after the successful completion of the process
improvement initiative noted above, which will determine his new
duties.
Question. How do posse comitatus, privacy restrictions, and other
laws and regulations concerning the collection of intelligence within
the U.S. affect the way U.S. NORTHCOM receives and uses intelligence?
Answer. U.S. NORTHCOM can accomplish its intelligence mission
within the framework of existing laws and policy and is vigilant in
ensuring all intelligence activities conducted in support of its
mission comply with intelligence oversight law and policy. All
intelligence activities conducted in support of U.S. NORTHCOM
operations are reviewed by legal staff to ensure they are conducted in
accordance with law and policy.

CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. How serious do you believe the cruise missile threat is
to the United States and its territories?
Answer. I believe the immediate threat is from high-speed
commercial aviation flying in a low-altitude profile, similar to a
cruise missile; or possibly an unmanned aircraft system that can be
built in one's garage. That said, the threat from cruise missiles
launched by a terrorist organization or rogue nation is also a real and
increasing, though currently somewhat limited, threat.
Question. If confirmed, what capabilities would you prioritize to
address this threat?
Answer. The key capability to counter this threat is persistent
wide area air surveillance, which provides timely identification,
classification, and assessment of tracks of interest critical in the
defense against cruise missiles. If confirmed, I will advocate for
continued research and for demonstration of promising technologies to
enhance our capabilities and support the ongoing Homeland Air and
Cruise Missile Functional Solutions Analysis. Upon completion, this
analysis will provide a recommended family of systems to meet our wide
area air surveillance requirements.

CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE

Question. How has the continental air defense mission changed since
the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, 2001?
Answer. The Command's mission has expanded since September 11 to
protect against domestic airborne threats. NORAD's defense posture is
now aligned to counter the new threat.
Question. Do you believe that current U.S. continental air defense
capabilities are adequate to meet national security needs?
Answer. Yes. NORAD has adapted to counter the terrorist threat
posed to the United States and Canada through improvements to
surveillance and communications systems and through better coordination
and information sharing with the interagency community.
Question. If confirmed, what capabilities and programs would you
prioritize to address any identified deficiencies?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure NORAD continues to enhance the
capabilities it has under Operation Noble Eagle to respond to a terror
event and quickly increase air defense posture during a crisis. Future
program priorities include Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense,
wide area air surveillance, and improving the North American air
surveillance picture not only for DOD, but also for our interagency
partners--notably the National Capital Region Coordination Center and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

HAWAIIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

1. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Renuart, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) works with U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to
address issues of national security. However, my State of Hawaii falls
under the jurisdiction of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). While I have
asked this question before to your predecessor, Admiral Keating, who
did understand and assured me that PACOM's interest and that of the
Pacific were being addressed, I have also asked this question to
Secretary Chertoff of DHS and he was unaware that NORTHCOM did not
include Hawaii and that it was under PACOM. In this regard, what
efforts will you make to ensure that Hawaii's interests are heard?
General Renuart. The first priority of every combatant commander is
to protect the homeland. To that end, U.S. PACOM has developed plans
for homeland defense and civil support of Hawaii, which falls into
Commander, U.S. PACOM's area of responsibility. U.S. NORTHCOM has
coordinated on U.S. PACOM's plans to ensure seamless coverage for
homeland defense and civil support across the United States and its
territories.

STATE ASSISTANCE

2. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Renuart, as you probably know,
it has been reported in the media that the U.S. Government's response
to Hurricane Katrina was not adequate or quick enough. What assurances
can you give State and local officials that NORTHCOM will be prepared
to respond should a State Governor request military assistance during a
disaster?
General Renuart. U.S. NORTHCOM is prepared to support a designated
primary Federal agency in the wake of disasters with specialized skills
and assets that can rapidly stabilize and improve the situation in the
event that the President approves a State Governor's request for
Federal assistance. All Department of Defense (DOD) support is provided
at the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense and in
accordance with the National Response Plan. When requested, U.S.
NORTHCOM will be fully engaged in supporting operations to save lives,
reduce suffering, and protect the infrastructure of our homeland.
U.S. NORTHCOM has taken significant steps to improve our response
capabilities based on lessons learned and findings in the House Select
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to
Hurricane Katrina report titled ``A Failure of Initiative,'' the White
House Report titled ``The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons
Learned,'' and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Report titled ``Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still
Unprepared.''
U.S. NORTHCOM has incorporated the Joint Staff standing execution
order (EXORD) for Defense Support of Civil Authorities into operational
planning for the upcoming hurricane season. The EXORD provides the U.S.
NORTHCOM Commander authority, in coordination with supporting commands
and military departments, to: deploy Defense Coordinating Officers
(DCOs) and their staffs; establish operational staging areas, Federal
mobilization centers, and DOD base support installations in support of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and deploy airborne
fire fighting systems upon receipt of a request for assistance from a
Federal primary agency. In addition, the U.S. NORTHCOM Commander can
place the following assets on 24-hour prepare to deploy orders: medium
and heavy lift support helicopters, fixed-wing search aircraft,
communications support packages, patient movement capability, a Joint
Task Force for command and control of Federal military forces, a
forward surgical team, and a deployable distribution operations center.
To further improve our response capability, we have:

Integrated full-time DCOs and their staffs into all 10
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions Developed
pre-scripted requests for assistance for FEMA, in collaboration
with DOD and DHS, based on anticipated capability requirements.
Purchased, in conjunction with DHS, cellular network
packages that include portable cell towers, over 100 cell
phones, over 40 laptop computers, a satellite terminal, and
radio bridging. U.S. NORTHCOM also procured 300 satellite
phones for distribution per request of the primary agency in
support of State officials.
Identified a series of deployed communication options
from each Service that can quickly adapt to support FEMA's pre-
scripted mission assignments and the needs of a request for
forces from a joint task force, in addition, we drafted
communications request for forces and identified assets from
the Services and Joint Communications Support Element (e.g.,
voice, video, and data packages to support a small command post
or large joint task force).
Conducted Exercise Vigilant Shield 06 from 4-14
December 2006. This exercise tested U.S. NORTHCOM's command and
control capability to provide defense support to the Nation
during a variety of simulated scenarios to include a potential
limited ballistic missile attack, a maritime domain threat, and
support to a lead agency in response to a simulated nuclear
weapons accident.
Conducted Exercise Ardent Sentry 06 from 8-19 May
2006. This exercise focused on both homeland defense and
defense support of civil authorities and included a Category 3
hurricane striking the Gulf Coast in the vicinity of New
Orleans.
Hosted or participated in more than 140 conferences or
tabletop exercises since Hurricane Katrina.
Developed procedures with Air Forces Northern to
increase visibility and provide deconfliction of airborne
rescue assets.
Coordinated on a damage assessment concept of
operations with DHS and the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency. Collaboration is ongoing on pre- and post-hurricane
imagery collection processes between DOD and interagency
partners, as well as dissemination methods for imagery
products.
Deployed information management mobile training teams
to demonstrate and instruct the use of collaborative tools and
information sharing processes to our DOD and interagency
partners. Our teams have trained National Guard Bureau Joint
Operations Center personnel and the staffs of 28 National Guard
Joint Force Headquarters-State, 11 of which are located in
hurricane regions. We are also coordinating with U.S. Army
North to train DCOs and Defense Coordinating Elements on the
use of collaborative tools, process and procedures to
facilitate greater information sharing. This initiative started
in late 2003 and is an ongoing process.
Coordinated with the U.S. Coast Guard and National
Guard Bureau on a Joint Search and Rescue Center for large-
scale operations.

3. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Renuart, how will you ensure
that the needs of State and local officials are addressed in NORTHCOM's
disaster relief plans?
General Renuart. U.S. NORTHCOM and its component commands
coordinate with State and local authorities, including the National
Guard, to gain situational awareness of their civil support and
consequence management efforts. For example, Joint Task Force-Civil
Support (JTF-CS) is U.S. NORTHCOM's subordinate component for chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive consequence
management operations. To develop specific plans for specific events,
JTF-CS used the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici cities as a baseline to evaluate
all levels of emergency response to estimate the scope and magnitude
and expedite U.S. NORTHCOM's supporting response. U.S. NORTHCOM, in its
planning for homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities,
takes into consideration the role of the National Guard as first
responders for any crisis.
______

[The nomination reference of Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart,
Jr., USAF, follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 26, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Air Force to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of
importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General

Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart,
Jr., USAF, which was transmitted to the committee at the time
the nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF

Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., is the Senior Military Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC. He serves as the principal
immediate office adviser to the Secretary in all matters pertaining to
the department. In addition to accompanying the Secretary on his travel
and coordinating support to these trips, he serves as the Senior
Military Liaison to the military Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and the combatant commands. He also ensures timely execution of
taskings as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
The general entered the Air Force in 1971 following graduation from
Indiana University. He was commissioned through the Officer Training
School in 1972. He has commanded a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) support group and two fighter wings. He served as Commander of
the 76th Fighter Squadron during Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm, and supported Operation Deny Flight as Director of Plans for the
NATO Combined Air Operations Center at Headquarters 5th Allied Tactical
Air Force. In addition, he commanded Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia
and 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Southwest Asia,
responsible for control of Operation Southern Watch. The general has
served as the U.S. Central Command Director of Operations, wherein he
oversaw the planning and execution of all joint and allied combat,
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction operations for Operations
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. He also served as Vice Commander,
Pacific Air Forces, where he was responsible for Air Force and Air
Component Command activities for the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.
The general has flown combat missions in Operations Desert Storm, Deny
Flight, Northern Watch, and Southern Watch.
Prior to assuming his current position, General Renuart was the
Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff. He provided
strategic direction, policy guidance, and planning focus to develop and
execute the National Military Strategy in support of worldwide national
security operations, politico-military affairs, international
negotiations, and organizational issues through coordination with the
combatant commands, the Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
defense agencies, other U.S. Government agencies, and international
organizations.

Education:
1971 Bachelor of Science degree in production and industrial
management, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.
1975 Master of Arts degree in psychology, Troy State University,
Troy, AL.
1977 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air
Force Base (AFB), AL.
1979 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL.
1992 Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
1997 Senior Officers in National Security Program, Johns Hopkins
University, Baltimore, MD.

Assignments:
January 1972-March 1973, student, undergraduate pilot training,
Laredo AFB, TX.
March 1973-July 1976, T-37 instructor pilot, Craig AFB, AL.
July 1976-September 1979, Assistant Professor of Aerospace Studies,
University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN.
September 1979-April 1980, student, AT-38 and A-10 training,
Holloman AFB, NM, and Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ.
May 1980-June 1982, A-10 instructor pilot and flight commander,
92nd Tactical Fighter Squadron, 81st Tactical Fighter Wing, Royal Air
Force Bentwaters, England.
June 1982-July 1984, operations officer, Detachment 2, 81st
Tactical Fighter Wing, Detachment 2, Leipheim Air Base, West Germany.
July 1984-November 1985, operations inspector, Office of the
Inspector General, Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein AB,
West Germany.
November 1985-September 1986, Executive Officer to the Inspector
General, Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein AB, West
Germany.
September 1986-July 1991, Chief of Wing Inspections, 23rd Tactical
Fighter Wing, later, Operations Officer, later, Commander, 76th
Tactical Fighter Squadron, England AFB, LA.
July 1991-July 1992, student, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
PA.
July 1992-March 1993, Director of Assignments, Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel, Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein
AB, Germany.
March 1993-October 1994, Commander, Headquarters Support Group,
Allied Air Forces Central Europe, NATO, Ramstein AB, Germany.
October 1994-June 1995, Executive to the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Operations, Operations Directorate, and senior U.S. representative,
Allied Air Forces Central Europe, NATO, Ramstein AB, Germany (November
1994-May 1995, Director of Plans, NATO Combined Air Operations Center,
5th Allied Tactical Air Force, Vicenza, Italy).
June 1995-April 1996, Assistant Director of Operations,
Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany.
April 1996-June 1998, Commander, 52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem AB,
Germany.
July 1998-March 2000, Commander, 347th Wing, Moody AFB, Georgia.
April 2000-May 2001, Commander, Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and
Commander, 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Southwest Asia,
U.S. Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
June 2001-November 2003, Director of Operations (J-3), U.S. Central
Command, MacDill AFB, FL.
December 2003-August 2005, Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces,
Hickam AFB, HI.
August 2005-August 2006, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy,
the Joint Staff, Washington, DC.
August 2006-present, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense, Washington, DC.

Flight information:
Rating: Command pilot.
Flight hours: More than 3,800, including 60 combat missions.
Aircraft flown: T-37, AT-38, A-10, F-16, F-15, C-130, and HH-60.

Major awards and decorations:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters
Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Aerial Achievement Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster

Effective dates of promotion:
Second Lieutenant, Jan. 12, 1972.
First Lieutenant, Jan. 12, 1974.
Captain, Jan. 12, 1976.
Major, Dec. 1, 1983.
Lieutenant Colonel, May 1, 1987.
Colonel, Nov. 1, 1992.
Brigadier General, Aug. 1, 1997.
Major General, Aug. 1, 2000.
Lieutenant General, Jan. 1, 2004.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Lt. Gen.
Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF, in connection with his nomination
follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Victor E. Renuart, Jr.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace
Defense Command.

3. Date of nomination:
February 26, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
26 Nov. 1949; Miami, FL.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Jill Jenner Renuart.

7. Names and ages of children:
Ryan Victor Renuart, 32.
Andrew John Renuart, 29.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Life Member -- Sigma Chi Fraternity.
Member -- U.S. Professional Tennis Association.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------

[The nomination of Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF,
was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2007,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 19, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp,
Jr., USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Chief of Engineers to the following offices (for the purpose of
these questions, the term ``Chief of Engineers'' should be read to
include Commanding General U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)):
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. As head of DOD, the Secretary of Defense has full
authority, direction, and control over all its elements. The Secretary
exercises this power over the Corps of Engineers through the Secretary
of the Army, whose responsibility for, and authority to conduct all
affairs of the Army is subject to the authority, direction, and control
of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with
the Secretary of Defense in fulfilling the Nation's national defense
priorities and efficiently administering the Corps of Engineers in
accordance with the policies established by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense.
Question. The Joint Staff.
Answer. The Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as military advisers to the
President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assist the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out the Chairman's
responsibilities of providing for the strategic direction, strategic
planning, and contingency planning; advising the Secretary of Defense
on requirements, programs, and budgets identified by the commanders of
the unified and specified combatant commands; developing doctrine for
the joint employment of the Armed Forces; providing for representation
of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United
Nations; furnishing certain reports to the Secretary of Defense; and
performing such other duties as may be prescribed by law or by the
President or the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will cooperate
fully with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the performance of their
responsibilities.
Question. The Secretary of the Army.
Answer. As head of the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the
Army is responsible for, and has the authority to conduct, all affairs
of the Department of the Army, subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army may
assign such of his functions, powers, and duties as he considers
appropriate to the Under Secretary of the Army, as well as the
Assistant Secretaries of the Army, and require officers of the Army to
report to these officials on any matter. If confirmed, I will support
the Secretary in the performance of the Secretary's important duties. I
will strive to establish and maintain a close, professional
relationship with the Secretary of the Army, based on full and candid
communication with the Secretary on all matters assigned to me.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works is
principally responsible for the overall supervision of the Army's civil
works functions, including programs for conservation and development of
the national water resources, including flood control, navigation,
shore protection, and related purposes. Carrying out the Army's civil
works program is a principal mission of the Corps of Engineers and the
complex issues that arise in this area demand a close, professional
relationship between the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil
Works and the Chief of Engineers, based on mutual respect, trust,
cooperation, and full communication. If confirmed, I am committed to
establishing and maintaining such a relationship.
Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
Answer. The General Counsel of the Army is the chief legal officer
of the Army. The General Counsel serves as counsel to the Secretary of
the Army and other Secretariat officials and is responsible for
determining the position of the Department of the Army on any legal
question or procedure. If confirmed, I will ensure that my Chief
Counsel maintains a close and professional relationship with the
General Counsel and actively seeks the General Counsel's guidance in
order to ensure that Army Corps of Engineers policies and practices are
in strict accordance with the law and the highest principles of ethical
conduct.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff.
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army performs the Chief of
Staff's duties under the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The
Chief of Staff also performs the duties prescribed by law as a member
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Army Staff assists the Secretary of the Army in carrying out
the Secretary's responsibilities, by furnishing professional advice and
operations expertise to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the
Assistant Secretaries of the Army, and to the Chief of Staff of the
Army. Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
the Army, the Army staff prepares for and assists in executing any
power, duty, or function of the Secretary or the Chief of Staff;
investigates and reports on the Army's efficiency and preparedness to
support military operations; supervises the execution of approved
plans; and coordinates the action of Army organizations, as directed by
the Secretary or Chief of Staff. As a statutory member of the Army
Staff, the Chief of Engineers assists the Secretary in carrying out the
Secretary's responsibilities and furnishes necessary professional
assistance to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant
Secretaries of the Army, and the Chief of Staff of the Army.
Specifically, the Chief of Engineers is the principal adviser to the
Army Staff on engineering and construction matters. In discharging
these responsibilities, the Chief of Engineers must develop positive,
professional relationships with the Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief of
Staff, the Deputy and Assistant Chief of Staff, the Surgeon General,
the Judge Advocate General, the Chief of Chaplains, and the Chief of
the Army Reserve, in order to ensure that the Army Staff works
harmoniously and effectively in assisting the Army Secretariat. I am
committed to establishing and maintaining such relationship with the
members of the Army Staff.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. The combatant commanders are responsible to the President
and to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions
assigned to the commands by the President or by the Secretary with the
approval of the President. Subject to the direction of the President,
the combatant commanders perform their duties under the authority,
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and are directly
responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of the commands to
carry out their assigned missions. These missions include providing
humanitarian and civil assistance, training the force, conducting joint
exercises, contingency activities, and other selected operations. If
confirmed, I will support the combatant commanders in the performance
of these important duties by providing any necessary engineering and
construction services required from the Corps of Engineers to the
combatant commanders' component commands.
Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.
Answer. The Corps of Engineers is providing a broad array of
engineering and construction-related services in Iraq generally to
either the Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander or the State Department.
In the first situation, the CENTCOM Commander has the primary
relationship with the U.S. Ambassador and my involvement with the
Ambassador would be in support of the CENTCOM Commander through my Gulf
Region Division Commander. In the second situation, my representative,
the Gulf Region Division Commander, would have a direct relationship
with the Ambassador, but would coordinate with the CENTCOM Commander
nonetheless.
Question. The State Governors.
Answer The execution of the Corps of Engineers civil and military
missions often demands a balancing of diverse interests. The proper
reconciliation of these interests requires an understanding of the
Corps' authorities and legal responsibilities and open communication
among all parties. I am committed to working cooperatively with the
Governors of the States for the public interest. If confirmed, I pledge
to establish and maintain a full dialogue with the Governors of the
States on all issues we must cooperatively address.
Question. Please describe the chain of command for the Chief of
Engineers on: (a) military matters; (b) civil works matters; (c)
operational matters; and (d) any other matters for which the Chief of
Engineers may be responsible.
Answer.
Military Matters
The Chief of Staff presides over the Army Staff and assists the
Secretary of the Army in carrying out the Secretary's responsibilities.
The Vice Chief of Staff has such authority and duties with respect to
the Army Staff as the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Army, may prescribe for him. As a statutory member of
the Army Staff, the Chief of Engineers reports to the Chief of Staff,
through the Vice Chief of Staff, with respect to military matters.
Civil Works Matters
The supervisory duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Civil Works extends to all civil works functions of the Army, including
those relating to the conservation and development of water resources.
The Chief of Engineers reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Civil Works on civil works functions.
Operational Matters
The Chief of Engineers serves as a member of the Army Staff and as
Commander of the USACE. In this latter capacity, the Chief of Engineers
commands nine engineer divisions and one engineer battalion. When
employed in support of military contingency operations, these engineer
assets fall under the command and control of the combatant commander
designated for the particular operation.
Any other matters for which the Chief of Engineers may be responsible
The Chief of Engineers reports to each of the Assistant Secretaries
within their areas of functional responsibility. For example, in the
areas of installation and real estate management, the Chief of
Engineers reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Installations and the Environment. Similarly, the Chief of Engineers
reports on procurement matters to the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA-ALT).
Question. Who is responsible for providing direction and
supervision to the Chief of Engineers in each of the four areas listed
above?
Answer. In each of these areas, the Chief of Engineers acts under
the overall authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the
Army. With respect to military matters, the Secretary has assigned to
the Chief of Staff the authority to preside over and supervise the Army
Staff, including the Chief of Engineers. With respect to civil works
functions, the Chief of Engineers reports to the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Civil Works. In operational contexts, command and control
of engineer assets is exercised by the combatant commanders designated
for the particular operation.
Question. In your view, are there any areas of responsibility where
it would be inappropriate for the Chief of Engineers to provide
information to the Secretary of the Army or the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Civil Works? If so, what areas and why?
Answer. No. Certain information may require protection from
disclosure, as in the case of certain procurement sensitive
information, however, even this information may be shared if
appropriate steps are taken to protect sensitive and proprietary
aspects of the information. The relationships between the Secretary of
the Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works and
the Chief of Engineers must be founded upon information sharing, and
full and open communication about all matters. If confirmed, I will
ensure that all Secretariat officials are informed about issues and
provided with all information pertinent to their functional areas of
responsibility.
Question. What is your view of the relative authority of the Chief
of Engineers, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, the
Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of
Defense with regard to the civil works functions of the Army Corps of
Engineers?
Answer. As head of DOD, the Secretary of Defense has full
authority, direction, and control over all elements within DOD.
Similarly, as head of the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the
Army has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the
Department of the Army. Therefore, either Secretary could personally
intervene in an issue involving the civil functions of the Corps of
Engineers. However, the principal responsibility for overall
supervision of the Corps civil works functions has been assigned to the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works by statute and various
directives. Generally speaking, this supervisory responsibility
includes the responsibility for setting program policies and for
coordinating with the Department of the Army, DOD, Office of Management
and Budget, and other executive branch officials on the Corps budget,
legislative program, and other matters of program interest involving
the Corps civil functions. In general, the Chief of Engineers is the
engineering and construction expert responsible for carrying out the
civil functions of the Corps and for conducting the various program,
project, or study activities that comprise the civil works program.
Typically, the Chief of Engineers does not interact with the Chief of
Staff of the Army on a regular basis with respect to matters involving
the Corps civil functions.
The work of the Chief of Engineers often involves issues of great
significance to the States and localities and their elected officials
in Congress.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in addressing such
matters with Congress?
Answer. I agree this work often does involve issues of great
significance to the States and localities and their elected officials
in Congress. In fulfilling its statutory requirements, the Corps must
interact positively to define an appropriate Federal role in addressing
these issues that recognizes fiscal realities, environmental, and other
societal considerations. The challenges the Corps faces are complex,
and there are many difficult decisions to be made. It is important that
all interests be brought to the table and that they be given a voice in
the development of solutions to our Nation's problems. The Corps must
be responsive to these interests and must engage in an open,
constructive, and cooperative dialogue with the States, localities, and
elected officials to ensure issues are resolved in a manner that
maximizes the public interest.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the civilian
and military leadership of the Army Corps of Engineers in developing
goals for Army Corps of Engineers programs and presenting these goals
to the legislative branch?
Answer. The civilian and military leadership of the Corps of
Engineers plays an important role in developing goals for Corps
programs and in presenting these goals to the legislative branch. These
goals are guided by the leaders' technical knowledge and understanding
of Corps capabilities and by information gleaned from a variety of
sources inside and outside the Corps of Engineers. The leaders' goals
must promote the public interest, be affordable, and comport with
existing law. Ultimately, the leadership's goals will set the direction
and tone for the execution of the Corps missions, if embraced by the
administration and Congress. Military and civilian leaders within the
Corps play a pivotal role in shaping these goals, and in ensuring that
the goals are supported by the executive branch and Congress. These
leaders may be asked by Congress to give testimony on the goals or to
answer questions about the goals. They must be prepared to enter into a
full and constructive dialogue with Congress to ensure that the goals
are understood by and endorsed by Congress as promoting the public
interest.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. Sections 3031, 3032, and 3036 of title 10, U.S.C.,
prescribe some of the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of
Engineers. Other civil works related responsibilities are described in
title 33, U.S.C.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer.
Background:
Undergraduate - Bachelor of Science with concentration
in Engineering from West Point (majors not offered at that
time);
Graduate - Masters Degree in Mechanical Engineering
from University of Michigan and Masters Degree in Business
Administration from Long Island University;
Registered Professional Engineer in State of Virginia;
Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering at West
Point.
Experience:
Commanded Combat and Combat Heavy (horizontal
construction) units at the Platoon and Company level;
Commanded 326 Engineer Battalion, 101st Airborne
Division during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm - built
Camp Eagle II;
District Engineer, Los Angeles District during
Northridge Earthquake and Arizona Floods - military and civil
works responsibilities;
Chief of Staff, Corps of Engineers;
Executive to the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Division Engineer, South Atlantic Division;
Special Assistant to Chief of Staff for privatization
and best business practices;
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management
overseeing construction, operations, and maintenance of all
Army Installations;
Commanding General, Maneuver Support Center and
Commandant of the Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, MO, in
charge of engineer training, doctrine, and future systems;
Commanding General, Accessions Command responsible for
Army recruiting and initial military training for officers and
enlisted soldiers.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Chief of Engineers?
Answer. If confirmed, my first priority would be to meet with the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, Corps Leaders, Army,
DOD, and administration leadership, as well as Members of Congress to
seek their input into the major challenges confronting the next Chief.
In my view, the next Chief--and probably the next several Chiefs--
must be concerned with the following issues.
Maintaining the technical competence and professionalism of the
Corps. Attracting and retaining the most talented employees is key. The
Corps must train, equip, and challenge its people properly, and
continue to move forward as a recognized leader in developing and
implementing the best technology. The integrity of the Corps of
Engineers rests on the objectivity, transparency, and scientific
validity of its analytical processes.
Meeting the Army's infrastructure transformation needs stemming
from the base realignment and closure (BRAC) decisions, the re-
stationing of troops, and the ongoing increase in the size of the Army.
This is coupled with a need for meeting future water resources needs as
the Nation grows and demographics change. I believe the refurbishing of
our civil infrastructure (in which the Corps of Engineers shares
responsibility) as highlighted in the American Society of Civil
Engineers Report Card on the state of the Nation's infrastructure will
be a major issue.
The Corps, working with other key players, must help create a joint
and interagency stability, security, transition, and reconstruction
doctrine and process. This may include the creation of a civilian
deployment force to support the kind of contingency operations we have
undertaken in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq.
I foresee a need for more comprehensive water resources and
infrastructure solutions with new and innovative approaches. The Corps,
as a member of a team, will play a role in determining the strategic
direction essential to success.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I would need to complete a thorough
assessment of the needs, challenges, and opportunities. I am familiar
with the military construction (MILCON) transformation efforts that the
Corps has already undertaken. These efforts should speed up the design
and construction of military facilities, and promote lower costs by
leveraging the capabilities of the private sector. I believe this work
will need to be monitored very closely over the next several years to
ensure continued success. I have also reviewed the 12 actions for
change first announced last June in New Orleans by Lieutenant General
Strock, in the wake of the Hurricane Katrina disaster. I would also
track these to ensure they achieve the desired results. It is the
responsibility of the Chief of Engineers, and the Corps as a whole, to
provide the most professional advice possible to the administration and
Congress. I see a need to assure that the Corps has a vigorous and
continuous strategic planning process, as well as a systematic and
effective way of engaging the broad array of stakeholders.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Chief of Engineers?
Answer. Many of the Corps' missions require balancing disparate
interests. The Corps must further the public interest while executing
the assigned missions.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
you establish to address these problems?
Answer. As previously discussed, if confirmed, my first priority
will be to meet with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil
Works, Corps leaders, Army and DOD leadership, others in the
administration, as well as with Members of Congress to seek their input
in preparation for developing a plan to meet the various challenges. I
believe that the Corps must continue to transform its business
processes in order to become more efficient and effective in the
execution of its missions. I would go to the most critical areas with
the greatest challenges to make a personal and thorough assessment of
the needs and to meet with stakeholders and officials.
Question. In your view, does the Army Corps of Engineers need to
make any changes in the way it operates? If so what changes would you
recommend?
Answer. Historically, the Nation's rich and abundant water, and
related land resources provided the foundation for our successful
development and rapid achievement of preeminence within the
international community. Since the beginning of our Nation, the USACE
has been a great asset, providing engineering support to the military,
developing our Nation's water resources, and restoring and protecting
our environment. The Corps has improved our quality of life by making
America more prosperous, safe, and secure. The Corps must be flexible
and continue to evolve if it is to continue to make important
contributions to the Nation and respond to today's and future
challenges.
If confirmed, assessing the need for changes would be a top
priority. Typically there are opportunities for improvements in any
organization. I am confident that, in consultation with Congress, Corps
partners, and others within the administration, we could determine
what, if any, changes are needed.

CONTRACTING FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Question. For the past 4 years, the Army Corps of Engineers has
played a major role in Iraq reconstruction contracting.
What do you see as the major successes of the Army Corps of
Engineers in Iraq reconstruction contracting?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Corps of Engineers has
successfully completed almost 3,400 Iraq reconstruction projects valued
at over $4 billion out of a planned total of almost 4,500 projects with
a total value of $8 billion. These projects have:

increased power generation benefiting 1.3 million
homes,
provided 834 new grade schools serving 325,000
students,
provided 250 border forts helping to secure more than
2,000 miles of Iraq's borders,
provided for new and restored water treatment
facilities benefiting 1.9 million Iraqis, and
provided 11 renovated hospitals serving approximately
5,500 patients per day.

Currently, 900 reconstruction projects are under construction and
scheduled for completion by the end of next year with an additional 200
projects in the planning phase. These projects employ, on average,
22,500 Iraqis each week. Currently 75 percent of the Corps' contracts
are awarded to Iraqi contractors who not only employ thousands of
Iraqis but also gain the expertise, capability, and experience needed
to continue the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure once the Corps
of Engineers' mission is complete.
Question. What is your understanding of the major failures?
Answer. According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR)
over 80 percent of the reconstruction projects audited by the SIGIR met
project requirements. I'll list a few of the more significant factors,
as I understand them, that contributed to project those difficulties:

Some contractors and their subcontractors failed to
complete projects to an acceptable level of quality or in a
timely manner due to security issues. Due to the hostile and
dangerous environment, contractor supervision and contractor
quality control was not always adequate.
Construction management and quality control for some
projects had to be managed at a distance due to the inability
for the project engineers, and the quality control and quality
assurance personnel to physically visit the site.
Due to security issues, prime contractors had
difficulty in managing subcontractors. This was a problem where
local subcontractors did not have the same quality standards as
the prime contractor.

Question. What changes, if any, do you believe that the Army Corps
of Engineers should make to improve its processes for reconstruction
contracting?
Answer. From my understanding, the procedures used by the Corps of
Engineers for reconstruction contracting in Iraq are the same as those
used by other executive agencies. They are grounded in public law and
the Federal Acquisition Regulation. I believe improvement in the
processes for reconstruction could be made. For example, the
procurement processes and practices followed for Iraq reconstruction
were peacetime practices. The Army and DOD, in consultation with
Congress, should determine whether alternate processes are necessary
during contingency operations. If confirmed, I will further consider
this issue and determine what potential changes I might recommend to
the Army and DOD to improve the overall process.
Question. The Army Corps of Engineers has been criticized for the
process by which major contracts for the reconstruction of the Iraqi
oil industry (the ``RIO I'' and ``RIO II'' contracts) were awarded.
The RIO I contract was awarded on a sole-source basis to the
company that helped the DOD assess the status of Iraq's oil
infrastructure--an apparent organizational conflict of interest.
Although the Army Corps of Engineers has maintained that this contract
was a temporary ``bridge'' contract, intended to last only until a
fully competitive contract could be awarded, the contract had a term of
up to 5 years and a value of up to $7 billion. By the time that follow-
on contracts were awarded more than a year later, DOD had already spent
more than $2 billion on a sole-source basis.
Do you believe that the Army Corps of Engineers did all that it
should have done to ensure competition for this major reconstruction
effort?
Answer. While I have not been personally involved with this
mission, it is my understanding that when the Army was assigned the
responsibility for executing the Contingency Support Plan, the mission
was still classified. Under the circumstances in which the Army was
operating, and given the requirements of the mission, the Corps of
Engineers determined that KBRS was the only contractor who could have
provided the required services within the required timeframe. A written
justification prepared by the Corps of Engineers requesting authority
to award a sole-source contract was reviewed and approved by the ASA-
ALT. It is my understanding that the Corps has always planned to
convert to a competitive contract as soon as practical, and that the
successive RIO contract was awarded competitively. Competition is
always preferable, and the more competition the better. Circumstances
and mission requirements sometimes dictate procurement methods. The
Corps must comply with all procurement laws and regulations to include
satisfying the requirement to provide a justification for limiting
competition. I understand that there were several independent reviews
of the award of the sole-source contract and those reviews found the
award to be proper.
Question. If confirmed, what, if anything, would you do differently
if faced by a situation like this in the future?
Answer. Not applicable, in view of my previous answer.
Question. The RIO II contract was awarded to two different
contractors, including the RIO I incumbent. The RIO I incumbent was
rated as excellent in areas including past performance, experience,
business management, and contract administration despite the fact that
the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) found systemic deficiencies in
the company's estimating and financial management systems that ``raised
serious concerns about overpricing'' and advised the Army Corps of
Engineers to exercise extreme caution in contracting with the company.
Do you believe that the Army Corps of Engineers did all that it
should have done to identify and address problems and deficiencies in
the performance of the RIO I contractor?
Answer. I am not personally familiar with the details of this
specific contractor issue. DCAA is an extremely important partner in
the execution of our mission and, if confirmed, I will continue to work
with DCAA as we move forward with our reconstruction mission. It must
be recognized however, that DCAA is only an adviser. In making a
decision regarding what to do in any given situation, the contracting
officer must take the information received from DCAA, along with the
information from all other sources.
Question. Do you believe that the Army Corps of Engineers
appropriately took these problems and deficiencies into account in
making its award decision on the RIO II contract?
Answer. I am not personally familiar with the details of this award
decision. However, in accordance with law and regulation, it is
ultimately the responsibility of the Source Selection Authority to make
an independent award decision based on the identified selection
criteria and facts and information available.
Question. On June 27, 2005, Bunnatine Greenhouse--then the senior
civilian at the Army Corps of Engineers responsible for contracting--
testified before the Democratic Policy Committee about the problems
that she saw with the RIO I and RIO II contracts. Ms. Greenhouse
alleged that these contracts were symptomatic of an ``old boys''
approach to contracting, more directed to achieving specific outcomes
than to compliance with contracting requirements, which she asserted
was pervasive at the Army Corps of Engineers.
Do you believe that the Army Corps of Engineers, in its
contracting, has focused too much on achieving specific outcomes and
not enough on compliance with contracting requirements?
Answer. In my experience, the Corps of Engineers is an agency with
a strong focus on complying with contracting requirements, while still
accomplishing the difficult and challenging missions it is assigned. If
I am confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Corps of Engineers
complies with all applicable contracting requirements.
Question. The SIGIR has reported on a series of Iraq reconstruction
projects that appear to have been spectacular failures. For example,
the SIGIR has reported that: (1) the RIO I contractor spent the full
$75 million allocated for the construction of a pipeline river
crossing, but achieved only 28 percent of the planned pipeline
throughput, resulting in the loss of more than $1.5 billion a year in
potential oil revenues to the Iraqi government; (2) plumbing was so
poorly installed at the Baghdad Police College that dripping sewage not
only threatened the health of students and instructors, but could
affect the structural integrity of the building; and (3) after the Army
Corps of Engineers spent $186 million on primary health care centers
throughout Iraq, the contract was terminated with only 6 health care
centers completed, 135 partially constructed, and the remainder
``descoped.''
What is your assessment of the SIGIR's evaluation of these
projects?
Answer. SIGIR provides a valuable service to the coalition force in
Iraq and the U.S. taxpayers. The feedback and assessment provided in
consultation with SIGIR has helped identify areas of concern and
improve processes during the reconstruction effort. SIGIR has stated
that the problem projects are not indicative of the overall
reconstruction effort in Iraq. Obviously, the three specific projects
mentioned fall into the category of problem projects.
SIGIR identified the Baghdad Police College as not having adequate
quality assurance oversight. The Corps of Engineers acknowledged that
quality assurance was inadequate to monitor all phases of construction
for each building given the size of the project. Communication failures
between quality control, quality assurance representatives, the prime
contractor, and the project engineers also contributed to the
situation. During the deficiency correction period, the Baghdad Police
College is continuing daily operations and normal training functions.
It is my understanding that the Corps of Engineers terminated the
original contract for the primary health care centers. The Corps of
Engineers has awarded subsequent contracts and is making steady
progress in the completion of the primary health care centers. It is my
understanding that the Corps of Engineers has completed 31 primary
health care centers and has 124 under construction.
Question. What is your understanding of the major reasons for the
failures of these and other major reconstruction projects in Iraq?
Answer. There are a number of reasons some projects were not
successful. A few of the more significant factors are:

Question. What lessons do you believe the Army Corps of Engineers
has learned from its experience in Iraq reconstruction contracting?
Answer. I believe the Corps of Engineers could benefit from the
following changes:

Consideration of new contingency contracting
procedures that balance the requirements to immediately provide
needed supplies and services in contingency situations with the
need to obtain competition.
Reduce over-reliance on large design-build and cost-
plus contracts in favor of smaller firm-fixed price and
indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts.
Implementation of the President's proposed Civilian
Reserve Corps.

Question. What additional lessons, if any, do you believe the Army
Corps of Engineers should learn from this experience?
Answer. I think the Corps of Engineers learned from the Iraq
reconstruction mission that for future similar missions, a common and
consistent theater construction management and oversight organization
is necessary to synchronize all construction activities. During the
Iraq reconstruction mission, multiple and overlapping organizations
stressed the limited volunteer pool for expertise and brought a layer
of inefficiency to the process. Quality assurance and quality control
could be better executed with a lead construction agent clearly defined
early in the effort. It is difficult and expensive to execute major
reconstruction efforts in a wartime environment.
Question. Outside experts reviewing U.S. reconstruction contracts
in Iraq have suggested that: (1) the Army Corps of Engineers and other
responsible agencies were not adequately staffed to award and oversee
these contracts; (2) the effort to hire one set of contractors to
oversee the work of other contractors was misguided; (3) instead of
bringing in U.S. contractors to undertake major reconstruction
projects, the reconstruction effort should have relied upon Iraqi
companies to undertake much smaller projects; and (4) U.S.
reconstruction goals were unrealistic, given the security situation in
the country.
What is your opinion on these issues?
Answer. (1) It is my understanding that providing personnel to
oversee contractors was difficult because of the limited number of
government civilian volunteers and the ability to provide them with
adequate security.
(2) In some cases, due to the limited number of government
civilians available, an additional layer of contractor oversight was
needed. Ultimately, however, oversight of U.S. Government
responsibilities was performed by U.S. Government civilians.
(3) Immediately after hostilities in 2003, it was necessary to
bring in U.S. contractors to perform reconstruction work because of the
unknown capabilities of the Iraqi construction industry. As the Iraqi
construction companies geared up, the Corps of Engineers was able to
initiate the Iraqi First Policy. Currently 75 percent of the Corps'
contracting actions are for Iraqi contractors. One of the Corps'
primary missions is capacity development within the Iraqi government to
raise the management, execution, operations and maintenance, and other
skill sets needed for the Iraqi government to assume the reconstruction
mission.
(4) The U.S. reconstruction goals were ambitious, but I would not
characterize them as unrealistic. It is my understanding that out of a
total of 10,600 Iraq reconstruction projects, over 8,500 have already
been completed. The remainder are either under construction or planned.
Also, the SIGIR in his most recent quarterly report identified that 80
percent of the projects audited during the last quarter were quality
construction.

NAVIGATION MISSION

Question. The Army Corps of Engineers has built and maintains an
intracoastal and inland network of commercial navigation channels,
locks, and dams for navigation. The Corps also maintains 300 commercial
harbors and more than 600 smaller harbors.
What do you view as the greatest challenges facing the Army Corps
of Engineers with respect to the execution of its navigation mission?
Answer. I expect one of the greatest challenges with the execution
of the navigation mission to be the maintenance and modernization of
aging infrastructure. Maintaining our ports and waterways is critical
to our economic well-being. An equally significant challenge to the
navigation mission is the management of hundreds of millions of cubic
yards of dredged material removed from our Nation's marine
transportation harbors and waterways. My understanding is that the
Corps is continually working to make dredging and placement of dredged
material environmentally safe and acceptable. I believe that the Corps
should continue these efforts and look for innovative ways to increase
harmony between the critical need for navigation improvements and our
precious aquatic environment.
Question. What do you see as the most significant navigation
projects planned for the next 10 years by the Army Corps of Engineers?
Answer. Many ports, gateways to domestic and international trade
and overseas military operations, are operating at the margin in terms
of channel depths. Segments of the inland waterway system are congested
and are in need of rehabilitation. Clearly we must sustain the
efficiency of our major ports to assure our competitiveness in world
trade. I believe that the Corps must be poised to meet these needs.
Question. What role, if any, do you believe the approval or
disapproval of navigation industry groups should play in decisions made
by the Army Corps of Engineers about specific projects?
Answer. Decisions regarding Corps of Engineers projects are the
responsibility of officials in the executive and legislative branches.
For its part, the Corps should listen to all interested parties and
stakeholders and fully integrate economic and environmental values. The
Water Resources Development Act of 1986 established the Inland
Waterways User Board and charged this board to report to the President
and Congress on priorities for investment in the inland system.
Question. In November 2000, the Army Inspector General found that
three Army Corps of Engineers officials had manipulated data in a cost-
benefit analysis in order to justify a $1 billion project.
What is your understanding of the steps that the Army Corps of
Engineers has taken since 2000 to ensure that projects are
appropriately analyzed and justified?
Answer. My understanding is that the Corps has made substantial
changes to assure that projects are appropriately analyzed and
justified. The Corps has strengthened its own procedures for internal
peer review and adopted procedures for external peer review under
guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget. The Directorate
of Civil Works now houses an Office of Water Project Review that is
separate from project development functions. It is my understanding
that a significant program of planning improvement is being undertaken
that includes training, model certification, and centers of planning
expertise.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
technical analyses conducted by and for the Army Corps of Engineers are
independent and sound?
Answer. If confirmed, I would evaluate the current process and be
guided by the principle that Corps technical analyses be absolutely
sound and the project evaluation process be transparent. The Chief of
Engineers must be trusted with the technical discretion essential to
meeting our Nation's water resources needs. External reviews can
contribute to reducing controversy and risk, but these reviews must be
integrated into the project development process not added at the end of
the process. Integration of external review will improve projects and
will assist the Corps in meeting urgent needs in a timely manner.

NATIONAL LEVEE SAFETY PROGRAM

Question. The Army Corps of Engineers has been criticized for its
failure to do more to protect New Orleans from catastrophic hurricane
damage. The alleged failures of the Army Corps include: (1) the
construction of a shipping channel that acted as a ``superhighway''
funneling the storm surge from Hurricane Katrina directly into New
Orleans; (2) the failure to properly account for the soil structure
under the New Orleans levees; (3) the failure to adequately maintain
the levees; and (4) the failure to construct levees sufficient to
protect the city in the event of a direct hit by a strong hurricane.
What is your view of these criticisms?
Answer. While I, like the rest of the Nation, am generally familiar
with the tragedies and widespread damages associated with Hurricane
Katrina, I am not personally familiar with the specific issues raised
above. I understand that the Corps of Engineers has initiated and been
involved with several ongoing analyses and studies of the potential
causes and effects of the hurricanes and the status of the hurricane
storm damage reduction projects in the New Orleans area. I understand
and appreciate the importance of this issue and, if confirmed, will
immediately learn more about the past, present, and future work and
issues associated with the ongoing efforts in the New Orleans area.
Speaking generally, I support, and would welcome thoughtful and
independent analysis of Corps activities such as those undertaken after
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. A full and complete understanding of what
happened in both the technical and decisionmaking arenas is an
essential component of assuring it does not happen again.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes to the structure,
processes, or priorities of the Army Corps of Engineers as a result of
the events in New Orleans?
Answer. I have not developed a position on the structure,
processes, or priorities of the Corps as a result of the events in New
Orleans. However, if confirmed, one of my first priorities will be to
thoroughly examine the issues in New Orleans and to determine if
potential changes to the Corps of Engineers structure or processes
would be beneficial. It is essential, in my view, that such an
examination be made in cooperation with Congress, others within the
administration, and a broad array of stakeholders.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army
Corps of Engineers is taking in the reconstruction of the New Orleans
levees to protect the city from a recurrence of the tragic events of
August 2005?
Answer. I know that the Corps of Engineers is involved in many
ongoing reconstruction efforts in the New Orleans area, including
improvements to the hurricane storm damage reduction projects. I know
that the Corps is working towards designing and building an integrated
system that will provide protection from a 100-year storm event. If
confirmed, I will make it a priority to learn about all ongoing efforts
in this area.
Question. The Army Corps of Engineers recently completed a
nationwide river levee inspection process and identified numerous
unacceptably maintained levees. Media reports quoted Corps of Engineers
officials as acknowledging that past inspections were not documented
adequately and that a lack of resources has made it difficult for
periodic inspections to be performed. The operation and maintenance of
levee systems is a shared responsibility of State and local sponsors,
however, there is enormous dependence on the Corps of Engineers for
inspection, identification of problems, risk assessment, and where
required, rehabilitation.
What is your opinion of what the Corps of Engineers and Federal,
State, and local authorities need to accomplish in order to ensure that
existing deficiencies in the national system of levees are addressed?
Answer. The management of the Nation's levees is a shared
responsibility among local, State, and Federal Government. I believe
that the Corps should maintain a leadership role in this management
responsibility and ensure that all parties are fulfilling their
responsibilities. This includes thorough, joint inspections by the
Corps and the levee owners, followed by immediate maintenance action by
the levee owners. The Corps possesses administrative options to require
proper operation and maintenance and I believe the Corps should
exercise those options when necessary in order to ensure that the
projects will perform as expected. Public safety must be the priority.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
those levees representing the highest risk of failure and loss of life
and property are rehabilitated?
Answer. Protecting the public from catastrophic flooding is a key
part of the Corps' mission. The Corps is currently in the process of
developing an assessment methodology to identify levees which represent
the highest risk of failure and loss of life and property. I believe
the Corps should, after identification, work with levee owners and
other key stakeholders to determine a rehabilitation plan using the
available processes and programs. The Corps must work closely with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, States, local governments, and
other stakeholders to ensure an understanding of risks and to develop
comprehensive solutions that best address the need to improve system
performance and reduce future flood damages.

HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING

Question. The Army Corps of Engineers played a major role in
contracting for reconstruction and relief in the wake of the major
hurricanes of 2005.
What is your understanding of the major successes of the Army Corps
of Engineers in relief and reconstruction contracting?
Answer. The Corps of Engineers has a long tradition of providing
disaster response assistance. Most recently, the Corps was a major
player in the Federal response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.
In addition to deploying over 8,000 Corps employees to provide disaster
support, it leveraged the expertise, capacity, and capabilities of the
private sector to provide relief assistance.
It is my understanding that a major contracting success is that of
the Corps' program which utilizes ``Pre-Awarded'' contracts. This
initiative provides the Corps with the ability to rapidly and
effectively respond in order to execute major relief missions. After
Hurricane Katrina, the Corps employed this initiative to rapidly
provide emergency services. These contracts allowed the Corps to
provide the initial assistance, while follow-on contracts could be
competitively awarded to provide additional capabilities and capacity.
Question. What is your understanding of the major failures?
Answer. I am not aware of any specific major failures; however, if
confirmed, I will look into the overall response to this, and other
emergencies, and look for ways to improve the Corps' processes.
Question. What changes, if any, do you believe that the Army Corps
of Engineers should make to improve its processes for reconstruction
and relief contracting?
Answer. From my experience with the Corps of Engineers, it is an
organization that is constantly looking for ways to improve. I believe
it is important that the Corps work closely with the Department of
Homeland Security, and other Federal and non-Federal partners, to
improve the collective abilities to deliver required commodities and
services in a timely, efficient, and cost-effective manner. The work
that the Corps performed during Hurricane Katrina has been and will
continue to be extensively audited and, if confirmed, I would look
forward to continue to work with these agencies to implement corrective
actions and improvements to the Corps' processes.
Question. Recent press articles have described a process in which
work was passed down from the Army Corps of Engineers to a prime
contractor, then to a subcontractor, then to another subcontractor--
with each company charging the government for profit and overhead--
before finally reaching the company that would actually do the work. In
one such case, the Army Corps of Engineers reportedly paid a prime
contractor $1.75 per square foot to nail plastic tarps onto damaged
roofs in Louisiana. The prime contractor paid another company 75 cents
per square foot to do the work; that subcontractor paid a third company
35 cents per square foot to do the work; and that subcontractor paid
yet another company 10 cents per square foot to do the work. In a
second such case, the Army Corps of Engineers reportedly paid prime
contractors $28 to $30 per cubic yard to remove debris. The companies
that actually performed the work were paid only $6 to $10 per cubic
yard.
What is your understanding of the payments made under these
contracts?
Answer. While I am not personally familiar with these particular
contracts, it is my understanding that the Corps of Engineers entered
into competitive contracts in order to complete its mission. Under such
contracts, the Corps would have no contractual relationship with
subcontractors that any prime contractor might engage. From my
experience, the Corps is an agency that expects all subcontractors to
be compensated for the work they perform and at the rate that their
contract requires. If confirmed, I will examine this issue in detail.
Question. What steps do you plan to take, if confirmed, to ensure
that the Army Corps of Engineers does not pay excessive ``pass-
through'' charges of this kind on future contracts?
Answer. I believe that the Corps should take steps to minimize the
tiering in the future. This could possibly be accomplished by awarding
more, smaller contracts to achieve the mission.
Question. The Federal agencies, including the Army Corps of
Engineers, have been criticized for awarding sole-source contracts on
the basis of ``urgent and compelling circumstances'' in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, even though some of these contracts were awarded
long after the hurricane took place or extended long beyond what could
be justified on the basis of that disaster.
Would you agree that the ``urgent and compelling'' exception to
competition requirements should be used to award a contract only on the
basis of an event, or series of events, that is reasonably proximate in
time to the contract award?
Answer. Yes, in general I believe that the ``urgent and
compelling'' exception should be used only in the immediate wake of the
disaster. I understand that the law requires competition except in very
limited circumstances and believe that competition is vitally
important. However, any determination regarding the specific use of an
``urgent and compelling'' exception to competition should be looked at
on a case-by-case basis. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the
Corps judiciously uses the ``urgent and compelling'' exception in
compliance with the applicable statutes and regulations.
Question. Would you agree that the term of a contract awarded on
the basis of the urgent and compelling exception to competition
requirements should not ordinarily exceed the period of time the agency
reasonably believes to be necessary to award a follow-on contract?
Answer. Yes, I agree that in general, the term of a contract
awarded under the ``urgent and compelling'' exception to competition
should not ordinarily exceed the time reasonably required to award a
follow-on contract. I understand that the law requires competition in
all but a few limited circumstances and I believe that competition is
the very foundation of Government contracting. However, the
determination to use the ``urgent and compelling'' exception and the
duration of the resulting contract must be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account the specific facts of the situation. If I am
confirmed, I will ensure that the Corps complies with the applicable
statue and regulations when using the ``urgent and compelling''
exception to competition.

COMPETITION IN THE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY PROGRAMS

Question. The USACE has historically been designated as the primary
contracting agent for military construction (MILCON) projects carried
out by the Department of the Air Force. However in recent years, due to
the perception of excessive overhead costs associated with the Corps of
Engineers, the Air Force has sought to establish an organic contracting
agency through the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence in San
Antonio, TX. Currently, the Air Force is limited by DOD policy to be
able to contract a maximum of 5 percent of its MILCON projects
organically, but in light of their success in achieving construction
savings, has requested approval for a higher percentage.
What is your view of the request by the Air Force to be allowed to
carry out a larger percentage of MILCON contracts?
Answer. The Corps of Engineers has successfully accomplished the
Air Force military design and construction mission since the Air Force
was established. I do not have an opinion on this specific issue at
this time. If I am confirmed, I will review the matter and will work
with DOD, the administration, and Congress to develop a position on
this matter.
Question. In your opinion, what would the impact be to the Army
Corps of Engineers by allowing the Air Force to serve as their own
contracting agent without limitations?
Answer. Congress passed a law in the early 1950s that designated
the Army and the Navy as the DOD construction agents and specific
certain assessments that needed to be completed prior to allowing
another agent to execute the DOD construction mission. If I am
confirmed, I will review the matter and will work with DOD, the
administration, and Congress to develop a position on this matter.
efficient management practices in the army corps of engineers
Question. In a report to Congress dated February 1, 2007, and
titled ``U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Response to Senate Report 109-
254, Management of Military Programs in the United States Corps of
Engineers, January 2007,'' the Commander of the U.S. Corps of Engineers
(USACE) stated that ``through MILCON Transformation, USACE will gain
economic efficiencies through design standardization of Army facility
types, centralization of design activities in USACE Centers of
Standardization, and focused business line contracting with regional
acquisition strategies.'' The report also forecasted that savings from
these efficiencies would be experienced by customers in later years
after full implementation of transformation initiatives, possibly
affecting rates charged by the Corps for supervision, inspection, and
overhead.
Do you support the goals of the Corps' current plan for MILCON
Transformation?
Answer. Yes. With the dramatic increase of construction that must
be accomplished in support of Army Transformation and the most recent
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005), I believe that the changes in
the Corps of Engineers' MILCON process are on target to assist the Army
to provide quality facilities less expensively and faster than the
legacy processes. The current construction environment dictated the
need to move from very prescriptive requirements to more performance-
based requirements in order to allow contractors to utilize industry
best practices and meet the Army's needs within the limited funds
allotted.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes or
improvements?
Answer. As MILCON Transformation is implemented, I expect the Corps
to collect lessons learned on MILCON Transformation projects as they
are completed and to make course corrections in the MILCON
Transformation process or wholesale changes if needed. I believe that
the strength of any successful process is continual assessment and
improvement.
Question. When do you expect the Corps' customers would begin to
see the real benefits of MILCON transformation in terms of decreased
costs for supervision, inspection, and overhead and improved delivery
times for construction products?
Answer. I understand that as a result of the greater use of
standard designs and ``adapt-build'' acquisition, the Army is expecting
a reduction in required design funds, over the Future Years Defense
Program fiscal years 2008-2013. Design fund savings is expected to be
$255 million which will be used to acquire high priority projects. With
the utilization of alternative construction methods such as modular or
pre-engineered structures and use of more industry best practices,
delivery times are expected to be shorter. Decreased costs in
supervision, inspection, and overhead should occur once both the Corps
and the contractors become more accustomed to the use of the new
processes.

USE OF INDEFINITE DELIVERY INDEFINITE QUANTITY (IDIQ) CONTRACTS FOR
CONSTRUCTION

Question. The Army Corps of Engineers plans to use IDIQ contracts
for a wide range of construction projects to support requirements of
Army modularity, the 2005 round of base realignments and closures, and
to implement the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy.
In your opinion, what are the pros and cons to the use of IDIQ
contracts for MILCON in the United States?
Answer. I believe that the use of regional IDIQ contracts for
MILCON will help the Army execute its program by allowing the Corps of
Engineers to use standardized adapt-build designs. In my opinion, some
advantages of utilizing IDIQ contracts may be:

Providing for a significantly shortened procurement
timeline for award of individual projects.
Allowing the Corps to award standardized facility
projects to contractors that have previous experience in
building with similar materials and methods.
Allowing the Corps to meet significantly shortened
project execution schedules.
Allowing the Corps to develop a ``Continuous Build''
program on standardized building types and to capture the
potential cost and schedule savings that may accrue as a
result.

The potential disadvantages to the use of regional IDIQ contracts
may occur if the MILCON program changes significantly or the number of
similar projects is reduced or funding disruptions occur in given
regions. Any of these changes may affect the ``Continuous Build''
program and the benefits associated with it.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact to the Corps of
Engineers if the use of IDIQ contracts were curtailed or limited by
Congress?
Answer. The most significant impact would likely be the Corps'
inability to meet the Army's execution schedules for re-stationing and
BRAC commitments. The curtailment or limiting of these types of
contracts would lengthen project procurement timelines and cause
project schedule delays that would ripple through the Army's execution
plans for re-stationing and BRAC.

BUNDLING OF CONTRACTS BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Question. The Army Corps of Engineers is faced with the significant
challenge of carrying out construction requirements over the next 5
years imposed by the combination of force structure changes due to Army
modularity, the 2005 round of Base Realignments and Closures, the
implementation of the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy,
and most recently, the Army's initiative to grow the force. In
response, the Corps plans to allow construction contractors to propose
alternate types of construction, including pre-manufactured and modular
buildings, to bundle projects for multiple buildings into one delivery
order, and to rely on design-build acquisitions, which requires one
contractor to provide both design and construction services. The net
effect of these proposals will be to reduce the pool of qualified
contractors able to bid on such large and complicated projects.
Question. In your view, what benefits, if any would be gained by
these initiatives?
Answer. I believe that there will be reduced costs based on the
experience gained from performing similar projects on a repetitive
basis. It stands to reason that the more projects that a single
contractor completes, the less costly each project becomes. For
example, a contractor may need only one management team to oversee the
construction of several buildings. Combining multiple projects should
also lead to efficiency savings due to shortened learning curve and
implementation of lessons learned, as well as material savings as
contractors buy in bigger quantities.
Question. What are the risks to increasing the size and range of
services required by these contracts?
Answer. It is a possibility that increasing the size of the
contracts and decreasing the pool of contractors could result in
reduced competition and an increase of costs. Large contracts may cause
the contractors to become overburdened. However, I believe that the
risk may be minimized through a thorough best value source selection
process. From my experience, the Corps has a very good track record
when it comes to construction source selection.
Question. In your opinion, how can the Corps of Engineers ensure a
healthy bid climate that allows for a full range of small and mid-range
businesses to compete for construction contracts?
Answer. I believe that the Corps must ensure that businesses of all
types may compete for construction contracts. Some ways in which to
achieve this goal would be to emphasize small and disadvantaged
business subcontracting goals, and to hold national and regional
industry days and technical forums. Additionally, requirements should
be developed so that small and mid-sized businesses are able to compete
and opportunities provided to disadvantaged contractors.
Question. In your opinion, what are the benefits and costs
resulting from the Corps of Engineers' decision to accept a less
permanent type of construction?
Answer. While developing the national acquisition strategy, it is
my understanding that the Corps has partnered with industry and
identified changes that may allow it to operate more efficiently. The
MILCON program uses technical performance criteria that rewards
innovative construction methods throughout the United States. Among
these innovative construction methods are offsite prefabricated modular
assemblies, tilt-up construction, panelized assemblies, the use of
combinations of different material types and others. The expected
benefits are an improvement in completion schedules and reduced costs.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

Question. If confirmed, you will take charge of the largest
construction program in the country. Virtually every major civil works
project of the Army Corps of Engineers raises environmental concerns.
What is your view of the appropriate balance between the missions
and projects of the Army Corps of Engineers and the National
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) and other environmental statutes?
Answer. I believe that the Corps can and must carry out its
missions in an environmentally responsible manner. In fact, one of the
Corps' three main civil works mission areas is Aquatic Ecosystem
Restoration. The Corps has a long record of coordinating its missions
and planning its projects in compliance with the provisions of NEPA and
other environmental statutes, which has led to better and more
environmentally sensitive projects. If confirmed, I am committed to
ensuring that they are planned and constructed in such a manner as to
avoid or minimize environmental impacts.
Question. The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for
environmental restoration projects at DOD Formerly Used Defense Sites
(FUDS) and at Department of Energy Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial
Action Program (FUSRAP) sites.
What do you view as the greatest challenges facing the Army Corps
of Engineers with respect to the execution of its environmental
restoration mission?
Answer. It is my understanding that continuing to execute the vital
cleanup mission while always protecting the health and safety of
workers and the public is perhaps the biggest challenge for the FUDS
Program and FUSRAP. Restoration standards and stakeholder expectations
are continuing to increase. The Corps must continue to apply good
science and management practices that will help to increase remediation
efficiency and to continue to meet the commitments made to
stakeholders.
Question. Do you believe that goals established for environmental
cleanup (including cleanup of unexploded ordnance) under these programs
are realistic and achievable?
Answer. The Corps does and should have aggressive goals for these
programs and meeting those goals will be a challenge. Most all of this
work is conducted on private property and involves numerous
stakeholders, many espousing conflicting agendas. If confirmed, I will
continue to press for ways to perform the mission in the most efficient
and effective manner possible.
Question. In the past, the Army Corps of Engineers has not always
been required to meet State's water quality standards in constructing
and operating its water resources projects.
Do you believe that the Army Corps of Engineers should be required
to meet State water quality standards in constructing and operating
Army Corps of Engineers projects?
Answer. Yes. I believe that the Corps should be a leader in the
environmental arena and, in most circumstances, should meet State water
quality requirements.
Question. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act requires landowners or
developers to obtain USACE permits to carry out activities involving
disposal of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of the
United States, including wetlands. For almost two decades, the stated
goal of the Federal Government has been ``no net loss of wetlands''.
Do you support the goal of ``no net loss of wetlands''?
Answer. Yes. Wetlands are important to human health, the
environment, and our economy.
Question. Do you believe that we are currently meeting that goal?
Answer. From what I understand, I do believe that the Corps is
meeting the goal of ``no net loss.'' This is an area I will explore if
confirmed.
Question. What specific steps do you believe that the Army Corps of
Engineers should take to move us closer to the goal of ``no net loss of
wetlands''?
Answer. I believe there are two principal measures that could be
implemented to assure that the Corps is meeting the goal of no net
loss. First, I believe the Corps must continue to improve its program
to verify that required mitigation is being furnished to replace lost
wetlands. Second, the Corps should develop a database to improve the
tracking of wetland impacts and mitigation. The combination of
increased review of mitigation with this new database will increase the
Corps' capability to confirm that it is meeting the goal of ``no net
loss of wetlands.''

RECRUITING AND RETENTION OF ARMY ENGINEERS

Question. In recent years, competition among employers for the
services of highly-qualified engineers has greatly increased.
What is your understanding of the Army's success in recruiting and
retaining for careers sufficient numbers of highly-qualified officers
and civilian employees for service in the Army Corps of Engineers?
Answer. From what I understand, the Corps is generally successful
in filling positions and usually has multiple highly-qualified
candidates for each position announced. The only area where the Corps
has experienced some recurring challenges is in filling requirements
for Iraq and Afghanistan and the large mission in the New Orleans area.
Many of the Corps' employees, both civilians and military officers,
have either professional engineering degrees or project management
skills experience. As I have previously indicated, recruiting and
retaining talented employees is key and is an area of great interest to
me.
Question. What do you view as the Corps of Engineers greatest
challenge in meeting its manpower and training and education
requirements?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Corps does not have a
problem meeting manpower requirements. The biggest challenge in
training and education is funding and being able to divert the
employees from their vital missions to obtain necessary training and
development. As the vast majority of Corps employees are project
funded, paying salaries during training periods has been and continues
to be a challenge.
Question. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that the
Army improves its attractiveness to highly-qualified individuals for
service in both the Active and Reserve components and in the civilian
workforce?
Answer. Recently, legislation was enacted providing additional
benefits for Corps employees willing to deploy in support of national
security missions. For example, a provision has been enacted in the
last several National Defense Authorization Acts that raises the pay
cap for overtime pay to civilians deployed in support of missions that
fall under the CENTCOM Commander's purview. Similar legislation has
been proposed for those employees deployed within the United States who
are supporting the ongoing reconstruction and restoration efforts in
New Orleans.

NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM

Question. The Army Chief of Engineers has responsibility for a
Federal civilian workforce of more than 35,000, portions of which are
in the process of transition to the National Security Personnel System
(NSPS). NSPS implementation efforts to date have underscored the
essential requirement for senior leadership understanding and oversight
in various NSPS features including employee perception of fairness,
rewards of performance based on merit, transparency in the development
of pay bands and pay pools, and adequate training for supervisors and
employees at all levels in the organization.
What is your understanding of the Corps of Engineers progress to
date in implementing NSPS, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that
the Army Corps of Engineers transition to NSPS is successful?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Corps is in the process of
converting to NSPS. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that this
system will be successfully implemented within the Corps of Engineers.

HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING FOR THE CIVILIAN WORKFORCE

Question. DOD is developing a comprehensive human capital strategic
plan for its Federal civilian workforce which is intended to identify
critical skills and competencies needed in the future civilian employee
workforce, as well as a plan of action for developing and reshaping the
Federal civilian workforce.
If confirmed, how would you approach the task of identifying gaps
in needed skills in the Army Corps of Engineers workforce and ensuring
that adequate resources, training, and professional development efforts
are undertaken to achieve the Corps' workforce goals?
Answer. I understand that the Office of Management and Budget has
given the Corps of Engineers the highest rating for progress and status
made in implementing the human capital initiatives under the
President's Management Agenda. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure
that the Corps continues to develop the workforce and achieve
appropriate goals.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

ARMY ENGINEERING RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND ENGINEERING CENTER

1. Senator Reed. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, how do the
research and development (R&D) programs of Army Engineering Research
Development and Engineering Center (ERDC) currently support the mission
of the Corps of Engineers?
General Van Antwerp. ERDC's R&D programs support the full spectrum
of Corps missions from peace to war. The ERDC's scientists and
engineers support effort cuts across all five of the Corps broad
mission areas; Water Resources, Environment, Infrastructure, Homeland
Security, and Warfighting. Their capabilities are complementary, and
reinforcing and are critical to the mission of the Corps.

2. Senator Reed. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, how will you work
to enhance the leveraging of the engineering and technical skills of
ERDC to assist in the performance of the Corps' mission?
General Van Antwerp. If confirmed, I will continue to fully support
the entire spectrum of research, development, technology infusion, and
sustainment within the Corps of Engineers. I look forward to meeting
with the ERDC leadership, lab directors, and scientists to learn more
about their efforts.

3. Senator Reed. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, how will you work
to ensure that the ERDC continues to maintain and improve its technical
workforce and facilities in order to best perform its mission?
General Van Antwerp. The Corps in its ``12 Actions for Change,''
highlighted its commitment to a competent, capable workforce as well as
a commitment to investing in R&D. If confirmed I intend to continue
that commitment and will make it a priority to visit the ERDC
facilities and assess the current status of the workforce and their
facilities.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

RECONSTRUCTION DURING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

4. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, it was a pleasure
to meet with you prior to your hearing, and I was pleased to hear that
one of the first things that you will do is to visit the Pacific
Region. In my State of Hawaii, the Army Corps of Engineers is very
important in particular for its work pertaining to shore protection,
water resources, and dam safety. In your response to the advance policy
questions, you mention that you ``believe improvement in the processes
for reconstruction could be made [in the area of reconstruction
contracting during contingency operations].'' While I understand that
you wish to discuss this matter with the Army and Department of Defense
(DOD), if there was one recommendation that you would suggest that
would improve the process for reconstruction contracting, what would
you suggest to change?
General Van Antwerp. Given the unique nature of the reconstruction
mission, I believe improvements in the processes for reconstruction can
be made. Specifically, the process for reconstruction contracting could
be improved by the consideration of new contingency contracting
procedures that balance the requirements to immediately provide needed
supplies and services in contingency situations with the need to obtain
competition. This type of change would most likely require changes to
the Federal Acquisition Regulations. If properly done, this could allow
Federal agencies such as the Corps of Engineers greater flexibility in
contracting in contingency operations.

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

5. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in your response
to the advance policy questions for this hearing, you listed as major
Army Corps' successes in Iraq ``increased power generation benefiting
1.3 million homes.'' Are you aware that during the week of February 22-
28, electricity availability averaged 6.2 hours per day in Baghdad and
9.7 hours nationwide? Electricity output for the week was 6 percent
below the same period in 2006. Since the beginning of 2004, we have
been unable to provide and sustain a significant increase in electrical
generation and distribution capacity to meet the Iraqi power demands. I
believe the chances of success in Iraq would be significantly enhanced
if critical and highly visible infrastructure projects, such as the
restoration of electrical power to the Iraqi citizens at a level
meeting or exceeding the demand by the Iraqi population, were to be
successful. What do you believe we can do to build on the Army Corps'
successes in Iraq to increase generation and distribution capacity and
sustain it at a higher level with a goal of meeting the needs of the
Iraqi population?
General Van Antwerp. I inquired about the electricity availability
in February. A significant portion of the generation capacity was taken
off-line for planned maintenance because demand is relatively low
during that timeframe. Demand has increased an average of around 10
percent per year since 2003. Last summer the Iraqi's reached a peak
generation of 5,700MW, and we expect they will exceed that this summer.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was allocated about $4.3 billion
to improve Iraq's electricity infrastructure. The World Bank estimated
in 2003 that it would take more than $20 billion to bring Iraq's
electrical system to the point where it could supply power to all of
Iraq for 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. That number is now estimated
to be as high as $40 to $50 billion. The Iraq reconstruction program is
just a stepping stone on the way to improving Iraq's electrical
infrastructure. It is my understanding that it will take several years
and significant international and Government of Iraq investment to
completely upgrade Iraq's electrical infrastructure and give Iraqis
power 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, nationwide.

6. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in your advance
policy questions responses for this hearing, you stated that many of
the Iraq reconstruction projects in Iraq had problems with contractor
supervision and quality due to the hostile environment. You further
stated that quality control had to be managed at a distance due to the
inability for project engineers and quality assurance personnel to
physically visit the site. Lack of appropriate oversight on contracting
in Iraq has been a major problem, and it seems to me that these types
of problems you described were predictable given the operational
environment in Iraq. What do you suggest we could have done, or should
do in the future, to prevent these types of problems, and to ensure
that the American people get the full value for their tax dollars?
General Van Antwerp. In his most recent quarterly report, it is my
understanding that the Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR) found
that 87 percent of the Iraq reconstruction projects reviewed by the
SIGIR during the last quarter met contract standards. While the goal
would obviously be 100 percent of the projects, I think an 87-percent
success rate in this difficult environment is encouraging.
The Iraq Reconstruction program is carried out in a hostile
environment with an inherent high risk and formidable security
challenges. Violence and hostile activity against United States and
Iraqi personnel does impede reconstruction efforts by slowing progress
on projects, restricting the movement of personnel, and diverting
resources from reconstruction to security. However, the customary
practices for the Corps' Quality Assurance that apply in a peacetime
environment are still relevant to the Iraq reconstruction effort. It is
my understanding that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region
Division, does everything it can to see that U.S. Government personnel
make timely visits to construction sites to ensure project quality,
enforce financial responsibility, and ensure that the end product is
constructed to meet the contract requirements. When U.S. personnel are
not able to visit a project site due to security concerns, I understand
the Corps' Gulf Region Division has Iraqi nationals conduct site visits
and assist U.S. personnel in providing quality assurance oversight. I
think including local nationals in the reconstruction team has worked
well and should be considered in future operations.

7. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, do you feel the
Army Corps has been given all of the resources it needs to do the job
in Iraq?
General Van Antwerp. Yes. Following combat operations the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers provided Forward Engineer Support Teams to begin the
process of restoring the electrical and oil infrastructure to provide
essential power and funds for the people of Iraq. As the mission
unfolded, the Corps became an important asset in the reconstruction of
Iraq which necessitated the establishment of the Corps' Gulf Region
Division in January 2004. In addition to its own staff, the Gulf Region
Division is supported by the Joint Services and has the ability to hire
critical Federal employees and specialized contractors. Also, the Gulf
Region Division has supplemented its staff by directly employing over
500 Iraqi citizens as engineers, architects, and planners. These
individuals are deeply involved in the reconstruction effort and will
be instrumental in continuing the reconstruction program once the
Corps' mission is complete. In addition, the Corps contracts
construction work directly to Iraqi contractors who in turn employ
thousands of Iraqis through their construction firms. Finally, the
Corps has, through reachback support, been able to make available the
technical expertise from a workforce of over 30,000 employees, 9
research laboratories, 10 divisions, and 41 districts. The Corps'
forward units involved in the Iraq reconstruction efforts are able to
reach back and tap the resources of the entire U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers which greatly assists them in their ability to accomplish the
reconstruction mission.

CORPS RECRUITING AND RETENTION

8. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in your response
to the advance policy questions, you indicated that ``attracting and
retaining the most talented employees'' is a key challenge facing the
next Chief of Engineers. Has the Army Corps had problems with
recruitment and retention of highly-qualified engineers?
General Van Antwerp. The Corps has generally been able to recruit,
train, and retain sufficient engineers and scientists to meet current
mission requirements. However, the Corps does face challenges in
meeting requirements in some selected areas, because we are relying on
voluntary temporary deployments to overseas areas and major post-
disaster reconstruction efforts. I expect that the Corps, along with
the rest of the public and private sector, will share in the future
challenge of having sufficient engineers and scientists enter the
workforce to meet the Nation's long-term needs.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Webb

LEVEE SYSTEM IN NEW ORLEANS

9. Senator Webb. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, it is my
understanding that a Corps of Engineers estimate said that levee
systems in New Orleans needed to be dramatically invigorated before
Hurricane Katrina. Can you confirm whether the Corps of Engineers
warned before Hurricane Katrina that a different approach to the city's
levee system should have been funded?
General Van Antwerp. It is my understanding that prior to Hurricane
Katrina, Congress had authorized work on a reconnaissance-level report
for category 4 and 5 protection for southeastern Louisiana and that
these efforts were underway when Hurricane Katrina struck. The report
was completed and it was recommended to proceed to the feasibility
phase. The Corps had worked with State and local governments to advance
the completion of this work and advised that the current hurricane
protection measures did not provide protection for category 4 or 5
storms.

10. Senator Webb. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, what
recommendations were advocated by the Corps of Engineers during the 7
years prior to Hurricane Katrina with respect to the levee system,
including budgetary, safety, and structural aspects?
General Van Antwerp. The Corps recognized the urgency to complete
construction of the ongoing levee projects, as well as the design and
approval for new levee projects for the greater New Orleans area. The
Corps' annual budget request included funding for the ongoing hurricane
protection projects. The West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection
Project was budgeted annually at a funding level to complete the first
level of protection as quickly as possible. The ongoing study to
evaluate higher levels of protection in several parishes in
southeastern Louisiana was proceeding to the feasibility phase. Several
areas were identified for evaluation for raising current levee systems,
construction of barriers that may prevent storm surges from moving
inland and wetlands construction and restoration.

11. Senator Webb. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, what are the
recommendations now?
General Van Antwerp. The Corps of Engineers is committed to
designing and constructing the best hurricane protection system for
people and the environment within the resources provided and remains
focused on restoring levees and floodwalls to the authorized heights
and completing all planned projects in conjunction with the ultimate
goal of providing 100-year protection for the system, as directed by
Public Law 109-234. Additionally, several measures to provide higher
levels of protection are now being reviewed under the Louisiana Coastal
Protection and Restoration Act evaluation requested by Congress
following Hurricane Katrina. This evaluation includes nonstructural
measures and coastal restoration as a way to provide comprehensive
hurricane protection.

12. Senator Webb. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, there are reports
that the pumps installed as part of a new pump-and-floodgate system to
control flooding from Lake Pontchartrain may not be working properly.
What is their status, and what is the status of the Corps' other major
repair and improvement projects for the levee system in New Orleans?
General Van Antwerp. It is my understanding that the Corps has
completed modifications on approximately one-half of the pumps and
continues to modify the remainder as quickly as possible. Additionally
I believe that there are plans to install additional pumps at the 17th
Street Canal and London Avenue Canal in the near future.
The Corps of Engineers completed its mission to restore levels of
protection to that which existed before Hurricane Katrina struck. The
Corps has repaired the 220 miles of damaged levees (approximately 213
of the 325 miles of the total levee and floodwall system).
The Corps of Engineers is preparing for the start of the 2007
hurricane season by focusing on improvements that will significantly
reduce risks for critical areas. This includes increasing the level of
protection at the three outfall canals. At the three canals, temporary
floodgates have been installed to prevent storm surge from entering the
outfall canals providing more effective storm and flood management.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

BALANCING DISPARATE INTERESTS

13. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in the advance
policy questions provided to you in preparation for this hearing, we
asked what you considered to be the most serious problems in the
performance of the functions of the Chief of Engineers. You responded,
``Many of the Corps' missions require balancing disparate interests.''
Can you elaborate on that answer? Specifically whose or what range of
interests?
General Van Antwerp. First, the Corps of Engineers has many varied
responsibilities including military construction (MILCON) in support of
our Armed Forces, infrastructure improvements in Iraq and Afghanistan,
support to other Federal agencies such as that provided to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency in its Superfund program, emergency
response activities, and the large water resources-based civil works
program, among others. This work is being carried out by a combined
force of Corps employees and contractors working throughout the United
States and in over 90 countries around the world. Each of these
missions is vitally important, each has distinct authorization and
funding sources and each has its own constituency and stakeholder
interests. The Corps' organization and focus must be balanced in such a
way as to successfully accomplish all of these missions concurrently.
Further, each of the separate missions has disparate interests
internal to the mission or program. For example, the Corps civil works
program includes projects having the primary benefit categories of
navigation, flood damage reduction, and environmental restoration.
Quite often, economic and environmental uses of water in these
categories are in direct competition requiring a balanced approach to
assure that both the Nation's economic strength and environmental
health are properly considered. To further complicate matters,
solutions to water resources problems today--especially in urban
areas--frequently come into conflict with other challenges which are
not within Corps missions areas such as providing efficient
transportation systems, urban economic redevelopment, providing
recreation opportunities, and so forth. It has become increasingly
apparent that it is inappropriate to optimize a solution for any one of
these challenges in such a way as to result in a sub-optimal solution
to the full range of problems confronting an area. Here again, balance
is required as a minimum, and ``win-win'' solutions should be actively
sought.

14. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, if confirmed,
how do you propose to balance those interests? What guiding principles
will you use in the process?
General Van Antwerp. The underlying guiding principles that must be
used in carrying out the Corps missions are those provided by the
administration and Congress through policy and legislation applicable
to those missions. If confirmed, I would expect to engage both the
administration and Congress on a regular basis to assure we are
proceeding appropriately.
Beyond that, and internal to the Corps, there are great
opportunities to use knowledge and experience gained in one Corps
program to inform and otherwise benefit the others. As you might
expect, the same Corps people who are working on one program one day
are often assigned to another program on another day. My observation is
that the Corps has always found this diversity of experience to be very
beneficial, both in terms of individual professional development and in
cross-fertilizing ideas among programs. I would expect to continue in
that mode if confirmed.
Externally, the fundamental prerequisite for identifying the
appropriate balance among disparate interests is continuous pursuit of
open and candid communications with all interested parties--both
listening carefully and offering information freely--and effective
partnerships with a wide range of stakeholder groups, other Federal
agencies, and State and local governments.

TRANSPARENCY IN CORPS ACTIVITIES

15. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, you have stated
in your responses to our advance policy questions about the Corps'
challenges that ``the integrity of the Corps of Engineers rests on the
objectivity, transparency, and scientific validity of its analytical
processes.'' Are you committed to complete transparency in all
contracting activities carried out by the Corps of Engineers?
General Van Antwerp. Absolutely. If confirmed I will see that the
Corps of Engineers keeps the public advised of new contracting
opportunities, emphasizing and utilizing the tools provided by the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Army Source Selection
Manual. The Army Source Selection Manual is an excellent resource for
contracting officers. The Source Selection Evaluation Team prescribes
best practices for source selections. This will allow the Corps to
conduct objective evaluation and source selection of contractors. I
commit to finding ways to improve the Corps transparency in regard to
our contracting procedures.

16. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, if confirmed,
what will you do to improve the objectivity and transparency of the
Corps' processes, particularly as they relate to open competition and
contract awards?
General Van Antwerp. I will reach out to industry through
conferences and workshops, ensure advertisement of all contracting
opportunities on the Army Single Face to Industry and Federal Business
Opportunities Web sites and make certain that the Corps' contracting
officers have the best and most current information on contracting best
practices for competition.

USE OF ``COST-PLUS'' CONTRACTS FOR CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES

17. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, to what extent
does the Corps of Engineers rely on the use of ``cost-plus'' contracts
for construction activities?
General Van Antwerp. The Corps of Engineers only employs ``cost-
plus'' contracts when required in accordance with statute and
regulation. The preferred contract type is always a firm fixed-price
contract. Unfortunately, circumstances do not always allow the use of
fixed-price contracts.

18. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, does the Corps
currently have any guidance or policies in place related to the use of
these contracts?
General Van Antwerp. The Corps of Engineers' contracting officers
follow FAR Part 16, ``Types of Contracts'' as supplemented by the
Defense FAR Supplement and the Army FAR Supplement in determining the
appropriate contract type.

19. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in your
opinion, what are the advantages and disadvantages to the use of
``cost-plus'' contracts?
General Van Antwerp. In accordance with FAR Part 16.301-2 cost
reimbursement contracts should be utilized ``only when uncertainties
involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated
with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract.''
In many situations the Corps faces projects where the uncertainties
are such that a cost-type contract is the only method available to
ensure successful completion of the project. If the site conditions,
the technology required, or the type of structure to be built are
complicated and the good result of the project is at risk, it is
necessary to use cost-type contracts as prescribed by FAR Part 16.
One of the disadvantages of cost-plus contracting is the lack of
``market forces'' as an incentive to control costs. This requires
increased contract surveillance and cost reviews in accordance with
statute and regulation. Use of effectively designed ``cost-plus''
incentive structures will allow the Corps to negate issues caused by
the contractor's lack of cost control. It is not to the contractor's
benefit to incur excessive costs, because a cost-plus incentive
contract will not result in increased fees and could led to reduced
fees.
Cost-reimbursement contracts do have a number of unique limiting
characteristics. Specifically, the FAR places three limits on their
usage. First, the contractor's accounting system must be adequate for
determining applicable costs. Second, government surveillance during
performance must provide reasonable assurance that efficient methods
and effective cost controls are employed by the contractor. Third, a
determination must be made that a cost-reimbursement contract is likely
to be less costly than any other type or that obtaining the needed
supplies or services without the use of a cost-reimbursement contract
is impracticable. FAR 16.301-3.
The Corps of Engineers contracting officers will continue to be
encouraged to use the tools the FAR has provided for limiting cost risk
when cost-type contracts are utilized.

20. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, if confirmed,
what will be your policy on the use of these types of contracts?
General Van Antwerp. If confirmed, I will assure that Corps of
Engineers contracting officers are charged with carefully considering
the project, risk of performance, and advantages and disadvantages of
the contract type when determining whether a cost-type contract is
appropriate for the project.

healthy business environment for small- and medium-size companies
21. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, I wanted to
follow up on a question we posed to you about maintaining a healthy bid
climate that allows for a full range of small- and mid-size businesses
to compete for construction projects. It seems that we have programs
established for small and disadvantaged businesses and that the large
multi-national companies will most be able to take advantage of the
Corps bundling strategy for construction contracts. That leaves the
entire mid-range of businesses without a competitive advantage. You
mentioned that ``requirements should be developed so that small and
mid-sized businesses are able to compete.'' If confirmed, how do you
propose to develop these requirements?
General Van Antwerp. When possible, I would assure that the Corps
breaks up requirements into sizes that are manageable by the small
business community wherever possible. Additionally, I will explore ways
in which contracts may be broken out such that they might not be true
small business set-asides, but would be of such sizes that could be
more easily accessible to mid-range businesses, i.e. those that do not
qualify as small businesses, but are not equipped to adequately compete
for very large contracts.

22. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, how can the
Corps ensure that mid-range companies will have a selection of projects
in which to bid on?
General Van Antwerp. Regarding mid-size firms, unfortunately this
is not a recognized business designation in Federal contracting. A
business is either small or large. Once a small business construction
firm exceeds its size limits to be considered as small business
(revenues ranging between $13 million-$31 million depending on its size
standard code), it now has to compete against large businesses with
revenues in the hundreds of millions of dollars or even in the billion
dollar range. This is not a level field of competition. Therefore, as
mentioned above, I would explore ways to offer contracting
opportunities for mid-range businesses.

QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION

23. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, you mentioned
in answers to advance policy questions submitted by this committee that
the Corps is using pre-fabricated modular and tilt-up construction in
an effort to save costs for the tremendous amount to new construction
required to satisfy requirements related to base realignment and
closure (BRAC), Army modularity, and the Army's increase in end
strength. As a professional engineer: what are the eventual costs of
using such construction methods versus the traditional Army Corps--use
of permanent type 5 construction methods?
General Van Antwerp. Traditionally, the Government has required
type 1 or 2 construction, which is construction comprised primarily of
steel and concrete. By allowing private contractors to propose a
broader range of construction types, the Army is allowing industry
innovations and construction techniques that maximize methods for both
cost and schedule reduction. Commercial techniques such as pre-
fabricated modular and tilt-up construction methods provide levels of
quality that are comparable to traditional construction methods. The
Corps of Engineers believes that by allowing the use of innovative
methods and materials, initial facility construction costs will be
reduced and that future facility maintenance costs will be similar to
costs experienced by the private sector where similar methods have been
used. However, it is recognized that life cycle maintenance costs
associated with commercial construction standards that are less robust
than traditional Corps standards may be higher. Nonetheless, the
mission timeline requirements necessitated the use of such standards.

24. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, what is the
design life of these new facilities versus type 5 construction methods?
General Van Antwerp. All facilities are built for a 50-year design
life whether they are type 5, which is a residential type standard, or
whether they are type 1 or 2, which is construction comprised primarily
of steel and concrete. In addition, the MILCON transformation strategy
provides additional flexibility to facility commanders by providing a
means by which the Army can more easily refurbish or re-adapt a
facility with a 50-year design life after only 25 years, a timeframe
similar to the life-cycle used in private industry.

25. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, by accepting a
lower design life for these new buildings in order to keep costs down,
are we building a legacy of ``World War II wood'' where entire bases of
failing buildings will have to be torn down and replaced in 30 years?
General Van Antwerp. The Army's MILCON transformation strategy is
built on constructing facilities with a 50-year design life that can be
built under compressed time schedules by using private industry
methods, materials, and techniques. The MILCON transformation strategy
uses industry innovations such as pre-fabrication, modular solutions,
pre-engineered facilities, and the standardization of facility designs,
to reduce costs while maintaining quality. The cost savings the Army
expects to realize are from improved methods, materials, and the use of
innovative techniques, not from accepting a lower design life. The Army
expects to get a minimum of 50 years out of facilities built with a 50-
year design life.

LAND ACQUISITIONS IN ARIZONA

26. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, the Army Corps
of Engineers is in the process of carrying out an Air Force requirement
to purchase, or otherwise acquire, private property in aircraft
accident zones around Luke Air Force Base, AZ. I have recently been
briefed that the Corps of Engineers may have to rely on land
condemnation or Federal seizure proceedings with four landowners in
order to preclude unsafe development in critical airfield zones. While
I understand and support the need for the Air Force to conduct safe
flying operations, I am concerned that the rights of private landowners
are preserved to the maximum extent possible. Can you look into this
matter and report back to this committee within 30 days on the Corps
plan to complete the land acquisitions for the Air Force, the process
the Corps will pursue to ensure fair and equitable treatment of these
landowners, and all other actions considered or conducted by the Corps,
including the use of restrictive easements, to preclude as a last
resort the seizure or condemnation of the properties?
General Van Antwerp. It is my understanding that the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers is acquiring restrictive easements and that
landowners will not be displaced. Also, none of the landowners are
being forced to change their current use of the land which is
predominantly unoccupied cropland. There is one landowner, Arizona
Motorsports, whose non-agricultural use of the land is being
grandfathered in.
I understand that the Corps of Engineers has concluded negotiations
for the majority of the necessary transactions, but anticipates having
to utilize condemnation for several of the transactions. The Corps of
Engineers is coordinating very closely with AETC and Luke Air Force
Base and intends to continue to work with owners to conclude the
transactions. If confirmed, I will ensure that the subject landowners
are treated fairly and that all laws and regulations governing the
taking of private property are followed.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

DREDGING THE APALACHICOLA RIVER

27. Senator Sessions. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in 2004,
Florida denied the Corps' application for a section 401 water quality
certification to dredge the Apalachicola River, which cut off
congressionally authorized navigation to the upstream States. Since
then, the Corps has failed to exercise its Federal preemptive
authority, including that contained in section 404(d) of the Clean
Water Act, to dredge the river despite being requested to do so. If you
are confirmed as Chief of Engineers, what will you do to restore
navigation to Alabama and Georgia?
General Van Antwerp. I understand that in connection with the
operation of any system of Corps multiple purpose reservoir projects,
such as those in the ACF Basin, the Corps must consider many factors
and interests in the operation of those projects to accomplish their
congressionally authorized purposes. The Corps must consider factors
such as navigation channel depths, drought conditions, and availability
of water to release or hold back in order to accomplish the various
multiple purposes of the projects, and such factors as the needs of
endangered species, fisheries, and shellfish; available funding or lack
thereof for dredging; and other maintenance activities. The Corps will
always exercise its best efforts to balance all of these factors in the
public interest and to fulfill all project purposes including
navigation to the greatest possible extent in order to maximize the
benefits of the projects.

THE CORPS' MISSION

28. Senator Sessions. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, the Corps'
mission continues to expand while its budget contracts, all at the
expense of the Corps' traditional programs such as navigation and flood
control. Recognizing the Corps is the only Federal agency with national
responsibilities for water resources development, how will you manage
the Corps to avoid taking on more nontraditional projects and
programs--which should be the responsibility of other Federal agencies
such as the Department of Interior and the Environmental Protection
Agency--and ensure the Corps focuses its limited resources on its own
established mission?
General Van Antwerp. The Corps' mission responsibilities and
assignments come through the policy oversight and guidance provided by
the administration and specific project and activity authorizations in
laws passed by Congress. In contrast to most other Federal agencies,
the Corps doesn't have a great deal of discretion in the specific
activities it undertakes. The Chief of Engineers can--and should--fully
inform decisionmakers in both the administration and Congress as to the
impacts on its traditional missions of proposals for the organization
to take on work outside of its traditional mission areas. Working with
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, I would expect to
be proactive in offering such information if confirmed.
Beyond that, it seems to me that the best avenue for dealing with
this problem is through comprehensive, collaborative, integrated
approaches to problem solving. This is often referred to as a watershed
approach. One element of such an approach is to seek ways to look more
comprehensively at the full range of problems in a region or watershed
before concentrating on site specific solutions to narrower problems.
To accomplish this effectively, interagency partnerships and actionable
memorandums of agreement among agencies are essential. Too often in the
past, we have seen Federal agencies focus exclusively on their own
discrete missions and tools without understanding the authorities and
capabilities of sister agencies, or attempting to partner with them. If
effective collaborations among relevant Federal agencies--and State and
local governments as well--were created and each partner were to bring
its respective authorities and resources to bear in solving
intersecting problems in a complementary manner, the need seen by some
for Corps mission expansion might be obviated.

FUNDING ALLOCATION

29. Senator Sessions. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in fiscal
year 2007, the Senate Appropriations Committee unanimously rejected the
administration's proposed ``regional allocation'' of operations and
maintenance (O&M) funding because of its encroachment on the
Constitutional prerogatives of Congress. Do you concur with this
proposed budget policy which has again been included in the fiscal year
2008 budget request for the Corps? If so, please explain what
influence, if any, would I or other Members of Congress have on the
eventual funding levels for individual waterways in my State, if
Congress should approve the administration's proposal?
General Van Antwerp. The O&M program is seen more and more as a
very dynamic program, with needs and priorities changing at a moments
notice. In a performance-based context, the Corps would manage the
funds in that account and in the basin, only moving funds to the
highest priority activities within that basin. The criteria used to
move funds would be those that were used to develop the overall O&M
program, which reflect a rigorous analysis to make best use of limited
funding.
Tentative, draft individual funding levels were placed on the
Corps' Web site when the 2008 budget request was introduced. From what
I understand, there are strict guidelines for reprogramming funds at
this time, so Members of Congress have significant influence over
funding levels for individual waterways. Traditionally, Congress has
appropriated funds by project and not by regional allocation and the
Corps executes the program accordingly.

WATER RESOURCES STUDY

30. Senator Sessions. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, it has been
over 30 years since Congress authorized a National Water Resources
Study Commission. Would you support congressional authorization in
Water Resources Development Act of a Presidential Commission to: (a)
assess the Nation's water resources needs; (b) ascertain the
performance or benefits of current Federal programs and projects; (c)
evaluate the effectiveness of present policies, principles, and
performance/measurement standards in making resource allocation
decisions; and (d) recommend needed changes pertaining to those Federal
water resources needs, policies, principles, standards, and programs?
General Van Antwerp. Depending on how it was constructed and
charged, such a commission could be very useful in raising awareness of
national needs and approaches to meeting them. The pressure on water
resources brought about by an increasing population and shifts in
population distribution argue for a National Water Resources Commission
and study. However, I don't think that waiting on the formation of a
commission and results from its inquiry should delay us from doing
today what we already know must be done. Existing policies, principles,
standards, and programs are broad and flexible enough so that much can
be done under them as they now exist. In the case of the Corps, a
continuing review and updating of agency rules and procedures developed
to implement current policies, procedures, and laws could go a long way
to addressing current and projected needs. If confirmed, I am committed
to such a continuing review.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Ensign

PROPER USE OF FUNDS FOR FACILITY REPAIRS

31. Senator Ensign. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in our review
over the past 2 weeks into the facility conditions at Walter Reed Army
Medical Center, I have come to the conclusion that the appalling
conditions in Building 18 were the result of a failure in leadership to
respond to and correct identified deficiencies. We heard witnesses
testify earlier this week that the Army and Defense Health Affairs had
received adequate resources from Congress, despite the pending BRAC
decision to close Walter Reed by 2011, to maintain this facility at an
acceptable level. In fact, over $670,000 was spent on renovations for
this facility between 2000 and 2005. What struck me is that in order
for this money to have been spent in Building 18, a military engineer
needed to have walked through the facility, talked to building
residents, and identified problems. Then funds must have been approved
at some level of command within the Army and provided to award a
contract for the two renovations. So, this wasn't necessarily an issue
of lack of oversight, it was an issue of misplaced priorities. My
question to you as a former Assistant Chef of Staff for Installation
Management, and now the potential Commanding General of the Army Corps
of Engineers--what happened? Did we waste $670,000 by, to use a little
known veterinary term, putting ``lipstick on a pig''?
General Van Antwerp. Funding for construction, sustainment, repair,
and maintenance of medical facilities--including all buildings at
Walter Reed Army Medical Center--is funded through the Defense Health
Program appropriation and managed by the TRICARE Management Activity
and the U.S. Army Medical Command.
It is my understanding that prior to the BRAC decision, the former
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Bldg. 40) and the Walter Reed
Inn (Bldg. 18) were considered as part of the Enhanced Use Lease
project. A lease was signed for Building 40. The destruction of
Building 18 and development of a new parking structure was not pursued
for two reasons; WRAMC students occupied the facility with no place to
relocate and the BRAC closure announcement. A large portion of the
$670,000 was used for minor renovations prior to Wounded Warriors
occupying the Walter Reed Inn (Bldg. 18) in late 2005.

32. Senator Ensign. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, is the Army
using its scarce O&M resources to fix up finishes rather than
addressing seriously deteriorated facility systems?
General Van Antwerp. The Army works very hard to get the most out
of every facility sustainment dollar.
The Army's Installation Management Command (IMCOM) manages the
facility sustainment program for the Army and has adequate oversight in
place. For example, any repair project estimated over $3 million must
be reviewed and approved by the Army Secretariat and any repair project
over $7.5 million is reported to Congress before a project can be
awarded.
As one of the organizations supported by the Corp of Engineers, it
is my opinion that the U.S. Army Medical Command is not wasting scare
resources on finishes rather than addressing deteriorated systems
within its medical facilities. The U.S. Army Medical Command has a
rigorous system for prioritizing facilities for sustainment, repair,
and modernization requirements to ensure that the Army's medical
facilities comply with the rigorous life-safety standards established
by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO). The Army's healthcare facilities consistently achieve high
scores on JCAHO surveys which suggests the Medical Command's Facility
Management Program is making good use of scarce O&M resources.

33. Senator Ensign. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, the Army has
already spent over $30,000 in the past 2 weeks to paint walls and patch
holes in Building 18. They are also in the process of conducting an
engineering survey of Building 18, which I am confident will result in
the need to replace a failed roof, replace a leaking plumbing system,
and upgrade an antiquated heating, air conditioning, and ventilation
system--all the root causes of mold infestation which will again emerge
on newly painted walls. So, who decided to spend money on drapes,
carpet, and ceiling tiles while ignoring the basic problems of Building
18?
General Van Antwerp. The U.S. Army Medical Command receives
separate funding for the construction, sustainment, restoration, and
maintenance of medical facilities from the Defense Health Program. The
decision to take immediate action to repair problems in Building 18 was
directed by the Army. Funding was provided by the U.S. Army Medical
Command.
The Corps of Engineers has developed, at the request of the U.S.
Army Medical Command, a phased repair plan for Building 18. The Corps
has already awarded a contract to replace the roof on Building 18, and
is preparing to award the necessary contracts for interior repairs
should the U.S. Army Medical Command decide it wants to continue to use
Building 18 for housing soldiers in the future.

34. Senator Ensign. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, Congress
provides O&M funds to the military Services with the understanding that
these funds will be applied wisely by military leaders to address the
most urgent requirements. I realize that public works for the Army
falls under the Army's Installation Management Agency, but does the
Commanding General of the Corps of Engineers--responsible for the
programming and design of major facility repairs--have a responsibility
to customers to provide expertise and counsel on the use of these
finds?
General Van Antwerp. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is indeed
responsible for providing planning, engineering, design, and
construction expertise and counsel at the request of Army customers or
other military Services. However, responsibility for the programming
and approval of major facility repairs rests with the respective
military Services. Specifically, for the Army, the Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (OACSIM) plans and
programs sustainment, restoration, and modernization requirements. The
Corps works very closely with OACSIM on both O&M funded repair projects
and MILCON funded projects to provide expertise and counsel on how to
best use the funds allocated. Ultimately, OACSIM approves and
prioritizes facilities for repair or construction and the Corps
provides design and construction services to complete the repairs or
new construction.

35. Senator Ensign. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, what policies
does the Corps have in place, or do you propose, to ensure this
expertise is provided?
General Van Antwerp. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has in place
a major program to provide quality, responsive, and cost-effective
installation support services for Army garrisons (to include the
capability to provide expertise and counsel on facility repair
projects). This program focuses on enhancing mission support
capabilities, supplementing inherent technical capabilities, and
extending manpower capacity at garrisons when needed. This support to
garrisons is normally fully reimbursable, meaning the garrisons seek
the Corps support when it is determined it is appropriate, and pays the
Corps for providing the services.
Standard Corps engineering, design, and construction criteria and
procedures are changed and adapted to IMCOM requirements when Corps of
Engineer districts conduct garrison support work. Supporting districts
comply with quality standards, including the Installation Design Guide,
the Army Installation Design Standards, and maintenance and repair
operational procedures. Health, life, safety, fire, or other statutory
or regulatory requirements are not compromised. In the event of
disagreement on the appropriateness of engineering and construction
criteria or procedures for installation support work, the issue is
raised through IMCOM channels and the Corps of Engineer district's
channels for quick resolution.
If confirmed, I will continue to seek improvement in Corps of
Engineers policies, processes, and procedures to optimize our support
to installations worldwide.

36. Senator Ensign. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, what can
Congress do to ensure the military Services fix the problems as opposed
to painting them over and wasting funds?
General Van Antwerp. I believe the Army has a strong program in
place for making the most of scarce O&M funds in repairing and
maintaining Army installations. However, in any process, improvements
can always be made and I appreciate your willingness to help the Army
in improving our processes. Congress can significantly help the Army
improve our program by approving the legislative proposal,
``Streamlining Military Construction to Reduce Facility Acquisition and
Construction Cycle Time,'' contained in the fiscal year 2008 budget
request: (Section 2932, which would amend section 2805 of title 10).
This proposal would raise the following thresholds: O&M from
$750,000 to $1.5 million; Unspecified Minor Construction from $1.5
million to $3 million; and Life-Health-Safety from $3 million to $7
million.
Increasing these cost limits would allow DOD to: (1) respond more
effectively to urgent and unforeseen requirements with properly sized
and scoped facilities; (2) reduce the recapitalization rate faster by
allowing facility projects under $3 million to be funded from the
unspecified minor MILCON account instead of the normal MILCON
programming and budgeting process; and (3) allow the DOD health care
community the same level of spending authority as the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA), allowing DOD to easily partner with the VA on
health care projects.
Additionally, providing annual authorization and appropriations
prior to the start of the fiscal year allows Army installations to
receive sustainment and construction funds when needed and allows the
Army to execute its program in a more timely and efficient manner.
______

[Letter requested by the committee follows:]

[The nomination reference of LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp,
Jr., USA, follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 7, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of
Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers,
and appointment to the grade indicated in the United States Army, while
assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
U.S.C., sections 601 and 3036:

To be Lieutenant General

LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr., 8468.
______

[The biographical sketch of LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr.,
USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr., USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended:
Engineer Officer Basic and Advanced Courses.
United States Army Command and General Staff College.
United States Army War College.

Educational degrees:
United States Military Academy -- BS -- No Major.
University of Michigan -- MS -- Engineering Mechanics.
Long Island University -- MBA -- Business Administration.

Foreign languages: None recorded.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates of
Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT................................................. 7 Jun. 72
1LT................................................. 7 Jun. 74
CPT................................................. 7 Jun. 76
MAJ................................................. 1 Dec. 81
LTC................................................. 1 Feb. 88
COL................................................. 1 Jun. 92
BG.................................................. 1 Aug. 96
MG.................................................. 1 Jan. 00
LTG................................................. 21 Nov. 04
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Feb. 73......................... Apr. 74........... Platoon Leader,
76th Engineer
Battalion,
(Construction),
Fort Meade, MD.
May 74.......................... Apr. 75........... Aide-de-Camp to
the Assistant
Commandant,
United States
Army Engineer
School, Fort
Belvoir, VA.
Apr. 75......................... Dec. 75........... Student, Engineer
Officer Advanced
Course, United
States Army
Engineer School,
Fort Belvoir, VA.
Dec. 75......................... Jun. 76........... Executive Officer,
65th Engineer
Battalion, 25th
Infantry
Division,
Schofield
Barracks, HI.
Jun. 76......................... Apr. 79........... Assistant Division
Engineer, 65th
Engineer
Battalion, 25th
Infantry
Division,
Schofield
Barracks, HI.
Apr. 79......................... May 81............ Student,
Department of
Mechanical
Engineering and
Applied
Mechanics, The
University of
Michigan, Ann
Arbor, MI.
May 81.......................... Jun. 82........... Instructor,
Department of
Mechanics, United
States Military
Academy, West
Point, NY.
Jun. 82......................... Jun. 84........... Assistant
Professor and
Executive
Officer,
Department of
Mechanics, United
States Army
Military Academy,
West Point, NY.
Jun. 84......................... Jun. 85........... Student, United
States Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS.
Jun. 85......................... Jun. 87........... Executive Officer,
84th Engineer
Battalion, 45th
General Support
Group, Schofield
Barracks, HI.
Jun. 87......................... Apr. 88........... Chief, Military
Engineering and
Construction
Division, United
States Army
Western Command,
Fort Shafter, HI.
Apr. 88......................... Apr. 89........... Executive Officer,
Office of the
Chief of
Engineers, United
States Army,
Washington, DC.
Apr. 89......................... Jun. 91........... Commander, 326th
Engineer
Battalion, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault),
Fort Campbell,
KY, and during
Operations Desert
Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia.
Jun. 91......................... Jun. 92........... Student, United
States Army War
College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA.
Jun. 92......................... Jun. 94........... District
Commander, United
States Army Corps
of Engineers, Los
Angeles District,
Los Angeles, CA.
Jul. 94......................... Jan. 95........... Chief of Staff,
United States
Army Corps of
Engineers,
Washington, DC.
Jan. 95......................... Mar. 96........... Executive
Assistant to the
Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Office
of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC.
Mar. 96......................... Jul. 98........... Commanding
General, United
States Army
Division, South
Atlantic,
Atlanta, GA.
Jul. 98......................... Jan. 99........... Director, Office
of Competitive
Sourcing, Office
of the Assistant
Secretary of the
Army (Research,
Development, and
Acquisition),
Washington, DC.
Jan. 99......................... Jul. 02........... Assistant Chief of
Staff for
Installation
Management,
United States
Army, Washington,
DC.
Jun. 02......................... Sep. 04........... Commanding
General, United
States Army
Maneuver Support
Center and Fort
Leonard Wood/
Commandant,
United States
Army Engineer
School, Fort
Leonard Wood, MO.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignments: Joint duty requirement waived due to
promotion and projected utilization based primarily on
scientific and technical skills.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman Jan. 95-Jun. 96 Colonel
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington,
DC (Cumulative joint credit awarded)...
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. decorations and badges:
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Achievement Medal
Parachutist Badge
Air Assault Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Robert L.
Van Antwerp, Jr., USA, in connection with his nomination
follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr.

2. Position to which nominated:
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of
Engineers.

3. Date of nomination:
February 7, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
January 27, 1950; Benton Harbor, MI.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Paula Eberly Van Antwerp.

7. Names and ages of children:
CPT Jeffrey Van Antwerp, 31.
CPT Lucas Van Antwerp, 29.
Mrs. Julia Tobias, 27.
Ms. Kathryn Van Antwerp, 24.
PVT Robert T. Van Antwerp, 20.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civil, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Society of American Military Engineers.
American Society of Civil Engineers.
Officers Christian Fellowship, Past President.
Great Dads, Past Chairman.
Association of the United States Army.

11. Honors and awards: List scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes, I agree.

Signature and Date

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr.
This 7th day of February, 2007.

[The nomination of LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr., USA, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2007,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on May 17, 2007.]

NOMINATIONS OF CLAUDE M. KICKLIGHTER TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; S. WARD CASSCELLS, M.D., TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS; AND WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF TO
BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Akaka, E.
Benjamin Nelson, McCaskill, Warner, Inhofe, Chambliss, Cornyn,
and Thune.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Gabriella Eisen, professional staff member; Creighton
Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K.
Levine, general counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional
staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel;
David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional
staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and
Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Benjamin L.
Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Darcie Tokioka,
assistant to Senator Akaka; Eric Pierce and Benjamin Rinaker,
assistants to Senator Ben Nelson; M. Bradford Foley, assistant
to Senator Pryor; Jason D. Raunch, assistant to Senator
McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Jeremy
Shull, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Mark J. Winter, assistant
to Senator Collins; and Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to
Senator Cornyn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets today to consider the nominations of James R. Clapper,
Jr., to be Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Claude
M. Kicklighter, to be Inspector General (IG) of the Department
of Defense (DOD); S. Ward Casscells, to be Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health Affairs; and William C. Ostendorff, to be
Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA).
We welcome our nominees and their families to today's
hearing. We know the long hours that senior DOD officials put
in every day. We appreciate the sacrifices that our nominees
are willing to make to serve their country. We know that they
are not going to be alone in making these sacrifices, so we, in
advance, thank the family members of our nominees for the
support and the assistance that we know that they are going to
need to provide.
Each of our nominees will be called upon, if confirmed, to
make important contributions to our national defense.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence carries the
heavy responsibility of ensuring that military forces and
policymakers receive objective and accurate intelligence
information and assessments. The Under Secretary for
Intelligence is also responsible for oversight of DOD
intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical
questioning that is the policy--and is, in addition to all
that, the policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on DOD
intelligence interrogations.
The DOD IG is responsible for keeping the rest of DOD
honest through independent review of the activities of the
Department and the conduct of senior officials. IG audits and
investigations have addressed a series of controversial and
important issues in recent years, from the Air Force tanker
lease to the intelligence activities of the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy prior to the Iraq war. This is
a position which demands the highest standards of ethics and
independence.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs is
responsible for the health care of military personnel,
including Active-Duty, National Guard, Reserve, and retired
personnel, and their families. The care provided, from the
battlefield through intermediary facilities in Germany to our
premier medical facilities in the United States, has been
extraordinary, saving the lives of troops with grievous wounds
who would not have survived in prior conflicts. On the other
hand, recent revelations at Walter Reed make it clear that we
have a long way to go with regard to the care and treatment of
these wounded warriors, particularly when they move from
inpatient to outpatient status, and that care for mental health
issues and traumatic brain injury must be significantly
enhanced.
Finally, the position of Administrator of NNSA is currently
vacant, so the Principal Deputy Administrator, if confirmed,
will act as Acting Administrator. The NNSA faces many
challenges, including maintaining adequate security at NNSA
sites, ensuring that workers have a safe environment in which
to work, managing projects to be on time and on budget, and
ensuring that both the nonproliferation and the weapons
programs are executed efficiently.
These are all extremely important positions that we're
considering this morning, and they merit the attention which
this committee is going to be giving to them.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we allow our
two colleagues from the Senate and our distinguished good
colleague from the House of Representatives, Representative
Everett--he is the ranking member on the Strategic Subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee, and you and I have dealt
with him many times in the course of conferences--go ahead and
then I'll say a few words, following them.
Chairman Levin. That's a very fine idea. We thank you for
that, Senator Warner.
Now, Senator Akaka, whenever he comes in, if our colleagues
would excuse this interruption in their introductions, we would
call on Senator Akaka, who has to chair his Veterans Affairs
Committee hearing this morning. So, we may be interrupting you,
or interfering with the flow of events here.
Senator Hutchison, I think we'll call on you first to
introduce Dr. Casscells.
Senator Warner. I'd like to note that Senator Cornyn was
also here with Senator Hutchison earlier this morning.
Chairman Levin. And still is.
Senator Warner. Oh, he still is here. Excuse me, Senator.
Senator Cornyn. I'm still down here, Senator. Down here
with the cheap seats. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. We have a lot of players out there.
Chairman Levin. We will call upon Senator Cornyn after
Senator Hutchison, if that's okay.
Senator Hutchison.

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF TEXAS

Senator Hutchison. Absolutely. Thank you, Senator Warner,
for allowing me to go first. I certainly appreciate it.
I am always happy to introduce people to this committee,
but this is a particularly special introduction because it's a
true friend, someone who I have known, along with his family,
for years. Today, I introduce Dr. Samuel W. Casscells--``Trip''
Casscells--to the committee for his confirmation. I also want
to acknowledge his wife, who is one of my friends also, and
their three children--his wife, Roxanne, and their three
children, Lily, Henry, and Sam. They are an incredible family.
As Senator Levin said earlier, when someone volunteers for
public service of the type that these four are going to do,
their families make a sacrifice, too, and they have certainly
been wonderful support for Dr. Casscells throughout his life.
Dr. Casscells has an incredible record of accomplishment.
He graduated cum laude from Yale, and then magna cum laude from
Harvard Medical School. He spent 6 years at the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). He is one of America's leading
cardiologists. He's a distinguished professor at the University
of Texas Health Science Center in Houston, and Associate
Director for Cardiology Research at the world-famous Texas
Heart Institute. He is the first civilian recipient of the
Army's Maxwell Thurman Award for his work in using new
technologies to improve military emergency medicine.
When you look at his life as a whole, there is one
overriding theme, and that is service to others. I recall the
day that he came to my office, nearly 6 years ago, and told me
that he had a very serious case of prostate cancer. His doctors
had told him the prognosis might not be good, and told him to
get his affairs in order. Like everyone else, I said, ``Slow
down, take care of yourself, and do everything you can to beat
this.'' He did not take my advice. He sped up. He kept on going
and fought this cancer ferociously. At the same time, he
continued his work in trying to protect the ports of Houston
against terrorism, to use technology to improve emergency
medical care for soldiers, to protect America from the avian
flu, and studying the connections between flu and
cardiovascular disease. While fighting for his life, he didn't
slow down a minute in his commitment to our country.
Then, the great news came. At the age of 53, he had
defeated the cancer. So, he sped up and continued to do more.
His father served as a doctor in World War II. While
cleaning out his father's closet, he decided that it was time
for him to serve as well. So, at the age of 53, with forces
deployed to Iraq, he began a campaign to convince the Army that
he should sign up for the Army Reserve and to try to go to
Iraq, which is exactly what he did. He is now a colonel in the
Army Reserve, and he went to Iraq for 3 months last year.
He is now volunteering to take on another very tough job,
and one that is very timely. But I think that because of his
commitment and the experience and what he has shown he wants to
do for our country, he is the perfect person for a very tough
job to make sure that we are giving the quality medical care,
in the field and after service, to our military personnel. I
cannot think of a better person who can do that job.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hutchison, for your very
eloquent and your very personal introduction. I know it makes a
great deal of difference to Dr. Casscells and to us.
Senator Cornyn.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
TEXAS

Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to join Senator Hutchison in introducing Dr.
Casscells to the committee. I won't repeat the fascinating
story of his life, really, and what brings him here today,
except to say that, as a physician, and especially as a
soldier, Dr. Casscells has proven his commitment to not only
health care, generally, and improving it for all Americans, but
particularly for improving health care services for the men and
women serving in the Armed Forces.
As you noted, Mr. Chairman, the recent revelations of
outpatient care at Walter Reed have caused all of us to raise
some very important questions and to look for ways that we can
improve what is already largely a very good record of health
care for our military, how we can help them cut red tape and
improve their transition--particularly seriously wounded
warriors from the DOD health care system to the Department of
Veterans' Affairs (VA)--with a minimum of delay and red tape,
as I say. I think that Dr. Casscells will be uniquely qualified
to help us as we work through that process.
I'm pleased to commend him to the committee, and hope,
along with Senator Hutchison, that his nomination is voted out
promptly to the floor and by the Senate so he can get to work.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Representative Everett, we're delighted to have you here to
introduce our next nominee.

STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE
STATE OF ALABAMA

Mr. Everett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Warner, and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
I certainly appreciate the opportunity to introduce a man
who's shown great loyalty and served this Nation for many
years. He's a man of high character and integrity. It is my
hope that this panel will confirm Bill Ostendorff as the next
Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration.
Since 2003, Bill has served as the staff director for
Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which I chaired for 4 years and
am now the ranking member. In working with Bill over the last
3\1/2\ years, he's become one of my closest advisors, due to
his professionalism and comprehensive understanding of some of
the most challenging issues facing the Departments of Defense
and Energy.
After graduating in 1976 from the U.S. Naval Academy with a
bachelor's of science degree in system engineering, he served
on six different submarines. Bill displayed tremendous
leadership when he commanded the attack submarine U.S.S.
Norfolk. In 1993, he led the U.S.S. Norfolk on the
Mediterranean deployment with the Roosevelt battle group.
Bill's ship was recognized by the commander of Submarine Force
Atlantic as having achieved the greatest improvement in combat
readiness among the 53 attack submarines in the Atlantic Fleet
in 1993, and was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation by
the Secretary of the Navy. In 1995, he was recognized by the
Commander of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet as a finalist for the Vice
Admiral James Stockdale Award for Inspirational Leadership in
Command. During his tour of duty he received four awards of the
Legion of Merit and other numerous campaign and unit awards. In
1996, due to a large part of his outstanding service at sea,
Bill brought his expertise to the classroom to train submarine
commanders as the Director of the Submarine Force Atlantic
Commanding Officer School. He then served as Director of the
Division of Mathematics and Science at the United States Naval
Academy from 1999 to 2002, at which point he retired from the
Navy as a captain.
Perhaps the only thing that could rival Bill's service to
his country is his devotion to his family. His wife, Chris, and
his three children, Becky, Chuck, and Jeff, have enjoyed his
constant love and support. I'm pleased that Chris and Becky are
here with us today.
It is without prejudice that I sit before you today and
introduce to you who I hope will be the next Deputy
Administrator of NNSA, Bill Ostendorff.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Congressman Everett, very much.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On behalf of the ranking member, Senator McCain, I ask
unanimous consent that his statement appear following your
statement.
Chairman Levin. It will, indeed.
I'll now place the opening statement of Senator McCain into
the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain

Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in welcoming General
Clapper, General Kicklighter, Doctor Casscells, and Mr.
Ostendorff and their families. I congratulate them on their
nominations, and thank them for their willingness to serve in
these important positions.
General Clapper, as Senator Levin indicated, you had a very
distinguished career in the Air Force, culminating in your
assignment as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from
1991 to 1995. After retirement, you returned to the
Intelligence Community, serving as Director of the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency from 2001 through 2006. We
appreciate your willingness to serve in this critically
important position as the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence. Obviously, the attacks of September 11 were a
massive intelligence failure. As the fight continues in Iraq
and Afghanistan, no one underestimates the role that rapid,
accurate, and detailed intelligence plays in combat operations.
In addition, if you are confirmed, you will be asked, in
concert with Admiral John McConnell, to continue efforts to
change and reform the Department of Defense components of the
national intelligence enterprise. In your responses to the
committee's advance policy questions, you wrote that ``neither
the Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence nor the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence are organized optimally
to promote efficient collaboration and coordination.'' You will
be asked to expand on that comment. It may be the most critical
aspect of intelligence reform.
General Kicklighter, welcome, and thank you for accepting
the challenge of serving as the Department of Defense (DOD)
Inspector General (IG). I want to underscore the importance of
the DOD IG's functions and urge you, if you are confirmed, to
consider this appointment as a mandate to strengthen the
independence and effectiveness of that office. The Office of
the DOD IG has contributed positively in the past to
acquisition reform, and, if confirmed you need to continue that
positive record of curtailing abuses in acquisition and in
providing timely, well-documented investigations in situations
in which the Services cannot be looked to for an independent,
objective inquiry. You have a wealth of experience from your
service as a senior commander in the Army, as an Assistant
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and as a Special Assistant to
the Secretaries of Defense and State in planning the
establishment of the new U.S. Mission in Baghdad and are well-
qualified for this important position.
Doctor Casscells, thank you for your willingness to serve
as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. I won't
attempt to list your extraordinary accomplishments today, but I
do want to acknowledge your decision to seek and accept a
commission in the Army Reserve in 2005 and your active-duty
deployments following Hurricane Katrina to assist in relief
efforts and again from August through December 2006 in Iraq
serving as liaison to Ambassador Khalilizad.
As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, you
will be confronted with some very difficult challenges
including how to maintain high quality health care, at home and
on the battlefield, while being challenged to achieve greater
efficiencies. Solutions to the problems we have seen at Walter
Reed in outpatient care must be identified and implemented.
Mr. Ostendorff, congratulations on your nomination to
become the Principal Deputy Administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NNSA was
established in the aftermath of continued security lapses at
the Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear weapons laboratories,
and what appeared to be an indifferent attitude on the part of
DOE towards the safety of its own workers and the reliable
operation of its own facilities. It is now 7 years later, and
the serious security lapses that occurred at Los Alamos just
last fall suggest that NNSA has not yet succeeded in creating
the culture and discipline around these national security
missions that the act had intended to foster.
If confirmed by the Senate, you will confront a variety of
management and operational challenges. You have an impressive
background of accomplishments in the Navy, however, and I know
you will bring great energy and commitment to the task. I look
forward to hearing your views of what is working, what is not,
and how you would tackle these challenges head on if confirmed.
I thank each of our nominees for their service and look
forward to their testimony today.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. In order to achieve brevity here in this
proceeding this morning, I'll just briefly comment.
First, General Kicklighter, I thank you for stepping up,
once again. What an extraordinary career and a wealth of wisdom
and experience that you bring to this job of IG. You have to
fight hard, and there will be times when you will be in an
adversarial position with some of your former colleagues and
respected peer groups in the military, but that's the job that
you understood and that you'll take on.
General Kicklighter. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. We have a magnificent, I think, Secretary
of Defense now, in Bob Gates, and he will look to you, as will
the Deputy and others in that Department for fair, objective,
and independent analysis of some of the very difficult
decisions that the Department from time to time must make.
I'll say a few words for you, Dr. Casscells, that my father
also served as a military doctor in World War I, and I know the
pride that you take in your father's service, as I took very
humbly in my father's service. I'm not sure that, in all the
years I've been here, I've known of a 53-year-old individual
volunteer to enter the military service, but that may be one of
the first around here. But well done to you.
How was boot camp, by the way? [Laughter.]
With that marvelous family of yours that has given you
support, you'll do just fine in this new position.
I also would say that we've spent some time here on this
committee with the problems, as Senator Cornyn said, associated
with Walter Reed. You'll be thrust into the center of that
situation. Just for what it's worth, I strongly believe that we
should focus our attention on accelerating the funding of the
new parts to go into Bethesda, and, likewise, the new hospital
that has been planned for many years to go at Fort Belvoir.
Those two bricks-and-mortar programs could move together very
quickly, and then eventually the fate of this historic
institution, Walter Reed, can be decided.
At this time, I would hope we do not try to amend the Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law because that would break a
precedent. Senator Levin and I have been on this committee for
29 years. We have handled all five of the BRAC pieces of
legislation. To my knowledge, we've never amended the law. I
think it's in our interest to maintain the integrity of that
process, but, at the same time, recognize that, when the time
comes for the transition, assuming it does take place, to the
newer institutions at Bethesda and Belvoir, decisions can be
made with regard to that property. It may well be that the
Veterans Administration might wish to pick it up for one of
their institutions.
To you, Skipper, well done. I think Admiral Rickover would
be very pleased to know that you're here today, carrying on the
institution and the training that he brought forth in your
specialized career in the United States Navy. Well done, and
thank you, to you and your family, stepping up for public
service.
I see our colleague here. Why doesn't he proceed, and then
I'll say a few words.
Chairman Levin. That would be great, thank you.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Senator Warner. Thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman.
Due to my chairing another hearing scheduled at this same
time, I appreciate you and other members of this committee, Mr.
Chairman, agreeing to accommodate my request to introduce
Lieutenant General Mick Kicklighter.
Mr. Chairman, it's a great honor for me today to present to
you and the distinguished members of this committee the
President's nominee to be the next Inspector General of the
Department of Defense, General Mick Kicklighter.
General Kicklighter is one of our Nation's most precious
kind of resources, a public servant who has dedicated his life
in service to our country. He has personally provided our
Nation with over 50 years of combined military and public
service. Following his retirement from the Army in 1991, after
a distinguished 35-year military career, he continued to answer
the call of duty to service to our country in various civilian
positions wherever his leadership was needed.
I met General Kicklighter through my brother, Reverend Dr.
Abraham Akaka, pastor of Kawaiahao Church, known as the
Westminster Abbey of Hawaii. We became close and personal
friends with General Mick Kicklighter and his wife, Elizabeth,
who's here today, and also the family, since he commanded the
25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii from
1984 to 1986. From that time, I have always known him to be an
honorable and selfless public servant who has always sought
opportunities to serve our great country.
General Kicklighter's accomplishments are many. I will not
go through all of them here, but I would like to note some of
the highlights.
As a public servant, he has served in a number of positions
in the Departments of State, Defense, and Veterans Affairs.
Most recently, he led, at the request of Secretaries of State
and Defense, the establishment of the Iraq/Afghanistan Joint
Transition Planning Group, a joint Department of State and DOD
team that provides analysis and recommendations for
coordinating efforts to address transition challenges in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
In prior assignments, he served as the Chief of Staff for
the VA; Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of State for
Stabilization and Security Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan;
Director of DOD's Iraq Transition Team; and Assistant Secretary
for Policy, Planning, and Preparedness in the VA. He also
served 5 years on the board of directors for Habitat for
Humanity International, 3 of which were as chairman.
But, Mr. Chairman, Mick Kicklighter's public service is not
even half of the story. As a member of our armed services for
35 years, General Kicklighter served as a leader in all levels
of military, from platoon to theater command, completing his
career as Commander of the U.S. Army Pacific. He also held
senior-level staff assignments with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of
the Army. A combat veteran, General Kicklighter served two
tours in Vietnam.
His list of awards is as long as his service to our
country. He has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal
three times, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of
Merit four times, the Bronze Star, the Meritorious Service
Medal twice, as well as a number of foreign decorations.
As a civilian, he has been awarded the Presidential Citizen
Medal, the Eisenhower Liberation Medal, the Decoration for
Exceptional Civilian Service, and has twice been awarded the
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service.
Mr. Chairman, I believe, if confirmed by the Senate, that
Mick Kicklighter will continue to give our country the high-
quality service and dedication that have been characteristic of
his service throughout his entire career, during which he was
supported by his wife, Elizabeth.
I would like to thank you, Elizabeth, and your family, for
all you have given and sacrificed for our country.
At this time, I would like to welcome General Kicklighter
to this committee.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to introduce
my close and personal friend, General Mick Kicklighter.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka, thank you so much.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have the privilege of introducing General Clapper. I
believe I had that privilege once before, and I'll mention that
in his long, distinguished career of over 4 decades involved in
the Intelligence Community, it's remarkable all the experience
that you've had in this area.
I also note that he served as a senior intelligence officer
for the U.S. Forces in Korea, the U.S. Pacific Command, and
then Strategic Air Command. He was the Air Force Chief of Staff
for Intelligence at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In 1991, General Clapper was
nominated to serve as Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, when I first had the occasion to meet him and work
through a confirmation process at that time.
He served honorably in that position for 4 years, during
the ever-shifting period following the end of the Cold War and
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Together
with other members of this committee, I worked closely with the
General and others to ensure our intelligence forces would not
be cut too steeply. Clearly, we saw our intelligence forces as
the first line of defense and a force multiplier. We saw the
necessity of maintaining a robust and capable intelligence
effort.
More recently, the General served as head of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) retiring from that
position in 2006. At NGA, he led the continuing transformation
from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency from its legacy
missions to become the leading agency for the creation and
exploitation of geospatial intelligence.
Under General Clapper's leadership, the NGA routinely
provided global intelligence and information security services
to the White House, Cabinet officials, and Congress, in
addition to a broad array of military, civil, and intelligence
customers.
General Clapper was also one of the first senior officials
in the U.S. Government to identify geospatial intelligence as
major strategic issues in our increasingly imagery-dependent
intelligence operations.
I'll put into the record his long achievements in the
private sector and the many awards and distinctions that this
famous man has received.
I congratulate you, General, and thank you for once again
stepping up to public service with the support of your family.
At this time, perhaps you'd take a moment to introduce your
family.
General Clapper. Yes, sir.
I'm pleased and proud to do so. First, my wife, Sue, of 42
years, herself a former National Security Agency employee; our
daughter, Jen, who's an elementary school principal in Fairfax;
her husband, Jay, who's a high-school teacher; our oldest
grandson, Ryan; and our granddaughter, Erin. I also have a son
and daughter-in-law, who are also schoolteachers, with two
boys, who live outside of Roanoke, VA.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Clapper. Obviously, I'm very proud of them, and
couldn't contemplate this without their support.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
One question, General, before I proceed. I understand you
started your distinguished career in the United States Marine
Corps.
General Clapper. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. It concerns me how that departure occurred
and the Air Force got you. Would you please clarify that for
the record?
General Clapper. Sir, I'm very proud of that, and proud to
note that both Senators from my home State of Virginia,
Senators Warner and Webb, and I all served in the Marine Corps.
I'm a proud graduate of the Platoon Leader Course, Quantico--
spent a wonderful summer at Quantico Marine Corps Station, way
back in 1961. My family still reminds me I never got over it. I
elected to move to the Air Force, since I grew up in the
intelligence business, as sort of the family business, and I
had more opportunities to pursue that line of work in the Air
Force.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner. You're not suggesting the Marines in any
way fail to have a high intelligence quotient.
General Clapper. Absolutely not, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Thank you very much. I want that clear for
the record.
General Clapper. I'm pleased and proud, sir, to be a
straight man for you anytime. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. That's right. Perhaps the others could
introduce their families?
Chairman Levin. They will. As we call on them for their
testimony, they could do that, at that time.
First let me proceed, though, with the standard questions
which we ask all of our witnesses, and we'll ask all of you at
one time.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
General Kicklighter. I have.
General Clapper. Yes, sir.
Dr. Casscells. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Kicklighter. No, sir.
General Clapper. No, sir.
Dr. Casscells. No, sir.
Mr. Ostendorff. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
General Kicklighter. Yes, sir.
General Clapper. Yes, sir.
Dr. Casscells. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Kicklighter. Yes, sir.
General Clapper. Yes, sir.
Dr. Casscells. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Kicklighter. Yes, sir.
General Clapper. Yes, sir.
Dr. Casscells. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
General Kicklighter. Yes, sir.
General Clapper. Yes, sir.
Dr. Casscells. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views,
when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views
differ from the administration in power?
General Kicklighter. Yes, sir.
General Clapper. Yes, sir.
Dr. Casscells. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner, when requested by a duly constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
General Kicklighter. Yes, sir.
General Clapper. Yes, sir.
Dr. Casscells. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Let us, again, invite you to introduce your families as we
call upon you. I think we'll just go in order, from left to
right here.
General Kicklighter, let's start with you.

STATEMENT OF LTG CLAUDE M. KICKLIGHTER, USA, (RET.), TO BE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

General Kicklighter. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. To
the distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear here today.
I'd also like to thank Senator Akaka, who took time away
from chairing the Veterans Affairs Committee to come and
introduce me.
My thanks also to President Bush for nominating me for this
very important position. Also a special thanks to Secretary
Gates for his support.
I'd like to introduce my college sweetheart, who's been my
wife for the past 52 years, Betty. She is truly the wind
beneath my wings, the toughest critic I have, and also the
strongest supporter, the love of my life. I thank Betty also
for three wonderful children, one of which is here, two could
not be here, but, even more, five even more wonderful
grandchildren.
I'd like to also introduce my son, Rick, and his wife,
Yvonne, and I know that the other two children and their
spouses are here in spirit, as well.
My military career actually began when I was a college
student and I enlisted in the Army Reserves while also enrolled
in the Reserve Officer Training Program on campus. I spent
almost 2 years as an Army reservist, and was honorably
discharged as a Sergeant E-5 when I graduated from college and
was commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant.
I spent almost 36 years on active duty, and, as I was
retiring, I was asked to plan and oversee the commemoration of
the 50th anniversary of World War II, and assist our Nation in
thanking and honoring the men and women, the Greatest
Generation, who saved not only this Nation, but literally saved
the world. This led to other jobs in the Departments of State,
Defense, and Veterans Affairs, for accumulation of about 15
additional years.
This past December, when I was asked to consider being
nominated for this position, which I knew as a very tough
position, I was in Afghanistan, leading an assessment team for
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Having been on the
ground a number of times in Iraq and Afghanistan with these
magnificent men and women fighting this global war against
terrorism, it is impossible for me not to want to do all I can
to support this, another great generation of Americans.
If confirmed, I will bring leadership, management skills,
and a broad-gauge approach to the Office of the Inspector
General. There's no doubt there's much that I have to learn and
relearn. But, if confirmed, I look forward to joining the IG
family and together will continue to build the IG team that our
troops, their families, the DOD, this Congress, and the
American people have a right to expect. We will remain
independent and objective, and we will keep the Secretary of
Defense and Congress fully and currently informed.
Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman and the members of this
committee, for giving me the opportunity to appear, and also to
respond to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
General Clapper.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., USAF, (RET.), TO
BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

General Clapper. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, and
distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
it is, indeed, an honor for me to appear before you today as
the nominee to serve as the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence.
Being nominated for this position is, for me, an unexpected
turn of events. When I left government, at the end of last
September, after serving for almost 5 years as Director of NGA,
I was convinced that was absolutely the end of my government
service. But when Secretary Robert Gates, for whom I have the
highest respect, asked if I would be willing to serve again, in
this position, I could not say no.
If I can leave one message with you today, it is this. My
compelling motivation now is what it has been in every position
in which I have served for over 43 years, not to do just what's
best for a Service, agency, department, or Intelligence
Community, it's do what's best for the Nation.
I regard the position of the Under Secretary of
Intelligence in DOD as a sacred trust, particularly now, with
so many of our magnificent men and women in uniform in harm's
way in Iraq and Afghanistan. I served two combat tours during
the Southeast Asian conflict, so I do know what it's like to
get shot at, and I understand how intelligence can literally be
a matter of life and death.
In the quarter century or so that I have dealt with
Congress in various capacities, I've come to believe strongly
in the need for congressional oversight particularly over
intelligence activities, which, for obvious reasons, cannot be
fully transparent to the public at large. That places, I think,
an even greater burden on intelligence leaders to ensure that
Congress is appropriately informed.
If confirmed, it would be my intention not to merely come
to Capitol Hill when summoned, but, rather, to keep you
informed and seek out and listen to your advice and counsel.
It's the highest distinction of my professional career to
have been asked by Secretary Gates and to have been nominated
by President Bush for this extremely critical position,
particularly at this difficult time.
This concludes my statement. I welcome your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
Dr. Casscells.

STATEMENT OF S. WARD CASSCELLS, M.D., TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS

Dr. Casscells. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity today. I am honored to be here to answer your
questions and to learn from you.
This is, for me, the honor of a lifetime, and I take it
very seriously, as someone who is just back from the conflict
and who lost friends there, and who, himself, was a patient
there and a doctor there. So, this position is a position of
enormous personal significance to me, and you can be sure that,
if confirmed, I will work closely with you. While I have a lot
to learn, I will give it everything I have.
Mr. Chairman, if I may take the liberty of introducing
these four redheads who mean the world to me, my wife, Roxanne;
my son, Sam; my daughter, Lily; and my son, Henry. This will,
if we are confirmed, be a big move for us, and they are well
aware that this will be a cut in their allowance. So, this is
something I thank them for, for their support, and I'd look
forward to you----
Chairman Levin. They're all shaking their heads, saying
that that was not part of the deal. [Laughter.]
We'll have to negotiate that later, but you have all the
Senators on your side, kids, on this one.
Dr. Casscells. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Doctor, very much.
Mr. Ostendorff.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF, TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Ostendorff. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and members
of the committee, I'm honored to be considered as the
President's nominee for the Principal Deputy Administrator of
the National Nuclear Security Administration.
I'm grateful to President Bush and to Secretary Bodman for
their confidence in me.
I want thank Congressman Everett for his very kind
introduction today.
I'd also like to thank my family and introduce my wife,
Chris, of 29 years, and my daughter, Becky, who is a law-school
student down in Charlottesville. We have two sons who couldn't
be here, one who is in college down at William and Mary, and
another who is serving as a 2nd lieutenant with the 2nd Stryker
Regiment, over in Vilseck, Germany. I also have my in-laws, Pat
and Lee Miller, my dear sister-in-law, Karen Fales, and her
husband, John, and their sons, Mark and Johnny. I'm very
grateful for their support and encouragement over many years.
I'd like to thank this committee for their strong support
of the NNSA mission. If confirmed, I'll look forward to working
closely with the members of this committee and the staff to
carry out the duties and responsibilities of the Principal
Deputy Administrator.
I'm excited about the opportunity, if confirmed, to serve
in a senior leadership position. The core missions of
maintaining the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons
stockpile, providing safe propulsion for our Navy, and of
reducing the global danger of weapons of mass destruction are
absolutely critical. I am humbled by the importance of the
task, and, if confirmed, commit to work tirelessly and
professionally to execute these vitally important missions.
I've been privileged to serve my country in the past.
Selected by Admiral Hyman Rickover back in 1975 to serve in the
Navy's Nuclear Propulsion Program, I served on six submarines,
and had the honor of commanding the U.S.S. Norfolk and
Submarine Squadron 6. I'm confident that my nuclear reactor and
nuclear weapons operational background, as well as leadership
experience, will serve me well, if confirmed.
My past 3\1/2\ years as a counsel and staff director to the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee on the House Armed Services
Committee has given me the opportunity to work very extensively
and closely with this committee and its staff, and has also
instilled a deep appreciation for the role of congressional
oversight of the executive branch.
The NNSA national security laboratory's and production
plant's workforce, both Federal and civilian, comprise a vital
national asset, one critical to our future national security.
If confirmed, I intend to provide the strong leadership and
management required for NNSA to continue to execute its
national security missions.
If confirmed, I'll also look forward to working with the
members of this committee and its staff. I commit to you
communications founded on integrity and responsiveness. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Ostendorff.
Again, we want to thank all the families for coming today.
We know how important it is that you be here for these
nominees. As a father and a grandfather, I particularly know
how important it is for the younger kids to be here, what a
boost that gives to our nominees.
Let's have an 8-minute round, if that's all right, Senator
Warner, for our first round.
Let me start with you, General Kicklighter. The question of
the IG's independence is, of course, critically important to
Congress, to the Nation, and not just to this committee, by the
way; other committees that have responsibility relative to IGs
look very closely and intensively at the operations of the IGs
to be certain that there's no intrusion on the independence and
objectivity of the IGs.
In your response to pre-hearing questions, you stated that,
if confirmed, you would fight to maintain the independence of
the Office of Inspector General. We asked you a series of
questions about the circumstances under which you thought it
might be appropriate for senior DOD officials to request that
the DOD IG not investigate a particular matter or not issue a
report on a particular matter. Your response was that only the
Secretary of Defense had the authority to make such requests to
the DOD IG, and that such authority exists only with regard to
sensitive matters within the scope of section 8 of the
Inspector General Act, and that the authority has never been
exercised. Is that your understanding?
General Kicklighter. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is my
understanding.
Chairman Levin. You also stated that any such request
outside of the authority given to the Secretary of Defense
under section 8 would be inappropriate and that you would
reject such a request and report it as a ``particularly serious
or flagrant problem, abuse, or deficiency,'' under section 5(d)
of the Inspector General Act. Is that correct?
General Kicklighter. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Is it your understanding that
the Secretary's authority under section 8 is personal to the
Secretary, and that it cannot be exercised informally by
members of the Secretary's staff or anyone else?
General Kicklighter. That is my understanding, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. You also indicated, in response to our pre-
hearing questions, that it is appropriate for the IG to consult
with officials in DOD before issuing an audit report ``to
ensure that the information in the report is factually accurate
and to resolve or minimize disagreements, where appropriate.''
Would you agree that that process must be transparent? In other
words, that the report in the IG working papers should reflect
the comments made by DOD officials and any changes that were
made in response to those comments?
General Kicklighter. I would, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Relative to Walter Reed, deficiencies in
housing and administration of injured soldiers, marines at
Walter Reed, have focused attention on an overly bureaucratic,
adversarial, and confusing physical disability evaluation
system in DOD. The officials have testified that they're
committed to improving the system to make it easier and fairer
to disabled servicemembers. In your view, what role should the
DOD IG have in improving the DOD disability evaluation system?
General Kicklighter. Mr. Chairman, I don't have knowledge
of what skill sets and staff we have, but I certainly would
strive to ensure we have the expertise we need to provide the
oversight to ensure that system is working as it should and
we're taking care of those wounded men and women coming back
off the battlefield. That would certainly be a very high
priority.
Chairman Levin. Finally, General, at the request of the
Armed Services Committee, the Office of Inspector General has
provided us with copies of source documents from the IG's
review of the DOD-directed investigations of detainee abuse.
We've requested source documents from the IG's review of the
activities of the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy prior to the war in Iraq. These documents have also been
requested by the Select Committee on Intelligence. Will you
pass along to the folks from the Department with whom you are
now working that the commitment of the acting IG to provide
those documents to the committee is important to us? We've,
again, asked for these documents, and we need to know when
those documents would be presented to us. Would you ask your
coordinator to get us that date?
General Kicklighter. Mr. Chairman, I will certainly pursue
that and try to get you that date. If confirmed, I will pursue
that as the IG.
[The information referred to follows:]

The requested source documents from the Inspector General's review
of the activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy prior to the war in Iraq were provided to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence on March 30, 2007. The Acting Inspector
General informed staff from the Senate Armed Services Committee of the
transfer.

Chairman Levin. We hope that those documents are provided
immediately.
General Kicklighter. I will certainly proceed down that
line, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Clapper, under the DOD directives, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has primary
responsibility for DOD intelligence, interrogations, detainee
debriefings, and tactical questioning, and serves as the policy
advisor to the Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence
interrogations. If confirmed, will you ensure that DOD
interrogations comply with the requirements of Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions, the Detainee Treatment Act, and the
Army Field Manual?
General Clapper. Absolutely. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
The Under Secretary is responsible for overseeing the
production of substantive intelligence, on the one hand, and
for ensuring that detainees are treated humanely, on the other
hand. Is it right that we put both jobs in the hands of one
official, or would it be better, in your view, to split them,
for example, by having the Under Secretary for Policy to be
responsible for policy regarding detainees?
General Clapper. Mr. Chairman, I actually haven't
considered that. I just think that though it would be difficult
to split that oversight responsibility, since the two are so
inextricably bound, so I guess my going-in position right now,
sir, this would be my personal view, is that should remain the
province of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General, in your answers to the committee's advance
questions, you indicated that you thought a major challenge in
the Intelligence Community is to ``clarify roles and
responsibilities in clandestine activities.'' Can you explain
what you meant by that?
General Clapper. Sir, for my own part, I think it is
essential that there be clarity between covert operations,
which is a term that is statutorily defined, has a specific
purpose, to elicit change in the political, economic, military,
or diplomatic behavior of a target. In that context, covert
activities are normally not conducted, I don't believe, by
uniformed military forces.
As contrasted with clandestine activities, at least in my
mind, the important distinction is that which is passive
intelligence-collection, information-gathering, no matter how--
which may be conducted, albeit true, under very risky,
hazardous conditions. Of course, there is the connection
between when you are doing clandestine collection as an
enabler, in support of a covert activity. I believe that, to
the maximum extent possible, there needs to be a line drawn
from an oversight perspective, as well as a risk perspective.
The important consideration here is whether if such an activity
is revealed inadvertently, or an adversary nation, in which
such an activity is being conducted, discovers it, that, in the
case of military forces, the Government would have the option
of acknowledging that, which then entitles those military
forces proper treatment under Geneva Conventions, et cetera;
whereas, that is not the case with covert activity as
statutorily defined. That's why I think there's a distinction
between activities conducted by DOD and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Chairman Levin. Just to conclude that point, since my time
is up, the Department has been ambiguous, at times--or
ambivalent, at times--about how military personnel, who might
be captured conducting clandestine operations, would be
treated, and whether their military status would be
acknowledged. You indicated there is an option of acknowledging
them. My question, I guess, would be this. Should it generally
not be the policy to acknowledge the status of military
personnel in such a situation? Should that not be the going-in
assumption?
General Clapper. Sir, obviously, you would prefer that--I'm
speaking theoretically here, or hypothetically--the particular
operation would not be revealed; but, if it is, I personally
think it's better that you be in a position, and be prepared
to, and have planned for, acknowledging the operation if it
involves military personnel, the expectation is that they could
be accorded treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention.
If you don't do that, then you put them in jeopardy for not
being accorded those privileges.
Chairman Levin. It is the expectation of our military
personnel, is it not, that they will have those protections if,
in fact, they are captured or detained?
General Clapper. Yes, sir, I believe so.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
I'll yield to Senator Inhofe, and then I'll be here for the
balance of the hearing.
Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator Warner. We're working on the other committee that you
and I are privileged to serve on today, so I have to do some of
those duties.
Let me start with you, General Clapper. When you first came
into my office, I could tell I hit a sensitive note when I told
you that, for so many years, I've been, in both the House and
the Senate, concerned about the process for getting security
clearances. We've seen the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) reports that talk about this, and so, it's like a lot of
things in this system here in Washington. We all know it's
wrong, we all know it doesn't work, we all know it's
antiquated, we all know that there are new technologies that
can be used, and we all express our concern, and then nothing's
done. Is something going to be done?
General Clapper. Sir, it's certainly my intent, in the time
that I have--if I'm confirmed, I would have remaining to do
something about a system that is an anachronism.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Clapper. We basically do security clearances the
same way we've done it since I first came in this business, 40-
plus years ago. Having recently gone through this once again
for this confirmation process--and I know I've spoken with
Director McConnell about this; he feels the same way, having
endured the same process--we absolutely have to do something to
change direction.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Clapper. I believe there is great potential in
researching the social sciences for determining other ways of
gauging the trustworthiness--and that's really what this is
about--the trustworthiness and reliability of people, other
than pounding on people's doors. I think if I am confirmed and
I have the wherewithal to do that, I'd like to pursue research
for that.
In the meantime, the position of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence does oversee the Defense Security
Service, which clearly has management challenges of
longstanding. It's been explained to me, I think they have a
good strategy for trying to get well, but it's going to take
money and attention.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, this is the information age. There are
so many things that are automated. I can't imagine anything, as
you said, not changing in 40 years. So, what I would request of
you--and you and I talked about this--there are a lot of
technologies out there I'd like to have you exposed to, and I
think you already have been, to some of them. But maybe in
another, oh, let's say, a couple of months, if we could have a
conversation about this to see if there's any progress being
made--is that reasonable? We could kind of stay on top of this?
General Clapper. Absolutely, sir. I'd be pleased to do
that, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Good. Good.
General Clapper. I appreciate your interest.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Good, thank you.
Mr. Ostendorff, you have a tough job ahead. I've been
concerned about keeping the secrets--I was quite outspoken,
back during the 1990s, when the energy labs were just opened
up. They did away with color-coded badges because they said,
``Well, that's demeaning to people with a lesser clearance than
others might have.'' Background checks, wire-tapping, all these
things, I just want no holds barred. I want to have security. I
just want to know if you have any new ideas on implementing any
new systems where we can keep our information secure.
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator, I'm aware, as I know you are, of
the recent events at Los Alamos National Laboratory, associated
with the loss of classified material.
Senator Inhofe. That's specifically what I had in mind.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir. There have been several
investigations by the Department of Energy IG and by other
independent bodies, looking at those security practices,
procedures, and compliance culture. I would commit, if
confirmed, to taking a hard look at what is the Federal
oversight force at the site doing to ensure that the security
standards are being met, that there are rigorous processes that
are being followed, and would come back to the committee, and
yourself, and provide you with feedback from that review.
Senator Inhofe. That's good.
General Kicklighter, I have the greatest respect for
Senator Akaka, but he dropped the ball in his introduction of
you, and forgot to mention the most significant thing, and that
is the fact that you were destined for greatness when you
started your career at Fort Sill, OK.
General Kicklighter. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. In your new relationship, I think you will
be inundated with requests, not just, as the chairman said,
you'll be getting from the Secretary, but also Members are
going to have requests. I would hope that you would keep in
mind and evaluate these as they come in, because sometimes
you'll get legitimate requests, sometimes they'll be
politically inspired requests. I think you're the person who
can make those determinations and keep that in mind.
General Kicklighter. Yes, sir, I certainly will.
Senator Inhofe. Good. Good.
Dr. Casscells, four redheads. I can't believe that.
[Laughter.]
That's great. I understand that when you were over there,
you were injured, so you kind of went through the process.
We've all watched the television series M*A*S*H over the years.
How similar was that to your experience?
Dr. Casscells. Senator Inhofe, I wasn't badly injured. It
was a small injury, but it was just enough to get me into the
system as a patient. We were coming back from visiting an Iraqi
hospital, and the convoy had to swerve because of a tripwire in
the road to avoid an improvised explosive device (IED). We went
up on the curb, and I was thrown into the side of the Humvee
and got a bloody elbow that got infected. I had that drained at
the 10th Combat Support Hospital (CSH) in Baghdad. It gave me
an interesting insight, because, as the major was draining my
elbow, an Army captain who was a nurse came in and said,
``Heads-up, everybody, we have three birds coming in with about
six Iraqi victims, bad IEDs. Everybody who hasn't given blood
lately, roll up your sleeves.'' Even though I was the senior
health policy guy for the country, I didn't realize that all
the Iraqi blood transfusions came from our soldier volunteers.
Then she caught sight of me and said to the major, ``What's
that colonel doing here? Get him out in the hall. I need that
bed.'' [Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. I think that answers the question.
Dr. Casscells. But then, when I got back, I did face the
bureaucracy that has been in the news lately, and that is very
frustrating. If it's frustrating for a colonel, you can imagine
how frustrating it is for a sergeant or corporal, particularly
if they've had a head injury or their family is 1,000 miles
away and can't be advocates for them. So, sir, we have to fix
that and make it fair and fast.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. One of your biggest problems is going
to be that you probably won't have the resources that you think
are really necessary to get this done. You're going to have to
be very innovative. It's going to be difficult to take care of
all the needs. But I know, with your background, you'll do a
great job.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to speak to the new IG for probably most of my time.
I have been trying to get a handle on the number of people that
we currently employ in DOD to look over the shoulders of the
way we're spending our money in DOD. I'm wondering if you have
any idea of the total number of employees that are currently on
the payroll in all of the auditing and investigation different
parts of DOD.
General Kicklighter. Senator, I do not have that data. I've
certainly looked at the numbers that they have in the IG's
office, but that's only a small portion of the numbers that go
all across DOD. If I am confirmed as the IG, I would certainly
dig into that for you and report back to you what those numbers
are and what I think we may be getting as a return on our
investment.
Senator McCaskill. I think it's close to 20,000 people,
from best I can tell. That's a lot of people--20,000 people.
Now, the interesting thing about it is, the organization chart
is not pretty. You have the IG's office, which you, of course,
will head; then you have defense contracting; then you have the
IGs in each of the Services.
General Kicklighter. Right.
Senator McCaskill. In each of those instances, there are
performance audits being done, with the exception of the
Defense Communications Agency (DCA). There are not performance
audits there. Of course, understanding that performance
audits--if any part of auditing could be called exciting, it's
performance auditing; and I'm kind of one those weirdos that
thinks it's all exciting. But the number of performance audits
that are done--one of my concerns is, who's consuming these
products? Could you tell me your view on--you've been in the
military a long time--how many IG reports have you read since
you have been in the military?
General Kicklighter. I can tell you that each time I was in
a command position or a management position and the IG wrote a
report, I read it very carefully. I think, generally speaking,
that the IG reports are considered very seriously at very high
levels. I would hope that's true. I certainly would look into
that.
Senator McCaskill. I'm curious about the audit products
from the other IGs, because I think they would, obviously, be
instructive, regardless of which Service you're in. I'm
wondering who consumes those, the ones that are produced by the
IG in the Army, the IG in the Marine Corps, the IG in the Navy,
and the IG in the Air Force.
General Kicklighter. I am certainly not an expert in that
arena right now, but I think one of the responsibilities of the
DOD IG's office is to provide oversight for all of the audits,
to make sure that, to the extent possible, you're not
duplicating and overlapping, and, also, you're not leaving a
lot of gaps out there that nobody's looking at. So, what I
believe you have to do--and I certainly have a lot to learn in
this arena, and I know you know an awful lot in this area--is
that we have to look at that to make sure it is an integrated
effort and we are using that data, to the best of our ability
and not wasting resources.
Senator McCaskill. I have looked into how many
Antideficiency Act (ADA) violations have actually been punished
in DOD, and the ADA obviously is just one of the tools, but a
very important tool to get in contracting abuses as it relates
to spending money you shouldn't be spending, spending it in
ways you're not supposed to be spending it, and spending it
when you're not supposed to be spending it.
General Kicklighter. It is very important.
In fiscal year 2005, there were seven ADA violations that
resulted in punishment. Seven. Billions and billions and
billions of dollars and 20,000 auditors and investigators, and
we got 7 cases that resulted in punishment. In fiscal year
2006, there were nine.
Now, part of the problem here is, of course, that the
military wants what they want when they want it, and, for all
the right reasons, they believe the purposes for which they
want it is noble. I can't imagine the amount of money we're
spending looking into ADA violations, because when you look at
the process by which these are looked into, it involves
hundreds of people. I mean, first somebody has to look at it,
and then somebody else looks at it, and then somebody else
looks at it, and then there's an opportunity to correct it. If
the money is there--this is what I think a lot of people don't
understand, that the ADA violations, when it's discovered, if
you can go back and find the money that is appropriate to spend
on that, it's like ``no harm, no foul.'' It's as if you didn't
do anything wrong. Now, that's not exactly how we deter
behavior.
I'd like your view on how we get accountability. I mean,
DOD has been on the high-risk list for GAO since 1990. There's
a sense that everybody kind of throws up their hands and says
we're not going to do any better, this is just the way it is.
I'd like your commitment today. There's the realization that in
government you don't have bottom-line pressure, it's not as if
there is an issue of profit or not-profit. That's the
discipline in the private sector. In government, the discipline
is the rules and whether or not people are held accountable. I
would like your view on this ADA process and how in the world
we are ever going to deter behavior if we are coming up with
fewer than 10 people a year that are punished for violating
that law.
General Kicklighter. Senator, let me respond to that. I
certainly agree with your comments.
I really don't feel qualified to give you an answer today,
but I'd like to get back to you on the antideficiency
violation. I think the things that you pointed out that are
occurring internally, I think the fact that we are doing so
many things with other Federal agencies, also have problems
with antideficiency violations when we're exchanging funds
between Federal agencies.
Senator McCaskill. Right. Interagency contracts. That's a
whole problem.
General Kicklighter. Yes. But if you would allow me--if
confirmed, I would very much like to look into this in great
detail, because I think your points are extremely valuable, and
I'd like permission to come back and report back to you on
this.
Senator McCaskill. That would be great. Thank you very
much.
Doctor, I certainly am impressed with your background and
your experience. I'm wondering how you feel about going into a
job where your primary frustration isn't going to be your skill
as a doctor; your primary frustration is going to be how you
begin to get a handle on a system where things are so
complicated. I will tell you that one of the soldiers I talked
to at Walter Reed, his narrative summary, which, as you are
aware, is very important to these soldiers that have been
wounded, because it really sets almost in stone, how they're
going to be treated, then, whether they'll remain on active
duty or whether they're going to be retired, militarily, or
whether they're going to be transitioned to VA. It took his
narrative summary 2\1/2\ weeks to go across the hall after the
doctor had done it--literally 2\1/2\ weeks, literally across
the hall. I would like your view on what kind of tenacity do
you bring to this, in terms of arm-wrestling the reality that
these systems have become so bogged down with paper. There is
technology, by the way, that's other places in the military
where a soldier can pull up his record on any computer in the
world, but the medical part, the part that really is causing
the stress in these soldiers' families about how they're going
to be treated the rest of their lives. It's very difficult for
them to get information in a way that would reflect the fact
that we're in 2007.
Dr. Casscells. Senator McCaskill, your points are very well
taken, and I have a major awareness that I will need a lot of
help, including this committee's help, in getting things done
that actually cut outside the lane of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health, because these problems do involve a very
inefficient and, to some extent, unfair disability
determination system, a very complex health care system that
has numerous controversial issues in it. The latter, I am more
comfortable with.
I will say that the directions that Dr. Winkenwerder has
been heading and pushing for an electronic medical record,
numerous efforts to improve efficiency and accountability, are
things that I would, if confirmed, naturally want to
accelerate, if that can be done. I don't know whether they're
at top speed or not. I do know that when I was in Iraq, it
amused me to look up my record on Army Knowledge Online, one of
our Web sites, and to find that my deployment status was amber,
which means I was not fit to be deployed, and yet, there I was.
So, clearly there are issues like that. We have primarily a
paper record. There are errors in paper records. There are so
many questions that are being addressed now by these various
task forces and hearings that are going on that one would want
to wait and study them carefully, if confirmed, because, to
date, I just know what I've read in the papers. I've driven by
the Armed Forces Retirement Home, walked around there, same
with Building 18. I've called the Soldier Hotline, the 800
Hotline. It's clear that the military is taking this very
seriously. I've read the President's statement, and Secretary
Gates and Acting Army Secretary Pete Geren, and it sounds like
there's a lot of support for improving things to take a system
which is very good and make it absolutely superb.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you all for your service. I
appreciate it very much.
Dr. Casscells. Thank you, ma'am.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Just on that one point of interagency contracts, talking to
my staff back here, we, back in the early 1990s, with a little
subcommittee over at what was then called the Governmental
Affairs, now the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee, got into what we then called ``offloading,'' which
is the same thing as ``interagency contracts.'' The best
estimate we can get is that there's probably 10 to 20 times
more money funneled through those contracts now, minimally,
than was then. There's been legislation that's been adopted to
try to stop it. We're going to review more legislation. I think
there's been two hearings now, in a subcommittee of this
committee, on these interagency contracts. The opportunity for
abuse is real, there's no accountability, there's very little
oversight, and there's no competition, frequently. But Senator
McCaskill's interest and passion in this area is going to help
us get over the goal line. We very much thank you for your
interest in these issues which are very dry sometimes. It's
very few Senators, frankly, that are willing to really sink
their teeth into these issues; and so, your willingness to do
so with such gusto, I must tell you, is really a terrific
boost.
Senator McCaskill. You should know, Mr. Chairman, I visited
the temporary building, the Army Materiel Command at Fort
Belvoir, yesterday, so I'll be anxious to share with you how
temporary it felt. It was the one that's 230,000 square feet.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. You're welcome.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To follow on our distinguished colleague's questions to Dr.
Casscells, you mentioned his primary management skills would be
heavy, but, in my conversations with the good doctor, he
assured me that he's going to do a little hands-on medicine
while he's in this position, not unlike our distinguished
former majority leader, Bill Frist, would intermittently leave
the Senate, put the frustration of the Senate behind him, and
go out and do heart operations. I always admired him for that.
I hope that these management burdens--you'll handle it,
but, at the same time, keep your skills up, and a little hands-
on medicine, I think, is good for the heart and the soul, and
to show the troops that you still know how to do it.
The TRICARE program, something that this committee has
taken great pride in--and you noted in one of your replies to
the committee's advance questions, that one of the TRICARE
strengths is that it is very inexpensive for the beneficiary,
compared to other health care plans. ``This statement may well
be inconsistent with the views of senior leaders in the
Department who have described TRICARE as unsustainable in its
present form.'' So, therein rests a challenge for you to sort
that out. I don't presume, at this point in time, that you can
give us a great deal of insight into how you would treat
TRICARE, but it's viewed by the men and women of the Armed
Forces and their families as a very essential part of the
contract America makes with these families when they undertake
their role in the military. So, I hope you give us your
assurances you'll do the best you can to strengthen that
program.
Dr. Casscells. Yes, sir. Senator Warner, I share your
concern. If I understand you correctly, sir, that increasing
copays and deductibles, particularly at this time, run the risk
of making it harder for us to recruit and retain the very best,
because people value enormously the health care given in the
military. They are willing to sleep in tents, on cots, they
don't demand the writs, but they would like, and deserve, the
very best medical care. This is true for their families, and
their budgets are lean. I know that the copays and the
deductibles have been flat for 12 or 13 years, and there's
understandable interest in raising them, because the private
sector is raising theirs, to decrease utilization. But, sir,
there are other efficiencies which can be sought. As Dr.
Winkenwerder has told this committee, and told us, as soldiers,
the more we get involved in our care, taking ownership of our
care as patients, the more we utilize electronic records, the
more we utilize disease management tools, Web-based discussion
groups, confidential chat groups, the more people help
themselves and help each other--these are often low-cost
opportunities for savings and health.
Finally, sir, I think, as part of our pay-for-performance,
we need to include pay-for-prevention. It has to be possible to
incentivize people better to engage in prevention for
themselves and to incentivize caregivers.
Senator Warner. I think that's a point well taken.
Moving on to another mission--and maybe you haven't really
had this brought to your attention fully, but the recruiting
and retention of doctors, nurses, dentists, and other health
care professionals is a source of great concern, and we must
keep the best and the finest in the ranks of the uniform; at
the same time, acquire, where necessary, civilians to work
under a contract arrangement in our medical system. As one of
the heads of personnel put it, we are failing in these areas
right now. I hope that you can put this as one of your top
priorities. You have an impressive career in the civilian
sector, and a strong basis of knowledge about military
medicine, and you have to go out and get the finest and the
brightest to keep the ranks filled.
In that context, two things. We, here in Congress, years
ago--as a matter of fact, I was in DOD when the very eminent
Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, had the idea to
establish our own medical college. That's been done, the
Uniformed Services University of the Health Care Sciences. That
came under scrutiny here recently in the BRAC process. A number
of us really went to bat and dissuaded the BRAC Commission from
discontinuing that. It has provided an extraordinary number of
very capable individuals, and they not only fulfill their
initial obligation, which they serve to pay back the Federal
Government and the taxpayer for their education, but they
continue on, and they have a very high percentage of those
physicians and others being trained becoming careerists in the
military. I would hope you'd take a good look at that.
If I might say, we are fortunate here in Congress to have a
very able retired submariner, now an admiral in the medical
corps, Dr. Eisold, who's our physician, and he cares for all of
us and disciplines all of us pretty well, I might add. He's
tough. But he's often come to me, particularly when I was
chairman of this committee for 6 years, and addressed questions
regarding the medical fraternity throughout the Services, was a
helpful advisor to me. I would hope you'd find the opportunity
to meet him--I'd be happy to arrange that--just to draw on his
many years of experience in military medicine, and, having come
from the ranks of a submariner before he took his medical
training, he actually was in the Navy, then took his training
as a doctor, and then went into the medical sciences of the
military, and now cares for us here. He really is an
extraordinary individual.
I was going to suggest, also, that you focus on the
question of the Gulf war illnesses. That frequently comes
before this committee, illnesses that could have been
associated with service in those areas of responsibilities
during that period of time.
So, I'll conclude my questions. I wish you well. I think
you're eminently qualified, and I know that you'll do a
splendid job, together with your family.
To you, Mr. Ostendorff, I thank you for your service. I
want to start off with the question of the nuclear stockpile.
That's a program that this committee has worked on for years
and years. It's to go back and assess what is the status of the
stockpile today, its availability in the time, should it--
hopefully never be needed--but, if it were needed, we need to
know whether that stockpile can meet the contingency required.
How familiar are you with the program?
Mr. Ostendorff. I'm fairly familiar, Senator, based on my
experience with the oversight committee.
Senator Warner. So, you full well know Congress's concern.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. I'm anxious to continue to support that
program, and the tremendous amount of money, billions of
dollars we've invested in it. But, in the absence of actual
testing--and I support the absence of actual testing--and,
therefore, this is the alternative, to determine the viability
and capability of the stockpile. Do you have any particular
thoughts you want to share with the committee at this time?
Mr. Ostendorff. Senator Warner, in the context of that
question, I think the ongoing Stockpile Stewardship Program run
by NNSA that has its life-extension programs to look at the
surveillance of aging effects on existing weapons that, in some
cases, have been around for 30 years or more, that those
ongoing research and development efforts are crucial, not just
to maintaining the existing stockpile, but to other efforts, to
learn more about materials in the context of some proposals for
the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program. It's all part
of one integrated program.
Senator Warner. Let's go to that very point, the RRW.
Earlier this month, the Nuclear Weapons Council, a joint body
of the Departments of Defense and Energy, announced the
selection of a design team for a possible replacement warhead.
This RRW would, if developed, replace a portion of the Nation's
seabased nuclear weapons. Based on your knowledge of the
program to this point, do you believe it will be possible to
develop and field a replacement warhead without requiring
underground nuclear testing?
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir. I have been a participant, along
with some of the staff who are behind you, in a number of
briefings by NNSA, including the laboratory directors at Los
Alamos, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and Sandia. We have
received very strong technical assurances that the RRW design
selected earlier this month can be pursued without the need to
resume underground nuclear testing. The various tools in the
Stockpile Stewardship campaign are viewed as being robust and
sufficient to the task to make sure that that can proceed. Next
year, there'll be a design, definition, and cost study. Of
course, any future plans to actually build an RRW weapon would
require congressional authorization in a future budget.
Senator Warner. I thank you. I wish you well.
General Kicklighter, in my opening statement, I expressed
to you some of my concerns. You answered it, in terms of the
independence that you must have to successfully operate. I
would, however, draw your attention to this tragic case of
Corporal Pat Tillman, which was just handled, but only from the
context that--how long it took the IG to do this. We had
another case here--it was a pressing case of the Air Force
Academy, and certain questions regarding, unfortunately, a
multitude of issues. Hopefully, the Academy's on a straight and
true course now, but, for a while, it was in stormy seas. I
would hope that you'd feel free--and, really, I ask that you
come back before the committee, at least inform the staff, in
about 90 days--do you have enough resources to operate that
office as you see appropriate?
General Kicklighter. Senator Warner, I certainly will be
glad to do that. In fact, my intention is to, if confirmed,
take a look at the mission resources available, and see what's
really needed in the way of structure and staff. I certainly
will be back to this staff and to this committee within 90 days
with my findings and recommendations.
Senator Warner. All right.
General Clapper, I've also covered--and others--most of the
questions that were of concern to me, but I want to bring one
to your attention, because I, fortunately, with other members
of the committee, have spent a lot of time here in these many
years working on unmanned vehicles. As a matter of fact, I
think it was 8 or 10, 12 years ago, I challenged the private
sector and the forces to each of them to get up to a certain
percentage of unmanned vehicles into their system. Now, there's
a lot of programs out there right now and, that's fortunate. A
lot of these programs are being developed jointly. I would ask
that you look at this Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program, because
it is an intelligence-gathering system, and come back to the
committee if you feel that there's just too much duplication
and effort out there, and other areas where we have a
shortfall. Do you have any particular points you'd like to add
about the unmanned vehicles here this morning?
General Clapper. Other than to say, sir, that, from my NGA
experience, I think it has a tremendous potential, and I think
I share your concern about management, proliferation, overlap,
and duplication. I would commit to you to look into that, sir,
if confirmed.
Senator Warner. Thank you, General. Also, through the
years, and particularly once Congress put in a new framework of
laws about our intelligence system--both Senator Levin and I
have had years of experience on the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, and we were part of drawing up those laws--
there's still a process to bring DOD into conformity with--I'm
not suggesting they're in violation now--but still, to bring it
into conformity with the overall goals of trying to establish a
system which comes up under the National Director for
Intelligence. But I feel very strongly--I just say for myself,
at this point in time--historically, the military have had
their own responsibility to develop that intelligence,
primarily tactical, which they need for daily operations of
those forces. In this push, pull, and reorganization, we've
done our best to preserve that. But that's something I want you
to keep a watchful eye on and make certain that it does not
fall below that level, drawing on your extensive experience,
that these operational commanders demand, and must have, to
effectively handle the missions that they are assigned. Do you
have a view on that?
General Clapper. Senator Warner, I think you're exactly on
target to raise that issue. It is a concern. Having served in
combat at the tactical level, having served as a J-2 three
times, having served as service intelligence chief once, and
having served as the director of a national agency embedded in
DOD, as well as the Defense Intelligence Agency, I think I have
some background and experience to examine all dimensions of
that issue.
When it comes down to it, it's a balance that has to be
struck between the competing fiefdoms, if you will. But I share
your perception on that.
Senator Warner. Welcome to the arena, and fight hard for
your troops.
General Clapper. I will, sir. Thank you.
Senator Warner. Because balance is fine, but, if there's a
tilt, tilt a little towards the troops.
General Clapper. Sir, there is absolutely no----
Senator Warner. You don't have to answer that question.
[Laughter.]
General Clapper. Okay, sir. No ambiguity about that.
Senator Warner. Yes, no ambiguity about that.
Mr. Chairman, I think that concludes all the questions that
I would have for this distinguished panel of witnesses. What an
extraordinarily well-qualified group of nominees. I think the
President and his team are to be congratulated on that.
I wish each of you well. It's a challenge. Many of you have
been before this committee and other committees of Congress to
accept positions, but this is a new chapter in your life, and
that of your families, and I wish you well.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Let me ask you, first, General Clapper, about the Counter-
Intelligence Field Activity (CIFA). There's been a suggestion,
I think, in last week's Newsweek, that there's a review going
on of the activities of CIFA, out of concern about CIFA's
collection and retention of information about U.S. citizens.
Also, it's heavy reliance on contractors. This was the question
of Talon, and this is the question of the database being
maintained with names and information, improperly. Do you
believe that CIFA itself should be engaged in
counterintelligence collection and analysis, or should it be
focused on coordinating the activities of the military
Services?
General Clapper. Sir, my inclination is probably the
latter, more of an overseer, coordinator, orchestrator, if you
will, of counterintelligence activities. There may be cases
where DOD departmental equities and security facilities or
people are in jeopardy and where the CIFA would have to play a
lead role. With respect to the Talon database program, that's
something I have had the opportunity to delve into, and there's
no question that there were, in the initial creation of that
database, which was sort of a neighborhood-watch sort of thing,
of some 13,000 records, approximately 186 of them involved
reporting on U.S. citizens principally demonstrating against
recruiting stations or educational institutions in support of
the military. Since about July 2005, it's my impression that
CIFA has cleansed the database of those records. They are in
retention in a general counsel repository, for oversight
purposes. Since that time, there have been mechanisms in place
to preclude the inclusion of such data.
It would be my intent, sir, if I'm confirmed, though, to
look at whether the candle's worth the flame here, to see
whether the output of this database is really worth having it
and if some other arrangement could be made to capture the data
that's important for DOD equities.
Chairman Levin. Would you let us know about that? Because
there's been some abuses and excesses here, which is troubling
to many of us.
General Clapper. I will, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Sir, my sense of the Talon database issue, albeit without the
advantage of being fully immersed in the details, is that OUSDI and
CIFA leaders have taken appropriate steps to both cleanse the database
and prevent recurrence of similar problems. Nonetheless, if confirmed,
I will get back to you and the committee with a more informed read of
whether the database provides value-added, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General, your predecessor pledged to the committee to
refrain from getting involved in the substance of intelligence,
the production and the analysis of substantive intelligence.
What Dr. Cambone said is that he saw the role that he was
occupying as one of policymaking and providing resources for
intelligence components. Do you agree with that?
General Clapper. Yes, sir, I do. In general terms, I think
that the position of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, and, for that matter, his predecessor form,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence, should play an important
resource and policy and oversight role, but should not engage
in substantive analysis issues.
Chairman Levin. Now, in response to the committee's advance
questions, you gave us the answer to this, but I want you to do
this again for the record, if you would. Give us your view on
the propriety of nonintelligence organizations engaging in
intelligence analysis.
General Clapper. Sir, I agree with the commentary that
Secretary Gates made about this, that intelligence analysis,
particularly in an all-source context, should be done,
conducted by those organizations, institutions, officially
charged with doing so; meaning, in our case, for example, the
Defense Intelligence Agency or CIA. I think special analytic
cells that are established for one reason or another, I think
they bear watching, scrutiny. In prior incumbencies, I've
encountered those kinds of efforts, and if I were the
responsible intelligence official, I would want to engage with
them to determine what the purpose was and what it is that was
not being satisfied by the established intelligence
institutions.
Chairman Levin. Should the established intelligence
institutions be aware if and when such a cell is created?
General Clapper. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. Aware of their activity so that they can
comment, in turn, on those activities?
General Clapper. Exactly, sir. I would also like to add,
sir, if I may, that, at the same time, we have questionable
intelligence activities, and there are also, I think, valid
red-teaming and this sort of thing. I think it's entirely
appropriate and necessary, for that matter, that policymakers,
commanders, whomever, question, probe, push back from
intelligence. That is certainly a legitimate, appropriate, and
necessary activity. To a certain extent, there's judgment here
involved in and it's kind of like pornography, you know it when
you see it. So, you have to be very vigilant as to the
existence and purpose of such activities.
Chairman Levin. When such activities exist, should they be
open, transparent to the folks that they are red-teaming?
General Clapper. Absolutely, sir. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you.
Dr. Casscells, let me ask you about the conversion of
military medical billets to civilian positions. In a briefing
to the committee staff last week, General Gale Pollock, the
Acting Surgeon General of the Army, and Major General Eric
Schoomaker, who's the new Walter Reed commander, said that they
believe we've gone too far in converting military medical
billets to civilian positions and that they're unable to hire
or contract civilians to fill converted positions in a timely
manner. General Pollock said that she would request relief from
the continuing requirements to convert military positions to
civilian positions, and I'm wondering, what are your views
regarding conversion of medically-related billets?
Dr. Casscells. Mr. Chairman, I have not had a chance to
talk to General Schoomaker or General Pollock, but I'm aware of
the general issue, and it's a critical one now, because so many
providers--nurses, doctors, therapists, psychologists--have
been deployed overseas, so the backfill issue is on everyone's
mind. It seems that there are not quite enough in some
specialties to backfill from the Reserves, and there has been a
strong interest, of course, in converting some billets to
civilian status in order to accept volunteers, for example,
from the public health service or from the private world. I've
been contacted by a number of private doctors who want to
serve, asking if they have the right training and are the right
age and so forth. That's something that, if confirmed, I would
want to look into very closely. But I would certainly not want
to see critical specialties contracted completely to the
private sector, because if you contract all your neurosurgery
to the private sector, then when you have a head-injured
soldier, sailor, airman, or marine, you won't have a
neurosurgeon. We had only one neurosurgeon in Baghdad at the
10th CSH, a person who was well trained, but that person's on
call 24/7. So, there are some billets, both in the continental
United States and overseas, that we struggle to fill, and the
combination of attention by me to recruitment, I think, to get
some docs like me to sign up in mid-career, as well as
judicious use of assistance offered from public health service
and the private practice of medicine and nursing, these should
enable us to provide these critical services.
So, there is a balance. Sir, if confirmed, I will look at
that very closely and be honored to work with you on it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. You made reference to electronic
medical records, and I'm wondering whether you could give us
some idea as to how you would accelerate the effective
implementation of a DOD electronic medical records system.
Dr. Casscells. Mr. Chairman, I haven't been in a management
role with these records, but I have used electronic medical
records for some 20 years. I've seen them evolve with painful
slowness, first at Mass General Hospital and Beth Israel
Hospital in Boston, at NIH, and Harvard Community Health Plan.
Everywhere I've worked, we have struggled to implement these
records, making them more user-friendly, providing incentives
for doctors to use them, and the like. The same, of course,
applies to nurses, psychologists, and other medical
professionals. So, there is no easy answer to this, but I am
heartened by the fact that DOD and the Veterans Administration
recently signed an agreement--I think it was in January--to
create a single in-patient medical record, which would not just
be an interoperable seamless transition of two records, but
would be one record.
There is a lot of commitment to this, a lot of dollars that
have been spent. It's been a little frustrating to all the
clinicians. I do know that Armed Forces Longitudinal Technology
Application is our showpiece right now in DOD health care.
There are plenty of providers who find it a little bit slow and
difficult to use. These are motivated, computer-savvy young
doctors, nurses, therapists, and so forth. So, we need to do
more to make this more user-friendly and provide better
incentives, sir.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Doctor, there's a recent report that
injured soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division were sent to
the training center at Fort Irwin, even though their injuries
prevented them from participating in training, and, in some
cases, prevented them from receiving prescribed physical
therapy. The article quotes military experts as saying that
they suspect that the deployment to Fort Irwin of injured
soldiers was an effort to pump up the manpower statistics used
to show readiness of Army units. During the Army posture
hearing recently, we asked Acting Secretary Geren and General
Schoomaker to look into similar allegations about the 3rd
Infantry Division changing medical profiles of soldiers so that
they could be deployed to Iraq. Both Secretary Geren and
General Schoomaker testified it would be improper to change a
profile for the purpose of making the soldier deployable. Do
you agree that it is improper to change a medical profile for
the purpose of making a servicemember deployable?
Dr. Casscells. Yes, sir, I certainly agree. While I'm not
familiar with the reports you've gotten concerning Fort Irwin
and Fort Ord, I do know that we've had many soldiers who have
asked to be deployed, despite a profile. They've really asked
that it be set aside and that there be a waiver so that they
could be deployed. That's quite a different thing from changing
a profile and basically forcing a soldier to duty. I would look
very seriously at that.
Chairman Levin. Okay. We'll look forward to your very
thoroughly checking this out, because it would be very
disturbing if, in fact, it's being done for that reason.
General Kicklighter, if you are confirmed as the IG, will
you ensure that these allegations, now from two different
sources, are thoroughly investigated by either the Army or by
your office?
General Kicklighter. Mr. Chairman, I will assure you that
will be the case.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Ostendorff, the NNSA has started a review of the
nuclear weapons complex--I think you've made reference to this
already--to determine the complex's future--``the future''
being defined as 2030. Are you going to be involved in making
decisions with respect to the complex of the future? Is it your
understanding that you would be involved in that?
Mr. Ostendorff. Chairman Levin, it's my understanding that,
if I am confirmed, I would be involved in assisting the
Administrator in those decisions, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Would you agree that the following elements
are necessary to make decisions with respect to that complex of
the future? I'm going to read them all at once, and then you
can tell me if there's any that you don't believe are
necessary. The anticipated size of the nuclear weapons
stockpile, both deployed and nondeployed warheads; the number
of different types of weapons in the stockpile; whether a RRW
is feasible; if the RRW is feasible, what percentage of the
stockpile will be comprised of those warheads, and what of
conventional warheads; and what quantity of fissile materials
would be required to support the stockpile in 2030? Would they
all be needed to be considered?
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. The NNSA has announced that it will make a
decision on the future nuclear weapons complex in December
2008, at the latest, will all of the items that I just read off
be known at that time?
Mr. Ostendorff. Mr. Chairman, I am not currently aware of
the status of discussions between the Department of Energy,
DOD, and the rest of the administration on the size of the
future stockpile. That is an area that you've highlighted that
certainly is a factor, and such things as, future pit
production requirements, and what number of warheads we have
for diversity in the stockpile. If confirmed, I would take a
hard look to make sure that those discussions are transparent
and are communicated back to Congress.
Chairman Levin. If those items have not been resolved, then
tell us what's going to be used as the basis for decisions
regarding the future nuclear weapons complex. Okay?
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Would you agree that if the RRW is
feasible, that a new warhead for use in existing delivery
systems--that it could be used for that purpose?
Mr. Ostendorff. It's my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that
the RRW concept studies and design definition studies which are
underway right now, to date have demonstrated that they could
achieve those characteristics and purposes.
Chairman Levin. Could they then, if it is feasible, be
usable in existing delivery systems?
Mr. Ostendorff. It is my understanding that the Air Force
and the Navy nuclear weapons directorates have reviewed the
existing reentry vehicle technologies and have not determined
that there would need to be any significant changes to the
delivery platforms.
Chairman Levin. Senator Thune, are you ready to go?
Senator Thune. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you. You look like you need a break.
Chairman Levin. I don't want to hold you here, because I
have a few more questions.
Senator Thune. Okay.
Chairman Levin. But I'm going to be here anyway, so let me
call on you, if you're ready.
Senator Thune. All right, thank you.
I thank the panel for their willingness to serve. I just
have a couple of questions I'd like to ask a couple of our
nominees.
First, for Dr. Casscells, in your advance policy questions,
you state that TRICARE key performance measures have improved
dramatically. Among those are claims processing and customer
satisfaction. What I would like to share with you are some
concerns I've heard from my constituents regarding TRICARE and
customer satisfaction.
South Dakota has approximately 7,000 military retirees who
are TRICARE-eligible. On more than one occasion, constituents
have indicated to me that health care providers are not
accepting TRICARE because of the time it takes to process
claims and because TRICARE is not reimbursing the health
provider enough. If confirmed, can you inform the committee as
to what steps you would take to improve the relationship
between TRICARE and private health care providers?
Dr. Casscells. Senator Thune, thank you. Yes, I have been
looking into that as a TRICARE patient and as a TRICARE
provider, not as a possible Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs. I have learned what I think most people have
already come to understand, which is that the TRICARE contracts
are not very generous financially to the providers. It is a
little bit too onerous in signing up for them and maintaining
them, given the relatively small number of patients that most
doctors in most towns would have, or most hospitals. So, while
I'm a TRICARE provider and patient, I'm at the University of
Texas, where there's a big staff to negotiate these contracts
and to help doctors with the regulations. The guys and gals in
private practice throw up their hands when they get yet another
complex contract. Some of them have said, ``It's more difficult
than Medicare, and, heck, I have zillions of Medicare patients,
but hardly any of TRICARE.'' So, we have to make it simpler,
and, if confirmed, I would work to do that.
In addition, sir, because the finances aren't so generous,
it has to be cast in a light that people get recognition for
taking on TRICARE patients. There has to be a sergeant or a
general from the local National Guard to come by and present a
plaque and to call the local newspaper and say, ``Thank heaven
for some doctors who are willing to step up and help with
TRICARE,'' because it is not the most remunerative, it's not
the easiest, but it's a way that they can help the country. We
need to recognize the doctors that way.
Senator Thune. In a follow-up to that, one of the other
concerns that I've heard is the lack of clarity of when and
under what circumstances TRICARE is the primary payer. This is
a confusing area, I think, of the health care industry, and
especially for seniors, who may be carrying multiple policies
and have multiple needs, like long-term care. Could you inform
the committee, as well, of any steps you believe need to be
taken to increase the level of education that TRICARE can
provide to its beneficiaries so that this confusion that exists
out there among those who are carrying multiple policies can be
eliminated, or at least reduced?
Dr. Casscells. Senator, I'm going to school on that,
myself, now. I can say, again, just as a TRICARE patient and
provider, that the Web site is getting better. The Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations has
been happy with the way it's gone so far. The ratings tend to
be higher than the average civilian hospital. But I'm sure we
can do better, and I do think that from the military leaders
I've spoken with, there is a commitment to do better in this
regard. But, as to the details, I'm still going to school on
them.
Senator Thune. I hope that as you go through that, you can
get some clarity and be able to communicate that with the many
retirees who are using the program, because it does seem to be
an issue on which there is great agreement that there is a lot
of confusion and that there needs to be some better explanation
of the various programs, particularly for seniors. Obviously,
we're dealing with this on other issues, like Medicare Part D,
as well. There is some confusion about the payer.
I have a question for General Kicklighter, I'm coming back
to the issue of health care--about the increasing cost of DOD
health care and the Department's plan to pay for it. DOD
statistics on total medical spending indicate a growth of $17.5
billion in fiscal year 2000, to an estimated $39 billion in
fiscal year 2007. I guess the question has to do with any
thoughts that you might have about addressing what is a growing
part of the DOD budget and any way that cost savings can be
achieved in that. It's sort of endemic in health care
generally, but that is a very substantial growth in one area of
your budget over a relatively small period of time. So, any
thoughts on that?
General Kicklighter. Senator Thune, I don't know exactly
what the health care capability is inside of the DOD's IG's
office, but I certainly will take a look at what our skills
are. If we don't have the skills we need to look at the growth
of health care budgets, and what impact that is, and what care
our recipients, both active and retired, are getting, I
certainly would be glad to look into that, and would like to
get back to you on that.
[The information referred to follows:]

If confirmed, I will review the skills sets within the DOD OIG and
the associated oversight requirements regarding health care. Upon
completion of my review, I will provide the committee with my
conclusions and recommended actions.

Senator Thune. I guess the reason I raise it is one of the
suggestions of the problem has been increasing accountability
and oversight for funds that get budgeted at the Department. I
know that health care is a cost, in any organization right now,
that is out of control. But if there are ways in which we can,
through greater accountability and oversight help address that.
We find that to be true in private health care, as well, that
there sometimes is, in any government program, folks that
figure out how to game the system. We want to make sure none of
that's happening with regard to health care provided by the
military.
General Kicklighter. What I'd like to do, Senator, is to
look into that, if confirmed, and get back to you as soon as I
possibly can, in a very short period of time.
Senator Thune. I appreciate that.
Thank you all very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Mr. Ostendorff, over half of the nonproliferation program
funding at NNSA is devoted to the mixed oxide (MOX) project
which is aimed at turning 34 tons of excess weapons-grade
plutonium into nuclear power reactor fuel. Several reports have
indicated that the cost for the project has increased
substantially. I'm wondering, if confirmed, whether you would
look into the cost and the schedule for that program, and
ensure that an independent cost estimate is available for the
project.
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir, I will.
Chairman Levin. Before construction activities begin for
the MOX facilities, would you report back to the committee also
on the status of the Russian companion effort to dispose of the
same amount of excess weapons-grade plutonium?
Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. That winds up the questioning of members.
We'll keep the record open for the usual length of time.
Again, we want to thank you for your service. We want to
thank your families. We particularly want to single out these
younger kids who have sat here so patiently all morning long. I
can't imagine, when I was their age, sitting still for as long
as they have sat still. So, this new generation is not only
computer literate, they are incredibly patient. I know their
fathers, their grandfathers--are very grateful to them and all
the family members for coming here again today.
With that, we will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Claude M. Kicklighter,
USA (Ret.), by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. Section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 provides
that Inspectors General shall be appointed on the basis of their
``integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial
analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or
investigations.'' What background and experience do you possess that
you believe qualifies you to perform the duties of the Department of
Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG), particularly in the area of
oversight, audit, and investigation?
Answer. In a career of over 35 years of military service, followed
by 15 years in the Senior Executive Service of the civil service, I
have had extensive executive responsibility and experience working with
issues related to public administration, management analysis,
accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, and investigation. I
obtained a Masters of Management degree to further develop a number of
these skills.
I have learned what to expect from an IG in turns of their duties
and responsibilities; my career has required that I maintain a close
professional relationship with the IG in each military and civilian
organization in which I have held senior management positions. I have
been part of and led several high-level government investigations and
have conducted numerous inspections intended to strengthen planning and
implementation of policies, programs, and performance at the
Departments of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and State.
During my years of public service, I have gained a broad-based
understanding of the functioning of DOD, in particular. I have made an
enduring commitment to the welfare and development of its civilian and
military personnel, and strive to set an appropriate example for them
in my personal conduct, integrity, and loyalty.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform these duties?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to become more familiar with statutes
and regulations applicable to government contracting in general and
defense procurement, in particular. I also plan to meet with a broad
cross-section of officials and personnel within DOD, including members
of the Armed Forces here and overseas, to listen to their concerns and
identify issues that might merit action by the Office of the Inspector
General (OIG). Also, I plan to spend time listening to the concerns of
the Members of Congress and their staffs.
If confirmed, I plan to engage the members of the Defense Council
on Integrity and Efficiency and the President's Council on Integrity
and Efficiency to better understand their effective roles.
I also intend to spend time with all elements of the DOD IG Office
to learn and benefit from their invaluable grass roots level insights.
Question. Based on your background and experience, are there any
changes that you would recommend with respect to the current
organization or responsibilities of the DOD IG?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to examine how the OIG is organized to
determine if any structural changes in the office are appropriate. I
also plan to determine whether the office is meeting the full range of
its statutory responsibilities within the context of the resources
available. It would be premature to offer any recommendations for
change in these areas until I have an opportunity to conduct the
necessary thorough evaluations.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would your working relationship be
with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Section 8(c) of the act states that the IG shall ``be the
principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for matters relating to
the prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs
and operations of the Department . . . .''
If confirmed, I will seek to establish a strong and effective
relationship with the Secretary of Defense that enables me to carry out
my statutory duties with the independence required under the act, while
enabling the Secretary to exercise his statutory supervisory authority.
I will consult directly with the Secretary as necessary and
appropriate, especially with respect to matters governed by section
8(b)(1) of the act. I also expect to continue the current practice of
providing weekly updates on ongoing issues to the special assistants
for the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, monthly
meetings with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and quarterly briefings
to the Under Secretaries on matters warranting their attention.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Section 3(a) of the Inspector General Act states that
``each IG shall report to and be under the general supervision of the
head of the establishment involved or, to the extent such authority is
delegated, the officer next in rank below such head.'' DOD Directive
5106.01, dated April 13, 2006, states that ``the IG of the DOD shall
report to and be under the general supervision of the Secretary of
Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense . . . .'' Accordingly, if
confirmed, I would expect my relationship with the Deputy Secretary of
Defense to almost mirror my relationship with the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief
Financial Officer) (USD(C/CFO).
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(C/CFO) on areas of
concern within the financial management arena which, I am told, the OIG
has identified as a major management challenge for Department. I will
conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to the
programs and operations of the establishment in order to promote
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. I would continue to work with
the USD(C/CFO) to formulate the OIG's portion of the annual President's
budget for submission to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as well as request required
resources to conduct the IG's mission.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).
Answer. I am informed that the OIG has also identified acquisition
processes and contract management as a major management challenge for
DOD. It is therefore essential for the IG to maintain an effective
working relationship with the USD(AT&L). If confirmed, I anticipate to
work particularly closely with the Under Secretary concerning the
allocation of OIG resources in the acquisition area, and how best to
implement audit recommendations pertaining to acquisition processes.
As IG, I would also recommend policies, in coordination with the
USD(AT&L) and the USD(Comptroller), to ensure that audit oversight of
contractor activities and financial management are coordinated and
carried out in an efficient manner to prevent duplication.
Question. The General Counsel of DOD.
Answer. The OIG has extensive legal expertise and resources that
are valuable to the OIG and, if confirmed, I will work as closely as
possible with the Counsel without compromising, or creating the
appearance of compromising, the independence of the OIG.
It is my understanding that the former DOD Office of the Deputy
General Counsel (Inspector General) was re-designated as the OIG Office
of the General Counsel. The nine positions that comprise the office
were transferred, with associated funding, from OSD to OIG. The OIG is
the appointing authority for all personnel and is responsible for
budgeting, personnel services, and other administrative support for the
OIG Office of General Counsel.
Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
Answer. I am advised that the IG and the Director of Operational
Tests and Evaluation have a common interest in ensuring that equipment
and weapons systems allocated to the warfighter perform effectively and
as planned. If confirmed, I would expect to consult as appropriate with
the Director concerning the initiation of oversight efforts in these
areas.
Question. The Inspectors General of the military departments,
defense agencies, and the Joint Staff.
Answer. Section 8(c)(2) of the act states that the IG of DOD
``shall . . . initiate, conduct, and supervise such audits and
investigations in the DOD (including the military departments) as the
IG considers appropriate . . .'' Section 8(c)(9) adds that the IG
``shall . . . give particular regard to the activities of the internal
audit, inspection, and investigative units of the military departments
with a view toward avoiding duplication and ensuring effective
coordination and cooperation. . .''
As I understand it, the DOD oversight community uses internal
coordination mechanisms to de-conflict potential duplicative efforts.
In addition, DOD directives implementing statute govern certain
programs in which the Inspectors General of the military departments
participate. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD IG continues to
coordinate and avoid duplicative efforts and works as a team.
Question. The Inspectors General of subordinate commands.
Answer. My relationship with the Inspectors General of subordinate
commands will be based on the OIG role described above in part G. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the other DOD Inspectors General to
carry out applicable policies and guidance; avoid duplication,
overlapping, and gaps; and work to build a strong team.
Question. The Criminal Investigative Services of the Military
Departments.
Answer. Under the act, the IG has the authority to initiate,
conduct, and supervise criminal investigations relating to any and all
programs and operations of the DOD. In addition, the IG is statutorily
authorized to develop policy, monitor and evaluate program performance,
and provide guidance regarding all criminal investigative programs
within the Department. It is my understanding that the DOD IG works
frequently in close coordination with the Military Criminal
Investigative Organizations (MCIOs) on joint investigations.
If confirmed, I will work closely with each of the MCIOs to ensure
that investigative resources are used effectively.
Question. The audit agencies of the military departments.
Answer. Section 4(a) of the act establishes broad jurisdiction for
the IG to conduct audits and investigations within DOD, and section
8(c)(2) states that the IG ``shall . . . initiate, conduct, and
supervise such audits and investigations in the DOD (including the
military departments) as the IG considers appropriate.''
If confirmed, I will continue to work with the audit agencies of
the military departments.
Question. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with DCAA, as
prescribed in the Inspector General Act. Although DCAA reports to the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), it operates under audit
policies established by the IG.
Question. The Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council.
Answer. As I understand it, the DOD OIG regularly provides comments
to the Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council on proposed changes to
the Defense Federal Acquisition Systems and also recommends changes as
a result of DOD OIG work. If confirmed, I would expect to continue
these practices.
Question. The Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition
Policy.
Answer. It is my understanding that the Director of Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy is responsible for oversight of a
large segment of the Defense Department's acquisition and contracting
operations and, accordingly, is a major recipient of reports provided
by the OIG. If confirmed, I would expect to continue the current
practice of working with the Director.
Question. The Comptroller General and the Government Accountability
Office (GAO).
Answer. It is my understanding the DOD OIG works very closely with
the Comptroller General and the GAO to coordinate planned and ongoing
audits and inspections to avoid any duplication of efforts. It is my
further understanding that the DOD OIG also has a GAO affairs office
that serves as the central liaison between GAO and DOD management
during GAO reviews of DOD programs and activities. If confirmed, I
would work to maintain this cooperative relationship between the
Comptroller General and GAO.
Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
(SIGIR).
Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD OIG has supported the
operations of the SIGIR and its predecessor, the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) Inspector General. In accordance with the IG Act and
Public Law 108-106, title 3, section 3001(f)(4), the DOD OIG
coordinates activities with the SIGIR as well as other oversight
community members, to avoid duplicating oversight efforts and to
minimize disruption to military operations.
As I also understand it, the DOD IG scope of oversight authority
encompasses all DOD funded operations and activities in Iraq and the
global war on terror, which today amounts to about $463 billion in
supplemental appropriations. The SIGIR focuses his oversight effort
only on funds designated for Iraq reconstruction, which has been
appropriated at about $30 billion. If confirmed, and in keeping with
the IG Act, I will work to ensure that the DOD OIG collaborates
effectively with the SIGIR to ensure that we protect the public
expenditures in Iraq for which we have oversight.
Question. The President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency
(PCIE).
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to be a very active participant in the
PCIE. As a Presidential-nominated and Senate-confirmed IG, the DOD IG
is a member of the PCIE which meets on a monthly basis. It is my
understanding that the DOD OIG currently serves on the PCIE Audit
Committee and chairs the Information Technology Committee. I intend to
participate fully and actively in the meetings of the PCIE and its
committees.
Question. The Defense Council on Integrity and Efficiency (DCIE).
Answer. If confirmed, as its chairperson, I would organize meetings
with the established members to discuss issues of common interest and
reinforce close working relationships.
Sections 2 and 3 of the DCIE Charter state that, in accordance with
section 2(2) of the IG Act, the DOD IG, who is the DCIE Chairman, is
responsible to provide ``leadership and coordination [in] activities
designed: (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the
administration of;, and (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in
such programs and operations.''
Question. The Office of Management and Budget.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Deputy Director for
Management of the OMB, who is the Chairperson of the PCIE.

MAJOR CHALLENGES, PROBLEMS, AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems
facing the next DOD IG?
Answer. Currently, I do not have sufficient knowledge to respond to
this question. However, if confirmed, it will be my top priority to
learn what challenges and problems the DOD IG office needs to address
and to ensure the adequacy of resources required to accomplish its
mission.
Question. If you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges and problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus audit, investigative, and
inspection efforts on the challenges identified in the Semiannual
Report, while working to identify new issues in consultation with
senior DOD officials and Congress. I will also work with senior DOD IG
officials to determine what additional resources the OIG may need to
fulfill its statutory responsibilities.
Question. If you are confirmed, what broad priorities would you
establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the DOD IG?
Answer. It is difficult as a nominee to formulate priorities
because I have not had access to the full range of information and
considerations that should inform them. Promoting efficiency and
preventing fraud in defense acquisitions will obviously be a high
priority--as well as effective support for the men and women of our
armed services serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. I will also ensure that
the OIG pursues aggressive oversight of contracting issues. There
undoubtedly are several other key matters that will merit
prioritization. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with senior
officials of the DOD and OIG, and with Congress, in establishing broad
priorities.
Question. Are there any areas currently under investigation or
review by the OIG which you do not believe are appropriate for
investigation or review by the DOD IG? If so, why?
Answer. I have no knowledge of any inappropriate areas at this
time.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the DOD IG?
Answer. The duties and functions of the IG of DOD are those
specified in sections 3, 4, and 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978,
as amended. Additional duties and responsibilities of the IG are
specified in DOD Directive No. 5106.01, which was signed by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense on April 13, 2006.
By statute, the IG conducts and supervises audits and
investigations relating to the programs and operations of DOD. The IG
also provides leadership and coordination, and recommends policy, for
activities designed to: (1) promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration of DOD programs and operations; and
(2) combat fraud, waste, and abuse. In addition, the IG is responsible
for keeping both the Secretary of Defense and Congress fully and
currently informed about problems and deficiencies in defense programs,
the need for corrective action, and the status of such action.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect that the Secretary of Defense will
prescribe for me the full range of duties and functions set forth in
the Inspector General Act, as amended, as well as the additional duties
and responsibilities specified in DOD Directive No. 5106.01. I also
anticipate he will provide specific areas that he is concerned about
and would like reviewed. I believe he would also expect for me to
protect the independence and objectivity of the office.
Question. Section 2 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 states
that its purpose is to create independent and objective units to
conduct and supervise audits and investigations; to provide leadership
and coordination and recommend policies designed to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness; to prevent and detect fraud and abuse;
and to provide a means for keeping Congress and agency heads fully and
currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of programs and operations and the necessity for and
progress of corrective action.
Are you committed to maintaining the independence of the DOD IG, as
set forth in the IG statute?
Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain the independence of the OIG
consistent with the provisions of the IG Act.
Question. Are you committed to keeping the Committee on Armed
Services ``fully and currently informed,'' and, if so, what steps will
you take, if confirmed, to ensure that this responsibility is carried
out?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, in accordance with section 2(3) of the
act, I will be committed to keeping the Committee on Armed Services
``fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating
to the administration of such programs and operations and the necessity
for and progress corrective action.'' I will do so through the
dissemination of OIG products such as the Semiannual Report to Congress
and audit reports. In addition, I will provide briefings for Members
and staff, and testimony at hearings, when requested, with the intent
of maintaining a close relationship.
Question. Section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 provides
that the head of an agency shall exercise ``general supervision'' over
an IG, but shall not ``prevent or prohibit the IG from initiating,
carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing
any subpoena during the course of any audit or investigation.''
What is your understanding of the supervisory authority of the
Secretary of Defense over the DOD IG with respect to audits and
investigations, in view of the independence provided by sections 2 and
3?
Answer. Section 2 of the act creates independent and objective
units . . . to provide a means for keeping the head of the
establishment and Congress fully and currently informed about problems
and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and
operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action.
Section 3 states that each IG shall report to and be under the general
supervision of the head of the establishment involved or, to the extent
such authority is delegated, to the office next in rank below such
head, but shall not report, or be subject to supervision by, any other
officer of such establishment. Moreover, neither the head of the
establishment nor the office next in rank shall prevent or prohibit the
IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or
investigation, or from issuing any subpoena during the course of any
audit or investigation.
Question. If confirmed, what action would you take if a senior
official of the Department sought to prevent you from ``initiating,
carrying out, or completing'' any audit or investigation within the
jurisdiction of the OIG?
Answer. If the action was taken outside the authority given to the
Secretary of Defense in section 8 of the IG Act, I would notify the
Secretary and request his assistance in ensuring compliance with the IG
Act by the senior official involved. Failure to resolve the issue,
would, in my view, constitute a ``particularly serious or flagrant
problem, abuse, or deficiency'' under section 5(d) of the IG Act. Under
this section, the IG is required to report the matter to the head of
the establishment, who is then required to transmit the IG's report to
Congress within 7 days.
Question. Section 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 states
that the DOD IG shall ``be under the authority, direction, and control
of the Secretary of Defense with respect to certain audits or
investigations which require access to information concerning sensitive
operational plans, intelligence matters, counterintelligence matters,
ongoing criminal investigations by other administrative units of the
DOD related to national security, or other matters, the disclosure of
which, would constitute a serious threat to national security.
What is your understanding of the procedures in place to effect the
authority and control of the Secretary of Defense over matters
delineated in section 8 of the act?
Answer. To my knowledge the procedure in place is to follow the IG
Act of 1978. Under 8(b)(1) or 8(b)(2) of the Inspector General Act, the
Secretary has the ``authority to stop any investigation, audit, or
issuance of subpoenas, if the Secretary determines that such a
prohibition is necessary to preserve the national security interests of
the United States.'' I am informed that this provision has never been
exercised. However, in the event that the Secretary exercises this
authority, I would submit an appropriate statement within 30 days to
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress, as
required under section 8(b)(3).
Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the IG
has, as a matter of practice, initiated and conducted audits or
investigations covered by section 8 differently from other audits or
investigations?
Answer. It is my understanding that the practice of the DOD IG with
respect to the initiation and conduct of audits and investigations
covered by section 8 is the same as for other audits and
investigations.
Question. What changes, if any, do you believe are needed in the
practices of the DOD IG for initiating and conducting audits or
investigations covered by section 8?
Answer. None to my knowledge.
Question. Sections 4 and 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 set
forth various duties and responsibilities of IGs beyond the conduct of
audits and investigations.
What is your understanding of the supervisory authority exercised
by the Secretary of Defense with regard to these issues?
Answer. Beyond the conduct of audits and investigations, section 4
directs the IG to ``review existing and proposed legislation and
regulations'' and make related recommendations in semiannual reports;
recommend policies to promote economy and efficiency in the
administration of Department programs and operations, and to prevent
and detect fraud and abuse; keep the Secretary of Defense and Congress
fully and currently informed about fraud and other serious problems,
abuses, and deficiencies; recommend corrective actions for such
problems, abuses, and deficiencies; and report on the progress made in
implementing such corrective actions. Section 8(c)(1) adds that the IG
shall ``be the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for
matters relating to the preventing and detection of fraud, waste, and
abuse.
It is my understanding that the operations above specified in
sections 4 and 8 come within the general supervisory authority of the
Secretary of Defense established under section 3(a).

INDEPENDENCE

Question. The DOD IG must ensure that the independence of the OIG
is maintained, that investigations are unbiased, particularly those
involving senior military and civilian officials, and promptly and
thoroughly completed, and that the highest standards of ethical conduct
are maintained.
Based on your background and work experience, are there any matters
currently under investigation or review by the DOD IG from which you
may be required to recuse yourself if confirmed? If so, why?
Answer. None to my knowledge.
Question. What is your understanding of the methods currently in
place to address incidents of alleged misconduct by the DOD IG? Do you
believe that these methods are adequate?
Answer. It is my understanding the PCIE Integrity Committee,
chaired by a representative from the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
has been established to ensure that administrative allegations against
IGs and certain staff members of the OIGs are appropriately and
expeditiously investigated and resolved. The results of Integrity
Committee investigations are provided to the Chair of the PCIE who may
forward the findings to the IGs agency head. The agency head is
required to respond to the Integrity Committee within 30 days regarding
the actions taken or planned to be taken in response to the
investigative findings. I also note that the President has the
authority to remove an IG.
To the best of my knowledge, these methods are adequate. I believe
this process, if properly applied, can be an effective means to
investigate alleged misconduct by IGs. However, I have not reviewed
specific cases referred to the Integrity Committee to determine if
those procedures are working effectively.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for the DOD IG to consult with officials in the OSD (or
other DOD officials outside the OIG) before issuing a report, regarding
the findings and recommendations in the report?
Answer. In regards to audits, inspections, senior official
investigations, and reprisal investigations, it is the current practice
for the OIG to consult with officials in the OSD, or other DOD
officials before issuing a report to ensure that the information in the
report is factually accurate and to resolve or minimize disagreements
on conclusions, findings, and recommendations. However, for criminal
investigations, it is not appropriate to discuss the results of ongoing
investigations.
Question. To the extent that you believe such consultation is
appropriate, what steps, if any, do you believe the IG should take to
keep a record of the consultation and record the results in the text of
the report?
Answer. I believe it is necessary to consult with all parties to
gather the facts to develop findings and recommendations. I am advised
that the facts that are relevant should be included in the text of the
report. A written record of all interviews and consultations are
maintained in the working papers. The procedures are in place to redact
certain information from reports in the appropriate circumstances.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for senior officials to request that the DOD IG not
investigate or review a particular matter?
Answer. Under section 8 of the Inspector General Act, the Secretary
of Defense has the authority to prohibit the IG from initiating,
carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation. That authority
may be exercised when the audit or investigation requires access to
information concerning: sensitive operational plans, intelligence
matters, counterintelligence matters, ongoing criminal investigations
by other administrative units of DOD related to national security, or
other matters the disclosure of which would constitute a serious threat
to national security. As noted previously, the Secretary of Defense has
never exercised his authority under section 8.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for senior officials to request that the DOD IG not
issue a report on a particular matter?
Answer. No one has the authority to ask the DOD IG not to issue a
report on a particular matter unless it is the Secretary of Defense,
under the provisions delineated in section 8.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for senior officials to request that the DOD IG alter
findings, recommendations, or other pertinent material in a report on a
particular matter?
Answer. In the course of conducting audits, inspections, and senior
official investigations, the OIG practice is to consult with officials
in the OSD, or with other senior level DOD officials, before issuing a
report to ensure that the information in the report is factually
accurate and to resolve or minimize disagreements where appropriate.
However, for criminal investigations, it is not appropriate to discuss
the results of ongoing investigations. The final decision on the
content of reports rests with the IG.
Question. If confirmed, how would you react to a request, which you
believed to be inappropriate, to not investigate a particular matter,
not issue a report on a particular matter, or alter findings,
recommendations, or other pertinent material in a report on a
particular matter?
Answer. With respect to the initiation or completion of an audit or
investigation, if the request was inappropriate and made outside the
authority given to the Secretary of Defense in section 8 of the IG Act,
I would reject the proposal. If and when necessary, I would notify the
Secretary and request his assistance in ensuring compliance with the IG
Act by the senior official involved.
Failure to resolve the issue, would, in my view, constitute a
``particularly serious or flagrant problem, abuse or deficiency'' under
section 5(d) of the IG Act. Under this section, the IG is required to
report the matter to the head of the establishment, who is then
required to transmit the IG's report to Congress.
Question. What is your understanding of the corrective measures
that were taken by the OIG in response to the report of the independent
assessment team tasked by the DOD IG in 2002 to evaluate the overall
effectiveness of the Office?
Answer. I know of the report and have read the Executive Summary.
If confirmed, I plan to review the report and the response in detail
and determine if corrective action were appropriate and effective.
Question. Do you believe that these corrective actions were
appropriate and effective?
Answer. Please see my response to the previous question.
Question. What is your view of the professionalism and expertise of
the career staff of the OIG?
Answer. During the briefings I have received, I have found the
staff at the DOD IG to be knowledgeable and professional.
Question. What relationship, if any, do you see between the career
staff of the OIG and the independence of the Office?
Answer. The credibility and effectiveness of IGs require a well-
trained and professional staff that is aware of the agency's unique
role and whose conduct and work products will be accepted as both
independent and objective.
Question. What role, if any, do you believe that the senior
leadership of the DOD should play in personnel decisions within the
OIG?
Answer. In personnel matters, section 6 of the IG Act provides the
IG the authority to ``select, appoint, and employ such officers and
employees as may be necessary for carrying out the functions, powers,
and duties'' of his office.
Question. The OIG currently relies upon legal advice provided by
the DOD Office of General Counsel. The Inspectors General of many other
Federal agencies have their own lawyers. Do you believe that reliance
on the legal advice of the DOD Office of General Counsel has the
potential to compromise the independence of the OIG?
Answer. I would expect to work with the DOD General Counsel on a
variety of matters. However, I would rely on the OIG General Counsel
legal advice for internal work products and processes.
Please also see my answer to the earlier question concerning the
relationship with the DOD General Counsel. See section G of
Relationships.

CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS

Question. The OIG frequently receives requests from congressional
committees and Members of Congress for audits and investigation of
matters of public interest.
What is your understanding of the manner in which the OIG handles
such requests?
Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD IG receives many
requests from congressional committees and Members of Congress for
oversight reviews, but adheres to the same principles of independence
in responding to those requests.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the OIG continues to
respond to congressional requests for audits or investigations in a
manner consistent with past practice?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for the OIG to redact the contents of any information
contained in a report it provides to Congress?
Answer. It is my understanding that consistent with the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), the practice of the DOD IG is to provide
unredacted copies of reports to oversight committees of Congress. The
DOD IG redacts information in reports released to the public in
accordance with the FOIA and the Privacy Act.

SENIOR OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS

Question. The OIG plays a key role in the investigation of
allegations of misconduct by senior officers and civilian employees of
the DOD. The Committee on Armed Services has a particular interest in
investigations concerning senior officials who are subject to Senate
confirmation, and relies upon the DOD IG, as well as the OSD, to ensure
that these investigations are accurate, complete, and accomplished in a
timely manner.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the
investigations relating to senior officials are completed in a timely
manner and that the results of investigations are promptly provided to
this committee?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the investigations
relating to senior officials to include those who are subject to Senate
confirmation are completed in a timely manner and that the results of
investigations are promptly provided to the committee.
Question. Do you believe that the current allocation of
responsibilities between the DOD IG and the IGs of the military
departments is appropriate to ensure fair and impartial investigations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the current allocation of
responsibilities between the DOD IG and the IGs of the military
departments is appropriate to ensure fair and impartial investigations.
resources and authorities of the dod ig's office and investigators
Question. Do you believe that the DOD IG's office has sufficient
resources (in personnel and dollars) to carry out its audit and
investigative responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will attempt to ensure that the DOD IG's
office has sufficient resources to carry out its audit and
investigative responsibilities.
Question. If confirmed, will you communicate any concerns that you
may have about the adequacy of resources available to the OIG to
Congress and this committee?
Answer. If confirmed, I will.
Question. Some Federal agencies have reacted to limited IG
resources by using contractors to perform some audit and investigative
functions.
What is your understanding of the DOD IG's role in determining
whether the use of contractor resources to perform audit or
investigative functions is appropriate?
Answer. For the audit function, the Inspector General Act, section
4(b)(1)(B) establishes the authority of each IG to establish guidelines
for determining when it shall be appropriate to use non-Federal
auditors. In addition, section 4(b)(1)(C) of the act states that the IG
shall take appropriate steps to ensure that any work performed by non-
Federal auditors complies with the standards established by the
Comptroller General.
With regard to the criminal investigative function, it is
considered inherently governmental and therefore contractors do not
perform such functions.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that the
use of contractor resources to perform such functions would be
appropriate?
Answer. It is my understanding that there is specific guidance in
DOD Directive 7600.2 on when it is permissible to use contractor
resources to perform audit functions. It specifically permits DOD
components to contract for audit services when applicable expertise is
unavailable, if augmentation of the audit staff is necessary to execute
the annual audit plan, or because temporary audit assistance is
required to meet audit reporting requirements mandated by Public Law or
DOD regulation. However, the directive includes an approval process to
ensure the appropriate use of non-Federal auditors and that they comply
with the Government Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller
General of the United States.
Question. In recent years, the DOD IG has sought and obtained
increased authority to issue subpoenas, carry weapons, and make
arrests.
Do you believe that the authorities of the OIG and its agents are
adequate in these areas, or would you recommend further changes in the
law?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the IGs current authorities for
adequacy.

DOD FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND AUDITS

Question. The performance of mandatory statutory duties, such as
the performance of financial audits, has consumed a growing share of
the resources of the IG's office, crowding out other important audit
priorities.
What is your view of the relative priority of financial audits, and
the resources that should be devoted to such audits?
Answer. Financial audits will continue to be a high priority
consistent with the President's Management Agenda Initiative, the
Secretary of Defense's top priorities, the Chief Financial Officers Act
of 1990, and the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1994.
It is my understanding that the OIG has received sufficient resources
to conduct financial statement audits under the current departmental
approach. However, as the Department improves audit readiness and the
requirements for financial statement audits increase, a reevaluation
may be necessary. If confirmed, I will work with the Department and
Congress to ensure that the appropriate level of resources continues to
be dedicated to financial audits. I will also seek to ensure that
resources committed to financial audits do not come at the expense of
other audit priorities.
Question. Do you believe that resources currently directed to the
audit of financial statements that are generally acknowledged to be
unreliable would better be directed to other objectives?
Answer. Without the benefit of first hand knowledge of resource
challenges faced by the DOD IG, I am not currently in a position to
determine whether resources would be better directed to other
objectives.
Question. Do you see any need for legislative changes to give the
IG greater flexibility to target audit resources?
Answer. If confirmed, I am prepared to work with the Department and
Congress to assess whether legislation in this area is appropriate.
Question. What is your view of the role of the DOD IG in evaluating
and contributing to improvements made in the Department's financial
management processes?
Answer. The role of the DOD OIG is to serve as a catalyst for
improvements in the Department's financial management processes. That
role should be consistent with the President's Management Agenda
Initiatives, the Department's top priorities, and statutory
requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD OIG continues
this vital function.

OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

Question. Problems with procurement, acquisition, and the ability
of the Department and the military departments to effectively oversee
acquisition programs have called into question the capability of
existing DOD oversight mechanisms.
What are your views on the need for reform in how the DOD procures
property and services?
Answer. I am informed that recent IG audit reports have identified
contracting and acquisition problems and that the auditors are working
with DOD management to correct those problems. If confirmed, I will
work with the Department to address ways to improve acquisition
procedures.
Question. What role, if any, do you believe the OIG should play in
achieving acquisition reform?
Answer. The role of the DOD OIG is to serve as a catalyst for
improvements in the Department's acquisition processes and contract
management. That role should be consistent with the President's
Management Agenda Initiatives, the Department's top priorities, and
statutory requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD OIG
continues this vital function.
Question. Do you believe that the DOD IG and the various Defense
auditing and contracting management activities have the resources
needed to conduct effective oversight over the Department's acquisition
programs?
Answer. If confirmed, conducting effective oversight over the
Department's acquisition programs will be among our top priorities in
the IG office. The men and women of our Armed Forces, and our Nation's
taxpayers, have a right to expect that the funds appropriated by
Congress for defense acquisitions are being utilized with cost-
efficiency and integrity.
Based on the information made available to me thus far, I am
concerned that the audit resources of the OIG have not kept pace with
the growth in contract expenditures for defense acquisitions. I am also
concerned that the current trend, if unchecked, will significantly
increase the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse in acquisition programs.
Therefore, if I am confirmed, it will be vital for the OIG, the
Department, and Congress to work together in a timely way to assess
whether the OIG has adequate resources to conduct this essential
oversight.
Question. Over the last 15 years, the DOD IG has gone from having
one auditor for every $500 million on contract by the DOD to one
auditor for every $2 billion on contract.
Do you believe that the DOD IG has the resources it needs to
conduct effective oversight over the Department's acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I am prepared to work with the Department and
Congress to assess whether the OIG has adequate resources to conduct
this essential oversight.
Question. The DOD IG has played an important role in advising the
DOD and Congress on the sufficiency of management controls in the
Department's acquisition programs and the impact that legislative and
regulatory proposals could have on such management controls.
How do you see the DOD IG's role in this area?
Answer. The DOD IG has an important role in helping the Department
to effectively and efficiently manage acquisition resources dedicated
to the support of the Department's mission, and in accounting for the
management of those resources to the taxpayer. If confirmed, I will
ensure that the DOD OIG continues its important advisory role.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Question. The DOD has adopted a ``zero tolerance'' position against
abuses of human trafficking and modified its policies to ensure that
United States military commands and activities and their personnel are
informed about factors contributing to human trafficking and take
preventative measures against behavior that contributes to this
problem. The DOD IG has investigated allegations of human trafficking
in Korea and the Balkans, and posted a survey on its Web site designed
to obtain information about potential human trafficking abuses from DOD
personnel.
What is the role of the DOD IG with respect to human trafficking?
Answer. It is my understanding that the IG strongly supports the
Department's ``zero tolerance'' policy against human trafficking by
evaluating programs and compliance, and by investigating allegations of
human trafficking that have a DOD nexus. Over the last 2\1/2\ years,
the DOD IG has been called upon to testify before Congress three times
and has also addressed international forums on its efforts regarding
trafficking in persons.
Question. What is your understanding of the actions that have been
taken by the OIG to prevent human trafficking abuses and the current
role of the DOD IG in formulating and enforcing the Department's
policies?
Answer. As referenced above, it is my understanding that the OIG
has evaluated DOD programs and compliance in Korea, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
On November 21, 2006, the OIG published its report titled
``Evaluation of the DOD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons.'' The
objective of the evaluation was to determine if DOD Directives,
implementing instructions, organization, metrics, and resources were
adequate for the DOD components to develop implementing programs. The
report made 14 major recommendations in the areas of coordination,
training, policy, and metrics. It is my understanding that the
Department published DOD Instruction 2200.01, ``Combating Trafficking
in Persons,'' on February 16, 2007, incorporating recommendations from
the November 2006 DOD IG report. It is my further understanding that it
is the responsibility of DOD management to formulate and enforce
policies regarding trafficking in persons.
It is my understanding that the DOD IG continues to encourage use
of the Defense Hotline to report human trafficking abuses. In October
2004, the OIG distributed over 17,000 Defense Hotline ``Trafficking in
Persons'' (TIP) posters to military and DOD civilian activities
worldwide.
Question. In April 2006, the Commander, U.S. Multinational Forces,
issued an order titled ``Prevention of Trafficking in Persons in MNF-
I,'' aimed at preventing human trafficking abuses by contractors
involving possibly thousands of foreign workers on U.S. bases in Iraq.
Media reports about the problem of abuses in Iraq among contractors
stated that allegations had been raised as early as 2004 with the DOD
IG, but that lengthy delays occurred before a response.
What is your understanding of the role the DOD IG has played in
investigating human trafficking allegations in Iraq?
Answer. It is my understanding that the OIG has worked closely with
other human trafficking ``stakeholders'' within the DOD, and with other
executive departments such as the Department of State. I also
understand that the IG conducted an inquiry, based on a February 2006
request from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
(USD(P&R)), that reviewed allegations of involuntary servitude
occurring under the auspices of DOD contractors in Iraq. In its
response to USD(P&R) in April 2006, the OIG concluded that it did not
have the authority to investigate foreign nations or foreign companies
inside countries which are the sources of laborers. Based on its
review, the IG made several recommendations:

DOD should continue to prosecute military members who
become involved in TIP or TIP-related activities, in accordance
with the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
DOD should ensure that all new contracts incorporate
the anti-TIP clause required by a proposed change to the
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR), once it is
approved.
DOD should evaluate rewriting existing contracts to
incorporate the language of the anti-TIP DFAR clause, once it
is approved.
Military department and combatant command IGs should
continue their involvement in DOD efforts to combat TIP, within
the limits of their authority.

The DOD IG supported changes to the DFAR to provide additional
controls regarding TIP for DOD contracts performed outside of the
United States. It is my understanding that an interim rule implementing
the change to the DFAR was published in October 2006.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed as the DOD IG, to
investigate and prevent the incidence of human trafficking abuses in
connection with DOD activities?
Answer. If confirmed, I would promote compliance with the DOD
``zero tolerance'' policy by periodically evaluating DOD programs to
combat human trafficking in coordination with other IGs throughout the
Department.

OVERSIGHT OF DOD ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is the relationship of the DOD IG to the SIGIR?
Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD OIG has supported the
operations of the SIGIR and its predecessor, the CPA Inspector General.
In accordance with the IG Act and Public Law 108-106, title 3, section
3001(f)(4), the DOD OIG coordinates activities with the SIGIR as well
as other oversight community members, to avoid duplicating oversight
efforts and to minimize disruption to military operations. See Section
O in Relationships.
Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities and
activities of the OIG in investigating and preventing fraud, waste, and
abuse of U.S.-provided resources for reconstruction and other purposes
in Iraq?
Answer. I am informed that the DOD OIG has, in accordance with its
legislatively mandated mission, conducted audits aimed at identifying
and preventing fraud, waste, and abuse of funds appropriated to the DOD
for its operations in Iraq. It is my further understanding that the DOD
OIG has established a forward operating element at Camp Victory in
Baghdad. The DOD OIG has also established an office in Qatar as an in-
theater base of operations. The staff in the Qatar office conducts
audits as required in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Qatar to support
the operational commander. Additionally, audits are also being
conducted in the continental United States (CONUS) on contracts awarded
and funds expended in the United States that provide significant
resources to support reconstruction and other purposes in Iraq.
I am advised that DCIS and its military criminal investigative
counterparts, in particular the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative
Command (Army CID), investigate major frauds, corruption, thefts, and
other compromises of DOD assets in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other
countries in that theater. Four DCIS agents are currently deployed to
Iraq and Kuwait, collocated with Army CID, to conduct operations and
investigations that primarily involve procurement fraud and public
corruption. In addition, the DCIS European office and DCIS CONUS
offices, along with the investigative partners (e.g., FBI), continue to
investigate Iraq-related matters and travel into theater to conduct
investigative operations, such as gathering evidence and conducting
interviews, when crimes are reported. However, the bulk of DCIS's
investigative activities occur in CONUS where corporate headquarters of
DOD contractors, key evidence, and Department of Justice prosecutorial
support are located.
Also, I have been informed that DCIS is a participant in the
International Contract Corruption Task Force, a formalized partnership
between Federal agencies to investigate and prosecute cases of contract
fraud and public corruption related to U.S. spending in Iraq. The Task
Force has established a Joint Operations Center specifically to
formally coordinate investigations and develop a criminal intelligence
capability to successfully prosecute fraud. It is my understanding that
DCIS has dedicated a special agent to the Joint Operations Center on a
full-time basis.
If confirmed, and in keeping with the IG Act, I will ensure that
the DOD OIG continues to focus oversight efforts to investigate and
prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of U.S.-provided resources for
reconstruction and other purposes in Iraq.
Question. What is your understanding of the responsibilities and
activities of the OIG in investigating and preventing fraud, waste, and
abuse of U.S.-provided resources for reconstruction and other purposes
in Afghanistan?
Answer. It is my understanding that DOD IG is responsible for
investigating fraud, waste, and abuse for funds appropriated to DOD for
its operations in Afghanistan. It is my further understanding that the
DOD OIG is initiating efforts to establish a forward deployed presence
in Afghanistan. The DOD OIG has established an office in Qatar as an
in-theater base of operations. Pursuant to the tenets of the IG Act, I
would ensure the DOD oversight efforts were coordinated with other
organizations conducting oversight in Afghanistan.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you plan to
make to the DOD IG's oversight activities in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD IG activities in Iraq
and Afghanistan remain as a top priority. I will also want to assess
the current level of oversight to ensure that adequate resources are
being devoted to this mission and that those resources are being
allocated appropriately.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your goals with respect to
the oversight, audit, and investigation of ongoing U.S. activities in
Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, it is my goal to ensure that the oversight
provided by the DOD IG of ongoing DOD activities in Iraq and
Afghanistan is consistent with the responsibilities contained in the IG
Act and is sufficient to provide assurance to Congress, the Secretary
of Defense, and to both the American taxpayer and the warfighter that
funds supporting DOD activities are expended appropriately and
effectively.
Question. The SIGIR has jurisdiction over contracts for the
reconstruction of Iraq, however, the Special IG does not have
jurisdiction over contracts to support our troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan. What role do you believe the DOD IG should play in the
oversight, audit, and investigation of such contracts?
Answer. The DOD IG office should have an active role in ensuring
stewardship of taxpayers' dollars and effective contract support for
our troops through diligent oversight of the contracting function. This
would include audits, inspections, and investigations, as required.
Question. Do you believe that a significant on-the-ground presence
in Iraq is necessary to perform this role?
Answer. As noted earlier, the DOD OIG has established an office in
Qatar as its in-theater base of operations for entry into Iraq as well
as Afghanistan and Kuwait. Additionally, the OIG has established a
forward operating presence at Camp Victory in Baghdad, and is in the
process of initiating efforts to establish a forward deployed presence
in Afghanistan.
Question. You have served as director of the Iraq-Afghanistan Joint
Transition Planning Group and a special adviser to the State Department
on stabilization and security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
Director of the DOD's Iraq Transition Team.
Please describe the role that you have played in U.S.
reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Answer. As Director of the Defense Department's Iraq Transition
Team, I served as part of a joint team with the Department of State to
develop a plan for closing down the CPA and standing-up the U.S.
Mission in Baghdad. We focused on two reconstruction objectives: (1)
transforming CPA's Reconstruction Project Management Office into the
State Department-run Iraq Reconstruction Management Office; (2)
establishing initial requirements for Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) in Iraq with respect to staffing, location, and security.
As Special Advisor to the State Department on Stabilization and
Security, the office looked at the structure, location, and security of
PRTs in Afghanistan and also recommended that the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers increase its support for U.S. Agency for International
Development's reconstruction effort in that country. With the departure
of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State our mission was ended,
and we did not have the time to focus on Iraq.
The Iraq/Afghanistan Transition Planning Group (IATPG), for which I
am Director, focused on assessing planning coordination of U.S.
Government activities in these two countries, as directed by the
Secretaries of State and Defense. In the specific area of
reconstruction, we provided an assessment of PRTs in Afghanistan and
made recommendations for improvement in the areas of planning,
integration of effort, and staffing.
Question. What is your view of the major successes of those
efforts?
Answer. Standing up the U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, and closing out the
CPA was accomplished on time and was successful in establishing the
initial framework for integration of our diplomatic and military
activities. It also provided the foundation for the development of the
PRT program initiative in Iraq. In Afghanistan, the IATPG advanced the
planning and evolution of the PRT effort, with special emphasis on the
merging of the U.S. PRT initiative with that of the International
Security Assistance Force.
Question. What is your view of the major failures of those efforts?
Answer. We should have pushed harder and sooner to combine police
and military training in a strong State and Defense Department
partnership in both countries. In the early stages of a
counterinsurgency war, when the police have to have both police and
paramilitary skills to be effective, I believe that DOD should have the
lead role in training the police and the military, as is the case
currently. When the situation is more permissive, then the lead can be
shifted. In any event, DOD, State, and Justice need to have a strong
partnership for police training to succeed rapidly.
To advance reconstruction activities requires security and
stability, which depends on effective Rule of Law. There should have
been more of an integrated interagency effort on establishing a Rule of
Law system from the very start of our engagement in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
I wish we could have made more progress in getting the PRTs staffed
with a balanced team of both military and especially civilian skill
sets required to achieve their mission.
Question. Do you see any potential for conflict between your
previous role in these efforts and your new role as DOD IG, if
confirmed?
Answer. I do not.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to address any
such conflict?
Answer. I do not believe this will present any conflict. However,
if there was every any doubt, I would recuse myself on any potential
conflicts of interest.
Question. Recent press articles have criticized the decision by
U.S. officials in 2003 and 2004 to shut down Iraqi state-owned
enterprises, resulting in the loss of employment for thousands of
Iraqis.
What is your view of this issue?
Answer. At the time, I was not aware of this decision. But, one of
the most critical problems faced today in Iraq is employment and
economic development. We should assist the Iraqi Government to increase
employment for the Iraqi people to the extent possible.
Question. Did you play any role in this decision?
Answer. I did not.
oversight of medical functions, including outpatient administration
Question. Reports of medical cases from military treatment
facilities involving tragic outcomes and allegations of medical
malpractice have raised questions about the adequacy of existing
reporting, investigatory, and readiness systems within the Defense
Health Program and military treatment facilities. The ability of those
outside the military medical system to fairly evaluate individual cases
and overall quality of care is affected by such factors as the tort
claim laws and adversarial litigation against the United States,
reliance on privileges from the release of documents and information
associated with such litigation and separate quality assurance systems,
patient privacy requirements, and concern about the reputations of
individual providers. Recently, deficiencies in the housing and
administration of severely injured soldiers and marines in a medical
hold status at Walter Reed Army Medical Center have raised questions
about the adequacy of oversight into the care of outpatients and
members involved in the disability evaluation system.
Do you have any views about the role the DOD IG should play in
improving visibility into and objective assessments of the quality of
care provided through the military medical system?
Answer. It is my understanding that health care is a major
management challenge identified in the last DOD IG Semiannual Report to
Congress. In particular, the DOD IG noted that the frequency and
duration of military deployments further stresses the military health
system in both the Active and Reserve components.
If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD OIG continues to provide
the independent review and oversight necessary of the military health
system. Without the benefit of detailed information on DOD oversight
efforts, I am not currently in a position to offer specific views about
actions the DOD OIG might take to improve its oversight of medical
functions.
My belief is that the DOD IG and the Service IG have a major role
to play in ensuring that these great American heroes and patriots are
receiving the health care they and their families have a right to
expect. But, I don't think it stops there. DOD and Department of
Veterans' Affairs (VA) should be working hand in glove to ensure the
transition between DOD and VA health care system is seamless. DOD
should work with VA to ensure that the best possible treatment and care
continues throughout recovery and in some cases, the rest of their
life. It does not stop there--I think they should do everything
possible to bring as many of our injured troops back to military duty,
commensurate with their ability. We should also find civilian positions
in DOD and other Federal agencies for these men and women.
Question. What resources and expertise does the DOD IG currently
have--or lack--to play a more prominent role in assessing the
performance of health care providers in the DOD?
Answer. I do not know the answer. If confirmed, this will be a top
priority for me to ensure that DOD IG has the resources and expertise
to play a prominent role in assessing and ensuring that the wounded
troops coming off the battlefield are getting the care they deserve.

INTELLIGENCE

Question. What is the role of the DOD IG with regard to
intelligence activities within DOD?
Answer. I am informed that the IG, through the Deputy Inspector
General for Intelligence, has responsibility for oversight of DOD
intelligence activities and components as identified in DOD Directive
5240.1, ``DOD Intelligence Activities,'' dated April 25, 1988. These
include all DOD components conducting intelligence activities,
including the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the military department intelligence and
counterintelligence activities, and other intelligence and
counterintelligence organizations, staffs, and offices, or elements
thereof, when used for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
purposes. Other organizations and components under the IG's oversight
not specifically identified in DOD Directive 5240.1 include the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), the
National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency. Responsibilities and functions of the IG as
outlined in DOD Directive 5106.1, ``Inspector General of the Department
of Defense,'' include the responsibility to audit, evaluate, monitor,
and review the programs, policies, procedures, and functions of the DOD
Intelligence Community to ensure that intelligence resources are
properly managed.
The DOD IG performs an oversight and coordination role through the
Joint Intelligence Coordination Working Group (JIOCG). The JIOCG is a
DOD working group chaired by the Deputy Inspector General for
Intelligence and includes representatives from the Service audit
agencies, military department IGs, and Defense Intelligence Agencies
IGs. The primary goal of the JIOCG is to avoid duplication of effort
and enhance coordination and cooperation among IGs and Auditors General
inside the DOD and promote information-sharing among IGs whose
functions include audits, inspections, evaluations, or investigations
of their respective departments and agencies.
Question. What is the relationship of the DOD IG to the Special
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight?
Answer. DOD Directive 5106.1 requires that intelligence-related
actions be coordinated, as appropriate, with the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) (ATSD(IO)) to determine
respective areas of responsibility in accordance with DOD Directive
5148.11, ``Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Oversight,'' dated May 21, 2004. (DOD Directive 5148.11 contains
similar language for the ATSD(IO) to coordinate with the IG, as
appropriate.) I am advised that the ATSD(IO) is a charter member of the
JIOCG, and that the OIG has a long history of coordination and
cooperation with the ATSD(IO).
Question. What is the relationship of the DOD IG to the IG of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)?
Answer. The DOD IG's primary relationship with the DNI IG concerns
participation in the Intelligence Community (IC) IG Forum. The IC IG
Forum promotes information-sharing among the IGs of the departments and
agencies of the IC whose functions include audits, inspections/
evaluations, or investigations of their respective departments and
agencies. The IC IG Forum also strives to avoid duplication of effort
and enhance effective coordination and cooperation among IC IGs. The
DNI IG chairs the IC IG Forum.
In addition to the IC IG Forum relationship, the DOD IG
participates in various projects and initiatives undertaken by the DNI
IG. The DNI IG also coordinates with the Office of the Deputy Inspector
General for Intelligence on all ongoing projects relating to DOD
organizations and activities.
Question. What is the role of the DOD IG with respect to detainee
matters?
Answer. According to my reading of the Inspector General Act, the
IG's statutory responsibility for oversight extends to oversight of
detainee and interrogation matters. In that regard, I am advised that
the OIG recently issued two final reports regarding detainee abuse.
Question. What is the role of the DOD IG with respect to
interrogation matters?
Answer. Please see my answer to the previous question.
Question. Do you have any concerns about whether investigations and
reviews conducted by the DOD IG with regard to intelligence activities
are or have been appropriate?
Answer. It is my understanding that all investigations and reviews
conducted have been within the IG's statutory authority.

INVESTIGATION INTO ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Question. The OIG recently completed an investigation into the
activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
related to pre-war intelligence on Iraq and the purported links between
Iraq and al Qaeda. This investigation was conducted in response to
requests from the Senate. The OIG has been criticized for conducting
this investigation and for the findings of the investigation.
What is your view of the OIG's investigation into the activities of
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
Answer. I have no knowledge of this case except a few news clips on
the evening news.
Question. Do you believe that the OIG should have conducted this
investigation?
Answer. Please see my response to the previous question.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

CHALLENGES

1. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, what do you see as
your most significant challenge as the Department of Defense (DOD)
Inspector General (IG)?
General Kicklighter. My top priority will be to learn what
challenges the DOD IG office needs to address and to ensure the
adequacy of resources required to accomplish its mission.
Promoting efficiency and preventing fraud in defense acquisitions
will obviously be a high priority--as well as effective support for the
men and women of our armed services serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. I
will also ensure that the OIG pursues aggressive oversight of
contracting issues. There undoubtedly are several other key matters
that will merit prioritization. If confirmed, I look forward to
consulting with current OIG management, the Department, and Congress,
in establishing broad priorities.

CONTRACTOR WASTE

2. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, there have been
many investigations and reports of contractor waste, fraud, and abuse
at DOD. How do you plan to address these issues, particularly as they
relate to government contractors?
General Kicklighter. Conducting effective oversight over the
Department's contracts will be among our top priorities in the IG
office. The men and women of our Armed Forces, and our Nation's
taxpayers, have a right to expect that the funds appropriated by
Congress for defense are being utilized with cost-efficiency and
integrity.

MEDICAL SYSTEM DEFICIENCIES

3. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, recently, the
military medical system has been exposed as having serious
deficiencies. What do you feel that the role of the IG is in
investigating these issues?
General Kicklighter. It is my understanding that health care is a
major management challenge identified in the last DOD IG Semiannual
Report to Congress. In particular, the DOD IG noted that the frequency
and duration of military deployments further stresses the military
health system in both the Active and Reserve components.
I will ensure that the DOD OIG continues to provide the independent
review and oversight necessary of the military health system. Without
the benefit of detailed information on DOD oversight efforts, I am not
currently in a position to offer specific views about actions the DOD
OIG might take to improve its oversight of medical functions.
My belief is that the DOD IG and the Service IG have a major role
to play in ensuring that these great American heroes and patriots are
receiving the health care they and their families have a right to
expect. But, I don't think it stops there. DOD and Department of
Veterans' Affairs (VA) should be working hand in glove to ensure the
transition between the DOD and the VA health care system is seamless.
DOD should work with VA to ensure that the best possible treatment and
care continues throughout recovery and in some case the rest of their
lives.

MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS

4. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, what do you see as
the most pressing systemic problems to be addressed within DOD?
General Kicklighter. In the Semiannual Report to Congress, the OIG
lists the most serious management and performance challenges faced by
the DOD based on the findings and recommendations of audits,
inspections, and investigations conducted during the year. In addition
to the global war on terrorism, the most recent Semiannual Report to
Congress lists the following challenges:

Joint Warfighting and Readiness
Human Capital
Information Security and Privacy
Acquisition Process and Contract Management
Financial Management
Health Care

5. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, are there other
situations on the order of the Walter Reed situation that need
attention before they become national media scandals?
General Kicklighter. Currently, I do not have sufficient knowledge
to identify such situations. It would be my goal to proactively
identify programs within DOD that require the attention of management
to either prevent fraud or abuse or to improve their efficiency and
effectiveness.

MISSING FUNDS IN IRAQ

6. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, what do you feel
is the role of the DOD IG in connection with identifying the
whereabouts of billions of dollars in missing funds in Iraq--funds that
might be being used by insurgents to fund operations against U.S.
forces?
General Kicklighter. Currently, I am not familiar with the details
regarding the missing funds in Iraq. I will look at the relevant
information and determine what action would be required by the Office
of the Inspector General.

7. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, what do you plan
to do to identify the location of and seize those funds?
General Kicklighter. Please see my response to the previous
question.

FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS

8. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, do you intend to
further investigate the conclusions of the report prepared by Acting
Inspector General Thomas Gimble regarding the pre-Iraq war activities
of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
General Kicklighter. I am not aware of any outstanding issues that
require further investigation at this time. I will work with Congress
to consider any further concerns and what additional work by the DOD IG
would be appropriate.

9. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, do you believe
that further investigation of these ``inappropriate activities,'' in
the words of the report, is warranted?
General Kicklighter. Please see my response to the previous
question.

10. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, do you believe
that reforms should be enacted to ensure that these activities do not
take place in the future?
General Kicklighter. As stated in the DOD OIG report, the creation
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the aggressive
efforts of the Director of National Intelligence's National
Intelligence Council and analytic integrity and standards have
contributed to a more favorable operational environment.

INVESTIGATING THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

11. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, as the IG for
DOD, how will you identify and investigate counterfeit material and
other forms of unauthorized product substitution into the procurement
system?
General Kicklighter. As I understand it, the introduction of
counterfeit material and other forms of unauthorized product
substitution into the procurement system has historically been and
continues to be one of the Office of the Inspector General's Defense
Criminal Investigative Service's highest priority for deterrence,
investigation, and prosecution. Product substitution investigations
comprise a major part of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service
inventory. We will continue the efforts already underway within the
Defense Criminal Investigative Service and expand if required.
______

[The nomination reference of LTG Claude M. Kicklighter, USA
(Ret.), follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 26, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Claude M. Kicklighter of Georgia, to be Inspector General,
Department of Defense, vice Joseph E. Schmitz, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of LTG Claude M. Kicklighter, USA
(Ret.), which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Claude M. ``Mick'' Kicklighter

Claude M. Kicklighter has served his country for over 50 years,
first as an Army officer for over 35 years, retiring as a Lieutenant
General, followed by over 15 years as a distinguished public servant.
Most recently, in October 2005, he was selected by the Secretaries of
State and Defense to establish and direct the Iraq/Afghanistan Joint
Transition Planning Group, a joint Department of State and Department
of Defense team that has provided analysis and recommendations for
coordinating efforts to address transition challenges in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
In addition to serving in this position, since his retirement in
1991, Mick Kicklighter has held a number of senior positions in the
Departments of Defense, State, and Veterans Affairs. Prior to his
current assignment, he was the Chief of Staff, Department of Veterans
Affairs. In 2004, he was designated as Special Advisor to the Deputy
Secretary of State for Stabilization and Security Operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. In 2003, he was Director of the Department of
Defense's Iraq Transition Team that, together with the Department of
State's Iraq Transition Team, planned the inactivation of the Coalition
Provisional Authority and the establishment of the new U.S. Mission
Baghdad.
Prior to this, Mick Kicklighter was nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, in 2001, as Assistant Secretary for Policy and
Planning, Department of Veterans Affairs, which later became the Office
of Policy, Planning, and Preparedness after the attacks on September
11, 2001. In this role, he was senior advisor to the Secretary on
strategic planning, policy research and analysis, program evaluation,
emergency operations, preparedness, and security and law enforcement.
Previously, he served as Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for
International Affairs. LTG(R) Kicklighter also was Director of our
Nation's commemorative activities in the United States and around the
globe that thanked and honored our World War II veterans and their
families during the 50th Anniversary of World War II.
During his more than 35-year career as a military officer, LTG(R)
Kicklighter commanded units at every level from platoon through Army
Division, and then commanded a theater Army. Senior level commands
included serving as Commander, U.S. Army Pacific, 25 Infantry Division
(Light), and the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command. He also held
senior level staff assignments with the Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of
the Army, including being the Director of the Army Staff, and Chief of
Staff at the Army Material Command.
During his military service, LTG(R) Kicklighter received the
Distinguished Service Medal (3 awards), the Defense Superior Service
Medal, the Legion of Merit (4 awards), and the Bronze Star, Meritorious
Service Medal (2 awards), Army Commendation Medal (5 awards) as well as
various foreign decorations; Argentina Order of May, French Order
National Du Merite; Korean Order of National Security Gugseon Medal;
and the Silver Honorary Order of Freedom of the Republic of Slovenia.
His civilian awards include the Presidential Citizen Medal, the
Eisenhower Liberation Medal, the Decoration for Exceptional Civilian
Service, and the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public
Service (twice).
While a public servant, he served on the Board of Directors for
Habitat for Humanity International and as its Chairman for 3 years.
Born and raised in Glennville, GA, Mick Kicklighter graduated from
Mercer University with a Bachelor of Arts Degree in biology and was
commissioned a Second Lieutenant in Field Artillery. He earned a Master
of Arts Degree in Management of National Resources from the School of
Business Administration, George Washington University, and is a
graduate of the United States Army Command and General Staff College,
and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. His overseas tours
include France, Germany, the Netherlands, Iran, and two tours in
Vietnam.
Mick Kicklighter is married to the former Elizabeth Exley and they
have three adult children--Elizabeth, Claude, Jr., and Richard--and
five grandchildren.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Claude M.
Kicklighter, USA (Ret.), in connection with his nomination
follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Claude M. Kicklighter, Sr.

2. Position to which nominated:
Inspector General for the Department of Defense.

3. Date of nomination:
26 February 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
22 August 1933; Glennville, GA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Elizabeth Exley Kicklighter.

7. Names and ages of children:
Elizabeth Jane Kicklighter Palmer, 10/12/55; Claude Milton
Kicklighter, Jr., 10/01/57; Richard Van Kicklighter, 10/14/58.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
George Washington University, Washington, DC.
Dates attended: 09/73-08/04
Degree: Masters of Arts Degree in Management of National Resources
from the School of Business Administration, George Washington
University
Date Degree Received: 08/74

Mercer University, Macon, GA
Dates Attended: 01/53-06/55
Degree: Bachelor of Arts/Biology
Date Degree Received: 06/55

University of Georgia, Athens, GA
Dates Attended: 09/52-12/52
Date Degree Received: N/A

Georgia Military College (Junior College), Millagevile, GA
Dates Attended: 09/51-06/52
Date Degree Received: N/A

Emory-At-Valdosta (Junior College), Valdosta, GA
Dates Attended: 08/50-05/51
Date Degree Received: N/A

Glennville High School, Glennville, GA
Dates Attended: 09/46-05/50
Diploma: High School Diploma
Date Diploma Received: 05/50

Military Schools as shown on Enclosure

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Director, Iraq/Afghanistan Transition Planning Group, Department of
Defense, 1401 Wilson Blvd, Suite 400, Rosslyn, VA, 10/2005-Present.
Chief of Staff, Department of Veterans Affairs, 810 Vermont Ave.,
NW, Washington DC, 02/2005-10/2005.
Special Advisor, Department of State, 2201 C St., NW, Washington,
DC, 10/2004-02/2005.
Director, Iraq/Afghanistan Transition Planning Group, Department of
Defense, 1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC, 12/2003-10/2004.
Assistant Secretary, Policy, Planning, and Preparedness, 08/2001-
12/2003.
Director, Acting, Assistant Secretary, Public and Intergovernmental
Affairs, 01/2001-08/2001.
Principal Deputy Under Secretary, Memorial Affairs, Department of
Veterans Affairs, 810 Vermont Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 04/2000-01/
2001.
Chief of Staff, Value America, Inc., Charlottesville, VA, 07/1999-
03/2000.
Deputy Under Secretary--International Affairs, The Pentagon, 102
Army Pentagon, Washington, DC, 10/1995-06/1999.
Director, WWII 50th Anniversary, DOD Committee, The Pentagon, 102
Army Pentagon, Washington, DC, 07/1991-09/1995.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
When I left Federal service in July 1999, I was asked to be a
consultant with the Department of the Army, without compensation, and I
accepted the position. I was never asked to perform any service. This
appointment began in October and expired in October.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
I served on the Vestry of The Falls Church (Falls Church, VA). I am
soon resigning on the Board of Enterprise Development.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Political contributions of Elizabeth and Claude Kicklighter from
March 2002 until March 2007:

2002:
16 April 2002...................... Republican National $125.00
Committee.
4 September 2002................... RNC Presidential 125.00
Victory Team.

2003:
31 January 2003.................... Republican National 150.00
Committee.
13 March 2003...................... Republican National 150.00
Committee.
7 July 2003........................ National Rep. 100.00
Senatorial Committee.
9 September 2003................... Republican National 150.00
Committee.
19 September 2003.................. National Rep. 100.00
Senatorial Committee.
12 December 2003................... National Rep. 100.00
Senatorial Committee.

2004:
11 March 2004...................... Bush-Cheney 2004...... 350.00
29 August 2004..................... Bush-Cheney 2004...... 100.00
29 August 2004..................... Republican National 150.00
Committee.
31 October 2004.................... Republican 300.00
Presidential Trust.
28 December 2004................... Republican National 450.00
Committee.

2006:
13 February 2006................... Republican National 500.00
Committee.
10 July 2006....................... Friends of George 145.00
Allen.
12 October 2006.................... Republican National 125.00
Committee.

2007:
None to Date.......................

My wife decides on our political contributions and signs all the
checks. Even though I rarely am consulted of these contributions, I
support her decisions and the right to make these contributions.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognition
for outstanding service or achievements.
Presidential Citizen Medal, 1995
Eisenhower Liberation Medal (presented by the U.S Holocaust
Memorial Council)
Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award, 1999
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 2006
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 1996
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 1994
Declaration for Exceptional Civilian Service presented by Secretary
of the Army, 1998
Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with three Oak Leaf Clusters
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster
Army Commendation Medal with four Oak Leaf Clusters
Secretary of Defense Identification Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army General Staff Identification Badge
Order of Aaron and Hur, awarded by the Chaplain's Corp
Argentina Order of May
French Order National du Merite
Korean Order of National Security Gugseon Medal
Silver honorary Order of Freedom from the Republic of Slovenia

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Wrote an article for Jane's Magazine describing NATO's Central
European Pipeline operation in 1981. Received a check for $200, which I
returned to the publisher.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have
copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
None.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate Committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------

[The nomination of LTG Claude M. Kicklighter, USA (Ret.),
was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 28, 2007,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April 12, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper,
USAF, (Ret.), by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with
answers supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))?
Answer. If I am confirmed for this position, my primary
responsibility will be to support the Secretary of Defense in
discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities
under title 10 and title 50, U.S.C. This includes:

Serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the
Secretary of Defense.
Exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf
of the Secretary of Defense, over all intelligence
organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD).
Ensuring that intelligence organizations in DOD are
manned, organized, trained, and equipped to support the
missions of the Department.
Ensuring that intelligence organizations in the
Department which are part of the National Intelligence
Community are responsive to the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), in the execution of the DNI's authorities.
Ensuring that the combatant forces, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are
provided with appropriate intelligence support.
Ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the
Department are conducted and managed efficiently and
effectively.
Overseeing DOD personnel, facility, and industrial
security to ensure adequacy, efficiency, and effectiveness.
Serving as the Program Executive for the Military
Intelligence Program (MIP), and ensuring that the Defense
components of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) are
robust, balanced, and in compliance with guidance and direction
of the DNI.
Ensuring the Department provides the U.S. Congress
with intelligence-related information sufficient to execute its
oversight responsibilities.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I have spent over 43 years in the profession of
intelligence--in the military, in civil service, in the private sector,
and in education. I have had the privilege and distinction of serving
for a total of over 8\1/2\ years as Director of two of the national
intelligence (and combat support) agencies, the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) (1991-1995) and the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA) (2001-2006).
I retired as a Lieutenant General in l995, after a 32-year career
in the United States Air Force. My assignments prior to my 4 years as
Director of DIA almost exclusively focused on intelligence and included
the Chief of Air Force intelligence during Operations Desert Shield/
Desert Storm and as Director of Intelligence (J-2) for three combatant
commands (COCOMs): U.S. Forces, Korea; Pacific Command; and Strategic
Air Command. I commanded an airborne Signals Intelligence unit in
combat, a national-level scientific and technical intelligence center,
and an Air Force Electronic Security Wing. I served two year-long
combat tours during the Southeast Asian conflict; during the second, I
flew 73 combat support missions in EC-47 aircraft over Laos and
Cambodia.
During my 6\1/2\ years in the private sector, I served as an
executive in four professional service companies in which my focus was
on the Intelligence Community as a client. I both led business units,
and served as a subject matter expert.
I have served on numerous government boards, commissions, panels,
advisory groups, and task forces, addressing intelligence-related
issues. I was a member of the Downing Assessment Task Force which
investigated the Khobar Towers bombings in l996; was vice chairman of a
congressionally-mandated commission chaired by former Governor Jim
Gilmore of Virginia on the subject of homeland security; and was a
member of the National Security Agency Advisory Board for over 4 years.
I am currently the Chairman of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
External Advisory Board, and am the Intelligence and National Security
Alliance Distinguished Professor of Intelligence at Georgetown
University.
I have worked with the Departments of State, Justice, Energy, and
Homeland Security in the course of my career, and served for a total of
11 years in the Pentagon for administrations of both political parties.
I understand intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels, having served in all three.
In sum, I believe I have the length, breadth, and depth of
professional experience in intelligence at all levels, functions, and
dimensions which distinctly qualifies me to serve as the USD(I).
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the USD(I)?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, and if the Secretary of Defense concurs,
I would restructure the organization of the USD(I) staff along
functional lines, and patterned after the DNI staff, as Director
McConnell intends to restructure it. This would help synchronize the
DOD intelligence components with the DNI.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. First and foremost, I believe the Secretary would expect me
to discharge the duties and functions--both explicit and implicit--
outlined in the response to the previous question under ``Duties.''
Second, the Secretary is committed to fully supporting the DNI, and
ensuring that the DNI has visibility and authority over the full range
of intelligence activities in the Department, without abrogating his
statutory obligations.
Third, given the magnitude of the responsibilities of the USD(I),
he will look to me to transfer any non-intelligence functions and
activities now residing with the position of the USD(I), to the
appropriate staff element.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the
following:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. I will attempt to relieve the Secretary of as many burdens
in the intelligence domain as possible, will keep him informed, and
seek his guidance and direction when appropriate.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. I would endeavor to keep the Deputy fully informed, seek
his guidance and direction when appropriate, and support him in his
role as the alter ego of the Secretary.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Each of the other four under secretaries has broad-gauged
responsibilities and authorities, which impact on intelligence in DOD,
and vice-versa. I intend to promote dialogue, understanding, and mutual
support.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network and
Information Integration (ASD(NII)).
Answer. My approach with the ASD(NII) would be the same as with the
under secretaries. The relationship here needs to be especially close,
since this office represents key enablers for the conduct of
intelligence activities.
Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee
Affairs.
Answer. I am not directly familiar with this office, since I did
not have occasion to interact with it in my former capacity as Director
of NGA. I would expect to foster close collaboration, particularly with
respect to oversight of detainee interrogation policy and procedures.
Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations/Low Intensity Conflict.
Answer. In the current world environment, the importance of Special
Operations has grown. There are pervasive interactions between
intelligence and special operations which entail mutual support and
clear lines of responsibility and oversight. I intend to pay close
attention to this relationship.
Question. The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence
Directors.
Answer. Having served as a Service Intelligence Director, I believe
I understand their perspectives and responsibilities to man, organize,
train, and equip the intelligence forces in each of the Services. As
such, I intend to support their needs, and work with them to address
these needs primarily through the management of the MIP. I would also
maintain an open dialogue with the Service Secretaries, providing
guidance and direction in intelligence and related issues, when
appropriate.
Question. The General Counsel of the DOD.
Answer. I am acutely aware of the crucial role the DOD General
Counsel plays, particularly because of the many complex legal issues
that arise in intelligence, security, and counterintelligence. I have
worked closely with this office as an Intelligence Agency Director
twice, and as Chief of Air Force Intelligence. I am very interested in
maintaining the current superb level of support from the Office of the
DOD General Counsel, particularly the senior ``embedded'' attorney
assigned to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
(OUSD(I)), for liaison and requisite legal guidance.
Question. The Commanders of the Combatant Commands.
Answer. I believe it is a prime obligation of the USD(I) to ensure
that the intelligence needs of the COCOMs are fulfilled. I have served
as the Director of Intelligence in three of these commands, and have
visited all of them many times during the course of my career. I
believe I have an informed perspective on each of them. I intend to
have an open dialogue with them, and, when possible, travel to each of
the commands to understand current needs and concerns. I would
anticipate working closely with the respective Directors of
Intelligence (J-2s) on a routine basis.
Question. The Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agencies.
Answer. Having served as Director of two of these agencies (DIA and
NGA), spent 8 years at National Security Agency (NSA), and worked
closely with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) for over 30
years, I believe I have a reasonably sound grasp of the cultures,
capabilities, and shortfalls of each of them. I intend to work closely
with the agency directors to: (1) stay informed as to what they are
doing; (2) assist them when possible; (3) and provide direction and
guidance when appropriate.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Air Force.
Answer. This relationship will be different than it was when I most
recently served as Director of NGA. Traditionally, this position has
been dual-hatted as the Director of NRO; currently, these two positions
are separate. I believe this is a much sounder arrangement. The Under
Secretary's remaining responsibilities still intersect with those of
the NRO, so I would anticipate coordination and collaboration.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
Answer. I would anticipate a very close relationship with the DNI.
The Secretary of Defense wishes to synchronize DOD intelligence with
the DNI. Eight of the 16 components of the Intelligence Community are
embedded in DOD, which constitute a substantial portion of the Nation's
intelligence capabilities and resources. I believe there are
improvements that can be made by clarifying this relationship
institutionally, and partnering with the DNI to manage intelligence as
a seamless enterprise. I agree with Admiral McConnell's priorities, and
intend to work cooperatively with the DNI to bring them to fruition,
without compromising the Secretary's statutory responsibilities and
authorities. On a personal level, Admiral McConnell and I have been
professional colleagues and personal friends for over 20 years. I
anticipate a very close, productive relationship with the DNI.
Question. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC).
Answer. I worked with the Director of the NCTC when I served as
Director of NGA. I was committed to the success of the NCTC then, and
would, if confirmed, continue to support the mission of this crucial
organization. I know and greatly respect Vice Admiral Redd, having
worked with him when he was a member of the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission.
Question. The Deputy Directors of National Intelligence.
Answer. I would intend to foster a collaborative relationship with
the DDNI's, as well as with designated counterparts on the USD(I)
staff. It would be my intent, if confirmed, to pattern the USD(I) staff
after the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), as
Admiral McConnell intends to restructure it. This, we are both
convinced, will promote closer coordination with counterparts. I have
known and worked with all the Deputy Directors of National
Intelligence, and would leverage these past productive working
relationships, as the USD(I).
Question. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with
intelligence responsibilities.
Answer. I would intend to bolster the close relationship I had with
these officials when I served as Director of NGA. I am familiar with
these elements, since NGA provides dedicated support to them,
particularly during national security special events, and in the wake
of natural disasters such as Hurricanes Rita/Katrina. I have known the
current Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, Charlie Allen, for over a
quarter of a century; he is a respected professional colleague and
close personal friend, and I would anticipate a continued close and
collaborative relationship.
major challenges, problems, and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the USD(I)?
Answer. Since I am nominated but not confirmed, I do not have an
inside perspective, but believe there are sets of issues that are
virtually perpetual, which I would outline as follows:

Internal to USD(I): There are organizational,
structural, and personnel issues that will have to be dealt
with arising from a change in leadership.
Internal to DOD: Collectively, there are challenges
confronting all of the eight intelligence components of the
Department. Similarly, each has component-centric issues and
challenges. If confirmed, I will have to select and rank those
which merit the attention from the USD(I) level. This
includes--by way of example, but not exhaustion--acquisition
challenges at NSA, NGA, and the NRO; human capital issues
across all components; programming and financial management
issues; oversight concerns involving the nexus of the needs of
national security and civil liberties; the balancing of
resources to satisfy many competing requirements, et cetera.
Above all, of course, are the continuing challenges involved in
ensuring intelligence support to our forces in harm's way,
particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. This includes--again, by
way of selected examples--intelligence support to thwarting
improvised explosive devices, sharing intelligence with
coalition forces, ensuring the flow of intelligence to and
through the ``last tactical mile'' (or, perhaps more aptly, the
``first tactical mile''); countering the adversary use of the
internet; and substantially improving foreign language
capabilities.
Intelligence Community: A major challenge (and an
opportunity, as well) is to crystallize the relationship with
the DNI. Challenges here include sharing and collaboration
between and among the ``stovepipes;'' overhauling security
policies; improving acquisition; clarifying roles and
responsibilities in clandestine activities, building on the
success of the National Clandestine Service; and transforming
analysis.

Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems
in the performance of the functions of the USD(I)?
Answer. This question infers to me ``what are the internal
obstacles to optimum performance of the USD(I) staff in the discharge
of its functions and responsibilities?''
It appears to me that the current organizational structure of the
USD(I) is neither optimized for the missions it must perform, nor
postured for the relationship that should exist with the DNI. The lack
of a designated full-time deputy has hindered internal coordination.
Moreover, I do not believe the current staff is large enough to fulfill
their existing responsibilities.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. See answer below.
Question. What management actions and timelines would you establish
to address these problems?
Answer. See answer below.
Question. What broad priorities would you establish in terms of
issues which must be addressed by the USD(I)?
Answer. I would cite the organizing principles of General Templar,
the successful architect of the British counterinsurgency campaign in
Malaya:

Get the priorities right
Get the instructions right
Get the organization right
Get the right people into the organization
Get the right spirit into the people
Get out of the way so they can get on with it.

If confirmed, I would intend to use the short tenure I will have as
an advantage, by focusing on the issues I have outlined in the
responses to the earlier question on major challenges, and driving
progress with a sense of urgency.
Accordingly, I anticipate promulgating a ``Campaign Plan''--a
concise, yet comprehensive statement of strategic intent, in which I
would describe objectives, priorities, and instructions, to reinforce
those of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. This will be the vehicle I
would use to articulate a common understanding, and to elicit a common
commitment by all DOD intelligence components, to a shared set of
goals.
I would hope to roll out this ``Campaign Plan'' very early in my
tenure. In doing so, I intend to consult with the four Agency Directors
and the four Service Intelligence Chiefs to gain their ``buy-in.'' I
would intend to capitalize on the initiative already underway to build
integrated ground architecture, and to harmonize that with similar
efforts underway by the DNI. This will form the basis for real-time
collaboration and data dissemination to the warfighter. I would intend
to empower the component heads by delegating the authorities necessary
to lead their components, and in so doing ensure that USD(I) is an
enabler, not an impediment, to their success.
I would rely upon them. I have ``been there, done that,'' both as
an Agency Director (twice), a Service Intelligence Chief, and a J-2
(three times), so I know their respective perspectives. I would demand
that they lead and manage their respective components as part of the
enterprise--and then hold them accountable--just as I wanted to be
treated when I held these positions.
I would particularly engage the active participation of the Service
Intelligence Chiefs--who these days are understandably consumed with
operational issues--in the dynamics of DOD intelligence. Their tactical
military perspectives are crucial. I would plan to engage actively with
the Military Intelligence Board, and to invigorate the Senior Military
Intelligence Officer Conferences as a forum to engage all the component
leadership.
Staff members who are expert only in DOD must be rotated to the
agencies, Services, or COCOMs to gain ``life experiences,'' (in accord
with the emphasis on ``joint duty'' for the entire Intelligence
Community). Overseers must be at least as knowledgeable as those whom
they oversee. Similarly, other experts need to be brought in to deal
with new and changing challenges, to replace dedicated but out-dated
bureaucrats.
Where appropriate, I would intend to travel to commands with
component heads or their senior representative, involving them in
problem identification and resolution.
I would look for ways to implement small, quick-reaction
capabilities, which often get lost in the wake of the ``big ticket''
programs.
I would impose a ``Ten-Day Rule'' for staffing issues and making
decisions, acknowledging that many issues are complex and perpetual.
I would intend to conduct an in-progress review of human
intelligence activities, both within the Department (to include the
involvement of Special Operations), and externally with the CIA and the
National Clandestine Service.
In sum, I would quote from LTC John Nagl's landmark book,
``Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife.'' While nominally a comparison of
the British experience in Malaya to that of the American effort in
Vietnam, it is really about cultural change, or more precisely, about
the manner in which organizations fail to adapt to change. Nagl cites
an instructive exchange between Field Marshal Montgomery and Colonial
Secretary Lyttelton, as they contemplated the way ahead in Malaya:

``Dear Lyttelton:
Malaya.
We must have a plan.
We must have a man.
When we have a man with a plan, we will succeed.
Not otherwise.
Montgomery.''

I trust the committee, and in turn the full Senate, will support
this man with a plan.
information superiority
Question. One major criticism of the creation of the Office of the
USD(I) was the separation of intelligence from the Department's other
information-intensive functions (such as command, control, information
systems, Chief Information Officer, and cyberspace defense) and the
creation of a new Assistant Secretary position to manage the latter
(the ASD(NII)). Critics argued that it was unwise to split these
functions, since they are inherently closely related and should be
integrated as part of a strategy for achieving ``information
superiority.'' The counterargument was that the intelligence function
had become so important and complex after September 11 that it required
full-time attention at the under secretary level.
Do you believe that the USD(I) and ASD(NII) positions should remain
separate?
Answer. Yes. I regard the establishment of the position of USD(I)
as long-overdue recognition of the importance, magnitude, and
complexity of intelligence. There is no more rationale for
subordinating intelligence to the stewards of the means for conveying
and protecting it, than for any other form of information. Virtually
any endeavor in DOD--operations, logistics, acquisition, medical,
personnel, as well as intelligence--are all information-intensive. The
ASD(NII) now has a holistic perspective to all forms of information,
not just intelligence. It is in a better position to look across all
information domains, and promote integration, robust networking, and
security.
Question. If you do think the positions should remain separate, do
you think that there are adequate mechanisms in place for coordination
and integration of the two broad functions?
Answer. Again, I do not have the ``insider'' perspective, but it is
my impression that sufficient coordination and integration mechanisms
for the two functions do exist. If confirmed, I would certainly plan to
verify that this is so, and would take appropriate action if I see need
for improvement.

INFORMATION SHARING

Question. There are still strong barriers to sharing, or allowing
access to, the mass of intelligence data that has not been included in
finished reports or analyses and approved for dissemination within the
Intelligence Community.
In one response to the problem, Congress mandated an ``information
sharing pilot'' program between the NSA and the DIA's Joint
Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), which
provided access for JITF-CT analysts to some NSA databases containing
unevaluated or ``raw'' intelligence. This pilot program demonstrated
that U.S. persons' privacy can be fully protected by giving non-NSA
analysts the same training that NSA analysts receive in minimization
procedures, subjecting the non-NSA analysts to the same auditing
procedures, and ensuring that non-NSA analysts would be disciplined the
same as NSA analysts for any transgressions. Since this pilot
concluded, NSA and DIA have negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) making access permanent. This MOU is now available to other
intelligence agencies as a model agreement for broadening access to NSA
terrorism information (but not information collected under the
Terrorist Surveillance Program).
Question. Do you support extending the access that DIA's JITF-CT
has gained to NSA databases to other organizations?
Answer. Like the NSA/DIA ``information sharing pilot'' mandated by
Congress, NSA and NGA embarked on a similar arrangement whereby NGA
employees were given access to selected NSA ``raw'' databases in the
interest of collaboration between the disciplines of signals
intelligence (SIGINT) and GEOINT. The centerpiece for this relationship
was the GEOCELL, but the approach was expanded to other collection and
analytic challenges. The agreement I struck with General Hayden, then
Director, NSA, was that any NGA employees who were given (selected)
access to SIGINT data had to abide by the same rules as NSA employees,
i.e. training, compliance with U.S. Signal Intelligence Directive 18,
auditing, and accountability for any transgressions. This program
enjoyed great success, and is still extant. So, yes, absolutely, I
would support selectively extending such access to other agencies and
other issues, under the same ground rules.
Question. If this model can work for NSA's sensitive SIGINT
information, do you believe it would also work for CIA's human
intelligence databases?
Allowing outside analysts to access foreign intelligence data in
the forms in which it is collected carries the risk that analysts will
sometimes not understand it and could be overwhelmed by the volume of
it. This concern has prompted proposals to augment access to raw
foreign intelligence data with: (1) multi-disciplinary teams composed
of experts from each of the collection disciplines (imagery, signals,
and human intelligence) and led by all-source analysts; and (2)
advanced information technology tools to help analysts search large
data holdings for correlations and connections and to understand the
results. Indeed, the individual intelligence agencies are exploiting
this very technology as the means to cope with information overload.
This technology could be used by analysts outside these agencies.
Answer. Yes, I do, with the provision of analogous ground rules.
Question. Do you support the concept of cross-agency and cross-
discipline analytic collaboration, either virtually or through physical
co-location, on the basis of common missions or targets where all the
analysts have common access?
Answer. Yes, I do, when such arrangements make sense and hold the
promise of better intelligence products, services, and solutions. My
only reservation about such arrangements is that in the rush to
proliferate and ``universalize'' them, tradecraft considerations are
compromised. That is, one of the great strengths of our system of
intelligence is the championing of the respective tradecraft by each of
the intelligence disciplines. We must be careful not to homogenize all
analysis; each form brings complementary attributes to the table, which
serves to promote competitive analysis.
Question. Do you support the paradigm that the information gathered
by the various collection agencies, such as CIA, NSA, and DIA, is not
``owned'' by those agencies, and those agencies not control decisions
about who should get access to collected information?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Should the DNI, rather than individual agencies, decide
who should get access?
Answer. Yes. The DNI should have benefit of input from each of the
data ``owners,'' but the rule sets should be established by the DNI.

HOMELAND DEFENSE

Question. With the establishment of the positions of USD(I), the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and the Commander
of Northern Command, DOD has been fundamentally reorganized to better
address the critical homeland defense mission.
In your view, what challenges lie ahead in integrating the
intelligence capabilities of DOD with those of the Department of
Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local
agencies?
Answer. I believe there are two dimensions to this question.
One relates to intelligence support to military forces which are
under the aegis of Northern Command (NORTHCOM). The relationship is
straightforward and conventional--that is, intelligence support is
rendered to NORTHCOM and its subordinate components, just as it would
be rendered to any other COCOM.
The second relates to the support which may be rendered to the
Department of Homeland Security, or some component of the Department,
directly. This is primarily, but not exclusively, an issue for the
agencies. In NGA's case, for example, virtually all of its products,
services, and solutions traditionally employed in a foreign
intelligence context can be applied in a domestic context. Two issues
are relevant here: (1) legal constraints on domestic surveillance, and
(2) potential competition for resources. It has been my experience that
both concerns are manageable.
I think the Department of Homeland Security has a very important
role to play, to broker, validate, and prioritize requirements from all
of its constituents, particularly at the State and local levels. I do
not believe it prudent to allow, for example, direct tasking of
Intelligence Community components by State and local officials. There
must always be a ``lead Federal agency'' to vet and sponsor such needs.
Question. Does DOD's existing requirements process adequately
support the establishment of intelligence requirements for the homeland
defense mission?
Answer. I do not have current information about how the process
works now, but from my NGA experience, I thought it worked well.
Question. As a former Director of the NGA, do you believe that you
had sufficient latitude and resources to assist domestic authorities in
emergency situations, such as existed in the aftermath of the September
11 attacks.
Answer. Yes, I did.
Question. Are you satisfied that there is adequate oversight within
the DOD on the domestic activities of the U.S. NORTHCOM?
Answer. I have no evidence to the contrary, but if confirmed, would
be vigilant to concerns about domestic surveillance activities.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. Secretary Rumsfeld established transformation of the
Armed Forces to meet 21st century threats as one of his highest
priorities.
In your judgment, what is the role of intelligence in the overall
transformation process?
Answer. Intelligence is a key enabler for transformation. I can
think of no military capability or doctrinal tenet that would not be
heavily dependent on and influenced by intelligence.
Question. Specifically for the Defense Intelligence Community, what
do you believe transformation should mean?
Answer. I believe there are two meanings implied in this question.
As indicated in the response to the previous question, intelligence is
a key enabler for transformation writ large. While it is enabling
department-wide transformation, intelligence must transform itself as
well. This means transformation of policies, tactics, techniques,
procedures, and technology.
Question. In your view, what transformational capabilities does our
Intelligence Community require?
Answer. One could name a long list; some illustrative examples
follow: We should ultimately acquire the global ``god's eye'' and
``god's ear'' collection and surveillance capability for foreign
intelligence needs. We need a robust integrated ground architecture
that is secure, consistent, reliable, and has multi-level security. We
need much more automation to relieve analysts of tedious ``grunt'' work
that can be done by computers (e.g. automatic target recognition,
automatic feature extraction, to name two specific cases I am familiar
with). We must improve collaboration and information sharing both
internally within the Intelligence Community, and externally with
partners and customers. We need to vastly improve language capability
and proficiency.

THE ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

Question. The defense intelligence structure has evolved over the
years, most recently with the creation of the Defense Human
Intelligence Service in 1996, the establishment of the NGA in 1997, the
formation of the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) in 2002, the
creation of the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and the evolution of the Joint
Intelligence Centers at the COCOMs into Joint Intelligence Operations
Centers (JIOCs).
In your view, is the current organizational structure of defense
intelligence the best structure to support military and national
intelligence needs?
Answer. The current organization of the Intelligence Community and
its Defense components are a product of a historical evolution which
traces its heritage from the National Security Act of 1947 through the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004.
Whether what we have is the ``best,'' is heavily dependent on the
criteria for ``best.''
I would observe that if one were to start with a blank piece of
paper and were tasked to design the optimum Intelligence Community for
the environment of today and the future, we would probably end up with
another design. But, ``we are where we are.''
Question. If not, what changes would you recommend to the current
structure?
Answer. I have given this matter a great deal of thought. At this
point in time, I have no major recommendations for change. Both the DNI
and the USD(I) are works in progress. I think we would be well served
to allow them to mature before mandating yet more change.
In the future, however, it may be worth considering the stand-up of
a cabinet-level Department of Intelligence, composed of the major
``engines of intelligence.'' Such a construct would provide products,
services, and solutions in common to a wide variety of customers. Even
after the IRTPA, we still have the basic organizational framework that
has been built piecemeal since l947. I believe that intelligence is so
crucial to the safety and security of this Nation, that it could merit
the stature and prominence represented by a full-fledged cabinet
department. This is not to suggest that, under such a construct, the
other cabinet departments--most notably DOD--would not still require
robust organic intelligence capabilities. However, I see no prospect
that such a radical change is feasible, so it is not something I would
recommend at this time.
Question. Do you think that DOD and the ODNI are effectively
integrated operationally?
Answer. No, I do not; this is not a criticism necessarily, but
rather a function of a new arrangement and new relationships maturing.
As stated previously, both organizations are works in progress. I have
every confidence that integration, coordination, and collaboration will
continue to improve.
Question. Do you believe that the ODNI is organized properly to
enable efficient joint planning and execution of intelligence
operations and activities?
Answer. I believe that neither the ODNI nor the USD(I) staffs are
organized optimally to promote efficient collaboration and
coordination. Both need restructuring; if confirmed, I intend to
pattern the USD(I) staff after his reorganized DNI staff. Doing so will
facilitate staff interactions and promote synchronization.
Question. For example, is there an analog to the DOD JIOC under the
DNI? Should there be?
Answer. One component of the DNI structure, the NCTC, is ``JIOC-
like.'' Otherwise, the DNI's missions and responsibilities are not
``operational'' in the classic DOD sense.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Question. Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld emphasized enhancing
the human intelligence capabilities of the DOD both within the Defense
HUMINT Service and Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Military forces,
and especially SOCOM forces, have been assigned the mission to conduct
military operations against terrorists abroad. This mission requires
that the military be prepared to act against terrorist targets in a
wide variety of situations abroad. It has been asserted that DOD
personnel have deployed to foreign countries and engaged in
counterterrorism activities without the approval or knowledge of the
cognizant Ambassador or the Chief of Station. Concerns have also been
raised that some military activities constitute covert actions that
under the law require a presidential finding.
Do you think that military activities in the areas of intelligence
gathering, preparation of the battlefield, and the use of force,
conducted pursuant to the counterterrorism mission, constitute covert
actions under the law?
Answer. The term ``covert action'' is statutorily defined to mean
``an activity or activities of the United States Government to
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it
is intended that the role of the United States will not be apparent or
acknowledged publicly. . . .'' Conversely, as I understand it, Congress
also statutorily stipulated certain categories of activities which
would not constitute covert action. They include acquiring
intelligence, traditional counterintelligence, traditional operational
security, traditional military activities, or administrative
activities. Clandestine activities--a term that is not statutorily
defined--are those activities conducted in secret, but which are, in an
intelligence context, passive in nature. For me, the crucial
distinction lies in whether an activity is ``passive'' (which is the
case with intelligence activities) or ``active'' (which is the case
with covert action). It is my understanding that military forces are
not conducting ``covert action.''
Question. Do you think that the (U.S.) ambassador in a country
should always be informed of all military activities taking place in
that country?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would only have jurisdiction over DOD
intelligence activities. My cardinal rule when I was the Director of
DIA was that all military intelligence activities under DIA's purview
would be made known to, and approved by, the respective Ambassador and
Chief of Station. I would, if confirmed, continue that policy.
Question. Do you think that coordination and cooperation among the
DOD, the State Department, and the ODNI have been adequate regarding
sensitive military operations abroad?
Answer. I am not in a position to answer this question
authoritatively. If confirmed, I would certainly be attentive to this
concern.
Question. To your knowledge, what is the Department's policy with
respect to acknowledging that the U.S. military personnel involved are
members of the U.S. Armed Forces in the event that they are taken into
custody by a foreign nation in which they are conducting these
activities?
Answer. Assuming ``these activities,'' are ``clandestine'' (as
opposed to ``covert actions''), the operative DOD policy is to
acknowledge the affiliation of military members in such a circumstance.
Question. What are your views regarding the recommendation of the
9/11 Commission that DOD take over responsibility for all so-called
paramilitary missions?
Answer. I am personally opposed to this proposal. I think it would
remove an ``arrow from the quiver'' of potential capabilities available
to the President.

NEED FOR INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Question. Intelligence analysis should be independent and free of
political pressure that it reach a certain conclusion, including a
conclusion that fits a particular policy preference.
If confirmed, would you ensure that all intelligence analysts
within DOD, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not
part of the defense intelligence structure, is free from such pressure?
Answer. Yes. Absolutely.
Question. What is your position on whether intelligence officers
and analysts should be able to testify to Congress on their
professional conclusions regarding a substantive intelligence issue
even if those views conflict with administration positions?
Answer. I have hard-won personal experience in this regard.
Accordingly, I have a very strong conviction that intelligence officers
should be free to speak their mind before Congress. This is regardless
of whether their views comport with administration positions or not, so
long as it is made clear that such views are personal, not those of the
administration.

CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WITHIN THE DOD

Question. The IRTPA of 2004 granted the DNI control over the
preparation and execution of the NIP budget and tasking of national
intelligence operations. However, IRTPA also contained language
asserting that nothing in the act should be construed as to impair the
authorities of secretaries of cabinet departments, and the Secretary of
Defense has delegated ``direction, control, and authority'' over the
national intelligence organizations within DOD to the USD(I)--the
highest form of authority in the executive branch.
What are your views on the balance of authorities accorded in IRTPA
to the DNI and to cabinet secretaries, particularly the Secretary of
Defense?
Answer. In a sense, they appear to be evenly balanced. On one hand,
Title I of the IRTPA ascribes extensive authorities over the
Intelligence Community to the DNI; on the other hand, section 1018
stipulates that these authorities are to be executed ``. . . in a
manner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory
responsibilities of the heads of departments. . . .''
Question. What are your views on the extent of the grant of
``authority, direction, and control'' to the USD(I) over DOD national
intelligence organizations?
Answer. The phrase ``authority, direction, and control'' is the
highest expression of executive branch power and influence. The
dictionary definitions of these terms are quite inclusive and
encompassing. In practice, however, policies, practices, and procedures
have evolved since l947 so that the exercise of ``authority, direction,
and control'' virtually always comports with the requirements of the
(now) DNI, based upon mutual understanding. I have served as Director
of two Combat Support Agencies, which also have national intelligence
responsibilities. There is an art form to balancing both obligations.
The more time I have spent in the Intelligence Community, the more I
have come to appreciate the importance of both personal relationships
among senior leaders and the value of established ways of conducting
business. These factors are almost as influential as statutes and their
interpretation.
Question. What type of relationship would you strive to establish,
if you are confirmed, with the DNI to ensure that DOD interests in
national intelligence are satisfied, that DOD adequately assists the
DNI in discharging his responsibilities, and that the defense
intelligence agencies are properly managed?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to explore with Vice Admiral
McConnell potential formal institutional arrangements that would serve
to clarify the relationship between the DNI and the USDI so that not
only DOD and DNI interests--but those of the Nation--are better served.
Question. Do you believe that the relationships, authorities,
processes, and structures in place between DOD and the DNI provide
sufficient influence for the DOD to ensure that the intelligence
capabilities DOD will need in the future to prepare for and conduct
military operations will be developed and acquired through the NIP?
Answer. Yes. There is a long history of the NIP (in its previous
form as the National Foreign Intelligence Program) satisfying military
requirements. I have seen no degradation in this practice. The USD(I)
is in a strong position to influence such support. Moreover, the newly
created MIP in DOD is much more coherent, and a better parallel to the
NIP, than was the combination of the predecessor program, the Joint MIP
and the aggregation of what was called Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities. These two programs (the NIP and MIP) provide a
congruent programmatic basis for improved intelligence capabilities.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

Question. The Washington Post reported on February 7, 2007, that
Admiral McConnell, in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, expressed the intention to alter the rules governing the
granting of security clearances to U.S. citizens who are naturalized or
born here to immigrant parents. Under existing rules, it is difficult
for these citizens to gain security clearances if any of their family
members live abroad or are not citizens. This hurdle makes it very
difficult for the Intelligence Community to hire American citizens with
much-needed language skills, cultural knowledge, and physical
characteristics to assist in the war on terrorism,
counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and other critical missions.
Do you agree with the view attributed to the DNI regarding the need
to re-examine the rules and processes for clearing U.S. citizens in
light of the pressing needs of the Intelligence Community for the
skills our citizens possess?
Answer. Yes.

JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated joint-duty tours for
military officers as a condition for promotion and instituted processes
intended to ensure that personnel serving in joint-duty billets are
promoted at the same or higher rates as those who did not serve in
joint-duty assignments. This measure was enacted in order to raise the
quality of personnel serving in joint assignments, such as on the Joint
Staff, COCOM staffs, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and to
instill a joint perspective in the officer corps across the Armed
Forces. By any measure, this requirement has paid enormous dividends.
The 9/11 Commission urged adoption of similar requirements for
Intelligence Community civilian personnel, to achieve the same goals--
improving the quality of staff serving in community positions, and
nurturing joint perspectives. The IRTPA of 2004 did not actually
mandate the adoption of this reform, and, to date, the Office of the
DNI has not acted on the 9/11 Commission recommendation.
The new DNI has indicated a strong desire to establish an ironclad
joint tour requirement for Intelligence Community civilians. If
confirmed, would you support this decision?
Answer. Philosophically, I am in agreement with Intelligence
Community civilian employees diversifying their professional horizons
through joint duty. I spent 9 years on active duty after the enactment
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and experienced (endured) the evolution
of the rules governing joint duty, particularly which billets
``counted'' for joint duty credit, and which ones didn't. As in all
such initiatives which potentially have a profound impact on employees'
careers and lives, the ``devil will be in the details'' of
implementation. I would hope that the components of the Intelligence
Community are granted some latitude to manage this program in a
``crawl-walk-run'' manner to achieve the objective.
Question. Would you support legislation in this area if the DNI
judges it to be necessary?
Answer. Yes, but I would hope the program could be developed and
executed without legislation.

ACQUISITION OVERSIGHT

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003 and the IRTPA of 2004 mandated that Milestone Decision Authority
(MDA) could no longer be delegated to, or exercised by, the Director of
the NSA. Congress took this action because of serious deficiencies in
NSA's systems acquisition capabilities that prevented the Agency from
effectively modernizing SIGINT capabilities to meet new threats. Since
Congress first acted to stimulate better executive branch oversight of
NSA systems acquisition, NSA's transformation program, Trailblazer, has
been terminated because of severe management problems, and its
successor, Turbulence, is experiencing the same management deficiencies
that have plagued NSA since at least the end of the Cold War.
What is your view of the seriousness of the acquisition management
problems at NSA?
Answer. While I have some familiarity with acquisition issues at
NSA, I am not sufficiently informed about current challenges to comment
authoritatively.
Question. What are your views about the ability of current NSA
personnel to effectively execute a transformation program?
Answer. I have the highest regard for the NSA workforce. I have no
doubt about their ability to execute a transformation program.
Question. Do you think that the Turbulence activity should remain
disaggregated and not managed as an integrated major program?
Answer. Again, I am not informed about the Turbulence activity. If
confirmed, I would intend to become familiar with it, and then, in
consultation with Director, National Security Agency and the DNI,
decide what action should be taken.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to strengthen
oversight of NSA's transformation efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I would first determine what oversight is
currently underway, and work with the DNI staff to establish a
coherent, systematic, and joint DNI/USDI (in conjunction with USD(AT&L)
oversight program.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY (CIFA)

Question. The DOD has established an organization called the CIFA.
CIFA is reportedly charged with protecting military facilities and
personnel and carrying out intelligence collection, analysis, and
operations within the United States.
Do you believe that it is appropriate that DOD has such an
organization (CIFA)?
Answer. Yes. It is imperative that foreign collection efforts
against the Department are aggressively detected, and then neutralized.
CIFA fulfills the counterintelligence mission at the strategic (in
contrast to the operational or tactical) level. This is an inherent
responsibility of the Department which I feel cannot be abrogated. It
is equally important that the proper balance be struck between the
counterintelligence mission on one hand, and the protection of civil
liberties on the other.
Question. What is the appropriate division of functions and
responsibilities between such a DOD organization and the National
Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) within the Intelligence Community?
Answer. CIFA's focus is on DOD equities, whereas the NCIX has a
broader, national perspective. NCIX promulgates broad strategies;
reaches out to industry, academic institutions, and other non-military
entities; and it oversees the counterintelligence functions in other
government agencies and departments. If confirmed, I will look for
opportunities to promote closer collaboration between CIFA and the
NCIX.
Question. Are you comfortable with CIFA reporting to the USD(I)?
CIFA is responsible for the TALON data base that was found to have
inappropriately included information on U.S. persons, including reports
on peaceful civilian protests and demonstrations inside the United
States, in contradiction of Executive orders and the rules published by
DOD.
Answer. Yes, I am comfortable with the current reporting chain, but
if confirmed, I will explore other options.
Question. What are you(r) views on the steps that should be taken
to preclude the possibility that CIFA or any other DOD organization
deals inappropriately with information on U.S. persons?
Answer. I am strongly supportive of protecting civil liberties. The
history of the Intelligence Community is replete with instances of
abuse of civil liberties--well intended, but abuse nonetheless. The
requisite elements of a program to prevent such abuse are: (1) clearly
articulated and widely publicized policies; (2) training, both basic
and refresher; and (3) a mechanism to verify compliance independently.
I am given to understand that in the instant case, corrective actions
have been taken to preclude the collection and inclusion of such
inappropriate information. If confirmed, I would plan to familiarize
myself in more detail with the corrective actions taken and underway,
and their effectiveness. I will be particularly interested in
determining how compliance is monitored independently.

ROLE IN ACQUIRING SPACE SYSTEMS

Question. If confirmed, what role do you anticipate you would have
in the requirements process for, and in oversight of, the acquisition
of space systems, including space systems for which milestone decision
authority rests with either the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics or the DOD Executive Agent for
Space?
Answer. I am not informed on exactly which space reconnaissance
systems are under the milestone decision authority of either of these
officials. If there are such systems under their purview, I would, if
confirmed, expect to be heavily involved in these management processes,
particularly the exercise of milestone decision authority.

INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT

Question. On February 9, 2007, the DOD Inspector General (IG)
issued a report titled ``Report on Review of the Pre-Iraqi War
Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy.'' That report concluded that the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) ``developed, produced, and then
disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al
Qaeda relationship, which included some conclusions that were
inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to
senior decisionmakers.'' The DOD IG concluded that these actions were
``inappropriate,'' and that ``this condition occurred because the
OUSD(P) expanded its role and mission from formulating Defense Policy
to analyzing and disseminating alternative intelligence.''
What are your views of the IG's report?
Answer. I have read both the DOD IG report on this matter and the
OUSD(P) rebuttal. I think this episode is a regrettable example of
apparent lack of trust in the analyses performed by the Intelligence
Community. I note that this occurred before the establishment of the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. If
confirmed, and if such a situation were to arise again, I would hope to
be involved, to ensure that: (1) policymakers and decisionmakers are
fully supported; (2) that all potential intelligence alternatives are
thoroughly explored and vetted; and (3) that any differing viewpoints
are made known to all involved parties.
As a general comment, I am strongly opposed to any
misrepresentation or distortion of intelligence.
Question. If you are confirmed, how would you ensure that DOD
intelligence elements, as distinct from policy offices, engage in
intelligence activities?
Answer. The first priority in this context is vigilance.
Intelligence officials must be alert to attempts by those outside the
Intelligence Community to engage in intelligence analysis. There are,
however, no empirical criteria for determining whether intelligence is
being distorted or misrepresented, or is simply being tested and
subjected to alternative points of view. One man's legitimate ``red
team'' is another man's inappropriate intelligence activity. To some
extent, this is in the realm of beauty (or lack thereof) being in the
eye of the beholder.

DOD INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION POLICY

Question. DOD Directive Number 3115.09 assigns the USD(I)
responsibility for providing oversight of intelligence operations,
detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning, and ensuring overall
development, coordination, approval, and promulgation of DOD policies
and implementation of plans related to intelligence interrogations,
detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning.
Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2005, memorandum
issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant
DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must
fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes. I fully support this policy.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes. I fully support these standards.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
Manual on interrogations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all relevant DOD policies
and plans comply with applicable U.S. law and international
obligations, including Common Article 3.
Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that
standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principles of
reciprocity, in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct
impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or
marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
Under DOD Directive Number 3115.09, the USD(I) is responsible for
developing policies and procedures, in coordination with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, the DOD General Counsel, and the
appropriate DOD components, to ensure that all contracts in support of
intelligence interrogation operations include the obligation to comply
with the standards of DOD Directive Number 3115.09 and exclude
performance of inherently governmental functions in accordance with DOD
Directive 1100.4 and that all contractor employees are properly
trained.
Answer. I strongly hold the view that the manner in which the
United States treats detainees may well impact how captured U.S.
soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated in future conflicts.
I believe that the Department's policies must be documented
accordingly.
Question. What do you believe is the proper role of contractors in
intelligence interrogation operations?
Answer. I believe it is permissible for contractors to participate
in detainee interrogations, as long as they comply with the policies
and guidance which govern DOD military and civilian interrogators. As I
understand it, DOD contractors who conduct government-approved
interrogations must be properly supervised and closely monitored
throughout the interrogation process, and may not, themselves, approve,
supervise, or monitor interrogations.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
intelligence interrogation operations are performed in a manner
consistent with the requirements of the manpower mix and that
contractors involved in such operations do not perform inherently
governmental functions?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure compliance with relevant DOD
directives.
These require that DOD contractors be trained and certified to the
same standard as DOD military and civilian interrogators, that contract
interrogators be properly supervised when conducting interrogations,
and that contractors do not approve, supervise, or oversee
interrogations. I would review, approve, and ensure coordination of all
DOD component plans, policies, orders, directives, and doctrine related
to intelligence interrogation operations, to include the role of
contractors.

INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

Question. An August 25, 2006, report by the DOD Office of the
Inspector General titled ``Review of DOD-Directed Investigations of
Detainee Abuse'' included the following finding: ``The USD(I) in
coordination with the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, should
develop and implement policy and procedures to preclude introducing
survival, escape, resistance, and evasion (SERE) techniques in an
environment other than training.''
Do you agree with the recommendation of the DOD IG that SERE
techniques should not be introduced into an environment other than
training?
Answer. Yes. I fully agree with the DOD IG's recommendation and
support the U.S. Joint Forces Commander's policy prohibiting Joint
Personnel Recovery Agency personnel from participating in any aspect of
the intelligence interrogation process.
Question. Has this finding been implemented by the USD(I)?
Answer. I am given to understand that the USD(I) fully supports the
U.S. Joint Forces Commander's policy prohibiting Joint Personnel
Recovery Agency personnel from participating in any aspect of the
intelligence interrogation process. The OUSD(I) has requested that U.S.
Joint Forces Command restate this prohibition in its interrogation
policy.
Question. If confirmed, would you ensure that policies and
procedures are developed and implemented to preclude the introduction
of SERE techniques in an environment other than training?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Commander of U.S.
Joint Forces Command interrogation policy prohibits Joint Personnel
Recovery Agency personnel from participating in any aspect of
intelligence interrogation operation.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Question Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor

INFORMATION SHARING

1. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Clapper, what policies would
you plan to implement to secure a more effective information sharing
relationship to prepare State and local first responders to a terrorist
event or natural disaster?
General Clapper. As a result of my experience on the Gilmore
Commission, as well as my time as Director of National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), I have become a strong proponent of sharing
as much information as possible with first responders, within the
constraints of law. If confirmed, I would work with the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) and the appropriate officials of the
Department of Homeland Security and the Office of Information Sharing
Environment to promote more timely and pervasive sharing of
intelligence-related information to this constituency. As well, I would
ensure that any requirements that Northern Command has in this area
would be addressed.
______

Question Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

2. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Clapper, when you were
Director of the NGA, you were a champion for using open source
information, including commercial imagery to support the intelligence
mission. Given the changing nature of the threats we face and the
availability of open source information, do you plan to continue the
work you did at NGA to encourage and expand the use of open source data
within the broader defense intelligence mission? The committee is aware
of agency initiatives to enrich classified information with open
source, but unfortunately they have suffered from inconsistent funding
and support.
General Clapper. If confirmed, I would most definitely emphasize
the utility and more pervasive use of open source information in the
broader defense intelligence context. If a DOD Coordinator of Open
Source information has not been designated, I would move to so
designate someone at a senior level to serve as the parallel with the
DNI's Director of Open Source.
______

[The nomination reference of Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper,
Jr., USAF, (Ret.), follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 29, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
James R. Clapper, Jr., of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, vice Stephen A. Cambone.
______

[The biographical sketch of Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr.,
USAF, (Ret.), which was transmitted to the committee at the
time the nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF, Retired
James R. Clapper, Jr., has devoted over 4 decades of service to the
Nation in the profession of intelligence--in the military, in industry,
in civil service, and in education.
He has the distinction of having served as director of two national
intelligence agencies for a total of over 8\1/2\ years--the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) 1991-1995, and the National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency (NGA) 2001-2006.
He retired as a Lieutenant General in 1995, after a 32-year career
in the United States Air Force. His assignments prior to his 4 years as
Director of DIA almost exclusively focused on intelligence and included
the Chief of Air Force intelligence during Operations Desert Shield/
Desert Storm and as (another singular distinction) Director of
Intelligence for three combatant commands: United States Forces, Korea,
Pacific Command, and Strategic Air Command. He previously commanded an
airborne Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) unit in combat, a national-level
scientific and technical intelligence center, and an Air Force SIGINT
Wing. He served 2-year-long combat tours during the Southeast Asian
conflict; during the second, he flew 73 combat support missions in EC-
47s over Laos and Cambodia.
During his 6 years in industry, he was an executive in three
successive professional services companies, where his focus was on the
Intelligence Community as a client. He both led business units and
served as a subject matter expert, expanding business and increasing
revenue in all three cases.
He has served as a consultant and advisor to Congress and the
Departments of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, and as a member
of many government panels, boards, commissions, and advisory groups. He
was a member of the Downing Assessment Task Force which investigated
the Khobar Towers bombings in 1996, and was vice chairman of a
congressionally-mandated commission chaired by former Governor Jim
Gilmore of Virginia on the subject of homeland security. He has
testified in Congress numerous times, and in Federal court as an expert
witness on intelligence tradecraft.
He hold's a bachelor's degree in government and politics from the
University of Maryland, a master's degree in political science from St.
Mary's University in San Antonio, TX, and an honorary doctorate in
strategic intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College,
where he taught as an adjunct professor. He now occupies the
Intelligence and Security Alliance Chair at Georgetown University's
School of Foreign Service, as Distinguished Professor of Military
Intelligence.
His military awards include two Defense Distinguished Service
Medals, the Air Force Distinguished Service Medal, and a host of other
United States military and foreign government awards and decorations.
His civilian awards and recognition include designation as one of the
Top 100 Information Technology Executives by Federal Computer Week
Magazine in 2001 and receipt of the NAACP National Distinguished
Service Award. He has received three National Intelligence
Distinguished Service Medals, the Department of Defense Distinguished
Civilian Service Award, the Coast Guard's Distinguished Public Service
Award, and the Presidentially-Conferred National Security Medal. He was
the 2006 winner of the prestigious William Oliver Baker award in
recognition of lifetime achievement in the National Intelligence
Community.
He now is the Senior Vice President/Chief Operating Officer of DFI-
International Government Services, Washington, DC.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Lt. Gen. James
R. Clapper, Jr., USAF, (Ret.), in connection with his
nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
James Robert Clapper, Jr., (Nickname: Jim).

2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

3. Date of nomination:
29 January 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
14 March 1941; Fort Wayne, IN.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Susan Terry Clapper.

7. Names and ages of children:
Jennifer Coakley, 40; Andrew Clapper, 35.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
B.A., University of Maryland, 1959-1963 (5 June 1963).
M.A., St. Mary's University, San Antonio, TX 1965-1970 (31 May
1970).

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Sep. 95-Mar. 97: Executive Vice President, Vredenburg, 1835
Alexander Bell Drive, Ste. 400, Reston, VA.
Mar. 97-Nov. 98: Principal, Booz-Allen-Hamilton, 8283 Greensboro
Drive, McLean, VA.
Nov. 98-Aug. 01: Vice President, Intelligence Programs, SRA
International, 4350 Fair Lakes Court, Fairfax, VA.
Sep. 01-Jun. 06: Director, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
(NGA), 4600 Sangamore Road, Bethesda, MD.
Jun. 06-Sep. 06: Special Assistant to the Deputy Director, NGA,
4600 Sangamore Road, Bethesda, MD. (CIA Retiree Transition Program).
Aug. 06-Present: INSA Distinguished Professor of Intelligence,
Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,
3600 N St., NW, Washington, DC.
Oct. 06-Present: Senior Vice President & COO, DFI International,
Government Services, 1717 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Ste. 1200, Washington,
DC.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None currently.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
Member, Board of Directors, GeoEye, 21700 Atlantic Blvd., Dulles,
VA.
Member, Board of Directors, 3001 Inc., 10300 Eaton Place, Suite
340, Fairfax, VA.
Member, Senior Advisory Board, Sierra Nevada Corp, 444 Salomon
Circle, Sparks, NV.
Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic & Intl Studies (CSIS), 1800 K
Street, NW, Washington, DC, (unpaid).
Advisor, U.S. Geospatial Intelligence Foundation, 2325 Dulles
Corner Blvd, Ste. 500, Herndon, VA, (unpaid).

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation--Advisor to the
Board of Directors.
Intelligence & National Security Alliance--Member.
Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association--Member of
Intelligence Committee.
National Cryptologic Foundation--Member.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Principal Military Decorations and Awards:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (2)
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (3)
Bronze Star Medal (2)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Air Force Meritorious Service Medal
Air Medal (2)

Civilian Awards and Recognition:
National Security Medal (Presidentially-conferred)
National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal (3)
DOD Distinguished Civilian Service Award
Coast Guard Distinguished Public Service Award
NAACP Meritorious Service Award
William Oliver Baker Award for lifetime achievement in
intelligence

Foreign Decorations:
Republic of Korea, France, Norway, and Canada

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Have written or by-lined many articles which were ``in-house''
professional treatises--nothing for the broader public domain.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF
(Ret.), was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March
28, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be
confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April
11, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to S. Ward Cassells, M.D., by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA))?
Answer. The ASD(HA) assists the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness and the Secretary of Defense in promoting and
safeguarding the health of military personnel and their families,
retirees, and others eligible for DOD health benefits. The role is
primarily one of setting health policies, in consultation with other
ASDs, the Services, and their Surgeons General, and Service ASDs. These
health policies include deployment health, both physical and mental.
The ASD also has an important, though less direct, role in health
education and research. Health Affairs is directly responsible for
managing TRICARE, and the Uniform Services University.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. As a practicing doctor, teacher, researcher, university
administrator, and Army Reserve colonel with two tours of duty in the
last 2 years, including most recently in Iraq, I have an appreciation
of the breadth, complexity, and urgency of DOD health issues. As I have
had limited management experience I will need the guidance of DOD
civilian and military leaders, and input from the troops and their
families. In addition I will ask for help from colleagues at Center for
Disease Control (CDC), National Institute of Health (NIH), Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), State, the World Health Organization, Red Cross, industry, and
others who can help. In particular, I will seek guidance from Senate
and House Members and their staffs whose expertise and dedication I
have come to appreciate in working with them on military health
research since 1995.
As a doctor, as a patient, I know that good medical care is
comprehensive, coordinated, compassionate, efficient, preventive, and
respectful of patient's privacy, time, and authority.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the ASD(HA)?
Answer. Yes, I need to learn more about DOD regulations and
finances, in order to accelerate decisionmaking so as to get benefits
and answers to injured troops and other beneficiaries.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect
that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. In addition to force protection, readiness, deployment
health, and TRICARE, the Secretary of Defense may call on the ASD(HA)
for advice on civil/military operations and global health issues. The
DOD has played an increasingly frequent and important role in disaster
readiness and response, both in the U.S. and abroad. Health care is a
critical part of this effort, and indeed the provision of health care
and assistance in capacity-building (education and facilities) is
proving to be a bridge to peace and a currency of diplomacy.
Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the
following:
The Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness,
The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
The Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of the
Services,
The ASD for Reserve Affairs,
The Surgeons General of each of the Services,
The TRICARE Lead Agents,
The TRICARE Support Contractors,
The Designated Providers' Chief Executive Officers (i.e., Uniformed
Services Treatment Facility CEOs),
Beneficiary Groups,
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
Answer. If confirmed as ASD(HA) I will have the opportunity and
duty to work closely with, and learn from, leaders in all the offices
and organizations listed above. I know many of them, and will request
meetings with the others, in person. Like most people, I have learned
that most problems arise from poor communication. Success requires
regular, frank meetings with partners and those we serve, consensus on
near-term and long-term goals, simple, fair and transparent processes,
and accountability. I am not embarrassed to ask for help, but also not
afraid to stand up for the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
their families.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the ASD(HA)?
Answer. The office is tasked, with continuously improving the
quality of health services while also reducing inefficiencies. The
challenges range from finding better ways to prevent and treat
battlefield injuries to better ways to assess and treat subtle,
complex, important conditions like post-traumatic stress and head
injuries. Also important is our readiness for potential threats such as
epidemic diseases, especially as troops increasingly work and live in
areas such as Asia and Africa where emerging infectious diseases often
arise. Other important issues are safety (in the hospital, at work, and
at home), obesity, and autism.
Administrative issues include the challenges of joint medical
command, BRAC, the role of outsourcing, interaction with other DOD
offices, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of
Homeland Security, and the Veterans Administration. Finally, the office
must assist with the recruitment and retention of dedicated and
talented health care personnel. Every satisfied military medical
professional can be encouraged to tell our story, safety in the
hospital at work and at home, obesity and autism.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. My limited experience to date with DOD health care needs
input from a broader group of providers, administrators, and especially
beneficiaries. I need to review the data the office has gathered, ask
for briefings, and get out in the field to ask questions and see for
myself. But it seems likely that there are opportunities for improving
services such as care of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and
traumatic brain injuries (TBI), disability determination, extremity
injuries and prosthetics. There may also be ways of improving,
simplifying, and safeguarding electronic medical records, and making
them portable--for care by private physicians or by the Veterans
Administration. It may also be important to do more to foster
innovation, to encourage and empower self-care, and to protect
whistleblowers.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems
confronting the ASD(HA)?
Answer. The most important immediate issue is identifying the
extent, causes, and correction of the problems that have been brought
to light at Walter Reed Army Hospital. I also understand that the
important work of the Mental Health Task Force has recommendations due
in May, and the task force on the future of military health care will
have their work completed late this year.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. Several commissions are addressing these issues and if
confirmed I will do all I can to assist them and to be guided by their
reports. If confirmed I plan to be a strong influence in ensuring our
wounded warriors and families are well cared for after they receive
care and in ensuring swift implementation of improvements recommended.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
for policy and program actions which must be addressed by the ASD(HA)?
Answer. The rank order of priorities of the problems noted above,
and others I may be become aware of, needs to be determined once I have
had the opportunity--if confirmed--of studying the issues from the
inside.

WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER

Question. Concern over outpatient facilities and care for severely
wounded servicemembers at Walter Reed Army Medical Center has been a
highly-visible issue over the past several weeks.
Based on your experience, do you believe the issues raised about
care and facilities at Walter Reed could be occurring at other military
medical hospitals or facilities?
Answer. I do not know. I visited Walter Reed's main hospital to see
patients and attend conferences several times over the past 2 years but
did not see Building 18. What I did see there, and at the naval
hospitals at Bethesda, Balboa, and Portsmouth, and Army hospitals such
as Beaumont and Evans, and at our facilities in Hawaii, Bangkok, Cairo,
Doha, and Kuwait, and when I was a patient in Ibn Sina (the 10th Combat
Support Hospital) in Baghdad, is excellent inpatient care and satisfied
patients. The areas were clean but not deluxe, or even very cheering. I
did not see or hear about the very real, intolerable problems in
Building 18. That shows how management issues and priorities can be
missed unless you look systematically, and listen carefully.
I did experience firsthand some errors and delays with my benefits,
but not the unacceptably slow, complex, and stingy disability system
outlined in recent press accounts. Ongoing patient and family surveys,
a vigilant press, staff reports up the chain of command and outside it
when justified, are critical to our providing the care our troops
deserve.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to examine care
for the wounded from the battlefield until discharge from DOD medical
treatment?
Answer. Battlefield care is excellent. I know that from the data,
from what I have seen as a doctor and as a patient in Iraq. The
civilian trauma and public health doctors are learning from lessons we
learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. Still, it requires vigilance,
innovation, and incentives for continuous improvement.
Question. What would you expect your role to be in support of
ongoing study of these issues by the Presidential Commission and the
DOD Independent Review Group?
Answer. To assist them in any way they request, and if not, then to
ask to be involved. It is important for the groups to hear from my
office, if confirmed, to provide perspective, and for us to hear from
them.

TRICARE

Question. If confirmed, what would be your short-term and long-term
goals for TRICARE?
Answer. TRICARE is the best health plan in the country and it must
only get better. My plan would be to look for opportunities to make the
link stronger between the direct care system and our vast purchased
care network even stronger in order to make the benefit better, more
seamless, of higher quality, and look for opportunities to make it more
affordable. One of TRICARE's strengths is that it is very inexpensive
for the beneficiary compared to other health plans. I believe we need
to look for ways to leverage the best public and private sector ideas
to make our system an example the beneficiaries and our Nations'
taxpayers can be proud of.
Question. If confirmed, how would you strengthen the partnership
between the Department and the TRICARE support contractors that is
necessary for the successful delivery of health care within the TRICARE
Program?
Answer. I will have a wholehearted commitment to TRICARE. In the
past few years, key performance measures for TRICARE have improved
dramatically--for example, claims processing and customer satisfaction.
Enrollment, especially for our retiree population has also increased. A
key feature of my commitment will be to seek further improvements in
the program, building on its many successes. There may be even more
opportunities to learn from commercial health plan experience by
building even stronger bonds with our many contract partners, to
coordinate TRICARE with other Federal health care programs, and to
belter capitalize on the unique capabilities of military medicine for
the good of the Nation and the world.
Question. Do you have any views on how health care support
contracts could be restructured to incentivize effective disease
management programs and cost-efficient delivery of health care
services?
Answer. It is a good example of how the opportunities with the
private sector can be leveraged. Future TRICARE contracts will continue
the triple option health benefits package. We will continue to use an
outcome-based approach where the government states the desired outcomes
and the bidders are to determine how to meet these outcomes using,
where possible, commercial best business practices. The timeframes for
implementation of the coniracts should assume that no significant
benefit changes will occur during the procurement cycle. While the
contracts will be designed, awarded, and administered centrally,
regional oversight of health care will be delegated to the Regional
Directors affirming the principle that health care is best administered
and monitored locally. In structuring our support to the military, we
cannot diminish the capabilities of the direct care system--and those
skills that only military medical providers can and should do.
Question. There continues to be concern expressed by TRICARE
beneficiaries about the adequacy and availability of health care
providers in some areas of the country. While health care support
contracts have access standards and timeliness requirements to ensure
beneficiaries have access to appropriate providers within a reasonable
period of time, this does not always happen. In addition, many
beneficiaries who choose the TRICARE Standard option report a lack of
availability of health care providers willing to accept new TRICARE
patients.
Answer. From all reports, the TRICARE contracts are working well
and have very robust networks. If a local problem exists, I will work
to understand what it is and take steps to ensure network adequacy is
improved.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving
the number and adequacy of providers under the TRICARE program?
Answer. I would begin by asking why some doctors are reluctant to
contract with TRICARE. As a recent TRICARE provider at the University
of Texas, I think the contracts can be simplified. I would take
aggressive steps to appeal to health systems in the States through both
our networks managers, our TRICARE regions, and through our Governors.
I would also appeal to professional associations to help educate those
provider networks on the service they could be providing for our
Nations' men and women in uniform. We may also be able to do more to
recognize and welcome new providers, such as presentations of awards by
local servicemembers. In general, the average participation rate of
providers accepting the TRICARE reimbursement rate is 96 percent. Our
managed care support contractors are aggressively recruiting additional
providers to join our networks. Where there are areas that are lacking
certain specialties, the contractor together with the TRICARE Regional
Offices initiates an action plan to address the concerns of those
providers in the locality. In addition, TMA is in the process of
implementing legislation to provide for locality-based reimbursement
rates for those Services that are lacking in certain areas. This
authority will improve health care access for all beneficiaries by
targeting providers who are currently not participating in the TRICARE
program.

COMMITMENT TO MILITARY RETIREES

Question. By law, DOD and the military departments must provide
health care through the Military Health Care System to those who have
retired from the uniformed services and their eligible family members.
What is your view of the importance of delivering health care
services to military retirees and their family members in ensuring the
overall readiness of U.S. Forces?
Answer. The commitment to delivering the highest quality care to
all of our over 9 million beneficiaries is paramount. The retired
servicemembers and their families, which is the vast majority of those
we care for, are an integral part of clinical experience base that our
providers and staff require in our Medical Treatment Facilities and in
our Graduate Medical Education programs to develop, maintain, and
advance their clinical skills.
Of course, military facility health care is a finite resource. The
entitlement to payment for civilian health care services under TRICARE,
now available to retirees over 65 as well as under 65, provides
assurance of comprehensive coverage for our retirees even when military
providers are not available.

RESOURCING MEDICAL BENEFITS

Question. Last year, DOD proposed an initiative referred to as
``Sustain the Benefit'' aimed at achieving savings in the Defense
Health Program. This proposal would have phased in significant
increases in TRICARE fees for military retirees under the age of 65 and
increased copayments for prescriptions filled in retail drug stores for
all categories of beneficiaries. A substantial portion of the projected
savings were based on the assumption that retirees would elect to use
their civilian employer's or some other health care plan in lieu of
TRICARE.
If confirmed, would you support initiatives designed to save costs
by discouraging retired military personnel from using their military
health benefit?
Answer. The increasing cost of health care for the department is of
great concern as it reduces its ability to fund other high priority
capabilities. Congress directed the Task Force on the Future of
Military Health Care which is now well into its deliberations and I
have reviewed their charter. A key area of their review is the health
care cost share structure between the beneficiaries and the government
and I will carefully review their recommendations as we develop future
initiatives along with other key stakeholders in the Department, in
Congress, and with our coalitions and associations.
Question. Do you have other ideas to achieve savings in the Defense
Health Care Program?
Answer. As I have reviewed the Military Healthcare System, there
may be continuing efforts we can take to find cost savings. I will
continue to work to improve the large TRICARE contracts to assure we
are getting best value and, I believe, as all other health care systems
have found, that we can incrementally improve our pharmacy benefits
management to assure we are providing the most effective drugs at the
best possible price. I also think that advancing the concept of
``shared services'' between the Services' medical departments and the
Health Affairs/TRICARE Management Activity, as outlined in Secretary
England's governance improvement memo makes sense. I see value in
making incremental, sensible, and reasonable steps to improve
governance, provides an excellent opportunity to reduce administrative
duplication, create more effective partnerships and services, and be
more efficient.
I strongly believe that faster and more effective implementation of
our electronic health record, Armed Forces Health Longitudinal
Technology Application, can also save time and money and improve
quality. Included in my initiatives will be to promote incentives for
prevention and disease management.
Question. Adequate financing of the Defense Health Program has long
been an issue. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2008
includes $486.3 million in efficiency savings from military hospitals.
The Surgeons General have testified that they cannot achieve savings of
this magnitude. These so-called ``efficiency wedges'' have been used
over the past 2 years by the Department in an attempt to force savings
in military hospitals.
Do you feel that these efficiency wedges remain an acceptable
financing approach?
Answer. If confirmed, I will examine the financing of the Defense
Health Program in detail to determine the best way forward and the
mechanisms we can use to assure that we adequately fund all elements of
our system. I strongly believe that efficiencies can be promoted if we
provide incentives for operating jointly, more efficiently, and with
higher quality.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to more
accurately project the cost of, and appropriately resource, both the
military hospitals and private sector care contracts within the Defense
Health Program?
Answer. If confirmed, I fully understand my responsibilities to
oversee the Defense Health Program appropriation. Since 2001, the
Military Health System has not required emergency supplemental
appropriations or reprogrammings (with exception of hurricane recovery,
global war on terror, the war on terror, and Avian Influenza)--which I
believe clearly demonstrates that we have benefited from congressional
and departmental financial support. Looking to the future, I do
understand that in the fall of 2006, the department as well as Office
of Management and Budget and external actuarial experts, did a thorough
analysis of the private sector care requirements for the Department. I
will review that effort. In addition I will continue to evaluate the
Services' financial requirements to make sure that they are provided
adequate resources to accomplish their complex and demanding missions.

CONVERSION OF MILITARY MEDICAL BILLETS TO CIVILIAN POSITIONS

Question. Conversion of certain military billets to civilian
positions has been a key objective of the Department's transformation
objectives. The committee has been concerned that in the area of
medical services, which are needed in wartime and peacetime, such
conversions could place both the quality and the effectiveness of
military health care including care of the battlefield wounded, at
risk.
What is your understanding of the extent to which civilian
substitution for military medical billets has taken place in the Army,
Navy, and Air Force?
Answer. In all efforts to become more efficient we must balance
appropriate numbers of providers and medical personnel against the
mission. We must also ensure a proper mix of specialists and military
providers and support personnel. At the same time we need to avoid
waste while maintaining depth in our forces for handling contingencies.
It is my understanding that the military-to-civilian conversion effort
was a consequence of a long and detailed examination, called
appropriately, the Medical Readiness Review of the military medical
force structure and billets. This review was done with the military
departments as well as other Office of the Secretary of Defense
activities. The analysis included an rigorous assessment of the cost of
conversions, availability of civilian replacements with proper
requisite skills and credentials, and the potential impact on the
quality of and access to healthcare. Experience has shown that the Army
successfully converted a considerable number of its military medical
billets in the 1990s and today their civilian staffing at the MTFs
often exceeds 50 percent civilians. The Navy and Air Force have done
fewer conversions in the past. Currently, the secretaries of the
military departments are certifying their fiscal year 2008 conversions
to Congress in accord with the provisions of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. If confirmed, I will oversee
this conversion process, in collaboration with the service surgeons to
assure that we do this effectively.
Question. If confirmed, will you examine the extent to which
military-to-civilian conversions played a role in the understaffing of
critical support positions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, as well
as a revaluation of conversion goals for all three Service medical
departments?
Answer. I am unaware of any shortage in critical clinical positions
but if confirmed I will work closely with the Army Surgeons General to
assure that any such issues are effectively and immediately addressed.

MILITARY HEALTH PROFESSIONAL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. DOD is facing severe shortages of military medical
professionals needed for its peacetime and wartime missions. The
Department relies on a combination of bonuses and incentives to recruit
and retain military health care professionals to provide care to
military members and their families.
What are your views on the adequacy of existing bonus and pay
incentive programs for both Active and Reserve components?
Answer. There is a delicate balance between being a steward of the
taxpayers' money, in which role we must justify every increase in
spending with proof that the increase will have a payback, versus being
a champion for the uniformed health care providers. As we analyze the
effects the Warfight war has on our professional population, we need to
be able to use effective, competitive, and fair financial tools to be
able to fill our gaps in the Active and Reserve Forces. The importance
of balancing efforts to recruit and retain the right numbers of
qualified individuals professionals to meet mission requirements is
enormous. Having less than the optimum number of uniformed health care
professionals may result in increased private sector care costs and
lower medical force morale. It is important to properly manage
recruiting, pay, and retention programs to ensure appropriate balance
for Department missions and beneficiary needs. As a provider in the
Reserve Force, I will bring a unique and current perspective to this
issue.
Question. Based on your service in the Army Reserve, do you have
any recommendations about the effectiveness of incentives for medical
personnel to join the Reserve Forces?
Answer. I am not aware of barriers to recruiting and retention,
especially in my current status. If those circumstances arise and I see
shortfalls or barriers, I will work to understand what they are and
take action to fix them.

SEAMLESS TRANSITION OF DISABLED SERVICEMEMBERS

Question. Recent hearings in both the House and Senate have
examined the challenges faced by servicemembers who are undergoing
disability evaluation and transitioning from the DOD to the Department
of Veterans' Affairs (VA) for health care services.
What are the critical elements necessary for a seamless transition
of health services from one agency's responsibility to another?
Answer. The critical elements for a seamless transition of health
services from one agency to another are: a full understanding of
medical care capabilities within both agencies by all medical providers
involved; clear communications of the transition plan between providers
in each agency and with the patient and patient's family; timely
transfer of all pertinent medical records before or at the time of
transfer of the patient; and, ongoing communication after the transfer
of the patient between the medical providers in each agency and with
the patient and patient's family.
Question. How can the transition for disabled servicemembers
between DOD and the VA be improved, especially in the area of health
care?
Answer. Improvements in the transition of health care between DOD
and VA can be achieved by early and concise communications to
servicemembers and their families about DOD and VA benefits and
programs they are entitled to based on their military status and
service. Two efforts would facilitate the early and concise
communication we desire. The first would be to establish a program that
assigns a specific DOD-VA team comprised of medical staff from both DOD
and VA to support each patient and his/her family during the transition
process. The second initiative would be to establish a single, user
friendly disability evaluation system that is evidence based, medically
endorsed, and most importantly, consistent with the civilian disability
system.
Question. Do you have any views about improvements that can be made
quickly to the Physical Disability Evaluation System, specifically the
medical evaluation board process?
Answer. DOD's Physical Disability Evaluation System is designed to
evaluate an individual's loss of capability to function once the
medical condition has reached maximum benefit from continued medical
care. The period of time necessary to make that assessment varies
widely from person to person, and is dependent on individual rates of
healing and response to restorative therapies. The medical evaluation
board process requires that maximum benefits of medical care be
completed. A change that would streamline the process would require
care providers to make an early, initial medical prediction of
capability after maximum benefits of medical care are complete, and
once the patient's medical condition is stable, then proceed with the
disability benefits determination based on that assessment. This would
require frequent re-evaluation of medical capability as the healing
process is continuing, and possible redetermination of benefits.

TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

Question. In Iraq and Afghanistan, our troops are facing the threat
of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Because of improved body armor,
troops are surviving IED blasts, but frequently suffer TBI from the
concussive effects of the blasts.
What tools are needed by medical personnel to adequately diagnose
and treat TBI on the battlefield, and do you think the Services have
the capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. Our medical personnel are doing a superb job identifying
and treating the severe TBI incidents on the battlefield. Far forward
surgical care is saving lives, and neurosurgical care is a significant
contributor. In August 2006 we started using the Military Acute
Concussion Assessment (MACE), along with a clinical practice guideline,
to help identify and document mild and moderate TBI. Educating troops
and their leadership about the importance of this evaluation as soon as
possible after even a mild injury, as well as educating medical
providers on this new tool, is our current challenge.
Question. What is your understanding of the ability of medical
personnel to diagnose and treat TBI in the continental United States
medical facilities?
Answer. One constant in medicine is ``to make a diagnosis, the
doctor must consider it.'' Our medical personnel are very aware of the
potential for TBI in our personnel, both at home and on the
battlefield. There is no easy, definitive test, (such as a blood test)
available today to quantify the nature and extent of injury associated
with TBI. However, we are extending the use of the MACE as a tool used
throughout the DOD system, and it will certainly help identify patients
who had TBI and determine if they still have symptoms. The majority of
mild TBI does not require specific treatment other than time to heal,
but we now believe we must document the incident and an assessment of
acute signs and symptoms as close to the time of injury as possible.
Treatment for persistent symptoms is available in our neurology
clinics.
Question. Should DOD have a comprehensive plan for prevention,
diagnosis, and treatment of TBI, and if confirmed, what actions would
you take to develop such a plan?
Answer. DOD is implementing a comprehensive plan to identify and
treat TBI. Use of the MACE whenever a servicemember is dazed, stunned,
or knocked out will document these events and trigger education for the
patient and medical follow-up. DOD will be asking individuals if they
experience any trauma to the head on the annual Periodic Health
Assessment. These questions will also be added to the Post Deployment
Health Assessment and the Post Deployment Health Reassessment.
Understanding what the causes of these injuries are will direct a
comprehensive preventive program.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the DOD
physical evaluation system and its ratings to fairly address the
conditions that result from TBI?
Answer. The DOD Physical Evaluation Board evaluates impaired
function and rates individuals against established criteria for
disability compensation. When that disability is severe, the system
works very well. As we shape a comprehensive DOD/VA system to assess,
diagnose, and treat mild and moderate TBI, we may need to modify the
disability evaluation system.

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

Question. Army leaders testified recently that some military
doctors are reluctant to diagnose servicemembers with PTSD because of
their concern that it could stigmatize them, resulting in possible harm
to careers.
What is your understanding of the scope of the problem of
diagnosing and treating PTSD in the Armed Forces?
Answer. The biggest problem with diagnosing and treating PTSD in
the Armed Forces is the same as that in the civilian world--having the
individuals recognize they have a problem and to then seek care. DOD is
educating its personnel about PTSD. DOD also assesses servicemember
concerns and symptoms of PTSD and related mental health issues upon
return from deployments and again 3 to 6 months later. Individuals who
identify symptoms are medically evaluated and referred for further
diagnosis and treatment if needed. PTSD and other mental health
conditions are treatable.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that
health care providers are appropriately trained and guided in
diagnosing PTSD?
Answer. DOD and the VA have developed clinical practice guidelines
for the diagnosis and treatment of PTSD. Continuing Medical Education
is a requirement for all practicing physicians and DOD has many
educational resources available to not only ensure our providers have
the expertise to diagnose PTSD, but that our servicemembers and their
families will be educated.
Question. What steps would you take, if any, to help destigmatize
PTSD and other mental health conditions?
Answer. The first step to destigmatize PTSD and other mental health
conditions is education of our military population. A major next step
would be to validate that those who seek and receive mental health care
are successful in continuing their military careers. Concerns about
loss of status with peers, leaders, and family members, and loss of
military career are the two major causes for individuals not seeking
care for PTSD and other mental health conditions.
Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made
three separate assessments over the past several years detailing the
immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S.
soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT III, found that
multiple deployers reported experiencing higher levels of acute stress,
and that overall levels of combat stressors are increasing. Some
reports allege that the DOD is deliberately underdiagnosing PTSD due to
a shortage of resources.
Answer. Acute stress and combat stress are very different
conditions from PTSD. The fact that DOD has been consistently
evaluating the mental health concerns and symptoms of its deployed
forces is important. Military departments have deployed mental health
providers in theater to provide the prevention and treatment needed for
combat stress and for mental health conditions. Resources have not
driven mental health care availability. Identifying needs for mental
health providers has driven the provision of mental health care
capabilities.
Question. Based on your experience, do you believe that PTSD is
underreportcd and underdiagnosed?
Answer. I believe PTSD is underreported by the individuals who have
it because of the stigma in our society about mental health. I also
believe that it is therefore under diagnosed because these individuals
are not seen by medical providers. However, I do believe that medical
providers are appropriately diagnosing PTSD, perhaps even over-
diagnosing PTSD, because the diagnostic criteria have not changed for
over a decade.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assess whether we currently
have the resources needed to address the mental health needs of
servicemembers during deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan and after
their return?
Answer. I would assess the adequacy of mental health resources by
reviewing the data from assessments in theater and after deployment
(post-deployment health assessment and post-deployment health
reassessment), and by reviewmg the medical care being provided in-
theater and after return home in our DOD system and the VA system.
Additionally, I would survey the servicemembers and their families for
their evaluation of the adequacy of our programs to meet their mental
health needs.
Question. Do you believe that the DOD disability ratings fairly
address the disabilities that result from PTSD?
Answer. The DOD disability rating system is designed to evaluate an
individual's functional capability. A diagnosis of PTSD requires that
the individual have some impairment, along with other symptoms. With
early diagnosis and treatment, it is believed that the impairment will
resolve, while other symptoms may persist or become intermittent.
Therefore it is difficult to definitively respond if the system
``fairly'' addresses disabilities that may no longer be present.

RESEARCH ON GULF WAR ILLNESS

Question. Both DOD and VA have conducted research on Gulf War
Illness stemming from health concerns of veterans.
What is your assessment of the evolution of research in this field
to date?
Answer. More research has been done to understand the health
concerns of veterans of the Gulf War than on any other war. The recent
Institute of Medicine review of the medical literature from this
research has stated that while there is no unique syndrome that has
been identified, the Gulf War veterans experience a wide spectrum of
symptoms at a rate nearly double that of military personnel who were on
active duty at that time but did not deploy. The medical challenge is
to better understand the causes of symptoms in our patients,
particularly for the subjective symptoms.
Question. What, in your view, are the promising areas for further
research, especially for the treatment of symptoms resulting from
neurological damage due to chemical exposures?
Answer. Medical science is developing a better understanding of
brain function and brain physiology due to better tools and better
understanding from research that has been ongoing in the fields of
mental health, traumatic brain injury and the spectrum of neurological
diseases like Alzheimer's, Parkinson's disease, amyolotrophic lateral
sclerosis, and others. Research focused on relating symptoms to
specific brain functions, insults, or neurotrarismitter changes would
have major importance, not only to Gulf War veterans, but to humanity.
Question. If confirmed, what approach would you take to assess the
core biomedical research programs of DOD to ensure that the objectives
and resourcing of such research is consistent with future potential
threats to U.S. Forces?
Answer. The core biomedical research programs in DOD are
requirements driven, and those requirements are based on military
unique issues. The governance of the biomedical research is through the
Armed Services Biomedical Research Evaluation and Management Committee
which the ASD(HA) co-chairs.

QUALITY OF DOD MEDICAL CARE

Question. Please describe your knowledge of quality improvement
programs in the civilian sector, and comment on how they would compare
to military health care quality programs.
Answer. Dr. Casscells, please comment herefrom 30 years of
experience with quality improvement processes at university, community,
and government hospitals, and health maintenance organizations, I have
seen these processes improve. They work best where there are electronic
medical records, and committed leadership that fosters a sense of
teamwork and energy, not intimidation. From my limited (2 years)
experience in Army Medicine I believe the process is taken very
seriously. From my service on GE Healthcare's Advisory Board, I am keen
to assist the Lean/Six Sigma initiative and process now underway at
DOD.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you take in the monitoring
of quality and patient safety throughout the military health care
system?
Answer. There has been an increasing awareness of the need to
improve the quality of care and patient safety in our medical
facilities across the Nation. The Institute of Medicine's reports ``To
Err is Human'' in 1999 and ``Crossing the Quality Chasm'' in 2001
sounded the alarm regarding the scope of the problem and the
opportunities for improvement. Improving Quality and Patient Safety
have been high priorities for the health systems with which I have
worked, and finding solutions to the problems we confront requires a
multifaceted, team approach: Quality care begins with well-trained and
qualified professionals who work together as a team. These
professionals must be provided appropriate ancillary support services
and facilities to create a safe ``environment of care'' focused upon
the needs of patients and their families. We must have automated
systems for documentation of care, surveillance, supply support, and to
meet the information needs of the health care team. Periodic assessment
of organizational programs and procedures by the Joint Commission and
other certifying organizations is important. Finally, senior leaders
must be committed to supporting health care quality and safety by
establishing strategic objectives and providing the resources necessary
to achieve them.
I am aware that the military health system has been engaged in
addressing quality and safety along with its civilian counterparts.
Military professionals, graduate medical education programs and
facilities also meet the same standards as those established for
civilian sector professionals and organizations. If confirmed, I can
assure you that providing high quality, safe health care for the men
and women who serve, their families and all other beneficiaries of the
Military Health System will be one of my highest priorities.

DENTAL BENEFITS

Question. The committee has increasingly heard complaints that DOD
dental benefits are less attractive than those offered by other
employers. Also, DOD beneficiaries, especially members of the Reserve
components, have shown a reluctance to use their dental benefits.
If confirmed, what action would you take to evaluate the
effectiveness of dental programs for the active duty, reservists, and
retirees and their dependents?
Answer. I would expect my staff to evaluate the benefit on an
ongoing basis, including analysis of enrollment and utilization, and
surveys of members to determine their satisfaction. I would expect to
work with Congress to make any necessary changes to the program.

ROLE OF PHYSICIANS IN INTERROGATIONS

Question. Under current DOD policies, a physician is authorized to
participate in the interrogation of a detainee with the approval of the
ASD(HA).
If confirmed, what criteria would you use for deciding to allow a
member of the medical profession to participate in interrogations?
Answer. I have not yet been briefed on this issue. In the civilian
sector, I am aware that law enforcement agencies often use medical
professionals to assist them with their investigations. Medical
professionals also assist the courts in assessing the mental health of
those accused or convicted of crimes. However, I am not familiar with
the current role of military medical professionals in interrogations.
If confirmed, I will review the use of military medical professionals
in interrogations.
Question. National and international medical organizations have
taken positions in opposition to DOD policy on this matter.
Do you think that DOD should have a different ethical standard for
its physicians than those adopted by recognized national and
international bodies?
Answer. I believe that military physicians and other medical
professionals should adhere to the same high level of ethical standards
that we expect of our physicians in civilian practice. Based upon my
experience as an Army reservist, and having observed military providers
firsthand in Iraq, I can tell you that military medical professionals
are exceptionally high in both clinical quality and ethical standards.
I am also aware that even national and international professional
bodies may disagree about what constitutes the ethical course of action
for some of the more controversial ethical issues facing healthcare
professionals, such as support for individuals at the end of life,
certain types of medical research, or involuntary treatment of the
mentally ill or others trying to harm themselves.
Question. If so, why?
Do you think that DOD's current policy needs to be re-evaluated?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review DOD's policy on use of medical
professionals in interrogations.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

FIXING THE MILITARY MEDICAL SYSTEM

1. Senator Byrd. Dr. Casscells, you are about to take charge of a
bureaucracy that many would describe as broken. Our service men and
women, now more than ever, are depending on your leadership to put the
military medical system on a new track. How do you intend to examine
the operations of the elements under your office to make changes as
appropriate?
Dr. Casscells. In the past year, the Military Health System took
several important steps in the multi-year transformation that will
prepare our military forces and our military medical forces for the
future. Our focus has been to develop greater joint capabilities and
joint operations. I am committed to achieving jointness,
interoperability, greater efficiency, improved outcomes, and world-
class education, research, and medical care.

2. Senator Byrd. Dr. Casscells, what do you see as your greatest
challenges?
Dr. Casscells. First, we must ensure that our wounded warriors
receive the care and treatment that they expect and deserve. The
Department is aggressively addressing weaknesses and looks forward to
considering recommendations of the various groups and task forces which
are reviewing the system at present. Second, the Department faces a
tremendous challenge with the growing costs and long-term
sustainability of the Military Health System. We need important changes
in our great health benefit program. TRICARE, to ensure a superior
benefit for the long-term. We need the help and support of Congress to
achieve this goal.

3. Senator Byrd. Dr. Casscells, if you encounter resistance to
making changes, are you prepared to report honestly to Congress about
the problems that you encounter?
Dr. Casscells. Yes. The Department is firmly committed to working
closely and openly with Congress in order to protect the health of our
servicemembers and to providing world-class health care to more than 9
million beneficiaries.

4. Senator Byrd. Dr. Casscells, there have been a number of efforts
by the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness to reduce the cost
of military medical functions. The Service Chiefs and the Surgeons
General have testified that the first year cuts were difficult, but
possible. They have also testified, however, that in the current and
future years, these so called ``efficiency wedges'' will affect
essential services. How are you going to deal with the pressures to
reduce spending from your boss, an economist, and the medical needs of
the individual soldiers?
Dr. Casscells. The foremost responsibility that I share within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and Service Surgeons General is to
provide quality care to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their
families. No one in the Department believes we can measure the quality
of care, or the compassion with which it is delivered by a financial
yardstick alone. The Department, working with our beneficiary support
activities and Congress, must continue to challenge itself to find
innovative and effective solutions to excel in that stewardship.

5. Senator Byrd. Dr. Casscells, the exchange of information
regarding military and veterans' medical and service records between
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) has never been particularly good. It is a continuing source of
problems for individual service men and women, and frustrating for
their families as well. How do you intend to approach this issue, and
what solutions do you propose to fix it?
Dr. Casscells. I recognize that the programs and benefits earned by
servicemembers could not be delivered without cooperation between DOD
and VA in the area of information sharing. I am also aware of the
concerns regarding the time it has taken to establish the desired level
of interoperability, and the resulting frustrations of providers,
servicemembers, and their families.
In the last several years, DOD and VA have made impressive
progress, and are leading the Nation in many ways in the sharing of
electronic health information, but there is room for improvement. I
intend to accelerate the efforts of DOD to achieve an even greater
degree of electronic health information sharing with VA.
In the short term, I will focus on our most critically injured
servicemembers by ensuring that the VA Polytrauma Centers receiving
inpatient transfers from Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the National
Naval Medical Center, and Brooke Army Medical Center also receive the
radiology images and medical records for these patients electronically.
Another immediate focus will be ensuring the data we capture
electronically in theater on injured and ill servicemembers is being
made available to the VA for patients that present to VA for care. This
will include information on inpatient and outpatient pharmacy and
allergy data, laboratory and radiology results, and encounter notes.
I will also focus on including more data in the current bi-
directional sharing of health information between DOD and VA for shared
patients. My aim is to share data at the most critical points first,
such as, the DOD medical records to the VA Polytrauma Centers, and then
to leverage these efforts, and accelerate the extent of electronic
health information sharing DOD and VA-wide.
I also intend to personally monitor, and be engaged in, to the
extent necessary, the efforts recently started to determine the right
approach for a joint inpatient electronic medical record application
for DOD and VA. Done right, this will support the needs of both
Departments and help ensure continuity of care. The timing is right for
an initiative such as this. With the full deployment of DOD's
electronic health record--Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology
Application--across the Military Health System accomplished, DOD is
poised to begin focusing on incorporating documentation of inpatient
care into AHLTA. My understanding is that VA needs to modernize the
inpatient portion of their electronic health record. I will ensure we
do not lose this opportunity to continue building on our significant
achievements in sharing electronic health information across department
lines in support of the men and women who serve and have served this
country.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor

AID ORGANIZATIONS

6. Senator Pryor. Dr. Casscells, as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs, you will be working closely with
organizations dedicated to our wounded soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines. What is your understanding of organizations like the Army
Emergency Relief and Air Force Aid Society, and what roles do you see
them playing with Veterans Affairs issues?
Dr. Casscells. The Army Emergency Relief and the Air Force Aid
Society are two incredibly beneficial organizations. Both are privately
funded, non-profit organizations that exist to help with the emergency
financial needs, such as food and rent, of their respective Service
active-duty personnel, retirees, and family members. Because of the
legal ramifications, I do not see a direct link with them in the
Department's interface with the VA. However, in the course of advising
personnel on making a transition to veteran status, the existence of
such organizations would certainly be present in the discussion,
especially in dealing with short-term financial issues.
______

[The nomination reference of S. Ward Casscells, M.D.,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 26, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
S. Ward Casscells of Texas, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense,
vice William Winkenwerder, Jr., resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of S. Ward Casscells, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of S. Ward Casscells, M.D.

Samuel Ward Casscells III, was born March 18, 1952, in Wilmington,
DE. He received the B.S. in biology cum laude from Yale in 1974, and
the M.D. magna cum laude from Harvard Medical School in 1979, winning
the Reznick Prize for his research with Nobel Laureate Bernard Lown,
M.D.
His residency in medicine was at the Beth Israel Hospital and
Harvard Community Health Plan, and his cardiology fellowship at
Massachusetts General Hospital, with a Kaiser Fellowship in clinical
epidemiology at the Harvard School of Public Health.
From 1985 to 1991, Dr. Casscells served in the Cardiology Branch at
the National Institutes of Health, followed by a sabbatical year at
Scripps Institutes of Medicine and Science in La Jolla, CA, working
under Nobel Laureate Roger Guillemin, M.D., Ph.D.
Dr. Casscells joined the University of Texas at Houston in 1992.
From 1994 to 2000 he served as the Levy Professor and Chief of
Cardiology at UT-Houston Medical School and Hermann (now Memorial
Hermann) Hospital and Associate Director for Cardiology Research at the
Texas Heart Institute/St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital. Dr. Casscells
established the President Bush Center for Cardiovascular Health in
1997. In November 2000 he was awarded the John Edward Tyson
Distinguished Professorship of Medicine. In 2001 the university added
the titles of Professor of Public Health and Vice-President for
Biotechnology. In 2004 the Texas Heart Institute named him Director of
Clinical Research.
Dr. Casscells is primarily involved in patient care, teaching and
research on vulnerable atherosclerotic plaque (detection and prevention
of heart attack and stroke) with James T. Willerson, M.D. He was the
first to identify influenza as a cause of heart attacks. In addition,
he is known for his work in growth factors, web-based health education,
disaster medicine, and the costs, ethics, and policy implications of
new technologies.
Dr. Casscells serves on the editorial boards of The American
Journal of Cardiology, The Texas Heart Institute Journal, Health
Leader, and The Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine. He formerly
served on the board of The Journal of Vascular Medicine and Biology,
and from 1993-2004 was Associate Editor of Circulation.
He was a co-founder of Selective Genetics, Inc., and Volcano
Corporation, and currently serves on the board of Volcano, and
SpectraCell, Inc. He served on the board of Lifeline Systems, Inc.,
until its acquisition by Philips in 2006. He serves on advisory boards
for GE Healthcare, Pepsi, GlaxoSmithKline, RediClinics, and Roche.
His current nonprofit activities include board service at
BioHouston, the Yes Preparatory School, and the Prostate Cancer
Foundation.
In 2004, Dr. Casscells established the Alliance for NanoHealth with
Rice University, UT MD Anderson Cancer Center, Baylor College of
Medicine, Texas A&M, and the University of Houston. He is also a
director of the UTHSC-M.D. Anderson-G.E. Center for Advanced Biomedical
Imaging.
Dr. Casscells has served since 1992 on the Board of Directors or
Advisory Board of the American Heart Association's Houston affiliate.
He was President of the Houston Cardiology Society from 1995 to 1996.
Dr. Casscells has also served on the boards of the Society of Vascular
Medicine, the Association of Professors of Cardiology, and the
University of Houston Law School's Institute of Health Law and Policy,
and the International Center for Medical Technology. Since 1996 Dr.
Casscells has been listed in Who's Who in Medicine, in Science and
Engineering, . . . in Education, . . . in America, . . . in the world.
In 1997, Dr. Casscells was elected to the Association of University
Cardiologists, and in 2000 to the American Clinical and Climatological
Association. In January 2001, Dr. Casscells was appointed to President
Bush's Health Care Advisory Committee. In 2001, he received the first
CIMIT award from Harvard Medical School, Massachusetts General Hospital
and MIT. In 2002, he was named a Hero of the Flood by the Memorial
Hermann Hospital. In 2004, he received the American Telemedicine
Association's General Maxwell Thurman Award.
The founding chairman of Defense of Houston, which won the 2002
Best Practice Award from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Dr. Casscells also leads the U.S. Army's T5 program (Texas
Training and Technology against Trauma and Terrorism). He and his team
have assisted in many major disasters from the Oklahoma City bombing
and Tokyo sarin gas attack to Hurricane Katrina. In January 2005, he
organized a tsunami relief effort and conducted a technology needs
assessment in Phuket. Dr. Casscells has served on numerous local,
State, and national commissions on biosecurity. In 2004, he established
the UT-Zogby poll on health issues. He was the medical honoree of the
2005 American Heart Association's Heart Ball in Houston.
A colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve, Dr. Casscells was mobilized in
2005 and assisted in the Army's response to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, for which he was awarded the Army Achievement Medal. For guiding
the Army's avian influenza preparedness, he received the Meritorious
Service Medal. From August to December 2006, he served in Iraq as
liaison to the U.S. Ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, receiving the Iraq
Campaign Medal, Armed Forces Reserve Medal with M Device, and Joint
Service Commendation Medal.
He and his wife, Roxanne Bell Casscells, a leader in historic
preservation, have three children, and are members of Christ Church
Cathedral.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by S. Ward
Casscells, M.D., in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Samuel Ward Casscells, M.D., (Col., USAR).

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.

3. Date of nomination:
February 26, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
March 18, 1952; Wilmington, Delaware.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Roxanne Bell Casscells.

7. Names and ages of children:
Sam, 04/18/92; Henry, 03/26/96; Lillian, 09/09/97.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Tower Hill School (Wilmington, DE), 9/1965-6/1970.
Yale College (New Haven, CT), 9/1970-5/1974, B.S., cum laude.
Harvard Medical School (Boston, MA), 7/74-05/79, M.D., magna cum
laude.
Beth Israel Hospital (Boston, MA), 7/79-5/83, residency in Internal
Medicine (Primary Care Track) and board certification.
Massachusetts General Hospital (Boston, MA), 7/82 to 06/85,
Cardiology Fellowship and Board Certification.
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (National Institutes of
Health, Bethesda, MD), 6/85-6/91, Senior Staff Fellow, Chief of
Clinical Service, then Senior Investigator.
Whittier Institute (Scripps Institutes of Medicine and Biology, La
Jolla, CA), 6/91-6/92, Molecular biology fellowship.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, 6431 Fannin,
Houston, TX, 1992-current.
Chief of Cardiology (1994-2001).
Vice President for Biotechnology (2001 to present).
John E. Tyson Distinguished Professor of Medicine (1999 to
present).
Professor of Public Health (2001-present).
Director, Clinical Research, Texas Heart Institute (2004-present).

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
1985-1992 Senior Investigator, Cardiology Branch, National Heart,
Lung, and Blood Institute
1992-1998 Training Mentor-NIH Grant ``Molecular and Cellular
Mechanisms of Heart Disease''
1993-1998 Principal Investigator-NIH Grant ``Molecular Atherectomy
Using FGF Receptors''
1994-1998 Co-Investigator, NIH Grant ``Genetically Enhanced
Cardiovascular Devices''
1997-2003 Disaster Relief and Emergency Medical Services--DOD
Grant #DAMD17-98-1-8002
1998 NIH(NHLBI)/FDA panel on Biomarkers
1997 FDA Advisory Panel on Circulatory Devices
1998-2000 Houston Task Force on Counterterrorism (appointed by
Mayor Lee Brown)
2001 Bush-Cheney Transition Health Care Advisory Committee
2001 Mayor Lee Brown's Medical Advisory Committee to the Emergency
Medical Strike Team
2004 Mayor Bill White's Homeland Security Policy Advisory Group
2005 Delegate, White House Conference on Aging
2005 Member, Congressman John Culberson's Science and Research
Advisory Committee
2005 Army mobilization for pandemic influenza readiness
2006 Army deployment to Iraq

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
American Heart Association
American College of Cardiology
City Tavern Club (Washington, DC)
Texas Heart Institute Cardiac Society
Christ Church Cathedral
Association of University Cardiologists
American Clinical and Climatological Association
Metropolitan Club (Washington, DC)
Reserve Officers Association
Association of Military Surgeons of the U.S.
Association of the United States Army
Dancers
Allegro
Coronado Club
Harvard Club of Houston
Yale Club of Houston
Aesculapian Club (Harvard Medical School)
The American Legion
(NB: excludes sports clubs)

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
2004 Finance Committee, Rep. John Culberson Campaign
2004 Mayor Bill White's Homeland Security Policy Advisory Group
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bell, R. Christopher............................ 2002 $1,000
2004 500
Bentsen, Kenneth Jr............................. 2002 3,000
Bonilla, Henry.................................. 2003 1,250
2006 500
Brady, Kevin.................................... 2004 1,000
Bush-Cheney 04.................................. 2004 1,000
Primary Inc.....................................
Bush-Cheney 04 Compliance Comm.................. 2004 1,000
Bush, George W (Bush for President)............. 2000 1,000
Cornyn, John.................................... 2002 750
2004 500
Culberson, John................................. 2006 1,000
DeLay, Tom...................................... 2002 1,000
2003 1,500
2004 1,000
2005 500
2006 1,500
Gohmert, Louis.................................. 2004 250
Hutchison, Kay Bailey........................... 2003 250
2004 1,000
2006 3,100
KPAC............................................ 2002 1.000
Neugebauer, Randy............................... 2004 250
National Republican Congressional............... 2003 500
New Texas Fund.................................. 2002 250
Sanford, Mark................................... 2004 250
Sessions, Pete.................................. 2004 250
Team Texas Committee............................ 2004 1,500
Wohlgemuth, Arlene.............................. 2004 250
McCain, John.................................... 2007 2,100
------------------------------------------------------------------------

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
1978 Class Day Speaker, Harvard Medical School
1979 Leon Reznick Prize for Research, Harvard Medical School
1984-1985 Chairman, Committee on Scientific Affairs, Massachusetts
Medical Society
1988 NHLBI Surgery Branch Teaching Award
1991 AHA Nation's Capital Affiliate Heartthrob Award
1995-1996 American Heart Association Central Research Review
Committee
1996-1999 Who's Who in America, Who's Who in the World, Who's Who
in Medicine and Science, Who's Who in Education
1996-2001 Theodore and Maureen O'Driscoll Levy Professor of
Medicine
1996-2000 Dean's Excellence Award, UT Houston
1996-2000 President's Citation for Outstanding Achievements in
Clinical Service, UTHSC
1998-2003 Advisory Board, University of Houston Health Law and
Policy Institute
1998 Board of Directors, Association of Professors of Cardiology
1998 Houston Task Force on Counterterrorism
1999 American Heart Association Operation Heartbeat Committee
2001 Bush-Cheney Health Care Advisory Committee
2001 Founding Director, International Center for Medical
Technology
2001-present John Edward Tyson Distinguished Professor of Medicine
CIMIT (Harvard & MIT) Research Achievement Award
2001 Tropical Storm Allison Hero Award from Memorial Hermann
Health Care System
2001-2007 Board of CAPCure, The Prostate Cancer Advocacy Group
(Now called The ``Prostate Cancer Foundation'')
2001-2002 Mayor's Medical Advisory Committee to the Emergency
Medical Strike Team
2001 Co-Founder, Volcano Therapeutics, Inc.
2002 Member, CSIS Panel on Bioterroism
2002 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Best Practice
Award for Defense of Houston
2003 Director, Texas Training and Technology Against Trauma and
Terrorism
2004 General Maxwell Thurman Award, American Telemedicine
Association
2004 Mayor Bill White's Homeland Security Policy Group
2004-2006 Zogby International Poll on Biotechnology
2004-2005 Board of Directors: Lifeline Systems, Inc., and
Spectracell, Inc; Advisory Boards: Eli Lilly, Inc., Glaxo SmithKline,
Inc., PepsiCo, Roche Laboratories
2005-2007 Cardiology Advisory Board, GE Healthcare
2005 American Heart Association's Heart Ball--Medical Honoree
2005 Delegate to The White House Conference on Aging
2005-2007 Member, Congressman John Culberson's Science and
Research Advisory Committee
2005 Army Achievement Medal
2005 Army Meritorious Service Medal
2006 Advisory Board, RediClinics
2006 Advisory Board, YES Preparatory School in Houston
2006 Medical Journal Houston's Physician Spotlight
2006 Physician Spotlight for ``O'' Magazine ``Avian Influenza''
(February)
2006 Prostate Cancer Foundation's Honoree at Honor your Father
event with the Houston Astros, Minute Maid Park, Houston (June)
2006 Texas Medical Center's Pandemic Flu Committee
2006 The Meritorious Achievement award presented by Iraq's Surgeon
General and induction as honorary member of the Iraqi Military Medical
Regiment
2006 Joint Service Commendation medal; Iraq Campaign medal; Armed
Forces Reserve medal with M Device.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of S. Ward Casscells, M.D., was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 28, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on March 29, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to William C. Ostendorff by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DUTIES

Question. Section 3213 of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) act states that the Principal Deputy
Administrator shall be appointed ``from among persons who have
extensive background in organizational management and are well
qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and
materials disposition programs of the administration in a manner that
advances and protects the national security of the United States.''
What background and experience do you possess that you believe
qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. My background and experience are well suited for the
performance of duties as Principal Deputy Administrator. In 1975, I was
personally selected by Admiral Rickover to serve in the nuclear power
program and did so for over 20 years as a career submarine officer. I
have served on six nuclear submarines, with 16 years of sea duty, with
significant responsibilities for both the operation and maintenance of
nuclear reactors and for the operational readiness of both strategic
and tactical nuclear weapons. Having served as the engineer officer and
commanding officer of nuclear attack submarines, I have years of
experience in dealing with complex nuclear issues, a background that is
directly relevant to the technical duties of the Principal Deputy
Administrator.
In the area of organizational management, I have had two
significant leadership positions in the Navy that are relevant to the
Principal Deputy Administrator position. First, I have served as the
commanding officer of a nuclear attack submarine squadron with
responsibilities for 8 nuclear attack submarines, a floating drydock,
and a support staff encompassing over 1,200 individuals. Working with
my staff, our job was to help the individual submarine commanding
officers and their crews achieve success by providing tailored
training, mentoring, and maintenance support. Second, I served as
Director of the Division of Mathematics and Science at the United
States Naval Academy, responsible for 5 academic departments and over
160 faculty, over two-thirds of whom had Ph.D.s in mathematics or
science. Both assignments required the clear articulation of policy and
effective, routine communications on many fronts, a role I see as
integral to the Principal Deputy Administrator position.
Finally, for the past 3\1/2\ years, I have served as counsel for
the House Armed Services Committee as the staff director for the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee where I have gained a deep appreciation
for the issues facing both the NNSA and the Department of Energy (DOE),
as well as the role of congressional oversight.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs?
Answer. While I am confident that my experience has prepared me for
the duties of Principal Deputy Administrator, I recognize that if
confirmed, I will have much to learn. From day one on the job, I would
spend a significant amount of time learning about both the organization
and its people, at headquarters and at the site offices, in order to
become a better leader and manager. One concrete action that I intend
to focus on if confirmed would be to establish and sustain clear and
unambiguous communications with a number of entities: the NNSA Federal
workforce; the contractors who operate the production plants and the
national security laboratories; DOE; other Federal agencies; State and
local governments and communities, and Congress. I have spent years at
sea ``walking around'' talking to sailors in my crew--I expect to build
upon that practice if confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator.
Question. Section 3213 also states that the Principal Deputy
Administrator ``shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as
the administrator may prescribe, including the coordination of
activities among the elements of the administration.''
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect
that the Administrator of the NNSA would prescribe to you?
Answer. If confirmed, my overarching responsibility would be to
work with the Administrator to provide solid leadership and management
within NNSA. As Principal Deputy, there are a number of duties that I
anticipate the Administrator would assign to me:

Serving as the Chief Operating Officer of NNSA,
responsible for the day-to-day operations of its staff both at
headquarters and at the site offices, including leading the
Federal workforce in overseeing the administration of the
management and operating contracts for the nuclear weapons
production facilities and national security laboratories.
Serving as the first line manager for NNSA senior
managers in headquarters and the field.
Leading the Management Council (senior headquarters
and site managers) and working with the council to coordinate
activities between headquarters and site offices.
Serving as the Central Technical Authority for NNSA.
Serving as the senior NNSA liaison with the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. What is your understanding of the role that you will play
in the overall administration of the NNSA, in the event that you are
confirmed?
Answer. In the event that I am confirmed as Principal Deputy
Administrator, I would expect to run the day-to-day operations of NNSA
for the Administrator, working with the NNSA headquarters and site
office personnel to execute NNSA's mission. I see an essential aspect
of that role as working directly with NNSA's Deputy and Associate
Administrators, and with the NNSA site office managers.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Principal Deputy Administrator?
Answer. The first is the leadership challenge of ensuring that NNSA
management works together as a smooth, effective team on a daily basis
to execute NNSA's national security mission. This requires both the
clear articulation and consistent execution of the role of Federal
oversight at headquarters and in the field. I believe it essential for
senior NNSA leaders to continually invigorate the highly talented
Federal workforce with a purposeful sense of mission and esprit de
corps.
Second, the recurring safety and security incidents in the complex
are of significant concern. One significant component of this problem
is directly related to the first challenge, which is exercising the
role of Federal oversight as intended when NNSA was created. Other
factors have been noted in a number of both internal and external
reviews. The protection of special nuclear material and nuclear weapons
design information against physical and cyber security threats goes to
the core of NNSA's mission and is an ongoing challenge.
The third challenge is advancing the transformation of the NNSA
nuclear weapons complex. Complex 2030, the plan to modernize the
nuclear weapons complex infrastructure, is critical to national
security. The process is currently underway to complete a Supplemental
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for Complex 2030 in
accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The
Nuclear Weapons Council also recently announced their selection of a
design for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). RRW design
definition and cost studies will help inform the administration and
Congress as to how to proceed for the future in a manner consistent
with the RRW program objectives contained in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. I would expect to thoughtfully
evaluate the results of both the Complex 2030 NEPA process and the RRW
design definition/cost studies as NNSA moves forward with plans to
transform the complex.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I would seek to instill a sense of
enthusiasm and dedication to the NNSA mission as Principal Deputy
Administrator. NNSA, both at headquarters and at the site offices, has
a tremendously talented workforce. I see my role as working with the
NNSA leadership team to ensure that there are clear standards and
expectations for the Federal workforce in performing its oversight
function and then to get out and ``look and listen'' to see how things
are going based on both my observations and those of the Administrator.
With respect to safety and security, I have already noted the
importance of Federal oversight. I will also add that careful,
objective monitoring of the performance of the management and operating
contractors is critical to improvement in these areas. Holding
contractors accountable for adherence to standards is integral to the
responsibilities of the Principal Deputy Administrator. In the area of
protecting our nuclear weapons design and other sensitive national
security information, I would expect to carefully evaluate Federal
staffing at the site offices to ensure they have personnel with the
requisite technical and security backgrounds to perform effective
oversight of security practices. I would also anticipate reviewing NNSA
security policies to see where they may be improved.
With respect to working with NNSA leadership on advancing complex
transformation, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the PEIS and RRW
evaluations were thorough and kept on schedule. I would also work to
ensure that the processes evaluating Complex 2030 transformation
(including the associated NEPA process) and the RRW are transparent
(consistent with security requirements) and that the communications
strategy is both precise and closely coordinated with the Department of
Defense. This strategy requires ensuring that the congressional
committees are kept informed and that NNSA is responsive to questions
and concerns.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Principal Deputy Administrator?
Answer. I believe that being successful as the Principal Deputy
Administrator will require clearly communicating to the Federal
workforce what is expected of them and ensuring that they have the
right cadre of skills and appropriate resources to perform their
oversight mission. I also consider as essential the building of a work
environment where all personnel feel that they are part of a team
performing a mission vital to national security.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would immediately work to establish myself
as an effective leader within NNSA. A first step here would be to meet
with the Federal workforce, both at headquarters and in the field, to
learn more about NNSA and how it executes its mission. Another critical
management step is to foster clear and effective communications, both
within NNSA headquarters and with the field offices, to establish an
environment where all are working together as a member of an integrated
team. Reviewing the safety and security posture and associated
corrective actions underway is an urgent task and one that I would hope
to have a firm grasp of within 3 months of assuming responsibilities as
Principal Deputy Administrator.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues that must be addressed by the Principal Deputy
Administrator?
Answer. If confirmed, my broad priorities would be to focus on
ensuring that the Federal workforce is effectively performing its
oversight mission throughout the complex. Effective oversight of the
contractor is critical to ensuring that the complex is properly
executing its mission, especially in key mission areas such as physical
and cyber-security. I would anticipate reviewing how the site offices
assess contractor performance as well as how this assessment and other
contractor performance information is communicated to and evaluated by
headquarters. This review also would require a careful evaluation of
whether the resources within the Federal workforce, especially in
technical and security areas, are adequate to perform the oversight
mission. Along with the review of site office oversight, I would expect
to assess how clearly headquarters communicates its expectations on
what is expected of oversight to the site offices as well as what
headquarters can do to better mentor and support the site offices.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs with the
following officials:
The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy.
Answer. Under the NNSA act, the Secretary, acting through the
Administrator, can direct the activities of NNSA. In addition, the
Secretary sets policy for NNSA and NNSA implements it. Under the DOE
Organization Act, the authority of the Secretary may be delegated to
the Deputy Secretary of Energy. As Principal Deputy Administrator, I
expect the Administrator would rely upon me to work directly with the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary on issues in their areas of
responsibility. Although the NNSA act establishes a clear chain of
command between the Administrator and the Secretary (or Deputy
Secretary), it does not limit my ability or responsibility to
communicate, cooperate, and coordinate with the Secretary, the Deputy
Secretary, and other senior officials in DOE.
Question. The Administrator of the NNSA.
Answer. The Administrator is the direct supervisor of the Principal
Deputy. He sets priorities for the Principal Deputy and serves as the
common superior to resolve any disputes between the Principal Deputy
and the other Deputy Administrators. He is also responsible for
ensuring that NNSA achieves the missions and priorities set by the
Secretary.
Question. Other Deputies in the NNSA.
Answer. The other deputies are direct reports to the Principal
Deputy who is their first line supervisor providing coordination,
integration, and oversight of their performance.
Question. The Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
Answer. The Principal Deputy works with the Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management (EM) in ensuring that NNSA supports and
facilitates the cleanup of legacy waste and contamination at NNSA
sites. The Principal Deputy coordinates EM's work at NNSA sites with
the Assistant Secretary for EM.
Question. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.
Answer. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs also serves as the Executive
Secretariat for the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). The NNSA
representative to the NWC is the Administrator and, if confirmed, I
will, along with the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, provide
support to the Administrator in this critical role. The Assistant also
chairs the subordinate committee to the NWC known as the Standing and
Safety Committee which reviews nuclear weapons safety issues and makes
recommendations to the NWC. The NNSA Office of Defense Programs has
personnel who serve on the Standing and Safety Committee.
Question. The Chairman of the NWC.
Answer. The NWC is a joint DOD-NNSA body established to facilitate
cooperation and coordination between the two agencies in fulfilling
their dual responsibilities for nuclear weapons stockpile management.
The Administrator is NNSA's representative to the NWC, which is chaired
by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics. The Principal Deputy supports the Administrator in his role
as a member of the NWC and may act on his behalf with the Chairman of
the NWC in the Administrator's absence. As Chief Technical Authority
within NNSA, the Principal Deputy may interact with the NWC on
technical issues.
Question. The Commander of United States Strategic Command
(STRATCOM).
Answer. The Commander of STRATCOM is the central customer at the
Department of Defense for the work of NNSA. Along with the three
national security laboratory directors, he provides his judgment
annually on the certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile along
with the NWC to the Secretary of Defense. I expect the Administrator
would direct me to support routine interactions with the Commander of
STRATCOM and his staff regarding military requirements and stockpile
size and composition.
Question. The nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy.
Answer. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and
Requirements is the Air Force directorate with responsibility for
policy and strategy for Air Force nuclear weapons operations and
requirements, including arms control activities ranging from treaty
negotiation support to implementation and compliance. The current
incumbent is Lieutenant General Carrol Chandler. This office is the Air
Force lead for activities to counter the proliferation of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.
The nuclear weapons directorate of the Navy is divided into policy
and technical organizations. The policy organization is the Strategy
and Policy Branch within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Rear Admiral Philip Cullom is the current incumbent. He serves as the
principal advisor on national/naval policy matters and National
Security Council (NSC) policy issues; and to advise and implement
national policies with respect to nuclear weapons, strategic programs,
and arms control initiatives. The Navy's nuclear weapon technical
organization is Strategic Systems Programs (SSP), currently led by Rear
Admiral Stephen Johnson. The Director of SSP is responsible for all
research, development, production, logistics, and support of the Navy's
Trident Missile Weapons Systems.
I would expect to have ongoing working relationships with these
Service offices, primarily through the NWC's Standing and Safety
Committee.
Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Facilities and
Operations.
Answer. The Principal Deputy is the first line supervisor for this
Senior Executive who is responsible for the corporate management and
oversight of NNSA's facilities management policies and programs,
project management systems, and office of environmental projects and
operations. I would expect daily interaction with this Associate
Administrator to provide oversight and to resolve any issues that may
arise between headquarters and site managers, and to ensure the
vitality of the industrial and laboratory infrastructure of NNSA. The
Principal Deputy performs the annual performance appraisal of this
Senior Executive, including the establishment of the performance plans
and recommendations for compensation and awards.
Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Management and
Administration.
Answer. The Principal Deputy is the first line supervisor for this
Senior Executive who is responsible for the overall business management
aspects of the NNSA enterprise by providing for the financial,
procurement and acquisition, human resources, information technology,
and day-to-day business operations of NNSA. The information technology
function also includes certain responsibilities for cyber-security
practices within NNSA. I would expect daily interaction with this
Associate Administrator to provide oversight, address concerns, and
resolve any issues that may arise between headquarters and site
managers. I would expect to work closely with this Associate
Administrator on staffing of the NNSA headquarters and site offices
with properly qualified individuals as well as management of the Future
Leaders Program. The Principal Deputy performs the annual performance
appraisal of this Senior Executive, including the establishment of the
performance plans and recommendations for compensation and awards.
Question. The DOE Director of Health, Safety, and Security.
Answer. The Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer advises the
Deputy Secretary and Secretary on all matters related to health,
safety, and security across the DOE complex. This office is responsible
for policy development and technical assistance, safety analysis,
corporate safety and security programs, education and training, and
conducts independent oversight and investigations. With these broad
responsibilities, if confirmed, I would expect to have regular contact
with the chief of this office. For instance, this office conducts
comprehensive assessments of the security posture, both physical and
cyber-security, at individual NNSA sites. I would anticipate a very
close working relationship with the chief in order to gain an external,
professional perspective of how NNSA is doing in those areas he
oversees and equally as important, how can NNSA improve its own
internal practices in these vital areas.
Question. The Under Secretary of Energy for Science and the
Director of the Office of Science.
Answer. I believe it is important to have a proactive working
relationship with the Under Secretary of Energy for Science and the
Director of the Office of Science. The DOE Office of Science is the
single largest supporter of basic research in the physical sciences in
the United States, and manages 10 world-class laboratories. If
confirmed, I would expect to cooperate with the Under Secretary to
leverage work between the science and national security laboratories on
disciplines of common interest such as high speed computing, high
energy physics, and materials sciences. As Principal Deputy
Administrator and Chief Technical Authority, I expect the Administrator
would rely upon me to work directly with the Under Secretary of Energy
for Science on issues in his area of responsibility.
Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect that the Principal Deputy
would be the senior liaison with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Board
on all management issues with NNSA. The board serves a vital statutory
oversight function for the NNSA complex, a role that I have come to
value as a congressional staff member conducting oversight of NNSA. I
would expect to have a very close relationship with the board and to
foster a positive sense of cooperation between senior NNSA management
and the board.

MANAGEMENT OF THE NNSA

Question. What is the role of NNSA's Management Council and, if
confirmed, what would be your relationship with the council?
Answer. The NNSA Management Council provides a formal mechanism to
help NNSA top managers deal promptly with crosscutting issues and to
identify opportunities for synergy across NNSA. If confirmed as the
Principal Deputy Administrator, I would be the lead official for all
Management Council activities, and as such, would strive to ensure that
all NNSA programs and activities are carried out in the most efficient
and effective manner possible. In this capacity, I would keep the
Administrator fully informed on all council activities and make sure
that the work of the council is carried out in full consonance with his
overall management objectives and policies.

WEAPONS PROGRAMS WORK FORCE

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for
the NNSA to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise, particularly
design capabilities, in the NNSA workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, working to retain and develop critical
nuclear weapons expertise will be one of my highest priorities. The
design and most other aspects of nuclear weapons require highly
specialized skills that are not found outside the nuclear weapons
complex but must be built on a foundation of advanced education. NNSA
sites often invest years in additional training of employees. The
applied use of these unique skills has proven to be the best method for
both developing and then maintaining the skills within the workforce.
NNSA must continue to develop its future workforce through knowledge
transfer. The most efficient and reliable approach to achieve this
objective is by having new hires work side-by-side with experienced
specialists.
With respect to design capabilities, the laboratories have had
efforts in place for some years to develop newly hired physicists and
specialists in related fields into designers. For a few years, the new
hires are integrated into existing teams, staffed and led by
experienced designers. My understanding is that this approach has been
successfully employed to develop a new cadre of designers as evidenced
by the successful participation of early career designers in the RRW
designs at the laboratories.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for
the NNSA to ensure that adequate and appropriate technical skills are
maintained in NNSA?
Answer. In 2006, NNSA committed to re-establishing an interagency
effort to identify critical skills as a step towards gaining a clearer
picture of the relative supply and demand for these highly-trained
personnel. NNSA has reached out to other agencies and to the private
sector for data on these critical skills. The emphasis is on
identifying those skills that are at highest risk and which, if lost,
would have the greatest consequences for the ability of the
laboratories and plants to carry out their missions. If confirmed, I
will work within NNSA to continue and expand on this work.
Question. In your view, what are the critical skills that are
needed in the NNSA?
Answer. I understand from the NNSA that there is concern regarding
the majority of the critical skills needed to support the nuclear
weapons program. In 2004, the National Science and Technology Council
Interagency Working Group on Critical Workforce Needs, led by the NNSA,
collected data across the defense, homeland security, and intelligence
communities on hundreds of critical skills and the expected difficulty
in finding U.S. citizens with those skills over the next 5 to 10 years.
NNSA identified almost 400 critical skills across all laboratories and
plants. NNSA has continued to make progress in developing a methodology
to use in identifying those skills likely to be at risk in the future
due to shortages of appropriately educated and trained U.S. citizens.
NNSA experts in the field expressed some degree of concern
regarding about 80 percent of the skills identified by NNSA, and
significant concern regarding 50 percent of the skills identified. The
concerns arise from the anticipated retirement of critically skilled
workers, mainly scientists and engineers, over the next few years and
the declining number of American citizens seeking graduate degrees in
relevant fields. Earning a Ph.D. in these fields takes 7 to 10 years,
and laboratories and plants often invest another 2 to 3 years in on-
the-job training. These long lead times complicate the hiring of
replacements for retiring specialists.

SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Question. One of the biggest initiatives of the DOE and the NNSA
over the past several years has been to implement the various changes
to the design basis threat (DBT) standard.
If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to help ensure
the NNSA meets the new DBT in a timely fashion?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure NNSA meets its
commitment to stay on the approved schedule for DBT compliance, stay
focused on finding innovative security solutions, and continue to make
progress in meeting the complex transformation goals. Meeting the new
DBT will require proactive steps to work with the Department to
consolidate special nuclear material in a timely and responsible
manner, to complete construction projects on time and on budget, and to
fully understand the impacts of any security related funding shortfalls
at individual sites.
Question. How should the NNSA maintain an appropriate balance
between adding security personnel and investing in force multiplying
technologies and infrastructure in this area?
Answer. NNSA has maintained its security police officer staffing at
about 2,400 persons in spite of significant increases in the DBT Policy
in 2003, 2004, and 2005. This is due to the deployment of early warning
and detection systems around key facilities, the use of barriers to
delay adversaries, providing hardened structures for key materials, and
providing its protective forces with more reliable and lethal weapons
systems and improved training. I think the real key to achieving
further efficiencies in the NNSA physical security mission rests in the
ability to reduce the overly large footprint of the nuclear weapons
complex and to make strategic investments in new facilities that are
built with today's security requirements in mind. One of my primary
endeavors, if confirmed for this position, will be to help lead NNSA in
its efforts to make the Complex 2030 vision a reality.
Question. In your opinion, what are the biggest safety and security
threats to the facilities and materials in the nuclear weapons program?
Answer. At this point, I think NNSA has made reasonable progress in
developing robust physical security programs to defend against outside
attacks. Continued investment in infrastructure security upgrades and
complex transformation efforts will further enhance the physical
security posture of the complex. The ``insider threat'' is one I would
want to explore more fully. I understand that the Department will focus
the 2008 DBT policy review on the insider threat and if confirmed, I
will ensure NNSA is a strong contributor to this review.
From my congressional committee oversight work, I have concluded
that there are perhaps more ``unknown threats'' in the cyber area than
in that of physical security. I am aware that NNSA is reviewing cyber
security protection requirements and using a risk-based approach to
determine what is the necessary amount of funding for cyber protection.
If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the NNSA Chief Information
Officer and the Department to evaluate the NNSA readiness and required
funding to counter current and future cyber security threats.

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

Question. What is your view of the Stockpile Stewardship Program's
progress towards its goal of being able to continuously certify the
U.S. enduring nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable,
without the need for underground nuclear testing?
Answer. The fact that there has not been a technical need to
recommend a nuclear test since 1992 is a testament to the success of
the Stockpile Stewardship Program to date. However, one cannot
overstate the importance of ensuring that the annual process to certify
the nuclear weapons stockpile is based on a solid scientific foundation
involving robust peer review and uncompromising integrity. If confirmed
as Principal Deputy Administrator, I would work hard to ensure that the
key programs supporting the Stockpile Stewardship Program receive top-
level management attention so as to stay on cost, on schedule, and meet
program requirements.
Question. In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges
confronting the Stockpile Stewardship Program?
Answer. In my opinion, the greatest challenges confronting the
Stockpile Stewardship Program all lead back to meeting commitments,
both near-term and long-term. Near-term, I see that NNSA has an
ambitious set of goals such as resuming tritium production,
accelerating warhead dismantlements, and delivering First Production
Units for the B61 and W76 Life Extension Programs. If confirmed, I will
work with the Administrator to ensure resources are balanced to keep
our commitments to the Department of Defense, Congress, and the public.
Long-term, the NNSA has a serious challenge in keeping the right set of
skilled workers at the laboratories, production sites, and in the
Federal workforce. Keeping the workforce engaged and exercised will be
essential in sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent without underground
nuclear testing.
Question. Do you fully support the goals of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program?
Answer. Yes, I fully support the goals of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program, which are: 1) to sustain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
weapons stockpile; 2) to maintain a fully capable, agile, responsive
nuclear weapons complex infrastructure; and 3) to conduct research and
development activities to ensure U.S. leadership in science and
technology. If confirmed, I look forward to playing a key role in
shaping the future of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Question. The NNSA and the Department of Defense have recently made
a decision to explore the feasibility of a new design for use as a RRW.
Do you support the idea of a RRW and in your view how would such a
program further nonproliferation goals of the United States?
Answer. Yes, I fully support the goals of the RRW program, and
believe it furthers nonproliferation objectives of the United States in
a number of ways. RRW should reduce the likelihood that the U.S. would
have to resort to nuclear testing in the future. Additionally, RRW
could allow further significant reductions in the number of total U.S.
nuclear warheads. A strong U.S. nuclear deterrent will also assure our
allies that are not nuclear weapons states that the U.S. can provide
their nuclear deterrent, obviating their need to develop and deploy
nuclear weapons.

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND THE FUTURE COMPLEX

Question. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released in
January 2002, contained the administration's plan to reduce the number
of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700
and 2,200 by 2012. These reductions were included in the Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2003, know as the Moscow Treaty.
Will any nuclear warheads be dismantled as a result of the NPR and
the Moscow Treaty?
Answer. The Department of Defense and DOE have developed a plan
that achieves President Bush's goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2012. The President's direction
results in dramatic cuts to the stockpile that existed when he took
office, and leads to a significant increase in total weapons available
for dismantlement. While there are no provisions in the NPR or the
Treaty of Moscow mandating specific dismantlement of warheads, the NNSA
has significantly increased dismantlements.
Question. With the large number of refurbishment and other life
extension program activities planned over the next 6 years, including
the possibility of a RRW, is there enough facility capacity and are
there sufficiently qualified personnel in the NNSA workforce to also
take on a large increase in dismantlement during the same time period?
Answer. Last year, the NNSA provided a dismantlement plan to
Congress that identified for dismantlement warheads that were in excess
of stockpile requirements. Through efforts such as the Pantex
Throughput Improvement Plan, the NNSA has significantly increased
weapon activities using available capacity. This has ensured the
critical enduring stockpile work for life extensions and surveillance
can be completed while significantly accelerating dismantlements. The
NNSA has determined that it can successfully achieve this goal. If
confirmed, I will evaluate how well the complex achieves its
dismantlement objectives and work to ensure the sites are properly
resourced for this key task.
Question. In your view, would NNSA be able to manage an accelerated
implementation of the Moscow Treaty if directed to do so?
Answer. The Moscow Treaty does not specifically identify a required
dismantlement rate; it only addresses limits on the number of
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The NNSA has already
significantly accelerated dismantlements. However, there are
limitations on how many operations can be done at Pantex. The current
workload plan that factors in surveillance, life extension programs,
dismantlements, pit packaging, and other required operations at Pantex
maximizes available throughput during the next several decades.
Significantly increasing the dismantlement rates at Pantex would impact
accomplishment of the critical work that supports the safety, security,
and reliability of the enduring stockpile. Additionally, there are
capacity limits across the complex on shipping, storage, component
dismantlement, and material disposition that constrain total
dismantlement throughput. If confirmed, I would work with Defense
Programs to optimize the workload across the nuclear weapons complex,
to include evaluating possible further acceleration of dismantlements.
Question. The NPR stated as one of its priority goals achievement
of a reinvigorated infrastructure across the nuclear weapons complex.
With competing budget priorities for the Stockpile Stewardship
Program, such as directed stockpile work, safety and security, and
maintenance and recapitalization, what steps would you take, if
confirmed, to ensure the infrastructure continues to be consolidated,
revitalized, and well-maintained?
Answer. I support the NNSA's ``Complex 2030'' transformation goals.
If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Administrator, I would work with
the Administrator in optimizing the NNSA budget to achieve complex
modernization and consolidation. If confirmed, I will demand
accountability of NNSA personnel, both contractor and Federal, as we
meet near-term commitments and I would work with Congress to ensure
appropriate funding for nuclear weapons complex and stockpile
transformation. As Counsel to the House Armed Services Committee, I am
well aware of the limited resources available and the need to make
tough decisions on competing priorities.
Question. What recommendations, if any, would you make to improve
management of the facilities in the nuclear weapons complex?
Answer. I am aware generally of NNSA's initiatives to improve
management of the nuclear weapons complex primarily through
transforming the contract relationship with its management and
operating contractors. If confirmed, and after conducting my own review
of these initiatives, I would expect to continue efforts to include
greater uniformity and accountability in contracts, include multi-site
incentives in contracts that enhance total enterprise objectives, and
provide for more effective integration across the nuclear weapons
complex. As the complex is transformed to be smaller, more efficient,
and more affordable, accurate, and timely communication of
expectations, progress, and issues is essential. I see one of the key
roles of the Principal Deputy Administrator is to ensure that the NNSA
contracts with the sites throughout the complex are well-managed and
professionally executed.
Question. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board recommended
several options to consolidate the weapons complex of the future.
If confirmed, would you commit to reviewing the consolidation
options being evaluated by NNSA, to ensure that modernization of
facilities is being complemented by consolidation of materials and
facilities as appropriate?
Answer. I am familiar with the nuclear weapons complex
transformation options and material consolidation initiatives being
considered by both the NNSA and the Department. If confirmed, I commit
to continue to review these options as part of NNSA management;
successful complex transformation and consolidation of both materials
and facilities are fundamental to the success of the nuclear weapons
program, and I would make them among my highest priorities as Principal
Deputy Administrator.
Question. Do you have any views on additional options that the NNSA
could or should consider or evaluate that would ensure the most
efficient complex of the future?
Answer. Many decisions on complex transformation must await
completion of the NEPA process and the formulation of detailed cost
studies for various transformation alternatives. I understand that
during the recently completed scoping process, NNSA received nearly
33,000 comments on its environmental impact statement (EIS) for complex
transformation and is considering those comments in preparing the draft
EIS, which, when issued, will provide another opportunity for public
review and comment. If confirmed, I would commit to conducting a
thorough review of the EIS process and outcomes to ensure that
decisionmaking going forward is well-informed and transparent. I would
anticipate working closely with the NNSA staff to carefully review the
cost studies and the underlying assumptions associated with the various
transformation options.
Question. There has been some criticism that the options being
considered by the NNSA, as part of the Complex 2030 EIS, will result in
modernization in place and no facilities consolidation.
If confirmed, and after you have a chance to review the options in
the EIS, if you believe that there are additional options that should
be included in the EIS, would you inform the committee?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, and if I believe there are additional
options for Complex 2030 that should be included in the NEPA process, I
will inform the committee. My understanding is that, based on comments
it received, NNSA is expanding the range of transformation alternatives
it will analyze in the EIS.

FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. Upon its creation, NNSA inherited an infrastructure in
need of significant repair and modernization, particularly at the
nuclear weapons plants. At the request of the DOE, Congress, in section
3133 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2002, established
the Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP).
Although FIRP appears to be making good progress in revitalizing
the nuclear weapons complex infrastructure through elimination of
maintenance backlogs, what recommendations would you make to ensure
that current and future maintenance activities, under the Readiness in
the Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) program, are in line with
industry benchmarks when FIRP is terminated, so that no additional
extensions of FIRP are required?
Answer. I understand that the NNSA is committed to maintaining its
facilities and infrastructure consistent with industry best practices.
The RTBF program has taken some significant steps to better align
facility operations and maintenance activities with industry practices
in preparation for the end of the FIRP. RTBF and FIRP are working on
enhancing the corporate facility condition performance measure to
formalize new sustainment strategies for both categories of facilities
which includes a national Work Breakdown Structure. One key aspect of
efficiently allocating maintenance resources is having a clear
understanding as to what happens to individual facilities as the
complex is transformed--NNSA cannot afford to refurbish outdated
buildings that may not be part of the future complex. If confirmed, I
commit to working with the various offices within NNSA to fully
integrate facility maintenance plans and priorities with transformation
plans.
Question. The DOE and the NNSA have begun to explore the
possibility of using third party or other alternate financing options
for construction projects.
If confirmed, would you commit to carefully review any NNSA
proposal to undertake construction projects with funding approaches
that deviate from the traditional line item funding approach?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that NNSA conducts a
rigorous, detailed, and formal review and analysis of any third-party
or other alternative financing proposal for construction in accordance
with the procedures established by the Deputy Secretary for such
proposals. To be approved, these proposals must demonstrate that they
represent a sound business decision and are in the best interest of the
Department and the taxpayer.
Question. In addition, would you commit to keep Congress fully
informed of any such proposals, to fully coordinate any proposal with
the Office of Management and Budget, and to ensure that any such
proposals include a business case documenting that any alternative
financing approach is in the best interest of the taxpayer?
Answer. Yes. I will keep Congress fully informed of any such
proposals and fully coordinate any proposals with the Office of
Management and Budget, in accordance with the Department's policies. I
will ensure that such proposals represent a sound business decision in
the best interests of the NNSA and show a clear financial advantage to
the taxpayer.
Question. One of the goals of the effort to modernize the nuclear
weapons complex is to reduce the number of square feet of building
space.
As the NNSA proceeds with construction projects in the future would
you commit to support the goal and work to include in the total project
cost of any new facility the disposition of any buildings or facilities
that are being replaced?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to work within NNSA to keep
Congress fully informed of plans for Decontamination and
Decommissioning (D&D) of old facilities being replaced by new
facilities, or for D&D of an equivalent amount of excess space if the
replaced facilities can be refurbished in a cost effective manner.
Reducing the footprint of the NNSA nuclear weapons complex is an
important component of the Department's preferred approach to complex
transformation known as Complex 2030. I understand that current NNSA
practices do not include disposition costs for old buildings in the
total project costs for new replacement facilities. If confirmed, I
commit to reviewing NNSA practices in this area.

ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT

Question. What responsibility do you believe the NNSA should have
for funding, managing, and disposing of its current and future
hazardous waste streams and environmental restoration?
Answer. Environmental restoration at the NNSA sites addresses
cleanup of legacy contamination and waste. This work is funded and
overseen by the Office of EM, and performed by NNSA contractors. It is
NNSA's responsibility to assure that this work is performed in a safe,
cost effective manner that meets regulatory requirements, and to ensure
that such activities are appropriately integrated with other ongoing
site mission activities.
As to future waste streams, these are the responsibility of NNSA.
NNSA is also responsible for ensuring that current operations comply
with all environmental requirements.
Question. What specific steps do you believe the NNSA should take
to negotiate programmatic responsibilities for environmental activities
between the NNSA and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for EM?
Answer. Presently, DOE's Office of EM provides funding to NNSA
sites for the EM work scope. This work includes legacy cleanup
activities and the disposition of legacy waste. EM defines the scope of
work and budget for projects at NNSA sites based on input and
recommendations from NNSA. However, NNSA maintains authority,
direction, and control as the landlord and contracting authority for EM
work conducted at NNSA sites. NNSA directs and executes the program
through its management structure and management and operating
contractors. NNSA then reports to EM on project performance against the
baseline and milestone schedules. This approach is consistent with the
NNSA act and budget direction from Congress.
I remain committed to successful execution of the EM-funded
activities at the NNSA sites and effective integration of this work
scope with our ongoing mission.
Question. If confirmed, what role do you anticipate you will play
in this process?
Answer. If I am confirmed, my role would be to ensure that NNSA and
its contractors perform EM work at our sites in an effective and
expeditious manner. It is my expectation that both my NNSA staff at
Headquarters and at the NNSA sites will be able to work within the
existing agreements and protocols to effectively execute the work.
However, in those instances where there are issues that cannot be
easily resolved, I expect to be fully engaged in resolution. To that
end, I will work both with NNSA, DOE, and State and Federal regulators
to develop appropriate solutions.

DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Question. In your view, are any policy or management improvements
needed in the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs? If so, what
improvements would you recommend?
Answer. In the policy area, I fully support NNSA's expansion of
nuclear nonproliferation program activities outside the former Soviet
Union and if confirmed, would work with the Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to advance these efforts. In the area
of program management, I am aware of concerns from NNSA related to the
challenges that arise from having to deal with two separate funding
mechanisms--one for program activity and the other for program
direction. I understand that NNSA believes the current funding
arrangement creates an impediment in terms of personnel management,
training, travel, and information technology support. If confirmed, I
would work with the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation to gain a better understanding of this management
concern and develop proposed corrective action.
Question. NNSA has significantly expanded its work in the Megaports
program in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
If confirmed, would you commit to keeping Congress fully informed
as to the success of, as well as any problems with, this cooperative
relationship?
Answer. During my time working for Congress, I have received
briefings on the Megaports program. As for the Megaports program's
cooperation with the DHS, I understand that NNSA has developed a close
working relationship with DHS and its various components, including
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO). NNSA has worked closely with CBP in coordinating the
implementation of the Megaports Initiative with their Container
Security Initiative. With DNDO, NNSA is working closely in the
development of the global nuclear detection architecture and in their
evaluation and procurement of next generation radiation detection
technologies. NNSA's success is clearly linked to that of DHS in these
important areas. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I
would work with NNSA and DHS leadership to foster a close cooperative
relationship.
If confirmed, I would commit to keeping Congress informed about the
status and health of NNSA's relationship with DHS.
Question. The NNSA has responsibility for the bulk of the Federal
Government's basic research on radiation detection technologies as well
as other nuclear technologies, such as those used in nuclear forensics.
If confirmed, would you commit to undertake a review of the
nonproliferation research and development program to ensure that it is
adequately funded and fully coordinated with the activities of other
Federal agencies?
Answer. I understand that NNSA's nonproliferation research and
development work has potential applicability to a number of Federal
agencies. Should I be confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I
commit to reviewing the NNSA funding as well as coordination with other
Federal agencies in the area of nonproliferation research and
development.

MATERIALS DISPOSITION PROGRAM

Question. The NNSA is responsible for implementing the United
States commitment to the Russian government to dispose of 34 metric
tons of weapons grade plutonium. There are many issues and challenges
facing the program including the fact that it is substantially over
budget. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
Congress directed DOE and NNSA to undertake an independent cost
estimate for the plutonium disposition program and facilities.
If confirmed, would you ensure that the congressional direction is
followed?
Answer. Yes. It is my understanding that DOE will submit its
response to this requirement in the near-term. If confirmed, I will do
my best to ensure that the NNSA complies with the congressional
direction on the plutonium disposition program in a timely fashion.

NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY

Question. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is scheduled to
achieve ignition by 2010. In order to accomplish this goal under
current funding, much of the experimental work has had to be postponed.
If confirmed, would you commit to examining any opportunities that
may exist to restore experimental work at the NIF in advance of
ignition?
Answer. Yes, I support the goal of ignition at the NIF and
appreciate the value of NIF pre-ignition experimental work to the
Stockpile Stewardship Campaign. I understand that the NNSA is working
to increase opportunities for experimental work at NIF prior to
ignition consistent with completion of NIF on its current baseline, the
ignition 2010 experimental campaign, and available budget. If
confirmed, I will examine opportunities to restore experimental work in
advance of NIF ignition.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING

Question. Do you support the current moratorium on testing?
Answer. Yes, I support the current moratorium on nuclear testing.
Supporting a vigorous Stockpile Stewardship Program and the RRW program
should reduce the likelihood in the long-term that the U.S. would have
to resort to nuclear testing in the future.
Question. Do you believe that there is a need at the present time
to resume underground nuclear weapons testing to support the current
stockpile or to support new or modified nuclear weapons?
Answer. No. I understand from the NNSA and the Department of
Defense that there are no foreseeable requirements that would lead to a
recommendation for a nuclear test for technical issues, either to
support the enduring stockpile or to support the RRW program.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Question for the record with answer supplied follows:]

Question Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

1. Senator Pryor. The National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) has said that the acquisition of nuclear weapons, weapons of
mass destruction capabilities, technologies, and expertise by rogue
states or terrorists stands as one of the most potent threats to the
United States and international security. What is your plan to address
these threats?
Mr. Ostendorff. The mission of NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation (DNN) is to detect, prevent, and reverse the
proliferation of nuclear materials, technology, and expertise. DNN's
programs are structured in support of multiple layers of defense
against nuclear proliferation and terrorism. NNSA's first line of
defense is to secure nuclear materials in place at vulnerable
materials, facilities, and sites worldwide. In this area, NNSA is
working to complete site security upgrades at Russian sites by the end
of 2008 as agreed to by the U.S. and Russia under the Bratislava
Initiative. NNSA's second line of defense is the deployment of
radiation detection monitors at border crossings and major seaports. In
this area, NNSA has equipped 88 land border crossings and 8 major
seaports with radiation detection equipment. This layered defense
strategy is bolstered by NNSA's efforts to reduce quantities of nuclear
materials, to develop cutting-edge proliferation detection
technologies, and to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.
If confirmed, I will continue and, where possible, accelerate work
in all of these areas to ensure that NNSA is doing all that it can to
prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction
capabilities, technologies, and expertise by rogue states or
terrorists. In addition to the work NNSA does, I plan to work closely
with other agencies of the U.S. Government as well as with
international partners through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism to coordinate national and international efforts to meet the
serious threat posed by nuclear proliferation and terrorism.
______

[The nomination reference of William C. Ostendorff
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 26, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
William Charles Ostendorff, of Virginia, to be Principal Deputy
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, vice Jerald S.
Paul, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of William C. Ostendorff, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Bill Ostendorff

A native of Shreveport, LA, Bill Ostendorff graduated from the
United States Naval Academy with merit in 1976 with a B.S. in Systems
Engineering. Following initial nuclear power and submarine training, he
served on six submarines, including command of U.S.S. Norfolk (SSN 714)
from 1992-1995. During this tour he conducted highly successful
classified overseas deployments to the Mediterranean and the North
Atlantic. U.S.S. Norfolk was recognized by Commander Submarine Force
Atlantic as having achieved the greatest improvement in combat
readiness among the 53 attack submarines in the Atlantic Fleet in 1993
and was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation by the Secretary of
the Navy. In 1995, he was recognized by Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet,
as a finalist for the Vice Admiral James Stockdale award for
inspirational leadership in command.
From 1996-1998, Bill was Director of the Submarine Force Atlantic
Prospective Commanding Officer School. From 1998-1999, he commanded the
1,200 men and women of Submarine Squadron Six in Norfolk, responsible
for the operations, maintenance, and training of 8 attack submarines
and a floating drydock. From 1999-2002, he served as Director of the
Division of Mathematics and Science at the United States Naval Academy.
Bill's awards include four awards of the Legion of Merit and
numerous campaign and unit awards. His education includes a JD from the
University of Texas (Order of the Coif), an LLM in International and
Comparative Law from Georgetown University Law Center (with
distinction), and graduate work in policy studies at the University of
Maryland. He is a member of the State Bar of Texas.
Upon retiring from the Navy in 2002 in the grade of Captain, Bill
joined the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, VA. In 2003,
he joined the staff of the House Armed Services Committee where he
assumed duties as staff director for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
which has oversight responsibilities for the Department of Energy's
Atomic Energy Defense Activities as well as the Department of Defense's
space, missile defense, and intelligence programs. Bill and his wife
Chris, reside in Oakton, VA, and have three children--Becky, a third
year law student at the University of Virginia; Chuck, an Army Second
Lieutenant stationed with the 2nd Calvary Regiment in Germany; and
Jeff, a second year student at the College of William and Mary.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by William C.
Ostendorff in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
William C. Ostendorff, Nickname: Bill.

2. Position to which nominated:
Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration.

3. Date of nomination:
February 26, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
October 22, 1954; Shreveport, LA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Christina Lee Miller Ostendorff.

7. Names and ages of children:
Rebecca Lee Ostendorff, 26; Second Lieutenant William Charles
Ostendorff, Jr., USA, 22; Jeffrey Thomas Ostendorff, 19.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Jesuit High School, Shreveport, LA, 1972.
United States Naval Academy, B.S. Systems Engineering, 1976.
University of Texas School of Law, J.D., 1984.
Georgetown University Law Center, LLM International Law, 1992.
University of Maryland School of Public Policy, Graduate
Certificate In Policy Analysis, 2005.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
August 2003-Present, Counsel, House Armed Services Committee.
August 2002-August 2003, Research Staff Member, Institute for
Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA.
August 1999-July 2002, Director of Division of Mathematics and
Science, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD.
April 1998-August 1999, Commander Submarine Squadron Six, Norfolk,
VA.
December 1995-March 1998, Director, Submarine Prospective
Commanding Officer School, Submarine Force Atlantic, Norfolk, VA.
November 1992-November 1995, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Norfolk,
(SSN 714) Norfolk, VA.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member State Bar of Texas (admitted 1984).
Life Member, United States Naval Academy Alumni Association.
Church of the Holy Comforter, Vienna, VA.
Grachur Club--a family summer retreat with a religious heritage on
Magothy River south of Baltimore, MD--President (started 2-year term
October 2005).

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
Republican National Committee member.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Republican National Committee contributions:
January 2007 - $30
October 2006 - $40
August 2006 - $30
January 2006 - $30
September 2005 - $25

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Military:
Legion of Merit (four awards)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Navy Commendation Medal (four awards)
Other Navy unit awards
Finalist 1995 Vice Admiral Stockdale Award for Inspirational
Leadership in Command

Law school:
Order of the Coif
Gene Woodfin Prize for Leadership
National Patent Moot Court Finalist

College:
Listed in Who's Who Among American College Students 1976.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of William C. Ostendorff was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 28, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on March 29, 2007.]

NOMINATION OF LTG DOUGLAS E. LUTE, USA, TO BE ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

----------

THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor, Webb, Warner, Inhofe,
Sessions, Dole, and Thune.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
research assistant; and William K. Sutey, professional staff
member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; and Richard
F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins and Kevin A.
Cronin.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; David E. Bonine and James Tuite,
assistants to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R.
Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey,
assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley and Terri Glaze,
assistants to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to
Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony
J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark Winter, assistant to
Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; and Stuart
C. Mallory and Jason Van Beeks, assistants to Senator Thune.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. We welcome this
morning Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, whom President Bush
has named as his choice for what the President called the
``full-time manager'' for the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Lieutenant General Lute has been serving as the
Director of Operations on the Joint Staff since September 2006.
Immediately prior to this assignment, he served for more than 2
years as the Director of Operations at the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), overseeing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
and other operations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility
(AOR).
General Lute is accompanied by his wife, Jane Holl Lute,
herself a retired Army officer, who is currently Assistant
Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations at the United
Nations; and we welcome you, Mrs. Lute.
General Lute is an accomplished senior officer with a
distinguished record and great experience in both military
tactics and national security strategy and policy. He's been
nominated for an unenviable position. He'll be responsible for
bringing coherence to an incoherent policy, a policy that is
still floundering after more than 4 years of war in Iraq.
We asked General Lute several advance policy questions
prior to the hearing, one of which was what authority he will
have to fulfill the responsibilities of the position to which
he is nominated. In his written reply he said that: ``The
position is an advisor and coordinator, without directive
authority beyond a small staff.'' He further said that the
ability to move policy forward had to do with such factors as
``presidential direction and support, acceptance by other
policy principals, broad commitment to a common cause,
cultivated interpersonal relationships, personal integrity, and
meaningful results.''
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, described as a close
personal friend of the President, almost a family member, was
either not able to get that presidential direction and support
or not able to employ it to bring coherence to the President's
policy, and one has to wonder, how does one expect that General
Lute can be more successful.
It is no secret that several retired four-star general
officers were offered the position and turned it down.
According to media reports, one reason given by one of the
generals was that the administration remains fundamentally
divided on how to carry out the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Retired Marine General Jack Sheehan, who declined
to be considered for the position, was quoted as saying, ``The
very fundamental issue is the administration doesn't know what
the hell or where the hell they're going.'' General Sheehan
reportedly expressed concern that the hawks within the
administration, including Vice President Dick Cheney, remain
more powerful than the pragmatists looking for an exit in Iraq.
That does not bode well for General Lute.
It is no secret that General Lute himself questioned the
so-called ``surge'' strategy for Iraq before its announcement
by the President last January. The results of the surge are not
very promising. Nearly 5 months after it began, the surge is
nearly complete, with the last U.S. combat brigade now being
deployed in Iraq. However, American casualties are at some of
the highest levels of the war, sectarian violence is rising
again after a short reduction, and the insurgency is as active
as ever, especially in the use of mass casualty-producing car
bombs against Iraqi civilians and the improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) against U.S. and Iraqi forces.
Iraqi units are reporting to Baghdad with an average of
only 70 percent strength and, while American soldiers have been
extended or deployed on 15-month tours with 12 or fewer months
between rotations, Iraqi soldiers are on 3-month tours to
Baghdad with no plan that we are aware of to return Iraqi units
back for another rotation once they depart. Those are the words
of Major General William Caldwell, the Multi-National Force-
Iraq spokesman, as quoted in the Washington Post.
Apparently the first Iraqi troop rotation was completed in
March, the second will be completed this month, and the third
is in preparation. Sooner or later, the Iraqis will run out of
troops for these rotations.
Just as troubling, with little continuity in Iraqi troop
presence, it'll be the Americans who will have to continue to
lead the constantly changing Iraqi forces in the Baghdad
neighborhoods. With no stable Iraqi troop presence in those
neighborhoods, there'll be little intelligence gleaned from the
Iraqi people and it will be the Americans who will be forced to
continue to take the lead in holding those neighborhoods.
In fact, media coverage of the weekly reports by American
brigade commanders indicates that only 128 of 457 neighborhoods
are under control and that insurgents have been cleared out in
those 128 and the population can be protected.
Now, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki promised that there
would be no political interference with the operation, but
there have been recent disturbing press reports of a department
of the prime minister's office, the office of commander in
chief, ``playing a major role in the arrest and removal of
senior Iraqi army and national police officers, some of whom
had apparently worked too aggressively to combat violent Shiite
militias.''
That report in the Washington Post quoted Brigadier General
Dana Petard, Commanding General of the Iraq Assistance Group,
which provides the military transition teams advising Iraqi
units, as saying: ``Their only crimes or offenses were that
they were successful,'' meaning successful against the Mahdi
Army. Then he goes on to say--and this is our general--``I'm
tired of seeing good Iraqi officers having to look over their
shoulders when they're trying to do the right thing.''
The surge is now nearly complete. The stated principal
purpose of the surge was to give space and time for the Iraqi
politicians to make progress on important political
reconciliation benchmarks, such as implementing legislation for
the equitable distribution of revenues from oil sales, de-
Baathification, and constitutional amendments that would lead
to reconciliation among the three main Iraqi groups. Progress
is not apparent in that all-important area of political
reconciliation.
I was dismayed to see a report in yesterday's Los Angeles
Times that Prime Minister Maliki's top political advisor, Sadiq
al-Rikabi, said that he doubts the prime minister will be able
to win passage of key legislation so ardently sought by U.S.
officials and quoted him as saying ``We hope to achieve some of
them, but solving the Iraqi problems and resolving the
different challenges in the next 3 months would need a
miracle.'' Those are his words.
How much more time should we give after 4 years in Iraq?
Baghdad is burning while the Iraqi politicians avoid accepting
responsibility for their country's future. I believe the only
chance to get Iraqi politicians to stand up is when they know
we are going to begin to stand down. Our soldiers risk their
lives while Iraqi politicians refuse to take the political
risks and make the necessary compromises to promote
reconciliation. We cannot continue to have the lives of
American servicemembers held hostage to Iraq political intrigue
and intransigence.
Now, I'm going to put the balance of my statement in the
record--it relates to Afghanistan--because Senator Inhofe needs
to leave immediately for another important assignment. So, with
Senator Warner's concurrence, I'm now going to call upon
Senator Inhofe for his opening remarks.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Balance of Senator Levin's Opening Statement

Another challenge of the new position for which General Lute has
been nominated will be to ensure that even as we're focused on Iraq
that we don't neglect the mission of bringing security and stability to
Afghanistan. This is a pivotal time for our efforts there. In 2006, the
security trends were in the wrong direction--attacks on coalition
forces, roadside bombs and suicide bombers were all up compared to the
year before. In response, the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) launched military operations to counter an
anticipated Taliban spring offensive. Last week, Secretary Gates during
his visit to Kabul was guardedly optimistic that coalition forces are
making progress against a Taliban resurgence. As British General David
Richards, former ISAF Commander, recently wrote, there may be a
``window of opportunity,'' thanks to ISAF and the Afghanistan security
forces, for the Afghan government and the international community to
promote governance and development for the Afghan people.
One of the main tasks of the position for which General Lute has
been nominated will be to ensure that the entire Government, both the
military and civilian components, are providing the necessary resources
to succeed in Afghanistan. Militarily, it is essential that our troop
levels, and those of our NATO allies and the Afghan security forces,
are sufficient to both clear areas of Taliban influence and then hold
those areas.
But, as General Lute states in his answers to pre-hearing advance
policy questions, ``the solution in Afghanistan will be political, not
military.'' To succeed, we, along with the international community,
must also commit the financial resources and civilian expertise to the
other components of the Afghanistan mission--improving governance and
bringing economic development through the joint military-civilian
Provincial Reconstruction Teams; fighting corruption; and countering
the scourge of the illegal drug trade. With more than 60 countries on
the ground in Afghanistan, as well as the United Nations, the European
Union and NATO, and the Afghan Government, the person coordinating this
effort will have his work cut out for him.

Senator Warner. I concur.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate
your accommodating this. We have an Environment and Public
Works Committee hearing that is very significant, as Senator
Warner knows, and I must be there.
Let me quickly say, General Lute, as we've discussed in my
office, I was one of those who didn't think this position was
necessary. However, I would say this, that if the position is
necessary and we're going to do it, you're the ideal person for
the job.
Let me just give you a different perspective from our
chairman, because I don't agree with his statement. After
having returned from my 14th trip in the AOR, not always in
Iraq but in the surrounding area, this is the first time that I
saw some results. This was just 2 weeks ago and I am really
excited about it. I think it's a combination of three things,
and what I'll ask you to do is respond to this in the record,
to find out what your feelings are about them.
One is, it appeared to me you had coinciding at the same
time the surge, the appearance of General David Petraeus, and
the concern of the Iraqis, primarily the clerics, over this
idea that we had all these cut-and-run resolutions here and
that all of a sudden they realized maybe they're going to have
to do this on their own, I think that actually provided
something very positive.
My experience there was mostly in the Anbar Province, I
remember, it was only a year ago that al Qaeda made the
announcement, this is going to be the capital of terrorism, if
you would, in Ramadi. Ramadi is now under control and the whole
Anbar Province does look very good.
In Fallujah, I've been there many times and I've watched
the progress--that's a place that we all have these visions of
this World War II type of door-to-door marine activity. It is
now virtually under the control of the Iraqi security forces,
something we did not expect could happen this soon.
I want to ask you to study this a little bit and tell me if
I'm wrong on this. We've heard a lot about Prime Minister
Maliki, Defense Minister Jassim, Dr. Rubaie, and all these
people we've met. But these are the political leaders. It
appeared to me that the progress being made is really being
made through the mosques. It's my understanding--and correct me
if I'm wrong in the record--that we've been monitoring the
messages that come from the mosques on a weekly basis. Up until
February, about 80 percent of these were anti-American
messages. They started dwindling down so that in the month of
April there was not one anti-American message coming out of the
mosques.
I've come to the conclusion the clerics, the imams, are
really the leaders and the reasons for the real progress I have
seen.
[The information referred to follows:]

It is true that there has been an overall decline in anti-American
rhetoric coming out of the mosques; despite this decline, however, the
coalition remains the overall primary target of insurgent and militia
attacks. Specifically in al Anbar, the dramatic decrease in violence
comes mainly from the actions of Sunni tribal leaders.

The second thing I'm going to ask you to respond to is on
two programs. One is what we in this country would call the
neighborhood watch program. Where somehow--and I assume it's
coming from the clerics--we're getting individuals, unarmed,
who are volunteering to go out with spray cans and spray paint
around the undetonated IEDs--cooperating just as we would in
this country on some of our anti-crime efforts.
[The information referred to follows:]

There are 9 District Councils and 88 Neighborhood Councils that
represent over 5 million citizens of Baghdad. Members of these councils
are selected from their peers, represent local citizen interests, and
provide interface with coalition forces and Iraqi security forces
(ISF). Because reconstruction and community governance are such a key
component of the Baghdad security plan, ISF, and Multi-National
Division-Baghdad are working very closely with these councils to
address neighborhood security concerns, restore essential services, and
facilitate civil-military projects designed to improve the quality of
life in each neighborhood.

The third thing I noticed, it was actually in Baghdad, was
called joint security stations, where our guys go out and
instead of coming back to the Green Zone after their missions,
they actually stay out in the neighborhoods with the Iraqi
security forces, developing very intimate relationships. To me,
this is the reason for that success and I see these successes
there.
The last thing I would ask you to talk about for the record
is, I've heard from people a lot of them don't even want this
to succeed over there--that the same model and the activity you
have in the Anbar Province is not something that would work in
the rest of Iraq. I'd like to know your feeling about that and
why these programs that I see as greatly successful would not
work in other parts of Iraq. That would be for the record, and
thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, for
allowing me to get my words in.
[The information referred to follows:]

The political progress in the past several months in al Anbar
province has dramatically improved the security situation there.
Essentially the Sunni tribes are standing up together to oppose al
Qaeda. We are beginning to see signs of similar Sunni tribal opposition
to al Qaeda in Diyala and Saladin provinces, and in some areas of
Baghdad. Some experts suggest that al Anbar is a special case because
it is so predominately Sunni and that similar tribal-based progress is
not likely in other areas that are mixed Sunni-Shia. My assessment is
that it is too early to tell whether this pattern will play out beyond
al Anbar, but it represents a potential for improving security that we
should support based on assessments of our leaders on the ground.

General Lute. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, we've changed the procedure
a little bit here to accommodate Senator Inhofe, but we don't
want to shortchange you on your opening statement, so let me
call on you.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. First, I extend a very warm welcome to you,
General and Mrs. Lute, and thank you and your family for many
years of loyal and dedicated service in the United States Army,
and most importantly to our Nation.
You are taking this position at the request of the
President of the United States. It's not one that you sought.
You are very, I think, happily and exceptionally good at
delivering the responsibility as Chief of the Staff of the
Joint Staff. As you well know, I've had the occasion on a
regular basis to come over and visit with you and other members
of the Joint Staff and observe you and the manner in which you,
with extraordinary professional capability, manage those
responsibilities on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
and the Secretary of Defense.
I commend you for all your posts, and I further reflect on
a trip that we took, again this time at the request of the
President on my behalf. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) commander at that time, General James Jones, asked you
to accompany me, and we went into Africa to examine some of the
areas that were experiencing civil strife and a turnover in
government. I saw firsthand how you handled yourself, both as a
soldier in a situation that was not entirely secure by any
measure and also with the heavy influx of diplomacy. So I have
the highest professional regard for you as a person and you
have my full support in this position.
Now, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman--and you and I have been
on this committee together many years, 29 to be exact--there
are strong divisions within the committee regarding policies as
it relates to Iraq and to a lesser extent to Afghanistan. The
chairman has expressed his. I most recently, together with a
number of other Senators, 52 to be exact, put a measure through
the Senate, which measure was eventually taken almost verbatim
and incorporated in the most recent appropriations bill, in
which in a bipartisan way we discussed the need for benchmarks,
an independent examination to be performed by a private sector
entity and a retired group of military officers as to the
professional capabilities today and projecting into the future
of the Iraqi security forces.
Of course everyone is free to discuss policy, but in my
judgment this hearing is about General Lute, his background,
his experience, his ability to fulfill this position. Now, this
position has been the subject of some characterizations by
certain retired officers who allegedly were invited to consider
it. I was somewhat struck--I have known several of those
officers very well--about their condemnation of it.
But that's not General Lute's problem. He didn't
participate in that, and I just don't think that those comments
by those officers are germane to this hearing. This hearing is
on whether or not this officer has the professional credentials
to fulfill this assignment requested by the President of the
United States, a nomination submitted to the Senate for
confirmation. I, for one, feel ever so strongly, based on
personal work with him over a period of several years, on his
extensive biographical material, this officer is more than
qualified to handle those positions.
I think one of the most important aspects of this
assignment, if not the most important in my judgment, in
addition to your credentials, is will you provide the President
your own impartial, straightforward personal advice on a range
of issues relating to these two AORs? That's it. I've come to
know you. In my dealings with you, you have always said to me,
even though perhaps knowing I didn't fully share those views,
these were your professional views, these were your
assessments.
There's been throughout the history of our country a number
of military officers who've stepped up to take on these
positions with our Presidents, remaining on active duty, but
assigned to the president. As this description of your job lays
out very clearly, you're reporting to him and reporting to him
only. For military career purposes, you do have your normal
chain of command, but that in no way is going to obstruct or
impede your ability to give the President your impartial
assessment of situations. Many of these situations we cannot
foresee on this date at this time, because this is an ever-
changing scenario, particularly in Iraq, politically,
economically, and militarily.
I was impressed. I've gone through very carefully the
responses that you've given to the questions propounded by the
committee, which we do as a matter of routine here for officers
coming forward for this type of position. But the question is
very interesting: ``What role, if any, did you play in the
development of the new Iraq strategy announced by the President
earlier this year, January 10? Press reports indicate that you
opposed the surge strategy during policy deliberations prior to
the President's decision. Is that true? If so, why? Have events
to date validated or invalidated your concerns?''
This is your reply, very straightforward I find: ``I
participated in the policy review prior to the President's
decision to adjust course in January 2007. During the review I
registered concerns''--your personal, professional concerns--
``that a military surge would likely have only temporary and
localized effects unless it were accompanied by counterpart
surges by the Iraqi Government and the other non-military
agencies of the U.S. Government. I also noted our enemies in
Iraq have in effect a vote and should be expected to take
specific steps to counter our efforts. The new policy took such
concerns into account. It's too soon to tell the outcome.''
I think that's a very straightforward answer, and that's
what I say is clear evidence of how you're going to handle this
important assignment with the President.
So I congratulate you and I think the President has chosen
well, and I'm happy to participate in this hearing this
morning.
I thank the chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Now, before we call upon you, General, pursuant to the
longstanding tradition of this committee, we ask all of our
nominees, military and civilian, to answer a series of advance
policy questions, which Senator Warner has referred to. These
questions and the nominee's responses will be made part of the
record.
There are also certain standard questions that we ask of
every nominee who appears before the committee. These are the
questions and we would appreciate your answers:
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
General Lute. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation
process?
General Lute. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
General Lute. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to Congressional requests?
General Lute. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Lute. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. Now, the next question is one which you
have answered for the record in a way which is more
complicated. I want to alert you to that and make sure we're on
the same wavelength here. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear
and testify upon request before this committee?
General Lute. Senator, I think, as I've demonstrated in the
past in my current position as the Director of Operations, I
fully respect the Senate's responsibilities for oversight, and
I have demonstrated that by quick, responsive appearances
before this committee a number of times. In this new position,
I'm advised that I may not be in such a position as I have in
the past. However, I'll do as directed by the White House.
Chairman Levin. I think we all understand the situation.
This has been a similar position that others have been in
before, and your answer will be made part of the record.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, on that, could we request
that the responses, which were somewhat more at length than
what the General just said, be placed in the record at this
point, taken out of the responses to the committee and put here
for ease of reference by those studying the record?
Chairman Levin. Yes, that's a good suggestion, and what we
will do is take that answer--we'll leave that in the questions
and answers which are already made part of the record. But in
addition, what Senator Warner is suggesting is that we will
take your answer to this particular question and, since it is
more complete than the one you just gave, understandably----
General Lute. Certainly.
Chairman Levin. We will make that part of the record at
this point.
[The information referred to follows:]
Congressional Oversight
In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if
confirmed for this position, to appear before this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress?
Response. During my service as the J-3 to Joint Chiefs of Staff, I
have always honored my obligations to this committee to offer testimony
when requested. With this new assignment, if confirmed, I am advised
that as an Assistant to the President, principles designed to ensure
that the President is provided with candid advice and to protect the
autonomy of the office would apply to me as they do to preclude the
testimonial appearances of other senior advisors to the President,
especially as they concern matters of national security. I understand
that these principles have applied to all other Active-Duty military
officers who have served as senior advisors to the President, including
those serving as National Security Advisor and Deputy National Security
Advisor, in prior administrations.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views
when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views
differ from the administration in power?
General Lute. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
General Lute. Senator, I think the answer there is very
similar to the previous one: As directed by the White House.
Chairman Levin. Well, here, though, it's a little different
question because we're asking you if you have a good faith
basis for denying the request will you give us the basis for
your denial.
General Lute. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Now, we would be delighted to hear
from you, General. Again, we thank you for your willingness to
take this position at the request of the President. We know
that you did not seek this position. You have always performed
your duties in a most professional manner. You have been
somebody who has provided great service to this Nation and we
are grateful for that, and we welcome you and we look forward
to your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF LTG DOUGLAS E. LUTE, USA, TO BE ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR FOR IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN

General Lute. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to at the outset join you in recognizing my wife
Jane, who's sitting here behind me and has been a constant
source of support for me, even while she contributes in a very
senior position at the United Nations. It's a real pleasure for
me and a great source of support that she's here today.
Senator Warner. We share those views.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much. Again, our thanks to
you, Mrs. Lute.
General Lute. It's an honor to come before you today for
this confirmation hearing. I want to express my sincere thanks
to you, Mr. Chairman, to Ranking Member Senator McCain, and to
Senator Warner for your prompt consideration of this
nomination, especially given the other pressing demands before
this committee.
Also, to the members of the committee with whom I have met
over the past several weeks, thank you for taking time to
discuss this position and my nomination.
To a person, those with whom I have spoken conveyed two
clear messages: first, a message of concern for the wellbeing
and safety of our men and women in harm's way; and second, that
we would all like to see us pursue a course of action that
makes our country safer while safeguarding our national
interests in the region. Surely we could call this the common
ground.
America is at war, and the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan represent what we in the military call the main
effort in the long war. The stakes for these two countries are
certainly high, as they are for all the countries in the
region. But the stakes for the United States are also high.
This region, where America has vital national interests, will
not succeed if Iraq and Afghanistan do not succeed. The U.S.
plays a vital role in this cause.
Where are we today? Not where any of us would like.
Especially in Iraq, progress has been too little and too slow.
No one is satisfied with the status quo, not the Iraqis, not
the key regional partners, not the U.S. Government, and not the
American people.
To change this, we are in the midst of executing a shift in
course, as announced by the President in January. Early results
are mixed. Conditions on the ground are deeply complex and
likely to continue to evolve, meaning that we'll need to
constantly adapt. Often in an environment as complex as Iraq,
measures that fix one problem in turn reveal challenges
elsewhere.
But one factor remains constant: the dedication and
sacrifice of our men and women, military and civilian, serving
in these combat zones. They're a continuing source of
inspiration to me and to my family.
The position for which I have been nominated is designed
for one fundamental purpose, to advise the President on how to
provide our troops and civilians in the field with increased,
focused, full-time, real-time support here in Washington. It
will do so in two basic ways: by executing policy decisions
comprehensively; and by developing policy adaptations to meet
changing needs on the ground.
If confirmed, I will report directly to the President. I
will brief him daily and act on his instructions in fulfilling
my duties. I will work closely with National Security Advisor
Steve Hadley to clarify priorities, establish milestones,
provide follow-through, and set the policy development agenda.
The aim is to bring additional energy, discipline, and sense of
urgency to the policy process. Our troops deserve this support.
Mr. Chairman, I'm a soldier and our country is at war. It's
my privilege to serve. This position represents a major
personal challenge and I'm humbled by the responsibility it
entails. If confirmed, I will give the President my
straightforward, candid professional advice. I ask for the
support of this committee for my nomination. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
We'll have an 8-minute round to begin.
You stated both in your answers to the questions for the
record and publicly that you were skeptical about the surge at
the time it was decided upon. You and I talked about this next
question yesterday in my office. Were the reasons for your
skepticism you believe justified by the events that have
occurred?
General Lute. Senator, I'd reply by saying I think the
bidding is still out. I expressed concerns in the policy
development phase, as you mentioned in your opening remarks,
that this not simply be a one-dimensional surge, that is a
military-only. We have taken steps on other dimensions inside
the U.S. Government and the Iraqi Government has taken some
steps to demonstrate that it understands that it must surge, if
you will, alongside of us.
I'd assess at this point that the Iraqi participation in
the surge has been uneven so far, and I think we're in the
early days and time will tell.
Chairman Levin. Do you still retain some of your skepticism
overall about the chances of the surge succeeding?
General Lute. Senator, I think as a military planner and an
operations officer, skepticism is a bit of a genetic setting.
We are constantly looking at what's happening on the ground----
Chairman Levin. I'm not sure what that means.
General Lute. What I mean by that is it comes naturally. We
are constantly looking at developments on the ground, assessing
them and asking, what if this, what if that. So I think we're
very much in that phase of this operations, where we're still
assessing.
Chairman Levin. During the last few years, General, what
other differences have you had with U.S. policy on Iraq?
General Lute. Senator, I'm trying to recall. I believe that
the policy review that we've just discussed was really the
first time I had an opportunity to participate first-hand in
the policy process.
Chairman Levin. My question's a little different, though:
What other differences have you had, not as part of the policy
process, but you personally? What other differences have you
felt?
General Lute. Senator, I believe that as I've watched this
for 3 years I've come away with three personal lessons, if you
will, that reflect my observations over those 3 years. One is
that there's no purely military solution to this fight; second,
that there's no American-only solution or purely American
solution to this fight; and then third, that we can't look at
Iraq and Afghanistan and the problems there without seeing them
through the lens of the region in which they exist. I'd suggest
that any differences or concerns I've had in the past 3 years
can be logged under those three categories.
Chairman Levin. Would you say that the way you've described
them reflects the differences that you felt during those 3
years?
General Lute. I think that's right, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, the report in the Washington Post a
few weeks ago said the following: that in an interview with
Charlie Rose of PBS in January 2006 that you said that the
military wanted ``to see a smaller, lighter, less prominent
U.S. force structure in Iraq, both to undercut the perception
of occupation and to prevent'' what you called the ``dependency
syndrome, the notion that U.S. forces will do what is necessary
and therefore local forces do not need to step up.''
Is that an accurate statement of your feelings at the time?
General Lute. It is, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Does that remain your feeling?
General Lute. It remains to the extent that those two
factors, the perception of occupation and what I called at the
time the dependency syndrome, are still factors to be taken
into account as we plot the way forward in Iraq.
Chairman Levin. Do you worry that the Iraqis might have a
dependency syndrome?
General Lute. Senator, I worry any time that we charge
young Americans to go out and work alongside an emerging
security force, like the Iraqi force, but like others we've
worked with across this region and beyond, that the sorts of
people we recruit and train into our Armed Forces are can-do,
positive, very affirmative and aggressive individuals, and it's
not always easy for them to step aside and let their hosts or
their local counterparts, step forward. So I think that's a
concern.
Chairman Levin. That's a concern that you have about our
professionalism. I'm talking about the Iraqis' dependency
syndrome. Are you worried that they might have a dependency
syndrome?
General Lute. That's a concern, Senator, and it's largely
based, as I said, on how we approach our duties alongside the
Iraqi forces.
Chairman Levin. In the last year and a half since January
2006, we have not had a smaller, lighter, less prominent U.S.
force in Iraq to undercut what you call the ``dependency
syndrome.'' Would you agree we have not carried out that goal
in the last year and a half?
General Lute. Senator, I agree that we have not. However, I
believe that statement was made in January 2006. In February
2006, of course, we saw the Golden Mosque bombing in Samarra,
which dramatically changed the conditions on the ground.
Chairman Levin. You've said, I think, that you don't
believe that there's a military solution for the violence, that
Iraqi politicians must work out reconciliation issues in order
for Iraq to have a successful outcome. Is that a fair
statement?
General Lute. It is.
Chairman Levin. What leverage does the United States have
to get the Iraqi political leaders to make the political
compromises which are necessary for a political solution? For
instance, do you think that U.S. troops' presence and the
protection that we offer to the Iraqi Government in the Green
Zone provides leverage and that therefore at least the
possibility of reducing U.S. troop presence needs to be
considered as a leverage method?
General Lute. Senator, I would look at the current state of
affairs slightly differently. I will come to the question. I
think that this isn't solely a question of leverage. I believe
that the Iraqi Government is committed to the sorts of
benchmarks that Senator Warner mentioned and that are now in
the most recent bill.
The question in my mind is not to what extent can we force
them or lever them to a particular outcome, but rather to what
degree do they actually have the capacity themselves to produce
that outcome and, if produced or if pressed too hard, will we
in turn end up with an outcome that isn't really worth the
paper it's written on? So I take that slightly from a different
perspective.
Chairman Levin. You indicate it's not solely a matter of
leverage. Is it at least partly a matter of leverage?
General Lute. I believe that we have asserted leverage to
the extent that the Iraqi Government officials clearly
understand that we're providing critical stability for them and
critical security for them, especially in the face of this 5-
brigade plus-up in Baghdad proper. We're giving them a golden
opportunity that they must seize to make progress on the
political front. I don't think there's any doubt in the mind of
any Iraqi politician that this is an opportunity they have to
seize.
Chairman Levin. Should there be consequences if they don't
seize it?
General Lute. I accept that might in some views increase
the leverage on these Iraqi officials, and it ought to be a
dimension of future policy consideration.
Chairman Levin. When you say ``in some views,'' is that
your view?
General Lute. Senator, only to the extent that, as I just
indicated, I have reservations about just how much leverage we
can apply on a system that is not very capable right now.
Chairman Levin. Is it your view that to some extent at
least that leverage may be useful?
General Lute. Senator, I agree that it ought to be
considered, that it may be useful.
Chairman Levin. My time is up. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to pick up on your last statement, which I found
to be a very profound one, and I think it's one that the
chairman and I and others agree with. Right now you said, your
words were, yes, there is a measure of leverage we have, but
your concern is about the capacity of the current elected
government to do those things that we set out in the
benchmarks. I think you said that at this time they're not
capable.
Would you like to amplify that, because that goes to the
very heart of what we're faced with in this situation in Iraq?
General Lute. Senator, what I meant by the government of
Iraq's capacity is simply that I think it's useful for all of
us to remember that this government was formed for the first
time just a year ago. They're at the 1-year mark. Further, this
is the first government of its kind, duly elected, founded on a
constitution which was endorsed by the Iraqi people, in the
history of Iraq.
So in these very early days of capacity-building inside the
Iraqi Government, I just caution that we should be aware that
this is a very immature, still emerging government.
Senator Warner. But I say to you--and you know more about
this than I do--we're paying a very heavy price to allow them
to grapple with seizing the reins of sovereignty. We're losing
brave soldiers, their lives, every week. Many more wounded
seriously for life every week. It is a balance that this
Congress, this President, and the American public must look at
each and every day. Put aside the enormity of the money.
There's nothing more precious to us than our military and their
families, and they have given a full measure.
When I listen to witnesses that say, yes, the government's
only been in business a year, yes--wake up. We're paying a
heavy price for them to establish this government.
General Lute. Senator, if I may.
Senator Warner. Yes.
General Lute. Those young men and women walking the streets
of Baghdad, Ramadi, Kirkuk, and other places today, Kabul,
Kandahar, and so forth, are foremost in my mind, and they're
absolutely behind my motivation to seek this appointment, seek
this nomination, your confirmation of this nomination, and try
to make a difference here in Washington. I share your concern
for those young men and women.
Senator Warner. I think we're progressing. Congress has now
required the President to come back up here by July 15 and give
us a current assessment, not wait until September. September
obviously is a critical period of time, but we need an interim
report. I look forward, as do other members, to receiving that
from the President. But foremost in our mind is the price that
we're paying to allow this government to constitute itself.
Now, the question is--I've looked at the history of a
number of your predecessors and they had various ranks. I
personally am not concerned that simply you're a three-star as
opposed to a four-star, yet you will be dealing with four-stars
almost on a basis of equality. But they must recognize, those
four-stars that deal with you, that you are the Assistant to
the President and in many ways speaking for him and advising
him.
Do you see any impediment by virtue of the disparity in
rank that you have with the seniors that you will be dealing
with?
General Lute. No, Senator, I don't.
Senator Warner. I'm confident that is the case.
Now, interagency. This committee has spent a good deal of
time--actually, we passed some provisions into law to enable
the various Cabinet officers, secretaries, administrators, and
the like, to induce their employees, more and more of them, to
take up responsible positions in Iraq. In our discussions that
you and I have had over the years, we recognize and are in full
agreement this cannot be resolved solely by the men and women
in uniform, together with our coalition partners. It has to be
an all-out effort across the board by our Federal Government,
and I think we have to acknowledge that has not occurred, and
even to the satisfaction of the President. In conversations
that I've had with him, and I've been in meetings where he, in
the presence of his senior Cabinet officers, has urged that
cooperation.
Now, that is part of your portfolio. Can you give us some
insight into how you intend to approach the need to get further
participation, whether it's the Department of Agriculture
trying to help restore agriculture in Iraq, whether it's trying
to restore a judicial system, or maybe not restore, create a
judicial system in Iraq? What are the criteria and how do you
intend to go about it?
General Lute. Senator, if confirmed my plan would be to
open, re-open actually because these communication channels
exist now, but re-open, based on this new position, open
communication channels with General Petraeus in Iraq and
General Daniel McNeil in Afghanistan and Ambassador William
Wood in Afghanistan and Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Iraq, and
ask them for their priorities for the sorts of interagency
support that you're suggesting here.
So rather than base it on old priorities, perhaps
priorities that linger from the past, I'd ask them for a fresh
assessment of what their priorities are and then focus like a
laser on meeting those commitments.
Senator Warner. If you see and learn from the various
Cabinet officers that there's a deficiency in the law, I would
hope that you would ask the President to promptly send to
Congress such legislative requirements as may be needed to make
certain all America is in this operation.
Now, of recent there's been a great deal of focus on the
Baker-Hamilton report. I personally have the highest regard for
those two individuals and the committee that put together that
report. I had a small hand in creating the situation which gave
rise to that report. I thought the report was very
constructive.
But in the light of the lack of progress with this surge in
the minds of many Members of Congress and the American public,
and other deficiencies that the chairman and myself pointed out
that we see as far as the execution of our policy, some members
are turning to that report--bills were filed this week in the
Senate--as a redirection of efforts.
I personally think we should certainly give the President
through July before we act on trying to put any additional
direction as to change of policy. That's my view. I'd like to
have the President's review in July. But it seems to me that
report is about 7 or 8 months old. It was written and put
together in the fall of 2006, and some of the assumptions in
that report--for example, I think they made a valid assumption
that this government, duly elected, was proceeding to become
more of a unity government, had set for itself benchmarks of
achievement of certain legislative steps that would bring about
reconciliation of the differences. That simply has not
happened. So that assumption to me, which gave rise to their
findings in that report, should go back and be reexamined
before the report is embraced.
Likewise, one of the assumptions is that the Iraqi security
forces, which have been in training now for some several years,
were gaining strength. I personally, just speaking for myself,
am not entirely satisfied with the measure of their
participation in the surge. We hear reports now that their
units are rolling over, as the chairman said, in a period of 90
days, when our troops are there for a year or more, and this is
causing friction.
Their table of organization is well below what is
constituted as needed for a viable fighting force. Today I
understand some of their units are marginally at 50 percent of
their full strength. Now, that's another assumption made by
Baker-Hamilton which I feel, no criticism to Baker-Hamilton,
but the assumption just hasn't proven out over time.
So as we go forward and await the President's assessment of
this program on July 15, I think we should forestall any
direction of Congress to try to dictate or suggest or in any
other way to the President what's to be done, until we get his
report on those issues.
I yield the floor.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Lute and Mrs. Lute, thank you very much for your
service. We welcome you here today.
I was just thinking as I've had the chance to get to know
you, General, and hearing you today that some of the most
impressive people I have met in my lifetime wear the uniform of
the U.S. military, and you're one of them. It's really quite
remarkable and we all have a lot to be grateful for. This goes
from the military police who are walking the beat in Baghdad
right to the top. I thank you very much for your service.
What I really mean to say is, I haven't met anybody in the
private sector who's any better than the best that we have to
offer, that you offer your country, and the others you serve
with in the military. I thank you for it.
I was struck--you said some very important things in your
opening statement and your answers to the questions asked by
the chairman and by Senator Warner. Just in your closing
paragraph you said quite simply: ``I am a soldier and our
country is at war. It is my privilege to serve.'' That's a real
sense of personal ethics and also national purpose, that really
continues to distinguish our military. I thank you for saying
that.
Again, I just went to Iraq last week and that's exactly--
even in the midst of dissent, even when soldiers tell you, I'm
not sure it was right for us to be here, or they wonder about
how it's going now--most of them don't, but some do--there's a
tremendous commitment to try to make it work and a pride in
being in service. It should be, and it is I believe, an
inspiration to us all.
I appreciate your opening statement because in a couple of
your paragraphs you put this in context. I think it's very
important for us to look at Iraq and Afghanistan as not
isolated. You said--I'm going to quote because these are strong
words--``America is at war and the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan represent what we in the military call our `main
effort in the long war.' '' I presume, parenthetically, we're
talking here about the war we're engaged in against the
Islamist extremist terrorists who attacked us on September 11.
Am I right about that?
General Lute. That's right, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. Then you go on to say: ``The stakes for
these two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, are high, as they
are for all the countries in the region.'' That's what I found
last week when I was there. I visited three of our best Arab
allies and Israel, and there is a profound sense of a conflict
there between the extremists and everybody else, in some sense
more directly between al Qaeda and Iran and in the rest of the
region, and that is part of what's going on in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
``But the stakes for the U.S. are also high,'' you say.
``This region, where America has vital national interests, will
not succeed''--the region won't succeed--``if Iraq and
Afghanistan do not succeed, and the U.S. plays a vital role in
this cause.''
So you have quite powerfully, directly put what's happening
in Iraq and Afghanistan in what I believe is the correct larger
context of the war against Islamist extremism and of an entire
region in which, and I quote you again, ``the U.S. has vital
national interests.'' I think it's very important as we go
forward that we understand all of that.
Let me just ask you this briefly as my time is limited. You
say the stakes for the U.S. are high in what happens in Iraq
and Afghanistan. You use the word ``succeed.'' What are the
negative consequences for the U.S. if we don't succeed in Iraq
and Afghanistan and what are the positive consequences if we
do?
General Lute. Senator, thank you for those comments. I
think the long-term, and I would even say the most vital
interest at stake in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the regions in
which these countries exist begins with defeating al Qaeda. It
is very clear that al Qaeda has made it a matter of priority to
reestablish a physical safe haven, which they lost when they
were driven from Afghanistan. They'd like to retake Afghanistan
and move back to that safe haven. But they now have declared
their main effort to be in Iraq. So first of all, we have this
interest of denying safe haven.
Senator Lieberman. Excuse me a moment. I thank you again
for that comment. So therefore I presume you would say that
anyone who says that we should pull out of Iraq so we can focus
on fighting al Qaeda has missed the point that, in fact, al
Qaeda today is our main enemy in Iraq?
General Lute. I'd argue that that's correct, yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. Please continue.
General Lute. Second of all, there are longstanding,
enduring relationships, security partnerships that we have in
the region, some of the countries that you visited. We have an
obligation to them in an effort to build longstanding stability
or enduring stability in the region.
That of course is linked as well to another interest, and
that is access to key natural resources. Then finally, I think
over the last years there's an increasingly important national
interest with regard to our future strategies toward Iran.
So at least in those four areas, I think there are things
that should draw our attention to the regional dimensions of
what's happening in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Senator Lieberman. Therefore, how important it is to do
everything we can, within reason obviously, to succeed and
avoid failure there?
General Lute. I agree, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. General, I appreciate, I know there has
been some media interest in the fact that in some sense you've
been portrayed as an opponent of the surge. But I think in your
answer to the question that you submitted to the committee you
again were right on target. ``I participated''--I quote from
you--``in the policy review prior to the President's decision
to go into the surge. I registered concerns that the military
surge would likely have only temporary and localized effect
unless it were accompanied by counterpart surges by the Iraqi
Government and by the other non-military agencies of the U.S.
Government. The new policy took such concerns into account.''
I can tell you that I certainly saw that when I went over
there last week. On one occasion I was briefed by one of our
brigade combat teams that has jurisdiction over a large area in
Baghdad, including the Haifa Street area, which was a scene of
terrible street combat and now is totally calm. I believe the
colonel in charge. He was most impressive. Colonel Roberts, I
believe, was his name. It was most interesting to me that they
made a presentation of what their goals are. They had eight
goals for the area of their responsibility. The first one was
military. The other seven were non-military. So I think the
position you argued for is being reflected on the ground, and I
believe with some success.
This gets to the point, which is the question always
raised, do we, those who support the policy, somehow think that
there's a strictly military solution to the violence in Iraq? I
can tell you I don't. I know you don't. I'll ask you, do you
agree that the President of the United States, the Commander in
Chief, doesn't think that there is a strictly military solution
to the problem in Iraq?
General Lute. Senator, I believe the President stated that
very clearly and certainly the policies that are in place right
now reflect that.
Senator Lieberman. I know that the same is true, but I'll
ask you, of General Petraeus, who's now commanding our forces
there?
General Lute. I believe that's a strongly held belief by
General Petraeus as well.
Senator Lieberman. My time is up, but I thank you for your
service. The final word I would say is this. The U.S. military
is carrying out an enormous range of responsibilities with
great effect, including mostly responsibilities that are non-
military. I saw the beginning of some of the provisional
reconstruction teams with personnel from other agencies there.
Frankly, I don't think the other agencies of the U.S.
Government are carrying a fair share of the responsibility
today in Iraq, and I hope you will do everything you can to
push them to do that. I'd say our military is in some sense
involved in the most ambitious, important effort of national
reconstruction that America has made since the Marshall Plan.
But they need some help from the non-military sections of our
Government.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General, welcome. For the record, let me say there's no one
in the uniform of the United States Army I admire more, respect
more. I've had the privilege of knowing you not only as a
professional, a colleague, but also as a friend. I have known
your wife longer and as someone who has distinguished herself
as an Army officer, and we have similar ties to West Point.
I am certainly going to support you, couldn't do otherwise.
But, to be blunt, I don't think I'm doing you a big favor.
My sense is, if you step back, your appointment represents
a devastating critique of the national security apparatus of
this White House, because all you're being asked to do was what
Stephen Hadley and Dr. Condoleezza Rice were supposed to be
doing for the last several years--identify problems, coordinate
resources, bring it to the attention of the President, and get
presidential direction. That has been abysmal.
I think also, I'm afraid that your position will be someone
who's there to take the blame, but not really have the kind of
access to the President and the resources you need to do the
job. I presume you will be reporting to Mr. Hadley?
General Lute. No, sir. I'll be reporting to the President
and coordinating with Mr. Hadley.
Senator Reed. Mr. Hadley will be reporting to the President
independently?
General Lute. On matters outside of Iraq and Afghanistan,
yes, sir.
Senator Reed. That I find interesting. Frankly,
Afghanistan, Iraq, and, related to that, Iran, are the most
critical foreign policy problems we face, and the National
Security Advisor of the United States has taken his hands off
that and given it to you? Is that your understanding?
General Lute. Sir, that's the design, yes.
Senator Reed. Well, then he should be fired, because,
frankly, if he's not capable of being the individual
responsible for those duties and they've passed it on to
someone else, then why is he there? That's my view.
In fact, I think if the President was really serious he
should replace Mr. Hadley, appoint you as a civilian, not as an
Army officer. Also, if he didn't choose to do that, replace
General Pace with you, because we do need a change in direction
and policy.
I just fear that you're going to be placed in an impossible
situation. I know why you're doing this job. It's because at
the core you're a soldier, because you understand what those
young men and women are doing out there, so you couldn't do
anything less. But I am very concerned that this is not going
to work. It is another political, public relations ploy, rather
than a significant change in strategy.
My respect for you is such that certainly I'll support you.
I wish you well, and if there's anything that you think I can
do to assist you please call upon me.
General Lute. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Let me just clarify one thing. Your answer is so critically
important here. Is there a written description of your job
which states what you have just said to Senator Reed, that you
are going to report to the President on Afghanistan and Iraq
and that Hadley does not have that any longer in his portfolio?
Is that in your written description?
General Lute. It is, sir. The best written description is
perhaps the response to the first policy question, which is an
extract of the job description itself.
Chairman Levin. But it excludes Hadley reporting.
General Lute. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. The way you described it, though----
Senator Warner. The way you described it, you indicated----
Chairman Levin.--you have that chunk of his portfolio.
General Lute. I believe that's right. It does not exclude
him from also advising, but the responsibilities for advising
for Iraq and Afghanistan, if confirmed, will be mine.
Chairman Levin. I agree with Senator Reed. I view that as
an astounding indictment and a bifurcation of the national
security job. Now there's two national security advisors to the
President, one on Iraq and Afghanistan and one on everything
else, despite all the relationship between Iraq-Afghanistan and
everything else. I think that Senator Reed has put his finger
on a very decisive point here and I find it, with him, kind of
astounding that that has been done.
That's not your doing, by the way. This is not in any sense
a criticism of you. It's quite the opposite.
I also agree with what Senator Reed said about you and why
you're doing this, because you're a patriot. It's that simple,
and we thank you for that.
Senator Bayh is next.
Senator Bayh. General, I understand you're from Michigan
City.
General Lute. I am, Senator.
Senator Bayh. Well, you come from good roots, but you've
been given a tough assignment. I share my colleagues' concern
that a good man has been put in a very difficult spot. I'm
going to be for you, just as Senator Reed said, but I do have
some questions I'd like to ask you your view.
I think it's important for the American people to get as
clear an understanding about the state of affairs in Iraq and
Afghanistan as we possibly can. I also serve on the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, so I hear from the
intelligence world, as well as the military world. I've been
struck over the years about the disparity sometime in the view
of events and the state of affairs between the two different
communities, and I'd like to ask you about that.
We had a briefing in the intelligence world on Iraq last
week and I'd like to share with you the consensus view of the
Intelligence Community and get your reaction to that. Their
overall consensus was that the trend in Iraq is negative. There
are occasional bright spots--for example, some developments in
al Anbar Province--but that those positive developments are
within the context of an overall negative trend.
Do you share that assessment?
General Lute. I think, Senator, when you consider beyond
simply the security setting, but also looking at the
opportunities presented to the Iraqi Government to make
progress on important political and economic measures along
with the intent of reconciliation, that I share that at best
the progress has been uneven.
Senator Bayh. Let me follow up on that. There may be some
convergence of opinions here. Their assessment was that the
prospect for political steps in Iraq toward meaningful
reconciliation among the different parties, that those steps
toward reconciliation, the political steps, would be marginal
at best through the end of this calendar year. We all agree
that political reconciliation is sort of the key to this
ultimately working out.
I was interested in your colloquy with Senator Warner about
your belief that they have the right intentions in terms of
embracing the benchmarks, but don't have the capacity. I would
encourage you to retain a healthy level of skepticism about
that. I mean, these folks were thinking about taking 2 months
off this summer. Now they've gone back on that, but where's the
sense of urgency? Their country's at risk of falling apart and
they just don't seem to grasp the need to move forward here in
material ways.
My question would be: Do you share the Intelligence
Community's assessment that the political steps toward
reconciliation are likely to be marginal at best through the
end of this calendar year?
General Lute. Senator, my assessment would be that they
have a very full agenda and have shown so far very little
progress.
Senator Bayh. We were also told that the state of the
insurgency, the level of violence and that sort of thing, was
in all likelihood going to be about where it is today a year
from now. Do you have an opinion about that?
General Lute. Senator, in the absence of the kind of
political and economic steps that are before the Iraqi
Government now, if they don't make progress on those sorts of
reconciliation measures, I'd share the view that we're not
likely to see much difference in the security situation.
Senator Bayh. You said our leverage was limited and that
they are sort of feeling their way along here. As Senator
Warner pointed out, I think many Americans are deeply concerned
about asking our brave soldiers, who I know you care deeply
about, to sacrifice themselves while a group of Iraqi political
leaders get their act together. I think the American people
understand the need for some degree of patience and resolve,
but where's the evidence that they're doing their part?
I would encourage you to focus on whatever leverage we
have. Some of us have concluded--I think Senator Warner,
perhaps others, will take a look at September and that
timeframe--but they're just not doing enough. Trying to build
up their confidence doesn't seem to have worked too well, and
that perhaps the opposite strategy of saying, look, you're
either going to do this or not, but you need to get on with it
here, that perhaps that sort of approach might be more
fruitful, because the other avenue just hasn't worked.
General Lute. Senator, I'd just add, if I may, that while
it's important for us to focus on the results coming out of the
government of Iraq for the good of Iraq, that whatever those
results the United States in my view retains long-term,
enduring interests in the region, which has us with a national
interest in the outcome in Iraq. So we have to balance what's
good for Iraq with what's good for the United States in the
region.
Senator Bayh. I agree with that.
General Lute. There's a careful balance here.
Senator Bayh. But we have to pursue our interests in the
most intelligent way.
With regard to your colloquy with Senator Lieberman, my
dear friend, about al Qaeda and that sort of thing, we cannot
let al Qaeda define how most intelligently to pursue our
national security interests. Which leads me to something else
that the Central Intelligence Agency's top expert on radical
Islam had to say last week. In his opinion our presence in Iraq
is creating more members of al Qaeda than we are killing in
Iraq. Do you have an opinion about that?
General Lute. Senator, again, I think we have to balance
those sorts of assessments, which I think have some
credibility, with a gross adjustment in the other direction,
which might feature leaving Iraq to al Qaeda. There has to be a
policy balance struck here between what's good for Iraq and
what's good for the region and what's ultimately good for
America.
Senator Bayh. A group of us just returned from Turkey last
week and they're very concerned about attacks emanating from
the Kurdish parts of northern Iraq. They feel that there are
some camps there occupied by radical Kurdish groups. They had
an attack in Ankara that killed several people and wounded
dozens more. About half a dozen police officers were just
killed, I think last week, in eastern Turkey.
This is a legitimate concern for them. They feel that
northern Iraq is being used as a safe haven for terror groups
to launch attacks on them. They would like our cooperation in
doing something about that. Otherwise they feel that they might
be forced to take direct action, which could be very
destabilizing in Iraq and probably not very successful in
cleaning out the camps.
Do you have any thoughts about what we can do to restrain
those radical groups?
General Lute. Senator, two thoughts on that. First, the
Kurdish situation and the potential that Kurdish terrorists in
northern Iraq may be influencing events inside Turkey
demonstrates well, I think, this notion of needing to put the
events in Iraq into a regional perspective. Usually when we
talk about regional perspective we're talking about east to
Iran or west to Syria or south to the Gulf States. I think
north to Turkey is a very important dimension of the regional
impact of Iraq.
The other thing that strikes me is, to go back to my
opening statement, this point of, in such a complex setting as
Iraq, as we make a policy adjustment to take on a new dimension
or adapt our policy towards a particular element of the
problem, we have to be careful that that's viewed in the
overall picture, because one adjustment may cause two or three
other perhaps unintended consequences. I think the situation
with the Kurds in the north is in that category.
Senator Bayh. I would encourage you to look at that,
because if the Turks for domestic political reasons feel that
they're forced to take more overt action that could have
consequences. My point simply was there are ways to deal with
the fallout in Iraq that's not going well that might in fact be
more effective than our current strategy there. This is
something that we're going to ultimately have to make a
decision about, whether the Iraqis have it within them to
reconcile in a way that this is going to work. Ultimately, if
we conclude that they don't, no matter how much we sacrifice,
no matter how long we stay, we better have a backup strategy
for dealing with the fallout of all of that as we begin to
recalibrate our presence there, because it is important to the
region, but many of us have concluded that our current way of
pursuing our interest is just not very intelligent and is in
fact harming our national security interests rather than
buttressing them.
My last question for you would be shifting gears a bit to
Afghanistan. Pakistan is going through a turbulent time here.
That tribal area along their western border has become,
unfortunately, a safe haven for al Qaeda. You said they're
searching for one in Iraq. They have one now in western
Pakistan.
President Musharraf has an election coming up, so he has to
deal with that. But look, we have a right to expect them to be
more aggressive and vigorous in dealing with those lawless
tribal areas. I'd like to ask you, what is it reasonable for us
to expect Pakistan to do to try and secure those areas, and how
do we strike a balance between the worry of destabilizing
Pakistan as they get more vigorous, or perhaps we might have to
get more vigorous for them if they just can't do it, on the one
hand, versus not doing enough or doing nothing and
destabilizing Afghanistan?
There's this tension there between destabilizing two
countries, both of which we want to try and stabilize. How do
you strike that balance? What specifically should we expect the
Pakistanis to do, because they've more or less pulled back from
those areas and that's led to an upsurge in Taliban activity?
General Lute. Senator, if confirmed, this would be very
high on my priority list, to deal with the unhelpful influences
both by way of the al Qaeda safe haven, but also I'd mention
the Taliban safe haven that exists in these border regions of
Pakistan. My sense is that Pakistan has done a lot as a key
ally in the war on terror, but I couple that view with the
impression that they have to do more.
I think there are things that we can do and that we're
beginning to undertake now by way of making their tribal-based
forces in the frontier regions more capable. I think that has
some promise, but that will be a long-term effort.
I think, more fundamentally, the key to the tribal regions
in Pakistan have to be viewed in a tribal perspective, and that
is essentially that the Pashtun people who reside there and who
are giving safe haven to al Qaeda and the Taliban don't only
reside there, and we have to look at this problem as the
Pashtun community at large, which also includes vast areas of
eastern and southern Afghanistan. So I'd look at it tribally in
a more regional take and then see what we can do in a targeted
way to improve the capacity of the Pakistani forces.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, General. I wish you well. I'm
going to vote for you. I would encourage you to have--and I'm
sure you will--a particularly realistic view of the Iraqi
political leadership, and constantly focus on what we can do to
leverage them in the right direction. Ultimately we're going to
have to conclude, are they capable of doing this? Not us, but
them, with our assistance. Can they reconcile, make the hard
political decisions, or are they just kicking the can down the
road constantly and the situation is deteriorating, and at some
point you reach the point of no return. I for one have
concluded that a greater sense of urgency is in order here on
their part or it's just not going to work.
Thank you.
General Lute. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, welcome to the process. I'd like to also give my
regards to your family. As someone who grew up in the military,
I know the sacrifices that they've had to go through to help
you reach the position that you're in.
Actually, my concerns here are twofold and they're not
related directly to your credentials or to the issues of Iraq
and Afghanistan per se. They first of all are related to how
this position was created and second to my concerns, and
they've been long-held concerns, about the possible confusion
of civil-military relations when we have active duty military
people over in political positions in an administration.
The first thing--and I hope you will help clarify this for
me--we hear that this position was created and at the same
time--I spent 5 years in the Pentagon and the way this
description is read and your description of it in your
testimony about advising the President on these matters,
helping to develop policy and these sorts of things, I don't
see how that is not redundant to what we are expecting General
Pace to do, what the Secretary of Defense ought to be doing,
what the National Security Advisor should be doing if he were
fully competent, the kind of advice that would be given from
Admiral Fallon, for whom I have a high regard.
Can you clarify for us the distinction there?
General Lute. Senator, you're right. As you list those
other principals in the policymaking team, the policy
development team--the Secretary of Defense, General Pace as the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Fallon as the combatant
commander for these two combat zones--that all of them
participate in the policy development process.
This position is slightly different in that I would advise
directly the President of the United States in both execution
matters and policy development matters on a full-time, 24-7
basis. This is a very focused, limited portfolio position,
while the Secretary of Defense, General Pace, and others who
sit at the table at the principals committee in the
policymaking table have responsibilities much broader than
that.
Senator Webb. I would submit--and this is not a knock in
any way on your credentials--but I would submit that if those
other individuals were properly doing their job, this position
wouldn't be necessary.
The second question that I have is, from the way that I
read your statement and also from past experiences with people
who are in uniform who move over into policy advisory and
policymaking positions inside an administration, that's a real
strain on the notion of civil-military relations, when you have
a uniformed military individual making political judgments and
giving political advice to a political administration.
I'm interested in hearing your thoughts about that.
General Lute. Senator, in my mind the key distinction is
advice versus decisionmaking. I'm not in the decisionmaking
chain. On the execution side, I'm not in the chain of command.
I am simply one of a number of assistants to the President, and
in this case I advise him on a relatively narrow portfolio.
Senator Webb. Wouldn't that also describe Mr. Hadley's
position? He's not a decisionmaker.
General Lute. I think it does describe Mr. Hadley's
position----
Senator Webb. But in the decisions that are developed and
in the advice that is developed there are political
considerations.
General Lute. Senator, I believe the President will turn to
me, based on my background, my experience, and my expertise,
and weigh most heavily on me or expect most heavily from me
professional, candid, military advice.
Senator Webb. Yes, but in terms of policy formulation
political considerations have to come in play.
General Lute. That's correct.
Senator Webb. There will come a time, more than likely,
history shows there will come a time when you will return to
the military, I would assume.
General Lute. Senator, we'll have to see how that goes, but
that's my intent, yes.
Senator Webb. So then you will return to the military, to
the uniformed military, as an individual who has had a policy
advisory position inside a political administration.
General Lute. If I return to the military, yes, Senator,
that'd be right. I'd return fully aware of the military chain
of command into which I'm returning.
Senator Webb. But also you would return as someone who--for
instance, similarly, when I was Assistant Secretary of Defense
I had a political position and an advisory position, but I was
a part of an administration and I was identified with that
administration. That concept with respect to civil-military
relations has concerned me for a long time. I just want to put
that on the table, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you for your testimony.
Chairman Levin. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you. Thank you for your years of service to
our country. I agree with my friend and colleague Senator Reed.
I don't know why you would put yourself in this position, but
I'm grateful that you saw that this was a way to continue your
service. I wish you well in a position that many of us believe
is an impossible one. We can only hope that perhaps you might
be listened to where others have been ignored for some years
now.
General, one of my concerns is that there is growing
pressure here in Congress, and it certainly is reflected around
the country, that at some point in the not very distant future
we will begin to withdraw our combat troops when it becomes
abundantly clear, as I believe it already is, that the Iraqis
are not yet done killing each other, they have no intention to
reach political resolution, and there is no one in the Iraqi
Government nor on the scene who appears able to emerge to try
to force those political settlements that are absolutely
essential to any kind of stability or security in Iraq.
We may, as I have said, have remaining missions that will
be concerned with al Qaeda, with the difficult position that we
find ourselves in vis-a-vis the Kurds, the Turks, and the
increasing pressure on the Kurds from the Sunnis to the south,
as well as perhaps a continuing training and logistical role if
the Iraqis get their act together, as well as protecting our
interests and attempting to figure out what to do about Iran
going forward.
I do not foresee a long-term role for our combat brigades
in the midst of this sectarian civil war. So to that end, since
we know it will be difficult, timeconsuming, and dangerous to
withdraw our troops and our equipment, I wrote to Secretary of
Defense Gates on May 23, and gave a copy of my letter to
General Pace, asking for briefings on what exactly the planning
was with respect to future, maybe even imminent, withdrawals of
U.S. forces from Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my letter to
Secretary Gates be made a part of the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Clinton. Certainly while sitting on this committee
both in public and in private encounters and conversations it
has disturbed me that there seems to have been only the most
general of contingency planning with respect to withdrawal. I
believe that withdrawal will be extraordinarily dangerous for
our troops. There are basically two ways out: up through the
north, assuming the Turks let us come out, and they didn't let
us come in, so that's a challenge--perhaps they will see their
interests differently--or through the south, along highways
that will be very difficult to control and protect. We know
that a great number of our casualties and injuries occur
because of the IEDs and now the more powerful explosives that
attack our convoys.
General Lute, I hope that among your many responsibilities
that you have assumed that you will look at this. May I ask
you, if you will, please turn your attention to this issue,
determine what level of planning has taken place, whether the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs have been briefed
about the level of planning, what kind of timeline would exist
if a decision for either military or political reasons were
taken to begin withdrawal, and that you would assume this to be
part of your responsibility in your new position.
General Lute. Thank you, Senator. I do think such an
adaptation, if the conditions on the ground call for it, will
be part of this position.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, General.
I think that among the many concerns that we have expressed
to you are the confusion over responsibilities and chain of
command. In fact, I think that has been an unfortunate hallmark
of this administration's policy toward Iraq from the very
beginning. It was unclear who was in charge after the invasion.
It certainly was opaque at best as to the extent of authority
exercised by Ambassador Paul Bremer. There's been a tremendous
amount of difficulty and lack of accountability up and down the
chain of command because there have been so many detours and
other actors that have been involved.
I think that one of your challenges will be trying to sort
all that out. It is certainly my opinion that the Vice
President's office has played a major role, continues to play a
major role, and runs a parallel operation. What is your
understanding of your responsibilities vis-a-vis the Vice
President?
General Lute. Senator, as I've said, I'll work directly for
the President. But of course the Vice President is on the
policy council, if you will, the principals committee of the
National Security Council, and as such is an important
participant in policy development considerations. So as I work
with the President to set the agenda for that council, I'll be
working with the Vice President and his staff.
Senator Clinton. I wish you well, because certainly that's
turned out to be a difficult situation for many. I don't know
quite how we ever really determine what the chain of command
inside the White House is. But certainly I think it's important
that whatever your advice is, it be given directly to the
President on a regular basis, and it would be my very strong
recommendation, if you haven't already negotiated that, that
you certainly try to obtain that assurance that you will be
working with and directly reporting to the President.
Finally, the question that Senator Bayh raised about Turkey
I think is increasingly critical. During the past few weeks
there has been an increase in tension between Turkey and the
Kurds, with the Turks bitterly complaining about continuing
Kurdish separatist attacks. I don't know that we've had a very
good briefing on that, Mr. Chairman. I can't figure out what is
and isn't really happening. We know that there's a great deal
of enmity between these forces. I'm told by the Kurds that
they've tried to put a stop to the separatist actions. I don't
know whether that's true. So I think it's important that we try
to sort it out.
Turkey is a very important ally of ours and I know that,
given some of the internal discontent and political upheaval
going on in Turkey, that there is tremendous nationalist
pressure on the Turkish military to respond to these attacks.
It's been reported that there was last Sunday an ambush and
killing of eight Turkish military personnel inside Kurdish
territory. Yesterday there were unconfirmed reports that some
Turkish military units crossed over the border to conduct raids
and limited clearing operations in suspected militant camp
locations.
I just urge, General, that you pay immediate attention to
this. I know that General Joseph Ralston was appointed as a
presidential envoy some time ago to the Turkish government. I
think this demands the highest and most urgent attention.
Clearly it is not in anyone's interest that the Turks cross the
border en masse and the Kurds need to understand that it is not
in their interest. But I would not be surprised to discover
that there were agents, provocateurs within the Kurdish area
either operating outside of the two principal Kurdish lines of
military command or in some back room deal involved with a few
people in Kurdistan, that needs to be reined in, if possible.
This situation is dangerous and difficult enough. We
certainly don't need to see it explode in the north.
General, I too will be supporting you because of my high
regard for you, what I know of your record, for those like
Senator Reed who are incredibly admiring of your service, which
I share. I hope that you, since you will be confirmed by the
Senate, will see it as part of your continuing responsibility
to keep Congress apprised of what is happening with your work.
General Lute. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Clinton.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, General. We appreciate your
willingness to take on this difficult and important task. For
some time I have believed that we needed more intensive
management from the President to really make sure that all the
various agencies and departments that are involved in Iraq and
Afghanistan are operating at the highest level of
cooperativeness and effectiveness.
For several years now, I have pointed out that
responsibilities such as the economy, oil production, water,
electricity, and others are the responsibility of the State
Department or other Government departments than the military.
My personal view is the military has performed extraordinarily
well. I believe, however, that they probably could have done
more in these other areas, but because other departments were
given that responsibility there's been some confusion about
responsibilities.
In areas involving the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
legal system, in my view there are too few personnel there.
Likewise, there are areas in which the State Department has not
functioned well because they do not have enough people in the
country, and at times the level of coordination has not been
effective.
I have recommended that the President appoint someone like
yourself to be his personal representative, his personal
advisor, who can identify the problems that are not getting
addressed and report them to him immediately so that he can use
his power, his decisionmaking authority, to make it happen.
Sometimes it takes an absolute direct decision by the President
to end logjams and uncertainties about responsibilities and in
a life and death situation like Iraq I don't think we've been
getting that done sufficiently. I think you can really help. I
think it would be a really positive step.
I believe Mr. Hadley has a tremendous challenge. He has a
worldwide challenge. He's with the G-8 and the President today
I think. He has China, he has South America, he has Africa, he
has Russia, all of those things on his plate that the National
Security Council does; and I'm not sure they are configured or
ever were considered to be an entity to really get into the
details of managing the difficulties that we are facing in Iraq
today. I think the President has done well in choosing a
military person who has real background in that area who has
the gumption to identify problems and confront them and help
him solve them. So I want to say that to you first.
Now, as I understand this you won't have a team that would
actually execute any proposal. Basically what you would do is
if there's a conflict in responsibility or disagreement, let's
say about how to establish a court system in Iraq, which I
think is way behind its schedule, you would figure out what you
thought was a solution and make a recommendation to the
President to help him issue the directives that could solve
that problem. But you wouldn't have people on your own staff to
go out and operate a court system. You would use the personnel
that are already there for that. Is that correct?
General Lute. That's correct, Senator. The execution will
continue to reside with the executive departments, as it does
today.
Senator Sessions. About how many staff personnel do you
expect to have?
General Lute. I have a small staff of about 10 or 12
people, sir.
Senator Sessions. So really it will be your personal
leadership and your personal determination that will get to the
bottom of these things and to give the President the best
possible advice. I mean, you're not going to be depending on a
big staff. You're going to be doing this personally.
General Lute. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Sessions. I think that's important. I think we need
some person of your stature, of your experience, to personally
get involved in these matters.
For example, on the question of creating an effective legal
system in Iraq, I concluded that Iraq has one-ninth as many
prison bed spaces as they have in my State of Alabama, which
isn't much different than the national average, and they have a
real problem with violence. I've been told DOJ is adding some
more prosecutor advisors. I've been told we are adding some bed
spaces and that we're doing some of the things that I had
previously suggested, which is sending judges out to try cases
in distant areas of Iraq so that the local judges' families
wouldn't be threatened.
I guess what I'm saying is I think somebody needs to look
at this and say, adding just a few more DOJ personnel and
adding another 10,000 bed spaces may not be close to enough,
and that we need to do 3, 4 times as many and do it promptly.
Would you be willing to make those kind of decisions and say,
status quo is not enough; we need to make dramatic change here?
General Lute. Senator, I think the key here is to go to
General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, get from
them sort of the ground truth in terms of where our priorities
should fall, and then once the President is advised of this
assessment, renders a decision, oversee and coordinate the
policy execution. I think I agree with everything you've said.
I would only add that I think that General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker are the key inputs to which issues should be
priorities.
Senator Sessions. You spoke wisely there. That's certainly
true. But I guess what I have perceived is that with regard to
other agencies than the Defense Department, that people will
tell you they're making progress, but if you look at the entire
picture it's not nearly enough. I know that Senator Levin and
all of us believe that infrastructure, governmental
improvements, political improvements, are necessary, and the
military can't carry this ball alone.
Would you agree that one of the key components of any
success we might have in Iraq is to make progress in those
areas other than just the military?
General Lute. Absolutely. I think the military performs or
provides a necessary contribution to this picture, but by
itself it's insufficient.
Senator Sessions. You served, I believe, on the staff of
General John Abizaid?
General Lute. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. What was your position and how long did
you do that?
General Lute. For 2 years I was General Abizaid's
operations officer, his J-3 as we call it.
Senator Sessions. He always expressed concern--and I
believe it was persuasive to me--that there was a danger in
overcommitting American troops in what could be perceived as an
occupation mode and not a supportive role, a temporary action.
Share your thoughts about that concern? Would you articulate
the tension between using military force and being an
occupation force?
General Lute. Senator, I think this goes right to the heart
of the question of are we in the lead or are the Iraqis in the
lead and are we supporting. I think at this point in this
fight, increasingly we need to take every opportunity to put
the Iraqis in the lead across the security, governance, and
economic dimensions of this struggle. If we fail to do that and
we retain the lead, I think there is a real risk that we'll be
seen as occupiers.
Senator Sessions. Now, there are some superb generals,
colonels, and all out there trying to do their job every day.
Do you think there's a danger that sometimes they may want to
do too much, just out of patriotism and commitment to mission?
General Lute. Senator, I think we recruit people and
advance people in our Armed Forces who see no problem too great
for their efforts and their dedication. That's simply the sort
of people we put on the battlefield. But we have to temper that
with a realization in this instance in particular that the
local Iraqi solution will be the enduring one.
Senator Sessions. Well said.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We have a few minutes before we're going to have to run.
We'll have maybe a 2-minute round now to get a couple of us in
before we have to run and vote. We will come back after two
votes.
General, do you agree that the main purpose of the surge
was to give space to the Iraqi politicians to reach a political
settlement involving reconciliation?
General Lute. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Therefore the measure of success of the
surge will be whether or not it has led to significant progress
towards political reconciliation?
General Lute. That's right, Senator.
Chairman Levin. It seems to me your answer raises a number
of questions that you doubt the capacity of the Iraqi
Government to reach a political reconciliation. I mean, if the
purpose of a surge is to give them breathing space to do
something they're incapable of doing, then it seems to me we
have a real double problem with this surge. We're losing a lot
of lives there during a surge whose purpose is to give
breathing space to an Iraqi Government which you have grave
doubts about the capacity to reach the very purpose of the
surge, which is to give them breathing space to reach the
political reconciliation.
By the way, I think they lack will, not capacity, so I
don't agree with you particularly on that. But taking your
argument, how do you then justify a surge whose purpose is to
give breathing space to a government that by your testimony you
doubt has the capacity to make the political reconciliation
compromises?
General Lute. Senator, I am concerned about the capacity of
this government, but I haven't passed final judgment on them. I
think it is possible that they can muster the will and enough
capacity to show progress and maybe by passing measures of
reconciliation, break this cycle of violence and this sort of
winner-take-all attitude that we sometimes see. So I am
concerned, but I'm not yet convinced that they're incapable or
unwilling.
Chairman Levin. I think there's an inconsistency there.
I'll just leave it at that.
Do you believe, General, that the debate that we've had in
Congress on amendments that call for troop reductions starting
at a certain point, that those debates undermine the troops?
General Lute. Senator, I know of no evidence of that. I
believe the sort of people that are serving in the American
Armed Forces today understand the democratic process, and in
fact that's what we've sworn to protect and defend. When they
see it play out here in Washington they understand that, and
they're driving on with the mission they were given.
Chairman Levin. So is it your answer then that you do not
believe that----
General Lute. I don't believe that it undercuts their
morale.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I think the colloquy between
Senator Reed and the General--I'd hope in the few moments while
we're voting maybe we can get some clarifications as to
actually what was said, because I don't want reporting out of
this hearing--it just concerns me. I've known Steven Hadley.
I've worked with him for 25 years and I have the highest regard
for him. I don't share my colleague's personal observation.
But the more important thing is, in any way has Mr.
Hadley's role with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan been
diminished by your now, presumably subject to confirmation,
joining as an advisor to the President on those two specific
AORs?
General Lute. Senator, I see my role as Steve Hadley's
teammate on Iraq and Afghanistan. Because Iraq and Afghanistan
must be viewed, as we've talked about here this morning, in a
regional context, where Steve Hadley does have primacy for
execution and policy development, it'd be very difficult to
draw a line between us or separate us on matters inside Iraq
and Afghanistan. But it is clear that, if confirmed, this
appointment will hold primary execution and policy development
for those two countries.
Senator Warner. But in no way is Mr. Hadley's role
diminished?
General Lute. Sir, he's not cut out of the process in any
way, and in fact there are two key lines, if you go to the
conventional wire and block diagram, for my position if
confirmed. One would be a direct line to the President; a
second would be a dotted, parallel line to Mr. Hadley for
coordination.
Senator Warner. Correct. I think that puts in perspective
my understanding.
Now, there have been announced two resignations from Mr.
Hadley's staff, very competent individuals. One was Meghan
O'Sullivan and another J.D. Crouch. Will you be picking up some
of their responsibilities?
General Lute. Almost none of J.D. Crouch's
responsibilities, but to a large extent Ms. O'Sullivan's, in
addition to others.
Senator Warner. I see. So you'll be picking that up.
But again, Hadley's operating and going to continue to
operate, I think as a very strong, professional advisor to the
President. In the history of national security advisors, he's
done a fine job. But his role has not been changed by virtue of
your addition, subject to confirmation?
General Lute. Senator, my view is that, if confirmed, Steve
Hadley will have a new teammate.
Senator Warner. Fine. But his role will not be diminished?
General Lute. That's not how I read it, correct.
Senator Warner. It'll be augmented.
General Lute. That's correct.
Senator Warner. I thank the witness.
Chairman Levin. We have asked for your testimony to be
transcribed in response to Senator Reed's questions, in
response to my questions on this subject.
Senator Warner. And mine.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner's as well. I think it will
speak for itself and we can get back into it.
Senator Warner. Give the witness a chance in the course of
this hearing, before there's reporting made on this hearing, to
review that and confirm or advise the committee about how he
stated it.
Chairman Levin. Very good.
Senator Sessions, if you would recess as soon as you're
done, we'd appreciate it.
Senator Sessions. I would be pleased.
With regard to schools, oil production, electricity, the
legal system--will you be digging into those in more depth than
Mr. Hadley could ever have time to do? I mean, won't that be
your responsibility, to figure out how these things are coming
along, get right in there with the authority of the President
behind you to see what the problems are and make advice on how
to fix it?
General Lute. That's the essence of the design of this
position, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions [presiding]. I don't think the National
Security Advisor can have the time to do all those things with
every other responsibility. I think it's going to enhance his
ability to be effective. Agencies I think have begun to drift
sometimes in these kind of situations, and by being a
representative of the President you have the authority to shake
things up, get things moving in a way that would be helpful to
us, and actually could make things safer for those superb
soldiers we have on the ground.
We will stand in recess.
General Lute. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the committee recessed, then
reconvened at 11:58 a.m.]
Chairman Levin [presiding]. General, I know you understand
how these things go, so I won't apologize too much. But
nonetheless, thank you for your patience. We're now back in
session.
I think that Senator Lieberman has not had his second
round. Senator Warner and I have. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. A very short round, I want to alert you.
It's like 2 or 3 minutes.
Senator Lieberman. It's not a long count. It's a short
round, okay.
Very briefly, I understand that this is an unusual position
you've been appointed to, but I must say, contrary to my friend
Senator Reed, I don't think your appointment suggests that
Steve Hadley should go. I think this is a recognition and a
kind of exercise of sound management that the advice to the
President on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are so
substantial that one person, the National Security Advisor,
can't do it all. Either he's going to spend all his time or too
much of it on Iraq and Afghanistan and ignore the rest of the
world in his advice to the President, or he's going to do the
opposite. Either one is not a good idea.
I note that your title is that you've been nominated to be
Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan and
Assistant to the President. Why Assistant to the President?
Because history tells us that nations do better when the
commander in chief is directly involved day to day in the
management of a war, and you're going to be his conduit to do
that.
I just wonder if I have it right. I guess the other point
is internal--this is real inside baseball--that you will chair
the so-called deputies committee when it comes to Iraq, but
obviously Mr. Hadley will continue to be involved in the
National Security Council overall, the principals.
General Lute. Right. Senator, let me be very clear about
this, because I don't want to leave any doubt based on the
earlier session.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
General Lute. Steve Hadley remains in all of his capacities
the National Security Advisor. He's responsible for national
security affairs across the global spectrum. His role is not
diminished by this appointment or this designed position. If
confirmed, I'll join him as a teammate, and I'll augment him by
providing him and the President 24-7 dedicated coverage of
policy execution and policy development for Iraq and
Afghanistan.
If I was confusing earlier, I'd like to set that straight.
To your specific point, yes, I will be, if confirmed, chairing
the deputies-level sessions inside the National Security
Council process, and Steve and I will be seated together at the
principals level.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. To me that clarifies it, and I
think your appointment, the creation of the position,
particularly putting you into it, is going to move us toward
better management both of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and of
the rest of our foreign policy. It's going to require a real
sense of mutual respect and, as you said, a sort of team spirit
between you and Mr. Hadley. That's where the problems can
occur.
But I know both of you and I think I know your skills, your
personalities, and your commitment to the higher national
purpose, and I don't have any doubt that the two of you will
make it work.
General Lute. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you for clarifying that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
We'll start our third round here. We'll just go maybe 3
minutes each because another vote has started. But I'm hoping
that we'll be able to finish up before we all leave this time.
General, there's been a report in yesterday's edition of
the New York Times that the Iraqi parliament voted to require
the government of Prime Minister Maliki to bring the matter of
how long American troops can stay in Iraq before lawmakers--to
bring that matter before the lawmakers, of how long American
troops can stay in Iraq, in order for any additional extensions
to occur.
Are you familiar with that?
General Lute. I read the same report, Senator.
Chairman Levin. How do you interpret that vote?
General Lute. Senator, I interpret that as an indication
that their council of representatives, the Iraqi parliament,
does want to assume control completely of Iraqi affairs. I
think this can be viewed as an expression of desired full
sovereignty on behalf of the Iraqi representatives. I think
that as we approach the fall and look at the current
authorizing resolution, which is a U.N. Security Council
resolution, and whether or not it will be extended or adapted
in some way, that the expression of the parliamentarians, the
elected representatives of Iraq, will be heard.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Gates has said that the votes
here in Congress that set a timetable, while he doesn't agree
with them, nonetheless perform a useful function in that they
put pressure on the Iraqi leaders to recognize that there is a
diminished congressional support for the President's policies
and that the American people are no longer, since at least
November, supporting the policies as well.
Do you agree with Secretary Gates that there's a useful
purpose to these votes, even though he disagrees with the
substance of the amendment; that when Congress does pass
amendments saying we'll begin to reduce troops as of a certain
time that does have a useful aspect to it?
General Lute. I think that the policy debate back here,
first of all, is watched very carefully by the Iraqi officials.
I agree with Secretary Gates that it helps them draw the right
conclusion, which is that our commitment to Iraq is not open-
ended.
Chairman Levin. Do you know if the Iraqi parliament has
finally decided whether it's going to take a 2-month summer
recess?
General Lute. Senator, we watch this pretty carefully in my
current position on the Joint Staff. We have reports, but I
don't yet have a confirmation that they've changed their
schedule.
Chairman Levin. On the question of your relationship to the
President and Mr. Hadley, the daily brief that you made
reference to--did you say a daily brief on Iraq?
General Lute. I said I expect to engage with the President
daily.
Chairman Levin. Is that something that you and Mr. Hadley
will do jointly or is that something you're going to be doing?
General Lute. I think I will, and my staff, will craft it
and then we'll coordinate it closely with Steve and his----
Chairman Levin. Who will actually be briefing the
President?
General Lute. Sir, as I have----
Chairman Levin. As far as you know.
General Lute. As far as I know, I will, and I fully
anticipate that Steve Hadley will be right there alongside of
me.
Chairman Levin. Will be there?
General Lute. Alongside.
Chairman Levin. Physically?
General Lute. I believe so, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner. [Pause.]
Senator Warner. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. We have a rough
handwritten transcript of what the earlier statement was. I
would simply say that I would hope that the witness could have
the opportunity to review his earlier statement in the
transcript in the context of his reply to our colleague from
Rhode Island's question, and if there's any further
clarification that you be given the leeway to so state that in
the record.
General Lute. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Warner. Fine.
Chairman Levin. On that matter, I would suggest that we get
the transcripts of all of the questions of any of us on the
subject that you're referring to, to the General, and that he
add whatever he wishes for the record.
Senator Warner. That's it precisely.
Chairman Levin. So we want to thank our reporter as well,
because he's done yeoman service in trying to transcribe this
during our recess.
[The information referred to follows:]

General Lute. I'd like to clarify that Steve Hadley retains all his
responsibilities as National Security Advisor. So he's responsible for
national security affairs across the spectrum of global issues. His
role is in no way diminished by this appointment or this designed
position. If confirmed, I'll join him as a teammate and I'll augment
him by providing him and the President 24-7 dedicated coverage of
policy execution and policy development for Iraq and Afghanistan. I
have the highest regard for Steve Hadley and, if confirmed, look
forward to working with him.
I'd like to clarify that the responsibilities for Iraq and
Afghanistan are not exclusively mine. The new position does not exclude
Steve Hadley and many others also from advising.

Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you. Now, Senator Lieberman brought
up an important thing about how General Lute, subject to
confirmation, would be conducting a certain segment of the
meetings on Iraq in the procedure of the NSC. It's my
understanding that was a function that Meghan O'Sullivan did.
Am I correct in that?
General Lute. Senator, not at the deputies or principals
level.
Senator Warner. Not at the deputies, but----
General Lute. But below that, yes, sir.
Senator Warner. That's the chairing that you will do, is
that correct?
General Lute. I'll actually chair at the deputies level and
participate at the principals level.
Senator Warner. So there's two levels of hearings or review
processes that regularly go on within the NSC. What was it that
Meghan O'Sullivan had?
General Lute. Senator, that's just below the deputies
level.
Senator Warner. Correct. But didn't you say you would be
picking up her responsibilities?
General Lute. Some of her responsibilities.
Senator Warner. Some of hers.
General Lute. Then additional responsibilities, and among
the additional are the roles on the deputies and principals
committee.
Senator Warner. Correct. But did she not conduct meetings
of a certain level?
General Lute. She did.
Senator Warner. Will you be continuing conducting those
meetings?
General Lute. Senator, I suspect I won't be doing those
myself, but rather one of my assistants will.
Senator Warner. I think that we've done our very best then
to try and get the record straight. I believe your response to
our colleague from Connecticut's question clarified it for my
purposes, that there is no diminution; as I stated in my
earlier question, that Mr. Hadley will carry on as he has
always done, and that you will be in a support role, and
directly--of course, for your own initiative, you have free
access to the President to, quite frankly, and I hope there are
occasions where you will be at variance to the National
Security Advisor in terms of some of his observations and
opinions. I anticipate that. Wouldn't you?
General Lute. That may well happen.
Senator Warner. You would have no reluctance to so speak?
General Lute. No, Senator, no reluctance.
Senator Warner. Therein is what this hearing is all about,
to hopefully assure this committee that you're going to be an
independent individual, and that is why the President selected
you, because you've manifested a certain measure of
independence in your previous positions as it relates to Iraq
and Afghanistan, and that you will continue to do so.
General Lute. That's exactly right, Senator. I don't intend
to change now.
Senator Warner. Now we go to the subject of Afghanistan,
which is of great concern to all of us. We tend to spend a
great deal of time, understandably, on Iraq. But this is a
situation that bears close attention. There are two difficult
things. One, I must say I read through carefully all your
answers to the advance policy questions, but I would hope that
you could go back and look at your answers and refine with more
specificity what you feel is the U.S. role as a part of the
NATO organization, as a part of our independent operations with
U.S. forces over there, as it relates to this insidious and
tragic situation of the growing dependence on drug revenues
indeed by the economy of Afghanistan and how that impairs, in
my judgment, the ability of the Karzai Government to go
forward.
Maybe quickly, what is the U.S. role? At one time Great
Britain, as roles were divided up, was given that
responsibility. Has that changed now in any way?
General Lute. The United Kingdom still retains the
international lead, based on the Bonn Conference of several
years ago, for counternarcotics in Afghanistan. We play a
supporting role in two fundamental ways: first, as one of the
26 member nations of NATO----
Senator Warner. Correct.
General Lute.--and then second of all, in a U.S.-only role,
if you will, because we retain some U.S.-only missions in
Afghanistan as well. In both of those capacities, as part of
NATO and U.S.-alone, we provide military support on an in
extremis and as-available basis to the U.K. and increasingly
the Afghan counternarcotic effort.
Senator Warner. But the direct responsibility rests with
the Afghan government?
General Lute. It does, that's correct.
Senator Warner. We're in there in a supporting role. When
called upon, we have the discretion to give that support or
not.
General Lute. That's correct.
Senator Warner. Because I don't want to see the American
GIs tasked as the principal persons that have to go in and
clean up this situation.
General Lute. That's right, Senator. This is fundamentally
a law enforcement and governance role, not a military role.
Senator Warner. That is correct.
Next I'd like to ask a question just quickly on the
national caveats, which are troublesome. There are some nations
that are in that NATO force which have a caveat on the use of
their forces, which caveat in many respects precludes them from
participating in active combat. Now, what do you hope to bring
about by way of a change in that situation?
General Lute. Senator, you'll appreciate that the NATO
command structure already and the political authorities in NATO
already understand what you're saying with regard to caveats,
which fundamentally restrict the flexibility of our commanders
on the ground, because he can't go to everyone and ask them to
do every task. He has to sort of keep a chart as to who agrees
to do what.
It's a major effort by General Bantz Craddock in his role,
both his NATO role and his U.S. role, to reduce those
conditions or those caveats, and I'll certainly do everything
possible to support that effort.
Senator Warner. Finally, in response to questions by my
colleagues here--and I copied down what you said--the council
of representatives are going to assume control of Iraqi
affairs. I believe that's what you said. But I did not
interpret that to say that they're going to preempt the prime
minister. Or how do you take your response and tie it to the
fact that the government consists of the council of
representatives and the prime minister and his ministers?
General Lute. Yes, Senator. What I meant by that earlier
response was their constitutional role, which is defined in the
constitution and has, of course, the parliament, if you will,
working alongside the prime minister and other government
officials.
Senator Warner. Right. So it's to foster stronger reins of
sovereignty within the framework of the constitution, which
outlines their roles as legislators and that of the prime
minister and his ministers.
General Lute. That's exactly right.
Senator Warner. Not in any way interpreted they're marching
off----
General Lute. This is in accordance with the constitution.
Senator Warner. Understood.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one
question. I know time is going.
This is in some sense a question, in some sense an appeal,
and it goes back, General, to something we talked about when
you came to my office. The American public's understanding of
what we're trying to do in Iraq and how we're doing it is
critically important to whether we succeed or fail there. I
think you'd agree that ultimately the enemy, al Qaeda, Iran,
can't defeat us in Iraq, but we can be defeated by an absence
of public support or understanding for what we're doing.
You are a very credible, straightforward communicator, an
effective communicator. You're now going to be Deputy National
Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. National Security
Advisor Steve Hadley has regularly gone before the press, gone
onto television, answering questions. I don't know whether the
President has asked you to do this as part of the job
definition, but I really appeal to you in the interest of your
own sense of service to be willing to spend some of your time,
not much because you have a big job to do, going out and
speaking to people about what we're trying to do and telling
them honestly how you think it's going. Will you do that?
General Lute. Senator, I'm, with you, concerned about the
full range of responsibilities and making sure I meet those
responsibilities as essentially an inside player. But I also
take your point that our ability to explain what we're doing
and where we're going is absolutely critical to the overall
success of this mission, and I take your point. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
I think you were asked before about an exit strategy and
planning pursuant to an exit strategy. Have you seen such
planning?
General Lute. I have not been privy to planning that has
any label such as that, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you know if it exists?
General Lute. I do not know that it exists.
Chairman Levin. Could you try to find out and let us know
for the record whether that planning exists and what the state
of it is and when did it begin?
General Lute. I understand the question, Senator, and I
will do so.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner. Would the chairman's question be enlarged
to say--you used ``exit strategy.'' There could well be some
planning with regard to some variance to the strategy announced
on January 10.
Chairman Levin. However the General wants to answer. He
understands the question and I think he----
General Lute. I think I do take Senator Warner's point,
that there's constant planning going on in terms of what might
happen, sort of what-if drills, if you will. That planning is
going on all the time. It could feature more troops in Iraq,
fewer troops in Iraq, troops in Iraq doing something else.
Chairman Levin. If you could just tell us what planning
there is for fewer troops in Iraq or the removal of troops from
Iraq and under what circumstances that would occur and how it
would be implemented. Okay?
General Lute. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. If you could do that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

The focus of planning now is on how to achieve our objectives in
Iraq. To my knowledge, no orders have been issued to begin planning for
an ``exit strategy,'' although military contingency planning at
multiple levels of command takes place continuously and routinely in an
effort to have options prepared to respond to changing conditions on
the ground.

Chairman Levin. In your opinion, would it be advisable for
the United States to maintain permanent military bases in Iraq?
General Lute. Senator, it's U.S. policy that we don't seek
this, and we also have no desire for control of resources.
These are two things that have been discussed with the Iraqi
Government. I believe the position there is very clear. We
simply don't seek long-term bases.
What we do seek is a more normalized nation-to-nation
relationship with the Government of Iraq, with the state of
Iraq.
Chairman Levin. Anything further, Senator Warner?
Senator Warner. No.
Chairman Levin. The record's going to stay open for your
answers, but also for questions of members of the committee. We
will keep the record open for 2 days. I have a number of
questions on Afghanistan which I didn't have time here to ask
you, and those will be some of my questions.
Again, we thank you very much for your presence, for your
willingness to take a very difficult job under circumstances
which are extraordinarily difficult, to put it mildly. From
everything we know about you, it is part of your character that
you would respond to this kind of a request from the President
of the United States.
We will now stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA,
by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses

RESPONSIBILITIES

Question. What are the responsibilities of the position for which
you have been nominated? What will be your responsibility for analyzing
and evaluating requirements and policies and making recommendations to
the President about:

increasing, sustaining, or reducing U.S. force levels
in theater; deployed force readiness, manning, equipment
availability/cross leveling/prioritization, modernization, and
supply;
operation and maintenance funding levels,
prioritization and cash flow necessary to support continued
operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF);
task distribution between and among Federal agencies
operating in support of OIF and OEF; and
command and control relationships between and among
Federal agencies in support of OIF and OEF.

Answer. Position description:
Goal:
Establish a full-time senior manager for implementation and
execution of the President's strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan and to
manage the interagency policy development process for Iraq and
Afghanistan and to help develop our ongoing strategy for these two
theaters in close coordination with the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs.
Mission:
To support our civilian and military leaders in the
field, in turning the President's new strategies for Iraq and
Afghanistan into a prioritized set of defined implementation
and execution tasks with clearly assigned responsibility,
deadlines, performance metrics (as appropriate), and a system
of accountability to ensure progress toward accomplishing those
tasks.
To manage the process of implementation and execution
of those tasks among Washington departments and agencies
working through the appropriate cabinet secretaries and agency
heads to help ensure full and prompt Washington support for
accomplishing the prioritized tasks established for Iraq and
Afghanistan.
To manage the interagency policy development process
for Iraq and Afghanistan policy and to help develop our ongoing
strategy for these two theaters in close coordination with the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Authority:
Report directly to the President as the Assistant to the President/
Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan and
coordinate with the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs as the Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and
Afghanistan. He is charged by the President to:

Request and receive from cabinet secretaries and
agency heads information, personnel, and additional resources/
assistance needed to carry out successfully the President's
strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan.
Receive and obtain fulfillment of requests from
civilian and military leaders in the field for assistance and
support in accomplishing the prioritized tasks established for
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Provide ``quick look'' assessments on the issues
identified by the President, reporting back to the President,
and carrying out any guidance given by the President working
through the appropriate cabinet secretaries and agency heads.
Investigate implementation/execution issues and
problems on his/her own authority to identify and remedy the
problems identified working through appropriate cabinet
secretaries and agency heads.
Manage interagency policy development and helping to
develop our ongoing strategy for these two theaters in close
coordination with the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs.

In summary, work at the direction of the President to execute
policy and assist in the development of future policy within the
established National Security Council (NSC) process for both Iraq and
Afghanistan, in direct support of the U.S. officials in the field. In
policy execution, emphasize setting priorities, focusing resources,
following through, and adapting as conditions change.

AUTHORITY

Question. What authority will you have to fulfill the
responsibilities of the position to which you are being appointed? What
will be the process for translating your analysis or evaluations of
requirements, policies, and recommendations to the President into
executable directives or orders for cabinet level officials and Federal
agencies to carry out? What is your authority to direct Federal
departments or agencies to provide personnel or resources in support of
U.S. operations and activities in Iraq and Afghanistan? Will you be
responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance with those
directives and orders within the Executive Branch, and, if so, by what
process will you do so? Do you believe that the authority of this
position will be commensurate to the responsibilities and the
objectives it is being given?
Answer. See position description above. The position is an advisor
and coordinator, without directive authority beyond a small staff. In
such a role, the ability to move policy forward has less to do with
than other factors, such as: Presidential direction and support,
acceptance by other policy principals, broad commitment to a common
cause, cultivated interpersonal relationships, personal integrity, and
meaningful results.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the position to which you are being appointed to the following offices:
The Chief of Staff to the President.
Answer. As one of several Assistants to the President, this
position requires close coordination with the Chief of Staff.
Question. The National Security Advisor.
Answer. This position calls for close coordination with the
National Security Advisor to ensure policy development and execution
for Iraq and Afghanistan are integrated effectively with regional
policies. Further, as a Deputy National Security Advisor, this position
is part of the NSC structure and can call on the resources of the NSC
staff.
Question. The Deputy National Security Advisor.
Answer. This position calls for close coordination with the Deputy
National Security Advisor to ensure policy development and execution
for Iraq and Afghanistan are integrated effectively with regional
policies.
Question. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. This position coordinates both policy development and
execution with these principals of the NSC.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS).
Answer. When the VCJCS stands in for the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as a principal of the NSC, this position
coordinates both policy development and execution with the VCJCS.
Question. The Commander, U.S. Central Command; the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe; the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command; the
supporting combatant commanders; the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq; and the
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.
Answer. This position is designed to support U.S. military and
diplomatic missions in Iraq and Afghanistan primarily by coordinating
with the department secretaries and employing the existing chains of
command and authority between Washington and the field.
Question. The Service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs.
Answer. This position is not intended to interact routinely with
these officials. Any interaction would be through the Department of
Defense.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. You will be entering this important position at a
critical time for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. What
background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you
for this position?
Answer. Throughout my 32-year military career, I have served
repeatedly in operational assignments requiring interagency
coordination including three tours on the Joint Staff in Washington,
two tours in the Middle East, and peacekeeping duties in the Balkans. I
have studied complex international crises over the past 20 years
including taking an advanced degree from Harvard University and serving
on the faculty at West Point with teaching assignments in this area.
I have recent operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan,
including 2 years (2004-2006) as the operations officer (J3) for U.S.
Central Command and the last year as Director of Operations (J3) on the
Joint Staff.
I am professionally and personally committed to our troops and
civilians in the field.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for
Iraq and Afghanistan? What plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. The key challenge is to harness and integrate the resources
of the Government to meet the needs of our leaders in the field, in
both policy execution and policy development.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the interagency process that the Assistant to the President/Deputy
National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan is intended to
correct? What management actions and time lines would you establish to
address these problems?
Answer. The purpose of this position is to build on the collective
desire to promote our national security interests in the region being
mindful of the challenges facing the men and women on the ground. In
practical terms, this will mean taking a sober view of where we are now
and focusing fully on the needs of Iraq and Afghanistan, even though
there is a full range of competing global commitments. This position
brings senior, full-time, dedicated focus on these two wars within the
NSC staff.

APPROPRIATE GRADE

Question. Do you believe that serving in the position to which you
are appointed as a lieutenant general makes it more difficult to
perform the functions of the office when dealing with cabinet officials
and higher ranking officers? How do you intend to fulfill your
responsibilities when dealing with officials of higher positions?
Answer. See earlier answer.

IRAQ

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing
the United States in Iraq? From your perspective, what are the top
lessons learned from our experience in Iraq?
Answer. One year into the Maliki Government we face persistent
violence, insufficient progress in governance and the economy, and
unhelpful influences from Syria and Iran. I believe it is too early to
draw up a list of strategic lessons from this ongoing experience; time
will judge. This position is designed to focus on where we are now and
how to forward to secure U.S. interests.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes
the United States has made to date in Iraq? Which of these do you
believe are still having an impact? What do you believe could be done
now to mitigate such impact? What do you believe are the most important
steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?
Answer. I believe we must put the conflict in Iraq in a broad,
regional context centered on long-term U.S. interests, including
defeating al Qaeda, supporting our key regional partners, and
containing regional threats.
Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the
new Iraq strategy announced by the President earlier this year? Press
reports indicate that you opposed the ``surge'' strategy during policy
deliberations prior to the President's decision. Is that true, and if
so, why? Have events to date validated or invalidated your concerns, if
any?
Answer. I participated in the policy review prior to the
President's decision to adjust course in January 2007. During the
review I registered concerns that a military ``surge'' would likely
have only temporary and localized effects unless it were accompanied by
counterpart ``surges'' by the Iraqi Government and the other,
nonmilitary agencies of the U.S. Government. I also noted that our
enemies in Iraq have, in effect, ``a vote'' and should be expected to
take specific steps to counter from our efforts. The new policy took
such concerns into account. It is too soon to tell the outcome.
Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution
in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one? Do you
believe that political compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a
necessary condition for a political solution? Do you believe that
quelling the current level of violence in Baghdad is a necessary
condition for a political solution?
Answer. There is no purely military solution in Iraq, nor is there
a purely American solution. Ultimately the outcome depends on a
political solution to rejecting violence and sharing power among all
the parties within Iraq. Improved security is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for this to happen. Suppressing violence in
Baghdad can provide time and space for a political solution.
Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders
to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution?
What leverage does the United States have in this regard?
What do you believe are the prospects for Iraqi political leaders
to make those compromises and, if made, what effect do you believe that
will have toward ending the sectarian violence and defeating the
insurgency?
What is the present status of the Iraqi Government's efforts to
meet the political benchmarks, including the Constitutional Review
Committee's recommendations; legislation on de-Baathification;
legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon
resources; legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq
benefit Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner; legislation on
procedures to form semi-autonomous regions, legislation establishing an
Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law,
provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections;
legislation addressing amnesty; and legislation establishing a strong
militia disarmament program?
What is the present status of the Iraqi Government's efforts to
meet the political-military benchmarks, including ensuring that Iraq's
political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations
against members of the Iraqi security forces; establishing supporting
political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the
Baghdad security plan; and allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi
revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential
services, on an equitable basis?
Will you be doing an ongoing assessment of the level of political
progress made by Iraqi leaders? Do you believe that the above listed
political and political-military benchmarks are appropriate for that
purpose?
What is the present status of the Iraqi Government's efforts to
meet the military benchmarks, including providing three trained and
ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations; providing Iraqi
commanders with all authorities to execute the Baghdad security plan
and to make tactical and operational decisions without political
intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists,
including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias; ensuring that the Iraqi
security forces are providing even handed enforcement of the law;
reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating
militia control of local security; establishing all of the planned
joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad; and increasing
the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating
independently?
Will you be doing an ongoing assessment of the level of the
progress made by Iraqi leaders on the military benchmarks? Do you
believe that the above listed military benchmarks are appropriate for
that purpose?
Answer. I believe the Iraqi Government intends to meet its
commitments. Progress towards publicized benchmarks in the past 5
months, however, has been uneven. On the security front the Iraqis have
made substantial progress on their commitments, while political and
economic steps have lagged behind. This position is designed to keep us
all focused on the same benchmarks, integrate the political-economic-
military dimensions of the policy, and plan far enough in advance to
account for various potential outcomes. Policy execution and policy
development, of course, will rely heavily on inputs and assessments
from the field.
Question. With regard to the recent ``surge strategy,'' what role
will you have in proposing or recommending changes to the strategy?
What role will you have in deciding or recommending when U.S. troops
can begin to draw down/redeploy? What do you see as a reasonable
estimate of the time it will take to demonstrate success in securing
Baghdad? How would you craft an ``exit strategy'' for U.S. forces in
Iraq? What are the necessary pre-conditions; how would you phase the
redeployment; and what residual forces would be needed for what period
of time, and for what purposes over the long term? What is the state of
planning for such an ``exit strategy?'' If none has begun, will you
order that such planning immediately begin?
Answer. This position includes advising the President during the
development of policy in Iraq as well as Afghanistan. This process will
involve the principals of the NSC and will be informed by assessments
from the field.
Question. Will you be doing an ongoing assessment of the capability
of Iraqi security forces to take on more of the security
responsibilities? What considerations will be factored into a decision
regarding whether (and if so, what kind and how much) U.S. military
equipment currently in Iraq should be left behind for use by the Iraqi
Army?
Answer. Given the central role of development of the ISF in our
strategy, I expect to monitor closely progress in its ability to assume
increased responsibilities for the security of Iraq. This progress will
rely heavily on assessments from MNF-I and its subordinate, MNSTC-I, as
well as from other outside experts such as the independent commission
called for in recent legislation.
Question. In the National Defense Authorization and Appropriation
Acts for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek
permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq. Do you
agree that it is not and should not be U.S. policy to seek permanent
basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over Iraq's oil
resources? If you agree, what are your views on the construction of any
additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?
Answer. Is it not U.S. policy to seek permanent military bases in
Iraq or to control Iraq's oil resources, which belong to the Iraqi
people. The United States may, however, discuss a long-term strategic
relationship with the Iraqi Government, as it does with many
governments in the region and around the world.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in
Afghanistan?
Answer. Overall progress is steady, but slow, and in parts, uneven.
The Government of Afghanistan has limited capacity to influence events
outside Kabul. The security situation is stable in some parts of the
country, despite increased Taliban activity elsewhere, including the
use of suicide bombings. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
forces have set back the Taliban efforts to gain momentum in the south
this year by preemptive offensive operations and the killing of the top
Taliban commander, Mullah Dudallah Lang. Yet, the Taliban enjoy
relative safe haven in the border regions of Pakistan.
Question. What is the status of efforts to develop and field an
effective Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP)
force? What is your assessment of the readiness of these forces to
conduct independent operations?
Answer. Progress with the ANA is steady with a number of ANA
battalions fighting effectively alongside NATO and U.S. forces;
however, they are not yet ready to operate independently. The ANP lag
behind the ANA in all areas.
Question. What is your assessment of the progress of
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan?
Answer. Our counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan are effective.
Yet, we know that this is only one dimension of this complex situation.
An over-reliance on one measure--for example, precise counterterrorist
strikes--will not solve the problem. We must bring together the
multiple strands of effective policy to have a sustainable, enduring
impact.
Question. Are NATO members providing a sufficient level of troops
and equipment for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to
carry out its security mission throughout Afghanistan? What can be done
to address any shortfalls in troops or equipment needed to carry out
NATO's Afghanistan mission and to eliminate any national restrictions
on the use of troops contributed to this mission?
Answer. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) has
identified shortcomings in NATO forces and national restrictions that
inhibit the flexibility of NATO commanders to employ forces across
Afghanistan. These issues are being addressed as priorities within NATO
channels. While these shortcomings need to be eliminated, they do not
jeopardize the mission.
Question. Do you believe there is a military solution to the
situation in Afghanistan, or does success in Afghanistan depend on a
political solution? In your view, what additional military or other
assistance is required to ensure the transition of Afghanistan to a
stable, democratic, and economically viable nation? What steps do you
believe coalition forces and the international community need to take
to improve the lives of the Afghani people in the near-term?
Answer. As in all counterinsurgencies, the solution in Afghanistan
will be political, not military. Most important at this stage is to
bring increased coherence to the multiple dimensions of the mission--
governance, economic, and security--by better integrating the NATO
mission, the U.S. missions, and the efforts of the international
community.
Question. Military intelligence officials have stated that Taliban
and al Qaeda attacks across the Afghan-Pakistan border have increased
two-fold, and in certain areas threefold, since last September when the
Pakistan Government signed an agreement with tribal elders in the
Waziristan region ceding control over some border areas in western
Pakistan. What more can be done to prevent cross border incursions by
the Taliban and al Qaeda from Pakistan into Afghanistan? In your view,
should the Pakistan Government be doing more to prevent these cross-
border incursions? What role do you believe U.S. forces should play in
preventing cross-border incursions?
Answer. Pakistan is one of our strongest allies in the war on
terror, but it must do more to control the regions along the border
with Afghanistan where both the Taliban and al Qaeda have relative
sanctuary. This should be a priority policy issue for this new
position.
Question. Afghanistan is in the Central Command's area of
responsibility. EUCOM oversees the NATO ISAF force in Afghanistan. In
your view, does this ``seam'' present any problems for the coordination
and effectiveness of the ISAF and OEF missions in Afghanistan?
Answer. The division of responsibilities between CENTCOM and NATO
are clear. Coordination measures are in place and working.
Question. News reports indicate that there is growing Afghan
resentment over civilian deaths during the past few months resulting
from U.S. airstrikes or counter-terrorism operations. It has also been
reported that these civilian deaths have become a Taliban propaganda
tool and generated tensions between U.S. commanders and NATO commanders
who do not want to be blamed for deaths resulting from U.S. operations.
Are you concerned that these reports of civilian deaths may be
undermining efforts to win the support of the Afghan people for the
mission in Afghanistan? What steps, if any, do you believe should be
taken to address this issue?
Answer. This is a serious issue that is central to the
counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan which intends to protect the
people of Afghanistan. The NATO and US commands in the field take every
measure to minimize the potential for civilian casualties; however,
these measures cannot eliminate the risks completely. Also, the enemy
employs deliberate tactics such as seeking refuge among civilians that
complicate our efforts.

COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY

Question. In November 2006 the U.N. and World Bank released a
report on the drug industry in Afghanistan. In February, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies released a report on Afghanistan,
which included recommendations regarding the counterdrug policy. Have
you read these reports? What is your opinion of their conclusions and
recommendations as they relate to the effectiveness of international
efforts to help Afghanistan combat illegal drug production and
trafficking? Do you believe that eradication is effective? Should
international military forces have an explicit counterdrug mission? If
so, should its focus be on interdiction, capturing drug lords and
destroying drug facilities? If not, what is the appropriate role for
the military?
Answer. The counterdrug effort is an integral part of our strategy
in Afghanistan, not only because the narcotics trade helps to finance
the insurgency but because it undermines progress in nearly every
dimension of our governance-economic-security strategy. I have reviewed
the reports mentioned here and agree that a long-term, comprehensive
approach is required. If confirmed, I will consider the counterdrug
aspect of the campaign in Afghanistan as one element leading to overall
success and seek to improve its integration with the other pillars of
the strategy.
Question. If the U.S. military were to take on the mission of
capturing drug lords and dismantling drug labs in Afghanistan, what
would be the impact on the drug trade in Afghanistan? What would be the
impact on the coalition counterinsurgency effort? What can DOD and the
military do--via the Provincial Reconstruction Teams or other means--to
support the counterdrug efforts of other agencies in those areas? What
is your view regarding the desirability and feasibility of licensing
poppy cultivation to produce legal opiates, similar to programs in
Turkey and India?
Answer. The tactics involved in countering the narcotics trade--
eradication, targeting the drug lords, alternative crops, employing the
PRTs, licensing cultivation, etc.--must derive from the strategy that
takes into account all dimensions of the campaign. Our challenge is to
integrate more effectively these dimensions given the international
division of responsibilities within Afghanistan. There is much work to
be done here, mainly by civilian agencies rather than the military.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate source of funding
for the activities of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in
Iraq and Afghanistan? Which department or agency in the Executive
Branch should administer the funding and oversee the activities of the
PRTs? Are current staffing levels for the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan
sufficient? What will be your responsibility with regard to ensuring
that U.S. departments or agencies are providing the appropriate
military and civilian personnel to fully staff PRTs?
Answer. As PRTs are a cornerstone of interagency integration at the
tactical level in Iraq and Afghanistan, their priorities, manning,
funding and effectiveness will be a matter of concern to this new
position. They represent a key means of extending support for
governance and economic progress to the provinces and deserve priority
attention.
Question. In your estimation, how should determinations be made for
PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan regarding what types of projects should
receive the highest priority for development and reconstruction
activities? Should PRTs give priority to small-scale efforts to repair
and develop infrastructure which bolster short-term employment?
Answer. Project priorities should be set in the field to ensure
close integration with the other elements of the campaign plan and
account for local conditions that can vary widely from one province or
district to another.

PAKISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current status of U.S.-
Pakistan military cooperation? What is your assessment of the level of
cooperation we have received from Pakistan in the war on terrorism?
Answer. Pakistan is one of our strongest allies in the war on
terror, but it must do more to control the regions along the border
with Afghanistan where both the Taliban and al Qaeda have relative
sanctuary. This should be a priority policy issue for this new
position.

IRAN

Question. What options do you believe are available to the United
States to counter Iran's growing influence in the region? Do you
believe that a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq, if the
situation on the ground in Iraq does not improve, could strengthen
Iran's influence in the region? Do you believe it is important to
continue to engage Iran in discussions regarding improving the security
situation in Iraq and to seek Iran's cooperation with respect to the
situation in Iraq?
Answer. Iran is one of the most important regional actors with
regard to Iraq and Afghanistan and therefore must be taken into account
as we execute current U.S. policy and develop future policy. This new
position will require close coordination with other elements of the NSC
and across the Departments to ensure our policies take a regional
perspective that includes Iran.

IRAQI REFUGEES

Question. The United Nations estimates that approximately 2.3
million Iraqis have fled the violence in their country; 1.8 million
have fled to surrounding countries, while some 500,000 have vacated
their homes for safer areas within Iraq. What is your assessment of the
refugee crisis in Iraq? Beyond working to improve the security
environment in Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military and/or
civilian agencies should play a role in addressing this crisis? Should
the U.S. be doing more to track the movement of Iraqis who worked on
weapons of mass destruction programs and to help them find legitimate
scientific employment in Iraq or elsewhere?
Answer. Refugees are a major concern because of the human suffering
involved, the potential for destabilizing neighbor states, and the
drain of talent from Iraq. Primary responsibility for refugees lays
with international organizations to which the U.S. provides support.

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if
confirmed for this position, to appear before this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. During my service as the J-3 to the JCS I have always
honored my obligations to this committee to offer testimony when
requested. With this new assignment, if confirmed, I am advised that as
an Assistant to the President, principles designed to ensure that the
President is provided with candid advice and to protect the autonomy of
the Office would apply to me as they do to preclude the testimonial
appearances of other senior advisors to the President, especially as
they concern matters of national security. I understand that these
principles have applied to all other active duty military officers who
have served as senior advisors to the President, including those
serving as National Security Advisor and Deputy National Security
Advisor, in prior administrations.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes. If, consistent with the limitations indicated in
response to the question above, I were to testify before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, any response I provided to a
question, including a question seeking my personal views, would be
truthful.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear
before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and
provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security
protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Assistant to the
President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and
Afghanistan? Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Please refer to the answer above addressing the principles
generally applicable to senior advisors to the President.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Please refer to the answer above addressing the principles
generally applicable to senior advisors to the President.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM IN IRAQ

1. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, I have been contacted by a company--CHF
International--that has done extensive work on community infrastructure
projects funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development in
Iraq through a program known as the Community Action Program. These
projects are identified and overseen by the Iraqis themselves,
contributing to Iraqi employment and making the projects themselves
more sustainable. CHF International believes that a dramatic expansion
of this approach would yield significant dividends for stability in
Iraq. If confirmed, will you review the Community Action Program and
determine the feasibility of the expanded approach recommended by CHF
International?
General Lute. Yes.

COORDINATION OF EFFORT IN AFGHANISTAN

2. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, in your answers to pre-hearing
questions, you stated that the most important step that needs to be
taken in Afghanistan at this time is to bring ``coherence'' to the
various aspects of the mission--governance, economic development,
security--by improving integration of the missions of the United
States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the
international community. As retired General Jim Jones testified to the
committee, there are currently over 60 countries with a presence on the
ground in Afghanistan, as well as NATO, the European Union, and the
United Nations (U.N.). What will be the responsibilities of the
position for which you've been nominated for bringing coherence within
the U.S. Government to the military and civilian components of the
Afghanistan mission?
General Lute. If confirmed, I will be in a position to contribute
in two basic ways. First, we in the U.S. Government must ensure that
U.S. initiatives in Afghanistan are coordinated as part of a coherent
U.S. approach to the complex problems there. Second, as one of the 26
members of the NATO alliance, we must continue to contribute to the
NATO effort and aim to move it and other international actors toward a
more comprehensive approach that includes governance and economic
development as well as security. Both of these responsibilities entail
coordinating across the departments of the U.S. interagency in support
of our military and civilian leaders in the field, in both the policy
development and the policy execution arenas.

3. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, what will be the responsibilities of
this position for integrating efforts at the international level to
bring stability and security to Afghanistan?
General Lute. Success in Afghanistan has international and national
dimensions. If confirmed, I will assist the President and the other
statutory members of the National Security Council to develop and
execute those parts of our strategy for Afghanistan that may require
integration of international and coalition matters.

4. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, will you have staff dedicated to
coordinating this international effort?
General Lute. If confirmed, I will have access to the staff
resources of the NSC--including staff with a primary focus on the
international dimensions of Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. I will also
work with Principals to ensure adequate focus, attention, and resources
are provided for our international engagement efforts in support of
Afghanistan.

WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY IN AFGHANISTAN

5. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, according to British General David
Richards, former Commander of the NATO International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), there may be a limited ``window of
opportunity'' for ISAF, the Afghan Government, and the international
community to increase the focus on governance and development to
benefit the Afghan people. Last fall, General Richards spoke about the
need for the Afghan people to see ``demonstrable improvement'' in their
lives over the next 6 months, or else an increasing number might choose
``the rotten future offered by the Taliban'' over the ``hopeful
future'' promised by coalition forces but not delivered. What steps do
you believe need to be taken in the near term to make a demonstrable
improvement in the lives of the Afghan people?
General Lute. In the near-term I believe we need to focus on
security, roads, and electricity. Security includes addressing the
Taliban safe haven in Pakistan. These are not short-term-only projects,
however; they require a long-term, coordinated approach that over time
extends the positive influence of the central government of Afghanistan
out to the provinces. In the end, the struggle in Afghanistan is about
governance.

CIVILIAN DEATHS

6. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, a series of incidents involving U.S.
airstrikes or attacks by U.S. Special Operations Forces are reported to
have resulted in the deaths of at least 90 civilians over the past
several weeks. According to news reports, the issue of civilian deaths
is also leading to resentment among the Afghan people and tensions
between American commanders and NATO commanders who are concerned NATO
forces are being blamed for deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism
operations. In early May, Afghan President Karzai declared that his
government can ``no longer accept'' the civilian casualties resulting
from U.S.-led operations. Are you concerned by these reports of growing
Afghan resentment and NATO tension over civilian deaths?
General Lute. Yes, I am concerned, as are the military and civilian
leaders in the field and here in Washington. The commands investigate
every incident to determine if procedures were followed and whether
procedures need to be revised. The commands also continuously
reevaluate our tactics to ensure that the benefits of our operations
outweigh the potential damage to our overall strategic-level goals that
could result from civilian casualties.

7. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, are these reports of civilian deaths
undermining our efforts to win the ``hearts and minds'' of the Afghan
people for the coalition's mission? What steps, if any, are you taking
in response?
General Lute. A rise in civilian deaths could certainly lead to
erosion of public support for the NATO mission among Afghans and if
such a rise continued unabated, then it could jeopardize the mission. I
believe our civilian and military leaders are fully aware of the
potential for adverse effects and are taking all prudent steps to
prevent civilian casualties. We should appreciate that these incidents
are not all accidents, however; some are deliberate acts attributable
to the enemy who hides among civilians and even uses them as shields
against NATO and coalition operations. In any case, all steps must be
taken to abide by the rules of engagement and avoid civilian
casualties.

8. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, according to one news report, a U.S.
military official said that some civilian casualties in Afghanistan
over the past year are the result of a reliance on air power to
compensate for a shortage of troops. Do you agree with this assessment?
Are additional coalition troops needed in Afghanistan?
General Lute. The senior NATO commander reports he has sufficient
troops to accomplish his combat mission. More forces are required to
train and advise the Afghan army and police.

COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY--SHIFT FROM ERADICATION TO INTERDICTION

9. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, in November, the U.N. and World Bank
released a report on the drug industry in Afghanistan that concluded
that international efforts to combat opium production--which would
include almost $400 million in Department of Defense counternarcotics
funds--have failed. The report recommended focusing on interdiction,
and targeting opium refining facilities and wealthy drug lords. Last
month a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) on Afghanistan also recommended shifting the effort from
eradication to interdiction and paying farmers for poppy, and not to
grow poppy. Your written response to the committee's pre-hearing policy
questions indicates that you have read these reports. Do you agree with
the recommendations made by the U.N./World Bank and CSIS reports--that
international forces should focus more on interdiction, capturing drug
lords, and destroying drug facilities? If so, should the U.S. military
help with interdiction?
General Lute. The counterdrug dimension of the overall mission in
Afghanistan must be part of a coherent campaign plan for Afghanistan,
with priorities established, responsibilities assigned, progress
measured, and follow-up conducted. There is much work to be done to
place counterdrug actions in this larger context, both within U.S.
policy and within the international effort. Within such a comprehensive
approach, I believe that the counterdrug mission is mainly a law
enforcement role, with international and U.S. military in support. The
current U.S. counternarcotics policy is a solid foundation and has five
pillars: public information, alternative livelihoods, eradication and
elimination, interdiction and law enforcement operations, and justice
reform and prosecution.

10. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, my understanding is that the U.S.
military does not currently have a counternarcotics mission in
Afghanistan. U.S. forces have been instructed to seize narcotics and
destroy labs that they come across during the course of their normal
operations, but they do not have an explicit order to seek and seize or
destroy narcotics, drug lords, or narcotics labs. Should U.S. forces
have an explicit counterdrug mission in Afghanistan?
General Lute. No, in my view the counterdrug mission is mainly a
law enforcement effort, with international and U.S. military in
support. The U.S. military support role includes intelligence sharing,
in extremis medical and fire support, and logistic support, when
available.

11. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, if confirmed, would you review the
military role in drug interdiction in Afghanistan to see if there is
more that NATO and U.S. forces can do?
General Lute. Yes.

12. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, would you work to ensure that NATO and
U.S. forces have the same counterdrug policies, especially towards
eradication?
General Lute. Yes.

DRUG ERADICATION AND COUNTERTERRORIST OBJECTIVES

13. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, critics of drug eradication efforts in
Afghanistan, such as the World Bank and U.N., have stated that
eradicating poppy hurts small, low-income farmers and turns them away
from the Afghan government and into Taliban supporters, thereby
undermining our counterterrorism efforts. Yet, the State Department
Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan
briefed to committee staff recently that only 15 percent of Afghans
grow poppy and that the majority of new cultivation is not being
conducted by small farmers, but by powerful drug dealers. Do you agree
with the State Department Coordinator's assessment regarding who would
be impacted by eradication efforts in areas that have seen the greatest
expansion of poppy cultivation?
General Lute. I am not an expert in this field, but if confirmed I
will aim to place counterdrug measures such as eradication into the
context of a broad, comprehensive strategy that addresses all the
dimensions of the challenges in Afghanistan.

14. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, what is your view on the tradeoff
between eradication and counterterrorism efforts?
General Lute. I believe that in complex environments such as
Afghanistan measures that fix one problem often reveal challenges
elsewhere. So, there may well be a trade-off between eradication on the
one hand and grassroots support for the Taliban on the other (although
this may vary from region to region depending on other issues). This
sort of interrelationship highlights why a comprehensive policy
approach is required, rather than a set of discreet approaches to
individual challenges.

15. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, how should eradication be implemented
or targeted to address counterterrorism concerns?
General Lute. I do not have a fixed opinion on this matter, but if
confirmed I would rely on the expert assessments from the field that
account for the complexities on the ground.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

FIGHTING TERRORISM

16. Senator Akaka. LTG Lute, a recent State Department report found
that terrorists are changing their tactics. Specifically, the report
states that ``Early terrorist attacks were largely expeditionary. The
organization selected and trained terrorists in one country, then
clandestinely inserted a team into the target country to attack a pre-
planned objective.'' The report further states that ``We have seen a
trend toward guerilla terrorism, where the organization seeks to grow
the team close to its target, using target country nationals.''
Finally, the report states that there is a ``shift in the nature of
terrorism, from traditional international terrorism of the late 20th
century into a new form of transnational non-state warfare that
resembles a form of global insurgency. This represents a new era of
warfare.'' This report suggests that the battlefield for the war
against terror is not limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. This concept of
terror turns the entire world into a battlefield. It seems to
strengthen the argument that we need to attack al Qaeda directly in
Pakistan rather than use Iraq as a surrogate battlefield. How do you
think this change in terrorist strategy should affect our military
strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan?
General Lute. I agree that the war against terror is not limited to
Iraq and Afghanistan. I believe we need to strike al Qaeda wherever we
find them and seek to deny them safe haven from which they can marshal
resources for international attacks. Al Qaeda has declared and
demonstrated its intent to establish safe havens in both Iraq and
Afghanistan and we should continue to take all steps to ensure they are
defeated in this effort.

17. Senator Akaka. LTG Lute, it seems that our strategy should
include doing more to attack the roots of terrorism to minimize the
sources of new terrorist recruits. Do you agree? If so, what strategies
do you suggest we use to attack the roots of terrorism?
General Lute. I agree that comprehensive counter-terror strategy
takes into account the root causes of the problem, not just the
symptoms. The current U.S. national plan is founded on a multi-faceted
approach and will require long-term commitment of the U.S. Government
to gain the effects required. Important components include information
operations to counterterrorist propaganda, measures to counter
terrorist financing, and steps to improve the counterterrorist
capacities of key partners, especially those which are most susceptible
to terrorist threats.

AL QAEDA IN IRAQ

18. Senator Akaka. LTG Lute, it is my understanding that most of al
Qaeda in Iraq's (AQIs) funding and training support comes from regional
sources, including Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. I also understand
that it gets some financial support from Tehran (despite the fact that
AQI is a Sunni organization), according to documents confiscated last
December from Iranian Revolutionary Guards operatives in northern Iraq.
However, it is my understanding that the bulk of AQI's financing comes
from smuggling and crime. You stated during the hearing that al Qaeda's
main focus is now on Iraq. What evidence (other than al Qaeda
propaganda statements) is there that supports your belief that al Qaeda
is primarily focusing its resources in Iraq?
General Lute. AQI draws resources from both within Iraq and from
across the region. I believe that AQI is largely self-sustaining and,
aside from propaganda and public statements of support, does not
require substantial financing or other forms of tangible support from
al Qaeda leaders outside Iraq. AQI is a decentralized element of al
Qaeda; the relationship is not strictly hierarchical. I conclude that
the al Qaeda movement's main effort is Iraq because that is what their
senior leaders declare and the scale of effort in Iraq dwarfs all other
operations. Much of al Qaeda's focus is on Iraq. Al Qaeda senior
leaders recognize the importance of Iraq as the central battlefield for
the return of the Islamic Caliphate. Both Bin Ladin and Zawahiri have a
keen interest in success in Iraq, and have encouraged AQI to use Iraq
as a platform for spreading the Islamic caliphate and for conducting
external attacks.

19. Senator Akaka. LTG Lute, clearly in the past couple of years,
al Qaeda has launched high profile attacks in other countries while
seemingly not really being involved in Iraq. One could argue that they
have successfully bogged down our resources in Iraq with minimal
investment on their part. It seems that al Qaeda's main focus really
has been reconstituting itself in Pakistan and supporting Taliban
efforts to retake Afghanistan. Do you agree? If not, why not?
General Lute. I agree that al Qaeda is reconstituting in the
western border regions of Pakistan and that they support the Taliban's
efforts to reestablish safe haven in Afghanistan. I disagree regarding
al Qaeda's role in Iraq. While we have seen some high-profile attacks
outside Iraq in the past 2 years, we have seen nearly 1,000 suicide
attacks within Iraq in 2005-2006. While these attacks are directed by
AQI itself and not directed centrally by al Qaeda senior leaders, this
level of effort represents the main front for the movement at large.
While the fight in Iraq continues under AQI, the broader al Qaeda
continues to seek safe haven wherever it can and continues to plot
against the U.S. and our allies globally. Al Qaeda and AQI are bound
together loosely by common ideology, not so much by shared resources.
The diversity and steady flow of foreign jihadists to Iraq indicates
the conflict is central to al Qaeda recruitment efforts.

20. Senator Akaka. LTG Lute, during your confirmation hearing,
Senator Bayh pointed out that we cannot let al Qaeda define how most
intelligently to pursue our national security interests. In addition,
he stated that the Central Intelligence Agency's top expert on radical
Islam believes that our presence in Iraq is creating more members of al
Qaeda than we are killing in Iraq, to which you replied that ``we have
to balance those sorts of assessments, which I think have some
credibility, with a gross adjustment in the other direction, which
might feature leaving Iraq to al Qaeda.'' Is it your professional
opinion that if the United States were to begin phased redeployment of
our troops out of Iraq, then al Qaeda in Iraq would likely defeat all
other parties in Iraq and assume control of the country, creating a
terrorist state? If so, why?
General Lute. I believe it is in the U.S. interest to defeat AQI,
denying them a safe haven in Iraq. I do not believe it is likely that
AQI will take control of Iraq, but they could establish safe haven
without controlling the entire country, and we and our Iraqi partners
must prevent this from happening. As long as AQI has a presence in
Iraq, either overtly or in clandestine cells, AQI will continue
attempts to sow instability, and the larger al Qaeda movement will seek
to leverage the group's capabilities for transnational attacks. I also
agree with the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq (January 2007),
which recognized that: ``AQI would attempt to use parts of the
country--particularly al Anbar province--to plan increased attacks in
and outside of Iraq'' in the event of a rapid Coalition withdrawal. The
best way to prevent a terrorist safe haven in Iraq is to help the
democratically elected Iraqi Government establish an Iraq that can
sustain, govern, and secure itself, and serve as a U.S. partner in the
war on terror.

21. Senator Akaka. LTG Lute, do you think the al Qaeda takeover
scenario is very likely if we were to pull our troops out--more likely
than a regional conflict or the emergence of a Shia-dominated state?
General Lute. I believe that if we were to leave Iraq before the
Iraqis were able to govern themselves, then al Qaeda would win in two
ways: first, they would be able to establish safe haven within under-
governed spaces in Iraq, and second, they would declare that they had
defeated America in the main fight, giving the larger AQ movement a
huge propaganda victory. I agree with the assessment of the Baker
Hamilton Iraq Study Group: ``Al Qaeda will portray any failure by the
United States in Iraq as a significant victory that will be featured
prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region and around
the world.'' This is not to say that AQI would seize control of all of
Iraq; I do not believe that is likely because the vast majority of
Iraqis themselves do not support AQI's vision of the future. Today
there are indications that anti-AQI sentiment is spreading in Iraq.
This sentiment has in some cases translated into anti-AQI action, and
groups that oppose AQI have formed in al Anbar province, Baghdad, and
increasingly in parts of Salah ad-Din and Diyala provinces. It will be
important in the coming weeks to sustain these efforts, with coalition
and, most important, Iraqi Government support.

INSURGENCY GROUPS IN IRAQ

22. Senator Akaka. LTG Lute, during a hearing last month, Admiral
Fallon stated that insurgency groups in Iraq have multiple and often
competing motivations for perpetuating violence; however, they are
united by two things: opposition to U.S. and coalition forces and
refusal to accept the legitimacy of an inclusive, representative
government. Do you agree with the admiral's statement, and if so, what
strategies would you recommend we use to try and bring these groups to
the table to discuss their differences, and potentially address the
underlying problems causing their resistance?
General Lute. I agree with Admiral Fallon's statement. I support
the ongoing, near-term effort to suppress sectarian violence,
especially in Baghdad, in order to provide time and space for Iraqi
political and economic progress that addresses underlying causes. An
important part of this effort is to attack and root out extremist
networks, both Sunni and Shia, which serve as a primary accelerator of
sectarian violence. We must also address the unhelpful influences of
Syria and Iran in Iraq. While we support the government and continue to
press for progress, I believe political solutions must be essentially
Iraqi. Only the Iraqis can move toward a meaningful sharing of
political and economic power that will undercut effectively the sources
of violence. Beyond the near-term, we need to set intermediate
objectives that move us toward a more sustainable, normalized
relationship with Iraq that addresses our long-term interests in the
region.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR
ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT

23. Senator Pryor. LTG Lute, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
established the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as an
advisor to the President of the United States. Admiral Fallon, General
Petraeus, and General Casey, for example, are also avenues of
information for which the President may rely on for advice. How will
the advice provided from you differ or have more significance than the
advice from these military leaders?
General Lute. This position would supplement and not replace the
advice the President receives on Iraq and Afghanistan from his
principals. If confirmed, the advice I would offer would focus on the
execution of policy decisions and on the coordination of our efforts in
meeting our objectives. I would also help facilitate policy development
and ensure that all elements of national power are working together to
advance our national interests in these critical theaters.

24. Senator Pryor. LTG Lute, if this position separates you from
other military leaders by the fact that you would have 24-hour access
to personally provide advice to the President, then how would your
advice be more significant than those military leaders providing advice
whose information comes from having 24-hours-a-day of ``boots on the
ground'' like General Petraeus?
General Lute. If confirmed, I do not believe my advice would be
``more significant'' than the advice the President receives from
leaders in the field who are in closest contact with the day-to-day
challenges and potential solutions. My advice would focus on U.S.
interagency coordination in Iraq and Afghanistan and on the execution
of policy. This is a different perspective, not necessarily a competing
perspective. I would also help ensure that our leaders in the field
receive the full support and dedicated resources from the many Federal
agencies and departments of the U.S. Government to help prosecute their
missions.

INFORMATION GATHERING

25. Senator Pryor. LTG Lute, with the current high operational
tempo in the war in Iraq, how will you gather information and prepare
your assessments from the field, but do so in a transparent way as to
not interrupt a deployed military commander's ability to prosecute the
war?
General Lute. If confirmed, I would draw mainly on existing
reporting arrangements and supplement these with routine personal
contact with leaders in the field and with counterparts in the
interagency. I would seek to avoid new requirements for information or
timeconsuming reports, while ensuring the U.S. interagency is focused
on the field leaders' priorities.

IRAQ STUDY GROUP

26. Senator Pryor. LTG Lute, what is your opinion of the
recommendations made by the Iraq Study Group?
General Lute. I believe the Iraq Study Group recommendations
represent significant contributions to our ongoing policy execution and
to future policy development.

IRAQI GOVERNMENT

27. Senator Pryor. LTG Lute, do you believe the government of Iraq
can achieve certain comprehensive security, political, and economic
milestones to transition the United States' mission from one of combat
to support?
General Lute. Yes, with our assistance and support from the region.
______

[The nomination reference of LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
May 23, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be Lieutenant General

LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA, 2691.
______

[The biographical sketch of LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time of the nomination
was referred, follows:]
Transcript of Service of LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA

Military schools attended:
Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses.
British Army Staff College.
Senior Service College Fellowship-The Atlantic Council.

Educational degrees:
United States Military Academy--BS--No Major.
Harvard University--MPA--Public Administration.

Foreign language(s): Spanish.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates of
Promotions appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT.................................................. 4 Jun. 1975
1LT.................................................. 4 Jun. 1977
CPT.................................................. 18 Nov. 1979
MAJ.................................................. 1 Jun. 1986
LTC.................................................. 1 Feb. 1992
COL.................................................. 1 Sep. 1996
BG................................................... 1 Oct. 2002
MG................................................... 1 Jan. 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
May 1976........................ May 1978.......... Platoon Leader,
later Troop
Executive
Officer, 1st
Squadron, 2d
Armored Cavalry,
VII Corps, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany.
May 1978........................ Dec. 1980......... S-1 (Adjutant),
later Commander,
C Troop, 1st
Squadron, 2d
Armored Cavalry,
VII Corps, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany.
Jan. 1981....................... July 1981......... Student, Armor
Officer Advanced
Course, United
States Army Armor
School, Fort
Knox, KY.
July 1981....................... June 1983......... Student, Kennedy
School of
Government,
Harvard
University,
Cambridge, MA.
June 1983....................... Sep. 1986......... Instructor, later
Assistant
Professor,
Department of
Social Sciences,
United States
Military Academy,
West Point, NY.
Sep. 1986....................... Dec. 1987......... Student, British
Army Staff
College, United
Kingdom.
Dec. 1987....................... Apr. 1989......... S-3 (Operations),
1st Squadron, 2d
Armored Cavalry
Regiment, VII
Corps, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany.
May 1989........................ June 1990......... S-3 (Operations),
2d Armored
Cavalry Regiment,
United States
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany.
June 1990....................... Nov. 1990......... Special Assistant
to the Vice Chief
of Staff, Army,
Washington, DC.
Nov. 1990....................... Apr. 1991......... S-3 (Operations),
2d Annored
Cavalry, VII
Corps, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany and
Operations Desert
Shield/Storm,
Saudi Arabia.
Apr. 1991....................... July 1992......... Speechwriter,
Office of the
Chief of Staff,
Army, Washington,
DC.
July 1992....................... July 1994......... Commander, 1st
Squadron, 197th
Cavalry Regiment,
1st Cavalry
Division, Fort
Hood, TX.
July 1994....................... June 1996......... Politico-Military
Planner, later
Chief, Central
and Eastern
European Branch,
J-5, The Joint
Staff,
Washington, DC.
June 1996....................... June 1997......... Senior Service
College Fellow,
The Atlantic
Council of the
United States,
Washington, DC.
July 1997....................... Aug 1998.......... Executive
Assistant, Office
of the Special
Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary
of Defense for
Gulf War
Illnesses,
Washington, DC.
Sep. 1998....................... Aug 2000.......... Commander, 2d
Armored Cavalry
Regiment, Fort
Polk, LA.
Aug 2000........................ Oct 2001.......... Executive
Assistant to the
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of
Staff, The Joint
Staff,
Washington, DC.
Oct 2001........................ Jan. 2003......... Assistant Division
Commander
(Support),1st
Infantry
Division, United
State Army Europe
andSeventh Army,
Germany and
Commander,
Multinational
Brigade (East),
Task Force
Falcon, KFOR,
Camp Bondsteel,
Kosovo.
Jan. 2003....................... June 2004......... Deputy Director
for Operations, J-
3. United States
European Command,
Germany.
June 2004....................... Sep. 2006......... Director of
Operations, J-3,
United States
Central Command,
MacDill Air Force
Base, FL.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Politico-Military Planner, later July 1994-June Lieutenant Colonel
Chief, Central and Eastern 1996.
European Branch, J-5, The Joint
Staff, Washington, DC (No Joint
Credit).
Executive Assistant, Office of July 1997-Aug. Colonel
the Special Assistant to the 1998.
Deputy Secretary of Defense for
Gulf War Illnesses, Washington,
DC.
Executive Assistant to the Aug. 2000-Oct. Colonel
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 2001.
Staff, The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Deputy Director for Operations, Jan. 2003-June Brigadier General
J-3, United States European 2004.
Command, Germany.
Director of Operations, J-3, June 2004-Sep. Brigadier General
United States Central Command, 2006.
MacDill Air Force Base, FL.
Director for Operations, J-3, Sep. 2006-Present. Major General
The Joint Staff, Washington,
DC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Achievement Medal
Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab
Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Douglas E.
Lute, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Douglas E. Lute.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for
Iraq and Afghanistan.

3. Date of nomination:
23 May 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
3 Nov. 1952; Michigan City, Indiana.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Jane Holl Lute (maiden name: Holl).

7. Names and ages of children:
Amy Kyleen Lute, 20; Adellyn Polomski, 19; and Kamryn Lute; 2.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, Association of United States Army.
Member, Second Cavalry Association.
Member, USMA Association of Graduates.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
During my service as the J-3 to the JCS I have always honored my
obligations to this committee to offer testimony when requested. With
this new assignment, if confirmed, I am advised that as an assistant to
the President, principles designed to ensure that the President is
provided with candid advice and to protect the autonomy of the Office
would apply to me as they do to preclude the testimonial appearances of
other senior advisors to the President, especially as they concern
matters of national security. I understand that these principles have
applied to all other active duty military officers who have served as
senior advisors to the President, including those serving as National
Security Advisor and Deputy National Security Advisor, in prior
administrations.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes. If consistent with the limitations indicated in response to
Question 12, I were to testify before any duly constituted committee of
Congress, any response I provided to a question, including a question
seeking my personal views, would be truthful.
______

[The nomination of LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on June 28, 2007, by a roll call
vote of 94-4, with 1 voting present.]

NOMINATIONS OF MICHAEL G. VICKERS TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT; VADM ERIC T. OLSON,
USN, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND; AND HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO
TO BE UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

----------

TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed,
presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Reed, Webb, Warner,
Inhofe, Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; and Peter
K. Levine, general counsel.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Micah H.
Harris.
Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh
and Michael D. Zehr, assistants to Senator Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. Today the
committee considers the nominations of Michael G. Vickers to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC); Vice Admiral Eric T. Olson, United
States Navy, to be Commander, United States Special Operations
Command (SOCOM); and the Honorable Thomas P. D'Agostino, to be
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of Energy
(DOE), and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA).
I also note that the Secretary of Energy, Secretary Samuel
W. Bodman, is here. Mr. Secretary, welcome. In a moment we'll
ask you to make a comment if you'd like.
We welcome our nominees and their families to today's
hearing. We know the long hours that senior Department of
Defense (DOD) and DOE officials put in every day and we
appreciate the sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make
to serve their country. We know that they will not be alone in
making these sacrifices, so we thank in advance the family
members of our nominees for the support and assistance that we
know they will need to provide.
Our committee has a longstanding tradition of asking our
nominees to introduce family members who may be present. Mr.
Vickers, if you would like to introduce your family members
that are here we'd be delighted.
Mr. Vickers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Behind me is my wife Melana Vickers and my three oldest
daughters, Natasha Vickers, Alexandra Vickers, and Sophia
Vickers; and then in the row behind them is my mother-in-law,
Oksana Bashuk Hepburn, and my brother-in-law, Roman Zyla. We
have two other daughters that could not be here today with
their dad. They're 5- and 2-years-old and they would have
stolen the show.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Vickers.
Admiral Olson, I understand your family, who served the
Navy and the Nation with great energy over many years, are
taking a little respite. So do you have any of your other
family members here today?
Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, I regret and my family regrets
that they're not here with me today. My wife and partner of 25
years Marilyn, my 20-year-old son Daniel, my 17-year-old
daughter Alyssa are off on a long-delayed and much anticipated
trip. But I know that I would not be here today without their
enduring love and support.
Senator Reed. We thank them, Admiral, for their service to
the Navy and the Nation also.
Mr. D'Agostino, do you have family members present?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to introduce my
mother, Dr. Annie-Claude D'Agostino, and to her left, my
father, Thomas Salvatore D'Agostino. My wife, Beth, and
children, Anne and Tommy, unfortunately are out of town and
unable to participate in the hearing. But I do owe them a great
debt of gratitude for allowing me to spend the time and energy
that's important for these positions.
Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. D'Agostino.
Each of our nominees will be called upon, if confirmed, to
make important contributions to our national security. Michael
Vickers has been nominated for the position of Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC). He has served as an Army Special Forces
noncommissioned officer and officer and as a Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations officer and is regarded as
an expert on special operations.
Mr. Vickers has been nominated at a time when the position
of ASD-SO/LIC may change substantially as a result of the
planned reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. If that reorganization goes forward as
contemplated, the ASD-SO/LIC will be responsible not only for
special operations issues, but also for strategic forces
policy, transformation, and the major force program budgets.
This committee has expressed concern that this new span of
responsibility may impede the ability of the Assistant
Secretary to maintain special operations as his principal duty,
as required by section 138 of title 10.
Vice Admiral Eric Olson is the first Navy SEAL ever to be
nominated for a fourth star and also the first naval officer to
be nominated to command SOCOM. Admiral Olson has served for the
last several years as Deputy Commander of SOCOM. He has
commanded at every level from SEAL platoon to the Navy's
Special Warfare Force Commander. He has served in several
conflicts and operations, including as a United Nations (U.N.)
military observer in Israel, Egypt, and in Asia.
If confirmed, Admiral Olson will take command of our
Special Operations Forces (SOF) at a time of significant
expansion in mission, size, and budget and when operational
tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo are at historic highs,
threatening to jeopardize long-term readiness.
Mr. D'Agostino has been nominated to be the Under Secretary
of Energy for Nuclear Security and the Administrator of the
NNSA. If confirmed, he will have responsibility not only for
the nuclear weapons programs, but also for the nonproliferation
programs. We hope that Mr. D'Agostino will be as strong an
advocate for these programs as his predecessors have been.
NNSA has focused its efforts on securing and consolidating
nuclear weapons and nuclear radiological material so that they
are not stolen or lost to become nuclear weapons or dirty bombs
and to detect any such materials should an attempt be made to
move them from country to country. One of the most significant
challenges facing NNSA is detection capability, as the most
dangerous materials, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, are
the most difficult to detect.
These are all critically important positions and I look
forward to the testimony of our nominees. At this time I'd like
to call on Senator Warner for any comments he may have.
Senator?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join
you in welcoming these three distinguished individuals, each of
whom have indicated a willingness to continue their long public
service, and I commend the President for having chosen very
wisely. Also, I thank all family members who are present here
today and those in absentia. The nominees each duly
acknowledged that their careers are highly dependent upon the
family members for the support needed to carry out the
responsibilities, which often involve many long hours.
Mr. Chairman, you gave a very thorough biographical sketch
of each of these nominees. I will not go into more detail. I'll
just ask that the remarks of Senator McCain, the ranking
member, be placed in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain

Thank you, Senator Reed.
I join you in welcoming Admiral Olson, Mr. Vickers, Mr. D'Agostino,
and their families and congratulating them on their nominations.
The importance of the United States Special Operations Command and
the pivotal role our Special Operations Forces play in national defense
cannot be overstated.
The origins of the Special Operations Command can be traced to the
aborted Desert One operation of April 25, 1980. Largely due to the
efforts of this committee and our former colleagues, Senator William
Cohen and Senator Sam Nunn, 7 years later in April 1987, the Special
Operations Command was formed. Our Nation is indebted to these highly
trained and dedicated special operators who have to undergo such
rigorous training to prepare themselves for the duties they perform.
Admiral Olson, having served as the Deputy Commander of the Special
Operations Command since August 2003, you are well prepared to relieve
a great soldier, General Bryan Brown. If confirmed, you will be the
first Navy SEAL to lead the Special Operations Command and to achieve
4-star rank. You will follow in the steps of some superb officers,
including General Brown, General Hugh Shelton, General Wayne Downing,
General Peter Schoomaker, and others. I congratulate you on this
achievement.
Michael Vickers is a Senior Vice President for Strategic Studies at
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a public policy
research institute located in Washington, DC. Mr. Vickers served on
active duty as an Army Special Forces Officer and CIA Operations
Officer from 1973 to 1986. Mr. Vickers has been involved in numerous
special forces operations, and more recently, has worked with senior
officials on the Quadrennial Defense Review and ongoing operations. I
consider the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict to be one of the most important
in the Department, and thank you for your willingness to serve in this
capacity.
Mr. D'Agostino last came before the committee in February 2006 and
was confirmed for his current position as Deputy Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration for Defense Programs shortly
thereafter. As a result--at least in part--of his Navy service under
the leadership of Admiral Rickover and his experience in the NNSA and
the Stockpile Stewardship Program, Mr. D'Agostino has a clear vision
for the future of this organization, which, once again, this committee
was so involved in creating.
I thank each of our nominees and look forward to their testimony.

Senator Warner. I would say, though, Admiral Olson, I take
a special pride in seeing you occupy this position as the first
sailor to take over this very important segment of
responsibility of our Armed Forces. I go back to Desert One in
April 1980. I was then serving on this committee as the ranking
member, and Senator Bill Cohen and myself and Senator Nunn
literally took on the Pentagon and the establishment to create
the structural and legislative framework to provide for the
magnificent force we call the Special Operations Force today,
which have earned, once we laid the cornerstone, the dedication
and sacrifice of the men and women and their families. I want
to come back to that momentarily. They have built this force
into what it is, as have the succession of commanders that have
preceded you.
I'll never forget one time going down with General Bryan D.
Brown to attend a funeral service where we lost quite a number
of SOFs in a helicopter crash in an operational status in a
combat zone. One of the widows of one of the lost Special
Operations personnel addressed an audience in a building I
estimate housed 400 or 500 with another 400 or 500 outside,
watching on a TV screen.
It was one of the most riveting and most magnificent
statements I ever heard by an individual on the occasion of the
loss of a loved one. She explained the dedication of the wives
of SOFs, be they officers or enlisted. Of course, that's
throughout our military services, but I always remember that.
Also, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize General Brown's
service. I've had the privilege of working with him these many
years and he has a little picture in his office of a skinny
little second lieutenant operating a helicopter in Vietnam,
where he flew many combat missions. He's of a generation of
that war of which very few are left now, that has really proven
you can come all the way up through the ranks and take on these
major commands and finish it with great distinction.
So my salute to General Brown and his family on the
occasion of, I anticipate, your Senate confirmation.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
As I've noted, Secretary Bodman is here. Mr. Secretary, if
you want to make a comment.
Senator Warner. Mr. D'Agostino, would you yield your seat
for a moment.
This a wonderful occasion for you to come up, Mr.
Secretary. We're pleased.
Secretary Bodman. I'm here really as a symbol of my support
for Mr. D'Agostino and the fine job that I expect that he will
do in the future.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much for that.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Before we begin and take your opening statements, there are
standard questions which I will pose to all of you. I will ask
the question and then in turn from Mr. D'Agostino, Admiral
Olson, and Mr. Vickers get a response.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Mr. D'Agostino?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes.
Senator Reed. Admiral?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Mr. Vickers?
Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation
process?
Mr. D'Agostino. No, sir.
Admiral Olson. No, sir.
Mr. Vickers. No, sir.
Senator Reed. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
requests for the record in hearings?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, I will.
Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I will.
Senator Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and
briefers in response to Congressional requests?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, they will.
Admiral Olson. They will.
Mr. Vickers. They will, sir.
Senator Reed. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Mr. D'Agostino. I agree, sir.
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. There are two questions reserved for serving
military officers. Admiral Olson, I'll direct them to you. Do
you agree to give your personal views when asked before this
committee to do so, even if those views differ from the
administration in power, Admiral?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Reed. Do you agree to provide documents, including
copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner
when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult
with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay
or denial in providing such documents?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, I have been informed that the last question is
for everyone. I need not repeat it. I think you understand the
question, Mr. Vickers. Do you agree?
Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Reed. Mr. D'Agostino?
Mr. D'Agostino. I agree, sir. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Now, Mr. Vickers, if you have an opening
statement.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL G. VICKERS, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Mr. Vickers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to
come before you today for this confirmation hearing. I am
deeply honored by and grateful to President Bush for his trust
and confidence in nominating me for Assistant Secretary of
Defense for SO/LIC at this very difficult time in our Nation's
history.
I had the honor of serving with Secretary Robert Gates at
the CIA during the 1980s. I am deeply honored and grateful to
have been asked once again to serve under his leadership. I
want to express my sincere appreciation to you, Senator Reed,
and to you, Senator Warner, for your consideration of this
nomination. If confirmed, I will consult with you often, seek
your counsel, and take it seriously.
I would be remiss if I did not thank my wife Melana and my
daughters Alexandra, Natasha, and Sophia and my other daughters
who couldn't be with us today, Oksana and Kalyna, for their
love and support. I could not contemplate a return to
government service without it.
Our Nation and DOD face a number of extremely serious
challenges, at the forefront of which are the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, with other very serious challenges gathering on
the horizon. If confirmed by the Senate, under the
reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy I would have responsibility, as you noted, Senator
Reed, for oversight of the Department's core warfighting
capabilities, from SOFs to general purpose forces to strategic
forces. I regard this responsibility as a sacred trust. If I am
confirmed, I will do my best to prove worthy of that trust.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes my opening remarks.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Vickers.
Admiral Olson?

STATEMENT OF VADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND

Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and Senator
Inhofe, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I'm deeply honored by my nomination to serve in this
position. As Senator Warner mentioned, SOCOM was created by
this body just over 20 years ago, and the wisdom included in
the language that established the command has been proven many
times in and between many conflicts since then.
This Nation expects to have forces that can respond to the
sound of guns with speed, skill, and discipline whenever and
wherever they are needed. The Nation also expects to have
forces that can operate with knowledge and wisdom well ahead of
the sound of guns in order to prevent violence from erupting.
The Nation expects to have forces that can silently emerge from
darkness with precision and daring to conduct missions that are
especially demanding and sensitive.
If confirmed, I will train, organize, equip, deploy, and,
when directed, employ this force in balance across the spectrum
of traditional and irregular warfare missions. I will plan and
lead DOD activities in the global war on terror as directed by
the Secretary of Defense. I will also work to maintain balance
in the lives of our people, providing the quality support that
they and their families deserve.
I've been privileged to serve in SOFs for nearly all of my
34 years of commissioned service. I am awed by the dedication,
the courage, and the sacrifice of these great service men and
women, and I am humbled to be considered for assignment as
their commander.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. D'Agostino?

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO TO BE UNDER SECRETARY
FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Mr. D'Agostino. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and members
of the committee, I'm both humbled and honored to be the
President's nominee for Under Secretary for Nuclear Security
and Administrator of the NNSA. I appreciate the confidence
placed in me by Secretary Bodman, who's taken time out of his
very busy schedule to be here today. If confirmed, I'll work
closely with Congress and the administration as we continue to
assure the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear
weapons stockpile and to further our nonproliferation and naval
reactors goals and objectives.
I have a personal attachment to the NNSA and considerable
affection for the people that make up the organization. I have
worked with many of them over the years and have great respect
for all the things that they've accomplished. If confirmed, I
look forward to continuing to work with Congress on national
security missions of the NNSA.
I've been with the DOE's nuclear weapons program now for
over 14 years and have witnessed remarkable changes. I'm
particularly proud of the steps taken to fulfill the
President's direction to reduce the stockpile to nearly one-
half by 2012. As a result of dramatic improvements in
procedures, tools, and policies, we've also increased the rate
of nuclear weapons dismantlement by 50 percent over last year's
level and will continue at that highly sharper rate for the
rest of the year. We're ensuring that these weapons will no
longer be used again and thus demonstrating that the United
States is serious about our nonproliferation leadership role in
the global community.
Increasing the dismantlement rate of excess warheads is
also a key part of the NNSA's future plans to transform and
reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile and develop the supporting
infrastructure that is modern, smaller, more efficient, and
more secure to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Moving forward to evaluate whether or not we should pursue
a strategy of reliable replacements to our Cold War nuclear
warheads is also pivotal to realizing this vision. Increased
confidence in our stockpile from reliable replacement warheads
(RRWs) may result in even greater dismantlement rates, sending
a strong message to the rest of the world that we're taking
meaningful steps to developing the right size nuclear weapons
stockpile.
Our continued investments in nuclear deterrent will also
assure our allies and obviate any need for them to develop and
field their own nuclear forces. Finally, the improved security
features of the RRW will prevent unauthorized use should a
warhead ever fall into the hands of terrorists.
In the area of nonproliferation, NNSA now works with over
100 international partners to secure and reduce the quantity of
nuclear and radiological materials, bolster the border security
overseas, and strengthen the international nonproliferation and
export control regimes. We're conducting cutting edge research
and development into nuclear detection technologies to provide
the tools we need to detect and prevent proliferation.
Meeting our commitments in the Bratislava Agreement to
conclude security upgrade activities at Russian nuclear sites
by the end of 2008 is also one of our highest priorities. As a
result of our efforts to accelerate this work, we're well
positioned to successfully reach this milestone on schedule.
Service to the Nation is very important to me. I have over
29 years of military service in the United States Navy and over
17 years of civil service in the Department of Navy and in the
DOE. As an officer in the Navy, I was selected by Admiral Hyman
Rickover, and trained as a nuclear submarine officer, and in
this capacity I managed technically complex, high hazard
operations on board nuclear submarines. This training instilled
in me a commitment to safety, quality, discipline, and
integrity that are so important when dealing with nuclear
operations.
For all of my professional life, I've focused service in
support of our Nation's security. I'm privileged to have been
able to serve my country and am confident that my experience
will serve me well, if confirmed.
If confirmed, I'll bring integrity and perseverance to the
administrator position and to the men and women of the NNSA who
work so hard on the important task of preserving our Nation's
security. With your approval, it would be my great privilege to
lead NNSA as we meet our challenges to work towards a better
future.
Thank you for your consideration.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. D'Agostino.
I would propose 8-minute rounds and I presume we'll have
several rounds.
Senator Warner. I'll yield my time to the colleague from
Oklahoma.
Senator Reed. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, if I could. I'm ranking
member of Environment and Public Works Committee. We're having
a hearing that starts right now and I'm going to have to be
there. I'd like to ask just a couple questions maybe for the
record.
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate it very much.
First of all, Mr. Vickers. I've been very interested and
somewhat instrumental in the 1206 and 1207 and, of course, 1208
sections of the U.S. Code, as it refers to Special Operations,
the train and equip funding. Section 1206 is about a $300
million program that allows people to train and equip nations.
Section 1207 is a lesser amount and that has to do with
civilian activities. But section 1208 is only $25 million and
that is there for Special Operations.
I'd like to know your feelings about the adequacy of that
account and how significant the section 1208 funds are and
maybe get some comments from the other nominees, too.
Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir. All of the accounts and authorities
provided in them are very important. The sections 1206 and 1207
authorities are primarily for stability and reconstruction
operations so that we can move rather rapidly to train and
equip foreign security forces; and the section 1208 authority
is for dealing with irregular forces.
During Operation Enduring Freedom when we went into
Afghanistan, DOD did not have these authorities, which the CIA
has historically had, and we were, therefore, at a
disadvantage. Thanks to congressional action on this, DOD now
has a very important capability, which in my personal opinion
should be extended.
Senator Inhofe. Is the section 1208 adequate, though?
That's the question.
Mr. Vickers. Sir, my understanding is SOCOM in the past few
years has spent most of the funds, I believe about $15 million
or so. As we move to give greater emphasis to an indirect
approach for the war on terror and to a global unconventional
warfare campaign, that level may need to be revisited.
Senator Inhofe. That's my thinking here. Special Ops used
to be rather small. Right now it's growing more rapidly than
any other element out there.
Do you agree with that, Admiral Olson?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I can't say absolutely that they're
growing more rapidly than any other, but we are certainly
growing rapidly.
Senator Inhofe. Why don't you do this. You look at the
adequacy of the section 1208 and let us know if it looks like
it might be a problem.
[The information referred to follows:]

The original $25 million amount for section 1208 authority was the
result of an initial estimate made almost 4 years ago, based on early
experiences in Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance and our sense of
what future unconventional warfare requirements might look like. At
that time, assumptions were that 1208 operations would be of relatively
short duration. In fact, most 1208 operations cross fiscal years and
require sustained or increased funding in the follow-on years.
Consequently, at the beginning of each fiscal year, the amount of
unobligated 1208 authority available to conduct new operations is less
than $25 million.
It is very important to extend the 1208 authority in fiscal year
2008. There are operations planned in fiscal year 2008 and
approximately half of the 1208 authority is projected to pay the costs
of operations already approved by the Secretary of Defense. The current
$25 million is adequate for fiscal year 2008. However, as Mr. Vickers
noted during the hearing, the greater emphasis on the indirect approach
in the global war on terror may require this amount be revisited.

Senator Inhofe. Admiral Olson, we hear a lot about OPTEMPO,
we hear about the Guard and Reserve and the problems that
they're having right now. We don't hear that much about Special
Operations Forces in terms of their recruiting, retention,
morale, and the impact on those of OPTEMPO. Where are we on
that now?
Admiral Olson. Sir, generally speaking the OPTEMPO of SOFs
is on par with the Army and the Marine Corps that we have heard
so much about. We are programmed, if the budgets are approved,
to grow about 13,000 people over the next 5 years. That's a
rate at which we can absorb the growth. Our recruiting is
matching that. Our pipeline training is matching that. Our
retention is matching that. So we are on par to execute that
growth.
Senator Inhofe. Very good.
Mr. D'Agostino, in your statement you discuss nuclear
nonproliferation programs in the states of the former Soviet
Union and identify North Korea as the greatest unmet
nonproliferation problem. Chinese companies have been
sanctioned for selling weapons technology to countries,
including Iran. Is China an unmet nonproliferation problem?
Mr. D'Agostino. In my view, at this point no, they are not.
We're working with China on a number of activities.
Particularly we like to engage them in bolstering what we call
our second line of defense program, which is the put nuclear
detection capabilities at borders, and they're working with us
on that, as well as looking at warhead safety and security.
There's a lot more that we can do with China and I would say
we're in the early stages of engagement in that area.
Since it's not an area that I deal with in my current job,
it is something that I'll be looking at in particular as we
move forward.
Senator Inhofe. On the no nuclear testing program, for as
long as they have had that I've been concerned whether or not
we're actually keeping a credible nuclear deterrent. I'm sure
that other members will be asking the same question. What is
your feeling now?
Mr. D'Agostino. Sir, one of my primary responsibilities is
to ensure that we annually assess the stockpile using the tools
that have been authorized and appropriated over the past number
of years. We feel we have significant confidence in our
warheads. That doesn't mean to say that we don't worry about
it, because every year they do get 1 year older on average, and
therefore, as we do know, materials change over time.
However, the tools that we have right now have allowed us
to actually address some problems that we wouldn't be able to
address in the days when we had testing. So we have some new
insights.
Senator Inhofe. So you think that you have new tools now
that you didn't have before that would give us some level of
confidence that we have something that works?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. The tools we have now compared to
the tools we had a decade ago are significantly different.
Computing tools for modeling and simulation, experimental tools
to extract a tremendous amount of data about how materials
change over time, have literally increased by orders of
magnitude.
Challenges remain. We are in the final stages of bringing
all of these tools on line and that will be completed when we
get into experimentation on the National Ignition Facility.
That doesn't mean to say we won't uncover a technical problem
in the future, but I feel very comfortable now with where we
are in our stockpile.
Senator Inhofe. Good. Let me just echo what the chairman
and Senator Warner said. I just think the world of all three of
you and look forward to working with you in your new
capacities.
Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Mr. Vickers, you come to this job with an extraordinary
range of both operational and analytical experience in special
operations. Yours will be a job that has the principal
responsible duty for oversight of special operations. The
reorganization is proposing to give you this breathtaking range
of responsibilities, from strategic weapons systems to the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), to the RRW, to
transformation issues, and to major program functions.
Do you believe that it's within the letter and the intent
of the law that this new responsibility--since the current law
says it's the principal duty for oversight of special
operations-low intensity conflict, do you see it as a conflict
with title 10?
Mr. Vickers. Sir, I agree that it is a very expanded
portfolio in terms of capabilities of the Department. But in
terms of span of control, counternarcotics and detainee affairs
were moved out and strategic capabilities and transformation
and with that oversight of conventional forces were moved in. I
think that very much depends upon the background of the nominee
as to which would pose the greater challenge.
I believe section 138 of title 10 is explicitly clear on
the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC,
which is the primary duty of that ASD will be oversight of
SOFs, both policy and resources. I do believe that under the
reorganization that law can be adhered to in both letter and
spirit.
Senator Reed. The more I hear about this, the more
skeptical I become, frankly, because there is I think sort of
more of a correlation between detainee operations and Special
Operations, between counternarcotics and Special Operations.
But you're going to be asked, potentially, to opine upon
whether we'll have a replacement warhead, whether we'll enter
into the START negotiations--a whole host of issues which are
complex.
It begs the question whether or not, even though you will
try your best to be the principal or devote your time, but
you'll be pulled in several diametrically opposing directions.
I must say, given your experience in Special Operations, you're
clearly prepared for the existing role of the SO/LIC. I don't
know if anyone can fill the role that's been proposed by this
reorganization.
Do you have apprehension about your ability to weigh in
effectively on issues like strategic programs, space warfare,
missile defense, and at the same time devote yourself with
great energy to what is the most critical issue we face while
we're at war today, which is special operations against the
global war on terrorism?
Mr. Vickers. Sir, I believe the background that I have
enables me to weigh in and to use this reorganization to
accomplish very important things for this and future
administrations. For the past 15 years, I have spent a large
portion of my time focused on space operations, information
operations, and how they might evolve in the future,
transformation of strategic strike operations, and
transformation of the broad portfolio of DOD, and have been a
high-level advisor since 1997 to DOD on those issues.
I realize this is a very broad portfolio, but I believe it
will also strengthen SOFs by having, frankly, more clout in the
Pentagon. I would like to note that the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, who if I am confirmed would be my immediate
supervisor, has responsibility for all those capabilities plus
homeland defense plus global security affairs and regional and
global defense policy. So if he can handle that span of
control, I believe I can assist him in doing that, sir, and if
confirmed I would certainly do my best to do so.
Senator Reed. One of the presumptions we have is that he
has all this control because he has good subordinates like
yourself who are focused laser-like on Special Operations.
Admiral Olson, you're sort of looking from SOCOM up to DOD.
Do you have any concerns, not because of Mr. Vickers or anyone
else's capability, but just the fact that there'll be so many
different missions in that office, that you won't get the
attention you need?
Admiral Olson. Sir, if I'm confirmed as the Commander of
SOCOM I would consider it essential that the Assistant
Secretary continue to serve as a member of the board of
directors of United States Special Operations. The voting
members are only six and the Assistant Secretary obviously is a
key vote.
Second, I would consider it essential that careful and
personal oversight of Major Force Program 11 funds be
maintained at the Assistant Secretary level. I would be
concerned about a dispersion of responsibilities regarding
Special Operations across the Deputy and Assistant Secretaries
of Defense. But in conversation with the office, we're assured
that that won't happen, that the right level of attention will
be paid to Special Operations issues.
So at this point we're optimistic and looking forward to
working with the new organization.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Olson, there have been reports of detainee abuse by
special operators before Abu Ghraib, which raises the question
of essentially what are the rules of engagement or
interrogation that our special operators apply? Can you give
this committee assurances, as military officers and
noncommissioned officers, that they operate within the very
strict purview of the Geneva Convention?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. SOFs adhere to the same policies,
regulations, and laws as all the other forces operating in the
theater. The policies are set by the commander, in Iraq and
Afghanistan are set by the Commander of Central Command and
adhere to the Detainee Treatment Act, and SOFs fall under the
same provisions.
Senator Reed. So you would claim no special exception given
the nature of their operations? They would follow the same
guidance as regular forces, conventional forces?
Admiral Olson. Sir, there are no exceptions granted to SOFs
regarding interrogations.
Senator Reed. Mr. Vickers, your view?
Mr. Vickers. I agree with Admiral Olson, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. D'Agostino, let me ask a question about the stockpile
stewardship program. It has been operating now for 14 years.
What additional assets are planned for the program to enhance
its capabilities?
Mr. D'Agostino. Mr. Chairman, the focus over the next few
years will be to fully realize the capabilities of the machines
that are coming on line right now and will be over the next
year and a half or so, particularly the Dual Axis Radiographic
Hydrodynamic Test machine, which is at Los Alamos. That machine
will allow us to take a look at imploding materials and see how
they change over time and to use that data for our computing
codes.
We'll continue to need investments in our simulation and
modeling program, as we put forth in our President's budget
request. We'll continue to move forward on our National
Ignition Facility and fully realize that. I feel pretty
comfortable with that suite of tools. Then of course what it
will really take is experiments working on those machines and
extracting that data. That will keep us busy for a number of
years to come in the near future.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
I have additional questions, but let me now yield and turn
to Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to return to your
question regarding the detainees. I did not hear either of the
witnesses--I think it was just that they used the name of the
statute, but I'd like to have you reply about the Army Field
Manual. That will be the guiding document for the actual hands-
on by the troops in the field; is that correct, Admiral Olson?
Admiral Olson. That's correct, sir. It's Army Field Manual
2-22.3. It is the operative manual and our forces follow it.
Mr. Vickers. That is correct, sir.
Senator Warner. I think it's extremely important that we
have that in the record.
I think you've covered, Mr. Chairman, the question of the
reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy and how that leaves your portfolio. But you're
confident, Mr. Vickers, that at this point in time one man can
handle the whole realm of responsibilities; is that correct?
Mr. Vickers. I do believe that is correct, Senator Warner,
and I believe that it is important to set priorities within
these areas, particularly in the last year and a half of an
administration. But I believe that important things can be done
in each area, and I would be happy to discuss those other
areas, some of which Senator Reed mentioned--RRW, missile
defense, and transformation of conventional forces as well.
Senator Warner. Again, your segment of overall DOD
responsibility was pretty well carved out and created by
Congress. I would like to have you provide for the record
hopefully your commitment that you will come back to Congress,
in due consultation with the Secretary of Defense, a
magnificent man, that you will not only advise the Secretary,
but also Congress, so that it can take any legislative action
as necessary. Do we have that commitment from you?
Mr. Vickers. You do, sir.
Senator Warner. Good, all right.
Mr. Chairman, I was handed a note by one of our able staff
that our committee in the military construction commitment,
which I believe you have a hand in, plans to include in the
mark on Wednesday a cut to a SOCOM project. I'd like to get the
Admiral's view about that project. It is the Naval Special
Warfare Command Facility at Dam Neck, VA. That's curious; it's
in my State. I can't imagine how that coincidence is coming
about. [Laughter.]
It's in the President's budget for $94.5 million,
construction of a SEAL team operation facility. Could you tell
us a little bit about that project, Admiral Olson?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. One of our major
units is stationed at Dam Neck in Virginia Beach, VA. That is a
unit that is scheduled to grow in its operational capability by
about 33 percent over the next 5 years. That is an essential
facility. It is a $94 million facility because it supports both
staff and operational aspects of what that unit does.
Senator Warner. I thank you. I have a detailed letter here,
which incidentally arrived on your desk this morning, Mr.
Chairman. At your opportunity would you take a look at it and
so advise me as to how you feel about that project?
Senator Reed. I'd be delighted, Senator.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Admiral, for that little bit.
Now to Mr. D'Agostino. I enjoyed very much our visit
yesterday reminiscing about Admiral Rickover.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Indeed, I had and still will always have
the highest regard for him. You're a survivor of that system.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. As a matter of fact, he, in your own words,
threw you physically out of his office twice, saying that he
was doubtful that you were up to submarine standards. But
somehow you managed to win his confidence and went on to have a
very extraordinary career in the United States Navy in the
submarine force, and now you take on this responsibility.
Let me draw to your attention that in 2000, Congress
created the NNSA as an outgrowth principally of concerns about
the security of the nuclear weapons labs. NNSA used to have
somewhat of an independence within the DOE.
Are you cognizant of that background?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, I am.
Senator Warner. You studied under your predecessor for some
period of time, did you not?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Warner. Did the concept of some sort of unwritten
but nevertheless de facto independence work to your
satisfaction?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. I think it has worked and I think
it will continue to improve our relationships. The way I look
at the relationship with the rest of the Department, we
particularly rely on the office led by Glenn Podonsky, who
provides an independent oversight element to our program and
gives me direct input. I talk to Mr. Podonsky at least once a
week, sometimes twice a week, as he has folks that are looking
not only within the NNSA but across the rest of the Department.
That independent look at the program, as well as my own
security organization, allows me to provide and do that
balancing and risk management that's so important.
I do think one of the areas that I'll be spending some time
on over the next 18 months or so, the acting Administrator
right now, Bill Ostendorff, has worked up a set of special
focus areas, and the area that Bill and I both believe needed
additional attention, me in my responsibility as the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs, is how we do oversight of
security, how we do oversight of nuclear safety, and how we do
oversight of cyber security.
So our relationship with the Department will allow us an
opportunity to really improve on that.
Senator Warner. You're fortunate to have a Secretary at the
head of your Department who understands this and has made it
work since the day he took over this job. You're fortunate in
that capacity. To have you here, Mr. Secretary, attending this
morning is a special honor to the committee.
I'd like to have, at this point in time, your own
assessment of the security at the various laboratories. They're
national assets, those labs, and this committee has taken a
special interest in them through the years while the DOE and
indeed the Committee on Energy in this Congress has sort of
joint responsibility. We each year as a rule have the lab
directors up to talk with them.
Give us your current assessment of the security
arrangements at the labs today and whether or not you feel in
your tenure you have to take some initiatives to strengthen it.
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely. Right now, I'm fairly
comfortable with the physical security element of where we are
with our laboratories, as well as our production sites. These
organizations get a fairly rigorous review by the security
organization within the NNSA, as well as Mr. Podonsky's
organization. There are clearly areas that need improvement
across the complex. We know what those areas are and we're
going to be focusing on those particular areas, as I mentioned
earlier.
I think there is an area that the Secretary and I and Mr.
Ostendorff will be spending more time on. I don't want to speak
for the Secretary, but I do know that the area of cyber
security is an area that concerns us greatly, because it's not
just the materials that we worry about, it's the information
about what to do with those materials that is something we need
to protect almost with the same level of rigor and attention.
Senator Warner. I want you to provide for the record
further details. I have but a minute left for the last question
on my first round to Mr. Vickers.
[The information referred to follows:]

What progress has NNSA made in improving physical security of the
Nuclear Weapons Complex?
One of the major challenges facing the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) has been, and remains, ensuring nuclear weapons
and special nuclear materials (SNM) in our care are well protected,
while at the same time, accessible for use in meeting the critical work
activities of our national security missions--maintaining a safe,
reliable, and credible nuclear deterrent, supporting the Nation's
nuclear nonproliferation efforts, and advancing energy security. I am
pleased to report that tremendous progress has been made to improve the
capability and readiness of our sites in meeting the post-September 11
terrorism threat. Over the past several years, in response to the
Department's 2003 Design Basis Threat (DBT) Policy, NNSA has taken
significant and sustained actions to improve the physical security at
each of the sites within the complex. Our upgrades have focused on
hardening our facilities from outside attack, employing security
technologies that provide us stronger defenses, and improving the
survivability and lethality of the protective forces we rely on to
defeat the terrorist threat. The net effect of the upgrades, which are
outlined below, is a robust and well-defended security posture across
the NNSA's diverse set of facilities and operations. I am particularly
pleased to report that our success in meeting the 2003 DBT Policy has
been independently confirmed by the Department's Inspector General and
by staff from the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Health, Safety,
and Security. While I am pleased with the work that has been
accomplished, there is more to do. The next challenge is to take this
strong physical security foundation and begin to implement upgrades
necessary to meet the requirements of the 2005 DBT Policy. We have
committed to the Department that we will meet these new requirements by
the end of fiscal year 2011.

NNSA PHYSICAL SECURITY UPGRADES

Upgrades Completed to Meet the 2003 Design Basis Threat Policy
The aggressive action taken by the NNSA field staff, both Federal
and contractor, has changed the face of security at each of the sites.
Over the past 3 years, we have invested over $277 million in security
upgrades at NNSA sites. Completed upgrades include:

Implemented a denial protection strategy designed to
ensure that adversaries are prevented from completing an on-
site in-situ improvised nuclear device (IND). All of our
Category I SNM sites moved from a strategy of containment and
now have in place denial strategies that seek to interdict and
destroy an enemy attack before adversaries can gain access to a
nuclear weapon or complete the assembly of an on-site IND.
Recapture/recovery plans are also in place to ensure our
security forces do not allow an adversary to escape with SNM.
Provided the DOE security police officers with armored
vehicles and heavy caliber weapons that significantly increase
their survivability and lethality. Armor-penetrating ammunition
and ballistically protected fighting positions also contributed
to improving their effectiveness. The increased security police
officer survivability has made site defenses stronger, while
minimizing the need to hire more security officers to account
for the expected attrition that would be a natural result of
the increased adversary force. Greater firepower also enables
the protective forces to defeat the adversary before they can
accomplish their mission.
Improved training capabilities by expanding training
ranges and support facilities: developing additional tactical
training courses, hiring instructors, and beginning the shift
to the ``Elite Forces'' model. This initiative will transform
our protective forces into a tactically oriented force, well
trained in the small team and weapons tactics needed to fight
in the current environment.
Used highly effective low-tech measures to upgrade the
physical security features of our sites. We installed physical
barriers around key approaches to sites and critical facilities
to provide increased standoff distances and to delay vehicle
and personnel movement. The standoff barriers also serve to
mitigate the effects of a vehicle bomb attack against key
facilities.
Employed technology solutions as force multipliers to
improve site defenses, including the critical aspects of
detection, assessment, delay, and response. We now have
tactical control over wider areas surrounding our nuclear
materials storage and processing facilities.
Worked to aggressively reduce the footprint associated
with SNM storage and processing operations. We removed Category
I SNM from Technical Area at Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL), greatly improving the effectiveness of the security
mission at LANL. We made great strides in reducing the number
of SNM target locations at Y-12 and the ongoing construction of
the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF) will
drive even further target area reductions.
Upgrades Planned to Meet the 2005 Design Basis Threat Policy
The 2005 DBT Policy represents an increase in the terrorist
adversary force of as much as 75 percent over the 2003 DBT levels.
While this is a large increase in threat capability, the 2003 DBT
upgrades outlined above have greatly improved the defenses at our NNSA
nuclear facilities. From this strong foundation, NNSA plans to invest
in physical security upgrades that will keep our sites among the best-
defended and most secure facilities in the world.

Construction of high security facilities, such as
HEUMF at Y-12 and the Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security
Upgrades Project at LANL.
Implementation of Complex 2030 as the long-term
configuration for a modernized Nuclear Weapons Complex. Complex
2030 to continue storage and processing consolidation efforts,
while also pursuing purpose-built facilities with built-in high
security features.
Continued SNM consolidation, particularly the
continuation of efforts at Y-12 to reduce the number of SNM
targets and elimination of Category I/II SNM from Sandia
National Laboratories by the end of fiscal year 2008.
Facility and target location hardening through
installation of standoff barriers and other physical upgrades.
Additional utilization of technology to augment the
detection, delay, and attrition of attacking forces.

Achieve detection further from our traditional
security boundaries.
Channel the adversary to pre-determined choke
points.
Mitigate the effects of vehicle borne
improvised explosive devices.
Engage the threat at longer distances and with
greater efficiency.
Increase the survivability of site protective
forces.
Fail-safe lethal denial systems.
Compartmentalization of vital planning
information.
Enhance command, control, and communication.
Enhance the tactical response capabilities of
the protective force.

Where necessary, hire additional protective forces to
counter the increased adversary force sizes.

Senator Warner. I don't know whether you had the
opportunity, Mr. Vickers, to read in the New York Times today
an article by Michael Gordon. Mr. Gordon was accompanying
Admiral William Fallon, the Central Command Commander, on a
visit to Iraq. All too often we focus our attention on General
David Petraeus. In no way do I suggest anything but the highest
regard for the General, but this Admiral is the top boss in
that region.
I presume in consultation with our President he made this
special trip down to meet with Prime Minister Maliki to, as
described by this article, realistically assess the situation
as of today and to remind Prime Minister Maliki that Congress
just a few weeks ago enacted and the President signed into law
a requirement that the President report to Congress on July 15
with regard to the situation in that AOR, specifically Iraq.
Of course, integral to that report will be the President's
assessment with regard to his January 10 surge situation. Now,
as I and others look at the surge, it is too early to say
exactly the measure of success, but in terms of the performance
of the men and women of the military, I think the surge has
demonstrated absolutely superb dedication and sacrifice on
their part. There's no doubt about that.
But the underlying purpose for the surge was to provide a
security situation in the capital of Iraq such that the
government could begin, with greater vigor, strength and
conviction, exercise the reins of sovereignty.
Now, I want to make a careful separation. The Armed Forces
are doing their job, but only a third of Baghdad has really
been subjected to the January 10 doctrine of the President.
Currently, the military is proceeding to do the balance as
additional troops have been added. But the thing about it is
the military is doing its job; the missing element is that the
government is not taking advantage of such increased security
as brought about by the surge to date and it's failing, in my
judgment, to exercise the degree of sovereignty necessary to
begin to pull Iraq out of this abyss it's sinking into.
This is set forth very clearly in this article. I'm going
to ask that part of the article be placed in today's record if
that's possible, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Warner. Did you have an opportunity to read the
article?
Mr. Vickers. I did, sir, and I concur with your assessment.
Senator Warner. Could you advise the committee, drawing on
your many years of experience in dealing with that region and
understanding of the culture and the nature of the people of
Iraq? It's rather unique. What do you portend for the future?
Is there a likelihood that the people are going to come to the
realization that we are there making these enormous sacrifices
for their benefit?
Mr. Vickers. We certainly hope so, Senator Warner. As you
pointed out, we are making enormous sacrifices to give them the
opportunity to do just that. But ultimately it must be the
Iraqis who decide what the future of Iraq will be. One of the
worrisome signs right now, besides the lack of progress on the
essential political front, is that sectarian identities are
hardening and have continued to harden, and therefore the link
between military operations and political outcome is not having
the full effect at this point in time that we would all hope
for.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
I wanted to first of all commend all of you gentlemen for
your willingness to serve our country and thank you for doing
so. I look forward to your confirmation.
I am delighted, Admiral, that we'll be keeping you in
Florida. As I told you when we had an opportunity to visit,
we're delighted that you're at SOCOM. We are so pleased that
you're housed at MacDill Air Force Base, where we hope that if
at any time we can be of assistance to you in making sure that
the State is being as hospitable as it can be that you would
let us know. We're very proud of our facilities there and happy
to be working with you.
My questions to you, Admiral, would be in the vein of how
do we help you make things better for SOCOM? I know that we're
facing a time in this situation that we are in the world where
increasing demands are being placed on your forces. My question
to you is how are you transforming and utilizing the resources
that you have to ensure that there is a SOCOM that is fully
capable to meet the asymmetric or irregular warfare that we're
in today?
Admiral Olson. Thank you, Senator Martinez. We are growing
significantly. We are growing a little bit over 13,000 people
in our force over the next 5 years. Continued support for the
budget request is the most helpful thing that this body can
provide SOCOM. We are programmed to grow at about the rate we
can absorb the growth. We are on track to do that. But it will
take continued careful monitorship and careful management of
our growth.
We are continuing to assess the very careful balance that
has to be sustained between direct and indirect actions in this
new world in which we live. We understand well that it is the
indirect actions that will be decisive, but the direct actions
are very important in order to enable the indirect actions to
have time to take their decisive effect. So continued support
for all of our components who are engaged in both direct and
indirect activities and support for our major platforms,
equipment items, to enable them to do the extremely demanding
things that we ask them to do is how this body can best serve
SOCOM.
Senator Martinez. On the issue of the budget, is the
President's budget request adequate in your opinion to meet
your needs?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Martinez. We're looking at equipment as well as
manpower, and I wanted to ask a question on each of those
things. On the equipment front, I know that fixed wing aircraft
has been something that you have needed. Mr. Vickers, please
feel free to comment if you would like. Where are we in terms
of meeting your needs for fixed wing aircraft? Explain to the
committee, if you would, why you have such a need and what, if
anything, we should be doing to help you?
Admiral Olson. Thank you, sir. The primary fixed wing
aircraft in Special Operations' inventory consist of several
variants of the C-130 Hercules aircraft, an old design that's
been upgraded over the years. But we are flying some that are
quite old, and a modernization program, a recapitalization
program, for our older model C-130s is essential. We are
working very closely with the Air Force to enable that.
The Air Force provides our fixed wing platforms and then we
invest our MFP-11 dollars to modify them to accomplish their
Special Operations-peculiar tasks. So this is a very carefully
negotiated acquisition process with the Air Force in fixed wing
aircraft, and with each of the Services, for those platforms
that are in common service within the Services, but for which
we have a Special Operations-peculiar modification requirement.
We have an immediate requirement for 37 modernized
aircraft. In working with the Air Force, we have in our budget
request enough funds to accommodate 20 of those across the
future years development plan and to deliver 12 within that
plan. Ideally there would be more rapid growth, but that is a
satisfactory growth rate for us.
Senator Martinez. In terms of manpower needs, one of the
things that I know you need is language and cultural training,
as well as simply just the manpower needs. In other words, is
recruitment up to speed? Is it what you want it to be? Are we
maintaining the level of folks coming into the force that you
need for this growth? Can you touch on the issue of language
and cultural training?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. Our manpower is a combination of
our recruitment efforts, our pipeline training efforts, and our
retention efforts. All three of those are on track in order to
accomplish the growth that we have requested and which has been
programmed for us should the budget be approved.
We have made significant changes in our schoolhouse
infrastructures in order to expand the pipeline opportunities.
In some of our schoolhouses we have doubled and almost tripled
our output of SOFs over the last couple of years. This body has
supported retention benefits that have had a great deal of
success in retaining our most senior and experienced people to
stay beyond the point at which they may have retired, to extend
them another 5 or 6 years of service, so that we are growing
the force rapidly without paying too high a price in terms of
making the force more youthful or less mature in its experience
level by retaining these long-serving members of our force.
All that is on track, sir, and I'm very optimistic that we
will meet our growth goals.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, sir.
I'm finished, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome to the process, all of you. I'd like to say first
of all to the presiding Senator that he and I both have had the
benefit of military service and then transitioning into
civilian policy. I think that's a tremendous benefit. I was
gratified, looking in the bios of the individuals here, that
all of them have spent time in the military, understanding all
the dimensions of that before moving into the civilian side.
I'd like to say that I think that's a great thing when we're
looking at the types of jobs that you will be doing.
I have had the opportunity to speak with Admiral Olson on
more than one occasion when he was testifying. I also enjoyed
our visit yesterday. I look forward to visiting with the other
two of you at some point. In the mean time, I'll be looking at
your materials here.
I'd like to congratulate Admiral Olson on becoming the
first four-star Special Operations Commander from the Navy
side. It's a great historical achievement.
I have one question that I would address to the Admiral,
also to Mr. Vickers, and it goes to an area of concern that
we've been seeing a lot, expressed a lot in the media, and also
from people who have a good deal of experience over in Iraq and
Afghanistan. That is the seam that is sort of blurring between
what our Special Operations people are doing and what
activities are being contracted out to private contractors,
such as Blackwater, Triple Canopy, and those sorts of
companies.
Part of this concern is operational, but also a part of it
is jurisdictional in terms of who has responsibility for
potential misconduct and those sorts of things. I'd like to
hear both of your perspectives on this.
Admiral Olson. Thank you, Senator Webb. I'll go first.
United States SOCOM employs a number of contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan, but all of them are employed in providing
services. They are helping us repair small arms, they're
helping with aircraft maintenance, they are helping with our
supply maintenance and those sorts of issues. We do not have
any contractors who are employed in any operational roles, sir.
Senator Webb. Do you work in conjunction with contractors
who are in operational roles?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I haven't been to the theater recently,
so I can't answer that with certainty. If confirmed, I will
certainly look into that. We have an informal relationship with
many of those contractors because we know who they are, having
been a supplier of many of the people who they hire. But in
terms of a formal working relationship with contractors in the
theater in an operational capacity, sir, I would take that as a
priority if confirmed and study it.
Senator Webb. I think it's a serious problem in a lot of
different ways. One of them being how the civilian societies
that we're working in view Americans. Over and over again I see
these stories of misconduct, and I'm not alleging widespread
misconduct, among these private contractors. But there are
incidents and if you're on the receiving end sometimes it's
difficult to see whether that person was actually an American
military person or in many cases not even an American, but a
foreigner using firepower without proper discretion, et cetera,
et cetera.
I would be curious to see in what areas there are
interactions and how that's worked out.
Mr. Vickers?
Mr. Vickers. I would underscore, sir, what Admiral Olson
said and just add that this is not an area that I have studied
in great depth, but what I have looked at, the American
military relies very heavily on contractors for all sorts of
things, logistics support and others, and there has been some
migration into some operational tasks, principally protective
security details that have been outsourced, which then carries
a whole range of other implications.
The quality of private contractors varies substantially.
Some are really first-rate and others less so as we move into
this new world. But I firmly believe that, while contractors
have a very useful role to play, it must be a confined role to
avoid the confusion that you mentioned in your remarks, sir.
Senator Webb. We're seeing a continual blurring of the
lines of an expansion of functions. We just voted out a bill in
this committee that arguably would put civilian contractors
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice if they are in an
operational environment. There's two strong concerns about that
as it plays out in reality, if it were to play out in reality.
The first is how do you really do that? Having sat on a few
courtmartials in my life, how do you convene a courtmartial for
a civilian with the sanctions that are in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice? You can't give them a bad conduct discharge.
What are they accepting in that scenario?
The other thing is, what is the perception about these
people who are wearing military uniforms, carrying arms, not
really in the military, but they're far enough into the
military that they're actually under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice? This is a situation I don't think we have
ever been in before. Part of it's driven by end strength
concerns and that sort of thing. But it's something that,
particularly in your area of responsibility, I think bears very
close watching.
I wish you the best and I'm happy to receive from all three
of you any communications if you have concerns where you think
we need to be taking a harder look at things.
Mr. Vickers. Thank you, sir.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Webb.
We will have a second round.
Mr. D'Agostino, without overly simplifying your
responsibilities, two major issues are the life extension
program to ensure the reliability of the stockpile and
consideration of a new RRW.
Mr. D'Agostino. That's right, sir.
Senator Reed. Lurking in all those issues is this notion
also of testing, to try to, if at all possible, definitely to
avoid testing. So it raises the question, at least in my mind,
if the life extension program can be maintained adequately and
we can ensure the reliability of the existing weapons, what is
the urgency for a RRW?
Mr. D'Agostino. I think the urgency is a matter of urgency
in being able to look into whether a RRW strategy is an
appropriate strategy to proceed forward. What we've learned
over the last few years, and particularly most recently in our
life extension, which in a sense is a special type of a life
extension--it's a life extension that replaces components
exactly the same way they were manufactured, in the exact same
fashion they were manufactured 30, 40, 50 years ago, and
designed 30, 40, 50 years ago.
What we've learned within the life extension program is
this is very expensive. It's very difficult to do technically
because in many cases we're bringing on manufacturing processes
that have been dormant for over 2 decades. In many cases these
are manufacturing processes, because we want to replicate them
exactly the way they've been done in the past, that don't have
what I would call the respect for the environment and worker
safety that we've learned over the last couple of decades in
being able to build things in a much smaller, more modern way,
with less impact.
So this has given us an opportunity to look at components,
and essentially RRW is a life extension because it's to replace
a warhead that has the same form, fit, and function. It's
carried on the exact same delivery platform. The only
difference is it is a different design and the design is going
to emphasize safety, using an insensitive high explosive
instead of conventional high explosives. It's a design that
will emphasize security. It will allow us to introduce high
technology security into a warhead. Those are technologies that
didn't exist 20, 30, 40 years ago when these systems were
designed and we are in a different security environment right
now than we were 3 or 4 decades ago.
It's going to allow us to introduce what we call
performance margin, which is another way of saying increase the
reliability of the components themselves to ensure that we
don't need to test that nuclear explosive package in the case
of materials aging questions as they come up.
The stockpile stewardship program has given us an
opportunity to study these, our existing Cold War stockpile, in
a way that says, does it make sense to introduce more security
into a warhead? I think the answer is yes. Does it make sense
to add additional safety into a warhead? I think the answer is
yes. So we take a look at that, and that's why we would like to
proceed forward, spend some money doing, not actually building
a warhead in the next year or 2, but actually doing the cost,
scope, and schedule studies necessary to determine whether it's
a good strategy or not.
Senator Reed. With respect to testing, if you came to the
conclusion that you could not produce this RRW without testing,
your recommendation would be not to produce it?
Mr. D'Agostino. That would be my recommendation, sir. If
confirmed, I would operate within a group called the Nuclear
Weapons Council, and that's how I'd like to move forward.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Olson, in your written testimony you said that the
biggest challenges facing you would include management of
Special Operations personnel and an unclear definition
authority that makes it hard for SOCOM to plan and synchronize
the war against terrorists. Can you elaborate on those two
concerns?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. In terms of the authorities for
management of the people, the Commander of SOCOM, in the
language of title 10, is held responsible for the combat
readiness of SOF, but he does not have full authority to manage
how that force is promoted, how they are schooled, or how they
are paid. So we have disparity across our force with the
different Service components in terms of pay scales and
promotion rates.
The language of the law says that the commander is
responsible for monitoring the management of Special Operations
personnel, but he has limited authority to actually execute
management of personnel. So it would bear careful study and
careful consideration and, if confirmed, I certainly would not
want to replace the Service responsibilities with respect to
personnel management, but I would seek a way by which the
United States SOCOM could better influence the management of
Special Operations personnel to achieve greater equity across
the force.
In terms of the second point, the Commander of SOCOM is
charged by the Secretary of Defense and by the President in the
Unified Command Plan as the lead combatant commander for
planning and synchronizing DOD activities in the global war on
terror. We are in a process of coordinating closely with the
Joint Staff, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with
the other combatant commanders around the globe, on how
actually to conduct the activities associated with those
responsibilities.
This is a challenge, the solution for which resides within
DOD. It is a new task, a new challenge for SOCOM, one that we
are still growing into, but I don't see any obstacles that we
can't overcome. It's just a matter of taking the right actions
in order to ensure that we are able to meet the expectations of
the Secretary of Defense and the President.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Vickers, I sound like a broken record, but I am still
highly skeptical of your newly expanded version of your job. I
would presume that in this new version of the SO/LIC
responsibilities you would have to coordinate with Air Force
Space Command. Is that something you anticipate doing?
Mr. Vickers. As a component command of Strategic Command,
yes, sir, much as with the Service Special Operations Commands.
But the principal relationship would be with the Commander of
Strategic Command.
Senator Reed. Again, I am skeptical because our assumption,
at least my simple assumption, was your principal combatant
commander that you talk to would be Admiral Olson and he'd be
the one and only. I don't want to wax poetic here, but you're
going to have a relationship now with Strategic Command.
General Henry Obering, head of the National Missile Defense
Agency, I assume you'll now have to establish some type of
working relationship there. Is that your view?
Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir, although the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy are right now heavily engaged
in missile defense negotiations and missile defense policy, and
so I believe, if confirmed, I would have some relief in the
missile defense area and my role would be more of a supporting
one, because the missile defense negotiations are very intense
right now and, given the both letter and spirit of section 138
of title 10, one has to set priorities.
Senator Reed. I could go down a list of other major
responsibilities you'll have. I see you putting yourself or
volunteering to be put in perhaps an impossible situation where
you can't serve all these different demands. To me, the clear
intent of Congress was to make it clear that your principal--
perhaps we should have said sole--responsibility would be for
the Special Operations-Low-Intensity Conflict.
Mr. Vickers. If I may, Senator, since Congress established
the ASD SO/LIC, various functions have moved in and out of
there, some less demanding, some more demanding: Western
hemisphere, regional policy toward South America,
counternarcotics, detainees, humanitarian assistance, and de-
mining. The difficulty of those has risen over time. Again, I
think it somewhat depends on the qualifications and background
of the nominee.
As I think Senator Warner pointed out, this reorganization
is a work in progress. Future administrations may choose, as
prior administrations have, to reorganize differently. But I
think there are some synergies that can be had at a high level
from having some oversight of other combatant commanders.
For example, SOCOM and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) now
share responsibility for civil affairs and psychological
operations oversight, SOCOM for overall proponency and support
of SOF, JFCOM for the conventional forces. Both Strategic
Command and SOCOM have large information operations missions.
So I believe that some synergies can be achieved by working
with both commanders, much as, if confirmed, my superiors in
DOD do as well.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Vickers.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me express my
appreciation to all of you gentlemen for your willingness to
serve. We look forward to getting you through this process and
confirmed. Admiral Olson, congratulations on being the first
Navy officer to serve at SOCOM.
I do have a question regarding the global war on terror,
which we all realize I think requires a different strategy for
countering the enemy than what was required in previous wars,
and SOCOM plays an integral role in that, and the need to
attack political, economic, social causes in conjunction with
the military effort that is ongoing. For that to happen, I
think there has to be a close relationship between SOCOM and
other government agencies that are essential for
counterterrorism and to conduct ongoing operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and other areas.
The global war on terror is not limited to the military and
does require actions by other government agencies. I guess what
I'd like to know is if you could discuss a little bit about how
you might expand the effort to synchronize with other
government agencies and departments with respect to fighting
the war on terror.
Admiral Olson. Thank you, Senator Thune. That's a very good
question. I think you've hit at the heart of something that's
very important to ultimate success in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
United States SOCOM does and will continue to coordinate very
closely with other agencies of government. We understand that
military actions alone will not lead to success, that it needs
to be a team effort. We are in the early stages of implementing
what we have defined as an interagency partnership plan which
will place over 100 liaison officers from SOCOM in other
agencies, primarily in the Washington area.
At the same time, we wake up every day in our headquarters
in Tampa with over 100 liaison officers from other agencies
represented on our compound at every level, attending the
morning meetings at a senior level and giving their personal
and their organizations' input in terms of advice to the
commander on the way ahead.
So we do have access to other agencies' ways of thinking.
We have access to some of their databases. We have access to
some of their plans and intent. All of this is very helpful in
enabling SOCOM to perform its duties as the lead combatant
command for planning and synchronizing the global war on
terror.
Senator Thune. I'd like to ask Mr. Vickers to comment on
that as well. You're a former CIA officer and Green Beret. How
would you expand interagency activities and synchronize efforts
with other government agencies and departments, particularly
CIA and State?
Mr. Vickers. Sir, I think the relationship between SOFs and
the CIA is a particularly important one for the global war on
terror. It is certainly no accident since the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, that the two organizations that have
probably grown substantially, if not the most, as Admiral Olson
has said, are the CIA and our SOFs.
Both of course are having challenges managing that growth,
but that growth is essential to a favorable outcome in this
war. I believe there are things we can do to build that
relationship further, to expand it to a larger portion of the
SOF force than has been done before, and to synchronize our
efforts better. We synchronize efforts from the national
implementation plan of the National Counterterrorism Center,
down through Admiral Olson as the lead combatant commander for
the war on terror, and then down to our commanders in the
field.
I believe we also need to make improvements at the sub-
region level--where we have interagency joint task forces, for
example, in the Horn of Africa, offering a model that can be
built upon--and at the country-team level. Terrorism occurs
globally, it occurs sub-regionally, and it occurs within
countries, and we need to adapt our institutions to make that
work.
In stability and reconstruction operations, we need to
build capabilities in other parts of the Department, like the
Department of State, and if confirmed I would work very hard on
doing that as well, sir.
Senator Thune. I appreciate that and would encourage those
efforts to continue. My impression, having been to Iraq several
times and Afghanistan, is that one of the components that's
been missing, I think, in our overall efforts has been some of
the ``soft power'' that we can bring. I even look at
agricultural efforts. I come from an agricultural State and I
look at the types of things that they could raise and grow in
Afghanistan besides poppies and think that there is a real
missed opportunity there.
In asking questions about what sort of involvement we have
from our U.S. Department of Agriculture in Afghanistan, I was
somewhat surprised that there wasn't more of an intensive
effort being made to educate people there about the types of
things that they could do for their economy and really create
some economic opportunity for the agricultural sector outside
of the things that they're growing today, which are a
detriment, I think, to the things that they need as a country
to move forward and things obviously we'd like to see
accomplished there.
Mr. Vickers, I wanted to ask you a question about the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). CBO has recommended
terminating the Airborne Laser (ABL) as a viable budget option.
My question is do you support that recommendation and if not
why do you believe that the ABL's continued development is
important to our missile defense strategy and how will it
enhance our capabilities?
Mr. Vickers. Sir, I do not support the CBO recommendation.
I think, while the jury is still out on ABL, it is very
important to progress through 2009, when we are scheduled to
have our first lethal shot test. The ABL, which has been under
development for some time, will provide an important boost
phase intercept capability that currently we lack in our other
portions of our layered missile defenses, and it will provide,
assuming it's operationally effective, a magazine load of 40
shots, for approximately $10,000 a shot. By comparison, our
lowest theater air defense rounds, the PAC-3, are about $3
million a shot. So it would be very effective potentially--
providing speed of light response. As with most new weapons,
once you develop them you find other uses for them that were
not envisioned at the time. I think we ought to continue with
research and development and go forward at least to 2009 so we
can see just how well it works.
Senator Thune. I appreciate that.
Thank you all very much for your answers.
Mr. Chairman, thank you and I look forward to seeing that
this process moves forward and we can get all these gentlemen
confirmed. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Warner?
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to address this question jointly to Mr. Vickers
and Admiral Olson. I draw to your attention a New York Times
article this Monday, June 11, or at least it came into my
possession today, written by John Burns out of Iraq, who's a
very competent reporter. It's a marvel how he's lasted.
The title is ``U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old al
Qaeda Allies.'' Now, given that the SOFs have had the primary
mission of dealing with al Qaeda, I think it's important that
we take a look at this thing. This is a very dramatic turn of
events, at least in the judgment of this humble Senator, where
we're going to now arm one side of this sectarian violence,
i.e. Sunni, because there has been some progress made in the al
Anbar Province, that the Sunnis are coming to the realization
that they should be fighting al Qaeda as strongly as the
coalition forces and principally the U.S. are fighting al
Qaeda.
But as I've done my studies of this situation over now 5
years, I think some of these citizens of Iraq will turn on a
dime and 1 day they're your friend and the next day they're
your enemy. I don't know the extent to which either of you
looked at this, but I'm going to encourage you to do so and
come back and provide for the record your own views on this
policy.
To the best of my understanding, Mr. Chairman--I consulted
with our senior staff--no one up here knew anything about this
dramatic change of policy before it was published here in the
press. It seems to me we ought to have some sort of a test case
before we in a widespread manner begin to provide arms to
certain segments of the Sunni population to purportedly fight
al Qaeda.
I'm asking you to provide it for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. Vickers. Enlisting Sunni tribes in the fight against al Qaeda
in Iraq (AQI) represents a major strategic success. Defeating AQI is a
principal U.S. war aim, and the Sunni population and its tribal
militias are the principal instruments through which the conflict must
and will be fought. Enlisting former Sunni insurgents in the fight
against AQI reduces, though by no means does it eliminate, risk to U.S.
forces in the near-term, and it better positions the U.S. to secure its
interests in Iraq over the longer-term. I support the limited policy of
providing support to former Sunni insurgents in the fight against AQI.
It would be preferable, in an ideal world, to not have armed militias,
but not having them could result in much less effective operations
against AQI in present-day Iraq. To be sure, providing support to
former Sunni insurgents is not without risk. There is always the risk
that former Sunni insurgents could use their weapons to attack U.S.
forces, or they could provide weapons to AQI. I believe these risks are
manageable, and that various measures--the provision of advisors and
tracking of weapons--can be adopted to ensure compliance. I do not
believe, moreover, that the policy of providing limited small arms
support to Sunni tribal militias who join the fight against AQI will
have a material adverse impact on the future stability of Iraq, or on
strategic balances among sectarian groups in the event of a full-blown
civil war in Iraq. Providing limited support to Sunni tribesmen and
former Sunni insurgents can, however, tip the strategic balance against
AQI, and secure the necessary cooperation of the Sunni population. Over
time, it is imperative that Sunni militias be incorporated into legally
constituted security forces.

Senator Warner. I just wondered at this point in time to
what extent either of you have had an opportunity to address
this. First, Admiral Olson, from an operational standpoint,
were you aware of this policy?
Admiral Olson. No, sir, I was not aware of it as a stated
policy.
Senator Warner. Any consultation to your knowledge between
the field commanders in Iraq and the SOCOM headquarters?
Admiral Olson. Sir, not that I'm aware of.
Senator Warner. Mr. Vickers?
Mr. Vickers. Sir, I was not involved in the policy, but I
would like to say that you're absolutely correct that the
turnaround with the Sunnis represents one of the most dramatic
changes in Iraq in the last 12 months.
Senator Warner. A positive one.
Mr. Vickers. Absolutely, sir. As you may recall, last
summer everyone was writing off al Anbar as lost. All the
intelligence assessments reflected that.
Senator Warner. If I could inject here, Senator Levin, now
the chairman of the committee--I was then chairman--and I
visited that province. When was it, August, September? We were
told by the intelligence officers that things were very grim
out there, and then suddenly a turnaround.
I think our field commanders, particularly the Marine
Corps, are entitled to credit for that. But this is a very
significant policy statement here. It looks as if it's going to
try to export the al Anbar model to other areas of Iraq.
It's very hard for us here at home to fully appreciate the
situation over there, even though we try to visit as often as
we can. I have confidence in General Petraeus and his field
commanders. But I see here a very dangerous situation, whereby
if arms that we provide to certain segments of the Sunni
population somehow slip through their hands and get into the
hands of others and are then turned against our forces.
The American public is stressed. Talk about the military
being stressed. The American public is stressed. To have their
loved ones killed, wounded, or injured by the weapons coming
out of the arsenals of America, filtering through the hands of
certain elements of the Iraqi security forces or however they
are transmitted to these Sunni groups, this is a problem. I
think we better lay a very careful foundation, a thorough one,
study it through, test it, and see what security situations
that we can have.
I'll admit, and I'm somewhat responsible myself, years ago
when we were literally arming certain insurgent elements in
Afghanistan, giving them these handheld ground-to-air missiles,
and frankly we failed to put in a device by which it terminated
the life of that instrument, such that they're turning up in
odd places of the world today still functioning as pieces of
military equipment.
I'm not suggesting you can take a rifle and put in some
mechanism to limit its life. Mr. Chairman, I have to tell you,
I'm going to probe into this very deeply and try and make some
further assessments.
Had you finished any response you wish to make, Mr.
Vickers? I've asked you to provide it for the record and
perhaps we better leave it at that point.
Do you have any further comment, Admiral? Is this a matter
that you're comfortable with? Your forces are on the point out
there.
Admiral Olson. Sir, with your permission I'll respond for
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Admiral Olson. I reviewed this policy based on dialogue with my
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) colleagues, and I support their
carefully limited efforts under the current circumstances. As I
understand it, this is not a broad, blanket policy. As the U.S. surge
has begun to squeeze al Qaeda and other extremists out of Baghdad, some
tribal sheikhs, both Sunni and Shia, have approached our Special
Operations A-detachments and asked for support to provide security for
their tribal areas and to rid them of foreign extremists. CENTCOM sees
this as a temporary opportunity to fight al Qaeda in areas where it
would not otherwise have the access or opportunity to do so. Their plan
is relatively modest in scope by providing some small arms, ammunition,
and security training to carefully vetted tribal members, who would be
formed into ``community watch'' elements to report on suspicious
intruders and protect the tribes from brutalism. In some cases, tribes
which have turned against al Qaeda have suffered severely for it
through beheadings and worse. Those tribes are looking to us to assist
them when the Government of Iraq cannot or will not. My sense is that
CENTCOM is doing everything possible to avoid both the perception and
the reality of inadvertently aggravating internal civil strife between
Sunnis and Shias. The activities of these tribal security elements will
be controlled to the extent possible by the advisory contact of our
Special Forces teams, and their duration will be only a few months,
after which they will be integrated into the Iraqi police forces or
disbanded. On that basis, I support their plan.

Senator Warner. All right. It's a wise answer by both of
the witnesses.
Back to the famous nuclear stockpile, to my good friend and
former partner here. Since the cessation of full-scale nuclear
weapons testing in 1992, the Stockpile Stewardship Program has
been developed to give us confidence in the inventory.
Yesterday during a very pleasant and informative visit we had
together, I said at that very table we brought in all the lab
directors at one time to assess the progress in this. Have you
developed a high confidence in this system as being able to
provide this country with the technical data it needs, one, to
provide safety, and two, to test components for such future
developments of nuclear weapons as this Nation may require?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, I'm very comfortable with the
system and with the Secretary we have now, who has a very
strong technical background, he's challenged us appropriately
in ways and probed certain areas to make sure that we have in
place the right way to look at the stockpile, particularly as
we get well into our second decade of no nuclear weapons
testing with our current stockpile.
Senator Warner. I do not anticipate any change in the
policy of nuclear testing. As a matter of fact, I think it's
important that we continue to lead as a Nation in terms of the
nonproliferation efforts to strengthen that policy.
On the issue of attrition, Admiral Olson, while the U.S.
Special Operations Command and its components are striving to
recruit and certify additional operators through their
qualification courses, are the SOF personnel of all ranks
leaving the Service at rates that are troublesome to you or do
you think it's under control?
Admiral Olson. Sir, thank you for asking the question about
our experienced SOF operators, whom we value so highly. We do
think it's under control. Largely with the support of this
body, we have offered retention incentives. They have had a
very positive effect. We are retaining our people at a rate
across the board above the Service average. They are choosing
to stay with us.
Senator Warner. That's important. You're above other
Services' average on retention now?
Admiral Olson. That's correct, sir.
Senator Warner. I think that's very reassuring.
Now, given the unusual nature of your operations,
individuals that are posted abroad for short periods, perform
missions, return, how does your rotation base at home versus
overseas compare to what is being adopted by the greater Army?
Admiral Olson. Sir, in general our rotation periods are
shorter, overseas for a shorter period, back for a shorter
period, maintaining about the same overall ratios as the Army
and the Marine Corps. But because of specific skill sets that
may deteriorate during overseas assignments, we need to get
them back with a greater frequency in order to bring those back
up.
So in general our force deploys for periods ranging from
about 90 days at a time up to about 7 months at a time, with
some staying as long as 12 months.
Senator Warner. By the way, in our recent discussions, you
promised to get me that framework of remarks by that
extraordinary naval captain that is still in the system. I
think he's going to stay. What's his name again?
Admiral Olson. He's Captain Pete Van Hooser, sir.
Senator Warner. Yes. He's overcome physical handicaps and
other challenges to remain on the cutting edge of working with
the organization. He's going to remain with you for a period of
time?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. That's good. You'll send me that speech
that he gave on the occasion of the loss of those troops?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. I thank you very much. I wish you well. You
have enormous responsibilities ahead of each of you.
Admiral Olson. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Warner.
I have one additional question if I may, Mr. Vickers. The
Principal Deputy to the Deputy Administrator of the NNSA is
supposed to be an Active-Duty military officer, flag officer,
assigned by DOD. This position has been vacant for more than 2
years. If you are confirmed will you look into why this
position remains vacant?
Mr. Vickers. I will, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, we thank you for very capable
services stepping in for Senator Levin this morning, who had
duties that precluded him from attending. I shall report back
favorably.
Senator Reed. Thank you. I'll be mentioned in dispatches.
Gentlemen, thank you very much, not only for your testimony
this morning, but for your dedication and service to the Nation
over careers of great distinction. Thank your families for us
as well.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Michael G. Vickers by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follows:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I will perform my duties under the direction
and control of the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. I will do my best to keep the Secretary well
informed and will seek his guidance and direction and provide him with
recommendations on policy matters within my purview.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate working very closely with the
Deputy Secretary on warfighting capabilities development and force
transformation, among other matters. I will ensure that the Deputy
Secretary has all the information he needs regarding my
responsibilities to perform these duties.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy and seek his guidance and direction on matters
pertaining to special operations, stability operations, force
transformation and resources, and strategic capabilities. I plan to
provide him with regular advice and recommendations on such matters.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)).
Answer. Special Operations and intelligence demand extensive mutual
support; therefore, if confirmed, I intend to foster a very close
relationship with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I
also intend to work closely with USD(I) on strengthening our
intelligence capabilities, including space and information operations
capabilities.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific
Security Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security
Affairs (ASD(GSA)).
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to maintain a close working
relationship with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense in the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I anticipate
working very closely with the three assistant secretaries who exercise
regional oversight of defense policy by providing them, along with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary, with special
operations and stability operations advice pertaining to ongoing
operations and operations in the planning stage. I anticipate working
very closely with the ASD(GSA) on several areas within ASD(GSA)'s
portfolio, including force employment policy (e.g. security cooperation
and contingency planning), partnership strategy, counterproliferation,
and counternarcotics.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. Successful policy oversight of special operations requires
close coordination and collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If
confirmed, I plan to maintain a close working relationship with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on special operations capabilities, strategic
capabilities, conventional capabilities, force transformation, and
resource guidance.
Question. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Secretaries and
Chiefs to ensure that the requirements to organize, train, and equip
Special Operations Forces (SOFs) are met. In addition, I will work
closely with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to ensure appropriate
policy oversight of their capabilities development.
Question. Commander, United States Special Operations Command
(SOCOM).
Answer. The relationship between the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander
of U.S. SOCOM is critical. Therefore, I anticipate fostering and
maintaining a close relationship with the Commander, characterized by
mutual support, frequent contact, and dynamic exchanges of information
and ideas in order to carry out the SO/LIC mission.
Question. Commander, United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
Answer. If confirmed, I will have responsibility for policy
oversight of U.S. STRATCOM, and I plan to forge a strong relationship
with the commander to ensure that we develop the strategic capabilities
(e.g., missile defense, nuclear and conventional, global strike,
information operations, and space capabilities) to meet a broad
spectrum of emerging challenges.
Question. Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate a close working relationship
with the Commander, JFCOM. Since JFCOM is the lead agent for force
transformation and modernization, I will forge a strong relationship
with the command to develop the future force.
Question. Commander, United States Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM).
Answer. U.S. TRANSCOM is a key functional command that provides
global deployment and sustainability for U.S. forces. If confirmed, I
will maintain a close working relationship with Commander, U.S.
TRANSCOM, to ensure that we maintain the most effective global
deployment and distribution capabilities.
Question. The regional COCOMs.
Answer. The regional COCOMs are at the forefront of the war on
terrorism and are responsible for maintaining a forward posture to
deter and dissuade adversaries and assure our allies. If confirmed, I
will work closely with the regional COCOMs to provide policy oversight
for the operational employment of capabilities within the portfolio of
ASD(SO/LIC). I will also ensure that the views of the regional COCOMs
are taken into account with respect to capabilities requirements.
Question. National Security Council and National Counterterrorism
Center.
Answer. SOF activities are central to counterterrorism; these
activities are being coordinated within the larger U.S. Government
counterterrorism effort through the NCTC's National Implementation Plan
(NIP). If confirmed, I will maintain ASD(SO/LIC)'s role as the primary
OSD interface on SOF and counterterrorism matters with the NIP,
continuing to coordinate and monitor OSD, Joint Staff, and combatant
command entities whose capabilities support the NIP. SO/LIC also will
continue to represent DOD in the interagency on relevant matters,
including participation in the Counterterrorism Support Group (CSG) and
other interagency processes.
Question. Central Intelligence Agency.
Answer. A close relationship between the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and SOFs is essential to counter terrorism and to conduct
ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas. If confirmed,
I anticipate working very closely with Director, CIA, and his key
subordinates. I will seek Memoranda of Agreements and Understanding
with the CIA to facilitate the effective employment of SOF and other
capabilities within the ASD(SO/LIC) portfolio.
Question. U.S Department of State (DOS).
Answer. The DOS is a key partner in counterterrorism and stability
and reconstruction operations. If confirmed, I will work with DOS to
develop effective strategies, policies, and capabilities to conduct
these types of operations. I will seek Memoranda of Agreements and
Understanding with the Department of State to ensure the effective
employment of SOF and other capabilities within the ASD(SO/LIC)
portfolio. I will use DOD resources, as required and authorized, to
assist the Department of State in developing its capabilities for
stability and reconstruction operations. If confirmed, I anticipate
working very closely with the Counselor to the Secretary of State and
the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs on
these matters.
Question. The commanders of the Service SOCOMs.
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the commanders
of the Service Special Operations component commands to ensure that
they develop and provide the capabilities that the Commander, U.S.
SOCOM, and the regional COCOMs require.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. For nearly all of the 34 years that have transpired since I
enlisted in the Special Forces, I have devoted my professional life to
the policy, strategy, operational, and resource aspects of the duties
assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC). My 13 years of
experience as a direct Special Forces (SF) enlistee (1970s version of
the 18X program), SF noncommissioned officer, SF commissioned officer
and commander of SOF operational units, and Operations Officer with the
CIA provided me with extensive operational experience across SOF
mission areas and across a wide range of geographical and operational
environments, in clandestine intelligence operations and covert action,
in interagency policy formulation and execution at the U.S. mission,
combatant command, subcombatant command, subcabinet, cabinet, and
presidential levels, in congressional oversight of very sensitive and
compartmented U.S. Government programs, and interaction with senior
allied and partner foreign government officials. I have had significant
operational experience across of a wide range of irregular warfare
disciplines, encompassing counterterrorism, unconventional warfare and
foreign internal defense/counterinsurgency, and have served on both the
``Black'' and ``White'' sides of SOF. As a CIA officer, I played a key
role in the Grenada rescue operation, for which I received a CIA award
for valor. In the aftermath of the Beirut bombings in 1983, I was a
core member of a CIA operational task force focused on identifying and
retaliating against the perpetrators of the attacks. During the mid-
1980s, I was the principal strategist for the largest and most
successful covert action program in the CIA's history: the successful
effort to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan, which contributed
significantly to ending the Cold War and facilitating the collapse of
the Soviet empire. Since the early 1990s, I have advised DOD on force
transformation, and have written about and worked extensively on the
Revolution in Military Affairs, space warfare, information warfare, and
the transformation of strategic warfare. I have been an advisor to the
senior leadership of DOD on the global war on terrorism since September
12, 2001. I played a central, substantive role during the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) advising the senior leadership of DOD
on the imperative of and strategies for rebalancing the warfighting
capabilities of the Department for the challenges of the 21st century.
With General Wayne Downing (USA, Retired) and Major General Bill
Garrison (USA, Retired), I provided the Secretary of Defense with a
comprehensive assessment of SOFs and their way forward. I have advised
President Bush and his war cabinet on strategy in Iraq. I have received
substantial graduate education in both management and in strategic
studies. I have provided extensive testimony to Congress on the global
war on terrorism, the Revolution in Military Affairs and force
transformation. If confirmed, I believe this combined experience
qualifies me to assume the duties of ASD(SO/LIC).

DUTIES

Question. Section 138(b) (4) of title 10, U.S.C., describes the
duties and roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)).
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
ASD(SO/LIC)?
Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal civilian advisor to the
Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict
matters. After the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, the ASD(SO/LIC) is
the principal special operations and low-intensity conflict official
within the senior management of DOD. The ASD(SO/LIC) has as his
principal duty overall supervision (to include oversight of policy and
resources) of special operations and low-intensity conflict activities.
These core tasks, according to U.S. SOCOM's 2007 Posture Statement,
include counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; direct action;
special reconnaissance; foreign internal defense; civil affairs,
information and psychological operations; and counterproliferation of
WMD. Section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., provides a very similar but not
identical list of SOF activities.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what changes, if any, in the
duties and functions of ASD(SO/LIC) do you expect that the Secretary of
Defense would prescribe for you?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense has reorganized his policy office.
Pursuant to the reorganization, the ASD(SO/LIC) will become the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC&IC)) will have, in
addition to policy oversight for special operations and stability
operations capabilities, policy oversight for strategic capabilities
and force transformation and resources. As such, ASD(SO/LIC&IC), after
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, will be the principal official
charged with oversight over all warfighting capabilities within the
senior management of DOD.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. As described above, given my experience in force
transformation and strategic capabilities, in addition to my experience
in SOF and irregular warfare, I believe that, if confirmed, I am
qualified to assume the duties of ASD(SO/LIC&IC).
Question. In your view, are the duties set forth in section
138(b)(4) of title 10, U.S.C., up-to-date, or should changes be
considered?
The duties outlined in section 138(b)(4) of title 10, U.S.C., do
not require changes at this time.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend?
Answer. None at this time.
Question. What DOD activities are currently encompassed by the
Department's definition of special operations and low-intensity
conflict?
Answer. Special operations and low-intensity conflict activities,
as defined in title 10, U.S.C., section 167, include direct action,
strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal
defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism,
humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, and such other
activities as may be specified by the President or Secretary of
Defense. U.S. SOCOM's nine core tasks, as noted in Question 4, are
similar but not identical.
Question. If confirmed, would you exercise overall supervision of
all special operations and low-intensity conflict activities of DOD?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In cases in which other Assistant Secretaries within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) exercise supervision over some
special operations and low-intensity conflict activities, what is the
relationship between your office and those other offices?
Answer. I am not aware of other Assistant Secretaries who exercise
supervision over special operations and low-intensity conflict
activities. I believe title 10 U.S.C., section 138(b)(4) is clear on
this point. If an activity pertains to special operations and low-
intensity conflict, then ASD(SO/LIC&IC) supervises and provides policy
and oversight, and is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense
on these matters. After the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense,
the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) is the principal special operations and low-
intensity conflict official within DOD. I recognize, however, that, if
confirmed, I would need to work closely on special operations and low-
intensity conflict matters with the regional and other functional ASDs
in the OSD.

SO/LIC ORGANIZATION

Question. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities
related to combating terrorism?
Answer. SOFs are central to combating terrorism. If confirmed, I
will work to ensure that SOF have clear policy guidance and sufficient
capabilities and resources to carry out such missions. If confirmed, I
also will work within DOD, with other government agencies, and in the
interagency process to ensure that we have the most effective policies,
strategies, capabilities, and operations for combating terrorism.
Question. How would you coordinate these responsibilities with the
ASD for Homeland Defense, who has responsibilities for combating
terrorism in the United States?
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as stipulated in
section 902 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003, will exercise principal responsibility for the
overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and
execution, and allocation of resources for the Department's combating
terrorism activities. If confirmed as the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I will
maintain oversight with regard to DOD's global combating terrorism
activities and coordinate closely with the ASD(HD) on matters related
to combating terrorism within the United States and the Western
Hemisphere.
Question. How would you coordinate these responsibilities with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and
Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy.
Question. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities
related to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance?
Answer. As a result of the policy reorganization, the
responsibility for overseeing peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
now falls under the ASD for Government Security Affairs (GSA). The
ASD(SO/LIC&IC)'s role is to ensure that U.S. forces have the
capabilities they need to participate in these types of activities and
to oversee Special Operation Forces and interdependent capabilities
when they participate in such activities.

POLICY OFFICE REORGANIZATION

Question. The office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
is currently being reorganized. We understand that the proposed
reorganization would place the following responsibilities under the
ASD(SO/LIC) in addition to responsibility for Special Operations,
combating terrorism, and stability operations: strategic capabilities,
and forces transformation and resources.
If confirmed, would these additional duties fall under your office?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What do you believe would be the impact of placing such a
broad span of issues under the ASD(SO/LIC)? Specifically, do you
believe the ASD(SO/LIC) would be able to work within the letter and
spirit of section 138(b)(4) of title 10, which states that oversight of
Special Operations should be the ASD's ``principal duty?''
Answer. I believe that, if confirmed, I am qualified to assume the
duties that would be assigned to me as ASD(SO/LIC&IC). I have
significant experience in each of the areas for which I would have
policy oversight, as well as significant experience in capability
transformation and integration. I believe that the duties assigned to
ASD(SO/LIC&IC) constitute a manageable span of control which is similar
to that assigned to other ASDs. I will be assisted by a Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, four DASDs and a substantial
staff of directors and action officers. In previous assignments of
similar scope and responsibility, I was able to accomplish the duties
assigned to me with far fewer staff resources. In some key areas that
fall within the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) portfolio, moreover, I will be assisted
in policy oversight by other senior policy officials who have vast
experience and expertise in these areas. The Under Secretary of Defense
(Policy) (USD(P)), for example, is currently heavily engaged in missile
defense negotiations, and I would expect him to continue to take a
primary role in this issue area. The USD(P) has a much larger span of
control than the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) and the USD(P), to my knowledge, is
considered to have a manageable span of control. In addition to having
oversight for all of the areas envisioned as falling under ASD(SO/
LIC&IC), the USD(P) has oversight of global security affairs, homeland
defense, and regional and global defense strategy and policy.
I believe that my recent experience in the 2006 QDR demonstrates
convincingly that I am capable, if confirmed, of assuming the duties of
ASD(SO/LIC&IC), and that the span of issues assigned to ASD(SO/LIC&IC)
is not too broad. As a senior advisor to OSD for the 2006 QDR, I
consulted intensively the development of new strategies and in
facilitating decisions by the senior leadership of the Department to
develop new capabilities and capacities in all of the areas that would
be placed under ASD(SO/LIC&IC). In addition to serving as a senior
advisor to the main QDR process, I was also asked to serve as Executive
Director for an external QDR ``Red Team'' that reported directly to the
Deputy Secretary. The membership of the Red Team included six retired
four-star officers who collectively represented all of the Services,
two regional combatant commands, SOCOM, and the Intelligence Community.
Nearly all of the Red Team's recommendations were subsequently adopted
by the main QDR process and the senior leadership of the Department. I
also was a core member of the team that developed the Downing Report
for the Secretary of Defense, which assessed SOF policies, processes,
organization, and capabilities. As was the case with the QDR Red Team
report, nearly all of the recommendations of the Downing Report were
subsequently adopted by the main QDR process and the senior leadership
of the Department.
I believe that the duties assigned to ASD(SO/LIC&IC) pursuant to
the reorganization of OUSD(P) will provide the Secretary of Defense
with substantially improved oversight of the Department's current and
future warfighting capabilities, and that special operations
capabilities and stability operations capabilities will be
substantially strengthened by having a single senior defense official
with oversight over all of the Department's warfighting capabilities.
SOF capabilities and capacities were substantially increased as a
result of the QDR, which, as described above, provided a ``proof of
principle'' for how an ASD(SO/LIC&IC) could function within the
Department. Placing policy oversight for ground general purpose
capabilities for irregular warfare and conventional campaigns under one
senior policy official will, in my judgment, substantially improve the
oversight of OSD. A single source of policy oversight of U.S. STRATCOM
and U.S. SOCOM will enable more effective collaboration and
coordination of strategic capabilities, specifically information
operations and prompt conventional strike, that are critical to
prosecuting the global war on terrorism.
If confirmed, I believe strongly that I will be able to work within
the letter and spirit of section 138(b)(4) of title 10, U.S.C., and
that oversight of special operations will remain the ``principal duty''
of ASD(SO/LIC&IC). I will remain a member of U.S. SOCOM's board of
directors, retain oversight of Major Force Program 11, and ensure that
there is no dilution of focus on Special Operations--on my part, as
well as within the organization which, if confirmed as ASD(SO/LIC&IC),
I would lead.
Question. If confirmed, under this new organization, how would you
fulfill your responsibilities related to strategic capabilities? What
would be the major challenges in this area, and, if confirmed, how
would you address them?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assume oversight and management of
issues related to strategic capabilities through oversight of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities. There
are a number of challenges that fall within this portfolio. One is to
ensure that the United States, its allies and friends, and its deployed
forces are protected from attack by ballistic missiles, especially
those that might carry weapons of mass destruction. Another is to
protect U.S. interests in the global commons of space and cyberspace,
particularly our freedom of action in these realms which are so
critical to U.S. security. A third challenge is to continue to address
U.S. deterrence needs for the 21st century, developing and implementing
a sustainable strategy to ensure that U.S. forces, including nuclear
forces and conventional global strike capabilities, meet the increased
range of challenges we face due to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress and our
allies to address these issues.
Question. If confirmed, under this new organization, how would you
fulfill your responsibilities related to forces transformation and
resources? What would be the major challenges in this area, and, if
confirmed, how would you address them?
Answer. The major challenge in the forces transformation and
resources area will be to facilitate the transformation of conventional
capabilities, as directed by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. This
will require, over time, significant rebalancing of the conventional
capabilities portfolio, including both substantial investment in new
capabilities and capacities as well as divestment of capabilities and
capacities whose strategic effectiveness is in decline. If confirmed, I
anticipate being the Department's principal policy official for forces
transformation and resources, and I would work closely with Congress to
address the major challenges in this area.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the ASD(SO/LIC)?
Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing
these challenges?
What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the
performance of the functions of the ASD(SO/LIC)?
If confirmed, what management action and timelines would you
establish to address these problems?
Answer. The overarching challenge that will confront the ASD(SO/
LIC&IC) will be to implement the direction provided in the 2006 QDR
across all of the Department's warfighting capabilities while providing
policy oversight over their employment. Rebalancing the overall Defense
portfolio over time will require significant reallocation of defense
resources. There are challenges specific to each issue area. Growing
SOF, as prescribed in the 2006 QDR, while maintaining quality
standards, will pose a significant challenge. Securing the necessary
authorities with the Department of State and the CIA to facilitate the
effective global employment of SOF will pose a second challenge.
Rebalancing ground general purpose force capabilities toward irregular
warfare while maintaining their capability to conduct conventional
campaigns is a third challenge. The tension between the need to
recapitalize current capabilities while transforming and expanding the
force to meet future threats will pose another major challenge.
Providing policy oversight for ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, coupled with the omnipresent potential for strategic
surprise in other areas, will pose a major challenge for senior policy
officials. I do not know at this time, which, if any of these or other
major challenges will pose the most serious problem for ASD(SO/LIC&IC).
If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress to develop action plans
that address these major challenges and any serious problems that
emerge.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD(SO/LIC)?
Answer. If confirmed, my top priorities will be to implement the
direction provided in the 2006 QDR across the Department's warfighting
capabilities, and to provide policy oversight of Special Operations,
conventional, and strategic forces. I would seek to develop the
capabilities that will be needed to win the global war on terrorism,
shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, such as China,
in ways favorable to U.S. interests, and deal with the challenges of a
more proliferated world in which both more States, as well as non-State
actors, have access to weapons of mass destruction. I strongly believe
that while the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) must address key capability requirements
in each of area assigned to him, it is imperative that the ASD place
all his attention on his top priorities.
If confirmed as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I would likely have two overarching
priorities, and two to three top priorities in each capability area. By
area, my priorities will likely be to:
Overarching Priorities:
Ensure that the warfighting capabilities under my
oversight are used in the most effective way possible to
achieve favorable outcomes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
broader global war on terrorism, and ensuring that all relevant
capabilities are brought to bear to eliminate al Qaeda
sanctuaries in Western Pakistan and other areas.
Build a high morale, strategically effective
organization in ASD(SO/LIC&IC) that is able to serve as the
principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all
DOD warfighting capabilities.
SOF Priorities:
Ensure that the Department develops and expands SOF
capabilities, capacities and posture without diluting quality
standards, to create a Global Counterterrorism Network capable
of winning the global war on terrorism that could principally
be waged in countries with which the United States is not at
war. Doing this will require bringing SOF capabilities and
operations into much closer strategic and operational alignment
with other government agencies.
Ensure that the Department develops the capabilities
to locate, tag and track terrorists and other threats to U.S.
interests and that future SOF have the capability to
clandestinely infiltrate into, conduct operations within and
exfiltrate from denied areas.
Achieve an appropriate balance--in strategy,
resources, and senior leader development--between indirect and
direct approaches to irregular warfare.
Ground General Purpose Force Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations
Priorities:
Ensure that ground general purpose forces develop the
required capabilities for steady-state and surge irregular
warfare operations while maintaining their capabilities for
conventional campaigns.
Assist the Department of State and other government
agencies and departments to develop stability operations
capabilities that will enable a more effective whole-of-
government approach to stability and reconstruction operations.
Strategic Capabilities Priorities:
Ensure that the Department has space and information
operations policy and capabilities to meet current and future
challenges.
Ensure that the Department has a prompt global strike
capability to deal with the sudden emergence of extremely time-
sensitive, high-value targets.
Support ongoing efforts to develop an effective
missile defense system and ensure that the Department develops
a robust nuclear deterrent capability to meet emerging
challenges.
Conventional Capabilities and Transformation Priorities:
Redefine force transformation to bring it into much
closer alignment with anticipated future challenges and defense
strategy, and ensure that the Department develops the
capabilities to conduct operations in a highly proliferated
world.
Ensure that sufficient resources are provided to
enable the Department to field the next generation long-range
strike system by 2018, that the potential for unmanned systems
is fully exploited across the Department's warfighting
capabilities.
Ensure that the Department develops the undersea
warfare capabilities necessary to shape the choices of
countries at strategic crossroads, and hedge against the
emergence of a potential near-peer competitor.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. About 5 years after securing a military victory against
the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, U.S. and international forces
are still fighting Taliban forces and other opponents of the Afghan
government.
What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan?
What are the weaknesses and shortcomings in the current effort to
combat terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan?
Answer. I am cautiously optimistic about the current situation in
Afghanistan. The Taliban regime has been removed from power; al Qaeda
no longer enjoys a safe haven in Afghanistan to plan and launch attacks
against the United States; and Afghanistan is a democratic state. The
Afghan government, with the support of the international community, is
extending its reach throughout the country; the Afghan economy is
growing; and more Afghans than ever before enjoy the benefits of
education and health care.
Nonetheless, challenges remain. We face tenacious enemies in the
Taliban, al Qaeda, and other extremist groups. The United States, under
Operation Enduring Freedom, leads the international counterterrorism
effort in Afghanistan. The NATO International Security Assistance
Force's mandate covers security and stability. We work closely with
other U.S. agencies and with our Allies and partners to execute a
counterinsurgency approach that combines military operations with other
critical elements such as development, capacity-building, diplomacy,
and communications. The lead for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is
the Afghan government. As such, the most important defense-related
effort in Afghanistan is the mission to train and equip the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF), which includes both the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANA appears
to be taking increasing responsibility for planning and executing
operations. Our focus now is to bring the ANP to the same level.
If I am confirmed, I would be pleased to discuss our efforts in
this area, including our weaknesses and shortcomings, in greater detail
in a closed hearing.
Question. If confirmed, what initiatives would you take to improve
the military effort to combat terrorism in Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe that military counterterrorism efforts in
Afghanistan, led by the U.S., are succeeding. Of course, there is
always room for improvement, and I would be pleased, if confirmed, to
discuss such matters in greater detail in closed session.
What is crucial now is that we build on our successes. For example,
the recent capture or death of senior Taliban and al Qaeda commanders,
especially Dadullah Lang, is a significant blow against the enemy.
In addition to maintaining pressure on these groups and
individuals, it is critical that we work with Pakistan and Afghanistan
to expand cooperation and strengthen existing mechanisms for
intelligence-sharing, military-to-military dialogue, and political
discourse, and support Pakistan's efforts to eliminate terrorist
sanctuaries in West Pakistan.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of SOFs in
Afghanistan, and the proper relationship between direct action and
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations there? SOFs direct
action and counterterrorism play key roles in Afghanistan, but they are
only one part of our overall effort.
We work closely with other government agencies and with our allies
and partners to help the Afghan government execute a comprehensive
counterinsurgency approach that combines military operations with other
critical elements such as development, capacity-building, good
governance, and communications.

TRANSFORMATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. Much attention has been focused on the transformation of
our conventional Armed Forces to make them more capable of conducting
counterinsurgency and combating terrorism missions.
Do you believe that our SOFs need to be transformed?
Answer. Yes. We are in a long irregular war that requires U.S.
Armed Forces to increasingly adopt indirect, unconventional, and
clandestine approaches. To that end, I strongly support the 2006 QDR
recommendation to increase SOF capabilities and capacities to perform
more demanding and specialized tasks to defeat terrorists and other
irregular challenges, while providing substantially increased global
presence. Increasing SOF capabilities and capacities also broadens and
deepens available U.S. strategic options for dealing with hostile
states. I believe that the 2006 QDR provides an appropriate vision and
strategy for the transformation of SOF.
Question. If so, what is your vision for such a transformation, and
how would the transformation of conventional forces complement a SOF
transformation, and vice versa?
Answer. Expanding the capability and capacity of SOF to take on the
more demanding and specialized tasks will require the ability to:

Conduct long-duration, indirect, and clandestine
operations in politically sensitive environments and denied
areas;
Locate, tag, and track dangerous individuals and other
high-value targets globally; and
Detect, locate, and render safe WMD.

As the 2006 QDR recommended, we need to increase both SOF and
conventional force capability and capacity to conduct and sustain long-
duration irregular operations.

For surge scenarios, the conventional force should
become as proficient in counterinsurgency and stabilization
operations as it is in high-intensity combat.
For steady-state operations, the conventional force
should possess the ability to train, mentor, and advise foreign
security forces.

Additionally, expanding the capability and capacity of conventional
forces through exploitation of the Revolution in Military Affairs,
will, as demonstrated in Operation Enduring Freedom, substantially
increase the effectiveness of unconventional warfare and special
operations.
My vision for transforming SOFs, conventional forces and strategic
forces is resident in the priorities (outlined in the answer to 24,
above) I would likely have, if confirmed, as ASD(SO/LIC&IC). My vision
is very closely aligned with the transformation vision outlined in the
2006 QDR. My vision is described more fully in my recent testimony to
the House Armed Services Committee on SOF and the global war on terror,
in several publications and reports I have authored or co-authored
while with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and in
numerous public speeches I have given on the topic. I have provided the
committee with several samples of each, and would be pleased to discuss
my vision in greater depth at the committee's request.
Question. Specifically, what do you believe transformation should
mean for the special operations community in terms of missions,
training, equipment, or in any other aspect?
Answer. SOF transformation should be focused on the capabilities,
capacities and posture required to win the global war on terrorism, and
on the capabilities and capacities required to conduct unconventional
warfare and SOF-intensive operations against hostile states, including
those who possess advanced anti-access capabilities. With respect to
the global war on terror, SOF transformation should result in
capabilities and capacities to plan and synchronize the global war on
terror and conduct persistent, low visibility indirect and clandestine
operations in scores of countries (with which the United States is not
at war) simultaneously. SOF transformation for the global war on terror
should substantially improve SOF's ability to operate in denied areas,
to locate, tag and track terrorists and other high-value targets and
threats, and to render safe multiple nuclear weapons simultaneously.
SOF transformation for operations against hostile states should focus
on the capabilities required to penetrate and operate in denied areas,
and to exploit the full potential of the Revolution in Military
Affairs. The development of SOF and global war on terror strategists
and senior leaders should also be a top transformation priority.
Additional details on SOF transformation are contained in my testimony
on SOF and the global war on terror before the House Armed Services
Committee.
Over the past 3 decades, as strategic circumstances have changed,
SOF has been required to take on new missions, such as
counterterrorism, information operations, and counterproliferation of
WMD. The only changes in missions currently envisioned that would
result from SOF and general purpose force transformation would be to
divest certain areas to the GPF, freeing up SOF to do more of the
unique missions for which they are specially trained, organized and
equipped (e.g., UW, CT). The ongoing transformation of both the
strategic environment and SOF capabilities, however, will undoubtedly
require SOF to take on new, as of yet unforeseen, missions in the
future. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this discussion with
the committee.
Question. Are the SOCOM and DOD investing in the technologies to
transform SOF according to the vision you describe?
Answer. Yes. U.S. SOCOM and the Department are investing in key
technologies to transform SOF. U.S. SOCOM has a strong technology
development program designed to deliver key capabilities to the SOF
warrior in the shortest time possible. In addition, the ASD(SO/LIC&IC)
is responsible for managing and providing technical oversight of the
Combating Terrorism Technology Support program. This program supports
many organizations, including U.S. SOCOM, to conduct rapid prototyping
for combating terrorism technologies. For the longer term, a new
Capabilities Based Assessment for Irregular Warfare is underway in the
Department which will help identify key capability gaps in irregular
warfare. Identifying these gaps will help the Department focus
technology development in new areas to the greatest benefit. Over time,
however, substantial additional resources will almost certainly be
needed if U.S. SOCOM is to fully realize my vision for transforming
SOF.
Question. What, if any, special role can SOCOM's development and
acquisition capability play in Service and DOD efforts?
Answer. U.S. SOCOM has its own development and acquisition program
for SOF-unique capabilities. The command also participates in Service-
common development and acquisition. For these Service-common
development and acquisition programs, U.S. SOCOM has a special role
including its unique capability needs in larger service programs. U.S.
SOCOM frequently takes a service common item and modifies it for SOF-
specific needs, which results in significant savings. This acquisition
operating practice, however, may become more problematic in the future
if, as anticipated, the platform needs of SOF and the general purpose
forces diverge significantly. For example, maintaining a long-range
clandestine air mobility capability for SOF after the Combat Talon and
other non-stealthy aircraft are no longer capable of penetrating into
denied airspace is a looming challenge that may require additional
resources to U.S. SOCOM. Ensuring that U.S. SOCOM requirements are met
by Service and Department acquisition programs or by the provision of
sufficient resources and program management capabilities to develop
SOF-unique platforms is a core responsibility of ASD(SO/LIC&IC).
Conversely, as general purpose forces become more involved in irregular
warfare, capabilities that were once SOF-unique could become
increasingly available to general purpose forces.
civilian oversight of the united states special operations command
Question. The 1986 Special Operations legislation assigned
extraordinary authority to the Commander, U.S. SOCOM, to conduct some
of the functions of both a military service and a unified combat
command.
Which civilian officials in the DOD exercise civilian oversight of
the ``service-like'' authorities of the Commander, U.S. SOCOM?
Answer. Per title 10, U.S.C. and DOD Directive 5111.10 (in
accordance with USD (P) priorities and guidance), the ASD SO/LIC&IC is
the principal civilian oversight for all SOF matters. Other DOD
civilian officials also exercise oversight in some capacity.

USD (AT&L) coordinates on acquisition issues
USD (P&R) coordinates on personnel policies such as
SOF unique incentive packages
USD (Comptroller) coordinates on SOF budget and year
of execution program issues
Service Secretaries coordinate on SOF manpower issues
Director, PA&E, coordinates on SOF Program development
and issues.

Question. In your view, what organizational relationship should
exist between the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, U.S. SOCOM? ASD(SO/
LIC) provides civilian oversight of all special operations matters as
required by title 10, U.S.C. As such, ASD(SO/LIC) provides policy and
resource guidance and advice to implement Secretary of Defense and
USD(P) priorities. ASD(SO/LIC) is a voting member of U.S. SOCOM's Board
of Directors for Program guidance and decisions. The relationship with
Commander, U.S. SOCOM should be collaborative and cooperative to ensure
that we develop the best possible forces and employ them effectively.
Question. What should be the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in preparation
and review of Major Force Program 11 and the Command's Program
Objective Memorandum?
Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) provides policy oversight of the
preparation and justification of the SOFs' program and budget. The ASD
co-chairs the U.S. SOCOM Board of Directors--the U.S. SOCOM resource
decision forum. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander,
U.S. SOCOM, to ensure that U.S. SOCOM funding sustains a ready, capable
force, to meet this new era's challenges.
Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the
research and development and procurement functions of the SOCOM? The
appropriate role of ASD(SO/LIC) is to provide policy oversight in
resolving special operations acquisition issues. As the lead OSD
official for SOF acquisition matters, ASD(SO/LIC) represents SOF
acquisition interests within DOD and before Congress. The
responsibilities and relationships between ASD(SO/LIC) and the
Commander, U.S. SOCOM are defined and described in a Memorandum of
Agreement between the ASD and Commander, U.S. SOCOM. The ASD directs
and provides policy oversight to technology development programs that
address priority mission areas to meet other departmental, interagency,
and international capability needs (e.g. the Technical Support Working
Group).
Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the
operational planning of missions that involve SOFs, whether the
supported command is SOCOM or a geographic command?
Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) serves as the principal advisor to the
Secretary of Defense for all aspects of employment, deployment, and
oversight of Special Operations and counterterrorism capabilities. SO/
LIC provides policy oversight of the mission planning for U.S. SOCOM
and geographic Combatant Commanders in the employment of SOF to ensure
compliance with public law and DOD priorities. ASD(SO/LIC) coordinates
deployment authorities and plans involving SOF within DOD and with
interagency partners as required.

EXPANDED ROLES OF UNITED STATES SOCOM

Question. U.S. SOCOM has additional, expanded responsibilities in
the global war on terrorism, as a supported COCOM, in addition to its
more traditional role as a supporting COCOM.
What role should ASD(SO/LIC) play in the oversight and planning of
such missions?
Answer. U.S. SOCOM should continue to exercise responsibility as
the lead planner and synchronizer for the global war on terrorism. As
U.S. SOCOM develops campaign plans in coordination with geographic
COCOMs and Combat Support Agencies, the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) should maintain
oversight of such planning and should develop concepts and initiatives
for the employment of SOF and coordinate or obtain the authorities
required within DOD, in the interagency and by Congress. ASD(SO/LIC&IC)
is responsible for ensuring that the requisite policies, authorities,
capabilities and resources are sufficient for execution of the plans
and operations for which U.S. SOCOM is responsible. ASD(SO/LIC&IC)
should also ensure that an appropriate balance in achieved between
indirect and direct approaches and capabilities in U.S. SOCOM plans,
operations, command structure and resource allocation decisions.
Question. In your view, what types of missions should SOCOM conduct
as a supported combatant command?
Answer. U.S. SOCOM's role should be, in accordance with the Unified
Command Plan, the supported commander for planning and synchronization
of the global war on terrorism. Actual mission execution in most
instances would still be conducted by Geographic Combatant Commanders,
or, more precisely, in accordance with title 10, U.S.C., section 167: a
special operations activity or mission shall be conducted under the
command of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose
geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted.
Only in rare instances, involving highly sensitive targets or
significant political considerations, would Commander U.S. SOCOM
execute a mission; specifically, he shall exercise command of a
selected special operations mission if directed to do so by the
President or the Secretary of Defense.
Question. In your view, how are intelligence activities different
from other SOCOM activities? U.S. SOCOM's primary activities are
directed at the operational and tactical level, using intelligence to
directly facilitate the conduct of everyday mission sets covering the
nine Special Operations Core Tasks. Since they are not directed by the
Director of National Intelligence for the purpose of collecting or
producing strategic intelligence, these activities fall outside of the
consolidated national intelligence program. Some compartmented
intelligence activities conducted by U.S. SOCOM elements are funded
under intelligence programs and operate under different authorities.

SIZE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The QDR called for increases in the size of SOFs.
Do you believe that we should increase the number of special
operations personnel?
If so, why, and by how much? If confirmed, would you consider
greater increases than those envisioned in the QDR?
Answer. Yes, I strongly believe it is imperative to increase the
number of special operations personnel as prescribed in the 2006 QDR.
SOF growth is a core aspect of SOF transformation. Only with this
growth, will U.S. SOCOM be able to realize the steady-state posture
that will likely be necessary to win the global war on terrorism. I
believe that the SOF growth prescribed in the 2006 QDR is sufficient,
but, if I am confirmed, and I determine at some point that additional
SOF growth is required, I will consult with Congress. The most likely
area for further growth in SOF capacity is in air capabilities.
Question. In your view, how can the size of SOFs be increased,
while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards
for special operators?
Answer. The 2006 QDR and the Downing Report focused significant
attention on strategies for growing SOF, while assuring that high
quality is maintained. This included ensuring that sufficient resources
are devoted to the institutional training base to accommodate
substantially increased throughput; exploiting the potential of direct
entry enlistment into Special Forces via the 18X program; ensuring that
Ranger units, who, in addition to providing critical capabilities, also
serve as a core recruiting base for Special Forces and Special Mission
Unit (SMU) personnel, are grown in proportion to the desired increase
in those units; and redesigning training programs to achieve greater
yield while maintaining quality. The Department's classified SMUs,
which are among the most difficult parts of the force to grow, given
their very low selection yield and the extensive training and
experience that is required to produce a successful operator, have
grown substantially since their inception, despite doubts that it could
be done, and are prescribed to grow substantially more as we continue
to shift from a reactive to a proactive CT force. SMU growth has been
accomplished without substantial dilution of quality.
To achieve the SOF growth prescribed by the QDR and develop and
maintain the intelligence capabilities and ability to operate in
politically sensitive and denied areas that we require for the global
war on terror, we must find innovative ways to retain experienced SOF.
The decline in the experience level of the force must be reversed. This
is challenge that SOF has in common with the National Clandestine
Service, which is also expanding its ranks substantially, and, as a
consequence, is seeing its experience levels decline. If confirmed, I
will work with Congress, U.S. SOCOM, the Services, and others in DOD to
achieve the SOF growth objectives of the 2006 QDR while maintaining the
high standards expected of SOF.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Question. What is your definition of strategic communications and
information operations, and what is the relationship between them?
Answer. Strategic communications are focused U.S. Government
communication processes and efforts to understand and engage key
audiences. The goal is to create, strengthen, or preserve favorable
conditions to advance national interests. Strategic communications is
an overt instrument.
Information operations are the integrated employment of various
techniques, including computer network operations, to influence or
disrupt adversarial decision making, capabilities and operations while
protecting our own. Information operations can be overt or covert. If
confirmed I will assess these issues and be happy to discuss them in
more detail in a closed session.
Information operations and strategic communications must be
complementary and coordinated.
Question. What role do you envision for SOCOM in overall U.S.
strategic communications and in U.S. information operations?
Answer. I see U.S. SOCOM playing a vital role in implementing
strategic communication plans and supporting the Geographic Combatant
Commanders' efforts to counter violent extremists around the world.
U.S. SOCOM also provides information operations capabilities, which if
confirmed, I will be happy to discuss in more detail in a closed
session.
Question. Under what circumstances would the Commander, SOCOM,
conduct information operations as a supported COCOM?
Answer. As the supported COCOM for planning and synchronizing the
global war on terror, U.S. SOCOM guides collaborative planning,
coordination, and when directed, execution of information operations. I
can envision U.S. SOCOM leading the execution of information operations
to support surgical, limited duration, counterterrorism, and other IW
missions.

MARINE CORPS SPECIAL OPERATORS

Question. What do you believe should be the appropriate
relationship between the Marine Corps and SOCOM?
Answer. I believe that U.S. SOCOM should develop a relationship
with the Marine Corps similar to the relationship that it has with the
Army, Air Force, and Navy.
U.S. SOCOM, in collaboration with ASD(SO/LIC&IC), should work
closely with the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps to
coordinate the title 10, U.S.C. ``Service like'' responsibilities of
U.S. SOCOM for the Marine Corps component.
Question. Do you believe that marines should be ``SOF for life,''
just as Army SOFs
Answer. I do not believe we have had enough experience yet with the
Marine Corps component of SOF to fully answer this question, but the
Department's experience with SOF from the other Services certainly
suggests that there should be a strong bias towards ``SOF for life.''
The Marine Corps are organized differently than Special Forces but they
share some of the same missions. Unlike Special Forces, however, there
is not a SOF unique military specialty for the Marine component, at
least not at this time. Current assignment policies for the Marine
Corps component envisions that individuals will rotate between SOF and
regular Marine Corps assignments. If confirmed, this is an issue that I
will examine closely in collaboration with the Marine Corps and U.S.
SOCOM.
Question. What can be done to improve the training of marines in
the Marine Corps Special Operations units to ensure that they possess
the language capabilities and cultural awareness that are needed for
counterterrorism and training missions? The Marine Corps already is
leading the other Services in providing regional and cultural expertise
to their Active Force. In addition, the marines make available web-
based training, distance learning and other tools, putting them in a
strong starting position to meet the language capability and cultural
awareness demands of special operations missions. If confirmed, I will
take a close look at what the Marine Corps has done and see how their
efforts can be expanded and how the other Services, and U.S. SOCOM, can
employ their learning tools.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

Question. What current missions, if any, do you believe can and
should be divested by SOCOM, and why?
Answer. I am aware that, as a follow-up to the 2006 QDR, the
Department is assessing the capability and capacity of the general-
purpose forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations and train,
equip, and advise large numbers of foreign security forces. This is one
candidate area for limited SOF divestment. A GPF capability to train,
equip and advise large numbers of foreign security forces could allow
SOF to focus on more SOF-unique and critical missions. SOF must
maintain a very robust train, equip, and advise foreign security forces
capability, however, to conduct operations in politically-sensitive
environments, to ensure SOF access for other SOF activities, and to
train, equip and advise irregular forces. The proper balance between
SOF and GPF in counterinsurgency operations is very much situation-
dependent.
Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM
should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding
them?
Answer. I do not currently foresee any additional missions that
U.S. SOCOM should assume. I believe however, that SOF-led approaches to
counterinsurgency are worth exploring. Counterinsurgency operations
conducted by the United States will, more often than not, be conducted
indirectly. SOF, and in particular its SF units, specialize in the
indirect approach. I believe that employing unconventional warfare
against non-state actors holds considerable promise as an expanded U.S.
SOCOM mission area. This approach could allow SOF to access areas which
would otherwise be denied. I believe that clandestine intelligence
operations are an area of possible mission growth for SOF. The global
war on terrorism has placed a premium on developing ``ruggedized'' case
officers, which SOF and U.S. SOCOM are well equipped to provide. I
strongly believe, however, covert action should remain the sole
responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency. If confirmed, I look
forward to discussing this issue in greater depth in a closed session
with the committee.
Question. What can be done to ensure that SOF missions with medium-
and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign
internal defense, receive as much emphasis and appropriate funding as
direct action?
Answer. Counterterrorist capabilities, both proactive and reactive,
counterproliferation of WMD capabilities, and clandestine operations
capabilities represent a critical national asset, and must be resourced
accordingly. U.S. SOCOM's indirect capabilities, however, are
increasingly central to the global war on terrorism. While the
resources devoted to U.S. SOCOM's indirect capabilities have increased
substantially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, this
part of the portfolio remains significantly under-resourced. Indirect
capabilities are underresourced, in my judgment, at both the Service
and U.S. SOCOM levels. Resourcing U.S. SOCOM's direct and indirect
capabilities should not, however, be a zero-sum game. While resources
devoted to U.S. SOCOM's indirect capabilities should be significantly
increased, resources should not simply be shifted from direct side to
the indirect. U.S. SOCOM's direct capabilities benefit immensely in the
allocation of resources from their designation as special mission
units, and their inclusion in a national mission force, sub-unified
command. Owing to their critical importance and command advantage, U.S.
SOCOM's direct capabilities also produce the preponderance of SOF
officers selected for high command. This could lead to an imbalance in
strategy. I do not believe, however, that there is such an imbalance
currently. The dominant approach in the global war on terrorism is
indirect, and this is recognized by U.S. SOCOM. The Commander, U.S.
SOCOM, moreover, has also recently selected an officer who specializes
in the indirect approach to become U.S. SOCOM's new Director of the
Center for Special Operations.
Assuring a proper balance between direct and indirect capabilities
will require additional resources devoted to indirect side, and some
believe the creation of new organizational and command arrangements as
well. An increase in resources could be facilitated by having the
Services designate at least some of U.S. SOCOM's indirect capabilities
as top priority special mission units on par with special mission units
that specialize in direct capabilities. Some believe the command
imbalance could be addressed by creating an equivalent three-star
indirect operational command--a Joint Unconventional Warfare Command
(JUWC). Under this proposal, indirect capabilities from across U.S.
SOCOM's Service components could be operationally assigned to this new
command. This would give U.S. SOCOM and the GCCs two operational
component commands instead of just one, with the Center for Special
Operations and the Theater SOCOM functioning as integrated planners and
synchronizers and force employers. This could increase the likelihood
that SOF officers who specialize in the indirect approach would have as
equal a shot at high command as their direct action counterparts.
SOF manpower, however, is a scarce resource. Creating new
headquarters should be done only if absolutely necessary, and then in
the most efficient manner possible. One approach that would meet at
least the latter criterion would be to convert an existing service
force provider headquarters into a provisional JUWC. Those who favor
this approach suggest that the Army's Special Forces Command could be a
candidate for this role.
I believe the ideas described above merit further study. If
confirmed, I will work with the Commander, U.S. SOCOM and the senior
defense civilian leadership to achieve an appropriate balance between
indirect and direct capabilities.

FUTURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Question. Many believe that the principal threats of the 21st
century will be asymmetric, unconventional ones, often emanating from
non-state actors.
Since asymmetric, unconventional threats must now be confronted by
our conventional forces, what is the future role of Special Operations?
What special threats must SOCOM be focused on for the future?
Answer. Irregular warfare (IW) will likely be the dominant form of
conflict for the foreseeable future. Both SOF and conventional forces
must place increased emphasis on it. Conventional forces--rebalanced
toward greater IW capabilities--and SOF are complementary capabilities,
not competitive.
Expanding the capability and capacity of conventional forces for
certain IW missions (e.g., COIN, Stability Operations, and FID) will
free up SOF to take on the more demanding and specialized tasks,
including:

Long-duration, indirect and clandestine operations in
politically sensitive environments and denied areas;
Locate, tag, and track dangerous individuals and other
high-value targets globally; and
Detect, locate, and render safe WMD.

These are core missions in the global war on terror. Additionally,
SOF must remain prepared to conduct unconventional warfare against
hostile states, and increase its capabilities to conduct SOF-intensive
operations in anti-access environments.

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. In your view, what have been the most significant lessons
learned by SOFs in recent military operations, and what are the future
operational, research and development, and procurement implications of
these lessons?
Answer. Operation Enduring Freedom revealed the power of
unconventional warfare when supported by precision airpower. A clear
implication of OEF is that national leadership now has an increasingly
viable indirect, small ground footprint option to decisively defeat a
hostile regime. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) has
shown the power of an indirect approach to counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism as well. One implication of OEF-P is that SOF-led
counterinsurgency concepts merit further study.
Proactive CT operations have shown that rapidly exploiting
intelligence to identify and strike new targets significantly increases
the odds of operational success. These operations also have shown that
persistent ISR is vital to success.

DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that Special
Operations capabilities are integrated into overall DOD research and
technology development programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) toward this end. DDR&E
publishes a strategic plan that guides investment and management
priorities for collective research and development programs. This plan
helps focus Department-wide science and technology priorities, and I
would work to include SOF capabilities and needs into those priorities.
I would also focus on leveraging Department-wide technology
developments.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL AWARENESS CAPABILITIES

Question. In your opinion, what is the role of technology in the
development of on-demand language and cultural awareness capabilities
for deployed special operators?
Answer. Technology has a valuable role in providing these
capabilities to our special operators. For example, we have developed
technological solutions that allow us to provide on-demand and reach-
back translation capabilities to our deployed forces. However, there is
no substitute for the expertise derived from personal interaction with
those who speak the language. Language and cultural immersion programs
are an important aspect of developing and maintaining language and
cultural capabilities.
Question. How should SOCOM address the erosion of language and
cultural deficiencies caused by the disproportionate deployment of
specialized operators to Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. Iraq and Afghanistan, undoubtedly, have created a challenge
for us to retain our language and cultural expertise in other areas.
We can mitigate at least partially the impact of deployments to
Iraq and Afghanistan by leveraging the web-based training, distance
learning, and Mobile Training Teams from the Defense Language Institute
as well as our internal special operation language and cultural
training capabilities.

COUNTERDRUG/COUNTERTERRORISM MISSIONS

Question. SOFs have been deeply involved in training forces in
Colombia to conduct unified counterdrug-counterterrorism missions.
In your view, what has been the success of training missions in
Colombia?
Answer. From my understanding, Colombia is safer today than in the
late 1990s; kidnappings, homicides, and massacres are at the lowest
levels in almost 20 years. By most indicators of military readiness,
Colombia's military is also better today than at any other time in
recent memory. Our training has helped produce a more professional and
capable corps; they are better motivated and more conscious of their
obligations to respect human rights.
Question. Are these appropriate missions for U.S. SOFs?
Answer. Yes. It is my understanding that SOF is making a major
contribution to the success of Plan Colombia.
Question. What, if any, benefit do unified counterdrug-
counterterrorist training missions in Colombia and counterdrug training
missions worldwide provide to SOFs?
Answer. In addition to the positive impact upon U.S. Government
counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts, SOF counterdrug and
counterterrorism training missions in Colombia and throughout the world
provide excellent opportunities for SOF to work with security and
military forces of partner nations. These missions strengthen SOF
skills such as instructor skills, language proficiency, and cultural
immersion in real-world settings. They also facilitate the development
of important professional and personal relationships that strengthen
U.S. access. At the operational level, integrated counternarcotics and
counterterrorism operations are complex contingencies that foster the
development of SOF strategists.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

Question. The office of ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for policy and
activities concerning stability operations, such as peacekeeping and
humanitarian assistance.
To your knowledge, what is the current involvement of the office of
the ASD(SO/LIC) in the planning and conduct of stability operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asian
and Pacific Security Affairs have the lead within Policy for planning
and conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. If
confirmed, I will be the principal advisor on special operations and
low-intensity conflict, and therefore, will work closely with my
regional counterparts to ensure appropriate oversight of any operations
in which SOF are employed. It is my aim, if confirmed, to significantly
increase the contribution of OSD's capability experts in policy,
strategy and operations. I believe that regional-functional operational
collaboration can produce vastly improved policy oversight. I also will
work to ensure that U.S. forces have the capabilities and capacity to
conduct stability operations in general; to assess feedback from
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere to identify ``lessons
learned;'' and to use that feedback to improve our future ability to
conduct stability operations.
I understand that SO/LIC is currently working to improve
coordination with interagency partners to help ensure greater
effectiveness of the U.S. Government in planning and conducting
stability operations. If confirmed, I plan to continue our efforts in
this area.
Question. Who has the principal responsibility within the
Department for the planning and conduct of stability operations in
these nations?
Answer. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
supervises the planning and conduct of stability operations in both
Afghanistan and Iraq, providing policy-level oversight and
coordination. The Joint Staff, in particular the Directorate for
Strategic Plans and Policies (J-5), also plays a critical role in
developing plans and operational guidance for the relevant combatant
commands. Within SO/LIC, the Stability Operations Capabilities office
supports relevant offices in Policy, including the regional desks and
the Offices of Coalition Affairs and Partnership Strategy, as subject-
matter experts on stability operations and by facilitating interagency
coordination with respect to stability operations-related issues.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in the planning
and conduct of ongoing and future stability operations? What are the
major challenges in this area and how would you address them?
Answer. Under the policy reorganization, the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) is
responsible for planning for stability operations, and developing
capabilities to conduct them. Among the major challenges that need to
be addressed are how to transition from the direct to the indirect
approach, and how to improve our ability to produce capable and
reliable foreign police forces. If confirmed, I would develop plans to
address these and other challenges in coordination with the regional
ASDs.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

Question. Psychological operations (PSYOPs) and Civil Affairs (CA)
have played prominent roles in recent military operations, from the
Balkans to Afghanistan to Iraq. Most U.S. PSYOPs and CA units and
capabilities are in our Reserve components.
What role does the ASD(SO/LIC) have in providing oversight for
PSYOPs and CA missions?
Answer. As the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of
Defense for DOD PSYOPs and CA, ASD(SO/LIC&IC) provides oversight of
PSYOPs and CA policy and planning. ASD(SO/LIC&IC) reviews all request
for forces for PSYOPs/CA assets and makes recommendations through the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Combatant command authority for
U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. SOCOM PSYOPs and CA
assets are split between U.S. SOCOM and U.S. JFCOM. If confirmed, I
will have policy oversight of both U.S. SOCOM and U.S. JFCOM, which
will allow me to identify policy and programming actions to better
support ongoing operations in these areas.
Question. In your view, do the Armed Forces have sufficient
personnel and other assets to conduct the range of PSYOPs and CA
missions being asked of them?
Answer. DOD is in the process of expanding CA and PSYOP structure
in both the Active and Reserve components of the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps. I also understand that the Joint Staff will conduct an analysis
of CA/PSYOP shortfalls within a study of irregular warfare in time for
the next POM. If confirmed, I also will review the CA and PSYOP
structure and work with the Joint Staff, the Services, and the
combatant commands to determine the shortfalls and how best to address
them.
Question. In your view, is the planned mix of Active and Reserve
components adequate in these areas?
Answer. No. I believe that we need a larger Active-Duty Civil
Affairs force. This will allow the Reserve force to focus more directly
on providing functional specialists (Government, Economics, and Public
Facilities) that leverage the civilian skills within our Reserve
components.
Question. What is the current and future impact on the training,
equipping, and promotion and individual assignments of CA reservists?
Answer. Our Reserve Civil Affairs force is under considerable
stress. The Army's Active CA component will focus on support for
Special Operations, while the Army's Reserve component will focus on
support to conventional operations. I understand that the Army is
reviewing the impact of the growth of CA on the training pipeline and
that USN and USMC are collaborating on their respective CA training
requirements. I do not know what the impact will be regarding the
assignments of CA reservists, but if confirmed, I will give attention
to this issue as we review how to develop adequate CA capabilities to
meet future challenges.

TRAINING CAPABILITY

Question. The ability of special forces personnel to train
realistically is of vital importance.
What capabilities do you consider most important for effective
training of special forces personnel?
Answer. Extended and advanced training is central to special
operations proficiency. Some SOF personnel, for example, require
constant advanced training, made possible only by real world exercises
and very sophisticated facilities, and access to the most advanced
training programs.
The most challenging task for SF personnel to perform is
unconventional warfare. Cultural and societal knowledge and language
and interpersonal skills are essential. Personalized learning
integrated into other SF training, immersion programs, and distance
learning tools are important, but language proficiency remains a very
challenging area for SF. Nothing replaces the fluency gained from
extended operational experience in a foreign language environment. Some
UW operations require advanced special operations training. Being able
to conduct UW at the operational level of war is increasingly
imperative, and improving our capabilities in this area will require
advanced SOF education. Maintaining SF combat skills requires
significant resources. Since UW is one of the hardest tasks to
simulate, significant operational experience is usually required to
gain mastery. Valuable UW experience might be gained by increasing the
number of SOF personnel who are detailed to other government agencies.
Question. What improvements are necessary, in your view, to enhance
training for special operations personnel?
Answer. Language proficiency is an area of particular concern.
Improving SOF proficiency will require substantial classroom
instruction but, more importantly, also regional immersion training.
Immersion training could be acquired by embedding officers and NCOs in
foreign military organizations.
A more robust program to train and educate SOF strategists should
also be studied.
Question. What, if any, training benefits accrue to U.S. SOFs from
training foreign military personnel?
Answer. SOF personnel gain long-term benefits from working with and
building relations with the foreign military personnel that they train.
Such activities augment SOF's language capabilities and cultural
awareness. By training foreign forces, U.S. SOF personnel also learn
their doctrine, tactics, and operating procedures.

TRAINING AND EQUIPPING INDIGENOUS FORCES FIGHTING WITH SOF

ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM

TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes. I believe that as a matter of policy, the Department
was already in compliance with the requirements of Common Article 3,
and that the Deputy Secretary's memo was sent to ensure that as a
matter of law, all DOD components understood that Common Article 3 was
the standard following the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency
operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes. I support the standards and believe that they
incorporate the lessons learned in prior conflicts as well as have
adapted to the enemies we face in the war on terrorism. I understand
Congress was fully briefed as to the new interrogation procedures. The
military intelligence community has stated that they believe that the
procedures outlined in FM 2-22.3, including Common Article 3 treatment,
provide the military with the best method for extracting timely
operational intelligence.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field
Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and
international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?
Answer. If confirmed as the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I will not have direct
responsibility for the implementation of detainee operations policy.
The office of Detainee Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Detainee Affairs, fall under the ASD(GSA), a position that is currently
vacant. The Acting, Mr. Benkert, has responsibility within policy for
the Office of Detainee Affairs. The Office of Detainee Affairs is
important in this question as it is the office primarily charged with
development of policy and conducting policy oversight on detainee
matters, per the DOD Directive, and Secretary Rumsfeld's July 2006
memorandum.
To the extent that my responsibilities for special operations
involve detention operations, I will ensure that our policies and
procedures are closely coordinated with broader detainee policy. I also
will ensure that guidance that we develop on detainee issues is
consistent with broader detention policies.
Question. The DOD Inspector General recently released a report on
detainee abuse noting reports of detainee abuse by a SMU Task Force in
Iraq that took place before the publicized behaviors at Abu Ghraib came
to light. Additionally, the report noted that personnel in this SMU
Task Force introduced battlefield interrogation techniques that
included abusive tactics such as sleep deprivation, stress positions,
the use of dogs, and the use of Survival Escape Resistance and Evasion
techniques--techniques designed specifically to imitate tactics by a
country that does not comply with Geneva.
Do you believe that such techniques contribute and are appropriate
in the struggle against terrorism?
Answer. I am not directly familiar with this report, however, I
believe that all U.S. Armed Forces have to comply with applicable law
and policy regarding the treatment of detainees.
Question. What is your understanding about how battlefield
interrogation techniques by such units were authorized and monitored?
Answer. I am not directly familiar with what policies or procedures
were in force at the time that these SMUs operated. I believe, however,
that DOD policy would have required that all interrogation tactics
conform with those described in Army Field Manual 34-52 and any
applicable specific rules of engagement issued by the Secretary of
Defense.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
our SOFs understand the necessity of complying with the Geneva
Conventions when detaining and interrogating those individuals under
U.S. control?
Answer. I would ensure that all policies and guidance that we
develop for SOF are consistent with broader detainee policy, and would
coordinate with the Office of Detainee Affairs on policy guidance that
I believed would affect detainee treatment.
Question. What steps would you take to ensure that those foreign
forces trained by our SOFs understand the same necessity?
Answer. As part of such training, our SOFs always indicate that
further military assistance and training is predicated on such foreign
forces adherence to the law of war.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

ARMING INSURGENTS

1. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, it has been reported in the media
recently that we are arming Sunni insurgents so that they can fight al
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Do you believe this is a good policy? If so, how
are we ensuring that these weapons are not turned against us either
during the battle with AQI or after the battle is over?
Mr. Vickers. Enlisting Sunni tribes in the fight against AQI
represents a major strategic success. Defeating AQI is a principal U.S.
war aim, and the Sunni population and its tribal militias are the
principal instruments through which the conflict must and will be
fought. Enlisting former Sunni insurgents in the fight against AQI
reduces, though by no means does it eliminate, risk to U.S. forces in
the near-term, and it better positions the U.S. to secure its interests
in Iraq over the longer-term. I support a limited policy of providing
support to former Sunni insurgents in the fight against AQI. It would
be preferable, in an ideal world, to not have armed militias, but not
having them could result in much less effective operations against AQI
in present-day Iraq. To be sure, providing support to former Sunni
insurgents is not without risk. There is always the risk that they
could use their weapons to attack U.S. forces, or they could provide
weapons to AQI. I believe these risks are manageable, and that various
measures--the provision of advisors and tracking of weapons--can be
adopted to ensure compliance. I do not believe, moreover, that the
policy of providing limited small arms support to Sunni militias who
join the fight against AQI will have a material adverse impact on the
future stability of Iraq, or on strategic balances among sectarian
groups in the event of a full-blown civil war in Iraq. Providing
limited support to Sunni tribesmen and former Sunni insurgents can,
however, tip the strategic balance against AQI, and secure the
necessary cooperation of the Sunni population. Over time, it is
imperative that Sunni militias be incorporated into legally constituted
security forces.

2. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, how will we make sure that the
weapons are returned or destroyed when they are not needed anymore?
Mr. Vickers. The Department of Defense controls and accounts for
defense articles and services provided to foreign nationals (both
permanent and temporary transfers) by issuing guidance consistent with
national security objectives and U.S. foreign policy. The goal of this
guidance is to ensure all forces understand and comply with U.S.
statutory requirements and DOD policies that govern U.S. international
transfers of defense articles and services. Furthermore, the guidance
issued outlines operational limitations and provisos, which are
designed to make certain all defense articles and services transferred
to foreign nationals, are accounted for and monitored throughout all
phases of operations. Weapons are issued as required for specific
duties and those not permanently transferred are returned when units
are demobilized.

3. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, how is our support to the insurgents
perceived by the Kurds and the Shia?
Mr. Vickers. Senior Kurdish leaders have expressed limited concern
over additional armed elements threatening the security of Iraq.
Kurdish leaders acknowledge the often hostile forces operating in the
region, but understand that they must balance Kurdish goals of
independence with U.S. aims to stabilize Iraq and defeat AQI. I think
that arming insurgents operating in central and western Iraq poses a
minimal threat to Kurdish control in northern Iraq. Senior Shia Iraqi
government leaders have expressed skepticism about coalition forces
arming insurgent groups as a way of fighting AQI, and they are
concerned that arming the insurgents would create new militias that
would eventually add to Iraqi security challenges. Iraqi Prime Minister
Maliki protested, and insisted that those bearing arms without
permission would be considered militias and would be dealt with as
such. Shia leaders have predicted that arming insurgents could destroy
all that has been achieved and that arming may promote added sectarian
violence. Providing limited small arms support to Sunni militias, I
believe, poses a minimal threat to Shia-populated regions, but it is
also important that we continue to work with the Shia leaders to
assuage their concerns.

CHANGE IN MILITARY STRATEGY

4. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, what would be the impact, in your
opinion, if we were to change our military strategy in Iraq so that our
troops would only be used to conduct offensive operations against
terrorist organizations (i.e., AQI, etc.), and all other Iraqi security
was immediately turned over to Iraqi security forces? The advantage in
doing this is that our troops would still be in the theater (although
probably at reduced levels) and engaging those organizations that were
deliberately inflaming sectarian strife, but would not be trying to
maintain security throughout Iraq. Of course, they would be able to
defend themselves, if attacked, and they could re-engage if the
security situation showed signs of catastrophic failure. Please provide
your opinion on how a strategy change like this might impact the
conflict in Iraq.
Mr. Vickers. The purpose of the temporary U.S. surge in operations
in Iraq is to reduce threats to the government and people of Iraq while
continuing to strengthen Iraqi capability and capacity to provide for
Iraq's security, and to create the conditions that would facilitate
political reconciliation of sectarian elements. While it is too soon to
tell if the surge in operations will achieve these objectives, it is
manifestly clear that Iraqis must ultimately be responsible for their
own security, and that U.S. forces must shift to a more limited and
indirect role. A premature shift to such a role, however, would carry
significant risk that the security situation in Iraq will deteriorate
substantially, with the break up of Iraq into sectarian successor
states a real possibility. The political and security situation could
deteriorate to such an extent that continued offensive operations
against terrorist organizations were placed in jeopardy. That said,
this transition must occur, and it is imperative, however events in
Iraq evolve, that the U.S. remain engaged, albeit in a more limited and
indirect way, if U.S. interests are to be secured. As a hedge against
Iraq's uncertain future, it appears increasingly evident that the U.S.
needs to pursue a two-track policy, which, while maintaining strong
support for the central Iraqi government, builds and maintains ties
with each major sectarian community. It is essential that U.S. forces
remain engaged in the training and development of Iraqi Security
Forces. At the tactical level, many of the Iraqi units have proven
marginally capable. However, at higher echelons it is apparent that the
support structure is not yet in place to enable self-sufficiency.
Therefore, without the support of U.S. forces, the ISF would
potentially fail in their security mission.

PAKISTAN AND AL QAEDA

5. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, it is clear that the Pakistani
government has not brought its full resources to bear in eliminating al
Qaeda's safe haven in Pakistan, and that they are not likely to in the
future. What are your views on the current situation in Pakistan?
Mr. Vickers. Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia, is a vital ally in
the global war on terrorism. If either country were to fall to radical
Islamists, the implications for U.S. security would be dire. The
situation in Pakistan is increasingly worrisome. The Islamist threat to
the government is growing, and al Qaeda has established numerous safe
havens, not just in western Pakistan, but throughout the country. It is
clear that that the September agreement, which suspended Pakistani Army
operations in the tribal areas, has failed to achieve its objectives.
It is imperative, in my view, that the U.S. increase its support for
the Government of Pakistan, including, but not limited to, in the
tribal areas of western Pakistan. Given the increasingly volatile
political situation, U.S. support must remain indirect and clandestine.
I believe the Government of Pakistan will strongly support such an
approach.

6. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, what strategies and policies do you
believe we should be using to capture Osama bin Laden?
Mr. Vickers. I believe the appropriate strategies are indirect and
clandestine ones. Our aim must be to assist the Government of Pakistan
is winning over the allegiance of the local population without further
inflaming a volatile political situation. Manhunting is an
extraordinarily difficult task, but if we increase the intensity of our
indirect and clandestine approach, we will eventually eliminate al
Qaeda's safe havens in western Pakistan and increase the likelihood
that we will succeed in killing or capturing al Qaeda's senior
leadership

FIGHTING TERRORISM STRATEGY

7. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, I believe that there are many
potential underlying causes that can make a person susceptible to being
recruited to be a terrorist. Our overall national strategy (according
to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)'s 2007 Posture Statement)
includes attacking the roots of terrorism. It's not clear how
comprehensive our strategy is for doing this. What strategies and
policies are currently being utilized in the global war on terror to
attack the roots of terrorism?
Mr. Vickers. There is no one reason why people turn to terrorism.
Therefore, we as a government must develop a strategy that addresses
the manifold underlying causes of why people turn to terrorism and this
can only be done through the development of a whole of government
approach. For example, the Department of Defense continues to work with
other government agencies to counter extreme ideologies and provide
foreign assistance more effectively. Such efforts intend to develop
viable ideological, political, and economic alternatives to the
extremist ideology that breeds terrorism.
The recent operations in the Philippines could provide a model for
future operations that seek to reduce terrorist safe havens and
recruiting grounds. Our approach in the Philippines has addressed the
terrorist problem from multiple angles. We have worked indirectly as
advisors to the Philippine government forces as they continue to
conduct operations against terrorist organizations. At the same time,
we have worked with local governments and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) to develop the economic and social infrastructure to strengthen
stability and thereby reduce the attractiveness of terrorism. From the
beginning, locals have been involved in the construction and rebuilding
efforts and, as a result, they have ``buy in'' to the success of the
country's future well-being, which helps drain the pool of potential
terrorists. We might look to apply the OIF-Philippines approach to
other terrorist safe havens.
We must move more quickly to integrate the tools of various U.S.
Government (USG) agencies so that we can apply a more comprehensive
approach to attacking the multiple roots of terrorism. There are
ongoing efforts to develop a USG-wide approach to helping our allies
and partners and, if confirmed, I look forward to engaging other
agencies in this endeavor.

8. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, do you have recommendations for
additional strategies or policies that could be used?
Mr. Vickers. See response to question 7.

9. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, it seems that poverty, or a poor
economy, could also be a factor in creating breeding grounds for
terrorists. What can we do to minimize this factor, especially in
poorer regions such as in Africa?
Mr. Vickers. A poor economy weakens governance capacity and causes
social instability, creating conditions ripe for terrorist recruitment
and sustenance. Our efforts in Africa must include a combination of
economic, military, and political aid to help African states better
govern their areas and reduce the threat posed by terrorist and other
illicit organizations.
The Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), for example,
focuses the capabilities of DOD, State, and USAID on defeating
terrorism and creating an environment inhospitable to it in North
Africa. While DOD focuses on developing the capabilities of North
African partner nation militaries, State, USAID, and other U.S.
Government agencies employ programs to promote good governance, provide
humanitarian assistance, improve economic infrastructure, and enable
the countries to assert tighter control over their territories.
Although relatively nascent, this effort has been successful and we
should look to continue to build on it to address other areas on the
continent.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh

UAV REQUIREMENTS

10. Senator Bayh. Mr. Vickers, according to testimony by Vice
Admiral Olson in April, SOCOM is unable to fulfill its standard medium
altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) orbit requirement. It is my
understanding that SOCOM's long-term budget does not contain enough
funding to manage this gap in the short-term. If so, how will SOCOM
address this unacceptable budgetary and requirement shortfall?
Mr. Vickers. SOCOM relies on Service-provided and SOF-unique UAVs
to meet its airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
needs. As Vice Admiral Olson has testified, SOCOM's ability to generate
UAV orbits is well short of actual requirements. If confirmed, I would
recommend a thorough review of UAV requirements to identify the scope
and volume of UAV needs to meet key operational and strategic goals.
Such a review would help prioritize the availability of assets to meet
our most pressing needs in the near to mid-term while ensuring that
near-term needs are properly balanced against longer-term ones. Some
operations, for example, will require the ability to clandestinely
penetrate denied air space, while others will need the ability to
maintain persistent surveillance over multiple wide areas
simultaneously. A portfolio of UAV capabilities will likely be
required, along with additional capacity. A thorough review of UAV
requirements will help ensure that DOD allocates sufficient resources
to this critical capability area.

11. Senator Bayh. Mr. Vickers, what strategy would you employ to
ensure that not only enough UAVs are in the air, but also have the
communication infrastructure, logistical chain, and pilot/operator
availability needed to meet this SOCOM requirement?
Mr. Vickers. UAVs are indeed only one part of a system that
includes communications infrastructure, logistical support, and trained
operators. Each of these components is critical to system performance.
Bandwidth constraints, for example, affect operational control of
flight systems, while the availability of trained operators and command
and control systems affect mission-capable rates. If confirmed, I would
work closely with the USD(I) and others to explore options within each
component of the UAV system to ensure that the Department and SOCOM
achieve maximum performance from our UAV assets
______

[The nomination reference of Michael G. Vickers follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
April 10, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Michael G. Vickers, of California, to be an Assistant Secretary of
Defense, vice Thomas W. O'Connell.
______

[The biographical sketch of Michael G. Vickers, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Michael G. Vickers

Michael G. (Mike) Vickers is Senior Vice President, Strategic
Studies, at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA),
a non-partisan, independent public policy research institute located in
Washington, DC. He directs a broad-based strategic studies program,
funded by the U.S. Government, the U.S. defense industry, and private
foundations. He provides regular commentary on national security,
defense, and intelligence issues in the national broadcast and print
media. His most recent CSBA monograph is ``The Revolution in War''
(2004).
In mid-2006, Mr. Vickers was asked to provide advice on Iraq
strategy to President Bush and his war cabinet. On May 30, Mr. Vickers
met with President Bush in the Oval Office to provide confidential
advice on the way forward in Iraq. On June 12, Mr. Vickers met again
with President Bush and his war cabinet at Camp David, Maryland. Mr.
Vickers' Memoranda to the President have been circulated at the highest
levels of the U.S. national security establishment.
Mr. Vickers served as a senior adviser to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense for the 2005-2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR), the Defense Department's major, 4-year review of strategy,
capabilities, and force structure. He was involved extensively in the
QDR, from defining its four focus areas and drafting the Secretary's
Terms of Reference, to writing the final report. In addition to his
work advising the main QDR effort, he also served as Executive Director
for a QDR ``Red Team,'' headed by Andy Marshall, Director for Net
Assessment, which was tasked by the Deputy Secretary to provide the
Department's senior leadership with an alternative assessment of the
QDR. The Red Team, which included six retired four-star officers,
recommended major changes to the Department's capability mix, the
majority of which were adopted. With General Wayne Downing, USA (Ret.),
and Major General Bill Garrison, USA (Ret.), Mr. Vickers also conducted
an independent assessment of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) (The
Downing Report) for Secretary Rumsfeld. Almost all of the
recommendations from the Independent SOFs Assessment were subsequently
implemented by the Department.
From 1973 to 1986, Mr. Vickers served as an Army Special Forces
Noncommissioned Officer, Special Forces Officer, and Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Operations Officer, with operational and
combat experience in Central America and the Caribbean, the Middle
East, and Central Asia. His irregular warfare experience spans
unconventional warfare, covert action, counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense.
During the mid-1980s, he was the principal strategist for the
largest covert action program in the CIA's history: the paramilitary
operation that drove the Soviet army out of Afghanistan and played a
major role in ending the Cold War. His Afghanistan experience is
described in the New York Times bestseller and soon-to-be-released
major motion picture, ``Charlie Wilson's War''. Mr. Vickers provided
strategic and operational direction to an insurgent force of more than
300 unit commanders, 150,000 full-time fighters, and 500,000 part-time
fighters. He developed paramilitary force structure and training
requirements and streamlined program logistics. He controlled an annual
budget approaching $1 billion, and oversaw a 400 percent growth in
program funding. He prepared policy recommendations for President
Reagan and the National Security Council, and regularly briefed
cognizant congressional committees on program results.
He coordinated the efforts of more than 10 foreign governments, and
traveled frequently to Europe and the Near and Far East to gain and
maintain broad international support for the program. He negotiated
several major covert materiel procurement contracts with foreign
suppliers. For his work on the Afghanistan Covert Action Program, Mr.
Vickers received a special promotion for exceptional performance.
In an earlier assignment with the CIA, Mr. Vickers planned the
clandestine intelligence and covert operations portions of a fast-
breaking rescue operation in the Caribbean. He deployed to the crisis
site during the critical time frame, and performed operational tasks in
a life threatening situation. Mr. Vickers received an award for heroism
from the Director of Central Intelligence for major contributions to
the success of the rescue mission, in another assignment, Mr. Vickers
served as operations officer for a joint CIA-DOD counterterrorist
operation in the Middle East. He received a commendation from the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency for outstanding
performance. Mr. Vickers also completed the Career Training Program, a
15-month program for future Agency leaders, and the advanced
paramilitary operations course.
As a Special Forces Officer, Mr. Vickers commanded a one-of-a-kind,
24-man, classified special operations unit. He played a major role in
resolving on-scene two major incidents of international terrorism in
Central America. He also directed contingency intelligence collection
activities throughout Latin America, and increased coverage in U.S.
Southern Command's area of responsibility by more than 200 percent. He
regularly advised U.S. ambassadors, senior military commanders and
other policy-level officials on military counterterrorist capabilities
and crisis response options. He served on a unified command task force
to plan contingency blockade and strike operations in Central America,
led emergency evacuation operations in El Salvador and Suriname, and
served as a national intelligence counterinsurgency advisor in El
Salvador. As a second lieutenant, he graduated first in his class from
the Special Forces Officer Course. Mr. Vickers was twice awarded the
Meritorious Service Medal for outstanding operational performance.
Mr. Vickers holds a Bachelor of Arts, Cum Laude, in International
Relations from the University of Alabama, and a Master of Business
Administration from the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania. Mr. Vickers will soon complete a doctoral dissertation on
the Structure of Military Revolutions, fulfilling the requirements for
the Doctor of Philosophy degree from Johns Hopkins University. During
the 1996-1997 academic year, Mr. Vickers served as Acting Co-Director
of the Strategic Studies Program at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies and taught graduate courses in Strategy and
Policy and Transformations of War.
Mr. Vickers holds Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information
clearances. He is married to Melana Zyla Vickers, and has five
daughters.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Michael G.
Vickers in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Michael G. Vickers.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities).

3. Date of nomination:
April 10, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
April 27, 1953; Burbank, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Melana Zyla Vickers (Maiden Name: Melana Kalyna Zyla).

7. Names and ages of children:
Alexandra N. Vickers, 18; Natasha N. Vickers, 15; Sophia N.
Vickers, 14; Oksana E. Vickers, 5; and Kalyna C. Vickers, 2.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Hollywood High School, 1968-1971, High School Diploma, 1971.
University of Alabama, 1980-1983, Bachelor of Arts, 1983.
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1986-1988, Master
of Business Administration, 1988.
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University, 1991-1995: resident Master's and Ph.D. student,
1996-present: nonresident Ph.D. student.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
January 2007-Present, Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies,
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1667 K Street, NW,
Suite 900, Washington, DC.
September 1996-December 2006, Director of Strategic Studies, Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW,
Suite 912, Washington, DC.
July 1996-June 1997, Professorial Lecturer and Acting Co-Director
of the Strategic Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1740 Massachusetts
Avenue, NW, Washington, DC.

Member, Independent Special Operations Forces Assessment,
2005
Member, Defense Science Board Task Force, 1996, 1998, 1999.

Full-Time Positions:

Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1983-
March 1986.
Commissioned Officer (2LT-CPT), United States Army, December
1978-June 1983 (Operational Detachment Commander and Special
Mission Unit Commander, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces
Group, June 1980-June 1983).
Noncommissioned Officer (PVT-SSG), United States Army, June
1973-December 1978 (Operational Detachment Weapons and
Demolitions Specialist, 10th Special Forces Group, 1974-1978).

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, National Presbyterian Church, Washington, DC.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
Member, Republican National Committee, 2004-Present.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Bush-Cheney 2004, $200.
Republican National Committee, 2004, $200.

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Alexander Hamilton Fellowship, Smith Richardson Foundation, 1993-
1997.
Certificate of Distinction, Central Intelligence Agency, 1984.
Bachelor of Arts, Cum Laude, University of Alabama, 1983.

Military Awards:
Meritorious Service Medal (2).
Good Conduct Medal.
National Defense Service Medal.
Ranger Tab.
Parachutist Badge.
Expert Infantry Badge.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

Signature and Date

[The nomination of Michael G. Vickers was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to VADM Eric T. Olson, USN,
by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follows:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. No, not at this time.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. I see no need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act at this
time.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders
under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies
and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
Answer. Yes.
Question. From the perspective you have gained in your previous
assignments, do you believe that the authority and responsibility of
the combatant commanders, in general, and the Commander, United States
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), in particular, are appropriate?
Answer. Yes. In general, the Commander, SOCOM's authorities and
responsibilities are appropriate. If confirmed, I will explore whether
modification to personnel management authorities are required.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other
sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important
relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Commander, SOCOM, to the
following offices:
The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would anticipate frequent interaction with
the Under Secretaries, particularly in the development of military
policy and the acquisition process. SOCOM maintains an especially close
relationship with the Office of Under Secretary for Policy, who has
primary responsibility for oversight of Special Operations Forces (SOF)
operations and resources. Importantly, the law requires that we
coordinate our involvement with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
through the CJCS.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict.
Answer. While SOCOM has the principal responsibility for the
readiness and preparation of SOF in support of the Geographic Combatant
Commanders, SOCOM's ability to execute those missions would be greatly
hindered without the sound policies and oversight, interagency
coordination, and advocacy provided by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Most of the
Under Secretary for Policy oversight responsibilities regarding SOCOM
are exercised through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Answer. I anticipate continued close coordination and cooperation
in the determination of SOCOM's role in homeland defense and to
determine the military support necessary to protect the United States
and its citizens during times of national emergency.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. Commander, SOCOM, coordinates activities through the CJCS.
This ensures the Chairman stays informed in order to execute his other
responsibilities and also provides our command with the beneficial
contributions of the Joint Staff. I see it as a commander's duty to
work with and through the Chairman in the execution of Presidential and
Secretary of Defense directed taskings.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) is a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and when the Chairman is absent,
or disabled, the Vice Chairman acts in his stead. The Joint
Requirements Oversight Council responsibilities are delegated to the
Vice Chairman. The VCJCS also regularly represents the Chairman on the
Interagency Deputy's Committee, the Defense Acquisition Board, and
other boards and councils as necessary. Thus, the VCJCS plays an
essential role for the CJCS in fulfilling his principal military
advisor obligations. Because of these important roles, communication
between a combatant commander and the VCJCS is as essential as it is
with the CJCS.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The combatant commander's authority over Service
components, including those forces assigned to him, is clear but
requires close coordination with the Secretaries to ensure no
infringement on those lawful responsibilities the Service Secretary
alone may discharge.
Question. The Service Chiefs.
Answer. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service
Chiefs, no combatant commander can hope to ensure the preparedness of
his assigned forces for Presidential directed missions. Individually
and collectively, the Joint Chiefs are a source of experience and
judgment that every combatant commander can call upon. If confirmed as
Commander, SOCOM, I intend to continue a full and frank dialogue with
the Chiefs of all the Services.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. The combatant commanders define requirements for their
respective areas of operational responsibility, an effort that assists
SOCOM in defining its support requirements. If confirmed, I intend to
foster an atmosphere of teamwork and trust in my relationship with the
combatant commanders. I will work closely with the other combatant
commanders in order to best synchronize Department of Defense (DOD)
activities in the global war on terrorism.
Question. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
Answer. Our primary responsibility is to write the DOD's global war
on terrorism plan in support of the National Implementation Plan, which
was developed by National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). In this role,
SOCOM is actively engaged to support them. We have continuously
assisted NCTC planning efforts and workgroups since its inception.
SOCOM has actively supported their development through exercise funding
and participation and the provision of embedded planners to coordinate
SOCOM support, facilitate synchronization, and assist NCTC's
Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning with planning,
implementation, and assessment efforts as required.
Question. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Answer. We are a consumer of CIA analysis. The Director of the CIA
has been to SOCOM on numerous occasions over the last year. The CIA has
liaison personnel at SOCOM and in the field, as well as SOCOM having a
liaison at the CIA.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. If confirmed, you will be entering this important
position at a critical time for the SOCOM.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer. My 33 years in special operations have afforded me
opportunities to serve and lead at every level. As a fully qualified
SEAL operator with an advanced degree in National Security Affairs, I
have both the training and education to lead this extraordinary force.
I am a Middle Eastern specialist, a basic Arabic linguist, and an
experienced joint planner. I have been decorated for personal valor as
a SOF operator in two conflicts. My service in top leadership positions
at both Service and joint headquarters has prepared me to operate at
the senior levels of government. I have been involved in nearly every
major decision regarding special operations for the last 4 years, and
have represented SOCOM to the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary
of Defense in several committees and working groups, including the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

MAJOR CHALLENGES/LESSONS LEARNED

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Commander, SOCOM?
Answer. The major challenges are:

Prioritizing the employment of SOF in order to gain
maximum value from this limited asset.
Sustaining the materiel readiness of our high-end
mobility platforms in a resource constrained environment.
Transforming our fixed-wing aviation fleet.
Shifting to a more expeditionary deployment posture.
Establishing the mechanisms and agreements with other
agencies of government that will facilitate the best
utilization of SOF globally.
Maintaining appropriately streamlined acquisition
processes and systems.
Growing the force at the programmed rate while
ensuring the quality and maturity that the Nation expects of
SOF.

Question. What are the most important lessons you have learned
during your tenure in senior leadership positions in the Special
Operations community?
Answer. Our people remain our most valuable asset.
SOF must be applied appropriately in order to conserve capability
and capacity.
SOF must remain flexible and responsive, with a strong set of
unique skills and abilities that can be rapidly applied.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to take a long-term approach to
special operations. We have been extremely successful in responding to
immediate requirements for several years at the expense of a fully
executable long-term plan. I intend to form teams to develop or improve
long range vision for global posture, interagency relationships, joint
training, SOF roles and missions, recruiting and retention, and
technology development.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of Commander, SOCOM?
Answer. The Commander, SOCOM, lacks authority to manage the
assignments, promotions, and pay of SOF. This inhibits his ability to
meet his responsibility to ensure the combat readiness of the force.
The Commander, SOCOM, is designated the lead combatant commander
for planning and synchronizing DOD activities against terrorists and
terrorist networks. That said, SOCOM's ability to drive behavior within
DOD is limited due to unclear definition of authorities. That makes
enforcement of those authorities difficult.
Question. What management actions and time lines would you
establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the senior DOD leadership
to clarify SOCOM's authorities with respect to influencing or
conducting operations inside and across other global combatant
commanders' areas of responsibility. This can be accomplished within
DOD policy and planning documents during their next review cycles.
Personnel management authorities must be carefully considered with
a goal of initiating solutions in fiscal year 2010.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Question. From your perspective as Deputy Commander, SOCOM, what
are the main ``lessons learned'' from Operation Iraqi Freedom,
including the ongoing stability operations?
Answer. There remains a need to enhance the Joint Force Commander's
ability to integrate capabilities and capacities of both SOF and the
general purpose forces (GPF) during execution of the global war on
terrorism in order to create a joint force that is equally competent in
irregular warfare as well as conventional warfare.
Three focus areas to achieving this goal are as follows:

There is an overlap of SOF and GPF capabilities. SOF
forces are routinely performing tasks that could be performed
by existing GPF capabilities or GPF with additional training.
Rebalancing GPF structure to mitigate shortfalls in low
density/high demand SOF assets is essential to the global war
on terrorism/Irregular Warfare (IW) effort.
Our forces will continue to face an irregular enemy.
There exists a necessity to move the IW concept to a full scale
capability.
Both SOF and GPF forces require enhanced language and
cultural training

Addressing these focus areas would lead to a joint force with
enhanced capabilities for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting
that allows it to be as compelling in IW as it is in conventional
warfare.
Question. What are the operational, research and development, and
procurement implications of those lessons?
Answer. SOF must be organized, trained, equipped, and employed in a
manner that enables full spectrum operations.
Question. How would you assess the adequacy of SOFs provided to
Central Command, both in terms of quantity and mix, to conduct
Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Answer. SOF in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations
have proven to be extraordinarily capable and responsive to the needs
of operational commanders. They provide operational flexibility to
adequately meet mission requirements.
Question. What is the short- and long-term impact of continued
operations in Iraq for SOFs, including in terms of readiness,
retention, and modernization?
Answer. Short-term gains in combat experience at the cost of
reduced capability in specific skill areas not utilized in OIF/OEF.
Long-term impact is uncertain. I anticipate manpower and equipment
recapitalization challenges.

AFGHANISTAN

POLICY OFFICE REORGANIZATION

Question. In your view, what is the impact on SOCOM of the ongoing
reorganization of the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy?
Answer. SOCOM has not felt any significant impact to date from the
reorganization.
Question. At what level do you believe most oversight of the
command will occur--at the level of the Assistant Secretary or Deputy
Assistant Secretary?
Answer. Most oversight will occur at the level of the Assistant
Secretary.

TRANSFORMATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. Much attention has been focused on the transformation of
our conventional Armed Forces to make them more capable of conducting
counterinsurgency and combating terrorism missions.
Do our SOFs need to be transformed?
Answer. SOF can never remain stagnant and are in continuous
transformation.
Question. If so, what is your vision for such a transformation, and
how would the transformation of conventional forces complement a SOF
transformation, and vice versa?
Answer. The foundation pillars of SOF transformation revolve around
three Strategic Objectives: global war on terrorism Lead, Global
Presence, and Global Expeditionary Force. SOCOM, while retaining an
unequaled ability to conduct rapid and precise direct action
operations, will also conduct operations in protracted regional and
global campaigns designed to subvert, attrit, and exhaust an adversary
rather than defeat him through direct conventional military
confrontation.
Question. Are the SOCOM and DOD--particularly the military
Services--investing in the technologies to transform SOF according to
the vision you describe?
Answer. Yes, we are investing in those types of technologies. There
are two integral parts to SOCOM's technology program--leveraging the
Services, Defense Agencies, and government laboratory efforts, while
harvesting those technology efforts that can be rapidly transitioned
into capabilities for the operator. We will continue to pursue
technological advances that address SOF-unique requirements but which
can also be integrated with the conventional forces.

RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. If confirmed, what metrics will you use to determine the
effectiveness of SOCOM technology development investments and whether
SOCOM is investing enough resources in these efforts?
Answer. We have created a series of technology road maps that
assist us in identifying promising solutions to our problems. These
road maps are schedule oriented; containing both the technology
development time lines and the formal acquisition program schedules. As
such, they have quantifiable metrics (cost, schedule, performance, and
technology readiness) embedded in them.

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Question. If confirmed, how you will ensure that SOCOM has the
highest quality acquisition workforce to develop and manage acquisition
and research and development programs?
Answer. The quality of our acquisition workforce is directly
related to the combination of the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act (DAWIA) standards, the Services' ability to continue to
provide properly trained military acquisition personnel to fill our
military billets, and our ability to hire qualified civilian personnel.
The quality in our acquisition workforce comes from ensuring that SOCOM
acquisition personnel (whether military or civilian) are trained and
certified to DAWIA standards. This ensures they have the acquisition
education, experience and training needed to effectively manage SOCOM
acquisition, research and development programs. By virtue of a series
of Memoranda of Agreement with the three Military Departments, SOCOM
also has access to and can obtain experienced advice, program
management support, and technical assistance from the Military
Departments for our SOCOM acquisition programs.

BASING FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy
released by the President in August 2004 called for SOFs from various
overseas locations in Europe and the Pacific theater to be relocated to
military installations in the United States in order to better manage
the demand for forces and high operations tempo.
Do you support this realignment of SOFs back to the United States?
Answer. Yes. The overall objective of the SOCOM Global SOF Posture
(GSP) is to establish a worldwide persistent joint SOF presence to
shape operational environments in support of the global war on
terrorism and theater security cooperation initiatives. The realignment
will permit a more tailorable force to accomplish this.
Question. In your opinion, does the realignment in any way diminish
the ability of SOFs to support the requirements of combatant
commanders? If so, how would you propose to address this problem?
Answer. No. Implementation of the GSP, when combined with SOF
growth, provides SOCOM the ability to manage SOF from a global
perspective and provides better flexibility to meet the increasing
demands of the combatant commanders.
Question. In your opinion, are SOFs based at locations in the
United States appropriately positioned to facilitate joint training,
operations, and rapid deployment?
Answer. Yes. Currently we have SOF spread throughout the United
States with the majority on or near both coasts. Although there are no
true joint bases, our units are generally based in close enough
proximity to enable joint training. If confirmed, I would seek
additional opportunities to enhance joint training.
Question. In your view, with the growth of SOFs end strength should
any military installations in the United States be designated solely as
Special Operations bases?
Answer. No. SOCOM is not structured or resourced to manage military
bases. The support provided by the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps in their roles as executive agents enables our forces to maintain
their Service culture, enhances SOF recruiting, and provides SOF with
access to Service-common facilities and transportation hubs resident on
or near major military installations. This close proximity to our
Services helps facilitate mobility and jointness without degrading our
SOF-unique requirements and capabilities.
Question. In your opinion, does SOCOM have access to sufficient
ranges in the United States to be able to adequately train for the full
range of joint, combined arms special operations missions?
Answer. Yes. We have access to a spectrum of ranges but face
ongoing coordination, utilization, and access challenges. Some of the
ranges we have historically used require intensive coordination and
often changes to training schedules to ensure sufficient range time.
SOCOM and its components, together with the Services, are
diligently working the issues. The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is
assisting us in certifying USMC ranges for nonstandard weapons. The
U.S. Army SOCOM has been very successful working with Army to ensure
Army SOF requirements are planned and built into Army ranges. The Air
Force SOCOM worked with the Joint National Training Center to establish
a Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) range for AC-130 gunship
use.
We are assessing the feasibility of investing in SOF ranges or in
establishing right-of-first-use agreements at installations with ranges
that support our requirements to improve access and reduce schedule
changes. Further, we are looking at options for moving some training
closer to our home bases.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. If confirmed, you would play an integral role in the
Department's combating terrorism mission.
Which DOD official provides the primary civilian oversight with
regard to SOCOM's combating terrorism mission?
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 138, establishes the duties of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict. He is the principal civilian advisor to the
Secretary of Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict,
as well as the senior management official within the Department for
special operations and low intensity conflict. These responsibilities
include the overall supervision of special operations directed toward
combating terrorism.
Question. What other DOD officials would be involved in oversight
of SOCOM's combating terrorism mission?
Answer. The Under Secretaries of Defense for Intelligence and
Policy both provide oversight, direction, and guidance to SOCOM's
efforts to execute its mission. I would anticipate continued, frequent
interaction with these two principal Under Secretaries.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Question. Information operations and information warfare will
likely play an increasing role in 21st century warfare.
What is your definition of information operations, and what role do
you envision for SOCOM in overall U.S. information operations?
Answer. Information operations are the integrated employment of
electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological
operations, military deception, and operations security to influence,
disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision
making while protecting our own information systems.
SOF play a significant role utilizing Information Operations to
achieve DOD objectives in the global war on terrorism. Through the
Geographic Combatant Commanders, SOCOM plans and integrates the full
range of information operations capabilities to deter, deny and degrade
extremist operations and networks, while building partner nation
capabilities and eliminating the conditions that foment terrorism.
SOCOM is the DOD proponent for psychological operations (PSYOP)
forces, training, and capabilities.
Question. Under what circumstances would the Commander, SOCOM,
conduct information operations as a supported combatant commander?
Answer. As the DOD lead for planning and synchronizing the war on
terrorism, SOCOM guides collaborative planning, coordination, and when
directed, execution of information operations. As the supported
command, SOCOM envisions execution of information operations to support
surgical, limited duration, counterterrorism missions, as well as
support to long range planning to develop coordinated, trans-regional
strategies against terrorists and their supporters.
Along with the DOD, SOCOM is also working with the Department of
State and other government agencies to develop integrated national
Strategic Communication processes and responsibilities, in which
information operations plays a significant role.

SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMAND

Question. As Deputy Commander, SOCOM, you have been involved in the
exercise of SOCOM's responsibilities as a supported combatant command,
and as a supporting combatant command.
In your view, under what circumstances should SOCOM conduct
operations as a supported combatant command?
Answer. When near simultaneous operations must be conducted within
two or more Global Combatant Commands, SOCOM would provide the
oversight to ensure synchronization and de-confliction of these
operations.
Also, a scenario that requires a very small and precise operation
that is SOF-peculiar in nature could lead to designation of SOCOM as
the supported commander.
Question. In your view, what resource, organization, and force
structure changes, if any, are required in order for SOCOM to more
effectively conduct both supporting and supported combatant command
responsibilities?
Answer. To meet our responsibilities as a supported combatant
command we must to continue to: properly man our components and
headquarters; ensure they have the latest equipment and technology; and
develop a better cross global combatant command, Service, coalition and
interagency compatible collaborative planning and execution
environment. We must also expand upon our liaison officer and Special
Operations Support Team programs with our coalition partners and
agencies.
Aircraft modernization, ISR platforms, and global sensor network
are three key areas that require additional resources.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. How successful has SOCOM been in recruiting and retaining
the personnel it needs?
Answer. The personnel readiness of SOF is excellent. Our primary
focus in fiscal year 2007 has been to maintain readiness while
executing current operational requirements and personnel growth.
Execution of retention incentives, coupled with the expansion of our
training base and ongoing efforts to improve recruiting, are the way
forward as we maintain and grow the force.
Recently implemented retention and bonus programs are having a
positive impact across all SOF personnel from all Services. Retention
numbers to date meet or exceed each Service's retention goals.
We are cautiously optimistic that recently implemented recruiting
and retention incentive programs will continue to positively shape the
force.
Question. What are the biggest challenges to retention you see in
the SOCOM community?
Answer. The greatest challenge will be the continued funding of
retention incentives in a climate of constrained resources.
Question. Specifically, what is the status of the efforts to
increase retention within SOCOM's components, and especially among the
Navy SEAL officers, all senior NCOs, and pilots?
Answer. SEAL officers will be eligible for the Critical Skills
Retention Bonus (CSRB) in 2007, which targets officers in pay grades O-
4 through O-6, with the goal of retaining selected officers up to the
25-year career milestone. It complements the existing Officer Career
Pay that was implemented in 1999 for officers with 6-14 years of
service. Since inception of the Officer Career Pay, retention increased
from a low of 34 percent to an average of 64 percent. Although the
results are still undetermined, the CSRB is expected to influence
retention behavior among Navy SEAL officers.
To retain the experience of senior noncommissioned officers, the
combination of CSRB and Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) is producing
positive results. For Army SOF in particular, the inception of the CSRB
and AIP in fiscal year 2005 is retaining a more mature force. The
average retirement time in service stood at 21.7 years for Special
Forces (SF) personnel. We were losing experienced leaders at a critical
career juncture. Fiscal year 2007 data shows that SF personnel now
retire at an average of 25 plus years time in service. This is a
significant jump in the right direction since inception of the CSRB and
targeted AIPs. This combination is also working well for the other SOF
components.
The Air Force Fixed Wing pilot population is being monitored
closely due to an increased number of young aviators being assigned.
This lack of experience concerns us because of the special skills
required to fly SOF mission profiles. This is why we are looking at
ways to increase the experience levels of fixed wing pilots. We have
identified the critical attributes believed to be keys to success of
SOF aviators and they will be stressed in our recruitment efforts. From
an assessment perspective, we currently measure progress at every level
of training and will continually look for ways to strengthen our
evaluation rigor throughout the process. The Air Force SOCOM, partnered
with the Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserves, will
continue to explore various venues in order to increase aircrew
experience levels.
Question. What steps need to be taken, in your view, to meet the
recruiting and retention goals of each of the Services' SOFs?
Answer. Recruiting will continue to be challenging. To mitigate
these challenges, we need your help in increasing the recruiting
budgets of the Services. The Services need greater flexibility to
reward those qualified candidates who accept the challenges of Special
Operations training. Recruiting commands need the flexibility of
additional resources to apply to areas that are most underresourced. By
continuing to work with the Services, I believe we will continue to
improve the SOF accession numbers.
Question. What monetary or nonmonetary incentives do you believe
would be most effective in this regard?
Answer. Monetary incentives including the Selective Re-enlistment
Bonus (SRB), Officer Continuation Pay (OCP), Critical Skills Retention
Bonus (CSRB), Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP), and Assignment
Incentive Pay (AIP) are proving to be critical force shaping tools. To
date, these have been the most effective retention tools we have.
Additionally, providing targeted enlistment bonuses for new SOF
accession candidates will help shape the future force.
We are currently exploring other quality of life benefits that are
difficult to quantify or measure in order to optimize their impact on
retention and readiness. I believe that intangible incentives, such as
camaraderie, job satisfaction, and family support are just as
important, if not more, so than monetary ones. However, the monetary
incentives are the only metrics we can quantifiably measure at this
time.
We will study the potential impact of adjustment to retirement
packages.

MARINE CORPS SPECIAL OPERATORS

Question. What do you believe should be the appropriate
relationship between the Marine Corps and SOCOM?
Answer. SOCOM should work with the Marine Corps as it does with the
other Services. A close relationship is especially important now as the
Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) continues to gain
initial capabilities.
Question. Do you believe that Marines should be ``SOF for life,''
just as Army SOFs are?
Answer. Yes, the career path of Marine SOF should be modeled after
the other SOF components.
Question. What can be done to improve the training of marines in
the Marine Corps Special Operations units to ensure that they possess
the language capabilities and cultural awareness that are needed for
counterterrorism and training missions?
Answer. The MARSOC is still not fully manned but is maturing at a
faster than expected rate, benefiting from our other Service
components' lessons learned. It has implemented a qualification
pipeline that includes language and cultural training. Additionally,
their principal training unit has regionally oriented its teams to
facilitate regionally focused training. Their program requires
continued emphasis and we must provide for sufficient training
capability afloat to account for sustainment and mission changes. They
are on the right track.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

Question. What current missions, if any, do you believe can and
should be divested by SOCOM, and why?
Answer. SOF should not divest any mission areas. There are some
tasks that should be handed off to GPFs at the right time.
Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM
should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding
them?
Answer. No, our current mission set is appropriate to meet
requirements to conduct both direct and in-direct operations.
Question. What can be done to ensure that SOF missions with medium-
and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign
internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that
they receive appropriate funding?
Answer. Continue to fully implement the QDR decisions related to
SOF growth in both capability and capacity. This will enable enhanced
training and more robust presence outside of CENTCOM's AOR.
Continue to support section 1208/1202 authorities as we work with
the Theater SOCOMs to support their regional efforts.

SIZE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

CIVIL AFFAIRS UNITS

Question. The increased role of the United States military in
numerous missions throughout the world has stressed SOCOM, in
particular the civil affairs units, most of which are in the Army
Reserve.
If the current high operational tempo continues, would it be
advisable to increase the number of civil affairs units?
Answer. This is something I would like to analyze over time.
Question. If so, should the increase be in the Active Army or the
Army Reserve and why?
Answer. Given the recent transition of Reserve Component
Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units to the Army, that is
where most increases should be concentrated should they be needed. SOF
retained the Active-Duty Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs
units, which were increased as part of the QDR.
Question. What impact has the high operational tempo had on
recruiting and retention in Reserve Civil Affairs units?
Answer. To date, Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations branches are relatively strong. Recruiting remains a focus
for junior officers while senior officers and enlisted inventories are
manned at greater than 100 percent strength.
Question. Reserve Civil Affairs personnel are now under the
administrative command of the Army.
What impact do believe this is having, and will have on the
training, equipping and promotion and individual assignments of Civil
Affairs reservists?
Answer. The transfer of U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Civil Affairs
personnel to the command of the Army occurred in October 2006 in an
effort to ensure better integration of USAR Civil Affairs units with
conventional forces. This action has been worked extensively by special
working groups from SOCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the U.S Army
to ensure that the full Civil Affairs capability is maintained and that
the warfighting requirements of the combatant commanders are met.
SOCOM, through the U.S. Army SOCOM, continues to retain joint
proponency for both Active and Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations forces, as well as the Training Center of Excellence. I have
full confidence in the U.S. Army's ability to fully execute its title
10 responsibilities in order to ensure the proper training, equipping,
and promotion of Civil Affairs soldiers within the U.S. Army Reserve.
The overall impact of this transfer to date is minimal.

READINESS AND OPTEMPO

Question. To what extent has the pace of operations in recent years
had an impact on U.S. SOCOM's readiness, retention, and resources?
Answer. Since September 11, 2001, the increased role of SOF in
fighting the global war on terrorism has been accompanied by increased
requests for base year and supplemental funding. In fiscal year 2001,
SOCOM received a total of $2.3 billion; the current fiscal year 2008,
the President's budget request seeks $6.2 billion; in addition, the
fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism request seeks another $2
billion in supplemental funding to support global war on terrorism
requirements.
With regard to retention, overall OPTEMPO has not had an adverse
effect on morale, recruitment, and retention. Morale and retention are
closely linked. Retention rates remain high for our enlisted SOF
operators.
Question. What actions can be taken to reduce any negative impacts?
Answer. Full and timely funding of the fiscal year 2008 President's
budget request and the fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism will
provide SOCOM with the resources needed to meet the challenges of its
increased missions and responsibilities of synchronizing the global war
on terrorism.
Question. Do you expect the QDR-related personnel increases to
alleviate the strain?
Answer. The QDR directed growth in both the size and capabilities
of SOF, allowing SOCOM to accomplish its increased missions and
responsibilities of synchronizing the global war on terrorism as both a
supported and supporting command. Overall, the QDR increases SOF by
13,119 personnel, and will: grow U.S. Army Special Forces, Rangers, and
SOF aviation; grow Active Army Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations; increase SEAL Team force levels; establish MARSOC as the
Marine Corps component of SOCOM; and create a SOF unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) squadron. This growth will enable some OPTEMPO relief.
More importantly, it will permit SOF presence in selected areas where
we have been underrepresented for several years.
Question. What is the current state of special operations
readiness, for all missions, for all Service components?
Answer. Operational readiness is at an all time high. Never in the
history of our organization has the SOF community received the level of
resource support, attention, and cooperation that we have realized and
programmed from the President, Congress, and the Service Chiefs. At the
same time, it is important to mention that deployed operational tempo
for the average servicemember assigned to a SOF unit, and equipment
utilization rates are also at their highest point in the history of our
organization. Managing the second and third order effects of compressed
rotational timelines, increased wear and tear on equipment, and impacts
within the families of our dedicated servicemembers is a challenge that
requires constant intrusive management and planning.
It is important to note that some manning shortfalls exist in a
number of select skill sets across all Service components. We are
managing this issue through increased accessions into the various
pipelines, targeted pay incentives, and increased recruiting efforts.
Question. Is it your understanding that these readiness assessments
include an assessment of current language skills for your
geographically-specialized operators? Should they?
Answer. SOCOM has paid inadequate attention to the true language
readiness of our force as a measure of total operational readiness. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure that readiness assessment includes
language metrics.
Question. What actions need to be taken, in your view, to address
reduced language and cultural awareness proficiency that results from
the fact that SOCOM has not been able to deploy many personnel to their
regional areas of expertise?
Answer. In the current environment, training time is short and
precious. We are still deploying SOF around the world but in smaller
numbers outside of CENTCOM and the rotations of units not regionally
oriented for CENTCOM has had an impact on language and regional
capability.
Most SOF language requirements and abilities are in the Army
component (Special Forces) and most of the initial language and culture
training is conducted in our basic training pipelines.
We need to make it easier for personnel to train by providing
greater access to proven, high quality training that can be delivered
more flexibly than the traditional classroom but that has proven,
measurable, results that are at least comparable to traditional
training. Options that have worked well for us include tailored, low
student to teacher ratio classes and delivering live training over the
web.
Immersion and iso-immersion are training formats that produce
significant results in short periods for students who have already
attained basic proficiency (level 1). Since CENTCOM rotations make
training time even more scarce, immersion and is-immersion training are
effective, if costly, means of maximizing the capability gained in the
short periods available.
Our current language proficiency (i.e. testing) measurement process
has a direct, negative impact on our training programs and, ultimately,
capability. Conversing is the key foreign language skill for special
operators; however, current test policy, infrastructure, and capacity
focus on the read/listen portion of Defense Language Proficiency Tests
that are increasingly constructed to serve users whose military tasks
center on listening at proficiency Level 2 and higher.
The result is that our instructors focus on read/listen skills to
demonstrate their effectiveness and our students focus on read/listen
skills to obtain foreign language incentive pay while our key
requirement is for speaking. SOFs language tasks are most often
performed in face-to-face conversations. The listening component of
these newer read/listen tests is less relevant to our requirements.
Those willing to dedicate the time should be provided a funded
incentive. Funding foreign language incentive pay for personnel whose
language proficiency is Level 1 or 1+ is important to increasing our
capability. Special Operations personnel generally attend courses that
target Level 1 proficiency and will train with a regional focus so that
subsequent training and assignments will enhance the individual's
capability over a career in SOF. Incentive pay at 1 and 1+ helps bridge
the gap from initial SOF capability to higher levels.
Increased provision of role players, in language, across a wider
range of exercises will also help to identify deficiencies while
cementing the importance of the cultural and language expertise. In the
long-term we need to increase the level of our capability and, as
previously alluded to, eventually reaching a ``closed-loop'' for all
SOF operators. Regional orientation for specific units will capitalize
on training and experience investments while yielding more expert
capability.
Question. If confirmed, what language programs, if any, would you
put in place to maintain and improve language skills?
Answer. There are some common elements in most of our programs. We
normally target language proficiency level 1 for initial courses. All
of our courses include relevant cultural content. SOCOM has a mature
language training program in place within Army SOF and we need to
continue this program and ensure it is fully funded.
The Marine SOF are rapidly establishing language and culture
training as integral parts of their qualifying training. They have well
thought-out plans in implementation now for sustainment and
enhancement. Currently, this is focused primarily on their trainers but
it is envisioned to eventually include the whole force. In the interim,
tailored training is provided to the counterterrorism units. Exportable
training support packages are also being provided to enable training
enroute for units afloat as missions may change. The long-term
effectiveness of the Marine SOF program hinges on retaining Marine SOF
within SOCOM and targeted regional orientation.
Regionalization is of less importance to SOF Air Force units, with
the exception of one squadron that specializes in training foreign
forces. This squadron recently implemented a training pipeline and
their initial and subsequent training are tied to regional orientation
but, without repetitive assignments in SOF will have limited success.
We are conducting several joint SOF language training programs now
and are assessing the results. We expect ready access to training time
and gyms to remain fit but we are often unable to meet that same
standard for language training.
These programs must be supported and facilitated with appropriate
funding, incentives, personnel assignment and management policies, and
relevant testing.

TRAINING AND EQUIPPING INDIGENOUS FORCES FIGHTING WITH SOF

Question. In section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress gave SOCOM a 2-year authority to train
and equip indigenous forces fighting alongside U.S. special operators.
This year the Department is seeking a reauthorization.
How has SOCOM used this authority, and to what effect?
Answer. During the last 3 years (fiscal years 2005-2007), SOCOM has
coordinated with the Geographic Combatant Commanders to use section
1208 funding authority in every theater. In some cases, it has been
used to better enable partner nation forces to support us in fixing and
finishing terrorists (e.g., the Philippines). In others, it has been
used to employ indigenous elements to gain access to hostile areas
where U.S. forces cannot openly operate and obtain information about
potential terrorist targets which could not be obtained through
conventional intelligence collection methods (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan,
Syria, and Horn of Africa). In all cases, section 1208 authority has
provided invaluable access and information that has saved American
lives and contributed to the successful apprehension of high-value
terrorist targets.
Question. If confirmed, how and where would you use this authority?
Answer. First, let me make the point that section 1208 funding
authority is used by the Geographic Combatant Commanders who are
conducting military operations using SOF. SOCOM does not conduct its
own section 1208 operations. Nevertheless, I would continue to support
the Global Combatant Commanders in using section 1208 in support of
counterterrorist operations to gain access to terrorist safe havens and
seek information that only indigenous tribes and native inhabitants can
provide. Our supported commanders have confirmed repeatedly that
section 1208 funding authority is an absolutely essential tool in the
war on terrorism.

ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM (ASDS)

Question. To date, about $885 million has been spent on developing
the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS). The fiscal year 2008 request
for ASDS is $10.6 million for procurement and $20.3 million for
research and development.
In your view, can SOCOM afford to have more than one ASDS?
Answer. The original requirement for a small fleet of manned dry
submersibles is unchanged, but it is clear that more than one of the
current ASDS platform is unaffordable unless costs can be reduced. The
Department cancelled the original ASDS program. As a result only one
ASDS hull exists, and only the correction of reliability problems on
that hull (designated ASDS-1) remain to be completed. The fiscal year
2008 funding is being used to correct these deficiencies through the
installation of a series of design and reliability improvements. The
Navy will be conducting an Alternate Material Solutions Analysis to
determine how to best meet current and future SOF undersea warfare
requirements. The analysis will examine a broad range of potential
material solutions and will recommend a solution or combination of
solutions to satisfy the capability gaps identified in a recent
capability gap analysis performed by the Commander, Naval Special
Warfare Command. The Alternate Material Solutions Analysis will also
include the respective cost estimates for the various solutions. This
will be completed by February 2008 and will inform any future program
decisions.
Question. How long will it take for you to ensure that we have an
operational ASDS?
Answer. We expect ASDS-1 to become fully operational and ready for
deployment to meet assigned missions in fiscal year 2008. The ASDS
Reliability Improvement Program was initiated in fiscal year 2006 to
improve the operational reliability of the existing ASDS vehicle (ASDS-
1), in order to make it fully operational and ready for deployment to
meet assigned missions. The ASDS Reliability Improvement Program is on
schedule. This ongoing reliability effort represents the major portions
of the funding shown in the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008
budget exhibits. As a result of this effort, ASDS-1 has demonstrated
significantly improved reliability within the past year during both
independent and mated underway operations.

TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective
counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field
Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and
international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the command strictly
complies with the DOD Law of War program. The program is enforced
through prompt investigation of allegations of abuse and where
appropriate, disciplinary actions, to include prosecution under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Question. The DOD Inspector General recently released a report on
detainee abuse noting reports of detainee abuse by a Special Mission
Unit (SMU) Task Force in Iraq that took place before the behaviors at
Abu Ghraib came to light. Additionally, the report noted that personnel
in this SMU Task Force introduced battlefield interrogation techniques
that included abusive tactics such as sleep deprivation, stress
positions, the use of dogs, and the use of Survival Escape Resistance
and Evasion techniques--techniques designed specifically to imitate
tactics by a country that does not comply with Geneva.
Do you believe that such techniques contribute to and are
appropriate in a struggle against terrorism?
Answer. No.
Question. What is your understanding of how battlefield
interrogation techniques by such units were monitored and authorized?
Answer. I have no personal knowledge of the battlefield
interrogation techniques noted above and who may or may not have
authorized those techniques for use. I do know that some of these
techniques (such as sleep deprivation) were outlined in the old Army
Field Manual and were, within certain limits, permissible.
Question. Have the responsible SMU personnel been held accountable
for their actions? If not, why not?
Answer. The personnel (whose conduct is described in the DOD IG
report of investigation) were assigned to another combatant command
during the time of the conduct that formed the basis of that
investigation. I am not thoroughly familiar with the corrective actions
taken by that command in response to the investigative findings and
recommendations. I am, however, aware of several instances of
administrative and punitive actions against SOF personnel who were
found to be in violation of the combatant commander's policies.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
our SOFs understand the necessity of complying with the Geneva
Conventions when detaining and interrogating individuals under U.S.
control?
Answer. The DOD Law of War Program and SOCOM require that all DOD
personnel and contractors must conduct operations in a manner
consistent with the Law of War and U.S. domestic law and policy.
Additionally, the DOD Detainee Program and Army Field manuals for
detainee operations and interrogations have similar requirements. SOCOM
enforces these regulations through unit and individual training before
and during all missions and on an annual basis. I would continue this
practice as one of my top priorities.
Question. What steps would you take to ensure that those foreign
forces trained by our SOFs understand the same necessity?
Answer. As part of such training, our SOFs always indicate that
further military assistance and training is predicated on such foreign
forces adherence to the law of war.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

ARMING INSURGENTS

1. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson, it has been reported in the
media recently that we are arming Sunni insurgents so that they can
fight al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Do you believe this is a good policy? If
so, how are we ensuring that these weapons are not turned against us
either during the battle with AQI or after the battle is over?
Admiral Olson. I would defer the bulk of this question to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
That said, from a Special Operations Forces (SOF) perspective, some
tribal sheikhs, both Sunni and Shia, have approached our special
operations A-detachments and asked for support to provide security for
their tribal areas and to rid them of foreign extremists. This is an
opportunity to enhance efforts to fight al Qaeda by capitalizing on
local opposition to al Qaeda in areas where such opposition did not
previously exist. The plan is relatively modest in scope by providing
security training to carefully vetted tribal members, who would be
formed into ``community watch'' elements to report on suspicious
intruders and protect the tribes from brutalism. This Department of
Defense (DOD) approved plan does not include arming these watch groups,
however, many of them do have their own arms.

2. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson, how will we make sure that
the weapons are returned or destroyed when they are not needed anymore?
Admiral Olson. Exports of Defense-related goods and technology can
have significant impact on our Nation's security. We need to ensure
that export of weapons support our security interests by protecting
important military advantages and by supporting the military
capabilities of our allies and friends that serve our mutual defense
interests. The U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) controls and
accounts for defense articles and services provided to foreign
nationals (both permanent and temporary transfers) by issuing guidance
consistent with national security objectives and U.S. foreign policy.
The goal of this guidance is to ensure all SOCOM's forces understand
and comply with U.S. statutory requirements and DOD policies that
govern U.S. international transfers of defense articles and services.
Furthermore, the guidance issued outlines operational limitations and
provisos which are designed to make certain all defense articles and
services transferred to foreign nationals are accounted for and
monitored throughout all phases of operations. Weapons are issued as
required for specific duties and those not permanently transferred are
returned when units are demobilized.

3. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson, how is our support to the
insurgents perceived by the Kurds and the Shia?
Admiral Olson. Senior Kurdish leaders have expressed limited
concern over additional armed elements facing the security of Iraq.
Kurdish leaders acknowledge the often hostile forces operating in the
region, and understand they must balance Kurdish goals of independence
with U.S. aims to stabilize Iraq and defeat al Qaeda. Arming insurgents
operating in central and southern Iraq poses minimal imposition to
Kurdish interests and authorities in northern Iraq.
Senior Shia Iraqi government leaders have expressed skepticism
about coalition forces arming insurgent groups as a way of fighting al
Qaeda, and they are concerned that arming the insurgents would create
new militias that would eventually add to Iraqi security challenges and
promote sectarian violence. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki expressed his
protest and insisted those bearing arms without permission would be
considered militias and would be dealt with as such. We are sensitive
to the concerns of the Iraqi government, and are working to ensure
these groups are properly vetted and coordinated with the ISF, to
create a mutually-beneficial relationship between the central
government and these local security units.

CHANGE IN MILITARY STRATEGY

4. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson, what would be the impact, in
your opinion, if we were to change our military strategy in Iraq so
that our troops would only be used to conduct offensive operations
against terrorist organizations (i.e., AQI, etc.), and all other Iraqi
security was immediately turned over to Iraqi security forces? The
advantage in doing this is that our troops would still be in the
theater (although probably at reduced levels) and engaging those
organizations that were deliberately inflaming sectarian strife, but
would not be trying to maintain security throughout Iraq. Of course,
they would be able to defend themselves, if attacked, and they could
re-engage if the security situation showed signs of catastrophic
failure. Please provide your opinion on how a strategy change like this
might impact the conflict in Iraq.
Admiral Olson. In my opinion, the impact would likely be a
deteriorating security situation that would make our continuation of
``offensive operations'' very difficult. Our current counterinsurgency
operations are amplifying our ability to conduct offensive operations
against terrorist organizations, including AQI. Without earning the
trust and support of local populations through our new strategy,
gathering the intelligence to go after key terrorist leaders and
networks would become increasingly difficult.
It is essential that U.S. forces remain engaged in the training and
development of the Iraqi Army. At the tactical level, many of the Iraqi
units have proven marginally capable. However, at higher echelons it is
apparent that the support structure is not yet in place to enable self-
sufficiency. Therefore, without the support of U.S. forces, the Iraqi
Army would potentially fail in their security mission.
As an aside, it is important to note that ``terrorist
organizations'' would be too narrow a definition of organizations
posing a threat to stability in Iraq. Using the latter definition of
``organizations that were deliberately inflaming sectarian strife''
would be more appropriate as there are a number of groups responsible
for the cycle of sectarian violence that are not labeled as terrorist
organizations (e.g.: the Jaysh al Mahdi). Additionally, the definition
would have to include both Sunni and Shi'a threats, as fringe elements
of both contribute to the current situation.

CONTRACTOR ROLES IN IRAQ

5. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson, during your confirmation
hearing, Senator Webb asked you if our SOF in Iraq were working with
contractors who were performing an operational role. You stated that
all of SOCOM's contractors were support only, but that you did not know
if they worked in conjunction with contractors hired by other commands
that are performing an operational role. You said that you would study
the issue, if confirmed. When do you expect to have the results of your
study? Please inform me of the results of your study when they are
available.
Admiral Olson. In my response to Senator Webb, I intended to
indicate that I would look into DOD policy concerning contractors in
the battlefield. SOCOM does not have cognizance over contractors that
are hired by other combatant commanders or the authority to initiate a
manpower study over them. Concerning DOD policy, in 2005 the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
promulgated a DOD-wide policy on this subject in DOD Instruction,
3020.41, entitled ``Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the
U.S. Armed Forces.'' My views on this subject are consistent with that
policy. If confirmed, I would enforce that policy at SOCOM.
In general, contractor personnel may support contingency operations
through their indirect participation in military operations, by
providing communications support, transporting munitions and other
supplies, performing maintenance functions for military equipment, and
providing security services. However, there are numerous issues that
need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. DOD Instruction 3020.41
provides a process for considering and making informed judgments on
those issues.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV) REQUIREMENTS

6. Senator Bayh. Vice Admiral Olson, according to your testimony in
April, SOCOM is unable to fulfill its standard UAV orbit requirement.
It is my understanding that SOCOM's long-term budget does not contain
enough funding to manage this gap in the short-term. If so, how would
you address this unacceptable budgetary and requirement shortfall?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM continues to rely on a combination of service-
provided and SOF-unique airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) to help meet our needs, and our current unmanned
aerial system roadmap already incorporates service programs such as the
MQ-1 Predator, RQ-7 Shadow, and MQ-9 Reaper. Currently we are working
with CENTCOM and the Joint Staff to meet the immediate surge
requirement of SOF in that theater. At the same time, we are
formalizing our fiscal years 10 to 15 enduring ISR requirements for
submission to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Our plan is to
maximize the use of Service programs as a means to satisfy our
requirements.

7. Senator Bayh. Vice Admiral Olson, what strategy would you employ
to ensure that not only enough UAVs are in the air, but also have the
communication infrastructure, logistical chain, and pilot/operator
availability needed to meet this SOCOM requirement?
Admiral Olson. We view the air vehicle as one part of a complete
system. Our current Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) requirements include
the communication infrastructure, logistics support, and pilot and
sensor operator availability. Our strategy is to resource, acquire, and
field complete systems.

8. Senator Bayh. Vice Admiral Olson, please describe SOCOM's
current and 5-year medium altitude UAV requirements. Are you able to
meet current requirements now and do you expect SOCOM to be able to
meet its medium altitude UAV requirements 5 years from now? Please
include in your answer personnel, new or current vehicles,
communication infrastructure, and logistical chains necessary to fill
SOCOM's current and 5-year medium altitude UAV requirements.
Admiral Olson. The U.S. CENTCOM, which SOCOM endorsed, and the
Joint Staff and Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell validated earlier this
year. We expect this requirement to be met by a combination of
resources from across the DOD, and we are working with CENTCOM, the
U.S. Strategic Command, and the Joint Staff to meet this need.
We are using lessons learned from SOF combat operations in multiple
theaters to define our future requirements for manned and unmanned
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Once
codified, we will submit our fiscal year 2010-2015 ISR enduring
requirements for submission to the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council.

JOINT RANGES

9. Senator Bayh. Vice Admiral Olson, would the use of SOF dedicated
joint ranges, especially with respect to airspace, permit better
training than you currently have?
Admiral Olson. Yes. However, access to current ranges is the key
element for SOF training. Current operational tempo for SOF and
conventional forces has increased the range requirements for all
Services. As SOF have few dedicated ranges, SOCOM Service Component
Commands are required to share available times with conventional
forces. SOCOM currently has standing memoranda of understanding with
tenant command range managers which ensure our components access to
ranges. Range management is best facilitated through service tenant
organizations. The prioritization of SOCOM components in intra-service
range scheduling would greatly assist in future range requirements.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark L. Pryor

SPECIAL FORCES REQUIREMENTS

10. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what is the timeline
required to grow the force and increase the number of operators in the
field?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM plans to add 5 Special Forces battalions,
which will consist of 444 personnel per year beginning fiscal year 2008
through fiscal year 2012.

11. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what aviation requirements
will be needed to compliment an increase in the numbers of future
Special Forces units?
Admiral Olson. We will need a mix of SOF fixed-wing, rotary-wing,
and tilt-rotor aircraft (both manned and unmanned) to provide SOF
mobility, strike, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) capability. Currently programmed increases in SOF aviation
capacity adequately address our current growth in the Future Years'
Defense Program. In fiscal year 2008, we are beginning a
recapitalization program for our SOF-tanker force. Recapitalizing our
fleet of 37- to 40-year-old aircraft will increase our mobility
capacity through improved aircraft capabilities and readiness of the
fleet. In conjunction with this recapitalization effort is a study on
the overarching long-term SOF mobility requirements. This study will be
completed in the fall 2007. We are also working with Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Services to acquire a fleet of small and
medium commercial variant military aircraft to fill a critical
capability gap. This small fleet of commercial variant aircraft will
have the ability to move small SOF teams in friendly but politically
sensitive areas in support of the global war on terrorism.

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

12. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what role will the Joint
Cargo Aircraft play in SOCOM?
Admiral Olson. The JCA will have a role in providing intra-theater
airlift, where US military presence is acceptable, for SOFs just as C-
17s, C-5s, C-130s and Operational Support Aircraft currently support.
That being said, JCA can only support a small part of the overall
SOF airlift requirement. There is no ``one-size-fits-all'' solution
when it comes to moving SOFs. SOF requires flexibility in platforms so
that small teams can be moved and supported in austere locations with
maximum efficiency and most importantly--with limited visibility.

BODY ARMOR

13. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what type of body armor does
SOCOM use?
Admiral Olson. The SOFs approved standard body armor system
consists of the Releasable Body Armor Vest (RBAV), hard armor plates,
soft armor inserts, and Modular Supplemental Armor Protection (MSAP).
This body armor system falls under the Special Operations Personal
Equipment Advanced Requirements (SPEAR) program line.

14. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what is the directive toward
body armor systems such as Dragon Skin?
Admiral Olson. SOCOM's Special Operations Personal Equipment
Advanced Requirements (SPEAR) body armor system is the only approved
SOCOM product authorized for use.

MARINE CORPS FORCES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

15. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what has been the impact of
Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) to SOCOM?
Admiral Olson. Each of the Services bring unique mission
capabilities to SOCOM, MARSOC included. MARSOC brings with it the
culture and heritage of the United States Marine Corps. MARSOC's unique
contributions to SOCOM are rooted in this history as a sea-based,
expeditionary force with a long history of mission success. In addition
to forces that are trained from the start to operate in an integrated
sea-air-ground, MARSOC also brings capabilities that are in the highest
demand globally: MARSOC command and control, intelligence,
counterintelligence, canine operations, interrogators, and other
specialized capabilities that can be employed in support of MARSOC or
other SOF units. MARSOC units also provide a force multiplier on the
battlefield, as integral elements of Marine Expeditionary Units with a
direct relationship and connection to Theater Special Operations
Commands and other theater SOF From its inception 24 February 2006,
MARSOC has had and continues to have significant global war on
terrorism effects in both developing our partner nations' CT
capabilities in four of the five Global Combatant Commands (no
opportunity in Northern Command yet), and in providing combat forces
for CENTCOM operations. All 15 Marine Special Operations Advisory Group
(formerly Foreign Military Training Unit) deployments to date have been
to global war on terrorism Priority and High Priority countries, and
both deployed Marine Special Operations Companies have been employed in
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. MARSOC has a little over
half of its programmed strength, and as it continues to grow it will
increase critical SOCOM capacity for both the indirect and direct lines
of operation for the war on terrorism. From four Foreign Military
Training Unit deployments in fiscal year 2006, Marine Special
Operations Advisory Groups will deploy to 14 or more events in fiscal
year 2007 and are currently slated for 28 deployments in fiscal year
2008. The Marine Special Operations Companies provide an integrated SOF
connection to deployed Marine Expeditionary Units, and provide Global
Combatant Commanders a force multiplier as a result. The companies are
employable as independent SOF units or as a supporting element to the
Marine Expeditionary Unit or other theater or coalition forces.
The bottom line is that in a very short time, MARSOC has been a
very beneficial SOF force multiplier for SOCOM.

16. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what is the unique
contribution of MARSOC toward SF operations?
Admiral Olson. Each of the Services bring unique mission
capabilities to SOCOM, MARSOC included. MARSOC brings with it the
culture and heritage of the United States Marine Corps. MARSOC's unique
contributions to SOCOM are rooted in this history as a sea-based,
expeditionary force with a long history of mission success. In addition
to forces that are trained from the start to operate in an integrated
sea-air-ground, MARSOC also brings capabilities that are in the highest
demand globally: MARSOC command and control, intelligence,
counterintelligence, canine operations, interrogators, and other
specialized capabilities that can be employed in support of MARSOC or
other SOF units. MARSOC units also provide a force multiplier on the
battlefield, as integral elements of Marine Expeditionary Units with a
direct relationship and connection to Theater Special Operations
Commands and other theater SOF.
______

[The nomination reference of VADM Eric T. Olson, USN,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
May 10, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Navy to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C, section 601:

To be Admiral

VADM Eric T. Olson, USN, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of VADM Eric T. Olson, USN, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Transcript of Naval Service For VADM Eric Thor Olson, USN

24 Jan. 1952.............................. Born in Tacoma, Washington
30 June 1969.............................. Midshipman, U. S. Naval
Academy
06 June 1973.............................. Ensign
06 June 1975.............................. Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 July 1977.............................. Lieutenant
01 Aug. 1982.............................. Lieutenant Commander
01 Sep. 1988.............................. Commander
01 July 1994.............................. Captain
29 July 1999.............................. Designated Rear Admiral
(lower half) while serving
in billets commensurate
with that grade
01 July 2000.............................. Rear Admiral (lower half)
19 Sep. 2002.............................. Designated Rear Admiral
while serving in billets
commensurate with that
grade
01 Oct. 2003.............................. Rear Admiral
02 Sep. 2003.............................. Vice Admiral, Service
continuous to date.

Assignments and duties:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Naval Academy (Administrative Assistant)... June 1973 Oct. 1973
Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, San Diego Oct. 1973 Apr. 1974
(DUINS)........................................
Underwater Demolition Team Twelve (Assistant Apr. 1974 Dec. 1976
Officer in Charge).............................
SEAL Team One (Platoon Commander)............... Dec. 1976 June 1978
U.S. Military Observation Group, United Nations July 1978 Jan. 1980
Truce Supervision Organization (DOD United
Nations Military Observer).....................
Naval Amphibious School, Coronado, CA (Swimmer Jan. 1980 Sep. 1981
Delivery Vehicle Training Division Officer)....
Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA (DUINS) Sep. 1981 Apr. 1983
XO, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team One.............. Apr. 1983 Dec. 1984
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (DUINS). Dec. 1984 Dec. 1985
Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA (DUINS) Dec. 1985 Mar. 1986
U.S. Military Liaison Office Tunisia (Joint Apr. 1986 June 1988
Service Programs and Training Officer).........
Naval Special Warfare Center, Coronado, CA June 1988 July 1989
(Director of Strategy and Tactics Group
Department)....................................
CO, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team One.............. July 1989 July 1991
Commander, Special Boat Squadron Two (Squadron July 1991 Aug. 1993
Commander).....................................
Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC Aug. 1993 July 1994
(CG Special Assistant, NAVSPECWARFARE Issues)..
Commander, Naval Special Warfare Development July 1994 June 1997
Group (Commander)..............................
Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC June 1997 Aug. 1999
(Chief of Staff)...............................
Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command........ Aug. 1999 Aug. 2002
Office of the CNO (Director, Strategy and Policy Aug. 2002 Aug. 2003
Division) (N51)................................
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command Aug. 2003 To date.
(Deputy).......................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Medals and awards:
Silver Star
Defense Superior Service Medal with Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star with ``V'' Device
Defense Meritorious Service Medal with Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
Meritorious Service Medal with two Gold Stars
Joint Service Commendation Medal with Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal
Combat Action Ribbon with one Gold Star
Joint Meritorious Unit Award with one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
Navy Unit Commendation
Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
National Defense Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with one Bronze Star
Vietnam Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Southwest Asia Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Armed Forces Service Medal
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with two Bronze Stars
Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon with two Bronze Stars
Coast Guard Special Operations Service Ribbon
United Nations Service Medal
Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
Kuwait Liberation (Kuwait)
Rifle Marksmanship Medal with Silver ``E''
Pistol Marksmanship Medal with Silver ``E''

Special qualifications:
BS (Business Administration) U.S. Naval Academy, 1973
MA (Foreign Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, 1985
Designated Joint Specialty Officer, 1988

Personal data:
Wife: Marilyn Olson of Yonkers, NY
Children: Daniel S. Olson (Son), Born: 24 November 1986; Alyssa D.
Olson (Daughter), Born: 9 August 1989.

Summary of joint duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Military Liaison Office Apr. 1986-June 1988 LCDR
Tunisia (Joint Service
Programs and Training Officer).
Joint Special Operations Aug. 1993-July 1994 CDR
Command, Fort Bragg, NC (CG
Special Assistant,
NAVSPECWARFARE Issues).
Joint Special Operations June 1997-Aug. 1999 CAPT
Command, Fort Bragg, NC (Chief
of Staff).
Commander, U.S. Special Aug. 2003-To Date VADM
Operations Command (Deputy).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by VADM Eric T.
Olson, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Eric T. Olson.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

3. Date of nomination:
May 10, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
January 24, 1952; Tacoma, Washington.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Marilyn Olson (Maiden Name: Marilyn Cannata).

7. Names and ages of children:
Daniel S. Olson, 20; Alyssa D. Olson, 17.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
UDT-SEAL Association.
UDT-SEAL Museum Association.
U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association
Military Ofifcers Association of America
U.S. Naval Institute
Special Forces Club (U.K.)

[The nomination of VADM Eric T. Olson, USN, was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on June 28, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino
by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. Will the duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security change or remain the same if you are confirmed for the
position, and if there are any changes proposed, what are those
changes?
Answer. If confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I
expect the duties of the position to remain the same as they have been,
at least for the near-term. If confirmed, I would work with the
Secretary to clarify those duties and modify them, if appropriate. I am
not aware of any currently proposed changes to the duties of the Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. The duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security are
clear--to lead the men and women of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) in their efforts to ensure America's nuclear
security. My background and experience is well suited for these duties.
As an officer in the U.S. Navy, I was selected by Admiral Rickover and
trained as a nuclear submarine officer. In this capacity, I managed
technically complex, high-hazard operations on nuclear submarines. This
training instilled a commitment to quality, discipline, and integrity
that are so important when dealing with nuclear operations. After over
8 years on Active-Duty in the submarine force I continued to serve in
the national security arena as a Naval Reserve Officer, as a propulsion
systems program manager for the Seawolf (SSN21) submarine, and in a
variety of positions in the Department of Energy (DOE). My background
within DOE includes a wide variety of both technical and management
positions; in the areas of tritium reactor restart, as Deputy Director
in the Office of Stockpile Computation, as the Deputy Director for
Nuclear Weapons Research, Development and Simulation, as the Assistant
Deputy Administrator for Program Integration in the Office of Defense
Programs, and most recently, as the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, leading the $5 billion Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). I
was recently asked to serve as the Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security, coincidental with the submission of fiscal year 2008 budget
request to Congress and accompanying testimony. This quickly educated
me about the details of other programs in NNSA such as Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation. If confirmed, I would continue to learn more about
the scope of the NNSA's nonproliferation expertise and
responsibilities, but I believe my background and experience are well
suited for the role of Under Secretary for Nuclear Security.
I earned a Masters in Business-Finance from John Hopkins University
and a Masters in National Security Studies from the Naval War College.
I have almost 31 years of service in both the U.S. Navy and as a civil
servant. I have attained the rank of Captain in the Naval Reserve. All
of my professional experience has been focused on service (military and
civilian) in support of our national security. I am privileged to have
been able to serve my country and am confident that this combination of
service and education qualifies me to perform the duties of the Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security?
Answer. The importance of the position of Under Secretary of
Nuclear Security demands that anyone who holds that position must
always be abreast of current developments in not only nuclear security
but also national security as a whole. I believe I am aware of the
scope of the duties of the position, but expect to focus my near-term
efforts on broadening my knowledge base of initiatives outside of
NNSA's Defense Programs.
As I have stressed as Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs,
good communication within NNSA and with our colleagues in DOE, with
Congress, with the Department of Defense (DOD) and with other
stakeholders is essential. Clear and effective communication is a
primary key to success in any organization, and even more important
with an organization that is large, geographically dispersed and that
manages complex technical operations. I would look to increase the
amount of time I spend talking to all levels of management, technical
and support staff, in headquarters and the field.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional or new duties
and functions, if any, do you expect that the Secretary of Energy would
prescribe for you other than those described above?
Answer. I am not aware of any additional duties and functions that
the Secretary of Energy would prescribe for me, other than to
efficiently and effectively manage the operations of NNSA. If
confirmed, I would work with the Secretary to clarify his expectations.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the following
officials in carrying out your duties:
The Secretary of Energy.
Answer. I will work with the Secretary as I have as the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs and as I did during the period I
served as the Acting Administrator earlier this year. I have come to
understand the Secretary's leadership style quite well while serving in
these positions. His door has always been open to me and I look forward
to working with him on cross-cutting issues for NNSA and the
Department.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Energy.
Answer. I will work with the Deputy Secretary as I have as the
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs and as I did during the
period I served as the Acting Administrator earlier this year. I have
become familiar with the Deputy Secretary's his leadership style while
serving in these positions. The Deputy Secretary serves as the
Department's Chief Operating Officer and we have regular interaction on
crosscutting NNSA and departmental issues.
Question. The Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.
Answer. The Deputy Administrators are the direct reports to the
Administrator of NNSA. These individuals bring a great wealth of
knowledge and policy expertise in their assigned areas. I know all of
the current Deputies and Associate Administrators very well and look
forward to leading them if confirmed. It's critical to the
organization's success that I have complete trust in these individuals
in order to carry out the NNSA mission.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, Kenneth J. Krieg, is also the Chairman of the Nuclear
Weapons Council (NWC), which is the focal point for the relationship
between DOE and DOD. The NNSA Administrator is DOE's NWC member and
deals directly with the Under Secretary of Defense on nuclear security
issues.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Ambassador Eric
S. Edelman, is a member of the NWC, which is the focal point for the
relationship between DOE and DOD. The NNSA Administrator is DOE's NWC
member and deals directly with the Under Secretary of Defense on
nuclear security issues.
Question. The Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force.
Answer. Relationships with the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air
Force are important to issues related to nuclear security. NNSA
generally deals with the uniformed Services more than the Service
Secretaries through the NWC system. As a former Navy officer and
current political appointee, I am well aware of the importance of
civilian control of the military. If confirmed as an Under Secretary, I
would seek to nurture relations with the Secretaries of the Navy and
the Air Force.
Question. The Commanders of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S.
Northern Command.
Answer. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General James E.
Cartwright, is a member of the NWC. The NNSA Administrator works with
the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command on a wide variety of
significant nuclear weapons issues such as the annual assessment of the
safety, reliability and performance of the nuclear weapons stockpile. I
have established a good working relationship with General Cartwright in
my current job and look forward to continuing that relationship if
confirmed.
NNSA will continue its current close cooperation with Northern
Command, primarily in the area of Emergency Operations. We have worked
closely with NORTHCOM on exercise planning and have been full
participants in both the Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield series of
exercises. In fact, during last December's Vigilant Shield exercise the
NNSA assigned a liaison officer to the NORTHCOM Headquarters in
Colorado Springs for the duration of the exercise. We will continue
this effort to ensure full and integrated operations in the case of a
real emergency.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict.
Answer. The Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
is included in our overall support to and coordination with DOD in a
number of areas. As part of our support, we have provided a full-time
resident liaison to Special Operations Command to facilitate access to
the unique capabilities of DOE's national laboratories and to enhance
the already close working relationship with DOE and NNSA.
If confirmed by the Senate, I will make sure that DOE'S unique
nuclear capabilities, skills and assets are available to DOD or any
other Federal entity.
Question. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs
Answer. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense is the Chairman
of the NWC Standing and Safety Committee, the flag officer or Senior
Executive Service ``working level'' group in the NWC system. In my
experience, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs and his
Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator have more regular contact with
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense than the NNSA Administrator,
but I would encourage close coordination with DOD at all levels within
the NNSA and DOE. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense plays a key
role in the NWC system, so I view the NNSA's relationship with that
office as vitally important. The Director of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency also reports to the Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense, so if confirmed, I expect to work with the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense on matters generally outside the NWC system, such
as nonproliferation.
Question. The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
Answer. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) works with the
NNSA's Offices of Defense Programs, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation,
and Emergency Operations on a number of issues, ranging from individual
weapon system Project Officer Groups to hosting DTRA-sponsored work at
NNSA sites and collaboration on nonproliferation issues. If confirmed,
I would expect the Deputy Administrators for Defense Programs and
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to work most directly with the
Director of DTRA, but I would maintain contact with the Director, as
well.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence and other senior
leaders of the Intelligence Community.
Answer. DOE is a member of the Intelligence Community. Within DOE,
the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence has
primary responsibility for the Department's interactions with the
Director of National Intelligence and other Intelligence Community
components. Each of the NNSA national laboratories maintains a Field
Intelligence Element (FIE) that carries out analysis and technical work
to fulfill DOE's intelligence responsibilities.
If confirmed, I will continue to give my strong support to this
cooperation and ensure that the Intelligence Community continues to
have excellent access to the NNSA labs through the existing
Intelligence Work-for-Others process.
Question. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with
responsibilities for nuclear homeland security matters
Answer. NNSA has a close working relationship with the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) at all levels. I will continue to draw upon
these working relationships and try to improve upon them through closer
coordination on matters affecting the Nation's security.
I assure you that my staff and I, particularly my Associate
Administrator for Emergency Operations, will continue the cooperative
relationships we have built since the Department of Homeland Security
was created. For example, we will continue to work closely in updating
the National Response Plan (NRP) to define and refine the Federal
Government's responsibilities in the event of radiological or nuclear
emergencies and incidents. Our two organizations will continue our good
work on the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National
Preparedness System, and the comprehensive Homeland Security Exercise
Program where we test our abilities to respond to many types of
incidents in addition to radiological and nuclear emergencies. We will
continue to work closely with DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO) as partners to assess the Nation's radiological or nuclear
vulnerabilities and risks, to mitigate radiological or nuclear threats,
and to develop a robust technical nuclear forensics capability in
cooperation with DNDO's National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center
(NTNFC).
Finally, we stand ready to execute our responsibilities under the
National Response Plan to deploy our Nuclear Incident Response Team
(NIRT) and fulfill our responsibilities under the Homeland Security Act
for domestic radiological or nuclear events. For example, should an
improvised nuclear device be discovered in the United States, we would
give our full support to the Department of Homeland Security as the
overall incident manager and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) as the lead law enforcement agency. We have worked hard to forge
these cooperative relationships and I can assure you that we will
continue this collaborative approach.
Question. Officials in the Department of State with responsibility
for nuclear nonproliferation matters
Answer. NNSA works closely with the Department of State in the area
of nuclear nonproliferation and, if confirmed as the Under Secretary
for Nuclear Security, I would continue to do so. For instance, NNSA
works in close concert with State to forward the goals of the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. NNSA also supports State as it
interfaces with the IAEA through the technical expertise within our
national laboratories to work on the toughest nuclear nonproliferation
issues we face, including Iran and North Korea.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?
Answer. There are a number of challenges that will need to be
addressed in the upcoming years, and NNSA is working to intensify
efforts on the most difficult issues by creating a small number of
Special Focus Areas.

The future of our nuclear weapons stockpile and how
that shapes our plans for Complex 2030.
The role of Federal oversight, especially in the areas
of nuclear safety and cyber security.
Moving forward smartly and effectively in the
consolidation and disposition of special nuclear materials
(SNM).
The vision of the future for our national security
laboratories.
Enhancing project management within NNSA.
Enhancing NNSA's future as an Employer of Choice.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will lead the effort recently
initiated by the Acting Administrator by setting clear expected
outcomes, identifying expected deliverables, and establishing
timeframes for execution. Integrated Action Teams, led by senior
executives, have been formed for each Special Focus Area to deliver on
what needs to be done and to ensure completion. I will empower the team
leads to have the appropriate resources and decisionmaking authority in
their areas, and I will personally engage with each of the teams on a
regular basis to stay informed of progress and eliminate any obstacles
I can.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit my personal involvement and
that of the management team at the NNSA to set aggressive but realistic
time lines for all of these areas. Some of these areas have firm time
lines already, such as a Record of Decision (fall 2008) for our Complex
2030 effort and plans to remove all Category I and II SNM from Sandia
National Laboratories (SNL) in the next year and from Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) by 2014. Firm timelines will be
established for those areas that do not yet have them, and NNSA
management and staff will be held accountable for completing actions in
a timely manner.
Question. Please explain the importance you place on continuing to
ensure a unique organizational identity for the NNSA and what steps you
would take to ensure such an identity if confirmed?
Answer. It is very important to ensure an organizational identity
for the NNSA. In my experience in leadership and management over the
past 30 years, organizations are most effective when there is a clear
mission, clearly defined responsibilities, and when members of that
organization understand where they fit in to accomplish that mission.
When I was named acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, I
was concerned with the organization's reputation and the efficiency of
the program. Soon after formally take over the Defense Programs
organization I established the organizational theme of ``Getting the
Job Done!'' and identified a specific list of deliverables that would
be accomplished within the following 2 years. These deliverables are
challenging, important, and help focus the Defense Programs
organization (both Federal employees and contractors across the nuclear
weapons complex). To date, the theme of ``Getting the Job Done!'' has
permeated the organization and has led to a focus of priorities and
resources to ensure that all those in Defense Programs know what is
expected and where our priorities lie. The ``Getting the Job Done!''
accomplishments by the NNSA included: delivering the B61-ALT357 first
production unit; extracting tritium for the first time in over a
decade; completing plutonium aging studies in pits; and just recently
announcing that we have increased the rate of nuclear weapons
dismantlements by 50 percent over last year's level 4 months ahead of
schedule.
This established identity is working in Defense Programs and will
work in the NNSA. The key is to focus on mission priorities, ensure
that all members of the organization understand the goals and where
they fit in to accomplish the results.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
to address the issues that would confront the Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security?
Answer. If confirmed, the broad priorities that I would establish
to address the issues that would confront the NNSA and me personally
are in the areas of safety, security, Federal oversight, and mission
success. I plan to set clear program expectations and then focus on
these broad areas by ensuring that everyone, both those within the NNSA
and those that partner with us and benefit from our success,
understands what is expected and has the resources to complete their
objectives.

OVERALL MANAGEMENT

Question. Do you believe that there are any organizational
structure issues in the NNSA that should be addressed to improve
management and operations of the NNSA, or that you would address if
confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to closely evaluate and implement
changes that reinforce line management oversight. The current NNSA
structure was a radical departure from the Department's previous
regional model, which was in place for 60 years. The NNSA approach of
strong site offices places authority and accountability directly at the
sites where work is actually performed. Now, 5 years later with our
policies and governance models having matured, it is time to look at
refocusing policy expertise to strengthen our direct line management
functions. To that end, I hope to review and right-size all
headquarters advisory and oversight functions based on mission need and
rigorous workforce analysis.
Question. On December 20, 2002, NNSA announced a plan to
restructure its management, including a 20-percent reduction in Federal
personnel in 5 years. That 5-year period will be up in December 2007.
Have these goals been achieved? If not, why not?
Answer. Yes, NNSA achieved its personnel reduction goals ahead of
schedule at the end of fiscal year 2004.
The reengineering effort for Federal personnel was working in two
directions simultaneously: reducing and streamlining most sites and
field locations, while at the same time increasing line-program areas
experiencing major mission growth. For organizations involved in this
reengineering (IWSA Service Center, headquarters, and the 8 site
offices), there was a reduction of 383 FTEs, which represents a
reduction of 20.5 percent. At the same time, the programs exempt from
reengineering--Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Emergency
Response--were increased by 43 FTEs, about 15 percent. The net change
in NNSA's Federal staffing from 2002 to 2004 was a reduction of 17
percent.
NNSA has continued its aggressive efforts in workforce
restructuring and is now ready to embark on the next phase of
reengineering that will further adjust program staffing in line with
future missions, and assure the transition of critical skills in the
next several years when a ``bow wave'' of retirements is expected.
Question. Do you believe that the expertise of DOE personnel
serving outside the NNSA can be helpful to you if confirmed?
Answer. I believe that the success of the NNSA is very dependent on
the experience and support of all Departmental employees. NNSA's record
of accomplishments and our ability to quickly address operational
shortfalls in human capital, financial management, information
technology, physical and cyber security, acquisition management as well
as environmental health and the complexities of our management issues
would not have been possible without the ability to leverage
departmental assets as we do. If confirmed, I will continue to seek
access to departmental talent in order to best serve our mission and
avoid costly duplication of effort.
Question. Specifically, what expertise do you believe would be
helpful and how will you utilize this expertise if you are confirmed?
Answer. I believe that the most critical expertise is the
independent oversight provided for safety, environment, and security--
both physical and cyber security--as well as independent cost
estimating and construction management. All of these disciplines are
critical to NNSA and the Department's success. If confirmed, I intend
to strengthen their involvement in our 5-year program planning and
execution process.
Question. Are you aware of any limitations on your authority, if
confirmed, to draw on that expertise?
Answer. There are no limitations on the authority of the Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security to draw upon the expertise of DOE
personnel serving outside of the NNSA for assistance in achieving
NNSA's mission and fulfilling its responsibilities. Of course, the
Under Secretary's authority to draw on such assistance is, as it is in
other matters, subject to the ultimate authority of the Secretary to
direct all officials within the DOE and to establish priorities for
NNSA and all other organizations within the Department.
Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, the DOE intelligence function was combined with the
counterintelligence functions of NNSA and DOE into one single
departmental office.
How is this change working in your view?
Answer. NNSA continues to receive excellent support from the
combined counterintelligence organizations. In fact, the organizational
change has brought about greater synergy and the NNSA is receiving the
benefits of the consolidation.
Question. Are there any issues that are not being addressed or
addressed in an insufficient manner?
Answer. No.
Question. Would you recommend any changes to the combined
organization?
Answer. At this point in time, I would not recommend any changes to
this combined organization if confirmed.
Question. What is your view of the extent to which the NNSA is
bound by the existing rules, regulations, and directives of DOE and
what flexibility, if any, do you believe you would have in implementing
such rules, regulations, and directives?
Answer. NNSA must comply with rules, regulations and directives
issued by the Secretary of Energy. The Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security is responsible for ensuring that NNSA and its contractors
comply with these requirements. Some rules and regulations provide
specific exemption procedures that NNSA can invoke if the Under
Secretary concludes an exemption is warranted. In addition, the DOE
Departmental Directives Program Manual provides a general exemption
procedure that allows NNSA to deviate from DOE directives requirements.
The Manual also permits Departmental elements, including NNSA, to issue
``supplemental directives'' that may be used to implement requirements
in directives, assign responsibilities and establish procedures within
a particular Departmental element. Finally, under the NNSA Act, the
Under Secretary has the authority to issue NNSA-specific policies,
``unless disapproved by the Secretary.''
Question. NNSA, in large measure, was created in response to
security lapses at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). However,
security lapses, particularly at Los Alamos, have continued to occur.
Section 3212(b)(10) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000 provides that ``the Administrator has authority over,
and is responsible for all programs and activities of the
administration, including administration of contracts, including the
management and operations of the nuclear weapons production facilities
and the national security laboratories.''
If confirmed, what would be your plan to make sure that security
lapses do not continue at the NNSA facilities?
Answer. While there have been some high-visibility security lapses
within the NNSA since its establishment, I believe we have made
significant progress in improving the physical and cyber security of
our nuclear weapons complex. The Associate Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Security and the NNSA Chief Information Officer have both
brought increased formality to the headquarters management of their
security programs and we are seeing improvements. If confirmed, I
intend to strengthen our Federal line oversight of security to
establish common expectations by which we exercise our legal and
contractual authorities to ensure the security of our critical national
security assets. I also intend to continue the strong partnership we
have with the Department's Office of Health, Safety, and Security and
the Department's Chief Information Officer to develop the policies and
rules necessary for effective security systems.
Question. If confirmed, what policies would you institute to
improve the manner in which managers of NNSA facilities deal with
security matters?
Answer. There needs to be a formal process for establishing clear
security performance expectations down to the lowest level of the
organization, then holding people and organizations accountable for
meeting those expectations. My approach to addressing these issues
would be to continue the work we have already started, which is to put
greater emphasis on our capabilities to actively manage the security
program. This approach has four major thrusts:

Reducing the number of security areas and operations
will allow us to focus our attention and resources on
revitalizing the protection system components that provide the
foundation for good security.
Ensuring that we have a highly qualified Federal
staff, in the right numbers, to actively manage and oversee the
NNSA security program.
Promoting stronger functional accountability within
the security program by creating stronger lines of authority
and accountability between the HQ and the field.
Providing comprehensive oversight of field security to
assess contractor performance against the expectations--
rewarding good performance and providing penalties for
ineffective performance.

I am very pleased to report that we have made significant progress
in our security management and oversight capabilities, and we have
developed some very promising approaches. For example, we have
established peer reviews and Performance Assurance Assessments for
improving the interactions and collaborations between the sites and HQ.
I am confident that these initiatives will result in better performance
expectations and a much stronger security program. If confirmed, I
would actively work with the Principal Deputy to ensure these focus
areas are fully developed and implemented.

DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Question. What do you see are the highest priorities of the
nonproliferation programs at NNSA?
Answer. The highest priorities in the nonproliferation programs are
to fulfill the President's commitments made under the Bratislava
Nuclear Security Initiative to complete nuclear security upgrades at
Russian facilities by the 2008 deadline. Another priority is the
repatriation of high enriched uranium from around the world to more
secure locations in the U.S. or Russia, and the conversion of HEU-
fueled reactors to use LEU fuel. In addition to these specific
challenges, the nation faces emerging threats of the sort presented by
a nuclear-capable North Korea and an Iranian regime apparently bent on
acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. We must continue our efforts
to combat nuclear terrorism by helping. other countries better secure
their nuclear materials, eliminating excess materials, preventing the
export of sensitive technologies, engaging foreign scientists with
meaningful work in peaceful commerce, and by detecting illicit
trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials.
Question. While the bulk of the nonproliferation programs at NNSA
continue to be focused on the states of the former Soviet Union, a
growing number of programs are focused on states other than the former
Soviet Union. Do you believe that there are additional opportunities
for cooperation with states outside of the former Soviet Union? If
confirmed what would be your priorities in these areas?
Answer. NNSA does work in nearly a hundred countries around the
globe. Many of our efforts--Megaports, Sister Labs, Safeguards, Export
Control, and certainly our Global Threat Reduction Initiative--are all
aimed at working with other nations to increase their capacity, and
thus our own, to deter, prevent, detect proliferation of WMD materials,
technology, and expertise. If confirmed, I would expand these bilateral
and multilateral programs where necessary to achieve the purpose for
which they are intended--to protect this Nation as far from U.S. shores
as possible.
Question. What do you believe is the greatest challenge in the
nonproliferation programs with Russia?
Answer. NNSA's programs with Russia have been, on the whole, very
successful in the past several years. We have created an environment of
mutual trust and understanding with our Russian counterparts, and high
level attention, such as the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative,
have helped us accelerate our efforts in selected, critical areas. The
nature of our relationship with Russia has transitioned from a donor-
recipient relationship to one of partnership. They are planning on
playing an ever larger role in financing portions of some of these
nonproliferation efforts, and we are eager to work with them in areas
associated with expanded use of nuclear power. We see them as strong
partners in this arena. Our biggest remaining challenge is to
completely transition some of the bilateral assistance programs (such
as MPC&A) to full Russian funding and to ensure that those programs
receive the Russian commitment, funding and budget attention required.
Question. In your view what are the three greatest unmet
nonproliferation problems? Would you propose to address these needs if
confirmed? What resources or cooperation would you need to meet such
needs?
Answer. North Korea remains one of the largest nonproliferation
problems we face. We have expertise in our complex that stands poised
to work with the State Department and the IAEA should agreement be
reached to dismantle North Korea's nuclear facilities. Until that time,
we must be vigilant in preventing North Korea from exporting its
nuclear material, technologies and know-how to others, including
terrorists. We can do this by helping those in the region improve their
detection capabilities, helping to train border guards and other
officials to recognize dual-use technologies, and by strengthening the
export control regime worldwide. A second challenge remains the sheer
amount of nuclear and radiological material that exists all over the
world. There is an urgent need to reduce the amount of excess material,
to convert research reactors that use HEU to LEU, and to ensure that a
renaissance in nuclear power does not also result in the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. Better export controls, strengthened
safeguards technologies, a Reliable Fuel Supply, GTRI and GNEP all play
an important role. Finally, we need better detection capability. So we
need to focus more of our R&D effort on novel approaches to standoff
nuclear and radiological detection that will not impede trade flows or
impose unnecessary burdens on the world's commerce.

MEGAPORTS

Question. NNSA has worked to expand the Megaports program as
quickly as funding and agreements with host countries are available.
What are the current limiting factors in further acceleration of the
Megaports program and, if confirmed, how would you address these
factors?
Answer. As you are aware, the Megaports Initiative has expanded
quickly over the past 2 years. There are 21 agreements in place for
cooperation on this important nonproliferation program. We have been
well supported with funding, especially with the recent fiscal year
2007 supplemental of $72 million. We are continuing our outreach
efforts with host governments and expect to complete additional
agreements soon with Malaysia, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey, and
Yemen. The greatest limiting factor in the Megaports program is the
fact that we cannot simply drop into another country and set up
radiation detectors wherever we think they are required. We need the
assent and cooperation of foreign partners, including both foreign
governments and private port operators. Issues of national sovereignty,
data-sharing arrangements, and concerns about potential operational
impacts at foreign ports all play a role in our ability to move this
program forward. The Megaports program has been very successful thus
far and appears to be poised for further successes.
Question. The Megaports program is coordinated with other work that
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is carrying out in foreign
ports. In your view are there opportunities to improve cooperation with
DHS?
Answer. NNSA has developed a close working relationship with DHS
and its various components, including Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The link with
CBP is crucial to coordinating our Megaports Initiative with DHS's
Container Security Initiative. We are also working closely with DNDO in
the development of a global nuclear detection architecture, and in
evaluation and procurement of next generation radiation detection
technologies. NNSA's success is clearly linked to that of DHS in these
important areas. NNSA is a critical partner in this relationship with
our experience and expertise in international nuclear nonproliferation
programs, nuclear materials and weapons science, and implementation of
international security projects. If confirmed as the Under Secretary
for Nuclear Security, I will continue this close partnership with DHS.
Question. One of the continuing challenges to the Megaports
program, as well as other programs designed to detect nuclear and
radiological materials, is that the materials that could pose the
greatest risk, plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU), are the
most difficult to detect. NNSA has the responsibility for basic
detection research and development programs. While other agencies, such
as DHS, have responsibility for near term development efforts, the DOD
has responsibilities as well.
Are the various detection efforts fully coordinated, or do you
believe that additional efforts at coordination are needed?
Answer. I understand that NNSA's nonproliferation research and
development work has broad applicability to a number of Federal
agencies. If I am confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security, I will make an effort to focus on NNSA's research and
development, as well as the coordination process with other Federal
agencies, and see if additional efforts of coordination might be
needed.

NONPROLIFERATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Question. In addition to the detection technologies mentioned
above, NNSA has responsibility for a broad range of research and
development efforts.
If confirmed what would be your nonproliferation research and
development priorities?
Answer. I firmly believe that one of this Nation's great treasures
is its scientific and technical capability, a significant portion of
which resides in our national laboratory system. Should I be confirmed,
I would direct our nonproliferation R&D program to continue its
coordinating efforts with other appropriate elements of the Federal
Government in developing novel approaches to the problem of standoff
detection of nuclear weapons-related materials. I would also seek
improved capabilities for rapid post-event attribution and analysis.
Question. Do you believe that there are research and development
areas that need more attention or funding?
Answer. As to funding, the President's request for nonproliferation
research and development funding represents an appropriate balance
between needs and resources. However, to the extent that our policies
and requirements change with world events, I would certainly reassess
the need for additional resources as required. As to specific areas of
attention, should I be confirmed, I would direct our nonproliferation
R&D program to continue its coordinating efforts with other appropriate
elements of the Federal Government in developing new and novel
approaches to the problem of standoff detection of nuclear weapons-
related materials. I would also seek improved capabilities for rapid
post-event attribution and analysis.

FISSILE MATERIALS DISPOSITION

Question. The United States and Russia have each committed to the
disposition of 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium so that it will not
be used for weapons purposes. This is a very expensive program and has
had many difficulties associated with it.
What is the current status of the U.S. and Russian efforts to agree
upon a mutual date to complete disposition of the respective 34 tons of
weapons grade plutonium?
Answer. Russia has proposed to dispose of its 34 metric tons of
weapon grade plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel primarily in the BN-
600 and BN-800 fast reactors. Because this proposed disposition
scenario is consistent with its national energy strategy, for the first
time, Rosatom has proposed funding a significant portion of the program
itself. Our view is that this commitment should be perceived as a major
success.
NNSA is currently working with Russia to define the details of the
Russian plan in order to ensure that appropriate proliferation concerns
regarding fast reactors are addressed and we expect to reach agreement
later this summer. Our current estimate is that both sides will
complete disposition of 34 metric tons each of weapons grade plutonium
in the 2035-2040 timeframe.
Question. What plans are there to dispose of additional amounts of
weapons grade plutonium?
Answer. The Department is currently evaluating the cost and
technical feasibility of using the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility in
South Carolina for the following potential missions: 1) to dispose of
up to 9 metric tons of impure plutonium currently proposed for
disposition in DOE'S planned small-scale Plutonium Vitrification
process; 2) to dispose of additional weapons grade plutonium (beyond
the 34 metric tons) expected to be declared surplus as plutonium
requirements are reevaluated and dismantlements accelerated in
connection with transformation of the nuclear weapons stockpile; and 3)
to fabricate start-up fuel for fast reactors in support of the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership, once a decision on the fuel form for fast
reactors has been made.

WEAPONS PROGRAMS PERSONNEL

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
retain critical nuclear weapons expertise in both the NNSA and the
contractor workforce?
Answer. Retaining and developing critical nuclear weapons expertise
is essential to the long-term vitality of the nuclear weapons program.
As Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, I am personally involved
in a number of specific steps designed to retain critical nuclear
weapons expertise in both the NNSA and the contractor workforce. If
confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I would look to
the NNSA management team to continue this work, with my continued
personal involvement. Some specific steps we are currently taking
include: 1) participation of early career designers in the Reliable
Replacement Warhead designs at the national laboratories; 2) re-
establishing an interagency effort to identify critical skills as a
step towards gaining a clearer picture of the relative supply and
demand for our highly trained personnel; 3) refining the methodology to
use in identifying those skills likely to be at risk in the future due
to shortages of appropriately educated and trained U.S. citizens; 4)
utilizing the NNSA Future Leaders Program, where new college graduates
with engineering and business administration degrees are recruited to
work at the NNSA in management-track positions; 5) fully supporting
work such as the Defense Science Board's Task Force on Nuclear
Deterrence Skills, led by Admiral (retired) Henry Chiles.
I am very aware of the potential shortage of critically skilled
workers at NNSA and our contractors due to impending retirements and
the declining number of American citizens seeking graduate degrees in
relevant fields, and realize there is no immediate fix for the
situation. We need to continue to make working with the nuclear weapons
program attractive to critically skilled workers, by offering
competitive wages and benefits, but also by stressing the opportunities
to contribute to national security by working with the best scientific
tools in the world.
Question. Do you support retaining the capability to remanufacture
every component expected to be found in the stockpile in the near term?
What are the most pressing remanufacturing needs?
Answer. A key objective of stockpile and nuclear weapons complex
transformation is to eliminate the need to retain the capability to
remanufacture every component expected to be found in the present
stockpile. Some existing components are problematic to make or involve
hazardous materials that we want to eliminate. I support changes to
transform the current weapons complex. The most pressing
remanufacturing needs are for nuclear components in weapons.
Specifically in the near-term, we need more efficient ways to
manufacture parts in secondaries produced at our Y-12 National Security
Complex. For the long-term, we need to resolve inadequacies in our
capability to manufacture plutonium pits consistent with meeting
national security requirements.

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

Question. The SSP has successfully supported the annual nuclear
weapons certification effort for the last 15 years. Other than the
National Ignition Facility what other capabilities, if any, would be
needed to ensure that the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable
without nuclear weapons testing?
Answer. The SSP is a highly integrated program that encompasses
everything related to supporting the nuclear weapons stockpile so that
it is safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear weapons testing. The
large variety of capabilities in the SSP are complementary and work
together to add confidence in assessing the state of the stockpile as
it ages and as we pursue stockpile transformation. The National
Ignition Facility has never been seen as the only capability needed for
stockpile assessment. Its benefits in the areas of inertial confinement
fusion and ignition will aid greatly in our knowledge of nuclear
weapons, but only in concert with other capabilities such as those
offered by the Advanced Simulation and Computing program, the stockpile
evaluation program, and other parts of the SSP. The Secure
Transportation Asset and safety basis work are two areas of the SSP
that could be overlooked at the expense of high-profile facilities, but
they are essential for the entire program to function as designed.
Question. In your view is the SSP fully coordinated with DOD?
Answer. In my view, the SSP is well coordinated with DOD. Through
the NWC system, the DOE and the DOD communicate priorities and
requirements on a continual basis. While DOD is not asked to
``approve'' every element of the SSP, DOD is fully aware of SSP plans
through regular briefings and information exchanges at levels up to and
including the Secretaries of Energy and Defense. The SSP only exists to
fulfill the nuclear weapons stockpile requirements set by DOD and
endorsed by the President, so it is to DOE's benefit to have as full
coordination as possible with DOD, especially in light of limited
resources and tough choices that need to be made about how best to
transform the nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure.
Question. The NNSA is in the early stages of an effort to develop a
new nuclear warhead to be a replacement for an existing warhead,
without nuclear weapons . testing. This effort is the reliable
replacement warhead (RRW) program.
Do you believe that the SSP is capable of meeting this new
challenge in the coming years?
Answer. I fully believe that the SSP, as detailed in the fiscal
year 2008 budget request and supporting material, is capable of meeting
the challenge of transforming the nuclear weapons stockpile through a
RRW strategy in the coming years.
Question. If you are confirmed, and if during your tenure a problem
arises in the RRW program that would require nuclear weapons testing,
would you cancel the RRW program?
Answer. A fundamental premise of the RRW program is that any
replacement warhead would be certified and fielded without the need to
conduct an underground nuclear test. The RRW program is intended to
ensure, for the foreseeable future, the Nation's ability to sustain the
nuclear weapons stockpile while minimizing the likelihood of having to
return to underground nuclear testing. By relaxing Cold War design
constraints (e.g., maximum yield in a minimum size/weight package), the
RRW program will allow us to design replacement warheads that will
provide the same military capabilities as the legacy warheads they
replace, while incorporating improved performance margins, reduced
uncertainties, and integration of advanced safety and security
features.
In recent years, our stockpile surveillance program has discovered
anomalies that could only have been resolved by a test during the era
of nuclear testing. Today, we are able to resolve those anomalies
through the use of our Stockpile Stewardship tools.
The increased margins in RRW systems would further decrease the
likelihood of a technical issue requiring a test to resolve.
Replacement warhead designs will be designed to provide more favorable
reliability and performance margins than those currently in the
stockpile, and will be less sensitive to incremental aging effects or
manufacturing variances. It is anticipated that the RRW, designed with
large margins, would be less susceptible to an anomaly or defect
requiring testing than legacy stockpile warheads.
Question. When do you anticipate the 2006 annual stockpile
memorandum will be completed?
Answer. DOE and DOD are currently coordinating final formulation of
the fiscal year 2007-2012 Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum. Staff
within each Department have been working very hard to get the
memorandum finalized, signed, and sent to the President. I anticipate
it will be submitted to the President soon.

NUCLEAR MATERIALS CONSOLIDATION

Question. Maintaining nuclear weapons materials at sites
dramatically increases security costs and requirements. DOE and the
NNSA have been working for many years to develop a materials
consolidation plan to consolidate these materials at a smaller number
of sites to reduce security costs. One of the sites that has been
waiting for many years to move its nuclear materials is LLNL.
Maintaining nuclear weapons materials at sites dramatically
increases security costs and requirements. DOE and the NNSA have been
working for many years to develop a materials consolidation plan to
consolidate these materials at a smaller number of sites to reduce
security costs. One of the sites that has been waiting for many years
to move its nuclear materials is LLNL.
In your view, is it possible to move the material in the next 12
months? Is there capacity at the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) or at
LANL or at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to accept this material?
Answer. LLNL has both excess materials and materials needed to
support current mission requirements. There will be no significant
security cost savings until both programmatic and excess materials are
removed from the site. Some, but not all, of the excess material is
packaged and ready for shipment. We can begin to ship excess materials
offsite in fiscal year 2008, assuming the availability of
transportation assets and a receiver site. For most excess materials,
the plan is to move the materials directly to the site where they will
be processed for final disposition. The proposed disposition path for
most of the excess material at LLNL is through the SRS. SRS has
capacity to accept materials packaged in long-term storage containers,
but very limited space to accept other packages.
LANL has insufficient space to accept the LLNL excess material, and
has its own excess materials that must be removed to make room for
programmatic materials from LLNL. Excess materials could potentially be
moved to the DAF at the Nevada Test Site, but because of concerns about
mission compatibility and extremely limited material handling/
processing capabilities, DAF is not an ideal solution.
Question. What is your understanding of the overall plan to
consolidate NNSA material?
Answer. Most HEU materials have been consolidated to the Y-12
National Security Complex. NNSA plans to continue to dispose of excess
HEU materials and consolidate remaining materials within a much smaller
security perimeter at Y-12. NNSA is currently removing all Category I
and II SNM from SNL, with completion expected later this calendar year.
In the longer term, NNSA plans to remove all Category I and II SNM from
LLNL by 2014, and from LANL by 2022. Excess materials will be removed
from LLNL and LANL as storage and disposition capabilities are made
available at receiving sites. Programmatic materials from LLNL will be
moved to LANL, the DAF at the Nevada Test Site, or other sites as
appropriate. Long-term planning will not be finalized until after
issuance of the Supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement-Complex 2030.
Question. In your view, are efforts to achieve consolidation of
materials storage adequately coordinated between DOE and NNSA?
Answer. Coordination between DOE and NNSA on consolidation of
nuclear materials has been very good. The NNSA has been working with
the DOE Office of Environmental Management to schedule the removal of
excess materials from Y-12, SNL, LLNL, and LANL. NNSA is coordinating
with the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy to transfer sodium-bonded HEU,
currently stored at SNL, for consolidation with similar materials at
Idaho National Laboratory. Similar plans are under development for
consolidation of uranium-233 and plutonium-238 materials.
The major impediment to material consolidation is the availability
of storage space and disposition processing capabilities. Coordination
between all programs is essential to take advantage of remaining
storage and processing capacity and capability. Development of new or
replacement processing capability is also needed.' NNSA is coordinating
with other DOE program offices to assure that new processing
capabilities have the appropriate capabilities and capacity for
efficient disposition of materials, regardless of current program
owner.
Secure transportation assets are managed within the NNSA for the
entire DOE, but must be made available to support DOE materials
consolidation actions. The highest materials consolidation priority
within the Department is removal of SNM from the Hanford Site. We will
continue to work with all program offices to ensure mission-critical
transportation support is available as required, and materials
consolidation activities are supported as effectively and efficiently
as possible.

FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. The Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization
Program (FIRP) was established to address long-deferred maintenance
backlogs in the nuclear weapons complex, particularly at the
manufacturing facilities.
Is it your understanding that FIRP is on track to address the
maintenance backlog on schedule by the end of 2013, as stipulated in
law?
Answer. The FIRP is a well run program which continues to
significantly improve the physical condition of the nuclear weapons
complex. However, there remains a large backlog of deferred maintenance
across the complex. Under the current financially constrained Future-
Years Nuclear Security Program, the FIRP will be unable to fully meet
its commitment to address the deferred maintenance backlog by the end
of 2013.
Question. In your view, has the Readiness in the Technical Base and
Facilities (RTBF) program adequately addressed current maintenance
issues or is a new backlog being created?
Answer. The RTBF program is addressing current maintenance issues
at our most important program facilities. However, our program
infrastructure is aging and increased maintenance investment is
required to maintain facility availability. To ensure the highest
priority maintenance issues are addressed, RTBF program managers have
worked with field elements over the last 18 months to screen and
prioritize over 5,000 program facilities into two defined mission
dependency categories, consistent with Federal Real Property Council
and Departmental guidance. The first category, Mission Critical,
consists of those program facilities that are necessary to conduct
mission work and complete program milestones. The second category,
Mission Dependent (Not Critical), represents a larger number of support
facilities needed to enable the completion of important program work.
As a result of targeted investments from the RTBF program and the FIRP,
facility conditions for our Mission Critical facilities are in the good
to excellent range as compared to industry standards, and our Mission
Dependent facilities are in satisfactory condition. While challenges
remain to minimize the maintenance backlog as we consider program
changes that may present opportunities to shrink weapons complex
footprint, the RTBF program is adequately structured and managed to
ensure priority maintenance issues at our most important facilities are
addressed in a timely manner.
Question. In your view, what specific standards should be applied
to ensure that the RTBF program meets current and future maintenance
needs across the nuclear weapons complex so that additional scope is
not added to FIRP?
Answer. Currently, NNSA is working with the DOE'S Office of
Engineering and Construction Management to consider additional
standards and facility sustainment models that could be applied to
ensure maintenance is adequately addressed for all DOE facilities.
Given the age of many program facilities and known budget constraints,
we may decide to increase maintenance backlogs at select NNSA
facilities that do not have an enduring program need, but this will not
result in increased FIRP scope. During the next 5 years of the Future
Years Nuclear Security Plan, pending program decisions related to long-
term program requirements may also result in additional opportunities
for consolidation of capabilities. As program capabilities are
consolidated, near-term maintenance backlog increases may occur until
excess facilities and infrastructure assets are dispositioned.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
surplus buildings are torn down or transferred so that they will not
need long-term maintenance?
Answer. Surplus buildings are a concern for the NNSA. Total NNSA
parametric cost estimates for decontamination and demolition (D&D) for
the period of fiscal year 2006 to 2010 have been reported as
approximately $530 million, with LANL, LLNL, and the Y-12 National
Security Complex as the largest contributors. D&D is a key to our
continuing modernization of the complex, and our commitment to worker
safety and health.
NNSA has several efforts underway to address our inventory of
surplus buildings. First, for our legacy contaminated buildings we work
closely with the Office of Environmental Management, the departmental
organization responsible for addressing unfunded environmental
liabilities and for executing the work. Second, NNSA has had a very
successful demolition program underway for most of this decade--the
Facilities Infrastructure and Recapitalization Program. This well-run
and cost-efficient program has to date achieved a footprint reduction
of 2.7 million gross square feet. If confirmed I will provide
appropriate emphasis on ensuring that surplus buildings are torn down
or transferred so that they will not need long-term maintenance.
Question. Would you support including the cost of tearing down
those buildings that are being replaced within the total project cost
of any new construction?
Answer. Yes. Report language in the Fiscal Year 2005 Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Bill specifically states:

``The costs of D&D for the facilities that are being replaced
be included in the costs of all construction projects and
identify such D&D costs clearly in the construction project
data sheet.''

I support this approach, and if confirmed, will continue to do so.
Demolition is a key tool to reducing the size of the Nuclear Weapons
Complex, streamlining operations, and assuring worker safety and
health.
Question. What is your understanding of the schedule for tearing
down the old administration building at LANL?
Answer. The Nuclear Security and Science Building (NSSB) project
was completed on schedule and approximately $5 million under budget in
2006. The majority of the occupants of SM-43, the old administration
building, have been relocated to the new facility. The majority of the
SM-43 facility is now being transitioned toward disposition by wing
closure, facility characterization, and disconnection of utilities.
Because of the existing infrastructure at SM-43, including secure
networks, and in anticipation of other new space becoming available in
the near future, a portion of the facility will be maintained for
occupancy into fiscal year 2008. Once the remaining personnel have been
relocated, the entire facility will be closed and prepared for
completion of D&D.
LANL is currently in the process of placing much of the SM-43
facility in cold-standby as part of a phased approach to facilitate
ultimate D&D. LANL will continue to use a small portion (100,000
square feet out of a total of over 300,000 square feet) into fiscal
year 2008. Much of the staff (700) has been moved to other facilities
including the new NSSB. The current strategy is to empty the facility
by the close of fiscal year 2008 and complete D&D by fiscal year 2011.
Question. DOE and NNSA often build one of a kind or first of a kind
buildings.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that NNSA
construction projects are managed to be completed within budget and on
time?
Answer. If confirmed, my broad priorities would be to focus on
ensuring that the Federal workforce is effectively performing its
oversight mission throughout the complex. Effective oversight of the
contractor is critical to ensuring that the complex is properly
executing its mission. I, along with the acting Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security, have identified six Special Focus Areas that we will
use to drive the NNSA to improve its performance during the next 18
months. One of these six is to Integrate Project Management Best
Practices throughout the NNSA. As part of this effort, I would
anticipate reviewing the management of constructions projects in
accordance with DOE O 413.3, to include identifying best practices and
integrating lessons learned in our performance. This review would also
require a careful evaluation of whether the resources within the
Federal workforce are currently adequate. NNSA has also recently
strengthened its Independent Project Reviews to ensure that technical,
safety, and security requirements are fully identified and integrated
early into our construction projects and that lessons learned and best
practices from other organizations, sites, and projects are implemented
into our NNSA projects. These actions, along with others underway in
the Department, will help ensure that we demonstrate improved
performance in managing our construction projects.
Question. What additional costing, project management and design
skills do you believe are needed in the NNSA?
Answer. In the area of project management, I believe we have one of
the best project management certification programs in the Federal
Government. We have certified over 60 individuals through this program.
We do need to improve our ability to develop accurate cost estimates
for our very complex projects. We rely heavily on our M&O contractors
and our Architect Engineering firms to develop the designs for our
facilities. The Federal job is to establish the facility requirements
and to communicate those requirements clearly to the contractors who
then design the facilities to meet those requirements. However, as part
of the Deputy Secretary's direction to integrate safety into design, we
need to have our Federal employees participate more heavily in the
design reviews that are conducted at various points in the design stage
of our projects. I support efforts and policies that ensure contractors
are designing the facilities to meet our requirements in a safe manner.
Question. At what point in the Critical Decision timeline do you
believe an independent cost estimate should be performed for a
construction project, and why?
Answer. Critical Decision 2, Approve Performance Baseline, is the
point at which we establish the baseline for our projects, and that is
the point in the Critical Decision timeline that I believe an
Independent Cost Estimate should be performed. However, these types of
detailed bottoms-up cost estimates are very expensive to perform and
should not be performed on every project but rather reserved for those
that are sufficiently complex or technically challenging such that
there is significant value in conducting the cost estimate.

OPERATIONAL SAFETY

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that
nuclear and other operational safety issues are fully addressed in the
design of new NNSA buildings?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to have NNSA follow the Department's
standard, Integration of Safety into Nuclear Facility Design. NNSA has
been complying with the early draft of the new standard and will
operate in full compliance with the final version when implemented.
This new standard requires early identification of Safety Class systems
and other safety related requirements early in the project life cycle,
just after approval of Mission Need. These measures ensure that all
safety requirements are articulated, validated and understood early in
the project life cycle.
Subsequent to Conceptual Design, configuration control in
accordance with nuclear safety rule requirements will ensure that
safety requirements are updated as new information becomes available.
Compliance with the nuclear safety rule and nuclear quality assurance
standard helps to ensure requirements are accurately translated into
effective design features, that these design features are constructed
correctly, that operational procedures correctly implement that both
the design features and operator requirements essential to safety, and
that all maintenance and operating personnel are adequately trained.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that
nuclear operational safety issues are identified by the Defense Nuclear
Safety Board early in any construction design process and promptly
resolved?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that NNSA Federal employees and
contractors continue to work closely with the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) members and staff to ensure that all
safety concerns are understood and promptly resolved. Where such
resolution is not possible; I will ensure that the issue is raised to
the attention of NNSA senior management for action. I will not allow
construction to begin on any phase of a nuclear project until I am
satisfied that all pertinent nuclear safety issues are satisfactorily
resolved.

NOTIFICATION OF CONGRESS

Question. If confirmed, would you commit to promptly notifying
Congress of any significant issues in the safety, security or
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. If confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I
will continue my practice of being open with Congress about issues and
concerns affecting the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear weapons
complex. Management and staff from the Office of Defense Programs
routinely brief Members of Congress and congressional staff on the
state of the stockpile and complex, as requested on specific subjects
and on their own initiative. It is important to note that the most
useful and comprehensive briefings and notifications come jointly from
DOE and DOD, so Congress can get a complete picture of any concerns and
how they affect not just nuclear warheads, but the overall nuclear
security posture.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM IN EUROPE

1. Senator Akaka. Mr. D'Agostino, in your opinion, how might your
role as the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration be complicated by the current problems with Russia over
the deployment of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe?
Mr. D'Agostino. The National Nuclear Security Administration has
cooperated with Russia for over a decade on a number of programs to
strengthen nuclear security and safety throughout Russia, the former
Soviet Union, and now across the globe. This cooperation is based upon
our mutually-shared nonproliferation objectives, and has evolved based
upon changes in the global environment, including the post-September 11
threat of nuclear terrorism. Our nuclear nonproliferation relationship
with Russia has been excellent, and I believe that our shared common
goals will allow continued cooperation on these important issues.

IRAN

2. Senator Akaka. Mr. D'Agostino, in your opinion, has the
international community exhausted all of its options in trying to
convince Iran to back off on its nuclear program?
Mr. D'Agostino. The United States is working closely with its
international partners to achieve a diplomatic solution to the threat
posed by Iran's nuclear activities. I share the President's confidence
that this diplomatic approach is the right strategy for our country at
this time and fully support it.

3. Senator Akaka. Mr. D'Agostino, some people have recently spoken
out in the media advocating launching an attack on Iran to punish them
for training and equipping foreign lighters who then attack and kill
American soldiers in Iraq. What do you think would be the impact of an
attack on Iran on international efforts to stop their nuclear program?
Mr. D'Agostino. The United States is committed to achieving a
diplomatic solution to the challenges posed by Iran and I support fully
the President's policy towards Iran. As the President, Secretary Gates,
and Secretary Rice have reiterated, military action is neither
desirable nor inevitable. Further questions regarding Iranian lethal
activities in Iraq are best addressed by the Departments of State and
Defense.
______

[The nomination reference of Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
May 21, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Thomas P. D'Agostino, of Maryland, to be Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security, Department of Energy, vice Linton F. Brooks,
resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch by Thomas Paul D'Agostino

Thomas Paul D'Agostino is the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs at the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). Mr. D'Agostino directs the Stockpile Stewardship
Program (SSP), which is responsible for maintaining the safety,
security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.
The NNSA's nuclear weapons complex includes three national research
laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and four production plants. Mr.
D'Agostino's nomination to be the NNSA's Administrator was sent to the
Senate on May 21, 2007.
Defense Programs oversees the SSP, which employs over 30,000 people
around the country. This program encompasses operations associated with
manufacturing, maintaining, refurbishing, and dismantling the nuclear
weapons stockpile. Defense Programs also provides oversight and
direction of the research, development, and engineering support to
maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile in
the absence of underground testing, and assures the capability for
maintaining the readiness to test and develop new warheads, if
required.
In his previous assignments, Mr. D'Agostino served as the Assistant
Deputy Administrator for Program Integration where he supported the
Deputy Administrator and directed the formulation of the programs,
plans, and budget for the SSP. He was also previously the Deputy
Director for the Nuclear Weapons Research, Development, and Simulation
Program where he directed the formulation of the programs and budget
for the research and development program that supports the SSP. From
1989 to 1996, Mr. D'Agostino worked in numerous assignments within the
Federal Government in the startup of the Department's tritium
production reactors and at the Naval Sea Systems Command as a program
manager for the Seawolf submarine propulsion system.
Mr. D'Agostino recently retired as a captain in the U.S. Naval
Reserves where he has served with the Navy Inspector General and with
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare in
developing concepts for new attack submarine propulsion systems. He
also served with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans,
Policy, and Operations (N3/5) in the Navy Command Center in the
Pentagon. In this capacity, he was the French Desk Officer for the
Chief of Naval Operations responsible for all Politico-Military
interactions with the French Navy and served as the duty captain at the
Navy Command Center.
He spent over 8 years on Active-Duty in the Navy as a submarine
officer to include assignments on board the U.S.S. Skipjack (SSN 585)
and with the Board of Inspection and Survey where he was the Main
Propulsion and Nuclear Reactor Inspector. In this position, he
performed nuclear reactor and propulsion engineering inspections for
over 65 submarines and nuclear-powered ships in the Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets.
Mr. D'Agostino's awards include the Navy Commendation Medal with
Gold Stars, Navy Achievement Medal, Navy Expeditionary Medal,
Meritorious Unit Commendation, National Defense Service Medal,
Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Award, and numerous other
awards. Mr. D'Agostino is married to the former Beth Ann Alemany of
Manchester, CT, and has two children.
Mr. D'Agostino was nominated by the President for his current
office on January 27, 2006, and was confirmed by the Senate on February
17, 2006. He was sworn in on February 22, 2006. Mr. D'Agostino served
as NNSA's Acting Administrator from January 22, 2007 to April 27, 2007.
Education:
Naval War College, Newport, RI, MS National Security Studies, 1997
(Distinguished Graduate); Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, MS
Business Finance, 1992, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, BS
Physical Science, 1980.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Thomas P.
D'Agostino in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Thomas Paul D'Agostino.

2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National
Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.

3. Date of nomination:
May 21, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
January 17, 1959; Washington, DC.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Beth Anne Alemany.

7. Names and ages of children:
Anne Elizabeth D'Agostino, 20; Thomas Scott D'Agostino, 17.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
U.S. Naval War College, August 1996-June 1997, MA, National
Security Studies.
Johns Hopkins University, September 1992-May 1995, MS, Business
Finance.
U.S. Naval Academy, July 1976-May 1980, BS, Physical Science.

- Acting Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration (January 22, 2007-April 27, 2007).
Within Office of Defense Programs:
- Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs (February 2006-
present)
- Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs (May 2005-
February 2006)
- Assistant Deputy Administrator for Program Integration
(November 2002-February 2006)
- Deputy Assistant Deputy Administrator for Research,
Development, and Simulation (October 2000-November 2002)
- Engineer, Office of the Assistant Deputy Administrator for
Research, Development, and Simulation (March 2000-October 2000)
- Deputy Director, OFfice of Stockpile Computation (June 1997-
March 2000)
- Engineer, Office of Economic Competitiveness (June 1992-June
1997)
- Engineer, Office of Savannah River Restart (July 1990-June
1992)

January 1988-present, U.S. Naval Reserves (Captain), Washington,
DC, Inactive Reservist, S-2 status (July 25, 2006)
Served with:
- Navy Inspector General
- Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare
- Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and
Operations

May 1998-October 2005, Uniformed Services Benefit Association (life
insurance company), Kansas City, KS
Member, Board of Directors and Board of Advisors

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
U.S. Naval War College Foundation.
U.S. Naval War Alumni Association.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Navy Commendation Medal with Gold Stars
Navy Achievement Medal
Navy Expeditionary Medal
Meritorious Unit Commendation (Navy)
National Defense Service Medal
Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Award

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
Testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee, Subcommittee
on Strategic Forces (as NNSA's Acting Administrator), March 28, 2007.
``The Reliable Replacement Warhead and the Future U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Program.'' Remarks at the National Defense University Capitol
Hill Breakfast Seminar Series, May 9, 2007.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2007.]

NOMINATION OF HON. PRESTON M. GEREN TO BE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

----------

TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:39 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, Warner, Chambliss, Dole,
Cornyn, Thune, and Martinez.
Other Senator present: Senator Hutchison.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Gabriella Eisen,
professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling; counsel; Michael J. McCord,
professional staff member; and William G.P. Monahan, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority
counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Diana
G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins and Fletcher L.
Cork.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Darcie Tokioka, assistant to
Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I.
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to
Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J.
Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Andrew King, assistant to
Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole;
Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C.
Mallory and Jason Van Beek, assistants to Senator Thune; and
Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. We're here today
to consider the nomination of Pete Geren to a position which
he's been serving in an acting capacity for several months,
namely Secretary of the Army.
What we're going to do is change the usual order of
business here today. I know Senator Hutchison has other things
that she must do, and so we're going to call upon her first to
make the introductions so that she can then be free to leave if
she wishes and miss the brilliance of my opening statement and
other opening statements. Senator Hutchison, if you're ready we
would call upon you to introduce our nominee.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, our other colleague is the
co-author of this program, so maybe he could have a few
minutes.
Chairman Levin. We'd be delighted to call on Senator Cornyn
as well.
Senator Hutchison.

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF TEXAS

Senator Hutchison. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you so much for accommodating my schedule. It's very
thoughtful of you.
I'm so proud to be here to introduce Pete Geren to be
Secretary of the Army. I started really working with Pete,
although I knew him even before, when I was elected to the
Senate, he was a Member of Congress, and has done a wonderful
job. He was on the House Armed Services Committee and he has
really had a lifetime of public service. In fact, his brother
Charlie is also a member of the Texas House of Representatives
and is also a good friend.
When Pete served in Congress, he was the primary architect
behind the transformation of the Fort Worth Joint Reserve
Training Base from the former Carswell Air Force Base. When
that base closed, Pete was the one who saw the possible use to
locate Reserve assets from all the Services and consolidate
their training in one location. Today that joint training base
has proven to be the model for others around the country. He
saw this benefit years ago and really was the architect.
Pete brought his wonderful family here, who I have also
known for years: his wife Becky and their three daughters:
Tracy, Annie, and Mary. Clearly, they have made a sacrifice
along with this lifetime public servant. They are strong
supporters and sources of strength for Pete as he has had a
continuing call to duty in Washington, despite multiple moves,
and I think they are to be commended as well.
With the many challenges over the past 6 years, Pete Geren
has become the go-to person at the Department of Defense (DOD).
When the Air Force was having difficulty after a procurement
crisis, Pete took over as Acting Secretary of the Air Force and
helped navigate the Service through tough times and worked
closely with Congress on many of the DOD initiatives. Because
of his grace, his devotion to fact, his ability to master
detail, and the esteem in which he is held on and off the Hill,
he is respected in both the military and civilian ranks.
Since assuming the role of Acting Secretary of the Army,
Pete has focused on restoring confidence in the Army Medical
Corps, supporting the Army family, and growing the Army while
working on the best path toward modernization. He is devoted to
the soldiers. His first official act as Acting Secretary was to
meet with the medical staff and patients at Walter Reed Army
Medical Hospital. At that time he said: ``We've let the
soldiers down and we're going to do better.''
He knows what's best for the Army and he will make sure
that our troops get what they need, and we all know, Mr.
Chairman, the Army is bearing the brunt right now of our war on
terror and they deserve to have a Secretary, hopefully
confirmed very quickly, who is devoted to the Army, to helping
it grow in the best possible way, but always tuned in to that
Army family and making sure they have what they need to support
their people who are fighting for our freedom.
Thank you very much for letting me speak and introduce a
good friend and also one of the best public servants I have
ever worked with. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hutchison, for your very
valuable introduction.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your usual
courtesy. Thank you for letting me say a few words on behalf of
Pete Geren, a great Texan and a great American.
Senator Hutchison, the senior Senator from Texas, did an
excellent job, as she did when Pete was nominated to be Under
Secretary of the Army over 2 years ago, and I just want to add
a few words on my own. I can't help but remember the statement
of Bob Bullock, whose name Pete will recognize, former
lieutenant governor, long-time political figure in Texas, who I
heard one time say: ``There are two types of people in public
life, those who want to be somebody and those who want to do
something.'' Pete is of the latter variety. He's somebody who
has continued to lead the United States Army and serve so ably
in DOD and has done a superb job serving our Nation since he
arrived at DOD in 2001.
As Senator Hutchison noted, he is uniquely qualified as a
former Member of Congress with four terms in the House and time
on the House Armed Services Committee. If confirmed, this could
be Pete's fourth major position within DOD. I don't know too
many civilian leaders that have led two different Services, as
Pete has done as Acting Secretary of the Air Force and of the
Army.
It's good to see his family here with him. One of the
things that's impressed me about Pete's service with DOD is his
commitment to supporting our service men and women, and
particularly as a former Air Force brat myself, military
families. Pete, as we all know, played a critical role in
working to improve the quality of support to our wounded
servicemembers and their families after the recent events at
Walter Reed. His strong leadership at a difficult time for the
Army and the Nation was critical to ensuring that our military
and their families receive only the best care and support for
their service and sacrifice for the country.
Mr. Chairman, this committee has seen over the past 6 years
a strong, committed, yet caring and compassionate, leader in
Pete Geren in his various roles within DOD. In particular with
the recent events at Walter Reed highlighting the challenges
and providing the best health care and transitional services to
our wounded warriors, we've seen that Pete Geren is a uniquely
qualified leader to solve the most complex challenges within
the Army, and I strongly recommend to the committee that they
support this nomination by the President of Pete Geren to serve
as Secretary of the Army.
He's a proven leader and the Army needs his depth, his
experience, and his commitment. I'm proud to support this
nomination on behalf of someone who exemplifies the spirit of
selfless service to the Nation. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. Thank you again,
Senator Hutchison.
Let me first call upon you, Secretary Geren, before I give
my statement, to introduce your family if you will.
Mr. Geren. I'm proud to do that, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman
and Senator Warner, I'm proud that my wife and my three
daughters are able to join me today: my wife Becky; my oldest
daughter Tracy, who's a rising senior; my middle daughter
Annie, who's going into the ninth grade; and Mary, who's going
into the fifth grade.
Mr. Chairman, they are all Texans through and through, as
is their mother, and they miss home. I want to thank them very
much for hanging in there with me over the years we've been in
Washington.
Chairman Levin. We thank you. We thank them for their
support for their husband and their father.
I look at your three daughters, I'm reminded of my three
daughters who were about the same ages as your three daughters
when I arrived in Washington. How important they were to me, to
my wife Barbara, that they were there supporting us, because
they're part of this job and you can't function well without
the support of your family. We all know that. We've seen that
over and over again. So we're grateful to them, as well as we
are to you for your public service.
Mr. Geren. Thank you.
Senator Warner. I'd like to join you, Mr. Chairman, in
those comments. I would only add that they have done more than
hang in. They are really there behind you 100 percent, and get
him home in the evenings. Most decisions made in the Department
after 8 o'clock at night are reversed the next morning. So get
him home. Save him. He's a pivotal figure in the future of the
United States Army and our defense posture.
I'm hopeful that the Senate will confirm you.
Mr. Geren. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. If he doesn't get home for dinner, you can
blame us. We're probably the ones who kept him busy answering
our questions.
Under Secretary Geren was suddenly called upon to step up
to his greater responsibilities as Acting Secretary of the Army
shortly after the serious problems at Walter Reed Army Medical
Hospital surfaced in February 2007. The Secretary of Defense
determined that new leadership was needed to address those
problems. Secretary Geren took prompt action to further
identify the causes of those problems and to put in motion the
process to begin corrective action.
We were all dismayed to learn that the Army failed to meet
its obligation to provide for the proper care of injured and
wounded soldiers recuperating at Walter Reed Hospital. We were
dismayed to learn about the physical conditions of the
buildings and the bureaucratic roadblocks and delays, about a
disability evaluation process in disarray.
Just last Friday, the report of the DOD Task Force on
Mental Health found that the stigma surrounding post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) and other mental health issues continues
to serve as a barrier to many servicemembers seeking help.
Additionally, the task force found that there are major issues
with accessibility and numbers of mental health services and
providers, stating that the ``military system does not have
enough fiscal or personnel resources to adequately support the
psychological health of servicemembers and their families.''
Reports in the Washington Post on Sunday and Monday suggest
that the Army does not have adequate programs or sufficient
mental health staff to properly treat the 20 to 40 soldiers
evacuated each month because of mental problems resulting from
day-to-day intensity of combat that they face.
I'm proud to say that this committee, working with the
Veterans Affairs Committee, acted last Thursday to address
those and the larger myriad of problems by approving and
reporting to the full Senate the Dignified Treatment of Wounded
Warriors Act. We created a center of excellence for the
diagnosis and treatment of PTSD. We authorized a number of
measures to improve the prevention, diagnosis, mitigation, and
treatment of PTSD and traumatic brain injury (TBI) and we
require an educational initiative to reduce the stigma
associated with seeking help for those conditions. We directed
in our bill improvements to the military's disability
evaluation system. We require the Secretaries of Defense and
Veterans Affairs (VA) to develop a comprehensive policy for the
care, management, and transition from DOD to the VA of severely
injured servicemembers.
This bill also enhances the health care benefits for
medically retired servicemembers and authorizes medical care
for their family members who leave their homes and jobs to help
care for them.
All Americans expect that the Secretary will address these
problems and continue to give corrective efforts to these and
previously discovered problems, that his utmost attention is
required to ensure that our wounded soldiers are treated in the
manner that they so manifestly deserve and that the American
public insists upon.
Secretary Geren's responsibilities are sobering and his
challenges are immense. He will lead an Army which has borne a
huge burden since September 11, 2001, and has suffered the
greatest number of casualties. The Army has been engaged in
Afghanistan for over 5 years and is in its fifth year of war in
Iraq. With the President's surge, the number of soldiers
engaged in Iraq will approach previous high level marks. Some
Army units are on or entering their third year of Afghanistan
or Iraq service and some individual soldiers are in their
fourth year. Tours of duty have been extended. National
Guardsmen and reservists are called up for periods beyond
anybody's expectation.
While Americans differ in their opinions about the wisdom
of policies behind these operations in Iraq particularly,
Americans recognize and honor the bravery, self-sacrifice, and
devotion to duty of our military personnel and their families.
As for those of us in Congress, no matter how we voted on
authorizing the war and whether we've been critics or
supporters of the President's handling of the war, we are
determined to see that our troops and their families are
supported in every possible way.
With the heaviest burden in this war falling on the Army,
Secretary Geren's challenge, indeed the challenge for the Army,
the Nation, and Congress, is sustaining an Army fully engaged
in current operations while also modernizing and transforming
that Army to meet future threats. The realities of warfare in
the 21st century demands, in Army parlance, boots on the
ground. It requires an Army that is optimally organized,
trained, and equipped for anything we might ask it to do, all
of which are the primary responsibilities of the Secretary of
the Army. He must ensure an Army that is ready for all its
potential missions, both today and in the future.
Secretary Geren must deal with an Army which in order to
sustain the readiness levels in its deployed forces has seen
the readiness of its nondeployed forces steadily decline. Most
of those nondeployed units are not ready. Consequently, getting
those units fully equipped and trained for their rotations is
difficult and risky for the Nation should these forces be
deployed before they are ready.
In testimony to this committee earlier this year, General
Peter Schoomaker, then Army Chief of Staff, was direct in his
concern for the strategic depth of our Army and its readiness.
He was clear in his apprehensions about the short- and long-
term risks resulting from the lower readiness levels of our
nondeployed forces. We will be looking to Secretary Geren to
take the actions necessary to reduce that risk and to restore
the readiness of the Army for both current and future
contingencies.
In a marked change of position, the administration now
supports an increase in the Army's Active-Duty end strength by
65,000 soldiers to 547,000 over the next 5 years. As we are now
in year 5 of the Iraq war, the proposed increases come late. We
all understand the stress on our forces in Iraq, but few of
these proposed additional soldiers would be trained and ready
to help relieve that stress in the next year or 2.
During his own nomination hearing, General George Casey,
Army Chief of Staff, said that he intended to see whether it
was possible to speed up that process.
We must guard against merely creating a larger version of a
less ready force. Secretary Geren will have to ensure that Army
plans for expansion are comprehensive and detailed and do all
that he can to ensure that they are fully resourced. He must
ensure that Congress understands what is needed to bring our
ground forces to the levels of strength and readiness necessary
to avoid the unacceptable risks and the readiness shortfalls
that exist today and to modernize our Army to meet our national
security requirements in the future.
Secretary Geren, we look forward to hearing what you
believe are the greatest challenges that the Army is facing and
how you would address them as Secretary of the Army if the
Senate confirms you to that position. Again, we thank you for
your service. We thank your family for their support, and I
call on Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was a very
comprehensive opening statement and what I'll do is ask to put
my statement in the record.
I join you, of course, in welcoming the family, and I point
out the rather extraordinary career which you've outlined in
detail of this nominee. Since 2001, in many ways he's been
preparing for this very moment and, subject to confirmation by
the Senate, carrying out the duties of the Secretary of the
Army.
It's a great challenge. It's a wonderful job. As you go
through life and continue your distinguished career, I doubt
there will be one more challenging and more fulfilling than
this.
Service to the men and women of the Armed Forces is a rare
opportunity. It is a deep and abiding privilege for those who
enter that realm of what we call civilian control of the
military. Subject to your strength, your conviction, and your
dedication, you will earn their respect and that they deserve,
and you have the capabilities in my judgment to give them.
I point out Admiral Michael Mullen when it broke that he
will be the next nominee to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
was asked what concerned him the most. He says: I lay awake at
night worrying about the United States Army. That was a
carefully phrased statement, but I think it's shared by all of
those serving in the Pentagon today. That is that the United
States Army needs the strongest of leadership at this point in
history. I'm of the opinion that you can give that leadership
and will give that leadership.
I only add one word of advice and that is that I presume
the Secretary of the Army has a regular conference with the
Secretary of Defense. That was the way we worked it when I was
privileged to be Secretary of the Navy many years ago. I just
hope that you give our Secretary of Defense Robert Gates the
best, the toughest advice that you possibly can. He's a fine
man and he can't be expected to do the 360 degrees day-in and
day-out. He needs the Secretaries of the Services to come forth
and to give him the unvarnished facts, so that together the two
of you can make the correct decisions for the future of the
Army. I hope that you will make that commitment.
Yesterday, we had a very good conversation in my office, as
we've had many times together. But I was particularly impressed
with your candor on the factual situation that faces you today,
and particularly that vehicle that's come to the attention of
so many people in DOD, and most specifically the Army and
Marine Corps, the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP)
vehicle, and how you're concerned that previous decisions in
the Department of the Army--you made that clear to me--just did
not take into consideration the urgency and the quantity of
those vehicles that are needed.
I hope either in your opening comments or in the course of
the colloquy we'll have with our witness today that you will
point out what you intend to do to remedy that situation.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in welcoming Secretary Geren
and his family. I see some familiar faces out there who were with us
last year on February 15, 2006, for Mr. Geren's previous nomination
hearing in the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Thank you for being with
us again today.
At your previous nomination hearing, I noted the importance of
family support to senior military and civilian leaders when the demands
of the position manifest themselves. I'm sure there have been many long
days and sacrifices by all of you. We are very appreciative of your
support for your husband and father, and I hope you will always
remember the importance of his service and contributions to the Army
and the Department of Defense.
I recall having noted at the last hearing, however, that any time
spent at the Pentagon office after 7:30 was to be questioned since any
decisions made are likely to be reversed by 7:30 the next morning. Can
you comment on the validity of that theory?
Secretary Geren, there are very few individuals who are more highly
qualified than you to serve as Secretary of the Army. From the time you
returned to duty, so to speak, in September 2001, you have been
preparing for this assignment. The responsibilities of the Service
Secretaries for the ``training, equipping, and organizing'' of the
Armed Forces are absolutely crucial to their vitality and success. From
my own experience as Secretary of the Navy, I can say that, while
today's problems may dominate your attention, many of the decisions
that you would make as Secretary of the Army will have effects for
years to come. You may already have experienced this having previously
served as Acting Secretary of the Air Force and now the Army.
I won't attempt to recount all the issues which you have worked on
and will confront if you are confirmed. You surely will be questioned
today about the Army's strategic readiness and the effects of current
operations on the Army's ability to respond to worldwide threats. You
will be asked about trends in recruiting and retention in the Guard,
Reserve, and Active Forces and the ability of the Army to meet its
planned increase of 47,000 soldiers in 5 years. Of course, the morale
of the force--and family members--under very difficult conditions of
service for many soldiers--is of great concern for all of us. You
testified on various occasions following the revelations at Walter Reed
Army Medical Center in February of this year, and we will want to hear
more about the Army's response and what more needs to be done
especially in the areas of outpatient care, including mental health
services.
I urge you to evaluate critically and clearly the capabilities of
the Army in meeting its mission and listen carefully to the Army's
uniformed leaders and their views in this regard. I have publicly
expressed my admiration and support for our magnificent All Volunteer
Force, which has been 34 years in the making. I believe this force has
met the challenges it faces and will continue to do so, but I am
concerned that the force not be stretched beyond the breaking point.
You are key to the future of the Army in this regard, and Secretary
Gates needs your absolute best advice and counsel. I urged Secretary
Gates in his confirmation hearing last December not to restrict his
advice, or personal opinions, regarding current and future strategy
evaluations, and to be fearless--fearless--in discharging his statutory
obligations. I offer the same advice to you.

Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, thank you so much.
Let me now ask Secretary Geren the standard questions that
we ask of all nominees who appear before this committee. Have
you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Mr. Geren. Yes, I will.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Geren. No.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. Geren. Yes, I will.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Mr. Geren. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Mr. Geren. Yes, I will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Mr. Geren. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF HON. PRESTON M. GEREN, TO BE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Mr. Geren. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and members of the
committee: It truly is an honor to be before you today as the
President's nominee to be Secretary of the Army. I want to
thank the President for his confidence in me and Dr. Gates for
his confidence as well. It's truly a privilege to have this
opportunity.
Let me thank Senator Hutchison and Senator Cornyn for their
very kind remarks, two great leaders for our State, two great
leaders in the Senate. I deeply appreciate, and I know my
family does as well, their kind and generous remarks.
Mr. Chairman, I'd also like to note Senator Hutchison's
predecessor, who was the person who brought me into public
life, Senator Lloyd Bentsen. Had it not been for the
opportunity to work for Senator Bentsen, I'm confident I would
not have the opportunities to serve in our government today.
Senator Bentsen passed away over the past year, a great
American, a great Senator, and I want to acknowledge my debt to
him.
Chairman Levin. Thank you for that, for all of us.
Mr. Geren. Senator, I introduced my family earlier. I have,
as you do, three wonderful girls, three great kids. Again, I
want to thank them for standing with me and standing with Becky
and me in our time here in Washington and all the time.
My family and I came to Washington planning a 3-year hitch
and 6 years later we're still here. I joined DOD in August 2001
expecting a peacetime assignment in business transformation of
DOD. Then came September 11 and the war. There's a sense of
mission working among our military during time of war that's
hard to walk away from.
For the past 6 years, I've watched soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines go off to war, and I've watched their
families stand steadfast and unwavering in their support of
their departed loved ones and live with the uncertainty of
whether he or she would return home. They live with the
certainty that there would be birthdays, holidays,
anniversaries, graduations, and the ups and downs of everyday
life that their loved one would miss, for 12 months originally
and now 15 months, and too often watched those families live
with a loss when their loved one did not return.
I've been inspired by the selfless service of our soldiers
and humbled by the sacrifice of their families. I've held staff
and leadership jobs in the Pentagon over these past 6 years and
consider it the privilege of a lifetime to have the opportunity
to work on behalf of our men and women in our Nation's military
and their families during the time of war.
Our grateful Nation cannot do enough and I'm honored to
play a part, a supporting role, in their service to our Nation
on the front lines.
When I came before you seeking confirmation as Under
Secretary of the Army, I told you my top priority would be
taking care of soldiers and their families. I reaffirm that
commitment today with a greater understanding of that
responsibility. My year as Under Secretary of the Army taught
me much. My 4 months as Acting Secretary of the Army has taught
me much more.
We have over 140,000 soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. We
can never take our eye off of that ball. They are counting on
their Army, the big Army, to continue to provide them the
training, equipment, and leadership to take the fight to the
enemy and defend themselves. They count on their Army
leadership back home to move the bureaucracy on the homefront.
They count on their Secretary and their Chief to stand up for
them, get them what they need when they need it.
We must act with urgency every day, every day, to meet
their needs. Today the issue is MRAP. Tomorrow it will be
different. The enemy is forever changing and forever adapting.
Mr. Chairman, further, as an Army we pledge never to leave
a fallen comrade. That is not an abstract notion. That means on
the battlefield, in the hospital, in the outpatient clinic, or
over a life of dependency if that is what's required to fulfill
this pledge.
I have witnessed the cost in human terms and to the
institution of the Army when we break faith with that pledge,
as a handful did at Walter Reed. A few let down the many and
broke that bond of trust. But I have seen soldiers, enlisted
noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers respond when they
learn that someone has let down a soldier. They step up and
they make it right, they make it better, and they do not rest
until the job is done, and they expect and demand
accountability.
I've seen the strain of multiple deployments on soldiers'
families. A wife and a mother said recently: ``I can hold the
family together for one deployment. Two is harder and three is
harder still.'' Over half of our soldiers today are married
with families. Over 700,000 children are in the families of our
soldiers. The health of the All-Volunteer Force depends on the
health of those families.
We must expect that our future offers an era of persistent
conflict. We will continue to ask much of the Army family. We
must meet the needs of our families, provide them with a
quality of life comparable to the quality of their service and
sacrifice. It's the right thing to do and the future of our
All-Volunteer Force depends on it.
As President Lincoln pledged to us as a Nation: ``Our duty
does not stop when our soldier or our Nation leaves the field
of battle. We must care for those who have borne the battle,
his widow and his orphan.'' That commitment extends over the
horizon and we have learned we have much to do to fulfill that
commitment.
Lately we have come face to face with some of our
shortcomings--a complex disability system that can frustrate
and fail to meet the needs of soldiers, a system that often
fails to acknowledge, understand, and treat some of the most
debilitating, yet invisible, wounds of war, leaving soldiers to
return from war only to battle bureaucracy at home, and leaving
families at a loss on how to cope.
DOD, working with the VA and this committee and this
Congress, has an opportunity that does not come along often, to
move our Nation a quantum leap forward in fulfillment of that
commitment. We cannot squander this opportunity and, Mr.
Chairman and Senator Warner, I commend this committee for the
step forward you took last week in your bill to start the
process of meeting the needs of those wounded warriors, and we
look forward to working with you to push that initiative.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for all
you do for our soldiers and their families. The Army has no
greater friend than this committee. Article 1, Section 8 of the
Constitution makes the Army and Congress full partners in the
defense of our Nation and in the service of our soldiers and
their families. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to
work with you in discharging our duty to those soldiers.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Geren, thank you for a heartfelt
and a powerful statement. I can't remember that I've ever heard
a better one, frankly, coming from a nominee. It was very
personal and I just wish every American, every soldier, and
every one of their families could have heard your opening
statement.
In your response to the committee's advance policy
questions, Mr. Secretary, you stated that if confirmed that
you'll conduct a comprehensive review of the Army's medical
support requirements and how the Army can better recruit and
retain medical, dental, nursing, and behavioral health
personnel.
This is obviously an urgent and a critical issue. The
weekend's articles in the Washington Post showed that the ranks
of licensed psychologists, for instance, have thinned in recent
years, dropping from 450 to 350. Many psychologists who have
left reported difficulty in handling the stress of facing such
pained soldiers as a reason that they left. Many of the
psychologists who remained are inexperienced to treat patients
with PTSD like they would patients with alcohol or marital
problems.
The articles suggest that the Army does not have the
infrastructure or the mental health personnel to deal with the
large number of soldiers suffering from PTSD. They report that
the Army has no PTSD center at Walter Reed, the place to which
most soldiers who experience combat-related mental health
problems are evacuated, and note that the Army's psychiatric
treatment is weak compared with the best PTSD programs that the
Government offers.
The article also reports that, even though Walter Reed
maintains the largest psychiatric department in the Army, it
lacks enough psychiatrists and clinicians to properly treat the
growing number of soldiers returning with combat stress.
What is the Department doing to increase the number of
trained, qualified, and experienced mental health professionals
that are needed to handle this deluge of soldiers that are
returning from this war with PTSD?
Mr. Geren. Sir, you sum up the Army's challenges very well
in your comments. We recognize that we have a great deal of
work to do in this area. We have begun the process. Last week
we executed a contract to hire 200 more mental health
professionals in the Army, which would increase our mental
health professionals by over 20 percent.
It's an area of shortage. It's an area of shortage not only
in the Army, but it's an area of shortage in the communities
that surround our military installations. So for many
specialties the families and soldiers can turn to the TRICARE
system and get service in the local economy. That same shortage
of mental health professionals exists in the communities as
well. We recognize that.
Acting Surgeon General Gale Pollock, that's a top priority
of hers and I worked with her over the last few months to
identify resources for us to expand in that area.
Let me say some other things that we're trying to do to
leverage resources. In a couple of weeks we're going to launch
a train-teach program to teach everybody in the Army how to
identify the symptoms of PTSD. We have a four-star conference
later this week. General Casey is going to introduce it to
those four-star generals next week. But we are still working it
through the peer review process. We'll be working with the Hill
as well.
We recognize we have a challenge there, and the mental
health professionals are one of the areas that we send
downrange at higher percentage than any other mental health
field because of the need in theater. But we are trying to do a
better job of teaching our leaders in the Army to spot those
problems before they become serious problems. We're trying to
staff up. We're trying to work with the TRICARE system to help
them provide more mental health care professionals outside of
the Army system.
Sir, I acknowledge that's a major challenge for us, and let
me just expand it a little further: PTSD as well as TBI, are
two of the signature wounds of this conflict, and we're working
them, but we have a lot of work to do.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
By the way, we're going to have an 8-minute round on our
first round.
On May 4, 2007, the Department released the findings of the
Mental Health Advisory Team's fourth assessment of the mental
health and well-being of soldiers and marines in Iraq. That
team found that, among numerous other things, multiple
deployments directly correlate with higher levels of acute
stress and that lengthy deployments lead to higher rates of
mental health and marital problems.
The team found that the deployment length was more of a
concern for soldiers than marines, who tended to have fewer
deployment concerns than soldiers. The report is dated November
17, 2006. That's about 5 months before it was released, for
reasons I'm not sure I understand why there was such a delay.
But nonetheless, that report predates Secretary Gates's
announcement on April 11, 2007, that tours of duty for soldiers
serving in Iraq would be extended from 12 to 15 months.
You, in your opening statement, made very eloquent
reference to the strain of multiple deployments on families. My
question is, did the Army consider the findings of the Mental
Health Advisory Team when developing the plan to extend Army
tours to 15 months?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir, that's one of the many inputs that we
considered when we made that recommendation to Dr. Gates. With
the demand signal from theater, we were faced with two choices,
neither of which was very good. The choice which was how we had
been moving up until the point of that decision was waiting
until the last minute and then extending troops in theater,
with little warning, in some cases after they had already begun
their redeployment home.
The better of those two tough choices was to go ahead and
make a decision on the 15-month deployments with the commitment
that there would be 12 months of dwell time in between those
deployments, recognizing that it is a very difficult strain on
the families. We've asked much of them; with that we're asking
more. We are going to do what we can to support those soldiers
and their families in these deployments. It's one of the
reasons that we have identified additional resources to put in
family programs immediately. We've moved them in over the last
couple weeks to support families, to help them during this
extended deployment.
Chairman Levin. On the question of the MRAP vehicles, the
Army's validated requirement for MRAP vehicles is only 2,500,
and by contrast the Marines' validated requirement is 3,700.
The Marines' validated requirement is going to permit them to
replace all of their up-armored Humvees with MRAP vehicles. The
Army has said that the requirement of the Army could go as high
as 17,000 MRAP vehicles, but there seems to be some reluctance
on the part of the Army to validate that higher requirement.
What is the Army's reluctance to validate the higher
requirement for the MRAPs?
Mr. Geren. My commitment and the commitment of the Army is
to provide every MRAP to theater as quick as we possibly can
that they need in theater. General Ray Odierno requested over
17,000, a one-to-one replacement for the Humvee. The Chief and
I asked our G-3 and G-8 to go to theater--they left several
days ago; they got back last night--to look at that requirement
and determine, to prioritize it and look at what the immediate
needs are, recognizing that there are some Humvees that perhaps
because of their mission would not need to be replaced,
certainly not immediately, maybe not in the long-term, but
looking at what the need is.
They got back last night. They're going to make a
recommendation. I can't tell you the number, but whatever that
requirement is we're going to meet it and we're going to move
it to theater as fast as we can. The money that you gave us a
month ago, we committed it last week. We are using that money
to buy a version of the MRAP vehicle. We're working with the
Navy and the Marines to ramp up the production capacity so that
we can get these to the theater as fast as possible. Every
validated requirement we're going to do our best to fill.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, in a news interview last
weekend General David Petraeus indicated that the surge would
not be completed and that its mission would not be completed by
September. He said that historically counterinsurgencies have
gone on for 9 or 10 years.
The question is this: should the higher troop level of the
surge continue into the spring of 2008? Several Army officials
have said privately that units will have to be extended even
longer than the current 15-month deployment or the dwell time
between rotations would have to be reduced below the 12 months
that you just mentioned. What are the implications for Army
units if the current troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan are
maintained into the spring of 2008?
Mr. Geren. We're in the process of exploring those options.
It's too early to judge the surge. It's too early to look into
the next year. But for the Army we have to begin to plan. We
have to look at our options. We're exploring numerous options
and have to look at all the components of the Army, the total
Army. We have to look at every way that we can to support that
demand.
At this point in time we're not in a position to answer
that fully. We are looking over the horizon, trying to
anticipate what it might be and looking at the options on how
we will fill that demand. But we're committed to filling the
requirements that the combatant commander asks and we have been
able to do so up until now and we will continue to do so.
Chairman Levin. You're saying that if the surge's higher
troop levels are continued into 2008 that there are options to
fill those levels other than extending the deployments and
other than reducing the dwell times? Is that what you're
saying?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. We have also the option of looking at
the different utilization of the Guard and Reserve, different
force mix. Also, the other Services have supported us in some
of our ground missions up until now. Both the Air Force and the
Navy have put troops into areas where they're not their
conventional area of service. So we will explore all those
options. Really, at the present time I am not able to look that
far into the future and give you any certainty on how we would
fill it if in fact it becomes necessary.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, how well you know that the past 18 months
particularly there have been many opinions rendered about the
Army: severely overstressed, overextended. Even the word
``broken'' has been used. But to the best I can judge, the
record clearly indicates that the Army each time has stepped up
and met the challenge and has never, never tried to pull back
or failed to respond to the orders of the Commander in Chief,
whether it be the President, Commander of Central Command, the
Chief of Staff of the Army, and others, indeed the Secretary of
Defense.
You and I know there are limits, limits from the standpoint
of human endurance, family stress and strain, limits in the
availability of equipment and so forth. We haven't reached them
yet, fortunately, in my judgment. But what series of
benchmarks, what series of alarms, have you put in place to
alert you as the Secretary of the Army, if confirmed, that we
have to make some corrective courses and indeed might require
you to go to the Secretary of Defense and point it out and
those deficiencies that you've discovered could well impact on
our policy, whether it's how long we stay, to whether we can
keep our troops there for longer periods, as the chairman said?
What is the framework of alarm systems you have in place?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. As you've noted, Senator, repeatedly,
the All-Volunteer Force is a national treasure. This is the
first time we have fought an extended conflict with an All-
Volunteer Force since the Revolutionary War. We were reminded
of that over and over this past week as we celebrated the
Army's 232nd birthday. Parallels between the Army of 1775 and
the Army of 2007, an All-Volunteer Force in the field.
We have to keep a close watch on all indicators of the
health of that Army. But as you correctly point out, sir, in
this conflict when the Nation called, our soldiers have stepped
up time and time and time again. Perhaps the greatest indicator
of the commitment of those soldiers and the morale of those
soldiers is the retention rates. Our retention rates continue
to exceed our goals. Our retention rates among those who have
deployed exceed the retention rates of those who have not
deployed.
So we have an Army that continues to step up and meet the
challenge. But we have to watch for those warning signs, as you
alert us. The front line in identifying those warning signs is
the NCOs and the junior officers in the field. They have to
know what's going on mentally, emotionally, and physically with
their soldiers, and they have to be in a position to step up
and meet the needs of those soldiers and not let a problem
fester there.
We're working to try to make that front-line soldier a
better judge of the needs of the people that he or she leads.
This train-teach program that I talked about earlier, we're
going to teach every leader in the Army how to spot some of the
emotional stresses, PTSD and other mental disorders, while
they're still in their infant stages. They're our front lines
and all the other indicators lag those indicators that they
see. We have to stay in touch with them.
You look at other indicators, though, that tell us about
the health of the force--absent without leave rates, desertion
rates, drug use, criminal activity, accidents. We have seen
most of those indicators hold steady. Three have not held
steady and are troubling. Accidents have increased, as have
suicides and divorces. One thing I've done since I've been at
the Army is the Army senior staff gets together every
Wednesday. We call it our balcony brief. I've added two slides
to that brief, one is suicides and one is class A accidents
that result in fatalities, so that our Army leadership every
week, in addition to everything they're doing all week long, is
alerted to those two indicators as well as the other
indicators.
The Army has stepped up. I have no doubt it will continue
to do so, but we must take steps necessary to protect this
treasure.
Senator Warner. There are limits to human endurance.
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. We have to recognize that.
Now, there has been some indication of shortage in the
junior grade officers, the captains and the majors, in terms of
your retention.
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. For the first time you failed to meet your
recruiting levels. It was just by several hundred, but
nevertheless, failed to meet the goal. I'm pleased that you in
the Army formally announced we missed our goal on recruiting.
That indicates a certain softness that's in the system now. Do
you acknowledge there being softness and what steps are you
taking to remedy it?
Mr. Geren. Let me mention one other important area of
emphasis for us in making sure that we meet the needs of the
soldiers, and that's meeting the needs of the families. You can
destroy an Army by burning the soldier out or burning the
family out. Staying in touch with those families and supporting
them is a key ingredient to making sure that we retain the
health.
We did experience this in the month of May for the first
time in 23 months a recruiting shortfall. Our goal was 5,500.
We made 5,100. The Guard also fell a little short of its
recruiting goal. Over the course of this year, though, both the
Active-Duty and the Guard are higher than our recruiting
target. The Reserves remain a little below, in the low 90
percent range.
It's something we have to watch very closely. We have to.
We are expanding our number of recruiters. We are also
monitoring the environment in which we recruit. Many of the
influencers are now expressing reluctance when they ought
encourage their people.
Senator Warner. It's the traditional family influence. We
discussed that yesterday.
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir, parents and other influencers.
Senator Warner. Less enthusiastic about encouraging their
family members to join the military. Let's face facts.
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. That's a serious turn of events.
Mr. Geren. It is.
Recruiting remains a challenge. I believe we'll make our
80,000 goal this year. We are on track to do that. But when you
consider such a small percentage of the Nation steps up and
supports our Army during this time, we have to do a better job
of broadening the base and getting more Americans to consider
this opportunity for service.
Senator Warner. What about the junior officer situation?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. With the junior officers, particularly
captains and majors, we do have a shortage. Most of that
shortage is attributable to changes in force structure with
modularity. In 2005, we needed approximately 23,000 captains
and majors. In 2013, we're going to need 30,000 captains and
majors.
We also, in addition to the brigade combat teams we have in
theater, we have many captains and majors supporting training
over there of the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi military.
So we have a 7,000 shortfall. We have seen the retention rate
for captains and majors slide a little bit from historical
norms, but really just a little bit. That's not a significant
contributor to this shortfall. But the two big contributors are
the change in force structure and then the reduction in
accessions late in the 1990s. We're paying the price for that
today.
We have a program in place, a fairly robust program to try
to address this shortage and try to grow it.
Senator Warner. Let's turn to the important role played by
the National Guard and the Army Reserve. More and more we've
relied on them in this conflict. I think percentage-wise the
only precedent is perhaps World War II, when they were all
integrated into one fighting force. But you have to keep a
strong Guard and Reserve. What steps are you taking in that
area?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. As you well know, with the changes
that we made as a country in the 1990s we've grown the Reserve
component to 55 percent of our total Army end strength. We
cannot go to war without the Guard and Reserve, and we fight as
one, we have to train as one, and we have to equip as one.
One of the most important initiatives we have under way is
an unprecedented equipment investment in the Guard and
Reserves. From 2005 to 2013 we're going to invest about $37
billion in the Guard and in the Reserves about $10 billion. In
the next 18 months the Guard will get $10 billion worth of new
equipment; the Reserves get $2.6 billion. This is just a piece
of the effort to make sure that the Guard is properly equipped
and is going to be ready to meet the call when we do turn to
them, as we have repeatedly in this conflict, and they've
performed with extraordinary distinction.
Senator Warner. In this, as you say, conflict, two
principally, Afghanistan and Iraq, and understandably the
principal focus is on the needs for these conflicts. But at the
same time, as Secretary you have to project ahead a minimum of
a decade, indeed beyond, to put in place those programs and
initiatives which will build America's future Army.
Now, how are you going to do that and at the same time meet
the extraordinary requirements of these conflicts?
Mr. Geren. Over the history of our country, we have often
beggared the future in the understandable interest of meeting
the needs of the present. We cannot allow that to happen with
this Army. The platforms that we have in theater today are
platforms in many cases that are older than the soldiers that
are operating them.
The Future Combat System is our number one modernization
priority for the Army. It's the only Army program in the top 10
modernization programs for DOD. I want to thank this committee
for your strong support of that system. But that system not
only is going to replace our manned ground vehicles with
systems that are more survivable, more capable----
Senator Warner. My time has run out. But you have in mind
the future Army at the same time you're building towards those
goals?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Senator Warner. The Senator from Connecticut.
Senator Lieberman [presiding]. Thank you. Chairman Levin
had to leave for a few moments, so he asked me to chair for a
while. So it becomes my great pleasure as my first act to
recognize myself to ask you the next round of questions.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Geren, I can't thank you enough for your service
to our country in so many capacities. It shouldn't even have to
be noted, but I'm proud to say you were a Democratic Member of
Congress. You served as Commander in Chief in this Army in the
highest tradition of nonpartisan, perhaps bipartisan, service.
I thank you for it. It makes us all proud of you personally as
a friend, but also it sets a model, I think, for the rest of
the country.
I thank you for your opening statement. I agree with
Chairman Levin. I may have heard a better one, but I can't
remember it this morning. It was very moving.
I want to pick up the line of questions that both the
chairman and the ranking member began with about the size of
the Army as it faces the challenges that it is facing for us
now. Just to mention, and you touched on it briefly, I think we
will look back or historians will look back at the 1990s and
say that we once again made a mistake that nations repeatedly
make postwar, which is post-Cold War we reduced the size of the
Army too drastically, generally speaking from about 780,000 to
about 480,000. The Army therefore has felt the stress of its
involvement in the global war on terror.
But I will tell you what you know and every time I'm out to
see our troops in the field, that they are meeting the call.
They are meeting it with not only a high sense of purpose and
honor, but with tremendous skill and effectiveness. I see some
stress emotionally that we've talked about. But I don't see any
diminution in the quality of service that the men and women of
the Army are giving, and I thank you for that.
Now, obviously we all worry, as Senator Warner said, that
there comes a breaking point. I appreciated your answer to
Senator Levin's question about what options we have if we
determine, if the Commander in Chief determines, that the level
of troop support that we have in Iraq now at the so-called
surge level needs to be maintained, because we never want to be
in a position where our resources determine our strategy
instead of our resources being there to meet what our generals
on the ground tell us they need to succeed.
I just want to pursue a bit of that. The first is to
emphasize and maybe ask you to give a little more content,
where do we find the troops necessary? Talk a little bit in
more detail about the reenlistment rate, if you would, of those
who have been actively deployed or not?
Mr. Geren. The reenlistment rate has exceeded our goals. In
fact, when you look at our plan to grow the Army, our
recruiting numbers hardly change over the next 5 years. We're
going to grow it by 7,000 a year. Our recruiting number stays
roughly at 80,000 every year from here on. We grow the Army
through retention and we shape the Army with retentions in
areas where we need to grow the Army.
The retention has been strong. It's about 102 percent of
our goal.
Senator Lieberman. How do you set the goal? That's
impressive. First, how do you set the goal?
Mr. Geren. The goals are based on what our needs are in
those ranks, in those grades, and how many soldiers we need in
that area. Of course, in captains and majors we need them all.
Senator Lieberman. So you're at 102 percent of your goal as
of now?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Obviously, the next way to go is
recruitment, and I know that, as you've indicated, we're
falling a little bit below. Why don't you give us more detail
on that and break it down again in terms of Active-Duty, Guard,
and Reserve?
Mr. Geren. Our Active-Duty goal through the end of the year
is 80,000. We are above target. But in May, for the first time
in 23 months, we dropped below the monthly target. Our goal was
5,500. We got 5,100.
The Guard came off of a string of consecutive months of
exceeding their goal and also fell a little short.
Senator Lieberman. The Guard, can you give us a percentage?
Mr. Geren. The Guard I believe is around 92 percent. I'd
like to provide the details for the record if I could. They are
also on track.
I want to mention one thing the Guard has done. The Guard
has come up with a very innovative recruiting model which the
Reserves are now following and the Army Active-Duty is
following as well, turning every Guardsman into a recruiter and
giving a bonus. The program has been extraordinarily successful
and we've learned that from the Guard. We appreciate their
leadership in the area and we are incorporating the practices
that they've developed to help us meet our recruiting goals.
It's been remarkably successful.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Army National Guard recruiting goal through May 2007 was 3,012,
with an actual 3,456 National Guard soldiers recruited, a percentage of
114 percent.
The June 2007 Army National Guard recruiting goal was 3,324, with
an actual 3,258 Army National Guard soldiers recruited, a percentage of
98 percent.
The Army National Guard's recruiting goal through June 2007 was
26,405 with an actual recruited: 28,173 (106.7 percent).

Senator Lieberman. Senator Warner and you talked about some
of the problems related to recruiting. Let me just step back
for a moment and put it in this larger context. Under the
President's budget, the plan was to move the Army to 547,000
personnel and to do so in 5 years, which would bring us to
2012, even 2013.
When General Casey came before us for his first testimony
after his confirmation hearing, I and others expressed some
impatience with the idea that we had to wait 5 years to get the
Army up to 547,000. He said that he was going to take a look at
doing it more quickly and that was a priority for him, which we
appreciated.
I wonder if you could report to us on how that process is
going, whether you share General Casey's goal of seeing if we
can reach the 547,000 a lot sooner, since we're obviously in
battle right now?
Mr. Geren. I do share that goal and we are examining it
right now. We're working on it daily. One of the task forces
that we put together focuses on that. It's an issue that goes
beyond recruiting. We have to make sure that we have the
training bases. We have to make sure we have the barracks. We
have to make sure we have all the support systems.
Obviously, it would require moving the budget numbers
around and sustaining these soldiers over the course of the
time and that cost would begin earlier in the budget process.
But we have told Secretary Gates that this is a matter that we
are pursuing and considering, but I cannot tell you today that
we've figured out how to get it done or that there is a way
with certainty that we're going to get it done. But that's our
commitment and we're exploring how to do that.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. You had a sentence or
two that touched on this. Incidentally, Senator Ben Nelson is
here and his subcommittee of this committee led the full
committee in authorizing in the bill that we reported out of
committee both making the 7,000 increase in personnel that the
President recommended permanent, not temporary, and adding
13,000 additional. So that both creates an opportunity but also
gives you a challenge.
I urge you to look as you suggested you might, at an array
of different methods you might follow to increase the
recruiting, because the fact is that we are still engaging a
very small percentage of our overall population of eligible age
groups in service in the military, and I hope that you'll feel
encouraged to come back and ask for a supplemental
appropriation to make that possible if it's necessary, because
it seems to me that there's nothing more important to the Army
and to the safety and success of those in it now that would
give you the adequate personnel that you need to carry out the
missions the country is giving you.
Mr. Geren. Thank you. I just note very quickly, as part of
this effort to grow the force, we're also looking at the blue
to green program, recruiting officers from other Services,
particularly the Air Force; also looking at opportunities to
bring soldiers from the Reserve component onto Active-Duty. We
have only an informal survey, but there are many who are
interested in doing that.
The initial enlistee, the first termers, is a part of that
initiative. But we also have to fill out the Army, shape the
Army. So we are looking at other ways to bring in experienced
soldiers that can fill the other grades.
Senator Lieberman. Good. My time is winding up, but I want
to make one final point and if you have a quick response. I was
struck when I was in Iraq the last time, which was about 2
weeks ago, about how many of our personnel in uniform are doing
non-military work. I don't mean just logistics. I don't mean
that at all. I mean nation-building. It is in one sense quite
impressive and I wish every American could see what the U.S.
Army and others are doing to rebuild the government, the health
care system, the education system, and to secure the
neighborhoods.
But some of that in the best of all worlds should, frankly,
be done by people from other departments of our Government. I
just wonder whether it's time, notwithstanding the excellence
with which the Army particularly is doing this, to see if you
can't get a little more help, as Ambassador Ryan Crocker seemed
to be appealing for more help from the State Department in the
letter to Secretary Rice that we read about this morning.
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir, that would certainly be valuable.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I thank you for your outstanding service to
our country, for your presentation this morning, and I
certainly look forward to supporting your nomination.
A number of senior officers estimates that the Army's long-
term budget outlook for about the next 10 years is about $200
billion below what will be needed to fully fund the expanded
Army, reset the force, and field the Future Combat System. In
your professional opinion, are anticipated funding levels both
over and beyond the Future Years Defense Plan adequate to
accomplish these goals?
Mr. Geren. Senator, in last year's budget--and I was Under
Secretary at the time; Secretary Francis Harvey was Secretary
of the Army and we had General Peter Schoomaker as Chief of
Staff--we worked with the Secretary of Defense and with the
Office of Management and Budget and were able to raise some
issues with them and secured additional funding over the next
5-years program.
Dr. Gates has come to Chief Casey and me and asked us to
present to him a plan to deal with readiness issues and we are
in the process of doing that. We have a good working
relationship with the Secretary and he's working with us to
address long-term needs. I can't tell you where we will end up
at the end of that process. But he shares our concern, your
concern, this committee's concern, about readiness issues of
the Army and he's working with us to try to identify ways to
meet those needs.
Thank you for that question. I appreciate it.
Senator Dole. What do you believe is the single most
important responsibility of the Secretary of the Army?
Mr. Geren. The statutory responsibility, the Secretary of
the Army is the senior official in the Army in fulfilling our
statutory obligation to organize, train, man, and equip our
Army. It's hard to say what the most important role is. By
statute, the job of the Secretary is to present the policies,
the requirements of the Army, to the Secretary of Defense, to
the executive branch, and to develop the budget and advocate
for the budget to Congress, to the Secretary, and to the
executive branch.
But as I think about my short time in the job as Acting
Secretary of the Army, I think I have to put at the top of the
list being an advocate for the soldiers and their families,
being an advocate for the soldiers, and making sure that their
voice is heard. The Secretary is in a unique position to act on
those needs and it's critical that the Secretary takes that
responsibility seriously. It doesn't show up, I guess, in the
statute, but I would put it at the top of the list as well.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
If you believe that the Army is not being funded adequately
now or in the future, will you tell this committee in plain
terms what you believe and will you spell out for us the
practical implications of the underfunding?
Mr. Geren. Yes, Senator. I support the President's budget,
but I'm going to work with the Secretary of Defense. The
Secretary of Defense has shown us an open door to work with on
the funding issues. I have every confidence that we, working
with the Secretary of Defense, are going to be able to meet the
funding needs of the Army.
Senator Dole. Do you believe that the time has come that we
should begin a discussion in this country of the need to fund
our regular military budget at no less than 4 percent of gross
domestic product? Is it time to begin that discussion?
Mr. Geren. I don't know that I could speak to that. At the
present time, as far as a share of our gross national product,
the share going into our military is by historical standards
low. But the perspective I bring on the budget is looking at it
from the Army's needs and then going forward from there, rather
than looking at the resources of the country and attaching a
percentage. But certainly the percentage that's devoted to
national security at the present time is low by historical
standards.
Senator Dole. Let me follow up on an earlier question. What
do you believe should be done to substantially improve inter-
agency cooperation?
Mr. Geren. I don't know that I have a good answer right now
for that. Dr. Gates has been very effective in working with the
other departments of Government and I see progress on many
fronts as a result of that. As far as the Army and the
leadership of the Army, most of our work with the other
agencies flows through Dr. Gates. Now, there is an area where
we are working very effectively, I believe, with another
Government agency and that's the VA when it comes to wounded
warriors and this disability system. We have a task force that
has all the Service Secretaries on it, chaired by Secretary
England and the Deputy for VA. I see a great constructive
working relationship there developing and I believe it'll work
hand in glove with the legislation that you have recently
passed helping wounded warriors.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Dole.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Aloha, Mr. Geren.
Mr. Geren. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Akaka. I'm so happy to be here with you this
morning as you're the nominee for Secretary of the Army, and we
have had a good prior chance to speak about other things. I
would just like to start out by saying that I'm grateful to you
and your family for your years of dedicated service to our
country and for continuing to serve our country in these
challenging times.
To give your family a chance to stretch, I would like to
introduce your family who's present here and welcome them as
well: your wife Becky that's here seated in the front seat.
Becky, welcome, and three lovely daughters: Tracy, Annie, and
Mary. We welcome you here to this hearing for your dad.
Mr. Geren. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Akaka. If confirmed, you will have some extremely
difficult challenges facing you as Secretary of the Army. With
your background, though, I believe you are well-qualified to
handle these challenges and to continue to lead the Army's
modernization so that it will be ready to face any of the
Nation's security challenges in the 21st century. I want to
wish you well in doing that.
Mr. Geren. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, the Army Times last week
reported on the massive backlog of mail delivery at Walter
Reed. According to the article, the backlog was the fault of a
contract employee who held onto the mail for individuals that
he was unable to find. Have you verified that this problem is
unique to Walter Reed and is not occurring at other medical
centers?
Mr. Geren. Sir, I can't tell you that it's unique to Walter
Reed. When I learned about it last week, I called General Eric
Schoomaker and said, we have to fix this right now, and asked
him and asked General Pollock to assess the mail system at
every one of our major medical centers around the country, and
we're doing that right now.
It's absolutely unacceptable. We had over 4,500 pieces of
undelivered mail. In my opening remarks I talked about how it
makes you proud to see how soldiers respond when they learn
that somebody has let down another soldier. When General
Schoomaker and General Michael Tucker, his deputy commanding
general, were alerted to this problem, they immediately
assigned 30 personnel, jumped right in the middle of those
4,500 pieces of mail, and by midnight that night got those
letters in the mail back to soldiers. That's the kind of
leadership that we have at Walter Reed now and I'm very proud
to see it, and that kind of responsiveness of soldiers taking
care of soldiers.
But I can't tell you that we don't have that problem
elsewhere, and we are looking across the system to make sure
that we do not. As you well know, there are few things more
important than mail. I've been told if you get the food right,
you get the mail right, you're a long way to getting your job
done. We are working to get the mail right, sir.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary, before your time, in 2004 the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that the
Secretary of Defense develop and implement an action plan based
on lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom to resolve
issues with mail delivery at that time to the troops in Iraq
and Afghanistan. DOD in its formal review of this report
concurred with GAO's recommendations and was at that time
taking steps to implement them.
Do you know if this has been done? If so, have any surveys
of the troops been conducted to see if their satisfaction with
the mail service has improved?
Mr. Geren. Sir, I don't know. I'm not familiar with that
GAO report, but I'll follow up on it and I'll get back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Army accepted both GAO recommendations on improving mail
delivery in theater. The first recommendation was to improve the
quality of transit time data for postal operations by implementing a
system that will accurately track, calculate, and report postal transit
times. The Army initiated the use of U.S. Postal Service's ``Product
Tracking System'' and now tracks mail delivery to troop level for any
barcoded mail, such as Express, Insured, Certified, Registered, and
Delivery Confirmation. The Military Postal Service Agency contracted
with the Army Information Systems Engineering Command to complete the
DOD Information Assurance Certification Accreditation Process (DIACAP)
for Automated Military Postal System and the barcode scanners. DIACAP
will satisfy the requirements for the Federal Information Security
Management Act and accreditation for all Services. The current
estimated completion date for DIACAP is September 2007.
The second GAO recommendation was to determine what longstanding
postal issues need to be resolved, and develop a specific course of
action and timetable for their resolution. This includes: strengthening
the joint postal planning function and specifying a body to ensure the
implementation of postal operations in theater; deploying properly
trained and equipped postal troops into theater prior to the mail
build-up; and dedicating adequate postal facilities, heavy equipment,
and transportation assets for postal operations.
In October 2003, the Joint Service Postal Conference produced a
Joint Services After Action Report (AAR) that was developed from the
input of all the Services. The AAR also includes recommendations from
postal experts that were in attendance at the Conference. The Defense
Business Board recommended using contractors and government civilians
to perform postal functions and on January 23, 2007, DOD Contracting
Policy signed a memorandum, subject: Personnel Authorized to Fill/
Perform MPS Positions/Functions which provides guidance on contracting
postal positions/functions. Postal units are trained and certified by
the U.S. Forces Command Army Postal Program Manager and the Adjutant
General's School before being deployed. Additionally, facilities and
equipment have been identified and dedicated to the postal mission.

Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Yesterday the Washington Post reported that there continues
to be problems at Walter Reed. The main thrust of the article
is that at Walter Reed care for soldiers struggling with war's
mental trauma is undermined by, one, doctor shortages; and two,
unfocused treatment methods. Secretary Geren, since you are
currently the Acting Secretary, can you tell us if you were
already aware of the problems described in the article and, if
so, what has been done about that? If you were not previously
aware of the problems, can you tell us why we are finding out
about the problems at Walter Reed through the Washington Post?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. From the time I became Acting
Secretary and began working in the health area, I became very
much aware of the challenges in the mental health area. The
mental health professionals, it's a part of our medical team
that we send in disproportionate numbers into theater, to
Afghanistan, Iraq, and into Kuwait. We have stressed the
workforce of the medical professionals in the mental health
area that was already short and we've stressed it more with
deployments.
The TRICARE system that supports our soldiers and families
in many installations around the country also does not have an
adequate supply of mental health professionals. General
Pollock, the Acting Surgeon General, has brought the concerns
about that to my attention and we've been working on them over
the last few months. Last week we announced the hiring of 200
new mental health professionals, to commence immediately.
They're going into the workforce right now. Walter Reed is in
the market trying to hire other mental health professionals.
That began even before this 200, so that would be in addition
to that.
But we do have a shortage in that area. The workforce is
stretched. They do extraordinary work. They do an outstanding
job. But they need greater resources, both for the families and
the soldiers.
The PTSD issue, which was talked about a good bit in that
article, is one that I'm very well aware of. General Pollock
has developed a train-teach program for PTSD as a force
multiplier. It's not only a problem that our mental health
professionals can help us address, but every soldier in the
Army we are going to teach how to spot the symptoms of PTSD so
that we can engage early. Early engagement with somebody that's
suffering the emotional challenges of PTSD improves their
recovery dramatically.
We're also looking at ways to work force multipliers in
other areas, use our mental health professionals to train other
people in the Army, train suicide prevention techniques to
other soldiers. We are going to work and continue to work to
expand our resources in the mental health area, but it's a
tough area to fill. The private marketplace is also short of
mental health professionals, particularly in rural areas, and
many of our bases and installations are in rural areas or in
areas surrounded by smaller cities. Where you may have a large
number of mental health professionals in a major metropolitan
area, in other cities, in small cities, you don't. So it is a
challenge. We're working it hard.
Senator Akaka. One of the parts of yesterday's Washington
Post articles on Walter Reed that alarmed me and I'm sure many
others was that the patient, Private First Class Joshua
Calloway, was still not tested for TBI 7 months after arriving
in Walter Reed, despite showing potential symptoms. In
addition, one would have thought that he would have been tested
upon arrival or shortly thereafter since he survived several
bomb blasts while deployed in Iraq.
According to the article, Mr. Secretary, there are 43 times
as many troops with psychological injuries from this war as
from physical injuries. Why then are we still failing to test
soldiers for TBI, if you know that answer?
Mr. Geren. We are expanding our testing for TBI. We have
seen some of the hospitals in the system, particularly Madigan
Army Medical Center, that have developed some good protocols.
The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Richard Cody, and
I have worked together over the last several months. He
developed a medical action plan and we sent tiger teams out to
every major medical installation, tried to learn what best
practices were, and we're working to move those best practices
across the system.
In the area of PTSD and TBI, we are applying more
resources. We are applying both financial and personnel
resources in that area. We continue to do better, and our
mental health professionals are dedicated to that task, and I
can assure you, Senator, that it's going to receive the highest
attention of your Army leadership and we work it every day.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responsiveness, Mr.
Secretary. I want to wish you well and I want you to know that
you do have my support.
Mr. Geren. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your willingness to continue
to serve. Mr. Chairman, I have known Secretary Geren since the
first day I arrived in the U.S. House of Representatives in
1995 and we served on the House Armed Services Committee
together for the remaining 4 years that Pete was in the House.
During that time, I had the opportunity to work with him on any
number of issues in a very bipartisan way.
I have never known anyone who has had more commitment and a
higher interest in the men and women in our military. He has
made sure that their quality of life and their ability to serve
were looked after. He's one of those individuals who is
certainly unique because of his high degree of honor and his
high degree of integrity. He's exactly the type of individual
that we need in leadership positions at the Pentagon in this
very critical time in our history.
Pete, I thank you for your willingness to continue to
serve, as well as to Becky and the girls. It's a family
commitment to public service. Pete, you have certainly
exhibited everything that's good about public service in all of
your years, and for that we thank you.
Mr. Geren. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that very much.
Senator Chambliss. I just have one comment. In our visit
the other day in my office, I mentioned to you about the
experience I shared recently with spouses of deployed
individuals down at Fort Stewart. I was very pleased to hear
you talk about your commitment to the families of these
individuals and recognize that there are some 700,000 young
people who are children of members of the Army. In these
difficult times and when it is such a family commitment to
service, I'm pleased to hear you say you're going to put a lot
of emphasis on making sure that quality of life gets better for
these folks.
We shared with you the letter I mentioned to you about some
specific issues that these ladies shared with me. I would just
simply ask you to take a look at that at your earliest
convenience and see how we can respond to them to make sure
that life is better for these brave men and women who are
serving us overseas right now, particularly in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Mr. Geren. I certainly will.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you again for your service and I
look forward to supporting you both here as well as on the
floor as we proceed with this appointment.
Mr. Geren. Thank you very much.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Geren, I wish you well. You actually bring to
mind one of my mentors when I first came into the Pentagon, an
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Jack Marsh, who was a former
Democratic Congressman serving in a Republican administration
and did a tremendous job for our country and for the people of
the Army, and certainly helped me when I was Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to really get my arms
around Army force structure issues and those sorts of things.
Again, I wish you well. I have three questions for you. The
first is a procedural matter, but I hope you will agree that
timely responses to questions from people appearing before this
committee are an essential function of what we do up here. I
would have two comments about that.
First, I gave a specific list of questions to Assistant
Secretary Claude Bolton in April that are not that difficult to
answer and we've not heard from him, and I hope you can tweak
the system a little bit because they're important to us in
terms of evaluating what's going on in Iraq.
Mr. Geren. I was made aware of that yesterday and followed
up on that last night and received an e-mail late last night, a
commitment that they are working on it and going to move out as
quickly as possible.
Senator Webb. When I had the privilege of serving as a
marine on then-Secretary Warner's staff, we had a 48-hour
turnaround on anything that hit our desk, and the
computerization wasn't anywhere near where it is today. But we
rarely missed our 48-hour turnarounds. I think it would improve
relations if those sorts of responses could come from DOD.
Mr. Geren. I appreciate that and I commit that we'll do our
best to respond quickly. If circumstances prevent our
responding quickly for whatever reason, we owe you an
explanation. We must stay in touch with you and provide you the
information as quickly as we can.
Senator Webb. Second, I watched your full testimony from my
office before I came over here. I appreciate very much where
your motivations are, and I've heard you say again how
important it is for you to be, in your words, an advocate for
the soldiers and their families. As you may know, I am deeply
troubled by the 15-month deployment requirements that have been
put on the Army, even separate from the less than one-to-one
ratio with the 12-month dwell time back here.
In fact, I was at a party about 10 days ago when my son got
back from Iraq. A long-time family friend, a woman who served
in Vietnam, her husband served in Vietnam, her son is a young
Army officer--and by the way, she supports your President, she
voted for your President--she came up to me and she said: ``You
have to try to help; you have to put some sense into these
people; these 15-month deployments are going to wreck the
Army.''
I'm just wondering, who was talking for the wellbeing and
the health of the soldiers when this requirement was put down?
I personally cannot see any element of a strategy of a
commitment that's been going on for more than 4 years that can
justify doing this to the soldiers and the Army and the
families back here.
You made a comment, and I think you're right on. I grew up
in the military. My dad was deployed at one time for 3 years
intermittently. I've been deployed. My son's been deployed and
extended. When you talk about burning out an Army by burning
out a soldier and by burning out the family, when you look at a
lot of the difficulties that we're seeing with these people
coming back, it seems to me that somebody needs to be a voice
in terms of dwell time and the length of these deployments.
Mr. Geren. Let me speak to that. Senator, I have to tell
you that when we were forced to face the decision of how we
were going to meet the demand from the combatant commanders and
we considered the two options that were in front of us, one was
to continue as we were going and make decisions on extensions
on an ad hoc basis, and we found ourselves making them over and
over on an ad hoc basis--in fact, we had a couple of instances
where we had brigades, already had some of the folks back home
when we decided to extend.
Considering where we stand right now, in order to meet the
demand from the combatant commander, extensions were
inevitable, and we had to choose between having these ad hoc
extensions and treating every unit differently with no
predictability, no commitment on what the dwell time would be,
or as the best in my opinion of the two bad choices, coming up
with a 15-month extension with a commitment on 12 months.
Now, we hope to work ourselves out of that. But considering
where we found ourselves when that decision was made, I felt it
was the best of the two very tough choices to make. Our goal is
to get back to one-to-one, in fact to get better than one-to-
one. Our model makes it considerably better. But that was the
decision that I believe was the right one.
I appreciate the burden that it puts on soldiers and their
families. We were asking a lot before. With this we're asking
more. But when I consider the two options that were in front of
us, I felt it was the better of the two.
Senator Webb. I would submit that somebody needs to go in
to the big boss and close the door and talk about what this is
doing to the United States military. By the way, there is
precedent for Congress to step in on these sorts of issues, the
precedent being the other end of deployments during Korea, when
troops were being sent over before they were fully trained and
Congress stepped in and said: You're not sending anybody over
until they have been in the military for 120 days.
Somewhere along the lines here, I believe we need to get a
strategy that takes into account the troops that are available
or we're going to really see some problems, and perhaps the
indicators that we've been seeing from these West Point classes
may be the canary in the coal mine.
The third question goes to force structure. I'm a real
believer in the innovation that has taken place in the Army and
I would commend the leadership of the Army for that. I strongly
support the modernization programs, as you know when you came
to see me on that. But having done a lot of work on Army force
structure, here's a question that I would have just for my own
reference.
It seems to me that the Army moving into its brigade system
still has its general officer assignments based on a divisional
system. Am I understanding that correctly?
Mr. Geren. I don't know the answer to that. I'd have to
check.
Senator Webb. That came up when I was meeting with General
Cody. I'm just curious as to--and this could be provided for
the record--as someone who spent a good bit of time trying to
sort these things out, how many general officers--may I ask
this question for the record so we can understand: How many
general officers at what rank were in the United States Army in
1968, when there were 18\2/3\ divisions and about 1.6 million
people on Active-Duty? How many general officers were in the
Army in 1986, when there were 761,000 on Active-Duty and 18
divisions? How many general officers are in the United States
Army today? I would like to see that relatively soon, if I may.
Mr. Geren. I'll get back with you before the sun sets today
on that one.
[The information referred to follows:]

The following information was provided to your office on June 19,
2007.
General officers under the modular design continue to be assigned
at the division level. When the Army went to the modular force, it
converted brigades to brigade combat teams (BCTs) and the appropriate
rank for the commander is colonel. However, a BCT is a more complex
organization than a brigade; therefore, each BCT was given another
colonel to serve as the deputy commander. This did not have a
significant impact on the Active component, but the National Guard has
been transitioning from brigadier general level brigade commanders to
colonel level BCT commanders. The division is still a necessary level
of command, flexible to serve as a Joint Task Force, commanded by a
two-star general, with one or two assistant division commanders.
The table below provides the Active component numbers for general
officers.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grade/Year 1968 1986 2007
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GA.............................................................. 2 0 0
GEN............................................................. 17 11 10
LTG............................................................. 45 47 45
MG.............................................................. 200 148 98
BG.............................................................. 257 206 154
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Senator Webb. Thank you very much and good luck in your new
assignment.
Mr. Geren. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, welcome and thank you for your willingness
to serve at this important time in our Nation's history.
Today in the Orlando Sentinel it was reported a story which
essentially focused on the concern in Florida that in the event
of a serious hurricane hitting our coast this year that the
National Guard might not be prepared to respond to such an
event. The story did say that in fact there was equipment that
was at 63 percent of authorized levels in helicopters and I
believe it was 62 or 63 percent both for Humvees as well as for
helicopters.
General Douglas Burnett, who I believe is a terrific leader
for our Guard and does a great job, was professing his
confidence that they could in fact respond, as they have so
ably in the past, we hope it would be averted, but if such an
event should occur, I just want to know your take on this. I
wanted to understand what you felt was the current state of
readiness for the Florida National Guard specifically and the
Guard in general in terms of equipment.
Mr. Geren. Let me talk about the equipping plans for the
Army to begin with and then talk about the hurricane
preparedness. We have in our budget from 2005 to 2013 a really
unprecedented level of investment in the Guard. We're starting
from years of, to use General Schoomaker's term, holes in the
yard. We made the Guard and Reserve 55 percent of our military
back in the 1990s and we did not equip it properly. Our budget
will put nearly $40 billion from 2005 to 2013 in the Guard and
help meet many of those shortfalls. Over the next 18 months,
$10 billion worth of equipment will go to the Guard, with a
heavy emphasis on trucks, helicopters, and light aircraft. So
many of the shortfalls that have been noted in much of the
discussion of the Guard lately will be met over the next 18
months.
But we recognize there's more to do in the near-term to
meet these hurricane needs. Our Active-Duty Army worked with
The Adjutants General (TAGs) of all the States--and your State
has great leaders on this--to build compacts to make sure that
any equipment shortfalls that are identified that would relate
to the hurricane season and hurricane preparedness are met.
Last hurricane season the consortium of all the TAGs--and they
use the term--this is an odd one, but--horizontal and vertical
States, the Gulf Coast States and the East Coast States--that
consortium of States, including Guam, the Virgin Islands, and
Puerto Rico, came up with 11,000 pieces of equipment that they
were short, and the Army provided those 11,000 pieces of
equipment.
This year, because of the improvements in the readiness and
the Guard equipping, I presented the same question to them and
the number was 2,500 pieces of equipment. We are almost, at
least for the continental United States, at 100 percent of
filling that 2,500. We are a little short in a couple of the
island territories.
General Cody, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, looks at
that issue regularly. He has conference calls with the TAGs and
asks them, do you have what you need, is there equipment that
we can provide you? That 2,500-2,700 pieces of equipment was
the demand that we got from the States and we have stepped up
to fill it.
That as well as the partnerships between the States, so you
have regional compacts so the different States can partner in
the event one experiences a major crisis. So in the short-term
that's how we are working with the States to meet their needs.
But in the long-term, we're making an investment in the Reserve
component equipment and we'll continue to do that.
Senator Martinez. You feel comfortable and confident that
the Florida National Guard is capable and able to respond to a
natural disaster in Florida with the component of the compact
and assistance that may come to be brought to bear?
Mr. Geren. They've certainly been able to respond in the
past and done an extraordinary job, even in the year, as you
know better than I, when you had four hurricanes come up the
peninsula.
Senator Martinez. General Burnett is very comfortable and
confident that they can respond. I just wanted to hear your
perspective on it, in addition to the long-term plan for
equipment and meeting those equipment needs.
Mr. Geren. I'm confident that we have met the needs as
identified to us by the TAGs, and they have done a great job of
preparing an action plan and were very specific in the kinds of
equipment that they needed and we've gotten that equipment to
them. I think we're about 89-90 percent overall, close to 100
percent when you look at the continental United States. The
average is down a little bit when you consider the islands and
Hawaii, but we are working to deliver that right now. The
equipment is on its way.
Senator Martinez. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I've had the privilege of serving with Secretary Geren in
the House of Representatives and I can personally attest to his
competence, his integrity, and his decency. Mr. Secretary, I
think you're going to be a superb Secretary of the Army and I
certainly support you.
Let me focus on some issues, but first let me associate
myself with Senator Webb's comments with respect to the 15-
month tours of duty. These are magnificent young men and women
that are doing the job of soldiering in the United States Army,
but they can only take so much. I think there's a serious,
serious danger here going forward indefinitely that those types
of tours and the effects will accumulate. We're seeing some of
the events you've already pointed out very candidly--suicide
rates, marital discord. That's probably the bow wave of
something worse coming behind if we can't change the policy.
But I'll stop there and ask a specific question. Stop-loss.
Do you anticipate that the stop-loss policy will remain in
effect for the foreseeable future? I understand about 5,500
soldiers were denied their voluntary request to leave the
Service this year, 6,200 this year and 5,500 next year. Is that
about right?
Mr. Geren. Right now we have about 8,000 that are under
stop-loss. Last year it was about 11,000. We anticipate by the
end of the year it will be around 5,500-6,000. We look at the
stop-loss as a necessary process right now to meet our
deployment schedules. Secretary Gates thinks, and I agree with
him, stop-loss is something that we need to work our way out
of. I have tasked the Army to come up with a plan to work us
out of stop-loss, to come up with alternatives, to come up with
incentives. I have met with the Army staff multiple times over
the 4 months that I've been in this job as Acting Secretary on
that issue and continue to work with him. We have to look at
creative ways to avoid using stop-loss as much as we have.
I'd like to tell you that we would be able to have a plan
that we would do away with it entirely in the next year or so.
I don't think we'll get there. But we need to be on a steady
decline in the use of stop-loss. We need to come up with
alternatives and we're working to do that.
Senator Reed. To what extent does the stop-loss skew your
retention statistics? Are they totally separate?
Mr. Geren. We look at it as separate. When we give you end
strength numbers, it includes the stop-loss number, but it's
not part of our grow the force strategy. It's not part of our
calculation for growing the force. We use it to maintain unit
cohesiveness in advance of deployment primarily and make sure
that we have the skill levels and we have the unit cohesion
necessary.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, when you're talking about 102
percent retention rate, does that include those people who are
staying because they can't leave?
Mr. Geren. I don't believe so, but let me get back with you
for the record on that. I don't think that we include it, but I
am not certain. Let me be certain and get back with you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Army retention rates are determined by the number of soldiers who
reenlisted divided against the available population in a given fiscal
year. Soldiers retained in the Army under the provisions of stop-loss
are a part of the available population as long as their adjusted
expiration term of service date is in the fiscal year in question.

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
In terms of junior officer retention, which is a critical
point, but also probably more critical to the success of any
small unit is the NCOs. The retention rate at E-5 and E-6 and
in particular military occupational specialties (MOSs), combat
MOSs, are they holding up?
Mr. Geren. Let me get back with you for the record on that.
They're holding up well, but that's also an area in our new
force structure that creates a much greater demand for those
grades and it's an area where we do have a shortage long-term.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Army's retention rates for sergeant and staff sergeant in
combat and combat support military occupational specialties, which are
high-density specialties in brigade combat teams, are reflected in the
below chart.

Senator Reed. As you check, Mr. Secretary, one of my
concerns is that there are military occupation specialties
which are less stressful in some cases than being an infantry
squad leader or an armored platoon leader, cavalry squad
leader, et cetera. I think you have to drill down to the
specifics of those individual young men and women who are going
out into leadership roles into our forward units and let us
know how that's holding up.
Mr. Geren. Right, I certainly will.
Senator Reed. One of the issues I think that's been
unintentionally prompted by the surge is I am told that the
requirements for reset have had to be deferred, the funding
just simply to get equipment into the theater for these
additional forces. Is that true? Has the reset money been
diverted into the surge?
Mr. Geren. No, it has not. We've applied about 80 percent
of the $17 billion that you have provided us. That will provide
the equipment sets for reset for 24 brigade combat teams. We
are working all the depots, except there's only one depot
that's not operating at the maximum capacity necessary, in
order to process that equipment through the depots.
Because of the surge, some of that equipment is staying in
theater longer and will be coming home next year, and it will
put more demand on the depots than we currently have right now.
It will exceed the demand. Because it is staying in theater
longer, we have less to reset in the depots than we would have
otherwise.
Senator Reed. Can you give me an idea of the ongoing tempo
for reset funding going forward? As you indicated, we applied
about $17 billion this year. How long and how much will we have
to spend to reset the force?
Mr. Geren. I need to get back with you on our estimates. We
have it in our planning documents, but I need to get back with
those specific numbers.
[The information referred to follows:]

Reset funding is not programmed across the Future Years Defense
Plan but is based upon equipment that was actually destroyed, damaged,
stressed, or worn out during operations and requested as part of the
global war on terrorism appropriations. At pre-surge levels our
estimated overall future reset requirements were $13-$14 billion a year
(plus 2 to 3 years each year beyond the cessation of the current
conflict). The increasing requirements for Army units in Iraq and
Afghanistan will increase reset requirements, which we currently
estimate to be an additional $2.5 billion to $3.5 billion a year.

Senator Reed. There has been some concern about obviously
the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which is the
greatest casualty-producer in Iraq particularly and to some
degree occurring in Afghanistan. There's been a commitment to
the MRAP vehicle. That's something that I presume you fully
support?
Mr. Geren. I strongly support it, yes, I do.
Senator Reed. In terms of the Army after Iraq, I don't
think we can be too presumptuous, but certainly we have to
think that vehicle would not be particularly useful for
operations beyond Iraq, or would it?
Mr. Geren. I believe that it would be. I think any conflict
we find ourselves in going forward, the success that this
insurgency has had using IEDs as a weapon against the United
States, I would think any enemy contemplating a conflict with
the United States would consider that as a weapon to use
against us. So I would think it would.
Just real quickly on the MRAP, the vehicle that we've
chosen as our top priority for the Army has the capacity to add
additional armor. We are working on a FRAG Kit 6 that would
help counter the threat of the explosively formed penetrators
and we're looking at MRAP candidates that have enough
additional capacity on the system to be able to hang that armor
and be able to support it. But I think that we have to look at
them as a vehicle that will be part of the Army going forward.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, again it's been a privilege to
work with you and I look forward to working with you in your
new capacity.
Mr. Geren. Thank you very much, Senator. I appreciate it
very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your service. I remember
first meeting you out in Broken Bow, Nebraska, where you
brought a congressional team out to whip the Nebraska team on
the one-box pheasant hunt. You've been shooting straight ever
since.
Mr. Geren. Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate your concern about the use
of the stop-loss program because I too think that, while it's a
legal way of returning soldiers, it's unpopular and over time
and other multiple deployments, lengthy deployments,
extensions, will erode support for the military internally from
where it's most important, for a number of the individuals in
the NCO ranks, as well as it will cause others not to accept
commissions and will cause us ultimately problems that will beg
us to solve.
What I'd like to do is ask you about holding contractors on
the battlefield accountable. In responding to the committee's
advance policy question on control and accountability of
contractor personnel for their actions on the battlefield, you
mentioned the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)
and the requirement for contractors to comply with the terms
and conditions of their contracts. But you do not mention the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). A provision in the
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007 amended the UCMJ to clarify that it applied to persons
serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field at a
time of declared war or contingency operation. This would of
course include many, if not most, contractors on the
battlefield.
Do you believe that contractors on the battlefield should
be subject to the UCMJ?
Mr. Geren. Just real quickly, Senator, I'd like to speak on
the stop-loss point. I agree with you it's something we need to
work our way out of. At the present time, the Army does not
have a good plan out of that and we are continuing to work it.
As far as holding contractors accountable on the
battlefield, we have approximately 128,000 people working in
contract capacity in Iraq today. I have just lately started to
examine the issue of the contracting and the issue of whether
or not we can hold contractors--in many cases they're third
party nationals. Out of that 128,000, only about 30,000 are
American citizens. Of the rest, many of them are Iraqis. Many
others are third party nationals.
The lawyers have briefed me that with a full reading of the
MEJA that we would be able to bring almost everybody that works
for a contractor to justice under that act. They raise
questions about the challenges of using the UCMJ as an
alternative, and I'm not far along in my understanding of their
concerns there. I know we all share a commitment for
accountability for those contractors.
The number of contractors, the role that contractors play
now in support of our military, raises many questions that
we're having to work through, and that accountability issue is
one of them. So I really am not prepared to speak to the UCMJ
application at this point, but I'm working on that issue and
I'd like to provide you an answer for the record if I could.
Senator Ben Nelson. If you would, because I think this
question is an important one, particularly as you go back and
look at Abu Ghraib. There were questions asked whether the
contractors there were going to be held responsible. You get
into all sorts of very difficult issues. But I think that the
2007 act was designed to solve the question of whether or not
they could be held accountable. Now, if there are legal
questions as to why they can't be, obviously we'd be very
interested to see what those arguments are.
But I think the goal was clear and that was to hold them
accountable so that we don't go through the issue of people who
are side by side that are not held accountable under the
typical UCMJ.
Mr. Geren. I certainly share your commitment to holding
them accountable and making them responsible. In the work that
I've done with the lawyers to try to understand the issue, they
talk about the fabric of the legal systems that overlap and
address issues of contractor accountability, some depending
upon whether it was an American citizen or a foreign national.
You have the Iraqi criminal justice system. Obviously you have
the MEJA, our Justice Department, and then this new tool of the
UCMJ. So I need to get back with you as I understand it better.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Joint Service Committee (JSC) on Military Justice was
established by the Department of Defense (DOD) to assist the President
of the United States in fulfilling his responsibility to prescribe
rules and regulations applicable to trials by court-martial and to
facilitate the DOD's annual review of the Manual for Courts-Martial
(MCM), as required by Executive Order 12473. The JSC comprises senior
uniformed lawyers from each of the military departments and the Coast
Guard, together with advisory members from the Office of the General
Counsel, DOD; the Office of the Legal Counsel to the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff; and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
Among its other functions, the JSC proposes modifications to the MCM to
reflect changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
The JSC has worked to craft policy and procedures to implement the
recent amendment to title 10 U.S.C. 802a, which took effect on the date
of enactment and extends UCMJ jurisdiction over persons serving with or
accompanying an armed force in the field ``in time of declared war or a
contingency operation.'' In this regard, the JSC has examined several
key policy issues, to include potential limits on the worldwide
application of this expanded jurisdiction; the appropriate level at
which the court-martial of a person ``serving with or accompanying an
armed force'' may be convened; and the proper procedures to resolve
issues of concurrent jurisdiction in the Federal civilian and military
courts, which issues may be generated by some overlap between MEJA and
title 10 U.S.C. 802a. The JSC provided its recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense through the General Counsel of DOD and the
recommendations are pending final staffing within DOD.

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
As a former governor, I am a big supporter of our National
Guard Forces. We've used them in Nebraska in the past when I
was Governor and I think they've been used on other occasions
since I've left. But the goal was to in every case have
sufficient members of the Guard left on duty or available for
duty in emergencies in the States. Until we get that shortage
of equipment taken care of, there is always going to be the
question of whether or not they're going to have the right
equipment or enough of it in the case of an emergency. So I
hope that you'll make your staff aware of how important it is.
I'm sure they think about it, about how important it is to get
a reset going as quickly as we possibly can, to make certain
that the Guard is fully capable of responding to an emergency,
even in the case of mutual aid that's going from one to protect
the other, but it leaves the other unprotected.
As you know from your Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska
experience, tornado activity is common and it is not uncommon
that the storm can go through and affect several States to one
degree or another similarly and at the same time. So I hope
that you'll push staff to work as fast as possible with funding
to reset the Guard as quickly as possible.
Mr. Geren. I certainly will. Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
You made reference to 128,000 people working in contract
capacity. What percentage of those are working for contractors?
In other words, sometimes you read a statistic that we have
128,000 contractors in Iraq and that gives the impression that
we have 128,000 people that have signed contracts with us.
Mr. Geren. That's 128,000 contract employees.
Chairman Levin. How many of those would have contracts
signed with the American Government, rather than people working
for those people?
Mr. Geren. I don't know the answer to that. I'll have to
get back with you on that.
Chairman Levin. I think it would be useful.
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Quite a distinction.
Mr. Geren. Let me get back to you with certainty, but I
believe all those are working on contracts or in support of
American operations.
[The information referred to follows:]

As of April 5, 2007, Multi-National Force-Iraq census of contractor
employees reports 128,880 contractor employees operating in Iraq. These
128,880 employees (20,819-U.S. citizens, 108,061-non-U.S. citizens)
perform on 1,525 prime contracts and associated subcontracts. These
employees represent 660 different companies operating in Iraq who have
been awarded prime contracts from the Department of Defense. The
Department of the Army does not have a list of prime and
subcontractors. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has been working with U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) to identify all contractors working in Iraq
and may have that information.

Chairman Levin. They may be working on contracts, but these
can be people who are working serving food.
Mr. Geren. Many of them are. In fact, the logistics
support, housekeeping, food, laundry, that's the largest
percentage.
Chairman Levin. Those folks haven't signed contracts with
the Government. They're employed by people who have signed
contracts with the Government; is that correct?
Mr. Geren. That's right, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Can you get us the number of people who
actually have contracts with the Government, as distinguished
from people who are working for those, to give us those two
numbers?
Mr. Geren. The actual number of people who have entered
into contracts with the Government and then the number of
employees that fall under those?
Chairman Levin. Under those contractors, right.
The reference has been made here to Abu Ghraib and I'd like
to just understand what you know about the Abu Ghraib incident
from your role as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
from September 2001 to July 2005. There's a group that's a
working group that was called the Geren-Maples Working Group or
something like that. What was your role as apparently the
congressional interface on issues regarding detainee treatment
and abuse?
Mr. Geren. The working group that you've referred to was
set up I believe in May after the revelations at Abu Ghraib
came out. It started as a small, rather informal group that was
largely working to respond to queries from the Hill and provide
information to the Hill, as well as provide information to the
press.
A good bit of our early work was just working, frankly,
with your committee and providing you the documents that you
needed in order to conduct your oversight. As the months moved
on and we had more and more reports, the reports made many
recommendations on how we could do detention operations better.
Secretary Rumsfeld charged our group, our task force that I
chaired with General Michael Maples, and the task force grew.
We had a couple dozen people that worked for it in some
capacity at one time or another.
One of our primary responsibilities was taking those--I
think we ended up with 500 different recommendations on how we
could do detention operations better--and parcel them out in
the Department: Army, you do this; Joint Staff, you do this;
Navy, you do this; this is a joint effort. So that became a
very large part of our work, taking those recommendations from
all the different independent commissions and turning them into
action items.
We also came up with some ideas of our own on how the
Department could be better organized to respond to detention
operations, recognizing that going forward in counterinsurgency
warfare, detention operations would become an increasingly
important part of the work of the United States of America in
our role abroad.
For example, we recommended to the Secretary and he
accepted the recommendation to create a Deputy Secretary of
Defense for Detainee Affairs, so we could bring all the
different organizations in the Department that worked detainee
affairs up through one single person. We also worked with the
International Committee of the Red Cross to come up with a way
to better handle their reports so they could inform the people
in the field as well as inform Department leadership and inform
Congress, and we worked with your committee to come up with a
protocol in order to handle those.
So our role was to take the lessons that we learned from
the tragedy of Abu Ghraib and other incidents where we fell
down and take those into the lessons learned and help build an
organization in the Department that was better able to handle
detention operations.
Chairman Levin. The recent article in the New Yorker quotes
Major General Antonio Taguba, who was the officer who
investigated the Abu Ghraib abuses, and also is saying that he
didn't believe that Secretary Rumsfeld was truthful with
Congress when he said that nobody in the Pentagon was aware of
the nature of the photographs of abuse at Abu Ghraib until
after those pictures were made public.
Then the article goes on to quote e-mails that were sent to
senior Pentagon leaders, including Secretary Rumsfeld's
military adviser, General Bantz Craddock, as early as January
2004, and those e-mails describe the abuses which were depicted
in the photographs in a very vivid way, that detainees were
performing indecent acts or were forced to perform indecent
acts with each other, guards physically assaulting detainees by
beating and dragging them with choker chains. Those e-mails
again began in January 2004.
But Secretary Rumsfeld testified to this committee in May
2004 that he was not aware of the abuses. I'm wondering whether
or not, for instance, you were aware of the January 2004 e-
mails describing in graphic terms the abuse of detainees at Abu
Ghraib?
Mr. Geren. I was not. I didn't begin working on detainee
operations at all in any capacity until May. I believe the 60
Minutes segment was in late April and then I started working
again initially in support of the legislative effort to respond
to your requests. But I was not involved early on at all and,
other than the Taguba report, which I did read, I'm not aware
of the basis for General Taguba's additional accusations.
Chairman Levin. You have not talked to Craddock or Taguba
or Rumsfeld about those e-mails?
Mr. Geren. No, sir, I have not.
Chairman Levin. Were you occupying that position as a
member of the working group when Secretary Rumsfeld testified
to this committee in May 2004?
Mr. Geren. I don't believe we had our formal working group
set up at that point. I was already being asked to support
Powell Moore in the legislative effort and it evolved into the
working group. But early on it was much more informal.
Chairman Levin. ``Early on'' being May, when you started?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Or was it earlier than that?
Mr. Geren. No. It was late April when the information
became public on 60 Minutes and I worked just in a supporting
role in May. I'm not sure when we actually set up the task
force, but I was certainly in a supporting role. In fact, some
of the missteps we had in trying to get the Taguba report here
to the committee, I worked on that, and we had a lot of little
technical glitches on it. So one of my earliest recollections
was trying to get the Taguba report to your committee.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Thune.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you'd yield to me
to do two quick questions? I had intended to ask the questions
along the line about these allegations, and I have no way of
verifying the allegations of General Taguba. I went into some
detail with the nominee yesterday on this issue. I think we had
one fundamental agreement and that is that General Taguba's
report was well-respected here in Congress, I felt. Did you,
Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. I thought so.
Senator Warner. He very ably testified. You mentioned
yesterday you felt that was the attitude certainly within the
Department of the Army. Why don't you use your own words as you
described it yesterday?
Mr. Geren. I remember the Taguba report being well-received
and I don't remember any criticism at all of the Taguba report.
It was a very large report. It covered a wide range of issues.
We took the Taguba report, immediately started working to try
to address the issues that he raised in that report. I don't
remember any criticism whatsoever of either General Taguba
personally or his work product. Not to say I was in every
meeting or every conversation, but I don't remember him being
received as anything other than someone who had done an
excellent job with a very tough assignment.
Senator Warner. But in summary to the chairman's question,
you can represent to the committee in no way were you ever
consulted or made decisions with respect to his career once he
finished the work on that report and then began to proceed to
other assignments?
Mr. Geren. I was not. In fact--and I learned yesterday
after I made an inquiry about the Army's decision for General
Taguba to retire, General Cody discussed that with General
Taguba in January 2006. I joined the Army as Under Secretary in
February 2006. So the decision on his retirement was made
before I got there. It was formally approved by Secretary
Harvey in the summer of 2006, but I had no involvement.
In fact, until this latest publicity about General Taguba
came out, a couple of the articles over the last several days,
I didn't realize that General Taguba had retired.
Senator Warner. Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, I talked with
General Cody about it and drew on my own experience in the
context that the elevation of a two-star officer to a three-
star rank is statistically only about 10 or 12 percent of two-
stars reach three-star rank. I'm not here pronouncing any
judgment on General Taguba because he certainly, as I said,
performed well here before Congress. So we're not in possession
of the facts that gave rise to the Chief of Staff of the Army's
decision as implemented by General Cody--usually traditionally
the Vice Chief is the one who notifies the general officers
with respect to their selection or nonselection for advancement
in rank.
In talking with General Cody, he assured me that the Army's
about 10 or 12 percent, as was the Navy when I was Secretary of
the Navy, and that it's a very difficult call for the Chief of
Staff and the Vice Chief to make when the twos are up for
consideration for the three rank.
This article was well-written by a seasoned journalist with
considerable experience in investigative reporting. But at this
point in time is no implication from that article with respect
to this nominee and I think you've assured us of that.
My last question is that you raised the statement that I
have made that I think the greatest asset we have today is the
All-Volunteer Force, and that's spread through all of the
Services. But the Army has wisely adopted, and indeed the other
Services and the Secretaries of Defense, the total force
concept. In other words, we look upon the Army as being one. I
remember that emblem that the Army wore for many years.
Is that still the case, total force concept, and the Guard
is equally respected and treated equally with respect to the
regulars?
Mr. Geren. It is. We are committed to a total force, one
Army: Active, Guard, and Reserve.
Senator Warner. So that concept continues to this day.
Mr. Geren. Let me just mention real quickly one thing that
we've done in the health care area. As you might remember, when
we learned more about what was going on at Walter Reed in our
outpatient clinics; there we had two separate populations. We
had medical holds, which was Active-Duty; medical holdovers,
which was the Reserve component. We've done away with that now.
We have one outpatient population now and they're organized in
a brigade, and we've taken that distinction away. Just one more
step to ensure that they are treated as one.
Senator Warner. That's clear, but it had persisted out of
Walter Reed for some lengthy period of time, though, until this
most serious problem arose and came to public attention. I
commend the Army for quickly removing that distinction. That's
throughout our medical system now in the Army?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. On June 15 it went medical system-
wide.
Senator Warner. I thank the chair. I thank my colleagues.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, thank you.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you. I am always happy to yield to the
distinguished Senator from Virginia.
Mr. Secretary, I thank you for being here. I thank you for
your willingness to answer the call to public service, for your
past service to our country, and also to your family. I know we
have had this discussion in the past about the sacrifices that
not only the people who are involved in public life make, but
also the people closest to them, their families. So we
appreciate your willingness and their willingness to be here
and to be willing to step up to what is indeed a very difficult
challenge. We appreciate your service.
I understand most everything that can be said has been said
today probably, or that can be asked has been asked. So I won't
belabor the point. I was with a contingent of National Guard
members from my State of South Dakota yesterday, too, and I
understand many of those questions have been beat into the
ground already.
But I do want to ask a question about modernization, which
I suspect has been touched on as well. One of the challenges
that we're going to face is modernizing our Army to meet our
extraordinary security challenges in this century. Over the
years, the Future Combat System has faced many criticisms and
continues to do so. Since it is critical that we transform and
modernize our Army, I'd like to know how are some of the past
and possible proposed reductions in the Future Combat System--
and I understand the House has proposed making some significant
cutbacks in that program--how are those proposed reductions
driving changes to some of the program milestones?
Mr. Geren. Thank you, Senator, and I want to thank this
committee for its strong support of Future Combat System.
It takes decades for us to change the major weapons systems
in the Army. The platforms that we have today are platforms
that began in the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s--the Bradleys,
the tanks, most of the helicopter fleet. For us to modernize
and be able to bring these new systems in years from now, we
have to begin now. We have to live with the decisions we make
today long into the future.
The cuts that we have seen over the last couple years have
caused us to string out the investment in the Future Combat
System, and that does make it more expensive. The Future Combat
System not only is the modernization program for the future of
the Army; it's also a very important component of our effort to
equip our troops in the near-term as well.
The ultimate goal, though, is for the Future Combat System
to connect the soldier to the network, give that soldier
situational awareness, let him be able to track blue forces,
let him or her know where his comrades are, to use the network
in order to increase his situational awareness of the battle
space which he's operating in. It will radically transform the
ability of our soldier to perform, whether it's in urban
settings like we find ourselves today; and it will connect the
soldier in a way that will enhance his ability and it will also
reduce his vulnerabilities.
It's an important part of the future of our Army and any
time we experience cutbacks--and if we were to experience
cutbacks as proposed by the House, their $800 million cut which
takes away much of the network and the manned ground vehicles,
it would be a major setback, it would delay the program, and it
would also add significant additional costs if we had to string
it out.
The other concern, too, is you lose the technology base.
The program depends on being able to keep--it's a
technologically very challenging undertaking--the scientists,
the computer scientists, all the people that are part of that
team. When a cutback happens, it causes the team to break up
and they go on. They're the tops in their field and they have
other things they can do and other places that they go.
So it not only challenges us in our effort to keep the
program on track, it also threatens the intellectual capital
that's assembled to move the program along.
Senator Thune. I was going to ask you about the technology
spinout because I think you alluded to that, that the cuts have
to be affecting that as well. There's a recent GAO report that
said that the Future Combat System has made tangible progress
during the past year in requirements and technology; however,
concerns continue to linger because of the need to meet
demonstrated knowledge points. If confirmed, how are you going
to manage the risks and the expectations of this program and
meet the required milestones, given what we just talked about
with some of the budgetary constraints that we're facing?
Mr. Geren. The Future Combat System, and I wish we had
changed the name, frankly, because the future truly is now, not
to sound like I'm using cliches. But it's the top modernization
priority for the Department of the Army. It will remain the top
modernization priority for whomever sits in this chair for
years to come.
As Acting Secretary and, if confirmed as Secretary, and the
same for my successor, it will be a top priority. The
leadership of the Army will continue to work the program to
make sure that we stay on budget and we meet the milestones.
Key to that, though, is predictable funding. If we are not able
to rely on predictable funding, it's going to require a lot of
work-arounds; it's going to be a real challenge. But I can
assure you, whoever sits in the seat of the Secretary of the
Army is going to be working on a regular basis overseeing that
program.
Senator Thune. I thank you again for your leadership and
for your willingness to serve and look forward to your
confirmation.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
I just have an additional question or two about the article
in the New Yorker that was about the Taguba report. In the
article, General Taguba is quoted as saying the following:
``The fact is that we violated the laws of land warfare at Abu
Ghraib. We violated the tenets of the Geneva Convention. We
violated our own principles, and we violated the core of our
military values. I believe even today that those civilian and
military leaders responsible should be held accountable.''
Do you agree with that?
Mr. Geren. Sir, when we look back at what came of the
Taguba report, it resulted in multiple prosecutions, a number
of people who are serving time today. I have every belief that
the evidence that was raised in General Taguba's report was
followed where the facts led. I know in all of my work on the
detainee task force in support of every one of those
investigations and those reports our instructions were follow
the facts where they lead, leave no stone unturned, and work
with this committee and work with Congress to get to the truth.
I'm not aware of any allegations of misconduct that weren't
aggressively investigated and prosecuted. I'm not.
Chairman Levin. But in terms of his quote here, do you
believe that we violated the laws of land warfare at Abu
Ghraib? Do you believe we violated the tenets of the Geneva
Convention?
They were violated, put it that way. Do you believe that
the laws of land warfare were violated at Abu Ghraib? Do you
believe that the tenets of the Geneva Convention were violated?
Do you believe our principles were violated, that the core of
our military values were violated at Abu Ghraib? That's my
question.
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir, I do.
Chairman Levin. Do you believe that civilian and military
leaders who are responsible should be held accountable? Whether
that's happened or not isn't the question. Should they be held
accountable?
Mr. Geren. Should people responsible be held accountable?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Mr. Geren. Sir, absolutely, and I can assure you if I'm
confirmed that I'm going to insist on a high standard of
accountability.
Chairman Levin. Now, one of the things that General Taguba
is quoted as saying in this article is that he was to
investigate only the military police at Abu Ghraib and not
those above them in the chain of command. Is that your
understanding of what his instructions were?
Mr. Geren. I don't know what his charge was. I didn't get
involved in this issue at all until the Taguba report was
complete, and that was my first encounter with Taguba, was when
it was created. One thing that I felt, and I don't think it was
intentional, that ended up posing a challenge for the whole
understanding of Abu Ghraib was how we investigated different
pieces of it. We did the military police with one
investigation, we did the intelligence officers with another
investigation. Instead of having them proceed together on
parallel, you ended up having them seriatim, and that posed a
challenge for all of us in trying to understand what we needed
to do to make detention operations better, and it delayed it.
It rolled it out over months, close to a year. In fact, I think
we probably rolled into the next year with the final report.
But I'm not aware of the charge that General Ricardo
Sanchez gave to General Taguba. If I saw that instruction, I
don't remember seeing it. I'm sure it was in our library.
Chairman Levin. So that when he's quoted in this New Yorker
article as saying that he was ``legally prevented from further
investigation into higher authority,'' you're not familiar with
that charge or if that's accurate or not? Do you know if he was
prevented legally from further investigation into higher
authority?
Mr. Geren. What his instrument of investigation was, was a
15-6, and I've never seen it. It's possible that we had a copy
of his 15-6 and my guess is if we did it was in our library.
But I don't remember seeing it and I don't know what was
General Sanchez's charge. It wouldn't surprise me, though,
based on the way many of these other investigations, that he
was told: You look at the military police, because perhaps at
the beginning they thought that's what the problem was, and the
soldiers that ended up going to jail fell under that review. As
we learned from him, he started having additional
investigations added to the mix, and 12 investigations later we
finally had it covered.
Chairman Levin. So you're just not in a position to say
whether he was legally prevented from further investigation
into higher authority? You're just not familiar enough with
either the instruction to him or his guidance to know whether
that was accurate or not?
Mr. Geren. No, but I expect that he has a written charge
from General Sanchez authorizing his 15-6, and that General
Sanchez, I assume he was the approving authority for it as
well. So I'd be glad to go back and look for those documents.
I'm not aware of them, though.
Chairman Levin. Perhaps you could do that for the record,
indicate or find out, give us your assessment of that
statement. It's a quote of his in the New Yorker. Just check
out the record to the extent you can, instructions to him and
the 15-6 as to whether he was ``prevented from further
investigation into higher authority.'' Could you check that out
for the record?
Mr. Geren. What I believe I could do without actually
interviewing General Taguba would be to find the charge for his
15-6 and try to find that document and provide it to the
committee. If there were any private conversations that he had
with General Sanchez, I don't know how I would determine that.
But if this would meet your request, sir, we'll work to get the
charging document and also the approving document when General
Sanchez accepted his 15-6.
[The information referred to follows:]
Appointment of Major General Taguba as Investigating Officer in the
800th Military Police Brigade's Detention and Internment Operations
Senator Levin, I have enclosed a copy of the January 31, 2004,
Coalition Forces Land Component Command Memorandum appointing MG
Antonio Taguba as investigating officer. This packet also includes MG
Taguba's orders from U.S. CENTCOM, dated January 24, 2004, directing
him to conduct an investigation into the 800th MP Brigade's detention
and internment operations; and Lieutenant General McKiernan's approval
of the report of proceedings by the investigating officer.

Chairman Levin. That would be fine. We think we have the
document, but why don't you check out the approving document
because I'm not sure we have that one.
We end with a bang. We end with two bangs. Thank you so
much. Thank you and your family again for your service, your
family for their patience and support. Your daughters look
absolutely fascinated in each one of your answers throughout
this 3-hour hearing. We thank them for looking fascinated. Your
wife I know, as well, is very much into how well you did. We
look forward to bringing your nomination to the floor promptly
and having you confirmed.
Mr. Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Preston M. ``Pete''
Geren by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has made a profound and positive
change in the operation of the Department of Defense (DOD). While I
believe that the framework established by Goldwater-Nichols has
significantly improved interservice and joint relationships and
clarified responsibilities, the Department, working with Congress,
should continually assess the law in light of improving capabilities,
evolving threats, and changing organizational dynamics.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. This milestone legislation has served our Nation well for
more than two decades If confirmed, I would certainly work with
Congress to determine whether the act should be revised to better
address the requirements of combatant commanders and the needs and
challenges confronting the military departments in today's security
environment. I also assess whether the law might be modified to more
effectively allocate roles and responsibilities among the Joint Staff,
the combatant commanders, the military departments, and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD). One particular issue that merits review
is accountability for conduct of deployed forces.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have a varied background in public service and a wide
range of experience that is well-suited to this position. I served four
terms in the U.S. House of Representatives, representing the 12th
Congressional District of Texas, and for much of that time I was a
member of the House Armed Services Committee. In that position, I
worked directly with other Members of Congress and DOD on issues of
significant interest to the military departments and the American
people. I came to DOD in 2001, where I have held several staff and
leadership positions. Serving as Acting Secretary of the Air Force gave
me an appreciation of the challenges, capabilities, and achievements of
another department. That perspective has been very useful in
discharging my duties with the Army. As the Under Secretary and Acting
Secretary of the Army, I developed an appreciation for, and a deeper
understanding of, the unique demands and challenges facing the premier
land force on the globe. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to
continuing to serve the Army and this Nation. If confirmed, I pledge my
best effort every day to be worthy of the trust placed in me by the
President and the Senate, and to uphold the proud tradition of selfless
service that characterizes the United States Army.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Secretary of the Army?
Answer. The Secretary of the Army is the head of the Department of
the Army and is responsible for, and has authority to conduct, all
functions of the Department prescribed by law or by the President or
Secretary of Defense.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
the duties and functions of the Secretary of the Army, as set forth
respectively in section 3013 of title 10, U.S.C., or in regulations of
DOD pertaining to functions of the Secretary of the Army?
Answer. At this time I have no specific recommendations for change.
However, I intend to engage in an ongoing process of consultation with
Army leaders, others in DOD, and Congress to pursue opportunities for
improvement. I will not hesitate to recommend changes that I believe
are in the best interests of the Army.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties, if
any, do you expect that Secretary Gates will prescribe for you?
Answer. As he has done with other Service Secretaries, Secretary
Gates may prescribe additional duties that support him in carrying out
his duties and responsibilities to ensure that DOD successfully
accomplishes the many demanding and varied missions with which it has
been entrusted. At this time, I am not aware of any additional duties
Secretary Gates may be considering. However, if confirmed, I will carry
out any additional duties to the best of my ability.
Question. What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign
to the Under Secretary of the Army?
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army performs such duties and
exercises such powers as the Secretary of the Army prescribes. The
Under Secretary is the Secretary's principal civilian assistant and
advisor on issues of critical importance to the Army. If I am
confirmed, and a new Under Secretary of the Army is nominated and
confirmed, I will review the current assignment of functions,
responsibilities, and duties within the Army Secretariat and determine
the capacities in which the Under Secretary can most appropriately
support my efforts to ensure that the Department of the Army is
efficiently administered in accordance with law and the policies
promulgated by OSD.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you
would confront if confirmed as Secretary of the Army?
Answer. The Army is faced with many major challenges, including
providing proper support to soldiers and families in time of war,
enhancing readiness, providing quality housing, modernizing our Cold
War-era equipment, and meeting recruiting and retention goals just to
name a few. A major challenge will be to modernize our Army to meet the
extraordinary security challenges of the 21st century, no matter when
and from where such challenge arises. Equally important is establishing
strategic depth, the ability to respond to all challenges the Nation
faces. Additionally, the Army must transform its support infrastructure
and integrate Base Realignment and Closure decisions. Finally, our
increased operational tempo and multiple combat tours in Iraq and
Afghanistan have placed a heavy burden on soldiers and their families.
We must provide a quality of life commensurate with the quality of
their service. We must not shrink from our responsibility as a Nation
to care for those who have become ill, injured, or wounded in the
service of our Nation--and we must do better for those suffering from
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injuries
(TBI). Much has been accomplished to ensure that we meet this solemn
obligation, yet much remains to be done. We owe our wounded nothing
short of the very best medical care that our Nation can provide.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. A major part of addressing these challenges will be to work
collaboratively with members of this committee, the entire Congress,
the President, and Secretary Gates. I am committed to maintaining the
Army as the dominant land force in the world, and with your help, I am
confident of success. On many of these issues we have already made
great strides, particularly on the medical front. Where I can make
administrative decisions, I will act. If legislation is required, I
won't be shy about coming to you.
I will also join with Chief of Staff Casey in pursuing several
critical initiatives, including growing the Army and making necessary
readiness improvements; building momentum and continuity of our
modernization efforts; completing the transition of the Reserve
component to an operational force; and adapting our institutional
processes to support an expeditionary Army that is currently suffering
from the cumulative effects of 5 years at war.
Of special interest to me will be addressing the challenges facing
the very essence of the Army, the center of our formation--soldiers and
their families. The strain of multiple deployments demands that we step
up our support to families. So I will work to further develop and
implement the Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP) to provide better health
care for our soldiers and their families, and continue working to
develop better ways to deal with PTSD and TBI.

IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS

Question. Many soldiers are on their third and some their fourth
major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Recently, unit deployments
have been extended to 15 months and dwell time in some cases is less
than 12 months.
What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what do these
indicators tell you about that level of stress currently?
Answer. In this period of high operational tempo, we must closely
monitor the condition of our soldiers and their families. Army leaders,
officers, and NCOs must pay close attention to the mental and physical
condition of their soldiers and address issues as soon as they arise.
These leaders are the front line in ensuring we understand the
condition of our soldiers and respond accordingly. Other indicators lag
the awareness of those leaders. But, there are other indicators we
watch closely. The high reenlistment rates we have experienced and
continue to experience over the course of this conflict indicate that
the morale of our soldiers remains strong. Additionally, Army
discipline and misconduct rates, including desertion rates, absence
without leave, drug use, and courts-martial, have remained steady over
the last few years. However, other indicators are deeply troubling and
offer cause for concern, such as the increase in divorce and suicide
rates.
Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments
can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for
the Army?
Answer. The Army will not be able to maintain its current level of
commitments indefinitely without significant adjustments. The stress on
the force is a major concern to all leaders in the Army and we are
constantly monitoring and adjusting recruiting and retention incentives
to keep pace with operational demand and Army transformation. The Army
has taken action to mitigate these concerns by growing the size of the
force, better utilizing the Reserve component, rebalancing military to
civilian conversions, and monitoring the time individual soldiers spend
at home between deployments. We also must do more to support the
families of soldiers who are shouldering the burden of multiple
deployments. Family support programs must be improved.

ARMY BUDGET SHARE

Question. The Army Posture Statement points out that the defense
budget allocation by Service has changed little over time with the Air
Force and Navy around 30 percent and the Army around 25 percent.
Moreover, since the Army is manpower intensive, and personnel costs eat
up a large part of its budget, only 25 percent of the Army's budget
goes toward research, development, and acquisition, as compared to 38
percent in the Navy and 43 percent in the Air Force. Further, the
Army's overall share of the DOD investment dollars is only 17 percent,
as compared to 33 percent for the Navy and 35 percent for the Air
Force. The result is that ``the Army has been unable to invest in the
capabilities needed to sustain a rising operational tempo and to
prepare for emerging threats.''
What is your understanding of the effects of this funding
discrepancy on the Army?
Answer. In spite of rising budgets for the Army, the Army continues
to work to address shortfalls in equipment and infrastructure that have
accumulated over many years. In order to properly prepare for the
future threats the Army must work to build in our nondeployed forces
full spectrum readiness and strategic depth. The Army must achieve
improved levels of readiness in our nondeployed forces or accept a
force with suboptimal capability. We also are working to make overdue
investment in housing and facilities. We have made great strides over
the past 3 years in fixing our equipment readiness challenges and need
your continued support.
Question. What specifically have you done as Under Secretary of the
Army and what do you intend to do if confirmed as the Secretary to
address this funding discrepancy?
Answer. I have made matching Army resources to strategic
requirements a central theme during my tenure as the Acting Secretary
of the Army. Working with OSD and the Office of Management and Budget
during the development of the President's fiscal year 2008 budget, the
Army received increased funding levels for fiscal years 2008-2013. If I
am confirmed as Secretary of the Army, I will continue to ensure we are
good stewards of our Nation's resources, and continue to work closely
with members of this committee, Congress, and the administration to
remedy Army readiness issues that result from previous funding
shortfalls in the investment accounts.
Question. Have you discussed this problem with the Secretary of
Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense? What is your understanding
of what, if anything, they intend to do to address this discrepancy?
Answer. While building the President's fiscal year 2008 budget, we
shared the impact of these funding shortfalls with the Secretary of
Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. We effectively
communicated and quantified challenges the Army faces in preparing for
current conflicts and other emerging requirements. As a result of this
collaborative effort the Army's resources were increased by more than
$7 billion per year. Secretary of Defense Gates is working with the
Army to meet readiness requirements and to ensure the Army has the
resources necessary to support the National Military Strategy.
Secretary Gates also is supporting the Army's modernization efforts.

POSTURE FOR THE FUTURE

Question. Do you believe that current Army initiatives such as Grow
the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems
adequately posture the Army to meet the most likely threats of the next
two or three decades?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure the Army is ready
to meet the most likely future threats. Grow the Force, Modularity, and
Transformation to the Future Combat Systems will help posture the Army
to meet those threats. We cannot predict threats with any certainty so
we must build full spectrum readiness and strategic depth to ensure we
are prepared for whatever may lie ahead. Our goal must be to build an
Army versatile and agile enough to be employed in the range of military
operations, across the major operational environments, in support of
our national security strategy. The Army initiatives are designed to
give the Army maximum flexibility to respond to continual and
asymmetrical threats over the next 30 years.
Question. What other initiatives would you pursue in this regard if
confirmed as Secretary of the Army?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will pursue initiatives that ensure
the Army is postured to fight and win across the full range of military
operations against a variety of opponents with differing capabilities
and provide better support to our Army families. The new Chief of Staff
of the Army, General Casey, is working with Army leadership to advance
a list of initiatives that seek to achieve these goals. Among the top
priorities is support for soldiers and families, including improved
health care for soldiers and dependents. Additionally, our disability
system, built over generations, has become a bureaucratic maze and
needlessly complex. It is a system that frustrates, and often stymies,
the best intentions of dedicated public servants and compromises the
Army values we pledge to uphold. In simplest terms, a soldier who
fights battles abroad should not have to fight bureaucracy at home. The
Army is working with OSD to revamp this antiquated disability system.

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What are the major lessons learned from Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) which you
would seek to address if confirmed as Secretary of the Army?
Answer. Lessons learned from OIF/OEF have led the Army to improve
its training for counterinsurgency warfare. On the homefront, the pace
of operations has placed great stress on Army families and we are
building programs to better support our families. We must expand
language skills and enhance cultural awareness to be successful in the
operations and missions our Armed Forces are engaged in today. The Army
must continue to modernize and sustain its combat training centers,
home station training, and institutional training, instilling and
sustaining a warrior ethos in soldiers and leaders who are trained to
be agile and adaptable. Detention operations have improved over the
course of the conflict, but we must continue to look for ways to
enhance our capabilities in this area. With growth in the Army's force
structure and the challenges this places on training, the Army needs to
continue to assess ways to train efficiently, using training resources
from all Army components, as appropriate. As the Army develops its
operational rhythm, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) will continue to
play a critical role in synchronizing cyclic training, while placing
focus on theater-specific training requirements, such as training to
defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Because of the large load
that the Reserve component (Army National Guard and the Reserves) is
pulling, the Army needs to assess continually its mobilization
policies, balancing training requirements to meet the appropriate level
of Reserve component operational readiness with the domestic mission
and requirements of the Guard and Reserves.
Question. More specifically, what are the lessons learned
concerning manning, training, and equipping the Army which you intend
to address if confirmed?
Answer. The Army must build on its distance learning program to
enable soldiers in the field the ability to train individually on
skills otherwise not available when deployed. Further, the Army must
take appropriate measures to provide adequate Training Support Systems
(TSS) at Army installations to support full spectrum training. Units
must have greater capabilities at home stations to train across the
spectrum of conflict in a training environment replicating the
contemporary operating environment. One equipping lesson learned is
that consistent, timely, and adequate funding is required to increase
the equipment available for operations and training. We are taking
steps to transition the LOGCAP contract from one to eventually three
contractors to increase capabilities and generate competition. We must
find ways to immediately respond to the stress and demands placed on
our military families. We need to work to be able to change quickly to
succeed in this type of conflict, facing a nimble and adaptive enemy.

POST-IRAQ OFFICER RETENTION PLANNING

Question. After the Vietnam War there was a large reduction in
force which some believed masked a voluntary departure of some of the
best and brightest junior officers from Active-Duty who, after serving
in very responsible positions at a relatively young age in combat, had
difficulty adjusting to a peacetime Army. The nature of the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan--small unit actions where junior leaders are not
only military leaders, but also diplomats and city managers, and where
they have even greater authority to act on their own initiatives--may
produce similar behavior and consequent difficulty in retaining highly-
trained and experienced junior officers.
Do you agree that this is a potential problem, and if so, how would
you address it if confirmed as Secretary of the Army?
Answer. After the Iraq War, we may face the risk of losing the
``best and brightest,'' combat-experienced officers and NCOs from our
Army. We cannot allow the Army to drift in a post-conflict setting.
This will require refocusing the Army, retaining the best and brightest
soldiers, and leveraging combat-experienced soldiers in key and
critical assignments, such as the Training and Doctrine Command. If I
am confirmed, one of my most important tasks will be to develop
retention measures to keep combat-experienced soldiers in the Army. We
also must develop programs to better support families in an
expeditionary Army during a period of persistent conflict.

END STRENGTH AND RECRUITING GOALS

Question. The Army's recruiting goal for fiscal year 2008 is 80,000
recruits, the same as in fiscal year 2007. The Army has told the
committee that it expects to end fiscal year 2007 with over 518,000
soldiers after starting the calendar year with around 502,000. The Army
then plans to grow the force in fiscal year 2008 by another 7,000
soldiers to end the fiscal year at over 525,000 soldiers.
How is the Army progressing in meeting its recruiting goals for
this fiscal year? Is the Army on pace to meet its year-end goals?
Answer. The fiscal year 2006 end strength was 505,400. I expect
that the Army will meet and exceed its fiscal year 2007 recruiting goal
of 80,000 soldiers. Although the Army missed the monthly recruiting
goal in May, for the year it remains ahead of requirements to achieve
the fiscal year 2007 recruiting goal. We have added additional
recruiters to help us meet our targets and are maintaining vigilance to
quickly react to downward trends and indicators.
Question. How can the Army increase its end strength to over
518,000 this year and over 525,000 next year without increasing its
recruiting goal?
Answer. Based on current analysis, an increase in recruiting goals
is not necessary to meet our planned growth in Army end strength. In
addition to recruiting, the Army uses retention and loss management
tools as levers to manage end strength. Throughout fiscal year 2006 and
the first half of fiscal year 2007, the Army has focused on retaining
more initial term soldiers and has seen attrition drop to record lows.
The combination of these tools has enabled the Army to grow strength
faster.
Question. Has the Army changed its standards to achieve its
recruiting mission and to meet its end strength goals?
Answer. The Army closely monitors indicators of quality in our
recruits. Every soldier who enlists in the Army has been screened to
ensure they have the appropriate qualifications to perform his or her
designated Military Occupational Specialty. The Army continues to use
the DOD quality marks as one measurement, while taking other steps to
achieve results, such as reduction of training base attrition. The Army
has experienced a decline in high school diploma graduates and an
increase in Category IV recruits. These trends must be monitored
closely, but performance in those areas remain well above historical
standards.
Question. What is the current end strength of the Army today?
Answer. The end-of-month May end strength for the Active Army was
507,459.
Question. What do you project the Army's end strength to be at the
end of this fiscal year?
Answer. The Active Army end strength is projected to be 519,800 at
the end of this fiscal year.
Question. In the past, the Army has asserted that, given recruiting
challenges and training infrastructure, it can only grow its end
strength by 5,000 to 7,000 soldiers per year. Is this still an accurate
projection, or can the Army grow the force by more than 7,000 soldiers
per year?
Answer. Growth of the Army beyond 7,000 per year is a factor of
recruiting and retention. Each area has its specific challenges and
requirements. For example, if we wanted to accelerate recruiting above
80,000 per year there would have to be an increase in recruiting
resources and incentives, but also, basing, training, and equipment
issues to address. Facilities such as barracks and developing training
areas and ranges to accommodate the increased forces will take time to
plan and construct.

STOP LOSS AUTHORITY

Question. How many soldiers do you expect the Army to retain under
stop loss authority at the end of fiscal year 2007, in order to
increase end strength to 518,000?
Answer. The Army uses stop loss to grow end strength, to maintain
unit cohesion, and to prepare and maintain units for deployment. We
expect stop loss to account for 6,300 toward the fiscal year 2007 end
strength of 519,800.
Question. How many soldiers does the Army estimate it will retain
under stop loss authority in fiscal year 2008 to achieve end strength
of 525,000?
Answer. The Army expects stop loss authorities to account for 5,500
toward the fiscal year 2008 end strength of over 525,000.
Question. What is the Army's plan for reducing stop loss as it
increases its end strength through the out-years?
Answer. The Army, under the direction of OSD, is working to meet
the Secretary of Defense's intent to reduce the use of stop loss as
reflected in the January 19, 2007, announcement concerning
``Utilization of the Total Force.'' The Army is currently developing a
plan for minimizing the use of stop loss. The Army has commenced a
complete review of the Army's stop loss policy and is in the process of
identifying ways to reduce the need for stop loss.

ARMY PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT

Question. The Army has long followed the dictates of the concept of
``train as you fight.'' In some cases, however, units have had to fight
on prepositioned equipment that was less modern than that on which they
had trained in the continental United States (CONUS).
What is your understanding of the effect on mission capability of
operationally having to use equipment from prepositioned stocks that is
not as modern as that with which the unit regularly trains?
Answer. The equipment that has been drawn from the Army
Prepositioned Stocks (APS) met operational requirements. The
prepositioned equipment drawn combined with the Theater Provided
Equipment met the combat capability required for the BCTs to which it
was issued.
Question. What changes to policies regarding use of prepositioned
equipment stocks would you recommend, if confirmed?
Answer. The last 4 years demonstrated that the APS program was
flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army's ability to deploy
forces in support of combatant command requirements and adapt to
changing strategic requirements. We must replenish the stocks with
equipment that meets the needs of the modular force. I will review the
underlying policy, but I am not aware of any changes needed at this
time.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current
plan for reconstituting Army prepositioned equipment upon the
withdrawal of units from Iraq?
Answer. APS capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the
maximum level of strategic flexibility and operational agility. The
Army has an APS Strategy 2013 which articulates the afloat and ashore
equipment required to meet the future responsiveness needs of the
combatant commanders. Once the current operational and equipping tempo
stabilizes, the Army will develop an executable timeline within
available resources to reset its APS sets according to the APS Strategy
2013.

EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

Question. In your view, is deploying additional brigades to Iraq
likely to increase the strain on maintenance systems and further reduce
equipment availability for training?
Answer. The 5-BCT surge and 15-month troop extension in Iraq will
delay some units' redeployment and postpone some equipment reset from
fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2008 or fiscal year 2009.
The Army has plans in place to ensure these delays do not impact
training or equipping of next to deploy units. This delay in retrograde
and reset of approximately six BCT sets of equipment will result in
some increased stress in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. Despite the
projected increase in reset activities in these years, adequate,
continued, and timely funding for reset will prevent a degradation of
Army maintenance systems.
Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to
fully support the predeployment training and operations for the next
rotation to OIF/OEF?
Answer. The Army has enough equipment to ensure forces are
adequately prepared for and can successfully conduct operations in OIF/
OEF. No soldier will go into combat without the proper training and
equipment. There are, however, some equipment shortages in CONUS that
require sharing equipment among predeployed units to ensure they are
fully trained before deploying. Equipment sharing is generally managed
at the brigade or division-level by transferring equipment among units
to support specific training events. The Army works diligently to
schedule forces for deployment as early as possible and to project the
mission they must perform when deployed. As part of each
synchronization cycle, a Department-level Force Validation Committee
works to ensure that deploying forces are provided all the personnel
and equipment required for their mission. Additionally, a Training
Support and Resources Conference meets to ensure deploying forces have
all the training support tools they need to train for their mission and
are scheduled for a mission rehearsal exercise.
Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for
training and operations?
Answer. All soldiers receive the required training and equipment
before going into combat. Active, Guard, and Reserve must be certified
as ready before they are put in harms way. Achieving the necessary unit
readiness involves consolidating training sets at our installations to
compensate for equipment shortfalls among nondeployed units. The most
common Active and Reserve component high-demand predeployment training
equipment shortfalls occur with force protection-related equipment,
where equipping solutions are developed to meet specific theater
requirements. Most of the production of these items goes straight into
theater to meet the force protection demand. These items include up-
armored light, medium, and heavy tactical trucks, special route
clearance vehicles (to include the RG-31, Buffalo, Husky, and Cougar),
and counter remote-controlled IED warfare devices. We retain a limited
number of these systems for home station training and at our combat
training centers so soldiers will gain experience with these systems
before they deploy. Additionally, a large number of our soldiers
already have one or more rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have
direct experience with these systems.
Other items of equipment with limited availability for home station
training include kits designed to increase the survivability of
standard Army equipment, including the Bradley and Tank Urban
Survivability Kits, and up-armored HMMWV fragmentation kits. These kits
are provided in theater. Finally, there are some additional training
equipment gaps in specific areas which are driven by the Army's desire
to get the most modern and capable systems immediately into the hands
of our soldiers in combat operations. These items include the most
recent version of the Army Battle Command System, the Command Post of
the Future, some advanced intelligence systems, and biometric systems.
The Army is working to get appropriate levels of systems to support
training the force into the training base and at unit home stations, as
well as in our Combat Training Centers.
Significant quantities of Army equipment remain in Iraq and
Afghanistan to minimize the time lost, and associated costs, in
transporting equipment to and from these missions. The result is that
units at home station have less than full sets of authorized equipment.
Although rotating equipment between training units allows us to achieve
the training requirements before deployment, these units are limited in
their ability to support other contingencies around the world should
the need arise.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these
shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and
operate?
Answer. The Army has taken measures to overcome the impact on
training of equipment shortfalls by creating training sets of equipment
and rotating units through training. Congress has allocated $17.1
billion in fiscal year 2007 supplemental dollars for the Army to reset
the force. Over 70 percent of these supplemental funds have been
obligated as of mid-April 2007 and will allow the Army to double the
workload at its depots. The number of tanks, Bradleys, and other
tracked vehicles being overhauled is being quadrupled. While the use of
training sets is not the optimal solution, units have and will continue
to meet all required training and readiness standards prior to
commitment into combat. If I am confirmed, I would continue these
efforts. I would also work with the administration and Congress to
ensure that the Army develops budget requirements to better equip the
forces at home station, between deployments, and to build strategic
depth to support other contingencies that may be directed by the
national leadership.

EQUIPMENT REPAIR/RESET

Question. Congress provided the Army with $17.1 billion in fiscal
year 2007 to help with the reset of nondeployed forces and accelerate
the repair and replacement of equipment.
What impact do you expect the increased funding to have on the
readiness of our ground forces, and how soon do you expect to see this
impact?
Answer. The funding has helped prevent erosion of unit readiness
and restores equipment to a desired level of combat capability
necessary for a unit's future mission. The $17.1 billion provides the
resources to replace, repair, and recapitalize equipment for 24 brigade
combat teams and support units. Contracts to replace battle losses are
being put in place during fiscal year 2007, but most of the equipment
will not be delivered to the Army until fiscal year 2008. The reset
funding will meet the requirements to properly equip our deploying
forces, but will not address all equipment shortfalls or equipment
still committed overseas in support of OIF and OEF.
Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are
operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for
reset?
Answer. Our depots currently are not operating at full capacity.
They are operating at the capacity necessary to meet current
requirements and available funding. Each depot's production capacity is
being optimized by each equipment type/commodity. In fiscal year 2007
we have scheduled 130,000 items to be reset. Because of timely,
predictable funding, we were able to expand output. We have scheduled
an additional 25,000 items this year.
The $17.1 billion received in fiscal year 2007 works off all fiscal
year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 depot backlog and we do not need them to
do more in fiscal year 2007. The depots are repairing enough equipment
to meet the requirements for next-to-deploy forces. The fiscal year
2007 supplemental funding also allows reset of 24 BCTs within 18-24
months.
Should Army requirements change, depots could do more and increase
their capacity with predictable funding, available spare parts,
increased work force, and more retrograded equipment.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be
taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it
available for operations and training?
Answer. Consistent, timely, and adequate funding is required to
increase the equipment available for operations and training.
Congressional support has given the Army the necessary funding to
eliminate the current depot backlog. For instance, the HMMWV backlog is
projected to be eliminated by March 2008. The capacity to fix equipment
depends on funding, past procurement, depot production, and retrograde
from theater. Due to the large amount of equipment in theater, funding
for reset must continue 2-3 years beyond the end of this conflict
Question. What impact do you believe the President's decision to
send an additional five brigades to Iraq is likely to have on the pool
of equipment available for nondeployed units to train with at home?
Answer. All units will be fully trained and equipped before going
into combat. The Army will continue to be able to provide sufficient
equipment for nondeployed soldiers to properly train before deployment.
However, we will continue to rotate training sets among units as we did
before the surge. For example, the Army is moving Up-armored High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (UAHs) between units to ensure
predeployment training requirements are met at home station, while
units in theater are provided the quantities of UAHs required to
perform their combat mission. The Army is also addressing this
equipping challenge by using reset to repair, replace, and recapitalize
equipment, filling training requirements from new production, and
requesting additional funding to purchase needed equipment.
Question. What impact is it likely to have on the ability of Army
National Guard units to respond to homeland security and disaster
relief missions?
Answer. The plus-up has had no effect on Army National Guard units'
ability to respond to and perform homeland security and disaster relief
missions. Plus-up units are all Active component and their equipment
came from new production and other Active component units, not from
existing Army National Guard pools of equipment.

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

Question. In your role as the Acting Secretary, you have been
involved in the Army's evolving requirement for the Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. A recent memo from you to Secretary
Gates indicated that the current Army requirement for MRAP vehicles is
2,500, but that the requirement could be increased to 17,700. The U.S.
Marine Corps has decided to replace all of its Up-armored HMMWVs (UAHs)
with MRAP vehicles.
Is the current Army requirement for MRAP vehicles still 2,500 and,
if so, is that number adequate to meet the Army's needs?
Answer. Buying the MRAPs we need to better protect soldiers and
getting them to theatre as soon as possible is our top near-term
acquisition priority. The Army requirement for MRAP vehicles is much
greater than 2,500 and Army leadership is working to determine the
proper number. The Army has sent a high level team to theater to better
understand the theater request. The Army has committed the supplemental
funding provided by Congress to acquire 900 MRAP vehicles and will
field the first vehicles this fall. We are working with the Navy and
Marine Corps to achieve the highest production rates possible, as soon
as possible, for MRAPs.

U.S. ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE IN EUROPE

Question. A major drawdown of U.S. military personnel in Europe is
underway. The heart of this proposal is a reduction of approximately
47,000 Army personnel and the relocation of 3 combat brigades from
Europe to the United States. After that decision had already been made,
the fiscal year 2008 budget proposes to add 65,000 soldiers to Army
Active-Duty end strength over the next 5 years. As part of this
increase, the Army proposes to create six new light infantry combat
brigades.
If confirmed as the Secretary of the Army, what would be your role
and responsibility in the final determination of the permanent station
location for each of the six additional brigades?
Answer. If confirmed as the Secretary of the Army, I would ensure
the Army considers operational, fiscal, and environmental implications
of force growth and ongoing realignments prior to determining
stationing locations.
Question. In your current role as the Acting Secretary, what
criteria has the Army developed to assess locations for the placement
of the six brigades?
Answer. The Army will use the best military value criteria,
training capacity, power projection, logistics infrastructure and
capacity, soldier well-being, cost and growth capacity, and
environmental considerations. The criteria are derived from the 2005
base realignment and closure analysis. We will ensure that our
planning, analysis, and criteria meet all of the requirements included
in the National Environmental Policy Act.
Question. Do you believe the consideration of locations for the
final determination of the permanent station location for each of the
six additional Active brigades should include Army Reserve and Guard
installations in the United States?
Answer. The Army is in the initial stages of analyzing installation
capacity and capability for supporting six brigade combat teams. Army
Reserve and Guard installations in the United States are being
considered.
Question. Given the role our forces in Europe have played in
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, do you believe it would be in
our strategic interest to base one or more of these six additional
brigades in Europe?
Answer. Our current strategy which is the Global Defense Posture
Realignment strategy calls for a shift to a more CONUS-based, joint and
expeditionary Army and the Army plans to base the six new brigades in
CONUS.
Question. What is your current role as Acting Secretary of the Army
in the decision of how many, if any, of these additional 65,000 Army
personnel should be based in Europe, when do you expect this basing
decision to be made, and what would your role be in making this
decision, if confirmed?
Answer. In my current role, I provide recommendations on global
basing strategy and ensure the Army's recommended stationing decisions
are consistent with strategic guidance and meet the requirements of the
combatant commander. If confirmed, I would expect to continue providing
my recommendations to OSD in these critical areas.
Question. In your opinion, should DOD determine the location of the
six brigades before making any irrevocable decisions to return property
in Europe?
Answer. The Army is proceeding with analysis of the CONUS basing
options for the six brigades consistent with the strategic guidance
from the Secretary of Defense. Currently, there are no plans to utilize
European options.
Question. The training ranges at the National Training Center in
California and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana are
already fully utilized. If the ongoing drawdown from four heavy
brigades to one Stryker brigade in Europe is fully implemented, it
seems likely that the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany
will not be fully utilized.
Do you believe we should take the availability of this training
range, and the cost avoidance of not building new ranges if we have an
underutilized range available, into consideration in deciding whether
or how soon to draw down our ground forces in Europe, and where to base
the proposed six new brigade combat teams?
Answer. One of the Secretary of the Army's responsibilities is to
ensure the responsible stewardship of all Army resources whether the
resource is funding, equipment, or facilities. If confirmed as
Secretary of the Army, any basing decision would include a complete
analysis of resource requirements and availability.

ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. The Army invests in science and technology (S&T) programs
to develop advanced capabilities to support current operations and
future Army systems. The Army's budget request has included a declining
level of investment in S&T programs over each of the last 4 fiscal
years.
What do you see as the role that Army S&T programs will play in
continuing to develop capabilities for current and future Army systems?
Answer. The Army's S&T program is the investment the Army makes in
our future soldiers. This program has to be as adaptable and responsive
as our soldiers in the field. The Army's S&T strategy should be to
pursue technologies that will enable the future force while
simultaneously seizing opportunities to enhance the current force.
Question. Do you believe that the Army should increase its level of
investment in S&T programs?
Answer. The Army's planned S&T investments seek to mature and
demonstrate the key technologies needed to give our soldiers the best
possible equipment now and in the future. Given the current environment
and priorities, I believe our level of investment is appropriate.
Question. What metrics would you use, if confirmed, to judge the
value of Army S&T programs?
Answer. The real value of S&T programs is measured by the increased
capability of the force achieved when new technologies are inserted
into systems and equipment and that equipment is provided to fully-
trained soldiers. While technology is still in S&T, we use the standard
DOD established Technology Readiness Levels to report when technologies
are judged to be mature enough for successful transition to an
acquisition program of record.
Question. What role should Army laboratories play in supporting
current operations and in developing new capabilities to support Army
missions?
Answer. The S&T community can support current operations in three
ways. First, soldiers are benefiting today from technologies that
emerged from past investments. Using our Rapid Equipping initiative, we
are seeking to field technologies as soon as possible to help in the
warfight. Second, the Army should exploit transition opportunities by
accelerating mature technologies from ongoing S&T efforts. Third, we
should also seek to leverage the expertise of our scientists and
engineers to develop solutions to unforeseen problems encountered
during current operations. To enhance the current force, Army S&T
should be providing limited quantities of advanced technology
prototypes to our soldiers deployed to the fight.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that weapon systems
and other technologies that are fielded by the Army are adequately
operationally tested?
Answer. Operational testing is of critical importance and one of
the cornerstones of the Army's acquisition program. It ensures that the
systems and technologies work not only from a technical aspect, but
also from the perspective of how our soldiers will use these systems
around the world in actual operations. The Army has a systematic
approach to test new systems under the conditions that replicate actual
combat as much as possible. The Army partners the Army Test and
Evaluation Command with the Program Executive Offices, the Training and
Doctrine Command, and the soldiers from various Army Commands to plan
and execute very thorough operational tests. I fully understand the
importance to the Army of operational testing and the impact it has on
ensuring the right systems get to our soldiers. As Secretary, I will
insist we conduct thorough operational tests so we understand how the
system performs in the hands of our soldiers prior to fielding.
Question. Are you satisfied with the acquisition community's
ability to address the operational needs of deployed forces?
Answer. The Army constantly seeks more agility in addressing the
anticipated and unanticipated operational needs of deployed forces. OEF
and OIF have transformed the way we approach this topic. The
acquisition community must always balance the need to fill requirements
with the need to comply with laws and regulations. The biggest
challenges for the acquisition community are retaining trained people,
managing the interaction with requirements and testing communities, and
managing complex programs that require high levels of oversight.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you have to
speed the ability for the Army to provide operational forces with the
specific systems and other capabilities that they request?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to continue funding the Rapid
Equipping Force (REF) to rapidly increase mission capability while
reducing risk to soldiers and others. The REF equips operational
commanders with off-the-shelf solutions or near-term developmental
items that can be researched, developed, and acquired quickly. The Army
must also continue to develop, test, and evaluate key technologies and
systems under operational conditions and rapidly field those
capabilities that will enable our forces to rapidly confront an
adaptive enemy. Additionally, a reexamination of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation and Defense Acquisition Regulation and our
acquisition processes should be undertaken to reflect the asymmetric,
catastrophic, and irregular situations we are facing in the current
environment.

ARMY LABORATORIES AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING CENTERS

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army
laboratories and research and development centers have the highest
quality workforce, laboratory infrastructure, resources, and
management, so that they can continue to support deployed warfighters
and develop next generation capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I would encourage the recruitment and
retention of the highest quality laboratory workforce. The Army has
already taken significant advantage of the authorities provided by
Congress for recruiting bonuses, laboratory pay banding, pay-for-
performance, incentive awards, and employee advanced education and
development programs. Our vital laboratory infrastructure is
fundamental to exploit the knowledge of our people and to attract and
retain the most talented scientists and engineers to work for the Army.
Despite tremendous pressures on resources to fund current operations
and Army modernization we have struggled to sustain S&T funding at
roughly $1.7 billion for the past several budgets. The Army promotes
efficient use of these resources and effective laboratory management
through multiple processes: peer groups, laboratory internal management
reviews, Army headquarters and cross-Service technology reviews, as
well as input from subject-matter experts from industry, academia, and
other government agencies.

ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION EFFORTS

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army's test
and evaluation infrastructure is robust enough to ensure that new
systems and technologies are tested to verify their combat
effectiveness and suitability?
Answer. The infrastructure today is fully meeting the current
requirements of the global war on terror. Fiscal year 2011 will be a
challenge to ensure long-term test and evaluation infrastructure. My
intent is to address the test and evaluation infrastructure in the next
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP

1. Creating foundational language and cultural expertise in
the officer, civilian, and enlisted ranks for both Active and
Reserve components.
2. Creating the capacity to surge language and cultural
resources beyond these foundational and in-house capabilities.
3. Establishing a cadre of language specialists possessing a
level 3/3/3 ability (listening/reading/speaking).
4. Establishing a process to track the accession, separation,
and promotion rates of language professionals and Foreign Area
Officers (FAOs).

The Army is addressing language training across a broad spectrum of
skill levels. Today, language training involves more than just making
soldiers into linguists; it involves giving soldiers of all specialties
basic communication skills that are needed in the contemporary
operating environment. The Army is not making every soldier a language
expert, but giving them tools to succeed in the environment in which
they will operate. For our language experts, the Army has set a high
language proficiency goal of 3-listening, 3-reading, and 3-speaking.
The Army increased Foreign Language Proficiency Pay Policy to encourage
soldiers to improve their existing proficiency and acquire new language
capabilities in critical languages. We are also using online tools such
as Rosetta Stone as well as native-speaking role players in training
scenarios to replicate the contemporary operating environment.
Additionally, we have embedded the tasks of the Language Transformation
Roadmap in a new chapter of Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and
Leader Development, and language training is a part of our
predeployment ARFORGEN model. One of our key initiatives was the
creation of Military Operations Specialty 09L which recruits native
foreign language speakers to be interpreters/translators. The Army is
the only Service with a program such as 09L. We have trained and sent
forward 377 trained interpreters in support of the global war on
terrorism, as well as expanding the program to all components of the
Army. These language experts as well as others such as our FAOs are
tracked by Army career field managers.
Question. What is your assessment of an appropriate timeframe
within which results can be realized in this critical area?
Answer. This is a capability that we are building, and the fruits
of our work through the Language Transformation Roadmap and other
initiatives will take time to produce results. In the mean time,
contract linguists and 09L interpreters and translators are vital to
our capacity to surge language resources.

ARMY MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING PROCESS

Question. Over the past several years, the Army's planning,
programming, and budgeting process has not kept pace with rapidly
changing requirements. While this is more understandable for events
like the Presidential decision to surge additional forces into Iraq, it
is less understandable with respect to long-term program decisions such
as the modular conversion of Army brigades or the more recent proposal
to increase the size of the Army. It has become routine for the Army to
submit ``placeholders'' instead of actual program plans in budget
requests, and to purchase temporary facilities followed almost
immediately by additional funding requests to buy permanent facilities
to replace the temporary ones.
What is your assessment of the Army's management and planning
process?
Answer. The Army planning, programming, and budgeting process ties
together strategic guidance with the capabilities required to carry out
the National Military Strategy while working within the constraints of
fiscal guidance. The Army manages mission requirements for resources
and manpower over a 5- to 6-year period. The Army seeks to balance the
need for both the current force and future force to ensure our soldiers
and their families have the necessary capabilities, facilities, and
programs to meet their needs. However, no matter how well the staff
plans for the future, there will always be unforeseen changes to
requirements (especially in today's environment) and decisions made
beyond the control of the Army. New plans require time to establish,
and sometimes temporary solutions must be implemented. These temporary
solutions and other lessons learned often lead to unexpected capability
gains to Army formations engaged in combat. As the Army attempts to
provide these new capabilities and lessons learned to our soldier
engaged in combat, timelines for decisions on emerging capabilities do
not always match timelines associated with the planning, programming,
and budget process. Placeholders should be used sparingly, but they
allow the Army to make the best decision on prudent use of available
resources in this fluid environment.
Question. In your view, does the Army have enough people with the
right skills to manage the changes being attempted, or is the Army
undertaking more organizational change than it is capable of
accomplishing during a time of war?
Answer. The Army is transforming its processes designed to identify
and eliminate wasteful practices while gaining greater efficiencies.
The Army is attempting to garner savings to self-finance many of its
initiatives, while sustaining our capabilities to meet the increasing
demands of our wartime missions. I believe the Army has the right group
of people with the right skill sets to see the Army through these
challenging times. The Army must, however, continue to provide the
necessary training as new technologies and processes are made available
to improve productivity and remain a relevant and ready force.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you plan to take to
improve the Army's management and planning processes, in particular for
major force structure and program changes?
Answer. If confirmed, I will examine how we can make the process
more adaptive to the changing environment, building upon the positive
working relationships the Army has built with DOD leaders. I believe
improvements can be instituted to make the process more efficient. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy for Business
Transformation to engage the Army staff in a concerted effort to
identify and implement meaningful change and process improvements. In
this effort, however, I would maintain a central focus on the readiness
of the Army to fight the global war on terror.

ARMY INSTALLATIONS

Question. The Department of the Army recently was criticized for
substandard facility conditions at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center,
which in part led to leadership changes in the chain of command for the
center.
In your current role as the Acting Secretary, have you seen a
change in how the leaders in the Department of the Army address the
conditions and quality of facilities and installations throughout the
Army?
Answer. First, I'd like to address the steps we have taken with the
Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP) to improve medical facilities. The
Installation Management Command (IMCOM) has conducted a 100 percent
review of Warrior in Transition barracks and identified corrective
measures required to bring them up to standard. Additionally, the IMCOM
has identified requirements for other buildings on installations that
Warriors in Transition would use. Army-wide, quality of life remains a
top Army priority to ensure soldiers and families have safe and
adequate facilities to live, work, and train. The Army has made
substantial progress in the last 4 years increasing Base Operations
Support 41 percent and Facility Sustainment/Restoration and
Modernization 15 percent. We have doubled our effort in Restoration and
Modernization funding to $200 million per year. Care for our families
is foremost in the Army's stationing and mobilization of soldiers. The
environment in which our soldiers and families live, work, and train
plays a key role in recruiting and retaining the All-Volunteer Force.
For example, 19,000 family homes have been built or modernized under
the Residential Communities Initiative. This is quality housing that
our families proudly call home. Although, we are still not doing as
much as we would like in this time of war and constrained resources, we
continue to make consistent and steady progress toward improving the
installation services necessary to sustain the All-Volunteer Force.
Question. In your opinion, does the Department of the Army have
additional problems with facility conditions across the Army aside from
the ones identified at Walter Reed? If so, how serious are they?
Answer. We have identified shortcoming in other facilities across
the Army and are working to address them. The Army is continuously
challenged to balance facility sustainment, restoration, and
modernization projects to meet mission and life, health, and safety
requirements. Facilities projects compete for funding and must be
prioritized for execution over a number of years. If confirmed, I will
make it a top priority to ensure that our efforts to improve facilities
for our wounded warriors, soldiers, and families are continued.
Question. If confirmed, would you implement any additional programs
or guidance to ensure our soldiers work and live in adequate
facilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I would implement initiatives from three
working groups which address issues in this area. One initiative,
enhancing the quality of support to soldiers, civilians, and families,
will develop a plan for improvements to installation services. Another
initiative, complete Reserve component transition, will complete the
conversion to modular units and adjust and resource post-deployment
policies and family support programs to ensure care of soldiers and
their families that are dispersed throughout the United States. A third
initiative, Adapt Army Institutions to Support an Expeditionary Army at
War, will provide initiatives to support soldiers, civilians, families,
and wounded warriors with reliable and standard levels of quality of
life. Also, it will offer improved installation management systems to
better align with ARFORGEN phases and mitigate the effects of repeated
deployments. This would include improving services, facilities, and the
military construction process.

CONTRACT SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

Question. DOD has engaged in the privatization of many of its
support functions. As a result, the Department now relies heavily on
contractors to perform acquisition, budget, and financial management
functions that are critical to the execution of the Department's
mission. Senior DOD officials have informed the committee both formally
and informally that, because of reductions in the acquisition work
force, the Department now lacks the capability to effectively oversee
the work performed by its support contractors.
Are you concerned about the extent to which the Army has become
reliant upon contractors to perform critical functions?
Answer. The Army is committing additional personnel and resources
to provide the required level of contract administration on large
contracts, particularly for the Army's contracting officers who support
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another area of concern is a
shortage of Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) within units to
provide surveillance on service contracts in support of contingency
operations.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take
to ensure that it has the resources it needs to provide effective
oversight for its support contractors?
Answer. Working within existing manpower constraints, the Army
needs to ensure that its limited contract oversight resources are
organized and employed in the most efficient manner. In addition, it
needs to continue to place appropriate management emphasis on COR
training.
Question. The privatization of functions previously performed by
DOD employees now extends to many functions performed on the
battlefield. As a result, many functions that were performed by DOD
personnel as recently as the Gulf War have been performed by contractor
personnel in the current conflict in Iraq.
Do you believe that the DOD has reached, or exceeded, an
appropriate balance in providing for the performance of functions by
contractors on the battlefield?
Answer. The downsizing of the Army in the 1990s has increased the
need for contractors to provide non-inherently governmental functions.
The use of contractors is a force multiplier enabling the U.S. Army to
keep soldiers engaged in core U.S. Army missions. Currently, there are
an estimated 129,000 contractors in Iraq. They continue to perform a
vital role performing services such as mail delivery, laundry and food
services, water and ground transportation of goods, road and rail
maintenance, construction, base operations, petroleum supply, and
maintenance and technical support for high-technology systems. The Army
balances the need to use contractors to provide critically needed
services while using soldiers and DOD civilians to perform inherently
governmental functions.
Question. Where do you believe that the DOD should draw the line
between functions on the battlefield that can and should be performed
by contractors and functions that should only be performed by DOD
personnel?
Answer. DOD must maintain vigilance to ensure that only non-
inherently governmental functions are contracted out.
Question. Do you believe that contractors on the battlefield are
subject to appropriate levels of control and accountability for their
actions, or would additional regulation be appropriate?
Answer. With changing conditions on the ground, we must be vigilant
to ensure that we maintain proper oversight over our contract
workforce. I believe that existing controls are appropriate but must be
re-evaluated regularly. In October 2005, the DOD issued DOD Instruction
3020.41 titled ``Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S.
Armed Forces,'' to address contingency contractor personnel. Section
6.1.3 states that ``contingency contractor personnel fulfilling
contracts with the U.S. Armed Forces may be subject to prosecution
under Federal law, including but not limited to, the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), 18 U.S.C. 3261, which extends
U.S. Federal criminal jurisdiction to certain DOD contingency
contractor personnel, for certain offenses committed outside U.S.
territory.'' The Department of Justice has responsibility for
prosecuting violations of Federal law. Besides being subject to Federal
law, contractors must abide by the terms and conditions in their
contracts. All DOD contracts being performed in a combatant commander's
area of operations require that contractor employees adhere to the
policies and directives of the combatant commander.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. The Army has fielded the Patriot system and is upgrading
all Patriot units to the most modern and capable PAC-3 configuration.
The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is being
developed as a near-term system for defending against short-, medium-,
and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
What do you believe is the Army's proper role in fielding,
operating, sustaining, and funding missile defenses, and how does that
role relate to the role of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)?
Answer. As a member of the joint team, the Army is responsible to
field and operate land-based missile defenses as capabilities are made
available by the MDA. Upon transition and transfer of land-based
missile defense elements to the Army, the Army will assume
responsibility for the operations and sustainment of these
capabilities. MDA is responsible for research and development of
missile defense capabilities and the Army is responsible for their
operations and support of the land-based systems. The Army's close
partnership with MDA throughout the developmental process has enabled
us to succeed in putting capabilities in the field and enabled us to
achieve the interoperability of these capabilities with the other
Services and our allies.

STRATEGIC RISK

Question. Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create higher levels of strategic
risk for the United States based on the availability of trained and
ready forces for other contingencies?
Answer. Strategic risk for the Nation must be considered from a
joint perspective. As for the Army's role in support of the National
Military Strategy, the Army's increased operational tempo and multiple
combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan limit Army resources available for
other contingencies.
Question. How would you characterize the increase in strategic risk
in terms of the Army's ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ a force
for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of risk acceptable?
Answer. Strategic risk must be considered from a joint perspective.
The Army can still meet strategic requirements to mobilize, deploy, and
employ its forces in support of national military strategic objectives;
however, if the OEF and OIF demand does not decrease, the Army may
require a longer timeline to provide resources to support a new
contingency. The level of risk that the force faces today is increased,
but the force remains capable of responding to an unforeseen surge
requirement. We will continue to work with Congress and OSD to reduce
risk.
Question. What impact, if any, do you expect the decision to
increase Army forces committed to Iraq to have on our ability to meet
our security obligations in other parts of the world?
Answer. Our Nation's strategies to respond to threats around the
world involve all components of our Nation's defense, including all
four Services. High utilization of the resources of one Service may
require an adjustment in the role of the other Services. Army forces
committed to Iraq do limit the Army's ability to meet other security
obligations around the world. The decision to lengthen combat tours
would be lengthened to 15 months reflects that increased demand;
however, our Nation's military is capable of meeting and defeating
threats to the Nation in support of current national and defense
strategies.
Question. How and over what period of time, in your view, will
increases to Army end strength reduce or mitigate this risk?
Answer. The Army's approved growth in end-strength will increase
the Army's ability to respond to contingencies. We must grow the Army,
and we are working to do that, adding 65,000 to the Active-Duty Force,
8,000 to the Guard, and 1,000 to the Reserve over the next 5 years. But
we must remain flexible as circumstances change to meet future demands.
The ``Grow the Army Plan'' is based on lessons learned from the past 5
years and increases the strategic depth for the Army to meet global
requirements of the long war. The growth will not be limited to BCTs.
The growth will also enhance other combat capabilities (Patriot Air
Defense), combat support (Military Intelligence, Engineer, and Military
Police) and combat service support (Transportation, Quartermaster,
Medical, Ordnance and Maintenance). The plan recognizes increased
demands on the Institutional Army to recruit, train, and sustain the
operational force. Adjustments must reflect growth in the operational
force while we continue to seek efficiencies in the Institutional Army
to reduce its percentage of the Army's end strength.
Question. What additional actions, in your view, are necessary to
reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?
Answer. Adequate and predictable funding of modernization and
transformation efforts are critical to mitigating this strategic risk.
Policy and budgets must match the current strategy and demand. We also
must build the capacity of our international partners and allies as we
cannot face these challenges alone. We must invest in partner nations
who know the culture, language, and geography of our enemies. The
President's budget includes vital funds for that effort. Additionally,
rebalancing the forces in the Reserve component and fully transitioning
the Reserve component from a Strategic Reserve to an operational force
will further mitigate risk.

WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER

Question. You testified before the committee at the Army posture
hearing on March 15, 2007, and again at a joint hearing of the Senate
Armed Services Committee and the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee on
April 15, 2007, regarding revelations of poor conditions for outpatient
soldiers at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. At those hearings, you
discussed the many ways the Army planned to address the issues at
Walter Reed, including personnel changes, the creation of new offices
to address the specific needs of wounded soldiers, and changes in the
resources and facilities for outpatient care.
What is your assessment of the overall changes that have been made
thus far at Walter Reed, and what more needs to be done?
Answer. I am encouraged by the accomplishments made by MG Gale
Pollock, Acting Surgeon General, MG Eric Schoomaker, Commander, Walter
Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), and his Deputy, BG Michael Tucker,
over the past 90 days. They have shown a commitment to correcting
deficiencies in the management of outpatient care, to include providing
for the needs of the families of our brave soldiers. As a result of
these efforts, along with others planned for the coming months, I am
confident that our warriors in transition and their families will to
receive the best medical and restorative care and support services
possible.
Question. What specific changes have been made to address the
issues of care and treatment for outpatients and their families?
Answer. The most important steps taken to date are the
establishment at WRAMC of the Warrior Transition Brigade (WTB), along
with the introduction of the concept of a ``triad'' of a primary care
manager (usually a physician), a nurse case manager, and a squad
leader. The WTB provides the leadership structure necessary to allow
our warriors to focus on healing. Soldiers previously living in
Building 18 now reside in high quality housing: Abrams Hall and the
Mologne House, located on the WRAMC Campus, both provide telephone,
cable television, and internet service in each warrior in transition
room. As a result of the findings of the 2006 Army's Physical
Disability Evaluation Transformation Initiative, WRAMC is beta testing
a streamlined approach to Medical Evaluation Board processing, reducing
the number of required documents from 38 to 18. Another accomplishment
is the establishment of the Soldier Family Assistance Center (SFAC). At
WRAMC, the SFAC is centrally located within the hospital and is
designed to support the needs of warrior family members. The SFAC is a
concept that has worked with great success at Brooke Army Medical
Center in San Antonio, TX, and I believe will be of great benefit at
WRAMC and to all Army treatment facilities. These and numerous other
improvements that Major General Schoomaker and his staff have
implemented at WRAMC are part of a comprehensive AMAP that was first
implemented in April 2007. I am confident that the Army is not only
correcting the deficiencies at WRAMC, but is developing a comprehensive
program to ensure that warriors in transition and their families
receive the best quality care and support possible at all Army
treatment facilities.
Question. If confirmed, what measures would you propose to minimize
or mitigate the detrimental effects, if any, from the closure of Walter
Reed as required by the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Round?
Answer. The Army, working with DOD and Congress, is seeking to
accelerate the construction of the new center at Bethesda. The Army is
committed that WRAMC will remain fully operational until the new center
is fully operational. The ability to manage patient care functions
between the medical centers appropriately and seamlessly, is
facilitated by the ongoing functional integration of clinical services
at WRAMC and National Naval Medical Center (NNMC). The Army expects
that all the major clinical services at WRAMC and NNMC will be
functionally integrated before the end of the current calendar year.
Integrated clinical service provides active patient management spanning
inpatient and outpatient at both institutions. When the transition from
WRAMC to the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center is
completed, all of the lessons learned and the functional integration
process will be fully implemented. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
that we maintain WRAMC at full operational capacity until the NNMC is
prepared to provide medical care to our soldiers.

MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The Army is facing significant shortages in critically
needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve components. The
committee is concerned that growing medical support requirements,
caused by the stand-up of Brigade Combat Teams, potential growth of the
Army, surge requirements in theater, and other factors will compound
the already serious challenges faced in recruitment and retention of
medical, dental, nurse, and behavioral health personnel. Moreover, the
committee understands that the Army continues to direct conversion of
military medical billets to civilian or contractor billets.
If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review of the
medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new
requirements for 2008 and beyond?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will undertake a comprehensive review
of the medical support requirements for the Army, to include a review
of authorities necessary to increase recruitment and retention of
medical, dental, nurse, and behavioral health personnel.
Question. What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think
are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill
medical support requirements as its mission and end strength grow?
Answer. To continue to fulfill medical support requirements as its
mission and end strength grow, the Army needs to explore the use of
special pays and retention bonuses for health care professionals and
authority to appoint officers in the Army Medical Department with a
reduced military service obligation. We also need to explore ways to
improve TRICARE services for soldiers and families.

NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM

Question. Congress enacted broad changes in the DOD civilian
personnel system in 2004 to provide the Department with more flexible
tools for the management of its civilian workforce in support of our
national security. However, DOD employee unions have strongly resisted
the implementation of the proposed new system.
What is your view of the success of the National Security Personnel
System (NSPS) implementation within the Army so far, and if confirmed,
what would be your expectation for continued implementation of NSPS
within the Army?
Answer. The implementation of NSPS thus far is successful. More
than 41,000 Army civilians have now been converted to NSPS.
Implementation efforts have been well planned and managed and have
incorporated a robust program of communication and training for Army
managers and employees. The Army's first pay-for-performance rating
cycle was also successful with employees receiving performance-based
pay in January 2007. The NSPS performance management process resulted
in greater communication between supervisors and employees to develop
meaningful job objectives aligned with organizational goals and
resulting performance ratings reflected the workforce's contribution
toward achieving such goals. NSPS has allowed for increased flexibility
in rewarding exceptional performance. Lessons learned from our
implementation experiences are being used to adjust policy and
training. An additional 29,000 employees are scheduled for conversion
to NSPS during the November 2007 to February 2008 timeframe.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
broader employee acceptance of NSPS?
Answer. Management support and accountability are essential to
employee acceptance. If confirmed, I will assure that managers are held
accountable for communicating performance expectations, and that they
provide fair and equitable ratings. Building consensus through
communication and transparency is paramount to successful
implementation. Therefore, the Army will maximize our unprecedented
training effort to ensure that all participants understand the new
system and their roles in making it successful.
Question. Based on your experience, what are the critical factors
for successful implementation of a total transformation of work force
policies and rules, including performance-based pay?
Answer. Among the factors I consider critical are leadership
commitment and support, and an educated and knowledgeable workforce.
NSPS is a key pillar in Army's transformation plan and is integral to
developing the right mix of people and skills across the Total Force. I
will ensure all leaders are committed to NSPS and remain engaged in the
successful implementation. Further, I will endorse a pay-for-
performance system that is consistent, fair, equitable, and recognizes
our employees based on their contribution to mission accomplishment.
Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor the acceptance of the
NSPS and what role would you expect to play in managing the NSPS
implementation in the Army?
Answer. I strongly support the need for transformation in civilian
management. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate actively the
effectiveness and impact of the implementation of NSPS and will set
that tone for the leadership in the Army as we continue to implement
NSPS. The Army has established an NSPS Program Management Office that
recommends Army NSPS policy, provides guidance, monitors
implementation, and will keep me informed of progress and any issues
that require my attention. These policy decisions are made with the
guidance of an NSPS General Officer Steering Committee. In addition to
the inclusion of NSPS-specific questions in Army's annual workforce
survey, onsite evaluations to assess program effectiveness are being
performed which will provide additional implementation feedback and
lessons learned. Finally, Army, along with the other Services, works
closely with the Program Executive Office, NSPS, on evaluation methods
and tools that will be useful for monitoring NSPS and its acceptance.
The Army will be able to consider DOD-wide survey and implementation
results, and compare them to what we find through Army.

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with
it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward
thinking management of senior executives.
What is your vision for the management and development of the Army
senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important
areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and
technical fields?
Answer. The Department of the Army has taken a very deliberate and
direct approach to Senior Executive Service (SES) management within the
Army. If confirmed, I intend to continue this initiative. The Army
looks to its SES Corps as a replacement for military leaders in
critically important areas, such as acquisition, financial management,
science, engineering, and human resource management fields. As the Army
has sent its flag officers into joint billets to support the war, it
has replaced them with SES members. Army is reallocating positions to
ensure senior executives are aligned with evolving business strategy.
My vision for the management and development of senior executives is a
senior civilian workforce that possesses a broad background of
experiences to prepare them to move between positions in order to meet
the continually changing mission needs of the Army. Those experiences
will have been gained in the Army and in other military departments and
agencies. There will be a systematic and progressive assignment pattern
for executives that will lead them to positions of greater
responsibility. I am committed to providing for the professional
development and management of our civilian executives in ways
consistent with what the Army has done for its General Office Corps for
many years. As the Army moves forward with its transformation, if
confirmed, I will be committed to reinforcing and institutionalizing
the value that each senior executive brings to the leadership team and
to promoting and sustaining high morale and esprit de corps.

RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION

Question. In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and
systems have been characterized as ``inefficient and rigid'' and
readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind,
cross-leveling, and reset policies.
What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve
component forces in meeting combat missions?
Answer. I support the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army
Reserve (USAR) transitioning from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational
Reserve that will provide the rotational depth needed to meet our
global commitments and homeland defense and homeland security
requirements. Our ``Grow the Army Plan'' is based on lessons learned
and a thorough analysis of combatant commander requirements. As we
transform and rebalance our Reserve components they will enhance the
Army's strategic depth. The Army proposes to grow the Reserve component
by 9,000 by fiscal year 2012. As we grow the force, the ARNG will
continue to transform to Brigade Combat Teams and rebalance its force
structure to provide additional Combat Support and Combat Service
Support capabilities. The USAR will continue to rebalance its
institutional force and to increase Combat Support and Combat Service
Support operational force capacity.
Question. What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current
Reserve Force management policies?
Answer. The Army's goal for mobilization of Reserve component units
will remain a 1-year mobilized to 5-years demobilized ratio. However,
due to operational demand, some units may be remobilized sooner. In
order to meet joint force requirements, the Army is adapting and
implementing the ARFORGEN process. The goal of the ARFORGEN process is
provide us a flow of ready forces to meet operational requirements and
will provide predictability for our soldiers, families, and employers.
ARFORGEN, when fully implemented together with our Reserve component
utilization policy and our rebalancing initiatives should provide us
with the flexibility and capabilities we need for our Operational
Reserve.
Question. Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively
to the Reserve?
Answer. I support Army efforts to balance our capabilities within
and across the Active component, National Guard, and Army Reserve to
develop a total force that provides strategic depth and full-spectrum
capabilities. The combined effects of growing the force, rebalancing,
and transforming to a modular force will posture the Army to meet the
needs of the Nation by increasing Combat, Combat Support, and Combat
Service Support capabilities.

ARMY FAMILY ACTION PLAN

Question. The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in
identifying and promoting quality-of-life issues for Army families.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to
ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately
resourced?
Answer. If confirmed, meeting the needs of our soldiers and their
families will be my highest priority. The Army Family Action Plan
(AFAP) will play an important role in meeting this priority. The AFAP
is a dynamic program which enables the military community to share and
raise issues which are most pressing to Army soldiers, civilians, and
family members. This process further allows senior leadership to
address and/or resolve issues brought forward or identified by these
members of the Army community. AFAP is recognized and supported by
commanders and is the force behind legislative, regulatory, and policy
changes as well as improvements to programs and services across the
Services. Current funding and staffing shortfalls challenge the ability
to provide sufficient support to command, soldiers, and family members.
Army Community Service (ACS) programs and services are instrumental in
alleviating family member stress by building strong resilient families
and increasing soldier and family readiness. Compassion fatigue and
burnout are beginning to impact staff, Family Readiness Group (FRG)
leaders, and leader spouses as they provide needed programs and
services to family members. To address this concern, the Family and
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Command is developing and training
Mobile Assistance Teams to relocate to installations to augment and
provide respite. Additionally, to meet surge capabilities and address
reintegration and reunion issues, additional Military Family Life
Consultants are needed. These professionals provide consistent support
and education to soldiers and families on dealing with the effects of
deployments by developing positive coping mechanisms.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, BRAC, extended deployment lengths, and the
planned growth of the Army?
Answer. Army Community Service has worked extensively with
garrisons to develop individual plans to meet staffing, funding, and
programming needs. The Army updates these plans quarterly to ensure
centers are continually addressing staffing and resource requirements
and are changing missions and strategies to meet mission and deployment
surge capabilities. If confirmed, I would monitor these plans to ensure
that family needs are addressed as the Army grows and undertakes global
restationing, BRAC, and extended deployments.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve
component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family
readiness?
Answer. Supporting families of our geographically dispersed
soldiers and family members poses special challenges but will be a high
priority for me if I am confirmed. The Army has developed an Integrated
Multi-component Family Support Network (IMFSN) to assist us in meeting
this challenge. If confirmed, I would support the efforts of IMFSN and
other programs to ensure that family support systems and services are
accessible, consistent, and predictable for Guard and Reserve soldiers,
and family members during all phases of deployment. We do not have all
the answers but we must engage with Reserve component soldiers and
families to develop programs that meet their needs. The welfare of the
Army family, Active and Reserve components, is critical to the health
of the U.S. Army.

MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT TEAM IV

Question. The Army's mental health assessment studies in the Iraqi
theater have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health
conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in
OIF.
Based on the findings of MHAT IV that soldiers experience increase
stress due to multiple and lengthened deployments, what actions would
you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate numbers of mental
health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon
their return?
Answer. The Army is committed to providing our soldiers the best
mental health care possible. Indeed, we are now initiating an effort to
recruit an additional 200 mental health professionals, to be based in
CONUS and in theater. The Army plans other major changes as part of our
comprehensive AMAP. Next month, the Army will roll out an extensive
educational program on PTSD and TBI for all its soldiers and leaders.
This program consists of a standardized presentation commanders will
use to inform and educate both soldiers and leaders. The teaching
materials and visual support products are in the final stages of
development and are undergoing review by military and civilian health
professionals. The Army also is developing proposals for establishing
TBI and PTSD Centers of Excellence to provide nationwide education and
training to Army leaders, clinicians, soldiers, and their families.
Additionally, under current practices mental health assessments are
conducted on all soldiers prior to deploying, immediately upon
redeployment, and 3 to 6 months following redeployment.
Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of
the Army's mental health assessment teams, and what are the lessons
which can be applied to future deployments?
Answer. The MHATs have many valuable findings, including: 1) the
impact of deployment lengths and multiple deployments on soldiers'
mental health; 2) the level of combat continues to be the main
determinant of a soldier's mental-health status; 3) good NCO leadership
is the key to sustaining a soldier's mental health and well-being; 4)
the suicide prevention program needs to be modified for the combat
environment; and 5) there continues to be a perceived stigma for those
that seek mental health care. The importance of leadership in the
mitigation of mental health difficulties is one of many lessons that
can be applied to future deployments. If I am confirmed, I will also
reinforce the need to provide comprehensive and easily accessible
behavioral health care, both in theater and at home.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE RECALL POLICY

Question. A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies recommended that the Army revitalize its
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program by culling existing IRR
databases and ensuring that the Army has valid contact information on
IRR members who may be recalled to serve.
What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that
applies to both officer and enlisted members of the IRR?
Answer. DOD IRR policy mandates the separation within 2 years of
IRR officers who have fulfilled their Military Service Obligation
unless they elect to remain in the IRR. To date, over 10,000 IRR
officers have been notified that they have to make this election.
Approximately 75 percent have been transferred to the inactive status
list or separated. The Army is developing a policy applicable to the
enlisted IRR population that will also transfer nonparticipants to the
inactive status list until separation. The Army has clarified current
mobilization policy in the Personnel Policy Guidance which is made
available on the Web and made specifically available to the IRR
soldiers via the IRR soldier portal, a Web site maintained exclusively
for IRR soldiers and their families.
Question. What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization
database?
Answer. The Army has several initiatives to improve the IRR
database. Two of the initiatives seek to improve IRR data
reconciliation and control of the IRR population. These initiatives
address methods to reset the force by conducting a systematic screening
of all data records for nonmobilization assets, to include soldiers
passed over for promotion, those with security violations, physical
disqualifications, documented hardship, and adverse characterizations
of service. Following such a screening, the Army would determine the
appropriate disposition of individuals and process for final resolution
those soldiers who no longer have further potential for useful military
service. When appropriate, these soldiers are being separated.
Additionally, the Human Resources Command has processed over 20,000
existing bad addresses through a new contract with a credit bureau
agency reducing the number of incorrect addresses from 35 percent to 10
percent on the database. Through these combined efforts, the IRR
population has been reduced by approximately 25 percent to
approximately 78,000.
Question. What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the
All-Volunteer Total Force, and what is your opinion about the role the
IRR should play in the future?
Answer. The IRR has served honorably and has been a critical
element to fill shortfalls in the both the Active and Reserve
components. As of June 2007, the Army has mobilized 10,339 IRR soldiers
to augment the global war on terror. The IRR will continue to serve a
critical role in the future. In accordance with the IRR Transformation
Plan, the Army is taking measures to change the ``cultural'' attitude
about the IRR from a strategic to an operational force. Those IRR
soldiers meeting operational readiness will be referred to as
Individual Warriors with the ability to earn a Reserve retirement
through various opportunities targeted specifically at them for their
active role in participating in the program.

OFFICER SHORTAGES

Question. A report issued by the Congressional Research Service
(CRS) in July 2006 found that the Army projects an officer shortage of
nearly 3,000 in fiscal year 2007, with the most acute shortfalls in the
grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years of service. Unless
corrective action is taken, CRS found that shortages will persist
through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention improves.
What is your understanding of the reasons for the current
shortfall, and what steps is the Army taking to meet this mid-career
officer shortfall?
Answer. The current Army need to grow the officer corps is
primarily due to increased requirements for Regular Army Competitive
Category captains and majors. These will increase from 23,500 in 2005
to nearly 30,000 by 2010. Retention rates are slightly below historical
averages but account for a small percentage of the shortfall. Steps to
address this shortfall are answered in the next answer.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure
adequate numbers of highly-qualified captains and majors are serving on
Active-Duty over the next 10 years?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the Army's strategy to meet
these added requirements by increasing lieutenant accessions and
raising the selection rates for captains and majors. The Army has also
called to Active-Duty Reserve component officers and accepted increased
numbers of interservice transfers of officers with the Blue to Green
program, generating 1,000 additional officers. The second part of the
Army's strategy is a proposal to retain officers who otherwise would
leave Active Duty. The retention tools include a captain's retention
menu of incentives including graduate school education, preferences for
basing, and a $20,000 Captain's Critical Skills Retention Bonus at a
greater rate. The growth of Army requirements necessitates retaining
mid-grade officers in critical skills. While unprecedented for the
Army, bonuses to retain mid-grade officers are being employed very
successfully by the Navy. If confirmed, it will be one of my most
important tasks to fill our increasing demand for captains and majors
by keeping our current force of combat-experienced junior officers in
the Army.

NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, AND READINESS

Question. Legislative proposals introduced in 2006 and 2007,
recommendations by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves
submitted on March, 1, 2007, and responses by the Department in
response to these calls for change are all currently under
consideration.
How do you assess the changes in the roles and mission of the
National Guard and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau?
Answer. The past 4\1/2\ years of war and emergencies at home have
demonstrated the degree to which the Nation relies on the National
Guard. As we have increasingly utilized the National Guard at home and
overseas, it has become clear that the National Guard must be
organized, trained, and equipped to serve as an integral part of our
operational force, not a ``Strategic Reserve.'' The Army, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Reserve component leaders are working together to
provide greater predictability and support for our Reserve component
soldiers, their families, and employers. In support of these missions
and the Defense Secretary's new policy, the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau is working with the Governors, Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the Army
and Air Force, as well as other Federal agencies when National Guard
Forces are supporting those agencies. We rely on the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau to act as our key link to and advisor on matters
pertaining to the National Guard. It is a testament to the inherent
flexibility of the current organization of the National Guard Bureau
that not one mission has been unexecuted in this environment of high-
demand, dual-purpose requirements, and I would expect that
extraordinary performance to continue.
Question. Do you think that the current Army processes for
planning, programming, and budgeting sufficiently address the
requirements of the National Guard? What is the appropriate role for
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?
It has been my experience as the Under Secretary that the current
Army planning, programming, and budgeting process has been effective in
examining, assessing, prioritizing, and allocating resources to the
Total Army--the Active component and the Reserve component. The Army is
currently executing and programming unprecedented resource levels to
the Reserve component. The Director of the Army National Guard and
Chief, National Guard Bureau are fully represented in Army planning and
programming deliberations. Their respective staffs have been integrated
directly into the Department of the Army headquarters staff so that we
fully understand Reserve component requirements and so that there is
full transparency resulting in an improved total force. As a result,
the Chief, National Guard Bureau and Director of the Army National
Guard have maintained a ``One Army'' perspective and spirit. If I am
confirmed, I will ensure that the Active and Reserve component will
continue to work in concert to provide the land component capabilities
our Nation needs.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the resourcing
needs of the National Guard are fully considered and resourced through
the Army budget?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that leaders from the
National Guard are included fully in budget planning, negotiations, and
execution. As the Acting Secretary of the Army, I work closely with
National Guard leaders and will continue to do so. Further, as the
Acting Secretary of the Army, I have been engaged with the leaders of
the Guard and Reserve, the Secretary of Defense, and the other military
departments in an effort to implement or incorporate several of the
goals and improvements that are contained in proposed legislation or
have been recommended by the Commission. One of those improvements is
to amend the Charter to specify that the Chief, National Guard Bureau
will also serve as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters involving planning,
operation, and integration of non-Federalized National Guard Forces,
and other matters as the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.
If confirmed, I will work in full partnership within DOD to assess the
way ahead for the National Guard.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of the National
Guard Bureau vis-a-vis the Army, Air Force, and Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. As the Acting Secretary of the Army, I have been engaged
with the Secretary of Defense, National Guard leaders, and the other
military departments in an effort to implement several of the goals and
improvements that are contained in proposed legislation or have been
recommended by the Commission. As directed by the Secretary of Defense,
the Department of Defense and the Army are in the process of
implementing the proposals attached as Exhibit A to these questions.

SPACE

Question. The Army has recently restructured its program executive
office for air and missile defense to include Army space efforts, and
issued a new Army space policy.
Are you satisfied that current DOD management structures adequately
support Army equities in space?
Answer. I believe that there are opportunities for improvement. The
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System helps to ensure
all Service equities are addressed but is too slow and cumbersome when
applied to unique space systems. The establishment of an Executive
Agent for Space is a positive development to bring together these
inherently joint and interagency capabilities but the current processes
are immature. These processes will continue to evolve and will further
enhance the Army's equities in space.
Question. Are you satisfied with the current level of effort in the
Army related to space programs? Do you believe these efforts have the
right focus?
Answer. As the importance of space programs increases across DOD,
we need to continually keep pace within the Army to ensure that we
fully leverage these capabilities. Some of our capabilities are one of
a kind, and we are working to ensure we can maintain the capabilities
needed to support our forces. The Army's Senior Space Council,
comprised of two- and three-star generals with vested interests in
space, monitor Army efforts related to space programs and are chartered
to ensure Army space needs are addressed. In addition, the Army is
developing a cadre of space professionals by leveraging joint education
resources.
Question. The Army currently defines its space career field as a
subset of the information technology career field. Do you believe the
information technology career field structure is adequate to support
Army space interests?
Answer. Although space officers are managed in the Information
Operations technology career field, they are individually managed by a
dedicated space assignment officer. This structure ensures the space
officers receive the necessary guidance and developmental assignments.
Question. Do you believe that the space career fields of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force should be integrated?
Answer. While we continue to strive to achieve greater jointness
and integration in space operations, I do not believe that the Services
space career fields should be integrated. Addressing the Army only, I
believe that we need a core of space professionals that deeply
understand Army needs, doctrine, and operations.
Question. Does the Army plan to assign personnel to the new
Operational Responsive Space Office (ORSO)?
Answer. Yes, the extent and at what rank will be decided as the
office design is finalized. The Army considers the ORSO a key emerging
space office and is actively participating in the development and
expects to play an integral part in the long-term operation.

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
PROMOTIONAL VIDEO

1. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, in 2004, you participated in a
promotional video for the Christian Embassy (CE) that featured senior
military and civilian defense officials and was filmed inside the
Pentagon. What was your understanding as to the audience for whom this
video was intended?
Mr. Geren. The CE is one of the many religious groups of various
faiths that provide programs and services to the civilian and military
personnel in the Pentagon. During my tenure in Congress and my first 2
years in the Pentagon, I participated in the CE programs. The programs
are provided free of charge to participants. I was asked by a member of
the CE staff to record a statement to the supporters who sponsor the CE
programs speaking to the value of the program and thanking them for
their support. I understood the audience to be the people who made the
various programs possible. I was surprised to learn it was put on the
internet and had distribution broader than the people who supported the
CE programs. It was intended as a message of thanks to the people who
made the work of the CE possible. When I learned it had been posted on
a Web site (2 years after it was recorded) I requested that it be
removed and it was.

2. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, do you believe that it was
appropriate for Department of Defense (DOD) officials to permit the
filming of this video inside the Pentagon? If not, do you believe that
it was appropriate for you to participate in the video?
Mr. Geren. I understood my participation to serve to thank the
people who made the CE programs in the Pentagon possible. As the
programs are publicly advertised and held in the Pentagon, the same as
programs for other faiths, it did not occur to me that an expression of
gratitude to the sponsors and supporters was inappropriate. I recognize
that I should not use my position in the Department to advance fund-
raising efforts by nonprofits. Filming should not be done in the
Pentagon in a manner where the surroundings are identifiable and could
be perceived as official endorsement by the Department. At the time, it
did not seem inappropriate, however, knowing what I know now and
considering my position today I would decline to be interviewed.

3. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, do you believe that it would be
appropriate for you to participate in such a video as Secretary of the
Army or Acting Secretary of the Army?
Mr. Geren. No. It would not be appropriate to use my position in
DOD to endorse any other organization other than the Combined Federal
Campaign (CFC), Army Emergency Relief, and those organizations listed
in the Joint Ethics Regulation, section 3-210, for which official
support is authorized. Further, I recognize that even though I may
endorse the CFC, it is inappropriate to use my position to endorse any
individual participant.

4. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, what impact, if any, do you
believe your participation in this video is likely to have on your
credibility on issues regarding the role of religion in the military,
should you be confirmed as Secretary?
Mr. Geren. I hope it will have no impact, but I cannot predict with
certainty how the matter may be viewed or construed by others. I
believe you will find that my record, both public and private, would
demonstrate that I respect the rights, liberties, and beliefs of
others. I assure you that, if confirmed, I will conduct the
responsibilities of this office fully respectful of the religious
beliefs of all faiths, and of those who have no faith.

U.S. ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE IN EUROPE

5. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, in your written responses to the
advance policy questions regarding basing options to support the
proposed growth of the Army, you state that there are no plans to use
European basing options. This contradicts the Army's notice of intent
published in the Federal Register on May 16, 2007. This notice
describes the Army's proposed programmatic environmental impact
statement (PEIS) for basing options to support the proposed growth of
the Army, and specifically refers to bases outside the United States.
Please clarify your written response to this question. Is the Army
considering options to put any newly created units in Europe?
Mr. Geren. The PEIS is one of several tools used to assist
decisionmakers. As required by the National Environmental Policy Act,
the PEIS will analyze alternatives that are reasonable and realistic as
we develop solutions to station the larger Army force. One of the
alternatives will look at using existing infrastructure in order to
properly analyze environmental impacts. However, our current strategy
is based on the Global Defense Posture Review that calls for a more
continental United States (CONUS)-based, joint and expeditionary Army.

6. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, is the Army considering options
that would leave units in Europe that might otherwise have been
relocated to the United States prior to the proposal to increase the
size of the Army?
Mr. Geren. The Army is currently executing the Global Defense
Posture Review which restations a number of Germany-based units to
CONUS locations and is programmed to be completed by fiscal year 2011.
The Army must, however, continue to assess the continually changing
strategic environment so that it can support our National Security and
Military Strategy and meet the combatant commanders' requirements while
fighting the global war on terror. For analytical assessments, this
leaves all options open for consideration. At this time, there have
been no recommendations or plans submitted by the Army to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for stationing additional forces in
Europe or to reverse previous decisions regarding the 2004 Global
Defense Posture Review.

7. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, your answer may not be the same
to both questions, yet in either case, such actions, which your Federal
Register notice states the Army is considering, would require the Army
as a manner of prudent management to make these basing decisions before
making any irrevocable decisions to return property to the German
government. Is the Army going to make these basing decisions before
turning over any property in Germany that might be needed to support
the basing options described in the Army's Federal Register notice?
Mr. Geren. DOD should not take irrevocable action to return
property or move units from overseas before it has determined the CONUS
locations for the new Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). Installations in
Germany should be considered strategic assets and any action to return
property to host nations must be carefully weighed against future
strategic requirements and previous decisions.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

SEAMLESS ADMINISTRATION TRANSITION

8. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren, administration changes are often
times of discontinuity in Service programs, policies, and even
personnel. These discontinuities could lead to a loss of critical
capabilities while the Army is still heavily engaged in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere. If confirmed, what do you plan to do to
make the transition between administrations more seamless and having
the least negative impact on Army capabilities, soldiers, and
civilians?
Mr. Geren. My goal is to do everything possible to make the
transition to a new administration seamless and as least disruptive as
possible for the Army. I will work with civilian and military leaders
in the Army to plan and execute the transition in full cooperation with
the representatives of the new administration. During a change in
administration each Service has a presidential appointee from the
previous administration in place during the transition of
administrations for continuity. The Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army manages the political transition for the Army.
She will work with the Director of the Army staff and the transition
team of the incoming official to ensue a seamless transition for both
the Army and the incoming official. The Director of the Army staff is
enlisted to assist in collecting information papers from the Army staff
to provide the incoming official, after confirmation, information they
will require in their first 90 days in office. A travel schedule is
also developed to get the incoming official to see and meet with Army
installations. To aid in this transition, I will also make available
all necessary records and files as well as make myself personally
available to the transition team.

MANUFACTURING RESEARCH

9. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren, if confirmed, how will you ensure
that the Army's Manufacturing Technology program is effective in
developing manufacturing technologies and processes that can increase
the capability and reduce the costs of Army systems?
Mr. Geren. The ability to efficiently manufacture technologically
advanced material is essential to achieve our science and technology
(S&T) strategy. I would sustain our efforts to synchronize
manufacturing processes and new technology development. This increases
the opportunities to accelerate technology transition into production
and to provide enhanced capabilities to our soldiers. For mature
technologies that are already fielded in systems, the manufacturing
technology program seeks to develop improved components and or
techniques to manufacture components to reduce production costs or
sustainment costs.

10. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren, how will you work to ensure that
these innovative manufacturing processes are widely distributed and
adopted throughout the defense industrial base?
Mr. Geren. I will support continued industry collaboration and
information sharing about innovative manufacturing technology processes
to promote industry-wide understanding and implementation of advanced
techniques to reduce acquisition and sustainment costs of Army systems.

ARMY UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROGRAMS

11. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren, if confirmed, how will you
determine what is the appropriate level of investment for the Army in
university research programs that develop next generation combat
capabilities while training the next generation of engineers,
scientists, and technology leaders?
Mr. Geren. The Army's S&T investment portfolio seeks balance across
the three budget activities of basic research (18 percent), applied
research (40 percent), and technology development (42 percent) to
transform new understanding into enabling technology for warfighting
capability. We believe this to be an appropriate balance to execute our
S&T strategy that seeks to provide near-term solutions to warfighter
needs today while simultaneously pursuing research that will enable
brand new or perhaps unforeseen technology applications in the mid- and
far-term. We invest roughly 18 percent of the requested S&T budget or
over $300 million a year into basic research. Of that nearly 70 percent
is provided to universities. Despite many competing demands for
resources to engage in the global war on terrorism we have been able to
sustain roughly this level of research funding since the beginning of
the decade. Army research funding has been sufficient to capitalize on
new opportunities in nanoscience and biosciences as well as advanced
simulations to enable technology in new types of materials for soldier
protection, situational awareness, and sustainment. It is always
challenging to determine an optimum amount in any area of investment;
however, based upon our experience we think that the research
investment levels are appropriate to the total investment in research
and development at $10.6 billion in the President's budget request for
fiscal year 2008.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

TROOP MAIL DELIVERY

12. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, as we discussed during your
hearing, the Army Times last week reported on the massive backlog of
mail delivery at Walter Reed. According to the article, the backlog was
the fault of a contract employee who held onto mail for individuals who
he was unable to locate. You indicated that you have not yet verified
whether this problem is unique to Walter Reed, and is not occurring at
our other medical centers. Would you please check to see if this is an
isolated instance, and notify us of your findings when you are done?
Mr. Geren. The incident at Walter Reed was an isolated event. I
directed an assessment of the 10 most populated medical hold mail
facilities for Wounded Warrior Transition Units and all 10 facilities
received a satisfactory rating.

13. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, in 2004, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that the Secretary of Defense
develop and implement an action plan based on lessons learned from
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to resolve issues with mail delivery to
the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The GAO report was report number
GAO-04-084, titled, ``Operation Iraqi Freedom Longstanding Problems
Hampering Mail Delivery Need to Be Resolved,'' dated April 2004. DOD,
in its formal review of this report, concurred with GAO's
recommendations and was, at the time, taking steps to implement them.
During your confirmation hearing, I asked you if you knew whether DOD
had completed the actions recommended in the GAO report, and if any
surveys of the troops have been conducted to see if their satisfaction
with the mail service has improved. You indicated that you did not
know, but would check into it and find out. Would you please inform us
of your findings?
Mr. Geren. DOD has implemented the recommendations for executive
action as specified in the GAO report. Currently, the primary method of
measuring our quality assurance of mail service provided is through the
DOD Interactive Customer Evaluation system (ICE). This is a Web-based
customer survey available to all DOD employees to submit complaints or
comments on a variety of issues, including the postal service.
Currently, neither ICE nor installation commanders have generated any
negative reports back to the Military Postal Service Agency. The U.S.
Army Military Postal Service Agency is committed to providing the
highest quality of service in support of all servicemembers deployed
around the world.

STRYKER TRAINING

14. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, as you may know, the Army has
agreed to limit training necessary to prepare the 25th Infantry
Division's 2nd BCT to fight in Iraq as a Stryker Combat unit. Based on
the Army's own assessment of its needs, it is my understanding that
five training programs, four at Schofield Barracks and one at the Big
Island's Pohakuloa Training area, were allowed to continue. Do you
believe that the more limited training program outlined by the Army
will afford Hawaii's Stryker Brigade the training necessary to fulfill
their mission requirements? If your answer is no, do you anticipate
that the Army will need to transfer the Stryker Brigade training
activities currently conducted in Hawaii to an alternate location?
Mr. Geren. The limitations on training of the Stryker Brigade
Combat Team (SBCT) were due to litigation over the environmental impact
statement and the Army's decision to transform the 2-25 to a SBCT in
Hawaii. The litigation resulted in the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals and the U.S. District Court in Hawaii placing temporary
injunctions on this transformation and training until the Army
completes a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement. The Army then
outlined an extensive training program, consisting of live fire and
non-live fire training tasks, necessary to transform 2-25 SBCT and
prepare it for deployment to Iraq later this year. In its Interim
Injunction Order, the U.S. District Court allowed the Army to proceed
with a limited training program, as well as the completion of the
Stryker equipment fielding process.
What you refer to as the five training programs the Court allowed
the Army to proceed with are actually five Stryker-related construction
projects, not training programs. Three of these construction projects
are training ranges, one is the Stryker motor pool and one is the
multiple deployment facility. These are the projects the Army
identified as being critical to preparing 2-25 SBCT for its deployment.
The training of 2-25 SBCT in Hawaii has been conducted within the
limits of the injunction. It will be supplemented with training at the
Southern California Logistics Area in August which is necessitated by
the scope of the injunction. This training, in conjunction with
training in September to be conducted at the National Training Center
in California, will ensure the unit is combat-ready when it arrives in
Iraq.
The Army must retain the ability to train Pacific-based units on
Hawaii, including the Hawaii-based Stryker brigade. Our units in Hawaii
provide critical support to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. The
unit must be prepared to respond to quick reaction contingencies within
the Pacific. To do this, units stationed in Hawaii require the
capability to train in Hawaii to ensure they are ready for deployment,
without the lengthy notification and off-island training periods
afforded to us in our support of OIF. This training capability is
particularly essential for our company level units and leaders.

15. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, has the Army's Environmental
Command established a time line for the completion of the court ordered
supplemental environmental impact statement?
Mr. Geren. Yes. The supplemental environmental impact statement is
scheduled for completion by November 5, 2007, with a record of decision
by December 5, 2007, which then completes the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) process.

NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT

16. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, one of the concerns that is
being expressed by many States today is the shortage of equipment for
National Guard, and the potential that equipment shortages may make it
difficult for the Army National Guard (ARNG) to respond effectively to
any disasters that may occur. Most National Guard units were not fully
equipped before the Iraq War, and the equipment shortages have been
made more severe by the Guard deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
problem is exacerbated for Hawaii (and probably Alaska, too) because of
the physical separation from the rest of the States making it difficult
for neighboring States to provide assistance in the event of a
disaster. Has the National Guard developed plans by which they can
rapidly share equipment between neighboring States during a disaster
until such time as equipment resets can be completed? In particular,
are there plans in place that would provide rapid assistance to more
remote locations, such as Hawaii, in the event of a disaster that
overwhelms the remaining capabilities of the Hawaii National Guard? If
not, will you, if confirmed, ensure that plans are made for such a
contingency?
Mr. Geren. There are several plans in place to augment the military
equipment of the Hawaii and Alaska National Guard as needed in response
to a homeland security event. National Guard Regulation 500-3, Response
Management Plan, for Civil Support Team (CST) responses, outlines the
plan to share CSTs among States. All States, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are participants in Emergency
Management Assistance Compact system (Guam is not). Every State also
makes more specific agreements with surrounding States in various forms
for support in the event of a natural or man made disaster, as part of
their emergency response planning process. Hawaii and Guam have
agreements in place with U.S. Army Pacific for Active-Duty support
during hurricanes. The Active Army and Army Reserve have identified
military equipment that could go to each State as requested. We expect
that these plans will be most effective in a predictable scenario.
Sharing equipment, particularly over the long distances to Alaska and
Hawaii, costs time. A scenario that arrives without warning or multiple
homeland security events will strain this plan. This is why the Army
plans to invest $21 billion in restocking National Guard equipment
before the end of the Future Years Defense Plan, which will restore the
percentage of National Guard domestic equipment at the nearly pre-
September 11 level.

DEPLETED URANIUM

17. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, on June 13, 2007, the Honolulu
Weekly published an article discussing depleted uranium (DU) issues in
Hawaii. As you may already know, a number of spotting rounds that
contained DU were found at Schofield Barracks while construction was
being performed for the Stryker Brigade. What is troubling about the
article is that it discusses how the Army has been unresponsive to the
concerns of local residents on this issue. This is of great concern for
me as it affects the safety of the community. Has the Army ever stored
DU munitions or any other form of DU anywhere in Hawaii or the
surrounding waters? If so, what is the current status of these
facilities?
Mr. Geren. Let me first assure you that public safety is our first
and foremost concern. Our dedication to responsiveness and the
protection of public health have shaped our actions since we discovered
DU fragments from the M101 spotting round.
We first learned that DU was used at Schofield Barracks in the
summer of 2005, when fragments from M101 spotting rounds for the Davy
Crockett weapon system were discovered during range modernization
efforts. Until this discovery, we were not aware that this formerly
classified weapon system had been used in training on Hawaii. As soon
as we became aware of the DU, we provided information about the
potential effects of DU to the command for distribution and began
archival research to determine the source and extent of the M101's use
in Hawaii. We have learned that 714 M101 spotting rounds, containing
6.7 oz each of DU, were shipped to Hawaii in April 1962.
Although there is no record that these munitions were used at
Schofield Barracks, the presence of the DU fragments from the M101
spotting round indicates that training with this round was conducted on
this range during the mid-1960s. From our archival research, we also
learned that the range footprints of the Makua Military Reservation and
the Pohakuloa Training Area would accommodate training with this
munition. As you may be aware from recent articles in Hawaii's press,
we have now conducted a scoping survey to determine if the M101
spotting rounds were also used at these ranges. Our survey confirmed
the presence of DU fragments at the Pohakuloa Training Area, but was
inconclusive at the Makua Military Reservation because of heavy
vegetation in the likely impact area, if the M101 had in fact been used
at Makua. We have also initiated a more detailed survey of Schofield
Barracks' range and determined that further investigation is required
for this range and the Pohakuloa Training Area, where DU was determined
present.
We have been working, and continue to work, with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Hawaii State Department of Health
to conduct the required investigations. We will continue this
collaborative effort as we evaluate the survey's results and determine
the response required to ensure the protection of human health and the
environment from the potential effects of DU. Additionally, we are
coordinating our efforts with the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, to obtain
their input on the medical aspects of our efforts. We have initiated
dialog with senior members of the State Legislature and the Governor's
Office to inform them of our plans. Further, we have initiated a public
outreach effort to provide updates to the public through the media and
develop other venues to ensure the widest dissemination of information
on the subject and our ongoing efforts to address DU.
Although the DU present at the impact areas on Schofield Barracks'
ranges and the Pohakuloa Training Area ranges does not present a hazard
to the public, we understand that it is a topic of significant interest
to the public and will ensure that our actions in response to the DU
are carried out in a transparent way.

18. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, if they still have DU stored in
them, have the facilities been licensed by the NRC for DU storage?
Mr. Geren. We are not storing DU munitions in Hawaii and have no
plan to do so. To our knowledge, the only DU present in Hawaii from
munitions-related activities consists of fragments from training
conducted between 1962 and 1968 using the M101 spotting round for the
Davy Crockett weapon system. We are currently working with the NRC and
the Hawaii State Department of Health to: (a) complete a detailed
survey of Schofield Barracks' range; (b) determine the actions
required, now that our scoping survey has verified the presence of DU
fragments on the Pohakuloa Training Area; and (c) decide what approach
will be taken to address the Makua Military Reservation where
overgrowth and explosive hazards precluded the conduct of a scoping
study. We will continue this collaborative effort as we evaluate the
results of our completed surveys, and determine the response required
to ensure the protection of human health and the environment from the
potential effects of DU.
If required to support our response action, we will obtain an
appropriate license from the NRC.

19. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, has the Army ever used DU for
any purpose (i.e., for munitions or any other purpose) anywhere in
Hawaii or the surrounding waters? If so, where?
Mr. Geren. We have found records indicating 714 M101 spotting
rounds containing DU, for the Davy Crockett weapons system, were
shipped to Hawaii in 1962. We have identified DU fragments from these
munitions on both Schofield Barracks' range complex and the Pohakuloa
Training Area. While we have evidence to indicate that certain areas
within the Makua Military Reservation were also able to accommodate
training with the M101 spotting round, overgrowth and explosive hazards
precluded our ability to verify safely whether DU fragments are also
present in these areas.
To the best of our knowledge, no other Army weapon systems that use
DU munitions have been fired at PTA. Although the Army has several
current systems capable of firing DU munitions, these munitions are not
used in Hawaii. A Nuclear Regulatory License is required to fire such
munitions. The Army does not have such a license and has no plans for
activities in Hawaii that would require such an authorization.

20. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, if so, what has been done to
ensure the safety of citizens from potential exposure to DU?
Mr. Geren. Once we became aware that DU was present on Schofield
Barracks' range, we initiated monitoring for DU in surface water
runoff. Although trace uranium is present, it is well within
Environment Protection Agency (EPA) safe drinking water standards.
Until further review, we are unable to determine whether the trace
uranium found is naturally occurring uranium or manmade (DU). When our
archival research indicated that certain areas within both the Makua
Military Reservation and Pohakuloa Training Area could have supported
firing of the M101 spotting round, we initiated action to conduct a
scoping study of these areas to determine whether it was also used in
those areas.
We are currently working with the NRC and the Hawaii State
Department of Health to: (a) complete a detail survey of Schofield
Barracks' range; (b) determine the actions required, now that our
scoping survey has verified the presence of DU fragments on the
Pohakuloa Training Area; and (c) decide what approach will be taken to
address the Makua Military Reservation where overgrowth and explosive
hazards precluded the conduct of a scoping study. We will continue this
collaborative effort as we evaluate the results and determine the
response required to ensure the protection of human health and the
environment from the potential effects of DU.
Additionally, we are coordinating our efforts with the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention to obtain their input on the medical
aspects of our efforts. We have initiated dialog with senior members of
the State Legislature and the Governor's Office to inform them of our
plans. Further, we have initiated a public outreach effort to provide
updates to the public through the media and develop other venues to
ensure the widest dissemination of information on the subject and our
ongoing efforts to address DU.

21. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, has the Army taken any steps to
address the concerns of the local residents cited in the article? If
not, why not?
Mr. Geren. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health, Mr. Tad Davis, is
currently engaged in an outreach plan with local media through print,
radio, and internet. Secretary Davis has briefed staff from the offices
of Senators Inouye and Akaka, Representatives Abercrombie and Hirono,
State legislators, and other stakeholders to outline the Army's four-
point plan regarding DU in Hawaii.
The Army's four-point plan to address DU is as follows:

(1) We have and will continue to provide all information
obtained to the Hawaii State Department of Health in a timely
manner.
(2) The State has been, and will remain, a partner in the
planning and execution of our extensive survey and monitoring
effort this summer to address Schofield Barracks' range, Makua
Military Reservation, and Pohakuloa Training Area.
(3) The State will be a partner in the planning and execution
of a mutually agreed upon response.
(4) The Army will provide any necessary training to State
participants.

On August 29, 2007, we assembled a panel of experts, from every
functional area involved in the survey process, including
representatives from a variety of Army agencies, the State of Hawaii
Department of Health, the NRC, the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry, and Cabrera Services, the contractor performing the
survey, and conducted a press conference at Schofield Barracks' range
area with all major media outlets to explain our survey process,
demonstrate the technology used to detect DU, and respond to questions.
Our plan is to provide all information we obtained about DU's use
in Hawaii to the Hawaii State Department of Health and the NRC, to work
with these agencies to conduct the necessary investigations, and to
include these agencies in execution of any response necessary to ensure
the protection of human health and the environment. In addition, we
will provide any necessary training to our State partners.

22. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, is the Army planning to conduct
an outreach to the local citizens to address their concerns and to
explain what the Army is doing about them? If not, why not?
Mr. Geren. We are committed to ensuring an open and collaborative
approach with the people of Hawaii as we seek to address their concerns
regarding the presence of DU. We will continue to reach out to Hawaii's
legislators, press, and public health organizations as we work with the
NRC and the Hawaii State Department of Health to determine the response
necessary to ensure the protection of human health and the environment
from the potential effects of DU. Our August 29, 2007, press conference
demonstrated our commitment.

LAND ACQUISITION

23. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, on June 21, 2007, USA Today
published an article about the Army's need to acquire significant
amounts of land to be able to support combat training with advanced
combat technology. The article states that the Army currently uses
about 7 million acres on 102 training sites and ranges across the
country, and needs to expand those training sites by 70 percent over
the next 4 years. This means that the Army will be looking to purchase
another 4.9 million acres by 2011. The article also states that
``Proposals already underway in California, Colorado, and Hawaii would
add 540,000 acres.'' How much total property is the Army looking to
acquire in Hawaii?
Mr. Geren. The USA Today article contained factual errors. The Army
has a 5 million acre doctrinal training land shortfall worldwide;
however; we are not pursuing that amount of land for acquisition. Land
acquisition is a relatively small (albeit important) part of the Army's
overall effort to meet its training land requirements. The Army plans
to meet its training land shortfall mainly through focused management
to maximize existing land holdings, buffering through partnerships,
utilization of other Federal lands where possible, and greater reliance
on simulators.
The Army already expanded the Pohakuloa Training Area, on the
island of Hawaii, and Schofield Barracks, on the island of Oahu, for a
total of 26,000 additional acres. This land acquisition, referenced in
the USA Today article, is complete and at this time, there are no plans
for additional land acquisition in Hawaii.

24. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, what locations is the Army
considering for making these acquisitions?
Mr. Geren. In 2003, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-3,
approved the Range and Training Land Strategy (RTLS). The purpose of
the RTLS is to address the increasing land deficit facing the Army. The
RTLS serves as the mechanism to prioritize Army training land
investment, and helps to optimize the use of all Army range and
training land assets. The RTLS provides a long-range plan for the Army
to provide the best range infrastructure and training land to units.
The RTLS has five phases. The first phase was to inventory current
Army training assets. The inventory was completed in 2002 and covered
nearly 500 Active and Reserve component installations and training
locations. The second phase examined land values, parcel ownership,
environmental constraints, environmental requirements, and population
trends from public records to identify opportunities for training land
acquisition and buffering. The third phase analyzed available land data
to recommend short-term and long-term opportunities based on Army
training priorities. The RTLS process ensures that Army planners
continually reevaluate against the Army Campaign Plan (ACP), so that
any investment decisions will match stationing changes. The fourth
phase was the establishment of planning objectives and the
identification of installations where land acquisition supports the
ACP. The key to this phase was to ensure that any land acquisition
effort was feasible, affordable, and manageable in terms of
environmental restrictions. Due to the timing of this fourth phase, the
Army was able to inform base realignment and closure stationing
recommendations with respect to training land, indicating where there
is potential to mitigate land deficits through long-term investment and
management. The fifth and final phase was to evaluate public attitudes
and provide outreach support to specific land acquisitions.
The deliberate phases of the RTLS provide the framework for the
Army to select the most appropriate course of action to address
training land shortfalls at specific Army installations. The options
that the Army can pursue include focused management to maximize
existing land holdings, buffering through partnerships, utilization of
other Federal lands where possible, and land acquisition.
In response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2007, section 2827(c), the Army has submitted a Report to Congress
on Potential Expansion of Army Operational Ranges. In this document,
the Army provides details concerning training requirements for Army
units and the underlying reasons for changes to unit training
requirements for land and alternatives to meet training land
shortfalls.
As stated previously, the Army is not looking at acquiring
additional land in Hawaii. In California, the Army is currently
acquiring additional training and mitigation land around the National
Training Center. Additionally, the Army has received approval from the
Secretary of Defense to pursue up to 418,000 acres of additional
training land to expand PCMS in Colorado, and the Army is working
closely with Congress to improve that land acquisition strategy. If
additional acquisition elsewhere is deemed necessary, the Army would
submit a waiver to DOD land acquisition moratorium, and if approved by
OSD, work with Congress and the public to explain the rationale and
proceed as required by law and regulation.

25. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, has the Army begun any outreach
to the local population to engage and inform them about the Army's
plans? If not, will the Army be doing so in the near future? If not,
why not?
Mr. Geren. The Army works hard to effectively communicate with its
neighbors about our plans. When we have significant new actions, the
NEPA process becomes the structured format for involving the community
and allowing a process for questions and comments.
In addition to the formal public involvement process driven by
NEPA, the Army has developed a Sustainable Range Program (SRP) Outreach
and Communication Campaign to improve public support and the Army's
understanding of public concerns related to live training. The Campaign
provides installations with a strategy to easily and effectively
communicate with the public regarding live fire training and
encroachment challenges. A training support package has been designed
as a part of the SRP Outreach and Communication Campaign to provide
installation staff with tools to help communicate with stakeholders
(government and non-government) and the local community on sustainable
range issues.
The Army is also working with OSD to establish positions which
support our local commanders with community outreach capabilities.
These positions will build on the expertise of the Public Affairs
Community, but go beyond our focus on media outlets to create a more
enduring relationship with people and organizations.

MEASURING SUCCESS

26. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, DOD has been providing
quarterly briefings to Congress on measuring our success in Iraq. One
of the parts of the report discusses which provinces have been turned
over to the Iraqi Government for full Iraqi control, including
provincial security. One of the seven provinces which have been turned
over to Iraqi control is the Maysan Province, which the Iraqis took
over on April 18, 2007. According to DOD, several other provinces are
close to meeting the criteria necessary for ``security independence.''
During the last week, British and Iraqi forces conducted raids in Amara
in the Maysan province. The British forces did much more than provide
logistical support. They were, in fact, part of the operational force.
Twenty people, characterized as militants, insurgents, Shiite
militiamen, and terrorists in different media reports, were killed. It
does not seem like the Iraqis have truly obtained security independence
in Maysan province if every time they deal with internal security
issues, they need coalition forces to assist. For measures of success
to be useful, they must be meaningful. Do you believe that the measure
of turning over provincial security to the Iraqis is a meaningful
measure of success? If so, why?
Mr. Geren. Sir, I appreciate your question; however, it would be
more appropriately addressed by the combatant commander in Iraq.

DEPLOYMENT HEALTH CLINICAL CENTER AT WALTER REED

27. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, according to the June 18, 2007,
article on Walter Reed in the Washington Post, the Deployment Health
Clinical Center (DHCC) at Walter Reed is one of the best treatment
centers for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in the country.
Unfortunately, it is small and can only handle about 65 patients a
year. The article rightly points out that this facility should be
expanded given the patient workload coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Instead, the article says that the DHCC was forced to give up newly
renovated quarters in March and was placed in temporary space one-third
the size to make room for a Soldier and Family Assistance Center. Given
that psychological injuries currently outnumber physical injuries to
our troops by a factor of 40-to-3, what message does reducing the space
for the DHCC, and failing to expand the program of treatment offered by
the DHCC, give the troops who have psychological injuries?
Mr. Geren. While the care DHCC is offering for PTSD is a critical
component of the spectrum of care for soldiers with war-related PTSD,
only 5 percent of affected soldiers require this level of care, are
clinically appropriate for it, and consent to participate. This
translates to about 1 percent of all Walter Reed psychiatric patients.
This suggests that while there may be a role for expansion of DHCC's
program to other sites, it is not the solution for the majority of
soldiers requiring psychiatric treatment.
It is true that the DHCC was moved to make room for the newly
expanded Soldier and Family Assistance Center. Their current location
is temporary in order to accommodate expanded services and much needed
renovation on a campus where space is at a premium. The command at
Walter Reed is comprehensively addressing space requirements to best
serve the needs of patients, families, and staff. This is part of the
Army's commitment to ensuring all soldiers receive a level of medical
care and support services commensurate with the quality of their
service. Toward that end, we are working closely with DOD to establish
a National Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic
Brain Injury. The mission of the Center will be to coordinate Service
programs for TBI and psychological health by establishing best
practices, research, and education.
In addition, this summer the Army launched an unprecedented
``leader-teach'' program designed to raise awareness, promote
treatment, and reduce the stigma associated with seeking behavioral
health care. The leader-teach training program involves leaders
teaching their soldiers in a small-unit environment about the signs and
symptoms of PTSD and mild TBI. General Casey kicked off the training at
the 4-star conference on 22 June 2007. All soldiers in the Army--both
Active and Reserve component--are required to receive this important
face-to-face training over the next 90 days.

28. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, how do doctors at Walter Reed
justify placing some PTSD patients in the DHCC while others receive
less effective treatment (i.e., group therapy)?
Mr. Geren. WRAMC is totally committed to the proper treatment of
soldiers with combat-related illnesses such as PTSD. All casualties are
screened for the presence of trauma-related illness. Those patients for
whom illnesses like PTSD are identified receive a thorough,
comprehensive diagnostic evaluation and treatment plan. The entire
spectrum of treatments is considered, including all those recommended
by the National Center for PTSD Studies, the American Psychiatric
Association, and the VA/DOD Clinical Practice Guideline for the
management of Post-Traumatic Stress outlined below:

Medication therapies (SRI, anxiolytics, sleep aids, etc.)
Individual therapies (cognitive therapy, exposure therapy,
eye movement desensitization and reprocessing, stress
inoculation training)
Group therapies (supportive, psychodynamic, and cognitive
with a trauma focus)
Adjunctive therapies (OT, art therapy, rec therapy,
relaxation training, etc.)
Clinical outcomes studies have proven the effectiveness of
our care.

The therapies offered often include group therapies as an effective
component of an overall treatment program. No patients are treated with
group therapy to the exclusion of other effective therapies. Effective
treatment is patient-centric and WRAMC strives to place all soldiers in
the treatment regimen most appropriate to each soldier's needs.
The Specialized Care Program offered by DHCC is an additional level
of care that is part of a spectrum of care that is required for a small
percentage of the more highly symptomatic patients. Not all patients
require this level of intensity for a full recovery, just as all
patients with any illness do not require hospitalization or an
intensive care unit to recover from their illness.
In an effort to better address and coordinate care for PTSD, the
Army is working closely with DOD to establish a National Center of
Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury. The
mission of the center will be to coordinate Services programs for TBI
and Psychological Health by establishing best practices, research, and
education. The center will also have VA liaisons and serve as a center
for collaboration with already established VA Centers of Excellence.
The vision for this center is to create a national resource for
developing: clinical standards and evidence based practice; integrated
multi-center research; excellence in education and training; and
coordination and collaboration with Federal and non-Federal partners.

29. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, in reading the June 18, 2007,
Washington Post article on treating patients at Walter Reed with PTSD,
I am very troubled that the article seems to show that our troops are
not being treated equally. Some troops receive the top quality
individual care at the DHCC while others are receiving group therapy.
Group therapy is noted in the article as not being consistent with the
latest research on the best treatment for PTSD. Private First Class
Calloway, the subject of the Post article, was dropped from the DHCC
program because he was having difficulty meeting appointments. I am
troubled by this because he should receive treatment based on his
symptoms, not have it taken away from him as a form of punishment. Are
we consistently providing the best treatment possible to our troops
suffering from PTSD or Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)? If so, how do you
explain the Calloway case described in the Washington Post article? If
not, why not?
Mr. Geren. The 3-week long Specialized Care Program offered by DHCC
is an additional level of care that is part of a spectrum of care that
is required for a small percentage of the more highly symptomatic
patients. Not all patients require this level of intensity for a full
recovery, just as all patients with any illness do not require
hospitalization or an intensive care unit to recover from their
illness.
Group therapy is in common use for PTSD patients. Unfortunately
very little research has been done to validate the effectiveness of
group therapy, or to delineate those characteristics of therapy that
lead to improved clinical outcomes. As the field of behavioral health
care moves forward, it will be very important for that research to be
done, so that we can provide optimal treatment for all our patients.
Privacy of medical information and related legal considerations
preclude a detailed account of the specifics of PFC Calloway's health
care at DHCC. We do have some extraordinarily complex patients. All are
evaluated and offered the full spectrum of treatment recommendations
for their presenting symptoms. In some cases, patients refuse treatment
or fail to comply with treatment recommendations, which makes it
difficult to keep them in a structured treatment program. DHCC never
uses availability, access, or administration of clinical treatment for
disciplinary or punitive reasons. To use clinical treatment in this way
under any circumstances is unethical, particularly for individuals with
mental or cognitive disabilities. We always try to be flexible and
adaptive to meet the individual patient's needs.
We consistently provide the best treatment possible to our troops
suffering from PTSD and TBI. However, we are constantly striving to
improve. We are hiring more behavioral health staff and initiating more
screening for TBI. We also regularly collaborate with the National
Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and with other experts in the
civilian world to ensure that our treatment methods are the most up-to-
date.

30. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, you stated in your advance
policy question responses that ``We must not shrink from our
responsibility as a Nation to care for those who have become ill,
injured, or wounded in the service of our Nation--and we must do better
for those suffering from PTSD and TBI.'' I know that all of the members
of this committee agree with you on that point. We know that the Army
has been taking corrective actions over the past couple of months to
eliminate the deficiencies that were identified by the Washington Post
back in February. My concern is that some of the corrective actions may
create new problems. For instance, the DHCC was forced to move out of
newly renovated facilities in March and into a temporary space one-
third the size to make room for the new Soldier and Family Assistance
Center. The DHCC is one of the best PTSD treatment centers in the
country. I am concerned that its effectiveness could be reduced by this
move. What metrics are being used by the Army to measure the success of
the corrective actions taken at Walter Reed and other Army medical
treatment facilities?
Mr. Geren. The Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP) is a phased effort
designed to develop a sustainable system where injured and ill soldiers
are medically treated and vocationally rehabilitated to prepare them
for successful return to duty or transition to active citizenship.
Phase 1 of the AMAP was completed on June 15, 2007, with the completion
of 10 immediate fixes ranging from the establishment of Warrior
Transition Units (WTUs) at Army Treatment Facilities in order to
provide effective leadership and care management of warriors in
transition to implementation Army-wide of the Joint Patient Tracking
Application to track wounded warriors from the battlefield to the
hospital; from the establishment of the Patient Care Triad of
physician, nurse, and squad leader to coordinate the care of every
warrior in transition to the activation of Reserve component lawyers
and paralegals to provide legal advocacy for warriors undergoing the
Physical Evaluation Board process. We have now entered Phase 2 of the
AMAP with new policies and standards of excellence in place. The focus
has shifted to supporting our newly-formed WTUs. The performance
measures are being finalized to ensure that a clear and common
understanding exists Army-wide of these new policies and standards, and
the resources needed for continued success. Beginning July 23, 2007,
these performance measures will begin to be evaluated at all locations
throughout the Army with WTUs. The capability to measure and track
compliance with all the requirements of the AMAP has been developed and
will be important as the Army medical department and Army leadership
continues to institutionalize the AMAP. To this end, measurable
outcomes have been developed for each action and will be used to
identify successes, as well as to identify areas needing specific
attention.

31. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, what have the metrics shown so
far?
Mr. Geren. The metrics of greatest concern at this time are those
that track timeliness of completion of AMAP tasks, as specified in
Department of the Army Execution Order (EXORD) 118-07, Healing
Warriors. The first order of business is to staff the Warrior
Transition Units (WTUs) with nurses, physicians, and squad leaders to
work as a team (referred to as a Triad in the AMAP) that works directly
with warriors in transition and their families. Command and control
personnel have already been assigned to all 35 WTUs and efforts to
staff these units to attain a minimum of 50 percent strength by
September 3, 2007, to Initial Operational Capability (IOC) are
proceeding. Currently, eight WTUs are staffed at essentially the 90
percent level necessary to attain full operational capability (set in
the EXORD to be completed for all WTUs by January 1, 2008).
Additionally, 11 WTUs are staffed at greater than 50 percent strength
for a combined total of 19 of 35 units (54 percent) already at the
level required by September 3, 2007. Efforts continue to staff the
remaining 16 WTUs to accomplish IOC. Currently being finalized are the
performance standards, checklists, and tracking capability to be
utilized when teams begin their staff assistance visits as part of
Phase 3 of the EXORD, beginning July 23, 2007. The initial intent of
these visits and the results obtained is to provide both Army Treatment
Facility and WTU unit commanders an initial ``yardstick'' by which to
measure success to date in implementing the AMAP. Additionally, these
tracking reports will provide senior leadership a complete yet concise
means of identifying both successes and shortcomings. This tracking
capability will also be valuable in the long-term to monitor ongoing
operations in support of the AMAP.

STRATEGIC RESERVE

32. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, you stated in your advance
policy question responses that ``As we have increasingly utilized the
National Guard at home and overseas, it has become clear that the
National Guard must be organized, trained, and equipped to serve as an
integral part of our operational force, not a `Strategic Reserve.' ''
Do you believe that a ``Strategic Reserve'' of troops is no longer
needed by the United States? If so, why? If not, who will serve as our
Strategic Reserve now that the National Guard and Reserves are part of
our operational force?
Mr. Geren. The geostrategic environment of persistent conflict
requires that our Army be responsive and flexible, and able to meet the
demands of an expeditionary force. We no longer have the luxury of
extended time periods for training after mobilization. Additionally,
QDR 2006 directed the Army to operationalize the Reserve components. As
such, we have implemented the ``train-alert-deploy'' model, to ensure
that Reserve units are ready prior to mobilization. Using this model,
Reserve units now provide a greater ability to support Homeland and
contingency requirements. The Army now uses the Army Force Generation
(ARFORGEN) model, a cyclic training and readiness process, which
synchronizes strategic planning, prioritization, and resourcing.
ARFORGEN fields available forces, Active or Reserve, to meet global
demands and will prepare forces in the ready pool to deploy to meet any
contingency requirements. With the Reserve component operating in the
ARFORGEN model--1:4, we would in effect have a Strategic Reserve in the
Reserve component units who are not in the ready pool, but would be
available if full mobilization were necessary. With ARFORGEN and
sufficient and timely funding, the Army will continue to field the best
led, equipped, manned, and trained cohesive units for deployment at
home and abroad.

EXPANDING THE WAR ON TERRORISM

33. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, according to a recent State
Department report, terrorists are changing their tactics. Specifically,
the report states that early terrorist attacks were largely
expeditionary, with terrorists selected and trained in one country,
then secretly inserted into the target country to conduct their attack.
The report further states that the new trend is toward guerilla
terrorism, where the terrorist team is grown close to its target, using
target country nationals. Finally, the report states that this trend is
a shift in the nature of terrorism, from traditional international
terrorism into a new form of transnational, non-state warfare that
resembles a form of global insurgency. This represents a new era of
warfare. This report suggests to me that the battlefield for the war on
terror is no longer limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, while our
military is tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the terrorists are
expanding the battlefield throughout the world. How do you think the
change in terrorist strategy should affect how we shape our military to
deal with the security issues of the 21st century?
Mr. Geren. The future strategic environment is one of persistent
conflict, and requires an Army with the capabilities and capacities to
meet these emerging challenges. For the foreseeable future, we will
likely face threats from state and non-state actors/proxies who will
seek to acquire and employ WMD, and challenge our advantages in space
and cyberspace. The Army is restoring depth and building full spectrum
capable forces while also improving our capabilities and capacities to
conduct irregular warfare and to execute the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) strategy, including its force planning construct. Our forces are
now conducting long-term counterinsurgency/irregular warfare (COIN/IW)
operations, building partner capacity (BPC), and providing capabilities
to protect the Homeland. We are improving our mobility, including high-
speed sealift. We are pursuing increased intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and C\4\I interoperability (Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence). We have also
provided for increased Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) and
improving the General Purpose Forces' (GPF) expeditionary capabilities,
development of language and cultural awareness, and leader development.
Even when the Army is task organized for non-lethal operations such as
building partner capacity, we are able to achieve escalation dominance
when required. We will continue our efforts to ensure that Army forces
are trained and ready through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
model and modular force conversions.

34. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, since September 11, the United
States has relied heavily on our military for prosecuting the war on
terror. Our invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have placed a heavy toll
on the readiness of our military, and on the ability of the National
Guard to provide disaster relief at home. In your opinion, has the war
in Iraq been an effective and efficient use of taxpayer resources in
fighting the global war on terror?
Mr. Geren. In my view, the Army has responded to events of
September 11 in an outstanding manner. The soldiers and families of our
Army should be proud of their service and their accomplishments. We
have the best led, trained, and equipped Army this Nation as ever
produced. In this long war, our soldiers will continue to face many
challenges and will continue to be prepared to answer the call to duty.

35. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, what do you see as the function
of law enforcement in protecting our Nation against terrorism versus
the function of the military?
Mr. Geren. The Posse Comitatus Act (title 18, U.S.C. section 1385)
and DOD policy place limitations on direct involvement in law
enforcement activities by military forces. Any deployment of DOD
resources and domestic incident management actions during an actual or
potential terrorist incident are conducted in coordination with the
Department of Justice.

END STRENGTH INCREASE

36. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, in your responses to the
advance policy questions, you stated that the Army will be able to meet
its fiscal year 2007 increased end strength without increasing its
recruiting targets for the fiscal year. You said this is because the
Army uses retention and loss management tools to manage end strength.
You further indicated that attrition is at record lows. What has
changed between last fiscal year and the current fiscal year that would
allow the Army to substantially grow in end strength with no increase
in recruiting?
Mr. Geren. The Army has three levers at its disposal to manage
strength: accessions, retention, and loss management. At the end of
fiscal year 2006, we projected end strength of 513,000 for fiscal year
2007. This forecast included 80,000 accessions, 62,000 in retention,
and 74,000 total losses, with a 6-month attrition holding at 12
percent. Additionally, total losses to date were approximately 2
percent lower than fiscal year 2005.
The current projection (as of end of month May 2007) is for a
fiscal year 2007 end strength of 518,400 including stop loss. This
increase is due to continued low attrition and a 5 percent increase in
retention rate primarily due to the special expiration term of service
bonuses currently offered. Additionally, more officers are being
accessed into the Army Competitive Category.
As a result of these management actions, the Army will be able to
increase its end strength without increasing recruiting.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

37. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, in your responses to the
advance policy questions, you stated that ``no soldier will go into
combat without the proper training and equipment.'' In order to meet
the heavier deployment schedule, has the Army reduced or modified in
any way the training requirements necessary to qualify as being fully
trained for deployment? If so, when and why was this done, and how was
the training modified?
Mr. Geren. The Army remains committed to ensuring our soldiers are
fully trained and ready to meet the challenges of the current operating
environment. We continue to explore alternative training methods and
strategies to provide the right training and education to our soldiers
and meet commanders' needs. Training has been modified at all levels
based on lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and
Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
The Army significantly modified enlisted Initial Entry Training
(IET) to include more night, urban, and convoy operations in a field
environment; and weapons and combat survival training. Warrior Tasks
and Battle Drills (WTBD) was introduced in 2004 and allows soldiers to
execute what they have learned through simulated warfighting
environments. Other training modifications for IET soldiers include the
implementation of Combat Lifesaver and weapons immersion training.
All soldiers now conduct advanced rifle marksmanship training which
provides the skills necessary to conduct short-range marksmanship in
order to prepare them for the contemporary operating environment.
Another training initiative is convoy live fire exercises. These
exercises are conducted in order to train soldiers on weapons safety
while on vehicles, weapons orientation, identifying IEDs, react to
IEDs, control fires, fire distribution, ammunition control, and build
overall soldier confidence.
To accommodate units and their deployment schedules, the Army is
making extensive use of mobile training teams (MTT) for the Basic
Noncommissioned Officer Course and several functional training courses.
MTTs travel home station units instead of having soldiers relocate to
separate training bases. This provides soldiers pre-deployment training
without having to leave their families before or after deployment.
The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is piloting a learning
model focused on mid-grade professional military education with initial
focus on the captains' career course. The model leverages use of
technology, Saturday training, fast tracking, and Guided Experiential
Learning (GEL). GEL is the instructional design and delivery strategy
which ensures training will be at least as effective as existing
instruction despite a reduction in training time. The Sergeants Major
Academy is also piloting the effectiveness of GEL.

38. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, has the Army made use of
accelerated programs to speed troops, particularly new recruits,
through training in time to meet unit deployment schedules? If so, how
are these training programs used, how many troops have been trained
through the accelerated program, and has the Army studied how soldiers
who have undergone the accelerated training have performed in combat?
Mr. Geren. The Army has adjusted courses at all levels to
accelerate training in response to operational unit demands for
personnel. For enlisted initial entry soldiers, two programs have been
piloted within the past year. The first, ability group batching, is a
process that accelerates select soldiers through Advanced Individual
Training (AIT). Soldiers chosen for accelerated training may display
strengths or more experience and education and it allows them to move
to designated units as soon as they meet course standards. Ability
group batching is being piloted at Forts Bliss, Jackson, and Lee. Fort
Bliss accelerated one military occupational specialty (MOS) class by 2
weeks and graduated 35 soldiers through this program. Fort Jackson's
pilot accelerates 30 soldiers per class and reduces the course time
from 12 weeks to 6 weeks. Fort Lee accelerated classes for 8 MOSs and
to date has graduated 1,803 soldiers through this program. Ability
group batching will not work with every MOS; MOSs with small numbers
and infrequent starts will not benefit from this initiative. End of AIT
course tests indicate these ability group batching graduates are as
well trained as their due course counterparts.
The second acceleration program for enlisted initial entry soldiers
is Assignment Oriented Training (AOT). AOT is a training approach used
primarily in AIT for those MOSs that can be assigned to different
echelons/types of units. Soldiers are trained using courses tailored to
the equipment and skill sets required for the first unit of assignment.
Each course trains only those critical tasks required to be performed
by the soldier for the specific echelon unit and its operational unique
equipment/systems. Four MOSs are currently conducting AOT training and
the Army is currently assessing additional MOSs for this program.
Professional development training for noncommissioned officers and
officers has been reduced through initiatives such as Saturday training
and incorporating more technology-based instruction. Courses have been
reduced in most cases by one-third of their original timeline. The Army
continues to provide technically competent, fully trained and confident
soldiers to the operational Army. Feedback during the most recent
Warrior Task and Battle Drills review indicates operational units and
veterans of OEF/OIF are satisfied with the quality of soldiers and
leaders completing training.

39. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, if the Army has studied the
results of accelerated training, what were the results of the study?
Mr. Geren. The Army is committed to providing operational units
with trained and ready soldiers who can deploy, fight, and survive in
today's contemporary operating environment. The Army has not conducted
an all-inclusive effort to evaluate the effects of accelerated training
initiatives; however, there are several pilot programs on accelerated
training. One of these was conducted on AOT. AOT is a training method
in which soldiers are trained only on those critical tasks required to
be performed by the soldier at his/her first assignment. In 2005, the
TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) completed Phase I of a study on AOT at
the U.S. Army Signal Center and School. Results showed that, when
assigned to correct units, AOT-trained soldiers arrived at units with
the basics and were ready for unit training. TRAC begins the next phase
of the study in October 2007.
Another pilot the Army is conducting is ability-group batching in
AIT. End of course testing in AIT shows that these soldiers are as
well-trained as other soldiers who did not go through the pilots.
However, it is clear ability-group batching is not suitable for all
military occupational specialties, especially low-density courses.
The Army Learning Model was analyzed at the July 2006 meeting of
the Secretary of the Army's Distributed Learning/Training Technology
Subcommittee and at the August 2006 Science of Learning Workshop
sponsored by the Army Research Institute. The model is being evaluated
for two Captains Career Courses in fiscal years 2007-2008; one at the
Field Artillery School and one at the Signal School. The TRADOC
Analysis Center is conducting the evaluations and will brief interim
results in January 2008.
TRADOC continually receives feedback from the operational Army to
ensure institutional training meets their needs. This feedback from the
field is continually derived through surveys, visits, lessons learned,
and periodic assessments of training. Additionally, every school
proponent ensures those soldiers graduating from accelerated training
programs meet and complete all course requirements.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh

ARMY UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

40. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren, please describe the Army's asset
acquisition and operator training strategies for the Warrior unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) program. Why did the Army end up selecting a model
based on the MQ-1 Predator as opposed to developing a new platform?
Mr. Geren.
Acquisition
The U.S. Army is adhering to the Integrated Acquisition Framework
and DOD 5000 series for development of the Sky Warrior--Extended Range/
Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) capability. Asset
Acquisition (Materiel Development) is based on the Operational
Requirement Document (ORD) which was published and approved by the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The ORD specifies the threshold
and objective requirements of the ER/MP system technical parameters
needed for the field Army as per the Mission Needs Summary and
Operations and Support Concept. The Army Project Manager-Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (PM-UAS) is charged with program management of the
system and will continue to meet acquisition milestones, as per DOD
5000.2, throughout the program life cycle.
Operator Training
The U.S. Army will have one single enlisted MOS for Tactical UAS.
The training course program of instruction will include a Common Core,
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Imagery, Air Vehicle
and Payload operations, Simulator and Flight training, and culminates
with Warrior drills and Capstone collective field training exercises.
Students will be administered Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
examinations at the conclusion of the common core tasks to earn FAA
certificates. Students will be provided 40 hours of flight simulation
prior to their first flight of any UAS to ensure proper operations and
techniques are soundly trained.
Selection Process
PM-UAS submitted a request for proposal (RFP) to industry in
October 2004 via Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps). Offerors
from industry provided proposals within the timeline to the Government
in accordance with the RFP addressing technical, program management,
past performance, and cost estimates. The Government conducted a Source
Selection Evaluation Board with a multi-disciplined team in two phases:
Evaluation of ``paper'' proposals to screen to ensure ``Go/No-Go''
criteria was met and areas were rated as specified in the Source
Selection Plan; and, offerors conducted a Systems Capabilities
Demonstration to show the Government current system capabilities and
performance. At conclusion of the Source Selection proceedings, the
Army's Source Selection Authority made decision in favor of General
Atomics-ASI to be the Army's future ER/MP.

41. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren, what advantages, if any, do you
find inherent in using contractors and noncertified pilots as Warrior
operators as opposed to the Air Force policy of using rated pilots?
Mr. Geren. At present, the Army utilizes a combination of enlisted
UAS MOS soldiers and contractors to operate our Warrior-A systems in
Iraq. Our enlisted soldiers perform all Warrior-A cruise pilot
functions and mission payload/sensor operations. Contractors purely
land and take-off the air vehicle. However, the Army is in the process
of training soldiers as take-off and landing pilots for the Warrior-A
air vehicles. Upon deployment this fall, our Warrior-A platoon for
CJTF-82, Afghanistan, will consist of pure military operations.
Additionally, our Sky Warrior Program of Record UAS will include an
automatic take-off and landing system, negating the requirement for
take-off and landing trained military operators. The use of highly
trained and qualified enlisted soldiers for Warrior-A and Sky Warrior
UAS operations affords the Army a more efficient use of our force
structure as 83 percent of the Army Aviation force structure are
enlisted soldiers. Second, from a fiscal perspective, it is more cost
effective to train existing enlisted soldiers to operate our UAS vice
converting them to commissioned officers with the prerequisite officer
training.

42. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren, what disadvantages were taken
into consideration before moving ahead with this proposal?
Mr. Geren. To date, the Army has trained over 6,000 enlisted
soldiers to operate our UASs. Most of these soldiers have completed one
if not multiple combat tours, making them experts in the safe
employment of UAS in support of tactical combat operations. Our UAS
enlisted MOS retention and recruitment is on track. UAS MOS initial
term reenlistment is 70 percent while the Army average is 50 percent.
Mid-term reenlistment for UAS MOSs is 74.5 percent, while the Army
average is 75.9 percent. Career reenlistment is 85.7 percent while the
Army average is 52 percent. To date, UAS recruitment for fiscal year
2007 is at 79 percent, with 2 plus months remaining in the fiscal year
to recruit 16 more UAS MOS soldiers. Our UAS training fully qualifies
our enlisted soldiers to safely and effectively operate UAS within both
the tactical and National Airspace Systems.

43. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren, where, in terms of an
overarching DOD medium to high altitude UAV plan, does the Army see
itself?
Mr. Geren. Perhaps the best way to define where the Army sees
itself is with an explanation of the definitions for UAVs as defined in
the Joint Field Manual 3-04.15, ``UAS Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of UASs'', dated
3 Aug 06. This document describes three classes of UAS: Manportable,
Tactical, and Theater.

Manportable UAS are small, self-contained, and portable.
Their use supports the small ground combat teams/elements in
the field. The Army's Raven UAS falls into this category. It is
hand-launched, soldier transported, and fielded to battalions
and smaller organizations. The Army's Future Combat System
(FCS) BCT will have its own manportable UAS, the Micro Air
Vehicle (MAV). The MAV will feature both ``hover and stare''
and ``perch and stare'' capabilities made possible by its lift-
augmented ducted fan propulsion system. This capability will
allow operation virtually anywhere, even in confined spaces.
Tactical UAS are larger systems that support maneuver
commanders at various tactical levels of command and can
support the small combat teams when so employed and are locally
controlled and operated by a specialized UAS unit. The Army's
Shadow, IGNAT, Hunter, Warrior A, and ER/MP Warrior all fall
into this category. The FCS BCT will have its own tactical
rotary-wing UAS, the Firescout.
Theater. The Army does not have any UAS that fall into this
category.

In addition to these definitions, the Joint UAS Center of
Excellence (JUAS COE) Concept of Operations (CONOPs), as endorsed by
the Army during fiscal year 2007, defines three Tactical UAS. The Raven
is considered a ``Tactical 1'' system by the JUAS COE CONOPs since it
is hand-launched, soldier transported, and fielded to battalions and
smaller organizations. The Shadow is defined as a ``Tactical 2'' system
per the JUAS COE CONOPs since it is mobile-launched, vehicle
transported, locally controlled and operated by a specialized UAS
platoon within the BCT. The IGNAT, Hunter, Warrior A, and ER/MP Warrior
are classed ``Tactical 3'' systems within the JUAS COE CONOPs since
they are organic to the division, conventionally launched (rolling
take-off) and primarily operated out of airfields. The FCS MAV is a
Tactical 1 and the Firescout is a Tactical 2, in accordance with the
JUAS COE CONOPs.
In summation, in accordance with the above two Joint publications,
the Army sees its medium altitude class of UASs being employed at the
tactical level of operations.

44. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren, how will the lessons learned
from the Air Force programs be evaluated for the Army's benefit?
Mr. Geren. To benefit from Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy UASs
lessons learned, The Army works through the Joint UAS Center of
Excellence (JUAS COE) for emerging CONOPs and Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures (TTPs), the Joint UAS Material Review Board for materiel
related solutions and TTPs as well as the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System for procurement. Additionally, the
Center for Army Lessons Learned and Training and Doctrine Command
validate, integrate, and transform Army and Joint operational lessons
learned into requirements, doctrine, CONOPs, and TTPs. The UAS lessons
learned from the Joint Force allows the Army to benefit and leverage
their experience to provide soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen the
best possible UAS support on the battlefield.

45. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren, how will the Army's lessons
learned impact future Navy and Air Force programs?
Mr. Geren. The JUAS Materiel Review Board (MRB) remains the DOD's
UAS forum to address materiel issues. Some of the objectives of the
JUAS MRB include ``Facilitate Service-level coordination of UAS
capabilities and potential future systems'' and ``Identify, resolve,
and/or mitigate materiel issues at the earliest opportunity in the
JCIDS process.'' Lessons learned through the acquisition of the Army's
programs are briefed to the JUAS MRB to ensure all DOD and Service
representatives have the most current information regarding materiel
issues and lessons learned. There have been multiple Acquisition
Project and Product Managers that have attended in the past providing
information briefings of UAS developments and procurements. Lessons
learned are shared with the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and other
DOD agencies and will be reviewed and considered in relation to their
Service programs.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

46. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, what is the Army requirement
for the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)?
Mr. Geren. Each of the Services has title 10 responsibilities for
providing direct support to their forces as outlined in Joint
Publication 3-17 and defined in Technical Publication 525-4-0. For
sustainment operations, Army fixed wing aviation perform those missions
which are between the intra-theater missions performed by the Air Force
and the tactical maneuver and movement performed by Army rotary wing,
or ground assets. Army commanders deploy organic fixed wing assets to
support routine sustainment and transport time-sensitive/mission-
critical parts, cargo, and/or personnel over strategic (inter-theater)
and operational/tactical (intra-theater) distances to forward-deployed
future forces in remote and austere locations. For the Army, the JCA
fills the gap of time sensitive mission critical re-supply versus
scheduled, bulk delivery by the Air Force. The JCA is procured to meet
this requirement while transforming Army aviation, specifically the
ARNG and the Army Reserve fixed-wing fleets to a more modern, capable
force. Without transformation of the Army's legacy fixed-wing fleet,
the Army will continue to pour funding into antiquated aircraft that
provide limited value on the battlefield and fly the CH-47 helicopters
on costly re-supply missions thus limiting the flexibility of the Joint
Force Ground Component Commander.

47. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, how will this aircraft's unique
capability increase the mobility of soldiers in the battlefield?
Mr. Geren. The Army's maneuver unit is the BCT which is a small
modular, flexible force that is used independently on an asymmetrical
battlefield, often in obscure locations. The JCA provides the ability
for the BCT to meet the needs of the ever changing battle space. The
JCA allows for a more effective movement of supplies with its
transloadability to CH-47 Chinook cargo helicopters while also
providing for more efficient resupply of mission critical/time-
sensitive items. With its ability to land on unimproved runways of
2,000 feet or less in length and operate in high/hot conditions, such
as Afghanistan, the JCA can deliver high priority supplies directly to
the user. The JCA reduces the risk and burden to soldiers by minimizing
the number of required ground convoys to resupply combat consumables,
such as fuel, ammunition, and spare parts, throughout a high threat
area of operations. The ability to resupply units is critical to
maintaining combat readiness.

48. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, do you believe the Army should
operate the JCA independent of the Air Force? If so, why?
Mr. Geren. Yes, the Army's primary mission is to operate the JCA in
an independent, direct support role under the control of the Joint
Force Commander (JFC). Its secondary role is to support the Air Force/
U.S. Transportation Command Common User Pool requirements. With both
the Army and Air Force deploying the JCA, the JFC has more flexibility
in meeting time sensitive as well as longer haul missions that don't
require a larger aircraft such as the C-130. The JFC needs the ability
to call on either the Army or Air Force to meet these key types of
missions. The JCA is not a unique program to just the Army and Air
Force. All Services have similar capabilities that exist in their
Services from UH-60s, UAVs, C-130s, to watercraft. Additionally, each
Service also relies on each other's joint training programs and
maintenance for these assets, JCA will be no different. The bottom line
is each Service has these capabilities to respond to their specific
title 10 responsibilities to support their forces. The JCA program was
vetted through the Joint Staff and DOD for its programmatics as well as
for its roles and missions and Concept of Operations and will co-exist
as complementary to the Air Force; which it will be used as a component
of the overall intra-theater lift requirement.

STOP LOSS POLICY

49. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, what is the Army's current stop
loss policy?
Mr. Geren. The Army's goal is to reduce the use of stop loss and
eventually eliminate its use. However, current demands on the force
require its use to provide trained and ready units to theater. Stop
loss allows the Army to sustain a force that has trained together as a
cohesive element, and maintain cohesion throughout its deployment.
Losses caused by separation and retirement adversely impact unit
training, cohesion, and stability in OIF and OEF deploying units. Stop
loss allows the Army to maintain unit cohesion and effectiveness in
combat. It is used sparingly, affecting only about 1 percent of the
total force, for limited periods of time. This balances the need for
unit effectiveness against the impact on individual soldiers. The
desired result of implementing stop loss is to retain trained,
experienced, and skilled manpower to ensure our formations, placed in
harm's way, remain cohesive, ready, and combat-effective elements,
throughout their deployment.
There are two stop loss models currently being used in support of
the Army's effort in the global war on terrorism.
a. Active Army unit stop loss. Applicable to all regular Army
soldiers assigned to organized Active Army units alerted or
participating in OIF and OEF.
b. Reserve component unit stop loss. Applicable to all Ready
Reserve soldiers who are members of ARNG or United States Army Reserve
assigned to Reserve component units alerted or mobilized in accordance
with section 12302 or 12304, title 10, U.S.C. for participation in
Operation Noble Eagle, OEF, and OIF.
Current stop loss applicability: The current stop loss policy is
minimalist by design and precisely implemented. The program only
affects soldiers in units selected to participate in OIF/OEF, from the
time of the unit's Mobilization/Latest Deployment Date minus 90 days
and continues through the demobilization/redeployment date, plus a
maximum of 90 days. The 90 days after return to the unit's permanent
duty/demobilization station is used to provide our soldiers time for
transition activities (separation and retirement), for medical
screening, and where applicable for processing for a permanent change
of station.
As of end of month May 2007, stop loss affects a total of 8,540
soldiers from all components (Active Army, 4,946; ARNG, 2,125; and Army
Reserve, 1,469). The current DOD guidance is to eliminate the Army's
use of stop loss as soon as operationally feasible. The Army still
requires stop loss to meet mission requirements; however, the Army
shares the Secretary of Defense goal and is using significant means to
minimize the use of stop loss while ensuring units are fully manned and
trained. The combination of various initiatives such as retention
bonuses, stop movement, accelerated unit leveling, assignment incentive
pay for deployment extensions, continued implementation of lifecycle
managed units, and sufficient forces supports a 1:2 deployment cycle.
The Army has reduced the total number of soldiers (all components) who
are affected by stop loss from an average of 13,800 in 2005 to an
average of 8,900 in 2007.

DEPLOYMENT EXTENSIONS

50. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, what factors influenced your
decision to extend deployments from 12 months to 15 months?
Mr. Geren. As an Army, to meet the demands from Central Command
(CENTCOM), we were forced with two ``bad'' choices: (1) continue with
the then current policy of extending deployments on an ad hoc basis,
with little or no notice, with the result that most soldiers were being
extended; or (2) establish the 15-month policy that guaranteed a 12-
month dwell time.
The better ``bad'' choice was the second. I recognize the heavy
burden this adds to our soldiers and families and it is our goal to
move back to 12-month deployments as soon as possible.

51. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, what effect do you believe this
new regulation will have on morale, not just for the soldiers but also
for their families?
Mr. Geren. I recognize that tour extensions have an adverse impact
on soldiers and families and we are committed to providing appropriate
levels of support that address the issues that arise. Additionally, our
goal is to return to 12-month deployments as soon as circumstances in
theater allow it. Based on the Army's response to the extensions of the
172d Stryker Brigade, Fort Wainwright, Alaska, and the 1/34 BCT,
Minnesota ARNG, the Army has applied a template of issues and
solutions, for execution in support of soldiers and families impacted
by the most recent unit extensions. Additionally, we continue to
review, adapt, and fund programs and services specifically targeted at
sustaining soldiers and families before, during, and after deployment.
One of the Army's current seven key initiatives is focused exclusively
on support for soldiers, civilians, and families as a key readiness
factor.

52. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, would you recommend an
additional leave period be granted during this extension?
Mr. Geren. The Under Secretary of Defense approved on July 13,
2007, an increase in the rest and recuperation leave period from 15
days to 18 days for servicemembers deployed to OEF or OIF for 15
months.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner

TOUR OF DUTY ROTATION OF MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS

53. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren, it has been reported that
certain Army medical officer specialties, such as internal medicine and
pediatrics, have been assigned 12- or even 15-month rotations in the
CENTCOM area of responsibility, while other specialties, such as
pulmonologists, are being assigned 6-month or shorter rotations. What
is the Army policy on rotational deployment of Medical Corps officers?
Mr. Geren. The Medical Corps officers deploying with BCTs serve for
the length of the unit's deployment. Commanders and deputy commanders
of deploying medical units serve for the length of the unit's
deployment. Medical Corps officers, other than the commanders and
deputy commanders, deploying to staff the area medical support units,
Forward Support Surgical Teams, and Combat Support Hospitals, depending
on their primary specialty, serve either 180 days or the length of the
unit deployment.
The U.S. Army Medical Command has identified 28 medical specialties
that will serve on 180-day rotations. In general terms, those 28
specialties require significant skills retraining when deployments
exceed 180 days. That is because the specialists do not perform the
full range of their specialty skills while deployed. Retraining that
exceeds 1 month in duration is considered excessive. The impact of
deployments beyond 180 days for those specialists represents an
additional loss of those specialty providers for the period of their
retraining. Examples of these specialties are cardiothoracic surgeons,
gastroenterologists, and pediatric cardiologists. We expect the other
11 medical specialties that deploy for longer periods of time to be
performing more of the range of their skills while in theater. Examples
of these specialties are psychiatrists, family practitioners, and
emergency medicine physicians.
Regardless of medical specialty, Graduate Medical Program directors
will not be deployed for more than 90 days. This is related to the
importance of the director's presence to run the Graduate Medical
Education Program and to satisfy the requirements of the Residency
Review Committee. The details of Medical Corps deployment length are
published in the Army's Personnel Policy Guidance.

54. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren, does that policy vary
depending on medical specialty?
Mr. Geren. Yes, the rotation policy varies based on duty position
in theater and medical specialty. The policy identifies 28 Medical
Corps Specialties that can deploy for no greater than 180 days and 11
specialties that can deploy for 15 months.

55. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren, can you provide an explanation
and justification for any disparity and what policy decisions were
taken into consideration?
Mr. Geren. Army Medical Corps officers are initially trained as
general/field medicine officers. Upon the completion of that training,
they are further trained in one of 37 specialties. While the Military
Healthcare System uses all these specialties to maintain a healthy
deployable Army, general/field medicine officers are the physicians in
greatest demand for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the
specialty demands for the theater are met, the other medical
specialties are used to meet the theater demand for general/field
medicine officers. We shortened the length of deployment for those
medical specialties that would have the greatest skill degradation
while deployed and those that would require significant retraining of
skills upon redeployment. Those specialties for which a deployment
greater than 6 months could be expected to require more than 30 days of
retraining were limited to deployments not to exceed 180 days.

56. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren, what actions are being taken
to ensure fair and equitable rotations for all medical officers?
Mr. Geren. There is an ongoing effort to ensure Medical Corps
officers will have similar deployment experiences during the duration
of the conflict. Initially, our efforts focused on ensuring that
physicians were not sent back a second time to theater while there were
other physicians in that specialty who had yet to deploy to theater. As
we now are deploying the same physicians back to theater, commands are
considering the number of months the physicians served in the combat
zone and the number of months since their return from theater (dwell
time). We make exceptions on repetitive deployments or on shortened
dwell time for volunteers. We collect data on each physician, showing
his/her individual deployment history. This data is readily available
to all levels of command within the U.S. Army Medical Command and is
used as a decisionmaking tool when scheduling physicians to deploy to
theater.

RETENTION OF MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS

57. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren, what are the current attrition
and retention rates, broken down by specialty, in the medical officer
ranks?
Mr. Geren. The overall retention rate for Medical Corps officers in
fiscal year 2006 was 60.69 percent. In fiscal year 2005 it was 54.42
percent. Retention rates are computed based on physicians who remain on
Active-Duty beyond their initial obligation date. A detailed breakdown
by medical specialty is provided in the below chart. Our total losses
for fiscal year 2006 were 402. 31.3 percent of those losses were to
retirements, the remainder was either discharges or release from
Active-Duty.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Retention
-------------------------------
AOC Medical Corps 2005 2006
(percent) (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
60A........................................... Operational Medicine............ N/A 100.00
60B........................................... Nuclear Medicine Officer........ 50.00 0.00
60C........................................... Preventive Medicine Officer..... 83.33 77.78
60D........................................... Occupational Medicine Officer... 100.00 100.00
60F........................................... Pulmonary Disease Officer....... 66.67 N/A
60G........................................... Gastroenterologist.............. 33.33 37.50
60H........................................... Cardiologist.................... 66.67 60.00
60J........................................... Obstetrician and Gynecologist... 66.67 46.15
60K........................................... Urologist....................... 100.00 87.50
60L........................................... Dermatologist................... 50.00 45.45
60M........................................... Allergist, Clinical Immunologist 100.00 50.00
60N........................................... Anesthesiologist................ 14.29 70.00
60P........................................... Pediatrician.................... 9.09 46.67
60Q........................................... Pediatric Subspecialist......... 100.00 100.00
60R........................................... Child Neurologist............... N/A N/A
60S........................................... Ophthalmologist................. 100.00 71.43
60T........................................... Otolaryngologist................ 100.00 66.67
60U........................................... Child Psychiatrist.............. 100.00 63.64
60V........................................... Neurologist..................... 0.00 50.00
60W........................................... Psychiatrist.................... 50.00 57.14
61A........................................... Nephrologist.................... N/A 0.00
61B........................................... Oncologist/Hematologist......... 25.00 25.00
61C........................................... Endocrinologist................. 50.00 N/A
61D........................................... Rheumatologist.................. 66.67 0.00
61E........................................... Clinical Pharmacologist......... N/A N/A
61F........................................... Internist....................... 68.00 50.00
61G........................................... Infectious Disease Officer...... 100.00 100.00
61H........................................... Family Medicine................. 46.67 59.65
61J........................................... General Surgeon................. 46.15 64.71
61K........................................... Thoracic Surgeon................ 0.00 100.00
61L........................................... Plastic Surgeon................. 50.00 100.00
61M........................................... Orthopedic Surgeon.............. 77.78 62.50
61N........................................... Flight Surgeon.................. 25.00 100.00
61P........................................... Physiatrist..................... 100.00 33.33
61Q........................................... Radiation Oncologist............ 100.00 100.00
61R........................................... Diagnostic Radiologist.......... 60.00 60.87
61U........................................... Pathologist..................... 40.00 84.62
61W........................................... Peripheral Vascular Surgeon..... N/A 100.00
61Z........................................... Neurosurgeon.................... 100.00 0.00
62A........................................... Emergency Medicine Physician.... 40.00 50.00
62B........................................... Field Surgeon................... 55.56 71.43
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 54.42 60.69
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

58. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren, have medical officers recently
retired or resigned from service indicated a pattern of morale or
deployment operation tempo as reasons for their leaving the Service?
Mr. Geren. Yes, morale and deployment operation tempo have impacted
on retention and retirement. Specific concerns raised by physicians in
exit surveys have been categorized in four main areas:

a. Prolonged deployments in excess of 6 months. Provider
consensus is that 6-month deployments (or shorter) would
significantly improve morale and retention.
b. Obstacles to patient care. These obstacles include
problems with Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology
Application, the Department's computerized recordkeeping system
that increases physician administration time, takes time away
from patients, is not user friendly, and adds no significant
provider benefits; continued increases in administrative
requirements/training; and a shortage of physicians and support
staff, both military and civilian.
c. Insufficient pay. Bonuses are not included in retirement
pay and entitlement bonuses have not changed since early 1990.
d. Family stabilization.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE GROUP

59. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren, I commend the Army on its
initiative to stand up an Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) to develop
tactics, training, and procedures for future conflicts. I believe that
this organization will benefit our military's endeavors as well in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The AWG currently maintains a temporary
headquarters and operations element in make-shift facilities at Fort
Meade, MD, and a training unit at Fort A.P. Hill, VA, while the Army is
in the process of determining a final location for the unit. While I
realize the current situation is temporary, I am concerned that the
potential scattering of elements among different installations will
have a detrimental impact on the AWG's effectiveness, while at the same
time being contrary to the Army's recent goals to consolidate missions
and activities of a particular unit under one flag at one installation.
If confirmed, what criteria will you use to determine a permanent
location for this unit that will serve the best interests of the Army?
Mr. Geren. At this time we are validating requirements and
assessing potential locations. The Army will base the final
recommendation upon three criteria groupings: operational, stationing,
and cost analyses. The permanent location recommendation will represent
the best of three criteria across the board. We will carefully consider
all relevant factors.

60. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren, in your opinion, what impact
would the separation of command, operational, and training elements of
this type of organization have on the efficiency and effectiveness of
the unit?
Mr. Geren. The AWG was designed as a decentralized organization
capable of operating and sustaining itself in a decentralized mode.
Nevertheless, the impact of separately located elements is one of the
relevant factors to be considered in our decision.

61. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren, I note with interest the
Army's recent interaction with representatives of the local communities
around the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site in Colorado and the community's
desire to enhance the economic benefit of supporting the Army's plans
for the expansion of ranges and the control of encroachment around
ranges. In your current role, is the Army taking into consideration the
concerns of local communities in force structure basing and range
expansion decisions involving training ranges?
Mr. Geren. Yes. The Army views itself as a partner and good
neighbor with the communities in which we live and depend upon, and
should always be willing to listen to the concerns of nearby
communities. The Army is presently preparing an Environmental Impact
Statement for continued transformation and potential expansion of the
Army. This process, conducted under the NEPA, requires consideration of
a range of alternative installations for siting major Army units. The
public plays an important role in identifying sites that should be
considered before a final decision is made. The Army takes into account
environmental and socio-economic factors, along with a whole host of
other relevant factors, such as the types of units, ranges, and support
facilities, prior to selecting an installation for home-basing and
training a specific unit. Public comments and concerns raised during
the NEPA review process allow the public to influence the final
decision regarding site selection for major Army units, as well as for
range expansion decisions involving training ranges.

62. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren, if confirmed, what would you
propose to address the concerns of local communities which take steps
to control encroachment inconsistent with Army training requirements
and which support increased range operations even at the expense of the
community's economic development?
Mr. Geren. Communities that take action to plan and limit economic
development in order to protect the essential training of American
soldiers are great friends of the Army. It demonstrates that
communities and installations are working together and have recognized
that poorly planned growth will neither support the long-term economic
viability of the community, nor the continued economic viability of the
installation.
Some of the vital tools that are available to produce a correct
economic analysis for the `growth versus encroachment' issue depend
upon Congress' continued support of the OSD Office of Economic
Adjustment's Joint Land Use Studies for communities around Army
installations. Similarly, continued congressional support of the DOD
Readiness and Environmental Protection Initiative is equally important.
The Army calls our own program under this authority the Army Compatible
Use Buffer Program. These programs are vital to community planning, and
congressional funding of conservation or compatible use buffers around
vital training, testing, and operating areas is essential to sustain
military readiness, ecological integrity, and economic prosperity.
In many cases, land use restrictions surrounding installations
contribute to the long-term economic viability of local communities.
Developing compatible land uses around Army installations does not
preclude continued economic activity on conserved lands. For example,
many Army installations are surrounded by agricultural farm and
ranchlands. Farmers and ranchers are good neighbors and their
operations do not adversely impact Army mission. Many farmers and
ranchers want to stay on their lands, but there is much pressure to
sell the land for commercial or residential development. Selling
development rights while retaining all other rights on their property
allows farmers and ranchers to receive payment for the development
value of their property while providing for continued agricultural and
other economic uses of their property. It represents a ``win-win''
outcome for both the Army and the local community.

63. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren, in your opinion, who will make
the final determination on the location of the AWG, and when is this
decision expected to be made?
Mr. Geren. The decision will be made in accordance with the
applicable stationing policies and regulations. There is not a
scheduled timeline for a decision. The Army will inform the community
of interest prior to public notification. The Secretary of Defense
retains the authority to station organizations within the National
Capital Region.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM

64. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Geren, Iraq and Afghanistan have
shown us that our ground forces still play a vital role in our national
defense. We have seen the effectiveness as well as some of the
limitations of our heavy armored vehicles. While we have added armor on
our trucks and Humvees to give our troops more protection, the Services
are looking to replace those vehicles with the Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicle. There is skepticism that the vehicles being
fielded as part of FCS will not adequately protect our soldiers in the
future. Can you tell us about the overall survivability capabilities of
the FCS manned ground vehicles (MGVs) compared to the vehicles they
will replace?
Mr. Geren. The FCS MGVs are being designed to be able to counter
current and future threats with the ability to upgrade protection as it
is developed. The FCS MGVs will have far better protection over a
number of older platforms including cannons, medical, reconnaissance,
maintenance, and command vehicles they will replace. The MGV team is
taking lessons learned from the Abrams Tank Urban Survival Kit program
and Bradley Urban Operations Kit program and incorporating them into
the MGV platforms. These survivability enhancements account for the
MGV's additional weight growth; such as the use of kits for mine blast
protection and the inclusion of active protective systems for rocket-
propelled grenade threats. Additionally, the MRAP vehicle program is
currently exploring solutions to counter the Explosively Formed
Penetrator (EFP) threat. When a suitable solution is available, the FCS
BCT will incorporate EFP protection to FCS platform as a kitted
solution.

65. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Geren, what level of ballistic
protection will they provide?
Mr. Geren. The FCS MGV will provide 14.5 millimeter, 360-degree
hemispheric protection, 30 millimeter protection over the frontal 60-
degree arc, as well as protection from rocket-propelled grenades, anti-
tank guided missiles, and high explosive/high-explosive anti-tank
effects. As further armor protection solutions are developed, the
platforms can be upgraded to meet future threats.

66. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Geren, how do the other aspects of
FCS help with making them more survivable?
Mr. Geren. In addition to the FCS MGV's armor and other vehicle
protection, the unmanned air and ground platforms, sensors and
intelligence systems that support an FCS BCT will enable soldiers to
avoid detection and avoid being hit--the soldiers will know what is
around the next block or hill. The passing and sharing of data from
sensors, UAVs, UGVs, unattended ground sensors, and other platforms is
not relayed by a radio call but appears on the common operating picture
screen inside the MGVs. This translates to passing and sharing real-
time data, not data or information that is passed through layers of
relays. The FCS BCT deploys unmanned platforms forward first--to sense
the battlefield--while gathering data and information that is instantly
passed to all in the sector. Should an MGV receive fire, its active
protection system reacts and removes the threat without damage to the
system.

67. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Geren, you stated that FCS is your
number one modernization program but significant cuts have impacted the
program. The Senate fully funds FCS in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 report language and states in
the Senate Report, ``it would be a critical mistake to abandon the
Army's core modernization effort.'' What is the current status of FCS
and its system of systems?
Mr. Geren. Currently, the FCS BCT is on schedule and on budget. All
planned engineering milestones to date have been met and successfully
completed. The evaluation, production, and fielding of Spin Out 1
capabilities are in process and will continue through 2008. Spin Out 1
has all of the required program acquisition controls in place, and all
systems within it are progressing through key engineering milestones.
Significant accomplishments include:

The Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar (NLOS-M) firing platform
completed its first iteration of testing at Camp Ripley, MN, in
April 2007, firing over 600 rounds in a little over 5 weeks
with no major faults. The results of the test demonstrated
NLOS-M is on the path to a superior fighting vehicle delivery
in 2011.
The build-up of the integration test bed chassis is in
progress at the Power & Energy (P&E) Systems Integration Lab
(SIL) at BAE, Santa Clara, CA. The chassis is used for
integrating the complete propulsion system. The power pack
(engine/generator) set is already assembled in the sponson of
the test bed (similar to vehicle assembly). Evaluation of the
fully integrated propulsion system in the P&E SIL will begin on
August 15, 2007, and continue through November 2007, for
immediate work supporting NLOS-C early prototypes.
The NLOS-C System Demonstrator fired more than 2,000 rounds
during 2005-2007 and the NLOS-C Firing Platform has fired more
than 270 of the scheduled 5,000 rounds since its delivery in
October 2006, to Yuma Proving Ground (YPG), Arizona. The
information and test data acquired through testing have been
incorporated into the threshold design of the NLOS-C pre-
production prototype vehicles scheduled to begin arriving at
YPG for testing in the summer of 2008.
In February 2007, the Army conducted the FCS Experiment 1.1,
where integration of sensors, soldiers, munitions, firing
platforms, and manned and unmanned aerial platforms in a
tactical scenario was successfully demonstrated at Fort Bliss,
TX. The experiment was a success, with over 160 Experiment 1.1
lessons learned captured. The participating soldiers praised
the FCS technologies, stating that they wished they could bring
them back to their units.

68. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Geren, what impact would another
budget cut have on FCS?
Mr. Geren. The proposed House Armed Services Committee budget cuts
would critically weaken the FCS BCT by causing a severe reduction in
technologies and fielded platforms. This cut would terminate 90 percent
of MGVs, 75 percent of Unmanned Ground Vehicles, 50 percent of Unmanned
Aerial Systems, and 20 percent of the System of Systems Engineering
effort required to integrate these systems in a network. A reduction in
these systems will result in a loss of capability and the inability to
meet requirements urgently needed by the soldier.
FCS BCT fills a strategic role in Army modernization that no other
unit in the military can fill. The goal of the FCS BCT is to be highly
transportable, lethal, survivable, and maneuverable. Current heavy
brigades lack the ability to deploy quickly, and light units lack the
lethality and survivability inherent in the FCS BCT. The loss of FCS
BCT or degradation of its technologies and capabilities will result in
a significant reduction-in-force effectiveness for the United States in
the future, especially as current forces continue to be used in ongoing
operations and are worn out, damaged, and retired.
Further, current forces are becoming aged, with outdated
technologies and communications equipment. Retrofitting these vehicles
may be prohibitively costly, or even not possible, given the weight,
space, and power requirements. FCS has these capabilities designed in
from the ground up. Another budget cut to FCS would remove most of
these capabilities and force us to maintain the Cold War technologies
for over 60-plus years, well beyond 2040.

NON-LINE-OF-SIGHT CANNON

69. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Geren, when people ask about our Army
cannon capability, I tell them the best thing we have is the World War
II-era Paladin. The M109 Paladin, a 155mm howitzer, was introduced in
the 1960s. It will remain the principle self-propelled Howitzer until
the arrival of the FCS NLOS-C. What is the status of the initial
prototypes of the FCS NLOS-C?
Mr. Geren. The NLOS-C initial prototypes completed a design review
in December 2006, and the first two systems are currently being
assembled at FCS integration labs around the country with an expected
delivery in May 2008. The NLOS-C initial prototype mission module is
currently undergoing qualification and safety testing at Yuma Proving
Ground from October 2006 through October 2008. As the first FCS MGV
platform to mature, the Army intends to field the NLOS-C by fiscal year
2010. This timeline allows the Army to meet congressional direction
from section 8086 of the DOD Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-
289).

70. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Geren, are you on schedule to deliver
all prototypes in 2008?
Mr. Geren. Program Manager FCS will deliver five NLOS-C early
prototypes by the end of calendar year 2008, based on the early 2006
24-ton configuration. The remaining three systems to be delivered in
calendar year 2009 will be based on the enhanced 27-ton configuration
with improved armor, suspension, propulsion, and electronics.

TRAIN AND EQUIP

71. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Geren, in your answers to the advance
policy questions, you discuss the importance of building the capacity
of our international partners and allies. You also discuss the
importance of investing in partner nations who know the culture,
language, and geography of our enemies. Section 1206 authorizes United
States general purpose forces to train and equip foreign state military
forces. What is your opinion of the current Section 1206 authority and
its ability to, in your words, ``build the capacity of our
international partners and allies?''
Mr. Geren. The current provisions of Section 1206 of the 2007
Defense Authorization Act, which expire annually, authorize the
Secretary of Defense to spend up to $300 million to conduct such train
and equip missions. DOD has requested that this authority be made
permanent and that the spending authority be increased to $750 million
per year.
I support the concept and the request made by the Department. If we
are to build partner capacity, it only logically follows that training
and equipping will play a major role in achieving that end. It could be
more effectively done under a 2-year authority to proceed since this
would allow continuity of training and give us the ability to procure
long lead time items. Clearly, the heart of the matter is the wisdom
and effectiveness of the train and equip projects we actually
undertake. The train and equip authority is, de facto, a tool that
geographic combatant commanders can use to shape the strategic
environment to America's benefit in their respective areas of
responsibility. They nominate specific projects to be undertaken under
the authority granted by Section 1206. The proposed projects are then
reviewed by Joint Staff, Defense Department, and State Department
staffs and approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Army
plays no direct role in this process; nevertheless, I have every
confidence in my colleagues and rest assured that their work will lead
to wise decisions. Army soldiers and civilians will be involved in
carrying out a portion of the tasks arising from the approved train and
equip projects. Here, too, I have every confidence that our soldiers
and civilians will do a fine job.
As is the case with any project we undertake, we must be mindful of
the opportunity cost. The Army's soldiers currently carry a very heavy
burden and we must be mindful of adding to that burden--after all,
carrying out these missions will involve family separations while
soldiers perform such training missions in foreign countries.
Similarly, the authorization to allocate funds to such train and equip
projects carried no appropriation with it; therefore, the Secretary
must carefully weigh the costs and benefits involved when he decides to
proceed with a 1206 project.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

BRAIN INJURIES

72. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, one out of every 10 returning
servicemembers are affected by TBI, which has been identified as the
signature wound of the global war on terror. Bomb blasts are the most
common cause of injury and death in Iraq. While improvements in body
armor and protective gear have enabled our troops to survive attacks
that once would have been deadly, they still do not fully protect
against damage from blasts from roadside explosives or suicide bombers.
As many as 28 percent of the 1.4 million troops who have served in Iraq
and Afghanistan have been exposed to bomb blasts and may have suffered
at least mild TBI. Sixty percent of the blast victims treated at Walter
Reed have been diagnosed with mild, moderate, or severe TBI. These
statistics, however, do not tell the whole story. While the evidence of
brain injury may be dramatically clear in some cases, in others there
may be no outward or visible evidence of trauma. It also can take days,
weeks, and even months before the symptoms of TBI are readily apparent.
As a consequence, mild or moderate TBI may go misdiagnosed or
undetected, particularly if the servicemember has sustained more
obvious injuries. Sadly, failure to accurately diagnose or treat TBI
can result in frustration and an endless series of hardships for our
returning veterans and their families. What specific measures do you
support to help ensure that troops with TBI receive accurate diagnoses
and care?
Mr. Geren. We have published and exported the Military Acute
Concussion Evaluation tool for use in theater; published clinical
practice guidelines for acute management of mild TBI in military
operational settings; and provided education for theater medics on
acute evaluation of concussions. We are adding TBI specific questions
to the Post Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) that all soldiers
complete upon returning from deployment. The TBI screen will be fully
functional in July. If a soldier answers yes to a potential traumatic
brain injury event like a fall, a motor vehicle accident, or being near
an explosion, then an additional more detailed questionnaire will open
and be reviewed by a clinician. Also, TBI specific questions have been
added to the new Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). This tool will be
used to catch up the entire Army by screening for TBI at the time of an
annual health assessment. Concurrently, we are performing TBI screening
for soldiers in theater following blast exposure even when no other
wounds or injuries have occurred. To emphasize the importance and
awareness of timely TBI care in those who are not obviously wounded or
injured, an All Army activity message delineating the appropriate TBI
evaluation and documentation was released on June 15, 2007.
Additionally, all servicemembers medically evacuated through Landstuhl
Regional Medical Center (LRMC) are screened for TBI if their condition
permits. Since medically evacuated soldiers may not receive a PDHA
prior to departing the combat theater or they may not be in a condition
to be screened for TBI at LRMC, the acting Surgeon General has directed
Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) commanders ensure that all OIF/OEF
medically-evacuated soldiers receive or have received the following
three evaluations: (1) the PDHA; (2) TBI screening and follow-up with a
clinician if necessary; and (3) the Post Deployment Health Reassessment
(PDHRA). In addition, we are deploying the Automated Neuropsychological
Assessment Metrics, an Army-owned computer based neurocognitive
assessment tool that has been used extensively in research and with the
military. This instrument provides an objective assessment of cognitive
performance that can be compared to military norms or the individual
soldier's baseline test results. Pre- and post-deployment
neurocognitive testing process was pilot tested at Fort Campbell on two
groups of 80 deploying soldiers on June 11 and 20, 2007. Soldiers will
be re-tested as part of the post-deployment medical processing. The
Surgeon General recently stood up a proponency office to address health
integration and rehabilitation. Our warriors with more severe TBI will
continue to receive the same cutting edge medical care delivered every
day at our military medical centers and at VA Polytrauma Centers.
Furthermore, our MTFs are working with the Defense and Veterans Brain
Injury Center to create a seamless TBI care network that provides the
right level of care at the best location for every soldier.

73. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, another concern of mine is
the personality disorder process and how it relates to PTSD and TBI.
There are indications that personality disorder discharges are being
used as a tool to quickly discharge servicemembers who have service-
connected mental health conditions, including PTSD and TBI. According
to an article by Joshua Kors titled ``How Specialist Town Lost his
Benefits'' (The Nation), Specialist Jon Town was injured and sustained
major loss of hearing in a rocket attack in Ramadi, Iraq, in October
2004. His injuries resulted in memory loss and depression, ending his
military career. But instead of sending Specialist Town through the
medical board process, the Army elected to give him a personality
disorder discharge, depriving him of disability benefits and guaranteed
VA care for his injuries. DOD records indicate that over 22,500
personality disorder discharges have been processed within the past 6
years. This is not a small number of individuals that supposedly had a
pre-existing personality disorder. While this number is small in
comparison to the overall discharge rate, misdiagnosis of potentially
debilitating brain injuries and their impact on personnel once
discharged is cause for concern. Consequently, I am concerned about the
use, and potential misuse, of the personality disorder discharge. What
is the process used by the Army to diagnose, if a servicemember has a
personality disorder?
Mr. Geren. If a soldier is referred by a commander to mental health
for consideration for a personality disorder separation, a clinical
evaluation of the soldier is performed. His or her psychiatric history
is reviewed. The soldier's current symptoms and functioning are
assessed. Information is also obtained from the unit, as to how the
soldier is performing. In the vast majority of cases there have been
significant performance difficulties that have led to the referral.
Psychological testing may be done if there are diagnostic questions.
Other collateral information may be obtained if needed. The soldier
must meet the diagnostic criteria in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) for a personality disorder. In addition,
other significant medical conditions should be excluded.
We separate soldiers under Chapter 5-13 (Personality Disorder) only
if the doctoral-level provider concludes the disorder is so severe that
the soldier's ability to function effectively in the military
environment is significantly impaired. This condition must be a deeply
ingrained maladaptive pattern of behavior of long duration that
interferes with the soldier's ability to perform duty (combat
exhaustion and other acute situational maladjustments do not meet these
criteria). The diagnosis of personality disorder must be established by
a psychiatrist or doctoral-level clinical psychologist with necessary
and appropriate professional credentials privileged to conduct DOD
evaluations.
In 2006, the Active Army discharged approximately 70,000 soldiers,
yet only 1,086 received a Chapter 5-13 separation. The Army has
averaged about 1,000 personality discharges per year since 1993.
The recent focus on personality disorders has allowed us the
opportunity to re-examine our procedures. We will review all cases
where a previously deployed soldier has received a personality disorder
discharge. We are also re-examining our internal review process. We
encourage any soldier who believes that they were incorrectly
discharged to appeal to the Army Discharge Review Board (ADRB). The
Army Medical Command stands ready to provide the ADRB with behavioral
health expertise as needed.

74. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, if such diagnosis is given,
what criteria are used to determine whether or not the servicemember
should be discharged?
Mr. Geren. Army policy for administrative separation on grounds of
personality disorder is not unilateral, but rather derives from
governing DOD policy. The basis is a deeply ingrained maladaptive
pattern of behavior of long duration, not amounting to physical
disability, that interferes with the soldier's ability to perform duty.
A key provision is that the diagnosis of personality disorder must be
established by a psychiatrist or psychologist. Separation is authorized
only if the diagnosis concludes that the personality disorder is so
severe that the soldier's ability to function effectively in the
military environment is significantly impaired (the criterion for
separation). Based on the psychiatrist or psychologist diagnosis and
conclusion, the soldier's unit commander initiates the separation
proceedings and refers them to the separation authority, the special
court-martial convening authority (Colonel). The Army Surgeon General
has directed a review of all personality disorder discharges of OIF/OEF
veterans be reviewed by behavioral health experts.

75. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, if a servicemember is
discharged with a personality disorder, what effect does this have to
the benefits they may receive as compared to someone who is diagnosed
with either PTSD or TBI?
Mr. Geren. Servicemembers determined unfit as a result of PTSD or
TBI are either retired or separated for disability. If separated, the
member gets 180 days of transitional health care. If retired, the
member is eligible for TRICARE. There is no recoupment of any unearned
portions of bonuses for separation or retirement for disability.
Generally, a servicemember with 6 or more years of Active service
who is administratively separated for a personality disorder would
receive half separation pay and 180 days of transitional health care.
In extraordinary instances, the Secretary may authorize full separation
pay when the specific reasons for separation and the overall quality of
the member's service have been such that denial would be clearly
unjust. Separation pay is significantly less than disability severance
pay. Unearned portion of any bonuses are recouped when a member is
separated for personality disorder.

MENTAL HEALTH EDUCATION

76. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, in your response to the
advance policy questions to this committee, you discussed the Mental
Health Assessment Team IV (MHAT IV) studies and actions the Army is
taking to ensure that appropriate numbers of mental health resources
are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return. You
mentioned that next month the Army will roll out an extensive education
program on PTSD and TBI. What will this education program consist of?
Mr. Geren. The Army launched a Chain Teaching program on July 18,
2007, as part of an aggressive campaign to educate more than 1 million
Active, Reserve, and National Guard soldiers about PTSD and mild TBI.
It is important to implement the Chain Teaching program to help us
identify those needing care, and make available the best medical care
we can provide. The Chain Teaching program is a Leaders Teaching
Soldiers program and will be presented initially to leaders in the
chain of command, who will then be responsible for presenting the
training to the soldiers in their command. The goal is to launch the
program Army-wide on July 18, 2007, and complete the training within 90
days. All soldiers in the Active Army, ARNG, and Army Reserve are
required to receive this training.
Both mild TBI and PTSD (post combat stress) can have negative
effects on a soldier's personal life, professional abilities, and
health. Soldiers may be affected by one or both conditions at the same
time and every soldier is entitled to help. These conditions are
treatable and can improve significantly with the right care. All
soldiers should watch themselves and their buddies for signs and
symptoms of concussion or post combat stress.
Leaders must be aware of their soldiers' conditions and needs, must
support their soldiers in getting help, and must eliminate bureaucratic
or organizational obstacles that interfere with soldiers' recovery. It
is important for soldiers and family members to have an awareness of
PTSD and mild TBI and to seek treatment for these conditions as soon as
possible. For soldiers who may need temporary or long-term medical
assistance, the Army and VA are prepared to provide them the best
health care possible.

77. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, what are the goals you hope
to accomplish with this program?
Mr. Geren. I hope to increase awareness and improve care for TBI,
PTSD, and other psychological effects of war. I also hope to diminish
the stigma attached to mental health treatment and counseling. The
Chain Teaching program will augment behavioral health assessment tools
and measures already in place, and emphasize the Army's commitment to
providing the best health care possible.

78. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, will the Army Guard and
Reserve be included in this extensive education program?
Mr. Geren. Yes, absolutely--the Army Guard and Reserve will receive
the exact same education and training as the Active Force.

GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES

79. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, on several occasions,
including your testimony to this committee, you emphasized that the
National Guard and Reserves are no longer Strategic Reserves but are
instead now Operational Reserves. You stated that the role of the
National Guard and Reserves has changed from being a Strategic Reserve
to part of the operational force and that the Army is a total force
now. You train as one, fight as one, and, as a result, one third of the
combat veterans from OIF and OEF come from the Guard and Reserve. I am
concerned, however, that by making the National Guard and Reserves an
operational force, we will not have the necessary Strategic Reserves
available should the need arise in the future. Why do you think this
change is beneficial to the Army?
Mr. Geren. The operational force will meet any future challenges.
The Army now uses Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), a cyclic training
and readiness process, which synchronizes strategic planning,
prioritization, and resourcing. ARFORGEN fields available forces--
Active and Reserve component--to meet global demands and will prepare
forces in the ready pool to deploy to meet any contingency
requirements. With the Reserve component operating in the ARFORGEN
model--1:4, we would in effect have a Strategic Reserve in the Reserve
component units who are not in the ready pool, but would be available
if full mobilization were necessary. With ARFORGEN and sufficient and
timely funding, the Army will continue to field the best led, equipped,
manned, and trained cohesive units for deployment at home and abroad.

80. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, what are the potential
impacts this could have on our Nation's ability to surge during future
conflicts?
Mr. Geren. The Nation's ability to respond to future conflicts and
disasters has improved with the reorientation of the ARNG and U.S. Army
Reserve as Operational Reserve Forces. They will be more ready in terms
of capacities, capabilities, and readiness as this change balances
resources, programs, and policies to support both current operations
and future force transformation. This methodology will ensure a
continuity of the effort and a correct application of limited
resources, while communicating current Army priorities to support the
global war on terrorism and Army Campaign Plan objectives.
______

[The nomination reference of Hon. Preston M. ``Pete'' Geren
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
May 24, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Preston M. Geren of Texas, to be Secretary of the Army, vice
Francis J. Harvey, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Preston M. ``Pete'' Geren,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Hon. Pete Geren

Pete Geren assumed his duties as Acting Secretary of the Army March
9, 2007, and will continue serving concurrently as the Under Secretary
of the Army.
As Acting Secretary of the Army, Mr. Geren has statutory
responsibility for all matters relating to the United States Army:
manpower, personnel, Reserve affairs, installations, environmental
issues, weapons systems and equipment acquisition, communications, and
financial management.
Mr. Geren is responsible for the Department of the Army's annual
budget and supplemental of over $200 billion. He leads a workforce of
over 1 million Active-Duty, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve
soldiers, 230,000 Department of the Army civilian employees, and
280,000 contracted service personnel. He has stewardship over 15
million acres of land.
Mr. Geren has been serving as the 28th Under Secretary of the Army
since February 21, 2006, following his nomination by President George
W. Bush and confirmation by the United States Senate.
Mr. Geren joined the Department pf Defense in September 2001 to
serve as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense with
responsibilities in the areas of interagency initiatives, legislative
affairs, and special projects. Mr. Geren served as Acting Secretary of
the Air Force from July to November 2005.
Prior to joining the Department of Defense, Mr. Geren was an
attorney and businessman in Fort Worth, Texas.
From 1989 until his retirement in 1997, Mr. Geren was a Member of
the U.S. Congress, representing the 12th Congressional District of
Texas for four terms. He served on the Armed Services, Science and
Technology, and Public Works and Transportation Committees during his
tenure in Congress.
Mr. Geren attended Georgia Tech from 1970-73 and received his BA
from the University of Texas in 1974 and his JD from the University of
Texas Law School in 1978.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Preston
M. ``Pete'' Geren in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Preston ``Pete'' Murdoch Geren III.

2. Position to which nominated:
Secretary of the Army.

3. Date of nomination:
May 24, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
January 29, 1952; Fort Worth, Texas.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Rebecca Ray Geren.

7. Names and ages of children:
Tracy Elizabeth Geren, 17; Sarah Anne Geren, 14; and Mary Caroline
Geren, 10.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Georgia Tech, 1970-1973, no degree.
University of Texas, B.A., 1974.
University of Texas, J.D., 1978.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
March 9, 2007-Present - Acting Secretary of the Army.
February 10, 2006-March 9, 2007 - Under Secretary of the Army.
November 2005-February 20, 2007 - Special Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense.
July 2005-November 2005 - Acting Secretary of the Air Force.
September 2001-July 2005 - Special Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense.
April 1999-August 2001 - Attorney, self-employed - 210 W. 6th
Street, Fort Worth, Texas.
January 1997-April 1999 - Management Consultant, Public Strategies,
Inc., 2421 Westport Parkway, Fort Worth, Texas.
September 1989-January 1997 - Member of Congress, 12th
Congressional District of Texas.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Honorary Member, Rotary Club of Fort Worth.
Member, Exchange Club of Fort Worth.
Member, State Bar of Texas.
Member, Fort Worth Club.
Member, City Club of Fort Worth.
Member, Rivercrest Country Club.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
Candidate for U.S. Congress: 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
January 5, 2001, Presidential Inaugural Committee, $475.
February 19, 2001, Jim Lane for City Council, $100.
February 26, 2001, Wendy Davis for City Council, $100.
March 20, 2001, Martin Frost for Congress, $250.
March 21, 2001, Frank Moss for City Council, $100.
March 22, 2001, Granger for Congress, $250.
April 25, 2001, Dionne Bagsby for County Commissioner, $150.
June 25, 2001, Blunt for Congress, $500.
October 8, 2003, Charlie Geren for State Representative, $1,000.
December 16, 2003, Friends of the University of Texas PAC, $500.
April 15, 2004, Koehler for School Board, $250.
April 25, 2005, Carter Burdette for City Council, $100.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Honorary PhD University of North Texas.
Outstanding Young University of Texas Alumnus.
Distinguished Alumnus, University of Texas Law School.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None, other than newsletter-type material when I was in Congress. I
do not have copies.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
Pentagon Flag Retreat Ceremony--Museum of American History.
Eulogy for Sonny Montgomery Funeral.
WRAMC Staff Address.
AUSA ILW Breakfast.
AUSA Army Civilian Luncheon.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Hon. Preston ``Pete'' M. Geren was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2007, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 13, 2007.]

NOMINATIONS OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND
GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF
GENERAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

----------

TUESDAY, JULY 31, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Clinton,
Pryor, Webb, McCaskill, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins,
Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, Martinez, and Corker.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Madelyn R.
Creedon, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K.
Levine, general counsel; Michael J. Noblet, research assistant;
and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority
counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member;
Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff
member; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; Diana
G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork and Kevin A.
Cronin.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and
Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M.
Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Christopher Caple,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey and Dahlia Reed,
assistants to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to
Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C.
Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant
to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants to
Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins;
Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Andrew
King, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to
Senator Dole; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune;
John L. Goetchius and Brian W. Walsh, assistants to Senator
Martinez; and Bradford T. Sellers, assistant to Senator Corker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Today we welcome Admiral Michael Mullen, the President's
nominee to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and
General James Cartwright, the nominee to be Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We congratulate both of you on your
exceptional careers, we thank you for your willingness to
continue to serve.
We also appreciate the support of your families. We all
know that the positions to which you have been nominated
require, not only hard work and a devotion to public service,
but also the support of your family.
If confirmed by the Senate, our two nominees will face
extraordinary challenges in the coming years. First and
foremost, the next Chairman and Vice Chairman will be called
upon to work with the senior civilian leadership within the
Department of Defense (DOD), the National Security Council, and
the President to address the ongoing crisis in Iraq.
Despite the loss of more than 3,600 of America's best and
bravest, despite 7 times that many wounded, and an expenditure
of $600 billion to date, and $10 billion more each month, Iraq
remains torn by sectarian strife, an unreliable police force,
and the Intelligence Community has recently reported to have
concluded that the years of our occupation of Iraq have seen a
surge of al Qaeda in Iraq.
Secretary Gates has stated that our troops are buying the
Iraqis time, to pursue reconciliation. Unfortunately, while our
troops have done everything that is asked of them, and more,
the Iraqi political leaders remain frozen by their own history,
unwilling to take political risks to reach the compromises so
essential to a constructive settlement of their national
problems.
The State Department reported to Congress last Thursday
that, ``Iraq's parliament in recent months has been at a
standstill, with nearly every session since November adjourned,
because as few as 65 of the 275 members made it to work.'' They
wrote that, ``Part of the problem is security, but Iraqi
officials also said they feared that members were losing
confidence in the institution, and in the country's fragile
democracy.''
The President continues to call for patience. But the
American people long ago lost patience with the failure of the
Iraqi leaders to do what everybody agrees needs to be done, if
success can come to Iraq. They must compromise their political
differences.
The American people want a change in course in Iraq, not
the continuation of a status quo, without a plan to force the
Iraqi leaders to take responsibility for their own country.
Giving the Iraqi political leaders more time to work out
agreements over resource sharing, power sharing, and
constitutional amendments isn't the plan, particularly in the
absence of consequences for their failure to do so.
Iraq is not the only challenge that the next Chairman and
Vice Chairman will face. Our senior military leadership also
faces a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, an al Qaeda operating
from safe havens in the Pakistan federally-administered tribal
areas; an unpredictable nuclear power in North Korea; an Iran
that seems to be aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons, and
causing problems throughout the region; an Army and Marine
Corps in need of tens of billions of dollars to replace and
repair equipment that has been damaged and destroyed in the
course of ongoing operations; the military's nondeployed ground
forces, that have a low level of readiness to meet any wartime
mission; weapons programs that despite the expenditure of more
than $100 billion a year, are increasingly unaffordable; a
military that faces constant challenge in recruiting the troops
that it needs; and men and women in uniform and their families
suffering from the increased strains of repeated deployments,
and a sustained high operational tempo.
Indeed, our ground forces are being stretched near the
breaking point, our Army and Marine Corps have attempted in
vain to stabilize rotational schemes for an unstable and open-
ended Iraq strategy. Deployments have become longer and longer,
while goals for breaks between deployments have gone unmet.
The leaders who will address these problems will need more
than the total commitment and hard work that they bring to the
job, and that we've come to expect from our military leaders.
We rely on our military leaders to provide independent military
advice to the President, the National Security Council, the
Secretary of Defense, and Congress. Too often, the voices of
our military leaders have been muted, by senior administration
officials, and some have told those civilian leaders what they
wanted to hear, instead of providing them with the unvarnished
facts that they really needed.
If our military is going to overcome the challenges that it
faces today, the new Chairman and Vice Chairman will have to be
willing to speak up forcefully and directly to their civilian
leaders, to speak the truth as they see it, to power.
Today's nominees are outstanding individuals, with
exceptional military backgrounds. If confirmed, they will be
assuming their positions as the most senior military leaders of
our Nation, responsible for the welfare and safety of all
America's military forces who are not only brave, but are also
true professionals; all that this or any other nation could
hope for. That is an awesome responsibility, but I believe that
our nominees are more than up to the task.
Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we might
recognize Senator Inhofe for a minute. He has to go to the
Environment and Public Works (EPW) Committee where he's a
ranking member.
Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, I'll make this very brief.
First of all, I'm in total support of the two outstanding
nominees here, and I look forward to working with you.
I will say this, Mr. Chairman, that I do agree with the
position that we really are stressed right now, in terms of
resources, assets, and force strength. All during the drawdown
of the 1990s, I was on the Senate floor saying that this day
would come, and this day is here.
But I want to say to both of you that after my 14th trip
over there, to the Iraqi area of responsibility, I came back
seeing incredible progress in terms of the Imams, the Clerics,
and the positive attitude of those individuals who are the
citizens, and the things that the Iraqis are doing, I just
thought that was great. I've read things that you folks have
said, similar to this.
The best news was, on the other side, two of the most
severe critics in the New York Times came back from a lengthy
period of time over there, and agree with virtually everything
that you two have said about the progress that's taking place
right now.
So, I congratulate you.
I thank you, Senator Warner. We do have the markup in the
EPW, and I have to attend that.
Senator Warner. You have my proxy?
Senator Inhofe. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we might, as a
committee, also recognize the newest member of the committee,
Senator Corker. We're delighted to have you, and that you
selected to come on this committee, where I hope that you will
move from that chair slowly down to this chair. It took 29
years for us, didn't it? [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. I'm not sure if the emphasis is on ``move''
or on ``slowly'' though. [Laughter.]
We do welcome you, very much. Senator Warner speaks for
everybody on this committee, and we join him in a very warm
welcome.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming
Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright, and I wonder if you
might introduce your families to those in attendance here?
Admiral Mullen. Certainly, Senator.
My wife Debra is here, sitting behind me.
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Admiral Mullen. My two sons who are both Active-Duty Navy
lieutenants, are not here today.
Senator Warner. But they're on Active-Duty, and accountable
this morning, somewhere.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. General Cartwright?
General Cartwright. Senator, my wife Sandy is sitting
behind me. Our oldest daughter, Billie Ann, is next to her. Her
husband is a member of the West Virginia National Guard, 2nd
Battalion, 9th Special Forces Group, and just recently returned
from his third combat tour.
Chairman Levin. Third combat tour.
General Cartwright. Our youngest daughter, who's not here,
and her husband are assigned in Europe, under the Defense
Intelligence Agency, one to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and one to the Army.
Senator Warner. Total contribution to our Nation's security
by your families. You exemplify so many military families all
across America.
I want to take a moment, Mr. Chairman, and I'm sure you
share with this me, to recognize that you two gentlemen replace
extraordinary officers who have served their country long and
well.
Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, former Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, retired last week after 37 years of naval
service, and a remarkable career, including service as
Commander of Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet, and other
submarine capabilities, but most importantly, surviving Admiral
Hyman Rickover, who I knew, and who was a magnificent trainer
of young men in our submarine forces.
I shall always remember Admiral Giambastiani, his total
availability, certainly to this Senator and other Senators, at
any time--day or night--to respond to inquiries, and other
problems that I had with the Department.
Admiral Mullen, you'll be relieving General Peter Pace, the
first United States Marine to serve as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. General Pace had no less distinguished career,
including service as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and as Commander of U.S. Southern Command. He recently
marked 40 years of commissioned service that began with combat
in Vietnam.
You, likewise, Admiral Mullen, were aboard ship during the
days of Vietnam, my recollection.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. I suspect in fulfilling this career, you'll
be almost the last person on Active-Duty to have served in the
Vietnam conflict.
I congratulate you and your family.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. I've heard General Pace speak very movingly
about the debt he felt, always, to the young marines under his
command, wherever they might have been, though, especially in
Vietnam. Most deeply to those whose families made the ultimate
sacrifice.
I would say, without any equivocation, that General Pace
fulfilled that promise, and he has honored all of those who
have served with him.
We thank General Pace, Admiral Giambastiani, and their
families, for their service.
Admiral, you and I have had a very interesting and
wonderful professional relationship for many years.
General Cartwright, likewise. I've had the opportunity to
get to know you and your family. Knowing you both as I do,
however, I believe it's your individual dedication to duty,
integrity, and accountability, as well as your experience that
have brought you to this day, and this hearing. I intend to
support both of you. I encourage my colleagues to do likewise.
There will be many questions about operations in Iraq
during the course of this hearing, and that's the way it should
be. I'd like, however, to focus on the question, as we move
forward, on the readiness of the Armed Forces, and ensuring the
continued success of the All-Volunteer Force.
I've had--literally--a lifetime association with the
concept of the All-Volunteer Force. As you'll recall, Admiral
Mullen, during the days of Vietnam, we had the draft. While
those that were drafted served honorably, today is an All-
Volunteer Force. It's probably the most bold experiment that
any military had ever tried, particularly in the wake of the
Vietnam War, but it has worked. It has succeeded beyond our
expectations. Now you two gentlemen become the trustees of what
I hope will be the continuation of the All-Volunteer Force
concept, as we meet the requirements of the military today, and
the years in the future.
Our Active-Duty and Reserve military personnel have
performed heroically since the attacks of September 11, 2001.
They have the respect and the gratitude of every member of this
committee, but more importantly, they have the respect and the
gratitude of Americans from coast to coast.
But our All-Volunteer Forces, particularly our ground
forces, have been on a wartime footing for 4 years. I know you
have your concerns, as I do, about the ability of these forces
to continue to recruit, to continue to replenish, reinforce,
and continue this tempo of operations, certainly over the next
6 to 12 months.
The men and women in the Armed Forces, and their families,
have humbled this Nation with their dedication to duty, and the
sacrifices that they have made. Despite the admiration to which
men and women in uniform are held today, however, there is this
concern about the ability of our recruiters, for example, to
replenish the force for the families of our military personnel
to continue to bear the burdens of the ongoing military tempo.
Many of the legislative initiatives taken by this
committee, under my leadership as chairman, and now our
distinguished colleague, my friend from Michigan--we've done
that, to bring forward those programs that we feel can help you
to do that job of keeping this All-Volunteer Force strong.
You both started your careers prior to 1973, and spent a
substantial part of those careers ensuring the success of our
professional forces. We have every confidence that the two of
you can do the same in the course of your respective jobs
coming up.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. I'd like to put in a statement on behalf of
Senator McCain, who was not able to be with us this morning.
Chairman Levin. Of course. That statement will be made part
of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain

I extend my congratulations to Admiral Mullen and General
Cartwright on their nominations for the two most senior positions in
the Armed Forces, that of Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and I thank them for their continued service to our
Nation.
Each of these officers has an impressive record of achievement--
Admiral Mullen as a Surface Warfare Officer, and General Cartwright as
a Marine Aviator. Their joint duty assignments and senior leadership
experience combined with their deep knowledge and understanding of the
Armed Forces make them uniquely qualified to serve as the principal
advisers to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of
Defense.
If confirmed, they will be installed during one of the most
challenging times in our Nation's national security history. We have
been involved in a violent struggle against the forces of militant
extremists since al Qaeda terrorists killed Americans on September 11.
Now we are fighting extremists in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other spots
across the world. While the struggle is currently centered in Iraq and
Afghanistan, we must be prepared and postured to successfully defend
our Nation and its interests around the globe for years to come.
Let me turn briefly to Iraq. We have made a great many mistakes in
this war, and both Baghdad and Washington remain divided about how to
correct them. There are no easy choices in Iraq, and the temptation is
to wash our hands of this messy situation. To follow this impulse,
however, would portend catastrophe. Withdrawing before there is a
stable and legitimate Iraqi authority would turn Iraq into a failed
state and a terrorist sanctuary, in the heart of the Middle East. We
have seen a failed state emerge after U.S. disengagement once before,
and it cost us terribly. In pre-September 11 Afghanistan, terrorists
found sanctuary to train and plan attacks with impunity. We cannot make
this fatal mistake again.
It is clear that the overall strategy that General Petraeus has put
into place, based on a traditional counterinsurgency strategy that
emphasizes protecting the population--and which gets our troops off of
the bases and into the areas they are trying to protect--is the correct
strategy. Some of my colleagues argue that we should return troops to
the forward operating bases and confine their activities to training
and targeted counterterrorism operations. That is precisely what we did
for three and a half years and the situation in Iraq only got worse. No
one can be certain whether this new strategy, which remains in the
early stages, can bring about ever greater stability. We can be sure,
however, that terminating this strategy as it is just commencing will
result in certain failure.
In an op-ed piece in the New York Times yesterday, Kenneth Pollack
and Michael O'Hanlon addressed security progress that they witnessed
during a recent visit to Iraq. They call upon Congress to sustain this
effort and not force a precipitous withdrawal. I have attached their
op-ed to my statement for inclusion in the record.
I would like to thank our nominees and their families for their
service and look forward to their speedy confirmation by the Senate. I
also wish to state my appreciation to General Pace and Admiral
Giambastiani for their years of service. They have my best wishes for
the future.
Above all, I want to recognize the men and women of our Armed
Forces and their selfless efforts throughout the world. Their task is
anything but easy. They have served multiple tours in combat zones and
in difficult assignments around the globe. They do so with courage,
determination, and skill that leaves us in awe. The success of our
Armed Forces begins with the individual servicemember and we are
eternally grateful for their willingness to serve our Nation, and the
support provided by members of their families.

Chairman Levin. Admiral Mullen?

STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF

Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and
distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank
you for the opportunity to be here with General Cartwright, as
you consider our nominations for Chairman and Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I appreciate your time and all of the support this
committee provides our brave men and women, and their families.
I'm also grateful to the President, and to the Secretary of
Defense, for their confidence in me. I appreciate the love and
support of my wife, Debra, here with me, and that of our two
sons, Jack and Michael, both of whom serve on Active-Duty in
the Navy.
Finally, I'm thankful for the opportunity and privilege to
continue to serve.
Should you confirm me, please know that for the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines, and their families, who have--and
are--performing so nobly, and sacrificing so much, I will
represent them with the full measure of my effort. To listen,
to learn, and to lead.
Mr. Chairman, I realize the war in Iraq weighs heavily on
your mind, as it does on the minds of the people of this great
country. It weighs heavily on mine. In a moment I will share
some thoughts about that conflict, but before I do, let me
outline what I believe will be my three overarching challenges
as we look into the future.
The first challenge is the defense of our national
interests in the Middle East. Iraq and Afghanistan, for sure,
the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, Sunni/Shia rivalries, the
rise of Islamic militants, the resurgence of al Qaeda,
Lebanon--all threaten to tear at fragile seams, and all bear
directly on the safety of the United States.
I'm especially concerned about the increasingly hostile
role played by Iran. I support diplomatic efforts to counter
Iran's destabilizing behavior, and hope their leaders will
choose to act responsibly. But, I find their support for
terrorism, and their nuclear ambitions deeply troubling.
My second challenge will be resetting, reconstituting, and
revitalizing our Armed Forces, particularly the ground forces.
There is strain. We are stretched. Though recruiting and
retention figures, in general, remain good, and morale is still
high, I do not take for granted the service of our people or
their families, and I worry about the toll this pace of
operations is taking on them, our equipment, and on our ability
to respond to other crises and contingencies.
I'm committed to achieving a two-to-one troop rotation as
soon as possible. I'm committed to making sure our wounded
warriors come home to the very best medical treatment possible,
in the very best medical facilities we can provide. I'm
committed to providing the equipment they need, specifically,
and urgently right now, more Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicles quickly to the fight. To make sure broken equipment
gets fixed, and worn-out equipment gets replaced faster.
The U.S. military remains the strongest in all the world,
but it is not unbreakable. Force reset, in all its forms,
cannot wait until the war in Iraq is over.
My third challenge is the proper balancing of strategic
risks for the future. Current operational commitments are
creating significant demands on the force. I worry, that with
all of the focus on Iraq, which is certainly appropriate, the
Nation might lapse into complacency about our still-mounting
global responsibilities. The longer, larger war on terror--and
I believe it is a long war--will likely take our troops to
places we do not now foresee, and will demand of them skills
they may not yet possess.
At the same time, we must stay ready to deter, if possible,
and defeat, if necessary, threats from regional powers who
possess conventional and, in some cases--in some cases--nuclear
capabilities.
How we stay engaged around the world--which we must do--how
we build and maintain partnerships--which we must do--will
largely determine our ability over the long-term to do so for
the Nation all that it expects of us. We must rebalance our
strategic risks carefully, and as soon as possible.
Let me now turn to Iraq, for you have a right to know where
I stand. I believe the surge is giving our operational
commanders the forces they needed to execute more effective
tactics, and improve security. That is happening. Security is
better. Not great, but better.
I believe security is critical to providing the Government
of Iraq the breathing space it needs to work toward political
national reconciliation and economic growth, which are
themselves, critical to a stable Iraq. Barring that, no amount
of troops, in no amount of time, will make much of a
difference.
I look forward, as I know you do, to hearing from
Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus in
September. I believe prudence dictates that we plan for an
eventual drawdown, and the transition of responsibilities to
Iraqi security forces, and we need to do that wisely.
I understand the frustration over the war, I share it. But
I am convinced that, because security in Iraq is tied to
security in the region, and because security in the region
bears directly on our own national security, we must consider
our next moves very carefully.
The Joint Chiefs are completing our own assessment. I plan
to, again, visit the theater myself in the near future to
better understand conditions on the ground. We are a military
at war, Mr. Chairman, and war is ugly, messy, and painful. Our
troops are fighting with honor. They are sacrificing bravely
and greatly, sometimes with their own lives.
Two short weeks ago, I pinned a silver star on a young man,
a Navy SEAL, who risked his life to save that of a comrade. I'm
inspired by the opportunity, the privilege, to continue to lead
men and women of our Armed Forces through what will surely be,
beyond Iraq, a protracted campaign that will define the quality
of American life for generations to come.
Whatever our tasking may be in the future, we are obliged
to the American people to defend them and their interests. To
make sure we are ready in every way, across every military
mission, to do their bidding. We must be able to win both wars,
and the peace that follows.
Should you confirm me as the next Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, you'll have my unmitigated and unwavering
dedication to that task. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you so much.
General Cartwright?

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF

General Cartwright. It's an honor to come before you today
for this confirmation hearing. I want to express my sincere
thanks to you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, for your prompt
consideration of this nomination, especially given the other
pressing demands before this committee.
Also, to the members of the committee with whom I've met
over the past several days, for taking the time to discuss the
position, and my nomination.
Mr. Chairman, I am truly honored to be nominated by the
President for the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. I am a marine. I took an oath to serve my country
when I joined the Service, and it's been a privilege to serve
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines for nearly 4 decades. It
is an honor to be considered for this position, it represents a
major personal challenge, and I'm humbled by the responsibility
it entails.
If confirmed, I will provide my straightforward, candid,
professional advice. I look forward to answering any questions
you have of me today, and, if confirmed, a continuing dialogue
with this committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Cartwright.
Let me begin by asking you both the standard questions that
we ask of our nominees, and you can both answer at the same
time, if you would.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
General Cartwright. I have.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties, or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Admiral Mullen. No, sir.
General Cartwright. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request, before this committee?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views,
when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views
differ from the administration in power?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents--
including copies of electronic forms of communication--in a
timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We'll have an 8-minute first round for questions.
Admiral, do you agree--given the purpose of the surge,
which is to give the Iraqi Government what you and the
President call ``breathing space'' to make the political
compromises needed for reconciliation and a political
settlement--that there's been very little, or no, progress in
terms of political settlements?
Admiral Mullen. Yes sir, I agree there does not appear to
be much political progress.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree--I think your statement made
this clear--but let me ask you directly, that without a
political settlement or a coming together and reconciling
differences, that there is little, or no, hope of ending the
violence in Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, in my statement, I try to be
very focused on this, that security is absolutely necessary to
provide the opportunity for the political center of gravity, in
Iraq, which is the political movement on the part of that
government. That needs to happen. Clearly, the space is being
created, and the political environment in Iraq, and that
government needs to move forward.
Chairman Levin. As you put it, no amount of troops can
solve their political problems for them?
Admiral Mullen. Over time, no sir, I don't believe they
can.
Chairman Levin. Now, assuming that there is a continuing
failure of the Iraqi political leaders to reach a political
settlement, there's going to be a range of options that we're
going to need to look at. Because you've said that the failure
to achieve tangible progress towards reconciliation will
require a strategic reassessment. Give us the range of options
that you think need to be considered, if September comes along,
and there's still no political progress. Start from, at one
end, an announcement that we're going to begin to reduce
troops, starting at a particular time, transitioning to a more
limited mission on the one hand, and on the other hand,
continuing the surge as it currently is. What options lie
between those that you believe need to be considered if this
failure of the Iraqi leaders continues?
Admiral Mullen. I think it's very important, Mr. Chairman,
as I indicated to get to September, and I'm very anxious to
hear, in particular, what Ambassador Crocker and General
Petraeus have to say. I have not spent time on the ground
lately, and I think it's vital that we hear what they have to
say, particularly with respect to the progress in the areas of
politics and economics, which are lagging in security.
Chairman Levin. If the report is that there's continued
failure in that area, what do you view as the options that
should be considered?
Admiral Mullen. I think over time the options are--on the
one hand, to continue the mission as it's described, which is
basically a security mission, mostly with the United States in
the lead, turning it over to the Iraqis in time. We are doing
some of that now--but mostly the operation that's occurring
right now is with the U.S. in the lead--at a level, from a
security standpoint, not to exceed the 15-12 rotation numbers
that Secretary Gates has laid out there. Because I'm very
concerned about exceeding that would start to break on the
Armed Forces. It gets to Senator Warner's point, which is,
longer-term preservation of the All-Volunteer Force, which I
think is vital.
A second option would be to start to turn over the security
mission to the Iraqi security forces more rapidly--basically,
put them in the lead as quickly as possible, and as they were
able to provide for that security, start to transition our
forces out to a lower level.
A third option, on the other end, would be to just move out
as soon as possible--and, in that second option, and actually
in the first two options--I think it's important that we
sustain a capability to fight al Qaeda. That we not let Iraq
implode, from an overall security standpoint, and that in this
transition, we give the Iraqis an opportunity to both lead--
from a security standpoint--as well as politically.
The third option would be to do it expeditiously. By
expeditiously, I mean, at the other end of the pole--move out
rapidly, and just bring troops home as rapidly as possible.
With what I understand right now, I would caution against that,
at this point. Because I am concerned about that kind of rapid
withdrawal, and what it might mean--not just for Iraq, but what
it would mean in the whole region.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral, Secretary Gates has often expressed support for
open debate in Congress on Iraq, and he said that, for
instance, the debate here on the Hill, in terms of reduction of
forces in Iraq, changing course in Iraq, was useful in terms of
letting the Iraqis fully understand the impatience here at
home, and the importance of their getting on with their
domestic reconciliation, and the importance of political
reconciliation to the success of the enterprise in Iraq. Do you
agree with Secretary Gates' statements about the importance and
value of the debate here on the Hill, in terms of putting
pressure on the Iraqi leaders?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I agree that the debate is
important, it is valuable, and that it certainly could put
pressure on the Iraqis, to see exactly what we're doing.
Chairman Levin. Is that pressure on them useful?
Admiral Mullen. If I were to measure that by the amount of
political progress, thus far, I think it's useful from our
perspective, I'm not sure it's had the impact some of us would
expect it to have, in terms of them moving forward politically,
and some of the other areas, but particularly politically.
Chairman Levin. Is it desirable that they feel pressure to
reach political settlement?
Admiral Mullen. I think we need to bring as much pressure
on them as we possibly can.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, you've indicated in your pre-
hearing questions that we should continue our strong support
for local police units in al Anbar Province, and other areas.
Have you seen press reports that indicate that our support for
those units--particularly those Sunni units in al Anbar
Province--that the Iraqi Government has not agreed to that
concept? Disagrees with the arming of the--particularly Sunni--
police in al Anbar? Have you seen those press reports?
Admiral Mullen. I have seen, I think, one report to that
effect, within the last week.
Chairman Levin. Does that create a caution in your mind,
that if trying to provide security in one area creates a
problem in terms of the Iraqi political leaders, particularly
the Prime Minister of Iraq, disagreeing with it, that we could
be--in a sense--making a political reconciliation more
difficult?
Admiral Mullen. What I've learned--particularly the Middle
East--is that we need to be mindful that when we make a move,
there can be unintended consequences--good and bad--associated
with that. We just need to be mindful of that as much as we
can, ahead of time, before a move is made.
In this particular area, I have a tremendous amount of
respect for David Petraeus and for Ryan Crocker. At this point,
it's really over to them. They clearly are in favor of this. In
addition to the political reconciliation in Baghdad, at the
head of government level, there is an important level of
political reconciliation which needs to take place in the
villages, in the tribes, on the ground. So I certainly think
that's going to be a very important connection to make, as
well.
Clearly, that is starting in al Anbar. The leadership in al
Anbar in recent months has gotten fed up with al Qaeda, and
it's been that combination of both the security we've provided,
and the leadership that is provided in the tribal areas that
has started to turn that around. I would, at this point,
certainly not push back on that. That doesn't mean the alarm
bell that may be going off in Baghdad, with the Government,
isn't a valid alarm.
Chairman Levin. My time is up. [Recess.]
We appreciate your patience during that interruption, and
we will now call on Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to follow up on the chairman's dialogue on the
importance of your leadership, as it relates to this most
complex situation facing us in Iraq.
I'm always one to go back and study history. I just want to
step back to November 2006. The chairman and I had come back
from Iraq at that time, and we both gave our respective views,
and I indicated that Iraq was, in my judgment, aimlessly
sliding sideways. We are coupled up to go back again, here,
very shortly on another trip.
But on that November 30, 2006, President Bush and Prime
Minister Maliki made a joint statement, following their meeting
in Amman, Jordan. I want to quote that statement: ``The Prime
Minister confirms the commitment of his government to advance
efforts towards national reconciliation and the need for all
Iraqis, and political forces in Iraq, to work against armed
elements responsible for violence and intimidation.''
Now, moving to January 10, 2007, when President Bush
addressed the Nation with his new strategy, following a series
of studies performed in the administration, the Joint Staff
made a contribution--you remember that period very well Admiral
Mullen, you were part of that.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. There were consultations with Congress. The
President made that rather dramatic statement on January 10
about the military surge that was required, in his judgment,
augmentation of forces, to bring about what he and Prime
Minister Maliki agreed upon, in November, in Amman, Jordan.
In his January 10 statement, again, he said, ``If the Iraqi
Government does not follow through on its promises, it will
lose the support of the American people, and it will lose the
support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act. The Prime
Minister understands this.''
Yesterday, the Iraq parliament adjourned without passing
any laws. You have answered in the advance questions, your own
candid assessments, and you've discussed them this morning.
So, we're faced with what I view now, is a surge of our
military forces, working with the Iraqi forces, and I think
credit should be given to the Iraqi forces, as having performed
in a credible manner, in their partnership of the two military
organizations, to perform the surge. If we see evidence, coming
forward now--as you indicated in your opening statement--of
success data points in the surge--not total, but indications.
The surge is moving forward, successfully. But the Maliki
Government is sliding backwards, and is failing in the
partnership that was established as the predicate, the
foundation, for the surge concept of January 10.
Now, you are faced with that. You have to sort this out. My
first question to you--what would be the consequences if
America failed to achieve that degree of stability for the
Iraqi people, who have voted for, and achieved, sovereignty. I
don't look upon this as achieving victory--just achieving a
security so that the Iraqi people can fully exercise a range of
sovereignty, and hopefully that nation will join other nations
in that region.
Now, given that, what are the consequences if this program
fails? Right now, it is a measure of failure. The military
going forward, the central government going backwards. What are
the consequences, or is it perceived that we, the United
States, have failed to bring about that level of security, and
maintained it so the government can take its place in the
world?
Admiral Mullen. I think the principal consequence that
would concern me most is the stability in the region. Which is
why, when I asked about possible alternatives, and I know
everybody understands this, but I think we need to reemphasize
it, we must move in a measured fashion.
One of the reasons I supported the surge, was because I
felt that it was very important to change the calculus. There
were questions out there that were unanswered, about will more
troops make a difference? Can we provide this security? Can we
take that issue off the table to focus more specifically on the
other legs of the stool--the economy, and the political aspect
of this.
Clearly, it has given us an opportunity to do that. In our
moves in the future, I think, we need to be mindful of that, as
well. To be sure, as we move, that if the calculus changes,
that we can see, clearly, what we should do, and do so in a
measured way.
I worry a lot about moves that would turn Iraq into a
cauldron, and I think that would be--not just bad for the
people of Iraq, not just bad for the people of America--but for
our vital interests in that part of the world.
Senator Warner. What about the consequences to the
economies of the world, about an unpredictable energy source in
that region?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Sixty percent of the known oil reserves--
I'm not talking just about Iraq--are in that region. If there's
instability there, that would have direct consequences on the
world economy.
Admiral Mullen. Vital interests certainly include
sustaining stability in that part of the world. Specifically,
resources and oil. Both near-term and long-term is the al Qaeda
threat, which we must continue to address that we don't put
Iraq in a position where their neighbors are emboldened, and
could move in. That's why I would argue strongly for measured
moves, that we clearly understand the risks.
Senator Warner. We have to address the consequences in
Iran.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Iran developing a nuclear capability, and
weaponry. The Palestinian conflict, the security of Israel--it
all is tied together.
Admiral Mullen. Yes sir, it is.
Senator Warner. We can't look at Iraq in isolation, do you
agree with that?
Admiral Mullen. I agree with that, yes, sir.
Senator Warner. General Cartwright, let's look in the
situation of this surge forward and the government backwards.
The troops today are smart, and they follow these things. They
recognize that they were called into this battle in this surge,
on the predicate there would be this partnership, between the
Maliki Government, and our President, and the coalition forces,
to succeed.
How do you think that the troops accept their challenge to
lose life and limb, to carry out their orders, when they see
the other half of the partnership is absolutely failing?
They communicate with their home base, they read
newspapers. They're as current on affairs as we are.
General Cartwright. Senator, they are smart. They are aware
of their surroundings, and they are aware of the objectives
that have been set in front of them--both the military
objectives, and the objectives to bring the government and the
economy into a more favorable vector.
They believe in their mission, they're going to do their
best to provide the head room--if we use that term--to allow
that government the opportunity. But, there comes a point at
which they're going to look at that, and say, ``How much
longer? For what price?'' if progress isn't seen.
Senator Warner. Right.
Finally, I say to both of you--Congress in its
appropriations bill, had language, the language started in this
committee, to create an independent analysis of the Iraqi
security forces under your former colleague, General James
Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps and our most recent NATO
Commander. That is up and running quite successfully, I've
worked with them. General Jones put together a team of a dozen
or so retired admirals, two police chiefs, and they're looking
at the viability of the Iraqi security forces today, and what
they'll look like tomorrow, and in the immediate future.
To his credit, Secretary Gates, I went to talk with him,
has given them tremendous support, to go into Iraq, where
they've just completed a weeks' study, they intend to return. I
hope that we can receive the commitment from both of you that
you will support that entity--the independent study--as
established by Congress in the appropriations bill, to go
forward and make that analysis.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. I spoke with General Jones before
he went, and basically just reviewed with him what he expected
to do. I have not spoken with him since his trip, and certainly
there's no one I have more personal respect for than Jim Jones.
I've served for him, and with him, so I'm sure that he will put
together a very valuable insight into what's going on with the
Iraqi security forces.
Senator Warner. That will be available in that timeframe
that you focused on so carefully in your testimony--early
September.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. You, likewise? He'll need support from time
to time, logistically, and so forth. That will be forthcoming,
then, from the JCS?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir. I will support him. I have
met with him since he has returned, to ensure that I understand
the scope of his mission, and we will work to ensure that he
gets the tools he needs to conduct that independent analysis.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Admiral, we also, in terms of giving us assurance, the
assessment that you referred to that the Joint Chiefs are
performing, I assume, would also be made available to this
committee?
Admiral Mullen. That assessment, Mr. Chairman, is part of
the internal deliberations in the tank to support advice to the
President. Certainly, if brought forward to discuss that, I'd
be happy to talk very frankly about my participation in that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. I join in welcoming you, Admiral Mullen
and General Cartwright. Admiral Mullen has extraordinary
experience--seven command tours, and his experience has been
broad, deep, and really, extremely impressive. You've been
dedicated to the Navy, the Nation's security, and we thank you
for your professionalism, and quite frankly, thank you for your
honesty and candor, and thoughtfulness in response to the
questions that have come here today.
On that Joint Chiefs' assessment--I have my own assessment,
along with the chairman--as I understand, that will be
available to the President, but not to Congress? Is that going
to be in early September, as well?
Admiral Mullen. That assessment is really their internal
deliberations, tied to advice both to the Secretary of Defense
and the President of the United States.
Senator Kennedy. But your understanding, that's going to be
in a timely way to be there at the time when the General----
Admiral Mullen. We expect to do that in continence with all
other activities in September.
Senator Kennedy. I thank you, Admiral, and I listened
carefully to your response about the cauldron in Iraq. I
believe, quite frankly, we're in a cauldron at the present
time, I'm not sure that the continued presence of American
troops is useful and helpful in dampening down the kinds of
intensity of the violence that we're seeing over there at this
period of time. I think you've stated very clearly the range of
considerations, but we read that National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) report, it is--as described--a situation where Americans
are constantly getting caught in the crossfires.
General Cartwright, I think you remind us with your own
background and experience of the extraordinary bravery and
courage of the service men and women, and they've been over
there 4 years. I'm always reminded, having brothers who served
in World War II, that war lasted a considerably shorter period
of time than this has lasted in a country of 28 million people,
and a country that we, basically, scorched 10 years ago. They
had a third-rate military kind of an operation, and we have our
men and women that are suffering and dying there, longer than
we fought in World War II, and they deserve the best policy.
For the very reasons that you've outlined--because of their
courage and their bravery. That's what many of us are
interested--as both of you are--in attempting to do.
Admiral Mullen, I'm concerned about when the President
announced the surge--he talked about security, he talked about
the opportunity for political reconciliation and
reconstruction. I think that most of us understand that on
those issues, the political reconciliation, we haven't seen
much evidence of, the conflict has continued, and the
reconstruction program has been hardly much to mention at all.
The issue that is very much before the American people is
the timeliness of, when is this judgment, and when your
decision is going to be made? You've outlined different
alternatives now. We had in January, when this surge was
started, Secretary Gates said, it was viewed as a temporary
surge. In February, Secretary Gates told the Senate
Appropriations Committee, ``I think General Petraeus believes
he'll have a pretty good idea of whether this surge is working,
probably by early summer.'' In April, Secretary Gates told us
more time would be needed. I think its been General Petraeus
view all along, sometime, at some point, during the summer,
mid- to late-summer, perhaps, he has thought that he would be
in a position to evaluate whether the plan was working.
In May, the President said even more time would be
necessary, he told us General Petraeus said, ``It would be at
least the end of the summer, before we can assess the impact of
this operation.'' Congress ought to give the Petraeus plan a
chance to work. A week later, Secretary Gates said the
administration would make their evaluation of the situation of
the surge in September.
On May 9, Lieutenant General Ray T. Odierno, the Commander
of Multi-National Force-Iraq, said the surge needs to go
through the beginning of next year, for sure. Then on July 20,
General Odierno again admitted that it would be at least
November before the military could provide a real assessment.
What the American people want is a real assessment. They
want it in a timely way. They've had assurance, by the
President and the Secretary of Defense, that we would have that
in September. You've indicated that, from your responses to the
questions from the chair and Senator Warner, that you thought
you'd be prepared to make that judgment as well.
Can you give us the assurance now, that that is your
timetable?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. That we are going to have that judgment
from you as to what these alternatives are by September?
Admiral Mullen. It is, to the best of my understanding
right now, the intent of Ambassador Crocker and General
Petraeus, to come in and deliver that assessment in September.
I talked about the timeliness of the Joint Chiefs assessment as
well.
Senator Kennedy. Let me ask you, comments that you made in
your earlier statements, if you could clarify about some of the
things you wrote in your questions to the committee. You
suggested that we, ``Work with the Government of Iraq to
achieve a long-term security agreement, that supports our
mutual interests.'' Yet, you wrote that you agree with the U.S.
policy not to seek permanent military bases. Can you clarify
what you mean by ``long-term security agreement'' and what you
mean by a ``commitment measured in years, not months''?
Admiral Mullen. I think that, Senator--and I'll just
reiterate what I said in my answer--that I understand the
United States' position with respect to permanent military
bases, I don't expect any. I think it is very important in the
long-term strategy, which has been laid out in the end state,
that Iraq is an ally in the war on terror, and that we have a
relationship which is supportive of each other in that part of
the world.
Senator Kennedy. So the long-term security agreement does
not include the permanent bases?
Admiral Mullen. That's correct, yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. I'm sure you believe, know, or understand
that the Iraqis believe those bases that are being built over
there, are going to be permanent American bases. At least,
that's the view of many.
Just shifting, because the time is moving on--I'm very
impressed by what you have talked about, and your vision of the
21st Century Navy, the fifth part, where you talk about the
training, the new challenges for training the professional
military officers. You need to have the firm grasp, and you've
reviewed those fundamentals--my time is short, you're familiar
with this--in tactics, technology, and leadership. You've
indicated that this was your intention, as the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), that you were going to have increased
diversity rewards for continuing education training, the
institutionalization of executive development. I don't know
whether you've referenced it as, Winston Churchill said,
``Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the
general, the more he contributes to maneuver, the less he
demands from slaughter.''
Do you want to just comment?
Admiral Mullen. I'll go to Senator Warner's comment about
the All-Volunteer Force. I think that we, as leaders, need to
pour ourself into the development of our people in the future.
It's across that full spectrum in what I see as a very
challenging world and global responsibilities and leadership
from the United States, which is very important.
Senator Kennedy. My time is up. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Mullen, this morning you described our troops as
being strained and stretched, and this is a concern that I
share, and that I think every member of this panel shares.
We've seen longer deployments, more waivers granted to recruits
with criminal records, we've actually seen an extension of the
age limit for recruits. We've also experienced considerable
difficulty in filling specialty positions, such as for
linguists--which are obviously very important in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Press reports have said that more than 50 Arabic linguists
have been discharged from our Armed Forces since the, ``Don't
Ask, Don't Tell'' policy was instituted. In addition to this
loss of translators, the estimates are that there were more
than 11,000 other servicemembers that have been separated since
``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' was instituted by Congress, back in
the early 1990s.
I've recently met with a retired admiral in Maine, who
urged me to urge you to reexamine the ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''
policy. In your view, should we reevaluate this policy?
Admiral Mullen. Senator, the current policy and law is, as
you've described. It's a policy that came in a time and was
greatly debated at the time that it was actually put in place.
I'm supportive of that policy, I really think it is for the
American people, to come forward, through this body, to both
debate that policy, and make changes, if that's appropriate.
That's how I see it. The current policy is one I support,
have supported, and until it changes, or really changes both in
policy and law, that's where I am.
Senator Collins. Would you encourage Congress to reevaluate
the policy?
Admiral Mullen. I'd love to have Congress make its own
decisions with respect to that. [Laughter.]
Senator Collins. Let me switch to a different issue,
involving Iraq. You've discussed this morning the possible
consequences of a rapid withdrawal, in response to Senator
Warner's question. Some of the proposals that members of
Congress have been putting forth, particularly in the House,
mandate a rapid withdrawal with a starting date, and an end
date.
Now, aside from the dire consequences, in your view, of a
rapid precipitous withdrawal on the Iraqis, on our country's
security, and on the region--are there logistical concerns?
Some of the proposals would give our troops very little time to
withdraw--just a matter of a few months. Is it practical, from
a logistics and safety concern, for a rapid withdrawal in a
matter of months, to be undertaken?
Admiral Mullen. Should we be put in that position, make the
decision to do that, we need to be, I think, mindful that it
will, logistically, it's a physics problem, it's just
physically going to take us some time to move. We have an
extraordinary amount of equipment there. We would have to
decide, what we would leave, what we would bring back, and what
we would repair.
In addition to that, I am extremely concerned in any
transition scenario, ensuring that we do it in a way that
protects our troops. That we don't expose them to the kind of
challenges that could be brought on. There's risk in being
there now, there will be risk in any kind of transition. But
that we plan for, and make sure that, any exposure is both
understood, risks are understood, and we absolutely minimize
it, to support their safety.
Senator Collins. Finally, I cannot leave this round of
questioning without bringing up a concern that you and I have
discussed many times. That is the adequacy of our shipbuilding
budget.
As CNO, you've done an extraordinary job in providing
funding toward the goal of a 313-ship fleet. That is, at a
minimum, what I believe is necessary to ensure that we have the
sea power necessary to project force. We have a real challenge
from China, for example, which is rebuilding its fleet at an
alarming rate.
If you are confirmed, will you continue to advocate for a
313-ship fleet?
Admiral Mullen. As of today, Senator, I am still the CNO,
and I'm still working hard to develop, support, and fund the
plan to which you refer, for 313 ships, which I think is vital
for our country.
Certainly, while I will have vast responsibilities, across
the entire Joint Force, and mindful of that, and we've spoken
to many of those--I'll never lose sight of what that number is,
and how we're doing.
I would also thank you for your continued support for
shipbuilding, and in particular, the shipyard, which is so
special to us, in building our new ships, and all of the
citizens of Maine who do that, and do that exceptionally well.
They are national treasures.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright, for your
extraordinary service, and your willingness to take on these
critical assignments at this critical time.
General Cartwright, I think you're finding out this morning
that one good thing about being Vice Chairman, is that you get
asked less questions than the Chairman. [Laughter.]
But, that will only be on occasions like this.
Admiral Mullen, most of the time has been spent on Iraq, I
don't really want to go over that much more, except to thank
you for your answers. I think they've been straightforward, and
important for us to hear.
You were asked in the question period whether you thought
there was any purely military solution to the problem in Iraq,
and you said, no--I want to say that, as one whose strongly
supportive of what we're doing in Iraq, I totally agree with
you. In the end, it has to be a political solution. The
military presence there is a necessary, but not sufficient,
basis for an ultimate solution.
It's necessary, one, because you have this real sectarian
violence, it's going on after these people have been liberated
from a brutal dictator.
Two, you have some outside forces that are stirring up the
sectarian violence, and don't want a political solution to
occur.
Now, I'm speaking particularly about al Qaeda in Iraq. Why
are we there? I thought in one sentence, or two sentences you
gave a very logical way--not only why we're there, but why when
we talk about a drawdown, to do it in a sensible, planned way.
That is because security in Iraq is tied to security in the
entire region. Security in that region of the world is--and has
always been--tied directly to American security.
That's why we're trying to get the Iraqi military to be
able to provide the security that is necessary for an ultimate
political solution.
I want to go in my questions to Iran. You mentioned it in
your opening statement, you said you were concerned with Iran's
aggressive posture, and destabilizing activities. Could you
just say a little bit more--in more detail--about what concerns
you most about Iran's activities today, in the Middle East and
beyond?
Admiral Mullen. I alerted strongly a year ago, when the
Israelis went into Lebanon, and the support that was clearly
there from Iran to support Hezbollah. Not that it was new, but
it was clearly highlighted in a way that the world could see.
Iran is now supporting the Taliban, in the Middle Eastern
view of ``the enemy of my enemy is my friend.''
Senator Lieberman. Because they've not previously been
allied, correct?
Admiral Mullen. They have been pretty strong enemies.
Senator Lieberman. Enemies. So why would you think it was--
--
Admiral Mullen. So, that strategic shift, for them to me,
is a big deal.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Admiral Mullen. The resurgence of the Taliban in
Afghanistan is of concern.
Senator Lieberman. So do you think that's, when you say
``the enemy of my enemy is my friend,'' it's us?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, absolutely. That's my view.
Senator Lieberman. I agree. If the Taliban's against us,
then Iran--no matter what the previous hostilities with the
Taliban, are going to support the Taliban now.
Admiral Mullen. Clearly we have strong indications to
evidence that they have provided technology that is, has made
its way into Iraq, is now making its way into Afghanistan, and
which are killing our soldiers and coalition soldiers.
Those are what I consider to be facts, in addition to the
rhetoric, which is very strong, in addition to the clear
support of many things in Southern Iraq, and then I would just
back off to just my CNO hat, as I have watched them operate
over the last couple of years in the Persian Gulf, to Senator
Warner's point about the resources that flow through that Gulf,
and the immediate global impact of strangling that out.
It is that combination of things--in addition to the
pursuit, certainly, of the capability of developing nuclear
weapons. This isn't just a view I've developed myself, because
I've talked to our friends in that part of the world, I've
interacted with many of the Gulf States. The leadership of
those States are very concerned about it, and it's very
important we assure our friends there, now and in the future,
that we will be there for them, and that all ties into this
whole regional stability piece. So, it is that combination of
things that makes me very concerned about Iran, and where
they're headed.
Senator Lieberman. That's part of the explanation of what
you meant about the impact of how we conclude, or go forward
with our presence in Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. If we do it too rapidly, if we do it
before they're ready, we create the cauldron, it will send a
signal to our allies in the region, and it will, of course,
encourage Iran.
Admiral Mullen. I think we need to do it thoughtfully,
measured, understand the risks, and be prepared for that.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Based on that ``enemy of my enemy
is my friend,'' would you agree that one of Iran's goals now--
both in Afghanistan and Iraq, and generally in the region, is
to try to push the United States out, or to push us, at least,
into a less prominent position?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. I would agree with that.
Senator Lieberman. That's a real concern. I would say not
only to us, but all of our allies in the region, including
particularly, the moderate Arab allies, and of course, Israel.
I want to thank you for being specific about the importance
of the Gulf, and the passage of oil through that Gulf. We
sometimes hesitate to do that. We have put ourselves--not to go
on about it here--into a dependent position when it comes to
how we power our society, we use too much oil from abroad. But,
the fact is, that's real now, and as Senator Warner suggested--
and you've answered--we ought not to be hesitant to say that
one of the reasons we need to maintain stability there--and
have the military presence, for instance, that the Navy
represents under your leadership in the Gulf, is that a crisis
there could raise the price of oil so high that it would have a
devastating impact on the world economy, but let's be
appropriately chauvinistic--on America's economy, and on the
quality of life of tens of millions of Americans.
We now have two carrier battle groups in the Gulf, is the
second one still there, or do I understand it may be deploying
out?
Admiral Mullen. We try not to discuss where they are and
what they're doing publicly, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
Admiral Mullen. But, clearly we've had a Navy presence
there since the late 1940s.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Admiral Mullen. I would expect we would continue to have
that--and we will continue to have aircraft carriers and other
naval assets in that part of the world, and we do.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Always the ability, in a moment
of crisis to move naval assets there rapidly.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Final question--totally different part
of the world, but as we're engaged in the battle against
Islamist extremism, Iran, al Qaeda, et cetera, there's a world
out there that we're trying very hard to manage, of rising
superpowers, particularly China--manage diplomatically, to
avoid conflict. But, you said in your prepared response, that
you believe long-term trends suggest that China is building a
military force scoped for operations beyond Taiwan. Could you
just talk about what you meant, and how you feel about our
relations with China?
Admiral Mullen. Clearly, their investment, their high-end
capability submarines, surface ships, they're talking now about
bringing an aircraft carrier within 2 to 3 years--and the
technologies, and the weapons, the aviations side--all of which
give them more capability than to just defend Taiwan.
I said in answering the question, a peaceful rise of China,
given many things including the economic engine that she is, is
a very good thing for the world. What I've spoken about
consistently, is the transparency of their development, on the
military side--and it has not been transparent, I actually
hosted my counterpart here--a few months ago--he had that
message loud and clear, and I actually hope, later on or in
mid-August to return that visit, to China, in a continued
desire to make and sustain contacts and engagements, so we do
understand each other better.
It's very important, thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, I have had the opportunity to
spend some personal time with the Admiral, and certainly
believe that he and the General are outstanding nominees. This
is my first hearing, and I want to thank you for the protocol
that you have in place, number one, the questions and answers
that they both have extensively answered, and having those in
advance, and second, the first come, first talk protocol that
you have here.
Because this is my first meeting, and I certainly do not
expect to ever do this again, I'm going to defer to some of the
more senior members, I know they're anxious to ask questions,
and I appreciate the opportunity to do that.
Chairman Levin. You're very wise to indicate you're not
going to repeat that mistake in the future. [Laughter.]
Senator Corker. Okay, thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
In that case, Senator Cornyn is next.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
Senator Corker, and welcome him to the committee as well. It's
nice to know some of us are gaining a little bit of seniority,
thanks to the addition of new members on the committee.
Admiral, General, welcome. Thank you, again, for your
service to our Nation, and your willingness to take on this
huge challenge.
I haven't been here the whole time, but I want to allude to
an op-ed piece that appeared in the New York Times yesterday by
Michael E. O'Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack, which is titled,
``A War We Might Just Win.'' Interesting title.
They say that here's the most important thing that
Americans need to understand. We're finally getting somewhere
in Iraq, at least in military terms, and they talk about what
victory might look like. They call it ``sustainable
stability,'' what they see as the victory there. They point out
to the high morale of our troops, a huge contrast with the mood
here in Washington, DC.
During the debates we've had on the way forward in Iraq,
and whether, and on what conditions we might withdraw our
troops, I've always believed that we all want our troops to
come home, as soon as possible, but the difference between us
are those who want to do so on a timetable--without regard to
conditions and consequences, and those who believe that it
ought to be based on conditions on the ground. We ought not
leave Iraq without the ability to sustain and defend itself,
not just because of what it would mean to our allies, but what
it would mean to us, in terms of a failed State in Iraq, and
the encouragement and emboldening that it would provide to al
Qaeda, and our other enemies.
Would you summarize, perhaps, Admiral, what you view as the
consequences of a withdrawal from Iraq that's based on a
timetable, without regard to conditions on the ground?
Admiral Mullen. If I may just briefly speak to the op-ed
piece, Senator, which you brought up. One of the things that
struck me about that, certainly, that it would come from
individuals who were very pessimistic, as they said, I think,
as recently as a year ago. That said, they focused on the
military side, and I feel very strongly that that, clearly, is
starting to go well, and providing the kind of space and time
we talked about earlier, in order for the Government of Iraq to
move forward.
The other thing that struck me was in my most recent trip,
which was over the holidays, was the contrast between what I
found on the ground, in theater, and what I thought was going
on based on being here. They spoke to this, as well. I really
do think that's an important piece for all of us, and it goes
back to listening to General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker
when they come in, and really understanding, and having their
birds' eye view for what's going on, so that when we make
decisions, we have that view in mind.
I worry about a mandated timetable. I worry about mandating
to any commander on the ground. Because it severely constrains
an operational, or a tactical, commander. I'm a warfighter at
heart, if I'm on the other side, and I know the timetable's out
there, it's going to create an opportunity for me to do some
things to possibly take advantage of that. It doesn't mean I
win, but certainly I can put that in my calculus.
That said, and General Petraeus said it yesterday in an
interview, the surge is scheduled to start to be relieved in
the spring, just with rotational units--and that it is
temporary--that's what the Secretary of Defense has said, and
we need to be mindful of that, as well.
So, there is a time element here, there is a condition on
the ground element here, and I think it is the mixing of those
two that we need to be mindful of, in terms of decisions that
we make in a measured way.
Senator Kennedy and I talked about a cauldron. Certainly
there are parts of Iraq that are not going well right now. I'm
concerned that it will turn into a failed State, one that
emboldens Iran, and other neighbors, those kinds of things,
when I talk about a cauldron. That would impact, not just Iraq
and the Middle East, but us.
Senator Cornyn. While there do appear to be objective
reasons to be more optimistic, although as far as our military
is concerned----
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, I would agree.
Senator Cornyn.--there seems to be an attitude that if we
just put enough pressure on the Iraqis, on the governance side,
that we can somehow force them to do, or persuade them to do
things that they might not otherwise do, or on a timetable that
might be more suitable to our preferences.
What I've always wondered is, if we put so much pressure on
the Iraqis that they collapse and are unable to govern
themselves without a lot more bloodshed, perhaps, a lot more
confusion and chaos in the meantime, that would seem to me to
be a bad thing, to put that much pressure on them.
I don't really know how to gauge that. I'd be interested in
your thoughts. How do we know that we're putting, let's say,
optimal pressure on them, to encourage them to govern
themselves, to take that responsibility, but not so much that
they just collapse, and create that failed State that we all
are concerned about.
Admiral Mullen. I struggle with that as well, Senator. I
don't have a specific answer with respect to that. I do, again,
go back to Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, and their
views of that, because they are there, to me, seemingly, they
would be able to--particularly the Ambassador--answer that
question better than anybody else. How far along that curve are
we? That they may collapse any minute, I just don't know.
Senator Cornyn. Mr. Chairman, in the spirit of Senator
Corker, I will yield back my remaining time.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral and General, not only for being here
today, but for your extraordinary service to the Nation and the
naval service. Thank you very much.
You said, Admiral Mullen, in response, I believe, to a
question of Senator Levin, that you were going to do your
utmost to maintain rotations of no more than 12 to 15 months.
Effectively, that means--as you also suggest--by next April,
regardless of the conditions on the ground, the surge will end,
because we simply will not be able to put manpower on the
ground, unless we extend rotations. Is that a fair assessment?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, that's fair.
Senator Reed. So, all this discussion of conditions on the
ground, let the thing play out--I think are trumped,
essentially, by an overwhelming reality of our force structure.
It has to end next April, the surge. I think we have to begin
to think about the end of the surge. There is a timetable
directed by the force structure that we have, and I think both
of you gentlemen recognize that. I think, again, we seriously
have to consider what happens after the surge. That is a lot of
what you will be thinking about, and General Cartwright will be
thinking about.
But, this notion that we're going to have an unlimited
opportunity to keep forces there at this level, that we're only
going to take forces down based upon General Petraeus'
suggestion that things are okay now, I think, is fully rebutted
by the force structure. Is that fair?
Admiral Mullen. I think that's fair, Senator. The other--
and this gets to responding to Senator Levin's question about
options, and how is the transition to the Iraqi security forces
going, when does that take place--back to Senator Cornyn's
point--I think all of us want to bring our forces home as soon
as we can. Those are other aspects of this that certainly will
be informed by understanding where we are with respect to how
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus see it.
Senator Reed. I appreciate the fact, and I just spent an
evening with both General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker about
2 weeks ago. They're terribly talented individuals who are
doing their best, but it seems that what is really driving the
situation--first, our force structure, second, again, I think
you've suggested this, there's been no real political progress
on the ground. That was one of the premises of the surge, that
there would be some significant political progress. Those two
factors, I don't think, will be significantly altered in the
next 60 days, or maybe even 6 months. Do you have any comments
on that?
Admiral Mullen. I'm actually very committed to waiting
until September to see where those two individuals are, sir.
Senator Reed. Let me change subjects, slightly. What is
Admiral Fallon's role as the Commander of U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), given that every suggestion by the White House is
that General Petraeus will be the deciding voice, in fact,
even, I think, General Pace's role seems to be somewhat
diminished. Are you concerned about that, in terms of, Chairman
of the JCS, your role as incumbent will be, as the Chief
Advisor to the President, will not be the chief advisor to the
President on this issue?
Admiral Mullen. My view, if confirmed to this position--and
it is actually my view as a member of the Joint Chiefs--is
General Petraeus, while a very important individual, and
clearly one for whom I have the greatest respect--is one voice.
He has a couple of bosses, one of whom is Bill Fallon, and Bill
Fallon is working this very hard, as well. I know that. I've
spent time with him. He has a voice in this, and will have a
voice in this, as we move forward. The same is true with the
Joint Chiefs, and General Pace has led that effort very well.
Senator Reed. One of the persistent problems is the
inability of non-DOD elements to complement the increased
forces, military forces, with civilian actors.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Do you see any progress on that front? If
there is not progress on that front, how do we address the
needs of reconstruction, how do we address the report by the
International Crisis Group, which I believe was issued
yesterday, which basically declares Iraq as a failed State?
Huge numbers of people who are without even access to water,
and frankly, that is a contrast to 2003. How do we deal with
that? If you're talking about stability, one of the most
destabilizing elements is people who are starving, and thirsty,
and desperate.
Admiral Mullen. Senator, one of the reasons I supported the
surge, was because of our Government's commitment, not just the
military lines, but the economic and political lines. Not just
to have Ambassador Crocker work the problem, but expand that
base.
We've expanded the number of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs), they are, in fact, being stood up, over the fall.
I am concerned about the pace of that--the other arms of
government are much more engaged with this surge than prior to
that surge, I've been concerned for a long time about the depth
and capacity for that kind of capability. I think we have to
have it as a government, not just for this run, but for the
future.
I remain concerned about that. It's better than it was, but
it's not where it needs to be.
Senator Reed. Just a final point. I have seen reports, news
reports, that were broadcast by al Zawahiri, that basically
suggested that, they see us as being trapped in Iraq. If we
disengage, that will be something that would not be consistent
with what they see as a strategy they feel is working very well
for them. Is there any credence in terms of that?
Admiral Mullen. When I laid out the three challenges in my
opening statement about the Middle East, and certainly Iraq and
Afghanistan as a part of that, and security in that area. That
is what I believe my leading challenge will be. We need to take
steps which ensure that we are stable for the short- and the
long-term there. That we move, in Iraq, with that in mind. I
don't consider that a trap, I consider that we clearly have
very complex, very tough challenges, that we have to work our
way through.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Again, Admiral and
General, your great service to the Navy and Marine Corps, and
your perspective service as the Chairman and the Vice Chairman
is something I think will give confidence to all of us.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you. My compliments to both of you
for your service to our Nation to pick up where Senator Reed
left off.
About 2 years ago, we had this debate about, do we need
more people in the Army or the Marine Corps, and there was a
pretty strong push-back that we didn't. Looking back, was it a
mistake not to build up the Army and Marine Corps sooner?
Admiral Mullen. I'm very supportive of building them up,
yes, sir.
Senator Graham. How many troops can we muster to stay in
Iraq on a sustained basis, come April?
Admiral Mullen. If you drop the guidelines, the specific
15-12 rotation----
Senator Graham. Let's assume we kept them.
Admiral Mullen. If we keep them--we can continue coming
down, we can rotate troops in behind the ones that would rotate
out, coming down from 20 right now, to 15, which we do without
relief. Based on what the mission is--15 brigades--based on
what the mission is----
Senator Graham. I'm an Air Force guy, just give me numbers.
I don't do brigades. How many people will we have?
Admiral Mullen. We have 160,000 there now, certainly as we
come down, we could back fill them. But, as I indicated
earlier, Senator, I'm very concerned about the stress that is
placed on our people. I think we have to put that into the
equation.
Senator Graham. So let's put that in the equation. Would it
be your advice, what you know now, what troop level could we
maintain without breaking force, given the 12-15 month dynamic,
come April?
Admiral Mullen. If we start to come down, it would take us
a couple of years to get us into a one-to-one rotation, that
means 1 year over, 1 year back. We have to come down to about
10 brigades, or let's say half the force that we have right
now, to move us towards a two-to-one rotation. Roughly, in that
ballpark. Which means, over for a year, back for 2 years. Which
is our goal right now.
Senator Graham. So, we would be reducing our force presence
by half?
Admiral Mullen. To achieve that, yes, sir. But it would
take us awhile to get there.
Senator Graham. How long?
Admiral Mullen. Probably 3 to 4 years.
Senator Graham. Now, we're trying to grow the size of the
Army and Marine Corps, and I assume, General Cartwright, you
support that?
General Cartwright. I do. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. The number we're picking for the Marine
Corps, is that the proper number, in your opinion?
General Cartwright. The 202,000 would allow us to get to
this 2 and 1 ratio, sooner. That sooner would not be measured
in multiple years, it may cut off a few months, because we have
to, not only train them, but we have to buy the equipment to
equip them. When you put the two of those together, getting
those forces into the field, and making them operationally
viable is going to take you 2 to 3 years.
Senator Graham. Admiral, when it comes to the Army, have we
picked the right number, in terms of growing the Army?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. As far as I understand right now,
in fact, I've spoken with General Casey about this as recently
as yesterday--and we discussed this, and where General Casey
wants to go is to get to the 547,000, which is the currently
approved number, and then evaluate where we need to go.
Senator Graham. Is it pretty clear that elements of the
Iranian Government are actively involved in killing American
soldiers?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. What do we do about that?
Admiral Mullen. I think we need to continue to, certainly,
make a point of that in every forum that we have, work hard on
shutting off the paths that the technology is coming through,
and consistent with my concern with their very strong
statements about where they're headed, and the support of the
terrorist regimes, I think we need to address that very
strongly.
Senator Graham. Why do you think they're trying to kill
American soldiers?
Admiral Mullen. Basically, in support of continuing to try
to make it difficult for us in Iraq. Actually, in Afghanistan,
as well.
Senator Graham. So, it's your belief that Iran is trying
to, basically, drive us out of Iraq so they would, I guess, be
a winner, if we left?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. How would they win?
Admiral Mullen. I think that the Shia connection between
Tehran and Baghdad is one of great concern. The influence that
they have with the Badr, the Mahdi Armies, is of great concern.
It's very difficult to predict how that would play,
specifically, in terms of what Iran would do, but I think
they'd be much more comfortable with a Shia-run government
right next to them.
Senator Graham. If it was perceived throughout the world
that the United States lost in Iraq, who would be the winners?
Admiral Mullen. Clearly, Iran would be. The challenge we
have with respect to al Qaeda, which I think we have to
continue to address, under all circumstances, there would be
the Islamic theocracies, the radicals, would certainly be seen
to be on the winning side.
Senator Graham. General, are we--through the surge--
diminishing al Qaeda's presence and viability in Iraq, or not?
General Cartwright. We are challenging it. In that
challenge, in areas, we are diminishing it, for sure. They are
resilient. They seem to have an unlimited pool from which to
draw from, if you're on the battlefield. In other words, as we
defeat, others come in behind.
But, the environment in which they're finding in Iraq, with
the surge, currently, is an unfriendly environment, and that's
challenging their ability to be resilient in that area.
Senator Graham. How would you define winning in Iraq,
Admiral?
Admiral Mullen. I worry a little bit about the terms
``success,'' ``failure,'' ``winning,'' and ``losing.''
Senator Graham. Wars are about winning and losing.
Admiral Mullen. I understand that. Yes, sir, I understand
that. A stable Iraq, which can govern itself, has control of
its borders, and gets to a level of national and local
reconciliation, as well as it not becoming a safe haven for al
Qaeda.
Senator Graham. How would you define winning, General
Cartwright?
General Cartwright. My sense is that we find a government
that observes the rule of law, number one. Number two, that we
have an economy in that country that's improving. Number three,
we have security. Number four, it sits in a strategic location,
geographically, it sits between extremists and moderates, and
that in that position it helps us, in a regional construct, as
we've spoken to, to help the area and the region develop in a
more logical and measured way.
Senator Graham. How would you assess our likelihood of
winning, given what you know now, Admiral Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. I think it's very important, back to the
regional stability, Senator, that we take steps to ensure that
it is secure.
Senator Graham. The question is not whether it's desirable
to win, but the likelihood of winning. We all know it's
desirable to win, but the likelihood?
Admiral Mullen. Based on the lack of political
reconciliation at the government level, although I spoke
earlier about some of it going on, at the local level, which I
think is important, I would be concerned about whether we'd be
winning in Iraq.
Senator Graham. General?
General Cartwright. I think we can win, Senator. It's going
to be a challenge. In September, we're going to get the
opportunity to assess that the path we're on is the right path,
or whether we want to make adjustments, but we do have the
ability, and we do have the staying power to do that. From a
regional perspective to create the environment that we want to
create out there.
Senator Graham. Finally, do you see Iraq as part of a
global struggle? Or an isolated regional event?
Admiral Mullen. At this point I see it actually, not
isolated but rather regional and global. I have come to believe
that there are very few struggles around the world that don't,
these days, have global impact.
Senator Graham. Would you agree this is a war, really, we
can't afford to lose, when it's all said and done?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to welcome both the Admiral and the General. It's
kind of scary to say this, but I've known Admiral Mullen for
more than 40 years now. I think that he is the right individual
for this job. He's someone who's always been known for his
clarity of thought, and for having the courage of his
convictions. I think we're seeing that at this hearing here
today.
General Cartwright, with your background, not only
tactically, but also having had enormous strategic
responsibilities in our country, I wish both of you well.
I'd like to just say something for the record, with
response to what my colleague from Texas mentioned on this op-
ed piece. Just to clarify, my thoughts from the individuals who
wrote the op-ed piece in the New York Times yesterday, at least
one of them, was one of the big supporters for the invasion of
Iraq in the first place. Mr. Pollack wrote a whole book about
why we should go in. Whatever the findings on the ground, I
don't think we should be characterizing this as people who have
been turned around by recent events.
Also, Admiral, I think you know this, and I was really
gratified to see the scope of your testimony, with respect to
our strategic obligations around the world, and also the fact
that you mentioned that we need to get back to the goal of a 2-
to-1 rotational cycle for our troops.
But the question, really, has never been, from this side,
whether we should pick one specific date, in terms of
withdrawing from Iraq. The question has been, how we
recuperate, as a Nation, for what many of us believe was an
enormous strategic blunder. Going into one specific country,
that was not directly threatening us, at a time when we needed
to be focusing on international terrorism at large, and the
other strategic considerations that you mentioned in your
report--and that really goes to how we balance all of our
national assets, not simply the military assets--and what does
it mean? What does it mean to fail? What does it mean to
succeed? You've been asked a number of leading questions here
with specific terms in them. But, in reality, what we have to
be doing here, is to figure out the right configuration of
national assets, that will allow us to diminish our presence,
physically, in Iraq, at the same time increasing the stability
of the region.
I don't think we focus on this enough, when we start
talking about the problems in Iraq. That, the issue of regional
instability, what you've alluded to a number of times in your
testimony, is the key. Not simply regional instability if we
were to make a precipitous withdrawal, but regional instability
now. Largely as a result of the fact that we went into Iraq in
the first place. We're now seeing oil at a higher level than
ever. We're pushing $80 a barrel on oil. That's always an
indicator from the international community about its unease
with what's happening in that region.
We're seeing turmoil with refugees, inside and out. The
number that I've seen is about 4.5 million refugees, about 2
million of those, right now in Jordan, straining that
government. We've seen sponsorship of ethnic factions from the
outside, we've spent a good bit of time talking about Iran. We
should also be talking about the Saudis, the numbers that I've
seen is the Saudis actually have a plurality of suicide bombers
in Iraq.
We see instability on the Turkish border, with respect to
Turkey now being threatened by the strength of the Kurdish
communities up there, and how it would affect Kurdistan at
large.
So, really, the question becomes, to what extent our
military presence in Iraq affects this instability, and to what
extent these issues should be dealt with through robust
diplomacy? I'd like your thoughts on that.
Admiral Mullen. I think that, back to my constant refrain
on regional stability, and then, specifically, getting to what
to do about Iraq, I think they're inextricably linked. We, as
we make decisions about moving forward, need to keep that in
mind.
You've described a few of the complexities that are clearly
here. It's where we are, and we need to be mindful of that as
we move forward. I don't think you can tear them apart, I don't
think you can de-link them. Many of these questions don't have
an answer that is very exact, this is, ``I know what we should
do, therefore let's do this,'' which is why I would argue for
us to move through this in a very measured way.
We do have regional and global responsibilities, that are
very much tied to how we move forward here.
Senator Webb. Right, and I think that the thing that we
often miss in this debate, because it's become like the Battle
of the Psalm, politically, in terms of the way people have dug
in up here on trying to resolve this issue, but there are
instabilities that have been created, simply because we're
there, and there are instabilities that could result if we
leave in the wrong way. But we do need, in my view, to be
moving toward that.
May I ask you, with respect to this notion of permanent
bases--we all agree that there shouldn't be permanent bases,
but how do we define a permanent base? I read an article
yesterday that said, ``Well, we're using sand bags instead of
concrete,'' but my view is that there ought to be a different
way to measure that. How do we define a permanent base, when we
say we're not going to have one?
Admiral Mullen. The way I think about it, is we have
permanent bases in places overseas right now, be it Germany for
the Army, for instance, or Okinawa for the Marine Corps, or
Cuzka for the Navy--those are permanent bases, where we have
permanent change of station (PCS) people, we have PCS families,
in many cases. In Bahrain we don't, we certainly have strong
support there. That's where I would draw the line. I recognize
the significance of the issue.
Senator Webb. I would say the term is--where I'm trying to
get here is--the term really has more diplomatic overtones than
it does structural.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Webb. A lot of people who wanted to move us into
Iraq were openly saying that we should be on the ground in Iraq
for the next 50 years. I would assume you don't agree with
that?
Admiral Mullen. I certainly haven't put any kind of
timetable like that. I do think we will be there for years, not
months, but I don't see it as, on a permanent basis.
Senator Webb. When you mentioned, if you move to the 2-to-1
rotational cycle, it would take 3 to 4 years to get there, this
was in response to Senator Graham's question. Would you say it
would take 3 to 4 years to get to 2-to-1, or 3 to 4 years to
get to 80,000 troops in Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. If we get down to about half of where we
are right now, somewhere around 8 to 10 brigades, it is my
understanding is it's about 3 to 4 years, in terms of being
able to sustain that with a rotation that isn't to----
Senator Webb. Just simply in terms of drawing out the
rotational cycles----
Admiral Mullen. That's right.
Senator Webb. Given the current mission.
Admiral Mullen. Also, the new troops, the increased end
strength in the ground forces, and we have a tendency to focus
on personnel only and for not just the Army, but also the
Marine Corps, and to General Cartwright's point earlier, we
have to provide the equipment--both repair it, as well as buy
it, and train them.
Senator Webb. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just one short
question, I don't want General Cartwright to think that he was
being totally ignored.
I have a much more parochial issue, but having worked in
the Pentagon and knowing that the sorts of things that the Vice
Chair works on, it seems to me, with such a high percentage of
officers in the military right now having enlisted service,
that we have a cap, generally, with Defense Officer Personnel
Management Act (DOPMA), of 30 years aggregate service before
you're forced to retire. It seems to me that we're losing a lot
of really highly-qualified officers, who particularly, if they
go through a program like the Marine Corps Enlisted
Commissioning Education Program (MECEP), or something where
they have college time that counts against their Active-Duty
time--we're losing a huge number of people with a lot of
talent, right about the 20-year level, when they become
lieutenant colonels, or commanders--wouldn't it be logical to
start the clock again for a lot of these people when they're
commissioned, in terms of their 30-year career?
General Cartwright. My sense is that, when we look at it,
at what's going on today, that the shortfalls that we have,
where we would like to have a little more capability than we
do, are in the mid-grade officers and mid-grade enlisted. They
really are--in Marine terms--the strategic corporals out there.
Their decisions carry strategic consequence on the battlefield.
Having a seasoned force in that area--and that talks to
grade-shaping, and those types of activities, is to our
benefit. We're looking at that, we're considering the options,
we have made some adjustments in how long people can serve, and
how we compensate them for serving longer, but I think you
bring up a good point, and if confirmed, we'll take a look at
that.
Senator Webb. I would like the opportunity to pursue that
at the subcommittee level.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, can I just take 60 seconds to
respond to that question?
Chairman Levin. Try 30 seconds.
Admiral Mullen. It's been my experience, Senator Webb, with
the 20-year goal out there, from when you come in to when
you're going to retire, is one that you really have to work
hard to penetrate. I've seen many great line-of-duty officers
who leave as lieutenants at the 20-year mark. So, I don't
disagree with the possibilities here, but we, I think, would
have to really come to grips with, how do we make the incentive
beyond 20? I mean, significantly.
Senator Webb. Let me clarify what I'm saying. You have
someone who's 10 years enlisted, 10 years an officer, who
maybe, when they get to the 30-year point is making lieutenant
colonel, who conceivably could be flag officer. But they're
topped out.
Admiral Mullen. Right.
Senator Webb. They're gone, and you're losing a great
resource.
Admiral Mullen. I would support that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, let me add my thanks for your service to our
country. You're doing a terrific job, and I look forward to
both of you being elevated to a different position, where you
can provide even stronger leadership.
Yesterday there was an announcement regarding foreign sale
of arms. First of all, what comments can you make relative to
the countries to whom a decision has been made, at least by the
administration that's come into Congress, relative to those
sale of arms? How much of an input did you gentlemen have in
that decision, and how big a role did that decision play in
this issue of regional stability that you allude to, Admiral
Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. Let me try to work it from the last
question first, Senator Chambliss. It played a significant role
in terms of regional stability, because I think we need to
ensure that our friends in that area can be reassured and
supported as we do in many places throughout the world.
I can't give you a list of who's there, because I haven't
seen it, but my specific involvement was tied to the ship piece
of what I believe is in the package--I haven't seen the final
package--but what I believe is in the package, specifically
with respect to Saudi Arabia. I've worked that in the building,
in terms of support. I've seen a list in the newspaper, but I
can't respond--I just don't know in terms of the level of
detail of all of the other countries that are actually in the
package.
Senator Chambliss. General Cartwright, any additional
comments?
General Cartwright. Senator, I have not been involved in
those discussions. Obviously, if I'm confirmed, then I would
have the opportunity to participate. But I would focus on the
regional issues, and the stability and the balance that it
either does, or does not, bring to the region.
Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, based on your comments
to Senator Graham in response to his questions, would you
consider Iraq to be the focal point of the global war on
terrorism today?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. I think that al Qaeda in Iraq is,
specifically, and not giving them a safe haven there. I'm also
concerned about the reemerging safe haven they have in
Pakistan, and that is clearly the focal point right now. But, I
don't limit it to that, because al Qaeda is out and about in
lots of places in the world.
Senator Chambliss. That being the case, and also with your
comments relative to the fact that we know that Iranians today
are participating in the attacks against our soldiers on the
ground in Iraq, is a military option against Iran, or is there
a military option against Iran that is lurking out there?
Admiral Mullen. I would hope that we could address this
issue, and these issues about Iran, diplomatically. I think, as
is always the case, for me, military force should be used as a
step of last resort, and that's where I'd put it right now.
Senator Chambliss. Let me switch gears a minute to
Afghanistan, we talk a lot about Iraq, obviously, but after our
initial success in Afghanistan, it's been necessary that we
increase the size of the force structure there, a lot of
activity on the ground and otherwise, in Afghanistan. Give us
your quick summation of where we are, relative to the conflict
in Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. In reviewing, starting last September as a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we started to look heavily
at Iraq and Afghanistan, and we'd actually, in that review, and
the Afghanistan piece, have looked for resurgence of the
Taliban, coming out of the winter thaw, and a significant
challenge with respect to that resurgence. That resurgence,
based on what I thought was going to happen, to the level that
we had predicted it would happen, and what has actually
occurred, has not been as significant as I thought it would be.
That said, I am concerned about its resurgence. Clearly,
the forces there--and there are American forces, as well as the
forces from NATO--are very important in moving ahead, and so
it's not as bad as we had, or as I had seen it to be at this
particular point. That said, it isn't going away, and it's
something I think we're going to continue to need to address.
Senator Chambliss. Are you comfortable with the speed with
which the Pakistani military is moving against our enemies in
Pakistan?
Admiral Mullen. I'm extremely concerned about the safe
haven which is being built in the Fa Ta region. I am moved in a
positive direction that, in fact, President Musharraf has
directed the Army to move in that direction. I know, having
been there recently, that is a huge challenge for him. I
honestly don't know, Senator, how fast they could react. I am
concerned with the speed with which the safe haven is building
up.
Senator Chambliss. With regard to these force structure
changes that we have inside of Iraq today, and the new strategy
we're pursuing, if we're looking at taking down that force
structure in April, based upon what you know today, are we
accomplishing the mission that additional force structure was
dedicated to?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. We are.
Senator Chambliss. At this point in time, without knowing
what's going to be said in this report next month, are we
seeing the kind of positive results that would justify--
irrespective of whether or not we have the soldiers to go back
in and replace those folks--are we justified in thinking that
we can reduce the size of the force structure next spring?
Admiral Mullen. Part of that is how much security do we
have next spring? It's very difficult for me to answer that
right now. The heart of the challenge right now, clearly is in
Baghdad. General Petraeus has said, and I take him at his word
in this regard, that he has no expectation that it will be
sustained beyond the spring. I saw him say that as recently as
yesterday.
Senator Chambliss. What about the improvement of the Iraqi
Army to step in behind us and maintain the security in those
areas--particularly of Baghdad, that we have at this point in
time, cleaned out, and are now holding?
Admiral Mullen. The report is that it's moved well in some
areas, and that in other areas it's uneven. In addition to the
Iraqi security forces, General Cartwright talked about this
earlier--key as well, is the development of the police force in
Iraq.
They've clearly made progress. In fact, the Iraqi security
forces on the military, in some cases, are performing
independent military operations, which is terrific. We're
moving in the right direction here. In some areas, not as
rapidly as we would like to be.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Mullen, I congratulate you on your nomination.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. I believe you have the depth of
knowledge and experience to lead us through these very
difficult times to some conclusion on our mission and our
transition to a new mission in Iraq.
General Cartwright, you and Sandy have been a very vital
part of our community in Omaha, and we're going to miss you. I
want to thank you for putting together the Global Innovation
and Technology Center in Omaha, which has invited community,
private sector management, and others, to develop new
strategies and innovations in our thinking in support of
STRATCOM, and we appreciate that very much. It will be a legacy
to, not only the community, but I think to our military.
As we look at the September 15 date, then recognizing the
realities of April, and given the fact that the President spoke
last week about Iraq and said al Qaeda and Iraq 95 times in a
very short period of time, shouldn't the mission be
transitioning to fighting al Qaeda as soon as we possibly can?
I know Senators Collins, Warner, and I and others felt that the
surge should be focused in al Anbar and other areas where al
Qaeda existed, rather than trying to intervene to create some
sort of temporary situation in Baghdad to give the government a
chance to catch it's breath, or as I think, General, you said
some head room, to be able to do this.
If the President said 95 times our threat in Iraq is al
Qaeda, why wouldn't we be repositioning and transitioning as
soon as possible if we know what's going to happen in April?
Why wouldn't we be getting ready for that today, and transition
the mission to fighting al Qaeda and supporting the government
in helping develop their peacekeeping, their military, and
police positions for security, and taking security of the
border, and protecting our assets in Iraq? Why wouldn't we look
to do that more immediately, rather than wait? Or will we, if
the report on September 15th would justify it, would we then
begin to transition our troops into that mission?
Admiral Mullen. In the counterinsurgency that we're
involved in, and I won't speak for General Petraeus, but my
understanding of it is, principally we have to protect the
people. Security for the Iraqi people is where that surge is
focused and it is providing that. It is moving in that
direction. We have a ways to go.
Senator Ben Nelson. Will it be temporary or will it be
permanent?
Admiral Mullen. I don't know sir.
But even in this counterinsurgency surge operation, the
focus is also very much on al Qaeda. That is, and in fact, it
is a combination of the tremendous men and women in the Army
and the Marine Corps, in particular, out west in Anbar,
combined with the strategic shift of the tribal leadership,
which has created a much more secure environment in Anbar than
existed as recently as 6 or 7 months ago. Whatever our mission
might be, whether it's what we have right now or when it
changes, an enduring piece of this is going to be focused on al
Qaeda. I think that is now and it will be no matter what. We
are making progress there.
Senator Ben Nelson. We're making progress, but they keep
growing in terms of their numbers and capabilities. So, under
that theory, wouldn't we want to put more emphasis on that part
of the surge? We supported going into al Anbar, we supported
the counterinsurgency efforts, overall. What we didn't support
was trying to intervene in somebody else's civil war. All the
talk about who wins strikes me as being odd because I don't
think you can ever win somebody else's civil war.
They have to win this war. We have to help them win a
peace. I think that's where our goal has to be. If al Qaeda is
the biggest threat to--it's been described as the biggest
threat to--the future of the Government in Iraq, I would think
that we would be putting more emphasis, sooner--without having
to wait until September 15 to decide to do that--because of the
urgency of the moment.
Admiral Mullen. My understanding Senator, is there's a
tremendous amount of emphasis on this now. In fact, it's the
Sunnis, in particular, in Anbar who are turning out al Qaeda.
Senator Ben Nelson. With our help?
Admiral Mullen. Yes sir, absolutely. It's a combination of
things. Having made that strategic shift our way, it's made it
much more difficult for them.
Senator Ben Nelson. But isn't it also occurring somewhat in
the north, in the Sunni regions as well?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do we have sufficient troops in the
north to help the tribal leaders fight against al Qaeda?
Admiral Mullen. Everything I understand is, yes we do sir.
We do. It's actually reasonably stable up there, with the
exception of a couple spots.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well then, why would there be a
suggestion that al Qaeda is growing in its strength in Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. My understanding is, clearly al Qaeda is
growing in its strength in terms of the safe haven, in
Pakistan, specifically. My assessment at this particular
point--and I'd have to go back and do some research--but my
assessment is that they are actually not growing in Iraq, that
in fact, the intensity with which we're engaging them is severe
and will continue to be severe.
Senator Ben Nelson. I guess I'm still of the opinion that
if we have them on the run, we ought to take them out and put
whatever forces it takes to do that, because that's going to
have a more enduring impact than trying to keep the temporary
peace in Iraq for an Iraqi Government that is taking the next
month off, while we continue to fight.
Now, I've been a supporter of the benchmarks because I've
always felt that we talk in terms of winning, losing, and
gaining ground. What would you say, in terms of evaluating the
success on the ground in Iraq, in terms of some metric? Are we
20 percent toward our goal there, are we 30 percent, or 10
percent, or 50 percent or more?
Admiral Mullen. I couldn't give you a number, Senator. I
just don't know. I know we're significantly better than we
were. We're headed in the right direction. That's what the
discussion is about--and I think Dave Petraeus had this right.
It took us several months to get the 5th Brigade there, which
got there in June. There's been significant positive steps
taken in security since the 5th Brigade was there. We're on a
campaign right now to continue that and that's why I think he
deserves the time to see how far he can move this before we
make judgments about where to go again, where to go next.
Senator Ben Nelson. I agree with you in not setting an end
date to how long our troops will be there, not to send the
message to our enemies and adversaries as to what date we plan
to withdraw or what our plans are. But I don't agree that we
shouldn't begin the process of transitioning troops into a
larger effort against al Qaeda at the present time. That's
something we could begin doing now. We wouldn't have to wait
until September 15. If the September 15 report says we ought to
do it, we ought to do it with warp speed, recognizing the
realities of how difficult it is to begin to move people into
that effort.
Admiral Mullen. Certainly.
Senator Ben Nelson. I'll finish with this last question--if
we did move to that kind of a mission rather than continuing to
try to intercede in a civil war, would that result in a
drawdown of troops?
Admiral Mullen. Clearly, if we only did that, if we turned
the security issue and the security challenge over to the Iraqi
security forces.
Senator Ben Nelson. But we would go ahead and continue to
support the borders and our assets and the Iraqi Government and
the military?
Admiral Mullen. Yes sir, but it would amount, essentially
to turning the security mission over to them and we would,
clearly, focus on al Qaeda, and it would result in, I think,
fewer troops.
Senator Ben Nelson. A significant number or do we have any
idea?
Admiral Mullen. It would depend on the threat. It really
would depend on the threat.
If I can, just for 1 second, on the border issue. There are
discussions about borders and keeping them secure--that is
something I'm not enough of an expert, although I'm concerned
about it, and I need to go study it--is historically, that's a
real challenge, keeping borders closed, or securing borders.
That discussion needs to be, I think, mindful of a significant
amount of capability from wherever, whether it's the host
nation or some other country that it would take to do something
like that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, and congratulations to both
of you. I look forward to working with you.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Admiral Mullen, General Cartwright, welcome to both of you
and congratulations on the new undertakings that you'll be
assigned to and asked to serve. I appreciate and thank both of
you for serving at this difficult time for our Nation.
In asking something fairly local, Senator Nelson and I both
are Florida Senators, and are very concerned about the
situation at Naval Station Mayport in Jacksonville, FL.
Admiral, I know you and I have talked about this from time to
time in your position as CNO. The question really has to do
with the situation at Mayport and the viability of it into the
future, relating to a disbursal of our nuclear carrier fleet on
the east coast. I wanted to ask your position on the strategic
disbursal of our Atlantic fleet carriers on the east coast, and
if you agree that it is in our national interest to ensure that
we maintain two nuclear carrier ports on the east coast of the
United States?
Admiral Mullen. I am, Senator, and I'm on the record more
than once for this, very supportive of strategic disbursal of
our carriers. I also consider the King's Bay, Mayport,
Jacksonville hub a vital part of our, both strategic interests
and key for, not just capability, but for our people for the
future. As I look at what I think the challenges will be in
recruiting and retaining, sailors--in particular--and their
families for the long run, it's a great hub that I think we
need to continue to invest in.
Senator Martinez. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Shifting to the broader issues that have been discussed so
much here this morning, having to do with our situation in
Iraq. I wanted to ask, perhaps both of you, to comment on this,
if you would.
One of the things that continues to concern many of us is
the interference by Iran in the violence that takes place in
Iraq. I know that last week there was an important diplomatic
interaction, which I'm not sure in the past has yielded any
benefits and perhaps it won't in the future as well, from a
military standpoint. What can we do to better protect the
borders of Iraq from intrusion by Iran and Syria? Having those
two States continue to increase the violence, increase the
weaponry, and the training for those who seek to continue to
create violence in Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. I think from the Iranian border perspective
that it is vital for us to continue to try to make sure our
forces, our security forces, coalition security forces, are
engaged in, at every level--and our entire Government,
actually--engaged at every level to stop the kinds of weapons
which are coming across that border from coming in.
I said earlier, I don't believe a military response is
appropriate at this time. I would never take that off the
table, with respect to Iran for the exact reason that you lay
out. I think the diplomatic path needs to be visited, we need
to continue to address it diplomatically, and in my view, it
shouldn't necessarily just be through us or direct engagement.
Iran has friends, needs, and supporters in large and
significant countries that they're engaged with that also may
offer avenues to bring pressure on Iran to cease providing this
kind of capabilities.
Senator Martinez. In other words, those countries that are
involved with Iran, in trade and commerce and other ways that
are important to Iran.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Martinez. That they should also manifest their
opposition to their involvement.
Admiral Mullen. Absolutely.
Senator Martinez. General, is there anything you'd like to
add on that?
General Cartwright. The only thing that I would add,
Senator, is at the tactical level, we should never cede our
responsibility and ability to defend ourselves. If we find
these adversaries in Iraq, and they're challenging our forces,
we don't give up the right to go after them, number one. Number
two, if we know with attribution who they are, then we ought to
hold them accountable. First, through the discussion you just
had. But, like the Admiral, I would not take military action
off the table force, if all other means don't work.
Senator Martinez. Again, being a Florida Senator, we are
very interested in U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and all
that it does with our partners and neighbors in the Western
Hemisphere. I just wanted to ask whether you felt that they
have the sufficient forces and all the necessary equipment that
they would need in order to fully exercise their mission? I
think one of the great concerns is the potential for a mass
migration situation emerging from Cuba, if that country should
become destabilized.
Admiral Mullen. Senator, you have a very active engaged
commander down there, by the name of Admiral Jim Stavridis.
Senator Martinez. Wonderful guy.
Admiral Mullen. I hear from him constantly about what
additional things I need to be doing to support them. We really
are working hard to support that. We have the U.S.N.S. Comfort,
the hospital ship down there.
Senator Martinez. Right.
Admiral Mullen. This summer, for several months, and she
has seen thousands--50, 60, 70,000 patients on this trip in
various countries. We have the global fleet station manifested
by the high-speed vessel the U.S.S. Swift, which is engaging
countries down there. We have our combatants, some of our
combatants that are down there. In recent times, we have as
much, if not more, capability deployed down there across all
the Services, as we have in recent times. That's in recognition
of what I think is a real need to be engaged and to stay
engaged for the future.
Senator Martinez. There's not been enough said about the
Comfort and the wonderful job that they've been doing in the
region. I've read some recent reports of their work in the
Nicaraguan region and I think it's terrific they are there. The
kind of good will that they are bringing and the kind of
healing and hope that they're bringing to children and others
in the region, I think, is commendable, sir.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Senator Martinez. It's a great thing.
In addition to the obvious for SOUTHCOM, I'm also concerned
about Colombia on Plan Colombia and the implementation of Plan
Colombia, and the commitment that I feel is so important that
we continue to have the improvement of the security conditions
in Colombia, as a great regional partner and ally, and I wonder
if you might comment on that. Again, I'd open it to both of you
to comment.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
I think what Colombia has done in recent years has been
extraordinary in terms of addressing the challenges that
government had, in terms of the crime associated with the drug
trade. That strategic support for that needs to continue.
I've met with my counterparts--actually I've met with the
last two Chiefs of Naval Operations--and, certainly pledged to
continue that. It is still a huge challenge and I think we need
to be very strong on that.
General Cartwright. I would agree, but on this question and
the previous question, the shortfall that probably worries me
the most about SOUTHCOM is our ability to support their
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs. We have
to improve that in order to help some of these nations help
themselves.
Senator Martinez. My time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country.
Admiral Mullen, I don't know you as well as I know General
Cartwright, because I've had the privilege of working directly
with him on all of the strategic stuff. But, your reputation is
impeccable.
Putting on my parochial and my national hat, as Senator
Martinez has, let me just state for the record that one of your
predecessors as CNO, Admiral Vernon Clark, said,
``Overcentralization of the carrier port structure is not a
good strategic move. The Navy should have two carrier-capable
homeports on each coast.'' He went on to say, ``It is my belief
that it would be a serious strategic mistake to have all of
those key assets of our Navy tied up in one port.'' That was in
response, for the record, specifically talking about the
disbursal of the nuclear carriers in the Atlantic Fleet.
Likewise, Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England, now Deputy
Secretary of Defense has said on the record, ``My judgment is
that dispersion is still the situation. A nuclear carrier
should be in Florida to replace the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy to
get some dispersion.''
Senator Martinez and I have just had a meeting with the
Secretary of the Navy, and he stated to us, in effect, the same
thing. He has stated to us this morning that he has stated that
for the record. I just don't have it in front of me. So, in
light of that and your statement, and I'm going to paraphrase
right here, ``I am very supportive of the strategic disbursal
of our carriers.'' You then went on to say, Admiral, King's Bay
and Mayport Complex is key for our strategic posture, as well
as key for our Navy personnel.
Admiral Mullen. And Jacksonville.
Senator Bill Nelson. Jacksonville, of course, Jacksonville
Naval Air Station. I wish we were still talking about Cecil,
but we can't be talking about that any more.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. I, actually, was working for
Admiral Clark when he said that. I agreed with what he said
then, I agree with it now.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Let me move on.
One of the sore points on this committee, Admiral, was in a
response to a question from Senator Levin directly to General
Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff--and this was, I believe
prior to the war, when Senator Levin asked this question--
Senator Levin asked, for the occupation, how long and how many?
General Shinseki said, ``Several hundred thousand for several
years.'' We know that the Bush administration disagreed with
that assessment and, indeed, the Secretary of Defense did not
even show up at General Shinseki's retirement. So, that sticks
in our craw here. What we want to know, and we believe--because
we believe in you--Admiral, as the principle uniform military
advisor to the President, how would you manage and present the
full range of advice presented to you by members of the JCS as
General Shinseki had done? Let's throw in the combatant
commanders, as well.
Admiral Mullen. I have spent an awful lot of my time in the
last 2 years, particularly over the last year, in the tank with
my counterpart Joint Chiefs. In particular, we have spent a
great deal of effort focusing --since last fall--on how we
should move ahead. General Pace has led that effort very well.
We have all had voices, we've all been very much heard, not
just with him, but also with the Secretary of Defense, who
meets with us in that tank regularly, as well as a meeting we
had with the President. That model, that directness, and the
frankness, is one to which I subscribe.
What I would tell you about what I would tell him is the
full range of options as frank as I can be and when, certainly,
asked here by you or other members, I would do the same.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Admiral, it's my understanding that it's your intention to
delegate responsibility over the strategic forces to General
Cartwright. What is your intention there?
Admiral Mullen. I haven't reached an intention on that,
yet. There's nobody that's better prepared to do that and as we
look at dividing up the workload, that makes a lot of sense to
me. But, he and I have not spent a great deal of time talking
about who's going to do what.
So my answer is, I don't know how that comes out.
Certainly, it makes sense to me.
Senator Bill Nelson. I have been told that was in the
works. It made a lot of sense because that fellow knows an
awful lot about strategic forces.
Let me ask you, what about, for example, this relationship
with Russia, and Russia now having thrown up a blockade with
regard to the opportunities for joint cooperation on such a
thing as national missile defense. How would you approach that?
Admiral Mullen. Clearly, that's something that I would lean
on General Cartwright for a great deal because of his
background and experience. The only reason I'm a little
hesitant, there will certainly be issues and levels that I'll
have to engage on in that portfolio. I am a supporter of having
a missile defense capability. Ballistic missiles are
proliferating. Clearly, there are challenges and existent
policy discussions about how that's going to actually be
implemented. I suspect at some point in time, I certainly would
be engaged, if I get confirmed for this job.
Just briefly, back to your first question. If it isn't
going to be that way, I'll let you know, in terms of General
Cartwright's responsibilities.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
Let me ask either of you, General Cartwright has, I know,
specific knowledge on these questions--the Stockpile
Stewardship Program of our nuclear stockpile and the question
is, that we are in this phase-down of reducing considerably the
number of nuclear weapons we have--both us and Russia. Does the
success of that program continue to support the moratorium on
nuclear weapons testing?
Admiral Mullen. From my perspective, yes sir, it does. I'll
let General Cartwright answer further.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Let me throw in an
additional question for you, then. If the Stockpile Stewardship
Program can support a new replacement warhead, is there any
doubt about its ability to support the Life Extension Program
as well?
General Cartwright. This issue kind of goes to the heart of
whether or not we do engineering to do what are called Life
Extension, which are updates to current weapons. The challenge
there is the weapons that we have were not designed to be
updated, so you're trying to take apart something that really
wasn't designed to be taken apart--versus what is called now
the reliable replacement option, which takes new technology,
same form-fit function to the weapon, same delivery systems, et
cetera, but brings in modern manufacturing capabilities,
engineers in safety, security, and reliability at the front
end, and gives us the opportunity, probably, to reduce,
particularly those weapons that are not in the operational
stockpile, but those that are in there for spares, backup, et
cetera, reduce that stockpile significantly.
The replacement options strength is its focus on safety and
security and its ability to reduce the stockpile that we have
today. That, to me, makes me lean more towards the reliable
replacement over the life extension. The value that we have out
of Stewardship was really characterized in understanding the
character of our current stockpile, its life and other
attributes, and what we could do about them, without having to
go back to aboveground or underground testing.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral and General, thank you for your service and your
willingness to answer the call. You both have extraordinary
records, and we're pleased that you're willing to take on, what
are very difficult and challenging jobs, as is evidenced by the
way in which your predecessor was treated in the job.
As the ranking member of the Seapower Subcommittee, I have
to express my displeasure at the way in which General Pace was
treated. His departure had nothing to do with his performance
or competence and everything to do with the politics of an
unpopular war. I think it's also unfortunate, since he was the
first marine to serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, for
that great institution, too.
But nonetheless, I wish him well on his future endeavors
and I hope that you are treated better than he was, as you
enter this very difficult and challenging job. We look forward
to working with you and know that we have a lot of heavy
lifting ahead of us.
Admiral Mullen, you will be our country's highest ranking
military officer. The July 2007 NIE serves as a constant
reminder that al Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups
continue to pose a threat to our security. So as a Nation at
war, your nomination comes at a very critical time. Given the
environment that we live in today, what do you consider to be
the biggest challenges facing our national security?
Admiral Mullen. The stability in the Middle East and, we
talked a lot about Iraq, Afghanistan, and al Qaeda. That's part
of that as well. We must get al Qaeda on the run and keep them
on the run.
The stress that our ground forces are going through,
specifically because of the number of deployments, number of
rotations, and the prospect for more. That they are, in fact,
away a lot more than they are home. The stress that not just
puts on individuals who are performing magnificently in
uniform, but also families. The balancing of the global
responsibilities we have, given we have ground forces that are
essentially very ready and exceptionally capable in the
counterinsurgency world, but we've let other mission
capabilities, certainly training and equipping and other areas
has degraded. There will continue to be global challenges that
we need to balance our strategic risk with respect to that.
Specifically, with respect to al Qaeda, Senator, since you
brought it up. They are still the essence of the most
significant threat we have. They have a safe haven now. They
have leadership, which is reinvigorated. They have lieutenants
back in place. They clearly have a stated challenge to hit us.
I applaud the efforts of many in this country and throughout
the world that have put us in a position where we have not been
struck again, but it's not because they don't have the intent
to do so.
Senator Thune. Would you say, Admiral, that it is the same
al Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan that we are fighting?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Thune. In other words, they are part of the same
global terrorist network, same group of killers with the same
intention and objective, and that is to figure out ways to
create regional instability and to kill Americans?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Thune. There was a question that was asked earlier,
I think by the Senator from Nebraska, regarding al Qaeda in
Iraq and I want to come back to that for just a minute, because
frankly, I wanted to make an earlier point about there's been a
lot said, that we need to go fight al Qaeda in Afghanistan and
somehow that's where the war is. It seems to me, at least, that
wherever al Qaeda is, is where the war is. Clearly, they are in
Iraq.
But, are they also, their presence in Baghdad, as well as
in Anbar? There's been a lot of discussion that if we're going
to go after al Qaeda we have to go into Anbar, that's where we
ought to be directing our efforts. What's the level and the
extent of the presence that al Qaeda has today in the Baghdad
area?
Admiral Mullen. They are principally west. I'd have come
back to you about the specific level that's there, but the
major concern for where al Qaeda in Iraq is has been west. In
the Sunni, both villages and certainly provinces.
[The information referred to follows:]

Admiral Mullen. [Deleted.]
General Cartwright. [Deleted.]

Senator Thune. Another question I wanted to ask has to do
with, you had stated in your advance policy questions, that one
of the most important actions that has to be taken to mitigate
and correct our lack of strategic depth is modernization across
all the Services. ``Much of our equipment''--this is your
quote--``is approaching or is at the limits of its service
life. Replacing aging equipment with modern systems and
integrating new capabilities will ensure our armed services
remain preeminent.''
The Services, obviously, are faced with tough choices
because we have near-term requirements balanced against long-
term investments, and ongoing operations with the military
modernization.
When faced with the budgetary constraints that we're forced
to spend on today's forces, rather than invest in tomorrow's, I
guess I'd be interested in getting your perspective about how
we strike that balance. Abraham Lincoln once said, ``You cannot
escape the responsibility of tomorrow by evading it today.''
So, how do we balance our immediate needs against our long-term
modernization so that we're prepared to meet the threats, not
only of today, but also in the future?
Admiral Mullen. We are, in fact, strategically at a very
significant time--because we are, all the Services are,
replacing equipment that was bought in the 1980s with the
buildup at that time.
So, each Service is moving to modernize through investment
in equipment for the future. By in large up to now, most of the
cost of war has been handled in the supplementals. Which also
includes some investment in modernization, as it should,
because we are wearing this gear out, in some cases, 10 to 20
times faster than we expected to wear it out.
The concern I have is over the long-term, as we take what
has been the supplemental, embed that in the base budget, is
will the resources be there in order to modernize? It's back to
the rebalancing piece and the challenges that exist globally. I
would have great concern about a precipitous drop in the
baseline defense budget, given the strategic environment in
which we're living.
I know, clearly the ground forces are going through
tremendous challenges because they're engaged in a war, they're
trying to transform, their equipment is wearing out, and
they're trying to modernize. In the Army's case, they're trying
to modularize as well. The Air Force and the Navy are
experiencing challenges with respect to equipment, airplanes,
in particular, that are wearing out, and some ships, in the
case of the Navy's point. Recapitalizing there is a real
challenge, as well.
We've also, the Air Force and the Navy, in particular, have
felt enormous pressure in the budget, in terms of supporting
what's going on with respect to the war. So that's kind of a
quick assessment of where I think we are and what the
challenges are, and they're significant.
Senator Thune. Would it be helped by a higher increased
top-line in the defense budget?
Admiral Mullen. Yes sir, it would. I'm not someone that
says, ``Just give me more money, everything will be okay.'' It
has to do with good stewardship of the money that we have, in
addition to recognizing the strains that we're under, at a
really critical time, and doing that well.
Senator Thune. One other question I had, has to do with,
DOD has been pushing for a variety of authorities and increases
in programs to engage other militaries. Is there a well thought
out strategy behind this effort? Could you discuss these
alleged problems between you and the State Department on
Section 1206, train and equip programs? Because that does seem
to be a way in which we can stretch our resources further, by
working and engaging with other militaries.
Admiral Mullen. I agree that it is a way to do that, to
work with State. We've done that, in great part, and that we
need to continue to do that for the future.
I talked earlier about surging the other arms of our
Government. I think the future is going to be much more about
the other arms of our Government, DOD and State specifically,
or State and Agriculture working together in ways that we
haven't necessarily in the past, because of the global
challenges that we have. So I applaud the move towards section
1206. It's a much more robust program than it's been and I
think we will need to continue to make it so in the future.
Senator Thune. Thank you very much, and my time has
expired. General, I didn't give you a chance to talk much, but
thank you again for you service, your willingness to serve, and
we look forward to working with you.
Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congratulations to both of you on your nominations and God
bless you and your families for your service to our country.
To kind of segue way off of Senator Thune's comments, I'd
like to spend a little bit of time talking about contracting.
We obviously have an explosion of contracting that has
occurred. In 2006, we had $151 billion of service contracts
that the military embraced. That's up from $80 billion in 1996.
That's an exponential increase.
The legal status of these contractors is murky and I will
tell you, after 6 months of looking at this with some
discipline, I am confident that the accountability is absent
without leave. I, after going to Iraq and spending some time
there with the contracting part of this operation, it's clear
to me that contracting has encountered a head-on collision with
the culture of command in a combat environment.
I would certainly appreciate your take on how we begin to
engrain in our military training for commanders, the
responsibility of contractor oversight. The model that the
military has worked with for years, in terms of a contracting
representative that is present, is not working. Because there
is turnover there, there is not any kind of long-term
specialized training, and ultimately at the end of the day--and
I will not identify which commander said this to me, but I can
assure you that there were a number of comments made that
caused great consternation, like, ``It may have cost $10
billion, but I wouldn't have cared if it cost $15 billion. I
needed the stuff when I needed it.''
There's this sense that, the commanders have their military
mission, which I'm very respectful of. They want to accomplish
that mission. They are really not as concerned about who's
watching the contractors, who has responsibility for the
contractors, what kind of accountability are we putting in
place. Until we hold those commanders responsible, I have a
feeling we're going to be, it's going to be all foam and no
beer in terms of what we're really accomplishing, in terms of
contractor accountability and oversight of these tax dollars.
I would appreciate your take on how we can get to, what I
think, is the nub of the matter and that is someone losing
their command or not getting promoted because of failure to
oversee contracts in a responsible way.
Admiral Mullen. Senator, in trying to respond to Senator
Thune--I'm very mindful of the challenges with resources.
Responsible stewardship of the taxpayers dollars is a high
priority for me, has been for a long time. It is a significant
amount of money. If you've been looking at this for 6 months,
you know a great deal more about it than I do, specifically. I
would have to do some research to come back with a more
thorough answer.
That said, I will say from a warfighting standpoint, from
an operational standpoint, my expectations for those in uniform
who are on their mission is not to spend a great deal of time
on that. I, actually, resonate with whoever said that. I'm not
happy to, I'm not arguing we should act that way, but those
individuals are so focused on carrying out the mission, that
they need it when they need it. We need to do this responsibly,
and have mechanisms in place--and it's an extraordinary number
of contractors as you have pointed out.
That said, the military commanders I have engaged with
since 2004 in Iraq and Afghanistan, but particularly in Iraq,
have been very supportive of the support that they've received
from the contractors. There's probably a great deal of work
that needs to be done here, but that a warfighter would respond
that way is not a surprise to me. I'm not sure that that's not
the right answer.
Senator McCaskill. I guess then that really is kind of part
of the problem. I'm a little concerned that I would know more
about it than you would, honestly, since we have more
contractors on the ground than we have military. It worries me
that this is not further up, and I have a man from Missouri who
was kidnapped as part of a convoy attack last November. We've
not heard from him since a video in January. If you look at
that contractor and what was going on, the way they were hiring
Iraqis, the way they were firing Iraqis, what they were paying
Iraqis, the weapons that they were caught with, the weapons
that were stolen, that were then sold back to them. What can
happen on the ground with these security contractors, in terms
of undermining our relationship with the Iraqi people.
I mean, we're spending a lot of time worrying about PRTs,
we're spending a lot of time about establishing a level of
trust with the Iraqi people that can be undermined, in an
instant, by a security guard that shoots a body guard of the
Vice President of the country. Or that the Iraqis that go back
and then are part of a convoy attack. I just, until someone at
the highest levels of the military embraces the idea that we
are now fighting this war with private contractors, in terms of
logistic support.
My dad peeled potatoes in World War II. We're not going to
have military guys peeling potatoes in the future. We're going
to have contractors peeling potatoes. I understand that there's
cost savings that can be realized there, but we haven't
realized them in this war. This war has cost more than it
should have because of our inability to get a handle on
contractors.
I get it that you relate to that commander wanting to fight
the military mission, but somewhere in the chain of command,
someone higher than a major, somebody that has the kind of
authority you all have, is going to have to take responsibility
for promoting, demoting, and disciplining the military for
their failure to oversee these contracts or they'll never get
fixed.
Admiral Mullen. Please don't take what I said, in terms of
not being supportive, that this, what you just described needs
to be done. We have moved tens of thousands of contractors into
theater very rapidly. So I certainly understand your concern.
It's an area that I owe you a better answer to, and I'll come
back and get it to you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Admiral Mullen. You raise valid points regarding contracting and
contractor management in Iraq. The Department takes seriously its
responsibility for management and oversight of its contracts,
regardless of where they are written and where they are executed. The
growth in contractor support of our forces in Iraq is a reflection of
broader trends in the Department towards increased contractor support
of our military due to post-Cold War force reductions. This growth has
presented challenges to the Department in terms of visibility,
management, and oversight of contracts and contractor personnel
supporting our forces in forward areas such as Iraq.
The Department has undertaken numerous initiatives and actions to
improve its ability to manage and oversee contracts and contractor
personnel in these forward areas.
One key action has been the formation of the Office of the
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support within
the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
Material Readiness. This office's mission is to establish and oversee
the program for managing contractor personnel in forward areas, per DOD
Instruction 3020.41, and to provide direction in other areas to support
more effective and efficient geographic combatant commander logistics
and material readiness needs. Key elements of its program include: 1)
Establish and maintain a policy framework to govern management of
contractor personnel in forward areas; 2) Develop and implement the
Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) Program for
contractor personnel tracking and accountability in forward areas; 3)
Establish deployable joint contracting planners to be co-located with
and report to the combatant commanders; 4) Establish a specialized
group of acquisition planning and execution staff to augment our
current deployable contingency contracting capability; 5) Develop
training and education programs for planning and managing contracting
services and contractor personnel and incorporation of these programs
into DOD leadership programs; and 6) Establish a ``Lessons Learned''
program. The Program Support Office program will respond to
requirements in Section 854 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007 that require the Department to develop joint
policy on requirements definition, contingency program management and
contingency contracting, including designating General Officer/Flag
Officer/Senior Executive Service (GO/FO/SES) level personnel with
responsibility for these areas during contingency operations.
Presently, a senior commissioned officer has been designated as the
Head of the Contracting Activity for the Joint Contracting Command-
Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). This individual reports directly to the
Multi-National Forces-Iraq and Afghanistan Commander, who reports
directly to the U.S. Central Command Combatant Commander. Further, a
clear line of authority and chain of command has been established for
the JCC-I/A, focused on joint capabilities and policy execution. This
contracting oversight structure is working well. Complete details of
DOD's comprehensive plan for improving management and oversight of
contracted support will be forthcoming in the upcoming interim report
to Congress on the implementation status of section 854 requirements.
To enable the Department to effectively deliver equipment and
services to meet warfighter needs, acquisition policies and procedures
have been established under the procurement umbrella of the Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR). The FAR is supplemented by the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR), and further defined by DOD
Directives, Instructions, Regulations, and Publications to satisfy
specific and unique contracting warfighter requirements. For example,
the Department issued a rule creating a new FAR/Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Part 18, ``Emergency
Acquisitions,'' which centralizes existing flexibilities available
under current law and facilitates expedited acquisition of supplies and
services in an emergency. The Department has also made significant
progress on a proposed FAR section entitled, ``Contractor Personnel in
a Theater of Operations or at a Diplomatic or Consular Mission.'' This
section addresses the issues of contractor personnel who provide
support to the mission of the U.S. Government in a theater of
operations outside the United States but are not covered by the DOD
clause for contractor personnel authorized to accompany the deployed
troops. The Department is awaiting final approval of the proposed FAR
clause from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy.
To help our Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) better
understand the myriad of new initiatives, a Joint Contingency
Contracting Community of Practice was created to promote knowledge
sharing across organizational boundaries. This collaborative tool
serves as a central repository for DOD contingency contracting learning
and job support assets, including policy and guidance information,
after-action reports, predeployment information, and related knowledge
to promote increased job performance. A Joint Contingency Contracting
Summit is held quarterly to foster innovative ideas and solutions to
increase support to our warfighters, identify strategic partnership
development opportunities, and promote a strategic outreach and
communication plan to increase awareness of these valuable tools and
resources.
The recent creation of the Emergency Procurement DFARS Committee is
helping to develop and implement initiatives that will allow our CCOs
to effectively and efficiently respond to contingency requirements. As
part of this committee, a Joint Contingency Contracting Working Group
has developed a DOD Contingency Contracting Guide that will be
incorporated into DFARS Part 18, Procedures, Guidance, and Instructions
(PGI). This guide is intended to provide practical advice as well as
reminders of policies that affect contracting in contingency
operations. In conjunction, we have also developed a pocket-sized CCO
handbook and compact disk that provide the essential information and
tools necessary to operate and train effectively in the joint
environment. Both the guide and handbook are useful tools that help us
standardize joint contingency contracting operations.
One of the most significant accomplishments to date to ensure
jointness and cross-service coordination in the area of contingency
contracting is the formulation of doctrine. A Joint Contracting Writing
Team is working to develop joint doctrine to ensure our contingency
contracting troops have clear and unambiguous guidance in the field.
This joint publication, titled, ``Contracting and Contractor Management
in Joint Operations,'' provides the combatant commanders, subordinate
Joint Force Commanders, and Service component commanders with
standardized guidance and information related to integrating
contracting and contactor management into joint operations. A draft of
the doctrine is currently being staffed.
The Department continues to aggressively look for ways to improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of contracted support to the
warfighter in forward areas.
______

General Cartwright. You raised a myriad of issues regarding
contracting and contractor management in Iraq. The Department takes
seriously its responsibility for management and oversight of its
contracts, regardless of where they are written and where they are
executed. The growth in contractor support of our forces in Iraq is a
reflection of broader trends in the Department towards increased
contractor support of our military due to post-Cold War force
reductions. This growth has presented challenges to the Department in
terms of visibility, management, and oversight of contracts and
contractor personnel supporting our forces in forward areas such as
Iraq.
The Department has undertaken numerous initiatives and actions to
improve its ability to manage and oversee contracts and contractor
personnel in these forward areas.
One key action has been the formation of the Office of the
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support within
the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
Material Readiness. This office's mission is to establish and oversee
the program for managing contractor personnel in forward areas, per DOD
Instruction 3020.41, and to provide direction in other areas to support
more effective and efficient geographic combatant commander logistics
and material readiness needs. Key elements of its program will include:
1) Establishing and maintaining a policy framework to govern management
of contractor personnel in forward areas; 2) Development and
implementation of the Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational
Tracker (SPOT) Program for contractor personnel tracking and
accountability in forward areas; 3) Establishment of deployable joint
contracting planners to be co-located with and report to the combatant
commanders; 4) Establishment of a specialized, specially selected group
of acquisition planning and execution staff to augment our current
deployable contingency contracting capability; 5) Development of
training and education programs for planning and managing contracting
services and contractor personnel and incorporation of these programs
into DOD leadership programs; and 6) Establishment of a ``Lessons
Learned'' program. The Program Support Office program will respond to
requirements in section 854 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007 that require the Department to develop joint
policy on requirements definition, contingency program management and
contingency contracting, including designating GO/FO/SES level
personnel with responsibility for these areas during contingency
operations. Presently, a senior commissioned officer has been
designated as the Head of the Contracting Activity for the Joint
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). This individual reports
directly to the Multi-National Forces-Iraq and Afghanistan Commander,
who reports directly to the U.S. Central Command Combatant Commander.
Further, a clear line of authority and chain of command has been
established for the JCC-I/A, focused on joint capabilities and policy
execution. This contracting oversight structure is working well.
Complete details of DOD's comprehensive plan for improving management
and oversight of contracted support will be forthcoming in the upcoming
interim report to Congress on the implementation status of section 854
requirements.
To enable the Department to effectively deliver equipment and
services to meet warfighter needs, acquisition policies and procedures
have been established under the procurement umbrella of the Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR). The FAR is supplemented by the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR), and further defined by DOD
Directives, Instructions, Regulations, and Publications to satisfy
specific and unique contracting warfighter requirements. For example,
the Department issued a rule creating a new FAR/Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Part 18, ``Emergency
Acquisitions,'' which centralizes existing flexibilities available
under current law and facilitates expedited acquisition of supplies and
services in an emergency. The Department has also made significant
progress on a proposed FAR section titled, ``Contractor Personnel in a
Theater of Operations or at a Diplomatic or Consular Mission.'' This
section addresses the issues of contractor personnel who provide
support to the mission of the U.S. Government in a theater of
operations outside the United States but are not covered by the DOD
clause for contractor personnel authorized to accompany the deployed
troops. The Department is awaiting final approval of the proposed FAR
clause from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy.
To help our Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) better
understand the myriad of new initiatives, a Joint Contingency
Contracting Community of Practice was created to promote knowledge
sharing across organizational boundaries. This collaborative tool
serves as a central repository for DOD contingency contracting learning
and job support assets, including policy and guidance information,
after-action reports, predeployment information, and related knowledge
to promote increased job performance. A Joint Contingency Contracting
Summit is held quarterly to foster innovative ideas and solutions to
increase support to our warfighters, identify strategic partnership
development opportunities, and promote a strategic outreach and
communication plan to increase awareness of these valuable tools and
resources.
The recent creation of the Emergency Procurement DFARS Committee is
helping to develop and implement initiatives that will allow our CCOs
to effectively and efficiently respond to contingency requirements. As
part of this committee, a Joint Contingency Contracting Working Group
has developed a DOD Contingency Contracting Guide that will be
incorporated into DFARS Part 18, Procedures, Guidance, and Instructions
(PGI). This guide is intended to provide practical advice as well as
reminders of policies that affect contracting in contingency
operations. In conjunction, we have also developed a pocket-sized CCO
handbook and compact disk that provide the essential information and
tools necessary to operate and train effectively in the joint
environment. Both the guide and handbook are useful tools that help us
standardize joint contingency contracting operations.
Probably one of the most significant accomplishments to date to
ensure jointness and cross-service coordination in the area of
contingency contracting is the formulation of doctrine. A Joint
Contracting Writing Team is working to develop joint doctrine to ensure
our contingency contracting troops have clear and unambiguous guidance
in the field. This joint publication, titled, ``Contracting and
Contractor Management in Joint Operations,'' provides the combatant
commanders, subordinate Joint Force Commanders, and Service component
commanders with standardized guidance and information related to
integrating contracting and contactor management into joint operations.
A draft of the doctrine is currently being staffed.
The Department continues to aggressively look for ways to improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of contracted support to the
warfighter in forward areas.

Senator McCaskill. That would be great. I appreciate that
very much.
I would also appreciate a specific answer about the man
from Jackson County, Missouri that was with the Crescent
Company, five of them were kidnapped back last November in a
convoy attack that--what I've read about it, it's clear that
some of the Iraqis that had worked for this company were part
of the attacking group. The implications there, obviously I'm
very concerned about this Missourian, who has not been heard
from, but if you look at what happened, it is anecdotal, but it
is symptomatic of the kind of problems that we have with some
of these security companies that are doing so much. They're
carrying weapons in the battlefield.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, ma'am.
[The information referred to follows:]

Admiral Mullen. [The information was provided to the committee in
classified form.]
General Cartwright. [The information was provided to the committee
in classified form.]

Senator McCaskill. They are shooting people in the
battlefield. They are killing Iraqi citizens sometimes. I think
we have to really do a much better job of getting a handle on
all that.
Thank you all, very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Chairman Levin.
Thank you gentlemen, we appreciate your service to your
country. I've gotten to know both of you over the years and
have respected your work and believe you're ready to assume
these big responsibilities.
General Cartwright, we have really worked together a lot on
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, of which I am now ranking
member, and formerly chaired, and you were, as Strategic
Commander, we did a lot of work together.
I won't ask some of the questions I could ask about that
because those are matters that I think we've discussed and we
have some idea about.
Admiral Mullen, you mentioned something in one of the
answers to the advance policy questions, that you thought
perhaps the most significant mistake we've made in this Iraq
effort, was that we did not fully integrate all elements of
U.S. national power in Iraq. I think that is a big problem for
us. For example, it's not the military's primary
responsibility, is it, to work with the Iraqi Government to
deal with the political problems they are facing. That's not
your primary responsibility, that's the State Department's
primary responsibility.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Sessions. Likewise, it's not the military's
responsibility to get the water and electricity operating or
the economy moving.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Or the agricultural products being
produced better.
So, we've created this situation in which the military, in
my way of thinking, is the one entity that works in Iraq. You
had to take over responsibilities that should not really be
yours. Will you press that issue?
Admiral Mullen. Yes sir, I will.
Senator Sessions. I would encourage you to do so and I also
think, perhaps, that General Lute's appointment maybe could
assist you. He's a National Security Advisor for Iraq. One of
the things that I understand the President wants him to do is
make sure that other agencies are all working together
effectively.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. I understand that is one of his
principle responsibilities and I very much look forward to
working with him in that regard. I have sat at the table for
the last couple years, and been very concerned about the entire
interagency process and I haven't been at the interagency
table. Certainly if confirmed, I'll have an opportunity to do
that. I can't just offer complaints, I'm going to have to offer
some solutions, as well. But we all believe that we need to
move forward in that regard.
Senator Sessions. I believe the military has done a really
fine job in Iraq. We've made some errors.
Admiral Mullen. Sure.
Senator Sessions. We can improve as we go forward, but a
lot of the problems are, that we talk about, such as Senator
Levin emphasizes the political solution is not primarily the
military's responsibility. It's really the State Department's
responsibility.
Admiral Mullen, you mentioned in some of your statements,
about the time you received this nomination that you were
concerned about the Army. You are a Navy person, so let me ask
you, will you be alert to the stresses on the Army? Will you be
quick to respond to the legitimate concerns that are out there?
They're doing better in many ways than I would have imagined.
Admiral Mullen. They are.
Senator Sessions. They are, reenlistment is still good.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. The morale is still good, but we're
asking an awful lot out of them. What are your concerns there?
Admiral Mullen. The Army and Marine Corps--they have been
absolutely extraordinary, and their morale is good. I've seen
that when I visit them in theater. Everyone that comes back, as
recently as last week, reports that same that their morale is
exceptionally good and they are executing at a level that makes
us all proud, in this All-Volunteer Force.
I am concerned about the number of deployments, the time
away, in fact, even when they are home there's training
associated with that. So they spend weeks, if not months, out
of their own house, again, away from their families. I believe
we have to relieve that.
As CNO, I have spent a great deal of my time focused on
this for my sailors and their families, and I assure you if I'm
confirmed as Chairman, I will do the same for all our forces,
particularly the ground forces, who are bearing the brunt of
this war.
Senator Sessions. I couldn't agree more. I say to General
Cartwright, I think we do need to think about those soldiers
out there.
Have you had the opportunity, Admiral Mullen and General
Cartwright, to read the counterinsurgency manual that General
Petraeus has produced? You may not have had a thorough
opportunity to, but have you read that?
Admiral Mullen. I have read, in detail, the key aspects of
counterinsurgency, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Most of us sit here and we respond to the
daily headlines in the media. Would you agree that it is an
important thing for American people and this Congress to
understand that there are principles of defeating an
insurgency, and that sometimes it takes time?
Admiral Mullen. It does take time.
Senator Sessions. All right. Divide the enemy, to deny them
bases of support, to co-opt certain groups, to deny them
supplies, divide them whenever possible, all of those things so
we can have some belief that General Petraeus, who wrote this
manual, is executing, not just an attack policy, but a
sophisticated multi-faceted policy designed, using historical
precedent to defeat this insurgency?
Admiral Mullen. As I read the manual, and my understanding,
Senator Sessions, of what is involved in counterinsurgency,
Dave Petraeus is doing exactly what he wrote and he is having
that kind of impact, specifically it is about security of the
people. Eventually about the politics of the country and that
the people will feel that this is a legitimate government.
That's not a short road. That doesn't happen in a few weeks or
months, but he's clearly on that path.
Senator Sessions. In Afghanistan there were decisions that
had to be made about, do you attack the warlords, or do you co-
opt them?
Admiral Mullen. Right.
Senator Sessions. Sometimes they were defeated militarily,
sometimes they were brought into the government. These are
tough, subtle decisions that need to be made, but always there
needs to be a vision for a victory, stability, and peace in the
government.
Admiral Mullen. Right. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Would you say to the American people that
sometimes progress may be made, that they don't see on
occasion?
Admiral Mullen. I think we would all be well served to
understand, both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency
principles that are embedded in this kind of situation. Again,
I think General Petraeus has moved very strongly in the right
direction.
Senator Sessions. It's a sophisticated and complex thing.
Admiral Mullen. It is.
Senator Sessions. It requires determination and persistence
and we can't be flopping around based on the latest polling
guides. We have to be focused on this issue in the long run and
I hope that, you'll be asked--both of you, to testify here--and
you'll be asked about this, the progress or lack of it in Iraq.
It's important.
I also want to say, Admiral Mullen, I appreciated your
enthusiastic, I would say, responses to the whole management of
DOD because that's one of your big responsibilities. General
Petraeus, he has that combat area, but you have to manage this
whole Department, consider our Ground Forces, our Naval Forces,
our Air Forces, our budget, what we can put our priorities on
and need to for the next 20-30 years. I believe you have the
ability to do that and we look forward to working with you.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
I wonder if Senator Clinton would yield to Senator Warner.
You are next to be called, but he just has a few additional
minutes and he needs to leave.
Senator Clinton. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner. Senator Clinton, may I thank you for that
courtesy. The many years that you've been on this committee,
that's the hallmark of your service. Courtesy, respect, and
you've been a good strong working partner through the years. We
don't want to lose you. [Laugher.]
Chairman Levin. Your time is up, Senator Warner.
[Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Gentlemen, my two good friends from
Florida, in exercising, understandably the interest of their
State--and we all feel that strongly--reviewed some of the past
deliberations within the Department of Navy regarding the
strategic disbursal doctrine.
But how well you and I know that doctrine started back in
the Cold War days when we were looking at the intercontinental
exchange of weaponry. So much has evolved since that period of
time and most particularly, what we learned from September 11,
that there isn't a single city or township in this country that
does not have a measure of vulnerability, if that type of
individual desires to bring harm to our citizens.
In the discussions that you've had with me and I had with
Admiral Vern Clark. I've always said you have to put the
securities interest first, and then do what is necessary.
So as you proceed to continue to look at these factors and
determine the various east coast facility ports that can best
serve our national security system, most particularly the Navy,
you will take into consideration, I'm sure, the changing world
of threats. How that really makes almost all the facilities
equally vulnerable, due to the diversity of threats we face
now, vice the old doctrine of intercontinental vulnerability.
Let's proceed in an open and clear way on that. There are
enormous costs involved to equip a port with facilities to
handle a nuclear carrier. You know that.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. I know that. They're far above the cost
associated with the conventional carriers. It is true that
they're being phased out, but the realities are, there are
other ways to balance the disbursal of naval assets, as opposed
to moving large carriers. Yes, Norfolk has proudly served that
purpose for generations of the nuclear carriers that are there.
At any one time, usually there's just one, maybe two at the
most in port, and the rest are dispersed.
My last question goes to Afghanistan. We want to make
certain today we cover fully that serious situation over there.
We have the continuing problem over there of the drug
elimination, which is at the core of funding. It looks like
it's well over half of the gross national product. We have the
national caveats, which are the rules by which the
participating countries in NATO allow or disallow the use of
their forces.
For example, there are no caveats on the U.S. force, the
British force, and I think, one or two of the others. Yet, for
reasons that elude me, other forces come in with restrictions
on the utilization of their forces, most particularly when it
relates to missions in harms' way. How will you deal with those
issues regarding Afghanistan?
Admiral Mullen. I think on the drug issue with Afghanistan,
it's a priority and I would continue to both make it a
priority, understand it in both its breadth and depth, and move
to bring every part of our national power to try to assist in
getting that right. Because it is clearly feeding the problem
that we're challenged with.
With respect to the caveats, in particular, in Afghanistan,
having come to this job that I'm in right now from Naples, and
been the Operational Commander in the Balkans where we still
have, today, upwards of 16,000 to 17,000 NATO troops in Kosovo.
At the time I took command, it was upwards of 24,000. We since
transitioned 7,000 troops in Bosnia to the European Union. The
issue of caveats is a significant one. My take on it, it comes
from governments' struggle with what they're going to provide.
They work their way through their own dynamic challenging
process of agreement and disagreement. It is in that commitment
and in that, oftentimes, arrived-at position that it's done so
with certain caveats.
I experienced in Kosovo, very specifically, governments or
forces from countries who were very limited, particularly if it
got to the use of force.
In this war, we need to continue to address this. We need
all arms of our Government, elements of national power to
continue to work this with the leadership of those countries in
addition to, in particular, the leadership in NATO. It's a
constant challenge and I don't believe in the long-run, we can
succeed without continuing to force that. If we don't, those
capabilities and those requirements, oftentimes, fall back on
us in what we've already described this morning as a very
stressed force. Near-term improvement in there, I think, is
very important.
Senator Warner. I thank you.
I wish you both the best and that with your families.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Chairman Levin. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
Admiral Mullen, General Cartwright, I appreciate greatly
your committed service to our Nation, and I also want to thank
your families, because I know they've served as well. Both of
you have long and distinguished careers that have taken you
around the world, and your families have been there with you
and supporting our country. I appreciate that.
As both of you are, I'm sure, aware, I have recently
corresponded with Secretary Gates, requesting briefings for the
appropriate oversight committees, including this one, and what
the current contingency plans are for any future withdrawal of
U.S. forces from Iraq. In my exchanges with Secretary Gates, I
pointed out that the seeds of many of the problems that
continue to plague us in Iraq, both in terms of troops and
mission, were planted in the failure to adequately plan for the
conflict and then properly equip our men and women in uniform.
After an exchange of letters with Secretary Gates and Under
Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman, this Thursday DOD will brief
this committee in a closed session, on the status of planning
for the redeployment of U.S. forces.
In his letter last week to me, Secretary Gates stated,
``You may rest assured that such planning is indeed taking
place with my active involvement, as well as that of senior
military and civilian officials and our commanders in the
field. I consider this contingency planning to be priority for
this Department.'' Let me ask you both, are you aware of the
contingency planning that Secretary Gates referred to in his
letter, Admiral Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. Yes ma'am, I am.
Senator Clinton. You also, General Cartwright?
General Cartwright. I'm aware. In my current job I don't
participate in it right now.
Senator Clinton. If confirmed, will each of you be involved
in so far as you know, in this contingency planning? Admiral
Mullen?
Admiral Mullen. Senator Clinton, in part of my advance
policy questions I was asked where I think we made mistakes.
One of the issues was I didn't think we have the planning that
we should have had in place. If confirmed, I'm very committed
to properly planning to the best of my ability, every possible
operation that we might be involved in. That certainly includes
the kind of contingency planning that you've asked about in
your letters and to which the Secretary has responded and of
which I am aware and, to a certain degree thus far, have
participated.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
General Cartwright?
General Cartwright. I concur.
Senator Clinton. I would ask each of you if you will commit
to keeping this committee and Congress informed, in classified
sessions, if necessary, about the process of contingency
planning for any future redeployment. Admiral?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. General?
General Cartwright. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. It is clear that, as you pointed out in
your answers to advance questions provided to this committee,
that many of us have serious concerns about the quality of
planning, the interaction between the military and civilian
leadership with respect to planning, the decision making
process, certainly leading up to the invasion and then
continuing in the years since. I think that many of us will be
looking to you as our chief military officers for our country,
to really focus in on this planning issue.
I've been impressed with Secretary Gates' openness and
willingness to interact with Congress, to listen to the
professional military leadership around him, but I'm looking
for ideas about how to institutionalize that. I think that the
lessons learned from the last years may be very difficult ones
for any of us to learn and apply, but we have to be committed
to doing so.
It does seem that Congress is moving toward an effort to
put down conditions for a phased redeployment and obviously,
whether that happens this year or next year, it's going to
happen at some point. None of us want to see the consequences
of poor planning.
The other issue here, that is not, perhaps, strictly within
the military's purview, is the question of the thousands of
Iraqi civilians who have been assisting us over the last
years--the translators and interpreters, the cooks, the embassy
employees--and recently Ambassador Crocker has raised very
serious questions about what exactly our planning is for them.
So I would suggest, perhaps, that it at least be considered in
the contingency planning, because that is a continuing
responsibility that we bear. I would appreciate each of you
taking that and moving forward.
I think that in your answers Admiral Mullen, in the advance
policy questions, you say something that I think all of us
agree with, and that is there is no purely military solution in
Iraq. Does that lead you to the conclusion that even if our
troops were to have tactical successes in parts of Iraq, as now
is being reported in al Anbar Province, that we cannot consider
our mission successful without political action? Even some
resolution of the differences among the various factions within
Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, ma'am. I think the lead issue is
political reconciliation for that government and progress on
the political leg of the security, economic, and political
three-legged stool that we've talked about. It absolutely has
to happen.
Senator Clinton. It appears that the political progress is
not occurring, and this is something that our chairman has been
particularly focused on, really from before the invasion, and
certainly consistently since. The failure to establish, and
then to achieve, benchmarks when we had the occupying authority
and in the years since we have seen an Iraqi Government
established.
Admiral, I have to ask, in your advance policy question
responses and what you have talked about today, given the lack
of political progress since the escalation began, despite what
may be, admittedly, short-term advances with the surge
strategy, how do we expect to obtain any evidence of political
movement, in the absence of a very different attitude and
capacity of the Iraqi Government, that were we to be there, as
you suggested, for years instead of months? Do you have any
suggestions as to what more could be done to force, or require,
the political resolution that is so necessary?
Admiral Mullen. I think it's been clearly stated within the
last year that they need to make progress in terms of amnesty,
de-Baathification, an oil-revenue sharing log, constitutional
reform, and relationships with the provinces. The progress
there has not been good, at least that's the current
assessment.
What I've asked to do is really wait until Ambassador
Crocker, who has the lead on this aspect of it, comes back with
General Petraeus and reports in September. I still maintain
that if we aren't making progress in that realm, the prospects
for movement in a positive direction are not very good. But,
waiting until then, I think, is important.
Senator Clinton. I agree with your assessment. I've
obviously reached that conclusion some time ago in terms of the
assessment as to what the Iraqis themselves are actually
willing to do. I think you could make a very strong case that
the Iraqis are not ready to put violence aside as a tool for
the various agendas they're pursuing--sectarian, political,
personal, and commercial. There's a lot of activity going on
here.
It does seem to me that either sooner--in my view, which is
the appropriate outcome, you both most likely will be
confirmed, which I think is a great tribute to you both, for
your service to this country--or later we will be faced with
implementing a new approach, a sort of post-surge approach. I
think that the political problems that the Iraqis are failing
to address will, unfortunately, require that we take a
different strategic attitude toward Iraq. The results will have
to be carefully monitored because obviously there are
consequences no matter what we do.
Two final points if I could, Mr. Chairman.
The concerns that many have--and regardless of where one
stands on how much time we should provide or not--the concerns
that we all share are the consequences for our troops and for
the Iraqi people, that will flow from a decision to redeploy.
If we redeploy out of Baghdad and concentrate on al Anbar. If
we redeploy into the north and concentrate on shoring up the
Kurds so that they're not subjected to, most likely, Sunni and
external problems, whatever the combination of actions might
be. It is incredibly important that it be managed and
implemented as carefully as possible because of the difficulty
of withdrawing troops and equipment. Everybody who has briefed
me on this, basically comes to the same conclusion--that this
is as dangerous as going in. We know that if our only way out
is through the south into Kuwait, it is especially dangerous
because the increasing chaotic situation in the south, with
various Shiite factions vying for control, will make us,
unfortunately, have to navigate an even more dangerous exit. I
would just underscore this, that this has to continue, and has
to be focused.
Finally, I think that the work that you will have to
supervise, not only is operational, of course, but may very
well be doctrinal. I mean, it took quite some time to rewrite,
revise, and update the counterinsurgency manual. The doctrines
that the former Secretary of Defense would quite often refer to
or throw out seem not to be based on very much work or,
frankly, institutional support and infrastructure.
So, I think that there is not only a very difficult
strategic and operational side of this, but also a doctrinal
side. I would strongly recommend that when you assume your new
positions, since you'll be consumed by the day-to-day
operations, because no matter what happens, it's going to be
incredibly intense, I would predict, both politically here in
Washington, but on the ground militarily and politically in
Iraq, that you think about--and perhaps in conjunction with
this committee and others--coming up with some process to look
at a lot of these doctrines and assumptions that clouded
judgment and undermined the careful thought that should go in
to any difficult and dangerous set of decisions, such as we
were making as a country.
I don't think it's something that either of you will have
the time to focus on, but under your supervision and
monitoring, I think it is extremely important that we really
understand where we're headed, with a new kind of enemy, with a
different kind of warfare, with a global threat, because we
will withdraw from Iraq. We will certainly do it, I believe,
almost regardless of what happens in next year with this
President, as soon as we change Presidents, and how we do it,
how we're prepared for it. But then we're going to have a lot
of other problems that we face globally that will need some
clear thinking on.
I wish you both well and I thank you for your service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Thank you also, for your initiative, which is just the
latest of many you've taken, to urge this committee to get that
briefing, that you referred to, on preparations and planning
for a phase reduction and redeployment of our forces. It will
take place at some point. In the view of many of us, sooner
rather than later, but in any event, it will take place and we
very much appreciate your suggestion that there be a briefing
that will take place, as you indicated, this week.
As indicated, there will be a second round of questions
should any colleagues within earshot or listening to this, want
to come back and ask a few additional questions.
Admiral, let me go back to Pakistan with you for a moment.
We've spoken somewhat about the fact that al Qaeda has a
sanctuary there. On the other hand, after the administration
said that it would pursue actionable targets anywhere in the
world, putting aside whether it was in Pakistan or any place
else, the Pakistan Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling
such talk irresponsible and dangerous.
Now, al Qaeda has grown in strength in the last few years.
They've grown in strength in Pakistan, they've grown in
strength in Iraq. What is your reaction to the Pakistani
reaction, that our suggestion that we would go after or could
go after al Qaeda in Pakistan or anywhere else in the world,
that kind of talk, according to their Foreign Ministry, is
irresponsible and dangerous?
Admiral Mullen. I think that, where we have a threat such
as this, we need to rest comfortably at some point, that it is
being addressed. We know it is a threat to us, it is a threat
to our country. That we must figure out a way to do that. So,
to discuss possibilities which would be the Government of
Pakistan addressing it directly. They are an important ally of
ours in this war on terror. They've expressed that, and that
might be one path, certainly, I consider, to be potentially a
very responsible path. That it is the only path, I don't think
that is open, is also a possibility. We should gather all the
strength of our Government and our allies to address that
threat.
Chairman Levin. You made reference in your response to
Senator Clinton to one of the mistakes, which you referred to
in your very open, forthright answer, on the question of the
mistakes which the United States has made in Iraq. I want to
compliment you on your willingness to set forth these mistakes.
They included, no early and significant dialogue with
neighboring countries, the disbanding of the Iraqi Army, a
divisive deBaathification process, and insufficient forces for
stability operations. You said that they're still having a
negative impact, including on your prescription, or including
on the ability that you hope we would have to mitigate the
impact by pursuing a balanced strategy in Iraq. Is that the
three-legged stool that you were referring to?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Would you agree that al Qaeda has
seen a resurgence in Pakistan and that it's stronger in Iraq
now than it was a few years ago?
Admiral Mullen. It is, it has certainly seen insurgence,
yes sir, and it is stronger. I worry about it, actually, not
just there, in other parts of the world.
Chairman Levin. Would you agree that it's stronger in Iraq
now than it was before the war?
Admiral Mullen. I really----
Chairman Levin. In Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. Yes sir, I understand that. We've actually
had some pretty significant successes against al Qaeda in Iraq.
Chairman Levin. Recently, but would you say it's stronger
before those successes, those recent successes, was it stronger
than al Qaeda was in Iraq before the war? In other words,
haven't they obviously----
Admiral Mullen. I think al Qaeda is stronger than when the
war started, yes sir. Certainly.
Chairman Levin. All right. That's fair enough.
The issue of detention policy has come up, and I was
wondering whether or not you agree with the policy that was set
forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum of Deputy Secretary of
Defense Gordon England, stating that all relevant DOD
directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures
must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you support the standards for detainee
treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on
interrogations that was issued in September 2006 and the DOD
directive that DOD issued on September 5, 2006?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. You believe it is consistent with effective
counterinsurgency operations for the United States forces to
comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Let me address this to you General, give
Admiral a moment or two to think about lunch. This is a
question of the Moscow Treaty, which set a goal for the U.S.
and Russia to have no more than 1,700 to 2,200 operational
deployed warheads by 2012--the Treaty does not address total
stockpile numbers or delivery systems, just operationally-
deployed warheads.
In your judgment, could we reduce the total stockpile size
and to dismantle some nuclear warheads before 2012, in other
words, the number of operationally deployed warheads--but is it
possible, in your judgment, to reduce the total stockpile size
before that year?
General Cartwright. 2012?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
General Cartwright. My sense is first, yes, we can. The
biggest leverage, I think, to do that and to do it
significantly is to move towards this earlier discussed
reliable replacement warhead.
But even absent that, we should be able to reduce that
stockpile. We have taken measures within the Department in
concert with the Department of Energy to begin doing that. We
actually have shown significant increases in the numbers of
weapons--military jargon, that we are de-miling, or removing--
from the stockpile. We need to stay on that path.
I agree that as long as there are other countries in the
world that have nuclear weapons, we're going to have to have a
deterrent in the nuclear side of the house. But that should be,
as has been stated several times--not today, but in our policy
documents--the smallest number necessary to be consistent with
national security needs. That's, as you say sir, the broader
stockpile, not just the operationally deployed weapons.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, you've had enough breathing space.
Let me come back to you.
Admiral Mullen. I'm ready.
Chairman Levin. You are, indeed. There's been a lot of
discussion this morning, perhaps more than on any other
subject, on the question of the failure of the Iraqi political
leaders to make progress. That is the strategic purpose of the
surge as stated by the President. Would you agree with that?
Admiral Mullen. Yes sir, it is.
Chairman Levin. That strategic purpose, even though there's
some evidence that there may be some positive progress on the
military side of the surge, in terms of the strategic purpose
of the surge, we have not seen any progress.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, it's the judgment of many of us that
in order for there to be political progress, that the political
leaders have to reach an accommodation. As a matter of fact, I
think that's almost a consensus point. Maliki himself has said
that it's the failure, and these are his words, ``The failure
of the Iraqi politicians to reach a political settlement that
is the cause of the continuing blood shed.''
It may be true that the State Department handles or
assesses, but it is also true that the only leverage that
exists is military leverage. I don't know of any other leverage
that we can apply. You'd think that the blood-letting inside of
Iraq would be adequate leverage on the Iraqi politicians. You'd
think that the prospect of an all out civil war--even worse
than there is now--would be enough leverage on the Iraqi
politicians. But the leverage that we have is embodied in the
forces that you will command and that the President, as
Commander in Chief, commands.
So, we're going to need you to do what you have promised
you would do and I know will do thoroughly, which is to give
thought to the issue that you said is the key issue, as to how
much leverage we can put on the Iraqi leaders by telling them
that their future is in their hands and we can't save them from
themselves. This open-ended commitment of our military is going
to end and when it's going to end. That is not exclusively in
your hands, obviously, that's going to ultimately be a decision
of the civilian leaders.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. But your recommendation on that point, as
well as General Petraeus' recommendation and CENTCOM
Commander's recommendation.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. These are critically important
recommendations. I would really press upon you, the power that
lies in your hands to force those Iraqi politicians. If you
make a mistake, maybe it would work out badly, but if you don't
use that leverage, it also could be a terrible waste of an
opportunity.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Your words and your answer to the question
that we asked prior to the hearing, you believe that quelling
the current level of violence in Baghdad is a necessary
condition for a political solution and as part of your answer
you said the following--and I couldn't agree with you more--
``Failure to achieve tangible progress towards reconciliation
requires a strategic reassessment.''
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I know you mean it. I'm glad you mean it.
I'm glad those words are there. I wish you all the best.
General, we've not paid adequate attention or given you
enough tough questions this morning. We'll try to, all of us,
make up for that at a later time. But we wish you both well.
We thank you, we thank your families for their support
because we all feel deeply, without it you could not do what
you need to do. You would not be where you're sitting today
without the support of your families.
That's true of us, by the way, in politics, may I say.
Although I don't want to end on that note, because it properly
should be ended on a note of thanks to you, the men and women
under your commands now, that you will be commanding, and the
families that give you such great support.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM Michael G. Mullen,
USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. You previously have answered the committee's policy
questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in
connection with your nomination to be the Chief of Naval Operations.
Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of
these reforms changed since you testified before the committee at your
most recent confirmation hearing for Chief of Naval Operations?
Answer. No. Overall, the Goldwater-Nichols reforms have
strengthened the warfighting and operational capabilities of our
combatant commands and our Nation. The importance of these reforms has
not diminished with time.

DUTIES

Question. Based on your experience as the Chief of Naval
Operations, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
the duties and functions of sections 152 through 155 of title 10,
U.S.C., relating to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS), and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff?
Answer. At this time, I do not recommend any changes to the law. If
confirmed, and after I have been in office for a sufficient time to
determine if changes are advisable, I will recommend changes as
appropriate or necessary.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I believe I am qualified to serve as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs and have significant experience in the duties required. I had
the privilege of seven command tours from which I gained a solid
operational foundation. I have served in three joint flag positions:
Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic; Commander, Allied Joint Force
Command Naples, Italy; and currently as Chief of Naval Operations.
While in command in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), I was
directly responsible for NATO operations in the Balkans, which included
17,000-24,000 troops on the ground, as well as standing up the military
school for the Iraqi security forces. As a Service Chief for the last 2
years, as a member of JCS, I have been an advisor to the Chairman,
Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, Homeland Security
Advisor, and the President, shaping military advice. Further, I served
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), completed five tours
at Navy headquarters, a tour with the Bureau of Naval Personnel and one
in naval training. Finally, I believe my background and experience will
be beneficial in leading the Armed Forces through the challenges that
lie ahead.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 151(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
Chairman of the JCS is the principal military adviser to the President,
the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense.
Other sections of law and traditional practice establish important
relationships between the Chairman and other officials.
Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the
Chairman of the JCS to the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is composed of OSD, the
military departments, the Chairman of JCS, the combatant commands, the
Inspector General of DOD, the Defense Agencies, DOD field activities,
and such other offices, agencies, activities, and commands established
or designated by law, or by the President or by the Secretary of
Defense. The functions of the heads of these offices are assigned by
the Secretary of Defense according to existing law. The Chairman and
the JCS are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the functions
assigned to them. Under title 10, the Chairman, JCS is the principal
military advisor to the President, the NSC, Homeland Security Council
(HSC), and the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of
Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act.
As such, the relationship of the Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is
similar to that with the Secretary.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional
areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and
oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type
memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These
instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD components. In
carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President
and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to
commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted
through the Chairman of JCS.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense
for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks & Information
Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to
one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their
responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of
Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the
unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of
JCS. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretaries
in a manner similar to that described above for the Under Secretaries.
Question. The General Counsel of DOD.
Answer. Under title 10, U.S.C., section 140, the DOD General
Counsel serves as the chief legal officer of DOD. In general, the DOD
General Counsel is responsible for overseeing legal services,
establishing policy and overseeing the DOD Standards of Conduct
Program, establishing policy and positions on specific legal issues and
advising on significant international law issues raised in major
military operations, the DOD Law of War Program, and legality of
weapons reviews. The office of the DOD General Counsel works closely
with the Office of Legal Counsel to the Chairman of JCS; and
communications with the combatant commanders by the DOD General Counsel
are normally transmitted through the Chairman of JCS.
Question. The Vice Chairman of JCS.
Answer. The Vice Chairman of JCS performs such duties as may be
prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of
Defense. When there is a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman or in
the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as
Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is
appointed or the absence or disability ceases.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 165, provides that, subject to
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and
subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the secretaries
of military departments are responsible for administration and support
of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands.
The Chairman advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to
which program recommendations and budget proposals of the military
departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the
priorities established for requirements of the combatant commands.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service
Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command.
However, this does not diminish their importance with respect to title
10 responsibilities, and among other things, they serve two significant
roles. First and foremost, they are responsible for the organization,
training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full
support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no combatant commander
can be ensured of the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions
directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President.
Second, as members of JCS, the Chiefs are advisers to the Chairman
and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their
respective Services. In this function, they play a critically important
role in shaping military advice and transforming our joint
capabilities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service Chiefs
to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements.

THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS.

Question. The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct
military operations around the world. By law, and to the extent
directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman
for the combatant commanders and is charged with overseeing their
activities. He provides a vital link between the combatant commanders
and other elements of DOD, and as directed by the President, may serve
as the means of communication between the combatant commanders and the
President or Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security
Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan.
Answer. The Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and
Afghanistan is a direct advisor to the President. As the role of the
Chairman is to serve as the principal military advisor to the
President, NSC, HSC, and Secretary of Defense, if confirmed, I will
work closely with him to ensure our efforts are synchronized across the
interagency and combatant commanders.
Question. The Commander, Multinational Forces-Iraq.
Answer. As a subordinate command of the United States Central
Command, the Chairman, JCS communicates to the Commander, Multinational
Forces-Iraq through the Commander, United States Central Command.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you
would face if confirmed as Chairman of JCS? My immediate concern is
Iraq. Progress in Iraq requires a committed security, stabilization,
reconstruction, and transition campaign. In the broader Middle East, I
believe stability is critical.
Resetting, reconstituting, and revitalizing our force demands my
focus. The war has spread our forces thin. I am concerned about the
effects of the stress on our ground forces. We need to achieve a 2-to-1
force rotation construct. We also need a force correctly shaped and
sized, trained, and equipped, to deter and prevent, and if necessary,
fight and win our Nation's wars.
I believe we must carefully rebalance the global strategic risk.
This is a critical time in our Nation's history, the challenges of the
Middle East and the current stress on our ground forces are
representative of the dynamic nature of the security challenges we face
in the 21st century.
Question. What do you consider to be the biggest problems that you
would confront, if confirmed?
Answer. My immediate concern is Iraq. Progress in Iraq requires a
committed security, stabilization, reconstruction, and transition
campaign. In the broader Middle East, I believe stability is critical.
Resetting, reconstituting, and revitalizing our force demands my
focus. The war has spread our forces thin. I am concerned about the
effects of the stress on our ground forces. We need to achieve a 2-to-1
force rotation construct. We also need a force correctly shaped and
sized, trained and equipped, to deter and prevent, and if necessary,
fight and win our Nation's wars.
I believe we must carefully rebalance the global strategic risk,
This is a critical time in our Nation's history, the challenges of the
Middle East and the current stress on our ground forces are
representative of the dynamic nature of the security challenges we face
in the 21st century.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges and problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would pursue a strategy focusing on vital
national interests, which employs all elements of national power, and
balances global strategic risk. Our military is central to supporting
vital national interests:

- Homeland secure from catastrophic attack;
- Sustained global influence, leadership and freedom of
action;
- Sustained strategic endurance and military superiority;
- Flourishing global and national economies;
- Assured access to strategic resources; and
- Regional stability in Middle East.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities as Chairman?
Answer. My immediate concern is Iraq. Progress in Iraq requires a
committed security, stabilization, reconstruction, and transition
campaign. In the broader Middle East, I believe stability is critical.
Resetting, reconstituting, and revitalizing our force demands my
focus. The war has spread our forces thin. I am concerned about the
effects of the stress on our ground forces. We need to achieve a 2-to-1
force rotation construct. We also need a force correctly shaped and
sized, trained and equipped, to deter and prevent, and if necessary,
fight and win our Nation's wars.
I believe we must carefully rebalance the global strategic risk.
This is a critical time in our Nation's history, the challenges of the
Middle East and the current stress on our ground forces are
representative of the dynamic nature of the security challenges we face
in the 21st century.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Question. There has been much discussion about the threats the
United States will face in the coming decades, including radical Islam,
the so-called ``long war'' against terrorism, and the growing potential
for confrontations with a range of violent non-state actors. We also
recognize now the importance of and requirement to be able to
competently conduct stability and support operations. There are also
pressures to take a broader view of the threat to United States
national security from potential political, economic, and social
instability caused by environmental catastrophes brought on by global
warming or natural disasters.
Are you satisfied that the 2004 National Military Strategy is
appropriate for the threats the Nation faces today and could face in
the coming decades? What changes, if any, should be considered?
Answer. The military objectives of the 2004 National Military
Strategy (NMS)--Protect the United States, Prevent Conflict and
Surprise Attacks, and Prevail Against Adversaries--were developed
broadly to remain relevant to the complexities of the emerging security
environment.
If confirmed as Chairman, I will continue to examine the NMS to
ensure it appropriately accounts for emerging trends, to include, where
appropriate, effects brought on by environmental catastrophes. I will
submit an updated assessment in February 2008 as required by title 10,
section 153(d).

ROLES AND MISSIONS

Question. Since the end of the Cold War, the Department has
considered and reconsidered its capabilities requirements, technology
acquisition strategies, organizational structure, and forces mix. The
geo-strategic environment appears to be changing faster than our
military can change to meet new threats, challenges, and opportunities.
Fundamental to change within the Armed Forces is agreement on the
appropriate distribution of roles and missions among the military
departments and several independent agencies. The last two Quadrennial
Defense Reviews (QDRs) have acknowledged major shifts in the strategic
environment facing the Nation, but recommended no changes to roles and
missions and only minor adjustments to the form and size of the defense
establishment.
Are you satisfied that our defense establishment is optimally
structured, that roles and missions of the military departments are
appropriately distributed, and that United States forces are properly
armed, trained, and equipped to meet the security challenges the Nation
faces today and into the next decade?
Answer. I believe we must continue to shift from a force that
focused on major combat operations to one that is more able to counter
the current unconventional threats our Nation faces. The United States
military must maximize the effectiveness of our asymmetric advantages
wherever they exist. We have learned several lessons from operational
experience, and as the last QDR points out we have prepared the armed
forces to defeat terrorist networks, defend the homeland in-depth,
prevent the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction, and
shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.
At the same time the last QDR considered how we think about the
enterprise, how we manage it, and how we field capabilities. We must
institutionalize that approach to enable the continued transformation
of the Department. I recognize the importance of continuing this
transformation in operations, strategy, and within the enterprise and
will do so, if confirmed.

STRATEGIC DEPTH

Question. At this moment, the U.S. ground forces are fully
committed to or exclusively preparing for operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In order to ensure that deployed forces are fully
prepared, personnel and equipment are cross leveled from nondeployed
units. Therefore, the few remaining brigades lack the personnel,
equipment, and training necessary for unrestricted availability to meet
any new contingency should one arise. This situation puts the Nation in
a perilous position. We lack what former Chief of Staff of the Army,
General Peter Schoomaker, called ``strategic depth.'' This lack of
military depth could embolden a potential adversary, slows our ability
to respond to a new emergency, and increases the probability of higher
casualties in any future conflict. In the absence of sufficient
strategic depth, the Nation must more carefully manage strategic risk.
What is your assessment of the current readiness of our Armed
Forces, and particularly our ground forces, for worldwide commitment to
any contingency and any level of operations?
Answer. Current operational commitments are creating significant
demands on the force, particularly our ground force. Readiness of
deployed forces and forces that are preparing to deploy remain our
highest priorities. Sustaining operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
while maintaining readiness to respond to new contingencies around the
globe, is a heavy burden on our current force structure. Current
operations are degrading our ability to perform full-spectrum
operations. That said, we have significant strategic depth resident in
our Air Force and Navy, which mitigates somewhat the current strategic
risk because of the stress on our ground forces.
While it is critical that we maintain our focus on current
operations, where possible, we are taking steps to enhance our ability
to respond to emerging or unplanned events. We are building strategic
depth by increasing the size of our forces.
Question. What in your view is the level of strategic risk the
Nation faces given the lack of depth in our ground forces?
Answer. The Chairman's Risk Assessment Report provided to Congress
in February 2007 was developed in consultation with the Joint Chiefs. I
endorse its classified assessment of the level of risk facing our
Nation. That level of risk is due to a number of factors, including
stress on the United States military, especially our ground forces.
From a military perspective, continued deployments, accelerated
equipment usage rates across the Services and high operational tempo
all contribute to risk and are unlikely to subside in the near term. I
am confident that our Armed Forces remain capable of defeating all who
threaten our Nation's security.
Question. What in your view are the three most important actions we
should take immediately to mitigate and correct our lack of strategic
depth?
Answer. Mitigating risk requires a number of actions, many already
ongoing. Priorities include efforts to:

(1) Get to a 2-to-1 force rotation metric; this will require
an increase in the size of the Army and Marine Corps. Growth
will improve our warfighting capacity and reduce the stress
experienced by our forces.
(2) Resetting, repairing, and replacing equipment worn out or
damaged in battle and restoring prepositioned stocks drawn to
equip new units or those committed to operations in Iraq or
Afghanistan will ensure our forces are ready to respond rapidly
to contingencies at home and abroad.
(3) We must also stress modernization across all the
Services. Much of our equipment is approaching or is at the
limits of its service life. Replacing aging equipment with
modern systems and integrating new capabilities will ensure our
Armed Forces remain preeminent.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. Please describe the progress that the Department,
including the JCS and the Joint Staff, has made in transforming the
Armed Forces.
Answer. I recognize the need to shift the balance of our
capabilities to better meet the irregular, disruptive, and potentially
catastrophic security challenges of the 21st century while maintaining
our ability to overmatch any traditional challenge that may arise to
confront us.
DOD has shifted its focus in the following ways:

From a peacetime tempo to a wartime sense of urgency
in an era of surprise and uncertainty;
From single-focused threats to multiple, distributed,
and complex challenges;
From a ``one-size-fits-all deterrence'' to tailored
deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks and near-peer
competitors;
From responding after crisis starts (reactive) to
preventive actions so problems do not become crises
(proactive); and from crisis response to shaping the future;
From peacetime planning to rapid Adaptive Planning;
From a focus on kinetics to a focus on effects;
From 20th century processes to 21st century
approaches--particularly how information used innovatively
generates power; and
From a DOD solutions to interagency, multi-lateral and
multi-national comprehensive approaches.

The JCS have championed the shift from dependence on large,
permanent overseas garrisons toward expeditionary operations utilizing
increasingly more austere bases abroad; from focusing on primarily
traditional combat operations toward greater capability to deal with
asymmetric challenges; from deconflicting joint operations to
integrated and even interdependent operations--all while massing the
cumulative power of joint forces to achieve synergistic effects.
Specific examples include:

Ground forces taking on more of the tasks heretofore
performed by Special Operations Forces;
Improving warfighter proficiency in irregular warfare;
counterinsurgency; and stabilization, transition, and
reconstruction operations;
Developing proficiency in foreign languages and
cultures;
Implementing ground-force modularity at all levels;
ensuring they are largely self-sustaining, and capable of
disaggregating into smaller, autonomous units (Army brigade
combat teams);
U.S. Marine Corps has established a Marine Corps
Special Operations Command and within it established Foreign
Military Training Units; and improved the capability to conduct
distributed operations as well as ``low-end'' SOF missions;
Special Operating Forces (SOF) are increasing their
capability to detect, locate, and render safe weapons of mass
destruction. SOF is also significantly increasing capacity;
U.S. Special Operations Command has been designated
the lead combatant command for planning, synchronizing, and
executing global operations against terrorist networks;
Joint air capabilities are shifting to systems with
far greater range and persistence; larger and more flexible
payloads for surveillance or strike; and the ability to
penetrate and sustain operations in denied areas;
Future joint air capabilities will exploit stealth and
advanced electronic warfare; they will include a mix of manned
and unmanned aircraft for both surveillance and strike;
Joint maritime forces including the Coast Guard are
increasingly conducting highly distributed operations with a
networked fleet that is more capable of projecting power in
littoral waters; and
The Navy is expanding its riverine capability for
river patrol, interdiction, and tactical troop movement on
inland waterways.

The Joint Staff supports and facilitates transformation efforts by
acting as the primary agent for developing and monitoring concept
development and joint experimentation.

The Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) family consists
of the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Joint Operating
Concepts, Joint Functional Concepts, and Joint Integrating
Concepts. These concepts look 8-20 years into the future and
serve to translate strategic guidance, such as the National
Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Strategic
Planning Guidance, into joint force capabilities through joint
experimentation.
The concept development and experimentation process
actively solicits and fosters participation by combatant
commanders, Services, and agencies to bring together and
leverage off the differing perspectives to address future
warfighting needs and challenges.
Joint Concept Development and Experimentation involves
the unprecedented integration of strategists, operational
planners, and participation of the requirements,
experimentation, and acquisition communities.

As an integral part of the capabilities based planning process, the
Joint Staff developed a Joint Capability Area framework and lexicon
representing the beginnings of a common language to discuss and
describe capabilities and increase transparency across related DOD
activities and processes.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your goals regarding
transformation in the future?

We must recruit and retain the high quality of our
joint force we must rapidly reset and transform the force to
meet the security challenges of the 21st century.
Our future military concepts all reflect the need for
addressing future security challenges as a unified team with
other interagency partners. One of my primary goals would
therefore be to push for DOD to partner with other interagency
members to address how we will achieve national security
objectives now and in the future through inter-governmental
concepts.
We must continue to build relationships with multi-
national partners and potential partners, laying the foundation
for future joint operations and shaping the environment for
those operations.

Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a larger role
in transformation? If so, in what ways?
Answer. I believe the Joint Staff should continue current
transformational initiatives and work harder to fuse the development of
JOpsC that will enable forces in the field to be more effective,
aggressively address and solve issues that fall in or across the seams
between the combatant commands, and work with the Services to ensure
our best ideas, efficiencies and technologies are made available to our
future warfighters.

JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

Question. The Chairman of JCS issued his vision for Joint Officer
Development (JOD) in November 2005. The Secretary of Defense approved a
Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional
Military Education (JPME) in April 2006, and published the DOD Joint
Officer Management Joint Qualification System Implementation Plan on
March 30, 2007.
Is the 2005 Chairman of JCS Vision for JOD consistent with your
views? If confirmed, will you revise this vision?
Answer. Yes, the 2005 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision
for JOD is consistent with my views. The premise of JOD vision is to
have a competency-based, lifelong continuum of learning . . . in a
joint context. The goal of JOD is to ensure we have the largest
possible body of fully qualified and inherently joint officers for
joint command and stag responsibilities. If confirmed, I will continue
to enforce the foundations addressed in the JOD vision to ensure our
officers are strategically minded, critical thinkers, and skilled joint
warfighters. I am committed to increasing levels of joint competency
and joint capabilities for all officers, both Active and Reserve.
If confirmed, I will remain fully supportive of JOD as it is
written today. I also understand that developing our officers is a
continuous process that will go through several iterations and reviews.
I am committed to ensuring they are prepared to support the vision and
strategy as laid out by the President and the Secretary of Defense.
Question. What do you consider to be the principal issues addressed
by the strategic plan, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you
hope to achieve?
Answer. The Strategic Plan modernizes JOD and management in the
21st century. The joint force management infrastructure must be as
dynamic as the environment in which the joint force operates to ensure
we have the right mix of joint educated, trained, and experienced
officers--the Plan recognizes this and meets the demands of today's
robust environment.
If confirmed, I will continue implementation of the new Joint
Officer Management process, per the changes authorized in National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007, to develop the
flexible joint manpower structure we need to meet the ever-changing
military environment. The Strategic Plan led to legislative changes
enabling the new Joint Qualification System will be responsive to the
warfighters in multi-Service, multi-national, and interagency
operations and produce the number of fully qualified and inherently
joint officers we need. It builds on Goldwater-Nichols' traditional
path to joint qualification and opens up the aperture by better
recognizing the accrual of joint experience.
Question. What do you consider to be the primary strengths and
weaknesses of the requirements for JPME with respect to qualification
as a joint specialty officer?
Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act correctly established Joint
Professional Military Education, along with a joint duty assignment, as
the standard for today's joint professional. For the past 20 years
officers have aspired to earn the Joint Specialty Officer designation.
While the premise of that designation (that an officer be proficient in
joint matters) remains the same, the title has changed under NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2007 to ``Joint Qualified Officer.''
Joint education remains central to the development of Joint
Qualified Officers--the strength of joint education is that it is at
the heart of JOD and is a major pillar of the Joint Learning Continuum
that also includes individual training, experience, and self-
development.
If confirmed as the Chairman, I understand my responsibility under
title 10, to ensure the necessary joint training and education of the
Armed Forces to accomplish strategic and contingency planning and
preparedness to conform to policy guidance from the President and the
Secretary of Defense is critical to the defense of our Nation.
The weakness is that we still have a challenge with capacity in
delivery of JPME Phase II--with the size of our current military
officer force today, the number of officers requiring JPME II far
exceeds our capacity to educate all officers at the JPME II level. We
do have the ability to provide every officer, both Active and Reserve
component, the opportunity to receive JPME Phase I credit, and have
been granted, thanks to the Congress' approval, expansion of Phase II
Joint education to the Senior Level Colleges' in-resident programs.
Question. What is your assessment of the appropriate balance
between education and experience in achieving qualification as a joint
specialty officer?
Answer. Both education and experience are critical to JOD. I
believe that our system must be flexible enough to provide selected
officers a tailored mix of the joint education, training and assignment
opportunities they need to gain the experience and achieve the
competency-level an organization requires to effectively fill critical
joint positions.

REBALANCING FORCES

Question. In a memorandum of July 9, 2003, the Secretary of Defense
directed action by the Services, the Joint Staff, and OSD aimed at
achieving better balance in the capabilities of the Active and Reserve
components. The Secretary noted that the Department ``needs to promote
judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force
rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient
application of manpower and technological solution based on a
disciplined force requirements process.''
What progress has been made in achieving the Secretary's vision?
Answer. The Secretary's vision encompassed three principal
objectives: rebalance the Active and Reserve Forces to reduce the need
for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve; establish a more
rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures that
force structure is designed appropriately and requests for forces are
validated promptly to provide timely notice of mobilization; and make
the mobilization and demobilization process more efficient.
We have instituted a new process for assignment, allocation, and
apportionment of United States military forces to the combatant
commands. The Global Force Management Process provides comprehensive
insight into the total number of United States Forces available in our
inventory forces and helps us match requirements with available forces.
Sourcing solutions are developed and then approved at a quarterly
Global Force Management Board designed to ensure the best options are
selected to achieve desired effects.
Additionally, the lessons learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom
concerning Reserve mobilization and demobilization have been put into
action. Specific recommendations were made, each with follow-on
actions, to enhance the capability of the Department to mobilize and
deploy Reserve Forces in the most effective manner possible. The
Department has rewritten policies that have been included in the Global
Force Management process. As part of this process, every Reserve
deployment is reviewed for an effective alternative source of
manpower--civilian, contractor, or volunteer.
In May of this year, the Secretary of Defense signed a memorandum
implementing changes recommended by the Commission on the National
Guard and Reserves. These changes, have met with considerable support
as they are designed to enhance the National Guard Bureau to meet the
national security requirements of the United States.
Rebalancing the force will continue to be an ongoing process. The
Reserve components, and the Total Force, must always preserve the
capability to operate across the full spectrum of conflict.
Question. What do you consider to be the biggest continuing
obstacles to achieving the goals that the Secretary of Defense has set
forth in his memorandum?
Answer. The biggest challenge is determining what capabilities
we'll need in the future and therefore, determining the appropriate
balance between the active and Reserve components while maintaining
sufficient warfighting capability. To that end, rebalancing of the
force is an ongoing activity within the Department. The Department
continually assesses its force structure and rebalancing within, and
between, the active and Reserve components with the expressed purpose
of improving readiness and deployability. Reserve component sources
must be adequately resourced and prepared for anticipated requirements.
Maintaining interoperability and providing the resources to train and
equip the Reserve Forces to a single operational standard remains a
Total Force imperative.
Not since World War II have the Reserve components been called upon
to perform in such a high operational tempo, and they have performed in
an exemplary manner. It is true that when you call out the Reserve
component you call out the Nation, and they have answered that call.

HEALTH CARE BENEFITS

Question. In May 2007, the Task Force on the Future of Military
Health Care issued an interim report concluding that ``to sustain and
improve military health care benefits for the long run, actions must be
taken now to adjust the system in the most cost-effective ways.'' Among
other recommendations, the Task Force recommends increasing the portion
of the costs borne by retirees under age 65, and suggesting an increase
in military retired pay to offset part or all of the increase if
Congress believes that the increases are too large relative to retired
pay.
What recommendations, if any, would you offer to address the
increasing cost of health care and other personnel benefits?
Answer. Our men and women in uniform make great sacrifices for
their Nation, and their personnel benefits, to include compensation and
health care programs, have always been a priority for me. The continued
support of Congress, and the Nation, is greatly appreciated by our
military servicemembers.
The rising cost of health care is clearly an issue we need to work
and will seek the support of Congress. Maintaining the life long
continuum of care is especially critical with the ongoing operations in
the Middle East. We need to strike a balance between our people, health
care, acquisition and operations and maintenance.
If confirmed, I will continue to support the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs as they lead the Department's ongoing effort
to promote efficiency in both our direct health care and purchased care
programs.
The Task Force on Military Health Care's final report will be
released in December. I look forward to review those recommendations
and will use the report findings to help shape an equitable plan to
sustain the benefit, while attempting to control the significant rise
in costs.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in
any shaping or rethinking of health care benefits for military
personnel, including retirees and their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support a health care benefit system
that is flexible, effective, and cost-efficient to serve the needs of
our military members, retirees, and their families.
I look forward to continuing our efforts with Congress and DOD to
ensure military personnel can serve their nation with the knowledge
that their health care benefits are secure. In this time of war, we are
committed to providing the best care possible for our forces that are
returning with combat injuries. I will also continue to support close
cooperation between the DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs to
improve care for our troops and for those who have left the Service.
Question. How would you assess the impact of health care benefits
on recruitment and retention of military personnel?
Answer. The recruiting and retention environment is very dynamic
and competitive, and a quality health care system is an important
cornerstone in our overall benefits package. Maintaining our high-
quality, All-Volunteer Force is dependent on our ability to continue to
recruit and retain men and women with a desire to serve their Nation.
Our health care benefits program clearly helps us in these efforts.
Question. What role should the Chairman of JCS, as opposed to the
service chiefs, play with respect to health care benefits?
Answer. If confirmed, my title 10 role is to provide military
advice to the President, NSC, HSC, and the Secretary of Defense. In
that capacity I will support the Services and the Department as they
evaluate benefit programs. The Service Chiefs have a direct function
within their respective departments in the delivery of health care
services in addition to offering appropriate advice as members of JCS.

SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY

Question. In response to a congressional requirement for
formulation of a comprehensive policy related to sexual assaults in the
Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense promulgated guidance aimed at
more effectively preventing sexual assaults, investigating incidents of
sexual assault, and responding to the needs of victims of sexual
assault.
What role, if any, has the Joint Staff played in monitoring
progress within the military services and the combatant commands' areas
of responsibility in order to ensure enforcement of a ``zero
tolerance'' policy relating to sexual assaults?
Answer. As a member of the DOD Sexual Assault Advisory Council, the
Joint Staff works closely with the Joint Task Force Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response team, the Services, and OSD. This ensures that
the policy is executable in the joint and multinational operational
environment.
The Joint Staff provides a monthly report to the task force on
Service progress in completing investigations of sexual assaults that
occur in the United States Central Command area of operations. The
Joint Staff also provides assistance to combatant commanders during the
development of their internal procedures; serve as a liaison staff to
address Service policy issues that might impact a commander's ability
to conduct investigations; and provides support to victims in the joint
environment.
Question. What reporting requirements or other forms of oversight
by service leaders do you think are necessary to ensure that the goals
of sexual assault prevention and response policies are achieved?
Answer. I do not believe we need any additional reporting
requirements on oversight by Service leaders. The prevention of sexual
assault is the responsibility of all leaders and every soldier, sailor,
airman, and marine. Leaders in particular must be apprised of command
climate and aware of sexual assault or harassment incidents, and remain
in the forefront to ensure that our policies are understood and
enforced. They should also be held accountable in this area.
Question. If confirmed, will you direct any changes to the Joint
Staff's responsibilities for addressing the issue of sexual assault in
the Armed Forces?
Answer. If confirmed, I will stress to the entire Armed Forces my
expectations. Every leader plays a vital role in the prevention of
sexual assault. The Joint Staff will monitor the training and incident
reporting of sexual assault very closely. Any changes to the Joint
Staff responsibilities would be initiated.

INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE

Question. During your assignment on the Joint Staff, you may have
had the opportunity to observe the working relationship between the
Chairman's legal advisor, the DOD General Counsel, the Judge Advocates
General of the Services and judge advocates advising commanders in the
field.
What is your view about the responsibility of the Chairman's legal
advisor to provide independent legal advice to you, other members of
JCS, and to the Joint Staff?
Answer. I view the Chairman of JCS Legal Counsel as having
responsibility for providing independent legal advice to the Chairman
in his role as principal military adviser to the President, the NSC,
HSC, and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, he must advise the
Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Joint Staff on the full spectrum of legal
issues. Given the Chairman's role as spokesman for the combatant
commanders, the Legal Counsel frequently advises and assists combatant
commander's legal staffs. In all of these roles, I expect the
Chairman's legal counsel to provide his best independent counsel.
Question. What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocates
General of the Services to provide independent legal advice to the
Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. I similarly believe that the Judge Advocates General should
provide their best independent counsel with regards to all of their
roles and responsibilities; to include advising the Chiefs of Staff.
Question. What is your view of the responsibility of judge
advocates within the services and joint commands to provide independent
legal advice to military commanders?
Answer. Uniformed staff judge advocates are essential to the proper
functioning of the Armed Forces. In the critical area of military
justice, commanders and commanding officers are required by statute
(title 10, section 806) to communicate with their staff judge advocates
with the purpose of receiving instruction and guidance in this field.
In addition, officers rely on their staff judge advocates for advice on
all types of legal matters, extending beyond their statutory
responsibilities. A staff judge advocate has a major responsibility to
promote the interests of a command by providing relevant, timely, and
independent advice to its military commander, whether at shore or in
the fleet. Title 10, section 5148(2)(2) reinforces the critical need
for independent advice from a staff judge advocate, by prohibiting all
interference with a judge advocate's ability to give independent legal
advice to commanders, as applied to any employee of DOD. Commanders
depend extensively on their staff judge advocates to provide
independent advice, which combines legal acumen and understanding of
military requirements and operations.

WOMEN IN COMBAT

Question. The issue of the appropriate role of women in the Armed
Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American
public.
What is your assessment of the performance of women in the Armed
Forces, particularly given the combat experiences of our military,
since the last major review of the assignment policy for women in 1994?
Answer. Today, more than 333,000 women serve in the United States
Armed Forces around the world and they are performing with distinction.
From commanders, pilots, crewmembers, technicians, to military police,
women will continue to play a critical role in the defense of our
Nation in a wide variety of assignments and skills.
Question. What is your understanding of the status of the report on
implementation of DOD policies with regard to the assignment of women
required by section 541 of Public Law 109-163?
Answer. It is my understanding the draft report is still being
worked within the Department and has not been released.
Question. Does the DOD have sufficient flexibility under current
law to make changes to the assignment policy for women when needed?
Answer. Current law provides adequate flexibility to make changes
to DOD assignment policy for women.
Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy are
needed?
Answer. The current DOD policy recognizes that women are an
integral part of our Armed Forces and provides the flexibility needed
to address changes to the operational environment. If confirmed, and
there are appropriate changes to be brought forward, I will do so.

COMMISSION ON NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves issued
a second interim report to Congress on March 1, 2007, recommending
among other things that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB)
should not be a member of JCS, but that the National Guard Bureau
should be a joint activity and the Commander or Deputy Commander of
U.S. Northern Command should be a Reserve or National Guard officer at
all times.
What is your opinion on the recommendations of the Commission?
Answer. I agree with the Secretary of Defense's memo dated 10 May
2007. The Secretary agreed in whole or part with 20 of the Commission's
recommendations and proposed alternatives for the 3 remaining
recommendations.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of senior
Reserve component officers on the Joint Staff and on the staffs of the
combatant commanders?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with senior officers from the
National Guard and the Reserves to assist me as advisors on National
Guard and Reserve matters.
Question. What is your view about making the CNGB a member of JCS?
What is your rationale for this opinion?
Answer. I do not recommend that the CNGB be a member of JCS. Due to
the impact that the National Guard has on national security, I believe
the CNGB should be invited to participate in JCS discussions when Guard
equities are addressed in a similar fashion as the Commandant of the
Coast Guard. In addition, if I am confirmed, the CNGB will have full
access to me and the upper echelons of the Joint Staff.

RELIANCE ON RESERVE COMPONENT

Question. The men and women of the Reserve component have performed
superbly in meeting the diverse challenges of the global war on
terrorism. Such a heavy use of the Reserve components however could
have potential adverse effects on recruiting, retention, and morale of
Guard and Reserve personnel.
What is your assessment of the impact of continuing Guard and
Reserve deployments on the readiness and attractiveness of service in
the Guard and Reserve?
Answer. The men and women of our Active and Reserve Force are
performing superbly. The prolonged demand on certain capabilities
resident in the Guard and Reserve is a serious concern. Of note, the
highest retention percentages in the Reserve components come from units
that have deployed for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi
Freedom--clearly, these servicemembers understand the importance of
their service and are volunteering again to continue to serve their
country. We must continue to ensure our personnel receive strong
support from their civilian employers, provide support for their
families, and we must also continue to closely monitor recruiting and
retention. I would like to thank the employers of the Reserve Force for
their understanding during this time of national need. The Armed Forces
will continue to need their support during this long war.
To decrease demand on the Reserve component, the Department has
several initiatives underway which help alleviate additional burden on
the Guard and Reserve including: (1) rebalancing of forces, (2)
modularization for a better deployment rotation base, (3) new training
and certification procedures for our Army Guard and Reserves prior to
mobilization to maximize their utility while minimizing their total
time away from home, and (4) increases in the Active component.
I understand that the Department is working hard to deal with the
prolonged demand on certain capabilities resident in the Guard and
Reserve. Secretary Gates redefined the mobilization policy when he
issued the ``Utilization of the Total Force: memorandum on 19 January
2007. In this memorandum, Secretary Gates identified the following:

1. Setting the length of involuntary mobilization at a
maximum of 12 months for Reserve component units;
2. Mobilizing ground forces on a unit versus individual
basis;
3. Establishing a planning objective with a ratio of 1 year
of mobilization followed by 5 years of ``dwell time'';
4. Establishing a new program to compensate, or provide for
incentives to members required to mobilize or deploy early or
often, or be extended beyond established rotation policy goals;
5. Reviewing hardship waiver programs to ensure they are
properly taking into account exceptional circumstance; and
6. Minimizing the use of stop loss as a force management
tool.

END STRENGTH OF ACTIVE-DUTY FORCES

Question. In light of the manpower demands of Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, what level of active-duty personnel (by
Service) do you believe is required for current and anticipated
missions?
Answer. The Services, Joint Staff, and OSD have looked at this
impact and have brought forward their force structure recommendations.
The Army and Marine Corps have planned growth that is consistent with
the future demands expected to be placed on our ground forces. This
planned growth is partially offset by limited manpower reductions in
the Navy and Air Force. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the
Services to determine the right size force as current and anticipated
missions change.
Question. How do you assess the progress made to date by the
Services in finding ways to reduce the numbers of military personnel
performing support functions that can better be performed by civilian
employees or contractors?
Answer. The conversion from military to civilian manpower has been
ongoing for some time. Military-to-civilian personnel targets are the
result of collaborative reviews and analyses between OSD and the
Services. This process has been effective and, as it is collaborative
with the Services, I believe it is working toward an effective balance
of personnel helping to accomplish the Department's mission.
Question. What manpower savings can be achieved through reductions
in overseas presence, application of technology, and changes in roles
and missions?
Answer. As we continue to shape our force in response to the
changing roles and missions around the world, there will continue to be
adjustments to where we posture our forces. If confirmed, I will work
with the Service Chiefs and the Department to evaluate the global
environment and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
regarding the appropriate placement of our forces to assist in carrying
out our Nation's global engagement strategies.
Question. What is your assessment about the feasibility and
advisability from a cost standpoint of increasing the end strength of
the Army to 547,000 and the Marine Corps to 202,000?
Answer. I support the planned growth in both the Army and Marine
Corps as we move toward a 2-to-1 force rotation metric. The two
Services have planned for and are prepared for the mission of
increasing their end strength. The President's budget submission has
included the costs associated with this needed growth of our ground
forces.
I fully realize the pressure that manpower accounts place on the
Department's budget. Salaries, health care, and other supporting
infrastructure all come at a cost, but it is my belief that our
soldiers and marines, and their families, are deserving of the relief
afforded by a greater end strength.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

(1) challenge them with great responsibilities;
(2) properly compensate them;
(3) provide for a balance that permits them to achieve
balance in their lives;
(4) provide an environment of support for their families:
good schools, good housing, and good medical care;
(5) achieve 2:1 dwell time for our ground forces; and
(6) the continued support of American people and the value
that our Nation places on the service and sacrifice of all
servicemembers and their families.

As with recruiting, we are very grateful for the tools provided by
Congress as they are critical to continued success in the retention of
our force.
Question. In your opinion, what impact is the current recruiting
environment likely to have on our ability to sustain an All-Volunteer
Force?
Answer. The All-Volunteer Force has served this Nation well for 34
years. It will continue to do so. It provides a force that is
intelligent, motivated, and dedicated, and meets our Nation's needs.

MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES

IRAQ

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing
the United States in Iraq?
Answer. In recent months, there has been a steady improvement in
the security lines of operation evidenced by both empirical data
(metrics) and the sense of the commanders. However, there is very
limited progress in reconciliation, which remains the precondition to
an Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and be an ally in
the war on terror. Execution of the governance and economic lines of
operation has been largely unsatisfactory, albeit nascent governmental
institutions and a lack of experience with the democratic process
hamper them. Current indications are that the Iraqi leadership is still
struggling in its ability to move forward with reconciliation and that
this political process will take time. The Iraqi political process is
the key enabler that must be a focus of our effort.
Question. From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned
from our experience in Iraq?
Answer. We face determined, agile enemies in Iraq. Achieving the
desired end-state will require a sustained and integrated interagency
effort as well as unity of effort with the Iraqi Government. Effective
strategic and operational planning by the interagency and with both our
coalition partners and the Iraqi Government is critical to our success.
The evolving regional strategic landscape requires the
reconstitution of our strategic depth and flexibility. We must ensure
we have the capacity to act in the future.
Achieving progress in Iraq and furthering broader U.S. regional
interests are inextricably linked. Slow progress in Iraq is undermining
U.S. credibility and weakening efforts to achieve regional objectives.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes
the United States has made to date in Iraq? Which of these do you
believe are still having an impact? What do you believe could be done
now to mitigate such impact?
Answer. I believe the most significant mistakes to date are:

(1) Did not fully integrate all elements of U.S. national
power in Iraq;
(2) Focused most attention on the Iraqi national power
structures with limited, engagement of the tribal and local
power structures;
(3) Did not establish an early and significant dialogue with
neighboring countries, adding to the complex security
environment a problematic border situation;
(4) Disbanded the entire Iraqi Amy, a potentially valuable
asset for security, reconstruction, and provision of services
to the Iraqi people, providing a recruiting pool for extremist
groups;
(5) Pursued a de-Baathification process that proved more
divisive than helpful, created a lingering vacuum in
governmental capability that still lingers, and exacerbated
sectarian tensions;
(6) Attempted to transition to stability operations with an
insufficient force; and
(7) Unsuccessful in communicating and convincing Iraqis and
regional audience of our intended goals.

I believe many of these are still having an impact. The void left
by a disbanded Iraqi Army and has not yet been filled by the Iraqi
security forces, allowing sectarian violence to continue in too many
areas.
I believe that pursuing a balanced strategy in Iraq, with full
interagency support, and an aggressive strategic communications plan
can mitigate this impact.
Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the
United States needs to take in Iraq?
Answer. Our approach must be consistent with enduring United States
vital and regional interests. We must commit to a long-term security
relationship with Iraq that facilitates political reconciliation,
supports development of a stable Iraq, and is directly tied to our
enduring long-term interests in the region.
We must work through the interagency and regional partners to
expand Iraqi governance and economic capacity. This effort must be
centered on developing effective incentives and disincentives (and
associated measures of effectiveness) to influence Government of Iraq
(GOI), Iraqi factions/leaders, regional states, as well as Syria and
Iran.
We must continue our long-term fight against al Qaeda, contain the
sectarian conflict within the borders of Iraq, and prevent large scale
civil war and the resultant humanitarian crisis.
Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution
in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?
Answer. No, there is no purely military solution in Iraq. The
enormous complexity, historic differences, competing views of the
future Iraq, and lack of trust in new institutions will require long-
term political and social solutions. In the near term, political
progress requires demonstrated commitment to national reconciliation in
order to address:

(1) de-Baathification and lack of proportional Sunni
representation in the Government, Army, and Police;
(2) Equitable distribution of oil revenue; and
(3) Amnesty.

Question. Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi
political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?
Answer. Yes. Compromise is a key to advancing solutions to the
political issues facing Iraq. For Iraq to progress politically, their
politicians need to view politics and democracy as more than just
majority rule, winner-take-all, or a zero-sum game.
Question. Do you believe that quelling the current level of
violence in Baghdad is a necessary condition for a political solution?
Answer. I believe that Baghdad is the center of gravity and that
reducing violence there is an essential enabler. However, as violence
is contained, there are two follow-on conditions required to
stabilizing the situation and facilitating an Iraqi political solution:

The GOI, with Coalition support, must make progress
toward reconciliation, eliminating the insurgency, decrease the
levels of sectarian, and intra-Shia violence, and set
conditions for the transfer of responsibility to GOI and Iraqi
security forces (ISF).
We must achieve unity of effort within the U.S.
Government (interagency), among coalition partners, and between
the coalition and the Iraqi Government.

Progress toward reconciliation and associated reductions in
sectarian and intra-Shia violence is vital; failure to achieve tangible
progress toward reconciliation requires a strategic reassessment.
Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders
to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution?
What leverage does the United States have in this regard? We cannot
impose political change upon the Iraqi political leadership.
Answer. We can, however, create the conditions of security that
help facilitate Iraqi political reconciliation. We are seeing the
beginning of this in the neighborhoods of Baghdad that have been
stabilized. A moderate degree of normalcy is returning and within those
areas, we are seeing increased cooperation between the local Iraqis and
the ISF and coalition forces.
We can also leverage our demonstrated commitment to a secure Iraq
to host a regional conference on Iraq. Together with regional
leadership, we could develop effective incentives and disincentives
(and associated measures of effectiveness) to influence the GOI, Iraqi
factions/leaders, and regional states.
The U.S. can forge regional political and economic support to the
GOI to further encourage GOI reconciliation. This regional approach
could seek to revive reconstruction funding, encourage business and
financial partnerships, and encourage additional support from neighbors
(e.g., establish embassies, direct investment, development assistance,
debt forgiveness, Iraqi ministry development, etc).
Some Iraq leaders are becoming increasingly intransigent as they
posture themselves for what they perceive to be our near-term
withdrawal. A U.S. lever to counter this intransigence and facilitate
political reconciliation would be a demonstrated commitment to our
enduring interests in Iraq and the region (e.g. work with the GOI to
achieve a long-term security agreement that supports our mutual
interests).
Inducing the fractured Iraqi leadership to move forward on
reconciliation will be difficult and it will take time. We do have some
powerful levers available to us including security guarantees,
financial incentives, favorable trade status, etc. However, these
levers may not be strong enough to outweigh the deep-seated mistrust
among the main political factions.
Question. What do you believe are the prospects for Iraqi political
leaders to make those compromises and, if made, what effect do you
believe this would have toward ending the sectarian violence and
defeating the insurgency?
Answer. I believe that the Iraqi political leadership, left to
their own internal processes, will have great difficulty achieving the
trust required to compromise and move forward on reconciliation.
Political and economic progress in Iraq will require patience,
persistence and a commitment measured in years not months. Our
strategies and force structure must be aligned to facilitate a lengthy
Iraqi political reconciliation process while addressing our own vital
interests in Iraq relative to the region: degradation of al Qaeda
(Iraq) and containment of the conflict.
Political reconciliation will be achieved when a sufficient level
of trust and compromise has been reached among the leadership of the
main political factions in Iraq. The ability to compromise is a key
enabler that will facilitate governance and decisionmaking. When the
GOI reaches this milestone, the leadership of political factions will
turn away from violence as a method for advancing their agenda, and
sectarian violence should decline precipitously. Without considerable
U.S., international and regional support and pressure, successful
reconciliation is unlikely in the near-term.
Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the
new Iraq strategy announced by the President earlier this year?
Answer. We had rigorous and thorough discussions and debates. I met
personally with the President and the Secretary of Defense in a
thorough discussion along with the other Joint Chiefs. The President
then made his decision, and I am in support of that decision and
working to make it succeed.
Question. With regard to the recent ``surge strategy,'' what role
will you have, if confirmed, in proposing or recommending changes to
the strategy? What role will you have in deciding or recommending when
U.S. troops can begin to reduce and transition to new missions?
Answer. If confirmed as Chairman, my role is to advise the
President and the Secretary of Defense this includes proposing or
recommending changes to strategy, troop reductions, or mission
transitions. I intend to be engaged from day one. I intend immediately
to go to the theater in order to more clearly understand conditions on
the ground.
Question. What do you see as a reasonable estimate of the time it
will take to demonstrate success in securing Baghdad?
Answer. I believe that we are demonstrating success in Baghdad
today. We have made progress toward breaking the cycle of sectarian
violence and eliminating al Qaeda strongholds in the city. Sectarian
violence is down below pre-surge levels. I will need to engage the
Commander U.S. Central Command and the Commander Multi-National Forces-
Iraq in order to achieve a more complete view on our way ahead and the
associated timetable.
Question. If confirmed, how would you craft an ``exit strategy''
for U.S. forces in Iraq? What are the necessary pre-conditions; how
would you phase the redeployment; and what residual forces would be
needed for what period of time, and for what purposes over the long-
term?
Answer. U.S. vital interests in the region and in Iraq require a
pragmatic, long-term commitment that will be measured in years not
months. The fight against al Qaeda (Iraq), containment of the conflict,
and prevention of full-scale civil war and attendant humanitarian
catastrophe necessitate a sustained force presence within Iraq.
Following the September reports from the combatant and operational
commanders, we must assess the current strategy and our ability to
support both our primary strategic objectives and the attainment of a
democratic Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and be an
ally in the war on terror. Our way forward in Iraq must be consistent
with and supportive of our broader regional interests.
Question. What is the state of planning for such an ``exit
strategy?'' If none has begun, will you require that such planning
begin?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take a very active role in all
existing and contingency planning efforts.
Question. What role will you play, if any, in an ongoing assessment
of the capability of Iraqi security forces to take on more of the
security responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the combatant commander in
the assessment of Iraqi security forces.
Question. What is your understanding of U.S. policy with respect to
the arming and support of Sunni militia forces against al Qaeda in al
Anbar province and elsewhere in Iraq? What would you recommend in this
regard?
Answer. It is my understanding that coalition forces are not arming
Sunni militias. I believe we should continue our strong support for
local Police Support Units (PSU) in al Anbar province and other areas
where the Ambassador and Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
support this concept. Indigenous forces are the key to success in the
Iraqi counterinsurgency as demonstrated in al Anbar, which has
witnessed an 80-percent decrease in enemy attacks since this time last
year. We must continue to focus our efforts in supporting homegrown
police and security forces in Iraq.
Question. What considerations will be factored into a decision
regarding whether (and if so, what kind and how much) U.S. military
equipment currently in Iraq should be left behind for use by the Iraqi
Army?
Answer. Equipment/material will be screened for redistribution in
theater. Items of military value will be retrograded in accordance with
applicable Military Regulations.
Equipment will also be screened for sufficient service life/
residual value to ensure retrograde is a fiscally sound course of
action. If not sufficient, we will then consider transfer to the Iraqi
Army.
Additionally, equipment that has undergone significant upgrade
since being deployed to theater (e.g. Uparmored HMMWVs, medium and
heavy trucks, etc.) may also be screened for transfer.
There are some other types of nonmilitary equipment managed by
contractors (e.g. generators, living trailers, tents, etc). These will
also be screened for transfer/donation to the ISF per Annex D of MNF-I
Framework Operation Order (OPORD).
Finally, certain non-military equipment/material that is deemed to
have significant value to help stimulate the Iraqi economy, will also
be screened for transfer/donation in accordance with Annex D of MNF-I
Framework OPORD.
Question. In the National Defense Authorization and Appropriation
Acts for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek
permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq.
Do you agree that it is not and should not be U.S. policy to seek
permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over
Iraq's oil resources?
Answer. I agree with U.S. policy not to seek permanent military
bases in Iraq or to control Iraq's oil resources.
Question. If you agree, what are your views on the construction of
any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?
Answer. I view any construction the U.S. undertakes in Iraq as
temporary basing of our forces. If confirmed, I will engage the GOI on
a long-term security relationship.
Question. Is the United States military capable of sustaining
present force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan without breaking the
force?
Answer. If confirmed, I will provide the Secretary of Defense and
the President my best military advice as our campaign progresses
regarding our missions and the appropriate force levels necessary to
achieve them. Of particular concern is the stress on the force. The
Army currently has a 15:12 month dwell ratio. The Marine Corps has a
7:7 month dwell ratio. My goal, if confirmed, is resetting the dwell
ratio to 2:1.
Question. Are you concerned about the negative impact of the
perceived occupation of a Muslim nation by the United States and its
western allies?
Answer. Yes. I am concerned about negative perceptions. In order to
change the negative impact, it is necessary to see the issues through
the eyes of the Muslim community and recognize their particular
concerns. If confirmed, I will work to bolster our strategic
communications.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the long-term prospects for
Afghan military forces to effectively provide a secure environment for
a democratically elected government to function?
Answer. Recent International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and
United States military efforts disrupted the Taliban's spring surge and
eliminated key leadership. Efforts like these are helping create the
stability necessary for eventual transition of security control from
NATO to the Afghanistan security forces (ASF). Challenges remain
however, including Taliban sanctuaries inside Afghanistan and Pakistan,
along with al Qaeda and Iranian support to the Taliban. We must do
everything necessary to ensure the success of NATO and facilitate their
continued long-term commitment.
Question. What, if any, types of military assistance would you
recommend in addition to current efforts?
Answer. We must work with our NATO allies to both fill the
requirements stated in the NATO Combined Joint Statement of
Responsibilities and reduce operational caveats. In addition to
military forces, it is critical that the United States, NATO and the
international community provide the supporting enablers that build
Government of Afghanistan capacity and integrate security operations
with governmental and economic development.
Question. What steps do you believe coalition forces and the
international community need to take in the near-term to improve the
lives of the Afghan people?
Answer. Reinforcing the Government of Afghanistan's ability to
protect and provide for the Afghan people is critical to marginalizing
the insurgency and creating a secure environment. The international
community has agreed to assist in the development and strengthening of
many vital institutions.
We have a critical need for trainers to support the Afghan National
Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), ministerial level mentors
to develop Afghan Government capacity, and the ability to execute
critical infrastructure projects which include roads, power, and rural
development.
Question. News reports indicate that there is growing Afghan
resentment over civilian deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism
operations and U.S. or NATO air strikes. Are you concerned that these
reports of civilian deaths are undermining efforts to win the support
of the Afghan people for the mission in Afghanistan? What steps, if
any, do you believe ought to be undertaken to address the issue of
civilian deaths in Afghanistan?
Answer. Yes. I am concerned about civilian deaths. Our military
commanders in Afghanistan exert considerable efforts to avoid civilian
casualties. These efforts include:

Continuously reevaluating our operational and tactical
approaches to ensure that the operational benefits outweigh the
potential damage to overall strategic goals that could result
from civilian casualties;
Investigating every incident to determine if
procedures were followed or if they need to be revised; and
Coordinated, credible post-incident reports are
conducted, followed by rapid reporting of conclusions, lessons,
and investigations.

Question. In November 2006, the U.N. and World Bank released a
report on the drug industry in Afghanistan. In February, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies released a report on Afghanistan,
which included recommendations regarding the counterdrug policy.
What is your opinion of the conclusions and recommendations of
these reports as they relate to the effectiveness of international
military efforts to help Afghanistan combat illegal drug production and
trafficking?
Answer. I agree with the broad conclusions that a comprehensive
``smart'' CN strategy is essential in order to combat illegal drug
production and trafficking.
Question. Should international military forces have an explicit
counterdrug mission? If so, should its focus be on interdiction,
capturing drug lords, and destroying drug facilities? If not, what is
the appropriate role for the military?
Answer. The current NATO/ISAF Operation Plan specifically
prescribes the military support to counternarcotics (CN) mission, that
includes the following sharing CN information; supporting the CN
information campaign; provision of enabling support to air & ground
lift for CN personnel and equipment; and supporting Afghan Government
CN operations.
Question. If the U.S. military were to take on the mission of
capturing drug lords and dismantling drug labs in Afghanistan, what
would be the impact on the drug trade in Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe our forces currently deployed to Afghanistan
should remain focused on stabilization and ANSF development missions.
Question. What can DOD and the military do--via the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams or other means--to support the counterdrug efforts
of other agencies in those areas?
Answer. It is my assessment that DOD should continue its support to
CN operations in Afghanistan and work closely with the interagency to
support CN programs through continued funding of National Interdiction
Unit (NIU) training.

PAKISTAN

Question. In your view, should the Pakistan Government be doing
more to eliminate safe havens for the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other
extremists in its tribal areas and elsewhere in Pakistan and to prevent
them from conducting cross-border incursions into Afghanistan?
Answer. Yes. Although the GOP has recently addressed AQ sanctuaries
and Taliban leadership in their border areas, expansion of the GOP's
partnership with ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan is needed to
support Afghanistan stability. We must continue to support the growth
to their Frontier Corps and recognize that the GOP political situation
is very complex with competing demands hindering its ability to fully
support United States goals. If confirmed, I will provide any requested
assistance to the GOP in its fight in the global war on terror and
extremism.

IRAN

Question. What options do you believe are available to the United
States to counter Iran's growing influence in the Middle East region?
Answer. The United States can leverage common interests and
objectives with our regional partners. These include:

Regional security
Freedom of navigation
Access to markets
Assured access to oil and other resources
Stable, unified Iraq
Resolution of the Middle East Peace Process

We also share common regional concerns:

Islamic extremism and the destabilizing influence from
Iranian sponsorship of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Taliban;
Iranian exploitation of Shia populations and the
growing Sunni-Shia rift;
Iranian hegemony and nuclear aspirations.

Iran is central to these concerns and remains the principal
destabilizing factor in the region. These commonalities of interests
and concerns should be leveraged to develop a regional cooperative
security capability while at the same time establishing a dialogue with
Iran to explore peaceful options.
Question. Do you believe that a protracted deployment of U.S.
troops in Iraq, if the situation on the ground in Iraq does not
improve, could strengthen Iran's influence in the region?
Answer. A protracted deployment of U.S. troops to Iraq, with no
change in the security situation, risks further emboldening Iranian
hegemonic ambitions and encourages their continued support to Shia
insurgents in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Growing Coalition
successes on the ground in Iraq should mitigate this risk and improve
the credibility of our message to create a regional security construct
to counter Iranian destabilizing activity.
Question. In your view, does Iran pose a near-term threat to the
United States by way of either its missile program or its suspected
nuclear weapons programs?
Answer. I am concerned that these programs potentially threaten our
allies and U.S. interests in the region. Iran's continued sponsorship
of regional terrorism coupled with it quest for a nuclear capability
reinforces the importance of continued deterrence mechanisms including
theater ballistic missile defense.
Question. If you believe either of these programs pose a near term
threat, what in your view are the best ways to address such a threat?
Answer. I am concerned with Iran's aggressive posture and
destabilizing activities. I support current international and regional
diplomatic and financial measures to counter Iranian behavior now to
preclude confrontation in the future.
Question. Other than nuclear or missile programs what are your
concerns, if any, about Iran?
Answer. As articulated above, Iran remains the principal
destabilizing factor in the region. In the last year Iran has supported
actions by Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and insurgent factions in Iraq. Iran is likely to leverage
geographic proximity and our regional partners' fear of reprisals and
threats of economic disruption to counter regional objections to their
hegemonic and nuclear ambitions. We must bolster our regional friends
and allies to counter these concerns and thwart Iran's destabilizing
activities.

CHINESE MILITARY

Question. What do you believe are the objectives of the Chinese
military modernization program?
Answer. China is a rising power in the world. We should have no
doubts about that. As China grows economically, we can expect that they
will want a military capable of protecting their national interests.
Those interests include, first and foremost, Taiwan, but also disputed
areas in the South China Sea. They also recognize their growing
economic interdependence with the rest of the world. Their economic
development depends on an assured supply of energy and other natural
resources.
Question. What do you believe are China's global political-military
objectives and specifically its objectives regarding Taiwan and the
Asia-Pacific region?
Answer. Rising Chinese military power is not just a U.S.-China
issue; it is an issue of interest to the entire Asia-Pacific region.
China increasingly understands the importance of stability in the Asia-
Pacific region. In that respect, we welcome China's positive
contributions in the Six-Party Talks on Korea, and its participation in
some international peacekeeping operations.
That said, China has refused to renounce the use of force against
Taiwan and its sustained military build-up across the Strait risks
disrupting the status quo. While China's near-term focus appears to be
on Taiwan, long-term trends suggest China is building a force scoped
for operations beyond Taiwan. Many of China's neighbors are watching
Chinese military modernization and adjusting their plans and
expenditures. Conflict between China and its neighbors could
potentially erupt over disputed territories, resource rights, or
energy. In response, our one-China policy insists on a peaceful
resolution of cross-strait differences. How do you believe the United
States should respond to the Chinese military modernization program?
Answer. As the QDR stated, China has the greatest potential to
compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military
technologies that could, over time, offset traditional U.S. military
advantages. We do not want to overreact but at the same time, we must
not under react. Our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the
right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other
possibilities.
Another response must be greater engagement between our militaries.
We need to avoid a situation where neither side understands the plans
and intentions of the other, and where we are prey to misunderstandings
of the other's goals. I hosted my Chinese Navy counterpart in
Washington in April and plan to travel to China myself next month. I
told Admiral Wu that I hoped our navies could cooperate in areas where
we have common concerns, starting with areas such as disaster relief.
Interaction at the Service Chief level needs to be complemented with
increasing contacts throughout our militaries. Let us bear in mind that
the American military continues to be pre-eminent in the world; we
should not exaggerate the challenge we face from a modernizing China
and a modernizing military. We need China to be much more transparent
than has occurred thus far.
Question. What changes, if any, do you believe that DOD should make
in the quality or quantity of military-to-military relations with
China, and why?
Answer. President Bush has said that we welcome a China that is
``peaceful and prosperous.'' We have called upon China to be a
``responsible stakeholder'' in the international system. To that end,
we are increasing cooperation in some areas and need to address with
the Chinese candidly those areas where we do have differences. That
means engaging with the Chinese military as broadly as possible,
reaching out to establish relationships with the next generation of
People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers.
This is not a one-way exchange, however. The lack of transparency
is a real problem. China's defense budget is increasing by double-digit
percentages per year. At issue is not the amount of increase, but the
discrepancy between the official budget and what China actually does--
the lack of transparency--which drives uncertainty and questions of
Chinese intent. I hope the next generation of our military will have
considerably greater exposure to China; we need a cadre of Chinese-
language officers in all our services who are expert in this region.
Question. In your view, what can the United States do to increase
transparency on the part of the Chinese military?
Answer. We need to increase engagement between the PLA and the U.S.
military. We have other senior level dialogues with China--on
economics, for instance, where we have candid and even frank
discussions of issues where we have differences. We should be as open
with the Chinese as they are willing to be with us. I would like to
regularize military discussions with the Chinese, to allow us to build
trust over time. That is the best way to encourage transparency in
their activities.

COLOMBIA

Question. U.S. military personnel have been involved in the
training and equipping of Colombian military forces involved in
counter-narcoterrorism operations. U.S. military personnel, however, do
not participate in or accompany Colombian counter-drug or counter-
insurgency forces on field operations in Colombia.
What changes, if any, would you recommend for the role of the U.S.
military in Colombia?
Answer. If confirmed, I would make no immediate changes to the role
of the United States military in Columbia. I believe the most
appropriate role for the United States military is to continue to
address systemic deficiencies in the training and employment of the
Colombian armed forces.
Question. What is your assessment of the progress achieved by the
Colombian armed forces in confronting the threat of narcoterrorism?
Answer. I believe the Colombian armed forces have progressed well
over the last few years. United States training and equipment as well
as intelligence support and planning advice have contributed
significantly to this progress.
The Colombian Military's (COLMIL) Plan Patriota offensive now
called Plan Consolidation the largest in the Nation's history,
continues to pressure FARC in its base areas. The COLMIL has captured
key nodes and dominates mobility corridors, denying FARC access to
support and population. A number of FARC, National Liberation Army
(ELN), and United Self-Defense Groups of Columbia (AUC) high value
targets have been killed or captured. Colombian police are now present
in all 1,098 municipalities.
Colombia's 2007 defense budget is 5.8 percent of GDP as compared to
2006 when it was 5.4 percent of GDP. This represents a 12-percent
increase in defense expenditures, from $7.11 billion to $7.96 billion.
Since President Uribe took office, the Colombian Armed Forces have
recruited over 100,000 new members. Finally, over 30,000 members of the
illegal armed groups have demobilized.
The COLMIL has made significant progress fighting narco-terrorists,
and their rapid expansion has enabled the Government of Colombia to
reestablish control of its territory and restore government presence
and services.
While the COLMIL is more ``forward-leaning'' than ever, their
mettle will continue to be tested as the illegal armed groups,
primarily FARC, resort to new tactics in order to undermine the
government's democratic consolidation plan.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Question. U.S. relations with Russia are strained over a variety of
issues.
If confirmed do you believe that there are any opportunities to
improve relations through military to military programs, or are there
any other actions that you would recommend be taken?
Answer. Yes. I believe the United States and Russian militaries
have made progress in the area of military cooperation since 2003 when
Presidents Bush and Putin directed their respective military chiefs to
focus on creating the capability to conduct combined military
operations for future missions.
This progress has been steady and tangible and certainly sets a
positive tone for other constructive security cooperation with Russia.
This cooperation has been personally directed by the United States and
Russian Presidents through the Presidential Action Checklist and has
yielded results.
I have witnessed the effects of establishing a relationship with my
counterpart in the Russian Navy in my capacity as the Chief of Naval
Operations. As a result of personal engagement, relations between
Admiral Masorin, the Commander in Chief of the Russian Federation Navy,
and me have fostered an increasing level of trust and openness. Admiral
Masorin is scheduled to conduct a counterpart visit here in the U.S. in
August, which will be the first one since 1996. This type of engagement
has enabled open discussions on topics varying from new concepts like
the 1,000 Ship Navy to more sensitive topics including Black Sea
engagement. If confirmed, I will continue to develop this kind of
relationship with my counterpart in Russia as well as in other
countries.
Question. In your view, are there any specific programmatic areas,
such as missile defense, further nuclear reductions, or space programs,
where cooperation with Russia could be beneficial?
Answer. I believe it is essential that we continue to encourage the
Russian Government to cooperate in addressing the emerging threat to
both our Nations from the proliferation of ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction. This includes missile defense and
enhancing counterterrorism cooperation with Russia.
If nuclear reductions will continue in a predictable and
transparent fashion, the potential exists to build trust and confidence
in the management of our respective strategic nuclear infrastructures.
I believe space programs offer an opportunity of mutual benefit. If
confirmed, I will recommend that we continue to seek out joint programs
on which we can cooperate, given the advanced technological capacities
of both our Nations.

REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Question. The United States has made a commitment to reduce the
number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads.
Do you believe reductions in the total number of warheads in the
stockpile are also feasible? If your answer is yes, how should
capabilities and requirements be evaluated to identify which warheads
and delivery systems could be retired and dismantled?
Answer. Yes. I am confident that the total number of weapons in our
stockpile can be reduced by developing a new triad composed of
offensive strike system, active and passive defenses, and a responsive.
These actions will allow us to preserve a credible deterrent with which
to meet our national security requirements and our obligations to our
allies, and reduce the overall size of our stockpile.
If confirmed, I will work closely with OSD, the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA), the Services, and combatant commands to
evaluate our nuclear force structure options with a broad view toward
the integration of non-nuclear and nuclear strike forces, missile
defenses, and a responsive infrastructure to reduce our reliance on
nuclear weapons while mitigating the risks associated with drawing down
United States nuclear forces.

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Question. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the
importance of planning and training for post-conflict stability and
support operations. Increased emphasis has been placed on stability and
support operations in DOD planning and guidance in order to achieve the
goal of full integration across all DOD activities.
What is your assessment of the Department's current emphasis on
planning for post-conflict scenarios?
Answer. The Department is explicitly addressing planning for post-
conflict scenarios as part of an aggressive implementation of
Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support to
Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.
Question. What role should the Joint Staff play in implementing the
new directive regarding post-conflict planning and the conduct of
stability and support operations?
Answer. I believe the Joint Staff should assist OSD in supervising
the implementation of the new directive by the Services and combatant
commands.
During the conduct of stability operations, the Joint Staff should
assist in coordinating such things as logistics, coalition building and
sustainment, and the provision of forces.
If confirmed, I will direct the Joint Staff to provide me with
analyses and insights pertaining to the policy, strategy, and progress
of stability operations.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate relationship
between DOD and other Federal agencies in the planning and conduct of
stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?
Answer. In my view, and as stated in National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD)-44, it is critical that the Secretaries of State and
Defense integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans
with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.
I believe that honoring this general framework for fully
coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military
operations at all levels is necessary and appropriate.
Question. What lessons do you believe the Department has learned
from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe the central lesson is the importance of post-
conflict planning and post-conflict training. In order to effectively
plan and execute post-conflict operations we must understand their role
in post-conflict operations.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. In May of this year, President Bush issued a statement
urging the Senate to act favorably on U.S. accession to the Law of the
Sea Convention.
Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea?
Answer. Yes, I support United States' accession to the Law of the
Sea Convention, and I believe that joining the Convention will
strengthen our military's ability to conduct operations.
Question. How would you answer the critics of the Convention who
assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the
United States?
Answer. I believe that accession to the Law of the Sea Convention
is in national security interest of our Nation. The basic tenets of the
Law of the Sea Convention are clear and the United States Armed Forces
reap many benefits from its provisions. From the right of unimpeded
transit passage through straits used for international navigation, to
reaffirming the sovereign immunity of our warships, providing a
framework for countering excessive claims of other States, and
preserving the right to conduct military activities in exclusive
economic zones, the Convention provides the stable and predictable
legal regime we need to conduct our operations today and in the future.
The ability of United States military forces to operate freely on,
over and above the vast military maneuver space of the oceans is
critical to our national security interests, the military in general,
and the Navy in particular. Your Navy's--and your military's--ability
to operate freely across the vast domain of the world's oceans in peace
and in war make possible the unfettered projection of American
influence and power. The military basis for support for the Law of the
Sea Convention is broad because it codifies fundamental benefits
important to our operating forces as they train and fight:

It codifies essential navigational freedoms through
key international straits and archipelagoes, in the exclusive
economic zone, and on the high seas;
It supports the operational maneuver space for combat
and other operations of our warships and aircraft; and
It enhances our own maritime interests in our
territorial sea, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone.

These provisions and others are important, and it is preferable for
the United States to be a party to the Convention that codifies the
freedoms of navigation and over flight needed to support United States
military operations. Likewise, it is beneficial to have a seat at the
table to shape future developments of the Law of the Sea Convention.
Amendments made to the Convention in the 1990s satisfied many of the
concerns that opponents have expressed.
Since 1983, the United States Navy has conducted its activities in
accordance with President Reagan's Statement on United States Oceans
Policy, operating consistent with the Convention's provisions on
navigational freedoms. If the United States becomes a party to the Law
of the Sea Convention, we would continue to operate as we have since
1983, and would be recognized for our leadership role in law of the sea
matters. Joining the Law of the Sea Convention will have no adverse
effect on the President's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) or on
United States intelligence gathering activities. Rather, joining the
Convention is another important step in prosecuting and ultimately
prevailing in the global war on terrorism.

TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Question. The Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the
United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Joint Staff should take to
ensure the humane treatment of detainees in DOD custody and to ensure
that such detainees are not subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment?
Answer. DOD has policies in place to require compliance with U.S.
law concerning humane treatment of detainees in DOD custody. In a July
7, 2006, memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense required all
components of the DOD to treat detainees in accordance with Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The 2006 DOD Directive (2310.01E)
governing the Department's Detainee Program requires that all persons
subject to the Directive to apply, at a minimum, the standards of
Common Article 3 to detainees in the custody of the DOD. The Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 also prohibits the use of any interrogation
technique not listed in the Army Field Manual on Intelligence
Interrogation with any person in the custody of DOD. That manual has
been revised, it is public, and it binds the operations of DOD.
I believe the Joint Staff should work to ensure all United States
military personnel engaged in detention operations comply with United
States domestic law, the Law of War, and our international treaty
obligations including the Prohibition on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

FUTURE OF NATO

Question. Over the past several years, NATO has experienced great
changes. NATO has enlarged with the addition of seven new members from
Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and has taken on an ambitious
stabilization mission in Afghanistan, as well as a training mission in
Iraq.
In your view, what are the greatest opportunities and challenges
that you foresee for NATO over the next 5 years?
Answer. In my view, NATO has proven its relevance by its ability to
transform from its Cold War posture to meet the out-of-area challenges
of the 21st century. NATO's greatest opportunities--and challenges--lay
in its ability to continue to transform in the coming years.
Most critically, NATO must demonstrate that it can deliver the
results needed in Afghanistan. NATO's military forces cannot alone
provide the long-term solution, but must play a role together with
other actors in the international community.
In the area of military capabilities, NATO and Allied nations must
continue to focus on expeditionary capacity. Enlargement of NATO and
expanding Alliance relationships with partner nations of all types will
present NATO with challenges and opportunities. Shaping how NATO
engages with partners, from the Mediterranean Dialogue to global
partnership initiatives, will in turn set the stage for future Alliance
initiatives critical to Allied security.
These opportunities will not come cheaply--which is perhaps one of
the greatest challenges facing the Alliance. Most Allies spend little
on defense. Transforming national militaries while also contributing
them to ongoing Alliance operations far from home is an expensive
prospect, but one that is absolutely critical to the future success of
NATO.
Question. Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the
next 5 years?
Answer. Accession to NATO is a political question for the 26 NATO
Allies.
Question. What progress are the NATO member nations, particularly
the new member nations, making with respect to transforming their
militaries, acquiring advanced capabilities, and enhancing their
interoperability with the U.S. and other NATO member nations?
Answer. Most Allies (due to limited resources made available to
defense ministries) are forced to make critical choices between
spending money on transforming their militaries or on contributing to
Alliance operations within existing capabilities.
Many Allies, however, have been able to strike a delicate balance
between these two choices, but with reduced effectiveness. The cost is
that national transformational processes are delayed, or have key
elements canceled, while contributions to operations are smaller, or
less capable, than needed.
The bottom line is that all but a few Allies meet the agreed-upon 2
percent of GDP allocated for defense spending--if this target was met,
across the board, almost all transformational and operation
requirements could be met.
Question. What steps could NATO take, in your view, to reduce
tensions with Russia?
Answer. I believe the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) can play a vital
role in mitigating tensions with Russia by addressing key strategic
issues, to include:

NATO and Russian perceptions of the ballistic missile
threat from the Middle East;
Cooperation in regional stabilization and
reconstruction efforts (e.g., in Iraq and Afghanistan);
Managing Russia's reaction to possible NATO
enlargement, as well as Russian suspicions about United States
and NATO activities in Europe and Central Asia; and
Determining how to best facilitate Russia's
fulfillment of its ``Istanbul Commitments'' in withdrawing
military forces from Moldova and Georgia.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. Section 234 of the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year
2005 requires operationally realistic testing of each block of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
Do you believe that in order to perform its intended function
successfully, the BMDS, including each of its elements, needs to be
operationally effective?
Answer. Yes. I believe the United States has a viable initial
operational capability and we are maturing the system toward a full
operational capability. Thorough testing is critical to operational
effectiveness, and, if confirmed, I will continue my commitment to
testing as the BMDS evolves.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should deploy
missile defense systems without regard to whether they are
operationally effective?
Answer. In view of the threats we face, today and will face in the
future, I believe the United States should deploy components of the
BMDS as soon as they become available even as we improve their
operational effectiveness. Due to our continuing successes with BMDS, I
remain confident in our initial operational capability and its
continued maturation.
Question. Do you believe that operationally realistic testing is
necessary to demonstrate and determine the operational capabilities and
limits of the BMDS, and to improve its operational capability?
Answer. Yes. I believe that operationally realistic testing is
necessary to demonstrate and determine the operational capabilities and
limits of the BMDS, and to improve its operational capability.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
ensure that the BMDS, and each of its elements, undergoes operationally
realistic testing?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the OSD, the Missile Defense
Agency, the military Services, and the combatant commands to ensure
operationally realistic testing is accomplished.
Question. The military is supposed to play an important role in
helping to determine requirements for our military capabilities, and to
help determine the capabilities that will meet the needs of the
combatant commanders for their operational plans.
What do you believe should be the role of the military (as the
warfighter) in helping to determine the requirements and force
structure needs for our ballistic missile defense forces, including
such elements as JCS, the combatant commands, the Joint Force Component
Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and the military departments?
Answer. I believe the military has a central role in helping to
determine the requirements and force structure needs of our ballistic
missile defense forces. The JCS provide military advice and oversight
of requirements and force structure. The combatant commands integrate
ballistic missile defense capabilities into operational plans and help
formulate requirements.
The Joint Force Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense
plans, integrates, coordinates, and conducts ballistic missile defense
operations for United States Strategic Command. The military Services
and the Missile Defense Agency provide resources, support, and
leadership to all elements of the BMDS.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to help ensure
that U.S. missile defense forces and capabilities meet the needs and
operational plans of the combatant commanders?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with OSD, the Missile Defense
Agency, and United States Strategic Command as they continue to fully
collaborate with the military Services and all combatant commands to
ensure the needs of the warfighter are met, to include training,
testing, wargaming, and conducting realistic exercises and simulations,
to improve the capability and reliability of the missile defense
system.
Question. Section 223 of the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007
establishes that ``it is the policy of the United States that the DOD
accord a priority within the missile defense program to the
development, testing, fielding, and improvement of effective near-term
missile defense capabilities, including the ground-based midcourse
defense system, the Aegis BMDS, the Patriot PAC-3 system, the Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense system, and the sensors necessary to support
such systems.''
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the
Department complies with this policy requirement in its development and
acquisition of missile defense capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with OSD, the Missile Defense
Agency, the military Services, and the combatant commands to ensure the
development, testing, acquisition, fielding, and improvement of
effective near-term missile defense capabilities to meet the threats
that we face today and will continue to face in the future.

ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role of the
Chairman or the Vice Chairman of JCS in the requirements determination,
resource allocation, or acquisition management processes?
Answer. No. I believe the role of the Chairman and the Vice
Chairman of JCS in the requirements determination, resource allocation
and acquisition management process is very effective. The processes are
improving and are meeting future joint warfighting needs. If confirmed,
I will focus on responsiveness to immediate and near-term joint
warfighting needs by working closely with the Services in executing the
joint urgent operational needs processes.
I also view the Joint Requirements Oversight Council initiatives
that provide enhanced assessments of proposed capabilities and weapon
systems by considering not only the Key Performance Parameters, but
also technology, cost, and schedule risks, increased emphasis on
affordability, and the ``watch list'' to monitor program cost baselines
as very likely to achieve improvement in acquisition management and
fielding capability quicker.
While I believe the Chairman and Vice Chairman roles are adequate,
the Service Chiefs need to have more authority and control in
acquisitions, by being placed in the acquisition chain-of-command.

DEFENSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

Question. Our investment in defense science and technology (S&T)
programs is designed to support defense transformation goals and
objectives and to ensure that warfighters of today and tomorrow have
superior and affordable technology to support their missions and to
give them revolutionary war-winning capabilities.
Do you believe there is adequate investment in innovative defense
science to develop the capabilities warfighters will need in 2020?
Answer. Yes. The fiscal year 2008 S&T budget ($10.7 billion)
represents approximately 2.3 percent of the Department's top line for
fiscal year 2008 and is planned to increase by 8.8 percent during
fiscal years 2008-2013.
Question. Do you believe current Defense S&T investment is
appropriately balanced between near-term and long-term needs?
Answer. Yes. The fiscal year 2008 S&T budget is well balanced, with
14 percent obligated for Basic Research, 40 percent for applied
research, and 46 percent for applied technology development. This
balance supports the Department's strategy to fulfill both near- and
long-term S&T needs. The various S&T enterprises within the Department
continue to deliver near-term solutions to the warfighter while
maintaining a long-term perspective to research and develop
capabilities for the future.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. The DOD efforts to quickly transition technologies to the
warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years.
Challenges remain to institutionalizing the transition of new
technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems
and platforms.
What are your views on the success of the Department's technology
transition programs in spiraling emerging technologies into use to
confront evolving threats and to meet warfighter needs?
Answer. I would contend that the pace of globalization has
accelerated the speed of war to the point that by fixating on today's
threat, we run the risk of growing myopic and ineffective. To outpace
the diverse and uncertain challenges we face now and in the future, we
need an acquisition system capable of transitioning new technologies
into existing programs to answer warfighter needs. While steps have
been taken to meet these challenges, clearly more must be done. Our
warfighters deserve this capability to confront evolving threats. If
confirmed, I will ensure Service and agency leadership continue to
embrace early transition planning and demonstrate methods for
transitioning technology.
Question. What more can be done to transition critical technologies
quickly to warfighters?
Answer. The Technology Transition Council has been re-engineered to
execute a federated approach to coordinating transition efforts across
the enterprise. If confirmed, I will continue to foster an environment
of creative thinking needed to keep pace with the speed of war,
delivering critical technologies to the warfighter.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor

MILITARY IN IRAQ

1. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, the debate over the global war on
terror has led a few current military leaders to agree that there is no
military solution for the war in Iraq. Do you agree with this
statement?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, there is no purely military solution in Iraq.
The enormous complexity, historic differences, competing views of the
future Iraq, and lack of trust in new institutions will require long-
term political and social solutions. In the near-term, political
progress requires demonstrated commitment to national reconciliation in
order to address:

(1) de-Baathification and lack of proportional Sunni
representation in the Government, Army, and police;
(2) Equitable distribution of oil revenue; and
(3) Amnesty.

2. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, what recommendation would you
make to the President and Secretary of Defense if General Patraeus'
September report indicates no change in the status of combat operations
in Iraq?
Admiral Mullen. Our approach must be consistent with enduring
United States vital and regional interests. We must commit to a long-
term security relationship with Iraq that facilitates political
reconciliation, supports development of a stable Iraq, and is directly
tied to our enduring long-term interests in the region.
We must work through the interagency and regional partners to
expand Iraqi governance and economic capacity. This effort must be
centered on developing effective incentives and disincentives (and
associated measures of effectiveness) to influence the Government of
Iraq (GOI), Iraqi factions/leaders, regional states, as well as Syria
and Iran.
We must continue our long-term fight against al Qaeda, contain the
sectarian conflict within the borders of Iraq, and prevent large scale
civil war and the resultant humanitarian crisis.

REFUGEES IN IRAQ

3. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, since 2003 approximately 2
million Iraqis have fled the country and 900,000 have been internally
displaced. With another 90,000 Iraqis fleeing every month, what
responsibility does the U.S. military have to ensure a secure
reintegration of refugees returning to Iraq following a troop
withdrawal?
Admiral Mullen. I believe the United States should develop a long-
term relationship with Iraq, beyond our current operations. While the
reintegration of Iraqi refugees into their society is the
responsibility of the GOI, the continued support and involvement of the
U.S., working in conjunction with the international community, is
important to the reintegration of Iraqi refugees
The U.S. and coalition can best support the GOI and their
reintegration efforts by working together to achieve a level of
security prior to withdrawal that would facilitate refugee
reintegration and avoid a larger humanitarian crisis. To this end, U.S.
and coalition forces should conduct contingency planning to address a
humanitarian crisis should one occur.
Given the sectarian divide within the Iraqi society, the GOIs
ability to provide security and essential services to the people of
Iraq is the key precursor to a successful reintegration effort.

4. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, how can we ever have a stable
Iraq with this much flux across the border?
Admiral Mullen. Iraq's borders are a tough issue, and we need to
address securing the Iraq borders very deliberately, in a measured
manner, while fully understanding the complex challenges in doing so.
That said, I believe Baghdad is the center of gravity and that reducing
the violence there is an essential enabler. As violence is contained,
there are two follow-on conditions required to stabilize the situation
and facilitate an Iraqi political solution:

The GOI, with coalition support, must make progress toward
reconciliation, eliminating the insurgency, decrease the levels
of sectarian, and intra-Shia violence, and set conditions for
the transfer of responsibility to the GOI and ISF.
We must achieve unity of effort within the U.S. Government
(interagency), among coalition partners, and between the
coalition and Iraqi Government.

Progress toward reconciliation and associated reductions in
sectarian and intra-Shia violence is vital; failure to achieve tangible
progress toward reconciliation requires a strategic reassessment.

5. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, this committee recently approved
the nomination of LTG Douglas Lute, USA, to the position of Assistant
to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and
Afghanistan. While the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joints Chiefs
of Staff also act as advisors to the President, what relationship do
you foresee having with General Lute and how does he fit into the
military chain of command?
Admiral Mullen. I foresee a collaborative, supportive working
relationship with General Lute. In response to your second question,
General Lute is not in the military chain of command. By title 10 (10
U.S.C. 151) the Chairman is the ``principle military advisor to the
President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense.''

NAVY OPERATIONS

6. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, do you believe the Navy's current
Helicopter Master Plan, dated 1998, should be updated to address the
realities of the global war on terror?
Admiral Mullen. The Navy's 2002 helicopter concept of operations
(CONOPs) combines the acquisition efficiencies of the 1998 Helicopter
Master Plan, which reduces the number of helicopter types operated by
the Navy from seven to two, with operational efficiencies achieved
through the reorganization of squadrons to align them with the
broadened warfighting requirements of Navy Carrier Strike Groups and
Expeditionary Forces. The 2002 helicopter CONOPs was updated this year
with a 2007 Navy Helicopter Force Analysis Study, which re-examined
helicopter support for Sea Power 21 concepts including the Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS) and global war on terrorism missions. This analysis
study is currently under the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OPNAV) review and will be incorporated in the next Helicopter Master
Plan.

7. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, how can the Navy operate with
pre-September 11 master plan in a post-September 11 operational
environment?
Admiral Mullen. The Navy and Marine Corps have changed their
operating philosophy to provide better defense in a post-September 11
operational environment. The Navy published two versions of the Naval
Operations Concept (NOC), both of which describe how the Navy/Marine
Corps team will contribute to the defense of our Nation. The first
edition of this document was signed in 2002 and entitled ``Naval
Operating Concept for Joint Operations.'' The current version is the
NOC 2006, and it refines and expands upon the 2002 version to deal with
the dynamic post-September 11 security environment.
The NOC is principally guided by national strategy as articulated
in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and
National Strategy for Maritime Security. Specifically, this concept
calls for more widely distributed forces to provide increased forward
presence, security cooperation with an expanding set of international
partners, preemption of nontraditional threats, and global response to
crises in regions around the world where access might be difficult.
The NOC espouses an approach for organizing and employing Navy and
Marine Corps capabilities to meet the strategic challenges of the
global war on terrorism. It seeks to make best use of the resources we
have today to counter the existing threats in our current strategic
environment. In short, the NOC is about how we are going to use what we
have today differently to best fight and win the war on terror,
positively participate in the global maritime community, yet remain
prepared to counter or defeat future threats against the United States,
be they traditional, irregular, disruptive, or catastrophic.
______

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN
NARROWBAND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

8. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, in his April 19, 2007, written
testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Vice Admiral James McArthur, USN, Commander
of the Naval Network Warfare Command, noted the shortage of narrowband
tactical satellite communications. To satisfy the increasing demand for
tactical satellite communications, the Navy is developing a fleet of
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellites. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has noted, however, that ``MUOS development
has become time-critical due to the failures of two ultra high
frequency (UHF) follow-on satellites. . . In June 2008, communications
capabilities are expected to drop below those required, and remain so
until the first MUOS satellite is available for operations in 2010.''
Is the Department of Defense (DOD) examining options for addressing
this communications capability gap?
Admiral Mullen. DOD has explored options to mitigate the UHF
availability gap until full fielding of MUOS. Options under
consideration include Integrated Waveform (IW), Leased Commercial
Satellite Communications, and possible early fielding of MUOS capable
terminals. The Department is currently fielding IW in two phases, with
Phase I to be completed in 2008 and Phase II projected for completion
in 2009. IW will provide higher channel throughput, better voice
quality, capability to support more networks per channel (up to 14
versus today's 1), enhanced flexibility to best configure a channel to
support the mission, and greater ease of use and operation.

9. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, does the Department believe MUOS
will address the full tactical satellite communications needs of the
Services after the constellation is fully operational? Or will
bandwidth need continue to outpace capacity?
Admiral Mullen. MUOS will provide a 10-fold increase in capacity
over UHF follow-on, providing UHF mobile communications for our
tactical users. MUOS will support almost 2,000 simultaneous worldwide
accesses to meet our bandwidth requirements. Understanding that
bandwidth need will always outpace available capacity, DOD is moving
forward with fielding MUOS, implementing IW, and pursuing the lease of
commercial satellite communications to minimize the disparity between
bandwidth needs and available capacity.

10. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, what are Department plans for
mitigating the narrowband satellite communications gap in the near- and
long-term?
Admiral Mullen. To meet near-term requirements, the Department is
implementing IW; pursuing Leased Commercial Satellite Communications;
and early fielding of the MUOS capable terminals to mitigate the
narrowband satellite communications gap until MUOS is fully
operational. For the long-term, the Department is in the preliminary
stages of determining the appropriate follow-on system for MUOS. The
MUOS constellation consists of four satellites and one spare. Satellite
design life is 10 years and projected satellite life span is up to 14
years.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

11. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, you mention in several
places in response to your advance policy questions that one of your
transformation goals is for DOD to address security challenges in
cooperation with other interagency members. Several people have
commented that this interagency cooperation is currently lacking,
particularly in U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. What are some
specific areas in which you would like to see interagency cooperation
improve, and what will you do as Chairman to help facilitate this
cooperation?
Admiral Mullen. I believe more attention is required in the
following areas:

Reform efforts that focus on developing the capability to
prepare for, plan, and execute interagency approaches to
national and homeland security challenges.
Ongoing efforts within the U.S. Government to develop
strategic planning and exercise capabilities, as well as
establishing protocols to achieve unity of effort between DOD,
the National Guard, and interagency partners in responding to
contingencies in the homeland.
Development of domestic and global contingency plans to
address the pandemic environment for synchronizing United
States military response both within DOD and with our
interagency partners.

As Chairman, I will facilitate this cooperation by providing the
appropriate level of military support and leadership to the interagency
effort.

12. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, regarding Iraq, what are
some specific ways that you believe interagency cooperation could
expand the economic and governance capacity of the Iraqis?
Admiral Mullen. We are already seeing successes at a local level in
our Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, where interagency
personnel from the State Department, U.S. Agency for International
Development, and U.S. Department of Agriculture are being integrated
into these teams embedded with Brigade Combat Teams. They are helping
improve provincial budget execution, working with provincial councils,
and engaging with former enemy combatants to broker bottom-up
reconciliation. We need to continue this effort.
At a national level, we have had less success. Staff at Embassy
Baghdad and Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) are working hard with the
GOI to improve the rule of law, execute their capital budget, and
protect their critical infrastructure. Unfortunately, provisions of
essential services have only improved slightly in many areas. To help
improve these efforts, embedded advisors are now being placed inside
key ministries: 26 advisors are in place, with another 20 embedded
advisors on their way. The Iraq Transition Assistance Office has 94
advisors dedicated to Iraqi ministries. In addition to these dedicated
personnel, other officials, such as the Treasury Attache's Office,
Embassy's Economic Section, and the joint MNF-I/Embassy Energy Fusion
Cell have been tasked to develop the capacity of Iraqi ministries. This
is a work in progress, but remains a very high priority.

RE-BASING INITIATIVES

13. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, there has been a good deal
of skepticism regarding the Pentagon's planning for the ``perfect
storm'' caused by the culmination of rebasing initiatives. The
implementation of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round,
which includes the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy
initiative to restation 70,000 troops and their families from Europe
and Korea to the U.S., Joint Basing initiatives, the Army and Marines'
efforts to grow the force, and the redeployment of troops from Iraq and
Afghanistan will all require military construction efforts that haven't
been seen since World War II. Is DOD on track in its planning for
rebasing?
Admiral Mullen. The Department is on track in its planning for
rebasing, even considering restationing 70,000 troops and their
families from Europe and Korea to the United States, Joint Basing
initiatives, the Army's and Marine's efforts to grow the force, and the
redeployment of troops from Iraq. All BRAC 2005 recommendations are
currently fully funded and on track to be implemented by the statutory
deadline of 15 September 2011. Guidance has been published to update
business plans based on execution realities, and these updates will
continue through implementation. The Department continues planning for
basing implications of the force growth in the continental United
States and any potential timing implications for implementation of
Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy decisions.

14. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, what is the status of these
efforts, and what do you see as the final outcome from the completion
of these initiatives in terms of military quality-of-life?
Admiral Mullen. The rebasing initiatives are on track. The scope of
restationing 70,000 troops and their families from Europe and Korea,
Joint Basing, growing the force, and the redeployment of troops from
Iraq and Afghanistan is momentous. However, unit deployments and
soldier, sailor, airman, marine, and family relocations are carefully
choreographed. Throughout these rebasing initiatives, we have done our
best to reduce the impact on the force.
The Department has included, as an integral component, a number of
important quality-of-life facilities in our construction projects over
the next 3 fiscal years. As these projects are accomplished, we see
significant improvement in the numbers and types of quality facilities,
which provide places for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
civilians and their families to work, live, and train. Our people
continue to make great sacrifices in fighting the global war on
terrorism and our Nation owes them a debt of gratitude. We therefore
see it as absolutely necessary to ensure we make every effort to match
their quality of life with the quality of service they provide our
Nation.

15. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, is the plan to draw down
troops in Europe outdated, given the ongoing war in Iraq and other
world developments?
Admiral Mullen. The current plan to draw down troops in Europe is
under review, based on Commander, U.S. European Command's (EUCOM)
concerns about meeting commitments within his area of responsibility.
The Joint Staff, OSD, EUCOM, and headquarters, U.S. Army are currently
reviewing U.S. troop strength in Europe. This review is based on
concerns about changes that have taken place worldwide since the 2004
Report to Congress on ``Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture.''
The recommendations from this review are expected by late September
2007.

HELICOPTERS

16. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, given the serious shortfall
across the Services in vertical lift assets, what is your plan as
Chairman to make certain we have the number and type of helicopters we
need to fight the war on terror and ensure the safety of our
warfighter? Do you consider this one of your top priorities?
Admiral Mullen. The Services have identified their vertical lift
requirements and our requirements, acquisition, and programming
processes are hard at work acquiring and replacing vertical lift
capability; searching for new, innovative means to provide the vital
logistical and attack capabilities afforded by vertical lift assets.
All vertical lift requirements in the Services are funded with the
exception of the Air Force's CSAR-X which is involved in a GAO protest.
The Air Force is currently meeting this requirement with the H-60H.
Once the GAO protest is resolved, the Air Force will continue with
procuring CSAR-X.
I believe a comprehensive plan to identify, procure, and field
future vertical lift assets is critical to fight the war on terror and
ensure the safety of our warfighters.

17. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, last year, the Navy
completed an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) that identified the need
for a new medium lift helicopter to supplement the capability of the H-
60. I do not believe there has been any follow through on meeting this
requirement. Where do we stand on this procurement, and what steps have
been taken to fulfill the need identified by the AOA?
Admiral Mullen. The Airborne Resupply/Logistics for the Sea Base
AOA is currently being staffed for final Navy approval. The AOA
addresses the heavy lift, medium range vertical lift requirement for
the Sea Base, in anticipation of retiring the MH-53E, which provides
heavy and medium lift support. Like the MH-53E, the material solution
for a future heavy lift requirement could suffice for the medium lift
requirement. The Navy is conducting additional vertical heavy lift
requirements analysis and developing a vertical heavy lift CONOPs.
Making a procurement decision with regard to vertical medium lift would
be premature in advance of these competing initiatives.

18. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, I am aware that the Navy's
H-60 Sierra is having tremendous difficulty meeting the basic
performance parameters for Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM)
mission--it's primary mission in conjunction with the LCS platform. Has
the Navy done an assessment of other available medium lift helicopters
to determine if there is an alternative to the H-60S that can meet the
AMCM mission requirements at an equal or similar cost per flight hour?
If not, when will such an analysis occur?
Admiral Mullen. The H-60 Sierra is in the developmental test phase
and is meeting performance characteristics for assigned missions.
Significant effort is ongoing to integrate a suite of AMCM systems onto
the MH-60S helicopter. The Navy continues to make progress in this
effort, with each of the five AMCM systems in various stages of
development. Contractor and developmental test evaluations for the MH-
60S/AQS-20A Organic AMCM mine hunting sonar have been successful; the
system is scheduled to commence operational test in October. The
process of integrating the MH-60S Airborne Mine Neutralization System
is ahead of schedule. Appropriate progress is being made on the
remaining three systems--Airborne Laser Mine Detection System, Organic
Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep, and Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance
System. The Navy does not have any plans to conduct analysis of other
available medium-lift helicopters as an alternative to the current MH-
60S/AMCM solution.

19. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, based on these shortfalls,
do you believe the Navy's current Helicopter Master Plan, dated 1998,
should be updated to address the realities of the global war on terror?
Admiral Mullen. Yes. The Navy's 2002 Helicopter CONOPs combines the
acquisition efficiencies of the 1998 Helicopter Master Plan, which
reduces the number of helicopter types operated by the Navy from seven
to two, with operational efficiencies achieved through the
reorganization of squadrons to align them with the broadened
warfighting requirements of Navy Carrier Strike Groups and
Expeditionary Forces. The 2002 Helicopter CONOPs was updated this year
with a 2007 Navy Helicopter Force Analysis Study, which re-examined
helicopter support for Sea Power 21 concepts including the LCS and
global war on terrorism missions. This analysis study is currently
under OPNAV review and will be incorporated in the next Helicopter
Master Plan.
______

[The nomination reference of ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 28, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment to the grade indicated while
assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
U.S.C., sections 152 and 601:

To be Admiral

ADM Michael G. Mullen, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Transcript of Naval Service for ADM Michael Glenn Mullen, USN

04 Oct. 1946.............................. Born in Los Angeles, CA
05 June 1968.............................. Ensign
05 June 1969.............................. Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 July 1971.............................. Lieutenant
01 Oct. 1977.............................. Lieutenant Commander
01 June 1983.............................. Commander
01 Sep. 1989.............................. Captain
01 Apr. 1996.............................. Rear Admiral (lower half)
05 Mar. 1998.............................. Designated Rear Admiral
while serving in billets
commensurate with that
grade
01 Oct. 1998.............................. Rear Admiral
21 Sep. 2000.............................. Designated Vice Admiral
while serving in billets
commensurate with that
grade
01 Nov. 2000.............................. Vice Admiral
28 Aug. 2003.............................. Admiral, Service continuous
to date

Assignments and duties:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fleet Training Center, San Diego, CA (DUINS).... June 1968 Aug. 1968
Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare School, San Diego, Aug. 1968 Sep. 1968
CA (DUINS).....................................
U.S.S. Collett (DD 730) (ASW Officer)........... Sep. 1968 June 1970
Naval Destroyer School, Newport, RI (DUINS)..... June 1970 Feb. 1971
Nuclear Weapons Training Group, Atlantic, Feb. 1971 Feb. 1971
Norfolk, VA (DUINS)............................
U.S.S. Blandy (DD 943) (Weapons/Operations Feb. 1971 Nov. 1972
Officer).......................................
Fleet Training Center, Norfolk, VA (DUINS)...... Nov. 1972 Jan. 1973
Staff, Commander Service Force, U.S. Atlantic Jan. 1973 Jan. 1973
Fleet (DUINS)..................................
CO, U.S.S. Noxubee (AOG 56)..................... Jan. 1973 July 1975
U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD (Company July 1975 May 1978
Officer/Executive Assistant to Commandant).....
Ship Material Readiness Group, Idaho Falls, ID May 1978 Oct. 1978
(DUINS)........................................
U.S.S. Fox (CG 33) (Engineering Officer)........ Oct. 1978 Apr. 1981
Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Apr. 1981 July 1981
Newport, RI (DUINS)............................
XO, U.S.S. Sterett (CG 31)...................... July 1981 Jan. 1983
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (DUINS). Jan. 1983 Mar. 1985
Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Apr. 1985 May 1985
Newport, RI (DUINS)............................
CO, U.S.S. Goldsborough (DDG 20)................ June 1985 Oct. 1987
Naval War College, Newport, RI (DUINS).......... Oct. 1987 Dec. 1987
Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Dec. 1987 Sep. 1989
Newport, RI (Director Surface Warfare Division
Officer Course)................................
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, Sep. 1989 Aug. 1991
DC (Military Staff Assistant to Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation)...............
Harvard University Advanced Management Program.. Aug. 1991 Nov. 1991
Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Nov. 1991 Nov. 1991
Newport, RI (DUINS)............................
Tactical Training Group Atlantic (DUINS)........ Nov. 1991 Dec. 1991
COMNAVSURFLANT (DUINS).......................... Dec. 1991 Jan. 1992
AEGIS Training Center, Dahlgren, VA (DUINS)..... Feb. 1992 Apr. 1992
CO, U.S.S. Yorktown (CG 48)..................... Apr. 1992 Jan. 1994
Bureau of Naval Personnel (Director, Surface Feb. 1994 Aug. 1995
Officer Distribution Division) (PERS-41).......
Office of CNO (Director, Surface Warfare Plans/ Aug. 1995 May 1996
Programs/Requirements Division, N863)..........
Office of CNO (Deputy Director, Surface Warfare May 1996 July 1996
Division, N86B)................................
Tactical Training Group Atlantic (DUINS)........ July 1996 Aug. 1996
Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO.......... Aug. 1996 May 1998
Office of CNO (Director, Surface Warfare May 1998 Oct. 2000
Division) (N86)................................
Commander, Second Fleet/Commander, Striking Oct. 2000 Aug. 2001
Fleet Atlantic.................................
Office of CNO (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Aug. 2001 Aug. 2003
for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments)
(N8)...........................................
Vice Chief of Naval Operations.................. Aug. 2003 Oct. 2004
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe/Commander, Oct. 2004 May 2005
Joint Forces, Naples...........................
Perspective Chief of Naval Operations........... May 2005 July 2005
Chief of Naval Operations....................... July 2005 To date
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Medals and awards:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal with one Gold Star
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with one Silver Star
Meritorious Service Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal
Navy Unit Commendation
Meritorious Unit Commendation
Navy ``E'' Ribbon with Wreath
Navy Expeditionary Medal
National Defense Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Vietnam Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with three Bronze Stars
Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon with one Bronze Star
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross Unit Citation with Bronze Palm
Republic of Vietnam Civil Actions Unit Citation with Bronze Palm
NATO Medal

Foreign awards:
Italian Defense General Staff Joint Forces Medal of Honor

Special qualifications:
BS (Naval Science) U.S. Naval Academy, 1968
MS (Operations Research) Naval Postgraduate School, 1985
Language Qualifications: Italian (Knowledge)

Personal data:
Wife: Deborah Morgan of Sherman Oaks, CA
Children: John Stewart Mullen (Son), Born: 30 April 1979; and
Michael Edward Mullen (Son), Born: 29 December 1980.

Summary of joint duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Sep. 1989-Aug. 1991..... CAPT
Washington, DC (Military Staff
Assistant for U.S. Navy Programs to
the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation).
Commander, Second Fleet/Commander, Oct. 2000-Aug. 2001..... VADM
Striking Fleet Atlantic.
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe/ Oct. 2004-May 2005...... ADM
Commander, Joint Forces, Naples.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM Michael G.
Mullen, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Michael Glenn Mullen.

2. Position to which nominated:
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Date of nomination:
28 June 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
October 4, 1946; Hollywood, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Deborah Morgan Mullen.

7. Names and ages of children:
LT John Stewart Mullen, USN, 28; LT Michael Edward Mullen, USN, 26.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Navy Marine Corps Relief Society, Board Member.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
National Order of the Legion of Honor (France) awarded on May 12,
2007.
Grand Officer of the Order of the Italian Republic (Italy) awarded
on April 14, 2007.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.

______

Signature and Date

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
M.G. Mullen, Admiral, USN.
This 29th day of June, 2007.

[The nomination of ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on August 3, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. James E. Cartwright,
USMC, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. You previously have answered the committee's policy
questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in
connection with your nomination to be Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM).
Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of
these reforms changed since you testified to the committee at your most
recent confirmation hearing for the position of Commander, U.S.
STRATCOM?
Answer. No. Overall, the Goldwater-Nichols reforms have clearly
strengthened the warfighting and operational capabilities of our
combatant commands (COCOMs) and our Nation. The importance of these
reforms has not diminished with time.
Question. Do you foresee the need for modifications of Goldwater-
Nichols in light of the changing environment? If so, what areas do you
believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?
Answer. I do not believe that changes to Goldwater-Nichols are
necessary at this time. However, I am aware of ongoing reviews. If
confirmed, I will study these efforts and provide my best military
advice.

DUTIES

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff as set forth in section 154 of title 10, U.S.C., and in
regulations of the Department of Defense (DOD) pertaining to functions
of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. None at this time.
Question. Based on your experience as Commander, U.S. STRATCOM,
what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in chapter 6 of
title 10, U.S.C., as it pertains to the powers and duties of combatant
commanders?
Answer. None at this time.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. Thirty-six years of military service, to include diverse
operational and staff assignments, have given me the background and
experience to serve as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
As the Joint Staff Director Force Structure, Resources and Assessment,
I evaluated major acquisition programs and budgets and gained
invaluable insight into the capability requirements development
process. As Commander, U.S. STRATCOM, I have been responsible for the
global command and control of United States strategic forces and worked
to deliver a broad range of strategic capabilities and options to the
President, Secretary of Defense, and geographic combatant commanders.
My years of operational and strategic experience have given me the
skills required to look to the future and assess the mix of
capabilities to prevail as we move into the future as a Nation.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following
officials:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman
performs the duties prescribed for him and other such duties as may be
prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of
Defense.
Additionally, in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the
Vice Chairman acts as the Chairman and performs the duties of the
Chairman until a successor is appointed or until the absence or
disability ceases. These duties include serving as the principal
military adviser to the President, the National Security Council and
the Secretary of Defense.
As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman may
submit advice or opinions to the Chairman in disagreement with, or in
addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the
National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman
submits such opinion or advice at the same time he delivers his own.
The Vice Chairman, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may
also individually or collectively, in his capacity as a military
adviser, provide the Secretary of Defense advice upon the Secretary's
request.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of
Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act.
As such, the relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy
Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary. In addition, the Vice
Chairman co-chairs the Deputies Advisory Working Group with the Deputy
Secretary of Defense to work key resource and management issues for
DOD.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as
a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as
prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of
Defense. when there is a vacancy in the office by the Chairman, or
during the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman
acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a
successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If
confirmed, I look forward to building a close and effective working
relationship with the Chairman.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional
areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and
oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type
memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These
instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD components. In
carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President
and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to
commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense
for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks and
Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are
subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out
their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and
Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to
commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that
described above for the Under Secretaries.
Question. The Secretaries of the military departments.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 165, provides that, subject to
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and
subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries
of military departments are responsible for administration and support
of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands.
The Chairman, or Vice Chairman when directed or when acting as the
Chairman, advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which
program recommendations and budget proposals of the military
departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the
priorities established for requirements of the COCOMs.
Of particular interest, the Under Secretary of the Air Force acts
as the Executive Agent for Space Program procurement, which is
especially important to the Vice Chairman in the role as Chairman of
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). If confirmed, I
recognize the importance of working closely with this senior official
on vitally important space programs.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service
Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. With
respect to title 10 responsibilities, they serve two significant roles.
First and foremost, they are responsible for the organization,
training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full
support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no combatant commander
can be ensured of the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions
directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President.
Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs are
advisers to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior
uniformed leaders of their respective Services. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the Service Chiefs and their Vice Chiefs to fulfill
warfighting and operational requirements.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct
military operations around the world. The Chairman provides a vital
link between the combatant commanders and other elements of DOD, and as
directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication
between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of
Defense. When the Vice Chairman is performing the Chairman's duties in
the latter's absence, he relates to the combatant commanders as if he
were the Chairman.
Question. The Special Assistant to the President/Deputy National
Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan.
Answer. As an officer serving in an agency outside DOD, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicates to the Special
Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq
and Afghanistan through the Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security.
Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a member
of the Nuclear Weapons Council along with the Under Secretary of Energy
for Nuclear Security. In this capacity, we will work together to
oversee and coordinate the Nation's nuclear weapons policies to include
the safety, security, and control issues for existing weapons and
proposed new weapons programs.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you
would face if confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. Winning the global war on terrorism is the Nation's highest
priority and our most pressing challenge. In this struggle, our Armed
Forces play a leading role in protecting the Homeland; attacking and
destroying terrorist networks; and countering ideological support for
terrorism--which is the decisive element of the U.S. Government war on
terrorism strategy.
Major challenges include building partnership capacity with partner
countries which reduce and defeat the threat of violent extremism, and
also attempting to resolve ``whole of government'' issues in this
campaign, to integrate all instruments of national power, influence,
and capability.
It is more efficient and effective to engage partner nations and
make investments to shape the security environment and deter violent
extremism than to commit U.S. forces in contingency operations.
Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere demonstrate the
importance of building the capacity and capability of partners and
allies to better secure and govern their own countries.
A major challenge we face in Iraq is to be able to rapidly
recognize and exploit new opportunities to make the reduction in
sectarian violence and security self-sustaining.
With regard to whole-of-government issues, we should continue to
move forward in a collaborative effort to develop the right interagency
mechanisms and authorities to better integrate all instruments of
national power, influence, and capability and to meet critical national
security needs.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we deny terrorists
the resources they need to operate and survive, enable partner nations
to counterterrorism, deny WMD proliferation and increase our capacity
for consequence management.
In addition, we will continue to defeat terrorists and their
organizations, counter State and non-State support for terrorism in
coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations
and contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter
ideological support for terrorism.
As a Nation, we should defeat violent extremist groups through the
disruption of transnational violent extremist networks, increases in
partner nation capacity and advances in government legitimacy until
terror groups pose only a local threat and are incapable of attacks on
the U.S. homeland, U.S. vital interests, or regional stability. Once
these conditions are established, we can conclude combat operations and
transition to an advisory role.
We should further aim, through this advisory role to support
foreign internal defense, deny the migration or expansion of violent
extremist groups through continued increases in partner nation
counterterrorism capacity and information sharing; by countering
ideological support to terrorism; and by producing a long term
development plan to reverse the underlying conditions that foment
discontent. Once our partner nations achieve overmatch against terror
groups, we can reduce our advisory presence to normal bilateral and
regional status.
We should support our partners through information sharing,
cooperative counterterrorism operations and countering ideological
support for terrorism. While DOD is not the lead Federal agency for
this effort, the military can contribute significantly through security
operations, humanitarian assistance, military-to-military contacts, and
the conduct of operations and military information operations.
We owe it to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to leverage
all instruments of our defense arsenal to defeat our adversaries. In
this regard, there have been some recent innovative steps to building
partnership capacity, such as the section 1206 authority that allows
the Defense and State Departments to more rapidly train and equip
partner military forces.
We must continue to build on the success of section 1206 by
enacting the Building Global Partnerships act, which will help us meet
critical national security needs.

JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

Question. If confirmed as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, you would be the Chairman of the JROC. The JROC has the
responsibility to validate Service requirements. As the Services
transformation initiatives have matured, some have been approved for
System Development and Demonstration (SDD) even though it appears that
some programs lacked the technical maturity the programs require to
transition into SDD.
What background and expertise do you possess that you believe
qualifies you to serve as the Chairman of the JROC?
Answer. In my previous assignment to the Joint Staff as Director,
Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate (J-8), whose
missions include serving as JROC Secretary and Chairman of the Joint
Capabilities Board, I gained insight into the internal roles, missions,
responsibilities, and processes of the JROC. As Commander, U.S.
STRATCOM, I gained a new and invaluable perspective into how the JROC
interacts with COCOMs. These most recent assignments provide me with
unique experience and expertise to fulfill the role of Chairman of the
JROC.
Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the
DOD acquisition process?
Answer. The JROC is engaging the acquisition and programming
communities earlier in the requirements process to improve JROC
decisions and enhance oversight of acquisition programs. The JROC is
performing an enhanced assessment of proposed capabilities and weapon
systems by considering not only the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs),
but also technology, cost, and schedule risks. These assessments ensure
that warfighter requirements are realistic and that cost and schedule
risks are reasonable. The JROC also considers overall affordability of
a weapons system before approving performance requirements.
Question. What is your vision for the role and priorities of the
JROC?
Answer. The direction for the JROC that Admiral Giambastiani
charted is sound and I intend on building on the work already
accomplished. Specifically, I am referring to the ``JROC Initiatives.''
These initiatives collectively assist the JROC in making better
informed fiscal decisions, conducting more comprehensive assessments of
the combatant commanders' warfighting issues and bringing stakeholders
from the Department and interagency to the JROC to solve appropriate
issues. My vision for the JROC is one that gets the JROC ahead of
strategic issues. One initiative in particular is the list of Most
Pressing Military Issues (MPMI), which serves as a focusing construct
for issues that come before the JROC. The MPMI, which include items
such as ``improve interagency coordination and planning to develop
shaping strategies to assist nations at strategic crossroads'' and
``improve information sharing to support operational forces and mission
partners by improving bandwith and information sharing tools'' to name
two, enable the JROC to provide priority guidance in solving COCOM and
Department issues.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend in the
membership of the JROC?
Answer. The JROC provides independent military advice to our senior
leaders by deciding which issues become validated military requirements
and which do not. I think the membership of the JROC is correct in
order to provide an independent military voice. However, I would
strongly support the JROC effort to bring together senior leaders, as
advisors, from across the Department and the interagency, to inform the
JROC in making more sound and affordable decisions. The incorporation
of senior civilian leaders as advisors to the JROC is important, and
will continue if I am confirmed as the Vice Chairman.
Question. Do you believe the current JROC process has been able to
adjust satisfactorily to a capabilities-based, vice threat-based,
approach in determining requirements?
Answer. The JROC has adapted well to Capabilities Based Planning
(CBP). Using a capabilities methodology during the fiscal year 2008
President's budget build, the JROC influenced the redistribution of
$5.2 billion in support of our combatant commanders. Additionally, the
JROC used a CBP approach in developing the list of MPMI which allows
the JROC to get ahead of strategic issues for the combatant commanders
and the department. However, we have room to improve, particularly
through increasing the linkage of Joint Experimentation and Joint
Concepts to acquisitions through the Joint Capabilities and Integration
Development System.
Question. Do you believe that the quantity of items required is
appropriately addressed in the JROC process, so that the capability
delivered by the item is present in appropriate numbers?
Answer. Yes. When the JROC approves the Capabilities Development
Document (CDD), the JROC approves the quantity of items needed to
achieve the Initial Operation Capability and Full Operation Capability.
The JROC's approval of a CDD is carried forward to the Defense
Acquisition Board where the Defense Acquisition Executive makes the
final decision on units to be procured.
Question. As you likely know, the outgoing Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff instituted policies and programs directed at
helping manage undesirable cost growth in certain major weapons
systems. One example is an initiative that imposes cost growth flags
for ``JROC Interest'' programs different from those triggered by Nunn-
McCurdy. Another example is an initiative that provides for expanded
participation of other stakeholders in the resource allocation process,
in the JROC. Still another example is an initiative that sought to
achieve greater involvement by the combatant commanders throughout the
requirements process.
To what extent would you support and continue implementation of
these, and any other such, initiatives?
Answer. I would support the continued implementation of the full
package of JROC initiatives previously instituted as they enable sound,
strategy driven decisions. Additionally, these initiatives:

Establish priorities for the Department;
Ensure resource informed and constrained decisions;
Establish a process that is accountable and
repeatable;
Align and synchronize processes throughout the
Department;
Facilitate timely delivery of capabilities to the
joint warfighter;
Provide guidance on the MPMIs;
Better capture the COCOM's requirements and voice for
future warfighting capabilities; and
Bring stakeholders from across the Department and
interagency to the JROC to solve issues.

Question. What principles would guide your approach to inviting,
and helping ensure the sufficient participation of, other such
stakeholders in the JROC?
Answer. The guiding principles associated with JROC participation
include:

Provide independent military advice to our civilian
leaders. To preserve the independent nature of this advice, the
voting membership of the JROC has been limited to the Nation's
senior warfighters responsible for training, manning, and
equipping our force;
Promote participation in the JROC process from across
the enterprise by informed stakeholders to ensure appropriate
context and comprehensive recommendations are provided to the
JROC; and
Promote utilization of Senior Warfighting Forums,
composed of the COCOM Vice Commanders to identify current and
future warfighting operational requirements.

Question. Are there other such initiatives instituted by the
outgoing Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that you view as
particularly likely, or unlikely, to be productive in achieving
acquisition reform?
Answer. Though still a pilot program, the Tri-Chaired Concept
Decision initiative may provide tangible benefits in the acquisition
reform arena by decreasing acquisition risk through the implementation
of a corporate investment decision process.
Question. The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (otherwise
referred to as ``the Kadish Report'') recommended reviewing and
modifying applicable regulations to require JROC approval to conduct
Initial Operational Testing and Evaluation (IOT&E) in an environment
other than that which was defined and documented in the Test and
Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) at the Milestone B decision. The Test and
Evaluation community agrees that IOT&E requirements are defined by the
TEMP, but takes the position that the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation and the service test agencies--not the JROC--are the
appropriate arbiters of what the TEMP requires. What is your view of
this issue?
Answer. I would agree with DOT&E and the Service test agencies that
they are the experts on how a system should be tested based on the KPPs
in the CDDs that the JROC validates.

ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role of the
Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the
requirements determination, resource allocation or acquisition
management processes?
Answer. I believe the role of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource
allocation, and acquisition management process is effective. The
processes themselves are continuously improving in meeting future joint
warfighting needs. We are working on improving the responsiveness to
the immediate and near term joint warfighting needs through the
Services and joint urgent needs processes.
Question. The committee has proposed various changes to DOD
acquisition procedures that are included in title VIII of S. 1547, the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008.
Sections 801 through 805 would address major defense acquisition
programs. If confirmed as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, you would head the requirements community in helping the
Department analyze and approve major defense acquisition programs.
What is your opinion about whether these provisions, if enacted,
would help the Department reform how it buys major weapons systems?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review these provisions in
detail, but if confirmed, I will work with the committee to enact the
best legislation possible to improve acquisition procedures.
Question. Which of these provisions, if any, do you have concerns
about and why?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review these provisions in
detail, but I am concerned that section 801(a) would define
``substantial savings'' for multi-year contracts and unnecessarily
limit the contracting options available for large programs where
significant taxpayer dollars could potentially be saved.
Question. In February 2007 the Secretary of Defense submitted a
report to Congress entitled ``Defense Acquisition Transformation Report
to Congress''.
If confirmed, to what extent would you support and continue
implementation of the defense acquisition reform initiatives set forth
in that report that directly involve the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff or the JROC, in particular, the Tri-Chair Concept
Decision initiative?
Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support the defense acquisition
reform initiatives set forth in the February 2007 ``Defense Acquisition
Transformation Report to Congress'' that directly involve the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the JROC, in particular, the
Tri-Chair Concept Decision initiative pilot program. I believe this
initiative shows promise in improving strategic investment decisions
for potential major acquisition programs.
Question. Are there other initiatives or tools discussed in the
Defense Acquisition Transformation Report that you view as particularly
likely, or unlikely, to be productive in achieving acquisition reform?
Answer. There are a few other initiatives discussed in the Defense
Acquisition Transformation Report that should be productive in
achieving acquisition reform. One is the Requirements Management
Certification Training Program being developed for military and
civilian requirements managers with responsibility for generating
requirements for major defense acquisition programs. This training will
produce a consistent understanding between the warfighters, the
acquisition community, and the resourcing community to improve delivery
of capability to the warfighter.
I also view the JROC initiatives that provide enhanced assessments
of proposed capabilities and weapon systems by considering not only the
KPPs, but also technology, cost, and schedule risks, increased emphasis
on affordability, and the ``watch list'' to monitor program cost
baselines as very likely to achieve improvement in acquisition
management and fielding capability quicker.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, you will serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing my membership on
the Nuclear Weapons Council in my new role as Vice Chairman.
My priorities will be ensuring the national security interests of
the United States continue to be met with a stockpile that is safe,
secure, and reliable; improving the responsiveness of our national
security infrastructure; and working with Congress to implement the
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program.
Together these initiatives will allow us to achieve effective
deterrence at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with our
national security requirements, and fulfill our obligations to allies
with a safe, secure, and modern arsenal.

JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued his
vision for Joint Officer Development (JOD) in November 2005. The
Secretary of Defense approved a Strategic Plan for Joint Officer
Management and Joint Professional Military Education in April 2006, and
published the DOD Joint Officer Management Joint Qualification System
Implementation Plan on March 30, 2007.
Is the 2005 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision for JOD
consistent with your views? If confirmed, will you revise this vision?
Answer. It is consistent--the premise of JOD vision is to have a
competency-based, lifelong continuum of learning . . . in a joint
context. The goal of JOD is to ensure we have the largest possible body
of fully qualified and inherently joint officers for joint command and
staff responsibilities. If confirmed, I will continue to enforce the
foundations addressed in the JOD vision to ensure our officers are
strategically minded, critical thinkers, and skilled joint warfighters,
and will remain committed to increase levels of joint competency and
joint capabilities for all officers, both Active and Reserve.
If confirmed, I will remain fully supportive of the JOD as it is
written today. I also understand that developing our officers is a
continuous process that will go through several iterations and reviews.
I am committed to ensuring they are prepared to support the vision and
strategy as laid out by the President and the Secretary of Defense.
Question. What do you consider to be the principal issues addressed
by the strategic plan, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you
hope to achieve?
Answer. The Strategic Plan modernizes joint officer development and
management in the 21st century. Today's military is actively and
decisively engaged in joint operations to an extent we never imagined.
The joint force management infrastructure must be as dynamic as the
environment in which the joint force operates to ensure we have the
right mix of joint educated, trained, and experienced officers--the
Strategic Plan recognizes this and meets the demands of today's robust
environment.
If confirmed, I will continue implementation of the new Joint
Officer Management process, per the changes authorized in the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2007, to develop the flexible joint manpower structure we
need to meet the ever-changing military environment. The Strategic Plan
led to legislative changes enabling the new Joint Qualification System
(JQS)--the JQS will be responsive to the warfighters in multi-Service,
multi-national and interagency operations and produce the number of
fully qualified and inherently joint officers we need. It builds on
Goldwater-Nichols' traditional path to joint qualification and opens up
the aperture by better recognizing the accrual of joint experience.
Leaders developed through this new process will become our future joint
leaders and strategic thinkers.
Question. What do you consider to be the primary strengths and
weaknesses of the requirements for joint professional military
education with respect to qualification as a joint specialty officer?
Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act correctly established Joint
Professional Military Education, along with a joint duty assignment, as
the standard for today's joint professional. For the past 20 years,
officers have aspired to earn the Joint Specialty Officer designation.
While the premise of that designation (that an officer be proficient in
joint matters) remains the same, the title has changed under NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2007 to ``Joint Qualified Officer. ``
Joint education remains central to the development of Joint
Qualified Officers--the strength of joint education is that it is at
the heart of joint officer development and is a major pillar of the
Joint Learning Continuum that also includes individual training,
experience, and self-development.
I understand the Chairman's responsibility under title 10, to
ensure the necessary joint training and education of the Armed Forces
to accomplish strategic and contingency planning and preparedness to
conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of
Defense is critical to the defense of our Nation.
The weakness is that we still have a challenge with capacity in
delivery of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II--with
the size of our current military officer force today, the number of
officers requiring JPME II far exceeds our capability to educate all
officers at the JPME II level. We do have the ability to provide every
officer, both Active and Reserve component, the opportunity to receive
JPME Phase I credit, and have been granted, thanks to the Congress'
approval, expansion of Phase II Joint education to the Senior Level
Colleges' in-resident programs.
Question. What is your assessment of the appropriate balance
between education and experience in achieving qualification as a joint
specialty officer?
Answer. Both education and experience are critical to joint officer
development. I believe that our system must be flexible enough to
provide selected officers a tailored mix of the joint education,
training and assignment opportunities they need to gain the experience
and achieve the competency-level an organization requires to
effectively fill critical joint positions.

REBALANCING FORCES

Question. In a memorandum of July 9, 2003, the Secretary of Defense
directed action by the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) aimed at achieving better balance in the
capabilities of the Active and Reserve components. The Secretary noted
that the Department ``needs to promote judicious and prudent use of the
Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce
strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological
solution based on a disciplined force requirements process.''
What progress has been made in achieving the Secretary's vision?
Answer. The Secretary's vision encompassed three principal
objectives: rebalance the active and Reserve Forces to reduce the need
for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve; establish a more
rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures that
force structure is designed appropriately and requests for forces are
validated promptly to provide timely notice of mobilization; and make
the mobilization and demobilization processes more efficient.
We have instituted a new process for assignment, allocation and
apportionment of U.S. military forces to the COCOMs. The Global Force
Management Process provides comprehensive insight into the total number
of U.S. Forces available in our inventory forces and helps us match
requirements with available forces. Sourcing solutions are developed
and then approved at a quarterly Global Force Management Board designed
to ensure the best options are selected to achieve desired effects.
Additionally, the lessons learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom
concerning Reserve mobilization and demobilization have been put into
action. Specific recommendations were made, each with follow-on
actions, to enhance the capability of the Department to mobilize and
deploy Reserve Forces in the most effective manner possible. The
Department has rewritten policies that have been included in the Global
Force Management process. As part of this process, every Reserve
deployment is reviewed for an effective alternative source of
manpower--civilian, contractor, or volunteer.
Rebalancing the force will continue to be an ongoing process. The
Reserve components, and the Total Force, must always preserve the
capability to operate across the full spectrum of conflict.
Question. What do you consider to be the biggest continuing
obstacles to achieving the goals that the Secretary of Defense has set
forth in his memorandum?
Answer. The biggest challenge is determining what capabilities we
will need in the future and therefore, determining the appropriate
balance between the active and Reserve components, while maintaining
sufficient warfighting capability. To that end, rebalancing the force
is an ongoing activity within the Department. The Department
continually assesses its force structure and rebalancing within, and
between, the active and Reserve components with the expressed purpose
of improving readiness and deployability. Reserve component sources
must be adequately resourced and prepared for anticipated requirements.
Not since World War II has DOD called on the Reserve components to
perform in such a high operational tempo, and they have performed in an
exemplary manner. It is true that when you call out the Reserve
component you call out the Nation, and they have answered that call.
However, maintaining interoperability and providing the resources to
train and equip the Reserve Forces to a single operational standard
remains a Total Force imperative.

HEALTH CARE BENEFITS

Question. In May 2007, The Task Force on the Future of Military
Health Care issued an interim report concluding that ``To sustain and
improve military health care benefits for the long run, actions must be
taken now to adjust the system in the most cost-effective ways.'' Among
other recommendations, the Task Force recommends increasing the portion
of the costs borne by retirees under age 65, and suggesting an increase
in military retired pay to offset part or all of the increase if
Congress believes that the increases are too large relative to retired
pay.
What recommendations, if any, would you offer to address the
increasing cost of health care and other personnel benefits?
Answer. Our men and women in uniform make great sacrifices for
their Nation, and their personnel benefits, to include compensation and
health care programs, have always been a priority for me. The continued
support of Congress, and the Nation, is greatly appreciated by our
military servicemembers.
The rising cost of health care is clearly an issue we need to work.
DOD health care costs will grow from a projected $38 billion in 2008 to
more than $65 billion by 2015. Because the Sustain the Benefit proposal
was not approved, we are faced with a $17.4 billion budget deficit
across the fiscal year 2009-2013 Program Objective Memorandum. If
confirmed, I will continue to support the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs as they lead the Department's ongoing effort to promote
efficiency in both our direct health care and purchased care programs.
The Task Force on Military Health Care's final report will be
released in December. I look forward to reviewing those recommendations
and will use the report findings to help shape an equitable plan to
sustain the benefit.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in
any shaping or rethinking of health care benefits for military
personnel, including retirees and their families?
Answer. We need to maintain a system that is flexible, effective,
and cost-efficient to serve the needs of our military members,
retirees, and their families.
If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our efforts with
Congress and the DOD to ensure military personnel can serve their
nation with the knowledge that their health care benefits are secure.
In this time of war, we are committed to providing the best care
possible for our forces that are returning with combat injuries. I will
also continue to support close cooperation between DOD and the
Department of Veterans Affairs to improve care for our troops and for
those who have left the Service.
Question. How would you assess the impact of health care benefits
on recruitment and retention of military personnel?
Answer. The recruiting and retention environment is very dynamic
and competitive, and a quality health care system is an important
cornerstone in our overall benefits package. Maintaining our high-
quality, All-Volunteer Force is dependent on our ability to continue to
attract and retain men and women with a desire to serve their Nation.
Our health care benefits program clearly helps us in these efforts.
Question. What role should the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, as opposed to the service chiefs, play with respect to health
care benefits?
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's title 10
responsibility is to provide military advice to the President and the
Secretary of Defense. In that capacity, he will support the Services
and the Department as they evaluate benefit programs. The Service
Chiefs have a direct function within their respective Departments in
the delivery of health care services in addition to offering
appropriate advice as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES

Question. The final report of the DOD Task Force on Mental Health
issued in June 2007 found evidence that the stigma associated with
mental illness represents a ``critical failure'' in the military,
preventing individuals from seeking needed care. The report states,
``Every military leader bears responsibility for addressing stigma;
leaders who fail to do so reduce the effectiveness of the
servicemembers they lead.''
If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure addressing the
stigma associated with mental illness in the military?
Answer. The stigma associated with mental health illness is an
issue in both the civilian community and the military. If confirmed, I
intend to provide strong leadership to ensure that we overcome this
impediment and expect leaders at every level to follow suit.
We have already started to address this issue within DOD. The
Services have implemented multiple initiatives to try to build
resilience, prevent adverse effects of combat stress and provide
increased access to mental health services, including initiatives such
as embedding mental health personnel in our deploying units and
performing post deployment health assessments and reassessments.
DOD currently has formed a ``Red Cell'' to look at over 365
recommendations from the Mental Health Task Force report as well as
several other reports. We are developing a plan of action to address
each of these recommendations. This action plan will be reported to
Congress within the next 60 to 90 days and I would work closely with
Congress, our military leaders, Veteran's Affairs and other Federal and
civilian organizations to see that our servicemembers and their
families psychological health and mental health issues are addressed.
Question. What is your view of the need for revision to military
policies on command notification and self-disclosure for purposes of
security clearances?
Answer. Secretary Gates recent announcement that the military
security clearance process will no longer include questions about
mental health care history is a significant step in, attempting to
remove the stigma of receiving mental health care among military
members, particularly in a time of war when combat stress is impacting
many of our servicemembers.

SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY

Question. In response to a congressional requirement for
formulation of a comprehensive policy related to sexual assaults in the
Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense promulgated guidance aimed at
more effectively preventing sexual assaults, investigating incidents of
sexual assault, and responding to the needs of victims of sexual
assault.
What role, if any, has the Joint Staff played in monitoring
progress within the military services and the COCOMs' areas of
responsibility in order to ensure enforcement of a ``zero tolerance''
policy relating to sexual assaults?
Answer. As a member of the DOD Sexual Assault Advisory Council, the
Joint Staff works closely with the Joint Task Force Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response team, the Services, and OSD. This ensures that
the policy is executable in the joint and multinational operational
environment.
The Joint Staff provides a monthly report to the task force on
Service progress in completing investigations of sexual assaults that
occur in the U.S. Central Command area of operations. The Joint Staff
also provides assistance to combatant commanders during the development
of their internal procedures; serves as a liaison staff to address
Service policy issues that might impact a commander's ability to
conduct investigations; and provides support to victims in the joint
environment.
Question. What reporting requirements or other forms of oversight
by service leaders do you think are necessary to ensure that the goals
of sexual assault prevention and response policies are achieved?
Answer. Prevention of sexual assault is the responsibility of all
leaders and every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine. Leaders in
particular must be apprised of command climate and aware of sexual
assault or harassment incidents, and remain in the forefront to ensure
that our policies are understood and enforced.

INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE

Question. During your assignment on the Joint Staff, you may have
had the opportunity to observe the working relationship between the
Chairman's legal advisor, the DOD General Counsel, the Judge Advocates
General of the Services and judge advocates advising commanders in the
field.
What is your view about the responsibility of the Chairman's legal
advisor to provide independent legal advice to you, other members of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the Joint Staff?
Answer. I view the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Legal
Counsel as having responsibility for providing independent legal advice
to the Chairman in his role as principal military adviser to the
President, the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council,
and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, he must advise the Chairman,
Vice Chairman, and Joint Staff on the full spectrum of legal issues.
Given the Chairman's role as spokesman for the combatant commanders,
the Legal Counsel frequently advises and assists combatant commander's
legal staffs. In all of these roles, I expect the Chairman's legal
counsel to provide his best independent counsel.
Question. What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocates
General of the services to provide independent legal advice to the
Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. I similarly believe that the Judge Advocates General should
provide their best independent counsel with regards to all of their
roles and responsibilities; to include advising the Chiefs of Staff
Question. What is your view of the responsibility of judge
advocates within the Services and joint commands to provide independent
legal advice to military commanders?
Answer. As with the Service Judge Advocate Generals, staff judge
advocates should also provide their best independent legal advice to
their commanders. With regard to military justice in particular,
convening authorities must at all times communicate directly with their
staff judge advocates.

WOMEN IN COMBAT

Question. The issue of the appropriate role of women in the Armed
Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American
public.
What is your assessment of the performance of women in the Armed
Forces, particularly given the combat experiences of our military,
since the last major review of the assignment policy for women in 1994?
Answer. Today, more than 333,000 women serve in the U.S. Armed
Forces around the world and they are performing magnificently and with
distinction. From crewmembers, technicians and commanders, to pilots
and military police, women will continue to play a critical role in the
defense of our Nation as officer and enlisted functional experts in a
variety of specialties.
Question. Given the nature of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and
the Army's ongoing effort to reorganize to become a more modular,
flexible, combat force, is the time right to conduct a comprehensive
review of the policy, regulations, and law pertaining to the assignment
of women in the Armed Forces?
Answer. The flexibility exists within current law and policy to
allow the Services to review their programs based on their
circumstances. I do not see the need for a comprehensive review at this
point.
Question. Does DOD have sufficient flexibility under current law to
make changes to the assignment policy for women when needed?
Answer. Current law provides adequate flexibility to make changes
to DOD assignment policy for women. The law recognizes that DOD and the
Services will need to constantly assess the role of women and the
dynamics of the constantly changing battlefield. The law and DOD policy
also allows the Services to impose additional restrictions based on
Service unique mission requirements.
Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy are
needed?
Answer. The current DOD policy recognizes that women are an
integral part of our Armed Forces and provides the flexibility needed
to address changes to the operational environment; no policy changes
are needed at this time.

COMMISSION ON NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves issued
a second interim report to Congress on March 1, 2007, recommending
among other things that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should
not be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but that the National
Guard Bureau should be a joint activity and the Commander or Deputy
Commander of U.S. Northern Command should be a Reserve of National
Guard officer at all times.
What is your opinion on the recommendations of the Commission?
Answer. I'm in complete agreement with the Secretary of Defense's
memo dated 10 May 2007. The Secretary agreed in whole or part with 20
of the Commission's recommendations and the proposed alternatives for
the others.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of senior
Reserve component officers on the Joint Staff and on the staffs of the
combatant commanders?
Answer. Reserve component officers should be embedded not only in
the upper echelons of the Joint Staff but throughout all of the COCOMs
to ensure best utilization of the total force.
If confirmed, I intend to actively consider all possible
candidates, including Reserve component general/flag officers for
billets at all COCOMs, as recommended by the Commission.
Question. What is your view about making the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? What is your
rationale for this opinion?
Answer. I fully support pending legislation to elevate the Chief of
the National Guard Bureau to a four-star position. I agree with the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau that the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau does not need to be a member of JCS. The Chief of the Guard
Bureau should be invited to participate when Guard equities are
addressed in a similar fashion as the Commandant of the Coast Guard. In
addition, the Chief, National Guard Bureau, will have full access to me
and the upper echelons of the Joint Staff.

RELIANCE ON RESERVE COMPONENT

Question. The men and women of the Reserve component have performed
superbly in meeting the diverse challenges of the global war on
terrorism. Such a heavy use of the Reserve components, however could
have potential adverse effects on recruiting, retention, and morale of
Guard and Reserve personnel.
What is your assessment of the impact of continuing Guard and
Reserve deployments on the readiness and attractiveness of service in
the Guard and Reserve?
Answer. The men and women of our Active and Reserve Force are
performing superbly in the global war on terrorism. However, the
prolonged demand on certain capabilities resident in the Guard and
Reserve is a serious concern, and we are working hard to deal with this
issue. Of note, the highest retention percentages in the Reserve
components come from units that have deployed for Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom--clearly, these servicemembers
understand the importance of their service and are volunteering again
to continue to serve their country. We must continue to ensure our
personnel receive strong support from their civilian employers, provide
support for their families, and we must also continue to closely
monitor recruiting and retention.
To decrease demand on the Reserve component, the Department has
several initiatives underway which help alleviate additional burden on
the Guard and Reserve including: (1) rebalancing of forces, (2)
modularization for a better deployment rotation base, (3) new training
and certification procedures for our Army Guard and Reserves prior to
mobilization to maximize their utility while minimizing their total
time away from home, and (4) increases in the Active component.
The men and women of our Active and Reserve Force are performing
superbly in the global war on terrorism. However, the prolonged demand
on certain capabilities resident in the Guard and Reserve is a serious
concern, and I understand that the Department is working hard to deal
with this issue. Secretary Gates redefined the mobilization policy when
he issued the ``Utilization of the Total Force: memorandum on 19
January 2007. In this memorandum, Secretary Gates identified the
following:

1. setting the length of involuntary mobilization at a
maximum of 12 months for Reserve component units;
2. mobilizing ground forces on a unit versus individual
basis;
3. establishing a planning objective with a ratio of 1 year
of mobilization followed by 5 years of ``dwell time'';
4. establishing a new program to compensate, or provide for
incentives to members required to mobilize or deploy early or
often, or be extended beyond established rotation policy goals;
5. reviewing hardship waiver programs to ensure they are
properly taking into account exceptional circumstance; and
6. minimizing the use of stop loss as a force management
tool.

Implementing these six areas will provide increased predictability
for our citizen soldiers, their civilian employers, and their families.
Readiness within the Reserve components continues to be strong
within the community-based forces. We will continue to monitor
recruiting and retention in both our Active component and Reserve
component forces.
Question. What missions, if any, do you consider appropriate for
permanent assignment to the Reserve component?
Answer. The Reserve components must be able to operate across the
full spectrum of conflict, and reflect their parent services total
force capabilities. The Nation has made a tremendous investment in its
military members. These highly trained individuals who, if they choose
to leave the Active components of their Services upon completion of
their obligated commitment, can re-serve America in their specialties
in the Guard and Reserve, if these components mirror the full
capabilities of their services.
However, the members of the Reserve components have developed
considerable expertise in the defense of the homeland, to include
maritime security, air sovereignty, and civil support, and are uniquely
prepared to lead and assist in the command, control, and direction of
these missions. As such, serious consideration should be given to
placing Reserve component leaders in command at Northern Command, Army
North, and all other domestic security missions as is currently being
done with the command of 1st Air Force.

END STRENGTH OF ACTIVE-DUTY FORCES

Question. In light of the manpower demands of Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, what level of Active-Duty personnel (by
Service) do you believe is required for current and anticipated
missions?
Answer. The overall force level is not completely representative of
the impact of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom on
the forces. However, the key point is the matching of capabilities to
mission requirements. Capability demands change based upon different
phases of the operation. Within this context, ground forces are the
largest aggregate of forces in high demand. The Services, Joint Staff,
and OSD have looked at this impact and have brought forward their force
structure recommendations. As such, the Army and Marine Corps have
planned growth that is consistent with the future demands expected to
be placed on our ground forces.
Question. How do you assess the progress made to date by the
services in finding ways to reduce the numbers of military personnel
performing support functions that can better be performed by civilian
employees or contractors?
Answer. The conversion from military-to-civilian manpower has been
ongoing for some time. Military-to-civilian personnel targets are the
result of collaborative reviews and analyses between OSD and the
Services. From these come Program Budget Decisions that implement the
conversions. This process has been effective and, as it is
collaborative with the Services, I believe it is working toward an
effective balance of personnel helping to accomplish the Department's
mission.
Question. What manpower savings can be achieved through reductions
in overseas presence, application of technology, and changes in roles
and missions?
Answer. As we continue to shape our force in response to the
changing roles and missions around the world, there will continue to be
adjustments to where we posture our forces. If confirmed, I look
forward to being a key advisor as the Department continuously evaluates
the global environment and determines the appropriate placement of our
forces to assist in carrying out our Nation's global engagement
strategies. Additionally, I look forward to playing a role in helping
determine the Service and DOD's priorities for development and
acquisition of new technologies. Improving capabilities through
technology is important and can result in manpower savings.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The ability of the Armed Forces to recruit highly
qualified young men and women and to retain experienced, highly
motivated commissioned and noncommissioned officers is influenced by
many factors, and is critical to the success of the All-Volunteer
Force. While retention in all the Services has remained strong,
recruiting data in 2007 have shown increasing difficulty for the Army,
Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Navy Reserve, and Air National Guard
in meeting monthly recruiting goals. The Active-Duty Army in particular
is facing difficulties, failing to meet its target for May and June.
What do you consider to be the most important elements of
successful recruiting?
Answer. The basic elements of successful recruiting continue to be:
tapping the reservoir of patriotism by providing the opportunity to
serve the Nation; offering America's best and brightest the chance to
serve in a proud and respected profession; possessing a properly
resourced cadre of highly motivated and trained recruiters; having
complete access to the recruiting pool; offering a competitive
compensation and benefits package; and providing the opportunity for
young men and women to achieve skills, education, and experience.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have to improve
recruiting for the ground forces?
Answer. We are very grateful for the tools that Congress has
provided (such as increased recruiting bonuses and raising the maximum
enlistment age) because they are proving valuable to our recruiting
efforts. The dynamic recruiting environment will remain very
competitive, and the Services continue to explore methods to improve
recruiting production. We look forward to the continued support from
Congress to give the Department the flexibility needed to adjust as
needed to meet this critical mission.
Question. How can the Department better target and reach the
``influencers''--the parents, teachers, and coaches who influence our
young men and women, and their career choices?
Answer. In order to compete with an improving economy, in an era
when the main influencers of our youth--parents, teachers, coaches,
etc.--are less inclined to recommend military Service, it will take the
entire Department and our Nation's senior leaders working together
collectively to ensure that the American people understand and
appreciate the critical importance that our All-Volunteer Force
provides to our Nation.
Question. What do you consider to be the most important components
in the success of all the Services in retaining experienced junior
officers, petty officers, and noncommissioned officers?
Answer. Superbly trained, well-equipped, and highly-dedicated
Americans have always been our Nation's ultimate asymmetric advantage.
Our ability to recruit these individuals is certainly critical to our
success, but of equal importance is our ability to retain these
experienced professionals. Our military has been successful at
retention because of its tradition of service, strong leadership at all
levels, and support by the Nation. Therefore, the most important
components of retaining our professional force are: (1) Believing that
the Nation values the service and family sacrifice of all
servicemembers; (2) Strong leadership and mentorship; (3) Personal and
professional development opportunities; (4) Opportunities to lead and
grow at every level throughout their careers; and (5) Competitive
compensation, benefits and incentive packages that reward their Service
and provide a good quality of life for their families. As with
recruiting, we are very grateful for the tools provided by Congress as
they are critical to continued success in the retention of our force.
Question. In your opinion, what impact is the current recruiting
environment likely to have on our ability to sustain an All-Volunteer
Force?
Answer. The All-Volunteer Force has served this Nation well for 34
years. It provides a force that is intelligent, motivated, and more
dedicated and more inclined to stay than the force I saw as a young
officer. Most importantly, it represents the society that it protects.
While there have been some isolated challenges in recruiting in the
recent past, thanks to the dynamic cadre of trained recruiting
professionals and the tremendous support of Congress, the All-Volunteer
Force should continue to provide the servicemembers needed to support
our Nation.

IRAQ

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing
the United States in Iraq?
Answer. Approximately 6 months into the execution of Operation
Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ), all surge forces have been in theater for 1
month and are conducting combat operations. Coordinated offensive
operations in Diyala Province and the Baghdad belts have begun to
disrupt al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and erode terrorist freedom of
operations.
Tribal, anti-AQI measures in al Anbar have sustained popular
rejection of AQI and reduced violence in the province sufficiently to
begin programs improving essential services and providing jobs. The
coalition and the Iraqi Government are expanding engagement to exploit
similar tribal movements in other provinces to reject terrorism and
promote stability.
Sufficient time has not yet elapsed to establish the kinds of
trends the surge seeks to create. General Petraeus will report on his
assessment of progress in September, and we should allow him that time
to develop the situation and provide his assessment and
recommendations.
However, we do have initial indicators. Encouraging trends thus far
include overall reductions in civilian casualties, murders, and
sectarian violence in Baghdad compared to pre-FAQ levels as well as
significant decreases in suicide and Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive
Device high profile attacks over the past 3 months.
Substantial security threats remain. Iraq-wide, the consistent
reductions in violence in Anbar province are matched by increased
attacks in Iraq and Diyala. High-profile attacks have decreased since
the beginning of FAQ, but remain too high. AQI uses high profile
attacks to damage key infrastructure such as bridges and mosque and to
cause high numbers of casualties to stoke sustained sectarian violence.
Despite a small spike in attacks in the wake of the 13 June Samarra
Golden Mosque bombing, Iraq appears to have avoided the spiraling
violence it witnessed after the February 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing.
Iraqi security forces (ISF) are growing in size and capability
while continuing to conduct operations alongside coalition forces. The
ISF still face many challenges including their sustainment capabilities
and manning levels--but they are facing these with our assistance while
continuing to fight the extremists and terrorist who threaten the
future of their nation.
A nascent governmental structure and immature political
institutions have slowed economic growth and hampered ministerial
capacity.
Question. From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned
from our experience in Iraq?
Answer. We entered this conflict without a centralized, coherent
counterinsurgency doctrine. We've fixed that problem, and General
Petraeus is using that doctrine now. Using the model of ``clear, hold,
build'', we've learned that the ground commander must have the
appropriate force levels to be able to hold the ground once it's
cleared.
Further, we've learned that, in order to build, commanders must
engage local leaders and make them part of the solution. In the more
rural areas, that means the tribal sheikhs. Indigenous forces are
perceived as more legitimate, which makes them more effective. We're
seeing evidence of this in the al Anbar province now.
We've learned that our enemy is incredibly adaptive; therefore, we
must be as well. From tactics to equipment, we must be able to quickly
alter our methods to meet a rapidly-changing environment. This not only
applies to ground units, but to service institutions and our industrial
base as well.
We must better understand the environment in which we will operate.
Iraq is a complex country, ethnically, religiously, and culturally.
That complexity must be taken into account at all levels. At the
tactical level, we've learned that the actions, or lack thereof, on the
part of junior leaders can have a strategic impact.
Accordingly, we have adjusted our junior and mid-grade officer,
noncommissioned officer, and individual training programs to ensure
that the leaders and troops conducting these operations are prepared
for the environment in which they operate. We have also created more
realistic training environments for deploying units.
Finally, I also believe we've learned that this type of conflict
requires a whole-of-government approach. This fight is not just a DOD
fight. It takes all the elements of national power--the Departments of
State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury--to succeed in this
complex environment.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes
the United States has made to date in Iraq? Which of these do you
believe are still having an impact? What do you believe could be done
now to mitigate such impact?
Answer. We have not integrated all elements of U.S. national power
in Iraq. Often, particularly in the early going, our military,
political, economic, and information powers were not well synchronized.
This resulted in missed opportunities and created difficulties that we
are still dealing with today.
Disbanding the entire Iraqi Army robbed the Government of Iraq
(GOI) of what might have been a valuable asset for reconstruction and
provision of services to the Iraqi people. Furthermore, this action
provided a recruiting pool for extremist groups.
The manner in which de-Baathification has been pursued has been
more divisive than helpful and the process demands reform.
We attempted to transition to stability operations with a force
that did not have the requisite manpower to do so. Thus, we gave way to
a rapidly-building insurgency and yielded the initiative to terrorist
organizations.
Our plus-up of forces is intended to isolate Baghdad and the belts
around it, reestablish a dominant security posture with ISF and
coalition forces, and provide the space for political and economic
growth to take place.
We did not tell our story to the Iraqis, regional audiences, or the
American people. Modifying public affairs and public diplomacy
institutions to better deliver messages to the Iraqi people should have
been conducted.
Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the
United States needs to take in Iraq?
Answer. Redouble our efforts to support the GOI in establishing the
security, stability, and long-term good governance required to forge
political agreements that build momentum for larger political
settlements and eventual reconciliation. Our political strategy to
achieve a political solution is key and our military efforts must
provide the supporting effort to achieve the needed political solution.
Develop effective and self-sufficient ISFs and transitioning
responsibilities to Iraq's Government as conditions allow. This should
give its people additional confidence to build and sustain
institutions.
Provide security to the people of Iraq which will allow the space
necessary for the GOI to make necessary political and economic
progress.
Convince Syria and Iran to work toward stability in Iraq--and
change their behaviors that promote instability in Iraq.
Support, via the International Compact and other economic
initiatives, near-term job creation programs, a significant expansion
of micro-credits, along with rehabilitation of viable state owned
enterprises that can open for business quickly is necessary.
Help the GOI build upon the impacts of moderates devoted to a
stable Iraq through engagements with elements of Iraqi society that
reject extremism and terrorism. Engagement and inclusion of moderate
elements will build the foundations necessary for eventual nation-wide
reconciliation.
We must have the needed authorities to continue coalition
operations in Iraq beyond 2007. Another United Nations Security Council
Resolution, with authorities similar to those of 2007, will be
necessary.
Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution
in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?
Answer. The majority of problems in Iraq require a political
solution. The most contentious issues are part of an overall settlement
and not individual issues in isolation. However, military force is
necessary to create the stability needed to foster dialogue and genuine
political progress.
We must be ready to seize upon improving security environments with
our political and economic teams to take advantage of fleeting windows
of opportunity.
However, there are elements in Iraq, specifically AQI and some Shia
extremists that can, and will, be dealt with by only military force.
Diplomatic efforts, similar to those made in the political
spectrum, must be reinvigorated with Iraq's neighbors. Support to
terrorist efforts in Iraq must be eliminated if success is to be
achieved in the near-term.
The bottom line is that the military dimension supports the
political dimension, which must take the lead in our strategy to
succeed in Iraq.
Question. Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi
political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?
Answer. Yes. Compromise is key to advancing solutions to the
political issues facing Iraq. It is important for Iraqi politicians to
acknowledge and embrace that politics is not zero-sum game and may
appear only marginally helpful in the short-term, but produce more
prosperous long-term benefits.
Political party leaders must be willing to compromise on individual
aspirations for the benefit of all Iraqis. We must limit the negative
impact associated with such decisions; ensure that all parties are
aware of the compromises made by opponents, and enable political
leaders to reach compromises in ways that maintains dignity.
Thus, the Government of Iraq must advance toward inclusion by
passing key legislation on reconciliation, sharing of oil and gas
revenues, and provincial powers. Further, holding timely provincial
elections and passing constitutional amendments on the matters agreed
upon last year would reduce incentives for violence.
Addressing all of these issues as parts of a larger question,
rather than trying to tackle each in isolation, will have the best
chance of success and is likely to yield the most favorable outcomes
for all concerned.
Question. Do you believe that quelling the current level of
violence in Baghdad is a necessary condition for a political solution?
Answer. Baghdad is the centerpiece of the political solution we
seek--its percentage of the populace, sectarian mix, and symbolism are
inescapable for the entire nation and region.
Baghdad, and the area, or belts, immediately surrounding the
capital city, is key terrain on the strategic landscape and must be
controlled to achieve enduring political gains. That said, security is
achieved in part due to political compromises and accommodations
competing factions make.
Proactive work by the U.S. Government to achieve diplomatic and
political solutions, while efforts to achieve military security
objectives are ongoing, will likely combine to produce the overall
effects we desire.
However, Iraq is a complex country with complex challenges. Some
problems manifest themselves at the national level while others have
local underpinnings. We cannot afford to limit our approach to simply
Baghdad.
Current coordinated coalition and ISF offensive operations in
Diyala province aim to quell violence outside of the capital in another
important area with a diverse population.
Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders
to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution?
What leverage does the United States have in this regard?
Iraqi leaders must embrace non-violent measures to achieve their
goals. Further, they must be willing to politically compromise for the
good of all Iraqi citizens.
The U.S. still has significant leverage to bring key players to
compromise, including diplomatic initiatives, economic and assistance
incentives, selective use of military force, and publicity and
information gathering and sharing.
Our allies, both in the region and around the world, can also
provide some needed leverage. The United Nations must also be fully
engaged in these measures.
Question. What do you believe are the prospects for Iraqi political
leaders to make those compromises and, if made, what effect do you
believe this would have toward ending the sectarian violence and
defeating the insurgency?
Answer. Prospects for compromise are marginally better, but linked
to security conditions. A stable environment is necessary for dialogue,
negotiations, and compromise.
The recent return of the Sadrist and Tawafuq blocs to the Iraqi
parliament reflect a significant compromise of powerful political
factions and is a positive step toward the Government of Iraq's
reconciliation efforts through key Parliamentary legislation on sharing
of oil and gas revenues and provincial powers.
Passing this legislation will go a long way to reducing and
defeating sectarian violence and the insurgency.
Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the
new Iraq strategy announced by the President earlier this year?
Answer. I was not involved in the development of the new Iraq
strategy.
Question. With regard to the recent ``surge strategy,'' what role
will you have, if confirmed, in proposing or recommending changes to
the strategy? What role will you have in deciding or recommending when
U.S. troops can begin to reduce and transition to new missions?
Answer. As Vice Chairman, my role is to advise the President and
the Secretary of Defense on the progress of the operation based on my
interaction with the combatant commander, Admiral Fallon, General
Petraeus, other members of JCS and our intelligence agencies.
Question. What do you see as a reasonable estimate of the time it
will take to demonstrate success in securing Baghdad?
Answer. We are demonstrating success in Baghdad today. We have made
significant progress toward breaking the cycle of sectarian violence
that had been growing last year. Sectarian violence is down below pre-
surge levels. Attacks on civilians and civilian casualties in Baghdad
are down below pre-surge levels and show a downward trend.
The numbers of high-profile attacks are down as well. And we are
rooting out terrorist cells that have entrenched themselves in the
city.
There are still challenges with security in a city as large as
Baghdad and one that has gone through so much. But we are seeing
success. Is Baghdad completely secure at this time? No, not entirely.
It has only been 1 month since the last of our additional brigades
arrived in Iraq.
We have provided the commanders on the ground additional resources
and we should provide them the time they need to apply those resources
to create the stability and security needed for political progress.
We will have a better idea of how well our new strategy is working
in September, but it will still take more than a couple of months to
see the political and economic results our current security efforts are
designed to support. 8-12 months is probably a much more reasonable
timeframe.
Question. If confirmed, how would you craft an ``exit strategy''
for U.S. forces in Iraq? What are the necessary pre-conditions; how
would you phase the redeployment; and what residual forces would be
needed for what period of time, and for what purposes over the long-
term?
Answer. I would characterize our strategic approach going forward
in different terms. ``Exit strategy'' implies withdrawal from Iraq
entirely. It is more likely that we will forge an enduring strategic
relationship with Iraq that will see a U.S. presence for some time to
come, although that presence may well beat lower force levels. In my
judgment our strategic interests in Iraq and the region will require a
national commitment for some time to come, although the nature of that
commitment will certainly evolve.
We should develop our strategy in conjunction with the other key
members of the national security team, to include the State Department,
Treasury Department, the Justice Department, among others, to insure
that all elements of our national power, diplomatic, economic, and
informational, are all operating along with the military instrument,
with a shared understanding of the plan.
Going forward, we must achieve the right balance between force
levels, their mission, and the situation on the ground from start to
finish.
Question. What is the state of planning for such an ``exit
strategy?'' If none has begun, will you require that such planning
begin?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe that detailed planning for all
likely contingencies should be undertaken and would recommend the
effort begin, if it is not already in progress. It is the duty of the
military to provide the best possible military advice for any
contingency to the President.
Question. What role will you play, if any, in an ongoing assessment
of the capability of ISFs to take on more of the security
responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continually assess the progress of
the ISFs, especially regarding the funding and equipping status. We
must continually work with the combatant commander, Admiral Fallon, to
ensure he is properly resourced to enable the ISFs to assume more
responsibility of the security of their country.
Question. What is your understanding of U.S. policy with respect to
the arming and support of Sunni militia forces against al Qaeda in al
Anbar province and elsewhere in Iraq? What would you recommend in this
regard?
Answer. While not directly involved in my current assignment, I
understand coalition forces are not arming Sunni militias; however, we
are supporting and augmenting local Police Support Units in various
provinces. Indigenous forces are the key to success in the Iraqi
counterinsurgency as demonstrated in Anbar, which has witnessed an 80-
percent decrease in enemy attacks since this time last year. We should
continue to focus our efforts in supporting homegrown police and
security forces in Iraq.
Question. What considerations will be factored into a decision
regarding whether (and if so, what kind and how much) U.S. military
equipment currently in Iraq should be left behind for use by the Iraqi
Army?
Answer. Equipment/material will be screened for redistribution in
theater. Items of military value will be retrograded IAW applicable
Military Regulations.
Equipment will also be screened for sufficient service life/
residual value to ensure retrograde is a fiscally sound course of
action. If not sufficient, we'll then consider transfer to the Iraqi
Army.
Additionally, equipment that has undergone significant upgrade
since being deployed to theater (e.g. uparmored HMMWVs, medium and
heavy trucks, etc.) may also be screened for transfer.
There are some other types of non-military equipment managed by
contractors (e.g. generators, living trailers, tents, etc). These will
also be screened for transfer/donation to the ISF per Annex D of MNF-I
Framework Operation Order.
Finally, certain non-military equipment/material that is deemed to
have significant value to help stimulate the Iraqi economy, will also
be screened for transfer/donation IAW Annex D of MNF-I Framework
Operation Order.
Question. In the National Defense Authorization and Appropriation
Acts for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek
permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq.
Do you agree that it is not and should not be U.S. policy to seek
permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over
Iraq's oil resources?
Answer. It is not U.S. policy to seek permanent military bases in
Iraq or to control Iraq's oil resources, which belong to the Iraqi
people. The United States may, however, discuss a long-term strategic
relationship with the Iraqi Government, as it does with many
governments in the region and around the world.
Question. If you agree, what are your views on the construction of
any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?
Answer. Any construction we undertake should be for the temporary
basing of our forces. We should, however, continue to engage the GOI on
a long-term security relationship. Any basing decisions will be made at
the request of the GOI.
Question. Is the United States military capable of sustaining
present force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan without breaking the
force?
Answer. Our current force levels, or ``surge'', were intended to be
a sustained increase in forces, but not one without an end. As we
achieve the conditions necessary to adjust force levels, we will work
with the Commanders of MNF-I and Central Command to redefine missions
appropriately. We see no extension beyond 15 months for any forces on
the ground--as General Petraeus announced in Iraq recently.
I will provide the Secretary of Defense and the President my best
military advice as our campaign progresses regarding our missions and
the appropriate force levels necessary to achieve them. The strain on
the Services, particularly the Army and Marine Corps--our service men
and women, and their families--has been and will remain one of many
operational considerations that influence our strategy.
Question. Are you concerned about the negative impact of the
perceived occupation of a Muslim nation by the United States and its
western allies?
Answer. I am concerned about negative perceptions, especially when
they are not based on the facts.
afghanistan
Question. What is your assessment of the long-term prospects for
Afghan military forces to effectively provide a secure environment for
a democratically elected government to function?
Answer. Based on the progress we have made to date with the army,
and are beginning to make with the police, the Afghan national security
forces should be able to provide a secure environment that will allow
the government to succeed.
The Afghan National Army is the first successful national
institution in Afghanistan in decades and enjoys considerable support
and respect from the Afghan people.
With continued effort and support from the U.S. Government and the
international community, both institutions will be a positive
contributor to the fledgling Afghan democracy.
Question. What, if any, types of military assistance would you
recommend in addition to current efforts?
Answer. We have not yet met the minimum requirements stated in the
NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirements. Continued diplomacy at
the highest levels will be required to address shortfalls and caveats,
which would make the troops we have much more effective. The most
critical shortfall is training Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams for
the Afghan National Army (ANA).
Question. What steps do you believe coalition forces and the
international community need to take in the near-term to improve the
lives of the Afghan people?
Answer. Reinforcing the Government of Afghanistan's ability to
protect and provide for the Afghan people is critical to marginalizing
the insurgency and creating a secure environment. The international
community has agreed to assist in the development and strengthening of
many vital institutions.
We have a need for trainers to support the ANA and ANP, ministerial
level mentors to develop Afghan Government capacity, and the ability to
execute critical infrastructure projects which include roads, power,
and rural development.
Question. News reports indicate that there is growing Afghan
resentment over civilian deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism
operations and U.S. or NATO airstrikes. Are you concerned that these
reports of civilian deaths are undermining efforts to win the support
of the Afghan people for the mission in Afghanistan? What steps, if
any, do you believe ought to be undertaken to address the issue of
civilian deaths in Afghanistan?
Question. Should international military forces have an explicit
counterdrug mission? If so, should its focus be on interdiction,
capturing drug lords and destroying drug facilities? If not, what is
the appropriate role for the military?
Answer. I am deeply concerned that reporting that is not balanced
may undermine our efforts. As far as the steps to be undertaken, I will
echo what is already being expressed by the operational commanders
involved:
There are three key elements to this issue, which include:

1. Ensuring clear measures exist to mitigate the risk to
civilians;
2. Coordinated, credible post-incident reports are completed
in a timely manner, followed by rapid reporting of conclusions,
lessons and investigations when warranted; and
3. The need for consistent, cohesive public messaging in
Kabul, Brussels, and nation capitals of what happened and why.

PAKISTAN

Question. In your view, what military means can and should the
United States employ to fight terrorists based in Pakistan?
Answer. At this time, I think Pakistan is doing as much as we can
reasonably expect in the border regions and elsewhere. On 11 July,
Pakistan forces stormed Islamabad's Red Mosque to end an 8-day siege in
which Islamic extremists had barricaded themselves in the Mosque.
The Taliban reacted to the assault by calling for the renunciation
of the North Waziristan Peace Agreement. Pakistan is now dealing with
the fallout of that battle, and has sent additional troops into the
Tribal Areas as the Taliban have launched a series of bombings which
have killed nearly 300 people in the days following the assault on the
Red Mosque.
Cooperation among the U.S., NATO-ISAF forces, and the Government of
Pakistan on both sides of the border is critical. For example, the
Tripartite Commission and the Border Security Subcommittee meetings are
important to enhancing this cooperation. The U.S. needs to stay engaged
in these meetings and continue to help bring all sides together in a
spirit of coalition cooperation and trust.
We continue to look at ways that U.S. and coalition forces can
improve interoperability and coordination along the border to reduce
cross-border incursions by extremist elements.

IRAN

Question. What options do you believe are available to the United
States to counter Iran's growing influence in the Middle East region?
Answer. Iran is one of the most important regional actors with
regard to Iraq, Afghanistan and the broader Middle East region, and
therefore must be taken into account as we execute and develop future
policy.
I fully support the current diplomatic initiatives with regard to
Iran, to include U.N. actions (both sanctions and financial measures),
regional initiatives, and international pressure.
I fully support DOS Gulf Security Dialogue initiative to reassure
our regional partners. This includes military aspects such as building
partnership capacity building, border security, missile defense, and
proliferation security initiatives.
Question. Do you believe that a protracted deployment of US. troops
in Iraq, if the situation on the ground in Iraq does not improve, could
strengthen Iran's influence in the region?
Answer. Regardless of the security situation in Iraq, if U.S. and
coalition are prematurely withdrawn, Iran would have unimpeded access,
and influence in Iraq. It is difficult to predict what effect this will
have in the region. Perhaps most troubling is the potential for
continued displacement of ethnic and religious groups.
Question. In your view, does Iran pose a near-term threat to the
United States by way of either its missile program or its suspected
nuclear weapons programs?
Answer. While these programs will not threaten the homeland in the
near term, they are on a path to threaten the United States and we
should not wait until the threat has matured to address it. Iran's
posturing can also threaten U.S. interests in the region.
Question. If you believe either of these programs pose a near-term
threat, what in your view are the best ways to address such a threat?
Answer. We should continue to support the current diplomatic
initiatives with regard to Iran, to include U.N. actions, regional
initiatives, financial measures, and international pressure.
We should encourage Iran to fulfill its responsibility with regard
to international agreements to the Nonproliferation Treaty and the
additional protocol.
We should initiate the fielding of defensive measures for the
homeland, our forward-deployed forces, friends, and allies.
Question. Other than nuclear or missile programs what are your
concerns, if any, about Iran?
Answer. Iranian malicious activities throughout the region through
the use of proxies to extend Iranian influence into sovereign nations
by providing weapons, technology, training, and finance to these
proxies.
I am concerned Iran's continued destabilizing activities will
impact stability and potentially impact the regional economy.
It is important to maintain and strengthen our relationships with
our regional partners and allies, by continuing to build partner
capacity, and land and maritime security to counter Iranian influence
in the region.
If confirmed, I will continue to work closely and coordinate with
all applicable U.S. Government departments to ensure our policies
toward Iran take a regional approach.

COLOMBIA

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend for the role of
the U.S. military in Colombia?
Answer. The most appropriate role for the U.S. military is to
continue to address systemic deficiencies in the training and
employment of the Colombian armed forces. Under the leadership of
President Uribe, Colombia has made important strides towards defeating
the narcoterrorists.
The Government of Colombia and the Colombian armed forces have
primary responsibility for bringing security and the rule-of law to
their sovereign nation.
The Colombian security forces and state intelligence services are
best suited to sift through the complex maze of local allegiances. They
are also best equipped to leverage the cooperation of local
communities.
Question. What is your assessment of the progress achieved by the
Colombian armed forces in confronting the threat of narcoterrorism?
Answer. The Colombian armed forces have progressed well over the
last few years. U.S. training and equipment as well as intelligence
support and planning advice have contributed significantly to this
progress.
The Colombian military's (COLMIL) Plan Patriota offensive now
called Plan Consolidatiorz the largest in the Nation's history,
continues to pressure Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in
its base areas. The COLMIL has captured key nodes and dominates
mobility corridors, denying FARC access to support and population. A
number of FARC, National Liberation Army (ELN), and United Self-Defense
Groups of Columbia (AUC) high value targets have been killed or
captured. Colombian police are now present in all 1,098 municipalities.
Colombia's 2007 defense budget is 5.8 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP) as compared to 2006 when it was 5.4 percent of GDP. This
represents a 12-percent increase in defense expenditures, from $7.11
billion to $7.96 billion. Since President Uribe took office, the
Colombian armed forces have recruited over 100,000 new members.
Finally, over 30,000 members of the illegal armed groups have
demobilized.
This is all good cause for validated optimism. The COLMIL has made
significant progress fighting narcoterrorists, and their rapid
expansion has enabled the Government of Colombia to reestablish control
of its territory and restore government presence and services.
While the COLMIL is more ```forward-leaning'' than ever, their
mettle will continue to be tested as the illegal armed groups primarily
FARC resort to new tactics in order to undermine the government's
democratic consolidation plan.
Despite COLMIL successes, the permanent presence of security forces
in areas previously held by the FARC is the only way to guarantee their
eventual defeat. Only sustained efforts against all illegal armed
groups will eventually win the peace.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Question. U.S. relations with Russia are strained over a variety of
issues. If confirmed do you believe that there are any opportunities to
improve relations through military to military programs, or are there
any other actions that you would recommend be taken?
Answer. The U.S. and Russian militaries have made progress in the
area of military cooperation since 2003 when Presidents Bush and Putin
directed their respective military chiefs to focus on creating the
capacity to conduct combined military operations for future missions.
This progress has been steady and tangible and sets a positive tone
for other constructive security cooperation with Russia.
This cooperation has been personally directed by the U.S. and
Russian Presidents through the Presidential Action Checklist and has
yielded results.
I believe that military-to-military programs would continue to
benefit from this level of oversight as the checklist process has
overcome bureaucratic obstacles that had previously been
insurmountable.
While military cooperation positively influences the broader
bilateral relationship, political and economic considerations will
continue to play a key role in the emergence of constructive strategic
relations. As Russia seeks a greater world leadership role, we should
encourage their constructive participation in both governmental
initiatives, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, and non-
governmental initiatives, such as the Clinton Global Initiative. In the
end, we stand a better chance of addressing some of the core issues
that breed conflict as partners with Russia.
Question. In your view, are there any specific programmatic areas,
such as missile defense, further nuclear reductions, or space programs,
where cooperation with Russia could be beneficial?
Answer. It is essential that we continue to encourage the Russian
Government to cooperate in addressing the emerging threat to both our
Nations from the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of
mass destruction. This includes in the arena of missile defense.
I would also highlight the importance of enhancing our
counterterrorism cooperation with Russia given the extremist threats
facing both our societies.
Nuclear reductions, as agreed to with the Russian Federation in the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty), should continue
in a predictable and transparent fashion with our Russian partners, in
such a way that builds trust and confidence in how we manage our
respective strategic nuclear infrastructures.
I would also maintain that space programs offer a potentially
fruitful and mutually beneficial area for combined work; we will
continue to seek out joint programs on which we can cooperate, given
the advanced technological capacities of both our Nations.
The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which seeks to
build collective and individual capacity to combat the global threat of
nuclear terrorism, is another example of how we can cooperate. In a
joint statement issued last month by U.S. Assistant Secretary John C.
Rood and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak, the
participants indicated they were pleased by the large increase in
participation in the Global Initiative at this meeting. Expanded
participation by the international community will help combat nuclear
terrorism and strengthen our capacity to prevent the acquisition of
nuclear materials and know-how by terrorists.

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Question. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the
importance of planning and training for post-conflict stability and
support operations. Increased emphasis has been placed on stability and
support operations in DOD planning and guidance in order to achieve the
goal of full integration across all DOD activities.
What is your assessment of the Department's current emphasis on
planning for post-conflict scenarios?
Answer. Planning for post-conflict scenarios is a very high
priority for the Department.
Stability operations are now a core U.S. military mission, with
priority across the Department comparable to combat operations.
The Department is explicitly addressing planning for post-conflict
scenarios as part of an aggressive implementation of DOD Directive
3000.05, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction Operations.
Full implementation will take years, especially as DOD partners
with civilian departments and agencies to develop new whole-of-
government planning and execution capabilities.
Question. How can the Joint Staff better implement the new
directives on post-conflict planning and the conduct of stability and
support operations?
Answer. The Joint Staff assists OSD in supervising the
implementation of the new directive by the Services and COCOMs.
During the conduct of stability operations, the Joint Staff should
assist in coordinating such things as logistics, coalition building &
sustainment, and the provision of forces. The Joint Staff should also
provide analyses and insights pertaining to the policy, strategy, and
progress of stability operations.
The Department can better implement DOD Directive 3000.05 and
National Security Planning Document (NSPD)-44 by strongly supporting
the budget requests of our civilian partners, especially the State
Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as they
develop and provide a civilian expeditionary capability that will be
able to effectively prepare for, plan, and conduct post-conflict and
stability and support operations.
Question. What lessons do you believe the Department has learned
from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. Post-conflict planning and post-conflict training are
essential.
The U.S. Government requires a whole-of-government approach in
order to effectively plan and execute post-conflict operations.
The U.S. Government has shortfalls in civilian expeditionary
capability, which is required to assist a post-conflict state in the
reconstitution of its governance, essential services, economy, rule of
law, and so on.
The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization is making progress in this area and its work in
developing a civilian response capability is fully supported by DOD.

COUNTER-DRUG OPERATIONS

Question. In your view, what technologies and tactics need to be
developed to improve the United States military's counterdrug
operations and assistance to other countries?
Answer. Success in counterdrug operations depends on the
synchronized application of all elements of U.S. national power:
diplomatic, informational, military and economic.
The U.S. military must act in conjunction with the Department of
State, the Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and our
international partners.
The goal is to assist willing nations in the source and transit
zones to build their own internal capacity for combating the production
and trafficking of illegal drugs.
The U.S. military should continue to provide support across a broad
spectrum of counterdrug operations. Specific military assistance
includes unit training for host nation counterdrug forces, providing
aviation support, intelligence analysis and providing military
equipment.
While there can be some gains by developing new technologies and
tactics, the U.S. should focus on broadening and expanding its
international partnerships in combating drug trafficking.

REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Question. The United States has made a commitment to reduce the
number of operationally-deployed nuclear warheads.
Do you believe reductions in the total number of warheads in the
stockpile are also feasible? If your answer is yes, how should
capabilities and requirements be evaluated to identify which warheads
and delivery systems could be retired and dismantled?
Answer. Yes. I am confident that working with Congress we can
reduce both the operationally deployed weapons and the total number of
weapons in our stockpile. In 2001, the President directed that the
United States reduce its operationally-deployed strategic nuclear
weapons from about 6,000 to 1,700 to 2,200 weapons by 2012--a two-
thirds reduction.
We can best achieve the goal of reducing the total number of
weapons in our stockpile by developing a responsive infrastructure and
the RRW. Together they will allow us to preserve a credible deterrent
with the lowest number of weapons necessary for national security.
If confirmed, I will work closely with OSD, the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA), the Services, and COCOMs to evaluate
our nuclear force structure options with a broad view toward the
integration of non-nuclear and nuclear strike forces, missile defenses,
and a responsive infrastructure to reduce our reliance on nuclear
weapons while mitigating the risks associated with drawing down U.S.
nuclear forces.

INTEGRATION OF SPACE PROGRAMS

Question. Previously, the Under Secretary of the Air Force was
designated as the Executive Agent for Space, which included being
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. This integration of
white and black space was one of the recommendations of the Space
Commission.
What is your view on the need to institute a more integrated
approach to both sides of the space community?
Answer. I agree strongly with the need to integrate black and white
space. We have been working this issue very hard for some years now.
Members of both communities participate in a number of joint bodies; we
are developing joint programs, and at senior levels have very tight
relationships. We have completed a virtual integration of our operation
centers and now have a common Deputy Commander in place to ensure
coordinated and synchronized operations. No process is perfect; there
is always room for improvement. But I believe we have been very
successful and anticipate that our success and close working
relationship will continue.

SPACE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Question. In many instances the military and intelligence space
programs have experienced technical, budget, and schedule difficulties.
In some instances these difficulties can be traced to problems with
establishing realistic, clear, requirements and then maintaining
control over the integrity of the requirements once established.
How in your view can or should the space systems requirements
process be improved?
Answer. While I am encouraged by the improvements that have been
made to the space systems requirements and acquisition processes over
the last several years, the space systems requirement process could be
further improved with additional collaboration and coordination between
the DOD's JROC and the DNI's Intelligence Community Mission
Requirements Board. This would result in increased vigilance and
scrutiny of the space requirements process. Additionally, where
appropriate, adoption of commercial practices could help to reduce the
requirements approval time.
Question. In many circumstances space programs take many years from
conception to launch. The result is that the technology in the
satellites is significantly out dated by the time the satellites are
launched and operational, which in turn, can lead to a decision to
terminate a program early, and look to a newer technology. This vicious
cycle results in significantly increased costs for space systems as
sunk costs are never fully amortized.
How in your view can this cycle be addressed?
Answer. This cycle can be addressed by reducing the complexity of
spacecraft and lift vehicles, designing smaller, lighter single-purpose
satellites rather than complex multi-purpose satellites which must be
sub-optimized to perform a variety of missions, by adopting commercial
practices to streamline the design and manufacturing process and by
pursuing a ``block build'' strategy that allows for infusion of new
technology as programs progress.

OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

Question. Do you support the concept of operationally responsive
small satellites and what do you see as the most promising
opportunities for small satellites?
Answer. I support the concept of Operationally Responsive Space
(ORS). The concept is intended to rapidly deliver space capabilities to
the Joint Force Commanders. This will enable the warfighter to
integrate space capabilities when and where needed to produce the
desired effect. ORS strategy includes rapid exploitation of new or
innovative space technical and operational capabilities, augmenting
space capabilities in time of crisis, and reconstituting capabilities
when required. ORS is presently in the experimentation and
demonstration phase. During this time we are using small satellites
called tactical satellites to help inform the ORS concept of
operations.

PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

Question. As the Commander of the U.S. STRATCOM, developing a
conventional, non-nuclear, prompt global strike capability has been a
priority for you. If confirmed you would continue to have a role in the
requirements development process for such a capability.
What is your vision of the capability that should be developed for
prompt global strike and the types of targets that would underpin the
need to develop the capability?
Answer. I envision an evolutionary strategy designed to yield a
range of prompt, non-nuclear kinetic alternatives for dealing with
time-sensitive or fleeting, high-value targets that are beyond the
reach of other conventional forces due to time and/or distance, where
the cost of inaction would be high.
Question. Would you envision multiple different types of systems
being developed?
Answer. Potentially, yes. We are currently reviewing a number of
concepts proposed by the Services to fill this capability gap. Our
evolutionary strategy will focus on delivering increasing capabilities
over time.
Question. How would you ensure that the capability developed is not
mistaken for a nuclear system?
Answer. We take the risks of misinterpretation seriously and are
actively engaged with others to develop transparency and confidence
building measures, drawing on our years of experience with other multi-
role systems such as the air launched cruise missile or tactical land
attack missile. As we pursue prompt global strike capabilities, we will
fully explore delivery system attributes such as basing and other
unambiguous signatures to further reduce these risks.
Question. Does the administration's decision not to extend the
START have any impact on development of a prompt global strike
capability?
Answer. It will provide greater flexibility to pursue prompt global
strike solutions, while simultaneously seeking to preserve appropriate
confidence building measures. In the end, we seek new systems that
contribute to national security and reduce our reliance upon nuclear
weapons.

RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

Question. The proposal for a RRW included in the fiscal year 2008
budget is for authority for an early phase in the nuclear weapons
development. Three of the relevant congressional committees have
recommended that the RRW proceed with phase 2A development only, and
the fourth committee recommended no funding for the RRW. Work in phase
2A would, if eventually approved and funded, begin to provide some
understanding as to whether RRW could meet the programmatic goals
established for it.
One of the goals is that it would be deployed without nuclear
weapons testing. Do you support this goal?
Answer. Yes. The RRW is specifically designed to provide greater
reliability and design margins than those currently in our stockpile.
RRW will allow the United States to manage the risks of the 21st
century while reducing the likelihood of returning to nuclear testing
to certify reliability. If this goal cannot be met we should reassess
proceeding with RRW.
Question. One of the goals is that it would enable additional
reductions to the overall stockpile. Do you support this goal?
Answer. Yes. The introduction of RRW will allow us to retire
weapons that are currently being retained in our stockpile to provide
Reserve capability in the event of a technical failure in the
operationally-deployed force. A challenge we face today is that our
Cold War legacy weapons move farther away from their original design
specifications with each successive service life extension.
RRW will reduce the need for continued updates to these legacy
systems and will allow us to retire increasing numbers of them from our
stockpile.
RRW is critical to sustaining long-term confidence in our nuclear
deterrent capability while sizing our stockpile to meet the challenges
of the 21st century security environment. If these goals cannot be met
we should reassess proceeding with RRW.
Question. One of the goals is that it would increase security and
safety of nuclear warheads. Do you support this goal?
Answer. Yes. RRW will make U.S. nuclear weapons safer and more
secure against unauthorized use given the security threats we face
today and will face in the future. RRW will incorporate state-of-the-
art security features that cannot be retro-fitted to older weapons.
Additionally, RRW designs will provide more reliable performance
margins than those currently in the stockpile, will help retire
hazardous materials found in legacy weapons, and will be less sensitive
to incremental aging effects and manufacturing variances. If this goal
cannot be met we should reassess proceeding with RRW.

CURRENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE

Question. As Commander of U.S. STRATCOM you were involved with the
annual surveillance process for the nuclear weapons stockpile.
In your view is the current stockpile safe, secure, and reliable?
Answer. Yes. Our stockpile stewardship program ensures the current
stockpile is safe, secure and reliable. However, as the Cold War era
stockpile ages, our ability to certify the stockpile in a non-testing
environment will be increasingly challenged.
The RRW program will allow us to meet the threats of the 21st
century with a stockpile that is increasingly safe, secure, and
reliable while reducing the likelihood of a return to nuclear testing.
Question. As Commander of U.S. STRATCOM, you worked closely with
the NNSA and its stockpile stewardship program.
In your view is the stockpile stewardship program providing the
tools to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the nuclear
weapons stockpile now and over the long-term?
Answer. Yes. The stockpile stewardship program has been
instrumental to our ability to ensure a safe, secure, and reliable
stockpile while observing our moratorium on nuclear testing.
In the longer-term, it is critical that our infrastructure,
including the national laboratories, maintain the critical nuclear
skills needed to meet the Nation's strategic requirements.
RRW will allow us to preserve our strategic nuclear capability with
a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile while furthering the goals of
the stockpile stewardship program.
Question. In your view is the stockpile stewardship program capable
of supporting design, engineering, development, manufacture, and
deployment of an RRW?
Answer. Yes. The NNSA oversees the stockpile stewardship program
and ensures the safety, security, and reliability of our existing
stockpile.
All aspects of the nuclear enterprise--the design teams at our
national laboratories, the manufacturing production facilities, and
other key parts of the Departments of Energy and Defense--will work
together to support the design, engineering, development, manufacture,
and deployment of RRW.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Question. The Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the
United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Joint Staff should take to
ensure the humane treatment of detainees in DOD custody and to ensure
that such detainees are not subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment?
Answer. DOD has policies in place to require compliance with U.S.
law concerning humane treatment of detainees in DOD custody. In a July
7, 2006 memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense required all
components of the DOD to treat detainees in accordance with Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The 2006 DOD Directive (2310.01E)
governing the Department's Detainee Program requires that all persons
subject to the Directive to apply, at a minimum, the standards of
Common Article 3 to detainees in the custody of DOD. The Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 also prohibits the use of any interrogation
technique not listed in the Army Field Manual on Intelligence
Interrogation with any person in the custody of DOD. That manual has
been revised, it is public, and it binds the operations of DOD.
With regards to detainee treatment, we acknowledge mistakes have
occurred in the past and we have learned valuable lessons in the U.S.
military. We have worked hard to ensure commanders demand the humane
treatment of all detainees at all locations.
United States military personnel engaged in detention operations
are required to comply with U.S. domestic law, the Law of War, and our
international treaty obligations including the Prohibition on Torture
and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, and Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. Section 234 of the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year
2005 requires operationally realistic testing of each block of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
Do you believe that in order to perform its intended function
successfully the BMDS, including each of its elements, needs to be
operationally effective?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should deploy
missile defense systems without regard to whether they are
operationally effective?
Answer. I believe there are two attributes that should be
considered in the operational deployment of BMDS; will it be
operationally effective, and/or will it affect the adversary's
behavior? I believe the decision to deploy BMDS is operationally sound.
Question. Do you believe that operationally realistic testing is
necessary to demonstrate and determine the operational capabilities and
limits of the BMDS, and to improve its operational capability?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
ensure that the BMDS, and each of its elements, undergoes operationally
realistic testing?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with OSD, the Missile Defense
Agency, the military Services, and the COCOMs to ensure operationally
realistic testing is accomplished.
We will conduct each test so that it continues to build on the
knowledge gained from previous efforts and adds challenging objectives,
with the goal of testing the system under increasingly realistic
circumstances to meet the needs of the warfighter.
Question. The military is supposed to play an important role in
helping to determine requirements for our military capabilities, and to
help determine the capabilities that will meet the needs of the
combatant commanders for their operational plans.
What do you believe should be the role of the military (as the
warfighter) in helping to determine the requirements and force
structure needs for our ballistic missile defense forces, including
such elements as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the COCOMs, the Joint Force
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and the military
departments?
Answer. The military should have, and has, a central role in
helping to determine the requirements and force structure needs of our
ballistic missile defense forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provide
military advice and oversight of requirements and force structure. The
COCOMs integrate ballistic missile defense capabilities into
operational plans and help formulate requirements.
The Joint Force Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense,
as a component for U.S. STRATCOM, conducts planning, integration,
coordination, and global synchronization in support of the geographic
COCOMs. The military Services and the Missile Defense Agency provide
resources, support, and leadership to all elements of the ballistic
missile defense system.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to help ensure
that U.S. missile defense forces and capabilities meet the needs and
operational plans of the combatant commanders?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with OSD, the Missile Defense
Agency, and United States STRATCOM as they continue to collaborate with
the military Services and COCOMs to ensure the needs of the warfighter
are met, to include training, testing, wargaming, and conducting
realistic exercises and simulations, to improve the capability and
reliability of the missile defense system.
Question. Section 223 of the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007
establishes that ``it is the policy of the United States that the DOD
accord a priority within the missile defense program to the
development, testing, fielding and improvement of effective near-term
missile defense capabilities, including the ground-based midcourse
defense system, the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, the Patriot
PAC-3 system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, and the
sensors necessary to support such systems.''
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the
Department complies with this policy requirement in its development and
acquisition of missile defense capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the OSD, the Missile Defense
Agency, the military Services, and the COCOMs to ensure the
development, testing, acquisition, fielding, and improvement of
effective near-term missile defense capabilities to meet the threats
that we face today and will continue to face in the future.

FUTURE OF NATO

Question. Over the past several years, NATO has experienced great
changes. NATO has enlarged with the addition of seven new members from
Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and has taken on an ambitious
stabilization mission in Afghanistan, as well as a training mission in
Iraq.
In your view, what are the greatest opportunities and challenges
that you foresee for NATO over the next 5 years?
Answer. NATO has proven its relevance by its ability to transform
from its Cold War posture to meet the out-of-area challenges of the
21st century. But transformation is not an end-state--rather, it is a
steady state. NATO's greatest opportunities--and challenges--lay in its
ability to continue to transform in the coming years.
Most critically, NATO must develop its role in the Comprehensive
Approach, the whole-of-international community approach that will
ultimately deliver the results needed in Afghanistan.
NATO's military forces cannot alone provide the long-term solution,
but must play a role together with other actors in the international
community, such as the European Union, the United Nations, and other
appropriate Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) and Nongovernmental
Organizations (NGOs).
In the area of military capabilities, NATO and Allied nations must
continue to focus on expeditionary capacity. Gaps in critical modem
capabilities, such as strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling,
helicopter support, and theater ballistic missile defense will need to
be addressed as well.
Enlargement of NATO and expanding Alliance relationships with
partner nations of all types will also present NATO with challenges and
opportunities. Shaping how NATO engages with partners, from the
Mediterranean Dialogue to global partnership initiatives, will in turn
set the stage for future Alliance initiatives critical to allied
security.
These opportunities will not come cheaply--which is perhaps one of
the greatest challenges facing the Alliance. Most allies spend
incredibly little on defense, especially considering the large
political commitments they have made. Transforming national militaries
while also contributing them to ongoing Alliance operations far from
home is an expensive prospect, but one that is absolutely critical to
the future success of NATO.
Question. Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the
next 5 years?
Answer. That is a political question that will have to be answered
by each of the 26 NATO Allies.
For the United States, that question will be decided by the
President and the Congress.
At the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, Allies stated that at the 2008
NATO Summit they will be prepared to extend invitations to those
aspirants who meet NATO's performance-based standards and are able to
contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability.
Question. What progress are the NATO member nations, particularly
the new member nations, making with respect to transforming their
militaries, acquiring advanced capabilities, and enhancing their
interoperability with the U.S. and other NATO member nations?
Answer. Most allies (due to limited resources made available to
defense ministries) are forced to make critical choices between
spending money on transforming their militaries or on contributing to
Alliance operations within existing capabilities.
Many allies, however, have been able to strike a delicate balance
between these two choices, but with reduced effectiveness. The cost is
that national transformational processes are delayed, or have key
elements canceled, while contributions to operations are smaller, or
less capable, than needed.
The bottom line is that all but a very few allies meet the agreed-
upon 2 percent of GDP allocated for defense spending--if this target
was met, across the board, almost all transformational and operation
requirements could be met.
Question. What steps could NATO take, in your view, to reduce
tensions with Russia?
Answer. Progress has been made within the context of the NATO-
Russia Council (NRC); however, I believe that this body can play a
dominant role in mitigating the threat of a renewed confrontation
between NATO and Russia. Its full potential has yet to be realized.
The NRC could play an integral role in addressing key strategic
issues to include:

NATO and Russian perceptions of the ballistic missile
threat from the Middle East;
Better orchestrated cooperation in regional
stabilization and reconstruction efforts (e.g., in Iraq and
Afghanistan);
Managing Russia's reaction to possible NATO
enlargement, as well as Russian suspicions about U.S. and NATO
activities in Europe and Central Asia; and
Determining how to best facilitate Russia's fullment
of its ``Istanbul Commitments'' in withdrawing military forces
from Moldova and Georgia.

Long-term goals would be to:

(1) Improve NATO-Russia politico-military cooperation, both
in Europe and globally, including cooperation in missile
defense;

Military-to-military engagement between Russia and
NATO, while still progressing with interest at the military
level, is considerably hindered by Russian political
constraints. The Partnership for Peace Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) that Russia signed in April 2005 was recently
ratified by the Duma. This SOFA could open up several new areas
of practical cooperation.

(2) To help manage allies' concerns about a resurgent and
assertive Russian Federation and remind them of the importance
of united push back against Russian behavior when needed; and
(3) To influence positively Russian public attitudes toward
NATO, promote democratic and defense reforms within Russia, and
encourage ``normal'' relations between Russia and its neighbors
in Europe and the Former Soviet Union.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) relies on support
from the Services for their ``service common'' equipment, which they
modify using their Major Force Program-11 budget. Often, however,
SOCOM's acquisition needs are not always adequately prioritized by
acquisition boards and by the Services.
What is your view on the appropriate relationship between SOCOM and
the Services and SOCOM and the acquisition boards?
Answer. The current relationship and alignment of SOCOM is
appropriate, and I believe fosters their ability to ensure their most
pressing needs are met. The Services work hard to ensure they
understand SOCOM needs and to provide the ``service-common'' equipment.
SOCOM has their own acquisition boards and processes for SOCOM-unique
equipment and that works well. In addition, they have a seat at the
appropriate AT&L acquisition forums when they have specific issues or
equities and that appears to be working well. At this time, I am not
aware of any specific SOCOM requirements which have been hindered by
the current relationships and processes.
Question. What, if anything, can and should be done to ensure that
SOCOM's acquisition needs are better met than they are to date?
Answer. I believe SOCOM is well postured to advocate and procure
systems to fill their needs. They are actively engaged with the JROC,
and, when needed, the JROC facilitates SOCOM issues and needs through
various processes such as the combatant commander Integrated Priority
Lists and Capability Gap Assessments. In addition, the Vice Chairman
co-chairs Defense Acquisition Boards and can help facilitate and
advocate on their behalf

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor

MILITARY IN IRAQ

1. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, the debate over the global
war on terror has led a few current military leaders to agree that
there is no military solution for the war in Iraq. Do you agree with
this statement?
General Cartwright. The solution to the war in Iraq is part
military, part political.

2. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, what recommendation would you
make to the President and Secretary of Defense if General Patraeus'
September report indicates no change in the status of combat operations
in Iraq?
General Cartwright. The Joint Staff is planning for all potential
contingencies. This planning is ongoing and will be completed after the
report comes out. Until then, it would be inappropriate to provide
conjecture as to how I might advise.

REFUGEES IN IRAQ

3. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, since 2003 approximately 2
million Iraqis have fled the country and 900,000 have been internally
displaced. With another 90,000 Iraqis fleeing every month, what
responsibility does the U.S. military have to ensure a secure
reintegration of refugees returning to Iraq following a troop
withdrawal?
General Cartwright. The United States has a strategic interest in
mitigating the humanitarian suffering and potentially region-wide
destabilizing impact of large numbers of Iraqi refugees and internally
displaced persons. Unfortunately, it is beyond our means to resettle
all who have moved away from their homes. Nor would it be easy to
discover the motivation for many of these relocations. I think it is
fair to say that some people move for reasons unrelated to security,
even in Iraq. To make matters more difficult, we do not really have a
good estimate of the number of emigres or Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs). There are estimates that vary widely. So, the magnitude of the
problem is an unknown. Although we have anecdotal evidence that many
have returned to their homes, particularly in places like al Anbar, we
do not have firm numbers. Based on this experience, I would say the
best thing we can do for the displaced population is to defeat the
terrorists and rogue militias that drove them away in the first place.

4. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, how can we ever have a stable
Iraq with this much flux across the border?
General Cartwright. Iraq's borders are a problem. But, that is not
unusual in this part of the world. Arab peoples do not look at borders
the same as Americans. There is the Bedouin tradition of free movement
across boundaries. In fact, some tribes straddle borders, so we have
families routinely crossing back and forth. Beyond this, some Iraqis
fled in search of better security or opportunities. The President's New
Way Forward is designed to address these reasons for emigration, by
improving security conditions in Iraq and rebuilding the economy as
best we can so that Iraqis no longer need to leave to have a safe and
prosperous life. Naturally, we focus most of our efforts on those
trying to enter Iraq for bad reasons: foreign fighters, weapons
smugglers, and other insurgent facilitators. To that end, we are making
progress in the development of the Iraqi Government's Department of
Border Enforcement, and we are working with neighboring countries to
increase the security of Iraq's borders. Syria and Iraq co-hosted a
border security conference in Syria on 8-9 August 2007, attended by
Iraq's neighboring states along with observers from the United Nations
``Permanent Five'' (U.S., U.K., Russia, China, and France), the United
Nations, the European Union, and the Arab League. Participants agreed
to continue cooperation on border security issues, to increased
intelligence sharing, and to convene a meeting of technical experts
from participating parties. We continue to encourage Iraq's neighbors
to play a constructive role in securing Iraq's borders.

5. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, this committee recently
approved the nomination of LTG Douglas Lute, USA, to the position of
Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for
Iraq and Afghanistan. While the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the
Joints Chiefs of Staff also act as advisors to the President, what
relationship do you foresee having with General Lute and how does he
fit into the military chain of command?
General Cartwright. I foresee a collaborative, supportive working
relationship with General Lute. Based on his tenure as the former Joint
Staff Director for Operations--and as you well know from his
confirmation hearing--he is clearly a very capable, qualified officer;
we look forward to working closely with him. In response to your second
question, General Lute is an advisor to the President and is not in the
military chain of command.

NAVY OPERATIONS

6. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, do you believe the Navy's
current Helicopter Master Plan, dated 1998, should be updated to
address the realities of the global war on terror?
General Cartwright. The Navy's 2002 Helicopter concept of
operations (CONOPs) combines the acquisition efficiencies of the 1998
Helicopter Master Plan, which reduces the number of helicopter types
operated by the Navy from seven to two, with operational efficiencies
achieved through the reorganization of squadrons to align them with the
broadened warfighting requirements of Navy Carrier Strike Groups and
Expeditionary Forces. The 2002 Helicopter CONOPs was updated this year
with a 2007 Navy Helicopter Force Analysis Study, which re-examined
helicopter support for Sea Power 21 concepts including the Littoral
Combat Ship and global war on terrorism missions. This analysis study
is currently under the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations review
and will be incorporated in the next Helicopter Master Plan.

7. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, how can the Navy operate with
pre-September 11 master plan in a post-September 11 operational
environment?
General Cartwright. The Navy and Marine Corps have changed their
operating philosophy to provide better defense in a post-September 11
operational environment. The Navy published two versions of the Naval
Operations Concept (NOC), both of which describe how the Navy/Marine
Corps team will contribute to the defense of our Nation. The first
edition of this document was signed in 2002 and titled ``Naval
Operating Concept for Joint Operations.'' The current version is the
NOC 2006, and it refines and expands upon the 2002 version to deal with
the dynamic post-September 11 security environment.
The NOC is principally guided by national strategy as articulated
in the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and
the National Strategy for Maritime Security. Specifically, this concept
calls for more widely distributed forces to provide increased forward
presence, security cooperation with an expanding set of international
partners, preemption of nontraditional threats, and global response to
crises in regions around the world where access might be difficult.
The NOC espouses an approach for organizing and employing Navy and
Marine Corps capabilites to meet the strategic challenges of the global
war on terrorism/long war. It seeks to make best use of the resources
we have today to counter the existing threats in our current strategic
environment. In short, the NOC is about how we are going to use what we
have today differently to best fight and win the War on Terror,
positively participate in the global maritime community, yet remain
prepared to counter or defeat future threats against the United States,
be they traditional, irregular, disruptive or catastrophic.
Therefore, contrary to what some may believe, the Navy and Marine
Corps are not operating with a ``pre-September 11 master plan,'' but
are using current doctrine like the NOC 2006 to focus on the major
strategic missions like homeland defense, war on terror/irregular
warfare, conventional campaigns, deterrence, and shaping and stability
operations.
______

Questions submitted by Senator John McCain

REBASING INITIATIVES

8. Senator McCain. General Cartwright, there has been a good deal
of skepticism regarding the Pentagon's planning for the ``perfect
storm'' caused by the culmination of rebasing initiatives. The
implementation of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round,
which includes the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy
initiative to restation 70,000 troops and their families from Europe
and Korea to the U.S., Joint Basing initiatives, the Army and Marines'
efforts to grow the force, and the redeployment of troops from Iraq and
Afghanistan will all require military construction efforts that haven't
been seen since World War II. Is the Department of Defense (DOD) on
track in its planning for rebasing?
General Cartwright. The Department is on track in its planning for
rebasing, even considering restationing 70,000 troops and their
families from Europe and Korea to the United States, Joint Basing
initiatives, the Army's and Marine's efforts to grow the force, and the
redeployment of troops from Iraq. All BRAC 2005 recommendations are
currently fully funded and on track to be implemented by the statutory
deadline of 15 September 2011. Guidance has been published to update
business plans based on execution realities, and these updates will
continue through implementation. The Department continues planning for
basing implications of the force growth in CONUS and any potential
timing implications for implementation of Integrated Global Presence
and Basing Strategy decisions.

9. Senator McCain. General Cartwright, what is the status of these
efforts, and what do you see as the final outcome from the completion
of these initiatives in terms of military quality-of-life?
General Cartwright. The rebasing initiatives are on track. The
scope of restationing 70,000 troops and their families from Europe and
Korea, Joint Basing, growing the force, and the redeployment of troops
from Iraq and Afghanistan is momentous. However, unit deployments and
soldier, sailor, airman, marine, and family relocations are carefully
choreographed. Throughout these rebasing initiatives, we have done our
best to reduce the impact on the force.
Quality-of-Life is one of the Department's top four priorities,
which also include win the war on terrorism, accelerate transformation,
and strengthen joint warfighting. Our priorities are mutually
supportive in that success in one will support success in others.
Conversely, delay in one will impede success in others. Bringing people
home alive and intact is Quality-of-Life Job #1. The best leadership,
the most innovative tactics, the best equipment, and the best force
protection are indispensable to this goal. We must show respect for the
men and women who serve this country in the way we man, train, equip,
mobilize, deploy, employ, sustain, redeploy, refurbish, and demobilize
the force. This applies to the Total Force--Active, Guard, Reserve;
military, civilian, and contractor. We must be mindful of the effects
making changes to the quality of life on one segment of the force has
on other segments of the force, as well as the second and third order
effects of initiatives in this area.
The Department has included, as an integral component, a number of
important quality-of-life facilities in our construction projects over
the next 3 fiscal years. As these projects are accomplished, we see
significant improvement in the numbers and types of quality facilities,
which provide places for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
civilians and their families to work, live, and train. Our people
continue to make great sacrifices in fighting the global war on
terrorism and our Nation owes them a debt of gratitude. We therefore
see it as absolutely necessary to ensure we make every effort to match
their quality of life with the quality of service they provide our
Nation.

10. Senator McCain. General Cartwright, is the plan to draw down
troops in Europe outdated, given the ongoing war in Iraq and other
world developments?
General Cartwright. The Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and Headquarters, U.S. Army,
are currently reviewing U.S. troop strength in Europe, based on the
EUCOM Commander's concerns about meeting commitments within his area of
responsibility. This review is based on concerns about changes that
have taken place worldwide since the 2004 Report to Congress on
``Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture.''

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

11. Senator McCain. General Cartwright, the Joint Cargo Aircraft
(JCA) has been a controversial topic over the last few years. Although
there is support for the program, and the Army and Air Force have
signed a Memorandum of Agreement establishing a joint requirement,
there is still no clear path ahead as to who should be the executive
agent for the program. Similar to last year, this year's House version
of the Defense Authorization Bill authorizes money for JCA to the Army,
although less than DOD requested, while the Senate version authorizes
money for the Air Force. Also last year, the authorizing committees
gave money for JCA to the Air Force, while the appropriations
committees moved the money to the Army. As the National Defense
Authorization and Appropriations Bills for Fiscal Year 2008 are
pending, where the money's final resting place will be is still in
question. Currently, the JCA is operating out of a Joint Program
Office, and is on cost and schedule. If the program is transferred
fully to the Air Force or fully to the Army, will they be able to
seamlessly assume full programmatic control and continue to maintain
cost and schedule?
General Cartwright. The Joint Cargo Aircraft program fulfills a
critical capability gap for the Army and the Air Force. The JCA will
replace aging C-23 and C-26 aircraft and will complement the existing
joint capabilities in order to fulfill the intratheater airlift
mission, focused on transporting time-sensitive mission-critical cargo
and passengers. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has validated
this requirement for both Services and believes that the joint CONOPs
developed by the Army and Air Force will optimize the efficiencies and
operational effectiveness for the Joint Force Commander.
The Joint Program Office is working closely with both Services to
field this capability as soon as possible to meet critical needs of the
joint warfighter and has developed a comprehensive joint acquisition
strategy in order to do so. According to the JCA program office, any
efforts to consolidate funding into one Service would likely increase
the overall program cost and delay the schedule of the program.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE EXECUTIVE AGENCY

12. Senator McCain. General Cartwright, in response to an Air Force
request, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) recently
endorsed the Air Force as the Executive Agent for Medium and High
Altitude Unmanned Aircraft Systems. The Joint Staff further recommended
the Air Force address equipment standardization and acquisition
streamlining. In 2005, the JROC determined that an executive agent
wasn't necessary, and instead created two Centers of Excellence and the
Joint Unmanned Aerial Systems Materiel Review Board to share
operational tips and work out best practices. The Army opposes
designating the Air Force as executive agent, as does the Navy. In your
view, does establishing an executive agent impact the legal
responsibilities and authorities of the various Services, specifically
in relation to acquisition management?
General Cartwright. I do not believe establishing an executive
agent would impact the Services' legal responsibilities or authorities.
That said, the DOD has a formal process, including legal review, to
assess and determine the applicability of executive agency to any given
issue. In the specific case of unmanned aerial vehicles, the Secretary
of Defense is currently reviewing the JROC's recommendations.

13. Senator McCain. General Cartwright, if confirmed, how will you
assure the Services manage their acquisition dollars in a way that
avoids duplication and maximizes current efficiencies, while operating
within the current acquisition regulations?
General Cartwright. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
I would serve as the co-chair for the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB).
The DAB is the DOD's senior oversight body for acquisition. The DAB
process is designed to ensure the Services avoid duplication, maximize
efficiencies, and comply with acquisition regulations.

14. Senator McCain. General Cartwright, how will you ensure that
the needs of the commanders on the ground and in the field are not
compromised in this area?
General Cartwright. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
I intend to be in close contact with all combatant commanders. Issues
impacting commanders on the ground and in the field will receive my
highest priority for resolution.
______

[The nomination reference of Gen. James E. Cartwright,
USMC, follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 28, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment to the grade indicated while
assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
U.S.C., sections 601 and 154:

To be General

Gen. James E. Cartwright, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC

General Cartwright assumed his duties as the Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command on 9 July 2004.
General Cartwright's previous assignment was as the Director for
Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J-8), the Joint Staff. As
director, he supported the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
force structure requirements; studies, analyses, and assessments; and
in the evaluation of military forces, plans, programs, and strategies.
As Secretary of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, he
coordinated Joint Staff actions in support of the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and represented the interests of the commanders
of the combatant commands in requirements generation, acquisition and
planning, and programming and budgeting.
General Cartwright was commissioned a second lieutenant in the
Marine Corps in November 1971. He attended Naval Flight Officer
training and graduated in April 1973. He attended Naval Aviator
training and graduated in January 1977. He has operational assignments
as a NFO in the F-4, and as a pilot in the F-4, OA-4, and F/A-18.
General Cartwright's operational assignments include: Commanding
General, First Marine Aircraft Wing (2000-2002), Deputy Commanding
General Marine Forces Atlantic (1999-2000), Commander Marine Aircraft
Group 31 (1994-1996), Commander Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232
(1992), Fixed Wing Operations Marine Aircraft Group 24 (1991),
Commander Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 12 (1989-1990),
Administration Officer and Officer-In-Charge Deployed Carrier
Operations VMFAT-101 (1983-1985), Aircraft Maintenance Officer VMFA-235
(1979-1982), Line Division Officer VMFA-333 U.S.S. Nimitz (1975-1977),
Embarkation OIC VMFA-251 & 232 (1973-1975).
General Cartwright's staff assignments include: Director for Force
Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8 the Joint Staff (2002-2004),
Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, J-8 the
Joint Staff (1996-1999), Deputy Aviation Plans, Policy, and Budgets
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (1993-1994), Assistant Program Manager
for Engineering, F/A-18 Naval Air Systems Command (1986-1989).
General Cartwright was named the Outstanding Carrier Aviator by the
Association of Naval Aviation in 1983. He graduated with distinction
from the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB 1986, and received
his Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 1991. He was selected for and
completed a fellowship with Massachusetts Institute of Technology in
1994.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. James E.
Cartwright, USMC, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
James E. Cartwright.

2. Position to which nominated:
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Date of nomination:
June 28, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
September 22, 1949; Rockford, IL.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Sandra K. Cartwright (maiden name: Waltz).

7. Names and ages of children:
Billee Ann Bennett, 33; and Jayme Roland, 27.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational or other institution.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
None.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2007,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 3, 2007.]

TO CONSIDER CERTAIN PENDING MILITARY NOMINATIONS

----------

TUESDAY, JULY 31, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Clinton,
Pryor, Webb, McCaskill, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins,
Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, Martinez, and Corker.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Madelyn R.
Creedon, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K.
Levine, general counsel; Michael J. Noblet, research assistant;
and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority
counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member;
Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff
member; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; Diana
G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork and Kevin A.
Cronin.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and
Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M.
Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Christopher Caple,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey and Dahlia Reed,
assistants to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to
Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C.
Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant
to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants to
Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins;
Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Andrew
King, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to
Senator Dole; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune;
John L, Goetchius and Brian W. Walsh, assistants to Senator
Martinez; and Bradford T. Sellers, assistant to Senator Corker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Before I call on Senator Warner, there is
now a quorum present. I would ask the committee to consider a
list of 1,875 pending military nominations, they've all been
before the committee the required length of time, and I would
ask for a motion to favorably report those nominations.
Senator Warner. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second? Seconded.
All in favor, say aye? [Chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, nay? [No response.]
The motion carries.
We appreciate that action and we'll call on Senator Warner.
Thank you for allowing me to do that before your turn.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on July 31, 2007
1. COL Bradly S. MacNealy, ARNG, to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 109).
2. In the Air Force, there are 27 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Maria M. Alsina) (Reference No.
368).
3. Maj. Gen. Daniel J. Darnell, USAF, to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Space and Information Operations, Plans and
Requirements, Headquarters, US Air Force (Reference No. 476).
4. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Victor G. Guillory) (Reference No. 501-2).
5. CAPT David J. Mercer, USN, to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 566).
6. In the Navy Reserve, there are 206 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Nicholas J. Alaga, Jr.) (Reference No. 567).
7. In the Army, there are 32 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with James E. Caraway, Jr.) (Reference
No. 628).
8. Col. Lyn D. Sherlock, USAF, to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 646).
9. Maj. Gen. Donald C. Wurster, USAF, to be lieutenant general and
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command (Reference No. 661).
10. Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, to be general and Vice Chief of
Staff, U.S. Air Force (Reference No. 685).
11. Lt. Gen. Arthur J. Lichte, USAF, to be general and Commander,
Air Mobility Command (Reference No. 686).
12. Gen. John D.W. Corley, USAF, to be general and Commander, Air
Combat Command (Reference No. 687).
13. Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz, USAF, to be lieutenant general and
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and Director, Air Staff (Reference No.
701).
14. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (Peter J. Oldmixon) (Reference No. 702).
15. In the Navy, there are 43 appointments to the grade of captain
and below (list begins with Dan L. Ammons) (Reference No. 703).
16. In the Navy, there are 19 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Gilbert Ayan) (Reference No.
704).
17. In the Navy, there are 16 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Simonia R. Blassingame) (Reference No.
705).
18. In the Navy, there are 20 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Jeffrey A. Bayless) (Reference No. 706).
19. In the Navy, there are 26 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Chris D. Agar) (Reference No. 707).
20. In the Navy, there are 27 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Paul B. Anderson) (Reference No. 708).
21. In the Navy, there are five appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Christina S. Hagen) (Reference No. 709).
22. In the Navy, there are 14 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Christopher J. Arends) (Reference No. 710).
23. In the Navy, there are 10 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Sarah A. Dachos) (Reference No. 711).
24. In the Navy, there are 26 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Benito E. Baylosis) (Reference No. 712).
25. In the Navy, there are 18 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Douglas S. Belvin) (Reference No. 713).
26. In the Navy, there are nine appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Fitzgerald Britton) (Reference No. 714).
27. In the Navy, there are 56 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with William L. Abbott) (Reference No. 715).
28. In the Navy, there are 538 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Kevin T. Aanestad) (Reference No. 716).
29. COL Michael J. Trombetta, USAR, to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 734).
30. In the Army, there are 23 appointments to the grade of major
general (list begins with Charles A. Anderson) (Reference No. 735).
31. RADM David Architzel, USN, to be vice admiral and Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition (Reference No. 736).
32. VADM John D. Stufflebeem, USN, to be vice admiral and Director,
Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference
No. 737).
33. RADM (Selectee) Adam M. Robinson, Jr., USN, to be vice admiral
and Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General
(Reference No. 738).
34. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to be lieutenant
colonel (Jonathan L. Huggins) (Reference No. 741).
35. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to be lieutenant
colonel (Nelson L. Reynolds) (Reference No. 742).
36. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to be lieutenant
colonel (Bryan M. Boyles) (Reference No. 743).
37. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to be major (Michael
S. Agabegi) (Reference No. 744).
38. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to be major (Freddie
M. Goldwire) (Reference No. 745)
39. In the Air Force, there are four appointments to be lieutenant
colonel and below (list begins with Val C. Hagans) (Reference No. 746).
40. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to be lieutenant
colonel and below (list begins with Kent S. Thompson) (Reference No.
747).
41. In the Air Force, there are four appointments to be major (list
begins with Thomas S. Butler) (Reference No. 748).
42. In the Army, there is one appointment to be colonel (Stephen T.
Sauter) (Reference No. 749).
43. In the Army, there is one appointment to be colonel (Terry D.
Bonner) (Reference No. 750).
44. In the Army, there is one appointment to be lieutenant colonel
(Mark Trawinski) (Reference No. 751).
45. In the Army, there is one appointment to be major (Francisco C.
Dominicci) (Reference No. 752).
46. In the Army, there is one appointment to be major (Joseph E.
Jones) (Reference No. 753).
47. In the Army, there is one appointment to be major (Colin S.
McKenzie) (Reference No. 754).
48. In the Army, there are two appointments to be major (list
begins with Lozay Foots) (Reference No. 755).
49. In the Army, there are two appointments to be major (list
begins with Louis R. Kubala) (Reference No. 756).
50. In the Army, there are two appointments to be major (list
begins with William A. McNaughton) (Reference No. 757).
51. In the Army, there are three appointments to be lieutenant
colonel and below (list begins with James E. Cole) (Reference No. 758).
52. In the Army, there are two appointments to be lieutenant
colonel (list begins with Daniel L. Duecker) (Reference No. 759).
53. In the Army, there are 44 appointments to be major (list begins
with Joseph A. Bernierrodriguez) (Reference No. 760).
54. In the Navy Reserve, there is one appointment to be captain
(Bruce S. Lavin) (Reference No. 761).
55. In the Navy Reserve, there are two appointments to be captain
(list begins with Christopher R. Davis) (Reference No. 762).
56. In the Navy Reserve, there are three appointments to be
commander (list begins with Robert D. Clery) (Reference No. 763).
57. In the Air Force, there are 24 appointments to be major general
(list begins with Robert R. Allardice) (Reference No. 769).
58. In the Army, there are 342 appointments to be major (list
begins with Mazen Abbas) (Reference No. 770).
59. In the Navy, there are 56 appointments to be commander (list
begins with Michael J. Allanson) (Reference No. 771).
60. In the Navy, there are 36 appointments to be commander (list
begins with Maria L. Aguayo) (Reference No. 772).
61. In the Navy, there are 27 appointments to be commander (list
begins with Antony Berchmanz) (Reference No. 773).
62. In the Navy, there are 58 appointments to be commander (list
begins with Eric J. Bach) (Reference No. 774).
63. In the Navy, there are 116 appointments to be commander (list
begins with Elizabeth M. Adriano) (Reference No. 775).
Total: 1,875.

[Whereupon, at 10:09 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

NOMINATIONS OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE
OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; GEN WILLIAM E. WARD,
USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND; GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, FOR
REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND; AND LT. GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, TO BE
GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND AND
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER FOR TRANSFORMATION

----------

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Bill Nelson, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Webb, Warner, Inhofe, Collins, Thune, and
Martinez.
Other Senators present: Senator Inouye.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard
W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional
staff member; Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: William M. Caniano,
professional staff member; David G. Collins, research
assistant; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff
member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Kristine
L. Svinicki, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Benjamin L.
Rubin, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator
Pryor; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J.
Lazarski and Nathan Reese, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Todd
Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Stuart C. Mallory and
Jason Van Beek, assistants to Senator Thune; and Brian W.
Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The Senate Armed
Services Committee will come to order.
Today, the committee considers the nominations of four
distinguished senior military officers: Admiral Gary Roughead,
the nominee to be Chief of Naval Operations (CNO); General
William Ward, the nominee for Commander, U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM); General Kevin Chilton, the nominee for Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM); and General James Mattis,
the nominee for Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
and Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation.
We all know that the long hours and hard work that are put
in by our senior military officials at the Department of
Defense (DOD) require commitment and sacrifice, not only from
our nominees, but also from their families. We greatly
appreciate the willingness of our nominees to carry their new
responsibilities that they will be carrying, but we also
appreciate the support of the families. Without that support,
these men could not possibly do what they have been asked to do
throughout their careers and what they are going to be asked to
do when they're confirmed. At the appropriate time, we will ask
our nominees to introduce their families.
Our nominees are an impressive group of officers, one from
each military service, as it happens, with a combined total of
more than 140 years in military service. Admiral Roughead has
served as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Commander of
the Pacific Fleet, and Commandant of the U.S. Naval Academy.
General Ward has served as Deputy Commander, U.S. European
Command (EUCOM) and as Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army
Europe, and 7th Army Germany. General Chilton has served as
Commander, Air Force Space Command, and has flown three Space
Shuttle missions. General Mattis has served as Commanding
General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and
Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division.
If confirmed, each of our nominees will be responsible for
helping the DOD face critical challenges.
Admiral Roughead would be the 29th CNO. He will face
difficult tasks of recruiting and retaining a quality force and
maintaining current readiness to conduct the ongoing war on
terrorism, while, at the same time, transforming the Navy force
structure to deal with the threats of the future in the face of
difficult cost and scheduling problems with the Navy's major
acquisition programs.
General Ward would be the first commander of a brand new
command, U.S. AFRICOM. He will be confronted by challenges of
transnational terrorism, instability, and the concern of many
Africans about the U.S. military's intention in Africa. This
committee will be looking to the new command to greatly improve
efforts to train members of African militaries for peacekeeping
missions in Africa.
General Chilton will be the Commander, U.S. STRATCOM, and
will face challenges of ensuring the safety and security of our
nuclear weapons, looking at the further reductions in the
nuclear stockpile, ensuring that the missile defense system is
fully tested, reliable, and focused on near-term threats,
working to improve our abilities to protect vital computer
networks, support the other combatant commanders, and
coordinate the various elements of the intelligence community
to ensure that the military has the most up-to-date and timely
intelligence.
General Mattis will be the new Commander of U.S. JFCOM.
JFCOM supports the development and integration of present and
future joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities. This
committee has a longstanding interest in this command's
mission, responsibilities, authorities, and activities with
respect to joint doctrine development, training,
experimentation, and acquisition.
General Mattis has also been nominated as Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation, one of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's (NATO) two strategic commanders. General Mattis
would be only the third to hold this position since Allied
Command Transformation was established in 2002. In this
capacity, he'll face the task of carrying out Allied Command
Transformation's mission of promoting the continuing
transformation of NATO's forces, capabilities, and doctrine,
and to enhance the Alliance's effectiveness and
interoperability.
I'm going to turn the gavel, now, over to Senator Ben
Nelson, who has agreed to take over as chair this morning,
because the fact that the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008 is on the floor, and I should be down on
the floor of the Senate. I'm very grateful to Senator Nelson
for accepting the responsibility. I'm sorry that I'm going to
miss most, if not all, of the testimony of you four gentlemen,
and the answers to the questions, but my staff is here and will
be following the hearing very closely.
Now, I'll ask my old friend and colleague--or my young old
friend and colleague----[Laughter.]
Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
We should acquaint our witnesses and families with the fact
that the Senate is scheduled to start a series of as many as
five votes around 11 o'clock. consequently, Mr. Chairman, I'm
going to ask unanimous consent to place in the record a
statement by Senator McCain, followed by a statement that I
have prepared. I join you in welcoming the families, and I'll
forego going into the details of those statements, because I
think you adequately covered it everything, and because it will
enable our members to have the maximum amount of time for
questions before they must depart for the important votes that
will take place at 11 o'clock.
Chairman Levin. Those statements will be made part of the
record.
Senator Warner. Fine.
[The prepared statements of Senator McCain and Senator
Warner follow:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain

I want to welcome and congratulate Admiral Roughead, General Ward,
General Chilton, Lieutenant General Mattis, and their families on your
nominations. Your nominations come at a critical time in our country's
history. The United States faces a myriad of strategic, diplomatic, and
military challenges. If confirmed, your commands will play an integral
role in ensuring the future security of our Nation, friends and allies.
Mr. Chairman, I have confidence in these nominees, their leadership and
experience and am grateful to them for their service.
Admiral Roughead, congratulations on your nomination as the 29th
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). I am a strong proponent of defense
acquisition reform. In this year's Senate version of the National
Defense Authorization Act, we have established a three-star military
deputy to the Service Acquisition Executive which would strengthen the
performance of the service acquisition executive; improve the oversight
provided military officers serving in acquisition commands; and,
strengthen the acquisition career field in the military. I look forward
to hearing your thoughts about appointing a Principal Military Deputy
with significant experience in the areas of acquisition and program
management. I also welcome your thoughts on what role the CNO and any
member of the Joint Chiefs should play in acquisition program
management.
While a great deal of emphasis has been placed on our ground
forces, the Navy faces significant challenges, including China's rapid
development of a blue-water navy and developing a comprehensive Indian
Ocean strategy which includes deterring threats to vital sea lanes of
communication and maintaining a capacity to facilitate humanitarian
assistance as the Navy did during the 2004 tsunami disaster. Our
efforts gain us a great deal of goodwill in the region and should
continue to build on those relationships. I look forward to hearing
your thoughts on the future of the Navy and how it will support the
National Military Strategy and your plans to implement the ``313-ship
Navy.''
General Ward, welcome and thank you for accepting this challenging
and important new assignment. The new Africa Command (AFRICOM) offers a
variety of opportunity not only for the military but for the
interagency. This new command will have unprecedented interagency
participation and cooperation. The establishment of AFRICOM is
testament to the growing importance of Africa to U.S. national security
and strategic interests. I hope AFRICOM will be a model example of how
the military working with other U.S. agencies can foster long-term
stability on the continent. While the U.S. has provided both military
training and humanitarian assistance to several African nations,
AFRICOM has an opportunity to manage all of these efforts and achieve
maximum results. I believe the most important role we can play in
Africa is in enhancing nations' governance, law enforcement and
peacekeeping capacity. AFRICOM's success will rely heavily on close
interagency cooperation. Your long and exemplary service and varied
experiences make you well-suited to lead this new command. I look
forward to hearing your vision for its development and mission.
General Chilton, as the current Commander of Air Force Space
Command, you are more than qualified to lead U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM). The mission of ``strategic forces'' has changed
significantly over the last 30 years and the threat to our strategic
forces. Now, we face a formidable threat to our information operations.
I look forward to hearing from you about what areas you are prepared to
improve within STRATCOM's diverse portfolio including, global strike,
space operations; information operations; missile defense; command and
control; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and countering
weapons of mass destruction. I am also very interested in the ongoing
investigation of the transport of nuclear warheads on a B-52 bomber in
September. I look forward to hearing the results of that investigation,
but I would also welcome your ideas about how to prevent such an
incident from happening again.
General James Mattis, thank you for your service. You have
performed admirably as the Commander of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces
Central Command. The Marines are a small service, but the work the
Marines have done in al-Anbar, Fallujah, and Kabul is remarkable. You
have done a formidable job in your current command and I congratulate
you on your nomination to serve as the Commander of the United States
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation. We will be well-served by
your vast experience and I appreciate all the work and sacrifice of the
men and women under your command. You have been on the frontlines of
the wars we are waging on multiple fronts. Never before have we asked
so much of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. In Iraq,
Afghanistan, and theaters around the world, our troops are
participating in an unprecedented number of joint operations and their
efforts appear nearly seamless. Our troops face daunting challenges,
but they are succeeding and excelling at every task they are given.
Despite the sacrifices of our brave men and women, Americans will
continue to face profound and pervasive threats to the liberty and
freedom that we so richly enjoy. If confirmed as JFCOM Commander, you
will play a pivotal role in developing our interoperability
requirements to counter these threats. Now more than ever, JFCOM must
be agile and responsive to an ever-evolving threat situation. I look
forward to hearing your priorities for improving our troops' readiness
and joint warfighting capabilities.
I thank all of the nominees and their families for being here today
and for all of their honorable and long service to this Nation. I look
forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
______

Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in welcoming Admiral Roughead,
General Ward, General Chilton, and Lieutenant General Mattis, and their
family members, and congratulating them on their nominations.
Admiral Roughead, we are delighted to have you appear before us as
the President's nominee to be the 29th Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).
You've earned this nomination and your current assignment as Commander,
U.S. Fleet Forces Command through a most impressive career of proven
leadership, including multiple command at-sea tours, and as Commander
of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The challenges before the CNO demand such
experience and more.
I will be interested in your views on how the new Maritime
Strategy, which the Navy is preparing to unveil, will influence the
size and shape and operations of our Navy in support of the National
Military Strategy. As well, I look for your plans to recapitalize the
fleet, to what Admiral Mullen has referred to as the ``313-ship Navy,''
and similarly, your plans to address the looming critical shortfall in
strike-fighter aircraft. It will be important to understand how you
propose to control requirements and control cost in order to achieve
these most fundamental objectives for the Navy. Again, I commend and
thank you for your dedicated service to our Nation and look forward to
your testimony today.
General Ward, you have been nominated to take on a very exciting
and challenging assignment. If confirmed, you will be the first
commander of the newly established Africa Command (AFRICOM). The
decision to have an independent command for Africa reflects a growing
recognition that the African continent is as important to U.S. national
security interests as are Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and South
America.
However, AFRICOM will have some unique attributes, as so many of
the challenges there require an intensive dedication of the non-
military tools of national power. The military also has a role to play
in helping to strengthen the capabilities of African nations to govern
their own spaces and to participate in peacekeeping operations. To be
successful, this command must be characterized by a very high degree of
cooperation with the Department of State and the country teams in U.S.
embassies on the continent. I can think of no officer better prepared
or more qualified to get this command off on a positive footing.
General Chilton, as the current Commander of Air Force Space
Command, with extensive space and nuclear force experience, you are
well qualified to lead U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). During the
Cold War, U.S. ``strategic forces'' were synonymous with nuclear
capabilities. Today, however, STRATCOM's mission goes well beyond
nuclear deterrence, and must take into account new threats to national
security posed by terrorism, rogue states, and non-state actors.
STRATCOM is now charged with integrating space operations:
information operations: missile defense: global command and control:
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance: global strike; combating
weapons of mass destruction (WMD): as well as the traditional mission
of strategic deterrence.
General Chilton, I will be interested to learn where you intend to
place your emphasis and how you view STRATCOM's role in fighting
today's threats. I'm sure the committee would also benefit from your
views on the September 5, 2007 incident regarding the inadvertent
transport of several nuclear warheads aboard a B-52 bomber, as well as
the broader question concerning the handling of nuclear weapons across
our forces. This is a matter of grave concern to this committee and the
chairman and ranking member have requested a full investigation.
The committee will also hear from Lieutenant General James Mattis
who has been nominated to serve as the Commander, United States Joint
Forces Command and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme
Allied Commander, Transformation.
General Mattis, your current service as Commander, U.S. Marine
Corps Forces Central Command, provides you a unique understanding of
the importance of the missions carried out by JFCOM. In its role as
force provider, JFCOM assigns nearly all conventional forces based in
the continental United States, while JFCOM is also charged with the
development of interoperability requirements which ensure our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines can combine their capabilities into a
single successful effort. To fulfill this role, JFCOM must maintain
close coordination with Active, National Guard, and Reserve elements
and deep awareness of current unit availability and readiness.
The committee looks forward to hearing about your plans and
priorities for strengthening both our readiness and our joint
warfighting capabilities. The committee is also very interested to hear
your plans for advancing NATO transformation and interoperability,
which is so critical to NATO's ability to carry out joint operations
in-theater and beyond, as in Afghanistan.
I thank each of our nominees, and their families, for their
continued service and look forward to their testimony.

Senator Warner. I think--at the appropriate time, it would
be nice to have each nominee introduce their families--
extraordinarily turned out--and it's so important, because we
all recognize that you're here today--recognized by our
President and about to be confirmed by the Senate; I'm
confident that each of you will be--only because of the strong
support that each of you receive through family structure in
these many years to reach the very, very top of your military
professions. So, I not only congratulate you, but your
families, who helped you achieve that goal.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Before Senator Nelson calls on each of you for your own
opening statements and to introduce your families, let me just
ask the standard questions.
These are questions that are asked by this committee of
each of our nominees. You can answer together.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
[Witnesses replied in the affirmative.]
Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation
process?
[Witnesses replied in the negative.]
Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines
established for requested communications, including questions
for the record at hearings?
[Witnesses replied in the affirmative.]
Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
[Witnesses replied in the affirmative.]
Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
[Witnesses replied in the affirmative.]
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon
request, before this committee?
[Witnesses replied in the affirmative.]
Do you agree to give your personal views, when asked before
this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the
administration in power?
[Witnesses replied in the affirmative.]
Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when
requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with
the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or
denial in providing such documents?
[Witnesses agreed.]
We thank you all.
Senator Nelson, thank you, again.
Senator Ben Nelson [presiding]. Are there any opening
statements from any of our members?
Senator Warner. I forego it, on behalf of Senator McCain
and myself. I believe we're anxious to proceed to questions.
Senator Ben Nelson. There being none----
Senator Inhofe. I would do the same.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay.
Admiral Roughead, we'll begin with you.

STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral Roughead. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of
the committee, it's a great honor to appear before this
committee as the nominee to be our Navy's CNO.
I'm grateful for the confidence placed in me by President
Bush, Secretary Gates, Secretary Winter, and Admiral Mike
Mullen.
I am most grateful for the support, the understanding, and
inspiration of my wife, Ellen, who has been with me all these
years, and our daughter, Elizabeth----
Senator Ben Nelson. How many years? [Laughter.]
Admiral Roughead. I'll let her answer that, sir.
[Laughter.]
1973 is when we first met. We had a very long courtship--9
years. She would never say yes. So, that's--for those years.
But then, we're also joined by our daughter, Elizabeth, who is
a junior at Middlebury College in Vermont, where she's majoring
in conservation biology. They truly are the loves of my life.
The opportunity to serve our Nation and to lead our Navy is
the highest honor for any naval officer. For the past 4 years,
I've had the privilege of leading our operational forces in the
Atlantic and the Pacific, Navy and Joint. I've watched our
sailors perform magnificently from the high end of combat to
the most extensive humanitarian and relief operation ever
undertaken by our military. Every day and in every environment,
I'm inspired by what they do and who they are. They are bright,
they are focused, they are tough, and they are competent, yet
they are compassionate when reaching out to others. They truly
are the face of our Nation in far-off lands.
Today, 51 percent of our force is underway, 41 percent are
deployed. We have 14,650 sailors on the ground in the Middle
East; 6,500--or just above 6,500--are there on individual
assignments. We are a ready, agile, and global Navy.
My priorities have been, and will be, maintaining our
current readiness, building the Navy of tomorrow, and that
which underpins all we do--our people--our sailors, our
civilians, and our very special families whose hallmarks are
sacrifice and self-reliance.
Maintaining our current readiness gives us the ability to
be an effective force anywhere in the world. With building the
Navy of tomorrow comes the responsibility, the accountability,
and the obligation to clearly and thoughtfully define how we
will fight and what we need, not want, to be able to do that.
We must accurately articulate our requirements, and be
disciplined in our process, to get us to that new future.
But all we acquire is of little worth without the people
who give it value. Our policies must enable us to recruit, to
retain, and to fulfill the young men and women of America, and
our Navy must reflect the demographic of our diverse Nation.
Those are my priorities. You know them so well, because,
without your leadership and your support and your interest, we
would not be the Navy that we are today or the Navy we must be
tomorrow.
Thank you for all you do to maintain our Navy. To lead our
Navy at this time is humbling, but, if confirmed, I am eager
and ready to do so. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Inouye is here to make a more appropriate
introduction, I believe.
Senator Inouye.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF HAWAII

Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much.
Thirty-four years ago, Admiral Gary Roughead was
commissioned as an Ensign in the United States Navy. After
graduating from the Naval Academy at Annapolis, the Admiral has
had a long and distinguished career in the Navy. He has served
several tours of duty at sea, and is remembered as the first
naval officer to command both an Aegis destroyer and an Aegis
cruiser. He also commanded the George Washington carrier battle
group and served as both the Deputy Commander at the Pacific
Command and the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.
Today, Admiral Roughead is the Commander of the U.S. Fleet
Forces Command, where he is responsible for providing manned,
trained, and equipped Navy operating forces worldwide. In this
capacity, he's also the supporting commander to U.S. JFCOM for
Naval Global Force Management and the Navy Supporting Component
to the U.S. Northern Command and U.S. STRATCOM.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this is a very,
very impressive resume. Admiral Roughead's various
responsibilities make him well-qualified to serve as the Navy's
next CNO.
But that is not the reason that I volunteered to recommend
him to the committee. My reasons are much more personal. Mr.
Chairman, for several years I've had the great pleasure to work
with the Admiral in his leadership positions, particularly in
the Pacific. I've come to know the Admiral as a man of keen
vision, tireless energy, great wisdom, and compassion. Admiral
Roughead possesses those elements of leadership which allow him
to be effective without instilling fear among his subordinates.
He has been successful without evoking jealousy among his
peers, and he has demonstrated great competence without
conceit.
He is a very rare man and superior naval officer who is
very deserving of the post to which he is nominated. The
country can do no better than to have him at the helm.
Mr. Chairman, I don't want to embarrass him, but there's
one story I wish to pass on regarding this nomination. Several
months ago, when it became known that Admiral Roughead was to
be considered for nomination as the next CNO, I began receiving
phone calls and messages from other senior naval leaders. In
every case, they suggested that the Admiral was the right man
for the job. But what was most surprising was when other
candidates for the position also suggested that they believed
that Admiral Roughead was the best choice. In all my years in
the Senate, I do not recall another time when this has
happened. I think that speaks volumes about the nominee.
So, Mr. Chairman, I'm here this morning to strongly endorse
the candidate, Admiral Gary Roughead, for the position of CNO.
I believe he is a superb choice, and I wholeheartedly recommend
him to the committee.
I thank you very much, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
General Ward?

STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM E. WARD, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA
COMMAND

General Ward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
Senator Warner, distinguished members of the committee. Thank
you for this opportunity to appear before you today.
I am deeply honored to have been nominated by the President
and the Secretary of the Defense to serve as the Commander of
the U.S. Africa Command. This has been a journey for me that I
am truly honored to be considered for, and I take this
nomination with a great degree of humility, as well as
serenity.
With me today is my wife--and, Senator, I think that she
would be okay with me saying--for 36 years. I hope so, anyway.
[Laughter.]
Joyce has been, as you've indicated, a very constant
support, and, truly, she is the rock upon which I stand. Also
with us today is our daughter, Kahni, and our son-in-law,
Kenyatta, who are both residents of the State of Virginia,
living here, and I am so proud of both of them and all that
they do. While not here, our son, KJ, is watching these
proceedings, if they've been televised, as he is overseas,
working in Germany.
Also accompanying me today is Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates,
from the State Department (DOS). Mary has been tapped to be the
Deputy to the Commander of this Command for Civil Military
Affairs.
The African continent is linked to the United States by
history, culture, economics, and geostrategic significance. The
continent's economic, social, political, and military
importance in global affairs has grown tremendously. In my
current capacity as Deputy Commander of EUCOM, I have traveled
extensively on this vast continent to meet military and
civilian leaders and witness our ongoing military engagement to
help bring stability. From my observations, I believe our
assistance to existing and emerging African security
institutions is most effective when it fosters African
solutions to African challenges.
Many African leaders and their collective organizations,
such as the African Union, have committed to work towards a
safe and secure environment on the continent to promote
effective development and governance. The United States EUCOM,
Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM) have
made great strides working with African militaries to enhance
the security on the continent through military exercises,
humanitarian programs, training events, and support to
peacekeeping operations.
Much of their success stems from listening to the Africans
and getting their perspective, and applying the solutions in
accordance with their stated needs and within our means. The
creation of AFRICOM will allow the DOD to view all of Africa
through a single lens of a single unified command, allowing us
to maximize our participation as a partner in pursuit of our
mutual interests for peace, prosperity, and stability.
I believe success and credibility on the continent will
only be gained by a continuous and sustained engagement with
African organizations and nations to enhance their capabilities
and capacity in achieving the goal of a stable and prosperous
Africa, where growth and expanded horizons exist for future
generations.
AFRICOM has the opportunity to redefine the concept of a
unified command with a vision and a willingness to look beyond
the current paradigm. Our interagency colleagues from DOS, the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and many
more who have also been working on the continent for decades
will be a part of this endeavor. A vision of this new command
will draw upon the expertise of its interagency members.
Together, the work will best offer the chance that military
efforts are harmonized with the work of the interagency,
nongovernmental humanitarian organizations, private enterprise,
and our international partners.
Mr. Chairman, if I am confirmed by the Senate, I pledge to
work hard to establish a command that is value-added for both
the United States and the peoples of Africa. I have been
privileged and honored to serve our great Nation as a soldier
for over 36 years. I will be honored to continue to serve
alongside the outstanding soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
coastguardsmen, and statesmen of AFRICOM as their commander.
I thank you for this opportunity, and I thank you for your
support to our Nation's servicemembers.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, General.
General Chilton?

STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC COMMAND

General Chilton. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
good morning.
Let me begin by first thanking all of you for allowing us
to testify before you today. I know how busy you have been, and
how busy you are going to be over the coming days, and I
greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.
I'm both humbled by the confidence that the Secretary of
Defense and the President placed in me with this nomination,
and humbled by your consideration of my nomination for this
very important position.
But I assure you I wouldn't be here today, or anywhere in
my career, if it wasn't for the wonderful family I have behind
me. I'd like to take the opportunity to begin by introducing my
wife, Cathy, of 19 years of marriage. Cathy, besides
maintaining the overhead of taking care of me over these many
years, somehow has managed to be the mother to four wonderful
daughters, and continue in her service to this country as a
reservist in our United States Air Force. Cathy is a Colonel in
our United States Air Force Reserve. So, she's figured out a
way to balance things far beyond anything I could ever do. Next
to Cathy is my eldest daughter, Madison, who will be
celebrating her 18th birthday tomorrow and is a senior in high
school and working hard toward going to college, and has a
love--she thinks--for veterinary medicine in her future. Next
to her is my daughter, Mary Catherine, who is a sophomore in
high school and is just the most wonderful person you'd ever
want to meet. Sitting next to Mary is my daughter, Megan, who
has begun her freshman year in high school this year. So, we
have quite a team at St. Mary's there in Colorado Springs.
Last, but certainly not least is my daughter, Morgan, who's 12
years old, and is in sixth grade. I am a kept man. [Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. Now, you're not implying that you outrank
Cathy.
General Chilton. Sir, I mentioned that she was a Colonel in
the Air Force Reserves. In the Chilton house, she is a 5-star
General. [Laughter.]
As I said, I truly would not be here today without their
love and support.
I am, again, humbled by the nomination to this very
important position as the Commander of U.S. STRATCOM. If
confirmed, I will be following in some big footsteps, those of
my friend General ``Hoss'' Cartwright. I take this nomination
very seriously, and I commit to you that I will give it my very
best, if confirmed.
Lastly, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity I've had
to meet with various members of the committee, for the working
relationships I've had with the Strategic Subcommittee in my
previous role as the Joint Functional Component Commander for
Space and Global Strike, and in my current position in Air
Force Space Command. These are relationships I know I will look
forward to continuing.
I look forward to your questions, and again, thank you very
much for this opportunity.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, General.
General Mattis?

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, TO BE GENERAL AND
TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND AND SUPREME
ALLIED COMMANDER FOR TRANSFORMATION

General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before the committee and taking your
valuable time for this hearing.
I am honored by the confidence the President and the
Secretary of Defense have placed in me to lead Supreme Allied
Command Transformation and U.S. Joint Forces Command. If
confirmed, I will do my best to carry out my duties and work
openly with Congress. Should you confirm me, my first priority
will be to support NATO and our combatant commanders in active
operations against the enemy. My second priority will be
preparing our NATO forces and the U.S. Joint Team to defeat
future enemies. I will blend these duties, guided always by my
respect for the troops, who put themselves on the line, for
their families, and for the defense of our way of life.
Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, and I'm ready for your
questions.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, General.
I think we'll begin with a round of questions at 6 minutes
each.
General Chilton, should you be confirmed, we look forward
to you joining an already great community in the Omaha/Bellevue
area of Nebraska. The addition of your family will raise the
population figures immensely in that area. [Laughter.]
I know the folks at STRATCOM are eager for your experience
and your leadership that you will bring to that position.
As you think about the STRATCOM future, are there any major
longer-term issues that need to be dealt with, other than the
ones that you'll begin with on a day-to-day basis? What are
your longer-term expectations?
General Chilton. Senator, STRATCOM has a lot on its plate,
and they have done, I think, a marvelous job in organizing all
the various mission responsibilities that the command has been
given.
I think that a couple of areas will take increased focus
and, I predict, will be growth areas in the future. One will be
the responsibilities in the space domain. Clearly, space is no
longer a sanctuary. That has been made clear to us this past
year. I think we need to be extra focused in this area to make
sure that we have the right command-and-control structures in
place, the right information in place, the right command
relationships in place to provide the space capabilities that
all our forces around the world have become dependent upon.
I think another area that we're going to want to raise our
focus on is in cyberspace, the global network, and the threats
to that particular domain. This is, again, another domain on
which the entire joint force has become dependent on, it's
integrated into the way we do operations, and it is a global
capability for which STRATCOM has specific authorities and
responsibilities.
At the same time, we have to keep our eye on the ball with
our strategic nuclear deterrent missions and our continuing
mission effort to combat WMD, integrate missile defenses,
coordinate information operations, and integrating
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset
requirements for the combatant commands around the world.
Senator Ben Nelson. The integration of offensive and
defensive systems is a major challenge. Do you think that there
are some specific things that might be helpful to make sure
that integration is as seamless as it can be?
General Chilton. Senator, I don't have any specific changes
that I have thought of at this time. What I will focus on, if
confirmed, is how we're moving forward in integrating missile
defense and the active and passive defense part of the new
triad with our offensive capabilities, both kinetic and
nonkinetic.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
General Mattis, when we met, earlier this week, you made a
very important point, in my opinion, that equipment and weapons
augment our operations, but the real way to win in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and perhaps in other parts of the world, is
through human bonds and relationships that can be developed
with our troops on the ground. You outlined the need to
readdress training in language and in culture, as well. Could
you give the committee some of your thoughts on how we might do
that and why you think that's important?
General Mattis. I can, Mr. Chairman. I believe we face an
enemy today lacking--the current enemy lacks a fleet, lacks an
air force. The way we need to dominate this enemy is to create
the kinds of bonds with people across the globe that checkmates
this enemy. We're going to have to be able to speak languages
and understand cultures that perhaps in the past have not been
so critical to our Nation's security. I think the way to do
this is with an emphasis on training and education, and perhaps
beyond things that we--historically, we looked at as the
military priorities--tactics, use of equipment, that sort of
thing. But we're in a type of war where we are not going to win
with a new radio or a new ship or a new airplane. We need those
in order to checkmate other enemies, so that they don't get
brave in certain areas that we don't want to confront them in.
But, at the same time, the enemy that we're up against today,
we are going to have to think differently if we want to deny
them an impact on our way of life.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Ward, as you undertake perhaps
one of the most challenging assignments that you might
anticipate, how would you approach, as the new commander,
dealing with cultures that perhaps have not had any real
connection with the United States--insular governments, insular
and isolated cultures? Do you have any thoughts about how you
might approach that?
General Ward. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
If confirmed, I think one of the underriding endeavors to
causing those with whom we would want to work to understand who
we are, is to build effective relationships. The business of
building relationships is a resource-intensive business, it
requires investment in time, it requires investment in those
things that are important to those with whom you want to be a
partner. If confirmed, I would continue to reinforce the sorts
of activities that would cause trust and confidence to be
built, because we, as a Nation, understand, and those with whom
we would want to partner understand us. That comes through
relationships. That comes through doing the sorts of things
that build mutual trust and confidence. That comes through
doing the sorts of things because we understand, are supportive
of mutual interests and mutual needs. We would invest time
towards that end, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. As we look at other cultures, so very
often we want those cultures to look like us almost
immediately. Do you think that you can create a command there
that will have, not only the interest in the other cultures,
but the patience to deal with cultures that are different than
ours, as opposed to wanting to absolutely proselyte those into
our culture?
General Ward. Senator, these things take time. I am aware
of the time, and that's why the investment over time is so
important, so that the trust and confidence that we would hope
would be established is seen, not because of words, but because
of deeds, and the things that we do in interacting over time. I
believe that that is critically important.
The other point there was, I'm an infantryman, and, for
many years, I've valued the importance of being in a foxhole,
symbolically, but also sometimes quite literally for
protection. But another important aspect of that foxhole is,
you have to get outside of it, go downrange and look back at it
from the perspective of others. I think that is also critical
to this endeavor, looking at this entire endeavor from the
perspective of others, so that we have our best opportunity of
getting in a way that causes the effects to be achieved that we
want to achieve. We must see it through the eyes of others, as
well.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have a question for each of you and ask that you
abbreviate your responses.
First, to the Admiral, the current CNO, an extraordinary
man who is soon to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, put
forth a new maritime strategy for national security. I presume
that you have examined it and that you have made a decision as
to whether you hope to continue along that same strategy.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, Senator. I've been a participant in
the development of that strategy this past year, participating
in the conversations with the country.
Senator Warner. Would you briefly describe what the tenets
are of that strategy?
Admiral Roughead. The tenets are--quite frankly, they
address much of what my colleagues have just addressed, to look
to the future, to not be captured by the status quo, to see
where the strategic trends are going to take us, to provide a
vision for our Navy and, actually, all of our maritime forces,
because we're doing this in cooperation with the Marine Corps
and the Coast Guard. But I intend to continue that process, and
it will serve us well.
Senator Warner. Second, he set a goal of 313 ships. We're
at 278 now. Do you hope to close that gap in the tenure of your
4 years, if confirmed, and is so, how?
Admiral Roughead. If confirmed, Senator, I'm going to work
to close that gap and get to 313 as a floor.
Senator Warner. Do you feel that the current budget, as
received by the Department of the Navy, will enable you to
allocate to or are you going to require some funds over and
above the normal allocation in the Department?
Admiral Roughead. Senator, clearly the current budget,
we're challenged to do that. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the committee to close that number.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
General Chilton, I think it's important that the committee
bring up a matter at this time. It's slightly out of the usual
questions that we ask of our nominees with regard to their
future plans. On August 29, the Air Force discovered that a B-
52 bomber inadvertently transported six advanced cruise
missiles armed with nuclear warheads from Minot, ND, to
Barksdale, LA. Can you tell us what role you'll have in the
investigation, and what steps you would take, if confirmed, to
ensure that this type of professional error never occurs again?
General Chilton. Senator, let me begin with my current
role. As the Commander of Air Force Space Command, I am in
charge of the safety and security of all of the nuclear weapons
that support our land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles. It is a responsibility I take very seriously, as does
the Commander of Air Combat Command with regard to the weapons
for the B-52 and the B-2 bombers.
Senator Warner. Understood.
General Chilton. If confirmed as the Commander of STRATCOM,
I would make sure that the service components who support
STRATCOM, who are chartered to maintain the security and safety
of our weapons, are doing their job. I would recommend that
STRATCOM staff participate in the inspections of those
facilities, and that we maintain the appropriate oversight, so
that we can do our job at STRATCOM, be prepared to employ those
weapons if called on. We cannot do that job if they are not
safe and secure.
Senator Warner. Clearly human error entered this equation,
but that error may have occurred as a consequence of the
appropriate check-offs or other security benchmarks that are in
place. You're going to have to go back and review that system
to determine where that human error entered and how it could
have been prevented if we'd taken steps in accordance with a
fixed series of benchmark checks. Is that correct?
General Chilton. Absolutely. In my current role, the plan
is to do that. Right now, Major General Raaberg is conducting
the investigation. We expect that to report out, the end of
this month. We have already taken actions, both in Air Force
Space Command and in Air Combat Command, to review our
procedures, to meet with those individuals responsible for
executing those procedures to make sure they clearly understand
the gravity of what they do, and make sure they are properly
trained. As the STRATCOM Commander, I would want to see those
results.
Senator Warner. I do feel very firmly that appropriate
accountability, if it is justified by the facts, should be
invoked by the Department.
General Mattis, you're going to have one of the toughest
jobs of anyone; namely, that you have to determine what is in
the inventory of the United States by virtue of available
forces to match up with potential contingencies, and, if need
be, an actual operating contingency, where forces have to move.
I think you're going to have to tell those field commanders and
others, from time to time, ``We don't have them.'' I hope that
you're prepared, as I've come to know you through the years--
prepared to say, ``No, they're not there;'' that you need the
resources to get them ready and have them available to meet
those contingencies.
General Mattis. Yes, Senator. I share your concern. I noted
General Casey's testimony yesterday.
Senator Warner. I draw your attention to that.
General Mattis. Yes, sir. I think that it's something that
we have to be prepared to say, and it's in the face of a U.S.
military that has never been willing to say no when it came to
a test of our resolve to defend this country. But we need to
have a balancing act here, where we can candidly and openly
share with you what we need to do our job, and recognize
sometimes we simply don't have the forces to do something. We
will provide that. I will get in consultation, if you confirm
me, with the component commanders there at JFCOM, and make
certain that's stated.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Lastly, General Ward, your challenges are quite great. You
are focused on, not only title 10, but title 22 activities. Why
don't you describe the difference between the two and how
you're going to balance that mission?
General Ward. Senator, thank you.
Briefly, the title 10 activities are those activities that
we, within the DOD, have proponency for. The title 22
activities are those within the DOS. The business of building
relationships--building partners' capacity is, in fact, the job
of each of those departments, as well as others within our
government. We would look to create an interagency approach. We
work in a very collaborative and harmonious way so that the
efforts that we each bring to that particular endeavor are best
realized in producing an effect that produces the stability,
the security, and the capacity within these organizations that
we'd like to see.
I think the interagency construct of the command, as
envisioned, as we work to bring that to full operational
capability, will go a long way in ensuring that we are
harmonized in working with the various elements of our
Government; most notably, the DOS, USAID, and DOD.
Senator Warner. I know your deputy will be from the DOS.
Having had some modest experience, those two Departments don't
always act like gear wheels together.
General Ward. Yes, sir
Senator Warner. You're going to have to solve some of that
friction.
My time is up.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's always interesting to follow my senior Senator and my
senior colleague from Virginia, because we've had so many
similar experiences, both in the military and in the Pentagon,
that I find that some of the questions I was going to ask have
just been asked. I think that's very healthy, in terms of
looking at where the focus is from this committee.
I'd, first of all, like to say, Mr. Chairman, that I've
been able to meet personally and at length with all of the
nominees. I'm very impressed with the quality and with the
matching of talent to the jobs. I intend to support, strongly,
everyone here. I've had the opportunity to ask a number of
questions, as I said.
I would say, to the Chilton family, having grown up in the
Air Force, I spent my last 3 years in high school in Omaha, and
I played a lot of baseball right across from the house where
you're going to live. I never quite made it into the big house,
but----[Laughter.]
--that's a--it's a wonderful place to live. I have great
confidence you're going to really enjoy it there.
I would also like to say I've had the pleasure of knowing,
for some time, General Mattis, and also Admiral Roughead, and
both are just absolutely superb officers. General Mattis, I
think it deserves to be pointed out, has commanded at every
level in the Marine Corps, starting at a rifle platoon. When
marines look at marines, that's the first thing you look at, in
terms of respect. I'm very confident that you're going to get
your hands on the issue that Senator Warner mentioned. It's a
really serious issue, in terms of what we are trying to do, on
both ends of this difficult problem, matching our people to the
mission; at the same time, not--in some cases, not defining the
mission properly when it comes to taking care of our people.
So, we need the kind of integrity that you're going to bring
here, and the kind of eyes you're going to put on this problem
in order to get some balance.
I have a couple of questions for Admiral Roughead, because
of the nature of the job you're going to be doing, that I'm
concerned about getting on the record. One is, what would you
say--we know we have a 313 floor for the Navy. We also know
that, in this type of environment, which cyclically occurs when
we get involved in these extensive ground operations, where we
have to sustain ground forces and we're burning up gear and all
the rest of that. Sometimes we tend to forget the strategic
issues that face us. That's something that General Chilton will
face on one level, but it's definitely something that affects
the Navy, because we start drawing down force structure, and it
takes so long to gear it back up again. What would you say
would be an optimal build right now? Not off the charts, but an
optimal build for the United States Navy, to meet its strategic
requirements around the world?
Admiral Roughead. Senator, I believe that the shipbuilding
plan that we have in place right now is giving us the balanced
fleet that we need. We are introducing some new classes of
ships that are challenging us in the shipbuilding account. But
that balanced fleet will give us the capability we need from
the high end to the more nontraditional missions that we're
going to face. So, as we have looked at our maritime strategy,
I believe the build plan that we are on will give us what we
need----
Senator Webb. Did you mention 313 is a floor?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
Senator Webb. What would be an optimal build?
Admiral Roughead. I would say that, as we look to the
future, the need to increase our ability to operate more in the
green water, closer to shore, is an area that we must look--and
I intend, if confirmed, to pursue that and explore any growth
in that area.
Senator Webb. So, you're not going to put a number on it.
Admiral Roughead. No, sir.
Senator Webb. Okay.
Admiral Roughead. It's very worthy of deeper consideration.
Senator Webb. I have two questions that I would like to get
written responses to. I don't want to take the time of the
committee on them. They're rather detailed. One of them relates
to the facilities in Norfolk Naval Shipyard that I think we
need to be paying some attention to. The other relates to
issues of home porting--carrier home porting and your views on
strategic dispersal in the modern era, where we're facing a
different kind of--in my view, a different kind of threat--the
terrorism threat, as opposed to the traditional conventional
threat that people like to use. I want to get those to you, and
I would appreciate a pretty quick turnaround on them, if you
could do it.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I will.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, if I might intervene, I would
hope that, General Chilton, you will issue a early invitation
to my colleague from Virginia to, at long last, come to the big
house. [Laughter.]
General Chilton. If confirmed, that'll be top on the list.
[Laughter.]
Senator Webb. I could take you to some pretty interesting
places. [Laughter.]
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have one question I want to ask each of the witnesses,
except for General Chilton, because he won't be dealing
directly with it, and that has to do with training and
equipping. We started the program, as you all know--I've talked
to you--although I apologize to you, Admiral, because we had to
cancel our meeting----
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe.--because of votes--but it's something that
we've tried. It's been very successful. I've made some 15 trips
to the area of responsibility over there, and the commanders in
the field all tell me that 1206, 1207, and 1208, and the
Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) are very, very
critical, and very, very significant. So, I'm going to ask that
question of three of you. Let's start with you, General Mattis.
General Mattis. Sir, this is the kind of war where
ammunition, at times, is better spent--the money for that is
better spent trying to make common cause with the people. This
is not a war that can be won purely by military means. We've
all heard that a number of times. We've seen the proof on the
ground. Those funds allow us to make immediate impacts and to
bring people around who may have been brought up on a diet of
hatred and bias, and bridge over to them, and create a sense of
common purpose. You've seen this work in al Anbar province, I
think for when the enemy made mistakes, we could then exploit
those mistakes.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, sir. So, you strongly support that.
General Mattis. Very strongly.
Senator Inhofe. Also, we had a conversation in my office
about your transformation and your commitment to the Future
Combat System (FCS). If you'd just make one quick comment on
that, we'll go on----
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe.--to the next one.
General Mattis. The Army has to modernize, sir. FCS is the
roadmap they've laid out. We don't need other countries with
artillery that can outrange ours, and this sort of thing. FCS
addresses those deficiencies.
Senator Inhofe. All right, fine.
General Chilton--and let me thank all four of you for your
service. I'm looking forward to supporting all four of you in
this confirmation process. I've often thought--I look back
wistfully at the days of the Cold War, when things were
predictable. When you look at our missile defense system right
now--which is deficient, in my opinion, in the boost phase, but
we're making progress in midcourse and terminal phase--do you
agree with me that perhaps that threat is greater now than it
was even back in the cold war, in terms of Iran and other
countries--North Korea and China--having capabilities they
didn't have before?
General Chilton. Yes, sir, I'd agree that the threat is
greater, and it's more dispersed around the globe, as well.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, and do you think we're going to be
equipped to deal with that?
General Chilton. Senator, I think that is a goal of----
Senator Inhofe. That's your job.
General Chilton. Well, my job----
Senator Inhofe. Partially.
General Chilton.--if confirmed, is to make sure we have an
integrated approach to missile defense that----
Senator Inhofe. Right.
General Chilton.--both serves the local theater commander,
as well as the global needs in defense of----
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Chilton.--the United States of America.
Senator Inhofe. Good. Very good.
Admiral Roughead, I won't ask you if you agree with me or
with the President, because you obviously are the President's
nominee, and not mine. I don't agree with the Law of the Sea
Treaty, and I think there are a lot of deficiencies. When you
look at this, the level of a superbureaucracy that we would be
answering to, I have some serious sovereignty questions.
The only thing I would ask you is--the Law of the Sea
Treaty does identify four specific areas in which ships may be
stopped at high seas: human trafficking, drug trafficking,
piracy, and unauthorized broadcasting. Doesn't have anything to
do--and I read this and come to the conclusion that if we have
knowledge that--intelligence that there's terrorist activities
or something like this, that we would not have that authority.
Does this bother you?
Admiral Roughead. Senator, when I look at the Law of the
Sea Treaty, I believe our operations at sea will be enhanced by
the Law of the Sea Treaty. The codification----
Senator Inhofe. That wasn't my question. My question was,
If we only have four ways of stopping them, and one of them is
not our suspicion they might have WMD or terrorism, is that a
concern to you?
Admiral Roughead. Senator, I believe that the authorities
that we have, and what would be afforded in the treaty, give us
the authorities we need to act on the high seas.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Military actions are exempt
under this treaty, but it doesn't define what ``military
actions'' are. Do you have a definition for that?
Admiral Roughead. Senator, I believe that the treaty will
allow us to conduct the operations that support our access to
our operations. So----
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Well, I'm looking forward to
supporting you. I disagree with you on this issue.
Admiral Roughead. Sure.
Senator Inhofe. Now, General Ward--first of all, we've had
a chance to really get to know each other. I'm delighted when I
look behind you and I see Mary Yates, because I've known Mary
in Burundi, Ghana, and other places, and I think you're going
to be really served well by her. Also, you and she have
something in common, that you agree and understand that--how
important, in the African continent, how--relationships are. As
you and I have talked before, I've had occasion to be over
there, probably more than 30 times, and develop these
relationships.
So, I'd first like to ask you if you would--when you take
this on--and I'm delighted we have AFRICOM. I have not liked
the way it's been divided between EUCOM and CENTCOM before, and
we've talked about this. One area of concern of mine is western
Sahara. Right now, I would only ask that you listen to some of
the experiences of former Secretary James Baker and the efforts
that he has had in trying to do something about this group
that's been wandering in the wilderness now for some 30 years.
I won't ask for a response, except that you will have that on
your radar screen.
Second, we do have, let's get back to train and equip. Do
you agree with the others on train and equip----
General Ward. I do, Senator. Those authorities and
flexibilities that are outlined in 1206, 1207, 1208, as well as
the expanded CERP, are precisely the sorts of tools that----
Senator Inhofe. Good.
General Ward.--are helpful in the field for doing things
that make a difference in the near term for long-term, positive
consequences.
Senator Inhofe. That's good. As far as the five African
brigades, it's not as well defined as I'd like it, but it's my
understanding--and not too many people on this committee are
really familiar with that--that we are really helping the
Africans to help themselves, to help them develop these--as we
see the squeeze in the Middle East, and we see the terrorism
activity going through Djibouti and down through the Horn of
Africa, and proliferating--I would only ask if you have any
opinions right now that you'd like to share with us about the
African brigades that we're pursuing right now.
General Ward. Those five African brigades, Senator, are in
differing levels of readiness, as well as capability. It's
important, I think, to be a partner with them to cause them to
be as capable as they can be, so that they can, indeed, pursue
the course that they've set out for themselves--i.e., taking
care of their problems, their challenges, either within their
borders, regionally, or on the continent. To the degree that we
can be of an assist to them in helping them achieve that
capacity, then that capability, over time, I believe, is
something that we ought to be pursuing.
Senator Inhofe. Exactly the response I wanted. Thank you
very much, and you're the man for the job.
I know my time's up. Admiral Roughead, I forgot to ask you
the train and equip question.
Admiral Roughead. Absolutely, Senator. As the Commander in
the Pacific, I made great use, and it makes----
Senator Inhofe. Good.
Admiral Roughead.--a huge difference.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Chilton, it's good to see all of your family here.
You don't have any boys? [Laughter.]
General Chilton. I don't, Senator. We have a boy dog at the
house. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Oh, boy dog. Oh. [Laughter.]
General Chilton. ``A.''
Senator Bill Nelson. I'm going to ask you to respond in
writing to the question. Our Strategic Forces Subcommittee is
going to be looking into the question of that nuclear weapon
that was flown from the north part of the country down to the
southern part of the country, and what we're going to do about
that, and then we'll confer with you as we get ready for that
hearing.
General Chilton. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Individuals at the highest level of Department of Defense (DOD)
remain engaged in the examination of this event, and investigations
into the incident will continue at all echelons over the next 4-6
months. Air Force leadership has requested review of the incident and
resulting Air Force actions by external organizations with varying
roles, to include the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Nuclear Support
Staff, the Joint Staff, the DOD Inspector General, and U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM). Major General Raaberg, ACC/A3, completed an
investigation of the chain of events that resulted in this occurrence,
at the direction of Commander, Air Combat Command. Commander. U.S.
STRATCOM has requested joint assessment and review of nuclear expertise
imbedded on staff to support ongoing investigations and review the role
of U.S. STRATCOM in providing oversight of services nuclear surety
processes.

Senator Bill Nelson. I want to ask you about--as we're
trying to give the warfighter and the commander greater
flexibility of getting up smaller satellites in operationally
responsive space, you have said that you think that the
STRATCOM should explore the feasibility of rapidly deploying
capabilities that can help these combatant commanders. Can you
describe for the committee what kind of investments you think
that are necessary at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg in order to
sustain and modernize these launch facilities so you could have
operationally responsive space?
General Chilton. Senator, I would say the investments we
need at Vandenberg and at Cape Canaveral go beyond just any
support we would provide for a responsive space launch
capability. Those two sites are fundamental to our access to
space, as a Nation, not only for military and intelligence
purposes, but also for commercial and for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, obviously. Over the
years--and I've seen this since I returned to the Air Force
back in 1998--we have had ongoing efforts to apply bandages, is
what I would call it, to sustain these launch sites. In my
current position as Commander of Air Force Space Command,
looking forward to the future, we have spent a good part of
this year taking a step back and asking, ``what can we do to
stop bandaiding the problems and actually move our launch sites
and the infrastructure forward to the 21st century and make the
critical improvements that we will need, to support not only a
responsive launch capability, but our continued operations?''
We're preparing to bring those concerns forward into the 2010
Program Objective Memorandum period, the investments we think
we need to be making across the Future Years Defense Program to
bring us up to where we need to be for the future.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. General Helms, the commander
down there, is concerned that we have that modernization, so
that we can respond. I'm sure the commander at Vandenberg feels
the same.
General Chilton. Absolutely.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, we're going to need to work with
you on that, and I assume that you and the new Space Command
Commander will be able to work together.
General Chilton. Absolutely, Senator. We'll focus our
efforts on that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Roughead, following up Senator
Webb's question that he said he was going to ask you in
writing, and on behalf of my colleague from Florida, Senator
Martinez, I want to recall, for the record of the committee,
what Admiral Clark, the CNO, said to this committee in February
2005, ``The Atlantic fleet should continue to be dispersed''--
talking about the carriers--``in two home ports.'' He went on
to say, ``The Navy should have two carrier-capable home ports
on each coast.'' Continuing the quote, ``It is my belief that
it would be a serious strategic mistake to have all of those
key assets of our Navy tied up in one port.''
Then, Deputy Secretary Gordon England, as the former
Secretary of the Navy, testified to our committee, ``My
judgment is that dispersion is still the situation. A nuclear
carrier should be in Florida to replace the John F. Kennedy to
get some dispersion.''
Now, we've talked about this privately. On behalf of my
colleague, Senator Martinez, and I, what we'd like is to have
you have the opportunity, for the record, to state, what do you
consider to be in the strategic assets of our country with
regard to the dispersal of the carrier assets?
[The information referred to follows:]

In the post-September 11 world, we must be aware of our
vulnerabilities with regard to our fleet, people, and infrastructure.
The Navy regularly assesses the force posture, strategic dispersal and
force protection needs of our afloat forces and our shore
infrastructure. In our assessments we examine the strategic environment
and potential threats. We assess where we need assets positioned to
generate the response and the presence to respond to likely
contingencies and tasking.
Before making decisions about positioning of forces, we must
consider a variety of factors including national security requirements,
environmental impacts, total cost and other programmatic implications,
impact on sailors and their families, and the current and future
strategic environment.

Admiral Roughead. Senator, similar to what we've just
completed in the Pacific, where we looked at what the force
posture and the positioning of those forces should be, I
believe the same process needs to take place on the East Coast
to look at the strategic environment that, not only we're in
today, but where we'll be going tomorrow, to look at what we
need positioned to generate the response and the presence that
will be important to our Nation and our Navy. That must be done
in the context of what we anticipate.
We have underway an environmental impact statement in
Mayport that is looking at a range of options in Mayport--13
options. I believe all that must come together to determine
what is best for the country and best for the Navy, in being
able to generate effective naval forces. If confirmed, I look
forward to being engaged in that, and to continuing to have
that discussion.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have in your mind that you're
going, as CNO, to implement a plan for carrying out this
principle of strategic dispersal?
Admiral Roughead. As CNO, I will be making a recommendation
to the Secretary as to where I believe our forces should be,
what those forces should be--not just the afloat forces, but
also our infrastructure, which is so important in being able to
generate that power. I intend to participate in that very
actively.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me thank all of you for your public service,
your extraordinary service. I look forward to supporting each
of you in your new role.
Admiral Roughead, it's a particular pleasure to welcome you
back to Washington. We worked together when you were head of
the Navy's Liaison Office, and I really enjoyed working with
you, particularly on shipbuilding issues back then. I could not
be more delighted with the President's nomination of you to be
the new CNO.
Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Collins. I was very pleased that my two colleagues
from Virginia mentioned Admiral Mullen's farsighted plan for a
313-ship Navy. You and I had the opportunity to discuss that in
the office. I was very pleased to hear you repeat, publicly
today, that you view it as a floor, because I think we have
been underfunding shipbuilding for many years, and it takes a
great deal of time to turn that around to ensure that we do
have the capability necessary to meet our national security
requirements. I look forward to ensuring that you have the
resources, not only to implement, but go beyond Admiral
Mullen's plan.
Now, part of the plan includes 55 Littoral Combat Ships
(LCS), which will give the Navy a new capability that it has
not previously had. That program has run into some problems,
both with schedule and with cost overruns. But it seems to me
that it's still vitally important. I would like to hear your
comments on the importance of the LCS program, in terms of
giving the Navy a needed capability that it currently lacks,
but also in helping us achieve the goal of a 313-ship fleet.
Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Senator.
The LCS is very important for the Navy. I've said, on
several occasions, that, had I had some LCS in the Pacific when
I was commanding the fleet there, I could have done much more.
The LCS represents a new way of taking on the threats that we
anticipate in the future. It is incorporating new technology
that is relevant to the manning concepts that we will have to
have in place as we move into the future, and LCS brings that
together. It is very important. It is not simply a ship that
will be used in what I refer to as the green water, but it's
one that, because of its flexibility in antisubmarine warfare
and mine warfare and antisurface warfare. It will be integral
into our more conventional force packages, our carrier strike
groups and our expeditionary strike groups.
So, even though LCS has gone through some challenges, I
believe that the steps that the Secretary and others have taken
are appropriate to get that ship to the fleet, where we need
it, and we need it quickly, and we need it in those numbers
that you spoke of, 55. LCS is very important to our Navy.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Another part of the plan that it's very important to
achieve the size fleet that we need is the guided missile
destroy (DDG) modernization program. Could you comment on that,
as well?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, Senator. In addition to the DDG,
also our amphibious transport dock and our cruiser
modernization, it is important that, when we have a fleet of
313 ships, that those ships be relevant to the type of threats
that we will face in the future. The modernization plan allows
us to do that. We have made significant investments in our
ships, particularly our DDGs and cruisers. We must make that
modernization plan a reality, so that those ships will be able
to serve for the life that we envisioned. That is equally as
important to shipbuilding, but keeping our current fleet
relevant and capable into the future.
Senator Collins. Indeed, we're able to apply some of the
lessons that we're learning on the DDG-1000 project in order to
reduce the crew size, for example, on the DDG-51 class of
destroyers, which I think also has benefits, in terms of the
life-cycle costs.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Collins. Admiral, I want to switch to another
important installation in my home State of Maine, and that is
the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, which is one of the four public
yards that the Navy has. Recently, the employees and the
commander of the shipyard brought to my attention that they
have been forced to turn away submarine availabilities,
including specialized repair activities for the U.S.S.
Alexandria and the U.S.S. San Juan, due to the workforce
constraints that have been imposed by the Navy. Portsmouth is
now limited to a civilian workforce of just over 3,900
civilians, yet the Navy has submarines in need of maintenance
and repair work, and it seems that this work is being delayed
due to what appear to be arbitrary manpower and overtime
limitations. In addition, there is always unforeseen emergency
maintenance or repair work that needs to be done.
If you are confirmed, will you evaluate the imposed
workforce levels at the public shipyards, including Portsmouth,
to ensure that they're sufficient to handle emergency and other
unforeseen work on Navy ships and submarines?
Admiral Roughead. I will, Senator, because our four Navy
shipyards and the work that they do, particularly on our
nuclear fleet, is very, very important. It's not just the
workforce, but the scheduling and the improvements that we make
there. All are factors in providing a ready fleet, and I will
be involved in that very closely.
Senator Collins. Thank you. I very much look forward to
working with you, as well as the other members of the panel.
The other members of the panel, I do have questions, for
the record, for you. But Maine's a big Navy State, so I had to
focus on Admiral Roughead.
Thank you.
Admiral Roughead. Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to add my support of the gentlemen who have
been nominated for these positions. This is a panel and a group
of nominees with great experience, great skill, and we're
grateful for your service to our country, each and every one of
you, and to your families--we appreciate the sacrifice and the
service of the families also undertake whenever you serve in
your capacity. So, we appreciate your willingness to take on
these important responsibilities.
General Chilton, I remember visiting with you about your
daughters in my office, and I have two daughters that are--
well, one's in college and one's in high school. You have
adventurous days ahead of you, and I only had half the
adventure, I guess I would say. But it's great fun, in all of
their activities, and I know you're going to enjoy those days
ahead of you.
I would like to ask you a question regarding a statement
that you made in response to the advance policy questions
regarding ballistic missile defense. You stated, and I quote,
that the ``unified command plan directs STRATCOM to plan,
integrate, coordinate global missile defense operations and
support for missile defense, as well as to develop and advocate
missile defense characteristics and capabilities for all
combatant commands. If confirmed, this is an area that I will
focus on to be sure I clearly understand the command's
authorities and responsibilities, as well as those of the
regional combatant commanders and the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA).''
Currently, MDA is tasked with many funding responsibilities
of missile defense, which include research and development,
procurement, and testing. This responsibility places a major
burden on the agency's primary research and development
mission. Assuming that you are confirmed as STRATCOM Commander,
I'd like to know what your thoughts are on seeing more
operational control of missile defense given to the active
forces in the manner that you described.
General Chilton. Senator, that is the goal, I believe, of
MDA to acquire these systems and then turn them over to the
Active Forces to operate as they mature and become ready. That
is my understanding of where we're headed. For the Airborne
Laser program, in particular, as the former Air Force
programmer, I know we were looking forward to the time period
when that system became certified for use. The Air Force was
going to take over operation of that system in support of the
combatant commanders around the world.
So, that is the way I see it moving forward.
Senator Thune. One of the questions I want to ask with
regard to the future of some of these programs is, do you
believe that direct energy technology is important to the
future of missile defense?
General Chilton. I absolutely believe that's an area we
need to continue to explore, because the potential return for
developing that type of capability, I think, could be
revolutionary.
Senator Thune. One of the, obviously, strategic
capabilities--our newest strategic capabilities--is missile
defense. By the end of the year, we should have 24 groundbased
interceptors fielded for the protection of the Homeland against
long-range ballistic missile threats; approximately 21 SM-3
missiles on Navy ships--10 Navy ships--to provide protection
against medium-range missiles; and hundreds of Patriot PACOM-3
missiles to protect against short-range ballistic missile
threats. Missile defense capabilities have been used, now, in
the two Gulf wars to protect U.S. forces; and during July 2006,
the groundbased midcourse defense system was ready to intercept
a long-range North Korean test missile, should it have been
necessary. How do you view the role of missile defense, as a
strategic capability?
General Chilton. It's absolutely a critical part, Senator,
of our triad today, which morphed from a classic, just
offensive, nuclear triad of the Cold War to one that provides
nuclear, conventional, and nonkinetic offensive capabilities
balanced with a defensive posture and defensive capabilities
through the missile defense system, and then our responsive
infrastructure being the third leg of that new triad. So,
missile defense is an absolutely critical element of the
strategic deterrent posture for this country.
Senator Thune. What impact do you think our initial
deployments have on our ability to address potential threats
that are posed by North Korea and Iran?
General Chilton. My understanding of our deployments today
is that they are focused to the west to deter against a North
Korean attack, and that we currently do not have the
capabilities in place for an Iranian attack, but this is a
threat that we foresee developing in the future.
Senator Thune. Do you have confidence in our currently-
deployed missile defense systems?
General Chilton. I do, sir, from the level of knowledge
that I have of them today. But, if confirmed, this will be an
area I will study. My current duties do not have me focusing a
lot on the end-to-end portion of that. As Air Force Space
Command Commander, we participate in the early-warning portion
and the midcourse tracking with some of our radar sites, and
I'm very confident in their ability to do their mission. The
end-to-end portion of that, I'll delve deeper into, if
confirmed.
Senator Thune. With regard to the missile defense
capabilities through 2013, do you think that these deployments
are going to keep pace with your understanding of the threats?
General Chilton. Senator, I do not know the schedule,
today, of the deployment plan for those weapons. I couldn't
give you an answer today as to whether or not that schedule
matches up with existing threat predictions.
Senator Thune. Well, again, my time is expired, so I didn't
get a chance to ask the other members of the panel questions.
But thank you, again, for your service to our country, and we
look forward to your confirmation.
Thank you very much.
General Chilton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Thune. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
We have five votes, starting around 11 o'clock, so I think
Senator Warner and I will wrap up the questions, and then we'll
gavel the hearing over.
Senator Warner, you indicated that you have additional
questions.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I do.
I'd like to start off with General Chilton. I listened very
carefully to your testimony, and read through all of the
documents and your responses to questions. I want to get down
to this concept of deterrence in strategic military activities
today, worldwide.
I've had some modest experience, some 5 years in the
Pentagon in the Navy Secretariat, and then coming here for
quite a few years. I've seen the evolution of this doctrine
through those years. It's predicated on the concept of mutual-
assured destruction: those nations that possess a nuclear
weapon, you deal with them, recognizing their capabilities, and
the doctrine of deterrence plays a critical role. Each nation
carefully reviews any consideration of even putting on
readiness their strategic nuclear capability, and certainly
before considering utilizing it, evaluates--what are the
consequences were the other country to initiate such a strike?
Those years I was in the Pentagon, we were at the pitch
intensity in what we've known as the Cold War with the Soviet
Union. But, throughout that period, we were always able to
engage the Soviet military in positive steps. For example, we
established the hotline, whereby each leader of their nation--
Soviet Union and the United States--could pick up a phone and
instantaneously reach their counterpart. We went through the
Incidents at Sea Agreement, which was negotiated with the
Soviet navy at the time their navy was challenging us on the
high seas of the world, challenging in certain respects. They
had capabilities that matched ours. I could enumerate a number
of other steps that we took between the United States and the
Soviet Union.
General Abizaid, a man whom I greatly respect, said
publicly the other day--and I want to try and paraphrase it
accurately--we could learn to live with a nation such as Iran,
should they possess a nuclear weapon, but I quickly draw to
your attention my response to that statement, that I do not see
in Iran today any of the capabilities, in terms of a military
chain of command, a review process, a rational, quiet analysis
of the consequences, should they ever obtain such a weapon, of
the utilization of that weapon. Therefore, I somewhat disagree
with my very valued friend, General Abizaid.
Now, North Korea, they do have a very significant military
chain of command. Again, the decision rests with the supreme
leader, so to speak. But, again, we're working our way through
that equation, I think, rather well, in terms of their
capability. Let's hope that that is removed from the world
scene. It is a world issue, it isn't simply a U.S. issue.
But I don't see it with Iran and such other nations that
may be trying to acquire the very fundamentals of constructing
a weapon. I want to get your reaction of how we can rely on
that concept of deterrence with a nation that does not have, in
our judgment, that very careful review and decisionmaking
policy by a government. How do we employ it today against these
emerging nations who desire to acquire these weapons?
General Chilton. Senator, I think the two key things I'm
hearing from you that worked so well in the Cold War time
period, were both transparency and confidence-building measures
that were taken between the countries to make sure we
understood each other's capability and decisionmaking
processes. I'm a proponent of transparency and confidence-
building measures, and military-to-military relationships with
all countries.
I also believe that, just because you don't completely
understand a competitor's process at a particular moment, it
does not mean they cannot be deterred, because of the
consequences that they could perceive from an untoward action
toward another country; in particular, us. It is also important
to understand our capability and our willingness to defend our
country. I think we always need to be clear about that, that we
are capable, willing, and ready, and then, even when there is
not transparency, I believe there still is a level of
deterrence. But there, as you point out, would remain a level
of uncertainty that is something that we would want to focus on
to remove that uncertainty.
Senator Warner. I don't wish to engage in any saber-
rattling here at this time--but to just draw to your attention
that we have to go back and revisit how the doctrine of mutual
assured destruction and other things worked in the past, and
examine them in the framework of--I'm not singling out Iran--
but those emerging nations. Just look at the performance of the
President of Iran here recently, publicly, against a background
of many similar actions and statements that just are so
illogical. It does begin to show that the doctrine of
deterrence needs to be reexamined with respect to these
emerging nations, given the apparent absence of that structure
that was present during the Cold War years.
Admiral Roughead, I'm glad that you, I thought, in a very
diplomatic and straightforward way, handled questions from our
colleague from Florida. As you readily are aware, there's a
little engagement between the States of Virginia and Florida on
the question of port security. But I've always felt that it's
imperative that we, in the Congress, support our military when
the military makes a decision which is in the best interest of
our Nation.
Now, the doctrine of strategic dispersal--again, my first
introduction was back in the years of the Cold War, when I was
privileged to serve in the Navy Secretariat, and that doctrine
was entirely different than it is today. While, during that
period, I think there was some validity to dispersal, today
it's quite different. At any one time in Virginia--I know you
know from your own experience--many times there are no carriers
in port, and then perhaps one coming in for upkeep and so
forth, and very quickly that ship is rotated out. It's not as
if suddenly everything is focused in one port. Those days
fortunately are pretty well gone because of the need to keep in
an operational status.
As you work through this, I would hope that you take into
consideration that there is a dramatic change in what I call
the fundamentals of strategic dispersal today from what it was
many years ago.
Lastly, I'd like to give you the opportunity to present
your views about the Law of the Sea. That issue could be before
the Senate very shortly. I again draw on some modest work in
that area, when I was in the Navy Secretariat. I went to the
Law of the Sea Conferences, at the direction of the Secretary
of Defense, to represent our country, and particularly to make
certain that the future operations of the United States Navy
were not in any way abrogated or impaired by a treaty. Now,
that work in the early 1970s on that treaty at that time has
pretty well been displaced by the treaty today which, in my
examination, as you said, enhances--in no way deters or
restricts--but, in fact, enhances the utility and the value of
our ships, deployed wherever they are in the world on the high
seas. Am I correct?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, Senator, it enhances, it codifies
what we need, to be able to operate. More importantly, by being
party to the treaty, it will give us a seat at the table as
that treaty is discussed, as provisions are considered; because
I believe, if you're not at the table, you don't have a voice.
I believe our efforts in the maritime domain need to be
influenced by what we think, what we believe, and what's in the
best interest of our country.
I also saw, in the Pacific, where, by not being party to
the treaty, as we were working on some of the proliferation
security initiatives, that some countries would avoid
participating with us because of that.
Senator Warner. The United States was not a signatory to
that treaty; and, therefore, the Navy did suffer, as a
consequence.
Admiral Roughead. That's correct. We did. Countries that
were very important to our relationships out there were very
apprehensive, and, in some cases, didn't participate. I would
never recommend being party to anything that limited our
strategic mobility, the ability to defend the country, or that
would put our sailors in harm's way.
Senator Warner. Fine.
Admiral Roughead. I don't see anything in the treaty that
would do that, and I believe we should accede to that treaty.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the
testimony of Admiral Roughead be conveyed to the chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They're going to have
primary jurisdiction and probably hold such hearings as they
deem necessary as they are reviewing this treaty.
I presume that is already well known and documented and
submitted as a part of the support for the Senate's
consideration of this treaty. Do you know that?
Admiral Roughead. I do not know specifically what was----
Senator Warner. Could you verify that?
Admiral Roughead. But I will verify that.
Senator Warner. We will forward your testimony, but I would
hope that the DOD has made known the views of the Navy with
regard to that treaty.
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much.
General Mattis, I read through your response to the
questions about your ``NATO hat,'' and this thing is drawn up
very cleverly by those writers in the Pentagon, about all your
responsibility with NATO, and you responded to a series of
questions. But, in reading through your responses to the
questions, I do not see any reference to--and there may be a
good reason for it--a situation that faces our forces operating
in Iraq today which is of great concern to this Senator. Excuse
me, in Afghanistan. Oftentimes, we're focused so much on Iraq,
we forget about a very essential military operation that we're
undertaking both directly with our military forces in
Afghanistan, and as a part of the NATO force, of which you have
these responsibilities. It's set out in our record in response
to your questions, so I won't ask for further amplification.
But here's the problem. In Afghanistan today, the growth of
narcotics is growing exponentially. The increase of the current
narcotic crop this past year was somewhere between 15 and 20
percent over what it was the year before. The funds from the
sale of those narcotics, grown in Afghanistan, processed, to
some degree, in Afghanistan, and then shipped throughout
Europe, has resulted in enormous amounts of dollars and other
forms of compensation flowing back to the Taliban and other
insurgents in Afghanistan. Those funds are enabling our
adversaries in Afghanistan to acquire sophisticated weapons, to
do many other things.
What do you understand is the current role of the NATO
forces? Do your responsibilities--in any way allow you to
inject your thinking into this problem? Because we have
Americans at increasing risk from this ever-increasing flow of
dollars back from the sale of those narcotics. I mean, we're
talking about multimillions of dollars of cash.
General Mattis. Yes, sir. Senator, I don't disagree with a
single word that you just said. I think you've summed up the
problem. I believe that the efforts of NATO and the U.S. forces
to create a stronger central government that creates control
over the country are on target. This is one of the
manifestations of a lack of governmental control. This is why
we need President Karzai's government to be strengthened, not
just with military purposes--not just for military purposes. We
need a dramatic leap in our interagency and our international
partners' efforts to reduce drug demand, to come up with
substitute crops and the kind of supporting infrastructure that
allows those crops to become viable, not simply a good program
that makes us feel good, but actually has an alternative for
those farmers, in light of how much money they're being paid
right now.
But I think that the preparation of the NATO forces, which
JFCOM and Allied Command-Transformation work together on, can
help address this. But it's a larger problem than just the
military preparation of the troops. I'll work as much as I can,
if I am confirmed, to broaden the aperture on this.
Senator Warner. Within the scope of your authority here--
and it seems to me a fairly broad authority--I would hope you
would inject your thinking because you've had a lot of
experience, in your career, with insurgency.
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. How many tours do you have to Iraq?
General Mattis. Depending on how you're counting, sir, too
many. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Well, quite a few.
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. You're familiar with this problem.
General Mattis. I've been in Afghanistan, sir.
Senator Warner. You have been in Afghanistan.
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. You're extraordinarily well-experienced.
Lastly, Mr. Chairman, in Afghanistan, is the question of
the national caveats. To those who may be following this
hearing, I would like to explain them--that when a NATO country
allocates some of its troops to a force deployed out of the
NATO area--the Balkans was one campaign, but this is the first
real, significant deployment of NATO forces in a combat role,
beyond the original parameters of the NATO forces in their
countries. They say, ``Our troops can be used only for A, B, C,
and D, and not E, F, G.'' As a consequence, the U.S. forces,
the British forces, the Canadian forces really don't have any
limitations. The commanders of the forces can utilize them for
any role in combat they deem appropriate. But the other forces
cannot be used. Frankly, it comes down to--some of them are not
exposed to the degree of risks that the U.S., British, and
Canadian troops are exposed to. What are we going to do about
that national caveat situation?
General Mattis. Sir, if confirmed, I would first of all
encourage that we all recognize the difficulty this makes for
unity of effort. It's one thing if we aren't going to have
unity of command--and you're aware of the command relationships
there. But unity of effort on a battlefield is critical if
we're to really make progress.
My intent would be to work collaboratively with General
Craddock and the Chiefs of Defense of NATO, and see how we can
move this forward, while recognizing that nations have
interests, and I know our own has interests, and we make
certain caveats, ourselves--not ones that impact on battlefield
efficiency in Afghanistan right now. But I think a certain
amount of understanding of where they're coming from, but an
aggressive search for common ground that will allow us to gain
this unity of effort that we need there, so that we have the
responsibilities and the demands placed, I think, equally
across the alliance forces.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
General Mattis. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Good luck, General.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you all for being here today, and
congratulations to your families for a job well done this
morning, and to all of you.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned a key word,
``families.'' We've stressed that. I'd like to have each of you
put into the record--I will not delay this hearing further--
some of the initiatives you're going to take with respect to
the families of those under your command.
[The information referred to follows:]

Admiral Roughead. The Navy has multiple initiatives to further
support the families of our sailors, these include:
Fleet and Family Support Programs
With increased programmed funds in fiscal year 2008 and the
outyears, the Navy has put greater emphasis on providing additional
prevention, education, and counseling services to Navy families.
Greater outreach to families is being accomplished through information
and referral, educational, individual consultation and clinical
counseling services at community centers, schools and in public-private
venture housing areas. Revitalization of family employment readiness
programs and services is also a focus for fiscal year 2008. In
addition, services are tailored and staffed to better meet the needs of
Navy families who have been disproportionately impacted by the global
war on terror. For example, school liaison positions have been created
to work with school districts and Navy families to ensure successful
transition of Navy children from one school to another, and to ensure
that the pressures facing military children are well understood by
teachers and school officials. The Navy is providing brief, solution-
focused clinical counseling services to a greater number of family
members, including children, in fiscal year 2008, and is providing home
visitation services to new parents who need assistance.
Individual Augmentee (IA) and Family Support
IA assignments are new for most sailors and their families. The
Navy continues to work hard to ensure that deployment services and
support are tailored and responsive to the unique needs of IA sailors
and their families. To improve understanding of, and responsiveness to,
the needs of sailors, families and Navy leadership, Navy has developed
IA Sailor, Family, and Command Handbooks that are posted on the World
Wide Web and are continually updated to provide basic information on IA
deployment preparation, readiness, and reunion issues. An IA Family
Connection Newsletter is distributed each month to IA families via Navy
Fleet and Family Support Centers and Command Ombudsmen. Additionally,
IA deployment readiness briefs are provided in various formats on a
regular basis, as are IA Information Fairs and ``Family and Friends''
homecoming programs. To better reach IA families who do not live near a
military installation but who have access to a computer, the Navy has
initiated ``virtual'' IA Family Discussion Groups. In fiscal year 2008,
Navy Fleet and Family Support Centers are committed to making telephone
outreach contacts to all IA families. Information, referral and ongoing
support to the family throughout the sailor's IA assignment are offered
during these outreach contacts. To date, about half of family members
contacted have asked for ongoing contact and support. Command Ombudsmen
are also receiving training on the uniqueness of IA deployment,
resources available to IA families, and indicators of possible combat
or operational stress.
Child and Youth Programs
Increased capability to support Navy family readiness in child and
youth programs includes an expansion plan of 4,000 additional child
care spaces utilizing various delivery systems (child development
centers, child development homes, 24/7 center/home care). To assist
parents and children with the challenges of frequent deployments, an
additional 100,000 hours of respite child care will be provided for
families of deployed servicemembers. In efforts to combat youth
obesity, the Navy will implement a nationwide youth fitness initiative
called ``FitFactor,'' as a means to increase youth interest and
awareness in the importance of healthy choices in life.
Family Financial Readiness
Financial fitness of sailors and their families is critical to
mission readiness. The Navy's Personal Financial Management Program
received national level recognition and was honored as the 2006
Outstanding Education Program of the Year by the Association of
Financial Counseling, Planning and Education. To ensure individual and
family financial fitness, the Navy has increased the number of
Accredited Financial Counselors available to work one-on-one with
sailors and family members to develop realistic and achievable
financial plans. Navy is also providing educational programs
specifically tailored to family members and teens, and is partnering
with on-base financial institutions, consumer awareness experts and
industry leaders to assist with financial fitness initiatives.
Navy Family Ombudsmen Program
A strong Command Ombudsman program helps ensure that families have
information necessary to meet the challenges of the military lifestyle
and that commanders have a better understanding of their families'
welfare and readiness. Navy ombudsmen serve as a liaison between the
command and families. In fiscal year 2007, the Navy undertook a number
of initiatives to strengthen, revitalize, and improve its Ombudsman
Program. These efforts, which are ongoing in fiscal year 2008, include
establishing an Ombudsmen Registry to identify Command Ombudsmen and
distribute timely information. In the event of a natural or manmade
disaster, the Registry may also be used by higher authority to
facilitate tracking and providing support to Navy families.
Personal and Family Preparedness
In fiscal year 2008, the Navy has placed a major emphasis on
personal and family preparedness. ``Operation Prepare'' is a
comprehensive marketing initiative disseminated Navy-wide. With the
theme, ``Be Informed, Have a Plan, Make a Kit,'' the initiative has
yielded enhanced personal and family readiness. The Navy-wide emphasis
on ``Operation Prepare'' has increased sailor and family awareness of
what to do to prepare for and respond to a manmade or natural disaster.
______

General Ward. High-quality, motivated people are the bedrock of our
Nation's defense readiness and they remain so due to our steadfast
commitment to their quality of life. For the U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM), providing quality of life support and services to the
command's servicemembers, civilians, and family members is a top
priority. Whether forward deployed temporarily or permanently assigned
on the continent, quality of life programs will be critical to the
success of the command in two fundamental ways. First, they will help
us attract and retain the best people--well-trained, motivated, and
highly-skilled. Second, quality of life programs ensure our people and
their families will be taken care of regardless of duty location. U.S.
AFRICOM's approach to quality of life will be in line with overall DOD
policy: holistic, but with special considerations given to the
possibility that some of our persons may operate in very austere
environments.
Quality of life initiatives will require that we provide
servicemembers, as well as those civilians who volunteer to come to
AFRICOM and support the work we do, with a fair and adequate
compensation system that recognizes the hardships associated with
working in very remote and isolated locations. There is a high
probability that some personnel will be located in areas without many
of the typical support services found at major military installations
in the United States.
We will continue to advocate for adequate family support, since
some of the command's personnel may need to be separated from their
families for extended periods of time while deployed to the African
continent. These areas include, but are not limited to: access to
health care, similar to that available in the States or that meets or
exceeds acceptable standards set by our medical experts; access to
adequate housing; access to excellent education for families; and the
availability of appropriate morale and welfare services. This support,
at home station, deployed and at remote locations, is essential to
provision of excellent quality of care for all of our personnel.
In the interim, any personnel assigned to duties in African nations
will likely be supported by agreements with individual embassies. We
often negotiate these agreements with embassy staffs to support limited
numbers of military personnel who work in foreign nations. There is a
fee for this service arrangement. It is through this comprehensive
vision and sufficient resourcing that we plan to provide an adequate
quality of life for our most precious resource, our people.
In conclusion, the AFRICOM is committed to providing a
comprehensive package of services that support the challenges of not
only the traditional military way of life, but also the unique
challenges associated with standing up a portion of the command in an
area of the world where issues associated with a lack of basic
infrastructure, disease, tropical illnesses, and overall health are
generally more prevalent than in most modern western societies.
Ultimately, our goal is to make AFRICOM an assignment of choice, built
on a top-quality, well-trained, highly-motivated, and appropriately
supported work force of dedicated servicemembers, civilian employees,
and their family members.
______

General Mattis. Increased deployments associated with the global
war on terrorism coupled with routine deployments for training and
other global commitments have significantly increased the operating
tempo of our Armed Forces. The frequency of deployments is difficult
enough for our servicemembers, but is also extremely taxing and
stressful on military families. Therefore, taking care of our families
must be a top priority for commanders at every level. As the Joint
Force trainer and Joint Force provider, one of my main goals will be to
establish predictable and stable training and rotation cycles for
deploying forces.
To accomplish this task requires advance planning and early
identification of force requirements. I will work with the Joint Staff,
supported combatant commanders, and my Service component commanders to
ensure early identification of future force requirements to support
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Knowing projected
deployment dates well in advance will provide a measure of stability
for servicemembers which will in turn reduce the emotional and mental
stress on families. Additionally, the implementation of the Force
Management Improvement Project coupled with the Defense Readiness
Reporting System will help streamline the Request for Forces (RFF)
process thus improving the predictability of force deployments.
Another way of creating constancy for families is maximizing the
efficiency of predeployment training. How much time a unit spends
overseas is normally the focus when discussing the impact of
deployments on families but a great deal of time is also spent away
from home conducting predeployment training. Finding ways to reduce the
amount of time spent away from home training is an excellent way of
improving the quality of life for servicemembers and their families. As
the Joint Force Trainer, I will constantly be looking for ways to
improve and maximize the efficiency of predeployment training in order
to minimize the impact on families. One of my first tasks as Commander,
U.S. Joint Forces Command, will be to review the Unified Endeavor
Mission Rehearsal Exercise Program to see where we might be able to
streamline the program while still providing high quality training to
deploying units. Leveraging existing Joint training capabilities such
as the Joint National Training Capability and Distant Learning programs
are excellent ways of reducing the amount of time spent away from home
conducting predeployment training. Synchronizing and integrating
predeployment training events with deployment schedules is an extremely
important aspect of improving the quality of life for our military
families.
Lastly, the Individual Augmentation process is another area that
needs to be reviewed. Currently, there are 7,000 Individual Augmentees
filling billets in over sixty Joint Task Force Headquarters worldwide.
Often, Individual Augmentee requirements are not well-defined or known
in advance. Even if the requirement is clearly identified or known in
advance, it is often difficult to match a person with the capabilities
and qualifications being requested. Consequently, personnel are often
notified on short notice that they must fill Individual Augmentee
billet which puts them and their families under unnecessary stress. In
my view, we must do a better job of integrating the Individual
Augmentation process with the RFF process to maximize the amount of
time an Individual Augmentee has to prepare for deployment. One of my
main objectives as Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, will be to
institutionalize an Individual Augmentation process that serves both
the needs of the supported combatant commanders and reduces the
turbulence inflicted on our servicemembers and their families.
Finally, creating a predictable and stable environment for our
military families is absolutely essential in maintaining the viability
of our All-Volunteer Force. Without a measure of predictability and
stability in their lives young Americans are less likely to join the
military and existing servicemembers are less likely to reenlist. Our
servicemembers and their families sacrifice a great deal to serve their
country and it is incumbent on us to do everything in our power to
provide them with a measure of steadiness when it comes to deployments.
This can only be done through sound leadership and proper advance
planning.
______

General Chilton. Initiatives that center on the family will be a
topic I carry forward in meetings and discussions with my functional,
Service, and component commanders, as well as my headquarters staff.
The focus will be on programs designed to recognize the contribution of
family members which enable our active duty servicemembers to serve the
Nation. The sacrifices made by spouses, and children in particular,
will be reviewed as we continue to increase our emphasis in this area.

Senator Warner. I think we have to always be in a forward-
looking mode, because the families of those in uniform are
serving an ever-increasing and important role. How often have
the witnesses come before this committee and told us that the
determination of a serviceperson to continue his or her
obligations and re-up, as we say in the old days, for the
enlisted person, and for an officer to extend into the next 4
or 5 years, his willingness or her willingness to serve. That
decision is made around the family table.
Senator Ben Nelson. We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM Gary Roughead, USN, by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. Almost 2 decades have passed since the enactment of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and
the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe
the implementation and impact of those reforms, particularly in your
joint assignments.
Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?
Answer. Yes. I strongly support full implementation of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
Since enactment, the act has increased cooperation among the Services
resulting in a more capable, effective, and agile Joint force.
Question. What is your view of the extent to which these defense
reforms have been implemented?
Answer. These defense reforms have enhanced our Nation's
warfighting capabilities; however, there is always room for process
improvement. Specifically, improvements in the acquisition process are
needed to ensure new systems are in full compliance with Joint
interoperability requirements, and to enhance the coordination and
interaction between those who define our requirements and those who
acquire our systems.
Question. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of
these defense reforms?
Answer. I consider the most important aspect of these defense
reforms to be the emphasis and commitment to joint warfighting and the
resulting benefit we derive from our experiences in joint warfare.
Operations directed by combatant commanders with forces from all the
Services have produced greater net effect than independent service
actions.
Question. The goals of Congress in enacting these defense reforms,
as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian
control; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the
combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring
the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their
responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and
to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense
resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and
improving the management and administration of the Department of
Defense (DOD).
Do you agree with these goals?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Recently, there have been expressions of interest and
testimony from senior military officers recommending modifications to
Goldwater-Nichols.
Do you believe that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-
Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might
be appropriate to address in these proposals?
Answer. Goldwater-Nichols has served us well, but in the past 20
years the security environment has changed significantly and a review
is worthy of consideration. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Secretary of the Navy if I see need
for specific improvement.
Question. What do you understand the role of the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) to be under the Goldwater-Nichols Act relative to the
SECDEF, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS), the other members of the Joint Chiefs, and the combatant
commanders?
Answer. The CNO has significant interaction with these leaders. If
confirmed, I will work for the SECDEF and the Secretary of the Navy,
who will be my direct civilian superior. I will be responsible under
the Secretary of the Navy for organizing, training, and equipping
forces in support of the combatant commanders. I will also be
responsible for the identification, validation, prioritization and
justification of resource requirements for Navy acquisition programs.
Along with the other Service Chiefs, I will be a member of the JCS
tasked with the responsibility for actively reviewing and evaluating
military matters and offering professional military advice to the
President, National Security Council, and SECDEF.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 5033 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the
responsibilities and authority of the CNS. Section 151 of title 10,
U.S.C., discusses the composition and functions of the JCS, including
the authority of the CNO, as a member of the JCS, to submit advice and
opinions to the President, the National Security Council, or the
SECDEF. Other sections of law and traditional practice, also establish
important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe
your understanding of the relationship of the CNO to the following
offices:
Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The SECDEF is the principal assistant to the President in
all matters relating to the DOD. As a Service Chief and member of the
JCS, the CNO is a military adviser to the SECDEF, particularly
regarding matters of naval warfare, policy, and strategy.
Question. Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy SECDEF, on occasion, serves as acting Secretary
in the absence of the Secretary. During these periods, the CNO's
relationship with the Deputy Secretary will essentially be the same as
with the Secretary. The Deputy Secretary is also responsible for the
day-to-day operation of the DOD. If confirmed, I will endeavor to
interact regularly with him and provide him with my best possible
professional military advice and the same level of support as I would
the Secretary.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Under current DOD Directives, Under Secretaries of Defense
coordinate and exchange information with DOD components, to include the
Services, in the functional areas under their cognizance. If confirmed
as CNO, I will respond and reciprocate. If confirmed, I will use this
exchange of information as I communicate with the Chairman of the JCS
and provide military advice to the SECDEF.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The CNO is a member of the JCS and, as such, works with and
through the Chairman in the execution of duties. Along with the other
Service Chiefs, I will be a member of the JCS tasked with the
responsibility for actively reviewing and evaluating military matters
and offering professional military advice to the President, National
Security Council, and SECDEF.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. When functioning as the acting Chairman, the Vice
Chairman's relationship with combatant commanders is that of the
Chairman. Also, the Vice Chairman has the same rights and obligations
as other members of the JCS. If confirmed, I would exchange views with
the Vice Chairman on any defense matter considered by the JCS. The Vice
Chairman also heads or has a key role on many boards that affect
readiness and programs and, therefore, the preparedness of naval
forces. If confirmed, I will establish a close relationship with the
Vice Chairman on these critical issues.
Question. The Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. The CNO is responsible, under the Secretary of the Navy
(SECNAV), for providing properly organized, trained, and equipped
forces to support combatant commanders in the accomplishment of their
missions. In addition, the CNO assists the Secretary of the Navy in the
development of plans and recommendations for the operation of the
Department of the Navy. The Navy enjoys a productive, collaborative
environment within the Department, and if confirmed, I will work
closely with the Secretary of the Navy.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Navy is the principal assistant
to the Secretary of the Navy and is first in line of succession. The
Under Secretary performs such duties, and exercises such powers, as the
Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I look forward to establishing a
close relationship with the Under Secretary and to working with him to
achieve the Secretary's goals.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy.
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy work with the Under
Secretary to achieve the Secretary's goals. Like the Under Secretary,
the Assistant Secretaries perform such duties, and exercises such
powers, as the Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I will work with
the Assistant Secretaries to achieve the Secretary's goals.
Question. The General Counsel of the Navy.
Answer. The General Counsel of the Navy serves as legal advisor to
the Department of the Navy and performs such functions as the Secretary
of the Navy shall direct and as necessary to provide for the proper
application of the law and effective delivery of legal services within
the Department. If confirmed, I will work closely with the General
Counsel to achieve the Secretary's goals.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
Answer. Under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 5148(d), the Judge Advocate General
(JAG) of the Navy performs duties relating to any and all Department of
Navy legal matters assigned to him by SECNAV. The JAG provides and
supervises the provision of all legal advice and related services
throughout the Department of the Navy, except for the advice and
services provided by the General Counsel. It is important that the CNO
receive independent legal advice from his senior uniformed judge
advocates. If confirmed, I will work closely with the JAG and seek the
JAG's legal advice.
Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Answer. A unique historical and operational relationship exists
between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Many of our capabilities,
programs, and personnel issues are inextricably linked. Our forces
deploy together, and both must be ready on arrival. If confirmed as
CNO, my relationship with the Commandant of the Marine Corps must be
exceptionally close and I will be committed to making every facet of
the Navy-Marine Corps team stronger.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force.
Answer. Our Armed Forces must work together to recognize each
other's strengths and to complement each other's capabilities. We must
achieve and maintain synergy in warfare, training, and procurement to
ensure each Service contributes optimally to Joint and combined
operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with my
counterparts to enhance Joint interoperability and other aspects of the
joint relationship in order to improve the warfighting capabilities of
the United States.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. The CNO's responsibility as a Service Chief is to provide
properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to the combatant
commanders to accomplish their military missions. If confirmed, I will
work to foster close working relationships with the unified and
specified combatant commanders.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next CNO?
Answer. The major focus of the next CNO must be to maintain current
readiness and provide ready, capable forces; to define and deliver a
relevant naval force for the future; and to ensure we recruit and
retain those military and civilian personnel who seek to serve our
country in the U.S. Navy. The preeminent challenge is balancing these
three priorities in a fiscally constrained environment. Each focus area
has its own challenges and opportunities.
Maintaining Current Readiness. We are continually generating forces
for the current fight and are deploying and employing our Navy much
differently than in years past. We are simultaneously providing ready
naval forces and personnel for Joint Force Commanders, sustaining
forward presence and fulfilling commitments to allies in other vital
regions, and responding to increasing demands in regions where we have
not routinely operated, specifically South America and Africa. Being
ready and responsive to carrying out a range of missions demands new
approaches to delivering operational availability at best cost.
Future Force. The means and methods of conflict and the security
environment undergo constant change. Technology and asymmetric
approaches are advancing rapidly. Our view of the future must address
strategic trends and not be captured by the status quo. Our ships,
submarines, aircraft, weapons, and networks must outpace potential
adversaries. The cost of future systems and the ability of our overall
acquisition processes to pace the speed of technological innovation is
increasingly challenging our ability to deliver a balanced force.
People. Our people are the foundation for all we do. The
demographics, attitudes, and expectations of our population are
changing and we must understand that dynamic. We are seeing that
influencers (parents, counselors, friends) are having more of an impact
on individual choices. Competition for talent in today's professional
marketplace is intense. Attracting and retaining a diverse, high-
quality Total Force of military and civilians must remain our highest
priority.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will remain committed to warfighting
readiness to ensure we remain agile, capable, and ready forward. I will
continue to employ our Fleet Response Plan to increase operational
availability of our traditional forces, and I will pay particular
attention to individual readiness as we continue to support the current
fight.
There is no question that our acquisition programs will be under
great pressure; therefore, to build the right forces for tomorrow we
must be exacting in developing requirements, mindful of the factors
that increase cost and committed to working with the acquisition
community and our Joint partners in doing all we can to be effective,
efficient, and timely in delivering future capability. Also, I will
continue to strengthen initiatives of the Navy Enterprise to identify
efficiencies and produce maximum cost savings Navy-wide, while
continuing to ensure our Navy remains strong, effective, and relevant.
We must size our force and implement policies so the young men and
women of our country see opportunity and achieve personal and
professional fulfillment by serving in our Navy. The competition for
people necessitates that we put in place policies that advantage us and
address the many rewards of service. We must be unwavering in our
obligation to take care of sailors and their families who suffer the
effects of combat.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the execution of the functions of the CNO?
Answer. In my view, the most serious problems the next CNO will
face in executing his duties are: (1) properly balancing current
resources allocated to sustain, train, and equip the Navy; (2)
obtaining the necessary resources to build and man the future Navy; and
(3) ensuring continuity among requirements, resourcing, and acquisition
in the existing planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
process.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with my Navy senior
leadership team, my fellow Service Chiefs, the Chairman of the JCS, the
Secretary of the Navy, and through him, the SECDEF and Congress to
develop balanced, fiscally-responsible approaches to addressing and
solving these problems.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. Section 5033 of title 10, U.S.C., requires the CNO to
have had significant experience in joint duty assignments, including at
least one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a flag
officer.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I believe that the breadth and depth of my experience as a
naval officer and joint warfighter qualifies me for this position. I
have had the privilege of six commands in the Pacific and Atlantic,
which form a solid operational foundation. I have served in several
Joint flag positions: Commander, Second Fleet and Commander, NATO
Striking Fleet; Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; Commander, U.S.
Pacific Fleet and Commander, Joint Task Force 519. I am serving
currently as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command responsible for the
Navy's Global Force Management and support to three combatant
commanders. Further, I have completed four assignments at Navy
headquarters, including a tour as the Navy's Chief of Legislative
Affairs. My tour as Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy
provided insight into naval education and training and the development
of officers as leaders in our Navy and Marine Corps.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. In May of this year, President Bush issued a statement
urging the Senate to act favorably on U.S. accession to the Law of the
Sea Convention. Officials of the DOD, including the previous CNO, have
advocated for accession to the Convention.
Do you support United States accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea?
Answer. Yes.
Question. How would you respond to critics of the Convention who
assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the
United States?
Answer. I believe that accession to the Law of the Sea Convention
is in our national security interests. The basic tenets of the
Convention are clear and beneficial to the Navy. From the right of
unimpeded transit passage through straits used for international
navigation and reaffirming the sovereign immunity of our warships, to
providing a framework for countering excessive claims of other states
and preserving the right to conduct military activities in exclusive
economic zones, the Convention provides the stable, predictable, and
recognized legal regime we need to conduct our operations today and in
the future.
U.S. military forces must be able to operate freely on, under, and
above the world's oceans. That freedom is critical to our national
security interests, the military in general, and the Navy in
particular. The Law of the Sea Convention codifies fundamental benefits
important to our operating forces as they train, transit, and fight.
Amendments made to the convention in the 1990s addressed many of the
concerns that opponents have expressed. Also, joining the convention
will not subject the U.S. Navy to the jurisdiction of international
courts, nor will it adversely affect the President's Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) or United States intelligence activities.
The convention is the bedrock legal instrument underpinning public
order for the world's oceans. By joining the convention, we can best
assert our leadership in oceans law and policy, and in conjunction with
our Freedom of Navigation program, we can best protect the navigational
rights and freedoms that are of such critical importance to our
Nation's security and economic prosperity.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. If confirmed, you would play an important role in the
process of transforming the Navy to meet new and emerging threats.
What are your goals regarding Navy transformation?
Answer. Transformation is never complete; it is a constant process
and attitude. Our new Maritime Strategy and our ongoing transformation
efforts, within the framework of Seapower 21, guide the Navy's future
direction. I believe we are already making great strides in developing
the capabilities we will need in coming years. Areas of particular
interest include cyberspace, unmanned systems, and Maritime Domain
Awareness. As we transform our warfighting models and concepts, we must
correspondingly evolve our recruiting, training, and retention efforts.
All require the highest degree of coordination with the other Services.

FLEET RESPONSE PLAN

Question. The Fleet Response Plan has been implemented to provide a
surge capability for ``presence with a purpose.'' In a report issued in
November 2005, the Government Accountability Office found that the Navy
had not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan. In
addition, there have been some reports indicating sailors'
dissatisfaction with unpredictability in the new deployment schedules.
What strengths and weaknesses have you perceived to date with the
implementation of the Fleet Response Plan?
Answer. The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) has many strengths. The FRP
enables the Navy to increase operational availability and generate more
forward presence on short notice than was possible in the past. It
allows the Navy to respond to global events more robustly with a
disciplined, deliberate process to ensure continuous availability of
trained, ready Navy forces. The FRP allows the Navy to identify clearly
the surge forces ready to respond to Maritime Security, Theater
Security Cooperation, Homeland Defense, Major Combat Operations, or
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations.
That said, the FRP rollout strategy did not initially provide a
timely, detailed explanation and evaluation of key management metrics
to our sailors. Accordingly, in August 2006, the CNO issued more
definitive FRP guidance. In my current capacity, I expanded that
guidance and I remain focused on effectively communicating the key
elements of the FRP throughout the Navy. I am confident that the FRP is
both viable and appropriate to meet the challenges today and tomorrow.
Question. After a FRP surge, do you feel there is sufficient ship
maintenance and repair capability in the public and private sectors to
quickly reconstitute the force?
Answer. Yes, there is sufficient maintenance and repair capability
to fulfill the Navy's maintenance and repair requirements for
reconstituting the force after a surge. After the initial surge for
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and enabled by funding from Congress, the
public and private sector demonstrated ample capacity for ship repair.
Question. Would that assessment change if the Navy were confronted
with several back-to-back surge demands?
Answer. No, the assessment would not change as long as the overall
FRP cycle lengths did not change dramatically and severe damage was not
incurred by a significant number of ships.

ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role of the
Office of the CNO in the requirements determination, resource
allocation, or acquisition management processes of the Department of
the Navy?
Answer. From my perspective, the role of the CNO in the
requirements determination and resource allocation process is clear and
appropriate. While the current cooperation among the CNO and
acquisition officials is good, it should not be personality dependent.
Service Chiefs should have a more formal role in acquisition management
to ensure continuity among the requirements, resourcing and acquisition
processes.
Question. Do you see a need for any change in the structure or
functions of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) or the
role played by the CNO and the Vice CNO in the JROC?
Answer. I do not. I have not yet been involved in the JROC process
but I look forward to participating. If confirmed, and after I have
participated in the process, I will recommend changes as appropriate.

RECAPITALIZING THE FLEET

Question. Despite the fact that Navy leadership has determined that
it needs to have a 313-ship fleet to meet the maritime requirements of
the National Military Strategy, it is currently operating with 277
battle force ships. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has concluded
that the Navy has underestimated the costs for building the 313-ship
fleet by approximately 30 percent. Additionally, the Navy has
acknowledged an approaching strike-fighter gap which may range from 50
to 220 aircraft (the range depending on the procurement rate for Joint
Strike Fighter aircraft and the service's ability to extend the service
life for F/A-18 C/D and E/F aircraft).
Do you agree with the CBO's assessment that there is significant
cost risk associated with the Navy's shipbuilding plan?
Answer. Estimating and controlling costs associated with far-term
warfighting requirements are always challenging. As cost estimates are
refined, the Navy may need to make adjustments to these important
programs.
Question. What actions do you believe are necessary to execute the
Navy's shipbuilding plan within the Navy's budget estimates?
Answer. The Navy's shipbuilding plan recognizes the need for
exacting requirements and cost control methods, which can only be
achieved in partnership with industry. The Navy continues to evaluate
each ship class and identify cost reduction opportunities while
balancing warfighting requirements, costs, and industrial base
realities.
The Navy is committed to stable out-year procurement that industry
can use to anticipate workload. This allows industry to commit
resources, create efficiencies, and decrease the end-cost of Navy
ships. The Navy plans greater use of contract incentives to contribute
to real cost containment in future shipbuilding plans. In addition, the
Navy plans to pursue other areas for improvement in the acquisition
workforce and organization to strengthen the foundations of the Navy's
shipbuilding efforts. As we build the future Fleet, discipline will be
required of all stakeholders to ensure success of the plan.
Question. How would you characterize the risks to mission
performance posed by the current shortfall in battle force ships and
the growing shortfall in tactical aircraft?
Answer. While the current risk is manageable in the near term, the
Navy's 313-ship force is needed to meet warfighting demands in 2020.
These demands include Conventional Campaigns Major Combat Operations
(MCOs), war on terror/irregular warfare, and homeland defense.
The Navy's strike-fighter shortfall will not manifest itself until
the 2016 timeframe and is not impacting the Navy's ability to meet
current combatant commander requirements.
Question. What adjustments to the respective programs are necessary
and appropriate to reduce that operational risk?
Answer. To achieve Navy's desired capability and capacity and to
minimize operational risk, we are reducing types and models of ships,
maximizing reuse of ship designs and components, and employing a
business model that encourages the use of open architecture and mission
systems modularity.
Similarly, our aviation plan balances aviation capabilities through
cost-wise investments in recapitalization, sustainment, and
modernization programs. Future Navy strike-fighter shortfalls will be
mitigated through inventory optimization and possible additional
procurement in POM-10.
In all areas, we will continue to work closely with our partners in
industry to control requirements and costs, and provide the industrial
base the stability it needs to become more productive.
Question. What further adjustments would you consider if the Navy's
program comes under further pressure due to cost growth?
Answer. In the face of the rising cost of naval ships and aviation
procurements, the Navy has increased its efforts to reduce costs,
improve its requirements estimation capability, and seek alternative,
lower cost solutions. Absent that, top-line relief may be required.

ALTERNATIVE FINANCING METHODS FOR SHIPBUILDING

Question. Navy leaders have testified that alternative financing
methods must be found for shipbuilding.
What are your views and recommendations on the benefits and
feasibility of alternative financing methods, such as incremental
funding and advance appropriations?
Answer. It is the Navy's policy to fully fund the cost of
shipbuilding programs in the year of contract award. However, there are
instances when alternative financing methods for ships should be used,
such as advance procurement and incremental funding for large capital
ships. It is advantageous to begin detail design in advance procurement
rather than in the year of full funding to allow maturation of the
design before construction begins. Advance procurement can lead to
construction efficiencies and less rework due to fewer design changes.
These financing methods must be used judiciously to preserve budget
discipline.
Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of such
alternative financing methods on the availability of funds for
shipbuilding?
Answer. Alternative financing methods allow the Navy to maintain
the shipbuilding industrial base through more efficient management of
shipbuilding and conservation, Navy total obligational authority,
provide greater flexibility in executing scarce resources, and help
avoid individual-year funding spikes. Whenever possible, the Navy
remains committed to following the full-funding policy.

ATTACK SUBMARINE FORCE LEVELS

Question. The Navy's most recent statement of requirements for
attack submarine force levels was 48 attack submarines. However, the
Navy projects that the number of attack submarines will fall as low as
40 boats and remain below the 48-boat requirement for more than a
decade. The Navy is now claiming that it will be able to mitigate this
shortage using three techniques: (1) building the new Virginia class
submarines faster by reducing the time between the start of
construction to delivery from the current level of 86 months for the
last boat to deliver to a level of 60 months; (2) extending the life of
some boats currently in the fleet from 3 to 24 months; and (3)
increasing the length of deployments. By using a combination of these
measures, the Navy claims that it will be able to maintain no less than
42 boats in the force and will be able to maintain the current level of
commitments to the combatant commanders (roughly 10 boats continuously
on deployment).
What is your assessment of whether the three techniques listed
above will yield a number of deployed attack submarines sufficient to
meet the requirements of the combatant commanders and other
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs?
Answer. The Navy has formulated options that can mitigate some of
the risk caused by having less than 48 attack submarines (SSNs) from
2020 through 2033. These options include reducing submarine build-time,
extending the hull life of selected submarines, and increasing the
length of some submarine deployments. These measures would enable the
Navy to maintain no less than 44 SSNs, which would provide about 10
forward deployed ``SSN years'' annually.
Despite the fact that attack submarine force levels will be less
than the required 48 SSNs from 2020 to 2033, the Navy should be able to
meet the combatant commanders' critical forward presence requests and
maintain a warfighting surge capability with acceptable risk.

NAVY/MARINE CORPS INTRANET AND NEXT GENERATION ENTERPRISE NETWORK
PROGRAM

Question. What is your assessment of the status of the Navy Marine
Corps Intranet (NMCI) program and the ability of that program to meet
the Department of the Navy's information technology needs? I have
recently served in three major headquarters that used NMCI. I believe
NMCI has decidedly improved the Navy's cyber-security posture. Are you
satisfied with the efforts to date to establish the Next Generation
Enterprise Network (NGEN) program?
Answer. The actions taken to date are appropriate for a program of
such importance to the Navy and Marine Corps. A requirements Task Force
has been established under the direction of the Department of the Navy
Chief Information Officer (DON CIO), OPNAV N6 and Headquarters Marine
Corps Command, Control, Communications and Computers (HQMC C4). The
Task Force has drafted an initial requirements document that will be
reviewed by Fleet Commanders and stakeholders. The acquisition for the
follow-on to NMCI will commence after requirements are approved.
Question. What significant lessons learned do you think that the
Navy should draw from NMCI as it scopes and structures the NGEN
program?
Answer. We have learned many lessons from the implementation and
operation of NMCI. First and foremost, IT is critical to both our
warfighting and business processes. In addition, networks require
alignment of enterprise resources and requirements, not just IT
resources. Systems must have rapidly adaptable architectures, improved
interoperability, options for increased collaboration, and increased
remote accessibility. Our networks must be secure, yet our information
assurance processes should not be onerous to users. The ability to
incorporate new technology through the life of the contract with
appropriate technical refresh must be assured.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM

Question. The budget request for defense Science and Technology
(S&T) still falls short of the Defense Science Board's recommended goal
of dedicating 3 percent of the total defense budget to S&T. In
particular, the Navy S&T program, especially the investment in long-
term, innovative work which has been so successful in confronting
emerging threats, has declined significantly since the fiscal year 2006
request.
If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess whether the Navy
is investing adequately in S&T programs?
Answer. There are three key components to an effective S&T program:
a strong investment in basic and early applied research to build the
scientific foundation for future technologies; an emphasis on key
``game changing'' initiatives that provide technological advantage to
the Navy and Marine Corps warfighter; and a critical focus on
transitioning S&T programs to the acquisition community and the fleet.
The metrics, therefore, are the balance of investment across these
three components, the rate of transition of deployable S&T products,
and the success of S&T products in precluding technological surprise by
potential adversaries.
Question. How would you assess the value and appropriate investment
level for basic research programs?
Answer. I believe that a strong investment in basic research
programs is necessary to ensure we can maintain our advantages into the
future. In my recent assignments, I have not dealt with investment
decisions for basic research programs. If confirmed, I will assess our
investment levels to ensure we derive the needed benefit from our S&T
programs.

TECHNICAL WORKFORCE

Question. A significant challenge facing the Navy today is an
impending shortage of high quality scientific and engineering talent to
work at Navy laboratories and technical centers.
In your view, what are the pros and cons of having Active-Duty Navy
personnel trained and working as scientists and engineers within the
Navy research and acquisition system?
Answer. There is significant advantage in having current
warfighting experience within the research and acquisition process for
future naval systems. The demands on Navy officers to meet the required
expertise in their Navy warfare areas, and our growing need to develop
officers with the requisite joint skills, may make this arrangement
very challenging. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to identify
specific needs and provide opportunities for select personnel to work
in Navy labs and technical centers.

TEST AND EVALUATION ISSUES

Question. What do you see as the role of the developmental and
operational test and evaluation communities with respect to rapid
acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other evolutionary acquisition
processes?
Answer. Developmental and operational test and evaluation
communities are critical to reducing development risk and to providing
Navy leadership the performance information needed to make good
acquisition, fielding, and deployment decisions.
Question. Are you satisfied with the Navy's test and evaluation
capabilities? In which areas, if any, do you feel the Navy should be
developing new test and evaluation capabilities?
Answer. I am satisfied with the Navy's test and evaluation
capabilities. However, our test and evaluation organization and
processes must not be outpaced by the speed of technological advance.

MILITARY-TO-CIVILIAN CONVERSIONS

Question. The Services have been engaged in a multiyear effort to
eliminate thousands of military billets and replace them with civilian
employees or contractor personnel. The Navy has been the most
aggressive service in targeting health profession billets for military-
to-civilian conversions.
If confirmed, how would you anticipate using military-to-civilian
conversions to shape the future force of the Navy.
Answer. The Navy continually reviews military billets to determine
which billets require the unique skills of a sailor and which billets
can best be filled as effectively, and at lower cost, by a civilian or
by private industry.
The results of these analyses will be used to ensure that sailors
continue to have viable and rewarding career paths, and that we
continue to support the Fleet with an appropriate mix of civilian and
uniformed professionals.
If confirmed, I will continue these efforts.
Question. If confirmed, what metrics would you establish to measure
the effectiveness of this management tool, and how would you determine
if and when DOD civilian employees and private contractors could
perform work in a more efficient or cost-effective manner?
Answer. The effectiveness of the Navy's military-to-civilian
conversion efforts must ultimately be measured by the degree to which
they meet the following criteria: maintaining or improving Fleet
readiness; the collective capability and competence of our Total Force;
and overall cost savings.
Question. How would you measure the impact of such conversions on
readiness?
Answer. Warfighting capability and readiness will be assessed using
existing metrics and methods of assessment applied across the Fleet by
the operational commander.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the quality and supply
of civilian physicians, dentists, and nurses to replace military
personnel, and their willingness to serve in the Federal civilian
workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, my measures would be the quality of care
provided to our sailors and families; whether those health
professionals are meeting standards for training, certification, and
licensure; and our recruiting and retention statistics on the civilian
personnel that work in our medical system.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. The Navy will play an important role in defending the
Nation against the threat of long range ballistic missile attack and in
defending allies, friends, and deployed forces against theater
ballistic missile threats.
Do you view ballistic missile defense as a core Navy mission?
Answer. Yes, I believe the Navy's ability to provide ballistic
missile defense will be increasingly important to Joint warfighting now
and in the future.
Question. What plans does the Navy have for testing the Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense System?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is currently charged with
testing of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System (ABMD) for the
Defense Department. Under this construct, the Navy will continue
testing the Aegis SM-3 missile defense capability under the current
agreement with MDA, providing full-time commitment of an Aegis cruiser
to the Testing and Evaluation (T&E) role. Additionally, the Navy plans
to modify other Aegis ships to conduct MDA missions when required.
Question. Are you satisfied with the current rate of production for
the SM-3?
Answer. Yes; however, I believe the current rate of production is
the minimum prudent rate.
Question. When will the Navy, vice the Missile Defense Agency,
begin acquisition of SM-3 missiles?
Answer. There is no approved plan for the Navy to begin acquisition
of SM-3 missiles.

NAVY END STRENGTH

Question. The department's proposed budget for fiscal year 2008
includes an Active-Duty end strength of 328,400, which include a
reduction of 12,300 sailors. The end strength requested for the Navy
Reserve is 67,800, which includes a reduction of 3,500 sailors.
Based on the manpower demands needed to fight the global war on
terrorism, including significant Active-Duty increases for the Army and
Marine Corps, do you think that these reductions in personnel in the
Navy continue to be warranted?
Answer. The Navy has been able to capitalize on efficiencies to
accomplish the manpower reductions to date while meeting operational
demands. We are quickly approaching the limits of those efficiencies
and the number of manpower reductions should begin to level out.
I am confident that the Navy has thoroughly analyzed current and
future manpower requirements in developing its manpower force
structure. The reductions we have taken to date have been made possible
by integrating a Total Force manpower solution, leveraging technology
on new platforms, reducing manpower intensive platforms, and finding
efficiencies in training and infrastructure including identifying work
that is no longer required and applying civilian substitutions to non-
military essential work.
Question. How do the proposed cuts in end strength take into
account the support requirements associated with the planned increases
in Marine Corps end strength?
Answer. Navy end strength includes increases to the Fleet Marine
Force that provides direct support for the new USMC operational unit
growth. In addition, resources were added to the Navy portion of the
Defense Health Program to provide medical benefits to the increased
number of Marines and their families.
Question. Do you view the additional 698 Active-Duty personnel
added by the House in H.R. 1585 as necessary to ensure Navy medical
personnel are available in adequate numbers to support Active and
Reserve component personnel, retirees, and their family members?
Answer. The health care mission to support military personnel,
retirees, and their family members can be fully met without the
additional 698 Active-Duty medical personnel proposed by H.R. 1585. The
additional 698 end strength would restore 209 military end strength
previously identified as military-to-civilian conversions. The
restoration of the 209 military end strength is not required to support
either the operational or health benefit mission of Navy Medicine. This
end strength has previously been identified as ``non-military''
essential and funding has been provided to hire the necessary civilian
personnel to ensure the health benefit mission is met.
The remaining 489 positions that H.R. 1585 addresses were
divestitures due to an overall Active-Duty reduction to Navy personnel.
Consequently, the health benefit mission to Active-Duty Forces has
decreased and can be met with current personnel levels. The reduction
of 489 positions did not impact any operational mission requirements.

NAVY RESERVE

Question. What is your vision for the roles and missions of the
Navy Reserve, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you seek to
achieve with respect to the Navy Reserve's organization, end strength,
and force structure?
Answer. As demonstrated through force generation, deployment and
redeployment, Reserve component forces meet two significant needs of
our Navy: (1) they provide capability and capacity in support of Major
Combat Operations; and (2) they provide operational augmentation to
meet routine military mission requirements. As such, we must maintain
the role of the Reserve component as our Strategic Baseline, and we
should capitalize on the ability of the Reserve component to provide
Operational Support in a predictable and periodic manner.
To best employ our Reserve component, we must align
organizationally and fiscally to realize the full value of the Reserve
component that can meet Operational Support missions.
The optimal size of the Navy Reserve is a function of capacity and
capabilities in the Active Force. We must ensure that the right
capabilities reside in the appropriate components and that components
are fully complementary. We must periodically review and validate
Reserve component capabilities in alignment with our working Active/
Reserve Integration (ARI) model. We must then recruit and retain
individuals with the required skills, in appropriate numbers, to
support Navy strategies and Operational Support requirements.

DEFENSE OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT

Question. The Navy has requested authorization for additional
Active-Duty officers in excess of Defense Officer Personnel Management
Act (DOPMA) limits in the grades of lieutenant commander, commander,
and captain even as significant reductions in end strength are being
implemented.
What is the rationale for increasing the number of Navy control
grade officers, and do you anticipate that additional increases will be
required in the future?
Answer. Navy needs a flexible tool that allows rapid adjustments as
requirements change. While aggregate Navy end strength and total
officer end strength continue to decline, the need for more senior and
experienced officers, as a percent of the officer corps, continues to
escalate. The current DOPMA tables worked well for a fleet with large
ships and large crews and predominantly multi-seat aircraft. But ships
with smaller crews and more single seat aircraft result in a need for
fewer junior officers, as a percentage, in our operational units. At
the same time, Joint education and billet requirements (Joint and non-
Joint) are increasing the demand for DOPMA-controlled officers.
The Navy has been operating at or near DOPMA limits for several
years but at the cost of suppressing the grade requirement of over 500
billets. Detailing to the true requirement of some billets and meeting
individual augmentee demands has created an effective shortage of
DOPMA-controlled officers. A solution to this shortage is the requested
DOPMA relief that would allow promotion to the true demand.
Additionally, the Chief of Naval Personnel is evaluating community
management practices, officer force shaping policies, and special and
incentive pays. These practices will better align Navy control grade
officer strength with today's operational trends while increasing
retention of officers reaching critical career decision points. The
DOPMA relief requested is adequate to cover current needs and provides
headroom to accommodate anticipated future growth.
Question. What changes to DOPMA or other statutory provisions
affecting Navy officer personnel management (including flag officers)
are needed or, at a minimum, should be considered?
Answer. I am grateful that both the Senate and House have included,
in their respective versions of the National Defense Authorization Bill
for Fiscal Year 2008, our request for a 5 percent across-the-board
increase in DOPMA control grades. Enactment of this provision will
allow Navy to gradually ease suppression of over 500 control grade
billets, thereby enhancing readiness as we begin filling those billets
with the officers possessing the right skills and experience required
by those billets. It also provides modest additional headspace to
permit us to address emerging control grade growth in support of joint,
combatant commander, and other Service support requirements. Navy is
continuing to explore options to retain more senior and experienced
officers on Active-Duty.
Question. What changes in law or policy with respect to numbers of
senior enlisted personnel and their training, education, and
utilization are needed in your judgment?
Answer. I am pleased the Senate version of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 includes a provision to increase
the upper limit on the authorized daily average of Active-Duty enlisted
members in pay grade E-9 from 1 to 1.25 percent of the enlisted force.
This change would increase the maximum limit for personnel in the
combined pay grades E-8 and E-9 to 3.75 percent and would allow the
Navy to best meet our needs.
This change addresses challenges that require a Total Force
composed of senior, well-educated, motivated, and competent people who
can adapt to the many demands of future missions. If enacted, it will
allow us to meet our needs for managing our senior enlisted personnel.

JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

Question. What is your assessment of the impact on Active-Duty and
Reserve officers of the newly implemented Joint Qualification System
(JQS)? Do you think additional changes in law or regulation are needed?
Answer. When the JQS is implemented on 1 October 2007, it will
recognize the skills that support U.S. military response to national
security threats, interagency coordination, combat operations, and
humanitarian crises. It will also account for the intensity,
environment, and duration or frequency of a joint experience. A key
change will be the ability to award credit to Reserve component
officers, previously not allowed.
The JQS provides the opportunity to create and sustain the largest
possible pool of fully-qualified and inherently joint leaders suitable
for joint command and staff responsibilities in both the Active-Duty
and Reserve components.
The new JQS is being implemented in spirals over the next 3 fiscal
years. Additional changes in law or regulation should only be
considered after full implementation of JQS.
Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with
becoming a Joint Qualified Officer, including links to promotion to
general and flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and
professional demands of Navy line officers?
Answer. We have made solid progress in policy initiatives linking
career progression and joint management policies within Navy line
officer career paths. Navy will plan for, prepare, and assign high
quality line officers to joint billets. We are creating a pool of well
qualified line officers who are fully qualified and inherently Joint
leaders suitable for joint command and staff responsibilities. We are
meeting our joint promotion objectives and we are filling our joint
assignments and JPME seats with our best and our brightest. Navy
acknowledges its responsibility to produce skilled joint leaders,
tested in their Service's roles, missions and capabilities, and we are
aggressively executing this responsibility.

SELECTIVE EARLY RETIREMENT AUTHORITY

Question. The Navy has requested that Congress reinstate enhanced
authority for selective early retirement.
What changes in existing law, if any, regarding selective early
retirement, are needed in your view?
Answer. Although the Navy does not routinely use Selective Early
Retirement (SER) as one of its primary force shaping tools, its
employment may become necessary as the Navy transforms to meet future
warfighting requirements. The extension of 10 U.S.C. 638a, Expanded
SER, would allow the Navy to effectively and efficiently manage
potential force structure changes without requiring the excessive
accession reductions used in the 1990s to meet end strength controls.
The Expanded SER would allow the Service Secretary to identify groups
of officers to be considered for early retirement by year group or
specialty within a competitive category, or any combination of those
identifiers. Current SER authority does not provide for the
identification of groups narrower than an entire competitive category
to be considered. The expanded authority is an important force
management tool for shaping the force to meet current and future
requirements.

REBALANCING FORCES

Question. In a memorandum dated July 9, 2003, the SECDEF directed
action by the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the SECDEF
aimed at achieving better balance in the capabilities of the Active and
Reserve components. The Secretary noted that the Department ``needs to
promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force
rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient
application of manpower and technological solutions based on a
disciplined force requirements process.''
What progress has the Navy made in achieving the Secretary's
vision?
Answer. We have effectively completed the initial rebalancing
efforts called for in the SECDEF's memorandum. Between fiscal year 2003
and fiscal year 2006 the Navy rebalanced over 33,000 spaces both within
and between the Active and Reserve components. Within that time, the
Navy created the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), which is
evolving into a relevant force for pre-conflict and reconstruction
operations and is an important dimension in the war on terrorism. The
ratio of the Active-Duty to Reserve personnel within NECC is nearly 1:1
(Active component 48 percent; Reserve component 52 percent).
Navy's robust planning, programming, and budgeting processes and
the focused efforts of our Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education
(MPTE) Enterprise allow us to continuously review the force, ensuring
that we have the right mix of Active-Duty, Reserve, government civilian
employees, and contractors to achieve mission success.
Question. What do you consider to be the biggest continuing
obstacles to achieving the goals that the SECDEF has set forth in his
memorandum?
Answer. The biggest obstacles to achieving the goals that the
SECDEF has set forth are the changing security environment and the
changing demographic from which we recruit. If confirmed, I am
committed to taking those steps needed to ensure we have access to the
full range of our Nation's talent.

INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES AND ``IN LIEU OF'' MISSIONS

Question. Secretary Winter, in his written testimony for the Navy
Posture Hearing earlier this year, stated that there were, at that
time, more than 8,000 sailors deployed in the Central Command (CENTCOM)
Area of Operations as Individual Augmentees (IAs) and 4,500 sailors
performing ``in lieu of'' missions.
Will the Navy continue to be able to support these nontraditional
assignments as it draws down its end strength?
Answer. Navy will be able to support augmentation assignments under
its current personnel inventory reduction plan. The majority of Navy
billets that are in the most demand for augmentation assignments are
not being eliminated. A careful review of specific active duty skill
areas, such as Seabees and Intelligence personnel, resulted in measures
to retain those specific billets and highly trained personnel. U.S.
Fleet Forces is using a Fleet IA Capacity Model to help calculate a
community's ability to source IA requirements. The Navy's intent is to
deploy task-organized units rather than individual or small group IAs
in the future.
Question. What are the criteria being applied to determine which
Active-Duty and Reserve officers and enlisted personnel are assigned
duty as individual augmentees?
Answer. We take into account several factors when selecting members
to source augmentation requirements and Reserve mobilizations;
specifically, skills identified during coordination of the Joint
sourcing plan for ``in lieu of'' and ``ad-hoc'' missions. The combatant
commander identifies the required skills (MOS, experience, etc) in the
Unit Request Form (URF) and/or the Request for Forces (RFF) documents
that are submitted to the Joint Staff. Through the Naval Personnel
Development Command, we can determine which specific Navy designator/
rating or Navy Enlisted Classification System code (NEC) best meets the
required skills. We then work with appropriate commands to identify and
plan additional training required to meet the specific joint mission
and the unique skill identified by the supported component commander.
Most positions tasked to Navy require basic skills in supply,
administration, engineering, medical or intelligence. After
establishing the required skills, volunteers are given priority.
Members must have the proper rating/designator and possess the required
skills, experience, clearance, and subspecialty (if required).
Additionally, all requirements are filled taking into consideration the
member's professional and personal circumstances and any potential
readiness impact on the sourcing commands.
Active-Duty Personnel Specifics: Individuals are selected by their
parent commands. U.S. Fleet Forces Command is responsible for assigning
appropriate tasking across all Navy commands. Navy major commands are
assigned requirements to fill augmentation requests, which are then
passed to subordinate commands to identify augmentees. Commands first
seek volunteers and then make assignments based on skill requirements.
Reserve Personnel Specifics: Volunteer drilling reservists who have
not been previously mobilized are considered first, followed by
previously identified sailors who were deferred/delayed but are now
available. After volunteers have been considered, nonvolunteers
assigned to supporting Reserve units (if applicable) and who have not
been previously mobilized are considered, then finally the applicable
community managers are asked to nominate qualified sailors. In addition
to skill requirements, other factors considered when selecting a sailor
include experience, Expiration of Active Obligated Service, and
Mobilization Availability Status (MAS) codes. Our Navy Reserve
alongside our Active component sailors are providing integrated
operational expertise to support a full range of operations.
Question. How do these assignments impact Navy readiness?
Answer. Navy's current readiness remains excellent. Congressional
support has been critical in this regard and, as a result, Navy units
and individual augmentees deploy properly trained and properly
equipped. I believe that the current level of effort is sustainable.
Currently, augmentation numbers represent approximately 3 percent of
the Total Force, 2 percent of the Active-Duty component force, and 4
percent of the Reserve component force. Fleet manning projections and
readiness indicators are continuously assessed. Navy Personnel Command
has undertaken a series of regular surveys and assessments to monitor
indications that the increased deployment/workload demands may be
adversely impacting retention or the health of the Force.

TRICARE FEE INCREASES

Question. In May 2007, the Task Force on the Future of Military
Health Care issued an interim report concluding that ``to sustain and
improve military health care benefits for the long run, actions must be
taken now to adjust the system in the most cost-effective ways.'' The
Task Force recommended increasing the portion of the costs borne by
retirees under age 65, and suggested an increase in military retired
pay to offset part or all of the increase if Congress believes that the
increases are too large relative to retired pay.
Do you agree with the view that TRICARE fees for military retirees
should be increased?
Answer. We must be very careful not to erode the confidence of the
men and women who serve in the United States Armed Forces and our
military retirees. We must continue to provide them with the healthcare
to which they are entitled while seeking ways to deliver healthcare
benefits in a flexible, effective, and cost-efficient manner. The fees
associated with the TRICARE plans should be balanced and fairly
adjusted with no one group carrying an undue burden, including the
taxpayer.
Question. What constraints, if any, should be imposed, in your
view, on a retiree's ability to use his or her TRICARE benefit?
Answer. Constraints should not be placed on a retiree's ability to
use his or her authorized TRICARE benefit. They should be afforded
every opportunity to exercise their healthcare benefits within the
established plan.
Question. What recommendations, if any, would you offer to address
the increasing cost of health care and other personnel benefits?
Answer. Preventable chronic disease linked to lifestyle accounts
for 75 percent of our health care costs. A strong emphasis on
integration of health and wellness must be the foundation of an
efficient healthcare system. Prevention programs such as tobacco
cessation, weight management and mental and physical well being provide
significant short and long term cost savings, as well as a more
responsive force. Other opportunities to reduce costs include
containing the growth of pharmacy costs by marketing the TRICARE Mail-
Order Pharmacy (TMOP) and encouraging the use of generic medications
when appropriate. The Navy should also continue improvement of our
electronic health data system, AHLTA, to increase the productivity of
our providers. Additionally, expanding and investing in telemedicine
and telehealth capabilities would enable the use of healthcare
resources in more remote locations.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in
any shaping or rethinking of health care benefits for military
personnel, including retirees and their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I will remain mindful of the challenges we
face in healthcare, I will know the quality of care that our
servicemembers and their families receive, and I will remain keenly
focused on this issue so vital to readiness and the welfare of our
sailors, retirees, and families.
Question. How would you assess the impact of such benefits and
changes on recruitment and retention of military personnel?
Answer. Military personnel and their families, to include retirees,
are strong advocates within our recruitment and retention efforts. The
healthcare benefit is a strong recruiting and retention factor and we
must ensure our benefits remain attractive within the overall U.S.
labor market.

SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY

Question. In response to a congressional requirement for
formulation of a comprehensive policy related to sexual assaults in the
Armed Forces, the SECDEF has promulgated guidance aimed at more
effectively preventing sexual assaults, investigating incidents of
sexual assault, and responding to the needs of victims of sexual
assault.
What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Navy's program
for preventing sexual assaults and addressing the needs of victims of
sexual assault?
Answer. Sexual assault is not tolerated in the Navy. When incidents
occur, the Navy is committed to effective victim response and
accountability for offenders. Prevention is our first priority, however
when incidents occur, the Navy has a comprehensive reliable process in
place to quickly respond to victims, offer reporting options, conduct a
full and fair investigation, and hold offenders accountable. We must
adhere to, assess and continually improve this process.
The senior leadership of the Navy communicated to each commanding
officer the expectations regarding Sexual Assault Victim Intervention
(SAVI) responsibilities and reporting compliance, and Navy policy
provides clear succinct guidance. Training on sexual assault awareness
and prevention is required and provided annually. Annual and periodic
training is required for all key stakeholders of the SAVI program to
include legal, medical, NCIS, and Chaplains. Training for sailors is
included throughout our curricula, including RTC Great Lakes, the Naval
Academy, and prospective commanding officer and executive officer
courses.
Navy continually monitors resources for the SAVI program, has
funded Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) positions to cover
all installations (40 percent increase in positions since 2005), and
trains Victim Advocates for all commands, both afloat and ashore. There
is ongoing collaboration throughout the Navy to assess and improve the
SAVI program and response to victims. Trained Victim Advocates respond
quickly when incidents are reported to offer advocacy, medical,
counseling, and military and civilian resources to victims. Each
installation conducts monthly Sexual Assault Case Management Group
meetings to review all unrestricted cases of sexual assault with key
responders to address any systemic gaps or barriers.
Navy is fully engaged in collaboration and support of DOD Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) and Service Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response programs. Commands transmit required
incident reports promptly. Data collected on both restricted and
unrestricted reports of sexual assault are forwarded to OSD SAPRO
quarterly meeting data collection requirements and trend analysis with
continual improvement in performance metrics.
Leaders are charged with remaining vigilant to the conditions that
precipitate sexual assault and with being responsive to the needs of
victims.

DEFENSE INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM

Question. Defense Incident-Based Reporting System (DIBRS) is an
information technology system funded and managed by the Defense
Manpower Data Center and required under DOD Directive 7730.47. It is
intended to provide more comprehensive data on the incidence and types
of crimes committed within the Armed Forces. The Department of the Navy
is developing a Department of the Navy Criminal Justice Information
System (DONCJIS) to satisfy DIBRS reporting requirements but has been
unable to predict when the system will be fully operational.
What is the status of the Navy's implementation of DIBRS and
DONCJIS?
Answer. Through DONCJIS, the Department will achieve full
compliance with all aspects of the DIBRS reporting requirement. The
Department has recently convened a Flag Officer-level Executive
Steering Committee (ESC) to provide additional focus and oversight to
the effort, with the goal of bringing the system to fruition in the
near term. An upcoming ESC meeting will establish the final, target
implementation date which is currently projected to be mid-fiscal year
2008.
Question. What utility do you see for Navy's senior leaders in
having the information available through DIBRS?
Answer. The Department does not anticipate using the DIBRS
reporting data directly. However, the data contained in DONCJIS will
provide tremendous value to Naval leaders in better understanding
critical trends affecting morale, safety, and readiness. In particular,
the Department's Uniform Crime Report, and associated analytical
products derived from DONCJIS, will provide more insight into the
quantity and types of criminal activity throughout the Navy and Marine
Corps. The richness of data available from DONCJIS, when fully
deployed, will provide the Department's leadership with much better
management oversight and actionable information than any other current
DOD system.

INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE

Question. In your past assignments, you have had the opportunity to
observe the working relationship between the Navy General Counsel, the
JAG of the Navy and judge advocates advising commanders in the field.
What is your view of the need for the JAG to provide independent
legal advice to the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps?
Answer. The CNO must receive independent advice from legal counsel.
The law appropriately prohibits any officer or employee of the DOD from
interfering with the JAG's independent legal advice to the Secretary of
the Navy and the CNO. An independent, candid and trusted relationship
among the JAG and CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps is
essential to the proper functioning of their positions.
Question. What is your view of the responsibility of judge
advocates within the Services and joint commands to provide independent
legal advice to military commanders?
Answer. Judge advocates in all the Services are obligated to
provide independent legal advice based on sound judgment and
experience. Their loyalty is to the government of the United States,
while simultaneously promoting the interests of their commander.
Commanders and commanding officers are obligated to discuss
military justice concerns with their staff judge advocates. Independent
legal advice to military commanders is the cornerstone of our military
justice system and the foundation for maintenance of good order and
discipline and accountability.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

Question. The Navy is involved in civil litigation over its use of
mid-frequency active sonar during training exercises and its impact on
the environment. A U.S. District Court in California recently enjoined
Navy's use of mid-frequency active sonar in the Southern California at-
sea training ranges through 2009 that impacted Navy training exercises
needed to ensure readiness for deployment of Navy ships, submarines,
and aircraft based on the west coast. On August 31, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted an emergency stay of the
District Court's injunction pending an appeal by the Navy.
What is the Navy doing to comply with environmental laws so it can
continue to effectively train with mid-frequency active sonar?
Answer. In 2002, the Navy began implementation of a comprehensive,
fully funded strategy to ensure compliance with applicable Federal
laws. In close coordination with the National Marine Fisheries Service,
we have developed an execution plan that will result in completion of
full environmental documentation of all major Navy training and
exercise areas. The process of completing this documentation, including
the required analysis and public comment periods, is a multi-year
effort. The end result will be compliance for our ranges and operating
areas.
We have issued public Notices of Intent in the Federal Register to
develop Environmental Impact Statements for twelve ranges and Operating
areas. We expect to finalize these documents by the end of 2009. Once
finalized, we will have fulfilled all legal requirements, including
obtaining all necessary authorizations and completing all required
consultations, for all training, including mid-frequency active sonar,
for our at-sea ranges and operating areas.
Concurrent with implementing our long term strategy, in the
interim, we have prepared environmental planning under the National
Environmental Policy Act and have obtained Biological Opinions under
the Endangered Species Act when necessary for all major exercises.
These exercises and other major exercises through January 2009 will be
conducted in compliance with the National Defense Exemption under the
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). The process of obtaining Letters
of Authorization under the MMPA is a several year effort; therefore the
exemption was necessary in order to allow our major exercises to be
conducted while the long term range and operating area documentation is
prepared. The National Defense Exemption was part of the strategy
developed with the National Marine Fisheries Service that allows both
agencies to apply resources to the long-term plan.
During the exemption period, we will continue to employ stringent,
scientifically based, mitigation measures, developed with National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's concurrence, to protect marine
mammals during all sonar activities.
Despite our compliance plan, lawsuits have been filed concerning
our Joint Task Force Exercises and Composite Training Unit Exercises
occurring in the Southern California Operating Area and our Undersea
Warfare Exercises occurring in the Hawaiian Islands Range Complex. We
are working with the Department of Justice in addressing these
lawsuits.
Continued training with active sonar is absolutely essential in
protecting the lives of our sailors and marines and our Nation's
defense. Increasingly quiet diesel-electric submarines continue to
proliferate throughout the world. Our Navy must train to counter
diesel-electric submarines and to ensure our forces can locate, track,
and defeat them. Active sonar is the primary system to accomplish this
task.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

1. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Roughead, the Navy testified before
this committee that the concept for procurement of the next three
surface combatant ships would be to bundle the research and development
and then reuse systems across all three ships. The three ships,
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), DDG-1000, and CG(X) were described as the
``family of ships.'' This committee has been very supportive of that
concept as we watch pressure on budgets and receive testimony on the
open architecture nature of the DDG-1000 research and development
program. However, it does not appear that the Navy is holding to its
plan as we see two separate combat systems in the LCS, no firm path
forward on CG(X) that will reuse DDG-1000 open architecture, hull, and
main engineering and combat systems. Reusing systems and subsystems
across a number of new development ships should save taxpayer dollars
while meeting Navy requirements. How do you intend to influence the
development requirements for these three ships to maximize the
application of key DDG-1000 technologies across all three ship classes?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy is benefiting from the ``family of
ships'' approach through the reuse of systems and technologies across
DDG-1000, CG(X) and LCS.
The CG(X) is part of the family of ships with its program of record
based on DDG-1000 features and technologies. The Analysis of
Alternatives results are currently under review, but design ship
decisions have not yet been finalized. The program is assessing the
potential reuse of 9 of the 10 DDG-1000 critical technologies,
including:

Integrated Composite Deckhouse & Apertures
Infrared Mockups
Multi-Function Radar (MFR), a component of the Dual Band
Radar (DBR)
Peripheral Vertical Launch System (PVLS)/Advanced VLS
Integrated Undersea Warfare (IUSW) System
Hull Form
Integrated Power System (IPS)
Autonomic Fire Suppression System (AFSS)
Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE)

The 10th DDG-1000 critical technology, the Advanced Gun System
(AGS), is not currently in the CG(X) alternatives due to different
mission requirements of the ships.
The Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) is a combat system that
integrates and coordinates the existing sensors and weapons systems
aboard most classes of non-AEGIS ships. SSDS is maximizing reuse of the
DDG-1000 Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) Infrastructure
software. The SSDS Mk 2 Combat System has integrated software
components of the DDG-1000 TSCE Infrastructure, planned for
installation on LPD 17 and CVN 68 Class ships. The Navy will continue
to promote the principles of Open Architecture as it moves forward with
completion of DDG-1000 software development. All applicable software
components related to the DDG-1000 critical technologies will be re-
usable by CG(X), if implemented. Other key DDG-1000 Combat System
capabilities (i.e. MH-60R integration, 57 mm gun, Electronic Warfare
(EW) System) will be evaluated as reuse candidates.
Regarding applicability to LCS, although the ship is complementary
to DDG-1000 and CG(X) from an operational need standpoint, the LCS ship
size, mission module concept, and procurement timelines have precluded,
to date, application of key DDG-1000 technologies, beyond common use of
the 57 mm gun system. Some DDG-1000 technologies are candidates for
potential insertion into future LCS flights, including human systems
integration, condition-based maintenance, and distance support.
Additionally, the Navy intends to procure LCS Flight 1 seaframes
starting in fiscal year 2011, with a Common Combat System and command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C\4\I) suite. The
Common Combat System requirements provide an open architecture solution
that is compatible with other ship classes in terms of sensors and
mission software, providing a more affordable and effective solution in
which the Government owns the data rights.
In addition, the Navy plans to leverage the DDG-1000 Dual Band
Radar investment on the CVN 78.
As delineated in the approach and examples above, the Navy remains
committed to bundling the research and development investments in DDG-
1000 and using them across the ``family of ships'' where applicable.

2. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Roughead, Congress has heard a lot
about the LCS program over the last several years, and much of it is
negative. I believe the difficulties this program is experiencing today
are the result, in part of the rush that occurred at the beginning of
the program. The capability to reach close to shore quickly is
undoubtedly a continuing requirement as global threat scenarios
continue to evolve. However, I'm concerned that the problems in the LCS
program jeopardize our ability to act effectively in this battle space
in the near term. Our committee stated in the mark-up of the fiscal
year 2008 defense budget that ``if the Navy really believed that the
threat were that urgent, it might have taken more near-term steps to
address it. For example, the Navy might not have cancelled the remote
mine hunting system capability on a number of the DDG-51 class
destroyers, ships that will be available to the combatant commanders
much sooner than LCS. The Navy might also have taken this modular
capability slated for the LCS and packaged those modules to deploy
sooner on ships of opportunity.'' Additionally, the Mission Module
Program Office, Program Executive Office (PEO) Littoral and Mine
Warfare, stated ``We do not necessarily need an LCS to deploy these
systems. Wherever a helicopter could land, whether it is a large-deck,
a carrier or a pier or shore facility, we could deploy this mine
warfare capability.'' Has the Navy taken a hard look at putting these
mission modules on other ships or forward-basing them on-shore while we
figure out whether we're on the right track with LCS hulls, or could we
completely eliminate the LCS hulls, and deploy the capability on other
ships?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, the Navy conducted thorough analysis to
determine the best ship class to deploy the three focused mission
packages. This analysis shows the LCS, with its speed, draft, payload,
and endurance is the optimal ship from which all three mission packages
can best be employed in order to close the littoral warfighting gaps.
The Navy's analysis examined multiple potential solutions to the
capability gaps identified in the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council's (JROC) Assured Maritime Access in the Littorals Initial
Capabilities Document (ICD). The JROC approved LCS ICD included a
Function Solutions Analysis (FSA) which examined seven solution
options, including procuring more of the current programmed force,
installing upgraded systems on the current force, and modifying the DDG
51 class hull to carry the three mission packages. The FSA recommended
the solution that contains the option for a new class of ships
specifically tailored to the focused missions of Mine Warfare,
Submarine Warfare, and Anti-submarine Warfare. The study also concluded
that the new focused-mission class produced the most affordable and
best overall performance against the littoral capability gaps.
LCS best addresses the capability gaps identified in the JROC's
Assured Maritime Access in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document.
It was designed from the keel up to specifically deploy the current
focused mission systems with a future capability to expand into other
roles. No other ship could deploy the full capability of a mission
package without overcoming significant challenges including computing
environment interfaces and space limitations. While there are elements
of a mission package that could possibly be deployed from other ship
types (e.g. an MH-53 can use the AQS-20 side-scan sonar for mine
hunting much as it uses the AQS-14 today, resulting in partial mine
countermeasures (MCM) capability when compared to the LCS mine warfare
mission modules), it is the whole LCS mission package that satisfies
the capability gap. Because of the uniqueness of the Mission Packages,
LCS is the preferred and optimal ship to use the mission packages and
mission modules.

3. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Roughead, the Navy has requested and I
support a 55 percent increase to the statutory cost cap for LCS, up to
$460 million. This figure represents only the sea frame, which as I
understand it, is basically the bare ship, without specific mission
capability like mine or anti-submarine warfare. Given that this is the
first time that I am aware of that we have procured the essential
mission capability of a ship separately from the hull, I believe we
should be considering the total acquisition cost when we consider the
future of this program. To compare the procurement cost of an LCS to
another ship, apples to apples, we would need to add the cost of the
ship and the mission modules. What is the cost of LCS with its mission
modules, and how does it compare to other, similarly outfitted ships
that are multi-mission capable?
Admiral Roughead. The projected end cost of an LCS sea frame
procured in fiscal year 2008 is $460 million. This includes the
following cost categories: basic construction, electronics (government
furnished equipment), change orders and other program costs.
During operations, an LCS will be outfitted with a single mission
package configured for either mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) or anti-surface warfare (SUW). The underlying strength of the LCS
lies in this innovative design approach, applying modularity for
operational flexibility. MP development and procurement separate from
the sea frames allows LCS warfighting capability to keep pace with
evolving threats, improve technology, and adapt more quickly than
traditional ship programs.
An MP consists of multiple mission modules, including mission
systems transported and housed in support containers with necessary
spares, special tools and other support equipment. An MP relies on
supporting aircraft, MP operating crew, and training and pipeline units
which are separately funded. In fiscal year 2008, the Navy request
includes $47.8 million to procure one mine warfare package, $12.5
million for one SUW package and $25.3 million for associated program
costs in OPN and RDT&E,N. The average baseline cost of each type of MP
across the entire program is $68 million per mine warfare package
(baseline package starting in fiscal year 2009), $42.3 million per ASW
package (baseline starting in fiscal year 2009) and $16.7 million per
SUW package (baseline starting in fiscal year 2010). Cost estimates
reflect planned integration of additional mission systems as these
become ready for operational use.
Due to differences in requirements, mission equipment and
operational concepts, there are no similarly outfitted, multi-mission
capable ships with which to compare costs.

4. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Roughead, given that we currently have
parallel development and production paths for these two designs, and
that the Navy has testified that they may actually keep both designs,
how does this impact life cycle costs?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy's restructured LCS program proposes
procurement of additional Flight 0 LCS ships in fiscal year 2008 and
fiscal year 2009 to meet operational requirements.
Procurement of additional Flight 0 ships may result in higher life
cycle costs, but is necessary to reduce risk in existing warfighting
capability gaps.
The two existing designs will undergo operational performance
testing in fiscal year 2009, and the results will be considered as part
of the evaluation for a single design selection for the fiscal year
2010 and later Flight 1 ships.
Selecting a single Flight 1 seaframe achieves commonality in hull,
mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) and C\4\I systems in the LCS class.
Continued procurement of two seaframe designs into fiscal year 2010 and
beyond is an alternative, should the Navy determine that each design
presents a unique operational advantage. The implementation of a common
combat system and C\4\I suite as part of Flight 1 would reduce
lifecycle cost of the common warfare system, but would not achieve the
savings in seaframe HM&E, crew training, and logistics costs
anticipated from selecting a single seaframe design.

5. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Roughead, isn't it more expensive to
have two different designs of the same ship from a training and
maintenance perspective?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, training and maintenance costs are more
expensive for two different designs. By design, however, the LCS combat
systems (mission modules) will have the same capabilities and
equipment, therefore significantly reducing associated training and
maintenance costs.
The Navy's proposed restructured LCS program continues to procure
ships from the existing Flight 0 designs, and supports selection of a
single Flight 1 design in fiscal year 2011 and out.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP PROGRAM

6. Senator Reed. Admiral Roughead, as you are aware, the LCS
program has had difficulties regarding cost overruns and changing
capability requirements. What is your plan and timeline for determining
requirements and total cost?
Admiral Roughead. The LCS program meets an urgent warfighting
requirement and is a critical component to achieving the Navy's force
structure objective of at least 313 ships. Significantly important, the
Navy monitors this program closely.
LCS capabilities requirements are delineated in the program's
Capabilities Development Document (CDD). The CDD reflects the specific
requirements of the ship and is eventually sent to industry team(s)
responsible for building to these requirements. The CDD goes through a
rigorous and formal development, review and approval process, and
ultimately requires JROC. There have been no changes to LCS capability
requirements as delineated in the CDD since JROC approval in May 2004.
Likewise, cost has been examined in great detail. The Navy
identified significant cost growth with the lead Lockheed Martin (LM)
ship and issued a 90-day stop work order in January 2007 for the second
LM ship, LCS 3, to provide time to assess factors contributing to the
cost growth and to develop an executable program plan for the way
ahead. Similarly, cost growth was identified with the lead General
Dynamics (GD) ship and the Navy suspended construction of the second GD
ship, LCS 4, to develop an executable program plan. In both cases, the
Navy evaluated the overall performance of the programs, working closely
with the contractors to address cost overruns and root causes.
The Navy has revised its estimates for LCS 1 and 2 end costs plus
post-delivery and outfitting, and has provided these estimates to
Congress. The Navy is committed to continue working with Congress on
this important program which is needed to fill existing warfighting
capability gaps. We will provide our revised acquisition plan with the
fiscal year 2009 budget submission.

7. Senator Reed. Admiral Roughead, what are your views on an
independent review board to assess both capabilities and costs?
Admiral Roughead. Independent review boards may be appropriate in
certain cases. With respect to the LCS, the Navy has conducted
extensive program assessments and has conducted various reviews. These
include reviews both by an independent Program Management Assist Group
and by the Naval Inspector General. As a result, the Navy has developed
an executable program plan that adjusts the acquisition profile, ship
cost estimates, budgets and schedules and provides resources for
effective management of cost, production and technical risk to deliver
ships to the Fleet to support the urgent warfighting requirement.
Of note, the Secretary of the Navy has recently announced his
intention to establish an advisory panel that will provide him with
independent advice and recommendations on matters of importance to the
Navy, including acquisition.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor

NAVY HELICOPTERS

8. Senator Pryor. Admiral Roughead, I am aware that the Navy's H-
60S is having difficulty meeting the basic performance parameters for
its Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) mission. Has the Navy
completed an assessment of an alternative medium lift helicopter to the
H-60S that can meet AMCM requirements at an equal or similar cost per
flight hour? If not, when will such an analysis occur?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy has designated the MH-60S as its future
airborne mine warfare helicopter; the MH-53E is the Fleet's current
AMCM platform. The Navy has no current plans to address alternatives
beyond the MH-60S to meet this established mission, now evolving with
the advent of new AMCM technological advances.
A significant effort is ongoing to integrate a suite of AMCM
systems on the MH-60S helicopter. The AQS-20A sonar mine hunting system
will be the first of these systems fielded. To date, it has
demonstrated successful performance and is scheduled to commence its
Operational Test in November 2007. Furthermore, the MH-60S has
successfully completed numerous aircraft developmental milestones,
demonstrating that it is capable of meeting basic AMCM performance
parameters.
The Navy is in the process of transforming its mine warfare
capability from the current, dedicated platform-centered capability to
an organic, LCS based capability. The MH-60S plays a critical role in
this LCS-mine warfare transition. The MH-60S will be able to perform
all mine countermeasures missions (mine hunting, mine sweeping, mine
identification and mine neutralization) through employment of a suite
of developing MIW systems. Future mine warfare concept of operations
will significantly further reduce timelines and risk from mines by
employing the MH-60S in addition to unmanned airborne, surface, and
subsurface vehicles. These systems will provide persistent operations,
allowing MH-60S utilization for rapid reacquisition and subsequent
neutralization of mines.
In June 2007, the Navy's helicopter concept of operations was
updated with the Navy Helicopter Force Analysis Study, which
reconfirmed the MH-60S's role in meeting AMCM requirements. With the
MH-60S and associated AMCM systems in early developmental stages of
meeting these requirements, the Navy does not currently plan to conduct
an additional assessment of an alternative medium lift helicopter for
mine warfare. The Navy will continue to closely monitor the
helicopter's development and performance to ensure that the warfighter
ultimately receives the most effective AMCM systems and delivery
helicopter.

9. Senator Pryor. Admiral Roughead, do you believe the Navy's
current Helicopter Master Plan, dated 1998, should be updated to
address new operational capabilities indicative of the global war on
terrorism?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy continually reevaluates Fleet warfighter
capabilities to ensure that they pace the current and future threats.
Developed in 1996, the Navy's Helicopter Master Plan was a
requirements-based acquisition strategy to recapitalize the Navy's
aging helicopter force while reducing future operating costs and
expanding warfighting capabilities and missions. That plan did pre-date
the Global War on Terror.
The Navy's follow-on 2002 Helicopter Concept of Operations (CONOPs)
leveraged the acquisition efficiencies of the Helicopter Master Plan
and brought operational efficiencies through the reorganization of
squadrons to align with the warfighting requirements of Navy Carrier
Strike Groups and Expeditionary Forces.
In 2007, the Helicopter CONOPs was updated with the Navy Helicopter
Force Analysis Study. The Navy Helicopter Force Analysis Study
determined the all encompassing helicopter force structure, mix of
helicopters, and required capabilities for Carrier Strike Group,
Expeditionary Strike Group, Maritime Pre-positioned Force--Future,
independent deployers, the global war on terror, continental U.S.
missions, and Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for LCSs to
support multi-mission force requirements and the Navy's 313-ship plan.
The Navy's requirements analysis process remains dynamic and is
designed to keep pace with current and future threats.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Webb

STRATEGIC DISPERSION OF THE FLEET

10. Senator Webb. Admiral Roughead, strategic dispersion of the
fleet may have made sense during the Cold War, but there is no sound
national-security reason for doing so today--especially for aircraft
carriers homeported in Norfolk, VA. Good stewardship of taxpayer
dollars also weighs against carrier homeport changes. Converting Naval
Station Mayport, FL, to accept a nuclear-powered carrier would require
expensive investments in nuclear-support infrastructure estimated at
$235 million to $500 million. Additionally, the Navy spent $155 million
in recent years to demolish and rebuild Pier 11 to support aircraft
carriers in Norfolk more effectively. The Navy should obtain a full
return on this investment in the future. Norfolk also offers a home-
porting advantage for carrier crews in terms of its immediate proximity
to public and private shipyards certified for maintenance,
modernization, and refueling of nuclear-powered ships. Given this
framework, what factors in the current and projected national-security
environment suggest the desirability of relocating an aircraft carrier
to Mayport? What argues against it?
Admiral Roughead. We are in the process of evaluating this issue.
Several factors will inform our decision, and could argue either for or
against a decision to relocate forces to Mayport. These factors
include:

Ability of fleet assets to meet combatant commander
requirements under the Fleet Response Plan (FRP);
Results of the ongoing Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
process;
Cost implications of any force structure shifts to Mayport;
Ability to meet nuclear carrier refueling and ship
maintenance requirements; and
Impact on our sailors and their families.

11. Senator Webb. Admiral Roughead, you said that the same process
used by the Navy to position aircraft carriers in the Pacific region
should be used on the east coast. There are substantial differences
between the Pacific and Atlantic regions, however, in terms of
geography, Navy forward presence, and operations. How would a change in
an aircraft carrier's homeport a few hundred miles from Norfolk to
Mayport improve the Navy's response and presence as you suggested?
Admiral Roughead. In reaching our decision on east coast carrier
homeporting, we must consider our ability to respond to combatant
commander mission requirements. Ships operating from Mayport, FL, would
offer an improved response time to the U.S. Southern Command Area of
Responsibility. Also, in the event naval forces were unable to operate
from Norfolk, Mayport would provide an alternate location from which
the Navy could support combatant commander requirements. These
operational considerations must be evaluated in the context of the
ongoing EIS process, the total cost implications, the ability to meet
nuclear carrier refueling and ship maintenance requirements, and the
impact on our sailors and their families.

12. Senator Webb. Admiral Roughead, Navy and Marine Corps carrier-
based aircraft squadrons are based close to Norfolk to afford the
carrier and its air wing more efficient and less costly at-sea
training, fleet and joint exercises, and operational deployments. In
what ways would the relocation of a carrier from Norfolk to Mayport
affect this logical and time-proven model?
Admiral Roughead. There would be a minimal affect. Fixed-wing
carrier based aircraft can fly, unrefueled to the Fleet Training Areas.
Fixed-wing aircraft at Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana and NAS Norfolk
can transit and join a carrier in the Virginia Capes or Jacksonville
Operating Areas. Rotary-wing aircraft also would experience a seamless
transition if required. Since the loss of the Fleet Training Areas in
Puerto Rico, the Jacksonville Operating Area has been used more
extensively for fleet and joint exercises and certification for
deployments.
Because east coast carrier air wings are currently composed of
squadrons from Virginia, South Carolina, Washington, and Florida; the
Navy's experience with carriers homeported in Mayport indicates this
would not significantly change our onload logistic requirements.

13. Senator Webb. Admiral Roughead, what is the current status and
future milestones for the current Navy Environmental Impact Study (EIS)
of relocating ships to Mayport?
Admiral Roughead. The Draft EIS will be released to the public in
March 2008. Public hearings are tentatively scheduled for April 2008.
The final EIS will likely be released to the public in December 2008. A
record of decision is anticipated in January 2009.

14. Senator Webb. Admiral Roughead, will the Navy's EIS study
address the full costs associated with relocating an aircraft carrier
from Norfolk to Mayport--to include needed investments in nuclear-
support infrastructure, the cost resulting from a crew's permanent
change of station, and other expenses generated when carriers would be
required to relocate to Norfolk for extended overhauls?
Admiral Roughead. The purpose of the EIS is to evaluate the
potential environmental impacts of homeporting additional U.S. Fleet
Forces surface ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL. Although the EIS
does include estimated costs associated with infrastructure
requirements for the various alternatives, an EIS is not required to,
and normally does not, analyze every cost associated with a proposed
action such as cost of permanent change of station moves.
In addition, I will provide to the Secretary an assessment of the
national security requirements and a recommended force laydown for his
consideration. In his final decision, the Secretary will consider the
national security requirements, strategic positioning of our ships,
existing capabilities, total cost, and other programmatic factors, and
the impact on our sailors and their families.

NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD

15. Senator Webb. Admiral Roughead, you state in your response to
one of the committee's advance policy questions that ship-repair
facilities are currently adequate to incorporate surges in deployment.
Virginia's Norfolk Naval Shipyard has made noteworthy performance
improvements in lowering costs and completing work on or ahead of
schedule, but serious and, in some cases, unsafe deficiencies exist.
They include aging, deteriorating buildings, piers, and dry docks; a
degraded electrical-distribution system; and an inefficient plant
layout for the maintenance, modernization, and repair of nuclear-
powered submarines and aircraft carriers. As Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), what is your plan to remedy these and other deficiencies to
allow Norfolk Naval Shipyard to remain a world-class facility?
Admiral Roughead. We recognize that the Navy has historically taken
risk in shore infrastructure investment to increase investment in
afloat readiness and future platforms and weapons systems. As a result,
the condition, capability and current and future readiness of our shore
infrastructure has degraded. We are embarking on a Shore Investment
Strategy that will direct a systematic and consistent approach to
assessing the material condition of our shore infrastructure and
provide a comprehensive, balanced investment program that will improve
our shore facilities worldwide, to include Norfolk Naval Shipyard.
Using Military Construction (MILCON) and Sustainment, Restoration
and Modernization programs, we have already begun to address
deficiencies as follows:

In addition to the MILCON Projects above, Navy awarded a fiscal
year 2007 special project, repair berths 3 & 4, for $22.7 million in
September 2007.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD

16. Senator Collins. Admiral Roughead, I would like to address a
topic of concern to me and many of my constituents in Maine, and that
is the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Portsmouth has a demonstrated
proficiency in work on attack submarines and continues to lead the
Nation in timely and cost-effective submarine overhaul, modernization,
and repair work. The shipyard was also identified as the ``gold
standard'' of public shipyards during the 2005 base realignment and
closure (BRAC) considerations and earlier this year, was designated as
the Ship Availability Planning and Engineering Center for the Virginia-
class of submarines. I have no doubt that the capable and dedicated
workforce at Portsmouth will rise to this challenge and that of
maintaining a new submarine class, as they have so many times before. I
visited the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard most recently in August, however,
and I am concerned that the Navy is not providing Portsmouth with the
infrastructure and facilities it needs to perform its important mission
in the most cost-effective manner possible. I will give you one example
to illustrate my point. Portsmouth is scheduled to perform its first
Virginia-class submarine availability in fiscal year 2010. The Navy's
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal year 2011 includes plans
to build a new waterfront support facility for Portsmouth's #3 drydock.
That drydock will be used to berth Virginia-class submarines. But,
those submarines are scheduled to start arriving at Portsmouth before
this waterfront support facility is built, and I am concerned that the
challenges posed by a new submarine class, coupled with those of an
already aging and dated facility, could cause unnecessary
inefficiencies and delays. The Navy's latest business plan for our
Nation's four public shipyards outlines the challenges we face in
modernizing our public shipyards' infrastructure, including funding
limitations and competing priorities. Yet, since 1992, approximately
$762 million have been spent on MILCON projects at the four public
shipyards, and only $63 million--just over 8 percent--of those funds
have been expended at Portsmouth. That figure is deeply disconcerting
to me and has understandably resulted in extensive needs at Portsmouth.
I believe that the men and women of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard warrant
greater support from the Navy in modernizing the shipyard's dated
facilities. If confirmed, would you pledge to thoroughly review and
modify as necessary the Navy's MILCON plans for Portsmouth and the
other public shipyards to ensure that their workforces are provided
with the facilities they need to complete their important missions?
Admiral Roughead. I do. The Navy recognized it has taken some risk
in shore infrastructure investment in the past to increase investment
in afloat readiness and future platform and weapons systems. As a
result, the condition, capability and current and future readiness of
our shore facilities have degraded. We will develop a Shore Investment
Strategy that will direct a systematic and consistent approach to
assessing the material condition of our shore infrastructure and
provide a comprehensive, balanced investment program that will improve
our shore facilities worldwide, including Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. I
am committed to this approach.

DDG-51 MODERNIZATION

17. Senator Collins. Admiral Roughead, DDG-51 modernization
upgrades will increase automation, enhance situational awareness, and
reduce the crew size per ship. At my urging, this committee has
included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 directing the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report
to Congress outlining the alternative acquisition strategies under
consideration for the DDG-51 modernization program, including the
potential use of the DDG-51 construction shipyards. Will you commit to
seriously reviewing the potential benefits of utilizing the uniquely
qualified and experienced DDG-51 construction shipyards for in-service
DDG-51 modernization?
Admiral Roughead. I am committed to the continued review and
refinement of the DDG modernization acquisition strategy, including
potential utilization of DDG-51 class construction shipyards.
Additionally, DDG-51 Class construction shipyards remain eligible to
compete/team for the multi-ship, multi-option cost contract vehicles in
ships' homeports.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

18. Senator Collins. Admiral Roughead, one concern that I have with
the proposed plan for the LCS program is that after the Navy down-
selects to one sea frame design, the Navy intends to have an open
competition to award the contract for construction of future LCSs. It
would seem to me that all of the pains that have been endured during
the design and construction of the first two ships would be lost if you
subsequently awarded a third party, that is neither LM nor the GD-Bath
Iron Works-Austal team, the final contract award. How does the Navy
plan to recoup the learning costs that have been associated with the
design and development by LM and GD if the contract is awarded to a
different shipyard?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy's intended approach will provide a
mature design package that incorporates the lessons learned from lead
ship design and construction. This complete design package, coupled
with the full and open competition acquisition plan for procurement,
will maximize competition to get the best price for the Navy.
While this strategy may result in additional nonrecurring start up
costs in the near-term, the approach expands potential sources, thereby
increasing competition to drive costs lower. Expanding potential
sources also enables higher production rates in the outyears needed to
procure a 55-ship LCS class and achieve the Navy's force structure
objective of at least 313 ships.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mel Martinez

DISPERSAL OF ATLANTIC FLEET

19. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, after the BRAC round of
2005, we are now left with two surface homeports on the Atlantic and
the Gulf of Mexico. With the retirement of U.S.S. John F. Kennedy we
now have all our carriers in the Atlantic located in Norfolk. What is
your position on the strategic dispersal of our Atlantic Fleet
carriers?
Admiral Roughead. We must carefully consider various factors before
deciding on potential strategic dispersal of our Atlantic Fleet assets,
including our carriers. The factors include:

Ability to meet combatant commander requirements under the
FRP,
results of the ongoing EIS process,
cost implications of any force structure shifts,
the ability to meet nuclear carrier refueling and ship
maintenance requirements, and
impact on sailors and their families.

We are in the process of evaluating this important strategic
matter.

20. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, do you agree that it is in
the best national security interest of the U.S. to maintain two nuclear
carrier home ports on the east coast?
Admiral Roughead. There are many factors to consider regarding
strategic dispersal options for the Fleet, including carriers. Two
carrier homeports on the east coast is a potential option that we are
studying. Several factors will inform the decision on carrier home
ports, including: the ability of fleet assets to meet combatant
commander requirements under the FRP, results of the ongoing EIS
process, cost implications of any force structure shifts, the ability
to meet nuclear carrier refueling and ship maintenance requirements,
and impact on sailors and their families.

21. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, there is an ongoing EIS at
Naval Station Mayport to determine what steps will be needed to make it
nuclear ready. What steps are the Navy taking now, while the fiscal
year 2009 budget is still being worked on, that will help hasten the
transition at Mayport into a nuclear ready port as quickly as possible?
Admiral Roughead. As you note, the EIS to review and assess a broad
range of alternatives for homeporting additional surface ships,
including a nuclear aircraft carrier, at Naval Station Mayport is
ongoing. The EIS is planned for completion in January 2009. Any near
term actions to ``hasten the transition at Mayport into a nuclear ready
port'' would be premature at this time. During the EIS process, the
Navy will continue to resource and maintain the existing infrastructure
at Naval Station Mayport to meet the mission of the installation.

10 CARRIER FLEET

22. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, the administration wants to
reduce the carrier fleet to 10 ships until the commissioning of the
U.S.S. Gerald Ford (10 carriers between the first quarter of fiscal
year 2013 and the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015). I understand
that current threat assessments are based on peace-time models and that
the risk during the 33 months where we would have 10 carriers has been
deemed an ``acceptable, although moderate, risk''. However, recent
movements by our enemies have shown that peace-time models may not fit
for our near- and longer-term future. Are 10 carriers adequate to meet
the national security threats around the globe?
Admiral Roughead. I am committed fully to an 11-carrier force, as
analysis indicates that fewer than 11 carriers is not acceptable for an
extended period. The Navy conducts risk analysis which is continually
updated based on changes in the threat environment. The analysis of the
temporary reduction in carrier numbers determined that our most
feasible option from a technical, fiscal, and risk perspective, is to
leverage the flexibility available in our operations and maintenance
schedules to manage the risk during the period of concern.
The Navy will be able to mitigate the majority of the carrier force
structure gap through selective rescheduling of carrier availabilities
(either advancing or delaying the planned start of selected
availabilities). The inherent flexibility provided by the FRP will
enable the Navy to further mitigate additional risk or shortfalls in
carrier force structure.

23. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, what can we do to help
alleviate some of the risk involved with maintaining a 10 carrier fleet
for the projected 33 month timespan?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy has conducted risk analysis that
balances projected demands with projected operations and maintenance
schedules, and has determined the risk to be moderate and acceptable.
The Navy looked at several options to mitigate the projected
shortfalls in carrier presence and surge capacity during that period
and determined the best mitigation strategy is to adjust maintenance
schedules to either delay or advance scheduled availabilities to align
with modified operating schedules. The inherent flexibilities of Navy's
FRP and the planned 50-year service life of Nimitz- and Gerald R. Ford-
class carriers permit several options to better optimize carrier strike
group availability. Examples include:

Delay Refueling Complex Overhauls and add Selected Restricted
Availabilities (SRAs).
Accelerate, delay, or shorten Docking Planned Incremental
Availabilities (DPIA).
Reschedule smaller maintenance availabilities including
Planned Incremental Availabilities, SRAs, and Continuous
Maintenance Availabilities.

While the above actions will help to mitigate risk during the
limited period of a 10 carrier fleet, they can not be sustained
indefinitely. I am committed fully to an 11-carrier force for the long
term.

24. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, in your opinion, what are
the greatest potential challenges and threats that face our currently
undersized naval fleet?
Admiral Roughead. The greatest potential threats that currently
face our Navy are:

The emergence of sensors, platforms, and weapons systems that
challenge the U.S. Navy's access to strategic maritime
environments.
The continued proliferation of asymmetric capabilities (such
as swarming small boats and mines) to lower-tier nations and
non-state actors that challenge unimpeded Navy operations.
The targeting and disruption of U.S. computer networks.
The evolution of terrorist means and methods, including
maritime threats to the homeland.

The Navy is meeting current near-term combatant commander demands
to counter these threats, but faces potential challenges in sustaining
current readiness levels while continuing to build the future fleet as
outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Navy's investment
strategy adequately balances today's capability and capacity
requirements with the longer-term realities of a changing future
security environment. Meeting these challenges requires a strong
commitment to sustained combat readiness, stable shipbuilding and
aircraft procurement programs, and pursuing, with our industry
partners, the efficiencies required to afford the future force.

25. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, should a contingency arise
where the President deems it necessary to deploy six or seven of our
aircraft carriers, what would be your plan to support this potential
mission?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy's FRP delivers enhanced surge
capability, while continuing to provide rotationally deployed forces to
fulfill Global Force Management commitments. The FRP goals are to
provide six carriers for surge response within 30 days of notification
and one carrier within 90 days. This readiness is referred to as
``6+1.''
Typically, the first carriers to respond to the contingency
described would include the carrier already deployed for rotational
presence and the carrier assigned to the Forward Deployed Naval Forces.
With forces based in the continental United States maintaining unit
readiness to support surge operations, aircraft carriers having
completed the Advanced Integrated Phase of training and certified as
Major Combat Operations (MCO) Ready would deploy next. Other carriers
in the Integrated or Basic Phases of training would receive accelerated
training to attain MCO surge certification and would deploy as
required, based on the contingency. Navy monitors FRP readiness very
closely and leverages the flexibility available in our operations and
maintenance schedules to meet all requirements.

SHIPBUILDING BUDGET

26. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, what will you do to ensure
that the cost overruns and late deliveries that some of our recent
shipbuilding projects have seen do not occur during your tenure as CNO?
Admiral Roughead. There have been a variety of reasons for cost
overruns and late deliveries in major shipbuilding programs, including
inadequate acquisition workforce staffing, overly optimistic cost
estimates, requirements growth (increased scope), inaccurate
assessments of technology maturity, poor performance in the shipyards,
and starting construction prior to design maturity. The acquisition and
requirements communities' goal remains to provide the Navy with the
Fleet required to meet national requirements.
The Navy has taken positive action to reduce requirements creep
through the Navy's Resources and Requirements Review Board, a senior
three-four star level board which reviews the capability and resource
requirements for all major acquisition programs. This process allows
the Navy to make better cost and capability requirements tradeoffs.
The only area in which the Navy requests assistance from the
committee is stability in program funding, the lack of which can result
in major cost increases. A commitment to the Navy's Annual Long Range
Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels will create predictable programs
in terms of funding and procurement requirements. The result enables
the industrial base to forecast future workload to plan investments in
capital and labor efficiency improvements to drive down end-costs and
improve delivery schedules.

27. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, in terms of the Navy's
overall budget, what steps will you take to ensure that the proposed
requirements and costs of our entire range of shipbuilding projects are
kept in line with the Navy's budget estimates?
Admiral Roughead. The Navy's shipbuilding plan recognizes the need
for careful management of requirements and aggressive cost control
measures. This can only be achieved in partnership with industry by
utilizing realistic assumptions, instilling discipline in shipbuilding
requirements, and driving more industry and government investments to
reduce cost. With more definition of future ship programs, the Navy may
need to adjust the average annual investment objective while always
validating the warfighting requirements as appropriate. Given the
importance of requirements-containment and cost-reduction to the
viability of the shipbuilding plan, the Navy continues to evaluate each
ship class and identify cost reduction opportunities while balancing
warfighting requirements, costs, and industrial base realities.
The Navy is committed to stable out-year procurements that industry
can use to anticipate workload. This, in turn, allows industry to
commit resources and create efficiencies to decrease the end-cost of
Navy ships. The Navy plans greater use of contract incentives, such as
steep share lines combined with performance incentives to contribute to
real cost containment in future shipbuilding plans. Also, the Navy will
pursue other areas for improvement in our acquisition workforce and
organization. As we build the future fleet, discipline will be required
of all stakeholders to ensure all shipbuilding projects are in line
with the Navy's budget estimates.

SUBMARINES

28. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, according to news reports,
between 2002 and last year, China built 14 new submarines, including
new Song-class vessels and several other types, both diesel- and
nuclear-powered. With the Chinese defense budget continuing to grow at
startling rates should the U.S. increase our own production of
submarines?
Admiral Roughead. A force of at least 313 ships, including 48
attack submarines, is necessary to meet future projected warfighting
requirements. These warfighting requirements are indexed to the
Department of Defense fiscal year 2020 threat assessments, which
include anticipated potential threat force levels and are compliant
with the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and Strategic Planning
Guidance. The shipbuilding plan detailed in Navy's Report to Congress
on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for fiscal
year 2007 is the best balance of anticipated resources to force
structure requirements.

29. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, for reasons of cost, what
are your thoughts on the U.S. developing and producing quiet diesel
submarines, which would potentially be a fraction of the cost of their
nuclear powered counterparts?
Admiral Roughead. Navy has no plans to build diesel submarines for
its own use. Diesel submarines do not meet our operational
requirements. Nuclear powered submarines are more effective in
potential wartime scenarios and are more cost effective when all
aspects of fielding a force of conventionally powered submarines are
considered.
______

[The nomination reference of ADM Gary Roughead, USN,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
August 2, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as Chief of Naval
Operations, United States Navy and appointment to the grade indicated
while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under
title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be Admiral

ADM Gary Roughead, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of ADM Gary Roughead, USN, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Transcript of Naval Service for ADM Gary Roughead, USN

15 July 1951.............................. Born in Buffalo, NY
30 June 1969.............................. Midshipman, U.S. Naval
Academy.
06 June 1973.............................. Ensign, U.S. Navy
06 June 1975.............................. Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 July 1977.............................. Lieutenant
01 Oct. 1981.............................. Lieutenant Commander
01 Oct. 1987.............................. Commander
01 Aug. 1993.............................. Captain
31 Oct. 1997.............................. Designated Rear Admiral
(lower half) while in
billets commensurate
serving with that grade
01 Oct. 1998.............................. Rear Admiral (lower half)
18 May 2000............................... Designated Rear Admiral
while serving in billets
commensurate with that
grade
01 Aug. 2001.............................. Rear Admiral
08 Aug. 2003.............................. Designated Vice Admiral
while serving in billets
commensurate with that
grade
15 Aug 2003............................... Vice Admiral
30 June 2005.............................. Designated Admiral while
serving in billets
commensurate with that
grade
01 Sep. 2005.............................. Admiral, service continuous
to date

Assignments and duties:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignments and Duties From To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Nuclear Power School, Naval Training June 1973 Oct. 1973
Center, Bainbridge, MD.........................
Fleet Combat Direction Systems Training Center Oct. 1973 Nov. 1973
Atlantic (DUINS)...............................
U.S.S. Josephus Daniels (DLG 27) (Gunnery Nov 1973 Oct. 1976
Assistant).....................................
Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Oct. 1976 Dec. 1976
Newport, RI (DUINS)............................
Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Jan. 1977 Feb. 1977
Fleet (PXO Briefings)..........................
Naval Guided Missiles School Dam Neck, VA, Feb. 1977 Mar. 1977
(DUINS)........................................
XO, U.S.S. Douglas (PG 100)..................... Apr. 1977 Oct. 1977
XO, U.S.S. Tacoma (PG 92)....................... Oct. 1977 June 1978
Surface Warfare Officers School Command Newport, July 1978 Apr. 1979
RI (DUINS).....................................
Service School Command, NTC, Great Lakes (DUINS) Apr. 1979 July 1979
Fleet Training Center, Norfolk, VA (DUINS)...... July 1979 July 1979
U.S.S. Obannon (DD 987) (Engineering Officer)... July 1979 Dec. 1981
Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Dec. 1981 Dec. 1983
Fleet (Aide and Flag Lieutenant)...............
Surface Warfare Officers School Command Newport, Dec. 1983 Feb. 1984
RI (DUINS).....................................
XO, U.S.S. Spruance (DD 963).................... Apr. 1984 Jan. 1986
Office of the CNO (Resource Sponsor for DD 963, Jan. 1986 Apr. 1987
DDG 993 Class Ship Survivability Coordinator)..
Office of Program Appraisal (Surface Warfare May 1987 Mar. 1988
Analyst).......................................
Immediate Office of the Secretary of the Navy Mar. 1988 Mar. 1990
(Administrative Aide to SECNAV)................
Senior Officer Ship Material Readiness Course, Mar. 1990 June 1990
Newport, RI (DUINS)............................
CO, U.S.S. Barry (DDG 52)....................... June 1990 Oct. 1993
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (Executive Oct. 1993 Aug. 1995
Assistant).....................................
CO, U.S.S. Port Royal (CG 73)................... Jan. 1996 July 1997
Commandant, U.S. Naval Academy.................. Aug. 1997 Apr. 2000
Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Two.......... Apr. 2000 Jan. 2001
Chief of Legislative Affairs.................... Jan. 2001 Aug. 2003
Commander, Striking Fleet Atlantic and Aug. 2003 Oct. 2004
Commander, Second Fleet........................
Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.......... Oct. 2004 June 2005
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet................... July 2005 May 2007
Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command............ May 2007 To date
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Medals and awards:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with three Gold Stars
Meritorious Service Medal with one Gold Star
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal Star with one Gold Star
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
Navy ``E'' Ribbon with two Silver ``Es''
National Defense Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with one Bronze Star
Vietnam Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star

Special qualifications:
BS (Foreign Affairs) U.S. Naval Academy, 1973.
Language qualification: Spanish (knowledge).

Personal data:
Wife: Ellen Weflen of Mulberry, IN.
Children: Elizabeth Anna Roughead (Daughter), Born: 19 April 1987.

Summary of joint duty assignments:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Position Dates Rank
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (Executive Assistant)............. Oct. 1993-Aug. 1995 Captain
Commander, Striking Fleet Atlantic................................ Aug. 2003-Oct. 2004 Vice Admiral
Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command............................ Oct. 2004-June 2005 Vice Admiral
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM Gary
Roughead, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Gary Roughead.

2. Position to which nominated:
Chief of Naval Operations.

3. Date of nomination:
July 26, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
July 15, 1951; Buffalo, NY.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Ellen Weflen Roughead.

7. Names and ages of children:
Daughter - Elizabeth (20).

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
U.S. Naval Institute - Member.
Surface Navy Association - Member.
U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association - Member.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of ADM Gary Roughead, USN, was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 27, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on September 28, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN William E. Ward, USA,
by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. As the Deputy Commander of the U.S. European Command
(EUCOM), I have witnessed firsthand the importance of a broad, global
perspective complemented by an integrated, joint approach that
synchronizes military activities and complements them with other
instruments of national power, nongovernmental agencies and our allies.
At EUCOM headquarters the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)
presents a model for combined, interagency cooperation. Every military
service that makes up the Command works closely with a representative
from the Departments of State (DOS), Justice, Treasury, Drug
Enforcement Agency, as well as with representatives from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and intelligence agencies to provide for the
effective coordination of the interagency effort.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be carefully examining what
modifications might be appropriate for this new unified command
structure as Africa Command (AFRICOM) evolves.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders
under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies
and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with
regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?
Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully examine what modifications
might be appropriate for this new unified command structure and will
inform the Department and Congress, as appropriate.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other
sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important
relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. AFRICOM to the
following offices:
The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. A direct command relationship between the Under Secretaries
of Defense and the AFRICOM Commander does not exist. However, I
anticipate that the AFRICOM Commander will regularly interact,
coordinate and exchange information with the Under Secretaries of
Defense on issues relating to African affairs. The commander should
directly communicate with the Under Secretaries of Defense on a regular
basis.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the
Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the AFRICOM Commander. The AFRICOM
Commander and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense will work together
on issues concerning Africa.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman functions under the authority, direction and
control of the National Command Authority. The Chairman will transmit
communications between the National Command Authority and the AFRICOM
Commander as well as oversee the activities of the Commander as
directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor
to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key
conduit between a unified commander, Interagency and the Service
Chiefs. The AFRICOM Commander will keep the Chairman informed on
significant issues regarding the AFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR).
The Commander will directly communicate with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on a regular basis.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; however, the AFRICOM Commander
will keep the Vice Chairman informed on all significant issues
regarding the AFRICOM AOR. The AFRICOM Commander also advises the Vice
Chairman in his role as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, the Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board,
co-chair of the Defense Advisory Working Group, and a member of the
Senior Readiness Oversight Council specifically on all joint issues
that address present and/or future joint warfighting capabilities.
Question. The Director of the Joint Staff.
Answer. There will be no direct command relationship between the
Director of the Joint Staff and the AFRICOM Commander. The AFRICOM
Commander will work with the Director of the Joint Staff on issues
related to Africa.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for
administration and support of forces that are employed by AFRICOM. The
Secretaries fulfill their responsibilities by exercising administrative
control through the Service Component Commands assigned to AFRICOM.
Question. The Service Chiefs.
Answer. The Service Chiefs are responsible for ensuring the
organization and readiness of each respective service branch and for
advising the President. However, the Service Chiefs do not have
operational command authority. The AFRICOM Commander will rely upon
each of the Service Chiefs to provide properly equipped and capable
forces to accomplish missions in the AFRICOM AOR.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. Once AFRICOM reaches Full Operational Capability, there
will be a series of agreements between AFRICOM and EUCOM with regards
to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Israel, Libya, Algeria,
Tunisia, Mauritania, and Morocco). There will also be unique commander
to commander agreements and memoranda concerning Egypt, Yemen, and Gulf
of Aden (between Central Command (CENTCOM) and AFRICOM). Formal
relationships between the AFRICOM Commander and the geographic and
functional Unified Commanders, like the other Unified Commanders, will
derive from command authority established by title 10, U.S.C., section
164. Combatant commanders closely coordinate as necessary to accomplish
all assigned missions.
Question. The Secretary of State.
Answer. While there will be no direct command relationship between
the Secretary of State and the AFRICOM Commander, there will be an
expectation of a close working relationship between the Secretary of
State and the AFRICOM Commander. Because AFRICOM is focused on title 22
activities, there is an expectation that AFRICOM will have a much
closer, more integrated working relationship with the DOS.
Question. The respective U.S. chiefs of mission.
Answer. There will be no formal command relationship between the
AFRICOM Commander and the U.S. Chiefs of Mission for the Nations of the
AFRICOM AOR. In a foreign country, the U.S. Ambassador is responsible
to the President for directing, coordinating and supervising all U.S.
Government elements in the host nation. The AFRICOM Commander will
coordinate and exchange information with U.S. Chiefs of Mission
regularly on matters of mutual interest, to include engagement
activities with partner militaries. In addition to the regular exchange
of information with the U.S. Chiefs of Mission, it is likely that just
as the Commander and Deputy Commander for EUCOM hosted regional
conferences, so too might the AFRICOM Commander. If confirmed, I intend
to continue this practice.
Question. The respective U.S. defense attaches.
Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the
respective U.S. defense attaches and the AFRICOM Commander. Military
protocol will be exercised between the U.S. defense attaches and
AFRICOM, as appropriate.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. If confirmed, you will be the first Commander of the
newly established United States AFRICOM.What background and experience
do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have been fortunate to serve in a number of positions
that have helped prepare me for these duties--foremost among them is my
service over the past 16 months as the Deputy Commander, U.S. EUCOM. In
this position I had the opportunity to work with our partners in Africa
and understand some of the challenges these nations face in providing
security for their people, modernizing their militaries, eliminating
corruption, and ensuring overall transparency in their governments. My
assignment as United States Security Coordinator, Israel-Palestinian
Authority allowed me to glean a unique perspective into the inner
workings of the DOS, which will be very useful given the interagency
construct of this new command. Working as Chief of the Office of
Military Cooperation in Egypt I served as a member of the Country Team
under Chief of Mission authority. This experience provided me
tremendous experience in the areas of security cooperation and
assistance, which I will apply across the continent of Africa.
Between service as a Brigade Commander of the 10th Mountain
Division during Operation Restore Hope on the Horn of Africa, followed
by a tour as Commander, Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
I gained hands-on experience in the conduct and management of post-
conflict stability and humanitarian relief operations which are complex
and dynamic. While the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the
United States Army in Europe, I learned a great deal about the
importance of the U.S. Army's presence in Europe and its engagement
activities with NATO and partner nations in Europe. Each of these
positions brought to light the need for close coordination, not only
between AFRICOM and its neighboring unified commands, but also among
AFRICOM, EUCOM, the African Union, and NATO.
I believe all these experiences are relevant towards understanding
the nature of the security situation in Africa and effectively
partnering with the Africans as they develop and implement solutions. A
fundamental focus of the AFRICOM Commander's engagement should include
careful consideration of what our partners need from the U.S. to help
them develop to meet their stated needs. Just as EUCOM focused on
security cooperation activities with African nations, so too will
AFRICOM continue developing capabilities of African nations to help
solidify our relations, achieve our mutual goals, and provide a bright
future full of promise and opportunity.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and
opportunities that would confront you as the first Commander of
AFRICOM?
Answer. A fundamental focus of the AFRICOM Commander's engagement
should include careful consideration of what our partners need from the
U.S. to help them develop to meet their stated needs. Just as EUCOM
focused on security cooperation activities with African nations, so too
will AFRICOM continue developing capabilities of African nations to
help solidify our relations, achieve our mutual goals, and provide a
bright future full of promise and opportunity for Africans everywhere.
I see the establishment of AFRICOM as a wonderful opportunity to
efficiently and effectively apply the elements of U.S. national power
in ways that help the Africans develop and implement their solutions to
African concerns. Establishing a new command and transferring
responsibilities to it is complex. Three unified commands and U.S.
AFRICOM's Transition Team have been working as a team to ensure no
disruption or confusion in the execution of on-going Department of
Defense (DOD) efforts in Africa.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges and opportunities?
Answer. My goal is to make the transition of operations and
activities to AFRICOM's responsibility as seamless as possible. I will
reinforce the excellent work currently being done on the continent and
the strong relationships already established. All three combatant
commands have had extensive and positive experiences working with DOS,
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and various
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). AFRICOM's exercises, training,
and humanitarian assistance efforts across the continent must occur in
ways that demonstrate value-added through its existence.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you anticipate to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of Commander, AFRICOM?
Answer. U.S. AFRICOM's contributions will be seen in terms of how
it directly contributes to the stability, security, health, and welfare
of the regional institutions, nations, and people of Africa. It will be
measured in terms of the strength, viability, and sustainment of the
programs it will be expected to carry out on behalf of the U.S.
government. Securing adequate resources to conduct those programs will
be one of my top priorities as commander of AFRICOM.
Question. What management actions and timelines would you establish
to address these problems?
Answer. Any actions taken should be premised on better facilitating
the activities of the U.S. Interagency. Additionally, U.S. AFRICOM's
value added will come by listening to the needs of our African Partners
and helping to find solutions by working with the African Union and its
African Regional Economic Communities, our European allies and other
partners and friends with a strong interest on the continent.

ORIGIN AND MISSION OF U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

Question. Please discuss the role that you have played in the
intra-DOD discussions which led to the creation of AFRICOM.
Answer. I participated in initial briefings to the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Staff concerning the potential impact on missions
and activities of EUCOM's portion of the proposed AFRICOM AOR.
Question. Please discuss the role that you have played in the
ongoing discussions with the AFRICOM implementation team and transition
team.
Answer. On behalf of the EUCOM Commander, I served as a member of
the executive committee monitoring the development of the AFRICOM
Implementation Guidance that formalized the parameters, requirements,
and timelines for the Transition Team's activities. I monitored the
progress of the Transition Team and ensured that the Transition Team
had adequate facilities prepared in Stuttgart so they could perform
their mission.
Question. What is your understanding of the mission of AFRICOM?
Answer. AFRICOM promotes U.S. National Security objectives by
working with African states and regional organizations to help
strengthen stability and security in the AOR. AFRICOM leads the in-
theater DOD response to support other U.S. Government agencies in
implementing U.S. Govermment security policies and strategies. In
concert with other U.S. Government and international partners, AFRICOM
conducts theater security cooperation activities to assist in building
security capacity and improve accountable governance. As directed, U.S.
AFRICOM conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to
crises.
Question. What do you believe to be the pros and cons of
establishing this new combatant command?
Answer. I believe the establishment of AFRICOM will add a more
unified focus to the continent. Furthermore, the elimination of Unified
Command Plan boundaries within Africa will position AFRICOM well to
establish strong and lasting habitual relationships with our African
partners (especially with the African Union), allies, and international
organizations operating on the continent.
There are two aspects of one primary ``con'' associated with the
creation of AFRICOM--the first is related to managing expectations of
the benefits realized with a U.S. Headquarters locating to the
Continent. The other aspect is managing the perception that a U.S.
military headquarters signals a heavy handedness to the continent.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CHAIN OF COMMAND

Question. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, no
final decisions have been made on the organizational structure and
chain of command of AFRICOM.
Please discuss how you envision the two Deputy Commanders--one DOD-
appointed and one State Department-appointed--functioning?
Answer. The Commander of AFRICOM will have two deputies: the Deputy
to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (filled by a senior DOS
Foreign Service officer) and the Deputy to the Commander for Military
Operations (filled by a military flag officer). Both positions are
three-star equivalents and peer equals. Each will have primary spheres
of responsibility to work in conjunction with the other. Since a State
Department official cannot exercise military command under title 10,
U.S.C., the Departments of Defense and State agreed to the title of
``Deputy to the Commander'' instead of ``Deputy Commander'' to ensure
parallelism between both positions without implying that both positions
have military command authority.
The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA)
will be responsible for directing the command's civil-military planning
and programs, with emphasis on aligning U.S. AFRICOM activity with that
of other U.S. Government departments and agencies carrying out U.S.
foreign policy. The Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations
(DCMO) will be responsible to implement and execute the command's
activities, including those planned and programmed by the DCMA.
Question. What responsibilities do you expect each deputy commander
to have under his or her jurisdiction?
Answer. The DCMA will be responsible for AFRICOM policy
development, resourcing, and program assessment. The DCMA will direct
the command's plans and programs associated with health, humanitarian
assistance, humanitarian mine action, disaster response, and security
sector reform.
The DCMO will be responsible for U.S. AFRICOM operational
implementation and execution. Additionally, the DCMO will exercise
combatant command authority under title 10, U.S.C., in the Commander's
absence.
Because we wish to integrate activities and eliminate
``stovepipes,'' both Deputies necessarily will collaborate and
coordinate with each other on activities within their respective
portfolios. To that end, they share responsibility to develop U.S.
AFRICOM partnerships and capacity through the planning and execution of
contingency and other operations (such as noncombatant evacuation,
humanitarian assistance, disaster response and peace support); joint
and combined training and exercises; foreign military training and
professional development; security assistance, and security sector
reform.
Question. What authority, if any, will the State Department/
Civilian Deputy have over military personnel?
Answer. Both the civilian DCMA and the uniformed DCMO have the
authority to direct activities within their appropriate areas of
responsibility. Both Deputies will have supervisory authority for
civilian and military personnel in those subordinate offices and
directorates for which the Deputies are responsible. Because the
civilian DCMA cannot hold military command authority under title 10,
U.S.C., the military DCMO will exercise combatant command in my
absence. The Departments of Defense and State are comfortable with this
arrangement.
Because U.S. AFRICOM will have non-DOD personnel ``seconded'' or
``detailed'' to the command as well as others serving in a traditional
liaison role, the command, DOD and the appropriate corresponding
department of agency will need to establish agreements regarding the
relationship between the command and the integrated non-DOD staff
member. We envision a similar arrangement to that already in place
between the Departments of Defense and other departments and agencies
for the Foreign Political Advisor (POLAD) and the representatives to
the JIACG. I do not believe that any statutory changes are necessary to
support either position.
Question. What authority, if any, will the DOD/Military Deputy have
over civilian personnel?
Answer. Interagency civilian personnel assigned to AFRICOM will
have authorities established in agreements between the DOD and the
respective agency.
Question. Do you believe any statutory changes are required to
facilitate the proper functioning of these deputy commanders?
Answer. The Departments of Defense and State have carefully
reviewed the roles, functions, and responsibilities of both deputies
and are confident that current authorities under title 10, U.S.C., are
adequate to support the respective duties and responsibilities for
AFRICOM. AFRICOM will be in a better position to evaluate statutory
sufficiency and, if appropriate, recommend any revisions or changes in
the coming months.
Question. If confirmed, will you maintain on your staff the
position of a State Department POLAD? If so, why? If not, why not?
Answer. Yes. I view the roles and responsibilities of a senior
POLAD as vital to the successful completion of the commander's mission.
These include providing advice on political ramifications of plans,
operations, and crisis response; assisting in representation with U.S.
Ambassadors and foreign officials within the AOR; and keeping the
commander informed on relevant authoritative foreign policy guidance.
The addition of the DCMA position in AFRICOM will not duplicate these
responsibilities.
Question. Other U.S. combatant commands are staffed by permanently
assigned active-duty and civilian personnel. It is the committee's
understanding that the Department plans to follow the Combined Joint
Task Force--Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) staffing model and use, almost
exclusively, short-term rotational personnel to staff the AFRICOM
headquarters.
In your view, do you think this staffing model is the most
effective one, and if so, why?
Answer. Permanently assigned active duty and civilian personnel
will be assigned to AFRICOM.
Question. In briefings provided to the committee, the Department
has indicated that civilians from a number of U.S. Government
departments and agencies will be detailed to AFRICOM.
What role do you envision these individuals playing in the daily
operations of AFRICOM?
Answer. AFRICOM's guiding principle will be to ensure coordination
of its activity with other U.S. Government departments and agencies,
and, as appropriate, with foreign governmental, international, non-
governmental, private and profit organizations, at early stages of the
planning and execution cycle. In order to enable this coordination,
AFRICOM headquarters' intent is to have an integrated staff of
permanently assigned DOD (military and civilian) and non-DOD U.S.
Government department and agency personnel, as well as liaison officers
and staff from foreign military and civilian organizations and AFRICOM
liaison personnel with duty at selected external organizations.
Non-DOD U.S. Government department and agency staff positions
within AFRICOM headquarters will be at three levels: senior leadership
and management positions (such as the Deputy to the Commander for
Civil-Military Activities and the directors or deputy directors of
headquarters offices or directorates); senior experts in advisory or
liaison capacities (such as the Foreign Policy Advisor, the Development
and Humanitarian Assistance Advisor, and the senior Treasury Department
representative), and subject-matter experts integrated into staff
positions throughout headquarters offices and directorates.
Senior expert advisors and liaison officers will represent their
parent organizations to AFRICOM, advise the Commander and staff
regarding parent organization and functional issues, communicate
AFRICOM and parent organization issues across functional activities,
and fully participate in AFRICOM headquarters planning and execution
support. They derive their authority from their parent organizations.
Subject-matter experts from non-DOD U.S. Government departments and
agencies will be detailed or ``seconded'' to AFRICOM. These subject-
matter experts are embedded within the headquarters staff at the
directorate level and below in both supervisory and action officer
positions after coordination with the providing organization. They
derive their authority from the AFRICOM Commander as exercised within
the organizational structure. Embedded officers will be fully qualified
to assume the duties and responsibilities of the position prior to
joining the AFRICOM staff. These officers contribute unique
perspectives at the inception of AFRICOM planning and ensure that
AFRICOM activities are compatible and integrated with those of other
U.S. Government departments and agencies.
Question. Will U.S. Ambassadors to African countries maintain chief
of mission authority over all U.S. Government activities in the
countries to which they are posted, including military relations, once
AFRICOM is in place?
Answer. Yes. U.S. Ambassadors will maintain chief of mission
authority over all U.S. Government activities in their countries. As
AFRICOM Commander, I will ensure that my senior subordinate leaders,
and my representatives in Embassies (Office of Security Cooperation
Chiefs) and I will ensure all military relations, activities, etc. are
closely coordinated with country teams. We will closely coordinate all
our activities with embassy chiefs of mission.
Question. In your opinion, how will AFRICOM differ from other
regional combatant commands?
Answer. The President directed DOD to establish AFRICOM, whose
focus will be to build a stable security environment that will enable
Africans to pursue broader goals, such as economic security. We believe
that the security aspect--one part of the ``three-pronged'' approach--
should be accomplished under U.S. DOD leadership. AFRICOM will support
the other two prongs, with the State Department conducting diplomacy,
and the Agency for International Development carrying out development
work. AFRICOM will also have elements and personnel from a variety of
government organizations, which will enhance its ability to provide
support in these areas.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend that AFRICOM include
Service component commands in a manner similar to other regional
combatant commands?
Answer. I believe the eventual structure of the Service components
should be a reflection of the scope of missions assigned. We are still
developing the concept of Service component commands for AFRICOM.

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

Question. What role, if any, do you expect to play, if confirmed,
in promoting U.S. public diplomacy in Africa?
Answer. AFRICOM will play a supporting role in advancing U.S.
public diplomacy on the continent.
Question. What role, if any, do you expect AFRICOM to play in
helping to coordinate U.S. diplomatic, foreign assistance, economic,
and military goals and activities?
Answer. AFRICOM will play a supporting role in the advancement of
U.S. diplomatic, foreign assistance, and economic goals. It will play
the leading role in the advancement of U.S. military goals and
activities.
Question. Some have asserted AFRICOM is simply an American effort
to protect U.S. access to gas and oil; to fight terrorists and Islamic
radicals; and to counter China's interest and activism.
How do you respond to these assertions?
Answer. AFRICOM will be primarily focused on conducting security
cooperation to build partnership capacities in areas such as
peacekeeping, maritime security, border security, counterterrorism
skills, and as appropriate supporting U.S. Government agencies and
implementing other programs that promote regional stability.

AFRICA-SPECIFIC SECURITY CHALLENGES

Question. Do you believe AFRICOM should address Africa-specific
security challenges, such as preventing the use of child soldiers and
countering the role of civil militias and other armed, nonterrorist
elements in conflict-prone countries? If so, how?
Answer. We can help our African partners address these kinds of
African-specific security challenges. Fostering a fundamental respect
for the rule of law should not stop within the civilian realm. By
capitalizing on our military relationships throughout the continent,
AFRICOM will be able to work with partner nation militaries as a
supporting role to the efforts of the DOS in addressing these problems.
By talking to African leaders and gaining an understanding of the depth
and the nature of these problems, and using an interagency approach we
can help build African capacities to deal with these challenges.

HIV/AIDS

Question. How much success has DOD had in efforts to counter AIDS
in African militaries?
Answer. DOD is a major player in the HIV/AIDS Interagency Country
Core Team with focus on the foreign militaries. DOD prevention efforts
are reducing the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS and effecting
behavioral changes needed to reduce HIV prevalence. In the past year,
DOD reached 378,000 with prevention messages; counseled and tested
87,000; trained 2,500 on HIV policy, 9,000 peer educators, 2,400
medical staff; supported 280 counseling and testing centers, 50
laboratories, 26,000 on anti-retroviral treatment.
Question. If confirmed, how, if at all, would you like to see such
efforts increased or programmatically altered? If so, how?
Answer. AFRICOM will continue to build on current DOD efforts in
Africa. We will continue our focus on prevention, capacity building,
and support our foreign military in HIV policy development to ensure
infrastructure is in place for HIV testing and counseling.
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) funding
directed towards the foreign militaries has increased from $9 million
in 10 countries in 2004, to $43 million in 20 countries in 2007.
However, the DOD Executive Agent for DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program
(DHAPP) efforts with the foreign militaries, the U.S. Naval Health
Research Center, supports over 20 countries that are not receiving
PEPFAR funding. DHAPP funding through congressional plus-ups to the
Defense Health Program averaged $3 million annually. In 2007, DHAPP was
unfunded resulting in uncertainties with DOD-initiated programs in
these non-PEPFAR countries. Continued congressional support will ensure
DHAPP's continuity and program success.
Question. In your view, should this effort be lead by DOD or by
other elements of the U.S. Government?
Answer. DOD is a critical member of the Interagency team led by the
DOS, Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator that synchronizes the U.S.
Government response to HIV/AIDS pandemic. DOD should continue to be the
lead on the U.S. Government HIV/AIDS prevention effort with the foreign
militaries. The success of our partnerships with the African foreign
military in the fight against HIV/AIDS will enhance national security
and regional stability.

DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

Question. What role would you expect AFRICOM to play in the area of
humanitarian assistance?
Answer. AFRICOM will play a supporting role. The U.S. military is
not an instrument of first resort in providing to humanitarian
assistance but supports civilian relief agencies. We recognize the
significant role and capabilities of USAID as the principal U.S. agency
extending assistance to countries responding to and recovering from
natural or manmade disaster. The U.S. military may be involved when it
provides a unique service; when the civilian response is overwhelmed;
and civilian authorities request assistance. The USAID Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance validates all such requests for U.S.
military assistance. Our role in this context will not change. We will
play the supporting role when necessary and appropriate. The difference
is that this command will be better prepared to respond to such
eventualities and to do so better. We will have USAID staff within the
command in order to help make sure that such responses when appropriate
and necessary are well-planned and executed.
Question. What steps, if any, do you expect AFRICOM to take to
enhance ongoing U.S. Government humanitarian assistance programs?
Answer. There will be a robust Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster
Relief branch within the command focused on Africa, which will include
the participation of USAID staff. This will enable better planning and
coordination of military support to humanitarian assistance efforts.
Question. In your view, what role, if any, should AFRICOM have in
addressing ongoing political conflicts or humanitarian crises such as
those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia,
Somalia, Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic?
Answer. AFRICOM will take an appropriate role as directed by U.S.
policy. A significant number of these existing crises will require
active participation on the part of African organizations, countries,
and leaders. AFRICOM will leverage traditional Theater Security
Cooperation programs to develop African capacity and capability to
respond to existing crises and hopefully prevent new ones from
emerging.
Question. In what program or policy areas not strictly related to
military matters, if any, do you believe AFRICOM should play a role?
Answer. AFRICOM is contemplated as playing a larger role in
development activities than a traditional combatant command, in close
coordination with agencies more directly involved in developmental
activities.
Question. What is your understanding of the role AFRICOM will play
in the area of development activities, which are overseen by USAID?
Answer. The command will play a supporting role, as required. We
recognize that USAID is the principal agency extending assistance to
countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and
engaging in democratic reforms; DOD plays a supporting role for USAID
development and humanitarian objectives.
Question. How do you expect AFRICOM would function in countries
without USAID missions?
Answer. In countries where there is no USAID presence, we would
further strengthen our ties with the regional programs, work with the
country team, as well as rely on USAID staff within the command to
assist in the appropriate design, coordination, and execution of
programs. USAID has three regional programs that cover many of the
other countries where there are no missions. CJTF-HOA, for example, has
been able to forge strong relationships throughout their area of
operation with these regional programs in support of efforts in
countries where USAID does not have a physical presence.
Question. How will AFRICOM coordinate its activities with those of
USAID?
Answer. AFRICOM will provide one African focused organization to
communicate and coordinate with USAID. USAID will have several staff
based in the command in order to further facilitate communications and
coordination, as well as bring the necessary expertise. The
establishment of the command will greatly facilitate USAID
communication and coordination with the DOD concerning Africa.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

Question. Since the Secretary of Defense announced in February 2007
the intention of the DOD to create a U.S. military combatant command
for Africa, there has been a great deal of debate of the location
regarding this new combatant command. What kind of headquarters
structure do you believe is most appropriate for AFRICOM? A strong
central location? A hub-and-spoke approach?
Answer. We are looking at all options and will determine
appropriate options after additional analysis and dialogue with
governments on the continent.
Question. What are the potential overseas basing implications
related to the establishment of AFRICOM?
Answer. We need to measure the acceptance of headquarters locations
in terms of the African Union (AU), subregional organizations, and
individual nations--we need to be welcomed. Furthermore, our presence
on the continent implies a long-term commitment. We will better
understand this once additional analysis is concluded.
Question. Are permanent bases envisioned as part of the new
command?
Answer. Permanent bases are not envisioned as part of the command.
Question. What criteria will be used to determine the size,
location, and management of these locations, including the site of a
permanent headquarters somewhere on the continent?
Answer. A site selection criteria was developed in coordination
with the DOS. Some of the criteria includes: political stability;
security factors; access to regional and intercontinental
transportation; availability of acceptable infrastructure; qualify of
life; proximity to the AU and regional organizations; proximity to U.S.
Government hubs; adequate Status of Forces Agreement. The transition
team has used these criteria to narrow down potential sites. Those
potential sites have been briefed to the DOS informally and we have
begun dialogue on the advantages and disadvantages of those sites.
Question. What, if any, additional cooperative security locations
does DOD hope to establish in Africa? What is the estimated cost of
establishing and operating these locations?
Answer. Once established, AFRICOM will conduct in-depth analysis to
determine if and where cooperative security locations are required to
meet logistics and Theater Security Cooperation engagement requirements
across the African continent.
Question. What, if any, plans does DOD have to expand the size of
its military presence and/or facilities (temporary or permanent) at
Camp Lemonier in Djibouti?
Answer. AFRICOM plans to utilize Camp Lemonier as an enduring
Forward Operating Site. There are no current plans to expand the U.S.
presence at Camp Lemonier. Once established, AFRICOM will conduct
analysis to determine the appropriate level and capability of assigned
personnel and facilities in order to meet strategic mission
requirements.

SECTION 1206 FUNDING

Question. Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended, established a new program that gives
the DOD the authority to spend, in coordination with the DOS, up to
$300 million of its operations and maintenance funds to train and equip
foreign militaries to undertake counterterrorism or stability
operations.
What is your assessment of the section 1206 program's impact in the
AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. In fiscal year 2006, $11 million of section 1206 money was
provided to build intelligence-sharing capacity for Pan-Sahel
countries, along with maritime domain awareness systems for countries
in the Gulf of Guinea. In Sao Tome and Principe, a basic Regional
Maritime Awareness Capability has been established. The full-up
capability is on schedule for completion prior to December 31, 2007.
The installation in Nigeria was delayed several months due to the
recent change in government, but the program has resumed and is making
progress. In the end, these nations will own, operate, sustain, and be
able to propagate this capability without external support. This
distributed partnership in maritime awareness will foster localized
ownership of regionally and internationally shared maritime security.
The fiscal year 2006 section 1206 program also included the Multi-
National Informational Sharing Initiative (MISI), an information
sharing capacity building program in Trans-Sahara Africa--specifically
Chad and Nigeria. This program greatly enhances the partner nation's
ability to respond to humanitarian crises and other threats.
Additionally, the technology will allow greater interoperability among
the U.N., U.S., and African agencies positioned to address these
crises.
For fiscal year 2008, section 1206 programs will play an even
larger role because AFRICOM's Foreign Military Financing budget has
been reduced to $16 million.
Question. Recent projects funded under section 1206 authorities
have provided assistance, as part of the larger East Africa Regional
Security Initiative, to Ethiopia and Chad, countries with poor human
rights records and a history of suppressing political opposition.
Why is it beneficial to provide 1206 assistance to these countries?
Answer. Security Cooperation programs remain the cornerstone of our
strategy to promote common security, which ultimately supports national
security objectives. Section 1206 authority is one of the many security
cooperation programs used to build relationships with countries like
Chad and Ethiopia that support U.S. strategic interests, enhance
partner security capabilities, and improve information exchange and
intelligence sharing.
Question. If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess the
relative costs and benefits of proposals for 1206 funding?
Answer. Successful section 1206 proposals are conceptualized in
collaboration with other U.S. agencies, meet urgent and emergent
regional security needs, and compliment existing interagency security
cooperation activities.

SECTION 1207 FUNDING

Question. Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006 authorized the Secretary of Defense to use or
transfer defense articles, services, training, or other support to the
Secretary of State to provide immediate reconstruction, security, or
stabilization assistance to a foreign country for the purpose of
restoring or maintaining peace and security in that country.
What is your assessment of the section 1207 program's impact in the
AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. While there are currently no 1207 being executed in Africa,
funds are being pursued for fiscal year 2008 to support programs in
Somalia, Mali, and Niger.

SECTION 1208 FUNDING

Question. In section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress gave DOD a 2-year authority to train and
equip indigenous forces fighting alongside U.S. special operators.
What is your assessment of this program?
Answer. The section 1208 authority gives us very important latitude
in our pursuit of Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS)
objectives in where more traditional security assistance and military-
to-military engagement authorities don't readily apply. We are
currently using the program to develop an indigenous intelligence
capacity in Niger. This capacity will be focused in the northwest
region of the country and will fill a critical capabilities gap of the
Nigerian military.
Question. If confirmed, how would you like to see the program used
in Africa?
Answer. We would continue to use the program in a fashion similar
to the concept we are implementing in Niger. We are developing similar
concepts for specific regions of Mali and Mauritania, and are
considering others in Chad and Nigeria. I believe the flexibility this
authority provides will remain useful for OEF-TS in particular for a
number of years.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Question. Since July 2005, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has helped to provide air transport for peacekeepers and
civilian police from African troops contributing countries into and out
of Darfur. NATO has also provided training to AU officers, mainly on
how to run a multinational military headquarters and manage information
effectively.
How would you envision AFRICOM interacting with NATO on operations
within the African AOR?
Answer. AFRICOM could assist NATO efforts on the African continent
by ensuring close coordination of U.S. contributions and capabilities
to NATO operations and training. NATO is uniquely suited to allow
AFRICOM access to European interests and capabilities and experience on
the African continent. Where authorized and appropriate, AFRICOM can
provide logistical support to NATO, professional military training and
engagement in conjunction with and other security cooperation and
outreach efforts. If confirmed, I will strongly support continued
participation of NATO's ongoing Mediterranean Dialogue with North
African nations.

UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS IN AFRICA

Question. The United Nations currently has six U.N. peacekeeping
missions in Africa. The U.N. also maintains over 50,000 peacekeeping
troops and police in Africa, and this does not include the expanded
U.N. Mission in Sudan.
What role do you see AFRICOM playing vis-a-vis these U.N.
peacekeeping missions?
Answer. U.N. peacekeeping missions need professionally trained
peacekeepers. The African Union's stated policy is to man as many
African peace support operations with African peacekeepers. To support
both of these objectives, AFRICOM will continue the work begun by EUCOM
and CENTCOM in assisting in the training of African peacekeepers.
AFRICOM will work closely with the State Department to train African
peacekeepers through the State Department's African Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.
Would you advocate expanding the U.S. military's role in support of
U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa?
Answer. The decision as to the U.S. Government's level of
participation in any U.N. peacekeeping mission will be made at the
highest levels of our government. If confirmed, my objective will be to
build a unified command that will respond to the level of participation
required to support U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa.

GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE

Question. In 2004, the President announced the Global Peace
Operations Initiative (GPOI). The goal of the initiative was to train
75,000 peacekeepers.
What role do you believe AFRICOM should have in support of this
initiative?
Answer. With State Department as the executive agent, GPOI expects
to train approximately 40,000 troops in AFRICOM's AOR. AFRICOM will
continue involvement in GPOI and ACOTA programs through existing
coordination mechanisms with State Department-hosted GPOI steering
conferences. Given title 10 and 22 funding guidelines and current
operations tempo, AFRICOM will also continue to provide small military
teams for special mentoring assistance to State Department-contracted
ACOTA training events.
Question. What is the prospective role of AFRICOM in ensuring that
GPOI is successful in Africa?
Answer. The State Department's ACOTA program, as the GPOI
peacekeeping training arm for Africa, is highly successful and is
increasing its program strength and effectiveness on the continent.
AFRICOM will aggressively work with State Department to resource
military mentors for ACOTA training events, and will continue to reach
out to European nations interested in partnering with peacekeeping
training.
Question. In your opinion, how quickly should GPOI be able to
provide basic deployment equipment packages to countries that are
willing to deploy troops immediately to current peacekeeping
operations, as in Darfur, but lack the resources to do so?
Answer. Through the ACOTA program, State Department maintains
standing contracts to provide training equipment for long-term self-
sustained training. These contracts also provide basic trainee
equipment packages for individual soldiers. These packages can be used
during peace support operations deployments. Operational deployment-
specific equipment falls under non-ACOTA GPOI funding. However, the
equipment needs of Troop Contributing Countries for peace support
operations in Darfur and other anticipated operations dwarf GPOI's
ability to provide the magnitude of equipment required to satisfy
United Nations Contingent Owned Equipment requirements.
Question. In your opinion, are GPOI training efforts providing
well-trained peacekeepers for U.N. and other operations?
Answer. I have personally witnessed the effectiveness of ACOTA
training in Rwanda as they prepared for their deployment in support of
the AU mission in Darfur. The troops I observed were well-trained and
well-equipped.
U.S.-sponsored peacekeeping training is responsible for the
majority of the approximately 17,000 African peacekeepers serving in
on-going peace support operations. Most partners have incorporated
ACOTA trainers into their long-term training programs to monitor and
observe indigenous training provided by GPOI-trained instructors. The
ACOTA program provides training and certifies instructors, which will
be critical for future United Nations Chapter VI and VII peace support
operations.

TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT FOR AFRICOM MISSIONS

Question. The defense research and technology community has
developed a number of capabilities that are potentially supportive of
AFRICOM's missions--including vaccines to combat infectious diseases,
language translation systems, and cultural modeling, simulation tools,
and wargames.
What specific technology-based capabilities do you feel need to be
developed or improved in order to best support AFRICOM's missions?
Answer. There are several capabilities that need to be developed to
best support AFRICOM missions. As stated earlier, promoting stability
among African nations will be a priority for AFRICOM. The size of
Africa, the length of its coast line, and the limited interior
infrastructure challenges the African nations in their ability to
maintain adequate air, land, and maritime awareness. To help address
this shortfall, I would like to see development of technologies that
provide adequate national and regional awareness of borders, coast
lines and air corridors. To support regional cooperation, I believe we
need to develop technology that allows for the national information
collected to be shared regionally. For these technologies to be adopted
by African nations, they need to be affordable, robust, and easy to
use.
Another major technology challenge for AFRICOM will be the
requirement, while responding to disasters or contingencies, to deliver
large amounts of humanitarian supplies and/or peace keepers quickly.
The current U.S. strategic lift system is limited in its capability to
deliver forces and support to areas that lack mature logistical
infrastructure. Technologies that would deliver units and supplies
anywhere in Africa within 3 to 5 days, independent of air and sea ports
or a road network, would allow AFRICOM to be responsive to shaping
opportunities by providing pre-hostility support, or reaching victims
of a natural disaster without having to wait for seaports, airports, or
roadways to be cleared or repaired.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the defense
research and acquisition community to ensure that they are aware of
those needs and supportive of AFRICOM's missions?
Answer. EUCOM has already actively engaged the research and
acquisition community to develop solutions for Africa-related
capability shortfalls. The community is aware of the requirement sets
required to support AFRICOM missions. These Concept Development and
Experimentation efforts and initiatives will ultimately transfer to
AFRICOM according to individual transition strategies.

TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION WITH AFRICA

Question. The DOD makes use of international research and
technology cooperation both to increase military capabilities,
especially for coalition and multinational operations, and to expand
and improve ties to friendly nations. Examples include work on advanced
technologies with South Africa and cooperative research activities in
Egypt and Kenya.
What opportunities do you see for the Department to expand its
research and technology cooperation activities in Africa?
Answer. The U.S. has developed research and development (R&D)
relationships with several African nations and AFRICOM will seek to
lead continued U.S. efforts in this arena. In our quest to develop
``African systems for Africans'', it behooves us to partner with
national industries to jointly develop technologies/systems to meet
their requirements. Our African partners have a strong desire to
operate and maintain their own systems, without any outside influences.
Early R&D and acquisition partnering will help facilitate initial
African acceptance and set the foundation for long-term transition to
African owned and operated systems.
Question. What benefits to AFRICOM's ability to accomplish its
missions might be accrued if the Department enhances its technology
cooperation activities in Africa?
Answer. Building Partnership Capacity within the African regions is
central to AFRICOM's strategic vision. By providing innovative
technology, new concepts, and mentoring to aid information sharing, we
directly influence security and stability of partner nations and
surrounding regions.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

Question. National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44)
assigns the DOS the responsibility to coordinate and lead integrated
U.S. Government efforts, involving all U.S. departments and agencies
with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct
stabilization and reconstruction activities. NSPD 44 also states that,
when relevant and appropriate, reconstruction and stabilization
contingency plans and missions will be coordinated with U.S. military
contingency plans to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing
U.S. military operations.
Are the new organizational constructs envisioned for AFRICOM, in
whatever form is eventually decided upon, going to be able to
adequately address capacity shortfalls in non-DOD organizations?
Answer. It will not be the specific task of AFRICOM to identify the
capacity shortfalls in non-DOD organizations. The envisioned
organizational construct for AFRICOM should provide insight into the
coordinated capacity of various organizations in meeting our shared
objectives.
Question. If not, what other steps are needed, in your view, to
address this issue, and how should they be accomplished?
Answer. The purpose of U.S. AFRICOM is to more appropriately
organize the DOD to serve the continent of Africa due to its growing
strategic importance. AFRICOM will provide a single point of response
for DOD when it comes to African challenges.
Question. What do you foresee as the main bureaucratic or
logistical obstacles to the success of the interdisciplinary-
interagency approach planned for AFRICOM?
Answer. Once full and complete mission analysis is accomplished
with an approved mission statement for AFRICOM, the work to enter
agreements and assign resources to implement the multi-disciplinary
approach will take greater shape.
Question. How do you plan to address these obstacles?
Answer. We have been working to develop agreements to share with
various agencies and departments that may want to join the AFRICOM
team. We continue to reach out to our interagency partners to conclude
agreements.
Question. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) formed Interagency
Directorate (J9) to spearhead coordination between its interagency
partners and to address quickly emerging challenges facing Central and
South America and the Caribbean. Some of the command's interagency
goals include: improving synchronization of operations and activities
between SOUTHCOM and other U.S. Government organizations operating in
this part of the world to create a collaborative, effective, and
efficient command, engage interagency partner decisionmakers, and
integrate personnel from these agencies on a full time basis into the
SOUTHCOM staff. This model and its purpose seems consistent with the
intentions of AFRICOM.
What is your assessment of the J9 model? Do you believe it would be
appropriate for AFRICOM?
Answer. We have looked at SOUTHCOM's J9 model and have already
begun to incorporate some of the good ideas of the J9 into the
Partnership Division of our Outreach Office. For example, we are
designing our Partnership Division as the ``portal'' to AFRICOM for the
interagency and outside partners, similar to what SOUTHCOM has done
with its J9. We have also met with members of U.S. Northern Command's
(NORTHCOM) JIACG to hear the lessons they learned while standing up
their JIACG.

TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP

Question. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is
a State Department-led initiative that seeks to eliminate and prevent
terrorist sanctuaries in the Trans-Sahel region of Africa.
Would you include this program as a part of AFRICOM's stability
operations?
Answer. Yes. Military power alone can not address the myriad of
issues facing the African continent today. The U.S. Government will
need to mobilize all facets of national power to counter the spread of
instability by assisting our partners overcome the economic, political,
and environmental conditions that have historically weakened their
institutions, thereby allowing African nations to concentrate on the
needs, aspirations and desires of the people. Only through the building
of sustainable relationships fostered by programs like the TSCTP which
fuses the capabilities of multiple U.S. Government agencies together
can we build the cooperation that will assist the African states in the
development of a stable and prosperous Africa. To contain and
ultimately eliminate violent extremism in the Trans-Sahara the conflict
will not be waged on the battlefield, but on the airwaves and in the
hearts and minds of the Trans-Saharan populace. TSCTP has broadened its
focus to take the battle to the enemy on the social, economic and
political fronts. Spurring economic development, expanding educational
opportunities, building health clinics, providing food assistance and
promoting good governance are all combined to be part of a long-term
public diplomacy and development campaign against radicalism.
Question. How do you expect the TSCTP program will be coordinated
among DOD, State and USAID participants within AFRICOM?
Answer. As an established program, TSCTP continues to demonstrate
the value of forging new processes in furthering cooperation among the
entire U.S. Government interagency community, not just that between
DOD/DOS and USAID and I anticipate that it will continue to utilize the
methods that presently exist. It is my desire that this program will
continue its great work at AFRICOM as it is presently doing for EUCOM
and will be a template for other interagency cooperation programs
within AFRICOM.
Question. What role do you foresee for the African Union or other
African organizations in stability operations in Africa, and how can
the new command best facilitate that role?
Answer. The nations of Africa and the organizations they have
formed to promote security and cooperation on the continent will carry
the lion's share of the burden when it comes to stability operations
and indeed all missions in Africa. AFRICOM is in a prime position to
assist building the military capabilities of those nations that strive
to take on greater regional responsibility through military to military
training and exercises. Additionally, when directed, the command will
be prepared to support African led operations, such as the airlift
provided for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). In general, by being a
committed and focused partner, the new command will work with African
nations and their organizations as they shoulder the demands of
maintaining security and prosperity on the continent.
Question. What role, if any, would you expect AFRICOM to play in
helping determine how agency resources will be allocated?
Answer. It is the intent of AFRICOM to work with our inter-agency
partners in ensuring full transparency of each of our programs, thus
leading to increased harmonization and effectiveness of our collective
efforts.

INTELLIGENCE ISSUES

Question. In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence
Reform Act, which created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
and charged it with conducting ``strategic operational planning'' to
combat terrorist threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad. NCTC has
taken the lead on developing the National Implementation Plan, a
detailed, interagency plan for combating terrorism, which assigns roles
and responsibilities to departments and agencies across the government.
What is your understanding of the role of the NCTC with respect to
AFRICOM?
Answer. With regard to AFRICOM, the NCTC develops strategic
guidance and the national, interagency objectives and tasks on counter
terrorism matters which AFRICOM, along with our interagency partners on
the continent, are responsible for implementing.
Question. How will AFRICOM's responsibilities for integrating
military and civilian planning interface with NCTC's responsibility for
integrating military and civilian planning?
Answer. AFRICOM, along with these other Departments and agencies,
has an obligation under NSPD-46 to work together very closely to ensure
that all of our plans and activities are coordinated, synchronized and
mutually reinforcing. It will be my priority to ensure that AFRICOM
planning is fully coordinated and integrated with our interagency
partners. The AFRICOM staff structure and integration of interagency
personnel in the Command is designed specifically toward this end.
Question. How are the specific agency roles and responsibilities
outlined in the National Implementation Plan integrated with AFRICOM's
efforts to bring stability to Africa?
Answer. A key underpinning for a more stable Africa is to encourage
all segments of the population to reject terrorism as a political
instrument. This requires that we build the trust and confidence of
African governments and populations that only comes through the
development of habitual relationships and implementation of programs
and initiatives which promote secure environments and political and
economic stability. It necessarily requires U.S. involvement across the
diplomatic, information, military and economic spectrum by the various
U.S. Departments engaged in Africa. Such engagement is already
occurring. However, for AFRICOM's efforts to be most effective, and for
our collective interagency efforts to be mutually reinforcing in
promoting stability, we must plan and implement our programs with a
high degree of routine coordination and full knowledge of programs and
capabilities all Departments bring to the African continent. How we
integrate AFRICOM's efforts with our interagency partners will be
through the development and implementation of specific counterterrorism
and security cooperation plans which are fully coordinated with the
other agencies and their planning efforts.

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Question. Africa has one of the most largest and most mature NGO
communities in the world. In many cases, the NGOs are the first
responders in Africa.
If confirmed, how would you expect to coordinate AFRICOM's
operations with these organizations?
Answer. AFRICOM will establish a robust relationship with the U.S.
Agency for International Development. AFRICOM will reach out to the NGO
community in Africa through our Partnership Division in our Outreach
Office. As we establish and maintain these key relationships we will
continue to coordinate our efforts with USAID representatives within
the command. We have learned from our recent efforts in the Horn of
Africa and elsewhere in Africa that there is a broad range of NGO and
community-based activities taking place. These activities bear
significant short-term and long-term results.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

Question. DOD has established policy designating stability
operations as a core U.S. military mission and directing that they
[stability operations] be prioritized comparable to combat operations.
The directive implementing this policy assigns the Commanders of the
Geographic Combatant Commands the responsibility to engage relevant
U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces,
International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the private sector in
stability operations planning, training, and exercising, as
appropriate.
What type of guidance and specific steps do you believe are
necessary for combatant commanders to effectively coordinate and
integrate planning with State, USAID, other U.S. agencies and
organizations, and multinational partners?
Answer. I think we agree with the premise that there needs to be
better interagency cooperation that facilitates the use of all aspects
of national power. This involves more than just establishing
headquarters, it involves a campaign based, comprehensive approach in
which all interagency players are involved in complex planning and
execution. A campaign, by definition, is a number of disparate actions
and activities that are coordinated to realize a singular end state.
Campaigns require authorities and funding--which come from the
executive branch and Congress.
Stability operations planning must be accomplished from inception
by a full interagency team. This prevents planning in a vacuum and
avoids the situation where a finalized and signed plan is passed on to
a partnering U.S. Government agency which cannot fulfill the roles and
responsibilities assigned in the plan. Finally, field outreach to the
embassies, USAID staff, and staff of other U.S. Government agencies
will aid significantly in coordination.
Question. What steps, staff, and resources are needed to establish
an interagency team within AFRICOM that can routinely and actively
contribute to DOD's operational planning?
Answer. We need people across the interagency assigned to AFRICOM
willing to be consistently engaged in the planning process--instead of
a military staff with interagency representatives only for perfunctory
planning, AFRICOM needs experienced interagency planners.
Another way of approaching this issue is to establish an
interagency planning school or curriculum which looks at campaign
planning from the interagency perspective. From there, we need to
codify a process for interagency campaign design. This process needs to
be a cooperative effort that goes beyond DOD. My hope is that this
concept will engender a productive dialogue that produces effectual
change that the military and our interagency partners can make in order
to improve interagency cooperation and teamwork. The Joint Staff J7 is
now looking at the idea of ``Mission-Centric Planning,'' a promising
recognition of the role that individual Country Teams can--and ought
to--play in operational planning.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address the challenges
associated with sharing information between DOD and non-DOD partners in
policy, organizational structures, training, or other measure within
the control of the combatant commander?
Answer. The key to solving the information sharing challenges is to
get the right representatives from other U.S. Government agencies at
the AFRICOM table; developing the mission focused teams with wide
spectrum expertise from across the interagency and when needed
facilitate reach back to home and field offices. For those key U.S.
Government agencies not represented at AFRICOM, I would aggressively
seek to bring in the appropriate out of area representation.
This is an area where non-DOD partners have to be taken on their
own terms. The DOD has much to gain and to offer in the information
sharing arena. As other non-DOD agencies often operate in a more
decentralized manner, DOD can utilize its expertise in information
gathering and synthesis to provide our interagency partners a regional
and multi-agency picture. This may directly benefit the country teams
and other organizations as they can see the actions outside of their
traditional areas of focus. The DOD will benefit from the vast regional
expertise and subject matter experts that the other government agencies
bring to the table. We also must recognize our partners' requirement
for information, which may well be in different formats and categories,
and work on developing common data bases which meet both DOD and non-
DOD needs.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you expect to
take to facilitate greater understanding of the planning process and
capabilities between DOD and non-DOD communities involved in stability
operations?
Answer. Planning and planning expertise are key to successful
operations in the DOD. As a result, attending planning courses is a
vital requirement for DOD planners. We need to significantly expand
available seats in planning courses, so that personnel for U.S.
Government agencies partnering with the DOD can attend these courses
and obtain the necessary level of planning expertise. Again, the
development of an interagency planning course might help in this area.
In addition, I would include DOS, USAID, and others in TSC planning
exercises and encourage AFRICOM staff to participate in the planning
exercises of DOS, USAID, and others.
Question. How do you believe the significant differences in the
capacity of non-DOD organizations to engage in stability operations
could best be addressed?
Answer. First, we must assess the planning and execution
capabilities of other U.S. Government agencies, since planning capacity
of USAID and other agencies is sometimes underestimated. Second,
develop common training modules, including interactive joint exercises,
which will help build capacities in areas lacking by other agencies
including emphasis on lessons learned from previous stability
operations.
A second issue is that non-DOD organizations, both government and
private, are structured so as to optimally meet the requirements of
their particular tasks, usually very differently than DOD
organizations. At the operational level, for example, the major
overseas planning entities for DOD are the geographic commands, whereas
for the DOS and most other U.S. Government agencies these entities are
the country teams in each host country.
We in DOD should not expect that the solution to interagency
cooperation in Stability Operations lies in making the rest of the U.S.
Government look like ourselves. In many aspects of stability operations
DOD would be the supporting agency, and we thus need to understand the
strengths and weaknesses of non-DOD agencies and concentrate how we can
gain greater synergy by working together. The real strength of the
COCOMs, the ability to plan and execute across international boundaries
on a regional basis, is a natural complement to the strengths of other
U.S. Government agencies represented in the Country Teams to cooperate
in furthering common U.S. goals within international boundaries.
One of the ways, that COCOMS can overcome the problems, and build
real synergy in Stability Operations, is to organize itself so as to be
able to work most effectively with non-DOD agencies. AFRICOM intends to
be a leader in developing this concept. This is a work in progress, but
I am convinced that we are on the right path for the future.

ARTICLE 98

Question. The State Department and DOD have been limited in their
ability to engage with some African nations because bilateral ``Article
98'' agreements, which protect American citizens from the International
Criminal Court, have not been secured.
What is your assessment of the impact of the inability of the U.S.
to provide foreign military assistance to countries with whom we have
not been able to negotiate Article 98 agreements?
Answer. AFRICOM's anticipated AOR will consist of over 50
countries. While only a handful of those countries are currently
adversely affected by the lack of an Article 98 agreement, two of the
most important regional powers, South Africa and Kenya, are included.
The other affected countries are Mali, Namibia, Niger, and Tanzania.
De-linking international military education and training (IMET)
with American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) sanctions was a
positive and critical step in rebuilding these relationships. However,
with ASPA sanctions blocking foreign military financing (FMF) for these
countries, bilateral sanctions are causing both direct and indirect
adverse effects, and these effects spread to other areas of U.S.
interest.
In South Africa the bulk of the FMF credits of $6 million (2002)
were applied to cases to support the South African National Defense
Forces (SANDF) C-130 fleet for parts and training. The suspension of
FMF support to South Africa played a part in their decision to
modernize their lift fleet with the Airbus M400 over the C130. The
effect will continue to be felt for decades to come as defense
contracts are lost to other countries, affecting both our defense
industry and our overall interoperability with the most powerful nation
on the continent. In Kenya, the prohibition on Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) is causing our support for their F5 aircraft to close. CENTCOM's
intent to support Kenya's desire to modernize their Airborne, special
operation forces, and counter terrorism elements will also not be
executable due to a lack of Foreign Military Financing.

DISASTER RESPONSE

Question. For each of the past several years, the continent of
Africa has experienced a number of major natural disasters. Most
recently, we have seen flooding in Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda. DOD has
responded in a limited way.
Should DOD's role in responding to such disasters change with the
standing up of AFRICOM?
Answer. DOD has an excellent working relationship with USAID's
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). We plan to have a liaison
officer from OFDA in our Command structure. Although I do not see our
role in support of OFDA, as the lead Federal agency for disaster
response, changing, I do see our ability to plan with and improve our
capability to provide support to OFDA greatly improving with the stand
up of AFRICOM, and given necessary resources to respond are provided
when requested.
Question. In some countries, a natural disaster compounds a
political conflict, thereby exacerbating existing security and
humanitarian conditions.
To what extent do you believe AFRICOM should step in to facilitate
humanitarian aid?
Answer. AFRICOM can call upon the unique capabilities of the U.S.
military to address a wide variety of issues resulting from natural
disasters or complex humanitarian emergencies. As a part of AFRICOM's
interagency approach to issues in Africa, I will follow the lead of the
U.S. Chief of Mission for the affected country, coordinating with and
supporting his/her efforts. At the same time any assets that are made
available to the issue will also be coordinated and vetted with OFDA.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Question. In your view, does the U.S. do enough to train African
militaries on matters such as respect for human rights, the rule of
law, and the proper role of the civilian-controlled military in a
democracy?
Answer. In my current position as Deputy Commander of EUCOM, I have
observed the serious effort that the Departments of Defense and State
devote to these issues as we work together in training African
militaries. For example, the State Department funds International
Military Education and Training programs that are implemented within
U.S. embassies by military officers assigned to our Offices of Defense
Cooperation and Defense Attache Offices. Foreign military members and
units proposed to receive U.S. Government funded training undergo a
``vetting procedure'' to review the backgrounds for human rights
violations. This vetting occurs for all security assistance programs
and military training programs. The State Department's African
Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, which often
includes U.S. military trainers, and Defense's Africa Center for
Strategic Studies programs both ``vet'' proposed trainees. During ACOTA
training events, human rights, rule of law, and the role of a civilian
controlled military in a democracy are all topics that are emphasized
as the U.S. Government trains African peacekeepers.
Question. If confirmed, would you expect to create an office within
AFRICOM to monitor and coordinate human rights issues?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to very closely analyze the command
structure of AFRICOM taking into consideration the new expertise
provided by incorporating interagency staff, before making a formal
decision on establishing a specific office to monitor human rights
issues.

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE--HORN OF AFRICA

Question. What is your view of the strategic importance of the Horn
of Africa to the United States?
Answer. There are a number of key reasons behind the ``strategic
importance'' of the HOA to the U.S. African countries are plagued with
internal and external tensions which have prevented economic growth and
political stability. The U.S. interagency efforts combined with the
CJTF-HOA presence helps to prevent regional conflict leading to a more
stable environment.
HOA, like the other regions in Africa, represents the next frontier
of global economic development and competition. Development of new
markets and new resources not only supports the U.S. economy, but
creates prosperity in a historically poor region, ameliorating the
underlying causes of instability and conflict.
Much of the world's oil flow and other critical mineral resources
pass through international waters near the HOA coast. It is vital for
the U.S. to prevent disruption of these global superhighways.
Historically, extremists have sought refuge in the HOA sub-region.
Not only do they present a threat to the U.S.-African partnership aimed
at pursuing political stability and economic prosperity, but from the
HOA it can be exported to other parts of the world. It is again of key
strategic importance that we do all that we can to prevail against such
a threat.
Question. With the standing up of AFRICOM, do you believe the U.S.
can play a more significant role in this subregion, particularly in a
country like Somalia? If so, how?
Answer. The standing up of AFRICOM will further contribute to the
current CJTF-HOA efforts aimed at promoting regional stability by
bringing a more focused and coherent interagency effort in the region.
With regard to Somalia, CJTF-HOA's military assistance to the Ugandan
Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) deployed in support of the AU
Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia provides a good example of the
significant role AFRICOM can bring to support a resolution for the
Somalia conflict.
CJTF-HOA supported the AU's logistic planning efforts to deploy the
UPDF to Mogadishu, facilitated medical training for the UPDF and worked
with a NGO to provide medical supplies to the UPDF for direct
assistance of the citizens in Mogadishu. CJTF-HOA also facilitated
training for UPDF marine forces in Kenya prior to their deployment to
protect the Mogadishu Seaport.
AFRICOM's focused attention on the HOA region and interagency staff
composition will facilitate a wide range of opportunities for
assistance to the AU's efforts in the region using African solutions to
African problems.

MARITIME SECURITY

Question. Maritime security has proven to be a significant issue on
the coasts of west and east Africa. In the west, northern migration to
Europe and the Gulf of Guinea are the challenges and, in the east,
pirating in the major shipping lanes and transporting of terrorists to
and from the Middle East are the challenges.
What is your assessment of EUCOM's efforts to combat maritime
threats in the west?
Answer. Africa presents some unique challenges in the maritime
security environment. The West Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea regions
of Africa are areas which clearly demonstrate the complexity of
maritime challenges present around the continent. In each of these
regions, problems such as illicit or criminal activity, piracy,
environmental and fisheries violations, resource theft, and
trafficking, occur on a routine and regular basis. The common
challenges in both of these regions highlight the extent of the
problem, and identify some of the various attributes that must
necessarily be addressed if a comprehensive maritime security solution
for Africa is to be provided. In the end, African solutions for African
challenges will yield the best results.
EUCOM is actively working with the Gulf of Guinea countries,
through Navy Europe (NAVEUR), to help them address their maritime
threats. The African Partnership Station (APS) program, about to
launch, will be another effort to help the Gulf of Guinea nations
combat their maritime threats.
Question. What is your assessment of U.S. CENTCOM's efforts to
combat maritime threats in the Horn of Africa?
Answer. The Horn of Africa region has unique maritime security
challenges that include problems such as illicit/criminal activity,
piracy, environmental and fisheries violations, resource theft, and
trafficking, which occur on a routine and regular basis. The challenges
extend beyond the Horn of Africa and include the entire West Indian
Ocean region of Africa. With over 4,750 miles of coastline and only 25
boats to provide maritime security, the region possesses virtually no
capability to interdict fishery theft, piracy, narco-trafficking, or
any other illicit activity in the maritime domain when it occurs.
CENTCOM's efforts to combat maritime threats in the Horn of Africa,
Naval Forces, Central (NAVCENT), and the Coalition Task Force, CTF-150,
working with the CJTF-HOA, have been focused on assisting the Africans
to combat terrorism, piracy, narcotic trafficking, and other illicit
activity. Through maritime interdiction operations, developing maritime
domain awareness, and providing military-to-military training, both
Task Forces have been working towards building regional capacity
through bi-lateral and multi-lateral engagements in the Horn of Africa
region. Presently, both the Horn of Africa and the West Indian Ocean
region lack significant naval forces, coastal security forces or
security structures to provide any meaningful or realistic deterrent.
CENTCOM, through the efforts of CTF-150 and CJTF-HOA, has made great
strides to assist the region in combating the threat while helping the
region strengthen its ability to fully maintain its maritime security.
AFRICOM will continue to build on these efforts and look to add value
where needed to lead toward African solutions for African
challenges.What role do you expect AFRICOM to play in efforts to combat
maritime threats in and around Africa?
Answer. AFRICOM will build upon the existing efforts to assist
African nations to build capacity in the areas of maritime security and
safety, specifically, in the Gulf of Guinea region, the Horn of Africa,
and the West Indian Ocean region. AFRICOM will add value to these
efforts, maximizing the resources that the Interagency, non-government
organizations, our international partners and our African partners
already bring to the continent.

EGYPT

Question. It is the committee's understanding that Egypt has been
given dual status in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs.
What is your understanding of how this dual status in two
geographic AORs will be implemented?
Answer. Operationally and administratively Egypt will be part of
the CENTCOM AOR. However, AFRICOM will have the ability to work with
Egypt on Africa-related issues.
Question. For instance, how would issues related to U.S. Foreign
Military Financing associated with Egypt be coordinated by the two
commands?
Answer. CENTCOM will have responsibility for the coordination of
foreign assistance programs for Egypt. There will be little change in
how security assistance and combatant command programs in general would
be managed with Egypt once AFRICOM reaches final operating capability.

AFRICAN UNION

Question. In December 2006, the State Department established a U.S.
Mission to the AU. The purpose of this mission is to forge a strategic
partnership with the AU that will further peace, stability and
prosperity throughout Africa. In March 2007, you visited with AU
officials about a number of issues, including AFRICOM.
In your assessment, is the AU receptive to the AFRICOM?
Answer. Yes. The AU's strong support of communications exercise
Africa Endeavor is an example of the positive development between the
AU and the USEUCOM. In addition, over the last few years EUCOM has
provided the AU advice, mentoring and tactical expertise as the AU
developed the concepts, doctrine, policies and procedures for Command,
Control, and Communications and Information Services (C\3\IS) which
will support the African Standby Forces. These programs will continue
under AFRICOM, fully endorsed by the AU.
Question. Do you believe the AU will be receptive to U.S.
assistance in the form of training and advisory and technical support
to the development of an African Standby Force?
Answer. Yes. The AU's stated policy is to man as many African peace
support operations as possible, sourced in large part through Africa
Standby Forces, which the AU intends to certify for initial operating
capability by 2010. To assist the AU in reaching its goal, AFRICOM will
assume sponsorship of ongoing command and control infrastructure
development and liaison officer support, continue to resource military
mentors for peacekeeping training, and develop new approaches to
supporting the AU and African Standby Forces.

LIBYA

Question. Over the past few years, the United States' relationship
with Libya has improved dramatically.
In your assessment, what should be the nature of our military-to-
military cooperation with Libya?
Answer. Libya's continuing transformation to responsible governance
and normalization in its relationship with the international community
shows a level of commitment by its leadership that necessitates a
deliberate, measured pace of engagement between our two militaries.
Initial activities align with U.S. Country Team initiatives to
highlight American goodwill, and to assess with Libyan military leaders
where we can best assist and collaborate to enhance their current
capabilities.
We have made steady progress with Libya since restrictions under
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) were modified in
February of this year. However, removal or waiver of legislative
restrictions imposed under Section 507 of the Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act of 2006 (Public Law
109-112) would provide additional opportunity to positively influence
our relationship with the Libyan military through English language
training and other International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program opportunities.
Question. In your opinion, is Libya's nonparticipation in the
Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Program (TSCTP) a liability for the
program?
Answer. Libya's eventual inclusion in the TSCTP will add value to
the program. But, I do not view their current absence as a liability.
TSCTP focus is much more on the Sahel countries that have less
capability than Libya or the rest of the Maghreb.

LIBERIA

Question. The United States and Liberia have long enjoyed a special
relationship, dating back to the 1820s when the first group of settlers
arrived in Liberia from the United States. Liberia now counts the
United States as its strongest supporter in its democratization and
reconstruction efforts. It has been reported that Liberia has expressed
a strong desire to be considered as one of the hubs of the new AFRICOM.
What role do you envision for Liberia in AFRICOM's planning?
Answer. The democratization and reconstruction programs in Liberia
are critical to restoring stability in that country and the West Africa
region as a whole. The United States Government, in conjunction with
other nations, multi-national organizations, and NGOs, is committed to
contributing to Liberia's continued transition from a post-conflict
society to a stable democracy. AFRICOM, along with DOS, USAID and other
key agencies will play a role in supporting the U.S. Government's
commitment to Liberia's reconstruction. The cornerstone of Liberia's
effort to rebuild its national defense is the U.S.-led Security Sector
Reform (SSR) program. To secure Liberia's peaceful security
environment, the United States is funding the creation of a new Armed
Forces of Liberia (AFL) by training and equipping a 2,000-soldier
force. The goal of the U.S. is to complete the rebuilding of the new
AFL forces in time for the U.N.'s peacekeeping mission to begin its
drawdown of forces in 2009. AFRICOM, in close coordination with the
efforts underway through the DOS, will continue to promote peace and
security within its programs and authorities.

MAGHREB/NORTH AFRICA

Question. Partially isolated from the rest of the continent by the
Atlas Mountains and the Sahara, the Maghreb has proven to be a
significant counter terrorism challenge for the United States. The
TSCTP has attempted to build the capacity of these northwest African
nations to conduct counterterrorism operations.
In your opinion, are U.S. efforts in this region adequate? Should
DOD be doing more?
Answer. The continued growth of al Qaeda's influence in North
Africa indicates that U.S. efforts in the region should be sustained.
In the Sahel, DOD is providing as much capacity building assistance as
those countries either desire or can effectively absorb. However, we
continue to seek ways that we can assist and enhance capabilities of
nations in the region. One specific area of success has been the
growing synergy between EUCOM's Trans-Sahara Partnership (TSP) and
DOS's TSCTP where we are discussing planned programs and activities
within the Interagency in an effort to build upon each other's success
and avoid duplication of effort or efforts at cross purposes. AFRICOM
can achieve more by working in a more coordinated and coherent way with
the U.S. Government Interagency, NGOs, and other partners seeking to
advance peace, stability, and security in Africa.
Question. How would you assess Libya's efforts to prevent terrorist
and criminal groups from exploiting remote territories in light of the
country's persistent inability to prevent large numbers of economic
migrants from crossing its borders?
Answer. As I understand, Libya faces some challenges in this
regard, as do most of the Maghreb and Sahelian countries. This
highlights the importance of positive engagement and influence with
Libya.

DARFUR, SUDAN

Question. More than 3 years of fighting in Darfur have destroyed
hundreds of villages, displaced 2.2 million people and led to hundreds
of thousands of deaths. If confirmed, you would be one of the U.S.
Government's most senior military advisors on matters relating to the
crisis in Darfur.
What is your assessment of the situation in Darfur and what
recommendations would you provide to your leadership as commander of
AFRICOM given the circumstances as they stand today?
From a military perspective, what is the proper role for the United
States and NATO to play in assisting the deployment of the UN-AU hybrid
mission and in supporting the pursuit of its mission?
Answer. The United States remains actively engaged in helping to
resolve the crisis in Darfur through humanitarian assistance, support
of the political process, and logistical assistance to the African
Union and the United Nation's support to the African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS) and its transition to a United Nations African Union
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). As part of the U.S. Government Interagency
effort, we actively plan for diplomatic and military contingencies to
pressure the Sudanese government to allow a United Nations peacekeeping
force in Darfur.
Through outreach to troop contributing countries (TCC) and with UN,
AU, and our partners, we are working to ensure that this hybrid force
will be deployed quickly and effectively with sufficient political and
military support to successfully bring peace to the war-torn Darfur.
DOD must continue to play its supporting role to ensure the timely
deployment of PK forces and provide logistic and planning.

SOUTH AFRICA

Question. South Africa has stated publicly its opposition to
AFRICOM and has indicated that it will not host AFRICOM personnel.
If confirmed, how would you intend to address South Africa's
concerns regarding AFRICOM, particularly given that country's position
of influence in Africa?
Answer. South Africa is a continental leader and has a key role in
the development of Africa. If confirmed, I intend to find areas of
common interest to develop a relationship built on trust and mutual
support. The resumption of International Military Education and
Training (IMET) last year, after a 4-year suspension due to the
American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) sanctions, was a
positive step forward. Ongoing Africa Contingency Operations Training
and Assistance (ACOTA) training and a scheduled medical exercise in
2009, will provide additional opportunities to strengthen our bi-
lateral relationship. Lastly I will continue direct dialogue with the
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and South African leaders
both civilian and military on the role and mission of AFRICOM.

CHINA

Question. In your opinion, what effect has China's engagement with
African militaries had on those militaries and on U.S. security
interests?
Answer. China's military involvement on the African continent
includes military education and training in China, military sales to
African countries to gain access to markets and resources, and roughly
1,300 peacekeepers that support all 7 U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
(PKO) in Africa. To date, China's military involvement has not had any
discernable impact on U.S. security interests in Africa. Addition of
new Chinese military equipment may pose unforeseen future
interoperability challenges.
Question. Do you foresee China's growing energy demands affecting
security developments in Africa?
Answer. Africa is growing in military, strategic and economic
importance in global affairs. We are seeking more effective ways to
prevent and respond to humanitarian crises, improve cooperative efforts
to stem trans-national terrorism and sustain enduring efforts that
contribute to African unity and bolster security on the continent.

NIGERIA

Question. Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa, has faced
intermittent political turmoil and economic crisis since gaining
independence in October 1960. Nigeria is one of the United States' key
strategic partners in Africa. The country is Africa's largest producer
of oil, and is America's fifth largest oil provider. As the continent's
second largest economy, Nigeria's stability and prosperity affect not
only those in the market for Nigerian oil, but the entire region. On
the military side, Nigeria has a 76,000 member strong military. Before
the lifting of sanctions by many Western nations, Nigeria had turned to
China, Russia, North Korea, and India for the purchase of military
equipment and training.
What constructive role do you believe AFRICOM can play in this
fragile country?
Answer. AFRICOM looks forward to opportunities with the new
Yar'Adua administration to enhance the relationship between our two
countries. Early indications are that the new leader is demonstrating a
bold willingness to address corruption and economic development. We see
Nigeria as a key regional partner. The United States and Nigeria are
now moving forward on common initiatives such as peacekeeping training,
Regional Maritime Domain Awareness, and consultations with other
international partners on energy security in the Niger Delta.
In addition to the typical security cooperation activities like
International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military
Financing (FMF), and the Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, there are
two major initiatives in which DOD plays a major role. Operation
Enduring Freedom--Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) is the military component of
the TSCTP. This program seeks to reduce ungoverned space that might be
exploited by terrorist groups and mitigate the influence of extremist
ideologies. In Nigeria, OEF-TS has concentrated primarily on
development and humanitarian assistance in Northern Nigeria as part of
the embassy's Muslim Outreach Program, as well as strategic
communications. Now that the elections are over we stand ready to
broaden and deepen OEF-TS activities to include training and equipping
counterterrorism forces and encouraging intelligence sharing with other
TSCTP partners.
DOD also participates in the quarterly meetings with the Government
of Nigeria on development and security in the Niger Delta. While there
is no military solution to the Niger Delta's problems, security can
enable development and political dialogue. DOD's contribution to this
effort is primarily in coastal and maritime security, as well as
initiatives aimed at reducing weapons trafficking. The cornerstone of
DOD efforts is a multi-million dollar program known as the Regional
Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) funded partially under 1206
Authority.
AFRICOM should also integrate its efforts with the West African
regional organization, Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) headquartered in Abuja, Nigeria. Over the past decade, Nigeria
provided over 45 percent of ECOWAS' military troop contributions for
peacekeeping missions. Through fiscal year 2008, DOD will support the
comprehensive training and equipping of additional Nigerian
peacekeeping battalions with mentors and advisors.

CLIMATE CHANGE

Question. During a recent visit to EUCOM, committee staff was
briefed on the security threats in Africa. One of the items discussed
by personnel from EUCOM's J2 Directorate was the impact of global
climate change.
What is your assessment of the threat posed to Africa by climate
change?
Answer. Climate change could exacerbate current instability in
Africa in a number of ways. Droughts, floods, and other effects of
climate change could lead to future crop failures, massive refugee
flows, and significant damage to African economies and societies. The
chaos and desperation of these tragedies could help undermine
governments, increase civil unrest, and promote extremism in a number
of countries.
Question. What are the national security implications for the
United States?
Answer. Climate change could pose a serious threat to U.S. national
security interest in Africa. Some countries could be pushed into
greater instability as a result of floods, droughts, or other
catastrophes brought on by global climate change. Unstable areas
provide the perfect recruiting ground for terrorist groups seeking new
blood for their war against the west. Devastating storms in the Gulf of
Guinea, for example, might damage the region's oil infrastructure,
leading to disruptions in oil production and higher oil prices for the
global economy.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes. I fully recognize and understand the importance of
congressional oversight as it is clearly outlined in the Constitution
of the United States.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes. Although the President is my Commander in Chief, and
he and the Secretary of Defense constitute my chain of command, I
recognize that my oath is to the Constitution. That document clearly
divides responsibilities with regard to defense between the executive
and legislative branches. For both the administration and Congress to
execute their respective responsibilities appropriately, it is
incumbent upon me to be honest and forthright with both while offering
my best military advice.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, AFRICOM?
Answer. Yes. That is an inherent part of my responsibilities as
outlined above, and I will be happy to appear when called.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Question Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

MARITIME SECURITY OF AFRICA

1. Senator Collins. General Ward, maritime security has proven to
be a significant issue on the coast of West and East Africa. In your
advance policy questions you state that Africa presents some unique
challenges in the maritime security environment. You also mentioned
that the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) is actively working with the
Gulf of Guinea countries, through Naval Forces, Europe (NAVEUR), to
help them address maritime threats. Can you tell us what you envision
will be the new U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) role in maritime
security on the west and east coast of Africa?
General Ward. AFRICOM, in concert with its naval component NAVEUR,
will continue the EUCOM legacy by working on building maritime
capability and capacity in Africa. NAVEUR will continue its role of
helping to build and maintain the core competencies of leadership and
combat readiness to counter any adversary, as well as develop new
capacities for our partners, such as maritime security and safety where
participating nations network maritime detection and identification
information to appropriate law enforcement agencies.
In particular, the Automated Identification System is the first
step to achieve this awareness and will provide a critical foundation
to the Global Maritime Partnerships. Additionally, another program
designed to enhance maritime security and safety is the Africa
Partnership Station. This initiative is designed to provide direct
assistance using at-sea training platforms that provide a persistent
regional presence with a minimal footprint ashore.
Deployments of vessels off West Africa will continue, utilizing
engagement teams from these vessels for familiarization events--from
small engine repair to health education--the efforts to build long
lasting partnerships will continue.
______

[The nomination reference of GEN William E. Ward, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
July 11, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General

GEN William E. Ward, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of GEN William E. Ward, USA, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Transcript of Naval Service for GEN William E. Ward, USA
Source of commissioned service: ROTC.

Military schools attended:
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College

Educational degrees:
Morgan State University - BA - Political Science
Pennsylvania State University - MA - Political Science

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates of
Promotions appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT................................................. 6 Jun 71
1LT................................................. 9 Oct 72
CPT................................................. 9 Jun 75
MAJ................................................. 1 Jan 83
LTC................................................. 1 Feb 89
COL................................................. 1 Jun 92
BG.................................................. 1 Mar 96
MG.................................................. 1 Feb 99
LTG................................................. 8 Oct 02
GEN................................................. 3 May 06
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Major duty assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sep. 71......................... May 74............ Rifle Platoon
Leader, later
Executive
Officer, A
Company, later
Anti-Tank Platoon
Leader, later
Motor Officer, 3d
Battalion, 325th
Infantry, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC.
May 74.......................... Oct. 74........... Liaison Officer,
2d Brigade, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Oct. 74......................... Apr. 76........... Rifle Platoon
Leader, B
Company, later
Commander, C
Company, 1st
Battalion
(Mechanized),
17th Infantry, 2d
Infantry
Division, Eighth
United States
Army, Korea.
Apr. 76......................... Dec. 76........... Student, Infantry
Officer Advanced
Course, United
States Army
Infantry School,
Fort Benning, GA.
Dec. 76......................... Nov. 78........... Student,
Pennsylvania
State University,
University Park,
PA.
Nov. 78......................... Apr. 82........... Instructor of
Social Sciences,
later Assistant
Professor,
Department of
Social Sciences,
United States
Military Academy,
West Point, NY.
Apr. 82......................... June 83........... Student, United
States Army
Command and
General Staff
College, Fort
Leavenworth, KS.
Aug. 83......................... May 85............ S-4 (Logistics),
210th Field
Artillery
Brigade, VII
Corps, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany.
May 85.......................... June 86........... Executive Officer,
United States
Army Military
Community
Activity--Aschaff
ensberg, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany.
June 86......................... June 87........... Executive Officer,
1st Battalion
(Mechanized), 7th
Infantry, 3d
Infantry
Division, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany.
July 87......................... Oct. 88........... Staff Officer
(Logistics),
Office of the
Deputy Chief of
Staff for
Logistics, United
States Army,
Washington, DC.
Oct. 88......................... July 91........... Commander, 5th
Battalion, 9th
Infantry, 2d
Brigade, later G-
4 (Logistics),
6th Infantry
Division (Light),
Fort Wainwright,
AK.
Aug. 91......................... June 92........... Student, United
States Army War
College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA.
June 92......................... June 94........... Commander, 2d
Brigade, 10th
Mountain Division
(Light), Fort
Drum, NY, and
Operation Restore
Hope, Mogadishu,
Somalia.
July 94......................... July 95........... Executive Officer
to the Vice Chief
of Staff, United
States Army,
Washington, DC.
July 95......................... Sep. 96........... Deputy Director
for Operations, J-
3, National
Military Command
Center, The Joint
Staff,
Washington, DC.
Sep. 96......................... Feb. 98........... Assistant Division
Commander
(Support), 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Feb. 98......................... July 99........... Chief, Office of
Military
Cooperation,
Egypt, American
Embassy, Egypt.
July 99......................... Nov. 00........... Commanding
General, 25th
Infantry Division
(Light) and
United States
Army, Hawaii,
Schofield
Barracks, HI.
Nov. 00......................... Oct. 02........... Vice Director for
Operations, J-3,
The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Oct. 02......................... Oct. 03........... Commander,
Stabilization
Force, Operation
Joint Forge,
Sarajevo, Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Nov. 03......................... Feb. 05........... Deputy Commanding
General/Chief of
Staff, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany.
Mar. 05......................... Dec. 05........... Deputy Commanding
General/Chief of
Staff, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany with
temporary duty as
United States
Security
Coordinator,
Israel-
Palestinian
Authority, Tel
Aviv.
Dec. 05......................... Apr. 06........... Deputy Commanding
General/Chief of
Staff, United
States Army
Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of joint assignments:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assisgnments Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deputy Director for Operations, July 95-Sep. 96 Colonel/Brigadier
J-3, National Military Command General
Center, The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Chief, Office of Military Feb. 98-July 99 Brigadier General/
Cooperation, Egypt, American Major
Embassy, Egypt.
Vice Director for Operations, J- Nov. 00-0ct. 02 Major General
3, The Joint Staff, Washington,
DC.
Commander, Stabilization Force, Oct. 02-0ct. 03 Lieutenant General
Operation Joint Forge,
Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina
(No Joint credit).
Deputy Commanding General/Chief Mar. 05-Dec. 05 Lieutenant General
of Staff, United States Army
Europe and Seventh Army,
Germany with temporary duty as
United States Security
Coordinator, Israel-Palestinian
Authority, Tel Aviv (No Joint
Credit).
Deputy Commander, United States May 06-Present General
European Command, Germany.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. Decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with six Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Combat Infantryman Badge
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN William E.
Ward, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
William E. Ward.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, United States Africa Command.

3. Date of nomination:
July 11, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
March 6, 1949; Baltimore, MD.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to the former Joyce Lewis.

7. Names and ages of children:
William E. Ward, Jr., age 34; and Kahni J. Ward, age 30.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Association for the U.S. Army; Omega Psi Phi Fraternity, Inc.; Army
War College Alumi Assoc.; Morgan State University Alumni Assoc.;
National Society of Pershing Rifles; Watertown New York Sunrise Rotary;
555 Parachute Infantry Assoc.; Army/Air Force Mutual Aid Assoc.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of GEN William E. Ward, USA, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 27, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on September 28, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Kevin P. Chilton,
USAF, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms
brought about fundamental change in the manner in which the Department
of Defense (DOD) and the Services carry out the mission of national
security.
Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of
these defense reforms?
Answer. The most positive aspect is the overall improvement in our
joint military operations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act resulted in much
needed improvements in joint doctrine, joint professional military
education, and joint strategic planning. Another important element is
clarity in the chain of command from the national leadership to the
combatant commanders and the unambiguous responsibility placed upon
each combatant commander for execution of the mission and preparedness
of assigned forces.
Question. What is your view of the extent to which these defense
reforms have been implemented?
Answer. I believe that the DOD has vigorously and successfully
pursued implementation of these reforms.
Question. The goals of Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special
Operations defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as
strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military
advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for
the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the
combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility;
increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency
planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources;
enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the
management and administration of the DOD.
Do you agree with these goals?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you foresee the need for additional modifications of
Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible
revisions to the national security strategy.
Answer. No. I do not believe changes to Goldwater-Nichols are
necessary at this time. If confirmed, I will monitor any proposals and
provide my best military advice.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)?
Answer. The Commander, STRATCOM maintains primary responsibility
among the combatant commanders for strategic nuclear forces to support
the national objective of strategic deterrence. Additional
responsibilities assigned by the President include providing integrated
global strike planning and command and control to deliver precision
kinetic and nonkinetic effects; developing characteristics and
capabilities, advocating, planning, and conducting space operations;
planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense support,
operations, and desired characteristic and capability development;
planning, integrating, and coordinating intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations;
integrating and coordinating DOD information operations efforts across
geographic areas of responsibilities; planning, leading and
coordinating DOD global network operations and defense; and serving as
the lead combatant commander integrating DOD efforts combating weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). Additionally, Commander, STRATCOM provides
strategic military advice to the Secretary of Defense and exercises
command over the organization and operation of all assigned forces and
headquarters in accordance with public law and DOD regulations.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. Over 31 years of commissioned service in the United States
military have prepared me for this position. My career includes diverse
and challenging operational and staff assignments, within both the Air
Force and Joint Service environments and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). I believe these assignments have prepared me for
the specific duties of the Commander, STRATCOM. My assignment as Task
Force 204 Commander (responsible for the readiness and generation of
our nuclear bomber fleet) combined with my command of STRATCOM's Joint
Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike (responsible
for integrated planning and command and control for space and global
strike operations) have prepared me for the STRATCOM responsibilities
for strategic nuclear forces, global strike and conducting space
operations. Further, my experiences as the Commander of Air Force Space
Command, coupled with those at NASA, to include work in launch, mission
control, on orbit operations, program management and international
negotiation, particularly with Russia, I believe will serve me well if
confirmed. In the cyber and information operations areas, my command of
the Air Force Network Operations Command and oversight of the Air
Force's information operations and intelligence wings as the 8th Air
Force Commander will be helpful. In the mission area of ISR, I've had
the opportunity to fly in the tactical and strategic mission areas in
the RF-4 and command the 9th Reconnaissance Wing, our Air Force's U-2
and now Global Hawk wing. Again, as the 8th Air Force Commander, I had
the opportunity to oversee all of our Air Force's manned reconnaissance
platforms. In the missile defense area as the Commander of Air Force
Space Command, I have had the opportunity to become very familiar with
the contributions the Air Force makes to this capability in the form of
space based and terrestrial early warning and tracking systems.
Finally, my staff positions as the Air Force programmer and Joint Staff
Deputy Director for Political Military Affairs for Asia, Pacific and
the Middle East have given me a strategic perspective that I think will
be of value if I am confirmed.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
STRATCOM?
Answer. My military career has provided me an ongoing opportunity
to expand leadership experiences, interact with new organizations and
people, and to continue the learning process. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with several of the organizations upon which
STRATCOM depends for continued success and which I did not have an
opportunity to work with while commanding STRATCOM's Joint Functional
Component Command for Space and Global Strike. I will also need to
increase my familiarity with these organizations (e.g. Department of
Energy-National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, Nuclear Weapons Council, etc.) and the contributions
they provide to mission success.

RELATIONSHIPS

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

Answer. In accordance with title 10, U.S.C., section 132, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense will perform such duties and exercise
powers prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense will act for and exercise the powers of the Secretary of
Defense when the Secretary is disabled or the office is vacant. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary on matters of
strategic importance.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their
respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries
exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their
responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and
directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary.
Communication between the Under Secretaries and combatant commanders is
direct unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy on all policy issues that affect STRATCOM
operations.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C, and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their
respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries
exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their
responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and
directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary.
Communication between the Under Secretaries and combatant commanders is
direct unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence on matters in the area of STRATCOM's assigned
responsibilities pertaining to intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR).
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their
respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries
exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their
responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and
directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary.
Communication between the Under Secretaries and combatant commanders is
direct unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics on Command issues
pertaining to his departmental responsibilities.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy serves under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Any relationship the Commander, STRATCOM requires with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy would exist with
and through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
executes responsibilities including overall supervision of the homeland
defense activities of the DOD while serving under the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy. Any relationship the Commander, STRATCOM
requires with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security
would exist with and through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
If confirmed, I look forward to this relationship in concert with the
Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, U.S. Pacific Command on
related national security issues.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., clearly establishes the Chairman as the
principal military adviser to the President, the National Security
Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
In this role he is the most senior ranking member of the armed forces
but does not exercise command over any military forces or serve in the
chain of command between the President and Secretary of Defense and
combatant commanders, although the President may transmit
communications through him. By law and as directed by the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman consults with the combatant commanders, evaluates
and assists in achieving their requirements and plans. He provides a
vital linkage between the combatant commanders and other elements of
the DOD. If confirmed, I will assist the chairman with my full and
diligent efforts and advice. If confirmed, I will keep the Secretary of
Defense informed on matters for which he may hold me personally
accountable and work through the Chairman in the fulfillment of my
duties, in keeping with all legal and departmental regulations.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Under title 10, U.S.C., section 165, subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and
subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries
of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and
support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands.
The authority exercised by a combatant commander over Service
components is quite clear but requires close coordination with each
Secretary to ensure there is no infringement upon those lawful
responsibilities which a Secretary alone may discharge. If confirmed, I
look forward to building a strong and productive relationship with each
of the Secretaries of the military departments.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service
Chiefs no longer serve in the operational chain of command. They now
serve to provide organized, trained, and equipped forces to be employed
by combatant commanders in accomplishing their assigned missions.
Additionally, these officers serve as members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and as such have a lawful obligation to provide military advice.
Individually and collectively, the Service Chiefs are a tremendous
source of experience and judgment. If confirmed, I will work closely
and confer regularly with the Service Chiefs.
Question. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
Answer. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is a DOD
organization engaged in the research and development, acquisition,
launch and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to
meet the needs of the Intelligence Community and of the DOD. According
to the Unified Command Plan (UCP), STRATCOM is the responsible
combatant commander for both space operations and for planning,
integrating, and coordinating intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations, as
directed. In these capacities, the Commander, STRATCOM must maintain a
close relationship with the Director of the NRO to coordinate and
represent requirements in these mission areas. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the Director of the NRO on matters of shared interest
and importance.
Question. The combatant commanders, including Commander, U.S.
Northern Command.
Answer. The Commander, STRATCOM, has both supported and supporting
relationships with other combatant commanders, largely identified
within the UCP, the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum, the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan, specific command arrangement agreements,
OPLANs, and CONPLANs. In general, the Commander, STRATCOM, is the
supported combatant commander for the national strategic war plan, for
planning and conducting DOD space operations, for planning, leading,
and coordinating DOD global network operations and defense and, in
general, is a supporting combatant commander for other UCP assigned
missions. These additional functional missions and our current era of
rapid global, technological, and threat changes create opportunities to
further refine the supporting/supported command relationships between
the combatant commands. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
other combatant commanders to broaden and enhance the level and range
of these relationships.
Question. The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration.
Question. According to title 50, U.S.C., section 2402, the
Department of Energy's Under Secretary for Nuclear Security serves as
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. The
Administrator is responsible for all Department of Energy programs and
activities related to nuclear weapons, including the stockpile
stewardship program. Although the Administrator serves outside the
DOD's operational control, he does serve on the Nuclear Weapons Council
and executes duties which closely concern STRATCOM. If confirmed, I
will work closely and confer regularly with the Administrator.
Question. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency.
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) serves as the missile
defense systems engineering and development organization for the DOD.
It provides the research, development, testing, and evaluation of the
missile defense and associated systems that would be employed by
combatant commanders. The current UCP charges STRATCOM with
responsibilities for planning, integrating, and coordinating global
missile defense operations, including developing and advocating for
missile defense characteristics and capabilities desired by combatant
commanders. Given these closely aligned responsibilities, both the
Commander, STRATCOM and its Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense must continue their close working
relationship with MDA. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Director of MDA to ensure that combatant commanders' required ballistic
missile defense and warning capabilities are appropriately and
effectively represented to MDA.
Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 139, provides for a Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation, who serves as the principal advisor to
the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on operational test and
evaluation in the DOD and the principal operational test and evaluation
official within the senior management of the DOD. The Director, as
allowed by law and departmental regulations, formulates policy,
provides guidance, coordinates, reviews, monitors, and makes
recommendations regarding test and evaluation matters under his
purview. If confirmed, I will work closely with and seek the advice of
the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in assessing the
progress of command programs of interest.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander, STRATCOM?
Answer. The rapidly transforming world has empowered our potential
adversaries to leverage information and space technologies to
asymmetrically threaten U.S. interests. Our civil, military, and
commercial systems are increasingly dependent on access to cyberspace
and space-based capabilities. These dependencies make securing these
domains crucial to our national security. The largest challenge facing
STRATCOM is managing the complexities of securing these domains while
meeting the demands of the command's other mission areas.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. First, ensure we have identified any/all capability gaps
required to perform our assigned missions. Next, determine if we have
the right command relations, organizations and tools in place to
provide for rapid, integrated and collaborative planning and execution
in our assigned mission areas and for the support we provide to the
other combatant commanders.
Question. What are your priorities for the STRATCOM?
Answer. Deliver space capabilities to support joint operations
around the globe. Provide the Nation a global deterrent capability to
prevent potential adversaries from acquiring and/or using WMD.
Integrate and synchronize DOD effects to combat adversary use and
proliferation of WMD. Enable decisive global kinetic and nonkinetic
combat effects through the application and advocacy of integrated ISR
space, cyberspace, and global strike operations, information
operations, integrated missile defense, and robust command and control.

STRATEGIC THREATS

Question. In your view, what are the most serious strategic threats
facing the United States today?
Answer. I believe the most serious strategic threat to the U.S.
today is the threat of non-state terrorist groups gaining control of
and using WMD against the homeland. Attacks impacting our freedom to
operate in space and cyberspace also pose serious strategic threats.
Question. What future strategic threats should the United States
prepare for?
Answer. We face four persistent and emerging global challenges:
traditional adversaries (nation-states), unconventional non-state or
state supported actors, catastrophic use of WMD, and disruptive
capabilities to supplant our advantages in particular operational
domains. Based on these challenges, and within STRATCOM's realm of
responsibility, several significant threats present themselves: those
that affect our cyber and space systems, WMD, and ballistic and cruise
missiles. Cyberspace and space are ``global commons,'' and as such, are
vitally important to our daily way of life and the economic well-being
of our Nation and the world. We have all observed manifestations of
threats to these domains in the recent past. WMD and ballistic missiles
are threats with obviously devastating consequences.

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND MISSIONS

Question. In an overarching sense, how do you define the STRATCOM
mission?
Answer. I think the command's current mission statement captures it
well: Provide the Nation with global deterrence capabilities and
synchronized DOD effects to combat adversary WMD worldwide. Enable
decisive global kinetic and non-kinetic combat effects through the
application and advocacy of integrated ISR, space and global strike
operations, information operations, integrated missile defense and
robust command and control.
Question. STRATCOM has absorbed multiple new missions since its
creation, with the most recent additions being cooperative threat
reduction, information operations, and computer network security.
How successful has STRATCOM been at integrating these new missions
and acquiring the expertise needed to perform them?
Answer. My current understanding is that Cooperative Threat
Reduction is a Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) mission and that
STRATCOM leverages DTRA through its Director, Dr. James Tegnelia, who
is also dual-hatted as the Director, STRATCOM Center for Combating
Weapons of Mass Destruction. If confirmed, I will assess the scope of
all mission areas, integration and expertise.
Question. What organizational challenges remain at STRATCOM related
to these new missions? Specifically, what additional work, if any,
remains to be done and what expertise, if any, needs to be acquired for
these new missions?
Answer. Challenges within all mission areas are a function of
mission maturity, integration with mission partners, operational
capabilities, and the environment in which operations take place. If
confirmed, I will evaluate all mission areas and determine the need for
additional prioritization and expertise. I will also examine the roles
and missions between the STRATCOM staff and the Joint Functional
Component Commanders.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes
in the missions currently assigned to STRATCOM? If so, what changes
would you recommend?
Answer. Not at this time. As my understanding of the missions
evolves and integration matures, I will assess command mission
effectiveness and recommend changes as appropriate.
Question. Are you aware of any additional new missions that are
being contemplated for the STRATCOM?
Answer. No.

ORGANIZATION

Question. General Cartwright, the previous Commander of the
STRATCOM reorganized the Command to establish a series of joint
functional component commands that correspond to the mission areas of
the STRATCOM.
If confirmed, would you maintain or modify this structure?
Answer. I do not have any present plans to modify this structure.
As my understanding of the missions evolves, and integration matures, I
will assess command mission effectiveness and recommend changes as
appropriate.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. How do you view the role of the Commander, STRATCOM,
related to ballistic missile defense?
Answer. The UCP directs STRATCOM to plan, integrate, coordinate
global missile defense operations and support for missile defense, as
well as to develop and advocate missile defense characteristics and
capabilities for all combatant commands. If confirmed, this is an area
that I will focus on to be sure I clearly understand the command's
authorities and responsibilities as well as those of the regional
combatant commanders and the MDA.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes
in the authorities of Commander, STRATCOM, as they relate to ballistic
missile defense?
Answer. As of today I would not recommend any changes. If
confirmed, I will continue the close working relationships with fellow
combatant commanders and the MDA that have been established, and make
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense ensuring the appropriate
authorities are in place to support the defense of our Nation and our
friends and allies.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in
the assessment of the military utility of ballistic missile defenses
against short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles?
Answer. DOD regulations require STRATCOM to direct, coordinate, and
report the Military Utility Assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS). The latest version of this report was delivered to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 July 2007 and to the
Secretary of Defense on 27 July 2007. I plan to continue submitting
this report annually until such time as the BMDS architecture has
matured and all elements have been transitioned to their respective
Services.
Question. What are your views on the relationship between ballistic
missile defenses and nuclear deterrence?
Answer. Ballistic missile defense represents an essential component
of our active and passive defensive measures to support our National
Military Strategy. Missile defense systems raise our adversaries'
perceived costs associated with their continued development of
ballistic missiles. In addition, our ballistic missile defenses enhance
deterrence by helping to deny adversaries the benefits they might seek
through ballistic missile attack. As a key component of the New Triad,
ballistic missile defense enhances global deterrence by complementing
strike assets and a responsive infrastructure.
Question. From the perspective of the warfighter, do you believe
that the spiral acquisition of ballistic missile defenses through
concurrent fielding, development, testing, and operations is
appropriate?
Answer. Yes. The capability-based spiral acquisition process with
the unique authorities given to the MDA provide critical ballistic
missile defense capabilities to the Nation faster than the traditional
processes.
Question. Do you believe that the exploitation of the operational
capabilities of the ballistic missile test bed provides a militarily
useful capability and contributes to deterrence?
Answer. Yes. I believe this approach can contribute to deterrence
of a limited long-range attack from North Korea.
Question. In your view, at what stage in the deployment of missile
defense capabilities should operationally realistic testing be
conducted?
Answer. When conducting operational testing, whether before or
after fielding, by definition the testing should be as operationally
realistic as possible. How and when development testing shifts to
operational testing and then follow on operational testing (classically
done after fielding) varies from program to program. I am not informed
enough at this point to have an opinion on at what stage in the
deployment of particular missile defense capability that operationally
realistic testing should be conducted. If confirmed, I will work
closely with MDA to understand their plans and criteria for deployment
of the various capabilities they are developing.
Question. In your view, what is the threat scenario driving a
decision to place interceptors in Eastern Europe, including both timing
and location?
Answer. The threat scenario involves an Iran that threatens Europe
and the U.S. Homeland with ballistic missiles. Iran has demonstrated
ballistic missile capabilities which make the ballistic missile threat
against Europe real today and, in the future, possible against the
United States. Add that to Iran's President publicly threatening
neighboring states, and Iran's developing nuclear program and I would
conclude that this is a threat and scenario we should address sooner
rather than later. If we choose to address this threat to our allies
and ourselves with a missile defense system then the selection of the
location for the deployment of this system becomes one dependent on the
geometry of missile trajectories and desired reaction timelines. If
confirmed, I will consult with MDA to better understand their
considerations for recommending specific deployment locations.
Question. In your view, what are the opportunities to work
collaboratively with Russia to address emerging ballistic missile
threats and the means to address such threats?
Answer. I think there are both technical and diplomatic
opportunities to work with Russia for the benefit of mutual national
security concerns over the ballistic missile threat. The recent Russian
proposal to use one of their radar systems is worth exploring and
encouraging.

SPACE

Question. What is your view on the responsiveness of current space
systems to meet warfighter needs and what are the opportunities for the
Operationally Response Space program to meet military and other space
requirements?
Answer. I think the current systems we have on orbit are very
responsive to warfighter needs today. That said, we should continue to
look for ways to make them even more responsive. We should also
continue to explore the feasibility of rapidly deploying capabilities
that can augment regional combatant commander emergent needs or
replenish lost capabilities should our current systems come under
attack. We should also look for ways to more rapidly deploy
breakthrough technological developments into the space domain. Today, I
believe these are the opportunities that the Operationally Responsive
Space (ORS) program should explore.
Question. What is your view of the ability of the DOD to develop
and deploy space systems in a cost-effective and timely manner?
Answer. I believe we have this ability. It takes capable government
and industry leadership in our program offices, requirement discipline,
targeted technological investment to reduce technical risk prior to
program start, and stable funding after program start.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe might be necessary to
improve the responsiveness of current space systems?
Answer. We need to completely re-architect the way we do space
surveillance and develop space situational awareness for our
operational commanders. Today, we have a legacy Cold War architecture
that is not responsive to today's needs let alone tomorrows.
Question. In your view, what are the most important unmet
requirements for space systems?
Answer. The need for adequate surveillance and reconnaissance of
the space domain, the regional combatant commander needs for
surveillance and reconnaissance in their areas of responsibility and
the need for increased global satellite communications bandwidth to
support global military operations.
Question. What do you believe should be done to meet those
requirements, and what space programs should be accorded highest
priority?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to be an advocate for the key
enhancements required of our future space systems. I will also advocate
through my Service components for investments in science and technology
to maintain our pre-eminence well into the future. In the near term,
programs supporting improved Space Situational Awareness capabilities,
improved Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and increased bandwidth would
be a high priority.
Question. How important, in your view, is persistent surveillance?
What programs do you believe are best able to provide this capability?
Answer. Persistent surveillance is paramount to developing a better
understanding of adversary intentions and a key contributor to a
credible strategic deterrent. It is also important to the successful
conduct of combat operations at the operational and tactical level of
warfare. Shorter revisit times provided by enhanced persistence can
increase opportunities to operate inside an adversary's decision cycle.
I believe we need to continue to work on ways to better integrate our
airborne and space-based Surveillance, and Reconnaissance system so
they can be employed in a complementary manner to increase the
persistence our combatant commanders require.
Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004, Congress approved a national policy to support two space launch
vehicles, or families of launch vehicles, capable of launching national
security payloads into space. Recently the two launch vehicles were
combined into one company to provide launch services to the U.S.
Government.
What are your expectations with respect to efficiencies, and when
would you expect these efficiencies to begin to be realized?
Answer. Last year, ULA projected annual savings on the order of
$150 million per year starting in 2011. These numbers were developed as
a snapshot in time based on expected launch rates. As we have seen in
the past, these rates can both increase and decrease, however, in any
case there should be efficiencies over the two company approach.
Question. What, in your view, should the United States do in the
future, and what steps would you take if confirmed, to ensure continued
reliable access to space?
Answer. I would advocate for continued attention to and appropriate
investment in the mission assurance programs the U.S. Air Force has put
in place today. I would also advocate for increased investment in the
sustainment and modernization of our two key launch sites at Vandenberg
and Cape Canaveral. I would support efforts to explore how we might
better leverage other launch ranges such as Wallops, Kwajalein, White
Sands, and Kodiak.
Question. Do you believe that the Nation should sustain redundant
space launch capabilities?
Answer. For today, yes.
Question. How important, in your view, is the Air Force
Operationally Responsive Launch program?
Answer. If you are referring to the ORS Office as required by the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, it is a joint effort vice
an Air Force program. I believe it is important to explore the
potential of this program to improve the responsiveness of current
capabilities, to augment current capabilities, to replenish lost
capabilities or accelerate deployment of breakthrough technologies.
Question. In your view, what are the most significant challenges
that the U.S. faces in military space programs and policy?
Answer. I believe the most significant challenge is getting a firm
grasp on Space Situational Awareness, answering the ``who, what, where,
and why'' of everything in orbit in a timely manner. We must also have
adequate plans and capabilities in place to ensure the current space
capabilities we provide to the joint fight can be either defended or
delivered by alternate means to deter our adversaries from attempting
to deny our freedom to operate in space.
Question. Training of U.S. military personnel to understand and to
incorporate space assets into all aspects of operations is critically
important to future success.
How would you address this challenge including ensuring that blue
force training includes space operations?
Answer. This has been a major focus area for me in my current
command. We are currently looking at the standards for how we assess,
train and develop our airmen in the space career fields and also how we
as an Air Force deliver the right level of education for all airmen at
our basic, intermediate and advanced schools. If confirmed, I will
advocate for increased support to the National Security Space Institute
and ask for an examination of our course curriculum in our joint
schools to see if we are conducting the right level of space education
in those institutions. I will also advocate for the inclusion of space
scenarios in our joint exercises to heighten awareness of the necessity
to include consideration of this domain in future conflicts.
Question. What role does the National Security Space Institute play
in the training process, and how could their training programs be
improved?
Answer. The National Security Space Institute is the DOD's premier
focal point for space education and training. It compliments existing
space education programs provided by the services by teaching joint
policy and doctrine, acquisition and integration, and preparing
warfighters for joint military operations. While not a joint
organization, it is operating in a joint manner. Continued efforts
should be made to attract space cadre from all services and coalition
partners, to establish firm community educational requirements and to
provide stable funding to support these requirements.
Question. What, in your view, are the priorities for improving
space situational awareness?
Answer. We must be able to improve our ability to rapidly detect
and track objects in orbit to evolve from cataloguing to understanding
and anticipating the purpose of each object in orbit. While sustaining
our current systems, we need to simultaneously improve our sensor
coverage of the space domain with a mix of ground and space-based
sensors while improving the data transmission architecture and
equipment necessary to fuse the data we collect into useable
information for the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Commander. At
the same time, we need to invest in the appropriate command and control
equipment to allow the JSpOC Commander to fulfill his mission of
supporting STRATCOM and the other regional and functional combatant
commanders. Additionally, we must continue to foster collaborative data
sharing with our allies and their systems to enhance global coverage.
Question. What programs and policies, in your view, should be
changed or added to ensure adequate space situational awareness?
Answer. I think as a government, we should examine the potential
utility of a code of conduct or ``rules of the road'' for the space
domain, thus providing a common understanding of acceptable or
unacceptable behavior within a medium shared by all nations.
Question. In 2002, the Executive Agent for Space was established
and the responsibility for space programs was consolidated under the
Executive Agent, the Under Secretary of the Air Force. This
consolidation was later undone, and today the responsibility for space
program management is spread among three positions.
What are your views on how military and national security space
should and could be integrated?
Answer. In the area of operational planning and execution, I
believe it is an imperative that military and national security space
be integrated. STRATCOM created the JSpOC to ensure a more focused
global command and control of DOD space operations. Their and the NRO's
efforts to better integrate the JSpOC and NRO operations center and to
share data are key to the successful conduct of space operations in any
future conflict.
Question. In your view, what role should the National Security
Space Office (NSSO) play in integrating military and national security
space?
Answer. My view is that the NSSO should assess existing national
security space acquisition strategies, plans, and programs in order to
advise national security space decisionmakers on matters affecting the
acquisition of national security space capabilities.
Question. In your view, should the role of the NSSO be modified or
expanded in any way?
Answer. Given the changes in various authorities in the department
over the past year, I believe NSSO roles and functions should be re-
examined by the Executive Agent for Space.

CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. In your view, how serious is the vulnerability of our
Nation and deployed military forces to the cruise missile threat?
Answer. Cruise missiles represent a credible threat to the
Homeland, deployed forces and allies. The preponderance of the cruise
missiles under development can carry nuclear, biological, or chemical
warheads and sub-munitions. Thus, prudent defense planning, active
defense design, and command and control are required to mitigate the
threat.
Question. What role do you believe STRATCOM should play in the
cruise missile defense of our Nation?
Answer. The STRATCOM role in the cruise missile defense of our
Nation should align with our current mission to integrate global
missile defense. By leveraging the Command's unique ballistic missile
defense advocacy and requirements role, similar cruise missile defense
capability requirements could be smoothly integrated into existing
processes.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Question. Do you believe that there is a minimum number of
strategic nuclear weapons needed to sustain a viable deterrent posture?
Answer. In today's world and for the foreseeable future, yes. The
size and composition of our nuclear forces should be determined by
taking into account a broad range of political-military considerations,
of which deterrence is but one factor. I fully support the President's
commitment to reduce the nuclear stockpile to the lowest level possible
consistent with our national security needs.
Question. In your view, is there a relationship between U.S.
nuclear deterrence policy and nonproliferation policy? If so, please
describe the relationship.
Answer. Yes, I believe there is a relationship. A credible U.S.
nuclear deterrent, in concert with treaty and alliance structures,
assures allies that the U.S. will deter, prevent, or limit damage to
them from adversary attacks. This removes incentives for many of them
to develop and deploy their own nuclear forces thereby encouraging
nonproliferation.
Question. There has been much discussion in the press and elsewhere
about the need for a new discussion on nuclear weapons policy. Former
Senator Sam Nunn, and former Secretaries of State George Shultz and
Henry Kissinger, and former Secretary of Defense William Perry, in a
joint editorial in January, 2007, called for the complete elimination
of nuclear weapons. If confirmed as Commander of the STRATCOM, you
would be involved in such discussions and in shaping the next U.S.
Nuclear Posture Review.
In your view, what are the key questions on which future analyses
of U.S. nuclear policy should focus?
Answer. U.S. nuclear weapons policy is the purview of the Secretary
of Defense. If confirmed, I will provide a combatant commander's
insights regarding the nuclear capability requirements necessary to
perform the missions assigned to U.S. nuclear forces under my command
by the Secretary of Defense. Some of the key questions I would think
should be examined for any future analyses include: Are nuclear weapons
still key to the national security interests of the U.S. and STRATCOM's
specific strategic deterrence mission? If not, what alternative
capabilities exist or should be fielded to meet those needs? If so,
what levels of force do we need to sustain and how should we proceed to
properly organize, train and equip them for the future?

RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

Question. The proposal for a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)
included in the fiscal year 2008 budget request seeks authority for an
early phase in the nuclear weapons development process. Three of the
relevant congressional committees have recommended that the RRW proceed
with phase 2A development only, the fourth committee recommended no
funding for the RRW. Work in phase 2A would, if eventually approved and
funded, begin to provide some understanding as to whether RRW could
meet the goals established.
One of the goals is that it would be deployed without nuclear
weapons testing. Do you support this goal?
Answer. Yes.
Question. One of the goals is that it would enable additional
reductions to the overall stockpile. Do you support this goal?
Answer. Yes.
Question. One of the goals is that it would increase the safety and
security of the weapons themselves. Do you support this goal?
Answer. Yes.

HARD AND DEEPLY BURIED TARGETS

Question. In your view, how adequate are current efforts to address
hard and deeply buried targets?
Answer. In my current position, I am not well enough informed as to
the adequacy of current efforts. If confirmed, I will examine our
current efforts. That said, it is clear that potential adversaries
protect their most highly valued assets in hardened and deeply buried
facilities. Deterrence requires that we possess a full spectrum of
capabilities to hold these highly valued assets at risk, whether
kinetically or nonkinetically. I support ongoing efforts to deliver the
robust suite of intelligence, planning and strike capabilities
necessary to enable full dimensional defeat of these facilities and the
high value assets they protect.
Question. If confirmed, would you support or recommend steps to
improve the management or coordination of development efforts to hold
at risk hard and deeply buried targets?
Answer. If confirmed, I would fully support an integrated
examination of the suite of capabilities necessary to enable full
dimensional defeat of these facilities and the high value assets they
protect. I believe an integrated approach would better direct
development efforts across the broad spectrum of potential military
solutions--kinetic and nonkinetic.
Question. Do you support development of new or modified nuclear
weapons to hold at risk hard or deeply buried targets?
Answer. The DOD must first define the capability required to hold
such targets at risk and then evaluate all potential material and non-
material solutions to engage them. I do not believe nuclear weapons
should be eliminated from consideration as a possible solution.

ARMS CONTROL

Question. In the last several years, the United States ratified the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty with Russia and withdrew from the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
What is your view of the significance of strategic arms control
agreements in the current environment?
Answer. I believe agreements must be verifiable to the satisfaction
of the signatories or they are of little value. Also, we need to keep
in mind that as weapons technologies proliferate around the world,
predicting which nations will come to possess advanced weaponry is
becoming increasingly difficult. In light of this, I think we should
ensure that future treaties are constructed to allow us to protect our
national interests in an evolving international environment.
Question. If confirmed, what arms control initiatives, or other
forms of cooperative initiatives related to armaments, if any, would
you recommend?
Answer. Arms control initiatives are in the purview of the policy
makers in the Department of State, DOD and National Security Council.
In order to provide my best military advice to those bodies, I would
first review our current arms control programs to better understand
where we are today and what we might do better with new initiatives.
Question. In your view, should the U.S. continue to abide by a
moratorium on nuclear weapons testing?
Answer. Given my current understanding of the health and readiness
of our forces, I would say yes for now. If confirmed, this is an area
that I will delve further into to better understand plans for
sustaining the health and readiness of our systems and work closely
with the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security
Administration, and our national laboratories.
Question. In your view, what elements of the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty would be beneficial to retain if the treaty is allowed
to expire in 2009?
Answer. It is my understanding that official U.S. negotiating
representatives are now discussing with their Russian counterparts an
agreement that would continue selected transparency and confidence
building measures that would continue to benefit both nations, and that
these elements would build on the openness both nations have
demonstrated in our mutual willingness to convince each other of our
sincerity to limit our strategic nuclear systems.

GLOBAL STRIKE

Question. Are you satisfied with service efforts to provide
appropriate weapon systems and platforms to support the STRATCOM global
strike mission, including conventional, prompt global strike?
Answer. Speaking from an Air Force perspective, I feel we are
headed down a path to develop the technologies that would enable our
participation in this mission. If confirmed, I will look across all
Services efforts and work closely with them to fill this capability
need.
Question. What strike weapon systems and platforms do you believe
are most important in this regard?
Answer. The Air Force-led Prompt Global Strike Analysis of
Alternatives will be complete in the spring of 2008. This analysis is
exploring military concepts proposed by the Services and industry to
identify the concepts best suited to close the prompt global strike
capability gap. I look forward to seeing the results of this analysis.

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

Question. What is your view of how well the Stockpile Stewardship
Program is proceeding towards its goal of being able to continuously
assess and annually certify the U.S. enduring nuclear weapons stockpile
as safe, secure, and reliable, without the need for underground nuclear
testing?
Answer. I do not have a view at this time. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the National Nuclear Security Administration to
better understand details of their Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Question. In your opinion, what are the biggest challenges for the
Stockpile Stewardship Program?
Answer. I have not formed an opinion on the challenges of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with the National Nuclear Security Administration to understand their
specific challenges.

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COOPERATION PROGRAMS

Question. The STRATCOM has a long history of conducting military-
to-military exchanges and discussions with its counterparts in Russia.
If confirmed, would you continue or expand this dialogue?
Answer. I would work to expand this dialogue.
Question. Would you expand your military-to-military programs to
include other countries, such as China?
Answer. Yes. That would be my advice to the Secretary of Defense.

STRATEGIC FORCES AND MISSIONS

Question. During the Cold War, the primary mission for strategic
forces was to deter the Soviet Union from using its nuclear weapons
and, more broadly, to contribute to U.S. efforts to contain the Soviet
Union. Strategic forces were therefore synonymous with nuclear forces.
This isn't the case today, as the wide-ranging missions assigned to
STRATCOM make clear.
What, in your view, is the primary mission for U.S. Strategic
Forces today and in the future?
Answer. As your question implies, our strategic forces are no
longer synonymous with our nuclear forces alone. Consistent with the
missions assigned to STRATCOM, I see our strategic forces as including
our Global Strike forces (nuclear and conventional), space forces,
cyber and information operations forces, global ISR forces, and
ballistic defense forces.
These forces serve to deter, dissuade and if necessary defeat
adversary attacks on the U.S. or its allies.
Question. Should we think differently about the use of strategic
forces today?
Answer. Yes, because the scope of those forces and their
contributions to our security have expanded significantly since the
Cold War.
Question. Given the mission for strategic forces, as you define it,
what capabilities are still needed to carry out that mission?
Answer. We require survivable, responsive Global Strike forces that
are second to none, space forces that ensure we have assured access to
space and the space capabilities that enable all U.S. military forces
to fight and win when and where necessary, cyber and information
operations forces that can protect our Nation's access to cyberspace
and can deny potential adversaries the ability to asymmetrically
undermine our military capabilities; global ISR forces that can provide
our military forces information about any adversary necessary to deter
or defeat them at acceptable cost; and integrated ballistic missile
defense forces that help dissuade potential adversaries from acquiring
ballistic missiles, deter adversaries from launching ballistic missile
attacks on the U.S. or its allies, and limit the damage adversary
ballistic missile attacks can inflict.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY AND HANDLING

Question. If confirmed, will you commit to working with the Nuclear
Weapons Council to undertake a review of nuclear security and handling
practices and procedures?
Answer. Yes.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

TREATMENT OF CYBER ATTACK AS A LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUE

1. Senator Reed. General Chilton, prior to September 11, 2001, the
United States Government, to a significant degree, treated the threat
of terrorism inside the United States more as a law enforcement problem
than as a national security threat that had to be stopped before it
occurred. Do you believe that we are doing the same thing with the
cyberspace threat? Is that a problem?
General Chilton. Current laws treat attacks from within the
continental United States (CONUS) against the government or its
citizens as a law enforcement problem, while prevention of attack upon
the homeland from external threats has historically been the
responsibility of the Department of Defense (DOD). However, the
cyberspace threat we face today is unconstrained by geopolitical
boundaries and norms. The speed of a cyber attack requires a proactive
approach to limit its effectiveness.
A cyber attack could appear to originate inside CONUS but actually
begin from overseas. Getting attack attribution right in minimum time
is instrumental in developing an appropriate response. Whether
considered a law enforcement or national security issue, the lead
department or agency designated to respond must be the best equipped
and have the authorities to combat the immediate threat.

2. Senator Reed. General Chilton, the lead agencies in defending
non-DOD information systems against attack are civil and the posture is
one of reacting to developing threats with what could be called passive
defensive measures. Do you believe that there should be a different
approach, and if so, how would you characterize it?
General Chilton. Response to the cyber attack threat directed at
our Nation requires a balanced set of capabilities to ensure DOD,
government and the civilian sectors are adequately protected. Private
and governmental organizations charged with defending the .org, .com,
.gov, and .mil domains continue to become increasingly vulnerable to
exploitation and attack by our adversaries. The characteristics
required to deter and defend these cyberspace domains are a balanced
set of capabilities that are agile, tailorable, persistent, and
scaleable with the necessary tools to react within the timelines and
proper authorities that deny the adversary his intended objective.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor

AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND PROVISIONAL

3. Senator Pryor. General Chilton, on September 12, 2007, the
Secretary of the Air Force announced the activation of the Air Force
Cyber Command Provisional (AFCYBER(P)) at Barksdale Air Force Base, LA.
The cyber domain is characterized by use of electronics and the
electromagnetic spectrum, including all energy such as radio waves,
microwaves, and directed energy. Considered to be an operational
domain, what are the planned roles and missions of AFCYBER(P)?
General Chilton. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the
Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying,
training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the U.S. Air Force
(USAF). As a combatant commander, it would be inappropriate for me to
answer questions within the Secretary's purview. I look forward to
partnering with the Air Force as it continues to develop Air Force
Cyber Command and the integration of its roles and missions with both
United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and DOD information
operations activities.

4. Senator Pryor. General Chilton, in an effort to establish a
permanent Major Command (MAJCOM), what criteria will the Air Force be
considering for the location of its headquarters?
General Chilton. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the
Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying,
training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant
commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within
the Secretary's purview.

5. Senator Pryor. General Chilton, what is the timetable for this
decision?
General Chilton. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the
Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying,
training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant
commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within
the Secretary's purview.

6. Senator Pryor. General Chilton, how many tenant units will there
be? What equipment is needed?
General Chilton. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the
Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying,
training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant
commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within
the Secretary's purview.

7. Senator Pryor. General Chilton, what kind of funding will be
required? How big will the command be?
General Chilton. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the
Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying,
training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant
commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within
the Secretary's purview.

8. Senator Pryor. General Chilton, does the Air Force have an
adequate pool of personnel specially trained to qualify as operators in
this command?
General Chilton. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the
Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying,
training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant
commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within
the Secretary's purview.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner

AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND

9. Senator Warner. General Chilton, the Air Force is currently in
the process of standing up the Air Force Cyber Command that will be
tasked with helping defend America's interests in cyber space. How do
you anticipate STRATCOM working with a new Air Force Cyber Command and
the other Services with respect to cyber warfare? What relationships do
you intend to foster given the mission STRATCOM shares with Air Force
Cyber Command?
General Chilton. As the combatant command charged with integrating
and coordinating DOD Information Operations, including computer network
defense, I anticipate working closely with the Secretary of the Air
Force as he develops this new Command, and with United States Joint
Forces command as the provider of forces. STRATCOM is organized with
joint functional components for its various mission areas. Cyberspace
spans Joint Functional Component Command-Network Warfare, Joint Task
Force-Global Network Operations, and Joint Information Operations
Warfare Command. I intend to foster mutually supportive relationships
as we explore how Air Force Cyber Command best fits as a provider of
warfighting assets into our overall Department mission.

10. Senator Warner. General Chilton, as the Air Force looks for a
permanent location for Cyber Command, in your view what characteristics
will the host region need to provide in order to successfully support
Cyber Command?
General Chilton. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the
Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying,
training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant
commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within
the Secretary's purview.

11. Senator Warner. General Chilton, would you believe that
collocation near existing DOD facilities, a well educated workforce
familiar with DOD, and a variety of advanced research institutions
would be beneficial for a Cyber Command location?
General Chilton. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the
Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying,
training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant
commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within
the Secretary's purview.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

ISR CAPABILITIES

12. Senator Collins. General Chilton, you mention that the largest
challenge facing STRATCOM is managing the complexities of securing
cyberspace and space-based capabilities, while meeting the demands of
the other combatant commands. A July Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report states that combatant commanders carrying out ongoing
operations rank the need for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as high on their priority lists. DOD
is investing in many ISR systems, to meet the growing demand for ISR
assets in theater. Are we making the right ISR investments to meet the
warfighter needs?
General Chilton. Yes, we are making the right ISR investments.
STRATCOM is a member of all the relevant forums and as the combatant
commander's advocate for ISR, we ensure that the combatant commander's
ISR requirements are captured, articulated and considered when shaping
the budget. Second, through our component, JFCC-ISR, we receive the
day-to-day combatant command's ISR requirements. We recommend the
allocation of DOD ISR capabilities and ensure that they are seamlessly
integrated and synchronized with those of the Intelligence Community to
support the joint warfighter's priority missions and needs.

[The nomination reference of Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
July 25, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Air Force to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of
importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General.

Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF
Gen. Kevin P. Chilton is Commander, Air Force Space Command,
Peterson Air Force Base, CO. He is responsible for the development,
acquisition and operation of the Air Force's space and missile systems.
The general oversees a global network of satellite command and control,
communications, missile warning and launch facilities, and ensures the
combat readiness of America's intercontinental ballistic missile force.
He leads more than 39,700 space professionals who provide combat forces
and capabilities to North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S.
Strategic Command.
General Chilton is a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Air Force
Academy Class of 1976. A Guggenheim Fellow, he completed a Master of
Science degree in mechanical engineering at Columbia University. He
flew operational assignments in the RF-4C and F-15 and is a graduate of
the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School. General Chilton conducted weapons
testing in various models of the F-4 and F-15 prior to joining the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1987. At NASA he flew
on three space shuttle missions and served as the Deputy Program
Manager for Operations for the International Space Station Program. The
general has served on the Air Force Space Command Staff, the Joint
Staff, the Air Staff, and commanded the 9th Reconnaissance Wing. Prior
to assuming his current position, he was Commander, 8th Air Force, and
Joint Functional Component Commander for Space and Global Strike, U.S.
Strategic Command.

Education:
1976 - Distinguished graduate, Bachelor of Science degree in
engineering science, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO.
1977 - Master of Science degree in mechanical engineering, Columbia
University, New York, NY.
1982 - Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air
Force Base, AL.
1984 - Distinguished graduate, U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School,
Edwards Air Force Base, CA.
1985 - Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence 2001 Air
War College, by correspondence.

Assignments:
May 1977-May 1978, student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams
Air Force Base, AZ.
May 1978-August 1978, student, RF-4C Replacement Training Unit,
Shaw Air Force Base, SC.
August 1978-November 1980, RF-4C pilot and instructor pilot, 15th
Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Kadena Air Base, Japan.
November 1980-August 1982, F-15C pilot, 67th Tactical Fighter
Squadron, Kadena Air Base, Japan.
August 1982-October 1982, student, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell
Air Force Base, AL.
October 1982-December 1983, F-15A pilot, instructor pilot and
flight commander, 9th and 7th tactical fighter squadrons, Holloman Air
Force Base, NM.
January 1984-December 1984, student, U.S. Air Force Test Pilot
School, Edwards Air Force Base, CA.
January 1985-August 1987, test pilot and operations officer, 3247th
Test Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, FL.
August 1987-August 1988, astronaut candidate, NASA, Johnson Space
Center, Houston, TX.
August 1988-May 1996, astronaut, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX.
May 1996-August 1998, Deputy Program Manager of Operations,
International Space Station Program, NASA, Johnson Space Center,
Houston, TX.
August 1998-May 1999, Deputy Director of Operations, Headquarters
Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO.
May 1999-September 2000, Commander, 9th Reconnaissance Wing, Beale
Air Force Base, CA.
October 2000-April 2002, Director of Politico-Military Affairs,
Asia-Pacific and Middle East, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC.
April 2002-August 2004, Director of Programs, Deputy Chief of Staff
for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC.
August 2004-August 2005, Acting Assistant Vice Chief of Staff,
Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC.
August 2005-June 2006, Commander, 8th Air Force, Barksdale Air
Force Base, LA, and Joint Functional Component Commander for Space and
Global Strike, U.S. Strategic Command, Mutt Air Force Base, NE.
June 2006-present, Commander, Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air
Force Base, CO.

Flight information:
Rating: Command astronaut pilot.
Flight hours: More than 5,000.
Aircraft flown: F-4C/D/E, F-15A/B/C/D, OV-104A and OV-105A (space
shuttles Atlantis and Endeavor), RF-4C, T-38, U-2 and VC-11, B-52H

Major awards and decorations:
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
Distinguished Flying Cross
Defense Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Commendation Medal
NASA Space Flight Medal with two oak leaf clusters
NASA Exceptional Service Medal
NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal

Other achievements:
Guggenheim Fellow
Commander's Trophy, Undergraduate Pilot Training
1982 Secretary of the Air Force Leadership Award
1984 Liethen-Tittle Award for top graduate, U.S. Air Force Test
Pilot School

Effective dates of promotion:
Second Lieutenant - June 2, 1976
First Lieutenant - June 2, 1978
Captain - June 2, 1980
Major - May 2, 1985
Lieutenant Colonel - June 2, 1989
Colonel - Jan. 1, 1993
Brigadier General - May 1, 1999
Major General - April 1, 2002
Lieutenant General - Aug. 9, 2005
General - June 26, 2006
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. Kevin P.
Chilton, USAF, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Kevin P. Chilton.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, United States Strategic Command.

3. Date of nomination:
July 19, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
Nov. 3, 1954; Los Angeles, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Catherine A. Chilton (maiden name: Dreyer).

7. Names and ages of children:
Madison, 17; Mary, 15; Megan, 13; and Morgan, 11.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Air Force Academy Association of Graduates.
Order of Daedaliens.
Air Force Association.
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 27, 2007,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on September 28, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis,
USMC, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The Department has made great progress in the joint arena
since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols. The changes to the Joint
Officer Management process enacted by the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2007 have corrected longstanding shortfalls. I
don't believe there is a need for any major modifications to the act,
however, given the current world environment and the challenges we face
we need to build on the successes of Goldwater-Nichols. There is room,
in my opinion, for additional refinement.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. Congress should consider means to increase integration of
all U.S. Government agencies in appropriate training and force
readiness environments in order to build the foundation for more
effective ``whole of government'' approaches to crisis prevention or
crisis resolution.
Continue Departmental efforts, such as Capability Portfolio
Management, to integrate acquisition and resource allocation processes
in meeting joint capability requirements. In other words, Services
develop ``Service-Specific'' systems and capabilities after joint
review and authorization to ensure joint/interoperability issues are
addressed.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)?
Answer. The Unified Command Plan focuses the command on two main
missions: 1) providing conventional forces trained to operate in a
joint, interagency, and multinational environment, and 2) transforming
the U.S. military's forces to meet the security challenges of the 21st
century. The Commander, JFCOM, serves as the chief advocate for
jointness and interoperability, championing the joint warfighting
requirements of the other combatant commanders. As such, he is
responsible for five major areas:

Serves as the Primary Joint Force Provider. In this
role, JFCOM has combatant command over a large portion of the
conventional forces of the U.S. Armed Forces and provides them
as trained and ready joint-capable forces to the other
combatant commanders when directed by the Secretary of Defense.
Functionally responsible for leading joint concept
development and experimentation (CDE) and coordinating the CDE
efforts of the Services, combatant commands, and defense
agencies to support joint interoperability and future joint
warfighting capabilities. The Commander of JFCOM is also tasked
with leading the development, exploration, and integration of
new joint warfighting concepts and serving as the DOD Executive
Agent for joint warfighting experimentation.
Serves as the lead Joint Force Integrator, responsible
for recommending changes in doctrine, organization, training,
material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
to integrate Service, defense agency, interagency and
multinational capabilities. A recently assigned responsibility
in this area is that of Joint Command and Control Capability
Portfolio Manager--a DOD effort to improve interoperability,
minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize
capability effectiveness.
Serves as the lead agent for Joint Force Training.
This effort is focused at the operational level with an
emphasis on Joint Task Force Commanders and their staffs and
the ability of U.S. forces to operate as part of a joint and
multinational force. Additionally, JFCOM is responsible for
leading the development of a distributed joint training
architecture and developing joint training standards.
Leads the collaborative development of joint readiness
standards for Joint Task Force Headquarters staffs, functional
component headquarters staffs, and headquarters designated as
potential joint headquarters or portion thereof, for
recommendation to the Chairman.

In addition to these Unified Command Plans (UCPs) assigned
missions, JFCOM has been assigned as the executive agent within the
Department of Defense (DOD) for the following mission areas:

Joint Urban Operations
Personnel Recovery
Joint Deployment Process Owner
Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct
Joint Experimentation

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT)?
Answer. The SACT is responsible to the military committee for
overall recommendations on transformation. He leads transformation of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military structures,
capabilities and doctrines, including those for the defense against
terrorism in order to improve the military effectiveness and
interoperability of the Alliance. He cooperates with the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR) on integrating and synchronizing
transformation efforts with operational activities and elements. He
also promotes improvements to the capabilities of NATO forces made
available by nations, especially for Combined Joint Task Forces and
NATO Response Force Operations. Specifically, SACT:

Leads, at the Strategic Commander level, the NATO
Defense Planning Process, including the development of the
Defense requirements review.
Develops Strategic Commander Force proposals within
the Force Planning Process and conducts Strategic Commander
assessment of national contributions to the NATO force
structure in coordination with national military authorities.
Leads, at the Strategic Commander level, the
development of NATO Joint and Combined concepts, policy and
doctrine, as well as Partnership for Peace military concepts in
cooperation with SACEUR.
Leads, at the Strategic Commander level, the
development of future Communications Information Systems
strategy, concepts, capabilities and architecture.
Leads, for military matters in NATO, partnership for
Peace and other non-NATO joint individual education and
training, and associated policy.
Assists SACEUR in the education and training of
functional commands and staff elements that plan for and
conduct operations with multinational and joint forces over the
full range of Alliance military missions.

Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of serving in
both of these roles simultaneously?
Answer. Both Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and JFCOM strive
for interoperable and interdependent forces. These efforts revolve
around the mutually supporting themes of operational lessons learned,
combined/joint training, interoperability, and CDE. It makes great
sense for one person to wear these two hats since these are parallel
missions--both are trying to achieve essentially the same goal. If
confirmed, I will continue to leverage the joint capabilities resident
in JFCOM with the transformation goals of NATO, as well as integrating
NATO processes and personnel into JFCOM experimentation and training
efforts--this is a win/win situation.
The significant challenge will be one of time management. NATO
conducts its business in formal high-level forums which require the
presence of both Strategic Commanders--both of whom are dual hated with
U.S. and NATO responsibilities. The vast majority of these meetings are
conducted in Europe. Maintaining the proper balance between JFCOM and
ACT duties will require my close attention, but it is a challenge that,
if confirmed, I am ready to meet.

BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I'm very fortunate to have had the opportunity to not only
serve over 35 years in uniform, but also to have commanded troops from
the platoon level up to my present assignment as Commander of the 1st
Marine Expeditionary Force, which is also the Marine component for U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM). Perhaps one of my most important
opportunities was leading the Marine Corps' Combat Development Command,
where I was able to help shape much of the current doctrine and
training that the Marine Corps has since incorporated. It was also
there that I was able to co-author, with General Petraeus, the new Army
and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual. Over the years, I've had
what I believe is considerable experience in joint operations and
working with coalition forces. In every assignment I was fortunate to
serve for, and lead, brave, innovative, and hardworking people, both in
uniform as well as senior civilian leadership. Above all, I have tried
to learn, mentor, and lead at every chance. All of this has prepared me
for this opportunity.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander,
JFCOM, and SACT, to the following:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Commander, JFCOM performs his duties under the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and is
directly responsible to him to carry out its assigned missions.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the
Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional
areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and
oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type
memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These
instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD components. In
carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President
and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to
the commanders and the unified and specified commands are transmitted
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense
for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, Intelligence Oversight, and
for Networks and Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of
Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In
carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President
and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to
commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that
described above for the Under Secretaries.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman is established by title 10 as the principal
military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The
Chairman serves as an advisor and is not, according to law, in the
operational chain of command, which runs from the President through the
Secretary to each combatant commander. The President directs
communications between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the
combatant commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This keeps the Chairman fully involved and allows the Chairman to
execute his other legal responsibilities. A key responsibility of the
Chairman is to speak for the combatant commanders, especially on
operational requirements. If confirmed as Commander, JFCOM, I will keep
the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters
for which I am personally accountable.
Question. Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
Answer. SACEUR is one of two co-equal Strategic Commanders within
NATO's command structure. As NATO's other Strategic Commander, the SACT
supports SACEUR in the education and training of functional commands
and staff elements that plan for and conduct operations, with
multinational and joint forces, over the full range of Alliance
military missions authorized by the North Atlantic Council/Defense
Planning Committee. ACT also conducts and evaluates training and
exercises of forces and headquarters, in coordination with and on
behalf of SACEUR. Lastly, ACT supports SACEUR in joint analysis,
evaluations and assessments of NATO-led operations and forces,
including NATO Response Force certification.
Question. The North Atlantic Council/Defense Planning Committee,
the NATO Chiefs of Defense and Defense Ministers, and the military
committee of NATO.
Answer. As one of two co-equal Strategic Commanders within NATO's
command structure, the SACT provides military advice to the military
committee, North Atlantic Council and Defense Planning Committee on
matters pertaining to transformation, as required. The Commander may
make recommendations directly to the military committee, the
International Military Staff, national Chiefs of Defense, Defense
Ministers and Heads of State and Government on transformational matters
affecting the capability improvement, interoperability, efficiency, and
sustainability of forces designated for NATO.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The secretaries of the military departments are responsible
for the administration and support of the forces assigned to the
combatant commands. The Commander, JFCOM, coordinates closely with the
secretaries to ensure the requirements to organize, train, and equip
forces assigned to JFCOM are met. Close coordination with each Service
Secretary is required to ensure that there is no infringement upon the
lawful responsibilities held by a Service Secretary.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and
equip their respective forces. No combatant commander can ensure
preparedness of his assigned forces without the full cooperation and
support of the Service Chiefs. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military
advice. The experience and judgment of the Service Chiefs provide an
invaluable resource for every combatant commander. If confirmed as
Commander, JFCOM, I will continue the close bond between the command,
the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard in order
to fully utilize their service capabilities, and to effectively employ
those capabilities as required to execute the missions of JFCOM.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. In general, JFCOM is a supporting command--its job is to
make the other combatant commands more successful. If confirmed, I will
continue the close relationships with other combatant commanders to
increase the effectiveness we've created, and continue to build mutual
support. The joint capabilities required by combatant commanders to
perform their missions--today and in the future--forms a large basis of
JFCOM's mission. Today's security environment dictates that JFCOM work
very closely with the other combatant commanders to execute our
national military strategy.
Question. The commanders of each of the Service's training and
doctrine commands
Answer. Tasked by the UCP as the executive agent for joint
warfighting experimentation, a strong relationship exists between JFCOM
and the Services' training and doctrine commands. General Smith has
maintained a close working relationship with these organizations and
their commanders via a monthly component commanders meeting, and if
confirmed, I will continue these relationships.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems
confronting the Commander, JFCOM?
Answer. From my present view outside the wire I would postulate
that the most significant challenge is meeting the combatant
commander's force sourcing requirements. The task of providing trained
and ready joint forces, on a predictable and stable schedule that
minimizes stress on families while providing adequate time for
training, will continue to be a challenge for anyone with the Global
Force Provider mission.
Second is the continuing challenge of developing capabilities that
are truly born joint. First and foremost is institutionalizing Joint
Command and Control. The assignment of JFCOM as the Joint Command and
Control Capability Portfolio manager appears to be a step in the right
direction.
Finally, continuing the overarching transformation of our joint
force while prosecuting current campaigns will be an ongoing challenge
as the strategic environment continues to evolve.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems
confronting the SACT?
Answer. My sense is training forces for deployment to Afghanistan
and other NATO operations is the most immediate challenge.
Incorporating and institutionalizing lessons learned in training,
capability development, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures
has historically been a problem for any organization. I expect some
challenges in this area. Transforming NATO military capabilities,
especially those of the newest NATO members, will be a complex,
expensive, and time consuming process. Preparing and cultivating
partner countries for possible accession into NATO I believe will be a
very delicate and complicated endeavor. Ensuring that the NATO Response
Force (NRF) is well resourced and remains a vehicle for experimentation
and transformation is an extremely important aspect of NATO's global
warfighting capability that I believe will require my attention.
Finally, working to build bridges and capabilities with Partnership for
Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative (ICI) countries will be an important aspect of my
responsibilities.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing them?
Answer. Since I am not confirmed yet, I have not had great insight
into the internal workings of either commands, so I cannot give as
complete an answer as I would like. Certainly, if confirmed, I will
continue to work with the other combatant commanders, as well as the
Services through JFCOM's component commands, to shape JFCOM's ability
to provide the most logical and effective sourcing solutions for the
joint warfighter. With respect to developing joint solutions while
programs are still on the drawing board, I would like to further expand
on the Capabilities' Portfolio Management efforts that are ongoing, and
look beyond just Joint Command and Control to evaluate other areas that
would be ripe for this style of management. Finally, I will continue to
leverage the training and experimentation efforts that the combatant
commanders and joint warfighters want and need, in order to take a
holistic approach to shaping combat development capabilities that our
forces involved in the current fight need in future years.

JOINT FORCE PROVIDER

Question. What is your understanding of the role of JFCOM as the
joint force provider to meet combatant commander requirements?
Answer. As the conventional Joint Force Provider (JFP), it is
JFCOM's goal to source all validated rotational and emergent force
requirements in support of the combatant commanders. To accomplish
this, JFCOM provides DOD leadership with the recommended force
allocation solutions to make proactive, risk-informed force management
and allocation decisions. JFCOM works to source these force
requirements through collaborating with JFCOM Service components, each
of the Services (both Active-Duty and Reserve) and combatant commands'
to meet combatant commands' force requirements.
Question. From your experience as Marine Forces Commander, CENTCOM,
what are your observations and evaluation of the performance of Joint
Forces Command in meeting your combatant command's force requirements?
Answer. Overall, JFCOM along with the other stakeholders in the
Global Force Management process are doing an outstanding job in
supporting the combatant commands' force requirements. But demand is
currently outpacing force supply in specific capability areas and the
current systems are not perfect. Problems remain: force stress,
persistent shortfalls use of in-lieu-of forces, et cetera. The cunning
enemy that we face is forcing us to adapt our force and staffing
requirements. At times, the force providing processes have not proven
agile enough to keep up with the pace of change and unplanned
requirements. This is the source of some frustration. To their credit,
however, JFCOM and other stakeholders in the Global Force Management
Process are, reviewing their processes: determining how to streamline
procedures and increase visibility in order to increase responsiveness
to combatant command force requirements.
Question. In this regard, include your observations and evaluations
of the use of `in lieu of' forces to meet theater requirements.
Answer. In my judgment, in-lieu-of (ILO) forces provide effective
support to meet theater requirements. ILO solutions are, by definition,
substitutions of force when the standard force is unavailable. As such,
ILO solutions provide capability to meet theater requirements that
would otherwise go unfilled. Of critical importance as ILO forces are
continued to be employed is ensuring that they have received the proper
training and equipment in order to enable their effectiveness.
Question. Based on your evaluation, what in your view are the most
urgent challenges requiring JFCOM attention and how would you propose
to meet these challenges or improve the command's efficiency or
effectiveness as the joint force provider to our combatant commands?
Answer. The most urgent challenge impacting JFCOM's effectiveness
as Primary Joint Force Provider is access to high quality force
readiness and force availability data. JFCOM is teaming with the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, Service
headquarters and technical organizations Defense Information Systems
Agency in several initiatives that are aimed at improving data access
and visibility. Ultimately, a global visibility capability tool is
envisioned that will enable JFCOM staff and supported combatant
commands to more rapidly access information and use it to develop
recommended force allocations for Secretary of Defense's consideration.

JOINT FORCE READINESS

Question. Joint Forces Command's current mission statement
acknowledges its responsibility to provide ``trained and ready joint
forces'' to our combatant commanders. The readiness of our nondeployed
forces, especially our ground forces, for worldwide commitment has been
impacted by the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
What is your unclassified assessment of the readiness of our
nondeployed land, air, and sea forces?
Answer. That portion of the armed services making up the ground
force is essentially either deployed forward in the global war on
terror or is in some stage of resetting for future deployment. Those
units that are in reset are challenged in their readiness by equipment
needs, rotation of manpower and time to train. The Services are doing
great work preparing these ground forces for their next deployment--but
every day in reset is crucial to preparing them and, in general, they
achieve a deployment ready state just in time for their next deployment
rotation. The air and maritime forces are more ready across the board,
but specific skill sets within those forces are also stressed due to
deployments (e.g., Military Intelligence, EOD).
Question. What policies, programs, or actions would you
specifically propose to strengthen the readiness of our nondeployed
air, land, and sea forces?
Answer. Continued support of Congress to provide resources
necessary to facilitate rapid force reset and recapitalization is
probably the most important single element to ensure a strengthening of
force readiness.

READINESS REPORTING SYSTEMS

Question. Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)
measures unit readiness for combat missions at the high end of the
spectrum of war rather than counterinsurgency, stabilization or other
contingency missions. The Department has developed and begun fielding
the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to replace GSORTS.
Based on your years of tactical unit command, both in garrison and
while deployed, what are your views of the importance of a
comprehensive, objective, accurate, reliable, adaptable, and timely
readiness reporting system?
Answer. A readiness reporting system as you have described is
obviously important. The readiness reporting system provides the basis
for force analysis that yields readiness and availability information
that underpins JFCOM's recommended sourcing solutions to meet the
geographic combatant commander's force needs.
Question. What in your view should be the requirements of a
readiness reporting system capable of meeting Joint Forces Command's
mission as joint force provider?
Answer. JFCOM has described the technical requirements for a
readiness reporting system mission tasks or a spectrum of military
missions that supports and dovetails with the aforementioned Global
Visibility Capability tool. In general terms, the readiness system
should reflect objective readiness metrics and subjective assessments
of a force's ability to carry out specific mission tasks or a spectrum
of military missions.
Question. In this regard, is it more important for Joint Forces
Command to have a clear picture of available Service capabilities or
the readiness data on specific units and systems, or both?
Answer. I would expect that JFCOM would require both to perform its
Joint Force Provider role. JFCOM currently works with its Service
components and each Service to generate the shared understanding of
what Service capabilities are available and why they are available--
based on unit readiness data. In its effort to improve Joint Force
Provider processes, JFCOM has defined needs for the Global Visibility
Capability tool include:

Force availability
Force capabilities identifies
Force structure
Force readiness
Global Force Management (GFM) strategic guidance
(priorities)
Force location
Force apportionment
Common operating picture
Works in progress (pending changes in the force)

Question. What weight would you assign to each of the requirements
you identify?
Answer. As JFCOM and other GFM stakeholders focus on development of
the Global Visibility Capability tool high priority items include:
force availability, force capabilities identifier, force structure,
force readiness. GFM strategic guidance, force location and force
apportionment are medium priority. Common operating picture and works
in progress are low priority.
Question. What is your understanding of or experience with the new
Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)?
Answer. The DRRS provides enhanced capability, and if we achieve
its goals, it can provide us solid foundation for force planning. I
believe this system is an improvement over previous reporting systems
although I need to discuss DRRS with the service components to
determine their confidence in the system before declaring my own
overall assessment.
Question. How would you evaluate this new system's ability to
assess the personnel, equipment, and training readiness of forces and
its utility in support of Joint Forces Command's joint force provider
process?
Answer. DRRS is a subjective readiness reporting system that
focuses on evaluation of a force's ability to execute mission essential
tasks rather than measure equipment, supply, manning and training
levels as a means of assessing readiness. DRRS continues to evolve and
its full potential to succeed as a readiness system remains to be seen.
Question. One of the concerns about the GSORTS and DRRS is the use
or misuse of the commander's ``subjective upgrade.'' Commanders are
authorized to raise or lower their reported level of readiness in a
more subjective fashion than is otherwise required in a strict
application of objective standards as defined in the readiness
reporting regulation.
Based on your years of tactical unit command, in general have you
used this authority to subjectively upgrade or downgrade your readiness
reports? If so, what philosophy has guided your use of subjective
upgrade or downgrade?
Answer. I have used subjective reporting in the past within the
parameters of the reporting system at the time. If the reporting system
directs an assessment of a units full spectrum combat mission, then the
full suite of equipment, manning and training is necessary to ready
that unit to the full spectrum level. If the unit is tasked with a less
demanding mission, for example, disaster relief--then a subjective
report of readiness against that lesser mission is helpful to reflect
that the unit is capable of success with the current state of manning,
equipment, and training. It's important to keep in mind that readiness
reports are intended for senior headquarters consumption and their
information needs and intents are key variables in defining any
readiness system. I have never hesitated to apply my military judgment
in assessing the readiness of units I commanded. Quantitative
assessments alone cannot adequately articulate a unit's readiness and I
strongly endorse holistic appraisals by commanders.
Question. How have you mentored your subordinate commanders in
their use of subjective upgrade in their readiness reporting to and
through you?
Answer. The U.S. Marine Corps trains leaders to be honest,
forthright, critical thinkers and they are selected to leadership
positions based, in large part, on their demonstration of good
judgment. I have relied on the good judgment of my subordinate
commanders to reflect accurately their unit's capabilities within the
parameters of the readiness reporting system. The readiness of their
units has been a subject of frequent discussion with my subordinate
commanders. I expect them to apply their judgment and report their
honest assessment.
Question. What in your view are the benefits and dangers of the use
of subjective upgrades or downgrades?
Answer. The obvious danger is that an inaccurate report may be used
as the basis for a decision to commit a unit to a mission that it is
not prepared to undertake. A benefit may occur when a subjective
readiness upgrade allows reflection of capabilities that are not
measured in an objective based system (e.g., a unit with a great deal
of leadership experience, but has not yet completed all training may be
more capable than objective assessment reveals).
Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor the use of subjective
upgrades or downgrades in the readiness reporting system to ensure that
Joint Forces Command has the most accurate, reliable, and timely
information necessary to meet its responsibilities as joint forces
provider?
Answer. I will monitor reports of force readiness through my
Service component commanders who are in the best position to
continually assess the accuracy and reliability of readiness reports. I
will also travel and observe unit training and share Joint training
lessons learned.

JOINT FORCE TRAINER

Question. Joint Forces Command also serves as a major joint force
trainer. In this role, the command certifies the training readiness of
Joint Task Force headquarters to plan, organize and manage the
execution of joint force operations at all levels of conflict. The
command supports combatant commander joint exercises and mission
rehearsal exercises prior to deployment of major headquarters. However,
Joint Forces Command does not certify the training readiness of
deploying forces at the unit or ``tactical'' level.
Based on your experience as Commander, Marine Forces, CENTCOM, what
is your evaluation of the readiness of Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps units as they are arriving in Iraq or Afghanistan?
Answer. I can speak authoritatively only on the Marine, Navy, Air
Force, and Army units I have personally observed or commanded over the
last 6 years of conflict. Technically and tactically their performance
has demonstrated a high state of readiness. Gaps in our
counterinsurgency doctrine and training have been addressed as we
adapted to the enemy situation.
The readiness of forces arriving in Iraq and Afghanistan for units
is good, but there is always room for improvement. The readiness of
individual Augmentees, those personnel who are called upon to fill
niche capabilities or to augment or round out a unit is improving, but
still requires more work. This assessment is based on a number of
factors: improved training, better lessons learned, changes in doctrine
and capabilities and the readiness to share this across the services
and through Joint organizations. We have adapted to changes in the
enemy but we must continue to adapt so agility is a key tenet in how we
improve. The key to this process is transitioning the lessons we
observe and experience on the battlefield into lessons learned in our
training, doctrine, tactics techniques and procedures. It is also about
recognizing and pushing forward the capabilities we need to the
warfighter as soon as they are ready and have been evaluated.
As the Joint Force Provider I will be committed to working through
our Components Commands Air Combat Command, Marine Forces Command,
Fleet Forces Command, and Army Forces Command, Services, and the
combatant commanders to make sure we provide the most ready forces that
meet combatant commander criteria across the globe. One of my first
tasks will be to assess this readiness with the Components and take
stock of combatant commander requirements and then ensure that JFCOM
provides and supports those units going into harm's way.
As the Joint Force Trainer I will continually assess and make
improvements in Joint training through Joint Headquarters Mission
Rehearsal Exercises, Joint Task Force training certification, Joint
Operational Analysis, and through direct interaction with the combatant
commanders. We will also review individual Augmentee training and
improve it using capabilities such as the Joint Knowledge Online system
that is designed to support the U.S. and coalition force individual
augmentees from predeployment, through deployment and post deployment
to provide courses and a place to ask the expert. I look forward to the
challenge of improving our readiness and training.
Question. Based on your observations and evaluations, should JFCOM
be assigned a greater role in setting standards and the certification
of the training readiness of tactical units prior to their deployment?
Answer. I believe that the Commander of the unit together with
their higher headquarters which is usually a JFCOM Component is in the
best position to certify training readiness of the units. Setting
standards for readiness is primarily accomplished by the combatant
commander and the Service but as the Commander, JFCOM, I will
continually assess and provide support to ensure that our troops are
trained and ready. This will include realistic training for commanders
and staffs of Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, Multi-National Force-
Iraq, Multi-National Corps--Iraq, and Combined Joint Task Force 82 in
Afghanistan. Significant expansion of joint distance learning tools
such as the Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability. We
will continue to improve enabling technology for all major Service
training centers and combatant commanders to train together in a
distributed environment through the Joint National Training Capability
(JNTC). We will continue to provide dedicated assessment teams to Iraq
and Afghanistan to identify areas for improved command and control of
U.S. and multi-national forces and as Commander of ACT I will ensure
that these improvements are shared throughout NATO.

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. One of JFCOM's missions is to conduct lessons learned
studies that can result in changes to joint tactics and doctrine. These
efforts are informed by the command's wargaming experimentation
program, as well as a number of advisors, including retired general
officers, who have been sent to Iraq to review the operational
situation.
Based on your experience as Commander, Marine Forces, CENTCOM, what
are your observations and evaluation of the Joint Forces Command's
lessons learned efforts?
Answer. JFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA)
embedded collection teams with the Joint Force Commander's Headquarters
during the course of operations. Those forward teams were in daily
communication with each other and reached back to analysts in the U.S.
This daily information sharing uncovered both immediately applicable
lessons for the commanders in the field, and provided more
comprehensive information on causality for subsequent analysis. This
approach is a great leap forward over sending interview teams forward
to collect information after the fact as we've historically done. It
provides a level of timeliness, fidelity and impact that has not been
achieved in previous lessons learned programs. Service teams have also
moved to this approach. This method has permitted rapid adaptation and
sharing of ``best practices'' between our various services and units.
It is a proven force multiplier in making us learning organizations.
Question. What are your observations and evaluation of how these
lessons learned impacted the conduct of operations in Iraq or
Afghanistan?
Answer. I observed two types of impacts: the first is the immediate
impact provided by forward collectors' observations to the operational
commanders, and the second is the result of subsequent analysis and
recommendations being shared with senior DOD and U.S. Government
leadership. JCOA analysis identified lessons and derived
recommendations that were fed into multiple efforts. As a result of the
sharing of joint and service lessons learned, training has been
reoriented in real time, organizations have been modified, and doctrine
rewritten to strengthen our intellectual approach to this form of war.
Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to improve the
command's lessons learned systems?
Answer. Key to the collection of needed data is trust in the
purpose and concept of JCOA's embedded missions. I intend to work and
advocate with my fellow combatant commanders to set the conditions at
the highest level for the continued success of JCOA's employment as
primary tool for operational level analytical support to the fielded
Joint Task Force headquarters. We will continue to infuse a sense of
urgency in disseminating best practices uncovered by sharing lessons
learned.
Additionally, the ability of U.S. forces to turn worldwide
collected lesson observations into knowledge will reach a new level
with the implementation this year of the Joint Lessons Learned
Information System (JLLIS). JLLIS allows for transparency among all the
service and combatant commands' lessons learned databases. The key for
JFCOM will be the development of business models to process this large
amount of information into knowledge, which we can then use to guide
improvements for the joint warfighter.
Finally, if confirmed, I intend to engage the Secretary of Defense
and Chairman on methods for ensuring resource allocations to the
recommendations that go forward based on our analysis and are approved
through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process.
Question. As the Consolidated Disposition Authority, you reviewed
the investigations into the conduct of marines that resulted in
civilian deaths in Haditha, Iraq.
What insights did you gain as a result of this duty?
Answer. The incident illuminated a number of issues, among them how
the violent extremists use civilians as cover for their activities as
well as the enemy's disregard of any historic norms for the protection
of innocents. In such wars ``among the people,'' our units must
demonstrate high performance coupled with strong self-discipline and
cultural understanding coupled with precision fires. We also require
engaged leaders who act as emotional ``shock absorbers'' for their
younger troops. Accountability, real and omnipresent, is as critical to
victory today as is training and equipping our forces.
Question. If confirmed, how would you incorporate these insights
into your responsibilities as Commander, JFCOM?
Answer. I will incorporate the lessons learned from this event into
joint training evolutions, especially in pre-deployment training for
units rotating into Iraq and Afghanistan. Live, simulated, and computer
based training, that replicates the ethical dilemmas found in combat
will be effective in minimizing these types of events. It is important
to teach our service men and women when and when not to use their
weapons. I will work with the services through the JFCOM Components to
ensure these training capabilities are highlighted. Additional language
and cultural training for our forces is also helpful in mitigating the
challenging situations that are often found in a counterinsurgency
environment. The Haditha incident also demonstrated the need to develop
better Counterimprovised Explosive Device (CIED) capabilities. I will
work with the Services and combatant commanders to develop these
capabilities

NATIONAL GUARD READINESS FOR CIVIL SUPPORT MISSIONS

Question. An issue of concern to Congress is the apparent low
levels of readiness of the National Guard for its domestic or civil
support missions. The reality is that we do not know with great
confidence the true ``readiness'' of the National Guard for its
domestic support missions because there is no national readiness
reporting system that objectively captures the National Guard's
personnel, equipment, or training requirements or their status relative
to those requirements.
What is your assessment of the National Guard's current readiness
to respond to the range of domestic contingencies that our states may
face?
Answer. I believe the National Guard maintains a good level of
readiness to respond to the range of domestic contingencies normally
faced by a State in a given year. This year National Guard forces have
responded, under state control, to floods, fires, hurricanes, tornados,
and the tragic bridge collapse in Minnesota. Governors and their TAGs
generally will not offer National Guard forces for deployment if they
believe that offering will negatively impact the state's ability to
respond to its citizens needs. The National Guard forces that have
returned from deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan generally are at lower
readiness levels and the Army is working diligently to reset these
forces.
Question. What in your view is the role or responsibility of JFCOM,
as the joint force provider, in developing a readiness reporting system
that monitors the Guard's readiness for civil support missions?
Answer. Once the DRRS is fully evolved and National Guard units are
reporting readiness via DRRS, the mission essential task based
readiness system could reflect National Guard readiness for civil
support missions.

JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

Question. The JROC has the responsibility to assist the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and assessing the priority of
joint military requirements to meet the national military strategy and
alternatives to any acquisition programs that have been identified.
How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the
Department's acquisition process?
Answer. Yes, in my experience as Commander, Marine Forces, CENTCOM,
where I have been the ultimate customer for decisions that the JROC
makes, my belief is that the JROC has been effective at engaging the
acquisition and programming communities earlier in the requirements
process to improve JROC decisions and enhance oversight of acquisition
programs. For example; JFCOM collected and analyzed lessons learned
from Afghanistan and Iraq. These lessons were compared to the
Integrated Priority Lists and Joint Quarterly Readiness Reports
submitted by the combatant commanders. This comparison was then used to
develop recommended approaches for resolution which were submitted to
the Joint Staff and JROC. All of these recommendations were endorsed by
the JROC.
Question. Do you see the need for any change in the organization or
structure of the JROC?
Answer. The JROC provides independent military advice to our senior
leaders by deciding which issues become validated military requirements
and which do not. I think the organization and structure of the JROC is
about right in order to provide that independent military voice.
However, I would strongly support the Vice Chairman, Joint Chief of
Staff and the JROC effort to bring together senior leaders, as
advisors, from across the Department and the Interagency, to inform the
JROC in making more sound and affordable decisions. I believe the
combatant commanders also need to have an effective voice in the
resource decisions of joint requirements and should be include as
advisors to this important body. It will be the one way that combatant
commanders can continue to influence the need to keep acquisition
programs interoperable. If confirmed, I look forward to investigating
options that include combatant commander representation in the JROC.
Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to interact with the
JROC in pursuing the development of improved joint force capabilities?
Answer. I would offer that the direction that Admiral Giambastiani
charted is sound and I am confident that General Cartwright will
continue to lead us in the right direction. All I can offer is that if
confirmed I will continue to bring the most significant warfighting
challenges pertaining to JFCOM and the combatant commanders to the
visibility of the JROC so that the JROC can make the best possible
decision about future capabilities and programs.
Question. Do you feel that the Commander, JFCOM, should have a
larger role in the activities of the JROC, given the unique JFCOM
mission to support joint warfighting?
Answer. In my view, we must continue to ``operationalize'' the JROC
and acquisition processes to respond with agility when Warfighter
Challenges are presented and validated. The Joint Capability
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is designed to impact mid-
to far-term capabilities and funding (3 years and beyond). The process
has less flexibility to quickly respond to emerging requirements within
the PPBE process in the near-term budget years (1-2 years). A variety
of ad hoc measures have been used to address this challenge.
Congress has assisted by providing authorities such as Limited
Acquisition Authority (LAA) to JFCOM. This authority has proven to be
of great value. One near-term solution is to extend this authority and
dedicate appropriate resources in order to have funds available to
quickly acquire joint warfighting capabilities for the combatant
commanders. In the long-term, the JCIDS process needs to adapt to more
effectively meet the demands and pace of today's operations. If
confirmed, I look forward to helping to develop a systemic way to
address these concerns.

JOINT REQUIREMENTS

Question. Commander, JFCOM, is responsible for advocating for the
interests of combatant commanders in the overall defense requirements
and acquisition process.
From your perspective has the JFCOM effectively represented the
requirements and needs of combatant commanders to the JROC and the
military Services?
Answer. Yes, JFCOM has well represented the requirements and needs
of the combatant commanders to the JROC.
Question. In your view, are combatant commanders capable of
identifying critical joint warfighting requirements and quickly
acquiring needed capabilities?
Answer. Yes, as one of the component commanders for CENTCOM it is
my belief that the combatant commander in working with their component
commanders is perfectly suited to identify those joint urgent needs for
adjudication by the JROC.
Question. What suggestions, if any, do you have for improving the
requirements and acquisition process to ensure that combatant
commanders are able to quickly acquire needed joint warfighting
capabilities?
Answer. This is a difficult question and one that I will be
interested in getting my hands around should I be confirmed. I will
tell you that combatant commanders currently have the ability to
provide their requirements to the Service acquisition community through
the Joint Staff. This system works for long-term needs. Combatant
commanders also have the ability to forward a Joint Urgent Operational
Need Statement to address their short-term, urgent needs. It is my
responsibility as a combatant commander in a supporting relationship to
help them find solutions to their problems.

JOINT CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

Question. In your view, how successful has JFCOM been in developing
and delivering new joint capabilities to the warfighter?
Answer. I think very successful. JFCOM continues to work with the
combatant commanders to determine warfighter gaps and challenges and
look for solutions. JFCOM develops new capabilities, often partnering
with the Services, and leverages our experimentation expertise, our
Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations, and our interim joint
capability development efforts to find solutions that can be
operationally tested and fielded. For example, JFCOM has partnered with
Services to develop and field test Machine Foreign Language Translation
Systems (MFLTS) that enable troops to better communicate with Host
nation populations. Several thousand of one-way translation devices are
currently in use and a two-way translation device is undergoing
developmental testing in Iraq.
Question. What steps would you take to improve JFCOM's efforts in
this area?
Answer. The ability to expeditiously develop new capability hinges
not only on identifying the right technology, but also on having access
to the resources (manpower and funding) to effectively pursue solutions
that meet the warfighter's needs. In addition to R&D funding, interim
solutions also require temporary operations and maintenance to ensure
sustainability. If confirmed, I will work with my staff to ensure that
JFCOM in partnership with Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and others as appropriate, are
adequately funded and provided the authorities necessary to enable the
development and fielding of interim solutions, until a Service program
of record is available to meet combatant commander urgent needs.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. By serving as the Department's ``transformation
laboratory,'' JFCOM enhances the combatant commands' capabilities as
outlined in the Department's UCP.
Do you believe JFCOM should play a larger role in transformation
and setting transformation policy? If so, how?
Answer. JFCOM's role and influence in transformation continues to
grow through constantly expanding interaction with the Services, Joint
Staff, and OSD in the joint experimentation, joint training, joint
integration, and joint force providing responsibilities as assigned by
the UCP. The JFCOM transformation role includes both interactions
within the existing DOD developmental processes and the ability to act
as a coordinator of Service, combatant commander, and agency efforts.
Transformation policy clearly rests with the Department. However, JFCOM
is afforded substantial and sufficient opportunity to inform
policymakers and to shape the mechanisms that execute transformation
policy.
Question. In your view, what capabilities that have been fielded
are truly transformational?
Answer. JFCOM and its partners have fielded several capabilities
that are truly transformational, not least of which is the Training
Transformation initiative that combines real forces with individuals
and crews in simulators and computer-generated forces that integrate
into a common operational picture for training. This JNTC rides on a
permanent network that continues to expand around the globe. Units and
forces can train at instrumented ranges or from home station, depending
upon their training objectives.
Enabling capabilities developed by JFCOM and partners, and
transforming the way operators perform in the field, include:

The Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange (KnIFE)
is a state-of-the-art data fusion capability and operations
center that has proved highly successful in meshing hundreds of
data sources to provide focused knowledge products on
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). KnIFE serves thousands of
customers including warfighters in the field and in training,
the research and development community, and interagency. KnIFE
is a division of the Joint Center for Operational Analysis and
is being expanded to address a variety of other asymmetric
threats.
The Joint Training Experimentation Network (JTEN),
developed as part of the JNTC, created a 24x7x365 persistent
network for joint training & experimentation, where none
existed before. The persistent network has enabled permanent
interconnectivity at the U.S. Secret-level between numerous
Service component and combatant commander national training
facilities, live instrumented ranges, model and simulation
centers of excellence (COEs), and other standing training
networks such as the USAF's Distributed Mission Operations
Network (DMON) and the Navy's Navy Continuous Training
Environment (NCTE).
The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution
Capability (JKDDC) is the DOD Training Transformation (T2)
program responsible for transforming individual joint training
capability. In the spring of 2007, JKDDC delivered the newly
enhanced Joint Knowledge Online (JKO), an enterprise portal
system providing access to a learning management system of
joint courseware and web-based learning tools and services via
Internet, military unclassified and classified networks. JKO
provides a more effective and convenient online training
opportunity for individuals to prepare in advance for
collective training exercises and integrated operations.
JFCOM assisted the geographic combatant commanders as
they established core elements for their Standing Joint Force
Headquarters. It transformed the concept of readiness for
operational-level joint command and control by establishing a
permanent, trained and ready organization for the combatant
commanders to employ when needed, providing joint C2 capability
to a Service-proved headquarters.
Joint Enabling Capabilities are a transformational
approach to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders
that are not currently met by the Services. They include
Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Elements, the Joint
Communications Support Element, the Joint Public Affairs
Support Element and Quick Reaction Teams of targeteers and
collection managers from the Joint Transformation Command--
Intelligence. Several other Joint Enabling Capabilities are
under development and in testing with operational forces.
Advanced terrain analysis prototype software
(Geospatial Analysis and Planning Support (GAPS)) to meet the
warfighter requirements for rapid route analysis and
identification, sensor planning and placement and counter fire
systems planning and placement.
Machine Foreign Language Translation System--
facilitates working with and establishing rapport with the
indigenous population.
Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation
(SEAS)--this tool models and simulates reactions of
institutions, organizations, and individuals that make up a
society and their effects on joint operations, and has been
employed in support of International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF).
Angel Fire--a Near Real Time Persistent Forensic
Capability, currently being tested on the battlefield by the
Marine Corps. The optical sensor device covers a 16 square
kilometer area and can provide the joint warfighter with a
dedicated sensor to rapidly respond to enemy actions and near
real-time reaction to an improvised explosive device (IED).

Question. What capabilities currently under development do you
consider to be truly transformational and deserving of support within
the Department and Congress?
Answer. The most critical lesson we have learned from Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Katrina is the need for a whole of government approach
to achieve national objectives. JFCOM experimentation in knitting
together the interagency and multinational communities has already
resulted in significant cross-domain collaborative advancements and
more realistic training for all who participate.
This whole of government approach also has considerable
applicability to the structure and functions of the new AFRICOM and for
the emerging regional objectives of Commander, SOUTHCOM. Applying
organizational and functional principles developed in experimentation
venues and refined in training venues can have a transformational
effect in our regional security cooperation and conflict prevention.
Operational modeling and simulation capability has a potentially
transformational effect on the operational planning, mission rehearsal,
operations execution, and effect assessment requirements of operational
commanders. New modeling capabilities that focus on the human element
have great potential for planning and assessing the effects of
irregular warfare.
Ensuring the integration and interoperability of U.S. and coalition
command and control capability is one transformational area that JFCOM
is making a major effort. Recently, JFCOM led a large joint and
coalition combat identification exercise at the Army's National
Training Center in California and Nellis AFB, NV. All 4 U.S. Services,
Special Operations Command, and partners from 8 NATO/ISAF nations
participated, bringing a total of 1,800 personnel, 40 vehicles, and 40
aircraft to the desert for 2 weeks to examine 16 different combat
identification technologies as well as procedures for executing digital
joint and combined close air support. I look forward to seeing the
after action report and technology analysis.
The management of DOD requirements, resources, and acquisition
strategy across specific capability portfolios to improve efficiency
and interoperability and reduce redundancy is another key
transformational area where JFCOM has a major effort ongoing. As
directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, JFCOM is the Joint Command
and Control Capability Portfolio Manager, one of four such portfolio
efforts across DOD. We have just finished a 5 month effort geared
toward recommending changes to Service programs for the fiscal year
2009 program objective memorandum (POM) that provide DOD with a more
balanced and responsive Joint Command and Control portfolio. We will do
the same for fiscal year 2010 and beyond.
Question. What metrics should the Department use to determine
whether it is investing enough resources and placing a high enough
priority in the transformation of its capabilities?
Answer. The ultimate metric is how well the capability meets the
current and future needs of the customer--the combatant commanders and
Services. Assessing these metrics requires constant engagement with
regional and other functional commands, the Service Chiefs, and other
agency staffs. Overall metrics need to be at the national strategic
level across the whole of government. Any metric that is solely focused
on DOD tells only part of the story.
Question. In your view, what role should JFCOM play in supporting
the Department, including the Services and defense agencies, in
achieving successful systematic migration of mission capabilities to
these new military technologies?
Answer. This is one of those questions in which I must immerse
myself if I am confirmed, because being outside JFCOM until now hasn't
given me the familiarity I need to answer. The answer probably lies
somewhere between providing the joint context as JFCOM currently does
for all Service and defense agency acquisition decisions, and some
measure of greater influence over acquisition decisions. What I do know
is that no capability we provide will survive unless it meets a
warfighter's need and is ultimately sustained in a Service or joint
program of record.

BUDGET AND RESOURCES

Question. Since 2001, the JFCOM budget authority has risen
considerably because of additional functional mission responsibilities
assigned to the command.
Have the increases kept pace with the JFCOM taskings and do you
foresee the need for future growth?
Answer. For the most part, resources have kept up with the growing
mission responsibilities. I understand, the resources to support the
JFCOM portfolio of solutions and capabilities has been a departmental
effort over the past few years, and the informed allocation of those
resources is intended to provide for that mission in support of
delivering the appropriate joint tools to the warfighter. As in any
organization available resources drive the prioritization of work.
As for future growth, I can not discount that possibility. As joint
warfighting capability gaps are identified, it will be critical for the
department to assess the risk, prioritize their effect on the overall
ability of the force to complete the mission, and then determine the
appropriate allocation/reallocation of resources as required to
mitigate or accept that risk.
Question. In what specific areas do you see the need for future
growth?
Answer. This is difficult to answer without having had a chance to
evaluate the command performance, but I believe there may be two areas
once evaluated to be ready for expansion, but that will need to be a
departmental and Presidential decision.
First is in the area of joint force management. Our current global
force management operations: emergent force sourcing, rotational force
sourcing, individual augmentation, exercise force sourcing, and
adaptive planning contingency sourcing, continue at an unprecedented
pace. This elevated operating tempo has placed significant stress on
the global force pool and highlighted the need for continued
improvements in visibility and sourcing of global force requirements,
adaptive and contingency planning, global assessment of risk, and rapid
evaluation of force readiness and availability.
Second, as we expand the scope of the department's capability
portfolio managers, there will be some near term requirement to
selectively expand the skill set and capacity of those personnel
executing the Joint Command and Control (JC2) capability portfolio
management functions for the Department at JFCOM. The critical effect
desired will be to foster the integration and interoperability of
strategic, operational and tactical C2 within a net-enabled
environment; scalable C2 capabilities responsive to evolving command
structure size, and seamlessly integrated with components and mission
partners; and the phase-out of non-interoperable, excess and/or
duplicative capabilities.
Lastly, as the joint enabling capability concept expands to fill
more and more of the combatant commanders' force requirements not met
by Service forces, there may be a need for increased manpower and
funding to maintain the readiness of these operational-level
capabilities commensurate with combatant commander requirements and the
readiness level of the tactical forces they command.
Question. Do you believe that JFCOM has adequate staff to
efficiently manage this increase in budget authority?
Answer. It is my understanding that efforts are underway to examine
that question. The rapid growth in the command's resources since 2001,
combined with a complex resourcing environment is driving JFCOM toward
an internal review that looks at business management and execution
processes to ensure that the command is adequately staffed. A quick
analysis, of the last 6 years of resourcing, appears to show that
management infrastructure has remained relatively flat, while mission
resourcing has grown; if confirmed, it is something that I will urge
the staff to continue to look at as we move forward.
Question. Do you believe that JFCOM has adequate government
technical staff to deal with its increasing role in acquisition
programs?
Answer. I believe the short answer is no, but if confirmed, I will
need to investigate this issue more closely. It is my understanding
that JFCOM is working with the department to determine required
capacity and capability, and identify the resources (fiscal and
manpower) needed to effectively execute the Joint Command and Control
(JC2) portfolio management mission. As JFCOM continues to expand its
influence and management across the JC2 portfolio, it will be critical
to develop and build upon the existing acquisition program oversight
capacity and capability. The likely solution will be a combination of
organic (JFCOM assigned) and non-organic (matrix'd as required)
technical staffing to provide the appropriate assessment and review.
Question. Approximately two-thirds of JFCOM headquarters staff is
government civilians or contractors.
In your view, is this large civilian and contractor workforce a
function of JFCOM's multiple functional responsibilities or is it a
reflection of a shortage of military personnel?
Answer. It is my understanding that JFCOM is working to meet the
needs of combatant commanders today while ensuring we are ready for the
requirements of tomorrow. In my experience this requires the right mix
of military, government civilians and contractors who together make up
an experienced work force. The contractor portion of the workforce
provides the flexibility to surge to taskings and to work on different
subject areas that may or may not have traditionally been part of
JFCOM's expertise. Contractors provide expertise and afford
organizational agility as missions change or new ones are added.
Government civilians provide program management, corporate knowledge
and continuity of effort. As military personnel become less available
for program management tasks to fill existing billets, they may be
replaced by government civilians. But government civilians cannot
replace the fresh operational expertise that military personnel bring
to solving JFCOM's problem sets.
Question. Do you believe that JFCOM has an appropriate mix of
military and civilian personnel?
Answer. If confirmed, one of my initial tasks will be to review
JFCOM's work force and ensure it meets mission requirements and most
optimally utilizes military, civilian and contractor personnel.

JOINT EXPERIMENTATION

Question. How would you rate the success of the joint
experimentation activities of JFCOM, and the Department as a whole, in
supporting the development of new concepts of operations?
Answer. Experimentation plays a useful and proven role in
transformation for identifying needed near and far term capabilities.
The art and science of experimentation have evolved considerably since
the days of Millennium Challenge 02, which cost far too much for the
learning achieved. Today's experimentation achieves far more at much
lower cost by employing a distributed network and involving far fewer
players, who can work from their home stations, all driven and assessed
by sophisticated, tailored modeling and simulation.
This increasingly sophisticated experimentation network allows
conceptual solutions to warfighter challenges to be tested through
hundreds if not thousands of iterations over short periods of time.
Testing elements of the supporting operating concepts to the Joint
Operations Concept process thus becomes much easier and far more
comprehensive.
By providing access to all sorts of military and other interagency
partners, this network has increased DOD-wide productivity and enabled
the Department to increase value derived from its experimentation
dollars, whether those dollars are joint or Service-specific.
Question. What changes would you recommend to increase the
effectiveness of joint experimentation activities?
Answer. Recent Department initiatives linking joint experimentation
to other acquisition and strategic guidance processes will go a long
way to aligning what have been to date very stovepiped processes. How
well remains to be seen, since the first information call is only now
being answered. But I believe this initiative has great potential for
increasing effectiveness across more than just experimentation.
The entire body of experimentation work has recently moved from
being defined as activity-driven to being defined as productivity-
driven, so that venues are now developed directly in response to
experimentation objectives, rather than objectives being tailored to
fit existing venues. This should have a considerable impact on
effectiveness.
One area requiring considerable improvement is the transition into
Service programs of record of those solutions validated through joint
experimentation in order to field and sustain those capabilities for
the joint operators.
Multinational and interagency participation and partnership in DOD
joint experimentation needs to be resourced and expanded.
Question. Based on your experience, do you believe that the overall
Department commitment and investment in joint experimentation is
adequate to ensure the effective integration and interoperability of
our future forces?
Answer. The Department is obviously committed to joint
experimentation. We will move to a higher level of integration when
defense agencies are fully incorporated in joint experimentation.
Efforts must continue to better align Service title 10 and joint
experimentation. Current investments in joint experimentation have
shown improvement in the integration and interoperability of joint
forces. Security challenges we face now and in the future mandate a
comprehensive approach to include interagency and multinational
partners. Current funding and policy for joint experimentation do not
facilitate this broadened body of work.
Question. What do you believe to be the appropriate role for JFCOM
in determining how the respective Services should invest their
experimentation dollars?
Answer. The UCP assigns JFCOM responsibility to lead joint CDE and
coordinate the CDE efforts of the Services, combatant commanders, and
defense agencies to support joint interoperability and future joint
warfighting capabilities. The Commander, JFCOM, is also tasked with
leading the development, exploration, and integration of new joint
warfighting concepts and serving as the DOD Executive Agent for joint
warfighting experimentation. This does not require strict JFCOM control
of how Services invest their experimentation dollar, but does require a
clear communication of the planned activities of Service
experimentation and the ability to develop a common vision of the
course of experimentation with the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, and
Joint Chiefs. Services can then exercise their appropriate fiscal
authorities under Title 10, guided by that common vision of the course
of experimentation.

URBAN OPERATIONS

Question. JFCOM's experimentation and lessons learned efforts have
had significant recent activity dedicated to understanding and
development of urban operations concepts.
What is your assessment of current DOD capabilities to conduct
urban operations?
Answer. The capability is improving but there is much work to be
done in this area. I believe my combat experience during Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) will be
helpful in this area.
Question. What major issues need to be addressed to improve those
capabilities?
Answer. The center of gravity for success in the urban environment
is winning the support of the population. They will decide which side
will succeed. If we win them over, we have millions of allies on our
side. If we lose their support, we have at best case, millions of non-
supporters; worst case, millions of enemies.
We gain the support of the population by securing and improving the
systems that make up the city. This includes basic services such as
power, water, and sewage, but also the political system, the
information system, even the social and cultural systems. When we
successfully provide the population a more compelling view of their
future than that provided them by our opponents, the population will
take over and make it impossible for the threat to exist there.
The tasks associated with securing the broad spectrum of urban
services are outside our traditional tactical thinking. We also
understand that this mission cannot be successfully accomplished with
military capability alone and that we need greater participation from
the interagency community, where much of this type of expertise
resides. The requirement for the use of military force to defeat the
threat has not gone away, but we now understand that military force
must be precisely applied in a much broader operational context.
Critical needs include:

Increased capacity for human intelligence.
Greater urban operations reconnaissance and
surveillance to assist in the counter-IED fight
Joint command and control systems that enable the
integration not only of military capability, but also of
interagency capability in a coalition environment.
Precise weapons effects that minimize collateral
damage
Strategic communications capabilities that improve our
ability to help the population understand the truth about what
we are doing and gain their support.
The ability to better visualize the urban operating
environment, including the ability to sense through the massive
structures of the city
Force tracking in the urban environment to ensure we
know exactly where all of our forces are located

Question. Based on results from the JFCOM Urban Resolve 2015
experiment last year, efforts are being made to promote the concept and
fielding of airborne persistent surveillance assets such as Angel Fire.
What is your assessment of the value of the development of improved
sensors, aircraft, and downlink technology and the field testing and
integration of these assets with feeds from other battlefield sensors?
Answer. It is incredibly valuable. Combatant commanders
consistently identify ``persistent surveillance'' as a capability gap
in their integrated priority lists, despite the fact that U.S. and
Coalition warfighters operate and maintain numerous aerial surveillance
platforms of varying capabilities. These individual platforms are
inherently limited in their ability to conduct persistent surveillance
primarily due to platform design and sensor characteristics,
particularly against an adaptive, elusive adversary; ISR data derived
from the platforms/sensors largely remains ``stovepiped'' within the
platform/sensor architecture until its value is diminished. A critical
component in implementing this approach is the development/
implementation of common standards, application, interfaces, and data
registries. If confirmed, I intend to continue to emphasize the
development of improved sensors and to ensure processes are jointly
synchronized and focused to enhance ISR integration with warfighting
capabilities.

JOINT FORCES COMMAND LIMITED ACQUISITION AUTHORITY

Question. Congress has provided the Commander, JFCOM, with the
authority to develop and acquire equipment for battle management
command, control, communications, and intelligence and other equipment
determined to be necessary for facilitating the use of joint forces in
military operations and enhancing the interoperability of equipment
used by the various components of joint forces.
What is your assessment of the benefits of this authority?
Answer. LAA, granted to the Secretary of Defense, has proven to be
an exceptionally useful and flexible tool for JFCOM in support of other
combatant commands, however, no funds were allocated to JFCOM to
support LAA. The benefits of authorities to rapidly acquire solutions
for the joint warfighter are obvious. But without proper resourcing we
will continue to lag the problem.
Based on warfighting shortfalls validated by combatant commanders,
LAA has allowed JFCOM to field mature technologies or improved
capability to the warfighters in the regional combatant commands more
rapidly than the normal DOD acquisition process.
Since 2004, JFCOM's implementation of LAA in support of the
combatant commands has been used to fund and accelerate seven critical
capabilities to the warfighter, in some cases years earlier than the
standard acquisition process would have provided them.
Question. Do you concur with the findings and recommendations of
the Government Accountability Office in its April 2007 report which
were somewhat critical of JFCOM's past and continued use of LAA?
Answer. I think that what JFCOM has been asked to do with LAA is a
challenging assignment particularly in light of the resource
constraints that JFCOM must follow.
That being stated, I do not agree with all the findings of the GAO
report, but concur with the Department's response to the GAO. My
interpretation of the GAO report is that GAO believes there is
duplication of effort between JRAC and LAA. While there may be cases
where the two processes may overlap, the intent is different and should
an overlap exist, coordination between JFCOM and JS/JRAC eliminates any
duplicative effort.
I will, if confirmed, fully participate in a review of the LAA
statute and JRAC processes to determine the role LAA should play in
support to operational needs of the joint warfighter and inform
Congress of the results of that review.
Question. What internal changes, if any, would you recommend to
improve the execution of the authority?
Answer. If confirmed I would commit to studying this more
thoroughly, but would offer that the statute could be modified to
include use of operations and maintenance funding to sustain
capabilities provided under the statute until either the recipient can
POM for sustainment funding or the capability transitions to a DOD
program of record. Another possibility could be to provide an
acquisition contingency program element made up of RDT&E, operation and
maintenance and OP dollars to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (USD(AT&L)) to fund JRAC and LAA
approved projects.
Question. Do you believe that an increase in acquisition staff size
is necessary?
Answer. I am not in a position to speak for USD(AT&L) on makeup and
organization of the Defense Acquisition Work Force in DOD. JFCOM,
however, has no acquisition staff and none is required at this time
since all acquisition transactions under LAA are executed through
Service/Agency Acquisition staffs using Service Acquisition
authorities. If the LAA statue was made permanent, and JFCOM was
empowered by USD(AT&L) to execute all aspects of acquisition authority,
I would then revisit the need, size and organization of an acquisition
staff to execute LAA responsibilities.
Question. Do you believe this authority should be made permanent?
Answer. It is my understanding that JFCOM has submitted a fiscal
year 2008 legislative proposal to that effect, which is currently under
consideration by the congressional defense committees. In light of the
GAO report, I think a thorough evaluation of the authority should be
reviewed and only after that review should LAA be made permanent. In
the meantime, I don't think Congress should let the current LAA statute
expire. I assure you that I will most certainly advocate the best and
most expedient way to get joint capabilities in the hands of the
warfighter.
Question. What additional acquisition authorities, if any, does
JFCOM require to rapidly address such joint warfighting challenges?
Answer. None at this time.
Question. Do you believe similar acquisition authority should be
extended to other combatant commands, and, if so, which commands and
why?
Answer. Special Operations Command already has acquisition
authority to meet specific needs of their special operations mission.
It is my belief that LAA was given to JFCOM to meet the unique
interoperability and C2 missions assigned to the command under the UCP
and reinforced recently by the Joint C2 CPM mandate of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. For those missions, JFCOM should be the single
entity determining the joint solutions to interoperability and C2
problems faced by all the combatant commanders.
Question. Will you recommend that the Department directly fund
JFCOM to support the authority--which has not occurred to date?
Answer. I would like to reserve judgment on whether to directly
fund JFCOM to support the authority pending my own internal review of
JFCOM's LAA. Although an acquisition contingency fund (program element)
made up of research, development, technology, and evaluation (RDT&E),
operations and maintenance and OP subheads available to USD(AT&L) to
fund LAA approved projects might be an attractive interim course of
action.
Question. What role should oversight officials from the Office of
the USD(AT&L) play in the utilization of JFCOM's acquisition authority?
Answer. While approval of LAA projects should remain the decision
of Commander, JFCOM, USD(AT&L) should have a responsibility to arrange
funding for the LAA projects and continue to perform an oversight role
in ensuring JFCOM doesn't violate acquisition regulations in the
execution of the LAA mission.

DEFENSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

Question. The Department's Science and Technology (S&T) programs
are designed to support defense transformation goals and objectives.
These programs are intended to ensure that warfighters--now and in the
future--have superior and affordable technology to support their
missions and to give them revolutionary war-winning capabilities.
Do you believe there is an adequate investment in innovative
defense science to develop the capabilities the Department will need in
the future?
Answer. It is my understanding that JFCOM has developed an
excellent working relationship with DARPA over time; if confirmed, I
intend to examine these issues more closely.
Question. Do you believe the Department's investment strategy for
S&T programs is correctly balanced between near-term and long-term
needs?
Answer. This is an area where I plan to review and analyze more
closely should I be confirmed.
Question. What is the role of JFCOM's modeling and simulation
program in development on new warfighting capabilities for DOD?
Answer. While JFCOM modeling and simulation (M&S) has focused on
developing new warfighting capabilities, more importantly it has
facilitated a more comprehensive understanding of the national and
global security environment of the 21st century. It replicates the
complexity and terrain of the security environment without placing
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in harms way. In addition, JFCOM
M&S enables complete integration of the other key players in national
security, such as multinational and interagency partners, with little
attendant risk (politically and operationally). Distributed operations
allow participants greater access to joint venues through the network,
and from their home stations, thus driving down costs and encouraging
participation.
The two major elements of JFCOM's M&S enterprise are
experimentation and training. M&S enables both in ways not even
considered possible less than 10 years ago.
For experimentation, the case of urban resolve is instructive. The
experiment modeled many of the situations we are facing in the urban
environment today, and modeled situations we fear may materialize in
the not too distant future. In this simulation-supported experiment,
JFCOM was able to take dozens of looks at proposed solutions, and when
something failed, reset and look again and again. Analysis took only
weeks, and successfully capabilities transitioned to fielding programs
within a few months.
For training, JFCOM manages the JNTC that integrates live forces
(the principal training audience) with a virtual input from individual/
team trainees operating simulators with constructive inputs from
computerized models. Live-virtual-constructive inputs are all combined
into a single operating picture that all the participants share.
Finally, M&S not only enables development of new warfighting
capabilities, but constitutes a new, emerging warfighting capability in
itself. Some of the M&S transformational capabilities that have already
been fielded are operational applications of models developed for other
reasons that are now being applied in planning, mission rehearsal,
mission execution, and assessment in direct support of operators.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITY PORTFOLIO MANAGER

Question. DOD recently assigned JFCOM the acquisition oversight
role of Joint Command and Control (JC2) Capability Portfolio Manager.
As you understand it, what does this responsibility entail and do
you believe it is consistent with the overall JFCOM mission and funding
levels?
Answer. As I understand it, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked
JFCOM to manage a group of like capabilities--in this case, Joint
Command and Control--across the enterprise to improve interoperability,
minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability
effectiveness. He also asked that JFCOM integrate requirements/
capabilities, acquisition and programmatics--across materiel and non-
materiel (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and
education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)) considerations. As
such, it fits exactly within the overall JFCOM mission space. However,
there maybe a need to selectively expand this capability in the future.
Question. What do you see as the major challenges towards the
development and deployment of joint, interoperable command, control,
and communications systems?
Answer. Portfolio management is a truly transformational effort by
the Department to apply common business rules to our warfighting
enterprise. In essence, we say we fight in a joint, combined, and
interagency environment that requires interoperable, scalable, net-
enabled command and control and associated systems, but we design and
procure these systems at the Service level, often independently from
similar efforts in the other Services. That is the niche JFCOM fills.
The command provides the joint, multinational, and interagency context
and understanding that is by definition missing from the Services and
it uses that knowledge to fill the critical joint gaps that exist in
the individual Service C2 and associated DOTMLPF efforts.

END STRENGTH OF ACTIVE-DUTY FORCES

Question. What level of active-duty personnel (by Service) do you
believe is required for current and anticipated missions?
Answer. This is not strictly a numbers game--the key is to find the
right amount of capability and have an instituted process for
effectively and efficiently employing it. Increasing the end strength
of the Army and Marine Corps can add capability, but it is just one
tool we can use to meet the demands of missions now and in the future.
Question. How would you assess the progress made to date by the
Services in reducing the numbers of military personnel performing
support functions through hiring of contractors or substitution of
civilian employees?
Answer. The Services have made significant inroads into shifting
duties from military personnel to contractors in the areas of combat
operations and moving support work to government civilians in non-
hostile areas around the globe. There are over 100,000 contractor
personnel working in Iraq right now which have enabled the military to
stay focused on the mission. Outside the conflict area, the government
civilian community provides a wealth of manpower to fill support
positions. The conversion of military to civilian billets is making
good progress, however it is imperative that we not lose sight of the
funds required to sustain this effort. We must also fund the continued
development of our civilian workforce. There is a challenge with
government civilians working in a combat zone and their pay incentives.
These individuals do not receive the tax and pay benefits currently
afforded uniformed military personnel. Given that we ask government
civilians to volunteer for work in a combat zone, I would encourage
Congress to examine government civilian compensation in a combat zone
and enact legislation in support of deployed government civilians.

RELIANCE ON RESERVE COMPONENT

Question. The men and women of the Reserve component have performed
superbly in meeting the diverse challenges of the global war on
terrorism and have been greatly relied upon in Operations Noble Eagle,
Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. The roles and missions that should
be assigned to the Reserve Forces is a matter of ongoing study.
What missions do you consider appropriate for permanent assignment
to the Reserve component?
Answer. Our Reserve Forces have demonstrated that with proper
training and equipping they are capable of performing alongside their
active counterparts in support of virtually any mission. I would not
categorically constrain any mission to either the active or the Reserve
components. I believe the National Guard should remain a dual-missioned
force available for both State and Federal Support missions.
Question. What should the focus of JFCOM be in ensuring that
Reserve Forces are trained and ready to participate effectively in
joint operations?
Answer. My experience is our Reserve Forces operate equally with
our Active-Duty Forces as an integral part of joint operations. The
focus for Reserve Forces should be to prepare them to seamlessly
participate effectively in joint operations alongside their Active duty
counterparts, and coalition partners regardless of the mission. Joint
Forces Command, along with the Services, should provide training for
Reserve Forces in the same manner that they train Active-Duty Forces.
Question. The Department's Training Transformation Implementation
Plan of June 10, 2003, provides that the Department's training program
will benefit both the Active Duty and Reserve components.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Reserve and the
National Guard benefit from the JNTC, a key component of the Training
Transformation Implementation Plan?
Answer. I will stay actively engaged with the leaders of the
Reserve components and JFCOM's Component Commander to ensure all joint
forces have an opportunity to benefit from the JNTC, appropriate to
their mission. Together, we will continue to develop collaborative
understanding of the joint enhancements required at key Reserve and
National Guard training programs.

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Capturing the joint lessons learned and improving our
ability to share them with our interagency partners
Developing joint concepts in collaboration with
interagency partners
Expanding joint exercises to include interagency
partners in the event development and execution
Expanding joint training efforts to include
interagency partners access and participation in exercises,
courseware development and online distributed training
Integrating Interagency partners into Joint Command
and Control solutions.

Question. What lessons do you believe the Department has learned
from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. Most lessons learned from our experiences of planning and
training for post-conflict operations is related to the importance of
integrating our interagency and multinational partners. The integration
issues emphasize the need to invest in:

Defining the lead and supporting roles and
responsibilities in the planning process
Developing collaborative decisionmaking processes
Developing compatible information systems to include
interface controls, data sharing, and disclosure processes
Expanding joint exercises to include interagency and
multinational partners in the exercise scenario and objective
development and execution.

JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY AGENCY

Question. In September 2004, the JFCOM Chief of Staff (MG James
Soligan) issued a memorandum entitled, ``Joint Personnel Recovery
Agency Mission Guidance,'' stating, in part, that ``the use of
resistance to interrogation knowledge for offensive purposes lies
outside the roles and responsibilities of Joint Personnel Recovery
Agency (JPRA),'' and that ``JPRA personnel will not conduct any
activities or make any recommendations on offensive interrogation
techniques or activities without specific approval from the JFCOM
Commander, Deputy Commander, or the Chief of Staff.'' The memorandum
further noted that, ``Deviations from the JPRA chartered mission of
this nature are policy decisions that will be forwarded to OSD for
action.''
If confirmed as Commander, JFCOM, would it be your intent that JPRA
continue to operate within these policy guidelines?
Answer. Yes, I will ensure that JPRA continues to operate in these
guidelines.

NATO TRANSFORMATION

Question. In their Summit Declaration issued at Riga, Latvia, in
November 2006, the NATO Heads of State emphasized ``the importance of
continuing transformation of NATO's capabilities and relationships.''
They also endorsed the Comprehensive Political Guidance, which provides
a framework and political direction for NATO's transformation over the
next 10 to 15 years.
What do you believe is the role of the SACT in bringing about the
transformational change to NATO forces?
Answer. SACT is the commander responsible to the military committee
for overall recommendations on transformation. In this capacity, he
leads the transformation of NATO military structures, and capabilities
and doctrines in order to improve the military effectiveness and
interoperability of the Alliance. Of the two Strategic Commanders, SACT
leads the defense planning process and in coordination with SACEUR,
delivers a comprehensive and capabilities based Defense Requirements
Review that identifies the Minimum Military Requirements in order to
fulfill the Level of Ambition that NATO's political leaders have set.
With respect to the transformational change to NATO forces, SACT's
role is to:

Transform NATO's military capabilities through a
rigorous process supported by concept development,
experimentation and a comprehensive training program.
Work with SACEUR to continue to describe how NATO
should conduct operations in the future and identify the
associated required military capabilities.
Respond to emerging operational requirements stemming
from current operations thereby assisting SACEUR.
Assist nations through the review of their individual
national defense plans and reform efforts.

Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for meeting
alliance capability requirements?
Answer. The Comprehensive Political Guidance provides a framework
and political direction for NATO's continuing transformation, and helps
ACT focus its work in support of improving NATO's ability to conduct
operations and missions, and developing usable capabilities. If
confirmed, my priorities for meeting Alliance capability requirements
would focus on aiding the efforts to develop agile, expeditionary,
interoperable and sustainable forces that can deploy quickly and
operate in an unpredictable, asymmetric environment; support the
improvement of deployability and sustainability of NATO forces, and
information superiority. Furthermore, I will focus on specific
capabilities in the field of training and education, which are also
essential as ACT moves forward with NATO's transformation endeavor.
Question. What do you foresee as the major challenges to NATO
transformation?
Answer. In current and future NATO missions, NATO headquarters and
tactical operations are increasingly joint and will be a common
denominator which will require need for interoperability and common
standards at the lowest tactical levels. Increasingly, these NATO
operations are alongside, and often include non-NATO nations and non-
military actors. One of the main challenges will be to ensure that NATO
possesses clear standards to ensure equipment interoperability and the
right processes, capabilities and the validation and qualification
tools to deliver the requisite training and education to ensure
interoperability of tactics, techniques and procedures.
Other major challenges that I foresee to NATO transformation are:

The delivery of timely transformational products to
Allied Command Operations and the Nations that improve and
transform the military forces.
Advancing a clear and common understanding throughout
the Alliance of military transformation and ACT's role in the
process, and provide the appropriate resources to meet the
associated requirements.
Capturing the right lessons learned from NATO
operations today, and implementing appropriate corrective
actions so that we can provide increasingly effective
capabilities for tomorrow's operations.

Question. It has been reported that NATO is reassessing the size
and scope of the NRF, a central element of NATO's transformation
efforts.
What is your assessment of the current capabilities of the NRF?
Answer. The NRF is based on a sound concept to deliver capable
expeditionary forces and to assist in transforming our military
capabilities to meet the security needs of the 21st century. The NRF
achieved Full Operational Capability in November 2006. However, it has
been reported lately that Nations are, at this stage, not in a position
to meet the full demands of the force and hence cannot provide all
required capabilities. The primary reason seems to be the current high
operational tempo, including operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans
that directly competes for forces and capabilities that might otherwise
be available for the NRF. This situation however impairs the ability of
the NRF to conduct the full range of its missions. The NRF as a vehicle
for NATO transformation remains a solid premise and one that I shall
support.
Question. What role do you believe the SACT can play in improving
the capabilities of the NRF?
Answer. The NRF has been identified as a primary vehicle for
transformation; besides being a credible force for expeditionary
operations across the full spectrum of military operations. As such, it
becomes the primary platform for improving and broadly incorporating
enhanced capabilities such as Counter IED, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,
and Fratricide Prevention equipment and procedures into Alliance forces
so they are available to the warfighter. The rotation of NRF forces
facilitates modernization and transformation of military forces across
the alliance, and then NRF exercises incorporate, refine, and ensure
joint and multinational interoperability to include doctrinal and
structural changes.
Therefore, I believe that the vital role SACT plays, in cooperation
and coordination with SACEUR, in improving the capabilities for the NRF
follows:

Ensuring that the NRF remains a key driver for
enhancing interoperability within the Alliance, particularly
through joint and combined education and training.
Promoting the NRF as the fundamental vehicle for the
incremental implementation and dissemination of new concepts
and capabilities and the one that possess the ability to
rapidly incorporate capability enhancements and implement them
into national forces that are committed to expeditionary joint
and combined operations.

Question. ACT is supported in its transformational efforts by a
number of multinational COEs. Currently there are seven NATO-accredited
COEs.
What do you believe is the proper role for COEs in supporting ACT's
transformation mission?
Answer. While not part of NATO's command/manning structure, ACT can
leverage some of the COE's expertise and products in support of the
transformation mission. By looking to ACT for recommendations on annual
work plans, the COEs can be assured of a focus of effort complimentary
to ACT and of benefit to the Alliance transformation efforts.
Specifically, there should be a good synergy of effort with the
Netherlands Command and Control, U.S. Combined Joint Operations from
the Sea, German-Netherlands Civil Military Cooperation, and Czech Joint
Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive (CBRNE) COEs.

JFCOM-ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION RELATIONSHIP

Question. What do you believe is the proper relationship between
JFCOM and ACT?
Answer. There is a great opportunity for synergy, collaboration and
support between the two commands--and it is very much a two-way street
that benefits both NATO and the U.S. The work being accomplished in the
areas of Joint Experimentation and Joint Training directly complement
similar efforts being undertaken by ACT. The expansion of the NATO/ISAF
mission in Afghanistan has increased the frequency of cooperation
between the two commands. Lesson learned in Afghanistan by NATO can be
applicable for U.S forces in Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and as we stand
up AFRICOM. The global war on terror and our enemy mandates that we
continue to build and support the symbiotic relationship between the
two commands. As NATO's North American Strategic Command I believe the
vision to place it in Norfolk alongside JFCOM was exactly correct. The
co-location of NATO's Transformation Command with JFCOM has already
proven to be an invaluable resource to the militaries of all NATO
countries, including the United States. I will push hard to ensure we
are working to maximize this relationship especially in key areas of
training, doctrine development, C2, intelligence fusion and
dissemination, new capabilities and experimentation, and lessons
learned and best practices. We will improve this effort as this
relationship matures in the crucible of support to the warfighter.
responses to wmd threats and natural disasters in the united states
Question. Deficiencies in the responses of Federal, State, and
local agencies to Hurricane Katrina have generated debate about the
appropriate role for military forces in responding to national crises.
What do you see as the appropriate role for Commander, JFCOM;
Commander, NORTHCOM; and the Governors and Adjutant Generals of each
State and territory in responding to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
incidents within the United States?
Answer. As Commander, JFCOM, has no AOR, JFCOM's role is that of
Joint Force Provider to Commander, NORTHCOM, or any other designated
Supported Commander, following a WMD incident. JFCOM is tasked to
provide forces requested by the Supported Commander and validated by
the Joint Staff (SECDEF) in a timely manner. The Commander, JFCOM, does
not generally provide forces to Governors or TAGs who have purview over
their own State National Guard forces, however if those forces are
Federalized by the President, they could be provided to the Supported
Commander by the Commander, JFCOM. It is generally assumed that in case
of a WMD incident the President would choose to use forces under title
10, but there is no guarantee of that eventuality. Should the response
be limited to title 32 forces, JFCOM would have a limited role in the
response.
Question. What is the appropriate role and response for Active-Duty
Military Forces in supporting civil authorities in responding to
natural and manmade disasters not involving WMD threats within the
United States?
Answer. Active-Duty Military Forces are always ready and willing to
give their help in recovering from disasters at home and have
demonstrated that repeatedly in the past. Most recent examples are the
Hurricane Katrina aftermath and the bridge collapse in Minnesota. DOD
has always demonstrated an appropriately aggressive posture toward
assistance, in support of a Lead Federal Agency (LFA) following a
disaster, often deploying forces within hours of stated need.
Question. Hurricane Katrina has demonstrated the importance of
joint and interagency training in preparation for support disaster
operations.
In your view, how could JFCOM influence joint and interagency
training to enable better coordination and response for natural
disaster operations?
Answer. There are probably two high-impact approaches JFCOM can use
to enable coordination and response during natural disaster operations:
experimentation and training. The first discovers best practices, the
second trains the entire interagency and non-governmental partners in
those best practices.
The Noble Resolve series of experiments that JFCOM initiated this
year brought together Federal, State, and local governments, commercial
organizations, Department of Homeland Security and its subordinate
agencies, all the Services, NORTHCOM, U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM), and subordinate operating forces, the National Guard
Bureau, and the National Guards of Virginia, Oregon, Washington State,
and Texas. These partnerships, and the progress they made in Noble
Resolve on best practices and organizational structures for both
natural and man-made disaster response, were very impressive and bode
well for the future. This series needs to continue.
Multinational Experiment 5 does the same for international
partners, and is informing EUCOM and AFRICOM on ways to integrate a
whole of government and multinational approach to humanitarian
assistance, disaster relief, and preventing conflict in Africa.
Joint exercises spread the best practices identified in lessons
learned and experimentation, and practically integrate Joint Forces and
Interagency partners. Of the 13 priority exercises conducted in fiscal
year 2007, 3 focused primarily on Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster
Relief (HA/DR) and Consequence Management or Foreign Consequence
Management.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION RESPONSE UNITS

Question. What role do you believe JFCOM should play in the
training, assessment of readiness, and employment of units with WMD
response missions, such as the WMD-Civil Support Teams and the CBRNE
Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF)?
Answer. JFCOM will assume expanded responsibilities in training and
assessment for the National Guard centric CCMRF construct scheduled to
initial operational capability in fiscal year 2009. JFCOM is tasked to
ensure that Service training plans are in accordance with NORTHCOM
joint mission-essential tasks (JMETs) for CCMRF units, which is a
relatively new mission for JFCOM. JFCOM will also assess readiness
against those JMETs and report that assessment to the SECDEF monthly
and the Senior Readiness Oversight Council quarterly. JFCOM will not
employ those units, but will provide them in a timely manner to a
supported commander following SECDEF validation of a requirement.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

INDUSTRY ROLE IN NATO TRANSFORMATION

1. Senator Reed. General Mattis, the Department of Defense (DOD)
has developed a number of methods by which industry helps shape and
partner in efforts to transform military technology. Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM) participates in these types of outreach and partnership
efforts in a number of venues. What role do you feel U.S. and European
industry can play in shaping and accelerating the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) transformation?
General Mattis. The U.S. Armed Forces have benefited greatly by
close collaboration between the DOD and the defense industry in
development and production of systems that have greater joint utility,
but we still have much that needs to be done. Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements have benefited both DOD and industry when if
comes to developing new capabilities. This construct might also be used
by NATO to advance transformational concepts and ideas. We're hampered
by too much proprietary development and production, and a lack of
common and interoperable standards across the board. In this regard,
properly constituted and safeguarded ``reading rooms,'' open to
properly cleared persons, may permit government and industry to share
advances and facilitate making open architectures for our new systems.
Certainly partnerships with industry, academia, and business are
vital to modernizing NATO's armed forces. JFCOM currently partners with
Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in a number of areas. As Commander,
JFCOM, and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, it is my intent to
strengthen and institutionalize these bonds whenever possible and
wherever they make sense. Additionally, ACT already has a close working
relationship with NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors
(CNAD), the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), and the NATO
Research and Technology Board. ACT also has a close working
relationship with the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency
(NC3A) and the NATO Standardization Agency which facilitates
transformation. Recently, NATO established the Defense Leaders Forum
(DLF) which brings together the very best industry, academic, and
business leaders to discuss and identify solutions for a variety of
challenging issues. ACT is actively involved in the DLF and I'm eager
to find ways to expand this participation in the future to accelerate
transformation. Cooperation and collaboration among these organizations
is absolutely essential in equipping NATO forces with the very best
equipment available. Lastly, I look forward to learning more about
these organizations and how they contribute to NATO transformation
efforts.

2. Senator Reed. General Mattis, how would you seek to establish
and improve ties between NATO's transformation efforts and defense
industry?
General Mattis. In an Alliance of 26 nations, all with their own
vital national interests at stake and voting citizens who depend on
jobs in their national defense industries, improving the flow of
information across the Alliance and between nations and industries is a
challenge. Clearly, there needs to be transparency in NATO's dealings
with industry and a refined focus on developing processes to share
information with industries which are acceptable to all nations. This
will provide an overarching framework for the Nations of NATO to
cooperate with industry to accelerate transformation of our systems and
processes.
This means that cooperation with industry should embrace the full
spectrum of capability development to include:

The early, exploratory stage of research and
development where research is facilitated by a free exchange of
ideas.
At the informal level by promoting and leading
informal networking to benefit from each other's best
practices, trends, and helping industry understand at different
levels the Alliance's perspective of the future.
Down the road by recognizing that despite national
interests, pooling of efforts can be beneficial in specific
areas.
Promote closer ties with the European Defense Agency.

BATTLEFIELD CASUALTIES

3. Senator Reed. General Mattis, in your future role at NATO, you
must address the social, intellectual, and training dimensions of
transformation. Many believe that a major driver in European defense
policy discussions centers on casualty expectations and ways to reduce
casualties, including technology-based and doctrinal approaches. What
roles would you expect the concerns for casualties, both civil and
military, to drive the willingness of NATO to commit forces and how
will transformation affect such political processes and the resulting
decisions?
General Mattis. Reducing casualties may be a major concern for any
country, but especially those with a democratic form of government.
Since NATO is an Alliance of 26 nations, one must contend with 26
separate political systems. Public support throughout the Alliance
nations is undermined by fragile political consensus over intervention
or by the impact of protracted involvement. This is complicated if
protection measures appear to be insufficient for the forces, if
military casualties are the result of fratricide incidents resulting
from a clear lack of interoperability, or if opposing forces are
allowed to win the strategic communication battle. There is no doubt
casualties have impacted national politics and policies for some of
NATO Allies, and of course national caveats restricting the forces of
some nations from fully participating in combat operations have
hindered NATO efforts in fighting the enemy.
Reducing the number of casualties on the battlefield is a top
priority. My goal as Commander, ACT, will be to leverage existing and
future technologies to reduce casualties on the battlefield wherever
possible regardless of whether or not it impacts a nation's decision to
send military forces into combat. Transformation will affect the
process by enhancing and adapting force protection to today's
environment, by reducing fratricide risks through interoperability
improvements, by teaching NATO forces to adjust the use of force to the
environment they are operating in, and by supporting information
operations efforts.
But the primary method of reducing casualties, whether from enemy
fires or fratricide, will seldom be technology based. Sound training of
leadership, smooth information-sharing processes in headquarters
staffed by officers who have mastered their warfighting skills,
cohesive formations that have trained together and integrated their
activities prior to entering the combat zone, and a shared appreciation
of the enemy situation (from the strategic to the tactical/small unit
level) will often be most fundamental to casualty reduction. We can
embolden our allies if we develop a shared appreciation for the threat
and ensure that we are doing everything possible, with technology and
sound military training, to reduce casualties to absolute minimums.

NATO TRANSFORMATION

4. Senator Reed. General Mattis, what institutions are in place
within NATO to accelerate technological transformation?
General Mattis. I think clearly the establishment of ACT as one of
the only two strategic commands in NATO was a monumental step. Other
institutions are:

NIAG is a subordinate organization of the CNAD and is
a key link between the military, nations, and industry.
CNAD and its five subordinate organizations
NATO Research and Technology Organization
NATO Standardization Organization and Standardization
Committee or Standardization Agency

I look forward to working with the military committee and the
Conference of National Armament Directors in official venues such as
the DLF and ACT Industry Day conferences.

5. Senator Reed. General Mattis, what are their authorities and
what are their responsibilities?
General Mattis. I cannot adequately answer this question at the
present time since I have not had an opportunity to fully review the
roles and missions of the aforementioned organizations. A full
assessment of authorities and responsibilities that are present or that
may be needed is on my agenda after I have taken command of ACT, and I
welcome the opportunity to discuss this with Senator Reed once I'm more
conversant on these complex issues.

6. Senator Reed. General Mattis, there is a great difficulty in
doing away with NATO programs that no longer fit within the
``transformed'' strategic NATO capabilities. What ideas would you
suggest in promoting ways to enable NATO to end investments in
capabilities that no longer fit within the structure of a transformed
organization?
General Mattis. I cannot adequately answer this question at the
present time since I have not had an opportunity to review NATO's List
of Required Capabilities, the Long-Term Capability Requirements list or
the Prioritized List of Capabilities Shortfalls. Nor have I been
briefed on the results of the Defense Readiness Review process.
However, one of my first steps as Commander, ACT, will be to conduct a
review of these documents in coordination and consultation with Allied
Command Operations and the Defense Review Committee. Programs that do
not satisfy NATO capability requirements outlined by the Defense Review
Committee or that are obsolete should be considered for termination.
Since money is a finite resource it is important that NATO use its
available resources as efficiently and wisely as possible. It is my
responsibility to be a conscientious steward of NATO Euros and to
ensure NATO is getting the best return on its investment by producing
the most effective capabilities possible.
As a preface to how I will approach this process of adapting/
modernizing our forces, I will ensure that we rigorously define the
military problem that needs to be solved--what desired accomplishment
is not currently being achieved. By working with our NATO allies to
sufficiently define the problem, we will better work together to divest
irrelevant capabilities and create capabilities necessary for today and
tomorrow's security. Without first adequately defining the problems we
face, no relevant modernization of our capabilities can be achieved.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

NATIONAL GUARD READINESS

7. Senator Collins. General Mattis, I am concerned about the level
of readiness of the National Guard for domestic and civil support
missions. This year, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, General H.
Steven Blum testified before the Commission on the National Guard and
Reserves that ``88 percent of the forces that are back here in the
United States after having been deployed are very poorly equipped today
in the Army National Guard.'' A Government Accountability Office report
that was also released this past year found that most State National
Guard leaders have expressed concerns about having sufficient equipment
to respond effectively to a large-scale disaster, whether natural or
manmade. In addition, a March 2007 report by the congressionally
chartered independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has
found that many Army and Air National Guard units stationed in the
United States are rated ``not ready.'' As the Joint Force Provider,
what is your assessment today of the Guard's current level of readiness
to provide adequate support to civil authorities in the event of
another catastrophic event like Hurricane Katrina?
General Mattis. I appreciate Lieutenant General Blum's testimony
and candor regarding the readiness of the National Guard. The high
tempo of operations and demands of global war on terrorism have
strained the Guard just as it has strained the Active component forces.
Material readiness remains a considerable challenge for all of our
forces; Active, Guard, and Reserve. In my role, as Joint Force Provider
and Joint Force Trainer, I look forward to working with Lieutenant
General Blum, the National Guard Bureau, and the Joint Staff in
identifying and finding ways to improve joint training and readiness
for National Guard units so they are capable of performing a wide range
of missions.
Providing adequate resources to the National Guard is one way of
ensuring they are properly equipped to perform their core missions.
Requested supplemental appropriations are specifically intended to
address material shortcomings, especially in Active Army and Army
National Guard units. During the next fiscal year, particular attention
is being paid to those National Guard units assigned to the Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive Consequence
Management Forces (CCMRF). Those units assigned to CCMRF missions will
have priority with regard to equipment fielding. The increased
equipping priority recognizes the importance of providing timely
support to civil authorities following any disaster, whether natural or
manmade. This increased readiness will assist Governors in their
domestic efforts when they employ their National Guard as well.
As noted in the question, the challenges with equipping National
Guard Forces are considerable; although, even when constrained by
equipment shortfalls is still capable of responding to domestic
disasters in support of State and Federal directives. Our job as senior
leaders, both military and civilian, is to ensure that we provide the
resources that enable our National Guardsmen to perform their duty
effectively today and tomorrow when the call comes.
______

[The nomination reference of Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis,
USMC, follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
September 12, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment to the grade of general
in the United States Marine Corps while assigned to a position of
importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General

Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, 0000.
______

[The biographical sketch of Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Resume of Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC
Assigned: 14 Aug. 2006.

Projected Rotation: 8 Nov. 2007.

Education/Oualifications:
Central Washington State University, BS, 1971
National War College, MS, 1994
The Basic School, 1972
Amphibious Warfare School, 1978
Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1985
National War College, 1994
Capstone, 2001
JFLCC, 2004
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 2006
Pinnacle, 2006
Infantry Officer
Joint Specialty Officer

Date of rank: 1 Jan. 2005.

Date of birth: 8 Sep. 1950.

Date commissioned: 9 Feb. 1972.

MRD: 1 July 10.

Languages: None.

Commands:
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (Lt.
Gen.: Oct. 2004-Aug. 2006).
Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Maj. Gen.: Aug. 2002-Aug.
2004).
Deputy Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force; and
Commanding General, 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (BGen: July 2001-
July 2002).
Commanding Officer, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Col.: June
1994-June 1996).
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Lt.Col.: Feb. 1990-
May 1992).
Commanding Officer, Recruiting Station Portland, OR (Maj: June
1985-Aug. 1988)

Joint assignments:
Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (BGen:
Mar. 2000-June 2001).
Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Col: June
1996-June 1998).

Service staff assignments:
Director, Manpower Plans and Policies Division (BGen: Aug. 1998-
Feb. 2000).
Head, Enlisted Assignments, Personnel Management Division (LtCol:
Apr. 1992-Aug. 1993).
Executive Officer, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (LtCol: Aug.
1989-Feb. 1990).
Operations Officer, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (LtCol: June
1989-July 1989).
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Lt. Gen. James
N. Mattis, USMC, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
James N. Mattis.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, United States Joint Forces Command and Supreme Allied
Commander, Transformation.

3. Date of nomination:
September 1, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
September 8, 1950; Pullman, WA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Single.

7. Names and ages of children:
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member of U.S. Naval Institute.
Member of Marine Corps Association.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 27, 2007,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on September 28, 2007.]

NOMINATIONS OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS; HON. DOUGLAS A.
BROOK TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
AND COMPTROLLER; AND MAJ. GEN. ROBERT L. SMOLEN, USAF, (RET.) TO BE
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION

----------

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, McCaskill,
Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, and Thune.
Other Senators present: Senators Stevens and Inouye.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel;
Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss,
minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff
member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Kristine
L. Svinicki, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Ali Z.
Pasha, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator
Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen
C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, Mark Powers,
and Nathan Reese, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Lindsey Neas, assistant to
Senator Dole; and Stuart C. Mallory and Jason Van Beek,
assistants to Senator Thune.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
The committee meets today to consider the nominations of
John Young to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics; Doug Brook to be Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller; and
Robert Smolen to be the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
Before I proceed with a brief introduction, I just want to
give everybody the good, reassuring news that Senator Warner is
doing just great. Many of us have checked in with his office,
and everybody on this committee, everybody in the Senate, was
worried about him, but I think our worries are over. The
doctors have advised us, and this is as recently as the last
few minutes when I checked with his office, that his heart is
behaving; it's probably behaving a lot better than he is, as a
matter of fact. The expectation remains that he will be home
over the weekend, and back at work next week. After talking to
his office, I would not be surprised to see him leaving the
hospital ahead of expectations. His wife, Jeanne, of course, is
doing great, and she has been with him consistently, morning
and night; and her being there is, I am sure, a big boost to
him. So, we'll start off with that good news this morning.
We welcome our nominees and their families to today's
hearing. We know the long hours that senior Department of
Defense (DOD) officials put in every day. We appreciate the
sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make to serve our
country. They will not be alone in making these sacrifices, so
we will thank, in advance, the families of our nominees for the
support and assistance that we know that they will provide to
our nominees, and that the nominees need.
I'd like to extend a particular welcome to Mr. Young, who
is well known to this committee because of his service here in
the Senate from 1993 to 2001 as a professional staff member for
the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations
Committee. Mr. Young has come before us for confirmation twice
before, once as the President's nominee to be Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition, and once as the nominee to be the DOD's Director
of Defense Research and Engineering. He has served admirably in
both capacities.
Later on, we will ask you, Mr. Young and the other
nominees, to introduce members of your family, but we think we
will hold off on doing that until each of you make your opening
statements, so that I can call on Senator Inhofe and then
Senator Stevens, who I know has a hectic schedule.
Mr. Young, if confirmed, will assume leadership of the
DOD's acquisition organization at a particularly difficult
time. Far too many of our major weapons acquisitions have been
plagued by cost increases, late deliveries to the warfighters,
and performance shortfalls. Earlier this year, the Department
reported that 25 of its major defense acquisition programs had
overruns of at least 50 percent. Since that time, the
Department has added six more major weapons systems to that
list. Over the last few years, we've seen an alarming lack of
acquisition planning across the Department, the excessive use
of time and materials contracts, undefinitized and other open-
ended commitments of DOD funds, and a pervasive failure to
perform contract oversight and management functions necessary
to protect the taxpayers' interest. The root cause of these and
other problems in the defense acquisition system is our failure
to maintain an acquisition workforce with the resources and
skills needed to manage the Department's acquisition system.
Earlier this year, the Acquisition Advisory Panel,
chartered pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act of
Fiscal Year 2004, reported that ``The Federal Government does
not have the capacity in its current acquisition workforce
necessary to meet the demands that have been placed on it. The
failure of the DOD, other Federal agencies, to adequately fund
the acquisition workforce,'' the panel concluded, ``is penny
wise and pound foolish, as it seriously undermines the pursuit
of good value for the expenditure of public resources.''
Mr. Brook served as Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Financial Management in the first Bush administration, but he
has another high qualification; he grew up in east Detroit.
That's just a few miles from where I live. He attended the
University of Michigan, graduating with a bachelor of arts
degree in 1965, and a master of public administration degree in
1967. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management, and Comptroller, Mr. Brook will face the
challenge of balancing the demands of ongoing operations and
current readiness against the acquisition programs important to
the future of the Navy. He will also play a key role in
modernizing the Navy's business systems so that they can
provide timely, accurate, and reliable financial information
needed to manage the Department.
Finally, Mr. Smolen has served in the U.S. Air Force for
more than 30 years, rising to command positions at Air Force
Space Command, Pacific Air Forces, and Air Force Materiel
Command. Mr. Smolen, if confirmed as Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs, will be responsible for maintaining the
safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile without
conducting nuclear testing. Many of those who have assisted in
performing this function in the past are at or past retirement
age. Attracting new scientists and engineers with the right
skills to meet the challenges of maintaining the stockpile,
retaining those with necessary expertise and experience, and
making sure that the knowledge is passed down, will be an
increasingly difficult challenge in the next few years.
Let me call, first, on Senator Inhofe. Then, Senator
Stevens, we will call upon you. I understand Senator Inouye may
also be coming. But let me first call on our acting ranking
member, Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You've already adequately explained why Senator Warner
isn't here, and I do have his statement; I'd like to read just
two sentences; and then put the entire statement in the record.
Chairman Levin. Please.
Senator Inhofe. In talking about the three nominees today,
Senator Warner states, ``I believe these nominees are excellent
choices. I would like to further voice my unqualified support
for their swift confirmation. I would also like to offer my
thanks and gratitude to their families for their service and
support.''
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

Mr Chairman, regrettably, I am unable to attend this hearing today
to receive the nominations of John J. Young, Jr. to be Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Douglas A. Brook
to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and
Comptroller; and Robert L. Smolen, to be Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration. I believe
these nominees are excellent choices, and I would like to further voice
my unqualified support for their swift confirmation. I would also like
to offer my thanks and gratitude to their families for their service
and support.
Over his career, Mr. Young has established an outstanding record of
service, working in a variety of posts in the government as well as in
the private sector. Currently, Mr. Young serves as the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering, a job he has held since 2005. In this
position, Mr. Young overseas the $70 billion defense research
enterprise, including the research laboratories of the armed services
and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Prior to
this, Mr. Young successfully served as the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. In addition, as a
former professional staff member of the Senate Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee, he is well versed in the workings of Congress,
particularly the committees which have jurisdiction over the armed
services. I expect that this experience will be useful throughout his
testimony today.
Mr. Young has had a distinguished public service career with over a
decade of service to his country and I am pleased to offer my strong
support for his nomination. He is eminently qualified to serve as Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Likewise, Dr. Brook's service as a professor of public policy and
Director of the Center for Defense Management Reform at the Naval Post
Graduate School make him uniquely qualified for the position of
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and
Comptroller.
Major General (Retired) Smolen will also bring a wealth of
experience to his duties as the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, including over
three decades of service in the United States Air Force where he
commanded at every level and served as the Director of the Air Force
Office of Nuclear and Counterproliferation.
If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working together with
these distinguished nominees to address the matters that currently
confront our military during this challenging period in our history.

Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I have had a chance to get to
know the nominees who are here today. I feel very good about
them. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, each one has an excellent
background and, I think they are qualified for the positions
for which they are nominated.
Mr. Young, you joined the staff of the Senate
Appropriations Committee from the private sector in 1993. You
served from 2001 to 2005 as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition, and, in 2005, became
the Director of Defense Engineering and Technology, DOD's Chief
Technology Officer. Earlier this year, you were assigned duties
as Principal Deputy. The diversity of your experience provides
you with unique qualifications to build on your predecessor,
promising initiatives and programs, as well as to meet the
pressing demands that come with the position of the chief
procurement officer for the DOD.
Mr. Brook served as Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Financial Management from 1990 to 1992. You have a wealth of
experience in business, government, military service, as a Navy
Reserve Supply Corps officer, and, most recently, in academia.
We appreciate your willingness to leave your current position
at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey, CA, and return
to Washington to serve in a similar capacity with the
Department of the Navy. I understand that Senator Warner
introduced you at your last nomination hearing, in February
1990. I happened to be there at the time. I'm sure he would
endorse you, as I said, in his opening statement.
Major General Smolen, your Air Force service since you were
commissioned in 1974 is extraordinary. I would only say that,
in all the accomplishments you've done, you conspicuously left
off the most significant thing about your career, and that is
your 2 years as wing commander at Tinker Air Force Base in
Oklahoma. So, without objection, I'd like his resume to include
that, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]
The positions to which you have all been nominated are
enormously important to our national security in the
organizations in which you serve. The personnel you will lead
are some of the most dedicated public servants in the Federal
workforce, and I believe that you folks are qualified to do
that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
We're delighted to have Senator Stevens with us to
introduce one of our nominees. I don't know if there's any
higher praise that can be given to a nominee than what fellow
staff members give to them, and our staffs are very, very high
in their praise of you, Mr. Young. But, I think, if there is
any higher praise, it would come from a Senator who knows you,
perhaps, better than any other Member of the U.S. Senate,
Senator Stevens.

STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
ALASKA

Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'd ask that my statement be included in the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
[The prepared statement of Senator Stevens follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Ted Stevens

It is an honor to introduce John Young to the committee today.
I have known John for the past 16 years. From 1991 to 2001, he
served as a staff member on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee,
which I co-chair with my good friend, Senator Dan Inouye. He is truly
bipartisan in that he worked for both Senator Inouye and myself. John
was a valuable member of our staff. He first came to our committee as a
Congressional Fellow from Sandia National Labs. He became a
professional staff member in 1993 and served as the staff analyst for a
variety of Department of Defense (DOD) programs.
President Bush nominated John to serve as the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition in 2001. He has
proved in this role that he is a skilled leader dedicated to ensuring
our men and women in uniform have the resources they need to complete
the mission.
John was instrumental in achieving significant improvements and
efficiencies in Navy's acquisition programs. He used innovative methods
to achieve cost savings in a variety of programs which had a tremendous
benefit to the Department of the Navy.
John's success as Assistant Secretary led President Bush to
nominate him to serve as Director of Defense Research and Engineering.
He has served in that position for the past 2 years and achieved a
series of major accomplishments related to his responsibilities. For
example, John formed and guided a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
(MRAP) vehicle Task Force at Secretary of Defense direction to ensure
the successful and coordinated delivery of the maximum number of MRAP
vehicles to deployed forces during calendar year 2007.
He led a DOD Energy Task Force which coordinated DOD efforts and
developed new initiatives.
He coalesced and coordinated DOD efforts on Biometrics to ensure
the program's successful support of global war on terrorism operations,
to gain greater collaboration across the components, and to engage the
interagency process in DOD Biometric activities.
He published a DOD Science and Technology Strategic Plan.
I am confident that John will approach his new position with the
same commitment and dedication he exhibited during his time as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy and as Director of Defense Research and
Engineering.
I join my co-chair and good friend, Senator Inouye, in supporting
his nomination, and I urge the committee to act swiftly on this matter.
Thank you.

Senator Stevens. You have each, members of the committee,
mentioned his background. Let me add that he actually became a
member of the Senate staff in 1991, when he came to us as a
congressional fellow from the Sandia National Labs before we
convinced him that he should join the staff of the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee. I can tell you, without any
question, that he's a man of integrity, commitment, and,
really, totally devoted to his position. He's also a pretty
good tennis player. With his help, I've been able to best
Senator Warner. He won't mind me mentioning that, because it's
not very often that that happens. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. We'll notify Senator Warner of that.
Senator Stevens. That'll wake him up, that's for sure.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. That'll get his heart going.
Senator Stevens. He was Director of Defense Research and
Engineering. He has been really outstanding in several ways.
For instance, I'm not sure you know that he formed and guided
the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle that we're
all so interested in, to ensure that it's successful, and
coordinated the delivery of the maximum number of MRAPs to be
deployed in calendar year 2007. He led the DOD Energy Task
Force, which has come up with several new initiatives. He
coordinated the DOD efforts on biometrics, and above all, he
has published a DOD Science and Technology (S&T) Strategic
Plan.
He's the right man for the right job. I tell you, I don't
know of any person that I have known in the time I have been
with my good friend, Senator Inouye, as one of us has been
chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee since 1981,
I think, of all the people that we've had who knew something
about the DOD, and particularly in the area in which he is,
really, very, very qualified, John Young has distinguished
himself. So, we're proud that he has been nominated for this
position, and we hope that you'll confirm him very rapidly.
It's an honor to be here with him and his family. You'll
find he has two fine young baseball players to greet you today.
Beyond that, he's a good father.
So, I recommend him highly, and hope we'll confirm him
quickly.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Stevens. Senator Inouye will be along. The two of
us have conducted our subcommittee in a manner that we are
chairman and co-chairman. When I stepped out and Senator Inouye
became chairman the first time, John Young remained in his
position and worked for the whole committee. We have that type
of subcommittee, and I do believe that you'll find he is a man
that's committed to the DOD in a totally nonpartisan concept.
He's a man of his word.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Stevens. That is a very
meaningful statement, indeed.
We're going to ask our witnesses, now, the standard set of
questions that we ask all of the nominees that come before us.
You can answer together.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest? [All three witnesses answered
in the affirmative.]
Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation
process? [All three witnesses answered in the negative.]
Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines
established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings? [All three witnesses answered in
the affirmative.]
Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests? [All three witnesses
answered in the affirmative.]
Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings? [All three witnesses answered in the
affirmative.]
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon
request, before this committee? [All three witnesses answered
in the affirmative.]
Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when
requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with
the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or
denial in providing such documents? [All three witnesses
answered in the affirmative.]
We thank you all.
Why don't we start with you, Mr. Young, with your opening
statement. If you would, please introduce your family or
friends that are with you, we'd love to meet them, as well.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and distinguished
members of the committee, actually, I thank you very much for
that opportunity.
I would not be here today if it were not for the love and
support of my wife, Barbara, my children, Nathan, William, and
Kathryn. They have directly and indirectly contributed to my
previous positions, and they will be a vital part of my ability
to perform the duties of this position, if confirmed. My
children were 10, 7, and 4 years old when they joined me for my
first appearance before this committee. So, they do mark time
for me, and, to some extent, for you.
First, I'm honored that President Bush, Secretary Gates,
and Secretary England have extended me their confidence and
support in nominating me to lead the defense acquisition team.
Chairman Levin. I wonder if we could interrupt you. I see
that a dear friend of yours and ours has arrived, I know he
wants to say a few words, and I know the kind of schedule he is
keeping.
We indicated, Senator Inouye, that you would probably be
able to get here, and I don't think Mr. Young would mind it one
bit if we interrupt his opening comments so that you could add
your introduction and support. Senator Stevens just also spoke.
So, let me interrupt you, Mr. Young, to welcome Senator
Inouye.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF HAWAII

Senator Inouye. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, Senator Sessions, Senator
Collins, I'm pleased to be here to introduce Mr. John Young,
the President's nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
As many of you will recall, on two occasions I've had the
privilege of introducing Mr. Young to this committee as the
President's nominee for positions within DOD. I'm pleased to
again speak for him in this new position for which he has been
nominated.
John Young left the committee to serve as the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition, and has been serving as the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering. In both of these positions, he has
earned high marks from senior leadership in DOD. These
accomplishments are too numerous to list, but his tireless
efforts to reform our business practices in shipbuilding,
aircraft manufacturing, and weapons procurement are very well
known to this committee and to the entire defense industry.
Mr. Young's long experience in acquisition matters for
Congress, DOD, and the private sector make him uniquely
equipped to become the next Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Therefore, I am most pleased to reintroduce him to you
formally, even though I know that many of you have gotten to
know him over the past 16 years. I again recommend him to you
without equivocation.
Mr. Chairman and members, he's a good person.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inouye. He's my friend.
Chairman Levin. Nothing more needs to be said. Thank you so
much, Senator Inouye for getting here.
Senator Inouye. I thank you very much.
Congratulations, John.
Mr. Young. Senator, thank you so much.
Chairman Levin. Okay, Mr. Young, let us now return to you
for your opening statement.
Mr. Young. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman.
I am honored that President Bush, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary England have extended to me their confidence and
support in nominating me to lead the defense acquisition team.
Second, I believe it is critical for the defense
acquisition executive to serve with the affirmation of the
United States Senate. Thus, I am very appreciative of the
committee's efforts to schedule and conduct this confirmation
hearing.
I'm also very grateful to Senator Inouye and Senator
Stevens for their kind words of introduction. Their service to
this Nation, their leadership, and their strong support for the
men and women who serve our Nation provide a true example for
me, and I have sought to constantly apply the principles I
learned from these gentlemen.
I believe my experiences have well prepared me for this
challenge. I have served almost 2 years as the Director of
Defense Research and Engineering. I also had the privilege of
serving for over 4 years as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research, Development, and Acquisition. Prior to that, I
worked for 10 years on the staff of the Senate, providing
oversight and analysis of aircraft procurement accounts, as
well as virtually all research, development, tests, and
evaluation programs. Finally, I have worked in industry and at
Sandia National Labs as an engineer and project manager. I
believe that the breadth, depth, and relevance of these
experiences will allow me to effectively serve as the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, if confirmed.
I believe strongly in the capability and dedication of the
defense acquisition team. However, I also believe that we need
to make a number of course corrections to improve our
performance. Our past efforts have delivered tremendous weapons
systems and remarkable capability; however, the cost growth the
Department has experienced represents a detrimental lost
opportunity to procure greater quantities or additional new
systems and capabilities. We must seek to deliver systems
within the budget in order to avoid cutting healthy programs or
to allow the acquisition team to deliver greater capability in
other areas.
We need to take a more active role in engaging the
requirements process, as the acquisition team. We must mature
technologies before moving into the costly final phases of
development. We must seek jointness and interoperability,
irrespective of service programs and budgets. We have to
provide a robust set of tools for the men and women who have
volunteered to protect and defend this Nation's freedom.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this
committee and Congress. I assure you that I will work with
determination to make these course corrections.
I would offer my thanks to each of you for your support of
every member of the DOD team, and I appreciate the chance to
appear before the committee today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Young.
General Smolen.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT L. SMOLEN, USAF, (RET.), TO BE
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

General Smolen. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, distinguished
members of the committee, I am both humbled and honored to be
the President's nominee for the position of Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs at the Department of
Energy's (DOE) NNSA.
First, I appreciate the confidence placed in me by
Secretary Bodman, and also by the NNSA Administrator, Tom
D'Agostino.
If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure the safe
and efficient operations of the nuclear weapons complex while
preparing NNSA's Defense Programs for the future to better meet
the needs of the 21st century.
I'd like to take this time, sir, to introduce my wife,
Andree. She has really been the Rock of Gibralter through 33
years worth of military service and more moves than I can
stand. I certainly appreciate her willingness to allow me to,
again, hopefully, continue to serve this great Nation.
I have three adult children. They're spread out all over,
and, unfortunately, are unable to be here today, but I also
want to thank them for the support they've given me throughout
the years, and their understanding.
As I began to think about my retirement from the Air Force,
which was just a couple of months ago, I originally thought
that perhaps I would pursue employment outside of government,
and I really hadn't contemplated anything of the nature of the
job that I am coming to talk to you about. I've always been a
big believer in public service, obviously. When the phone rang,
and I was asked if I would like to be considered for this
position, I simply believed it to be an extension of my service
to the Nation in uniform, and I knew instantly that I wanted to
pursue this challenge. I believe, if confirmed, that I will
continue to make a difference by building on this lifetime of
service. Nothing has made me prouder than serving my Nation,
with 33 years of military service, the last 10 of which I was
closely involved in operational nuclear issues within the Air
Force. Prior to my last assignment, which was the Commander of
the Air Force District of Washington, I served first as the
Deputy Director of Air Force Nuclear and Counterproliferation,
and later as the director of that office, before going over to
the White House, where I was the Director of Strategic
Capabilities Policy that encompassed all of the nuclear
programs, as well.
Prior to that, as Senator Inhofe mentioned, I had a number
of opportunities to command, one of which was at Tinker Air
Force Base. I have commanded at the squadron group wing and
major command level.
I trust that the background that I have demonstrates that I
can appropriately be qualified to be the Deputy Administrator
for Defense Programs; and to enhance my knowledge and
expertise, if confirmed, I plan to immediately engage with
those people who can help me better understand the complexities
of the issues and prioritize the challenges before NNSA's
defense programs. This will include meeting with staff and
managers in key parts of the program, both at headquarters and
in the field, along with NNSA's and DOE's management, their key
partners, such as the DOD and the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board, and Congress, as well.
As a result of dramatic improvements in procedures, tools,
and policies, just this week, NNSA announced that they
increased the rate of nuclear weapon dismantlements for fiscal
year 2007 by 146 percent over last year's level. They are
ensuring that these weapons can no longer be used again, and
thus, demonstrating that the United States is serious about
nonproliferation leadership role in the global community. I'm
also equally proud of the steps taken to fulfill the
President's direction to reduce the stockpile to nearly one-
half by 2012, compared to the 2001 levels.
I'm encouraged by NNSA's future plans to transform and
reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile and develop a supporting
infrastructure that is more modern, smaller, efficient, and
more secure to meet the challenges of tomorrow. I support the
ongoing studies to evaluate whether we should pursue a strategy
of reliable replacement to our cold war nuclear warheads. These
studies will allow NNSA to gather the data necessary for this
and subsequent administrations, in consultation with Congress,
to make decisions on our nuclear weapon stockpile.
In addition to the contribution of NNSA's dismantlement
efforts, the reliable replacement strategy also offers positive
implications for our nonproliferation objectives. The reduced
possibility of the need to conduct underground tests to
diagnose or remedy a stockpile reliability problem will bolster
efforts to dissuade other countries from testing.
If confirmed as the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, I will draw upon over 30 years of service in national
security matters to provide continued sound leadership for the
men and women of NNSA who work so hard on these critical
missions. With your approval, it would be my great privilege to
continue my career of service with NNSA.
I thank you very much for allowing me to be here today to
be able to address, and for your consideration for this
important position.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.
Dr. Brook?

STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS A. BROOK TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER

Dr. Brook. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate
very much your scheduling this hearing today to consider my
nomination. I am, similarly, honored that the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy have put
forth my nomination, and that I have the opportunity to appear
before you today.
I'm accompanied today by my wife, Mariana, seated behind
me. We've been married for 33 years. Mariana is a native of
Charlotte, NC, and we currently live in Pacific Grove, CA.
Seated next to Mariana is Professor Cynthia King. Dr. King is a
colleague of mine at the Naval Postgraduate School, and I'm
gratified at the support that I have from the President, the
Provost, the Dean, and my faculty colleagues at the Naval
Postgraduate School.
Mr. Chairman, it was 17 years ago that I last appeared
before this committee in the capacity of a nominee. I believe
you were a member of the committee, Mr. Chairman, as were some
other of your colleagues. At that time, Senator Warner
presented me, as Senator Inhofe mentioned, as a nominee for
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management. I now
find myself before you today as the nominee to be Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management.
If I recall correctly, at that hearing 17 years ago, I
pledged to the committee that, if confirmed, I would work, to
the best of my ability, to meet my responsibilities under title
10, and to exercise responsible leadership over the financial
operations of the Army.
Today, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I make
that same pledge to you. If confirmed, I will work, to the best
of my ability, to fulfill my duties under title 10 and exercise
responsible leadership over the financial operations of the
Department of the Navy.
Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for considering my
nomination. I am pleased to respond to your questions or
comments, and to hear your advice and concerns.
Chairman Levin. Okay. We're going to try an 8-minute first
round of questioning.
Mr. Young, let me start with you. As you mentioned, and I
mentioned in my opening statement, we have a large number of
major defense acquisition programs that have exceeded their
cost estimates by significant amounts. In January 2007, it was
reported that of the 25 defense acquisition programs that did
exceed their estimate by that amount, 8 were in the Army, 8 in
the Navy, and 9 in the Air Force. Another six have exceeded
their critical cost-growth threshold since then. Why is it, do
you think, that so many of our programs are so far over budget?
Mr. Young. I believe, sir, there are, unfortunately, a
number of factors in it. One, our budget process seeks to make,
in some cases, optimistic estimates about what it will cost to
develop a system and how much time it will take to deliver that
system. Then, we frequently set the requirements bar
optimistically high, in hopes that the technology will come in
a timely way to meet that requirement. When all those forces
collide, you end up with an optimistic schedule, excessive
requirements, and not enough funding. Then, you get in a spiral
where the programs take longer and cost significantly more. The
decisions you make along the way are suboptimal. It would be my
hope to do a much better job of structuring programs to
realistic requirements, realistic schedules, and as realistic
as possible an estimate of the budget it will take to do that,
and then manage those carefully. Programs have to be managed as
a contact sport, and I think, as you said, Mr. Chairman, we
probably need to look hard at making sure we have adequate
talent in the DOD to manage those programs.
Chairman Levin. One of the shifts that has occurred over
time, Mr. Young, is that the DOD now spends more for the
acquisition of services than it does for products, including
major weapons systems. Yet, the DOD Inspector General (IG) and
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have reported that
the Department consistently fails to conduct required
acquisition planning and contract oversight functions for its
service contracts. So, the GAO now is reporting that the DOD is
``ill-positioned to determine whether it is getting what it
pays for under these service contracts.'' Can you tell us what
steps you think you might be able to take, when confirmed, to
ensure that the taxpayers are getting their money's worth from
the $100 billion-plus that the DOD spends every year on
contracting for services?
Mr. Young. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there are efforts underway
now to develop a consistent set of policies across the DOD for
acquiring services and to coordinate the purchases of
procurements between the services, and then, wherever possible,
use competition as the driving force to help improve the value
we get. Then we have to take steps to increase, as you've said,
our oversight of those contracts. I will push in all of those
areas to improve our acquisition of services.
Chairman Levin. Last week, the Congress Daily reported that
the Army is currently unable to take delivery of more than
1,000 badly-needed family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV)
trucks, because the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) parts in
the truck's engine and transmissions contain specialty metals
that don't comply with the Berry Amendment. Until this issue is
addressed, the DOD will reportedly be unable to accept 2,200
trucks that are now under contract, or to order any additional
trucks from that contractor.
Now, there's a rule, being currently considered by the DOD,
which is called a COTS waiver, that would enable it to accept
delivery of the FMTVs and other similar systems which contain
these small amounts, presumably inadvertently, of COTS items.
Do you know, offhand, the status of that rulemaking? How
quickly would you hope that the DOD can address this problem?
Mr. Young. I tried to get the status of this in preparation
for the hearing, sir, and we have been able to accept a portion
of those vehicles under the COTS waiver you talked about,
because the law was changed, and the change in the law has
affected it. We were building trucks in stride, and the law
changed. Some of those trucks we have now been able to accept
with a COTS waiver. For another portion of the trucks, in new
orders, we have to take additional steps. I believe there's a
determination of nonavailability that will help us continue
procuring the trucks that the military must have.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Dr. Brook, let me ask you a few questions now. The DOD has
been working, over the last 6 years, to develop a business
enterprise architecture to ensure that its business systems
work in a coordinated manner to provide timely, accurate, and
reliable information to the managers of the DOD. Unfortunately,
the Comptroller General has reported that the enterprise
architectures of the military departments are not mature enough
to responsibly guide and constrain investment in business
systems. According to the GAO, the Navy has fully satisfied
only 10 of the 31 core framework elements of an enterprise
architecture. Are you familiar with this problem? If so, what
would be your plans to address it?
Dr. Brook. I am not familiar with the details of the
problem, but I sympathize with the statements of the
Comptroller General. This has been a difficult undertaking for
the DOD over many years, to conduct systems modernization and
get to the desired goal. I'm not sure what the Comptroller
General means, completely, when he talks about the maturity of
systems modernization, but, if confirmed, I would consider that
to be part of my responsibilities to look into, and I will look
forward to working with you on that topic, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Would you, when you're confirmed, get back
to us after you've had a chance to review that issue? Let us
know what steps are being taken.
Dr. Brook. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Developing a business Enterprise Architecture for an organization
as large and diverse as the Department of the Navy is a complex task.
Having been recently confirmed, I will provide my written response to
your office in January 2008 giving me the opportunity to thoroughly
review details associated with this issue.

Chairman Levin. Over the last several years, the DOD has
taken a number of steps to realign its management structure to
expedite and enhance its business transformation efforts. The
DOD established a new Defense Business Systems Management
Committee, the Business Transformation Agency, and Investment
Review Boards. The military departments do not appear to have
taken similar organizational steps, and decisionmaking remains
stovepiped in separate chains of command for financial
management, information technology management, acquisition
management, and other functions. Do you believe, Dr. Brook,
that the organizational structure of the Department of the Navy
is properly aligned to bring about business systems
modernization and financial management improvements? If not,
what steps do you plan on taking, if you're familiar enough to
share those with us?
Dr. Brook. Senator, I'm not entirely sure that the
Department of the Navy's governance structure for business
management reform is aligned with DOD, and I need more
information in order to respond intelligently toward that.
I do see that the DOD has, as you've mentioned, been
evolving different organizations and different alignments for
governance and implementation of business systems reform, and
it seems to me that if the Services, including the Navy,
perceive stability at the DOD level, it should follow suit with
their own organizational alignment.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Back, many years ago, at the first confirmation hearing of
Secretary Rumsfeld, I was pointing out some problems, as I saw
it, because the people of America have the expectation that we
would have the best of everything, and I am just contending
that we did not. So, in pursuing this with Secretary Rumsfeld,
I said, ``all the generals get together, and they're going to
decide, what are we going to need 10 years from now?'' and
they're going to be wrong. I've said, several times, Mr.
Chairman, when I was in the House Armed Services Committee, we
had someone, in 1994, testify that in 10 years we wouldn't need
ground troops. So, I said, ``Well, how do you resolve the
problem?'' He said, ``Well, for the entire 20th century, the
defense spending was 5.7 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP). After the drawdown of the 1990s, it went down to 2.7
percent.'' Now, unfortunately, when something happens, and then
you get into a war, you have to spend money on the things that
are bleeding the most, and quite often, that's not S&T.
According to a recent press report, you recently sent a
memorandum to the Secretary of Defense in which you assess
current spending of defense S&T as inadequate to keep pace with
emerging threats. The report concluded that the Pentagon has
been ``coasting on basic science investments of the last
century and noted that major corporations have disestablished
science centers and research labs.'' You concluded, ``The
reality is that the DOD is the predominant source of funds
pursuing basic and applied research in the physical sciences.''
I guess the question would be, are you concerned about the
adequacy of the current investment in S&T? What would you do to
improve it?
Mr. Young. I think, Senator, I offer a couple of answers.
Behind some of the context of that report and that memo is the
fact that S&T spending today in the DOD, on a historical basis,
going back 25 years, is at roughly its highest level that it's
been. In constant-dollar terms, we have a very high level of
S&T spending, presently.
To be fair, Secretary Gates asked me to offer him ideas
about the health of the S&T programs in areas where we can make
investments. I believe the S&T program could be more robust,
because we now find ourselves with new challenges. The S&T
program, that is healthy now, was largely defined, while it's
not totally true; we've made adjustments, but a lot of it was
defined by adversaries we expected to face on more conventional
battlefields. Today, as you know very well, the global war on
terrorism is facing unconventional adversaries on
unconventional battlefields, and that demands new investments
in other areas. So, I do believe there are some demands to
investigate new technologies that could help us in the warfare
we'll face in the future, and that that suggests we have to
make adjustments in S&T.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, well, don't get me wrong, I agree with
you. I would have probably given the same report. It goes
beyond just S&T. So, I guess what I'd ask of you and everyone
here is, as we go through the budget process, we be totally
upfront with each other and make sure that you do have what is
going to be necessary to meet these needs.
In a similar line, I'd ask General Smolen and Secretary
Young the same thing. As noted by the National Research Council
in their report, ``Rising Above the Gathering Storm,'' U.S.
advantages in S&T have begun to erode. The United States is
producing fewer scientists and engineers than our economic
competitors, such as India and China. We all know this is true,
and that this is not something that you can correct from your
position that I hope you'll be assuming. But we can look at our
laws as they are right now, in terms of recruiting people. It
bothers me when I see India and China and other countries
cranking out more scientists than we do. Do you have any
thoughts on how to correct this problem? I assume you agree
it's a problem. Either one of you.
Mr. Young. For my part, Senator, I absolutely do. I
inherited, I did not create, a problem called the National
Defense Education Program, where we reach out and recruit young
graduate-school-level engineers. I've doubled, in 2006, or in
2007, and doubled again in 2008, the funding for that program,
with the support of the Secretary and the Deputy. We've also
taken on expansion of that program into the high school level
to get kids interested in math and science early, so they do
become engineers. Then, beyond that, I'm very interested in
doing something that I think addresses the chairman's
questions, and that is, we mature technology by building
prototypes. In years past, we built a lot of prototypes. We
need to do that to mature technology, help us control costs.
That very process, I believe, will inspire a lot of young
people to come and work on DOD issues.
Senator Inhofe. What do you think, Dr. Brook? Because you
deal with the postgraduate group out there. Do you have any
ideas you want to share with us?
Dr. Brook. No, sir, I don't. I'm in the business school
there and on most campuses there's a wide gulf between the
business school and the engineering school.
Senator Inhofe. We seem to be getting enough lawyers.
[Laughter.]
It seems like--well, anyway.
Chairman Levin. Your time is up. [Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. No, it's not. Almost. [Laughter.]
Let me ask you this question, then, if I could, Dr. Brook.
The committee is encouraged by the DOD efforts to modernize its
financial management systems and accountability. The creation
of the Business Transformation Agency within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and annual detailed enterprise transition
plans are positive signs toward the DOD getting its financial
house in order. Now, I ask, if you are confirmed, what priority
would you assign to the review of the Navy's enterprise
transition plan contributions and its financial management
modernization?
Dr. Brook. Senator, that would be a very high priority of
mine. That's an area of specific interest for me, to see that
the financial management systems of the Department of the Navy
are improved. If confirmed, I will spend a great deal of
attention on that.
I think that the creation of the Defense Business
Transformation Agency, as you mentioned, is a significant step
in trying to institutionalize the efforts inside the DOD to
drive these reforms. If confirmed, I'd look forward to
participating in that effort.
Senator Inhofe. All right. I think that the chairman kind
of talked, but not directly, about the Defense Integrated
Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) program; or I think
it's pronounced ``dime-hers.'' I'd like to have your comments
as to your support of the full implementation of that program.
Dr. Brook. Senator, I am only vaguely aware that the DIMHRS
initiative is underway. I understand it's a way to merge
personnel management and pay in a system, but I don't know any
of the details on that. I'm not able to comment.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Well, my time is expired. I would ask Kathryn if she wants
to say anything about her daddy. [Laughter.]
No. Okay, that's fine. [Laughter.]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome to all of you, and thank you for your service.
One of the things I've struggled with since I began trying
to track financial accountability within the DOD is figuring
out who to blame. It's really hard to figure out who to blame
when something goes terribly wrong and taxpayer money is wasted
at unprecedented levels, because of the way this whole thing is
set up.
Mr. Young, what I would ask you is, who should be blamed?
If you're aware, I would love to hear, has there ever been,
that you know, any military commander who has lost a promotion
or who has been demoted, or anyone who has been fired, for
failure to oversee a contract appropriately, or failure to
definitize a contract appropriately, or failure to track the
monitoring of a contract appropriately, since you've been at
the DOD? Are you aware of anyone who has ever been demoted or
denied a promotion or fired over their failure to hold the
people in the DOD and in the military accountable for the way
they spend money?
Mr. Young. Yes, Senator, I'm aware of a few instances where
people were disciplined in those manners because of the failure
of a program to achieve success.
Senator McCaskill. Let me ask you, specifically, at what
point in time will it get to your desk? Like the Logistics
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract, for example, at
what point in time will it get to your desk? When we hit 10
billion of undefinitized contract? When we hit 15 billion? We
came in at 20 billion, in 1 year, of an undefinitized contract
that was cost-plus. At what point in time does it get to your
level, and you say, ``Wait a minute, something is not right
here''?
Mr. Young. As you're probably aware, there are defined
thresholds for acquisition-category programs, several hundred
million dollars of research and development (R&D) or higher
amounts for the procurement account, which guarantee I have a
voice in the milestone decision process for those programs. It
is my hope though to pursue those programs and get the team to
pursue those programs with the kind of discipline I think you
are seeking to demand.
Senator McCaskill. Did the LOGCAP program get to your
predecessor's desk? Did that contract get to that desk?
Mr. Young. I'm not sure I can answer that question. I
wasn't part of those discussions, but I believe, from memory,
that he did participate in, certainly, defining the acquisition
strategies for the new LOGCAP contract.
Senator McCaskill. If you wouldn't mind getting back to me
as to if it ever got to your predecessor's desk, and if so,
when it got to your predecessor's desk? That's part of my
problem.
[The information referred to follows:]

In general, the Department's approach to the management of
contracts, including undefinitized contract actions (UCAs), is to apply
a common policy and rely on decentralized execution of that policy. The
Department's policy on UCAs is derived from 10 U.S.C. 2326, and it is
implemented in Department of Defense (DOD) Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Subpart 217.74, which applies to all DOD
components.
Contracting officers must obtain the approval of the head of the
contracting activity before entering into any UCA or changing the scope
of an UCA after performance has already begun. The DFARS requires UCAs
to be definitized within 180 days. Not more than 50 percent of the
predefinitization not to exceed price may be obligated prior to
definitization, unless the contractor submits a qualifying proposal
before that 50 percent has been reached. In that case, no more than 75
percent may be obligated before definitization. A request to waive
these limitations must go to the head of the agency (e.g., the
Secretary of the Army or designee for an Army UCA), and no waiver may
be authorized except to support a contingency operation, a humanitarian
operation, or a peacekeeping operation.
Presently, nothing in law, policy, or regulation requires the head
of a contracting activity to notify higher authority regarding the
approval of a UCA or the head of an agency to notify the Office of the
Secretary of Defense regarding a waiver needed to support a contingency
operation, a humanitarian operation, or a peacekeeping operation.
However, in fiscal year 2008, the Director of Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Policy will be working in consultation with me to develop
updated policy guidance for the implementation and enforcement of
requirements applicable to UCAs.
Given the estimated size of the Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program IV, it is my understanding that the planned program acquisition
strategy was reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff
in July 2006 and subsequently discussed with Mr. Krieg, the then Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Senator McCaskill. I mean, you have to understand that,
when I was in Iraq, and they put up a PowerPoint slide of the
LOGCAP contract and the slide went from 20 billion 1 year, to
15 billion down, and I kept waiting for them to say to me,
``This is the great work we did,'' and then the woman who was
making the presentation in Baghdad said to me, ``The difference
between the 20 billion and the 15 billion was a fluke.'' Well,
when we have a $5-billion fluke, we have a real problem, in
terms of oversight and accountability, in terms of the way
these contracts are being managed.
Let me go to another subject, briefly, contractors
overseeing contractors, lead system integrators (LSI). I think
that, you know the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a good example
of where an LSI obviously didn't work. I know we have an LSI
with Future Combat Systems. This idea that the contractors are
watching contractors, and, particularly, we've seen examples
where contractors are watching contractors within cost-plus
contracts. So, let me see, we hire someone to do something, and
then they get to make money off the fact that they're going to
hire somebody else to do it and watch them. I don't think
that's what was envisioned, in terms of a cost-plus contract; a
contractor hiring a contractor who may hire a contractor, and
then the contractor at the top is making a cut off every single
one, and we've exponentially increased the cost of the contract
for the American taxpayer. I know you've been involved in the
littoral ``problem,'' I will gently call it. I think I could
call it something much more colorful. But if you would comment
about this phenomenon.
Mr. Young. Senator, I share your concerns about that, and I
believe those strategies, to use LSIs, have to be considered
very carefully. The best example I can tell you is that, with
Secretary England's support, in the Navy, we essentially
reversed that structure in the DD(X) destroyer program, because
there was a fee-on-fee, as we call it, issue, and we didn't
think we were getting the best value for the taxpayer's dollar.
So, I think those strategies have to be considered carefully,
and their use will be more rare, in my view, unless it's well
justified.
Senator McCaskill. I'm aware of that, and I'm encouraged by
it. We actually, as we say, changed the course of the ship,
which is great.
Finally, let me ask you about IG and auditing resources. If
you look at the growth, in terms of the acquisition budget over
the last 10 years, if you make the assumption that DOD had the
right number of auditors and investigators and acquisition
personnel prior to this growth, then a pretty strong case can
be made that you don't have enough. Now, having said that,
we've done a global calculation of around 20,000 people that
work in DOD in some form of auditing or investigations, and I'm
looking for that work product of 20,000 people, and I'm
searching it out, and I'm going to continue to search it out,
because it's not immediately transparent to the public where
that work product is. I think there's a whole lot of circle-
the-wagons that go on. I did not realize that the IGs within
the active military are not truly what we think of as IGs. They
don't report outside, they just go up the chain of command, and
try to help their commander. They're not providing transparency
to the public. Are you going to push for additional acquisition
personnel or auditing personnel or IG personnel as part of your
tenure?
Mr. Young. Senator, I actually had a chance to have a
discussion with the chairman yesterday about the fact that we
have legislative restrictions, which I believe this committee
is dealing with, that I hope the committee will succeed to give
us the flexibility to possibly add resources in acquisition
personnel, contracting personnel, and audit personnel. The best
example I can give you, or an anecdotal piece of data, is,
since 2001, the Defense Contract Management Agency has actually
been reduced from 12,100 to 9,700 people. In the early 1980s,
there were twice as many as those numbers. So, in light of the
instances you cited, the procurement budget's gone up to $100
billion, and the R&D budget has gone up substantially. It seems
we're going to have to apply more resources here to get
effective oversight.
Senator McCaskill. Mr. Chairman, I would certainly want to
help with that, because I think what's happened is, if it's a
new system, or if it's something that people want to fight for,
for their home district, we're more than willing to write as
big a check as we're asked to write. But somehow we have
artificially put constraints upon the level of personnel that
are watching these dollars, and there is no way we can expect
them to do the work that taxpayers expect if we're throwing all
the money at them that they ask for, in terms of operational
funds, but we will not allow them to have sufficient personnel
to watch the way we're spending that money. We're cutting off
our nose to spite our face.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCaskill, just, on that point,
what Mr. Young was referring to is a couple of provisions in
our bill, that will be going out at conference, which address
the two issues. One is a cap, which was put on the number of
personnel, which Congress placed. So, when you ask who's to
blame, in terms of the reductions in the personnel in
acquisition, we have the share of our responsibility.
Senator McCaskill. I wasn't here. No, just kidding.
[Laughter.]
That was a joke.
Chairman Levin. It's a fair comment. Those of us who were
here, the administration at the time, carry a share of
responsibility. There were some debates on that issue, by the
way. I haven't gone back to reconstruct those debates, but that
was not done without transparency. That was a debated item;
should we reduce the number of personnel? That's one thing.
We're going to take that cap off, or we're going to change that
cap, in our bill.
Second, there was an artificial limit on the number of
acquisition personnel. We have a lot more acquisition going on,
but we have the same number of people, and we've made a change
in that in our bill, as well.
Senator McCaskill. That's great.
Chairman Levin. We are very aware and active, in terms of
our efforts, this year, to try to get more folks involved in
acquisition oversight.
So, there are two things, specifically in the bill going to
conference, which will address the issue which you very
properly raise, and which you're so familiar with. Hopefully,
in conference we'll be able to persuade the House that our
course is the correct course. I'm not familiar with what
they've done, they may have similar provisions, I don't know.
If not, hopefully you can, and I know you will, weigh in on
that subject at conference.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to also extend a welcome to each of you gentlemen,
and thank you for your willingness to serve your country, and
to your families, who also make great sacrifice in that regard.
We appreciate their willingness to be a part and be involved in
public service, as well.
Mr. Young, I want to get on a line of questioning here
dealing with a recommendation in the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR). In the last QDR, the Air Force set a goal of increasing
long-range strike capability by 50 percent by 2025. That is a
goal which I welcome. Our current bomber fleet is performing
exceedingly well in both Afghanistan and Iraq; however, I am
concerned that we are heading toward a gap in our long-range
strike capability. The United States hasn't built a new bomber
since 1997. To compound the problem, we have advanced surface-
to-air missiles that are being proliferated worldwide, which
are creating formidable air defenses. As we saw in Turkey
during the invasion of Iraq, we can't always count on nations
to allow us to launch attacks on our enemy from close range.
While the F-22 and F-35 have excellent stealth capability, they
will not, for example, be able to fly from Diego Garcia to a
target thousands of miles away with limited fuel supply and
limited payload to strike a target as effectively as a B-1 or a
B-2 or a B-52.
Early this year, the Air Force released the long-range
strike white paper. The white paper quotes that a procurement
spike for the next-generation long-range strike platform is
expected to begin in 2011. As the DOD builds the fiscal year
2010 through fiscal year 2015 program objectives memorandum,
are you going to support the proposed 2011 funding spike for
the next-generation platform?
Mr. Young. Senator, I'd certainly support the goal outlined
by the QDR. Within that, though, I expect to work hard with the
Air Force and on behalf of the DOD to make sure we set the
requirements bar commensurate with the time and the budget we
intend to allot to that program. I think I would agree with you
that there is definitely merit to developing a new bomber, but
I'm anxious not to bring you another program where we
optimistically reach for too much requirement, we under-budget
it, and we set the schedule that may be optimistic. I want to
work with the Air Force to define a program that we have a high
confidence with coming back to you and telling you we'll
deliver successful results. With that, we will try to meet
those goals.
Senator Thune. The Air Force expects to have that, sort of,
revolutionary long-range strike capability by 2035. Do you
believe that the DOD will need a new long-range strike platform
between now and 2035, or do you think that the current bomber
fleet can survive that long, based on scheduled upgrades?
Mr. Young. Senator, I'd have to go and look at that set of
data. I have not looked at it in that level of detail. The
current initiative is pursuing a goal of a bomber possibly in a
gap by 2018. That's the first issue at hand. Can we define a
program and a set of requirements to meet that goal? There's no
question, in that longer-term timeframe, we have to have more
like a revolutionary bomber capability, and we'll have to work
with the Air Force to also define that program. It'll start
with technology investment to enable such a capability.
Senator Thune. If we don't have that kind of a capability,
what is the alternative? I mean, what else do we do to deal
with the threats that we're going to be encountering? If we're
not looking at a next-generation bomber, what are the
alternatives?
Mr. Young. I think we have no alternative but to look at a
next-generation bomber. I mean, we do have tools in our
inventory. There are significant weapons; we certainly have
Tomahawks and others. But to achieve the range you're talking
about, you have to have a next-generation bomber in your tool
set.
Senator Thune. Okay. One of the things that I wanted to
come back to you, too, in dealing, again, with bombers, the B-1
has played a vital role in the global war on terrorism. It's
provided close air support to troops on the ground, convoy
support for road patrols, and acts as a significant show of
force. The B-1 can also carry the largest payload of guided and
unguided weapons in the Air Force inventory, and is the
backbone of America's long-range bomber force. It can rapidly
deliver massive quantities of both precision and nonprecision
weapons against any adversary literally anywhere in the world
at any time. In addition, the B-1 and the F-15E are the only
weapons with the capability to fly low-altitude missions, day
or night, in any weather.
Given those contributions, I was surprised by a recent
decision, in July of this year, by your predecessor, as the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, Kenneth Krieg, to remove the B-1B from the list of
those Air Force programs designated with a DX rating, to be of
the highest national defense urgency. Under the Defense
Priorities and Allocations System, the priority of the B-1
bomber was lowered to a DO rating, indicating critical to
national defense; however DX takes precedence over DO programs.
So the B-1B will no longer merit having the highest-priority
access to parts, materials, and commodities.
Now, it is important, I think, to ensure that our most
pressing military needs are met first. So, based on my
concerns, in August of this year Senators Johnson, Hutchison,
Cornyn, and I sent a letter to your office requesting that the
DOD re-evaluate that decision to remove the B-1B as one of
their highest-priority programs. It's been over a month since
we sent the letter, and we've not received a response. So, I
would ask that, assuming you're confirmed in the position, if
you could get back to us on the status of that request, we
would greatly appreciate it.
Mr. Young. Absolutely, Senator. I'm sorry we have not
replied.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator, our response to your letter of August 28 regarding the B-
1B program being assigned a DO rather than a DX industrial priority
rating is in the final stages of review.
The Department applies DX industrial priority ratings to those
programs approved by the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of
Defense based on two criteria. First the program must be of the highest
national defense urgency based on military objectives and second, the
program must have compressed milestone delivery schedules which can
only be met with the industrial priority of a DX rating. During a
comprehensive review of the DX list earlier this year, the Department
made the decision to change the Defense Priorities and Allocations
System priority for several programs, including the B-1B program, from
DX to a DO rating.
Removal of the B-1B program from the DX list does not imply that
the B-1B is no longer important. As you have described here, the B-1B
is a versatile weapons system and the backbone of the heavy bomber
force. Rather, the priority rating was changed to DO because the
Department determined that a DO rating would be sufficient to meet the
Department's national defense objectives and the B-1B program's
schedule requirements.
If parts constraints surface for the B-1B, or for any other
program, the Department can, with assistance as needed from the
Department of Commerce, expedite subcontract or prime contract
deliveries on a case-by-case basis, even if this requires diverting
resources from a DX-rated program. Thus, there are processes in place
that assure the B-1B program continues to have priority access to parts
and materials.

Senator Thune. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I yield to Senator
Chambliss.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the courtesy of my colleague from Alabama.
Mr. Young, I had intended to start off my line of
questioning to you a little bit differently than what I'm going
to, because I thought Senator Graham might be here. Knowing
that he lives about 15 miles from Clemson University, I was
going to start off by talking about the Clemson game last week.
But since he's not here, we'll move on. [Laughter.]
Mr. Young. Probably better for both of us, Senator.
Senator Chambliss. Secretary Young, you have been in this
position, acting, now, for several months. This town is famous
for the rumors that surface around here from time to time, one
of which recently has been that there's discussion at the
Pentagon about the derailing of the multiyear contract for the
F-22 and the derailing of the proposed bridge money that may be
available for consideration for the purchase of additional F-
22s. My question to you is; is that rumor true? Is there any
conversation at the Pentagon relative to derailing the F-22
multiyear contract or the bridge money?
Mr. Young. I have not participated or observed any of those
discussions, certainly not derailing the existing F-22
multiyear procurement.
Senator Chambliss. Speaking of multiyears, we have several
others that are out there. Is there any conversation relative
to derailing any of the other multiyear contracts for any
branch of the service?
Mr. Young. Senator, I'm not aware of that, and I guess
that's an answer, but I'd be very concerned about discussions
like that. We enter into multiyear contracts to achieve the
savings and provide stability.
Senator Chambliss. Talking about multiyears, I just want to
confirm the conversation we had yesterday. Give us the benefit
of your thinking with regard to multiyear contracts, their
value to the services, as well as their value to the taxpayer.
Mr. Young. Senator, I am interested in entertaining a
discussion of multiyear procurements on every program where we
have good maturity in the program and the potential to save the
taxpayer dollars. I think any dollar saved for the taxpayer is
a dollar that we have a chance to either return to the Treasury
or buy additional capabilities for the warfighter, so we ought
to look at multiyears in every case. Only where the savings are
insignificant should we reconsider using a multiyear tool. I
think we also have to understand that, in some cases, when
we're buying at low procurement rates, multiyears help ensure
we don't bring more cost growth to the table, because vendors
and suppliers at low procurement rates subject the DOD to
annual adjustments in their prices. So, we can't always
anticipate what will happen to us if we don't use a multiyear
to try to give ourselves all the best chance to succeed and
save the taxpayer money.
Senator Chambliss. As I told you yesterday, I appreciate
that attitude, because I think, from a business perspective,
the multiyear is one of the best tools that we've ever
exercised, and whether it's the Pentagon or any other Federal
agency out there, we don't always do a good job of being
stewards of the taxpayer money. I think it's proven that we do
save money, and it is a great tool, and we need to use more of
it down the road.
Let me move to something that has surfaced recently. I want
to talk about an issue that was the subject of an article in
the Washington Post on Monday of this week. It appears that the
Air Force recommended that Commonwealth Research Institute
(CRI) hire Charles Riechers so he could provide specific
technical expertise in the area of acquisition, transformation,
and fleet modernization. He was hired under an existing
contract with CRI. The Air Force utilized his services as a
contractor, rather than a direct consultant, because it was
faster to get him under a current contract. The slant of the
Post article is that CRI hired him, but he was performing work
for the Air Force, rather than CRI. The Air Force says this is
not inappropriate, and what would have been inappropriate was
if Mr. Riechers had shared his research findings with CRI, as
that could give them an unfair advantage in future contract
competition.
My questions to you are; why didn't the Air Force simply
hire Mr. Riechers as a direct consultant? Is it common for DOD
to hire technical experts under scientific and engineering
technical assistance contracts? In your view, was there
anything inappropriate about the Air Force's actions?
Mr. Young. It is common, I think, for DOD to seek expert
technical advice under System Engineering Technical Assistance
(SETA) contracts. In general, we have those contracts. In some
cases, we have contracts through vehicles like a Navy Seaport,
where we compete for those services and ask a number of people;
can they provide this service? We get, hopefully, the best
price and the best technical value from that service.
It is unusual, to me, in my understanding of the system,
that we would go to an open contract and ask that a specific
person be put on that contract, and whether that contract is
broadly enough defined to let that person be brought to that
contract and asked to do work that may or may not have been in
the original scope of the contract. I think the Air Force would
have to answer those questions, but there are some unusual
dimensions to this, and then some that are a normal course of
business, where the DOD, finding itself with long timelines to
hire people, uses contracts to get the expertise we need to
oversee programs.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. Thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young, to follow up a bit on the long-term contracts
Senator Chambliss asked you about, I have an understanding
that, many times, in building highways, politicians are asked
to build 10 highways when they only have enough money for 5.
But, to make everybody happy, they start 10, and they end up
costing a lot more per highway than if they had just gone on
and promptly completed 5. You have Services, you have interest
groups, you have Members of Congress that want a whole bunch of
programs started. Do you think it's a valid concern that we
might do better if we delayed starting some of those projects
and then moved the ones we decide to move more rapidly, with
higher numbers of production each year, and then we might
actually get a better product at a lower cost?
Mr. Young. Senator, I believe that's absolutely true, and
the best example I can offer you is, I found myself, in the
Navy, as Assistant Secretary, signing a paper that I needed to
sign to proceed with procurement of a training aircraft.
Because we were buying those aircraft at eight a year, they
were costing $30 million apiece. The original plan was, I
think, to buy 14 to 15 a year, at $20 million apiece. So, I had
that studied, and we paid several hundred million dollars for
the same airplanes. We really never changed the requirement.
But, because we didn't demonstrate the very discipline you're
talking about, we paid several hundred million dollars more for
no more capability. I would like to have those discussions in
the DOD.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Dr. Brook, with regard to actually maintaining control over
the integrity and the smart spending of taxpayers' dollars, do
you have that responsibility? Will you use the IG to report to
you, or is it your basic responsibility just to manage the
dollars so that they are properly allocated and properly
accounted for?
Dr. Brook. Senator, if confirmed, it would be my primary
responsibility to oversee the development of the budgets and to
oversee the internal controls that the Navy would have in place
to manage dollars and be responsible. I, in the past, have
developed very close relationships with the IG and the audit
agencies, and have been able to work very closely with them to
make sure that we're monitoring the financial activities and
that we're following applicable laws and trying to be as
responsible as we can.
Senator Sessions. Within the Services, and in the Navy, in
particular, who is in charge of overall responsibility of
ascertaining whether or not programs are being managed well,
contractors are performing well, and they are held accountable,
if they do not?
Dr. Brook. Well, I think it's a shared responsibility among
the senior leadership of the Navy, depending on the functional
areas that we're working in.
Senator Sessions. So, you have the contracting officer, who
would be the first line of oversight. Is that right?
Dr. Brook. I'm not an expert in contracting, Senator. That
sounds reasonable, but I'm not sure.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think, sometimes we need pretty
robust independent review. The budget of DOD, I think,
certainly is not too large, but it's grown substantially. We're
talking about $450 billion of baseline defense budget, and even
a percentage of savings can free up money to complete programs
that we definitely need to complete. So, I'd hope that you will
understand. I think Congress needs to do a better job of
monitoring how we do it. I think you'll see that, in the
future. I hope that each of you will be out there on the front
line of doing it.
To follow up, Secretary Young, on Senator Inhofe's
questions about S&T, in your August report of this year you
expressed very real concern about S&T and our investment. Have
you given any thought to what the appropriate number is that we
need to increase those programs by, how much it would cost us
to be at the level we ought to be?
Mr. Young. In the memo, I cited to Secretary Gates that we
need to look at those metrics. The previous metric has been 3
percent. We've not achieved that metric. I'm not sure that's
the right metric. We need to go and look at businesses and even
investments by other countries, and set a better metric. But,
lacking that, I offered in that memo a number of investments
that would have us add approaching a couple of billion dollars
a year to the S&T budget, which would be near a 20-percent
increase in that budget. It was targeted to several things that
I think could pay dividends for the warfighter and the Nation.
Senator Sessions. Yes, I notice you indicated that it could
save money. I remember, early in the Bush administration, he
talked about leaping-ahead technology. In other words, not
investing in a system that's going to be out of date, but
leaping to, and perhaps investing in S&T, and being able to
develop a new paradigm of capability. Is that what you're
referring to? Can that happen? Are we doing enough in that
direction?
Mr. Young. I think both can happen. A number of those ideas
I offered, at Secretary Gates's request, were tailored to areas
that are nontraditional, related to the global war on terror
and other things, and then some of the areas are places where
we could have breakthrough technology that would develop a new
material that can let us move away from, say, MRAPs that weigh
30,000 to 80,000 pounds, and potentially develop a lighter
vehicle that's more mobile and tactically useful. We have to
make those investments in a next generation of materials, and,
as you've said, leap ahead of what we're buying today.
Senator Sessions. With regard to the LCS, I chaired the
Seapower Subcommittee in 1997, and during that time we began to
analyze how the new Navy would be configured. As I understand
it, 55 of these ships are to be completed, which would
represent about a sixth of the Navy's 300-plus fleet. The Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO) and others have made clear to us they
consider this a critical program that will just be an
absolutely necessary component of the Navy fleet. Some of the
cost increases have gone because the Navy has asked for and
obtained militarization of a ship that was originally thought
to be a commercial-type ship. Anyway, my question to you is; do
you believe this is a critical part of the Navy's fleet and
that this program needs to be maintained, with costs kept at a
minimum, and produced in a way that meets the Navy's needs, and
respects the taxpayers' investment?
Mr. Young. Senator, I believe I can legitimately claim to
be an original plank-owner on LCS, and I believe firmly and
strongly in the need for that capability in the Navy. I'm
disappointed about the costs, and we need to go attack that and
see if we can do better. But we have to have that class of ship
in the naval fleet.
Senator Sessions. It also saves money off personnel, as I
understand. Can you explain what this fast, mobile, shallow-
water vessel's capabilities are, and the number of personnel it
takes to operate it, compared to other ships?
Mr. Young. I think, Senator, it may be best pointed out by
an example that motivated me. Ahead of the Operation Iraqi
Freedom, we conducted approaching 1,000 boardings in the Gulf
waters of small dowels and other vessels. We were doing that
with destroyers, DDG-51s, that cost over $1 billion and have
crews of 350. Then, in some cases, that ship still has a speed
limit that won't let it run down adversaries who quickly move
to faster ships. LCS will let you run down that adversary with
a ship that doesn't cost $1 billion and with a crew that's more
like 50 people. It provides the capability and the opportunity
to save money, as you've said, and put fewer crew members at
risk. There are multiple dimensions to the benefits of LCS.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think so. I'm sorry we've had
some difficulties with that. I hope that you will keep it on
track and meet the challenges and the legitimate questions that
are raised.
Mr. Chairman, just briefly, a consistent concern we've
heard from service chiefs is that Goldwater-Nichols does not
sufficiently allow them to participate in the acquisition
process. In other words, civilian personnel is involved in
that. I note that Admiral Roughead recently stated his view
that we need to ``enhance the coordination and interaction
between those who define our requirements and those who acquire
the systems.''
First, I want to register that as a legitimate concern,
and, second, ask you if you'd briefly comment on it.
Mr. Young. Senator, I believe strongly in the enormous
wisdom that's embodied in Goldwater-Nichols and the importance
of having an acquisition team that has a line, through people
like me, to the President, and then a requirements team that
has a line also to the President, but through a military
advisory team, and then those teams working together. In my
time in the Navy, I had Saturday sessions with then CNO Vern
Clark, to set those requirements bars on LCS and say, ``If you
want to go this fast, it potentially will cost this much.'' We
need to work with them, and did, in my time in the Navy, on
what it would cost, how long it would take, and whether the
requirements bar needs to be that high. That acquisition team
needs to be able to push, sometimes, on those requirements on
behalf of the taxpayer and the President, as we did on DD(X),
when we took the firing rate from 12 rounds a minute, which was
a very costly gun and loading system, to 10 rounds a minute.
That small change made a big difference in cost. I need the
acquisition team to make those pushes. I need the requirements
team to stand their ground where it makes a military
difference, and get to a middle ground that's effective for
delivery.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
I want to go back to this contract that CRI had with the
Air Force that was used, apparently, to pay the civilian
contracting official $13,000-plus a month for that 2-month
period. I have trouble with your answer on that. It seems to me
it's just totally out of place for a company to be paying
someone for work that that person is not performing for that
company, to begin with. Whether or not that person is
performing work for the government or not is a different issue.
I'm not sure of that. There's been some statements made that he
was performing useful work. Here we had some Air Force official
telling a contractor to pay somebody $13,400 a month for work
not being performed for that company. It seems to me that is
unsustainable, that's wrong. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Young. Yes, I'm troubled with those dimensions of it,
sir.
Chairman Levin. There's also, I believe, that a company
would be given a fee, an administrative fee for its operations,
and that they would make money from that contract as well.
Would that likely be the case?
Mr. Young. I think, in virtually every case that is
correct. I think you're extremely familiar with the article.
This article cites that this company is a not-for-profit, so I
would have to ask the Air Force to understand whether there was
a fee-bearing portion of those costs.
Chairman Levin. It may be not-for-profit, but it's making
money on the contract.
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. The administrative charges, overhead
charges----
Mr. Young. In virtually every case, there are those
charges, absolutely.
Chairman Levin. Whether or not this is really a nonprofit
is another issue.
Mr. Young. Right.
Chairman Levin. That's an Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
issue. They can figure that out, even though some of the amount
of money which is going to the people who are working for that
nonprofit are pretty stunning amounts, whether it qualifies or
not is an IRS issue.
But I have trouble with the Air Force doing this. I think
it makes you ask; what is going on in contracting world, where
that is done? I'm wondering if you can get into this question
for us. After you're confirmed, which hopefully you will be,
very promptly, can you check into this contract and tell us
what happened? Is anyone held accountable if something wrong
was done here? Are there any rules against this kind of thing;
paying people for work they didn't perform for the entity that
is paying the person? Where is the accountability if that takes
place, and how common or frequent is this occurrence? It
reminds me a little bit of what we call offloading, where one
agency is using another agency's contract, when there's just a
lack of accountability in it. So, if you could get back to this
committee on that matter, and tell us; is it unusual, is it
common, and what action is being taken, if action is
appropriate? To me, it tells me that there's something amiss in
the world of contracting that this kind of a activity can take
place. Okay?
Mr. Young. I'd be happy to look at it in detail, and I'd
like to get your views of those facts when we get them to you,
sir.
Chairman Levin. All right, I'd like your views. We're happy
to give you our views, but I'd like your views about it, as
well, when you submit them to us.
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. Chairman, Air Force officials have provided the following
summary of the facts, circumstances and legal aspects of this contract.
The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) had a
requirement for scientific and engineering expertise. The Office of the
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force had an open
task order under an existing contract under which Commonwealth Research
Institute (CRI) was to provide the Air Force with technical expertise.
Mr. Riechers was well qualified to provide these services, and CRI
hired him to do so. Mr. Riechers provided scientific and engineering
technical assistance services to the Air Force and made recommendations
that were instrumental in engineering our acquisition transformation
and continuing the Air Force's modernization of our aging fleet. The
work Mr. Riechers performed was in accordance with the contract
Statement of Work with CRI. CRI management was responsible for the
overall direction and control of Mr. Riechers' performance.
For Economy Act transactions, it is not unusual for agencies to
acquire supplies or services through another Federal Agency. The basic
contract was issued by the Department of the Interior Southwest
Acquisition Branch on behalf of the Air Force, Directorate of Security
Counterintelligence and Special Programs Oversight (SAF/AAZ). The scope
of work includes performance of independent technical studies and
analyses; conduct of site surveys and field data collection; and
evaluation of initiatives, exercise support, and systems
demonstrations. The Economy Act (31 U.S.C. 1535) is applicable to
orders placed under this contract. The Economy Act permits ordering of
supplies and services through another Federal Agency when a more
specific statutory authority does not exist, there is no current
contracting vehicle for the acquisition, and it is more economical to
have another agency perform the contracting. (Note: FAR 17.501 defines
an ``interagency acquisition'' as ``a procedure by which an agency
needing supplies or services (the requesting agency) obtains them from
another agency (the servicing agency).'')
Based on the facts known to us at this time, the Air Force believes
that the authorization of the action that occurred was not prohibited
by law, regulation, or policy, nor was there a need for a deviation or
waiver to support any of these efforts. However, I cannot tell you that
I am comfortable with all aspects of this contracting action.
To further examine whether such events may have constituted an
impropriety, the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air
Force requested an independent investigation by the Department of
Defense Inspector General. I believe we should get the results of this
investigation to fully inform our review of this matter.

Chairman Levin. A question for you, General, if I have a
moment left in my time. There's been some criticism of the
approach that the NNSA has taken so far to efforts to modernize
and reduce the size of the nuclear weapons complex. Much of the
criticisms revolved around the fact that the NNSA is not
closing and consolidating any of the production sites. As the
modernization process moves forward, will you look carefully at
opportunities to close and consolidate production sites, if
appropriate?
General Smolen. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. All right. On the reliable replacement
warhead, you made reference to this, but the question now is,
at NNSA, as to whether they're going to be able to manage the
life extension program for nuclear weapons so that it's not cut
short in anticipation of any decision with respect to the
reliable replacement warhead. On the other hand, life extension
program should not be rushed to avoid the reliable replacement
warhead decision. What will you do to make sure that there's a
balancing of the research on the reliable replacement warhead
with the carrying out of the life extension program?
General Smolen. Sir, I believe the reliable replacement
warhead provides great promise for the future as an alternative
for us. We still need to do some study before we can make final
determinations on how effective that will be. In the absence of
knowing that, we certainly must proceed with the life extension
programs to continue to maintain the stockpile as credibly as
we possibly can.
With regard to the facilities, I will absolutely take a
close look at all of our facilities. There have been numerous
studies, sir, and I have been reviewing those studies, and I
hope to confer with colleagues, if confirmed, to understand all
of that much better. I think there may in fact be good
opportunity for consolidation, but at this time I still need to
know much more about what our options are before I could commit
to any specific actions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. At the risk of beating a dead horse, I
want to go back, also, to the contracting question. Since this
is, now, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Acquisitions in the
Air Force, this is someone whose job is all about
accountability. I'm concerned, first of all, I think, at first
blush, it potentially is an Antideficiency Act (ADA) violation.
The reason I say it could be an ADA violation is that section
1342 of the ADA says government employees can't accept
voluntary services. Well, if the government was getting the
benefit of his research for those 2 months, and the government
wasn't paying for it, then wasn't that voluntary? Wasn't he
providing a work product? He wasn't doing the work product for
his employer. He had no contact with his employer during those
2 months. He was working for the government during those 2
months, not for his employer. I think there's a real question
here as to whether or not the law was violated, whether or not
there was a felony committed by the Deputy Secretary for
Acquisition or by the DOD and by this person who provided work
to the government on a voluntary basis, even though his
employer was not asking for that work. All the employer was
doing was paying him.
Now, that's one concern I have. The second concern I have
is; what in the world are we giving CRI $26,000 for what they
don't need? What are we contracting with them for? I mean, if
they have $26,000 sitting around that they can pay to anybody
that the Pentagon asks them to pay, do they have more money
over there they're not using? Maybe we should ask them to
continue paying his salary as the Deputy Acquisition Director
for the Navy, if they have all this money sitting there. What
in the world are we giving them money for? Then, there's a
whole other level that is really troubling to me. Why are they
even called a not-for-profit? What is the not-for-profit? If
you read this article, and their excuses they use for being a
not-for-profit, I mean, have we no shame? I mean, we are
shoveling money at some of these people through the
appropriations processes like it's Monopoly money.
I think that what happened here was, it was easier to get
this guy's check covered for a couple of months from a friendly
contractor than go through the process you have to go through
to get him on the payroll at the Pentagon. So, we wanted to do
it quickly, so call a friendly contractor and let them write
the check for a couple of months. Isn't that exactly what the
ADA is supposed to prevent: giving a contractor an advantage at
the Pentagon by virtue of voluntary services?
Now, I know that's the legislative intent of that provision
of ADA. Whether or not you can fit this factual scenario firmly
within that prohibition under the law, but what worries me is
that no one seems to be really concerned about this, which
makes me think, as the chairman said, this may be very
commonplace.
Which leads me to my question on ADA and for my comptroller
friend. I have looked into ADA violations, and the record here
is very, very sparse. We've tried to get the information, from
DOD, how many ADAs have resulted in punishment. Now, if you
look at the kind of money that's being spent, and where it's
being spent, in fiscal year 2006 we've been able to determine,
with the number of potential cases only being 58, the number of
ADAs that resulted in punishment was 9. In fiscal year 2005,
there were seven. As of January 2007, there were only three.
Frankly, there were only 12, in terms of potential cases. Well,
I think this article outlines another potential case, and I
think that there are probably many, many other potential cases.
In your future position, I would like your commentary on what
we can do to instill a more aggressive attitude about the ADA
and what it is intended to accomplish. It's hard for me to
believe that there are few violations that are occurring. As I
looked into the process, I found it's incredibly byzantine.
With how long it takes and the investigation and they basically
say ``no harm, no foul,'' if the person has moved on. So, all
you have to do to really avoid ultimate punishment under this
is just go away. You can imagine, if we did that with all the
laws in the country that were felonies, if everyone just agreed
to change their job, no harm. I think we're going to have to
get a lot more serious about this if we want to change some of
the attitude there. So, I would like your comments about the
ADA and its enforcement.
Dr. Brook. Senator, I've never seen much data on the ADA,
either, so I don't know what the number of total cases are or
what the percentages of punishment are or what the different
levels of punishment might be. But I take your larger point
very seriously. I think accountability is critical in the
financial management area, and that's why the ADA was enacted.
I certainly take your comments to heart. I share your concern
about accountability, and it'll be a very important aspect of
my leadership, if confirmed.
Senator McCaskill. Let me, finally, if I could, just one
more question, Mr. Chairman.
I don't know, Mr. Young, what you can do, and maybe we
could have a conversation about this later, but I would like
your reflection upon how do we instill, in military training,
some kind of sense of responsibility for oversight on
contracting? What happened in Iraq was a function of us trying
to do more with fewer people. So, we took contracting to an
unprecedented level in every area. The military commanders are
quick to admit they wanted to make sure the ice cream was in
the mess hall, they wanted to make sure the latrines were
cleaned, they wanted to make sure the supplies moved. They
really didn't care what it was costing, in a global sense. I
don't mean to say they're not patriotic people that want to
support their country; of course they are. But that was not
their concern. Their concern was the mission. If you look at
the individuals who are tasked with overseeing these contracts
within each unit, these contracting officer representatives are
not trained. It was almost like you get the short straw, that
you're overlooking the contract.
I would appreciate you and Secretary Gates, to the extent
that you could have a conversation with him about this, talk
about what we need to do, in terms of training, because we're
not going to go backwards, I can't believe, because we don't
have the ground strength to do it. If we ever have another
contingency like this, and if we are ever in another conflict
like this, I think we're going to continue to contract. Now,
the problem is, we can't ever contract like this again. So, my
sense is that no one is really excited about the idea that we
start embedding training in the military about how you monitor
a contract. Do you have any comment on that?
Mr. Young. Absolutely, Senator. One, I want to assure you
that this is very high on Secretary Gates's list, near the top
of Secretary England's list. I participated in a meeting with
him on this issue yesterday. I participated earlier this week
in a meeting with Secretary Geren, the Army Secretary, on this.
I do think you'll see the Army seek to move some steps back.
We're trying to understand the issue. But what's changed is
what I think you've highlighted. As we move very hard to make
sure the military people who are at the pointy end of the
spear, there was a loss of focus on the fact that, when the
spear is deployed, there has to be certain support and certain
abilities to oversee that support; contingency contracting and
contingency contracting oversight. The recent issues are going
to refocus the DOD's attention at the most senior levels,
including mine, on this issue. I believe it will include
training, it will probably include people, and it'll include
changes to our processes.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Let me commend you, Senator McCaskill. The provision which
you and Senator Carper authored, which is in the bill, which
will require training for these nonacquisition people who are
doing contracting work in a deployed environment, will
hopefully survive conference. You, again, will be an active
part of that conference, but we want to commend you for that
effort, which is something which can then be implemented by the
DOD, because it does raise an important issue.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this
hearing. I think these are three able persons. You've conducted
a fair and complete hearing. I thank you, and I have no further
questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Are you all set, Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. In writing, if you would, I would like
your comments, Mr. Young, on the effectiveness of the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). You do not have a seat
on that council, and, of course, you know that the undercurrent
is, there's a lot of backscratching by the various branches,
``I won't mess with your program if you don't mess with mine.''
Should you have a seat on that Council? Should there be someone
watching to make sure that the Army's saying, ``Okay, I won't
complain about that if you promise you won't complain about
what I want to get through the JROC.'' If you believe you
should have a seat on that Council in your position that I'm
confident you'll be confirmed for, whether or not that might
have a cleansing effect, at least on the perception that might
be out there. I'm not sure it's a reality, as I say, but
certainly it's a perception that there may be some
backscratching going on.
Mr. Young. Senator, I'd welcome the chance to talk to you
about my experienced reality.
Senator McCaskill. Okay, great. I like that kind of
reality.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) was created as the
governing body of military expertise on the Joint Staff and is
chartered to provide independent, military advice and recommendations
to the Secretary of Defense and the President in validating military
requirements. With this as its primary function, the JROC seeks advice
from representatives across the Department of Defense (DOD). The JROC
charter was recently amended to include both the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the
Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller (USD(C)) as advisors.
Section 944 proposed by the House for the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 would make the USD(AT&L) and the
USD(C) permanent voting members of the JROC. While the JROC relies upon
the advice of these important civilian leaders, codifying the role of
these civilian leaders as permanent voting members may run counter to
the JROC's principal purpose of providing independent military advice
regarding the validation of warfighter requirements.
I believe it is most critical for the DOD and Service Acquisition
Executives, as the President's representatives and stewards of tax
dollars, to constantly question requirements in light of technology
maturity, cost, and alternate material or operational tactic solutions.
Further, the entire acquisition team should constantly identify and
push for joint solutions in every situation, including when unique
service requirements exist.

Chairman Levin. Before closing, let me, again, thank you
for your commitment to this Nation, to your families and
friends and colleagues who have come here to support you,
particularly, Mr. Young, to your children, who have not only
shown support for you through your career, but who have made an
amazing effort here to look interested throughout this hearing.
[Laughter.]
That really takes talent. I never could do that.
We thank you all, and we will move these nominations as
quickly as we possibly can.
We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to John J. Young, Jr., by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD)
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I do not see a need for modifications of Goldwater-Nichols
in the areas affecting acquisition. The civilian and military roles
defined in the act produce a healthy tension that balances warfighting
needs with taxpayer interests. I believe proposals to change this
aspect of Goldwater-Nichols by shifting acquisition to the Service
Chiefs would be a disservice to the President and our Nation's
taxpayers. The debate over requirements, technology, cost, and
capability should begin at levels below the President and the Secretary
of Defense. There is great risk in such a change of even further
overstating of requirements, growing unfunded requirements lists, and
further escalation in the cost of weapon systems.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. Based on my experience as the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering (DDR&E) and Department of the Navy Acquisition
Executive, I continue to oppose any modifications that would shift
acquisition program management to the Service Chiefs. For the sake of
the taxpayer, there needs to be a constant debate at all working levels
between the acquisition team--led by Presidential appointees--and the
requirements community--led by the Service Chiefs and the Joint Staff.
The debate should encompass available technology, cost, affordability,
delivered capability, joint options, and alternative solutions.

DUTIES

Question. Twenty years ago, Congress established the position of
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition in response to the
recommendations of the Packard Commission. The Packard Commission
report stated: ``This new Under Secretary . . . should be the Defense
Acquisition Executive. As such, he should supervise the performance of
the entire acquisition system and set overall policy for R&D,
procurement, logistics, and testing. He should have the responsibility
to determine that new programs are thoroughly researched, that military
requirements are verified, and that realistic cost estimates are made
before the start of full-scale development. (In general, we believe,
cost estimates should include the cost of operating and maintaining a
system through its life.) He should assure that an appropriate type of
procurement is employed, and that adequate operational testing is done
before the start of high-rate production. He also should be responsible
for determining the continuing adequacy of the defense industrial
base.''
Question. Do you believe that the position of Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) has the
duties and authorities necessary to carry out the recommendations of
the Packard Commission?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you see the need for modifications in the duties and
authorities of the USD(AT&L)?
Answer. No.
Question. Do you believe that the DOD has effectively implemented a
streamlined chain of command for acquisition programs, as envisioned by
the Packard Commission?
Answer. I believe that the Department has implemented acquisition
chains of command that provide the best management structure to meet
current acquisition requirements. If confirmed, I will continue to
examine these acquisition structures to improve outcomes and streamline
oversight.
Question. Do you see the need for modifications in that chain of
command, or in the duties and authorities of any of the officials in
that chain of command?
Answer. At the present time, I do not see any need for
modifications in the chain of command or in duties and authorities, but
modifications could be needed in the future as acquisition mission
requirements evolve. I believe the statutory reporting chain which
provides USD(AT&L) directive authority for Service acquisition programs
via the Service Secretaries is a critical authority which must be
maintained. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate the current
chains of command and recommend adjustments, if needed.
Question. Section 133 of title 10, U.S.C., describes the duties of
the USD(AT&L).
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that
Secretary Gates will prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary to assign me duties
and functions commensurate with the USD(AT&L) position, and any others
he may deem appropriate.
Question. Do you recommend any changes to the provisions of section
133 of title 10, U.S.C., with respect to the duties of the USD(AT&L)?
Answer. No.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you
plan to assign to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for
Acquisition and Technology and the DUSD for Logistics?
Answer. Based on my experience working with both positions, I do
not, at this time, see an urgent need for any major changes in the
roles and responsibilities of the DUSD for Acquisition and Technology
or the DUSD for Logistics and Material Readiness. At this time, the
duties assigned to each position serve an important role to meeting the
goals and objectives of the Secretary of Defense. I do believe that the
DDR&E should serve as the Department's principal staff assistant for
technology matters and the DUSD for Acquisition and Technology should
be the principal staff assistant for acquisition program management.
Question. In your view, should the USD(AT&L) be a member of the
Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC)?
Answer. The JROC membership may be appropriate. The USD(AT&L) must
at least participate in a full advisory role.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for managing an
acquisition system pursuant to which the DOD spends more than $200
billion each year. Section 133 of title 10, U.S.C., provides for the
Under Secretary to be appointed from among persons who have an
extensive management background in the private sector.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I believe that my responsibilities and service as the DDR&E
and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition provide substantial and unique background and experience
that qualifies me for this position. Further, my experience as a
professional staff member on the Senate Appropriations Defense
Subcommittee and my experience working in a variety of positions in
industry provides me with a strong and extensive background for this
position.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the USD(AT&L)?
Answer. As the DDR&E, I established a vision for the organization
of developing the technology to defeat any adversary on any
battlefield. I believe this vision, expanded to recognize including
acquisition and sustainment, to a high degree also outlines the
challenges I would face as USD(AT&L). We must ensure the Nation has the
technology, systems, training and support necessary to defeat
adversaries on every front--urban warfare to cyberspace. We must be
efficient with the nation's tax dollars in order to give the warfighter
the largest possible set of robust warfighting tools. The acquisition
team must ensure the tools are interoperable and joint and must execute
programs with speed and creativity. We have already seen the pace of
adjustment of our adversaries in the Global War on Terrorism. If
confirmed as the USD(AT&L), my challenge will be to oversee and
integrate the research, development, procurement, logistics, and
facilities functions within the available resources in order to ensure
the Nation maintains unmatched military capability. If confirmed, I
believe some of the more specific challenges I would confront include:

Improving the effectiveness, credibility, and
performance of the Defense Acquisition Team in every
acquisition business area.
Making proactive, clear progress in controlling cost
and requirements in order to deliver program results within
budget and schedule.
Ensuring the acquisition process is transparent,
objective, timely, and accountable.
Forging consensus among the acquisition, requirements,
and budget communities to enable effective acquisition.
Fostering a science and technology (S&T) program that
meets the Nation's future defense needs.
Implementing logistical and supply chain management
initiatives which are effective for the warfighter and the
defense enterprise.
Addressing industrial base challenges in an
increasingly globalized commercial marketplace.
Building and sustaining a high performing, agile, and
ethical defense acquisition workforce.
Ensuring business transformation efforts support sound
program decisions and financial management.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I expect to draw on my previous
experiences as well as the advice and counsel of all members of the
defense acquisition team in order to develop and implement a number of
initiatives to address these challenges. If confirmed, I also will seek
to work closely with the Services, agencies, and Congress to develop
and execute plans and initiatives that will make tangible progress on
these challenges.

MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION

Question. Please describe the approach taken by the Department to
reduce cycle time for major acquisition programs. Do you believe the
Department's approach has been successful?
Answer. I believe that the fundamental step in the DOD's efforts is
the requirement for appropriate Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) at
key milestones as mandated by Congress. Ensuring that we move
appropriately mature technology into successive stages of program
development is fundamental to controlling and reducing cycle times for
major acquisition programs.
The Department has also undertaken additional steps to control and
reduce cycle times. Key additional steps include efforts to stabilize
program funding and requirements in order to permit planned, deliberate
program execution. Additional supporting initiatives or pilot projects
include concept decision, Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES)
re-engineering and Performance Based Logistics. If confirmed, I will
work to build on these foundations to seek continued improvement.
Question. What specific steps has the DOD taken to adopt
incremental or phased acquisition approaches, such as spiral
development?
Answer. Incremental and Spiral acquisition strategies are being
utilized in the Department. These approaches are defined in DOD 5000.2,
are embedded in the Defense Acquisition University training for Program
Management, Systems Engineering and Contracting and are utilized by all
Services.
Question. How will the requirements process, budget process, and
testing regime change to accommodate spiral development?
Answer. Spiral development is an acquisition strategy and approach
that is designed to identify the end-state requirements, which are not
known at program initiation. Requirements, budget and test regime are
refined through demonstration and risk management.
Question. How should the Department ensure that the incremental or
phased acquisition programs have appropriate baselines against which to
measure performance?
Answer. Each program being executed under an incremental or phased
acquisition approach must still have clear requirements and metrics for
each phase or increment. There are two key elements of success. First,
the requirements of the initial increments must be commensurate with
the budget, schedule and technology available to the program. Second,
the Department must be able to adjust the requirements, shifting some
requirements to later phases or increments, in order to ensure
execution within budget and schedule.
Question. Over the last several years, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has prepared a series of reports for this
committee comparing the DOD approach to the acquisition of major
systems with the approach taken by best performers in the private
sector. GAO's principal conclusion has been that private sector
programs are more successful, in large part because they consistently
require a high level of maturity for new technologies before such
technologies are incorporated into product development programs. The
Department has responded to these findings by adopting technological
maturity goals in its acquisition policies.
How important is it, in your view, for the Department to mature its
technologies with research and development (R&D) funds before these
technologies are incorporated into product development programs?
Answer. I believe it is absolutely necessary for the Department to
appropriately mature technologies before they are incorporated into
product development programs. Experience demonstrates that programs
built on mature technologies are much more likely to meet cost,
schedule, and functional objectives. DOD R&D funds are an important,
and often the primary, method for maturing technologies.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the key components and technologies to be incorporated into major
acquisition programs meet the Department's technological maturity
goals?
Answer. Ensuring incorporation of mature technologies (e.g., TRL 6
at MS B, TRL 7 at MS C) into Major Defense Acquisition programs
requires a sustained approach that engages early with the program's
capabilities development and stays engaged through system design and
development (SDD). During my tenure as DDR&E, I have strongly
encouraged the Department's S&T staff to work closely with major
acquisition programs well before Milestone decision points to ensure
that technology immaturity issues are identified, and that technology
maturation plans are developed. If confirmed, I would continue this
practice through technology readiness assessments and quick-look
technology maturity evaluations to ensure that key components and
technologies satisfy technological maturity goals. If confirmed, I
expect to work to ensure that appropriate investments are made to
mature technology to support each stage of development.
Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to
ensure that research programs are sufficiently funded to reduce
technical risk in programs so that technological maturity can be
demonstrated at the appropriate time?
Answer. The DOD must adequately fund technology maturation for the
technologies necessary for our military systems. The Department has
many opportunities to leverage the research investments of other
Federal agencies and the commercial sector (including international
developments) to advance technological maturity. However, the final
result must be proven, appropriate stages of technical maturity for
advancement to the next stages of development.
Question. What role do you believe TRLs and Manufacturing Readiness
Levels (MRLs) should play in the Department's efforts to enhance
effective technology transition and reduce cost and risk in acquisition
programs?
Answer. TRLs have proven to be a very effective tool for focusing
Department attention and effort on technology maturation, and if
confirmed, I will continue to use them. MRLs are an emerging tool to
support acquisition decision making that shows promise. The DDR&E team
has worked with industry to develop MRLs that are reconciled with TRLs
and to provide a common framework for assessing and managing
manufacturing risk from technology development through each step of
acquisition.
Question. The committee has proposed various changes to DOD
acquisition procedures that are included in title VIII of S. 1547, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Sections 801
through 805 would address major defense acquisition programs.
What is your opinion about whether these provisions, if enacted,
would help the Department reform how it buys its largest and most
expensive weapons systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review each of the sections addressing
changes for multi-year procurement, Milestone B certification, DOD
organization and structure, investment strategy and report on total
ownership cost.
Question. Which of these provisions, if any, do you have concerns
about and why?
Answer. Consistent with the Statement of Administration Policy
regarding S. 1547, I am concerned that section 801(a) would define
``substantial savings'' for multiyear contracts. This definition would
unnecessarily limit the contracting options available for large
programs where significant taxpayer dollars could be saved.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES

Question. In February 2007 the Secretary of Defense submitted a
report to Congress entitled ``Defense Acquisition Transformation Report
to Congress''.
If confirmed, to what extent would you support and continue
implementation of the defense acquisition reform initiatives forth in
that report?
Answer. In general, I support the majority of the acquisition
reform initiatives identified in the Report. If confirmed, I will
support the implementation activities which are already underway and
evaluate additional ways and means to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of the system.
Question. In particular, please discuss your views about the
following:
Portfolio Management.
Answer. In general, I would support the Capability Portfolio
Management Initiative pilot that provides a common framework
recognizing federated ownership. It facilitates strategic choices and
improves the ability to make capability trade-offs. Successful
experiments in portfolio management are impacting strategic portfolios,
weapon systems, and weapon sustainment choices.
Question. Tri-Chair Concept Decision.
Answer. In general, I believe forums like the Tri-Chair and
processes like Concept Decision are very useful for the alignment of
the acquisition, requirements and resource teams in pursuit of a common
capability goal. I used similar tools and processes during my tenure in
the Navy in order to achieve alignment on a number of major acquisition
programs. If confirmed, I will review this initiative and the
associated pilots for any additional support or direction needed.
Question. Time-Defined Acquisitions.
Answer. In general, I support the Time-Defined Acquisition (TDA)
initiative which is designed to make schedule a key performance
parameter. The TDA approach seeks to prescribe a fixed time for
capability delivery and to use schedule to drive the program's focus,
plans and technology choices. If confirmed, I will review this
initiative for any additional support or direction needed.
Question. Investment Balance Reviews.
Answer. In general, I support the Investment Balance Reviews (IBR)
initiative that provides the Defense Acquisition Executive with the
opportunity to make course corrections during the life cycle of the
portfolio of capabilities, systems and programs. If confirmed, I will
review this initiative for any additional support or direction needed.
Question. Risk-Based Source Selection.
Answer. In general, I support this initiative to provide an
informed basis for assessing industry proposals, quantifying the risk
in terms of cost and time, and providing the basis for more informed
discussions with the offerers. If confirmed, I will review this
initiative for any additional support or direction needed.
Question. Acquisition of Services Policy.
Answer. In general, I support the initiative on Acquisition of
Services which is designed to reduce cycle time, increase competition
and provide better value for the Department. If confirmed, I will
review this initiative for any additional support or direction needed.
Question. Systems Engineering Excellence.
Answer. In general, I support this initiative which is designed to
strengthen our Systems and Software Engineering acquisition policy and
practices with a goal of world class performance for the Department. If
confirmed, I will review this initiative for any additional support or
direction needed.
Question. Award Fee and Incentive Policy.
Answer. During my tenure as the Navy Acquisition Executive, I
issued three memorandums providing policy and guidance on the use of
profit, incentives and award fees. These memoranda specifically pushed
for greater use of objective criteria for awarding fees, aligning the
payment of fees to measurable steps on the critical path through
development, and tailoring the profile for the award of fees to stages
of progress in development. I strongly believe the DOD must continue to
use fees as a vital tool in managing acquisition programs and
incentivizing performance. If confirmed, I expect to continue to push
for progress in the careful and judicious use of profit and fees.
Question. Open, Transparent, and Common Shared Data Resources with
Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR).
Answer. The Department needs better information tools for use in
managing its portfolio of programs and in monitoring progress in
program execution. The DAMIR system represents an effort to fill some
of these gaps. If confirmed, I will review this initiative for any
additional support or direction needed.
Question. Restructured DAES Reviews.
Answer. The DAES reviews provide a forum for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) to work with the Services and Agencies to
evaluate progress in program execution. Recent adjustments in the DAES
review process have sought to improve the quality of information and to
focus on the key metrics which provide insight into program execution.
These steps are useful, and the Department should continue to make
every effort to ensure program execution is carefully measured and
monitored to provide early signals of the need to take action and make
adjustments which can improve the probability of successful program
execution. In general, I support this initiative which is designed to
improve decision making, communication, trust and integrity between
OSD, the Joint Staff and the Services. If confirmed, I will review this
initiative for any additional support or direction.
Question. Policy on Excessive Pass-Through Charges.
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the interim policy issued April
26, 2007 as well as public comments in preparation for finalization of
a responsive policy.
Question. Are there other initiatives or tools discussed in the
Defense Acquisition Transformation Report that you view as particularly
likely, or unlikely, to be productive in achieving acquisition reform?
Answer. I am aware that the second Defense Acquisition
Transformation Report was recently submitted. The Report has identified
additional initiatives that are considered productive. If confirmed, I
will study all of the acquisition reform initiatives to determine
additional ways and means to improve the effectiveness and efficiency
of the system.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS AFFORDABILITY

Question. The investment budget for weapon systems has grown
substantially over the past few years to $150 billion per year. An
increasing share of this investment is being allocated to a few very
large systems such as the Joint Strike Fighter, Future Combat Systems,
and Missile Defense.
Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems
is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in major systems,
costs of current operations, projected increases in end strength, and
asset recapitalization?
Answer. Current investment budget projections for major systems do
suggest these programs are affordable under current topline estimates
and assumptions as well as given continuing support from Congress for
costs in other areas. However, the DOD must execute these programs
within budget and avoid incurring cost growth. The Department has been
emphasizing funding programs to more realistic estimates. This is a
practice I intend to continue, if confirmed.
Question. What would be the impact of a decision by the Department
to reduce purchases of major systems because of affordability issues?
Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully assess the impact of any
proposal to reduce purchases of major systems because of affordability
and utilize the assessment in making final recommendations.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and
guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?
Answer. The Department must ensure that only those technologies and
capabilities that are technologically mature are included in new
systems. If confirmed, I intend to emphasize realistic cost estimates
and funding profiles. If confirmed, I will also work to ensure that
program requirements are well understood at program initiation and are
stabilized as much as possible over the long-term to guard against
``requirement creep.''

LEAD SYSTEMS INTEGRATOR

Question. For the Future Combat Systems program and several other
major defense acquisition programs, the Department has hired a lead
system integrator (LSI) to set requirements, evaluate proposals, and
determine which systems will be incorporated into future weapon
systems.
What are your views on the LSI approach to managing the acquisition
of major weapon systems?
Answer. I believe the acquisition team should keep every single
management tool available in our toolbox, and the acquisition team
should make judicious choices about the use of these tools. In general,
I think the Department should use care in choosing an LSI strategy and
should have very specific reasons for selecting a lead systems
integrator approach. Use of an LSI for a major system acquisition is in
some ways similar to hiring a prime contractor to develop a materiel
solution to satisfy the government's need, which we strive to state in
terms of performance requirements. An LSI generally performs comparable
roles and responsibilities to a prime contractor. An LSI is subject to
the same safeguards that apply to all Federal contractors, as defined
by the standard clauses that are included in our contracts.
Question. What lines do you believe the Department should draw
between those acquisition responsibilities that are inherently
governmental and those that may be performed by contractors?
Answer. The rules regarding the performance of inherently
governmental functions do not vary. The Government retains
responsibility for the execution of the program; makes all
requirements, budgeting and policy decisions; and performs source
selections at the prime level.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
LSIs do not misuse their access to sensitive and proprietary
information of the DOD and other defense contractors?
Answer. The Department has contract terms, backed up by law and
regulation, that govern what a prime contractor can do with information
gained in the performance of a contract. Likewise, the subcontract
arrangement established between the prime and subcontractor contains
provisions that protect the subcontractor's information from misuse. If
confirmed, I will review these issues as necessary and determine
whether additional steps need to be taken.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
LSIs do not unnecessarily limit competition in a manner that would
disadvantage the government or potential competitors in the private
sector?
Answer. This is a concern that arises in many programs as the
defense industrial base becomes more concentrated. It is not an issue
particular to contracts using an LSI. If confirmed, I will review these
issues as necessary and determine whether additional steps need to be
taken.

MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENTS

Question. Providing a stable funding profile for defense programs
is absolutely essential to effective program management and
performance, for both DOD and the defense industry. One already tested
means of increasing program funding stability is the use of multiyear
contracts. At the same time, however, multiyear procurements tie up DOD
funds over long periods of time, making it difficult for the Department
to reallocate funds if they are needed to meet higher priority defense
needs.
What are your views on multiyear procurements? Under what
circumstances do you believe they should be used?
Answer. In general, I strongly favor multiyear procurement
strategies. Frequently, multiyear procurements can offer substantial
savings through improved economies in production processes, better use
of industrial facilities, and a reduction in the administrative burden
in the placement and administration of contracts. The following
criteria should be considered in deciding whether a program should be
considered for multiyear application: savings when compared to the
annual contracting methods; validity and stability of the mission need;
stability of the funding; stability of the configuration; associated
technical risks; degree of confidence in estimates of both contract
costs and anticipated savings; and promotion of national security.
Question. What is your opinion on the level of cost savings that
constitute ``substantial savings'' for purposes of the defense
multiyear procurement statute, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2306b?
Answer. I favor placing no threshold on the level of cost savings
that constitutes ``substantial savings.'' What is best for the taxpayer
is to preserve flexibility for the Department to maximize savings
through the use of multiyear contracts. Placing a threshold on
``substantial savings'' would unnecessarily limit the contracting
options available for large programs where significant taxpayer dollars
could be saved.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that a
multiyear contract should be used for procuring weapons systems that
have unsatisfactory program histories, e.g., displaying poor cost,
scheduling, or performance outcomes but which might otherwise comply
with the requirements of the defense multiyear procurement statute, 10
U.S.C. Sec. 2306b?
Answer. Additional analysis and careful review of all information
should be completed when a multi year contract is being considered for
use in procuring weapon systems that have unsatisfactory program
histories but which otherwise comply with the statutory requirements.
The Department would need to examine all risk factors to determine if
multiyear procurement would be appropriate.
Question. How would you analyze and evaluate proposals for
multiyear procurement for such programs?
Answer. The Department would need to examine all risk factors in
conjunction with the potential for cost savings to determine if
multiyear procurement would be appropriate for a program with an
unsatisfactory history. If confirmed, I will analyze and evaluate
proposals for multiyear procurements in accordance with all statutory
and regulatory requirements.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in
determining whether procuring such a system under a multiyear contract,
is appropriate and should be proposed to Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, the primary criteria I would seek to apply in
deciding the appropriateness of the use of a multiyear contract is the
potential for achieving cost savings for the Department and the
taxpayer and the potential for successful industry execution. The
determination of savings is clearly dependent on supporting criteria
such as the stability of the budget, the stability of the requirement,
the accuracy and validity of cost estimates, and the ability of the
contractor to perform.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, should DOD ever break a
multiyear procurement?
Answer. Given careful screening of programs prior to awarding the
multiyear contract, there should be very limited and unusual
circumstances that would result in the breaking (i.e., cancellation) of
a multiyear contract. If confirmed, the particular circumstances of any
given break for a multiyear procurement would be addressed on a case by
case basis.
Question. If confirmed, how will you treat proposals to renegotiate
multiyear procurements?
Answer. If confirmed, I would treat proposals to renegotiate
multiyear procurements very cautiously.

LEASING

Question. Over the last several years, there has been much debate
concerning the leasing of capital equipment to be used by the military
services. Advocates of leasing capital equipment have argued that
leases can enable the Department to obtain new equipment without
significant upfront funding. Opponents of such leases have argued that
this approach shifts today's budget problems to future generations,
limiting the flexibility of future leaders to address emerging national
security issues.
What are your views on leasing of capital equipment, and when, if
ever, do you consider such leasing to be a viable mechanism for
providing capabilities to the Department?
Answer. In general, I believe the acquisition team should keep
every single management tool available in our toolbox, and the
acquisition team should make judicious choices about the use of these
tools. I consider leasing of capital equipment to be a viable mechanism
for providing capabilities to the Department in a limited number of
circumstances. In general, I believe that a lease should be cost
effective for the DOD unless there are additional, compelling reasons
for use of a lease. Leases are rarely suitable for the acquisition of
major military systems and should not be used just to avoid upfront
investment costs.
Question. The Air Force proposal in 2001 to lease 100 tanker
aircraft was severely criticized by a series of independent reviewers--
including the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research
Service, the National Defense University, the GAO, and the DOD
Inspector General (IG)--before it was finally cancelled.
What do you believe were the major problems with the tanker lease
proposal?
Answer. The proposal has been critiqued by a series of independent
reviewers--including the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional
Research Service, the National Defense University, the GAO, and the DOD
IG. The reviews generally suggested there was a lack of transparency
and accountability within the Department. If confirmed, I will continue
to work to ensure that the lessons learned are incorporated into the
training, education, and business processes of the Department.
As an observer of the tanker lease proposal, I was concerned about
two significant issues. First, I believe the proposal needed a high
quality, accurate cost analysis to inform the deliberations. A proposal
of this scope may have also merited a concurrent, independent cost
analysis. The cost and a number of other factors should have been
weighed and debated in a more transparent process. Second, I believe
the Air Force had not carefully assessed the Service's ability to
purchase the tankers at the end of the lease within their projected
budgets beyond the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). A second lease
would have been costly to the taxpayer. Alternately, it would also have
been very expensive to slow or break other acquisition programs in
order to budget for the buyout of the lease just beyond the FYDP.
Question. What lessons do you believe the DOD should learn from the
failed effort to lease tanker aircraft?
Answer. The undertaking of an acquisition program of such a
magnitude needs to be fully transparent and consider the concerns of
all the stakeholders. Also, as is the case in virtually every
acquisition program, the DOD needed to fully understand the life cycle
cost issues, including buyout of the lease, and realistically assess
the affordability of the program within the reasonable projections of
the long-term budget.

TANKER RECAPITALIZATION

Question. Before the final KC-X Request for Proposals (RFP) was
disseminated, the Air Force briefed Congress on the benefits to the
Department of continuous competition over the life of the KC-X program,
particularly in view of the fact that modernizing the tanker fleet is
projected to take several decades. The assertion was made that,
consistent with experience, competition would provide the best product
for the Department at the best price.
What are your views on whether the current acquisition strategy
supporting the KC-X tanker program should have the benefit of
competition beyond the first 80 aircraft?
Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully review the KC-X tanker
program acquisition strategy. While it is possible the program could
benefit from competition beyond the initial procurement, I think there
would have to be clear and compelling potential for cost savings for
the taxpayers that would offset the potential cost increases of a new
competition, an additional non-recurring investment for development,
and a life cycle premium for different type model series aircraft. The
additional costs may be offset by the potential benefits of competition
as well as allowing the insertion of beneficial new technology to the
fleet. Frankly, it would be very difficult to accurately assess all of
these factors today, thus I believe that it is premature to make this
decision at this point in time.
Question. Do you agree or disagree with the findings of the IG's
report?
Answer. I understand that the DOD IG report on the Air Force KC-X
Aerial Refueling Tanker Aircraft Program of May 30, 2007, found that
the Air Force did not include in the KC-X acquisition strategy a
requirement to obtain accurate, complete, and current cost and pricing
data to determine the reasonableness of the contractor's proposed price
for the noncompetitive portion of the KC-X aircraft acquisition.
I also understand that the Air Force concurred with the finding and
will update the acquisition strategy for the Milestone B decision,
anticipated by the end of 2007. If confirmed, I will further review the
IG report as appropriate.
Question. What actions would you take if confirmed, to ensure that
the appropriate level of oversight will be possible and will occur on
the KC-X program?
Answer. As an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program, the milestone
decision authority for KC-X is the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE),
USD(AT&L). As you are aware, the Defense Acquisition System includes a
robust senior level review process to advise the DAE in his oversight
of program planning and execution. If confirmed, I will exercise all
appropriate and necessary oversight of this program, and the Department
will manage the program with transparency and openness.

UNSOLICITED C-17 GLOBEMASTER PROCUREMENT PROPOSAL

Question. In March 2007, the contractor supplying the C-17 aircraft
directed its long-lead suppliers for that aircraft to cease work on
parts which were not already under contract. The contractor
subsequently instructed its suppliers to resume work on providing parts
for 10 new C-17s beyond the number already on order with the Air Force
and its international customers. In a statement issued on June 19,
2007, the contractor explained its action citing ``increased bipartisan
congressional support'' and ``increasing signs that the U.S. Air Force
has requirements for 30 additional C-17s.'' The contractor reportedly
told these suppliers that it would ``commit [its] resources to provide
long-lead funding for the C-17s to be delivered after mid-2009'' and
that this ``action will protect the option in the months ahead for the
cost-effective acquisition of C-17s in fiscal year 2008.''
What is your view of the responsibility (if any) that the
Government bears when a contractor decides to build a product on
speculation that the Government might decide to buy it in the future?
Answer. The government bears no responsibility and should not
encourage such an action.
Question. Do you believe that the Government's responsibility for
such a decision changes if Government officials encourage the
contractor to do so? In your view, would such communications by a
Government official be appropriate?
Answer. The government should not encourage such an action, and it
would be inappropriate to have any such communications other than via
formal contracting actions.
Question. Are you aware of any such communications in this case?
Answer. No, I am not aware of any such communications.
Question. What are your views, if any, on whether the Air Force
should purchase additional C-17s that are not reflected in the Future
Years Defense Plan or the Air Force's Unfunded Priority List?
Answer. Force structure decisions should be based on military
judgment and sound planning and analysis regarding the future needs for
joint warfighting.
Question. If the Air Force were to pursue such purchases, what are
your views on how they should be funded? Do you believe that any such
funding should come from within the Air Force budget?
Answer. Any such purchase should be programmed and budgeted via the
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system.

LEAD SHIP FUNDING

Question. In recent years, the DOD has shifted its policy for
funding the construction of first ships of a class. While the
Department previously funded such vessels in Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy, they are now funded in R&D accounts. This change was
implemented to provide additional management flexibility, but it has
also resulted in reduced visibility over cost, schedule, and
performance. For example, the scope of problems with the Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS) was identified by the Navy only months before
available funds were exhausted.
Do you believe that funding the construction of first ships of a
class in R&D accounts is in the best interest of the DOD? If so, why?
Answer. As the Navy acquisition executive, I believed strongly in
funding the lead ship of a class with research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) funds. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
accurately predict the exact cost of a lead ship of a class. When cost
growth develops, the mechanisms in place between Congress and the
Pentagon for adjusting to unexpected cost increases can often result in
further delays and therefore even more cost increases. Indeed, the Ship
Cost Adjustment process, and the restriction to use funds in the year
of appropriation for paying ship cost increases is extremely cumbersome
and difficult. This process frankly encourages poor management choices
and late recognition of the need for funds.
It was my expectation that the DOD would make budget adjustments
for the lead ship, if necessary, in the annual RDT&E budget. Those
budgets would be fully visible to Congress and subject to Congress'
authorization and appropriation oversight. Congress would actually have
far greater visibility and oversight into our management of the lead
ship. There is absolutely no reason for there to be less visibility
into the cost of a lead ship funded in the RDT&E account. I am
committed to ensuring the DOD and Congress have full visibility into
the cost of our platforms. The Department always maintains an estimate
at completion for the cost of a ship regardless of the type of funds
used. The alternative is to budget a best estimate for a challenging
lead ship and wait several years to determine whether the large block
of single year funds has been sufficient. Indeed, I worry that the
early phase decisions in a construction program lasting several years
are not adequately cost constrained because of the availability of a
large block of single year funds provided to cover the entire cost of
the lead ship. I believe the annual appropriation of R&D funds would
actually put greater pressure on the acquisition team and industry to
make careful decisions about managing funds at each step of the lead
ship construction process.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Department and
Congress should take to address the lack of visibility that can result
from funding first ships of a class in R&D accounts?
Answer. I do not agree that funding the lead ship of a class
results in a lack of visibility into the cost of a ship. The visibility
into the cost of the lead ship is no better if the lead ship is
authorized and appropriated one single year block of funds for the
entire cost of the lead ship to spend over several years in
procurement. Indeed, Congress has been concerned in the past to learn
years later of the need for funds to complete the construction of
previously authorized and appropriated lead ships. Funding lead ships
in RDT&E actually provides Congress far greater visibility into the
cost and progress on a lead ship. The DOD will provide Congress an
estimate of the total cost of the lead ship and indicate the annual
increments in the RDT&E accounts. Congress will get an annual update on
the projected cost to complete the lead ship and will have the
opportunity to review and approve every cost increase and adjustment.
Indeed, Congress will have insight into possible cost growth far
earlier than a traditional lead ship procurement process where the
total initial cost estimate for the ship is almost spent, at taxpayer
expense, and the DOD and Congress are faced with new bills and a
significant sunk cost.
Question. What is your opinion on the use of fixed-price contracts
for lead ships?
Answer. The value and risk associated with using fixed-price
contracts for lead ships must be assessed in conjunction with the
technological challenges associated with each ship program. I support
Congress' approach as set forth in section 818 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, which directed the Milestone
Decision Authority to select the appropriate type of contract, after
reviewing the complexity and technological risk associated with the
program.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Question. Secretary Winter recently cancelled the contract for one
of the vessels in the LCS program as a result of the Navy's inability
to bring costs under control in that program. According to the Office
of the IG of the Navy, one of the contributing factors in the poor cost
performance on that program may have been the inexperience and lack of
qualifications of the Navy Program Manager.
What lessons should be learned from the problems experienced to
date with the LCS procurement?
Answer. I have not reviewed the LCS program in adequate detail to
determine the lessons learned. However, based on some cursory reviews,
I believe there are some initial lessons. First, every program requires
a valid and effective earned value management system in order to
provide industry and the government with an accurate, measurable sense
of progress. This was a serious deficiency for the LCS program. Second,
acquisition program management is a contact sport, and new ways of
doing business require even greater diligence and management attention.
The DOD has constantly learned that controlling requirements
adjustments requires constant attention and discipline. LCS affirmed
that there is another level of requirements, government technical
authority, which requires determined management and discipline. To be
certain, industry must perform, and it is not clear that the level of
industry performance on LCS was adequate. However, the government has a
responsibility to operate in a manner that can help enable success and
in a manner that is consistent with industry planning expectations. The
interpretation of technical authority and the translation of those
changes into performance made LCS delivery to budget impossible for
both government and industry.
Question. If confirmed, how would you expect to apply those
``lessons learned'' in overseeing the management of both the LCS and
other major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the DOD's efforts to ensure
that acquisition programs have management baselines which can be
tracked with an earned value management system. If confirmed, I will
also continue to evaluate appropriate additional steps that should be
taken to provide effective oversight of major defense acquisition
programs.
Question. As the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RDA) at the time, what was your role
in selecting the former LCS Program Manager and in approving his
qualifications for that position?
Answer. My recollection is that I approved the assignment of the
former LCS program manager for the position with reservations. During
my tenure as ASN(RDA), I generally sought to avoid approving waivers
and to reject officers for key acquisition positions unless those
officers met the acquisition experience and training criteria for those
positions. The military personnel detailing system generally put
forward one or more candidates, for assignment to open positions. In
this case, the military personnel system felt strongly that an
experienced operational officer with strong leadership skills should
manage the LCS program, despite his limited acquisition experience. The
military personnel system also felt that strong program executive
officer (PEO) oversight and supporting acquisition talent would fill
any gaps. There are many instances where I rejected personnel because
of the lack of acquisition experience and training. In this case, I
regrettably did not reject this assignment, acknowledging strong views
from the military personnel system.
Question. What steps need to be taken, in your view, to ensure that
officers selected for program management positions have sufficient
training and qualification to succeed?
Answer. We have a very capable work force from which to select our
prospective program managers. I would emphasize career management
including selection, training, tenure and mentoring of program
managers. Succession planning and a rigorous selection process are key
tools for obtaining capable military and civilian program managers. As
part of their career development process, officers seeking to manage
programs must pursue the training necessary to be certified and have
significant experience in acquisition management. I think the
Department should only in the rarest cases, if ever, assign an officer
without requisite acquisition credentials and experience to a program
management or PEO position.

SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT

Question. Problems with computer software have caused significant
delays and cost overruns in a number of major defense programs. Section
804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
required DOD to establish a program to improve the software acquisition
process.
What is the status of DOD's efforts to improve software development
in major weapon systems?
Answer. I understand that the Department has established a
Directorate for Systems and Software Engineering focused on improving
software assurance. The Directorate supports acquisition success
through software policy, guidance and best practices, reinforced
through program reviews; improves the state of practices for software
engineering; provides leadership and advocacy through outreach
initiatives; and fosters software resources to meet DOD needs. If
confirmed, I will evaluate as appropriate the DOD's progress and plans
in this area.
Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to
address delays and cost overruns associated with problems in the
development of software for major weapon systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would generally initiate an internal and/or
independent executive review of the major systems which have
experienced software delays and cost overruns.

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

Question. When a required capability is defined, one method to
ensure that capability is provided in the most cost-effective manner is
through the conduct of an analysis of alternatives (AOA). This analysis
not only helps to present alternatives, but also assists in the
determination of key performance parameters and the threshold and
objective values of these parameters.
Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it is appropriate
for the Department to proceed with the acquisition of a major system
without first conducting an AOA?
Answer. I do not believe it is appropriate for the Department to
proceed with the acquisition of a major Acquisition Category I (ACAT I)
level system without first conducting an AOA. I do believe there are
opportunities to improve the process by making AOA's tailored, more
timely and appropriately scoped.
Question. If confirmed, what will be your position on conducting
analyses of alternatives for the programs for which you will be the
Milestone Decision Authority?
Answer. If confirmed, I will generally expect that an appropriate
AOA will be conducted before any program for which I am the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) can proceed into development.

RAPID ACQUISITION

Question. Section 811 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 gave the Secretary of Defense
new authority to waive certain statutes and regulations where necessary
to acquire equipment that is urgently needed to avoid combat
fatalities.
What plans do you have, if confirmed, to use the rapid acquisition
authority provided by section 811?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Secretary's use of the
Rapid Acquisition Authority when it becomes necessary to waive certain
statutes and regulations that inhibit our ability to rapidly acquire
equipment that is urgently needed to avoid combat fatalities.
Question. Do you believe that the Department has the authority and
flexibility it needs to acquire products needed to avoid combat
fatalities? If not, what additional authority or flexibility do you
believe is needed?
Answer. The Department has significant authority and flexibility to
meet urgent operational needs, and the Rapid Acquisition Authority
granted by Congress further complements that authority and flexibility.
I believe the Department must continue its efforts to respond more
quickly and effectively to resolve urgent operational needs for our
forces in the field.
If confirmed, I will evaluate the need for additional changes as
these needs are identified, and I will make appropriate
recommendations.
Question. When the Department acquires equipment under section 811
or other authority without first undertaking full operational testing
and evaluation, what steps do you believe the Department should take to
ensure the long-term effectiveness and sustainability of the equipment?
Answer. I believe the Department takes appropriate steps when it
acquires equipment under section 811 or other authority. There is
prudent risk management to ensure that our forces receive equipment
that is appropriately safe, interoperable, suitable and effective for
its intended purpose. When the solutions to immediate warfighter needs
transition to programs of record, steps are taken to continue to verify
their long-term effectiveness and to ensure adequate sustainment and
training plans for the equipment are developed.

SERVICES CONTRACTING

Question. Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic increase
in the volume of services purchased by the DOD. At the request of the
committee, the GAO has compared DOD's practices for the management of
services contracts to the practices of best performers in the private
sector. GAO concluded that leading companies have achieved significant
savings by insisting upon greater visibility and management over their
services contracts and by conducting so-called ``spend'' analyses to
find more efficient ways to manage their service contractors. Section
801 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002
required DOD to move in this direction. While DOD has initiated efforts
to establish a management structure and leverage its purchasing power,
we understand such efforts remain in various stages of implementation.
What is the status of these efforts, and do you believe the
Department is providing appropriate stewardship over service contracts?
Answer. The DOD has a number of efforts underway in an effort to
improve management of service contracts. If confirmed, I will review
our progress and plans for these initiatives as necessary.
Question. Do you believe that the Department should conduct a
comprehensive analysis of its spending on contract services, as
recommended by GAO?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support near-term efforts to conduct
spend analyses to develop a better understanding of how the DOD buys
services.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to improve the
Department's management of its contracts for services?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Department's initiatives
and plans to manage this set of issues to ensure that we are making the
necessary progress in providing oversight and management of the
Department's acquisitions of services.
Question. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the DOD have
long agreed that Federal agencies could achieve significant savings and
improved performance by moving to performance-based services
contracting (PBSC). Most recently, the Army Environmental Program
informed the committee that it has achieved average savings of 27
percent over a period of several years as a result of moving to fixed-
price, performance-based contracts for environmental remediation.
Section 802 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002, as amended, established performance goals for increasing the use
of PBSC in DOD service contracts.
What is the status of the Department's efforts to increase the use
of PBSC in its service contracts?
Answer. I do not have direct experience in this area. However, I
would be pleased to work with Congress on this issue, if confirmed.
Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs
to take to increase the use of PBSC and meet the goals established in
section 802?
Answer. If confirmed, this is an issue which I would have to review
in detail in order to be able to make recommendations to the committee.

INTERAGENCY CONTRACTING

Question. GAO recently placed interagency contracting--the use by
one agency of contracts awarded by other agencies--on its list of high-
risk programs and operations. While interagency contracts provide a
much-needed simplified method for procuring commonly used goods and
services, GAO has found that the dramatic growth of interagency
contracts, the failure to clearly allocate responsibility between
agencies, and the incentives created by fee-for-services arrangements,
have combined to expose the DOD and other Federal agencies to the risk
of significant abuse and management. The DOD IG and the General
Services Administration (GSA) IG have identified a long series of
problems with interagency contracts, including lack of acquisition
planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials
contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures,
and failure to monitor contractor performance. DOD, in conjunction with
the GSA and the Office of Management and Budget, is taking a number of
actions to improve training and guidance on the use of this contract
approach.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to monitor and evaluate the
effectiveness of the actions currently underway or planned regarding
DOD's use of other agencies' contracts?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the efforts outlined in the
January 1, 2005 policy on the ``Proper Use of Non-DOD Contracts.''
Adequate data must be obtained so that DOD and the assisting agencies
know which DOD activities are utilizing non-DOD contracts to meet their
needs and to specifically identify what the assisting agencies are
acquiring on our behalf. The Department should continue the
coordination between OSD and the assisting agencies (i.e., GSA,
Interior, Treasury, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA)). The DOD should also seek to understand the driving forces
behind these activities, including the possibility that the DOD is not
adequately manned to independently execute and manage these efforts.
Question. Do you believe additional authority or measures are
needed to hold DOD or other agency personnel accountable for their use
of interagency contracts?
Answer. Given what I know today, I believe the authority and
regulations are sufficient in terms of accountability. If confirmed, I
will review and evaluate these issues as necessary.
Question. Do you believe contractors have any responsibility for
assuring that the work requested by DOD personnel is within the scope
of their contract?
Answer. The primary responsibility for ensuring work is within the
scope of a contract rests with the contracting officer.
Question. Do you believe that DOD's continued heavy reliance on
outside agencies to do award and manage contracts on its behalf is a
sign that the Department has failed to adequately staff its own
acquisition system?
Answer. I believe the DOD should seek to understand the driving
forces behind these activities, including the possibility that the DOD
is not adequately manned to independently execute and manage these
efforts. I believe the Department may determine that there are areas
where staffing is inadequate.

``BUY AMERICA''

Question. ``Buy America'' issues have been the source of
considerable controversy in recent years. As a result, there have been
a number of legislative efforts to place restrictions on the purchase
of defense products from foreign sources.
What benefits do you believe the Department obtains from
international participation in the defense industrial base?
Answer. International sales, purchases, and licensed production
ensure U.S. warfighters have access to the best technology in the
world. International participation also promotes international defense
cooperation, contributes to operational interoperability, and promotes
cost savings. These arrangements rationalize the defense equipment
supplier base to achieve the greatest efficiency in equipping our
collective forces.
Question. Under what conditions, if any, would you support the
imposition of domestic source restrictions for a particular product?
Answer. In certain instances involving national security and the
preservation of a key defense technology or production capability,
domestic source restrictions may be necessary. The Department has (and
has exercised) the authority to ``self-impose'' such domestic source
restrictions using the authority of 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(3). These
restrictions then are included in the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement.
Question. Section 831 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 requires the Secretary of
Defense to ensure that the United States firms and United States
employment in the defense sector are not disadvantaged by unilateral
procurement practices by foreign governments, such as the imposition of
offset agreements in a manner that undermines the United States
industrial base.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should take to
implement this requirement?
Answer. I understand that the DOD has established an interagency
team composed of the Departments of Defense, Labor, Commerce, and State
and the U.S. Trade Representative whose charter is to consult with
other nations about limiting the adverse effects of offsets. I think
the team should continue its work. If confirmed, I would review many
proposed actions to ensure they will not harm the economy, defense
industrial base, defense production, or defense preparedness.

SPECIALTY METALS

Question. Section 842 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 recodified the specialty metals
provision of the Berry Amendment in section 2533b of title 10, U.S.C.
On January 17, 2007, the Director of Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Policy issued a memorandum implementing the non-
availability exception in section 2533b. The January 17, 2007,
memorandum states: ``Several factors can and should be taken into
consideration in making a determination that compliant specialty metal
is not available. Are compliant parts, assemblies or components
available in the required form as and when needed? What are the costs
and time delays if requalification of certain parts of the system is
required? What will be the impact on the program's delivery schedule,
program costs, and mission needs?''
Do you believe that section 2533b provides the Department the
flexibility that it needs to ensure that it can purchase weapon systems
and parts in a timely manner for the national defense?
Answer. It is my understanding that the provision permits the
Department to utilize a non-availability exception when the Department
is not able to access compliant suppliers. If confirmed, I will review
this provision for a more complete understanding of flexibility for
assurance of our weapon system purchases.
Question. Do you believe that the steps taken by the Department to
implement section 2533b have been consistent with the requirements of
that provision?
Answer. If confirmed, I will complete any necessary reviews of the
steps taken to ensure the consistent implementation of the provision.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps, if any, would you
plan to take to ensure that section 2533b is implemented in a manner
that is consistent with the interests of the DOD?
Answer. The DOD has established a Strategic Materials Protection
Board, in accordance with Section 843 of Public Law 109-364. If
confirmed, I will become the Chairman of that Board. If confirmed, I
will seek to ensure that the Board examines national security and
domestic availability issues associated with specialty metals and other
strategic materials critical to national security.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend be made to
section 2533b?
Answer. If confirmed, I will complete appropriate reviews of the
implementation of section 2533b and make any necessary change
recommendations.
Question. On July 2, 2007, the DOD proposed to amend the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement to waive application of
section 2533b to commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items. The Federal
Register Notice states: ``Exercise of this statutory COTS waiver is
critical to DOD's access to the commercial marketplace.''
Do you support the Department's decision to exercise this exemption
authority?
Answer. In general, the acquisition of COTS products is one way to
consider cost, schedule and performance alternatives. If confirmed, I
will review the Department's decision as appropriate.
Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which COTS
items are embedded in major weapon systems purchased by the DOD?
Answer. To my knowledge, the Department has conducted no definitive
studies on the extent to which COTS items are embedded in major weapons
systems. If confirmed, it may be appropriate to ask major weapon system
programs to review the extent of COTS item usage in military systems.
Question. Do you believe that the DOD has sufficient market power
to persuade producers of COTS items to alter their commercial supply
chains to comply with the requirements of section 2533b?
Answer. When the Department is not the predominant buyer, it has
limited leverage in those markets. There is little incentive for
commercial companies to modify their procedures to meet the peculiar
requirements of the Department, particularly if the Department is a
small player in the market and changes would affect the firm's
competitiveness.
Question. Do you believe that it would be in the Department's
interest to do so?
Answer. In general, it is in the Departments best interest to get
the best value. If confirmed, I will review this area as appropriate.

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.
defense industry?
Answer. I believe the U.S. defense industry is a market leader and
innovator for products and services. Nevertheless, there are and will
always be challenges the Department must address. If confirmed, I would
work within the Department and with Congress to address them.
Question. Do you support further consolidation of the U.S. defense
industry?
Answer. There should be no blanket policy of encouraging or
discouraging further consolidation or divestiture. Each proposed
transaction must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in the context of
the individual market, the changing dynamics of that market, and the
need to preserve competition. Generally, I am concerned about
consolidation trends which have had an adverse impact on competition
opportunities for the DOD.
Question. What is your position on foreign investment in the U.S.
defense sector?
Answer. In general, I am not opposed to foreign investment in the
United States, provided there are checks and balances to protect our
national security.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the DOD should take to
ensure the continued health of the U.S. defense industry?
Answer. The Department should continue to take actions and make
decisions that strengthen that portion of the industrial base that
supports defense. The Department also should continue to focus its
acquisition strategies, both for development and production, in a
manner that encourages true competition and drives innovation--seeking
to draw nontraditional suppliers into the defense enterprise.

ROLE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND
LOGISTICS

Question. Concerns have been expressed that over time the purview
of the office of the USD(AT&L) has been diminished. The Department has
established a separate set of regulations for the acquisition of space
systems. The MDA has the primary role for missile defense systems and
has established its own acquisition approach for these systems. Air
Force acquisition scandals and the use of Other Transaction Authority
on the Future Combat Systems program have raised questions as to the
effectiveness of oversight provided by the USD(AT&L).
Do you believe that the USD(AT&L) has the authority necessary to
provide effective oversight over major acquisition programs of the
military departments and defense agencies?
Answer. At this point, I believe the USD(AT&L) has the authority
needed to execute the responsibilities of the position. Those
responsibilities include oversight of both Missile Defense and Space
Systems acquired by the Department of Defense. I believe that it is
important for the USD(AT&L) to fully exercise those authorities working
in partnership with the Services and Agencies.
Question. Do you believe that the USD(AT&L) should have additional
authority to reverse acquisition decisions of the military departments,
where the USD(AT&L) believes it is necessary to do so in the public
interest?
Answer. At this point, I do not believe additional authority is
required. The USD(AT&L) reviews ACAT I programs and has the ability to
assume cognizance over any other acquisition program in the department
in which the USD(AT&L) has a ``special interest.'' I do believe that
the offices in USD(AT&L) need transparency and visibility into all
Service and agency acquisition efforts. There may be cases where the
management team in USD(AT&L) should use available authorities to ensure
both public interest as well as greater jointness and interoperability.
Question. In your view, should the Service Acquisition Executives
(SAEs) report directly to the USD(AT&L)?
Answer. The current arrangement properly recognizes the
responsibility of the Secretary of each military department for all
affairs of that department, including supplying and equipping, and it
facilitates a strong tie between the SAEs and the other military
department leadership, including those developing capability needs. The
USD (AT&L) currently has adequate authority to provide guidance and
direction to the SAEs through the military department secretaries.
However, if confirmed, I would review what changes, if any, are
appropriate to improve oversight and communication.
Question. Do you believe that the Service Chiefs should play a role
in the acquisition chain of command?
Answer. The Service Chiefs have a key role to play in the
development of capability needs and in the planning and allocation of
resources consistent with those needs. I do not believe service chiefs
should play a formal role in the acquisition chain of command.
Question. What role should USD(AT&L) perform in the oversight and
acquisition of joint programs, the acquisition of space systems, and
missile defense systems?
Answer. The USD(AT&L) has cognizance over the entire acquisition
process including the oversight and acquisition of joint, space, and
missile defense systems. I believe this broad, corporate oversight role
is vital and should be maintained and fully exercised.

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Question. Over the last decade, DOD has reduced the size of its
acquisition workforce by almost half, without undertaking any
systematic planning or analysis to ensure that it would have the
specific skills and competencies needed to meet DOD's current and
future needs. Additionally, more than half of DOD's current workforce
will be eligible for early or regular retirement in the next 5 years.
While DOD has started the process of planning its long-term workforce
needs, GAO reports that the Department does not yet have a
comprehensive strategic workforce plan needed to guide its efforts.
In your view, what are the critical skills, capabilities, and tools
that DOD's workforce needs for the future? What steps will you take, if
confirmed, to ensure that the workforce will, in fact, possess them?
Answer. In general, some of the most pressing critical skills
needed for future success are program management, systems engineering,
cost estimating, logistics, contracting, and test and evaluation. I
believe that meeting warfighter needs demands continued leveraging of
technology, and this means we need a strong S&T component of the
acquisition workforce. If confirmed, I will support initiatives to
increase funding for workforce recruiting, development and retention
initiatives to ensure we have the right skills and capabilities. If
confirmed, I would hope to take steps to improve the speed, agility and
flexibility of DOD's processes for recruiting and hiring these critical
members of the workforce.
Question. Do you agree that the Department needs a comprehensive
human capital plan, including a gap analysis and specific recruiting,
retention and training goals, to guide the development of its
acquisition workforce?
Answer. I believe that a comprehensive human capital strategic plan
is a useful tool for guiding development of the acquisition, technology
and logistics workforce. I understand that the Under Secretary for
Defense, Personnel and Readiness, is leading department-wide efforts to
ensure comprehensive human capital planning. I will work closely with
his staff, the Services, and Congress to successfully implement
responsive workforce initiatives. I believe successful execution of
this plan will require process improvements which allow DOD to
effectively compete for human capital.
Question. Do you believe that DOD's workforce is large enough to
perform the tasks assigned to it? Do you support congressionally-
mandated cuts to the acquisition workforce, and do you think further
cuts are necessary?
Answer. I am not aware of any legislation pending which would
reduce the acquisition workforce. The appropriate size of the
acquisition workforce is a very important issue that I will engage in
partnership with the Services to ensure we have the workforce size,
capability and capacity to meet critically important acquisition needs.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee on this
challenge.
Question. Has the Department had difficulty in attracting and
retaining new staff to come into the acquisition workforce? If so, what
steps do you think are necessary to attract talented new hires?
Answer. During the past 5 years, data suggests that the Department
has experienced both success and challenges in attracting and retaining
acquisition workforce members. If confirmed, I will review the steps
being taken and provide guidance for continued improvement to address
this important area.
Question. What are your views regarding assertions that the
acquisition workforce is losing its technical and management expertise
and is beginning to rely too much on support contractors, Federally-
Funded Research and Development Centers, and, in some cases, prime
contractors for this expertise?
Answer. I do have concerns about our human capital in the
acquisition workforce and am keenly aware of challenges having to do
with technical expertise from my role as the DDR&E and Chief Technology
Officer of the Department. If confirmed, I will place a high priority
on efforts to attract, develop, and retain expertise in the technical
and managerial fields. Technical and managerial expertise provided by
the private sector has been, and I believe will continue to be, an
important contribution to national security. If confirmed, I intend to
ensure there is an appropriate balance of skills suited to the
circumstances and activities to be performed.
Question. What is the appropriate tenure for program managers and
PEOs to ensure continuity in major programs?
Answer. The assignment period for program managers and PEOs must
facilitate both continuity and individual accountability. On May 25,
2007, the USD(AT&L) issued a memorandum that expanded on existing
policy. The memo emphasized the statutory requirement (10 U.S.C. 1734)
for the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) to ensure a written
tenure agreement is prepared when a program manager is assigned to an
ACAT I or II program and highlighted that the tenure period for program
managers of major defense programs shall correspond to the major
milestone closest to 4 years or as tailored by the CAE based on unique
program requirements, such as significant milestones, events or
efforts. If confirmed, I would monitor implementation of these tenure
requirements to ensure continuity in major acquisition programs. I
believe that these tenure requirements are very important, and the
tenure requirements should be honored with only extremely rare
exceptions.

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT

Question. The Department is increasingly relying on civilian
contractors in combat areas for maintenance and support functions.
How do you view this trend? Do you believe that the Department has
drawn a clear and appropriate line between functions that should be
performed by DOD personnel and functions that may be performed by
contractors in a combat area?
Answer. The U.S. Armed Forces have always been supported by
civilian contractors, whether at peace or war. The post-Cold War force
reduction of military forces, the ``peace dividend,'' is the driving
force for where we are today. In order to maintain desired combat
capability, clearly an ``inherently governmental mission,'' in the
smaller force, the Department reduced the military logistical support
force structure. Contract capabilities fill the void and provide
support which can be drawn upon only as needed to perform functions
that must be accomplished to support the military forces. DOD has,
consistent with available resources, their allocation, and mission
requirements, defined those roles which remain inherently governmental
in nature. For example, only military forces may operate offensively
under rules of engagement. Security contractors are only permitted to
operate defensively and must conform to a separate set of instructions,
the Rules on the Use of Force. I believe this is an important topic in
the context of modern warfare, and if confirmed, I will examine these
issues carefully.
Question. Transforming supply chain management will require not
only process improvements but major investments in technology and
equipment ranging from the use of passive Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) tags to improve asset visibility to procuring
more trucks to improve theater distribution.
What steps do you believe are necessary to improve the management
of DOD's supply chain?
Answer. DOD Logistics is a complex business supporting all aspects
of the Department's supply chain. I understand that there are a number
of focused efforts underway to strengthen the effectiveness of joint
logistics and sustainment performance:

Integrating life cycle management principles into
acquisition and sustainment programs to provide better life
cycle reliability and materiel readiness for our weapons
systems and equipment.
Implementing programs to strengthen Supply Chain
Operations to include initiatives under the leadership of our
designated Distribution Process Owner, the United States
Transportation Command; as well as Continuous Process
Improvements such as the joint regional inventory management
initiative; and technology improvements, such use of RFID
technology.

If confirmed, I intend to continue these efforts and seek to
continue the trend of improved performance.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. What, in your view, is the role and value of S&T programs
in meeting the Department's transformation goals and in confronting
irregular, catastrophic, traditional and disruptive threats?
Answer. Over the past 2 years, I have had the honor of being the
DDR&E, the Department's Chief Technology Officer. In that role, I have
been the spokesman for value of the Department's S&T program. I believe
S&T is a vital element for modernizing and transforming the
capabilities of the military forces. Through new capabilities brought
about by the S&T program, we should enhance the Nation's capability to
confront irregular, catastrophic, traditional, and disruptive threats.
This past year, the DDR&E team brought forward a number of new programs
specifically focused on enhancing our capabilities in these new threat
areas. For instance, we are establishing a biometrics program to
identify people; we are establishing a program to tag, track, and
locate objects of interest; we established a program in human, social,
cultural and behavioral modeling, among others. Each should deliver a
capability to confront new world threats.
Question. If confirmed, what direction will you provide regarding
funding targets and priorities for the Department's long-term research
efforts?
Answer. Long-term research has been, and will continue to be, very
important to maintaining a supply of new capabilities to our
warfighters. Any funding targets or goals should be balanced against
other department goals, so I can't give an absolute funding target for
long-term research. As DDR&E, I strive to maintain and grow the basic
research investment of the Department to provide new opportunities. If
confirmed, maintaining and strengthening long-term research would be a
goal.
Question. What specific metrics would you use, if confirmed, to
assess whether the Department is making adequate investments in its
basic research programs?
Answer. Under my direction, DOD has begun the assembly of a science
and engineering investment database. A comprehensive database is the
initial, key step to providing transparency across all organizations in
the S&T enterprise and will form the baseline for future discussions.
The database should give us a better picture of our enterprise
investment in basic research and the ability to review and evaluate the
degree of investment concentration in specific fields or technologies.
By its very nature, the output of basic research is difficult to track.
In general, basic research output can be measured in at least three
areas: (1) New knowledge--publications in reference journals, (2)
Intellectual capital--students supported, degrees awarded, (3) Tech
transitions--new knowledge (scientific findings) picked up in
technology and development programs by the Services and industry. One
overarching goal is to ensure organizations funded by DOD and the
broader research community possess an understanding of our missions and
their technological areas of need. However, I believe we must move
beyond these traditional measures and identify relevant metrics to
ensure adequate investment in basic research.
Question. Do you feel that there is sufficient coordination between
and among the S&T programs of the military Services and defense
agencies?
Answer. During my tenure as the DDR&E, we instituted a new process,
which we call Reliance 21, to improve the coordination between the
military Services and departments. This new process was developed with
the S&T executives of all the components. The DOD's S&T stakeholders
instituted this change to improve the coordination and collaboration
among the components. The Reliance 21 process will improve
coordination, but we need to let the process mature before we determine
if it is sufficient. The DDR&E team has also instituted a detailed
database to catalogue and make available details on the S&T program
across the department--again, this is a work in progress, but
highlights that I believe the enterprise has an opportunity to more
efficiently and effectively coordinate S&T projects and investments.
Question. The DDR&E has been designated as the Chief Technology
Officer of the DOD.
In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Chief Technology
Officer of the DOD?
Answer. I believe the Chief Technology Officer should provide the
Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics advice on the ``state of the
art'' in militarily relevant technologies and oversee the planning
execution of a balanced, coordinated and proactive DOD S&T program.

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

Question. In your view, does the Director of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) report to the DDR&E?
Answer. Organizationally, the Director of DARPA reports to the
DDR&E. I believe it is essential for the Director of DARPA to report to
the DDR&E in order to permit the DDR&E to meet his or her
responsibilities as the Chief Technology Officer.
Question. In your view, has the authority provided by section 1101
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 been
used appropriately and effectively by DARPA to attract and retain a
highly qualified technical workforce?
Answer. DARPA's implementation of the section 1101 authority has
been an unqualified success. In fact, the Department modeled the Highly
Qualified Expert program based on DARPA's authority and its success
with it. DARPA has been able to attract and retain highly qualified
technical experts for limited term appointments. The ability to hire
these technical experts on limited terms, expeditiously and more
comparably and competitively with industry standards, that continues to
make this program successful. For example, under this authority, DARPA
has been able to make an employment offer and have the program manager
report for duty in as few as 6 working days. It would be helpful to be
able to exercise these authorities more broadly throughout the DOD.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in section 1101?
Answer. I understand that DARPA's management of 1101 program has
gone very well over the years. I am not aware of any need for changes
at this time.
Question. In your view, does DARPA's current program strike an
appropriate balance between investments in near-term technology
programs that are directly tied to current battlefield needs and
investments in longer-term research efforts that seek to develop future
capabilities? Should DARPA be focused principally on longer-term
threats and capabilities?
Answer. DARPA remains a vital element of the overall DOD research
and engineering program, and the Department's overall modernization and
transformation efforts. I do not believe that DARPA should be
exclusively focused on longer-term threats and capabilities. Technology
development and maturation follows different models, some of which are
integrated from far-term to near-term to fielding prototypes. It is
reasonable for DARPA to be engaged in technologies at different levels
of maturity. I believe the hallmark of DARPA should continue to be a
focus on higher risk activity.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. The Department's efforts to quickly transition
technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the
last few years. Challenges remain to institutionalizing the transition
of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons
systems and platforms.
What impediments to technology transition do you see within the
Department?
Answer. The primary challenge that impedes technology transition is
the lack of early and frequent interaction between the S&T and
acquisition communities in an effort to create windows of opportunity
for insertion of mature technology and to support proper and timely
budgeting. Our current budget processes limit our flexibility to
reallocate funds, posing another impediment to the Department's
opportunity to exploit and transition new technology. Finally, the
growing aversion to risk in programs generates another impediment to
technology transition. The military departments and agencies have made
improvements in early planning and investing for technology transition,
accelerating the movement of capabilities to the warfighter, and
initiating mechanisms for bridge funding. The Department, needs to
develop effective, strategic approaches to technology transition,
particularly for uniquely joint and transformational capabilities.
Additionally, taking advantage of the plethora of worldwide
innovation to achieve superiority and affordability is at odds with the
linear, deliberate nature of traditional military acquisitions. Our
programmatic, budgeting and contracting practices often deter
involvement of nontraditional businesses. I believe the Department
should develop and implement a number of initiatives to improve
outreach to, and participation by, these innovative, nontraditional
suppliers.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the
effectiveness of technology transition efforts?
Answer. As DDR&E, I have personally worked to advocate the
transition of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) and
other S&T programs. I have also initiated process changes to enhance
transition efforts. Further, I assigned the Assistant DUSD for
Innovation and Technology Transition to assume the role of an advocate
in a leadership position who is ``driving transition every day.'' If
confirmed, I will continue to support the acquisition team and all
viable initiatives to improve the DOD's access to, and adoption of, the
best technology solutions from all sources.
Question. What can be done from a budget, policy, and
organizational standpoint to facilitate the transition of technologies
from S&T programs into acquisition programs?
Answer. From a budget perspective, I believe it is important for
the DOD to have S&T funds which are generally available and can be
flexibly used to transition successful technology developments. A
breakthrough technology development can languish for 12-18 months
waiting for the budget process to provide funds which support final
development and utilization in a military system.
From a policy perspective, I believe the DOD should return to some
of the practices which were historically effective. Greater utilization
of prototypes offers the opportunity to mature technology, demonstrate
the technology's potential to acquisition and operational personnel,
enhance the management and systems engineering skills of our work
force, and allow a lower risk SDD phase. Most importantly, such
prototyping efforts would provide a useful tool for attracting
scientist and engineers into the defense acquisition workforce and for
inspiring our Nation's young people to pursue careers in science and
engineering.
I am not aware of significant organizational issues or impediments
at this time.
Question. Do you believe that the Department's S&T organizations
have the ability to carry technologies to higher levels of maturity
before handing them off to acquisition programs?
Answer. DOD S&T organizations are very capable of maturing
technologies. However, as has been noted for many years, there is
sometimes a ``valley of death'' between technology development efforts
and acquisition program receptors. Throughout DOD, there are many
efforts to bridge this valley of death. I believe it is important to
encourage such efforts.
Question. Section 2359a(c) of title 10, U.S.C., requires the
USD(AT&L) to carry out an initiative to facilitate the rapid transition
of new technologies from S&T programs into acquisition programs and to
designate a senior official of the Department to manage this
initiative.
If confirmed, would you expect to appoint a single technology
transition advocate who would be responsible for promoting technology
transition throughout the Department?
Answer. As DDR&E, I have asked the Assistant DUSD for Innovation
and Technology Transition to lead efforts to drive technology
transition every day. If confirmed, I will carefully evaluate
additional opportunities and initiatives that can support the
transition of technology to the warfighter.

TEST AND EVALUATION

Question. The Department has, on occasion, been criticized for
failing to adequately test its major weapon systems before these
systems are put into production.
What are your views about the degree of independence needed by the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) in ensuring the
success of the Department's acquisition programs?
Answer. In general, I believe an independent DOT&E is critical to
ensuring the Department's acquisition programs are realistically and
adequately tested in their intended operational environment. If
confirmed, I will seek the advice of the DOT&E on testing and
evaluation issues.
Question. Are you concerned with the level of test and evaluation
conducted by the contractors who are developing the systems to be
tested?
Answer. In general, I believe contractors are an important and
integral part of the test and evaluation process during system
development. If confirmed, I will evaluate this area and expect to
place greater emphasis on coordinating and integrating Contractor Test,
Developmental Test, and Operational Test and Evaluation.
Question. What is the impact of rapid fielding requirements on the
standard testing process?
Answer. Rapid fielding requirements place greater stress on the
entire acquisition team, including the test and evaluation community.
Traditional test and evaluation processes and procedures may not be
adequately responsive for rapid fielding efforts. My limited experience
suggests that the test and evaluation teams have worked very hard and
made necessary adjustments. I would cite the Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicle Program as a good example. If confirmed, I will work
with all stakeholders to ensure testing processes appropriately support
rapid fielding without delaying our response to these urgent
requirements.
Question. If confirmed, how will you work to ensure that all
equipment and technology that is deployed to warfighters is subject to
appropriate operational testing?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with DOT&E on testing and
evaluation issues.
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003 included several provisions to improve the management of DOD test
and evaluation facilities.
Are you satisfied with the manner in which these provisions have
been implemented?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the provisions and
implementation status as necessary to determine any corrections needed.
Question. Do you believe that the Department should take any
additional steps to improve the management of its test and evaluation
facilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review this area as necessary to
consider any additional steps to be taken to improve the management.
Question. As systems grow more sophisticated, networked, and
software-intensive, DOD's ability to test and evaluate them becomes
more difficult. Some systems-of-systems cannot be tested as a whole
until they are already bought and fielded.
Are you concerned with DOD's ability to test these new types of
systems?
Answer. I do believe there are concerns regarding the complexity,
range requirements, test equipment, and cost associated with systems of
systems testing. I understand that the DOD has developed a Joint Test
Roadmap which outlines an approach to link geographically distributed
test facilities, laboratories and ranges to create more realistic test
environments. If confirmed, I will work with all members of the
acquisition and testing teams to ensure the DOD addresses these issues
and to act on any valid recommendations.

JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT OFFICE

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving
the way in which Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Office
(JIEDDO) is developing and transitioning improvised explosive device
(IED) defeat technologies?
Answer. I believe the key challenge confronting JIEDDO in the
development and transition of technology is the institutional and
budget issues which arise when an activity is predominantly and
robustly funded by supplemental funds. Transitioning JIEDDO programs to
Service and agency programs of record without clarity about the point
of transition from supplemental to Service or agency budget funds
probably presents the greatest challenge. I understand that JIEDDO is
developing a detailed approach to transition JIEDDO sponsored IED
Defeat technologies to programs of record. The JIEDDO approach
addresses budgetary, oversight and long-term sustainment issues.
As DDR&E, I have taken steps to include JIEDDO in the Defense
Science and Technology Advisory Group (DSTAG) in an effort to create a
common knowledge about technology efforts on IED defeat programs and to
maintain a dialogue about responsibility and coordination on these
efforts. I would advocate continuation of JIEDDO discussions in the
DSTAG forum if confirmed.
Question. Based on your observations as DDR&E, do you feel that the
USD(AT&L) has the appropriate level of oversight and authority over
critical JIEDDO technology development and acquisition programs?
Answer. USD(AT&L) is closely linked to JIEDDO with representatives
participating in weekly resource and technology meetings chaired by the
JIEDDO. AT&L is also a member of the steering group that provides
oversight of major counter IED initiatives.
Question. In your view, is JIEDDO sufficiently aware of the S&T
efforts of the Department and the Services so that promising
technologies are rapidly identified and applied to the threat of
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)?
Answer. Through a series of meetings that occurred earlier this
year, JIEDDO provided to DDR&E an extensive overview of their entire
S&T program plus other focus areas including threats and current
projects. These discussions included counter IED programs and focus
areas to better defeat the medium- and long-term IED threat. Since
these meetings, I have taken steps to include JIEDDO in the DSTAG in an
effort to create a common knowledge about technology efforts on IED
defeat programs and to maintain a dialogue about responsibility and
coordination on these efforts. JIEDDO has full access to the S&T
programs and initiatives of the Department's RDT&E organization
including those of the Services, DARPA, and defense agencies.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. Section 234 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 requires operationally realistic
testing of each block of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
Do you believe that in order to perform its intended function
successfully the BMDS, including each of its elements, needs to be
operationally effective?
Answer. Clearly, each element of the BMDS and the overall system
must be operationally effective in order to successfully perform the
intended function.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should deploy
missile defense systems without regard to whether they are
operationally effective?
Answer. I do not believe that the United States should deploy
missile defense systems without regard to whether they are
operationally effective.
Question. Do you believe that operationally realistic testing is
necessary to demonstrate and determine the operational capabilities and
limits of the BMDS and to improve its operational capability?
Answer. I do believe that operationally realistic testing is
necessary to delivering and maturing an effective BMDS.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
ensure that the BMDS, and each of its elements, undergoes operationally
realistic testing?
Answer. I understand that the MDA presently is executing a plan to
expand the use of a Development/Operational Testing approach that
allows the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) warfighter community
(which represents all combatant commanders) and all the Service
Operational Test Agencies to be an integral part of the test program.
If confirmed, I would support this plan, and I would need to review
these plans and the proposed test activities to determine whether
additional steps are necessary or appropriate.
Question. All Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) are
required to complete initial operational test and evaluation before
going beyond low-rate initial production (LRIP). BMDS has not yet
undergone initial operational test and evaluation.
Do you believe that independent operational test and evaluation of
the BMDS, and each of its elements, is necessary to ensure that the
system and its elements are operationally effective and suitable for
combat?
Answer. I understand that the MDA currently conducts independent
evaluations which have been and will continue to be a foundation of the
MDA test program. I also understand that MDA seeks to include all
service Operational Test Agencies, military utility assessment teams,
and independent review teams in nearly all BMDS test events. I would
have to review MDA test plans in greater detail in order to provide a
personal perspective.
Question. At what point, if any, do you believe independent test
and evaluation of the BMDS, and each of its elements, should take
place?
Answer. I understand that it is MDA's policy to integrate
independent test and evaluation into their test program early which
gives them the ability to deliver capabilities and reduce cycle time,
as promised. Since the BMDS is a complex and integrated system on a
revolutionary scale, it seems appropriate to give full consideration to
each individual element. MDA is working closely with DOT&E and the
Services Operational Test Organization to accomplish independent test
and evaluation for the BMDS and each independent element. I would have
to review MDA test plans in greater detail in order to provide a
personal perspective.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
ensure that the BMDS and each of its elements undergoes independent
operational test and evaluation?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with DOT&E to see what testing is
planned and discuss any shortcomings identified by DOT&E. In some
cases, such as theater assets, individual elements may add independent
capabilities outside of the BMDS as a whole. In those cases, some
degree of independent testing may be appropriate.
Question. Congress has previously authorized the Secretary of
Defense to use funds authorized and appropriated for RDT&E for the MDA
for the fielding of ballistic missile defense capabilities.
Are you aware of any other major defense acquisition programs on
which the DOD is authorized to use RDT&E funds to field operational
systems?
Answer. Satellites and their ground control systems such as Space-
Based Infrared Radar System, National Polar-Orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System, and Advanced Extremely High Frequency
provide recent examples of DOD using RDT&E in Major Defense Acquisition
Programs to field initial operational capabilities. I am also aware of
the funding of the first two LCS ships using RDT&E funds.
Question. What, in your view, would be the positive and negative
implications of requiring the MDA to budget RDT&E funds for RDT&E
purposes, procurement funds for procurement purposes, operation and
maintenance funds for operation and maintenance purposes, and military
construction funds for military construction purposes?
Answer. Some have argued that improved transparency,
accountability, and oversight would result from this budgeting
requirement. However, the MDA organization believes they have had a
successful track record of delivering capabilities quickly because the
agency was granted the flexibility to use RDT&E funds for procurement,
O&M, and construction activities.
Question. Section 223 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 establishes that ``it is the
policy of the United States that the DOD accord a priority within the
missile defense program to the development, testing, fielding and
improvement of effective near-term missile defense capabilities,
including the ground-based midcourse defense system, the Aegis BMDS,
the Patriot PAC-3 system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
system, and the sensors necessary to support such systems.''
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the
Department complies with this policy requirement in its acquisition of
missile defense capabilities?
Answer. The MDA organization believes that the Department is
currently in compliance with this policy requirement. If confirmed, I
am prepared to review in detail any committee concerns regarding
compliance with this policy. If confirmed, I will also support
continuation of this policy in large part through my chairmanship of
the recently established Missile Defense Executive Board, which
provides oversight of MDA's integrated requirements, acquisition, and
budgeting processes.
Question. On January 2, 2002, the Secretary of Defense set forth
guidance and priorities for the Missile Defense Program. The Secretary
directed that Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) elements enter the formal
DOD acquisition cycle at Milestone C, concurrent with transfer of
service procurement responsibility, with the USD(AT&L) overseeing all
service missile defense procurement activity.
In your view, what principles should be applied in determining what
BMD elements enter the DOD acquisition cycle at Milestone C?
Answer. When a BMDS element is ready for transfer, the normal
procedure would be for USD(AT&L) to establish product teams to support
a Milestone C decision by the Defense Acquisition Board. Elements that
have reached Milestone C will be subject to legal requirements under
title 10 in accordance with the terms of the applicable statutes.
Question. After these elements have entered Milestone C, to what
extent should they be subject to legal requirements under title 10,
U.S.C., associated with programs entering the Defense Acquisition
System, e.g., 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2341, 2366, 2399, and 2433--2435?
LRIP rates for traditional acquisition programs are established at
Milestone B, but because the BMDS and its elements have not followed
DOD's milestone process, no LRIP quantities have been established.
In your view, how will those quantities be determined for those BMD
elements entering Milestone C, pursuant to the Secretary's guidance?
Answer. A reasonable and likely course of action would be for LRIP
rates for any BMDS components that may in the future be reviewed at a
Milestone C to be established by test requirements and quantities
necessary to ramp up to full rate production. If confirmed, I would
have to review the specific details of each program in order to
establish my views on these issues.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

Question. If confirmed as USD(AT&L), you will chair the Nuclear
Weapons Council (NWC).
In your view, what are, or should be, the highest priorities of the
NWC?
Answer. The NWC's highest priority should be to insure that the
Nation's current and future nuclear deterrent forces remain safe and
effective.
Question. What improvements, if any, do you believe should be made
to the operations of the NWC?
Answer. I would not suggest any immediate changes to the operations
of the NWC at this time. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
the members of the Council, Department of Energy, Joint Staff,
OSD(Policy), and STRATCOM to identify any appropriate improvements.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Question. There are significant problems with the management and
implementation of the DOD chemical weapons demilitarization program.
Congress has become increasingly concerned that the Department does not
appear to be on track to eliminate its chemical weapons in accordance
with the Chemical Weapons Convention timelines.
What steps is the Department taking to ensure that the U.S. remains
in compliance with its Treaty obligations for chemical weapons
destruction?
Answer. I understand that current estimates indicate that the
United States will not meet the Chemical Weapons Convention's
destruction deadline of April 29, 2012. The Department will continue to
examine ways to accelerate chemical weapons destruction, while insuring
the continued safety and security of the workers, communities and the
environment.
Question. Do you agree that the United States should make every
effort to meet its treaty commitments, including its obligations under
the Chemical Weapons Convention?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to move this
effort forward?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that:

1. Appropriate resources are applied;
2. Contract incentives are implemented; and
3. Alternative approaches for the destruction of chemical
weapons are implemented where safe and affordable.

CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

Question. The Comptroller General has strongly recommended that the
DOD establish a new position of Chief Management Officer to address the
many ``high-risk'' problems with the Department's systems and
processes. Earlier this year, the Institute for Defense Analysis
recommended that the Deputy Secretary of Defense be designated as the
Department's Chief Management Officer, and that he have a full-time
deputy, at a high level within the Department, to assist in that
effort.
What is your view of the recommendations of the Comptroller General
and the Institute for Defense Analysis regarding a Chief Management
Officer for the DOD?
Answer. I concur with the Deputy Secretary of Defense's two
previous statements to Congress about the creation of a Chief
Management Officer. Those statements are a May 11, 2007 letter to the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees and June 26, 2007 testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee.

The business functions of the Department can not be
managed separately from its operational matters. A single full-
scope Deputy Secretary is the best way to ensure that the
Department's business mission is aligned and integrated to
support the Department's warfighting mission.
I believe that new legislation regarding a Chief
Management Officer would impede rather than enhance
organizational effectiveness because an organization the size
of the Department needs to have a high degree of management
flexibility.
The key management issue to be addressed in the
Department is not the organizational structure as per se--
rather, it is how to ensure integration among otherwise diverse
operations. If confirmed, I will work toward that end.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

TEST AND EVALUATION

1. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress directed the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to provide a report to
Congress on ``Policies and Practices for Test and Evaluation.'' In July
2007, Congress received this report. Additionally, an implementation
policy was promised to Congress by December 2007. Which of the test and
evaluation (T&E) principles described and proposed for consideration in
the July 2007 report do you support?
Mr. Young. Requirements generation, program management, and systems
engineering (to include T&E), are three pillars the Department rests on
to ensure we acquire weapon systems that bring needed combat capability
to the warfighter. Earlier tester involvement with an operational focus
and better integration of developmental and operational testing will
enhance the ability of the Department to quickly field weapon systems
that will meet the warfighter's needs. The specific policies to
implement these principles are currently being staffed within the
Department. If confirmed, I will work with all stakeholders to ensure
these policies are reflected in the Department's acquisition
regulations and implemented.

2. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, which of the T&E principles do you not
support and why?
Mr. Young. In general, I believe all the fundamental principles
described in the report have merit. As I affirmed in my previous
response, the specifics to implement these principles are currently
being staffed within the Department. If confirmed, I will work with all
stakeholders to ensure the implementation of these policies.

3. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, what steps are you planning to take to
construct the implementation policy for T&E that, according to the
report, ``will be reported to Congress no later than the end of 2007''?
Mr. Young. Currently, AT&L's Developmental Test and Evaluation
organization within the Directorate for Systems and Software
Engineering is leading a working group consisting of members from
Service and DOT&E organizations. This group is defining the specific
policies which will then be incorporated in the appropriate Department
of Defense (DOD) issuances and guidance documents. Separately, work is
underway to update the Department's acquisition policy directive (DODD
5000.2) to incorporate any new policy changes to include T&E. If
confirmed, I will ensure the work continues to implement these policy
changes.

CLARITY OF BUDGET REQUESTS

4. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, Congress and the public depend on the
DOD to accurately and completely describe its budget request and the
program activities being proposed for funding using taxpayer dollars.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently found that ``DOD's
research and development budget requests to Congress do not provide
consistent, complete, and clear information.'' GAO made two specific
recommendations on the submission of budget materials to Congress to
address the issue, both revising the regulations that govern the
process and more carefully overseeing the development of these budget
materials. What is your assessment of the quality of the budget
justification materials sent to Congress?
Mr. Young. I believe the quality of budget justification materials
sent to Congress is, in general, sufficient in detail and accuracy to
allow informed decisionmaking. Also, the current formats used to
justify our budget requests provide enough flexibility to enable us to
describe programs that vary greatly in resources required, complexity,
and scope. However, I also believe improvements can be made. The
Department partially concurred with the GAO recommendations, noting
that we have a disciplined review process in place and will put
additional emphasis on proper reporting of program progress and planned
efforts.

5. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, what specific steps do you plan to take
to improve the quality of the budget materials submitted to Congress?
Mr. Young. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) to ensure budget justification documents are
prepared and distributed in a timely manner, are a relevant and
convenient source of information for Congress, and are consistent with
the information used in the acquisition process. I will take steps to
ensure I am engaged in potential resource and programmatic issues in
time to allow me to be part of an informed decision making process
during our budget development. I will also work to assure the
Department provides Congress more complete and relevant descriptions
and justifications for the resources we are requesting in our budget
materials.

6. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, do you plan to follow the specific
recommendations of the GAO in this area?
Mr. Young. GAO recommends the Secretary of Defense take several
actions aimed at providing Congress with more clear and complete
information on RDT&E funding requests. I support ensuring that Congress
receives relevant, timely, and accurate information in support of the
Department's budget request. If confirmed, I will take those
recommendations into account and work with the Comptroller on possible
implementation.

LAB PERSONNEL DEMONSTRATION ISSUES

7. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, in response to concerns voiced by Jo
Ann Davis, then Chair of the House Civil Service Subcommittee, that the
defense laboratories were being denied the ability to improve their
personnel demonstration programs, Deputy Secretary Gordon England, then
head of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) implementation
group, assured the chairperson in an April 26, 2004, letter that these
defense laboratories ``should be able to continue individually to
refine and evolve their successfully tailored systems over the next
several years if they determine that such adjustments are beneficial.''
Likewise, in a July 2006 letter to then Senate Armed Services
Committee Chairman John Warner, the Under Secretary for Personnel and
Readiness (P&R), Dr. David Chu, and your immediate predecessor, the
Under Secretary for AT&L, Kenneth Krieg, after lauding the performance
of the demonstration laboratories further stated ``demonstration
projects will continue to refine and evolve as indicated in the
enclosed plan'' prior to any incorporation into the NSPS.
I am concerned that these commitments to Congress have been
ignored. Though the laboratories have worked to develop numerous
substantive personnel flexibilities that could be used by the demo
labs, none have been approved. In fact, in a memorandum for the record
dated June 7, 2007, which reported on the meeting of officials from P&R
and from AT&L, including your deputy for laboratories, a minor proposed
laboratory amendment was denied stating the argument that ``the
Department is not receptive to requests for amendments that propose no
new interventions. The replication at an additional Software Technology
Research Laboratory (STRL) (demo lab) location of an intervention
previously implemented at another STRL location is not a new
intervention. The Department is not likely to gain significant
information from personnel innovations previously tested.''
This seems to indicate that the Department is not interested in
fulfilling Secretary England's commitment to Congress, and not
interested in utilizing successful personnel authorities to address the
Department's critical and growing technical workforce shortage. Do you
support this policy of not sharing successful flexibilities among the
demonstration labs?
Mr. Young. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of
Defense for P&R, who has the Department-wide lead in this matter, to
create the optimum long-term situation for all the DOD laboratories.

8. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, given the statements of Secretaries
England and Krieg, why have there been no laboratory amendments
approved by the Department since 2002?
Mr. Young. To my knowledge, no requests for amendments have been
submitted to test new personnel management interventions. This is
consistent with the June 7, 2007 memorandum, which reported on the
meeting of officials from Under Secretary for P&R and from former
USD(AT&L), and our Report to Congress which states, ``Science and
Technology Reinvention Laboratories will continue with their respective
demo systems and will be allowed to seek innovative enhancements and
refinements.'' that have not been previously tested.

9. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, as Director of Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E), and now as USD(AT&L), I understand that you are
the DOD proponent for these laboratories. What have you done and what
do you plan to do to implement the commitments made to Congress by Mr.
Krieg and Mr. England?
Mr. Young. As the DDR&E, it was the office of one of my direct
reports, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for Laboratories and
Basic Sciences (LABS), which had the lead for AT&L on the July 2006
letter sent to the Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner
from the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), Dr.
David S.C. Chu, and the former USD(AT&L), Kenneth J. Krieg. I remain
fully supportive of the views expressed in that letter and in my
response to your earlier question regarding ``why have there been no
laboratory amendments approved by the Department since 2002?''

10. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, can you give the committee assurances
that you will support the laboratories in their efforts to retain and
enhance the laboratory demonstration programs?
Mr. Young. To the extent authorized by my position, if confirmed by
the committee, I will implement policies which engender the most
favorable long-term circumstances for all the DOD laboratories.

APPROVAL OF AMENDMENT ON SHARING EXISTING FLEXIBILITIES

11. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, in May 2005, the DOD Office of
Civilian Personnel Policy, within the Office of the USD(P&R), approved
a laboratory personnel demonstration program amendment, which would
permit each laboratory to utilize the flexibilities available at other
demo laboratories. This approved amendment was sent to the Under
Secretary for his approval. To date, almost a year and a half later, no
action has been taken on this proposal. Do you support this proposal to
allow approved flexibilities to be shared among the demo labs?
Mr. Young. I support the conclusions of Dr. David S.C. Chu/
Honorable Kenneth J. Krieg Report to Congress. Consistent with that
report and the June 7, 2007 memorandum that I mentioned previously, it
is my understanding that the approval was not granted because the
``innovative enhancements and refinements'' requested had been
previously tested at one or more existing personnel demo lab locations.

12. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, as the proponent for laboratory
interests within the Pentagon, with the obligation to promote policies
and initiatives which benefit the long-term research capabilities of
these organizations, what actions have you taken during your tenure and
what actions would you take as Under Secretary to ensure that this
proposal is approved and executed?
Mr. Young. If confirmed, I will remain a strong supporter of all
policies which fashion the best possible long-term condition for all
DOD laboratories.

STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL ACQUISITION PLANNING

13. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, experts believe that successful
industrial companies managing complex operations have learned that
strategic plans provide the basis for a process that quickly and cost-
effectively serves their customer's needs with high-quality products.
They suggest that if DOD were to use an equivalent method, it would
manage its acquisition and science and technology (S&T) investments
using an overall strategic plan that is: (1) based on projected
capability needs of the combatant commanders; (2) vetted and
prioritized by authorities motivated primarily by joint, rather than
Service-specific, objectives; (3) budgeted according to those
priorities; and (4) backed up by detailed visions of the hardware,
software, and new doctrine required to realize each capability.
This plan would then be extended to generate a tactical action plan
that describes technical requirements and milestones, schedules, future
spending, and integrated Service and Defense Agency responsibilities
for executing each element. In this model, the Secretary and the Under
Secretary for AT&L would manage operations by periodically reviewing
progress on the tactical action plans and making necessary adjustments.
Do you see merit in moving DOD towards an acquisition and S&T
development process based on an industrial model that has a strategic
plan that leads to tactical action plans?
Mr. Young. As evidenced by the DOD Research and Engineering
Strategic Plan, published in the summer of 2007, I believe there is a
need, in some cases, for strategic plans to be aligned with the
National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the
needs of the combatant commanders. From a broader perspective, members
of the AT&L communities are deeply integrated in the development of the
``Guide to the Development of the Force'' (GDF) formerly known as the
DOD Strategic Planning Guidance. The GDF will be the overarching
framework that should align the Department's requirements and
capabilities with acquisition programs and resources. At a next level
of detail, I have been an advocate for the development of roadmaps in
selected technology and portfolio areas as key tools for guiding DOD
investment programs.

14. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, what steps do you plan to take to move
towards that model?
Mr. Young. Within the AT&L components, we are refining a series of
internal goals to link the acquisition enterprise to the strategic
national security priorities. It is my intention, if confirmed, to move
toward a more open, data-driven process for decisionmaking linked to
national security and DOD objectives. The internal goals should help us
do so.

15. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, do you believe that the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) should serve in the corporate management
role in the acquisition and S&T development process by actively
reviewing and if necessary, redirecting ongoing DOD programs?
Mr. Young. The USD(AT&L) serves as the Defense Acquisition
Executive within the DOD. Part of this responsibility is to acquire the
best possible weapons systems for the best possible price, and to do so
absolutely should involve directing program changes as required to
attain this ``best value.''

16. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, do you believe that the Reliance 21
initiatives you established as DDR&E should evolve into a process with
the industrial model's level of follow-through, management control, and
the necessary Service and agency commitment and cooperation? If so,
what barriers exist which would prevent the process from developing
into that type of activity, and what actions will you take to overcome
them?
Mr. Young. We instituted the Reliance 21 model for Defense S&T
planning to increase the corporate level visibility, inter-dependency,
and cooperation among the DOD components. Since we began the Reliance
21 process only last spring, it is premature to speculate on barriers
to the evolution of the model. To date, it seems to be working well,
but I believe more time is needed to really determine barriers to
complete implementation. However, it is clear to me that current DOD
programming and budgeting processes do present at least a hurdle for
the service official's proper resourcing of A&T plans and these hurdles
are even higher for the DDR&E team working at the corporate level.

ROLES AND AUTHORITIES OF DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

17. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, do you believe there should be any
changes made to the roles, authorities, or resources of the DDR&E?
Mr. Young. I believe the roles and authorities for the DDR&E are
sufficient at this time. Resources such as funding for programs and
people are balanced across Department-wide needs. I do have concerns
that the assignment of additional missions and oversight
responsibilities to DDR&E have not included additional experienced
personnel to execute these functions.

18. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, in the industrial sector, the Chief
Technology Officer (CTO) reports directly to the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO). The DDR&E has been designated as the CTO of the
Department. Do you think the Department would be better served by
having DDR&E report directly to the Secretary for Defense as opposed to
the Under Secretary for AT&L?
Mr. Young. I believe the reporting chain for the DDR&E is
appropriate. The DDR&E, as the CTO also does have direct access to the
Secretary of Defense.

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

19. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, in your answers to advance policy
questions you indicated that ``it is essential for the Director of
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to report to the
DDR&E in order to meet responsibilities as CTO.'' How should the fact
that the Director of DARPA reports to DDR&E be operationalized?
Mr. Young. In fact, the Director of DARPA does report to the DDR&E.
This reporting relationship is specified in DOD Directive 5134.3,
Director of Defense Research and Engineering where it clearly states
the DDR&E exercises authority, direction, and control over the Director
of the DARPA. It is important to maintain this organizational structure
and to ensure the DDR&E leadership team has full visibility and
appropriate participation in DARPA activities. No other actions are
needed.

20. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, based on your observations as DDR&E,
do you believe that DDR&E is currently exercising adequate authority
over DARPA?
Mr. Young. As DDR&E, I have made concrete progress in exercising
DDR&E authorities and responsibilities with regard to DARPA.

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

21. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, what steps do you plan to take to
limit the risks that the Department accepts through the acquisition of
critical defense technologies, such as integrated circuits, from
offshore vendors?
Mr. Young. The Department is committed to providing the best
capability to the warfighter. We want to promote interoperability with
our allies and coalition partners, and take full advantage of the
benefits offered by access to the most innovative, efficient, and
competitive suppliers--worldwide. The Department also wants to promote
consistency and fairness in dealing with its trading partners, an
important national security consideration in itself, while assuring
that the U.S. defense industrial base is sufficient to meet critical
defense needs. Consequently, the Department is willing to use reliable,
non-U.S. suppliers--consistent with national security requirements and
prudent risk management--when such use offers comparative advantages in
performance, cost, schedule, or coalition warfighting.
The Department is not acquiring military materiel produced overseas
to the detriment of national security or the U.S. defense industrial
base. The Department employs a small number of non-U.S. suppliers, and
the use of those suppliers does not introduce an unacceptable risk of
foreign vulnerability or negatively impact the long-term economic
viability of the national technological and industrial base. The record
indicates there has been no difference in reliability between the
Department's U.S. and non-U.S. suppliers. For example, the Study on
Impact of Foreign Sourcing of Systems conducted by the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, a focused analysis of
12 operationally important DOD programs completed in January 2004,
indicated that foreign subcontracts collectively represented only about
4.3 percent of the total contract value for those programs. We are
planning to conduct another focused subcontractor study in 2008 to
reexamine the extent of non-U.S. suppliers in our supply chain.
With regard to integrated circuits, these and related electronic
devices are increasingly dominated by global commercial markets.
Current commercial product development strategies and supply-chain
management practices may not, for DOD-purposes, adequately prevent
electronic device tampering, counterfeiting, and reverse engineering,
nor do they always adequately meet unique DOD performance and
maintainability requirements. In the early days of the semiconductor
industry, the military market was a large fraction of overall sales and
helped to drive technology. Today, the U.S. military portion of
microcircuits sales is approximately 1 percent of the world market and
less than 9 percent of the U.S. market ($3.6 billion out of $40.7
billion). With the increased growth of consumer markets, the DOD's
ability to control and influence the electronics sector has diminished.
Nevertheless, DOD is in the process of developing a trusted integrated
circuits strategy and policy that is comprehensive, viable, cost-
effective, realistic, and in the long-term ensures the supply of
trusted integrated circuits for sensitive defense applications.
This policy will include multi-layered defense-in-depth as a
practical strategy that involves people, technology, and operations;
anonymity in commercial off-the-shelf-integrated circuits procurement;
trusted suppliers, brokers, and products; design information
protection; anti-tamper technology; failure detection and forensics;
damage mitigation; and chip signature authentication.

22. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, what specific initiatives are you
considering that will support the strengthening of the defense
industrial base?
Mr. Young. The Department's preferred approach to establishing and
sustaining essential industrial and technological capabilities
supporting defense is to leverage its research, development,
acquisition, and logistics processes and decisions to create a
competitive environment that encourages industry to make sound
technology development investments, and to make sound technology
insertion and production facility/capacity decisions.
When these market forces are insufficient, the Department can use
Defense Production Act (DPA) tools to focus industry attention on
critical technology development, accelerate technology insertion into
manufacturing processes, create or expand critical production
facilities, and direct production capacity towards meeting the most
urgent warfighter needs. Title III of the DPA is specifically designed
to establish, expand, maintain, or modernize industrial capabilities
required for national defense. The Title III Program strengthens the
economic and technological competitiveness of the U.S. defense
industrial base, accelerates the transition of technologies from
research and development to affordable production and insertion into
defense systems, and can reduce U.S. dependency on foreign sources of
supply for critical materials and technologies.
For example, the Department is using the Title III Program to
sustain a U.S. production capability for high purity beryllium. High
purity beryllium possesses unique properties that make it indispensable
in many of today's critical U.S. defense systems, including sensors,
missiles and satellites, avionics, and nuclear weapons. The DOD
dominates the market for high purity beryllium and its active and full
involvement is necessary to sustain and shape the strategic direction
of the market. There are no reliable foreign suppliers that could
provide high purity beryllium, and without DOD involvement and support,
U.S. industry would not be able to provide sufficiently pure material
in the required quantities for defense applications. The Department has
therefore taken special action to maintain a domestic supply, and is
using the authorities in Title III of the DPA to contract with a U.S.
firm to build and operate a new high purity beryllium production plant
capable of meeting national security specifications. I think we should
look at fully utilizing the authorities in Title III and work with
Congress if we identify needs for additional authorities.

INDIRECT COSTS FOR UNIVERSITY DEFENSE RESEARCH

23. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, the House Defense Appropriations bill
includes language that limits the rate that a university can charge the
government for indirect, overhead costs related to the performance
basic research activities. The university community is very strongly
opposed to this provision. What is your position on the provision?
Mr. Young. University indirect costs are analyzed and indirect cost
rates negotiated to ensure these rates reflect the fair and reasonable
total cost of conducting research at these institutions. Consistent
with the Statement of Administration Policy on the House version of
H.R. 3222 and the Department's appeal to the appropriations conference,
I am opposed to the language imposing artificial, arbitrary caps on
indirect costs of basic research. A cap will likely lead some research
organizations to forego DOD basic research awards and accept support
only from other agencies and non-Federal sponsors, thus reducing DOD
access to world-class research needed to maintain the future
technological superiority of the U.S. military.

24. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, how do you intend to monitor and
control the indirect costs of research performed by contractors in
industry and academia so that government research programs are as
efficient and effective as possible?
Mr. Young. Based upon what I know today, the process for
negotiating a research organization's indirect cost rate involves a
substantial amount of monitoring and oversight of those costs. The
process includes scrutiny of the organization's rate proposal by
Federal agency negotiators who are contracting and accounting
professionals. Where DOD is the Federal agency designated by the Office
of Management and Budget to negotiate the government-wide rate at an
organization, the indirect cost proposal also is audited. In addition,
each research organization is required to disclose to the Government
its accounting practices that are used to ensure consistent and
appropriate charging of costs to Federal awards. Any change in an
organization's disclosed practices must be approved by the responsible
Federal agency. If confirmed, I will review and evaluate this area as
appropriate.

FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS

25. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, do you believe these ``ceilings'' on
the amount of work a Federally Funded Research and Development Centers
(FFRDC) can perform for DOD are in the best interests of the
Department?
Mr. Young. The Department has always opposed the continuation of
the externally imposed ceilings on the use of its FFRDCs. Each fiscal
year the Department identifies a need for FFRDC assistance to meet its
high quality contracted technical and analytical support for key
programs, including intelligence, space systems, command and control,
homeland defense, war on terrorism, and other areas where advanced
technologies are being bought to bear in support of the modernizing and
transforming United States Forces. The Department does not have enough
of the technical expertise in-house and relies on its FFRDCs to provide
high quality, bias-free analysis, systems engineering and other
technical support for its weapons and technology programs.
Military leadership also depends on the objective, independent
research performed by their FFRDCs as cornerstones for important
planning and investment decisions, yet not only does the Department
have an overall external imposed ceiling on its use of FFRDCs there is
also a sub-ceiling placed on its studies and analysis FFRDCs which
provide this support. With the uncertainties and dynamics of the
current world situation, there are more unknowns, therefore the
Department needs reliable quick turnaround independent evaluations and
recommendations for decisions. The return on investment by using the
FFRDCs is high.

26. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, what advantages does the Department
accrue from the ``ceilings''?
Mr. Young. The Department sees no advantages by having external
ceilings placed on its use of its FFRDCs. Each fiscal year the
Department has experiences shortfalls in its need for assistance and
support from its FFRDCs. The impact of the shortfalls is felt across
the Department and over the years as national priorities changes
different programs suffered.
Congress continues to provide additional funding for the global war
on terror, homeland security, space systems, missile defense, but
limits the Department's ability to select some of the most qualified
sources to obtain the needed high-quality technical and analytical
support. The significant, externally imposed restrictions on the
Department's use of its FFRDC in the 1990s have seen some relief in the
last few years but the FFRDCs are only at the fiscal year 1991 FFRDC
support levels.
The Department has previously urged Congress to support its request
that it be allowed to manage its FFRDCs without externally imposed
ceilings. If ceilings are to be continued, the Department would urge
support of its annual request for FFRDC support as contained in the
President's budget.

27. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, what steps do you plan to take to
ensure that the Department has the access it needs to the technical
expertise resident in the FFRDCs?
Mr. Young. Access to very specialized, unique, and unbiased
technical expertise is a primary reason for our FFRDCs and is, thus,
the center of a great deal of attention in our management of our use of
these institutions. The first step, and most important in the short
term, we are pursuing is creating tasks that bring FFRDC technical
talent to the very front lines of the global war on terrorism
operations by employing their tools and expertise in direct support of
real-time operational needs. The enthusiasm exhibited by FFRDC
personnel in working to directly support our operations, and its
utility to field commanders, is a testament to the effectiveness of
this initiative. From a researcher's point of view, there are other
steps as well: we work hard to maintain an environment such that our
FFRDC contractors can maintain continuity of employment so academics
need not devote constant attention to ``grantsmanship''; we provide
discretionary Independent Research and Development (IR&D) resources at
each FFRDC to pursue high-value, defense-relevant, intellectually
challenging, projects; and we minimize the bureaucratic impediments
associated with access to sensitive or proprietary data that
researchers experience in the private or academic sectors. Overall, we
try and foster an environment in which creative intellects--that may
not be attracted to government service for a variety of reasons--can
most effectively be employed in exploiting sophisticated, cutting-edge,
technologies for our defense needs.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

LOGCAP CONTRACTS

28. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, one of the responsibilities of the
USD(AT&L) is to ensure that DOD employs the appropriate procurement
type for its contracts. As the chairman of the Subcommittee on
Readiness and Management Support, I have been particularly concerned
about the appropriateness of DOD's wide-spread use of the war as a
justification to issue long-term, sole-source contracts. The Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has recommended that
the Federal Government should ``generally avoid the use of sole-source
and limited-competition contracting actions.'' Under what circumstances
would you consider it appropriate for a logistics support contract,
such as Kellogg, Brown, and Root's (KBR) Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program (LOGCAP) contract, to be awarded as a sole-source, cost-plus
award fee, long-term contract?
Mr. Young. KBR's LOGCAP III contract was not a sole-source
contract. This current LOGCAP III contract was competitively awarded in
December 2001. KBR was selected as the best value contractor from among
three competitive offerors.
Based on the LOGCAP II experience, where the volume of requirements
(that is, $50 million) from 1996 to 2001 did not support the use of
multiple contract awards, we did not pursue a multiple-award scenario
for LOGCAP III. For LOGCAP IV, the Defense Department chose to use a
multiple-award strategy based on the volume of requirements that we
have experienced under Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi
Freedom.

29. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, would you consider it appropriate to
allow the duration of such a contract to extend beyond the amount of
time necessary to replace it with a contract that was awarded through
open competition?
Mr. Young. To provide continuity in the delivery of required
services, the Department endeavors to put a new contract in place by
the time the predecessor contract is due to expire. When this is not
possible, the contracting officer must determine the best way to
provide for continued performance of necessary work pending the
availability of a new contract.
For example, the LOGCAP III contract, competitively awarded in
December 2001, was structured as a 1 year base contract, with nine 1
year options. It was structured intentionally to allow for rapid growth
and flexibility to support unknown future contingencies. As the program
grew and began to strain the resources of a single contractor, the Army
took action to identify various methods of increasing contractor
support and to assess the risks involved with various strategies to
satisfy the breadth and depth of the program's requirements. The result
was an acquisition strategy for LOGCAP support with multiple
contractors competitively responding to global requirements for urgent
support. The final strategy, determined in 2006, consists of a separate
LOGCAP IV support contract and multiple LOGCAP IV performance
contracts.

30. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, cost-plus award fee (CPAF) contracts
give little incentive to the contractor to keep costs low since there
is no risk to the contractor, and the award fee is based on contract
costs: the higher the costs, the greater the profit. In your opinion,
is this type of LOGCAP contract structure the best value for the
American taxpayer given the contractor's operating environment in Iraq,
or would you have structured the contract differently?
Mr. Young. The LOGCAP III contract has a variety of payment
provisions, including firm fixed price (FFP) that can be used when
there are firm requirements that are not susceptible to changes in
scope, quantity or schedule. It also includes CPAF provisions, which
are most appropriate when uncertainties in performance and cost do not
allow for fixed price contracting but incentivizing contractor
performance is still desired.
The largest volume of effort under the LOGCAP III contract for
performance in Southwest Asia has been CPAF. In Iraq and Afghanistan,
the Army determined that the uncertainties of performance conditions
and constant change have not supported the use of FFP contracts.
I would have to review the requirements and circumstances to
determine whether this is the optimal contract structure in my opinion.
I think we would need to apply strong management oversight to a
contract with a significant CPAF value.

CONTRACTOR ABUSE

31. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, DOD's budget, although large, is
still finite. As such, DOD contracting officials need to be good
stewards of the resources they are given. Every dollar wasted is a
dollar that could have been better spent on resetting equipment,
procuring new technologies, or caring for our wounded warriors. Yet DOD
contracting in Iraq has many problems leading to numerous examples of
waste, fraud, and abuse that have been identified by the SIGIR, GAO,
and other audit/oversight agencies. The SIGIR's findings characterize
the LOGCAP contract in Iraq as lacking transparency, oversight, and
financial accountability, and his findings included cases of waste,
fraud, abuse, and financial mismanagement.
For instance, SIGIR auditors found that KBR had repeatedly
overcharged the government by billing for work that it did not perform,
and paid suppliers more than amounts owed. Overhead expenses for such
activities as transportation, security, and office support ranged from
11 percent to as high as 55 percent of the contract value, and were
billed to reconstruction contracts by KBR. If confirmed, what actions
will you recommend DOD take to prevent contractor abuses such as these?
Mr. Young. I recently directed that all DOD contracting officers
must ensure that, prior to contract award, all statements of work and
terms and conditions that relate to the delivery of supplies or
services in or out of Iraq and Afghanistan must be approved by the
Commander, Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). I also
directed that JCC-I/A must be assigned contract administration
responsibility for the portion of the contract that relates to
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Director of Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy, in coordination with JCC-I/A and
the Joint Staff, is issuing implementing guidance. I believe these are
strong steps toward improving oversight.
Pursuant to section 813 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Technology) is chairing a panel on contracting
integrity. The panel includes a subcommittee to address contracting
integrity in a combat/contingency environment. Their initial report is
due to Congress in December 2007.

32. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, GAO provided an analysis of 93 award-
or-incentive-fee contracts awarded by DOD, and found that DOD
frequently paid most of the available award fees, regardless of whether
the contractor fell short of, met, or exceeded expectations. DOD
allowed contractors second chances to earn ``initially unearned'' or
deferred award fees, and paid a significant number and amount of fees
for performance that was judged to be ``acceptable, average, expected,
good, or satisfactory.'' GAO concluded that despite the fact that DOD
paid billions in award fees, DOD has little evidence to support its
contention that the payment of award fees improved contractor
performance. It appears that DOD's process for determining how much of
an award-fee or incentive-fee a contractor has earned is not
functioning properly in Iraq. If confirmed, how do you intend to
address the problem of overpayment of fees?
Mr. Young. As the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I issued three
memoranda on profit policy. I believe strongly that the Defense
Department must carefully use award and incentive fees as tools to
motivate successful program execution. I further believe that program
managers should award fees in proportion to performance. In general, I
believe the Defense Department should tie award fees to specific events
and deliverables to make this a more objective process. If confirmed, I
intend to push for the application of these principles in all
acquisition programs.
The Department has taken actions to address each of the seven
recommendations made by the GAO report that you reference and all of
the related requirements of section 814 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. These actions include:

(1) Issuing several policy memoranda providing revised
guidance to the military departments and defense agencies on
the use of award and incentive fees;
(2) Drafting revisions of the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement to incorporate this revised policy into
its regulations;
(3) Employing a FFRDC to assess various mechanisms for
evaluating contractor performance and making payment of award
fees;
(4) Assessing the results of that study, and the Department
plans to take appropriate action;
(5) Working to develop an automated process that will improve
its collection and assessment of relevant data on award and
incentive fees paid to contractors.

As a result of these actions, the Department is planning to publish
a Department-wide Award Fee Contract Guide to replace various guides
currently maintained by the military departments and defense agencies.
Senate Report 109-254 that accompanied the Senate's National
Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2007 made reference to some
of the Department's actions that I just mentioned, and it opined: ``The
committee commends Department plans to provide senior-level strategic
thinking to the manner in which the Department `governs, manages, and
executes its activities.' The committee believes that establishing some
guidelines, standards and accountability in the use of award and
incentive fee contracts, along with an evaluation of their strengths
and weaknesses when effectively used will improve productive use of
performance contracts.''
If confirmed, I intend to ensure that these efforts to improve our
regulations, policies, procedures, and practices are carried out
appropriately.

33. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, in 2000, the Federal Government
awarded $67.5 billion in non-competitive contracts. By 2005, that
figure increased 115 percent to $145 billion. The net result of this
growth in contracts was that the value of contracts overseen by the
average government procurement official rose by 83 percent. If
confirmed, what steps do you intend to take to ensure the acquisition
workforce is appropriately sized and structured to be able to carry out
its responsibilities of contract oversight? How do you intend to
improve contract oversight in the field, particularly in war zones,
such as Iraq and Afghanistan?
Mr. Young. As the Acting USD(AT&L), I am taking steps, in
partnership with the military departments, to ensure we have the right
workforce capability for all acquisition-related functions, including
contract oversight. I have established Enterprise Outcome #3: ``Take
Care of Our People,'' which includes establishing a comprehensive
workforce analysis and decisionmaking capability to support workforce
size, and structure decisions. I have taken steps to focus on critical
skill set gaps, both current and future, in important acquisition
mission areas. In support of the major people initiatives of the
Quadrennial Defense Review and DOD human capital strategies, we are
moving to standard competency models and competency assessments to
improve workforce career development, training, and management of
capability. Currently, the update efforts are complete (through Phase
II) for program management, life-cycle logistics, and contracting. Each
is going through subsequent validation and refinement. We have deployed
and accelerated a comprehensive competency assessment initiative for
the DOD contracting community. The contracting competency assessment
began in June 2007, and as of October 1, 2007, approximately 2,300
contracting personnel from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the
Air Force have participated in the pilot, and in fact, DLA has
completed its assessment. A DOD-wide assessment of the contracting
workforce will begin in January 2008. This competency assessment will
assist senior contracting leaders in identifying critical skill gaps
and defining appropriate workforce strategies. Their actions may
include reallocation of resources, targeted recruitment, better
retention strategies, and targeted expansion of education and training
resources. We are strengthening management and support to contracting
officer representatives (CORs) who provide an important oversight role.
We are improving COR training by adding additional lessons on
contingency contracting and the operational environment. We are
providing in-theater training support to the U.S Army and Joint
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A), and we have established
a quarterly training initiative to address training needs that are
identified by both the Army, through its Contracting Operations
Reviews, and separately by the Commander, JCC-I/A. Defense Acquisition
University (DAU) personnel are deploying again on October 30 to provide
a 4-day training session in-theater. This training will be conducted on
a quarterly basis.
To improve contract oversight in the field, particularly in areas
such as Iraq and Afghanistan, I directed that all DOD contracting
officers must ensure that, prior to contract award, all statements of
work and terms and conditions that relate to the delivery of supplies
or services in or out of Iraq and Afghanistan must be approved by the
Commander, JCC-I/A. I also directed that JCC-I/A must be assigned
contract administration responsibility for the portion of the contract
that relates to performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Director of
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, in coordination with JCC-I/
A and the Joint Staff, is issuing implementing guidance.

SECURITY CONTRACTORS

34. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, it seems to me that engaging enemy
combatants in a foreign country on behalf of the United States is an
``inherently governmental function.'' You seem to agree with this
statement in your response to advance policy question #101, but you
make a distinction between defensive and offensive operations in Iraq.
It is possible that the attempt to draw a distinction between the two
when battling a counterinsurgency could be a contributing cause of our
problems today? Trying to decide if an action taken by an Iraqi citizen
is an offensive action aimed at the asset guarded by the security
contractors may not always be clear cut.
For instance, it may not always be possible to determine the
intentions of an approaching vehicle, and therefore, the contractor may
choose to react aggressively. Based on media reports of Blackwater's
actions in Iraq, it seems possible that because the security
contractors are operating in a war zone, they are quicker to interpret
non-hostile actions by the local citizens as being hostile actions,
leading to responses that may have been inappropriate and
counterproductive to our counterinsurgency efforts.
We must remember that the local citizenry will perceive any action
taken by an American contractor on behalf of the U.S. Government, or
while escorting officials of the U.S. Government, as being an official
act of the U.S. Government. In addition, since our fight against the
Iraqi insurgency is one where we are trying to win the hearts and minds
of the local citizenry, it is imperative that all U.S. personnel
(military and civilian) respect the local population and provide a
positive representation of our country.
The negative perceptions of security contractors is obviously
compounded by their lack of accountability. It seems intuitive that
anyone engaging the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan should be following
the military rules of engagement and should be subject to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). As such, it is questionable whether
private security firms should have been used in Iraq and Afghanistan to
begin with, especially without being subject to any criminal penalties.
Obviously, real world events have showed us the problems of our
heavy reliance on these firms, as they are continuing to create
headaches for our counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.
In your opinion, what is the basis for concluding that the security
operations for U.S. Government/diplomatic officials in a war zone is
not inherently governmental, and therefore, can be contracted out to
contractors, such as Blackwater, Triple Canopy, and DynCorp?
Mr. Young. Security for U.S. Government/diplomatic officials
entails a wide range of operations. While some of these operations are
inherently governmental, others may be appropriate for contract
services.
Security provided by private security contractors (PSC) should be
limited or guided by orders or rules that identify specific ranges of
acceptable decisions or conduct and subject the discretionary authority
to final approval or regular oversight by government officials.
Geographic Combatant Commanders issue ``rules for the use of deadly
force'' that govern the use of weapons by civilians. These rules are
different from the ``rules of engagement'' applicable to military
forces.
Protection of innocent civilians is at the heart of all security
operations, whether conducted by the military or PSCs. In response to
``offensive'' versus ``defensive'' acts, the terms are potentially
misleading. Private security contractors are authorized to act in self
defense against legitimate threats against individual(s) they are
responsible for protecting, such as diplomatic personnel, and for their
own personal protection. For example, in an ambush, PSCs operate
differently from military forces. PSCs are trained to drive out of the
ambush site as quickly as possible, while military forces are trained
to assault towards the forces ambushing them. The PSC reaction is
defensive; the military, offensive. Both are acting in self defense.

35. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, given current events surrounding
security contractor operations in Iraq, will you conduct a reevaluation
of the roles of security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Mr. Young. Yes. A few weeks ago Secretary Gates sent a senior-level
team to Iraq to evaluate DOD's policies and procedures for DOD PSCs. As
a result of that trip, DOD has initiated several steps to improve
management and oversight of DOD PSCs. We are also engaging in
discussions on how we use contractors during contingency operations.
These discussions will include a reevaluation of the roles and
responsibilities of security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.

36. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, given that many of these contractor
personnel are former military, it can be argued that they do not
particularly possess any special skills that our military does not
already have. In addition, they cost two to three times what our troops
cost, and are not subject to any criminal penalties for their actions.
This sends the wrong message to our troops. It seems to me that if the
reason for needing contractors is just to free up troops for military
missions, then the military should request an increase in end strength
to compensate for the security contractor work, and replace the
contractors as soon as troops are ready to handle the mission. Do you
agree? If not, why not?
Mr. Young. This is a difficult question to answer as there are a
number of metrics to consider in arriving at a succinct response.
Increasing end strengths has long-term consequences relative to
remuneration over a full career and retirement benefits, whereas the
contractor augmentation of uniformed personnel has increased short-term
costs but without long-term impacts. It is important to note that DOD
contractors accompanying our armed forces are subject to criminal
penalties for their actions under both the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), and under the UCMJ. Nonetheless, the question
of security contractor roles deserves further study, review, and
consideration.

37. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, if confirmed, what steps do you
intend to take to address the DOD's reliance on security contractors in
war zones?
Mr. Young. Contractors have, since the beginning of this nation,
always played a vital role in defending our great country. In Iraq and
Afghanistan, PSCs are providing a variety of defensive security
functions, including: static and perimeter security, convoy escort,
personal security, and consultation services. As a result, more combat
troops are available to focus on operational objectives. At present,
private security contractors represent less than 5 percent of the total
contractor population. I will continue to evaluate the appropriateness
of this mix based upon a thorough risk analysis.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE

38. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, thank you for your recent report on
the July meeting of the Strategic Minerals Protection Board. I have
reviewed the Board's Terms of Reference and note that there is no
mention of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS). The NDS, as you may
know, has been the subject of study over the years and most recently in
a report released October 5, 2007, by the National Research Council
(NRC). The Council's report addresses many of the issues raised in the
Strategic Minerals Protection Board's Terms of Reference concerning the
supply of critical materials.
The NRC concludes that the DOD does not appear to have the
information systems for data collection and analysis necessary to
understand its actual materials requirements and their availability
over time. Also, the NRC's review of the history of the NDS clearly
indicates that the system has not been a priority consideration for the
DOD in the adjustment of policies and programs to most effectively and
efficiently manage the system. The NRC report recommends establishing a
new system within the DOD to collect and analyze data necessary to
manage and assure the supply of strategic or critical materials to the
military.
How would you propose to undertake a comprehensive assessment and
establishment of an integrated supply chain management approach to
assuring the supply of critical materials?
Mr. Young. The Department is currently reviewing the NRC
recommendations to determine the best course of action to ensure
availability of material for military Service needs. We will focus on
how to identify and capture material requirements on a timely basis.
Once material needs are established, the Department can apply supply
chain analysis processes to identify global commodity supply sources,
evaluate the supply chain weaknesses, and make a determination of the
most appropriate tool to assure continued supply of strategic or
critical materials.

39. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, how would you propose to integrate
the NDS into the Strategic Materials Protection Board's Terms of
Reference?
Mr. Young. The Department's Strategic Materials Protection Board
met for the first time on July 17, 2007. The Terms of Reference
approved at that meeting stated that the Board would: examine risks
associated with materials designated as critical to national security;
recommend a strategy to the President to ensure the domestic
availability of materials designated as critical to national security,
as appropriate; and recommend such other strategies to the President as
the Board considered appropriate to strengthen the industrial base with
respect to materials critical to national security. Depending on the
need, certain materials critical to national security could be added to
the NDS to mitigate supply disruption risks.

CORROSION

40. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, are you aware of the corrosion issue?
If so, do you agree that it is a serious issue that costs DOD an
enormous amount of taxpayer dollars each year, and that there are large
potential savings not being realized because program managers fail to
build corrosion prevention and control into their acquisition programs?
Mr. Young. Yes, I am very aware of the impact of corrosion on the
Department's equipment and infrastructure. The ongoing DOD cost of
corrosion study has identified $10 billion in annual corrosion
costs.\1\ In addition, I recognize that in the past, large corrosion
related savings have not been achieved in an environment of competing
performance requirements and that tradeoffs of corrosion protection
were likely made in some cases. For instance, corrosion protection was
traded for more environmentally friendly finish systems, etc. However,
more recently the DOD corrosion emphasis has resulted in policy and the
necessary tools, which I believe will result in corrosion being better
addressed in the hierarchy of those competing demands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Note that data from this study does not include Navy, Marine
Corps, and Air Force aircraft whose studies are still in progress.

41. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, what was your experience in the Navy
with regard to getting program managers to build corrosion prevention
and control into their systems?
Mr. Young. Among other initiatives, the Navy uses a combination of
training and corrosion program reviews to enhance the program manager's
consideration of corrosion during the acquisition process. For example,
the Navy worked closely with the DOD Corrosion Office to insert
corrosion-related content into program management courses at the DAU.
In addition, a Corrosion Prevention and Control Plan (CPCP) template
was developed for ships and submarines (to complement a previously-
developed CPCP template for aircraft) and it has been inserted into the
DOD Corrosion Prevention and Control Planning Guidebook, Spiral #3.
Finally, to insure consistency throughout the Department, a corrosion
DOD Instruction (DODI) is being finalized which will mandate this. The
DODI will require that each Service Secretary establish a process to
review and evaluate corrosion for all development, acquisition, and
sustainment contracts requiring an acquisition plan.

42. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, were you satisfied with the Navy's
efforts during your tenure there?
Mr. Young. While there is always room for improvement, the Navy was
aggressive in its corrosion prevention and mitigation activities during
my tenure. In addition to intra-Navy actions, we fully supported the
DOD Corrosion efforts by: providing over $12 million in matching
funding to support 30 joint-Service corrosion prevention/mitigation
projects; staffing key Corrosion Prevention and Control Integrated
Product Team positions with personnel; taking the lead in developing a
web-based product introduction process that enables suppliers to meet
DOD's corrosion prevention/mitigation requirements more quickly; and
acting aggressively on the results from the Navy ship/submarine cost of
corrosion study. Also, I am pleased to note, that the April 2007 DOD
corrosion prevention GAO audit showed that for implementing corrosion
prevention and control plans and forming corrosion prevention advisory
teams the Navy was leading the other Services. The new Corrosion
Prevention DOD Instruction will require that all Acquisition Category
1s to have both a corrosion prevention and control plan and corrosion
prevention advisory teams.

43. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, do you support giving corrosion
prevention and control higher priority in future weapons systems and in
the sustainment of current systems and if confirmed, will you give it
your personal attention?
Mr. Young. Yes, if confirmed, I will give corrosion prevention and
control high priority in future weapons systems and in the sustainment
of current systems. I will implement the direction in 10 U.S.C. 2228
and establish specific requirements for the DOD Corrosion Executive as
well as the Service Secretaries.

44. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, if the Air Force did know where they
were, then why were the missiles sent to Barksdale when the command on
the receiving end was not expecting them?
Mr. Young. The transfer of Advanced Cruise Missile bodies from
Minot Air Force Base (AFB) to Barksdale AFB was part of a scheduled
logistical relocation of the missile bodies that had been going on for
months. The team at Barksdale AFB was expecting to receive missile
bodies with ferry training payloads, as they had five times in the
past, and as required under the logistical relocation plan. The
Barksdale Team was not expecting to receive the nuclear warheads. The
DOD can provide the full details of the series of errors and oversights
associated with this incident at your convenience.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM

45. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Young, last July the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)--which is headed by the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is composed of the Vice
Chiefs of Staff of the military departments--agreed that the
requirements process for ballistic missile defense (BMD) should be
transitioned back into normal DOD processes, and the JROC would
establish oversight of missile defense requirements. This indicates
that the current system of missile defense requirements is not
satisfactory to the main requirements oversight body within the
Department, and raises a number of questions about the need to improve
oversight of missile defense acquisition within the Department, as well
as in Congress. If confirmed, will you pledge to work closely with this
committee to ensure rigorous oversight of the Department's missile
defense program and the Missile Defense Agency?
Mr. Young. If confirmed, I would be committed to rigorous oversight
of all defense acquisition programs, including the BMD System
acquisition.

46. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Young, if confirmed, would you
consider commissioning an independent review and assessment of the BMD
acquisition program?
Mr. Young. Yes, if confirmed, I would consider commissioning an
independent review and assessment of the BMD acquisition program. I
believe such a review is merited because it would provide a new
perspective, and perhaps new solutions, to many of the challenges
facing the BMD program today.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh

PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD TECHNOLOGY

47. Senator Bayh. Mr. Young, in a Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing on February 6, 2007, Secretary Gates was asked about the
investments the DOD was making to ensure that it has a reliable and
trusted supply of printed circuit boards for future and legacy systems
and to ensure necessary innovation in the design and manufacture of
this critical technology. He answered that one of the Department's
centerpiece efforts is the DLA sponsorship of logistics research and
development technology demonstrations under an Emerging Critical
Interconnection Technology (E/CIT) program. What investments in the E/
CIT program and other programs are you making that continue to address
the Department's vital printed circuit board requirements?
Mr. Young. The Department received appropriated funds from Congress
in fiscal year 2007 for logistics research and development of printed
circuit board technologies and demonstrations. Included in this
appropriation was funding for the preservation of access to reliable
printed circuit board manufacturing in the United States. In fiscal
years 2009-2010, we will look at the need and feasibility of adding
support for Printed Wiring Assemblies managed by the DLA in order to
best serve our military customers.

48. Senator Bayh. Mr. Young, in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Department was tasked with creating a
report regarding the recommendations of the National Research Council
Committee on Manufacturing Trends in Printed Circuit Board Technology.
How will it address future actions the Department intends to take?
Mr. Young. The Department has completed the draft report and is in
the final stage of coordination, which is expected to be submitted in
November 2007. The Department concurs with each recommendation and
identifies the implementation actions planned. Details will be
forthcoming in the fully coordinated report.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

BASIC RESEARCH FUNDING

49. Senator Clinton. Mr. Young, since 2002 in real terms the basic
research budgets proposed by the DOD declined by over 6 percent or
nearly $100 million. This is during a time period when the overall
research and technology development budget has grown by 35 percent or
$19 billion, along with huge increases in the DOD top-line budget. That
indicates that the Department has shifted emphasis to near-term, lower-
risk research and away from longer-term fundamental research that will
develop next generation warfighting capabilities and train the next
generation of scientists and engineers. Do you think that there has
been underinvestment in basic research by DOD? If so, what will you do
to address that underinvestment?
Mr. Young. The basic research budget in constant year dollars is up
8 percent from the President's Budget Request 2000 through 2008. Since
2002, the budget has declined 6 percent which illustrates a key fact:
within some small variation, the basic research budget for DOD has been
``flat'' for almost 20 years.
Continued investment in basic research is necessary to confront,
understand, predict, and counter not only the current threat but also
those which will evolve later in this century. We cannot predict the
next adversary, its weapons, its tactics, or its capabilities. If
confirmed, I will seek to ensure that all the Services and agencies do
not neglect their perpetual requirement to prepare for the future by
funding basic research today.

50. Senator Clinton. Mr. Young, what do you view as the value of
university research within the overall DOD technology development
strategy?
Mr. Young. DOD sponsored research at universities underpins the
development of future military capabilities in two ways. First,
universities are world-class research performers in science and
engineering fields important to national defense. Second, investment in
university research pays additional dividends through the associated
training of scientists and engineers, thereby helping to ensure the
future availability of talent needed for defense research and
development. For the DOD Basic Research program, universities are
prolific sources of discovery, new knowledge, and understanding that
lead to more effective and less expensive weapons systems. With the
benefit of hindsight, we can see patterns of prior basic research, much
of it performed at universities, that spawned today's revolutionary
military capabilities, including the Global Positioning System,
stealth, night vision, and precision strike. We expect equally
important new capabilities to emerge over the long-term from today's
investments in DOD basic research.

COMPUTER SCIENCE RESEARCH

51. Senator Clinton. Mr. Young, at your October 25, 2005,
confirmation hearing to be the DDR&E, I raised the important role that
DOD investments in fundamental research in computer science play in the
development of new warfighting capabilities. I asked you to look into
the issue of general disinvestment in fundamental computer science,
particularly by DARPA, due to the potential detrimental long-term
consequences. Have you reviewed the Department's investment strategy
for fundamental computer science?
Mr. Young. I agree that computer science research has an important
role in the development of new capabilities. The review that you've
asked for is underway. In advance of a final assessment, I can tell you
the progress to date. To gain insight from the research community, we
conducted a workshop with the academic chairs of the Nation's 10
largest university computer science research departments. After the
workshop we began reviewing reports and data from government
institutions that track the Federal investment. Currently, we are
looking at the DOD investment over the past several years in order to
complete the review.

52. Senator Clinton. Mr. Young, do you feel that the investment
situation has changed for the better since your confirmation as DDR&E?
Mr. Young. It is premature to answer the question prior to
completing the requested review of computer science research. I will
say, however, that several capability areas in which we have increased
our attention have reinforced the importance of computer science such
as biometrics, information assurance, large scale data set processing,
and networking.

53. Senator Clinton. Mr. Young, what steps will you take in your
new role to ensure that we have sufficient investment in this critical
area?
Mr. Young. As we continually explore opportunities and evaluate our
investments in S&T, we are watchful for areas where our investment is
out of balance with overall strategy and objectives. Our Reliance 21
process facilitates oversight by providing a mechanism to stand up
Technology Focus Teams (TFTs). TFTs are chartered by senior OSD and
Component S&T management to assess technologies or investment areas.
For example, this year we are having teams look at software, networks,
and large data sets. If the level of computer science research is
negatively affecting these particular technologies then the teams will
likely uncover that fact in their reviews. I expect Reliance 21 to be
an important tool in balancing our investment.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner

AEGIS COMBAT SYSTEMS

54. Senator Warner. Mr. Young, the contract for Aegis combat
systems on Navy surface ships has not been competed since 1969. When
you were the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development,
and Acquisition, you approved two sole-source justifications to spend a
total of $2.5 billion with the incumbent Aegis combat system contractor
on a cost-plus basis. You also took some innovative actions to try to
change the Navy's culture by embracing ``open architectures'' for these
ships to allow many other companies (particularly small businesses) to
provide cutting-edge computing systems and software at potentially much
lower cost. Could you please tell me DOD's current plan to evolve the
Aegis combat system into a true open architecture, using an open
business model that fosters competition between many companies?
Mr. Young. The Department of the Navy is implementing an
overarching strategy to acquire surface ship combat systems using an
open architecture model approach which takes into account acquisition
law, existing program delivery schedules, and supportability from both
a financial and personnel resources perspective.
Surface Warfare combat systems will transition from platform-based
development to capability-based development, realign architectures to
achieve commonality where appropriate, encourage competition to enhance
innovation and reduce costs, and decouple combat system development
from platform development while continuing to recognize the need for
some platform specific needs
Instead of a single, large company producing a separate and unique
combat system for each ship class and continuing to upgrade that system
over its life cycle, the Surface Navy is moving toward a competitive
environment where many participants--including small businesses and
other nontraditional DOD contractors--will contribute capabilities to
collaboratively deliver the best product for the best value using
commercial, open standards and open business models. This will allow an
unlimited number of qualified vendors to compete for and contribute to
the Surface Navy combat systems product line. The specific number of
companies that will bid and participate is unknown at this time.
The open architecture model encompasses both technical and business
aspects and is enabled by well designed system and component interfaces
that use open and published commercial standards, encourage
competition, facilitate software and hardware reuse over multiple ship
classes, enable incremental improvements, reduce dependency on prime
item integrators, and foster innovation from non-traditional DOD
companies.

55. Senator Warner. Mr. Young, on July 9, 2007, the Navy published
an announcement in the Federal Register of its intent to again extend
the Aegis Combat System Baseline Computer Program Development contract
with the incumbent contractor on a sole-source, cost-plus basis. The
same announcement says that ``competition is being considered for
fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2013 surface Navy combat systems
upgrades'' and that the Navy may conduct an ``Industry Day'' in July or
August to discuss it. This seems backwards--sole-source, non-
competitive contracting for hundreds of millions of dollars should be
DOD's last resort, not its first choice. If DOD were truly interested
in open systems with many vendors, why wouldn't you consult with
industry first to determine what could be competitively performed, and
then minimize the work that had to be performed sole-source?
Mr. Young. The July 9, 2007, Federal Register announcement is a
limited 1-year Navy extension of the Aegis Combat System Baseline
Computer Program Development contract to the minimum efforts required
for completion of development tasking in fiscal year 2008 in order to
prevent disruption to the Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) New
Construction ship deliveries and Cruiser Modernization.
Over the past several years the Navy has been working closely with
Industry and the other military departments to define an Objective
Combat Systems Architecture as well as the developmental work and
systems engineering required to evolve to this Navy-defined, standards-
based architecture. This new architecture will enable enhanced
innovation and allow qualified vendors to compete for and contribute to
the overall Surface Navy combat systems product line. The Industry Day
that was referenced in the July 2007 announcement, but was not
conducted, will address the developmental work associated with the
Objective Combat System Architecture. A new date for the Industry Day
is not set.

56. Senator Warner. Mr. Young, for the next $2 billion Aegis combat
system contract, how many new companies do you plan to allow to bid for
work?
Mr. Young. Instead of a single, large company producing a separate
and unique combat system for each ship class and continuing to upgrade
that system over its life cycle, the Surface Navy is moving toward a
competitive environment where many participants--including small
businesses and other non-traditional DOD contractors--will contribute
capabilities to collaboratively deliver the best product for the best
value using commercial, open standards and open business models. This
will allow an unlimited number of qualified vendors to compete for and
contribute to the Surface Navy combat systems product line. The
specific number of companies that will bid and participate is unknown
at this time.

57. Senator Warner. Mr. Young, how many of these will be at the
prime level, to foster head-to-head competition with the incumbent
contractor which has had a 40-year lock on this market?
Mr. Young. In order to manage the risk at an appropriate level for
our many programs of record, we will not implement this business model
in one single step. Rather, taking a measured approach, we will
capitalize on significant systems engineering and integration
experience resident with the incumbent prime contractors and move
toward greater competitive acquisition opportunities in design and
warfighting capability development over time.

58. Senator Warner. Mr. Young, please provide any written analysis
the Department has performed prior to the date of this hearing to
support the specific tasks that DOD does not currently plan to be
competed under the July 9 announcement, and the specific rationale for
not competing them.
Mr. Young. The July 9, 2007, Federal Register announcement is a
limited 1-year Navy extension of the Aegis Combat System Baseline
Computer Program Development contract to the minimum efforts required
for completion of development tasking in fiscal year 2008 in order to
prevent disruption to DDG New Construction ship deliveries and Cruiser
Modernization.
The Navy is currently defining an Objective Combat Systems
Architecture as well as the developmental work and systems engineering
required to evolve to this Navy-defined, standards-based architecture.
This new architecture will enable enhanced innovation and allow
qualified vendors to compete for and contribute to the overall Surface
Navy combat systems product line. The Navy has not completed analysis
of the specific tasks and definition of the work packages to be
competed for these efforts.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

SHIPYARD ACQUISITION STRATEGY

59. Senator Collins. Mr. Young, in 2005 you served as the Under
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. In
this capacity you were the architect of what I felt from the outset was
a very ill-advised one-shipyard acquisition strategy for what is now
the DDG-1000 program. As you were well aware, such a strategy would
likely have resulted in the loss of one of our Nation's two remaining
surface combatant shipyards. Fortunately, Congress took action to block
your proposal, and I hope that Hurricane Katrina has illustrated to you
the risks that a one-shipyard acquisition strategy would have entailed.
I conveyed to you the potential consequences of a natural disaster
or terrorist attack on one of our shipyards, and it is unfortunate that
the former came to pass. Our Gulf Coast shipyards are still recovering
from Hurricane Katrina after more than 2 years of rebuilding efforts.
So, I hope you have rethought your initial position on this matter and
recognize the long-term importance of maintaining competition in the
industrial base, which serves both to drive down costs over time and to
provide a surge capability in the event of national security
emergencies.
Do you have any thoughts or reflections you would like to share
with this committee regarding this matter?
Mr. Young. I would hope the DOD could have robust competition in as
many areas as possible. I believe industry consolidation through
mergers or acquisitions can limit the number of competitors and thus
the opportunity for competition. However, there may be cases where DOD
plans provide inadequate quantities or budgets to maintain viable
competitors over the long-term without paying cost premiums with
taxpayer funds, thus denying our warfighters other quantities or
capabilities that could be purchased. Unique cases of low quantity,
high cost items require careful analysis to evaluate all aspects of the
positive and negative benefits of an acquisition strategy for the
warfighter, the taxpayer, and the industrial base.

60. Senator Collins. Mr. Young, in your answers to the advanced
policy questions, you state that you are ``concerned about
consolidation trends which have had an adverse impact on competition
opportunities for the DOD.'' Yet, you previously advocated for a one-
shipyard acquisition strategy for the DDG-1000 program, citing short-
term budget pressures. Such an approach would have effectively
eliminated competition in the DDG-1000 program. How do you reconcile
your previous endorsement of a one-shipyard acquisition strategy for
the DDG-1000 program with this statement advocating competition?
Mr. Young. I believe there were many lessons as we evolved to the
current DD(X) strategy. I do believe that the final evolution of the
DD(X) acquisition strategy, the dual lead ship strategy that we
developed in the Navy, has created tremendous incentives for program
execution and cost control which will benefit the Navy and the Nation.
I look forward to the chance to learn more about the progress of the
DD(X) program.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP PROGRAM

61. Senator Collins. Mr. Young, the Navy's proposed plan for the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program is to eventually down-select to one
sea frame design and then have an open competition to award the
contract for the construction of all future LCSs. It would seem to me
that all of the pains that you have endured during the design and
construction of the first two ships would be lost if you subsequently
awarded a third party, that is neither Lockheed Martin nor the General
Dynamics-Bath Iron Works-Austal team, the final contract award.
What incentive is there for industry to become involved in a
program such as LCS if there is the possibility that after working
through the lead ship design and construction, there would be a
competition for the final contract award that would be open to
competitors that did not contribute or invest in the initial program
and which would profit from the work done by the original design
shipyards?
Mr. Young. I am not familiar with the current plans for the LCS
acquisition. I assure you that I will review the details of these
plans, if confirmed. The Department of the Navy is fairly paying the
industry teams for their work under the initial LCS program. However, I
think any possibility of awarding an LCS construction contract to a
third party would have to be considered carefully and in great detail.
DOD must understand the new risks that the Department might incur under
such an award.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

F-22 AIRCRAFT

62. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Young, if the Air Force comes forward
with a request for funding for a Lot 10 of F-22 aircraft during the
fiscal year 2009 or fiscal year 2010 budget process, will you support
that request?
Mr. Young. Yes, I would consider it. The Department would weigh
such a request in light of the other fiscal priorities within the
Department, during budget deliberations.

NUNN-MCCURDY

63. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Young, I believe the Nunn-McCurdy law is
a critical tool which provides the Services the ability to assess
whether a DOD program is experiencing cost overruns, as that program is
defined by its production profile described in the Services' and
Department's Program of Record. Will you assure the committee that the
current fixed firm price (FFP)/not-to-exceed (NTE) proposal that has
been submitted for the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engineering
Program will receive a complete and independent assessment by DOD, in
light of your responsibility for programs that are assessed by the
Services to have a Nunn-McCurdy breach?
Mr. Young. Yes. I have already initiated the Nunn-McCurdy review
process, as a result of Secretary Wynne's September 27, 2007,
notification of the breach to Congress. A review of the current
proposal will be an important part of that review.

64. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Young, I understand that Nunn-McCurdy
does not segregate service-directed profile changes and their resulting
cost increases from other cost increases, such as those resulting from
contractor and/or supplier factors. Should the current Nunn-McCurdy law
be amended in order to more appropriately segregate cost growth and
account for whom or what drove a program's cost increases?
Mr. Young. I would not recommend the suggested segregation since
circumstances differ from program to program, and could add additional
complexity to the Nunn-McCurdy process. I do believe it is useful to
understand the nature of cost increases and, if confirmed, would seek
to account for and explain them to Congress when the Nunn-McCurdy
statute applies.

65. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Young, do you believe that a Service
Secretary should be allowed to assess a Nunn-McCurdy breach without a
prior review by OSD/ATL or would you like to see the law amended to
provide this additional ``check and balance?''
Mr. Young. I intend to work closely with the Service Secretaries on
issues such as this, and see no reason for amending the Nunn-McCurdy
statute. Nothing in the statute precludes a Service Secretary from
reviewing programs and making recommendations at any time. I do believe
in a transparent process which should ensure that USD(AT&L) understands
the issue and nature of cost increases in a timely manner.

FIXED FIRM PRICE/NOT-TO-EXCEED CONTRACTS

66. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Young, do you feel that a FFP contract
or a NTE contract is an appropriate contractual vehicle to allow a
defense contractor to perform a service or modification at a FFP, or
NTE price limit, where the contractor assumes the risk to produce at or
below that price?
Mr. Young. Yes, when the requirements are firm and the contract
performance risks are well understood and manageable, it is perfectly
appropriate to use a FFP.
With regard to NTEs: We use NTE pricing with unpriced contractual
actions (UCAs). When we complete negotiations of a UCA we convert the
UCA to a definitized contract. When the requirements are firm and the
contract performance risks are well understood and manageable, we will
use a FFP contract as the appropriate contract vehicle.

67. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Young, do you believe that the use of
Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) clauses are appropriate in long-term
FFP and/or NTE contracts?
Mr. Young. In general, we prefer not to use EPA clauses. However,
in those instances when we have abnormally long periods of performance
(as is the case in many of our shipbuilding contracts) and there is a
great degree of uncertainty in the pricing of labor and materials in
those out-years, we will utilize EPA contract provisions in order to
protect the Government and the contractor against major fluctuations in
material and labor escalation, as the case may be.
______

[The nomination reference of John J. Young, Jr., follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 21, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
John J. Young, Jr., of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, vice Kenneth J. Krieg.
______

[The biographical sketch of John J. Young, Jr., which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of John J. Young, Jr.

On November 2, 2005, John J. Young, Jr. was appointed as the
Director, Defense Research and Engineering. As the Director, Mr. Young
is the Principal Advisor to the Secretary of Defense on technical
matters and acts as the Department's Chief Technology Officer. His
portfolio includes oversight of a $70 billion research enterprise;
which includes: Basic and Applied Research, development of certain
prototypes, oversight of the Service laboratories and federally funded
research and development centers, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, and the Defense Technical Information Center.
Mr. Young is a graduate of Georgia Institute of Technology, where
he participated in the cooperative engineering education program at
Georgia Tech, working with what is now Lockheed Martin Tactical
Aircraft Systems in Fort Worth, TX. Under this program, he worked in
eight different engineering groups primarily supporting the F-16
program and advanced fighter technology efforts. Mr. Young next worked
at the BDM Corporation in Huntsville, AL, providing engineering support
of Army missile defense interceptor programs.
After receiving a Master's degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics
from Stanford University, Mr. Young joined the technical staff at
Rockwell Missile Systems Division in Duluth, GA. He became a member of
the Technical Staff at Sandia National Laboratories in 1988 where he
worked on hypersonic weapon designs and maneuvering reentry vehicle
aerodynamics as well as standoff bomb concepts. While at Sandia, he was
selected as an American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
(AIAA) congressional fellow. He served his AIAA fellowship with the
Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and then joined the
committee's professional staff.
During his tenure with the committee, he served as the staff
analyst for Department of Defense (DOD) procurement, research,
development, test, and evaluation programs. Prior to leaving the
committee, he was responsible for reviewing all DOD aircraft
procurement programs as well as the activities of the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
He also evaluated the science and technology program budgets for the
Navy, Air Force, and Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Young is the former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition. As the Navy's Senior
Acquisition Executive, Mr. Young implemented a wide range of innovative
organizational and business practices to increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of Navy and Marine Corps procurement and research programs.
He stabilized programs and controlled cost through emphasis on
milestone-based incentive fees, control of change orders and
requirements, multi-year procurement contracts, and creation of
competitive and joint programs.
Under his leadership, the Navy acquisition team successfully
changed Navy acquisition approaches through programs like Operation
Respond and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). In response to the urgent
needs of the U.S. Marine Corps, he led the department's urgent
acquisition efforts under Operation Respond--a team established to
rapidly meet the technological and material requirements generated from
deployed warfighters serving in Iraq. Operation Respond efforts ensured
that the Marine Corps had needed items ranging from vehicle armor to
helicopter survivability equipment to ballistic goggles. LCS was
defined through collaborative work with the Chief of Naval Operations
and naval fleet leadership, leading to a keel laying in roughly 3 years
after program initiation. Mr. Young has also pursued greater jointness
on many efforts, including his successful merger of the Air Force and
Navy Joint Tactical Radio System clusters and the Distributed Common
Ground Station.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by John J. Young,
Jr., in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
John Jacob Young, Jr.

2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics.

3. Date of nomination:
June 21, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
May 29, 1962; Newnan, Georgia.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Barbara Joan Schleihauf.

7. Names and ages of children:
Nathan Jacob Young, 15; William Joseph Young, 13; and Kathryn
Elizabeth Young, 10.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Stanford University; 10/85-6/87; Master's in Aeronautics and
Astronautics; Stanford, CA.
Georgia Institute of Technology; 6/80-6/85; Bachelor's in Aerospace
Engineering; Atlanta, GA.
Newnan High School; 9/78-6/80; High School Diploma; Newnan, GA.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Department of Defense; Washington, DC, Director, Defense Research
and Engineering, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC;
11/05-Present.
Department of Navy; Washington, DC, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research, Development, and Acquisition), Department of the Navy,
Washington, DC; 7/01-11/05.
United States Senate, Committee on Appropriations; Washington, DC,
Professional Staff Member, Defense Appropriations Subcommittee,
Washington, DC; 12/93-7/01.
Sandia National Laboratory; Albuquerque, NM; Member of the
Technical Staff serving the U.S. Senate as an American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Congressional Fellow on the U.S.
Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Washington, DC; 1/91-12/93.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member--American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.
Member--Jamestown Parent Teacher Association.
Member--The Briarean Society, Phi Kappa Phi, Tau Beta Pi, Sigma
Gamma Tau, and Phi Eta Sigma college honor societies.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
2007--Selected as American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (AIAA) Fellow.
2006--Awarded the Defense Acquisition University David Acker Award
for Skill in Communication.
2005--Awarded Distinguished Public Service Award by the Secretary
of the Navy for invaluable contributions to the Department of the Navy
by leading the Operation Respond team and creating innovative
approaches to multi-year contracts that provided efficient warfare
systems to the taxpayer.
2003--Awarded Distinguished Public Service Award by the Secretary
of the Navy for implementing innovative business practices, stabilizing
the Navy's most important programs, and encouraging partnership with
industry.
Awarded certificate of service from the Secretary of the Navy for
10 years of service in the United States Government.
Selected for the 1996 National Security Leadership Course at
Syracuse University.
Selected for the 1996 class of Georgia Institute of Technology
Council of Outstanding Engineering Alumni.
Please see attachment sheet for additional recognitions and
achievements.

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
``Proper Objectives for the Strategic Defense Initiative'';
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Student Journal;
fall 1985.

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

Signature and Date

[The nomination of John J. Young, Jr., was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on November 15, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on November 16, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Douglas A. Brook by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses

DUTIES OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND
COMPTROLLER)

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and
Comptroller) (ASN(FM&C))?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be responsible for advising the
Secretary of the Navy on financial management matters and for directing
and managing all financial activities and operations of the Department
of the Navy (DON).
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I hold degrees in political science, public administration
and public policy and I have served as a Navy Supply Corps officer.
From 1990-1992, I served as Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial
Management) and in 1992-93 was Acting Director of the Office of
Personnel Management. I am currently on the faculty at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) where I teach a required course in Defense
Budget and Financial Management Policy. I am also director of the
Center for Defense Management Reform at NPS where I conduct and oversee
research in various areas of defense management.
Question. Do you believe that there are any actions that you need
to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the ASN(FM&C)?
Answer. Yes, although I am generally knowledgeable about Navy
financial management, I will need to make the transition from a
relatively abstract academic environment to the specific operational
environment. This means learning quickly the details of current Navy
financial management and comptrollership matters.

RELATIONSHIPS (OLA)

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the ASN(FM&C) and each of the following:
The Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. The ASN(FM&C) is the principal assistant and advisor to the
Secretary of the Navy on fiscal and budgetary matter. The ASN(FM&C)
also performs other duties as the Secretary may prescribe.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. Similarly, the ASN(FM&C) is also the principal assistant
and advisor to the Under Secretary of the Navy on fiscal and budgetary
matter. The ASN(FM&C) also performs other duties as the Under Secretary
may prescribe.
Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Navy.
Answer. The ASN(FM&C) provides advice on financial matters to the
other Assistant Secretaries, and provides financial management policy
leadership, guidance, implementation and coordination with the other
Assistant Secretaries. If confirmed, I would ensure that their
interests are represented in recommending financial alternatives to the
Secretary of the Navy. I would work to ensure that financial management
activities of the Department support their respective portfolios.
Question. The General Counsel of the Navy.
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to have a close working
relationship with the General Counsel, to understand and address the
legal implications of DON financial matters and to assure compliance
with fiscal law.
Question. The Chief of Naval Operations.
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to providing the support that
the Chief of Naval Operations requires in order to execute his duties
and responsibilities and achieve the mission of the Navy.
Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to providing the support that
the Commandant of the Marine Corps requires in order to execute his
duties and responsibilities and achieve the mission of the Marine
Corps.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
Answer. In the role of ASN(FM&C), I would, if confirmed, work with
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in the development and
execution of the budgetary and fiscal policies and initiatives of the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration/Chief Information Officer.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that DON information
technology systems that support diverse activities are properly managed
and resourced to accommodate the full spectrum of financial management
functions and reporting.
Question. The Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation.
Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the program
priorities of the DoN are well understood; that thorough DON program
reviews are conducted within the framework of the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process; the results are
communicated to leadership; and are in concert with overall Department
of Defense (DOD) strategy.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the
Army and Air Force.
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working closely with the
Assistant Secretaries of the Army and Air Force in the area of
financial management to support the efforts of the Secretary of Defense
and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in order to facilitate
decision making at all levels and achieve the strongest cooperation
between the Services possible. I am committed to working to foster a
cordial and productive working relationship with these colleagues.

CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ROLES IN THE NAVY BUDGET PROCESS

Question. What is your understanding of the division of
responsibility between the ASN(FM&C) and the senior military officers
responsible for budget matters in Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations and headquarters, Marine Corps, in making program and budget
decisions, including the preparation of the Navy Program Objective
Memorandum, the annual budget submission, and the Future Years Defense
Program?
Answer. If confirmed, I would have the responsibility and the
authority for all budget matters within the DON. The Director of the
Office of Budget would serve under my direct supervision and would be
responsible to me for the formulation, justification, and execution of
the Department's budget. The Navy and Marine Corps officers responsible
for programming would also serve as my principal military advisors in
my capacity to oversee development of the DON program objectives
memoranda.

BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION AGENCY

Question. The Department recently established the Business
Transformation Agency (BTA) to strengthen management of its business
systems modernization effort.
What is your understanding of the mission of the BTA and how its
mission affects the responsibilities of the ASN(FM&C)?
Answer. The stated mission of the BTA is ``to guide the
transformation of business operations throughout the DOD and to deliver
Enterprise-level capabilities that align to warfighter needs.'' It is
my understanding that the BTA provides the framework for DOD's future
business environment, using a ``tiered'' approach that allows
components to execute plans that are within this framework but also
allowing the flexibility to support unique mission requirements. This
approach, if executed properly, would support the effort to achieve
accurate and timely financial decisionmaking in DON.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the ASN(FM&C)
in providing the Navy's views to the BTA, or participating in the
decisionmaking process of the BTA, on issues of concern to the Navy?
Answer. BTA states that ``the Department's approach to business
transformation relies on tiered accountability at the enterprise,
component, and program levels [. . .]. The components are participants
in the governance process as well as key implementers.'' Thus, the
Assistant Secretary should be involved in establishing and implementing
DOD-wide financial management standards and improvement programs that
affect DON.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the ASN(FM&C)?
Answer. The DON, like all of DOD, is challenged by internal and
external pressures on its budgetary resources. Recognizing these
pressures and constructing budget proposals that meet the needs of the
Navy and the Nation will be an ongoing challenge. At the same time,
good financial management requires the systems, processes, and educated
and trained personnel to produce timely, accurate, and useful financial
information to support sound decisionmaking.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have to
address these challenges?
Answer. Recognizing that, if confirmed, my remaining term of office
is likely to be relatively short, I see three critical challenges:

First, the development of sound Navy and Marine Corps
budget proposals for fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010.
Second, to make discernible progress toward achieving
auditability of the Department's financial statements.
Third, to identify needs, plan, and invest in
appropriate training, education and career development for the
Navy's military and civilian financial management personnel.

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Navy's military and
civilian leaders to develop sound budget proposals that recognize the
needs of the Navy and Marine Corps and the fiscal environment in which
budgetary decisions will be made. With regard to financial statements,
I will endeavor to provide the leadership commitment required to make
progress toward achieving an auditable financial statement. In the
career development area, I will review and act where necessary to
develop a sound plan for education, training, career development and
assignment of financial management personnel.
In addition, the ASN(FM&C) is in a position to be an agent of
transformation, with capability to develop the strategies to make
financial and budgetary business operations more effective and
efficient. If confirmed, I would support the continued development of
improved DON business operations.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASN(FM&C)?
Answer. Please refer to the answers to the above questions. If
confirmed, I will quickly become engaged in the Navy's Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System process to assure that
every effort is made to produce sound and defensible budget proposals.
I will provide strong leadership support for making progress on the
Navy's financial statements under the Financial Improvement and Audit
Readiness plan. I will immediately begin a review of the education,
training, career development, and assignment of financial management
personnel.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Question. DOD's financial management deficiencies have been the
subject of many audit reports over the past 10 or more years. Despite
numerous strategies and initiatives, problems with financial management
and data continue.
What do you consider to be the top financial management issues that
must be addressed by the DON over the next 5 years?
Answer. I believe the top challenge will be to support an expanded
wartime mission to combat terrorism, and to execute that urgent mission
within resources provided by Congress. To be successful, we need to
fundamentally change the way we do business, documenting, and better
controlling our business processes, making them less costly and more
effective. In my experience, the weaknesses that are attributed to
financial management are symptomatic of weaknesses in our systems and
processes. There seems to be consensus between the audit community and
the department that the major challenge is the department's ability to
generate timely, relevant, and reliable financial information for
decisionmaking. Resolving that problem requires a combination of new
information systems, new business processes, training and education,
and cultural change. Those factors must all be addressed in balance to
ensure the department becomes more financially proficient and can
sustain that proficiency.
Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to ensure that progress
is made toward improved financial management in the Navy?
Answer. The Department has a Financial Improvement Program, which
is aligned with the DOD Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure progress is made in accordance with
that plan and will also look at whether adjustments are required to the
plan.
Question. If confirmed, what private business practices, if any,
would you advocate for adoption by the DOD and the Department of the
Navy?
Answer. Certainly some governmental activities are business-like
and some management practices can be incorporated from the private
sector. With respect to financial management, in those cases where
there is an appropriate private sector practice the Navy would benefit
by emulating, if confirmed, I would give them serious consideration. I
would also look to other well-run Federal or State governmental
agencies, or the non-profit sector, for management best practices.
Question. What are the most important performance measurements you
would use, if confirmed, to evaluate changes in the Navy's financial
operations to determine if its plans and initiatives are being
implemented as intended and anticipated results are being achieved?
Answer. I understand the importance of effective performance
measurement and support the use of metrics. I understand that both Navy
and the DOD comptroller are developing measures of progress in
financial management. If confirmed, I will work to understand and
employ these and other metrics to measure financial management
performance.
Question. Over the last several years, the DOD has taken a number
of steps to realign its management structure to expedite and enhance
its business transformation efforts. For example, the Department has
established a new Defense Business Systems Management Committee, the
BTA, and the Investment Review Boards. The military departments do not
appear to have taken similar organizational steps.
Do you believe that the organizational structure of the Department
of the Navy is properly aligned to bring about business systems
modernization and financial management improvements?
Answer. Over the past several years, the governance and management
structures for systems modernization and financial management
improvement have been evolving. To the extent those organizational
structures and plans are now stable, I believe it would make sense for
the components to follow suit. However, until such time as I can gain
greater experience and understanding of how these structures are
working, I cannot say whether they are currently properly aligned.
Question. If not, how do you believe the Department should be
restructured to more effectively address this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I would need to look into this matter in
depth from within before drawing any conclusions.

BUSINESS MANAGEMENT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Question. For the past several years, the Department has pursued a
Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) aimed, in part, at
correcting deficiencies in DOD's financial management and achieving the
ability to receive an unqualified ``clean'' audit.
Do you support continuing the BMMP?
Answer. In the evolution of the Department's efforts to transform
its business management practices, it is my understanding that the BTA
has superseded the BMMP. I support the objectives of business
management modernization and will work to make progress toward an
unqualified audit opinion.
Question. If confirmed, what would your role be in this business
modernization effort?
Answer. I would engage in BTA matters involving financial
capabilities and standards and support the Secretary's role in
deliberations of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee.
Question. The BMMP advocates top-down leadership in establishing an
enterprise architecture for business systems modernization. The
Services, however, appear to be pursuing independent pilot programs for
modernizing business systems, despite the risk that a Service-led
approach could produce numerous incompatible systems.
Do you support an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-led
approach to business modernization?
Answer. I support the defense business transformation goal of
tiered accountability where enterprise-wide policy and standards are
set by OSD and component-specific programs are managed by the
components in conformance with those standards and policies. I support
communication and coordination mechanisms to ensure both the
centralized and decentralized aspects of the work are efficient and
effective.
Question. If so, what would you do, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Navy supports such an approach?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the programs managed by
the Navy conform to the standards and policies set by OSD and the
various laws governing system development.
Question. A critical requirement of the BMMP is an ``enterprise
architecture'' that would establish standards and requirements for
modernization or new acquisition of business information technology
systems.
Do you agree that an effective enterprise architecture is a
critical step to ensure that new and modified business information
technology systems serve their intended purposes?
Answer. Yes. A common architecture more readily supports the
aggregation of financial data for reporting or to ensure that business
performance data is useful for management decisionmaking.
Question. The Comptroller General has taken the position that the
enterprise architectures of the military departments are not mature
enough to responsibly guide and constrain investment in business
systems. According to Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Navy
has fully satisfied only 10 of 31 core framework elements of an
enterprise architecture.
What is your view of this issue? If confirmed, what steps, if any,
do you plan to take to address this problem?
Answer. I will review the Comptroller General's report and take his
conclusions seriously. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Department's Chief Information Officer as I review the financial
improvement plans for the department to ensure that our investment in
business systems is aligned to DOD's objectives and guidance.
Question. Section 2222 of title 10, U.S.C., requires the DOD to
institute a process to ensure that money is not wasted on new or
upgraded defense business systems that are not in compliance with the
required enterprise architecture. The Comptroller General has testified
that the enterprise architectures of the military departments ``are not
mature.'' Nonetheless, they continue to invest billions of dollars
every year in thousands of business system programs.
What is your view of this issue?
Answer. I am not sufficiently knowledgeable about the maturity of
the Navy's enterprise architecture to comment. If confirmed, I will
review the Comptroller General's report and take his observations
seriously.
Question. Do you believe that we need additional controls on the
expenditure of funds for business systems until such time as the
required enterprise architecture is complete?
Answer. That is a specific remedy to an issue I do not yet fully
understand. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to look into this
matter, but at this time I am not able to comment.

GAO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM

Question. In testimony before the Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee, the Comptroller General of the United States, David M.
Walker, suggested that ``to improve the likelihood of meaningful,
broad-based financial management and related business reform'', DOD
should give the leaders of its functional areas, or ``domains,''
control of systems investments.
What is your view of this suggestion?
Answer. Generally, I believe that control of investments should be
delegated to the lowest level capable of handling that control. At the
same time, we have an enterprise-wide concern that requires some degree
of top-down control and oversight. I am not conversant in the specifics
of the ``domains'' referred to in the question but will look into that
matter, if confirmed.
Question. Mr. Walker testified that the DOD should fix its
financial management systems before it tries to develop auditable
financial statements. He stated that: ``Given the size, complexity, and
deeply ingrained nature of the financial management problems facing
DOD, heroic end-of-the-year efforts relied on by some agencies to
develop auditable financial statement balances are not feasible at DOD.
Instead, a sustained focus on the underlying problems impeding the
development of reliable financial data throughout the Department will
be necessary and is the best course of action.''
Do you agree with this statement?
Answer. My research supports the Comptroller General's view that
size and complexity are barriers to achieving unqualified audit
opinions. It has also shown that heroic effort can sometimes result in
improved audit reports but that such progress is generally
unsustainable. Instead, well-designed information systems and business
processes, leadership commitment, positive resource allocation and
well-trained people are required to go beyond short-term gains in this
area.
Question. What steps need to be taken in the Navy and Marine Corps
to achieve the goal stated by the Comptroller General?
Answer. I do not possess the level of detailed knowledge to
adequately answer that question. If confirmed, that question will be a
priority because, in my opinion, the Department will require leadership
to continue strengthening, tightening, and improving business
processes, systems, and the proficiency of its workforce.

LEASING MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS

Question. The controversy surrounding the Air Force 767 tanker
lease proposal raised significant concerns over leasing versus
purchasing major military equipment. The Navy and Marine Corps have
also entered several lease agreements in recent years for certain
logistical support ships.
What is your opinion of the pros and cons of leasing versus buying
major capital equipment? Is leasing a viable and cost-effective option
for procuring DON equipment, and if so, in what situations?
Answer. This is an area that I would intend to study carefully if
confirmed. If confirmed, working with the Assistant Secretary for
Research, Development, and Acquisition, I would support policies
requiring the completion of a business case analysis prior to a
determination to buy or lease equipment. Each situation should be
carefully reviewed and the results of the analysis should guide the
decision process.

SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING AND ANNUAL BUDGETING

Question. Since September 11, 2001, the DOD has paid for much of
the cost of ongoing military operations through supplemental
appropriations.
What are your views regarding the use of supplemental
appropriations to fund the cost of ongoing military operations?
Answer. When funding requirements are dynamic, long-range forecasts
are less reliable. Dynamic operational demands require a higher degree
of timeliness and flexibility. Supplemental appropriations have the
benefit of being more timely than the annual budget process and have
greater flexibilities to support the changing demands of a wartime
fiscal environment. Navy's support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF),
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and the global war on terror
continues to require a higher tempo of operations than expected for
peacetime operations. Thus it may not be practical to attempt to
program and budget for a dynamic war as far in advance as the normal
budget process requires. Therefore, it has been appropriate to fund the
global war on terror through the use of supplemental appropriations. I
also recognize that the Department has identified projected global war
on terror costs along with the fiscal year 2008 budget, and, if
confirmed, I would support this practice.

AUTHORIZATION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Question. Do you believe that an authorization pursuant to section
114 of title 10, U.S.C., is necessary before funds for operations and
maintenance, procurement, research and development, and military
construction may be made available for obligation by the DOD?
Answer. Yes. However I acknowledge that situations can occur where
funds have been appropriated but not authorized. I understand that it
has been the Department's practice to work with all the oversight
committees to resolve these matters. If confirmed, I will respect the
views and prerogatives of the Department's oversight committees and
will work closely with the committees to achieve a resolution of the
issues, as necessary.

INCREMENTAL FUNDING OF SHIPS

Question. Both the executive and legislative branches have
traditionally followed a policy of full funding for major capital
purchases such as ships. Recently, the Department of the Navy has begun
relying on alternative funding methods for the purchase of ships, such
as incremental funding or the purchase of an initial class of ships
through RDT&E funds instead of normal procurement accounts.
What is your opinion of these types of funding strategies and of
the pros and cons of incrementally funding ship construction?
Answer. I am aware that alternative funding approaches for ship
acquisition have been undertaken but I am not sufficiently
knowledgeable about these funding models to respond. Generally, I
believe that the present challenges of naval ship construction make it
imperative that the Navy work with Congress on appropriate financing
policies.

FUNDING FOR HEALTH CARE FACILITIES

Question. The conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center focused
considerable attention on the care, management, and transition of
wounded service members, as well as the condition of medical care
facilities.
What is your understanding of the Secretary of the Navy's
responsibility for the construction, maintenance, and modernization of
Navy medical facilities, including battalion aid stations which support
the U.S. Marine Corps?
Answer. This is an area I would have to study in detail, if
confirmed.
Question. Do you believe the current system of oversight and
funding for DOD medical facilities clearly defines responsibility and
authority between the military departments and the OSD?
Answer. This is an area I would have to study in detail, if
confirmed.
Question. What changes do you believe are necessary, if any, to
improve quality and accountability for Navy and Marine Corps medical
facilities?
Answer. This is an area I would have to study in detail, if
confirmed.

DEFENSE INTEGRATED MILITARY HUMAN RESOURCES SYSTEM

Question. To address pay and personnel record keeping, and other
personnel management requirements, DOD is developing the Defense
Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS), an integrated,
joint military personnel and pay system envisioned for use by all the
Services.
What is your understanding of the status of the development and
implementation of DIMHRS in the Department?
Answer. I am aware that the Department is pursuing a DOD-wide
solution for personnel management and pay through DIMHRS but I am not
sufficiently knowledgeable on the details of this program to comment.
If confirmed, I will make a point of understanding the financial
impacts of this initiative.
Question. What is your understanding of the Navy and Marine Corps
views of the pros and cons of implementing DIMHRS?
Answer. I understand that DON is committed to a transition to
DIMHRS following the Army and Air Force, but I am not sufficiently
knowledgeable on the details of this program to comment. If confirmed,
I will make a point of understanding the financial impacts of this
initiative.
Question. Do you support the full implementation of DIMHRS into the
DON? If not, why not?
Answer. I am not sufficiently knowledgeable on the details of this
program to comment. If confirmed, I will make a point of understanding
the financial impacts of this initiative.

FAMILIES FIRST

Question. For over 10 years, U.S. Transportation Command and its
subordinate command, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, have
worked to improve the process of moving servicemembers' household
goods. Implementation of the new system--``Families First''--will use a
``best value'' approach to contracting with movers that will focus on
quality of performance, web-based scheduling and tracking of shipments,
encouragement of door-to-door moves, and full replacement value for
damaged household goods. It has been estimated that implementation of
Families First would increase the annual costs for permanent change of
station moves by up to 13 percent.
What is your understanding of the implementation of Families First
and a full replacement value for damaged personal property in the Navy
and Marine Corps?
Answer. This is an area I would have to study in detail, if
confirmed. If confirmed, I will make a point of understanding the
financial impacts of this initiative.
Question. What is your understanding of the projected costs of
Families First to the Navy and Marine Corps over the next 5 years?
Answer. This is an area I would have to study in detail, if
confirmed. If confirmed, I will make a point of understanding the
financial impacts of this initiative.
Question. Do you support full implementation of the Families First
program, including the development of the Defense Personal Property
System, in the DON?
Answer. I strongly believe we should support our sailors and
marines and their families. Any proposal to make their household goods
shipments simpler, more timely, with greater assurances and lower
expense to the service member is worth serious consideration. I am not
familiar with the details of the Families First program, but, if
confirmed, I will certainly devote sufficient time to understanding it
and its impact on the overall DON budget.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[The nomination reference of Douglas A. Brook follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
June 5, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Douglas A. Brook, of California, to be an Assistant Secretary of
the Navy, vice Richard Greco, Jr., resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Douglas A. Brook, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Douglas A. Brook, Ph.D.

Dr. Douglas A. Brook is Professor of Public Policy and Director of
the Center for Defense Management Reform at the Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS) Monterey, CA. From 2002 until 2005, Dr. Brook was Dean of
the NPS Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. The School
offers defense-focused MBA program and other graduated education
programs for U.S. and international military officers.
Before joining NPS, Dr. Brook was Vice President, Government
Affairs for the LTV Corporation.
Prior to joining LTV, Brook served in two presidentially-appointed
positions. In 1992 he was Acting Director of the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, the central personnel management agency of the
Federal Government. From 1990 to 1992 Brook was Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Financial Management, the Army's senior financial
official.
Dr. Brook began his career as Director of Public Finance of the
National Association of Manufacturers in New York. Subsequently, he
joined the Libbey-Owens-Ford Company and served as Vice President and
head of the company's Washington, DC, office. In 1982 he founded Brook
Associates, Inc., a public affairs consulting business serving
corporate and trade association clients, which he managed until
assuming duties at the Pentagon. He also served two elected terms on
the Town Council of Vienna, VA.
Dr. Brook grew up in East Detroit, MI. He attended the University
of Michigan, graduating with a Bachelor of Arts degree in political
science in 1965 and a Master of Public Administration degree in 1967.
In 2001 he earned his Ph.D. in Public Policy at George Mason
University. He also completed the 1977 Executive Program at the
University of Virginia's Colgate Darden Graduate School of Business
Administration.
Brook served on active duty as a Navy Supply Corps officer and was
a member of the Naval Reserve for 30 years. He retired with the rank of
Captain.
Dr. Brook and his wife, Mariana, reside in Pacific Grove, CA.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Douglas A.
Brook in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Douglas A. Brook.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and
Comptroller).

3. Date of nomination:
June 5, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
January 15, 1944; Chicago, IL.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Mariana (Proctor) Brook.

7. Names and ages of children:
None.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
George Mason University, 1998-2001, Ph.D. May 2001.
University of Michigan 1966-1967, MPA, April 1967.
University of Michigan, 1961-1965, BA, December 1965.
East Detroit High School, 1958-1961, Graduate, June 1961.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
2005-Present--Professor of Public Policy and Director of Center for
Defense Management Reform, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
2002-2005--Dean, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
1993-2002--Vice President, Government Affairs, LTV Corporation,
Washington, DC.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Member and Chair--ISAC-7, 1994-2002.
Councilman--Town of Vienna, VA, 1979-1983.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Memberships (no offices held):

American Society of Military Comptrollers
Association for Public Policy and Management
American Society for Public Administration
Military Officers Association of America
Naval Reserve Association
Saltaire Property Owners Association
Duck (NC) United Methodist Church
Church in the Forest (Pebble Beach)
Congressional Country Club
Army and Navy Club
AARP
Naval Postgraduate School Foundation
Monterey Museum of Art
University of Michigan Alumni Association
Monterey Symphony Chorus

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
Candidate for Councilman, Town of Vienna, VA, 1978, 1979, 1981,
1983 (non-partisan).
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Joseph L. Fisher Doctoral Award, George Mason University School of
Public Policy, 2001.
Fellow, National Academy of Public Administration
Army Distinguished Civilian Service Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Armed Forces Reserve Medal
Meritorious Service Medal

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Douglas A. Brook and Cynthia L. King, ``Legislating Innovation in
Human Capital Management: Lessons From The Department of Homeland
Security,'' in Hannah Sistare and Terry Buss, eds., Innovations in
Human Capital Management (New York: M.E. Sharpa, 2007): forthcoming.
Douglas A. Brook and Philip J. Candreva, ``Business Management
Reform in the Department of Defense in Anticipation of Declining
Budgets,'' Public Budgeting & Finance, vol. 27. no. Fall 2007,
forthcoming.
Douglas A. Brook and Cynthia L. King, ``Civil Service Reform as
National Security,'' Public Administration Review, May-June 2007: 397-
405.
Douglas A. Brook, ``Dumping and Subsidy Cases at the ITC: Voting
Discretion and Commissioner Attributes,'' The International Trade
Journal, vol. XIX, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 309-335.
Douglas A. Brook, ``Meta-Strategic Lobbying: The 1998 Steel Imports
Case'' Business and Politics, vol. 7, no. 1 (2005), Article 4: 1-25.
Douglas A. Brook, ``Trade Policy Strategies and Enforcement
Choices: An Examination of the 1992 Steel Antidumping Cases,'' The
International Trade Journal, vol. XVII, no. 1 (Spring, 2003): 81-100.
Douglas A. Brook, ``Administrative Reform in the Federal
Government: Understanding the Search for Private Sector Management
Models--An Annotated Bibliography,'' Public Administration and
Management: An Interactive Journal, vol. 7, no. 2 (2002); 117-155.
Douglas A. Brook, Audited Financial Statements: Getting and
Sustaining ``Clean'' Opinions, monograph, (Washington: The
Pricewaterhouse Coopers Endowment for the Business of Government, July,
2001).
James P. Pfiffner and Douglas A. Brook, eds., The Future of Merit:
Twenty Years After the Civil Service Reform Act, (Washington: Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 2000)
Douglas A. Brook, ``Merit and The Civil Service Reform Act,'' in
James P. Pfiffner and Douglas A. Brook, eds., The Future of Merit:
Twenty Years After the Civil Service Reform Act, (Washington: Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 2000), 1-11.
Technical Reports and Working Papers
Douglas A. Brook and Philip J. Candreva, Business Reform in the
Department of Defense with a Declining Budget Top Line, Center for
Defense Management Reform Working Paper Series, NPS-CDMR-GM-06-008, 26
October 2006.
Douglas A. Brook, Bryan Hudgens, Benchmarking Best Practices in
Transformation for Sea Enterprise, Naval Postgraduate School Technical
Report Series NPS-CDMR-GM-06-006, September 15, 2006.
Douglas A. Brook, Cynthia L. King, David W. Anderson, and Joshua P.
Bahr, Legislating Civil Service Reform: The Homeland Security Act of
2002, Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report Series NPS-CDMR-HR-06-
006, June 2006.
Invited Presentations
Philip J. Candreva and Douglas A. Brook, ``Budget Uncertainty and
Business Management Reform in the Department of Defense: Some
Considerations for Acquisition Management,'' presented at 4th Annual
Acquisition Research Symposium, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
CA, May 16-17, 2007.
Douglas A. Brook and Cynthia L. King ``Legislating Civil Service
Reform: The Homeland Security Act of 2002.'' Keynote speakers for the
Standing Panel on Public Service, National Academy of Public
Administration, Washington DC. 15 November 2006.
Douglas A. Brook, discussant for paper by John E. Ullman, ``Defense
Cuts, Base Closings, and Conversion: Slow Reaction and Missed
Opportunities,'' presented at the conference George Bush: Leading in a
New World, Hofstra University, Hempsread, NY, April 17-19, 1997.
Discussant comments published in conference proceedings: From Cold War
to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H.W. Bush (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), pages 420-422.
Douglas A. Brook, ``Steel: Trade Policy in a Changed Environment.''
Presented at the conference Representation of Constituent Interests in
the Design and Implementation of U.S. Trade Policies: The Sweetland
Conference, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor November 8-9, 1997.
Paper published in Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern, eds.,
Constituent Interests and U.S. Trade Policies, (Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 1558), 133-144.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Douglas A. Brook was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on November 15, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on November 16, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Robert L. Smolen by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs?
Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is primarily
responsible for maintaining a safe, secure and reliable nuclear weapons
stockpile. This is accomplished by ensuring the safe and efficient
operations of the nuclear weapons complex, and preparing Defense
Programs for the future, to include both a transformed nuclear weapons
complex and nuclear weapons stockpile, to better meet the challenges of
the 21st century.
Question. Is it your understanding that the duties of the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs will change or remain the same as
those of your predecessor?
Answer. If I am confirmed, my duties as Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs will remain generally the same as those of my
predecessor. Relatively recent actions to place the Site Office
Managers under the Deputy Administrator and to create one organization
responsible for Readiness in Technical Base and Operations are settled.
Question. If you are aware of any proposed changes to the duties
and functions of the Deputy Administrator, what are those changes?
Answer. I am unaware of any proposed changes to the duties and
functions of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. I recently retired from the United States Air Force with
over 33 years of service and in 7 of the 10 years I was directly
involved in operational and policy issues relating directly to the
duties of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs. I began my
military career with operational experience in ground and airborne
nuclear missile command and control. I have served on the staff of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have also worked
in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force in Legislative Liaison;
first in the House of Representatives and later as the Chief of the
Senate office on Capitol Hill. Most recently, I served as Deputy
Director and then Director of the Air Force Office of Nuclear and
Counterproliferation in the Pentagon. At the conclusion of those
assignments, I served as the Director of the Strategic Capabilities
Policy in the Executive Office of the President, and was responsible
for the development, coordination, and implementation of national
security policies to support the President and the National Security
Council. In that capacity, I was the senior ranking military officer in
the White House complex. During the course of my career, I have
commanded units at the squadron, group, wing, and major command levels
while on assignment at Air Force Space Command, Pacific Air Forces
Command, Air Force Materiel Command, and Headquarters in the Air Force
District of Washington.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs?
Answer. I trust that my background and experience show me to be
appropriately qualified to be the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, and I hope the Senate will agree. To enhance my expertise and
knowledge, if confirmed, I plan to immediately engage with those people
who can help me better understand the complexities of the issues and
prioritize the challenges before Defense Programs. This will include
meeting with staff and managers in key parts of the program, both at
Headquarters and in the field, along with National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) and Department of Energy (DOE) management, key
partners such as the Department of Defense (DOD), Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board, and Congress. I realize that if I am
confirmed, I will be leading an organization with a proven track record
of success--my immediate challenge will be to learn how I can continue
to lead this exceptional group and to help build upon processes that
can make the organization even more productive.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional or new duties
and functions, if any, do you expect that the Administrator of the NNSA
would prescribe for you other than those described above?
Answer. I am unaware of any additional duties and functions that
the NNSA Administrator would prescribe for me, other than to continue
his efficient and effective management of defense programs operations.
If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to clarify his
expectations and strive to be a valued part of the team.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the following
officials in carrying out your duties:
The Secretary of Energy.
Answer. I have great respect for the Secretary and look forward to
working with him through the NNSA Administrator on Defense Programs
issues. The NNSA is very fortunate to have a Cabinet Secretary
representing us in the administration who can work with the Secretaries
of Defense, State, and Homeland Security on cross-cutting interagency
issues and policies concerning the Nation's security.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Energy.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary serves as the Department's Chief
Operating Officer and I expect to have regular interaction on issues
that affect both NNSA and other organizations within the Department.
From major construction projects to cyber security to pension policies,
there are many issues in which the Deputy Secretary plays a key role.
Question. The Other Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.
Answer. The Deputy Administrators for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors would be my peers if confirmed. I
have known both of these individuals for several years during my
military career. In fact, I regularly worked with the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation while we were at the
National Security Council. Both of these individuals bring a great
wealth of knowledge and policy expertise in their assigned areas. I
have been meeting with the Deputies and Associate Administrators to
better familiarize myself with the individuals and their specific
program responsibilities. I look forward to leading those in Defense
Programs if confirmed.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental
Management (EM).
Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs needs to have
a special working relationship with the Assistant Secretary for EM in
ensuring that NNSA supports and facilitates the cleanup of legacy waste
and contamination at NNSA sites. As we move towards a smaller
stockpile, decrease the number of sites with special nuclear materials,
and consolidate these materials across the complex we will need to work
hand-in-hand as one Department to meet our goals.
Question. The other relevant Assistant Secretaries of DOE.
Answer. I look forward to working with the other Assistant
Secretaries within the DOE, if confirmed. The DOE is a unique place
with many talented leaders in both NNSA and other DOE organizations.
Thus, in order to be most effective, there will need to be close
collaboration. As we move towards further diversification at our
national laboratories, I see myself working with the Office of Science
in particular for the greater good of NNSA, the Office of Science, and
the Nation.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).
Answer. I have personally known the prior two individuals confirmed
to this position and worked closely with them. As Acting USD(AT&L), Dr.
John Young, is the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)--focal
point for the relationship between the DOE and the DOD. My role would
be to support the NWC collectively by dealing directly with the
USD(AT&L), the NNSA Administrator (as DOE's voting member to the NWC),
and the distinguished members from U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM),
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), and the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all NNSA-specific matters
relevant to the NWC. Specifically, I would work with the USD(AT&L) by
attending NWC meetings and being heavily involved in all NWC matters.
As a former Director for Air Force nuclear programs, I am quite
familiar with this process.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Ambassador Eric
S. Edelman, is a member of the NWC--focal point for the relationship
between the DOE and DOD. While the NNSA Administrator serves as the NWC
voting member for DOE and would most likely deal directly with the
Under Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Administrator manages all NNSA
issues relating to Defense Programs. Specifically, I would deal
directly with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on nuclear
weapons policy matters, in coordination with the NNSA Administrator.
Question. The Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force.
Answer. Relationships with the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air
Force are important when dealing with issues related to nuclear
security and Defense Programs. Defense Programs generally deals with
the uniformed Services more than the Service Secretaries through the
NWC system. As a retired Air Force senior officer, I am well aware of
the importance of civilian control of the military and can use my
experience to help NNSA better understand relationships between the
Services and their respective Departments. I have had regular personal
contact with the Secretary of the Air Force who I have known for
several years. If confirmed as the Deputy Administrator, I would seek
to further cooperative relations with the Secretaries of the Navy and
the Air Force.
Question. The Commanders of STRATCOM and U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM).
Answer. The Commander of STRATCOM is a member of the NWC. The
current nominee, General Chilton, is a personal friend. The NNSA
Administrator and I would deal directly with the Commander of STRATCOM.
The Deputy Administrator is fundamentally important to the STRATCOM
relationship for all nuclear weapon program activities. One of the
Commander's most important duties related to NNSA is providing the
Annual Assessment Report to the President--a candid report on the
safety, reliability and expected performance of the nuclear weapons
stockpile, based on information from Defense Program advisors and the
national laboratories. As the Commander is responsible for deploying
the nuclear weapons stockpile, Defense Programs and STRATCOM must have
a close relationship at many levels. I expect that, if confirmed as the
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, I would spend a significant
amount of time working with the Commander and his staff, particularly
during this period of stockpile transformation. The Commander of
NORTHCOM is also a personal friend and colleague. All issues related to
carrying out his responsibilities with regard to homeland defense would
receive my focused and complete attention.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities.
Answer. Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict are included
in NNSA's overall support to and coordination with the DOD in a number
of areas. As part of our support, we have provided a full-time resident
liaison to Special Operations Command to facilitate its access to the
unique capabilities of DOE's national laboratories and to enhance the
already close working relationship with DOE and NNSA. If confirmed by
the Senate, I will ensure DOE's unique nuclear capabilities; skills and
assets are properly available to the DOD and other Federal entities.
Question. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.
Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs deals with
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs on a regular basis. The Assistant to the
Secretary is the Chairman of the NWC Standing and Safety Committee, the
flag officer or Senior Executive Service ``working level'' group in the
NWC system. In this capacity, even though the formal communications
path to the Assistant to the Secretary position is through the
Principal Deputy Administrator for Operations in Defense Programs, I
would expect to spend a significant amount of time working with the
Assistant to the Secretary, particularly during this period of
stockpile transformation.
Question. The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA).
Answer. The DTRA works with the NNSA's Offices of Defense Programs,
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Emergency Operations on a number
of issues, ranging from individual weapon system Project Officer Groups
to hosting DTRA-sponsored work at NNSA sites and collaborating on
nonproliferation issues. If confirmed, I would work directly with the
Director of DTRA to further our common goals.
Question. Officials in the Intelligence Community.
Answer. The DOE is a member of the Intelligence Community. Within
DOE, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
has primary responsibility for Departmental interactions with the
Director of National Intelligence and other Intelligence Community
components. Each of the NNSA national laboratories maintains a Field
Intelligence Element, responsible for conducting analysis and technical
work to fulfill DOE's intelligence responsibilities. If confirmed, I
will give my strong support to this cooperation and ensure that the
Intelligence Community continues to have excellent access to the
national security laboratories and other assets of the Office of
Defense Programs.
Question. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
with responsibilities for nuclear related homeland security matters.
Answer. NNSA has a close working relationship with the DHS at many
levels, most notably led by NNSA's Deputy Under Secretary for
Counterterrorism. If confirmed, I will draw upon these working
relationships, continue them, and try to improve upon them through
closer coordination on matters affecting national security. If I am
confirmed, Defense Programs will continue the cooperative relationships
prevalent since the creation of DHS. We will continue to work closely
in updating the National Response Plan (NRP) to define and refine the
Federal Government's responsibilities in the event of radiological or
nuclear emergencies and incidents. We will continue cooperative efforts
on the Homeland Security Exercise Program, where we test our abilities
to respond to many types of incidents in addition to radiological and
nuclear emergencies. We will continue to work closely with DHS's
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) as partners to assess the
Nation's radiological or nuclear vulnerabilities and risks, to mitigate
radiological or nuclear threats, and to develop a robust technical
nuclear forensics capability in cooperation with DNDO's National
Technical Nuclear Forensics Center. Finally, NNSA stands ready to
execute our responsibilities under the NRP to deploy our Nuclear
Incident Response Team and fulfill our responsibilities under the
Homeland Security Act for domestic radiological or nuclear events. For
example, should an improvised nuclear device be discovered in the
United States, Defense Programs is the lead technical office that would
support the overall Federal incident manager and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in its role as lead law enforcement agency. Defense
Programs has worked hard to forge these cooperative relationships and I
can assure you that I would continue this collaborative approach.
Question. Officials in the Department of State with responsibility
for nuclear nonproliferation matters.
Answer. NNSA works closely with the Department of State in the area
of nuclear nonproliferation. If confirmed as Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs I would continue to do so, most notably through
Defense Programs' Nuclear Counterterrorism Design Support Program and
NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. We will always be
mindful of the potential or perceived impacts to arms control and
nonproliferation of initiatives such as the Reliable Replacement
Warhead (RRW) and Complex Transformation. The Department of State can
be a valuable resource to assist with other countries' concerns.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs?
Answer. In my view, the major challenges confronting the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs are complex and stockpile
transformation. NNSA needs to continually articulate and refine its
plans to transform the stockpile and complex through the RRW Program
and Complex Transformation. Defense Programs, unlike many Federal
organizations, is requirements driven. While Defense Programs has made
significant improvements in meeting near-term commitments, relief on
legacy stockpile requirements has not been provided. At the same time,
modernization of many nuclear facilities is necessary due to aging and
growing safety and security concerns.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to meet the challenges of combining
near-term success with long-term transformation by setting clear
expectations and constant, clear communications. I was a tough
``customer'' while serving as the Air Force Director of Nuclear and
Counterproliferation, but NNSA consistently met my expectations. I
attribute that mostly to the good lines of communication established
between the Air Force and NNSA, from the depot level, through the
Project Officers Groups to the Commanders. I believe my Air Force
experience can help greatly in keeping those lines of communication
open. If confirmed, I would also continue to strengthen the notion of
an integrated nuclear weapons complex where everyone has measurable
metrics, is rewarded for success, and accountability is clear.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
would you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would immediately work to identify and
knock down barriers to success in the program. I do not yet have a
specific timeline in mind with regard to management actions. I will
develop one as soon as I am confident I understand the specific
challenges we face collectively and in the individual programs. If
desired, I believe that approximately 90 days after confirmation, I
could be prepared to share with Congress any specific management
actions anticipated for the near-term.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
to address the issues that would confront the Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs?
Answer. My highest priorities would be the same as my predecessors
have had--to maintain the safety, security and reliability of the
nuclear weapons stockpile while positioning the complex for future
transformation. NNSA must continue to meet its near-term deliverables
to the DOD while looking to the future. I believe NNSA can adequately
do both--and must in order to fulfill its responsibilities to the
Nation.

OVERALL MANAGEMENT

Question. Do you believe that there are any organizational
structure issues in the NNSA that should be addressed to improve
management and operations of the Office of the Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs, or that you would address if confirmed? If so, how
would you address these issues, if confirmed?
Answer. Constant improvement requires innovative thinking and fresh
ideas. I do not believe in changing just for the sake of change, but if
confirmed, I will assess the organizational structure and make
recommendations to the Administrator and Principal Deputy
Administrator. I will seek their thoughts on potentially improved ways
of doing business--if changes will be beneficial, cost effective, and
streamline the management.
Question. Do you believe that the expertise of DOE personnel
serving outside the NNSA can be helpful to you if confirmed?
Answer. I strongly believe this to be true and very beneficial. If
confirmed, I will work with the entire DOE and make full use of the
resources available within and outside of NNSA. Not only is it required
that we cooperate in many areas with other parts of the Department, but
I know there are many personnel that can provide assistance and advise
helpful to Defense Programs.
Question. If so, what expertise do you believe would be helpful and
how would you utilize this expertise if you are confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make it a high priority to understand
the full scope of the DOE's available resources. I understand that
Defense Programs works closely with many offices, such as the Office of
Engineering and Construction Management; the Office of Health, Safety
and Security; the Chief Financial Officer; the Office of Environmental
Management; and DOE's Chief Information Officer. These offices, and
others within the Department, have expertise that can contribute to the
success of the missions of the Office of Defense Programs and NNSA.
Question. Are you aware of any limitations on the authority of the
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to draw on that expertise?
Answer. There are no limits that I am aware of to drawing on the
expertise of other offices in the DOE. I view these other offices, such
as the Office of Engineering and Construction Management and the Office
of Health, Safety and Security, as invaluable assets to the NNSA and
Defense Programs. For example, both of these Offices provide valuable
external reviews and recommendations regarding our activities and
facilities.
Question. What is your view of the extent to which the NNSA is
bound by the existing rules, regulations, and directives of the DOE and
what flexibility, if any, do you believe you would have in implementing
such rules, regulations, and directives that would pertain to the
Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs?
Answer. My understanding is that NNSA must comply with rules,
regulations, and directives issued by the Secretary of Energy and the
Deputy Secretary. The NNSA Administrator is responsible for ensuring
that NNSA and its contractors comply with these requirements, and that
responsibility flows down to the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs. Some rules and regulations provide specific exemption
procedures that NNSA can invoke if the NNSA Administrator concludes an
exemption is warranted. In addition, the DOE Departmental Directives
Program Manual provides a general exemption procedure that allows NNSA
to deviate from DOE directives. This manual also permits Departmental
elements, including NNSA, to issue ``supplemental directives'' that may
be used to implement requirements in directives, assign
responsibilities and establish procedures within a particular
Departmental element. Finally, under the NNSA Act, the NNSA
Administrator has authority to issue NNSA-specific policies, ``unless
disapproved by the Secretary.''
Question. NNSA, in large measure, was created in response to
security lapses at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). However,
security lapses, particularly at Los Alamos, have continued to occur.
Section 3212(b)(10) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000 provides that ``the Administrator has authority over,
and is responsible for all programs and activities of the
Administration, including administration of contracts, including the
management and operations of the nuclear weapons production facilities
and the national security laboratories.''
If confirmed, how would you plan to assist the Administrator of the
NNSA to make sure that security lapses do not occur at the NNSA
facilities?
Answer. Security of nuclear weapons, nuclear material and design
information is an extremely important challenge of paramount importance
to national security. I have extensive experience in this area, from
the early days of my career as a Minuteman missile system crew member,
instructor and evaluator, to my command assignments, and most recently
as the Commander of the Air Force District of Washington. My knowledge
and emphasis on nuclear security will help the Administrator, the Chief
of Defense Nuclear Security, the Associate Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Security, and the Site Office Managers focus appropriately on
the importance of security at our sites and while nuclear material is
on the road in the control of the Office of Secure Transportation. Any
breech in security could bring grave consequences to our Nation, and if
confirmed, I will do everything in my power to ensure that the complex
remains safe and secure, and we will take immediate actions to remedy
any marginal system. Practically speaking, some initiatives such as
leveraging technology to the fullest extent possible and consolidating
nuclear materials to fewer locations will take time and funding. I will
be a strong advocate for creating the most secure nuclear weapons
complex possible. We need to change the culture at our national
laboratories, and I understand that NNSA and the Secretary have made
great progress in this by holding the current and former contractors at
LANL accountable for this lapse and by improving Federal oversight of
cyber security and the protection of classified information, integrity,
responsibility, and accountability are key aspects of a successful
security program and I will do everything possible to continue the
efforts currently underway.
Question. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is
responsible for activities occurring at NNSA laboratories and
production sites across the country.
What are your views on the appropriate roles and responsibilities
of field managers relative to those of Defense Programs Headquarters
managers?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to gaining a thorough
understanding about the perspectives of both field and Headquarters
managers. There is a close cooperation between field and headquarters
managers in defense programs, but generally headquarters sets
expectations through a number of program and contract mechanisms. Field
managers provide daily oversight of the contractors, since they are
closest to the work being performed. I realize there are formal
delegations of responsibilities between the field and Headquarters,
especially since the Assistant Deputy Administrators and Site Office
Managers all report to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs.
There needs to be a high degree of integration of efforts and constant
communication. As a senior military commander, I am familiar with the
normal friction that often exists between field and headquarters. Trust
and communications are vital to success and essential to productivity
and smooth operations.
Question. What is your view of Defense Programs' organizational
structure?
Answer. My understanding of the Defense Programs organizational
structure is that it works reasonably well, especially considering the
scope of the mission. I do not see any major disconnects, duplication
of effort or insurmountable barriers to communication. If confirmed, I
would soon take a hard look at the structure and look for potential
improvements. I think it very important that I understand why and how
the current structure operates and what potential improvements might be
cost effective before recommending any change.
Question. In your view, is there a well-delineated and consistent
chain of command and reporting structure from the field staff to
headquarters staff and from the contractors to Federal officials?
Answer. From what I have learned to date, I believe there is an
established chain of command and reporting structure in place at NNSA,
but to remain strong and effective with new personnel, it needs to be
constantly utilized and reinforced. Based on my Air Force experience, I
am comfortable with the chain of command and I know the consequences of
deviating from the prescribed path. Everyone must know and learn their
roles. If confirmed, I will emphasize the necessity of using the chain
of command for passing information and formal guidance in both
directions.

WEAPONS PROGRAMS PERSONNEL

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to
retain critical nuclear weapons expertise in both the NNSA and the
contractor workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, working to retain and develop critical
nuclear weapons expertise in both the NNSA and the contractor workforce
will be a high priority of mine. When I was in charge of the Air Force
nuclear program I had very similar concerns and our office reinstituted
a fellowship program with five DOE laboratories to provide 10 young
officers each year with specialized nuclear experience while working at
the labs. Simply put, the most advanced experimental and computational
facilities are not worth much without the right people to use them. As
the Nation's ``brain trust,'' NNSA must continue to strive to make
itself and its contractors ``Employers of Choice.'' I am impressed with
NNSA's Future Leaders Program, and want to do everything in my power to
support it. My personal experience in identifying development
opportunities for officers within the Air Force nuclear program showed
me the value in identifying critical personnel and taking positive
steps to retain them. I also like efforts such as mentoring young
weapon designers, many of whom have never participated in a nuclear
test, with real work such as the RRW program. I also appreciate the
fact that NNSA realizes it faces a real challenge with a large
retirement-eligible portion of the Federal and contractor workforce and
is taking steps to address it.
Question. Do you support retaining the capability to re-manufacture
every component expected to be found in the stockpile in the near-term?
Answer. First and foremost, I support maintaining the safety,
security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This often
requires the remanufacture of components, but sometimes that is not the
most prudent approach. Stockpile and Complex Transformation are trying
to eliminate the need to retain the capability to remanufacture every
component expected to be found in the present stockpile. In fact, many
components cannot be reproduced because the materials are no longer
available due to prohibitions on their use by regulation or to loss of
the technologies that precede them. Several existing components are
problematic to make or involve hazardous materials that NNSA wants to
eliminate. If RRW proves to be a viable alternative, this would also
help in eliminating the need to remanufacture each and every component.
Question. What do you see as the most pressing remanufacturing
needs?
Answer. In discussions with Defense Programs staff, the most
pressing remanufacturing needs appear to involve secondaries made at
the Y-12 National Security Complex and plutonium pits. These are
extremely intricate nuclear components that cannot be made today in
quantities high enough to satisfy the projected need, especially if a
problem develops in the stockpile. If confirmed, I look forward to
learning more about these and related issues and contributing to a
solution.

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

Question. The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) has successfully
supported the annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last
15 years.
Other than the National Ignition Facility, in your view, what other
capabilities, if any, would be needed to ensure that the stockpile is
safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear weapons testing?
Answer. In my view, the SSP has been successful and is on an
appropriate path for continued success. Due to the highly integrated
nature of the SSP and constrained budgets, Defense Programs has not
planned for much redundancy in capabilities in the future. The National
Ignition Facility and other high profile facilities and capabilities
each play a complementary role in the SSP and the transformed nuclear
weapons complex; confidence in the safety, security and reliability of
the stockpile could be adversely affected if parts of the program are
not seen to completion. This confidence is subjective and not ``pass/
fail.'' I trust the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the people who
make up the SSP will meet the challenge to continue to support the
stockpile, and if confirmed, I will work to provide the most
appropriate tools for them to do so.
Question. In your view is the SSP fully coordinated with the DOD,
and if not what would you plan to do if confirmed to improve the
coordination?
Answer. In my view, the SSP appears to be well coordinated with the
DOD. There is constant communication between the DOE and DOD at many
levels, ranging from routine tasks such as warhead maintenance and
surveillance to more policy-oriented issues such as stockpile and
complex transformation. I know, from my experience as the Air Force
Director of Nuclear and Counterproliferation, that open communication
is key to mutual DOE/DOD success, and if confirmed, I will make every
effort to foster good communications between the Departments.
Question. The NNSA is in the early stages of an effort to develop a
new nuclear warhead to be a replacement for an existing warhead,
without nuclear weapons testing. This effort is the RRW program.
Do you believe that the SSP is capable of meeting this new
challenge in the coming years?
Answer. I believe that the SSP is capable of meeting the challenge
of transforming the nuclear weapons stockpile through a RRW strategy in
the coming years. The RRW strategy appears to hold great promise for
many reasons. The top three in my view are: (1) an opportunity to
reduce the numbers of currently stockpiled weapons with RRWs that are
less sensitive to aging effects or manufacturing variability; (2)
incorporating advanced safety and security features to maintain
positive assurances against theft, loss, and/or misuse of these
replacement warheads; and (3) improved confidence in the reliability of
the nuclear weapons stockpile, through increased performance margins
and reduced uncertainties, allowing these weapons to be certified
without conducting an underground test, through the use of the advanced
Stockpile Stewardship tools. There are a multitude of other good
aspects to RRW that show it to be an idea with great merit.
Question. If you are confirmed, and if during your tenure NNSA
concludes it is not possible to develop or deploy an RRW without full
scale nuclear weapons testing, would you recommend cancellation of the
RRW program?
Answer. I understand that a fundamental tenant of the RRW strategy
is to certify and field the warheads without the need to conduct
nuclear testing. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about
RRW and the relationship of performance margins versus uncertainties.
Determining RRWs viability from the standpoint of the required science
is a valuable endeavor. The decision to proceed to production, with or
without testing, would be a matter for debate at the highest levels and
involve a value judgment relative to a policy decision. If an RRW
design leads to a recommendation to conduct a full scale nuclear test,
there is certainly the option to do a modification to the design rather
than a cancellation of the RRW program. The prudent course of action,
in my view, requires us to know the full range of alternatives and only
then choose a way ahead based on a critical analysis that considers our
national security needs. The premise of RRW is sound, if the U.S. is to
maintain a long-term safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent; it
may need adjustments rather than cancellation.

COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION

Question. If confirmed you will play a key role in the steps to
modernize and downsize the nuclear weapons complex. This is a needed
but difficult process.
If confirmed, would you review whether an external commission such
as a Base Realignment and Closure-type process would be helpful or is
needed to accomplish such downsizing and modernization?
Answer. If confirmed, Complex Transformation will be a key
initiative that I will pursue as Deputy Administrator. As part of that
process, I understand that external commissions such as a Base
Realignment and Closure-type process have been considered but not
thought to be appropriate for this situation. While I am not yet in an
informed enough position to challenge that position, I will discuss the
issue carefully with those who came to that conclusion. I also
understand that NNSA is following the well-established National
Environmental Policy Act process for informing its decisions on Complex
Transformation, and there will be opportunities for comment by the
public and other interested stakeholders.

THIRD-PARTY FINANCING

Question. If confirmed, would you agree to carefully review all
proposals for third-party financing and ensure that before
implementation the proposal will be cost effective and is consistent
with all DOE, Office of Management and Budget, and General Services
Administration rules and regulations as appropriate?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would carefully review all proposals
for third-party financing of Defense Programs facilities to ensure that
before implementation, the proposal is cost-effective and consistent
with all applicable rules and regulations.

FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. The Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization
Program was established to address long-deferred maintenance backlogs
in the nuclear weapons complex, particularly at the manufacturing
facilities.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that surplus
buildings are torn down or transferred so that they will not need long-
term maintenance?
Answer. If confirmed, Complex Transformation will be a key
initiative that I will pursue as Deputy Administrator. A central part
of Complex Transformation is ensuring that surplus buildings are torn
down so that they will not need long-term maintenance or transferred to
other programs that are committed to their proper maintenance. I expect
to work closely with the Offices of Infrastructure and Environment
within the NNSA and EM in DOE (and other organizations) to achieve
these objectives. I understand that both of these Offices have well-
established programs for dealing with excess facilities. If confirmed,
I will work with them to ensure that surplus buildings are torn down or
transferred so that they will not need long-term maintenance funded by
the Weapons Activities account. During the course of my military
career, I served as a base commander on at least three occasions. While
the governing directives are not exactly the same, I am familiar with
issues like this and I will make every effort to pay close attention to
these concerns.
Question. Would you support including the cost of tearing down
those buildings that are being replaced within the total project cost
of any new construction?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support steps to minimize financial
liabilities on the Weapons Activities account, including the cost of
tearing down those buildings that are being replaced within the total
project cost of any new construction. To portray the full scope of
projects, we must present the full scope and cost of new construction,
to include demolition of old buildings.
Question. What is your understanding of the schedule for tearing
down the old administration building at LANL?
Answer. I understand that the Nuclear Security and Science Building
project at LANL was completed on schedule and approximately $5 million
under budget in 2006. Once the remaining personnel have been relocated
from the old administration building in early fiscal year 2008, NNSA's
plan is to close the entire facility and prepare it for completion of
Decontamination and Demolition (D&D). NNSA's current strategy is to
empty the facility by the close of fiscal year 2008 and complete D&D by
fiscal year 2011.
Question. DOE and NNSA often build one of a kind or first of a kind
buildings.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that NNSA
construction projects are managed to be completed within budget and on
time?
Answer. If confirmed, one of my highest priorities will be to
demand accountability across the nuclear weapons complex, in both the
Federal and contractor workforce. We must keep commitments, to include
meeting key milestones for cost and schedule on construction projects.
I understand that improving project management is one of the six
``Focus Areas'' that is already being emphasized by NNSA. I will
quickly learn more about this and the other focus areas, and ask
fundamental questions such as: 1) do we have the right people in place
to do the job; 2) are we using all available resources, within NNSA,
within DOE, and even outside DOE; and 3) are the commitments we have
made still reasonable (have circumstances or requirements changed)? I
will work with the Federal Project Directors within NNSA and look for
help from all available sources. Recognizing the importance of project
management, in addition to my usual ``courtesy calls'' as the nominee,
I have met with staff from the Office of Facility and Infrastructure
Acquisition and Operations and the Office of Infrastructure and
Environment to discuss both general project management within NNSA and
to review progress on specific high-profile projects.
Question. What additional costing, project management and design
skills do you believe are needed in the Federal staff of the Office of
Defense Programs or in the NNSA?
Answer. I am not yet in a position to say what additional costing,
project management and design skills are needed in the Federal staff of
defense programs or NNSA, but I do understand this is an area of
emphasis within NNSA. Because this is such an important area to the
success of Complex Transformation and the very future of the nuclear
weapons complex, I will ensure that good project management within
defense programs remains a high priority and I will make every effort
for the Federal and contractor staff to obtain the skills that are
necessary for success. I also believe there needs to be a forum where
all parties can bring suggestions forward to both arrive at the right
conclusion, and to ensure the needed buy-in and cooperation that will
garner broad support.
Question. At what point in the Critical Decision time line do you
believe an independent cost estimate should be performed for a
construction project, and why?
Answer. Based on my understanding of the Critical Decision
timeline, I believe an Independent Cost Estimate should be performed
for complex and high cost projects prior to setting the project
baseline at Critical Decision 2 (Approve Performance Baseline). This is
early enough in the process to make an impact and correct issues, but
far enough along that there is appropriate fidelity in the estimated
project design, scope, and schedule.
Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that all design
issues impacting operational safety requirements are fully resolved
before Critical Decision 3?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that all design issues
impacting operational safety requirements are fully resolved well
before Critical Decision 3 (Approve Start of Construction). Due to the
importance of operational safety requirements, they should be resolved
as soon as possible in the design process, and certainly before
construction begins. This is also consistent with the Department's
draft standard, Integration of Safety into Nuclear Facility Design.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that
nuclear and other operational safety issues are fully addressed in the
design of new NNSA buildings?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to have defense programs follow the
Department's standard, Integration of Safety into Nuclear Facility
Design, once it is final. I understand that NNSA has been complying
with the draft of the new standard and will operate in full compliance
with the final version when implemented. This new standard requires
early identification of Safety Class systems and other safety related
requirements early in the project life cycle, just after approval of
Mission Need. These measures ensure that all safety requirements are
articulated, validated, and understood early in the project life cycle.

LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS

Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for managing the
life extension programs (LEPs) for existing nuclear warheads.
What is your general assessment of the effectiveness of the ongoing
and planned life extension programs?
Answer. I believe the LEPs are highly effective for extending the
near-term life of warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile, but I also
strongly support transitioning the stockpile based on a RRW strategy.
Based on my Air Force experience, I am intimately familiar with the
LEPs for the W87 (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile warhead) and the
B61-7/11 (strategic bombs). I understand there are production
challenges with restarting a unique component needed for the W76
(Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile warhead) LEP, but that is being
appropriately addressed. I understand that more and more aging defects
are being discovered in the legacy stockpile so refurbishment schedules
will need to be closely coordinated and updated with the military
service if an RRW strategy is not pursued. With smaller numbers in the
existing stockpile inventory, the ability to substitute is almost not
at option. Therefore the need for flexibility becomes increasingly
important.
Question. How well, in your view, does the nuclear weapons
complex--encompassing the laboratories and the production sites--
function as an integrated complex and, externally, with the DOD in
executing the LEPs?
Answer. My impression is that the nuclear weapons complex,
including all the sites, works relatively well together and with the
DOD. In learning more about defense programs, I have been struck at how
often I hear about the integrated complex succeeding together. I
understand that there is a strong emphasis on complex-wide milestones
and that even performance fees at each of the sites are inter-related.
That is an extremely strong motivator for integrated success, and one
that I would plan to continue, if confirmed. Thanks to the vision of
the current leadership in DOE and NNSA, I see an even stronger
partnership with the Air Force than when I was Director of Nuclear and
Counterproliferation.
Question. Do you believe the efficiency with which NNSA manages the
execution of the LEPs can be improved, and if so, how?
Answer. I am not yet aware of a specific way to improve the
management of the LEP, but because of their importance to Defense
Programs and the continued health of the nuclear weapons stockpile, I
expect to personally review the execution of the LEPs, if confirmed. My
fresh perspective, coming from the outside of NNSA and as a former DOD
``customer'' may allow me to identify areas for improvement.

NOTIFICATION OF CONGRESS

Question. If confirmed, would you commit to promptly notifying
Congress of any significant issues in the safety, security or
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would promptly notify Congress of any
issues affecting the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear weapons
complex. I understand that the officials in the Office of Defense
Programs often brief congressional members and their staffs about the
state of the stockpile and complex. I would continue that practice,
both when there are emerging issues and even if there are not.
Continuous communication is to everyone's advantage. Having served in
the Air Force congressional liaison offices of the Senate and the
House, I am a strong believer in open dialogue. I pledge to make myself
and/or a knowledgeable staff member available at any time to address
any issues of concern.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

NUCLEAR MISSILES TRANSPORTATION

1. Senator Akaka. General Smolen, last month, six nuclear-armed
advanced cruise missiles were flown from Minot Air Force Base in North
Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana where they sat on the
tarmac for 10 hours undetected. Much of the media attention on this
incident seems to have missed the key issue: how did six nuclear cruise
missiles get lost? Lost seems to be the appropriate characterization
here because the Air Force did not appear to know where the missiles
were.
General Smolen. This event was very disturbing. Since I retired,
effective August 1, 2007, and I am not yet confirmed, my knowledge of
the specific events surrounding this issue is limited to what I read in
the media and second hand information from friends. Since I have not
been a party to the facts, it is inappropriate for me to comment
further at this time. Please be assured, however, that if confirmed, I
will ensure our personnel in National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) review the circumstances as they become available and we will
apply any lessons we can learn.

2. Senator Akaka. General Smolen, it is my understanding that there
is a strict chain of custody for all nuclear weapons, and that the
handling of these weapons is covered in great detail in Air Force
procedures and regulations. This fact makes it even harder to believe
that a mistake of this magnitude could happen. Every person who orders
the movement of these weapons, or handles them, would have had to sign
off on the movement. One does not just quickly move a 1-ton cruise
missile, or six of them for that matter, and then ``forget about
them.''
Obviously, we need to know how six nuclear cruise missiles got out
of their bunkers and onto a combat aircraft without being noticed by
the wing commander, squadron commander, munitions maintenance squadron,
the bomber's crew chief and command pilot, and moved onto another Air
Force base without being noticed by the receiving air base's staff for
10 hours.
Secretary Gates has appropriately ordered an independent
investigation of the incident, in addition to the Air Force's own
inquiry.
Does it seem credible to you that this many people would
simultaneously make a mistake of this magnitude and lose track of six
nuclear missiles? If so, how do you think this could have happened?
General Smolen. Any comments I make without having the factual
information would be pure speculation. NNSA focuses completely on
nuclear weapons and thus there should be no diversion of attention on
any other aspect of our mission. Again, without more specifics on what
really contributed to the Minot incident, we can only review in general
terms our own procedures and emphasize continued strict adherence to
checklists and procedures.

3. Senator Akaka. General Smolen, in your opinion, how does this
incident relate to concern for reliability of control over nuclear
weapons and nuclear materials in other countries, such as Russia and
Pakistan?
General Smolen. Human error and the chance of human error must be
eliminated by every extent possible. The very fact that something of
this nature happened highlights our need to always be vigilant and work
cooperatively with every country that possesses nuclear weapons and
materials. We have been very successful in building bonds of trust and
confidence and reducing nuclear weapons and dangerous materials. Those
efforts are centered in NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)
programs and if confirmed, I'll personally offer any assistance that
will further my colleague Will Tobey's, Deputy Administrator for DNN,
leadership efforts for progress in these critical areas. NNSA's Defense
Programs and DNN organizations share many common interests and have a
synergy.

4. Senator Akaka. General Smolen, in your opinion, if this were an
accident, do you have concerns about the readiness of our military
personnel when they are making critical mistakes with our nuclear
arsenal? If so, how do we best address this?
General Smolen. I was honored to serve as a senior military leader
for a number of years and I can assure you America's sons and daughters
are the most dedicated, patriotic, and responsible young men and women
in our Nation. I am fully and equally confident that senior leadership
in the Department of Defense will take every step necessary to ensure
that whatever contributed to this error is corrected. NNSA will review
every aspect of how we do business to ensure no elements exist that
could lead to any similar event with weapons and materials under our
control. I'm certain the USAF will correct whatever went wrong. As
recently reported, they will also hold accountable everyone who may
have failed to follow required directives, or provide the required
oversight and leadership. Because the overall bomber emphasis is now
far more centered on conventional missions, some of the historically
intense focus attributed to the nuclear missions may have eroded. If
that is a factor, it most certainly will be addressed. In that regard,
organization, training, experience, and oversight must all be
considered. We can and will learn from this. I'm confident it will
serve to eliminate any complacency that may have existed while
simultaneously emphasizing the critical importance of the need for
constant vigilance and focus-traits demanded of all personnel handling
nuclear weapons.

5. Senator Akaka. General Smolen, I find it somewhat disturbing
that Barksdale is an operational bomber base that is also a staging
area for Middle Eastern operations. In your opinion, are there
legitimate, non-war related, operational, or logistical reasons for
shipping nuclear missiles to Barksdale at this time? If so, what are
some of the possible reasons?
General Smolen. Based on my previous military service, I can tell
you that virtually every military base in our Nation plays some role in
the deployment supporting the global war on terror. Our aircraft and
personnel deploy to a variety of overseas locations. With a limited
number of bases, combat platforms, people, and storage areas, it is
quite common to see multiple missions at a variety of locations.
Training, maintenance, and logistical support are a matter of routine
and conducted regularly and professionally. The important aspect is to
uncover the fact or series of circumstances that led to what happened
and put in place ironclad procedures to ensure it cannot happen
anywhere again.
______

[The nomination reference of Maj. Gen. Robert L. Smolen,
USAF, (Ret.) follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
July 31, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Robert L. Smolen, of Pennsylvania, to be Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, vice Thomas
P. D'Agostino.
______

[The biographical sketch of Maj. Gen. Robert L. Smolen,
USAF, (Ret.), which was transmitted to the committee at the
time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Robert L. Smolen

Major General (Ret.) Robert L. Smolen was nominated by the
President on July 31, 2007 to serve, pending confirmation by the United
States Senate, as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs at the
National Nuclear Security Administration. From 1974 to 2007, he served
his country with honor in the United States Air Force (USAF).
Prior to being nominated, Smolen served as Commander for the Air
Force District of Washington (AFDW) located at Bolling Air Force Base
in Washington, DC. The Air Force District of Washington provides the
single Air Force voice and component to the Joint Forces Headquarters-
National Capital Region, as well as organizes, trains and equips combat
forces for the aerospace expeditionary forces, homeland operations,
civil support, national special security events and ceremonial events.
In addition, AFDW serves as the Uniform Code of Military Justice
authority for more than 40,000 personnel and provides major command-
level support for more than 24,000 personnel assigned worldwide.
Smolen entered the Air Force in 1974 as a distinguished graduate of
the Air Force ROTC program at Allegheny College in Meadville, PA. He
has operational experience in both ground and airborne nuclear missile
command and control. He served on the staff of the Secretary of Defense
and was the Director of Manpower and Personnel on the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. He twice served in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
in the Office of Congressional Legislative Liaison on Capitol Hill,
first in the House of Representatives and later as the Chief of the
Senate office. He was both the Deputy and later the Director of the Air
Force Office of Nuclear and Counterproliferation, Headquarters U.S. Air
Force. Smolen held positions on the staff at Headquarters North
American Aerospace Defense Command and Headquarters Air Training
Command.
He has commanded units at the squadron, group, wing, and Major
Command levels at Air Force Space Command, Pacific Air Forces, Air
Force Materiel Command, and Headquarters USAF. He recently served as
the Director, Strategic Capabilities Policy, Executive Office of the
President, where he was responsible for the development, coordination,
and implementation of national security policies to support the
President and the National Security Council. In this capacity he also
served as the senior ranking military officer on the White House
complex.
Smolen holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in communications from
Allegheny College located in Meadville, PA. He also holds graduate
degrees in public administration from the University of Oklahoma, and
international relations from Auburn University. He attended the Air War
College located at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. In addition, he was
a fellow at both in the Seminar XXI Program, Foreign Policy and the
National Interest, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the
National and International Security Program at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University. He has also completed
several seminars at Johns Hopkins University in national security
decisionmaking.
Smolen presently resides in Springfield, VA, with his wife Adriane.
They have been married for over 33 years and have three adult children.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Maj. Gen.
Robert L. Smolen, USAF, (Ret.) in connection with his
nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Robert Lee Smolen, (Bob).

2. Position to which nominated:
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear
Security Administration, Department of Energy.

3. Date of nomination:
July 31, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
February 9, 1952; San Diego, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Adriane Renee Andree.

7. Names and ages of children:
Amanda, 30; Robert, 27; Emily, 24.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Allegheny College, Meadville, PA -- Bachelor of Arts, 1974.
University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK -- Master of Public
Administration, 1976.
Auburn University, Montgomery, AL -- Master of Political Science,
1985.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Retired August 1, 2007. United States Air Force (Major General).
Commander, Air Force District of Washington, USAF, Washington, DC,
April 2006-August 2007.
Director, Strategic Policy and Arms Control, National Security
Council Staff, The White House, Washington, DC, August 2004-April 2006.
Director, Nuclear and Counterproliferation, HQ USAF, The Pentagon,
Washington, DC, May 2002-August 2004.
Director, Manpower and Personnel (J-1), Office of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, December 1999-May 2002.
Deputy Director, Nuclear and Counterproliferation, HQ USAF, The
Pentagon, Washington, DC, February 1998-December 1999.
Commander, 72nd Air Base Wing, Tinker Air Force Base, USAF,
Oklahoma, July 1996-February 1998.
Chief, Air Force Senate Liaison Office, Office of the Secretary of
the Air Force, Russell Building, Washington, DC, July 1995-July 1996.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member, Board of Directors, Army Air Force Mutual Aid Association
Member, Board of Directors, National Capitol Council, Boy Scouts of
America
Member, Pi Sigma Alpha, National Political Science Honor Society
Lifetime Member of the Board of Regents, National Eagle Scout
Association
Lifetime Member of the American Legion
Lifetime Member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars
Lifetime Member of the Air Force Association
Lifetime Member of the Military Officers Association
Member, Former Governors Association, American Red Cross

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal (2)
Defense Superior Service Medal (2)
Legion of Merit
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (4)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal (2)
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Air Force Achievement Medal
Combat Readiness Medal
National Defense Service Medal (3)
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Korea Defense Service Medal
Distinguished Eagle Scout Award

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
Attached are the following speeches:
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

1. Air Force District of Washington Contracting Conference,
November 14, 2006.
2. Speech to Quarterly Meeting of the DW Steel Chapter of the Air
Force Association, April 10, 2007.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Maj. Gen. Robert L. Smolen, USAF,
(Ret.), was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on
November 15, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination
be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on
November 16, 2007.]

TO CONSIDER CERTAIN PENDING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY NOMINATIONS

----------

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:56 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Byrd, Reed,
Akaka, Ben Nelson, Pryor, Webb, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions,
Collins, Martinez, and Corker.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general
counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; Sean G.
Stackley, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki,
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Jessica L.
Kingston, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator
Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman;
Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Bonni Berge,
assistant to Senator Akaka; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to
Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Anthony J.
Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Mark J. Winter,
assistant to Senator Collins; Matthew R. Rimkunas, assistant to
Senator Graham; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator
Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. I would now ask the committee to consider 3
civilian nominations and a list of 135 pending military
nominations.
First, ask the committee to consider the nomination of John
Young, Jr., to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics. His nomination has been before the
committee the required length of time. Is there a motion to
favorably report the nomination of Secretary Young?
Senator Warner. So moved.
Chairman Levin. It has been moved. Is there a second?
Senator Reed. I second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
All opposed, nay. [No response.]
The motion carries.
Second, I would ask the committee to consider the
nomination of Douglas Brook to be Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller. His nomination
has been before the committee the required length of time. Is
there a motion to favorably report that nomination?
Senator Warner. So moved.
Senator Reed. Second.
Chairman Levin. Seconded. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus
of ayes.]
The motion carries.
Next, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of
Robert Smolen to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs,
National Nuclear Security Administration. Is there a motion to
favorably report that nomination?
Senator Warner. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Collins. Second.
Chairman Levin. All those in favor, say aye. [A chorus of
ayes.]
The motion carries.
Finally, I ask the committee to consider a list of 135
pending military nominations. All of these nominations have
been before the committee the required length of time. Is there
a motion to favorably report?
Senator Warner. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Second?
Senator Inhofe. Second.
Chairman Levin. All those in favor, say aye. [A chorus of
ayes.]
Nays? [No response.]
The ayes have it. The motion carries. Thank you very much.

[The nomination reference of Robert L. Smolen follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
July 31, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Robert L. Smolen, of Pennsylvania, to be Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, vice Thomas
P. D'Agostino.
______

[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on November 15,
2007.
1. Lt. Gen. Carrol H. Chandler, USAF, to be general and Commander,
Pacific Air Forces; Air Component Commander for United States Pacific
Command; and Executive Director, Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff
(Reference No. 477).
2. COL Donald L. Rutherford, USA, to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 997).
3. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Joseph Caravalho, Jr.) (Reference
No. 998).
4. LTG Thomas F. Metz, USA, to be lieutenant general and Director,
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (Reference No.
1016).
5. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
captain (Michael V. Siebert) (Reference No. 1017).
6. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Brian D. Oneil) (Reference No. 1018).
7. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Anthony Barber) (Reference No. 1019).
8. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Tim C. Lawson) (Reference No. 1020).
9. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Richard D. Fox II) (Reference No. 1021).
10. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (John G. Goulet) (Reference No. 1022).
11. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (David L. Patten) (Reference No. 1023).
12. In the Army, there are 51 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Mark J. Benedict)
(Reference No. 1024).
13. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Melvin L. Chattman) (Reference No. 1025).
14. In the Marine Corps, there are seven appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Dana R. Brown) (Reference No. 1026).
15. In the Navy, there are 60 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Julian D. Arellano) (Reference
No. 1027).
16. MG Jeffrey A, Sorenson, USA, to be lieutenant general and Chief
Information Officer/G-6, Office of the Secretary of the Army (Reference
No. 1038).
Total: 135.

[Whereupon, at 9:58 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

NOMINATIONS OF MARY BETH LONG TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; JAMES SHINN TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS; CRAIG W. DUEHRING TO
BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE
AFFAIRS; AND JOHN H. GIBSON TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

----------

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Webb, Warner,
and Thune.
Other Senators present: Senator Norm Coleman.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional
staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member;
Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel;
Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; and William G.P.
Monahan, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; David G. Collins, research
assistant; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss,
minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member;
Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; Diana G.
Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority
counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Ali Z. Pasha,
and Benjamin L. Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Warner; Todd Stiefler, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Brian Polley, assistant to Senator Cornyn;
and Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Today the Senate Armed Services Committee considers the
nomination of Mary Beth Long to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs; James Shinn to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs; Craig Duehring to be Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; and John Gibson to be
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management.
We welcome our nominees and their families to today's
hearing. We know of the long hours which senior Department of
Defense (DOD) officials put in every day, we appreciate the
sacrifices our nominees are willing to make to serve our
Nation, but we also know that they're not alone in making these
sacrifices. So we thank in advance the family members of our
nominees for the support and assistance that they will be
providing.
In the last 2 years, Ms. Long has served as Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs and, if confirmed, she will be responsible for
helping formulate DOD policy in the Middle East, Europe, and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Africa. Foremost
of these challenges will be the situation in Iraq, where there
is no indication that Iraq's political leaders are taking
advantage of the breathing space created by a reduction in
violence to make the political compromises necessary for
reconciliation, and in Afghanistan, where we continue to try to
persuade our NATO allies to step up and provide the troops,
equipment, and trainers needed for the success of our mission,
and where NATO's reputation is on the line.
Almost as challenging is our policy towards Iran, where a
new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) found that Iran halted
its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003, but it also
found that Iran could resume that program very easily and
therefore, given its bellicose rhetoric and support for
terrorists, remains a major threat.
Over the last 4 years, Dr. Shinn has served first as
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia on the National
Intelligence Council and more recently as Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs. If confirmed, Dr. Shinn will be responsible for DOD
policy in an area that encompasses more than half the world's
population. The challenges that he faces will include the use
of Pakistani territory as a haven by al Qaeda and the Taliban,
the unstable situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves,
and managing the U.S. relationship with the growing economic
and military power of China.
Mr. Duehring has served the DOD as Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. If
confirmed, he will face the challenge of managing the
downsizing of the Active Duty Air Force without sacrificing the
ability of the Department to accomplish its national security
mission.
Mr. Gibson has served the DOD as Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Management Reform and Acting Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Financial Management and, if confirmed, he will
face the challenge of modernizing the Air Force's business
systems so that they can provide the timely, accurate, and
reliable financial information needed to manage the Department.
We wish our nominees well as they take on these challenges.
We'll ask you later on as you make your opening comments to
introduce your families if they are with you. Now I'll call on
Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I had the privilege yesterday of having an extensive
opportunity to visit with each of these nominees and my first
observation is as citizens we're very fortunate that four very,
very capable individuals are stepping up to serve once again
another chapter in their already distinguished public service
careers.
At this point in time in any administration, lots of folks
are thinking of how they can best plan their next chapter,
usually in the private sector. But each of these individuals
have served with distinction in the DOD and now are willing to
accept another level of promotion and finish out presumably
this term of the presidency of George Bush. So we're fortunate
in that context.
I've also had the opportunity to meet the families and at
the appropriate time I'd be delighted to have you introduce
them, because families are a very essential part of your
ability to perform these tasks. Having served in the Department
myself for many years a long time ago, I know the long hours,
the separation from family that's occasioned by these arduous
challenges that you're going to accept, and without that
support you simply cannot perform your duties as ably as you
must.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, let us proceed. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Warner.
Let me now ask each of you the standard questions which we
ask of all nominees that appear before this committee, and you
can answer it all at once. First, have you adhered to
applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of
interest?
Ms. Long. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibson. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Ms. Long. No.
Mr. Shinn. No.
Mr. Duehring. No.
Mr. Gibson. No.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
Ms. Long. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibson. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Ms. Long. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibson. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Ms. Long. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibson. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Ms. Long. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibson. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Ms. Long. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibson. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Let me start with you, Ms. Long. Will you
give us your opening comments and introduce anybody you might
wish to introduce to us?

STATEMENT OF MARY BETH LONG, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Ms. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members
of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to come here
today for this confirmation hearing. I'm deeply honored that
President Bush and Secretary Gates nominated me for the
position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs. If confirmed, I look forward to
working closely with the committee, with the United States
Senate, and with your colleagues in the House of
Representatives in a spirit of true bipartisanship to advance
the security of the United States.
I'd like at this time to introduce and to thank my
Pennsylvania family: my mother, Betsy Long, and my father, Ken
Long, who are sitting behind me; my brother-in-law, Dan Herman;
as well as my Alexandria family who are here to support me.
There are some issues that are so vital to our Nation that
we cannot be effective in meeting these challenges unless
Congress and the President work together. So I look forward, if
I am confirmed, to working with this committee to meet those
challenges. In my time thus far in the Department I have been
privileged to work with this committee and its staff on a
number of issues and I look forward to doing so in the future,
if confirmed.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Ms. Long.
Mr. Shinn?

STATEMENT OF JAMES SHINN, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. Shinn. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, other
members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today. I'm grateful to President Bush for his
confidence in putting forward this nomination and to Secretary
Gates for his support. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with this committee and other Members of Congress on Asian
affairs.
I'd like to, if I may, acknowledge my wife, Masako, who's
not here. She's with my daughter in school today. We've been
married for more than 25 years and I'd like to acknowledge her
for her love and support in this job.
Chairman Levin. We thank you for that. Okay, thank you.
Senator Coleman, are you ready to make an introduction?

STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
MINNESOTA

Senator Coleman. I am ready, Mr. Chairman, and it comes, I
believe, at an opportune time. I thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Senator Warner, for the opportunity to be with you today, and
it's my great honor to come before you today to introduce Craig
Duehring from our home State of Minnesota. Mr. Duehring is the
embodiment of the old saying, ``Make service your first
priority and success will follow.'' His service began in 1968,
shortly after completing his studies at Minnesota State
University at Mankato in southern Minnesota. Within a year he
had deployed to Vietnam, where he completed over 800 missions
during the Vietnam War as a forward air controller. Throughout
his 28 years in the Air Force, Mr. Duehring flew more than a
dozen types of aircraft, amassing over 1,200 hours in the A-10
Thunderbolt II.
His military awards and decorations include the Silver
Star, the Defense Superior Service Medal, 2 Distinguished
Flying Crosses, three Meritorious Service Medals, 27 Air
Medals, 2 Air Force Commendation Medals, the Vietnamese Cross
of Gallantry Individual Award, and the Vietnamese Staff Service
Honor Medal First Class. You must have a strong chest to carry
those medals.
Mr. Duehring is also a recipient of the Air Force's highest
individual award for leadership in the senior officer category,
the Lance P. Sijan Award.
Mr. Duehring's service since retiring from the Air Force
has been equally impressive. Prior to his current assignment,
Mr. Duehring served 6 years as a Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. He performed the
duties of Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs in the absence of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs, including an extended period during and
following the attacks on September 11, 2001.
Throughout these assignments Mr. Duehring has continued his
connections to the North Star State. He has an excellent
working relationship with the Adjutant General of the Minnesota
National Guard, Larry Shellito, along with the entire Minnesota
Guard organization.
In the spring of 2005, I had the pleasure of touring
Minnesota with Mr. Duehring to thank Minnesota's National
Guardsmen and reservists for their service and to solicit their
input on the challenges facing our citizen-soldiers and their
families. When we stopped in Rochester, Minnesota, we had the
chance to visit with Terry Wermagger and Linda Hauten,
volunteers with the Family Readiness Group (FRG) in Austin, MN.
The FRG serves the soldiers and families of Bravo Company,
434th Main Support Battalion, Minnesota National Guard, which
was deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom at the time.
The company included both Terry's and Linda's husbands.
Mr. Duehring took the time to listen to concerns of those
families and to find new ways to support their efforts with
their FRG. He heard the story about the FRG raising more than
$10,000 to assist local military families through the sale of
3,000 yellow ribbon shirts and other items and he applauded the
families for encouraging the community of Austin, MN, to set
aside the 11th day of each month to recognize and support their
soldiers and families.
The point, Mr. Chairman, is that Mr. Duehring knows the
personal impact of the work the Office of Reserve Affairs does
every day. He knows what it means for the families who are
dealing with their loved ones being overseas. He knows the
value of reintegration for our troops returning home to
civilian life and he knows how to make a positive impact on
these families at a Federal level.
Mr. Chairman, I am confident that Mr. Duehring will
continue his excellent record of service in the position of
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs and I look forward to and fully support his
confirmation.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Coleman, and we
know you have to leave because you have a hectic schedule, as
always. But we thank you very much.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Duehring?

STATEMENT OF CRAIG W. DUEHRING, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS

Mr. Duehring. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and
distinguished members of the committee. A special thank you to
Senator Coleman for taking time out of his busy schedule to
come and help a fellow Minnesotan along in a very important
occasion.
I would like to first introduce my wife, Terry Duehring,
who's here with me today, as she always is and has been for 26-
plus years, going on 27 years. I'd also like to mention my
father-in-law, Chief Master Sergeant Richard Blevins, Retired,
United States Air Force. He joined the Air Force in 1947 when
it became a separate service and retired in 1977. So this year
is his 60th anniversary, just as it is for the United States
Air Force. Dad, as you know him, has been an inspiration to me,
a role model, and a mentor. He's here and his good wishes and
his prayers will sustain me today.
I'm honored to appear before you today as the President's
nominee to become the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs. I'm also grateful to the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force for
choosing me as their candidate for this important position. In
June of this year the President appointed me to fill an
existing vacancy as the acting Assistant Secretary, so I have
had nearly 6 months learning the ropes and doing what I could
to learn the issues that most affect the Air Force today, and
to work with my colleagues to implement changes to policy
within the limits of my appointment.
One of my first goals was to get out and listen to the
airmen and to their families, who will express their concerns
in their own words. To that end, I visited 11 bases and 4 major
headquarters in slightly over 2 months. My normal means of
communication is a townhall format, where anyone can ask any
question and make any statement. It is the fastest, most
effective way I knew to take the pulse of what was happening in
our Air Force today.
When I answered the questions sent over last week by the
committee, I identified four areas of concern which are a
compilation of what I learned on those visits and what the
Department has set as goals. Briefly, they were: one,
continuing to fight the global war on terrorism; two, reduce
the stress on our airmen and families; three, provide the best
possible treatment for our wounded warriors; and four,
recapitalize and prepare for the next war.
Mr. Chairman, I have done what I could as a senior staff
officer, but as an acting, my authority is limited. During the
6 years that I was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs, I appeared before congressional
committees and panels nine times. During that same period,
members of this committee and other congressional committees in
concert with the DOD passed 168 separate legislative items that
enhanced the effectiveness of and provided for the members of
the Reserve component.
I have never found anyone who recalls so much being done
for our servicemembers in such a short period of time. It is an
astounding achievement, a tribute to the teamwork that exists
today. If confirmed, I will be able to take my place as a full
member of that team and we will set even more records.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Duehring.
Mr. Gibson?

STATEMENT OF JOHN H. GIBSON, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
AIR FORCE FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Mr. Gibson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and distinguished
members of this committee: Thank you for the opportunity to
appear today before this committee to be considered for the
position of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Financial
Management. I would like to recognize several family members
with me today, without whose support none of this would be
possible. My wife, Lauris, and my youngest son, Davis, are with
me today. Unfortunately, my oldest son, Holden, could not be
with us. However, as any parent of a teenager will empathize,
when he professed his need to be in school I did not argue the
point. I want to publicly thank them all for their tremendous
sacrifice that they have made to allow me the chance to serve
my country. Life in Texas was happy, productive, and stable,
but they were willing, although not always enthusiastic, to
join me in my quest to serve, and for this I owe them so very
much.
It is an honor to be nominated by the President and
supported by Secretary Gates, Secretary England, and Secretary
Wynne to serve in this position, and if confirmed, it will be a
tremendous and challenging opportunity to serve in an
organization of dedicated men and women in both the uniformed
and the civilian forces who are consummate and dedicated
professionals. This opportunity also has a very special
personal meaning, as I will be joining the service of my
father.
If confirmed, it is my plan to work with these
professionals to address the budgetary and financial management
issues facing the Air Force, with the goal of maximizing the
budgetary resources to meet the mission demands, and continuing
to advance business operations, financial processes, and
systems to improve Air Force financial management.
Accountability, transparency, and communication are all
fundamental philosophies of mine and if I am fortunate enough
to be confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you,
Mr. Chairman, this committee, and Congress on Air Force
financial management issues.
Thank you again for your consideration today and I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Gibson.
Let me start with you, Ms. Long. The purpose of the surge
of U.S. troops into Iraq at the beginning of the year was to
reduce the violence in order to give the Iraqi political
leaders the breathing space to make political compromises
necessary for reconciliation. Prime Minister Maliki set out a
series of legislative benchmarks--laws on de-Baathification,
hydrocarbons, amnesty, disarmament--in September 2006. They
were reaffirmed by the presidency council in October 2006. They
were supposed to have been completed long ago.
How many of the legislative benchmarks which the Iraqi
government set for themselves have been achieved?
Ms. Long. Senator, none of those benchmarks have been
achieved.
Chairman Levin. On a scale of A to F, what grade would you
give the Maliki government?
Ms. Long. Senator, at this time I would give the Maliki
government an F.
Chairman Levin. By the way, it's an 8-minute round. I think
that will work for all of us.
What are the mechanisms available to us to pressure the
Maliki Government to work out these differences, to work out
the political compromises which are essential to win the
conflict? Without those political compromises, there's not
going to be an end to the conflict. What are the pressure
points that we can apply?
Ms. Long. Senator, I share your concern that the national
government chaired by Prime Minister Maliki has not performed
in an exemplary manner by passing key legislative reform, and
if confirmed, I will work with you and your committee to use
all of those leverages that we have available to us to
encourage the national government to move forward.
I think there are a number of leverage points. Working with
Congress, both General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker serve as
facilitators in working with the various blocs within the
national government of Iraq in order to persuade them and to
encourage them of the importance of the legislation.
Of course, the presence of our troops in Iraq provides us a
certain amount of leverage and influence in order to persuade
the Iraqis of the need for legislative reform in order to
secure the gains that we've already gained through the
increased stability.
Senator, we're also working with Iraq's neighbors to help
the neighbors of Iraq influence that government, provide it
with the security and confidence that it will be a stable
presence in the region. Then of course, we work through the
multinational and multilateral organizations to encourage them
to help the Iraqis come to reconciliation and to pass these key
legislative reforms.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Relative to our Iran policy, the recent NIE states that one
of the Intelligence Community's key judgments is that in the
fall of 2003 Teheran halted its nuclear weapons program. Are
there any changes in our policy that result from this NIE?
Ms. Long. Senator, I agree that the NIE is a watershed
moment in our posture vis-a-vis Iran and that, if confirmed, I
will work, again with your staff, to explore all the
possibilities presented by the new intelligence. Probably the
most significant opportunity is the Intelligence Community's
more strongly held position that Iran did have hidden an
illegal weapons program, and I think that the world, Iran, and
the United States are all reassessing what the meaning of that
more strongly held view is as an opportunity for Iran to come
clean regarding the program. It also serves as an opportunity
for the international community to understand the influence
that it had exerted against Iran up until 2003, which led to
this decision, was the right kind of influence. Furthermore, it
is an opportunity to increase that in order to further Iran's
transparency and its turn away from a nuclear program.
Chairman Levin. So that the NIE presents opportunities, if
it's accurate?
Ms. Long. I think it does present opportunities, yes,
Senator.
Chairman Levin. You describe it as a watershed moment.
Ms. Long. I think it's a watershed moment, Senator, in that
for the first time the Intelligence Community from a moderate
to a high confidence standard does believe and affirmed its
earlier position that Iran had an illegal weapons program.
Chairman Levin. Is there significance to their finding that
that was suspended in 2003?
Ms. Long. I think it is significant, Senator, in that it
shows that the international pressure that was put on Iran up
until that time had its effect and persuaded the Iranians to
put aside the nuclear weapons program, at least at that time.
Chairman Levin. If, in fact, they had suspended it, is that
a significant fact?
Ms. Long. If, in fact, they have suspended it, I believe
that is a significant fact in that it shows that the pressure
applied had an impact, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Is that the only significance to it?
Ms. Long. No, Senator, I think there are a number of other
significances, as I alluded.
Chairman Levin. All right.
Dr. Shinn, let me ask you about China. The Quadrennial
Defense Review identifies China as a likely competitor. Is it a
foregone conclusion that China and the United States will be at
odds over security in the Pacific?
Mr. Shinn. I think that's probably the most important
question that we face, Senator, going forward. I don't think
it's a foregone conclusion by any means that we're bound to be
competitors because of China's military buildup. But it could
turn out that way.
Chairman Levin. What actions should be taken to try to
avoid an unhealthy competition?
Mr. Shinn. Senator, I think the combination of engagement
with the Chinese, military-to-military engagement in
particular, can help remove the possibility for accidents, for
example, and misunderstandings. On the other hand, I think
equally important is for us to maintain our forces in readiness
in the Pacific, to signal to the Chinese that we're serious
about our defense commitments in the region.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Duehring, let me ask you just one
question and then I'll turn it over to Senator Warner. The
Boston Globe in a recent paper reported that the administration
has proposed a new regulation that would require the military
Services to coordinate with the politically appointed general
counsels before any member of the Judge Advocate General Corps
could be promoted. Are you familiar with that?
Mr. Duehring. Sir, the first time I heard of that was when
somebody pointed out that very article yesterday afternoon. I
honestly have no other information on that.
Chairman Levin. We are going to be asking the
administration if that is accurate, because this would
effectively give civilian lawyers who are political appointees
a veto over the recommendations of promotion boards. If that
article is true, would you agree that that might be an
inappropriate interference with the promotion board process?
Mr. Duehring. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to look at it a little
bit further, because I don't know if all the information is in
that report. Sometimes that happens. It may be taken out of
context, and I'd like to be able to prepare a decent statement
perhaps at a later time.
Chairman Levin. If you could give us your answer for the
record after checking that out, we would appreciate that.
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

Although I had seen the article from the Boston Goble, this matter
has not yet formally come to my attention as it is currently in
staffing to the Services. I am advised that it was not language
developed by the Air Force, and that the Department of Defense is
deleting that language from the draft instruction. That language will
not be in the final version of the instruction.
In summary, the language has been removed which should put the
immediate issue to rest. Additionally, on a personal level, I believe
that the ability of the Judge Advocate to provide independent advice
should not be impaired. As I stated in testimony, there is no place in
the promotion process for inappropriate political influence.

Chairman Levin. My time is up. After Senator Warner,
Senator Webb has kindly agreed that he will take over the gavel
for a little while until I return. Thank you very much, Senator
Webb. He'll be recognized after Senator Warner.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Long, I'd like to return to the chairman's opening
question, a very important one, about Iraq and how our
President designed this policy, together with the regional
military commanders, notably General Petraeus and Admiral
Fallon, of the surge concept. Militarily, the surge has
achieved its goal, namely to reduce the level of casualties,
not only of the United States and other coalition forces, but
of the civilians.
One of the perhaps unintended consequences has been the
proliferation of a lot of reconciliation at the bottom. It had
been taking place in certain areas, particularly those sectors
where the Marines had been operating for some time. But it
seemed to flourish as the surge proceeded. Will that constitute
some leverage on the central government which, as you very
succinctly agreed with the chairman, has just not performed the
responsibilities of a government of a sovereign nation to
exercise the levers of sovereignty to the greater benefit of
its citizens? It has failed to do that in many ways.
So could you describe your understanding of what is taking
place in terms of the bits and pieces of reconciliation that
appear to be taking place in a number of provinces?
Ms. Long. Thank you for your question, Senator. Absolutely,
that one of the benefits of the surge, as well as the combined
strategic emphasis on the counterinsurgency strategy that
General Petraeus and Admiral Fallon instituted, is this
grasroots development, which we now call the Concerned Local
Citizens. There are over 60,000 of these groups that are now
operating in Iraq.
Senator Warner. 60,000 groups?
Ms. Long. 60,000 individuals. Excuse me.
Senator Warner. Individuals, I see.
Ms. Long. Yes, that are either parts of tribes or other
local groups, neighborhood groups. It started, as the Senator
correctly pointed out, in al-Anbar under the auspices of the
Marine Corps and now we are working to spread that to other
provinces.
These groups have sworn their cooperation with coalition
and U.S. forces and are cooperating with us and the Iraqi
forces against al Qaeda and the foreign fighters in Iraq. In
addition to that, these groups are working with local
governments and are strengthening at a grassroots level the
reconciliation efforts that the Senator referred to.
From a national level, there are reconciliation efforts
that are in place, that have not met the key legislative
benchmarks that Senator Levin was referring to, but have been
effective in furthering some of the Maliki government's goals.
For example, while there isn't a formal revenue-sharing plan,
revenue has been distributed to the various provinces and is
being pushed out beyond Baghdad.
On the area of reconciliation as well, Senator, there was
recently passed a pension reform law that for the first time
treated former Baathists similarly to----
Senator Warner. There's been some modest action by the
Maliki Government, but it is not in any way measurable as it
relates to the goals set out in January of this year when the
President announced the surge policy----
Ms. Long. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Warner.--that surge to provide a security blanket
of types to enable the government to fully exercise its
sovereignty. But I draw your attention again to the question I
had: were these proliferation of small reconciliations at the
bottom a means to leverage this government to wake up and begin
to do more at the top, or has the government tried to frustrate
in any way the development of these reconciliations at the
lower level?
Ms. Long. They are indeed a leverage, Senator.
Senator Warner. They are leverage?
Ms. Long. Yes.
Senator Warner. Has the government tried to encourage it?
I've read reports it's tried to frustrate it in some ways.
Ms. Long. Senator, my understanding is Prime Minister
Maliki has met with representatives of some of the Sunni tribal
groups. The national government is now going through the
process of deciding or determining to what level it will
support various groups. Some of the groups, individuals will be
integrated into the normal security apparatus and some will
not. It's very much in flux at this point.
Senator Warner. So Maliki then has given some tacit
recognition to this taking place and in some ways, as you say,
cash is flowing down, although whoever opened the spigot could
close it overnight, that cash flow. So that's in place.
Ms. Long. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. I hope that we can take some modest
encouragement. But do you see any evidence that would lead you
to the conclusion that in the near-term future, say the next 90
days, there's likely to be any actions taken by the Maliki
Government on the main ones--deBaathification, and the allowing
of the provinces to have free elections, et cetera?
Ms. Long. Senator, we're very concerned that the Maliki
government act. I do understand that the government plans after
the period of the haj to take on as its first priority effort
passage of the Iraqi budget, which will have significant impact
on some of these efforts, and then quickly to turn to
deBaathification. So I am aware that that is the priority
effort of the Maliki Government within the next 90 to 120 days,
sir.
Senator Warner. If you had to diagnose the problem of why
the Maliki government hasn't performed, is it rooted in the
time, historic corruption that exists, the hatred and mistrust
that exist between the Sunnis and the Shia? Are those still the
fundamental basic causes that preclude these human beings
elected by their own people, or parties as the case may be in
this government, and not by the President of the United States?
We didn't select these people, but we have to, as we say, deal
with the cards that were dealt us? Is that still the basic
reason they can't come together?
Ms. Long. Senator, I would agree that those are the basic
reasons. I would allude to what Ambassador Crocker has alluded
to, which is, even beyond getting these groups together for the
first time, these are individuals who don't have a lot of
government experience, do not have a lot of organizational
experience, and a very, very young government institutional
apparatus.
Senator Warner. While our losses of life and limb have gone
down, we're still sustaining loss of life as a consequence of
the inaction of the central government. If they were to act
responsibly and do as prescribed by their constitution and
charter, I personally think there would be far fewer casualties
today, both of the coalition forces, of our military, and the
civilians. Do you agree with that?
Ms. Long. I agree. Every casualty is one casualty too many,
sir.
Senator Warner. Mr. Shinn, as to Turkey, we read this
morning this report to the effect that there's going to be some
active military action initiated by the Turkish government
against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) factions. Could you
bring us up to date on that and what are the implications on
our ability to try and keep as much tranquility in that region
of Iraq as possible?
Mr. Shinn. Senator, I agree that's a pretty important
point. I would have to defer to Ms. Long, within whose area
Turkey and Iraq principally fall.
Senator Warner. It's on the border of your area.
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Ms. Long. As the Senator is aware, we share the concern
regarding the turbulence in northern Iraq and we are working
with the Turkish government and the Iraqi government, as well
as the regional Kurdish government, all of whom have openly
declared the PKK to be a terrorist organization, to make sure
that to the extent possible the conflict and the instability in
northern Iraq is minimized.
As this committee is aware, General Petraeus, as well as
the Vice Chairman, are working personally with Chief of Staff
Segun in Turkey in order to further diplomatic and other non-
kinetic solutions to this problem, sir.
Senator Warner. This is my last question here, to Mr. Shinn
on the question of the Navy and the denial of our ships to make
those port calls. Having had some experience myself in the Navy
secretariat, I know full well that those port calls are planned
well in advance, with full notification and I assume
recognition in writing of the acceptance of the ship to dock
and stay there for a period of time.
What's your best analysis of what happened? It caused great
hardship to the crew and families of our carrier, so how can
that be precluded in the future?
Mr. Shinn. You're right, Senator, it was a big hardship on
the members, the family members of the crew, as well as the
crew themselves of the carrier, as well as the other vessels
who were denied access to Hong Kong in the same period of time.
We've heard various explanations, both official and
unofficial, from the Chinese government as to what happened.
Frankly, we're still baffled. They don't completely add up.
There have been several explanations, none of which are
satisfactory, and we look forward to a plausible and full
official explanation from the Chinese government of what
happened.
Senator Warner. More importantly is that you have a
procedure by which it cannot happen again.
Mr. Shinn. Absolutely.
Senator Warner. I pointed out to you the value of the
Incidents at Sea Agreement which was negotiated many, many
years ago between the United States and the Soviet Union, that
is still in effect, and it obviates many of these types of
situations.
Mr. Shinn. That was a good model, and in fact I understand
from Admiral Fallon when he was at Pacific Command that the Sea
Agreement that you negotiated with the Russians was an
inspiration for the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement,
which was designed to help avoid these kind of
misunderstandings.
Senator Warner. By the way, I had the privilege of
discussing both of you with Admiral Fallon and he's very
favorably impressed with your professional services, both Ms.
Long and you, Mr. Shinn.
Thank you, Senator Webb, for your indulgence.
Senator Webb [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Warner, my
senior Senator.
I'd like to thank all of you for your willingness to
continue to serve. I have 5 years in the Pentagon, 1 as an
Active Duty marine and on then-Secretary Warner's staff
actually, my last year in the Marine Corps, and then 4 as a
defense executive. It's a great place to work, and to get
motivated every day by the people who wear the uniform.
I also grew up in the Air Force. I think both of you
gentlemen know what that means. Anybody who's seen the movie
``The Great Santini,'' that was the way I grew up. I can still
remember standing at parade rest in front of my chest of
drawers on Saturday morning, waiting for the old man to come in
and inspect my room.
I have some questions for all of you. If my time runs out,
I'll come back. I'd like to give you the opportunity to clarify
this for the record, Mr. Duehring, on these political
promotions. It's an extremely serious impingement for anyone
who has spent time around the career military. It was one of
the central issues in the Tailhook scandal, frankly, when this
committee was insisting on doing a secondary evaluation of the
fitness reports of people who had already passed through the
promotion boards. I spoke strongly about that well before I
ever thought I would run.
I would assume you agree that, other than in the form of a
fitness report of a civilian superior or reporting officer,
that there should be no political input in the military
promotion process?
Mr. Duehring. Senator, there should definitely be no
political input in the promotion process. There's no difficulty
with that. My concern was when I got the question, I didn't
really understand what the article was reporting. So any answer
that I gave would be sheer conjecture on my part and I thought,
since I just heard about it, it would be better just to take it
for the record.
Senator Webb. But as a guiding principle, I think we should
all agree that there should be no political input in the
promotion process other than through the forms of fitness
reports. Wouldn't you agree with that?
Mr. Duehring. No political input, that's correct, sir.
Senator Webb. Can you explain what the functions of the
Patrick Henry Center for Individual Liberty are?
Mr. Duehring. It was a conservative organization, one of
many here in the Washington area, that is headquartered here.
It was built around its founder, Gary Aldrich, who had been an
FBI agent and retired, and promoted conservative causes. At the
time I had just moved back to Washington, DC, and needed to get
involved in something to keep my mind going until I found out
what I was really going to be able to do to serve my country.
Senator Webb. Could you explain the mission statement of
the 501[c][3]?
Mr. Duehring. Generic?
Senator Webb. Yes.
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Senator Webb. What was the mission statement of the
organization?
Mr. Duehring. It was called the Patrick Henry Center for
Individual Liberty. People came to him to talk about if they
thought that they were being prosecuted or persecuted for what
they might have said, that he would give advice because of his
background.
Senator Webb. Former government officials?
Mr. Duehring. I don't recall any government officials.
Senator Webb. Or former Federal employees? Basically former
Federal employees who believed that they had been improperly
treated?
Mr. Duehring. I would say it was like a counseling service.
So he didn't actually go out and do something on their behalf
except talk to them directly. It was a very, very small group.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Ms. Long, I'd like to ask you a question just as a follow-
on to the question with respect to Iran and the NIE. What is
your view of the motivation of Iran in its cooperation with the
multinational effort that resulted in the formation of the
Karzai Government in Afghanistan?
Ms. Long. Senator, the cooperation of Iran in the early
stages of the Afghan government, I don't have the details on
that. I do understand that there was some cooperation provided,
particularly support to or acknowledgment of U.S. military
activities in order to deconflict and provide safety so that
none of our actions were misinterpreted.
Senator Webb. But it did actively participate in a
multinational effort preceding the comments of the
administration that marked them as members of the axis of evil.
Would you have any thoughts on what their motivation would have
been?
Ms. Long. No, I would not, Senator Webb. Unfortunately,
Afghanistan falls in Mr. Shinn's area of responsibility.
However, I am responsible for the area of Iran and I do not
have any insights as to Iranian motivations at that time.
Senator Webb. But this does impact on the question of
Iran's motivation in taking certain actions. On the one hand,
you were indicating that in your view that Iran would have
terminated, let's just say, its alleged nuclear program. But
let's assume for the conversation that it exists, and that they
terminated that simply as a result of international pressure.
But they did step forward in the Afghani situation, preceding
our labeling them a member of the axis of evil, in a way that
assisted the formation of the Karzai government.
That would seem to me to be an indicator at some level that
they operate from practicality, rather than simply from
external pressure.
Ms. Long. Senator, I would agree with you. I think Iran
from a practical standpoint often does a risk versus gain
analysis of particularly its standing in the international
community. At the same time, it cooperated on the formation of
the Karzai government, however, it was continuing to fund and
to support Hezbollah and other terrorist activity worldwide.
Most recently, I believe Karzai has been fairly clear in
that he finds Iran to be a destabilizing influence in Kabul, as
well as a new source or at least a newly discovered source of
support to insurgent activity and Taliban along Afghanistan's
border. So it's very difficult to gauge the motivations of
Iran. On the one hand, they are very concerned about their
international standing; on the other hand, not concerned enough
to cease their international activities in support of
terrorism.
Senator Webb. There were opportunities that this
administration had that were arguably overlooked that could
have affected Iran's conduct in a different way. That's the
point.
Mr. Shinn, you have long experience in East Asia. I've been
concerned for many years about Chinese military activities in
the South China Sea and beyond. Actually, I wrote a piece in
the New York Times 9 years ago about the Spratlys and the
Paracels, and here we see it popping up again. There were
demonstrations in Hanoi that coincided with the military visit
there.
I'm wondering about your take on Chinese intentions and
activities in the Spratlys and the Paracels.
Mr. Shinn. That's a good question, Senator, and I'm afraid
I don't have any good answer to the question. I have observed
and studied Chinese military activities in the South China Sea
and, even beyond that, their expansion of the People's
Liberation Army, air force, and navy. The problem we have is
divining their intent. They have this great capability, but the
intent remains fairly opaque, whether it's in the South China
Sea or across the straits in Taiwan.
That's one of the reasons for, I think, the great care and
vigilance with which we have to deal with the Chinese military.
Senator Webb. So you're involved in this area now in your
present job?
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Senator Webb. Have you seen any indications in the time
that you've been in this job that the Chinese have increased
their interest in sovereignty issues in the Paracels and the
Spratlys?
Mr. Shinn. We have certainly seen a greater level of
military activity in the region. There are some ships and some
aircraft that are outside what I take to be some of their
historic patterns. Whether they intend to use that to advance
their sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, I'm not sure.
But the risk is always there, Senator.
Senator Webb. The activities have increased, is your
comment?
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for your service to our country and
your willingness to take on new and additional responsibilities
and work on behalf of the people of this country in maintaining
our national security. So thank you very much for being here
today and for your willingness to accept those responsibilities
and respond to questions that some of us have regarding those.
I'd like to direct a couple questions if I might to Mr.
Gibson. First off, the Air Force Financial Service Center
opened earlier this year at Ellsworth Air Force Base. The Air
Force is leading the way when it comes to financial
transformation to serve our Nation's airmen, and I'm very proud
that this effort is taking place in my home State.
My question is, are you familiar with that Air Force
Financial Service Center and do you support the Air Force
financial service transformation efforts that are being
undertaken at Ellsworth?
Mr. Gibson. Senator, your question addresses a very
important aspect of financial management and that is continuous
improvement of the business operations. I am not familiar with
a lot of the details and analysis that went into that movement
and consolidation at Ellsworth. However, if I'm confirmed I
would believe it would be my responsibility to be a champion
and be a leader in the area of continuing to improve business
operations in the Air Force and I would make it a priority to
get up to speed on that and once again support and continue
that effort.
Senator Thune. I would welcome the opportunity to host you
at Ellsworth and show you the work that's underway out there.
But like I said, we've been very pleased that Ellsworth was
chosen for that mission. We think it's an important one. We
think that the transformation that's being undertaken by the
Air Force is important and might be something that is
replicated in some of the other Services. But I would hope that
we could count on you to be able to continue to support that
important mission and its location at Ellsworth Air Force Base.
Mr. Gibson. Senator, as I mentioned, it's a priority of
mine and it would be a pleasure to come out and see that
operation and what's being done there.
Senator Thune. You served in previous positions, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense, the
Comptroller, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Financial Management. Based on that experience, could you
provide some examples of the types of challenges that the Air
Force faces in managing its resources because of a lack of
predictability in funding and the failure to get the necessary
bridge funding that would come with a global war on terror
supplemental? What types of issues do you deal with when you
don't have the kind of reliability and predictable funding
stream that you need?
Mr. Gibson. Senator, I am familiar with that concept.
However, budget execution has not been in my portfolio. I would
hesitate to comment on some of the ramifications associated
with execution of the base bill and the supplemental bill and
the appropriate actions it might have on operations. Again, I
would hesitate to comment on that.
Senator Thune. That's probably a very safe answer for you
right now.
One other question. Earlier this year, the Air Force
released its long-range strike white paper, which states that
the procurement spike for the next generation long-range strike
platform is expected to begin in 2011. If confirmed, one of
your responsibilities along with the Director of the Air Force
budget will be making program and budget decisions and
preparing the program objective memorandum (POM) in the Future
Years Defense Program.
Given this, as the Air Force builds the fiscal years 2010
through 2015 POM, will you support the proposed 2011 funding
spike for the next generation long-range strike platform?
Mr. Gibson. Senator, I'm not familiar with all the details
relating to that program. If I'm confirmed, Senator, my
understanding is that my role would be to work with Air Force
leadership, the programming area, the program budget folks, to
take the budgetary resources that we have and match them as
best we can to the priorities of the missions.
Senator Thune. Period?
Mr. Gibson. Period.
Senator Thune. I was waiting for the next part of that
answer.
Let me address one other, if I might, issue in which I have
a great deal of interest, and that's the area of aviation fuel
expenditures. In fiscal year 2006, the Air Force, according to
the numbers I have, consumed 2.6 billion gallons of aviation
fuel at a cost of approximately $5.7 billion. That breaks down
to approximately 7.1 million gallons per day is used. To make
matters worse, every time the price for a barrel of oil goes up
by $10 the Air Force faces another $610 million increase in
fuel costs.
These costs need to be reprogrammed from existing accounts
or accounted for in an appropriations supplemental. To address
that problem, the Air Force has set a goal of obtaining 50
percent of its fuel needs from domestic sources by 2016. One of
those sources is a 50-50 synthetic fuel blend used in the
successful 2007 flight test of a B-52. It's also slated for
testing in the engines of the C-17 and the B-1 bomber. If
confirmed, would you support further funding of research and
purchase of synthetic fuels for use by the Air Force and will
you work to program funds for synthetic fuels for the next
Future Years Defense Program for fiscal years 2010 to 2015?
Mr. Gibson. Senator, I'm aware of the ongoing efforts to
improve, maximize what we get from our fuel dollars. This
includes a number of initiatives, both reaching economies and
also alternative fuels such as the synfuels. I'm not familiar
with the specifics with regard to the Air Force budget in this
matter. However, if confirmed, if this effort truly supports
maximizing what we do with our budgetary resources and helps
achieve the mission, then I would fully support it.
Senator Thune. I appreciate your responses and I know that
in a setting like this, my questions are somewhat specific and
your answers probably by necessity have to be somewhat general.
But once you are confirmed, I would love to sit down with you
and perhaps drill down a little bit with some of these issues
that I've raised.
Mr. Gibson. Senator, if I'm confirmed, it would be my
pleasure.
Senator Thune. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In your absence
we've continued under the leadership of Senator Webb a very
good series of questions. I'm going to wrap up with one for Mr.
Duehring.
First, the issue of annual enrollment fees for the retirees
eligible for TRICARE is an issue of great concern to the
Department and Congress. I understand that a DOD task force is
calling for urgent action to increase TRICARE fees for
retirees, including a fee for TRICARE For Life. TRICARE is
something that this committee can take great pride in. We did
the basic legislation on that some years ago.
What are your views about the cost of TRICARE and whether a
means needs to be developed to change the enrollment fee
structure?
Mr. Duehring. Senator Warner, as a retiree, I am very
interested in what happens to TRICARE and the fees, if they
have to be increased or what have you. Our office right now has
not been involved in that discussion. I do know there is a
discussion at the DOD level. It has not come down to the
Services yet. We're all aware of the fact that the TRICARE
budget is increasing.
What I will do, if confirmed, I will take the interests of
the committee, and of course, as I mentioned before----
Senator Warner. Would you find the opportunity to reply to
the record on this very quickly, the best you can?
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of Defense has evaluated the cost of TRICARE and
changes to the enrollment fee structure as recommended by the Task
Force on the Future of Military Health Care. The Task Force was
mandated by the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007 (section 711 of P.L. 109-364) to assess and recommend
changes that would help sustain military health care services to
members of the Armed Forces, retirees, and their families.
I will review the Task Force findings and evaluate their
recommendations to help contain an increasing TRICARE budget while
still sustaining military health care services for airmen, retirees,
and their families.
Increasing enrollment fees should not be the only driver of change;
we must also balance this with improving health care business and
management practices to ensure we maintain our Air Force readiness
posture along with taking care of our airmen, retirees, and their
families.

Senator Warner. Again, Mr. Shinn--and I also address this
to Mrs. Long because you have jurisdiction over NATO. NATO is
the military force now operating in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is
in Mr. Shinn's AOR. The New York Times reported on December 16
the following:

``Deeply concerned about the prospect of failure in
Afghanistan, the Bush administration and NATO have
begun three top-to-bottom reviews of the entire
mission, from security and counterterrorism to
political consolidation and economic development,
according to American and alliance officials. The
reviews are an acknowledgment of the need for greater
coordination in fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda in
Afghanistan, halting the rising opium production and
trafficking that finances the insurgency, and helping
the Kabul government extend its legitimacy and
control.''

The article is very well written and it goes on.
I think we want in our record this morning your
perspectives on the current situation and the future situation
in Afghanistan, and if you would lead off, and then I would
invite Ms. Long to make a contribution with respect to NATO.
Mr. Shinn. Thank you, Senator. With regard to the strategic
planning exercise that was mentioned in the newspaper, I'm
aware of at least two such reviews: one that Secretary Gates
discussed last week with the NATO allies in Scotland, where the
idea was for us to have a joint vision for the 3- to 5-year
horizon, with appropriate milestones for Afghanistan that
everybody could sign up to at the Bucharest summit. I would
defer to Ms. Long in a moment to talk more about that.
The other review was undertaken again by Admiral Fallon,
known to you and to me in my previous job; when he took over
the Central Command (CENTCOM) job, as is his bent, drilled down
very deeply into the fundamental strategy in Afghanistan, and
continues to work that with the mission in Kabul, in particular
how to integrate the economic with the military part of the
counterinsurgency.
With regard to the overall situation in Afghanistan, I also
had a chance to discuss this with Senator Levin when I called
on him yesterday.
Senator Warner. We also discussed it when you visited with
me yesterday.
Mr. Shinn. Yes.
Senator Warner. I have a very, very high regard for Admiral
Fallon. I'm quite interested in what steps he is taking on
this. Is one of these reports being prepared by CENTCOM?
Mr. Shinn. By CENTCOM in collaboration with the embassy,
yes, sir.
Senator Warner. With the embassy?
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. There are three of them. So that would
account for one. The other one, is that originated by Secretary
Gates?
Mr. Shinn. Yes, the one working with the NATO allies was
initiated by Secretary Gates. I'm not familiar with what the
third one might be.
Senator Warner. We going to come to grapple with the
question of narcotics, which is a very serious question because
it's generating so much cash. What cash is beginning to
infiltrate back to finance the operations of the Taliban?
Mr. Shinn. That's absolutely right and that's one of the
more alarming aspects of the conflict in Afghanistan, with no
easy answers. The export of opium from Afghanistan was in
excess of 8,000 metric tons last year. It's a big increase from
the year before. Even though we have, we and our allies and the
Afghan government, a 5-part strategy to deal with this, the
results have not been very encouraging.
Senator Warner. If anything, discouraging, because of the
increase of production this past season over the previous year.
Now, Ms. Long, to the NATO aspect of it, because NATO is a
full partner in the situation. Recently, the Secretary of
Defense, in I thought very stern terms, talked to NATO about
their role and what must be done to strengthen our operating
forces. I presume part of that report and discussion bordered
on the question of narcotics, which is the banker for the
Taliban.
Ms. Long. It did, Senator. The only thing I would add to
what Dr. Shinn said is to explain that the 3- to 5-year vision
is exactly what the Senator alluded to. It's a mechanism for
focusing and enhancing NATO's efforts in Afghanistan, to
include the narcotics effort. Narcotics and the
counternarcotics activity of NATO in conjunction with the
Afghan government was one of the subjects that was raised most
recently at the meeting in the United Kingdom of contributing
nations that are participating in the regional command.
Senator Warner. Bottom line, each of these problems is
contributing to the loss of American life, and the loss of
American limb. We have an obligation to do everything we can,
an obligation to those in uniform and their families back home,
to get a firmer grip on this situation.
My last question would be related to Russia, which again is
in your portfolio, Ms. Long. I wonder how you sleep at night.
You have all the problems one can possibly imagine.
Obviously, the relationships have somewhat deteriorated
here in the last perhaps 18 months, partially because Russia
now is feeling the benefit of the revenues from its sale of
petroleum. Its coffers are now somewhat filled as compared to
several years ago. How do we propose to try and improve those
relationships? Because we are relatively the two powerful
nations that border those areas in Central Europe.
Ms. Long. Thank you, Senator. I share your concern
regarding our dealing with Russia, and there has been a recent
shift in Russia's relationship not only with the United States,
but with the international community. Probably the most obvious
evidence of that is its recent suspension of the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and most recently not to provide
the data information that is required under that agreement on
December 15.
On the one hand, we remain strict with our principles of
democracy in dealing with Russia in terms of its development
and its responsible role as an international player. On the
other hand, in terms of things like missile defense, we are
reaching out to Russia in order to garner its support and its
participation, where we can encourage it to do so, to play a
constructive role in regional security by either exchanging
data with it regarding the missile defense issue or even
inviting it to participate by visiting some of our missile
defense structures here in the United States.
So it is a balancing act, Senator. But we know that we need
to move forward in order to deal with Russia in today's
context.
Senator Warner. Is Russia beginning to reinvest and
refurbish its military to a measurable increase?
Ms. Long. There are some indications that Russia is
reinvesting in portions of its military, yes.
Senator Warner. Which portions are receiving that benefit?
Ms. Long. I'd rather have that conversation in closed
session, Senator.
Senator Warner. All right.
Ms. Long. I apologize. I'm not sure how much of it is open.
Senator Warner. Clearly, the figures show that they're
pumping some of these new revenues back into refurbishing their
military?
Ms. Long. Russia has not abandoned development of its
military, no, Senator.
Senator Warner. I thank the witnesses. I wish you well. You
have my support. I do hope, Mr. Chairman, we can act on these
nominations with the usual dispatch that you use.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We're just going to pause for one moment. [Pause.]
Ms. Long, let me pick up on the NATO question that you were
asked. The Secretary was quoted or reported to have said
something about toning down U.S. appeals to NATO allies for
more troops, equipment, and trainers for the NATO-led effort in
Afghanistan. Is it your understanding that Secretary Gates
intends to pull back from pressing our allies to do more?
Ms. Long. Senator, I believe the newspaper article quoted
the Secretary as saying that he would no longer hammer NATO
allies. I think that is open to misinterpretation. If
confirmed, I do believe I will be working with the Secretary to
continue putting pressure on NATO in order for it to fulfill
its commitments in Afghanistan. What I believe the Secretary
was referring to was looking for more creative ways, including
this visionary statement, in order to continue enhancing NATO's
efforts in Afghanistan.
Chairman Levin. You made reference in the answers to your
pre-hearing questions about the CFE Treaty and indicated that
if outstanding problems can be solved, the present treaty can
and should be replaced by the adapted treaty to reflect post-
Cold War realities. Can you just expand on that a bit here?
Ms. Long. Thank you, Senator. I think one of the criticisms
of the CFE is, for example, the bloc-to-bloc structure that
that treaty envisioned or actually is based upon. I believe
that basis was appropriate at the time that the treaty was
formed because it dealt with an east-west configuration that
has changed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
My understanding is that one of the provisions of the
treaty that may be addressed by the the Adapted CFE Treaty, if
it is passed by the countries, is to dissolve the bloc-to-bloc
treatment and deal with the equipment and forces from a
national perspective. That would be one of the issues, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Duehring, the National Defense
Authorization Act which we just passed authorizes an active Air
Force end strength of 329,000. Is there any reason why we
should not expect the President's request for fiscal year 2009
to include those numbers that you know of? There was a
reference to a lower number that the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force made. Do you know what the intent is or what the Air
Force's request is in that regard? Is there any reason to
believe it's not going to be the 329,000?
Mr. Duehring. The last information I had was from before
the time that that act was passed. So I have a little bit of a
history of intentions, but what I'd like to do is study that a
little bit more. We're all concerned about the decreasing
numbers and the impact it has on our ability to carry out the
war. I'll be happy to take that.
Chairman Levin. All right. Let us know anything that you're
able and willing to tell us about that for the record, would
you?
[The information referred to follows:]

Active Duty end strength is currently programmed to go from 328,600
in fiscal year 2008 to 316,600 by the end of fiscal year 2009. However,
the Air Force will submit as a follow on to the President's fiscal year
2009 budget a report on the Air Force's Total Force end strength
requirements to include new and emerging missions as directed by the
fiscal year 2008 House Conference Committee report.

Chairman Levin. Mr. Duehring, a recent CBS News
investigation found that the suicide rate among veterans is
twice that of civilians and it's clear that some military
personnel returning from Iraq and Afghanistan are struggling
with those experiences. Do you know what the Air Force is doing
to assess the mental health situation of our servicemembers and
to aid that situation of those members who are returning from
Iraq and Afghanistan? Do you know what efforts are underway
there?
Mr. Duehring. Mr. Chairman, I know that the Air Force
actually started some work in this area around 1997 when it
created a program to try to stem the rising tide of suicides
which was occurring even at that time. I was looking at the
charts that we prepared for this briefing and there's a
noticeable dropoff. I know that our suicide rates run very,
very closely to the statistical average for the United States.
Of course, any suicide is bad. It's part of our ongoing program
of assessments that we do when people return from overseas, and
if confirmed, I will make this one of my very highest
priorities.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Gibson, given your experience in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, under the Comptroller as
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Management Reform,
and you also have some previous experience in the Comptroller's
organization as a financial management official, would you give
us your assessment as to how the DOD management systems and
business processes measure up to private sector standards?
Mr. Gibson. Senator, your comments and your question are
about a significant issue in the Department with regard to
financial management. Ultimately, our goal is to generate
timely, accurate, and reliable information. One aspect of this
is improving our business processes. But another is modernizing
our financial systems. This is a significant undertaking and
through the creation of the Business Transformation Agency, we
are working this at the enterprise level, with tiered
accountability.
It is hard for me to compare the systems at the Department,
being that the complexity and size--we are the largest
corporation in the world. But I can tell you that we are
working this issue through the enterprise transition plan, and
if I am confirmed, it would be a top priority of mine to
support the enterprise transition plan and its compliance in
the Air Force.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Gibson, every couple years the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) puts together a high-
risk list of management problems in the Federal Government. The
DOD routinely accounts for more than half of the items on the
GAO high-risk list. Are you familiar with that GAO high-risk
list?
Mr. Gibson. Yes, sir, I am.
Chairman Levin. Are you going to be able to make progress
in that area? How confident are you, given the history of
either failed efforts or lack of efforts, in this area? How
confident are you that the Air Force will look different in
terms of management a year or 2 years or 3 years from now than
it does, that it'll look different?
Mr. Gibson. Senator, two key areas that relate to financial
management associated with the GAO high-risk are performance
and governance of our business systems and financial management
weaknesses related to providing timely, accurate, and reliable
data. If confirmed, I intend to make progress towards an
unqualified audit opinion a high priority. Improving financial
processes and modernizing systems via the financial improvement
and audit readiness plan and the enterprise transition plan
will be a significant aspect.
Additionally, if confirmed, providing governance and
oversight of business systems will be a priority and GAO will
be a valuable third party partner, and I will continue to work
with them on these issues.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Gibson, Mr. Duehring, Mr. Shinn, and Ms. Long, thank
you all for your testimony, for your willingness to serve. We
again thank your families for their support.
We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Mary Beth Long by Chairman
Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(ISA)?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on international
security strategy and policy issues of the Department of Defense (DOD)
interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of
Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)), the
Middle East, and Africa, their governments and defense establishments,
and for oversight of security cooperation programs and foreign military
sales programs in these regions.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
you anticipate that Secretary Gates would prescribe for you?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe that the Secretary would ask me to
manage the day-to-day, multilateral, regional, and bilateral defense
relations with the governments in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
He also would ask me to develop, coordinate, and oversee the
implementation of policy related to NATO and other institutions with a
security dimension. He would likely ask that I represent the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense in
interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations dealing
with these assigned areas of responsibility, when appropriate. Finally,
I would likely be asked to monitor and provide policy recommendations
related to the conduct of U.S. military operations in the countries and
regions under the areas of my responsibility, as well as on the
participation of those countries and organizations in security or
defense operations elsewhere that have an impact on U.S. defense
considerations.
Question. What impact has the reorganization of the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy had on the functions and duties
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs?
Answer. Prior to the reorganization of the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
ISA had responsibility for bilateral and regional policy issues
globally, except for in Europe and Eurasia. ISA also had responsibility
for the conduct of Prisoners of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA)
affairs, coalition management, activities related to support to public
diplomacy, and oversight of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
The reorganization of policy aligned the policy regional offices
more closely to the combatant commands. The Assistant Secretary of
Defense for ISA retained responsibility for Africa and the Middle East.
European, Eurasian, and NATO matters were added to the ISA portfolio.
The Office of Asian Affairs, including matters pertaining to
Afghanistan (except for NATO operations in Afghanistan), now falls
under the new Office of the Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific
Security Affairs. The Western Hemisphere Office also moved; it now
falls under the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense.
The new policy organization gathers functional responsibilities
under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) and Interdependent Capabilities and the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security
Affairs. Coalition management issues, POW/MIA affairs, and oversight of
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency are now housed under the Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs. Personnel
working public diplomacy issues now report to the Support for Public
Diplomacy Directorate.
Question. What challenges has the reorganization created for
carrying out those functions and duties, and what steps would you take
to address those challenges?
Answer. The reorganization of policy created a more effectively
balanced organization with a greater ability to address post-Cold War,
crosscutting issues. It also made the policy organization more flexible
and adaptive to evolving policy challenges and leadership priorities.
This resulted in offices with a broader expertise in the different
facets of a single issue. This is a benefit rather than a challenge,
but it does require close coordination across the portfolios of the
various Assistant Secretaries. The Office of the Under Secretary must
continue to ensure that it remains true to the spirit of the
reorganization--to remain flexible and adaptive as the security
challenges we face constantly change, and to adjust priorities and
allocation of resources accordingly.
Question. How do you see the civilian role, as opposed to the
military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?
Answer. From the briefings I have received, I understand that the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's office initiates the biennial
contingency planning cycle on behalf of the Secretary through the
Contingency Planning Guidance. Following the guidance in this document,
which the President approves, combatant commanders develop operation
plans for prescribed scenarios. As they are being developed, the
Secretary of Defense periodically reviews the most important of these
plans with the responsible combatant commander. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy follows the development of this body of plans and
assists the Secretary in a formal review of the plans, which are then
submitted for his approval.
Question. Will the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for
ISA include responsibility for dealing with NATO nuclear matters?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA serves as the
Chair of the NATO High Level Group, the advisory body to NATO's Nuclear
Planning Group. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA performs
this duty in very close coordination with the Assistant Secretary for
SO/LIC, who has responsibility for strategic capabilities, including
nuclear forces.
Question. Will the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for
ISA include any responsibility for formulating strategic nuclear
policy?
Answer. No. These duties belong to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for SO/LIC and Interdependent Capabilities.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I believe I am qualified for this position by a combination
of the over 15 years of government experience in the intelligence and
policy arenas, my experience dealing with international issues and
foreign officials, and by the skills I have developed as an attorney
and manager.
I have served in the DOD since 2004 and have held the position as
the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA since
August 2005. In this capacity, I have been called upon to perform many
of the duties and roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
particularly since the departure of Assistant Secretary Peter Rodman in
March 2007. In the 27 months as the Principal Deputy in ISA, I have
become steeped in the issues that the Assistant Secretary must confront
and have represented ISA within the interagency and with senior foreign
defense counterparts. In addition, I have testified before, and have
regular interaction with, Congress on ISA issues. I also have
established effective working relationships with my DOD counterparts,
as well as with my interagency and foreign colleagues.
Prior to my current assignment in the Department, I served as the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics for over a
year, beginning that appointment in May 2004. As the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, I worked extensively with
ISA and related Department, interagency, and foreign colleagues, as
well as with Congress. Much of my work in that office focused on
building capacity in Afghanistan and transnational threats.
Before coming to the DOD, I served with the Central Intelligence
Agency from 1986-1999. While there, I developed experience working with
many issues related to the ISA portfolio and gained significant
experience dealing with the interagency and foreign government
officials. In particular, I worked closely with the Departments of
State and Defense on terrorism, nuclear issues, and other transnational
threats, even serving as the Embassy ``Principal (Anti-) Money
Laundering Officer'' and representative to multilateral organizations,
including those on conventional weapons and weapons transfer issues.
From 1999 to May 2004, I practiced law with Williams & Connolly
LLP. In that capacity, I developed many of the skills necessary to
successful performance as an Assistant Secretary, including critical
thinking, creative problem-solving, and the conduct of complex
negotiations.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense;
The Deputy Secretary of Defense;
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence;
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
The Secretaries of the Military Departments;
The Chiefs of Staff of the Services;
The combatant commanders, in particular Central Command,
European Command (EUCOM), and Africa Command (AFRICOM);
The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific
Security Affairs;
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security
Affairs; and
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and
Interdependent Capabilities.

Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and
Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy. I will work closely with the Principal Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy. I also expect to develop and maintain close
working relationships with the Under Secretaries and Assistant
Secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of DOD, the
Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with combatant commanders.
The position requires close coordination with the other Assistant
Secretaries of Defense within OSD Policy, as appropriate. Examples of
this coordination would include working with the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs on
the role of NATO in Afghanistan; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
SO/LIC and Interdependent Capabilities on counterterrorism,
particularly in Iraq, and on nuclear matters; the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs on
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in my area of
responsibility; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Global Security Affairs on Counternarcotics, and coalition affairs,
proliferation, and security assistance matters.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA? Assuming you
are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?
Answer. A number of the major challenges that the next Assistant
Secretary of Defense for ISA will confront are related to how best to
support the U.S. warfighter deployed in the regions under the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for ISA. In the
areas under ISA responsibility, there are currently significant numbers
of U.S. forces deployed--many of them in combat or combat support
roles--including over 150,000 in Iraq. In the next year, there will be
many political and other transitions that significantly impact these
forces as governments of coalition partners face elections and mandate
renewals, as the Iraqi and Afghan governments mature, and as U.S.
forces adjust in number and mandate. Should I be confirmed, I will
commit myself to working in close partnership with Congress, the
military departments and other agencies, our coalition partners, and
the Iraqi and Afghan Governments, to properly support our deployed
warfighters.

IRAQ

Question. The President has said that the purpose of the surge over
the last year was to give Iraqi politicians the breathing space to
effect reconciliation.
Would you agree that reconciliation has not been achieved and,
consequently, the surge has not met its stated purpose?
Answer. The President's New Way Forward, announced in January 2007,
increased the number of U.S. troops in Iraq in order to facilitate
political progress and to give Iraq the time and assistance needed to
build the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces and government
capacity.
As General Petraeus has indicated, the increase in troop strength
combined with a tactical focus on counterinsurgency have been
successful in bringing violence down to levels comparable to the spring
of 2005--thus allowing political progress to take place, particularly
at a local level. While this political progress has taken place, it has
not been in the way we originally expected. Bottom-up reconciliation
has occurred at the local and provincial level with Iraqi citizens
rejecting al Qaeda in Iraq and forming Concerned Local Citizen groups.
Provincial governments are also functioning more effectively. At the
national level, political developments have been less encouraging.
National reconciliation is still a work in progress, but economic
development is occurring and efforts to advance significant
legislation, such as the deBaathification legislation, are underway.
A significant challenge for the next months will be supporting, in
consultation with Congress, the Government of Iraq's ability to
capitalize on local gains, to pass key legislation, and to promote
national reconciliation, including by capitalizing on the momentum of
bottom-up progress to meet enhanced top-down efforts.
Question. What leverage do you believe the United States has to
induce Iraqi politicians to effect reconciliation?
Answer. Surely our presence in Iraq, our active involvement with
the Iraqi Government leaders, our relationships with Iraq's neighbors,
and our engagement in support of Iraq in multinational force provide us
with significant leverage. As Ambassador Crocker stated, a crucial
question is whether Iraq's collective national leadership is ready to
prioritize the interests of the Government of Iraq over sectarian and
community interests. Ambassador Crocker believes Iraq's leaders have
the will to tackle these problems.
An important aspect of U.S. leverage is our ability to serve as a
facilitator for enabling the Iraqis to make the hard decisions
necessary in order to determine their own destiny. We appeal to Iraqi
national interest and observe that Iraq will prosper if the interests
of all elements of society are accommodated.
Finally, we have significant leverage through our relationships
with allies neighboring Iraq. For example, the Neighbors Ministerial
meetings have been helpful in addressing issues such as border
security, refugees, and energy, and we have worked hard to support Iraq
as it leads this process.
Question. How quickly do you believe U.S. troop levels could and
should be reduced in Iraq? On what do you base this?
Answer. In close and continuing dialogue with Congress, I believe
the assessment should be based on the recommendation of the commander
on the ground. When General Petraeus testified before Congress in
September, he stated that he believed we would be able to reduce our
forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by the summer of
2008 without jeopardizing hard-fought security gains. Thus far, the
trend looks favorable.
This coming spring, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will
return to report to Congress and the American people on the status of
developments in Iraq. At that time, he will address how quickly he
believes U.S. troop levels can be reduced. It is our hope that he will
report that the reductions currently contemplated can be executed and
will provide his advice on further reductions.
Question. What level of U.S. force presence do you foresee in Iraq
over the long term? What missions do you see those forces performing?
How long do you believe that period will be?
Answer. We are working closely with our Iraqi partners to determine
what our presence will look like beyond the summer of 2008; however, as
General Petraeus stated in his testimony last September, ``our
experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into
the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even
hazardous.'' Determining the final nature and level of that presence
depends upon what the Iraqis desire as well as what we believe we
should provide, and should be determined in close coordination with
Congress.
Most likely, the relationship will build upon the Declaration of
Principles signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki on
November 26. This declaration commits the Governments of the United
States and Iraq to agree to a long-term security agreement to regulate
our security relationship by July 31, 2008.
As the President stated, the United States envisions the creation
of an enduring relationship that is in the best interest of both the
United States and Iraq, which would include security cooperation to
help provide for Iraqi stability and to prosecute the war on terror.
Troop levels would be governed by the conditions on the ground.
Specifically, it is envisioned that U.S. troops might be required to
deter external aggression, support Iraq in its effort to combat
terrorist groups, and to train and equip the Iraqi security forces.
The United States does not seek permanent bases in Iraq. In the
next months, it will be engaging the Iraqis in discussion on the nature
of our continued presence, including the protection of our forces (to
include Status of Forces-like protections) and the support required for
our long-term relationship with them. It is likely that we may seek
agreements with the Iraqis to provide access to facilities to support
our activities.

IRAQ LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What do you believe to be the major lessons learned from
the Iraq invasion and the ongoing effort to stabilize the country?
Answer. As Secretary Gates recently said to an audience at Kansas
State University, ``One of the most important lessons from our
experience in Iraq, Afghanista`n, and elsewhere has been the decisive
role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any
meaningful, long-term success.'' Essential ingredients for
stabilization include economic development, institution building,
internal reconciliation, governance, basic services, the training and
equipping the indigenous military and police forces, and strategic
communications.
Our experience in Iraq has also taught us the importance of
deploying civilian expertise. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are
designed to employ civilians experienced in agriculture, governance,
and other aspects of development--to work with and alongside the
military to improve the lives of the local population, a key tenet of
any counterinsurgency effort. Where they are on the ground--even in
small numbers--we see tangible and often dramatic improvements.
Another lesson deserving of highlighting is the importance of
enabling and empowering our partners to defend and govern themselves.
The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police--once the
province of Special Forces--is now a key mission for the military as a
whole and a key to our success in Iraq.

IRAQ REFUGEES

Question. The United Nations estimates that over 4 million Iraqis
have been displaced by violence, and over 2.3 million have vacated
their homes for safer areas within Iraq. Further, 1.5 million are now
living in Syria, and over 1 million refugees inhabit Jordan, Iran,
Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, and Turkey. Most of these Iraqis are determined
to be resettled to North America or Europe, and few consider return to
Iraq a viable option.
What do you believe should be the role of the DOD with regard to
managing the return of refugees to Iraq?
Answer. DOD's role is to support the State Department and other
U.S. agencies that work with international organizations responsible
for assisting refugees, or internally displaced persons, and promoting
their safe return.
Another key role is to help the government of Iraq to provide its
citizens with a secure environment in which to resume their lives.

MIDDLE EAST ARMS PACKAGE

Question. The administration's recently proposed $30 billion arms
package was presented to Congress as a critical means by which U.S.
allies in the Middle East could deter Iranian influence in the region.
In light of the recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on
Iran, do you believe the scope of this arms package should or should
not be reconsidered?
Answer. As Secretary Gates said recently in Manama (on December 8,
2007), the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) is a joint State Department-DOD
initiative oriented toward developing a strategic framework to enhance
and strengthen regional security. The proposed sales associated with
the GSD should help maintain the balance of power in the region by
assisting countries to counter conventional as well as unconventional,
asymmetric, and terrorist threats, including threats posed by ballistic
missiles. The weapons systems associated with the GSD are primarily
defensive in nature and are designed to help our friends deter and
defend against such threats, including those from Iran.

IRAN

Question. Do you support a diplomatic approach for engaging
directly with Iran regarding stability and security in Iraq?
Answer. Yes. The Department supports the effort led by Ambassador
Crocker in dialogue with the Iranians regarding all of our concerns
related to Iraqi stability and security. We are seeking to convince
Iran that it is to its benefit that Iraq becomes a neighbor that is
stable, secure, and prosperous.
Question. From a policy perspective, what impact does the recent
NIE on Iran have on the Department's thinking about Iran as a regional
threat and a threat to the United States?
Answer. As the President has stated, our thinking on Iran has not
changed. Further, as Secretary Gates emphasized in Manama, the report
expresses with greater confidence than ever that Iran did have a
nuclear weapons program--developed secretly, kept hidden for years, and
in violation of its international obligations. As the Secretary said in
his Manama speech, the Iranians do have the mechanisms still in place
to restart their program at any time. Importantly, the estimate did not
identify impediments to Iran restarting the program.

LIBYA

Question. Over the past few years, the United States' relationship
with Libya has changed dramatically.
From a policy perspective, in your assessment, what should be the
nature of our military-to-military cooperation with Libya?
Answer. Any military-to-military relationship with Libya needs to
be developed and conducted within the overall context of a coordinated
U.S. Government policy framework and in close consultation with
Congress. Such a relationship should be supportive of Libya's
continuing transformation to a responsible form of government and
sustained normalization of its relationship with the international
community.
Question. How should DOD engage with other countries removed from
the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?
Answer. DOD should proceed deliberately, on a case-by-case basis,
and in close consultation with Congress. It would be important to
develop military-to-military relations and conduct DOD activities
within a well-coordinated U.S. Government policy framework and in a way
that reinforces respect for human rights and international law.

SYRIA

Question. Do you believe it is in the United States' interest to
engage Syria in a direct dialogue regarding stability and security in
Iraq?
Answer. There are opportunities for Syria to engage in constructive
dialogue on this issue, and I welcome Syria to take advantage of these
opportunities--through our Embassy in Damascus, opportunities such as
the recent Annapolis dialogue, through multinational fora to include
the U.N., or indirectly, perhaps through the Iraqis or others. But for
engagement to be productive, Syria must stop its destabilizing behavior
in the region, including permitting terrorist networks to move suicide
bombs into Iraq, harboring former Iraqi Baathist regime leaders and
regional terrorist groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine-Governing Command, enabling the flow of weapons to
Hizballah in Lebanon, and working against Lebanon's democratic
institutions.

NATO FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. General John Craddock, Supreme Allied Commander Europe,
has said that the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan is short on maneuver battalions; intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance; helicopters; lift; and operational
mentoring and liaison teams (OMLTs) for training the Afghanistan
National Security Forces (ANSF).
What do you believe can and should be done to persuade NATO members
to provide the additional troops and equipment to meet the Afghanistan
mission requirements?
Answer. We should continue to engage NATO at all levels and at all
opportunities. We also should continue to engage NATO members
bilaterally to encourage their support in filling NATO shortfalls. In
addition, Secretary Gates and others should continue to engage NATO
members and others in meetings like the U.K.-hosted meeting of the
eight Allied Defense Ministers contributing forces and capabilities to
ISAF Regional Command-South held earlier this month. As Secretary Gates
mentioned recently before Congress, our goal is for allies to agree to
a strategic concept that outlines where we want to be in 3 to 5 years
in Afghanistan, where we hope the Afghan Government will be, the ways
in which we intend to get there, and ways in which we can measure
progress. It is our belief that such a strategy will help increase
support among allied legislatures and electorates for the Afghan
mission and therefore assist in generating the force, resources, and
flexibility required for ISAF to succeed.
Question. Should NATO put more emphasis on training the ANSF to
take on a greater role in providing security throughout Afghanistan,
including by providing more OMLTs? What do you believe are the benefits
and risks of such an approach?
Answer. Yes; NATO should put more emphasis on training the ANSF,
particularly by providing more, and more capable, OMLTs. Although NATO
is not in a position to take over the ANSF training mission, allies can
contribute significantly by overcoming the existing and projected
shortfall in the number and capabilities of OMLTs.
Question. What do you believe should be done to induce NATO members
to remove national restrictions on the use of their troops in
Afghanistan?
Answer. As indicated above, we will engage at all opportunities to
stress the need for allies to lift national caveats that hamper
employment of their forces by the ISAF commander. Additionally, by
developing and implementing a strategic concept with benchmarks and
agreed-upon goals, we may increase support among legislatures and
electorates so allied governments are willing to lift national caveats
on how their forces are used.

MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE

Question. The United States has proposed deploying a long-range
missile defense system in Europe that is intended to provide protection
for the United States and most, but not all, of NATO Europe against
ballistic missiles. Since this proposed system would not cover all of
NATO Europe, it has caused concern within NATO because of the critical
principle of the indivisibility of security of all of NATO's nations.
Do you support the principle of the indivisibility of security of
all NATO nations and, if confirmed, would you work to ensure that any
missile defense system (or system-of-systems) to protect NATO Europe is
consistent with this critical principle?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will reinforce the message conveyed by
the Under Secretary of Defense and others before the North Atlantic
Council, the NATO-Russia Council, partner nations, and others to assure
them that we will work to ensure that any missile defense system to
protect NATO is consistent with the important principle of
indivisibility of alliance security.
Question. The United States is proposing to pay for the deployment
of a missile defense system to provide protection for the United States
and most of NATO Europe, but is not proposing to pay for missile
defense protection of the rest of NATO Europe, nor to seek NATO funding
for the proposed deployment.
What is your view on how the costs of missile defense of Europe
should be paid, and what responsibility the various NATO nations should
have in paying for such defense?
Answer. In Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC
and Interdependent Capabilities has primary responsibility for much of
the deployment and functional aspects of the missile defense system we
propose. That said, the U.S. elements we are proposing to field in
Europe would represent a substantial U.S. contribution to the defense
of NATO territory. It would be premature to discuss possible funding
arrangements for any defenses in addition to those the United States is
proposing. I note, however, that NATO is already funding the Active
Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense program to defend deployed
NATO forces. It is possible that this existing program could be
expanded so that, in concert with short-range missile defenses being
developed and acquired by several NATO allies, these elements might
provide an integrated defense for those allies not covered by the U.S.
system.
Question. Do you believe the United States should be willing to pay
for missile defense protection of the portions of NATO Europe not
covered by the proposed European deployment, or that other NATO nations
should be willing to pay for portions of the proposed deployment?
Answer. My previous answer applies equally well to this question.
The proposed U.S. system would represent a substantial U.S.
contribution to the defense of allied territory. Since the architecture
of the complementary short- to medium-range system has not been
determined, it is premature to discuss possible funding arrangements.
However, the active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense NATO is
already acquiring could be used as the command and control backbone for
missile defenses being developed and acquired by several NATO allies
that could be employed to cover the remainder of NATO territory. If
confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure appropriate transparency
and coordination as we move forward on this effort.
Question. The Commander of EUCOM is the combatant commander
responsible for the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), including
defense against ballistic missile attack. It is unclear what role EUCOM
will play in missile defense in Europe, since the long-range system
proposed for deployment in Europe is expected to be controlled by U.S.
Northern Command from the United States.
What role do you believe would be appropriate for EUCOM in missile
defense of its AOR, and what role do you believe EUCOM should have in
coordinating and operating missile defenses with NATO for defense of
Europe?
Answer. In Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC
and Interdependent Capabilities is the lead for the technical and
implementation considerations of the proposed deployment. That said,
development of the command and control arrangements for missile
defenses in Europe, which will ultimately include both short- and long-
range defenses, is undoubtedly a complex matter. If confirmed, as we
develop the appropriate command and control and other arrangements, I
will consult closely with allies, the relevant combatant commanders,
and Congress on this issue.

KOSOVO

Question. Nearly 16,000 NATO troops currently participate in the
Kosovo Force (KFOR) providing security and stabilization assistance.
What changes, if any, do you anticipate in the role or requirements
of KFOR, and for U.S. forces in particular, after the ``troika''--the
European Union, Russia, and the United States--report to U.N. Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon later this month regarding Kosovo's future status?
Answer. If confirmed, I will endeavor to support the Department's
position that, at least in the short-term, KFOR's role should remain
the same--to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo,
providing assistance to the U.N. Mission in Kosovo and monitoring,
verifying, and when necessary, enforcing compliance with the conditions
related to the cessation of hostilities in 1999. I do not foresee KFOR
taking on additional tasks normally performed by police forces or
customs officials.
Now that the troika has reported to U.N. Secretary General Ban that
the talks were not successful, the next step is for the International
Community to decide whether the comprehensive settlement package put
forward by U.N. Special Representative Ahtisaari should serve as a
basis for a new political framework in Kosovo. If that decision is
made, I would expect KFOR to continue its current mission through a
transition period to a new supervisory regime.

FUTURE OF NATO

Question. What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that
you foresee for NATO over the next 5 years?
Answer. NATO has the opportunity to complete its transformation
from a static military alliance, focused on territorial defense, to an
alliance that can deliver security wherever allies' common security
interests are threatened around the globe. As a part of this, NATO has
the opportunity to professionalize, transform, and develop the forces
of its new members. NATO also has the opportunity to enhance
interoperability and NATO's overall capabilities--through initiatives
such as enhancing alliance strategic airlift, improving Alliance
Special Operations Forces capabilities, and adapting the NATO Command
Structure.
The primary and continuing challenge is to get allies to devote the
resources needed to continue transforming their military forces to
succeed in expeditionary operations such as Afghanistan. In that
operation, generating the needed forces and capabilities has been
difficult due to budget shortfalls and a shortage of capable and
interoperable expeditionary forces.
Question. Do you support further enlargement of NATO within the
next 5 years?
Answer. I believe that NATO's door should be open to new members as
long as they meet NATO's performance-based standards. It is my belief
that enlargement will promote a Europe free, whole, and at peace, and I
support NATO's efforts to prepare aspirants for the responsibilities
and obligations of membership.
Question. What more can the United States do to encourage NATO
member nations to spend more on defense, transform their militaries,
acquire advanced capabilities, and enhance their interoperability with
the United States and other NATO member nations?
Answer. The United States can help by demonstrating its political
commitment to the alliance, working through NATO to address today's
complex global security challenges, and by making it clear to allies
that we expect them to bear an equitable share of the burden of
alliance security.
The United States must also lead by example, continuing to field
expeditionary and state-of-the-art forces and capabilities, and
employing them in a NATO context, so allied nations can see first-hand
the benefits of military transformation and the requirements for allied
interoperability.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

Question. The European Union's (EU) European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP) reflects the EU's intention to create a capability to
conduct military operations in response to international crises in
cases where ``NATO as a whole is not engaged.'' Concerns have been
raised that the ESDP could compete with, rather than complement, the
NATO alliance.
Do you believe that the United States and its European allies have
taken sufficient steps to ensure that ESDP is implemented in a way that
complements and strengthens NATO?
Answer. The administration supports ESDP on the understanding it
would increase our allies' and partners' military capabilities, would
conduct missions where NATO was not engaged, and would do so in a
manner cooperative with NATO. The United States and most allies have
worked hard to strengthen NATO-EU cooperation. Much has been
accomplished, in policy consultations and on real-world missions like
in Bosnia. Still, we expect continuing U.S. and allied efforts to
maintain and bolster this cooperation. If confirmed, I will work with
allies in consultation with Congress to ensure that the ESDP is
implemented in a manner that ensures it complements, and does not
duplicate or detract from, NATO.

ENGAGEMENT POLICY

Question. One of the central pillars of our recent national
security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building
relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, Joint
Combined Exchange Training exercises, combatant commander exercises,
and humanitarian de-mining operations, have been used to achieve this
goal.
Do you believe that these activities contribute positively to U.S.
national security?
Answer. Yes. The challenges we face today--defeating terrorist
networks, defending the Homelands of ourselves and our allies, shaping
the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing
hostile states from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction--
cannot be accomplished by one country alone, no matter how powerful.
Military engagement helps build the capacity of friendly and allied
militaries, enabling them to contribute to our mutual security,
including to the fight against terrorism. These activities also
facilitate international cooperation and interoperability.
Question. If confirmed, would you support continued engagement
activities of the U.S. military?
Answer. Yes, for the reasons noted above.
Question. What improvements, if any, would you suggest to the
interagency process for implementing these authorities?
Answer. DOD works closely with the State Department to plan and
implement security cooperation globally. As the Secretary of Defense
said recently in his Landon Lecture series remarks at Kansas State
University, new threats require our government to operate differently--
to act with unity, agility, and creativity. As the Secretary stated,
these new threats will require that we devote considerably more
resources to America's non-military instruments of power. I believe
these instruments of power include regular military engagement.

RUSSIA

Question. U.S.-Russian relations have experienced increased
tensions over the past several months, including as a result of Russian
reactions to the U.S. proposal for a missile defense site in Europe.
What is your vision for U.S.-Russia relations in promoting security
in Europe and globally?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek constructive cooperation with
Russia to promote European and global security--of course, while
remaining true to our principles. We have a robust bilateral annual
work plan with the Russians, consisting of over 100 planned events that
are mainly focused on exchanges and developing interoperability. These
include numerous exercises, both sea-based and on the ground. Moreover,
we are engaged in discussions with Russia to try to find how we can
cooperate in the area of missile defense to counter the growing
ballistic missile threat, as well as to assuage Russian concerns about
the proposed missile defense program. For example, over the last
months, we have had numerous exchanges with the Russians on the
``expert level'' concerning the proposed missile defense sites, as well
as high-level engagements, including by Secretary Gates, with Russian
interlocutors.
At the same time, we must defend our interests and advance our
values. The Cold War is long over and the United States and Russia are
no longer strategic competitors, but we are concerned about the
apparent ``enemy image'' many Russians have of the United States and
NATO, their suspension of the CFE Treaty, their opposition to missile
defense plans which are not a threat to their security, and Russian
arms sales to countries of concern.
Question. Does support for ratification of the Adapted CFE remain
in the interest of the United States and its NATO allies?
Answer. I believe that the CFE regime remains in our interest, and
that if outstanding problems can be solved, the present Treaty can and
should be replaced by the Adapted Treaty to reflect post-Cold war
realities (for example, by eliminating the current Treaty's bloc-to-
bloc structure).
Question. What do you believe would be the impact of Russian
suspension of the CFE Treaty on security in Europe?
Answer. The impact on security will depend on future Russian
actions. Russian officials have said they will not be bound by CFE
equipment limitations, but that they have no plans to build up their
forces as long as other states do not do so.
The transparency provided by CFE notifications and inspections have
contributed greatly to where we are today, including the increased
confidence of the states in the region. It appears that those
notifications and inspections will not occur during suspension and this
may decrease the confidence among the states party to the treaty over
time.
Question. Is it in the U.S. interest to engage with Russia to
persuade them to adhere to their obligations under the CFE Treaty?
Answer. The CFE Treaty and other treaties have contributed greatly
to where we are today--for example, by leading to reductions in over
69,000 items of military equipment and establishing current limits that
contribute to stability in Europe. The Under Secretary for Policy and
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA has been fully
engaged in support of efforts led by the Department of State Assistant
Secretary Dan Fried and others in encouraging the Russians to reverse
their decision to suspend. Indeed, we have participated in meetings and
co-chaired exchanges with the Russians in an attempt to resolve Russian
concerns related to the treaty. If confirmed, I will continue our
activities to encourage Russia to reverse its decision on suspension
and to engage with us to resolve outstanding problems.
Question. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will expire
in December 2009. In your view, what elements of this treaty should be
extended or modified?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be responsible for the Department's
overall relationship with Russia. Specific issues related to strategic
nuclear arms, however, fall under the responsibility of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and Interdependent Capabilities, Mr.
Vickers. That said, I recognize that START was invaluable in reducing
strategic forces at the end of the Cold War and providing us with the
security posture we now enjoy. The context of our strategic
relationship with Russia has changed since the Cold War, however, and
discussions on this and related issues should reflect the current
security contexts in which we now find ourselves. While we are not
allies with Russia, we do need to cooperate with it on a range of
issues, including counter-WMD and counterterrorism. If confirmed, I
will work closely with Assistant Secretary Vickers and the Department
of State to further our national security interests, including in this
area. It is my understanding that efforts are underway in the
interagency to address this issue and that those efforts include
limited dialogue with the Russians on post-START.
Question. Do you believe that the international arms control legal
framework with Russia and other former Soviet states, including the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the START, and the Treaty on
Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), continue to promote security and
stability in Europe and globally?
Answer. As I noted in my previous answer, I recognize that START
was invaluable in reducing strategic forces at the end of the Cold War
and providing us with the security posture we now enjoy. They also
contributed significantly to the confidence of many of our allies. The
context of our strategic relationship with Russia has changed since the
Cold War, however, and discussions with the Russians should reflect the
current security contexts in which we now find ourselves. While we are
not allies with Russia, we do need to cooperate with it on a range of
issues. If confirmed, I would continue the senior-level engagement, as
well as the transparency and confidence building measures, for building
trust with the Russians, as well as for providing insight and
understanding of their concerns.
Question. In your view does continuing the presence of U.S.
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe serve any national security purpose,
and if so, what is that purpose?
Answer. Yes; the U.S. nuclear forces committed to NATO and based in
Europe are one of the most tangible signs of our commitment to the
indivisibility of security to all NATO nations, as well as to extended
deterrence. In addition, they are a critical political and military
link between the United States and its European allies. By maintaining
our commitment to extended deterrence and sizing our force posture at
the appropriate level, we support our allies and reduce the incentive
for others to develop independent nuclear capabilities. Moreover, the
weapons provide a very real capability to respond to aggression and, as
such, serve as an important deterrent to such aggression.
Question. If these tactical nuclear weapons were to be removed from
Europe, could there be any political or other benefits as a result?
Answer. Removal of those weapons would undermine a visible aspect
of alliance solidarity and eliminate a capability that, by its very
existence, helps reduce the incentive for others to develop independent
nuclear capabilities, and helps deter emerging threats.
Question. In general, what are your views on continuing to maintain
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe? Is there a point in time or a
set of circumstances at which or under which you would support removing
these tactical nuclear weapons?
Answer. NATO's nuclear forces are of critical political-military
importance. These forces: provide unique capabilities that cannot be
met by conventional weapons; support the basic NATO precepts of shared
risks and responsibilities and widespread participation; and strengthen
the link between North American and European members of the alliance.
It is my view, as well as that of the current administration and of the
NATO alliance, that U.S. nuclear weapons should remain in Europe as
tangible evidence of our commitment to the indivisibility of security
to all NATO nations.
Question. If confirmed, what responsibilities would you have with
respect to nonproliferation programs, such as the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) Program, in Russia and the states of the former Soviet
Union and in making any decisions about where and when geographic
expansion of the CTR programs should occur?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant
Secretary for Global Security Affairs, who is responsible for the
management of nonproliferation programs for the DOD, to ensure that
policy decisions regarding the direction of CTR programs take into
account regional and political-military implications.

AFRICA COMMAND

Question. Full Operational Capability (FOC) for AFRICOM is
scheduled for October 1, 2009, and there remains a significant amount
of work to be completed, including standing up a staff, an adequate
headquarters, and a forward deployed capability.
In your assessment, is the DOD moving too quickly to make fully
operational a major geographic combatant command or is the current
schedule manageable?
Answer. The timelines we have developed for AFRICOM's establishment
as a fully operational unified command are aggressive; however, I
believe we can achieve them through continued concerted efforts within
the Department, with our interagency partners, and with the support of
Congress. AFRICOM reached initial operational capacity this past
October and is progressing steadily toward FOC in October 2008.
Although FOC is a significant milestone, the command will continue to
evolve and improve as we incorporate lessons learned and best
practices. If confirmed, I will continue to dialogue with Congress in
establishing the command.
Question. AFRICOM is contemplated as playing a larger role in
development activities than have other combatant commands. On the
African continent, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) currently has more than 20 bilateral field missions and three
regional missions.
What is your understanding of the role AFRICOM will play in the
area of development activities?
Answer. I fully recognize the unique role and significant
capabilities of USAID as the primary U.S. agency providing development
and disaster relief assistance abroad. AFRICOM will play a supporting
role in development activities when necessary and appropriate. USAID
staff within the command will help ensure that such responses when
appropriate and necessary are well-planned, well-coordinated, and well-
executed, to include their integration with other USAID efforts in the
region.
Question. From a policy perspective, what do you believe to be the
appropriate role of the DOD in delivering development and humanitarian
services?
Answer. DOD, and therefore the command, plays a supporting role in
delivering development and humanitarian services, as required. The U.S.
military is not an instrument of first resort in providing humanitarian
assistance but supports civilian relief agencies. I recognize that
USAID is the principal agency extending assistance to countries
recovering from disaster or authorized to receive development
assistance.

U.S. MILITARY BASING IN EUROPE

Question. On August 16, 2004, the President announced an Integrated
Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) touted as the most
comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the
end of the Korean War. As part of force transformation efforts which
also included a domestic base realignment and closure round, hundreds
of military bases and facilities at overseas locations would be closed
and roughly 70,000 personnel would return from Europe and Asia to bases
in the United States. Recently the Secretary of Defense has indicated
that the number of U.S. military personnel to be returned from Europe
may potentially be reduced, and some bases originally scheduled for
closure might remain open for an unspecified period of time.
Do you support the goals of the IGPBS which would reduce the number
of installations and the force posture of U.S. forces stationed
overseas, specifically in Germany?
Answer. Yes. While I defer to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for SO/LIC and Interdependent Capabilities, if confirmed, I will
support the decisions supporting the current posture plan for Europe to
transform Cold War legacy forces and bases into a more relevant and
flexible network of capabilities for dealing with post-September 11
security challenges. It is my understanding that since the IGPBS was
signed in 2004, for various reasons, General Craddock has requested
that the Secretary reconsider the number of forces that will remain in
Germany, at least for the short term. If confirmed, I look forward to
working closely with Congress on this issue.
Question. What is your understanding of the reasons for the
Secretary of Defense to reassess the original goals of the IGPBS?
Answer. As stated above, the Department is considering retaining
some force posture in theater longer than originally anticipated to
address a number of issues, including the near-term security
cooperation needs with European partners. This potential change may
also help ensure the quality of life for soldiers and families as part
of the Army's plans for stationing new ``Grow the Force'' units. If
confirmed, I will work closely with Congress on this issue.
Question. In your assessment, does DOD need to propose to the
President an update to the IGPBS strategy due to new trends or emerging
threats?
Answer. The Department continually reassesses and refines its
posture plans to address changes in the strategic environment.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

KOSOVO

1. Senator McCain. Ms. Long, it is expected that in the coming
weeks Kosovo will declare its independence and that declaration will be
supported by the United States and the European Union (EU). Serbia and
Russia oppose a unilateral declaration of Kosovo independence creating
the potential for instability and violence in that volatile region. Is
the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) prepared for this situation and for the
potential for increased violence in and around Kosovo?
Ms. Long. NATO's KFOR is prepared to deal with potential increased
violence in Kosovo. Since mid-2006, KFOR has conducted a series of
planning exercises and rehearsals to prepare for all likely
contingencies. These planning sessions and exercises often include
members of the local and United Nations Interim Administration in
Kosovo police, as well as representatives from the many international
and non-governmental organizations operating in Kosovo. KFOR has also
increased its operational tempo, visible presence, and intelligence
gathering activities.
Through the Joint Implementation Commission, KFOR maintains contact
with the Armed Forces of Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Macedonia to
ensure transparency and reduce tension.
Over the past few years, NATO has succeeded in removing nearly all
caveats that troop contributing nations have placed on the use of their
forces. The KFOR commander now has the authority to move his forces
anywhere they are needed. KFOR routinely moves units from their
habitual sectors to other parts of Kosovo to familiarize them with the
terrain and local situation.
The KFOR commander can also call on a series of local and over the
horizon Reserve Forces. These units rehearse deploying to Kosovo and
operating throughout the province. Although KFOR is only authorized to
operate in Kosovo, NATO maintains small headquarters in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, and Belgrade. If necessary, NATO can
deploy its over the horizon Reserves to Bosnia-Herzegovina to reinforce
the EU's peacekeeping force.

2. Senator McCain. Ms. Long, what do you foresee as the worst case
scenario for which KFOR must be prepared?
Ms. Long. Since Serbia's President, Foreign and Defense Ministers,
and Chief of General Staff have stated that Belgrade will not intervene
in Kosovo militarily, the worst case scenario for which KFOR must be
prepared is a Kosovar Serb rejection of Pristina's declaration of
independence. Serbs comprise the vast majority of people living in
northern Kosovo--an area that shares a contiguous border with Serbia.
A declaration and recognition of independence could spark inter-
ethnic violence, cause Kosovar Serbs living in southern Kosovo to leave
their homes, and cause northern Serbs to challenge KFOR's authority. A
Kosovar Serb rejection of independence could also result in a de facto
partition. NATO and the international community have developed
contingency plans for this and other scenarios.
If the leadership in Belgrade does decide to intervene militarily
in Kosovo, NATO has the authority under U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1244 and a 1999 North Atlantic Council decision to engage in
combat operations.

3. Senator McCain. Ms. Long, what steps are being taken
diplomatically to lessen the possibility that serious and sustained
violence will result?
Ms. Long. We and our State Department colleagues have been working
closely with allies, countries in the region, NATO, the EU, the U.N.
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, and other international
organizations to lessen the probability that sustained and serious
violence will occur in Kosovo.
We worked diligently to develop and solidify international
consensus to resolve Kosovo's political status and asked Ambassador
Frank Wisner to represent the United States during the recent EU/
Russia/U.S. Troika discussion.
We support the EU's decision to plan for an International Civilian
Office and deploy a police and justice mission and we have asked
nations that provide troops to KFOR to keep their forces in Kosovo
regardless of the outcome of the status process.
Finally, we maintain constant contact with officials in Belgrade
and Pristina to reinforce our expectation that those countries refrain
from provocative acts and actively discourage violence of any kind. The
EU and other partners have taken similar action. We have also conveyed
our expectations to all the relevant communities in Serbia and Kosovo
and seek to keep open lines of communication with them.

AFRICA COMMAND

4. Senator McCain. Ms. Long, establishment of the new U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM) continues to be a work in progress as both the
structure of the organization and its mission are continually being
refined. Recent briefings to committee staff have suggested that
together, the military services could provide up to 1,000 personnel to
the AFRICOM headquarters staff. Where would this large number of
service personnel dedicated to AFRICOM be stationed?
Ms. Long. The headquarters for AFRICOM is currently at Kelley
Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany. This will be the interim location while
the headquarters staff is assembled and refined during a multi-year
process. The Kelley Barracks site makes use of existing facilities that
have housed U.S. military administrative offices and headquarters staff
for over 60 years. This location is a few kilometers from the U.S.
European Command at Patch Barracks, Vaihingen, Germany. This allows for
specialists and administrative staff to closely coordinate during the
transition.
Possible locations for future AFRICOM presence are still under
discussion. We believe AFRICOM will be more effective if some members
of the headquarters staff are physically living and working on the
African continent. This will allow them to continuously interact face-
to-face with their counterparts in African governments and with
nongovernmental organizations. Site-selection criteria for future
AFRICOM sites have been developed in coordination with the Department
of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
Some of the criteria include political stability, security, access to
regional and intercontinental transportation, and availability of
acceptable infrastructure. Other criteria also under consideration
include quality of life, proximity to the African Union and regional
organizations, proximity to U.S. Government hubs, and adequate Status
of Forces Agreements. We have also discussed possible sites with
potential host governments and a decision will be made in close
coordination with State, USAID, embassies, Congress, and host
governments.

5. Senator McCain. Ms. Long, what exactly would they be charged
with doing?
Ms. Long. AFRICOM is a unified combatant command that has
geographic responsibilities for all U.S. military functions and
activities for the continent of Africa. Its focus will be on
prevention, presence, and preparation, instead of reaction and
response. Day-to-day tasks will include planning for and conducting
security assistance, building partnership capacities, encouraging
security sector reform, and enhancing the professionalism of African
militaries.
As with all combatant commands, AFRICOM will also be responsible
for the functions of command over assigned military forces. These
functions include organizing and employing commands and forces,
assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative
direction over all aspects of military operations. Other functions
include conducting joint training and providing the logistics necessary
to accomplish assigned missions. Command authority will be exercised
through subordinate military organizations, normally through Joint
Force Commanders and Service component commanders.
The guiding principle for AFRICOM's headquarters staff will be to
ensure close coordination of its activities with other U.S. Government
departments and agencies and as appropriate with foreign governmental,
international, non-governmental, private, and nonprofit organizations.
The purpose will be to enhance and synchronize security assistance
activities in Africa as much as possible. To enable this coordination,
AFRICOM will have an integrated staff of permanently assigned DOD
(military and civilian) and non-DOD U.S. Government personnel from
organizations such as the State Department and the USAID. In addition,
we hope to include liaison officers and staff from foreign military and
other non-U.S. civilian organizations in the AFRICOM headquarters, with
corresponding AFRICOM liaison personnel assigned duty at selected
external organizations.

6. Senator McCain. Ms. Long, considering that this command will not
have dedicated military forces assigned to it, do you think the
headquarters staff currently envisaged is larger than needed for a
command whose focus is more on theater engagement than on military
operations?
Ms. Long. The size of the headquarters staff was developed based on
an analytic process that links assigned missions and requirements to
necessary functions and tasks. Personnel requirements, descriptions,
and skills were then developed to appropriately perform these
functions.
Unlike traditional unified combatant commands, AFRICOM will focus
principally on war prevention rather than warfighting. However, as a
regional combatant command, it is possible that AFRICOM could be
assigned command military forces to conduct military operations to
deter aggression and respond to crises. Therefore, the size of the
headquarters staff has been designed to appropriately perform both
prevention and response functions.
______

[The nomination reference of Mary Beth Long follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
November 8, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Mary Beth Long, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of
Defense, vice Peter W. Rodman, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Mary Beth Long, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Mary Beth Long

CURRENT ASSIGNMENTS

Mary Beth Long became Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs in August 2005. In this
capacity, she serves as the principal assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), who is
the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on the formulation
and coordination of international security strategy and policy for the
Middle East and Persian Gulf; Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization; and Africa. Since March 2007, Ms. Long has represented
ISA in the Assistant Secretary's absence.
Prior to her current position, Ms. Long was appointed Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics on May 19, 2004.
She oversaw the Department's counternarcotics efforts in the United
States and abroad. In addition to developing the Department's
counternarcotics policy worldwide, including for Afghanistan and
Colombia, Ms. Long managed over 100 programs supporting domestic and
international law enforcement, and oversaw funds in excess of $900
million.

PAST EXPERIENCES

Ms. Long worked for the Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of
Operations, from 1986 to 1999. Her CIA experience includes operations
targeting narcotics, WMD, and terrorism targets. From May to September
1996, she served as Deputy and Acting Chief for the Haiti Task Force.
She was co-chair of a joint priority CIA-DEA counternarcotics targeting
team. She has worked extensively with the DEA and FBI. While at the
CIA, Ms. Long also worked extensively with the State Department and
served separately as an Embassy Principal Money Laundering Officer and
an Embassy representative to multilateral negotiations on weapons
issues. During her time at the Agency, Ms. Long successfully completed
the Clandestine Operations in Dangerous Areas (CODA) course and
paramilitary training. She received several CIA awards, including some
for her work in covert action. From 1999 until May 2004, Ms. Long
practiced law with Williams & Connolly LLP, where she specialized in
civil litigation matters.

EDUCATION

Ms. Long is a graduate (cum laude) of Washington and Lee University
School of Law and a University Scholar and Honors Graduate from the
Pennsylvania State University (cum laude), where she received a
Bachelor of Arts in Communications Studies. Ms. Long also attended the
Taiwan National University and the Fu Ren Catholic University (Taiwan).
She is fluent in Spanish and has some familiarity with Chinese and
Arabic.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Mary Beth Long
in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Mary Beth Long.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

3. Date of nomination:
November 9, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
August 20, 1963; Clearfield, PA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Divorced (1991).

7. Names and ages of children:
None.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Washington and Lee School of Law (1995-1998), JD granted in May
1998.
Penn State University (1981-1985), B.A. Honors Graduate, cum laude,
1985.
Taiwan National University (1983).
Fu Ren Catholic University, Taiwan (1983).

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Department of Defense, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (2005-current), Pentagon.
Department of Defense, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics (2004-2005), Pentagon.
Williams & Connolly LLP, associate lawyer (1999-2004), Washington,
DC.
Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations (1986-1999),
Various.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
American Bar Association, member.
Virginia Bar Association, inactive member.
Penn State University Schreyer Honors College, External Board
Member.
Phi Beta Kappa, member.
Omicron Delta Kappa, member.
Save the Bay, member.
Penn State Alumni Association, member.
Washington and Lee School of Law Alumni, member.
Republican Party National Membership Association, member.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Friends of the Eighth District (date: 2003) $250 (funds returned).
Bush-Cheney 2004 (date: 2003) $750.
Republican National Committee (date: 2006, 2005) $200.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Academic or associated with schools:
University Scholars Program, Honors Graduate, Penn State (1985),
cum laude.
Outstanding Scholar Alumni, Schreyer Honors College, Penn State
(2006) (inaugural recipient).
Phi Beta Kappa (1986-current) (leadership/academic achievement).
National Negotiation Competition, Second Place (1997).
Best Oral Advocate, Moot Court (1997).
Golden Key Honor Society (1980).
Professional:
Central Intelligence Agency (various Superior and Outstanding
Performance Awards 1987-1999).

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Mary Beth Long was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on December 18, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on December 19, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to James Shinn by Chairman
Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs (ASD(APSA))?
Answer. It is my understanding that the ASD(APSA), a newly created
position in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(USD(P)), is the civilian advisor to the USD(P) and the Secretary of
Defense on national security matters in the Asian and Pacific region.
The ASD(APSA) is responsible for developing regional security and
defense strategy; formulating and coordinating regional defense
policies in support of the Secretary's objectives; overseeing
operational execution of the Secretary's approved policies for the
region; and fostering bilateral and multilateral security relationships
in the region. The ASD(APSA) is the focal point for Asia policy within
the Department of Defense (DOD) for the DOD components, the United
States Pacific Command, United States Central Command, and for the
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. The ASD(APSA) represents the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in interagency policy
deliberations and international negotiations related to the Asian and
Pacific region.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I believe that I am qualified to perform these duties, if
confirmed, by a combination of regional expertise, management training,
and experience in several U.S. Government agencies.
In terms of regional expertise, I have spent a good deal of my
adult life working on Asia problems, as a businessman, as a scholar,
and as a U.S. Government official. I have worked or traveled in every
country in the area of responsibility (AOR) (with a few notable
exceptions such as North Korea) and lived in the region for about 7
years. As a business executive, I set up and subsequently helped manage
subsidiary corporations in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, China,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and
India. As a scholar I wrote several publications and books on the
region, which in retrospect have pretty well stood the test of time.
In terms of management skills, I am a professional manager by
trade, with a good track record of setting goals and achieving results.
I have built and managed organizations ranging from 30 to 3,000
employees, with both line and staff experience on the enterprise level,
in various positions with prime responsibility for production
operations, research and development, sales and marketing, finance and
audit, and corporate governance.
In terms of government experience, I have worked in the Department
of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the DOD--principally on
Asian security and economic problems, and closely involved in the
interagency policy process.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the ASD(APSA)?
Answer. Given the breadth of the responsibilities of this position
and the complexity of the region, I have a great deal to learn. If
confirmed, I intend to focus on three areas in particular: a better
understanding of the title 10 authorities applicable to the DOD and the
military departments, how the DOD trains and equips forces for use in
the region, especially with regard to the force and base realignments
in Asia; a better grasp of how decisions are made and operationally
executed for force allocation and deployment in the region generally,
and for Afghanistan in particular; more insight on congressional
process, policy concerns, and preferences in Asia, especially for
budget formulation and conditionality on security cooperation in the
region.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the ASD(APSA) to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense;
The Deputy Secretary of Defense;
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence;
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
The Secretaries of the Military Departments;
The Chiefs of Staff of the Services;
The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command;
The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command;
The Commander, U.S. Central Command;
The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities;
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs;
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas Security Affairs; and
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security
Affairs.

Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and
Deputy Secretary of Defense through the USD(P). I will work closely
with the Principal Deputy USD(P). I expect to develop and maintain a
close working relationship with under secretaries and assistant
secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of the DOD, the
Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with combatant commanders. As
appropriate, if confirmed, I would also work closely with and
coordinate with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense within OSD
Policy; a lot of policy challenges in Asia involve resources and
expertise that are distributed across the functional portfolios of OSD.
Examples of this coordination include working with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on the role of
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan; the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
and Interdependent Capabilities on counterterrorism and Pakistan; the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas
Security Affairs on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts
in Asia; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security
Affairs on counternarcotics, nuclear, and security assistance matters.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next ASD(APSA)?
Answer. I believe there are six major challenges in Asia and the
Pacific that the next ASD(APSA) will face. First, in Afghanistan, the
Afghan Government needs support to counter and defeat the insurgency.
Second, North Korea's conventional military threat, weapons of mass
destruction, and proliferation activities are a threat to regional
security. Third, China's military buildup may be tipping the stability
balance in the Taiwan Strait and poses an unknown risk to the region at
large. Fourth, there are a lot of challenges that could slow down or
derail the alliance transformation and strengthening of our important
security alliances with Japan and South Korea. Fifth, a conventional or
even nuclear confrontation between Pakistan and India would be a
disaster. Finally, in Southeast Asia we face challenges in sustaining
defense reforms and democratic consolidation, as well as maintaining
effective counterterrorism cooperation.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. Strategies for dealing with these challenges are largely in
place at the Pentagon, among the U.S. interagency, and in agreements
with our partners in the region. If confirmed, I see the challenge as
principally one of careful, sustained execution of these strategies
rather than devising new initiatives. In Afghanistan, my principal
focus would be on supporting coalition efforts to train and equip
Afghan security forces, as well as integrate both the military and
governance elements of the counterinsurgency. This also includes
working with Pakistan to eliminate safehavens in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Regarding North Korea, I would work
with the Department of State and regional partners to press North Korea
to meet its commitments--including denuclearization--as agreed to
during the Six-Party Talks, while maintaining the capability to deter
potential North Korea military threats and countering proliferation
activities. With regard to China, the strategy is one of careful,
measured military engagement with the Government of China and the
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), pressing for transparency while also
sustaining our military capabilities to fulfill our defense commitments
in the region. In order to sustain the realignment and transformation
processes already underway, we need to review progress constantly and
resolve challenges in the bilateral relations with both Tokyo and
Seoul: these are complex, multi-stage projects that require sustained
political and budgetary support on both sides of the Pacific. In South
Asia, I would work with the Department of State to promote confidence
building measures between India and Pakistan while continuing to
develop our bilateral security relations with both nations. Finally, in
Southeast Asia I would sustain and expand our relations with regional
militaries (Burma notably not included) to promote regional security,
defense reforms, and respect for human rights.

GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE REVIEW

Question. Perhaps more than in any other combatant command,
military exigencies in the U.S. Pacific Command are subject to the
``tyranny of distance'' in getting forces to points of conflict.
In your view, how important is the forward basing strategy to the
ability of U.S. Pacific Command to execute its operational
contingencies, and did the Global Posture Review appropriately take
this into account?
Answer. Forward basing remains a key element of United States
security strategy in the Pacific. This was borne out in the Department
of Defense comprehensive review of U.S. global defense posture from
2003-04, which took into account the contingency and steady-state needs
of our forces regionally and globally. This review examined operational
needs within and across the theater, and emphasized transforming our
host-nation relationships, as well as changing the footprint of
facilities and forces in the region to deal with future security
challenges more effectively.
Question. What do you see as the implications of the proposed
global force structure changes with respect to the Asia-Pacific,
particularly in Korea and Japan?
Answer. I believe our posture changes in Korea and Japan are
strengthening our alliances and better positioning U.S. forces. By
relocating U.S. personnel, we will remove longstanding host-nation
concerns such as noise and encroachment without compromising their
missions. We will also improve and enhance our mutual defense
infrastructure in the region, incorporating and executing several large
investment projects from the governments of South Korea and Japan.
Question. What impact, if any, do you expect the proposed changes
in posture will have on our ability to defend South Korea and Japan,
and to react to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait?
Answer. These posture changes increase our flexibility to respond
when and where U.S. forces are needed, and strengthen our overall
capacity to deter coercive and aggressive action in the Asia-Pacific
region.
Planned posture changes in the region will strengthen deterrent and
strike capabilities (i.e., U.S. maritime, air, and deployable ground
forces) forward in the Pacific as well as strategic mobility and
command and control (C2) support from the United States--all of which
are relevant to supporting our allied commitments for self-defense in
contingencies. The United States has global responsibilities, and the
changes to our force posture are a reflection of these
responsibilities. These posture changes are not directed against a
particular country or contingency. Rather, we believe that by being
clear about our interests and supporting our allies and partners,
conflict can be avoided.
Question. The Army is planning to add 65,000 personnel to its
permanent force structure over the course of the Future Years Defense
Program, including the creation of six additional Active-Duty combat
brigades. The Marine Corps is proposing to add 27,000 personnel over
the same period.
Do you believe that any of these additional personnel and units
should be assigned to commands located in Pacific Command's AOR in
order to meet Pacific Command's requirements?
Answer. The proposals to expand the Army and Marine Corps would
allow us to reexamine our basing options and ensure that we have the
optimum mix of forces to execute the National Military Strategy and its
Asian components. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Commander
of the U.S. Pacific Command and others in the Department of Defense to
determine if and where additional forward deployed forces in Asia might
make sense. Before I would provide my recommendation to Department of
Defense leadership, we would also want to consult closely with our
allies and regional partners, given the complexity of the existing
alliance agreements and the challenging roadmap for long-term execution
of the realignment plans.
Question. If so, to what extent do you believe these additional
forces should be forward-deployed, as in Korea or Japan, or deployed in
the United States, such as Hawaii or Alaska?
Answer. If confirmed, I would need to review specific proposals
before making a recommendation. In general, I believe that these
deployment decisions should be driven principally by the evolving and
potential threats in Asia, as well as by the Department of Defense
contingency plans and their training requirements. Currently, I believe
that U.S. force levels in Korea and Japan--as agreed to under our
ongoing alliance transformation discussions--represent an appropriate
posture for U.S. defense needs. Going forward, we should continually
evaluate other options--including stationing those forces elsewhere in
the world, or in the United States and its territories.

NORTH KOREA

Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near-term
threats to U.S. national security interests in Asia.
What is your assessment of the current security situation on the
Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to
verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?
Answer. Even as the North and South negotiate with each other to
reduce tensions, the DMZ remains heavily fortified, and two of the
world's largest conventional military forces face each other across
that line. The United States also has 28,000 troops on the Peninsula
and is committed to the defense of the South in case of an attack by
the North.
The Department of State is the lead on the Six-Party Talks
mechanism, and it appears that some progress has been made. The proof
is in the implementation, however; and the next major milestone is
North Korea's full declaration of all its nuclear facilities,
materials, and programs by the end of this year.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United
States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD
capabilities and the export of those capabilities?
Answer. North Korea is a serious threat to the United States and to
the rest of Asia. The North's missile capabilities allow it to strike
all of its neighbors and the United States. North Korea exports
missiles to the rest of the world. North Korea now has a demonstrated
nuclear capability and has made veiled threats of proliferating nuclear
capabilities.
Question. Do you believe that Kim Jong Il would be willing to give
up North Korea's nuclear weapons and facilities? If so, under what
conditions?
Answer. I do not know whether, or if so under what conditions, Kim
Jong Il and the North Koreans would be willing to give up their nuclear
weapons, programs, and facilities.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH KOREA (ROK)

Question. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-ROK alliance has
been a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This
relationship is currently undergoing significant change.
Please describe the state of the current U.S. security relationship
with South Korea.
Answer. Our alliance is over a half-century old and it remains
strong, reflecting the common values and aspirations of our peoples.
The North Korean nuclear and conventional threat remains the focal
point of our alliance's deterrent and defense posture. I believe the
Republic of Korea's troop deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have made
significant contributions to the global war against terrorism. Korea
has also made peacekeeping contributions to the U.N. Mission in
Lebanon. South Korea's commitment to reconstruction in Iraq and
Afghanistan reflects our shared concern for freedom in other parts of
the world.
Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to
improve the U.S.-South Korean security relationship?
Answer. First, we must complete the realignment of U.S. forces on
the peninsula. Execution of this complex task will alleviate much of
the friction between U.S. forces and Korean citizens, while still
providing the necessary levels of deterrence and defense readiness and
posture. Our Korean partner is committed to this task and is on track
so far. Second, we must complete the historic transition of operational
command in 2012, when Republic of Korea Forces will assume the lead
role in the defense of their nation, backed up fully by the supporting
role of United States forces. The ROK Armed Forces and USFK are engaged
in the complex investments of equipment, training, and facilities to
prepare for this transition; so far, this process too is on track.
Third, we must continue to assess the mutual benefits of this alliance
and explain those benefits (and their costs) to our publics on both
sides of the alliance.
Question. Do you support expanding the number of personnel assigned
to Korea for 2 or 3 years of duty and the number of military and
civilian personnel authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for
these longer tours of duty?
Answer. General Bell, the Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea,
has explained the merits of this proposal, and as far as I understand,
it is consistent with the policy goals of the force realignment and our
alliance with the Republic of Korea. Having said that, I believe the
Department of Defense will also need to study the proposal to ensure
that we have adequate resources to support the expansion.

JAPAN

Question. How would you characterize the U.S. security relationship
with Japan?
Answer. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and
prosperity in Asia. Our alliance has held fast through the turbulence
of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and some contentious
trade disputes. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a
complicated force transformation process that requires a lot of effort,
money, and time. That process is still on track. On the other hand,
Japan has been slow in expanding the role and missions of its Self-
Defense Force. We have also had problems with the proper handling of
classified information in Japan and are working together to prevent
this in the future. If confirmed, I would work to keep the
transformation process on track and seek to expand our cooperation in
additional areas of mutual concern, such as missile defense.
Question. What is your view of Japan's current level of
contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF)?
Answer. Japan is wrestling with a fundamental re-evaluation of how
to use its very capable self defense forces in international security
missions. The overall trend has been forward, but slow. However, the
decision to suspend support to OEF was a backward step, and a
disappointment to members of the coalition and to many in Japan itself.
Japan's refueling efforts in the Indian Ocean and Japanese
participation in OEF were important both to the war on terror and to
demonstrate Japan's contributions to the region's future. Security and
reconstruction operations are continuing, and we are working to
mitigate the loss of Japan's refueling support. In terms of Japan's
support for Iraq, Japan's Ground Self-Defense Forces served in Iraq
from February 2004 to July 2006. Its Air Self-Defense Forces continue
to provide C-130 airlift support. Japan has also been a major financial
contributor in support of efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Question. If confirmed, what if anything, would you do to encourage
greater Japanese participation in these operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would urge the Japanese government to
implement a new legal basis for continued participation in OEF that is
consistent with the needs of the coalition.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to
become a more active partner in security activities with the United
States and in the international security arena?
Answer. The security environment in Asia is changing and we need a
more capable alliance with Japan to deal with those challenges, with
greater interoperability between our Armed Forces at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. If confirmed, I would work to
encourage Japan's increasing contributions to the alliance, both
regionally and globally. Cooperation should range from missile defense
to increased joint training opportunities--in Guam for example.
Question. In the interest of increased security cooperation among
Asian democracies, what steps, if any, should Japan take to address
outstanding grievances with its neighbors?
Answer. I believe it is important for Japan to cultivate
constructive relations with all of its neighbors. By moving forward,
Japan and other East Asian nations can increase their security
cooperation. By working with other U.S. allies and friends in the
region, Japan can increase its contribution to peace, security, and
prosperity throughout Asia and globally.

CHINA--RELATIONSHIP

Question. Many observers believe that one of the key national
security challenges of this century is how to manage China's emergence
as a major regional and global economic and military power.
How would you characterize the U.S. relationship with China?
Answer. I would characterize the U.S.-China security relationship
as complex, with some elements of cooperation and others of potential
competition. The military aspect of the relationship is embedded within
an even more complex set of political and economic relationships
between Washington and Beijing, and fundamentally colors our security
relationships with Japan, South Korea, the Southeast Asian nations, and
Taiwan. Our task at the Department of Defense is to expand the
cooperative aspects of the military relationship where it builds
confidence and avoids misunderstandings, while also preparing to deter
or counter points of security competition.
Question. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-
China military-to-military relations, and do you favor increased
military-to-military contacts with China?
Answer. I would assess current U.S.-China military-to-military
relations as generally positive, with some signs of progress, sometimes
lacking in transparency, and marred by incidents such as the ASAT shot
in January 2007, the broaching of a Song-class submarine near the
U.S.S. Kitty Hawk in October 2006, and the Kitty Hawk port denial in
November 2007. I understand and support the statutory limitations on
U.S.-China military exchanges provided for in section 1201 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
Question. How do you assess the current cross-Strait relationship,
and how can we help to prevent miscalculation by either side?
Answer. I assess the current cross-Strait relationship between
China and Taiwan as tense but relatively stable. In order to help
prevent miscalculation by either side, I support U.S. policy of being
committed to a peaceful resolution of the China-Taiwan problem in a
manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I
support the President's stated policy of one China, based upon the
three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. If confirmed, I would
oppose any unilateral acts by China or Taiwan to change the status quo,
as we define it.
From a defense perspective, I believe the best way to prevent
miscalculation by either side is to remain firm in our commitments to
Taiwan, while maintaining a candid, constructive relationship with the
PRC. A strong Taiwan is more capable of engaging in political dialogue
with the PRC and resisting coercion.
Question. China recently denied permission to U.S. military ships
for port visits to Hong Kong and for U.S. vessels to take refuge in
Chinese ports or waters during inclement weather.
What is your view of the causes of these Chinese denials, and what,
if anything, can be done to ensure that this does not happen in the
future?
Answer. We raised our concerns with the Chinese, and have not
received a coherent official explanation, as far as I know. This was an
unfortunate decision by China and ran counter to well-established norms
of maritime behavior.
Better communications with the Government of China and with the
PLA, such as by implementing the long-delayed direct Defense Telephone
Link, and more substantive bilateral exchanges--especially under the
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement--may help to avoid such
problems in the future, but they certainly cannot ensure they don't
happen again.
Question. On April 1, 2001, a Chinese jet collided in mid-air with
a U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft endangering the U.S. personnel and resulting
in the death of the Chinese pilot.
Describe the steps that have been taken to prevent incidents of
this nature in the future. What additional efforts, if any, do you
believe may be necessary?
Answer. During the most recent round of U.S.-China Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement talks, both sides agreed to conduct a
joint maritime search and rescue exercise, which was completed in
November 2006. The value of this type of exchange is that it creates a
forum in which each side can gain a better understanding of how the
other would respond in the event of a disaster at sea. These types of
events can also help to improve the safety of sailors and airmen
operating in close proximity to each other by promoting within the
Chinese armed forces patterns of behavior that favor safety and
adherence to international norms.
Question. In your view, is there the potential for similar
dangerous incidents with China to occur at sea or elsewhere?
Answer. This could happen again. Aggressive navigational practices
by Chinese vessels and aircraft cause concern for the safety of air and
maritime forces operating in proximity of each other. If confirmed, I
would continue efforts already underway to send a clear and consistent
message to China that such aggressive practices are dangerous and that
China should respect the freedoms and rights guaranteed to all states
under international law for the use of sea and airspace.
Question. If confirmed, what policy direction, if any, would you
recommend to the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command to prevent such
incidents?
Answer. It is essential that all Department of Defense components,
including U.S. Pacific Command, continue to conduct crisis management
training to ensure communication and coordination mechanisms are in
place. We will continue to use the Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement to stress the importance of maritime safety with China. We
have also engaged in what I call ``fire drill'' training in OSD in
order to better cope with such an EP-3 type incident should it occur
again.

CHINA--MILITARY MODERNIZATION

Question. China's economy is growing by as much as 10 percent per
year, and China is using that economic growth to fund a substantial
military modernization.
In your view, what is China's intent in pursuing such a rapid
military modernization?
Answer. I am deeply concerned about China's military buildup--I
prefer ``build-up'' to the term ``modernization.'' China's publicly
announced defense budgets continue to grow at rates that exceed growth
of the overall economy, reaching over $46 billion in 2007. Actual
expenditures in 2007 could be as much as $85 billion to $125 billion.
China continues to invest heavily in strategic weapons, power
projection, area denial, and asymmetric warfare. China appears focused
in the near-term on generating capabilities for potential Taiwan
contingencies, including those that would involve U.S. intervention.
Over the long-term, China's military buildup suggests it is building
capabilities to deal with a broader variety of contingencies in the
region. We have very limited insight into China's intent behind this
build-up of capability.

CHINA--ANTI-SATELLITE TEST

Question. On January 11, 2007, China used a ground-based missile to
hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test
creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the
international community.
What is your view of China's purpose in conducting this test?
Answer. We do not know what China's purpose was in conducting this
test. In the absence of explanations by the PLA or the Government of
China, we must view the January 2007 ASAT test in the context of
China's broader military build-up, which includes enhanced capabilities
for anti-access and area denial. This could be part of a strategy to
develop a full range of ASAT capabilities, including ground-based
lasers and jammers.
Question. What do you see as the implications of this test for the
U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in
space?
Answer. If deployed, China's direct-ascent ASAT could hold U.S.
satellites in low earth orbit at risk and eventually satellites in
higher orbits, including the Global Positioning System and other
warning systems. The test was inconsistent with the spirit of
cooperation in space exploration and raises concerns about the
credibility of China's declaratory statements against the weaponization
of space. The United States reserves the right to defend and protect
its space systems. A broad range of diplomatic and military options are
required to meet the challenges posed by China's counterspace
capabilities--including its ASAT systems.
Question. What are your views regarding the potential weaponization
of space?
Answer. I support U.S. longstanding national policies of supporting
the right of all nations to use outer space for peaceful purposes, the
right of free passage through space, and the right to prevent those
that would do us harm from using space for hostile purposes.

U.S.-CHINA PROPOSED DIALOGUE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Question. A delegation led by USD(P) Edelman proposed in recent
talks with officers of China's People's Liberation Army to begin a
``dialogue'' on nuclear weapons and strategy. According to Pentagon
spokesmen, the Department has not defined the exact scope or desired
objectives of such a dialogue.
Do you believe such a dialogue can be carried out in a manner
consistent with the requirements of section 1201 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, which prohibits any
military-to-military exchange or contact with representatives of the
People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China in 12
specific areas including, specifically, nuclear operations?
Answer. I believe that such a dialogue, if appropriately
constructed and effectively managed, can--and must--remain within the
statutory limitations on U.S.-China military-to-military exchanges, as
provided for in section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2000.

TAIWAN

Question. What are the priorities, in your view, for U.S. military
assistance to Taiwan?
Answer. I believe priority areas include: hardening of critical
infrastructure; ensuring increased munitions are available to counter
the threat; and an advanced integrated air and missile defense. The
United States and Taiwan will continue to work together to review
defensive needs considering the current and projected PRC threat.
Question. What is your view of the relationship between the type of
assistance we offer Taiwan and regional stability?
Answer. The United States is closely monitoring the shifting
balance in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan's defense needs, and we are
well aware of the increasing capability of the PRC military. Regional
stability depends on a strong Taiwan. Taiwan must be able to deter PRC
coercion, and the best deterrent available to Taiwan is a strong
defensive military.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-
Philippines military-to-military relations?
Answer. The Philippines is one of the United States' five treaty
allies in East Asia and is a committed bilateral and regional partner
in combating terrorism. Our alliance remains strong and the Philippines
remains crucial to the United States and to regional stability in
general. I believe our top two priorities with the Philippines are
counterterrorism cooperation and defense reform.
Question. What is your view of the effectiveness of the Special
Operation Forces assistance being provided to the Philippines military
in its fight against terrorist groups?
Answer. The Philippines faces terrorist threats from Abu Sayyaf
Group, Jemaah Islamiyah, and the Communist New People's Army. The Joint
Special Operations Task Force is working effectively by, through, and
with the armed forces of the Philippines to provide assistance in an
indirect manner that is consistent with Philippine constitutional
restrictions on foreign forces.
Question. What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if
confirmed, to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in
combat in the Republic of the Philippines?
Answer. The established current policy guidelines are clear: the
Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement guide our
bilateral policy with the Republic of Philippines. The Philippine
constitution prevents foreign forces from conducting combat operations
in the Philippines.

INDONESIA

Question. Indonesia is a key Asian power, and is the largest Muslim
country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on
opportunities to improve and expand U.S. relations with Indonesia where
possible.
What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian
Government is cooperating with the United States in the global war on
terrorism?
Answer. Although I would defer to Assistant Secretary of Defense
for SO/LIC and Interdependent Capabilities on this question, I believe
that the Government of Indonesia has cooperated closely and effectively
with the United States and our allies in tracking and combating global
terrorist networks in the region, particularly against the Jema'a
Islamiyah wing of the jihadi threat.
Question. Is it your understanding that the Indonesian Government
is cooperating in the investigation into the murder of two American
school teachers and one Indonesian school teacher in an ambush in Papua
in August 2002?
Answer. Yes. Secretary of State Rice reported to Congress in
February 2005 that the Indonesian Government and Armed Forces were
cooperating with the FBI's investigation into the Timika murders. In
2006, suspects in the case turned themselves in to the FBI and were
subsequently put on trial in Indonesia. The defendants were found
guilty of the murders in November 2006, and the lead defendant was
sentenced to death.
Question. What is your view of the current state of military-to-
military contacts with Indonesia?
Answer. Current military-to-military contacts with Indonesia are
positive and expanding. If confirmed, I would work for the continued
normalization of our defense relations with Indonesia. I believe that
enhanced military contacts with the Indonesian military can help cement
the recent progress we have seen on human rights, particularly in
conflict areas such as Aceh and Papua, maritime security, and military
reforms. I also appreciate Indonesia's contribution to peacekeeping
operations--including Lebanon. Going forward, I would like to see our
military-to-military contacts with Indonesia deepen through a series of
regular, predictable exercises and engagements.
Question. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-
military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-
military contacts, in close consultation with Congress and the
Department of State.
Question. What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian
military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces,
adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and
cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute
those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?
Answer. The pace of military reform remains slow but steady. Some
of the ``less difficult'' reforms--separation of the police from the
military, eliminating formal political roles for the TNI, increasing
accountability, and human rights training--have already taken place.
The orderly TNI withdrawal from Aceh and progress on the planned
divestiture of TNI businesses by the end of 2007 are evidence of
ongoing reform. The 2002 Defense Law and the 2004 TNI Law formally
codified the roles and responsibilities of the TNI as a mechanism to
support, not replace, civilian government. Continued ``hard'' reforms
that we must continue to push for include full accountability for past
human rights abuses, strengthening civilian control, putting the TNI
fully ``on budget'', and continued professionalization of the TNI
officer corps.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for
human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?
Answer. If confirmed, I would sustain our efforts of encouraging
professionalism within the military in terms of both human rights
respect and accountability, through bilateral security discussions,
joint training, military assistance, and military training programs.

INDIA

Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India
military-to-military relationship?
Answer. The U.S.-India military-to-military relationship is
positive and getting stronger, based on a perceived confluence of
strategic interests on both sides. In the past 6 years, our defense
ties have become increasingly robust, with frequent bilateral exchanges
and dialogue, a slate of increasingly sophisticated annual military
exercises, and potential for expanded defense trade. We anticipate that
India will continue to promote security in the Indian Ocean region and
beyond through its disaster response, maritime security, and
peacekeeping efforts.
Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you
establish for this relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, there are a number of areas I would like to
build on in the relationship with India. First, we would like to work
with India to strengthen our mutual capabilities to fight terrorism.
Second, we would like to strengthen our maritime cooperation with
India, to promote our mutual objectives in coping with disaster
response, piracy, proliferation, terrorism, and energy security. The
United States and India also have a common goal of ensuring the free
flow of commerce through key sea lanes. The third priority should be to
build our defense trade relationship with India. The United States is a
new entrant into the Indian defense market and we see defense sales as
a way to promote interoperability, promote people-to-people contacts,
and strengthen the strategic relationship. Our fourth area of emphasis
will be to deepen our already robust military-to-military relationship
with more sophisticated exercises. Finally, we would like to move our
cooperation forward on missile defense by engaging the Government of
India in policy discussions and joint collaboration on technical
projects.
Question. What relationship, if any, do you believe exists between
the armed groups conducting terrorist attacks in India, and the armed
groups conducting attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe these armed groups share some common objectives
and ideology, as well as drawing from a similar (though not identical)
pool of recruits and receiving support from similar (though not
identical) sources.
Question. What, in your view, is the effect, if any, of the fact
that there is currently no civil nuclear cooperation agreement with
India?
Answer. It doesn't help our security relationship that the
cooperation agreement appears currently stalled. But we do not believe
that defense cooperation with India depends on the outcome of the civil
nuclear agreement.

INTERNATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN

Question. In September, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer urged that an ``international coordinator'' be appointed to
oversee and coordinate the efforts of the international community in
Afghanistan.
Do you agree that there is a need for greater coordination of the
efforts of the international community in Afghanistan?
Answer. Yes, I agree that there is a need for greater coordination
of the international community efforts in Afghanistan. Some 72
countries and international organizations are currently working in
Afghanistan to help the government and the Afghan people, so
coordination is a challenge.
Economic, governance, and security assistance must be thoroughly
integrated and support the long-term national development strategy of
the Government of Afghanistan.
Question. Would you support the appointment of an international
coordinator to oversee and coordinate these efforts?
Answer. Yes; a senior international coordinator, if chosen
properly, would be helpful in ensuring complementary efforts within the
international community and that our efforts are supportive of the
Afghan government. An international coordinator could play an important
role in identifying requirements and raising awareness about the needs
of Afghanistan.

SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. An August 2007 United Nations report found that the
security situation in Afghanistan has ``deteriorated at a constant rate
through 2007.'' At the same time, there continue to be shortfalls among
NATO members in meeting the mission requirements for the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, particularly in
maneuver battalions, helicopters, and the operational mentoring and
liaison teams for training the Afghanistan National Security Forces
(ANSF).
What is your assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan?
Do you agree that the situation has deteriorated through 2007?
Answer. The security situation in Afghanistan remains challenging.
I am not sure that the overall security situation has deteriorated
through 2007. It is not clear whether the increased number of violent
incidents is due to a stronger insurgency, or more aggressive and
comprehensive actions taken by the ANSF and ISAF.
Still, ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan have been unable to
hold some areas that they have cleared with military operations.
Therefore, ISAF and more importantly the Government of Afghanistan have
not capitalized consistently on initial successes by extending
governance and delivering services that would transform the political
environment and lead to long-term success. In the long run, the
Government of Afghanistan must offer greater prospects for sustained
security and livelihood than the insurgency; military operations are
providing a window for expanded governance.
Question. What do you believe can and should be done to induce ISAF
countries to provide the additional forces, training teams, and
equipment needed to meet mission requirements in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in OSD/ISA to
press ISAF and other coalition members to provide additional forces and
equipment for Afghanistan. It is an exercise in persuasion: the
legislatures and publics in ISAF contributing nations must be made
aware of how victory in Afghanistan is a common, vital interest.
Responsibility for this persuasion rests primarily with the Government
of Afghanistan and by the governments of our coalition partners. We can
play a supporting role. Secretary Gates made this point to our NATO
allies in November at the Noordwijk Ministerial and again last week in
Edinburgh.
Question. Are there changes to our strategy in Afghanistan that you
would recommend to improve the security situation?
Answer. I believe we have the right strategy in Afghanistan for
long-term success, focusing on enabling the government of Afghanistan
to provide governance and security as the insurgency is put down. If
confirmed, I would focus on the execution of this strategy, making sure
that we and our ISAF allies and other international partners provide
sufficient resources in a timely, appropriate, and coordinated manner.

AFGHANISTAN--RECONSTRUCTION

Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between
reconstruction and development in Afghanistan and achieving the U.S.
objective of a stable, self-governing democratic Afghanistan?
Answer. I believe that reconstruction and development are
absolutely critical to achieving our strategic goals in Afghanistan.
For Afghanistan to be stable and self-governing, it must attract the
loyalty of its citizens by providing economic opportunity; to sustain
its provision of core government services, especially the security
services, the Government of Afghanistan needs tax revenues from a
thriving economy.
Since 2001, the U.S. Government as a whole has provided over $7.6
billion in reconstruction and development assistance to Afghanistan. We
will provide over $2.3 billion in fiscal year 2008. About 40 percent of
this aid has been devoted to infrastructure projects, primarily roads,
and power.

AFGHANISTAN--COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS

Question. What is your assessment of international and U.S.
counterdrug efforts in Afghanistan? Do you believe that NATO and the
United States military are doing enough to help the Afghan government
to tackle this problem? If not, what do you believe we should do?
Answer. Overall poppy planting and opium production are way up in
2007, about 193,000 hectares and 8,000 tons respectively according to
UN estimates, despite counternarcotics efforts by the Government of
Afghanistan and the international community. I believe the current
five-pillared strategy for counternarcotics in Afghanistan
(interdiction, eradication, public information, justice reform, and
alternative development) is the right approach, when all of the pillars
are implemented comprehensively. I agree with the conclusions of the
August 2007 review of our counternarcotics strategy, which recommended
that the United States should increase alternative development
assistance and amplify the scope and intensity of interdiction and
eradication operations; integrate drug interdiction operations into
counterinsurgency (COIN) missions through a single planning and command
and control structure; and develop greater political will for the
counternarcotics effort among the Government of Afghanistan, allies,
and international organizations.

PAKISTAN

Question. Do you believe that the Government of Pakistan is doing
enough to eliminate safe havens for the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other
extremists in the FATAs?
Answer. No; Pakistan can do more to eliminate these safe havens in
the FATA, and we must help them build the COIN capacity and the
sustained political will to do so. We should remember that Pakistan has
deployed 100,000 troops in the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province,
has suffered more than 1,000 combat deaths in support of OEF
objectives, and has captured and turned over more senior Al Qaeda and
Taliban operatives than any other coalition partner. That said,
Pakistan should end the state of emergency as President Musharraf has
promised and conduct free, fair, transparent, and credible national
elections in January. As long as the attention of the Pakistan military
is diverted by internal security duties in support of the state of
emergency, it is less able to focus time and energy on rooting out
terrorist safe havens in the western border region.
Question. To what extent, if any, should U.S. military assistance
to Pakistan be conditioned on the Government of Pakistan's progress in
combating terrorism and on reinstating democratic government and
abiding by democratic principles?
Answer. I agree with former Secretary of Defense Perry who once
observed that such conditionalities are a ``blunt instrument'' that do
not increase our influence or leverage with Pakistan, and may reduce
it. Legislating conditionality sends a message that is contrary to the
long-term partnership that we have worked hard to communicate to the
Pakistanis.
Coalition support funds are not assistance, but a mechanism for
reimbursements to a number of coalition countries for their actual
logistical, military, and other expenses incurred in supporting U.S.
military operations.
Section 1206 authority is a vital tool that allows DOD and the
Department of State to train and equip coalition partners for urgent
missions. Using 1206 and other capacity building authorities to train
and equip the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps supports our strategy of
rooting out safe havens for the Taliban and violent extremists.
Foreign military financing (FMF) is also an important instrument in
our bilateral relationship, one that is supportive of our
counterterrorism objectives. FMF to Pakistan has supported its efforts
to acquire weapons and equipment that have played a direct role in its
efforts against Taliban and al Qaeda forces in the border region. FMF
has also supported Pakistan's legitimate regional security
requirements.
International military education and training (IMET) allows mid-
level Pakistani officers to be exposed to U.S. military education and
culture, as well as to form relationships with counterpart U.S.
officers. With the role that the Pakistan Army plays in its society,
such relationships are critical to maintaining an open line of
communication at times of crisis. IMET contributes to abiding by
democratic principles by exposing Pakistani military officers to U.S.
professional military education, including service under civilian
authority and the role of the military in a democracy.

PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) /MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) ACCOUNTING EFFORTS

Question. The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command, U.S. Pacific
Command, is critical to the recovery and identification of remains of
missing military members. Recovery of remains of U.S. servicemembers
from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam war continue to be a
very high priority. In 2005, DOD suspended U.S. cooperation with North
Korea on recovery and identification of the remains of U.S. personnel,
citing concern for the security of U.S. personnel in North Korea.
In your view is there any reason why we should not now resume
cooperation with North Korea to recover the remains of U.S. personnel?
Answer. I agree that recovery of remains of our servicemembers is a
high priority. I believe that resuming joint recovery operations in
North Korea hinges principally on progress toward denuclearization and
normalization. Once North Korea has met these conditions, DOD would
need to work with North Korea to ensure the security of our recovery
personnel, gain access to sites that are of interest, and agree on
appropriate costs of DPRK operations.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the AOR of the U.S. Pacific
Command?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to reinforce the DOD commitment
to investigating, recovering, repatriating, and identifying the remains
of missing Americans from all conflicts in all theaters of operations
in Asia.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take, if any,
specifically with regard to recovery efforts in North Korea?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with senior leadership
within DOD, the Department of State, and other U.S. Government
departments to support every reasonable effort to resume operations
once the DPRK has established acceptable conditions.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE POLICY

Question. In February 2005, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz approved the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap to
improve the Department's foreign language capability and regional area
expertise. Since then, the Department has been working toward
implementing that roadmap.
To your knowledge, how many Mandarin and/or Cantonese speakers does
DOD have in intelligence analyst positions? Is this number sufficient
to ensure good intelligence assessments for use by the Office of Asian
and Pacific Security Affairs?
Answer. I have been told that information regarding the number of
DOD intelligence analysts who speak Mandarin and/or Cantonese is
classified; however, DOD is able to provide this information to
Congress in a classified forum. At the unclassified level, I can tell
you that there are over 5,800 military personnel (officers and
enlisted) with at least a basic capability in Mandarin and/or
Cantonese. Of those, over 1,000 are considered proficient in Mandarin.
I would like to see these numbers grow by increasing our investment in
Chinese language skills for both civilians and military personnel.
Question. In your view, how should the Federal Government expand
the foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel in order
to improve the quality of intelligence input to, and policy output by,
the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would strongly support all efforts by the
Federal Government to expand the language skills of both civilian and
military personnel, including expanded language training, better use of
``legacy'' speakers, and higher expectations of language competency in
key foreign assignments. As a Japanese speaker myself, I know how many
years it takes to become competent in ``hard'' languages. Countries in
the APSA AOR use 7 of the DOD ``top 10 strategic languages,'' including
Chinese, Korean, Russian, Hindi, Indonesian, Dari, Japanese, and
Arabic. Within the DOD, we should encourage our Service Academies and
ROTC students to learn languages. We should also continue the process
of inventorying both civilian and military legacy speakers. I support
the idea of expanding financial incentives for civilians and military
personnel to learn and maintain their language skills. DOD's Foreign
Language Proficiency Pay for civilians and Foreign Language Proficiency
Bonuses for military personnel are a step in the right direction.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

CHINA

1. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, in your answers to pre-hearing policy
questions, you wrote, ``China's military buildup may be tipping the
stability balance in the Taiwan Strait and poses an unknown risk to the
region at large.'' Why do we not know ``for sure'' whether China is
tipping the balance?
Dr. Shinn. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is embarked on an
ambitious, long-term military buildup. The Department of Defense Annual
Report to Congress on Military Power of the People's Republic of China
has documented these changes and has found that the military balance
across the Taiwan Strait has been shifting in the mainland's favor. At
the same time, Taiwan can still take steps to mitigate and even reverse
this trend. Although the United States has a fairly clear understanding
of China's growing capabilities, the lack of transparency surrounding
the PLA's buildup has left it to the United States to infer China's
intent. Without knowing China's intent, we cannot be sure whether China
will use its growing military capability to alter the balance in the
region.

2. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, what do we need in terms of
intelligence or information in order to be able to know this?
Dr. Shinn. An accurate assessment of the military balance in the
Taiwan Strait depends on our ability to assess the current and
projected future military capabilities of both China and Taiwan. With
respect to Taiwan, I believe the United States through the American
Institute in Taiwan should continue to work with the Taiwan Armed
Forces so that we have a common understanding of Taiwan's defense needs
and the strategies and resources required to provide for them. With
respect to mainland China, where the lack of transparency is a problem,
we should seek to clarify China's military and security strategies as
well as its approach to the use of force.

3. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, what do you mean by an ``unknown
risk?''
Dr. Shinn. The degree of risk is a function of both the impact and
probability of China's military buildup. Regarding impact, China's
military buildup is increasing Beijing's options for military coercion,
press diplomatic advantage, advance interests, or resolve disputes.
Regarding probability, the lack of transparency surrounding China's
buildup leads us to question China's intent.

4. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, is the possibility of ``unknown risk''
as great as the possibility of no ``unknown risk?''
Dr. Shinn. The U.S. Department of Defense has a fairly
sophisticated understanding of China's growing military capabilities,
but we lack insight into China's intent because China's military
buildup is occurring in the absence of transparency. Without greater
transparency, the United States and other Asian nations cannot fully
determine the degree and type of risk that China's buildup poses.

CHINA--MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS

5. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, what is your opinion regarding the
utility of military-to-military cooperation with China?
Dr. Shinn. I believe that military-to-military exchanges between
the United States and China can provide useful forums for our two
countries to share views. All exchanges must be consistent with the
congressional guidelines articulated in Section 1201 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-05).

6. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, would you maintain or
continue to increase ties with them as a means of fostering
transparency and potentially gaining leverage over their actions?
Dr. Shinn. I believe the future level and frequency of U.S.-China
military-to-military contacts should depend on whether the PLA improves
the transparency and reciprocity of our exchanges. If confirmed, I
would support increasing those exchanges that improve air and maritime
safety, as well as those that encourage China to act responsibly on the
regional and global scene. I would ensure that all contacts are
consistent with the guidelines found in section 1201 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-05).

7. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, how can we use our engagement with
China to ensure that our ships--especially those in duress--are given
safe haven, and that we have predictability when dealing with the
Chinese government?
Dr. Shinn. I believe that senior U.S. officials should continue to
raise the issue of maritime safety during meetings with Chinese
counterparts. I agree with the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral
Tim Keating, who has expressed his strong dissatisfaction with China's
decision to deny safe harbor to U.S. vessels seeking shelter during a
storm.

CHINESE ANTISATELLITE

8. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, in your answers to pre-hearing
questions dealing with China's test in January of an antisatellite
(ASAT) capability, you indicate that ``a broad range of diplomatic and
military options are required to meet the challenges posed by China's
counterspace capabilities--including its ASAT system.'' Would you
support starting an international dialogue on space rules of the road
as part of the diplomatic options? If not, what diplomatic options
would you support?
Dr. Shinn. On matters of space policy, I would defer to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities, who advises
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and Interdependent
Capabilities, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the
Secretary of Defense on these matters. If confirmed, I would support
both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives to promote the
safe and responsible use of space, consistent with our national space
policy.

9. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, what military options do you envision
as needed to meet Chinese counterspace capabilities?
Dr. Shinn. I believe that the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities is in the best position
to elaborate on military options regarding U.S. national space policy.
I understand that our space policy is designed to ensure the United
States retains the ability to deny an adversary access to space
capabilities that it can use for purposes hostile to U.S. national
interests.

AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN

10. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, do you believe that Secretary Gates
will continue to put pressure on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) allies to send more troops and equipment, and to eliminate the
restrictions on their employment?
Dr. Shinn. Yes. As Secretary Gates has said, it is a continuing
effort to get our NATO allies to increase their contributions to
coalition efforts in Afghanistan. I believe this is an exercise in
persuasion and that the Secretary will continue to press on both of
these points. The Combined Joint Statement of Requirements for forces
and equipment in Afghanistan still has shortfalls, and meeting these
shortfalls demands greater contributions from all NATO members. For
example, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams are critical to
building an effective Afghan National Army. There is a growing need for
more of these teams. Additionally, we cannot have a two-tier NATO
alliance--those who fight and those who do not. The Secretary strongly
believes, as do I, that countries offering resources to NATO operations
should give the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Commander the flexibility to use those resources as he deems necessary
to accomplish the mission most effectively. Geographic and operational
limitations on employment of forces minimize the ISAF Commander's
ability to shape operations in Afghanistan.

11. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, do you believe that the Government of
Pakistan is doing enough to eliminate safe havens for terrorists in
Pakistan?
Dr. Shinn. No, I believe Pakistan can and should do more to
eliminate safe havens for terrorists in the Federally Administered
Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan. At the same time, we should remember
that Pakistan has deployed 100,000 troops in the FATA and Northwest
Frontier Province, has suffered more than 1,000 combat deaths in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom objectives, and has captured and
turned over more senior al Qaeda and Taliban operatives than any other
coalition partner. If confirmed, I would support efforts to help
Pakistan improve the counterinsurgency capability of the Pakistan Army
and paramilitary forces by providing more training, equipment, and
shared intelligence.

12. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, do you believe that we can just
keeping doing what we are doing right now?
Dr. Shinn. In Afghanistan, I believe that we have the right
strategy for long-term success, but we need to improve our execution. I
support an Afghanistan strategy that focuses on strengthening the
government, improving security, countering narcotics, and supporting
reconstruction and economic development. If confirmed, I would strive
to improve our implementation in Afghanistan by encouraging our
international allies to do more, pressing to eliminate caveats on
employing forces already deployed, and supporting the appointment of a
senior envoy who will work to improve coordination of reconstruction
and development efforts.
In Pakistan, we also need to make more progress. We are in the
early stages of a 5-year, multi-phase plan to improve the
counterinsurgency capability of the Pakistan Army and the paramilitary
Frontier Corps, which will make both much more effective in eliminating
the terrorist safe havens in the FATA of Pakistan. If confirmed, I
would support efforts to help Pakistani forces develop greater capacity
through training and equipment assistance. I would also support
programs to enhance Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities.

13. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, what if any, additional
changes would you advocate to deal with the Afghan-Pakistan terrorism
issue?
Dr. Shinn. I agree with Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC
and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD/SO/LIC&IC) Mike Vickers, who has
advocated working closely with Pakistan and Afghanistan to strengthen
existing mechanisms for intelligence-sharing, military-to-military
dialogue and political discourse, and support to Pakistan's efforts to
eliminate terrorist sanctuaries in the FATA. If confirmed, I would work
closely with the ASD/SO/LIC&IC to ensure that U.S. defense policy--
including our training and equipping initiatives--supports our
counterterrorism objectives for both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

PHILIPPINES

14. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, what will you do to
ensure that the likelihood of U.S. servicemembers being involved in
combat in the Philippines remains low?
Dr. Shinn. The legal and policy guidelines are clear on the issue
of avoiding the involvement of U.S. forces in combat operations in the
Philippines. The Philippine Constitution prevents foreign forces from
conducting combat operations in the Philippines. The United States must
respect Philippine sovereignty and will not violate Philippine Law. The
Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement guide our
bilateral policy with the Republic of Philippines. DOD has also
promulgated Rules of Engagement (ROE) for deployed U.S. forces that
outlines the limited circumstances under which deadly force may be
used. If confirmed, I would work to ensure we adhere to these
guidelines.

15. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, will you inform the committee in
advance of any changes in the nature and scope of U.S. military
assistance to the Philippines?
Dr. Shinn. Yes, I will keep Congress informed regarding significant
changes in the nature and scope of U.S. forces that are advising and
assisting the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Further, I will consult
closely with Congress on all matters related to U.S. military
assistance to the Philippines. Congress plays a key role by
appropriating grant assistance, especially International Military
Education and Training (IMET) funds and Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) funds. The IMET and FMF programs in the Philippines are critical
components of the integrated approach we are taking to build capacity
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

KOREA

16. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, what is your view on the best
approach to the threat posed by North Korea?
Dr. Shinn. I support the current U.S. strategy for North Korea,
which is centered on maintaining peace through deterrence while
pursuing diplomacy to achieve denuclearization of the North. With
regards to deterrence, the U.S. alliances with both the Republic of
Korea (ROK) and Japan remain strong. Regarding diplomacy, the United
States is working closely with our allies, our Six-Party Talks
partners, and the international community to urge North Korea to
fulfill its commitments as reflected in the September 19, 2005, joint
statement. Going forward, we must judge the intent of North Korea by
its actions, especially its nuclear denuclearization. If confirmed, I
would work with the Department of State and regional partners to press
North Korea to meet its commitments while maintaining the capability to
deter potential North Korea military threats and countering
proliferation activities.

17. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, do you believe that our current
diplomatic approach will succeed in denuclearizing the Korean
peninsula?
Dr. Shinn. I agree with the assessment of President Bush and
Secretary Rice that the Six-Party Talks have delivered measurable
results, but that much hard work still remains. The disabling of the
plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon is an important step, but
North Korea must still fulfill all of the commitments it made in the
September 2005 Joint Statement. I believe the next important step is
for North Korea to provide a complete and correct declaration that
includes all of its nuclear programs, including its nuclear weapons
programs and nuclear weapons, and proliferation activities.

NORTH KOREA--POW/MIA RECOVERY EFFORTS

18. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, in 2005 Secretary Rumsfeld suddenly
ceased cooperation with North Korea on recovery and identification of
U.S. servicemembers. Up until that point, recovery efforts were
continuing, regardless of the breakdown in relations on the nuclear and
missile issues.
Your answers to pre-hearing policy questions state that ``resuming
joint recovery operations in North Korea hinges principally on progress
toward denuclearization and normalization.'' This implies that you
would continue to link the POW-MIA efforts politically with other
issues. Yet, Ambassador Charles Ray, the Deputy Assistant Secretary
responsible for POW-MIA recovery, told committee staff that he didn't
want the recovery efforts politicized. Is there any way that you can
foresee that we might resume recovery efforts with North Korea,
independent of what might happen in the Six-Party Talks?
Dr. Shinn. I agree with Ambassador Ray that we should not
politicize our POW/MIA recovery efforts in North Korea. Ambassador Ray
and I also agree that denuclearizing the Korean peninsula is not a
political issue, but rather it is a security issue. Once the United
States has seen sufficient verifiable progress towards
denuclearization, we should consider resuming recovery operations. If
confirmed, I would work with Ambassador Ray to seek to resume recovery
operations once North Korea meets its obligations. The next step in
this process is for North Korea to declare all its nuclear programs
completely and accurately. We would also need to ensure that conditions
for recovery operations in North Korea limit the risk posed to U.S.
personnel and advance Korean War personnel accounting.

JAPAN

19. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, how reliable an ally is Japan?
Dr. Shinn. Japan is a reliable ally, and we are strengthening our
alliance further through ongoing transformation efforts. Although there
have been some disappointments, such as the temporary termination of
at-sea-refueling in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, the overall
trend in the security relationship has been very positive. If
confirmed, I would encourage Japan to further its contribution to the
alliance by expanding the role and missions of its Self-Defense Force.

20. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, will you work to get
the Japanese to contribute more forces in Afghanistan--a Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) for example?
Dr. Shinn. If confirmed, I would continue working toward that end.
A key objective of U.S. policy is to encourage Japan to increase both
its security and development-related contributions to Afghanistan.
Although I recognize Japan's contributions, and that Japan has certain
constitutional and policy limitations, I believe that Japan has
tremendous capability to do more in Afghanistan--whether by means of
reconstruction assistance or by providing military capability,
mentoring, or civilian expertise in the PRTs. If confirmed, I would
continue to convey Afghanistan's needs to Japan.

INDIA-PAKISTAN

21. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, what impact do you believe the
failure to establish a U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation
agreement would have on relations between India and Pakistan?
Dr. Shinn. I do not believe that the U.S.-India civilian nuclear
cooperation agreement has had a significant impact on Indo-Pakistani
relations. I am encouraged on other fronts--such as the ongoing
Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan--and am hopeful that this
dialogue will lead to improved relations between the two countries.

22. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, what, if anything,
would you do to foster good Indo-Pakistani relations to bring stability
to Afghanistan?
Dr. Shinn. I agree with Secretary Gates, who has called for all
Asian countries--including India and Pakistan--to play a larger role in
promoting Afghanistan's reconstruction and development. If confirmed, I
would also advocate the continuation of ongoing confidence building
measures between India and Pakistan as a means of promoting regional
stability. I would encourage India to be transparent in its efforts to
mitigate Pakistani concerns. I also view the Pakistani redeployment of
certain forces from the Indian border to the FATA as a positive step.

INDONESIA

23. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, in your written answers to pre-
hearing questions, you advocate increased military-to-military
cooperation with Indonesia. If confirmed, will you ensure that
Indonesians are cooperating to the fullest extent possible with us in
the investigation of the 2002 murder of Americans in Papua, and that we
do not work with units or individuals involved in past human rights
violations?
Dr. Shinn. Secretary of State Rice reported to Congress in February
2005 that the Indonesian Government and Armed Forces were cooperating
fully with the FBI's investigation into the 2002 murder of Americans in
Papua. In 2006, suspects in the case turned themselves in to agents of
the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and were subsequently put on
trial in Indonesia. The defendants were found guilty of the murders in
November 2006, and the lead defendant was sentenced to death.
In accordance with U.S. laws, all foreign security force personnel
and units receiving U.S. military training and assistance are vetted
for credible allegations of involvement in past gross violations of
human rights. Known human rights violators are not provided such
training. In the past 3 years, we have denied more than 120 Indonesian
applications for training after finding allegations of past human
rights abuses. In implementing our military-to-military programs, I
will ensure we continue to comply with applicable laws.

PROLIFERATION

24. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, in your answers to our pre-hearing
policy questions you mention proliferation prevention programs as
important to many of the problems in the region. In the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, new authority is
provided to the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to expand
programs outside of the former Soviet Union. Do you see areas of
opportunity for the CTR program in your area of responsibility?
Dr. Shinn. I am familiar with the success story of Kazakhstan,
which became a non-nuclear weapons state in 1995 with the assistance of
the CTR program. I have also been briefed on some of the other CTR
programs the Defense Threat Reduction Agency operates. If confirmed, I
would work with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Security Affairs (OASD/GSA) to identify and advocate possible
uses of this new authority within the rest of the Asian and the Pacific
area of responsibility.

25. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, how would you work with the CTR
program office in developing such programs?
Dr. Shinn. If confirmed, I would work with the OASD/GSA to develop
a prioritized list of Asian and Pacific countries that might benefit
from the new congressional authority. Once we have identified and
developed specific programs, I would support OASD/GSA throughout the
process of advocating and implementing the programs with the individual
Asian and Pacific countries.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

PAKISTAN

26. Senator McCain. Dr. Shinn, Pakistan is a country of tremendous
importance to our strategic interests currently undergoing severe
political instability. The Taliban continue to operate out of the
border area and pose a continuing threat to Afghanistan's security and
stability. Extremists also pose a threat internal to Pakistan, and this
is particularly troubling in light of Pakistan's nuclear weapons
program. In retrospect, do you believe U.S. policy toward Pakistan has
been too focused and dependent on the current leader of Pakistan?
Dr. Shinn. I believe the shared interests of the United States and
Pakistan transcend the personality of any particular leader. As
President Bush has said, the United States and Pakistan have a shared
interest in building stable and sustainable democracy and in promoting
peace and security, stability, prosperity, and democracy in South Asia
and across the globe. Our relationship is with the people and
government of Pakistan, not with President Musharraf or any other
particular leader that may follow him in the future. Now that President
Musharraf has stepped down as Chief of Army Staff, we expect to have a
similarly close relationship with his successor in that position,
General Ashfaq Kiyani. As Pakistan prepares to conduct a general
election, I share the hope of Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Boucher that upcoming parliamentary elections in Pakistan will lead to
the formation of a civilian-led government, under a civilian president
for the first time since 1999.

27. Senator McCain. Dr. Shinn, what is the United States doing to
enhance its military cooperation with Pakistan and to ensure that the
U.S.-Pakistan relationship will remain strong even if there is a change
in leadership there?
Dr. Shinn. The U.S.-Pakistan defense relationship is more robust
now than at any time in the past. As Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Boucher recently testified, since 2002 the United States has
provided security assistance to Pakistan totaling $1.9 billion. From
the DOD, this has included $1.2 billion in Foreign Military Financing,
$87 million in counter-narcotics funding, and $37.2 million in Section
1206 counterterrorism funding. In addition, we have provided $5.3
billion in Coalition Support Funds to reimburse Pakistan for expenses
incurred in the war on terror. One way we can help sustain our defense
cooperation in the face of potential leadership changes is through our
military-to-military interactions. Today, more than 100 Pakistani
students annually attend military courses in U.S. professional military
educational institutions, and an additional 50 or more attend courses
conducted under the Counterterrorism Fellowship program. If confirmed,
I would work with my counterparts at the Department of State and with
Congress to ensure that we maintain this momentum and sustain our
military cooperation with Pakistan.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune

NORTH KOREA-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

28. Senator Thune. Dr. Shinn, last year during the Pacific Command-
U.S. Forces Korea status hearing I questioned General Bell, commander
of U.S. Forces in Korea, about his testimony in which he requested that
Congress fully fund the Airborne Laser (ABL) program. To me, General
Bell's testimony carries a great deal of credibility because his troops
face a real ballistic missile threat on a daily basis. General Bell
described a situation where the ABL is important because it is designed
to kill ballistic missiles in the boost phase. A terminal intercept,
General Bell explained, could have consequences because of the fallout
associated with intercepting a missile over a small, densely populated
area like South Korea or Japan. He further stressed his point by
pointing out that the July 4, 2006 missile test by North Korea resulted
in six successful ballistic launches and one failure. What is your
current understanding of North Korea's ballistic missile program and
the threat it poses to the Pacific theater?
Dr. Shinn. I would defer to the Missile Defense Agency to assess
the technical merits of specific missile defense systems or programs.
However, if confirmed, I would encourage U.S. friends and allies to
expand their cooperation with the United States to improve our Asian
missile defense architecture.

29. Senator Thune. Dr. Shinn, do you share General Bell's
conclusion that Congress needs to continue funding and supporting boost
phase ballistic missile programs?
Dr. Shinn. If confirmed, I would actively advocate expanding our
ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation with U.S. allies and
friends in Asia and the Pacific. The threat of ballistic missiles
continues to grow, and the participation by our Asian partners in
cooperative missile defense efforts reduces the costs to the United
States and allows our partners to contribute technology and
capabilities that are difficult for the United States to achieve by
itself. Some nations can contribute powerful land-based radars. Others
can provide additional sea-based missile capabilities. Others can
provide technology to support the production process.
Japan is the United States' most significant international partner
for BMD. Both nations remain deeply committed to strengthening BMD
cooperation. Significant recent developments include the U.S.
deployment of a forward-based missile defense radar in northern Japan,
the deployment of multiple BMD-capable Aegis ships, and the deployment
of a PAC-3 battalion in Okinawa. Japan accelerated plans to modify four
Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 interceptors. The first of these
Aegis ships successfully completed its first SM-3 flight test in
December 2007. Japan is also upgrading its Patriot system to PAC-3
capability, and has already fielded its first upgraded fire unit. Japan
and the United States are engaged in a number of cooperative efforts on
BMD, including the development of the SM-3 Blk II interceptor.
If confirmed, I would work with our Japanese allies to strengthen
our operational cooperation and coordination. Alliance BMD capabilities
contribute to the alliance's overall deterrence posture, and it is
important that U.S. and Japanese systems can operate together
effectively.

30. Senator Thune. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, what steps will you
take to work with our allies, specifically Japan, in addressing the
ballistic missile threat in the Asian theater?
Dr. Shinn. I would defer to the Missile Defense Agency to assess
the technical merits of specific missile defense systems or programs.
However, if confirmed, I would encourage U.S. friends and allies to
expand their cooperation with the United States to improve our Asian
missile defense architecture.

31. Senator Thune. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, will you support direct
energy technology as a method for intercepting ballistic missiles in
the boost phase?
Dr. Shinn. I would defer to the Missile Defense Agency to assess
the technical merits of specific missile defense systems or programs.
However, if confirmed, I would encourage U.S. friends and allies to
expand their cooperation with the United States to improve our Asian
missile defense architecture.
______

[The nomination reference of James Shinn follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
October 23, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
James Shinn, of New Jersey, to be an Assistant Secretary of
Defense. (New position.)
______

[The biographical sketch of James Shinn, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of James J. Shinn

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

As the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian
and Pacific Security Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (USD(P)), Mr. Shinn is the civilian advisor to the
USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on national security matters in the
Asian and Pacific region. He is responsible for developing regional
security and defense strategy; formulating and coordinating regional
defense policies in support of the Secretary's objectives; overseeing
operational execution of the Secretary's approved policies for the
region; and fostering bilateral and multilateral defense and military
relationships in the region. Mr. Shinn is the focal point for Secretary
of Defense policies of interest within the Office of the USD(P) and
with the DOD components and the interagency for United States Pacific
Command, United States Central Command, and for the Asia-Pacific Center
for Security Studies. Mr. Shinn also represents the USD(P) and the
Secretary of Defense in interagency policy deliberations and
international negotiations related to the Asian and Pacific region.

PAST EXPERIENCE

Before coming to the Pentagon, James Shinn was the National
Intelligence Officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence
Council, first at the Central Intelligence Agency and then the newly-
created Office of the Director of National Intelligence, from 2003-
2006. After working for Chase Manhattan Bank in New York and Tokyo, Mr.
Shinn served in the East Asia Bureau of the U.S. Department of State
from 1976-79. He then spent 15 years in high technology firms in
Silicon Valley and Asia, first at Advanced Micro Devices, an integrated
circuit firm, and at Dialogic, a voice processing software firm, which
he co-founded. Dialogic did an initial public offering in 1992, and
then was acquired by the Intel Corporation. After Dialogic, he worked
with several high tech and financial services firms, as an investor and
outside director. Mr. Shinn was the Senior Fellow for Asia at the
Council on Foreign Relations in New York from 1993-96, where he wrote
or edited several task force reports and two books, including Weaving
the Net: Conditional Engagement With China (1996), and Fires Across the
Water: Transnational Problems in Asia (1998), both published by the
Council on Foreign Relations Press. From 2002 to 2003 he taught courses
on technical innovation and technology and foreign policy, at Princeton
University's Department of Electrical Engineering and the Woodrow
Wilson School of Public Affairs, and at Georgetown University's School
of Foreign Service. In 2002, he was nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate as Public Delegate to the United Nations
General Assembly. He co-authored with Peter Gourevitch, Political Power
and Corporate Control: the New Global Politics of Corporate Governance,
published by Princeton University Press (2005).

EDUCATION AND FAMILY

Mr. Shinn has a BA from Princeton (1973), an MBA from Harvard
(1981), and a Ph.D. from Princeton (2001). He once spoke good Japanese,
passable French, and functional German, but no more. Mr. Shinn lives
with his wife and three children in Washington, DC, and New York City.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by James Shinn in
connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
James Joseph Shinn.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs,
Office of the Secretary of Defense.

3. Date of nomination:
October 23, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
October 22, 1951; Mount Holly, NJ.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Masako Hashigami (Shinn).

7. Names and ages of children:
Alice, 7; Hiroshi, 15; Kiyoshi, 31.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Princeton University, 9/69-6/73, BA.
Harvard University, 9/99-6/81, MBA.
Princeton University, 9/97-6/01, Ph.D.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs, Office of Secretary of Defense; Department of Defense;
Washington DC; 02/07-present.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, National Intelligence
Council; Central Intelligence Agency and Office of Director of National
Intelligence; Washington DC; 11/03-01/07.
Visiting Professor, School of Foreign Service; Georgetown
University; Washington DC; 8/02-12/06.
(Adjunct after 11/03)
Lecturer, Department of Electrical Engineering and Woodrow Wilson
School; Princeton University; Princeton, NJ; 9/01-6/02.
Ph.D. candidate, Woodrow Wilson School; Princeton University;
Princeton, NJ; 09/97-06/01.
Senior Fellow for Asia; Council on Foreign Relations; New York, NY;
10/93-6/97.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Analyst, Bureau of East Asian Affairs; U.S. Department of State;
Washington DC; 04/77-04/79.
Public Delegate, General Assembly, U.S. Mission to the United
Nations; U.S. Department of State; New York, NY; 09/02-05/03.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Princeton Brooke Foundation (501c non-profit charitable
foundation); Trustee.
Pacific Forum/CSIS (501c non-profit think tank); Advisory Board.
Princeton Scholars in the Nation's Service (non-profit educational
board); Advisory Board.
Ophthalmology Department, Columbia University Hospital (non-profit
medical research); Advisory Board (1998-2002).
Council on Foreign Relations (non-profit think tank); Member.
Harvard Club of New York; Member.
Kenwood Country Club; Member.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Republican National Committee, 09/03, $25,000.
Republican Leadership Council, 06/03, $25,000.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
None.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
``Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China''; CFR-
Brookings Press; 1996.
``Riding the Tigers: American Commercial Diplomacy in Asia'' (with
Jeffrey Garten and Robert Zoellick); CFR-Brookings Press; 1998.
``The Strains of War and the Tests of Peace'' (with Harold Brown,
Richard Armitage, and Bruce Stokes); CFR-Brookings Press; 1998.
``Fires Across the Water Transnational Problems in Asia''; CFR-
Brookings Press; 1998.
``How Shareholder Reforms Pay Foreign Policy Dividends'' (with
Peter Gourevitch); CFR-Brookings Press; 2002.
``Red-Teaming the Data Gap'' (with Jan Lodal); CFR-Brookings Press;
2002.
``Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of
Corporate Governance'' (with Peter Gourevitch); Princeton University
Press; 2005.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
``Tracking Asia's Black Swans'', remarks prepared for the
International Institute of Strategic Studies conference on ``Managing
Global Security and Risk,'' September 7-9, 2007.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of James Shinn was reported to the Senate
by Chairman Levin on December 18, 2007, with the recommendation
that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed
by the Senate on December 19, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Craig W. Duehring by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

Questions and Responses

DEFENSE REFORMS

DUTIES

Question. Section 8016 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
shall have the principal duty of ``overall supervision of manpower and
Reserve component affairs of the Department of the Air Force.''
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that
Secretary Wynne will assign to you?
Answer. The principle duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force are to support the tasks assigned by the Secretary of the Air
Force. These duties include providing guidance, direction, and
oversight for Air Force military and civilian manpower/personnel
programs; medical readiness and health care; plus Reserve component
affairs. The Assistant Secretary is also responsible for oversight of
the operation of the Air Force Personnel Council and its component
boards--the Air Force Civilian Appellate Review Office and the Air
Force Board for the Correction of Military Records.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:
The Secretary of the Air Force.
Answer. As my direct supervisor, I will continue to meet with the
Secretary of the Air Force on a regular and as required basis. I will
provide him with my honest assessment and advice.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Air Force.
Answer. I will take direction from the Under Secretary of the Air
Force in the absence of the Secretary. During other periods, I will
work closely with him in areas of common interest.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness (PDASD/RA).
Answer. I have already established an excellent working
relationship with Dr. Chu and his entire staff. I am confident that I
will be able to articulate Air Force interests and positions with all
of them.
Question. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness.
Answer. In my earlier capacity as PDASD/RA, I established a
relationship of mutual respect between myself and Mr. Dominguez. I
expect that relationship to continue.
Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force.
Answer. The Air Force General Counsel has a significant role to
play in virtually all policy decisions in the Air Force. In my capacity
as acting ASAF/M&RA I have already established a strong relationship
with the General Counsel and the members of her staff.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
(ASD/RA).
Answer. I performed the duties of the ASD/RA for 15 months during
the opening days of this administration, to include the tumultuous
events surrounding the attacks of September 11. Beginning in October
2002, when the current ASD/RA was confirmed by the Senate and sworn in,
I was his principal deputy and, as such, was very involved in every
aspect of operations conducted by that office. To this day, we have
retained both a personal and professional relationship which I believe
can only enhance our mutual responsibilities to make certain that the
members of the National Guard and Reserve components continue to
receive the tools they need to protect our Nation.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.
Answer. I have worked successfully with Dr. Casscells and his staff
since the secretary was sworn in on a myriad of health issues, some of
which have received much public and congressional attention as well as
others that are less visible. All are important to our fighting men and
women and their families. If I am confirmed, I look forward to working
with the Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs to ensure that our
servicemembers receive the best medical attention that this Nation can
provide.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, except as otherwise
prescribed by law, performs his duties under the authority, direction,
and control of the Secretary of the Air Force and is directly
responsible to the Secretary. If confirmed, I would, as the senior
civilian charged with policy decision for personnel and manpower areas
under my authority, seek to work closely with the Chief of Staff to
carry out the duties prescribed by the Secretary of the Air Force. In
my present capacity I have an excellent working relationship with
General Moseley.
Question. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Personnel.
Answer. Much of the day-to-day operations involving Air Force
personnel are actually handled by the staff members of the DCS/
Personnel. As such the DCS/Personnel implements the policies approved
by the Secretary of the Air Force. Recently, the Secretary of the Air
Force signed a document that reinforced the role of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force (M&RA) as being responsible for personnel
and manpower policy decisions affecting our Air Force family and
ensuring oversight of those policies. Confirmation by the Senate will
complete that action.
Question. The Surgeon General of the Air Force.
Answer. The effects of the global war on terror highlighted the
need for change in the medical support that our airmen receive. Beyond
that, our efforts also directly affect the quality and timeliness of
treatment that all of our brave servicemembers receive, especially when
it involves the medevac system. If I am confirmed, I will continue to
work closely with Lieutenant General Roudebush and his staff to meet
the changing needs of our medical system.
Question. The Chief, National Guard Bureau.
Answer. I have known Lieutenant General Blum professionally for
over 6\1/2\ years. We have traveled together numerous times in Europe,
the southwest U.S.-Mexican border, and to numerous other locations
throughout the country to gather information and make absolutely
certain that our National Guard soldiers and airmen meet the
requirements of their Governors and the missions that they have
shouldered in title 10 and title 32 status. If I am confirmed, I will
continue to work with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and his
staff to continue our support for his people and to implement any
changes in responsibility that he may face as the result of
congressional direction.
Question. The Director, Air National Guard.
Answer. Lieutenant General McKinley and I have a close working
relationship that permits us both to meet the challenges brought about
by the global war on terrorism, base realignment and closure,
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and myriad of other programs that
affect both operations and personnel in the Air National Guard (ANG).
In my current status, we meet regularly to make certain that our
actions are open and transparent to one another. I know the ANG
programs as well as anyone at my level. If confirmed, I will be able to
be more proactive in proposing solutions to and even anticipate
problems that will require congressional support.
Question. The Chief, Air Force Reserve.
Answer. My relationship with Lieutenant General Bradley is
virtually identical as that with the Director of the ANG. His
challenges and solutions differ somewhat because his organization has a
national scope only. We meet regularly for the same reasons that I meet
with Lieutenant General McKinley. Often, we all meet together to
discuss our common areas of concern. If confirmed, my ability to bring
about change that they need will increase dramatically.
Question. Airmen and their families.
Answer. Our Air Force family is the most important asset we have.
If confirmed, I will devote all of my energies to improving processes,
programs, and procedures used by our people to carry out their mission
of protecting the citizens of the United States. I look forward to
working with Congress to continuously seek out new solutions to both
old and new challenges. I pride myself as being a good listener and I
tend to travel extensively. I will keep in touch with our airmen and
their families by seeking them out on their turf.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. First, I spent 28 years as an officer in the United States
Air Force. As a pilot, I have flown over 800 combat missions and earned
a Silver Star and 2 Distinguished Flying Crosses. I was a commander
during a very turbulent period in my squadron's history. During that
tour, I was awarded the Air Force's highest individual award for
Leadership--the Lance P. Sijan Award. Second, I spent 6 rewarding years
as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs covering the activities of all seven Reserve components
beginning 50 days before September 11, 2001, and continuing until June
29, 2007, when the President appointed me as the acting Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Since that
appointment, I have immersed myself in the responsibilities associated
with this job. Finally, my father-in-law, CMSgt (Ret.) Richard D.
Blevins, who is a hero to me, retired from the Air Force after 30 years
of service. In our house, we are truly an Air Force family.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs?
Answer. I most certainly do. While I know much about the National
Guard and Reserves as well as many of the benefits programs that are
common to all Services, I intend to learn as much as possible about the
other aspects of my job that are unique to the Air Force. While I have
begun this task within the confines of the headquarters already, if I
am confirmed, I will be able to work more closely with Congress and the
committee staff personnel to become more proactive in programs and
issues that affect our people.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems
confronting the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs?
Answer. There are several. First, there is the continuing challenge
of providing qualified personnel to continue to fight in the global war
on terrorism. Second, we must reduce the stress on airman and their
families who are shouldering the burden of repeated operational
rotations. Third, we must make absolutely certain that our wounded
warriors receive the finest possible treatment available. Fourth, we
must plan for the next war and support the Secretary of the Air Force's
initiatives to recapitalize the fleet.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. The Air Force relies upon volunteers to meet our
commitments around the world. Recruiting, retention, training, and
planning are essential elements of our plans. If we meet the needs of
our people, our people will meet the needs of the Air Force. Second, my
visits with airmen and their families lead me to believe that we can
sustain a volunteer rotation cycle indefinitely if we establish a
reasonable dwell ratio. The burden needs to be shared by all. Third, I
am extremely proud of the men and women who make up our medevac
mission--the first step on the road to recovery for all wounded
warriors from this war. We need to partner with the rest of the
department as well as the Department of Veterans Affairs as we seek to
improve the care that these heroes receive once they return. Finally,
there are threats in this world that are potentially even greater than
the terrorist threats we face today. I share the Secretary's deep
concern that, if we are to meet the threats of the future, we must
recapitalize our hardware and develop new capabilities in the cyber
world. People remain at the center of all these challenges.

AIR FORCE ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS

Question. Following the QDR, the Air Force began a process to
reduce the size of its total force by 40,000 airmen. Last year, the Air
Force cut 23,000 personnel, and under the President's budget request
for fiscal year 2008, the Air Force plans to cut another 5,600 active
airmen. Planning for fiscal year 2009 contemplates additional
reductions that would result in an Active-Duty end strength of 316,000
airmen by the end of that fiscal year.
How will the Air Force achieve these planned force reductions, and
what is your understanding of the probable effects they will have on
readiness, quality of life, and retention?
Answer. The PBD 720 FYDP reductions have already been programmed.
Preserving readiness, sustaining deployment and contingency missions
while managing risk to home stations missions were all factors taken
into consideration when determining where the cuts should take place.
As a result of these reductions individuals/organizations face
increased/intense steady-state mission demands and may deploy more
frequently.
Question. The Air Force is currently developing a strategy to
achieve the force reductions needed in fiscal year 2009. No final
decisions have been made at this point, but we expect to fully use the
tools available in law--voluntary first, then involuntary. The
authorities include voluntary separation pay, reductions in force,
selective early retirements, and force shaping of probationary officers
(less than 4 years of commissioned service). We will also take
advantage of waivers from time-in-grade and commissioned service
requirements for retirement.
What is your understanding of military service leaders' views about
whether an end strength of 316,000 will be sufficient for the Air Force
to achieve its assigned missions in the future?
Answer. 316,500 Active-Duty end strength is only sufficient for a
78 combat wing equivalent force structure, while the most current Air
Force vision to support combatant commanders requires manpower
associated with an 86 wing equivalent structure, requiring Active-Duty
end strength to grow to 330,000+. The DCS/Personnel staff is chartered
to prepare a Congressional Reporting Requirement on a Review of Total
Air Force End Strength Requirements, specifically the capabilities the
current force structure provides, any shortfalls for new and emerging
missions, and an explanation on how the Air Force could balance the
budgetary demands necessary to implement any corrective policy action
within its own budget. This report is due to Congress on 5 February
2008.
Question. In your view, will an end strength of 316,000 allow the
Air Force to perform and accomplish its assigned missions?
Answer. No. This is a similar question to the previous question.
Currently the proposed end strength supports a 78 combat wing
structure. As the combatant command requirements increase, our need for
additional manpower will increase to fulfill that mission.
Question. If the Air Force Special Operations Command requires
additional end strength, do you believe that the Air Force will be able
to support this requirement?
Answer. Air Force will continue to provide the active military end
strength as long as SOCOM provides the dollars to buy the end strength.
Question. To what extent does the Air Force plan to rely on
military-to-civilian conversions to achieve reductions in end strength
while continuing to perform its missions, and what is your
understanding of the availability of funding for civilian salaries, and
the amount of time needed to achieve significant reductions using this
means?
Answer. The Air Force does not plan on using military-to-civilian
conversion to achieve significant reductions. The Air Force has
instituted an active military floor of 316,500 during the fiscal year
2009 Program Budget Review. Per fiscal year 2010 POM Preparation
Instruction, military end strength may not be ``cashed in'' as savings
or as an offset to pay shortfalls in other areas without the consent of
DCS/Personnel. No military-to-civilian conversion were programmed in
the fiscal year 2009 PB given the 316,500 active military floor nor has
the plan in the past or the future been to use military-to-civilian
conversions as a means to achieve reductions in end strength. Fiscal
year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 military-to-civilian conversions focused
on reducing stress; civilian positions were added and military
realigned to stressed career fields (no military end strength
reductions). Fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 military-to-civilian
conversions focused on converting non-military essential positions to
civilian; military personnel funding transferred to civilian O&M to
fund conversions (military end strength reduced).
Question. A recent Air Force Times article quotes Air Force
Secretary Wynne as concluding that the draw-down, which in his words
was intended to maximize the resources that could be applied to
recapitalization, was not having the intended effect and has only
slowed--not reversed--the aging of the fleet.
What is your assessment of whether the ongoing Air Force personnel
reductions will significantly affect achievement of recapitalization?
Answer. The personnel cuts were specifically programmed to help
with the recapitalization of our force and the personnel savings have
specifically been reprogrammed for meeting that requirement.
Question. How will the increased number of Army and Marine Corps
ground forces affect Air Force personnel requirements?
Answer. As the U.S. Army and Marines are targeted for significant
increases to bolster combat capability, there will be a commensurate
requirement for an increase in Air Force manpower to ensure the
effectiveness of the interdependent, joint team. Our Air Mobility units
are intrinsically tied to supporting our Army and Marine team with
logistical reach to go and be supplied anywhere in the world. Our
weather teams, tactical air control, and other forces are imbedded with
or closely tied with the ground forces. Air Force provides the full
range of air assets as part of the interdependent joint fight,
including increased Special Forces and Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance requirements. Failure to recognize and fund the increase
in capabilities provided by the Air Force via aforementioned
Congressional Report on Total Air Force Active Military End Strength
Requirements will impact the Air Force's flexibility to support the
expanded ground forces.

AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR FORCE RESERVE END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS

Question. Under the President's 2008 budget request, the Air Force
plans to cut 7,700 part-time end strength positions from the ANG and
Air Force Reserve (AFR) over the next year.
What is your understanding of how the ANG and AFR will absorb these
reductions in end strength over the FYDP given the missions they have
been assigned worldwide?
Answer. The ANG chose not to take a reduction in their end
strength.. They funded the manpower positions through internal
rebalancing.
The AFR focused on maintaining combat capability when making PBD
720 reductions and focused the majority of its PBD 720 reductions on
the Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) force. IMA reductions
minimized the operational risk to the Air Force by retaining needed
experience by re-rolling IMAs to the participating Individual Ready
Reserve where the Air Force still has access to their capabilities.
Question. What is your understanding of the current status of
coordination about the impact of these reductions with the National
Guard Bureau and the State National Guard units affected?
Answer. The ANG is not part of the 7,700 person reduction.
Question. What missions currently assigned to the ANG and AFR would
be changed or eliminated in order to meet end strength reductions?
Answer. There are mission changes underway in the Reserve
component. As part of the Total Force Integration the Air Force is
reviewing which component is best suited to support Air Force missions.

OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs, what role would you expect to play, if
any, in the officer management and promotion system, including policies
affecting general officers?
Answer. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs enjoys a close working relationship with
DCS/Personnel. As the policy owner for officer management and
promotions, I expect that to continue. I feel very comfortable that, if
confirmed, I could continue to provide the Secretary of the Air Force
the appropriate guidance in these policy areas, to include policies
affecting general officers.

EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY SPOUSES

Question. In your view, what progress has the Air Force made, and
what actions need to be taken to provide increased employment
opportunities for military spouses?
Answer. Today, more and more spouses seek the personal fulfillment
of a career. When this is coupled with the fact that many families need
two incomes to maintain their quality of life, spouse employment
opportunities become crucial to recruitment and retention. Air Force,
through the Airman and Family Readiness Centers, has developed
employment assistance services to meet the challenges spouses face in
training for and finding suitable positions and, as they relocate,
continuing and progressing in their chosen career fields. Baseline
services at all centers include classes and individual consultation on
career planning and personal development. Resource centers provide
guided access to computers, laser printers, internet information on
careers, and the development of job search skills, as well as local and
long distance job listings. Individual career counseling and planning,
assessment instruments, and interpretation of results are available.
Air Force partners with the Air Force Aid Society and grants are
offered every year to fund special programs at selected installations
that train spouses in portable skills such as medical transcription and
operating a home- or virtual-business. Recently Air Force has partnered
with OSD and DOL in a pilot program that offers up to $3,000 per spouse
to train or become licensed/certified in transportable careers. This
Military Spouse Career Advancement Account pilot focuses on preparing
spouses to work in high-growth, high-demand industries and occupations
such as health care, information technology, early childhood education,
and information technology. The pilot is currently available at six Air
Force bases as well as other Services' installations. Air Force will
work in conjunction with the other partners to ensure that pilot is
successful and the opportunity is expanded to other installations. In
addition, A&FR staff constantly network with local employers and human
resource managers to promote the military spouse as a prime candidate
for employment and partner with schools, non-profits, and other
community organizations to offer career fairs and other employment
resource opportunities.

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICES (SES)

Question. The Air Force initiated a senior leader management model
to enhance and improve management, development, and assignment of SES
executives and general officers.
What is your assessment of how the Air Force program is working?
Answer. This is working well. Senior civilian leaders are managed
from a total force perspective with the intention of developing and
utilizing executive resources consistent with requirements of the Air
Force.
Question. What is your vision of the approach the Air Force should
take to further improve the management, development, and assignment of
SES members, especially in the critically important areas of
acquisition, logistics, financial, personnel, and contract management?
Answer. The current system that is in place is working well. I
would continue to endorse the Air Force-level assessment board of
senior executives to determine leadership potential necessary for our
future. Not to be confused with a promotion board, the assessment board
is designed to assist in preparing development and utilization plans to
place Senior Executives in the right jobs, with the right training, at
the right time to best meet corporate requirements. Results of this
board often reflect, or result in, the interchangeability of our senior
executive workforce with their uniformed, General Officer counterparts.

JOINT ASSIGNMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Question. The QDR of February 2006 calls for reorienting defense
capabilities in support of joint operations, to include joint air,
joint mobility, and joint command and control.
What is your assessment of the opportunities currently available
for joint training and assignment today for both military and civilian
personnel in the Department of the Air Force?
Answer. The Air Force has adequate opportunities for joint training
and assignment. Let me explain.
Given the inherent ``jointness'' of how we are currently operating
for global war on terrorism, we have seen significant improvement in
how we prepare our people for joint operations and an increase in
assignments that require a significant amount of joint understanding.
At the same time, we have an eye on requirements. Along that line, the
Air Force recently reviewed its ability to prepare officers for joint
assignments by convening a panel of experts--internal and external. We
concluded that opportunities exist, but our efforts should be more
coordinated to ensure we grow military leaders who are steeped in joint
as well as military leaders who have been exposed to joint matters. Up
to now, our efforts have focused on ensuring military leaders have been
exposed to joint experience. We plan to make this shift through
guidance to our developmental teams. In addition, we plan on
capitalizing on the legislative changes that established a non-billet-
based, career-long, multi-level JQS, which allows for many more
opportunities to gain, credit, and collect joint capabilities to an
expansive pool of airmen.
The Air Force also remains concerned about preparing civilian
leaders for joint operations. In fact, the Air Force is the executive
agent to five of the nine combatant commands which means employees of
these combatant commands are Air Force employees which facilitates
movement of Air Force civilian employees in and out of joint
organizations. Since the Air Force employs a strong career programs
construct in which development of employees for Air Force corporately
managed positions, including joint positions, is a primary goal.
Therefore there are ongoing efforts to ensure we've developed and/or
recruited the talent needed to fill these key positions. Moreover, as
the Department moves to emphasize joint matters for civilian employees
the Air Force seeks innovative ways to provide more senior civilian
leaders with joint opportunities. Recently, the Air Force has been
using developmental positions to ensure up-and-coming civilian leaders
can have joint assignments (for example in the Joint Staff, Office of
the Secretary of Defense staff, non-Air Force serviced combatant
commands). In future spirals of the JQS, we will also be looking at
capturing experience of our civilian workforce and how to optimize
opportunities to increase our joint-capable inventory.
Finally, not only does the Air Force train military and civilian
members based on joint assignment requirements, but we also provide
many joint education opportunities. In fact, 100 percent of our majors
and 100 percent of our Air Force civilians starting with Pay Band 2 can
complete Air Command and Staff College by correspondence which provides
Joint Professional Military Education level I (JPME-I) certification.
In addition, we send almost 450 majors and Pay Band 2 civilians to in-
residence JPME-1 schools each year. We also send over 275 lieutenant
colonels, colonels, and civilian equivalents to in-residence Joint
Professional Military Education level II (JPME-II) certifying schools
each year. Based on joint assignments and deployment requirements, we
also send approximately 320 officers each year to the Joint and
Combined Warfighting School at Joint Forces Staff College where they
also receive JPME-II certification. The Air Force believes in educating
our military and our civilians as we prepare them for higher-level jobs
that support the joint fight.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the adequacy of the
Air Force civilian workforce--in terms of training, experience, and
numbers of government personnel--to support the Air Force mission?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to use the developmental
boards that determine how many and which civilians need what level of
training.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to move closer
to the goal of reorienting Air Force personnel in support of joint
operations?
Answer. The Air Force goal always is to organize, train, and equip
forces to provide air, space, and cyberspace power in support of
national defense goals. This by definition means we'll continue to
focus on providing trained personnel to support joint operations. Steps
we'll take would be those already underway--understand the air, space,
and cyberspace capabilities required by the joint world, inventory the
personnel we have available to meet those requirements, and implement
plans to close any gaps that exist.

MEDICAL PERSONNEL SHORTAGES

Question. The military medical corps of all three departments are
facing unprecedented challenges in the recruitment and retention of
medical and dental personnel needed to support DOD's medical mission.
What is your understanding of the Air Force's current ability to
achieve recruiting and retention goals for medical personnel?
Answer. The Air Force is no different than the other Services.
Significant challenges exist in the recruiting and retention of medical
personnel due to lucrative, private sector salaries, which are
continuing to rise. Currently, the Air Force's medical, dental, and
nurse corps have significant manning challenges that are directly
attributable to the recruiting and retention of these personnel. As the
cost of recruiting individuals to the medical specialties has
increased, the Air Force's ability to retain experienced personnel has
declined--compounding the problem. Without doubt, substantial
challenges remain for the Air Force in order to compete with the
private medical sector.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address
recruitment and retention challenges in the Air Force Medical Services
as well as the AFR?
Answer. If confirmed, I would use the Air Force Recruiting and
Retention Investment Strategy Council inputs to determine the right
strategy--what pays and at what level.
The Reserves are facing the same challenges as the Active Duty. We
have an active ``Continuum of Service'' program at headquarters, U.S.
Air Force, to address gaps that need closing to make the Total Force
even more effective as we move forward to operationalize the Reserve
Forces.
Question. Are you confident that the Department has sufficient
tools to achieve goals for recruitment and retention of highly skilled
health care personnel? If not, what additional tools might be worthy of
consideration in the future?
Answer. Yes, the Air Force has received multiple authorities over
the past 18 months, including the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007
authorization to pay accession bonuses to fully qualified physicians.
We now have 23 different pay types for the 4 Air Force Medical Service
Corps--Medical, Dental, Biomedical Sciences, and Nurse Corps. We also
received authorization to increase the maximum amount of these pays,
generating special pays and bonuses that contribute to a rewarding Air
Force career. In addition to tools for attracting qualified candidates
for the uniformed Air Force, we have direct hiring authority for
civilian health care professions in selected specialties. This
authority significantly decreases the processes and time required for
hiring. These authorities are vital in helping the Air Force
successfully compete with the private sector for highly qualified and
motivated health care professionals.

PERSONNEL AND HEALTH CARE COSTS

Question. Senior military leaders have testified in favor of the
administration's proposals to significantly increase health care fees
for military retirees as a result of the growing portion of the DOD
budget devoted to personnel and benefit costs.
Do you share the view that future operational readiness of the
armed forces is threatened by the increasing costs of personnel
benefits?
Answer. The balance between operational needs and personnel
benefits requires hard decisions but I do not see personnel benefits as
posing a threat to the operational readiness of the Air Force. Within
Air Force, our corporate structure judiciously balances operational
requirements against personnel requirements and compensation. It is our
people who enable the Air Force to accomplish its mission. Attracting
capable personnel to the Air Force at times requires special bonuses.
Retaining trained and experienced personnel likewise requires bonuses
and special pays to make Air Force compensation competitive with that
offered by the private sector or other Federal and State agencies. On
the operational side, our personnel require equipment, planes, weapons,
and systems to accomplish the mission. Air Force will continue to
follow a planned approach that balances personnel compensation and
benefits with operational requirements.
Question. What efficiencies and personnel benefit changes do you
believe warrant consideration to ensure a viable and affordable force?
Answer. Before efficiencies or changes are made to personnel
benefits, the Air Force evaluates the effectiveness of existing
benefits in attracting and retaining personnel. Programs are updated
based on what we learn from our airmen and civilian employees. Within
Air Force, a lean work force of highly trained and motivated airmen and
civilian employees utilize the newest technologies to accomplish the
mission. The Active Duty, Reserve and Guard members, and civilian
employees who compose our Total Force are highly trained and motivated,
and use the newest technologies to create a seamless, integrated force
that is properly shaped and organized to meet all challenges. Air Force
will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of benefits in recruiting
and retaining a productive work force, update or modify those programs
based on the needs and priorities of our personnel, and balance
personnel requirements with operational requirements. We will also
continue to train and educate our Total Force, as well as use
technology to maintain efficiency and effectiveness.

NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM

Question. The Department is phasing in a pay-for-performance system
under the National Security Personnel System (NSPS).
Based on your experience, what is your assessment of the adequacy
and quality of training that is being provided on the new personnel
system?
Answer. Air Force has successfully converted over 39,000 employees.
This represents nearly all nonbargaining general schedule civilian
employees. The small number that have not yet converted are title 5 ANG
employees who will convert with their title 32 counterparts, currently
scheduled for March 2008. A robust training program delivered in
advance of NSPS implementation was key to Air Force's success. The
purpose of the training was to teach skills and behaviors to implement
and sustain NSPS and to educate employees about NSPS.
Air Force made available a blended approach of e-Learning courses
using the Air Force portal and classroom training to address critical
employee behavior, such as effective communications, problem solving,
change-readiness, and leadership, under NSPS. Over 109,000 training
occurrences for such courses were recorded to date in the Air Force.
Air Force funded train-the-trainer training for a large cadre of
trainers from both management and personnel. This prepared our bases
and commands with the capability to deliver NSPS technical courses to
the workforce, including military managers, prior to NSPS deployment.
Over 72,000 training occurrences for such courses have been recorded to
date in Air Force.
Question. What are the most critical features of NSPS for the Air
Force?
Answer. The most critical feature of NSPS for the Air Force is the
performance management system that is foundational to NSPS because it
is a significant change from the two-tier system in place for the
remainder of the workforce. Increased management responsibility for
compensation is another critical feature.
Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor the acceptance of the
new system by the Air Force civilian workforce, and how would you
intervene if acceptance of the system fell below expected levels?
Answer. I plan to monitor acceptance using the Annual Status of
Forces Survey of DOD Civilian Employees, administered for the DOD by
the Defense Manpower Data Center. The survey assesses leadership and
management practices that contribute to agency performance; and
employee satisfaction with leadership policies and practices, work
environment, rewards and recognition for professional accomplishment
and personal contributions to achieving organizational mission,
opportunity for professional development and growth, and opportunity to
contribute to achieving organizational mission. We recently received
the results of the 2007 survey and are reviewing those results to
determine the questions that serve as bellwether(s) for NSPS acceptance
as well as the level of change that would warrant intervention and the
method of intervention.

AIR FORCE FAMILY SUPPORT

Question. What are the key characteristics needed to ensure
adequate support for Active and Reserve component families,
particularly those who live great distances from military
installations?
Answer. The key characteristics are timely support for the family
members and accessibility regardless of the Air Force component. Air
Force supports families, both Active and Reserve components, through a
variety of programs and services such as Extended Duty Child Care, Air
Force Stay Connected deployment kits, Airman and Family Readiness
Centers, and Reserve Family Readiness Programs.
Question. How do you perceive the relationship between quality of
life improvements and your own top priorities for military recruitment
and retention?
Answer. We are very aware of the fact that we recruit the airman
but retain the family. Quality of life programs that complement our
monetary programs are critically important and very well aligned with
my top priorities for recruitment and retention. However, the pace of
deployments is taking a toll on our families. Airmen love to contribute
to the global war on terrorism, and we take exceptional care of the
families left behind, but the pace of absenteeism from the homefront
has an impact that quality of life sometimes cannot alleviate.
Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements to military
quality of life would you make a priority, and how do you envision
working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, family advocacy
groups, and Congress to achieve them?
Answer. We have multiple programs to enhance the quality of life.
As I go out and talk to the airman around the world I will ask for
their feedback.

GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER NOMINATIONS

Question. Under section 506 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the Services must provide substantiated
adverse information to promotion selection boards selecting officers
for promotion to the grades of O7 and above.
What is your understanding of the status of the Air Force's
implementation of this requirement?
Answer. The Air Force has provided substantiated adverse
information to general officer selection boards in the form of Senior
Officer Unfavorable Information Files (SOUIFs) for at least the last 10
years. A SOUIF contains the following: substantiated adverse
information collected by the Inspector General, any action taken by the
commander, and the officer's comment or response to the SOUIF, if any.
If adverse information is not substantiated in time for review by a
promotion selection board, that information will be presented to a
promotion review board before the Secretary of the Air Force decides
whether to support the officer for appointment to the next higher
grade.
Question. What guidance is currently being provided by the
Secretary of the Air Force to promotion selection board members about
the manner in which such adverse information should be considered?
Answer. In his Memorandum of Instructions to each general officer
selection board, the Secretary of the Air Force addresses adverse
information when discussing SOUIFs and Exemplary Conduct provisions. In
particular, he describes what is contained in a SOUIF--adverse
information collected by the Inspector General and command action, in
addition to the officer's comment or response, if any. He also
instructs the board to ``first make the judgment in each case whether
the matter described in the SOUIF has served as a learning experience
or is symptomatic of carelessness or character flaw, and then consider
whether the incident should be a bar to promotion.'' The Secretary of
the Air Force also outlines the exemplary conduct provisions as set
forth in title 10, U.S.C., section 8583. Finally, by signing the board
report, all board members certify to the Secretary of the Air Force
that ``the officers recommended for promotion, including those who had
adverse information furnished to the board, are in the opinion of the
majority of the members of the board fully qualified and best qualified
for promotion to meet the needs of the Air Force consistent with the
exemplary conduct requirements of section 8583, of title 10, U.S.C.''

INTERSERVICE TRANSFERS

Question. At the same time that the Army and Marine Corps are
working harder than ever to achieve recruiting and retention goals, the
Air Force has implemented force reductions affecting junior officers
and is planning for additional significant reductions in Active-Duty
and Reserve military personnel. While a bonus for interservice transfer
has been authorized, additional incentives may be necessary to
encourage ``blue to green'' (BtG) transfers in order to retain airmen
with valuable military training, skills, and experience.
What is your assessment of the adequacy of existing incentives for
interservice transfers by Air Force personnel facing involuntary
separation?
Answer. The Air Force has targeted its drawdown on officers and
enlisted in overage career fields and overage year groups to shape the
force as we achieve authorized end strength. By incorporating the BtG
program with other voluntary force shaping initiatives, we maximize the
options for our officers and enlisted who might otherwise face possible
involuntary separation. Increasing the Army's interservice transfer
incentive from $2,500 to $10,000 has had a positive effect.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
enhance the number of BtG interservice transfers?
Answer. Continue to highlight the opportunities for Air Force
officers and enlisted facing further drawdown that they can continue
their military careers and retain the attractive benefits of Active
Duty service by transferring to the Army. Some examples that the Air
Force is already doing to enhance the program:

Air Force provided FSB/RIF eligible list information to Army
so they could send out over 2,500 BtG mailers.
Air Force waived recoupment of unearned portions of most
bonuses for those going BtG.
Posted announcements of BtG program on LESs
Force Shaping messages contain BtG transfer information.
Advertises the program via the Force Shaping website.
Briefs BtG during all transition seminars.

WOUNDED WARRIORS AND DISABILITY EVALUATION

Question. What do you consider to be the most critical changes that
are needed in the current disability evaluation system?
Answer. To the servicemember, the Disability Evaluation System
(DES) is overly bureaucratic, complex, and frustrating . . . and takes
many months to complete. The DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs
(DVA) are proactively addressing the issues raised by Congress, Review
Groups, and Commissions regarding the DES.
Two major concerns involve the differences among the Services and
between DOD and DVA regarding how disability ratings are determined, as
well as the duplicative physical exam requirements of the Services and
DVA. DOD and DVA are working jointly to integrate the activities of
both Departments to simplify the process, foster consistency, and
provide a smooth post-separation transition for veterans and their
families.
Regarding the two major concerns, on November 26, 2007, DOD and DVA
initiated a joint DES pilot program in the National Capital Region to
streamline the DES process, as well as implement other process
improvements. Members referred into the DES pilot will undergo a
single, comprehensive DVA physical examination, eliminating the other
physical exam required by each Service. Additionally, the DVA has the
responsibility for determining disability ratings for all Service-
connected conditions, unfitting or not. The Services will decide
whether a servicemember with an unfitting condition will be separated
or retired based on this DVA-determined rating(s)--this will simplify
the physical determination and foster consistency of decisions among
the Services and between DOD and DVA.
The DES pilot also will test enhanced non-clinical care and
administrative activities, such as case management, benefits education,
and the counseling requirements associated with disability case
processing. The goal of the DES pilot is to shorten the time required
to transition servicemembers to veteran status and provide them with
their VA benefits and compensation.
Overall, our objective is to improve the timeliness, effectiveness,
and transparency of the DES process, as well as case management
practices for our servicemembers.

DIVERSITY IN THE AIR FORCE

Question. In its policies and practices, the Air Force is committed
to the principles of equal opportunity with the goal of promoting
equity, eliminating unlawful discrimination, and building teamwork and
readiness.
Answer. Where and when appropriate, the Air Force uses and should
continue to use affirmative action plans and measures aimed at
achieving and nurturing diversity. For example, the Air Force has
active programs to support the reemployment and accommodation of
service disabled veterans and people with targeted disabilities.
Through such programs as the Disabled Veterans Affirmative Action
Program and the Air Force Wounded Warrior Program, disabled veterans
are both valued and sought after in the Air Force. They currently
represent almost 12 percent of the permanent workforce. In fact, the
Air Force was recently recognized by DOD as the best military
department for its employment of people with targeted disabilities.
Question. What is your view of the proper use of affirmative action
plans and measures aimed at achieving or nurturing diversity in the
Armed Forces?
Answer. The Air Force has already incorporated appropriate DOD
policy on diversity into guidance provided to promotion selection
boards.
In accordance with DOD Promotion Board Guidance, ``To remain
competitive, the Department must have members from the entire spectrum
of qualified talent available in the United States. Accordingly, DOD
needs to make every effort to encourage service by individuals from all
backgrounds by providing for the equal treatment and equitable
consideration of all personnel considered for promotion.''
I fully endorse this guidance.
Question. In your opinion, how, if at all, should considerations
relating to gender and minority status with respect to race, ethnicity,
and nationality be addressed in the guidance provided by the Secretary
to promotion selection boards?
Answer. The Air Force has already incorporated appropriate DOD
policy on diversity into guidance provided to promotion selection
boards.
In accordance with DOD Promotion Board Guidance, ``To remain
competitive, the Department must have members from the entire spectrum
of qualified talent available in the United States. Accordingly, DOD
needs to make every effort to encourage service by individuals from all
backgrounds by providing for the equal treatment and equitable
consideration of all personnel considered for promotion.''
I fully endorse this guidance.
Question. What is your understanding of the manner in which
considerations relating to gender and race, ethnicity, and nationality
are used in cadet selection policies at the U.S. Air Force Academy
(USAFA)?
Answer. The Air Force welcomes and supports diversity at our USAFA.
We are convinced that diversity significantly enhances the quality of
higher education. We encourage everyone who believes that he or she may
qualify to apply for admissions. USAFA is committed to consider all
applications lawfully, individually, and fairly. That means that
selection decisions are made without regard to religion, race,
ethnicity, nationality, or gender. The exception to this is that we
have a strong international cadet program where cadets are nominated by
their home nations.
Question. Do you agree with the USAFA's approach with respect to
the selection of applicants?
Answer. First, we have a process today that results in a Cadet Wing
full of great cadets. The current selection process is lawful, and is
being administered fairly. Selection decisions are made without regard
to religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, or gender. In the past 2
years the Academy has accepted the highest number of women cadets ever,
and of African American cadets in recent history. However, we are
absolutely committed to achieving greater diversity. The way to
continue to improve is through recruiting a more diverse applicant
pool. The Academy is developing a very robust diversity plan to achieve
that end. We are also working through our Board of Visitors to improve
the congressional nomination submission rate. In addition, we are
beginning to look at diversity as a broader composition of individual
characteristics then just race, ethnicity, or gender. In order to
expose all cadets to the broadest possible range of ideas and
experiences, USAFA considers such things as life's experiences,
socioeconomic background, whether an individual is a first generation
college student, language abilities, and more. This approach will
broaden the aperture for recruiting, and we believe will result in ever
a richer educational experience for future cadets.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. On February 25, 2004, the Senate Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Personnel conducted a hearing on policies and programs
of the DOD for preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault
in the Armed Forces at which the service vice chiefs endorsed a ``zero
tolerance'' standard. Subsequently, in response to congressional
direction, the Department developed a comprehensive set of policies and
procedures aimed at improving prevention of and response to incidents
of sexual assaults, including appropriate resources and care for
victims of sexual assault.
Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures,
particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?
Answer. Yes, I do. Sexual assault is a complex problem. The
decision to allow victims the opportunity to make a restricted report,
thereby providing her or him time to receive medical assistance and
counseling, the ability to provide forensic evidence, and the time to
regain control of the decisions impacting their lives is an important
factor in helping the victim to begin to heal. We want victims to
report this crime so that we can hold offenders accountable but we know
that this is the most under reported crime in America and we need to
provide a venue where victims who are reluctant to report can receive
care.
Question. What is your understanding of the manner in which the new
policies have been implemented in the Air Force?
Answer. My understanding is that the Air Force has taken a very
aggressive approach to addressing sexual assault. As a result of an Air
Force-wide Assessment of U.S. Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response in 2004, coupled with the DOD Task Force Report on Care for
Victims of Sexual Assault, the Air Force implemented an aggressive
prevention and response program. Full-time Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators (SARCs) are in place at Air Force installations working
directly for the Vice Wing Commander. The majority are GS-12 civilian
employees. A portion of the SARCs are Active-Duty military so that
there are a sufficient number of trained SARCs for deployment.
Volunteer victim advocates (military and DOD civilian employees) are
screened by the SARCS and trained to assist victims. SARCs and Victim
Advocates receive 40 hours of initial training in subjects such as
victimology, critical advocacy skills, knowledge of the military,
victim reporting preferences, criminal investigative processes,
military judicial and evidentiary requirements, and health care
management of sexual assault and medical resources/treatment options.
With the assistance of subject matter experts, the Air Education and
Training Command developed and is deploying educational modules at all
levels of basic, intermediate, professional military education levels,
and for pre-deployment.
The Air Force is currently developing a Bystander Intervention
program to address other methods of prevention.
Question. If confirmed, what oversight role would you expect to
play in implementing DOD policies on sexual assault throughout the Air
Force, including Active and Reserve components?
Answer. I believe the Air Force has made significant progress in
victim assistance and prevention but the complexity of this issue and
its pervasiveness throughout all society require that we continue to
monitor policies and procedures and their effectiveness. I would work
closely with OSD Personnel and Readiness and the various Air Force
functional communities who are vital to our success to assess progress
and make policy corrections where necessary. While the portfolio of the
Assistant Secretary contains policy oversight responsibility for some
of the key first responders (personnel, health care providers, Guard
and Reserve) I would work closely with all first responders to maintain
a proactive and vital Air Force team . . . with the goal of eliminating
the crime but assuring that where there is a victim, she or he receives
the best care we can provide.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY

Question. In 2003, in response to complaints of sexual assaults and
harassment of female cadets at the USAFA, the Secretary of the Air
Force and the Chief of Staff initiated the ``Agenda for Change'' (AfC),
which introduced numerous changes at the Academy aimed at preventing
and responding to incidents of sexual assault.
What elements of the AfC have been most effective and which have
been modified or dropped, and why?
Answer. The AfC called for a strong focus on development of the
character that is expected from a commissioned Air Force officer--the
honor and integrity that reflect the core values of the Air Force. That
means developing cadets so that their loyalty to these values and to
the institution is above loyalty to their peers or anyone who betrays
these values. Much of what appears in the AfC is designed to achieve
that singular purpose. The extensive policies, training, and procedures
to prevent and respond to sexual assault are prime examples of that
focus. It was this refocusing on developing officers of character that
has been most effective because it drove a positive change in the cadet
culture.
While the intent of the AfC is being met, we have backed off on
some individual directives. For example, we made some organizational
changes--such as changing to Vice Superintendent to a Director of
Staff, or having the Director of Athletics report to the Commandant of
Cadets, that over time proved not to be ideal organizational
constructs, therefore, we reverted to the original structure.
Question. What is your assessment of the reforms included in the
AfC, and what is your understanding of the current equal opportunity
climate at the USAFA?
Answer. The AfC was the initial catalyst that started moving the
Academy in the right direction. Combined with the many recommendations
we received from reviews, surveys, and reports such as the Fowler Panel
Report we have made great progress. As we continue to move forward, we
need to ensure we don't lose sight of the underlying AfC principles--
developing officers of character motivated to lead in the Air Force.
The equal opportunity climate at the USAFA is, overall, very
positive.
Question. The reviews, focused on the status and problems
experienced by female cadets at the USAFA in 2003, demonstrated the
importance of focused, informed oversight by service civilian and
military senior leaders of conditions for female cadets and midshipmen.
The Service Academy 2006 Sexual Harassment and Assault Survey found
that even with the implementation of corrective measures, sexual
assault and harassment continue to be factors negatively affecting
female cadets at the military academies.
What is your evaluation of the conclusions and recommendations of
the Service Academy 2006 Sexual Harassment and Assault Survey and the
Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at
the Military Service Academies?
Answer. We examined each of the conclusions and recommendations
made available to us through the various reviews, reports, and surveys,
and they have been instrumental in the development of our policies and
programs. Specifically, the Service Academy 2006 Gender Relations
Survey provided considerable insight into the status of unwanted,
gender related behaviors. It showed we still have work to do in
addressing these complex social issues. However, it also showed
significant progress in our training programs and overall improvement
in female perceptions of USAFA leadership and cadet culture. These were
very positive trends. It was also one of the only reports we have seen
that provided some context to this issue by sighting the prevalence of
these crimes in civilian institutions.
The Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the
Military Service Academies primarily addressed the United States
Military Academy and Naval Academies because the Fowler Panel had
previously completed a very detailed review of the USAFA. In fact, by
the time the report was released the USAFA was already in compliance or
acting on 41 of the report's 44 primary recommendations. This was
largely due to the fact that we had taken decisive action on the Fowler
Panel recommendations--addressing all 21 recommendations spanning
accountability, oversight, organizational culture, intervention, and
response to sexual assault.
Question. What actions would you expect to take, if confirmed, to
address the problems of sexual assault and sexual harassment at the
USAFA and with respect to the Air Force's programs in this regard?
Answer. First, I would like to emphasize the significant attention,
resources, and deep commitment that has been put forth on these issues
by leaders in Congress, OSD, the Air Force, and the Academy over the
last several years. We have made progress. The recently released Annual
Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at U.S. Military Service
Academies for Academic Year 2006-2007 conducted by the DOD Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Officer highlights that progress. It
states, ``The USAFA leadership has clearly demonstrated commitment to
their Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program through sustained
and dedicated efforts. USAFA has done an outstanding job developing and
continuously improving policies, procedures, and processes designed to
prevent and respond to sexual violence in accordance with DOD
policies.'' It goes on to state that, ``Appropriate mechanisms are in
place both at Headquarters Air Force (HAF) and USAFA to ensure
oversight of the effectiveness of the sexual assault prevention and
response program at USAFA.''
Now is the time for dedicated, persistent oversight. I will ensure
we stay focused on providing the best possible education and training,
the best prevention and response programs, and continue to improve the
cadet culture. One sexual assault is too many, so we simply cannot let
up on continuously improving on what we have started here.

RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE AIR FORCE

Question. What is your assessment of corrective measures taken at
the USAFA to ensure religious tolerance and respect, and of Air Force
guidelines regarding religious tolerance that were promulgated in
August 2005?
Answer. USAFA has made great strides in enhancing their religious
respect program. Initially, HAF helped them in developing and
implementing an extensive training program based on respecting
individual values that reached every cadet and every member of the
faculty, staff, and permanent party. That type of training has now been
incorporated into initial recurring training. It is important to note
that the steps taken at the USAFA to ensure religious tolerance and
respect are directly in line with the religious respect guidelines for
the greater Air Force. It is critical that we have one consistent set
of guidelines that are fair to everyone and applied equally across the
board because the USAFA is not an institution unto itself but part of
the larger Air Force.
The task of providing for free exercise of religion, while not
appearing to establish a religion, is complex enough in any government
setting. Arguably, it is even more complex in a military environment,
and yet again more challenging in a university military setting. The
Revised Interim Guidelines Concerning Free Exercise of Religion in the
Air Force, dated February 9, 2006, represents a thoughtful effort to
strike the right balance on this issue. The guidelines remain interim
because we need to be absolutely sure we have this right, and living
with the guidelines for an extended period of time is the best way to
understand their full impact.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you think need to be
taken with respect to the role of military chaplains in performing
their duties in ministering to airmen?
Answer. I don't anticipate making any significant changes to the
interim guidelines until we have more experience with them. The
guidelines task HQ Air Education and Training Command with developing a
plan for incorporating the guidelines in all venues of formal training
and education for officers, enlisted, and civilian personnel where Air
Force Core Values and professional standards are addressed. In
addition, we are developing a computer-based training program for all
Air Force members. We are well on our way to creating a climate founded
on respect. Dedicated and determined oversight is what is needed now to
ensure we remain focused on that outcome.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP

Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by
the Department on March 30, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at
transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities, to include
revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities-based
requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for
both military and civilian personnel.
What is your understanding of the status of the actions identified
in the Defense Language Transformation roadmap?
Answer. As the acting Under Secretary, I've kept abreast of the
Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, and I can tell you with
certainty that the Air Force is fully committed to increasing language
and cultural capabilities amongst our airmen. As of June 2007, the Air
Force achieved Full Operational Capability with respect to the 10
specific tasks assigned to the Services. In addition, Joe McDade, the
Air Force's Senior Language Authority, is actively engaged in the
Defense Language Steering Committee in facilitating achievement of the
remaining 12 tasks to be completed under the Roadmap.
The Air Force's specific initiatives have established a strong
foundation for embedding language and cultural competencies within our
force. As a matter of fact, our institutional competencies embrace
language and culture as part of airman development throughout a career.
I look forward to continued coordination with Dr. Chu as the DOD
continues along the path of Defense Language Transformation to meet
irregular warfare and stability, security, and transition missions.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to identify
foreign language requirements, and to design military and civilian
personnel policies and programs to fill those gaps?
Answer. The changing nature of warfare, and the advent of stability
and security operations as the norm, have highlighted the need for Air
Force personnel to be able to operate in diverse regions with diverse
cultures. The nature of our mobile force also demonstrates our airmen's
adaptability to diverse cultures, which enables operational
effectiveness. I will continue to champion Air Force efforts to
identify language requirements and cultural skill sets and focus on
deliberately developing language capabilities based on validated
requirements.
Question. The Air Force works with the USD (Policy) in publishing
the Department of Defense Strategic Language List, which reflects
regions and languages the DOD anticipates engagement in over the next
15 years. Additionally, the Air Force Senior Language Authority
supplements that list based on unique Air Force missions. Upon
confirmation, I will continue to ensure Air Force coordination with the
combatant commands and defense agencies to fully identify foreign
language requirements.
Question. What is your assessment of an appropriate time frame
within which results can be realized in this critical area?
Answer. The Air Force is continuing to target airman for
development . . . the right airman, at the right place, at the right
time. Since implementation of the Language Transformation Roadmap,
there have already been results in developing a foundational and surge
capability within the Air Force. Our airmen deploying overseas are
provided language familiarization kits while airman supporting the
rebuilding of the Iraqi and Afghani Air Forces are receiving language
training from Defense Language Institute mobile training teams.
I also realize that learning a language is not an overnight
endeavor. In the summer of 2010, the Air Force will be commissioning
the first cohort of Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets on foreign
language scholarships and seeing the benefits of increased summer
immersion tours and study abroad opportunities. The path has been laid
and I believe if we fly the course we will continue to see the
benefits.
Question. Do you believe that Air Force language proficiency
incentives for personnel are appropriate and effective--that is that
they encourage personnel to learn foreign languages? If not, why, and
what would you do to address this issue, if confirmed?
Answer. The increases in foreign language proficiency pay (FLPP) in
June 2006 may have incentivized some who were already familiar with one
of the strategic languages. However, it takes the average person
several years to achieve fluency in a nonromance language at a level
that qualifies for FLPP. If confirmed, I will ensure the appropriate
emphasis is continued to be placed on foreign language skills, to
include an increased focus on sustaining and enhancing capabilities.
Question. What is your view regarding whether Air Force Special
Operators should be ``SOF for life'' from the perspective of language
and cultural awareness training and retention?
Answer. I support the Air Force premise of the right airmen, at the
right place, at the right time. In terms of SOF airmen with a specific
mission enhanced by language, cultural and regional awareness, I view
retention in line with Air Force requirements. I will continue to
ensure training and education opportunities are targeted to the right
airmen to ensure Air Force support of the SOCOM mission is met.

FAMILIES FIRST

Question. For over 10 years, U.S. Transportation Command and its
subordinate command, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, have
worked to improve the process of moving servicemembers' household
goods. Implementation of the new system--``Families First''--will use a
``best value'' approach to contracting with movers that will focus on
quality of performance, web-based scheduling, member counseling, and
tracking of shipments using the new Defense Personnel Property System
(DPS), encouragement of door-to-door moves, and full replacement value
for damaged household goods. Implementation of Families First and DPS
is now taking place, but the support of the military Services is
critical to its success.
What is your understanding of the progress being made in the Air
Force, including adequate funding, in implementing the Families First
program, and what challenges remain?
Answer. Based on the recently authorized $100 million (PBD) to
cover anticipated increased costs associated with Families First
implementation and Full Replacement Value protection for loss and
damage to household goods shipments, we understand there is sufficient
funding within the Air Force.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you and the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel expect to play in ensuring that Families First is
fully explained to airmen and women and that customer satisfaction
surveys are submitted in order to ensure the system works as intended
to measure the performance of movers?
Answer. Our role is one of support to A4 who has responsibility for
household goods transportation activities within the Air Force. At the
time of assignment notification, military members are advised to
contact their location Transportation Office to arrangement household
goods movement. USTRANSCOM developed a robust customer satisfaction
survey process, tracks progress, and provides feedback to A4.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

1. Senator Levin. Mr. Duehring, a draft DOD Instruction currently
circulating within the Pentagon would provide that:

``The appointment of a judge advocate (or for the Marine
Corps, an officer designated as a judge advocate) requires the
coordination of the General Counsel of the Military Department
concerned for appointment of officers to grades O-6 and below,
and requires the coordination of the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense for officers appointed to grades above O-
6.''

In your view, would such a requirement, if adopted: effectively
give civilian lawyers--political appointees--a veto over the
recommendations of promotion boards?
Mr. Duehring. Although I had seen the article from the Boston
Goble, this matter has not yet formally come to my attention as it is
currently in staffing to the Services. I am advised that it was not
language developed by the Air Force, and that DOD is deleting that
language from the draft instruction.

2. Senator Levin. In your view, would such a requirement, if
adopted: constitute an improper interference of political appointees in
the promotion board process?
Mr. Duehring. That language will not be in the final version of the
instruction.

3. Senator Levin. In your view, would such a requirement, if
adopted: have a potentially chilling effect on legal advice furnished
by JAG attorneys to military commanders, and by JAG to the Chiefs of
Staff?
Mr. Duehring. That language will not be in the final version of the
instruction.

4. Senator Levin. In your view, would such a requirement, if
adopted: call into question the neutrality and impartiality of legal
advice furnished by military lawyers?
Mr. Duehring. That language will not be in the final version of the
instruction.
In summary, the language has been removed which should put the
immediate issue to rest. Additionally, on a personal level, I believe
that the ability of the JAG to provide independent advice should not be
impaired. As I state in testimony, there is no place in the promotion
process for inappropriate political influence.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

TRICARE FOR RESERVES

5. Senator McCain. Mr. Duehring, the readiness of the Reserve
component for military operations, particularly physical fitness and
readiness, has been a major concern, resulting in a number of
initiatives, including authorization of TRICARE benefits for Reserves.
Based on your experience within the Department, has the health status
of Reserve components improved measurably since 2001, or is medical and
dental readiness a continuing problem? If so, why?
Mr. Duehring. The medical readiness and physical fitness of Air
Reserve Component (ARC) servicemembers continue to improve steadily.
Tracking of the six individual readiness metrics mandated by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), i.e. dental readiness, periodic
health assessments, immunization status, laboratory tests, no
deployment limiting conditions, and individual medical equipment and
fitness readiness allows the Services to focus their efforts for
improving these areas. These improvements result from command emphasis,
medical squadron diligence, focused contractual support, and individual
servicemember effort.
The ARC funds a Reserve Health Readiness Program contract that has
increased dental readiness by providing additional dental exams for its
members. OSD funds a Post Deployment Health Reassessment contract that
provides increased screening services, thereby increasing the members'
continuum of care following deployments.
Qualifying National Guard and Reserve members and their families
may purchase the TRICARE Reserve Select health care and/or the TRICARE
Dental Program. Reservists ordered to Active Duty for a period of more
than 30 consecutive days have the same medical and dental TRICARE
coverage as Active-Duty servicemembers.
Network adequacy for TRICARE-eligible reservists varies by region.
We continue to investigate this issue and work with our managed care
support contractors to increase TRICARE participation within the
network by health care providers.
We continually review, research, and implement programs and
legislation that will improve the medical readiness and physical
fitness of the Reserve components.

6. Senator McCain. Mr. Duehring, if confirmed, how would you
recommend better monitoring and improving the health status of Air
Force Reserve and Air National Guard personnel?
Mr. Duehring. Accelerating the electronic health record portion of
AHLTA would facilitate access to VA medical records belonging to ARC
personnel, enabling DOD to better monitor and ultimately improve the
health status of those personnel. Currently, DOD relies on episodic
screening for medical readiness examinations and self-reporting by the
servicemember. Gaps in the available medical data and elective
disclosure or nondisclosure by the servicemember may adversely impact
readiness decisions made on the servicemember's behalf. Thus access to
a servicemember's VA medical record will increase the validity of the
assessment of a servicemember's medical readiness.
We must continue to encourage increased participation in the
TRICARE Reserve Select healthcare program and TRICARE Dental program.
In those regional areas lacking complete coverage we must continue to
seek ways to make the coverage robust for all TRICARE-eligible Reserve
members.
New accessions to the ARC often have extensive dental requirements
and basic and technical training schedules do not allow for time to
address more than basic dental needs. Providing a dental benefit after
completion of basic military training, technical school, or
deployments, similar to the Transitional Assistance Management Program
for medical care, would help alleviate this problem.

ROLE OF CIVILIANS IN EXPEDITIONARY MISSIONS

7. Senator McCain. Mr. Duehring, one of the issues that this
committee will have to address in this and future conflicts is the
utilization of Federal civilian employees in support of expeditionary
missions. What are your views on the incentives needed to promote
civilian service, including support of contingency operations?
Mr. Duehring. Federal civilians do currently deploy in support of
expeditionary missions. In fact, many are hired with the expectation
they will deploy into combat theaters. DOD has aggressively pursued
incentives. The current program covers needs of the individual as
evidenced by our success in recruiting civilian employees for
nontraditional jobs such as the joint OSD/State Department Provisional
Reconstruction Team mission in Iraq just last year.
There is continuing pressure for tax exempt status for deployed
civilians, similar to the benefit military members receive. Since the
pay/compensation structures of our military and civilian members are so
different, it is difficult to make a direct comparison of benefits, but
the lack of tax exemption is perceived as an inequity.

8. Senator McCain. Mr. Duehring, if confirmed, how would you lead
the Air Force civilian service to even higher levels of training and
performance?
Mr. Duehring. Air Force civilians are an increasingly large
percentage of our workforce, and we rely on them as never before to
deliver air, space, and cyberspace power in support of the Nation's
security.
Already the Air Force has strong programs in place to promote
career-long development of our civilian workforce, including
opportunities for our civilian employees to attend professional
development in residence without a tax on our organizations. We also
have formal developmental constructs in place and utilize development
teams to assess the potential of civilian employees, vectoring those
who participate toward appropriate developmental opportunities--
educational, training, or experiential (e.g., reassignment).
Moreover, we have collaborated with others in DOD to implement a
pay-for-performance culture by transitioning as many government service
employees as possible to the National Security Personnel System and
transitioning all senior civilians (e.g., members of the Senior
Executive Service) to a pay-for-performance system.
My efforts after confirmation will focus on continuing the
implementation of developmental programs for civilians as well as
furthering the culture change required in a pay-for-performance system.
Performance based management requires a shift in thinking from a task-
based to a competency-based system which will enable capabilities
planning.
As we increasingly compete for top talent, we will continue to
focus on force management planning tools and workforce flexibilities to
continue to attract, retain, and reward a high-performing workforce.
The cornerstone of our strategy will be to continue to develop and
implement a competency-based occupational management system. We have
teamed with other DOD partners already in development of broad
competencies in several of our mission critical occupations.
Identification of the competencies and competency gaps in these mission
critical occupations will enable us to focus deliberate development and
training on those occupations that have the most impact on capability.
I look forward to the opportunity to ensure our Air Force is best
positioned to utilize its personnel--military and civilian--in support
of our Nation's security.
______

[The nomination reference of Craig W. Duehring follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
November 15, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Craig W. Duehring, of Minnesota, to be an Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force, vice Michael L. Dominguez.
______

[The biographical sketch of Craig W. Duehring, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Craig W. Duehring

Mr. Duehring is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs and the acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
As the Principal Deputy, Mr. Duehring serves as the senior deputy
to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs in policy
development and overall supervision of the Reserve Forces of the Armed
Forces of the United States. He is the chief staff advisor to the
Assistant Secretary for all functional areas and responsibilities
assigned to the office.
As the acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs. Mr. Duehring heads a four-division department that
deals at the policy level with Air Force Manpower and Reserve Affairs
issues. He is responsible for providing overall supervision of
manpower, military and civilian personnel, Reserve component affairs,
and readiness support for the Department of the Air Force.
Previously, Mr. Duehring served on the Bush-Cheney Transition Team
and the Department of Defense Transition Team. He was the executive
director of the Patrick Henry Center for Individual Liberty, a non-
profit 501(c)(3) educational and charitable foundation located in
Fairfax, VA. Mr. Duehring was the endorsed Republican candidate for the
Minnesota 2nd Congressional District in 1998. He is a 28-year military
veteran, retiring as a colonel in the U.S. Air Force in February 1996.
His final military assignment was as the U.S. Air Attache to the
Republic of Indonesia.
He is a decorated combat pilot, completing over 800 missions during
the Vietnam war as a Forward Air Controller. Mr. Duehring has flown
more than a dozen types of aircraft, amassing over 1,200 hours in the
A-10 Thunderbolt II. His military awards and decorations include the
Silver Star, the Defense Superior Service Medal, 2 Distinguished Flying
Crosses, 3 Meritorious Service Medals, 27 Air Medals, 2 Air Force
Commendation Medals, the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry (individual
award), and the Vietnamese Staff Service Honor Medal (1st Class). Mr.
Duehring is also a recipient of the Air Force's highest individual
award for leadership in the senior officer category, the Lance P. Sijan
(SIGH-john) Award. Mr. Duehring holds a bachelor of science in History
and Sociology from Minnesota State University at Mankato, and a master
of science in Counseling and Guidance from Troy State University.
He is a native of Mankato, MN.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Craig W.
Duehring in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Craig William Duehring.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs.

3. Date of nomination:
November 15, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
April 25, 1945; Mankato, MN.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Theresa Bayne Duehring.

7. Names and ages of children:
None.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Minnesota State University at Mankato, BA, December 1967.
Troy State University, MS, June 1975.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Feb. 1996, retired from U.S. Air Force (Colonel).
Feb. 1996-Nov. 1998, seeking political office, U.S. House of
Representatives MN-02.
Nov. 1998-Nov. 1999 (est.) unemployed.
Nov. 1999-July 2000 (est. dates) Executive Director, Patrick Henry
Center for Individual Liberty, Gary Aldridge - president, 10525 West
Drive, Fairfax, VA.
July 2000 (est.)-July 2001, I worked various volunteer positions on
the Bush-Cheney campaign including the transition team.
July 2001-present, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs, (PDASD/RA), Pentagon.
June 2007-present, PDASD/RA and Acting Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force, Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Edgar Allen Poe Society (The Ravens)--fraternal organization of
forward air controllers who flew in Southeast Asia using the call sign
``Raven.'' 1972-present.
American Legion--affiliated with China Post #1. 1975-present.
Veterans of Foreign Wars--affiliated with Post #1648, New Ulm, MN.
Life member since 1996.
Reserve Officers Association--2002-present.
Air Force Association--1968-present.
National Military Family Association--app 1992-2005.
National Association of Military Services--1997-2005.
German Historical Institute--2002-present.
Junior Pioneers of New Ulm, MN. Life member since 1996.
Brown County (Minnesota) Historical Society--1996-present.
AARP--1995-present.
Deadalians--Fraternal Order of Military Pilots--2002-present.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
Republican Candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives (MN-2)
1996.
Republican Candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives (MN-2)
1998.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
President George Bush.
Mark Kennedy for Senate.
Sen. Norm Coleman.
Sen. George Allen.
Rep. Gil Gutknecht.
Rep. John Kline.
Rep. Mark Kennedy.

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Awards and Honors:
Silver Star
Defense Superior Service Medal
Distinguished Flying Cross with oak leaf cluster
Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Air Medal with 26 oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross
Republic of Vietnam Staff Service Medal (First Class)
Other Achievements:
1987 Lance P. Sijan Award, senior officer category

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Multiple speeches given as the endorsed Republican candidate for
Congress in the 1996-1998 timeframe. I also wrote letters to the editor
during that period. Prior to my appointment as the PDASD/RA at the
Department of Defense, I often gave speeches to civic groups about my
time in Southeast Asia. My current duties require quite a bit of public
speaking on behalf of the Department of Defense and the U.S. Air
Force--mostly to military audiences. I have not published any books,
opinion columns, and the like.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Craig W. Duehring was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on December 18, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on December 19, 2007.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to John H. Gibson by Chairman
Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

Questions and Responses

DUTIES OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT)

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management)?
Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Financial Management) is principally responsible for the
exercise of the comptrollership functions of the Air Force, including
all financial management functions. Additionally, this position is
responsible for all financial management activities and operations of
the Air Force and advising the Secretary of the Air Force on financial
management.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. Currently, I am serving as Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Management Reform) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD)/Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), and have also
previously served as the acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Financial Management) also in the OSD/Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller). Both of these experiences have allowed me direct
involvement in and exposure to many of the financial management
strategies, efforts, and challenges which exist throughout the
Department. Additionally, I have previously held several senior
executive level management positions in the private sector in which I
have been directly responsible for financial, management, operating,
and strategic performance of an organization. Also, I received an
undergraduate degree in Finance, and an undergraduate degree in
Economics as well as a Masters in Business Administration.
Question. Do you believe that there are any actions that you need
to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management)?
Answer. Although my current position has allowed me some insight
into Air Force financial management, if confirmed, I will need to
quickly become familiar with this area in much greater detail,
including the specific challenges and issues the Air Force financial
management organization is addressing, both short- and long-term.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) and
each of the following?
The Secretary of the Air Force.
Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Financial Management) is the principal advisor to the Secretary
of the Air Force on financial management matters. The Assistant
Secretary (Financial Management) also performs other duties as the
Secretary may prescribe.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Air Force.
Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Financial Management) is also the principal advisor to the Under
Secretary of the Air Force on financial management matters. The
Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) also performs other duties
as the Under Secretary may prescribe.
Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force.
Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary (Financial
Management) works closely with the other Assistant Secretaries of the
Air Force, and provides advice and input on financial matters, and
provides financial management policy leadership, guidance,
implementation and coordination, as appropriate.
Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force.
Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Financial Management) would have a close working relationship
with the General Counsel of the Air Force, to always include an
understanding of any and all legal implications in Air Force financial
matters to assure compliance with the appropriate rules and
regulations.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
Answer. Considering my current service in the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) office, it is my understanding, the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) works closely with
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in the development and
execution of financial, budgetary, and fiscal policies as they relate
to the Air Force.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Information Integration/Chief Information Officer.
Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Financial Management) works closely with the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (NII) to ensure that Department of the Air Force's diverse
and extensive information technology systems are properly managed and
resourced to accommodate and perform the full spectrum of financial
management functions and reporting which is required to achieve the Air
Force's financial management reporting goals.
Question. The Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation.
Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Financial Management) would work with the Director, Program
Analysis and Evaluation to ensure the program priorities of the Air
Force are well understood and thorough Air Force program reviews are
conducted within the framework of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution (PPBE) process and timetable. Additionally, this
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) works to
convey and communicate the results to Air Force leadership, and ensures
the results are in line with overall Department of Defense (DOD)
strategy.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Financial Management) would work closely with the Chief of Staff
to provide support required in order to execute his duties and
responsibilities to achieve the overall mission of the Air Force.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the
Army and the Navy.
Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Financial Management) works closely with the with the Assistant
Secretaries of the Army and Navy in the area of financial management in
an effort to facilitate integrated and coordinated decision making at
all levels and achieve the strongest cooperation between the Services
possible. A cordial and productive working relationship with these
colleagues is essential to successfully supporting the efforts of the
Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ROLES IN THE AIR FORCE BUDGET PROCESS

Question. What is your understanding of the division of
responsibility between the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Financial Management) and the senior military officer (the Director,
Air Force Budget) responsible for budget matters in the Air Force
Financial Management office in making program and budget decisions,
including the preparation of the Air Force Program Objective
Memorandum, the annual budget submission, and the Future Years Defense
Program?
Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Financial Management) has the responsibility and authority for
all budget matters within the Air Force, and accordingly, the Director,
Air Force Budget would serve as a direct report to the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) and would be
responsible for the formulation, justification, and execution of the
Air Force budget, including the preparation of the Air Force Program
Objective Memorandum and the Future Years Defense Program.

BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION AGENCY

Question. The Department recently established the Business
Transformation Agency (BTA) to strengthen management of its business
systems modernization effort.
What is your understanding of the mission of this Agency and how
its mission affects the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force (Financial Management)?
Answer. Given my current role in the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller) and its interactions with the BTA, it is my
understanding, the mission of the BTA is responsible for executing
enterprise level business transformation and therefore works with the
functional leaders and components to accomplish its mission. Given the
BTA stated mission and the tiered accountability approach to its
execution, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial
Management) will be allowed the flexibility to direct the requirements
for the Air Force financial management mission, while continuously
coordinating and integrating with the BTA to ensure meeting the
enterprise level mission requirements as well.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) in providing the Air
Force's views to the Agency, or participating in the decisionmaking
process of the agency, on issues of concern to the Air Force?
Answer. It is my understanding, given the tiered accountability
governance of the BTA's mission, the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Financial Management) should continuously coordinate and
integrate with the BTA to ensure the BTA is aware of the ongoing Air
Force issues, as well as to understand the challenges and issues at the
enterprise level.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial
Management)?
Answer. In my opinion, the major challenges the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force (Financial Management) will face are: significant,
continuous pressure on budgetary resources and the constant challenges
of meeting the Air Force's mission needs with the resources available;
and continuing the significant effort to improve the Air Force's
financial management through improvement in financial processes and
financial systems.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have to
address these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Air Force
leadership to develop and execute sound, logical, and workable budgets
which take into account the Air Force mission objectives as well as the
overall budgetary environment. Additionally, I will work with the Air
Force and DOD leadership to continue, and possibly enhance, the Air
Force efforts to achieve improved business processes and systems,
primarily through active oversight and involvement in the Air Force's
responsibilities in the FIAR and Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP)
programs. Lastly, as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Financial Management) serves in a financial management leadership
role, my goal would be to provide strategic leadership and vision in
areas the Air Force can benefit financially and operationally on a
longer-term basis.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force (Financial Management)?
Answer. If confirmed, my priorities would be to focus on the major
challenges: addressing budgetary pressures and performance; sustaining
the ongoing improvement in business processes, systems, and operations;
and providing strategic guidance in the financial management area.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Question. The DOD's financial management deficiencies have been the
subject of many audit reports over the past 10 or more years. Despite
numerous strategies and inefficiencies, problems with financial
management and data continue.
What do you consider to be the top financial management issues that
must be addressed by the Department of the Air Force?
Answer. As it relates to financial management issues which have
been the subject of many audit reports, it is my opinion the
significant financial management and data issues to be addressed are:
continued improvement in business processes and operations; continued
improvement in business systems; and addressing the culture to embrace
and support these system and process improvements.
Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to ensure that progress
is made toward improved financial management in the Air Force?
Answer. If confirmed, my initial plan to ensure financial
management progress continues would be to: support the Air Force's
compliance with the FIAR and ETP programs; evaluate, support, and
enhance the Air Force efforts to improve business processes and
operations; support and be involved in any efforts to communicate the
qualities and benefits of process and systems improvements; support
efforts for training and education all across the financial management
spectrum; and work with other areas of the Department to benefit from
best practices, insights, and synergies as it relates to all these
areas.
Question. If confirmed, what private business practices, if any,
would you advocate for adoption by the DOD and the Department of the
Air Force?
Answer. Although the DOD and the Department of the Air Force are
unique from the private sector in their mission and in many operational
aspects, there are certainly a number of financial and management
practices which are similar to the private sector and could benefit
from best practices being used elsewhere. If confirmed, I would
encourage the sharing of best practices with not only the other
Services, agencies, and departments in the Federal Government, but
strongly advocate awareness and adoption of practices where there is an
appropriate private sector practice the Air Force would benefit by
emulating.
Question. What are the most important performance measurements you
would use, if confirmed, to evaluate changes in the Air Force's
financial operations to determine if its plans and initiatives are
being implemented as intended and anticipated results are being
achieved?
Answer. Performance metrics play a significant role in the success
of any financial operations, and if confirmed, I will work to
understand and manage the current financial performance metrics the Air
Force is employing and also will work with the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) to ensure the financial performance metrics the
Air Force uses in the future will support the financial operations
success of both the DOD and the Department of the Air Force.
Question. Over the last several years, the DOD has taken a number
of steps to realign its management structure to expedite and enhance
its business transformation efforts. For example, the Department has
established a new Defense Business Systems Management Committee, the
BTA, and the Investment Review Boards. The military departments do not
appear to have taken similar organizational steps.
Do you believe the organizational structure of the Department of
the Air Force is properly aligned to bring about business systems
modernization and improvements in the financial management of the Air
Force?
Answer. In my current role in the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) I am aware the Department has and is constantly
evolving its management and oversight of its business transformation
efforts, and recent governance changes have served to increase the
oversight and inclusiveness of transformation efforts department-wide.
I am not familiar with the specifics of the Air Force's organizational
structure and governance to comment on its current alignment with the
overall DOD structure.
Question. If not, how do you believe the Department should be
restructured to more effectively address these issues?
Answer. At this point I do not have a complete understanding of how
the Air Force is structured to address this issue, however, if
confirmed, I would work to fully understand this issue and be capable
of addressing whether the current governance structure is adequate.

ENTERPRISE TRANSITION PLAN

Question. For the past several years, the administration has
published an ETP aimed, in part, at correcting deficiencies in the
DOD's financial management and ability to receive an unqualified
``clean'' audit.
If confirmed, what would your role be in this business
modernization effort?
Answer. If confirmed, it is my belief the Assistant Secretary
(Financial Management) should play an instrumental role in
coordinating, facilitating, and championing the business modernization
efforts in the Air Force.
Question. The Business Management Modernization Program advocates
top-down leadership in establishing an enterprise architecture for
business systems modernization. The Services, however, appear to be
pursuing independent pilot programs for modernizing business systems,
despite the risk that a Service-led approach could produce numerous
incompatible systems.
Do you support an OSD-led approach to business modernization?
Answer. I support a common, integrated, and coordinated enterprise
level led approach to business modernization, with tiered
accountability empowering the execution of the programs at the local
level to foster the most efficient and effective execution and the most
efficient use of taxpayer dollars.
Question. If so, what would you do, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Air Force supports such an approach?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to coordinate and facilitate Air
Force efforts to ensure the programs managed by the Air Force conform
to the standards and policies set by OSD and the various laws governing
system development.
Question. A critical requirement of the ETP is an enterprise
architecture that would establish standards and requirements for
modernization or new acquisition of business information technology
systems.
Do you agree that an effective enterprise architecture is a
critical step to ensure that new and modified business information
technology systems serve their intended purposes?
Answer. Yes. A common, integrated, and coordinated architecture is
essential to the effective and efficient aggregation of financial data
for reporting, thereby optimizing, the information available for
management decisionmaking.

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM

Question. The Comptroller General has taken the position that the
enterprise architectures of the military departments are not mature
enough to responsibly guide and constrain investment in business
systems. According to GAO, the Air Force has fully satisfied only 14 of
31 core framework elements of an enterprise architecture.
What is your view of this issue? If confirmed, what steps, if any,
do you plan to take to address this problem?
Answer. I am not familiar with the details of the Air Force's
scoring for the core framework elements the Comptroller General is
referring to. If I am confirmed, it would be my intention to thoroughly
review the Comptroller General's report, become familiar with this
issue, and consider his valuable conclusions very seriously.
Question. Section 2222 of title 10, U.S.C., requires the DOD to
institute a process to ensure that money is not wasted on new or
upgraded defense business systems that are not in compliance with the
required enterprise architecture. The Comptroller General has testified
that the enterprise architectures of the military departments ``are not
mature.'' Nonetheless, they continue to invest billions of dollars
every year in thousands of business system programs.
What is your view of this issue?
Answer. Through my current position, I am familiar with the
evolving enterprise level governance structure which has been put in
place, and it is my view this structure, and the current integration
and oversight of investments in modernizing business systems, is
effective and continuously improving. I do not have an understanding of
the military departments (and specifically the Air Force) level of
maturity as it relates to the governance and status of their enterprise
architecture efforts and therefore do not feel I can comment.
Question. Do you believe that we need additional controls on the
expenditure of funds for business systems until such time as the
required enterprise architecture is complete?
Answer. Since I do not have a full understanding of the Air Force's
business systems governance and processes, it would be premature for me
to comment as to the adequacy of their internal controls. However, if
confirmed, given the significant amount of taxpayer dollars being
invested in these systems, and the important role the systems play in
future financial management success, this would be an important area to
quickly understand and become involved in.
Question. In testimony before the Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee, the Comptroller General of the United States, David M.
Walker, suggested that to improve the likelihood of meaningful, broad-
based financial management and related business reform at DOD, DOD
should give the leaders of DOD's functional areas, or ``domains,''
control of systems investments.
What is your view of this suggestion?
Answer. Since I am not familiar with the specific governance
structure of ``domains'' which exist in the Air Force, I would not be
comfortable expressing a view as it relates to the Air Force. However,
in general, it is my belief the most effective and efficient use of any
investment occurs with control at the local level. It should be noted,
in situations where local ``domains'' are building blocks of enterprise
level programs, a top down oversight and integration should also exist.
Question. Mr. Walker testified that the DOD should fix its
financial management systems before it tries to develop auditable
financial statements. He explained that: ``Given the size, complexity,
and deeply ingrained nature of the financial management problems facing
DOD, heroic end-of-the-year efforts relied on by some agencies to
develop auditable financial statement balances are not feasible at DOD.
Instead, a sustained focus on the underlying problems impeding the
development of reliable financial data throughout the Department will
be necessary and is the best course of action.''
Do you agree with this statement?
Answer. Yes, with the general spirit of Comptroller General
Walker's statement.
Question. What steps need to be taken in the Air Force to achieve
the goal stated by the Comptroller General?
Answer. I am not aware of the details of the Air Force programs and
efforts to achieve the goals Comptroller General Walker is referring
to, however, in general, compliance with the FIAR and ETP programs (as
they relate to Air Force) are going to be significant contributors to
achieve the goals Comptroller General Walker is proposing.

LEASING MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS

Question. The controversy surrounding the Air Force 767 tanker
lease proposal raised significant concerns over leasing versus
purchasing major military equipment.
What is your opinion of leasing versus buying major capital
equipment?
Answer. In the private sector, both options have value, but the
best choice is strictly contingent upon the financial and operational
variables involved, and each situation is unique. I am not intimately
familiar with the specifics or arguments of leasing versus purchase as
it relates to the Federal environment, and therefore cannot comment one
way or another.
Question. Is leasing a viable and cost-effective option for
procuring Department of the Air Force equipment, and if so, in what
situations?
Answer. I am not familiar with the specifics or arguments of the
leasing versus purchase evaluation in the Federal environment, and more
specifically as it might pertain to the Air Force. However, if I am
confirmed, this is an area that I would quickly become familiar with,
consult with the functional areas, as well as this committee to
determine the financial management opinion on the option which is the
highest, best, and most proper use of the taxpayer's dollars.

SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING AND ANNUAL BUDGETING

Question. Since September 11, 2001, the DOD has paid for much of
the cost of ongoing military operations through supplemental
appropriations.
What are your views regarding the use of supplemental
appropriations to fund the cost of ongoing military operations?
Answer. Recently, supplemental appropriations have been used as a
funding mechanism for war-related military operations in a very fluid,
dynamic environment, as opposed to the base budgeting process which has
a longer lead time and is more rigid in nature. More recently, the
global war on terror anticipated costs have been combined with the base
budget. It is my opinion that budgeting for costs associated with
global war on terror can be presented in either fashion, and if
confirmed, I will work with the Air Force, Department leadership, and
Congress to support the presentation of the budget in which ever
fashion is chosen.

AUTHORIZATION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Question. Do you believe that an authorization pursuant to section
114 of title 10, U.S.C., is necessary before funds for operations and
maintenance, procurement, research and development, and military
construction may be made available for obligation by the DOD?
Answer. Yes. I do recognize situations can occur where funds have
been appropriated but not authorized in the Department, and it is my
understanding it is the Department's practice to work with all the
oversight committees to communicate and resolve these situations. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the oversight committees to achieve
a resolution of the situation, if it arises, and will respect the views
and rights of the committees.

INCREMENTAL FUNDING

Question. Both the executive and legislative branches have
traditionally followed a policy of full funding for major capital
purchases such as aircraft. However, the Department of the Air Force
has used incremental funding to purchase certain satellites.
What is your view of the incremental funding of major capital
investments?
Answer. I do not have a full understanding of the details or
arguments of the full versus incremental funding analysis, and more
specifically as it would pertain to the Air Force. However, if I am
confirmed, this is an area that I would work to better understand, and
consult with the functional areas, as well as this committee to
determine the financial management opinion on the option which is the
highest, best, and most proper use of the taxpayer's dollars.

FUNDING FOR HEALTH CARE FACILITIES

Question. The conditions identified at Walter Reed Army Medical
Center in February 2007 focused considerable attention on the care,
management, and transition of wounded servicemembers, as well as the
condition of medical care facilities.
What is your understanding of the Secretary of the Air Force's
responsibility for the maintenance and modernization of Air Force
medical facilities?
Answer. I am not familiar with the responsibilities of the
Secretary of the Air Force as it relates to maintenance and
modernization of Air Force medical facilities.
Question. Do you believe the current system of oversight and
funding for DOD medical facilities clearly defines responsibility and
authority between the military departments and the OSD?
Answer. I am not familiar with the current system of governance and
funding for DOD medical facilities as it relates to the
responsibilities and authorities between the military departments and
the OSD.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

[The nomination reference of John H. Gibson follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
October 26, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
John H. Gibson, of Texas, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force, vice Michael Montelongo, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of John H. Gibson, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of John H. Gibson II

Jay Gibson joined the Department of Defense in February 2006 to
serve as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Management Reform) in the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) with
responsibilities for pursuing financial, operational, and management
improvements across the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as
defense wide. Mr. Gibson also served as the acting Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Financial Management) from August 2006 to July
2007.
Prior to joining the Department of Defense, Mr. Gibson held several
senior management roles in private industry.
Most recently, Mr. Gibson managed a consulting organization
focusing on the workout and turnaround environment providing advisory
sendees to both borrowers and lenders. Earlier in his career, he served
in senior executive roles with several different organizations in
financial, operational, strategic, and policy positions.
Mr. Gibson received two undergraduate degrees (Bachelor of Business
Administration-Finance, Bachelor of Arts-Economics) from the University
of Texas at Austin, and his Masters in Business Administration from the
University of Dallas. Mr. Gibson and his wife are from Texas, and have
two sons.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by John H. Gibson
in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Part A--Biographical Information

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
John H. Gibson II.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management).

3. Date of nomination:
October 26, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
February 15, 1959; Flushing, NY.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Lauris Marie Hillard.

7. Names and ages of children:
John Holdon Gibson III, age 14.
Davis Hillard Gibson, age 11.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Bachelor of Arts, Economics, The University of Texas at Austin, May
1981.
Bachelor of Business Administration, Finance, The University of
Texas at Austin, December 1981.
Masters of Business Administration, The University of Dallas,
August 1994.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Management Reform), Office of
the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 2006 to present.
Managing Director, DK Consulting Group, LLC, Abilene, TX, June 1999
to January 2006.
Vice President/COO, Galbraith Electric Company, Abilene, TX,
February 1995 to May 1999.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
City of Abilene, Electrical Subcommittee (Appointed/Resigned).
Airport Development Board, Facilities and Planning Subcommittee,
Taylor County, TX (Appointed/Resigned).

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
St. John's Episcopal Church, McLean, VA--Member.
Jewel Chanty Ball, Fort Worth, TX (Charitable)--Member.
Steeplechase Club of Fort Worth, Fort Worth, TX (Social)--
Nonresident Member.
Air Force Association--Member.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
Volunteer--Bush/Cheney 2004.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
2003 - Bush/Cheney 2004 - $2,000.
2002 - Texans for Senator John Cornyn - $500.
2005 - Dyer for Schoolboard - $200.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
None.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
None.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of John H. Gibson was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on December 18, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on December 19, 2007.]
APPENDIX

Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire on Biographical and Financial
Information Requested of Civilian Nominees

------

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)

5. Date and place of birth:

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)

7. Names and ages of children:

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Instructions to the Nominee: Information furnished in Parts B
through F will be retained in the committee's executive files and will
not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the
committee.

Name:

Part B--Future Employment Relationships
1. Will you sever all business connections with your present
employers, business firms, business associations or business
organizations if you are confirmed by the Senate?

2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue
outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service
with the government? If so, explain.

3. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after
completing government service to resume employment, affiliation or
practice with your previous employer, business firm, association or
organization?

4. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any
capacity after you leave government service?

5. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?

6. If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until
the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable?

Part C--Potential Conflicts of Interest
1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation
agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates,
clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other
relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in
the position to which you have been nominated.

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial
transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for
yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in
any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the
position to which you have been nominated.

4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have
engaged for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the
passage, defeat or modification of any legislation or affecting the
administration and execution of law or public policy.

5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest,
including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above
items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

6. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions
provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are
nominated and by the Attorney General's office concerning potential
conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this
position?

Part D--Legal Matters
1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics
for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to
any court, administrative agency, professional association,
disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide
details.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by
any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of
any Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance,
other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer
ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency
proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic
offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information,
favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in
connection with your nomination.

Part E--Foreign Affiliations
1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g.,
employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with
or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled
by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such
relationship.

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a
law, accounting, public relations firm or other service organization,
have any of your or your spouse's associates represented, in any
capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an
entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe
such relationship.

3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any
compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business
transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a
foreign government? If so, please furnish details.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

Part F--Financial Data
All information requested under this heading must be provided for
yourself, your spouse, and your dependents.

1. Describe the terms of any beneficial trust or blind trust of
which you, your spouse, or your dependents may be a beneficiary. In the
case of a blind trust, provide the name of the trustee(s) and a copy of
the trust agreement.

2. Provide a description of any fiduciary responsibility or power
of attorney which you hold for or on behalf of any other person.

3. List sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from
deferred income arrangements, stock options, executory contracts and
other future benefits which you expect to derive from current or
previous business relationships, professional services and firm
memberships, employers, clients and customers.

4. Have you filed a Federal income tax return for each of the past
10 years? If not, please explain.

5. Have your taxes always been paid on time?

6. Were all your taxes, Federal, State, and local, current (filed
and paid) as of the date of your nomination?

7. Has the Internal Revenue Service ever audited your Federal tax
return? If so, what resulted from the audit?

8. Have any tax liens, either Federal, State, or local, been filed
against you or against any real property or personal property which you
own either individually, jointly, or in partnership?

(The committee may require that copies of your Federal income tax
returns be provided to the committee. These documents will be made
available only to Senators and the staff designated by the Chairman.
They will not be available for public inspection.)

----------------------------------.

This ---------- day of --------------------------, 20------.
______

Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire on Biographical and Financial
Information Requested of Certain Senior Military Nominees

------

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES FOR
CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS
Instructions to the Nominee:

Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an
additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number
(i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.
If you have completed this form in connection with a prior military
nomination, you may use the following procedure in lieu of submitting a
new form. In your letter to the Chairman, add the following paragraph
to the end:

``I hereby incorporate by reference the information and commitments
contained in the Senate Armed Services Committee form
`Biographical and Financial Information Requested of Nominees
for Certain Senior Military Positions,' submitted to the
Committee on [insert date or your prior form]. I agree that all
such commitments apply to the position to which I have been
nominated and that all such information is current except as
follows: . . . .'' [If any information on your prior form needs
to be updated, please cite the part of the form and the
question number and set forth the updated information in your
letter to the Chairman.]

Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.
Also include your office telephone number.)

5. Date and place of birth:

6. Marital Status: (Include name of husband or wife, including
wife's maiden name.)

7. Names and ages of children:

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational or other institution.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
other organizations.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

Instructions to the Nominee: Information furnished in Parts B
through E will be retained in the committee's executive files and will
not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the
committee.

Name:

Part B--Future Employment Relationships
1. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue
outside employment, with or without compensation, during your military
service. If so, explain.

2. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any
capacity after you leave military service?

Part C--Potential Conflicts of Interest
1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation
agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates,
clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other
relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in
the position to which you have been nominated.

4. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest,
including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above
items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

5. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions
provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are
nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential
conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this
position?

6. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by
any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of
Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other
than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer
ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency
proceeding or litigation? If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic
offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information,
favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in
connection with your nomination.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

----------------------------------.

This ---------- day of --------------------------, 20------.