[Senate Hearing 110-369]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-369
THE STATE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 15, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The State of the United States Army
november 15, 2007
Page
Geren, Hon. Preston M. ``Pete'', III, Secretary of the Army...... 7
Casey, GEN George W., Jr., USA, Chief of Staff, United States
Army........................................................... 15
(iii)
THE STATE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Commmittee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Byrd,
Reed, Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Pryor, Webb, Warner,
Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Cornyn, Thune, Martinez, and Corker.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Michael J.
Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel;
Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and William K. Sutey,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; Sean G.
Stackley, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki,
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Jessica L.
Kingston, Benjamin L. Rubin, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator
Byrd; Frederick M. Downey and Colleen J. Shogan, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Andrew R.
Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey,
assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to
Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Stuart C.
Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Stacie L. Oliver,
assistant to Senator Corker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Today, Secretary Geren and General Casey testify before our
committee on the state of the Army. Secretary Geren testified 8
months ago, on March 15, along with then-Chief of Staff,
General Schoomaker, at the annual Army posture hearing. General
Casey, no stranger to the Senate, is testifying for the first
time before the full committee as Army Chief of Staff.
We welcome you both and we thank you for your service.
Over the last 8 months since Secretary Geren testified, the
Army's committed even more forces to the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Thousands more soldiers have deployed to those
wars, hundreds more have died, and thousands more have been
injured, many of them critically. These soldiers, their marine
counterparts, their families, have borne the greatest burdens
of these wars, and we owe them our heartfelt thanks.
Less than one-half of 1 percent of Americans, volunteers
all, are fighting these wars while the vast majority of
Americans go about their daily lives, largely unaffected and
uninvolved. Yet, while Americans differ in their opinions about
the war in Iraq, all Americans recognize and honor the bravery,
self-sacrifice, and devotion to duty of our soldiers and their
families; indeed, that of all of our military personnel and
their families. Recognizing and honoring the soldiers and their
families is not enough. All of us, no matter how we voted on
authorizing the war and whether we've been critics or
supporters of the President's handling of the war, are
determined to see that our troops and their families are
supported in every possible way.
The pending National Defense Authorization Bill is an
effort to do that, providing, as it does, a 3\1/2\ percent
across-the-board pay raise, enhanced education-assistance
benefits for reservists, increased hardship-duty pay,
authorizing end-strength increases for the ground forces, fully
funding operations and maintenance (O&M) accounts, adding
substantial additional funding for critical force-protection
equipment, and supporting Army transformation.
Guiding our continuing efforts to support our troops must
be an honest assessment of where we are, in terms of military
readiness and investment in capabilities, present and future.
We need our military leaders, in uniform and out of uniform, to
help us help them by giving us the unvarnished truth as they
see it about the state of the military and what needs to be
done, no matter how costly or how politically popular or
unpopular.
The Army has been engaged in Afghanistan for over 6 years,
and it is now in its fifth year of war in Iraq. None of the
rosy predictions have come true. In fact, with the recent
surge, the number of soldiers engaged in Iraq has approached
previous high-level marks. Some Army units are on or entering
their third year of Afghanistan or Iraq service, and some
individual soldiers are on their fourth.
According to recent press reports, Admiral Mullen, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meeting with Army
captains at Fort Sill last month, found the most prevalent
concern was the impact on those soldiers and their families of
the repeated deployments of 15 months, with 12 or fewer months
home between rotations. One captain said, ``We have soldiers
that have spent more time in combat than World War II. Is there
a point where you can say,'' he said, ``that you've had
enough?''
The heaviest burden in this war has fallen on the ground
forces and on their families, and we simply must find a way, as
General Casey has said, to bring the Army back in balance so
that the demand for soldiers does not exceed, and continue to
exceed, the supply. To do that, it is essential to turn over
responsibility for internal security more quickly to Iraqi
forces, and to reduce U.S. force levels in Iraq, or we will not
achieve that balance.
The impact of the wars has affected the Army in many ways.
In order to sustain the necessary high readiness levels in our
deployed forces, the readiness of our nondeployed forces has
steadily declined. Equipment and people are worn out. Most of
those nondeployed units are not ready to be deployed.
Consequently, getting those units reset and fully equipped and
trained for their rotation to Iraq or Afghanistan is that much
more difficult and risky. Getting those units equipped and
trained for all potential conflicts, including high-intensity
combat, is virtually impossible and is not being done. This
Nation faces a substantially increased risk, should those
forces be required to respond to other full-spectrum
requirements of the national military strategy. The surge of
additional forces to Iraq earlier this year puts even more
pressure on an already strained readiness situation.
Long before the President announced his new strategy in
Iraq, military leaders raised questions about the Nation's
readiness to deal with other contingencies. In his testimony to
this committee last February, General Schoomaker was direct in
his concern for the strategic depth of our Army and its
readiness. He was clear in his apprehensions about the short-
and long-term risks resulting from the lower readiness levels
of our nondeployed forces. General Casey sounded a similar
alarm in his recent testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee. I believe the current situation is intolerable,
there can be no excuse for subjecting this Nation to that
degree of risk.
In a marked change of position for the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Army, earlier this year, proposed increasing
its Active Duty end strength by 65,000 soldiers, to 547,000,
over the next 5 years. General Casey has said that he wants to
shorten that time by 2 years. In year 5 of the Iraq war, the
proposed increases have come late, despite the proposals for
increases from Senators on this committee over the past several
years, proposals that the DOD previously opposed. But, even
with General Casey's efforts to speed up the process, few of
these proposed additional soldiers would be trained and ready
to help relieve the stress on the Army in the next year or two.
Plus, there are many who say even those increases are
sufficient for the strategy the Army must be prepared to
execute over the long term.
When increasing end strength, recruiting and retention
become ever more critical. While quantity is, of course,
important, quality must remain the highest priority. The Army
must continue to uphold high standards--moral, intellectual,
and physical--for new recruits, to ensure that these young men
and women are capable of handling the great demands that they
will face.
The committee is concerned that the Army is relaxing
recruiting standards and approving more waivers in order to
meet requirements. The press report cited earlier said that
another one of those captains in the meeting with Admiral
Mullen who said the following: ``concern over the Army's
growing practice of granting waivers to recruits for legal and
health problems,'' saying that he spent 80 percent of his time
dealing with the 13 ``problem children,'' as he put it, in his
100-person unit, some of whom went absent without leave or had
been methamphetamine dealers.
It has been reported that 18 percent of new recruits this
year required a waiver, up by half from 2 years ago, and that
recruitment from category 4, the least skilled category, has
increased eightfold over the past 2 years. We cannot allow the
Army to reach the state of the hollow Army of the 1970s. We
must find a way to both increase the size of the Army and to
maintain its standards.
Had we started in earnest to grow the Army even 4 years
ago, our forces today would be less stressed and more ready. We
must guard against merely creating a larger version of a less-
ready force. Army plans for expansion must be comprehensive,
detailed, and fully resourced.
The Secretary of the Army must marshal the necessary
resources to meet this challenge. Congress must understand what
is needed to bring our ground forces to the level of strength
and readiness necessary to avoid the unacceptable risks and
readiness shortfalls that exist today.
As daunting as it is to meet the current readiness
challenge, we must also modernize our Army to meet our
readiness requirements and our national security requirements
into the future, and we must do so intelligently. In doing so,
we must not fail to capture the lessons learned since the end
of the Cold War and apply those lessons to building the force
of the future.
Although it appears somewhat fashionable to question the
relevance of ground forces prior to September 11, that can
hardly be the case now. The reality of warfare in the 21st
century demands both the high intensity force-on-force combat,
as characterized in the early weeks of the Iraq war, and the
grinding, all-encompassing stability and support and
counterinsurgency operations of the last few years. The answer
is not one mission or the other; the Army must be prepared to
do both. Almost all types of warfare require, in Army parlance,
``boots-on-the-ground,'' they require an Army that is optimally
organized, trained, and equipped for anything that we might ask
it to do. The challenge for the Army, for this Nation, and for
Congress, is sustaining an Army fully engaged in current
operations of all varieties, while also modernizing and
transforming that Army to meet future threats.
This hearing will, hopefully, help us understand the state
of the Army today and what needs to be done to ensure an Army
that is ready for all of its potential missions, both today and
in the future. The Army and Congress owe nothing less to the
soldiers, their families, and to the American people.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Geren and General Casey, thank
you for testifying before the committee today on the state of the Army.
You both have enjoyed long and distinguished careers serving this
Nation and I appreciate your patriotism. General Casey, as Commander of
Multinational Forces-Iraq, you and I disagreed on the initial execution
of the war in Iraq. Thankfully, the strategy I advocated for the first
3 years of this war--a counterinsurgency strategy--prevailed and we are
winning. I just regret that we wasted so much time on a strategy that
was doomed from the start, but now we're succeeding. Overall violence
is down 55 percent since June; civilian deaths are down 75 percent and
we will begin to reduce our footprint there according to the situation
on the ground. Despite our recent successes, the fight against radical
Islamic extremism will remain the national security challenge of our
time. Iraq is the central front of this conflict according to General
Petraeus and our enemies.
I commend General Petraeus and all of the soldiers, airmen and
marines under his command. However, I want to commend the Army in
particular. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a tremendous
toll on all our brave men and women in uniform. No Service, active-duty
and reservists, has been asked to do more than the Army. It has been
the backbone in our fight against Islamic extremism in Iraq and
Afghanistan. I am grateful for each and every one of these soldiers for
their service, their sacrifice and patriotism.
We are winning in Iraq precisely because we have a strong, agile,
and capable Army, but if we are to claim victory in this war and meet
the challenges that will continue to confront us in the 21st century--
we must grow the Army. Much of the reason, the Army is seriously
overstretched is because it has been underfunded for decades.
Just as we did at the start of the Cold War, we must anticipate and
prepare for future challenges and not resign ourselves to the paradigms
of the past. Our Armed Forces are seriously overstretched and under
resourced. I have called for an increase in the U.S. Army and the
Marine Corps from the currently planned level of roughly 750,000 troops
to 900,000 troops. While the enemy we confront threatens the freedom,
peace and security, we tend to take all too often for granted,
recruitment cannot rely solely on patriotism. Recruitment requires more
resources and it will take time but it must be done and it must be done
now.
Along with more personnel, our military, the Army specifically
needs more equipment to make up for recent losses and it needs to
update current equipment and facilities. We can offset some of this by
cutting wasteful spending and choosing to help the troops rather than
earmarking billions of dollars for pet projects and special interest.
We can afford to spend more on defense. Currently, we spend less than 4
cents of every dollar that our economy generates on defense, that's
less than what we spent during the Cold War. We face a formidable
adversary--one who is determined to destroy us and our way of life.
These radical Islamists are not afraid to die, nor do they
differentiate between soldiers or civilians in their effort to incite a
global jihad. We must accelerate the transformation of our military;
build a larger and more nimble Army that is fully-capable of deploying
without calling up Reserve units. We must invest and configure the Army
to fight the enemies of the future not the past. For years, I've call
for a larger Army. Now that the Army is at its near breaking point we
realize what it will take to confront our enemy, on our terms, and
destroy him.
But we don't just need more soldiers, we need more soldiers with
the skills necessary to help friendly governments and their militaries
resist our common foes. The Army should have at least 20,000 soldiers
dedicated to partnering with militaries abroad. We also need to
increase the number of U.S. personnel available to engage in Special
Forces Operations, civil affairs activities, military policing, and
military intelligence. We need a nonmilitary deployable police force to
train foreign forces and to help maintain law and order in states on
the verge of collapse.
It has taken us too long and too many lives for us to get it right
in Iraq. Now that we are on the right path, it would be a national
disgrace for us not to learn from the mistakes of the past and
vigorously ensure they are not made in the future. For years, I have
warned administrations of both parties that any major conflict ran the
risk of breaking our military, particularly the U.S. Army. I hope,
today, we all understand the grave consequences of inaction and are
prepared to take the steps necessary to enhance our national defense
and ensure that none of our brave men and women are ever sacrificed in
vain.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just agree with a couple of things that you said, in
terms of our readiness. It happens that I was chairman of the
Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee during the 1990s,
when we downgraded the military. I can remember, many times,
going to the floor of the Senate and saying that we'll rue the
day and the euphoric attitude that, ``The Cold War is over, we
don't need a military anymore.'' So, the readiness went down,
modernization went down, end strength went down, and we're
paying for it now. Nobody knew that September 11 would take
place. Nobody knew that we'd be in this long, arduous war.
But I'll say this. You made reference to the hollow
military of the Carter administration. A lot of the same things
are going on today. We had to build up, and build up fast. It
wasn't easy to do. I've been over there probably more than any
other member has, 15 times in the area of responsibility. I'm
going to be going to Afghanistan, Mr. Chairman, a couple of
weeks from now. Every time I go, I see something that surprises
me even more. I was a product of the draft, and I've always
felt that we wouldn't be able to sustain the things we're doing
today without having compulsory service. But I was wrong. I see
these kids out there, and I see the commitment that they have,
and I see, particularly since the surge, the two or three times
that I've been there since then, to see not just the attitude
of our troops that are over there--but the fact that they are
now living with and working with the Iraqi security forces
(ISF), and they're developing intimate relationships, and we're
seeing the imams and the clerics no longer giving anti-American
messages in their weekly mosque meetings. I think a lot of that
is due to the fact that this has happened. The surge clearly
has worked.
I was gratified, yesterday, when up in room S-407 of the
Capitol, the secure room--even though that's classified, a lot
of the details are not classified--the fact that our improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) are down 65 percent, attacks are down
50 percent, casualties are down by 50 percent.
My major concern now is that things are going well, and
we're going to be able to tough it out. In your opening
statements, you say something about the re-enlistments and some
of the figures that we're having that are very, very favorable
right now--but I would hope, also, that we keep in mind that we
have to continue with the modernization program. I don't want
the Future Combat System (FCS) program to suffer as a result of
what we're going through right now, because we have to prepare
for the future.
I remember my last year in the House of Representatives on
the House Armed Services Committee--it was 1994--I remember,
someone testified--they said, ``In 10 years, we will no longer
need ground troops.'' That's what they said. So, I have felt
that if the American people's expectations are high--and I
believe that we should have the best of everything--best on the
ground, best in the air, best strike vehicles, best lift
vehicles--that we should be prepared to have a larger
percentage of our gross domestic product (GDP) to go into the
military.
I would hope that we can keep online with the FCS programs
and these good things that you guys are doing.
I just can't think of a better way to compliment the two of
you than to say you're the best that there are, and you're
doing a great job, and America appreciates you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Secretary Geren?
STATEMENT OF HON. PRESTON M. ``PETE'' GEREN III, SECRETARY OF
THE ARMY
Secretary Geren. Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe, thank you
very much for the opportunity to appear before your committee,
and I appreciate the opportunity to talk with you and other
members of the committee.
Mr. Chairman, I have a written statement I would like to
submit for the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
Secretary Geren. You talked, in your opening statement, Mr.
Chairman, about the strong bipartisan support our Army has. We
certainly do have that, and, on behalf of the Army, I want to
thank this Congress for your support.
I recently met with the senior military leader of the
British Army, and he was lamenting what a poor relationship
they had with their parliament, and, frankly, with the British
people, and how difficult it was to get them to cooperate with
the British Army in meeting their needs and understanding their
concerns. I told him, ``We don't have that problem.'' We're
very grateful for the partnership that we have with the United
States Congress and our United States Army. Thank you all very
much for that.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Secretary Geren. I also want to thank members who regularly
go visit the troops all around the world. As you well know,
that means a tremendous amount to the troops. It's important
for them to be able to talk to you firsthand. All of you use
your very scarce time to get out around the world, and they
appreciate it very much.
We're here today to talk about the strategic direction for
the Army. I'd like to just summarize some of the points that I
made in my written statement.
I'd like to talk about four areas that are very important
for the long-term strategic needs of the Army: one; health care
issues, taking care of soldiers who have borne the battle;
contracting issues; support to families, Mr. Chairman, as you
discussed in your opening statement; and then I'd like to just
conclude briefly with--talking about our need for predictable
funding, and particularly for the supplemental that's in front
of Congress now.
Out of calamity comes opportunity. Those of us who have
been in the political world understand that, when crisis comes,
it gives us an opportunity to do some things that we couldn't
do without that crisis. It gives the political energy, the
bureaucratic energy, to take on some hard issues and make some
changes that are necessary, that we would never get around to,
were it not for that.
Unfortunately, we've had two calamities that have exposed
some weaknesses in our Army; and we're using those calamities
to seize the opportunity.
One, well known to this committee, an area that you all
have worked so aggressively in, is in the area of health care.
What happened at Walter Reed, now nearly a year ago, has given
us an opportunity to totally transform the military health care
system, the government's disability system, something that we
needed to do, and we are seizing this opportunity. Mr. Chairman
and other members of the committee, we thank you for the work
that you all have done in this area, as well. We look forward
to continuing to work together.
Our approach to the problems that surfaced at Walter Reed
were on two fronts. One was: fix the immediate problem. In
response to that, we have created an entirely new system for
meeting the needs of our outpatients and wounded warriors.
We've put 35 Warrior Transition Units (WTU) all across the
country. You all have at your desk, it looks like a small
thing, but it's a very important change in the way we run our
WTUs. A different mission statement on the front, that talks
about the job of the soldier who is in the WTU. Then, on the
back is that soldier's chain of command. So, every soldier in
the WTU knows who to call if he or she has a problem. This was
a suggestion that came from Congress--have an 800 number for
all of our folks in our health care system, and we've created a
triad in support of all those soldiers.
We also have learned what we don't know about Traumatic
Brain Injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Congress has been very generous in providing us funds, and we
are making great progress, but we still have a ways to go.
Reform of the disability system, this is something that
Congress, DOD, and the administration are working hard on. We
are beginning a pilot program, November 26, in the national
capital region, to experiment with a single physical and other
innovations.
Second area: contracting. We have unfortunately learned the
hard way--that our contracting system was not up to meeting the
needs of the Army in this century. Right now--or in 2007, the
Army did 25 percent of all contracting for the entire
government, $111 billion.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Geren, I hate to do this to you,
but we have a quorum, and it's very much to the advantage of
the Secretary to have some of our business done while we have a
quorum.
Secretary Geren. I understand that.
Chairman Levin. So, I'm going to take this opportunity,
since a quorum is present and one of our members must leave,
which would end our quorum. [Recess.]
Thank you. Please continue Secretary Geren.
Secretary Geren. On the subject of contracting, we also
found ourselves with some very serious problems, primarily in
theater, in the Kuwait contracting which led to reactions on
two fronts by us. One was to put a task force in place that
worked to immediately stop the bleeding. But, as with the
health care challenge, we are also looking long-term. What have
we learned from this, and what can we do to fix the contracting
system? What we've learned from the work of Dr. Gansler in the
Commission, it's a problem that we have in the Department of
Army, a problem we have in the DOD, and, frankly, a problem
that extends across the government. We need to do a better job
of developing professional acquisition and contracting
officers, provide the resources, the training, and valuing the
invaluable role that these acquisition and contracting officers
provide to our government. So, this is an area where we'll be
doing a great deal of work.
As we look to this era of persistent conflict, and we look
at how we are organized, trained, and equipped for conflict
today, this one-to-one ratio of contractors to deployed forces
is no aberration. The outsourcing that we've done as a result
of the downsizing we did in the 1990s, this large size of the
contracting workforce is a part of the future of our Army, and
we have to do a better job of organizing, training, and
equipping, and coordinating the work of those contractors in
support of our soldiers.
Lastly; families. Mr. Chairman, you spoke of this. We are
in the 7th year of war in Afghanistan, over 4\1/2\ years of war
in Iraq. This is the third longest conflict in United States
history, behind the Vietnam War and the Revolutionary War. It's
the longest conflict we have ever fought with an All-Volunteer
Force, by quite a long shot. We're in uncharted waters, both
for the soldiers and for the families.
This All-Volunteer Force is a different Army than we've
ever had before, when you look at the demographics. Over half
of the soldiers are married, and more than half of those
spouses work outside the home. The support that we provided to
those key members of the All-Volunteer Force over the first 25
years doesn't work as we move into the 7th year of conflict. We
have to do a better job of supporting those families.
One of the things that we've done recently--and you also
have one of these at your desk--across the entire Army, all 154
camp, posts, and stations around the world, we are entering
into a Covenant with the Families--the commanders at each
facility are signing this covenant; General Casey and I signed
it here, and have been traveling around the world and signing
it with soldiers--but, recognizing the importance of the
families and the health of our All-Volunteer Force. Our
families are volunteers. Our soldiers are volunteers, but our
families are volunteers, as well, and our system must do a
better job of supporting those families.
We moved $100 million out of our budget, last summer, into
family programs in 2008, with the supplemental, and the base,
we've moved $1.4 billion into family programs. We ask your
support for those initiatives, but also ask your help as we
consider innovative ways to support families, that critical
part of our All-Volunteer Force.
Let me just conclude with a brief comment on the
supplemental. Through our appropriations, we received $27
billion in O&M funds. We spend roughly $6.6 billion a month, if
you look at the Army's O&M and look at the funding that we
provide to global war on terror. Very quickly, we run through
the resources that are available to us. When the President
signed the Appropriations Bill, it stopped the other source of
funding for the global war on terror. Secretary Gates has told
us to start planning for what we're going to do if we reach the
point where we do run out of our O&M funding, and start making
plans for what we, as an Army, would do to deal with that
eventuality.
Last year, we had bridge funding that helped us through
this period. This year, we don't have that funding. So, we know
there are many issues you all are working through regarding
that supplemental, but it's very important for us to be able to
provide the orderly and reliable support to our soldiers, for
us to get that funding.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Geren. Thank you, members of the committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Geren follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Pete Geren
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, I want to thank you for inviting
General Casey and myself to appear before you today to discuss the
Army's strategic imperatives.
I'd also like to thank all of you for your unwavering support of
our soldiers and their families. I know they appreciate your ongoing
efforts to provide them not only with the ways and means to achieve the
strategic objectives that our Nation demands, but also to improve their
quality of life. Congress has been a partner in creating the remarkable
Army we have today; we need the continued support of Congress and this
committee to support and sustain it.
Today, I'd like to discuss how our work with the Congress can help
the Army execute its critical missions and achieve the four imperatives
essential to the success of the Army. Those imperatives are:
Sustain our soldiers, families, and Army civilians;
Prepare our soldiers for success in the current
conflict;
Reset the force expeditiously for future
contingencies; and
Transform the Army to meet the demands of the 21st
century.
Every issue I discuss with you this morning falls under one of
those imperatives. They are crucial to the future of the Army and
General Casey and I will work as a team to implement them. But we can't
do it alone. We need Congress to be part of that team.
In September, I visited soldiers and units in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Kuwait, and Germany. As you all have seen on your own congressional
delegations, our units, and their leaders, and most especially our
great soldiers, continue doing a superb job under the most challenging
conditions. Their courage and service are truly inspiring.
We are now into the 7th year of major combat operations in the
global war on terror, making this the third longest war in American
history, after the Revolutionary War and Vietnam. This is also the
first extended conflict since the Revolution to be fought with an All-
Volunteer Force.
To be sure, our Army is being stretched to meet the demands of the
current conflict. The Army has over 150,000 soldiers in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Kuwait, including approximately 16 percent Army
National Guard and Reserve soldiers. Since the beginning of combat
operations, over 550,000 soldiers have served in combat zones; over
200,000 have been deployed multiple times. Our All-Volunteer Force is a
national treasure, but after 6 years of major combat operations, it is
in uncharted waters. We are adapting our policies, programs, and
investments to reflect the realties of this era of persistent conflict.
The All-Volunteer Force is 34-years-old. Some of you may recall
that in its very first decade it struggled with many difficulties
including military pay that was inadequate to sustain a force of
volunteers. In the early 1980s, Congress increased pay a total of 26
percent and has sustained competitive pay since that time. Today, the
strain of multiple deployments on soldiers requires us likewise to work
together to adapt in a way that ensures the health and well-being of
the All-Volunteer Force.
Despite our many challenges, our soldiers remain the best-trained,
best-led, and best-equipped force we have ever put in the field. Our
soldiers count on their Army leadership to provide them the training,
equipment, and leadership to take the fight to the enemy. They also
count on Army leadership to make sure their families receive the
support they need to stay Army strong.
On the wall in one of the Army conference rooms there is this quote
by former Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams: ``People are
not in the Army, they are the Army.''
The people who ``are'' the Army extend to more than just the
soldiers. Spouses and children are as much a part of the Army as the
soldiers they love. Everyone in Army leadership recognizes the role of
the family in the All-Volunteer Force and is committed to improving
support to our Army families; and I am proud to partner with General
Casey in working to improve the quality of life for soldiers and their
families.
We are asking a great deal of our soldiers and Army families and we
cannot expect that these demands will diminish in the foreseeable
future. Organizational and institutional changes will continue for
years and we must expect and plan for a future typified by persistent
conflict and continuing deployments.
In order to sustain our All-Volunteer Force, we must do more to
provide soldiers and families a quality of life equal to the quality of
their service. Family support systems--such as health care, housing,
childcare, and education--designed for the pre-September 11 peacetime
Army must be adapted to sustain an Army at war.
Furthermore, the demographics of today's Army are markedly
different from any Army that has fought an extended conflict in our
Nation's history. Over half of our soldiers are married and a majority
of Army spouses are employed. Army families include over 700,000
children--a number greater than the entire population of the capital
city where we meet today. These demographics alone pose new challenges.
When a married mother or father deploys, he or she leaves behind a
single parent household and all the challenges associated with that
family dynamic. Single-parent soldiers must leave their children in the
care of others. With multiple deployments and dwell time filled with
training for the next deployment, the stress on the family increases.
SUPPORT FOR SOLDIERS AND FAMILIES
Recognizing this, General Casey and I have recently signed the Army
Family Covenant, which states:
We recognize the commitment and increasing sacrifices
that our families are making every day.
We recognize the strength of our soldiers comes from
the strength of their families.
We are committed to providing soldiers and families a
quality of life that is commensurate with their service.
We are committed to providing our families a strong,
supportive environment where they can thrive.
We are committed to building a partnership with Army
families that enhances their strength and resilience.
We are committed to improving family readiness by:
Standardizing and funding existing family
programs and services.
Increasing accessibility and quality of health
care.
Improving soldier and family housing.
Ensuring excellence in schools, youth
services, and child care.
Expanding education and employment
opportunities for family members.
The covenant is a solemn commitment by our Army to do more for our
soldiers and families; to provide them a quality of life commensurate
with the quality of their service.
When it comes to soldiers and families, Congress has been a strong
partner in the service of our Army. For example, the Army continues to
improve soldier and family housing, bolstered by congressional
legislation allowing the Army to leverage its housing assets through
private sector participation in military housing--we call it the
Residential Community Initiative (RCI).
As of the beginning of this month, the Army had privatized almost
79,000 homes on 36 installations. The total cost to date is estimated
at $10.4 billion of which the Army share is only $1.3 billion. The
quality of the homes and neighborhoods built under the RCI has improved
dramatically the quality of life for our Army families.
Just a few weeks ago, I toured RCI homes and talked with Army
families at Fort Belvoir about this program. An Army spouse I spoke
with said she was so pleased with the housing and her community that
she didn't really mind too much if her husband had to deploy, as long
as she could stay in her house. She and her husband shared a laugh over
that comment.
A Sergeant said: ``As long as my family is happy, it makes it
easier to go to work.'' That kind of peace of mind is one of the
reasons why these kinds of programs are so important to our readiness.
Congress deserves a great deal of the credit for this program and I
look forward to working together on new initiatives to help Army
families.
Besides the RCI, the Army is on a course to eventually eliminate
inadequate family housing, first in the continental United States
(CONUS), later outside the CONUS. Additionally, we also have been
expanding housing for unmarried senior noncommissioned officers and
officers at locations where off-post rentals are not available.
Our facility modernization efforts continue to focus on the long-
term effort to improve Senior Unaccompanied Personnel Housing and we
have delivered 200 new units in recent years at no cost to the Army
with plans for another 1,200. In the past 5 fiscal years, the Army has
invested about $5.5 billion to fix, upgrade, and replace permanent
party barracks for 72,400 soldiers.
The Army is shifting additional resources into family programs for
2008 and beyond. In recent years, the Army has increased by 40 the
number of Child Development Centers with plans for 22 more. We also
continue to build new fitness facilities, chapels, and youth centers.
We've invested $170 million in 19 new post exchanges.
Last summer, the Army transferred $100 million into existing family
programs, which had an immediate and positive impact. These funds are
being used to hire Family Readiness Support Assistants down to the
battalion level, expand the availability and reduce the cost of child
care, provide additional respite care for family members with special
needs, and enhance morale and recreational programs across the Army.
Additionally, after many months of work, the Army recently launched
the Army Soldier-Family Action Plan (ASFAP). This plan to support
families is based on the input of families from across our Army--here
and around the globe. ASFAP will address issues such as education,
access and quality of health care, employment opportunities, improved
housing, and the resourcing of existing Army programs. It will be an
important step forward, but it is not the final answer to the needs of
Army families.
We have established a good momentum in improving life for Army
families--we need the continued assistance of Congress, now and in the
future, to keep that momentum going.
KEEPING FAITH WITH WOUNDED WARRIORS
As an Army, we pledge never to leave a fallen comrade--that means
on the battlefield, in the hospital, in the outpatient clinic, or over
a lifetime of dependency if that is what is required. I have witnessed
the cost in human terms and to the institution of the Army when we
break faith with that sacred pledge, as a handful did at Walter Reed
Army Medical Center (WRAMC), and we have worked hard to make that
right.
Indeed, the silver lining in the WRAMC breakdown is that it
prompted the Army to make dramatic changes in the way we care for our
wounded warriors that go far beyond the fixes at WRAMC. Since that
time, your Army has moved out aggressively to change what we can on our
own.
I am pleased to report that we have made significant progress in
the areas of infrastructure, leadership, and processes issues as part
of our Army Medical Action Plan. A few examples:
We've given wounded warriors a new mission that is
codified in the Wounded Warrior Mission Statement: ``I am a
Warrior in Transition. My job is to heal as I transition back
to duty or become a productive, responsible citizen in society.
This is not a status but a mission. I will succeed in this
mission because I am a Warrior.''
We've consolidated Medical Hold and Medical Holdover
into single Warrior Transition Units (WTU), organized into
military units that are under the command and control of the
medical treatment facility commander. The WTU's mission is to
focus solely on the care, treatment, and compassionate
disposition of its soldiers.
We've institutionalized a triad of support for every
wounded warrior to include a primary care manager, nurse case
manager, and squad leader, and we've organized outpatients in a
chain of command.
We've established Soldier and Family Assistance
Centers at medical centers across the entire Army. These are
one-stop shops where soldiers and families can get the
information they need regarding entitlements, benefits, and
services.
There is now a Wounded Soldier Family Hotline that
provides Warriors in Transition and their families 24-hour
access to information and assistance.
We've initiated a Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) chain teaching program
for every soldier in the Army, to not only educate and assist
them in recognizing, preventing, and treating these conditions,
but also to help remove the stigma associated with these
injuries. Similar training is being provided to family members.
The problems at Walter Reed also led to a partnership between the
Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs to
overhaul our military disability system--the Senior Oversight Committee
(SOC).
The SOC goal is as simple to identify as it will be difficult to
implement: a seamless transition for our soldiers from the Department
of Defense disability system either back to service in the Army or to a
productive life as a veteran. We begin that task not by thinking in
terms of how we can improve the current outmoded system, but thinking
instead about what kind of system we would build if we could start from
scratch.
The SOC has directed:
DOD and the VA to establish a single, comprehensive,
standardized medical exam for all Wounded Warriors;
the VA to update its rating disabilities schedule to
include TBI; and
the establishment of a TBI/PTSD Center of Excellence
supported by a $900 million appropriation from Congress.
President Lincoln pledged our Nation to care for those who shall
have borne the battle, their widows, and now, widowers and orphans.
That pledge must be constantly renewed, not with words, but with deeds.
I believe that the Department of Defense, Congress, and the Department
of Veterans Affairs have an opportunity that does not come along
often--to overhaul the entire military disability system. Let us not
squander the opportunity.
FORCE OF THE FUTURE
Even without the global war on terror, we would be a busy Army,
implementing the largest base realignment and closure in history. We
are growing the total Army by 74,000 and completing the transformation
of the Reserve component from a strategic Reserve to an operational
force. We are half-way through the largest organizational change since
World War II, converting our combat and enabling formations to modular
formations. Our depots are operating at historical levels to reset and
recapitalize our battle damaged vehicles and equipment. We are working
to transform and modernize the force.
Our depots are operating at historical levels to reset and
recapitalize our battle-damaged vehicles and equipment. We need your
continued help with this vital reset effort.
We must transform and modernize the force that has served us so
well. That force relies on the Stryker and what we called the ``Big
5''--the Abrams, Bradley, Blackhawk, Apache, and Patriot--to meet the
challenges of a very different enemy.
The new enemy that has emerged will not fight us in military
formations on classic battlefields. The kind of warfare that dominated
during the Cold War years is far different from the kind of warfare we
confront now or will confront in the future.
So we in the Army are changing the way we think and fight. We are
changing training, organization, and equipment to meet all
contingencies. We are pursuing a modernization effort that ensures
dominance in the full spectrum of land operations.
The purpose of the Army modernization effort is to maintain
dominance in land operations--we never want to send our soldiers into a
fair fight. The goal of Army modernization is to know before the enemy
does where our forces are and where the enemy is. Knowledge is power,
and nowhere is that dictum more applicable than on the battlefield.
The Future Combat System (FCS) will give our soldiers the knowledge
they need to fight and win in any battle space, day or night, whether
the battle is conventional or asymmetrical. Indeed, theatre commanders
are validating the FCS as they request for field use the operational
capabilities and technologies that we are currently developing in FCS.
For example, a few years ago in Afghanistan, one commander watched
as his soldiers heaved grappling hooks into caves to detect booby
traps. He knew there had to be a better way. So he asked for robots his
soldiers could send into those caves. Robotic eyes and ears can tell
our soldiers who and what is in that cave, down that alley, or in that
darkened building--before they go in.
Through FCS spinouts, soldiers now have those robots and we are
providing other capabilities that are critical to their current
missions and force protection--unmanned aerial drones, ground sensors,
and communications devices capable of sharing critical intelligence
data with troops on a real-time basis.
We are doing all we can to allow our soldiers to accomplish their
mission while mitigating their risk--force protection remains our top
priority. Indeed, in the last few years the Army has experienced the
greatest change in force protection since World War II.
The soldier of today looks far different even from the soldier of 6
years ago. Consider, in 2001 it cost the Army $11,000 to outfit a
soldier; now it costs $17,000.
The Army is rapidly fielding the best new equipment to our forces.
To date we have fielded:
over 1 million sets of body armor to all soldiers and
DOD civilians;
over 21,000 uparmored HMMWVs and over 50,000 frag
kits;
theater requirement for 970 Armored Security Vehicles;
and
over 47,000 improvised explosive device defeat
systems.
Integrated force protection strategy also includes Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, which Congress has done so much to
support. To update you, the JROC has approved the Army's request for
10,000 MRAPs and production is now underway at several facilities. By
the end of April 2008, we project that we will have fielded almost
4,100 MRAPs.
Force protection will continue to be the highest priority and key
challenges remain. The enemy continues to evolve and we must try to
stay a step ahead.
As you can see, the Army has a full plate. To meet these
obligations smoothly and efficiently, timely, predictable funding is
essential.
Make no mistake--timely funding is not about the war in Iraq; it is
about taking care of soldiers and their families and defending this
country.
Training and maintenance--and ultimately readiness--are perishable.
Without stable and timely funding for these activities, skills diminish
and equipment and facilities degrade.
I cannot stress enough how critical it is that Congress pass
essential funding legislation in a timely manner. Our soldiers depend
upon your legislation.
Additionally, in a few short months, you will see the fiscal year
2009 President's budget and global war on terrorism supplemental
funding request arrive on the Hill. You will see that the Army's part
of that submission will fully support the four imperatives in our
strategic direction: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. We look
forward for your continued support in fulfilling these imperatives.
CONTRACTING ISSUES
On September 12, I commissioned Dr. Jacques Gansler to provide a
comprehensive review of the Army's acquisition system. The Commission
was given a broad charter to examine current operations as well as to
ensure future contracting operations are more effective, efficient and
transparent. Based on his extensive experience within DOD and
specifically as a former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, I was confident that Dr. Gansler would
provide an uncompromising, big-picture review that the Army needed. On
November 1, I accepted the report from the ``Commission on Army
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations''
chaired by Dr. Gansler.
My decision to charter the Gansler Commission followed
investigations and audits which cited contractors and government
contracting officials for corrupt activity related to contingency
contracting operations. The investigations continue. As of November 6,
the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command is conducting 80
investigations relating to contract fraud in Iraq, Kuwait, and
Afghanistan. While the cases vary in severity and complexity, most
involve bribery. There are confirmed bribes in excess of $15 million.
Twenty-three U.S. citizens, to include 18 government employees, both
military and civilian, have been charged or indicted in Federal court.
Contracts valued at more than $6 billion are affected. As a result of
initial indications of this corruption within theater, the Army
reorganized its contracting office in Kuwait, replaced its leaders,
increased the size of the staff and provided more ethics training.
Dr. Gansler's report offered a very blunt and comprehensive
assessment that I asked for and that the Army needed, and he also
outlined a plan for the way ahead after citing structural weaknesses
and organizational shortcomings in the U.S. Army's acquisition and
contracting system used to support expeditionary operations. The
commission outlined four areas as critical to future success:
(1) increased stature, quantity and career development for contracting
personnel both military and civilian, particularly for
expeditionary operations;
(2) restructure of the organization and responsibility to facilitate
contracting and contract management;
(3) training and tools for overall contracting activities in
expeditionary operations; and
(4) obtaining legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable
contracting effectiveness--important in expeditionary
operations.
The Gansler report traced many of the difficulties to post-Cold War
cuts in the Army acquisition budget, which led to an undersized
acquisition workforce in the face of an expanding workload. This
workforce has not been properly sized, trained, structured, or
empowered to meet the needs of our warfighters, in major expeditionary
operations. In fact, currently with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the Army administered over 25 percent of all Federal contracts in
fiscal year 2007, valued in excess of $111 billion. We also need to do
a better job in training our commanders on their responsibilities for
requirements definition and contractor performance.
Complementing the Gansler Commission's strategic review, I also
formed an internal Army task force to review current contracting
operations and take immediate action where appropriate. The Army
Contracting Task Force, co-chaired by Lieutenant General N. Ross
Thompson, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics and Technology; and Ms. Kathryn Condon,
Executive Deputy to the commanding general of the U.S. Army Materiel
Command, has already made recommendations and is implementing
improvements.
Expeditionary military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
placed extraordinary demands on the contracting system and our
contracting support personnel. The U.S. Army has never fought an
extended conflict that required such reliance on contractor support.
Approximately half of the personnel currently deployed in Iraq are
contractor employees, who provide food services, interpreters,
communications, equipment repair and other important services.
Contracting and procurement must be an Army core competency.
While the overwhelming majority of our contracting workforce,
civilian and military, is doing an outstanding job under challenging
circumstances, we must do a better job of organizing, resourcing, and
supporting them in their critical work. We will take the steps
necessary to ensure that we execute our responsibility effectively,
efficiently and fully consistent with Army values.
CONCLUSION
To paraphrase General Abrams, soldiers and their families are the
All-Volunteer Force. We cannot have a healthy All-Volunteer Force
without healthy Army families.
In today's Army, you recruit the soldier, you retain the family.
Working with General Casey, I am confident we will do both and we will
do both well.
I look forward to the dialogue with you today. We seek your
continued strong support that will enable the Army to execute its many
missions and help us to achieve the four imperatives set out by the
Chief of Staff General George Casey. With your continued assistance to
our soldiers and their families, we will remain the pre-eminent land
power and we will remain Army Strong!
Again, thank you for allowing me to testify. I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Levin. General Casey?
STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY
General Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee.
I welcome the opportunity to come before you today to share
my views with you on what I've seen in my first 7 months on the
job, and to talk about the direction that the Secretary and I
believe we need to move the Army, with your help, in the next 3
or 4 years.
As has been pointed out, our Nation has been at war for
over 6 years, and our Army has been a leader on the front lines
of that war, both abroad and at home. Over time, these
operations have expanded in scope and duration, and, as a
result, our All-Volunteer Force has been stretched and
stressed.
Over the last 6 years, Congress has responded to our
request for resources; and that kind of commitment to the Army,
our soldiers, and our families is both necessary and deeply
appreciated.
We live in a world where global terrorism and extremist
ideologies are realities. As I look to the future, I believe
that the next decades will be ones of what I call ``persistent
conflict.'' What I mean by that is a period of protracted
confrontation among states, nonstates, and individual actors
who are increasingly willing to use violence to accomplish
their political and ideological ends. There are several
emerging global trends that I believe are likely to exacerbate
this period of protracted confrontation. I'd like to mention
just a few.
First of all: globalization. Now, there's no question that
globalization has had very positive effects on the prosperity
of a lot of people around the globe, but it has also created
``have'' and ``have-not'' conditions that are ripe for
exploitation by some of these global terrorist groups.
Technology is another double-edged sword. The same
innovations that improve the quality of life and education and
livelihood are also employed by terrorists who export terror
around the globe and to manipulate our media.
Demographic change. The populations of these lesser-
developed countries are expected to double in the next 20
years. That'll create a youth bulge that, again, is ripe for
exploitation by terrorist groups, especially as most of the
governments of these lesser-developed countries are unable to
deal with large populations.
The demand for energy, water, and food for growing
populations is likely to increase competition, and possibly
conflict.
I was on climate change and natural disasters. Now, they
can cause humanitarian crises, population migrations, and
epidemic diseases.
The last two trends, global trends that worry me the most,
are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and safe
havens.
But there are over 1,200 terrorist groups around the world,
and we know for a fact that a lot of them, particularly al
Qaeda, are seeking weapons of mass destruction. I firmly
believe that if they get a weapon, they'll attempt to use it
against a developed country.
With respect to safe havens--and by that, I mean countries
that are unwilling or unable to govern their own territory,
much like we had in Afghanistan prior to September 11--safe
havens can be used by these terrorists to plan and export their
terrorist operations around the world.
So, those are the trends that I believe will exacerbate
this period of persistent conflict. While analysts generally
agree with those trends, and they also agree that we can't rule
out conflict with a state actor, however unlikely that may be--
they also agree that we're going to be unlikely to predict the
time, location, or scope of these coming conflicts.
We do know, however, that the Army will remain central to
our Nation's security, and that we need versatile and agile
forces that can rapidly adapt to unexpected circumstances.
Now, the Army has a vision to build those forces, and we're
already executing it. We intend to transform the current force
into a campaign-quality expeditionary force that is capable of
supporting the needs of combatant commanders across the
spectrum of conflict, from peacetime engagement to conventional
war in the 21st century. That's what we're about.
So, Mr. Chairman, as we look to the future, we do so with
an Army that's already stretched by the impacts of 6 years at
war. While we remain a resilient, committed, professional
force, today's Army is out of balance. The current demand for
our forces exceeds the sustainable supply. We're consumed with
meeting the demands of the current fight, and are unable to
provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other
contingencies.
Our Reserve components are performing magnificently, but in
an operational role for which they were neither organized or
resourced. Our current operations requirements for forces in
limited periods of time between the deployments necessitates a
focus on counterinsurgency training at the expense of training
for the full spectrum of operations.
Soldiers, families, support systems, and equipment are
stressed by the demands of these repeated deployments. Overall,
we're consuming our readiness as fast as we can build it. But,
with your help, we can act to restore balance and preserve this
All-Volunteer Force, restore necessary depth and breadth to
Army capabilities, and build capacity for the future.
Mr. Chairman, I believe there are four imperatives that we
need to do to restore the Army to balance. Implementing these
imperatives will require several years, considerable resources,
and the continued support of Congress and the American people.
Those imperatives are: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform.
First imperative: sustain. As Secretary Geren said, we need
to improve the manner in which we sustain the Army's soldiers,
families, and civilians. The recruiting and training--and
retaining of our soldiers, who are the centerpiece of this
force, can only be done by transforming our quality recruits
into soldiers who are physically tough, mentally adaptive, and
who live the warrior ethos. These warriors are our ultimate
asymmetric advantage, and that's the one thing that no enemy
can duplicate, now or in the future. We need to keep them with
us.
I mentioned we recognize the strain on families. We also
recognize they play an increasing role in the readiness of this
All-Volunteer Force, so we will ensure the quality of life for
soldiers and their families is commensurate with the quality of
their magnificent service.
We will also ensure that our wounded warriors are cared for
and reintegrated into the Army and society, and we'll never
forget our moral obligation to the spouses and children and
families who have lost their soldier since September 11.
Second imperative: prepare. We need to continue to prepare
forces for success in the current conflict. With your help,
we've made great strides in equipping our soldiers, and we're
continually adapting our training and equipment to keep pace
with an evolving enemy.
We remain committed to providing our deploying soldiers the
best available equipment to ensure they maintain a
technological advantage over any enemy that they face. We will
also continue to provide tough, demanding training at home
stations and combat training centers to give our soldiers and
leaders the confidence they need to succeed in these complex
environments. Military success in this war is tied to the
capabilities of our leaders and soldiers, and we will not fail
to prepare them for success.
Third is: reset. We have to continue in this--especially in
this period, to reset our soldiers for future deployments, as
well as future contingencies. Let me stress the point that, as
we reset, we are resetting for the future, not resetting the
past.
Since 2003, equipment has been used at a rate of over five
times what we program, in harsh, demanding desert conditions.
So, in addition to fixing, replacing, and upgrading our
equipment, and retraining for future missions, we also have to
revitalize our soldiers and their families by providing them
the time and the opportunity to recover from the cumulative
effects of sustained operations.
Resetting our force is critical to restoring readiness, and
reset must continue as long as we have forced deployed and for
several years thereafter. The commitment to providing the
resources to reset our forces is essential to restoring
strategic depth and flexibility in the defense of the country.
Lastly; transform. We must transform our Army to meet the
demands of the 21st century. Transformation for us is a
holistic effort to adapt how we fight, how we train, how we
modernize, how we develop leaders, how we base our forces, and
how we support our soldiers, families, and civilians. It's a
journey for us, not a destination.
Let me just say a few words about one element of our
transformation. That's modernization.
We believe we must continually modernize our forces to put
our cold-war formations and our cold-war systems behind us, and
to provide our soldiers with a decisive advantage over any
enemy that they face.
With your help, we'll continue to rapidly field the best
equipment to our fighting forces, to upgrade and modernize
existing combat and support systems, to incorporate new
technologies spun out of the FCS, and, finally, to begin the
fielding of FCS Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) themselves. We're
ultimately working toward an agile, globally responsive Army
that's enhanced by modern networks, precision sensors,
precision weapons, and platforms that are lighter, less
logistics-dependent, and less manpower-intensive. It's truly a
21st-century force.
Sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. Each of these
imperatives requires resources. At the start of fiscal year
2007, Congress provided the Army sufficient base and
supplemental funding to support the war, to reset, and to
maintain and train the force. We did a lot of good with that.
As Secretary Geren said, we have challenges this year. We need
prompt funding of our global war on terror requirements to
sustain the momentum that you've helped us gain in putting
ourselves back in balance.
In closing, your Army is the best in the world at what it
does, and we are that way because of our values, because of our
ethos and because of our people.
We talk about our warrior ethos, and it is what all of our
soldiers are grounded in, and it gives us a unifying theme
across the whole force.
Let me just wrap up, then. I get a lot of questions on
quality. Some of you mentioned ``quality'' here. I was in
Baghdad in August, I had the opportunity to pin a Silver Star
on a young sergeant. It was Sergeant Kenneth Thomas. He was a
member of the 1st Cavalry Division. He was out on a riverboat
patrol on the Tigris River with the Iraqi police. The patrol
was ambushed from the riverbank by about 50 to 75 insurgents.
The Iraqi policeman that was manning the machine gun, the
primary weapon of the boat, abandoned his position. Sergeant
Thomas jumped on the weapon, began returning fire as incoming
rounds bounced off the steel plates around the boat. They tried
to punch through. They couldn't. They diverted to the opposite
side of the river, got everyone out of the boat into a
depression; so, they weren't taking fire, but they couldn't get
out. The squad leader turned around and looked ask Sergeant
Thomas and said, ``Get us a way out of here.'' He charged up
the bank of the river, under fire, only to find that his
departure exit was stopped by a fence. He took out his wire
cutters, he began cutting the fence. The fence was electric. It
knocked him down. He got back up. He continued to cut the
fence, while the gloves were melting in his hand. He got
through, pulled the whole squad through. The last guy got hung
up, and this is all under fire. He went back, knowing he was
going to get jolted again, got knocked down, dragged the last
guy through, organized the squad, assaulted a house, and
secured it so they could be evacuated. About an hour and a half
of steady combat. For that, he was awarded the Silver Star.
That's the kind of men and women that you have in your Armed
Forces today.
But it will require more than the courage and value of our
soldiers to ensure our Army can continue to fight and win the
Nation's wars in an era of persistent conflict. It'll require
clear recognition by national leaders, like yourselves, of the
threats and challenges that America faces in the years ahead
and the need to ensure that our Armed Forces are prepared to
meet them. I am optimistic that we can work together to face
those challenges.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Casey follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, on behalf
of the more than 1 million Active, Guard, and Reserve soldiers, their
families, and the civilians of the United States Army, serving around
the globe, the Secretary and I welcome the opportunity to discuss the
direction we intend to take the Army in the next several years.
Our Nation has been at war for over 6 years. Our Army has been a
leader on the front lines of this war and back here at home--protecting
our people and securing our borders. Over time, these operations have
expanded in scope and duration. As a result, they have stretched and
stressed our All-Volunteer Force.
Over these last 6 years, Congress has responded to the Army's
requests for resources. In fiscal year 2007 alone, Congress provided
over $200 billion to the Army, most at the start of the fiscal year and
in time for the fully-funded Reset Program. That kind of commitment to
the Army and our soldiers is both necessary and deeply appreciated.
We live in a world where global terrorism and extremist ideologies
are real threats. As we look to the future, national security experts
are virtually unanimous in predicting that the next several decades
will be ones of persistent conflict--protracted confrontation among
state, non-state, and individual actors that use violence to achieve
their political and ideological ends. Adversaries will employ
propaganda, threat, intimidation, and overt violence to coerce people
and gain control of their land or resources. Some will avoid our proven
advantages by adopting asymmetric techniques, utilizing indirect
approaches, and immersing themselves in the population.
Many of these conflicts will likely be protracted--ebbing and
flowing in intensity, challenging our Nation's will to persevere.
Several emerging global trends may fuel this violence and enable
extremist groups to undermine governments, societies, and values.
Globalization, despite its positive effects on global prosperity, may
create ``have'' and ``have not'' conditions that spawn conflict.
Population growth and its ``youth bulge'' will increase opportunities
for instability, radicalism, and extremism. Resource demand for energy,
water, and food for growing populations will increase competition and
conflict. Adverse impacts of climate change and natural disasters may
cause humanitarian crises, population migrations, and epidemic
diseases. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will increase
the potential for catastrophic attacks that will be globally
destabilizing and detrimental to economic development. Finally, failed
or failing states unable or unwilling to maintain control over their
territory may provide safe havens for global or regional terrorist
groups to prepare and export terror.
While analysts generally agree on these trends, we cannot predict
the exact time, location, or scope of individual conflicts. We do know,
however, that the Army will remain central to our national strategy to
ensure our security in spite of these threatening trends. We need to
ensure our forces are agile enough to respond rapidly to unexpected
circumstances; led by versatile, culturally astute, and adaptive
leaders; and supported by institutions capable of sustaining operations
for as long as necessary to ensure victory. The Army has a vision to
build that force, and is already executing this vision. We will
continue along these lines and transform our current force into a
campaign-quality expeditionary force that is capable of supporting the
needs of combatant commanders operating effectively with joint,
interagency, and multinational partners across the spectrum of conflict
from peacetime engagement to conventional war. Simultaneously, the Army
will pursue the necessary actions to restore balance to our current
forces.
While we remain a resilient and committed professional force, our
Army today is out of balance for several reasons. The current demand
for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply. We are consumed with
meeting the demands of the current fight and are unable to provide
ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies.
Our Reserve components are performing an operational role for which
they were neither originally designed nor resourced. Current
operational requirements for forces and limited periods between
deployments necessitate a focus on counterinsurgency to the detriment
of preparedness for the full range of military missions. Soldiers,
families, and equipment are stretched and stressed by the demands of
lengthy and repeated deployments with insufficient recovery time.
Equipment used repeatedly in harsh environmental conditions is wearing
out at a far greater pace than expected. Army support systems including
health care, education, and family support systems that were designed
for the pre-September 11 era are straining under the pressures from 6
years at war.
Overall, our readiness is being consumed as fast as we can build
it. We will act quickly to restore balance to preserve our All-
Volunteer Force, restore necessary depth and breadth to Army
capabilities, and build essential capacity for the future, Four
``imperatives'' frame the work we will do. Implementing them will
require several years, considerable resources, and sustained commitment
from Congress and the American people.
First, we need to improve the manner in which we sustain the Army's
soldiers, families, and civilians. Recruiting, training, and retaining
our soldiers--the centerpiece of the Army--can only be done by
transforming quality recruits into soldiers who are physically tough,
mentally adaptive and live the Warrior Ethos. These Warriors are our
ultimate asymmetric advantage--the one thing that cannot be matched by
our adversaries--now or in the future. We recognize the strain on
families, are aware that families play an important role in maintaining
the readiness of our All-Volunteer Force, and must therefore ensure
that their quality of life is commensurate with their quality of
service. For these reasons, we will build a partnership with Army
families and improve family readiness by standardizing and funding
existing family programs and services; increasing accessibility and
quality of health care; improving soldier and family housing; ensuring
excellence in schools, youth services, and family child care; and
expanding education and employment opportunities for family members. We
will also ensure that our Wounded Warriors are cared for and
reintegrated into the Army and society. We must never forget our moral
obligation to the spouses, children, and families who have lost their
soldier since September 11. Finally, we must continue to support our
Army civilians. They have a 230-year record of dedicated service and
they remain an integral part of the Army. As the Army's missions evolve
and become more complex, so will the roles of Army civilians.
Second, we will continue to prepare forces to succeed in the
current conflict. We have made great strides in equipping our soldiers
and are continually adapting our training and equipment to keep pace
with an evolving enemy. We remain committed to providing all deploying
soldiers the best available equipment to ensure they maintain a
technological advantage over any enemy they face. We will continue to
provide tough, demanding training at home stations and in our combat
training centers to give our soldiers and their leaders the confidence
they need to succeed in these complex environments. We will implement
the Army Force Generation model by 2011 to manage the preparation of
forces for employment and improve predictability for soldiers and
families. Military success in this war is tied to the capabilities of
our leaders and our soldiers--we will not fail to prepare them for
success.
Third, we must continue to reset our units and rebuild the
readiness consumed in operations to prepare them for future deployments
and future contingencies. Sustained combat has taken a toll on our
soldiers, leaders, families, and equipment. Since 2003, equipment has
been used at a rate over five times that programmed--in harsh and
demanding desert and mountainous conditions. In addition to fixing,
replacing, and upgrading our equipment and retraining for future
missions, we must also revitalize our soldiers and families by
providing them time and opportunity to recover in order to reverse the
cumulative effects of a sustained high operational tempo. Resetting our
forces is critical to restoring readiness--this year we will reset over
130,000 pieces of equipment and almost 200,000 soldiers. Reset must
continue as long as we have forces deployed and for several years
thereafter to ensure readiness for the future. Commitment to providing
the resources to reset our forces is essential to restoring balance and
to providing strategic depth and flexibility for the Nation.
Fourth, we must continue to transform our Army to meet the demands
of the 21st century. Transformation is a holistic effort to adapt how
we fight, train, modernize, develop leaders, station, and support our
soldiers, families, and civilians. Transformation is a journey--not a
destination. Transformation is also a multi-faceted process.
We must grow the Army to provide and sustain sufficient forces for
the full range and duration of current operations and future
contingencies. This growth will allow us to revitalize and balance our
force, reduce deployment periods, increase dwell time, increase
capability and capacity, and strengthen the systems that support our
forces. We have authorization to increase the Army's size by 74,000
soldiers over the next 5 years. We will achieve this as fast as
possible.
We must continuously modernize our forces to put our Cold War
formations and systems behind us and to provide our soldiers a decisive
advantage over our enemies. We will continue to rapidly field the best
new equipment to our fighting forces, upgrade and modernize existing
systems, incorporate new technologies derived from the Future Combat
Systems research and development, and soon begin to field the Future
Combat Systems themselves. We are ultimately working toward an agile,
globally responsive Army that is enhanced by modern networks,
surveillance sensors, precision weapons, and platforms that are
lighter, less logistics-dependant, and less manpower-intensive.
We are over half-way through the largest organizational change
since World War II. We must continue to convert our combat and enabling
formations to modular units that are more deployable, tailorable, and
versatile, and have demonstrated their effectiveness in Iraq and
Afghanistan. We must also continue to rebalance our capabilities by
converting less necessary skills to those in high demand, and by
shifting much-needed Reserve Forces into the Active component.
We must continue institutional change in processes, policies, and
procedures to support an expeditionary Army during a time of war. Most
of our systems were designed to support the pre-September 11 Army. Our
transformation cannot be cemented until the institutional systems--
personnel, education, training, health care, procurement, and support
among them--are adapted to meet the realities of our current and future
environments. We will continue Army Business Transformation through
management, contracting, and acquisition reform; comprehensive redesign
of organizations and business processes that support our expeditionary
Army at war; and consolidation of bases and activities. While this is
largely an internal process, it may well be the most difficult aspect
of transformation--and the one that is most essential to giving us the
Army we will need for the rest of this century.
We must continue to adapt our Reserve components from a paradigm of
a strategic Reserve only mobilized in national emergencies, to an
operational Reserve, employed on a cyclical basis to add depth to the
Active Force. This has been happening for the last 6 years and will be
required in a future of persistent conflict. Operationalizing the
Reserve components requires national and State consensus and support as
well as continued commitment from Reserve component employers,
soldiers, and families. It necessitates changes in the way we train,
equip, resource, and mobilize the Reserve components.
We must continue to develop agile and adaptive leaders. Leaders in
the 21st century must be competent in their core proficiencies; broad
enough to operate across the spectrum of conflict--from humanitarian
and peacekeeping operations through counterinsurgency to major
conventional operations; able to operate in joint, interagency, and
combined environments and leverage political and diplomatic efforts in
achieving their objectives; at home in other cultures, able to use this
awareness and understanding to support operations in innovative ways;
and courageous enough to see and exploit opportunities in the
challenges and complexities of our future operating environments.
Each of these imperatives requires resources--on time and in the
amounts needed to meet the mission. We are 46 days into fiscal year
2008, and it is imperative that the Army and Congress work in
partnership to ensure that funding is made available to the Army in
order for us to sustain, prepare, reset, and transform.
With enactment of the DOD Appropriations Bill, the Army can
continue essential missions for a limited time. Lack of funding for the
global war on terror will cause us to tap into our base programs to
continue essential operations. In the case of our operation and
maintenance account, we project that with the base program paying for
both base and global war on terrorism costs at current levels, OMA
funds will be exhausted by late January, or if Congress approves a
reprogramming request, mid-late February.
I ask Congress to provide the necessary resources to ensure we
maintain continuity of funding in order to support an Army at War. Our
continued and close partnership with Congress will be essential as we
restore the Army's balance over the next several years.
The Army has long been the strength of this Nation. We were in
1775, and we are today. For 232 years, the Army has symbolized, in the
truest sense, American resolve and commitment to defend its interests.
We protect the homeland and lead the Nation's efforts against the
scourge of global terror, and we will do so in a future of persistent
conflict. Our soldiers, their families, and our Army civilians
epitomize what is best about America: they work hard, selflessly carry
heavy burdens, and are willing to face a hard road ahead.
Today, we are locked in a war against a global extremist threat
that is fixed on defeating the United States and destroying our way of
life. This foe will not go away nor will it give up easily. At stake is
the power of our values and our civilization--exemplified by the
promise of America--to confront and defeat the menace of extremist
terrorists. At stake is whether the authority of those who treasure the
rights of free individuals will stand firm against the ruthless and
pitiless men who wantonly slay the defenseless. At stake is whether the
future will be framed by the individual freedoms we hold so dear or be
dominated by demented forms of extremism. At stake is whether we will
continue to expand freedom, opportunity, and decency for those who
thirst for it, or let fall the darkness of extremism and terror.
Faced with such a long and difficult struggle, we must remind
ourselves that this Army exists to field forces for victory. We are at
war, fighting for our freedom, our security, and our future as a
Nation. We have made hard sacrifices, and there will be more. We have
lost more than 2,400 soldiers to hostile fire and had over 20,000
wounded--nearly a quarter of those from the Reserve components. We have
also awarded a Medal of Honor, 9 Distinguished Service Cross Medals,
440 Silver Stars, and more than 6,700 other awards for valor.
Our soldiers, families, and civilians are the strength of our Army
and they make the Army the strength of the Nation. Their sacrifices are
what builds a better future for others, and preserves our way of life.
They will lead our Nation to victory over our enemies. They will
preserve the peace for us and for our allies. Our Warrior Ethos has it
right--I will always place the mission first, I will never quit, I will
never accept defeat, and I will never leave a fallen comrade.
The Secretary and I are greatly encouraged by the recent actions of
Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Defense, which reflect
clear recognition of our challenges following 6 years of war. We look
forward to working with you to maintain our Army--still the best in the
world at what we do.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
First, let me ask you, Mr. Secretary--we have wounded
warrior legislation, a very extensive and comprehensive
legislation, as part of our Senate-passed authorization bill.
It would end the conflicts in disability assessments, it would
end the waits for disability assessments, it would end the gaps
between the DOD and the Veterans Administration (VA). We've
worked very carefully with the Veterans Affairs Committee on
this legislation. Does the administration support our wounded
warrior legislation?
Secretary Geren. Well, we see parts of this legislation
that work very well with what we're trying to do. The President
would like to see Dole-Shalala implemented, and I understand--I
haven't seen the----
Chairman Levin. There are some additional provisions in
Dole-Shalala which are not in our provision. I know the
President would like them to be adopted. But, as far as our
legislation goes, which is comprehensive, does the President
support our legislation?
Secretary Geren. Let me speak from the perspective of the
Department of the Army and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD). Again, the President has said he wants to see
Dole-Shalala, in its entirety, enacted. Your legislation
addresses parts of that, but not all of it.
Chairman Levin. I would have put it the other way. I would
say Dole-Shalala addresses part of our legislation and adds
something to it. Would you accept that?
Secretary Geren. There's overlap and issues in your
legislation that aren't covered in Dole-Shalala, and vice
versa.
Chairman Levin. All right. Let me move on, then.
Chairman Levin. General, the training and equipment
readiness for our nondeployed units has fallen sharply, would
you agree with that?
General Casey. It's actually stayed about the same since
last summer and it's not good.
Chairman Levin. All right. But last summer was below what
it needs to be.
General Casey. Right.
Chairman Levin. Would you tell us how far below what it
needs to be it is, and whether that is an acceptable risk.
General Casey. At this level of classification at this
hearing----
Chairman Levin. Yes.
General Casey.--as you'll recall from last summer, it is
not where it needs, and that is a key element of putting
ourselves back in balance. To do that, we have to increase the
supply of our forces, and the demand has to come down. The
sooner we do those two things, the faster we will build the
readiness in the next-to-deploy forces.
Chairman Levin. Is the current level of risk, which has
accompanied that lower level that it needs to be, an acceptable
level of risk?
General Casey. I believe the level of strategic risk is
acceptable.
Chairman Levin. It is.
General, would you agree with the following statement: that
the Army went to war in Iraq with insufficient body armor,
insufficient armor on wheeled vehicles, insufficient radios,
machine guns, insufficient aviation survivability equipment--
would you agree with that? If you do agree, can you tell us
what we are doing to overcome those shortfalls and how we're
factoring in the lessons that are learned from current
operations to preclude or to minimize those kind of problems in
the future? But, first, would you agree with that, what I said
at the beginning?
What are we doing now to avoid those from being repeated?
General Casey. I think, as I said in my opening statement,
we have already made great strides in equipping our soldiers.
But I think Senator Inhofe's point here about what happened in
the 1990s is instructive for all of us. As I came in and I had
my transition team look out to 2020, I also had them look back
13 years, to 1994, and I said, ``What was the country doing
then?'' We were basking in the glow of the great success in
Operation Desert Storm, basking in the glow of success in the
Cold War, looking around to spend the peace dividend, and
decreasing the size of the Army by about 300,000. So, we made
some decisions a decade ago that put us in the position we
found ourselves in on September 11, and I think that's a huge
message for this committee. When we make mistakes like that, it
takes another decade or so to fix them. So, we all need to work
on that together.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
On recruiting and retention, according to Army data,
retention of West Point graduates is lower than historical
norms. The West Point class of 2000 saw 34 percent leave the
Service as soon as they were able; 54 percent of that class
left active Service by the 5\1/2\-year point. Can you tell us
if that is troubling, and, if so, what is being done to reverse
that trend?
The second part of this question has to do with the
increase over the last 4 years of new recruits that lack a high
school diploma. In 2003, 94 percent of all new recruits
graduated from high school; in fiscal year 2007, the number had
dropped to 79 percent.
So, both in terms of retention of the West Point graduates,
which is at the lower level than historically the case, but
also in terms of the increase of category-4 recruits, which
means the lower number of high school graduates, in particular;
what is the Army doing in both of those areas?
General Casey. First of all, on the officer retention,
Senator, your data on the--those West Point classes is, in
fact, right. They're 8 percent above historic norms.
Chairman Levin. Above, in terms of dropout?
General Casey. Of dropouts.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
General Casey. Now, that said, officer retention, in
general, is stable. But it is one of our primary concerns. As I
said in my statement, we invest in these young captains and
majors and sergeants, and it's an 8- to 10-year investment. If
we lose them, it takes another decade to build them back. So,
we're very concerned about that. Several months ago, we
initiated a selective retention bonus for captains. Over 9,000
captains have already taken that bonus, and so, we think that's
a very positive incentive. We are concerned about it. We have
to keep the good people with us. That's my greatest concern.
On the quality of recruits, all of our recruits are
qualified. They may not have a high school diploma, but they
have a high school education. We are meeting standards in the
lowest categories, and in the first three intelligence
categories. We are watching that very closely. When Secretary
Gates agreed to accelerate the growth of the Army by 2 years,
he did it with the proviso that we not sacrifice quality to do
that. The Secretary and I are committed to coming across on
that.
Chairman Levin. Is the increase in the number of category-4
recruits a problem, as far as you can see? I'm asking you
whether or not it's the increase in that percentage, does that
trouble you? That's all I'm asking.
General Casey. No. It's such a small percentage increase,
I'm not concerned about that right now.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I commend both of you. The Army, at this point in its
history, needs strong leadership. I view, in both of you, that
potential that you've given it, are giving it, and will
continue to give it.
I want to turn to that very interesting statement, that you
look into the future, General Casey, and you see persistent
conflict. Regrettably, that may well be the state of the world.
But, I also wish to draw your attention to the fact that we are
focusing, here today and the coming budgets, on the Army and
meeting the four imperatives that you listed, General Casey.
But, bear in mind that that persistent conflict is across a
spectrum of challenges that really require this country to
maintain a very strong Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Army.
So, throughout history there's always been, I think, a
strong competition between the military departments, for
resources. I was privileged to serve in the Pentagon many years
ago as the Navy Secretary. I saw it firsthand. I've seen it
here these many years that I've been privileged to serve on
this committee. That will continue. But, at this point in time,
I think the pendulum has to swing somewhat towards the Army to
meet your four imperatives. We cannot take our eye off that
persistent conflict, diversity, and the challenge that the
overall Armed Forces may meet.
After the privilege of being in this body for many years
and associated with the military. I think future Presidents,
future Congresses are going to exercise, within their
respective constitutional powers, very, very firm oversight and
direction on future military operations. This one has taught us
many lessons, not only Iraq, but the continuing situation in
Afghanistan. As a consequence, as we do that, we have to keep a
balanced force structure, as envisioned by Goldwater-Nichols,
the jointness that has made, I think, our Armed Forces stronger
and more effective today.
You said you need our help. There's a disposition in the
Congress to give that help. But is that help only in the form
of money, or do you wish to have some legislation to enable you
to achieve the four imperatives that you've listed?
General Casey. Senator, it's primarily in the form of
money. However, I will tell you, I mentioned the fact that the
National Guard and Reserve are executing operational missions
that they weren't originally designed for, and we are working
within the Department here to reshape some of the legislation
and policies that were put in place in the 1950s for a
different kind of Guard and Reserve. We've changed the paradigm
on our Reserve component forces, and I think we need to level
with them, tell it what it is. To do that, I think it's
ultimately going to require some legislation to change that.
So, I'd like to work with you on that in the coming months.
Senator Warner. Will that be forthcoming in the present
budget cycle for 2009?
General Casey. I think it'll probably be 2010. I don't
think we're at a point to get it into 2009 just yet.
Senator Warner. I want to talk broadly about another issue.
Quite interesting. There's an excellent article, in my
judgment, in today's Washington Post on the military
perspective of the situation in Iraq and how the surge
operations have achieved the result that the President laid
down; that is, a greater security.
Senator Warner. Yesterday, many of us attended briefings
with the Secretary of State and Defense and confirmed we have
not received that degree of political reconciliation from top
down, as distinguished from bottom up.
A number of officers have spoken out, I think, very
courageously on this, but, nevertheless, anonymously and that
brings me to the following. We're all familiar with General
Sanchez's comments on October 12, when he spoke about the war,
and he said, ``America is living in a nightmare with no end in
sight.''
Now, I fully respect the right of a retired officer to make
those comments, hopefully within the bounds never to inflict
injury or greater risk to the forces fighting. But in that same
forum, he was asked why he did not bring up his concerns about
the conduct of the war when he was on Active Duty. He
responded, ``The last thing you want is for currently-serving
officers to stand up to political leadership.''
Reading in that article today, I think those officers that
were quoted were within the confines, but what is your
direction, General Casey, to your officer corps today about
their responsibility to speak up while in uniform and address
issues which they see, particularly those on the front lines of
the combat situation, like the deterioration of the ability of
the Iraqi government to come forward and respond to the
improved security arrangements which have been fought so hard;
death, wounds, and all sorts of sacrifices to achieve it?
General Casey. Senator, what I tell my generals is, they're
obliged to ask the hard questions and to speak the hard truths.
They owe it to the country, and they owe it to their soldiers
to ensure the political leaders, here, their unvarnished views
on hard issues. I tried to do that the whole time I was in
Iraq, and I encourage everybody to do the same.
Senator Warner. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
I listened carefully--General Casey, you talked about the
attitude of the defense of our country after Operation Desert
Storm and the Cold War, and that's where we were in September
11; but on September 11 the Army had 1,300,000 in Active Duty.
We're battling against Iraq, of 25 million, that had been
beaten 10 years before against--whose army had been disbanded,
military had been put in jail--Iraqis who had fought the
Iranians during that period of time. Five years later, you're
saying the current demand on our forces exceeds the sustainable
supply, we are consumed with meeting demands of the current
fight, unable to provide ready forces rapidly as necessary for
potential. Our Reserve components are performing an operational
role which they are neither originally designed nor resourced,
current operational requirements for forces in limited periods
between deployment necessitates a focus on counterinsurgent, to
the detriment of preparedness for full range of military
missions; soldiers, families, equipment are stretched by
demands of lengthy, repeated deployments, equipment used in
harsh environment, wearing out at a far greater pace than
expected. Who is this mythical military that's battling and
taking on an army of 1,300,000 people and find ourselves in
this kind of shape? Who is this incredible military force that
is challenging the greatest military force that we had, even on
September 11? Who are they?
General Casey. Are you talking about the insurgents and the
terrorists that are operating inside Iraq and Afghanistan?
Senator Kennedy. I'm talking about who has challenged our
military, that it put the military in the condition that you've
just described, when we had 1,300,000 at the start of the war,
against a country of 25 million, which we defeated successfully
10 years before, and whose army had been basically dismissed,
the military had been put in jail, and now we have this
incredible force, and you talk about how we are going to, in
the military, we're going to have to take on this increasingly
threatening force that is out there, the enemy. How did this
all happen?
How are we going to alter, change, and shift it?
General Casey. Senator, I'd go back to what we said about
decisions that were made in the 1990s. This force in numbers
was 1.3 million, but it was not organized, trained, and
equipped fully.
Senator Kennedy. 1,300,000 against, who? What were they
against?
General Casey. Half of those are in the Guard and Reserve.
Senator Kennedy. All right. But who's their opposition?
General Casey. The opposition was originally the Iraqi
military, which we dealt with quite rapidly.
Senator Kennedy. The military, they were defeated and
disbanded.
General Casey. Right.
Senator Kennedy. With this 1,300,000, who is it that we
can't handle?
General Casey. But I'd go back to that 1,300,000, Senator,
was not properly organized, trained, and equipped.
Senator Kennedy. To take on an Iraq of 25 million, that had
been defeated----
General Casey. To take on anything.
Senator Kennedy.--10 years before and had a defense budget
of, what?
General Casey. There's a perception that the National Guard
left a bunch of its equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan.
They never had it.
Senator Kennedy. If we can keep moving, just to follow up
on a question posed by Senator Levin. As I understand it, over
half of the West Point class of 2000 left as soon as possible;
2001 fared slightly better, 54 percent. So, are we losing half
of the West Point class now?
General Casey. Those figures sound about right, Senator. As
I told Senator Levin.
Senator Kennedy. Is that the best that we can do?
General Casey. That is slightly above historical norms.
Senator Kennedy. Is that acceptable to you? Just as
somebody who takes seriously the people I appoint to the
military academy, I'm really rather shocked that the people
that I appoint, that get that opportunity to serve, are not
staying in there. They make all kinds of representations when
they're looking for these appointments to go to the military
academy, and they're outstanding young people. Well, why is it
that they're not staying in, with the kinds of opportunities
they have and the expressions I'm sure they've made to each and
every one of us. We appoint a certain percent; the House of
Representatives, the President selects the others; and only
half of the people that we appoint are staying in the military
from West Point.
General Casey. Yes. Senator, all those decisions to stay or
go are very personal decisions. As I talk to the young captains
and majors, a big factor is the extended deployments that we're
putting them on. As I said, we have to put ourselves back in
balance.
Senator Kennedy. This is in today's Washington Post. It
talked about Army Lieutenant General Odierno, the commander.
It's unclear how long the window, as Senator Warner pointed
openly, declined at least as they define in attack--sharp
reduction on attacks on troops and civilians. The lack of
political progress calls into question the core rationale
behind the troop buildup President Bush announced in January,
which is premised on the notion of improved security to create
space for Iraqis to arrive at new power-sharing. What happens
if there is no breakthrough at the next summit--if that doesn't
happen, Odierno said, we're going to have to review our
strategy.
Here's General Campbell, 1st Cavalry, complained last week,
``The Iraqi politicians, out of touch, ministers don't get out,
they don't know what the hell is going on, on the ground.''
Aren't we effectively outsourcing American military and
security issues to the politicians in Iraq that refuse to leave
the buildings and go out and see what's going on and making an
accommodation so that we might be able to see the beginning of
the withdrawal of American troops?
General Casey. I wouldn't agree with the statement that
we're outsourcing security, Senator.
Senator Kennedy. He couldn't say it any better, ``The
ministers don't get out, they don't know what the hell is going
on, on the ground.'' We're still staying over there? How long
are we going to stay over there? Until the civilian leadership
understand what's going, on the ground?
General Casey. Senator, I think the better way to say it is
what we have all said, that the solution in Iraq is ultimately
not a military solution, it's a political solution. I applaud
those officers for speaking out about that.
Senator Warner. I join you and applaud those officers for
speaking out, because that's the type of information this body
needs.
Chairman Levin. I think we all, by the way, are grateful
when military officers speak out, speak honestly. We ask them
to do that. They do that. Their comments this morning, as far
as I'm concerned, are just what many of us have been saying for
the last few years, and we're grateful for that.
Secretary Geren. Mr. Chairman, I'm concerned that perhaps
something that General Casey or I said has been misunderstood,
based on Senator Kennedy's question. I just want to make sure
the record is correct, as far as the number of Active Duty
soldiers. Perhaps we said something referring to the total
military, but the active-duty military, in 2001, was about
482,000, and we're now at about 520,000. But with Guard and
Reserve, it approaches a million. Just to make sure that the
record reflects that. When you look at the rest of the military
(Air Force and Navy) obviously, the numbers are greater. But I
want to make sure the record was clear on that.
Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you.
Senator Sessions. Is that just Army? You said ``the
military.''
Secretary Geren. 520,000 Active Duty Army and roughly a
half a million in the Guard and Reserve. So, the total Army is
around a million soldiers today.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, in your testimony you referred briefly to
improvements in treatment for TBI, which many people have
called the signature wound of this war. I first became very
concerned about the lack of accurate and timely diagnoses of
TBI when a neurologist from Maine came to see me many months
ago and told me about a soldier, whom he diagnosed as having
TBI, who had not been caught in any of the screening. That,
obviously, is very serious. You talk, in your testimony, about
having a program for every soldier to educate and assist them
in recognizing and preventing TBI, but what the medical experts
tell me would be most effective is if there were both pre- and
post-deployment screening specifically for TBI, so there would
be a baseline test that could be used, upon a soldier's return,
to compare, to see if, in fact, there is an incident of TBI
that has not been picked up. Are you doing that kind of
screening now?
Secretary Geren. You're exactly right, we just started this
past summer in order to properly diagnose and analyze the
information we have, it's important to have baseline
information. For all the combat brigades that are going over
now, we do a baseline test before they go. By early next year,
we will have that test for everybody that deploys. But we do
need that information before they leave, so we have something
to compare to when they get back. When they get back, we have
an immediate post-deployment health assessment, which includes
a TBI test. Six months later, we have a second. But we started,
this summer, at Fort Campbell, with a pilot program on doing
the predeployment screening, and it's something we're going to
extend to the entire force. Very important. I agree with you,
Senator.
Chairman Levin. I want to thank Senator Collins, by the
way. One of the reasons we have, in our bill, that requirement
for predeployment and postdeployment screening is because of
her efforts. Other members of this committee made a real point
of putting that into our wounded warriors legislation. There's
a number of us who have been involved in that.
Secretary Geren. Thank you, I appreciate that. That's a
very important initiative.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm also concerned about reports that PTSD is showing up,
particularly in our Guard and Reserve members, many months
after they've returned and have resumed their civilian jobs.
You mentioned, just now, a 6-month reassessment. Is that
happening for Guard and Reserve members? General Casey, if this
should be directed to you instead, don't hesitate to intervene.
Secretary Geren. It's for all forces that have been
deployed. This issue, I know you're aware of, but I want to
mention. Starting last summer, we started a chain-teach program
with the goal of reaching all of our soldiers--Active, Guard,
and Reserve--on how to spot the symptoms for both PTSD and TBI.
It's a chain-teach program. So far, we've now taught it to over
750,000 of our million soldiers. We're going to complete the
rest over the coming months. But it's a primer on, what kind of
symptoms to look for, what do you do for treatment? I think,
most importantly, we believe that this chain-teach program is
going to help remove the stigma, so people that are
experiencing problems in this area will come forward and try to
deal with them, and not be something they're ashamed of. We're
also providing this chain teaching to families, as well, so
they would be in a position to spot these symptoms in their
loved ones.
So, it's an area where we have a lot to learn. Congress has
provided us considerable additional resources. You all gave us
$900 million last year in the supplemental, $300 million for
research and $600 million for clinical, and we are working to
apply those resources effectively.
Senator Warner asked things that Congress could help us
with--both for mental health and other types of health care
services, there's a shortage of trained providers. We've had an
effort out to hire 300 new mental health workers. We've been
able to fill less than a third of those, up until now. It's a
real challenge for us.
We also hear, from around the country, that we aren't
getting the kind of participation in the TRICARE system to
provide services to our soldiers and their families outside of
off-post. So, the health care area is an area that, as a
country, where we face shortages, and it impacts our ability to
deliver those services, but it's an area where, as an Army, we
recognize the challenge, and we're doing better, but it's an
area, working with Congress, I'm hopeful we'll continue to
improve.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
General Casey, I assume you're familiar with a relatively
new Government Accountability Office (GAO) report--it came out
in September--that talks about the readiness challenges of the
Army National Guard. It points out that equipment shortages and
personnel challenges have increased as a result of the onerous
demands that are being put on the Guard and Reserve components,
as they're being deployed more and more often overseas--and it
raises concerns about whether our Guard units have sufficient
resources, in terms of equipment and personnel, to cope with
natural disasters when they're called up by the States'
Governors and also their homeland security responsibilities,
which are of particular concern to me, given my
responsibilities on the Homeland Security Committee.
What is being done specifically to ensure that we have
adequate resources at home to cope with homeland security
challenges and natural disasters?
General Casey. Thank you very much, Senator. We are working
very closely with the Guard to ensure that they have sufficient
equipment on hand to deal with State missions, as well as to
prepare themselves for future missions; and then, we are
absolutely committed to ensuring, when they do deploy, they
deploy with the latest and best possible equipment.
We've made great strides in this area, but we have a few
more years to go. With your help, we have about $35 billion
over the last few years to put against National Guard
equipment; about half of that, $14 billion, will be fielded in
the next 2 years.
So, just let me give you some examples of what that means.
In 2001, there were about 5,800 heavy trucks in the Guard; by
next year--or by 2009, that'll be up to 32,000. Radios, in
2001, 13,000; by 2009, 66,000.
So, it's coming. It's not there yet. We do specific work on
hurricane seasons to make sure that the States that are
hurricane prone have the equipment they need for those, but we
understand the needs and we're committed to providing the Guard
the equipment that they need for both State and for real
missions.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired. I would suggest
that the September GAO report paints a far worse picture than
what General Casey has just described, and I think it would be
helpful to the committee if the General would respond more
specifically to the findings in the GAO report.
General Casey. I don't want to try to paint a rosy picture.
We are where we are now. What I tried to give you was where
we'd be in 2 years.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. General, if you could, for the record,
respond to the GAO report, as requested by Senator Collins,
we'd appreciate it.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) report sought to address
the sufficiency of tracking reset expenditures and the reset strategies
of the Army and Marine Corps. As noted on page 40 of the report, the
Department of Defense nonconcurred with the GAO's findings.
In this report, the GAO noted that large amounts of National Guard
equipment had been left in theater to support ongoing operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, citing a dated report from October 2005. The
facts show that, as of November 25, 2007, the Army National Guard had
left less than 1 percent of its equipment behind.
The Army has committed an unprecedented level of resources to
address National Guard equipping needs. With $17.1 billion in fiscal
year 2007 funding, the Army reset 9 Army National Guard Brigades,
repaired 55,145 pieces of National Guard equipment at the State level,
and began procuring $2.5 billion in equipment to replace Reserve
equipment left behind in theater. We are also fencing $27 billion for
Army National Guard procurement through 2013. Equipment deliveries are
beginning to fill shortages and modernize our fleets.
However, we need your continued support. Working together, we will
ensure the Army National Guard maintains the necessary equipment to
conduct homeland defense and security missions, while also completing
its transition from a strategic Reserve to an operational Reserve.
Chairman Levin. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. General Casey, in your comments before the
National Press Club in August, and in your prepared testimony
today, you suggest that increasing competition for oil
resources, particularly with the growing demand in China and
India, will be a source of international conflict in coming
decades. You appear to be suggesting that a primary
justification for developing an expanded military is to secure
adequate oil supplies for the U.S. If so, is that not an
unrealistic objective, and would it not be more prudent to
accelerate investment in infrastructure and alternative energy
and to ensure that market mechanisms operate smoothly?
General Casey. That was not what I was trying to suggest,
Senator. I was just trying to point out the fact that--for
example, the middle class population of India is burgeoning,
and it already exceeds the population of the United States. The
estimates that I have read about oil research and
infrastructure improvements say that it's not going to bridge
the gap, we're not going to have the oil resources that we
need. As people try to shift to cleaner fuels, like natural
gas, 60 percent of the world's natural gas resources are in
Russia, Iran, and Qatar--we're going to be drawn more to the
Middle East, I think, rather than less. China also has a
burgeoning middle class. I believe the competition, not just
for oil resources, but for water and other things, is going to
generate global competition. Now, whether it turns to conflict
remains to be seen.
Senator Byrd. The International Energy Agency forecasts--
contrary, I believe, to your estimate that the demand for oil
will outpace supply by around 2030--forecasts that the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries will have
little spare capacity left by 2012, and predicts that supply
increases from other producers will start flagging as early as
2009. Now, if this estimate is accurate, the competition, that
you suggest may occur, is already upon us. Specifically, what
role do you see the military taking in this global struggle for
energy resources?
General Casey. Yes. I don't see the military playing a
direct role in it, Senator. What I highlighted those trends, of
which this is one, as trends that could exacerbate what is
already likely to be a period of protracted confrontation. But
I do not see the military having a direct role in this.
Senator Byrd. You do not.
Iran currently has a stable government and economy, and has
the second largest oil Reserves, globally, with approximately
10 percent of the world's oil. While the U.S. does not import
oil from Iran, the economies of Japan and Europe are dependent
on Iranian oil production and export. Is a military conflict in
Iran a practical approach to addressing our differences with
the Iranian government? Is it a practical approach?
General Casey. Senator, that's a policy question here that
I wouldn't even want to comment on.
Senator Byrd. It sounds more like a practical approach to
oblivion, a military conflict in Iran.
General Casey, does the United States have the military
depth to conduct combat operations in Iran? Could we be certain
that a U.S. strike would destroy all Iranian nuclear
facilities?
General Casey. Senator, you're asking hypothetical
situations that would have to have a lot of conditions before I
could even give you a remote answer to that. I'd prefer not to
address it.
Senator Byrd. Well, hypothetical--I'm asking a question. I
don't think we're talking about hypothetical situations here.
Does the United States have the military depth to conduct
combat operations in Iran? Could we be certain that a U.S.
strike would destroy all Iranian nuclear facilities.
General Casey. Senator, the U.S. military has the depth to
conduct combat operations anywhere in the world. On the second
question, the track record for destroying targets entirely by
air is not 100 percent, and so, I would expect any type of
attack wouldn't be 100-percent successful. Again, this is a
hypothetical situation.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both of the witnesses today for their
service to our country at this difficult time.
General Casey, would you expand for me on the condition of
the National Guard and its equipment as we were faced in a
post-September 11 world which then require their deployment?
Because I'm not sure that was fully answered earlier. So, if
you wouldn't mind.
General Casey. As I started to respond to Senator Kennedy,
the Guard and Reserve Forces, prior to September 11, were not
fully manned and equipped. There's a perception that the reason
that the Guard and Reserve have equipment shortages was that
they left it in Iraq is just not true. Less than 5 percent of
the Guard and the Reserve equipment was left in Iraq. They
never had it, to begin with, because they were a strategic
Reserve, and that's what I said in my opening statement. We're
using them in a role that they weren't originally designed or
resourced for, as an operational Reserve.
Now, that said, we've made great strides, right from the
beginning, in ensuring that the Guard and Reserve had the
equipment, the right equipment, when they deployed. We made a
decision, back when I was the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army,
to issue the first new soldier personal equipment to the Guard
brigades that were going over in early 2004, and that has
continued. We have shared the quality of the equipment with the
Active, the Guard, and Reserve equitably.
Now, as I said to Senator Collins, we're not where we need
to be right now, by any stretch of the imagination. But you
have given us the resources that are going to allow us, over
the next several years, to buy the equipment and bring the
Guard and Reserve back to the point where they need to be so
that they can support the State missions, train for further
missions, and have the quality equipment they need when they
deploy.
Senator Martinez. General, you spoke earlier in your
testimony, about the challenges of globalization, the ``have''
and ``have-nots,'' which, merged into humanitarian crises,
could lead to mischief in the world and potential conflict and
problems. My question has to do with the role that you envision
for the Army, but, as well, the totality of our Federal
Government as we respond to problems abroad that might present
themselves, where nations may have problems that, if
unaddressed, would lead them to potential conflict, how we
address the issues of financial problems, health issues,
housing issues, rule of law, education, and the potential for
economic development and growth, which could then lead to a
healthier environment in which it would be more difficult for
the mischief you spoke of to sustain itself. Could you address
how we are prepared, or not prepared, for that type of
challenge in the 21st century?
General Casey. Senator, first of all, considering the
different trends I mentioned, the reason that they're important
to us, from a security perspective now, is because global
terrorism and extremism are realities that we're dealing with,
and they create recruits that can sustain this effort. As you
suggest, it's not necessarily going to be the military solution
that is the one that is ultimately going to bring stability to
these different countries. As we are seeing in Iraq and
Afghanistan, there is a great need for civil efforts to do the
kind of things that the military doesn't necessarily do, like
build rule-of-law institutions, build financial institutions,
municipal government and those kinds of things.
As we look to the future, I believe that we, as a country,
need to think about how we are organized to do that most
effectively, because I've been looking at this since Bosnia,
and I remember, after going into Bosnia, saying, ``You know, we
ought to put together a group''--I thought it was an
international group--``that could do post-conflict
reconstruction kinds of things.''
Senator Martinez. But sometimes this might even arise in
the context of no conflict, in fact, but it might be as a
proactive measure.
General Casey. It could prevent it.
Senator Martinez.--could prevent further conflict or
developing conflicts in underdeveloped areas of the world.
General Casey. I think you're exactly right. Any strategy
that helps people help themselves, I believe, is the one that
would be successful.
I don't know, Mr. Secretary, if you have any views on that.
Senator Martinez. Mr. Secretary, I wanted to ask you about
the family concerns that you expressed and that I know all of
us share, in terms of the stress that the continued deployments
and the length of the conflicts we've been involved in have had
on the military's backbone, which is the strength of the
military--families. I was particularly intrigued in your
testimony that you mentioned a program of privatized housing
programs within the Army, and I wonder if you might comment on
that a little more and give us your assessment of the
Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) and the success that
it has had.
Secretary Geren. Senator, thank you for bringing up the
RCI. Again, a question that Senator Warner asked earlier,
``What are things that Congress can do to help the Army, in
addition to funding?'' that's a great example. The RCI was not
something that we started, it was something Congress started.
It was authority that you all gave us in the late 1990s, and in
2001 the Army embraced it, and it's been a tremendous success.
We're in the process, by leveraging government resources
with private investors, of privatizing all the on-post housing
in the United States Army. We will have invested close to a
billion in the private sector. We'll invest around 10 billion
in this effort to privatize. I know many of you have been to
the installations and seen this RCI housing. They're top-
quality homes, and they're real neighborhoods--an important
part of sustaining an All-Volunteer Force. When we ask families
and young men and women to devote their lives and their careers
to the military, they shouldn't have to live with substandard
housing, they ought to have the kind of housing in the Army
that they would expect for comparably accomplished people on
the outside. With this RCI, it's been a tremendous success.
It'll take us several more years to complete it across the
Army, but every place we've done it, the response from the
families has been great. In most cases, you double the size of
the number of square feet in a housing unit, building
sidewalks, building neighborhoods, building parks, building
community centers. It has been a tremendous success, and it's
allowed us to bring into the Army so many of the innovations in
housing and neighborhood development that most Americans on the
outside just flat take for granted, but we had not incorporated
into the quality of life for families. But the commitment the
Chief mentioned, quality of life commensurate with the quality
of the service, housing has to be at the top of that list. It's
at the top of the list of any family you talk to.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, General Casey, Secretary
Geren, both of you.
Thank you. My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Casey, published reports suggest that, except for
the brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan, and those preparing to
deploy, that the remaining brigades of the Army are--very few,
if any--are C1; they're either C3 because of training,
equipment, or personnel. Is that a fair estimate of your
situation?
General Casey. It is. I mean, that's what I said--that's
one of the main elements of being out of balance.
Senator Reed. So, roughly a half of the brigades in the
United States Army are not ready, according to your own
measures.
General Casey. That's true. I'm hesitating, only because of
the classification of the hearing.
Senator Reed. I understand that, but this has been
discussed in the press.
General Casey. Again, that's a key element of being out of
balance.
Senator Reed. Was that the case in 2000?
General Casey. That was not the case, Senator.
Senator Reed. Not the case. So, in the last 6 years, we
have seen a deterioration in the readiness of the Army, based
on its own measures of readiness. Is that accurate?
General Casey. Not exactly, Senator. We have seen a
deterioration of readiness of the next-to-deploy units. The
ones that are being committed in Iraq and Afghanistan which are
absolutely first rate.
Senator Reed. I'm not suggesting, as I said, that the units
you're deploying in Iraq are fully ready. You've done that. But
half of the Army, roughly, is not ready, by your own measures,
and that's a significant deterioration from 2000.
General Casey. It is not--it is true--and, again, this was
raised in the summer of 2006, and it hasn't really changed much
because I said in my testimony, we're consuming readiness as
fast as we build it, because of the rotation scheme.
Senator Reed. But there's been a significant change. I
mean, the administration has allowed this condition to persist
for 6 years. We have all allowed it to----
General Casey. Several variables contribute to this in
building readiness. One of the first is, as I said, the demand
for this exceeds our sustainable supply. Everyone's either
going or getting ready to go. So, because they're turning so
quickly, they have time to do counterinsurgency training and
not full-spectrum training. I think we rate ourselves on our
ability to do full-spectrum training.
Senator Reed. I know that.
General Casey. The second piece is the equipment, and we
discussed it, with the Guard. The same type of thing applied to
the Active Force. You have given us the money, and it takes
about 2 years from the time we get the money from you until
that equipment is in the unit. So, it has been addressed.
There's a time lag----
Senator Reed. The reality is that in 6 years, we've seen
the readiness of the Army deteriorate significantly. I think we
have to be careful--excepting those forces that are committed,
who are fully ready to deploy, and you're sending them out
ready, but we have a significant problem here, because it
reflects your ability to conduct full-spectrum operations.
There's no strategic Reserve from a land-forces perspective.
We're in a much more difficult situation than we were 6 years
ago.
The administration reluctantly increased the size of the
Army. Do you think they did it fast enough and with a
significant increase to meet your demand problem?
General Casey. I can't comment on the speed, I wasn't in
this position when they did that.
Senator Reed. Well, they didn't do it immediately, because
they resisted it for several years when some of us proposed it.
General Casey. I believe that the 547,000 Active that we're
building here is a good milestone. I believe it's probably not
big enough. However, I want to get there. Once we get that
going, then I want to have a discussion about, ``Okay, does it
need to be bigger? If so, are we prepared to provide the
resources to make it the quality of force that we need?'' I
don't want big. Big is not necessarily good. Big and hollow is
bad.
Senator Reed. Well, getting there is going to be a
challenge, because just staying in place is a challenge. You're
recruiting, and you've met your standards for the last several
months. One of the ways you've done that is to draw on your
delayed-entry pool. Until recently, you tried to maintain a
pool by the measure of 25 percent, I guess, which is a baseline
number you try to maintain. Now it's down to 9 percent. You're
pulling people forward and counting them. Are you robbing Peter
to pay Paul? I think there are two issues here. One is, can you
keep making this present end-state number? Two is, how do you
grow the force if you--if it's hard just to stay in place?
General Casey. We believe we can. We based our accelerated
growth initiative on the premise that we could recruit about
80,000 a year. We think we can do that. The Secretary and I
directed, several months ago, a soup-to-nuts review of how
we're doing this, because this is the first time we've had to
recruit an All-Volunteer Force in a protracted conflict since
the Revolution, and we need to do things differently. So we're
working that very hard.
The second piece of it is, we're going to increase our
retention a bit. Retention is generally good, with the
exception of the officer retention that we've talked about here
earlier. But in the noncommissioned officers, retention is
generally good, and that's very important.
We're also working on a program we call Active First, where
the Guard, who has been very successful with the local
recruiting initiative, is going to bring folks online and then
put them in the Active Force for 3\1/2\ to 4 years, and then
they go back to the Guard without prejudice and with GI bill
benefits.
We think those three things, together, will give us the
84,000 or so a year we need to grow the force by 2010.
Senator Reed. The overall thrust of your questions is that
you have to get the Army back in balance. Is your objective
premised on bringing down the deployment in Iraq from the
current roughly 160 to 130 or 120? Alternatively, if you have
to maintain the 160 level in Iraq, you can't bring your forces
in balance.
General Casey. When we get down to the 15-brigade level,
which----
Senator Reed. Which is roughly 130?
General Casey.--what the President has said, by July 2008,
we can get ourselves back in balance. It will just take us
longer. So, if we get down to less than that, we can do this by
about 2011, which is my target.
Senator Reed. The final point I want to make is that--long-
term, the Army--would have a very difficult time surging again,
past 160,000 troops in Iraq, because that would put you further
out of balance.
General Casey. Oh, sure. Sure.
Senator Reed. So, there's an operational force structure
constraint on the number of forces we can put in Iraq.
General Casey. Without more extensive mobilization of Guard
and Reserve brigades, yes.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Geren. If I could just add one thing, quickly.
When you talked about the readiness issue, and there's just one
factor that's important to that. In your discussion at the end
of your comments about the deployment schedule--at the point in
time when we're able to have soldiers at home longer, that will
also impact the readiness. With the short period of time that
they're home today, the ability to train up for multiple
specialties is challenging. As we see the time at home grow,
the training piece of the readiness indicators will improve.
But when you're home for 12 months, and getting ready to go
back for counterinsurgency operations, it limits the other type
of training that you can take on and be competent at. So,
that's an issue that will get better as the deployment schedule
gets more back in balance.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your
service.
I want to ask General Casey, if I might, a question,
because earlier this year, at the Army posture hearing, I
believe, that your predecessor, General Schoomaker, raised
concerns about the effect of not delivering adequate and
predictable funding, particularly in the form of supplemental
funding for the war effort. We're 46 days into the first
quarter of fiscal year 2008, we don't have an authorization
bill, we don't have a bridge funding bill for DOD, and we don't
have a fiscal year 2008 global war on terror supplemental. We
recently sent a Defense appropriations bill to the President,
which he has signed into law, but that has little to do with
the war effort.
So my question is, what will be the effect of no timely
bridge funding or supplemental funding? Will you have to cancel
service contracts, lay people off, slow down work at depots,
those sorts of things, if you could address that subject?
Secretary Geren. Secretary Gates has instructed us to begin
planning for that possibility. The signing of the
appropriations bill did two things. One, it gave us money for
our base budget, but it also stopped the continuing-resolution
funding that was going to support the war. So, now we're faced
with having to fund the war, without a bridge, out of the base
budget. Our Army O&M account is about $27 billion. When you
look at our Army base budget needs plus the war, you're talking
about $6.6 billion a month. If the Army is asked to fund this
without any type of bridge or without any additional resources,
we're going to run through that $27 billion probably around
mid-February, and we cannot wait until then to start making
some of the decisions that will have to be made.
Our employment contracts, many of them require 60 or 45
days notice before you can furlough somebody. We have many of
the services that are provided by civilians, by contractors. It
would have a hugely detrimental effect on the home base. We
will beggar the home front to make sure that our soldiers that
are in theater have everything that they need, and it will put
a terrible burden on soldiers, on families, on the
institutional Army, our ability to train.
Timely funding is absolutely essential. An organization of
our size cannot live effectively with unpredictable funding,
and we need that supplemental passed soon or we're going to
have to start planning for the possibility that we're not going
to have it.
Senator Thune. General Schoomaker also testified that the
Army was forced to cash-flow itself through the first quarter
of fiscal year 2006. Could you explain what that means? Will
the Army have to do that again?
Secretary Geren. We're in that position now. The O&M
account is our account that offers us the greatest flexibility.
Most of the other accounts are constrained by specific--we call
the term ``color of money.'' But we would find ourselves having
to spend that O&M money, not only to support the Army, but also
to support the war effort. So, we are in that position today,
and using up the funds at a rate of $6.5 billion a month
against a $27 billion total.
Senator Thune. Mr. Secretary, there's a saying that you
recruit a soldier, but you re-enlist a family. This year,
Congress has yet to send the Military Construction (MILCON)/
Veterans Affairs appropriations bill to the President to get
signed into law. MILCON funding goes to support important
aspects of military quality-of-life issues, such as barracks,
training facilities, childcare centers, and family housing
units. What is the status of the Army's MILCON accounts?
Without a MILCON appropriations bill signed into law, when is
the Army going to experience problems paying for military
infrastructure and quality-of-life expenditures?
Secretary Geren. The impact of no MILCON bill affects us on
several levels. Last year the MILCON bill was slow; we didn't
get it until well into the fiscal year. We're operating, in the
MILCON area, still under a continuing resolution, but that
holds up about $5 billion that we have planned for all types of
military construction projects.
Now, the base realignment and closure (BRAC) piece of this
is still able to be funded under the continuing resolution, but
at reduced levels. So, it threatens our ability to meet the
BRAC timelines.
But MILCON is a significant piece of the quality of life
for soldiers and their families, and if we cannot get the
MILCON bill, it holds up about $5 billion, with a delay, and it
will impact our construction for barracks, for other types of
quality-of-life improvements, and impact our ability to meet
our timelines of moving soldiers around the system. It poses a
real challenge for us. Every day that goes by after the end of
the last fiscal year puts that part of our Army planning and
budgeting under stress.
Senator Thune. General, how do these funding issues, the
lack thereof, affect our ability to reset and transform?
General Casey. From my perspective as the Chief, the two
primary aspects of lack of stable, predictable funding; in
particular, the current situation. First is, it makes my job--
organizing, training, and equipping the force, harder. Every
time you have a delay or a perturbation, you get second- and
third-order effects that just takes you months to recover from.
I mentioned, in my opening statement, about last year. We
got the funding--the global war on terror funding with the
base, and, as a result of that, we were able to get right into
reset--reset 27 brigades last year, 18 in the Active component,
9 in the Reserve component. Our depots processed 123,000 big
pieces of equipment, like tanks and Bradleys, and they fixed
over 10,000 Humvees for the Guard and Reserve. So, there's a
lot we can do with the money on time.
The second element I'd comment on is just that--my role as
a spokesman for the Army soldiers and families. We have about
nine brigades that are coming back from Iraq right now, between
September and January, and it just sends absolutely the wrong
signal to those soldiers and families who have been out there
for 15 months, to have the potential of the services that
support them when they come home cancel.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary and General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
I want to follow up on Senator Collins' question on how
we're screening our soldiers for PTSD and TBI before and after
deployment. Army researchers released a report, 2 days ago,
that found between 27 and 35 percent of troops returning from
Iraq are experiencing mental health issues. General Casey, are
these troops identified as--mental health issues considered by
the Army as being deployable, or are they considered to be
wounded? I just wonder how you classify that. In particular,
can you address those who are found to be suffering from PTSD
or TBI, and what happens to them?
General Casey. Overall, Senator, it really depends on the
severity of the injury, but we have had a proactive program
here, since early in the conflict, to measure mental health,
and we've continually upgraded that program over time. We
started off just with a post-deployment assessment. As you read
in that article, about 2005 we started an additional
reassessment at 6 months, because our doctors told us that the
symptoms sometimes take that long to develop. We found what we
thought we'd find.
The other element that the Secretary mentioned there, we've
added a baseline assessment on the front end, so we have
something to compare it to.
We're working on helmet sensors that we can put in a
soldier's helmet that will measure the blasts that he or she is
exposed to, and then we can measure that and keep track, like
we used to do with those nuclear dosimeters; you measure
impacts overtime.
So, it's been a steady process. Again, as the Secretary
said to me, the most important element of success here is to
reduce the stigma attached to PTSD and TBI. This chain-teaching
program that we initiated in July is that we hope to be
beginning to turn that, and we've already seen indications that
it has; people are more willing to come forward and talk about
what's really an injury, not a mental health problem.
Senator Akaka. General Casey, Hawaii's 29th BCT has been
notified that they will be deployed to Kuwait next summer,
which is only 2\1/2\ years after returning from their last
deployment in Iraq. This is far less than the goal of 5 years
between deployments for National Guard and Reserves. By the
time they return from this deployment, they will have spent
2\1/2\ years deployed in the Middle East over the previous 5-
year period. While they have a greater time between
deployments, their operational tempo is still comparable to the
tempo for Active Duty soldiers, in that it is 1 month home for
every month deployed.
The question, General Casey is, has the 29th BCT been given
adequate time to reset its equipment and complete its training
requirements in time to meet the deployment schedule? Have any
training requirements been modified, reduced, or even
accelerated in order to meet the deployment schedule? If so,
what are those potential impacts on the unit?
General Casey. Yes, Senator. While I don't know the
specifics of the preparedness of that particular brigade, I can
tell you that, for the Guard and Reserve, much like for the
Active, we're not meeting our objective goals for deployment-
to-dwell ratios. The Guard and Reserve are running about one to
three-and-a-half. Obviously there are some, like the 29th, that
are less than that. Again, this is part of putting ourselves
back in balance.
I will address your questions on the specifics of the
29th's preparations, here, and I'll get back to you
individually, if that's all right.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Army National Guard and 1st Army will ensure the 29th BCT is
well-trained, properly equipped, adequately resourced, and fully
prepared to meet mission requirements when it deploys next summer. As
the 29th BCT prepares for its second wartime mission, pre-deployment
unit training will be conducted at Schofield Barracks to ensure the
unit's readiness meets the same high standards set for every Army
unit--whether Active or Reserve.
The 29th BCT is 1 of 15 Army National Guard brigades deploying in
fiscal year 2009. All of these brigades have between 20 and 40 months
of dwell time. Admittedly, the dwell time does not meet our ultimate
goal of a 1:5 deployment-to-dwell ratio. It is in keeping, however,
with the dwell time of other brigades being called upon for deployment.
Meanwhile, the Army is providing $14 billion worth of new equipment
to the Army National Guard over the next 2 years to reduce equipment
shortages. We will ensure that critical equipment items are available
to support Hawaii's pre-deployment training through a cross-leveling of
equipment within Hawaii and with other States and territories.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Secretary Geren, in your prepared statement, you briefly
described the Gansler Commission started to examine current
Army contracting operations to ensure that future contracting
operations are more effective, efficient, and transparent. You
indicated that the Commission identified a number of
recommendations that you consider critical to future
contracting success. Are you committed to implementing all of
the Commission's recommendations? If not, can you describe
those that you will not be implementing? Also, how long will it
take to complete the implementation of the Commission's
recommendations?
Secretary Geren. Dr. Gansler finished his work a few weeks
ago, and I asked for a very blunt assessment of our situation,
and he gave us that. His report is going to provide a
guideline, a blueprint for us as we move forward in the
contracting area. He raised issues that are not just specific
to the Army, but OSD, and there are issues for the entire
Federal Government. The acquisition workforce, the contracting
workforce, has been under-resourced, under-invested. We saw
steady downward pressure on this workforce in the 1990s, and
the seams were exposed in a dramatic way when we saw this big
ramp-up in contracting that came with the war. But the problems
had been there for a while.
We already are implementing some of his recommendations.
Some are DOD-wide. I met with Secretary Gates, and he's
instructed the other Services, as well as the OSD staff, to
look at this and look where these reforms should be undertaken
across the entire DOD.
But what we've learned, as an Army, we are under-resourced
in this area, we do not have enough personnel, we do not have
the proper training, we do not have the proper leadership
structure when it comes to acquisition and contracting, and we
are not developing either soldiers or civilians in this area to
meet the challenges of contracting.
We have a great deal of work to do. It's not going to
happen overnight. It's going to be years. It's an area that I
expect, in the next couple of months, we'll be coming forward
with some legislative initiatives--ask you to consider and to
support us as we make these reforms.
The Army of the future, the DOD forces, whether they are
Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marines, are going to go to war
strongly supported by a large contractor base. We have to shape
our organized training-and-equip efforts to make sure that
those are properly coordinated. We have not done a good job up
until now. It's one of the lessons that we've learned from this
protracted conflict. It's a lesson we're taking to heart, and
we're working aggressively to implement the recommendations of
Dr. Gansler. I'm going to keep him involved over the coming
months to make sure that we stay on track.
Senator Akaka. Finally, Secretary Geren, you indicated that
the Commission's recommendations were in four broad areas. One
of those areas is obtaining legislative, regulatory, and policy
assistance to enable contracting effectiveness by important
expeditionary operations. My question to you is, do you need
help from Congress to implement any of the recommendations? If
so, how can we help?
Secretary Geren. We will need help from Congress. We're
working with the Secretary of Defense's office to put together
that package. We don't have it yet. But we will be coming to
you with requests for help, because there will be some areas
where we need some legislative assistance, and there will be
some policy changes. Not only will we come to you with
suggestions, but, both among your membership and among your
staff, you have people very experienced in this area, and I see
us working together to address this issue. It will be a
multiyear effort, because we've dug this hole over 15 years,
and it's going to take more than the next year to dig ourselves
out of it.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. General Casey and Secretary Geren, we
thank you for your excellent work. We have to recognize and
always remember that our Army is a national treasure. It's
performed beyond expectations that any of us could have had for
them. The volunteer Army has continued to work in a prolonged
conflict, our people are still signing up to join the Army, and
retention remains above what many of us could expect. But we do
know there's a limit, and if we stress our Army too strong, we
can hurt or damage this fabulous institution that's served us
so well. So, I want you to know that we want to be informed on
the real problems that you have, and this Congress, I believe,
will respond.
I had a number of things I wanted to ask you about, but,
listening to your comments and thinking through where we are,
we simply have to talk about the funding for our soldiers who
are in conflict now. We have to have this funding, and we
cannot wait and wait and wait, and leave the DOD in a position
of having to rob Peter to pay Paul, to manipulate budget
accounts, creating all kinds of uncertainty. That is exactly
the wrong thing for us to do at this time.
I see Deputy Secretary England's letter from just a few
days ago to Congressman Murtha, in which he says, ``Without
this critical funding, the Department will have no choice but
to deplete key appropriations accounts by early next year. In
particular, the Army's operation and maintenance account will
be completely exhausted in mid- to late-January. The limited
general transfer authority available can only provide 3
additional weeks of relief. This situation will result in a
profoundly negative impact on the defense civilian workforce,
depot situation, base operations, and training activities.
Specifically, DOD would have to begin notifications as early as
next year to properly carry out the resulting closure of
military facilities, furloughing civilian workers, and deferral
of contract activity.''
Do you agree that that's the kind of serious situation
we're facing if we don't pass the supplemental for our troops?
Secretary Geren. Without the supplemental, we will run
through our O&M account. We have to fund the base operations of
the Army, as well as the global war on terror, out of that
account.
At the end of your question, you mentioned the civilians.
This will fall most heavily on them. The Military Personnel
(MILPERS) accounts will continue to pay soldiers, but if we do
not get some funding relief by mid-February, we'll be in a
position where we'll have to start furloughing our civilians,
canceling contracts. It would be over 100,000 civilians,
potentially, to be furloughed. In contrast to years before, we
don't have a bridge this year to sustain us while we wait.
Senator Sessions. When you say a ``bridge,'' what do you
mean, a ``bridge''?
Secretary Geren. In years past, when we've found ourselves
waiting on the supplemental, there have been bridge funds that
have helped bridge the gap, I guess is where the term came
from. We don't have that this year. When the President signed
the appropriations bill, it cut off the continuing resolution
support to the war effort. So, a large organization such as
ours cannot turn on a dime. The Secretary has instructed us to
start planning for the possibility that this impasse continues.
It would have a dramatic effect. We will have to make serious
cuts on services on the homefront in order to continue to
sustain operations overseas; it will fall heavily on home-based
troops and their families and on installations.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Secretary, I'm sure you can go on for
a whole lot more dire consequences of us failing to do this.
Let me just say what I think pretty much is undisputable. We
had a big debate this summer over whether or not we were going
to fund the surge and continue our effort in Iraq, or withdraw
or set a firm date and pull out. We rejected that. We agreed to
fund General Petraeus and the activities that are going on over
there, with additional surge. That has, in recent weeks,
produced positive results beyond what I think any of us would
have imagined at the time when we did that. So, we're having
positive results of an unexpected degree, and now we're at a
point where we're nickel-and-diming you, delaying you on the
fundamental monies you need to continue what is turning out to
be a successful military operation.
So, I just think we can't do this. It's just unthinkable
that we would commit military men and women to harm's way--
General Casey, you've commanded those troops over there--
they're entitled to absolute support from the United States
Congress. If we're going to say we're not going to do this
anymore, and we're just going to quit, well, let us step up and
say that; but that's not what we said this summer, when things
were much more grim than they are today. After a full
discussion this summer, Congress said, ``Let's go forward.''
So, let's not play political games with this now. It increases
the risk to our soldiers.
General Casey, do you believe that if we leave the
uncertainty of funding for the operations we have underway
today, that this can adversely affect the morale and confidence
of our military and our allies, and can put them at greater
risk?
General Casey. As I said earlier, Senator, it sends
absolutely the wrong signal to our soldiers and to our
families.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think we'll work through this. People have some strong
feelings about the war, they wish we hadn't started it, they're
not happy with the way it's been conducted. I know that. But,
at this point, our great Nation has to make a decision, and I
think our decision was made this summer, to go forward and give
our military a chance to be successful, which they are proving
able to do.
I do want to note that, with regard to the complaints about
the Government of Iraq and the legislators there, I share a lot
of those concerns, but would note, for the most part, that's a
responsibility of the State Department and other departments of
Government, not the United States military, to work with the
Government in Iraq. I'm just concerned that State Department is
having difficulty, it seems to me, in fulfilling their
requirements in this very difficult time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Ben Nelson?
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both of you for your service to our
country.
Obviously, General Casey, you have commanded the troops in
Iraq. Secretary Geren, you're getting your feet wet, helping
the Army as its Secretary, and we appreciate that, as well, and
appreciate your depth of knowledge in this hearing.
Part of the problem we have here with the funding is just
fundamental, and that is that so much of the funding of this
war, and resetting and repairing, is coming in the form of a
supplemental, as opposed to being within the general budget to
begin with. We've talked to Secretary Gates about this, and I
understand that there are some things that are not predictable.
I know you want predictable funding. I think if we can make
sure that more of this funding is in the budget, that we deal
with an authorization and appropriations in the ordinary course
of what we do here, we'll be a lot better off, and I think the
military will be a lot better off, as well.
So, we're all responsible for some unpredictable funding
situations here because of the lack of having this in the
regular budget. If it's in the regular budget, it's going to be
less likely to become a political football, as, in some cases,
it may be today.
But I think there's a serious concern that some have in
saying that we want to fund it all, and I respect that
position. It's not mine. I think we should fully fund the war
effort, and that we should pass the supplemental. But I think
we ought to do it in a way where there are no strings attached
to it. There is a rope. The rope is to pull it back up for a
review on March 31, 2008, in light of what we would require,
and that would be a report from General Petraeus, as we've had
before, before Congress. We have a report from the GAO and a
report from the President on the success, or lack of success,
or at least the effort at achieving the benchmarks, at least
the major four benchmarks that we know that we've put in the
last supplemental. I think it's appropriate to review how this
is going. That's part of the problem. Just approving $190
billion and saying, ``Okay, that's that, and what's next? Well,
we'll find out after all that.'' I think continuing to have an
interest, where we pull it back up with a rope, but without
strings, if you understand the difference that I'm saying--it's
probably a western Nebraska term, to put a rope on something to
pull it back up. But I think that's what we have to do, to take
a look at it once it's all funded.
I agree with you that it needs to be predictable. I don't
agree with those who suggest Congress is making it less
predictable, because it becomes less predictable because of the
process. If we change the process, I think the funding will be
more predictable for the military.
What are your thoughts, Secretary Geren?
Secretary Geren. Well, last year, with the delivery of the
President's budget, we delivered part of what became the
supplemental request.
Senator Ben Nelson. I think we plugged-in about $50 billion
or something like that.
Secretary Geren. So, it was a step in the right direction.
I think the earlier we can get the request through the
administration to Congress, the better. The day that we're able
to have those all considered together would be an improvement
over the situation we find ourselves in today.
Senator Ben Nelson. Be more predictable, because we're not
assuming that everything offered would be included.
Secretary Geren. No.
Senator Ben Nelson. But the size of it would be most likely
included in some debate in authorization about the details.
Secretary Geren. Go through the normal processes that are
set up for considering it. I think that would be an
improvement. Again, by submitting most of it at the beginning
of the year, it provided the opportunity for it to move more
according to regular order, but there was an additional request
in the fall. But in the Army we are looking towards the day
when we expect that the supplementals will all be absorbed into
the base budget, and trying to look down the road and plan
accordingly. The process in Congress, with the authorization
and appropriations committee working together, that would
provide an approach that would increase the chances of moving
things together in a predictable fashion, I agree with you.
Senator Ben Nelson. I hope that you'll continue to believe
that--I know you will--and also express that concern and our
frustration to Secretary Gates, because I know he's interested
in getting the base budget much more in line with what the
requirements will be, so that we don't end up with
supplementals, which are outside the budget, in effect. They
don't go through the authorization process. As far as I
understand it, they don't even add technically to the deficit,
that they drop directly to the bottom line of the debt. We have
to get away from that kind of funding. There are things that
are predictable. I think most of the expenses for this war will
be predictable. Hurricane Katrina is not predictable. But there
are differences, and I don't think we ought to be using
supplementals the way we are right now.
One other thing, and that is going to be my proposal, at
some point along the way, that we approve all of it, if the 50
percent or the 70 percent that's being talked about do not
pass, then I would like to see us go to something like I just
outlined: full funding, no strings, but a rope.
Thank you, again, for your candor. Also, please express our
appreciation to the generals and the military officials who, in
the Washington Post today, were so candid about the future of
the political side of Iraq. We've all put pressure on Prime
Minister al-Maliki, and we've put pressure on the Shiite
government to reach out in a more fundamentally fair and
equitable way to the Sunnis to bring about reconciliation.
These comments tell us that the time that we put in place for
them with the very successful surge, militarily, at a short
term, they're squandering the opportunity. We can't continue to
give them this opportunity if they're not going to step forward
and run their government themselves, which they have to do
fundamentally correct by meeting at least the top four
benchmarks.
Once again, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was going to mention the same thing that Senator Nelson
did about the article, so I associate myself with his remarks
there.
I had to attend this other meeting, the same place Senator
Warner is right now, so I apologize if I ask what has already
been. General Casey, you mentioned your three areas of concern,
the last one being the reset problems. I think that you didn't
get a chance to elaborate enough on that. It seems to me--and I
could be wrong--as I go around and I visit the depots, they are
doing their job; they seem to be adequately funded. But the
logjam seems to be getting the product of those depots back to
the field of battle. Is this right? Where do you see the
problem?
General Casey. I'm not aware of a difficulty in getting the
fixed equipment back out to units. The challenge that we have
with the reset is what we've been talking about here with
respect to lack of predictable funding. We have to buy the
spares that we use in a reset, 2 years out. So, every time you
delay with funding, you push back the time when those spares
and things are available.
Senator Inhofe. So, there's really not the problem of
getting them out, because I can tell you where to go to see the
long lines of the products that have been finished that still
haven't quite reached there, so it might be something we can
look into.
General Casey. With all the money that you gave us, we have
also, over the past 4 years, put in a significant effort in
improving the efficiency of the depots. Last year, 12 of our
depots won the Shingo award, which is a public-sector award for
manufacturing excellence. I wanted to get that on the record
because it's a significant accomplishment here. So, we're
efficiently using the money that Congress has provided.
Senator Inhofe. I know you are. By the way, although it's
not a subject of this committee hearing, the same thing is true
with air logistics centers around the country, and they've
done, really, a good job, very competitive job.
Secretary Geren, you and I have had many discussions about
FCS and where we are right now. A statement that you made, I
will quote. You said, ``FCS will give our soldiers the
knowledge they need to fight and win in any battle space, day
or night, whether the battle is conventional or asymmetric.''
While FCS is not in the field yet, there are--the
technologies and the spin-outs on FCS are in the fight right
now--aerial drones, robots, sensors, communications equipment.
Now, my concern is this, that the Defense Appropriations
Bill for Fiscal Year 2008 contains provisions that are vital
for the continued success of the funding of FCS, and yet, it
was cut, I believe, by a little over $200 million--I think,
$205, $206 million. I'd like to get your idea as to what effect
that's going to have, that cut, in the progress of the FCS.
Secretary Geren. Well, let me first say, I want to thank
this committee for your strong support of FCS. When we look at
the future, and look at full-spectrum readiness, the FCS is an
important part of full-spectrum readiness, for whatever type of
conflict we find ourselves in. FCS is a part of the answer to
the readiness challenge that we have.
Over the years that we have had the FCS program, it has
been cut approximately $850 million. That has caused the
program to slow down. It has caused it to be restructured,
caused it to be changed--in some areas, significantly.
This cut this year will cause some challenges. We're
working through it right now, trying to figure out how we
minimize the impact. But we believe that it could slow--it
could slow the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) cannon, it could slow
other aspects of the program, the spin-outs. I can't tell you
with certainty today, but, once we got word of the $200-million
cut, we have gone to work to figure out how to minimize the
impact. It will be significant, and it will slow it down. Those
delays end up costing more in the long-term. So, it won't save
money long-term, it'll cost money long-term.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Secretary, you brought up the NLOS
cannon. That's one of my major concerns. If you look at the
deficiencies that we have relative to prospective enemies in
the field, the cannon is, in my opinion, number one. There are
five countries now, including South Africa, that make a better
cannon system, artillery system, than we have. In fact, ours is
really the World War II technology of the old Paladin. I can
remember, about 2 years ago, 3 years ago, I made the statement
that it's so antiquated that, after every shot, you have to get
out and swab the breach, and nobody believed me until we showed
them the pictures.
So, that's something that needs to stay on schedule, as all
of these do, and I'm really concerned about it.
Let me just ask you a question, of either one or both of
you. We've talked about the top line. During the Eisenhower
administration, the percentage was as high as 10 percent. I'm
talking a percentage of GDP. We heard testimony about 8 years
ago from Secretary Rumsfeld in response to a question at that
time, and--about the problems that we're facing in the future.
I know we're concerned about what's bleeding the most today,
but we still have to look toward the future. That's what FCS is
all about. They commented that we went through the entire last
century of averaging 5.7 percent of GDP on military readiness
and on military spending. It got down to as low as 2.7 at the
end of the 1990s. I'd just like to get your thoughts to get in
the record at this time as to where you think we ought to be
eventually looking into the future.
One of the reasons for this is that I don't care how smart,
General Casey, all of your generals are, if you look at, ``What
is our problem going to be 10 years from now?'' you're going to
guess, but you'll probably be wrong. So, the only way to
resolve that is to have the best of everything. So, do you have
any thoughts on that, where we ought to be in the future?
Secretary Geren. Well, one of the biggest challenges for us
as a country, over the history of this country, has been
sustaining readiness in between conflicts. I think the nature
of a democracy is, when a war is over, we think they'll never
happen again, and we, unfortunately, plan accordingly. All of
us who were here in the 1990s are guilty of letting hope
triumph over our country's experience.
I don't know what the right percentage is. But I think, as
leaders in this country, one of the biggest challenges is going
to be maintaining the kind of investments, when this war is
over, whenever that is. Modernization initiatives, like FCS, I
think, come under particular challenge at times when--in
between conflicts, when Americans' interests turn elsewhere, as
they did in the 1990s--in sustaining a good base of funding,
particularly for modernization, and maintaining a quality
civilian workforce, as well as a properly trained uniformed
military in those periods, to me, is one of the biggest
challenges. How we lock ourselves into that course of action in
between conflicts, I think, is a real challenge for us. I don't
know that I know the answer, but I think it's something that,
as leaders, we just need to make sure that the country focuses
on the reality of the challenge, and not repeat the mistake
that we made in the 1990s.
Senator Inhofe. Excellent statement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, there's been some rhetoric from the other side
today, with the implication that people on this side may be
reluctant to fully fund the people who are actually on the
battlefield. We all know that's not going to happen. I don't
know anybody up here who would, in any way, be moving toward
that direction. In fact, I don't know anybody up here who
doesn't strongly believe that, when we put the United States
military into the field, it's going to be able to control its
battle space. That's just not the questions. We all know that.
The true questions before us really are the strategic benefit
of these tactical policies that are in play, and you could take
a look at the front page of the Washington Post today and see
that that's a debate that isn't limited to Democrat versus
Republican, or even civilian versus military. It's something
we're all struggling with.
There's been some comment today, some questions about the
utility of using the attrition rates from West Point. Mr.
Chairman, we've seen this go back and forth. General, you've
made a comment, saying that these numbers are just marginally
above the traditional attrition rates.
I have a letter here that I received from a West Point
Class of 2002 graduate, last week, who was actually thanking me
for the dwell-time amendment that I introduced, ``As a soldier
and Iraq war veteran with two tours, I can vouch for the
importance of your dwell-time amendment. Though the amendment
fell a few votes short, I sincerely appreciate the fact that
someone in our Congress understands the strain that multiple
deployments are placing on our soldiers, families, unit
training, and equipment.'' He then goes into the attrition
rates. In his letter he mentions this data that's been going
back and forth all year, saying that more than 54 percent of
the 935 graduates in the Class of 2000 had left Active Duty by
last January. More than 46 percent of 2001. He says in here
that these numbers are staggering, considering that,
previously, West Point officer attrition rates usually fell
between 10 and 30 percent for similar time increments.
So, what I would ask--and I would assume this could be done
in a timely manner--is that you could provide us data--even
these numbers that we're using here, the 54 percent and 46
percent, that data's now 11 months old. That's as of the end of
the last year. So, if you could give us, in a timely manner,
what the numbers are and how they compare with time
increments--similar time increments in other classes, I think
we can clear the air on this, Mr. Chairman, if we could put
this in the record, as well.
Secretary Geren. We can get you that information today,
Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
The information requested by Senator Webb was directly provided to
him in the form of charts. These charts are attached.
Senator Webb. Okay, thank you.
General Casey. I checked it recently, before we came up
here, and it's about 8 percent above normal.
Senator Webb. We've been going back and forth on this, and
I have other questions I want to ask, but I would like to see
the data. This individual said, actually along the lines of
what you have said, ``I can tell you that, for many of us, the
decision to leave the Service is not because we dislike the
Army. When we decide to get out, we make it because we
understand the realities of multiple redeployments and the
burden it places on our families and loved ones,'' et cetera.
I'm looking at your covenant, which you're talking about
today, and I would suggest that the best thing you can do for
families is to enact a sensible rotation policy for our troops.
General, I recall when you called me and told me that you were
going to the 15-month deployment with a 12-month at-home dwell
time, I was stunned, as someone who knows what it's like to
have a dad deployed, who knows what it's like to be deployed,
who knows what it's like to have a son deployed, and who has 5
years in the Pentagon, 4 years in policymaking, that it's
something I would have expected a lot of pushback from on the
uniformed side. Your comment to me at the time was to the
effect that you have to feed the strategy, that somebody else
creates the strategy, the Army has to feed it.
Then, when we had General Petraeus here in September, I
asked him about it, and his initial comment was, ``Well, that's
something for the Chief of Staff of the Army.''
So, my first question, if you could answer this in a
sentence, is; who is accountable for this policy?
General Casey. We made the recommendation to the Secretary
of Defense to go to the 15-month policy, for three reasons. I
don't remember our particular conversations, but this is what
I've said consistently. One is to support the needs of the
commander in the field. Two, it gave us more predictability for
our soldiers and families. We were in a position where we were
getting ready to extend a brigade a month, and you know how
that works, you're next to go, you know you're going, but you
don't. So, that's the second. The third, probably the most
important, was, we needed 12 months at home to ensure that the
soldiers deploying were adequately prepared.
Now, we have a common interest in establishing, as you
said, a reasonable deployment policy. We are working that very
hard. The 15 months was always intended to be temporary. We
will come off of that as soon as we can. I'm working that very
hard right now, with all of my different commanders.
Senator Webb. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has stated
that his goal is a 2-to-1, not a 1-to-1. What is your goal?
General Casey. Our goal is 1-to-3, but we don't expect to
see----
Senator Webb. 1-to-3?
General Casey. 1-to-3.
Senator Webb. For Active Duty?
General Casey. For Active Duty, to sustain. Now, we're not
going to get there anytime in the near future, so 1-to-2 is our
short-term goal.
Senator Webb. When would you expect to see that?
General Casey. One of the key elements of putting the Army
back in balance is to get there by about 2011. To do that, we
have to increase our supply, which we'll do by about 10 BCTs,
and the demand has died down.
Senator Webb. My time is running out, here. I want to ask
you one other question, just to clear the air on something else
here. You said something which I believe is important, and that
is, looking in the future, at the types of enemies we're going
to face, that we cannot predict the time, nature, or location
of future conflicts. I think that is a basic assumption of
American strategy. Would you agree that it is strategically
dangerous to have such a high percentage of our ground forces
tied down in one country that was not directly threatening us
in the first place, and whose major tensions now seem to be
sectarian, particularly with the fluidity of al Qaeda? Would
you believe that's dangerous, strategically, for us to be tied
down the way we are?
General Casey. I wouldn't agree with your whole statement,
Senator, but to have all of the numbers of forces that we have
committed now increases our level of strategic risk. But, as I
said, I believe, looking broadly at the strategic situation,
right now it's an acceptable level of risk.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, welcome.
General Casey, as the former Commander of Multinational
Forces in Iraq and General Petraeus's predecessor, could you
give the committee your assessment of the effectiveness of the
surge of additional troops and operations in Iraq over the last
few months?
General Casey. I could give you my personal views, but I
think General Petraeus did a marvelous job of laying that out
for everybody in September, and I certainly agree with the way
he portrayed it.
Senator Cornyn. I agree, he did a good job in September.
Maybe I could just ask you to update your observations from
that September timeframe over the last 2 months.
General Casey. My impression is, reading the reports and
actually talking to General Petraeus, that the security
situation has continued to improve.
Senator Cornyn. Certainly seems to be all----
General Casey. I'm hesitating--it's not what I do anymore.
Senator Cornyn. I gotcha. There seems to be all the
published reports I read, the number of attacks, down;
casualties, down; IEDs, down; imported explosively formed
penetrators from Iran, down. Sounds like some progress.
I want to ask you a little bit about the criticism that has
been made against national Iraqi leaders for lack of political
reconciliation progress, and to just ask you, from your
experience--and you have more experience than just about
anybody on the planet in Iraq--were you surprised, or did you
expect to see the kind of reconciliation process from the
bottom up that we've observed in places like Anbar province,
and which is now apparently extending to other areas of the
country?
General Casey. I wasn't surprised with the progress in
Anbar province. That was in process, as we were there. So, the
seeds were basically laid for this progress there.
I'm exceeding my brief here, but the Sunni were really in
the middle, in the time I was leading, because they were being
attacked by al Qaeda, they were being attacked by the Shi'a,
and they were being attacked by us, if they were attacking us.
So, the fact that they've decided to come in and seek some
support is not surprising to me.
Senator Cornyn. Well, I guess there are different types of
political reconciliation--for our own country, as I recall my
American history, with the 13 colonies and the States that
created the National government. So, it shouldn't be surprising
to us that local and provincial reconciliation progress could
well proceed and complement efforts made for reconciliation at
the National level. I would expect that all of us, hoping and
praying for success in our efforts, and our ability to bring
our troops home as soon as conditions on the ground permit, I
would think we would all rejoice and be pleased at those
developments.
You and Secretary Geren have talked about the consequences
of limiting the funds for the so-called ``bridge,'' which I
would think, for a more descriptive term, would be: ``emergency
troop funding for the war effort'' would be a better way to
talk about it--but the House has sent over a $50 billion
emergency troop funding bill, when the Pentagon has requested a
$200 billion fund, right at a quarter of what's requested, but
it comes with a few additions, which I'd like for you to
comment on. One is a goal for withdrawal of all troops by
December 15, 2008. What would be the consequence of Congress
adopting, and the President signing, a troop funding provision
that provided a goal for withdrawing on December 15, 2008?
Chairman Levin. Would Senator Cornyn yield, just on that?
Because it doesn't say ``all troops.'' I wonder if the Senator
might agree that it doesn't say ``all.''
Senator Cornyn. I stand corrected, Mr. Chairman. A goal for
withdrawal of all troops, except those necessary for
diplomatic, security, counterterror operations, by December 15,
2008.
Secretary Geren. Well, the President, as I understand, made
it clear that he wouldn't sign an appropriation with those sort
of strings and with those sort of limitations.
Senator Cornyn. Let me amend my question. What would be the
consequence of Congress passing that legislation? We can leave
it to the President to make his mind up as to what he intends
to do with it.
Secretary Geren. From the perspective of the Army, in our
organize, train, and equip role, I'd be reluctant to offer a
strategic or a tactical perspective from the field. So, I
decline to answer that, other than that the President has made
it clear that he will not sign that, and so, the Army is having
to plan as if that route to funding our needs is not going to
become a reality. We are forced to look into the future, try to
anticipate what our funding challenges are going to be, and
plan accordingly, and that's what we're doing.
Senator Cornyn. I am asking you what a withdrawal date,
even as a goal--whether that is helpful or unhelpful, in terms
of advancing the security situation in Iraq.
General Casey, what's your opinion?
General Casey. With my Joint Chiefs hat on, Senator, I----
Senator Cornyn. Sir, you have those four stars on your
shoulder, and I respect your military judgment, and, whether or
not it's within your current portfolio, you have a lot more
experience than anybody up here on this side of the bench, and
I'd like your views.
General Casey. It has been the consistent policy of the
Joint Chiefs that any type of firm withdrawal date would
undermine our ability to conduct the operations there in Iraq
or Afghanistan.
Senator Cornyn. Would it make any military sense to--in
your opinion, General Casey, to limit the range of permissible
operations, by the Commander of Multinational Forces in Iraq,
to diplomatic security and counterterror operations?
General Casey. It's also been the consistent position of
the Chiefs that any statutory limitation to the mission of the
commander on the ground in an environment as complex as Iraq
is, it would be extremely detrimental to the accomplishment of
his mission.
Senator Cornyn. That's your view as well?
General Casey. Yes.
Senator Cornyn. Finally, there's a provision in the House
bill that would extend the Army's approved interrogation
techniques under the Army Field Manual to all Federal agencies
and employees. Do you have any opinion or understanding as to
why a provision that would not apply to the uniformed military
would be included in a emergency troop funding bill?
General Casey. I don't, Senator. I don't have any
background on that.
Senator Cornyn. That was, I take it, not part of the
request from the Pentagon, to cover non-uniformed government
employees.
General Casey. Not from the Department of the Army. I don't
know if the DOD had something.
Senator Cornyn. Mr. Secretary, is that your understanding,
as well?
Secretary Geren. That is. That was not part of the request.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time's up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Bayh?
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country.
You've been very patient today, and I appreciate your presence
here.
I have the unfortunate duty to ask, particularly you, Mr.
Secretary, about something that I hope to never have to ask an
official of our government about again, and that is the
unnecessary death of an American serviceman because of the
apparent negligence or incompetence of our own government. I
think we all agree here that wounded servicemen deserve the
very best care, but that does not appear to have been the case
when it comes to Indiana National Guardsman Sergeant Gerald
Cassidy. By all indications, the enemy could not kill him, but
our own government did. Not intentionally, to be sure. But the
end result apparently was the same.
I wrote you a letter about this, Mr. Secretary, on October
10, which states in part: ``Sergeant Cassidy was assigned to
Fort Knox following injuries he sustained in Iraq. He died at
Fort Knox on September 21, under the Army's care, just days
before he was to be sent home. Preliminary reports state that
he may have lain unconscious in his room for several days, and
was possibly dead for several hours before being discovered.''
So far, I haven't received a response to my letter, but I
hope to have one here before too long.
On August 10, Mr. Secretary, you were quoted in the U.S.
Army press as saying of wounded soldiers who had previously
been placed on medical hold, and I'm quoting here, ``They're
all in WTUs, being treated like soldiers rather than patients.
Every soldier has a primary-care manager, a nurse that's a care
manager, and a squad leader who understands the soldier and can
work the soldier through the system.''
On September 21, Sergeant Cassidy died at Fort Knox, as I
indicated. By all accounts, he was not receiving the level of
care and attention that you said was in place on August 10.
Five days later, a GAO study reported that only 17--that's less
than a majority--of the 32 WTUs were in place, and they had--
they had 50-percent staff in place--17 of the 32 WTUs had less
than 50 percent staff in place, and 46 percent of eligible
soldiers had yet to be assigned to a WTU.
So, Mr. Secretary, my first question is, what can you tell
us today to assure the American people that the Army is fixing
this problem and there won't be another fatality like Sergeant
Cassidy's or another Walter Reed? The situation is particularly
shocking, given the revelations at Walter Reed. I'm concerned
about whether we only respond to adverse publicity, and when
these folks in the press go away, whether it's just a return to
business as usual. So, what can you tell us to assure us that
the system is being fixed? In particular, why should we place
confidence in your response, given the disparity between the
press release and the GAO report, about a month later, and what
they found to be the case?
Secretary Geren. Let me start with Sergeant Cassidy, a
tragedy for the Army and a tragedy for his family. The matter
is under investigation, but we have already taken steps--
relieved his entire chain of command. His platoon sergeant, his
captain, and his battalion commander were all relieved as a
result of their conduct of the operations regarding Sergeant
Cassidy.
Senator Bayh. By the way, Mr. Secretary, while I'm being a
little tough on you here today, I do want to compliment you and
those who made those steps. I mean, there seems to have been
some real accountability in the chain of command, which I think
is appropriate.
Secretary Geren. They were all relieved immediately. I
asked General Schoomaker and General Tucker to go up there and
assess the situation. They have. We've made changes there. I've
been to Fort Knox, I've been briefed on the situation from
General Williams. I also met with all the soldiers in that WTU,
and with all their senior leaders out of the room so I could
hear from them personally, and did. We've taken steps there to
correct that problem.
As far as WTUs across the country----
Senator Bayh. How can you assure us this is an anomaly?
This took place after the whole Walter Reed revelations.
In your opinion, was this just an isolated incident? How
can we assure people this isn't going to happen again?
Secretary Geren. Thankfully, so far, it has proven to be an
isolated incident. We took steps to address it, and we put
people in place that are the right leaders to assume that role.
Since we began the WTUs, last spring, we've moved an
additional 1,700 soldiers into support of the soldiers that
we've put in WTUs. By January 1, we'll be up to the full
complement, which is 2,400. So, we have, since we were made
aware of the problems late last winter, early spring, we've put
1,700 soldiers in support of those soldiers in WTUs. It's not
to 100 percent yet. It'll be 100 percent in January.
Senator Bayh. So, you're saying the situation found in the
GAO report will be rectified by this coming January?
Secretary Geren. The GAO report talked about the numbers
who are there now. We were not able to, just overnight, put
2,400 soldiers--the right soldiers--into these positions. We
don't only want to fill the positions, we're trying to move the
best soldiers. In fact, the battalion commander we put in after
the one that we relieved, one of the tops in the field, and
he's a wounded warrior himself, and I met with him when I was
out there. We've moved 1,700 in. By January, we will have all
2,400 in. The system is a completely different approach to----
Senator Bayh. So, all eligible soldiers will be in these
units by this coming January?
Secretary Geren. All these WTUs will be fully staffed.
Senator Bayh. So, the staff will be adequate, but what
about the soldiers who are eligible? Will they have been
assigned to them?
Secretary Geren. The soldiers will be assigned, based on a
determination of what their individual needs are and what their
medical-care needs are. But the soldiers that we deem to be
best suited for assignment in those WTUs, yes, will be.
Senator Bayh. Let me ask you about that, a little bit. In
the civilian world, when you have a medical problem, you seek
out the best specialist, and you try and get their care. As I
understand it, one of the issues here is that, in the military,
you're assigned to the base closest to where the family
resides, at least that was the case here. Since we're from
Indiana, he was assigned to Fort Knox. My staff has traveled
down there, and the senior officer at Fort Knox candidly told a
member of my staff that, at least in his opinion, that Fort
Knox is not the right place for a soldier with a TBI, which was
believed what Sergeant Cassidy had. So, my question to you, Mr.
Secretary, is, don't you think a loving family would prefer to
see that their--I mean, if you can get the right care and be
close, that's ideal. But if you have to choose between being
close or getting the right care, my guess is, most families
would choose: get the right care.
Secretary Geren. When the soldiers are assigned to a WTU,
the right care is the primary consideration, also take into
consideration what sort of family support would be available.
It's a balancing act. In fact, when I was at Fort Knox
recently, I had two soldiers in the WTU complain that they were
not closer to home. One was from Oregon, and he said, ``I'd
like to be closer to Oregon.'' One was from Rhode Island. So,
there is that tension.
The family support, as you well know, is very important.
The family support that people are able to deliver out at
Walter Reed is an important part of their rehabilitation. So,
there's a tension there. We try to put the soldiers close to
the medical care that they need. I was at Fort Campbell last
week, and we run daily buses back and forth to the Vanderbilt
Hospital to make sure that our soldiers can have that highly
specialized care that's available there. So, it is a balancing
act, but the availability of the health care is the primary
driver of those decisions.
Senator Bayh. Let me ask you one last thing about that. One
of the tragic aspects here is that the family actually did get
actively involved and had a team of private neurologists and
brain specialists lined up in Indianapolis to help provide for
care for the young man. But it took 5 months for the transfer
order to be approved. Why did it take so long? What can we do
to shorten those delays?
Secretary Geren. I can't speak--to the details of that
aspect. That is being investigated.
I can tell you, though, one of the things that we see is
absolutely essential in providing good care to these soldiers
is to make sure that their voice is heard. The squad leader who
is in charge of his unit, it's his or her job to make sure that
these issues are raised up the chain of command, that they
don't stay buried, like they apparently did at Walter Reed, to
give that soldier a voice. Every one of those soldiers has a
card, one is at your desk, that has his chain of command on the
back.
Senator Bayh. That didn't appear to have happened here. I
mean, it took 5 months.
Secretary Geren. Sir, it failed. As I said, we relieved his
entire chain of command, three soldiers that were in his chain
of command lost their job because of how they handled this
case. Unacceptable.
Senator Bayh. That's what I wanted to hear, Mr. Secretary.
In your opinion, this situation was unacceptable.
Secretary Geren. Unacceptable, and I think the decisions on
accountability demonstrated that we believe that, and we acted
on that.
Senator Bayh. I'll tell you where I'm coming from. I'm sure
both of you gentlemen will agree with this. My heart goes out
to the family of this soldier, and obviously, they're grief-
stricken. But the least we can do is try to ensure, to them and
the American people, that this sort of thing isn't going to
happen again.
Secretary Geren. I can assure you, we hold nothing closer
to our heart than the commitment to that very principle, not
only as civilians, but as soldiers.
When you saw what happened at Walter Reed, I was very
heartened by the response of the Army and soldiers to that
situation. Soldiers take care of soldiers. If somebody drops
the ball in taking care of a soldier, it violates everything
soldiers stand for. When we have a situation where a soldier
fails another soldier, this is an institution that holds those
folks accountable.
Senator Bayh. Mr. Secretary, that's what I want to hear. I
mean, accountability, a commitment to correcting the situation,
making sure there are no more Sergeant Gerald Cassidys.
Secretary Geren. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Bayh. We owe that to these men and women. We owe
that to their families. I'm going to be following up with you
and your staff to make sure, not only do we get to the bottom
of this particular incident, but that we put in place the
systemic improvements that you indicated here, and that they're
actually put in place.
Secretary Geren. I share your commitment, I assure you.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is the situation that I have alluded to you.
Chairman Levin. I was going to make reference to that.
Senator Bayh has been very, very active on this issue and
the implications of this issue, not just for Sergeant Cassidy,
tragically gone, and his family, but for other soldiers.
The language that we have added to the wounded warrior
legislation, which is added at the request of Senator Bayh, to
make sure that people like Sergeant Cassidy are not only given
the appropriate level of care, public or private, but in a
facility closest to their home. That language is now in our
wounded warrior legislation, and we want to thank Senator Bayh
for that effort. It's there because of that effort.
We, as a committee, are interested in this matter, in this
particular case, and the outcome of your investigation in this
matter, which you say is underway, so that, as a committee
matter, in addition to Senator Bayh's very urgent and
passionate involvement in this, we would ask that you let the
committee know of the outcome of this investigation.
Secretary Geren. Certainly will.
Chairman Levin. As well as Senator Bayh, personally.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Geren. Certainly will. Mr. Chairman, this matter
is very troubling. The new surgeon general, before he was a
surgeon general, but while he was under consideration, asked
him to go up and meet with the families. It was a major
failing. General Schoomaker is personally involved in making
sure that we rectify this situation. General Tucker, who has
also met with your committee, is working this issue. We take it
very seriously, I can assure you. I think our actions would
support that, and we will certainly keep you informed.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Secretary and General, you were asked by Senator Cornyn
about the language in the House bill. First, on the transition
question to the more limited mission that is currently the
case. Have you read the language?
Secretary Geren. No, sir, I have not.
Chairman Levin. Well, then let me tell you that he left out
one of the critical missions, when he did state the missions
that are laid out here. In addition to protecting diplomatic
facilities, U.S. Armed Forces, and American citizens, and
engaging in counterterrorism operations, there's a third
mission, which is to conduct limited training, equipping, and
providing logistical and intelligence support to the ISF.
That's an important element of the House language.
I understand that the administration has adopted a goal of
transitioning our mission, putting greater responsibility on
the Iraqi forces, so that it is the intent of the
administration to transition the mission from what we currently
have to the Iraqi forces and evolving into a more limited
mission over time for our forces. Is that correct, General?
General Casey. We still have a strategy to transition the
security mission to the ISF, that's correct.
Chairman Levin. All right, can you then state what the
transition would be to for us? Is it different from what I've
just read? I'm just wondering, is the transition to the
mission, which you talk about a transition to give them greater
responsibility. Is the transition to the mission that would
remain for us different from what I just read to you?
General Casey. Here's the difference. To say that the
commander just has a counterterrorism mission----
Chairman Levin. It doesn't say----
General Casey. But--as opposed to a counterinsurgency
mission, for example--you can't tell the players apart, who's a
terrorist, who's an insurgent.
Chairman Levin. Right.
General Casey. It's just an artificial imposition on the
commander that would only make his job harder, and make the
troops have to work a heck of a lot harder. That's the concern
on this.
Chairman Levin. I understand. What did the President mean
when he said that he would transition the mission so that there
would be greater responsibility on the Iraqi troops, lesser
responsibility--what does the Commander in Chief mean by saying
there will be a transition?
General Casey. I'm dated on this, now, but----
Chairman Levin. Secretary Geren, what does he mean?
Secretary Geren. I can't speak to that.
Chairman Levin. All right. Second, you've indicated, if
there were a firm withdrawal date, that that would be a
problem. Would you agree that the language that I'm going to
read to you does not represent a firm withdrawal date, but,
rather, a goal? Would you agree to that? I'm going to read you
the language, ``The goal for the completion of the transition
of the Armed Forces shall be a date not later than December 15,
2008.'' Would you agree that that is not a firm withdrawal
date, but as it states, a goal? Would you agree with that?
Secretary Geren?
Secretary Geren. Well, the language you read used the word
``goal.''
Chairman Levin. That's correct. Is that the same as a firm
withdrawal date, to you? Does the words mean ``firm withdrawal
date'' to you when it's stated to be a goal?
Secretary Geren. I would like to read all of the language.
This is a first impression for me. I had not seen the
language----
Chairman Levin. All right. What is the goal for your
transition, the President's transition? Is there a goal? You've
stated there's a transition that he's spoken about, to Iraqi
forces having greater responsibility. Let me ask you, What is
his goal for the completion?
Secretary Geren. I have not spoken to the strategy of the
combatant commander in the field.
Chairman Levin. No, of the Commander in Chief.
Secretary Geren. No, I don't believe that I've spoken to
that, either.
Chairman Levin. But is there a goal?
Secretary Geren. Sir, my role is: organize, train, and
equip. I'm really not prepared to talk about the strategy of
the combatant commanders here today.
Chairman Levin. I wasn't asking you about the combatant
commanders. I've asked you about the Commander in Chief.
Secretary Geren. Sir, as well, the conduct of the war is
outside of the purview of my responsibilities.
Chairman Levin. General, is there a goal for the transition
that you've referred to?
General Casey. You're asking us to make policy comments
here.
Chairman Levin. No, I'm not.
General Casey. We're not the policy guys.
Chairman Levin. I'm just asking you, is there one? I'm not
asking you, what should be the goal? That's policy. I'm asking
you, is there one? That's fact. Is there a goal for the
transition that the President has talked about? That's my
question. Do you know of a goal?
General Casey. A temporal goal?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
General Casey. I do not know of a temporal goal.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Geren. I do not know of a temporal goal.
Chairman Levin. Well, there sure as heck ought to be--if
there's going to be a transition, which the President has
spoken of, it seems to me that to simply say there will be one,
without a goal, is to just simply talk air, rather than to talk
anything that has a message in it to both our troops, to the
American people, the American Congress, and to the Iraqi
leaders. It is just words, unless there's at least a goal. I'm
not talking about a firm date. I'm talking about a goal of a
date for something to be achieved. Don't you have goals in the
military for most of your missions to be achieved? Isn't that
kind of ordinary?
General Casey. Sure, we do.
Chairman Levin. Final question. Do you agree with General
Odierno's comments in today's Washington Post?
Secretary Geren. Could you read them? I'm sorry, I don't--
--
Chairman Levin. I will. Are you familiar with them,
General?
General Casey. I have not read them. I've just heard them
quoted here today.
Chairman Levin. Well, what he's saying, it's unclear how
long this window of opportunity is going to be open for the
political leaders of Iraq to reach a political accommodation.
Do you agree with that?
Secretary Geren. Sir, you're asking me to offer opinions in
an area in which I don't have the experience or the current
knowledge.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that we're going to have to
review our strategy if the political leaders don't reach an
accommodation?
Secretary Geren. Once again, sir, this is beyond my area of
expertise or responsibility.
Chairman Levin. General?
General Casey. Same thing. I mean, I don't know the
specifics and the context he was talking in.
Chairman Levin. He's trying to put some pressure on the
Iraqi political leaders, saying what everyone's seeing with our
own eyes. Our military has performed magnificently,
courageously, bravely, at great cost of blood and treasure. Now
the purpose of the surge, as he states, and as the article
states, and as the President stated, was to give the political
leaders breathing space to reach a political accommodation.
That was its purpose. It has achieved some military gains--
hopefully, longstanding, but we don't know how long they'll
last. That was the question about, how long will that window of
opportunity be open? No one knows. It could be a lull. Maybe
not. Hopefully, long-lasting. But the purpose of the surge, as
stated by the Commander in Chief, was to give the political
leaders breathing space. They haven't used it. No one knows how
long the window of opportunity's going to be open. General
Odierno says, and I think that's clear, no one knows for sure
that can--but, for heaven's sakes, are you not able to say
whether or not you agree with General Odierno, the commander in
the field, as to whether or not we're going to have to review
our strategy if the political leaders don't do what they
committed to do, which is to work out those political
settlements in those key areas? Aren't you able to say whether
or not you agree with that?
General Casey. We don't make the strategy, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Personally. I'm asking your personal
opinion. Do you agree with General Odierno, as a personal
matter?
General Casey. I don't know the context and the timeline
he's talking about.
Chairman Levin. All right. Well, he talks about by next
summer.
General Casey. So, he's saying to review the strategy by
next----
Chairman Levin. If there's no breakthrough by next summer--
that was the question, apparently, to him. Do you agree with
that?
General Casey. Yes, that would make sense to me, yes.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Secretary Geren. Sir, I don't have enough information to
offer an informed opinion.
Chairman Levin. All right, thanks. Fair enough.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, those are very important
questions, and I think the witnesses--as they state, that falls
beyond the daily purview of what they're responsible for. But,
nevertheless, I would suggest to my good friend, the chairman,
as soon as we come back from this hearing, in 2 weeks, that
perhaps this committee could get the witnesses who are directly
responsible--namely, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, perhaps
others who are directly responsible for the formulation of
policy. Because I will answer the question that General Odierno
posed. I think we do have to review the strategy in the light
of the inability of this Government of Iraq to have fulfilled
what I believe to have been a commitment they made to the
President at the time of the initiation in January--namely,
January 10--of the surge. You have my support.
With all deference to our witnesses, I think they've done a
very fine job of giving us tough, pragmatic, forthcoming
responses to a wide range of questions. If there's one thing
that I would carry out of here with, each of you have shown an
enormous compassion from the men and women of the Armed Forces
and their families. I remember, I was privileged, early on in
my career in the DOD, to get to know General Abrams. I think I
quote him accurately. He once said, ``The people are not in the
Army, they are the Army.'' I think you ought to put that up on
the wall down there. That's one for all of us to follow.
Secretary Geren. Sir, I'm pleased to tell you, it is on the
wall in our conference room, and it's a guiding principle for
us.
Senator Warner. Is it really? I'm pleased, because I
remember Secretary Melvin Laird went out, handpicked him to
take on that job, and history someday may record that, had he
been given a little more time, we might have had some different
results in that period of our history. I agree with the
chairman, the Army has performed brilliantly under these
circumstances. They've carried out the orders of the Commander
in Chief. Mr. Chairman, but we must address and I hope you'll
consider that possibility.
Chairman Levin. On that point, if the Senator would just
yield. I thank him for his comments. Those commitments that
were made by the Government of Iraq were actually made, now, a
year ago, even long before the surge.
Senator Warner. Shortly after you and I came back from
Iraq.
Chairman Levin. Exactly right. It was actually made a year
ago this month. They were supposed to have been completed more
than a year ago. Those commitments were supposed to have been
carried out, in part, by a year ago this month--carried out,
not made. They were made a year and a half ago.
I couldn't agree with General Odierno more, except for one
thing. I agree with him, it's not clear how long the window is
going to be open, but--we're going to have to review our
strategy? It's long overdue that we review our strategy if they
don't carry out what they've done. In other words, we shouldn't
wait until next summer. That's the only disagreement I have.
These commitments were supposed to have been carried out a year
ago.
I welcome the suggestion of Senator Warner. As always, he's
playing a very constructive role. I think we will look into the
possibility that, in the 2 weeks after we have this, when we
come back, that we should see if we can get both the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense up here to
talk about what General Odierno is saying, which is, basically,
the need to review strategy when the leaders of the Iraq
Government don't do what they committed to do.
As my dear friend Senator Warner knows, last time we came
back, I went so far as to recommend that, because of the
failure of the Iraqi political leaders, that the assembly over
there pick some leader who would carry out their commitments.
Obviously, we can't bind the government. We're not going to
dictate to the Iraqi government. They're a sovereign
government. But we have a right to make recommendations and to
make observations, and they have failed miserably in their
political roles to carry out the commitments that they made to
themselves. We didn't extract those commitments from them, they
made those commitments to themselves. Those are Iraqi
commitments. It seems to me that, when we look at the sacrifice
which has been made by our troops, their families, and the
American people, in terms of their treasury, the least we can
tell the Iraqi leaders is what General Odierno signaled in this
morning's Washington Post, that we have to review our strategy
when they continue to fail to carry out the political
commitments that they made.
I've interrupted Senator Warner.
I just want to thank you, again.
Senator Warner. I would simply follow on, Mr. Chairman, you
and I returned to Iraq, in September of this year, and, in the
presence of the president of Iraq, they displayed to us draft
documents to solve the energy--the question--the de-
Baathification. They represented to us it was forthcoming.
Chairman Levin. Very true.
Senator Warner. Now that was in August and September. So,
you have my support, and I think it's wise that we have our
distinguished Secretary of Defense, who spoke with us
yesterday--you and I had the opportunity to question him
yesterday--together with the Chairman, to come up and review
that issue that you raise. I support, 100 percent.
I'd just like to tie up, Mr. Chairman, one or two things.
First, this Blackwater situation. We're not about, here
today, in a few minutes, to try and pronounce judgment, but I
think we'd better dispel any thought that the Army could pick
up the myriad of responsibilities that Blackwater has been
performing by way of internal security in Iraq. I just would
like to have that as a part of the record. It's not that, if
ordered, you wouldn't do your best, but that would put an undue
stress, and particularly a category of individuals--namely,
security forces--both the Army--we'd probably be a combined
security force, with all of our services participating--but I
just think that is something, for the moment, that's not an
option. Would I be correct on that, General Casey?
General Casey. I'm not sure exactly what's going on over
there on this but for us to replace the Blackwater security and
provide personal security would be very, very difficult for us
to do.
Senator Warner. So, let's hope those in positions of
responsibility--I know the Secretary of State is working on
this issue, as are others--they can work it out so that there's
accountability that somehow does not suddenly, overnight, think
we're going to pick it up here in the United States Army.
Secretary Geren. Approximately--many other security firms
operating in Iraq, around 8,000 or 9,000--so, if steps were
taken, either by the Iraqi government or elsewhere, that caused
those to leave, it would put a very heavy burden on our
commitment.
Senator Warner. Well, indeed, it would.
The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle,
Congress is supporting the acquisition of the numbers that you
desire. I just wondered two things, General. Are we constantly
doing a red-team/blue-team analysis of the technical aspects of
that piece of very expensive equipment, to look into the future
as to possible vulnerabilities, and, consequently, in the
design now, taking care of every one that we can possibly----
General Casey. We do that for all of our systems, Senator.
We work very closely with Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization.
Senator Warner. That's all I need to know.
General Casey. Yes.
Senator Warner. Are we designing that vehicle such that it
could be adapted to future Army missions, which could be
somewhat different than this one, both in Iraq and Afghanistan?
General Casey. Short answer is yes, although it's not
intended to be a replacement for the up-armored Humvee. We
still need the joint light tactical vehicle. We always had the
intention of taking these, once they're done with them in Iraq,
and put them in pre-positioned sets, because the IED, I
believe, is going to be part of this landscape here for the
future.
Senator Warner. Regrettably, it's going to be a weapon of
the future.
Your recruiting projections for 2008, have you announced
what they are?
Secretary Geren. Our goals are 80,000, plus 1,600 that we
are forecasting to achieve from the Guard Active First Program.
So, for the active duty, it would be 81,600, including those
that have the active and a follow-on Guard commitment.
Senator Warner. Is that for fiscal year 2008?
Secretary Geren. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Warner. Are you reasonably confident you're going
to be able to reach those goals?
Secretary Geren. We're committed to doing that. It's a
tough recruiting environment, but we believe that those are
achievable. Last year, we had to work hard to meet those goals,
but we did. I believe we'll accomplish the goal this year.
Senator Warner. If it came to a judgment call that you're
having to rely on trying to build your force and to meet your
goals, in terms of numbers, but you don't see the quality
coming in, I would hope both of you'd raise your hand and say,
``Time out.'' We're not going to burden the Army with
individuals, which, historically, particularly going back to
your early days in the military, and that I knew, with the
draft situation, General Casey--that put a tremendous burden,
trying--a few individuals on the officer--junior officer corps
and the senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs), to try and deal
with those situations. You'll call, ``Time out''?
Secretary Geren. Yes, sir, absolutely. We're committed to
maintaining the quality.
General Casey. We've already told Secretary Gates that that
was one of the conditions of this accelerated growth.
Senator Warner. Good.
Now, your retention of NCOs, the backbone of so much of
your work, beyond that 20-year level, that is appearing to be
somewhat of a weak spot. Are you taking some steps to try and
encourage that, retention of those individuals beyond their 20-
year----
Secretary Geren. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner.--enabling them to get to their retirement?
General Casey. Senator, we are not having a problem with
NCO retention. I've not heard of a problem of NCO retention
past 20, except in some specific skills, like signal
intelligence and special forces.
Senator Warner. Fine, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I think we've had a very good hearing. I
commend you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner, very much.
Secretary Geren. Mr. Chairman, could I say one thing?
Chairman Levin. Of course.
Secretary Geren. Following on Senator Warner's question
at--early in the hearing about what Congress can do, other than
send us money. Money certainly helps. But this Covenant with
Families, we are in uncharted waters when it comes to family
support. All-Volunteer Force, 7 years of war. Never have we
done this before as a Nation. The families are volunteers, just
like the soldiers are volunteers. If we're going to maintain
this national treasure of the All-Volunteer Force, we're going
to have to do more to sustain these families--look for better
ways to provide employment opportunities for spouses, look for
better ways to meet the educational needs for kids, health
care, housing. I don't think we can sit here today and say what
it needs to look like 3 years from now 5 years from now, but if
we continue in this era of persistent conflict, the stress on
the families is going to be something that we have not
addressed as a Nation previously. I don't think it's just this
committee. It's broader than this committee. But I invite you
all to help us think through this. All the good ideas won't
come from the Department of the Army. The RCI came from an
initiative that you started in the late 1990s.
So, this, to me, is one of the most important strategic
issues we face as a Nation. If we're going to retain the All-
Volunteer Force, how do we retain the All-Volunteer Family? I
think that's one of the biggest challenges we face as an Army
and a DOD, and I'd invite your participation as we move out, to
try to figure out what that needs to look like next year and 5
years from now.
Senator Warner. I think that's an important observation,
Mr. Secretary, and you have to put it in the framework that our
Nation, while the population is--I've never seen greater
support for the military, since World War II really, when it
was quite clear that every man and woman in the United States
supported the people in uniform. That level of support is
there. But, at the same time, World War II, there was a great
deal of sharing of the hardships between the civilians at home
and the military and the military families. We were all sharing
hardships. Today, our population--I'm not faulting it, just
observing--they're moving on. But these young families are
competing with other wives at the malls, in the shopping
places, and in the schooling and the education, and, while the
Army and the other military branches do provide some benefits,
they're very much part of the mainstream of America. That
mainstream, while supporting them, is not faced with the
burdens that these families have.
Secretary Geren. That's true, as I've mentioned, we're
signing this Covenant with Families at every camp, post, and
station. We're finishing it up right now. In the spring, we're
going to do the same thing, a Community Covenant with the
Families at every camp, post, and station, to draw--we get
tremendous support, as you well know, from communities around
our posts, where they help the families, everything from mowing
lawns to childcare and all sorts of other financial benefits.
But we're going to ask these communities to sign on the dotted
line, to broaden the level of support we get at the community
level.
I think the significance of the challenge we face in this
really can't be overstated. We have never fought an extended
conflict with an All-Volunteer Force before. Half of these
soldiers are married. The success will depend upon those
families hanging with us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all.
Chairman Levin. There is, in the wounded warrior
legislation that's part of our authorization bill, a number of
provisions which reflect that commitment to families.
Secretary Geren. There certainly are.
Chairman Levin. We thank you both.
We stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
NATICK SOLDIER CENTER
1. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Geren, I understand that the Natick
Soldier Center (NSC) would be better able to hire and retain high
quality scientists and engineers and therefore be better able to
perform their designated missions if a laboratory personnel
demonstration program--similar to one currently being executed at the
Air Force Research Laboratory and other defense labs--is established
there. I understand that Natick's attempts to establish a personnel
demonstration program (as they are authorized to by Congress) has been
stifled by other parts of the Department of Defense (DOD). What are the
advantages and disadvantages of establishing a personnel demonstration
program at Natick?
Secretary Geren. The previous DOD policy that allowed for new
laboratory demonstration projects to be approved only if they provided
for new ``interventions'' different from existing initiatives at
laboratories has been impacted by the recently passed legislative
initiatives contained in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
for Fiscal Year 2008, sections 1106 and 1107. Given the initiatives
within the NDAA, Natick will be able to use any flexibility available
to any other demonstration laboratory enumerated in the legislation.
Therefore, the Army will not require any statutory changes to implement
a laboratory demonstration program at Natick.
2. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Geren, what is the plan and timeline
for the rapid establishment and implementation of a laboratory
personnel demonstration program at the NSC?
Secretary Geren. In order to be considered for Laboratory
Demonstration status, an organization must be designated as a Science
and Technology Reinvention Laboratory (STRL). The NSC pre-cursor
organization, the Soldier, Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM),
was designated by Congress as an STRL in 2004. At issue is whether the
STRL designation remains valid based on SBCCOM's restructuring that
formed NSC. The Office of General Counsel (OGC) for the Department of
the Army has requested a determination of this designation by the DOD
OGC. Upon the legal determination of the NSC status as an STRL, the
Army will act appropriately.
3. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Geren, what are the current
bureaucratic barriers to the establishment of a personnel demonstration
program at Natick?
Secretary Geren. There are no bureaucratic issues to establishing a
laboratory demonstration program at the NSC if the DOD OGC determines
the center can retain its status as a valid STRL.
4. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Geren, do you require any statutory
changes to Army or DOD personnel authorities to enable Natick to
establish and implement its demonstration program?
Secretary Geren. The Army does not require any statutory changes to
implement a laboratory demonstration program at Natick.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Senator Evan Bayh
DEPLOYMENT
5. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, now that the ``surge'' in Iraq is ending, when will the Army
provide relief by shortening deployments to a more manageable year, or,
like the Marine Corps, to 7 months?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. If the reduction in surge forces
is completed by July 2008 as planned, our goal is to shorten deployment
lengths shortly after that. However, circumstances in theater outside
of the control of the Army will influence the timetable on shortening
deployments.
6. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, when will the Army give soldiers the same amount of time home as
they are asked to spend deployed?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. Our short-term goal is to give
our Active component soldiers at least the same amount of time home as
they are deployed (1:1 ratio) and to have our Reserve component forces
mobilized for 12 months every 4 years (1:4 ratio). We are currently not
meeting this goal for either component. It will take a few more
rotations to meet our goal.
If the reduction in surge forces is completed by July 2008 as
planned, our goal is to shorten deployment lengths shortly after that.
However, circumstances in theater outside of the control of the Army
will influence the timetable on shortening deployments.
EDUCATION
7. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, with regards to the continued improvement and innovation of
professional military education (PME) in the Army, how will you measure
success?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. To measure the success of PME we
continuously evaluate our performance in four critical areas. We use
our findings to make appropriate adjustments to our training curricula.
First, we continuously seek feedback from combat-experienced soldiers
on whether we are providing the right content. Our processes for review
of course content are continuous and rigorous. Professional educators
and social scientists apply best practices in educational design to
ensure coherent programs.
Second, we use performance-based testing and assessment to ensure
that every Army leader who graduates from a PME course can perform the
course objectives to standard.
Third, we survey PME graduates and their supervisors 6 months after
graduation through our Quality Assurance program. This lets us know if
graduates are successfully applying what they've learned in PME to
perform their duties once they return to their units. Our annual
``Leadership Assessment Survey'' provides another systematic means to
assess leader performance quality. The emerging Multi-Source Assessment
and Feedback Program will generate aggregated data on leader
performance from the perspectives of subordinates, superiors, peers,
and the leaders themselves.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of our units and integrate
lessons learned. We use professional observers and trainers at the
Combat Training Centers to assess the collective performance of units
in a realistic training environment. During deployments, Combined Arms
Assessment Teams collect data on unit and leader performance in actual
operations. The Center for Army Lessons Learned identifies and
validates lessons learned and ensures we integrate them into our PME
curricula as appropriate. By continuously reviewing progress in these
four areas we are providing effective PME.
8. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, do you think it is time for a top-to-bottom review of the Army's
PME, with the goal of better understanding what we're doing today, and
more importantly, making recommendations to improve the system?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Army Leader Development
Program (ALDP) represents the Army's continual effort to identify,
develop and manage the leadership development of our soldiers and
civilians. As part of this effort, between 2000 and 2007, we conducted
several studies and programs to include the Army Training and Leader
Development Panel (ATLDP), Task Force Leader Development and Education
(TF LD&E), Review of Education, Training, and Assignment of Leaders
(RCTAL), Army Leaders for the 21st Century, and, most recently, we have
launched Army Initiative #5 to ``Accelerate Leader Development.''
Based on feedback from these studies, we have restructured our PME
and synchronized it with operational deployment cycles by using a
balance of home station training, distributed learning and resident
instruction. Examples of changes include:
Officer Education and Warrant Officer Education have
been integrated into a single Officer Education System (OES).
OES focuses on Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) in a
Joint, Intergovernmental, Interagency, and Multinational (JIIM)
environment.
Noncommissioned Officer Education has incorporated a
life-long learning strategy, to balance focus on traditional
Warrior Leader core competencies with development of critical
thinking and resource management skills.
The ALDP is the Army's solution to continuously assess leader
development and its supporting education systems and programs.
PROMOTION
9. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, how does the Army promote diversity at flag rank when the
promotion system is designed to get us officers who have gotten mud on
their boots by walking a well-traveled career path?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The strength of our Army comes
from our diversity. We recently created a Diversity Task Force, headed
by a general officer, to assess the current state of Army Diversity. It
will access policies, practices, and leader awareness and training for
military and civilians: benchmark successful private industry and
government models against Army diversity; identify strengths and
weaknesses; and recommend the way ahead. Our goals are to fill our
General Officer Corps with the best-qualified officers and for our
General Officer diversity to reflect that of our Army.
RESET
10. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, assuming that the Army's responsibilities in Iraq draw down
sharply over the next 2 years, how long will it take the Army to reset
its force so that it is fully prepared to handle 21st century threats?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. Reset must continue as long as
we have forces deployed and for several years thereafter to ensure
readiness for the future. Commitment to providing the resources to
reset our forces is essential to restoring balance and to providing
strategic depth and flexibility for the Nation.
WARFARE
11. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, please describe the kind of Army you believe is necessary to
properly execute a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. As we look to the future,
national security experts are virtually unanimous in predicting that
the next several decades will be ones of persistent conflict protracted
confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that use
violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. We need to
ensure our forces are agile enough to respond rapidly to unexpected
circumstances and led by versatile, culturally astute, and adaptive
leaders. The Army has a vision to build that force, and is already
executing this vision. We will continue along these lines and transform
our current force into a campaign-quality expeditionary force that is
capable of supporting the needs of combatant commanders operating
effectively with joint, interagency, and multinational partners across
the spectrum of conflict from peacetime engagement to conventional war.
A COIN campaign requires a mix of offensive, defensive, and
stability operations--in other words, FSOs--conducted along multiple
lines of operations. COIN requires that our soldiers are able to employ
a mix of familiar combat tasks along with other skills more often
associated with nonmilitary agencies.
12. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, generally, how is today's Army preparing for asymmetric and
irregular warfare in the future?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Army has been an active
participant in a number of initiatives aimed at improving the Joint
Force's ability to train for and conduct asymmetric and irregular
warfare (IW) in the future. The Army helped develop the Irregular
Warfare Joint Operating Concept, approved in September 2007, which
describes how future Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) could conduct
protracted IW in the 2014-2026 timeframe. We are also participating in
the IW Capabilities Based Assessment to identify and sponsor potential
solutions to our capability gaps.
As we grow the Army, we are improving our capability to conduct
asymmetric and irregular warfare by adding six Brigade Combat Teams
(BCTs) by fiscal year 2011. We are growing and rebalancing the
operating force to provide more of the capabilities in the highest
demand such as military intelligence, military police, engineers,
special forces and support units. We are also exploring the concept of
a Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group to support security
cooperation activities such as training and advising foreign security
forces within regional combatant commands.
RECRUITING AND RETENTION STANDARDS
13. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, what risks do you see in the Army's lowering of its standards
for enlisted recruits, specifically, on the Army's lowering of
standards for age, health, education, and criminal records?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Army pays close attention to
the quality of the force. Without exception, every soldier enlisting in
the Army is fully qualified for the job for which he/she is enlisting.
We monitor the attrition rates by all the categories you've listed due
to the inherent risks they potentially pose (higher attrition, less
trainability, more indiscipline, et cetera). If negative trends are
identified, the Army will make policy changes as required. The age
limit is currently set at 42 in order to allow soldiers an opportunity
to serve 20 years before the mandatory retirement age of 62. Our older
soldiers have demonstrated their ability to perform their duties. In
general, they are highly disciplined, motivated, and great leaders.
14. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, how has the lowering of standards negatively and positively
impacted today's forces?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Army has made policy changes
in recent years which have assisted in meeting our recruiting goals for
fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Without exception, every soldier the Army
recruits is fully qualified for the job for which he/she is enlisting.
Although the numbers of waivers granted has increased in recent years,
the impact appears to be minimal in terms of attrition, a key
indicator. In fact, overall attrition for those enlisting with a waiver
dropped from 18.4 percent to 15.1 percent from fiscal year 2005 to
fiscal year 2006, and, on average, attrition rates were as good or
better in every waiver category. For example, the 12 month attrition
rate for medical waivers in fiscal year 2005 was 19.4 percent and
dropped to 15.4 percent in fiscal year 2006. We will continue to
closely monitor the impact of all policy changes and make adjustments
as required.
15. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, how will it positively or negatively impact the force in 5-10
years?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. We have not seen a significant
increase in attrition for those soldiers who have been granted waivers.
Accomplishing our recruiting mission by accessing soldiers with waivers
positively affects the future of the force by allowing us to continue
to grow the Army. Soldiers who are accessed with waivers must meet
Military Occupation Specialty qualifications the same as soldiers
without waivers. The Army has numerous programs in place to assist all
soldiers in improving their military and civilian education.
16. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, has there been a similar relaxation of standards for incoming
officers?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. Over the last 10 years, DOD and
Army standards have remained unchanged. The Army is exploring
innovative ways to attract exceptionally qualified and talented
Americans to meet the high standards for becoming an officer.
Applicants must possess the leadership attributes and technical skills
required for success in today's challenging environment. Our ability to
recruit in the current environment--which is unprecedented in the
history of the All-Volunteer Force--requires innovation, as well as
perseverance. We must recognize that those who volunteer to serve
during these difficult times, have distinct qualities all their own.
17. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, why do you believe that junior officers are leaving in such
significant numbers and what, other than offering retention bonuses, do
you plan on doing to stop that loss?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The loss rates for junior
officers are still lower than our historical average rate of losses
over the past 7 years both across the Army Competitive Category
branches and specialties, and in the specific grades of captain and
major. However, we do have shortages because of the growth in
authorized positions required to create modular formations and
transform our force for the 21st century. We are addressing this
challenge through both accessions and retention. Since 2004, the Army
has increased officer accessions by 1,000 officers, called over 600
Reserve component officers to active duty, and transferred over 400
officers separating from the Air Force and Navy through Blue-to-Green
interservice transfers. In addition, to facilitate these efforts we
have:
Increased cadet class size for U.S. Military Academy
(USMA) and increased Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)
scholarship options
Increased ROTC stipends to retain cadets all the way
to commissioning
Doubled the capacity of the Green to Gold program for
Officer Candidate School
Streamlined NCO nominations for OCS
Begun to appoint officers to the SELRES vice IRR,
enhancing flexibility
Increased the cap on Reserve component scholarship
reimbursements
Our retention strategy is focused on near-term, mid-term, and long-
term initiatives to meet growth requirements. We have implemented pre-
commissioning incentives to allow cadets to select a branch of choice,
post of choice or graduate school opportunity to extend their
obligation by 3 years. This program was immediately successful in
extending the obligations of 1,100 officers in fiscal year 2006 and
1,600 for fiscal year 2007. We will feel the increased retention effect
in fiscal year 2010 and beyond when the original obligations of these
officers would have lapsed.
We have also implemented a ``Menu of Incentives'' program to retain
a maximum number of our highly experienced mid-career officers. This
initiative currently targets most of the Army's captains in year groups
1999 through 2005 by providing an opportunity to select a Branch of
Choice, Post of Choice, Military School options, an Advanced Degree, or
Critical Skills Retention Bonus in exchange for their agreement to
serve 3 additional years beyond their active duty sendee obligation. We
expect to retain an additional 1,800 officers above normal retention
patterns between now and 2010 through this incentive.
18. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, what does this development mean for the Army's planned growth?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Army is trying to retain
mid-level officers at higher than normal rates to help fill growing
requirements caused by increased end strength and reorganization to a
modular concept that requires more mid-grade officers. We have
developed a menu of options that is available to officers upon
promotion to captain and prior to their completion of their Active-Duty
Service obligation. This menu provides officers a choice of incentives
in exchange for 3 additional years of Active-Duty Service. Officers may
elect to get their post or branch/functional area of choice; attend a
military school or obtain language training; attend a fully funded
graduate degree program; or receive a Critical Skills Retention Bonus.
19. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, as the Army's responsibilities in Iraq lessen, do you foresee
junior and mid-career officer retention improving?
Secretary Geren. Yes. Our Nation has been at war for over 6 years.
Our Army has been a leader on the front lines of this war and back here
at home--protecting our people and securing our borders. Over time,
these operations have expanded in scope and duration. Soldiers and
families are stretched and stressed by the demands of lengthy and
repeated deployments. This has tested the commitment of the All-
Volunteer Force, and although they continue to serve and to excel in
tough situations we must never take their service for granted. With
congressional assistance we are continuing to improve the manner in
which we sustain the Army's soldiers, families, civilians, and wounded
warriors. Through these improvements and by providing soldiers more
time at home, we expect to see more of our highly-experienced officers
extend their careers and continue serving the Nation from within the
Army.
20. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, as the Army grows, do you anticipate it to be a one-for-one
growth in comparison with units and capabilities the Army has now?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. In January 2007, the President
approved an increase in Army end strength by 74,200 (65,000 Active
component, 8,200 Army National Guard (ARNG), and 1,000 U.S. Army
Reserve (USAR)). Approximately 51,200 of this growth is a one-for-one
basis--an increase in the number of units providing existing or new
capabilities. Approximately 7,400 of this growth is reflected in design
changes to existing force structure to meet operational needs or to
mitigate capability shortfalls in existing units. Additionally, 15,600
of the Active component growth is invested in the generating force and
individuals' accounts to improve capabilities in supporting the
operating force growth and sustainment. The plan builds toward a total
of 76 BCTs and approximately 227 support brigades with enabling combat
support and combat service support structure to improve the balance of
forces across all three components and better meet the global force
demand in an era of persistent conflict. This decision to expand the
size of the Army reflects the clear recognition by the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and Congress of the importance of joint ground
forces to meet strategic requirements and the need to reduce stress on
soldiers and families related to the increasing and enduring
operational demands.
HARDWARE AND EQUIPMENT
21. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, what sort of specific hardware currently in the Army's
inventory, or that the Army is preparing to procure, best provides the
Army with the capabilities to meet 21st century threats?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The core effort to meet the
needs of the 21st century lies in the development and fielding of
Future Combat Systems (FCS) BCTs, and FCS enabled modular brigades. We
are ultimately working toward a force that is agile, globally
responsive, and enhanced by modern networks, precision weapons, and
platforms that are lighter, less logistically dependent and less
manpower intensive. Current systems such as Stryker, Blue Force
Tracker, and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment One are
moving us in the right direction.
Additionally, FCS precursor capabilities are deployed to theater
today. These include: 18 Micro Air Vehicles, precursor Class I Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), with Navy Explosive Ordinance Disposal teams;
3,700 deployed iRobot/PACBOT precursor Small Unmanned Ground Vehicles;
and in 2008, 18 precursor Class I UAVs deploying with the 2/25 Stryker
BCT in support of their operational needs statement.
Finally, FCS Science and Technology (S&T) efforts have also
resulted in the deployment of improved fragmentary protection kits for
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) and Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. While these efforts are beneficial to
the soldier, fielding FCS BCTs and FCS enabled brigades remains our
core effort in transforming to a force that meets the needs of soldiers
in an era of persistent conflict.
22. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, what kinds of hardware and equipment is the Army currently
procuring that could be labeled legacy as opposed to transformational?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. Each item the Army is currently
procuring fills a requirement in transforming to a 21st century force.
The organizational component of transformation is the conversion to
modular brigade formations which requires us to draw heavily from
current force systems. We are upgrading these systems as a primary
element of our modernization strategy. For example: we are replacing
aging M35 (2\1/2\-ton trucks) with the Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicles; we are upgrading Abrams and Bradley fleets to two variants
across the force; and we are working towards a Patriot pure fleet and
the fielding of Apache Block III.
23. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, do you believe that the Army, and DOD at large, is investing
enough in transformational technologies?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. Despite the demands of the
ongoing global war on terrorism, the Army has been able to maintain its
annual S&T funding requests at over $ 1.7 billion in the past two
budgets. We believe this level of investment will be sufficient to
provide the transformational technologies needed to support the Army
acquisition strategics in the future. Our main modernization program,
FCS, has been cut by $1 billion over the past several years, impacting
our ability to invest in transformational technologies.
24. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, what are the risks of investing too heavily in legacy platforms?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The risk in investing too
heavily into current platforms carries an increasingly large
operational and support cost burden. Current systems are limited in the
level of increased capability that can be added due to the inherent
design constraints of the system. As a result, we may have to send our
soldiers into battle without the latest, technologically advanced
equipment. For example, our current tactical wheeled vehicle fleet in
Iraq and Afghanistan was not designed to be armored, nor were they
designed to carry all the communications and intelligence/electronic
warfare.
By investing in modern technologies we expect to realize
significant savings in reduced life cycle costs compared to maintaining
and upgrading current systems which require an increasingly large
operational and support cost burden. For example, we expect to save $66
million per year in sustainment, training, and manning costs for every
heavy BCT that we reequip with the FCS. Upgrading our M1 tanks with FCS
technologies would cost more than purchasing new manned ground
vehicles.
These are some of the reasons why we must continuously modernize
our forces to put our Cold War formations and systems behind us and to
provide our soldiers a decisive advantage over our enemies. We will
continue to rapidly field the best new equipment to our fighting
forces, upgrade and modernize existing systems, incorporate new
technologies derived from the FCS research and development, and soon
begin to field the FCS themselves. We are ultimately working toward an
agile, globally responsive Army that is enhanced by modern networks,
surveillance sensors, precision weapons, and platforms that are
lighter, less logistics-dependant, and less manpower-intensive.
25. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, what are the risks of overinvesting in transformational
technologies?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. All technology investments have
degrees of risk to achieve desired outcomes. The Army S&T portfolio
balances investments among the higher risk basic and applied research
programs and the lower risk, more mature advanced technology
development programs. The diversity of this portfolio is an appropriate
balance between investment in technologies that have high potential for
paradigm shifting, transformational capabilities and technologies that
significantly improve performance in traditional capability domains.
FOREIGN AREA EXPERT OFFICER PROGRAM
26. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, are there plans to expand the Army's Foreign Area Expert Officer
Program as the Army grows?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. Over the last year, we have
increased Foreign Area Officer (FAO) authorizations from 769 to 825. To
meet future challenges, we have developed International Military
Affairs (IMA) organizations. These organizations provide a capability
for supporting warfighter requirements and developing multi-skilled
FAOs to become future senior leaders. IMAs for United States Army
Central, United States Army South, United States Army Pacific, and
United Slates Army Europe will be fully established by 2010. These IMAs
will initially provide us an additional 40 FAOs. along with a roadmap
to add 30 more FAOs by 2012. We anticipate adding more FAOs in the
future to meet requirements for homeland defense missions and the new
United States Africa Command.
We continually balance Army requirements against planned
capabilities and make adjustments within fiscal planning guidance.
There is always a risk that our commanders will require more FAOs than
we can provide. We are filling requirements now that were unforeseen
several years ago--this causes us to pull FAOs out of other required
assignments to meet emerging demands. We believe our IMAs will help
relieve some of this turbulence, but we are continuing to develop
alternatives. Our future is challenging, but the Army FAO program is
healthier than it has ever been. We believe that our plans are on the
right track, and that the only real risk we face is resources
associated with the implementation of our plans.
27. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, what are the risks of that decision?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. See answer to question 26.
RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS (ROTC)
28. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, has the Army planned on increasing communication between the
USMA and the Army ROTC program, so that rejected USMA applicants are
targeted for ROTC scholarships? If not, why not?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. Yes. The Army has significantly
increased coordination between the USMA and USACC (ROTC) in the last 12
months. Applicant sharing is at the center of these coordination
efforts:
Marketing: All West Point marketing-related
publications (brochures, catalogues, et cetera) and the West
Point admissions website list ROTC as an alternate
commissioning source and encourage candidates to apply.
Candidate Surveys: The USMA Candidate Questionnaire
asks candidates if they want to be considered for a ROTC
scholarship, if they check yes, West Point forwards the
information to Cadet Command electronically.
Candidate File Sharing: West Point habitually sends
ROTC candidate information at these dates:
1st File (end of February). Criteria:
Candidates who did not receive a nomination.
2nd File (end of March). Criteria: Candidates
with a nomination whose files are closed.
Qualified Not Selected (mid-May). Criteria:
Candidates who are fully qualified but not offered
admission to USMA.
Monthly Two-Way File Sharing: Candidate file sharing
became two-way in September 2006. USMA and ROTC exchange files
monthly for candidates interested in both commissioning
sources.
GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
29. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, how has global war on terror's focus on multinational non-state
adversaries impacted the Army's PME?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. Leaders now receive a doctrinal
education in Stability Operations (SO) and COIN Operations, which
includes programmed instruction, practical exercises, staff exercises
and field training exercises. Scenarios and practical exercises portray
the many real-world adversaries (insurgent groups, paramilitary
organizations, private security organizations, criminal organizations,
and non-governmental organizations) in a constantly changing full-
spectrum environment. Tactical and technical lessons learned from
operational deployments such as Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom augment classroom instruction. Leaders also receive
instruction in Cultural Understanding, Escalation of Force, Every
Soldier a Sensor (situational awareness), and Foreign Internal Defense.
JOB SKILLS
30. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, a November 17, 2007 Washington Post article described an Army
General Officer promotion board that would emphasize the importance of
nontraditional jobs and skills in promotion. Please describe those
skills and jobs and compare them to what you would consider traditional
jobs and skills.
Secretary Geren and General Casey. We must continue to develop
agile and adaptive leaders. Leaders in the 21st century must be
competent in their core proficiencies; broad enough to operate across
the spectrum of conflict--from humanitarian and peacekeeping operations
through counterinsurgency to major conventional operations: able to
operate in joint, interagency, and combined environments and leverage
political and diplomatic efforts in achieving their objectives; at home
in other cultures, able to use this awareness and understanding to
support operations in innovative ways; and courageous enough to see and
exploit opportunities in the challenges and complexities of our future
operating environments. We recognize that the positions the Army must
fill, both within and outside the Army, require individuals with
different strengths, capabilities, and backgrounds. Regardless of an
officer's area of specialty, the experience gained through deployments
and in other challenging assignments prepares our officers to lead and
train soldiers. It is important for officers to have the right mix of
field and headquarters experience, training, and education to meet the
current and future leadership requirements of both the Army and the
Joint Force.
31. Senator Kennedy and Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General
Casey, as the Army's responsibilities in Iraq begin to dissipate, how
will you ensure that lessons our military has learned in Iraq and
Afghanistan remain relevant in Army training and education?
Secretary Geren. By using Lessons Learned Integration--a
collaborative network that connects approximately 20 observers in
combat zones with analysts at every major institutional Army training
organization and operational force in continental United States--we
have significantly reduced ``flash to bang time'' for disseminating
best practices from the field and incorporating them into our training
and education systems. More than 15,000 observations, insights, lessons
and tactics, techniques, procedures have been pushed directly to Army
schools and training centers over the past 12 months.
The Combined Arms Center (CAC) also manages lessons learned
websites (classified and unclassified) that allow all servicemembers to
search, download products, and request specific information. The CAC
publishes over 100 lessons learned handbooks, newsletters, and studies
annually. The Center for Army Lessons Learned has distributed nearly 1
million of these products to all branches of the military, joint
headquarters, interagency organizations, coalition partners, and our
allies.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
RECRUITING AND RETENTION STANDARDS
32. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, the Washington Post is
reporting that the Army is again considering lowering its standards to
allow in still more new recruits with trouble in their backgrounds,
such as a criminal record. Can you confirm the report in the Washington
Post?
Secretary Geren. The Army will maintain the same standards for 2008
as we did for 2007.
33. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, is the Army considering
reducing its standards again? If so, what changes are being considered,
and why?
Secretary Geren. The Army has not changed its recruiting quality
benchmarks. These marks, 90 percent high school graduates (HSDG), 60
percent Test Score Category (TSC) I-IIIA, and no more than 4 percent
TSC IV are established by DOD for all Services and our goal is to
attain them. Although law prescribes much lower standards <20 percent
CAT IV and >65 percent HSDG, Army focuses on meeting DOD quality marks.
In 2007, we met our recruiting goal of 80,000, but fell short of
attaining the quality mark for HSDG at 79 percent. We did meet the
quality marks set for TSC I-IIIA at 60.83 percent and CAT IV at 3.97
percent. Every recruit must have a high school diploma or equivalent
(e.g., GED, home-schooled). Our focus for 2008 recruiting mission of
80,000 remains geared toward meeting or exceeding prescribed DOD
quality marks.
34. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, what are the effects of
changing the standards?
Secretary Geren. Without a doubt, America continues to have the
best Army in the world, and its capabilities today are unmatched by any
other time in our Nation's history. Thus far. we have not noticed any
negative trends associated with recent policy changes. These changes
(age increase, weight allowances, tattoo policy, misdemeanors, et
cetera) provide the opportunity for hundreds of individuals--who
previously would not have been afforded the opportunity to serve--with
the chance to volunteer to defend their Nation as part of America's
Army. Additionally, these changes align Army policies to more closely
reflect American society in general. The performance of these men and
women during our Nation's protracted struggle to defeat global
terrorism demonstrates that the quality of today's force remains on par
with the generations of soldiers who have served from Valley Forge to
the beaches of Normandy to the berms of Operations Desert Shield/Desert
Storm. In fact, the willingness that this small group of the eligible
U.S. population displays by volunteering to serve their Nation in the
Army is a quality that we should hope exists in all Americans.
35. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, have the impacts of these
changes on the force been studied? If so, could you please provide us
with the study. If not, how are you assessing whether or not to lower
the standards?
Secretary Geren. The Army will maintain the same standards for 2008
as we did for 2007. We continually check for any second-order effects
of changes, such as declining trainability, good order and discipline,
et cetera. So far, the Army has not seen any significant change in
these soldiers' ability to complete training for their military
occupational specialty (MOS). Every soldier enlisting is qualified for
his/her MOS.
36. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, in your confirmation hearing
responses to my questions for the record, you stated your belief that
the Army could meet its commitment to increase its end strength with no
increase in recruiting. You stated that this could be done because of
continued low attrition, and a 5-percent increase in retention due to
special expiration of service bonuses currently being offered. Do you
still believe that the Army can meet its increased end strength
requirements without increases in recruiting? If so, can you meet the
increased strength requirements without further erosion of the Army's
recruiting standards? If not, do you need help from Congress?
Secretary Geren. The Army is on track to grow end strength by more
than 10,000 in fiscal year 2008 with 80,000 Recruiting Mission, 1.6K
Active First accessions and 1.6K additional fiscal year 2008 ETS
soldiers from the retention program. The Army will grow by more than
7,000 in fiscal year 2009 with 80,000 U.S. Army Recruiting Command
(USAREC) accessions and 8,000 in fiscal year 2010 with 80,000 USAREC
accessions. Recent initiatives and increased incentives have greatly
aided in achieving over 161,000 accessions over the past 2 years. The
Army expects to continue this success and meet its 80,000 recruiting
mission in fiscal year 2008 while maintaining current standards. The
continued support of Congress is critical in our efforts to growing the
Army. One of our greatest needs is positive influences to encourage our
Nation's youth to serve their country.
37. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, how much is the Army currently
spending on recruiting and retention bonuses?
Secretary Geren. In fiscal year 2007, the Army spent $1.12 billion
in recruiting and retention bonuses. This figure is composed of
reenlistment bonuses ($565.3 million), enlistment bonuses ($472.7
million), and education benefits ($80.9 million).
38. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, how much was the Army spending
prior to September 11?
Secretary Geren. The historical total spending in recruiting and
retention from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2001 is as follows:
fiscal year 1997, $98.9 million; fiscal year 1998, $108.9 million;
fiscal year 1999, $178.6 million; fiscal year 2000, $200.3 million; and
fiscal year 2001, $278.8 million.
The total funding for each year is the sum of the Selective
Reenlistment Bonus and the Enlistment Bonus.
TRAINING
39. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, Government Executive.com
reported on November 12, 2007, that ``the reduction in standards has
been modest. Pentagon figures show that although only 79 percent of
Army recruits in 2006 had high school diplomas--down from a 90 percent
level achieved in recent years--the percentage of soldiers who failed
basic training has dropped. Instances of bad conduct, unauthorized
absences, and desertion are unchanged.'' Can you explain why the
percentage of soldiers who have failed basic training has dropped?
Secretary Geren. We are witnessing positive effects from two
fundamental modifications to the execution of Basic Combat Training.
First, we revised the content of training provided to new soldiers by
introducing warrior tasks and battle drills. Soldiers train with a
heightened realism and receive more exposure to weapons training,
combatives, and convoy live-fire training before departing basic combat
training. Physical fitness training was redesigned to both improve
performance and decrease injuries (injuries are highly related to
attrition). This warrior focused training has created the most
challenging and effective warrior-oriented basic training in the
history of the Army.
Second, we changed the training philosophy of Basic Combat Training
by introducing the Soldier Investment Strategy. We adjusted the Basic
Combat Training approach to one of coaching, mentoring, and teaching.
We changed the image of the drill sergeant to one of an authoritative
and respectful role model charged with encouraging and leading young
soldiers through the mastery of combat tasks and accomplishment of
tough, challenging training.
We have increased the rigor and relevance of Basic Combat Training
to produce fully trained soldiers who can immediately contribute to a
unit in combat. These changes have resonated with our youth and allowed
us to decrease Basic Combat Training attrition from 15 percent in 2004
to 6 percent in 2007.
40. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, have the standards for passing
basic training been changed since 2000?
Secretary Geren. Since 2000, Basic Combat Training has increased in
rigor by updating training methods, equipment, and tasks to meet the
needs of an Army at war. The Basic Combat Training program of
instruction was completely revised in October 2004 based on lessons
learned in the operational environment. All soldiers receive
challenging, focused training in Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills, crew
served weapons, urban operations, convoy protection procedures, and all
soldiers are certified as combat lifesavers. Soldiers now train, march,
and shoot in full combat gear (helmet, pads and body armor) to
replicate the tactical environment. This includes a weapons immersion
program in which soldiers must carry and take care of their rifle from
the first week of training until graduation.
The Basic Combat Training program of instruction and graduation
requirements are under constant review and evaluation to ensure
relevance to current and future combat operations.
41. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, in your prepared statement, you
stated that ``We are growing the total Army by 74,000 and completing
the transformation of the Reserve component from a strategic Reserve to
an operational force.'' You may recall that I asked you during your
confirmation hearing whether or not we should maintain a ``strategic
Reserve.'' In your response, you stated that ``We no longer have the
luxury of extended time periods for training after mobilization.''
However, if we had maintained a strategic Reserve before September 11,
we would have had 6 years to train them and bring them online, and we
would not be stressing our troops with the operational tempo (OPTEMPO)
we have today. We would also have troops available for any
contingencies that emerge while we are engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In light of our current situation, do you think it may be appropriate
to reconsider the Quadrennial Defense Review decision to operationalize
the Reserve Components, and begin the development of a new strategic
Reserve (even if it would necessitate a large growth in the Reserve
component)?
Secretary Geren. Transitioning the Reserve component to an
operational force integrates the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army
Reserve into the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN), and
synchronizes planning, prioritization, and resourcing for sustainable
force generation. Integration of the Reserve component into the
ARFORGEN process better enables Reserve component employment as part of
the Joint Force while preserving some ability to expand the scope by
accelerating availability. The ARFORGEN will make available a
continuous mix of ground capabilities with each component providing
complementing units. The Strategic Reserves are those formations
throughout the depth of the process, behind those deployed or next to
deploy.
MILITARY CONTRACTORS
42. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Casey, a bill has
been proposed in the House that would require the rapid withdrawal of
hundreds of armed security contractors who provide protective services
for the State Department in Iraq. Specifically, the bill would phase
out approximately 800 armed contractors who work for Blackwater,
DynCorp International, and Triple Canopy in Iraq over the next 6
months, and requires them to be replaced with military or diplomatic
security personnel or military police. Does the Army have the ability
to meet the requirements of this bill?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Army does not have the
ability to immediately replace these armed contractors. To do so would
require a phased approach. Initially Central Command (CENTCOM) would
have to replace the armed contractors with forces already deployed to
the CENTCOM theater. This would potentially require CENTCOM to leave
other theater requirements unfulfilled. The Army or any Services'
ability to replace armed contractors would depend on CENTCOM's analysis
of the armed contractor requirement which would result in either a
Request for Forces or Joint Manning Document. CENTCOM's analysis would
include the desired rank, MOS, and level of training required. Once
CENTCOM submits the requirements to the Joint Staff, all Services would
conduct an analysis to determine their ability to meet the requirement
and a feasible timeline to replace the armed contractors. For example,
our Military Police forces are a highly demand asset but they are
limited in supply. If CENTCOM's requirement called for one of our
highly demanded forces, it is highly unlikely the Army could
immediately fulfill this requirement.
This challenge highlights one of the many reasons why we must
continue to grow and transform our Army to meet the demands of the 21st
century. We are over half-way through the largest organizational change
since World War II, and we must continue to rebalance our capabilities
by converting less necessary skills to those in high demand, and by
shifting much-needed Reserve Forces into the Active component.
43. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Casey, considering
the difficulties that have been caused by the use of private security
contractors (PSCs) in Iraq, is the Army considering any steps to
eliminate the need for any agency to use security contractors in future
conflicts? If so, what actions are being considered? If not, why not?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. Currently, there are no plans to
eliminate the use of PSCs. To date, there are approximately 20,000 to
30,000 DOD contractor personnel performing security services in Iraq.
The Army estimates that it would take several years to assume the
duties currently being performed by PSCs.
PSCs perform a number of functions, to include private security
details for senior officers and civilians, working as static guards for
Forward Operating Bases, providing site security on reconstruction
projects, and accompanying contractor convoys of supplies.
The use of contractors is a force multiplier enabling the U.S. Army
to keep soldiers engaged in core U.S. Army missions, such as combat
operations. Reassigning soldiers to perform security support services
would take them from critical warfighting activities.
44. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Casey, is the Army
paying either directly or indirectly (e.g., through the Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program contract) for security contractor support in Iraq?
If so, which contractors are providing support, what kind of support
are they providing, how much support is being provided by each
contractor in person-days per year, and what are the costs to the Army?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
advises that the Army has contracted for private security and
transportation services with various vendors in Iraq. The total number
of contract employees providing these services is 6,048 at a cost of
$690 million per year.
Additionally, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has contracted for
PSC services from Aegis Defense Services. Aegis provides 1,386
contractor personnel at an approximate cost of $200 million per year.
45. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Casey, please answer
the same questions for Afghanistan and for any other major Army
operations around the world.
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
advises that the Army has contracted for private security and
transportation services with various vendors in Afghanistan. The total
number of contract employees providing these services is 3,152 at a
cost of $18 million per year.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has contracted directly with a
local Afghanistan-based firm to provide security services for U.S.
personnel. The contract provides for 30 guards a day and 25 bilingual
personnel a day for a cost of $72,000 per month.
CHINA AND RUSSIA
46. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren and General Casey, the Chinese
military has been experiencing double digit increases in its budget
since the early 1990s. It seems pretty clear that China's intention is
to build itself up into being a superpower. In addition, the
administration's plans to deploy two anti-ballistic missile systems in
Europe has led Russia to suspend its participation in the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. In addition, they are considering
withdrawing from the 1988 treaty on short- and intermediate-range
missiles. How do you think that China's military buildup or Russia's
recent actions should affect the force structure for the Army going
forward from here?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The nature of future conflict
necessitates that we transform the Army for full spectrum capabilities.
It is vital that our Army ensures that units and soldiers have the
right capabilities to accomplish the wide variety of operations that we
will conduct in the 21st century. Continuous modernization is the key
to enhancing our capabilities and maintaining a technological advantage
over any enemy we face.
PSYCHOLOGICAL DAMAGE
47. Senator Akaka. General Casey, the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) has nearly 50,000 documented cases of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) since the Afghanistan War began. This number far
exceeds the 30,000 military personnel officially classified by the
Pentagon as wounded in the conflicts. The discrepancy in these numbers
support a view held by many health officials that troops tend to
ignore, hide, or fail to recognize their mental health wounds until
after their military service. As I noted during the hearing, a study
conducted by Army researchers, released on November 13, found that the
number of soldiers experiencing mental health issues may be between 27
and 35 percent. The study also concluded that soldiers are more likely
to report mental health distress 3 to 6 months after returning from
Iraq. I am very concerned that there may be a substantial number of our
troops currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan who are suffering from
mental health issues such as PTSD and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI).
Moreover, I am concerned that we may be sending them back for multiple
deployments while still suffering from these conditions, and that this
could be exacerbating their condition. During the hearing, I asked you
if the troops identified as having mental health issues are considered
by the Army as being deployable or are they considered to be wounded. I
specifically asked you to address this question relative to those who
are found to be suffering from PTSD or TBI. Your answer was somewhat
disconcerting. You replied that ``it really depends on the severity of
the injury.'' The reason your answer is disconcerting is that it seems
that whether a person is wounded or not should have nothing to do with
severity. They are either injured, or they are not. The severity is
something one would expect to be considered during treatment. Is the
Army deploying troops who are still suffering from PTSD and TBI
incurred during previous deployments?
General Casey. The Army does not deploy soldiers if they are
incapable of performing their assigned missions. Our commanders, in
consultation with medical health professionals, consider each soldier's
fitness for deployment based upon their symptoms, responsiveness to
treatment, what medical care is available in theater, the opinions of
physicians, and the input from the soldier. We do not knowingly deploy
any soldier who is suffering from a debilitating injury, whether
physical or mental.
It is important to note that many people with mild TBI fully
recover. We are accustomed to seeing athletes in contact sports suffer
a concussion, recover, and then be allowed to play either later in the
game or in the next game. Many of our soldiers who suffer a concussion/
mild TBI experience a similar recovery pattern, and are thus, returned
to duty.
48. Senator Akaka. General Casey, what is the DOD or Army policy
for deploying troops with mental health issues?
General Casey. The Army does not deploy soldiers if they are
incapable of performing their assigned missions. We medically evaluate
and clear all deploying soldiers as part of our predeployment
preparations. Medical professionals make recommendations to Commanders
regarding each soldier's readiness to deploy. Soldiers who have fully
recovered from mental health issues such as PTSD would likely be
medically cleared to deploy. Soldiers who demonstrate persistent
symptoms that interfere with their duties would not be cleared to
deploy; rather, they would be further evaluated and treated for their
condition. Commanders make the decision to deploy or not deploy a
soldier based on the recommendation of our medical professionals.
49. Senator Akaka. General Casey, how much recovery time is being
provided to troops who have mental health issues before they are
deployed again?
General Casey. Soldiers are given as much time as they need to
medically recover--we do not set a limit. The time period for recovery
varies based on the type of illness, its severity, and its impact on an
individual's level of functioning (for example, ability to do the job,
get along with others, or take care of one's self). We will not deploy
soldiers if they are incapable of performing their assigned missions.
50. Senator Akaka. General Casey, what percentage of troops
returning from Iraq have been identified as having TBI?
General Casey. There are three levels of severity regarding closed
TBI: mild, moderate, and severe. There are also penetrating TBIs,
moderate, severe, and penetrating injuries usually result in the
servicemember's immediate evacuation. Approximately 770 servicemembers
have been evacuated from theater for moderate, severe, or penetrating
TBI.
Based on self-reports from servicemembers during post-deployment
screening, between 10-20 percent of soldiers returning from Iraq have
suffered a concussion or mild TBI; however, not all of these soldiers
have persistent physical symptoms beyond what they experienced around
the time of injury.
51. Senator Akaka. General Casey, both TBI and PTSD have symptoms
that could be detrimental in combat. What are the potential impacts of
deploying soldiers with TBI or PTSD on the soldier and on the soldier's
unit?
General Casey. As part of the Army's unprecedented chain-teaching
program, we have trained over 750,000 soldiers to recognize the signs
and symptoms of PTSD and mild TBI. It is important for soldiers and
family members to have an awareness of PTSD and mild TBI and to seek
treatment for these conditions as soon as possible.
PTSD and mild TBI may impair soldier combat effectiveness. They can
lead to poor marksmanship, delayed reaction time, a decreased ability
to concentrate, or other performance changes that last for several days
or longer. Soldiers who have been injured in a blast or who have had a
head injury from a vehicle accident, fall, or other injury are
evaluated by a health care provider. The health care provider evaluates
the soldier's symptoms and performance before making a recommendation
to return the soldier to duty. Providers carefully evaluate soldiers to
prevent any negative mission impact.
The Army recently issued Clinical Management Guidance to primary
care providers with information and guidance on the evaluation and
treatment of soldiers with mild TBI. Soldiers with PTSD, depending upon
the severity of PTSD symptoms, can remain in theater and often complete
their tour with their unit. However in cases of mild TBI or PTSD, a
commander who feels the soldier is a risk to himself or the unit will
refer the soldier to appropriate medical channels for an evaluation and
treatment as required. In some cases it may be necessary to medically
evacuate the soldier from theater for additional treatment.
52. Senator Akaka. General Casey, during the hearing, I asked the
following question, and you committed to responding in writing.
Hawaii's 29th BCT has been notified that they will be deployed to
Kuwait next summer which is only 2 years after returning from their
last deployment in Iraq. This is far less than the goal of 5 years
between deployments for National Guard and Reserves. By the time they
return from this deployment, they will have spent 2 years deployed in
the Middle East over the previous 5 year period. While they have a
greater time between deployments, their OPTEMPO is still comparable to
the tempo for our active duty soldiers in that it is 1 month home for
every month deployed. Has the 29th BCT been given adequate time to
reset its equipment and complete its training requirements in time to
meet the deployment schedule?
General Casey. The deployment schedule is achievable. The Army
National Guard and 1st Army will ensure the 29th BCT is well-trained,
properly equipped, adequately resourced, and fully prepared to meet
mission requirements when it deploys next summer. As the 29th BCT
prepares for its second wartime mission, pre-deployment unit training
will be conducted at Schofield Barracks to ensure the unit's readiness
meets the same high standards set for every Army unit--whether Active
or Reserve.
The 29th BCT is 1 of 15 Army National Guard brigades deploying in
fiscal year 2009. All of these brigades have between 20 and 40 months
of dwell time. Admittedly, the dwell time does not meet our ultimate
goal of a 1:5 deployment-to-dwell ratio. It is in keeping, however,
with the dwell time of other brigades being called upon for deployment.
Meanwhile, the Army is providing $14 billion worth of new equipment
to the Army National Guard over the next 2 years to reduce equipment
shortages. We will ensure that critical equipment items are available
to support Hawaii's pre-deployment training through a cross-leveling of
equipment within Hawaii and with other States and territories.
53. Senator Akaka. General Casey, have any training requirements
been modified, reduced, or accelerated in order to meet the deployment
schedule, and if so, what are the potential impacts on the unit?
General Casey. The 29th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) will
have the training needed to be successful in its mission. State/
territory Adjutants General have certification authority for pre-
mobilization training. The Director of the Army National Guard has
validation authority for this pre-mobilization training that was once
the responsibility of First Army. In early November, the National Guard
Bureau hosted a conference in Dallas, TX, for all BCTs and States/
territories deploying in the next 3 years to synchronize the pre-
mobilization training efforts. The 29th IBCT and the Hawaii National
Guard were in attendance. The National Guard Bureau is working to
finalize coordination for the 29th IBCT, to ensure their success at
their mobilization station training and performing their mission
overseas.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh
JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE
54. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General Casey, what is the
status of the ongoing Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study currently being
undertaken by the Army?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. Senator, the study you reference
in your question is called the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy, which
was presented to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) on
November 15, 2007. The Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy addressed how
the Army will use a mixed-fleet approach to balance the protection,
performance, and payload requirements necessary to protect the soldier
while achieving mission goals.
55. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General Casey, when is the
study expected to conclude?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. It is not a one-time effort.
Instead, the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy will be continually
refined to account for changes that occur in the global operating
environment and variations in funding. Additionally, the strategy will
be adjusted to reflect vehicle performance and capabilities captured by
soldier feedback, such as feedback on the performance of the newly
fielded MRAP vehicles.
56. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren and General Casey, has the Army
established requirements for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)?
Is there sufficient fiscal year 2008 funding available to support the
program?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Army is currently in the
midst of a comprehensive study, the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy,
which will inform requirements across the range of Tactical Wheeled
Vehicle fleets, to include JLTV. It would be premature to provide
specific numbers until that study is complete. There is sufficient
fiscal year 2008 funding available to support the program.
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
57. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren, can you provide more detail on
the Army's PTSD and TBI initiatives as they related to both the
warfighter and their families that is mentioned in your testimony?
Secretary Geren. The Army is committed to ensuring all returning
veterans receive the behavioral health care they need. Army leadership
is taking aggressive, far-reaching steps to provide an array of
behavioral health services for soldiers and their families to help
those dealing with PTSD or TBI. Specific initiatives include the Post-
Deployment Health Assessment and Post-Deployment Health Reassessment;
used to screen, identify, and refer for intervention those soldiers at
risk for PTSD and the other mental health effects of war. We are now
performing baseline cognitive assessments on all deploying soldiers
using the Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics. The Army
also initiated numerous new training programs such as ``Battlemind''
for soldiers and spouses. Provider Resiliency Training, and updated
Combat and Operational Stress Control training. As part of the Army's
unprecedented Chain Teaching program, over 750,000 soldiers and family
members have been trained to recognize the signs and symptoms of PTSD
and mild TBI. We have also developed instructional DVD/CDs for Families
such as ``Mr. Poe and Friends'' and ``Military Youth Coping with
Separation: When Family Members Deploy.''
In addition, several Army and DOD websites contain easily
accessible information regarding TBI and PTSD:
The Deployment Health Clinical Center, http://
www.pdhealth.mil/TBl.asp/#eat;
Army Behavioral Health, http:/
www.behavioralhealth.army.mil/chainteaching/index.html; and
Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center, http://
www.dvbic.org/.
58. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren, the Army has published several
Broad Agency Announcements in fiscal year 2007 for research into both
PTSD and TBI. What further efforts does Army plan to make in fiscal
year 2008 to continue and further investigate ways to prevent and treat
these conditions?
Secretary Geren. In fiscal year 2008 the Army will continue to
emphasize the importance of treating and preventing PTSD and TBI. The
fiscal year 2007 war supplemental will fund studies to be identified
from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2013 that will focus on the
key gaps in knowledge for PTSD and TBI prevention, detection and
intervention. The PTSD/TBI Research Program's Clinical Consortium award
is designed to introduce new, cutting edge PTSD and TBI focused
(including PTSD/TBI overlap) clinical studies at multiple study sites,
over a 5-year projected period. This was designed to provide a means
for a continual influx and evaluation of potential novel treatments
and/or interventions. Additionally, it provides an ongoing means of
expedited fielding of successful treatments and interventions. Another
extension of this fiscal year 2007 funding program is to facilitate
collaboration with the congressionally mandated DOD PTSD/TBI Center of
Excellence.
The Millennium Cohort Study (MilCohort) will continue to follow
more than 148,000 U.S. military personnel during and after their
military service for up to 21 years. The Army began funding MilCohort
in 2001 for the largest epidemiological cohort study in military
history to determine how military occupational exposures affect long-
term health by demonstrating a method for establishing the long-term
health risks and benefits to mental and physical health associated with
military service.
In fiscal year 2008 the Army will continue evaluation studies
assessing the impact of Battlemind training on soldiers' mental health
status. A spouse version of Battlemind was also developed last year
with validation studies underway in fiscal year 2008. The Battlemind
Training System was developed by the Walter Reed Army Institute of
Research and represents the only scientifically validated resilience
training program in the military. The research on post-deployment
Battlemind Training found that it is an effective method of reducing
mental health concerns compared to standard stress education briefings
soldiers typically received.
59. Senator Bayh. Secretary Geren, how will Army ensure that the
best ideas from private industry and university researchers are
considered as it further examines the best ways to address both PTSD
and TBI needs?
Secretary Geren. The U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel
Command (USAMRMC) actively engages private industry and university
researchers to capture their creative and innovative approaches to help
solve current and future challenges in the form of research proposal
submissions. The well established process utilized by USAMRMC to
execute our core programs and the fiscal year 2007 War Supplemental
funded PTSD/TBI Research Program ensures that proposals are solicited
worldwide from industry, academia, and Federal entities.
The USAMRMC uses external scientists to review the Army's medical
research programs and proposals to ensure they are state-of-the-art and
of high quality. Following protocol submission, the proposal evaluation
and selection consists of an unbiased two tier review process, which
requires that all proposals undergo both scientific (peer) review as
well as programmatic review. The peer review panel is comprised mostly
of external scientists that are experts in their fields. The
programmatic review panel, consisting of representatives from the
Departments of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and Health and Human
Services, conducts programmatic review and makes funding
recommendations.
The Army executes the DOD Executive Agency for the Prevention,
Mitigation, and Treatment of Blast Injuries (Blast EA). The Blast EA
has and will continue to survey the needs and programs from all the
Services. It coordinates current and planned research efforts and
programs future research needs to expand the President's Budget to
support PTSD and TBI research in civilian universities, private
industry, and the military Services. One example of both academic and
military involvement is a drug study for treating anxiety after a TBI
which is taking place in hospitals from each of the Services and the
VA. Imaging technologies are being evaluated by several universities
such as the University of Pennsylvania and the University of
Pittsburgh.
NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM
60. Senator Bayh. General Casey, you discuss the four imperatives
to restore depth and breadth to Army capabilities, including preparing
forces to succeed in the current conflict. That preparation should
include sufficient instruction in the languages and cultures of the
regions in which they will serve. The National Security Education
Program (NSEP) is helping to educate U.S. personnel who will be
stationed in regions critical to U.S. national security interests. What
are your plans to expand the teaching of language and culture carried
out through NSEP, particularly in critical areas such as the Central
Asian Languages, so that the entire array of personnel, from infantry
to commanders, are adequately prepared to function in these locations?
General Casey. The NSEP is not an Army program. Recently however,
NSEP engaged with the Defense Language Office (DLO) to provide ROTC
cadets the opportunity to study critical languages and cultures. NSEP
established four programs in fiscal year 2007, including Indiana
University's Central Asian Language program where 24 Army ROTC cadets
participate. The Army will continue to work with NSEP, the DLO, and
Army ROTC detachments to expand NSEP programs to universities with
large concentrations of Army ROTC cadets. In addition to NSEP, the Army
continues to pursue a wide range of programs to ensure that soldiers
receive instruction in the languages and cultures of the regions in
which they will serve.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION
61. Senator Clinton. Secretary Geren and General Casey, the United
States Army met fiscal year 2007 recruitment goals by allowing more
recruits to enter active duty with a moral waiver; allowing more
recruits to enter active duty without a high school diploma; providing
shorter and more lucrative enlistment contracts; and increasing the
maximum age of recruits from 35 to 42 years. What additional measures
will the United States Army take in order to meet recruiting goals in
fiscal year 2008 given the increased end strength goals assigned to its
recruiting mission?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. The Army should be able to meet
its end strength objectives while maintaining a recruiting mission of
approximately 80,000 per year. The current policies, initiatives, and
incentive packages should be adequate to meet those recruiting
missions. Although we are facing the most difficult recruiting
environment since the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force, the Army
recruited over 80,000 individuals to serve in the active Army in each
of the past 2 years.
62. Senator Clinton. Secretary Geren and General Casey, will the
quality of the force and future readiness suffer as a result of the
lower recruit entry standards?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. While the Army met recruiting
quality marks mandated by law, we did fall short of the DOD recruiting
standard to have 90 percent of our new recruits enter with a high
school diploma. There are troubling trends that challenge the
recruiting market: the National average for high school graduation is
80 percent with urban areas less than 50 percent and 36 percent of our
contracts come from the southern region with those lower graduation
rates. The Army looks at quality as more than DOD quality marks and
therefore each soldier we enlist with a waiver is thoroughly screened
before being approved for entry. We have seen increases in waivers over
the past few years and remain vigilant in our screening process. Our
2007 study of waivered recruits, as compared to non-waivered recruits
from 2003 to 2006, showed these soldiers performed, by several
standards, better than non-waivered recruits. We do not envision the
quality of the force or future readiness of the Army suffering, but it
is a matter that requires constant vigilance.
63. Senator Clinton. Secretary Geren and General Casey, what
efforts will the United States Army take to mitigate potential morale
and discipline problems arising from this recruit demographic?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. There are no indicators
demonstrating recruits coming into the force are creating adverse
morale and discipline problems. Each recruit coming into the Army is
fully qualified for his or her duty and expected to perform as a
soldier within a unit according to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. A recent study was conducted to see if they were attrition
differences between applicants coming in the Army with a moral waiver
and those without a moral waiver. The study showed that there were no
significant differences between the recruits entering the Army with a
moral waiver compared to the recruits entering the Army without a moral
waiver in terms of adverse action discharges (fiscal years 2003-2006
cohort data).
READINESS
64. Senator Clinton. Secretary Geren and General Casey, in General
Casey's testimony, a concern was raised that the United States Army is
currently ``consuming readiness faster than it can be produced.'' This
is a critical indicator that the current OPTEMPO is having near-term
and long-term readiness effects. What specific readiness is being
consumed faster than it can be produced?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. General Casey's written
testimony stated that ``overall, our readiness is being consumed as
fast as we can build it.'' This is because the current demand for our
forces exceeds the sustainable supply. We are fully consumed with
meeting the demands of the current fight and will be challenged to
generate ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential
contingencies. Current operational requirements for forces and limited
periods between deployments necessitate a focus on counterinsurgency
training and preparation to the detriment of preparedness for the full
range of military missions. Units and equipment are stressed by the
demands of lengthy and repeated deployments with insufficient recovery
time. Equipment used repeatedly in harsh environmental conditions is
wearing out at 5-8 times the peacetime rate.
To address long-term readiness concerns, we are acting quickly in
order to meet combatant commander needs, restore balance to preserve
our All-Volunteer Force, and restore necessary depth and capacity for
the future. In the near-term we continue to deploy units that are fully
manned, trained and equipped for their theater assigned mission. Our
units that have just returned from a deployment will initially have
lower readiness due to personnel turnover and equipment shortages. We
dedicate timely resources to increase each unit's readiness by
providing the soldiers, equipment, and training required to perform its
assigned mission. Currently, the demand for trained and ready units
exceeds our ability to provide enough soldiers and equipment to units
during reset, the first 6-month period of a unit's return from
deployment. With full, timely and predictable funding, we will be able
to provide units more of their required equipment, earlier in the
process rather than just-in-time for their next deployment. This will
also help us restore the Army's strategic depth and increase our
flexibility to defend the Nation.
65. Senator Clinton. Secretary Geren and General Casey, what
current equipment re-set programs are being impacted by these cited to
consumption OPTEMPO rates?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. Currently, no equipment reset
program is being impacted by the higher OPTEMPO rate; however, the
delay of supplemental funding in fiscal year 2008 may limit the Army's
ability to reset all equipment in a timely manner. For the past 6
years, the Army has ensured that every deployed unit has had the
necessary equipment to accomplish its assigned mission. To support the
increased OPTEMPO for the surge in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army
extended units in theater and accelerated the deployment of units.
To reverse the effects of combat stress on the equipment, the Army
is resetting its equipment at an unprecedented rate. Army reset ensures
that when units return from combat their equipment is restored to the
desired level of combat capability commensurate with future mission
requirements. Thanks to past congressional support, the depot
production in 2007 was the highest output since Vietnam. The depots
have adequate capacity to meet the Army's needs. The Army has sustained
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for 6 years with equipment
serviceability readiness at greater than 85 percent for ground
equipment and greater than 75 percent for aviation equipment.
To sustain equipment readiness, the Army requires timely and
adequate funding. Cash flowing the Army's reset operation and
maintenance requirements with the base budget funding places other
programs at risk. Without the $10.6 billion requested for procurement
in the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request, the Army will not
be able to purchase replacement equipment for battle losses, Army
prepositioned stocks, and theater provided equipment. For each day that
funding is delayed, the delivery of essential systems to soldiers is
delayed. Continued support from Congress will ensure that the Army
maintains the equipment readiness to support the warfighter and start
restoring the Army's strategic depth.
66. Senator Clinton. Secretary Geren and General Casey, what impact
are these consumption OPTEMPO rates having on force protection for
deployed soldiers?
Secretary Geren and General Casey. There are no force protection
impacts as a result of the current high OPTEMPO rate. The Army is fully
committed to providing force protection for our deployed soldiers and
has considered OPTEMPO rates in its force protection equipment
procurements, fielding, and reset plans.
Since the start of war the Army, with congressional support, has
substantively increased the amount and level of force protection. For
instance:
The in-theater truck fleet, all of which are armored,
will be filled to 100 percent of the requirement in January
2008. The light truck fleet is already filled to 100 percent,
and our medium and heavy truck fleets which are filled to 99
percent of requirements are scheduled to be completed in
December 2007 and January 2008 respectively. Due to high
OPTEMPO demands, these fleets undergo a rebuild process in
Theater, as well as battle loss and battle damage replacements
from new production.
The Theater Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) requirement
is filled to 100 percent and production will support
replacement of destroyed ASVs.
The Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV) replaces the
previously fielded outer tactical vest and is being issued to
all deploying soldiers, Army civilians, and other attached
personnel. The IOTV production rate of 25,000 per month will
support the unit rotation plan.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT
67. Senator Pryor. General Casey, with roots in a genuine decision
of jointness, the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) has been a hotly debated
platform for intra-theater airlift. As an example of joint teaming
between the Services, this aircraft was validated in the Joint
Capabilities Integration Development System process, approved by the
JROC, managed by a Joint Program Office (JPO), and produced a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) cosigned by the Vice Chiefs of Staff of
the Army and the Air Force. Have you had a discussion or do you plan to
have discussions with General Moseley regarding the necessity of the
JCA as a viable weapon system in a service organic role for the Army
and the roles and mission debate that has surrounded this issue?
General Casey. The Army and Air Force have been in agreement on the
roles and missions of the JCA for quite a while, an agreement
recognized by the signing of an MOA on 20 June 2006. General Moseley
and I continue to discuss a variety of topics to include the JCA. In
the upcoming Army and Air Force Staff Talks, we will discuss how to
better support the JCA program to the benefit of both Services, but
there is no intent to readdress roles and missions on the JCA. The Army
does not have interest in taking on responsibility for intra-theater
airlift with the JCA, nor was the JCA ever intended to compete with the
Air Force's C-17 or C-130 aircraft roles and missions. Our focus is to
modernize our cargo fleet of aircraft with a better, modern, more
capable aircraft that will conduct the same organic, direct support
missions the Army has been conducting with airplanes and helicopters
for decades. The JCA is a complementary system that fills a gap at the
tactical (as opposed to operational or strategic) level. That gap is
the movement of time sensitive, mission critical cargo and key
personnel from the Initial Staging Base or Port of Debarkation (POD) to
the BCT and below. This is sometimes described as ``the last tactical
mile'' of the end-to-end distribution system. These BCTs and smaller
units are often deployed to austere locations across the noncontiguous
battlefield. So, the JCA is a multifunctional aircraft that enables the
JFC to achieve full spectrum dominance through the application of
focused logistics.
LIGHT UTILITY HELICOPTER
68. Senator Pryor. General Casey, the Operational Test and
Evaluation (OT&E) Report for the UH-72A Lakota, dated July 2007,
concludes that this light utility helicopter (LUH) may not meet
prescribed performance criteria to support homeland defense
initiatives, and in particular has shown a vulnerability for various
avionics failures while operating in hot environments. As the Army
plans to field 322 LUH aircraft over the next 8 years, what are your
plans to remedy the shortfalls identified in this report?
General Casey. The LUH program is successfully executing the Army's
transformation strategy. We are continuing to move forward with full
rate production to procure 322 aircraft to return UH-60 Blackhawks to
the warfight and replace aging UM-1 and OH-58 aircraft. The LUH
fielding is on schedule and on budget and meets or exceeds the Joint
Staff approved key performance parameters (KPPs).
The two issues identified in the Director, OT&E report stating the
aircraft was ``not operationally suitable'' and ``not operationally
effective'' in certain environments were the cockpit/cabin heat and the
medical evacuation of two critical patients. Both issues have been
resolved. The Army Research Lab recently tested and evaluated the
improved ventilation kit and concluded that the system is operationally
effective, suitable, and safe, even in hot environments. There have
been no equipment failures from excessive cockpit heat and the
``fixes'' that have been incorporated into the aircraft will preclude
any equipment failures in the future.
To address concerns over operations in the MEDEVAC LUH, a medical
evacuation kit, consisting of medical evacuation equipment mounts,
ceiling rails and additional lighting, has been evaluated and approved.
It allows for a cabin configuration that will facilitate the
accomplishment of medical attendant tasks. The LUH is not required to
transport more than one critical patient at a time.
In terms of lift performance the LUH exceeds its KPP to lift 906
pounds out of ground effect. It is important to note that in all
atmospheric conditions LUH exceeds the lift performance of the aged UH-
1 and OH-58 aircraft it is replacing.
In summary the LUH Program is successfully meeting all cost,
schedule and required performance targets specified in the acquisition
strategy. To date, the Army has purchased 42 UH-72A aircraft and 16 of
these have been delivered to units in the field.
DEPLOYMENTS
69. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, I am concerned that the
repeated deployments of our Active Army Forces for extended periods of
combat (boots-on-the-ground extended from 12 to 15 months) is having a
detrimental impact on the retention of some of our most experienced
junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Extended
deployments with reduced dwell time must be creating tremendous stress
on the families. What are your plans for reducing the length of combat
deployments?
Secretary Geren. The interim Army Deployment Policy deploys
soldiers for not more than 15 months with at least 12 months of dwell
before being deployed again. We made the recommendation to the
Secretary of Defense to go to the 15-month policy for three reasons:
one, to support the needs of the commander in the field; two, to give
us more predictability for our soldiers and families; and three, we
needed 12 months at home to ensure that the soldiers deploying were
adequately prepared. The 15-month policy was always intended to be
temporary and we will come off of that as soon as we can. The Army is
growing capacity to help achieve a rotation model of 12 month
deployments followed by at least 12 months at home station. The
continued goal of the Army is a sustainable unit deployment to dwell
ratio of 1:3 in a steady state security environment (for example, 9
months deployed, 27 months home), or 1:2 in a sustainable surge
environment.
70. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, what do you consider an
acceptable period of dwell time for soldiers deployed for 15 months?
Secretary Geren. The continued goal of the Army is a sustainable
deployment to dwell ratio of 1:3 in a steady-state security environment
(for example, 9 months deployed, 27 months home), or a ratio of 1:2 in
a surge environment. In the near-term, the Army is growing capacity to
help achieve a model of 12 month deployments followed by at least 12
months at home station.
71. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, why is the Marine Corps able to
continue sustained operations with 7 month deployments while the Army
had to extend deployments from 12 to 15 months?
Secretary Geren. Both the Army and the Marine Corps are rotating
their combat forces at slightly less than a 1:1 deployment to dwell
ratio. Army combat units currently spend up to 15 months overseas, with
at least 12 months to reset and prepare. In other words, soldiers are
deployed 15 months out of 27 months. Marines deploy for 7 month
rotations with only 6 months back, and, over two rotation cycles, that
represents 14 months deployed out of 26 months. We are currently unable
to sustain shorter deployments because of the volume of Army forces
required.
RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION
72. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, what data are you tracking to
assess the impact on the force? For example, retention rate of junior
officers and NCOs; divorce rates; suicide rates; number of medically
non-deployed soldiers; equipment availability rates; equipment
operational rates.
Secretary Geren. The data tracked by the Army covers a full
spectrum of readiness indicators to include personnel and equipment.
From a personnel readiness perspective, the Army looks at deployable
individuals within the total force for mission requirements. Many
factors influence the available population, to include medical and
legal issues, professional schooling requirements, and job
qualifications. To monitor stressors on the force, the Army has, for
several years, tracked recruiting; first term attrition; and the
retention of enlisted soldiers, noncommissioned and commissioned
officers. We closely monitor other behaviors such as divorce rates,
suicide reports, alcohol and drug abuse statistics as well as general
misconduct and attrition rates. We monitor equipment readiness by
tracking equipping levels and operational readiness of the Army's
fleets, weapons, and other essential equipment.
REAL PROPERTY
73. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, I'm sure you are aware that the
Department has the authority to transfer real property to community
redevelopment organizations at no cost if those communities agree to
reinvest land sales and leasing revenues back into job creation and
infrastructure development. It would be my hope that the Army disposal
plans for these closing installations balances both public auctions
with these no cost and other public benefit transfers. We have many
financial challenges in executing Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
projects, but it is important to me that communities are not left
without resources to cope with the economic recovery they face and some
of this property should be considered for open space and other
important public uses. Can you assure this committee that the
Department will implement a balanced approach to property disposal and
grant broad deference to community reuse plans the way the law
intended?
Secretary Geren. Yes, the Army will implement a balanced approach
to property disposal and grant broad deference to community reuse plans
as the law intended. We are following the property disposal process as
directed by law. By law, Local Reuse Authorities are responsible for
State, local, and homeless screening and for producing reuse plans that
consider the needs of homeless service providers and other state or
local requests for property for public benefit. The Army will seek fair
market value for BRAC property, and properly conveyance actions can
include economic development conveyances at fair market value, or under
certain circumstances, at no cost. In cases where the Army markets
properties for sale, we will work with the Local Reuse Authorities and
market the property in a way that is consistent with their reuse plans.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
READINESS
74. Senator Collins. General Casey, as ranking member of the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, I am very
concerned about the Federal use of our Nation's National Guard
soldiers. During the last Congress, Senator Lieberman and I worked
together on the committee, investigating many of the problems that
plagued the Government's response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster in
New Orleans. I am concerned however, that 2 years after Hurricane
Katrina, our National Guard forces may not be ready to perform their
critical domestic missions, because either the personnel or equipment
have been deployed overseas. A September 2007 Government Accountability
Office (GAO) study found that the Army National Guard has less than
one-third of their required equipment available. The study also found
that DOD has not fully reassessed its equipment, personnel, and
training needs and developed a new model for the Reserve component that
is appropriate to the new strategic environment. The GAO study adds
that the Army has begun two transformation initiatives to enhance
Reserve unit's ability to conduct 21st century operations. These
initiatives are significant, but the extent to which they will
alleviate equipment and personnel challenges is unclear. What
reassessment, if any, is being done by the Army to determine the
appropriate equipment, personnel, and training needs of the Army Guard
and Reserve, based on the new strategic environment?
General Casey. The Army is conducting an assessment of the
requirements to transition the Reserve components from a strategic to
an operational Reserve. This is part of transforming an Army to meet
the demands of the 21st century, an era of persistent conflict. Our
assessment includes a review of pre- and post-mobilization training
requirements and the associated resources.
We are continuing to rebalance the force across all components to
ensure we have the right types of units and soldiers with the skills
that are in the greatest demand--infantry, engineer, military police,
military intelligence, and Special Operations Forces. This is a
collaborative process. We are working closely with the Army Reserve,
National Guard Bureau, the Adjutants General Force Structure Committee,
and others within the Department of Defense to address the right mix of
capabilities and the balance between the Active and Reserve components.
We have committed an unprecedented level of resources to address
Reserve component equipment needs. For example, we are fencing $27
billion for Army National Guard procurement through 2013, and we have
fielded new Abrams Integrated Management tanks, howitzers, and
communication equipment to the National Guard. The Reserve components
are receiving our best night vision equipment, GPS receivers, battle
command equipment, and trucks.
Given the National Guard's role as both an operational force and
the States' first military responder for homeland defense and civil
support, the Army is committed to resource the Army National Guard
consistent with those roles. We have fielded more than 11,000 pieces of
critical equipment to hurricane States, and we have worked closely with
the National Guard leadership to identify ``dual use'' equipment in
their ``essential 10'' capabilities.
The Army Reserve remains among the Nation's first title 10
responders to provide assistance in serious natural or manmade
disasters, accidents, or catastrophes that occur in the United States
and its territories. To ensure that they can meet these
responsibilities, we have fenced approximately $3.9 billion for Army
Reserve procurement in fiscal years 2005-2011.
Thanks to congressional support in fiscal year 2007, we have been
able to provide units more essential equipment earlier in their
training cycle to better facilitate pre-deployment training.
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE
75. Senator Collins. General Casey, during the Army's annual budget
posture hearing last winter, then Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Peter Schoomaker, testified that 55 percent of the total Army force was
made up from the National Guard and Reserves. I was surprised and
concerned about that figure and had the opportunity to ask General
Schoomaker whether he was comfortable with that ratio, that is only 45
percent of the total force being made up of active duty soldiers and 55
percent being National Guardsman and reservists. He stated that he was
not. I next asked him that if he were designing the total force from
scratch today, or had a magic wand, what portion would be Active Duty
and what portion would be Guard and Reserve Forces. General Schoomaker
answered that he believed that the Active Forces were too small and
that he would be more comfortable if there was something more on the
order of 60 percent Active and 40 percent Reserve. I would be very
interested in your views in this regard. Do you believe that the ratio
proposed by General Schoomaker, that is 60 percent Active Duty, 40
percent National Guard and Reserve, is the correct one?
General Casey. In the current environment, 60/40 is a more
appropriate ratio. We have congressional authorization to increase the
Army's size by 74,000 soldiers over the next 5 years. The Army plans to
accelerate the growth in the Active component and the Army National
Guard (ARNG) to fiscal year 2010. This will bring the Army's end
strength to 547,400 Active component soldiers; 358,200 ARNG; and
206,000 Army Reserve. This growth will also change the ratio of Active
component/Reserve component to 49/51.
As I testified on November 15, I believe the 547,000 that we're
building in the Active component is a good milestone, but probably not
big enough. This growth will allow us to revitalize and balance our
forces, reduce deployment periods, increase dwell time, increase
capability and capacity, and strengthen the systems that support our
forces. As we get close to 547,000, we will need to have a discussion
about whether the Army needs to be bigger, and if so, a discussion
about whether we are prepared to provide the resources to make it the
quality of force that we need. Creating a large but unresourced and
``hollow'' Army is not what we need.
``DON'T ASK/DON'T TELL'' POLICY
76 and 77. Senator Collins. General Casey, this morning you
described the Army as being strained and stretched. This is a concern
that I share and that I think every member of this panel shares. During
the past few years, we have seen longer deployments and more waivers
granted to recruits with criminal records. In fact, the DOD recently
granted an extension of the age limit for recruits. The DOD continues
to have difficulty in filling specialty positions such as for
linguists, which are obviously very important in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The DOD has said that 85 linguists, of which 14 were Arabic trained,
have been discharged from our Armed Forces since the ``don't ask/don't
tell'' policy was instituted. In addition to the loss of translators,
more than 9,000 other servicemembers have been separated since ``don't
ask/don't tell'' policy was instituted by President Clinton back in
1993. Last spring I met with a retired admiral in Maine who urged me to
urge the DOD to reexamine the ``don't ask/don't tell'' policy. In your
view, should Congress reconsider this policy? Would you welcome
reconsideration of this policy?
General Casey. ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' is a political, not
military, policy (10 U.S.C. Sec. 654). As Chief of Staff of the Army, I
am focused on my title 10 responsibilities of preparing and sustaining
an Army at war. My job is to ensure your Army abides by the Nation's
laws and policies concerning homosexual conduct and military Service,
not to make them. Your Army will continue to do this with fairness to
all concerned, as we did with the policy that preceded ``Don't Ask,
Don't Tell,'' and the policy that may someday replace it.
DOD SPENDING
78. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, all of the Services are
facing tight fiscal constraints and they have to make the hard choices
between equipment and people. In some instances, we can reduce the
amount of people through the implementation of technology. This
however, has its own costs associated with it. Over the last decade,
the total percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) spent on
defense has steadily declined. This year the total amount is around 4
percent of GDP. In order to adequately meet the requirement to grow the
Army and Marine Corp personnel while at the same time ensuring we
recapitalize all our forces, including naval shipbuilding and aircraft
for the Air Force, do you believe that the Congress should increase the
top line budget dollars for the DOD?
Secretary Geren. While I am aware of the budget issues facing the
other services, I am only able to comment on the Army's budget issues.
We need increases and the funding, in fact, does increase in fiscal
year 2008 and over the Program Objective Memorandum.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
LAKOTA HELICOPTER
79. Senator Chambliss. General Casey, I have heard about some of
the problems associated with the Army's new Lakota helicopter. I
understand the purpose of these LUHs is for homeland security and
disaster relief missions within the United States or other non-combat
zones. Critics say the nature of the problems are threefold: excessive
heat in the aircraft cockpit and cabin; the aircraft does not meet
prescribed performance criteria for internal and external loads; and
the aircraft is not effective for medical evacuation of two litter
patients requiring critical medical care. Although the aircraft meets
certain performance criteria, and the Army has identified potential
work-arounds for what appears to be deficiencies in the helicopter, can
you explain the Army's plan to continue full production and acquisition
of the remaining helicopters when DOD's Office of OT&E judged the UH-
72A Lakota to be ``not operationally suitable'' and ``not operationally
effective?'' I would appreciate your response to these findings, and
your explanation of what the Army is considering in terms of moving
forward to mitigate any identified problems.
General Casey. The LUH (UH-72A) Program is successfully executing
the Army's transformation strategy. We are continuing to move forward
with full rate production to procure 322 aircraft to return UH-60
Blackhawks to the warfight and replace aging UH-1 and OH-58 aircraft.
The LUH fielding is on schedule, on budget, and meets or exceeds the
Joint Staff approved key performance parameters (KPP's). The two issues
identified in the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)
Report stating the aircraft was ``not operationally suitable'' and
``not operationally effective'' in certain environments were the
cockpit/cabin heat and the medical evacuation of two critical patients.
While the evacuation of two critical patients was never a key
performance parameter for this aircraft, the Army has pursued an
improvement to the Medevac configuration to address concerns raised in
the OTE. Both have been resolved. The Army Research Lab (ARL) recently
tested and evaluated the improved ventilation kit and concluded that
the system is operationally effective, suitable, and safe, even in hot
environments. No equipment failures have resulted from excessive
cockpit heat.
A medical evacuation kit, consisting of medical evacuation
equipment mounts, ceiling rails and additional lighting, has been
evaluated and approved. It allows for a cabin configuration that will
facilitate the accomplishment of medical attendant tasks. The LUH is
not required to transport more than one critical patient at a time.
In terms of lift performance the LUH exceeds its KPP to lift 906
lbs. out of ground effect (OGE) in any of its variants. It is important
to note that the LUH far exceeds the lift performance of the aged UH-1
and OH-58 aircraft it is replacing in all atmospheric conditions.
In summary the LUH Program is meeting all cost, schedule and
required performance targets specified in the acquisition strategy. To
date, the Army has purchased 42 LUH aircraft with 16 delivered.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
80. Senator Chambliss. General Casey, over the past several months,
there have been a number of troubling incidents in which Afghan
civilians have been killed or injured in encounters between coalition
forces and al Qaeda. It is my understanding that the rules of
engagement actually restrict the use of non-precision weapons due to
the sensitivity to civilian casualties. Field commanders in both
Afghanistan and Iraq have submitted two Operational Needs Statements
citing the urgent need for a precision fire capability organic to our
infantry BCTs to enable them to effectively engage enemy targets and
minimize the risk to noncombatants. This requirement has also been a
top priority for the Infantry School at Fort Benning for some time. The
capability in question is the Precision Guided Mortar Munitions (PGMM),
a program that the defense appropriations bill indicates merits support
and funding. It is my understanding that the Army's analysis identifies
PGMM as the best solution for meeting the operational need as well.
Given the operational need and the importance to both the Afghan
leadership and the U.S. forces of minimizing civilian casualties, what
is the Army's plan to field PGMM within the next 12 months, and will
you send Congress a reprogramming request as suggested in the National
Defense Appropriations Bill?
General Casey. The field commander's Operational Needs Statement
(ONS) identified an urgent need for a precision guided 120mm mortar
munition with a low Circular Error of Probability (CEP) with both the
Global Positioning System (GPS) and Semi-Active Laser (SAL) guidance
system capabilities. To date, the PGMM has not met the requirements in
the ONS as it demonstrated a low CEP with only a SAL guidance system,
The Army is mitigating its operational needs capability gaps in
Afghanistan with the deployment of the M777A2 Howitzer, which is
capable of firing the 155mm Excalibur round. The Army recognizes that
the M777A2 and Excalibur are not organic to an Infantry Brigade Combat
Team (IBCT), but the howitzer is regularly deployed to join an IBCT in
a reinforcing role. In Iraq, a similar capability is already available
from many static locations across the country. The IBCT commander can
also request precision munitions from long range missile or aviation
assets in either the area of operations.
The Army is considering restoring the PGMM program. If a decision
is made to restore PGMM. a reprogramming action to support fiscal year
2008 funding requirements will be required.
The Future Combat Systems (FCS) program provides precision fires
capability through its Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C), Non-Line-of-
Sight Mortar (NLOS-M), and Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS).
The NLOS-C is also capable of firing the Excalibur 155mm, GPS-guided
round with a range of 23 kilometers. The FCS Brigade Combat Team (FBCT)
is designed with the additional capabilities provided by the NLOS-M and
the NLOS-LS. The NLOS-LS platform provides 15 precision munitions with
a range of 40 kilometers that have the ability to be fired and
forgotten or guided in flight. Through the use of these three
platforms, the FBCT is able to mitigate the risk of not having PGMM in
the future force.
ACQUISITION WORKFORCE
81. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Geren, acquisition reform is never
far from the front line of the defense world. In fact, a panel led by a
former Under Secretary for Defense Acquisition recently made a number
of recommendations for Army acquisition aimed at ultimately reducing
contracting waste and fraud. One of the findings was that the
acquisition workforce is understaffed, overworked, undertrained, and
undersupported. I understand you are considering the panel's
recommendations right now. In terms of acquisition, what are your
thoughts on the panel's findings relative to the Lakota helicopter and
some of the concerns with the aircraft that have recently come to
light?
Mr. Geren. The Army is appreciative of the thorough and candid
assessment the Gansler Commission Report provides. The post-Cold War
cuts to the Army acquisition budget were a contributing factor in
today's undersized acquisition workforce. The workload in contracting
actions has increased more than 350 percent in the last 12 years, yet
the Army's contracting-oversight has almost been cut in half.
Furthermore, of those tasked to provide oversight, only 36 percent in
Iraq and Kuwait are certified.
The contracting-oversight workforce has not been adequately
expanded, trained, structured, or empowered to meet the needs of the
warfighter. Further, an emphasis on expeditionary contracting is
essential, as the needs of the operational commander are often
immediate. This is not a problem limited to the Army, but is systemic
throughout the Federal Government, which is short approximately 1,500
to 2,000 contracting officers.
The procurement of the LUH is a sterling example of a streamlined
acquisition process, utilizing a Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS)/Non-
Developmental Item (NDI) to meet Army requirements. The UH-72A Lakota
(LUH) is a military use of a widely used commercial helicopter within
the U.S. for medical evacuation, law enforcement, media use and VIP
transport. It has proven itself as a general purpose helicopter. The
use of this COTS/NDI aircraft saved hundreds of millions of dollars in
research and development costs and years of time. In just over two
years, the Lakota has gone from requirements approval to full rate
production.
The Lakota program was a ``full and open competition'' and the
selection of the UH-72A was a ``best value'' for the government. The
program fielding is on schedule, on budget, and meets or exceeds the
Joint Staff approved key performance parameters. More importantly, the
performance of the UH-72A far exceeds that of the aging UH-1 and OH-58
aircraft it is replacing and returns UH-60 Blackhawk aircraft to the
warfight, specifically for the Army National Guard.
Key findings from the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
report regarding cockpit/cabin heat issues and the medical evacuation
of critical patients have been resolved. The Army Research Lab recently
tested and evaluated the improved ventilation kit and concluded that
the system is operationally effective, suitable, and safe, even in hot
environments. Additionally, a medical evacuation kit, consisting of
medical evacuation equipment mounts, ceiling rails and additional
lighting, has been evaluated and approved.
As the LUH program moves forward I am confident the Lakota will
continue to exceed our expectations.
82. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Geren, what can Congress do to
support the Army as you work to eliminate shortcomings and make
improvements in your acquisition workforce?
Secretary Geren. The Gansler Commission Report identified numerous
concerns and issues related to the acquisition workforce. The Army is
reviewing the findings and recommendations and intends to submit
legislative proposals to eliminate the identified shortcomings and to
make improvements in our acquisition workforce. The following is a
representative list of improvements that may require congressional
support:
The Army and the Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA) do not have sufficient numbers of contracting officers
and contracting administrators to handle the significantly
increased workload that we are confronting in the high tempo
contingency operating environment.
Certain civil service provisions also may require
amendment to ensure that contracting officers who volunteer to
go into a war zone have insurance parity with the military.
Continued support for increased stature, quality, and
career development for contracting personnel, military as well
as civilian, particularly for expeditionary operations. Funding
for entry level trainees to make their service competitive with
industry, including hiring and retention bonuses, and funds to
defray the cost of relocation.
Support for the restructuring of the organization and
responsibility to facilitate contracting and contract
management.
Support for legislation, as well as regulatory and
policy changes to increase contracting effectiveness. This
support is crucial in expeditionary operations.
The Army and DCMA also will need support as they take
significant steps to improve oversight by implementing the
following steps:
Funding to increase the number of military
contingency contracting officers and our deployable
civilian workforces as COR and ACOs. CORs that need
training are typically from the technical or customer
communities.
Reexamine our utilization of CORs and ACOs to
make them more effective by ensuring their availability
for and subsequent placement where requirements are
most acute.
Implementing new regulations or policy that
improves oversight of contract services by requiring
all requiring organizations to maintain a cadre of
trained CORs who have the function in their performance
standards.
Expanding the number and types of in theater
services contracts for which ACO will be responsible.
[Whereupon, at 12:44 p.m., the committee adjourned.]