[Senate Hearing 110-370]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-370
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
FIRST SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
on
NOMINATIONS OF
LTG DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN; GEN GEORGE W.
CASEY, JR., USA; ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN; LT. GEN. VICTOR E.
RENUART, JR., USAF; LTG ROBERT L. VAN ANTWERP, USA; CLAUDE M.
KICKLIGHTER; JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., S. WARD CASSCELLS, M.D., WILLIAM C.
OSTENDORFF; LTG DOUGLAS E. LUTE, USA; MICHAEL G. VICKERS; VADM ERIC T.
OLSON, USN; HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO; HON. PRESTON M. GEREN; ADM
MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN; GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC; ADM GARY
ROUGHEAD, USN; GEN WILLIAM E. WARD, USA; GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF;
LT. GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC; HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., HON. DOUGLAS A
BROOK; MAJ. GEN. ROBERT L. SMOLEN, USAF; MARY BETH LONG; JAMES SHINN;
CRAIG W. DUEHRING; AND JOHN H. GIBSON
----------
JANUARY 23, 30; FEBRUARY 1, 6, 27; MARCH 8, 27; JUNE 7, 12, 19; JULY
31; SEPTEMBER 27; OCTOBER 4; NOVEMBER 15; DECEMBER 18, 2007
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
110TH CONGRESS
S. Hrg. 110-370
NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
FIRST SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
on
NOMINATIONS OF
LTG DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN; GEN GEORGE W.
CASEY, JR., USA; ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN; LT. GEN. VICTOR E.
RENUART, JR., USAF; LTG ROBERT L. VAN ANTWERP, USA; CLAUDE M.
KICKLIGHTER; JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., S. WARD CASSCELLS, M.D., WILLIAM C.
OSTENDORFF; LTG DOUGLAS E. LUTE, USA; MICHAEL G. VICKERS; VADM ERIC T.
OLSON, USN; HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO; HON. PRESTON M. GEREN; ADM
MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN; GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC; ADM GARY
ROUGHEAD, USN; GEN WILLIAM E. WARD, USA; GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF;
LT. GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC; HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., HON. DOUGLAS A
BROOK; MAJ. GEN. ROBERT L. SMOLEN, USAF; MARY BETH LONG; JAMES SHINN;
CRAIG W. DUEHRING; AND JOHN H. GIBSON
__________
JANUARY 23, 30; FEBRUARY 1, 6, 27; MARCH 8, 27; JUNE 7, 12, 19; JULY
31; SEPTEMBER 27; OCTOBER 4; NOVEMBER 15; DECEMBER 18, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
42-309 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
(from January 12, 2007-July 17, 2007)
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN CORNYN, Texas
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
______
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
(from July 18, 2007-December 31, 2007)
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Page
january 23, 2007
Nomination of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA, to be General and
Commander, Multinational Forces-Iraq........................... 1
Statement of:
Petraeus, LTG David H., USA, to be General and Commander,
Multinational Forces-Iraq...................................... 4
january 30, 2007
Nomination of ADM William J. Fallon, USN, for Reappointment to
the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, United States Central
Command........................................................ 111
Statement of:
Fallon, ADM William J., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and to be Commander, United States Central Command..... 124
february 1, 2007
Nomination of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, United States
Army........................................................... 191
Statement of:
Casey, GEN George W., Jr., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Chief of Staff, United States Army........... 195
february 6, 2007
To Consider the Nominations of ADM William J. Fallon, USN, for
Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, U.S.
Central Command; GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, for
Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff
of the Army; and to Vote on Pending Military Nominations....... 301
february 27, 2007
To Consider Certain Pending Military Nominations................. 305
march 8, 2007
Nominations of ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN, for Reappointment to
the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, United States Pacific
Command; Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF, for Appointment
to be General and to be Commander, United States Northern
Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command;
and LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp, USA, for Reappointment to the
Grade of Lieutenant General and to be Chief of Engineers/
Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers...... 309
(iii)
Statements of:
Keating, ADM Timothy J., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and to be Commander, United States Pacific Command..... 313
Renuart, Lt. Gen. Victor E., Jr., USAF, for Appointment to be
General and to be Commander, United States Northern Command/
Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command............ 314
Van Antwerp, LTG Robert L., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade
of Lieutenant General and to be Chief of Engineers/Commanding
General, United States Army Corps of Engineers................. 315
march 27, 2007
Nominations of Claude M. Kicklighter to be Inspector General,
Department of Defense; James R. Clapper, Jr., to be Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; S. Ward Casscells, M.D.,
to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; and
William C. Ostendorff to be Principal Deputy Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration....................... 403
Statements of:
Hutchison, Hon. Kay Bailey, U.S. Senator from the State of Texas. 405
Cornyn, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Texas.......... 406
Everett, Hon. Terry, U.S. Representative from the State of
Alabama........................................................ 407
Kicklighter, LTG Claude M., USA, (Ret.), to be Inspector General,
Department of Defense.......................................... 414
Clapper, Lt. Gen. James R., Jr., USAF, (Ret.), to be Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.......................... 415
Casscells, S. Ward, M.D., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Health Affairs............................................. 416
Ostendorff, William C., to be Principal Deputy Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration....................... 416
june 7, 2007
Nomination of LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA, to be Assistant to the
President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and
Afghanistan.................................................... 543
Statement of:
Lute, LTG Douglas E., USA, to be Assistant to the President and
Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan...... 552
june 12, 2007
Nominations of Michael G. Vickers to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; VADM
Eric T. Olson, USN, for Appointment to the Grade of Admiral and
to be Commander, United States Special Operations Command; and
Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino to be Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security, Department of Energy, and Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration....................... 603
Statements of:
Vickers, Michael G., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.................. 608
Olson, VADM Eric T., USN, for Appointment to the Grade of Admiral
and to be Commander, United States Special Operations Command.. 609
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., to be Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security, Department of Energy, and Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration....................... 610
june 19, 2007
Nomination of Hon. Preston M. Geren to be Secretary of the Army.. 701
Statements of:
Hutchison, Hon. Kay Bailey, U.S. Senator from the State of Texas. 702
Geren, Hon. Preston M., to be Secretary of the Army.............. 709
july 31, 2007
Nominations of ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, for Reappointment to
the Grade of Admiral and to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; and Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC, for Reappointment to
the Grade of General and to be Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff................................................ 809
Statements of:
Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff........ 815
Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, for Reappointment to the Grade
of General and to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 817
july 31, 2007
To Consider Certain Pending Military Nominations................. 941
september 27, 2007
Nominations of ADM Gary Roughead, USN, for Reappointment to the
Grade of Admiral and to be Chief of Naval Operations; GEN
William E. Ward, USA, for Appointment to the Grade of General
and to be Commander, United States Africa Command; Gen. Kevin
P. Chilton, USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and
to be Commander, United States Strategic Command; and Lt. Gen.
James N. Mattis, USMC, to be General and to be Commander,
United States Joint Forces Command and Supreme Allied Commander
for Transformation............................................. 945
Statements of:
Roughead, ADM Gary, USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and to be Chief of Naval Operations.................... 951
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from the State of Hawaii.... 952
Ward, GEN William E., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, United States Africa Command...... 953
Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, United States Strategic Command... 955
Mattis, Lt. Gen. James N., USMC, to be General and to be
Commander, United States Joint Forces Command and Supreme
Allied Commander for Transformation............................ 956
october 4, 2007
Nominations of Hon. John J. Young, Jr., to be Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Hon.
Douglas A. Brook to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management and Comptroller; and Maj. Gen. Robert L.
Smolen, USAF, (Ret.) to be Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration............. 1085
Statements of:
Stevens, Hon. Ted, U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska......... 1089
Young, Hon. John J., Jr., to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics......................... 1092
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from the State of Hawaii.... 1092
Smolen, Maj. Gen. Robert L., USAF, (Ret.), to be Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security
Administration................................................. 1094
Brook, Hon. Douglas A., to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management and Comptroller........................... 1095
november 15, 2007
To Consider Certain Pending Civilian and Military Nominations.... 1191
december 18, 2007
Nominations of Mary Beth Long to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs; James Shinn to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs; Craig W. Duehring to be Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; and John H. Gibson to
be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial
Management..................................................... 1195
Statements of:
Long, Mary Beth, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs................................. 1198
Shinn, James, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Security Affairs....................................... 1199
Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from the State of Minnesota..... 1199
Duehring, Craig W., to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Manpower and Reserve Affairs............................... 1200
Gibson, John H., to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Financial Management........................................... 1201
APPENDIX......................................................... 1289
NOMINATION OF LTG DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER,
MULTINATIONAL FORCES-IRAQ
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor, Webb,
McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins,
Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn, Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, chief counsel; Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member;
Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morriss,
minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff
member; Bryan D. Parker, minority investigative counsel;
Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Jill L. Simodejka, research
assistant; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Diana
G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Fletcher L.
Cork, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Joseph Axelrad and
Sharon L. Waxman, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M.
Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator
Bill Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Lauren
Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson and
Michael Sozan, assistants to Senator Webb; Nichole M.
Distefano, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Richard H. Fontaine,
Jr., assistant to Senator McCain; Sandra Luff, assistant to
Senator Warner; Jeremy Shull, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Arch
Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark Winter,
assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham;
Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson,
assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C. Mallory and Bob Taylor,
assistants to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to
Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. The hearing will come to order.
General Petraeus' nomination to become the Commander of
Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) may be the single most
important command in the Nation's defense establishment. The
Nation will entrust him with the operational command and
welfare of over 130,000 American servicemembers, many of whom
will be deployed in Baghdad in the middle of a protracted and
bloody sectarian battle over the future of Iraq. He will take
over from General George Casey, who has served in this position
since 2004.
General Petraeus is well known to this committee. In July
2004 and again in June 2005, General Petraeus provided the
committee valuable insights from his experiences as an infantry
division commander during and immediately after the invasion of
Iraq and from his tenure as the commander of early U.S. efforts
to train and equip Iraqi security forces, experiences that he
no doubt will draw heavily upon in the days ahead.
General Petraeus is well-qualified for this command, widely
recognized for the depth and the breadth of his education,
training, and operational experience. Noteworthy is his recent
leadership of the team that wrote the new counterinsurgency
manual for the Army and Marine Corps. In addition to our
interest in his assessment of current conditions and
operations, many of our questions this morning will probe the
theory and practice of counterinsurgency and their application
in today's Iraq, which is not experiencing a traditional
insurgency, but rather a mixture of sectarian violence and an
emerging civil war, as well as an insurgency against the
government.
Prime Minister Maliki has acknowledged that the crisis in
Iraq is a political crisis. President Bush says this troop
surge and other increased U.S. commitments are based upon the
Iraqi political leaders keeping their pledges to meet
benchmarks on the military, political, and economic front. He
says this even though Iraqi political leaders have not followed
through on their pledges in the past.
Secretary Gates on January 12 described four categories of
benchmarks that we would be monitoring. In the first are the
military benchmarks, including deployment of effective Iraqi
forces into Baghdad and access to all neighborhoods without
political interference. In the second category of Secretary
Gates are those benchmarks relating to the whole part of the
strategy on how effectively Iraqi forces control an area once
it is cleared. In the third are benchmarks relating to the
economic recovery of a controlled area. In the fourth are
benchmarks relating to the Iraqis reaching political
compromises on outstanding issues, including provincial
elections, power-sharing, and the distribution of oil revenues.
This morning we will probe General Petraeus' assessment of
the current situation in Iraq. We will want to understand his
views on the importance of the Iraqis meeting their commitments
and what pressure are we willing to place on the Iraqi
leadership to meet the benchmarks that they have agreed to. We
will ask for his assessment of the readiness of U.S. forces in
and on their way to Iraq for counterinsurgency operations. We
will want to hear how he intends to employ forces that are now
surging into Iraq. We will want to know what timeline he has in
mind to measure the pace and scope of Iraqi security forces'
assumption of the counterinsurgency fight.
We all appreciate General Petraeus' service and his
willingness to lead our forces at this critical and dangerous
time.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
want to thank you for your rapid consideration of this
nomination. You and your staff have made this possible and I
appreciate it very much. I hope we can, at the completion of
the testimony today, move quickly forward to the vote on
General Petraeus' nomination. But again, I want to thank you
for the rapid consideration of this important nomination.
General Petraeus, I join Chairman Levin in welcoming you
here today and congratulating you. It is hard to imagine a more
important military nomination than that of General David
Petraeus. General, you know better than others the stakes in
this war, the benefits of success, and the potential
catastrophic consequences of failure. You, having literally
written the book on counterinsurgency, understand the strategy
and tactics that must guide the President's increase in U.S.
force levels. You, General, will have great responsibility for
the course of future American actions in Iraq.
But to state the obvious, your job will be very difficult.
We have made many mistakes in this war. From the initial
invasion, we had too few troops in Iraq and we never redressed
this deficiency. We played whack-a-mole instead of clearing and
holding. We adopted an inadequate and unrealistic light
footprint coalition strategy that focused on turning over to
Iraqis missions that they were plainly unable to complete.
Administration officials frequently and repeatedly issued
unjustifiably optimistic assessments and predictions about the
situation in Iraq. We responded ineffectively to the hostile
actions of Sunni, Shia, and foreign fighters alike and the
vagaries of the Iraqi government.
Somewhat dismaying that only now, after nearly 4 years at
war in Iraq, is the United States moving toward a traditional
counterinsurgency strategy aimed first at the protection of the
Iraqi population and supported by troop levels appropriate to
their mission.
Whether the projected surge is sufficient to accomplish all
that our leaders will ask of our troops remains an open
question in my mind and I look forward, General, to your
testimony on this score. But I believe that the fundamental
components of the new strategy are needed in Iraq, and that
they have been necessary for a long time. By quelling the
violence in Baghdad and with your leadership, improving our
training and reinforcement efforts, we will allow the economic
and political process to move forward and create a situation
which will permit confidence and optimism.
While I believe that this will present a solid chance of
success, I would note again that the new plan does not on its
own guarantee success. Bringing down the violence in Iraq will
help give Prime Minister Maliki and others the political space
they need to pursue reconciliation. But it is up to the Iraqis
to make these tough decisions. It is absolutely imperative that
they seize this opportunity. It may well be their last.
We have needed a new military leadership in Iraq for some
time and there is no one in the U.S. military better suited to
implement the President's new strategy than General Petraeus. I
am confident that you will receive broad support in the Senate,
as will Admiral Fallon, who has been nominated as the next head
of Central Command. It is absolutely essential that the Senate
act promptly on your nomination. I hope that following Senate
action the President will direct you to take the next flight to
Iraq and assume command. Your role is that important.
If confirmed, this will be your third assignment in Iraq
since the war began in March 2003. You led the 101st Airborne
Division with great distinction in northern Iraq in 2003. You
were later recognized for making significant improvements in
the training of the Iraqi security forces after a slow start
and missteps during the early months of the Coalition
Provisional Authority.
Most recently, as Commander of the U.S. Army's Combined
Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, you led the development of the
Army's doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency
environment. This revised doctrine is designed to merge
traditional approaches to counterinsurgency operations with the
realities of the 21st century.
Mr. Chairman, in the foreword to the new field manual
General Petraeus wrote, ``Conducting a successful
counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force
led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders.'' I
believe that this committee has just such a leader before it
today and that he is someone we can look to for leadership in
this, America's final chance to prevail in Iraq.
General, I thank you and your family for the sacrifices you
have made and your career of selfless service to our Nation. I
look forward to your testimony today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
General Petraeus.
STATEMENT OF LTG DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, TO BE GENERAL AND
COMMANDER, MULTINATIONAL FORCES-IRAQ
General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of
the committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I would
like to begin this morning by briefly reviewing the situation
in Iraq, explaining the change in focus of the new strategy,
and discussing the way ahead. This statement is a bit longer
than usual, but, as I discussed with you last week, Mr.
Chairman, I believe it is important that the committee hear it
and I appreciate the opportunity to present it.
The situation in Iraq has deteriorated significantly since
the bombing this past February of the al-Askari Mosque in
Samarra, the third holiest Shia Islamic shrine. The increase in
the level of violence since then, fueled by the insurgent and
sectarian fighting that spiraled in the wake of the bombing,
has made progress in Iraq very difficult and created
particularly challenging dynamics in the capital city of
Baghdad.
Indeed, many Iraqis in Baghdad today confront life or
death, stay or leave decisions on a daily basis. They take
risks incalculable to us just to get to work, to educate their
children, and to feed their families.
In this environment, Iraq's new government, fourth in 3\1/
2\ years, has found it difficult to gain traction. Though
disappointing, this should not be a surprise. We should recall
that after the liberation of Iraq in 2003 every governmental
institution in the country collapsed. A society already
traumatized by decades of Saddam's brutal rule was thrown into
complete turmoil and the effects are still evident throughout
the country and in Iraqi society.
Iraq and its new government have been challenged by
insurgents, international terrorists, sectarian militias,
regional meddling, violent criminals, governmental dysfunction,
and corruption. Iraq's security forces and new governmental
institutions have struggled in this increasingly threatening
environment and the elections that gave us such hope actually
intensified sectarian divisions in the population at the
expense of the sense of Iraqi identity.
In this exceedingly difficult situation, it has proven very
hard for the new government to develop capacity and to address
the issues that must be resolved to enable progress.
The escalation of violence in 2006 undermined the coalition
strategy and raised the prospect of a failed Iraqi state, an
outcome that would be in no group's interest save that of
certain extremist organizations and perhaps states in the
region that wish Iraq and the United States ill. In truth, no
one can predict the impact of a failed Iraq on regional
stability, the international economy, the global war on terror,
America's standing in the world, and the lives of the Iraqi
people.
In response to the deterioration of the situation in Iraq,
a new way ahead was developed and announced earlier this month.
With implementation of this approach, the mission of MNF-I will
be modified, making security of the population, particularly in
Baghdad, and in partnership with Iraqi forces, the focus of the
military effort. For a military commander, the term ``secure''
is a clearly defined doctrinal task, meaning to gain control of
an area or terrain feature and to protect it from the enemy.
Thus, the task will be clear-cut, though difficult. Certainly,
upcoming operations will be carried out in full partnership
with Iraqi forces, with them in the lead whenever possible and
with arm's length when that is not possible.
Transition of Iraqi forces in provinces to Iraqi control
will continue to feature prominently in the coalition plan and,
as recommended by the Iraqi Study Group, the advisor effort
will be substantially reinforced.
The primacy of population security in the capital will mean
a greater focus on that task, particularly in the most
threatened neighborhoods. This will, of course, require that
our unit commanders and their Iraqi counterparts develop a
detailed appreciation of the areas in which they will operate,
recognizing that they may face a combination of Sunni
insurgents, international terrorists, sectarian militias, and
violent criminals.
Together with Iraqi forces, a persistent presence in these
neighborhoods will be essential. Different approaches will be
required in different locations. Whatever the approach, though,
the objective will be to achieve sufficient security to provide
the space and time for the Iraqi government to come to grips
with the tough decisions its members must make to enable Iraq
to move forward. In short, it is not just that there will be
additional forces in Baghdad. It is what they will do and how
they will do it that is important.
Some of the members of this committee have observed that
there is no military solution to the problems of Iraq. They are
correct. Ultimate success in Iraq will be determined by actions
in the Iraqi political and economic arenas on such central
issues as governance, the amount of power devolved to the
provinces and possibly regions, the distribution of oil
revenues, national reconciliation, resolution of sectarian
differences, and so on.
Success will also depend on improvements in the capacity of
Iraq's ministry, in the provision of basic services, in the
establishment of the rule of law, and in economic development.
It is, however, exceedingly difficult for the Iraqi government
to come to grips with the toughest issues it must resolve while
survival is the primary concern of so many in Iraq's capital.
For this reason, military action to improve security, while not
wholly sufficient to solve Iraq's problems, is certainly
necessary, and that is why additional U.S. and Iraqi forces are
moving to Baghdad.
The way ahead is designed to be a comprehensive approach.
Indeed, the objectives of helping Iraqis increase the capacity
of their governmental institutions, putting Iraq's unemployed
to work, and improving the lot in life of Iraqi citizens
require additional resources, many of which will be Iraqi. In
carrying out the non-kinetic elements of the strategy, however,
our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians downrange
must get all the help they can from all the agencies of our
Government.
There is a plan to increase that assistance and it is
hugely important. This clearly is the time for the leaders of
all our governmental departments to ask how their agencies can
contribute to the endeavor in Iraq and to provide all the
assistance that they can. Our military is making an enormous
commitment in Iraq. We need the rest of the departments to do
likewise, to help the Iraqi government get the country and its
citizens working and to use Iraq's substantial oil revenues for
the benefit of all the Iraqi people.
Having described the general approach, I would like to
offer a word on expectations. It will take time for the
additional forces to flow to Iraq, time for them to gain an
understanding of the areas in which they will operate, time to
plan with and get to know their Iraqi partners, time to set
conditions for the successful conduct of security operations,
and of course time to conduct those operations and then to
build on what they achieve.
None of this will be rapid. In fact, the way ahead will be
neither quick nor easy, and there undoubtedly will be tough
days. We face a determined, adaptable, barbaric enemy. He will
try to wait us out. In fact, any such endeavor is a test of
wills and there are no guarantees. The only assurance I can
give you is that, if confirmed, I will provide MNF-I the best
leadership and direction I can muster, I will work to ensure
unity of effort with the ambassador and our Iraqi and coalition
partners, and I will provide my bosses and you with forthright
professional military advice with respect to the missions given
to MNF-I and the situation on the ground in Iraq.
In that regard, I would welcome opportunities to provide
periodic updates to this body. Beyond that, I want to assure
you that should I determine that the new strategy cannot
succeed, I will provide such an assessment.
If confirmed, this assignment will be my fourth year or
longer deployment since the summer of 2001, three of those to
Iraq. My family and I understand what our country has asked of
its men and women in uniform and of their families since
September 11. In fact, I would like to take this opportunity to
thank the American people for their wonderful support in recent
years of our men and women in uniform.
Tom Brokaw observed to me one day in northern Iraq that
those who have served our Nation since September 11 comprise
the new greatest generation. I agree strongly with that
observation and I know the members of this committee do, too.
Over the past 15 months I have been privileged to oversee
the organizations that educate our Army's leaders, draft our
doctrine, capture lessons learned, and help our units prepare
for deployment. This assignment has provided me a keen
awareness of what we have asked of our soldiers and of their
families. In view of that, I applaud the recent announcement to
expand our country's ground forces. Our ongoing endeavors in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere are people-intensive and it is
heartening to know that there will be more soldiers and marines
to shoulder the load.
I recognize that deploying more forces to Iraq runs counter
to efforts to increase the time at home for our troops between
deployments. I share concerns about that. However, if we are to
carry out the MNF-I mission in accordance with the new
strategy, the additional forces that have been directed to move
to Iraq will be essential, as will again greatly increased
support by our Government's other agencies, additional
resources for reconstruction and economic initiatives, and a
number of other actions critical to what must be a broad,
comprehensive, multifaceted approach to the challenges in Iraq.
Many of the emails I have received in recent weeks have had
as their subject line ``Congratulations, I think.'' I
understand the message they are conveying. I know how heavy a
rucksack I will have to shoulder in Iraq, if confirmed. I am
willing to take on the position for which I have been nominated
because I believe in serving one's Nation when asked, because I
regard it as a distinct honor to be able to soldier again with
those who are part of the brotherhood of the close fight, and
because I feel an obligation to help the ``Shabil Iraq,'' the
vast majority of whom have the same desires of people the world
over: security for themselves and their loved ones,
satisfaction of their basic needs, and an opportunity to better
their lot in life.
In closing, the situation in Iraq is dire. The stakes are
high. There are no easy choices. The way ahead will be very
hard. Progress will require determination and difficult U.S.
and Iraqi actions especially the latter, as ultimately the
outcome will be determined by the Iraqis. But hard is not
hopeless. If confirmed, I pledge to do my utmost to lead our
wonderful men and women in uniform and those of our coalition
partners in Iraq as we endeavor to help the Iraqis make the
most of the opportunity our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines have given to them.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General. Again, we thank you for
your service. We thank you for your very eloquent testimony.
Thank your family as well for us, if you would.
There are standard questions which we ask of nominees which
we will put to you right now. Have you adhered to applicable
laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views
when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views
differ from the administration in power?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We will have an 8-minute round to begin with.
General Petraeus, General Casey says that, ``the longer
that U.S. forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq's
security it lengthens the time that the Government of Iraq has
to take the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing
with the militias.'' General Abizaid said recently, ``I believe
that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from taking more
responsibility for their own future.''
Do you agree with those two generals?
General Petraeus. Sir, my mission will be different than
the mission that they had, if confirmed. In fact, I talked to
General Abizaid and General Casey both in the past week and
they both support the increase in U.S. forces as a way of
helping the Iraqi government get the time and space that it
needs to be able to come to grips with the difficult decisions
that they in fact identified.
Chairman Levin. We will ask General Casey when he is before
us as to whether or not he still stands with the statement
which he has made and which General Abizaid has also made,
along the line that the more American forces that we provide
the less likely it is that the Iraqis will take responsibility
for their own future.
On the question of benchmarks, General, President Bush says
that the Iraqis have agreed to meet certain political,
economic, and military benchmarks. Are you familiar with the
President's statement?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you seen those benchmarks?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have not seen lists of them. I am
familiar with his statement and of course with the benchmarks
that you outlined that Secretary Gates mentioned earlier.
Chairman Levin. Have you seen the actual benchmarks that
the President referred to?
General Petraeus. If you are talking about the slides and
the briefing, sir? I am not sure which you are actually
referring to.
Chairman Levin. The President has referred to benchmarks.
He has said that the Iraqis have agreed to benchmarks and that
we will hold the Iraqis to those benchmarks. Have you seen the
benchmarks the President referred to?
General Petraeus. Yes, that is correct. I know what you are
talking about sir, in terms of what they have agreed to provide
in terms of the military forces in Iraq, money for the
reconstruction, money for foreign military sales, and so forth,
yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you see to it that we get a copy of
those benchmarks?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The requested benchmarks have been provided to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense which is coordinating turnover of this
information.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that we will hold the Iraqi
government to the benchmarks that it has announced?
General Petraeus. We certainly will to the very best of our
ability, sir.
Chairman Levin. How are we going to do that? What is the
leverage on them?
General Petraeus. Sir, there are a number of different ways
of leverage. Among them are providing assistance or withholding
assistance in various forms of the lines of operation that are
pursued in Iraq.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that the success of the
strategy is dependent upon the Iraqis carrying out their
commitments?
General Petraeus. I do, sir.
Chairman Levin. Over the last several weeks, we have heard
about rhetorical off-ramps that are built into the flow of
21,000 additional troops, which implies that the U.S.
commitment is conditional. Secretary Gates said that there is
plenty of opportunity before many of the 21,000 additional
troops arrive to evaluate, ``whether the Iraqis are fulfilling
their commitments to us.''
Now, a story in this morning's Washington Post indicates
that you do not intend to use off-ramps to slow or cancel the
deployment of additional U.S. forces to Iraq even if the Iraqis
fail to meet their commitments. Is that story true?
General Petraeus. No, sir, it is not. I think that was, ``a
source close to General Petraeus'' or something like that. What
I would do in the event that the Iraqi benchmarks are not met
is obviously discuss that with my boss at Central Command, with
the Secretary of Defense, and then, frankly, determine what it
is that we are going to do.
Chairman Levin. So as of this time, do you know whether the
flow of additional forces is conditional upon the Iraqis
keeping their political, economic, and military commitments?
General Petraeus. Sir, I do not believe that there are
specific conditions that are established. I know again that
there is certainly a keen awareness of the Iraqis and what it
is that they are supposed to do. In fact, General Odierno has
reported to me that three to four of the battalions, of the
Iraqi commitment, actually are already in Baghdad, and that
they came in at something like the 80 percent figure. That
includes their leave numbers, however.
Chairman Levin. Do you believe that it is important that
the Iraqis understand that they need to reach the political
settlements which are essential to resolve the sectarian
violence and to defeat the hard-core insurgents?
General Petraeus. It is very important, sir.
Chairman Levin. What forms would that pressure take?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think everything from moral
suasion in meetings to again either giving additional or
withholding assistance.
Chairman Levin. Could that also mean providing or not
providing parts of the 21,000 troops?
General Petraeus. Sir, it could.
Chairman Levin. Now, we understand from columnist David
Broder and from what you said here this morning that you are
willing to provide a regular report every couple weeks on Iraqi
progress on meeting the agreed upon benchmarks. Is that
accurate?
General Petraeus. Sir, I would be happy to provide updates
to this body on whatever basis. I would like to make sure it is
long enough to make sure it is meaningful and yet certainly
short enough so you can keep track of what is going on.
Chairman Levin. We appreciate that, and we also want you to
not be bogged down with reports. We like them regularly, but we
do not want you to be focusing on reporting to us. You have
other duties to perform.
General Petraeus. Right, sir.
Chairman Levin. But we would then expect those regular
reports, because for some of us and I think many of us it is
critically important that that pressure be felt by the Iraqi
government. They have not complied with previous commitments
that they have made. I am very doubtful as one Senator that it
is likely they are going to carry out the other commitments
that they have made. I just think history should make us very
dubious about the likelihood that they are going to carry out
these critically important commitments in the political area as
well as the military and economic area.
But those reports, to the extent that you will make those
regularly, will be valuable to us in determining whether or not
the Iraqi government is doing what only they can do, which is
to work out the settlement of differences and to carry out
their commitments.
Reports do not constitute pressure by themselves. They are
useful, but simply reporting that Iraqis have failed to achieve
a benchmark does not mean much if there are no consequences to
that failure. As I said, they have consistently failed to meet
their commitments to increase forces in Baghdad, to stay on
schedule for the drafting of their constitution, to hold a
national reconciliation conference, or disarm the sectarian
militias. So consequences need to be clear, real, significant,
and used if pressure is going to make a difference in terms of
Iraqi behavior. Would you agree with that?
General Petraeus. I would, sir.
Chairman Levin. General, will U.S. forces have unfettered
access and complete freedom of action in all neighborhoods,
without Iraqi political interference?
General Petraeus. I am told they already do, sir, but it is
something I will certainly confirm, if confirmed.
Chairman Levin. Who will have the operational and tactical
control of U.S. battalions that are partnered with the nine
Iraqi brigades in the nine sectors of Baghdad?
General Petraeus. U.S. commanders, sir.
Chairman Levin. Who will have operational and tactical
control of the nine Iraqi brigades themselves?
General Petraeus. I believe it is Iraqi commanders, sir,
and to ensure unity of effort what General Odierno is already
working on in fact is linkages at each of the levels of
command, co-located command posts, terms of reference, and so
forth.
Chairman Levin. What about the U.S. adviser teams that are
embedded with Iraqi units that are operating in Baghdad? Who
will have operational and tactical control of those teams?
General Petraeus. U.S. units, sir.
Chairman Levin. Who will be responsible for the force
protection of U.S. adviser teams with Iraqi units?
General Petraeus. The unit in whose area they are located,
sir.
Chairman Levin. The U.S. unit?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
My time has expired. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, in your view, since you have been
intimately involved in Iraq from the beginning, suppose we
announce tomorrow that we would withdraw within 4 to 6 months.
What are the results there in Iraq and in the region?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think that sectarian groups would
obviously begin to stake out their turf, try to expand their
turf. They would do that by greatly increased ethnic cleansing.
There is the very real possibility of involvement of countries
from elsewhere in the region around Iraq entering Iraq to take
sides with one or the other groups.
There is the possibility certainly of an international
terrorist organization truly getting a grip on some substantial
piece of Iraq. There is the possibility of problems in the
global economy should in fact this cause a disruption to the
flow of oil and a number of other potential outcomes, none of
which are positive.
Senator McCain. Eventually there is every likelihood of a
scenario of chaos?
General Petraeus. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Suppose we send you over to your new job,
General, only we tell you that you cannot have any additional
troops. Can you get your job done?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Senator McCain. Suppose that we send you additional troops
and we tell those troops that, we support you, but we are
convinced that you cannot accomplish your mission and we do not
support the mission we are sending you on. What effect does
that have on the morale of your troops?
General Petraeus. It would not be a beneficial effect, sir.
Obviously, a commander would like to go forward with as much
flexibility as he can achieve. I was assured yesterday by the
Secretary of Defense, by the way, that if we need additional
assets, my job is to ask for them. If they are not provided in
some case, my job is to tell my boss the risk involved in
accomplishing the mission without the assets that are required.
At some point, of course, you may have to go back and say that
you cannot accomplish the mission because of the assets that
have not been provided.
Senator McCain. You are fairly familiar with the Iraqi
leadership. You have known these individuals. Based on your
experience with them, how effective do you think threats of
withdrawal of U.S. troops are in achieving real progress in
Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, there are certain elements in the
government that might actually welcome withdrawal. There are
others certainly that would fear it greatly. It certainly
depends on which side of these various divides they're on. I do
not think that the responsible members of that government right
now certainly want us to withdraw, and if it is levers that we
are after, again withdrawing support from a specific
organization or perhaps institution in my experience was more
effective in trying to get a desired outcome.
Senator McCain. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its
state of readiness, how long do you believe the increased troop
levels and tempo of operations can be sustained?
General Petraeus. Sir, my understanding is that there are
contingency plans being developed to sustain the surge, the
increased force levels, if that is required. Having said that,
as I mentioned in my opening statement, I am keenly aware of
the strain on our soldiers and marines in particular, and on
our families, certainly the other members of the military who
are in positions that have been deploying, and it is for that
reason that, as I mentioned, I applaud the increase in our
ground forces in particular.
Senator McCain. You were a young officer following our
defeat in the Vietnam War. Would you contemplate the effects of
defeat in Iraq as compared with an additional, very difficult
strain on our men and women in the military who are having to
serve more than we would want them to?
General Petraeus. Sir, obviously what our men and women in
the military want to do, I think, is to accomplish their
mission and then to come home.
Senator McCain. I am saying it took us a long time to
recover from losing the war, did it not?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Do you understand the command and control
relationships between the American and Iraqi forces in this new
plan? I am very concerned about unity of command.
General Petraeus. Sir, I share your concern. Again, on the
one hand, though, we have pushed Iraqis to do more, to take
charge in many cases, and so we have in fact almost a good
news, bad news story. The good news is that the Iraqis are
willing to take command in many cases. The bad news is that
makes us have to achieve unity of effort rather than unity of
command, and that is why we would have to have those
relationships all the way up and down, with command posts co-
located and so forth to assure that.
Senator McCain. We need to get that sorted out, General.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. I know of no successful military operation
where you have dual command.
In your judgment, what is a reasonable estimate of the time
needed to demonstrate whether such efforts, these efforts, are
having success?
General Petraeus. Sir, under the current plan as I
understand it, the final brigade would be operational in Iraq
at the end of May, giving them time to get established, to
understand the situation on the ground. Other forces will have
already certainly been moving into their areas of operation. I
would think that we would have indicators at the least during
the late summer of the ability to clear and hold and then build
in the Baghdad area and to secure that population.
Senator McCain. Will all five brigades be massed
simultaneously or is there some other plan to have all five
brigades move more slowly into Baghdad?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have not----
Senator McCain. In other words, are you confident that they
are getting them over there as quickly as possible?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have asked that those forces be
moved as rapidly as possible, if I am confirmed.
Senator McCain. Are you confident that they will be?
General Petraeus. Sir, the Secretary and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs said yesterday that they are in fact scrubbing
that, if you will, to determine how quickly they can in fact
move those forces there.
Senator McCain. You were in Haiti and Bosnia and you are
familiar with Kosovo. It took an overwhelming number of
military boots on the ground in Kosovo and Bosnia in order to
bring about the end of what was basically sectarian violence,
Serbs killing Muslims, Muslims or in the case of Kosovo,
Albanians, right?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Yet your numbers, by any estimate or
formula that you use, you are receiving are either inadequate
or bare minimum. Does that concern you?
General Petraeus. It does, sir. If you look at the
counterinsurgency manual, for example, and you have the 1-to-50
ratio of counterinsurgents to citizens, you would say that,
well, for Baghdad's population you should have somewhere around
120,000 security forces. If you add all of the U.S. forces that
will be on the ground when we have the full increase in forces,
including Special Operations Forces, all the Iraqi forces,
military and police, you get to about 85,000. Not all of those
are as effective as we might want them to be, particularly in
the police side. However, there are tens of thousands of
contract security forces and ministerial security forces that
do in fact guard facilities and secure institutions and so
forth that our forces, coalition or Iraqi forces, would
otherwise have to guard and secure, and so that does give me
reason to believe that we can accomplish the mission in Baghdad
with the additional forces.
Senator McCain. How is the morale?
General Petraeus. Sir, the morale is good. Troops in the
field take it one day at a time, sometimes one foot in front of
the other foot, and continue to move forward to accomplish
their mission.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome,
General Petraeus.
General Petraeus, I have concerns about this policy, but I
have every intention of voting for you. I think you are an
outstanding military officer. Our soldiers really deserve the
best and I think they are getting it with your service, even
though we have some real reservations, I do, just generally on
the policy.
I think Americans really are looking and asking about this
timeline, these benchmarks which you referred to and responded
to the chairman and also Senator McCain. They are really
wondering now, with the announcement by the President about
these additional kind of forces, what are the benchmarks and
whether they can be met. I know this is an old issue, an old
question, and it will be older before I am sure the end of the
hearing. But you have talked about late summer in terms of the
military aspect. With regard to the security, the President has
even indicated in his speech that he believed that all the
provinces, he thought, would be secured by the fall.
To establish its authenticity, the Iraqi government plans
to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces
by November. That is security. We are talking about the
political decisions that have been reached earlier. What are
really the benchmarks that you have established yourself, that
they will have to be realized to really know whether we are
making progress?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have general benchmarks in my
mind. Obviously, until I can go over to Iraq, if confirmed, and
sit down with the staff over there and work through the
specific timing of which battalions and brigade headquarters
arrive when, when they expect to get certain decisions to see
what Iraqi resources are committed, and so forth, and what
timeline.
Senator Kennedy. I am thinking now in terms of the non-
military, I mean of the oil revenue law, the provincial
elections, and the demilitarization of the militias. Do you
have these benchmarks established now? I think Americans want
to know when we are going to expect we can measure some
progress. You have been very frank in indicating you would come
back to the committee. You have been very frank in indicating
that if this does not work as an operation you do not rule out
moving in another direction.
But what is the best you can tell the American people as to
what would be the benchmarks? You have given it to us with
regard to security. Is there any additional information you can
give us with regards to reaching the benchmarks on these other
items which are so essential, obviously, in terms of the new
direction of Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, I cannot give you dates at this
point in time. Again, I can tell you, however, that I have in
fact discussed some of this already just in passing with Deputy
Prime Minister of Iraq Barham Salih and with others who have
called to congratulate me on the nomination.
Senator Kennedy. You were kind enough to drop off a nice
book when you were good enough to visit and I have gotten
through a good part of it during the past few days and over the
weekend. In that were these words, effectively: ``Sometimes,
the more force is used the less effective it is. Any use of
force produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen.
The more force applied, the greater the chance of collateral
damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases the
opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military
activities as brutal.''
The manual talks about the importance of the decisive
battle for the people's minds. Many have argued that the
overwhelming military force presence in Iraq actually will
inflame the insurgency. What is your view on that?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think that at this point in
Baghdad the population just wants to be secure and, truthfully,
they do not care who does it. They would like it to be
legitimate Iraqi security forces that are fair and impartial. I
heard, for example, early feedback that a Kurdish unit that has
moved into a mixed area in Baghdad was actually received well
because in fact they provided some additional security that did
not exist before.
Again, if confirmed, that is something I obviously have to
see for myself on the ground, to walk the streets, to talk to
the people, and to get a sense of that for myself. But that is
my personal view right now from afar.
Senator Kennedy. Some have said, if you have 140,000 troops
over there who are not able to gain security, why do you
believe an additional 22,000 are likely to gain it?
General Petraeus. Sir, to some degree it has to do with how
they are used. Again, if the mission is as it is now under the
new approach, to focus on the security of the population, then
forces must locate with and live with that population,
certainly again link arms with Iraqi forces in this particular
case, coordinating with all the others that might be in an area
as well.
Senator Kennedy. The idea of tens of thousands of American
troops in combat in downtown Baghdad, what is your reaction to
whether that really helps win the hearts and minds of the
people or whether it is perceived as increasing hostility by
American soldiers? How do you measure that? This is also
referred to in the book.
General Petraeus. Sir, obviously it depends literally on
how those forces conduct themselves, how they carry out their
missions, if they are both respectful and firm as required.
Certainly there will be a need to kill or capture those bad
elements that I talked about. On the other hand, what we want
to do, of course, is to clear areas as quickly as possible to
provide security for them of a persistent nature and then to
enable the holding and the building piece that is the real key
to achieving the support of the population.
Senator Kennedy. You have in your manual ``Long-term
success depends on the people taking charge of their own
affairs, consenting to the government's rule.'' What is the
time? The number of soldiers now that are being sent over
there, how long are those soldiers going to be sent over there?
We have heard words about escalation, we have words of surge.
Is this going to be permanent? Is it temporary? What is the
time limitation that you can tell us about?
General Petraeus. Sir, I do not know what the time
limitation is at this point.
Senator Kennedy. At this point therefore we should assume
that they will remain over there until we hear further from
you?
General Petraeus. As they are needed for that particular
mission, yes, sir. Senator, if I could, I think it is important
to remember that this particular government, the Prime Minister
Maliki government, has only been in office 8 months. They are
the fourth Iraqi government in 3\1/2\ years and, given the
situation in Baghdad, I think it is not wholly surprising that
they have had a tough time getting their feet on the ground.
In fact, there are some signs certainly literally in recent
days and weeks that there is a stiffer approach.
Senator Kennedy. I thank you, General. I think many of us
are concerned that we have had surges in the past at Najaf,
Fallujah, Baghdad, and after the Samarra temple, and they have
not been successful, and there is concern, which I share, about
the surge at the present time, whether this can really achieve
the objectives which you have outlined. But in any event, I
appreciate your service. Thank you for your willingness to
lead.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, I think I do not recall anyone being so
praised by all sides as you have been. I honestly believe you
are the right person for this very difficult task before us. I
have enjoyed being with you on three different occasions in
Iraq and we got the very strong impression that you had a
handle on things, and I appreciate what you are about to get
into.
Let me voice a concern that I have, and I think that I am
not going to ask you to respond to a question unless there is
time at the end of my questioning. That is on the justice
system that we hear so much about. I know there are several
attorneys that will probably be addressing this in questions
after I am completed.
But any time a top lieutenant to al-Sadr, one who has been
involved in torture, assassinations, and then is just turned
loose at the request of the Prime Minister, it is something
that bothers me a great deal. I have heard Senator Sessions
talk about analogies between Alabama incarcerations and what is
happening over there. In Texas, some 170,000 people are
incarcerated, while only 28,000 are in Iraq. We know it is a
problem that needs to be addressed and if there is time I will
ask you a question on that.
But I wanted to first, before doing that, get into the
success story of Somalia. The train and equip program there--I
had occasion to be in Ethiopia on numerous occasions while they
were going through this program, and when they were called upon
to go with us into Somalia it was a huge success.
I am wondering if there is anything you can draw on from
that success that might have application to what your mission
is going to be in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, I will certainly look at it. I must
be candid and say I have not seen something that is directly
transportable so far. Certainly there are ways that the
assistance has been provided there that has been unique and
useful, I think, but that is something I will certainly look
at.
Senator Inhofe. This authorization committee has been very
straightforward in coming up with funds for train and equip,
but also for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP).
I heard you say in your opening statement, you talked about
more resources in the neighborhoods, things that you can do in
the neighborhoods. I know that I have talked to General
Chiarelli and you about CERP.
Tell us a little bit about how more effective it would be
if you have more capability to respond to some of these needs
immediately than going through the system that we are more
accustomed to?
General Petraeus. Sir, in the counterinsurgency field
manual there is actually a line in there that says ``Money is
ammunition,'' and at certain points money can be the most
important ammunition. There are certainly points when real
ammunition is the best ammunition, but there are times
certainly, once you have done the clear and hold, where you are
trying to build, where the most important asset is that ability
to help get streets cleaner, connect sewage lines, make small
improvements in the lives of people that are very meaningful
right off the bat. That has been aided enormously by CERP.
I would like to add, though, that as I have thought about
the prospect of going back to Iraq, I have thought that our
effort--and in fact there is an effort by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Paul Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary for
Business Transformation, to pursue this, to either reestablish
or build sustainable, self-sustaining small businesses and
industries in Iraq as being hugely important. Iraq does enjoy
some enormous comparative advantages when it comes to the
production of certain types of materials, among them asphalt,
fertilizer, of course a variety of petroleum products and so
forth, some agricultural products, and I think that we have to
look very hard and fund those opportunities that are self-
sustained vice those that are just of a Works Progress
Administration (WPA)-type nature.
Senator Inhofe. On the WPA-type of deal, it was either you
or General Chiarelli who told me about the fact that you had
lines into Baghdad neighborhoods, but no grid to bring them in.
General Petraeus. That is correct, yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. So they are climbing up with wire and
electrocuting themselves trying to bring it in. This is the
type of thing that can be done in my opinion immediately, and I
would hope that you would tell us as we develop next year's
legislation if you think we need to have more attention to that
program, to CERP.
General Petraeus. Sir, I certainly will, and I can assure
the committee that I also intend to encourage the Iraqi
government to use the substantial resources that it has. I have
in fact also been in communication with the minister of
finance, who is a former colleague there, through an
interpreter, to encourage them very strongly to spend the oil
revenues that they have. There are reports of as much as $10 to
$12 billion that is available on the Iraqi side. I think it is
very important that they use that and that they use it on the
behalf of all Iraqis and not just in one area or another.
Senator Inhofe. That is good.
Senator McCain mentioned the experience in Bosnia. I can
remember being up in Tuzla when they said that in terms of the
ethnic violence that it would never be resolved, this was early
on, and yet it was, as Senator McCain pointed out. So I think
it showed in a very difficult area, that is a different
culture--I understand that. But if it was resolved there, do
you think it can ultimately be resolved in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, that is certainly my hope. I must
tell you that in my first year, really throughout the first
2\1/2\ years in Iraq, my sense was that this was a country in
which the divides were actually less than those in Bosnia. Real
ethnic hatred is what you find when you read Evo Andrich's
book, ``The Bridge Over the Drina,'' and some of the
unspeakable acts that were inflicted upon each other in the
centuries of ethnic violence in the fault lines in the Balkans.
There is great intermarriage in Iraq, particularly in
Baghdad. Unfortunately, in the wake of the Samarra mosque
bombing the ethnic divides have grown, and I think it is very
important to secure the population, so that we can stop that
kind of violence before it spirals farther and so that we do
not have to do what happened in Bosnia, which is wait for the
civil war to take place and then to come in.
Senator Inhofe. That is an excellent answer.
Senator McCain also talked about the morale, how is the
morale. Your answer was fairly short, but I know from my
experience over there that the morale is very good. Is this not
reflected in the reenlistment numbers?
General Petraeus. Sir, the reenlistment numbers continue to
be very substantial, and particularly by those who are in units
serving in theater. They continually way outpace the goals for
reenlistment. I am really talking on the Army. I believe it is
the same situation in the Marine Corps, and that is actually a
real heartening, continuing heartening development.
Senator Inhofe. It is. That is something I observed.
With just 1 minute left, let me just mention, in The Early
Bird this morning they mentioned four things attributed to your
statements: inadequate planning for the liberation, failing to
recognize the emerging insurgency, not having enough troops in
certain areas, and holding elections in such a way that it was
divisive instead of unifying. Are there any one of these four
areas that you would like to elaborate on?
General Petraeus. The fourth one is not correct, actually.
If you look at the advance policy question, what I stated
really was something that many other people have recognized and
that was merely that the elections had to some degree the
opposite effect of what we had hoped for, and that was that
because of the voting along sectarian divides that they did not
unify the country as much as we had hoped. It had nothing to do
with the conduct of the elections. Frankly, I thought the
conduct of the elections was admirable in each case and frankly
quite heroic by the Iraqis who pulled that off.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, General. I look
forward to working with you in this new capacity.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Petraeus. Thank you for your willingness
to serve. Your testimony this morning and your answers to our
questions have been excellent. You have been candid and
confident at the same time. You have been candid about the
mistakes that have been made and about the challenges we face,
but you have been confident about the way in which we can do
better, and I appreciate that.
I also appreciate the fact that you have been to Iraq, that
you understand not only its history but its present. There is a
temptation, a danger that people just following the news of the
suicide bombings and sectarian death squads will assume that
everybody in Iraq is involved in sectarian violence or
terrorists or the insurgency. You know that is not true. You
have testified that it is not, that most of the people of Iraq,
the overwhelming majority, as you have said, quite naturally
want to live a better and freer life, and the question is
whether we can help their government help them do that.
I want to ask you a series of questions which in some sense
summarize what you have said, because I think it has been very
compelling. General Petraeus, you have said this morning that
serious mistakes have been made in the conduct of the war in
Iraq since Saddam was overthrown in 2003. Is that right?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir. I did provide a
description of those in the advance policy questions.
Senator Lieberman. You have also said that you understand
and appreciate the disappointment of the American people and
their representatives here in Congress about the lack of
progress in the war in Iraq today.
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lieberman. You have also said that you fear that
there would be disastrous consequences for Iraq, for the
region, for the world economy, and for the United States in the
war on terrorism if we exit Iraq prematurely.
General Petraeus. Correct, sir.
Senator Lieberman. You have said that you believe this new
way ahead for Iraq that has been presented, with military,
economic, and political components, is in fact a new and
different strategy for Iraq than what has been tried thus far;
is that correct?
General Petraeus. I believe it is, yes, sir. There are
cases in Iraq where this has actually been conducted in the
past. Fallujah, which remains to this day since it was
liberated and has become one of the better gated communities in
that region, is an example of that. Tal Afar is another
example, although again we have to continue to watch the hold
and build piece on that.
Senator Lieberman. Based on those examples that you have
cited and your own expertise in counterinsurgency, am I correct
to conclude that you believe that this new way ahead, this new
plan for Iraq, can in fact work?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lieberman. When you say work, I mean diminish the
violence being carried out by the enemies of stability and
progress in Iraq, so that the Iraqis can achieve a political
and economic solution themselves; is that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. You have said, General, in response to
questions from Senator Levin, I believe, that you would agree
to report regularly, perhaps by video conference, to Members of
Congress about the progress or lack of said that you are
seeing.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. In fact, you have said that you would
tell us quite directly whether we are succeeding or failing as
your mission goes forward; is that correct?
General Petraeus. Correct, sir.
Senator Lieberman. You also said, in response to a question
from Senator McCain, that adoption of a resolution of
disapproval, which is contemplated by our colleagues and
probably will be on the Senate floor, disapproval of the new
way ahead in Iraq, would not, if I remember your words, have a
beneficial effect on our troops in Iraq.
But I want to ask you, what effect would Senate passage of
a resolution of disapproval of this new way ahead that you
embrace have on our enemies in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, as I stated in my opening statement,
this is a test of wills at the end of the day, and in that
regard, speaking purely as a military commander, if confirmed,
albeit one who frankly does understand enormously and treasures
the value of free and open debate, free speech, who has put
himself in harm's way to protect those great features of our
democracy, nonetheless, having said that, a commander in such
an endeavor would obviously like the enemy to feel that there
is no hope.
Senator Lieberman. A Senate-passed resolution of
disapproval for this new strategy in Iraq would give the enemy
some encouragement, some clear expression that the American
people were divided?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Based on the answers that you have given
and on your extraordinary record of service to our country and
your expertise in counterinsurgency, that you have literally
written the book, and your belief that this new way ahead is in
fact different from what we are trying right now, with the
exception of the few cities that you cited where it worked, and
your testimony that passage of resolutions of disapproval would
not have a beneficial effect on our troops and on the enemy, I
want to make a plea to my colleagues in the Senate. I
understand that the trains are on the legislative track and
they are heading toward a collision. But I want to urge my
colleagues to consider your testimony this morning and to put
the brakes on.
You will, in my opinion, receive unanimous or near-
unanimous support, and you should. You deserve it, from this
committee and from the Senate. But I fear that a resolution of
disapproval will send you over there with us saying you are a
good and great general, but we do not agree with what you
believe we need to do in Iraq.
So I want to appeal to my colleagues to consider with
regard to the resolutions of disapproval or the caps on troops
or the cutoff of funds to step back for a moment and give you a
chance and the 160,000 American soldiers you will be commanding
a chance, perhaps a last chance, to succeed in Iraq. If, God
forbid, you are unable to succeed, then there will be plenty of
time for the resolutions of disapproval or the other
alternatives that have been contemplated.
General Petraeus, I think you are being sent into one of
the most challenging and important circumstances that a general
in our history has been sent into. I was thinking it may be
comparable to when President Truman sent General Matthew
Ridgway to Korea to replace General MacArthur when things were
bleak, and General Ridgway succeeded.
I pray that you will succeed similarly in Iraq. I believe
you can and will succeed similarly in Iraq. I appeal to my
colleagues today to give you this chance, again perhaps the
last chance, to succeed and avoid the disaster that failure
will bring.
All of my colleagues here--and we have different opinions
on this question--no one is embracing failure. No one is
suggesting defeat. We have different ways that we believe we
can do better. I believe you deserve the opportunity as the
general we are going to send over to lead our effort, to carry
out this way that you believe can and will succeed.
Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Sessions is next. Thank you.
[Audience interruption.]
Chairman Levin. We would appreciate, madam, if you would
please sit down. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Petraeus, for your service, the years
that you have spent away from your family serving your country,
the efforts that you have expended in Iraq on two different
tours. I visited you both when you were with the 101st in Mosul
and commanding that unit also in Baghdad when you were training
and working toward training those troops.
I do not think there is anyone more experienced on the
ground than you. Thank you for being willing to go back again
at this critical juncture in our Nation's history.
I would just like to thank Senator Lieberman for his
comments. Senator Lieberman voted for this war, as over three-
fourths of our Senate did, and he has worked hard to help us be
successful. We want you to be successful. I think the comment I
would make to my colleagues is that if a resolution is not
going to help you be successful, why do we need it? I would
just make that comment at this point.
General Petraeus, I would like to ask a few brief
questions. A critical part of all of this for the American
people is uncertainty about how things are going. I asked
Secretary Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Pace if things
got to the point where we could not be successful would they
tell us so. You have indicated, I think, in your opening
statement that you would. But I would like you to say that, so
the American people would know that a person who knows that
country, who has written a manual on counterinsurgency, if you
believe it cannot be successful you will tell us so we can take
a new action?
General Petraeus. Sir, I firmly believe that I have an
obligation to the great young men and women of our country that
are putting themselves in harm's way and certainly to all
Americans to tell my boss if I believe that the strategy cannot
succeed at some point.
Senator Sessions. You would not be going if you did not
think there was a realistic opportunity to succeed; is that
correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, you talked about
walking the streets. You used that phrase. I know you used it
when we were in Mosul and visited with you. Do you think it is
important for a commander and will you take every effort to
determine what is actually happening on the streets and how the
Iraqi people are responding to the conditions there, and do you
consider that a critical part of your leadership?
General Petraeus. I do, sir.
Senator Sessions. You have written the counterinsurgency
manual and it requires a number of steps and coordinated
efforts to occur, but is it not true that a number of things
that are necessary for success are required to be done by
agencies other than the Department of Defense?
General Petraeus. It is, sir, and to perform them with a
unity of effort.
Senator Sessions. There is a courtesy by departments, that
we do not want to be critical of one another and agencies do
not do that. But I hope that you will not hesitate to insist
that you obtain in a prompt timeframe the resources, the
support, whether it be electricity or water or police or jails,
that you will ask for even if it means other agencies may take
it critically.
General Petraeus. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Sessions. I think we are in a critical time. I
believe the Defense Department fully understands it because
their soldiers are at risk every single day. It is a matter of
life and death to them, and we have to raise the level of
support I think from other agencies and departments of this
government.
Now, you have been there. I remember when you explained to
us some difficulties, problems, errors that occurred. You
talked about the de-Baathification program going so far as to
have every professor at the Mosul University be terminated,
causing an uproar at the whole university. You also talked
about the need for more CERP money, that is the money that a
commander could utilize immediately to fix a problem that is
needed to be fixed, also gaining credibility for that
commander.
Do you think, now that you are going back to command this
operation, that you can help eliminate those problems based on
your experience, and will you have the support necessary to do
so?
General Petraeus. Sir, I will certainly do my very best.
Just for accuracy's sake, Ambassador Bremer, in fact, gave me
the authorization to perform a reconciliation process for Mosul
University. There were actually about 120 professors that were
affected in that case and we did, in fact, conduct a
reconciliation process--no Baath Party members on the
committee, judicial oversight, and so forth from the Iraqi
side. Unfortunately, and contrary to what he wanted as well,
because it was not just de-Baathification, it was also
reconciliation that was planned, that was not able to be
consummated when we delivered all the paperwork to Baghdad, it
was never acted upon.
Senator Sessions. You used that word ``reconciliation.''
You used it when we were introduced to the city council that
had been established in Mosul of Kurds, Christians, Shias, and
Sunnis, as I recall. Tell us, is reconciliation possible in
Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, it has to be possible for the goals
to be achieved in Iraq as they are right now certainly, and we
saw examples of that throughout time. We have also seen
examples of the hardening of the ethnic differences and
sectarian differences, certainly in the wake again of the
Samarra bombing throughout the latter part of 2006.
Senator Sessions. Senator Inhofe mentioned my concern over
the prisons and lack of ability to detain persons that have
been arrested there. There is an article in the January-
February Military Review that is consistent with the point I
have been making for some months. It notes that added together,
1 in 17 Iraqis are in jail. That is two to three times less
than the percentage of people in jail in the United States. Yet
the chances of a civilian being killed in Iraq are 20 times
greater.
It goes on to note that if you cannot identify the
insurgent and you cannot imprison him when you do arrest him,
you are not going to prevail. That is a military reality, not
an economic or a political one.
I feel strongly that this coordinating among agencies has
not occurred sufficiently to get us a justice system that
works. Do you share that concern, and if you need additional
resources for prisons or courts, will you ask for that?
General Petraeus. Sir, I will, and I do believe they are
needed. I believe the rule of law has three pillars: police,
judicial, and detentions. We have put a great deal of effort
into the police. The results have not always been what we have
wanted. We need to put considerably additional effort into the
judicial side and into the detention side.
As Senator Inhofe mentioned, I think the prison capacity in
Iraq is one-sixth that of the State of Texas, and they are not
fighting an insurgency.
Senator Sessions. General Petraeus, thank you for your
leadership. I believe we do have a realistic chance of success
in Iraq. I believe changes in our policy were necessary to
achieve that. I hope that you will utilize the leadership
opportunity you have to insist that you get the support from
the various agencies that are necessary to create a
comprehensive and successful effort in Iraq.
I would just say to my friend, the President of the United
States, whose heart I know is broken by the losses we have
suffered, but who believes in the justness of this cause, that
more than he would like it will be necessary for him to focus
on the other agencies and departments of this government to
ensure that they respond immediately to the requirements that
you have to be successful. I believe he will do that, but it is
going to take more of his personal time than he would like, I
am sure his advisers would like him to give. But bureaucracies
are not easy to move and in war, speed and decisiveness are key
ingredients, and we need that.
Thank you.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Petraeus. In response to the questions
that Senator Sessions raised about coordination and also in
your own testimony, which is a plea for further support, it is
your opinion that the Secretary of State and the Department of
State have failed to adequately support military operations in
Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, it is my belief that the overall
interagency effort needs to be substantially more robust than
it is.
Senator Reed. Do you have any indication it will?
General Petraeus. Sir, that was part of the plan that was
laid out by the President. I have talked with some of the
individuals involved in establishing that. There is a doubling
of the Province Reconstruction Team (PRT) members as one of
those areas, and it is certainly something that I will pursue
because, as I mentioned, governmental capacity-building in Iraq
is hugely important to the comprehensive effort.
Senator Reed. General, you served extensively in Iraq. We
have all on this committee had the occasion to visit there. But
we have heard repeated stories about building up the PRTs
without any significant progress in that regard. This seems to
me another one of these plans that never seem to get effected.
I think I agree with you. I agree with Senator Sessions.
The Department of Defense, military officers, enlisted men and
women, have been carrying the burden here without adequate
support, and I do not see anything in this plan really that
will augment your efforts, which I think undercuts your ability
to perform your mission.
Let me go back to the heart of what you are engaged in.
Under the counterinsurgency manual which you prepared and you
have indicated, 120,000 troops is the doctrinal force size
structure. There is about 85,000 troops total, you have
indicated. Probably the 50,000 Iraqi forces, if there are
10,000 reliable troops, that is more than I think we can
reasonably expect. So I am guessing or speculating you have
40,000 effective troops for a mission that requires 120,000.
So it is your best military advice that this increment of
20,000 American forces is adequate to do this job?
General Petraeus. Senator, I believe again that the
additional forces, these tens of thousands of contract security
forces and ministerial security forces, actually do relieve us
of substantial burdens that otherwise coalition or Iraqi forces
would have to bear.
Senator Reed. General, as I was out there I was shocked.
Even Prime Minister Maliki told me that some of these
ministerial forces are worse than the insurgents.
General Petraeus. Some indeed, yes.
Senator Reed. They are disreputable, they are involved with
the sectarian killings. I do not know, but does Blackwater work
for you now?
General Petraeus. Blackwater does not work for me, although
they are under contract certainly to a number of organizations.
But as you have seen on your trips, for example, the U.S.
embassy is guarded by contract guards. My personal security on
my last tour was actually contracted out to I think it was a
British security firm so that we could free up the military
police to secure my own officers who did not have security
provided for them.
So again, that frees up our forces and it does that in
numerous different places.
Senator Reed. General, that situation has existed before
this surge. I find it hard to believe that you would give as
your best advice to this committee that the differential,
probably 40,000 troops in terms of doctrine, is going to be
made up by ministerial forces of Iraq that are generally
unreliable and by private American contractors or other
contractors. Is that the differential that is being made up?
General Petraeus. Sir, again the additional U.S. forces
will double the number of U.S. forces in Baghdad. The second,
of course, is how they are used. Again, to secure the
population those forces have to be in the population and that
will be critical.
Senator Reed. Let us talk about how they are used. First,
as alluded to in other questioning, there is a real question of
unity of command. You have a bifurcated command structure. It
is the nature of this operation. You have a sovereign state. In
any other counterinsurgencies, in Belfast, in Algeria, there
was no lack of unity of command. It was essentially part of the
country. So that is a problem.
Also, I would like to ask about enablers. One of the
problems in any military operation is not so often ground
combat forces, it is translators, civil affairs officers,
people with the cultural sensitivities you talked about so
eloquently. Do you have adequate enablers to do this new
mission?
General Petraeus. Sir, that I do not know. Again, if
confirmed, that is high on my list, to determine if we have not
just those enablers, but also all the combat support and combat
service support elements that you will recall from your own
service are so critical to enabling the soldier who is on
point.
Senator Reed. We are presenting this strategy as a new
forward with a new plan, and a key element as you indicate that
you are not quite sure we have those forces in place or can
generate those forces.
General Petraeus. Sir, I have talked to General Odierno
about this. Not to be presumptive, but in fact when people
consulted me, in my current position, during the development of
the strategy General Odierno assured me that they had been
looking very hard at the enablers and that they think that they
are going to be okay generally in the combat service support
arena.
But again, that is something I have to confirm for myself,
if confirmed, and once I get on the ground.
Senator Reed. Let me also ask, because this new tactical
approach, this new strategic approach, has potential benefits,
but it also has inherent difficulties. You will disperse
American forces to small groups. You will have to supply those
forces. The most significant attack against our forces are
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against convoys, which
means you will be multiplying the convoys in Baghdad, exposing
more of them to attack. Is that a fair estimate of the risks?
General Petraeus. There is certainly risk. Obviously, as we
disperse soldiers you always want to make sure that they are
capable over anything that they could confront out there. But
certainly there will be soldiers literally on the road. There
will be soldiers on the streets and so forth.
Senator Reed. The other issue, General, that has come up, I
was out last fall. I talked to General Miegs, U.S. Army
(Retired), and I talked to many other commanders on the ground,
and they said in 6 months this situation will resolve itself
one way or the other. Your timeframe for deployment takes you,
as you indicate, to May when you will get your troops in
country. You have a lot of work to do to prepare the battle
space, to move the troops in.
We seem to be pushing quite close to that 6-month window,
for what it is worth, before you will actually start taking
concerted effective action on the ground. Just in terms of
timing, is that accurate?
General Petraeus. Sir, again, I really need to get into the
plan with Lieutenant General Odierno and to see how the forces
will be employed. I think you have to wait until you have a
certain critical mass of forces on the ground to take action so
that you do not do the whack-a-mole and all we do is go into
this neighborhood and then go into that neighborhood. So that
you want to start with a certain degree of critical mass. I do
not know that that degree is all five brigades having to be
there and completely set before you begin operations.
Senator Reed. In response to Senator McCain's question
about what happens if we announce some type of withdrawal, you
indicated that sectarian groups have been staking out turf. Are
they doing that now?
General Petraeus. In some cases they certainly are, yes,
sir. Certainly along the fault lines in threatened
neighborhoods that has been taking place.
Senator Reed. That is likely to accelerate or decelerate,
regardless of what we do?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think if we secure the
neighborhoods that that will decelerate.
Senator Reed. But at this point it seems to you to be
progressing rapidly?
General Petraeus. No, sir, I am not so sure. Again, it is
hard from this distance to get the real granularity of what is
going on. There clearly is additional ethnic displacement, soft
ethnic cleansing, whatever term you want to use. How prevalent
that is is hard again for me at this distance.
Senator Reed. You mentioned ethnic cleansing. That I think
is happening and the description of whether it is deliberate,
part of a plan, or just spontaneous is something you will, I
presume, determine when you get out there on the ground.
The other issue you raised is the involvement of other
countries. There is a significant involvement of the regional
countries there now, and one of the things that seems
perplexing to me is that there are leading figures in this
government that have close, long-time ties to Iran. I think
that will continue regardless of what you are able to do on the
ground, I presume.
General Petraeus. It certainly presents challenges if in
fact it manifests itself in resisting actions against those who
are helping the enemies of the new Iraq, not just of the
coalition forces but the enemies of the new Iraq, in Iraq. As
you are well aware, there have been actions against Iranian
elements in Iraq, and again that will be one of the challenges
that we will have to come to grips with, and those ties clearly
complicate matters.
Senator Reed. One final point. One of the consequences of
what you do, regardless of the ultimate level of success--and I
wish you success because the lives of a lot of young Americans
are in your hands and you know that, and you will perform I
think magnificently taking care of those troops. But we could
unwittingly be entrenching a government in Baghdad that has
close and continuing ties with Iran. That is a distinct
possibility.
General Petraeus. Sir, I would have to do literally a
leadership profile of that to make a reasonable assessment of
that. My understanding is that Prime Minister Maliki certainly
is under pressure in respects with that, but that he has also
pushed back as well. So again, once I get on the ground, if
confirmed, and can sort out these various dynamics and
influences and how firm they are, then we can move forward.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, first let me echo the sentiments of
everyone here, that I am so grateful that you have agreed to
undertake this enormous challenge. I have great confidence in
you personally and I hope that you succeed.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Collins. I have read a very interesting article
that you wrote on counterinsurgency that was published a year
ago in the Military Review. You offered 14 observations based
on your previous tours of duty. As I look at those
observations, observations that I think are insightful and that
I agree with, I conclude that they are not consistent with the
new strategy that we are about to embark on.
Your first observation, you quote Lieutenant Colonel T.E.
Lawrence, British Army (1888-1935)--also known as ``Lawrence of
Arabia'' in August 1917 and you say: ``Do not try to do too
much with your own hands.'' You talk about the need for the
Iraqis to step up to the plate. I worry that the strategy that
we are about to pursue in this country relieves pressure on the
Iraqis to do what must be done and that we are making the
mistake that you caution against.
There is a big question here of what comes first. Do you
need to provide the additional troops and the security in order
to give Maliki and other Iraqi leaders the space to do the
political moves that need to be undertaken, or in fact are you
lessening the possibility they are going to do that? If Iraqi
leaders had more fully integrated the Sunni minority into the
government, if they had passed an oil distribution law that
distributed the revenues more equitably, if they had amended
the constitution, if they had held provincial elections, would
we be where we are today?
General Petraeus. We would not, Senator. What you described
really has been truly an intellectual tension, frankly, about
the mission in Iraq all along. You do have in the back of your
mind always the wisdom of Lawrence of Arabia about not trying
to do too much with your own hands. We used to say what we want
to do is we want to help the Iraqis get up on their feet, we
want to be near them, we want to back them up. But there are
times when they start to wobble and the question is when do you
move back in and provide assistance.
In the wake of the bombing of the Samarra mosque and the
violence that escalated throughout the latter part of 2006, I
think we have arrived at a point where in fact we do need to
help them a bit more in providing security in particular, with
arm's linked, with them in forward, in front, wherever we can,
for the Baghdad population in particular.
Again, this of course is the fourth government in 3\1/2\
years and I think at times we probably have had expectations
that were greater than they might have been, given the
challenges. But I remember living through each of these
transitions, and you would get a new government in and it
seemed as if they were already facing an election for the next
government or the next constitutional referendum or what have
you. It has been very difficult for them.
They do now have the permanent government, the elected
government. It has only been in office for 8 months. It has
been a very violent 8 months in a period of enormous pressure
on the leadership of Iraq. They do now have, according to
Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, the oil law nearing
completion. There has been progress, incremental progress to be
sure.
So again, I think you very accurately captured truthfully
the intellectual tension between the fear that our presence
retards progress, holds it back, or that our presence can help.
I do believe at this point that our presence can help and is
needed.
Senator Collins. Your second observation is that: ``A
liberating force must act quickly because every army of
liberation has a half-life beyond which it turns into an army
of occupation.'' Again, this insight seems right on the money
to me.
When I was in Iraq with several of my colleagues last
month, we had a very interesting presentation by one of the
British commanders in Basra. He described a declining consent
line. He said originally when the coalition forces arrived that
they were welcomed, but over time their presence has become
resented and less and less tolerated.
You talk about this being a race against the clock, but I
wonder if the clock has already run out, if we are already
perceived by the vast majority of Iraqis not as liberators any
more, but as occupiers.
General Petraeus. That is another great question, Senator.
First, I would start by saying that every area of Iraq is
different and unique, and that in some areas, interestingly,
areas where we came to be seen as an army of occupation, we
might now once again be seen as an army of liberation because
we help provide the degree of security that has been lacking in
their lives.
So I think it is important again to put your finger on the
pulse of that neighborhood, of that muhallah, that district,
that province, and then to act in accordance with that. The
area in which the British are located, of course, is a much
more cohesive area. It is a very predominantly Shia Iraqi area,
and it is an area where, although there are certainly all kinds
of internal differences and challenges, the Iraqis generally
feel like they can get on without us over time, and that is why
of course the British contingent has gradually been drawing
down in Basra and the other southern, southeastern provinces.
Senator Collins. But that is why the British commander's
observations were so interesting to me. That is not an area
where you have Sunni versus Shiite. It is a Shia area. Yet,
despite that, we are seeing less and less tolerance for the
presence of foreign forces, and that concerns me.
General Petraeus. I think that is understandable, Senator,
if I may, because if you think about again any country that has
another army on its soil, again at some point tires of that.
That is really the essence of what that lesson was. In truth,
what it was really getting at is that when you get into one of
these things you have to know exactly what your transition
plans are. You have to have the stability and reconstruction
organizations, resources, concepts, and principles already in
your back pocket as you go downrange.
Senator Collins. Finally, I have to comment on your answer
to my very dear friend, Senator Lieberman, about the impact of
the passage of a resolution and whether that would, I believe
the words were, demonstrate to the enemy that the American
people are divided. General, the American people are not
divided in support of our troops. The American people are not
divided in wishing you all the success in the world despite our
disagreement with the strategy.
I must say that the resolution that I have been working on
with Senator Ben Nelson and Senator Warner is very clear in
expressing support for our troops. I do not think it is going
to come as any surprise to the enemy that the American people
are in fact deeply divided over this strategy, but nothing
divides us in our common support of the brave men and women who
are fighting in Iraq, and nothing divides us in our common
support, that we hope we are wrong and that this strategy is a
success, and we wish you well as you undertake this very
dangerous and difficult mission.
General Petraeus. Thank you very much, Senator.
If I could just add, I very much appreciate Congress'
critical oversight responsibilities, I truly do, and I
understand those very much as a student and as a one-time
political science professor.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. I think that point of view is very
important, Senator Collins, to get across, because the way the
questions were framed before would cast some doubt on those of
us who would support Senator Warner's resolution. Certainly we
hope and pray for success, but obviously the American people
are divided about the conduct of this war. Is it any wonder? We
were not told the truth about weapons of mass destruction, nor
about troop strengths, nor about the cost of the war, nor about
the sectarian violence. So is it any wonder that there is a
huge division of opinion about the conduct of this war? That is
the point that we are trying to get at here.
Now, you are going to be confirmed. Your reputation
obviously precedes you and we hope and pray for your leadership
being a success. There is a lot at stake for this country. I
appreciate what you shared with me in our private visit.
I want to ask four questions for the record. When you come
to testify before us again with the civilian leadership at your
side, will you be silent if your civilian leaders provide false
or misleading information?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you for that.
In 2004, you wrote an optimistic article about the progress
of the Iraqi troop training. You praised their progress and how
you were expecting their performance in the field. Well, those
expectations were not fulfilled. For example, you cited in this
article 100,000 Iraqi police and soldiers as trained and
equipped, with tens of thousands more in the pipeline. It is
2\1/2\ years later. How many Iraqi soldiers and police are
trained and equipped today, General?
General Petraeus. Sir, my understanding from the latest
report of the Multinational Security Transition Commander-Iraq
is that there are 325,000 or so that have completed the
training, that met the requirement to be called trained, and
have the basic equipment that we agreed upon as the metric to
be called equipped.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are they reliable?
General Petraeus. They are not all reliable, sir. Again,
and in fairness, if I could, in that article I also qualified
it and pointed out the many challenges that were being faced in
that mission as well. I tried to be quite realistic while also
giving an accurate assessment again of those particular metrics
which we subsequently developed into the more rigorous
assessment, transitional readiness assessment and so forth.
Senator Bill Nelson. Can you put a percentage on it that
are reliable?
General Petraeus. Sir, I cannot from this divide. I
literally have only that particular report that was sent to me.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me tell you about a conversation I
had with our Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey. They both
said--this was back before Christmas--that they would not
support a surge unless there is a specific plan for success,
and the ambassador even said, and I quote, that he did not want
more American kids wasting their lives unless he had ``a high
degree of confidence in the plan.''
Do you have a high degree of confidence in this plan?
General Petraeus. Sir, I believe this plan can succeed if
in fact all of those enablers and all the rest of the
assistance is in fact provided. As I have mentioned several
times here today, I am determined to make sure that people know
that we have that. Again, in my periodic updates to this body I
will be happy to report whether that has been forthcoming or
not.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you for that.
My last question is, earlier in your testimony you stated
that morale of our troops is high, something to that effect.
You may have said good.
General Petraeus. I think ``good'' is actually the
statement, yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. We had a surge earlier this past
summer and I am quoting from a Washington Post story on July
27. Army Staff Sergeant Jose Sistos said, ``Think of what you
hate most about your job, then think of doing what you hate
most for 5 straight hours every single day, sometimes twice a
day, in 120 degree heat. Then ask how morale is.''
Another member of that team, Specialist Tim Ivy, as quoted
in the Washington Post said: ``Honestly, it just feels like we
are driving around waiting to get blown up. That is the most
honest answer that I could give you,'' said the specialist.
General Petraeus. Sir, I remember that story.
Senator Bill Nelson. How do you respond?
General Petraeus. I would like to respond to that. First of
all, there is nothing easy about wearing body armor and kevlar
in harm's way in 125 degree temperatures. It is hard
physically, it is hard mentally. It is a grind and it becomes a
``Groundhog Day'' existence. In fact, there were some units
that had groundhog coins that they handed out as unit coins to
commemorate that type of existence.
On the other hand, the reenlistment rates, particularly in
theater, continue to remain so far above the requirements that
clearly there is some sense among those soldiers that serving
their country is something that they want to continue to do.
They want to continue to serve in units with the individuals on
their right and left that they have soldiered with.
So again, nothing easy about it. By the way, the driving
around waiting to get blown up is something that, certainly
there is driving around in a population protection strategy.
There has to be. But there needs to be a purpose to the
presence of those soldiers in those neighborhoods and it is to
secure those neighborhoods and that should be the objective, as
opposed to perhaps living outside the neighborhood and entering
it a couple of times a day with a vehicular patrol, in which
case a soldier could feel that he is doing what that soldier
told the reporter.
Senator Bill Nelson. Godspeed, General.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, is it fair to say that one of the reasons that we
have the highest rate of reenlistment among those who have
served in Iraq is that they believe it is part of the global
struggle, the war on terror?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think again there are a lot of
reasons why someone raises his or her hand again and again. I
mentioned a couple of them, a sense that you are serving a
cause that is larger than self, serving one's country. I
personally have always felt that the reason that I stayed in
and many others have stayed in is because we like the people we
do what we do with. We feel privileged to be around those who
have these same concepts of selfless service, the Army values
that we embrace--the other services have the same--and that is
in fact a hugely important reason.
I would add certainly that the improvements that have been
made in quality of life--you are never going to get rich
wearing the uniform, but this body and our Congress and various
administrations have over the years certainly made it so that
at least it is a reasonable quality of life for our soldiers
and for their families. We should never forget that we enlist
the soldier, but it is the family that we often reenlist.
Senator Graham. You are going back for the third time or
the fourth time? Third time?
General Petraeus. Sir, it is the third time to Iraq. It is
the fourth year or longer deployment since 2001. The first one
of those was in Bosnia from 2001 to 2002.
Senator Graham. Do you believe that Iraq affects the
overall war on terror or not?
General Petraeus. I do, sir. Clearly there are elements of
the greater al-Qaeda network of international extremists that
want something very different than the Iraq that most Iraqis
want and want something very different in that region and in
the world.
Senator Graham. Who bombed the Golden Mosque?
General Petraeus. Sir, I believe that it was from this
extremist group. It may again have been insurgent elements, but
certainly those who obviously did not want the new Iraq to
succeed and wanted to ignite sectarian violence. If I could
add, I think that there is some of that going on right now. I
think they see the increases in forces. I think they see
perhaps the Iraqi government showing some toughness. I think
that they want to derail that before it gets any momentum.
Senator Graham. That was part of Zarqawi's hope before he
was killed, to create a sectarian war; is that correct?
General Petraeus. Sir, that is correct.
Senator Graham. Now, when it comes to trying to evaluate
what to do and why we are doing whatever course we chart, I
just want to associate myself with Senator Lieberman. No matter
how well-intentioned, a resolution being opposed to this new
strategy is a vote of no confidence in you. No matter how well-
intentioned, the enemy will see it as a weakened resolve. No
matter how well-intentioned, those people going to fight this
war are going to say, well, I am going, but Congress says good
luck but you are going to lose.
I just hope we understand that. I think it is the global
struggle, and if you think it is Vietnam, if you really believe
we are in Vietnam, you should cut off funding. Not one other
person should die in this cause. Not one American should lose a
limb. No one should get hurt and we should come home tomorrow.
General, is this Vietnam?
General Petraeus. Sir, Vietnam was Vietnam. As a student of
lessons of history and someone who did a dissertation that
focused on those, every case is unique, and Iraq is Iraq. It
has lots of problems. There are a few of them that are
certainly related or similar to those in Vietnam. There are a
lot that are very different. I truly think that we have to be
sensitive to the uniqueness of each situation.
Senator Graham. Let me ask you this. The consequences of
losing in Vietnam compared to a failed state in Iraq, how would
you compare the two in terms of our overall national security?
General Petraeus. I think there is really no telling what
could happen if Iraq fails. I explained some of the potential
consequences of that, in a region that is hugely important to
the rest of the world, on a fault line really between perhaps
moderates and extremists, not just between different faiths
within Islam and different ethnic groups, in a very volatile
region.
Senator Graham. Who is the biggest winner? Name some
winners of a failed state in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Certainly al Qaeda, the greater al Qaeda
network, states that embrace extremist ideologies, those states
who wish the United States and perhaps the western world ill.
Senator Graham. Would Iran be a big winner if you had a
failed state in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, it certainly could be. There are
some who say that Iran could. I think perhaps they are torn,
actually, because it could actually cause some real
consequences for their own population.
Senator Graham. Does Iran want a democracy in Iraq?
General Petraeus. I do not believe they do. Certainly, if I
could add to the previous one, I do not mean to imply that Iran
has not been meddling in Iraq, nor that it has not been
providing training, sophisticated improvised explosives and
other devices that have created casualties and huge problems in
Iraq.
Senator Graham. I am going to make a statement and see if
you agree with it: One of the biggest nightmares of the
dictatorship in Syria and the theocracy in Iran is to have a
functioning democracy in Iraq. It threatens their regimes.
General Petraeus. I think that is true, sir. It would
obviously depend on what that----
Senator Graham. Do you believe it is remotely possible to
have a democracy with this level of violence in Iraq?
General Petraeus. I think it is very challenging, sir.
Senator Graham. Some resolutions say that we go to Anbar
but we leave Baghdad alone, that we do not put any troops in
Baghdad. On my last trip to Iraq we met with a citizens group
made up of Sunnis, Shias, I think a Kurdish person was there--I
cannot remember--but they were all Baghdad residents. The one
thing they told every member of our delegation is, if you leave
there will be a bloodbath in Baghdad. Do you agree with that?
General Petraeus. I do, sir.
Senator Graham. So if there is a bloodbath in Baghdad, are
we going to sit on the sidelines and watch it happen? Is that
in our national interest?
General Petraeus. Sir, that is not our strategy at this
time.
Senator Graham. Can you have a functioning democracy where
the capital itself is not secure?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Senator Graham. General, when it comes time to do what you
are going to be required to do, one of those things you are
going to have to do unfortunately is tell some loved ones that
their family member was killed as part of this surge. What are
you going to tell them?
General Petraeus. Sir, I am going to tell them that they
served their country admirably in a mission that I believe is
honorable. I have had to do this before, obviously, and it is
the toughest duty of any leader.
Senator Graham. IEDs, that is the biggest threat to our
troops. 70 percent of our casualties are from IEDs, is that
correct?
General Petraeus. I believe that is correct, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Let me if I can very quickly explain how
the new surge may affect that. One group of people involved in
the IEDs are people without a job and they do it for the money;
is that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Graham. So if you could improve the economy and
have jobs available to people other than being in the IED
business, hopefully that over time would help. That is part of
the surge, right, create a better economy?
General Petraeus. That is correct, and it also could reduce
the militias.
Senator Graham. Second, there is another component to this.
If the person down the street who was caught putting an IED in
the ground to kill Iraqi troops and American troops, if they
went to jail for 30 years or got executed that might deter
IEDs; is that correct?
General Petraeus. Correct.
Senator Graham. That is part of the surge.
Would you consider suggesting to your Iraqi counterparts to
create a military tribunal to handle these type crimes?
General Petraeus. I would, sir.
Senator Graham. Finally, an increased double capacity, a
military surge doubling the combat capability to hold areas
cleared, the hope would be to put pressure on the IED makers
militarily, economically, and under the rule of law, to go
after them, so you are not driving around waiting to get blown
up.
When we go, are the gloves off? Are we going to go wherever
we need to go and get wherever we need to get to fight and win
this war?
General Petraeus. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for your lifetime of service and taking
on this very difficult assignment. I want to begin by
associating my remarks with those of Senator Collins. We are in
a dire situation, using your adjective, in part because
Congress was supine under the Republican majority, failing to
conduct oversight and demanding accountability, and because the
President and his team, particularly the former Secretary of
Defense, refused to adapt to the changing circumstances on the
ground.
If this hearing were being held 3 years ago, I would have a
much higher degree of optimism. It has nothing to do with the
loyalty, the warrior skills, and the leadership of our men and
women in uniform. It has everything to do with the years of
lost opportunities and the failures of the Iraqis to step up
and take responsibility for their own future.
It appears also, General, that the strategy that is being
put forward inspires skepticism for good reason. Your manual,
the Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual, as we have
already discussed, not only suggests a minimum force level of
approximately 120,000, but the manual places great importance
on building up internal institutions and training to provide
security.
This escalation, despite the rhetoric about other goals,
places primary emphasis on American military involvement, not
Iraqi institutions. The manual makes clear the interconnections
of political and military progress, that one cannot be achieved
without the other.
I have been quite gratified to hear all the positive
references to Bosnia in this hearing. I can remember very well
in 2001 and 2002 hearing nothing but derision about nation-
building and about peacekeeping and about sufficient levels of
force going in to back up whatever the political objectives
might be.
You will take on a difficult role in Iraq at a time of
peril, based on your leadership and expertise. But what those
of us who are issuing resolutions and statements of disapproval
fear is that you are being sent to administer a policy that
frankly does not reflect your experience or advice or the
experience and advice of our most recent example in dealing
with ethnic violence, namely Bosnia.
You wrote the book, General, but the policy is not by the
book. You are being asked to square the circle, to find a
military solution to a political crisis. I among others on this
committee have put forward ideas about disapproving the
escalation, not because we in any way embrace failure or
defeat, but because we are trying to get the attention of our
government and the Government of Iraq.
On my recent trip to Iraq along with Senator Bayh, our
interaction with the Prime Minister and his team did not
inspire confidence. What I, speaking for myself, am attempting
to do is to send a very clear message to the Iraqi government
that they cannot rely on the blood and treasure of America any
longer, that we are not going to go into Baghdad and embed our
young men and women in very dangerous neighborhoods where we
cannot possibly provide force protection because they will not
step up and do what everyone knows they must do for themselves.
I very sincerely but wholeheartedly disagree with those who
are trying to once again up the rhetoric about our position in
Iraq instead of taking a hard look about what will actually on
the ground change the behavior and actions of this Iraqi
government.
In the absence of the kind of political full-court press
that we put on in Bosnia--when I landed in Tuzla, I was briefed
by Russians, French, Germans, and Americans. We had an
international force, an international commitment. We had
brought people to the point where they understood that success
there was essential to their national security. I see nothing
coming from this administration that it is willing to pursue
such a policy now. They will not talk to bad people and it is
bad people you talk to in order to try to further political
goals, not your friends. They will not put the kind of pressure
on a consistent basis on the government that is required in
order to change their behavior.
I have said that I would never cut money for our troops
when they are in harm's way, but I sure would threaten to cut
money for the Iraqi troops and for the security for the Iraqi
leadership. I do not know how else to get their attention.
But one thing I am particularly concerned about is the
failure of security for our troops. The incident in Kharbala
over the weekend is scary. It raises questions that we do not
have answers to.
So let me, beyond my statement of joining in the comments
with Senator Collins and rejecting those of our other friends
on the panel who think that statements of disapproval are
somehow going to undermine our effort when I think they will
send the clearest message--we know this policy is going
forward. We know the troops are moving. We know that we are not
likely to stop this escalation. But we are going to do
everything we can to send a message to our government and the
Iraqi government that they had better change, because the enemy
we are confronting is adaptable, it is intelligent, it learns.
It got a hold of our military uniforms, went through those
gates after having cleared all those police checkpoints, killed
five of our soldiers in a meeting talking about security in
Iraq.
I do not believe that we are playing with a team on the
other side that understands the stakes as we described them. So
one thing I would ask, General, is please do everything you can
to get additional security. The Humvees are turning into
deathtraps, as we see the sophistication of the IEDs. We do not
have enough of the mine protection vehicles, we have not even
ordered enough, and we have not put them into the theater.
If we are going to put these soldiers and marines into
these very exposed positions, which this strategy calls for,
please come to us, ask for whatever you need to try to provide
maximum protection. I disapprove of the policy. I think it is a
dead end. It continues the blank check. But if we are going to
do it, then let us make sure we have every possible piece of
equipment and resource necessary to protect these young men and
women that we are asking to go out and put this policy forward,
when we are not doing the political side of the equation that
is necessary to maximize the chance for their safety and
success.
General Petraeus. I will do that, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, you obviously have a great challenge in front of
you. Having visited with you on the ground in Iraq on a couple
of different occasions, watching you in action as you train the
Iraqi troops and the Iraqi security police, I have all the
confidence in the world that you are the right general at the
right time to be going on this mission. Had you personally
attracted the attention of the enemy and had this change in
direction not attracted the attention of the enemy, I do not
think we would have seen the statements coming out of al Qaeda
that we have seen in the last couple of days. So I think the
challenge is there, but, as I say, I am very confident that you
are going to be up to it.
One comment I have made about this change in strategy from
day 1 is that my support of the change would be only if the
additional troops had a specific mission and at the time that
mission is completed that those troops are redeployed. Now, I
asked that question to Secretary Gates and General Pace a
couple of weeks ago, if that is in fact the mission. Is it your
understanding that those are the directions which you have
relative to the increase in the troops?
General Petraeus. Sir, in my discussion with the Secretary
of Defense yesterday he made it very clear that I should ask
for what we need to accomplish any mission that is given to us,
and of course you want to redeploy forces when they are no
longer needed for a mission. That is about as good as I can
answer that particular question.
Senator Chambliss. This plan that is described as a change
in strategy actually was in part developed by the Iraqi
leadership, is that not correct?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have not been in on the planning
in Baghdad and I am not in a position to comment on that. I
have talked to General Odierno about aspects of the plan, but I
did not ask him specifically the level of Iraqi involvement in
it. I do know that the Iraqi headquarters for the Baghdad
security operation is relatively new. The commander, as I think
you know, was just appointed a few weeks ago. So I am not sure
how much specific input that particular headquarters has had in
this plan to date.
But again, obviously once I get on the ground, if
confirmed, that is something I would have to dig into.
Senator Chambliss. I say that because Secretary Gates
responded affirmatively to that question the other day. The
reason I start with that is that I have some real concerns
about the leadership in Iraq and their capability of carrying
out their plans. While I disagree with my distinguished
colleague from New York that this is going to require purely a
political resolution, you are not a political person; you are a
military person, and it is going to require a political
resolution and a military resolution. Otherwise we do not need
to send you over there.
I think we have to have confidence that the Iraqi
leadership politically as well as militarily is going to be
able to do what they say they are going to be able to do.
Now, I want to ask you two questions about that. First of
all, knowing what you know about the political leadership in
Iraq, do you have confidence that they are willing to make the
commitment that they have said they are going to make to make
sure that we can accomplish this mission that you have been
given?
Second, you have been on the ground training Iraqi troops.
You have been living amongst them, so to speak, for two
different 12-month deployments. Do you have confidence that the
Iraqi military can step up and do finally what we have been
anticipating and hoping that they would do for the entire
period of time that we have been inside of Iraq?
General Petraeus. Sir, in response to those questions,
having not been in Iraq for some 16 months, and although I do
know and have worked with a number of the Iraqi leaders in this
government, I do not know Prime Minister Maliki personally, and
I will have to determine for myself. We will obviously have to
have a number of close meetings and develop a relationship.
That support from the Iraqi government is absolutely
critical. As you mentioned, military force is necessary but not
sufficient. The sufficient piece is the additional political
component, and again that is something that I will have to
determine the presence of as I get on the ground.
The same, frankly, with the Iraqi security forces. Again,
having been out of Iraq for 16 months, one of the tasks I will
have to undertake is in fact to assess their state at this
point in time. The fact is that they have received reasonable
training and they have received reasonable equipping. Both of
those can always be improved and the equipment does need to get
more robust over time, although they have received thousands of
up-armored Humvees to my understanding, as an example.
But what I will have to do again is to determine the will
component of this. Military forces, to be effective have skill
and will, and what we will have to determine is the presence of
both. But the will component will be the most important.
Senator Chambliss. One issue that I have had relative to
this ongoing conflict is the fact that I have been disappointed
that from an intelligence-gathering standpoint we have not in
my opinion achieved the results that we should have been
achieving at this point in time. I am pleased to see that you
have already been down to Fort Gordon in the last few days to
see what we are doing there relative to supporting the war in
Iraq, and we are doing some great things.
But in comparing the level of intelligence that the 101st
Airborne Division received in Mosul during your tenure as
commander versus the level of intelligence that Task Force
Olympia received after you departed, you noted that the lack of
intelligence Task Force Olympia received played a significant
role in the decreasing security situation in Mosul. I would
appreciate your elaborating on why intelligence decreased under
Task Force Olympia, what lessons MNF-I learned in this
situation, and how these lessons are being incorporated in the
current operations and intelligence activities.
General Petraeus. Sir, the 101st Airborne Division had its
habitual division military intelligence battalion at that time,
which is a very robust structure. We were fortunate to have
partners from all of the intelligence agencies in our
government and to have special mission unit elements working
with us as well.
We were also fortunate to have a number of individuals who
had served in Bosnia, where we created a joint interagency task
force for counterterrorism, and that is really what you are
doing when you are conducting targeted operations in a
counterinsurgency environment. Putting all of that together
when the insurgents did make a push in the area, and once we
were able to get a grip on that push, our analysts were able to
provide actionable intelligence that was very good. In one
night alone, for example, simultaneously we took down 35
different sites at 2 o'clock in the morning in Mosul. Another
time, we did 25 sites simultaneously, just in that one city,
and in many cases there were others outside the city that we
did simultaneously as well.
The night we did the 35, we got 23 of the individuals that
we were after, with one shot fired. Most of those were knocks
on the door rather than blowing the door down. That was the
level of the refinement of both the process and the resourcing
that we had at that time.
Task Force Olympia was not an existing organization. It was
taken out of the I Corps headquarters at Fort Lewis,
Washington, the tactical command post of that corps
headquarters, and they did not have the normal robust military
intelligence battalion that we had supporting them. We did
anticipate problems with this, frankly, and did raise concerns
about that. It took months for those to materialize, but in the
wake of the assassination of the governor some 5 or 6 months
after we left in a very fractious political process that
resulted in Sunni Arabs, many of them, walking away from the
province council table, the insurgents were able to start
putting roots down again.
As that happened, the intelligence elements of Task Force
Olympia were not able to generate the same amount of actionable
intelligence. You then enter into a spiral where, because there
is more insurgent presence, there is greater intimidation of
local security forces and your intelligence agents, your human
intelligence agents, which means less intelligence, which means
less effective raids, which means more bad guys, and you can
see it spirals downward until in fact it did implode in
November during the operation in Fallujah the enemy opened up a
new front up in Mosul, building on the infrastructure that they
had been able to establish there and also building on the fact
that they had been able over time to intimidate very severely
the police in Mosul in particular and their leadership.
That is really what I was getting at with that particular
case. So it was both a substantially reduced amount of the
intelligence analysis capability that was so important when we
were conducting our operations and to some degree there was
less of the joint interagency task force capability as well
because that headquarters was not as robust as a division
headquarters either.
I did feel at the time that they took over that they could
maintain the security situation because of actually tens of
thousands of Iraqi forces that were trained during our time. In
fact, these forces did prove themselves in April 2004 when the
rest of the country really experienced very substantial
difficulties. But over time, as that spiral began, particularly
in the late summer of 2004, it became increasingly difficult to
keep pulling the roots out as fast as the bad guys were putting
the roots down.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, General. As you accept this
challenge, obviously our best wishes go to you for a huge
success. Thank you.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, I want to say on the front end that I
support your nomination very enthusiastically.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Senator Pryor. I think you are the right person for this. I
have concerns, as we have discussed previously, about the surge
or the augmentation, whatever you want to call it. Basically, I
have three basic concerns. We have talked about these before,
but first is the practicalities, and that is where you get into
the thousand questions about where do our troops come from, how
does it impact the National Guard component, and training and
equipment. There is literally a thousand questions there that I
have concerns about.
Second is, I am concerned that our best U.S. military minds
are divided on this surge strategy. Again, I am basing that on
press reports and just reading a lot of retired people mostly
and their thoughts and their impressions of what the best next
step is.
The third concern I have is I am very concerned that there
is insufficient Iraqi buy-in. My sense is that this is not
worth doing unless the Iraqis buy into this strategy because I
think fundamentally that is what we are talking about here, is
the Iraqi government, the leadership, military police, et
cetera. They have to take over and take responsibility for
their country, and we need to over time give that
responsibility to them. I think most Americans would like us to
do that sooner rather than later.
You have mentioned in some of your comments and just what
you have said in the past several days that your perception is
basically there is now a changed mission in Iraq. Is that fair?
General Petraeus. It certainly is, a change in mission
where the focus will be on the security of the population as
the foremost objective and transition is not foremost. Really,
throughout much of 2006 transition has of course been foremost
and frankly, I thought for a very long time myself that that
was the right approach to take as well. It was in the wake of
the violence, of course, of the fall of this last year and the
winter that has proven to be undermined as the way ahead.
Senator Pryor. Let me follow up on one of Senator Kennedy's
questions a few moments ago when he asked about benchmarks. You
said you had a set of general benchmarks in your mind, but it
would take time to develop more specific and more particular
benchmarks. I think that is a fair understanding of what you
said.
My follow-up question on that is, it seems to me that the
circumstances in Iraq have changed considerably over the last
year, and as you are coming up with your set of firm benchmarks
that we can measure success or failure using your benchmarks,
what happens if the circumstances are continually changing and
how much time do you need to get to the benchmarks so we can
measure how successful we are being there?
General Petraeus. Senator, some of the benchmarks I think
perhaps will exist on my arrival, if confirmed. Among those
might be schedules of Iraqi troop deployments and the like.
Some of those I think are fairly straightforward. I think it is
more difficult when you get into some of the very difficult
issues that the Iraqi government will have to come to grips
with in determining what is the level of process toward
decisions on some of these very challenging issues that
obviously have to be resolved for Iraq to move forward in the
direction that everyone hopes it will move.
Senator Pryor. That is one reason I have confidence in you,
because I know that you are very focused on that and you are
going to do your dead level best to make sure that you have a
handle on the progress we are making, if we are making
progress, and where we are not, trying to take steps to fix
that.
In the manual that has been talked about today, the
counterinsurgency manual, in fact the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette
editorial page quoted a section of that today or several
sections, and it said that: ``Victory is achieved when the
populace consents to the government's legitimacy and stops
actively and passively supporting the insurgency.'' I think
clearly that is a good definition of victory.
But what I would ask you to do, this is about keeping
Congress more informed than in years past. If you can help us
measure how we are moving toward victory, if you can give us
objective criteria that we can look at where we can measure if
we are actually progressing the way we want to progress.
So whatever those metrics are, whatever those statistics
are, you are going to have to help us do that, because one of
the frustrations I think I have had is that it has been very
difficult for me to gauge whether we are moving forward or
whether we are losing ground in Iraq.
Also in your counterinsurgency manual, you give an equation
there that says there should be one counterinsurgent for every
50 inhabitants. I am wondering about the numbers in Baghdad. I
believe Baghdad is about 6 million. Are we at that number, that
1 to 50 ratio? Are we there? Will we be there with the surge?
General Petraeus. Senator, we will. If you lump together
all of the existing U.S. forces and forces to deploy, existing
Iraqi forces and forces to deploy, you get to about 85,000.
Certainly not all those are equal. Some are much better than
others.
You then should add in tens of thousands of additional
forces that are over there that provide, of all things,
contract security for our embassy. Myself, I was secured by
contract security in my last tour there, and that frees up
uniformed forces to perform other missions and those have to be
factored in as well. The same with the ministerial security
forces, acknowledging certainly that some of those ministerial
security forces are part of the problem instead of part of the
solution. But they do in fact secure, again, facilities and
infrastructure that would otherwise have to be secured by U.S.
or Iraqi forces.
Senator Pryor. Just for the sake of clarity, when you talk
about a counterinsurgent are you talking about anybody that is
on our side? I mean, it could be the Iraqi police, obviously
the Iraqi army, obviously other Iraqi security forces?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Pryor. But it could also be contractors?
General Petraeus. If they are performing security
functions, yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. So it is whoever it may be, just as long as
they are performing security functions?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir. Again, if you will, that is
sort of a modern evolution of counterinsurgency strategy, if
you will, because certainly in Malaya and other places there
were not contract security elements in those days, although
they certainly counted their governmental security elements
like the ministerial security forces.
Senator Pryor. What happens if you get in there and the
Iraqi forces, whether they be a police unit or a brigade,
whatever size it may be, what if they just fail to meet the
obligations that they have? What if they either just do not
show up or they just do not perform well? My suspicion is you
will find them performing unevenly from area to area.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. What do you do when they do not meet the
standard?
General Petraeus. There will be some of that, there is no
question. In those cases we will have to go to their bosses and
demand corrective action. That is easier said than done. But it
is something that we will have to do.
In my last tour in Iraq, on one occasion I went to the
minister of interior and told him that we had withdrawn all
logistical, funding, and equipment support for a particular
element in the Baghdad police force and that would remain
withdrawn until certain individuals who we caught mistreating
detainees were apprehended and dealt with, and those
individuals were apprehended and dealt with.
Senator Pryor. I just had one follow-up question to what
Senator Bill Nelson asked a few moments ago. I think his
question--I wrote it down; I think I have it right--Will you be
silent if your civilian leaders provide false or misleading
information? I think that is what he said, and you said, no,
you would not remain silent, which is the right answer.
But if you find yourself in that situation where you have
civilian leadership in this country that is not providing
accurate and true information, what will you do?
General Petraeus. Sir, I will provide accurate and true
information. I think the committee ought to know that. I would
be very happy to stay on the banks of the Missouri River at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, instead of going back to the banks of
the Euphrates River, and I am doing this out of a sense of
service, again to those great young men and women who are over
there, and because this is what the military does.
But this is not about being beholden to anyone. This is not
about, again, being aligned with any party or anyone else. I
will give you my best professional military advice, and if
people do not like it, then they can find someone else to give
better professional military advice.
Senator Pryor. I think that is why you are the right guy
for the job.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Pryor.
Before we call on Senator Thune, let me just follow up on
something that Senator Pryor said and give the Defense
Department notice of a request that we are going to insist be
complied with. It has to do with the benchmarks issue or the
measurements which Senator Pryor made reference to. Back in
November when the question of benchmarks came up, we asked both
Secretaries of Defense and State, for copies of the benchmarks
that were referred to by the President. The President has said
specifically that we will hold the Iraqi government to the
benchmarks it has announced.
We asked again. When we did not get those benchmarks, we
asked the Secretary of Defense. We got a letter back from the
Secretary of Defense on December 4th saying that the request
for the benchmarks would be referred to the State Department.
We have written the State Department again, Secretary Rice,
saying we want the benchmarks. This was a January 16th letter.
Now, we are determined that we are going to get the
benchmarks which the President says that the Iraqi government
has announced it will follow. We are determined we are going to
get those. I do not want to hold up your nomination. Nobody
does. We are going to speed your nomination as quickly as we
can because we think that it should be speeded up, for all the
reasons you have heard here today.
But there must be representatives here of the Defense
Department and the State Department. Whether there are or not,
we are going to make it clear that we are going to find a way
to get copies of those benchmarks that you say you saw on
slides. Now, I made reference in the letters just to political
benchmarks, but we are going to insist--and I use the word
``insist'' and I think this will be a bipartisan insistence;
this is not a partisan issue. This is information this
committee is entitled to, that Congress is entitled to. I am
looking at you, but I am talking to the people at the Defense
Department and the State Department who are within earshot
here.
We are going to insist that we get copies of the benchmarks
on the political, economic, and military aspects that have been
agreed to by the Iraqi government, which the President has said
he is going to insist that they comply with.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here today. Thank you for your
extraordinary service to our country and for your willingness
to undertake a very challenging and difficult task.
I want to follow up. You answered in response to a question
Senator McCain asked earlier today about what would happen if
the United States were to leave Iraq now or follow the advice
of some up here and that is to begin withdrawing. You mentioned
some of the things, ethnic cleansing, other countries
interferring, terrorist groups moving in, disruptions in the
flow of oil, a whole lot of consequences of that step or that
action.
What I would like to have you do if you could is expand a
little bit on that answer in terms of what it would mean to the
United States and to our security interests, because I think
too often people here in this country do not understand or make
the connection between what is happening over there and what
that means to national security here at home for the United
States. Could you just expand on that answer a little bit and
what the implications could be for people here at home and why
this fight is so important, not just to that region but to U.S.
interests?
General Petraeus. Sir, there is a number of broad
categories, if you will, that I think deserve mention. One of
those certainly is the potential--and all of these are
potentials. As I said in my opening statement, no one really
knows the consequences of a failed Iraqi state. But certainly
regional instability could be a result of that if surrounding
countries felt that they had to enter Iraq for some reason or
other to safeguard one ethnic group or another.
Were some portion of Iraq to become truly a terrorist
training camp, and the potential certainly exists for that in
places like Anbar Province and other areas that are under more
of the insurgent control, obviously that is a much shorter trip
to countries of friends in that region, to other western
countries, and to the United States than from other possible
camps, say in the Afghan-Pakistan border regions or something
like that.
I think you do have to consider U.S. standing in the world,
if you will. I think that is an important factor. I think, as
you mentioned the international economy, one does not know if
the oil flow would be disrupted, but certainly were that to
happen, were there again to be regional instability that
erupted, again there is the potential that that could erupt--
that could degrade the availability of the energy resources in
that area, the oil and natural gas.
Again, no one really knows what these consequences truly
would be. They are all potential, and they all are certainly
worrisome.
Senator Thune. Let me ask you, if I could, a follow-up
question that has been posed a couple of times this morning, I
think first by Senator Lieberman and a couple of others on the
panel. It has to do with these resolutions that get put on the
Senate floor, that I think in many cases are designed to
respond to political conditions here at home rather than to
conditions on the ground in Iraq. If thought were being given
to the effect on the troops and the conditions on the ground in
Iraq, I do not think you would probably see as many of these
resolutions floating around here on Capitol Hill, and I know
that they do not have the force of law when you are talking
about a non-binding resolution. I think the real opportunity
here for Congress to have a say in this, if they wanted to,
would be with respect to the purse and the power that we have
in terms of appropriations. At least nobody evidently wants to
take that step.
But these resolutions are symbolic, in that I think they
send a signal and a message to our troops. They obviously are
perceived around the world as having some meaning. I do not
happen to believe that our troops make the distinction between
support for them and a lack of support for their mission. Would
you comment on that as well, just as a follow-up to the
questions that have been asked earlier?
General Petraeus. Sir, again, I am not a politician. I am a
guy who wears a uniform and has for 32 years plus. I am,
however, very sensitive, as I mentioned before, to Congress'
responsibilities in terms of oversight, accountability, and so
forth. I understand also very much the frustration of the
American people, of Congress, frankly of all of us, with the
situation in Iraq.
I think, however, putting on the uniform and as a
prospective commander, if confirmed, that the question has to
be, I guess at least that I would ask myself, what message will
the enemy take from this, what message will the soldiers and I
take from it?
If I could, I would just really like to leave it at that,
because, candidly, there are a number of resolutions out there,
without actually getting into details, which I would just as
soon avoid anyway, frankly, learning that mine fields are best
avoided and gone around rather than walked through on some
occasions. I would like to leave that one there, Senator.
Senator Thune. A very diplomatic answer. But I come back to
that point because I think that the questions that have been
asked earlier--what is most important in the debate that is
occurring up here right now, in my view at least, is the impact
that it has on the men and women who are wearing the uniform.
You are a career military officer, someone who works day in and
day out with the troops. Those of us who are up here obviously
have constituencies back home that we respond to and clearly
many of these messages or resolutions are directed or targeted
at some of those constituencies, who have a sense of
frustration about this war.
But it seems to me that the bottom line concern that we
have to have is that our troops understand that we are
committed to them and support them and want to make sure that
they have every opportunity to be victorious, to complete the
mission. That is what soldiers do. I am very concerned about
the mixed messages that are sent by statements that are made
here, not so much again as they are directed to constituencies
back in the States, but more importantly what impact that has
on the men and women who are carrying out this responsibility
in the theater where they could be in harm's way.
What about the issue of the borders? There has been a lot
made about Syria, Iran, troops coming in, foreign fighters.
What steps are we taking to cut that off and what more can we
do?
General Petraeus. Sir, that is not a subject that I have
discussed in any detail at all, again, with General Odierno.
Again, I was truly trying to avoid any kind of presumptive
behavior, although at one point when I was being asked about--
during the development of the strategy I thought that I did
have to talk to our operational commander on the ground and
confirm that his troops-to-task analysis did require all five
of the brigades and the two additional battalions in Anbar
Province, which he said that it did.
I do know that he shares the concern over the borders. We
have very briefly discussed it in passing. But I do not know at
this point in time what the plans are to strengthen the
defenses, the security, along the Iranian border and along the
Syrian border in particular.
Senator Thune. I see, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I am sorry I missed a good amount of your question
and answer period. I was here for your testimony. I had two
other hearings I had to go to.
I want you to know I appreciate your diplomacy as it
regards my colleague Senator Thune's question. The issue of the
attitudes of people who are serving is in my view not wholly
appropriate to the political debate. You and I had a discussion
about that when you visited me. I think there are a number of
polls out there. There was a poll last year during the campaign
that showed more than 70 percent of the troops in Iraq believe
we should be out within a year. There is a poll in the Service
Times fairly recently that showed a majority of the people in
the military no longer support the approach of this
administration in terms of how the war should be fought. I
think we up here and the senior military are the fiduciaries of
the goodwill and the service of those people, and it is not
always appropriate to be bringing them so directly into the
process.
I also would like to say for the record that so many of
these predictions that are being bandied about regarding the
implications of a withdrawal, first of all, I think play to the
worst case scenario of a precipitous withdrawal. The others,
for instance an increase in terrorist activity, decrease in the
United States standing around the world, and effect on the
United States economy, the empowerment of Iran, are the exact
conditions that many of us who were warning against going into
Iraq were making, which would occur as a result, and in some
cases have. I just think that is something that should be said
for the record.
In your testimony, when you talked about your measures of
success you mentioned the rule of law, and one of the strongest
feelings that I have is that law and order is the first
stepping-stone toward some sort of success here, but we have to
go toward a point where law and order is being administered by
the Iraqis, through the Iraqis, on behalf of the Iraqis.
Otherwise you get a situation similar to Northern Ireland years
ago, and just the notion of a British soldier on the street was
enough to inflame the emotions of a lot of people over there.
That goes to one of the concerns that I have about the way
that this strategy is being articulated. It is one thing to
talk about the measurements of success, but I think what we
really need to hear is a clear articulation of end point. My
belief is that in terms of our national strategy with Iraq the
successful end point would be a time when there are no longer
United States combat forces on the streets of Iraq. Would you
agree with that objective?
General Petraeus. Senator, I would. I think the condition
the rest of the country is in would obviously pertain as well.
If you achieved no more troops in Iraq but the whole thing just
came apart at the seams, then I am not sure that that would be
the objective that you would want to strive for.
Senator Webb. The removal of combat troops from the streets
of Iraq?
General Petraeus. Certainly, over time that is where you
want to be, yes, sir, again assuming that there is security on
those streets in Iraq and that we have enabled and helped the
Iraqis to get to that.
Senator Webb. Right, but that would be a doable
articulation of where we want to end up?
General Petraeus. That is certainly where we want to end up
militarily, yes, sir.
Senator Webb. I have another question regarding the
training of Iraqi forces, and this is just a question from
having participated in the Vietnam War and watching some very
fine South Vietnamese soldiers get in many cases culturally
conflicted by the type of training that the United States was
bringing to them, and having spent time in Lebanon as a
journalist and watching the difficulty that they had trying to
build up a Lebanese army with all the difficult factions very
similar to Iraq.
General Petraeus. Right.
Senator Webb. The question that I have is really asking for
your observation, having done this. To what extent are these
Iraqi forces less capable because of the training that they
have not received from the Americans and to what extent are
they less capable because of a lack of motivation, for instance
a fear of affiliating with the central government that is so
weak, or cultural issues, those sorts of things?
General Petraeus. I think it is probably more the latter
than the former, in truth. I think that over time we did build
a respectable training and equipping program. It was relatively
comparable to what we do for our own soldiers. Over time we
have built institutions--military academy, staff colleges,
basic training academies, branch schools, and all the rest--and
again, this really does come back to the heart of the issue, as
I mentioned in my opening statement, that there is not a
military solution, there is a political solution. Military
force is, again, necessary but not sufficient, and getting to
that will component of this equation, what you talk about, who
are we fighting for, what are we fighting for, is crucially
important in this case, and that is again the ultimate kind of
resolution of the problems in Iraq.
Senator Webb. Do you see that there is any sort of stigma
associated to Iraqi units that are directly affiliating with
Americans in different parts of the Iraqi society?
General Petraeus. Sir, again I would have to march my way
around the country, but I do not really think that is the case.
We have very small, relatively small, embedded teams,
partnership programs, throughout the country with the military.
I am not sure the same can be said of the police, which is a
wholly different issue because they obviously are local. They
come from the local neighborhood, and if you have a situation
in which intimidation sets in over time, of course, then there
can be a problem of affiliation between them and what can be
seen, again, in some of those areas as occupiers.
You have seen it, I know, in Anbar Province, where it has
gone back and forth, and right now there appears to be a trend
in the positive direction where sheiks are stepping up and they
do want to be affiliated with and supported by the U.S. Marines
and Army forces who are in Anbar Province. That was not the
case as little as perhaps 6 months ago or certainly before
that.
So again, I think you really have to look around the
country, and I think we have to be very sensitive and, frankly,
nuanced in how we operate in those different areas.
Senator Webb. I wish you well and I look forward to hearing
your observations after you hit the ground.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I would like to state unequivocally that I have
great admiration personally for you and your professional
accomplishments, and I express my thanks to you for leaving the
banks of the Missouri and be willing to return, and do so out
of a sense of deep patriotism and love for this Nation and the
forces that you will eventually command.
If you succeed, and I hope you do, fervently I hope you do,
you will have earned rightfully the gratitude of the people of
this country, and indeed the people of much of the world,
because hopefully that would bring stability to this government
and allow it to exercise the full range of sovereignty.
But I have to tell you, and this is personal, I go back 35,
36, 37 years, when as Secretary of the Navy, I sat at that very
table where you are in this very room on a number of occasions
and in other rooms of this Congress, trying to explain, since I
was a part of the civilian structure, governmental structure
directing that war. I heard the crossfire in the questions and
in the debates, and this hearing today brought it all back.
There is no real parallel to the conflicts as such that we
are experiencing today, but there is this situation of the
Nation pulling back. How well I remember, with my friend Jim
Webb here and John McCain bravely in uniform in those days, how
they came back home to a public that did not greet them with
the warmth, the respect, and the thanks that they deserved.
But today it is quite different. This whole Nation is in
support of the men and women of the Armed Forces. I say to you
I think every member of this committee--and I know every one of
them well, on that side of the aisle, on this side of the
aisle, having had the privilege of occupying that chair for
some 6 years--we are not a division here today of patriots who
support the troops and those who are making statements and
working on resolutions that could be translated as aiding and
abetting the enemy.
We are trying to exercise the fundamental responsibilities
of our democracy and how this Nation has two coequal branches
of the government, each bearing its own responsibilities.
I hope that this colloquy has not entrapped you into some
responses that you might later regret. I wonder if you would
just give me the assurance that you will go back and examine
this transcript as to what you replied with respect to certain
of these questions and review it, because we want you to
succeed and I am not sure just how the reporting will come out
of this hearing, nor at this moment am I fully able to judge
how the people across this land seeing this hearing through the
lens of that camera will interpret it.
But in defense of those colleagues--and I am one and I
accept full responsibility for what I did yesterday in leading
an effort with my distinguished colleagues, Senators Collins
and Ben Nelson of this committee, in putting forth a
resolution. But we did so in response to the President's
comments to the Nation on the 10th of this month, and I read
from his transcript:
``In the days ahead, my national security team will
fully brief Congress on the new strategy. If members
have improvements that can be made, we will make them.
If circumstances change, we will adjust. Honorable
people have different views and they will voice their
criticisms. It is fair to hold our views up to the
scrutiny of all involved and have a responsibility to
explain how the path they propose would be more likely
to succeed.''
Since we just put in our resolution late yesterday--and we
did so not to have a confrontation with the President, but
following his advice we had some recommendations, which he may
or may not accept. They were expressed by heartfelt beliefs
held by the three of us and we think other members of the
Senate.
I feel that we have performed our duty as we see it and
that time will tell. We purposely did not file it. I am getting
technical here. We put it in the record, but it is not filed
before the Senate, and we will withhold any further action on
our resolution until the Foreign Relations Committee, which has
primary jurisdiction, reviews certain resolutions before it and
responsible to the floor of the Senate. Then and at that time
will we consider whether or not we should make any changes and
whether we submit it as a resolution as a substitute for that
promulgated by the Foreign Relations Committee.
I just urge you to go back and look at that, because I am
very proud of this committee and I do not want an impression,
certainly among the Armed Forces, that we are not all steadfast
behind them, and that sort of a misimpression could create the
very forces that I witnessed when I was in that chair and saw
America pull back and eventually the funding problem, which I
hope we never experience here as a means by which to exercise
the authority of our equal branch, Congress.
Now, let us proceed to my point here. This resolution we
put in looked at options that the President might consider
using a force level somewhat less than the 20,500. We fully
support, inferentially, the force levels the President wants to
send to Anbar. There we are directly in combat with al Qaeda,
which is so fundamental to this whole war on terrorism
throughout the globe. But we looked at also the means by which
the benchmarks could be made very clear to the American public
most important and to Congress, and as you direct the
operation, which will be sequenced, the first section of
Baghdad that you begin to work the plan on, let us see if the
Iraqis indeed reported for duty in full force, as the plan
envisions, indeed took the lead, as they say, in the fight,
which is primarily sectarian violence, and that the political
structure will not try and abrogate the decisions made by the
field commanders, both U.S. and Iraqi, as they move forward
with the plan. Those are very critical to the success.
In my understanding--and you have been very forthright--you
have not helped develop this plan. It has been entrusted to
those commanders in country, understandably. But you in a
sense, if confirmed, and in the written letter that you advised
the President, you are accepting the responsibility to
implement that plan. So I take my comments to my colleagues a
step further and say, if there comes a time when you feel there
should be a change to the plan and hopefully, as we recommend
to the President, a lesser force level of U.S. forces is
possible, you will address that to your superiors, the
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and
hopefully implement that.
Am I correct in that?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. Now, finally this question of the sectarian
violence which concerns me greatly. The root causes of that
violence are almost incomprehensible. Here we have through
great sacrifice of life and limb and an enormous sum of funds,
not only the United States but coalition forces, given this
nation its sovereignty, and all we ask in return is it take the
full reins of sovereignty and exercise it.
My concern is why do we need to put such a heavy emphasis
of U.S. forces into Baghdad when we have trained 188,000 Iraqi
military? Why should they not take the preponderance of the
responsibility to cope with the sectarian violence? They can
understand the language. They have some comprehension of the
root causes why a Sunni and a Shia who have lived side by side
for many years are now at each other's throats and seek only to
kill and destroy one another.
Why could not our forces be redeployed into areas where
those 188,000 Iraqis are geographically in other regions and
withdraw the Iraqi forces from those regions and put them into
Baghdad to carry forward this mission, which is important, very
important, to bring down, hopefully, lower that level, so that
the people of Baghdad have some quality of life, so that the
government has some sense of personal security and governmental
security, so they can carry out the functions of sovereignty?
Those are the issues that we bring to you. Do you have a
thought on that? Why could we not simply utilize the Iraqis to
fight this sectarian violence and not the American GIs?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir. Sir, first of all, I think that
the effort in Iraq, in Baghdad, will be predominantly Iraqi. I
think that as we total up numbers of forces and various
contributions that they will far outnumber U.S. forces in the
Baghdad security plan. They are in fact moving forces from
other places in the country where the troops-to-task situation
allow that to happen. I happened to meet last night with the
Iraqi chief of defense staff, their chairman of the joint
chiefs of staff, General Babakar Zabbari, who is a long-time
comrade starting up in northern Iraq, where he commanded the
Pesh Merga that helped us liberate northern Iraq. He then
eventually was elevated to be his country's senior military
officer.
He stated that they are training additional forces--I
believe it was in the order of 25,000 or 30,000 additional
military forces--that will also be used to augment the elements
that are going to Baghdad. Again, he also echoed what I
mentioned earlier, that the initial battalions are actually in
Baghdad, according to General Odierno as well, and are starting
to get set again to contribute to that operation.
Senator Warner. If they fail to live up to their
commitments--and I hope they do not--if they fail to meet the
benchmarks of the initial phases of the Baghdad operation, are
you prepared to come back to your superiors, indeed the
President and the Secretary of Defense and others, and say, we
should not go forward until somehow we get not only the
assurance but the actuality of their participating in
successive phases of this Baghdad operation?
General Petraeus. I am prepared to do that, Senator.
Senator Warner. I thank you. I wish you good luck and I
wish you have success.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to begin by saying, Senator Warner, how
appropriate and moving I thought your opening comments were.
There has been a lot of commentary at this hearing this
morning about the morale of the troops and about the need to
defeat our adversaries. I think the best thing we can do to
support the morale of our troops and defeat our adversaries is
to have a policy that maximizes our chances for success. It
would be ironic indeed if we remain silent in furtherance of a
false unity, in deference to a policy unlikely to succeed. I do
not see what that would do for either the morale of our troops
or to defeat our adversaries. So, particularly from your side
of the aisle, I thought your comments were absolutely
appropriate and indeed moving.
Senator Warner. I thank the Senator.
Senator Bayh. General, I would like to follow up on that
for a moment. I think Senator Webb was also right, being a
military man, not to want to drag those of you in uniform into
political debates. So I am not going to ask you about specific
resolutions or all that kind of thing. But the issue of troop
morale is something that you are an expert on and that has been
raised here today. So I would like to ask you very plainly:
Does a hearing like this, with the diversity of opinion that
has been expressed here, undermine the morale of our troops?
General Petraeus. Senator, I seriously doubt that our
troops are sitting watching C-SPAN 3 in Iraq right now.
Senator Bayh. Further testimony to the intelligence of our
military men and women. [Laughter.]
General Petraeus. Sir, I do not know how much attention
they are paying to this debate.
Senator Bayh. Well, the issue has been raised. It is a
philosophical question, not a political one, but it is
important because every American, as Senator Warner was saying,
cares about the morale of our troops. So does diversity of
opinion in our society about the right thing to do in Iraq,
that maximizes our chances for success, does a healthy debate
about the right course that maximizes our chance of this
turning out well, does the freedom inherent to a democracy,
does that make us weak?
General Petraeus. Sir, I think I stated earlier how
important I think free and open debate and the marketplace of
ideas and all the other great qualities that our country has
achieved are in fact to our country. I think some of the
soldiers will be out there saying, yeah, go get them. Some will
be saying, what is that all about. Some will just keep their
head down and go about their mission.
Senator Bayh. So what you are saying, General, is that our
men and women who wear the uniform really are a lot like
Americans back at home? They have diverse opinions, too.
General Petraeus. Sir, that is where they come from.
Senator Bayh. They are probably sophisticated enough to
take all this in and accept it for whatever it is worth.
General Petraeus. Sir, I think that is an accurate
statement.
Senator Bayh. I thought so and I am glad to hear you say
that.
What is behind a lot of this--and you heard some of this
also, I have heard there are concerns about micromanaging, and
I think the Vice President said the other day you cannot run a
war by committee. But there is a lot of history here--I think
you have alluded to some of it--a history of mistakes by the
civilian leadership, a history of the Iraqis, who you quite
accurately indicated and it was universally the opinion that
Senator Clinton and I heard when we were in Iraq that the
Iraqis are essential to the success of this mission and yet
they have been too often unable or unwilling to step up and do
their part. There is that history we bring to this.
So to deal with both the mismanagement of this on our
civilian side here and the lack of resolve on the part of the
Iraqis there, many of us feel that it is our responsibility now
to step up and to provide better direction to this whole thing.
That is what you hear going on.
So with that by way of background, you said a couple of
interesting things that I think were both accurate, but I would
like to combine them in a little bit different way. At one
point in your testimony you said you thought that at the bottom
of all this at its essence it was a test of wills; is that
correct?
General Petraeus. Sir, that is correct. I think any such
endeavor is a test of wills at some point with the enemy. Now,
there are many factors in the test.
Senator Bayh. This is what I would like to get to. I think
that statement is correct, but I want to combine it with
another statement that you have made and I hear repeatedly from
our military men and women, which is, look, no matter how long
we stay or how hard we fight or how much we spend or how many
of us die, it is ultimately up to them.
I think what you were about to say is it is not only a test
of our will, that is a part of it, but it is also fundamentally
a test of the Iraqis' intentions, whether they are willing and
able to do what it takes ultimately to make this successful. Is
that not also true?
General Petraeus. It is, and I have made that point, of
course, several times today. This is at the end of the day up
to the Iraqis.
Senator Bayh. I would like to ask a couple questions about
that, because my strong impression is that the American people
are willing to be constant and strong in support of a policy
they believe is likely to work, but they can also understand
when things are not working too well and when a change of
course is in order, and that is when they begin to hesitate and
withdraw their support.
So the questions I would like to ask today get to the heart
of what do the Iraqis intend, why should we have confidence in
them, and what steps can we take to maximize the chances that
they will do what is in their own interests and maximize the
chances that our efforts there will succeed in helping them.
I would like to get to what Senator Levin mentioned to you
a couple of times. You have spoken about consequences. We have
talked about benchmarks and timelines, but ultimately there
have to be consequences. Otherwise I am afraid the Iraqis will
not take us seriously and the American people will conclude
without consequences this really is more of the same.
You spoke generally about, if things are not going so well
we will have to look at what we can do for them and what we
might withhold from them. That is a pretty general statement.
Can you be more specific than that, because I am afraid without
more specifics----
General Petraeus. Certainly, yes, sir. I can give examples
of in fact what I did in the past. As the Multinational
Security Transition Command-Iraq commander, the train and equip
program commander, there was a case toward the end of my time
in command where leaders of the major crimes unit in Baghdad
were found mistreating detainees. So I went to the minister of
defense with the evidence of this and announced that we were
withdrawing all financial, logistical, adviser, and equipment
support for that element until he arrested and tried those
individuals. He did do that, and we then over time resumed the
assistance that we were providing to them. That is an example
of that.
There are positive reinforcements, if you will. The Iraqi
special operations force brigade is arguably the best special
operations unit in the entire region. They are among the most
experienced. They are the ones in many cases who have been
conducting the operations in recent weeks and months to go
after some of the senior leaders of the Jaysh al-Mahdi, Moqtada
al-Sadr's militia, and they have done so well that we
continually reinforce that with increasingly better, more
capable equipment, better facilities, better quality of life, a
special operations bonus, and so forth.
So again, there are two ways of going at that and those are
examples of those.
Senator Bayh. Those are the kind of specific consequences
we are looking for, but that deals with the military side of
things and a lot of this is going to depend on the Iraqi
political leadership.
General Petraeus. Correct.
Senator Bayh. Which, when Senator Clinton and I met with
the Prime Minister last week, he said to us what I understand
is essentially what he said to the President last November,
which is: Look, we do not want your brave soldiers dying here,
either; I want you to leave Baghdad. Just give us heavier
weapons, you guys withdraw to the periphery, and let us do what
we need to do.
Now we have adopted a policy diametrically opposite to
that. Why does he have such a different opinion about what
needs to be done to secure Baghdad?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have not had a chance to talk to
Prime Minister Maliki. I do not know what his view on this is.
I had actually been told that he had supported it after
conversations with the President.
I do not know. I will have to determine, if confirmed, once
I get on the ground.
Senator Bayh. I think when you do talk to him, General, you
will find that he will. When I pressed him and I said, ``well,
do you then think that our policy of adding more troops is the
wrong one?'' He started backing up and he said, ``well, that is
not exactly''--but you could tell what he really meant. If he
had first choice, he would be doing things differently there.
The reason that is important to me is that I am looking for
some insight into is he willing to do what needs to be done
here. How can we ask them to make different political decisions
in support of a policy they may not really embrace?
Let me give you a couple of other examples just quickly. We
arrest people affiliated with Iran, Iranian agents, sometimes
we think implicated in the explosive devices that are killing
Americans. The message from the Iranian government is that we
have to let them go. He has publicly resisted the setting of
benchmarks and yet he endorses the steps that need to be
undertaken. Well, if you really endorse the steps that need to
be undertaken, why would you resist being held publicly
accountable?
All that leads me to wonder, do they really have it in them
to make the hard decisions that need to be done? So my question
to you is, with the situation about the Iranians, his
resistance to benchmarks, and all that kind of thing, what
leads you to be confident of these people?
General Petraeus. There have been some reasonably positive
developments in recent weeks actually where they have hung
tough, have not released one of the very senior Moqtada al-Sadr
affiliates, where their forces have reported, where there are
developments in Anbar Province and so forth. But again, I am
with you in the fact that only time will tell, Senator. If
confirmed, I need to get back to a country that I have not been
to in 16 months and determine what the will is.
As I mentioned earlier, if I detect that they do not want
it as much as we want it, I will report that to my boss.
Senator Bayh. That is why Senator Levin and I and others
keep getting back to the notion of consequences, because all
too often in the past they have said the right things, but they
have not done the right things, what has led us to question the
strategy of constantly reassuring them to try and build up
their confidence so that they will have the security to do the
difficult things. It has led some of us to conclude that
perhaps a different approach to encouraging them to do the
difficult things is in order.
So my time has expired, but my last question to you is, you
said that, I think the words that you used were, ``that the
responsible elements among the Iraqis did not want us to
leave.'' I think that is what I heard you say, ``the
responsible elements did not want us to leave.''
General Petraeus. There are thousands, actually tens of
thousands, of Iraqis who have died actually defending their
country, far more than our soldiers, each of which is a tragedy
for that family.
Senator Bayh. Here is my parting question, and again it is
by way of trying to figure out: What can we do to get them to
do what is in their own best interests here, what needs to be
done? So if you are telling me that the responsible Iraqis do
not want us to leave precipitously, but at the same time you
then said that if we talk about redeployment that would have an
adverse consequence on them, so my question to you is: If they
want us to stay, but then we say, look, if you do not do the
right things we may not be able to stay, why would that not
lead them to do the things necessary to getting us to do what
you are telling us they want us to do, which is to remain long
enough for them to make a go of it?
How can we hold those two thoughts at the same time? They
want something, but when we tell them we may take it away it
does not have an impact on their thinking.
General Petraeus. Their challenge right now, Senator, I
believe is that they are in a capital city that is insecure, in
which citizens make life or death decisions on a daily basis,
just trying to get to work, get their kids to school, get some
food. You cannot come to grips with the tough decisions that a
government has to resolve in a situation like that. Their
security forces have not been able to deal with the rise in
violence in the wake of the bombing of the mosque in Samarra,
which unleashed a tremendous amount of tit for tat and back and
forth violence. The objective is to get a grip on that, to
provide improved security, to give the Iraqi government the
space and the time to come to grips with these political
decisions that will ultimately carry them forward.
Senator Bayh. General, I support your nomination and I wish
you well.
General Petraeus. Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
Now, after Senators Martinez and McCaskill there will be a
second round. The amount of time will not be as long as 8
minutes, but we will work through lunch. Do you have a problem
with that?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Or do you need a break for other purposes?
General Petraeus. No; ready to go, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Good morning, General. Congratulations on
your nomination and thank you for your distinguished service
and your willingness to undertake this very difficult
assignment. I know I echo what all others have said, but I have
never heard such unanimous praise here today and in other
quarters of your service, your capacity, and your capability.
So I thank you for your service and for your willingness to
undertake this very difficult task.
Chairman Levin. Senator Martinez, forgive me for
interrupting. But while we have as many folks with us as
possible, I just want to inform all of us that the committee
will be conducting a hearing next Tuesday, January 30, to
consider the nomination of Admiral William Fallon to be
Commander, U.S. Central Command, and will be conducting a
hearing on Thursday, February 1, to consider the nomination of
General George Casey to be Chief of Staff of the Army. I did
talk about these dates with Senator McCain, so he knew those
two dates would be used.
Forgive the interruption, but I wanted to get that out.
Senator Martinez. Getting back to the topic at hand,
obviously the new plan for Iraq comes after months and months
of political commentary and debate, much as has been discussed
here today in the open democracy that we are, for there to be a
different plan, a change in Iraqi policy. Now we do have a new
plan for Iraq.
My understanding of the plan is that it is not just an
increase in the number of troops, which I might point out when
accomplished will not put us at a level of troops in Iraq which
is even equal to the highest number we have had in the course
of this effort; is that correct? I mean, our troop levels in
Iraq have gone up and down.
General Petraeus. They have. I believe that there have been
periods when we have had more than we will have at the end of
this particular increase.
Senator Martinez. The focus has been on the troop levels,
but there actually are more issues related to this new plan
than just an increase in troops. To be clear now, the troops
that are going into Baghdad are not going as American forces at
the front end. My understanding from the President's
explanation of this new plan is that the Iraqis will be at the
front and that they will not be taking a back seat; they will
be in the front and center.
My understanding further is that troops have already begun
to move into Baghdad and that the Maliki government has carried
out the first benchmark, which is will the Iraqi troops report,
and they have begun to report; is that correct?
General Petraeus. The initial elements, yes, sir. Again, I
want to be clear that not all, but their schedule is not for
all of them to be there by any stretch of the imagination
either.
Senator Martinez. But they have begun to be there?
General Petraeus. They have indeed, yes, sir.
Senator Martinez. Second, that there are political as well
as economic development, reconstruction elements to this plan.
General Petraeus. That is correct.
Senator Martinez. Those are equally important and in fact
you have emphasized, as I would emphasize, the fact that there
needs to be a political settlement among the Iraqis the
distribution of the oil revenues, amendments to the
constitution. Those are important things.
General Petraeus. Correct, sir.
Senator Martinez. So when some here might say that in fact
we need a political settlement, we are all in agreement that
there needs to be a political solution to the problems in Iraq.
The question really is, can these political solutions take
place in the midst of chaos, killing, and everyday violence at
levels that are really unsustainable and unimaginable. So it
seems to me that it is logical to suggest that we have to
dampen down the violence so that we can give an opportunity for
there to be a political settlement and an environment conducive
to a political settlement. Secondarily, it would seem to me to
be fairly difficult to be involved in the business of
reconstruction, water, sewer, electricity, garbage pickup, et
cetera, when you in fact have a chaotic and disruptive
situation. So it seems to me, frankly, no different than it
would be in an American city if all of a sudden we had
lawlessness and a breakdown in the rule of law. It would be
rather difficult to have economic development programs in a
neighborhood.
General Petraeus. Correct.
Senator Martinez. One of the issues that has troubled me
since I was in Baghdad in October was the fact that I saw a
serious political division among those who are attempting to
run the Iraqi government. Particularly, I was troubled by the
fact that some ministries seem to be under the political
control of Moqtada al-Sadr and that those ministries,
particularly the ministry of health, are not only not
cooperative, but would not even meet with Americans, would not
even discuss the issues of the day with Americans.
Is there any sign or any indication that you have or do you
share my concern that it would be impossible for us to see a
united Iraqi government until issues like that are resolved?
General Petraeus. I share your concern, Senator.
Senator Martinez. I have heard it repeatedly said by other
distinguished Members of the Senate that the generals do not
support this plan. Again, when the President was explaining
this plan to me and others, he mentioned that General Casey has
had a hand in the development of this plan. My understanding is
clearly that you do support this plan and believe it has a
reasonable chance of success.
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Senator Martinez. So when some would say that generals do
not support it, I suppose one can find generals who might not
support it, particularly maybe a retired general. But those of
you in charge with carrying out the mission do believe that it
has a reasonable chance of success?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Martinez. General--and I will conclude with this,
Mr. Chairman--I have heard the importance of the Senate debate,
that the Senate is a democratic institution where we all have a
high degree of responsibility, and also I think sometimes an
elevated self-importance. But I also have heard something that
I find disturbing here today, which is the suggestion that
civilian leaders of our Department of Defense at a time of war
would either give knowingly false or misleading testimony to
this Congress. I find that request of the General to stand up
and speak to that issue to be frankly unnecessary. Just like I
do not besmirch the opinions of those in the Senate who might
differ with this current plan or question their patriotism, I
also think it is unnecessary to question the veracity or the
seriousness of purpose, the integrity or the honor of the
people that we have confirmed to be the civilian leadership in
the Department of Defense. I just found that troubling and not
in keeping with the level of discourse that the colleague from
Virginia was expressing about the issues of the day.
I too believe that if someone disapproves of this plan and
believes it is a dead end that they too then have a
responsibility to seek to stop the action and not just send a
message. I think it calls for further and stronger action than
just a message.
General, I wish you well. I believe, like you do, that this
is a plan that has a reasonable chance of success. I agree and
believe, like you do, that the consequences of failure in Iraq
are serious and would do great harm to our Nation. So my best
hopes and I know those of this Nation go with you in your new
mission, and look forward to working with you to help you
succeed as we all try to succeed in this very difficult
struggle, but one which I think is inextricably tied to the
overall global war on terror. I thank you for your patience
today.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I first have to comment on the irony of those who are
critical of any resolutions that are being brought forward
concerning this latest plan in Iraq. We are ostensibly spending
hundreds of billions of dollars and sacrificing the most
precious lives imaginable in this cause, to build a democracy.
In November, I think something much stronger than a resolution
came forth from this country. It was not a Senate resolution.
It was an election, and that election confirmed the strong
foundation we have in this country for the democratic process.
I think expressing our opinions through resolutions is
exactly what keeps this institution and the people we represent
living in a wonderful country because of the democratic
institutions. I think it is ironic that we would criticize
those resolutions in light of the fact that they merely reflect
what the elections did in this country, and that was say to the
government: We think what you are doing is not working and it
is not what we think this country should be doing. So I wanted
to comment on that irony.
I also wanted to talk to you a little bit, General. First
of all, you and I had a chance to visit, and we will miss you
on the banks of the Missouri.
General Petraeus. Even if it is on the wrong bank?
[Laughter.]
Senator McCaskill. Even though you are on the Kansas side.
We will not go into that. We certainly claim Leavenworth in the
greater Kansas City area and know the kind of work you have
done at Leavenworth. I noticed your wife in the paper the other
day working on the task force over in Topeka on the payday loan
issue; please, thank her for that work with Governor Sebelius.
General Petraeus. I will, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. I read in the paper this morning about
Company C of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, that is
in Gazaliyah and they have begun this work and there are 105 of
them there, and this article talked about that they had a
firefight the other night and, instead of moving on to another
patrol, they stayed because they are there defending what is
now their home. They have set up base there and they will be
operating out of this neighborhood, a very dangerous
neighborhood, where there is the fighting between the Sunnis
and the Shia.
This article was very troubling to me for several reasons.
I think one, it was on a human level where it discussed one of
your observations of soldiering in Iraq in the Military Review
article that Senator Collins referred to, I also read, and one
of it was that you cannot do too much with your own hands. This
article points out that right now our American military find
themselves as jailers, doctors, construction workers, garbage
men, guardians, and detectives. It points out with specificity
that there is a young 4-year-old girl that was brought into the
base and the reason she was brought there, she was terribly
ill, was because her parents did not want her taken to the
nearby hospital because it was Shiite and they feared that
their entire family would be killed while their daughter's life
was being saved in this hospital. So as a result, our medic,
our military medic, was caring for this 4-year-old girl.
Now, I think that brings home in a way that we cannot talk
about in terms of military protocol the incredible, huge
nature, the enormity in every sense of the word, of this
problem. I think the part of the article that was most
troubling to me was when they talked about ``the soldiers also
got their first glimpse of the green Iraqi forces who will
share their mission and eventually, they hope, take it over.
The soldiers talked about them with a mixture of bemusement,
disdain, and mistrust.''
`` `You could talk about partnership, but you would be
lying,' said one soldier who asked that his name not be used
for fear of punishment by his superiors.''
When I read your article on counterinsurgency and your
observations, no fewer than 6 of the 14 lessons learned deal
directly with what we have talked about primarily in this
hearing this morning, and that is what else is working over
there besides the excellent work of the American military? What
I would ask of you is your willingness to be very aggressive to
report back on these six requirements that you state that are
necessary to effectively fight counterinsurgency. I am going to
briefly go through those six for the record:
``One, do not try to do too much with your own hands.''
``Two, increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to
success.''
Number seven, the third one, ``Everyone must do nation-
building.''
``Help build institutions, not just units.''
Another one: ``Success in a counterinsurgency requires more
than just military operations.''
Finally: ``Ultimate success depends on local leaders.''
That one really kind of sticks in my craw because that is where
the rubber is going to meet the road in this plan. It is
terribly unfair what you are being asked to do and what our
military is being asked to do, because basically we are asking
you to succeed basically ignoring six of your own lessons
because they are not there now. We do not have the local
leaders there. If we did we would not be getting the mixed
signals we are getting from Maliki and we would see more
confidence that our military would have in the green forces
that ostensibly are going to be leading this.
I would like you to comment on what this soldier said and
the fear I have that what we are going to hear in Washington is
never going to match what really is happening on the ground in
Iraq.
General Petraeus. First of all, in that case--again, you
were reading an article. I did read that article this morning.
It does not strike me as the application of, if you will, the
objective plan when it is fully developed and when we have
substantially more forces on the ground, in a case where you
learn about the area in which you are going to operate, plan
with the Iraqi forces with whom you will partner, determine how
it is that you are going to secure that area, go in, do clear
it, again understand the businesses, the local leaders,
whatever else it is, the sectarian tensions and so forth, and
then in fact ensure the security of that area so that you can
do the hold and the build phases.
Certainly those subset of the observations from my own time
soldiering in Iraq are observations that inform me as I
contemplate going back over there, if confirmed. There are
others actually that are also important in this. Again, the way
we carry this out is hugely important so that you do not have
just a company that is an outpost in an area that does not have
perhaps adequate security, although it sounds to me as if the
one thing they did do was certainly prepare their force
protection for 3 days before they occupied that location.
So that is the first observation that I would offer. The
second is, again as I have pledged several times already today,
if I think that they do not want it as much as we do, at some
point I will tell my boss that and I will tell you that if it
happens to come in one of our updates or something.
Senator McCaskill. I do not have any time left, but let me
briefly also talk a little bit about the money, the CERP. I
discussed this with Secretary Gates and General Pace when they
were here. The CERP I think is important, but the problem I
have with it, it is a little bit good money after bad. We have
spent so much money trying to build and so much of what we have
spent--I will not even get into the incredible problems of
contracting and no accountability. I will not even put on the
auditor's hat here.
I am just talking about how much that we have actually done
that has been destroyed after we did it and the fact that if
the Iraqi military is going to stand on its own and be lead in
this that they should be the ones distributing CERP funds, not
the American military.
Are you aware of any plans to train the green forces, the
Iraqi forces, to begin to distribute some of the $10 billion in
surpluses that the Iraqi government has to begin winning the
hearts and minds of the people especially in these mixed
neighborhoods, that they can look to the Iraqi military as a
fair place to try to build neighborhoods regardless of what
area of town they are in?
General Petraeus. I have actually heard that discussed. I
do not know of plans to do that, though. Again, my discussions
with folks over there have really been limited to just getting
that amount of information that I needed to provide input when
I was consulted during the development of the new strategy.
I think it is something that is very worthy of
consideration. I think that certainly again they have to spend
their money. One of the reasons we have to have a comprehensive
effort is to help them build the capacity to spend their money,
because they have not been able to spend all that they have on
behalf of the Iraqi people.
If I could, with respect to CERP, CERP is great for the WPA
types of programs, but we will also look very hard for self-
sustaining types of businesses and industries and so forth that
we can either help revive or build as well. I think those are
very important in this endeavor, so that you do not just pay to
have the streets cleaned again, which is a notable
accomplishment, but again 6 months from now if you do not
achieve what you need to achieve with the ministry of public
works you will be back where you were before.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you and we all wish you, not just
Godspeed, but success and health.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
General, I think everybody in Congress and every American
wants us to succeed, wants to maximize the chances of success.
The question is how best do we do that. There is no difference,
however, between people on that issue. So it seems to me for
you or others to say how important it is for us to succeed,
that is the point, which is that the course that we have been
on is a course towards failure. The question is how do you
change course. The importance of changing course, how do you
maximize the chances of success. Are you with me so far?
General Petraeus. I am, Senator.
Chairman Levin. The next question then is how do you change
course once you decide that the course you are on is not
working, despite those claims of the Vice President that the
insurgency was in its last throes--that was a couple years
ago--despite the claim of the President just a few months ago
that we are absolutely winning in Iraq, when it is clear now
that even he acknowledges we are not winning in Iraq.
So for folks who talk about just we cannot fail, as though
somehow or other that automatically means that we follow the
President, it seems to me there is a totally illogical
conclusion. We have been following the President's course. It
has been a course that has led us towards failure and the
President did not recognize that apparently until after the
American people told him that.
So success is our goal and the question is how. There are
two different approaches towards that. One is increased
military commitment, that somehow or other giving the Iraqis
more breathing space will make it more likely that they will
reach a political settlement. The other approach is, no, they
have had plenty of breathing space, 3\1/2\ years; they need
pressure. They need to be told that it is not an open-ended
commitment, as the President finally said, at least
rhetorically, that it is not an open-ended commitment, that
they must reach a political settlement if this thing is going
to be resolved.
Now, does additional military presence contribute to the
Iraqis reaching a political settlement or does embedding our
troops in neighborhoods, number one, create a lot more targets,
and does it take the Iraqis off the hook? Does it tell the
Iraqis that we are going to increase our military presence,
does that tell the Iraqis that somehow or other their future is
in our hands rather than their own? That is an honest debate,
it seems to me, which is the heart of the matter here.
So far would you agree with that?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. So it is not a disagreement over whether it
is important to succeed. It is not a disagreement over whether
failure is going to hurt in a whole host of ways. The question
is what are the Iraqis going to read into increased American
presence in their neighborhoods? What will they take from that?
Now, my understanding is the Prime Minister of Iraq went to
Jordan and proposed to our President that the Iraqis take over
the security of Baghdad. Is that your understanding?
General Petraeus. Sir, I have heard press reports of that.
I do not have firsthand knowledge of that.
Chairman Levin. Have the Iraqis asked us for more American
troops? I know they are supporting the President.
General Petraeus. Sir, I do not know.
Chairman Levin. You do not know if they have asked us for
more?
General Petraeus. I do not, no, sir.
Chairman Levin. All right. One of the many things that our
troops deserve, it seems to me, beside all the equipment, all
the training, everything we can give them to succeed, support
for their families, it seems to me that one of the things that
our troops deserve is our honest assessments, and that they
make a distinction between supporting them and supporting the
policies of the administration. Would you agree with that?
General Petraeus. Yes.
Chairman Levin. They make a distinction, because I have met
with the troops I do not know how many times now in Iraq and I
tell them, look, I have been a critic going in, I have been a
critic of the way this thing has been run, but, folks, you have
the support of every Member of Congress. We are not cutting
your funding. We are going to support you as long as you are
there. The question is how do we succeed so you can come home.
That is the question.
General Petraeus. Right.
Chairman Levin. They welcome an honest debate. I have
gotten so many letters and comments from troops saying, this is
worthy of your debate, you are making an honest assessment,
keep at it. So many of our troops have said that, and you have
heard about public opinion polls so far.
I just want to make sure that you are not intending to be
interpreted as supporting a resolution or opposing a
resolution, number one, by your testimony. Is that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Levin. Number two, that you acknowledge that the
goal of those who want to put pressure on the Iraqi leadership
to step up and reach political settlements, is it the same goal
that you have, which is that political settlement and political
settlement alone by the Iraqis is our ultimate way of providing
security and success in Iraq?
General Petraeus. Correct, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Can we have a functioning democracy
in Iraq without political leaders in Iraq making the
compromises that they need to make?
General Petraeus. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. You made a reference to the fact that there
has been incremental progress recently, that there has been
apparently a draft of a----
General Petraeus. A couple of encouraging signs, I think
would be a way to characterize it, sir.
Chairman Levin. That would be on the political front in
terms of reaching apparently a draft on the oil revenue?
General Petraeus. A draft on the oil revenues, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. So that they have been able to make at
least that incremental progress without a surge; is that
correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Levin. President Talabani of Iraq has said that
American troops are going to be there as long as the Iraqis
want us there. Is that accurate? Should that be our decision,
not their decision, as to how long?
General Petraeus. I wonder if he--yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Are you familiar with that?
General Petraeus. I am not, sir.
Chairman Levin. All right. Is it our goal to pacify the
militias or just to disarm them? Not ``just''; let me restate
that because it is not just to disarm. Is it our goal to pacify
Baghdad or to disarm the militias, or both?
General Petraeus. Sir, the security in Baghdad can only be
achieved by any extralegal individuals being off the streets.
So it does not matter if they are international extremists,
insurgents, Sunni Arab insurgents, violent criminals, militia
members, or what have you. They all are those who violate the
idea that the Iraqi government has the legitimate use of force.
Chairman Levin. If the militias merely reduce their
visibility in Baghdad or move their operations to areas where
Iraqi and U.S. forces are not present in strength, does that
accomplish our goal?
General Petraeus. No, sir. In fact, there has been
substantial discussion about the follow-on, the disarmament,
the demobilization, and the reintegration (DDR) of various
militia elements.
Chairman Levin. Prime Minister Maliki has asserted that
U.S. refusal to provide the Iraqi security forces with weapons
and equipment hurt their ability to secure Baghdad. Do you
agree with that?
General Petraeus. Sir, I need to look at that. I did
actually look over the weekend at the list of weapons and
equipment that has been provided by the U.S. and bought with
Iraqi money as well. It is actually quite substantial at this
point. There is certainly the need for more and as they do in
fact train more obviously there will be an additional
requirement for equipment.
There is a requirement for more robust and additional armor
protection and heavier weaponry for some of their elements. But
we have actually provided quite substantial weaponry so far.
Chairman Levin. Would you let us know about your assessment
on that?
General Petraeus. I will, sir.
Chairman Levin. Because that is quite a statement, when we
have the Prime Minister of Iraq saying that the problem is that
we have not given them the equipment so that they could secure
Baghdad. That is quite an allegation.
General Petraeus. Sir, they have actually committed $1.5
billion to foreign military sales actually with the U.S., for
what that is worth, and that should enable them also. This, I
am told, will be the first year in which they spend more in
their defense budget than we spend in our train and equip
budget.
Chairman Levin. Are you going to plan for the redeployment
from Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the surge as just part of the
planning process?
General Petraeus. Sir, obviously you have to have
contingencies. You are always looking at what you are doing. So
the answer to that would obviously be yes.
Chairman Levin. With that qualification and understanding.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Finally, I want you to go back in time. We
have spent I think all of this morning pretty much talking
about where we are at and where we are going, the differences
that exist on that issue or those issues. I want you to go back
to the time when Ambassador Bremer decided to disband the Iraqi
army and to also deBaathify to the extent that he did.
Did you agree, if you can put yourself back in time, with
those decisions?
General Petraeus. Sir, I would like to qualify it. I will
say no, but I would like to qualify it, because there is really
some nuance to this. Ambassador Bremer is actually correct when
he says, first of all, they had already disestablished
themselves by and large. They had not done what in fact one of
the assumptions, or at least you would hope that a number of
them would remain in their own barracks, safeguard their
equipment, turn the turrets or their tanks over to the rear,
and just wait to be partners with us. That did not materialize
and unfortunately a lot of their stuff was looted as they went
out the door.
So there was really not a formally constituted military at
that time, although it certainly could reassemble. It did
reassemble. The challenge--and beyond that, it had vast numbers
of very high-ranking officers. Arguably, it was to some degree
Saddam's jobs program for very senior officers. In Nineveh
Province alone, there were 1,100 brigadier generals and above,
for example, although there was only one army corps.
Having said that, the challenge was of course with this
army that Iraq perhaps did not need in the long-term was now
unemployed. It was really the issue of how long it took to
announce the stipends, the follow-on opportunities for them,
how they would be able to feed their families, and again what
their future held, and to some degree a degree of disrespect,
frankly, for an institution that in the Iraqis' eyes was
perhaps the one institution that had been the least corrupted.
I am talking about the military now, not the Special Republican
Guards or some of these other organizations.
That period between the announcement of the
disestablishment and the announcement of stipends, was roughly
5 weeks or so. That was a difficult period in Iraq. All of the
military commanders in Iraq at that time registered their
concerns, because in fact the former Iraqi military did
assemble and it made their views very clearly known, and
eventually those turned into riots and eventually some were
actually killed outside the Green Zone and so forth before the
stipends were announced.
Crowds are a very big challenge when you are in an endeavor
like that and you really do not like to see crowds because
someone can shoot out of a crowd and then you have a real force
protection issue on your hands, and that did in fact
materialize during that time, and arguably that may have been
where some of the initial elements of the insurgency began to
gain strength.
With respect to the deBaathification policy, clearly Iraq
had to have a deBaathification policy. There is no question
about that. Ambassador Bremer did intend for there to be not
just deBaathification, but in fact exceptions to that policy in
substantial numbers that would amount to reconciliation.
In fact, when I had a conversation with him in Mosul in the
summer of 2003 he gave the 101st the authority to allow the
Iraqis to conduct a reconciliation process, for which we did
provide judicial oversight. That was conducted initially for
Mosul University and then some of the others. The key there was
to get the paperwork down to Baghdad to the deBaathification
committee, and unfortunately a process that had a fair degree
of rigor to it--I think it was less than 60 percent would have
been fully ``reconciled,'' and none of them would have gone to
leadership positions. I had already personally fired the higher
level Baath official who was the head of the university. But
for these individuals, say 120 or so professors, many of whom
were educated in western universities, which is one reason they
had to be Baath Party members, to go overseas.
So that was a real challenge, and all the military
commanders did register their concerns during that time,
because it was a period when obviously many of those affected
were Sunni Arab, perhaps most, although there were Shia in the
fold as well. But in the areas where most of the U.S.
commanders were, that affected Sunni Arabs, and that obviously
caused significant challenges for us.
Chairman Levin. Our commanders then registered their
concerns about that policy?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. In the way you have discussed?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Petraeus. Again, to be fair, there was an intent to
do reconciliation. Ambassador Bremer himself has on several
occasions noted that he had intended to do that, wanted to do
that, and was just not able to get it done because of the
committee.
Chairman Levin. Of what?
General Petraeus. The deBaathification committee of the
Iraqi Governing Council.
Chairman Levin. Who was head of that committee?
General Petraeus. I think it was Ahmed Chalabi, sir.
Chairman Levin. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Petraeus. Your testimony has been very
impressive. I must say that I was particularly impressed when,
after 4 hours in the chair, Senator Levin offered you a chance
for a personal break and you said it was not necessary. That is
impressive. I am going to try to be brief.
I do want to first generally respond to something Senator
Levin said and agree with him, in case there is any
misimpression. The two of us have disagreed on some of the
policies we have followed in Iraq, and we disagree today. But
one thing we agree on is that both of us are looking for a way
to succeed in Iraq. We just have different paths that we think
will work better. I would say that is true of all the members
of this committee, and I would add that insofar as some
sensitivity was expressed earlier I am sure all the members of
the committee support our troops who are there and would not do
anything to oppose them.
Having said that, what I did earlier was two things. One is
that, in response to questions Senator McCain and I asked about
the possible impact of a Senate resolution of disapproval, I
thought you were clear, which is that you really did not say
much about the impact on the morale of the troops. You said in
the negative almost, that you could not imagine there would be
a beneficial effect. You did not say anything about a negative
effect.
With regard to the impact of a resolution of disapproval on
our enemies, you, I thought, expressed concern that in a war
like this, which is in good part a test of wills, that it might
give them hope. Clearly that is not the intention of the
sponsors in the Senate of such a resolution, but that is part
of what we have to ask ourselves, what are the consequences.
I made a different kind of plea to my colleagues here, and
I repeat it, which is now at the end of this hearing everyone
has expressed great respect for you, appreciation that you are
taking on this mission, and as far as I could hear everyone on
this committee is going to support your nomination. Yet, one
question that I do remember--I did not ask it--you were asked
whether you thought you could be successful in your new command
without the additional troops provided and the additional
economic and interagency support, political support, that the
plan offers, and you said no.
So I worry that we are both going to confirm you and yet we
are going to pass a resolution that says we are not in favor of
what you need to succeed. Of course, the resolution will not
cut off that aid, so that in a way is the reassuring part of
it.
That is why I ask my colleagues again to think about
holding back a while on such resolutions, to give you a chance
to implement what you have said, and I believe most would
agree, is a different policy, a new approach, in the dire
circumstances that you will find in Iraq, because, as I think
all of us agree on this committee certainly, the consequences
of failure really I believe will be, some would say could be,
disastrous for the United States, for Iraq, for the Middle
East, for the war on terrorism, and for the world economy.
I want to just ask you two or three brief questions. The
first is, I do want to thank you for resisting the temptation
that some of my colleagues offered to you to offer pledges
based on time. We will know by X date. I think the more honest
and really responsive answer you gave was that you will report
to us regularly and you will tell us regularly how it is going
and what is working and what is not, and then we will make the
judgments accordingly.
Two brief questions about what you will find. The
deployment plan envisions the early deployment of three Army
brigades and the alert of three more Army brigades to follow.
Some have asked, why not all six at once? I am not going to ask
you that question. I am just going to ask you if when you get
there you find that you need more than the three brigades more
quickly, is it fair to assume that you will request that
expedited deployment of those troops?
General Petraeus. Sir, actually I have told the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense that we should
flow all five brigades and the two battalions for Anbar
Province as quickly as we can.
Senator Lieberman. That is great. Thank you.
The second question is similar. Obviously, you know that
there was great concern here in Congress and among the American
people about what was seen in the earlier stages of the
conflict in Iraq as inadequate troop protection equipment. As
we send in these additional 21,000 American troops, I assume we
can count on you to let us know and your superiors know
immediately whether enough equipment is coming along with them,
including, of course, troop protection equipment?
General Petraeus. Sir, I will.
Chairman Levin. A final question. I wish that this was not
just on C-SPAN 3, but on evening television, for the American
people to see more broadly, because I do think, while your
testimony is before this committee, you have answered today for
members of the committee a lot of the questions that are in the
minds of the American people. Look, they are disappointed with
what they see. We are all disappointed. You are disappointed.
So the question that I think they would ask you: Is it
worth it to now send 21,000 more troops? Is it possible to
succeed? But the more specific question I want to ask, because
I hear this all the time: the Shia and Sunni Muslims have been
fighting each other for more than a millennium. Why do we think
we can possibly end this fighting? Why would we send more of
our troops now, according to this new way forward, into the
middle of that kind of violence, which is now called sectarian
violence?
General Petraeus. First of all, there are countries in that
region where there are one or the other majority. Iraq itself
does have a history of actual substantial intermarriage, not
just getting along well together. Unfortunately, some of the
violence, some of the developments, again in particular in the
wake of the bombing of the Askari mosque in February of this
past year, in a sense magnified the sectarian divides that in
some cases were nowhere near as large. That does give me hope
that in fact Sunni, Shia, Kurd, Yizzidi, Shabback, Turkoman,
Christian, and all of the other elements of Iraq can, in fact,
get along together. It will not be easy, but if we could get
them to where they are shouting instead of shooting that would
be a very substantial improvement.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much. Godspeed.
General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. General, just to clarify the issue of the
pace of the 21,000 troop deployment.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. The National Security Adviser, Mr. Hadley,
suggested that the pace will depend a lot on the Iraqis
performing. Secretary Gates said there will be plenty of
opportunity before many of the 21,000 additional troops arrive
to evaluate, ``whether the Iraqis are fulfilling their
commitments to us.''
I believe it was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who
talked about off-ramps, in other words turning off the 21,000
flow somewhere in the middle, suggesting that that would depend
upon whether the Iraqis come through with their commitments.
You seem to take a very different approach. Do you differ
from Secretary Gates when he says that there is going to be
plenty of opportunity, which is a plus, before many of the
21,000 additional troops arrive to evaluate, ``whether the
Iraqis are fulfilling their commitments to us''?
General Petraeus. No, sir, I do not. What I stated was that
as the military commander who is given a mission, that is a
different mission, to improve security in Baghdad for the
population, what I have told the Chairman and the Secretary is
that I would like to get those forces on the ground as quickly
as possible. That is not, I do not think, contradictory with
anything that they have said that is a force generation process
issue.
Whether I come back to them at some point and somehow have
so much of a sense that perhaps they are not living up to their
side of the bargain, that we want to call a time out, I think
that is a different issue actually from what you have to plan,
what you have to assume when you are planning, and also what a
commander asks for to try to improve the chances of success.
Chairman Levin. On that question of a time out, that is a
time out that you might consider calling for under the
circumstances? Is that right, given what you said this morning?
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I am not saying you are going to call for a
time out.
General Petraeus. Right, sure.
Chairman Levin. I am saying you will consider calling for a
time out. You want to leave that possibility open depending on
whether the Iraqis carry out their commitments?
General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Levin. All of which points to the value of
pressure on the Iraqis; would you agree with that?
General Petraeus. I would, sir.
Chairman Levin. I welcome Senator Lieberman's comments, by
the way. The only thing I think, it is right when you get to
the end of your suggestion about what you need to succeed, and
those of us who disagree that a deeper military involvement is
not what you need to succeed, it is not because we do not want
the Iraqis to succeed or us to succeed. It is because we
believe it is up to the Iraqis to reach a political settlement
and only then can there be a chance of success in Iraq.
That represents the issue, whether or not more military
presence and involvement promote that goal of Iraqis achieving
political settlement or not. That is where the difference is
and, although you I think there is value in additional troops,
that basically is a mission which has been given to you, is
that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. You have not decided that is the right
policy. You agree with the policy, but the policy decision was
not yours; is that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. The letters that I referred to before
asking for the benchmarks, the series of letters, we will make
part of the record at this time. I want to clarify two things:
one, that we talked about both benchmarks and timelines,
because apparently the Iraqis have agreed on both. But whether
that is true, whether it is just the benchmarks and not the
timelines, whatever the Iraqis have agreed to in that regard we
want to see.
Two, it is not just, as the letters refer to, the
benchmarks for a political process; it is also benchmarks which
they have agreed to on military commitments of theirs, on
economic, financial commitments of theirs, as well as on
political commitments that they have not yet carried out.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Levin. General, you have been very strong,
steadfast in staying with us this morning. I am sure there
would have been moments when you would have liked to have a few
minutes off, not because the questions were too difficult for
you to handle, but for other, more personal reasons. But in any
event, we thank you for your sticking with us here so we could
conclude this hearing in good order.
We will now stand adjourned and we will do our very best to
get your nomination to a vote of this committee just as quickly
as we possibly can. We thank you again and we now stand
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:36 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to LTG David H. Petraeus,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-
Nichols Act has been a success. Our military forces are more
interoperable today than they ever have been in our Nation's history.
This achievement has been remarkable. The next step is to ensure the
ability of the military and civilian departments to work closely
together. Counterinsurgency warfare requires a total commitment of the
government--both military and civilian agencies--and unity of effort is
crucial to success.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. One of the most pressing needs is for the creation of
interagency doctrine for the prosecution of counterinsurgency and
stability operations. The State Department Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs has taken initial steps toward this end. During a conference
hosted jointly by State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I
proposed several actions that could help foster greater interagency
capacity, and I recently seconded two majors from Fort Leavenworth
(awaiting the start of the next School of Advanced Military Studies
course) to the State Department to work this issue. Beyond development
of doctrine in this area, there is discussion on creating an
interagency Center for Complex Operations, which would be an
intellectual clearinghouse for ideas and best practices in the many
facets of irregular warfare. This appears to be a low-cost, but high-
payoff, action that the committee should consider supporting.
DUTIES
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I)?
Answer. The Commanding General (CG) of MNF-I commands forces within
Iraq and is the senior military representative to the U.S. Chief of
Mission. MNF-I is a Combined Joint Task Force under Operational Control
(OPCON) to the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). MNF-I
conducts operations in support of the Government of Iraq, U.S. Mission
and other international organizations. The CG exercises Tactical
Control (TACON) of non-U.S. Coalition Forces and OPCON of the
Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) and the Multinational Security
Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). This is a strategic level command.
Question. What are the differences between the duties and functions
of the Commander, MNF-I and the Commander, MNC-I?
Answer. The Commanding General of MNC-I is the senior operational
level commander in Iraq. He directly commands forces conducting
operations to restore order and security in Iraq.
The commander of the MNF-I has a wider responsibility which covers
strategic issues and the political/military interface, working with the
U.S. Ambassador and Government of Iraq to integrate all aspects of the
campaign such as security, governance, economic development,
communication, and transition.
Question. What background and experience, including joint duty
assignments, do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform
these duties?
Answer. I believe that I have a good background for the duties of
MNF-I CG, if confirmed. First, I have, of course, served in Iraq for
some 2\1/3\ years and have a good understanding of the country, its
government, and many of its leaders from all factions. Second, I have
had a number of joint assignments at relatively high level--as a
temporary duty Special Assistant to Commander in Chief, Allied Forces
Southern Europe (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)), as
Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Command, Europe (NATO), as
Operations Chief of the United Nations (UN) Force in Haiti, as
Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as
Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations of SFOR in Bosnia, and, of course,
as the Commander of MNSTC-I and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq.
Third, I believe I have a reasonably solid academic/intellectual
background, having studied, as well as served in, major combat
operations, counterinsurgency operations, peacekeeping operations, and
peace enforcement operations. Most recently, in my current position, I
oversaw the development of the new Army/Marine Corps manual on
counterinsurgency and also oversaw changes to other Army doctrinal
manuals, our leader development programs, our combat training centers,
and a variety of other activities that support the preparation of our
leaders and units for deployment to Iraq. Finally, I believe I
understand the requirements of strategic-level leadership, which is
what, after all, MNF-I is all about.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander,
MNF-I?
Answer. Yes, and I will complete them before deploying, if
confirmed. In particular, I need to establish initial personal
relationships with the members of the JCS I don't know (I have done
this with the Vice CJCS and CJCS and key Joint Staff members already);
get briefings on the interagency's support for the important ``non-
kinetic'' aspects of the new way ahead; meet again with the Secretary
of Defense and President--and certain interagency leaders; and discuss
Iraq with several leaders of the intelligence community with whom I
have not yet been able to meet. The most important, frankly, is getting
an understanding of the level of interagency support that will be
forthcoming. That will obviously be key to the comprehensive approach
that is essential in Iraq.
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the next Commander, MNF-I?
Answer. There are many challenges in Iraq, but I would point out
four of particular concern. The top challenge is providing the security
necessary to reduce the cycle of violence in Iraq today. This will be a
difficult mission and time is not on our side. We must focus on
population security, particularly in Baghdad, to give the Iraqi
government the breathing space it needs to become more effective. The
second challenge is continuing the development of capable Iraqi
security forces (ISFs), relatively free of ethnic and sectarian bias.
The Iraqi Army has made much progress, but is uneven, and the police
remain a challenge. The third challenge is the integration of the
interagency effort to ensure that progress is made along all lines of
operation--not just security, but economic, governance, and the rule of
law as well. That is related to the fourth challenge, and that is the
lack of capacity of the Iraqi government. Iraq has enormous natural
resources and potential wealth. However, to take advantage of its
blessings, not only must security be improved, but critical national
issues must be resolved by the Iraqis, on issues such as national
reconciliation, the devolution of power below Baghdad, the distribution
of oil wealth, and so on. Only through unity of effort of all--
coalition and Iraqi, military and civilian--can we bring the full
weight of our effort to bear on the difficult situation in Iraq.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. Population security is the top priority. We must clear and
hold the neighborhoods of Baghdad to break the cycle of violence that
is preventing political progress in Iraq. We can only do this by
establishing persistent presence--coalition, as well as Iraqi--in Iraqi
neighborhoods. I plan to ensure that some of our forces locate in the
neighborhoods they protect and that they fight closely linked with
their Iraqi counterparts--with the Iraqis in the lead whenever
possible--to secure the population.
I will also work to improve the capability of the ISFs by
augmenting the size and capabilities of the embedded transition teams
that advise these forces. Beyond this, I will enhance the partnership
between U.S. units and Iraqi units, which increases the operating
capabilities of both forces. The Iraqi units have greater cultural
awareness and linguistic capabilities, while U.S. forces bring greater
military capabilities to the battlefield. Iraqi and U.S. elements are
more effective at population security and preparing for gradual
transition when working together.
To improve interagency cooperation, I applaud the recent efforts to
embed the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in the Brigade Combat
Team (BCT) headquarters (HQs) for those provinces in which BCTs are the
senior HQs, or in the division headquarters in areas where they are the
senior HQs in a province. This will provide a synergy that will
significantly enhance our ability to conduct stability and
reconstruction operations in Iraq.
I will do all that I can, in partnership with the Ambassador, to
ensure that our interagency is doing all possible to help develop
capacity in the Iraqi government and to enable it to come to grips with
the tough issues it must resolve.
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Commander, MNF-I?
Answer. As the military commander, my broad priorities would
support the development of an Iraqi state that is a stable, reasonably
representative democracy that respects the rights of all Iraqis and can
provide for its own security, with Iraqi security institutions that act
professionally and according to the interests of all Iraqi people. My
more immediate priorities would address the challenges that MNF-I faces
today--security of the population to enable political progress,
enhancement of ISFs capabilities to provide the Iraqi government a
monopoly on the use of force, support for effective interagency
cooperation to bring the full weight of our national resources to bear
on the problem, and assistance to interagency elements as they work to
help the Iraqi government build capacity and resolve the tough issues
it confronts. Other priorities would include countering the threats
posed by Iranian and Syrian meddling in Iraq, and the continued mission
of dismantling terrorist networks and killing or capturing those who
refuse to accept a unified, stable Iraq.
LESSONS LEARNED
Question. What were the major lessons you learned in your previous
Iraq tours, both leading a division and leading the effort to
establish, train, and equip security forces, that are the most
applicable to the duties you are about to assume?
Answer. Perhaps the best way to answer this is to attach an article
I wrote upon returning from Iraq after my last tour there. In it, I
laid out the lessons I learned in the form of 14 observations, noted
below; they are still valid, though they obviously require nuanced
application depending on the specific situation in each case (which is
explained in the article). The article attached explains them in
detail.
1. ``Do not try to do too much with your own hands.''
2. Act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-
life.
3. Money is ammunition.
4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to
success.
5. Analyze ``costs and benefits'' before each operation.
6. Intelligence is the key to success.
7. Everyone must do nation-building.
8. Help build institutions, not just units.
9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier.
10. Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just
military operations.
11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders.
12. Remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants.
13. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders.
14. A leader's most important task is to set the right tone.
Question. During your prior combat tours of duty in Iraq, were
there any incidents of which you were aware within your command of
alleged detainee abuse or abuse of civilians?
Answer. There was one specific case of alleged detainee abuse in
the 101st Airborne that was brought to my level. It was a few months
into our time in Mosul (and prompted us to establish clear standards
relatively early on), and did not involve death or serious injury. I
took action in that case, which included a general officer letter of
reprimand and relief of the senior individual involved and lesser
action against others. We very quickly then issued clear instructions
to all elements in the 101st Airborne Division Task Force that all
detainees would be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention,
ensured refresher education in what that meant, began a process of
inspecting all detention facilities in the Division at least weekly,
and started a process of having the Red Cross representative in the
area and Ninevah Province Council members (including an Imam) visit our
facilities on a regular basis, as well.
There was also at least one case of mistreatment of a civilian that
I recall--in which a small element improperly confiscated a vehicle
from a local citizen who was stopped at a checkpoint, with the element
leader then not being forthright about the incident during subsequent
inquiries. (The civilian was not physically mistreated.) We formally
investigated, took nonjudicial action under UCMJ against those
involved, and compensated the citizen.
There were numerous other cases of damage incidental to operations
for which we compensated the citizens affected.
As the MSNTC-I Commander, we did not operate detention facilities;
however, some of the Iraqi units we advised did do that, and we had
serious challenges in a few of those in the summer of 2005 before I
left Iraq. In each case, we documented possible cases of mistreatment,
shared the evidence with the Minister of Interior and MNF-I HQs, helped
the Minister and respective Iraqi units conduct remedial training, and,
in at least one case, withdrew all financial/equipment/advisor support
for an element (in that case due to actions by several leaders of the
Baghdad Major Crimes unit) until individuals were removed and/or
disciplined.
Question. If so, please explain the circumstances and describe the
actions that you took in response to these incidents?
Answer. Answered above.
U.S. MISTAKES
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes
the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?
Answer. First, there were a number of assumptions and assessments
that did not bear out. Prominent among them was the assumption that
Iraqis would remain in their barracks and ministry facilities and
resume their functions as soon as interim governmental structures were
in place. That obviously did not transpire. The assessment of the Iraqi
infrastructure did not capture how fragile and abysmally maintained it
was (and this challenge, of course, was compounded by looting).
Additionally, although most Iraqis did, in fact, greet us as liberators
(and that was true even in most Sunni Arab areas), there was an
underestimation of the degree of resistance that would develop as,
inevitably, a Shiite majority government began to emerge and the Sunni
Arabs, especially, the Saddamists, realized that the days of their
dominating Iraq were over. Sunni Arab resistance was also fueled by
other actions noted below.
Beyond that, as noted recently by President Bush, there were a
number of situations that did not develop as was envisioned:
There was the feeling that elections would enhance the
Iraqi sense of nationalism. Instead, the elections hardened
sectarian positions as Iraqis voted largely based on ethnic and
sectarian group identity.
There was an underestimation of the security
challenges in Iraq, particularly in 2006 in the wake of the
bombing of the mosque in Samara, coupled with an over-
estimation of our ability to create new security institutions
following the disbandment of the ISFs--which was not helped by
the planning issues described below.
It repeatedly took us time to recognize changes in the
security environment and to react to them. What began as an
insurgency has morphed into a conflict that includes insurgent
attacks, terrorism, sectarian violence, and violent crime. Our
responses have had to continue to evolve in response, but that
has not always been easy.
A number of mistakes were made by both political and military
leaders during the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom:
The very slow (if that) execution of the
reconciliation component of de-Baathification left tens of
thousands of former Baath Party members (many of them Sunni
Arabs, but also some Shiite) feeling that they had no future
opportunities in, or reason to support, the new Iraq. To be
fair to CPA, Ambassador Bremer intended to execute
reconciliation (or exceptions to the de-Baathification order)
and gave me permission, e.g., to do so on a trial basis in
Ninevah Province; however, when we submitted the results of the
reconciliation commission conducted for Mosul University and
subsequent requests for exception generated by Iraqi processes
with judicial oversight, no action was taken on them by the de-
Baathification committee in Baghdad. As realization set in
among those affected that there was to be no reconciliation, we
could feel support for the new Iraq ebbing in Sunni Arab
majority areas.
Disbanding the Iraqi army (which was, to be sure, an
army that Iraq did not need in the long-term as it had vastly
more senior officers than were remotely required and was more
of a jobs program than a competent military force) without
simultaneously announcing a stipend and pension program for
those in the Army, the future plan for Iraq's defense forces,
and provisions for joining those forces undoubtedly created
tens of thousands of former soldiers and officers who were
angry, feeling disrespected, and worried about how they would
feed their families. (The stipend plan was eventually announced
some 5 weeks after the disestablishment was announced, but it
did not cover senior officers, who remained, therefore,
influential critics of the new Iraq.) This action likely
fueled, at least in part, the early growth of the insurgency
and anti-coalition feeling.
We took too long to recognize the growing insurgency
and to take steps to counter it, though we did eventually come
to grips with it.
We took too long to develop the concepts and
structures needed to build effective ISFs to assist in
providing security to the Iraqi people.
Misconduct at Abu Gharyb and in other less
sensational, but still damaging cases, inflamed the insurgency
and damaged the credibility of coalition forces in Iraq, in the
region, and around the world.
We obviously had inadequate plans, concepts,
organizations, resources, and policies for the conduct of Phase
IV (stability and reconstruction) operations; consequently, we
were slow to move into Phase IV operations.
We had, for the first 15 months or more in Iraq, an
inadequate military structure. With hindsight, it is clear that
it took too long to transform V Corps HQs into Commander, Joint
Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) HQs, and that even when we had CJTF-7
HQs, it was not capable of looking both up and down (i.e.
performing both political-military/strategic functions and
serving as the senior operational headquarters for
counterinsurgency and stability operations). Moreover, it is
clear that we should have built what eventually became MNSTC-I
HQs and the TF-34 HQs (which oversees detainee/interrogation
operations) much sooner, along with the other organizations
that were eventually established (e.g., the Gulf Region Corps
of Engineer HQs).
Although not a problem in the 101st Airborne Division
area of responsibility (AOR) during my time as 101st commander,
it is clear that in certain other AORs there were more tasks
than troops--especially in Anbar Province for at least the
first year and likely in other areas as well.
Finally, the strategy pursued in the wake of the
bombing of the Al Askariya Mosque in Samarra in February 2006
was unable to arrest the spiraling violence and rise of harmful
sectarian activities. Repeated operations in Baghdad, in
particular, to clear, hold, and build did not prove durable due
to lack of sufficient Iraqi and coalition forces for the hold
phase of the operations.
Question. Which of these mistakes, if any, are still having an
impact, with which you will have to deal, if confirmed?
Answer. We continue to feel the effects of many of the issues
stated above. If confirmed, I intend to work with the U.S. Ambassador
to gain traction on a number of levels--security for the Iraqi people,
establishment of effective local governance and economic development
that will create stakeholders in the new Iraq, reconciliation, the
continued establishment of effective ISFs, and establishment of rule of
law to ensure effective justice to all Iraqis.
MOSUL
Question. When you commanded your division in Mosul in 2003 the
city appeared to be relatively quiet and stable. That changed
considerably in 2004 and later.
Why do you believe that happened?
Answer. The situation in Mosul deteriorated significantly about 9
months after the 101st Airborne Division departed from Iraq. There were
several reasons for this development. First, the insurgents made a
concerted effort to open a new front as it became clear that the
Coalition was going to conduct operations to clear Fallujah in the fall
of 2004. Second, the Sunni Arab governor of Ninevah Province was
assassinated in late June 2004 (the night of the transition of
sovereignty, while on the road to Baghdad, south of Ninevah Province).
In the fractious political process that followed, many of the Sunni
Arabs left the provincial council in protest over the way the
replacement governor was selected. This left a Sunni Arab majority
province without adequate Sunni Arab representation in the provincial
council. Undoubtedly, this led to some of them and their followers no
longer supporting the new Iraq and some others likely tacitly or
actively supporting the insurgents as they sought to put roots down in
Ninevah and began a concerted campaign of intimidation of Sunni Arabs
who supported the new Iraq. Third, many level-4 Baath Party members
lost hope over time that they would ever have a role in the new Iraq
due to stalling over reconciliation in Baghdad, despite the special
exemption given to the 101st Airborne Division by Ambassador Bremer in
the late summer of 2003 to conduct a special reconciliation process in
Ninevah Province and Ambassador Bremer's encouragement to all to use
the exception process in the CPA order. Finally, the forces that
replaced the 101st Airborne Division--called Task Force Olympia--were
only a little over one-third the size of the 101st Airborne (though
they started out about half our size), had many fewer helicopters and
other enablers, and one of their battalions was subsequently taken
frequently to be used as the CJTF-7 Reserve. At the time TF Olympia
replaced us in late January/early February, I believed its forces would
be sufficient to secure Ninevah Province due to the presence of the
tens of thousands of ISFs we had recruited, trained, and equipped, and
with whom we operated closely on a daily basis. That was borne out by
the Iraqis' performance during the uprisings in April 2004 when Mosul
was one of the few places in Iraq where Iraqi forces did well. Over
time, however, the Iraqi forces slowly deteriorated following the
Governor's assassination, as the insurgents mounted a brutal campaign
of intimidation. Ultimately, that degraded their effectiveness and
began a spiral downward that didn't end until during the Fallujah
operation in November 2004, during which a concerted attack in Mosul
revealed the police to be completely intimidated and ineffective, and
overwhelmed many of the Iraqi Army elements, as well. (Regretably,
although both BG Ham and I repeatedly requested replacement of the
once-aggressive Police Chief in the fall of 2004, the Minister of
Interior was never willing to take that action, despite clear signs
that the Chief and his family had been severely attacked and
intimidated.) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Task Force
Olympia's HQs lacked the same robust intelligence structure that the
101st Airborne Division possessed, which proved a serious shortfall in
the intelligence-intensive business of counterinsurgency warfare. Where
the 101st Airborne had largely been able to generate the precise
intelligence that helped us tear out the ``roots'' of the insurgents
almost as fast as they were established, this proved more challenging,
particularly over time, for Task Force Olympia.
ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW IRAQ STRATEGY
Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the
new Iraq strategy recently announced by the President?
Answer. I met with the Secretary of Defense a couple of days after
he took office and before he left for his first trip to Iraq, and we
discussed the situation there during that meeting. We subsequently
talked after his trip, as well. I also talked to the CJCS several times
during this period, noting that a population security emphasis, in
Baghdad in particular, was necessary to help the Iraqis gain the time/
space for the tough decisions they faced and discussing the general
force levels that were likely to be required. As the strategy was
refined, I talked on several occasions to LTG Ray Odierno to confirm
that his troop-to-task analysis required the force levels that are part
of the new strategy, and I relayed my support for those levels to the
CJCS and the Secretary. I also supported the additional emphasis on the
advisory effort and the additional resources for the reconstruction
effort (both in terms of funding and personnel for PRTs and
governmental ministry capacity development).
IRAQI ARMY REINFORCEMENTS
Question. The Iraqi government has agreed to send an additional
three Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad, two of which will apparently be
predominately Kurdish.
Do you know why Kurdish units were selected?
Answer. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) and MNC-I made the
decision to deploy the two predominantly Kurdish battalions to support
the Baghdad Security Plan primarily based upon the low threat levels in
their original assigned areas of responsibility, the readiness levels
of the units involved during their time as elements of the IGFC, and
the desire to involve these relatively well-trained units in the effort
to establish security in the capital city.
Question. Do you believe that Kurdish units will be more effective
than other units in enhancing security in Baghdad? Why?
Answer. I have confidence in the expected performance of these
units, though there are likely to be challenges due to language issues
(few of their enlisted soldiers speak Arabic) and, possibly, due to
operating away from predominantly Kurdish areas for the first time
(though some of the battalions did serve in mixed-ethnic areas in the
vicinity of Mosul). In considering other factors, there has been little
in the way of corruption or other sectarian issues reported in these
units. Additionally, because of their combat experience and
predominantly Kurdish soldiers, there tends to be a higher level of
unit cohesion in these formations. Because of their home locations,
there is a lower likelihood these units will have issues with
infiltration by anti-governmental entities. Finally, commanders
involved in training these units, as well as their coalition advisors,
assess that they are unlikely to be biased when conducting operations
in the locations to which they are being assigned.
Question. How do you believe Sunni or Shiite Arabs will react to
Kurdish troops in their neighborhoods?
Answer. I believe that in the end all parties will accept the
presence of these forces in an effort to secure Baghdad. Initial
feedback from a Lieutenant Colonel on the ground with whom I correspond
is that one of the first battalions to arrive has been welcomed as it
has brought improved security--though it is obviously still very early
on in this effort.
MNF-I considered several aspects prior to making the decision to
use these Kurdish-based forces. For example, MNF-I studied whether both
the Sunni and Shiite leaders would consider this an attempt by Kurdish
entities to expand their influence. While there have been some
statements by radical Shiite leaders and some reservations offered by
Sunnis, the assessment is that the people of Baghdad will adopt a wait-
and-see position. In the end, if security is enhanced, all parties will
benefit and likely will be grateful.
Question. How do you believe the Mahdi Army will react to Kurdish
troops entering Sadr City?
Answer. I believe the reaction in Sadr City to any security forces,
not just Kurdish ones (and it is not clear that Kurdish forces will
operate in Sadr City), will vary depending upon the perception of the
mission, size, and composition of forces, duration of operations, and
response of key Shiite leaders.
This is, however, a very dynamic period, and actions taken in Sadr
City will have to be carefully considered. While it is possible Muqtada
al-Sadr will respond with harsh rhetoric that could escalate into
violence, there is also the possibility that political engagement by
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will result in a tense, but calm entry
of Iraqi forces into Sadr City. As a leader within the Shiite
community, Muqtada al-Sadr must demonstrate the willingness to act
constitutionally, responsibly, and within the rule of law, regardless
of what kind of ISFs are involved. Having said this, again, any actions
involving Sadr City will be very sensitive and will require
considerable thought and preparation.
Question. What is your understanding of how Iraqi brigades which
are predominantly Sunni or Shiite will be deployed--i.e., among their
own sect or the other?
Answer. ISFs will be assigned areas of operations throughout
Baghdad without regard to sectarian composition of the units. Brigades
of the 6th and 9th Iraqi Divisions, each of which have a mix of Shiite
and Sunni personnel (though predominantly Shiite in their makeup) will
be employed in all nine administrative districts of the city. It is
true that some districts in the city are predominantly Shiite, while
others are predominantly Sunni. However, U.S. Army battalions will be
partnered with these Iraqi brigades to reinforce the practice that all
security forces operate in a professional, disciplined, and ethical
manner, and in accordance with the rule of law, international
humanitarian norms, and recognized international standards for
enforcement and protection of human rights.
Question. What are the implications either way?
Answer. It is important to ensure no particular sect feels
persecuted by the deployment of any ISF in their neighborhood. The
partnering of a U.S. battalion with each ISF brigade will ensure that
sectarian divisions and mistrust are kept to a minimum.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Question. What do you understand to be the command and control
relationships between American and Iraqi forces in the new Baghdad
security plan?
Answer. This is an exceedingly important issue. Getting the
relationship between our forces and the ISFs right is critical to
operating together. At its simplest, U.S. commanders will command and
retain OPCON of U.S. forces; Iraqi commanders will command Iraqi forces
and exercise OPCON over them once transitioned from the tactical
control of U.S. forces (this has taken place for the 6th Division and
in the case of many other Iraqi units in recent months). If confirmed,
I intend to ensure that there is very close cooperation between U.S.
and Iraqi headquarters to ensure unity of effort, careful coordination
of operations, and clear knowledge of what each force is doing. Of
necessity, this will include Iraqi and U.S. Special Operations Forces
and Police Forces as well. As I understand it, the Baghdad plan is to
be an Iraqi Plan, devised by the Iraqis in consultation with, and
supported by, MNF-I and MNC-I, and U.S. forces, under the command of
U.S. commanders, will act in support of the Iraqi effort to establish
security in Baghdad.
Question. Do you have any concerns?
Answer. Yes. MNF-I and MNC-I will need to carefully work out
liaison arrangements, colocation of command posts, terms of reference
that delineate respective responsibilities for various combat, combat
support, and combat service support activities, communications to
support all of this, and so forth. Having said this, coalition forces
have been working with ISFs for some time and have developed an
understanding of the relationships involved, and they will use that
experience to inform the actions to be taken in this case.
CONFRONTING THE MILITIAS
Question. Based on your knowledge, is the Iraqi government taking
the steps it must to confront and control the militias?
Answer. Militias and armed groups are a challenge with which MNF-I
and the Iraqi government must contend. One reason the Iraqi government
has not confronted militias in a meaningful way is that, regrettably,
they fill a security need. Another reason is that some political
parties derive their political strength from their militias, which
provide both security and allow for the provision of basic services to
the people.
Article 9 of the Iraqi Constitution prohibits militias and
stipulates that ``the Iraqi armed forces and security services will be
composed of the components of the Iraqi people with due consideration
given to their balance and representation without discrimination or
exclusion. They shall be subject to the control of the civilian
authority, shall defend Iraq, shall not be used as an instrument to
oppress the Iraqi people, shall not interfere in political affairs, and
shall have no role in the transfer of authority.'' In short, the
security forces of Iraq must be professional and apolitical, and they
must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
Once ISFs, backed by coalition forces, gain control of Baghdad and
provide security to the people, the need for militias to protect local
areas will cease to provide a justification for their existence. The
Iraqi government can then work to execute a comprehensive disarmament,
disbandment, and reintegration (DDR) program. Recent reports indicate
that Prime Minister Maliki understands the need to deal with the
militias.
Question. What role would you expect to play on this issue, if
confirmed?
Answer. Iraqi government intermediaries, coalition leaders, and
U.S. Embassy Baghdad personnel are involved in discussions to provide
opportunities for militia groups to enter into a DDR process. If
confirmed, I would support and be involved in these efforts.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, would you recommend
that American troops enter Sadr City?
Answer. American troops enter Sadr City regularly in response to
operational needs. These operations are likely to continue. As the ISFs
transition into a leading role, I would expect to see a more prominent
ISF presence in Sadr City and, as part of that, it is likely American
troops will also be present, but principally in a supporting role and
to ensure full situational awareness of the actions of the Iraqi
forces.
Question. In your judgment, how effective will the addition of more
U.S. troops be in securing Baghdad if Prime Minister Maliki continues
to allow militias to exist and operate?
Answer. Prime Minister Maliki has indicated a willingness to deal
with militias and this effort will be of central importance in securing
Baghdad. Additional U.S. troops will be important in the overall effort
by providing the necessary capacity to continue with clearing insurgent
forces from contested areas while also partnering with Iraqi Army and
Iraqi Police in order to bolster their capability to prevent sectarian
violence, whether on the part of militias, terrorists, or insurgent
groups.
COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE
Question. According to the new counterinsurgency manual, ``20
(soldiers or police forces) per 1,000 residents'' is often considered
the minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency
operations. Baghdad alone, according to doctrine, requires a force of
120,000-130,000 personnel to meet the minimum requirement. However,
when the planned increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces is complete, Baghdad
would only have about 80,000 security forces.
Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops is sufficient and
if so, why? What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of
the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation
from doctrine?
Answer. Forces currently in or moving to Baghdad should be
sufficient to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations given the
anticipated political-military situation and planned phased operations.
Answer. The recommended force ratio is a ``rule of thumb,''
distilled for simplicity's sake from numerous complex cases of
counterinsurgency operations. These cases may differ significantly in
terms of geography, urbanization, or enemy strength.
The counterinsurgency doctrine clearly states that host nation
police and army forces are a key part of the equation, as are special
operating forces and other security elements. Baghdad is a city of
roughly 6 million people, so a 1:50 ratio of security forces to
population would be equal to roughly 120,000 counterinsurgents. Iraqi
Army, Police, and Special Operations Forces, together with the U.S.
forces currently on the ground or deploying to Baghdad in the months
ahead, total approximately 85,000--though, to be sure, not all of those
are of the same levels of effectiveness, and some of the police
undoubtedly are of limited effectiveness. However, we do not
necessarily have to secure every part of Baghdad at once--this can be
done in stages--and will have to be done that way given the way the
forces are expected to flow into Iraq. Beyond that, tens of thousands
of ministry security forces and tens of thousands of civilian (often
third country) contracted guard forces protect key sites in Baghdad
(including, for example, the U.S. Embassy, MNSTC-I HQs, the Ministry of
Oil, etc.) that MNF-I and the Iraqi government would otherwise have to
detail soldiers or police to protect. These forces, again, number in
the tens of thousands--and although by no means all are of high
capability and some are undoubtedly compromised, they do secure
hundreds of sites that otherwise would require coalition or Iraqi
military or police forces. Thus, with the addition of all five U.S.
brigades under orders to reinforce Baghdad and the ISFs either in
Baghdad or headed to the city, there should be sufficient military
forces available to achieve our objective of securing Baghdad.
LENGTH OF IRAQI INSURGENCY
Question. General Casey has said that 20th century
counterinsurgency efforts typically lasted 9 years.
Do you believe the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq could last as
long as 9 years, or even longer?
Answer. I agree with General Casey that the counterinsurgency
campaign in Iraq will continue for some time, but its duration will
depend on a variety of factors that about which it is very difficult to
make judgments. What I am clear about, however, is that the Government
of Iraq must ultimately win this fight, with coalition forces in a
supporting role. Thus, while it is possible that the counterinsurgency
campaign in Iraq could, indeed, last 9 years or more, that should not
be taken to imply that U.S. forces would be involved in substantial
numbers for the duration of that period.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Question. With the expected increase of U.S. troop levels in Iraq
by over 20,000, do you believe there is sufficient combat service
support in place or will that have to be augmented as well?
Answer. Generally, BCTs have their own combat service support units
to sustain their soldiers and equipment; however, I am sure that one of
the tasks being undertaken by MNC-I in recent weeks has been
determination of requirements for any additional combat service support
elements above brigade level. This will be an area on which I will
focus following arrival in Iraq, if I am confirmed. Should additional
so-called enablers be needed, I will request them.
Question. If so, by how much?
Answer. MNF-I reports that it has a mature theater base in place
and does not anticipate a large requirement for augmentation of combat
service support capabilities.
Question. Do you see any problems with the extent of reliance of
U.S. forces in Iraq on contractor support?
Answer. No. The Army has always benefited from contracted non-
military support in one form or another, though that reliance has grown
substantially in recent years. Contractors allow the military a great
deal of flexibility to meet sustainment and life support requirements;
they also help with security in some cases. They must be well-
integrated, but over time MNF-I has developed mechanisms to ensure
synchronization of contractor support and military activities.
SUSTAINMENT
Question. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of
readiness, how long do you believe the increased troop levels and
operations tempo can be sustained?
Answer. My personal sense is that the Army is stretched and is
straining; however, the Army is making plans to sustain increased troop
levels should that be required. Nonetheless, the strain on the Active
and Reserve components is clear. Soldiers in some units are returning
to Iraq in a year or less, and that is obviously difficult for them and
their families, and it makes preparation of units challenging as well.
My own family is well-acquainted with this challenge, as my return to
Iraq, if confirmed, will be my fourth year-or-longer deployment since
2001. Reset of equipment is also a challenge--though additional funds
received recently should help the Army considerably to meet the demand,
though it is likely to take some time to ramp up the depots fully.
Having said that, as MNF-I commander, it would be beyond my brief to
determine the overall health of the Army and Marine Corps--though it
would be something about which I would be concerned. It would be my job
to determine the troops and resources required to accomplish the
mission in Iraq, and to inform the CENTCOM commander and Secretary of
Defense of those requirements. It is more appropriate for the Joint
Staff and the Services to determine how long we can sustain a surge. I
am encouraged, however, by Secretary of Defense Gates' announcement
that the end strength of our Army and Marine Corps will be increased.
Clearly, the conflict in Iraq has been hard on our ground forces, and I
support the Secretary's efforts to ensure we have the forces needed we
need for what are frequently very people-intensive operations.
STATE OF TRAINING AND EQUIPPING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
Question. What is your understanding of the state of training and
equipping of ISFs?
Answer. My understanding is that, with some exceptions, the Iraqi
Objective Counterinsurgency (COIN) Force and Iraqi Objective Civil
Security Force (totaling approximately 325,000 personnel) were issued
100 percent of their pacing items of equipment (i.e. their most
important items) and that 100 percent of their personnel were trained.
The exceptions are for the remaining portions of the Navy and the Air
Force and approximately 2,000 support troops, all of which have
significantly longer training timelines and specialized training
requirements. The Objective COIN Force units do, however, face
challenges in sufficient fill of leaders, who take a long time to
develop, and in development of higher-level staff skills and
intelligence elements, which also take time to develop. The Iraqi
government is addressing these shortfalls through a combination of
former commissioned and noncommissioned officer (NCO) recalls and
prospective policies to accelerate promotion to corporal and sergeant
for recruits with requisite levels of civilian education. The ISFs have
also experienced attrition due to combat losses and absences over the
last 18 months. To address this attrition, MNSTC-I and the Iraqi
government are generating some 30,000 replacements, 18,000 of which
will address the attrition that has occurred over the last year and
half, and another 12,000 to bring these units to 110 percent to address
the effects of Iraqi leave policies and to provide some personnel
flexibility to unit commanders. Over 6,500 of these soldiers have
graduated and joined the force and the second cycle of almost 8,000
will graduate shortly.
Question. What concerns do you have about the ability of those
units to participate in the implementation of the new Baghdad security
plan?
Answer. Iraqi units, at all levels, continue to perform well when
partnered with coalition forces. An immature logistics system, a
shortage of mid-grade leadership, and the ultimate loyalty of select
units/leaders remain my primary concerns. These concerns are currently
being addressed through continued development of the ISF logistical
structure, coalition force emergency logistical support, partner
relationships between Iraqi and coalition force units (which are being
strengthened), embedding of Transition (Advisor) Teams in Iraqi units
down to at least the battalion level, and a variety of actions to
foster loyalty and professionalism like a soldier's creed, oaths of
office, a Center for Ethics and Leadership, the Iraqi Military Academy,
the Staff Colleges, and so on.
FORCE PROTECTION
Question. The new Baghdad security plan apparently envisions
American units being colocated with Iraqi units spread out over
approximately 30 mini-bases throughout Baghdad.
In general, how could you, as Commander, MNF-I, accommodate and
protect those forces and the forces which would have to resupply them
on a daily basis?
Answer. As explained to me, under the Baghdad Security Plan,
coalition forces will establish Joint Security Stations (JSSs) with the
Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi National Police. The stations
will be strategically positioned throughout the city to accommodate
dispersed, joint patrols, and to provide CENTCOM and control hubs that
ultimately feed back into the Baghdad Security Command. The
establishment of JSSs will include enhancing force protection and
developing essential sustainment and life support. Many of the JSSs are
located at existing Iraqi Police Stations, but will require
vulnerability assessments prior to occupation by coalition forces.
Based on these assessments the necessary force protection enhancements
will be completed to mitigate the risks of attack. Force protection
enhancements will include improvements such as entry control points,
external barriers to redirect traffic flows and/or reinforce
perimeters, increased protection from indirect fires, and guard posts/
towers where required. Additionally, robust Quick Reaction Forces, as
well as redundant and secure communications with parent Forward
Operating Bases and with coalition patrols operating in the area, will
enhance the force protection posture of each JSS.
Sustainment of our forces will be just as critical as their
protection. Coalition forces patrolling from JSSs will have adequate
levels of food, fuel, water, medical supplies, and ammunition on hand
to preserve their combat capability. The JSSs will be resupplied as the
forces rotate into and out of the primary Forward Operating Bases
(FBOs), rather than through daily resupply convoys. Essentially, the
forces operating out of a JSS will be self-sustaining for their period
of operations, with replacements arriving with their own requisite
supplies as forces rotate. The basic, enduring life support packages at
each JSS might include tents, generators, and environmental control
units which will be positioned within the site's perimeter.
Question. What is your understanding of whether the security plan
requires the contracting of additional U.S. bases and facilities?
Answer. Current planning does not anticipate the requirement to
reopen previously transferred FOBs or the creation of new ones. MNF-I
is using space on existing FOBs that have the capacity for the first
three reinforcing BCTs, with basing requirements for the remaining two
currently under development.
MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS
Question. Do you believe that the size, structure, number, and
operating procedures for U.S. Military and Police Transition Teams
embedded with ISFs need to be changed in any way?
Answer. Yes. There is unquestionable linkage between ISF
progression and the embedded transition team program. Despite the
success achieved by the embedding of transition teams, the current
Military Transition Team (MTT) size is insufficient to meet all
operational requirements and permit an optimum level of support. The
commander of MNC-I has initiated a plan to enhance MTTs to increase
their effectiveness. Based on conditions within each multinational
division (MND) area of responsibility, primarily relating to levels of
violence and ISF capacity for independent operations, MTTs are being
augmented by assets controlled by the respective MND Commanders. U.S.
BCTs are the primary resource providers for these enhancements.
Enhanced MTTs have the ability to advise ISF units down to company
level.
The current size, structure, and number of Police Transition Teams
(PTT) is appropriate for the missions they are assigned. There are
three different types of PTTs: station, district, and provincial. The
nucleus of all PTTs is a military police squad with additional U.S.
Army personnel added at the district and provincial level. Because of
the mission and scope of responsibility of an Iraqi Police provincial
directorate, the typical PTT working at that level is larger and
includes additional military and civilian members who possess other
specialties and expertise such as operations, personnel, logistics, and
maintenance management. The other two key and essential components of
all PTTs are interpreters and International Police Liaison Officers
(IPLOs). Multinational Corps-Iraq is currently providing PTTs at a
ratio of one for every three police stations, one for every two police
districts, and one for every one provincial police directorate. The
current operating procedures have resulted in clear visibility on the
effectiveness and capabilities of Iraqi Police, from station through
provincial level, and helped improve the Iraqi Police ability to
conduct basic law and order missions. Upon arrival in Iraq, if
confirmed, I will assess this again to see if augmentation is required.
Question. What do you recommend?
Answer. Throughout Iraq, the enhancement of the baseline MTTs will
continue based on an assessment of the security situation in each MND
area of responsibility. The estimate provided to me by the MNF-I staff
is that it will take 6-12 months to move to enhanced MTTs throughout
Iraq. Continuing and expanding the transition team program over time
will energize ISF progression and eventually facilitate a change in
relationship as the embedded transition teams move more toward the
advising role and less toward mentoring or even, to a degree, leading.
The current ratio of PTTs at the station, district, and provincial
levels is adequate, but we also need to relocate some PTTs from
provinces that have moved to Provincial Iraqi Control to provinces that
have not achieved Provincial Iraqi Control. IPLOs and interpreters are
absolutely essential to successful PTT operations. MNC-I continues to
have difficulty recruiting and fielding new interpreters; additional
emphasis and incentives need to be established to retain the qualified
interpreters we currently employ. Additionally, if the IPLO program is
ended too soon, the lack of this law enforcement expertise and
experience would have a significant and adverse impact. A
recommendation for making the IPLO program even better is to recruit
law enforcement experts from other Middle Eastern nations (such as
Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc.) into the program.
Question. What is your understanding of how the Army and Marine
Corps are ensuring that U.S. troops are properly trained for this duty,
to include dissemination of ``lessons learned'' to incoming teams?
Answer. Only qualified officers and NCOs are chosen to fill these
critical positions, based upon their grade, skill, and experience
match, balanced with dwell time. To facilitate and synchronize this
effort, Army, Air Force, and Navy ``external'' transition team training
was consolidated and is now conducted at Fort Riley, Kansas by the 1st
Infantry Division. The two-star commander there, his staff, and a BCT
now execute the full spectrum of tasks required to man, train, and
equip external transition teams. The Marines are running a similar
program at Twentynine Palms, CA. Transition team training is based on
seven core competencies--combat skills, force protection, team support
processes, technical and tactical training, advisor skills,
counterinsurgency operations, and understanding the culture (which
alone encompasses about 50 hours of training to empower the teams'
abilities to forge a positive relationship with their Iraqi
counterpart). The lessons learned process is critical and is integrated
before, during, and after a team embeds with an ISF unit. Throughout
training, team members are in communication with the team they will
replace so they may exchange information, pass back these lessons, and
learn about their Iraqi unit prior to deployment. Additionally,
programs like Fort Riley (60 days), Camp Buehring (Kuwait, 6 days), and
the Phoenix Academy (Taji, Iraq, 8 days) undergo continuous review so
that the training can remain relevant by adapting the training model as
necessary based on input from the field and changing conditions in
theater. Once in theater, teams execute a 60-day assessment of the
training they received in preparation for their assignment as advisors,
complete a formal end of tour assessment to codify lessons learned, and
an assessment of the transition between their team and the follow-on
team. The Iraq Assistance Group (IAG) has also compiled transition team
lessons learned on the IAG website for all transition teams to utilize.
The Combat Studies Institute and Center for Army Lessons Learned have
captured lessons on transition team operations and techniques and
published them as well.
The Military Police Brigade fully sources the PTTs and provides
RSOI, implementation, execution, and mission oversight of the PTT
Program. The brigade brings a cohesive and organic element to training,
resourcing, and equipping PTTs which are actually military police
squads already trained for law enforcement skills. These MP units are
trained at home station to perform this mission. These teams are
embedded with IPLOs who are trained, hired, and managed by the State
Department. Host nation police building and training is a doctrinal
military police mission. Experiences and lessons learned at Panama,
Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo all contribute to continued mission
development and application. Lessons learned and up-to-date TTPs are
disseminated back to the deploying units through direct contact with
units on the ground, Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS), Mission
Readiness Exercise (MRX), and then Relief-In-Place (RIP) Program during
which the MP Brigade conducts a PTT certification. Additionally,
lessons learned are disseminated through the Center for Army Lessons
Learned Website, Senior Leader forums (many virtual), the Battle
Command Training Program COIN Seminars, combat training center mission
rehearsal exercises, the Joint Center for International Security Force
Assistance, and doctrine development efforts.
Question. If confirmed, what would you recommend in this regard?
Answer. First, it is necessary to retain the core transition team
and ensure it continues to receive the best possible training in
preparation for its mission of mentoring and advising the ISF unit.
This core structure is the expertise upon which additional enhancement
is placed. They are the subject matter experts within the transition
team. Second, as conditions on the ground permit, I would expedite the
enhancement of transition teams to capitalize on their contributions
toward ISF development. This must be done in a manner that also
balances other operational requirements, which will lessen as the
levels of violence become more manageable for the ISF. Furthermore,
leaders should direct the widest dissemination of lessons learned by
our teams. The team in training as well as any team in theater must be
alerted to newly developed tactics, techniques, and procedures that are
proving successful in application. This is done through the Center for
Army Lessons Learned, the Combat Studies Institute, and the Joint
Center for International Security Force Assistance at Fort Leavenworth,
among other agencies.
DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS
Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
2006 memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention?
Answer. Yes. The standards outlined in Common Article 3 should be
the standard for U.S. and coalition forces to adhere to in regards to
the handling of detainees at all levels. In fact, as I noted in
responding to one of the earlier questions, after an early case of
detainee mistreatment, I directed that detainees in the 101st Airborne
Division area of responsibility would be handled in accordance with the
Geneva Convention, as those were the standards our soldiers understood.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes. I believe having one interrogation standard outlined
in one document adds clarity. The new FM clearly articulates what is
and what is not authorized and effectively identifies methods to ensure
accountability.
Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that
standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of
reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that
the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact
on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are
treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes.
Question. You oversaw the issuance of a new Army doctrine on
counterinsurgency operations. Do you believe it is consistent with
effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully
with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention?
Answer. Yes. We can conduct effective interrogation and detention
in wartime in a counterinsurgency environment and comply with the
requirements outlined in Common Article 3; in fact, we had
international human rights organizations participate in the COIN
Seminar we hosted to discuss a very early draft of the manual. That
conference, in fact, was co-hosted by Harvard's Carr Center for Human
Rights.
IRAQ STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
Question. What is your understanding of the status of Department of
Defense efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to
increase employment in Iraq?
Answer. When the Task Force to Improve Business and Stability
Operations-Iraq (TF BSO) arrived in Iraq, it expected to find a Soviet-
style, aging State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) industrial base that was
grossly uncompetitive. First-hand evaluations, however, reveal that
some of these factories possess modern--even automated--equipment, and
are capable of producing materials and manufactured goods that would be
competitive in both Iraqi and world markets. Some facilities have
deteriorated or suffered from a lack of recapitalization, and require
varying amounts of refurbishment. Other SOEs are simply obsolete,
either because they produce materials or finished goods for which there
is little or no demand, or because they require cost-prohibitive
investment prior to restarting operations. SOEs traditionally employ
large numbers of Iraqis. Their closure still requires that the
Government of Iraq address manpower costs, principally through
retraining programs and job placement assistance. TF BSO is not
advocating U.S. Government investment in Iraqi factories, and is
committed to the long-term policy of economic privatization.
Beyond this, having helped Iraqi industries reestablish cement
plants, small refineries, and asphalt plants, among others, while
commanding the 101st Airborne Division, my view is that there are
numerous industries that could be reestablished--ideally with Iraqi
funds--and could be self-sustaining, as they enjoy a comparative
advantage in some factor of production (e.g., Iraq has vast sulfur
reserves, reportedly the largest in the world, which would be used to
refine high-grade sulfur for industrial purposes and production of
fertilizer; Iraq also has large deposits of ``sour crude'' that are
ideal for asphalt production). I strongly support encouraging such
initiatives.
Question. If so, what is your view of these efforts?
Answer. I strongly support the efforts of this task force. TF BSO
is assessing Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM) SOEs as well as
private factories. MIM is responsible for approximately 56 of the 190
or so SOEs nationwide. These 56 SOEs have approximately 200 factories.
Within the 56 MIM SOEs, TF BSO has assessed 25 of these and is working
closely with Deputy Prime Minister Salih and the MIM to revitalize the
existing Iraqi industry base. Where competitive industrial capacity
exists, TF BSO and DOD will do everything they can to support the
ministries, the factories, and provincial leadership to restart
operations, re-employing as many current workers as circumstances
permit. Several of the SOEs visited are in relatively good shape and
can be restarted with minimal investment in power restoration. Initial
efforts identified 10 large factories, from Baghdad through Al Anbar
Province, where $6 million provided by the Iraqi government can restart
operations and reemploy 11,000 workers. The products that these
facilities generate will help to meet local and DOD demands, and have
the potential to serve broader U.S. and global markets.
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction
(SIGIR) conducts comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations
which are valuable to Congress.
If confirmed, what steps would you take to support the audits,
inspections, and investigations conducted by the SIGIR?
Question. The SIGIR reports provide valuable insight to the Force
Commander, the Ambassador, and officials in Washington. I supported the
activities of the SIGIR as MNSTC-I Commander and, if confirmed, I will
support them as the commander of MNF-I. I should note that I also
supported the activities of the Government Accountability Office during
my time in Iraq and following return to the U.S., and I also invited
the Army Audit Agency to audit activities of the 101st Airborne and
MNSTC-I on two or three occasions while I was in Iraq.
MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS IN THEATER
Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made
three separate assessments over the past several years detailing the
immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S.
soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT III, found that
multiple deployers reported experiencing higher levels of acute stress,
and that overall levels of combat stressors are increasing. These types
of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of troops
are returning from duty in Iraq with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD), depression, and other mental health issues.
What is your understanding of the key findings of the previous
mental health assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key
findings, and the effect of such actions?
Answer. The MHAT assessments looked at morale, mental health
staffing, access to mental health care, stress from multiple
deployments, and leadership issues. The general findings from the
studies showed that multiple deployments and longer deployments were by
far the leading factors that increased the incidence of mental health
issues. The studies recommended redistribution of mental health staff
to provide better coverage and the development of a suicide prevention
program within theater.
The MHAT 4 study completed in October 2006 showed that the staffing
was better, which improved access to mental health care for troops. In
August 2006, the MNF-I Surgeon published behavioral health guidelines,
which implemented recommendations from the MHAT III study. These
included the establishment of a multi-disciplinary Suicide Prevention
Committee, whose purpose is to address theater-specific issues related
to military member suicides.
In addition there is a mental health web site for commanders on the
MNF-I portal and there are mandatory pre- and post-deployment mental
health assessments and reassessments (3-6 months post deployment). MNF-
I has also created a working group consisting of G1 personnel, CID
agents, chaplains, surgeons, and mental health professionals that meets
not less than quarterly to assess the status of mental health in the
AOR.
Question. If confirmed, would you support continuous mental health
assessments of the U.S. forces in Iraq?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you have any views on how to best address the mental
health needs of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment?
Answer. As explained above, I believe we are doing a considerable
amount to support the mental health of the force in Iraq; having said
that, we must continue to re-examine whether we are doing all that we
can in this critical area. Iraq is a war zone and we can diminish but
not eliminate mental health problems. MNF-I has the assets and
capabilities to provide prevention measures and treatment throughout
Iraq, to include teams that periodically perform outreach at main bases
and remote sites to identify potential issues. If confirmed, I will
monitor this area closely.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, MNF-I?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
IRAN AND SYRIA
1. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, during the
President's address to the Nation, he asserted that succeeding in Iraq
also required defending its territorial integrity. He stated that Iran
was providing material support for attacks on our troops, that we will
interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria, and that we will
seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and
training to our enemies in Iraq. I am concerned about how this will be
done, and what potential it creates for a regional escalation. In
particular, I want to make sure we have adequately planned for
protecting our troops in the event of a regional escalation. I note
that the recent deployment of another carrier strike group to the
Persian Gulf area and the nomination of a Navy Admiral to head U.S.
Central Command which seems to indicate an expansion of military focus
beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. What do you believe is the potential for
our efforts to interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria to
cause an escalation to a regional conflict?
General Petraeus. One of our broad priorities in Iraq will include
countering the threats posed by Iranian and Syrian support to
extremists in Iraq, along with the continued mission of dismantling
terrorist networks in the country.
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) works closely with the developing
Iraqi border security forces to interdict the trafficking of foreign
fighters, weapons, explosives, and other contraband across the borders
of Iraq. I will work closely with the Ambassador as he and the
diplomatic community pursue actions to disrupt influence from external
sources, while simultaneously working to prevent potential escalation.
MNF-I continues to take measures to ensure our troops' protection
from all identified threats, and we are keeping a close eye on evolving
threats, both from within Iraq and from neighboring countries.
2. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, in your opinion,
does the lack of diplomatic engagement with Iran and Syria increase the
risk of an escalation?
General Petraeus. With respect, the conduct of diplomatic
engagement with Iran and Syria is beyond my purview, though I have
discussed ongoing and contemplated actions with various members of the
State Department, and I know that they are carefully weighing the pros
and cons of various initiatives.
3. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, have specific plans
been developed to protect our troops if it does escalate?
General Petraeus. As I noted earlier, we constantly assess how to
improve the force protection posture of our troops, while
simultaneously working to ensure mission accomplishment. We have
examined and continue to examine potential threats from all quarters,
including greater outside involvement in Iraq, and we take appropriate
measures in response--including constant upgrading of personal
protective equipment, addition of surveillance assets, improvements to
vehicular protection, improved weaponry, and so on.
NEW STRATEGY
4. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, it is my
understanding that you are one of the Army's leading authorities on
counterinsurgency. As such, I'm interested in your evaluation of the
new strategy for the surge. Specifically, would you suggest any
additional actions that were excluded from the new strategy (e.g., seek
additional troops or other forms of assistance from our allies,
coalition partners, or Iraq's neighboring nations)?
General Petraeus. The Army's new counterinsurgency manual makes
clear that security of the population must be the priority in a
situation like that in Iraq--and it will be our priority as we conduct
the surge. We must, together with our Iraqi partners, clear, control,
and retain the neighborhoods of Baghdad to break the cycle of violence
that is preventing political progress in Iraq. We can only do this by
establishing persistent presence--coalition, as well as Iraqi--in Iraqi
neighborhoods. I plan to ensure that a portion of our forces locate in
the neighborhoods they protect and that they carry out operations
closely linked with their Iraqi counterparts--with the Iraqis in the
lead whenever possible--to secure the population.
The enemies we face are adaptive and as requirements change, I will
request additional support (the accelerated arrival of the 3d Infantry
Division Headquarters is a result of this), if needed, and clearly
outline the various risks to our strategy. We will also work closely
with our interagency, coalition, and Iraqi partners to set the
conditions for success in Iraq.
5. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, would you suggest
improvements to any of the tactics that are included in the new
strategy?
General Petraeus. I am pleased with the changes our military is
making in training, manning, and equipping the force to fight this kind
of conflict. Two big changes are being asked of our forces under this
new strategy--the expanded use of enhanced and embedded transition
teams and the renewed emphasis on positioning forces in the
neighborhoods among the people. Our military has done a good job with
the collection and dissemination of lessons learned and the practice of
the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures in our training centers
as troops prepare to deploy. Our troops and leaders are prepared for
the implementation of the new strategy, though we undoubtedly will
continue to learn as we carry out the new operations--and we plan to
share lessons throughout the force as we do.
6. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, you recently were
interviewed by Spiegel magazine, a German periodical. During the
interview, you stated that much of counterinsurgency operations is
counter-intuitive. You further called counterinsurgency operations
``war at the graduate level'' and ``thinking man's warfare.'' You also
said that we want our young officers to think, not memorize, because
they cannot kill their way out of an insurgency. You indicated that you
have to take out the elements that will never reconcile with the new
government, or with the system, but then try to win over the rest of
the population. This part is not done with tanks and rifles. How well-
trained are the junior officers and troops in the counterinsurgency
doctrine?
General Petraeus. Over the past 15 months, I have been privileged
to oversee the organizations that educate our Army's leaders, draft our
doctrine, capture lessons learned, and help our units prepare for
deployment.
Our small unit leaders are increasingly well-trained for
counterinsurgency warfare. The Army and Marine Corps' professional
military educational institutions have institutionalized the new
counterinsurgency doctrine recently published in Field Manual 3-24
(that process began well before the manual was finally published, based
on articles and lessons learned). Furthermore, our combat training
centers now focus on counterinsurgency operations during unit mission
rehearsal exercises. Leaders are further honed by counterinsurgency
seminars and training conducted in the United States, Kuwait, and at
the Taji Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence in Iraq. This training
has made our junior leaders and soldiers better prepared for
counterinsurgency warfare and more adaptive to the situations they will
face in Iraq. Learning continues, however, and the Center for Army
Lessons Learned, Asymmetric Warfare Group, and other elements
facilitate the collection and distribution of lessons that we continue
to capture.
7. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, how prepared are
they to implement the President's new strategy for the surge?
General Petraeus. Our officers and troops are well-trained, well-
equipped, and ready for the tactics asked of them in this new
strategy--though it will represent a change in operating style for some
units, and we will continue to learn new lessons as we carry out the
surge.
8. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, how well-trained are
the Iraqi security forces (ISFs) in counterinsurgency doctrine?
General Petraeus. The ISFs have made solid gains in professionalism
and capability over the past 3 years, though they still have a long way
to go in certain elements. They are especially effective when operating
in concert with coalition forces at population security. The Iraqi
units obviously have greater cultural awareness and linguistic
capabilities, while U.S. forces bring greater military capabilities to
the battlefield.
9. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, given that the new
strategy for the surge is heavily reliant on the Iraqis leading the
security efforts, how can we be sure that they have correctly
identified ``the elements that will never reconcile with the new
government'' and will not just be utilizing their position to eliminate
dissenters?
General Petraeus. In fact, there is work to be done in this area,
and I have discussed it with the Prime Minister and the Ministers of
Defense and Interior. Actions have already been taken against a number
of leaders and units shown to be using their positions for sectarian
purposes, and more will be taken--increasingly by Iraqi officials and
elements. While we are generally encouraged by the slow growth in
professionalism of the ISFs, we believe that a very robust partnering
of coalition forces with the Iraqi Army and National Police elements
will prevent any such sectarian bias in their application of force as
we help the Iraqi government identify elements and leaders who need to
be removed and, in some cases, brought to justice.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nelson
PRESIDENT'S NEW PLAN
10. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, obviously, a
drop in violence is a benchmark, but that can be temporary as we have
seen in Iraq. What should policymakers specifically be looking to see
on the ground in Baghdad over the next 6 months with the President's
new plan?
General Petraeus. A reduction in violence as part of improving
security for the people clearly is the top indicator. Over time, that
is one that must be seen. But it will take time. We may or may not see
a significant drop in violence at the beginning of the operation, but
the key is the long-term improvement of security, public confidence,
basic services, economic development, and government capacity. We will
not eliminate violence from the streets of Baghdad on our watch, but we
must help the Iraqis reduce the level of violence, intimidation of the
populations of various neighborhoods, and so on. I believe that over a
period of months there will be a reduction of violence, although it
will be uneven and will differ from area to area. This achievement is
nonetheless critical to allowing the other elements of national power
to come to bear on the problem in Baghdad and Iraq as a whole, and for
Iraq to resolve the political issues that are the true solution to its
long-term problems.
11. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, how long will
it be before the committee can be notified of the results of the plan?
General Petraeus. It will take several months at the least. That
allows for the time for the additional forces to flow to Iraq, time for
them to gain an understanding of the areas in which they will operate,
time to plan with and get to know their Iraqi partners, time to set
conditions for the successful conduct of security operations, and, of
course, time to conduct those operations and then to build on what they
achieve. Success, again, will occur over a period of months, not weeks
or days.
None of this, in fact, will be rapid. The way ahead will be neither
quick nor easy, and there undoubtedly will be tough days. We face a
determined, adaptable, and barbaric enemy. MNF-I will work closely with
our Iraqi ISF partners to secure the population and help to facilitate
the enhancement of quality of life for the citizens, and I do believe
we can do that. I will provide periodic updates when requested.
12. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, if the plan is
tried, attempted, and is not successful, will you come back to Congress
and explain what happened and why?
General Petraeus. I will provide you with forthright, professional
military advice with respect to the missions given to MNF-I and the
situation on the ground in Iraq. Should I determine that new strategy
cannot succeed, I will provide such an assessment.
MILITIAS
13. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, in my opinion,
Iraq will not long survive as a nation with armed militias roaming the
streets of Baghdad. We know the profound impact armed militias have had
in Israel and Lebanon. I am, to say the least, skeptical about the
Prime Minister's desire to take on Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi army. Does
Prime Minister Maliki have the will to engage Shia militias?
General Petraeus. I have already begun, together with the
Ambassador, developing a relationship with Prime Minister Maliki. My
early impression is that he is genuinely concerned with the future of
Iraq and not just the interests of his sect or political coalition. He
does appear to want to be Prime Minister for all Iraqis and has taken
steps that confirm this. That is critical, as the Iraqi government
dealing fairly with all sects and ethnic groups is critical for long-
term political and military success. I will work closely with the Prime
Minister and his commanders to help them enforce the law and secure the
population. Prime Minister Maliki has already taken steps in this
direction by ensuring that there are no safe havens in Iraq, and
insurgents, terrorists, and criminals will be dealt with in accordance
with the law regardless of sect or ethnicity.
14. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, if a decision
is made not to engage Sadr at this time, what could that mean when
American forces leave?
General Petraeus. I will work with the Iraqi government to engage
all organizations within Iraqi society who are genuinely amenable to
political negotiation and accommodation. A lasting peace can only be
secured by the creation of a political compact that encompasses all
parties willing to join such an enterprise. Those organizations that
refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the government of Iraq will be
neutralized to the extent that they will be unable to interfere with
the governance of the country.
15. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, is it a good
idea to leave an armed militia in Iraq's capital?
General Petraeus. No. We want to see an Iraq in which the
government, through its established and regulated police and army,
maintains a monopoly on the possession and use of organized armed
force.
16. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, could you see
a scenario where the military and al-Sadr's militia work together to
further cleanse Baghdad of their Sunni presence?
General Petraeus. That is obviously one of the scenarios the surge
is intended to prevent.
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
17. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, in your
estimation, how many troops do ISFs have that are trained and capable
of undertaking the President's new plan?
General Petraeus. Iraqi Army, Police, and Special Operations
Forces, together with the U.S. forces currently on the ground or
deploying to Baghdad (and this is Baghdad-centric) in the months ahead,
will total some 85,000--though, to be sure, not all of those are of the
same levels of effectiveness. I have emphasized to the Iraqi government
the necessity of ensuring that these forces deploy at 100 percent
strength, and the Ministry of Defense is taking action to ensure that
this happens. It did not, with some of the earlier deployers. With the
addition of all five U.S. brigades under orders to reinforce Baghdad
and the ISFs either in Baghdad or headed to the city, there should be
sufficient military forces available to achieve our objective of
securing Baghdad, which will improve security and set the conditions
for U.S. Government and Iraqi government advances in the decisive areas
of governance, economic development, and Rule of Law.
18. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, what
confidence do you have in the capacity of these troops to both
``clear'' and ``hold''?
General Petraeus. I believe this plan can succeed. We have to
change the longstanding paradigm of clearing a neighborhood and then
moving on in favor of a constant and active presence among the people.
This will be a change for both coalition and Iraqi forces, but I am
confident that they will adapt and perform admirably.
The ISFs have received reasonable training and they've received
reasonable equipping. Leadership on the ground with the soldiers and
policemen will make the difference and we are seeing an increase in the
professionalism, confidence, and capability of Iraqi leaders.
19. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, do you believe
the Iraqis have accepted this plan as their own and not simply an
American plan?
General Petraeus. Yes.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Webb
ACCOUNTABILITY
20. Senator Webb. Lieutenant General Petraeus, you have stated that
``money is ammunition'' in Iraq; do you agree that immediate, full
accountability is essential for money already appropriated and spent?
General Petraeus. Depending on the situation, money can be more
important than ammunition in the counterinsurgency fight. Once money is
available, the challenge is to spend it effectively and quickly to
rapidly achieve measurable results. Money needs to be provided as soon
as possible to the organizations that have the capability and capacity
to spend it in such a manner. At the same time, the American public
rightfully deserves to know that its funds are spent carefully and
transparently. I believe that we have the processes in place to use
money for its intended purposes without compromising the trust and
confidence of the United States taxpayer. In the past, I personally
requested assistance from teams of auditors from the Army Audit Agency.
I also supported the activities of the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Department of Defense Inspector General
(DOD IG), and Government Accountability Office (GAO), and overseen
corrective measures when areas needing improvement have been
identified. I met with the SIGIR and DOD IG in Washington, in fact, and
pledged continued support to them.
21. Senator Webb. Lieutenant General Petraeus, if so, how will you
assist this committee in providing such accountability and in assuring
transparency in ongoing projects?
General Petraeus. We have fiscal oversight processes in place now
in MNF-I. For example, the SIGIR reports provide valuable insight to
the Force Commander, the Ambassador, and officials in Washington.
Again, I supported the activities of the SIGIR as Multnational Security
Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Commander and I will support them as
the Commander of MNF-I. I should note that I also supported the
activities of the GAO during my time in Iraq and following return to
the U.S., and I also invited the Army Audit Agency to audit activities
of the 101st Airborne and MNSTC-I on two or three occasions while I was
in Iraq. It is important that Congress and the American people have
confidence that we are diligently expending funds allocated to us.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole
COOPERATION
22. Senator Dole. Lieutenant General Petraeus, one of your
predecessors, LTG Peter Chiarelli, has stressed the need for unity of
command. Would you explain your views on the issue, first at it relates
to the need for greater cooperation between the U.S. Ambassador and the
Commander of the MNF-Is, than was the case with your predecessors, and
then link those thoughts with the need for greater unity of effort both
between U.S. organizations, primarily DOD and the State Department, and
then with the Iraqi government.
General Petraeus. Only through unity of effort of all--coalition
and Iraqi, military and civilian--can we bring the full weight of our
effort to bear on the difficult situation in Iraq. You have my
commitment that I will work closely with the Ambassador to fully
coordinate our actions in Iraq. Only through the full application of
all elements of national power, through the various agencies, will we
have the chance to achieve success.
Our military is making an enormous commitment in Iraq. The
integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has
been a success. Our military forces are more interoperable today than
they ever have been in our Nation's history. This achievement is
impressive. Over time, we need the rest of the departments to do
likewise, to help the Iraqi government get the country and its citizens
working, and to use Iraq's substantial oil revenues for the benefit of
all the Iraqi people.
The next step is to ensure the ability of the military and civilian
departments to work closely together. Counterinsurgency warfare
requires a total commitment of the government--both military and
civilian agencies--and unity of effort is crucial to success.
Integration of the interagency effort to ensure that progress is made
along all lines-of-operation--not just security, but economic,
governance, and the rule of law as well--is a significant challenge. I
applaud the recent efforts to embed the Provincial Reconstruction Teams
in the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) headquarters for those provinces in
which BCTs are the senior headquarters, or in the division headquarters
in areas where they are the senior headquarters in a province. This
will provide a synergy that will significantly enhance our ability to
conduct stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq.
I will do all that I can, in partnership with the Ambassador, to
ensure that our interagency is doing all possible to help develop
capacity in the Iraqi government and to enable it to come to grips with
the tough issues it must resolve.
SUNNI/SHIITE RELATIONS
23. Senator Dole. Lieutenant General Petraeus, do you agree with
the testimony of General Keane, U.S. Army (Retired), on January 25 that
the catalyst that drives sectarian violence in Iraq is Sunni violence
against the Shiite population?
General Petraeus. This is a very complicated situation. Sunni
violence against Shia is just one aspect of violence in Iraq. There is
also the continuing al Qaeda terrorism. Shia violence against Sunnis
plays a part, as does Shia on Shia violence. Organized criminal
violence is also an unsettling factor. To place full responsibility on
the Sunnis misrepresents the complex threat environment in Iraq, though
some of the catalysts for sectarian violence (such as the Samarra
mosque bombing) were earned out by Sunni extremists.
24. Senator Dole. Lieutenant General Petraeus, what is your plan
for the deployment of forces across targeted neighborhoods in Baghdad
so as to avoid, to the fullest extent possible, any appearance of bias
toward either Sunnis or Shiites?
General Petraeus. ISFs will be assigned areas of operations
throughout Baghdad without regard to sectarian composition of the
units. Brigades of the 6th and 9th Iraqi Divisions, each of which have
a mix of Shia and Sunni personnel (though predominantly Shia in their
makeup) will be employed in all nine administrative districts of the
city. It is true that some districts in the city are predominantly
Shia, while others are predominantly Sunni. However, U.S. Army
battalions will be partnered with these Iraqi brigades to reinforce the
practice that all security forces operate in a professional,
disciplined, and ethical manner, and in accordance with the rule of
law, international humanitarian norms, and recognized international
standards for enforcement and protection of human rights.
It is important to ensure no particular sect feels persecuted by
the deployment of any ISF in their neighborhood. The partnering of a
U.S. battalion with each ISF brigade will ensure that sectarian
divisions and mistrust are kept to a minimum.
______
[The nomination reference of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 16, 2007.
Ordered, that the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be General.
LTG David H. Petraeus, 1960.
______
[The biographical sketch of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Resume of Service Career of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA
Source of commissioned service: USMA.
Military schools attended:
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses,
Armor Officer Advanced Course,
United States Army Command and General Staff College,
Senior Service College Fellowship--Georgetown University.
Educational degrees:
United States Military Academy--BS--No Major.
Princeton University--MPA--International Relations.
Princeton University--PHD--International Relations.
Foreign language(s): None recorded.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates of appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT....................................... 5 Jun 74
1LT....................................... 5 Jun 76
CPT....................................... 8 Aug 78
MAJ....................................... 1 Aug 85
LTC....................................... 1 Apr 91
COL....................................... 1 Sep 95
BG........................................ 1 Jan 00
MG........................................ 1 Jan 03
LTG....................................... 18 May 04
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
May 75.......................... Jan 79............ Platoon Leader, C
Company, later S-
4 (Logistics),
later S-1
(Personnel),
509th Airborne
Battalion Combat
Team, Vicenza,
Italy.
Jan 79.......................... Jul 79 Assistant S-3
(Operations), 2d
Brigade, 24th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA.
Jul 79 May 81............ Commander, A
Company, later S-
3 (Operations),
2d Battalion,
19th Infantry,
24th Infantry
Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA.
May 81.......................... May 82............ Aide-de-Camp to
the Division
Commander, 24th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Stewart, GA.
May 82.......................... Jun 83............ Student, Command
and General Staff
Officer Course,
Fort Leavenworth,
KS.
Jun 83.......................... Jun 85............ Student, Princeton
University,
Princeton, NJ.
Jul 85 Jun 87............ Instructor, later
Assistant
Professor,
Department of
Social Sciences,
United States
Military Academy,
West Point, NY.
Jun 87.......................... Jun 88............ Military Assistant
to the Supreme
Allied Commander
Europe, Supreme
Headquarters,
Allied Powers
Europe, Belgium.
Jun 88.......................... Aug 89............ S-3 (Operations),
2d Battalion,
30th Infantry,
later 1st
Brigade, 3d
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
United States
Army Europe,
Germany.
Aug 89.......................... Aug 91............ Aide/Assistant
Executive Officer
to the Chief of
Staff, United
States Army,
Washington, DC.
Aug 91.......................... Jul 93 Commander, 3d
Battalion, 187th
Infantry, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault),
Fort Campbell,
KY.
Jul 93 Jul 94 G-3 (Operations)/
Director of
Plans, Training,
and Mobilization,
101st Airborne
Division (Air
Assault), Fort
Campbell, KY.
Aug 94.......................... Jan 95............ Senior Service
College Fellow,
Georgetown
University,
Washington, DC.
Jan 95.......................... Jun 95............ Chief Operations
Officer, U.N.
Mission in Haiti,
Operation Uphold
Democracy, Haiti.
Jun 95.......................... Jun 97............ Commander, 1st
Brigade, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Jun 97.......................... Sep 97............ Executive
Assistant to the
Director of the
Joint Staff, The
Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Oct 97.......................... Aug 99............ Executive
Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
Office of the
Joint Chiefs of
Staff,
Washington, DC.
Aug 99.......................... Jul 00 Assistant Division
Commander
(Operations), 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, North
Carolina and
Commanding
General, Combined
Joint Task Force-
Kuwait, Operation
Desert Spring,
Kuwait.
Jul 00 Aug 00............ Acting Commanding
General, 82d
Airborne
Division, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Aug 00.......................... Jun 01............ Chief of Staff,
XVIII Airborne
Corps, Fort
Bragg, NC.
Jun 01.......................... Jun 02............ Assistant Chief of
Staff for
Operations, SFOR
and Deputy
Commander, United
States Joint
Interagency
Counterterrorism
Task Force,
Operation Joint
Forge, Sarajevo,
Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Jul 02 May 04............ Commanding
General, 101st
Airborne Division
(Air Assault) and
Fort Campbell,
Fort Campbell,
KY, and Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
May 04.......................... Sep 05............ Commander,
Multinational
Security
Transition
Command-Iraq/
Commander, NATO
Training Mission-
Iraq, Operation
Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Assistant to the Supreme Jun 87-Jun 88 Major
Allied Commander Europe, Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Powers
Europe, Belgium (Cumulative
Joint Credit).
Chief Operations Officer, U.N. Jan 95-Jun 95 Lieutenant Colonel
Mission in Haiti, Operation
Uphold Democracy, Haiti (No
Joint Credit).
Executive Assistant to the Jun 97-Aug 99 Colonel
Director, The Joint Staff, later
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC.
Commanding General, Combined Aug 99-Sep 99 Colonel
Joint Task Force-Kuwait,
Operation Desert Spring, Kuwait
(No Joint Credit).
Assistant Chief of Staff for Jun 01-Jun 02 Brigadier General
Operations, SFOR and Deputy
Commander, United States Joint
Interagency Counter-Terrorism
Task Force, Operation Joint
Forge, Sarajevo, Bosnia-
Herzegovina (No joint credit).
Commander, Multinational Security May 04-Sep 05 Lieutenant General
Transition Command-Iraq/
Commander, NATO Training Mission-
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal with ``V'' Device
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Achievement Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Combat Action Badge
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Air Assault Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG David H.
Petraeus, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
David H. Petraeus.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom.
3. Date of nomination:
16 Jan. 2007.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
7 November 1952; Cornwall on Hudson, New York.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Hollister Knowlton Petraeus.
7. Names and ages of children:
Anne, 24; Stephen, 20.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Council on Foreign Relations.
Association of the United States Army.
Association of Graduates, United States Military Academy.
82d Airborne Division Assosciation.
101st Airborne Division Association.
504th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.
Static Line Association.
555th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.
187th Infantry Regiment Association.
SHAPE Alumni Association.
7th Armored Division Association.
Princeton Alumni Association.
United States Parachute Association.
Command and General Staff Foundation.
11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
David H. Petraeus.
This 16th day of January, 2007.
[The nomination of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on January 24, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on January 26, 2007.]
NOMINATION OF ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Webb,
McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins,
Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; and Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel, Evelyn
N. Farkas, professional staff member; Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine,
general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J.
Noblet, research assistant; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member;
Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer,
professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member;
Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer,
professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff
member; and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins and Fletcher L.
Cork.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Darcie Tokioka, assistant to Senator Akaka; Caroline Tess,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Benjamin Rinaker, assistant
to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator
Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Gordon I.
Peterson and Michael L. Sozan, assistants to Senator Webb;
Nichole M. Distefano, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Vince
Piperni and Jeremy Shull, assistants to Senator Inhofe, Mark J.
Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to
Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Stuart
C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh,
assistant to Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Today, we welcome Admiral William J. Fallon, USN, the
President's nominee for Commander, U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM). Admiral Fallon has distinguished himself in service
to our country for over 39 years in a number of challenging and
important assignments, including 24 years in naval aviation,
logging over 4,800 flight hours, and then a succession of staff
and command positions, culminating as the current Commander,
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).
We're particularly grateful for Admiral Fallon's
willingness to take on another, and probably the most
challenging assignment of all as the CENTCOM Commander,
following in the footsteps of General John Abizaid. One of the
critical attributes that any geographic combatant commander
must have is an ability to understand the geopolitical context
of the region, as well as the political dynamics internal to
the countries that comprise the region.
In his current assignment as Commander of the U.S. PACOM,
Admiral Fallon has exhibited a keen understanding of political
dynamics, successfully building renewed military-to-military
relationships with China and Indonesia, two of the most
important countries in the Pacific. His demonstrated ability in
this regard will serve this Nation well when dealing with the
complex politics of the Persian Gulf and understanding the
interactions between the use of force and political dynamics in
Iraq.
While the situation in Iraq will no doubt demand a large
degree of his attention and time, the challenges in the CENTCOM
area of responsibility (AOR) are diverse, difficult, and, at
times, seemingly intractable. They're also of immense
importance to the security of this Nation. The U.S. CENTCOM is
the U.S. military's most challenging combatant command. The
threats the U.S. faces in the CENTCOM AOR go far beyond Iraq
and Afghanistan. Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Somalia, and the Horn of
Africa, among other locations, also pose significant potential
threats to the United States. As the top military commander in
this unstable region of the world, Congress and the President
will be relying heavily on Admiral Fallon's advice.
The challenges in the CENTCOM AOR are complex and
interrelated. As the Iraq Study Group stated, Iraq cannot be
addressed effectively in isolation from other major regional
issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. His predecessor in
the position to which Admiral Fallon has been nominated,
General Abizaid, testified to this committee on August 3, 2006,
saying, ``Iraq sits at the center of the broader regional
problem.'' General Abizaid made a similar point in December,
when he said, ``You have to internationalize the problem. You
have to attack it diplomatically, geostrategically. You can't
just apply a microscope on a particular problem in downtown
Baghdad and a particular problem in downtown Kabul and say
that, somehow or another, if you throw enough military forces
at it, then you're going to solve the broader issues in the
region of extremism.''
This broader struggle against violent extremism extending
throughout the region poses a significant challenge for the
next Commander of U.S. CENTCOM. Ambassador John Negroponte, the
Director of the National Intelligence (DNI), testified before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that al Qaeda
remains the greatest terrorist threat to our security interests
and those of our allies. He said that al Qaeda is operating
from secure hideouts in Pakistan, developing stronger
operational relationships that radiate throughout the Middle
East, Northern Africa, and Europe. Ambassador Negroponte has
also warned of the growing shadow of Iranian influence in the
Middle East region. Iranian support for Shia militias in Iraq,
their backing of Hezbollah in Lebanon, possible Iranian
influence with Shiites in western Afghanistan, and Iran's
ongoing pursuit of a nuclear capability all pose risks to
regional security and to international security. The next
CENTCOM Commander will need to provide straightforward,
independent advice on the most effective course of action for
deterring Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons and to
dominate its neighbors, and the likely consequences of
escalating tensions with Iran.
Syria also poses a challenge to security in the region.
Recently renewed violence in Lebanon is yet another example of
the negative impact that Syria, as well as Iran, appears to be
having on stability in the region.
Over the last month, the CENTCOM footprint in Djibouti has
gone from largely unknown to the newest public front in the
global war on terror. Two recent air strikes by AC-130 gunships
in southern Somalia have highlighted a depth of U.S. concern
for the potential impact of threats emanating from a highly
unstable failed state. DNI Negroponte, in fact, in testimony
before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, said that al
Qaeda remains determined to exploit the turmoil in Somalia.
But, of course, the two great threats, Afghanistan and
Iraq, are what we'll probably spend most of our time on this
morning and what Admiral Fallon will be spending, no doubt,
most of his time on. The rising threat of a resurgent Taliban
and al Qaeda in Afghanistan: over the past year, there's been a
dramatic rise in violence, particularly in the southern and
eastern regions of the country, and military experts anticipate
a spring offensive by the Taliban that is likely to be even
more violent. International efforts to combat opium production,
a major source of insurgent funding, are failing, with opium
production in Afghanistan at record levels. U.S. and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commanders in Afghanistan
have indicated that additional troops are needed for the
mission; and yet, the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) remains about 15 percent short of the
troop and equipment levels that NATO leaders have agreed to
provide. In addition, ISAF operations are hindered by national
caveats imposed by some NATO members on the movement or use of
their troops in theater. The next CENTCOM Commander will have
to work to overcome these challenges, and others, to ensure
success in Afghanistan.
The most daunting challenge will be Iraq. Admiral Fallon
will be called upon to execute the President's new strategy in
Iraq. President Bush's new approach is predominantly a military
strategy, although Prime Minister Maliki himself has said that
the only solution is a political solution, and that's a
sentiment that was expressed, as well, by our current top
commanders, General George Casey and General Abizaid.
Admiral Fallon will have to determine how to pressure Iraqi
political leaders to make the political compromises essential
to a political solution. It will be most interesting hearing
whether he intends to do so; and, if so, how. The Iraqi leaders
made commitments about modifications to their constitution,
taking over responsibility for security, only to break those
commitments; and, so far, without consequences.
Admiral, we again thank you for your tremendous devotion to
this Nation, and your service to our Nation. We thank your
family, as well, for their support.
I now call upon Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I join the chairman in congratulating you, Admiral Fallon,
on your nomination in this very important responsibility and in
these very difficult times. You bring nearly 4 decades of
military experiences to the challenge America faces, and
obviously your performance at PACOM is the reason why you are
here before us today and taking on these new responsibilities.
I think the chairman has covered the challenges that we
face, and, while I would just like to re-emphasize, in
Afghanistan, General Karl Eikenberry said, on January 16,
``It's going to be a violent spring, and we're going to have
violence into this summer.'' Obviously our attention is focused
on Iraq, but I think that it's very clear that there's going to
be a very difficult time in Afghanistan very soon. One of the
areas that you are going to need to work on is to get our
allies to participate, not only in numbers, but also in terms
of mission. Many of our allies who are there in Afghanistan are
so restricted in their activities that they are far from as
useful as they can be.
On January 10, the President proposed a new strategy for
Iraq that has economic, diplomatic, and military components. We
all have a new team of Secretary of Defense, senior military
commanders, and a new Ambassador in Iraq. These are positive
developments in a situation that can best be described as dire.
This war has been mishandled. No one doubts that mistakes have
been made in Iraq, and no one disagrees that the consequences
of a failed state there are potentially catastrophic.
Admiral Fallon, the chairman will ask you one of the
routine questions that we ask nominees to positions of higher
command, and that is, ``If asked your personal opinion, you
will give a candid assessment.'' I have to tell you, this
committee did not get candid assessments in the past. I view
that with deep regret, because I think the American people and
their representatives deserved better.
I want you to emphatically assure Chairman Levin when he
asks you that question, that you will, indeed, give us your
candid and best assessment of the situation. Too often,
administration officials came before this committee and the
American people and painted a rosy scenario, when it was not
there. Yesterday, you and I, and Senator Clinton, were in San
Antonio, and one of the most moving experiences of my life was
to watch these young, brave soldiers who have been so badly
injured and made such enormous sacrifice before us in that
audience. We owe them more and better leadership and a better
strategy than we have provided them with in the past, Admiral.
This is probably our last opportunity, this change in
strategy, to salvage a very difficult situation. I hope you
know, and will tell this committee, how difficult and arduous
this task will be because of the hole that we have dug for
ourselves, to a very large degree.
I, again, congratulate you. We look forward to working with
you. I don't think we can have a better person to fill this
position of enormous responsibility.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Chairman Levin. Admiral Fallon, welcome again and please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL
COMMAND
Admiral Fallon. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, Senator
Warner, Senator Kennedy, and distinguished members of the
committee, good morning, and thank you for this opportunity to
appear before you.
I'm honored by the confidence of the President and the
Secretary of Defense in nominating me for this position, but I
am under no illusion regarding the magnitude of the tasks and
the challenges we face in this region of the world. From Beirut
to Kashmir, conflict and areas of instability abound; yet, as
you well know, this region, with some 630 million people, the
cradle of Western Civilization, is of critical importance to
our Nation and the world.
Last week, General David Petraeus provided a detailed
evaluation of the situation in Iraq. I concur in his
assessment, and I recognize this as the top priority for
CENTCOM attention. The situation in Iraq is serious and clearly
in need of new and different actions.
Earlier this month, President Bush outlined a new way
forward for the United States in Iraq. General Petraeus
described refocusing on the Iraqi population as the center of
attention for security.
The situation in Iraq will not be resolved solely through
military means. Security is but one aspect of what must be a
comprehensive effort to address not only this issue, but
economic development and a reinvigorated participatory
political process in Iraq by Iraqis. In developing these new
initiatives, we will need major and sustained assistance from
other government agencies, and I would welcome volunteers,
particularly in the areas of political and economic
development.
The situation in Afghanistan, although much improved from
the days of Taliban rule, is fragile. The Government of
Afghanistan, with ISAF support, has made significant progress,
but faces a resurgence of Taliban activity, particularly in the
southern part of the country. Other security challenges include
Lebanon, the Horn of Africa, with several nations facing
internal unrest and insurgent activity. Iranian support for
terrorism and sectarian violence beyond its borders and its
pursuit of nuclear capability is destabilizing and troubling.
In addressing these and other challenges in the region, I
would, if confirmed, solicit the opinions and suggestions of
our allies and partners in the region and the world. There is
no doubt that other nations in the region could be helpful with
this situation in Iraq.
I truly believe that most people in Afghanistan and Iraq
seek peace and an opportunity to enjoy a decent life for
themselves and their families. It has been my experience in the
Asia-Pacific region that progress in advancing the aspirations
and desires of people require stability and security. American
military forces and their civilian counterparts have been
performing superbly in their efforts to provide these essential
needs in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. I am humbled by
their service, dedication, courage, and sacrifice. It would be
my high honor to serve in CENTCOM with these great Americans
and our coalition partners.
I believe the situation in Iraq can be turned around. But
time is short. There are no guarantees, but you can depend on
me for my best effort. I pray for God's help, and I draw
confidence in the indomitable spirit and skilled dedication of
our service men and women.
Thank you for your support.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you.
Now, the standard questions which Senator McCain has
referred to.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Admiral Fallon. I have not.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record and hearings?
Admiral Fallon. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Admiral Fallon. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Admiral Fallon. They will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify, upon request, before this committee?
Admiral Fallon. I do.
Chairman Levin. This is the question which Senator McCain
referred to; it means a great deal to us. We're deadly serious
about it. We are about all the questions, but this one really
becomes more and more important as we look at the recent
history. Do you agree to give your personal views, when asked
before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from
the administration in power?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, I do.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral. For starters, we'll do
a 6-minute round of questions on an early-bird basis.
Admiral, there is not just a question of 21,000 troops that
are going to go to Iraq under the President's new policy, but
there's also a different strategy for those troops. They will
be holding Baghdad neighborhoods, not just inserted, not just
clearing, but then remaining and holding neighborhoods in that
city, presumably with Iraqi units, if they do what they've not
done so far, which is to carry out their commitments to move
into neighborhoods. They will be operating under 30-or-so mini
bases in platoon- or company-sized units.
How do you foresee preventing incidences such as recently
happened in Karbala, where five American soldiers were abducted
and then killed while in a meeting with Iraqi security forces
in a supposedly secure compound? In other words, our troops are
going to be inserted into the most difficult areas imaginable,
right into the neighborhoods, right in the face of the Iraqis.
How are we going to avoid the increased risks that are created
by that kind of face-to-face presence?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, there's clearly going to be an
increased risk in this area. I've spoken with General Petraeus.
I have a lot to learn, much research to do, and a lot of
dialogue yet to go on so that I have a better understanding of
the detail of his intentions. I believe that he's going to need
some time, when he gets on the ground out there, to sort this
out.
But it seems pretty obvious to me that what we have been
doing has not been working. We have not been getting the
results that we desire, and we clearly have to do something
different. There is a significant body of evidence that
indicates that approaching an insurgency such as we are facing
now--and that wasn't the case several years ago in Iraq, but
it's clearly the case now--there's a body of evidence that
indicates that to be successful in this endeavor, historically
you've had to get in amongst the population to convince them
that you really care about them and that you are able to
provide security on-scene rather than just passing through an
area.
I can give you my experience in the Asia-Pacific region. We
have some ongoing insurgencies in Southeast Asia, as you're
well aware. In the Philippines, there's been significant
progress, particularly recently. Our approach to action in the
Philippines to combat the insurgencies that are ongoing there
has been multipronged; in fact, very similar to what has been
outlined for us to pursue in Iraq. It involves being down with
the armed forces with whom we're working. In the Pacific, it's
with the Philippine armed forces. In Iraq, we're going to have
to get with theirs. It involves getting our people in front of
the population so that they can see that they're engaged and
give them confidence.
Chairman Levin. Didn't we intentionally keep our people
out, away from the smaller units?
Admiral Fallon. In the Philippines, we have kept our people
away from those small units going into combat, but an essential
part of the security desire down there was to, in fact, engage
with the population in a broad base of humanitarian engineering
activities, so they actually see our people regularly.
Chairman Levin. Was there an interface as directly, as
intimately, in the Philippines with the population, as it true
in Baghdad?
Admiral Fallon. The situation is not nearly as dangerous,
obviously, in Sulu as it is in Baghdad.
Chairman Levin. General Abizaid testified in November that
he has talked with all the divisional commanders, with General
Casey and General Martin Dempsey. They all talked together. He
asked them whether or not, if we brought in more American
troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve
success in Iraq? They all said no. He went on to explain--and
this is General Abizaid, just a few months ago--``It's easy for
the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more
American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking
more responsibility for their own future.''
Have you spoken with General Abizaid?
Admiral Fallon. I've spoken with General Abizaid, but not
on this subject.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree with his testimony on that
subject?
Admiral Fallon. I don't know, Senator, but I'll give you my
opinion and assessment. What we've been doing is not working,
and we need to be doing, it seems to me, something different.
General Petraeus has outlined, in extensive detail before you,
a proposal to try to enhance stability and security in Baghdad
and the rest of Iraq, and I would be anxious, if confirmed, to
work with him to try and implement this. General Petraeus has,
in our discussions, made very clear to me that this will
require more troops. I don't know how many troops. Frankly, I
aim to find out and have my own opinions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. One of the issues on the number
of troops was the testimony that we've received about off-
ramps, that, as these brigades move in, perhaps one a month, or
whatever the rate turns out to be, that there are off-ramps,
that we don't have to continue that flow, if the Iraqis do not
carry out their commitments.
Stephen Hadley, the National Security Advisor, said U.S.
force increases will be ``pay-as-you-go, depending a lot on the
Iraqis performing.''
Secretary Gates said there's plenty of opportunity before
many of the 21,000 additional troops arrive to evaluate,
``whether the Iraqis are fulfilling their commitments to us.''
General Pace told us the Iraqis must ``put action behind
their words. Our flow of forces will allow us to modify what we
do next.''
Now, what is the policy, do you know, in terms of off-
ramps? Is this policy subject to change, as our brigades go in,
if the Iraqis are not carrying out their commitments, as we've
been assured before this committee? Even General Petraeus, when
he was here, said that he wanted all five brigades in Iraq as
quickly as possible. He did say that. But then, he said their
flow, not ``would be,'' could be tied to Iraqi military,
political, or economic progress. What do you understand the
policy to be? Could this flow change? Could it be slowed down,
stopped, if the Iraqis do not carry out the commitment? My
operative word there is, ``could it'' be slowed down?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I have not gotten into the details
of these plans. I have a full-time job in PACOM, and I've tried
to stay away from the details of CENTCOM until such time as I
might be confirmed; then I intend to dive into it.
General Petraeus, in our meeting before he left, indicated
that he thought he needed these additional troops. I do not
know the details of how he plans to use them. I'm sure he's
going to have to consult with his generals on the ground once
he gets into position, and then figure it out. I'd be happy to
take that question and come back to you, if it's appropriate,
at a later time.
Chairman Levin. If you would let us know, for the record,
what is your understanding specifically on that issue, we would
appreciate it.
[The information referred to follows:]
There is no policy on troop deployment and redeployment in
correlation to Iraqi military, political, and economic progress/
failure. Troop deployments and redeployments are based upon missions
(requirements, needs, and conditions), the situation, the enemy,
commander recommendations, and requests.
Chairman Levin. I'm surprised that you don't have that
understanding going in, frankly. This is a policy issue which
has been decided, presumably, by the policymakers.
Admiral Fallon. Yes, but I'm----
Chairman Levin. Nonetheless, if you say you don't know the
policy in that regard, we have to take that as your answer.
Admiral Fallon. If I could, just a comment. I'm not sure
that you can have a policy plan ahead of time that would
dictate the intricacies of what forces move into what areas for
what tasks.
Chairman Levin. I'm sure that's not true, either, but you
could have a policy which says that we can modify this as these
brigades show up if the Iraqis have not carried out their
commitments. Could modify.
Admiral Fallon. Sure.
Chairman Levin. That's certainly, it seems to me, a
credible policy.
Admiral Fallon. Seems pretty reasonable to me, sir.
Obviously, as we're making modifications to what we've been
doing in Iraq now, I would expect we'd do the same thing in the
future.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go back to Afghanistan for a second. We have
plans to increase our troop strength there by some 2,500. Have
you gotten into this issue enough to have a handle on how
serious this spring is going to be and what's going to be
required?
Admiral Fallon. No, Senator, I've been watching from a
distance, just reading news reports. I have not talked with
General Eikenberry about this, although I've asked to have him
come back through the Pacific, on his way back home, to get a
better insight.
Senator McCain. What is your degree of confidence that the
Iraqi Government and military are up to the task that we are
now embarking on in this new strategy?
Admiral Fallon. Critical question, particularly in the
political arena, and I don't have an assessment of that. I have
not personally met any of the civilian political leadership in
Iraq. I do have some knowledge of the Iraqi military, albeit
just a slice, from a couple of visits to PACOM base forces that
are serving in Iraq. I was out there last month to see some of
them. My initial assessment is that there are some good troops
and some that need a lot of work. There are some leaders that
have impressed me as people that understood and ``got it,'' and
were effective, and others that are probably less so. I would
speculate--a danger here--that that's not a dissimilar
situation throughout the country.
The challenge I see is identifying those leaders that are
going to be effective, those units that are trained, or can be
trained, to do what needs to be done and to encourage them to
pick up the load. If this is not successful, then we're going
to have problems.
But all of this is a backdrop to the kind of political
backbone and tough decisionmaking that I believe is required of
the leadership in Baghdad.
I think, to be fair to them, they have a tough row to hoe.
This is not like, as you know much better than I, our country.
In my reading, going back to 2003, we have hundreds of good
ideas of things that we would like to see in Iraq that are more
reflective of the kind of society and process that we enjoy
here. It seems to me that we probably erred in our assessment
of the ability of these people to take on all of these tasks at
the same time. It seems to me that one of the things in the
back of my mind that I'd like to get answered is to meet with
the people that have been working this issue, particularly our
ambassadors, our diplomats, to get an assessment of what's
realistic and what's practical. Maybe we ought to redefine the
goals here a bit and do something that's more realistic, in
terms of getting some progress, and then maybe take on the
other things later.
Senator McCain. Again, we would like a realistic assessment
of the situation. On numerous occasions in the past, witnesses
have told us that the training and equipping of the Iraqi
military was going just fine.
Admiral Fallon. One of the challenges--and this is not
unique to the situation in Iraq; I think we face it in all
aspects of our lives--we tend to assess things in ways that
are--you used the comment, or I think Senator Levin used the
``rosy'' word before--in terms that will not hurt people's
feelings, that will--whatever. The fact of the matter is, of
all places, we need candid assessments, and you'll get them
from me.
Senator McCain. I believe, Admiral, that it will be
difficult, in the short-term, to determine the progress of the
military side of this equation. I think it's going to be
difficult. It has taken us 3\1/2\ years, at least, to get into
the dire situation that we are in today. But I do agree with
Senator Levin that there are certain benchmarks that we could
expect the Iraqi Government to comply with, such as disarming
individual militias, the number of Iraqi military that will
actually be deployed in Baghdad alongside ours. As you may
remember, in the past they promised six brigades, and only two
battalions showed up. Also legislation to ensure that the oil
resources benefit the Sunni, as well as the Shia. In other
words, I think that we could know fairly soon whether we are
going to have an Iraqi government that is truly committed to
this overall process. Would you agree with that?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think there's an obvious need to
have actions taken by the Government of Iraq to get on their--
shouldn't use the word ``timeline,'' because I've never
actually seen a timeline, but they have stated a number of
these objectives; you've enumerated a couple of these now--and
it's pretty clear to me that they have to take these steps or
we're not going to be effective in the security business. It
seems to me that, again, from my glancing visit through that
country last month, there is a lack of confidence among the
other sects--other than the Shia--within this country, of the
desire of the government to actually address issues in the
entire country. So, it seems to me--again, from a distance; and
this is politics--that an essential foundation to making
progress in this country is for that government to step up and
start making some of these tough decisions. I recognize it's
difficult. There's a lot of baggage in the legacy, which you're
well aware of. But unless this begins to happen, I doubt that
we're going to be effective in the military arena.
Senator McCain. I read, with some interest, the remarks of
the Iranian Ambassador, the last few days, and there are many
who think we ought to begin ``a dialogue'' with the Iranians.
Do you have any view on that issue?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think that Iranian activity,
particularly regarding Iraq, has not been helpful, to date. I
would welcome steps by the Iraqi government that would indicate
that they are interested in long-term----
Senator McCain. You mean the Iranian Government.
Admiral Fallon. I'm sorry, Iranian Government--that would
indicate they really are interested in helping the situation.
To date, I haven't seen that. I think we need to see some of
those kinds of steps, again, then over to the political and
diplomatic arena to see what can be done.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Next would be Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Admiral, and welcome to your family. We are very
pleased to have you before this committee, and I thank you for
your years of distinguished service to our country.
I know that you are in the process of confirmation, and
that it may be difficult to give specific answers to some of
these questions, because you're not yet confirmed, and you
haven't had the opportunity to really get a firsthand view for
yourself. But, if I could, Admiral, one of the issues that
concerns me, and, I think, other members of this committee,
regards the lack of unity of command for the Iraqi and U.S.
forces that will be operating in and around Baghdad. In fact,
we've heard, from retired General Jack Keane and General
Petraeus, their concerns about what this means. I'm having
trouble getting to the bottom of this, because General Petraeus
sounded somewhat surprised about it and reflected some of his
concerns, and General Keane, who apparently was very active in
helping to devise the plan the President has put forth, also
said that it was very dangerous and frustrating not to have
unity of command.
Can you shed any light on this decision for our committee?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, not yet, but this is clearly a
very significant, critical item. We have to know exactly who's
reporting to whom, for what purposes. I would expect that
General Petraeus will have this at the top of his list when he
gets out there. There are ways to do this but we have to make
sure that the lines are straight if we're going to be
effective.
Senator Clinton. I would appreciate that. I welcome the
openness that both you and General Petraeus have exhibited to
the committee, and I hope that we could hear from both of you
in short order about this. I hope we can hear that it has been
fixed, because some of these stories coming out of the fighting
on Haifa Street, the recent large engagement near Najaf, have
certainly raised serious questions about the Iraqi military's
capacity to take actions which we thought they were capable of.
Certainly, we don't want to put our young men and women into
harm's way with that level of confusion.
Second, Admiral, I asked General Petraeus--this was really
more of a plea; some have characterized it as a prayer--that we
not send our new troops into Baghdad without being fully
equipped and ready. There have been a number of articles in the
last week, and there is one today in the Washington Post, about
how equipment for the added troops is lacking. We are short
thousands of vehicles, armor kits, and other equipment. We do
not have the capacity to quickly turn around that equipment. In
fact, Lieutenant General Speakes has said that we're going to
have to be, pretty much improvising, trying to share equipment,
which I find deeply troubling. I'm also concerned that the
United States has agreed to sell 600 up-armored Humvees to Iraq
this year for its security forces, and, again, quoting General
Speakes, saying that ``such sales better not be at the expense
of the American soldier or marine.'' Again, Admiral, do you
know anything yet about whether or not we're going to have the
equipment for these additional combat brigades?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I do not know the details of that.
I can tell you that, in PACOM, there's been a request made for
us to look at the equipment that we have in this region and to
send some of it to the Middle East, equipment that might be
appropriate to soldiers and marines that are headed in that
direction.
I know, from my experience, that the units are not all
equipped in the same manner, particularly the Army units, which
have a diverse background. Some are light infantry, some are
heavier, and they have different types and varieties of
vehicles.
I found it interesting, from a professional side, when I
was in Iraq, as I traveled around the country recently, to note
the differences between the units. The thought occurred to me
that it would be interesting--and I'd like to find out the
answers of just how one goes about using these different
equipment sets in different situations--as we rotate troops
from one area to another, how effective they are, and so forth.
So, I have it in the back of my mind, and would like to take
this up with General Petraeus to do an assessment of what
essential things are necessary to put our people in the best
possible position. We'll do that as soon as we get there.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate that, Admiral, and I would
hope, perhaps, that the committee would send a very clear
message to Secretary Gates and the Pentagon that we want that
assessment done as quickly as possible, and that whatever
actions need to be taken in order to provide the necessary
equipment be done so. I know every one of us doesn't want to
hear stories about continuing lack of equipment costing
American lives and injuries such as those we saw yesterday when
we were both at San Antonio.
Finally, Admiral, this question about the diplomatic aspect
of this assignment that you've undertaken is one that I'm very
interested in, because we all know there's no military
solution. There's no military solution in Iraq, and there's no
military solution in Afghanistan. How do you see your role, and
what tools do we have at our disposal, on the one hand, to try
to assess and rein in Iranian influence in the region, and, on
the other end of your AOR, to create better relations and
working conditions between Pakistan and Afghanistan? Could you
just briefly respond to those, please?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, very interesting area, I wouldn't
presume to dive too deeply into this pool yet, because I don't
know enough detail. But a couple of observations from the
outside:
There's a lot that isn't being done. In fact, I see an
awful lot of sitting, watching, by the neighborhood, and it's
high time that changed. I would be very anxious to try to
engage, and intend to engage, with our Department of State,
Secretary Rice and her folks, to have a full understanding of
this, and then maybe we can figure out, collectively, how to
proceed.
Regarding Pakistan/Afghanistan, having been operating on
the other side of the boundary, if you would, between theaters,
I've had a chance to watch the Indian/Pakistan dynamic now for
a couple of years. I see change, and it's for the better. I
believe that this change could potentially be very helpful to
the situation in Afghanistan, and perhaps even in Iraq, as
Pakistan and India slowly are taking steps to reduce tension
along the border in Kashmir.
By the way, it's pretty fascinating, and a shame for the
world, I believe, to note that there are almost 1.5 million
troops facing each other along this border. But steps are being
taken in the right direction, and I think the potential to have
tensions continue to ease ought to give us some opportunities
to perhaps have the Paks do even more than they're doing.
They've done a phenomenal amount in this war on terror, but I
think things could be done that would be additionally helpful
in Afghanistan. The Indian ties to Iran and their energy needs,
and ties in other places in the region, I think, could
potentially be exploited. I'll be anxious to talk with our
State Department colleagues and to see what might be done in
this area.
Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton, and thank you,
also, for raising the equipment issue. I just talked to Senator
McCain, we will be sending a letter to the Secretary of Defense
this afternoon the matter that you raise and some of the other
equipment studies, the shortfall studies which have been
forthcoming. So, thank you for raising that.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, if I could put a p.s. on the
equipment thing, there's a reality today that this is a fast-
moving issue, in that the enemy that we face, particularly in
Iraq, is very adaptive, very skilled at observing and changing
their tactics and procedures. So, equipment that was, we
thought, pretty effective in protecting our troops just a
matter of months ago is now being, in fact, challenged by some
of the techniques and devices over there. I'm learning, as we
go in, that this is a fast-moving ball game and we'll have to
be adaptable to try to stay ahead of it. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. That's fine, but I think the equipment that
Senator Clinton's talking is equipment that we know is needed
by the troops that are going in.
Admiral Fallon. I understand.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral. Nice to meet with you again. I've had
the privilege of working with you and knowing you for many
years. I thank your family for joining you on this arduous task
ahead of you.
I'd like to say just a word about General Abizaid. He
served 3\1/2\ years in this position, came before this
committee many times. There's been some suggestions that
perhaps we have not, as a committee, received candid
assessments from some our witnesses, and I concur in that. But
I think, in General Abizaid's case, he has been very
forthcoming. I think he deserves a lot of credit--and his
family--for that contribution that he made in this most
difficult situation for these many years.
Clearly, in your testimony today and that of General
Petraeus, each of you have distanced yourself from the plan, as
announced by the President on January 20. That's
understandable, because both of you had your respective jobs--
you, in the Pacific; he, here in the United States--and the
plan was largely drawn up by those individuals--from General
Abizaid, General Casey, and others--in the current positions
that they hold. Juxtaposed against that is your own comment to
the effect that you see there's clear requirement for new and
different actions.
Now, the team that put the plan together are now moving
out, and you're moving in and being handed this plan. I just
hope that you will exercise your authority and responsibility
to the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to point out those areas in this plan which you feel needs
flexibility, options that can be pursued other than the
rigidity of just 20,000 new troops right into the face of
sectarian violence. Some of us here on this committee, and
others--a group of 10, bipartisan--have tried to respond to the
President's request for suggestions, and we have provided those
suggestions in the form of saying, ``Mr. President, look at all
options by which you may not need that full complement, and,
Mr. President, look carefully at the rules of engagement, such
that we minimize the injection of the U.S. GI right into the
crossfire of sectarian violence.''
We are reading about a successful operation, north of
Najaf, where the Iraqi forces clearly, I think, took the lead
and eliminated a substantial enemy. That's the good news. The
bad news is that fight was precipitated by religious quarrels
between Iraqis, Sunni and Shia and others, that go back over a
thousand years. Our group of 10, in making recommendations,
simply say that the Iraqi forces, by virtue of their knowledge
of the language, their knowledge of the culture, are far better
qualified to try and go in and resolve that type of sectarian
violence. I hope that you will take our suggestions in the
spirit of not trying to embolden the enemy, but to
conscientiously point out where we can take actions to save
lives, and particularly those of our American GIs.
In no way do we try to cut forces, withdraw, set
timetables. It's simply, ``Look at the options.'' In there, we
point out, also, the questions about the chain of command which
was raised here by our colleague. I urge you to go back and
look at the colloquy that I had with General Keane in this room
last Friday in which we explored that very carefully. He, the
former Vice Chief of the Army, clearly pointed out grave
concerns that he and others have. I asked him, could he show
any precedent whereby the United States forces, which always
operated on a unified chain of command under American
officers--have we ever tried to go into this joint operation,
where there's going to be Iraqi commander and American
commander at the top and all the way down to the company level?
We do not want fingerpointing if a action goes wrong between
the American and the Iraqi, saying whose fault it was. That has
to be clarified.
Finally, I point out, I think you have unique abilities to
go into this very sensitive and equally important, if not
greater important area, with regard to Iran. I support the
President in his statements, of recent, of firmness of
commitment to resolve that situation. But I say to you, drawn
on the experience of how we maintained a ring of deterrence
around the Soviet Union in the Cold War. I think the use of
force in that situation is a very last resort. Should we not
engage other countries in performing a ring of deterrence?
Initially, that ring could be the age-old doctrine of seapower,
what we call battleship diplomacy, the presence of our two
carriers. Why should not the European nations send a ship or
two to also add to the strength of the signal we're trying to
send to that country that we're not going to permit them to go
forward with nuclear power? I urge you to look at the history
of NATO, its success in curtailing the Cold War, and use that
as the initial steps to the extent that any military action
should be used, because we have to curtail it. Does that have
any interest or appeal to you, that concept?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, the whole idea is most appealing,
because we have plenty to do right now with active combat
operations ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's clear to me
that, to date, the Iranians have not been playing a
constructive role in addressing any of these, and, in fact, are
challenging us in other areas. I'll be very anxious to work
with our allies, friends, and colleagues around the world, and
open to any and every idea in how we might approach this
situation.
Senator Warner. I think it's important. I draw your
attention to a New York Times article, of January 30, in which
they say, ``The administration says that European governments
provided $18 billion in loan guarantees for Iran in 2005.''
It's to their interest, as well as it is to the United States
interest, to contain that country with regard to its
aggressiveness and potentiality in building nuclear weapons.
My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner. As to the
references made to benchmarks, I'm going to put in the record
at this time a letter that Senator McCain and I wrote to
Secretary Rice last week insisting that the benchmarks that the
President referred to in his January 10 address to the Nation
and that the Iraqi Government has agreed to be provided. If
these benchmarks are not received by the end of today, Senator
McCain and I will be consulting on what will be the next step
to obtain these benchmarks. This is not something that you,
Admiral, are going to be able to deal with. This isn't an
assignment for you. I'm just saying publicly that these
benchmarks now have been requested three times and have not
been received. The letter, as well as earlier letters of mine,
will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Levin. I will call next on Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Admiral. Good luck as you engage in some very
serious and responsible challenges in CENTCOM.
When you look at the plan that you're about to implement
with General Petraeus, on paper it could be made to work if you
have the right assumptions. One of those assumptions is that
you're going to get all the support you need from the State
Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Justice
Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(AID). I don't think that's a very good assumption, since we
have never gotten that, in the last 3 years. How many real
extra bodies are going out to accompany these 20,000 extra
troops and civilian agencies?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I don't know. I am aware----
Senator Reed. Isn't that important for you to know, sir?
Admiral Fallon. I intend to find out. It's clear that we
will have to have agreement between the interagency on
formulating the appropriate human resources to go address this
problem. I do not have that kind of detail. I've not engaged in
that conversation.
Senator Reed. Admiral, I appreciate that, but the new
strategy sounds a lot like the old strategy to me. We were
going to clear, hold, and build. The President was talking
about that 2 years ago. We had examples of this in Tal Afar and
other places, and we were clearing. The question was, could we
hold? Maybe we can hold now, but the build part never seemed to
arrive.
Admiral Fallon. Absolutely critical. If we're going to be
successful, we have to have the follow-up economic activity and
development to enable these people to stand on their own feet.
It doesn't happen, then it's not going to work.
Senator Reed. Again, General--Admiral--excuse me, forgive
me my background. [Laughter.]
I'm projecting. Forgive me.
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. We've gone down this road so many times.
We've heard--and I don't think this is a question of lack of
candor, this is a question of people saying, ``If I get all I
need, I can do this.'' We never get what we need on the
nonkinetic side of the equation.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, if I could, a couple of thoughts.
One, in my experience, we're always asking for more than we'll
usually get, and we'll have to figure out how to do the best we
can. But I think that the situation here is that clearly the
President recognizes the need for change in this situation in
Iraq. He's made some decisions. Some of those decisions involve
military forces and leadership positions. He's asked, through
the Secretary, for me to be considered for this position.
General Petraeus has already been here. These are part of the
resources being applied. I think we need--General Petraeus,
myself, if I'm confirmed--to sit down with our colleagues in
the interagencies and to figure out the details of these plans,
which I am not aware, but very anxious to get into, because it
seems to me that if I'm supposed to be the CENTCOM Commander,
we clearly have to have an understanding and be joined at the
hip in what we agree is the way to go forward. We are not there
yet. We are going to need some time to figure out the steps and
to lay this out in the kind of detail that's going to actually
give us some results.
Senator Reed. Let me also suggest some other areas that are
more directly within your purview. This strategy implies a
significant increase of translators, a significant increase of
civil affairs officers. What we've heard, in terms of this
surge, is 20,000 combat brigades. The question is, where are
these translators coming from? If you're going to send--and I'd
go back to Senator Levin's comments--you're sending a platoon
of young Americans into the middle of the neighborhood, from
all over this country, and they cannot speak to their
neighbors, you're just asking for trouble. How many
translators? Again, Admiral, out of the last 3 years, whenever
you talked to a senior commander out there, and you ask him,
``What do you need?''--it was never, ``Give me some more combat
brigades.'' It's ``Give me translators, give me AID people,
give me agriculture people.'' It was ``gimme, gimme,'' but
nothing ever happened.
Admiral Fallon. I'll be at the head of that list, because,
unlike General Abizaid, I am not fluent in Arabic, and so, I'm
going to need some help, as well. I recognize this is a big
challenge.
Senator Reed. As I look at this proposal, there are some
obvious shortcomings that we know about right now and we
haven't reconciled. Yet, we're touting this as the last best
chance that this will work, ``We wargamed it on the ground, we
have everything we need.'' I don't think we have everything we
need. The issue that Senator Warner raised about unity of
command, and General Keane, who spoke to that it is a grave
concern. It's an obvious flaw, or an obvious shortcoming in
this plan, we know of right now, and yet, we're embarking into
this situation.
I was trying to think--you might be able to help me--is
there an applicable example of a significant urban insurgency
that was successfully defeated with a divided command? I can't
think--Algeria, with the French? Belfast, the British were in
charge. I can't think of any other significant urban
insurgencies.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, you, better than most, understand
the necessity for having clean and clearly recognizable chain
of command, and if you could allow us some time to figure out
the details of this plan, there's a lot of talk about ``the
plan, the plan.'' In my mind, we have a plan when we have the
details for each level in the chain of command to carry out the
specific functions that are going to be necessary to achieve
success. I have not even begun to see a significant outline of
that, so I need to do some work. If confirmed, it'll be a prime
order of business.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Reed. Admiral, your patriotism serving the Nation
is remarkable. You are well qualified to assume a very daunting
task. I would associate myself with Senator Warner's comments
about General Abizaid. I think he, also, gave himself to the
last measure to serve this country.
The final point I'd make is, you need time, but time is
quickly running out. It's not what we're doing, it's what the
American people are doing. They have listened for 3 years, and
they have formed very strong conclusions, which don't allow you
much time at all.
Admiral Fallon. I understand, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Fallon, everyone's been blowing smoke at you.
You've had a great career. You and I have fought together, for
3 years, what I called the Battle of Vieques, and you were
there at the time. I do believe that resulted in a lack of
unified training that we weren't able to keep that live range
open. I just wanted to publicly thank you for the leadership
you showed. You had the Pace-Fallon report, and you stayed in
there and did everything you could. I enjoyed those 3 years of
battling on your side.
As we look from this point forward, I think it might be
worthwhile--no one has asked you this--you'll be working with
General Petraeus, and you could take a number of different
approaches. You could take the 30,000-foot view and largely
defer to General Petraeus on Iraqi matters, or would you
anticipate having more of a hands-on approach? How do you think
you'll work with General Petraeus?
Admiral Fallon. I look forward to working with General
Petraeus. We have not had an extensive history together, but
I've been anxious to work with him. I have followed his career.
I've read some of his work. I think he basically has a very
firm understanding of what's required, plus he has this
extensive experience.
We have different jobs and different responsibilities,
Senator. General Petraeus is going to be our commander of the
multinational forces on the ground for Iraq. I view my
responsibilities as much wider than that. I have a strong
obligation to support him and his work, and will do that to the
maximum extent possible. But it seems to me that there's an
expectation that I be working outside the borders of Iraq to
try to get the neighborhood, for example, to help us, and to
continue to work these other issues, like Afghanistan.
I'd be looking to work in a complementary manner, but, I'll
tell you, I'd love to stay up here, but I'm not going to
hesitate to dive down and to ask the tough questions--love to
stay up here, but I'm not going to hesitate to ask the tough
questions if I don't think we're getting results, and that's
the key thing that's missing in this entire program, of late,
is the results that are absolutely necessary if we're going to
be able to wrap this up and get our troops back.
Senator Inhofe. Since we have shorter rounds than we
normally have, for the record I'd like to have you look into
the successes. We've been real big on the train-and-equip
program here, and it's been very successful. I think probably
the best model for that would have been us with the Ethiopians
and how they came along to Somalia in a very successful
operation. I'd like to have you think about that and maybe, for
the record, respond as to what lessons we have learned there
that might be worth getting into.
[The information referred to follows:]
The United States military has provided training and equipment to
Ethiopia and other countries in the Horn of Africa (HOA) that have been
integral partners in the global war on terrorism. While difficult to
quantify, this security cooperation and the resulting strong bilateral
relationship contributed positively to Ethiopia's operations in its
recent military intervention in Somalia. However, it is the close
Ethiopian-U.S. military relationship which substantiates the potential
benefit of regional security cooperation programs (e.g. International
Military Education and Training and Foreign Military Financing with
Ethiopia, Kenya, and other HOA partners. The United States should
continue to train and equip forces partnering with the U.S. in order to
further their military's training professionalism and capabilities,
while supporting the global war on terrorism. U.S. theater security
cooperation programs require increased priority, emphasis, and support
in order to promote similar successful cooperation stories, and further
U.S. national security interests in the HOA.
Senator Inhofe. I would also say, even though this would be
more General Petraeus than you, but on the CERP program,
there's been a consistency of the combatant commanders and
everyone, from the bottom to the top, that that is a program
where we can get a lot more for our money if we give greater
authority in the field to use that program.
General Keane, when he was here last week, he talked about
the same thing, on the troop levels in Afghanistan. It's kind
of interesting to me, because I've been over there 12 times--my
last trip was with General Jones in Afghanistan. It was my
clear view, at that time, that the military part of that was
pretty near over, and now it's the rebuilding and assisting in
that type of thing. Have you had a chance to look into where we
are right now and to assess whether or not we do need to have--
that you would agree with General Keane that we need to have
enhancement of the troop level in Afghanistan?
Admiral Fallon. I don't have a fair enough assessment to
give you an honest answer. I can give you impressions from my
last visit. I saw things that were really good. I saw security
in some areas that looked like it had the situation under
control. I saw political activity. I saw functioning
governments in some areas. But everything that I've heard from
reports that I've read indicates that we need a pretty
significant push now on the economic side to move this country
along.
Senator Inhofe. I think some of the questions asked of you
might not be totally fair, in that you've been in PACOM. This
is new to you. You don't have all the answers. On the other
hand, there could be an advantage to that. You don't go in with
a prejudiced perspective. I know when I was there, and talked
to people like Abdul Jazim, Dr. Rubaie, and Prime Minister
Maliki.
Do you have any outside impression as to whether you think
that the Prime Minister is going to change his behavior from
the past?
Admiral Fallon. I don't know, Senator. I haven't met him. I
look forward to it.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Senator Clinton brought up this
thing about the up-armor. You mentioned something about PACOM
might have equipment that could be used over there. The fact
that you recognize this is a moving target, it's a changing
game, and what was appropriate 6 months ago may not be
appropriate now. I think it's very important that you do take
an assessment of what is in the other commands that can be
transferred there, and also try to evaluate what is going to be
needed there. I think you have indicated you will be doing
that.
Finally, Admiral Fallon, I was critical, back during the
Clinton administration, when I expected that the North Koreans
had a lot greater delivery capability for missiles than
everybody else did, and I asked--in writing, in a letter--and
I'm going from memory now--I think it was August 20, 1998, as
to, when would it be that the North Koreans would have the
capability of reaching the United States with a multistage
rocket? The answer came back: between 5 and 10 years. Seven
days later, on August 28, 1998, they fired one that had that
capability. Now, this morning, in the Early Bird, it says that
North Korea and Iran are cooperating in developing long-range
weapons, and it says Iran is likely to develop capability of
reaching the United States before 2015. To me, that's not very
well informed, and it wouldn't be that long.
How concerned are you over this relationship between North
Korea and Iran and their potential capability, in terms of
having long-range weapons that could reach the United States?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'd note that, although the North
Koreans tried that launch in 1998, they also tried another one
last year, still unsuccessful, which is some measure of
consolation, I'd expect, although they appear to be pushing
very hard to achieve this capability. There's no doubt that
there's been an interaction between North Korea and Iran, in
exchanging technology.
It seems to me that the scrutiny of the world has greatly
intensified on North Korea, particularly in this past year, and
so, we're all watching very carefully to try to mitigate any
attempt to proliferate technology that they may have. I don't
know what the timelines are. I haven't studied the Iranian
situation to the extent that I have the North Korean. The North
Koreans are clearly threatening in their capabilities to their
neighbors, not yet to us. We're going to have to watch it, and
I'll be anxious to learn more about the Iranians.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral. My time is expired. But
I have every confidence that the team of Fallon and Petraeus
will be very successful.
Thank you.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Fallon, aloha and welcome to the Hill and to the
U.S. Senate. I also want to add my aloha and welcome to Mary
and the family here, gathered and to tell you folks that you've
been a great family for Hawaii and for our Nation. Admiral,
you've served us so well as PACOM Commander, and I look forward
to your confirmation here.
I think that it is fitting, on this day, the 145th
anniversary of the launching of the Navy's first ironclad
warship, the U.S.S. Monitor--that, if confirmed by the Senate,
Admiral, you will be the first Navy admiral to command the
United States Central Command. This speaks well of your
leadership in the Pacific and Asia and of your accomplishments
as an officer in our Nation's military. I thank you for your
nearly 40 years of dedicated service already to our country. I
also want to say thank you to Mary, too, because without her
support, it would have been very difficult for you and for us.
Admiral, I have some questions that I want to ask you.
CENTCOM has never been commanded by a Navy flag officer in its
entire history. Your nomination by the administration is, I
guess you can look at it, somewhat unique. It raises the
question of, why now, in the war on terror, during a time when
we have two ground conflicts ongoing simultaneously in the
CENTCOM AOR, is a Navy admiral the best choice to head CENTCOM?
So, my question, Admiral Fallon, to you is, did Secretary Gates
or any other administration officer explain to you the
reasoning behind their decision to nominate you to be the next
Commander of CENTCOM? If so, what was their basis? If not, why
do you believe that you are the best choice for the job, given
the current operational environment in the CENTCOM AOR?
Admiral?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, in my conversation with Secretary
Gates, the color of my uniform wasn't the issue. I believe that
what they're looking for is someone with experience, which I
have been fortunate to have acquired in these 40 years, and
someone who is already familiar with the workings of a regional
command and the requirements of that position. We have very
highly-qualified ground officers, Army officers, that are
designated to lead our forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and
I believe that the administration is looking for someone with
experience and a willingness to work with these people.
I've found, in the Pacific, that the opportunity to engage
with nations throughout the region was beneficial to moving us
forward in the areas of security and stability, and I look
forward to doing the same thing in CENTCOM.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
From what you've done in the Pacific--for me, there's no
question, I'm proud of you and what you've done, and know that
you can deal with the situations that are ahead of us.
Admiral, the New York Times published an article on Sunday
describing an ambitious plan outlined by the Iranian Ambassador
to Baghdad. Specifically, Iran plans to greatly expand its
economic and military ties with Iraq, including an Iranian
National Bank branch in the heart of the capital. News reports
yesterday described the President's response. Specifically, he
was quoted as saying that, ``We will respond firmly.'' If
Tehran escalates its military actions in Iraq and threatens
American forces or Iraqi citizens, I'm concerned about the
possibility of the Iraq conflict as escalating to a regional
conflict. I am particularly concerned, because the
administration is not engaging the Iranians in diplomatic
discussions, which may limit our ``firm'' response to military
options only. In this January 10 speech regarding the surge,
the President stated that we will, ``interrupt the flow of
support from Iran and Syrian,'' and that we will seek out and
destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training
to our enemies in Iraq. It is clear, from this committee's
discussion with Secretary Gates and General Petraeus, that the
U.S. does not have sufficient troop levels in Iraq to secure
the borders from Iran and Syria while maintaining our
counterinsurgency activities in Baghdad and Anbar.
Admiral, do you believe that we can interrupt Iranian and
Syrian support from within the borders of Iraq? What options do
you believe our military has to provide the firm response to
Iran indicated by the President without causing an escalation
to a regional conflict?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, as I stated earlier, I believe
that the Iranians have yet to play a really constructive role
in the Iraqi situation. There's a lot of history here. You're
certainly aware of the Shia relationship in southern Iraq with
the Iranians. Yet, from what I've read and been led to believe,
this is not a totally onesided issue, that, in fact, there are
many people that have historically recognized Iraq as a
separate entity than Iran, and so forth.
Regarding the insurgency, if we're going to be effective in
quelling the violence and establishing some sense of stability,
we're going to have to move to isolate these insurgents and the
militias from their supplies of weapons and other materials.
How we're going to do that remains to be seen, to me. I'm going
to have to work with General Petraeus and our commanders to
figure out how to make an effective strategy, and then
implement this to get the results we want on the ground.
But it seems to me, in the entire approach to Iran, that
we'll be looking for help from the region, and to look at the
full range of options that are open to us diplomatically and
every other way.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Admiral. My time is
expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Admiral Fallon, let me once again welcome you
to this committee, and your family, as well, and thank you for
your outstanding service to our country. I look forward to
working with you in the months and years ahead.
What do you believe are Iran's military and political
intentions in the region, particularly regarding the Persian
Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz? Do you believe that one of
Iran's long-term objectives is to control the flow of oil
through the strait?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, it's difficult for me to ascertain
what's in the minds of the leadership in Tehran in this regard.
We can only make judgments, I believe, based on the behavior
that we've seen to date. They have not been helpful in Iraq,
and it seems to me that, in the region, as they grow their
military capabilities, we're going to have to pay close
attention to what they do and what they may bring to the table.
Now, the U.S. has been, as you well know, playing a
significant role in this part of the world for many decades. I
believe it's in our interest to remain engaged in this region.
My historical discussions with our allies and cooperating
nations in this region indicate a longstanding concern about
Iranian intentions and their influence in the Gulf. It seems to
me that, based on my read of their military hardware
acquisitions and development of tactics and so forth, that they
are posturing themselves with the capability to attempt to deny
us the ability to operate in this vicinity.
But I would note that this is not a one-sided situation, in
that Iran is, I believe, critically dependent on its exports of
petroleum products for its economic vitality, and those
exports, of course, go through the same Strait of Hormuz that
they would potentially seek to deny us access to.
So, it seems to me that there are lots of issues here,
there are many things that ought to be considered as we
approach our engagement in the region. I'll be very anxious to,
particularly, consult with the Gulf-region nations to see
what's new, what's learned, because it's been a number of years
since I actually engaged in this area.
Senator Dole. What do you consider to be the implications
for the United States, for our allies in the region, if the
President's latest deployment fails, if Iraq descends into
civil war? Could you also reflect on implications for Lebanon,
Israel, Jordan, the Gulf states, Afghanistan, and Pakistan?
Admiral Fallon. You've given me a long list of challenges
here to deal with.
Senator Dole. Right. It's a broad question.
Admiral Fallon. I believe there are relationships between
many of these, in a number of areas. I don't know exactly what
the timelines are, but I believe that we have a real challenge
and very little time to start effecting results on the ground.
But it's been my experience that if one can actually see
results in an effort, that people tend to key in on those
results and take heart and move forward. Nowhere has this been
more apparent to me than recently in the southern Philippines,
where the longtime engagement of the U.S. in helping the
Philippine Government and the Armed Forces in trying to build
their capabilities and in working with the population, has been
slowly but surely gaining success, and now, with the recent
military successes of the Philippine army, you can almost see
this thing start to really gain momentum.
The key thing, in my mind, is to arrest this continuing
spiral of violence, to start making some steps in a positive
direction, and then we'll have to assess, on a regular basis--
honestly assess where we are and see how we move forward. I
don't think there's any magic here. I don't have any idea what
the timelines may be, how many months or weeks it's going to
take, but it's very clear that we have to do something
different. We have a prescription for a number of capabilities
that we're going to bring together, and hopefully we'll come up
with the right recipe here to start making progress.
Senator Dole. Let me ask you, in Afghanistan, about the
opium trade, the profiting that's occurring, immensely
profitable, for the Taliban, at this point, actively engaged in
this area. Eradication, obviously, is the necessary first step,
but it has to be complemented by other programs so that Afghan
farmers can make a living, so that they have sufficient long-
term security to ensure that they're not terrorized into
replanting these drug-producing crops.
The President's proposal calls for about $10.6 billion. Is
this sufficient to both cover the increased security issue, as
well as the necessity of the alternative crop programs? Could
you just comment on how you see this situation?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, to be honest, I don't have the
details. I will tell you that, from my most recent visit there,
I got a sense, at least in the eastern part of the country,
that there was a governing structure, an Afghan governing
structure, that was in place. It was young. It was immature.
They were keen to develop themselves in economic ways that were
not reliant upon the drug trade. I believe this is a real
challenge with lots of issues. There's a tradition here that
goes back many centuries for this kind of activity. I'll be
very curious to see what options we may have available. It
seems to me that there's a reasonable degree of security in
most areas, except the south, and if that's the case, then a
strong economic injection of realistic activities would be
what's really needed here. But I'll be happy to get back to you
after I get a better assessment of the situation.
Senator Dole. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Dole.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Thank you, Admiral Fallon, for your service.
Mr. Chairman, I'd appreciate being included on the letter
about the equipment for those that are going to be deployed
abroad.
Chairman Levin. We'd be happy to do that.
Senator Kennedy. Admiral, as has been mentioned during the
course of the questioning, Iran has become an increasingly more
powerful player in the Middle East, but its nuclear ambitions
and support for international terrorism are a threat to the
regional stability and to our national security, and the
question is what to do about it. Senator Akaka mentioned the
President said, on January 10, that Iran is providing material
support for attacks on American troops and that we'd disrupt
the attacks, destroy the networks providing weapons and
training to our enemies, and the next day we raided the Iranian
Government office in Iraq. Last week, President Bush authorized
U.S. forces in Iraq to kill or capture Iranian operatives
inside Iraq. Yesterday, the President further raised the
temperature by saying if Iran escalates its military actions in
Iraq to the detriment of our troops and/or innocent Iraqi
people, we'll respond firmly.
Some have suggested that your nomination, because you'd be
the first naval officer to hold this command, plus the fact
that the U.S. recently sent an additional aircraft carrier
battle group to the Gulf, might be a sign the administration is
preparing for military action against Iran. I certainly hope
this is not the case. Obviously, Congress must be involved in
any decision to broaden war to Iran.
Have you been asked to update war plans for Iran?
Admiral Fallon. No, sir. In fact, I'm not familiar with any
of the CENTCOM plans.
Senator Kennedy. You'd brief the committee, the chair or
the ranking member, if you were asked to do so?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'd be happy to come back and
answer questions you might have.
Senator Kennedy. Okay.
You were well known, during the years in PACOM, for
dialogue with countries in the region. As Pacific Commander,
you gave a speech in Beijing, where you talked about the need
to increase our interactions with China. You said, ``If we're
open with one another, if we share information and ideas, I
think my experience has been, the tendency is to reduce
anxiety, to reduce the fears of the unknown and the suspicions
that come from lack of knowledge and doubt.'' Do you see merit
to that approach in CENTCOM?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, Senator. To the extent that we
can understand better the thoughts and actions of others
reduces substantially, in my experience, the danger of
miscalculation. So, I strongly endorse that approach.
Senator Kennedy. Would you include Iran in that, as well?
Admiral Fallon. I think that in the Iranian situation, I
have to get a better assessment of exactly where we stand.
Senator Kennedy. But you don't exclude that possibility.
Admiral Fallon. I wouldn't exclude that.
Senator Kennedy. Yes.
Admiral Fallon. I'd note that, in China, for example, we
had extensive interaction in almost every other area, aside
from mil-to-mil, so we had a strong foundation. I'm not quite
sure where we stand with Iran and those other areas.
Senator Kennedy. Has the President told you not to talk to
the Iranians?
Admiral Fallon. He has not.
Senator Kennedy. I think, as you point out, there's no
dialogue--exchange of information that would seem to--we would
lack the opportunity, I think, to get the true motivations.
Can you tell us what is your assessment of the Iranian
naval capabilities, and how the U.S. would neutralize these
capabilities?
Admiral Fallon. My understanding of their capabilities is
that they are trying to grow an anti-access force that I
believe would be intended to try to deny us access to the Gulf,
if a situation arose that they might feel compelled to do that.
We are well aware of their capability.
Senator Kennedy. Could you elaborate a little bit on the
anti-access? What does that mean in layman's terms?
Admiral Fallon. They are well aware that the United States
Navy, all of our forces--and, in fact, we operate jointly, as
you well know, in all of our endeavors today. We have very
strong capabilities in many areas. My read of Iranian
investment and training activities tells me that they are aware
of our strike capabilities, for example, they're aware of our
aircraft carrier and submarine strengths, and that they would
try to come up with ways to neutralize us, or keep us as far
away as they could from the scene of action.
Senator Kennedy. Do you believe that they have the ability
to close the Straits of Hormuz?
Admiral Fallon. I would be happy to take that one for the
record. Maybe we could have that in a closed hearing.
Senator Kennedy. Okay.
[The information referred to follows:]
Iran continues to spend a significant portion of its defense budget
on naval forces. Iran's strategy in part centers on their ability to
control and/or close the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, Iran maintains
the capability to interdict sea lanes of communication throughout the
Arabian Gulf and selectively target one or more Gulf countries' off-
shore infrastructure, commercial transit lanes, and anchorages
throughout the region.
Iran maintains a large inventory of naval mines, an expanding
coastal defense force equipped with a mix of Chinese manufactured anti-
ship cruise missile launchers, an extensive mix of high speed fast
attack craft equipped with torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles and
at least 3,000 smaller patrol boats equipped with a mix of heavy
machine guns, rocket propelled grenade launchers, shoulder launched
surface-to-air missile launchers, and anti-tank guided missiles.
Iranian leaders likely realize their naval forces cannot win a
conventional force-on-force naval engagement with U.S. naval forces,
and have therefore developed a strategy that uses their geographic
advantage to put into play a layered defense strategy that relies on
waves of near-simultaneous attacks against maritime targets to
overwhelm the defenses of the target.
Given Iran's current naval forces capability, Iran could attempt to
temporarily close the Strait of Hormuz for a short period, principally
using naval mines and coastal defense forces.
By regional standards, Iran has a well-equipped and professional
navy. Diplomacy and deterrence are our primary means of maintaining
access through the Strait of Hormuz. Should our relationship with Iran
deteriorate to the point of hostilities, we are capable of neutralizing
the military threat to U.S. naval vessels and preserving access through
the strait for commercial traffic.
Senator Kennedy. Finally, Admiral, there was a reference to
an earlier question that was about benchmarks and reaching a
timeframe for benchmarks. Could you comment on that? Do you
think it's necessary to have measurable benchmarks and
timetables set, and, if those benchmarks are not met, that they
have consequences? Or do you believe that this should be open-
ended in terms of reaching benchmarks?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, clearly, not open-ended. I'm not
sure that's the right term. I've heard this now for the last
week, since I've been in town.
Senator Kennedy. Okay.
Admiral Fallon. We have to see progress. We're going to
have to assess the steps. For example, the Iraqi Government has
a significant list of actions that they have stated their
intention to implement. I'd sure like to see some of these
occur.
Senator Kennedy. Okay. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy.
I believe Senator Thune is next.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you for a lifetime of service to your
country, and thank you, as well, for undertaking what is yet
another challenging task so vital to the security interests of
the United States.
During the first Gulf war, you commanded a carrier air wing
on the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt. Since you've previously
commanded combat operations in the Gulf region, can you comment
on how you believe the CENTCOM AOR has changed since Operation
Desert Storm?
Admiral Fallon. First of all, Senator, the boundaries have
changed. There are other nations now in the CENTCOM area that
were not part of the AOR before, so it's a broader domain,
probably more challenges, certainly more active issues ongoing
now than were the focus of attention at that time. I will be
very interested to getting, now, to the next couple of layers
down to see exactly what people are thinking about and why
they're thinking in those matters, as I get out there. But lots
of changes, of course. There are still lots of historical
issues that remain, from my understanding, and I'll be anxious
to get into these and see what we can do to improve,
collectively, the security of this area.
Senator Thune. Do you think that an increased naval
presence in the region will act as a force multiplier to our
ground forces there?
Admiral Fallon. That'll be something I'll be interested to
find out. My understanding today is that the majority of the
activities and the capabilities that are being used are ground.
But I would note that I've seen news reports, have not seen any
intelligence reports this last couple of days, but it's my
understanding, at least from the news media assessments, that
air support was used. The extent to which this is the case and
what's necessary, I just don't know. I'll have to wait until I
get there.
Senator Thune. Do you think that the Navy can maintain a
two-carrier presence in the region indefinitely without
overstretching the Navy?
Admiral Fallon. I don't know. I think I'd go back and have
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) field that question. I can
tell you that I'm an advocate of the flexibility of our forces,
particularly our maritime and air forces, that we ought to use
these in ways to achieve multiple goals, not just deterrence,
which is clearly one of the objectives here, but to engage in
the regions in which we operate, to help support our alliances
and our relationships with people. At the same time, we gain
valuable experience for our own people in training in different
areas. So I think I would let the CNO handle that one, as far
as an internal Navy issue goes.
Senator Thune. One of the things that you had said in your
answer to the advance policy questions regarding your
assessment of the current situation facing the United States in
Iraq, you stated that, ``Sectarian-motivated violence now
inhibits political progress, effective governance, and economic
development. Many other factors, including poor infrastructure,
corruption, and lack of experience at governance, have
exacerbated widespread mistrust between sectarian groups within
Iraq.''
Do you believe that the situation, as you've described it,
can improve if the current security situation in Iraq remains
as it is?
Admiral Fallon. Unlikely.
Senator Thune. If confirmed as CENTCOM Commander, do you
believe that the Iraqi security forces will benefit from an
increased U.S. troop presence, thereby helping them to secure
Baghdad and lay the foundation for a proper withdrawal of
American troops from Iraq?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think that's a really complex
equation, and what I am very interested in finding out is the
extent to which these Iraqi troops are really capable and are
willing, and have the leadership, to stand up and actually do
the things that we would like to have them do. Numbers are
interesting, but it's what they get for results that matter.
So, I'll be very curious--part of the proposal, as I understand
it, is to also substantially ramp up the number of U.S. embeds
in training for these forces. I'm anxious, if confirmed, to
have my own assessment of how we really stand with these
forces. I suspect we're going to see a wide range of capability
and competence. Clearly, the intention is to raise that level
of competency to the maximum extent possible so that we can do
what we really desire to do here.
Senator Thune. It's been stated that America's commitment
is not open-ended. What do you think the consequences should be
if the Iraqi Government fails to step up and follow through on
its promises?
Admiral Fallon. I think those are questions that are
probably best left to the political and diplomatic levels, but
I will make a couple of observations.
I am anxious to see the kind of demonstrated leadership
that I believe is essential for the Iraqi Government to make
progress with its people, but I'm also sensitive to the fact
that this is a very challenging situation to put someone in, to
have a nation newly emerging from decades of totalitarian
abuse, if you would, from a leadership that was corrupt and
very damaging to individuals and organizations.
There is--my understanding--little in the way of tradition.
There's very little in the history here that lends itself to
the kinds of expectations we would like to have from a
pluralistic democratic society. I am not a particularly patient
man. You could probably get some verification of that from my
staff and from my family. But I believe that in this situation,
we're going to have to have some degree of willingness to give
them some time. Nonetheless, we have to see some action, we
have to get some results.
Senator Thune. We are anxious, Admiral, to get you
confirmed and over there so you can begin to make those
assessments and undertake this very important responsibility.
Thank you, again, for your service, and we look forward to
moving you through the process.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I want to congratulate you and your family for all
the sacrifices that you've made and for this new assignment,
and also express my condolences that you will soon be
relocating from Hawaii, which probably the best command that
anyone can have.
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Senator Webb. You have a remarkable diversity of
experiences you are bringing to the table here. You have a lot
of operational experience, you have time in the other building
over there, you have a lot of experience working with Congress,
and, most importantly, you have high-level command experience.
I want you to know at the outset that I've been really
impressed with the depth and the quality of your answers. I
intend to support you fully.
I have a couple of questions that I would like to put to
you.
First, you've spent a good bit of your career operationally
deployed as a naval aviator. You know the costs of deployment
on family life and just the wear and tear on individuals. There
are people who are calling this situation a new strategy. I've
said, a number of times, I don't believe that. I can't see a
new strategy here, in terms of national strategy. What I see is
a sort of an operational adjustment. The possibility here is
that we're going to end up with continued deployment cycles
until the situation can be figured out. We're working from a
pretty fixed baseline, particularly of soldiers and marines, of
people that are available, and units that are available, for
these tasks. On the one hand, the increase of our troop levels,
in the short term, is going to put additional strain on the
Army and the Marine Corps force structure; in the mid-term,
particularly, it is going to place a hardship on the rotational
cycles of units, possibly even further down the line. I couple
that with a concern that's been stated many times on the
Foreign Relations Committee and in this committee as we've had
these hearings over the last month, that was also stated in the
Iraq Study Group Report, that adding more American troops
``could conceivably worsen those aspects of the security
problem that are fed by the view that the United States
presence is intended to be a long-term occupation.'' So, on the
one hand, we have the wear and tear on the troops, and on the
other, we have the perceptions in Iraq that might actually
cause this to be a countervailing influence. I'm wondering if
you have any comments about that.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I certainly share your concerns,
particularly regarding the impact on our forces. I've watched
this very carefully from my current position, because we, as
you well know, have been rotating Pacific-based forces,
particularly Marine and Army forces, into the CENTCOM region.
So, I stay very close to our commanders, and then make my own
assessments, as well. While the Army and Marine Corps have
different constructs in the way they approach their combat
units and their people, there is a common denominator here, and
that is the mid-level leadership, both enlisted and officer, is
in the mode now of repetitive visits to Iraq and Afghanistan.
There is certainly some tremendously good experience being
gained, but I am highly sensitive to the wear and tear on them,
and their families, in particular.
Clearly, this is not going to be something that we would
like to continue for an extended period of time. I will tell
you that I'm going to watch it very closely. Again, I believe
that the potential for success in Iraq--and I truly believe
that we can be successful, or I wouldn't take this job--a lot
of this depends on our ability to actually use the resources in
an effective manner. The numbers, again, interesting, but
doesn't really tell the tale.
What are we really going to do with these people, and how
are we going to measure the results, seems to me to be the real
issue here.
Senator Webb. You have earned a reputation, and you've
increased that reputation over the past hour or so, as someone
who is willing to pursue diplomatic approaches, not in the
sense of backing away from military issues, such as deterrence,
but as someone who's willing to work to develop the right kind
of harmonious relationships, or at least reduce the level of
hostility in relationships. You've done that with China, you've
done that, to a certain extent, with North Korea. I would like
to point out, we did engage Iran, as everyone knows, after the
initial invasion of Afghanistan. We brought them into the
formula when we were looking at the formation of the Karzai
government. It also should be pointed out that the Iraqi
Government itself is engaging Iran. You've made a few
statements in the recent past about wanting to encourage Iran
to play a constructive role.
An overwhelming percentage of the people who have testified
in the Foreign Relations Committee, and a good percentage of
the people who have testified here, the experts on the region,
say that, in terms of a true national strategy here, unless we
have a robust diplomatic effort of some sort that goes hand in
hand with what we're doing, we're not going to reach a solution
to this problem that will increase the stability of the region
and do the other things that we want to do.
How are you looking at that, in terms of Syria and Iran?
Admiral Fallon. Philosophically, I believe in having all
the cards available to put on the table, as the potential might
exist to play them. My approach to PACOM was to go and ask
questions and listen extensively to every voice that I could
find that I thought had the experience and wisdom to provide me
some good advice before I set out on a project to try to help
us engage in a manner that might be useful on security and
stability. I'd like to pursue the same thing in the Middle
East. I have a lot to learn. It seems to me that we make
progress when we are willing to be open and to use every means
at our disposal to try to achieve the ends. But this, of
course, requires reciprocal actions from the other parties. I
don't know the extent to which those endeavors have been
undertaken in the Middle East, but I am very anxious to find
out and to try to play a constructive role in that.
Obviously, we have a Department of State that is the lead
entity for diplomatic engagement with nations. We're seeing
that play out in the Pacific, with Korea, for example. But
there are roles that we, as military commanders, can play, as
well, and I'll be anxious to have a conversation with the
Secretary of State and her principals in this matter so we can
see what the right way ahead is.
Senator Webb. I appreciate your answers, and wish you good
luck.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Good morning, Admiral. I thought I might differ with my
colleague from Virginia on something or another, but I never
thought I would differ more deeply than to suggest that you now
have a hardship assignment, being stationed in Tampa, Florida.
I want to welcome you and your family to our State, and I know,
on behalf of Governor Charlie Crist, we're delighted that
you'll be coming, upon your confirmation. I do trust and hope
that, during your time there, if there's anything we can do to
make your stay better, or your mission easier to accomplish,
that you will not hesitate to call on us. We consider Tampa to
be a welcoming and friendly place. I know you know our State.
You've been in Jacksonville before, and we look forward to
having you.
Recently, I had the opportunity to speak to a high-ranking
official of the Iraqi Government, in fact, a couple of days
ago--and one of the things that he stressed with me was the
regret of the lack of, and the need for, a security agreement
with the United States Government, between the Iraqi and the
U.S. Governments. Apparently, to his way of thinking, it is
essential for there to be such an agreement in place, for the
Government of Iraq to then fully be able to carry out the type
of things that we anticipate that they should be doing in this
new way forward. Are you aware of the status of that? If not,
would you address that issue, upon taking your command?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I don't have any knowledge of it,
but I'd be happy to take a look at it, if confirmed.
Senator Martinez. Perhaps you and General Petraeus could
look at that. I did not realize that this was an issue, but I--
--
Admiral Fallon. It's probably not surprising, since we're
basically starting from the ground floor and building a defense
and security structure in that country.
Senator Martinez. I think the concern was the lack of
flexibility for them to be able to act and direct their own
forces, and things of that nature.
Admiral, turning us to Afghanistan, and, of course, to
Iraq, as well--the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) seems
to be a key part of our strategy of reconstruction and
rebuilding, which I think is so essential to political
acquiescence, and, I think, particularly in southern
Afghanistan, this is of great importance. I was wondering
whether you have faith in these PRTs and this approach, and
what you might do to enhance their success?
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator. I'll be anxious to get
more detailed understanding of what they've been able to
accomplish. It seems to me that it's a great idea. It looks
terrific on paper. I've actually visited with a couple of these
PRT entities in Iraq and Afghanistan. It seems to me that this
is an issue, in fact, that I'd like to discuss with General
Petraeus, because I think that the effectiveness of these PRTs
is going to be significantly related to the degree of security
of the environment in which they operate. If you were able to
maximize the capabilities of the individuals that are assigned
to these teams, then we need to ensure that they're actually
being able to engage in the population issues that are desired.
So, I don't have enough detail yet. I'm favorably inclined
to this kind of a construct, and look forward to finding out
how we're really doing.
Senator Martinez. One of the issues in Afghanistan, of
course, under NATO command, is the commitment of our NATO
partners to doing all that is necessary. I know the chairman,
in his opening remarks, touched upon the limitations upon the
use of some of our allies forces. How will you be addressing
that issue?
Admiral Fallon. That's one area in which I do have
significant experience, having worked with NATO and been a
commander in NATO before, and spent a couple of years in the
policy shop, working in and out of Brussels. There's some
phenomenal goodness that's come out of the NATO alliance, and
I'll tell you frankly that I've learned a lot from our NATO
allies. But it is challenging to have an operational construct
in which you have a long list of caveats that our commanders
have to deal with. I don't know enough yet to really be making
any public statements on it. I'll be interested to consult with
our folks in Afghanistan. I think there's a tremendous amount
of goodness in having the NATO nations step up and to be a part
of the solution in Afghanistan. Exactly how we figure out how
to optimize this contribution is probably a challenge that we
need to undertake. But I do have familiarity with the process
and a pretty good understanding of the background and how
nations work together in this alliance, so I'll look forward to
working with them.
Senator Martinez. On the issue of Iran, I understand that
there's been some concern raised by the President's comments;
however, I find them to be consistent with the responsibilities
of the Commander in Chief. I think what he said was that if
Iran operatives are causing harm and death to our troops, that
we will deal with them forcefully and that we will come after
them and arrest them or otherwise deal with them. Do you find
anything troubling about that policy? Does it immediately
suggest some more aggressive actions against Iran, other than
dealing with their incursions into Iraq and creating conditions
that will cause harm to our troops?
Admiral Fallon. Seems to me we need to take every step
that's reasonable in the circumstances to try to provide this
atmosphere of security and stability. The Iranian international
behavior has drawn the attention and response from the
international community. This isn't, I believe, just the
President seeing a problem with this country's behavior, the
leadership in this country's behavior. These are issues that
I'm anxious to get a better understanding of, particularly as
it pertains to activity inside of Iraq, and to work, to the
maximum extent possible, to try and find the right solutions.
Senator Martinez. Admiral, my time is expired, but I want
to thank you for your service, your family's sacrifice, and
your willingness to undertake this difficult assignment, and
wish you well.
Thank you.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Fallon, thank you. It's great to be able to listen
to you today. I must say--you couldn't see this, because you
were looking at the committee--when you said that you're not a
patient man, I would describe the response of your family as a
benign smile, which is to say, I think they agreed with that,
but, nonetheless, continue to love you. [Laughter.]
That's a good way to go off to this assignment. We're going
to need your impatience here, as well as the thoughtfulness
that you've shown the committee this morning.
Earlier, in response to a question from one of my
colleagues, you, I think, gave an interesting and important
answer about the extent to which, as I heard it--and I want you
to confirm whether I heard it right--you would be involved in
what might be called the day-to-day command of Multi-National
Forces in Iraq. I thought I heard you say--and, of course,
that's General Petraeus's job; obviously, you'd be watching
what's happening, asking questions, as presumably you would
with General McNeill, when he takes over the NATO forces and
American forces, because you have a lot else to do in that AOR.
Did I hear you right?
Admiral Fallon. I believe you did, from your description of
my comments. I have a regional responsibility, and will be
working hard in those lanes. I will rely on our commanders in
the field, the subordinate commanders, to carry out their jobs.
But I believe that's the responsibility of command to make sure
that I understand what they're doing and how they're doing it.
The key issue for me and for this Nation in Iraq is to be
getting results. So, those are the kinds of questions I'm going
to be asking and the expectations that I'll have for General
Petraeus and other commanders are that they have a plan, they
understand what we're trying to do, and they can show me--the
term ``benchmarks'' has been used here--I'd like to see a plan
of action and milestones to actually get somewhere, and I will
be tracking those results. To the extent that I have to be
engaged with them on a day-to-day level, I will, to assure me,
give me the confidence so that I can come back and assure the
leadership of this Nation that we're actually making progress
in the endeavors we've undertaken.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that answer. Personally, I
believe it's the right one. We have good commanders on the
ground that we've sent there. Obviously, you have broad
responsibilities in the region. It seems to me--and I think no
matter how we feel, particularly about what's happening in Iraq
now here on this panel, and what we think should happen, that
most everybody agrees that what's happening in Iraq has
regional implications and, I would say, is part of a larger
regional conflict playing out. So, to the extent that you have
time to deal with that regionally throughout CENTCOM, the
Middle East generally, which, as you've said, has always been
an area of priority concern for American foreign policy
interested in stability, both politically and because of the
economic importance to our country, of oil, and now facing an
enemy of the larger war against Islamist extremism and
terrorism, an enemy which has, generally speaking, emerged from
that region, I think it's critically important that you have
the time to help our Nation make progress on those larger
concerns.
I want to ask this question. It has struck me, at various
times when I've traveled around to meet our commanders on
different commands, that, in a way that most people don't
appreciate, PACOM from which you've come, but also CENTCOM to
which you're going--the military leader that we put in charge
there is, in my ways, the most prominent American
representative in the region. Sometimes people call for a
special representative to the Middle East. I think you're going
to be the special representative to the Middle East. I
appreciated, before, what you said, in response to another
colleague's question, that you would be consulting with the
State Department and the Secretary of State, because I think--
and I base this with appreciation on the good work, military-
to-military, but also military-to-governmental leaders in the
region that you've done in PACOM--that you have the potential
to help us make progress, not only in our military relations,
but in our diplomatic relations, with our allies and others in
the region. I just wanted to ask you whether, as you go off,
you consider that to be one of your priorities.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, thank you for your confidence.
I'll be happy to play any role that would be constructive in
this area. In the Pacific, the far Pacific and Asia are, of
course, a long way from Washington, D.C., and so, we have the
opportunity to engage, to a greater extent, probably than might
be the case in other areas that are closer to the U.S.
There's also a longstanding tradition of good work by many
of my predecessors out there who have established relationships
and expectations with these nations that continue to this day.
So, it was a real joy to actually get out and visit these
countries, and not just the military people, but their
political, diplomatic leaders, as well, and to get folks to
engage on issues of common concern. It's worked out there, and
I've seen it work in other areas. I'll be anxious to do
whatever I can, and to play as helpful a role as possible here
in this region, as well.
Senator Lieberman. I think there is an enormous role that
you can play. The fact is that in many parts of the world where
people on the ground may not have friendly thoughts toward us,
generally, today, unfortunately, they continue to have a lot of
respect and appreciation for the American military. Your
ability to build on that in your relations with the indigenous
militaries in the region, but also with the political
leadership, I think can be very important at this critical
moment in our relations with the command you're about to take.
I thank you very much, and wish you all the blessings as
you go forward with your family.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, we do all wish you well. Just the 30,000-foot view
of things--and if you've been asked these questions before, I
apologize--but from the big things, in terms of this new
command that you're taking on, General Petraeus said that he
believed that Iraq was part of the overall war on terror, that
it was a central battlefront. Do you concur in that?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, I certainly do.
Senator Graham. So, the outcome in Iraq would affect the
overall war on terror positively or negatively. It's not a
neutral event. You agree?
Admiral Fallon. Absolutely not.
Senator Graham. Okay. There's a debate here on the role of
Congress as to what we should do and how we should do it, and
that's part of democracy. General Petraeus said that a
resolution passed by Congress disapproving of the mission that
he's about to embark on, in his opinion, would be detrimental
to morale. What's your opinion?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think these issues are being
discussed in the political realm, and I'd prefer to keep them
there. I'll be honest with you, I haven't even looked at the
wording of any of these proposals. I have a very significant
military task to do, if confirmed, and I'd much prefer to focus
on that activity to try to effect some results that we could
all be happy with.
Senator Graham. Is Iraq winnable, militarily?
Admiral Fallon. Not militarily. But could this situation in
Iraq be turned around? I firmly believe it can, if we have the
engagement of the capabilities that are necessary to help----
Senator Graham. I agree, we're not seeking a military
victory in Iraq, we're trying to turn around the situation, in
terms of security. That's the goal, right?
Admiral Fallon. Security and stability, so that the
government has a chance to stand up on its own. But this is not
a ``do this, and then maybe you can do this.''
Senator Graham. What would be ``winning'' in Iraq?
Admiral Fallon. I don't know what ``winning'' is. This is
one of the things that I'd be working with the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of State to lay out, with our
subordinate commanders. But it seems to me that what we're
trying to do here is to give this young government an
opportunity to be representative of its people and to govern
this country in a manner that people could be happy.
Senator Graham. Can I suggest what ``winning'' might be?
That you have a stable, functioning democracy in Iraq out of
the ashes of a dictatorship that's an ally in the war on
terror, where women have a robust role in society? Would that
be a good definition of ``winning''?
Admiral Fallon. I think there are a lot of aspects there
that would be pretty positive, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. Could you envision a democracy
emerging in Iraq with this level of violence at the current
state?
Admiral Fallon. I would have two comments. One, clearly not
much in the way of progress is going to occur with the current
levels of violence and instability, but I think that we would
probably be wise to temper our expectations here, that the
likelihood that Iraq is suddenly going to turn into something
that looks close to what we enjoy here in this country is going
to be a long time coming. But, first things first. Get some
stability and security for the people and then----
Senator Graham. Well, that's the question. What is the
first thing first? Is the first thing for us to start
withdrawing, so the Iraqis will step up to the plate and do
more? Or is the first thing to help the Iraqis get control of
the violence so they can solve their problems politically?
What's your view of the first thing?
Admiral Fallon. My view is that there are several first
things, but there's a fundamental understanding of----
Senator Graham. Well, what's the first of the first things?
Admiral Fallon. We have help to increase security and
stability in that country.
Senator Graham. That's going to take, partially, military
involvement.
Admiral Fallon. Sure.
Senator Graham. Let's walk through the whole idea of the
surge. It's on more than one front. The 21,500 troops are
designed to help provide a better security environment
militarily, is that correct?
Admiral Fallon. The troops that are going in are to try to
enable us to effect a different operational construct on the
ground. As General Petraeus outlined in his visit here last
week, the idea is to try----
Senator Graham. What does that mean? We're trying to send
more troops to help the Iraqis control the violence, with them
out front. We're having a better ability to hold. Is that
correct?
Admiral Fallon. Some of the Iraqis have demonstrated an
ability to be effective, and some have not. It's a work in
progress.
Senator Graham. The problem we're trying to send troops to
correct is the ability to hold once we clear. Is that correct?
Admiral Fallon. If we are to be effective, we have to be
able to secure some of these neighborhoods and some of these
areas in the country so that the processes of democracy have a
chance to succeed.
Senator Graham. Do you think troops being sent in can help
accomplish that goal?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. The other thing that we're trying to
surge is economic ability of the country. Unemployment in
Baghdad is at almost 40 percent in some regions. Part of the
strategy is to create jobs so people will not be tempted to
take money from militias to attack our troops. Is that correct?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. Another part of the strategy is to
have a rule of law so that any group, regardless of background,
if they engage in actions against our troops or to topple the
government, they will pay a heavy price. Is that correct?
Admiral Fallon. My understanding is that aspect of society,
government in Iraq, is very poorly developed.
Senator Graham. So, we need to develop along three fronts:
a better rule of law, a better economy, and a better security
environment. That's the plan of the surge, right, on three
fronts?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think there are many tasks in
Iraq, and the biggest challenge right now is to get the level
of violence down, to establish baseline security that will
enable us to move forward on some of these other areas.
Senator Graham. You would support sending more troops to
accomplish that goal?
Admiral Fallon. I don't know how many troops are going to
be necessary to effect the outcome that we want, but General
Petraeus, in my conversations with him, communicated that he
believes he needs these troops now to get moving----
Senator Graham. If he said he needed more, you would
support him?
Admiral Fallon. I don't know, sir. I haven't been there
yet, and I'm not in a position to make that judgment.
Senator Graham. Well, is his judgment about 21,500--does it
make sense to you?
Admiral Fallon. I will better be able to give you an
informed answer when I understand the situation better.
Senator Graham. From the Iranian point of view, if you were
informed, early on in your tenure here, that there was a
sanctuary being provided by the Iranian Government for
terrorists who are killing American soldiers and military
personnel in Iraq, is that in our National interest to allow
that sanctuary to continue?
Admiral Fallon. That doesn't sound like a good idea to me.
It's one of the things that I'll be interested in learning if I
get the opportunity to get the intel briefs from CENTCOM.
Senator Graham. Finally, last question, from the Iranian
point of view, do you consider, based on what you know now,
that the Iranian involvement in Iraq is counterproductive to
developing a democracy in Iraq?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'm not sure what the Iranian
viewpoint is here, but it seems to me that, from my
observations from the outside, that we have not seen a
constructive role in Iraq from Iran. I would be interested to
find out if, in fact, this is the case or not.
Senator Graham. Good luck, Admiral.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, you can tell by the comments
that have been made that there is a difference of opinion on
this committee as to the effectiveness of the President's
decision on an additional 21,000 troops. Senator Warner
mentioned that there are 10 Senators that have joined him. I am
one of the 10. It is my personal feeling that the 21,000
troops, most of which are to go into Baghdad, will not help in
the middle of the situation of sectarian violence that we find,
which Senator Warner correctly noted, goes back a thousand
years. It actually goes back almost 1,500 years, right after
the death of Mohammed, when his son-in-law split off, and that
became the Shiite sect, born of rebellion and revenge. It's
been going on ever since. It's going on there right now.
I want you to know how much I appreciate your candor and
your openmindedness in approaching this, because good
intentioned, well-informed Senators at this table have a
different opinion about this. Personally, I think that
additional troops in Anbar province would help. The Marine
generals there convinced me that it would help. But not in
Baghdad, and certainly not 20,000. Maybe 200,000, maybe 300,000
in Baghdad, but not 20,000.
So, I approach my comments and my questions with that as a
background. I also want to say that this Senator, along with
several others, including numbers that have mentioned it here
today, appreciate the candor with which General Abizaid has
come to that table over and over again. Personally, I hate to
see him step down. But he has given his full measure in a very
difficult situation. As I said to General Petraeus, I would say
to you, Godspeed, Admiral, as you embark on this enormously
important duty, taking over, with the goal of stabilizing Iraq.
I appreciate the fact that you took a risk stepping out,
with regard to China. What can we expect with regard to Iran?
What kind of reach-out? I know you can't answer it, but just,
kind of, give me a flavor of your attitude as we approach this
difficult thing and in that Baker-Hamilton Report--and, by the
way, they are testifying this afternoon to our Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. They said an aggressive diplomatic effort
in the entire region, including Syria and Iran.
But give me the state of your mind, if you would.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I will be very anxious to consult
with colleagues in the Department of State and in the region to
gain a better appreciation than I have of the situation in
Iraq. But I believe that there are some significant
differences, just right off the bat, in the situation I
encountered in China. First and foremost, I believe, is the
extent to which the relationship between the U.S. and China had
developed on many fronts prior to my arrival. In fact, there
were things that we were able to do in our engagement that had
been done by some predecessors. My understanding, from this
vantage point, of the situation in Iran is that we are not at
that level at all. There is activity that's occurred on the
part of the Iranian government that has been seen by the
international community as not only not helpful in the region,
but in the world, and particularly in regard to the potential
to develop nuclear weapons.
So, I believe we have to be cautious and careful in our
approaches to this country, but I am quite anxious to find out,
to the best of my ability, the lay of the land, and then work
with colleagues at State to see what the best way forward is.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you for your comments, and thank
you for your openmindedness.
I want to ask you about the training and equipping of Iraqi
troops. I don't want to concentrate on just the number of Iraqi
troops trained, but, rather, your assessment of how reliable
they are. The reason I want to raise this issue with you is
that I raised this with General Petraeus. The number, 325,000
had been thrown out in an answer to my question from General
Petraeus. I asked, ``Are they reliable?'' He said, ``They are
not all reliable, sir,'' and then went on to modify and qualify
that. Then I said, ``Well, can you put a percentage on it of
how many of them are reliable?'' He says, ``Sir, I cannot, from
this divide.'' Can you give us any sense of what you think that
we would have some greater degree of comfort with regard to a
plan that the President has of going into Baghdad, on a dual
command structure in the operation of ``clear'' and then
``hold,'' before you ever get to ``build,'' having the Iraqi
army and the U.S. military side by side?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'd go back, first, to a comment
on dual command structure. I have no idea what the structure is
that the ground commanders over there have in mind, but
whatever it is, it has to be one in which we can effectively
employ our forces and we have the confidence that we can
safeguard their well-being.
I cannot tell you, with any degree of accuracy, what
percentage of troops, or what the numbers are, that are
effective. I believe that this is pretty judgmental, it's
pretty subjective, in my opinion, my experience, and it's one
that I am very anxious to gain an appreciation for from our
ground commanders.
I've always been someone who felt more comfortable in
smaller numbers of very effective capabilities than a large
number of whatever is decorating the landscape. So, I will be
very interested in trying to find out where we really stand
with these forces.
Because we're going to depend on them to carry the water.
This is the objective here, is to turn this over to them so
they can effectively safeguard their country.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I want to make one other
comment.
It's hard for me to understand how we can come to the table
and support a surge that is predicated on the fact of the
reliability of the Iraqi army, when nobody can answer if, in
fact, the Iraqi army is reliable, and that we're asking 20,000
more Americans to go in there to fight alongside Iraqi troops,
when we, in fact, don't know. Nobody has been able to answer.
These are questions that Senator Warner, Senator Levin, and I
and others have been asking.
I'll just finish, Mr. Chairman. How would you go about
measuring the reliability of the Iraqi troops?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, from my experience, we observe
them training. This is how we measure and conduct our
assessments of our own troops. We watch them in their training,
and then we put them in situations in which we can actually see
them perform, and then we make an assessment of their ability
to measure up to the expectations that we have. I would expect
to have our commanders doing the exact same thing with the
Iraqi forces, with an understanding that, first and foremost,
these are Iraqi forces working for an Iraqi command structure
and Iraqi Government. I think this is an issue in which we have
to be a little careful, here, about putting pretty heavy
fingerprints. Certainly, we have to have confidence that the
security structure in Iraq is going to be able to carry its end
of the bargain up, or clearly we're not going to be successful.
Senator Bill Nelson. In the spirit of candor, you will come
back to us and report on your measurement of whether or not
they're reliable.
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, welcome to the committee today, and thank you for
being the great soldier that you are. We appreciate your
service to our country and your taking on this very daunting
challenge which you have ahead of you at CENTCOM. But knowing
that you spent--although it be a very brief time at Glenco, we
know that you're well trained to take on this task ahead of
you.
Admiral Fallon. Five years in ``Albenny,'' too, sir.
Senator Chambliss. ``Albenny,'' huh? I can tell you were,
when you say it that way.
First of all, let me just say that I think you're going to
be working with another truly great American in General
Petraeus, and this is going to be the first time in a while
that we've had a Navy CENTCOM Commander and an Army general in
theater. Any dynamics there that you think are advantageous to
us, from the standpoint of having two branches represented?
Admiral Fallon. I think you have tremendous potential for
synergy. General Petraeus, widely respected for his expertise
and thoughtful approach to land warfare, and I've been
operating in a different environment, but anxious to
collaborate in any way we can.
Senator Chambliss. Good.
I just have one question for you, and it really relates to
Afghanistan. Last week, I had the privilege of meeting with the
Assistant Minister of Defense for Afghanistan, Mr. Mohibullah.
While he discussed the progress of the Afghan national army is
making in growing and training their forces, he reiterated to
me the importance of a strong and continuous commitment by the
United States to the security of Afghanistan. At the same time,
one of his priorities is to train and equip Afghan forces in
order to lessen the Afghanis' reliance on U.S. forces.
I believe that this is an extremely important priority,
since, in the end, it's the Afghan forces who can best defend
and secure Afghanistan, and because U.S. forces are
increasingly stretched thin due to commitments in Iraq, as well
as elsewhere. I'd appreciate you discussing, a little bit, how
the United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan are partnering
with the Afghan army to facilitate this training and equipping,
and explain what you will do to ensure that this training
proceeds as quickly and efficiently as possible.
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I am also anxious to get into this
and find out the details. I don't have the appreciation I'd
like for this. I'm told that the Afghan national army is making
progress, and not just in numbers, but in competence. The
anecdotals that I hear from our people are pretty favorable. We
have more work to do with the police, but I think I can
understand that.
So, I'll be anxious to see just how we're doing, and I'd be
happy to report back to you when I have an assessment of that.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Like others, I want to thank you for your service, and
thank your family.
I am very aware, as I think many Americans are at this
point, of the serious problems that we have in the area of
acquisition and contracting in Iraq. Frankly, I sat in on a
hearing last week in a subcommittee of this committee, where I
realized that this problem is not limited to the conflict in
Iraq, that there are serious and significant issues with the
way the Department of Defense is purchasing and contracting for
services.
Who should be held accountable within the military when
there is serious problems with the way money is being misspent
or in cases of actual fraud and bribery?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'm not familiar with the details
of this issue. We hold commanders accountable. In my
experience, the responsible individuals measure up to our
expectations, and particularly the applicable laws and
regulations, and, if they don't, then they pay the consequence.
Senator McCaskill. I guess what I'm trying to get at is
we're not in a moneymaking operation in the Government. There
is no bottom-line pressure. We don't need to worry about
whether we're making a profit. So, the only way we have of
controlling the way money is spent is who's held accountable.
I'm beginning to get information that is just, frankly, mind-
numbing about the lack of accountability within the Department
of Defense as it relates to problems with acquisition and
purchasing. An example of the Inspector General's (IG) warning
that they are violating the Antideficiency Act, and then they
did it a hundred more times, after warned by the IG that what
they were doing, in terms of the way they were purchasing
things, was violating the law. I understand the rub between
urgent and compelling, and you want to go quickly and get
necessary equipment. I think what I'm worried about is that I
noticed, over the weekend, somebody was found guilty of
bribery, the person who was in charge of comptroller on the
ground with the Provisional Reconstruction Authority in Iraq,
and evidently, a couple of Reserve officers were co-
conspirators. But when does it move up the food chain? I took
the seat of an American figure in history that had a favorite
saying about ``The buck stops here.'' Where does the buck stop
for these problems? Who, within the military command, takes
responsibility for the problems beneath their command as it
relates to acquisition and contracts?
Admiral Fallon. Ma'am, my experience, if I'm the
responsible commander, I'll take responsibility for it. I don't
know any detail of the accusations or of the issues. I'll be
happy to try to find out. I believe that it's a key component
of our responsibility, as leaders, to be accountable, to be
efficient, as well as effective, with the resources that the
American people, the taxpayers of this country, give to us. I
think there should be little doubt in the minds of our
commanders that they're going to be held accountable for that,
and I'd be happy to look into it, if you'd give me some
specifics.
Senator McCaskill. Are you aware of any time under your
command while you've been serving your country--so well, by the
way, in many different capacities--are you ever aware of anyone
under your command being found either administratively or
legally liable under the Antideficiency Act?
Admiral Fallon. I don't think I can answer that question
honestly without a little bit of research.
Senator McCaskill. Okay. As it relates to the rub, when it
comes to that--and that is, equipment for the men and women who
are serving us--I want to briefly tell you a true story.
Last February, there was an article in the Monett, MO,
newspaper about this community coming together because a young
National Guard member who was serving in Iraq had written home
and asked his mom to go down to the local tool and die shop. He
said, ``Mom, we've gotten the armor for vehicles over here in
our unit, but we don't have any tools to put them on. Would you
see if the man that owns the local tool and die shop would send
us the tools we need to put the armor on our vehicles?'' After
that was published a lot of people at Monett were really proud
of what they had done, because, of course, they sent them the
tools to put the armor on their vehicles. My sister and I went
down to the basement and dug out the letters from my dad, who
served in World War II in Europe, and he wrote home for peanut
brittle and for new socks. He didn't write home for tools to
put the armor on his vehicle.
With the National Guard being stretched as they are, and
with all the stories we've read of equipment they're leaving
behind that is no longer operable, how are we taking steps to
make sure that we don't have these young men and women having
to write home for the tools to put the armor on their vehicle?
Admiral Fallon. Ma'am, all I can tell you is that, if I'm
confirmed, I'll do everything in my power to ensure that our
forces are the best-equipped, best-trained, and best-prepared
to conduct the operations we ask them to do.
Senator McCaskill. In terms of before a Guard or Reserve
unit is sent over, is there some internal process that would
help me understand that someone has to check off that all the
equipment they need is ready and available before they're sent?
Or is it, you send them and then try to figure it out later?
Admiral Fallon. No, that's certainly not the way it is.
There are all kinds of processes that are in place to try to
make sure that we have the appropriate equipment and so forth.
But I think a reality of life is that there are going to be
many issues and many cases of desires for things, and the
ability of the system, if you would, be it the Army or the
other Services or the Guard, to meet those demands is something
that has to be worked and negotiated. I think, my experience,
one of the challenges of command is to try to determine what
the appropriate balance is between the desire and the need. I
can tell you from my experience, there's an endless desire. If
I listened to all the demands that were asked of me, there's
not enough money in the world to cover these things.
Senator McCaskill. Sure.
Admiral Fallon. So, you, I would hope, would rely on the
judgment and experience of those in command to try to make the
best determination as to where we are with these things.
I can tell you that, if I get out into this command, I'll
certainly be happy to be take a look at it, and would make it a
priority, to the best of my ability, to make sure that our
folks are as well prepared as we can make them for whatever we
ask them to do.
Senator McCaskill. I would appreciate it if you would try
to follow up with the committee and with my office about the
question I asked about violations of the Antideficiency Act and
what accountability there is.
[The information referred to follows:]
While reporting and remedial action of Antideficiency Act (ADA)
violations are the purview of the Services under title 10, I am
committed to ensuring component commanders meet their fiscal
responsibilities. Also, understand this committee requested ADA
violation data from the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller
during her February 6, 2006, testimony, thus defer to her response on
the number of violations.
Senator McCaskill. Second, I didn't have time for this, but
I would like to know, and, once again, this could be in a
follow-up later. Is there a plan for what happens if this
doesn't work, if the Iraqi brigades don't show up, if the
police personnel don't stand up, if this is not successful--is
there a plan, going forward?
[The information referred to follows:]
Adjustments to our force posture and strategy are conditioned
based. As we identify changes to both the friendly and enemy situation,
modifications and adaptations to our tactical plans will be made and
should be expected. As the Iraqi's deploy forces to the Baghdad area,
we will be able to evaluate their effectiveness and progress.
Simultaneously, we will continually evaluate our effectiveness on the
ground. Our contingency planning for the way forward will be based on
such assessments and we will adjust our plans accordingly.
Senator McCaskill. I think you've been very candid today. I
think we all value that highly. Thank you. I think you've done
a great job today, and I wish you the very best and safety.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Chairman Levin.
Admiral Fallon, you've had, by all accounts, an excellent
tenure in the Pacific. You've been out on that blue water, and
now you have some brown sand to spend your time on. It'll be
quite a change, I think. But your abilities are well
recognized. You're known as a strong leader, a person who's
willing to stand up, say what he believes, and insist that
things happen that ought to happen, and when they should
happen.
I know the equipment situation is not perfect, but I don't
believe any military has ever been better equipped, better
supplied than this one has. In this very distant theater, and
very hostile, and remote areas, I'm sure there have been some
times when equipment and things were not what we needed.
They're entitled to the best equipment, the best strategy--
that's important, a good strategy--and execution of that
strategy. My former Deputy Attorney General in Alabama, General
Richard Allen, a retired Army Reserve general, used to quote
Patton as saying--I think it was like this--``A poor plan
violently executed today is better than a good plan tomorrow.''
What I want to tell you is that there is an intense
interest in this area. We do not have a lot of time. When
General Petraeus says, ``I need this kind of equipment, I need
the State Department to do this, I need improvement on
electricity, or I need more this or that,'' I mean, somebody
has to get it. The time is short. This is a matter of high
national importance, important for the national security of
this country, our foreign policy, our credibility as a Nation,
and our safety, that we be successful in Iraq. I still believe
firmly that is a realistic possibility that we can achieve. But
we don't have much time, and we don't need to wait around a lot
of time.
First let me ask you--I know you've talked with General
Petraeus, and he spoke to me, and I asked him about you, and he
was very complimentary of you. Since he's going back now for
his third tour, he has helped train the Iraqi army. He knows, I
assume, almost all of their leaders personally. Do you think
you have the kind of relationship that can be effective? How
can you help him be effective in Iraq?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I'll look forward to working with
General Petraeus. We have only recently met and had several
conversations, not nearly enough to be where we want to be,
but, hopefully, in due course, that'll occur.
I think we're tremendously advantaged having his experience
on the ground. His successive tours over there, although
clearly very demanding on himself, and, particularly, his
family, should give him the insight to be able to pretty
quickly assess where we are, because he's seen this now from
several years back, the year before last, and now today. I
would think this would be immensely valuable as we try to
really find out where we are.
I hope to be of assistance to him, using my experience in
other areas and in this region of the world, as well, to try to
put his work in Iraq in the perspective of the region. I think
that, while he's going to be hard at work inside the country,
working those details, I might be of benefit to him around the
periphery to try to set the conditions that might be favorable
for him to execute his actions inside the country.
Senator Sessions. I think that's a good answer, and it has
potential to be a good relationship, and I hope that you will
work on that.
Senator Reed and, I think, a number of Senators on both
sides of the aisle, have been concerned about the interagency
process. In one of our briefings, I asked, about the State
Department, who's in charge of economic development, and the
answer is the State Department. Who's in charge of
infrastructure improvement? The answer, fundamentally, is the
State Department. Who's in charge of intergovernmental
relations? The answer is the State Department. Who's in charge
of building a court system? Justice and State. Who's in charge
of a lot of these things? Other departments and agencies. All
of those matters I just mentioned, would you not agree, are
critical to a stable and peaceful Iraq--improvement in those
areas?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, of course. We need to make
progress in each of these areas. I can tell you, from my
experience in the Pacific, we had what I consider a terrific
working relationship with the Department of State--with our
Ambassadors in the region, with Secretary Christopher Hill, the
East Asia Pacific Assistant Secretary. We worked issues every
day, from a regional perspective, individual ambassadors
working within the countries, to try to work with each other to
set the conditions to enable us to be successful. I could
probably spend half an hour on that.
Senator Sessions. I'm not demeaning the State Department.
I'm just talking about this problem. You're going in an
area, and we need things done now. We don't need to be waiting
for months and months to get negotiations and go through some
bureaucratic process to get a power plant in some area of Iraq
that's critical to gaining stability for the local mayor, who
wants to be on our side, and we have to ask it, and it goes
around, and, a year later, it occurs. I'm pretty worried about
that. Frankly, the State and the other departments, who also
need to contribute more, are having a hard time getting people
to come. They're not as willing to go out in dangerous areas as
the military is. So, I think some of the matters need to be
turned over to the military, more than perhaps in the past, and
that the other agencies of our Government need to be more
responsive to the legitimate needs of our soldiers, who are
placing their lives at risk.
Are you willing to use the courage and determination that
you're famous for to stand up for our soldiers there, to make
sure this whole interagency process works, and, if need be,
call the President of the United States? He's in charge of this
thing. He's the one that can direct any agency to do anything
to make these things happen.
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, and I believe he's anxious to do
whatever is necessary to enable us to achieve success. We're
going to work this, hard. Recognize the need to have these
folks, but also recognize that the military is an expeditionary
organization, we're geared to working overseas and at long
distances. The Department of State certainly is not, except in
their ambassadors. But I recognize the issue. We're going to do
everything we can.
Senator Sessions. It's something to work on. But, for
example, if you conclude that we need 2 to 3 times the number
of prison bed spaces as I believe we do in the immediate
future, and probably 5 to 10 times in the long term, will you
push the bureaucracy to get moving on it? Because, truthfully,
we have a catch-and-release policy there now, catching
dangerous people and releasing them, because there's no way to
get them housed. Are you willing to take an aggressive action
on that if need be?
Admiral Fallon. You bet, sir.
Senator Sessions. You've also confronted the question of
missile defense in the Pacific with North Korea. Now we see the
danger with the Iranians, who move that up. I think you've said
that our defenses for missile defense capabilities should keep
pace with the threat. It seems that the threat is stepping up
its pace. Do you think that we need to keep pace with that as
we develop our defense budgets?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir, Senator. I believe we need to
stay ahead of the power curve, and I believe we've made
substantial progress in this country, in the past year, in
missile defense. We might want to discuss that in a different
setting. But there's been a lot of progress made, and a lot of
lessons that we've learned in the Pacific, that I think would
be applicable here, in other regions of the world, as well.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
We'll have a 3-minute second round.
Admiral, in the advance policy questions, you were asked,
``What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to
make the political compromises necessary for a political
solution?'' What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?
Your answer, ``Current levels of suffering experienced by the
Iraqi population should motivate the political leaders to make
progress.''
Admiral, that hasn't happened. They've had 3\1/2\ years-
plus of suffering. It hasn't motivated the Iraqi political
leaders to make the compromises, which everybody says are
essential to be made if there's going to be an end to the
violence. I don't know of anybody, no matter what side of this
issue they are, or who does not say there must be a political
solution if there's going to be an end to the violence. The
Iraqis have not reached those political compromises. It seems
to me what pressure will be put on them and will make them
reach those compromises is the issue which divides so many of
us. But I don't think your answer, frankly, is satisfactory,
``The suffering experienced by the Iraqi population should
motivate the leaders.'' Of course it should, but it hasn't. So,
my question is, what other leverage, since that hasn't worked,
does the U.S. have in this regard?
Admiral Fallon. Senator Levin, you're aware that the Iraqi
Government has outlined a series of steps that have been called
benchmarks in some quarters----
Chairman Levin. Most of which they've not taken.
Admiral Fallon. --and they need to take these steps.
Chairman Levin. But what's the leverage?
Admiral Fallon. We need to hold them accountable.
Chairman Levin. How?
Admiral Fallon. By, I believe, having a very firm dialogue
with the leadership. Some of that, I believe, has already
occurred. We have given them some time----
Chairman Levin. What are the consequences if they fail
again?
Admiral Fallon. If there's no progress, then I don't
believe we're going to be successful in the military actions.
There has to be a commensurate movement forward in political
background that's going to give these people the confidence
that they can actually effectively move forward as a country.
Chairman Levin. How important, Admiral, are clear, real,
significant consequences on the Iraqi politicians if they fail
to keep these military commitments, political commitments, and
economic commitments? Must there be clear, real, significant
consequences that they understand will follow, if they continue
to fail to keep their commitments?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I believe that there will have to
be a firm understanding that we are not in an open-ended
situation where we're just going to sit around and wait forever
for things to happen. But I also believe that it's not going to
be particularly constructive right now to tape an edict of a
number of actions and give deadlines. I believe in giving them
some time. How much time? I don't know. But time is running
out. Clearly, I think there's a pretty broad understanding,
certainly in my mind and others that I've talked to, that they
are going to need to take actions.
Chairman Levin. Let me just ask if you agree with General
Richard Zilmer, who's the commanding general of our Multi-
National Force-West in Iraq--a Marine general, and head of the
1st Marine Expeditionary Force. He responded to a question the
other day about the impact on morale of discussions of various
resolutions in the U.S. Senate. I'm not asking you to comment
on the resolutions. You've indicated, I think, very properly,
may I say, that you're not going to get involved in the
political side of the debate. You're going to focus on the
military missions. Here's what he said, though, about morale,
which is very much a matter within your concern. He was asked,
``Is there an impact on morale about these--all these debates
that are going on?'' ``Well,'' he said, ``between television
and all the rest, and the Internet--marines, sailors, and
soldiers, they know what's going on, not only in the United
States, but around the world, so they have an opportunity to
see and view the news, as anyone else does.'' He said that,
``Yes, we understand there's a debate back home about the
direction of the war and where it's going.'' He says, ``But the
morale remains very high out here. Our marines understand what
their mission is. We watch what happens back home, but I'm not
concerned about losing sight of the focus.'' Then he said,
``I'm very comfortable that, despite the debate that goes on
back there, our folks over here are staying true to the
mission.''
Have you heard anything to the contrary?
Admiral Fallon. I'm not familiar with that statement. I can
only tell you, Senator, what I observe from my interaction with
our forces there. As General Zilmer is said to have indicated,
they are very focused on their mission. I think the things that
affect their morale most directly are their confidence in one
another, in the training they've received, and, most
importantly, their ability to be successful in their mission.
If they feel that they're actually making progress, then their
morale is going to be good. If they feel that they are being
given necessary tools to accomplish their mission and--be they
equipment and otherwise--if they feel that they're being led by
competent, responsible leaders, then their morale is going to
be good. So, my observation was that, in most of the places
that I visited, my assessment was that our people were feeling
that they had the tools and that they were working hard. I
think it's our responsibility, as leaders, to give them these
necessary capabilities so that they can be successful.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I looked at your distinguished biography and the
sentence in here, ``Admiral Fallon began his naval aviation
service flying in an RA-5C Vigilante with a combat deployment
to Vietnam.'' That was about the time that I was in the
Pentagon, as you recall, and you were a young lieutenant JG
about that time?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Both of us remember very clearly the tragic
circumstances here at home of the American public pulling back
of giving the support of the people to the men and women of the
Armed Forces. I think it was misfortune. A lot of your
generation, when they got back home, having served courageously
and at enormous sacrifice, did not return to the welcome arms
that they were entitled to. Today, it's quite different. I find
the American people are solidly behind our uniformed members
and their families, the greatest respect and the heartfelt
feelings for the losses and the sacrifices, and the respect the
families have for what their servicepersons are doing. So, it's
a changed situation. But I think it's essential that we
continue to work with the American public so that they better
understand what are our goals, and are they realistic, and how
those young people are going to be employed in the new
strategy.
Today, I have to say, with the greatest respect--I've been
privileged here, with my dear friend Carl Levin, 29 years on
this committee, with many officers coming before us in
engagements of our forces overseas and the problems associated,
and when I add that to my own years in the Pentagon, having
been associated with fine persons like yourself, it's a
continuing learning experience for me. I learn greatly from
each day of the association with the men and women in uniform.
My sincere respect and affection for them is just there, and
always will be. But the point I wish to make is that I think
you've handled yourself today with a seasoned wisdom that
you've gained through these many years, and you very carefully
stuck to the role of a military professional, and, no matter
the questions that were put to you, no matter the political
differences we have--and I respect my colleagues on both sides
of the arguments--you steadfastly did not let yourself get
entrapped into that political discussion. You clearly impressed
upon this committee, and, indeed, the Senate, and, I think, the
public that have followed this hearing, you're going out to
this job with the experience we need for that new CENTCOM
Commander, with an open mind and a willingness to look at all
aspects of it and to recognize that the buck stops on your
desk, no matter how many fine subordinate commanders you have--
the buck stops on your desk. You've shown the flexibility, the
openness of mind, to look at the plan as it now is, and to
decide what is best to achieve the mission.
As I say, my concern is on this question of the unified
chain of command, not departing from time-tested tradition. My
concern rests with the American GIs being injected into these
situations which go back, as we say, 1,400 years in
disagreements. I have no disrespect for the Muslim religion,
but it is hard to understand and follow, and how, today, Muslim
is falling upon Muslim with the animosity and the bitterness
that leads to the killing and the instability.
I wish General Petraeus the very best. I'm reassured by
your coming as the overall boss, that you will infuse into your
command that seasoned wisdom that you have, and that, together,
collectively, you can work on this plan and try and make it
work, but make it work in such a way as more and more
responsibility goes to the Iraqis, as recommended by the Baker-
Hamilton Commission. I do hope that you've had an opportunity
to look through this. Their reports, and what they're done, and
how you assess particularly their recommendations with regard
to the diplomatic offensive that we have to take in that
region, bring those countries of that region together, because
the adverse effects--and I totally agree with the President--a
loss of this situation will implode that region into such
strife that it will impact not only the region, but the entire
world, and peace, stability, and the ability of the free
nations to do what we can to eliminate this terrorism, which is
on the growth, unfortunately, and spreading.
I wish you well, but I would just want to remind people
that you bring to this office--and I commend the President for
selecting you--the depth of wisdom that you've exhibited here
today, and you will work with your commanders to get the
violence down, but hopefully to do it in such a way that more
and more of the Iraqis take the lead--that's a phrase we
haven't heard in this debate--take the lead, which means
getting out there in front. They understand the language, they
understand the culture. Our youngsters are doing the best to
support them to take that lead. To that extent, I hope we could
lower the level of Americans involved directly in that Baghdad
situation. There are 6 to 7 million people, and there's only so
much a military force of an additional 20,000, if we have to
put the whole complement in there, can do together with the
Iraqis, unless the Iraqis step up and continue to augment their
participation.
We have trained, over a period of 2\1/2\ years, at an
enormous expense to this country, upwards of 200,000 of these
individuals. What perplexes me, why they can't take over the
principal responsibility, and that our rules of engagement can
be drawn up in such a way as if they're charged with the
sectarian violence. In al Anbar, our resolution says, ``Mr.
President, you're correct, full force,'' because there we're
engaged with al Qaeda, the very organization that precipitated
the problems that we're experiencing in that region today.
I thank you very much, but, Mr. Chairman, I believe this is
an opportunity for our committee to get on record your concerns
about a very important development in our overall national
security, and that is now the recognized capability of China to
interdict satellites above. We have a tremendous dependence on
the use of our satellites for a variety of reasons, and now
there's concrete evidence that they have the capability, from a
ground station to that high altitude, to bring down and
incapacitate those missiles. Those hearing devices that we have
up there, the platforms that are so essential to our overall
security--can you just give us a general assessment of that
situation and how best we are going to cope with it in the
future?
Chairman Levin. I wonder, Senator Warner, if he could do
that for the record, because we are at the tail end of a vote
here now, and I want to give Senator Sessions a few minutes.
Senator Warner. Well, I guess you're right.
[The information referred to follows:]
As you are no doubt aware, China's action evoked strong protests
from other countries with space-based assets, and rightfully so. This
event is being perceived as a major setback for international space
cooperation which over the years has yielded enormous benefit to the
world in the commercial and scientific arenas. Unfortunately, this
event is reminiscent of the ``Cold War'' thinking that fueled the arms
races of that period of history and is counterproductive to future
cooperation programs and objectives. How we should react to this
development must be decided upon after intense national-level study and
in collaboration with the international community.
Senator Warner. Could I impose, Mr. Chairman, by suggesting
that your letter that you received from the Secretary of State
on the matter of benchmarks--I'm all in favor of benchmarks,
but if we try, here in Congress, to legislate too many
benchmarks, really beyond the assessment of the Secretary of
State, who has the principal responsibility, we could force
this Government to go tilt, and we'd better know what's going
to take their place if it goes tilt, because I'm not one to
sign on to this as the last step, this augmentation in Baghdad,
the last chance. I come back to the President's phrase, ``We
cannot let this region implode.'' So, if, for some reason, this
program in Baghdad is not successful, we have to press on with
some other program, and I hope that we don't gravitate--
Congress--to such a detailed outline of benchmarks and the
consequences--there should be consequences for failure, but I
don't want those consequences so heavy that they could
literally topple this government, because we don't know what
might come along and replace it.
Chairman Levin. We'll have more to say about the Secretary
of State's letter later.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Admiral Fallon, as I understand the difficulty we have in
Iraq in achieving a political settlement which ultimately what
we need and will be essential, as Senator Levin has so ably and
often pointed out, but sometimes it's hard to reach an
agreement if one side or the other feels like they're winning
or making progress through violence and military action.
General Keane suggested that some intelligence indicated that
the Sunnis thought they were prevailing, that they were
winning. Then it's hard to negotiate, is it not, with them?
That to really achieve a negotiated political settlement in
which this new government participates in an effective way, we
have to have a certain level of security and stability for that
to occur in. Is that sort of the challenge we have here?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, you know certainly better than I
that the business of politics is about compromise. The level of
violence, particularly recently, in Iraq, I can't believe that
this is encouraging any one of the factions to think that
they're winning, because clearly people are losing lives and an
awful lot of blood and treasure along with it.
If this endeavor of a pluralistic democratic entity in
Baghdad is going to survive, it's going to require political
courage and leadership, I believe, to stand up and make
decisions that can be helpful to people. It's going to be
tough, because they all have baggage. The degree to which any
of them believes they're winning now is pretty much of a
stretch.
Senator Sessions. It's obvious, from our perspective,
they're all losing, the whole country and the region is losing,
and it's sad, beyond belief. But insurgencies oftentimes are
willing to persist for years, as long as they think they are
making some progress toward goals. All I'm saying to you is,
you have to have somebody to negotiate with, you have to have
somebody to have agreements with, and if they're now prepared
to sit down with you and negotiate effectively, I'm not sure we
need to blame it all on the existing government and the Shia
majority, when they are being consistently attacked by the
Sunni/al Qaeda/Baathist group. That's why my understanding is
that we have to maintain a military presence now to try to
stabilize the area so these negotiations can occur.
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir. There's lots of bad and lots of
blame to spread around. My suggestion would be--if I were in a
position to have a discussion with the leaders in Iraq--would
be to do their best to leave as much of the past behind and
just focus on the potential and the consequences if they fail
to take this opportunity and step forward.
Senator Sessions. I think that's correct. Of course, I
believe, in Colombia, for example, it became pretty clear that
oppressing the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
aggressively with military force was the only way that it was
going to reach some sort of peaceful settlement in Colombia. I
think they've made progress by increasing their military
effort. We wish that wouldn't happen, we wish we could talk our
way out of all of these things, but sometimes people are so
determined that it takes military force, unfortunately.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Admiral, thank you. We wish you all the best. We thank you
and your family. We will hope, now, that we'll be able to
report this nomination quickly and get this to the floor.
You're well qualified. I think all have expressed our support
of you. Your candor and your objectivity is important to us.
We're going to continue to rely and count on that. We just wish
you the best of luck.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Levin. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to ADM William J. Fallon,
USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in
these modifications?
Answer. I have no recommendations for amending Goldwater-Nichols at
this time. However, if confirmed, I would not hesitate to offer
proposals in the future that I would consider helpful.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders
under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies
and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with
regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?
Answer. No.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other
sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important
relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) to the following offices:
The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Commander, U.S. CENTCOM coordinates and exchanges
information with the Under Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and
meet U.S. CENTCOM priorities and requirements for support.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Commander, U.S. CENTCOM coordinates and exchanges
information with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense as needed to set
and meet U.S. CENTCOM priorities and requirements for support.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the
President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Section
163 of title 10, U.S.C., allows communication between the President or
the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to flow through
the Chairman. As is custom and traditional practice, and as instructed
by the Unified Command Plan, I would normally communicate with the
Secretary through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. I would communicate with and coordinate with the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as required and in the absence of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The Director of the Joint Staff.
Answer. I would also communicate and coordinate with the Director
as necessary and expect the Deputy Commander, U.S. CENTCOM or Chief of
Staff, U.S. CENTCOM would communicate regularly with the Director of
the Joint Staff.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible
for the administration and support of forces assigned to the combatant
commands. Commander, U.S. CENTCOM coordinates closely with the
secretaries to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip
CENTCOM forces are met.
Question. The Service Chiefs.
Answer. Commander, U.S. CENTCOM communicates and exchanges
information with the Service Chiefs of Staff to support their
responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces.
Successful execution of the U.S. CENTCOM mission responsibilities
requires close coordination with the Service Chiefs. If confirmed, I
intend to work closely with the Service Chiefs of Staff to understand
their service capabilities and to effectively employ those capabilities
in executing the U.S. CENTCOM mission.
Question. The other combatant commanders.
Answer. Commander, U.S. CENTCOM maintains close relationships with
the other combatant commanders. These relationships are critical to the
execution of our National Military Strategy, and are characterized by
mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of
information on key issues.
Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.
Answer. I would necessarily have a close working relationship with
the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq in order to ensure unity of effort between
U.S. military and all other U.S. Government activities in Iraq.
QUALIFICATIONS
Question. If confirmed, you will be entering this important
position at a critical time for the U.S. CENTCOM.
What background and experience do you have that you believe
qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have benefited from a broad range of assignments during
my nearly 40 years in uniform, from tactical to operational command,
and have considerable experience with joint and coalition operations,
including combat operations. I was privileged to command Carrier Air
Wing Eight in U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt in 1991 during Operation Desert
Storm. In 1995, as a flag officer, I served as Commander, Carrier Group
Eight and Commander, Battle Force, U.S. Sixth Fleet during North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation Deliberate Force in
Bosnia. During these operations, I worked closely with joint U.S. and
combined forces in planning, coordinating, and executing sustained
combat operations. I also served as Deputy Director for Operations,
Joint Task Force Southwest Asia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, directing air
operations in the Iraqi No-Fly Zones. I have additional experience in
joint and combined planning and operations at both the operational and
strategic levels through assignments as Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans
and Policy, for the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and as
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff for the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and the
former U.S. Atlantic Command, the predecessor to U.S. Joint Forces
Command. For nearly 3 years, I served as Commander, U.S. Second Fleet
and NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic, working directly with all U.S. armed
services as well as those of our NATO allies in training and in
developing and testing joint and combined tactics for the entire
spectrum of combat operations. As Vice Chief of Naval Operations from
2000 to 2003, I worked in close cooperation with OSD, the Joint Staff,
and the other armed services developing transformational strategies and
joint requirements. As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and U.S.
Atlantic Fleet from October 2003 to February 2005, I served as Naval
Component Commander to U.S. Joint Forces Command, and supported U.S.
Northern Command and U.S. Strategic Command. In my current assignment
as Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), I have gained extensive
experience in the largest combatant command AOR, with more than 60
percent of the world's population and four of the five largest economic
GDPs. This area has presented several challenges, including the
maintenance of sensitive alliances, insurgencies in southeast Asia, the
situation in North Korea, and the U.S. relationship with the People's
Republic of China. The widely varied opportunities I have had during my
career have given me a deep appreciation of, and experience with, all
branches of our Armed Forces, the interagency, and many of our allies
and partners.
MAJOR CHALLENGES
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Commander, U.S. CENTCOM?
Answer.
Combatting the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan
and directing the restoration of security and stability in
these nations.
Countering the extremist threat which destabilizes
governments in the region, commits attacks on the U.S. and
numerous other nations, and continues to threaten the U.S.
Homeland.
The relationship with Iran and its support to
insurgents and destabilizing activities in regional nations.
Protecting vital lines of commerce in the region.
Continuing instability and humanitarian crises in
Africa.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Specifically, I intend to:
Support U.S. national interests and policies.
Work closely with our ambassadors and military
commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to address the critical need
for security and stability in these countries.
Work in close consultation with U.S. agencies and
military commanders, and with our friends in the region to
develop a clear understanding and appreciation of U.S. national
interests and the issues facing the Nations in the U.S. CENTCOM
region.
Signal the strong resolve of the United States to
protect its national interests and to enhance regional
stability.
Posture U.S. forces to deploy and respond rapidly to
regional security concerns.
MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of Commander, U.S. CENTCOM?
Answer. Clearly, the most serious problems are the ongoing combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Question. What management actions and timelines would you establish
to address these problems?
Answer. My intention is to gain a full appreciation of the
situation in the region as quickly as possible and then to provide
appropriate direction and guidance to our military forces.
iraq
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing
the United States in Iraq?
Answer. Significant progress has been made in developing Iraqi
security forces and governing institutions since the collapse of the
Saddam Hussein regime. The Iraqi people have approved a new
constitution and elected a permanent, multi-party government. The Iraqi
government has recognized the requirement for security and has
identified steps to improve the prospects for political reconciliation
and economic growth.
However, the insurgent bombing of the Al Askariya Mosque in
February 2006 reversed the momentum that followed the successful Iraqi
elections. Sectarian-motivated violence now inhibits political
progress, effective governance, and economic development. Many other
factors, including poor infrastructure, corruption, and lack of
experience at governance have exacerbated widespread mistrust between
sectarian groups within Iraq.
Levels of violence perpetuated by al Qaeda terrorists, insurgents
aligned with the previous regime and competing sectarian death squads
have increased steadily during the past year. Al Qaeda operatives and
their allies target U.S. and Iraqi security forces and innocent
civilians in an effort to discredit the U.S. and Iraqi governments and
incite sectarian violence wherever possible. Their goal is instability
and chaos. Other insurgents and sectarian entities are pursuing their
own murderous agendas, receiving support from within Iran and Syria.
Although growing in number and confidence, much of the Iraqi
security force has not yet demonstrated an ability to stand on its own
in the face of multiple onslaughts to stability. U.S. military strategy
of having the Iraqi security forces lead most of the security effort
has not been as successful as anticipated.
Question. From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned
from our experience in Iraq?
Answer. U.S. forces in Iraq remain disciplined, spirited, and
adaptable in the face of difficult battlefield conditions. Our forces
have been training and have partnered with Iraqi security forces to
establish a secure environment for the newly elected government of
Iraq. This endeavor has proven more challenging than expected with many
assumptions either incorrectly drawn or unfulfilled. Securing the
stability of the country has been more difficult than anticipated. Our
ability to correctly assess the political, economic, and security
situation in Iraq has been lacking. While successful in clearing areas
of insurgent and terrorist activity, we have relearned the need to hold
these areas secure until Iraqi security forces and local political and
economic activity have provided essential confidence to the population.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes
the U.S. has made to date in Iraq? Which of these do you believe are
still having an impact?
Answer. President Bush, in his 10 January address to the Nation,
highlighted the key mistakes:
Miscalculating that initial elections would bring
Iraqis together;
Believing that as we trained Iraqi security forces, we
could accomplish our mission with fewer U.S. troops;
Underestimating the ability of al Qaeda and Sunni
insurgents to provoke sectarian conflict; and
Failing to anticipate the extent of the response of
radical Shia elements and death squads.
The issues cited here are still effecting the situation but actions
are underway by the Iraqi and U.S. Governments to address them.
Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the
United States needs to take in Iraq?
Answer. The most important step we need to take in Iraq is to work
with the Iraqi government to improve security. We also need to
facilitate economic and infrastructure development while helping the
Iraqis establish and maintain a viable representative political
process.
Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the
new Iraq strategy recently announced by the President?
Answer. In my position as Commander U.S. PACOM, I have not directly
participated in the development of the new Iraq strategy.
Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution
in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?
Answer. Although the military effort is critical to progress, a
successful Iraq strategy will require coordinated economic, diplomatic,
and political as well as security development.
Question. Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi
political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?
Answer. A successful political process requires compromise. The
three principal factions in Iraq must find a way to cooperate on
essential issues.
Question. Do you believe that quelling the current level of
violence is a necessary condition for a political solution?
Answer. Substantially reducing the level of sectarian violence is
essential to facilitate improved political process.
Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders
to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution?
What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?
Answer. Current levels of suffering experienced by the Iraqi
population should motivate the political leaders to make progress.
President Bush has clearly stated the need for a partnership between
Prime Minister Maliki, Iraqi moderates, and the United States where all
parties are clear on expectations and responsibilities. The Iraqi
government has cited a number of actions it considers essential to
national political progress. We should carefully monitor and assess the
progress in these actions.
Question. What do you see as a reasonable estimate of the time it
will take to demonstrate success in securing Baghdad?
Answer. I would not speculate on the amount of time or levels of
success which might be possible from my current position. But the
urgent need to make progress is obvious.
Question. In the fiscal year 2007 Defense Authorization and
Appropriation Acts Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek
permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq.
Do you agree that it is not and should not be the policy of the
United States to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to
exercise control over Iraq's oil resources?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If you agree, what are your views on the construction of
any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?
Answer. Operational commanders may request construction of
temporary sites to facilitate necessary operations, and I would give
appropriate consideration to such requests.
Question. For the past several years, the Army and Marine Corps
have had separate areas of responsibility in Iraq, with Marine forces
assigned to the Anbar province. The two services have different
logistics systems, and the Combined Forces Land Component Command
(CFLCC) appears to now focus almost exclusively on Army requirements.
Do you believe the Army and Marine Corps forces operating in Iraq
have an appropriate degree of jointness?
Answer. From observation during my visits to Iraq and through
discussion with various commanders, I believe the Army and Marine Corps
forces operating in Iraq have demonstrated an adequate degree of Joint
cooperation, both operationally and logistically. The 3rd Army
Headquarters serves both as the CFLCC and as the Army Forces (ARFOR)
command with title 10 logistics responsibilities. As the ARFOR
Commander, 3rd Army conducts joint and combined logistics operations,
including support for Marine Expeditionary Unit rotations. At the
tactical level, an Army Brigade Combat Team is deployed with the Marine
Expeditionary Force operating in Anbar Province. An Army Corps Support
Group, also deployed to Anbar Province, integrates logistic support for
Marine units within the Theater Logistics Architecture. If confirmed, I
will assess all aspects of jointness and ensure collaboration on
operational and logistic matters between the Services.
Question. Do you see any problems with the extent of reliance of
U.S. forces in Iraq on contractor support?
Answer. I do not have sufficient knowledge to address this
question.
AFGHANISTAN
Question. More than 4 years after securing a military victory
against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, that nation remains a
place with areas of unrest.
What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan?
Answer. Much progress has been achieved in Afghanistan. The
expansion of the International Security and Assistance Force and
transition of the counterinsurgency mission to NATO command are
positive steps. The resurgence of the Taliban in some areas of the
country is a concern and must be addressed if political progress and
economic development are to be sustained.
Question. What is the status of efforts to develop and field an
effective Afghan Army and national police force?
Answer. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is becoming more
professional and growing in confidence. As of this month, approximately
32,000 of the 70,000 planned ANA soldiers have received training and
equipment and now routinely engage the enemy alongside U.S. and
coalition forces.
More than 60,000 of the planned 82,000 Ministry of the Interior
police officers have received training and equipment. Although they are
not as professional or capable as the ANA, improvement has been noted.
Continued focus on Afghan Police training and education will be
critical to the future of Afghanistan, and close attention must be paid
to ensure progress is being made in the effectiveness of the force.
Question. In your view, what additional military or other
assistance is required to ensure the transition of Afghanistan to a
stable, democratic, and economically viable nation?
Answer. Continued military assistance to expand security will be
the critical enabler of success. Support to the ANA and police must
continue as well as economic assistance and expanding good governance
throughout Afghanistan.
Question. In October 2006, British LTG Richards, Commander of the
NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in
Afghanistan, warned that coalition forces may be running out of time to
show measurable progress in Afghanistan. He stated that if there is no
progress in improving conditions for the Afghani people, they may
choose ``the rotten future offered by the Taliban'' over the hopeful
future which coalition forces have taken too long to deliver.
Do you agree with LTG Richards' assessment that coalition forces
have a limited window of opportunity in which to show improvements in
the lives of the Afghani people?
Answer. I would not speculate on the resilience of the Afghan
people, although I would note they have endured the trauma of war for
almost 30 years.
Question. What steps do you believe coalition forces can take to
improve the lives of the Afghani people in the near term?
Answer. We should strive to provide enhanced security in areas
where the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and international aid
agencies are assisting reconstruction efforts. We should look for
economic development opportunities to offset the opium production.
We should support ISAF Afghan Development Zone (ADZ) initiatives,
with security efforts in key regions setting conditions for
reconstruction and governance. ADZs complement the Afghan Government's
National Development Strategy for security, governance, rule of law,
and human rights, and economic and social development. This overarching
strategy deserves our support.
Question. Military intelligence officials have stated that Taliban
and al Qaeda attacks across the Afghan-Pakistan border have increased
fourfold since September when the Pakistan Government signed an
agreement with tribal elders in the border region ceding control over
some border areas in western Pakistan.
What more can be done to prevent cross border incursions by the
Taliban and al Qaeda from Pakistan into Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to study the situation in
Afghanistan and consult with the military leadership there to determine
the best way to address this issue.
Question. In your view, should the Pakistan Government be doing
more to prevent these cross-border incursions?
Answer. Yes. I believe that more could be done, and I will focus
attention on this issue to determine what recommendations I will
forward in this regard.
Question. What role do you believe U.S. forces should play?
Answer. We can enhance the capacity of Pakistan's Frontier Corps
through our security assistance program. We will continue to provide
intelligence support as well.
Question. Afghanistan is in the CENTCOM's area of responsibility
(AOR). U.S. European Command (EUCOM) oversees the NATO ISAF force in
Afghanistan.
In your view, does this ``seam'' present any problems for the
coordination and effectiveness of the ISAF and Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) missions in Afghanistan?
Answer. I do not foresee any issues with the CENTCOM-SHAPE
Relationship. NATO involvement in Afghanistan has been closely
coordinated with CENTCOM. Throughout the process, measures to ensure
synergy, maintenance of momentum, and reliable deconfliction of
operations were painstakingly considered. I have extensive personal
experience with the NATO military and political processes, which should
facilitate my interaction and effectiveness with the NATO-CENTCOM
relationship.
PAKISTAN
Question. What is your assessment of the current status of U.S.-
Pakistan military cooperation?
Answer. U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation has progressively
improved since 11 September 2001. We coordinate military activities
through a U.S. liaison team in Islamabad and the Pakistani military
presence in Tampa, Bahrain, and Afghanistan.
Question. What is your assessment of the level of cooperation we
have received from Pakistan in the war on terrorism?
Answer. Pakistan is an effective and vital partner in the war on
terror. Pakistan has captured or killed more suspected AQ and Taliban
than any other coalition member.
Question. What is your assessment of the current situation with
regard to Pakistani-Indian relations?
Answer. Relations between India and Pakistan have improved through
confidence building measures and dialogue during the past 2 years.
Kashmir remains the core issue, but progress is being realized through
incremental steps.
FORMER SOVIET UNION STATES
Question. Several former Soviet states have played roles in
supporting the U.S. and coalition forces in the global war on
terrorism.
What is your assessment of current U.S. military relationships with
these nations, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan?
Answer. Contributions from former Soviet states in Central Asia
have been significant and helpful. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan have provided basing and overflight from the beginning of
the global war on terror. Other former Soviet states including Latvia,
Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Georgia, and Estonia have provided
troops in support of the coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The U.S. military relationship with many of the former Soviet
states continues to develop incrementally. Much of our interaction is
focused on building the capacity of these nations to ensure regional
stability and security.
Question. What security challenges do you see in this portion of
the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. The security challenges in the Central Asian states are of
concern because of the impact of extremism and criminal activity on
economic development and the fragility of the governments.
Additionally, the harsh environmental legacy of Soviet weapons and
industrial programs, combined with severely restricted supplies of
fresh water, further hobble legitimate economic growth.
IRAN
Question. Ambassador John Negroponte, Director of National
Intelligence, recently testified before the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee about Iran's growing influence in the Persian Gulf region. He
stated, ``Under the Ahmadinejad government, Iran is enhancing its
ability to project its military power, primarily with ballistic
missiles and naval power--with the goal of dominating the Gulf region
and deterring potential adversaries.''
Do you agree with Ambassador Negroponte's assessment to the Senate
Select Intelligence Committee regarding Iran's goals in the region?
Answer. Yes. In addition to these conventional means, Iran is
attempting to enhance its power through asymmetric means, such as
support to international terrorism and the pursuit of a nuclear weapons
capability.
Question. What options do you believe are available to the United
States to counter Iran's growing influence in the region?
Answer. We should continue to work through the United Nations
Security Council to enjoin the Iranian regime to halt its enrichment of
uranium and its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
We should continue to develop a regional security framework with
our partners in the Gulf to deter Iranian aggression and protect our
common interests. This framework can include security assistance,
missile defense, joint exercises, and information sharing.
Question. What is the view of U.S. allies in the region with regard
to the threat posed by Iran?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to speak with our allies in the
region about this issue. From my perspective as PACOM commander, I
sense that our allies in the region are more concerned about the
potential threat posed by Iran now than at any time since the Iran-Iraq
War.
Question. What is your assessment of the prospects for political
reform in Iran?
Answer. Iran's political system is slowly changing as its people
increasingly participate in representative processes. However, the
unelected institutions of the Iranian regime are well entrenched, hold
the preponderance of political power in Iran, and control of Iran's
military forces and intelligence services.
Question. Do you believe that a protracted deployment of U.S.
troops in Iraq, if the situation on the ground in Iraq does not
improve, could strengthen Iran's influence in the region?
Answer. The protracted deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq would not
necessarily strengthen Iran's influence in the region.
IRAQI REFUGEES
Question. The United Nations estimates that approximately 2.3
million Iraqis have fled the violence in their country; 1.8 million
have fled to surrounding countries, while some 500,000 have vacated
their homes for safer areas within Iraq.
What is your assessment of the refugee crisis in Iraq?
Answer. There are some refugee problems inside Iraq, and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is currently working the
situation in the Northern Kurdistan Region. A greater refugee challenge
exists in neighboring countries, which are dealing with the situation
with their own resources and the support of the International
Community. Once Iraq is stable and secure, I believe that a majority
will return. The larger problem in Iraq is Internally Displaced Persons
who affect regional demographics and pose a potential threat to long-
term security and stability.
Question. Beyond working to improve the security environment in
Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in
addressing this crisis?
Answer. The U.S. military's role in providing humanitarian relief
for these persons will depend on the needs of the mission in Iraq and
the availability of U.S. forces.
HORN OF AFRICA
Question. One of CENTCOM's significant sub-regions is the Horn of
Africa (HOA). Until a new African Command is stood up, CENTCOM will
continue to be responsible for this region, which will likely
experience continued instability and humanitarian crisis as
demonstrated by recent events in Somalia.
What is the strategic importance of this region to the United
States?
Answer. HOA sits astride one of the most critical sea lines of
communication in the world. It is imperative that we maintain freedom
of navigation to ensure strategic maritime access to the CENTCOM AOR
and freedom of movement of ocean-borne commerce. We must remain engaged
in HOA to deny terrorist organizations the ability to operate freely by
building host nation capacities and governance capability to reduce
ungoverned spaces. Commander, Joint Task Force-HOA has been engaged
with key partner countries in the area, conducting humanitarian and
civil military operations, as well as building host nation
capabilities.
Question. Over the last few weeks, the U.S. military has had a very
public presence in Somalia.
What is your understanding of the U.S. Government's policy for
Somalia and how U.S. military action there supports that policy?
Answer. The U.S. has three principal goals in Somalia: 1) support
the establishment of a stable government based on genuine national
reconciliation; 2) promote security and stability on the ground; and 3)
respond to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.
AFRICA COMMAND
Question. Over the last year or so, the U.S. Government has
mobilized more of its resources to focus on the strategic importance of
Africa. The Department of Defense has played an important role through
two Combatant Commands--EUCOM via the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism
Program and CENTCOM via the creation of the Combined Joint Task Force--
HOA. There are 53 countries in Africa--42 are in the EUCOM AOR and 11
are in the CENTCOM AOR.
Do you support the proposal to create a new unified command for
Africa and to transfer responsibility for operations in the HOA to that
new command?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed as Commander, USCENTCOM, I will support
the standup of AFRICOM by doing whatever we can to implement this new
command.
Question. What impact would such a transfer have on the conduct of
antiterrorism and other operations in that region?
Answer. I would not anticipate any degradation in our antiterrorism
efforts.
Question. What will you do to ensure a smooth transition and to
manage the seams between CENTCOM and the new African Command?
Answer. To ensure a smooth transition, AFRICOM will be established
incrementally with the support of EUCOM, which is responsible for
military operations in most of Africa. This phased approach should
minimize turnover concerns as mission sets are transferred from EUCOM,
CENTCOM, and PACOM to AFRICOM.
With respect to seams between CENTCOM and AFRICOM, we will manage
these situations through direct coordination between commands, just as
we have done previously with EUCOM and continue to do with PACOM.
DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS
Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
2006 memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that
standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of
reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that
the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact
on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are
treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
Answer. I believe that we should pay careful attention to ensuring
that standards for detainee treatment comply fully with the law and
reflect American values. We also should be aware of the risk that the
manner in which we treat our own detainees may have an effect on the
manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are treated
should they be captured in future conflicts. U.S. Armed Forces policy
is to treat all detainees, no matter their status, humanely and in
accordance with the law of war. However, as you well know, the enemy we
are currently fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq have repeatedly
demonstrated their absolute disregard for the law of war, including the
provisions of Common Article 3.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective
counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the
requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes.
Question. How will you ensure that U.S. forces in the CENTCOM AOR
comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive,
and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding
detention and interrogation operations?
Answer. I will continue to emphasize law of war training and
specific training for those involved in interrogation. I will also
ensure U.S. operational commanders comply with all applicable
regulations and law, including the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.
SCIENTIFIC ADVISORS FOR COMBATANT COMMANDERS
Question. Scientific advisors to combatant commanders have been
effectively utilized as a means of technology transition and providing
operators' solutions to warfighter challenges.
If confirmed, how would your command make use of the technical
expertise available in the Services and their laboratories in order to
provide scientific and technical advice to the warfighters?
Answer. If confirmed, I will task the Science Advisor to work
closely with the broader scientific community--particularly the Service
laboratories and the Office of the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering--to ensure that U.S. CENTCOM benefits from the best
technical advice our Nation has to offer. Routine interaction with
these organizations would also help U.S. CENTCOM shape the Department's
research and development effort to match up with command requirements.
BANDWIDTH ON THE BATTLEFIELD
Question. Unmanned assets, such as persistent unmanned aerial
vehicles, require tremendous bandwidth capacity. Command and control,
blue force tracking and movement of intelligence products also use
significant amounts of bandwidth.
What challenges do you anticipate in fully utilizing these
important assets with the limited bandwidth currently available to the
warfighter?
Answer. The chief challenge is efficiently managing the bandwidth
to achieve maximum impact from intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities.
Question. What is your assessment of the bandwidth available during
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)?
Answer. My initial assessment is that bandwidth is sufficient for
intelligence product dissemination and situational awareness. However,
as the requirement for additional full-motion video ISR assets and
other bandwidth intensive systems come online, the current bandwidth
could become a limiting factor, but I would push hard for increased
efficiency of utilization.
MISSILE AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREATS
Question. Iran continues to develop short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles and could develop ballistic missiles capable of
reaching the United States in the relatively near-term. The
Intelligence Community assesses that Iran could test such a missile
later this decade and will ``likely'' pose an ICBM threat to the United
States by 2015. Iran also has a significant naval presence in the
Persian Gulf, and shore-based antiship cruise missiles. The
Intelligence Community also assesses that Iran is actively pursuing
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and could have nuclear weapons
within the decade.
How do you evaluate Iran's current capability to use ballistic
missiles and WMD against U.S. forces, allies and friends, and what is
your projection of Iran's future capabilities?
Answer. Iran can employ ballistic missiles up to 1,300 km with
little/no advance warning and with greater accuracy and effectiveness
than Iraq demonstrated in 1991 and 2003. Iran has expanded ballistic
missile forces and capabilities, but remains dependent on foreign
technical support. Tehran can employ CW via missile, artillery, and
aerial weapons, although it is unclear if a standing CW stockpile
exists. Iran is unlikely to produce enough fissile material for a
nuclear weapon until mid-next decade.
Question. How do you evaluate Iran's cruise missile capabilities,
and Iran's ability to threaten U.S. naval forces and commercial
shipping in the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Arabian
Sea?
Answer. Iran can threaten undefended commercial shipping and create
a tactically challenging environment for naval forces in constrained
waters of the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf region. However, Iran also
has operational and tactical weaknesses that can be effectively
exploited by U.S. forces.
Question. If confirmed, how would you protect the troops and allies
under your command from these threats?
Answer. After consulting with select nations in the CENTCOM AOR and
confirming their support, I would use a combination of U.S. and
Coalition Ballistic Missile Defense and Early Warning (EW) capabilities
to protect both U.S. and Coalition critical military and geopolitical
assets.
SEXUAL ASSAULT
Question. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. CENTCOM, you will be
responsible for ensuring compliance with DOD policies on prevention of
and response to sexual assaults throughout the CENTCOM AOR.
What lessons did you learn in implementation of sexual assault
training, reporting protocols and command awareness during your tour as
Commander, U.S. PACOM, that can be applied in the U.S. CENTCOM?
Answer. As PACOM Commander, I observed that training--both pre-
deployment and response personnel training--is essential in preventing
and effectively responding to allegations and incidents of sexual
assault. Additionally, I believe that the Department of Defense Sexual
Assault Prevention Program has provided commanders clear, proactive
sexual assault response protocols.
Question. What are the unique issues that you believe need to be
addressed to ensure that policies on prevention, reporting, medical
treatment and victim support are available in the operational
environments of Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. We should maintain sexual assault awareness in the
operational environment by conducting recurring in-theater training. We
should also continue to ensure that supplies, trained personnel, and
transportation resources are readily accessible and available to
deployed personnel.
Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the current adequacy
of such resources in the CENTCOM AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that CENTCOM sexual assault
policy and practice align with current Department of Defense polices as
prescribed in DODD 6495 and DODI 6495. I would maintain command
emphasis on these policies and the Sexual Assault Prevention Program.
MENTAL HEALTH IN THEATER
Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made
three separate assessments over the past several years detailing the
immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S.
soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT III, found that
multiple deployers reported experiencing higher levels of acute stress,
and that overall levels of combat stressors are increasing. These types
of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of troops
are returning from duty in Iraq with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,
depression, and other mental health issues.
Please summarize for the committee your understanding of the key
findings of each of the previous mental health assessments, actions
taken to address key findings in each, and the effect of such actions.
Answer. I understand these studies concluded that multiple or long
deployments can lead to increased incidents of mental health issues.
The level of combat and quality of noncommissioned officer leadership
directly affect servicemembers' mental health. The Military Services
have established an array of assessment, prevention, and treatment
programs that provide mental health support before, during, and after
deployments.
I understand that CENTCOM policy requires pre- and post-deployment
mental health assessments and reassessments. MNF-I has created an
expert working group to assess the status of mental health in the AOR.
CENTCOM has also redistributed mental health staff to provide better
coverage for deployed personnel.
Question. If confirmed, would you support continuous mental health
assessments of the U.S. forces in Iraq, to include naval forces on the
ground?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you have any thoughts on how we can best address the
mental health needs of our troops and their families, in terms of both
prevention and treatment?
Answer. We must continue to re-examine whether we are doing all we
should to meet the mental health needs of deployed personnel. Where
possible, I will work with the Service Chiefs to ensure they have
adequate programs and support systems at their respective installations
to support servicemembers and their families back home.
Question. If confirmed, will you request additional behavioral
health resources from all three Services, if needed, to meet the needs
of current and future units deployed to Iraq?
Answer. Yes. If additional Mental Health Forces are requested in
support of OIF/OEF and global war on terrorism, I will work with the
Joint Staff and the Global Force Manager, Joint Forces Command, for
additional mental health resources.
Question. The DOD Mental Health Task Force recently received
testimony that the U.S. military does not have enough adequately
trained mental health professionals to meet the growing needs for
mental health support in the military.
Do you share this concern about the adequacy of mental health
professionals to support members of the Armed Forces, especially those
in deployed and operational environments, and their families?
Answer. I am always concerned about the welfare of our
servicemembers, our DOD civilians, and their families. If confirmed, I
would expect commanders to leverage all resources--morale, welfare,
religious support, and family support programs as well as health
professionals--to meet the mental health needs of our servicemembers
and their families. I believe that if additional capabilities were
needed in the CENTCOM AOR, the Services would provide them.
Question. As commander of the U.S. PACOM, what steps have you taken
to ensure adequate mental health support for deployed military members
and their families?
Answer. As PACOM Commander, I have worked with my subordinate
commanders to regularly assess our mental health requirements and the
adequacy of available mental health resources.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure the
adequacy of mental health support and resources in the CENTCOM AOR both
in general, and specifically in combat zones?
Answer. The mental health of deployed forces in theater is a major
responsibility of the leadership of the Armed Forces. It is a
responsibility to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine,
to the fighting force as a whole, to their families, and to the Nation.
The military Services have in place a broad array of assessment,
prevention, and treatment programs. Medical conditions that may limit
or disqualify deployed servicemembers are continually assessed, while
screening, assessment, and educational programs take place across the
entire deployment cycle. A spectrum of prevention, stress control, and
mental health care is available in theater. Pre- and post-deployment
health assessments are conducted. Each branch of Service has specific
combat stress and deployment mental health support programs available
before, during, and after the deployment cycle. These provide support
tailored to the Service's mission and risk factors their personnel
might face. In addition, cross-functional planning teams bring together
subject matter experts from across the Services, the Joint Staff, and
DOD.
I support a very robust program of mental health prevention,
assessment, and treatment. I have not had an opportunity to be briefed
on the Army's MHAT assessments, nor to develop a specific action plan
to address any needed strengthening of the current program. If I am
confirmed, I will look to both our health care professionals and
command leadership to help me assess the needs, and will seek support
from the military and civilian leadership of the Department. If I am
confirmed and if I determine additional mental health professionals are
needed in theater, I will ask for them.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. I agree.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. I agree.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. CENTCOM?
Answer. I agree.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. I agree.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. I intend to cooperate fully with Congress to ensure an
appropriate and timely response from U.S. CENTCOM to all congressional
requests.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
LEVERAGE ON IRAQI LEADERS
1. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, Iraqi political leaders have
demonstrated little progress in decreasing the increased levels of
sectarian violence over the past year. On page 9, of responses provided
to the advance policy questions, specifically ``What do you believe
will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises
necessary for a political solution? What leverage does the U.S. have in
this regard?'' The answer provided stated, ``Current levels of
suffering experienced by the Iraqi population should motivate the
political leaders to make progress.'' Does the U.S. have any other
leverage over the Iraqi political leaders?
Admiral Fallon. There are a number of economic, political, and
military options that could offer a degree of leverage. General
Petraeus is working directly with officials in the Government of Iraq
to ascertain the best combination of U.S. policies to expedite national
reconciliation.
2. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, many of us believe that
beginning a phased redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq will force the
Iraqis to make the tough political compromises to make progress. Do you
think adjustments in our force levels offer potential leverage with the
Iraqis?
Admiral Fallon. The Government of Iraq is under tremendous pressure
from the U.S. Government and the Iraqi people to produce tangible
results. Decreasing our troop levels at this time would weaken Prime
Minister Maliki and embolden the insurgents.
Although our support for the Government of Iraq is not open ended,
it is imperative that we provide Prime Minister Maliki and his
government time and space to establish the institutions of governance,
after decades of totalitarian rule.
PRIVATE CONTRACTORS
3. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, many of us on the Committee
have been concerned about the extent to which we have relied on private
contractors in Iraq. On page 10, of responses provided to the advance
policy questions, specifically ``Do you see any problems with the
extent of reliance of U.S. forces in Iraq on contractor support?'' The
answer provided stated, ``I do not have sufficient knowledge to address
this question." Will you look into this issue once you are confirmed?
Admiral Fallon. Yes.
IRAQI GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY
4. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, a main tenet of
counterinsurgency doctrine is that victory is achieved when the
populace consents to the government's legitimacy and stops their active
and passive support to the insurgency. Do you believe that the current
government in Baghdad is currently governing in a way that enhances its
legitimacy?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, the current government is focused on quickly
restoring basic services to increase populace support. Establishing
reasonable security is of primary importance in this endeavor.
5. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, is the fighting in Baghdad the
result of an insurgency or a sectarian civil war?
Admiral Fallon. Iraqi society's growing polarization, the
persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general,
and all sides' ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an
increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism.
Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress
during the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security
situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the
latter part of 2006.
Extremists--most notably the Sunni jihadist group al Qaeda in Iraq
and Shia oppositionist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)--continue to act as very
effective accelerators for what has become a self-sustaining inter-
sectarian struggle between Shia and Sunnis.
The Intelligence Community judges that the term ``civil war'' does
not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which
includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al Qaeda and Sunni insurgent
attacks on coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated
violence. Nonetheless, the term ``civil war'' accurately describes key
elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-
sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence,
ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements.''
6. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, how will you tailor the best
practices of counterinsurgency to quell the continued sectarian blood
letting?
Admiral Fallon. I will provide General Petraeus the strategic
guidance and resources he needs to execute an effective
counterinsurgency campaign. General Petraeus and I will continuously
assess the progress and adjust as required to ensure success.
Additionally, I will work in concert with the State Department to
remove outside support for insurgents and militias in Iraq.
IRAN'S STRATEGIC POSITION
7. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, the Washington Post published
an article on January 30, 2007 about Iran's ascendance titled ``With
Iran Ascendant, U.S. is Seen at Fault: Arab Allies in Region Feeling
Pressure.'' It points out that prior to our invasion of Iraq, Iran was
bordered by two unfriendly countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, but now
seems to be ascendant in the region. What is your evaluation of Iran's
strategic position in the region since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in
2002?
Admiral Fallon. Iran is actively seeking to expand influence in the
region. Coincidentally, the fall of the Taliban and Saddam regimes
removed a strategic counterweight to Iranian influence. However,
regional nations with U.S. support are working together diplomatically
to reduce this influence. Additionally, the security and stability
provided by the U.S. military presence serves to counter balance Iran's
military power.
8. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, do you have an opinion as to
the desirability of the U.S. engaging in a dialogue with Iran about
their activities in Iraq? About the Iranian nuclear program?
Admiral Fallon. Engaging Iran is a policy decision. President Bush
and Secretary of State Rice have offered to hold talks with Iran's
leaders on Iraq, regional security, and nuclear issues, after they
suspend uranium enrichment. Engagement and dialog with Iran to discuss
Iraq would be desirable if Iran demonstrates a willingness to support
international efforts to stabilize Iraq.
In regards to the Iranian nuclear program, the international
community, with the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737,
clearly agreed that the world does not want a nuclear-armed Iran. U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) continues to engage with regional partners to
facilitate counterproliferation activities and enhancement of regional
security.
______
Question Submitted by Senator John McCain
SEA-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
9. Senator McCain. Admiral Fallon, as U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)
Commander, you are aware that the Department of Defense plans to equip
18 Pacific Fleet Aegis-class destroyers and cruisers by 2010 with a
sea-based ballistic missile defense capability to defend against the
ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea. In your response to an
advance policy question, you write: ``Iran can employ ballistic
missiles up to 1,300 kilometers with little/no advance warning and with
greater accuracy and effectiveness than Iraq demonstrated in 1991 and
2003.'' Given your recognition of the ballistic missile threat posed by
Iran, would it not make strategic sense to accelerate efforts to
similarly equip our Aegis ships in and near the CENTCOM area of
responsibility with a ballistic missile defense capability?
Admiral Fallon. Yes.
______
[The nomination reference of ADM William J. Fallon, USN,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 16, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States
Navy to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance
and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:
To be Admiral
ADM William J. Fallon, 0304.
______
Transcript of Naval Service for ADM William Joseph Fallon, USN
30 December 1944 - Born in East Orange, New Jersey.
16 September 1963 - Midshipman, U.S. Naval Reserve, Naval Reserve
Officers Training Corps.
15 May 1967 - Ensign to rank from 7 June 1967.
01 July 1968 - Lieutenant (junior grade).
01 July 1970 - Lieutenant.
01 July 1976 - Lieutenant Commander.
01 April 1982 - Commander.
01 September 1988 - Captain.
23 August 1993 - Designated Rear Admiral (lower half) while serving
in billets commensurate with that grade.
01 October 1994 - Rear Admiral (lower half).
01 January 1997 - Rear Admiral.
20 September 1996 - Vice Admiral.
06 October 2000 - Designated Admiral while serving in billets
commensurate with that grade.
01 November 2000 - Admiral, service continuous to date.
Assignments and Duties:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Air Basic Training Command, U.S. Naval Air May 1967 Nov. 1967
Station, Pensacola, FL (DUINS).................
U.S. Naval Air Technical Center, Glynco, GA Nov. 1967 Dec. 1967
(DUINS)........................................
U.S. Naval Station, New York, NY................ Dec. 1967 Jan. 1968
Reconnaissance Attack Squadron THREE (DUINS).... Jan. 1968 Dec. 1968
Naval Justice School (DUINS).................... Dec. 1968 Feb. 1969
Reconnaissance Attack Squadron FIVE, Feb. 1969 Oct. 1970
(Reconnaissance Attack Navigator)..............
Commander, Reconnaissance Attack Wing ONE, Oct. 1970 July 1972
(Administrative Officer).......................
Staff, Commander Fleet Air, Jacksonville, FL July 1972 July 1973
(Flag Lieutenant/Flag Secretary)...............
DEP COMNA V AIRLANTTACAIR (Aide/Administrative July 1973 June 1974
Officer).......................................
Attack Squadron FOUR TWO (DUINS)................ June 1974 Dec. 1974
Attack Squadron SEVEN FIVE (Avionics/Armament Dec. 1974 July 1977
Officer/Training Officer)......................
Naval War College (DUlNS)....................... July 1977 July 1978
Attack Squadron FOUR TWO (DUINS)................ July 1978 Oct. 1978
Attack Squadron SIX FIVE (Operations Officer/ Oct. 1978 Feb. 1981
Executive Assistant)...........................
Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force Feb. 1981 July 1982
(Operational Test Coordinator of Attack Weapons
Systems).......................................
Attack Squadron FOUR TWO (DUINS)................ July 1982 Nov. 1982
XO, Attack Squadron SIX FIVE.................... Nov. 1982 May 1984
CO, Attack Squadron SIX FIVE.................... May 1984 Sep. 1985
Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet Sep. 1985 Dec. 1985
(DUlNS)........................................
Carrier Air Wing EIGHT (Deputy Air Wing Jan. 1986 July 1987
Commander).....................................
Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet July 1987 Jan. 1989
(Air Wing Training and Readiness Officer)......
Commander, Medium Attack Wing ONE............... Jan. 1989 Feb. 1990
Commander, Carrier Air Wing EIGHT............... Mar. 1990 Aug. 1991
National Defense University (DUINS)............. Aug. 1991 June 1992
Office of the CNO (Deputy Director, Aviation July 1992 Sep. 1993
Plans and Requirements Branch) (N880B).........
Commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia Aug. 1992 Nov. 1992
(Deputy Staff Operations Officer, J-3).........
SACLANT (Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Sep. 1993 June 1995
Policy)........................................
Commander, Carrier Group EIGHT.................. June 1995 Feb. 1996
COMLANTFLT (Deputy and Chief of Staff).......... Feb. 1996 Sep. 1996
U.S. Atlantic Command (Deputy Commander in Chief Sep. 1996 Nov. 1997
and Chief of Staff)............................
Commander, SECOND Fleet/Commander, Striking Nov. 1997 Oct. 2000
Fleet Atlantic.................................
Vice Chief of Naval Operations.................. Oct. 2000 Oct. 2003
Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Oct. 2003 Feb. 2005
Fleet Forces Command...........................
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command................. Feb. 2005 To date
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medals and awards:
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with three Gold Stars
Bronze Star Medal with Combat ``V''
Meritorious Service Medal with two Gold Stars
Air Medal with Bronze Numeral ``6'', Gold Star, and Combat ``V''
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one Gold Star, and
Combat ``V''
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Navy Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
Meritorious Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star
Navy ``E'' Ribbon with two Es
Navy Expeditionary Medal with one Bronze Star
National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two Bronze Stars
Vietnam Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Southwest Asia Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star
NATO Medal
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross Unit Citation
Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal with Device
Kuwait Liberation Medal with Device (Saudi Arabia)
Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kuwait)
Special qualifications:
BA (Social Science) Villanova University, 1967
MA (International Studies) Old Dominion University, 1982
Graduate of Naval War College, 1978
Graduate of National War College, 1992
Designated Naval Flight Officer, 1967
Designated Joint Specialty Officer, 1995
Language Qualifications: French (Knowledge)
Personal data:
Wife: Mary Elizabeth Trapp of Scarsdale, New York
Children: Susan K. Fallon (Daughter), Born: 1 March 1971.
Barbara L. Fallon (Daughter), Born: 21 November 1973.
William P. Fallon (Son), Born: 31 July 1976.
Christina A. Fallon (Daughter), Born: 4 March 1983.
Summary of joint duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assignment Dates Rank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Commander, Carrier Air Wing EIGHT.... Jan. 91-Apr. 91 Capt.
SACLANT (Assistant Chief of Staff for Sep. 93-June 1995 RDML
Plans and Policy)....................
USCINCLANT (Deputy Commander in Chief Sep. 96-Nov. 97 VADM
and Chief of Staff)..................
Commander, SECOND Fleet/Commander, Nov. 97-Oct. 00 VADM
Striking Fleet Atlantic..............
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command....... Feb. 05-to date ADM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Desert Storm
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM William J.
Fallon, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
William J. Fallon.
2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, United States Central Command.
3. Date of nomination:
16 January 2007.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
30 December 1944; East Orange, New Jersey.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Mary E. Trapp Fallon.
7. Names and ages of children:
Susan K. Fallon, 35; Barbara L. Fallon, 33; William P. Fallon, 30;
and Christina A. Fallon, 23.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
Occidental College Golbal Affairs Advisory Board.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
American Automobile Association
American Meteorological Society
Army & Navy Club
Association of Naval Aviation
Deer Run Condominium Owners Association Board (Big Sky, MT)
Bishopsgate (Virginia Beach, VA) Civic League
Hampton Roads World Affairs Council
Knights of Columbus
Mercedes Benz Club of America
National Geographic Society
National War College Alumni Association
Navy Federal Credit Union
Old Dominion University Alumni Association
Smithsonian Institute
Our Lady Star of the Sea (VA Beach, VA) Catholic School Board
Tailhook Association
U.S. Naval Institute
Veterans of Foreign Affairs
Villanova University Alumni Association
Villanova University Varsity Club
Villanova University Wildcat Club.
11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
Villanova University Alumni Loyalty Award
Old Dominion University Distinguished Alumnus Award
Naval War College Distinguished Alumnus Award
Camden Catholic High School Distinguished Alumnus Award
Business Executives for National Security Eisenhower Award
USO of Philadelphia/South Jersey Liberty Award.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted
committee of the Senate?
Yes.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
ADM William J. Fallon, USN.
This 17th day of January, 2007.
[The nomination of ADM William J. Fallon, USN, was reported
to the Senate by Chairman Levin on February 6, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on February 7, 2007.]
NOMINATION OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor, Webb,
McCaskill, McCain, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins,
Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Michael J.
Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel;
Peter K. Levine, chief counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional
staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
research assistant; Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff
member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member;
Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer,
minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul,
professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Diana G.
Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Micah H. Harris and Jessica L.
Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Joseph Axelrad,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to
Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton;
Lauren Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson
and Michael Sozan, assistants to Senator Webb; Nichole M.
Distefano, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Richard H. Fontaine,
Jr., assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell and Jeremy
Shull, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Arch Galloway II,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark Winter, assistant to
Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey
Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson,
assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C. Mallory and Bob Taylor,
assistants to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to
Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning. Today we welcome General
George Casey, the President's nominee to replace General Peter
Schoomaker as the Chief of Staff of the United States Army. We
are also pleased to welcome General Casey's family, who we will
ask him to introduce in a moment, and we all know just how
vitally important families are to the men and women who serve
in the military and we thank them for their service as well as
you for your service, General.
General Casey is well known to members of this committee
and to the American people as Commanding General, Multi-
National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), in which capacity he has served
for over 2\1/2\ years. Prior to that command he was Vice Chief
of Staff of the Army, which was preceded by an assignment as
Director of the Joint Staff, and before that as Director of
Strategy, Plans and Policy, J5, on the Joint Staff.
General Casey is an infantryman, having commanded at all
levels up to and including division command. As an assistant
division commander he served in Bosnia and earlier in his
career he served in Cairo as an United Nations (U.N.) military
observer with the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization. He also
served a tour of duty as a congressional liaison officer.
As commander in Iraq, General Casey is of course identified
with the administration's Iraq strategy. His focus was on
training and equipping Iraqi security forces to bring them as
quickly as possible to a level where they could relieve
American forces from the burden of providing the security that
Iraqis should be providing for themselves.
In this strategy, he was joined by his boss, U.S. Central
Command Commander General John Abizaid, and his subordinate,
the corps commander, Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli.
General Casey put it this way, ``The longer we in the United
States forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq's
security, it lengthens the time that the Government of Iraq has
to take the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing
with the militias. The other thing is that they can continue to
blame us for all of Iraq's problems, which are at base their
problems.''
General Casey and other commanders had to deal with the
consequences of the myriad of flawed policies, including having
insufficient forces at the outset of the operation, failing to
properly plan for the postwar stability operations, disbanding
the Iraqi army, and an overly extensive de-Baathification
program, to name but a few. How well he carried out his
responsibilities will be one of the topics this morning.
We also need to understand what role he played in the
development of the new strategy and his expectations for the
new approach, what has changed that he now apparently believes
that more U.S. troops will help reduce sectarian violence when
he did not seem to believe that before, how would he deal with
the sectarian militias if they are going underground and hiding
weapons instead of directly confronting coalition forces in the
short term; what are their future goals; how long is it
expected that they will stay underground; should coalition
forces seek to disarm the Mahdi Army so they cannot come out
from underground at a later time; what are his concerns about
the lack of unity of command between U.S. and Iraqi forces;
what should be done about it; who will really be taking the
lead down at the small unit level in the neighborhoods; and how
will the U.S. platoons and companies living with and operating
with the Iraqi security forces in these small neighborhood
minibases not become involved in violent interface with Iraqis;
what benchmarks would he be looking for the determine whether
Iraqi commitments are being kept; if the Iraqi government fails
to deploy the additional units to Baghdad according to the
benchmarks to which it has agreed, what does he believe should
be the consequences; what progress has there been on Iraqi
leaders meeting the political commitments they have made; and
does he believe there should be consequences for failures to
meet those commitments?
We also need to inquire as to how long General Casey
believes the increased troop level can be sustained by an army
whose non-deployed units are suffering from significant
readiness problems, as has been testified to by the current
Chief of Staff, as well as to what he considers to be his
greatest challenges should he be confirmed as the next Army
Chief of Staff.
Again, we welcome you, General. We look forward to your
testimony.
I now call upon Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Casey, welcome. I am grateful for your
extraordinary service and personal sacrifice throughout your
career. In addition, I would like to express my appreciation to
your family for their support of your service, as well as the
support they have provided to the men and women in uniform and
their families.
You have been nominated to be the 37th Chief of Staff of
the Army. The ranks of previous Army chiefs of staff are filled
with such distinguished officers as General of the Armies John
J. Pershing, George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Omar
N. Bradley, as well as General J. Lawton Collins, Matthew B.
Ridgway, and Maxwell D. Taylor. This nomination is a great
honor and an even greater responsibility.
While I do not in any way question your honor, your
patriotism, or your service to our country, I do question some
of the decisions and judgments you have made over the past 2\1/
2\ years as Commander of MNF-I. During that time things have
gotten markedly and progressively worse and the situation in
Iraq can now best be described as dire and deteriorating. I
regret that our window of opportunity to reverse momentum may
be closing.
The bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra last February
sparked sectarian violence throughout Iraq and Baghdad in
particular. Yet in the face of this dramatic change in the
Iraqi security environment, our military strategy remained
essentially unchanged. Instead of conducting a traditional
counterinsurgency campaign, our troops focused on training and
equipping Iraqis, hoping in vain that they could do the job.
After repeated elections and political events demonstrated
that the democratic process would not on its own bring down the
level of violence, our troops did not begin focusing on
protecting the population. Instead, coalition and Iraqi forces
launched Operation Together Forward in June 2006. This
operation, aimed at securing Baghdad, failed. Yet the coalition
launched Operation Together Forward 2 in August in a very
similar fashion. The result, predictably, was a similar
failure.
The result of these and other missteps have been
unprecedented levels of violence in Iraq and a pervasive lack
of security that inhibits political and economic activity. In
the 3\1/2\ years after the initial invasion, we finally turn
toward a strategy that implements all three elements of the
clear, hold, and build approach, focuses on protecting the
population, and is carried out by, I hope, a sufficient number
of additional U.S. forces.
I am not certain five additional brigades in Baghdad and
one more in Anbar Province are sufficient to do the job. I am
certain, however, that the job cannot be done with just two
additional brigades, as you, General Casey, had advocated.
General Casey, you were one of the individuals who has been
the architects of U.S. military strategy in Iraq over the last
2 years. While there are very pressing questions about the
future of the Army, you will of course in this hearing be asked
to review the mistakes in American strategy in Iraq during your
command, how the previous Iraq strategy was formulated, why it
failed, why there were not changes sooner, and the lessons that
were learned. You will also be asked to comment on progress in
training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, to include
your previous statements about their readiness. In addition,
you will be asked to respond to questions about the President's
new strategy, to include the troop increase and the command and
control of American forces in Baghdad.
You should expect questions about your role in planning and
execution of the initial invasion of Iraq and post-Saddam Iraq,
while you were assigned to key positions on the Joint Staff in
the Pentagon from 2002 to 2004. You will need to explain why
your assessment of the situation in Iraq has differed so
radically from that of most observers and why your predictions
of future success have been so unrealistically rosy.
During my trip to Iraq in early 2005, you predicted a
significant decline in violence over the remainder of the year
as the democratic process took hold and as more Iraqi troops
were trained. One year later during another visit to Iraq, I
heard nearly the same predictions, with the time line simply
pushed back by a year. In December during a trip that several
other Senators and I made to Iraq, you stated that we were
winning in Iraq and that every day we are making progress
toward meeting our strategic objectives.
Just this month, you predicted publicly that there would be
progress, ``gradually over the next 60 to 80 days,'' and that
people in Baghdad would probably feel safe in their
neighborhoods by the summer.
In light of these remarks and decisions, I have expressed
serious concerns about your nomination as Chief of Staff of the
Army. My strong reservations persist. I look forward to your
testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
General Casey, would you please proceed with your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES
ARMY
General Casey. I will, Senator. Thank you very much.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished
Senators. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today on my nomination to serve as the Army Chief of Staff. I
am honored that the President nominated me to this important
post and I thank you for considering the nomination.
I also want to thank the members of the committee for the
support they have provided to America's Army over the past
years. We could not do what we are doing around the globe today
without your support, so thank you for that.
Let me begin by paying tribute to our troops and their
families, the real heroes of the war on terror and the campaign
in Iraq. The American people should be tremendously proud and
grateful of the magnificent job the men and women of their
Armed Forces are doing in a tough and demanding environment in
Iraq. Over 3,000 men and women have given their lives to build
a new Iraq, to bring liberty and democracy to 27 million
Iraqis, and to ensure security for the United States of
America. They will not be forgotten.
I also want to acknowledge the families who make tremendous
sacrifices on behalf of their loved ones a half a world away.
They shoulder a heavy burden and we are blessed with their
unwavering support. Courage is not reserved for the
battlefield.
I especially want to thank my bride of 36 years, Sheila,
for her courage, grace, and support over the last 2\1/2\ years.
She, like all our families of our deployed men and women,
epitomizes the core values of duty and selfless service. So let
me just say thank you, dear. My wife Sheila. [Applause.]
My son, Ryan, and his wife, Laura; my son, Sean; and my
brother-in-law, Dick O'Brien. That is the family.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to assure you that I have
thought hard about what it means to be the Chief of Staff of
the Army and want to assure you that I am aware of the
tremendous responsibilities associated with this office. I
firmly believe in the Army's vision to remain the world's
preeminent land power, relevant and ready to meet the
challenges of the 21st century.
In Iraq I have been in the unique position to watch a
transformed Army deal with the challenges of 21st century
warfare and I would like to share with you just three
preliminary thoughts. First, the quality of the men and women
of the U.S. Army are the best that I have seen in 36 years in
service. They blend intellect, drive, compassion, courage, and
commitment to succeed daily in a very difficult environment.
Our soldiers and families are our most precious resource and
they will be my top priority.
Second, I see the power of the Army's transformation on the
streets of Iraq every day. The enhanced capabilities of the
modular units allow them to handle the complexities of the
Iraqi environment. If I am confirmed you should expect to see
continuity in the transformation initiatives that General Peter
Schoomaker has put into action.
Third, the men and women of the Army National Guard and the
Army Reserve have been indispensable to our efforts in Iraq and
we must contemplate and implement policies and procedures that
recognize two facts: one, that we are approaching a point where
about half of our Guard and Reserve soldiers will be combat
veterans; and two, we require the continued participation of
the Guard and Reserve in our operations around the world. While
I know the Army has been aggressively working these issues,
Guard and Reserve issues will have my full attention.
I have seen our Army at war in the 21st century and believe
my experience in that regard will be valuable to the Army. I am
also conscious that Iraq is not the only future and as Chief of
Staff of the Army, I will take a broader view.
Next, Mr. Chairman, I would like just to say a few words
about Iraq. Just 2\1/2\ years ago, Iraq was totally dependent
on coalition forces for security. Today Iraqis are poised to
assume responsibility for their own security by the end of
2007, still with some level of support from us. The path that
brought us to this point has not been easy, but it has been
part of a concerted effort to build an Iraq that can secure,
sustain, and govern itself.
Sectarian violence is the greatest threat to Iraq's ability
to accomplish this objective and to move forward. Since
February with the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra,
the sectarian violence in Iraq has greatly complicated our
ability to accomplish our strategic objectives. It makes it
harder for the population, traumatized by 3 decades under
Saddam Hussein, to make the compromises necessary to equitably
resolve what is the fundamental conflict in Iraq, the division
of political and economic power among Iraqis.
This is a challenge we can help them address, but one they
must ultimately resolve themselves. I continue to firmly
believe that enduring strategic success in Iraq must be
achieved by Iraqis.
I know there are questions in people's minds about where I
stand on troop levels, particularly with respect to the most
recent deployment of troops to Baghdad. There are no questions
in my mind. I can tell you that I have been doing what I told
you I would do 2\1/2\ years ago at my confirmation hearing. I
told you I would ask for the troops I believed I required to
accomplish the mission and I believe I have.
Over the course of the mission I have asked for and
received more troops at least six times: in support of the
operation in Fallujah in late 2004; in support of the January
2005 elections; to implement the transition team, the embed
concept, in the spring of 2005; to support the October
referendum and December elections in 2005; to support the
Baghdad security plan in 2006; and again in December 2006 to
reinforce Iraqi efforts in Baghdad. I have also sent troops
home once, following the December 2005 elections as a result of
improvements in the Iraqi security forces over the course of
the year.
Now, with respect to my most recent request for forces, the
planning began in November shortly after we changed out the
Baghdad division. There was a normal rotation of divisions in
Baghdad in the middle of November. The corps commander and I at
that time sat down with the new commander and gave him our
intent and told him to take a blank sheet of paper and tell us
what it would take to help the Iraqis restore stability in
their capital.
This is part of a continuous assessment process that we
have ongoing there. We are constantly looking at how we are
doing, what we should be doing differently.
Around the same time, the Iraqis came forward with their
own approach, and together we developed the coordinated plan
that we are now implementing. My commanders told me that they
needed two brigades to implement this plan and I asked for
those forces. At the same time we worked with the Iraqi prime
minister to ensure that there was political commitment to the
Baghdad effort.
In a series of addresses following his meeting with the
President in Amman and continuing through his Army Day address
on January 6, Prime Minister Maliki announced the political
commitments that we were looking for. We will continue to
monitor the delivery on these commitments, but so far the
results have been heartening.
Now, some will ask, why cannot the Iraqi security forces do
this by themselves? The Iraqi security forces are 2\1/2\ years
into a 3\1/2\-year developmental process. They are not quite
ready to assume security responsibility in Baghdad or Iraq. But
they are increasingly ready and willing the take the lead in
these security operations with our support.
They are also challenged by sectarian tensions and actions
that have shaken the confidence of some of their populations in
their security forces. For the Iraqis to successfully assume
and sustain the security responsibility, their security forces
must emerge as the dominant security force in the country. To
do this, political and militia influence over the security
forces must be eliminated and levels of sectarian violence,
particularly in the capital, must be brought down
substantially, brought down to the point where the people in
Baghdad can feel safe in their neighborhoods.
This is what we are working toward in Baghdad. It will take
time and the Iraqis do need our help.
What we and the Iraqis are doing in Iraq is a hard, tough
business. Fighting this type of campaign while rebuilding a
dilapidated infrastructure, building a representative
government where none existed before, and reconciling ethnic
and sectarian differences makes it even more difficult and
complex. The struggle in Iraq is winnable, but it will, as I
have said before this committee, take patience and will.
Mr. Chairman, in closing I would like to go back to the
Army. I am a soldier. My roots are in the Army and I know the
pride of wearing this uniform. You can say I have been part of
the Army all my life. I was born in an Army hospital in Japan
where my father was a member of the occupation forces. I am an
Army brat that went to four high schools in three countries.
Sheila and the boys grew up in the Army and my youngest son
joined the Army Reserve as a private at age 34 because he too
wanted to serve.
I have devoted my life to the Army. I took hard jobs around
the world because they were important to our country. I must
admit I am amazed when I hear comments to the effect that I am
being nominated as a reward. Mr. Chairman, the members of the
committee know full well the challenges and the multitude of
challenges facing the Army over the next 4 years. Service as
Army Chief of Staff is not a reward; it is a duty. It is about
service and it is about personal commitment to the men and
women of the United States Army.
If confirmed, I acknowledge the hard work ahead to maintain
our position as the greatest army on the planet. I will need
and ask for your help, and I pledge to work in partnership with
you, Mr. Chairman, and the rest of the members of the committee
and to consult with you frequently and candidly.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to taking your
questions.
Chairman Levin. General, thank you.
We have a series of standard questions which we ask of all
nominees. First, have you adhered to applicable laws and
regulations governing conflicts of interest?
General Casey. I have.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Casey. I have not.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
General Casey. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Casey. I will.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Casey. They will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree if confirmed to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
General Casey. I will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views
when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views
differ from the administration?
General Casey. I will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
General Casey. I will.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We will have a 6-minute first round of questions.
General, we understand you support the President's
strategy, the new strategy which involves a surge of troops
into Iraq. You were asked for your recommendation and you
apparently recommended two brigades, as you just testified to,
based on your commander's recommendations to you?
General Casey. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. We asked General Abizaid back in November
of last year when he appeared before this committee whether we
needed more troops or he supported more troops going to Iraq.
He said that he met with every divisional commander, General
Casey, the Corps Commander, General Dempsey, ``We all talked
together and I said, in your professional opinion if you were
to bring in more American troops now does it add considerably
to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? They all said no,
and the reason is because we want Iraqis to do more. It is easy
for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that
more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from
taking more responsibility for their own future.''
General Abizaid said that he spoke to you and that his
opinion reflected your opinion and that of all the other
commanders. Was that true when he said it?
General Casey. I am not exactly sure when in November it
was, but it was.
Chairman Levin. So you have changed your view since
November?
General Casey. As I described in my opening testimony,
Senator, in mid-November was when the reevaluation of the plan
was taking place. I suspect John and I talked before that. That
does reflect my general view on additional U.S. forces in Iraq.
Chairman Levin. It reflects a general view, but then there
was some kind of a reevaluation which took place in mid-
November?
General Casey. That is right, Senator. We are constantly
reevaluating how we are doing and what we need.
Chairman Levin. But that position that General Abizaid
stated was your position when you spoke to him in early
November presumably still remains your general view?
General Casey. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. If that is your general view, what has
changed? Why are you modifying your general view for this
surge?
General Casey. What has changed, Senator, is several
things. One, the development of a plan, a new plan that was
conceived by the Iraqis and worked in concert with us. So there
is a plan that laid out requirements for those forces. So just
to say do you need more forces is one thing. To say do you need
more forces to execute this plan is quite another. We do need
two additional brigades to implement that plan.
Chairman Levin. The Iraqis came in with a plan that said
they did not want any additional American forces inside of
Baghdad; is that not true? That was their plan that was
presented to the President in Amman?
General Casey. I think that is a misunderstanding. I have
read those newspaper reports. That was not the case. I was in
Amman and that issue was never raised.
Chairman Levin. So the Iraqis did not say that they did not
seek American forces in Amman?
General Casey. They did not.
Chairman Levin. Did they seek American forces in Baghdad?
General Casey. There was not a large, long discussion about
the plan that they presented. They basically passed it across
the table and there was actually quite a short discussion.
Chairman Levin. Did the plan that they passed across the
table include additional American troops?
General Casey. It broadly identified the requirement for
additional troops. I do not believe that it specified Iraqi or
coalition. Now, for Prime Minister Maliki, he would generally
rather not have additional coalition forces. That is his
position. But he has listened to recommendations from his
commander and from me about the need for these forces and he is
accepting those forces on an as-needed basis.
Chairman Levin. Basically he felt that more security forces
were needed inside Baghdad? He did not specify that any
coalition forces would be needed as part of that, but it came
from you and others that if there are going to be additional
forces inside of Baghdad that coalition forces would be needed
to provide some supplementary support; is that fair?
General Casey. That is fair, Senator.
Chairman Levin. There is an article in this morning's Miami
Herald which says the following: Jafari, when he was prime
minister, recollected some meetings with U.S. officials and he
said that in the meetings held twice a week he urged coalition
forces to take action against the militias. In attendance, he
said, were Army General George Casey, then the top U.S.
commander in Iraq, the U.S. ambassador, the British ambassador,
and a British general.
Jafari said he asked the officials to force police and army
recruits to pledge loyalty to the government and to consider a
military strike against the militias while they were still
isolated from the public. ``They were not cooperating with
us,'' Jafari said.
A former Jafari aide said he believed U.S. officials did
not take action because they did not want to get involved in a
political dispute between Jafari's Dawa Party and the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Iraq's largest
Shiite political party.
Was that request made of you by Jafari when he was prime
minister and is it true that we rejected that request, and if
so for what reason?
General Casey. I just want to make sure I have the specific
request right. Could you please repeat what he said?
Chairman Levin. He asked officials--that is you; you are
the only named one by name; he mentioned the ambassador and so
forth. But by name he said that he asked you and the others to,
``force''--this is not a quote. This is the article that says
this: that Jafari asked you to force police and army recruits
to pledge loyalty to the government and to consider a military
strike against the militias while they were still isolated from
the public. Jafari then is quoted as saying ``They''--you--
``were not cooperating with us.''
Could you comment on that?
General Casey. I have not seen the article, Senator, but
there is some strongly revisionist history going on there by
the former prime minister.
Chairman Levin. Strongly? I am sorry?
General Casey. Revisionist history going on there by the
former prime minister.
I do not recall the request to force the police and army to
pledge, but we have done that several times over the course of
the last year both in the army and in the police, where the
soldiers and the police have taken a loyalty pledge to the
government. But I do not remember getting that request from the
prime minister.
Quite the contrary to him asking me to make a military
strike, which I do not ever recall him asking me to take any
action, particularly a military strike against militia, that
government was an impediment to our action against the militia.
He was working very hard on the political side of things to
keep the Sadrists under control. But frankly, I went to him
with a group several times to get him to take action and allow
us to take military action against the militia, and was denied.
We had difficulty getting him to even issue a statement on
a weapons ban that his police and army officers wanted so that
they could enforce the weapons ban on the streets of Iraq. He
dragged his feet on that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. General Casey, I was interested in your
opening statement, which continues to be optimistic. In recent
days the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and General Abizaid's designated successor Admiral
Fallon have all stated we are not winning and we had a failed
strategy. Now, those are clearcut statements for the record.
Do you agree with that assessment?
General Casey. Do I agree that we have a failed strategy?
Senator McCain. We had a failed policy and we are not
winning.
General Casey. Senator, I do not agree that we have a
failed policy. I believe the President's new strategy will
enhance the policy that we have.
Senator McCain. So you view this change in strategy as just
an enhancement of the previous policy?
General Casey. It is a significant shift, but I believe it
will be an enhancement over the current policy. The policy of
training and equipping Iraqi security forces and gradually
passing security responsibility to them as they are ready is
still an important element of the current strategy and it is
part of the Amman agreement.
Senator McCain. So you disagree with the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral
Fallon that we had a failed policy?
General Casey. I do, Senator. I do not believe that the
current policy has failed.
Senator McCain. I would like to give you a quote. There are
many quotes, but one I would be interested in your response to.
A Pentagon press conference on December 16, 2004, ``My view of
winning is that we are broadly on track to accomplishing our
objectives, with Iraqi security forces that are capable of
maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq as a safe haven for
terror, I believe we are on track to get there by December
2005.''
Was that statement accurate that you made in 2004?
General Casey. I do not recall the specifics of--
Senator McCain. I have given you a direct quote from your
statement.
General Casey. It said that what would be ready by the end
of 2005?
Senator McCain. ``My view of winning is that we are broadly
on track to accomplishing our objectives. With Iraqi security
forces that are capable of maintaining domestic order and
denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror, and I believe we are
on track to get there by December 2005.''
You made that statement in December 2004.
General Casey. That obviously has not panned out. We have
projections that we work on with the development of the
security forces. Again, I do not remember the context of that,
but the institutional aspects of building these security forces
has always been programmed to take longer than that. So I am
not quite sure what I was focusing on there. But it obviously
has not panned out, Senator.
Senator McCain. I do not want to belabor it, but there is a
series of quotes. As short a time ago as October 11, 2006, ``
`The idea that the country is aflame in sectarian violence is
just not right,' Casey said. `I do not subscribe to the civil
war idea.' ''
September 30, 2005: ``We have a strategy and a plan for
success in Iraq and we are broadly on track in achieving our
goals.''
General Casey, almost everybody that I know that has
testified before this committee and talked to, has said we had
a failed policy, we are not winning; those are the judgments,
and ``serious mistakes were made.'' That is in the comments
made by the President of the United States.
Last year, in the month of December, we had the third
highest number of American servicemen deaths in Iraq, as you
well know.
Do you believe that this job, this change in strategy or,
as you call it the new job, can be done with less than five
brigades that General Petraeus says he needs?
General Casey. I believe that the job in Baghdad as it is
designed now can be done with less than that. But having the
flexibility to have the other three brigades on a deployment
cycle gives General Petraeus great flexibility. It allows him
to make assessments on whether the plan is working or not and
to either reinforce success, maintain momentum, or put more
forces in a place where the plans are not working.
I believe that this five brigade plan gives great
flexibility to General Petraeus at a very important time in the
mission.
Senator McCain. This is a time when almost all of our major
concerns and military experts' major concern is whether five
brigades are enough, and a very short time ago you simply asked
for two brigades. We just have a fundamental disagreement,
General Casey, with facts on the ground and with what has
happened in Iraq over now one of the longest wars in our
history and where we are today.
I believe it is abundantly clear that we are at a point in
Iraq where we are going to have to succeed within in the coming
months or we are going to have to experience catastrophic
consequences associated with it. It took us a long time to get
where we are today. I do not believe that from the beginning
when General Shinseki's testimony before this committee was
repudiated and he was removed from his job because he said we
needed a sufficient number of troops that would have done the
job, throughout we have paid a very heavy price in American
blood and treasure in what the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the new Commander of
Central Command (CENTCOM) say is a ``failed policy.''
I regret that we were not given better and more accurate
information as these past years unfolded.
I could ask you to respond to an abundance of quotes I have
here in front of me that painted a very optimistic and rosy
scenario, which did not comport in the view of many of us with
the actual conditions on the ground and that many of us who
greatly feared that we would be in the critical situation that
we are in today.
So General, as I say, I do not question your honorable
service. I have the most respect for you, your family, and
their service to our Nation. I question seriously the judgment
that was employed in your execution of your responsibilities in
Iraq. We have paid a very heavy price in American blood and
treasure because of what is now agreed to by literally everyone
is a failed policy.
I would be very happy to hear your response, General.
General Casey. Senator, I do not think there is any
question that the situation in the center of the country,
particularly in the capital, is bad, and we are working very
hard to rectify that. As I mentioned in my opening statement,
the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in February added a
completely new dimension to our challenges in Iraq, and dealing
with the sectarian violence and helping the Iraqis deal with
sectarian violence has been a very significant challenge.
As I also mentioned, the country will not be able to move
forward with their security forces and it will not be able to
move forward politically or economically until they come to
grips with that situation.
I recognize we have a fundamental disagreement and in my
mind the question has always been should we do it or should
they do it. ``It'' being restore security. What I have tried to
do in my time there is strike the right balance that allowed
the Iraqi security forces and the government to keep moving
forward, but at the same time having enough coalition presence
there so that we could get the job done.
The situation in the capital, as you point out, is not
good. It requires additional forces and I believe the flow plan
to support that puts the forces in the right position and gives
General Petraeus great flexibility.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Casey, good morning. Let me pick up on something
you said to Senator McCain, which is that you do not agree that
our policy in Iraq has been a failure. I want to ask you why
you think it has not been a failure.
General Casey. The policy that I have been following has
always been designed to do two things: to bring the insurgents
and terrorists, the levels of violence, down to levels that
could be contained by increasingly capable Iraqi security
forces. That is happening in the better part of the country. It
is not happening in Baghdad. It is not happening in Anbar. It
is not happening in Diyala Province.
Senator Lieberman. So you would say--and do not let me put
words in your mouth--that while there have been failures,
disappointments, in Baghdad as of today, that the policy that
you followed has succeeded in other parts of Iraq?
General Casey. There are three provinces in southern Iraq
that are already under provincial Iraqi control. The fight that
took place earlier this week in Najaf Province took place in a
province that was under Iraqi control.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Casey. It worked just like we had laid out in the
memorandums of understanding. The police found it. It was too
much for them. They called the Iraqi army. The Iraqi army came,
it was too much for them, they called us. But the Iraqis dealt
with it with our support.
There are three provinces in the north, the Kurdish
provinces, that once they resolve some disagreements with the
government over budget they will also fall under Iraqi control,
and other provinces are projected over the course of the rest
of this year to assume responsibility for their own security.
That process is working. It is working slowly, but it is
working.
Senator Lieberman. So if you were asked a different kind of
question, which is whether you believe the situation in Iraq is
deteriorating, is it fair to say that you would say it is not
deteriorating in most of the country, but is in Baghdad?
General Casey. I would say the situation is definitely
deteriorating in Baghdad, in the center of the country. It is
not necessarily deteriorating across Iraq. I want to say 14 of
the 18 provinces have 10 or less incidents of violence a day.
Baghdad has 30 or 40 incidents a day, to give you some
comparison.
The levels of violence in the capital are significant. Now,
it is the capital of the country and we should not discount the
impact that not being able to control their capital has on the
government and has on the rest of the country. That is really
our challenge.
Senator Lieberman. Am I correct to conclude from what you
have said earlier this morning that you support the new
military, economic, and political plan for Iraq as the
President has announced it?
General Casey. I do, Senator, and I was consulted on that.
I participated in the development of the strategy.
Senator Lieberman. Do you believe that it will succeed?
General Casey. I believe that it can work.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Casey. As I have said, in war there are no
guarantees. But this plan, I believe it is the appropriate
strategy and it has the appropriate levels of resources
attached to it. So I believe the plan can work.
Senator Lieberman. I presume you are saying that you
believe it has a higher probability of working than any other
plan you have heard described?
General Casey. That is a fair statement, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. One of the other alternatives being
discussed by some of our colleagues is to mandate the beginning
of a withdrawal within a set period of months. How would you
evaluate that as an alternative path to success in Iraq?
General Casey. As the commander, I would resist any type of
mandated timetables that would limit my flexibility to deal
with the situation on the ground.
Senator Lieberman. Do you fear that if we in fact began to
withdraw that the situation in Iraq would deteriorate even
further, in other words withdraw on a deadline as opposed to
based on improved conditions there?
General Casey. As I said, I do not believe that a mandated
timetable not tied to conditions on the ground would be
helpful. My sense is people on the ground would take advantage
of that.
Senator Lieberman. Understood.
Let me ask you a few questions actually about the job for
which you are being nominated, Chief of Staff of the Army.
Would you say, based on the Army's involvement in Iraq and
other circumstances, that the U.S. Army today is broken?
General Casey. No, Senator, I would not. I came in the Army
36 years ago and I saw a broken Army. The first platoon I
walked into as a lieutenant in my first assignment in Germany
had nine people in it and four of those people were pending
discharge. We did not have money to train, we did not have
money to fix our vehicles.
I can remember guys painting over bumper numbers, the
vehicle identification number on a vehicle, because they only
had one that worked and when they had an inspection they
changed the number and take that vehicle up because it was the
only one that worked. It was broken badly.
Senator Lieberman. But it is not now?
General Casey. I see in Iraq every day a splendid Army.
Now, I know that General Schoomaker has problems with the
forces yet to deploy and some of the strategic elements that
will deploy later, but from what I see in Iraq, Senator, the
Army is far from broken.
Senator Lieberman. I agree with you, of course. It is the
best in the world, and I believe the best we have ever had.
I want to ask you a final question about the increase in
end strength that the President and Secretary Gates are
recommending to take the Army up to 540,000. Is that adequate?
General Casey. Senator, in the short time I have been back
and plugged into Army issues, I am being told by the Army Staff
that that is in fact adequate now. However, they have an
analysis process that they repeatedly run and they will
continue to look at whether it is sufficient to meet their
needs over time. But right now I am being told it is
sufficient.
Senator Lieberman. My time is up. Thank you, General Casey.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. General Casey, thank you for reciting your
commitment personally and that of your family to the United
States Army. You did not make reference to your father and the
fact that he was a very brave soldier. He was a two-star
general commanding the First Infantry Division in Vietnam and
lost his life in the line of duty. I think it is important that
we look at the total of the individual that is before us today
and that is an important factor, because you have to inspire.
One of your major responsibilities as the Chief of Staff of the
Army is to inspire your people, to set the example to continue
on so that America can enjoy the finest Army of any in the
world.
I want to go back to your comments just now about your
participation in this new plan and particularly the comments of
my colleagues, which are accurate, about the ever-widening
circle of individuals talking about a failed policy, certainly
during calendar year 2006. Having served in the Pentagon myself
as a part of the civilian team, I know full well how under our
Constitution ever since George Washington civilians are in
charge of our military. They devise the policy, they issue the
orders, and our military individuals carry out those orders, or
at times I have seen senior officers respectfully disagree and,
frankly, resign rather than carry out a policy which they feel
is wrong.
I judge that the policy and the orders that you carried out
were consistent with those traditions and that you were given
orders, and in this instance we should bear in mind that you
were subordinate to CENTCOM Commander, General John Abizaid,
whom I have a great deal of confidence in as a military
commander. Is that not correct?
General Casey. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. That he in turn received his orders from
the President, transmitted in some respects through the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; is that not correct?
General Casey. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. Now, did you feel free at any time to reach
out and question the orders that you were given to carry out?
General Casey. I did, Senator. In fact, there was a strong
dialogue about the policy between both our civilian leadership
and General Abizaid and myself. I believe in the policy that I
am implementing, Senator Warner. Did I not believe in it, I
would have taken other actions, as you suggested.
Senator Warner. It seems to me that as we assess the
accountability for the past that where--and I think you today
indicated you accept your share of the responsibility----
General Casey. I do.
Senator Warner.--an equal if not a greater share falls upon
the civilians that devised the policy and issued the orders.
Now, we come down to this very critical point you made
here, and I copied it down pretty carefully. You said that when
you were working on the new strategy, the plan enunciated by
the President on January 10, that you felt two brigades; I
expect you changed that to ``brigades''--were sufficient to
carry it out, with an augmentation of the marines of a
battalion or two in Anbar; is that correct?
General Casey. That is correct. I do not want to put too
fine a point on this, but what you are talking about, are
requirements for the Baghdad security plan.
Senator Warner. That is correct.
General Casey. I would differentiate that from the
President's strategy. But the Baghdad plan is part of that
strategy.
Senator Warner. At what point did you say to someone that
you need two more brigades and an additional battalion in
Anbar? Was it not a part of the planning phases of the January
10 plan or was it separate?
General Casey. Around right before Christmas is when I
asked for the additional forces.
Senator Warner. Was it to implement the plan that the
President announced or a plan that you were devising with
regard to increasing the level of security in Baghdad?
General Casey. The latter, Senator. It was asked for
because of the Baghdad security plan.
Senator Warner. I see. So it was a part of your input into
the thinking for a new plan to raise the level of security in
Baghdad?
General Casey. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. Then you say: ``well, I recognize that if
you give the higher figure which is in the plan now, 20,500,
that would give the new commander more flexibility.'' Had you
remained as the commander would not you have wanted the
additional flexibility of the additional increments of two more
brigades?
General Casey. I would have welcomed the flexibility of
having access to three more brigades if I remained there.
Senator Warner. But why did you not ask for the full
complement of the four to five brigades, rather than just the
two? Could it have been because of your concern and that of
General Abizaid that the bringing on of additional troops was
going into the face of a rising resentment among the Iraqi
people for more and more troops?
General Casey. Senator, my general belief is I did not want
to bring one more American soldier into Iraq than was necessary
to accomplish the mission. So what I asked for was the two
brigades and the ability to maintain a reserve in Kuwait in
case I needed additional flexibility.
Senator Warner. All right. Let me go to the question of the
extent we can use the trained Iraqi forces--and that training
was done largely during your 2\1/2\ years--or turn in and bring
in more U.S. forces, it is a constant balance. That is where,
speaking for myself and I think some others who have associated
with me on a resolution, we urge the President to look at all
options to charge the Iraqis with a greater and greater degree
of the new plan in Baghdad.
They understand the language. They understand the culture
and are better able to cope with this sectarian violence, which
is so difficult to comprehend, and the killing. Why are we not
putting greater emphasis on the utilization of Iraqi forces and
less on the U.S. GI being put into that cauldron of terror
generated by mistrust between the Iraqis and the Sunnis that
goes back 1,400 years?
General Casey. I would say, Senator, that we are relying
more on the Iraqis and forcing the Iraqis to take a more
leading role in resolving the situation in Baghdad. They came
up with the plan. They will lead the plan. I agree with you,
they are much better at understanding what is going on on the
streets of their own country than our soldiers are.
One of the challenges we have, though, I mentioned in my
opening statement. It is the confidence of all the population
in the different elements of their security forces. Largely,
the Sunni population of Baghdad do not trust the police. So one
of the schemes that will be used as part of this plan is joint
manning with police, army, and coalition forces to do that.
That is where the coalition comes in, because when they see us
operating with the Iraqi police particularly the population has
a greater level of confidence that the forces will treat them
properly.
Senator Warner. My time is up. My hope and my prayers are
this plan succeeds, but it succeeds by a greater and greater
reliance on the Iraqi forces and we will not have to use the
full 20,500 Americans to implement this. Let the Iraqis step
forward. We have trained them for 2\1/2\ years, invested a lot
of time and money, and they should be the ones that carry the
burden in Baghdad.
General Casey. They are willing to do that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Casey, thank you for your many years of service and
your family's service to our Nation.
Over the last 2 years I have been advocating benchmarks,
measurable goals, to measure progress in Iraq. I know you have
heard me say this previously. What benchmarks does General
Petraeus need now to measure the military progress that we hope
to be made in Iraq? What goals and how will we measure that?
You have your own view about whether we have been
successful in Iraq and you have stated that. You have General
Jack Keane saying something different and others also saying it
is a failed policy. How can we get something clear going in
with a new plan, would that be benchmarks? How would we measure
them and how could we tell whether they are a success and to
what degree a success?
General Casey. That is something that we have been working
already in Baghdad here and I will just run down a few points.
These are the things that we are thinking about as important
elements to measure so that we can get some sense of progress.
First of all, pretty simply a reduction in the lawlessness
and the level of sectarian killings. We track that over time
and I will say that over the last 5 or 6 weeks we actually have
seen a gradual downturn in sectarian incidents. Now, there has
been an upturn in the high profile attacks, the car bombs and
suicide attacks. But in general there has been a downturn over
the last 5 or 6 weeks.
Second, we set as a goal, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, we want to continue to work the security situation
in Baghdad with the Iraqis until the people of Baghdad can feel
safe in their neighborhood. We are seeing a systematic effort,
primarily by the Shia militia, to move Sunni population out of
mixed neighborhoods. We see it to a smaller scale in the Sunni
neighborhoods. We have to help the Iraqis reverse that.
Third, we believe that the Iraqi security forces have to
emerge as the dominant security force with the confidence of
the people of Baghdad. We measure that by polls over time and
by our observations.
Fourth, we think there needs to be improvement in the basic
needs in Baghdad, we and the Iraqis are supporting economic
plans to raise the level of services.
Fifth, we think it is important to turn the population
against violence in general, and we measure that, their
feelings on that, through polls.
Finally, we think it is important that political and
religious leaders actively engage in efforts to lessen the
tensions, and so we would measure that by the active engagement
of the leaders.
So those are some of the metrics that we are thinking
about, using, and will use to measure progress in Baghdad.
Senator Ben Nelson. With this plan, this looks like these
are now conditions for staying. I have been advocating
conditions for staying as opposed to dates for withdrawal or
mandated troop reductions or other programs of that kind. If we
measure against these benchmarks that you just identified and
we are not succeeding, are there consequences or is it just the
opportunity to now change plans and come with a new plan?
Are these benchmarks conditions for staying or are they
just benchmarks for evaluating a plan?
General Casey. Senator, I am sorry. I am not quite sure
what you mean about conditions for staying.
Senator Ben Nelson. If these benchmarks all end up with a
failing grade do we just change the plan or do we begin to say,
these are conditions now for leaving. In other words, I
understand you have to modify plans along the way. Are we just
modifying the plan along the way or are there true consequences
if the Iraqis do not step forward, if they do not stand up
their forces, if they cannot quell the violence in their
neighborhoods, if they cannot take the lead? Do we consider
that just the consequences that mean we will have to change the
plan or does it mean we begin to think about withdrawing?
General Casey. I understand now, Senator. The metrics I
described to you are metrics to measure progress in the plan.
They are not anything beyond that. Now, you ask are there
consequences of the plan not progressing or the Iraqis not
meeting their commitments. That is a political judgment that we
would work with the government.
We review these metrics. We review these metrics with the
government and tell them what they are doing or not doing as a
means of continuing to move the plan forward.
Senator Ben Nelson. We understand the problem that any
democracy or attempted democracy has with militias involved in
their military or in their government. If the Iraqis are
unwilling to move forward in Sadr City against Moqutada al-Sadr
and the Mahdi Army, would that be a pretty good indication that
the plan is not succeeding or would that be a reason to believe
that maybe our commitment to Iraq should be reevaluated?
General Casey. It is a hypothetical, Senator, but if we
were denied access to Sadr City, I would consider that a
significant breach in the commitments that the prime minister
has already made and we would have to have serious discussions
with the government.
Senator Ben Nelson. But have we not already been denied
access to certain political leaders? Have we not already been
denied access to take certain actions against the militias or
other instances where they have told us no for political
reasons or for other reasons?
General Casey. In the past they have, Senator. But I will
tell you, in the past probably 2 months we have not been denied
access to any target and the prime minister is doing what he
said he was going to do. He was going to target everyone who is
breaking the law.
Senator Ben Nelson. Have we asked for access to the Mahdi
Army and al-Sadr?
General Casey. We are actively working our plans for Sadr
City with the Iraqis.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first say how difficult this is because it seems as
if each time I have been in the area of responsibility (AOR),
which has been 12 times, I have come back with great success
stories. I can remember when General Madhi Hashim took over in
Fallujah. He, at one time, was Saddam Hussein's brigade
commander and became really very close and enamored with our
Marines up there, and they have done a great job. In fact, he
later on was moved down to Baghdad to perform security there. I
can remember a trip shortly after that where this general was
in charge of, I believe, the entire eastern one-third of
Baghdad. We did not have any of our boots on the ground. The
security was all provided by the Iraqis. Yet, after that it
changed.
I agree with Senator Warner, as everyone agrees, that we
want to get to the point where these guys can take care of
their own security.
We have seen it moving around. But I want to spend my time
on a couple of the real serious problems we have in the new
job, if you are confirmed, that you will be facing. First one--
and you cannot wait until the change of command on this one
because it is critical today and I think the most critical
thing that you better be thinking about. I know that General
Peter Schoomaker is. I had dinner with him a couple nights ago.
He is most concerned about that, and that is the required
implementation of the base realignment and closure (BRAC) that
we passed.
It is interesting for me to bring this up because I was one
of those who was opposed to having this BRAC round. The reason,
General Casey, is because I said on the Senate floor: Yes, it
may be true that this BRAC round will save $20 billion, but
that is not going to be immediate. It is going to cost us money
in the mean time.
Now, the Continuing Resolution (CR) that the majority has,
and hopefully the Democrats will massage this a little bit and
correct this problem, shorts the account for military
construction under the BRAC by $3.1 billion. Now, in the event
that that is not done, can you explain the implementation or
the problems that we are going to be facing if we do not
properly fund that BRAC account in terms of our troops'
rotation and the things that will not be done as a result of
that shortage of $3.1 billion?
General Casey. I could not talk about the specifics of
that, but as you suggest a cut of that magnitude would have a
huge impact on our ability to manage the installations across
the Army, at a time when we are rotating soldiers back and
forth to combat zones. But I have not been into the specifics
on that.
Senator Inhofe. I think it is time that you are. What I
would like to ask you is by tomorrow, have for the record an
outline of the problems that you will be facing in your new
job, if you are confirmed, if we do not adequately fund that
BRAC account. I do not know how you are going to do it. How can
you plan in the future?
Right now we have come up with good plans to start rotating
troops and bringing them back. We have very carefully designed
this as to what the housing is going to be, and how we are
going to implement that. That is going to be a serious problem.
So I would like to have that--after you have consulted with
General Schoomaker and other people--so I can be talking about
this.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Inhofe. Now, of all the jobs, the tough jobs, I
know you had the toughest job in the world over there, but for
right now I would like to have you forget about that and think
about the job that you would be facing as the Chief. You have
title 10 responsibilities as the Chief to provide the required
troops and equipment. You have the BRAC problem that we are
talking about now.
If I wanted to discourage you, I would remind you that the
Army is facing equipment hurdles in bringing the troop surge to
Iraq. It needs 1,500 more up-armored trucks. The Army is going
to have to draw on prepositioned stocks and it will take
months, probably the summer, to outfit the new vehicles. I had
some conversations with General Schoomaker recently.
I want to read something from his testimony before this
committee. He said: ``To meet combatant commanders' immediate
needs, we pulled equipment from across the force to equip the
soldiers deploying in harm's way. This practice, which we are
continuing today, increases risk of our next-to-deploy units.
It limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic
contingencies.''
The Army National Guard right now has only 40 percent of
their required equipment. Then we have the Future Combat System
(FCS), and every time we need money we move that FCS to the
right and delay its implementation. Until we finish that, we
are sending our kids out to battle in equipment that is not as
good as our potential adversaries could have.
These are huge problems. I am not going to ask you to solve
the problems this morning, but I would just like to have you
address: What background and unique characteristics do you have
to meet these, these really critical problems that you will be
facing?
General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
These are the basic resource modernization challenges and
tradeoffs that I think that I faced as the Vice Chief of Staff
of the Army when we were working on the FCS system back then.
Senator Inhofe. You have always been a real strong
supporter of that. I am talking about from this point forward
with these new competitions for funds; how are we going to do
this and you have already said, in the previous position that
you held you did face these problems.
General Casey. Right. It is standard operational
requirements: strategy, modernization, and resources. One of my
jobs as the Chief of Staff of the Army will be to strike the
appropriate balance between current demands and current
readiness and our ability, as you suggest, to field the type of
force that we are going to need in the next decade. That I
think in a nutshell is what I will be doing as the Chief of
Staff of the Army.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. So if you would for the
record bring back what I was asking for tomorrow, that would be
very helpful to me and to many of us on this panel, bringing to
the surface the serious problem that is there.
I would say, in response to that last question that I asked
you, that it is going to be a real tough job and I think you
are the man for the job. Thank you for your service.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to
you, General Casey, for your years of service, and thanks also
to your family because they have served along with you, and we
are grateful to all of you.
I want to follow up on the line of questioning Senator
Inhofe was pursuing because I have been concerned about the
readiness level of units being deployed to Iraq, and in last
year's National Defense Authorization Bill, I authored an
amendment that was included in the final act, that would
require the Government Accountability Office to conduct a
comprehensive assessment of the readiness of our ground forces
within the Army and Marine Corps no later than June 1 of this
year.
But even before that report is completed, there have been a
series of disturbing reports that our troops do not have the
equipment they need as they are being deployed to Iraq. At a
January 23, House Armed Services Committee hearing, General
Schoomaker stated, ``We are in a dangerous, uncertain, and
unpredictable time,'' and reiterated his concerns about the
readiness levels of non-deployed combat units.
Five combat brigade teams are deploying to Iraq to support
the proposed escalation of U.S. forces there. These units are
part of the pool of nondeployed combat units. General, I want
to ask a series of questions that follow up on our conversation
yesterday in my office, because I know this is a grave concern
to you and to all of us.
Are you at this point able to assert with a 100-percent
level of confidence to this committee that every soldier being
deployed to Iraq as part of this escalation will have all the
necessary personal equipment?
General Casey. Senator, that is my goal and I know that is
General Pete Schoomaker's goal, and we work very hard to ensure
that that happens.
Senator Clinton. Can you similarly assure us that every
soldier being deployed as part of this escalation will receive
all the necessary training for this dangerous assignment?
General Casey. Again, that is the objective that both
General Schoomaker and I have stated to our organizations.
Senator Clinton. Finally, will each and every soldier being
deployed as part of this escalation have all the necessary
force protection available to them to perform their mission?
General Casey. As I mentioned to you yesterday, I gave that
guidance several weeks ago, that that would in fact be the
case.
Senator Clinton. Now, according to yesterday's Business
Week summary of a new Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector
General (IG) report, the IG is concerned that the U.S. military
has failed to adequately equip soldiers in Iraq and
Afghanistan, especially for nontraditional duties such as
training Iraqi security forces and handling detainees.
The equipment shortages were attributed to basic management
failures among military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.
U.S. CENTCOM lacks standard policies for requesting and
tracking equipment requirements for units to perform their
duties.
General, have you seen this IG's report?
General Casey. I have not, Senator.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that the
committee request a copy of the IG's report that was referred
to in the Business Week story and that it be made available to
the committee as soon as possible.
Chairman Levin. It will be requested and will be shared
with everybody.
Senator Clinton. General, as commander of U.S. forces in
Iraq were you aware of the IG's investigation?
General Casey. This is the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction's (SIGIR) report?
Senator Clinton. Yes.
General Casey. I am aware of a continuing IG process going
on. I was not aware of this specific investigation. I know they
are out there all the time doing a range of investigations.
Senator Clinton. Do you know if any member of your command
cooperated with this particular report?
General Casey. I do not, but I assume they do because they
routinely work with the SIGIRs in doing that reports.
Senator Clinton. Could you report back to the committee
what your find about the level of cooperation with this report,
please?
General Casey. I will, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
The information requested was provided by General Casey on February
16, 2007, in the attached letter.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Are you aware of the problems that are apparently cited in
this report, as set forth in press accounts of it?
General Casey. I am not. I am actually a little surprised.
I think you said it was the equipping of transition teams, I
spend a lot of personal time making sure that these teams have
the best equipment because they operate relatively
independently, and we have gone to great lengths to make sure
they have the equipment. I go up and talk to each group as they
come through and I have not heard any mention of the transition
teams being shortchanged on equipment.
Chairman Levin. Senator Clinton, if I could just interrupt.
We did receive that IG report that you referred to, apparently
last night, and it is now in our files. It is classified
Secret, so when you read it if there are parts of it that you
feel should be declassified we will make those requests.
Sorry for the interruption.
Senator Clinton. No. I would appreciate that, Mr. Chairman,
because earlier this week I questioned Admiral Fallon about an
article in the Washington Post titled ``Equipment for Added
Troops Is Lacking, New Iraq Forces Must Make Do, Officials
Say.'' Mr. Chairman, I would like that article to become a part
of the record of this hearing as well.
Chairman Levin. It will be part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Clinton. After the hearing, the chairman and
ranking member sent a letter to Secretary Gates asking about
the readiness of our troops. In that article were very specific
and disturbing questions from Lieutenant General Stephen
Speakes and others about the lack of equipment, the lack of
readiness. Among the concerns were the proper level of armor
for vehicles, prepositioned sets issued in Kuwait are the add-
on armor type and do not provide adequate protection,
insufficient add-on armor kits for logistics trucks and prime
movers, insufficient and incomplete electronic countermeasure
devices designed to defeat improvised explosive devices,
insufficient force protection materials for the outposts we are
building in Baghdad and throughout Anbar Province, insufficient
training sets of equipment and vehicles at home station for
units to train on in preparation for deployments.
I am very concerned that we are pursuing a policy that,
regardless of what one thinks about it or how one evaluates its
chances for success, certainly raises the fears that so many of
our young men and women are going to be put into very dangerous
situations in neighborhoods in Baghdad, dependent upon their
Iraqi counterparts who may or may not be reliable. Mr.
Chairman, I believe that because of these disturbing reports
about equipment shortages we should as we begin to debate the
Warner-Levin proposal include provisions that require that
adequate equipment and training be mandated so that we do not
send any young American into this dangerous mission without
knowing that they are as well-prepared, as ready and equipped
as they deserve to be to try to fulfill this mission.
General Casey. I do not think anyone feels stronger about
that than I do, Senator.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Senator Chambliss, going according to the list that I have
is always a little bit awkward, but we have an early bird rule
and I just follow what our clerk tells me, is the earliest
birds get the worm.
Senator Chambliss. I do think Senator Sessions was here
before I was, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to go, but he was here.
Senator Sessions. I was here when you gaveled this hearing.
Chairman Levin. I am going to call on Senator Sessions. If
you would share this with Senator Sessions. Unhappily, you are
not even listed on here. Our clerk is going to get a raise--get
a rise out of me. [Laughter.]
Thank you, and I appreciate that very much, Senator
Chambliss.
Senator Sessions, forgive the error.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. You are
very gracious as always.
Let me just ask you this, General Casey. You have been
leading men in combat for some time now. As Chief of Staff of
the Army, will you take every effort and utilize every power
you have to ensure those soldiers when they hit the ground in
Iraq are properly equipped and supported?
General Casey. And trained, I will.
Senator Sessions. With regard to the soldiers that are
going there, they are fully equipped with their $17,000-plus
worth of equipment and all that goes for each soldier; is that
right?
General Casey. Yes.
Senator Sessions. We had testimony the other day that two
or three of the brigades would be ready to go fully equipped
and a couple of brigades may lack some uparmored vehicles or
transport vehicles and that they were working on that. But if
you can confirm you will utilize every power you have to make
sure those brigades are fully equipped?
General Casey. I will, Senator. In fact, I gave
instructions several weeks ago in Iraq that we would not bring
anybody in who was not prepared.
Senator Sessions. So if they do not send them to you
properly equipped you are not going to put them on the street?
General Casey. Right.
Senator Sessions. General Casey, thank you for your
leadership and service to our Nation for 37 years. You were
born in an Army hospital in occupied Japan, son of an Army man.
I do not know if he was an officer or not. My father served in
occupied Japan and I guess one of the great things in the
history of the world is MacArthur and our military's efforts to
create a prosperous, free Japan today. It is one of the great
things that happened in our world. We have invested a lot of
effort now in trying to bring Iraq to some such level as that.
That would be our dream.
You now have a son in the military. So I know that many of
us are frustrated about troop levels and strategies and plans.
I would just say this. I liked it a while ago when you said you
did not want to ask for one more soldier to be sent to Iraq
than you believed was absolutely needed. I think that is where
most of the American people are. That is where the people are
who are dubious of this war. That is where the people are who
support our efforts, like I do.
I do not want to send a single person there that is not
necessary. I want to add this in as part of my thanks to you.
You were Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army. They
asked you to go to Iraq for 18 months to deal with the
challenges there. You accepted that responsibility. You went
and you have stayed now 30 months away from your family, giving
your every waking moment to a successful policy there. I thank
you for that.
I cannot see how that can do anything but help you be a
more effective, sensitive, knowledgeable Chief of Staff of the
Army. So I think I wanted to say that.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sessions. I think it was a general in the German
army that said few strategies exist beyond the first shot of
the war. Things change. They really change rapidly, do they
not, in an asymmetrical insurgency type situation we are facing
in Iraq?
General Casey. They do, Senator. It is interesting, the
threat has changed three times in the 2\1/2\ years I have been
there at my level, and at the tactical level it changes faster
than that.
Senator Sessions. General Petraeus wrote the
counterinsurgency manual. It is filled with so many subtleties
and demands on the military to alter and change tactics,
strategies, and initiatives constantly in a struggle like this,
would it not?
General Casey. It is. In fact, in the summer of 2005 I was
getting a sense that our soldiers were not really effectively
applying what counterinsurgency doctrine that we have, and I
sent a team out to check. What they came back and said is, they
generally understand it, but not everybody has all the tools,
and if the commander gets it, the unit gets it. So we
established a counterinsurgency academy in Iraq where every
brigade commander brings his battalion and company commanders
through a week-long course to work on the subtleties and the
nuances of counterinsurgency operations inside Iraq. It has
proved very effective. Over 5,000 leaders have actually been
through that course already and we are expanding it now to
bring Iraqis in so that they can pick up the counterinsurgency
operations.
Senator Sessions. General Abizaid in a private conversation
several years ago in Iraq on a C-130 when only the two of us
could hear one another, and hardly that, explained to me his
personal belief as to why we ought not to bring in more troops
than necessary to do the job. There is a real tension there and
you have touched it. I do not know, maybe Senator McCain is
right. I do not know.
But I have always adhered to his view, and I think you
share it, that we want to keep the pressure on the Iraqis to
step up their capability so it is their country and their
nation that they are defending. If you bring in too much
support it could erode or lessen the pressure on them to assume
responsibility.
Is that part of your analysis?
General Casey. That is exactly right. I saw this in Bosnia
myself as a brigadier general. I remember watching myself going
out and trying to solve the problems of Bosnia and as a result
my sense was that they became dependent on us and they did
less.
Senator Sessions. What about the Lawrence of Arabia quote?
What is that? Can you recall that for us?
General Casey. ``Better they do it imperfectly with their
own hands than you do it perfectly with yours.'' I use that
quote with each of the classes in the counterinsurgency
academy.
Senator Sessions. He was expert in the Arab culture, and
that is I think good advice.
It has been a struggle and it has been tough, and we are
disappointed that it has not gone smoother. We all wish it had.
But war requires leadership. Leaders make hard decisions. They
accept responsibility for their decisions and we live with
those decisions. You have made some tough decisions. I think
you have done a good job. But whether or not we agree or
disagree with every decision you have made, I believe we can
all agree that your career as Vice Chief of the Army and this
experience now, 30 months extended tour in Iraq, will help you
to be even more effective as Chief of Staff of the Army, and I
intend to support you.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sessions. My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions, and I again
apologize for the mistake here.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
having had to step out. I am trying to be in two places at once
this morning. We had a Foreign Relations Committee hearing as
well.
General, I want to express my best wishes to you and to
your family. My congratulations to you and my appreciation for
the service that you have given. I would like in several
different ways to associate myself with the comments that my
fellow Senator from Virginia made. I do not think it is a
consequence of the honor of representing Virginia so much as
the fact that we both served in the Marine Corps, we both had
the privilege of serving in that Pentagon as Secretary of the
Navy, and I think it brings a little bit different focus on
some of the questions that have been asked of you this morning.
I think that a few of the questions that have been asked of
you--I am not going to ask you to comment on this, but I think
it bears saying--are evidence that your situation this morning
represents the classic conundrum of military service at the
highest level. In this administration it has not been unheard
of for officers who spoke too loudly very often to have lost
their jobs, and at the same time to speak too softly often
causes the military leader in historical situations rather than
the civilian boss to be blamed when things go wrong.
I believe strongly that military leaders should be held
accountable, but certainly in this situation today from a lot
of people's perspectives, including my own, the consequences of
what I believe has been a failed strategy should be shared at a
far higher level.
I have a question with respect to your assumption of your
new responsibilities that I would like to ask of you, and it
relates to the fact that we currently have an estimated 100,000
civilian contractors working in Iraq. On the one hand, I have
heard comments from many senior military leaders that clearly
we could not do it without them--I hear this over and over
again--because of force structure deficiencies that have been
built into the end strength levels, particularly in the Army.
At the same time, I have a concern about the cost of these
people and also the accountability that pertains to this
concept of, for lack of a better phrase, renting an army. This
is a rent-an-army out there. The costs in many ways are
obvious, particularly in the short-term. There are so many
stories of individuals leaving Active Duty who are making maybe
$20,000 and they can go over and work for five to nine times
that and doing quasi-military work in the same country, pretty
much doing the same kinds of things.
The notion of accountability is deeply troubling. I am not
aware of any cases where misconduct--and I am not talking about
the contracting situation, which we are trying to get our arms
around, but human misconduct--shooting Iraqis out in the
villages, these sorts of things. I am not aware of any incident
where that sort of misconduct has been brought to proper
justice. There may be. There may be one or two, but I am not
aware of it.
So my question really is, would it not be better for this
country if those tasks, particularly the quasi-military gun-
fighting task, were being performed by Active-Duty military
soldiers, in terms of cost and accountability?
General Casey. In terms of cost, I am not sure, Senator. We
talked yesterday on this, the notion of what is the long-term
cost to take a soldier, bring him in, train him to do this
logistical task, and take care of his family, when you compare
that to the cost of the logistics contract. I have not seen the
figures on the cost-benefit on that.
Senator Webb. I would be interested in having those as you
assume your new job. I think it is something worthy of
discussion on the costs.
General Casey. I think the other part of this, though, it
is important that these contractors are used for logistics type
skills and not necessarily the combat skills I think you
mentioned there earlier. We have I want to say about 20,000
armed security contractors there that we have worked with and
coordinate with. Those are the ones that we have to watch very
carefully.
Senator Webb. Another factor in this, and it does go into
the way that our force structure levels have oscillated and the
way that they are going to now, is the disruption of the
rotational cycles and the hardship that puts on planning, on
morale, particularly in the mid-term, of the Army and the
Marine Corps to continue operating in Iraq. Do you have a
comment on that?
General Casey. By disruption in the rotation cycles, you
mean extensions?
Senator Webb. Extensions and accelerating deployments. We
ideally want a two for one, let us say, cycle and we have been
operating on one for ones, and I know the new Commandant has
mentioned he very much wants to get back to a two to one for a
lot of reasons, including morale.
General Casey. I think it is clear that those extensions
and accelerations place additional stress on the force. I do
not think there is any question about that. I believe that is
exactly what this increase in Army end strength is designed to
alleviate. That will not happen overnight. It takes a while to
build those forces.
But I think it is interesting. I have already seen a
brigade, one of these transformed brigades, that did not exist
when I was the Vice Chief of the Army, has already been to Iraq
and left. So it is not a long-term process, but it does take
some time.
Senator Webb. I am certainly hopeful that we can reduce the
force structure so that we can have a different discussion
regarding the end strength numbers that have been proposed. But
certainly in the short-term we have a real problem here.
If I may--my time has expired--I would just like to say one
other thing. I would like again to associate myself with
something that Senator Warner said and express my gratitude to
your father for the service that he gave our country and for
all of us to remember that he did give his life in service to
our country.
I grew up in the military as well. When you were sitting
there talking about your schools, I counted. I put on a piece
of paper, I went to nine schools in 5 years at one point
traveling around in the career military. I know what that does
to a family, and you and your family have my gratitude. Thank
you very much.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
I think Senators Warner and Webb speak for all of us in
referring to your father for his service and the way in which
you have continued that tradition. It is important that we all
recognize that legacy and that gift which he gave to his
country.
General Casey. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As Mr. Webb was saying, he spent 5 years and went to nine
schools. Senator Graham said he spent 9 years in the fifth
grade. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. Do you want equal time, Senator Graham? You
can have equal time if you need that. [Laughter.]
Senator Graham. I cannot rebut it. [Laughter.]
Senator Chambliss. General Casey, first of all let me just
echo the sentiments of all of us in thanking you and your
family for the terrific commitment that you have all made to
the service to our country and to tell you how much we
appreciate that commitment. I know it is a family commitment,
too. It is not just you. You are correct, without the support
of your wife and your sons you would not be where you are
today. So we do appreciate that.
General, what is the role of the Army Chief of Staff in the
decisionmaking process concerning the war in Iraq today?
General Casey. As the Army Chief of Staff, I would sit as a
member of the Joint Chiefs and have a direct role in
formulating military advice to the Secretary of Defense and to
the President.
Senator Chambliss. So is there a difference in what you
would do as Chief of Staff relative to the war inside of Iraq
and outside of Iraq?
General Casey. If I think I understand the direction here,
Senator, inside Iraq I would be looking primarily inside Iraq
and looking at the appropriate strategies to apply in Iraq. As
a member of the Joint Chiefs, I believe I would be looking at a
broader context and how the war in Iraq fit broadly into our
overall security strategies of the United States.
Senator Chambliss. You have been Commander of the MNF-I for
2\1/2\ years. We cannot say that it has been a successful 2\1/
2\ years. The situation over there is very dire right now. What
do you bring to the table as potentially the next Chief of
Staff of the Army that you did not bring to the table as
Commander of the MNF-I?
General Casey. That is a good question, Senator. I agree
with you, the situation in Iraq is certainly not where I
thought it would be when I was going out the door, and I am no
more comfortable with the situation in Iraq than you or anybody
else is.
I will tell you that the experience I have gained in 2\1/2\
years in a very difficult environment has seasoned me in ways I
probably do not even fully understand now. I have had to deal
at the highest levels of our Government. I have mentored three
Iraqi prime ministers in political-military interactions. I
have dealt with three different ambassadors, four coalition
corps commanders.
I have learned an awful lot about strategic leadership and
I believe that will help me greatly as the Chief of Staff of
the Army. I mentioned some of the more narrow insights that I
received in terms of people, transformation, and Guard and
Reserve matters. But I think the big thing that I will bring
back from Iraq is the seasoning and strategic leadership skills
that I gained over 2\1/2\ years.
Senator Chambliss. General, you and I have had a couple of
private conversations about troop strength in Iraq, and
obviously you did not think we needed additional troops early
on and you have now come to the realization that you think we
do. At a press conference in October 2006 when you were asked
if more troops are needed, ``Maybe, and, as I have said all
along, if we do I will ask for the troops that I need, both
coalition and Iraqis.''
Now, some time after October 2006 into November-December,
apparently you concurred in the fact that an additional two
brigades originally were needed. The President has made a
decision to send an additional four brigades into Iraq and you
concur in that decision. Take me through that process. What
changed your mind? How do you decide now that you concur, that
in October we did not need troops, November we need two
brigades, now you agree we need four brigades?
General Casey. I laid a little bit of that out in my
opening testimony, Senator, but let me just review the bidding.
We are constantly looking at the situation in Baghdad, looking
for ways to improve it. In the middle of November, the Baghdad
division changed and we had a new commander in there, so it was
an opportunity for us to take a fresh look at the situation
with a new set of eyes.
I sat down with him and the corps commander and said: Take
a blank piece of paper and look at this hard and tell us what
you need to help the Iraqis stabilize their capital. At the
same time, the Iraqis came forward with their plan, and this is
the plan for nine districts with an Iraqi brigade and a
coalition battalion in each district. We worked that with the
Iraqis and have continued to develop that over time.
As my commanders and the Iraqis worked that plan, they came
back and said: We are two brigades short; we need two
additional coalition brigades and three Iraqi brigades to make
this plan work. That evolution went from about the middle of
November until the latter part of December, and right before
Christmas I asked for the additional two brigades.
Now, there were three other brigades that were offered and
they were flowing on a time line that allowed us to make
assessments on whether or not they would be needed. As I said,
my bias is that I do not want to bring one more soldier in
there than we need. I was okay with having those forces
basically in reserve to be called forward if necessary. Now
that I am leaving, having those forces in reserve and prepared
to come I think gives General Petraeus, the new commander
there, great flexibility to do what he thinks he needs to do.
He will probably look at things differently than I do.
That is how my thinking has evolved. But I always again go
back to my base case, which is I do not want to bring one more
American soldier or marine in there than I think we need to do
the job.
Senator Chambliss. If General Petraeus comes to you as the
Army Chief of Staff and said, I need additional assets,
including additional troops, if we are truly going to
successful in this operation, are you going to give them to
him?
General Casey. I will, Senator. In fact, I will tell him
the same thing that Pete Schoomaker told me when I went to Iraq
2\1/2\ years ago, and that was: Ask for what you need; we will
figure it out.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We are now aware that about $38 billion of taxpayer money
has been spent on what was proposed to be a reconstruction
effort in Iraq. I think it would be kind to say that most
analyses of those expenditures would indicate that all or most
of it appears to not have been effectively used, since if you
look at the measures of electricity produced and oil and the
stocks of gasoline, are at all-time low levels.
Since you were there, General Casey, I am frustrated by
what I have learned from the IG's report in terms of
contracting processes at DOD. I am even more frustrated at the
idea that we have spent $38 billion while the Iraqis are
sitting with surpluses that they ``are unable to spend
appropriately.''
Can you give us a ground view of how we could have made
this large a mistake in terms of the moneys that have been
spent and ended up with the kind of failure we have had in
terms of meaningful reconstruction?
General Casey. I have not seen the report that you are
mentioning here, Senator. The reconstruction effort has, no
question, been challenging and we worked very hard with the
Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, the ambassador, and our
engineers to ensure that the money that was allocated for the
reconstruction of Iraq was appropriately spent. That, as you
suggest, has not always been the case.
The other issue that you mentioned is a challenge, and that
is the Iraqis' ability to spend their own money. It is a
combination of poor or nonexistent contracting procedures and
fear of corruption. The result has been that we have to do some
fairly significant work with them, particularly on the security
side, to get them, to help them, spend their money. The work
that Lieutenant General Robert Dempsey has done getting a
foreign military sales program going for them allows us to
spend their money and it lessens some of the burden on that.
When I got there there were less than 250 of the Iraq
Reconstruction Fund projects started. We have now started over
3,000 of the 3,400 projects as part of that. But I think
probably about 75 percent of those things are done and the rest
of them will be done here over time.
It is a tough environment both in terms of contracting and
in terms of getting the appropriate materials for the projects
to be done and then to secure the sites.
Senator McCaskill. Perhaps we are just getting all the bad
news and we are not getting any of the good news on
reconstruction. But I think it would be important for this
committee to know your view of what successes there have been.
I am frustrated that the person who is supposed to help Iraq
spend their $10 billion they have made supposedly a commitment
to spend under this new strategy, that that person was selected
the day before the plan was announced by the State Department.
It is a little unfair for me to be questioning you in this
regard because I think the military has done an incredible job.
But I keep hearing that it is the economic infrastructure and
the political infrastructure that is going to make the
difference in terms of long-term success in this country, and
it appears to me that we are so focused on what we are doing
militarily that we are--and I hate to be flippant, but from
what I have read I am not sure we are the right people to
advise the Iraqis on how to spend their money, if we spent $38
billion and we cannot point to any success in terms of
improvement of the infrastructure.
I would like your input on that as you take your new
position because we know there is going to be more money asked
of the American people in this regard, and I think we need to
be able to explain to them how that many billions of dollars
could have been spent with some real horror stories, and how we
can possibly chase that money with more money until we have
more assurances that there is going to be meaningful progress
made. I would really appreciate your input on that as you take
this position.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator. Your point that the
progress on the economic and political fronts must accompany
military and security progress is exactly right. They all must
go forward together, as you point out.
Senator McCaskill. The other area I wanted to ask you about
briefly before my time expires is about recruitment. We have
another incident that has occurred in St. Louis that I believe
will be made public in the coming weeks, about inappropriate
things being said by recruitment officers to potential recruits
about the potential danger and other things. I know there has
been some national stories in this regard.
Could you address the pressures that the Army feels about
recruitment and what you think you can do to make sure that
there are not any abuses occurring in the recruitment process?
General Casey. I am not aware of the specific incident that
you are talking about. My sense is we are doing fairly well in
all three components in recruiting. Everyone met their December
objectives. The Army and the National Guard are ahead for the
fiscal year in terms of recruiting and the Reserves are about
90 percent of where they need to be for the year.
Recruiting is always a tough challenge and there are always
pressures there. You raise a good point. I am sure that the
Army has quality control measures to ensure that those
pressures do not cause people to overstep their bounds, as you
suggest has happened in St. Louis.
Senator McCaskill. I think you are going to see this around
the country, unfortunately, General, or fortunately, depending
on your perspective, that these news outlets are going to be
sending hidden cameras in to record recruitment conversations,
and when there are things said that are inappropriate, I think
they are going to become very high profile.
I support the President's call for a larger active military
and I understand that is going to mean there is a great deal of
recruitment pressure, hopefully, as far as the eye can see. I
think as we face those pressures to increase the size of our
military, I think it is really important that you get a handle
on what is being said person to person in these recruitment
appointments and make sure that there are not any young men or
women that are being misled.
Thank you very much.
General Casey. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General, my compliments to you and your family for a very
long career of distinguished service. But this is about a war
that cannot be lost, and it is almost like I am hearing two
different wars being described here. When you hear General
Petraeus testify and Admiral Fallon, there is a general
belief--let me just put it this way. General Petraeus said:
``Senator Graham, this is not double down; this is all in.'' Do
you agree with that?
General Casey. It is not double down, it is all in?
Senator Graham. All in. This new policy is all in. This is
our last best chance to get this right.
General Casey. I agree with that. As I described in my
opening testimony, the Iraqis are in a position to assume
responsibility for their security by the end of the year if we
can get the sectarian situation in the capital under control.
Senator Graham. The point I am trying to make has nothing
to do with the Iraqis. To all of my colleagues who believe we
cannot lose in Iraq, this is our last chance. The public is
going to break against us big time.
The Army is broken. You have asked for more troops to clean
out Fallujah and Fallujah got reoccupied. There has never been
a willingness on your part during your time as commander in
Iraq to accept the idea that maybe General Eric Shinseki was
right. Was General Shinseki right?
General Casey. My boss, General Abizaid, has said he agrees
with that, and he was there on the ground----
Senator Graham. For 2\1/2\ years everybody that has come
before us has fought the idea that General Shinseki was right.
Everybody that has come before in the last 2\1/2\ years,
including General Abizaid, says the Army is doing fine, and
December 14, 2006, General Schoomaker went to the House and
said the Army is broken.
This is the last best chance and the question is, the last
hand to be played, should you play it? Have you been fighting
for the last 2\1/2\ years a counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq?
General Casey. We have, Senator. In fact, in August 2004
when we first came in, Ambassador John Negroponte and I----
Senator Graham. Have you had the troop levels consistent
with a counterinsurgency program as described by General
Petraeus for the last 2\1/2\ years?
General Casey. We have. It varies with the security
situation around the country, and we have had the ratios that
we needed when we needed them. Fallujah is a good example. I
guess I question your----
Senator Graham. Could I go to Fallujah tomorrow? Could I go
downtown to Fallujah tomorrow as a Senator?
General Casey. You could.
Senator Graham. I asked to go and they would not let me.
General Casey. I actually took Senator Robb down there. If
you had asked me I would have----
Senator Graham. I asked to go to Ramadi and they would not
let me.
General Casey. Ramadi is a little tougher, Senator.
Senator Graham. The point I am trying to make is it is
clear to me that we have never had the force levels to be
claiming we have been fighting a counterinsurgency.
What percentage of the population is contained in the four
provinces that are out of control in Iraq?
General Casey. I would not characterize the provinces as
out of control in Iraq. Baghdad and Anbar are very difficult.
Diyalah and Sal-a-Din are not out of control.
Senator Graham. What percentage of the country would it be
impossible for an American to walk down the street without
being afraid of getting shot at or killed?
General Casey. Probably, about half actually, Senator.
Senator Graham. Well, here we are 2\1/2\ years later. Half
the country, no American can walk down the street. We are
talking about sending 21,500 more as our last best chance. I
asked why 21,500. I have been told that is all we have, that if
we wanted to send 50,000 we could not get them. Is that true?
General Casey. I do not know that to be true, Senator. I
have not heard that.
Senator Graham. That is something we need to know from the
Chief of Staff of the Army. I believe that is all we have. The
reason we are not sending 31,500 is we just cannot get them.
I share Senator Warner's view, I do not know if this is
going to work or not. But I know now we are in a mess and this
is the last best chance. The question I have is, the advice you
have given--I mean, you are saying we need more troops because
the Iraqis have changed their plan. I have never been told by
an Iraqi prime ministerial official that they want 21,500 more
troops. Have you?
General Casey. No, I have not, Senator.
Senator Graham. No further questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Graham, no one would say that
General Shinseki was right because Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld was not going to let them say that. You and I come to
the same conclusion, that there is nothing magic about the
21,000, it ought to be a lot more. I suspect what you have just
said is correct, that we do not have the ability to produce a
lot more.
But the question for me is will this 21,000, 17,000 of
which will go into Baghdad, will it do any good? I personally
believe that the troops going into Anbar will do some good, and
I was convinced by the Marine generals there that was the case.
But it is a sad commentary, and I did not plan to say this,
but you certainly laid the groundwork, that when we have a
career 35-year general as the head of the Army and he gives an
honest and straightforward answer to Senator Levin in front of
this committee, to occupy how many troops and how long do you
need, he said ``Several hundred thousand for several years.''
Of course, I think what is concerning Senator Graham is the
fact over the last several years that nobody in the uniformed
military would challenge the Secretary of Defense.
General, you have my admiration for your career and as I
look at your little family back there they have sacrificed, and
yet it is an honor also for them in this public service that
people give in the service to their country.
I wanted to ask, since so much of the success of this plan
is predicated on the fact that the Iraqi army is going to be
reliable, I have asked and other Senators have asked all of the
witnesses that have come here--Secretary Gates, General
Petraeus, Admiral Fallon--is the Iraqi army reliable and how
much? No one has given a straight answer and, as you and I
talked in my office, I indicated that I was going to ask you
that question.
Would you share for us what you think about the
reliability?
General Casey. As I said yesterday, Senator, it is a mixed
bag and there are good units that are fairly reliable and there
are other units that are less reliable. About a couple of
months ago I directed that we add a reliability index to the
normal monthly readiness report. For some time now we have been
doing a readiness report with the Iraqis on their units--the
people, equipment, training, those standard things. What we
were not getting was your point. We were not getting at the
reliability.
What we were finding is you could have all your people, you
can have all your weapons, your vehicles can all work, but if
we cannot depend on you it is a different problem. I have yet
to get my first report back on that, Senator. But I think your
point is exactly right.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me run this by you then. I have
checked and I have it in writing that what I am about to state
is unclassified. A senior officer on the Joint Staff with
significant military experience has testified to the Senate
that, of the 325,000 Iraqi army and police, that about 130,000
are actually army trained and equipped, and of that 130,000
half of them approximately are geographically located and half
of them, or about 65,000, are nationally recruited and more
reliable; and that of that 65,000, they are expecting, of the
Iraqi army, 30,000 to be in Baghdad.
That same senior officer, when I asked the question how
many are reliable, gave an astoundingly high percentage of 80
percent of that 30,000 in Baghdad.
Your comments?
General Casey. 80 percent in Baghdad reliable of those
forces, that does not strike me as an unrealistically high
number. Knowing the units that we have in Baghdad on the army
side, that is probably about right.
Just on the point on geographically located units versus
nationally recruited, what we have, I think people know, that 5
of the 10 Iraqi divisions are the former National Guard units
that were recruited locally, and they are fairly reliable in
their local areas. But what we have found, when we wanted to
move them someplace else we have had challenges with them. The
Iraqis have put in a deployability scheme where they work their
way through this, and we have actually seen that that has made
a difference.
The other ones, the nationally recruited ones, as you say
or as you suggest, they are more mobile, but I guess what I am
going to say is it is not a reliability issue just because the
one happens to be geographic and one happens not to be.
Senator Bill Nelson. You can understand the concern that we
have when we ask over and over on a plan that is predicated on
the reliability of the Iraqi forces, putting more of our men
and women in Baghdad in a combat situation, where in the
doctrine of clear, hold, and build that you are going to clear
with the Iraqi forces and it is going to be more Iraqi forces
than American forces that will go in and clear an area. So
naturally we as the Senate Armed Services Committee need to
know what is the professional military's judgment of what is
the reliability of those forces that are going in.
Yet we cannot get anybody to give us a consistent or even
an answer. Would you please do that when you have taken over
the reins as Chief of Staff?
General Casey. I will actually do it before that. I will
give you some feedback from the reliability assessment that I
have asked for from my units.
Senator Bill Nelson. Twenty percent unreliable, if those
statements by this senior officer are correct. Then report back
to us, why is it that they are unreliable? Do they not show up?
Are they criminals? Have they been infiltrated by the militia?
Of course, that is a high number and would certainly undermine
the mission of the Iraqi army in Baghdad.
General Casey. I would not get fixed on 80 percent. I do
not know where he got that number. I said it did not strike me
as artificially high. The reasons you mentioned why people
would be unreliable are exactly right, and if you add poor
leadership to that you would have about the four or five things
that make these units unreliable.
The fact of the matter is, and one of the reasons we are
partnering these coalition units with the Iraqi units, is they
fight better when they are with us. We have demonstrated that
time and time again. So we put a little steel in their spine
when they are standing next to an American soldier or an
American marine.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, over and over this committee
we have been told by the Secretary of Defense that he had
hundreds of thousands that were trained and equipped Iraqi army
that were reliable. That was incorrect information, and that
leads us to this point. What we want is the truth and we will
look forward to receiving that from you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The information requested was provided by General Casey on February
16, 2007, in the attached letter.
General Casey. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. General Casey, let me also thank you and your
family for your outstanding service to our country, and I look
forward to our continued work together in the future.
The Congressional Budget Office in its most recent long-
term assessment of the DOD budget estimates that the shortfall
between anticipated funding levels and what is required is a
minimum of an additional $52 billion per year across the Future
Years Defense Program and well out into the future. My
understanding of the fiscal year 2008 budget request at this
point is that the top-line figure keeps pace with inflation,
but there is no real growth.
Given the cost of the war, the cost of reset, the cost of
increasing active duty end strength, the cost of developing and
procuring FCSs, it is apparent that there is an appreciable
risk, measure of risk, in the budget. What areas of the Army
budget give you the greatest reason for concern as we look out
over the next few years?
General Casey. I will rapidly expend my knowledge on this,
so I will give you just a couple of thoughts, Senator. I think
my greatest concern is our ability to equip, provide the
soldiers that are deploying with the best equipment in time for
their training, so that they can be successful in whatever
combat mission they are going on.
I think the second main concern I have is the reset, the
recapitalization of the force as it comes back out of Iraq. We
need to ensure that we have an appropriate level of funding so
that we can fix what we have that is broken.
Then, as Senator Inhofe was talking about earlier, we
cannot take our eye off modernization and the FCSs. So I will
balance the challenges of near-term readiness with long-term
modernization over time. But those are the three things I think
that come to mind.
I will add one more and that is having enough money to
ensure that we provide the soldiers and families of the Army
who are going through this very difficult and stressful period
with a quality of life befitting them.
Senator Dole. I am a strong proponent of increasing the
Active Duty Army's end strength. This increase is necessary to
have the forces to respond to major regional threats, to meet
critical homeland security, defense, and peacekeeping needs,
and to accommodate the increasing number of long-term
deployments connected with the war on terror.
Every brigade in the North Carolina-based 82nd Airborne
Division has deployed three times since the fall of 2001. In
short, today's high operational tempo is driving home the point
that end strength is too low. The next Army Chief of Staff will
confront difficult budgetary pressures. Give me your assurance
that you will not jettison the proposal to increase Army end
strength in pursuit of funds to pay for other pressing needs.
General Casey. I will certainly work to sustain the new end
strength addition here. I guess never say never, Senator, but I
agree with you that we need to increase that end strength and
we need to build the forces that will come from that end
strength for exactly the reasons that you suggest.
Senator Dole. North Carolina is home to the Joint Special
Operations Command, the Army Special Operations Command, and
the new Marine Special Operations Command. I as much as anyone
want our special forces to grow, but we need to grow the forces
in a manner that does not sacrifice quality in pursuit of
quantity. Would you share with us your thoughts regarding the
expansion of the special operations community over the next
several years and particularly the pace of that expansion?
General Casey. I could not comment on the specifics of the
plan, Senator. But I can tell you that working with the special
forces in the past 2\1/2\ years in Iraq and watching the value
that they bring to these types of counterinsurgency missions
that we will be facing here in the 21st century, I am a big
proponent of special forces myself.
We have been working on this for a while and, again as you
suggest, increasing the size of these forces without impacting
their quality and the experience that they have is critical.
But I could not tell you now what the specifics of the Army's
plan are for growing the special forces.
Senator Dole. Let me ask one other question. The United
States has enormous resources and expertise in a number of non-
DOD departments and agencies that could be better utilized to
help us achieve our national security objectives in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It is fair to say that today most,
if not all, national security objectives pursued by the United
States are fundamentally interagency in nature. Do you believe
it is time for Congress to consider Goldwater-Nichols II type
legislation to improve interagency coordination?
General Casey. I think it is something that ought to be
looked at. You are exactly right. I have watched this now in
Bosnia, I have watched it in Kosovo, and I have watched it in
Iraq, and it really is an area where we keep relearning the
same lessons again. I think some type of program that would
leverage the skills from across all of the interagency in a
sustained way I think would be very helpful to us all.
Every time we have done it we have said we will never do
this again and so we forget the lessons, and then we do it
again. I think your notion is exactly right.
Senator Dole. Thank you, General Casey. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. General Casey, Senator Levin has
indicated I am the next in order.
First, let me thank you for your devoted service to the
Army and the Nation and that of your family. We appreciate it
and respect it. You are someone who has inspired a lot of
soldiers with your dedication and I thank you for that.
You assumed command in Iraq in 2005, is that correct?
General Casey. July 1, 2004.
Senator Reed. 2004, excuse me. At that time, I think you
could properly say that you were assigned to manage some of the
consequences of failure: insufficient forces--many of my
colleagues have spoken about that--despite General Shinseki's
prescient comments to this committee; a de-Baathification
policy that alienated the Sunnis; an Abu Ghraib incident which
further endangered our status in that region and in that
country; emerging sectarian violence, which was already evident
when you took command.
I think the record should show that as you assumed this
command there were significant and serious failures already
with our approach and endeavor in Iraq. The policy and the
strategy that I understood that you were pursuing based upon
the President's comments was described as clear, hold, and
build; is that an accurate description?
General Casey. It is, Senator.
Senator Reed. Let us try to take that apart. Clearing was
done on numerous occasions by American forces, operating
sometimes with Iraq security forces. But there has been
criticism lately that the Iraqi security forces were incapable
of holding terrain and we had insufficient forces to do that.
Is that a valid criticism of the strategy?
General Casey. Not necessarily. In Baghdad it is probably a
valid criticism. The August Baghdad plan where we went in and
cleared focus areas, as we called them, specific areas of
Baghdad where the sectarian strife was the greatest, we went in
and cleared those, established basically a perimeter around
them, and then gradually backed ourselves out as the Iraqi
security forces were more able to take charge.
By and large, they did not prove capable of holding onto
those areas without continued support from us.
Senator Reed. Did you inform the Secretary of Defense and
the President that aspect of the strategy was not working at
that time?
General Casey. I told them that the holding on the focus
areas was not working. In fact, now that you are asking me
about it, I recall specifically saying that we were having
challenges with the reliability of the Iraqi security forces in
the focus areas. So yes, I did.
Senator Reed. Did they direct in any way or did you request
an increase in forces, American forces? How were you preparing
to compensate for this noted deficiency?
General Casey. As we looked at the sectarian violence over
time, we asked for more forces in the June time period as we
saw a spike in the sectarian violence, and that is when the
Stryker Brigade was extended and we basically put two more
brigades into Baghdad.
What we did not get when we put those forces in was the
political commitment from the Iraqis to target anyone who is
breaking the law, not to have any safe havens, not to have
political influence on the security forces, the commitments
that Maliki has since made and is delivering on. That was the
difference, and I was reluctant throughout the fall to ask for
additional forces when I knew I did not have the political
commitment of the Iraqis to let us do our jobs.
Senator Reed. What you seem to be saying, General, is that
in terms of the decisive factor it is not the size of our
forces there, but the political commitment of the Iraqi
government, and that with adequate political commitment our
forces are either adequate or do not require significant
increase; is that fair?
General Casey. I think that is a fair statement. In
counterinsurgency operations, the political and the military
have to go forward together.
Senator Reed. Let me take on the third leg of this
strategy, build. I would note, as you probably might be aware,
that yesterday the SIGIR essentially examined the Iraqi
government and said all the ministries are dysfunctional, with
some exceptions. You are responsible for two of these
ministries, interior and defense. My experience is that they
are probably more capable than the others.
But the other responsibilities are borne by the Department
of State. Have you communicated at all to the President the
inability of other government agencies to complement this
policy?
General Casey. We talk about that regularly. I think one of
the things that has caused us problems is the fact that the
government has changed three times in 2 years, and so we are on
our third set of ministers right now and third set of
ministries. So the growth of the ministries has not been
straight line. As a matter of fact, it has been sporadic.
Senator Reed. What I find puzzling is that if the strategy
is clear, hold, and build and it has been evident, not only
yesterday but ever since we have been there, that the Iraqi
government is dysfunctional, our complementary agencies--Agency
for International Development, Departments of State, Justice,
Agriculture, and Treasury--have not provided the resources
necessary, why did this not--and you communicated it to the
President--why did this not cause a reevaluation of our
strategy by the President and the Secretary of Defense?
General Casey. I think what you are seeing in the
President's----
Senator Reed. We are seeing it after an election. We are
not seeing it a year ago or 2 years ago, when in fact on the
ground this was evident.
General Casey. One of the other things I have seen with the
three governments is it takes everybody about 6 months to get
their legs under them and start governing. These folks are not
experienced ministers. They have not served in government
before. So it takes them a while to understand and develop
their governing skills.
Maliki's government did not take over until about May 20
and he did not get his defense ministers until early June. Now
we are talking maybe 8 months that he has been in charge. They
make, what I have seen, in most of the ministries gradual
progress. There are others that are just so corrupt they are
not going to make any progress.
Senator Reed. My time has expired, but I understand, and I
think you feel the same way, is--and we say it repeatedly, but
the question is do we mean it--that a military strategy alone
without a functional Iraqi government and without the support
of non-DOD agencies cannot effectively prevail in Iraq. Is that
accurate?
General Casey. That is accurate.
Senator Reed. I have not seen a lot of commitment outside
of DOD to succeeding in Iraq. This government is still
dysfunctional and, as you point out, some of these problems are
beyond the next 6 months or a year because it is corruption, it
is political advantage, it is the existential struggle between
Shia and Sunnis, that are not resolved by a consultant from
McKinsey.
I just wonder again--I do not wonder now, after this
dialogue--but that clear, hold, and build never was a strategy
that was working because we were not building, and this
strategy of a surge I think is probably compromised by the same
factors.
General Casey. The clear, hold, and build has worked for us
locally, in Fallujah for example. The build phase takes a long
time because of the inefficiencies within the different
ministries, but it has worked for us locally.
Senator Reed. My time is up. One point if I may. I have
traveled out, as you have, to Fallujah a number of times, and
the times I have been there there has been one State Department
officer out there trying to make this happen, a 36, 37-year-
old, brave, courageous State Department official.
General Casey. Dale Weston.
Senator Reed. Dale.
General Casey. He is a fine young man, yes.
Senator Reed. He has needed help for 2 or 3 years and it
has not arrived.
Thank you.
General Casey. There is actually a Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) out in Anbar that is part of that
effort.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. General, let me echo what has been said
repeatedly here and express my appreciation for your service to
your country under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, and
also to your family. I recall running into your wife at a
function almost 2 years ago and at that time she was anxiously
awaiting your arrival back here, and then it was extended. So I
know there is a tremendous sacrifice on the part of your family
as well, and we appreciate what your commitment and dedication
to this country and its national security entails for your
family as well.
Chairman Levin. Senator Thune, I hate to interrupt you. The
roll call vote has begun. I think you will have time to finish
your questions.
Senator Thune. Right.
Chairman Levin. Are you going to be able to stay? If you
could turn this then over to Senator Bayh after your time is
up, and then I will be back by the time you are done. Thank you
and sorry for the interruption.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
I agree with some of what my colleague from Rhode Island
just said. I think a critical component in the clear, hold, and
build strategy is the build part of it, and my impression is,
having visited Iraq several times, that is a component that has
been very deficient in terms of our strategy. I believe the
same thing has been true to some degree in Afghanistan, having
visited there.
I have been over to Iraq several times. I have visited with
you there in theater, as well as when you have been in front of
this committee. One of the things that we often hear in front
of this committee is about the Sunni and Shia extremists. I
mentioned this to you in a private meeting, that it seems to me
at least that a lot of times people forget when we talk about
the duration of this fight how things have changed and how we
have had to adapt to the changes on the ground.
There was a lot of talk a little over a year ago about
being able to transition out and start pulling our troops out,
and then the Samarra mosque was bombed in February 2006 and
everything changed. The paradigm changed entirely and the
sectarian piece of this puzzle began to really rage and has
ever since.
I think oftentimes we forget that we would like to see
progress. I think we were seeing some progress up to that
point. But the scenario has changed entirely.
There has been a lot of focus on Sunni and Shia extremists.
Based on your last 2\1/2\ years in Iraq, is there a growing
concern among the moderate population of Baghdad and Iraq, both
Sunni and Shia, that time is not on their side and that it is
in their best interest to secure the future before it descends
further? Do you see a sense of urgency among the moderate
elements in the country?
General Casey. Senator, there is no question that the
moderate elements would like to see the country move forward.
But what we are seeing is--and Baghdad is a great example of
this--you have the extremists on both sides attacking each
other's populations, and that creates fear and intimidation
among the moderates, that makes them unwilling to compromise
until they see that they have some chance of surviving this.
That is why it is so important now to bring security, to
help the Iraqis bring security to Baghdad, so that we can get
on with the rest of the progress.
Senator Thune. You have probably spent more time with the
prime minister than anybody else in the military, or DOD for
that matter. What is your assessment of his reliability and do
you believe that, despite these sectarian differences, he has
the commitment level now to see this through?
My impression at least in the last visit over there is that
they are getting it, they understand that the clock is working
against them, that public support in the States, that our
willingness to continue to provide military support to their
effort is on the wane. What is your sense about his level of
commitment?
General Casey. I think the prime minister is committed to
bringing stability to Baghdad and to the rest of the country.
As we agreed on the Baghdad security plan and agreed on the
Iraqi commander for that, there was no question in my mind that
he did not understand that this was the last best chance to
succeed.
So I put him in the very-committed-to-this column. As I
mentioned earlier, he made a range of commitments in several
speeches and he is delivering so far on those commitments.
Senator Thune. So much of what this strategy, its success,
depends upon his commitment as well as the commitment of the
military there. It seems to me at least that they are stepping
up. So far what we are seeing, I am encouraged by that, as you
are as well. But the real focus, of course, is security in
Baghdad and the willingness of the Iraqi military and the Iraqi
political leadership to take on these militias and do what
needs to be done to bring that kind of security.
Do you think--and I know this question has been batted
around a lot here this morning and for the past several weeks--
that with the force, the additional troop strength that we are
bringing into Baghdad, that we can get this done? The question
is could you use 30,000 or 50,000? I know you have had a lot of
input in the formulation of this current plan.
I guess I just want to hear you say that, your assessment
of whether we can get it done with this number.
General Casey. I believe we can, Senator. I believe that
the commitment, the political commitment of the Iraqi
government to the success of this plan, is probably more
important right now than the additional troops. But I believe
that with the troops that are in the pipeline this plan can
work.
Senator Thune. I am out of time Mr. Chairman, I have a
question which I will submit for the record, and I know that
Senator Bayh probably wants to get in here before the vote.
I appreciate your answers. Our hopes and prayers are with
our troops and our efforts, and with your leadership. The other
challenge that we face is the Army transitions, both in
doctrine and equipment, from a Cold War posture to a more
lethal and agile force, which this current conflict has
certainly shown a light on the need for. I will submit those
for the record and I thank you again for your service.
I yield back my time.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Bayh [presiding]. General, thank you for being here
today. I am going to have to run to make this vote. I just have
three quick questions. I will just move through them very
rapidly.
I think what you have heard here today is everyone
expressed their admiration for you as an individual and for
your family and for your family's service. The problem that we
face, the dilemma in some of our minds, is that the policy in
Iraq has gone terribly wrong and there needs to be some
accountability for that, and who is responsible. That is the
question that many are asking. Are you responsible or are
others responsible for some of the mistakes that have been
made?
So my first question to you is, were you given everything
by the civilian leadership that you requested to make this
policy that you devised a success?
General Casey. I was, Senator. All of the requests that I
talked about earlier in my opening statement were filled by the
Department. I would just like to say, you are exactly right. I
am responsible for the military aspects of this campaign and to
the extent that people have problems with the way that has been
conducted I am the one who is responsible.
Senator Bayh. Were you in a position of actually authoring
the policy or implementing a policy derived in large part by
others, specifically the Secretary of Defense?
General Casey. We shaped the policy in Iraq and worked it
up and presented it to the chain of command. The Secretary of
Defense and the President discussed it and it was then given
back to us.
Senator Bayh. Was it altered in material part by the
civilian leadership or did they adopt your policy pretty much
as you presented it to them?
General Casey. I would not say it was adopted pretty much
as presented, but it was hard questions asked, adjustments
made. I would not say it was rubber stamped, if that is where
you are going.
Senator Bayh. Well, but they did not put constraints upon
your policy that prevented you from doing what you thought
needed to be done? It was your policy?
General Casey. It was in fact my strategy.
Senator Bayh. Your strategy.
General Casey. My strategy, better word.
As I said to Senator Warner earlier, if I disagreed with
that I would have done something completely different.
Senator Bayh. I think Senator Warner asked questions about
that.
Here is part of the dilemma that we face as well, General.
Many have felt that the civilian leadership has made some
tragic errors in judgment. Under our system we cannot replace
some of those civilians, particularly the Vice President and
the President of the United States. So we have to ensure that
those under the civilian leadership are competent, wise, and
are willing to differ with the civilian leadership when that is
in the best interests of the United States.
So my final question to you, and then just one brief
comment before I have to go, is can you give us an example of
where you differed with the civilian leadership and were
willing to speak out and say, look, this just is not right, you
need to take a different course here? I know in the military
chain of command it is a difficult thing because you have
obligations to follow orders and that kind of thing. But I
guess what I am looking for here is some sense of independence,
of your willingness to speak your own mind and not just take
direction from on high, given the fact that many of us have
concluded that the civilian leadership has not pursued a very
wise course here.
General Casey. An example of, as you said, differing with
civilian leadership was on the PRTs. General Abizaid and I felt
very strongly that these things were necessary if we were going
to build the capacity at the provincial level so that the
provinces could succeed. Others in the Department disagreed
with that and did not want to go forward with that. But General
Abizaid and I continued to work through the Department and with
the ambassador and the Department of State and we ultimately
prevailed and gained the PRTs.
I will say I was heard, Senator. I do not feel like I was
constrained in any way from expressing my opinion, and I did.
The strategy that I articulated here today is my strategy and I
believe in it. It may not have produced the results on the
timelines that people expected or wanted, but I do believe that
it has laid the foundation for our ultimate success in Iraq.
But it was mine.
Senator Bayh. I appreciate your candor in that regard. It
is not uncommon around this town that people try and deny
responsibility or shift responsibility, so I appreciate your
willingness to accept responsibility.
My final comment has to do with something that Senator
Clinton mentioned, and it is not a question so much as it is
just an observation. One of the most shameless things that has
happened in the course of this undertaking was that incident
in--I cannot remember whether it was Kuwait or Baghdad; maybe
it was Kuwait--involving the hillbilly armor, where the
soldiers had to stand up and say, look, we have to find scrap
metal to weld onto the side of our vehicles. So some of these
reports that she alluded to and some others were, it looks like
there may be a shortage of uparmored Humvees and other things.
We just cannot allow this to happen again. I personally,
since I have taken an interest in the Humvees, have asked the
Pentagon over and over again, do we have enough, are we doing
enough. Frankly, they were just dropping the ball on this. Now,
it is understandable, although lamentable, maybe once. But it
is not acceptable when it happens over and over and over again.
So I really encourage you to get to the bottom of this.
Then there is just one last observation. There is a report
that says, ``Adding to the crunch, the U.S. Government has
agreed to sell 600 uparmored Humvees to Iraq this year for its
security forces. Such sales `better not be at the expense of
the American soldier or marine,' Speakes''--you know who I am
referring to--`` `told defense reporters recently.' ''
Look, if there is a shortage our guys have to come first,
right?
General Casey. They do. They do. But the flip side of that
coin is the Iraqi security forces are out there on the street
fighting themselves.
Senator Bayh. You have to be candid and aggressive in
telling us what you need. Frankly, the Pentagon, for reasons
that just mystify me, was saying they had enough when it was
pretty clear they did not have enough. So let us know what is
really necessary and we will provide it.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator. I will.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, General.
Senator Warner [presiding]. Senator, you have about a
minute to make the vote. I am going to miss it because I think
staying here is more important than the vote.
I listened carefully over the last few days about comments
made by a number of colleagues with respect to the very serious
questions that are facing us today. On a weekend talk show a
colleague said the following: ``I say this is the last chance
for the Iraqis to step up and do their part.'' This morning a
colleague said this is the ``last best chance.''
In the resolution that I put before the Senate I drew on
the President's comments. This is paraphrasing what I believed
he said and something I firmly believe and support the
President in this conclusion. The resolution says ``The Senate
believes a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to
regional and world peace and the long-term security interests
of the United States are best served by an Iraq that can
sustain, govern, and defend itself and serve as an ally in the
war against extremism.''
I said clearly in here I support the President. I find
those statements clash. I am hopeful that General Petraeus can
carry forward with the plan. I think the plan could be modified
to employ fewer than 21,500 troops and place greater emphasis
on the Iraqis carrying the burden of elevating the security,
improving it in Baghdad, that security being the consequence of
ever-increasing sectarian violence. I have already made that
speech.
If that plan for some reason does not measure up to the
goals of success, I have to believe that prudent military
commanders such as yourself have a follow-on situation to
support the President's goal as I enunciated. Can you advise
the committee as to the state of that planning and to the
extent you can such elements of such a plan that you can share
without violating any classification?
General Casey. The contingency planning that is going on
now is for the employment of the last three brigades, and so
the planners are actively looking at what happens if we do not
get security in this district of Baghdad and so they are
working through that right now.
Senator Warner. Can you speak up a little louder?
General Casey. They are working through those things right
now at the tactical level.
What I said earlier was that the political commitment of
the Iraqis is more important here than the additional troops.
So that has to come and it has to be sustained. So one of the
things that I will be working with the ambassador on and I know
he is already working on is to not only sustain the level of
political commitment we have, but to move forward with
reconciliation efforts so that we gradually bring the different
ethnic and sectarian groups together and get on with building a
representative government that respects all of their rights.
Senator Warner. But do you agree with the President with
regard to we have to have a measure of success, we cannot let
this government fail?
General Casey. I do. We definitely need to support this
government.
Senator Warner. Fine.
General Casey. They have to bring something to the table as
well, and they are doing that.
Senator Warner. I understand the contingencies. I fully
appreciate the importance of the Iraqi government living up to
its commitments in benchmarks and in other ways. I do not
question that. I draw on Senator Reed's point, and I brought
this up in earlier hearings of this committee this past week. A
chain is no stronger than its weakest link and you have three,
I think really four--it is the political commitments of the
Iraqi government to be fulfilled; it is the other departments
and agencies of our Government that have to fulfill; it is the
military plan; and it is the diplomatic plan.
So it is all four links and really the failure of one could
bring down the total. Would that not be correct?
General Casey. I agree with that, Senator. All four of
those things need to go forward together.
Senator Warner. Then I come back. You can assure the
committee that there is some fallback if this Baghdad surge
concept in nine areas does not meet whatever goals that you as
the commander have set, and that this would not be the last
chance, this campaign in Baghdad?
General Casey. I think that is a fair way to put it. I do
not think it is the absolute last chance, but it certainly is
the best chance right now that we have.
Senator Warner. Then you and I are in concurrence that we
cannot portray to our brave forces that have made these
enormous sacrifices that in any way our will is going to waver
to carry forward as best we can to achieve that measure of
success that the President has set forth here.
I come to another issue that has caused this Senator great
concern. It has been my privilege to have had some long
association with the U.S. military. My own career in uniform is
very modest and of little consequence, but I have had the
benefit of learning through these years of my association with
the military. I am concerned about this concept of the dual
command structure for, let us call it, the Baghdad plan as
announced by the President.
In his announcement he made reference to the Iraqis will
have a commander, a senior commander, in each of the nine
provinces, and presumably a commander above each of the nine
Iraqi commanders; that the United States will likewise have a
chain of command in each province. As I understand it you will
have a battalion level force assigned with, working in support
of, the Iraqi forces, which hopefully will be on the point, and
they have their reporting chain of command.
My concern is when you have this duality, dual concept,
that you come down to the company level and the Iraqi company
commander or platoon commander in all probability is saying
that this mission we have before us, we have to maneuver to the
left, the American platoon commander says, oh no, my
calculations, we have to maneuver to the right. If whichever
they follow does not succeed then you precipitate a finger-
pointing right down at the tactical level between two
commanders who exercised their best judgment.
Is that a potential that could occur under this plan and
what assurances do we have that that will not happen?
General Casey. Senator, if you put two military guys in a
room they are going to disagree on tactics. So I do not think
there is any question that, what you are describing could
happen.
But let me take you back to the beginning on this thing.
There is a parallel chain of command and, as you know better
than anyone, U.S. forces operate under U.S. command and that
will happen. Now, the command structure for the Iraqis is a
significant improvement over what we have been working on with
them in the past iterations of the Baghdad security plan. It
finally gets unity of effort of the Iraqi army and the Iraqi
police and the national police under a single commander.
The way they have set it up is there is a Baghdad
commander, there are two commanders, one for each side of the
river, and then there are nine district commanders. In that
district, each district, will be an Iraqi brigadier. All of the
Iraqi security forces, the local police, the national police,
and army, will report to that one commander. That is a big
difference.
It is not a natural thing, I think, for police and the
military to work together. There has always been friction in
that with the Iraqis. This is a great step forward. I have been
working for some months here and I have told my subordinate
commanders, I want to be able to put my finger on a map of
Baghdad and I want you to be able to tell me who, what Iraqi,
is responsible for security in that area. We can do that now
and that is important.
Now, your concerns are correct ones. They come from the,
okay, how do the Americans and the Iraqis work together. At
each level from General Ray Odierno, the Baghdad commander, to
General Fill with the two district commanders, to the brigade
commander and the battalion commander in each of the districts,
they are partnered at every level and they work very closely
together. We still have our transition teams working with these
Iraqis.
Senator Warner. The embedded, the embedded.
General Casey. I am sorry, the embedded.
Senator Warner. Correct.
General Casey. So they are linked and have close liaison at
every level. I just talked to General Odierno this morning. He
was out visiting with each of his commanders and they are
comfortable with the arrangements that are being worked out.
Senator Warner. Heretofore we have had a unified command of
the American structure and you are assuring me that has not
been changed?
General Casey. No, it absolutely has not changed.
Senator Warner. The American GI is accountable for the
orders he gets from the American chain of command right up to
your successor; is that correct?
General Casey. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. Now, therefore that has been the way we
have operated in Iraq and more or less we have devised the plan
by which the joint operations to the extent we have had them
with the Iraqi forces have been carried out.
General Casey. That started to change in September as we
gradually returned Iraqi forces from my operational control to
Iraqi operational control. In September, you may recall we
stood up the ground force command, that headquarters is now
directing Iraqi operations.
Senator Warner. In our meeting in my office here a day or
so ago, I urged that you look at the testimony of General
Keane, former Vice Chief of the United States Army, now
retired, a very valued and knowledgeable individual. He had
concern with this plan. Did you read that testimony?
General Casey. I did.
Senator Warner. You read the colloquy that I had with him?
General Casey. Yes.
Senator Warner. He concluded that he is going to urge
General Petraeus once he takes over to get this thing
straightened out. Now, can you translate for us what that means
and what you hope to achieve, because I also asked General
Keane, did he know of any precedent where our forces operating
with others have had the type of command structure that this
new strategy plan of the President as announced on the 10th
envisions. He said he did not know of a precedent.
General Casey. My sense is--and I probably need to talk to
Jack, but my sense was from reading that is Jack did not have
all the details of how this was going to actually be
implemented. It is a non-standard arrangement.
Senator Warner. You are breaking new ground.
General Casey. We have been. Actually, we have been
operating in smaller operations like this around Iraq for some
time. As we are transitioning to Iraqi security force lead,
there are non-standard arrangements as we go through the
transition period, and that is really kind of what is happening
now.
Senator Warner. Is there not an element of risk now that is
somewhat greater for our forces operating with the Iraqis?
Unfortunately, we continue to get more factual evidence that
the Iraqi forces, some components are not ready to do certain
things. Yet we are going forward in reliance on their
professional capability. I am just wondering, does this chain
of command increase in any way the risk of the American GI
participating in these operations?
General Casey. I do not think so. As I said, General
Odierno was out. He has visited all the brigade commanders in
Baghdad and had the conversation with them, and he reported to
me this morning that he is comfortable with this arrangement.
Now, is it as good as having everybody lined up and working
for us? No. There will be more friction than that. But I do not
think that it significantly increases the risk to our forces.
Senator Warner. My time is up. Colleague, why do you not
just take charge?
Senator Cornyn [presiding]. General Casey, thank you very
much----
General Casey. If we all leave before they come back, I
will buy you both coffee. [Laughter.]
Senator Cornyn. I appreciate your patience, but more than
that I appreciate your service to our country. As I told you in
my office, as a military brat myself I understand the impact of
the service by the uniformed member on families, and I
appreciate your family being here with you today and the
support they have given you in allowing you to perform so well
in the service of your country.
I want to ask you about the Iraqis. One of the earliest
signs we will see if the Iraqis are living up to their
commitment is whether they are providing additional forces as
promised. What has been the experience? Have they followed
through on their promises or have they been lacking in follow-
through?
General Casey. They are in the process of following through
on those promises. They are actually pretty close to being on
schedule, pretty close to being on schedule with the deployment
of the brigades to Baghdad. I think we are now, with two of the
three brigade headquarters and four of the seven battalions
have moved to Baghdad.
Now, they are coming in with the range of 55 to 65 percent
strength because of people they left back. We are working with
them to increase the strength of the forces that they have in
Baghdad. But they are delivering so far on what they said they
would do.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Senator Cornyn, forgive the
interruption, but I understand there is a second vote on now,
if I am correct. Is that correct? I would ask you, when you are
done would you recess, because we will come back into session.
There are more questions to be asked.
Senator Cornyn. Certainly.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I believe you said earlier when it came to the prime
minister's commitment to take on lawbreakers without regard to
ethnicity or religious affiliation that for the last 2 months
at least you have seen a commitment by the Iraqi government to
take on all lawbreakers and those who are exacting violence
against the population. Did I hear that correctly?
General Casey. You heard that correctly, Senator.
Senator Cornyn. I read with some interest an article in
this morning's Washington Post. It was excerpted from your
written comments, but the headline of it said ``General: Shiite
Militia Leaders Leaving Baghdad Strongholds.'' From what this
article suggests--and I would like for you to confirm it or
explain it--it is the threat even of our building our forces
and not only clearing but actually holding areas that are
currently occupied by militias and others seeking to generate
chaos there, it is even the threat of force is causing the
Shiite militias to actually leave some of these areas, and it
is having an impact.
Could you explain how that is possible or what your
understanding is?
General Casey. This is a phenomenon that we saw in August
as well. Just the announcement of the extension of the Stryker
Brigade had a dampening effect on the levels of sectarian
violence. The same thing is happening again. Actually, it has
been a combination of things this time. As we have announced
the deployment of the additional troops, we have seen, as I
said, in about 5 or 6 weeks a downward trend in ethnosectarian
incidents.
The other thing that has been happening, though, is we have
been putting strong military pressure on the death squads and
the death squads' leadership, and we have in fact picked up
five or six of their key leaders here in the last several
weeks. So that has had a big impact on them.
The newspaper I think is reporting on reports from us that
we are actually seeing some of these senior leaders move out of
Sadr City and into safer places. That is good news, bad news.
We will continue to target them wherever they might go within
Iraq.
Senator Cornyn. The bad news portion would be if they would
simply lay low somewhere else and then come back once perhaps
the forces were not deployed there to hold the area and come
back and do the same old thing again?
General Casey. Right. That has been one of the challenges
with the militia. They blend away. They do not stand and fight.
They see us coming, they just blend into the background.
Senator Cornyn. General Casey, I do not want to embroil you
in the political debates here in Congress and I promise you I
will not do that. But I will ask your professional military
judgment if in fact in this test of wills, as General Petraeus
has called it, the enemy sees us lacking in will or believes we
will not follow through on our commitments to not only clear
areas in Baghdad but hold them, to allow the building to go
forward, what sort of consequences, practical consequences,
does that have to a commander on the ground?
General Casey. If the enemy sees that we are not following
through on our commitments?
Senator Cornyn. If the enemy believes that, notwithstanding
our statements, that we ultimately, that Washington, that the
political leadership, says we do not believe we can win, so we
are not going to follow through, what kind of consequences does
that have as a practical matter on the ground?
General Casey. It certainly strengthens the enemy and with
the particular enemy that we are dealing with, I think they
would use it with their information campaigns as a recruiting
tool. I have already seen it starting to come out, that the
Americans are beaten, they are defeated, come to Iraq now if
you want to be involved in beating the Americans.
Senator Cornyn. You have seen that, used that for their own
propaganda pieces?
General Casey. I have seen it in the al Qaeda propaganda.
Senator Cornyn. Some have suggested that we continue to
fight the insurgency in al Anbar, but not send reinforcements
to deal with the Shia militias in Baghdad. What would be your
military assessment of the impact of such a plan?
General Casey. As I have said throughout the course of the
hearing today, Senator, we have to help the Iraqis secure
Baghdad if the country is going to go forward and if they are
going to credibly assume responsibility for their security this
year. We have to lower the levels of sectarian violence in
their capital. We have to help them do that. So that is, in my
view, a much higher priority than what is going on in Anbar.
Now, Anbar is important because al Qaeda is trying to
establish a safe haven there from which they can export terror,
and we have enough forces to keep the pressure on both in
Baghdad and in Anbar.
Senator Cornyn. If we fail to send additional
reinforcements to deal with the Shia militia and the ethnic
violence, is it your military judgment that our chances of
success would be markedly diminished?
General Casey. Absolutely. In Baghdad it is not just Shia
militia. It is both Sunni and Shia extremists, and we have to
deal with both and we need the forces in both Baghdad and
Anbar.
Senator Cornyn. Let me ask you just a last question, about
the consequences of our leaving Iraq before the Iraqis are able
to sustain, govern, and defend themselves. Some have suggested
that regional conflict would almost surely ensue, with Iranian
Shia taking advantage of the opportunity to support the Shia in
Iraq to the detriment of the Sunnis, perhaps engage in even
greater ethnic cleansing against the Sunnis, perhaps then
precipitating an entry by the Saudis and other Sunni-majority
countries to come in and protect the Sunnis.
That is one of the suggestions that I have heard. The other
is that Iraq could well become another failed state and thus a
platform for terrorist organizations like al Qaeda to train,
recruit, and launch future terrorist attacks.
In your view are either one or both of those plausible
outcomes if in fact we leave Iraq before it is able to sustain,
govern, and defend itself?
General Casey. I think both are entirely plausible.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Senator Collins [presiding]. Thank you.
General Casey, first let me explain that I ran into
Chairman Levin, who told me to go ahead and proceed with my
questions. So for the next 10 minutes I get to be chairman of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, a position I have always
coveted. [Laughter.]
General Casey. I will make you the same offer I made
Senator Cornyn. If we both leave now before they come back, I
will buy you coffee. [Laughter.]
Senator Collins. No such luck. [Laughter.]
Let me, however, start with my very sincere appreciation
for your dedicated service to your country and to the United
States Army.
I want to bring up three issues with you today. The first
is the impact of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan on our
National Guard and reservists. Just last week former Secretary
of Defense William Perry testified before this committee that
the agreement with our citizen-soldiers had been shattered.
Similarly, the adjutant general of the Maine National Guard has
expressed to me grave concern about the impact of the recent
change in policy that says that National Guard forces may now
be involuntarily mobilized more often than once every 5 years.
He has stated that if the 24-month, total month policy changes
and Maine National Guard troops are involuntarily called up for
a second time or in a few cases a third time in support of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, that the Maine National
Guard will not be able to sustain its current force structure,
and he is very worried about the impact on recruitment and
retention.
General Casey, I have had two members of my own staff
called up, so I know personally the impact this has on
employers, on families, and on the citizen-soldiers themselves.
Are we not asking too much of our National Guard? That is
my first question to you, and a related question: Are you
concerned about the long-term impact on retention and
recruitment of our National Guard members that this policy will
have?
General Casey. It is certainly something that warrants all
of our attention, Senator. I would agree with you on that. The
numbers on recruiting and retention for the Guard seem to be
right now okay, but we certainly keep our eyes on the impacts
of this change in policy.
As I mentioned in my opening testimony, one of the three
things I would make a priority as the Chief of Staff of the
Army is the Guard and Reserve. I know the Army is working on
it, but as the Vice Chief we were working on building a system
that would get the Guard units more predictability in what they
were doing and to leverage the fact that almost half of them
now are going to be combat veterans and they do not need to
have 90 to 120 of post-mobilization training. We have to be
smarter about how we treat them and how we use them so that
when we do have to call them up, we have maximum time on
mission and minimum time on preparation, so there is less time
away from their families.
Lots to do here, and I very much agree with your base point
that we need to watch the impact of this policy change here on
recruiting and retention.
Senator Collins. Should we also be looking at improving the
benefits for National Guard and reservists? For example, I am
thinking of the educational benefits under the Montgomery GI
Bill. Should we try to more thoroughly align the benefits for
Guard members to make them more parallel with Active Duty,
given the increased demands that we are making on them?
General Casey. I definitely think that is something to be
looked at, but I think you know the resource tradeoffs of
those. But I think that is exactly right. Benefits as
incentives to continued service in the Guard, I think that
needs to be looked at.
Senator Collins. General, the second issue that I want to
bring up to you is one that we discussed in my office
yesterday. That is my tremendous concern about reports that we
will be sending troops into Iraq without adequate protection
and equipment. I want to follow up on the line of questioning
that some of our members have already raised with you.
It actually was not a report by the Special Inspector
General on current troops' equipment. It was the unclassified
executive summary of an audit done by DOD's own IG. It is dated
January 25 of this year, so it is a very new report. It is
titled ``Equipment Status of Deployed Forces Within U.S.
Central Command.''
The findings of this audit trouble me greatly. The IG
performed the audit to determine whether units deployed to Iraq
and Afghanistan were equipped in accordance with mission
requirements. The IG's office received responses from
approximately 1,100 servicemembers, so this was a significant
sample, and its report states that these individuals,
``experienced shortages of force protection equipment such as
up-armored vehicles, electronic countermeasure devices, crew-
served weapons, and communications equipment.'' As a result,
servicemembers were not always equipped to effectively complete
their missions.
This troubles me terribly. I think it is simply wrong for
us to send troops into harm's way without fully equipping them,
without giving them uparmored vehicles. I understand why in the
early days of the war this was a problem and many of us worked
very hard to increase funding for up-armored Humvees, for
example. But I do not understand why this is still a problem,
according to the DOD IG, and I am extremely concerned that if
it is a problem for some troops serving now that we are not
prepared to fully equip the troops that will soon be on their
way.
General Casey. I agree with you, Senator. I have not seen
the report, but I am concerned about what you just read to me.
When I get back tomorrow I will take a hard look at that and
find out what the heck is going on, because I have not heard in
my visits to the units complaints about equipment shortages, in
fact quite the contrary. So it needs some looking into.
Senator Collins. It does. You and I discussed the equipment
for troops on their way to Iraq or who will soon be on their
way to Iraq, and I was pleased for your assurances that this is
a high priority for you and that you have already in fact
issued a directive to ensure that the troops do not go if they
are not equipped.
But here is a report from DOD's own IG that says that
current troops do not have what they need. So I would ask you
to look at this report and to report back to the committee on
your findings, because this really is troubling. It is such an
obligation.
General Casey. I have a long airplane ride.
Senator Collins. So you have plenty of time to look into
it.
[The information referred to follows:]
The information requested was provided by General Casey on February
16, 2007, in the attached letter.
Senator Collins. Finally, General, you have said many times
that you do not want to send one more American soldier to Iraq
than is necessary to perform the mission. You have also very
candidly testified that when you looked at the Baghdad security
plan you asked for two brigades and that is what you felt was
adequate. You have also, however, said today that you support
the President's plan for five brigades. Does that not violate
your principle, based on your earlier assessment that only two
brigades are needed, that you should not send one more American
soldier to Iraq than is necessary?
General Casey. Not really, because, as I said, in my mind
the other three brigades should be called forward after an
assessment has been made of the situation on the ground and
whether or not there has been success in the mission in the
Baghdad area. So it is one thing to say all five brigades are
going into Baghdad. It is another to say you have two, we have
a decision point here for the third; we will assess to see what
is going on, if we need it we will bring it in, if not we will
not. The same thing for the fourth, the same thing for the
fifth.
So I think the way the force flow is arranged gives the new
commander lots of flexibility to either use the forces based on
his assessment of the need or not use the forces.
Senator Collins. I understand your deferring to the new
commander, to General Petraeus's view. But I need to ask you
outright, if you were still in Iraq would you be happy with
just two brigades?
General Casey. I would still want a reserve that I could
call forward if things did not work out the way we had hoped or
to take advantage of an opportunity that presented itself.
Senator Collins. But you would start out with two brigades?
That assessment has not changed?
General Casey. That is where we are, that is right.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Warner had to cut short his questions because of
the vote, so I am going to call on Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
have received information that the National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE), which was in some large part generated by
members of this committee, will soon be released in a
classified form and made available to the committee. For those
following the hearings, that is the evaluation of a subject by
our entire Intelligence Community. This particular one is to be
focused on Iraq.
General, were you asked to make a contribution to that NIE?
I am just going to talk process.
General Casey. I have seen the executive summary and
offered comments.
Senator Warner. That is fine. All I want to know is that
you were a part of the process and you had an opportunity to
get your evaluation in before it went into final print, I
presume?
General Casey. I did.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, because that is an
important document. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that it be put in
S-407 of the Capitol where traditionally we--or whereever--and
we urge members to read that, because in the context of this
very important broad issue before the Senate today and
certainly into the next week, I think it would be valuable to
get the assessment of the Intelligence Community about their
own evaluation of the situation in Iraq today and most
particularly Baghdad.
Now, General, the Congress of the United States over many
years has funded the National War College, the Navy War
College, and Carlisle Barracks. We also have this new command
now that studies the overall operations of our forces, that is
located down in Virginia, the one that Admiral Edmund
Giambastiani put together.
Do you have any knowledge of the traditional practice of
wargaming plans having been done in those various forums,
wargaming being, for those that are following the hearing,
where you establish an A team, a B team, or a blue team, a red
team, and they try to assess the likelihood of success of the
plan or what modifications should be made to the plan? In other
words, it is a professional good exchange. It is very important
we do it in many situations.
Do you have knowledge of it having been done in the
preparation of this plan as enunciated by the President on 10
January?
General Casey. I do not have any knowledge one way or the
other, Senator.
Senator Warner. All right. I have to tell you, there is
testimony in the record by other witnesses before this
committee that teams were sent to your AOR for the purposes of
conducting such an evaluation. I accept your answer you do not
have knowledge, which means you certainly did not see any work
product. But I would ask that the record be left open so that
you can go back into your command and see what, if any, type of
wargaming might have been done.
General Casey. Oh, I thought you were speaking of war
colleges and Joint Forces Command.
Senator Warner. In other words, Congress funds a whole
number of military institutions for the purpose of doing
wargaming, to make assessments of the likelihood of success of
a plan or how a plan should be modified.
General Casey. We routinely do it in our planning process.
I would be surprised if that was not done in Iraq.
Senator Warner. Well then, was it done within your command?
Did you have a sort of a structure that looked at the plan as
it was unfolding and presumably just before the President
announced it to determine on a professional basis between young
men and women officers looking at it and giving their best
judgment as to the strength of the plan, the likelihood of
success, or the likelihood it would not succeed unless certain
corrections are made?
General Casey. The actual wargaming of the Baghdad plan
would have been done at the corps level. You are asking me
whether we wargamed the overall strategy. No, we did not.
Senator Warner. All right. So it would have to be done up
at corps level and that would be General Abizaid?
General Casey. General Odierno.
Senator Warner. Odierno.
General Casey. It is a tactical level plan.
Senator Warner. He is a subordinate commander to you, is
he?
General Casey. Right.
Senator Warner. So you do not know whether he did it and
what the results?
General Casey. I cannot tell you conclusively he did it. I
tell you that we do wargaming as part of all of our planning. I
would be surprised if some level of wargaming was not done, but
I cannot tell you conclusively that it was.
Senator Warner. All right. Could you then supply that for
the record?
General Casey. I will.
[The information referred to follows:]
During my testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 1
February 2007 you asked if we had done any wargaming as part of the
formal planning process used to develop the current Baghdad security
plan. I replied that during operational planning we routinely conduct
such wargaming and that I would confirm for you that we had.
The Multi-National Corp-Iraq conducted a detailed wargame from 22-
24 December 2006 to examine several courses of action. They followed
that up on 24 December with a course of action brief to the commander
that included the results of the wargaming. The commander used the
results of that wargaming as he developed his operations order.
On behalf of all our servicemembers and coalition partners, thank
you and the committee for your continued steadfast support to our
mission in Iraq.
Senator Warner. In September 2006--and Chairman Levin, it
was just before you and I made that trip together in the region
in October, and we visited the Marines, you will recall. While
it was classified, I think I can make reference to in September
2006 the Washington Post reported that ``The chief of
intelligence of the Marine Corps in Iraq filed a report
concluding that the prospects for securing Anbar Province are
dim.''
That report was classified, so I will not ask you to
comment on it. But we actually had the opportunity to have a
colloquy with that colonel and his commanding officer and
others. I then asked questions about al Anbar.
What is the state today of the power of the al Qaeda
elements of this insurgency? Is it growing? Is it
strengthening? Do we have sufficient forces in your judgment to
repress that organization?
General Casey. I would say that the strength of al Qaeda in
Anbar Province is diminishing. I talked to General Zumer, the
commander in Anbar, right before I left. He told me that for
the first time since the war there are Iraqi police in every
district in Anbar Province. That is a big step. They have had
very good success recruiting police. They have trained over
9,000 police, on their way to about 14,000 police.
So that is a big success. The real major success has come
on the political level with a group of tribal leaders who
banded together and started to take on al Qaeda on their own,
and then, with the assistance of Prime Minister Maliki, they
were able to merge some of these leaders into the provincial
council run by the governor. So when this report, the
intelligence report you spoke of, there was not a political
track in Anbar. There is now. There were not many police in
Anbar. There are now.
Senator Warner. But as a part of your plan, that is the
January 10 plan which you worked on, you do recommend
additional forces in al Anbar?
General Casey. I did.
Senator Warner. Was that for the purpose of further
diminishing the influence of al Qaeda?
General Casey. Absolutely, it was to maintain the momentum
that they already had. I actually went out there in October. I
was getting a briefing from the commander in Ramadi and he was
describing what was happening. I said: ``It looks like you have
an opportunity here; what could you do with another
battalion?'' He said: ``I could clean out Ramadi.'' So we asked
for the Marine Expeditionary Unit and brought it in in
November, and he has used that. These other units now are to
backfill that Marine Expeditionary Unit so that we maintain
pressure on these guys throughout Anbar Province.
Senator Warner. My final question. You in the earlier
responses described really the enormity of your task as the
Multi-National Commander. Among it was dealing with, I think
you said, three successive prime ministers; is that correct?
General Casey. It is, Senator.
Senator Warner. We have an ambassador there. I am trying to
determine the degree of responsibility that you have with
respect to the political side. Remember we said this new plan
has four components. One of them is dealing with the Iraqi
government.
Is under the new plan there to be more State Department
officials, more emphasis put on the ambassadorial role to deal
with that? Or is your successor to continue to have to find
time apart from his military responsibilities to handle much of
the intergovernmental relationships?
General Casey. Ambassador Zol Kollazaid handles the
political business with the prime minister. What I work with
him is the political-military aspects: what type of commitments
do I need from the prime minister to support the military plan?
What do I need from the government in terms of economic support
for the plan? Those are the types of interactions that I have.
I do not get involved in the strictly political stuff. Zol
takes care of that.
Senator Warner. So if, for example, in the forthcoming
Baghdad surge campaign, the Iraqis fail to keep their
commitments, benchmarks as we call them, and the most specific
one and the one which I have included in my resolution, and you
have alluded to it today, it is that commitment that no longer
will the political structure of the prime minister and his
subordinates be reaching out and telling tactical commanders,
this is what you will have to do, and then calling up and
saying, what you have already done on your own initiative, undo
it and pull back.
Whose responsibility will it be to make sure and certain
that the Iraqis are living up to that and other benchmarks? Is
it the United States ambassador, now filled by another
individual, a very able person--I have dealt with him through
the years--and his team, or is it back on the commanding
officer of the MNF-I, your successor?
General Casey. I would look after the military aspects. For
example, if we had a call to a unit to undo something that was
done, I would get that report back up to my chain and Zol and I
would go see the prime minister.
Senator Warner. He is now to be succeeded by another
individual?
General Casey. Right.
So basically, Senator, I would deal with the military
commitments, and I have a system already set up for monitoring
those. Zol would deal with the political commitments.
Senator Warner. Then if that fails it is part of your
responsibility and the failure of those commitments by the
Iraqi political structure then would fall in other words, the
buck stops on your desk and not the State Department?
General Casey. For example, if they did not deliver on a
commitment to pass the electoral law or to pass the oil law,
that is Zol's business.
Senator Warner. Correct.
General Casey. If they are not delivering on their
commitment not to allow safe havens and are restricting our
operations in an area, that is on me. So we work it together.
Senator Warner. Now, that last phrase is important, you
``work it together.'' So you are really working in partnership
with the U.S. ambassador?
General Casey. Oh, absolutely.
Senator Warner. I see. I would think that primary
responsibility for the enforcement of those benchmarks should
be primarily with the Secretary of State and her ambassadors. I
think you should think through and have some clarification.
General Casey. The benchmarks absolutely fall under Zol's
purview. Again, it is the military-related commitments that I
keep an eye on.
Senator Warner. There I think you would be in the role of
an expert adviser to the United States ambassador, rather than
one that----
General Casey. What happens is we go over together.
Senator Warner. All right. All I am saying is there could
be a subsequent assessment of what went right and what went
wrong here, and I think that having again unified commands with
various responsibilities, whether it is on the diplomatic side
or it is on the military side, would be beneficial.
I thank the chair.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
General, the Iraqis have agreed to benchmarks before, is
that not correct?
General Casey. They did.
Chairman Levin. Did they not agree in October to
benchmarks?
General Casey. September-October, I think you are right.
Chairman Levin. Did they live up to those benchmarks?
General Casey. Not in all cases.
Chairman Levin. How about in most cases?
General Casey. They did, they made progress on some things.
Chairman Levin. Did they deny that they had agreed to
benchmarks? Let me read----
General Casey. I think there was some discussion by the
prime minister that he----
Chairman Levin. Some discussion? He flat out--according to
the Washington Post on October 25, ``Maliki lashed out today at
the United States, saying his popularly elected government
would not bend to U.S.-imposed benchmarks,'' and denied that he
had agreed to the benchmarks. Were you aware of that?
General Casey. I am aware of that----
Chairman Levin. No, but is it true that he denied that he
agreed to them?
General Casey. It is.
Chairman Levin. Does that not make you nervous, when he did
agree to them and then a day later or 2 days later denies that
he agreed to them?
General Casey. I do not know that he did agree with them.
Other members of the presidency council--they have this policy
council for national security and that was the group that it
was discussed with. I do not know whether the prime minister
was actually there or not.
Chairman Levin. I see. So when Khalilzad said ``Iraqi
leaders have agreed to a time line for making the hard
decisions needed to resolve these issues''--that is his quote--
you are not sure that Maliki was involved among the Iraqi
leaders that had agreed?
General Casey. I am not, but Zol would know that.
Chairman Levin. All right, so you are not sure that Maliki
ever agreed to the ones that everybody else says he agreed to?
General Casey. I am not.
Chairman Levin. Okay, that is fair. That is a straight
answer.
We have talked a little bit about what General Shinseki
said here about needing more troops and about the way he was
treated. Do you have any feelings about the way he was treated
after he spoke honestly about his opinion?
General Casey. I do not think he was treated well.
Chairman Levin. You have indicated on a number of occasions
that your efforts were thwarted by Iraqi leaders.
By the way, I could not agree with you more relative to
Shinseki. I think he was treated miserably and that message I
think was an insult to everybody in uniform. But I will leave
it at that. You gave me an answer which is perfectly consistent
with what I just said, although perhaps not as purple in its
prose.
General, you have indicated this morning that you raised a
number of problems when, a number of times you were thwarted,
more accurately when Prime Minister Jafari objected to
something you were trying to get done and Prime Minister Maliki
I believe did not insist that his troops act without political
interference, indeed involved himself. He would not allow
certain things to happen.
You objected to that because you were trying to make things
happen. Did you tell your chain of command? Did you take that
to the higher level in those cases and tell either General
Abizaid or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or whoever you
would have been reporting to, probably General Abizaid, that
you were having those problems?
General Casey. Yes. I would not write a report or
something, but in my discussions with them, which were
frequent, I would highlight the difficulties I was having. But
I will tell you, Senator, I have watched Prime Minister Maliki
grow over the last 8 months and over the last several months
there have been no restrictions on what we are doing. That has
changed over time and I think changed for the positive.
Chairman Levin. You were asked in your prehearing questions
what were the most significant mistakes the United States has
made to date in Iraq, and you had quite a long list of
mistakes. You did not list among those mistakes some of the
most commonly agreed to mistakes. I will not say that everyone
has agreed to these, but these have been noted and they are
significant.
General Casey. I kind of stuck to the things on my watch.
Chairman Levin. I see.
General Casey. I tried not to go back to the beginning.
Chairman Levin. One of the things which has affected you
was the disbandment of the Iraqi army. That was before your
watch, but nonetheless, do you have any feelings about that
action as to whether that was a wise course, to not bring the
Iraqi army back from their homes? Not the top level officers,
but most of the people who were in the army. Was that a mistake
in your judgment?
General Casey. Looking back, the Iraqi army was suspect to
80 percent of the country, the Kurds and the Shia.
Chairman Levin. Even though the Shia made up most of the
army?
General Casey. Right, but it was the leadership.
Chairman Levin. The leadership was suspect. I am talking
about 80 percent of the army, not the leaders.
General Casey. Right.
Chairman Levin. The people who were thrown out of work with
guns and no pay.
General Casey. I understand.
Chairman Levin. Was that a mistake?
General Casey. I cannot talk to the timing of how it was
done, but my sense is something would have had to have been
done with that Iraqi army that was the instrument of repression
by the Saddam Hussein regime. The other thing I will tell you--
--
Chairman Levin. Would the removal of the top leadership
have sent the right signal?
General Casey. It certainly could have.
Chairman Levin. What about the de-Baathification program?
Did it go too far?
General Casey. It did. It still is.
Chairman Levin. What about the failure to adequately plan
for the occupation, looking at a worst case scenario or a more
complex occupation? Was that a mistake?
General Casey. It certainly was, and it was compounded by
the execution.
Chairman Levin. Now, what the President himself said is
that he had a choice to make--he just said this a couple weeks
ago--``to do what we were doing, and one could define that
maybe a slow failure, or change what we were doing.'' So the
President has described what was happening before he made his
change of strategy--regardless of whether we think it was a
significant change or not; that is not the point at the
moment--he defined what was happening as, ``maybe a slow
failure,'' and that we needed to change strategy.
Do you agree with that description of what was happening?
General Casey. Slow failure? Do I agree that Iraq was
moving toward a slow failure?
Chairman Levin. That maybe what was happening--I am using
the President's exact words because he did not say it was. He
said maybe was a slow failure. You have said that you did not
think it was a failure. I am asking you, since the President
described what was happening as ``maybe a slow failure,'' do
you----
General Casey. It is not lost on me that the Commander in
Chief was not satisfied with what was going on.
Chairman Levin. But his description--even he came to the
point after all these years of not having what everybody
wanted, which is success in Iraq, he finally described mistakes
were made, and then he said, yes, one could define that, doing
what we are doing, as ``maybe a slow failure.''
I am just wondering whether you would agree with that.
General Casey. I actually do not see it as slow failure. I
actually see it as slow progress.
Chairman Levin. All right. My time is up and I think
Senator Sessions is next. Senator Sessions, we did not pass
over you this time.
Senator Warner. Senator, would you yield just for a moment?
Senator Sessions. I would be pleased to.
Senator Warner. I want to catch this last vote.
General, I have been here throughout this hearing and it
has been a good tough one and a thorough one. But your
testimony today has reinforced my earlier opinion when I
arrived here at the beginning this morning that you are the
President's choice for Chief of Staff of the Army. The
institution of the Army is really involved in this, that
wonderful institutional tradition of the Army, and you will
have my support.
General Casey. Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. General Casey, I am not comfortable with
this insistence on trying to work the word ``failure'' into
what is happening. I think we are all uneasy. I think the
American people are uneasy. They are troubled. Things have not
gone as well as we would like, and you have said that several
times. But ``failure'' suggests a doomed event, and you have
been through that now 30 months. You have worked with the Iraqi
government and I am sure have been frustrated many times on the
difference of cultural responses and the different leaderships
they have had there and all.
Do you feel like under the plan that has been proposed and
we intend to carry out that we can be successful in Iraq?
General Casey. I do. I believe, as I said in my testimony,
the situation in Iraq is winnable. It is very winnable. It is
hard, though.
Senator Sessions. It is hard and it is slow, and there are
good days and bad days, good months and bad months. Would you
say it that way?
General Casey. There are.
Senator Sessions. Senators Levin and Warner and I, and I
believe Mark Pryor, were in Ramadi. We were briefed by the
Marine colonel, intelligence officer in the command, and we
were troubled by the reports that we got at that time. I had
the opportunity to talk with General Peter Pace, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, last night for a good while and I asked
him about that. He said that same briefer briefed him several
months later and had seen some significant steps for progress
being made. You seem to be saying the same thing.
So in this kind of counterinsurgency operation that we are
in, is it not a mistake to go into any one particular area of
the country at a given day, whether it is up or down, and try
to express a total evaluation of our entire effort?
General Casey. Absolutely. One of the things that I do that
most people do not is I look at the whole country and I travel
about the whole country. I have been to every province, visit
the units there. I get assessments from the guys and gals that
are out there on the ground dealing with the Iraqis every day.
A lot of what comes out of Iraq is Baghdad-centric and it
comes out of the Green Zone, and you really have to get out and
around Iraq to get a full appreciation of what is going on
there. Again, I am not sugar-coating the situation in Baghdad.
It is bad.
Senator Sessions. You do agree that since such a large
percentage of the population is there and it is the capital,
that Baghdad must be secured? That is a critical event for us
right now?
General Casey. It is, Senator.
Senator Sessions. We have around 23,000 troops in
Afghanistan. They have almost the same population as Iraq. I
think a lot of us hoped that we could keep the numbers down.
But Iraq has turned out to be more complex and difficult and
more violent and it has required us to maintain troops longer
than I would have liked. Hopefully, this will be a surge that
can lead to progress and we can get back on the path that you
tried to get us on, which is a downward drawing of our troops
and continuing to push up the Iraqi troops.
I am concerned, General Casey, about our prison and law
enforcement system there. To follow up on Senator Warner's
comment first, if we need more prison beds to place people who
have been convicted and arrested by Iraqi forces, is that the
U.S. military or is that the State Department ambassador's role
to find the money for that?
General Casey. That is the State Department.
Senator Sessions. If we need to create a new trial system,
which I strongly think should be a military trial system,
because we are in such a state of disorder, and try those
people who are threats against the state in an Iraqi military
court system, would that be the State Department's
responsibility to get such a court system up or the military?
General Casey. The State Department is responsible for the
rule of law and for assisting the Iraqis in developing the rule
of law institutions.
Senator Sessions. They bring in the Department of Justice
and others?
General Casey. Yes.
Senator Sessions. I just want to tell you, I am not happy
with that. I do not think we have gotten nearly far enough
along. As I have noted, we have one-ninth as many bed spaces
and prisoners in custody in Iraq per capita as we have in
Alabama. I saw another military writer in a military journal
write that on a per capita basis there was about six times as
many in prison in Vietnam during that conflict.
It just indicates, objectively looked at, that we have a
lot of dangerous people out there, and if they are not
arrested, apprehended, and removed, then you cannot have
credibility in a city like Baghdad. They need to know that when
somebody bad is caught they are gone, it is not a revolving
door.
Are you aware of the complaints in that regard and will you
take steps as Chief of Staff to support efforts to improve the
law enforcement system there?
General Casey. In Iraq?
Senator Sessions. Yes.
General Casey. We work closely with the embassy on the rule
of law program. As you suggest, it is something that needs an
awful lot more work.
Senator Sessions. General Casey, that is what we hear over
and over again. But it is your soldiers that are out there day
after day being shot at, sometimes by the same people that were
caught and released. I am glad you say it is the State
Department's responsibility, but really it is the United
States' responsibility. It is our soldiers there, our policy
that we need to execute.
I guess I want you to say that you will break some china if
need be to get this thing moving, if we have to get on the
State Department or have it transferred to the military to get
it done.
General Casey. I will.
Senator Sessions. That is good.
General Casey. Can I just say, though, that we also have
our own detention system where we have about 15,000 Iraqis, and
that does not operate in a catch and release program, and we
are actually expanding our capacity by another 4,000 or 5,000
so that we can continue to hold the Iraqi security detainees
and not have to put them back out on the street. So we work
that and watch that very closely.
Senator Sessions. One final brief question. Prime Minister
Maliki is elected. He is a politician like we are. He has
constituencies. His people have pride and he has some pride.
Would you say we want him to assume responsibility, we want him
to declare it is his responsibility to run Iraq, and we ought
to be somewhat sympathetic and understanding if he takes the
position he does not need help and his people can do it?
You express that better than I. But I sense a tension there
between his desire to be a strong leader for his country and to
create an independent Iraq that is not run by the United
States, at the same time they are just not able to do
everything there.
General Casey. I would say that that is an accurate
description of his desires. He does want to be in charge, not
only of the government but of his security forces, and we are
working with him to enable him to do that. But that is a good
thing. That is a good thing.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions, thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General. It has been a long
morning, but I have a couple of points I would like to raise
with you.
In your written submission you suggest that, in response to
our operations in Baghdad, that the Shia militias would likely
lie low, perhaps at the behest of their colleagues in the
government, who have been urging them to do that, but that the
Sunnis would tend to hunker down in the neighborhoods because
they are connected to the neighborhoods, which raises I think
in my mind at least the question that the effect of our
operations or the perception of our operations at least
initially would be that we are conducting generally attacks
against Sunni forces at the behest of the Shia government,
which could be exploited and, frankly, the opposition has been
much more adroit than we have in the information warfare, as a
way of showing us that we have thrown our lot in with the Shia,
we are attacking the Sunnis.
That I think will harden the resistance in the Sunni
community to reconciliation and it certainly will create a
regional dynamic where Sunni governments, sympathizers in the
region might be compelled to, if not enter, at least to provide
increased support.
Is that a concern of yours?
General Casey. It is a concern and it is something that
both we and the Iraqis are concerned about. That is part of the
prime minister's commitment, is evenhanded enforcement of the
law against anyone who breaks it. So we are working with the
Iraqi planners to ensure that the operations that are conducted
are conducted in a balanced fashion.
Senator Reed. But it seems again, and I tend to agree with
your assessment of the likely at least initial reaction, that
the Shia militia are deliberately avoiding contact with us. If
the Sunnis are in such position where they can--and you and I
have both had conversations with the prime minister and when
you talk about the insurgency it is a Sunni insurgency. The
sectarian violence is something that does not register as
forcefully in his mind as it does in ours. It is a Sunni
insurgency, and we are going after that Sunni insurgency. Those
are literally his words to me.
I think this is potentially a very serious consequence of
this operation. But let me ask you an additional question. Let
us assume there is a period of remission, but the cancer still
exists. The cancer is militias, both Sunni and Shia, with the
capacity to quickly assume the battle. The other part of the
cancer I think is a dysfunctional Iraqi government, not just
its security services but its whole governmental apparatus.
If we do have this period of remission, what do we do? Is
that a justification to withdraw forces, or do we have to
continue to stay there at a very substantial force level
because these capacities still exist? The bottom line is, how
long do you think we will be keeping roughly 140,000 troops in
Iraq, but more precisely 20,000-plus, 30,000 American forces in
Baghdad, maneuver forces? I am not talking about anything but
maneuver forces.
General Casey. I mentioned the metrics earlier about we
have some ways of trying to figure out are we making progress
in Baghdad or are we not. There certainly is a chance that
people will leave town, lie low. What I said in my opening
testimony is for this to be successful the Iraqi security
forces have to emerge as the dominant security force. So in
addition to the security operations, in addition to
establishing these bases that will maintain, allow them to
maintain security force presence in these areas to prevent a
return, it also needs to be worked on the political side to
remove political support from the militia.
So that takes time. Now, my sense is, as I have said
publicly, we will start seeing an impact in 60 days or so, I
think. One way or the other, we will start seeing an impact.
Assuming things continue to progress positively, it will
probably be the end of the summer before Baghdad is at a level
of security that people are more inclined to feel comfortable
with.
What happens with respect to our forces after that, it is
up to somebody else to figure out. But I would look at the
results on the ground and decide what I needed and what I did
not need.
Senator Reed. Just a final comment. One of the unfortunate
aspects of this whole operation is what progress we have made
has been reversed in some cases. I think, as you suggested,
before the Samarra bombing we thought we had made real
progress, that things were going our way, and then it was
quickly and suddenly reversed. That is a concern I have going
forward, that we might get a remission, but unless we make
fundamental changes--and I think what you also suggested is
that--and this goes I think to the focus of the difference
between your approach and those who have criticized you, is
that, at what point will the Iraqi forces be capable of taking
a lead and sustaining that leadership.
In the past you have thought they were and it turned out
that they did not have that capacity, or at least that is the
perception. I think going forward that is going to be one of
the critical issues that we all have to address. You will not
be doing that job. You will be Chief of Staff of the Army. But
I think we will be still considering that issue.
I do not know if you have a final comment, but I thank you
for your patience and your testimony.
General Casey. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. General, I think you have said that a
political settlement is essential if there is going to be an
end to the violence in Iraq; is that fair? Does that represent
your view?
General Casey. Political reconciliation, yes.
Chairman Levin. Right. That is going to require an
agreement on power sharing, resource sharing, autonomy issues,
on the political side.
General Casey. Right.
Chairman Levin. Is that correct?
General Casey. That is where those benchmarks come from.
Chairman Levin. Right.
General Casey. Those benchmarks are the key political
agreements they have to happen.
Chairman Levin. Those are benchmarks, those promises have
been made long ago. There was supposed to be a commission which
would look at proposed changes to the constitution that was
supposed to come into existence 90 days after the assembly took
office; is that not correct?
General Casey. They formed the commission. The commission
is meeting, I am told.
Chairman Levin. Have they followed their benchmark for
reporting to the assembly, do you know?
General Casey. I think my recollection is there is a
benchmark coming up here in January.
Chairman Levin. For reporting to the assembly?
General Casey. I believe so. I think they have 4 months to
come back.
Chairman Levin. I think the original law of Iraq was that
90 days after they took office they were supposed to report
back in 4 months, 120 days after, that they were supposed to
report back. That was not met, is that accurate? They did not
do that in 120 days?
General Casey. They are reporting back I think about 4
months after they formed the commission.
Chairman Levin. But not 4 months after the assembly was
created; is that correct?
General Casey. I think that is right.
Chairman Levin. You have talked about the training and you
made a couple references here, one to the length of time it was
supposed to take to train the Iraqi security forces. You said
this was a 3-year program at one point, but that does not mean
that for each of the troops in the Iraqi security forces it
would be a 3-year training program. It is like a 6-week
training program.
General Casey. Exactly. I am speaking about the
institutions of the military and police forces.
Chairman Levin. All right. But in terms of the numbers that
have been trained and equipped to take the lead, that number is
now at?
General Casey. Over 300,000.
Chairman Levin. 300,000.
General Casey. About 330,000.
Chairman Levin. About half of those are army?
General Casey. 135,000 army, 190,000 police.
Chairman Levin. So 135,000 army are now trained and
equipped and 190,000 police are now trained and equipped?
General Casey. We have trained 135,000 army soldiers and
equipped them. Okay, now, of that group--both army and police,
there have been 26,000 Iraqi security forces that we have
trained that are killed or wounded to the point where they
cannot work.
Chairman Levin. So there is 130,000 roughly army that have
been----
General Casey. Been through the country.
Chairman Levin. Through our program.
General Casey. Right.
Chairman Levin. Trained, equipped, and ready to take the
lead, theoretically?
General Casey. No.
Chairman Levin. No?
General Casey. Three steps. Trained and equipped: they are
formed, they are given their uniforms, they are organized into
units, and they have had some basic level of training, step
one. Step two, in the lead: They begin to function with our
transition teams and they grow as units so that they get to the
point where they can do counterinsurgency operations with our
support. Step three: independence.
Chairman Levin. Now, step two; how many of the 135,000 have
finished step two?
General Casey. We look at units.
Chairman Levin. How many units?
General Casey. Right now, 8 out of 10 divisions are in the
lead. I want to say 30 out of 36 brigades, and probably 90 or
so of the 112 battalions are in the lead.
Chairman Levin. So now translate that into people? Roughly
how many of the 135,000 are in those units you just described
that are in the lead, roughly?
General Casey. Right. What I will do is I will take off the
air force and the navy, and so I would say probably around
120,000.
Chairman Levin. 120,000, okay.
General Casey. That is a SWAG, but----
Chairman Levin. No, that is fine.
You have indicated that the piece of paper which was
delivered by Mr. Maliki to our President in Amman probably did
not say that they needed American troops; they probably would
have said they needed additional or they needed troops; is that
correct?
General Casey. That is my recollection.
Chairman Levin. Why would he not have used those troops
that you just referred to that were trained and equipped to do
the Baghdad job? Or did he, or do you not know?
General Casey. No, he did. But the rest of the country
still requires security forces, and we are drawing----
Chairman Levin. But the rest of the country is pacified
more. You said the big problem is Baghdad. Why would he not
move enough troops to Baghdad to do what needs to be done in
Baghdad since the rest of the country is calmer?
General Casey. He is doing that, and he has moved two
brigades, moving another brigade from the west, from the north,
into Baghdad.
Chairman Levin. So how many troops of his would then be in
Baghdad after he makes the move?
General Casey. Of his?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
General Casey. Total I would say somewhere between 60,000
and 70,000.
Chairman Levin. Which leaves about another how many, 60,000
that are trained and equipped and able to take the lead?
General Casey. Armed forces throughout the rest of the
country?
Chairman Levin. Right.
General Casey. Ballpark.
Chairman Levin. What we are going to do is request the
White House to tell us what apparently you are not sure of,
which is whether Maliki was more specific as to whether he
wanted or did not want American troops to be part of the
Baghdad operation. You said you think he just said troops in
that piece of paper that he dropped----
General Casey. But I think I also said that he leans toward
not wanting to have to bring in more coalition forces, and when
we have gone to him in this particular case with his commanders
and the ministers and said, this is what we need for this
mission, he has said okay.
Chairman Levin. This is what we need.
General Casey. Right.
Chairman Levin. This is what we need. What America needs?
General Casey. We collectively, Iraqis and coalition
forces, three Iraqi, two coalition.
Chairman Levin. Then he accepted that?
General Casey. He accepted that.
Chairman Levin. But that was our proposal?
General Casey. That was a joint proposal from the Iraqi
ministers and us.
Chairman Levin. You got together with the Iraqi ministers
and then went to the prime minister and made a statement to him
that, we believe this mission requires coalition forces?
General Casey. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. Would you say the Iraqi military that were
involved in the statement to the prime minister were persuaded
of that? Did they initiate the idea or did we initiate the
idea?
General Casey. It came out of our planning, but they
accepted and even endorsed the idea.
Chairman Levin. So it came out of our--I will not repeat
what you said. I think that addresses the question in an
adequate way.
My time is up. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. No, thank you.
Chairman Levin. I think the only other question that I
have----
General Casey. Do I have Dan Cox to thank for all these
questions? [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. No. No, he shares the load. [Laughter.]
Senator Sessions. While you are looking----
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Senator Sessions. To follow up now on our soldiers and what
they have there, you have issued orders--I believe it is you--
that Humvees and vehicles should not be outside protected areas
that are not up-armored to specifications; is that correct?
General Casey. That is correct, sir.
Senator Sessions. Is any soldier being sent out on patrol
or duty without kevlar, the vests that they have, the equipment
that they are authorized and expected to have?
General Casey. I hope not.
Senator Sessions. That would be against policy and
procedure?
General Casey. Absolutely.
Senator Sessions. You believe you have in theater
sufficient equipment and that day after day when they are out
there doing their duty they have the specified equipment,
protective gear, and that kind of thing? I guess I want to say
to American mothers and fathers and family members, we keep
hearing this talk about shortage of equipment. Can you tell us,
are they not pretty well-equipped?
General Casey. They are very well-equipped. The discussion
today about this report about a lack of equipment is not
something that I have heard as I have gone out and visited the
soldiers, and I rarely if ever get comments from soldiers about
things they do not have, and I ask.
Senator Sessions. If you become Chief of Staff, do you
understand it is your responsibility to make sure that
equipment--ultimately it is your responsibility to see that
equipment gets to the soldier in the field so that General
Petraeus or whoever is commanding them can have it if they need
it?
General Casey. I do.
Senator Sessions. You will accept that responsibility?
General Casey. I go after it hard.
Senator Sessions. I know we have shortages here and there,
but I do believe that when I have been there that the equipment
is there and we have done a pretty darn good job of doing it in
a very distant, difficult land.
General Casey. I think so, too.
Chairman Levin. This is a question which Senator Reed
raised and I want to just press you a little bit harder on it.
That has to do with the militias going underground, which
apparently they are going to do, and taking their arms with
them. Is that troubling for you?
General Casey. It is something we have to watch. As I said,
before we go the militias are going to have to be dealt with,
and we need to deal with them in a security way and in a
political way. But at the end of the day the Iraqi security
forces have to be the dominant force in Iraq, and right now
they are not, without our help.
Chairman Levin. Can they be dealt with without dealing with
the political issues which are there?
General Casey. No. They can, but it would be much more
violent.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that there is usefulness to
political pressure being placed on the Iraqi leaders to reach
settlements?
General Casey. Absolutely. But if I could comment on that,
it is not just Prime Minister Maliki that people need to
pressure. There is a political base in the United Alliance that
is very responsible for the policies that he is following. So
pressure along a range of leaders from Iraq is in my view much
more productive than just squeezing the prime minister.
Chairman Levin. No, I agree. That is why I always say Iraqi
political leaders, not just the prime minister. But that is a
necessary ingredient if there is going to be a solution in your
opinion?
General Casey. It is. The other thing that I think it was
useful in pushing Iraqi leaders toward a reconciliation, is the
discussion about accountability. Saddam Hussein was just hung
for his crimes against the people of Iraq. But thousands of
Iraqis have died over the past year at the hands of death
squads. There has to be an accountability for that, too, and I
think the Iraqi political leaders need to understand that.
Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions, I think, has focused on
what is essential if there is going to be accountability, which
is that there not be a catch and release program. We thank him
for his leadership in this area. He has really focused on
something that is important in terms of accountability and
justice being dispensed in Iraq.
General, unless there are additional questions, we will
stand adjourned. We thank you for your stamina. I know it is
nothing probably in terms of your experience wearing that
uniform; this stamina is probably pretty mild, at least in
terms of how much time you sat there. But in any event, we
thank you for your service and we thank again your family.
General Casey. Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:34 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to GEN George W. Casey, Jr.,
USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follows:]
Questions and Responses
DEFENSE REFORMS
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD)
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). These
reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
education and in the execution of military operations.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved our ability to
conduct joint operations. I have no specific recommendations for
modifying the act itself.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. There is good reason to consider the development of
Goldwater-Nichols Act-like legislation to delineate roles and
responsibilities of Federal agencies in support of contingency
operations.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the chiefs of staff under
the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and
processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
Answer. Yes.
RELATIONSHIPS
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chief of Staff
of the Army to the following offices:
Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as the head of DOD and the
principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to DOD,
issues guidance and direction to the military departments. If
confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense and his
Deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the
Army in accordance with such directives. As a member of the JCS, I will
serve as a military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, as
appropriate. I will cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense to
ensure that the Army properly implements the policies established by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In coordination with the
Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Secretary of Defense
in articulating the views of the Army.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under
Secretaries perform responsibilities that require them, from time to
time, to issue guidance--and in the case of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direction--to the
military departments. If confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary
of the Army, I will communicate with the Under Secretaries in
articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with them to
ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance
and direction issued by OSD.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense have functional
responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of
guidance to the military departments. If confirmed, I will, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Army, communicate with the
Assistant Secretaries of Defense in articulating the views of the Army.
I will cooperate fully with them to ensure that the Army is
administered in accordance with guidance promulgated by OSD.
Question. The Chairman of JCS.
Answer. The Chairman of JCS is the principal military adviser to
the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of
Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman plans the
strategic direction and contingency operations of the Armed Forces;
advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets
identified by the commanders of the combatant commands; develops
doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; reports on
assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces;
provides for representation of the United States on the Military Staff
Committee of the United Nations; and performs such other duties as may
be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.
In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the
Chief of Staff of the Army assists the Chairman in providing military
advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, as a member of JCS, it would be my
duty to provide frank and timely advice and opinions to the Chairman to
assist him in his performance of these responsibilities. If confirmed,
in addition, upon request, I will as a member of JCS provide my
individual military advice to the President, the National Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense. As appropriate, I will provide
advice in addition to or in disagreement with that of the Chairman. I
will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with
the Chairman and will communicate directly and openly with him on
policy matters involving the Army and the Armed Forces as a whole.
Question. The Vice Chairman of JCS.
Answer. The Vice Chairman of JCS assists the Chairman in providing
military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. If
confirmed as a member of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, it would be my
duty to ensure that the Vice Chairman is provided my frank views and
opinions to assist him in his performance of his responsibilities.
Question. The Secretary of the Army.
Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the
Army would be close, direct, and supportive. My responsibilities would
also involve communicating the Army Staff's plans to the Secretary of
the Army and supervising the implementation of the Secretary's
decisions through the Army Staff and Army commands and agencies. In
this capacity, my actions would be subject to the authority, direction,
and control of the Secretary of the Army. In my capacity as a member of
JCS, I would also be responsible for appropriately informing the
Secretary of the Army about conclusions reached by JCS and about
significant military operations, to the extent such action does not
impair independence in the performance of duties as member of JCS. I
anticipate that I would at all times work closely and in concert with
the Secretary of the Army to establish the best policies for the Army
in light of national interests.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Army.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's
principal civilian assistant and performs such duties and exercises
such powers as the Secretary of the Army prescribes. His
responsibilities require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and
direction to the Army Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the
Secretary of the Army, and to the Under Secretary through the Secretary
of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such
directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary of the Army
to ensure that the policies established by the Office of the Secretary
of the Army are properly implemented. I will communicate openly and
directly with the Under Secretary of the Army in articulating the views
of the Army Staff, Army commands, and Army agencies.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional
responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of
guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I
will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each
of the Assistant Secretaries to foster an environment of cooperative
teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we deal
together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning
requirements facing the Army.
Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the
Department of the Army. His duties include coordinating legal and
policy advice to all members of the Department regarding matters of
interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the
Army on any legal questions or procedures other than military justice
matters assigned to The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I will
establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the
General Counsel to assist him in the performance of these important
duties.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General serves as the Chief of Staff's
principal legal advisor. He provides legal advice concerning the
organization, powers, duties, functions and administrative procedures
of the Army. The Judge Advocate General also advises the Chief of Staff
on military justice matters, environmental law, international law
issues arising from deployment of U.S. forces overseas and
implementation of the DOD Law of War Program. The Chief of Staff does
not appoint The Judge Advocate General, and does not have the personal
authority to remove him. This enables the The Judge Advocate General to
provide independent legal advice to the Chief of Staff.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the other Services.
Answer. If confirmed, as a member of JCS, it would be my duty to
engage in frank and timely exchanges of advice and opinions with my
fellow Service Chiefs in their roles as members of JCS. I look forward
to developing strong working relationships with these colleagues, many
of whom I know from previous service.
Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant
commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary of Defense, and are directly responsible to
the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of their commands to
carry out missions assigned to them. As directed by the Secretary of
Defense, the military department secretaries assign all forces under
their jurisdiction, except those forces necessary to perform the
missions of the military departments, to the combatant commands to
perform missions assigned to those commands. In addition, subject to
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and
the authority of combatant commanders under title 10, U.C.S., section
164(c), the military department secretaries are responsible for
administering and supporting the forces that they assign to a combatant
command. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the combatant
commanders in performing these administrative and support
responsibilities. I will establish close, professional relationships
with the combatant commanders and communicate directly and openly with
them on matters involving the Department of the Army and Army forces
and personnel assigned to or supporting these commands.
QUALIFICATIONS
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have a fundamental grounding and practical experience in
Army, joint, and coalition organizations from the tactical through the
strategic level. I spent 21 years in the Army learning my craft in
tactical organizations or tactically-focused schooling including one-
third of that time in command of soldiers and numerous training and
operational deployments. I served in a variety of command and staff
positions where I gained experience in strategic and combined
operations including a tour as a military observer in the United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem, a tour of duty in
the Army's Office of Legislative Liaison, service on Army, Joint Forces
Command, and the Joint Staffs, and as Commander of the Multinational
Force Iraq deployed in Iraq for the last 30 months. I also served as
the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, and I believe this has provided me broad
knowledge, experience, and insight into the business of running the
Army in support of the requirements of the national security strategy.
In particular my tour of duty in Iraq has caused me to recognize the
quality of our service men and women and the need to focus on them and
their families if we are to sustain the magnificent force we have
today.
MAJOR CHALLENGES
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. Growing the Army by 65,000 over 5 years in a manner that
balances current warfighting requirements, responsible allocation of
resources, and future strategic needs.
Recruiting and retaining quality soldiers, civilians,
and families.
Resetting units, equipment, and personnel following
deployment so they can respond to strategic requirements as
rapidly as possible.
Maintaining readiness appropriate to mission
requirements while continuing to fight a war on terror.
Balancing future investment strategies with resource
realities.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, my first priority will be to get out and
assess the situation first-hand by talking to soldiers, civilians, and
families as well as the combatant commanders they serve.
My second priority will be to develop effective plans to maintain
our position as the finest Army in the world in a manner consistent
with future requirements and resources. I intend to work closely with
appropriate agencies in both executive and legislative branches to
develop and execute these plans.
MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?
Answer. Management of an Army at war while preparing that Army for
the long-term challenges of the global war on terror, as well as for
as-yet unforeseen requirements in service to the Nation in the future.
Question. What management actions and time lines would you
establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Joint
Chiefs, the Secretary of the Army and, through him, the Secretary of
Defense to quickly develop balanced and realistic approaches to solving
these problems.
VISION FOR THE FUTURE
Question. What is your vision for the Army of the future?
Answer. The current Army Vision is well-accepted and relevant. If
confirmed, I intend to assess the current state of the Army and its
expected operating environment in the future; identify major issues,
challenges, and opportunities; assess existing plans and programs; and
confirm if current initiatives conform to the proper strategic
direction. Where I believe change is warranted, I will, in consultation
with the Secretary of the Army, propose refinement and/or resource
reallocation.
Question. What roles do you believe the Army should play in
contingency, humanitarian, and peace operations?
Answer. The Army provides relevant and ready forces to the
combatant commanders and it develops soldiers, leaders, equipment, and
organizations for the future. To do this the Army must be resourced
appropriately to accomplish these tasks consistent with the strategic
direction of the Nation's civilian leadership.
Question. Do you see any unnecessary redundancy between Army and
Marine Corps ground combat forces, particularly between Army light
divisions and Marine Corps divisions?
Answer. No. The entire DOD force structure must be looked at in
terms of combatant commander requirements. Infantry Brigade Combat
Teams (IBCTs) provide capabilities as unique to the Army as U.S. Marine
Corps formations do for the Marines. Some IBCTs are specially trained
in airborne operations, others through habitual association with
assault helicopter organizations, are specially trained for air assault
operations. At the same time, U.S. Marine Corps forces are specially
trained for amphibious operations.
ARMY ROLE IN THE JOINT FORCE
Question. The U.S. military fights as a joint force and strives to
achieve realistic training for military operations. The Army provides
trained and equipped forces for joint military operations.
How do you believe the Army can best contribute to improved joint
military capabilities while preserving its service unique capabilities
and culture?
Answer. The Army exists to serve the American people, to protect
vital national interests, and to fulfill national military obligations.
The Army's title 10 responsibility to the Nation is to provide
responsive and ready land power--the best manned, trained, equipped,
and led forces this Nation can produce--to combatant commanders in
support of national strategies. It is also charged with providing
combat enabling capabilities and support to facilitate the other
Services to accomplish their missions. The Army brings to the fight
several capabilities to improve joint warfighting effectiveness.
First and foremost, the Army deploys and employs Army soldiers--
boots-on-the-ground (BOG)--a clear demonstration of our Nation's
resolve to protect and defend its national interests and protect the
interests of our allies. Over the past 4 years, the Army has become
more expeditionary, changing from its traditional divisional structure
to a modular brigade-based force. This change has been extraordinary;
particularly given the global force demand and the fact that we have
essentially been developing and institutionalizing these capabilities
while we are at war. This change is producing a rapidly deployable,
power projection Army that is part of a joint team. It is of
unprecedented campaign quality, with agile and adaptive leaders that
are comfortable executing throughout the entire spectrum of conflict.
The Army is able to achieve decisive outcomes across the full spectrum
of operations. It is characterized by strategic agility, mobility,
speed, survivability, lethality, sustainability, and network enabled
situation awareness and connectivity. Recent operations validate that
the Army either possesses the right capabilities, or is developing the
right capabilities and capacities, to complement and balance the joint
force. The Army is forward looking--a ``learning'' and adaptive
organization that is focused on producing future capabilities to
support Joint Force Commanders. Army capabilities ensure tactical and
operational networked interoperability with the U.S. Marine Corps, as
well as the interdependence on seamless air and naval fires and joint
close air support. Army logistics systems have and will continue to
provide superb campaign quality support to multiple services. Our
future force combat systems are being designed to maximize
interdependencies and interoperability requirements based on lessons
learned and future operating concepts developed by the Joint Planning
Community. Army systems and capabilities will enable us to seamlessly
integrate with other Services to address traditional, irregular,
catastrophic, and disruptive threats to our Nation and achieve desired
outcomes.
Our modular formations provide the joint force with the right mix
of light, medium and heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) as well as the
key enabling forces. The Army will also continue to invest heavily in
Special Forces, and is aggressively providing these forces today to
joint commanders for worldwide employment. Army transformation improves
the capabilities of soldiers engaged in the long war against terrorism
and improves the capability of the joint force to defend the homeland,
deter conflict in critical regions, respond promptly to small-scale
contingencies, and swiftly defeat the enemy in major combat
operations--all designed to support the needs of the combatant
commanders and our Nation.
JOINT EXPERIMENTATION
Question. The Army has conducted a wide range of experiments to
identify the path forward toward a digitized force, but has done much
less with regard to transformation to the Objective Force. In the arena
of joint experimentation, while the Army has participated in a few
joint experimentation activities over the last couple years, it is
clear that more joint experimentation is necessary to meet future
operational challenges.
What is your view of the need for joint experimentation and how do
you see the Army participating in future joint experimentation
activities as we move further into the 21st century?
Answer. There is no question as to the need for joint
experimentation; our National Security Strategy clearly establishes our
method of employing coherently joint forces to achieve our security
objectives. The Army fully engages with the U.S. Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM) in the planning, development, execution, and assessment of
experiments--examples include the cosponsored Unified Quest wargame as
well as the Urban Resolve series of experiments. In the latter case,
the Army recently embedded our major annual concept development
experiment--Omni Fusion--within JFCOM's Urban Resolve experiment. We
also devote significant effort to conduct even our smaller scale
experiments with a robust joint context. The Army also partners with
JFCOM in the area of interagency and multinational experimentation. In
support of the latter, we have developed or are developing project
arrangements with our key multinational partners to enable full
participation in our experimentation programs.
Question. Do you believe that Army experimentation has been
sufficient in support of transformation to the Objective Force?
Answer. Yes, the Army has conducted a great deal of experimentation
over the last several years. These include: technical prototype
experiments such as the C\4\ISR On the Move Test Bed annual experiments
and a vast array of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations; field
experiments such as the Air Assault Expeditionary Force and those
conducted by the Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab; large scale live,
virtual, and constructive experiments, specifically, the annual OMNI
Fusion experiments. The Army continues to increase its experimentation
capabilities as we stand up our latest experimentation asset, the Army
Evaluation Task Force, which will be available for conducting future
FCS experiments.
MISSILE DEFENSE
Question. Do you consider missile defense to be one of the Army's
core missions?
Answer. Yes, I consider missile defense to be one of the Army's
core missions and competencies--as it has been for 51 years. As the
world's preeminent land power, providing land-based missile defense to
the homeland, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies is an
essential core capability the Army provides our Nation. It supports the
President's direction in NSPD-23. The Army presently operates two
ballistic missile defense capabilities--the Patriot Advance Capability-
3 system and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system--and we will
continue to expand our role as additional capabilities are deployed
such as the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system.
Question. What is your view of the proper relationship between the
Army and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)?
Answer. I view the relationship between the Army and the MDA as a
critical partnership in a unique mission area in the defense of our
Nation. The Army, through our Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Army Service
Component Command, and in coordination with STRATCOM, plays a key role
in representing the warfighters' missile defense required capabilities
to the MDA. This input helps to define and frame the missile defense
capabilities that the defense of our homeland, our deployed forces, our
friends, and allies require. In general, the MDA should be a supporting
agency to each of the Services.
Question. What do you think the Army's responsibilities are or
should be with respect to development, procurement, and operation of
missile defense systems?
Answer. The Army provides land warfighting capabilities, including
force and asset protection, to the combatant commanders. These enduring
responsibilities result in the Army serving as a principal contributor
to the development, procurement, doctrine, operational integration,
execution, and assessment of land-based missile defense capabilities.
The Army has a strong history over the past half century of assisting
in the development of missile defense technologies and systems
including the current Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) used as the
interceptor on the currently fielded Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs)
and the Multiple-Kill Vehicle that will replace the EKV on the GBIs
when fielded.
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes
the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?
Answer. As articulated by the President of the United States, there
are a number of areas that did not turn out as envisioned.
Question. There was the feeling that Iraqi elections would bring a
sense of nationalism for all of the population and would bring the
Iraqi's together. Unfortunately, the results seem to have promoted
increased sectarian divisions within the country instead.
We underestimated the ability of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Sunni
insurgents to provoke sectarian conflict and failed to preempt the
attack against the Golden Mosque in Samarra.
We thought that as more Iraqi security forces (ISFs) were trained
and equipped, we would be able to gradually shift ever increasing
security responsibilities to them and thus reduce our forces
proportionately. This is occurring slower than we originally projected.
We were slow to anticipate the extent of the radical Shia death
squads.
We did not have enough Iraqi and coalition forces to continue to
secure neighborhoods that had been previously cleared of terrorists and
insurgents.
We allowed too many restrictions to be placed upon our forces.
Which are still having an impact?
Answer. The impact focused efforts by both Shia death squads and
AQI and Sunni insurgents to provoke sectarian violence is still being
felt in the greater Baghdad area. The Prime Minister's recent
commitments to provide additional ISFs, enforce the law against all
violators, not to allow safe havens, and to eliminate political
interference should ensure the conditions exist to successfully provide
security for the capital while reducing sectarian violence.
Question. You have said that 20th century counterinsurgency efforts
typically lasted 9 years.
Do you believe the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq could last as
long as 9 years? Could it last even longer?
Answer. Counterinsurgency is an extremely complex form of warfare
that, at its core, is a struggle for the support of the population.
Progress is measured by effects, not time. I agree that the
counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq will continue for some time.
``SURGE'' OF U.S. TROOPS IN IRAQ
Question. What is your best estimate of how much the surge in
troops the President has proposed is going to cost the Army during
fiscal year 2007?
Answer. I understand that Army commands and supporting agencies are
working now to refine initial estimates. Several major factors are
still in play, including additional equipment requirements and final
determination of the support force mix, that may be needed to support
additional combat brigades. It will also be necessary to augment
theater support capabilities to provide for the increased Army and
Marine Corps presence.
Question. Can the Army deploy an additional five brigades to Iraq
with only about 21,000 additional people, or will additional military,
civilian, or contractor support personnel be required on top of the
direct increase of 21,000 military personnel?
Answer. BCTs are designed to deploy and join an existing command
and control structure already established for employment in a theater
of war. This is the case with the five BCTs committed for the force
increase in Iraq. However, given the nature of the counterinsurgency
mission, there are certain additional combat support and combat service
support capabilities required to enable fully the commitment of the
additional brigades. These capabilities include logistical enablers,
intelligence assets, military police, and a command/control node. Based
on the current mature base of support already in theater, additional
civilian and contractor personnel required should be minimal.
Question. Given the Army's state of readiness, how long do you
believe the increased troop levels and operations tempo can be
sustained?
Answer. Over the past 4 years the troop levels in Iraq have varied
based on conditions on the ground, and we have experienced surge
periods before. In December 2004, 20 BCTs provided enhanced security
for national elections and again in November 2005, when 19 BCTs enabled
the final round of national elections. The current effort to provide
five additional BCTs and enablers from the Army represents an
additional conditions-based force increase. This effort cannot be
indefinitely sustained without increased resources and policy support.
Question. Have you done any planning for the redeployment from Iraq
of U.S. forces beyond the surge?
Answer. I believe the Army can sustain the increased force levels
in Iraq through the remainder of this fiscal year. We've extended
several units in Iraq beyond their scheduled rotation dates and we've
returned units to Iraq with less than 12 months at home station in
order to meet the requirements on the ground. However, this pace exacts
a toll on the force--on equipment, on soldiers, and on their families.
As the President announced, an end strength increase will help; we'll
be able to field additional BCTs over time. Additionally, we'll
continually review and adjust our force generation model to ensure no
soldier deploys without the proper training and equipment. The Reserve
component (RC) is invaluable as a part of the total force, and I
believe recent policy changes on mobilization timelines will also
enhance overall readiness.
Question. What are the stages you would envision in such a
redeployment?
Answer. When conditions permit and requirements call for fewer
BCTs, we would adjust the force flow to redeploy those units whose
tours had been extended, while meeting BOG durations (of 1 year) for
other deployed units. We would also support dwell times (of 1 year) for
units available to deploy from continental United States (CONUS) back
into Iraq. I would additionally make a priority of either keeping a
brigade in a Reserve status in Kuwait or keeping a brigade in a
heightened alert status, prepared to deploy from CONUS, which would
give the commander the flexibility needed to address an unexpected
escalation of violence. If the requirement for fewer brigades came to
pass, we would redeploy forces, or hold forces in CONUS, until we
achieved the required number of brigades needed in Iraq. We would also
reduce in an appropriate manner combat support, combat service support,
headquarters strengths, and contractors. We would shrink our basing
footprint to meet the needs of the operational commander. All of this
would be a deliberate process synchronized with the transfer of
security responsibility to the Iraqis.
Question. In testimony on January 23, Lieutenant General David
Petraeus, nominated to become Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq,
said that he would prefer to accelerate the flow of the five additional
combat brigades to Iraq as quickly as possible. The current plan calls
for the deployment of roughly one brigade per month through May.
Do you believe that this acceleration of the flow is practicable?
By how much can it reasonably be accelerated?
Answer. The Army has rotated forces into the Central Command
(CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) for the past 5 years.
Infrastructure and procedures in the AOR, enhanced over time, enable
the timely deployment of forces. The Army continuously plans force
rotation and prepares next to deploy forces. As such, the BCTs
designated to deploy this spring have been preparing for the past 8 to
10 months and are approaching full mission readiness. Accelerating the
deployment of these BCTs decreases preparation and training time by 45
to 60 days. As we accelerate, we will not send soldiers without proper
training and the best equipment possible. Even with the short timeframe
to execute this mission, the Army will be able to execute this
reinforcement; and all of the BCTs will receive required training and
equipment prior to employment in theater. Further, no accelerated BCT
will fall below a 1:1 deployment to dwell ratio. The current schedule
of accelerated deployments is feasible and the Army today is on track
to meet the required arrival dates established by the theater commander
for all four remaining BCTs. The theater commander will decide on any
new requirement to further accelerate the force flow. The current plan
of deployments represents the most practicable acceleration. The lead
time required to provide each BCT with an appropriate mission rehearsal
exercise (MRE) precludes deploying faster without increasing risk. U.S.
Army Forces Command continues to refine training and equipping
schedules to maximize unit readiness for deployment and
counterinsurgency operations.
Question. What are the most acute manning, training, equipping, and
transportation problems that you see in trying to accelerate the
deployment of all five brigades?
Answer. All five BCTs will deploy manned, trained, and equipped to
perform their mission. The Army will not deploy any BCTs that are not
ready for combat. The Army will deploy all five brigades fully manned.
All five BCTs will be trained to perform their assigned mission. The
greatest training challenge is available training time prior to
deployment. The Army is accelerating the execution of some of the MREs.
The Army will use a combination of organic unit equipment, TPE, APS
stocks, and cross-leveling to equip the deploying BCTs. All will be
equipped to perform their mission before they enter Iraq. The most
acute equipping challenge is add-on armor for medium and heavy tactical
wheeled vehicles. Units will cross-level as an interim solution until
new production can fill the complete requirement. If I am confirmed, I
will work to ensure that no soldier deploys to Iraq without adequate
force protection equipment. The increased demand for operational
equipment will have a longer-term impact on the Army's equipment
retrograde and reset program.
Question. In your view, could accelerating the ``surge'' of forces
reduce our leverage with the Iraqi leaders to keep their military,
political, and economic commitments?
Answer. No, it should not. The Government of Iraq is eager to
assume greater security responsibility from the coalition and
understands the need to make military, political, and economic gains
during this period to maintain positive momentum and continue the
decrease in violence. The increased flexibility to support Iraqi led
stability operations provided by the increased force level of U.S.
forces can help establish the conditions necessary for the political
process to go forward.
Question. Do you believe that quelling the current level of
violence is a necessary condition for a political solution in Iraq?
Answer. Reducing the levels of sectarian violence in the capital is
key to our efforts to stabilize Iraq. The central challenge facing us
is how we can best apply all of the elements of power to break the
cycle of sectarian violence; this must be resolved for us to succeed.
Reduction in violence will set the conditions for reconciliation to
occur which will, in turn, set the stage for transition of security
responsibility to the Government of Iraq and the adaptation of
coalition presence within the country.
Question. Do you believe that it is feasible for current and
projected U.S. forces in Iraq, in conjunction with available Iraqi
forces, to achieve this objective?
Answer. I believe this plan can work. I believe the ISFs, in
conjunction with U.S forces assistance, can achieve stability in Iraq.
The increase in U.S. forces is a key piece of our new strategy to
secure Baghdad. These additional forces will work alongside the ISF to
help the Iraqis secure neighborhoods, protect the local population, and
ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the
security that Baghdad needs for recovery and reconciliation.
Additionally, Prime Minister Maliki has given us his pledge that
political or sectarian interference will not limit Iraqi and American
forces in pursuing all those who break the law.
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
Question. For more than 2 years, you have served as Commander,
Multi-National Forces-Iraq. Prime Minister Maliki asserted that U.S.
refusal to provide the ISFs with weapons and equipment hurt their
ability to secure Baghdad.
Do you agree with the Prime Minister's assertion?
Answer. No, and we have recently briefed him on the status of
equipping his forces. We've entered into an agreement on the size,
equipment, and capabilities of the ISF with each of Iraq's three
governments and met the obligations consistent with those agreements.
We have adequately trained and equipped a 325,000-man security force
which I believe will become capable of defending Iraq from internal
threats.
Question. What is your view of the state of training and equipping
of ISFs and whether they have what they need to meet the military
commitments of the Iraqi leaders?
Answer. The objective counterinsurgency and civil security forces
are adequately sized, balanced, and equipped to counter Iraq's internal
threat with our support. With continued training and experience they
will be capable of independent counterinsurgency operations.
Question. What concerns, if any, do you have about the ability of
those units to participate in the execution of the new Baghdad security
plan?
Answer. The ISF have demonstrated their increasing capability at
the tactical level; however, the synchronization of unit movements, the
application of enablers such as aviation and intelligence systems, and
the ability to work the full spectrum required to include civil-
military operations require additional training. I remain concerned
about the reliability of some of the local and national police. We will
watch them carefully.
Question. The Iraqi government has agreed to send an additional
three Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad, two of which will apparently be
predominately Kurdish.
What is your understanding of why Kurdish units were selected?
Answer. The forces assigned to each/any operational area, including
Baghdad, are determined by a deliberate planning/estimate process. The
level of forces currently identified for operations in Baghdad are
assessed as being what is required for the tasks, when balanced,
militarily and politically, against the need for forces elsewhere
within Iraq. This decision is made by the Prime Minister (and Commander
in Chief) informed by his principal advisors; both Iraqi and coalition.
Question. Do you believe that these units have a greater loyalty to
the central government than other units?
Answer. I believe these units are loyal to the central government.
Question. How do you believe Sunni or Shia Arabs are likely to
react to Kurdish troops in their neighborhoods?
Answer. All parties will accept the use of Kurdish forces. In the
end, if stability is enhanced, the central government will be seen as
providing a secure environment, and this is what all sides desire.
Question. How do you believe the Mahdi Army is likely to react to
Kurdish troops entering Sadr City?
Answer. It is not clear Kurdish units will enter Sadr City as part
of the Baghdad security plan. If they were to do so, the reaction in
Sadr City would likely vary, depending upon the perception of the
mission, size and composition of forces used, duration of operations,
and reaction to the political situation of the moment.
Question. What is your understanding of where Iraqi brigades that
are predominantly Sunni or Shia are likely to be deployed--among their
own sect or the other? What do you see as the implications either way?
Answer. The forces that will be employed in Baghdad are a mixture
of ethnic groups and religious sects. It is one of the tenets of the
Baghdad security plan that ISF in general must gain the trust and
confidence of the Iraqi people. Therefore, it is the intention of
Lieutenant Aboud to intermingle all components of the ISF so that
together they can be seen as a positive force in providing security.
Question. The performance of the Iraqi government has been uneven.
The new way forward calls for the ISFs to do more, especially in
Baghdad.
Are you personally confident that the ISFs can meet this challenge?
Answer. I believe the ISF can meet this challenge with our support.
Question. Do you believe Prime Minister Maliki can achieve the
benchmarks that the President has discussed? Have you seen those
benchmarks? If so, please describe them for the committee?
Answer. I believe that Prime Minister Maliki will sincerely and
aggressively try to achieve the benchmarks. He has also made
commitments to ensure the ISF and coalition have the freedoms of action
and authority to accomplish their mission.
1. Military commander given all authorities to execute his
plan.
2. No political interference in security.
3. No militia controlling local security.
4. Even handed enforcement of the law.
5. No safe havens.
Question. In October 2006, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi
Reconstruction released three reports. One found that nearly one of
every 25 weapons the U.S. military bought for ISFs was missing. A
second report found that ``significant challenges remain that put at
risk'' the U.S. military's goal of transferring all logistics
operations to the Iraqi defense ministry by the end of 2007.
Are you familiar with these reports?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What actions if any have you taken in response to their
findings?
Answer. We have had a very positive and productive relationship
with many organizations that have helped us assess the status of the
train and equip mission to include the Government Accountability
Office, SIGIR, and DOD Inspector General. In every case, the
recommendations of these groups have been acted upon, and
accountability continues to improve. We believe that it is both our
aspiration and the aspiration of the MoD and MoI to be largely self-
reliant in logistics by the end of 2007 and the 2007 ISF budget is
adequate to the task; however, our ability to achieve that is assessed
monthly and adapted as necessary.
U.S. OPERATIONS WITH ISFS
Question. What is your understanding of the command and control
relationships between American and Iraqi forces in the new Baghdad
security plan?
Answer. U.S. forces will operate under U.S. command and support ISF
operations in each of the nine districts of Baghdad. They will work
closely with the sector brigade commander who will have command of all
ISFs in that sector.
Question. Do you have any concerns about these relationships?
Answer. I believe these relationships are adequate but will require
close coordination and liaison. The fact that the majority of forces
operating in Baghdad have been working together for sometime should
assist these relationships. In order to mitigate against potential
problems close liaison will be required at all levels of command.
Question. The new Baghdad security plan apparently envisions
American units being co-located with Iraqi units spread out over
approximately 30 mini-bases throughout Baghdad.
What is your understanding of how those forces and the forces which
will have to resupply them on a daily basis will be protected?
Answer. Under the Baghdad security plan, coalition forces will
establish Joint Security Stations with the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police,
and the Iraqi National Police. The stations are strategically
positioned throughout the city to accommodate dispersed, joint patrols,
and to provide a CENTCOM and control hub. The establishment of Joint
Security Stations includes enhancing force protection and developing
essential sustainment and life support packages at each Joint Security
Station. Many of the Joint Security Stations are located at existing
Iraqi Police Stations. Force protection enhancements will include
improvements such as entry control points, external barriers to
redirect traffic flows and/or reinforce perimeters, increased
protection from indirect fires, and guard posts/towers where required.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend in the size,
structure, number, or operating procedures for U.S. forces embedded
with ISFs?
Answer. There is unquestionable linkage between ISF progression and
the embedded Transition Team program. The current Transition Team size
is insufficient to permit an optimum level of advisement to their
respective ISF unit. In recognition of this, Multi-National Forces-Iraq
has initiated the enhancement of transition teams to increase their
effectiveness while balancing other operational requirements. Based on
conditions within each MND's AOR, primarily relating to the levels of
violence and ISF capacity for independent operations, transition teams
are undergoing enhancement.
THE MILITIAS AND THE INSURGENTS
Question. What are your views on how the Iraqi government should
confront the militias?
Answer. There are numerous militias in Iraq; each has its own goals
and motivations. The Iraqi government must make clear that armed groups
operating outside the law will not be tolerated. As some militia
members will not be interested in reconciling with the Iraqi
government, the ISFs will have to deal with them militarily or treat
them as criminal elements. In order to deal effectively with these
illegal armed groups, the Iraqi government should also engage in
substantive dialogue with militia leaders in order to identify their
motivations and concerns. The Iraqi government must also provide for
militia members in order that they might support their families while
being fully reintegrated into civil society.
Question. Do you believe that the Iraqi government is likely to do
so in a timely manner?
Answer. The Iraqi government is already confronting militias in
order to curtail sectarian violence. As ISFs gain strength and
confidence, their ability to confront the militias will improve as
well. Success against one group could have a cascading positive effect,
and place additional pressure on other illegal armed groups to
terminate hostilities. However, success against militias will not be
achieved on our timetable, but on Iraq's.
Question. How effective do you believe the addition of more U.S.
troops will be in securing Baghdad if the Iraqi government fails to
take effective, timely action to confront the militias?
Answer. Absent a concerted effort by the Iraqi government to
curtail militia activity, an increase in U.S. troop strength may reduce
sectarian violence in the short-term, but at the cost of increased
attacks against coalition forces and reduced confidence in the
capabilities and trustworthiness of the ISFs.
Question. There have been some recent news reports that the Shiite
political elite are advising Moqtada al Sadr to ``lay low''--much as
was done after confrontations with the U.S. military in Najaf in 2004,
and that he and his militia are heeding that call. The fear is that
they will simply re-emerge after the so-called surge of U.S. troops is
over.
Do you believe this is a real concern, and if so, what should be
done about it?
Answer. Shia political and religious leaders are advising Muqtada
al-Sadr to rein in his militia and play a constructive role in the
political process. These warnings are coming from individuals Sadr
respects--and who themselves have concluded past mistakes should not be
repeated. Furthermore, we have seen what we assess to be a qualitative
difference in the Iraqi government's willingness to take on extremist
elements--including al-Sadr's militia.
A situation where al-Sadr's militia attempted to resurge after
``laying low'' would clearly present a challenge the Iraqi government
would need to confront, which is why our current operations must focus
on having the ISF emerge as the dominant security force in he country.
Question. What are your views on whether American troops should
enter Sadr City, and if so, under what circumstances?
Answer. If we are to provide security for the people of Iraq it is
important that we do not allow safe havens for militias or terrorists.
As a result American troops already regularly enter Sadr City when
operational needs dictate it. I expect this to continue in the future
and anticipate that, as further progress is made, American troops will
be stationed in Sadr City alongside Iraqi Army and Iraqi NP units.
Question. How do you believe the Madhi Army or the Iraqi residents
of Sadr City would react to American troops entering Sadr City and
staying there?
Answer. American troops already enter Sadr City regularly in
response to operational needs, which is likely to continue. The Mahdi
Army largely follows Muqtada al-Sadr's current public directives to
refrain from directly engaging coalition forces entering Sadr City or
other predominately Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad. Though we are still
assessing the sincerity of recent statements by Sadr City leaders
supporting the Baghdad security plan, it is a positive sign residents
are willing to work with the Iraqi government to improve their
security.
Question. Do you expect to see Sunni insurgents and Shia militia
members leaving Baghdad as a result of increased U.S. and Iraqi troop
presence?
Answer. We are already seeing it. Sunni extremists such as AQI will
likely replicate their response to previous security operations. Their
leadership is likely to relocate outside the immediate area of Baghdad
to areas northwest and south of Baghdad, leaving lower level fighters
in the city to continue high-profile attacks when and where possible
against civilians, Shia militias, ISFs, and coalition forces. Sunni
resistance fighters are locally based and will attempt to go to ground
within their general areas, preparing for future operations following
coalition forces departure. We have seen numerous indications Shia
militia leaders will leave, or have already left, Sadr City to avoid
capture by Iraqi and coalition security forces. The effectiveness of
recent detainment operations is likely causing these actions.
Question. If so, do you believe that this could this result in a
higher level of violence in the rest of the country?
Answer. Robust security operations in Baghdad and a resulting
movement of antagonists and weapons into the Baghdad belt areas could
result in heightened levels of confrontation in these urban belts. It
is unlikely the limited displacement of insurgents and Shia militia
from Baghdad will cause a significant increase in violence in other
areas of Iraq. Baghdad is the center of gravity. The movement of
fighters to foment violence in other areas would diminish capabilities
focused on the central struggle. However, to mitigate pressure on
militias and extremists in Baghdad and the surrounding areas, other
elements within these organizations may increase attacks along the
southern lines of communications.
Question. What are your views on how we should address that
possibility?
Answer. This is an operational consideration that is addressed in
contingency planning prior to commencing operations. Since any
significant increase in violence is unlikely to spread beyond the areas
surrounding Baghdad, the key is to control lines of communications into
and out of Baghdad and as well as to secure the main supply routes,
especially those to the south. Increased use of Iraqi Army and national
police to protect the lines of communications and establishment of
regional reaction forces to respond to threats external to Baghdad are
prudent measures to implement. A number of other options could be used
to counter the dispersion of violence to areas surrounding the city.
These include exerting positive control over entry-exit points and
increased patrolling and intelligence collection in areas of concern.
STRATEGIC RISK
Question. Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create higher levels of strategic
risk for the United States based on the availability of trained and
ready forces for other contingencies?
Answer. A fundamental challenge impacting Army readiness and
strategic depth is the need to establish a proper balance between
strategy and resources. Current demands exceed the strategy outlined in
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and exceed the resources provided
to execute the QDR-based strategy. While the U.S. Army can still meet
its commitments in support of approved contingency plans, our concern
is with our capacity to provide sufficient next to deploy forces
capable of surging to meet other contingency requirements as they arise
and to deter potential aggressors. The immediate challenge lies in the
readiness of these currently non-deployed, next to deploy forces. The
Army's requirements, particularly to reset, recapitalize, and replace
damaged equipment must be fully funded to restore the strategic depth
of our Army necessary to respond decisively to potential strategic
contingencies. Full, timely, and predictable funding is critical for
the Army to sustain the growing global commitments of our force. The
recent decision to grow our ground forces and to assure access to the
Reserve component will increase the strategic depth to sustain the high
levels of demand for Army forces. The size of our Army has a deterrent
effect on potential enemies.
If so, how would you characterize the increase in strategic risk in
terms of the Army's ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ a force for
a new contingency? In your view, is this level of risk acceptable?
Answer. The current pace of operations has reduced the time between
deployments, exacerbated equipment shortfalls that impact nondeployed
forces and pre-positioned stocks, and degraded training for full
spectrum operations. Currently, Army units focus their training on
preparing for counterinsurgency operations. To meet combatant
commander's immediate wartime needs, the Army is pooling equipment from
across the force to equip soldiers deploying into harm's way. This
practice continues today, increasing risk to our next to deploy forces
and limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic contingencies.
The Army continues efforts to operationalize the Reserve component,
which includes a large portion of the Army's key enabling capabilities,
to improve our ability to respond to new contingencies. Fully and
continuously integrating the Reserve and National Guard balanced
capabilities into ongoing operations is critical to our effectiveness
and enhances the readiness of non-deployed forces by allowing more time
to reset, re-equip, and conduct full spectrum training in order to be
prepared for contingency operations at home and abroad. The Department
is updating Reserve governance and employment policies in accordance
with the Secretary of Defense's new mobilization policy, to allow for
greater access to these forces. These policy goals include managing
mobilization on a unit, instead of an individual, basis. The recently
completed Chairman's Risk Assessment provides specific detail to the
strategic risk of the military in meeting the National Military
Strategy and risk mitigation efforts.
Question. What is the impact of the decision to increase Army
forces committed to Iraq on our ability to meet our security
obligations in other parts of the world?
Answer. Increasing force commitment to Iraq does have an impact on
our capabilities. However, that the Army still has combat capability
and will meet its obligations, clearly, we must plan for and address
future challenges in this dangerous and uncertain time. I agree with
General Schoomaker's concern about our strategic depth and assessment
against many of our contingency plans--it could take longer to execute
some of those plans in terms of the timelines that are expected. In
such cases, joint capabilities will mitigate those ground force
capabilities delayed by the force generation timelines. The approved
increase in Army end strength, though not a near-term solution, will
help restore this capacity and provide us with a deterrent capability.
It should also be noted that the enemies that we face are not ours
alone, they threaten many others as well. As such, the Army and the DOD
are working hard to build the security capacity of willing partners,
through its security cooperation efforts, which in the long-term should
enable regional deterrence and greater self defense.
Question. How and over what period of time, in your view, will
increases to Army end strength reduce or mitigate this risk?
Answer. I would refer you to the Chairman's Risk Assessment for the
specifics which are classified. However, as has been publicly
announced, the recent decisions by the President and Secretary of
Defense to grow our ground forces and to assure access to all
components of our force will help to establish the balanced inventory
required to meet and sustain demand for Army forces. It will require
time and resources to man, train, and equip this force. We must
continue to leverage through building partnership capacity and security
cooperation efforts, the development of the security capacity of our
global partners. The current plan calls for increasing the size of the
Active Army. The complete benefit of this growth will not be realized
until the 2012 timeframe. The Army plans to increase both BCTs and key
enabling units in our Active component (AC), Army National Guard, and
Army Reserve. This growth will expand our rotational pool to 76 BCTs
and more than 200 enabling organizations in the operational force of
the total Army. Our goal is to provide a continuous supply of BCTs to
meet approved global commitments. Our immediate challenge lies in the
readiness of the next to deploy and surge forces. Generating whole,
cohesive units that are fully manned, trained, and equipped will ensure
that they are fully ready for the strategic and operational demands of
the combatant commander. This will require a national commitment to
sustain predictable resourcing over time and to build our force in a
balanced, coordinated fashion while providing adequately for the needs
of our All-Volunteer soldiers and their families.
Question. What additional actions, in your view, are necessary to
reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?
Answer. Congressional support for increased total obligation
authority for the Army and timely wartime supplemental funding remain
key elements of reducing strategic risk. Expansion of the Army,
continued transformation, assured access to the Reserve components,
recapitalization, and increased funding are some of the key means
essential to reducing overall strategic risk. We must be able to
harness the other elements of national power to shape the strategic
environment and reduce the likelihood of crisis. Fully resourcing our
security cooperation activities, increasing the security capacity of
strategic partners, strengthening our unity of effort within our
interagency, and improving and increasing our Nation's expeditionary
advisory and assistance capabilities are also essential to mitigate
strategic risk.
ROTATION CYCLES/SCHEDULES
Question. The Active Army's ratio of time spent deployed to time at
home station is already approaching 1:1--that is for each year deployed
a soldier spends 1 year at home station. The Active Army objective is
1:2 where soldiers can expect to be home for 2 years for each year
deployed. The Reserve component objective is 1.5 where soldiers can
expect to be home for 5 years for each year deployed. Despite the
desired deployed to ``dwell'' ratio, the increase in forces committed
to Iraq is likely to drive this ratio even higher.
What impact do you expect the proposed troop surge in Iraq to have
on the so-called ``dwell time'' of Army soldiers? Is it possible that
this surge could drive the Army past the 1:1 level?
Answer. Over the past 5 years very few units have not met the 1:1
ratio between rotations, though the Army minimum goal for Active
component units at surge is a 1:2 ratio and objective steady state goal
it is a 1:3 ratio. Currently, most Active component BCTs as well as
combat support and combat service support are averaging about 1:1.
Reserve component units have mostly been mobilized only once, so Army
National Guard and for Army Reserve rotation goals have not been
exceeded. Ultimately, the decision rests with the theater commander to
determine his requirements. I understand that the Army is finalizing
the force rotation set for the rest of this year and for 2008 in order
to ensure that we continue to provide the required capabilities to the
combatant commanders. No units in the plus-up will break the 1:1
rotation level. For the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) force rotations for fiscal years 2007-2009, the
recent change in mobilization policy for the Reserve component begins
to provide to the Army predictable access to required capabilities.
During the implementation to resume proportional contributions to the
theater some units, particularly Active component BCTs, certain Active
component enabling capabilities (military police, engineers, and
others) and Reserve component military police and engineers, will be
asked to rotate at a ratio that exceeds policy goals. The Army will
identify these units as soon as possible in order to maximize time for
their training, manning, and equipping. The Army will deploy only
trained and ready units.
Question. How do you think a deployed to dwell ratio of 1:1 is
likely to impact the readiness of deployed and non-deployed units?
Answer. When units redeploy from Iraq and Afghanistan, their reset
periods at home station are truncated due to the short time before they
redeploy next. It increases the challenge to ensure units are reset and
trained for their next deployment equipment and people. Stress is
increased on soldiers and families.
Question. What is your assessment of the impact of the decision to
increase Army end strength on the rotation schedule and how long will
it take for this impact to make a difference?
Answer. The decision puts us on a path to enhance the depth and
breadth of capabilities, yet will require several years, considerable
resources, and a sustained national commitment to bring it to fruition.
Although it will not immediately alleviate strategic risk as we assess
it today, it will better posture us to meet sustained levels of force
deployment for the long war. If we grow the Army to 547,000 Active/
358,000 ARNG/206,000 USAR; have recurrent, assured access to the
Reserve component, rotate at surge with the Active component at 1:2 and
the Reserve component at 1:4 with a 12-month Reserve component
mobilization (9-month BOG), the Army will be able to generate about the
same capacity as with today's programmed force by fiscal year 2013.
Question. How will the proposed surge impact the ability of the
Army National Guard to respond to homeland security and other disaster
response missions?
Answer. It is my belief that the surge will not materially impact
on the ability of the Army National Guard to respond to missions here
at home. The surge is composed primarily of Active component units. One
National Guard BCT (1-34th MNARNG) already deployed in theater was
extended 120 days as part of the surge but will return home this
August. The Guard will continue to be able to support the Southwest
Border Mission. The Chief, National Guard Bureau, together with the
Army leadership, has committed to the goal of having at least 50
percent of a Governor's National Guard forces available to respond to
State missions.
EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY
Question. Both deploying and non-deploying Active component and
Reserve component Army units are training without all their required
equipment. Deploying units do not receive some of their equipment until
late in their pre-deployment training cycle or as they arrive in
theater.
In your view, is deploying additional brigades to Iraq likely to
increase the strain on maintenance systems and further reduce equipment
availability for training?
Answer. I would agree that additional brigades will increase
workload, but we have demonstrated we have the depth of capacity to
meet requirements. With adequate funding and lead time, we can leverage
our organic capability, public and private partnerships, and contracts
to meet these requirements
Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to
fully support the pre-deployment training and operations of surging
units?
Answer. The Army's number one priority, and one that I would
maintain if I am confirmed, is to ensure soldiers going into the
warfight have the equipment they need. Units will use a combination of
organic unit equipment, theater provided equipment, Army prepositioned
stocks, and cross-leveling to equip the deploying BCTs.
Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for
training and operations?
Answer. Due to theater requirements, some equipment is unavailable
for units to train with prior to deployment. The most common shortfall
occurs with force protection equipment, where equipping solutions are
developed to meet specific theater threats, and production of these
items go straight into theater to meet demand.
Question. In terms of shortfalls for training items, some key
pieces of equipment include uparmored HMMWVs, engineer route clearing
equipment, and counter rocket artillery and mortar fire system. In
terms of shortfalls for operations, all units are fully equipped to
meet operational demands.
What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these
shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and
operate?
Answer. The most important element of ensuring units have what they
need is ensuring sufficient, predictable, stable funding. Stable and
predictable budgets that are enacted early with distribution of both
base and bridge supplemental funding within 30 days of the start of the
fiscal year allow us to deliver the right equipment, on-time.
EQUIPMENT REPAIR/RESET
Question. Congress provided the Army with $17 billion in fiscal
year 2007 to help with the reset of non-deployed forces and accelerate
the repair and replacement of equipment.
What impact do you expect the increased funding to have on the
readiness of our ground forces, and how soon do you expect to see this
impact?
Answer. Based on what I know now, I believe equipping the force
will take time. We must fill the historical holes in our force,
transform the Army, and modernize. The $17.1 billion has a minor impact
on equipment on hand quantities, and the procurement dollars provided
pay back the Reserve component for equipment left in theater and to
replace battle losses. The $17.1 billion has the greatest impact on the
equipment serviceability status which is realized when depot and field
level reset is completed during the 180 day reset window for
redeploying units.
Further, as the $17.1 billion for reset was available at the
beginning of the fiscal year, the Army was able to synchronize
resources, people, and materiel to align with the flow of equipment
from returning units into the reset process. For instance, timely
funding has allowed depots to order parts in advance of equipment
arrival, thus speeding the reset process.
Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are
operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for
reset?
Answer. Executing the $17.1 billion reset program does not exceed
the maximum capacity of our depots. I understand that the Army's depots
have the capacity and are on track to execute all funding associated
with the reset dollars.
As the $17.1 billion for reset was available at the beginning of
the fiscal year, the Army was able to synchronize resources, people,
and materiel to align with the flow of equipment from returning units
into the reset process. For instance, timely funding has allowed depots
to order parts in advance of equipment arrival, thus speeding the reset
process.
The Army's organic depots have steadily increased their capability
while simultaneously increasing efficiencies. For example, Red River
Army Depot, will see work increase from 400 items a month in October
2006 to 700 a month in September 2007. The Anniston Army Depot will
increase from 1,000 items a month in October 2006 to 3,000 per month in
September 2007.
Question. What additional steps do you believe could be taken to
increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it available
for operations and training?
Answer. As I indicated previously, I believe that the most
important element of ensuring units have what they need is ensuring we
have sufficient, predictable, stable, funding. Stable and predictable
budgets that are enacted early with distribution of both base and
bridge supplemental funding within 30 days of the start of the fiscal
year allow us to deliver the right equipment, on-time. The Army needs
continued congressional help in passing the 2007 main supplemental
funding early this spring to properly sustain the Army.
Question. What impact do you believe the President's proposal to
send an additional five brigades to Iraq is likely to have on the pool
of equipment available for non-deployed units to train with at home?
Answer. The additional brigades will increase the need for
equipment as units intensify training for deployment. Some of the
deploying units will take equipment with them which will require the
Army to realign available equipment for nondeploying units to train
with. The Army will need to better manage the equipment to ensure
proper distribution.
Question. What impact is it likely to have on the ability of Army
National Guard units to respond to homeland security and disaster
relief missions?
Answer. This increase in deployed forces could only affect the Army
National Guard's ability to respond to homeland security and disaster
relief missions to the degree that we deploy Army National Guard units.
I understand that the Army does not plan to transfer any Army National
Guard equipment to other components. However, as demonstrated with last
season's hurricane preparedness, the Army can provide necessary
disaster support through mutual aid compacts, equipment loans, and
forces from the Active component and Army Reserve components.
RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION
Question. In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and
systems have been characterized as ``inefficient and rigid'' and
readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind,
cross-leveling, and reset policies.
What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve
component forces in meeting combat missions?
Answer. Today's Strategic Contemporary Operating Environment (COE)
has mandated a transition of the Reserve components of our Army from a
Strategic Reserve to an integrated, vital, and resourced Operational
Force. Since September 11, the Reserve component has been used
judiciously and prudently in support of the global war on terror, both
here and abroad, and will continue to help meet the global force
requirements given the Army.
Question. What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current
Reserve Force management policies?
Answer. The changes in Reserve component mobilization policy will
facilitate consistent access to Reserve component units. Most
importantly, these changes will also provide greater predictability of
deployments for our soldiers, their families, and employers.
Question. Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively
to the Reserve?
Answer. No. The Reserve component will be routinely assigned
directed missions as part of ARFORGEN. The first days of any conflict
or contingency response pretty much demands an Active component course
of action. Support capabilities are needed across both the Active
components and Reserve components. The distribution of what
capabilities exist in what components will be the result of carefully
developed and coordinated plans.
LOW DENSITY/HIGH DEMAND FORCES
Question. In your professional judgment, how would you address the
Army's management of low density units such as military police, civil
affairs, and others which are in extremely high demand in this new
strategic environment?
Answer. The Army is aggressively rebalancing its formations to
reduce structure we do not need, mitigate high-demand/low-density
shortfalls, and redistributing soldiers to increase the size of the
operating force by reducing the Institutional Army. We've identified
well over 100,000 of capabilities to rebalance and have already
rebalanced over 57,000 of that. I understand that the Army plans to
reduce the Institutional Army from over 104,000 in fiscal year 2003 to
80,000 by fiscal year 2013. The Army must, however, maintain
Institutional capacity to generate and sustain the force growth. As a
result, we've reduced armor, field artillery, and headquarters to grow
the capabilities that you've identified: infantry, special forces,
civil affairs, psyops, MPs, MI, engineers. Just as importantly, the
Army is changing the way it develops leaders and trains soldiers. The
Army is building pentatheletes who can operate in an ambiguous
environment and perform a broader range of tasks in addition to their
core competencies. They are much more culturally aware, the Army has
emphasized language proficiency, moreover broadening our leader's
experience through advanced civilian schooling. The cumulative effects
of this are leaders equally adept at non-kinetic solutions.
Question. Are there functional changes among the Active components
and Reserve components that you believe should be made?
Answer. The Army must continue to balance the force across all
three components and maintain recurrent, assured access to the
Reserves. Our Reserve components are now an integral part of our
operational force. They are organized in modular formations and will be
manned, trained, and equipped to deploy. I believe our Army is better
integrated today than we have been for a long time. The Army will
continue to grow the modular force across all three components to build
strategic depth; provide rotational capability for steady state levels;
and bring a campaign quality to our Army that will meet the global
strategic demands of the long war.
ARMY READINESS
Question. On January 23, General Schoomaker testified before the
House Armed Services Committee that Army readiness was even worse now
than it was last June. He said: ``I testified in June that I had
concerns about the strategic depth of the Army. That was about 7 months
ago. Since that time, we have increased stress on the Army. We are
using the supplemental funding to reset the Army as fast as we can but,
there's latency in delivery. We have it moving very quickly, but the
delivery is yet to be taken. So my concerns are increased over what
they were in June, in terms of what the pressure is on our force, both
in terms of dwell time, in terms of equippage, in terms of time
available to train and all the rest of it.''
Do you share General Schoomaker's assessment that Army readiness
has declined over the past 6 months?
Answer. Yes, I do. The forces in theater are the best trained, best
led, and best equipped before crossing the berm to execute the combat
missions which they have been assigned. However, ensuring units in
theater are properly resourced and trained has come at the expense of
those units that are not deployed. To meet the combatant commander's
immediate needs we have pooled equipment from across the force.
Although absolutely necessary to support soldiers deploying into harm's
way, this practice has increased the un-readiness in our next-to-deploy
forces and limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic
contingencies. The 2007 supplemental will arrest the decline of the
readiness in the force that General Schoomaker described. However,
since that time operational demand has obviously increased and only
serves to accentuate the fact that operational demand still exceeds
strategy, which still exceeds resources.
Question. To what degree would the proposed surge exacerbate the
readiness problems identified by General Schoomaker?
Answer. Intuitively, this increase in demand will exacerbate the
stress on soldiers, leaders, families, and equipment. Any shortfalls
for units which are deploying will be met using our ``pooling concept''
to ensure these units can meet their operational missions. More
importantly, to actually achieve the surge force levels we must not
only accelerate the deployment of five BCTs, but must also extend five
BCTs already in Iraq. Finally, the Army must pull forward the
deployment of five future BCTs to replace the BCTs that were
accelerated in the rotation plans.
Question. Do you believe the current state of Army readiness is
acceptable?
Answer. I am concerned that the operational demand continues to
exceed the QDR strategy and available resources. America's Army remains
at war and we will be fighting this war for the foreseeable future.
Question. How do you see the war in Iraq and operations in
Afghanistan impacting the readiness of Army forces that may be called
upon to respond to an attack or other incident or disaster inside the
United States?
Answer. It is my understanding that the National Guard Bureau,
working with the Governors and State Adjutants General, have identified
the baseline equipment requirements so each State's units are capable
of meeting their homeland defense and homeland security requirements.
Additionally, the Army leadership has request $20 billion over the
program to ensure the Army National Guard is properly equipped to
respond to an attack or other incident or disaster inside the United
States.
PERMANENT BASES IN IRAQ
Question. Last year's defense authorization and appropriation acts
prohibited the use of funds to establish permanent bases in Iraq.
Do you agree with that prohibition, or do you think the United
States should reserve the right to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces
in Iraq?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the Iraq basing prohibition on permanent
facilities.
Question. If you agree, what are your views on the construction of
any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?
Answer. All current U.S. funded facilities and infrastructure for
coalition forces in Iraq are of temporary construction, as directed by
CENTCOM policy. It is built to a ``good enough'' standard which I have
consistently instructed all OIF commands and construction agents to
implement. The plus up of forces may require the construction of
additional facilities. If necessary, these will be temporary in nature
and built to the same ``good enough'' standard.
JOINTNESS OF ARMY-MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS
Question. For the past several years, the Army and Marine Corps
have had separate areas of responsibility in Iraq, with Marine forces
assigned to the Anbar province.
Do you believe the Army and Marine Corps forces operating in Iraq
have an appropriate degree of jointness?
Answer. Unequivocally yes, U.S. and coalition forces are planning
and conducting joint operations everyday spanning from the platoon to
MNF-I level throughout Iraq. Fundamental to all military operations is
a clear delineation of three dimensional boundaries. While the land
boundaries of MND-W may appear to specify a Marine only operation, I
assure you they operate jointly incorporating multiple USA BCTs, USAF
CAS and multiple Service and Interagency Special Operations Forces and
Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets.
END STRENGTH INCREASES
Question. The President recently announced the administration's
intent to increase the Army's end strength by 65,000 soldiers. First,
the administration intends to make permanent the 30,000 temporary
increase in end strength now in effect. Second, the administration
intends to add 35,000 new soldiers over the next 5 years, including an
additional 6,000 new soldiers in 2007; 7,000 additional new soldiers
per year through 2011; and 1,000 additional new soldiers in 2012.
What is your understanding of why the Department is now proposing a
permanent increase in end strength that it has resisted in the recent
past?
Answer. General Schoomaker asked for permission to grow by 30,000
and Congress supported it. The Army has taken advantage of that
temporary authority given in National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
for Fiscal Year 2005 to grow its Active Force by 30,000--we are
currently at 505.4k and are now on a ramp toward 518,000 by the end of
fiscal year 2007. The Army has received considerable support to execute
current operations, to reset our forces, to rebalance our components,
and to build a modular Army. However, the demand has exceeded both the
``supply'' posited in the strategy, and the resources provided. We will
need continued support to close the gap between requirements and
resources, particularly as we maintain an extraordinarily high
operational pace while growing the Army. The decision by the President
and the Secretary of Defense to grow the ground forces will build the
strategic depth and capacity necessary to meet the global demands of
the long war.
Question. In your view, are the administration's proposed end
strength increases achievable in the timeframe stated?
Answer. Yes. The Army will get to 518,000 in the Active component
by the end of fiscal year 2007. I understand that the Army will be able
to meet a recruiting goal of 80,000, and the additional Military
Occupation Skill goal of over 3,000. The Army will grow by at least
7,000 each year over the next 5 years on a ramp to achieve an end
strength of 547,400 by fiscal year 2012.
Question. Is it your understanding that these increases are
consistent with the Army's requests?
Answer. Yes, this end strength increase is consistent with the
Army's request, particularly with respect to growth in its operating
force.
Question. To what extent do you believe the Army will have to rely
on stop loss to achieve the increases in end strength?
Answer. The Army does not rely on stop loss to achieve the strength
increase. We use targeted stop loss to ensure unit cohesiveness in
combat zones. Approximately 1 percent of the total force is affected by
stop loss and only for a finite time period. It is my judgment that
we'll need to rely on targeted stop loss at least in the near-term. I
understand the Army is currently reviewing its use of stop loss at the
request of Secretary Gates. The Department's initial assessment is that
accessions of 1,500 per year will be needed if targeted stop loss is
terminated.
Question. Has the Army conducted a comprehensive and forward-
looking assessment of its end strength requirements? If so, please
describe the assessment, its assumptions, and its conclusions.
Answer. I am confident that the Army has been and will continue to
be forward looking in determining its force structure. We have a mature
analytical process that's based on strategic direction from the
National Military Strategy, from OSD, and the Joint Staff. It builds
toward future requirements at the end of the program and beyond. The
process is adaptive, however, to rebalance capabilities to meet
operational demands. The underlying assumption was the requirement to
fight two major combat operations, nearly simultaneously with one a
win--decisively; and the other a swiftly defeat the effort. During QDR
it was determined that a force designed to support 70 BCTs was
sufficient. This enabled the Army to provide 18-19 BCTs per rotation to
meet global demands.
The recent assessment by the Joint Staff that the Army's enduring
requirement to provide up to 23 BCTs to meet strategic, global demand
requires continued growth to 76 BCTs and the growth of requisite
combat, combat support, and combat service support units to provide
operational and strategic flexibility. This capacity is needed to
sustain the long war.
Question. What is your understanding of the estimated steady-state
annual costs of increasing the Army's end strength to 547,400 as
proposed by the administration?
Answer. My best estimate is $8.2 billion, which includes both the
increased cost to military pay and operations and maintenance.
Question. Historically, increasing operating and personnel costs
often crowd out spending for modernization programs.
If confirmed as Chief of Staff, would you be prepared to recommend
curtailing or cancelling modernization programs to pay for this
increase in end strength?
Answer. If I am confirmed, my role as Chief of Staff will be to
provide ready forces to combatant commanders. Those forces must be
ready today and in the future. My commitment is to apply my judgment to
maintain that balance and provide ready forces consistent with
resources provided.
Question. If not, where do you anticipate the additional resources
would come from?
Answer. If confirmed, my role as Chief of Staff is to provide ready
forces to combatant commanders. Those forces must be ready today and in
the future. My commitment is to apply my judgment to maintain that
balance and provide ready forces consistent with resources provided.
Question. Do you believe that this end strength increase would
continue to be needed even if our deployment of troops to Iraq ends or
is significantly reduced, or do you believe that this increase is
driven in significant measure by our troop requirements in Iraq?
Answer. I believe that the end strength increase must continue. The
future security environment is dangerous and uncertain and the Nation
must continue support to the long war; increase commitment to security
cooperation; increase deterrence in key areas of the world; reduce the
deployment stress on the force; and to fully prepare for future
challenges. Both the superior capabilities and the size of the force
combine to enable sustained global engagement, deterrence, and response
in order to fully protect national interests, prevent aggression, and
prevail when called upon. The Army Campaign plan to develop and field
capable units and systems is producing the optimum mix of land
capabilities for the joint force; it is both affordable and essential
for the Nation in order to win the war today and prepare for an
uncertain future. Joint ground forces are proving to be the primary
military instrument for creating favorable and enduring security
conditions in many crisis regions around the world. Presence, or BOG,
sends a message of commitment and intent to our potential adversaries.
Since 1989, the Army has supported 43 joint operations, many of which
require a continuous rotation of forces to support our allies and
attain the desired national strategic effects.
The Army is on a very much needed acceleration plan to grow six new
BCTs and enabling organizations in our Active component and other key
enabling organizations in our Army National Guard and Army Reserve.
This will expand our rotational pool to 76 BCTs and more than 200
enabling organizations in the operational force of the total Army. Our
goal is to provide a continuous supply of BCTs and key enabling
capabilities to meet approved global commitments. Today, the Nation has
over 258,000 American soldiers deployed in 89 countries engaged in
deterrence operations, theater security cooperation, and joint and
multi-national operations in support of national strategic objectives.
Joint ground forces bear the heaviest burden fighting simultaneous
campaigns, primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. Over 740,000 Active and
Reserve soldiers have served overseas in support of the Nation's war on
terrorism. Active component BCTs deploy to combat at a rate of 1 year
deployed for 1 year training at home station. This accelerated pace of
deployment is 1 full year faster than the Army's surge goal of 1 year
deployed for 2 years training at home station and 2 years faster than
our sustainable steady state rate. We must reduce this stress on the
force by building our strategic depth. The end strength increase,
coupled with assured Reserve component access is critical to achieve a
steady state that affords predictability and sustainable deployment
effort for our soldiers. Completion of the 76 BCT and 200 plus enabling
units will provide a sustainable supply of military capabilities that
meet the requirements of worldwide Joint Force Commanders now and in
the future.
RECRUITING
Question. The ability of the Army to recruit highly qualified young
men and women is influenced by many factors and is critical to the
success of the All-Volunteer Force.
What do you consider to be the most important elements of
successful recruiting for the Army?
Answer. The most important elements for recruiting success are the
support of the Nation's citizens and Congress in providing the soldiers
and resources required to maintain our ability to guard our freedom
against those who desire otherwise. Successful recruiting for the Army
requires us to recruit qualified men and women in the numbers required
to man our units.
Question. What are the Army's recruiting goals for fiscal years
2007 and 2008? Have these goals been adjusted in light of the increased
end strength?
Answer. The recruiting missions for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 will
remain 80,000. In fiscal year 2007, we have an additional requirement
to support the acceleration of two BCTs. We anticipate this MOS
precision requirement will result in a mission over-achievement of
3,000 to 4,000. Given the current planning assumptions and manpower
models, these recruiting goals support the increased end strength goal
for 2012.
Question. What is your assessment of the Army's ability to reach
its Active-Duty recruiting goal in fiscal years 2007 and 2008?
Answer. Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force will continue to be a
challenge due to high employment rates, the improving economy, the
decreasing qualified market, and the war. Given continued congressional
support and funding, however, the Army can achieve the mission.
Question. Is it your understanding that the Army will have to
change its enlistment standards to achieve these recruiting goals?
Answer. The ability to meet and maintain the DOD quality marks (90
percent HSDG/60 percent Mental Category I-IIIA/<4 percent Category IV)
in the current and future recruiting market will be the greater
challenge. The Army has and will continue to implement measures to
reduce this challenge through programs and policies that lower
attrition rates, increase the potential market, and utilize creative
incentives. However, the Army will only enlist soldiers who are
qualified and volunteer to serve this Nation.
Question. What is your view about the appropriate assignment and
overall numbers, if any, of ``Category IV'' recruits in the Army, i.e.,
those individuals who score below the 31st percentile on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test?
Answer. As with all recruits, the Army assigns ``Category IV''
recruits to military occupational specialties that they are qualified
to fill. The Category IV issue is a question of ``trainability''. The
Army has and will continue to implement measures to reduce this
challenge and prepare all soldiers for future combat and duty
requirements. These soldiers, when properly trained and led, are fully
capable of supporting and defending the Nation. I do not see the Army
exceeding the current DOD standard of 4 percent even though the
congressional limit is 20 percent.
Question. What is your understanding of trends in the Army with
respect to incidents of recruiter sexual misconduct with potential
recruits?
Answer. Any recruiter misconduct is unacceptable. Recruiters are
the first to contact this country's most sacred and precious resource--
the men and women who volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces of this
great country. Sexual misconduct, with or without consent, is not and
never has been acceptable. We will continue to take the appropriate
action against those few who believe that they can use their position
for personal gain. We have zero tolerance for this type of conduct. The
recruiting leadership reviews reports of recruiter conduct and
establishes polices to prevent this and other forms of misconduct
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to
prevent such incidents?
Answer. Sexual misconduct in the recruiting process or in the Army
is unacceptable--as it is in the rest of American society. For the
Army, the consequences can be far more damaging to unit effectiveness;
commanders at all levels through values based education and corrective
action to enforce the standards. If I am confirmed, I will act to
implement policies that decrease the possibilities of this type of
misconduct. I support the use of all processes, administrative and
judicial, against those who willing choose to commit these acts of
misconduct.
MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
Question. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most
sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems have been
identified in the past in the planning and procedures for mobilization
and demobilization, including inadequate health screening and medical
readiness monitoring, antiquated pay systems, limited transitional
assistance programs upon demobilization, and medical holdovers.
What is your assessment of advances made in improving mobilization
and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems still
exist?
Answer. Mobilization processes are vastly improved since 2001. The
Army has automated its mobilization request process. These efforts are
responsible for alerts/notifications that are occurring 90-180 days in
advance of mobilization and ensure that individual orders are in the
hands of soldiers at least 45 days prior to their mobilization date.
The objective of the Army in ARFORGEN FOC is that units will be alerted
1 year in advance of possible mobilization. The recent change in
Reserve component mobilization policy will enable unit versus
individual mobilization and enhance cohesion. There are now significant
efforts that are underway to move a great deal of training from a post-
mobilization timeframe to the left of the mobilization date. This will
require additional training and resources to be made available to
Reserve component units in the year prior to a potential mobilization.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
changes to the organization and policies affecting the Reserve
components aimed at ensuring their readiness for future mobilization
requirements?
Answer. A key to success for ensuring our Reserve components are
ready for future mobilizations is to provide sufficient equipment and
resources, especially in the year prior to mobilization. With Congress'
continued assistance, the Army can provide Reserve component forces
that are in a higher state of readiness upon mobilization to execute
missions around the world.
INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE RECALL POLICY
Question. A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the Army revitalize its
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program by culling existing IRR
databases and ensuring that the Army has valid contact information on
IRR members who may be recalled to serve.
What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that
applies to both officer and enlisted members of the IRR?
Answer. The Army's concept plan for increased IRR readiness centers
on the IRR Transformation Plan which was approved for execution in
November 2005 by the Secretary of the Army. Programmed initiatives are:
Changing the culture of the IRR,
Managing individual expectations, and
Improving readiness reporting.
Additionally, the execution of a DOD IRR Decision Point Policy
mandates the removal, within 2 years, of IRR officers who have
fulfilled their Military Service Obligation (MSO) unless they
positively elect to remain in the IRR. To date approximately 4,000 or
more soldiers have been transferred to the inactive status list and
ultimately separated. Culling these programmed initiatives and aligning
the IRR with the Army Force Generation Model--Reset/Train; Ready;
Available, adds more predictability in mobilization rotations. These
model enforces positive contact, refresher training as individual
skills degrade, and ensures the deployable readiness of the IW.
Question. What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization
database?
Answer. The Army has two primary transformation initiatives which
are data reconciliation and establishing a control IRR population.
These initiatives address methods to reset the force by conducting a
systematic screening of all data records; determine disposition of
individuals; and process for final resolution those soldiers who no
longer have further potential for useful military service if mobilized
by a recommendation for separation. The Human Resources Command
processed over 17,000 existing bad addresses through a credit bureau
agency to provide last known addresses of soldiers. Additionally, the
Human Resources Command has identified non-mobilization assets that
includes soldiers passed over for promotion, with security violations,
physical disqualifications, documented hardship, and adverse
characterizations of service. Where appropriate, these soldiers are
being separated. Through these efforts the current IRR population of
82,000 has been reduced by 25 percent and could potentially be reduced
down to approximately 60,000 soldiers.
SUPPORT FOR SEVERELY WOUNDED SOLDIERS
Question. Improved body armor and combat casualty care have enabled
many thousands of soldiers to survive wounds received in OIF and OEF.
As a result far more soldiers survive with injuries which, in previous
conflicts, would have resulted in death.
What are your views on the Army's commitment and responsibility for
severely injured members and their families?
Answer. Our Army is committed to and accepts the responsibility for
our severely wounded warriors and their families. In April 2004, the
Army established the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) program. AW2's
guiding principle is part of our Army's Warrior Ethos, ``I Will Never
Leave a Fallen Comrade''.
Wounded warriors who are not part of the AW2 program have access to
robust resources and an array of support, from our hospitals, the Army
Career and Alumni Program, Army Emergency Relief, Veterans Affairs, and
a myriad of community support programs. These great American heroes
will also benefit from the recently opened Center for the Intrepid at
Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, TX.
Our Army is committed, and I am personally committed, to caring for
our severely wounded warriors and their families who have sacrificed
selflessly for our Army and our Nation.
Question. What suggestions do you have for improving the Army's
support for severely wounded soldiers?
Answer. The AW2 program has grown and will continue to expand as
needed to accommodate our wounded warriors, placing more soldier Family
Management Specialists in Military Medical Treatment Facilities and
Veterans Affairs Medical Centers as the need arises. I believe that the
Army must continue to make this a high priority and if I am confirmed,
I will work to ensure it is resourced appropriately.
The AW2 program began with 2 soldier family management specialists
and now currently has 43 on board. The AW2 program has a soldier family
management specialist at 16 Veterans Affairs Medical Centers and at 8
military medical treatment facilities. Two more soldiers family
management specialists are planned at other military medical treatment
facilities and five more are planned at additional Veterans Affairs
Medical Center.
Question. Section 588 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 contains a
provision intended to ensure that other than appropriate medical review
and physical disability evaluation, there should be no barrier in
policy or law to an opportunity for a highly motivated member to return
to Active-Duty following rehabilitation from injuries incurred in
military service.
How would you assess the Army's compliance with this provision to
date?
Answer. Our Army supports the provisions of NDAA 2005 regarding
allowing our highly motivated wounded warriors to return to serve on
Active-Duty.
We recognize the value of keeping the expertise and experience of
our severely wounded warriors in our Army. We have made business
process and regulatory changes to assist these highly motivated
warriors to stay in the fight. The first priority for our severely
wounded warriors and their families is their recovery and
rehabilitation. After treatment, our warriors are afforded the
opportunity to remain on Active-Duty, should they so desire.
The Army develops a 5-year plan that encompasses all aspects of the
severely wounded warrior's life and career such as: location of
assignment, professional schools, duties, and health care access for
their particular needs--focused on a professionally and personally
fulfilling career.
Question. If confirmed, would you continue to support the efforts
of members who wish to return to Active-Duty following recovery and
rehabilitation from injuries received in military service?
Answer. Support for our wounded warriors is and would remain a top
priority. We take care of our wounded heroes. The AW2 program's vision
is that our wounded warriors and their families become self sufficient,
contributing members of our communities; living and espousing the
Warrior Ethos, knowing our Army and Nation remembers.
MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS IN IRAQ
Question. The Army's mental health assessment teams have completed
three comprehensive assessments of the immediate effects of combat on
mental health conditions of U.S. soldiers in the Iraq theater. The most
recent study, MHAT III, found that overall levels of combat stressors
are increasing. In sum, increasing numbers of troops are returning with
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and other mental
health issues. According to the Army's MHAT III report, the Armed
Forces Medical Examiner also reported 22 suicides by Army soldiers in
Iraq in calendar year 2005--a rate nearly twice that reported for the
previous year.
What do you see as the greatest challenges being faced by the Army
in terms of identifying and meeting mental health needs of soldiers and
their families?
Answer. I understand that the Army has implemented most of the
recommendations of the MHAT reports, including the further
redistribution of mental health staff to provide uniform coverage and
the further development of suicide prevention efforts in theater.
However several challenges remain. We need to ensure access to care,
and reduce stigma associated with behavioral health treatment.
Availability of mental health professionals remains a national problem
and this shortage effects the Army's ability to recruit and retain
these professionals and it effects TRICARE's ability to expand networks
of civilian mental health providers. Training our soldiers, leaders,
and families on the long-term signs of stress-related behavioral
disorders is the best way to combat stigma and ensure that soldiers who
need help seek help. If confirmed, I would fully support the
development of innovative training programs for soldiers, families, and
leaders that address this important issue.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
ensure the adequacy of mental health resources both in the theater and
in CONUS for U.S. soldiers and their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support the existing
programs developed by the Army and DOD. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel (DCSPER) and The Army Surgeon General (TSG) share
responsibility for the prevention and screening for PTSD for both
Active component and Reserve component soldiers. The DCSPER manages the
Deployment Cycle Support Program aimed at soldiers and family members
and TSG has policy oversight of the Combat and Operational Stress
Control program aimed at soldiers serving in the global war on terror.
TSG also has command responsibility for behavioral health services at
Army medical treatment facilities around the world providing treatment
for all Army beneficiaries. I also will continue to support the
continued development and expansion of new programs such as Battlemind
training and the Respect.MIL program. Battlemind provides scenario-
based training for soldiers and families in all phases of the
deployment cycle. Respect.MIL trains primary care providers to diagnose
PTSD and other combat stress problems and manage treatment of those
disorders in the primary care clinic, improving access and further
reducing the stigma associated with seeking behavioral health care.
Question. According to the MHAT III study, fewer soldiers report
that they received sufficient training to identify other soldiers at
risk for suicide.
If confirmed, what actions will you take to reassess the adequacy
of suicide prevention programs within the Army?
Answer. An updated suicide prevention program has already been
implemented, which has numerous initiatives. The DCSPER is revising
suicide prevention training and planning in direct response to this
MHAT finding. There will be specific education provided during initial
entry training and throughout the soldier's tenure in the Army. If
confirmed, I will continue to support these initiatives. One of the
major emphases of the revised training is the importance of taking care
of one's buddies. Small unit leaders must encourage help-seeking
behaviors, recognize warning signs of suicidal behavior, and refer for
care if needed. The most common motives for suicide in our soldiers are
difficulties in intimate relationships, and occupational/legal/
financial difficulties. Leaders must consider a referral to the
chaplains, combat stress control teams or other behavioral health
specialists anytime they see a soldier struggling with these problems.
Question. Based on your experience in theater, what additional
resources do you think are necessary to prevent suicides in the Army?
Answer. The Army's senior leaders are already behind the push to
decrease stigma and improve access to behavioral health care. However,
there is no simple solution to decreasing the suicide rate. Army's
behavioral health providers are very busy, but they rely on soldiers
seeking help or the soldier's buddies or chain of command recognizing
symptoms and intervening to get the soldier help. Our health care
providers are supplemented by chaplains, counselors, and TRICARE
network providers. The Army needs to keep doing everything possible to
recruit and retain military behavioral healthcare providers and seeking
additional authorities to enhance retention when necessary. If
confirmed, I would also encourage civilian providers to join the
TRICARE network to demonstrate their support for the sacrifices our
soldiers and families make on behalf of the Nation.
OFFICER SHORTAGES
Question. A report issued by the Congressional Research Service
(CRS) in July 2006 found that the Army projects an officer shortage of
nearly 3,000 in fiscal year 2007, with the most acute shortfalls in the
grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years of service. Unless
corrective action is taken, CRS found that shortages will persist
through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention improves.
What is your understanding of the reasons for the current
shortfall, and what steps is the Army taking to meet this mid-career
officer shortfall?
Answer. The current shortfall of officers is a result of the rapid
increase in force structure (modularity and end strength increases).
Since 2002, the Army has grown over 8,000 officer positions; roughly 88
percent of this growth is in the ranks of senior captain and major.
Since it takes 10 years to grow/develop a major, to grow the officer
force we need to retain more of our ``best and brightest'' officers and
increase our officer accessions.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure
adequate numbers of highly qualified captains and majors are serving on
Active-Duty over the next 10 years?
Answer. The Army is continuing to explore other options for
retaining more of our best officers. Some of these options include
offering captains who are completing their initial Active-Duty service
an officer critical skills retention bonus of $20,000 in exchange of 4-
years of Active-Duty service. The Army is also preparing policy to
implement provisions in existing law that will enable lieutenant
colonels and colonels to serve an additional 5-years past their
Mandatory Retirement Date (MRD) as long as they haven't reach age 62.
The Army expects this policy to be published within the next couple of
months and is confident that it will be able to meet future manning
needs.
MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION
Question. The Army is facing significant shortages in critically
needed medical personnel in both Active components and Reserve
components. The committee is concerned that growing medical support
requirements, caused by the stand-up of BCTs, potential growth of the
Army, and surge requirements in theater, will compound the already
serious challenges faced in recruitment and retention of medical,
dental, nurse, and behavioral health personnel. Moreover, the committee
understands that the Army continues to direct conversion of military
medical billets to civilian or contractor billets.
Will you assure the committee that, if confirmed, you will
undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements
for the Army, incorporating all new requirements for 2008 and beyond?
Answer. I fully support a quality medical force that can meet the
Army's medical readiness requirements and can maintain our commitment
of quality health care for Army families and retirees. If confirmed, I
will support a comprehensive assessment of current Army manpower
strategies on medical military/civilian conversion to ensure these
plans remain relevant to bolstering Army operational readiness, and
further, are in sync with plans to grow Army end strength.
Question. What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think
are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill
medical support requirements as its mission and end-strength grow?
Answer. Critical to our success are adequate and appropriate
funding for necessary recruitment programs such as Active and Reserve
Health Professions Loan Repayment Program, Health Professions
Scholarship Program, Specialized Training Assistance Program, Medical
and Dental School Stipend Program, and the other Accession Bonus
programs all of which we have current legislative authority. As we
develop Army wide initiatives to retain our quality and battle hardened
soldiers, we must ensure that the Army Medical Department requirements
are met. Elimination or modification of the 8-year MSO, replaced with a
more flexible MSO scale, will assist us in the recruiting efforts of
qualified medical professionals. We need a comprehensive review of the
Medical Special Pays and should consider restructuring our current
system to include all health care providers. This will be fundamental
toward eliminating the shortages experienced in our Dental and Nurse
Corps. Legislative initiatives which provide greater flexibility to
transfer between Army components must be explored and enhanced. This is
especially true with regard to the currently required scrolling
process. The current process has created impediments to the rapid
accession of health care professionals into all components of our
force. Our civilian workforce has become increasingly important as the
medical force is reshaped. Adequate and appropriate funding is needed
to support the backfill of converted military billets.
NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM
Question. Congress enacted broad changes in the DOD civilian
personnel system in 2004 to provide the Department with more flexible
tools for the management of its civilian workforce in support of our
national security. Although the Department is presently enjoined from
implementation of a new labor-relations system, the Department is
planning to move ahead in the implementation of a new pay-for-
performance system for its non-union employees.
Based on your experience, what are the critical factors for
successful implementation of a total transformation of workforce
policies and rules, including performance-based pay?
Answer. Among the factors I consider critical are leadership
commitment and support and an educated and knowledgeable workforce. The
Army must focus on a pay for performance system that is consistent,
fair, equitable, and recognizes our top performers. The Army has
successfully completed the first performance management payout which
has demonstrated a clear linkage between employee performance and
organizational goals. The Army's approach includes an incremental
deployment schedule that allows supervisors and employees to be
adequately trained and the application of lessons learned from earlier
workforce conversions. If I am confirmed, I am committed to ensuring
that the Army workforce is trained and ready for this new system.
Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor the acceptance of the
National Security Personnel System (NSPS) and what role would you
expect to play in managing the NSPS implementation in the Army?
Answer. I strongly support the need for transformation in civilian
management--particularly pay for performance--and will set that tone
for the leadership in the Army as we implement NSPS. The Army has
established an NSPS Program Management Office that recommends Army NSPS
policy, provides guidance, monitors implementation, and will keep me
informed of progress and any issues that require my attention. In
addition to the inclusion of NSPS-specific questions in Army's annual
workforce survey, on-site evaluations to assess program effectiveness
are being performed which will provide additional implementation
feedback and lessons learned. Finally, Army is leading the way in the
monitoring of NSPS DOD-wide. Our Civilian Personnel Evaluation Agency
has been designated by DOD to evaluate the NSPS performance management
system for deployment to the entire Department.
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE
Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with
it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward
thinking management of senior executives.
What is your vision for the management and development of the Army
senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important
areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and
technical fields?
Answer. I support the Secretary of the Army's approach to Senior
Executive Service (SES) management within the Army and share his vision
of a senior civilian workforce that possesses a broad background of
experiences that will have prepared them to move between positions to
meet the continually changing mission needs of the Army. I recognize
the value of our senior workforce, and if I am confirmed, I will be
committed to providing for the professional development and management
of civilian executives in ways similar to the management of Army
General Officer Corps. If I am confirmed, I would support the
Secretary's goals to strengthen the senior executive corps
contributions to leadership team and to promote and sustain high morale
and esprit de corps within our civilian workforce.
SEXUAL ASSAULT
Question. On February 25, 2004, the Senate Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Personnel conducted a hearing on policies and programs
of the DOD for preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault
in the Armed Forces at which the Service Vice Chiefs endorsed a ``zero
tolerance'' standard. Subsequently, in response to congressional
direction, the Department developed a comprehensive set of policies and
procedures aimed at improving prevention of and response to incidents
of sexual assaults, including appropriate resources and care for
victims of sexual assault.
What is your understanding of the practices currently in use in the
Army to ensure awareness of and tracking of the disposition of reported
sexual assaults?
Answer. Since 2004, the Army has implemented a comprehensive Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Program. A key element of this program
is the awareness training developed and taught at every level of the
Army's institutional training--from initial entry to the Army War
College. Additionally, unit refresher training is an annual requirement
for all Army units. Also, as part of this program, the Army collects
and analyzes selected sexual assault incident data, which is provided
for quarterly and annual reports to DOD for consolidation into the
Secretary of Defense annual report to Congress.
Question. What progress has been made in ensuring that adequate
numbers of sexual assault victim advocates are available in Army units
worldwide?
Answer. The Army has taken significant steps to improve the
assistance to victims of all sexual assaults, with enhanced recognition
of the special circumstances that apply to deployments. A key element
of the Army's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program is the
victim advocacy component which is led by Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators (SARCs) at every Army installation. These SARCs are
supported by a cadre of full-time, professional Victim Advocates or
appointed Unit Victim Advocates (UVA) who interact directly with
victims of sexual assault.
Additionally, Deployable SARCs (DSARCs) and UVA provide advocacy
services in a deployed environment. DSARCs are soldiers trained and
responsible for coordinating the sexual assault prevention and response
program (as a collateral duty) in a specified area of a deployed
theater. Army policy requires one deployable SARC at each brigade level
unit and higher echelon. UVA are soldiers trained to provide victim
advocacy as a collateral duty while deployed. Army policy requires two
UVA for each battalion sized unit.
Question. If confirmed, what oversight role would you expect to
play?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure compliance with established
policies and procedures at all levels of command, including those in
the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves.
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE ARMY
Question. What is your assessment of policies within the Army aimed
at ensuring religious tolerance and respect?
Answer. I believe that Army regulations provide commanders and
other leaders ample guidance regarding the free exercise of religion,
religious tolerance, and respect in the Army. AR 600-20, Army Command
policy; AR 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army; and
DOD directive 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the
Military Services, provide detailed guidance on the important
responsibilities of commanders and leaders in this regard. It is my
understanding that these policies are consistent with the Constitution
and I believe they foster religious tolerance and respect within our
Army.
WOMEN IN COMBAT
Question. Section 541 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 required the
Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on his review of the current
and future implementation of the policy regarding assignment of women
in combat. In conducting the review, the Secretary of Defense is
directed to closely examine Army unit modularization efforts and
associated personnel assignment policies to ensure their compliance
with the DOD policy on women in combat that has been in effect since
1994.
What is your view of the appropriate combat role for female
soldiers on the modern battlefield?
Answer. The study requested by Congress and underway within the DOD
will help the Department understand the implications for, and
feasibility of, current policies regarding women in combat,
particularly in view of the Army's transformation to a modular force
and the irregular, non-linear nature of battlefields associated with
today's conflicts.
It is my understanding that the Army's transformation to modular
units is expected to be based on the current policy concerning the
assignment of women. Women have and will continue to be an integral
part of our Army team, performing exceptionally well in all specialties
and positions open to them. Women make up about 14 percent of the
Active Army, 23 percent of the Army Reserve, and 13 percent of the Army
National Guard. Approximately 10 percent of the forces deployed in
support of the global war on terrorism are women soldiers. Today,
almost 13,000 women soldiers--10 percent of the force--are serving in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
These women, like their male counterparts and the Army's civilians,
are serving honorably, selflessly, and courageously. If confirmed, I
would ensure that the Army complies with laws and regulations in this
matter.
Question. In your opinion, is the current and planned future Army
personnel assignment policy for women consistent with the DOD ground
combat exclusion policy in effect since October 1994?
Answer. The Army completed a thorough review of our policy late in
2005. The Secretary of the Army determined that our policy is
consistent with that of DOD. I agree with the Secretary's assessment.
Question. How do you anticipate you will participate in the review
of the policy required by section 541?
Answer. The OSD has undertaken to complete the comprehensive review
requests by this committee and Congress. It is an important study of
complex issues critical to the Department. The Army will support the
OSD to complete this review. The Army, DOD, and Congress must work
closely together on this issue. If confirmed, I will endeavor to
provide the Secretary with cogent advice regarding implementation of
this policy. If in the future the Army determines that there is a need
to seek a change to the policy, I will, if confirmed, comply fully with
all notification requirements in title 10, U.S.C.
FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP
Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by
the Department on March 30, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at
transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities, to include
revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based
requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for
both military and civilian personnel.
What is your understanding of steps being taken within the Army to
achieve the goals of the Defense Language Transformation roadmap?
Answer. The Army is actively engaged in all 43 tasks identified in
the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap and has undertaken many
initiatives to achieve the roadmap goals of: 1) Create Foundational
Language and Regional Area Expertise; 2) Create the Capacity to Surge;
3) Establish a Cadre of Language Professionals and Address Language
Requirements at Lower Skill Levels; and 4) Establish a Process to Track
the Accession and Career Progression of Military Personnel with
Language Skill and Foreign Area Officers.
Question. What is your assessment of an appropriate time frame
within which results can be realized in this critical area?
Answer. The Army is already achieving results as envisioned in the
Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. Pinpointing the time frame
when we will fully realize all of the goals of the roadmap is difficult
to do with precision, since language training takes time, and many of
the roadmap initiatives are dependent on availability of adequate
resources. The Army is improving the number, quality, and management of
its foreign language speakers, and actively pursuing programs which
provide all soldiers appropriate linguistic skills to support current
operations. Much has been accomplished but there is more to be done--
within available resources and operational requirements, we are taking
the appropriate steps to achieve the results envisioned in the Defense
Language Transformation Roadmap in the shortest time possible.
MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE
Question. In May 2004 the Department published its first
Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which articulated a compact with
military families on key quality of life factors, such as family
support, child care, education, health care, and morale, welfare, and
recreation services.
How do you perceive the relationship between quality of life and
your own top priorities for recruitment, retention, and readiness of
Army personnel?
Answer. Strengthening the mental, physical, spiritual, and material
condition of our soldiers, civilians, and their families enables them
to achieve their individual goals while balancing the demanding
institutional needs of today's expeditionary Army. The well-being of
our people and their quality of life are my top priorities.
Army Well-Being and Quality of Life programs are extensive. They
range from pay and compensation, medical, and morale, welfare, and
recreation (MWR) to housing and family readiness programs. Our
recruiting efforts must be competitive with private industry. Our
ability to reach out and gain access to our young men and women is
critical. The retention of each soldier is directly related to the
value of their achievements and maintaining the vital support of their
families. As we bring our soldiers and their units to their peak
readiness, we must enable the readiness of our Army families.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to assess the
adequacy of family support programs for both the Active components and
Reserve components?
Answer. The adequacy of family support programs is assessed
annually by Installation Status Report Services rating. In addition,
the Active component accreditation program ensures that Active
component centers worldwide maintain the level of quality performance
specified in the MWR program standards set by the MWR Board of
Directors. The family support programs are also assessed using customer
feedback at the installation level and through the MWR Needs and
Leisure Survey.
The Multi-Component Family Support Network, a seamless array of
family support services accessed by the soldier and family--Active,
Guard, and Reserve, regardless of their geographical location, will
also be significant means of collecting customer feedback and improving
support programs.
In addition, each year, the Active Army, Army National Guard, and
Army Reserve will assess requirements for global war on terror funding
and request the additional funds as necessary.
Question. What actions do you think are necessary in order to
support best practices for support of family members of deployed
forces, and would you attempt to replicate such practices throughout
the Army?
Answer. There are many programs and support systems that I
categorize as best practices. Deployment Cycle Support (DCS) is a
comprehensive process that ensures soldiers, DA civilians, and their
families are better prepared and sustained through the deployment
cycle. It provides a means to identify soldiers, DA civilians, and
families who may need assistance with the challenges inherent with
extended deployments. The goal of the DCS process is to facilitate
soldier, DA civilian, and family well-being throughout the deployment
cycle. Services for DA civilians and families are integrated in every
stage of the process, and they are highly encouraged to take advantage
of resources provided.
The Army Information Line is an integrated system consisting of a
toll-free phone service, a dynamic Web presence, and on-line
publications. This system provides accurate information, useful
resources, and problem resolution tailored for Army soldiers and their
families to include the extended families of our soldiers. This service
includes a Web presence (Our Survivors) uniquely configured to support
the survivors of our fallen soldiers. An experienced staff answers the
Army information line and provides responses to inquiries received
through the Army Families Online Web site (www.armyfamiliesonline.org).
A great example is the Strong Bonds Program administered by our
chaplains. The Chaplain Corps gives our soldiers and families the
skills needed to thrive in Army life by conducting a series of marriage
strengthening retreats and training events. Recognizing that even our
single soldiers are in or are beginning relationships, in fiscal year
2005 this program was expanded to provide training to single soldiers
in how to build life-long relationships. In fiscal year 2006 the
chaplains led over 600 of these events attended by nearly 25,000
soldiers and family members in all Army components. This and other
family support programs represent a solid network that allows our
soldiers to build great lives and effectively serve their country
through full careers.
Question. In your view, what progress has been made, and what
actions need to be taken in the Army to provide increased employment
opportunities for military spouses?
Answer. The Army continues to work with the Nation's business
community to support spouse employment opportunities. Since 2003, the
Army has signed statements of support with 18 Fortune 500 companies.
These firms pledged their best efforts to increase employment
opportunities for our spouses by connecting them to new and existing
jobs, portable jobs, and other methods of pursuing lifetime career
goals. During the past 2 years, these companies have employed over
11,000 Army spouses.
RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND ACQUISITION PROCESSES
Question. Are you familiar with the Army's resource allocation and
acquisition processes?
Answer. Yes, I have familiarity with and played a role in the PPBE
process during my tenure as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving
those processes?
Answer. QDR 06 continued us on the path of linking resources to
joint capabilities. The Army provides a variety of capabilities to
joint forces, and I look forward to working with OSD and the Joint
Staff to continue improvement of management by capability portfolio as
noted in the QDR 2006 report.
Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role played by
the Army Chief of Staff in the resource allocation and acquisition
processes?
Answer. If I am confirmed, my role as CSA is to recommend balanced
allocation of resources to provide ready forces today and for future
challenges. While specific processes within OSD continue to evolve, my
role in focusing on readiness of forces remains constant.
ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Question. The Army invests in science and technology (S&T) programs
to develop advanced capabilities to support current operations and
future Army systems. The Army's budget request has included a declining
level of investment in S&T programs over each of the last 4 fiscal
years.
What do you see as the role that Army S&T programs will play in
continuing to develop capabilities for current and future Army systems?
Answer. The Army's S&T program is the investment that the Army
makes in our future soldiers. This program must be adaptable and
responsive to our soldiers in the field. The Army's S&T strategy should
be to pursue technologies that will enable the future force while
simultaneously seizing opportunities to enhance the current force.
Question. Do you believe that the Army should increase its level of
investment in S&T programs?
Answer. The Army's planned S&T investments will mature and
demonstrate the key technologies needed to give our soldiers the best
possible equipment now and in the future. Given the current environment
and priorities, I believe our level of investment is appropriate.
Question. What metrics will you use to judge the value of Army S&T
programs?
Answer. The real value of S&T programs is measured in the increased
capability of the force achieved when new technologies are inserted
into systems and equipment. While programs are still in S&T, we use the
standard Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) to determine when
technologies are mature enough to transition.
Question. What role should Army laboratories play in supporting
current operations and in developing new capabilities to support Army
missions?
Answer. From my vantage point, I believe that the S&T community can
support current operations in three ways. First, soldiers are
benefiting today from technologies that emerged from past investments.
Second, the Army should exploit transition opportunities by
accelerating mature technologies from ongoing S&T efforts. Third, we
should also seek to leverage the expertise of our scientists and
engineers to develop solutions to unforeseen problems encountered
during current operations. To enhance the current force, Army S&T
should provide limited quantities of advanced technology prototypes to
our soldiers deployed to the current fight.
Question. How will you ensure that weapon systems and other
technologies that are fielded by the Army are adequately operationally
tested?
Answer. The Army should not field systems that are not safety-
certified nor rigorously tested in an operational environment. Current
systems undergo an operational evaluation conducted by an independent
organization that reports to the Army Chief of Staff. These evaluations
ensure first that every system fielded to our soldiers is safe to use,
and then provide an assessment of system effectiveness, suitability,
and survivability. If I am confirmed, I would work with the Army
testing community to ensure vigorous compliance with applicable testing
standards, including those set forth in Army Regulation, AR 70-1, Army
Acquisition Policy, and DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition
System. I would also work closely with the Army acquisition workforce,
to ensure weapons systems are tested and determined to be suitable,
feasible, safe, and validated to meet the current threat.
Question. Are you satisfied with the acquisition community's
ability to address the operational needs of deployed forces?
Answer. Yes, from my experience it takes more than the acquisition
community to quickly respond to our soldiers' needs in a wartime
environment. The Army is addressing those needs through a process of
requirements validation, funding allocation, and acquisition
activities. The Army has streamlined the acquisition process by
reducing the time required to validate requirements, approve funds, and
develop solutions to meet those requirements. This change in culture
has required all facets of the acquisition process--requirements,
resources, development, test, production, and fieldings--to reduce the
time necessary to complete their tasks. For example, the Army has
addressed our soldiers' need for better Individual Body Armor
capability. It was quickly validated as a requirement and prioritized
for funding to ensure successful systems development and procurement.
To date, the Army has fielded seven versions of the Individual Body
Armor Suite, each better than the last.
Question. What recommendations would you have to speed the ability
for the Army to provide operational forces with the specific systems
and other capabilities that they request?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will continuously monitor the process
from requirements generation, funding, and through the acquisition
process, to provide the soldiers what they need as quickly as we can in
a safe, feasible, suitable, manner within acceptable risk tolerance.
The Army needs to closely examine the emerging threats and operational
requirements of soldiers in theater. I would continue the Army's
commitment to providing our troops the best equipment possible and work
with industry partners to pursue research development and procurement
of the most advanced capabilities available. Finally, I would ensure
that the Army does not purchase or field any system that is not proven,
tested, and validated as operationally ready and safe.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Staff, Army?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
CONTRACT SECURITY FORCES
1. Senator Akaka. General Casey, if confirmed as the Army Chief of
Staff, one of your responsibilities will be to provide independent
military advice to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and
Congress. As such, I am interested in your views regarding reliance on
contractor security forces in Baghdad. When General Petraeus testified
before this committee last week, he indicated that he thought the surge
troop levels would be sufficient even though they are significantly
less than the levels recommended by the Army's counterinsurgency
doctrine. General Petraeus reasoned that because there are tens of
thousands of civilian contract security forces protecting key sites in
Baghdad, the Multi-National Force-Iraq and the Iraqi government would
not have to detail resources to protect these sites. Thus, the addition
of all five U.S. brigades under orders to reinforce Baghdad and the
Iraqi Security Forces either in Baghdad or headed to the city should
provide sufficient military forces to achieve our objective of securing
Baghdad. Since you are the General who is probably most familiar with
the current situation in Baghdad, can you tell us your assessment of
how much we can rely on contract security forces to support our new
mission of making Baghdad more secure? In your answer, please address
the level of operational and tactical control we have on these
contractors, as well as how well-equipped and well-trained they are.
General Casey. We rely on coalition forces and Iraqi security
forces to make Baghdad more secure. They are the ones patrolling the
neighborhoods, interacting with the population, manning the
checkpoints, and responding to crises. Contract security personnel
support this effort by protecting certain fixed sites and key
personnel. Their service is important in the overall effort. They are
trained and equipped by the respective contractor firms. Control is
exercised by their supervisory structure which is guided by the tenets
of the agreed upon contract. My impression has been that they are
prepared for their tasks and that they perform well.
2. Senator Akaka. General Casey, what are the rules of engagement
for the contract security forces relative to insurgents?
General Casey. [Deleted.]
3. Senator Akaka. General Casey, how likely are these contract
security forces to become primary targets for the insurgency as we
implement the President's strategy?
General Casey. I do not believe it is likely that, as we implement
the President's strategy, contract security forces will become primary
targets for the insurgency. Ongoing counterinsurgency operations in
Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq are designed to reduce levels of
violence. Over time, I would anticipate that we will see gradually
improving conditions with reductions in sectarian violence and attacks
on coalition forces. Contract security personnel accept certain risks
inherent in their responsibilities but they are no greater than those
run by members of the coalition forces or the Iraqi security forces.
They are trained and equipped for their missions where they apply risk
mitigation based on their experience and their understanding of the
complex environment. I believe they will continue to face dangerous
situations and periodic attacks, but I do not see them becoming the
primary target of the insurgents.
______
[The nomination reference of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 16, 2007.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of Staff,
United States Army, and appointment to the grade indicated while
assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
U.S.C., sections 3033 and 601:
To be General
George W. Casey, Jr., 1204.
______
[The biographical sketch of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Resume of Service Career of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA
Source of commissioned service: ROTC.
Military schools attended:
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Course
Armed Forces Staff College
Senior Service College Fellowship--The Atlantic Council
Educational degrees:
Georgetown University--BS--International Relations
University of Denver--MA--International Relations
Foreign language(s): None recorded.
Promotions:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates of
Appointment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2LT................................................. 21 Oct. 70
1LT................................................. 21 Oct. 71
CPT................................................. 21 Oct. 74
MAJ................................................. 6 Sep. 80
LTC................................................. 1 Aug. 85
COL................................................. 1 May 91
BG.................................................. 1 Jul. 96
MG.................................................. 1 Sep. 99
LTG................................................. 31 Oct. 01
GEN................................................. 1 Dec. 03
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major duty assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Assignment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Apr. 71......................... Sep. 72........... Mortar Platoon
Leader, later
Liaison Officer,
Headquarters and
Headquarters
Company, 2d
Battalion, 509th
Infantry
(Airborne), 8th
Infantry
Division, United
States Army
Europe, Germany.
Sep. 72......................... Jun. 73........... Platoon Leader, A
Company, 2d
Battalion 509th
Infantry
(Airborne), 8th
Infantry
Division, United
States Army
Europe, Germany.
Jun. 73......................... Oct. 74........... Mortar Platoon
Leader, later
Executive
Officer, A
Company, 1st
Battalion, 509th
Infantry
(Airborne),
United States
Army Southern
European Task
Force, Italy.
Oct. 74......................... Dec. 75........... Student, Ranger
School and
Infantry Officer
Advanced Course,
United States
Army Infantry
School, Fort
Benning, GA.
Dec. 75......................... Apr. 77........... Assistant S-4
(Logistics),
later S-4, 1st
Battalion, 11th
Infantry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO.
Apr. 77......................... Apr. 78........... Commander, C
Company, 1st
Battalion, 11th
Infantry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO.
Apr. 78......................... Dec. 78........... Commander, Combat
Support Company,
1st Battalion,
11th Infantry
Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO.
Dec. 78......................... May 80............ Student,
International
Studies,
University of
Denver, Denver,
CO.
Jun. 80......................... Jan. 81........... Student, Armed
Forces Staff
College, Norfolk,
VA.
Feb. 81......................... Feb. 82........... Department of
Defense Military
Observer, United
States Military
Observer Group,
United Nations
Truce Supervision
Organization,
Jerusalem.
Feb. 82......................... Feb. 84........... S-3 (Operations),
later Executive
Officer, 1st
Battalion, 10th
Infantry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO.
Feb. 84......................... May 85............ Secretary of the
General Staff,
4th Infantry
Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO.
Jul. 85......................... Jul. 87........... Commander, 1st
Battalion, 10th
Infantry, 4th
Infantry Division
(Mechanized),
Fort Carson, CO.
Aug. 87......................... Jul. 88........... Student, United
States Army
Senior Service
College
Fellowship, The
Atlantic Council,
Washington, DC.
Jul. 88......................... Dec. 89........... Congressional
Program
Coordinator,
Office of the
Chief of
Legislative
Liaison,
Washington, DC.
Dec. 89......................... Jun. 91........... Special Assistant
to the Chief of
Staff, Army,
Washington, DC.
Aug. 91......................... May 93............ Chief of Staff,
1st Cavalry
Division, Fort
Hood, TX.
May 93.......................... Mar. 95........... Commander, 3d
Brigade, 1st
Cavalry Division,
Fort Hood, TX.
Mar. 95......................... Jul. 96........... Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-3
(Operations),
later Chief of
Staff, V Corps,
United States
Army, Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany and
Operation Joint
Endeavor,
Hungary.
Jul. 96......................... Aug. 97........... Assistant Division
Commander
(Maneuver), later
Assistant
Division
Commander
(Support), 1st
Armored Division,
United States
Army, Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany and Task
Force Eagle,
Operation Joint
Endeavor Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Aug. 97......................... Jun. 99........... Deputy Director
for Politico-
Military Affairs,
J-5, The Joint
Staff,
Washington, DC.
Jul. 99......................... Jul. 01........... Commanding
General, 1st
Armored Division,
United States
Army Europe and
Seventh Army,
Germany.
Jul. 01......................... Oct. 01........... Commander, Joint
Warfighting
Center/Director,
Joint Training, J-
7, United States
Joint Forces
Command, Suffolk,
VA.
Oct. 01......................... Oct. 03........... Director,
Strategic Plans
and Policy, J-5,
later Director,
The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC.
Oct. 03......................... Jun. 04........... Vice Chief of
Staff, United
States Army,
Washington, DC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of joint assignments:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates Grade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Defense Military Feb. 81-Feb. 82... Major
Observer, United States
Military Observer Group, United
Nations Truce Supervision
Organization, Jerusalem (no
joint credit)
Deputy Director for Politico- Aug. 97-Jun. 99... Brigadier General
Military Affairs J-5, The Joint
Staff, Washington, DC
Commander, Joint Warfighting Jul. 01-Oct. 01... Major General
Center/Director Joint Training,
J-7, United States Joint Forces
Command, Suffolk, VA (no joint
credit)
Director, Strategic Plans and Oct. 01-Jan. 03... Lieutenant General
Policy, J-5, The Joint Staff,
Washington, DC
Director, The Joint Staff, Jan. 03-Oct. 03... Lieutenant General
Washington, DC
Commander, Multi-National Force- Jul. 04-Present... General
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Iraq
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. decorations and badges:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN George W.
Casey, Jr., USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
George W. Casey, Jr.
2. Position to which nominated:
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
3. Date of nomination:
January 16, 2007.
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]
5. Date and place of birth:
22/07/48, Sendai, Japan.
6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Sheila Lynch Casey.
7. Names and ages of children:
Sean Patrick Casey, 35; Ryan Michael Casey, 34.
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
There are no positions other than those listed in the service
record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.
10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Association of the United States Army.
11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
There are no honors or awards other than those listed on the
service record extract provided to the committee by the executive
branch.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
constituted committee of the Senate?
I do.
13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the administration in power?
I do.
______
[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------
Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
George W. Casey, Jr.
This 15th day of January, 2007.
[The nomination of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on February 6, 2007,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on February 8, 2007.]
TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATIONS OF ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN, FOR
REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND; GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE
OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY; AND TO VOTE ON PENDING
MILITARY NOMINATIONS
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m. in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Byrd,
Reed, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, McCain, Warner,
Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Chambliss, Dole, Thune, and
Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearing clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, minority
counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn
N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member;
Derek J. Maurer, professional staff member; David M. Morriss,
minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff
member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F.
Rusten, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley,
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Fletcher L.
Cork, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce
and Benjamin Rinaker, assistants to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd
Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant
to Senator Clinton; Lauren Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Nichole M.
Distefano, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Warner; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins;
D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Clyde A. Taylor
IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to
Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole;
Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; and Stuart
C. Mallory and Bob Taylor, assistants to Senator Thune.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. We have a quorum, and I ask the committee
now--and we've all been notified--to consider the nominations
of 2 general officer nominations and a list of 37 pending
military nominations.
First, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of
Admiral William Fallon for reappointment to the grade of
admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Central Command. Admiral
Fallon testified before the committee on his nomination last
Tuesday.
Is there a motion to favorably report Admiral Fallon's
nomination?
Senator Kennedy. So move.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator McCain. Second.
Chairman Levin. The Clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Kennedy?
Senator Kennedy. Aye.
The Clerk Mr. Byrd?
Senator Byrd. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Lieberman? [No response.]
Mr. Reed?
Senator Reed. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Akaka? [No response.]
Mr. Nelson of Florida? [No response.]
Mr. Nelson of Nebraska?
Senator Ben Nelson. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Bayh? [No response.]
Mrs. Clinton? [No response.]
Mr. Pryor? [No response.]
Mr. Webb?
Senator Webb. Aye.
The Clerk. Mrs. McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. McCain?
Senator McCain. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Warner?
Senator Warner. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Inhofe? [No response.]
Mr. Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Collins?
Senator Collins. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Ensign?
Senator Ensign. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chambliss?
Senator Chambliss. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Graham? [No response.]
Mrs. Dole?
Senator Dole. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Cornyn? [No response.]
Mr. Thune?
Senator Thune. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Martinez?
Senator Martinez. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Aye.
The Clerk. Sixteen ayes, no nays.
Chairman Levin. The motion carries, 16 to 0, and the record
will be kept open for the others. The motion carries.
Next, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of
General George Casey for reappointment to the grade of general
and to be Chief of Staff of the Army.
Is there a motion to favorably report General Casey's
nomination to the Senate?
Senator Kennedy. So move.
Chairman Levin. Second?
Senator Collins. Second.
Chairman Levin. Clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Kennedy?
Senator Kennedy. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Byrd?
Senator Byrd. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Lieberman? [No response.]
Mr. Reed?
Senator Reed. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Akaka? [No response.]
Mr. Nelson of Florida? [No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Nelson of Nebraska?
Senator Ben Nelson. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Bayh? [No response.]
Mrs. Clinton? [No response.]
Mr. Pryor? [No response.]
Mr. Webb?
Senator Webb. Aye.
The Clerk. Mrs. McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. McCain?
Senator McCain. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Warner?
Senator Warner. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Inhofe? [No response.]
Mr. Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Collins?
Senator Collins. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Ensign?
Senator Ensign. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Chambliss?
Senator Chambliss. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Graham? [No response.]
Mrs. Dole?
Senator Dole. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Cornyn? [No response.]
Mr. Thune?
Senator Thune. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Martinez?
Senator Martinez. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Lieberman?
Senator Lieberman. Aye.
The Clerk. Fourteen ayes, three nays.
Chairman Levin. Fourteen ayes, three nays, the motion
carries. The record will be kept open for those who are
missing. The motion will be favorably reported.
Finally, I ask the committee to consider a list of 37
pending military nominations.
Is there a motion to favorably report those 37 nominations?
Senator Kennedy. So move.
Chairman Levin. Second?
Senator Warner. Second.
Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
Senator Warner. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, no. [No response.]
The ayes have it, the motion carries.
Thank you all.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on February 6,
2007.
1. GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, to be general and Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army (Reference No. 177).
2. ADM William J. Fallon, USN, to be admiral and Commander, U.S.
Central Command (Reference No. 181).
3. LTG James M. Dubik, USA, to be lieutenant general and Commander,
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq and Commander, NATO
Training Mission-Iraq, U.S. Central Command (Reference No. 179).
4. BG Thomas W. Travis, USAF, to be major general (Reference No
195).
5. Col. David H. Cyr, USAF, to be brigadier general (Reference No.
196).
6. Col. Douglas J. Robb, USAF, to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 197).
7. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 16 appointments to the grade
of major general and below (list begins with Frank J. Casserino)
(Reference No. 198).
8. In the Air Force, there are six appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Michael D. Jacobson)
(Reference No. 200).
9. In the Air Force, there are 11 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Stuart C. Calle)
(Reference No. 201).
Total: 39.
[Whereupon, at 10:15 a.m., the executive session
adjourned.]
TO CONSIDER CERTAIN PENDING MILITARY NOMINATIONS
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:54 a.m. in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, Bayh, Pryor, Webb, Warner, Inhofe,
Sessions, Collins, Graham, Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell,
professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and
Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M.
Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Micah H.
Harris, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Joseph Axelrad and
Sharon L. Waxman, assistants to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Richard Kessler and Darcie Tokioka, assistants to Senator
Akaka; Sherry Davich and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator
Bill Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew
Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Lauren Henry, assistant
to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator
Webb; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Arch
Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter,
assistant to Senator Collins; Adam G. Brake, assistant to
Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Stuart
C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh,
assistant to Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. We now have a quorum, so I would ask my
colleagues to consider a list of 1,281 pending military
nominations. They have all been before the committee the
required length of time. We know of no objection to any of
them. Is there a motion to favorably report these 1,281
military nominations to the Senate?
Senator Thune. So moved.
Chairman Levin. A second?
Senator Inhofe. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, no? [No response.]
The ayes have it. The motion carries.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on February 27,
2007.
1. In the Marine Corps there are 11 appointments to be brigadier
general (list begins with David H. Berger) (Reference No. 189).
2. In the Air Force Reserve there are 30 appointments to the grade
of major general and below (list begins with Shelby G. Bryant)
(Reference No. 210).
3. Col. Tracy L. Garrett, USMCR to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 214).
4. In the Air Force there are 14 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Gino L. Auteri) (Reference No. 216).
5. In the Air Force there are 15 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Brian E. Bergeron) (Reference No. 217).
6. In the Air Force there are 35 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Brian D. Affleck) (Reference No. 218).
7. In the Air Force there are 24 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with William R. Baez) (Reference No.
219).
8. In the Air Force there are 151 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Kent D. Abbott) (Reference No.
220).
9. In the Air Force there are four appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Anthony J. Pacenta)
(Reference No. 221).
10. In the Air Force there are 51 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Tansel Acar) (Reference No. 222).
11. In the Air Force there are 287 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Brian G. Accola) (Reference No. 223).
12. In the Army Reserve there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Todd A. Plimpton) (Reference No. 224).
13. In the Army Reserve there are two appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Perry L. Hagaman) (Reference No. 225).
14. In the Army there are 84 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with David W. Admire) (Reference No. 226).
15. In the Army there are 129 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with James A. Adamec) (Reference No. 227).
16. In the Army there are 26 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Dennis R. Bell) (Reference No. 228).
17. In the Army there are 157 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Ronald J. Aquino) (Reference No. 229).
18. MG Benjamin C. Freakley, USA to be lieutenant general and
Commanding General, U.S. Army Accessions Command/Deputy Commanding
General for Initial Military Training, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (Reference No. 254).
19. In the Air Force there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Jeffrey M. Klosky)
(Reference No. 256).
20. In the Army Reserve there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Miyako N. Schanley) (Reference No. 257).
21. In the Army there are 72 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Anthony C. Adolph) (Reference No. 258).
22. In the Army Reserve there are 26 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Andrew W. Aquino) (Reference No. 259).
23. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Donald E. Evans, Jr.) (Reference
No. 261).
24. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Jorge L. Medina) (Reference No. 262).
25. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Douglas M. Finn) (Reference No.
263).
26. In the Marine Corps there are three appointments to the grade
of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Charles E. Brown) (Reference
No. 264).
27. In the Marine Corps there are four appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Steven P. Couture) (Reference No.
265).
28. In the Marine Corps there are 94 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Jonathan G. Allen) (Reference No. 266).
29. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of commander
(Mark A. Gladue) (Reference No. 268).
30. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of captain
(Terry L. Rucker) (Reference No. 270).
31. In the Army there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Susan M. Osovitzoien) (Reference No. 273).
32. In the Army there is one appointment to the grade of major (Tom
K. Stanton) (Reference No. 274).
33. In the Army there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Evan F. Tillman) (Reference No. 275).
34. In the Army there are three appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Michael A. Clark) (Reference No. 276).
35. In the Army there are seven appointments to the grade of
colonel and below (list begins with Edward W. Trudo) (Reference No.
277).
36. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Charles E. Daniels) (Reference No. 278).
37. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Brian T. Thompson) (Reference No. 279).
38. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Michael R. Cirillo) (Reference No. 280).
39. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Vernon L. Dariso) (Reference No. 281).
40. In the Marine Corps there are four appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Leonard R. Domitrovits) (Reference No. 282).
41. In the Marine Corps there are nine appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Samson P. Avenetti) (Reference No. 283).
42. In the Marine Corps there are seven appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Jason B. Davis) (Reference No. 284).
43. In the Marine Corps there are six appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Darren L. Ducoing) (Reference No. 285).
44. In the Marine Corps there are four appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Robert T. Charlton) (Reference No. 286).
Total: 1,281
[Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the business meeting adjourned
and the committee proceeded to other business.]
NOMINATIONS OF ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND;
LT. GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, FOR APPOINTMENT TO BE GENERAL
AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH
AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND; AND LTG ROBERT L. VAN ANTWERP, USA,
FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF
ENGINEERS/COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Bill Nelson,
Pryor, Webb, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, and Thune.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan,
professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff
member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Peter
K. Levine, general counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul,
professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Sean G.
Stackley, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler,
professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork and Kevin A.
Cronin.
Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Christopher Caple, Sherry
Davich, and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson;
Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Jennifer Park,
Gordon I. Peterson, and Michael Sozan, assistants to Senator
Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Jeremy Shull,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Mark J. Winter, assistant to
Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; and Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today, the
committee considers the nominations of three distinguished
senior military officers: Admiral Timothy Keating, the nominee
for Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM); General Victor
Renuart, the nominee for Commander, U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD); and General Robert Van Antwerp, the nominee
for Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers. We welcome each of you, congratulate you,
and we also welcome your families, who we will ask you--those
of you who have family members with you--to introduce them
later on because we know that the long hours and the hard work
that is put in by our senior military officials requires
commitment and sacrifice not only from those officials and from
our nominees, but also from their family members, and we
greatly appreciate their willingness to bear and share your
burden and responsibility.
Each of our nominees has served his country in the military
for more than 30 years. Admiral Keating has served as Commander
of the Fifth Fleet, Director of the Joint Staff, and Commander
of U.S. NORTHCOM. General Renuart has flown more than 60 combat
missions, has served as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy
on the Joint Staff, and Senior Military Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense. General Van Antwerp has served as
Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army for Installation
Management and Commandant of the U.S. Army Engineers School at
Fort Leonard Wood. He has an even higher qualification,
however. He is a native Michigander who grew up in Benton
Harbor and St. Joseph and received his master's degree in
engineering from the University of Michigan.
If confirmed, each of our nominees will be responsible for
helping the Department of Defense (DOD) face critical
challenges. Admiral Keating, if confirmed, will take command of
U.S. PACOM, the command which encompasses nearly 60 percent of
the world's population and over half of the Earth's surface and
includes six of the largest military forces, several of the
biggest economies, and the two largest Muslim and democratic
countries. This assignment comes at a time when we face complex
challenges from China and North Korea as well as the continuing
threat of terrorism in Indonesia, the Philippines, and
elsewhere in the region.
General Renuart, if confirmed, will take over U.S.
NORTHCOM, the command which was established after September 11,
2001, to provide for the defense of the United States and, when
directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, for
providing military support to civil authorities. The mission of
this command includes responding to natural disasters like
Hurricane Katrina and manmade disasters such as incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction here at home.
Finally, General Van Antwerp will assume command of the
Army Corps of Engineers. This command is responsible for both
military works, including contracting for Iraq reconstruction,
and civil works, such as repairing levees that have been
damaged, destroyed, or unacceptably maintained in New Orleans
and elsewhere.
I know that our nominees are up to these challenges. They
look forward to assuming these challenges and we look forward
to having them answer some of our questions and then hopefully
a prompt confirmation by the United States Senate.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I agree that
these are men of extraordinary ability. It is impressive,
frankly, to see the educational level and the talent level we
have throughout our military. I do not think it has ever been
higher, but particularly in our general officers. They have had
extraordinary experiences and education.
So I welcome you here. I'm glad to see my former chairman,
Senator Warner. I would be pleased to defer to him, but look
forward to a few questions, Mr. Chairman. I think all of us are
impressed with these nominees and we appreciate your leadership
for America.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, would you like to add
anything?
Senator Warner. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know all
these gentlemen quite well and we are fortunate as a Nation to
have them and their families make this continued contribution
to public service.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Before I call on you for any opening
statement that you each might have and to introduce your
families, let me ask you the standard questions which we ask of
all nominees.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes.
General Van Antwerp. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Admiral Keating. No, sir.
General Renuart. No, sir.
General Van Antwerp. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record in hearings?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views
when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views
differ from the administration in power?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now, Admiral Keating, let me call on you for an opening
statement and introductions.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, could I ask that a statement
by the distinguished ranking member, Senator McCain, be placed
in the record following yours?
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in welcoming Admiral Keating,
Lieutenant General Renuart, and Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, and
their family members, and congratulating them on their nominations.
Admiral Keating, you have had a distinguished career as a naval
aviator, on the Joint Staff, and culminating in your assignment as
Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Your nomination to be
Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) comes at a time of great
challenge and opportunity in the Pacific area of responsibility. North
Korea's nuclear and missile programs continue to pose a threat to its
neighbors and to America's interests in East Asia.
Last week's agreement might be a first step on the path to a
denuclearized Korean peninsula, but that is far from certain. It is
unclear whether North Korea is now truly committed to real
verification, a full accounting of all nuclear materials and
facilities, both plutonium- and uranium-based, and the full
denuclearization that must be the essence of any lasting agreement. As
we observe in the weeks ahead whether Pyongyang is taking initial steps
toward disarmament and sealing its Yongbyon reactor, let us proceed
cautiously. In the meantime, PACOM plays a vital role in providing
stability and deterrence in support of this diplomatic effort.
It also plays a critical role in sustaining and expanding the U.S.-
Japan strategic alliance, the cornerstone of our security umbrella in
northeast Asia. PACOM and the Commander of U.S. Forces Japan must keep
up the robust level of dialogue and ensure elements of our
relationship, such as the Defense Policy Reform Initiative, are on
track. There are a number of ideas circulating about the ways in which
we can strengthen our already robust bilateral ties with Japan, and I'd
note that the ``Armitage II'' report, which was recently released,
addresses this in some detail.
With respect to China, if confirmed, you will have the important
task of taking the measure of a rapidly modernizing military. Cross-
strait relations are relatively calm at the moment, but history
suggests that this delicate relationship, which remains at the core of
U.S. interests in the region requires our close attention. Beijing's
regional and global aspirations are growing, and properly managing this
relationship is vital.
Fortunately, the United States does not face these challenges
alone. One of the vital responsibilities of the PACOM Commander is to
work closely with our key allies in the region--Japan, South Korea,
Australia, to name a few--to strengthen bilateral relations and to
develop multilateral approaches and responses to the challenges and
opportunities that we face in the U.S. PACOM.
General Renuart, you have had an impressive career in the Air Force
and in joint assignments, and I congratulate you on your nomination.
U.S. NORTHCOM is now looked to as the military command that will defend
against another attack on United States soil. If confirmed as Commander
of U.S. NORTHCOM, you will be responsible for defending the Nation
against attacks by hostile forces and for providing critical support to
civil authorities in responding to domestic emergencies, terrorist
attacks, and for designated law enforcement activities.
As our Armed Forces contend with a rigorous tempo of operations
abroad, the Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM must ensure that the command has
the capability to perform its important homeland defense and civil
support missions.
General Van Antwerp, the Corps of Engineers is faced with an
unprecedented level of interest and pressure from Congress and all
Americans in the range of activities this Nation will ask you to carry
out over the next 5 years.
In reviewing your answers to this committee in preparation for this
hearing, I am struck by the magnitude of your mission--providing
emergency repairs to our national levee and dam systems which have
suffered from years of neglect; responding to the engineering needs of
our military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan; and providing the
facilities and infrastructure required for the United States Army to
transform and grow its forces. I trust you will be a Chief of Engineers
who will be able to accomplish all this while ensuring a transparent,
competitive contracting environment provides our taxpayers with the
best value in construction and services.
I thank each of our nominees for their service and look forward to
their testimony today.
Chairman Levin. Admiral Keating.
STATEMENT OF ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES PACIFIC
COMMAND
Admiral Keating. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
committee: It is a great honor to be nominated by the President
to command the United States Pacific Command and I am grateful
for his confidence and I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you this morning.
With me this morning is a woman who brings so much joy to
all of our lives, my wife Wanda Lee Keating. Who cannot be with
us this morning, our son Daniel, who is an F-18 pilot,
lieutenant commander in the Navy down at Virginia Beach, VA.
With us, our daughter Julie and her husband, Commander Paul
Camardella, he too is an F-18 pilot in Virginia Beach, and
their daughter, our granddaughter, Lauren Joy Camardella. My
brother Danby Keating is also with us.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask our senior enlisted
adviser, Sergeant Major Scott Frye, United States Marine Corps,
to stand if I could Mr. Chairman, if it pleases you, I would
like to recognize Sergeant Major Frye, who will retire at the
end of this month, with 32 years of service to his Corps, our
command, and our country.
Thank you, Sergeant Major Frye.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Sergeant Major.
Admiral Keating. In my current role, Mr. Chairman, as
Commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM, I would also like to express
my appreciation to your committee for your abiding support of
our men and women in uniform. During my career I have enjoyed
many deployments on our aircraft carriers to the western
Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Wanda Lee and I lived in Hawaii
during an earlier assignment at PACOM headquarters, and we
lived in Japan for over 2 years while I had the privilege of
commanding our forward deployed carrier battle group.
During those years I have developed a keen appreciation for
the vibrancy and complexity of this vast region. Today the
healthy alliances, positive economic trends, and potential for
U.S.-led regional cooperation make it clear to all of us that
opportunity is abundant in the Pacific.
Japan is a good example of a key United States alliance
that benefits our Nation and the region. The U.S.-Japan
relationship continues to mature and agreements such as the
Defense Policy Review Initiative illustrate the progress we are
making.
PACOM's emphasis on the war on terror, on security
cooperation with allies and partners, on the readiness and
posture of our forward deployed forces, and on our operational
plans seems appropriate to me. If confirmed, I intend to use
these principles as the foundation during my tenure. I am
committed to ensuring the men and women of the command are
ready and are resourced to sustain peace and stability in the
region and to contribute appropriately to U.S. global
commitments.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, if confirmed as Commander of U.S.
Pacific Command, I will seek the counsel and insights of our
allies, partners, and Members of Congress. I will collaborate
with our ambassadors in the region to execute and advance
United States policy goals throughout the Asia Pacific theater.
Mr. Chairman, thank you and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you. I know how much of her
middle name your granddaughter brings to the family. Lauren
Joy's middle name I am sure is very appropriate and we are
delighted to have your granddaughter and her mother and her
grandmother, as well as her grandfather--I never want to leave
out grandfathers--here with us this morning.
Admiral Keating. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. General Renuart.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, FOR
APPOINTMENT TO BE GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
COMMAND
General Renuart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of
the committee. I too am honored to be here today as the
President's nominee to become Commander, NORAD, and Commander,
U.S. NORTHCOM. If confirmed, I look forward to serving in these
key critical roles.
I appear before you knowing that the missions of both of
these commands are demanding and that challenges are great.
Having the homeland as the mission of NORTHCOM and NORAD is
truly a sacred honor and it dictates adherence to the highest
standards of vigilance, service, and integrity, and it is
expected to be such by all of our citizens all of the time.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to recognize the superb
leadership of my good friend, Admiral Tim Keating, NORTHCOM's
current commander. He has forged a really great team and leaves
a legacy as he completes his tour and, I might add, big shoes
to fill.
But I look forward, if confirmed by the committee, to this
challenge. My service on the Joint Staff and in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense has reinforced the value of close
working relationships among the combatant commands, the
military Services, defense agencies, the interagency community,
this committee, and Members of Congress, and, importantly in
this job, the Governors and Adjutants General of the States
across our country.
If confirmed, I will join the men and women of NORAD and
NORTHCOM in dedicating ourselves to the defense of the
homeland. We will continue to work collaboratively with the
other combatant commands. We will work closely with our Federal
and State partners, our interagency partners, the National
Guard, and the countries of Canada and Mexico, with whom we
maintain a close relationship. We will continue to train hard
to execute our mission and we will work hard to ensure that we
never let the country down.
Given the guidance of the President and the Secretary of
Defense, it is a very challenging road ahead, but I look
forward to the opportunity to travel that road.
Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not publicly
recognize my wife, Jill, present here today, for her nearly 36
years of service to our Nation as a military spouse. We are the
proud parents of two sons. Our oldest is a three-tour combat
veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq, a combat rescue helicopter
crew member; and our younger son has served the Nation for 27
months in the Peace Corps and is currently a medical student at
the University of Pennsylvania.
Our military families bear a heavy burden during these
difficult times and it is important always that we honor that
commitment at every opportunity we have.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
opportunity to appear here today and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
General Van Antwerp.
STATEMENT OF LTG ROBERT L. VAN ANTWERP, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF
ENGINEERS/COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS
General Van Antwerp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee. I, too, am honored to appear before you today as
the President's nominee for the Chief of Engineers and the
Commanding General of the Corps of Engineers.
This summer, I will have served 35 years as a soldier and
as an engineer, 34 of those have been with my wife, Paula. She
is not here today because she is with my granddaughter down in
Florida. We have five children: two beautiful daughters, Julia
and Catherine, and three sons. My oldest son, Jeff, is a major
in the Army at West Point. He is an infantry guy. My next son
is Luke and he is a Special Forces captain. Both of them just
came out of Iraq recently for combat tours. My youngest son,
Rob, is a Purple Heart recipient for what he sustained in
combat in Iraq. He is doing well and he is settling near the
Fort Campbell area.
I am a registered professional engineer. I commanded an
engineer battalion in combat, commanded the Los Angeles
District during the Northridge earthquakes and the floods in
Arizona, and commanded the South Atlantic Division of the Corps
of Engineers. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, I was the
installation manager for the Army and then I went and commanded
one of those installations, so I got to grade my own paper.
Finally, right now I am the Commanding General of Accessions
Command, so I am responsible for recruiting and initial
military training for the Army.
The Nation looks to the Corps to meet the engineering needs
of today and have the capability to meet those needs tomorrow.
The Corps is deeply engaged, as you are all aware, now
rebuilding the vital infrastructure in Iraq and Afghanistan and
also in the reconstruction and renovation of the Gulf Coast.
The integrity and professionalism of the Corps is essential
to the confidence of the American people. If I am confirmed as
Chief of Engineers, I will work closely with the
administration, stakeholders, and Congress as I discharge my
leadership responsibilities. I look forward to working closely
with this committee and with other committees that have
oversight in addressing the missions and challenges ahead. If
confirmed, I pledge to provide strong and decisive leadership
for the Corps in its important civil works and military
missions.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement.
Chairman Levin. I thank each of you and again your
families, particularly those in your family who carry on the
military service that you have so nobly and professionally
followed in your own lives.
Admiral Keating, let me begin with you. The Quadrennial
Defense Review identifies China as a likely competitor. Is it a
foregone conclusion that China and the United States would be
at odds over security in the Pacific?
Admiral Keating. I do not think it is a foregone
conclusion, Senator.
Chairman Levin. How do you believe we could minimize that
possible outcome that nobody would like to see?
Admiral Keating. If confirmed, I would intend to pursue a
series of robust engagements with principally the People's
Liberation Army of China, not just in terms of frequency but in
terms of complexity. We would engage in exercises of some
sophistication and frequency and we would pay close attention
to the development of their weapons systems and their
capabilities, with a weather eye on whether they intend to use
those against Taiwan.
Chairman Levin. Given the possibility of political or
military miscalculation between China and Taiwan, what role do
you think the United States military can play in trying to
reduce cross-strait tensions?
Admiral Keating. It goes to the heart of transparency, Mr.
Chairman. I would say that if we deal with some frequency at
several levels with the Chinese, if we exercise with them, all
Services, if we ensure they are aware of our capabilities and
our intent, I think we will go a long way to defusing potential
strife across the Straits of Taiwan.
Chairman Levin. Relative to the Philippines, Admiral, our
military mission in the southern Philippines since 2001 has
been aimed at helping the Philippine military to defeat the Abu
Sayyaf group and to deal with other terrorist groups. Your
predecessors have assured this committee that, ``U.S.
participants will not engage in combat,'' in the Philippines,
without prejudice, of course, to their right of self-defense.
Are you committed to continuing that policy?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I have one other question on that relative
to the Philippines. During hearings before this committee,
General Myers, Admiral Fargo, and Admiral Fallon stated that
U.S. troops would conduct training at the battalion level and
assured us that if there were a decision for U.S. teams to work
at the company level that this committee would be notified, and
they have kept their word. Is that your intent as well?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Relative to Korea, Admiral, give us your assessment, if you
can, from your perspective of the agreement that we apparently
reached with North Korea last month?
Admiral Keating. From what I know, Mr. Chairman, it is
positive and beneficial. We need to have the access to verify
North Korea is upholding their side of the agreement, if you
will. But it appears to be a positive step toward
denuclearization of the peninsula, and that would lead to
stability and peace on the peninsula and that is a worthwhile
goal.
Chairman Levin. General Renuart, NORTHCOM has operational
responsibility for the ballistic missile defense of the United
States. One of the concerns that we have is that deployed
ground-based midcourse defense systems show that they are
operationally effective and reliable. Do you agree, first of
all, that it is essential that any ground-based system be
operationally effective and reliable?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, yes, sir, I do.
Chairman Levin. If you are confirmed and you learn or
believe that this system is not operationally effective and
reliable, will you take prompt steps to inform the committee?
General Renuart. Yes, sir, I will.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that it is important that we
use operationally realistic flight tests to demonstrate the
operational capability of the ground-based system?
General Renuart. Yes, sir, I do.
Chairman Levin. If confirmed, will you work with the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to understand his
view of the operational capability and any limitations on the
ground-based midcourse system?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, I will do that.
Chairman Levin. One of the problems, General Renuart, that
we had before the September 11 terrorist attacks was a lack of
information-sharing among relevant Government agencies.
Congress addressed this problem in our intelligence reform
legislation in 2004 and we want to ensure that information is
being shared as needed to protect our Nation against
terrorists.
Now, I understand that NORTHCOM withdrew its representative
to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) last year
because NORTHCOM and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
found that it was just too hard to get information and
cooperation from the NCTC. It sounds like an unacceptable
situation and it is a problem that would need to be fixed.
If confirmed, how do you plan to address this problem and
to ensure that there is good information-sharing and
cooperation between NORTHCOM and the NCTC?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question
because it is critically important that we have the right
amount and level of intelligence sharing among all the relevant
agencies. I am aware of the move a few months ago to withdraw a
portion of the intelligence elements that were assigned from
NORTHCOM and the DIA. I am aware also that General Maples, the
Director of the DIA, has undertaken now a process to put that
back in place, and if confirmed, I will continue to press hard
for that because I believe that is critically important. The
NCTC really is one of those opportunities we have for
transparency among the Intelligence Community.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
My time has expired.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Keating, thank you for your
service. You were NORTHCOM Commander, which General Renuart
will soon be taking over. In that capacity, you had the
responsibility to manage and launch, if need be, our ground-
based missile defense system; is that correct?
Admiral Keating. That is correct, sir.
Senator Sessions. On July 4, the North Koreans announced or
we identified their launch and saw their launches occur, which
ended up not to threaten the United States. In your opinion,
were we capable of executing a launch of our missile defense
system that, had they had a missile that could have reached the
United States, we could have knocked that down?
Admiral Keating. We were capable. We had exercised and we
were ready that day, Senator.
Senator Sessions. So you were actually prepared to launch,
if need be, and had confidence that, even though we were early
in the process, had a missile threatened the United States, it
could have been knocked down?
Admiral Keating. It is a small point, Senator. The short
answer is yes, sir. I would not have been the authorizing
official that day. The Secretary of Defense was on the line
with us, so I am confident it would have been his decision. But
we were prepared to launch if he had given us the direction.
Senator Sessions. Do you think that experience will be
valuable to you as you, in the Pacific, deal with the theater
missile defense systems that we have on so many of our ships
and other areas?
Admiral Keating. Most assuredly, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. General Renuart, you made a comment about
our testing of last year, September I believe, the last major
test that we had. It was a successful operational test. How
would you evaluate the complexity of that test and its validity
as to establishing that we have a system that will actually
work?
General Renuart. Senator, I am far from an expert on the
technical aspects, but I was able to observe from my position
within the Joint Staff. It is my view that the capabilities of
the system evident in that test would allow us, as Admiral
Keating mentioned, to be effective against a North Korean type
threat.
I think it is important to ensure that if we are going to
fully field the system that we ensure that it has the
capability to be effective against some variety of threats.
Clearly it is not an umbrella and I, if confirmed, will
continue to work for an active operational test process as we
continue to field the system.
Senator Sessions. I agree. I think for a lot of people,
they may not have realized just how much good work has been
done for quite a number of years that would bring us to the
point of being able to knock down an incoming missile. It is
hard for most of us to believe that is possible, but once again
you say it is. We have seen the tests that have been
successful. This last test was a very realistic, whole entire
system test. I think that is important.
General Renuart, as NORTHCOM Commander, you explained to me
as we chatted about your belief that you need to relate
effectively with the National Guard. Would you explain your
mission with regard to homeland security and how you envision
your relationship with the Guard and Reserve?
General Renuart. Thank you, Senator. I think it is
important to understand that in NORTHCOM--its mission
principally is to provide support initially to State and
Federal agencies as they respond to disasters that might occur
throughout the country. But when directed by the President or
the Secretary, we could assume a more active role. So it is
important to ensure that on a day-to-day basis NORTHCOM has
good visibility as the principal combatant command on the
readiness of potential forces that could come to it from both
the Active and the Reserve component, the command must also
understand carefully how the individual States view their
capabilities to respond to a disaster or an emergency; and
given that information, then maintain a close relationship with
the States, the Guard, and the Active component to ensure that
we do have the tools to connect, communicate, and be effective.
Senator Sessions. Thank you and I look forward to your
service and working with you in that regard.
General Van Antwerp, the Corps is an important part of our
Nation's defense and really civil strength. You have a
tremendous background and I know you are going to be successful
in that office. I appreciate the opportunity to chat with you
recently. I am glad to know that you do not feel you have a
legal mandate to write any new manual at this point and that
you understand the sensitivity of the water situation between
the three States in the southeast. Our Governors are working
hard to get an agreement that would be wonderful, and I believe
they can do that and I think it is important that the Corps of
Engineers be a neutral but supportive agency in that process.
Would you agree with that?
General Van Antwerp. I agree, Senator.
Senator Sessions. General Van Antwerp, tell me about,
briefly if you would, how much the Corps has contributed to
Iraq and Afghanistan? I have a very positive impression of
their effectiveness. I believe they responded, maybe because of
their military association and background, in great ways in
those countries, and wonder if there is a possibility in the
years to come that we might expand the Corps in a way that
could help us in these kind of rebuilding efforts, these
nation-building efforts or stability operations that might
occur around the world.
Have you had any thoughts about that?
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir, I do agree. I think the
Corps has contributed greatly. We have the Gulf Region Division
with four different elements of it. We have the northern,
central, and southern divisions, and there is an Afghani
district. They have done wonderful things. What I know is, of
the 4,500 projects in Iraq totaling about $8 billion, that the
Corps has executed 3,400 of those already. Another 900 are in
construction and 200 are in planning and design, so moving well
on their way to completing those. So the Corps has contributed
very much.
To your second part----
Senator Sessions. How much of that do you utilize Iraqi or
Afghani contractors or workers that you supervise, rather than
just do the work yourselves?
General Van Antwerp. That is an excellent question. Today
about 75 percent of the contracts I am told are with Iraqi
contractors and their employees. So the supervision over it is
by the Corps of Engineers, but many of the contractors, the
majority, are Iraqi contractors today.
Senator Sessions. I interrupted you, I think.
General Van Antwerp. Senator, I was just going to address
the second issue of how do we prepare for this for the future,
how do you make sure there are enough emergency management
people and people that could respond quickly. I think it means
you have to keep the expertise in the Corps to do that, and
then you have to have some ability to have people that are
tracking and watching that could deploy without degrading the
rest of your work that you are doing elsewhere.
I think it is something that we need to look at in the
future, for other contingencies how do we have that group of
young people that can get there quickly and get it moving on
the ground.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, we have always known that the military families
are the ones that provide so many of the young men and women
who continue to follow your careers in the military. But I
cannot recall, Mr. Chairman, when we have had three before us
with more outstanding contributions than each of you men in
that. So I again join the chairman and others in commending you
and your respective spouses for providing much-needed quality
talent for our Armed Forces.
Admiral, it is just a pleasure to see you advance to this
position. I think it is no secret for those of us who have had
associations with the United States Navy, it is a tossup
between every officer's desire to be in the position to which
you have been nominated by the President or Chief of Naval
Operations. I will not ask you which you prefer because you are
going to get this one. [Laughter.]
Admiral Keating. My wife has what is called the peanut
butter theory, Mr. Secretary. She says: Put peanut butter in
your mouth, put your tongue against the peanut butter, and do
not talk.
Senator Warner. That is correct. Good advice.
The chairman asked you some questions on North Korea. I
would like to follow up. Apparently the President of South
Korea most recently said that the two nations, if this current
detente with North Korea goes forward and we are able to
achieve the goals that the Six-Party Talks laid down, I mean
all the goals, would like to see the exploration of a peace
treaty to replace the armistice which has been in effect since
1953. It is hard to believe that for over a half century we
have not been able to forge a treaty to once and for all put to
rest that conflict.
Have you had an opportunity to explore that, and do you
have any initial thoughts on the advisability and how it would
impact on the need to continue certain security relationships
with South Korea even if a peace treaty were put in place?
Admiral Keating. Senator, I have not gone into that in any
detail with either Admiral Fallon, his staff, or General Bell
and his staff. If confirmed, that would be something we would
clearly devote considerable interest to if our State Department
were able to table the issue. I am hardly opposed to it, but,
as you say, we have been in an armistice situation for half a
century and it would take some very prudent discussions within
our Government and with our allies in South Korea to go forward
with such a consideration.
Senator Warner. I'm going to let Senator Inhofe go ahead of
me.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Warner, I appreciate it very much.
I just received a notice I have to go to another committee.
There are a couple of things real briefly if I could just
mention----
Senator Warner. Go ahead, take your time.
Senator Inhofe. First of all, General Renuart, Senator
Sessions was talking before we came in, so I do not know how
far you got into this. I have talked to you about this,
personally I think one of the greatest responsibilities you are
going to have is the ballistic missile defense. I just guess I
would ask you if you believe that we are adequately at a level
that is a comfort level for you in terms of threats from North
Korea, China, Russia, or wherever they might come from?
General Renuart. Senator, I would be careful to say at a
comfort level because I am still really just learning all of
the breadth of the capability. If confirmed, I would really
dive into that in much greater detail. But my initial
impression is that, and based on the capabilities that we saw
over the July 4 weekend when we had the intention to defend, I
think we have a very good capability for the threat we see
today, but I think that threat is growing and it is important
to continue the testing to ensure that the system when fielded
is capable of meeting all the goals.
Senator Inhofe. What I would like, and I know Senator
Sessions and maybe some other members of this committee, have
always been very interested in this. When you are entrenched,
when you get in there and have a chance for a total evaluation,
just come forth, be very honest with us as to what resources
you need, because I think that is one of the greatest threats
that we have out there.
By the way, Senator Warner and I were talking about all
three of you having kids in there and you, General Van Antwerp,
with three, and one was injured. We are just very proud of you.
To me, I look at the three of you and I think of that as being
kind of an American tradition that goes from generation to
generation. We are very proud.
With the 92,000 or so increases that are going to be coming
in the new combat units, you are going to have to have new
support. Are you satisfied with the resources and of being able
to accommodate that?
General Renuart. I am sorry, Senator? For me?
Senator Inhofe. No, I am talking about General Van Antwerp
right now.
General Van Antwerp. Accommodate?
Senator Inhofe. The new responsibilities that come with the
increased number of combat units that are going to come with
the 92,000 increase.
General Van Antwerp. Right. The Army's portion of that is
65,000, and part of that is in our restationing plan. Of course
you have to have the facilities and everything that goes with
this, and it is very much linked with base realignment and
closure as far as movement of people. But we do have a plan for
the stationing of all those units and the building of those
units through 2012.
Senator Inhofe. I want you to repeat the numbers that you
used in response to Senator Sessions' question. I was kind of
impressed with that when you talked about the number of
projects and the amount of money and where you are with that.
General Van Antwerp. This is in Iraq. The Corps was
assigned 4,500 projects for the tune of about $8 billion. Thus
far they have completed 3,400 of those projects. Then the rest
of them, there are 900 projects that are under construction and
another 200 projects that are in some stage of planning and
design.
Senator Inhofe. Using the Iraqis for a lot of this work?
General Van Antwerp. Right, for about three-quarters of it.
Senator Inhofe. The only other thing I wanted to--and I
told General Keating I would do this--we have been very active
in both the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program and the section 1206 and 1207 train and equip
programs. The IMET program at one time had the restriction on
it, which we have now lifted, because we were assuming that the
international officers were the ones who were benefiting from
such a program. It appears to me as I see people coming over
here in droves for training that is the best money that we can
spend, particularly in your new area of responsibility.
I would like to know your level of interest with the IMET
program and also the train and equip program, because that will
continue to be a discussion of this committee.
Admiral Keating. Senator, we are vitally interested in the
IMET program. Since our discussion, we went back and there are
over 20 heads of service or chiefs of defense who are in
position or who have recently retired in foreign militaries who
have attended just the National War College. That is a dramatic
dividend on a relatively small investment. The understanding of
tactics, techniques, and capabilities that is developed as
those officers attend our school is profound.
As far as train and equip, you have given PACOM the
authority, in collaboration with the State Department, to
expend money in a fairly short timeline to countries in the
particular area of maritime security, Malaysia and Sri Lanka.
The benefits of that investment can perhaps be measured by
Lloyd's of London reducing premiums for ships transitting the
Straits of Malacca from wartime premiums to something below
that. We think that is a direct reflection of the investment we
have made under section 1206.
Senator Inhofe. I can only say, and I say this also to my
friends on the committee, that if we do not really utilize the
advantages that come with an IMET program, China is doing it.
Admiral Keating. Right.
Senator Inhofe. They have an exhaustive program right now
that--I would just like to beat them to the punch.
Senator Warner, thank you for allowing me to infringe upon
your time.
Senator Warner. No, not at all. I am going to be here
throughout the hearing.
I want to associate myself with my distinguished
colleague's support for the IMET program. All of us who have
had many years on this committee--and the three here have been
here for a couple of decades--recognize as we travel and visit
other nations, which is our responsibility, particularly on the
Armed Services Committee, how proud some of these foreign
officers are to step up and say: I am a product of America's
IMET educational system. It is a sense of confidence that we
have in that officer and his ability to hopefully strengthen
the ties between his nation or her as the case may be, and the
United States.
Senator Inhofe. I would say particularly now also in
Africa, they are so proud to be a product. It is a great
program.
Senator Warner. Senator, there is no one here that has
logged more time traveling in those distressed areas of Africa
than you.
Mr. Chairman, I think I will pick up if I may. One of your
colleagues appeared, but then disappeared.
Chairman Levin. Please.
Senator Warner. Admiral Keating, your predecessor worked
very closely with the committee through the years and we
anticipate no less on your part. But one of the things that I
always admired was his initiatives to do the proactive approach
to advancing U.S.-Chinese military-to-military relations. This
is extremely important, particularly as China now is, in a very
strong and forceful way, increasing its military capabilities
and spreading its influence throughout the world.
I look back on the days when we were dealing in the Cold
War and we always had the feeling that the senior military and
the Soviet Union at that time were individuals that would
carefully think through all options for initiating certain
actions, most particularly anything related to the strategic
use of those assets. I just hope that you will carry on in that
context.
Do you feel there is an opportunity to pick up where he
left off and expand?
Admiral Keating. You bet, Senator. A huge potential here
and, if confirmed, we will do our best to capitalize on that
opportunity.
Senator Warner. In the most intense chapters of the Cold
War, there was always a sense of confidence in the quality, the
ability, and the judgment of the senior military. We simply, at
least from my perspective, I do not know that we have that
insight into China. There seems to me such a veil of secrecy
and withdrawal that it is going to take some forceful
initiatives on your part.
Which brings me to, when you and I visited most recently we
talked about the history of the Incidents at Sea, the agreement
that we have between, in this case, the Navy of the United
States and the navy of the former Soviet Union. Currently that
agreement is still in effect, because there was a tragic event
when we had the clash of the aircraft and that confrontation.
Had that framework been in place, I think we would have been
able to work our way through that situation more expeditiously,
and indeed we may well have prevented it, because that concept
of agreement is to recognize the potential and the requirement
of both militaries, to do surveillance, but do it in a way that
those assets, be they ships or aircraft, are not likely to have
actual contact and confrontation.
Will you continue to take a look at that?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. If confirmed, we will undertake
an aggressive, but measured and reasonable, approach as we can
to the senior military leadership, and not just the senior
military leaders, but at as many levels as we can with the
Chinese military, and it goes to IMET, so as to develop
relationships, an understanding, and a common bond and to
continue the exercises that PACOM has underway. They have done
two search and rescue exercises within the past couple years.
As you say, Senator, those would likely have led to a different
outcome of the EP-3 incident if it were to occur now, and it is
unlikely that it would occur.
Senator Warner. General Renuart, this committee had a great
deal to do with the establishment of the legislation which
created the 55 Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams
to ensure that each State and territory of the United States
has at least one team. Some of the larger States have more than
one. To date 47 of these teams have been certified by DOD as
mission capable. States will also depend on the National Guard,
the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear high yield
explosive (CBRNE) enhanced weapons response force package, and
the CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package teams available to
each in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) areas.
You are going to pick up from Admiral Keating and we are
fortunate today that he is present, because we know full well
of the achievements that he had. But I do hope that you
contin