[Senate Hearing 110-311]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-311
THE ANTIDRUG PACKAGE FOR MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA: AN EVALUATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 15, 2007
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, statement....... 5
Johnson, Hon. David, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden,
Jr......................................................... 43
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Robert Menendez.. 55
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Menendez, Hon. Robert Menendez, U.S. Senator from New Jersey,
opening statement.............................................. 1
Shannon, Hon. Thomas, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC........ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Gerard, Leo W., International president, United Steelworkers,
prepared statement............................................. 35
(iii)
THE ANTIDRUG PACKAGE FOR MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA: AN EVALUATION
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Boxer, Webb, Lugar, Corker, and
Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. The hearing of the Committee on Foreign
Relations will now come to order.
It's my pleasure to welcome our witnesses today, Assistant
Secretary Shannon and Assistant Secretary Johnson. We
appreciate you coming before the committee.
We've called this hearing to review the President's
proposed Plan Mexico. I call it Plan Mexico because it sounds,
in many respects as I've seen it, like Plan Colombia. It's a
plan that raises serious questions about our Nation's
priorities within the hemisphere.
To begin with, this request has been categorized as an
emergency. When some of us have known for years the problems
and needs of our southern neighbors, while we have been ringing
the alarm bells, it seems to me that the administration has
repeatedly hit the snooze button. Now they're finally awake,
but running late, so they've come to Congress without any
consultation declaring an emergency.
With Plan Mexico, the President is requesting emergency
supplemental funding to help combat the drug and gang problem
in Mexico and Central America to the tune of $500 million for
Mexico and $50 million for Central America. That is a first
tranche.
I certainly take a backseat to no one in my ongoing efforts
over the last 15 years in the House and now on this committee
to increase resources for a variety of issues, as it relates to
Latin America, especially on the development side and, on the
protection of human rights. But this proposal is long on
military support and falls far short when it comes to support
for the people in the region.
Again, I find it particularly disturbing that the plan was
negotiated and developed without any consultation with Congress
whatsoever. That being said, the area where we seem to have
some agreement is in recognizing that the current drug-related
killings, insecurity, and fear continue to pose major problems
for Mexico and for the United States.
The current level and senseless manner of violence in
Mexico is both alarming and disturbing, especially considering
the common border we share. Unfortunately, corruption continues
to plague institutions at all levels, and on top of that,
Mexico now faces an increasing consumption and production
problem.
For the South, Central America continues to grapple with
gangs and gang violence, as well as increasing rates of drug
trafficking.
There is no question help is needed. The question however
is how we go about it in the most effective way to reach our
goals. And that is the question I hope will guide the hearing
today and how we will debate and amend this package in the
future.
On that note, while this proposal has certainly brought the
problem to the forefront, I'm not convinced it is the most
effective solution to reach our goals. There are some serious
shortcomings, which I will address today.
First, I believe this package takes a one-dimensional
approach to a multidimensional problem. In your own budget
justification, the administration cites a quote from former
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, which rings true to me and
is worthy of mention. He says, and you used this quote, ``We
will not enjoy development without security. We will not enjoy
security without development. And we will not enjoy either
without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are
advanced, none will succeed.'' That's the end of that quote,
and I couldn't agree more.
But as I look at this funding request, I see a very one-
sided approach to a very multifaceted problem. That means this
proposal fails to deal with many of the components that must be
addressed in order to successfully tackle this problem. I see
things like eight new helicopters, two new surveillance planes,
new gamma ray scanners, communications equipment, all of which
are important catalysts for security, but have little to do
with development or human rights. In fact, the State Department
itself, has stated that 40 percent of the assistance in this
supplemental request will be provided to the Mexican military.
I'm already concerned about Mexico's increased reliance on
its Armed Forces for counterdrug activities, because increased
militarization does not address long-term development and
reform needs within Mexico, not to mention the human rights
implications of militarization and of giving money to Mexican
institutions, which, according to Amnesty International, ``Have
a long history of serious human rights violations, lack of
independence, transparency, and ineffectiveness.''
Finally, it's ironic to me that the genesis for this
request was during the President's March 2007 trip to Latin
America, a trip in which he emphasized the need for more social
and development assistance to our southern neighbors.
Second, I'm surprised by the nature of this request. To
come and ask Congress for this money in an emergency
supplemental request, as akin to now fixing the levies in New
Orleans. This problem has existed for a while in both Mexico
and Central America, and I certainly hope this emergency
request is not just a way for the administration to avoid the
obligation of paying for what we should have done for years.
The emergency nature of the request raises other serious
questions. What is the expected length of this package, 2
years, 3 years? President Calderon will be in office for more--
for 5 more years. Are we expecting to end this aid before his
term is over?
Finally and most importantly, how will this package effect
overall funding to Latin America in the fiscal year 2009
budget? I, for one, cannot support a package that cuts further
into funding for a region that has the highest social inequity
in the world and that has seen proposed cuts for funding and
core development assistance every year since 2001.
The fact that this request is considered an emergency, goes
to what I believe is a core problem. We have no comprehensive
policy in Latin America, otherwise we wouldn't be here today.
We would have been doing the right thing all along and avoided
this emergency altogether.
I have several other concerns, but I'll wait until the
questioning to pursue them. I hope today will be the beginning
of an honest and forthright debate on this package. I hope the
discussion will prompt a broader debate about our foreign
assistance priorities to Latin America.
If there are no objections, I ask that a statement from the
United Steel Workers be submitted to the record, on behalf of
Senator Biden.
Without objection, so ordered.
Senator Menendez. And with that, I turn to the
distinguished ranking member of the committee, Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR.
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
thank you especially for chairing this important hearing on the
President's supplemental funding request to combat
narcotrafficking through Mexico and Central America, known as
the Merida Initiative.
Since entering office last December, Mexican President
Felipe Calderon moved to improve public security in his
country. And the Mexican Government has committed $2.5 billion
to combat drug trafficking next year, launched aggressive
antidrug operations in 10 Mexican States, replaced numerous
high-ranking Federal police officers in anticorruption
campaigns, and created a unified national crime database.
The Calderon government has strengthened law enforcement
cooperation, extraditing close to 80 criminals to the United
States this year, including cartel kingpins. It has also made
record seizures of cocaine, methamphetamine precursors, cash,
and other assets. The ongoing public security campaign has
reduced the legal impunity that the drug cartels have
traditionally enjoyed in Mexico, but it's come at a high cost.
Mexico has suffered approximately 2,650 drug-related
killings since the beginning of this year, compared to 2,120 in
2006. The Merida Initiative is an attempt to seize the
opportunity created by Mexico's invigorated anticrime campaign
by funding key programs and building stronger cooperation
between Mexico and the United States. It recognizes that 90
percent of the cocaine entering the United States transits
Mexico and that our efforts to combat this drug flow and
associated criminal activities depend on a partnership with the
Mexican Government.
To assist Mexico's efforts, the Merida Initiative provides
$500 million, including $306 million for counternarcotics,
counterterrorism, and border security; $100 million for
institution-building and the rule of law; and $56 million for
public security and law enforcement. In addition, the
administration has proposed $50 million to boost
counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and law enforcement in
Central America.
I'm concerned that this portion of the request falls short
of what is required. Though Mexico has made progress against
organized crime, the strength of criminal gangs in Central
America is growing. Gangs in Central America have emerged as
major social factors and they've been expanding their influence
in relatively ungoverned areas as they exploit for their drug
trafficking operations.
Central American leaders and public opinion, especially in
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have characterized this
situation as a regional emergency requiring an urgent response.
Central America is the primary transit point for people and
drugs destined for the United States from Colombia. Increasing
crime in Central America threatens regional stability,
debilitates national economies, and exacerbates illegal
migration to the United States.
In the past, political wrangling and resource constraints
have hampered Central America's response to the drug trade. But
recently, Central American countries have agreed to strengthen
regional security through the Central America Integration
System. Together they have produced a comprehensive regional
security strategy.
The Central American officials feel that they will not be
able to confront threats effectively without more assistance.
They fear the gang members and drug traffickers will flee
Mexico for Central America, where it will be easier to operate.
As one senior Central American Government official stated,
``In this case, Mexico's gain could be our loss.'' In this
context, I'm hopeful that additional funds will be found for
Central America, as this initiative goes forward, perhaps
during the fiscal year 2009 appropriations cycle. It's
especially important that the Merida Initiative be implemented
as a regional plan and progress be evaluated according to what
is happening in both Mexico and its neighbors to the south.
In Mexico, President Calderon is laying the groundwork for
deeper cooperation with the United States, articulating a
message that makes clear that coordination in sensitive areas
will require more compromise, more mutual trust, and respect
for each other's sovereignty.
One area that requires more cooperation is arms
trafficking. A member of my senior staff returned this month
from a visit to Mexico City, where he met with Mexican
Government officials and members of the Mexican Senate
regarding attitudes toward the Merida Initiative. He found
Mexican officials generally supportive, but they consistently
called on him to relay their concerns about the flow of guns
and explosives from the United States into Mexico.
American Embassy officials confirmed that the United States
is a major source of weapons for Mexican gangs and drug
runners. As the Merida Initiative goes forward, American
agencies must work closely with Mexican officials to address
this problem. We do not want to create a self-defeating
situation in which a critical foreign assistance program, meant
to assist a neighbor and enhance U.S. security, is being
undercut by an illegal flow of weapons originating from within
our own borders.
I look forward to the insights of our distinguished
witnesses on these and other issues related to this initiative.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Is there any other Senator who has an opening statement?
Senator Boxer. Senator Menendez, I----
Senator Menendez. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. I don't have an opening
statement. I just want to say that I have a lot of concerns
about this, on many, many levels, that I understand you,
Senator Menendez, really, I think, spoke for me in some of
those concerns.
It's--as I see this President veto bills that give our
people a lot of hope and then he vetoes these bills, education,
health research, war on cancer, because we don't have money.
And now we're looking at a huge amount of money for a military
type of project, which, I don't know, at the end of the day
does really help our relations. I have just a lot of concerns
about this.
Drug trafficking in Mexico is a horrific, horrific problem,
and no one knows more than my State. I'll tell you, I've looked
at treatment for all. It's a lot cheaper than this thing. We
haven't even approached the demand side. So, I get confused
about this, I get confused about this.
We don't have treatment for the people who want treatment.
They're--they're part of the problem because they're demanding
these drugs. We've got horrible trafficking in Mexico, which we
all want to end, and it's a one-dimensional type of approach.
We have all the money in the world for this, but no money for
our kids here at home, like a million of them waiting for after
school. I don't get it, I don't get the balance here.
So I--I'm going to listen and--but I'm a skeptic on this.
Thanks.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Isakson, do you have anything?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you, Senator Menendez, and I
won't make a long statement, but I have a keen interest in this
issue. Some months back I called on an emergency supplemental
for border security between the United States and Mexico in
total, because of the immigration issue that this country
faces. I notice in this proposal, there's some $300 million, as
I understand it, for border security, which in part, may help
us with some of the immigration problem that we have.
Second, it is my understanding that since we passed the
legislation in the Senate last year, restricting access to many
of the components to methamphetamine, that the demand is now
being met by those components coming over from Mexico into the
United States of America. And I know in the South, there is no
greater scourge than the scourge of methamphetamine. So I am
anxious to hear the testimony. I think it does rise to the
level of an emergency supplemental, if in fact it is
comprehensive and targeted in those two areas.
So, I appreciate the two of you being here today testifying
and look forward to hearing your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
With that, Secretary Shannon, we'll start with you. We'll
have both of your full statements be entered into the record.
We'd ask you to summarize in about 5 minutes or so, so that we
can maximize our time for an exchange. And we recognize you and
welcome you to the committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS SHANNON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU
OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Shannon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Lugar, other members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the Merida Initiative and the new
paradigm that it represents for regional security cooperation
among the United States, Mexico, and the countries of Central
America.
As noted, the President has asked for $550 million for the
Merida Initiative in the supplemental budget request; $500
million of that funding would go to Mexico as the first tranche
of what we hope will be a $1.4 billion multiyear security
cooperation package; and $50 million would target Central
America, with the hope that as we deepen our discussion with
Central America on the basis of their security strategy, that
we would be able to look to additional funding in the future.
This is an important moment in the fight against
transnational drug trafficking and organized crime and one that
requires urgent action on the part of all nations involved.
President Bush recognized that the United States has an
unprecedented opportunity to reduce the economic and human toll
in our cities and towns emanating from cross-border organized
crime. The governments and citizens of Mexico and Central
America have recognized the threat to their own stability and
prosperity. They are taking courageous steps to confront these
criminal elements, and are now seeking U.S. support to ensure a
comprehensive and integrated regional effort.
Over the past decade, drug trafficking and other criminal
organizations have grown in size and strength, aggressively
seeking to undermine and intimidate government institutions in
Mexico and Central America, compromising municipal and state
law enforcement entities, and substantially weakening these
governments' ability to maintain public security and expand the
rule of law. This proliferation has generated a surge in crime
and violence throughout the region, including in the United
States.
None of what I have described above will come as a surprise
to our partners in the region. These leaders have used some of
the same language to describe and acknowledge the challenges
they are facing and they are acting on it. The leaders of these
nations are already working to beat back violence and crime for
their citizens and they have turned to us to join them as
partners.
In Mexico, President Calderon has acted decisively, using
the most effective tools at his disposal. He is reorganizing
the Federal police, putting new and additional resources in the
hands of his security services, deploying military units to
support police operations, rooting out corrupt officials,
attacking impunity, arresting major crime figures, and
extraditing a record number of drug kingpins and other
criminals to the United States.
However, President Calderon has recognized that leadership
and political will are not enough, he needs greater
institutional and material resources to ensure both near-term
success and long-term institutional change. In an unprecedented
step, he has asked the United States to launch a new
partnership with Mexico and to help him strengthen Mexican law
enforcement, public safety, and border security to defeat the
drug and criminal organizations.
At the same time, the nations of Central America have
committed to collective action to address these common security
concerns. Through the Central American Integration System,
SICA, the governments have expressed the political resolve to
join forces to strengthen regional security, however they lack
sufficient tools and capacity to execute that will.
The impetus for the Merida Initiative, as noted, came out
of the President's March trip to the region, particularly his
visits to Guatemala and Mexico, where security concerns
dominated the conversations with President Berger and President
Calderon. In the course of these discussions and the followup
consultations with both Mexico and Central America, we have
been able to develop the framework of a new regional security
partnership.
Throughout this process, we have tried to shape the Merida
Initiative to be comprehensive, balanced, and timely. The
initiative is comprehensive in that it deals with security in
all its components and builds on a variety of initiatives that
are taking place now in the United States, Mexico, and Central
America.
The initiative is balanced because it involves a range of
security institutions in Mexico and Central America, with a
particular focus on building capacity and capability in
civilian sectors.
Finally, the Merida Initiative is timely because it
responds to a real-time threat, as organized crime attempts to
overwhelm the stability and well-being of democratic States in
Mexico and in Central America.
Just as our partners in the region acknowledge the extent
of the threat, President Bush has accepted that the United
States shares responsibility and is prepared to step up to do
our part. This request reflects how the United States would
like to work with the Governments of Mexico and Central America
through the use of foreign assistance funds.
As President Bush has stated, ``Regional problems require
regional solutions.'' The Merida Initiative is where each
nation's domestic efforts are combined with regional
cooperation and collaboration to multiply the effects of our
actions. It clearly shows we realize that drug trafficking and
criminal organizations do not respect political boundaries and
that we must synchronize our tactics and confront the problem
together.
The President's vision for this hemisphere is rooted in
partnership, the type of partnership that the Merida Initiative
represents. He has stressed that all in the region, including
the United States, have a shared responsibility for combating
this crime and violence that so gravely affect our citizens. We
have far-reaching geographic, economic, and demographic links
to Mexico and Central America and a compelling national
security interest in helping the governments of this region
succeed in the battle against crime and insecurity. We believe
the Merida Initiative represents the best hope for tackling the
problem in a thorough manner with our willing partners.
Mr. Chairman, we welcome your offer to have an honest and
thorough debate and discussion on the initiative. We
acknowledge that there has been concern expressed regarding the
lack of prior consultations before the public announcement of
the supplemental request. We regret we were unable to engage in
such consultations. Our intention was to present to the
Congress a credible security cooperation package that reflected
the best work of our interagency community and discussions with
our Mexican and Central American counterparts.
This process took longer than expected. As we proceed, Mr.
Chairman, we commit to work closely with you and your committee
and other relevant committees and staff, to ensure that
together we can craft a security cooperation package that will
meet national security interests and take full advantage of the
historic opportunity that lies before us.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shannon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas A. Shannon, Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Merida Initiative and the
new paradigm that it represents for regional security cooperation among
the United States, Mexico, and the countries of Central America.
The President has asked for $550 million for the Merida Initiative
in the supplemental budget request; $500 million of that funding would
go to Mexico as the first tranche of what we hope will be a $1.4
billion multiyear security cooperation package, and $50 million would
target Central America.
This is an important moment in the fight against transnational drug
trafficking and organized crime; and one that requires urgent action on
the part of all nations involved. President Bush recognized that the
United States has an unprecedented opportunity to reduce the economic
and human toll in our cities and towns emanating from cross-border
organized crime. The governments and citizens of Mexico and Central
America have recognized the threat to their own stability and
prosperity. They are taking courageous steps to confront these criminal
elements, and are now seeking U.S. support to ensure a comprehensive
and integrated regional effort.
Over the past decade, drug trafficking and other criminal
organizations have grown in size and strength, aggressively seeking to
undermine and intimidate government institutions in Mexico and Central
America, compromising municipal and state law enforcement entities, and
substantially weakening these governments' ability to maintain public
security and expand the rule of law. This proliferation has generated a
surge in crime and violence throughout the region, including in the
United States.
We have seen the emergence of gangs as major social actors, the
corruption of the police, judiciary, and prison systems, and a growing
popular demand for governments to respond to the threat posed by these
criminal organizations. The effects of this growing problem are also
readily apparent in the United States in the form of gang violence,
crime, and higher rates of trafficking in persons and illegal drugs--
all of which threaten our own national security and impose mounting
economic costs.
None of what I have described above will come as a surprise to our
partners in the region--these leaders have used some of the same
language to describe and acknowledge the challenges they are facing.
And they are acting on it. The leaders of these nations are already
working to beat back violence and crime for their citizens and they
have turned to us to join them--as partners.
In Mexico, President Calderon has acted decisively, using the most
effective tools at his disposal. He is reorganizing the Federal police,
putting new and additional resources in the hands of his security
services, deploying military units to support police operations,
rooting out corrupt officials, attacking impunity, arresting major
crime figures, and extraditing a record number of drug kingpins and
other criminals to the United States. The determination and commitment
shown by the Calderon administration is historic; and the early results
impressive. In the course of 1 month, two seizures alone have netted
over 30 tons of cocaine destined for Mexico and/or the United States,
shattering all previous records for drug seizures in Mexico. In fact,
our understanding is that Mexico has confiscated more cocaine in the
first year of the Calderon administration than any other since they
began keeping records.
However, President Calderon has recognized that leadership and
political will are not enough; he needs greater institutional and
material resources to ensure both near-term success and long-term
institutional change. In an unprecedented step, he has asked the United
States to launch a new partnership with Mexico and to help him
strengthen Mexican law enforcement, public safety, and border security
to defeat the drug and criminal organizations. This is not a
``traditional'' foreign assistance request. It is, as our joint
declaration called it, ``a new paradigm for security cooperation.''
At the same time, the nations of Central America have committed to
collective action to address these common security concerns. Through
the Central American Integration System (SICA), the governments have
expressed the political resolve to join forces to strengthen regional
security; however they lack sufficient tools and capacity to execute
such will. Despite these challenges, national authorities remain
committed to the fight; using their own limited resources and equipment
to interdict narcotics, arrest drug cartel members, and extradite high-
profile drug traffickers to the United States for prosecution. The
countries of Central America are also committed to working among
themselves as well as with the United States. In March, the Government
of Panama, working with DEA and Coast Guard, seized a record 17 metric
tons of cocaine. And just last week, in a combined operation involving
U.S. law enforcement and the National Police of both Nicaragua and
Costa Rica, 250 kilograms of cocaine were confiscated in Nicaragua.
These examples demonstrate that in Central America, as in Mexico, there
are courageous partners with whom we can work cooperatively.
The impetus for the Merida Initiative came out of the President's
March trip to the region; particularly his visits to Guatemala and
Mexico, where security concerns dominated the conversations with
President Berger and President Calderon. In the course of these
discussions and the follow-on consultations with both Mexico and
Central America, we have been able to develop the framework of a new
regional security partnership.
Throughout this process, we have tried to shape the Merida
Initiative to be comprehensive, balanced, and timely. The initiative is
comprehensive in that it deals with security in all its components and
builds on a variety of initiatives that are taking place now in the
United States, Mexico, and Central America. Combined with the push we
have made against drug trafficking and the flow of other illicit goods
elsewhere in the region, the Merida Initiative represents an effort to
integrate security programs from the Andes, through the isthmus of
Central America and into Mexico, up to the Southwest border of the
United States. This is a hemispheric assault to cripple drug
trafficking and criminal organizations, disrupt and dismantle their
networks, and help fortify state institutions to ensure these groups
can no longer operate effectively.
The initiative is balanced because it involves a range of security
institutions in Mexico and Central America, with a particular focus on
building capacity and capability in civilian sectors. The entire
Central America portion of the supplemental request and nearly 60
percent of the Mexico portion is going to civilian agencies in those
countries. Our goal in balancing the package is to assist Mexico and
Central America in their immediate fight against organized crime, to
improve connectivity and communications among the various law
enforcement agencies, and to support the institutional reform necessary
to fortify the state institutions of justice and rule of law that are
essential for the long-term protection of civil and human rights.
Finally, the Merida Initiative is timely because it responds to a
real-time threat, as organized crime attempts to overwhelm the
stability and well-being of democratic States in Mexico and in Central
America. Our allies in this region have already begun to act and have
called on us to assist them as quickly as possible. The urgency of
their appeal is palpable, and we should not miss the opportunity to
capitalize on the successes we have witnessed so far, as well as to
forge a stronger alliance with willing partners.
Just as our partners in the region acknowledge the extent of the
threat, President Bush has accepted that the U.S. shares responsibility
and is prepared to step up to do our part. This request reflects how
the United States would like to work with the Governments of Mexico and
Central America through the use of foreign assistance funds. And I have
already spoken to the increased efforts by which these governments have
begun the fight themselves. What is not captured in this supplemental
request is what the United States is doing domestically to contribute
to this partnership.
While I defer to U.S. domestic law enforcement agencies to provide
you details, I can tell you that the Merida Initiative was designed to
complement what the United States has been doing on our side of the
border to address issues such as arms and bulk cash trafficking, gangs,
and demand for drugs. Through a number of domestic strategies and
programs--such as the Southwest Border Counter-
Narcotics Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the U.S
Strategy for Combating Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico--
we are working domestically to enhance our efforts against the
trafficking of drugs, arms, money, and humans, as well as to reduce the
demand for drugs within the United States.
However, each nation working on its own is not enough. As President
Bush has stated, regional problems require regional solutions. The
Merida Initiative is where each nation's domestic efforts are combined
with regional cooperation and collaboration to multiply the effects of
our actions. It clearly shows we realize that drug trafficking and
criminal organizations do not respect political boundaries and that we
must synchronize our tactics and confront the problem together.
This new paradigm is not without its challenges, but we believe
they are challenges that can be overcome. Oversight and accountability
are essential in this process and we have structured the package in
such as way as to assure this. We also plan to build on the efforts of
the Governments of Mexico and Central America in protecting human
rights and rooting out corruption; all participants agree that these
are indispensable components of any security cooperation partnership.
Having visited Mexico with Deputy Secretary Negroponte 2 weeks ago,
and having led the U.S. delegation to the first U.S.-SICA Dialogue on
Security in Guatemala in July, I can tell you that I am struck by the
immediacy of the threat. Equally, I have been impressed by the
commitment of the governments involved to work together to finally put
an end to the growing violence and crime.
The President's vision for this hemisphere is rooted in
partnership; the type of partnership that the Merida Initiative
represents. He has stressed that all in the region, including the
United States, have a shared responsibility for combating this crime
and violence that so gravely affect our citizens. We have far-reaching
geographic, economic, and demographic links to Mexico and Central
America and a compelling national security interest in helping the
governments of this region succeed in the battle against crime and
insecurity. We believe the Merida Initiative represents the best hope
for tackling the problem in a thorough manner with our willing
partners.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Secretary Johnson.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID JOHNSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman----
Senator Menendez. Would you put your microphone on?
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator
Lugar, Senator Boxer, Senator Isakson, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the Merida Initiative to confront
narcotics trafficking in Mexico and Central America.
I've submitted a written statement for the record, which I
will summarize briefly. As Assistant Secretary Shannon noted,
Mexico and Central America have already made considerable
progress against criminal networks, and have shown an
unprecedented willingness to work together to address these
threats. We're beginning to see some positive signs that these
efforts, together with successful counterdrug programs in the
Andean source zone, may be having a measurable impact on the
availability of drugs here in the United States. Clearly, this
is a compelling moment of opportunity further to advance our
common national security interests.
Through bilateral and multilateral initiatives, the
Governments of Mexico and Central America are demonstrating
unprecedented will to work with us and each other to address
these issues. This is a compelling opportunity to advance our
common national security interests.
U.S. support through the Merida Initiative will focus on
three broad areas. First, counternarcotics, counterterrorism,
and border security. Second, public security and law
enforcement. And third, institution-building and rule of law.
The primary goal is to diminish the power and impunity of
criminal organizations by strengthening border controls,
enhancing law enforcement capacity, and improving justice and
correction systems. Of the $550 million included in the
supplemental request, $500 million would support reinvigorated
cooperation with Mexico.
As Senator Lugar noted, approximately 90 percent of the
cocaine bound for the United States transits Mexico and Mexico
is the principal foreign source for methamphetamine and
marijuana consumed in the United States.
Drug-related violence has spread to all parts of Mexico and
into the United States. Through this initiative, U.S.
assistance will seek to build upon existing programs in the
areas of border security, interdiction, and criminal justice
reform.
For example, supplemental funding would provide specialized
inspection equipment and canine teams, communications
technology, and aircraft to support interdiction activities.
Our assistance would also provide technical assistance in areas
such as vetting of Mexico's newly established Federal police
force, case management software, and the establishment of
witness protection programs.
We also plan to enhance information-sharing, related to
terrorist travel, through the advanced passenger information
system. The proposal also seeks to address money laundering and
drug demand in the region. In Central America, programs will be
tailored to the needs of individual countries in areas such as
criminal gang activity and small arms trafficking.
The Merida Initiative represents a rare, perhaps even a
unique opportunity to address security concerns in our
hemisphere. But we also recognize that it requires a
significant investment on the part of the American taxpayer.
Proper financial management of a program of this size and scope
is a significant challenge. Should Congress approve funding for
this worthwhile initiative, my top priority will be to ensure
that effective financial controls are in place, and that we
have the staffing necessary for effective oversight.
Like our other counterdrug and law enforcement programs,
funding would be obligated through bilateral letters of
agreement and include safeguards, such as end-use monitoring
for equipment and screening of trainees.
Mr. Chairman, in response to the concerns that you and
others have expressed, concerning the lack of prior
consultations, I regret that we did not provide you with more
detailed information earlier. We have now sought to provide
Congress with this credible and as defensible proposal as
possible, and the process of validating requirements took
longer than we wished. We look forward to continued dialog with
you to shape this proposal into a plan that is in the best
interest of the United States, Mexico, and Central America.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today.
I look forward to working with you on these important issues, I
look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, other members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to discuss the Merida Initiative to confront
transnational narcotics trafficking and organized crime in Mexico and
Central America.
As Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon explained, our partners in
Mexico and Central America have already made considerable progress in
their own efforts to fight these transnational organized criminal
networks, and they would like our help to do more. Through bilateral
and multilateral initiatives, the Governments of Mexico and Central
America are demonstrating unprecedented will to work with us and each
other to address these issues. This is a compelling opportunity to
advance our common national security interests.
Roughly 90 percent of all the cocaine consumed in the United States
transits Mexico. The country is also the largest foreign supplier of
marijuana and the largest foreign source of methamphetamine consumed in
the United States. Central American officials have identified gangs,
drug trafficking, and trafficking of arms as the most pressing security
concerns in that region. The Merida Initiative will respond to those
security threats and build on existing strategies and programs. We are
confronting vulnerabilities posed from the increasingly violent nature
of the security situation in Mexico and Central America that if left
unchecked, could open the way for more dangerous threats to emerge.
Through the Merida Initiative, the United States seeks to
strengthen our partners' capacities in three broad areas: (1) Counter-
Narcotics, Counterterrorism, and Border Security; (2) Public Security
and Law Enforcement; and (3) Institution Building and Rule of Law.
Through this cooperative effort, we intend to achieve the following
strategic goals: Break the power and impunity of criminal
organizations; strengthen border, air, and maritime controls from the
Southwest border of the United States to Panama; improve the capacity
of justice systems in the region to conduct investigations and
prosecutions, consolidate the rule of law, protect human rights, and
reform prison management; curtail criminal gang activity; and reduce
the demand for drugs throughout the region.
This cooperation is designed to build on activities already
underway in the region. For example, Mexico is undertaking historic
efforts to improve coordination among security agencies, modernize law
enforcement agencies and professionalize their staff. Since his
inauguration in December 2006, President Calderon has taken decisive
action against transnational criminal organizations by deploying 24,000
troops to support joint police-military counternarcotics operations in
10 Mexican States, increasing extraditions, and initiating large scale
police reform.
The results of these efforts are striking. The Calderon
administration has extradited a record 79 fugitives to the United
States this year, including prominent members of the gulf drug
trafficking organization. Mexican law enforcement authorities have
seized over $200 million in cash from a methamphetamine trafficking
organization, and have seized record amounts of narcotics. Seizures of
cocaine, marijuana, opium gum, heroin, and methamphetamine are on pace
to exceed last year's totals. As noted by Assistant Secretary Shannon,
cocaine seizures in recent weeks have shattered all previous records in
Mexico. We are also beginning to see encouraging signs that these
achievements, together with successful programs in the Andean source
zone, may be having a measurable impact on the availability of cocaine
here in the United States.
Mexico has also made great strides in its efforts to root out
official corruption. Since coming into power, the Calderon
administration has conducted thousands of inquiries and investigations
into possible malfeasance or misconduct. These investigations resulted
in the dismissal of over 1,600 employees, the suspension of nearly
2,000, as well as thousands of reprimands. The imposition of economic
sanctions against corrupt Federal employees brought the equivalent of
over $300 million in fines and reimbursements into the Mexican
treasury.
Existing U.S. programs complement and support the historic
counternarcotics efforts of the Calderon administration. For example,
we are conducting programs supporting professionalization and justice
system restructuring. These efforts include training and other support
to police reform, and development of Federal police institutions and
infrastructure. These programs support the vetting of Mexican law
enforcement agents and assist State and Federal police and prosecutors.
We provided training for 4,627 Government of Mexico officials in 2007,
and have plans to train about 5,800 in 2008. Our Good Governance
programs support rule of law education programs and promote
anticorruption initiatives within the Mexican Federal bureaucracy.
Looking into the future, the Merida Initiative, if approved, will
include various efforts to improve crime prevention, modernize the
Mexican police force, and provide institution-building and the rule of
law. Case management software, technical assistance programs, and
equipment will support Mexico's judicial and police reforms by
enhancing their ability to investigate, convict, sentence, and securely
detain those who commit crimes. Technical assistance and training
programs will support Mexico's development of offices of professional
responsibility, inspectors general, and new institutions designed to
receive and act on citizen complaints. Increased training for
prosecutors, defenders, and court managers in Central America, will
assist with judicial reform. The initiative will expand needed
technical assistance on prison management and aid in severing the
connection between incarcerated criminals and their criminal
organizations.
One of our existing programs supports antimoney laundering efforts
by the Government of Mexico, by assisting the Government's Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU) and by supporting police and prosecutors who
investigate money laundering-related crimes. As part of the Merida
Initiative, we plan to support the FIU through the expansion of
software for data management and data analysis associated with
financial intelligence functions and law enforcement.
Nearly half of our current programs focus on interdiction,
including support for the Mexican counterparts of our Federal law
enforcement agencies. To further advance this cooperation, funding
under the Merida Initiative focuses support for a Consolidated Crime
Information System; purchasing special investigative equipment,
vehicles and computers for the new Federal Police Corps; creating
special police units to focus on high-profile criminal targets and
deploy at major airports and seaports; assessing security and
installing equipment at Mexico's largest seaports; and procuring
additional clandestine laboratory vehicles and safety gear to assist
the Government of Mexico in combating methamphetamine. This program
includes specialized equipment and training to safely and effectively
dismantle methamphetamine super labs.
Our existing programs focus on border security by principally
providing inspection equipment and associated tactical training to
support inspection capabilities of police, customs, and immigration.
Funds also provide equipment and specially trained canine teams to
pursue arms trafficking and explosives. Through linkages with the USG's
Advanced Passenger Information System, we also facilitate the real-time
interchange of information related to potential counterterrorism
targets.
The Merida Initiative includes several programs to support
interdiction and border security efforts such as information technology
support that will assist Mexico's Federal migration authorities improve
their database and document verification capabilities. Additional
communications equipment will improve their ability to conduct rescue
and patrol operations along Mexico's southern border. Equipment for a
secure communications network, data management, and forensic analysis
will strengthen coordination among Mexican law enforcement agencies and
greatly enhance Mexico's ability to prosecute narcotrafficking and
other transborder crimes. Technologies such as gamma-ray scanners,
density measurement devices, and commodity testing kits will help
prevent the cross-border movement of illicit drugs, firearms, financial
assets, and trafficked persons. Expansion of weapons tracing programs
will enable increased joint and individual country investigations and
prosecutions of illegal arms trafficking. Enhanced information systems
in Mexico will strengthen analytical capabilities and interconnectivity
across law enforcement agencies and improve information-sharing with
U.S. counterparts. Additional transport and light aircraft in Mexico
will give security agencies the capability to rapidly reinforce law
enforcement operations nationwide.
In Central America, maritime assistance and both fixed and mobile
nonintrusive inspection assistance, will allow regional migration
officials to better defend national sovereignty from land and sea
incursions by illegal traffickers. In addition, technical assistance,
training, and nonlethal equipment will improve policing and promote
preventative and community policing. Specialized antigang units in El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala will also improve investigation and
prosecution of dangerous gang members in the United States, Central
America, and Mexico. Moreover, the Merida Initiative will provide
funding to implement all five elements of the U.S. Strategy to Combat
Criminal Gangs, including improved processes for repatriation and
strong community action programs to prevent youth from joining gangs.
We will also begin a focused program to address illicit trafficking of
small arms and light weapons throughout the region by providing a
regional adviser, training and stockpile management and destruction
assistance.
Finally, an existing U.S. program supports demand-reduction efforts
by Mexican governmental and nongovernmental entities that pursue drug
remediation, rehabilitation, and public awareness activities. The
Merida Initiative will build significantly on these small programs by
providing technological support to the Mexican National Network for
Technological Transfers in Addictions, which will improve its ability
to deliver drug treatment and prevention services across Mexico.
The Merida Initiative will be implemented through bilateral Letters
of Agreement with the host governments that will include provision for
end-use monitoring. We will work with the interagency to identify
implementers for the various programs under the Merida Initiative,
building on the results of interagency validation teams that verified
the proposals in consultation with Mexican and Central American
government agencies, and by expanding ongoing interagency cooperative
relationships at the various embassies and consulates in the region.
Senator Menendez. Thank you both.
We'll start the questioning with 7-minute rounds and since
this is the only panel that we have on the issue, we'll
probably go through a second round again. And the Chair will
recognize himself to start off with.
Mr. Secretary, you've cited a series of things. I want to
ask you, very briefly tell me, a, b, c, this is what we're
going to accomplish with this initiative. What is your
strategic objective, a, b, c? If there's an a, b, and c, there
might be only a, but whatever.
Mr. Johnson. The strategic objectives are several-fold.
First, in Mexico and Central America: Work with our partners to
fight organized crime and drug cartels. This means ending the
ability of organized crime to threaten the democratic States of
Mexico and Central America. This is why we believe it's an
emergency today. We believe these organized crime institutions
are indeed threatening the democratic States of Mexico and
Central America.
Second, in the process of breaking down organized crime
groups and cartels, reduce the flow of narcotics to the United
States, and look for ways to ensure that as we reduce that flow
of narcotics, it does not move elsewhere in the region. This is
why we have Central America as part of this package. In order
to address a regional approach, and it's why we are beginning a
deeper conversation on security with our Caribbean partners.
Third, build new and enduring relationships with law
enforcement institutions in the region, especially in Mexico
and Central America. We have been approached by the Mexicans
and by the Governments of Central America in an unprecedented
fashion. We believe this is an opportunity to break down
longstanding taboos in our national relationships and build new
levels of cooperation that will not only enhance security
cooperation, but will enhance broader political and diplomatic
cooperation throughout the region.
Senator Menendez. Well, if part of what we are trying to do
is stop the flow of narcotics into the United States and to
deal with the drug cartels, why do we not deal with the fact
that, in this initiative, with the report, Secretary Johnson,
that was issued by your Bureau in March of this year, that
Mexico supplies a large share of the heroin distributed in the
United States. It is the largest foreign supplier of marijuana
to the United States market, and a major supplier and producer
of methamphetamine. And the World Drug Report of 2007, from the
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, estimates that Mexico is one of
the top two marijuana producers of the world.
And there's other information about how Mexico is now
facing a consumption issue, as well. So we have a huge
production part, forgetting about the transiting of drugs
through Mexico from other places. We have a huge production of
some of these issues within Mexico itself. Nothing, nothing, in
this initiative is going to deal with that. Is that correct?
Mr. Johnson. I'd say, on the contrary. Unlike----
Senator Menendez. What exactly are you going to do as it
relates to production?
Mr. Johnson. The effort here is focused not on eradication,
as you recognize, but is focused on interdiction. And it is
focused on confronting the organized criminal networks, which
are multifaceted in nature, in the sense that their products
are across the board.
So, by confronting these--these criminal networks, I think
we do make the best investment of the taxpayers money to deal
with all of these questions of illicit product, illicit
narcotics that are destined for the United States, as well as
transiting Mexico.
Senator Menendez. But I listened to both your testimonies
and looked at your backup offerings that you've given the
committee and members. You talk a lot about the violence, which
of course is a real concern. Certainly if we arm the military,
giving 40 percent of this initiative to the military, there
will be a reduction of violence, but we will not get to the
core issues of production and we will not get to the core
issues of consumption. These cartels are very strategic, so we
move the problem out of Mexico and we move it, maybe, to the
Caribbean.
I mean, I don't understand how we can take a one-faceted
approach to a multifaceted problem.
Mr. Johnson. I don't think this is a single-faceted
approach. A significant portion of the monetary investment,
because of the expensive aircraft, is dedicated to acquisition
of both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. So in terms of the
proportion, that is a significant part, but those are expensive
things to do. But there is, within this proposal, demand
reduction, programs for the rule of law, programs to support
the vetting of the entire Mexican national police force of
approximately 35,000 individuals.
So, I think there is--there is a comprehensive approach
here, one that seeks to get at the threat to the Mexican State
that comes from organized crime and the----
Senator Menendez. Can you point out, to the demand
reduction part of this package?
Mr. Johnson. I believe it is about $7 million.
Senator Menendez. And what is the intention of the demand
reduction?
Mr. Johnson. The intent would be to assist the Mexican
Government in its own ongoing programs, providing it with
expertise that we've generated here in the United States, in
order for them to help deal with the same type of challenge
that we face.
Senator Menendez. So they will have a better demand
reduction than we've had here in the United States?
Mr. Johnson. Well, I think that we would like to provide
them with some of the expertise that we've developed.
Senator Menendez. I hope we get better expertise than that.
Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, How much money, and are you
going to cut any aid to the rest of Latin America as a result
of it?
Mr. Shannon. Right now we're envisioning a 3-year program
for Mexico of $1.4 billion. We have a $50 million request for
Central America. We will have further discussions with Central
America to determine what else we will be able to fund in
Central America, as we take a deeper look at the security
strategy that their heads of state are about to approve.
This is a supplemental request now. It will not affect
fiscal year 2008 levels. We are in discussion on fiscal year
2009. We understand and share your concern about our larger
effort to promote investment broadly in our interests in Latin
America, and it is not our intention to have this program
reduce our social spending in Latin America.
Senator Menendez. It is not your intention. That's a
diplomatic word----
Mr. Shannon. Well, it's----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Phrasing, not your
intention. The question is, Can the administration say to this
committee, that the resources it seeks for this initiative,
will not come out of already-cut development assistance to this
hemisphere?
Mr. Shannon. We're in the process of preparing the 2009
budget to present to the Congress.
Senator Menendez. So you cannot tell us that at this point?
Mr. Shannon. So, until that budget is complete, I cannot
give you final figures, but I----
Senator Menendez. Do you intend to continue to ask for the
other parts of this as emergency supplementals as well, or do
you intend to work that within the budget for the next 2 years
that you project?
Mr. Shannon. Our intention is to work within the budget.
Senator Menendez. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Certainly, if the figure often utilized now, that 90
percent of the cocaine trade that enters the United States
comes through Mexico, one point of oversight that we might be
able to exercise in the committee, with your help, is to try to
devise what metrics that are available for measuring progress
of the Merida Initiative. In other words, can we suggest that
during the coming year, we would note a decrease of the amount
of cocaine coming from Mexico or for that matter, if 90 percent
is coming through Mexico now from anywhere else? And if so,
obviously this is of consequence to the American people.
The cost of cocaine usage and trade in our country is very,
very considerable. And therefore, a $500 million investment on
this basis alone might be shown to have good returns. But how
would be able to gauge that? Have you thought about the metrics
of measuring our progress here?
Mr. Johnson. I think the two easiest to count, but perhaps
the, somewhat misleading ones, would be to count increases in
successful extradition requests and in seizures. But I think
that only gets to the part that is most easily divided into
numbers. What we're aiming for here, is a reduction that is
difficult to quantify, and the threat to the Mexican State that
comes from organized crime. And ultimately, it will be in the
form of significantly reduced violence among those individuals,
or among those groups that affects our own border.
But, I think it's going to be difficult to quantify that in
the same way that you would count the other issues.
Senator Lugar. I'm sure it would be, but at the same time,
this is being billed as an eradication of a drug issue, and I
don't deny the consequences of having greater stability in
Mexico, and the initiative the Mexicans have taken, to want to
work with us more cooperatively. But I--it just appears to me
and may, if you haven't worked this out thus far with the
Mexicans or ourselves, perhaps this is an invitation to do so.
I think this is a way of making an impact in terms of
public opinion, which is significant. As you say, you might
make a judgment as to whether the Government in Mexico is more
stable or not, but the current government really wants to take
constructive action, is why the President of the country has
approached you. So, please take a look at that if you will.
Let me just ask about the Central Americans. At least we've
had some conversation with Central American officials who feel
that this might be effective as a matter of fact, so effective
that the traffic would move in their direction. Now, some would
say it's already coming through many of their countries, but
what they're talking about literally, is that the organized
criminals or those doing vast amounts of cocaine traffic, would
find some new nexus for their activities. And therefore, they
would say, take hold of this.
Now, you're spending $500 million on Mexico, albeit in a
broad gamut of activities you've mentioned, and $50 million for
us. But if, in fact, your $500 million is effective, we may be
overrun by your success there. Have you had conversations with
Central Americans along those lines, and what has been their
testimony to you?
Mr. Shannon. Yes; we have. In fact, we're involved in quite
extensive discussions with Central America. Effectively the
Mexico program and the Central American programs are running
along parallel tracks, but they're operating at different
speeds. One, because with Mexico we're dealing with a single
country, in Central America we're dealing with many.
And what we've been doing with the Central Americans is
working through the Central American Integration System, SICA,
in order to construct a broader regional security dialog. This
has taken place. It's the first time in recent Central American
history that the Central American civilian security agencies
have met at ministerial level, have identified security
priorities, met with the United States in a security dialog--
which took place in July, and I led our delegation to that
dialog--established broad priorities for security strategy for
fighting organized crime and drug trafficking, fighting weapons
trafficking, and fighting gangs--and then began to work with
their security ministry to develop a larger Central American
security strategy.
They have done that, it has been approved at a ministerial
level, it will be approved by the Central American Presidents
on December 12. Following that approval, we will then begin the
technical discussions with Central Americans, similar to what
we had with the Mexicans. And, we see the initial $50 million
in this supplemental request as an important component in
building off this regional cooperation, linking law enforcement
and intelligence agencies to better understand the flow of
organized crime in the region, and building some communications
and interoperability among the Central American countries.
It's our hope that as we deepen these discussions, we will
understand better where else we can provide assistance.
Senator Lugar. So in years 2 and 3, based on this December
conference and others, you might have a different type of
request for moneys or for assistance for those Central American
countries?
Mr. Shannon. This is our hope. We believe this will be
necessary, sir.
Senator Lugar. Now, can you make a comment--in my opening
statement, I touched upon a common lament of Mexican officials,
as that is, they say drugs may be flowing through our country
from Central America or from wherever, but on the other hand,
arms are flowing from you folks in the United States into
Mexico. The very instability that you decry, may be caused by
whatever you are unable to control. What are we doing with
regard to that? It may or may not be a part of this program,
but I think you've intimated it is, because you're talking
about security of the Mexican State?
Mr. Johnson. Senator, if I could respond to that. It is
outside the scope of this request, because it's, in fact, a
domestic expenditure, but we're under discussions with Treasury
and with Justice's Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau, about
the moneys that might be necessary to improve their registry
program to take better account of Hispanic name conventions, so
that we can more easily exchange data with the Mexican
authorities and seek to curb the flow of arms from the United
States into Mexico.
Senator Lugar. Perhaps we can have some metrics on that in
due course, too. It would be reassuring, at least, to Mexicans
who want more cooperation with us.
Mr. Shannon. Senator, if I may. As Assistant Secretary
Johnson noted, we are very focused on working with the Mexicans
on the issue of weapons trafficking. Part of our national
Southwestern border strategy focuses on weapons trafficking
into Mexico.
And as noted, we hope to be able to share information with
the Mexicans that will allow us to identify where these weapons
are coming from in the United States, as the Mexicans interdict
them. And since improving interdiction is part of the broader
initiative, we believe that as the Mexicans improve their
interdiction capabilities along the northern border, they will
be capturing more weapons shipments. We will be able to use
serial numbers to identify where those weapons come from, and
this will allow us to do the necessary prosecutions here.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
It's interesting that while we're going to spend maybe $1.5
billion, with part of it being gun trafficking from the United
States to Mexico, we have prohibitions against gun tracing.
Ironic, isn't it.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Lots of irony.
As we bleed red ink here in this country, I want to ask you
again, how much is this emergency request?
Mr. Shannon. The entire request is $550 million.
Senator Boxer. And how are you paying for it?
Mr. Shannon. Through the supplemental request.
Senator Boxer. Well, how is that paid for? Just tell the
truth to the American people; what does that mean?
Mr. Shannon. Well, it's money appropriated and authorized
by the Congress.
Senator Boxer. Yeah; go on. And how is it paid for? It's
asked for in emergency supplemental.
Mr. Shannon. Correct.
Senator Boxer. Is there an offset to pay for it? And are
you asking that we cut something else to pay for this?
Mr. Shannon. No, ma'am.
Senator Boxer. Why not?
Mr. Shannon. Well----
Senator Boxer. Why not?
Mr. Shannon. Ma'am, I regret that--that I'm not from the
Office of Management and Budget, so I can't talk about the
broader----
Senator Boxer. OK, well let me say----
Mr. Shannon [continuing]. Possibility.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. I think everybody has, in my
opinion, should feel a responsibility to pay for something they
want. This is going downhill quickly. We are in debt, debt,
debt, all on the backs of our kids. And listen, I want to stop
this drug abuse in our country. I've had treatment on demand
forever. I voted for every dollar to send more Border Patrol to
stop crime at the border. The U.S. attorneys in San Diego, at
my request, are focusing on these problems. And I would say, if
this was adding to the Border Patrol, how many more Border
Patrol do we put on in this, on our side of the border, in this
proposal?
Mr. Shannon. Ma'am, this is a foreign assistance proposal,
so the moneys can only be spent as part of the foreign
assistance budget----
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Shannon [continuing]. So they won't be putting more
Border Patrol.
Senator Boxer. No more Border Patrol. OK. Because Senator
Isakson mentioned that, I wanted to make that clear. Because
any day of the week I'd vote to put more Border Patrol on our
side, focusing on the drugs and the crime, because that's what
we really want to get at, at the border.
You know, I don't know if you saw this article, ``How Hard
is Mexico Fighting Drugs,'' in Time Magazine, Friday, November
9. So it's pretty new. And I'll just read from this if I can,
Mr. Chairman.
``Every time Mexico wants U.S. helicopters, mountains of
methamphetamine suddenly get intercepted on their way to the
border. The problem is, once Mexico wins the prize, a lot of
its law enforcement usually repays the favor by joining up
again with the country's drug cartels. That was the case a
decade ago, when Washington agreed to begin sharing important
antidrug intelligence with Mexico. And no less than Mexico's
drug czar--the drug czar in Mexico, Army General Jesus
Gutierrez Ribollo--was discovered to be in the pocket of
Mexico's major drug lord.''
We've seen this movie before. It's gotten to be almost a
ritual. Now what protections do you have against corruption?
Mr. Johnson. I think the major one we are seeking through
this program is two-fold. One is to provide assistance to the
Mexican authorities through both training and other assistance,
so that they can investigate, provide polygraph testing to
their entire new Federal police service.
In addition to that, DEA and the Immigration Customs
Enforcement Office are, or have already created and will create
additional, what they call vetted units, individuals that are
organized into groups, with whom they work, that they have
conducted background investigations on, that they have
conducted polygraph tests on, and they can be as sure as one
can be that they are individuals in groups with whom they can
work and share information.
Senator Boxer. So this pattern doesn't disturb you, this
past pattern, that's described in this particular article? Does
it disturb you?
Mr. Johnson. Well, that's at least part of the motivation
for, throughout the world, when we're working on these types of
programs, to take steps, as I described, to avoid compromise.
Senator Boxer. Yeah; because you know what, I like to be
Uncle Sam, I don't like to be Uncle Sucker. I don't like to see
taxpayers, in this case, our grandkids have to pay for this
program, because you admit you're not--you're not paying for
it, that's not your suggestion. And yet, we've seen in the past
when we give them assistance what has happened. So, I'm going
to hold you to that if this goes forward.
Now, I talked before about supply and demand. And if no one
here wanted drugs, what a beautiful world it would be, huh? And
so, I wonder whether you know what the administration's
proposed budget is this year on antidrug spending in America--
in America--to help our people get off drugs and to keep them
off drugs. Do you know? Are you aware of it?
Mr. Johnson. It's outside the scope of my work, but I
understand that it's $4.6 billion to a variety of Federal
prevention and treatment initiatives.
Senator Boxer. OK, well let's just say it's a $166.7
million decline from 2007 spending levels. It cuts prevention
spending, while continuing to increase funding for overseas and
interdiction. This is an outrage. You know, I think we should
take care of our youngsters over here and give them some help,
then talk to me about giving, you know, $1.4 billion to another
country. Cutting--cutting prevention here, it's very bizarre.
We've got to do both, we've got to do both, because it's supply
and demand.
I would just say, Mr. Chairman, California has a lot at
stake here, and I want to see improvement here, but I don't
like to see good California taxpayers and American taxpayers,
whether from Georgia or Indiana or New Jersey or anywhere else,
paying money and then finding out the people we were dealing
with turn around and play footsy with the drug lords. And I
think it's really important that we know what we're doing, and
that's why the point about consultation, is not just an
afterthought. A lot of us care a lot about this.
And I know the President had a press release and said he
wanted to help and we're all--we want to help Mexico. Mexico's
our neighbor, Mexico's our friend, and when Mexico doesn't do
well, it certainly hurts--hurts my State. It hurts my State a
lot. So, I want to--I want to be helpful here.
My last question in the last couple of seconds has to do
with extradited fugitives. In your opening statement, Secretary
Johnson, you state that the Calderon administration has
extradited a record 79 fugitives. And this is a positive
development.
I was involved in one of those cases, one of those
fugitives was Jorge Arroyo-Garcia, a drug dealer who killed a
California Sheriff's deputy in 2002. And I've been working with
the widow to get him extradited. Now, he finally was handed
over in 2007, was a very, very difficult time for the widow.
She was frustrated and angry, he was allowed to hide in Mexico
for years. And after all of our work together, we--we wound up
seeing Garcia sentenced to life without parole for the brutal
murder, which is a very positive thing. And the reason he was
finally arrested and extradited, was because the Mexican
Supreme Court ruled that life sentences without the possibility
of parole were constitutional.
Should this initiative be conditioned on the continued
cooperation of Mexican authorities to extradite wanted
criminals like Garcia? Because I can tell you, it would be a
nonstarter for me if we didn't make that part of this, because
we had to fight too, too long to make sure this murderer went
to prison.
So, have you thought about a condition such as that,
continued cooperation on the extradition of wanted criminals
like Garcia?
Mr. Johnson. As far as I am personally aware, we have not
had a discussion with the Government of Mexico on
conditionality with that respect. We have, though, had the
experience of continued improvement in the extradition
relationship over the course of the last several years. That
has been quite pleasing, not just in this case, but across the
board.
Senator Boxer. Well, if it's quite pleasing, we ought to
make it part of this deal, because I can tell you, it wasn't
quite pleasing to work with this widow for 3 years and see her
pain at the fact that this guy was running around. So, I would,
again, consultation, that's an issue I would have raised, and
we are going to have it raised later.
Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank both of you for your service. I appreciate you
coming before us today. Secretary Shannon, you talked about, in
your prepared comments, that 60 percent of the money that is
going to Mexico is going to civilian organizations. And I know
that there's been some discussion about our oversight of you,
and I don't know if we've touched on this or not--I stepped out
for one moment--but how are you all going to conduct oversight
of these civilian organizations? And then, on issues of
sovereignty or conflict, explain to us a little bit about how
that will work between the countries, our country, their
country, and how those conflicts will be settled.
Mr. Shannon. Happily, Senator. I'll also allow my colleague
to talk a bit about how we use letters of agreement and end-use
monitoring, in order to track the use of equipment and
training.
But first, let me highlight the fact, that in the $550
million that we're asking for, there will not be money
transfers to either Mexico or to Central American countries.
Everything will be either equipment or training. And this
equipment and training will be provided through letters of
agreement that we negotiate with the Mexicans that do have end-
use monitoring requirements, that Ambassador Johnson can
address.
In terms of sovereignty, in Mexico, the Mexican fight
against organized crime and drug trafficking will be a Mexican
fight. All operational activities will be undertaken by Mexican
authorities. We will be in a position to provide equipment and
training and information through arrangements we have currently
from the Drug Enforcement Agency, U.S. Customs, and other
Department of Homeland Security agencies working in Mexico.
But we are effectively looking for ways to enhance the
ability of Mexican institutions to protect the Mexican State,
because this is really the central challenge that Mexico faces
at this point.
The purpose of organized crime, in its engagement with the
state, unlike political insurgencies, is not to conquer the
state, it's to debilitate it, it's to weaken it to the point
that it cannot undertake its functions of fighting crime, which
creates space that allows organized crime to operate in. One of
the things we're attempting to do--working with the Mexicans,
working with the Calderon administration--is to enhance the
capability of Mexican institutions to fight their own fight.
What is significant about the request that we received from
Mexico and the negotiations and the effort to build a
partnership with Mexico at this point, is that Mexico has never
asked for this level of assistance in the past. It has never
opened itself to this kind of dialog with us, it has never
proposed this kind of cooperation. And, from our point of view,
this is indicative of the gravity of the situation, but also
the opportunity that presents itself to us.
Mr. Johnson. If I could just say a couple more words about
the end-use monitoring issue. We do undertake to provide both
the provision of the equipment and the supplies and spares, as
well as the training, with specific provisions for how we will
have access to this equipment, how it will be used, and an
ability to have an audit trail, so that we can examine so that
we'll know that these conditions under which it's been
transferred have been complied with.
With respect to the training, that will be carried out by
both U.S. Government entities, where appropriate elements of
the Department of Justice or Homeland Security, as well as, in
the cases where it's more appropriate and efficient, by the
U.S. private sector. Some of that will take place in Mexico,
some of it in the United States. The individuals who are--who
take part, the Mexican nationals who take part in that
training, their names will be provided to us ahead of time, we
will undertake to determine and ensure that none of those
individuals have been involved in any criminality or any abuse
of human rights that has been documented in the past, and so
that we can be as--as sure as one can be that we're providing
training to people who, that is both appropriate and will be
effective to do so.
Senator Corker. You know, we have a tendency around here,
we're probably the worst, those of us sitting up here, at
creating new initiatives all the time, that don't take into
account other things that are occurring. I'm sure that's not
the case here, but would you explain how this is working in
concert with--with other activities right now? And then, after
speaking to that, talk a little bit about how it ties into some
of the things inside of our country. I know we have some, in
the southeast part of our country for sure and I'm sure other
places also, that's what I'm familiar with, we have cartels
operating inside our country, and I'd love to hear a little bit
about how those are--those efforts are being coordinated with
eradicating that inside our country.
Mr. Shannon. Senator, in regards to how this links to our
other activities in the region, we are trying to build, with
the Merida Initiative, a larger regional approach to fighting
organized crime and drug trafficking throughout Latin America
and into the United States. We have focused, for quite some
time, on source countries, especially those countries in the
Andes, such as Colombia, where the vast majority of cocaine is
produced, recognizing that there are other source countries for
heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines.
But we're also focused now on the transit lanes of drugs as
they move out of the Andes through Central America and Mexico.
As has been noted in some of the statements, we now believe
that about 90 percent of all the cocaine entering the United
States moves through Mexico. This is because of a change in
nature of organized crime and cartels in the region, but also
because of success that we've had in interdicting the movement
of cocaine in the Caribbean.
So, what we want to do is link our source-zone strategies
with our transit and end-market strategies, so that we have a
single regional approach. And as we do this, also begin
conversations in the Caribbean and enhance the ability of
Caribbean nations to make sure that drugs don't slip back into
the Caribbean.
The one problem we have in addressing the larger Caribbean
strategy, at this point in time, is Venezuela, because most of
the cocaine that's moving through the Caribbean at this time,
is moving through Venezuela--with Venezuela acting as a
trampoline--either moving to Hispaniola, to either Haiti or the
Dominican Republic, or moving to West Africa, and from there it
moves up into Europe.
At one point we had a fairly robust counterdrug cooperation
strategy with Venezuela that has suffered over the past several
years, under the government of Hugo Chavez. We have negotiated
a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Venezuela,
in an effort to improve our drug cooperation, and especially
improve the activity of U.S. agencies in conjunction with
Venezuelan agencies. And although we've concluded that treaty,
the Government of Venezuela has yet to sign it.
Mr. Johnson. Just to add quickly. We have, currently, a set
of programs working with Mexico, principally on the--in the
border area. They are funded at the level of about $25 million.
But this program we're talking about is a quantum leap beyond
that, both because of the threat that we face, as well as the
opportunity that we think is unique, that's been provided here.
Senator Corker. If you would, just--and how that ties to
some of the things that are happening inside of our country,
though there's full coordination both ways.
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. There, I mean, there--we are working
hand in glove, if you will, with this program, coordinating
with our law enforcement authorities, our Federal ones, the FBI
and the Immigration and Customs enforcement people in
particular. They are supportive of this program, believe it
will help them in their work along the border.
I can't tell you how it would impact things, you know, well
into the interior of the country though.
Senator Corker. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, are either of you comfortable with the level of
law enforcement efforts inside this country, with respect to
drugs?
Mr. Shannon. Sir, do you mean the activity of U.S. law
enforcement agencies?
Senator Webb. Yes. Inside this country, governmental
entities addressing the drug situation inside this country. Are
either of you comfortable with the level or are you satisfied
with the effectiveness inside the country?
Mr. Shannon. Well sir, we can always do more and we have to
do more.
Senator Webb. We do have to do more.
Mr. Shannon. But----
Senator Webb. Are either of you comfortable with the
effectiveness of the antigang law enforcement efforts inside
this country?
Mr. Shannon. By comfortable, well obviously we need----
Senator Webb. Satisfied as an American.
Mr. Shannon. No. Satisfied, no. We need to do more. We
always need to do more.
Senator Webb. This is--this is the difficulty that I'm
having with this proposal. And I salute you for all the efforts
that you're doing, in terms of coordinating with other
countries and that sort of thing. I mean, when you talk about
the threat to the Mexican State, we have a threat to the
American State. And I'd love to have a $1.4 billion,
particularly in the area of gangs.
I mean, when we talk about drugs, the difficulty with
drugs, it is global, not, you know, not simply, heavily Mexico,
but not simply in that part of the world. But it's also local.
There was an article in the Economist a couple of weeks ago
that said the No. 1 agricultural crop in California is
marijuana. And wherever it starts, and we talk about demand
reduction programs, you know, the difficulty in the United
States is it's a demand-pull problem. And where the these
different entities are trafficking just depends on, it's almost
like guerilla warfare. You know, it's where you push here,
they're going to be over here.
And the situation with gangs is a very serious problem
here. Northern Virginia is second only to certain areas in
California, in terms of gang activity, violent gang activity.
In fact, I would--I would like to hear your thoughts on the
gang activity in the United States that has its roots in Mexico
and Central America. MS13 is all over northern Virginia. How do
we address that situation with what you're doing?
Mr. Shannon. Thank you very much for raising this Senator.
This is a very important issue and as an American, I have a
interest in this, but I also have a special appreciation. Both
of my brothers are special agents in the FBI. One was head of
the FBI Dallas Violent Crimes Task Force. He is currently
stationed at our Embassy in Baghdad. I have another stationed
in California, who will be also going on temporary duty to
Baghdad shortly as part of a FBI contingent.
So, I've been around law enforcement officers for quite
some time. I've lived with them. And I understand the tough
nature of their job. I would note that as we attempt to find a
successful strategy against organized crime, as we try to find
a successful strategy against gangs and drug cartels, we have
to recognize the transnational nature of these criminal
phenomenon.
And yes indeed, we can spend more money inside the United
States and maybe we should be doing that, but we can't, at the
same time, ignore what's happening outside the United States.
And the degree to which weakened democratic States in Mexico
and Central America will enhance the ability of organized crime
to function and operate inside the United States.
And we're seeing this especially in regard to gangs. You
mentioned the Central American gangs, which really are a
scourge in northern Virginia and in parts of California. And
one of the things we have been attempting to do in our security
dialog with Central America is develop an antigang strategy,
which will attempt to address gang violence in Central America,
recognizing that there is communication, movement, and
cooperation between gangs operating out of Central America and
in several of the municipal areas in the United States.
And this is why, in the Central American portion of this
package, we will be fully funding a gang strategy, which is
designed, not only to improve the capacity of law enforcement
agencies in Central America to identify and address gang
issues, but also, it has a social or preventative side to it
that recognizes that many of the gang members join gangs
because of a fundamental breakdown in families and society, and
attempt to help the countries of Central America, especially
the focal points of gang activity, like El Salvador and
Honduras and Guatemala, to begin to build some preventative
programs that will address at-risk youth.
Senator Webb. Well, to a certain extent, these violent
gangs are businesses. To a certain extent, they're
insurgencies, quite frankly. I mean, you can go into Central
America and see MS13 bumper stickers on cars like we have
Redskins up here. You know, it's not necessarily a stigma to be
a member of one of these gangs down there, and we have a
problem here.
I learned a long time ago, as a Marine rifle platoon and
Company Commander fighting a guerilla war, you can chase them
in the mountains all you want and you will get one or two, but
you figure out where they have to go and that's where you set
up your ambushes, you know. The people who are trafficking this
stuff and the people who are conducting this activity, many of
them have to come here. And this is where we need to have
really robust enforcement. And I'm very concerned as an
American that that's not occurring.
And to give you just another analogy, having spent time as
a journalist in Afghanistan a few years ago, all of the stuff
we've been doing in Afghanistan and we hardly ever end up
talking about it up here in the Senate. We can talk about
corruption of government, we can talk about alternate
agricultural crops, et cetera, but the truth of it is, I can't
tell you that every village in Afghanistan had an opium patch.
I can tell you every village I was in, in Afghanistan, had an
opium patch, and I was in nine different places. And it's a
demand-pull problem again, you know, they know that there's a
market and you can't run around Afghanistan and pull up every
poppy plant. You come back here, where the source of the
problem, and that's where you put your energy.
And, again, in all due respect to what you're doing--and I
do respect what you're doing and what your brothers are doing--
I think we need to have the right kind of strategy, in order to
kind of work this from the inside out.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Shannon, I want to discuss the border security
piece for a second. A significant part of illegal immigration
into the United States is drug related or drug induced. Is that
not correct?
Mr. Shannon. I believe, sir, that the majority of illegal
immigration coming in the United States is economically driven.
It's people leaving Central America and Mexico in search of
jobs in the United States.
Senator Isakson. But aren't a number of the drugs coming
into this country flowing through illegal entries?
Mr. Shannon. Oh, I'm sorry, I misunderstood the question.
Without a doubt, most of the drugs are flowing through illegal
entries.
Senator Isakson. Mr. Johnson, you made a statement which I
caught very quickly, and I've been trying to find it in the
printed speech and I can't, but you said, ``We've finally
broken through some longstanding taboos.'' I am curious what
you were referring to, in terms of longstanding taboos.
Mr. Shannon. Well sir, our relationship with Mexico has
been a complicated relationship historically. And Mexican
nationalism is a powerful, emotional, psychological, political
force in Mexico. And, the Mexicans have always sought, as they
have engaged with us, to do so in a way that ensures their
sovereignty is respected, and they believe that they are
entering, not in a relationship of a donor and client, but a
partnership. And therefore, they've jealously guarded certain
aspects of their relationship with us.
The fact that they have approached the United States and
underscored a willingness to work with us in a fashion that
they've never done before, is striking. And, this reflects, not
only the political will of President Calderon, but it also
reflects an understanding by the President and his political
advisors that Mexican citizens recognize the danger that Mexico
faces right now. And that Mexican citizens themselves, are
prepared for a deeper, different kind of relationship with the
United States. And that's the taboo that's being broken down.
Senator Isakson. Well, that's what I hope you meant,
because I went to the border in January, both San Luis and Yuma
section, as well San Diego. And we were finding, for the first
time, increased cooperation by the Mexican Government, in terms
of their law enforcement on their side of the border, vis-a-
vis, the illegal immigration issue.
I'm really not going to put you in the position of
responding to this statement, but I find it interesting that
$31.3 million of this proposal is money going to the Mexican
Immigration Agency's National Migration Institute, and a good
portion of this on the interdiction and border security is for
the type of equipment you need in securing the Southwestern
border. I find it further interesting that $1.4 billion is
almost half of the $3 billion we had put in the Defense bill,
which got taken out recently for border security.
And the point I want to make is this, I sense for the first
time in Calderon--President Calderon--a sense different from
what was true under Vicente Fox. I think there is a new
paradigm. I think some old taboos are going away. And I know in
one of the questions you referred to not leveraging or
conditioning U.S. participation in this to anything from
Mexico, but this is the type of thing when we should begin
striking agreements with the Mexican Government in the bigger
picture of border security.
We think it's a $3 to $4 billion capital investment to do
what we need to do to get the border secure. If we do that, it
makes your job, and what you're trying to do here a whole lot
easier, because ultimately, inability to transit across the
border, easily, is the best thing we can do to stop the flow of
drugs, at least on the land border, then you have to deal with
other areas.
So, Mr. Chairman, my only comment on this, is that when we
talk about $550 million, which is a third of the $1.4 billion,
which is 50 percent of the $3 billion that is what we think we
need, albeit it was taken out of the Defense authorization
bill.
I hope as you bring programs like this forward, that are
United States-Mexican programs--whether it's immigration or
whether it's illegal drugs--it would be a part of a bigger plan
to ultimately do what we've got to do, and that is secure the
border between the United States and Mexico, because that, in
the end, is the solution to a lot of the microproblems we're
attempting to address.
And like I said, that was a speech, that wasn't a question,
you don't have to answer it, but I had to get that in, Mr.
Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Menendez. And you did it successfully. [Laughter.]
We'll go through a second round of questions and the Chair
will recognize himself.
Secretary Johnson, what did we spend on Plan Colombia,
about $5 million so far? Secretary Shannon, is that about
right?
Mr. Johnson. Roughly.
Senator Menendez. Well, $5 billion later in Plan Colombia,
we are largely at the level of production of cocaine that we
were at before we started Plan Colombia. If we talk about the
reduction of violence, yes, we have helped Colombia succeed in
that respect.
But, as an effort on the narcotics front, I don't know that
we can consider it a success, $5 billion later. And it seems to
me that if the administration wants to present this initiative
in that context, it hasn't learned much from Plan Colombia.
It seems to me, if you want to talk about this initiative
as largely being to create greater security and help reduce
violence in Mexico and along the United States-Mexican border,
that's one thing. But to suggest that it is going to help us
significantly in the narcotics flow is another, because we had
that experience. At $5 billion later with Plan Colombia, we've
got largely the production that we had before, and we still
have--as your own testimony has talked about--the flows from
Colombia, through maybe, Central America, through Mexico, to
the United States. So it seems we didn't achieve anything
there.
My point is, you'd think we'd learn from 5 billion dollars'
worth of experiences, that you need to have a multifaceted
approach to achieve this problem.
Which goes back to the statement that you put all in your
justification documents to the Congress. I want to quote Kofi
Annan's statement where he says, ``We will not enjoy
development without security, we will not enjoy security
without development, and we will not enjoy either without
respect for human rights.'' And it's human rights that I now
want to talk about.
In 2003, the U.N. Committee Against Torture found that the
``Mexican police commonly use torture and resort to it
systematically as another method of criminal investigation,
readily available, whenever required, in order to advance the
process.''
In November 2005, the Mexican National Commission on Human
Rights reported that torture remained widespread in Mexico.
According to human rights organizations, judges often ignore
reports of the use of torture to extract information or
confessions from criminal suspects, lending way to statements
potentially made under duress.
The role of the Mexican military has been expanded to
include law enforcement operations, and active military
personnel are working side by side with police in Oaxaca, where
there have been social movements met with reported excessive
use of force, by State, municipal, and Federal police.
And then, the State Department put out in its Human Rights
Report for 2006, which was issued in March of this year,
saying, ``A deeply entrenched culture of impunity and
corruption persisted in Mexico, particularly at the State and
local level. Among the human rights problems reported were,
unlawful killings by security forces, kidnappings--including by
police--torture, arbitrary arrests and detention, corruption,
inefficiency, and a lack of transparency in the judicial
system.''
This is the framework of which we're going to give 40
percent of resources to the Mexican military. My concern is--
what is being done in this process to make it very clear to
prevent that all of these resources that the use--the
widespread use of torture in the public security and criminal
justice systems under the very entities that are going to be
the end receivers of the President's proposal--are going to the
people who have this history or, the institutions that have
this history? How are we going to guarantee that the very money
that we're trying to provide for the purposes of security, I'll
call it security, I won't call it the rest, because I don't
think it does very much about the rest--don't go to the very
entities that are going to continue to commit a history that
has been documented, both internationally and by the State
Department? Are we going to only allow these moneys to go
through vetted battalions, or vetted police forces? What's your
control here to guarantee that our money isn't being used to
perpetuate human rights violations?
Mr. Johnson. That's exactly our intention--to take these
money--take the training programs, to take the provision of
equipment, and to provide it only to individuals and groups
that we can assure ourselves have not been engaged in these
activities.
One of the key things you said in quoting, I believe, the
State Department report, that we're not going to get at, and
that is the State and local. This is focused, at this point,
exclusively on Federal forces. And I would, I think at least in
that report, the indication was that this type of activity
takes place, if I'm remembering correctly, from what you said,
mostly at the State and local level. So that----
Senator Menendez. It's not only at the State and local
level.
Mr. Johnson. No; I did not mean to say that.
Senator Menendez. I just wanted to----
Mr. Johnson. I think, in terms of the training, the
provision of training and the provision of equipment that is
included in this request----
Senator Menendez. How are you going to vet those entities?
Mr. Johnson. We're going to use the materials that we have
in the United States, as well as our Embassy in Mexico,
national name checks, the databases that we have access to, to
determine whether any of the individuals concerned or if it's
a--concerns a unit, any of the units that we might be providing
equipment for, have been engaged in any activities that you
described.
Senator Menendez. Do we have such a database that would
tell us who our human rights violators in the military and the
national police in Mexico?
Mr. Johnson. We use those databases worldwide when we're--
in order to comply with the law, as to what's required in terms
of providing equipment or providing training, providing any
assistance.
Senator Menendez. So, Mexico understands that we're only
going to let them have the helicopters and the resources only
to vetted entities, is that what you're telling me?
Mr. Johnson. To vetted individuals, or vetted entities.
Training, to individuals. It's in the law. We----
Senator Menendez. Well, I'd like to pursue that a little
bit more.
Mr. Johnson. OK.
Senator Menendez. The reality is, I'd like to see how we
are going to vet these entities. Because, I certainly have
heard from more than my share of entities within Mexico who are
concerned about how these resources get used by those entities
within Mexico, those law enforcement and military entities in
Mexico, some which have the history that I recited earlier.
And, we cannot as a country, at the same time that we want
to help, be in the midst of giving resources to those parts of
the Mexican Army and/or the Mexican national police that might
very well be engaged in human rights violations.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'm curious about your general overview of relations with
Mexico.
The third paragraph in your opening statement, Secretary
Shannon, indicates, ``President Bush recognized the United
States has an unprecedented opportunity to reduce the economic
and human toll in our cities and towns, emanating from cross-
border crime,'' and then you follow through in the second page
of your testimony, that ``President Calderon has acted
decisively, using the most effective tools at his disposal,
reorganizing the Federal police, and putting new and additional
resources in the hands of security services, deploying military
units to support operations, arresting crime figures,
extraditing record number,'' as evidence that there is
something different here.
And I gather, one of the reasons why you're approaching
with some urgency, as an emergency situation is to pay tribute
to the fact that there is this kind of initiative, and an
invitation for us, the United States, to participate with the
President and his officials in Mexico. But, I don't want to
overstate the rationale, I really want you to state it.
In other words, leaving aside the particulars of the
initiative, what is the shape of the relationship now? Why is
it new, or unprecedented or different than any we've had
before, and offers you such encouragement through this, that
you're coming forward at this point for this emergency
appropriation?
Mr. Shannon. Thank you very much, Mr. Senator.
I think in some ways the question goes to the very heart of
why we have presented this as a supplemental, and the
opportunity that we think is before us at this point in time.
Obviously, Mexico is a longstanding neighbor and a country
with which we have a long and complicated relationship. But we
saw, following the election of Vicente Fox, a desire and a
willingness to reestablish, or transform in some fashion, the
nature of the bilateral relationship, and focus on those
specific issues that link the United States and Mexico, as
opposed to those that separate it.
With the election of Felipe Calderon, we found that that
same kind of commitment to transformation of relationship, but
also a recognition that there was one key issue--which was the
fight against organized crime and drug cartels--that threatened
Mexico, that opened an opportunity for cooperation with the
United States, in the interests of both countries.
And it was the commitment from President Calderon and
concomitant commitment from President Bush to recognize our
responsibility in addressing this shared threat that really
opens this unique and important space.
Because, as I noted earlier to Senator Isakson, President
Calderon is taking a political risk. He's taking a political
risk by reaching out to the United States in this fashion. The
fact that he is doing it, I think, underscores the seriousness
of the problem, but it also highlights what we might be able to
accomplish through successful cooperation and partnership.
Because it is evident from polling data and elsewhere, that the
Mexican people themselves are ready for a different kind of
relationship with the United States, one built on partnership.
And if we can accomplish that, not only will we achieve
important national security goals in the United States and in
Mexico, but we will be transforming the nature of the
diplomatic and political relationship that will allow, I think,
the United States and Mexico to cooperate more fully in other
areas of interest to us.
Senator Lugar. I think that's very important, and that's
why I appreciate your underlining that.
At the beginning of President Bush's administration, there
was hope that there would be--through his own understanding as
Governor of Texas--a new chapter in the relationship, and I
think that was moving ahead.
Many have testified before this committee that the events
of
9/11, the preoccupation of the United States, understandably,
with a different set of circumstances led to disappointment by
President Vicente Fox.
I would just say, personally in that period of time, which
there was an emphasis with Mexico, I made a personal appeal to
President Fox, to send a consult from Mexico to Indianapolis,
to relieve the difficulties in Chicago that were servicing all
of the Mexican citizens in the Midwest, and this consult
performed extraordinary service to our State and likewise to
all the citizens that he was serving, both Americans and
Mexican.
And, so I've seen, and am enthused about the prospects,
when the green light is there.
But, at the same time, it would appear that with the new
Presidency, as you would say, he's prepared to take some
political risk. He's taken some action so it's a track record.
The appeal, therefore, to us. And that seems to me to be an
important underline.
I think without mitigating the importance of each of the
personal or technical circumstances we've talked about today
with the program, it's the overall relationship that really has
to be in focus here, at a time that we've had very, very
difficult debates on immigration issues and other ways in which
we have discussed Mexico and the relationship and the border.
So, I just take this opportunity for this second round of
questioning to emphasize that part, the importance of the
relationship, and I appreciate your testimony.
Mr. Shannon. Well, Senator, thank you very much. As we work
with the Congress on this proposal, I would emphasize that we
are open to an honest, comprehensive debate about all aspects
of this proposal. But I would underscore that history lies
before us. This is an opportunity that has not been presented
before, we should not let it go.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
I just have one or two other questions. I certainly agree
with Senator Lugar, that the relationship is of incredible
importance. And any opportunity, in a change in that
relationship for the better, should be pursued.
But by the same token, the creation of an opportunity for a
relationship does not create an emergency for the asking of
half a billion dollars. That's a different dynamic, that's a
question as to whether or not we have an emergency, which does
not get paid for, which goes on to the national debt. And that
certainly, in my view, should be judged independently.
Let me ask you this, you said in response--I forget which
one of you answered that--there is not a money transfer here to
the Mexican Government. There is only equipment, training, and
information. The information, I assume, is that intelligence?
Mr. Johnson. The information is basically intellectual
property, the training itself, training individuals, training
trainers. The exchange of information, in terms of what we
commonly call intelligence, is going on already.
Senator Menendez. So we are sharing intelligence already?
Mr. Johnson. We're sharing information, with respect to
joint operations with units that are already vetted, working
with the DEA, for example.
Senator Menendez. But are we sharing other forms of
intelligence with the Mexican Government, intelligence that is
sensitive for these purposes already, are we doing that?
Mr. Johnson. In terms of law enforcement, absolutely. I'm
not sure what you're----
Senator Menendez. And are we satisfied that the sharing of
our intelligence isn't misused by entities--Senator Boxer
referred to some of the entities that have actually then joined
with the cartels--against the Mexican Government itself, and
obviously would be against our own interests.
Mr. Johnson. How----
Senator Menendez. My point is, you said we're going to
share information. Information about systems and procedures,
that's one thing, intelligence is another. And how we share
that intelligence and making sure that we are sharing it in
such a way that we are convinced that the intelligence we are
sharing is being used with vetted entities, in which that
intelligence will not be used against our vital interests, is
very important. Can you guarantee the committee that that's
being done now and that's what's going to be done here?
Mr. Johnson. That's exactly what's being done now. That
takes place within the law enforcement framework, as opposed to
this training and assistance framework. We will be providing
the training for individuals and groups and equipment for them,
so that this exchange of information can be more effective and
that they will have the capability, when we are working on
joint operations, to actually carry them out. But we've
already--in terms of the Drug Enforcement Administration,
already undertakes to background checks, polygraph examinations
for the individual groups with which they work on these
operations.
Senator Menendez. Well let me ask you this, some 40 percent
of the proposal for Mexico is focused on 10 aircraft, 8
helicopters, and 2 maritime surveillance planes. What is the
strategy that is being committed to purchase the 10 aircraft,
and how are these going to contribute substantially to breaking
the backs of the cartels?
Mr. Johnson. The aircraft in question have been looked at,
in terms of their interoperability, both with us and with what
the Mexicans already have. So the type of helicopters are being
purchased, ones that they already--similar to ones they already
have in their inventory.
In terms of the fixed-wing aircrafts, they are the same
kind and equipped similarly to the one that our U.S. Coast
Guard uses, so that we can work together--they're for the
Mexican Navy--so that we can work together, where our joint
surveillance works in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as in the
Pacific. I mean, that's our intention, is to provide them with
the platforms, so that they can work cooperatively with us on
what we believe to be a joint threat.
Senator Menendez. I appreciate the interoperable aspects
and that they are similar to our own. The question is, if
you're going to dedicate 40 percent of the money to Mexico
based on this, this is 40 percent of your proposed solution.
The question is, What is the strategy being deployed by the use
of this equipment, that is going to be part of, being 40
percent of the solution? How is this going to make a difference
in breaking the backs of the cartels?
Mr. Johnson. It's going to provide both the collection
platform, as well as the mobility, so that when operations are
undertaken for interdiction and to deter the operations of
these cartels, you can actually move people to where they need
to be.
Senator Menendez. Well, in that regard, let me ask you,
What role did the United States, Mexican, and Central American
law enforcement entities play in the development of this aid
package?
Mr. Shannon. Within the United States, our interagency
community on the United States side, which meant all Federal
United States agencies--DEA, FBI, Customs, and DHS, with its
corresponding agencies--engaged with all the Mexican public
security ministries, including the counterparts of the
different United States institutions, such as DEA and Customs,
and had a series of technical meetings in the United States and
in Mexico.
And then we also had what we called validation teams that
traveled from the United States, again, with representatives
from all the relevant agencies and law enforcement entities, to
meet with their counterparts in Mexico to discuss the different
items that we were looking at to determine how they linked to a
broader strategy and how they could be used effectively.
In Central America, our engagement was two-fold. It was
through civilian, public sector, public security ministries, in
terms of building our larger SICA-U.S. security dialog, but
also, each of our Embassies, working through our narcotics
assistance section, engaged with the law enforcement entities
that they normally work with.
Senator Menendez. Did we engage our military with the
Mexican military?
Mr. Shannon. Yes; we did. Although the money that's being
requested now is INCLE money, in other words, it'll be money
managed through the Department of State, our Defense Department
participated in validation teams, looking at the different
aircraft requirement, especially the helicopters and the
aircraft.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me thank you both for your
testimony today.
Let me close by saying, I think many of us I should say--
want to take full advantage of any opportunity to enter into a
more comprehensive relationship with Mexico. It is an
incredibly important partner of the United States, we share a
common border, and we share a common interest. So, those of us,
however, that have criticisms of the package as devised, should
not be viewed as not wanting to engage in that relationship and
not wanting to be helpful to the Mexican Government, and
certainly to the Central American Governments to achieve the
goal.
However, the question is how do we best achieve that. And
some of us believe that the package as devised, does not meet
our collective goals. Some of us are concerned about ensuring
that human rights provisions are safeguarded in this process.
Some of us are concerned if development issues are considered,
because we learned if you tell a poor coca farmer in Colombia
that you're just going to eradicate his field, then he goes to
another field to go plant coca. He's going to do whatever he
has to do to sustain his family. If you give him a sustainable
development alternative, then maybe he will move away from
that.
And the reality is, $5 billion later, and Plan Colombia is
only in the late stages of that and, we have some understanding
that development assistance might be part of the solution.
We have our friends who are concerned about immigration, as
we all are in this country, and undocumented immigration. You
know, people flee for basically two reasons: Dire economic
necessity or civil unrest. And so the reality is we are doing
nothing about dire economic necessity, so we still have people
come to the north.
And then we have a demand in this country for illicit
drugs. We don't do what we need to do in order to reduce the
demand, and therefore, we continue to draw the flow of
narcotics to this country.
So, it just seems to me that having spent billions of
dollars in similar initiatives, we have yet to learn some of
those lessons. I hope the administration will be thinking about
some of those lessons as we move forward in however shape this
initiative might take place.
I appreciate both of you coming and your answers to
questions. The record will remain open for 2 days so that
committee members may submit additional questions to our
witnesses. And we ask our witnesses to respond expeditiously to
those questions.
If no one has any additional comments, the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Leo W. Gerard, International President, United
Steelworkers
congress should not provide funding for plan mexico until the
government ends its political persecution of the national miners' and
metalworkers' union
Introduction
The United Steel Workers (``USW'') is deeply concerned that an
emergency funding package the administration recently requested for the
Government of Mexico (``GOM'') may be used to undermine labor rights,
civil rights, and human rights in that country and further may be used
to target political opposition arising from labor and other social
movements in Mexico. Like Plan Colombia, a Plan Mexico could result in
gross violations of human rights, which would have the effect of
undermining the rule of law in Mexico and creating a climate of terror
and fear instead of cultivating individual freedom and justice for all
Mexicans. As leading human rights organizations such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch have documented, Mexican security
forces operate in an environment of impunity which has given them a
free rein to commit serious human rights violations.\1\ Indeed, on
October 11 a U.S. immigration judge stopped the deportation proceedings
of a former drug informant based on the grounds that under the U.N.
Convention Against Torture the informant would be at risk of torture by
the Mexican Government if deported to Mexico.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Amnesty International, ``Laws Without Justice'' (Feb. 7,
2007); Human Rights Watch, ``Lost in Transition'' (2006).
\2\ See El Paso Times, ``Judge Halts Deportation of Juarez Drug
Informant,'' October 26, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mexico has systematically repressed independent, democratic labor
unions who have attempted to challenge the government-dominated system
of labor relations--a system established under 70 years of one-party
rule and which continues to this day.\3\ In particular, the USW is very
concerned about the political persecution of the National Miners' and
Metalworkers' Union (``Los Mineros'') and its democratically elected
leader, Napoleon Gomez Urrutia (``Gomez''). This persecution has lead
to continued labor strife, the wrongful killing of three union members
and the willful disregard of mine safety, which caused a horrific mine
explosion at the Pasta de Conchos mine in 2006 leaving 65 miners dead.
Continuing impunity has also meant a complete failure to hold
accountable the parties responsible for the deaths of those 65
mineworkers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See Lance Compa, ``Justice for All: The Struggle for Worker
Rights in Mexico,'' AFL-CIO Solidarity Center 2004; Public
Communication to the U.S. National Administrative Office under the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) Concerning the
Introduction of Reforms to the Federal Labor Code of Mexico, 17
February 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gomez was illegally removed from office and threatened with arrest
on trumped up charges because he was fighting hard for better wages and
working conditions, forming alliances with other international unions
to increase the bargaining power of Los Mineros, and opposing labor law
reforms promoted by the government that would have weakened workers'
rights. While the Mexican Federal courts have reinstated Gomez to his
union position and acquitted him of baseless criminal charges, the GOM
has appealed that acquittal,\4\ and at the same time is working to
undermine Los Mineros. Thus, it is imperative that the GOM understand
that its blatant abuse of power against legitimate unions and their
leaders will not be condoned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See ``Impugna PGR amparo a Gomez Urrutia'' (translation: PGR
challenges Gomez Urrutia on appeal), Reforma, Nov. 6, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background of Plan Mexico
On October 22, 2007, the administration sent Congress a
supplemental war spending proposal exceeding $1.96 billon. That
emergency spending request includes $500 million for the Mexican
Government to combat transnational crime and illicit drugs. The $500
million is a downpayment on a multiyear, $1.4 billion aid package to
Mexico and is the culmination of a deal struck behind closed doors
between Presidents Bush and Calderon without consultation with or
advice from the members of the U.S. or Mexican Congress. The
administration has released few details about Plan Mexico, preferring
to simply ram it through Congress by wrapping it into other war
spending.
According to news stories, the bulk of the first tranche of funding
would be for several transport helicopters and two surveillance planes,
with lesser amounts to purchase inspection equipment and upgrade
technology for the Mexican attorney general's office. Yet, how the
funds would be spent is a matter of conjecture, as the moneys provided
under Plan Mexico come with no human rights or other conditions
attached.
The Political Persecution of Napoleon Gomez Urrutia and Los Mineros
The plight of Napoleon Gomez is a wakeup call to all in Congress
who are concerned with labor and civil rights in Mexico and with that
government's establishing and adhering to a rule of law and not men.
Independent labor unions have been a particular target of government
repression. Before any funding is approved, Congress should understand
the story of Mr. Gomez and should call upon the GOM to end its
persecution of this union leader by dropping its appeal of his
acquittal on criminal charges--charges that were blatantly false--so
that he may return to Mexico and resume his rightful position as the
democratically elected leader of Los Mineros union. The GOM also should
cease in its efforts to undermine Los Mineros by supporting pro-company
unions, and should act immediately to enforce and to strengthen health
and safety protections in the mining industry.
As described in detail below, the GOM and Grupo Mexico, a privately
owned Mexican multinational that is the third largest privately held
copper mining company in the world, engaged in a broad-scale attack
aimed at eviscerating the union and eliminating Gomez as the head of
Los Mineros by:
Improperly withdrawing legal recognition of Gomez as a union
official;
Using excessive force during a strike that wrongfully killed
union members;
Installing a pro-company union once Gomez was illegally
ousted;
Ignoring life-threatening mine safety problems that lead to
the mine explosion at Pasta de Conchos mine and 65 dead miners;
Filing baseless charges in Federal and State courts against
Gomez.
Los Mineros Under the Leadership of Napoleon Gomez: A New Direction
Los Mineros \5\ was founded in 1934 and represents Mexican workers
in the mine and metal industries under some 80 collective bargaining
agreements with Mexican employers. Los Mineros was led for 40 years by
Napoleon Gomez Sada and during that time maintained a close
relationship with the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).
In 2002, Napoleon Gomez Urrutia, the son of Gomez Sada, became the new
General Secretary of Los Mineros.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The formal abbreviation for the National Union of Mine and
Metal Workers is SNTMMSRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gomez, an Oxford-trained economist, had a different approach; he
instituted a democratic union structure and started to fight for
improved wages, benefits, and working conditions. Gomez demanded that
jobs that had been contracted out by the mining companies be
``contracted in,'' thereby adding thousands of new members for Los
Mineros.\6\ Gomez fought for increased wages arguing that Mexican and
multinational companies were reaping immense profits from the global
boom in basic metals fueled by demand from China, yet wage increases
were stuck at levels negotiated from an earlier time when the Mexican
Government owned the mines. With Mr. Gomez in power, in 2005
steelworkers at the Sicartsa mill, Mexico's largest steel producer,
went on strike and finally gained a 42-percent increase in wages and
benefits that reflected the market boom in basic metals.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``Exigen a AHMSA sindicalizar a subcontratados'' (translation:
Demand that AHMSA unionize subcontractors), El Siglo de Torreon, June
29, 2004.
\7\ ``Huelga en Sicartsa, por `anomalias' de Villacero''
(translation: Strike in SICARTSA over ``anomalies'' of Villacero), La
Jornada Michoacan, 1 August 2005; Termina huelga en la siderurgica
Sicartsa que duo mes y medio'' (translation: Strike at SICARTSA that
lasted a month and a half ends), EFE, September 19, 2005; ``Sindicato
minero gano en conflictos'' (translation: Miners' union wins in
conflicts), Excelsior, February 23, 2007. See ``CEREAL, a cien anos de
cananea: el protagonismo minero bajo el acoso del estado Mexicano''
(translation: A hundred years after Cananea, the mineworkers' actions
under attack by the Mexican state), December 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, Gomez recognized the need to forge international
alliances with mining unions in other countries to counter an industry
increasingly dominated by large multinational companies. Los Mineros
became active in the International Metalworkers Federation and entered
into a strategic alliance with the United Steel Workers.\8\ When the
USW struck Asarco in July 2005, Los Mineros held a 1-day nationwide
solidarity strike.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Gomez's actions brought him into conflict with the PRI-
dominated national union body, the Labor Congress, which favored a more
conciliatory approach. Gomez upset the party leadership by opposing
proposed labor law reforms which, he argued, would impose labor
flexibility measures on workers with little in return. On February 15,
2006, a group of dissident unions, including Los Mineros, split off
from the Labor Congress. See ``Fractura en el CT; entre golpes
eligieron a dos lideres'' (translation: Rupture in the CT; two leaders
elected amid blows), La Jornada, February 16, 2006.
\9\ See ``Normalidad en Grupo Mexico tras huelga en apoyo a otros
mineros'' (translation: Situation normal at Grupo Mexico after strike
in support of other mineworkers) EFE, August 16, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, Gomez was able to help bring closure to a protracted 15-
year court battle between Los Mineros and the company, Grupo Mexico,
over moneys owed to the union by the company.\10\ When the Cananea and
Nacozari mines were privatized in 1990, as part of the privatization
agreement Grupo Mexico was required to pay 5 percent of the purchase
price into a trust fund to be administered by Los Mineros in accordance
with the union's bylaws.\11\ The company simply refused. Los Mineros
sued, but it was not until Gomez took over and carried out a strike in
2004, that the company, after a court order, agreed to pay the funds
into the union trust.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Grupo Mexico, which is owned by the Larrea family, is the
third largest copper producer in the world with major holdings in Peru,
including the Southern Peru Copper Company, as well as the largest
copper mine in Mexico, the Cananea mine. All told, Grupo Mexico owns 11
mines in Mexico, many acquired through government privatization. It
also owns Asarco, a mining company with properties in Arizona and
Texas.
\11\ See International Metalworkers' Federation (``IMF''): Report
of IMF Fact Finding Mission to Mexico at (2006); see also IMF complaint
to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Case No. 2478.
\12\ See ``Guerra minera'' (translation: Mine war), El Norte, July
6, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What ensued was a campaign by the GOM and Grupo Mexico to
eviscerate the union's hard-fought gains and to strip all power from
Gomez in his leadership position. The result has been continued labor
strife, the wrongful killings of union members, and the willful
ignoring of mine safety, which lead to a terrible explosion in 2006
that left 65 miners dead at Grupo Mexico's Pasta de Conchos mine.
GOM's Illegal Ouster of Gomez as Head of Los Mineros
The GOM illegally ousted Gomez and the entire executive committee
on February 17, 2006. At that time the GOM also froze all union assets,
as well as the personal assets of Gomez. The alleged basis for the
removal was a letter from members of the union's oversight committee
\13\ to the Labor Secretariat alleging embezzlement of the trust fund
moneys. The GOM's action was not made public until February 28, after
Gomez had denounced the Government for ``industrial homicide'' in the
deaths of 65 mineworkers at Pasta de Conchos.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The oversight committee is termed the Vigilance and Justice
Commission of Los Mineros.
\14\ See ``Gomez Urrutia acusa a Minera Mexico de `homicidio
industrial' y mentir a deudos'' (translation: Gomez Urrutia accuses
Grupo Mexico of ``industrial homicide'' and lying to the survivors), La
Jornada, February 28, 2006; see also ``La STPS desconoce a Gomez
Urrutia como dirigente nacional de mineros'' (translation: The STPS
derecognizes Gomez Urrutia as national leader of the mineworkers), La
Jornada, March 1, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gomez was not restored to office until April, 2007, when a Mexican
Federal court ruled that the signatures on the letter used to remove
him were forged and ordered the Secretary of Labor to officially
recognize Gomez as the General Secretary of Los Mineros.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See ``Mexican Court Reinstates Union Leader,'' Associated
Press, April 11, 2007; ``Court Orders Restoration of Gomez U.,'' El
Universal, April 12, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GOM's action was a blatant violation of Mexican and
international labor law. First, under Mexican labor law, the election
and removal of union officers is governed by union constitutions. The
constitution of Los Mineros states that officers can be removed for
malfeasance only by the union's national convention and only following
an investigation and trial conducted by the union's Vigilance and
Justice Commission. That did not occur here.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The Vigilance and Justice Commission had no legal authority to
elect a new slate of officers--this may be done only by the union
convention. See Submission of the United Steelworkers to the National
Administrative Office under the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation, November 9, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the GOM has a longstanding practice requiring government
authorization for union officials to enter into contracts. The infamous
``toma de nota'' (the name given to the authorization) obviously
interferes with union governance and thus is subject to political
manipulation. Such a requirement violates the International Labor
Organization Convention No. 87, which mandates that public authorities
refrain from any interference that would impede the right of unions to
elect their representatives and to organize and conduct their
activities and programs.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ The GOM is a signatory to ILO Convention No. 87. The
International Metalworkers Federation filed a complaint with the ILO
Committee on Freedom of Association in October 2006 (ILO Case No.
2487), claiming violations of the Convention by the GOM in its dealings
with Gomez and Los Mineros.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, the underlying allegation which formed the basis for his
ouster from the union by the Labor Secretariat--embezzlement of the
union trust fund--was a blatant fabrication.\18\ On April 11, 2007, a
Mexican Federal court found signatures on the letter at issue were
forged. A unanimous three-judge panel ordered the Secretary of Labor,
Javier Lozano Alarcon, to officially recognize Gomez as the General
Secretary of Los Mineros. The court specifically found that the Labor
Secretariat had overstepped its authority and failed to comply with
established procedures.\19\ Indeed, in a bizarre twist that indicates
an attempt to tamper with the evidence, the key documents used to
allege the forgery actually were stolen from the Federal prosecutor's
office.\20\ While copies were made which were then shown to be
forgeries, the theft of the original forged documents essentially means
that no one could be prosecuted for the forgery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ See ``PGR Confirms That Elias Morales Falsified a Signature to
Replace Gomez-Urrutia,'' La Jornada, April 10, 2007.
\19\ See ``Mexican Court Reinstates Union Leader,'' Associated
Press, April 11, 2007; ``Court Orders Restoration of Gomez U.,'' El
Universal, April 12, 2007.
\20\ See ``Evidence of Forgery Pilfered From PGR,'' El Universal,
April 14, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Pro-Company Union Results in Labor Strife and Union Members Killed
in Strike
When the GOM illegally ousted Gomez and the executive committee, it
replaced them with a new slate headed by Elias Morales, a former union
member. Morales proceeded to renegotiate a number of union contracts on
terms more favorable to the companies.\21\ Morales also purged union
members who supported Gomez.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ See ``La negociacion de contratos, con Elias'' (translation:
The negotiation of contracts, with Elias, Milenio, January 19, 2007;
``Continuan disputas en el sindicato minero'' (translation: Disputes in
mineworkers' union continue), El Economista, 1 February 2007.
\22\ See ``Estalla violencia en al 14,'' (translation: Violence
flares in Section 14), Zocalo, January 13, 2007; ``Despiden a 7
mineros; denuncian represion de Minera Mexico,'' (translation: Seven
miners fired; they denounce repression in Grupo Mexico), Zocalo, 14
January 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The union fought back against the government's interference. In
response to the attacks on Gomez and the union leadership, the union
called a nationwide strike. In the town of Lazaro Cardenas workers
struck the largest steel mill in Mexico, Sicartsa. As thousands
gathered in the streets in support, Federal and State police surrounded
the strikers and on April 20, 2006, shot and killed two union members--
Jose Luis Castillo Zuniga and Hector Alvarez Gomez--and many were
injured.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See ``Steel Workers in Mexico Clash With Police,''
upsidedown.org, April 26, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GOM's National Human Rights Commission investigated the
killings and found that (1) the police operation was not approved by
the courts in direct violation of the Mexican Constitution, (2) the
police engaged in excessive force,\24\ and there was a lack of
diligence and professionalism in investigating the excessive force
used.\25\ No one has ever been charged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ The National Human Rights Commission found that excessive
force resulted in two workers killed, 21 wounded by gunfire, and 33
others injured. On the other hand, the police sustained only minor
injuries. See National Human Rights Commission: Recommendation 037/
2006, Oct. 11, 2006.
\25\ National Human Rights Commission: Recommendation 037/2006,
Oct. 11, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grupo Mexico's Continued Efforts to Break Los Mineros
With Gomez on the defensive, Grupo Mexico used its control over his
government-appointed replacement, Elias Morales, to slash payrolls,
wages, and benefits. At the La Caridad mine in Nacozari, Grupo Mexico
broke its contract with the union in the summer of 2006 and fired 900
of its 1,300 workers. The company then rehired some of the workers as
contractors with lower pay and no benefits, while carefully screening
out supporters of Gomez.\26\ When workers who had been fired attempted
to meet with company officials on August 11, 2007, they were attacked
and one union member, Reynaldo Hernandez Gonzalez, was shot and
killed.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ See ``Termina Grupo Mexico relacion con mineros de Sonora''
(translation: Grupo Mexico terminates its relation with miners in
Sonora), La Jornada, June 10, 2006; ``Comienza GM la recontratacion de
ex obreros en la mina La Caridad'' (translation: GM begins rehiring
exworkers at the La Caridad mine), La Jornada, August 2, 2006.
\27\ See ``Mexico Mine Disputes Intensify; Miner Killed In Clash,''
Dow Jones Newswires, 13 August 2007; ``One Dead After Miners Fight at
Mexico Copper Pit,'' Reuters, 12 August 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After these efforts to oust Los Mineros failed, Grupo Mexico began
setting up company unions to further undermine that union.\28\ The
Federal Labor Board ordered ``elections'' in eight Grupo Mexico mines
across the country with only 36 hours notice to Los Mineros. Workers
were locked in the mines, intimidated, and forced to cast their votes
publicly in front of Grupo Mexico officials.\29\ Los Mineros is
appealing this ham-fisted power grab by Grupo Mexico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ See ``Mexico's Cananea Copper Miners To Set Up New Union--
Report,'' Dow Jones Newswires, July 12, 2007; ``Labor Unions Demand
Mexico Drop Charges Vs Miners Leader,'' Dow Jones Newswires, September
5, 2007; ``Otorgan toma de nota a otro sindicato minero'' (translation:
Toma de nota authorized for another miners' union), Milenio, November
1, 2007; ``Consigue registro cuarto sindicato minero'' (translation:
Fourth mineworkers' union obtains registration), El Imparcial, November
6, 2007.
\29\ CEREAL Bulletin, September 4, 2007. The GOM's undemocratic
practice of forcing workers to vote publicly in union elections has
continued despite the lack of any legal foundation and despite the
Joint Declaration signed by the U.S. and Mexican Labor Secretaries in
which Mexico pledged to ``promote secret ballots and neutral voting
places.'' Agreement on Ministerial Consultations, U.S. NAO Submissions
9702 and 9703, May 18, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Pasta de Conchos Coal Mine Disaster: A Ticking Time Bomb Waiting to
Explode
On February 19, 2006, an explosion of methane gas in Grupo Mexico's
Pasta de Conchos coal mine in the north of Mexico brought into sharp
focus what is at stake in this labor battle. Sixty-five miners were
trapped inside. To date, the bodies of 63 dead have not been
recovered.\30\ After the explosion, Gomez spoke out forcefully,
accusing Grupo Mexico and the Minister of Labor of ``industrial
homicide.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ In December 2006, Grupo Mexico summarily fired all of its
union employees at Pasta de Conchos and replaced them with independent
contract employees. See ``Pierden derechos con tal de trabajar''
(translation: Right to work is lost), Excelsior, 16 January 2007;
``Emplean a novatos en mina'' (translation: Newcomers hired at mine)
Excelsior, 17 January 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several investigations were conducted, including one by a special
committee of the Mexican Legislature.\31\ The investigations uncovered
a pattern of negligence and gross omission. For instance, the National
Human Rights Commission (CNDH) found that the Labor Secretariat was
responsible for failing to properly provide adequate resources to
enforce mine safety and for allowing Grupo Mexico to operate despite so
many mining safety violations.\32\ The special investigative committee
of the Mexican Congress, in a report presented last month, reached the
same conclusions,\33\ as did the Labor Secretariat's own report on the
disaster.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Informe de la comision especial para conocer las
responsabilidades y origen de la tragedia de la mina Pasta de Conchos,
de resultados finales de las investigaciones objeto de este organo
legislativo, Gaceta Parlamentaria, Camara de Diputados, numero 2308-I,
martes 31 de julio de 2007.
\32\ Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos, Recomendacion No. 26/
2006, Sobre el caso de los trabajadores de la empresa industrial Minera
Mexico, S.A. DE C.V. (Unidad Pasta de Conchos), 17 July 2006.
\33\ See Attachment A, Conclusions of the Special Congressional
Committee to Determine the Responsibility for the Explosion at Pasta de
Conchos Mine (Mexican Legislature).
\34\ ``Arbitrators Order Mexican Miners Back to Work,'' San Antonio
Express-News, August 8, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, the mine had a history of serious violations.\35\ In July
2004, Federal inspectors found numerous safety violations, including,
most critically, failure to use antistatic powder that prevents machine
sparks from igniting a methane gas explosion, as well as other
potential fire hazards. Apparently, none of these violations was
corrected.\36\ In February 2006, just 2 weeks before the disaster, the
inspectors determined that Grupo Mexico had not taken several required
corrective measures, most importantly measures to contain methane gas
within acceptable levels and the use of antistatic powder to contain
sparking that could ignite methane gas. See Attachment A: ``Conclusions
of the Special Congressional Committee to Determine the Responsibility
for the Explosion at Pasta De Conchos Mine'' (Mexican Legislature).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ In the 6 years prior to the 2006 explosion, it was reported
that the Federal Government had found 188 safety violations at Pasta de
Conchos. See ``Gov't. Was Aware of Safety Violations.'' El Universal,
26 February 2007.
\36\ See ``Gov't. Was Aware of Safety Violations.'' El Universal,
26 February 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trumped Up Corruption Charges Brought to Silence Gomez
On March 2, 2006, the GOM brought criminal charges for alleged
fraud and embezzlement of the $55 million Los Mineros trust fund.\37\
The GOM froze the bank accounts of Los Mineros and Gomez and seized his
personal property. Fearing for the safety of himself and his family,
Gomez took refuge in Canada, where he remains.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ See ``Investiga la PGR a Gomez Urrutia por corrupcion, informa
Presidencia'' (translation: The PGR is investigating Gomez Urrutia,
says the Presidency), La Jornada, March 3, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the past year, the GOM's legal case against Gomez has slowly
collapsed.\38\ In October of 2007, a Mexican Federal Court acquitted
Gomez of criminality with regard to the trust fund.\39\ The GOM,
however, continues its attack by appealing this decision. Likewise,
similar charges were rejected by state courts \40\ or simply abandoned
by prosecutors.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ For instance, state claims that the $55 million trust was
created on behalf of the workers at the privatized mines and not the
union--have been systematically rejected by the courts, which have held
that the funds were rightfully the union's property. See ``Napo gana en
definitiva la libertad via amparo'' (translation: Napo definitively
wins freedom on appeal), Milenio, June 14, 2007.
\39\ See ``Mexican Union Leader Cleared of Graft,'' San Antonio
Express-News, 18 October 2007.
\40\ See ``Napo gana en definitiva la libertad via amparo''
(translation: Napo definitively wins freedom on appeal), Milenio, June
14, 2007
\41\ See ``Gomez Urrutia, exculpado de fraude contra el gremio
minero'' (translation: Gomez Urrutia exonerated of fraud against
miners' union), La Jornada, June 8, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, an independent audit conducted by the Swiss auditing
firm of Horwath Berney, S.A.\42\ determined that all of the trust fund
moneys were accounted for and that payments made from the trust fund
were made with the approval of the union's executive committee, as
required by the original privatization agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Horwath Berney Audit S.A: Special review of the use of funds
received by Los Mineros from Grupo Mexico, August 3, 2007. The study
was conducted on behalf of the International Metalworkers' Federation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
The USW urges the GOM to drop its appeal of the acquittal by the
Mexican Federal Court, which, as described above, cleared Gomez of
wrongdoing and instead to let Gomez return home to resume his duties as
the head of Los Mineros without fear of further persecution. As
discussed above, in April 2007 a Federal court in Mexico ruled that
Gomez was improperly removed as head of the union and has ordered him
reinstated.
Mexico needs strong, independent union leaders to honestly
represent workers and fight for their well-being and dignity and to
prevent tragic disasters. Gomez is such a leader. It seems evident that
labor strife and serious safety problems will continue if independent
union leaders like Gomez are not permitted to conduct lawful union
activities. In fact, a report issued this week about the mine safety
issues at Grupo Mexico's Cananea copper mine shows that the GOM is
still not enforcing basic mine safety, and that workers' health and
lives are being needlessly jeopardized. See Attachment B: ``Executive
Summary of Cananea Mine Safety Report by the Maquiladora Health and
Safety Support Network'' (MHSSN) available at http://mhssn.igc.org/
CananeaOHSReport.pdf. Mexican mine workers deserve better.
Congress should not provide funding for Plan Mexico until Gomez is
permitted to return to Mexico without fear of further politically
motivated retribution. The USW urges Congress to hold hearings on
violations of labor rights and human rights in Mexico to allow for the
victims of this and other cases to speak to you directly. Intimidation
and violence against workers and unions and reckless indifference to
safe working conditions should be part of Mexico's past, not its
future.
attachment a--conclusions of the special congressional committee to
determine the responsibility for the explosion at pasta de conchos mine
(mexican legislature)
The following conclusions were presented to the Chamber of Deputies
on October 3, 2007:
1. The established hypothesis of an event caused by negligence and
omission was proved, and responsibility was established
2. The tragedy of the Pasta de Conchos Mine was the product of a
great explosion caused by an excessive concentration of methane gas and
coal dust, which caused the collapse of practically the entire mine.
3. The presence of methane gas was a product of the negligence and
omission of the company holding the concession [Grupo Mexico], based on
the following considerations:
a. Failure to complete the blocking off of the old passages 1
East and West, which generated the concentration of methane;
b. The lack of continuous spraying to avoid the suspension of
coal dust, which is a highly flammable material;
c. Inadequate spreading of antistatic powder throughout the
entire mine;
d. Inefficient ventilation;
e. The lack of sufficient methane meters, which had been
requested repeatedly by the Joint Safety and Health Committee;
and
f. The failure to isolate high-voltage electrical lines
inside the mine, as well as the failure to isolate the control
panels and to keep them clean, as reflected in the Minutes of
the Joint Safety and Health Committee.
4. There was no system of internal communication within the mine,
resulting in the trapped group of miners being cut off and the failure
of the watchman to notify the mine manager until 30 minutes after the
explosion. The manager, in turn, did not notify the Federal and State
authorities until after 7 in the morning.
5. There were no emergency exits or alarm systems, which would have
given the trapped miners a better chance of survival.
6. The authorities of the Federal Labor Delegation in Coahuila
committed serious and culpable negligence and omission by ignoring the
noncompliance with safety measures by the concession holder Industrial
Minera Mexico, S.A. de C.V., which cut short the lives of the workers
on the third shift. They have administrative and criminal
responsibility for not carrying out their duty as established by the
Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, the Federal Law of
Administrative Responsibility of Public Functionaries, the Federal
Labor Law and other applicable norms.
7. The Secretariat of the Economy did not comply with its duties
established in the Mining Law (articulo 7, fraccion XII, 53 y 58); and
concealed the reports of the Mexican Geological Service concerning the
compliance by the concession holder Industrial Minera Mexico with
safety norms at the Pasta de Conchos Mine.
8. There is responsibility on the part of Industrial Minera Mexico,
and therefore of Grupo Mexico, as the parent company of IMMSA with
mutual responsibility, and of General de Hulla, in the deaths of the
Pasta de Conchos miners.
9. The Federal Labor Delegation in the State of Coahuila is also
responsible for the deaths of the miners at Pasta de Conchos.
10. There is responsibility on the part of the Secretariat of Labor
and Social Welfare and the Secretariat of the Economy, for
noncompliance with their duties, which is subject to the sanctions
established in the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States
in its Article 109 and 110, the Law of Administrative Responsibilities
of Public Functionaries, the Federal Penal Code and applicable
legislation.
11. From the Recommendation No. 26/2006 of the CNDH we infer the
responsibility of the Mexican State for the negligent behavior of the
public servants of the STPS, Coahuila Delegation. For this reason the
CNDH recommends the payment of compensation to the families of the
deceased workers. It should be mentioned that this recommendation was
accepted on behalf of the STPS by the responsible officials.
Nonetheless as of today the corresponding payments have not been made,
with the result that the families have been forced to file lawsuits in
the Federal Tribunal of Fiscal and Administrative Justice. It is
necessary to state that this Special Commission infers that the
recommendation of the CNDH is correct in the facts that it establishes
and in the corresponding legal conclusions. For this reason we concur
that the State must take responsibility based on the negligence of the
aforementioned public servants.
attachment b--executive summary of cananea mine safety report by the
maquiladora health and safety support network
An independent team of safety and health professionals organized by
the Maquiladora Health and Safety Support Network (MHSSN) conducted an
inspection of the Cananea mine from October 5-8, 2007, and performed
tests on a sample population of 68 workers (available at http://
mhssn.igc.org/CananeaOHSReport.pdf). The conclusion of the survey team
is that there are serious health and safety hazards at the Cananea mine
that require immediate attention and other that require long-term
corrections in order to protect workers at the facility from both
instantaneous accidents and chronic exposures generating occupational
diseases. The MHSSN investigation revealed:
The conditions observed inside the mine and processing
plants, and the work practices reported by the interviewed
workers, paint a clear picture of a workplace being
``deliberately run into the ground.'' A serious lack of
preventive maintenance, failure to repair equipment and correct
visible safety hazards, and a conspicuous lack of basic
housekeeping has created a worksite workers have been exposed
to high levels of toxic dusts and acid mists, operate
malfunctioning and poorly maintained equipment, and work in
simply dangerous surroundings.
The deliberate dismantling of dust collectors in the
concentrator area processing plants by Grupo Mexico
approximately 2 years ago means that workers in these areas
have been subjected to high concentrations of dust containing
23 percent quartz silica, with 51 percent of sampled dust in
the respirable particle-size range, protected only by
completely inadequate personal respirators. Occupational
exposures to silica can lead to debilitating, fatal respiratory
diseases including silicosis and lung cancer.
Semiquantitative calculations indicate workers in the
concentrator area are exposed to dust levels of at least 10
milligrams per cubic meter of air (mg/m3). The
respirable quartz silica component of this dust would be at
least 1.2 mg/m3, or 10 times greater than the
Mexican maximum permissible exposure limit (LMPE) of 0.1 mg/
m3. Without any operating dust collection equipment,
workers in the concentrator area must be provided with powered
air-purifying respirators (PAPRs), or supplied-air respirators
in continuous flow mode, to protect them against inhalation
exposures to silica dust, instead of the paper filtering face
pieces currently in use.
Implementation of Grupo Mexico's overall safety program at
the mine has not resulted in effective, comprehensive
protection of workers. There are serious health and safety
hazards created by industrial-scale mining, crushing and
pulverizing, acid leaching and electro-plating, and milling
operations to produce fine powder copper ore from a huge open-
pit, hard-rock mine. The required Joint Management-Labor Safety
Committee is small--six members total--and unable to conduct or
oversee effective safety inspections, hazard corrections,
accident investigations, and employee training.
Grupo Mexico has not conducted sufficient industrial hygiene
monitoring to identify, evaluate, and later control health
hazards to miners including exposure to mineral dusts
(including silica), acid mists, airborne solvents, high noise
levels, high vibration levels, hot and cold conditions. The
employer has failed to inform, as required by Mexican law,
monitored employees of their measured exposures to hazardous
substances.
Grupo Mexico has not conducted a comprehensive medical
surveillance program to determine the health status of workers
exposed to airborne contaminants (silica, heavy metals like
lead, acid mist, solvents) and physical hazards such as noise
and vibration. The employer has failed to inform, as required
by Mexican law, the few workers who have been examined of the
results of the medical tests.
Grupo Mexico has not provided the training required by
Mexican law to workers with hazardous exposures that trigger
the training requirement. Despite high noise levels, exposure
to chemicals, and exposures to energized machines, 91 percent
of the interviewed mines had not received noise training, 58
percent had not received chemical hazards training, 70 percent
had not received electrical hazards training, and 75 percent
did not get training on lockout/tagout procedures for operating
and repairing energized equipment.
Grupo Mexico has failed to install effective ventilation and
source pollution controls in the two ESDE plants to prevent
hazardous exposures to sulfuric acid mists to workers. One
marker of the levels of acid mist is that the floors and
structural steel frame of ESDE II building have been eaten away
by highly concentrated acid mist.
In addition to disassembling or failing to install effective
local exhaust ventilation to reduce worker exposure to airborne
contaminants, Grupo Mexico has relied on personal protective
equipment (PPE), inappropriate N-95 paper respirators, to
protect workers from particulates, acids and vapors. Moreover,
respirator users have not been medically evaluated, fit-tested
and trained in the use of the PPE.
Although the OHS survey team could not verify the exact
circumstances of the 50 separate accidents reported to have
occurred onsite in the last 12 months, the anecdotal reports of
broken limbs, amputations, electrocutions, falls, burns, and at
least one fatality, suggest these incidents were the result of
unsafe working conditions, poorly maintained machinery and
equipment, and inadequate safety procedures. Such root causes
of the reported accidents would closely coincide with the
onsite observations of the OHS survey team.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon to Questions Submitted
by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question 1. In the Joint Declaration dated October 22, 2007, the
United States and Mexican Governments announced this aid as the first
installment of a multiyear $1.4 billion aid package. Over how many
years is the aid projected to last? What is the breakdown for the
succeeding 2 years?
Answer. We currently envision the Merida Initiative as a 3-year
package of security cooperation with Mexico. We have asked Congress for
$500 million for Mexico in the fiscal year 2008 emergency supplemental.
The fiscal year 2009 foreign assistance budget is still under
discussion with OMB. We look forward to reviewing it with you once it
is presented to the Congress.
Question 2. The administration frames this as a 3-year security
cooperation package, but I understand that the Mexican Government views
this as the beginning of a long-term financial commitment by the United
States. Assuming Congress funds the proposal at the President's
requested level ($1.4 billion), would you expect the financial
component of U.S. assistance to cease at the end of the 3-year period?
If not, what sort of assistance do you envision beyond 3 years?
Answer. The Merida Initiative is a 3-year security cooperation
package. It responds to a request made by the Government of Mexico and
has a specific set of goals and objectives. We believe the Merida
Initiative will foster even closer ongoing, cooperative relations
between the United States and Mexico. This may require some
expenditures above the baseline of recent years, but we do not
anticipate an ongoing financial component of the magnitude we are
proposing now.
Question 3a. The joint statement notes that Mexico has increased
its security spending aimed at drug trafficking networks to $2.5
billion annually.
In total, what is the Mexican Government contributing from its
budget to combat drug trafficking and major criminal organizations?
Answer. Out of an approximate overall security budget for 2007 of
$7 billion (depending on exchange-rate variations), the Government of
Mexico is dedicating approximately $2.4 billion to the fight against
organized crime and drug trafficking. It is important to remember that
the states and municipal governments expend far greater amounts on
security and law enforcement, since they have primary jurisdiction.
According to the Embassy of Mexico, the Federal budget for 2007
includes funding directed to the fight against organized crime in the
following areas, in millions of dollars:
National Council Against Addictions............................... 78.6
Ministry of Communications and Transport.......................... 10.2
Customs........................................................... 11.7
Financial Intelligence Unit....................................... 5.1
Ministry of the Interior.......................................... 277.7
Ministry of National Defense...................................... 131.8
Ministry of the Navy.............................................. 21.1
Office of the Attorney General.................................... 36.5
Public Security Support Fund (FASP)............................... 459.3
Ministry of Public Security....................................... 1,255
Federal Preventive Police--(433.7)
Prevention and Social Rehabilitation--(222.5)
Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System--
(106)
Other areas (including Security Council and Minors Council)--
(492.8)
______
Total....................................................... 2,386
Question 3b. Has it committed to this level of funding--or even
increased funding--for the next 2 or 3 years?
Answer. President Calderon has publicly stated that restoring
public safety and security is the top priority of his administration.
As such, he has committed to taking those steps necessary to ensuring
this priority.
Question 3c. In Colombia, an additional tax was imposed to fund
programs for ``Plan Colombia.'' Is Mexico seeking additional revenue
sources domestically to pay for increased security efforts?
Answer. According to published Government of Mexico (GOM) figures,
spending for 2008 on the Ministry of Public Security will increase by
39.4 percent, for the Ministry of Defense by 4.6 percent, for the Navy
by 2.1 percent, for the Office of the Attorney General by 6 percent,
and the Secretariat of the Interior by 28 percent. More detailed
breakdowns for component agencies and specific projects are not yet
available.
GOM revenues for 2008 will increase by 1.2 percent of GDP, or
approximately USD 11.7 billion, as a result of tax changes in the
Public Finance Reform legislation, which was approved September 2007.
Question 4. Your testimony failed to provide any detail to a key
question: What will success look like? Beyond amorphous goals of
``reduced violence'' and increased stability, can you provide specific
performance metrics that we intend to achieve? Please provide a
detailed list of goals and performance metrics for this package.
Answer. The fight against organized crime and drug trafficking in
Mexico and Central America is tough, complex, and long term. The
commitment made by these countries is significant, and their
democratically elected governments will be held to account by voters.
The metric used by the citizens of Mexico and Central America will be
palpable and reflect their individual experiences: Can they win back
control of their communities and institutions, and build lives free of
intimidation and fear?
Our role in this great struggle is specific and immediate. In the
short term, we will determine the effectiveness of the Merida
Initiative by:
Increased arrests of drug traffickers and gang members, and
the harassment and dismantling of organized crime syndicates;
Increased interdiction of illegal drugs and weapons;
Improved effectiveness of the national judicial systems,
leading to a reduction in criminal case backlogs, a reduction
in the average length of trials, and increased confidence in
the courts;
Improved law enforcement cooperation across institutional
and national boundaries, leading to greater coordination of
police action, and the ability to pursue and arrest criminals
throughout Mesoamerica.
In the long term, we will measure the effectiveness of the Merida
Initiative by its ability to transform the tone and substance of our
bilateral and regional cooperation. The Merida Initiative represents a
new and innovative method to address shared responsibilities and shared
challenges. Its success, or failure, will shape the future of our
relationships.
Question 5. Many of the criminal organizations in Mexico fund
themselves through the drug trade. If one of the major goals of the
initiative is to dismantle these criminal organizations, shouldn't
another logical goal be reduced drug trade and flow into the United
States? If so, given your expectation that our assistance will lead to
``significantly reduced violence,'' how much concomitant reduction in
drug flow to the U.S. can we expect to see?
Answer. We strongly believe that by assisting Mexico and the
countries of Central America in confronting drug trafficking and
criminal organizations--as well as helping them strengthen their state
institutions--a reduction of illicit drugs flowing into the United
States from Mexico and Central America is likely.
The four primary goals of the Merida Initiative are to (1) break
the power and impunity of criminal organizations in Mexico and Central
America; (2) assist the Governments of Mexico and Central America in
strengthening border, air, and maritime controls from the Southwest
border of the United States to Panama; (3) improve the capacity of
justice systems in the region to conduct investigations and
prosecutions, implement the rule of law, protect human rights, and
sever the influence of incarcerated criminals with outside criminal
organizations; and (4) curtail gang activity in Mexico and Central
America and diminish the demand for drugs in the region.
The Merida Initiative is a key component in the U.S. Government's
efforts to enhance security and the rule of law in the region. These
include cooperation with other governments in the hemisphere to reduce
the production and trafficking of, as well as demand for, illegal
drugs. In the Western Hemisphere, these programs include the Southwest
Border Counternarcotics Strategy, joint interdiction programs with the
countries of the Caribbean and the United Kingdom, as well as our
efforts with our South American neighbors to attack drug production at
its source.
The supply of drugs flowing into the United States is, therefore,
subject to a number of complex factors that are beyond the scope of the
Merida Initiative. However, by focusing on attacking and dismantling
the drug trafficking and criminal organizations, strengthening state
institutions in Mexico and Central America, and reducing the levels of
demand for drugs throughout the region, it is our hope that a reduction
in violence, strengthening of state institutions and the rule of law,
and increased demand reduction will be accompanied by a corresponding
reduction in the flow of drugs entering the United States from Mexico
and Central America.
For our part, it is important to address domestic drug consumption.
Reducing demand for illegal drugs will be critical to reducing the
volume of illicit drugs entering the United States. As we implement the
foreign assistance programs under the Merida Initiative, we are
coordinating with U.S. agencies engaged in demand reduction.
Question 6. Senator Menendez pointed out that in 2003 the U.N.
Committee Against Torture found that the Mexican police commonly use
torture as a method of criminal investigation, and a report 2 years
later by the Mexican National Commission on Human Rights reported that
torture remains widespread in Mexico. What assurance can you provide
the committee that our assistance, in whatever form, will not be used
to facilitate these tactics? What assurances have you received from the
Mexican Government that human rights standards, in general, will be
respected in the policies and programs supported through this aid
package?
Answer. Mexican law prohibits torture and does not allow the use of
coerced confessions. Nevertheless, it continues to be a serious
problem. The Mexican Government has taken steps in recent years to
prevent any unlawful use of torture or coerced confessions by police or
military personnel.
In 2003, the Mexican Government promulgated guidelines that require
prosecutors and other law enforcement personnel to receive training on
human rights and police practice according to the Manual on the
Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This is commonly known as
the ``Istanbul Protocol'' and was adopted by the Human Rights
Commission of the United Nations. It establishes assessment,
investigation, and reporting guidelines and procedures in accordance
with international human rights standards and international
instruments.
The Merida Initiative includes funding to help strengthen and
expand the Office of Inspector General within the Mexican Attorney
General's Office, the Office of Professional Responsibility within the
new Mexican Federal Police, civilian complaint centers, and civilian
watchdog organizations. These tools will help maintain public
accountability of law enforcement and justice sector institutions, and
are strongly supported by the Calderon administration, which has
recognized the need to enhance their functions.
In late September 2007, in response to allegations of human rights
violations, the Mexican military accepted all of the recommendations of
Mexico's National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH). The Mexican
Secretariat of Defense affirmed its commitment to collaborating with
CNDH on all outstanding investigations. In October, a civilian court
found four soldiers guilty of rape and sentenced them to up to 41 years
in prison. This represented the first time that military personnel have
been tried in a civilian court in Mexico.
Question 7. What lessons have you learned from our assistance
program in Colombia, and how specifically are these lessons applied to
the Mexico proposal?
Answer. There are significant differences between Plan Colombia and
the Merida Initiative. Plan Colombia had components, such as
eradication and the fight against armed groups seeking to overthrow the
state that the Merida Initiative does not have. The Merida Initiative
is a more focused program with the vast majority of resources flowing
to civilian institutions.
We learned several important lessons in Colombia. First, the fight
against drug trafficking and organized crime is not simply a matter of
eradication or interrupting the transit of illicit goods. Organized
criminal organizations today seek to control institutions of the state
through violence and corruption. To address that, we are working with
Mexico and the countries of Central America on building institutions
that respond efficiently and democratically to the legitimate needs of
communities and cities. These institutions must be transparent and
accountable if they are to displace organized crime. Our common
approach with Mexican and Central American partners involves attacking
not only the leaders of organized crime, but also the financial and
personal networks these leaders use to manage their criminal
operations.
Another lesson is the importance of working with communities to
counter the negative influence of criminal organizations. This will
require improved communication by authorities with communities in which
the fight against organized crime is being conducted.
Finally, our experience in Colombia has clearly demonstrated the
importance of committed national leadership, as we have seen in
President Uribe. President Calderon and his colleagues in Central
America have also demonstrated strong leadership in confronting these
threats.
Question 8. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently
reported that while the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
had completed a congressionally mandated Southwest Border Strategy, it
had not completed an accompanying implementation plan. The GAO
recommended that ONDCP and the U.S. counternarcotics interagency
community coordinate with the Government of Mexico before it completed
the implementation plan. How does this initiative relate to the
Southwest Border Strategy and its implementation plan? Does it supplant
it? Does it add to it? Are the two plans coordinated with each other?
Answer. The National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy
(SWBS) was formally approved by the administration on March 23, 2006.
An Implementation Working Group (IWG) was subsequently formed under the
leadership of the Department of Homeland Security Office of
Counternarcotics Enforcement, and Department of Justice Office of the
Deputy Attorney General, to oversee the implementation of the
strategy's objectives. A classified implementation plan was completed
in the summer of 2007, and following consultations with Congress and
the Government of Mexico, the National Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy was announced publicly in October during a
visit by ONDCP Director Walters to San Diego.
Although the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy
was developed through the interagency process prior to the Merida
Initiative, we have made sure that the two programs are complementary.
The SWBS is primarily a domestic coordination plan, focused on what the
United States can do on its side of the border to reduce the flow of
illegal drugs. However, key aspects of the strategy include measures to
enhance border controls and coordinate with the Government of Mexico to
conduct seizures, investigations, and prosecutions. A key distinction
between the two initiatives is that the Southwest Border Strategy
primarily seeks to improve operational coordination, while the Merida
Initiative provides the tools to improve the Government of Mexico's
counterdrug and public security capacities, in addition to seeking
enhanced cooperation in law enforcement and security matters.
We believe that by coordinating each nation's domestic efforts,
working jointly through improved cooperation and communication, and
providing additional resources and support to Mexico and Central
America under the Merida Initiative, we will have the foundation to
establish a new, fully integrated framework of cooperation for law
enforcement partnership throughout this region.
Question 9. How was this aid package developed and what input did
the Government of Mexico have? Please be specific.
Answer. United States-Mexico Process: In March, President Bush
concluded his five-country visit of Latin America with a meeting with
President Calderon in Merida, Mexico. Not only did the two of them
build upon their initial conversation of November 2006, but President
Bush also carried up the ideas of regional cooperation he had just
discussed with President Berger in Guatemala.
In May, Mexican Foreign Minister Espinosa presented the Mexican
Government's proposal for U.S. Government security cooperation.
Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon led a group of senior U.S. officials to
Mexico City to discuss the broad outlines of the request with our
Mexican counterparts.
Thereafter, Mexican officials met with U.S. officials from a wide
variety of agencies. GOM officials presented the broad outlines of
their plans to combat drug trafficking and related violence. USG
officials asked questions about how the GOM request supported those
plans. Over the course of 2 months, validation teams--composed of USG
experts from among the interagency--traveled to Mexico for several days
at a time to discuss specific program components with their
counterparts.
United States-Central America Process: In March, the President also
met with President Berger of Guatemala. During that meeting, they
discussed the need for a comprehensive regional security plan to
address citizen insecurity in the region.
The interagency began planning in Washington, while the Central
American Integration System (SICA) worked to finalize their regional
security strategy. Assistant Secretary Shannon led the U.S. delegation
to the first U.S.-SICA Dialogue on Security, where SICA identified drug
trafficking, illicit trafficking of arms, and gangs as the most
pressing security concerns.
The USG interagency community reviewed the SICA request process,
making use of needs analyses conducted by posts, to develop an
appropriate response to the Central American threat and needs analysis.
We will continue to work with SICA and the Central American
governments as we move forward.
Question 10. What is the Government of Mexico's strategy for
attacking the drug trafficking threat in Mexico? How does the aid
proposal relate to this strategy? Does it simply provide aid in
furtherance of it, or does it involve changing Mexico's current
strategy, priorities, and programs?
Answer. Under President Calderon, the Government of Mexico has
already taken bold action to confront and dismantle the drug
trafficking and criminal organizations that have spread violence
throughout the country. U.S. assistance under the Merida Initiative
seeks to support Mexico by implementing specific strategies through
which both governments agree the U.S. can contribute valuable and
unique assistance.
Mexico's strategy against these criminal organizations falls under
four areas: (1) To recover public spaces from the cartels and maximize
full operational control of Mexican territory; (2) to dismantle the
drug trafficking and organized crime groups that are threatening public
order in Mexico; (3) to strengthen the criminal justice organizations
necessary to apprehend and prosecute the traffickers, and (4) to reduce
domestic demand for drugs within Mexico.
Question 11a. The largest single category of assistance for
Mexico--some 40 percent--is for eight Bell 412 helicopters for the
Mexican Air Force, and two CASA CN-235-300 maritime patrol aircraft for
the Mexican Navy. In the past, Mexico has had trouble maintaining U.S.-
provided aircraft. In the late 1990s, 73 UH-1H helicopters were
returned to the United States as unflyable. More recently, GAO said the
Department of Defense was discontinuing support for other UH-1H
helicopters; it also indicated that the Government of Mexico did not
provide the necessary funding to upgrade the C-26 aircraft surveillance
capability.
How were the helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft selected?
What are the mission requirements for each platform?
Answer. The GOM determined their mission requirements (range,
payload, etc.) and identified aircraft that best met those
requirements. In addition, a USG interagency validation team with
representatives from the Department of State, the Department of
Defense, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Homeland Security
reviewed the Mexican mission analysis and aircraft selection process.
The present request includes helicopters for the Mexican Army/Air Force
(SEDENA) and surveillance aircraft for the Navy (SEMAR). The aircraft
requested in the proposal now before Congress reflects the outcome of
those working sessions.
Key requirements identified by SEDENA for the helicopters included:
Night vision capability; hard points and wiring; cargo hook; armored
crew seats; state-of-the-art navigation and communication equipment;
MEDEVAC equipment; sufficient cargo and equipment capacity in Mexico's
geographic/atmospheric conditions (8,000+ feet altitude); and a robust
capacity for operational response. The fact that Mexico already
operates four BH-412 helicopters was another key factor in determining
which helicopter is the best operational, maintenance, and training fit
for SEDENA.
SEMAR defined the requirements for the maritime patrol aircraft as
including: Electronic cockpit instrument displays; palletized system to
outfit the aircraft for different missions; Forward Looking Infrared/
Electro-optics (FLIR/EO); Inverted Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR)
system; Automatic Identification System (AIS) receiver; Electronic
Support Measures (ESM); Flare launch system; and a 2,300 nm range. In
addition, SEMAR noted that it was interested in an aircraft that lent
itself to using operational techniques similar to those of the U.S.
Coast Guard, which is integrating the same aircraft into its fleet.
Question 11b. How will the Government of Mexico use the aircraft?
What end-use restrictions will the United States place on the aircraft?
How will the United States monitor the use of these aircraft?
Answer. SEDENA's mission for the helicopters is multipurpose, to
include transporting troops and police to fight organized crime and
drug trafficking; supporting civilian populations in case of disaster;
reconnaissance; transporting supplies; undertaking search and rescue;
MEDEVAC; and providing a surveillance platform for counterterrorism.
Most importantly, these helicopters will give the Mexican Air Force a
complete squadron of BH-412 helicopters (the Mexican Air Force has four
BH-412 helicopters on hand) that can provide mobility to rapid reaction
forces.
SEMAR's mission for its maritime patrol aircraft is aerial
surveillance patrol used to establish better control over maritime
territorial limits and to deny the use of the eastern Pacific and
western Caribbean to transnational criminal organizations and
terrorists.
The proposed funding source for the acquisition of these aircraft
for the military is the INCLE account. As such, Mexico is required to
employ these aircraft in a manner consistent with the agreed purposes
of the funding. The U.S. will monitor the status of these aircraft to
determine that they are being used and maintained appropriately and to
continually be aware of the location of these aircraft. The USG will
employ onsite visits, reports, and inspections to verify that Mexican
use of the equipment complies with the purposes of the Merida
Initiative and letters of agreement between Mexico and the United
States.
Question 11c. What are the operational flying rates for the Bell
412 helicopters currently in service for the Mexican Air Force?
Answer. SEDENA's operational cost per flight hour is roughly
US$2,000, which includes fuel, depreciation, and operation time into
account. During a visit to Santa Lucia Air Base in November, the Bell
412 squadron indicated that they were able to keep the four aircraft at
an operational flying rate near 90 percent. One of the aircraft was
undergoing a 150-hour inspection, and it appeared to be in excellent
condition. Technicians were performing the maintenance in accordance
with applicable manufacturer's technical manuals in English.
Question 11d. What are the operational flying rates for the CASA
212 aircraft currently in service for the Mexican Navy?
Answer. SEMAR's operational flying rate for the CASA 212 is
currently 400 hours per year with a planned increase to 600 hours per
year.
Question 11e. The detailed justification states that Mexico's
short-term objective is to build a fleet of six CASA 235s and seven
CASA 212s for maritime surveillance. Over what time period is this goal
expected to be met?
Answer. SEMAR has not shared an acquisition timeline, although it
has indicated its need to begin purchasing CASA 235s in the near-term
if the USG does not provide them. SEMAR has noted that all of its six
CASA 212-CEs were purchased in 1982 and have an expected remaining
service life of 6 years, which suggests an urgent need to purchase new
aircraft.
Question 11f. Have decisions been made about where these aircraft
will be based? What role did, or will, the United States have, in
making such decisions?
Answer. The Mexican AF has indicated that the Bell 412s will be
based at Santa Lucia Air Base, near Mexico City. Although the squadron
is based at Santa Lucia, the aircraft will be deployed throughout
Mexico to meet operational requirements. Aircraft are deployed with the
necessary operational, logistics, and maintenance elements to operate
in the deployed environment. Additionally, if a higher level of
maintenance skill is required, more skilled teams would be deployed to
the helicopter location to bring the aircraft to an operational
condition.
SEMAR has 25 years experience working with CASA 212-CEs, operating
them out of three bases--La Paz, Baja California Sur; Veracruz,
Veracruz; Tapachula, Chiapas. (A fourth base is planned for Campeche,
Chiapas.) These bases have hangars and workshops adequate to service
more than SEMAR's present fleet of seven CASA C-212-CEs. USG experts
are familiar with these bases and agree that they are adequate for
fulfilling the mission and for maintaining the equipment.
Question 11g. What is the anticipated procurement and production
schedule for the aircraft? If the funds are appropriated within the
next few months, when would you anticipate the aircraft will come off
the line?
Answer. In November meetings with Bell Helicopter and the ODC
(Office of Defense Coordination) Mexico, Bell indicated that the
aircraft is anticipated to come off the line approximately 1 year after
an order is made for the first two or three aircraft, and within the
following calendar year after that for the remaining aircraft. We
anticipate delivery of the first aircraft for SEMAR 18-20 months after
contract award, with the second aircraft delivered 1 month later.
Question 11h. How many pilots will be needed to fly the aircraft?
How much pilot training will be necessary before the Mexican Armed
Forces can utilize the aircraft? Where will the training be conducted?
Who will pay for it? At what cost? How long will such training take?
Answer. Both the Bell 412s for SEDENA and the CASA 235s for SEMAR
will be provided through a Foreign Military Sales framework, a total
package approach, which includes recommended training, supply support,
and technical assistance. All of these items have been incorporated
into the supplemental request. Transition training (training
experienced pilots to fly a new type of helicopter) for the aircraft
and systems is normally provided by the equipment manufacturer as part
of the purchase package.
The Mexican Air Force has about 60 pilots for the Bell 212, which
is a similar airframe as the 412. The current plan is to transition 212
pilots to the 412. Mexican officials indicated they currently have the
internal capability to conduct transitional training. Additionally,
because the 412 would replace aging 212s, maintenance and logistics
personnel would also be transitioned to the Bell 412. The similarity in
airframes for maintenance purposes would require minimal training for
maintenance personnel to transition to the 412. It is anticipated that
the GOM would be able to absorb the 412s mostly using internal
resources for training. It is not anticipated that the Mexican AF would
need any long-term training/contractor support for operations or
maintenance. Initial training for maintenance and operations will be
provided with the acquisition of the Bell 412s. However, the long-term
approach is for the Mexican Air Force to train its own pilots through
train-the-trainer programs. Transition training is of limited duration,
accomplished over the period of several months.
For the CASA 235s for SEMAR, the notional crew for each of the two
additional aircraft is five personnel, two of whom are pilots. For 25
years SEMAR pilots have capably flown CASA 212s, which are similar in
configuration to the requested CASA 235s. With this pool of experienced
pilots, we do not anticipate the need for initial training, and the
package includes funding for transition training. Training is planned
for up to eight pilots per airframe, covering 20 working days of ground
training, 128 hours in a simulator, and 36 flight hours. All training
would occur in the U.S. The cost of conducting the pilot and
maintenance training is included in the proposed assistance and is
budgeted for $1.4 million. SEMAR would fund student travel and living
allowances separately.
Question 11i. How many maintenance personnel will be needed to
sustain the new aircraft? Is additional training required for them? If
so, what is the plan for such training?
Answer. As discussed in section (h), Mexican AF (MAF) personnel are
currently maintaining Bell 212s, a similar airframe. The MAF intends to
decommission older Bell 212s with the arrival of the 412s. This would
enable these maintenance personnel with similar maintenance training
requirements to transition to the 412 with limited transition training.
The plan for this transition training is to send personnel to training
provided by Bell during the acquisition period of the aircraft.
Additional technicians would be trained internally by the MAF.
The MAF indicated that air force units host maintenance personnel
with equipment maintenance capability. Additionally they have developed
intermediate and depot level maintenance capabilities for their
helicopters. Their maintenance plan enables the MAF to conduct all
these levels of maintenance at home station and at any deployed
locations in Mexico.
The proposed training for SEMAR would provide up to six maintenance
technicians per airframe, including 40 working days of powerplant/
systems, electrical/
instruments/avionics and engine run-up training. All training would
occur in the U.S. The cost of conducting the pilot and maintenance
training is included in the proposed assistance and is budgeted for
$1.4 million. SEMAR would fund student travel and living allowances,
separately.
Question 11j. What degree of contractor support will be necessary
for logistics and maintenance of the aircraft? For how long?
Answer. We anticipate that the MAF will not require any long-term
contractor support for the operation, logistics, and maintenance of the
Bell 412s. With the acquisition of the helicopters, the plan is to
purchase the necessary parts for a 2-year operational period. This
support period will allow the MAF to develop internal logistics
capabilities to meet the increased demand for the additional eight
aircraft. It is envisioned that the development of this capability will
be mainly through internal MAF resources with minimal assistance from
outside contractors.
The proposed initial logistic support for the SEMAR aircraft
includes notional operation-level spares for a period of 3 years,
assuming 700 flight hours per year, plus one spare turbo-prop engine
per airframe. The budget for spares included in the proposed assistance
is $6 million per airframe. Additionally, the proposed assistance
includes $3.5 million for full in-service technical support provided by
in-country vendor field representatives for a period of 3 years. In
combination, this logistic support proposal should provide aircraft
operational availability of 90 percent.
Question 12. The most recent National Drug Threat Assessment issued
by the National Drug Intelligence Center indicated that the trafficking
of drugs in the eastern Pacific increased substantially in the last
couple of years. That suggests a need for significant assets in
maritime interdiction. Yet the request is for only two maritime patrol
aircraft (CASA 235) that cost $50 million apiece. What other measures
are the two governments taking, or planning to take, to confront
trafficking in this corridor?
Answer. The U.S. Coast Guard and Mexico are working closely in many
areas to improve maritime cooperation. In early December, a delegation
from the Mexican Navy (led by Secretary of the Navy Admiral Sanyez)
visited U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters to discuss ways to improve
cooperative efforts. The Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR) is itself
looking to procure small boats to improve law enforcement presence
along their coasts and discussed various options with U.S. Coast Guard
officials.
Over the past year, the Coast Guard has noted a significant
improvement in Government of Mexico's responsiveness to inquiries on
vessels claiming Mexican nationality. The Mexican Navy officials stated
that the GOM is working hard to improve coverage of their maritime
regions through an automated information system, which will provide
greater transparency of the maritime traffic in the eastern Pacific
Ocean. The USG, through the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS)
and the USCG's Eleventh District, continues to conduct detection,
monitoring, and drug interdiction operations in the eastern Pacific
narcotics trafficking transit zone. The USG has discussed establishing
agreed interdiction principles with Mexico, which would improve our
ability to more quickly reach decisions on tactical maritime
cooperation; however, no formal agreement or process has been
established.
Question 13. I have long been concerned with corruption in the
Mexican Government, including in its law enforcement institutions. What
specific measures will be taken to ensure that assistance is provided
only to vetted units? Who will conduct the vetting, by what standard,
and in what capacity?
Answer. Some Mexican Federal law enforcement agencies are beginning
to use polygraphs as one aspect of a developing comprehensive vetting
program to weed out corrupt officers. USG law enforcement agencies
(LEAs) and the Embassy Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) are all helping
train Mexican Federal LEA personnel in administering polygraph
examinations. USG LEAs and NAS will continue to independently vet units
they work with directly.
The Secretariat for Public Security (SSP) has announced plans to
hire an additional 8,000 investigators, adding to an already existing
Federal police force of about 27,000. Our understanding is that this
additional capacity will allow all new recruits to undergo initial
vetting, while all SSP personnel will be subject to periodic vetting.
To ensure that assistance is only provided to the intended
recipients, such as vetted units, the Embassy has in place end-use
monitoring systems, which allow Foreign Service Officers staffing the
Narcotics/Law Enforcement Affairs Sections (NAS) in our Embassies in
Mexico and the Central America countries to oversee the programs. These
individuals are supported in Washington by Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) subject and country
experts, as well as budget and management experts. For example, INL
regularly sends in-house experts to evaluate procedures and records at
NAS operations throughout the world, conducting Management Assessment
Visits that review NAS policies and procedures for internal management
controls, property management (including end-use monitoring),
contracting and procurement, financial management and human resources
management.
Each NAS monitors the condition and maintenance of commodities
provided to the recipient agency of the host governments. They use this
information to produce an end-use monitoring report which forms part of
a comprehensive annual report to Congress. The State Department
considers end-use monitoring one of the critical management tasks for
which field offices are responsible.
The Merida Initiative will also combat corruption through programs
for police professionalization and training, including ethics and
anticorruption training, support for the Government of Mexico's Federal
anticorruption agency (Secretariat of Public Administration); an
expansion of an existing Culture of Lawfulness project designed to
develop public support for the rule of law; assistance to the Office of
the Attorney General (PGR) in establishing citizen complaint offices to
provide a venue for the public to register complaints of malfeasance or
abuse; and strengthening the PGR's Office of Inspector General, and the
SSP's Office of Professional Responsibility, to improve internal
integrity mechanisms in the Mexican law enforcement community. The
initiative will also provide training for civil society NGOs to educate
the general populace concerning their rights, responsibilities, and
recourse to redress grievances; and will encourage NGO participation on
advisory boards to monitor the effectiveness of citizen complaint
centers and internal oversight bodies.
Question 14. The aid proposal calls for $37 million for
``additional staff, equipment, and technical assistance and evaluation
costs needed'' to implement and monitor the Mexico program. In a press
briefing on October 22, Assistant Secretary Shannon stated that we are
``not going to have to increase . . . our personnel footprint in
Mexico.'' This statement was preceded by a reference to law enforcement
officers. Was the statement about not increasing personnel focused only
on law enforcement officers, or all personnel?
Answer. On October 22, Assistant Secretary Shannon was speaking
about law enforcement and military personnel. Initial estimates
indicate that providing the full level of program support and oversight
functions will require up to 75 additional personnel. The majority
would be foreign national staff filling financial management
(accounting, voucher examination) and logistics support capacities, but
would also include several personal services contract (PSC) personnel
focusing on contract and project management and oversight. They would
be based in Washington, DC, Mexico, and Central America.
Question 15. How many additional U.S. personnel, whether direct
hires or contractors, will be necessary to implement and monitor the
Mexico program? Where will they be located? What funds may be needed to
provide necessary office space in Embassy Mexico City?
Answer. Initial personnel estimates indicate that providing the
full level of program support and oversight functions for the programs
requested will require up to 75 additional personnel in Mexico, Central
America, and Washington, DC; most of these would be involved in
managing the resources provided to Mexico. The majority of these
additional personnel would be foreign national staff filling financial
management (e.g., accounting and voucher examination) and logistics
support capacities. These additional personnel would also include
personal services contract (PSC) personnel focusing on contract and
project management, project oversight, and financial and contacts
audits.
The Embassy in Mexico City is still considering the best means to
provide adequate office space for these staff. Any arrangement must
meet all relevant regulations regarding security.
The funds requested for overhead ought to be adequate to cover the
administrative requirements for managing these resources appropriately.
Question 16. Please provide a breakdown, by agency, of the number
of personnel in Embassy Mexico City working on law enforcement matters
(including the NAS, DEA, FBI, DHS, etc.) as of the start of fiscal
2008.
Answer. There are 284 personnel working on law enforcement matters
across Mission Mexico, which includes the constituent posts. Of these,
220 are U.S. direct hires or personal service contractors (U.S. DH/PSC)
and 64 are Locally Employed Staff (LES). For the agency and post
breakdown, please see the chart below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agency LES U.S. DH/PSC Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
State/Narcotics Affairs Section
(NAS)
Mexico City.................. 10 7 17
--------------------------------------
Total...................... 10 7 17
======================================
DOJ/Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA)
Mexico City.................. 6 44 50
Ciudad Juarez................ 1 6 7
Guadalajara.................. 2 7 9
Matamoros.................... ........... 6 6
Merida....................... 1 5 6
Monterrey.................... 2 7 9
Nogales...................... ........... 6 6
Nuevo Laredo................. ........... 6 6
Tijuana...................... 2 8 10
Mazatlan..................... 4 7 11
Hermosillo................... 1 6 7
--------------------------------------
Total...................... 19 108 127
======================================
DOJ/Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)
Mexico City.................. ........... 22 22
Ciudad Juarez................ ........... 2 2
Guadalajara.................. ........... 3 3
Monterrey.................... ........... 3 3
Tijuana...................... ........... 2 2
Hermosillo................... ........... 1 1
--------------------------------------
Total...................... ........... 33 33
======================================
DOJ/Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire Arms
and E. (ATF)
Mexico City.................. 2 4 6
Monterrey.................... ........... 2 2
--------------------------------------
Total...................... 2 6 8
======================================
DOJ/Office of International
Affairs (OIA)
Mexico City.................. ........... 2 2
--------------------------------------
Total...................... ........... 2 2
======================================
DOJ/U.S. Marshall (USMS)
Mexico City.................. 2 3 5
--------------------------------------
Total...................... 2 3 5
======================================
DHS/U.S. Citizen & Immigration
Services (CIS)
Mexico City.................. 7 6 13
Ciudad Juarez................ 3 3 6
Monterrey.................... 3 2 5
Tijuana...................... 3 1 4
--------------------------------------
Total...................... 16 12 28
======================================
DHS/Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE)
Mexico City.................. 5 14 19
Ciudad Juarez................ 2 3 5
Monterrey.................... 2 5 7
Tijuana...................... ........... 3 3
Hermosillo................... ........... 5 5
--------------------------------------
Total...................... 9 30 39
======================================
DHS/Customs and Border Protection
(CBP)
Mexico City.................. 3 7 10
--------------------------------------
Total...................... 3 7 10
======================================
DHS/U.S. Secret Service (USSS)
Mexico City.................. 1 3 4
--------------------------------------
Total...................... 1 3 4
======================================
DHS/Transportation Security
Administration (ATS)
Mexico City.................. 1 1 2
--------------------------------------
Total...................... 1 1 2
======================================
Mexico City.................. 1 2 3
--------------------------------------
Total...................... 1 2 3
======================================
Treasury/Internal Revenue Service/
Criminal Investigation Division
(IRS-CID)
Mexico City.................. ........... 2 2
--------------------------------------
Total...................... ........... 2 2
======================================
DOD/Information Analysis Center
(IAC)
Mexico City.................. ........... 4 4
--------------------------------------
Total...................... ........... 4 4
======================================
Grand total................ 64 220 284
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 17. A recent report by the Government Accountability
Office noted the United States and Mexico have cooperated on maritime
interdiction in recent years but that the two countries have not agreed
to a bilateral maritime cooperation agreement to allow U.S. law
enforcement personnel to board and search Mexican-flagged vessels
without asking the Government of Mexico for authority to board on a
case-by-case basis.
a. What measures are currently in place for boarding suspect
vessels?
b. Are we seeking such an agreement that would provide authority to
board in advance, and what obstacles are there to achieving such an
agreement?
Answer. The Calderon administration has been noticeably more
responsive to U.S. requests to board suspect Mexican-flagged vessels
than were previous administrations. While there is currently no formal
maritime agreement between the United States and Mexico, Government of
Mexico (GOM) permission to board a Mexican-flag vessel is accomplished
by approaching the GOM on a case-by-case basis, pursuant to article 17
of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988.
Question 18. In March 2007, the Bureau of Western Wemisphere
Affairs issued a fact sheet stating that the Inter-American Convention
Against Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in firearms will ``make
the citizens of the hemisphere safer.'' But just a month earlier, in a
letter to this committee setting forth its priorities for treaties in
the 110th Congress, the Department stated that it did not support
Senate action on this convention.
If the convention will make the citizens of the hemisphere safer,
and the Government of Mexico is asking for our help in reducing
firearms trafficking, why does the administration not support Senate
action on this convention?
Answer. The Department of State continues to believe that the
Organization of American States' Convention against Illicit
Manufacturing of and trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives,
and Other Related Material (CIFTA) will make the citizens of the
hemisphere safer by helping shut down the illicit transnational arms
market that fuels the violence associated with drug trafficking,
terrorism, and international organized crime. We therefore share your
interest in the CIFTA and appreciate the importance you attach to it.
We are in the process of reviewing the convention and consulting
with the interagency community, industry, and civil society on the
importance we attach to ratification of this convention.
Question 19a. Information provided to the committee indicates that
of the funds for Central America, nearly $15 million, or nearly 30
percent, are not allocated to a specific country. The material
indicates that it will be determined based on consultations with the
Central American Integration System.
Why was this proposal submitted at this time, given that you have
not yet finished even preliminary planning for how you would spend the
funds?
Answer. The administration's plan calls for $14.8 million of the
$50 million request to be spent on prison reform and basic nonlethal
equipment for police forces. During USG consultations with the Central
American Integration System (SICA) on the Merida Initiative, the State
Department requested that each Central American Government provide a
list of prioritized nonlethal equipment and prison reform needs.
Central American nations are in the process of finalizing their
requirements. Once we receive these, we will send expert teams to the
region in early 2008 to refine these requests, which will allow us to
rapidly finalize our proposed allocations in these two categories.
Question 19b. When do you expect to complete these consultations
and then be able to provide Congress with more specific information?
Answer. These consultations at the Embassy level have been ongoing
and build on our existing counternarcotics and law enforcement
programs. We expect to begin sending Washington-based, specialized
interagency teams to Central America in early 2008. We should be able
to provide more specific information to Congress as soon as possible
after the assessments are completed.
Question 19c. What assessments have been conducted in preparation
of this request?
Answer. Our Embassies in Central America have ongoing relationships
with public and security forces that form the basis for assessing and
determining individual countries' needs. Following President Bush's
important consultations with President Berger in March, Assistant
Secretary Shannon led the U.S. delegation to the first U.S.-SICA
Dialogue on Security in July. There, SICA identified drug trafficking,
illicit trafficking of arms, and gangs as the most pressing security
concerns. In August, embassies in the region provided to the Department
their own comprehensive assessment of needs. Throughout September and
October, multiple Washington interagency meetings considered this
information and compiled the program proposals for Central America
submitted under the Merida Initiative supplemental request. The SICA
regional security plan that was presented in September (and formally
approved by the SICA presidents on December 12 at their SICA summit)
provided valuable information for these deliberations. In November, USG
officials formally presented and briefed the administration's Central
America request to the SICA vice-ministers.
Question 20. What additional U.S. personnel will be needed--whether
direct hires or contractors--to implement the Central American portion
of this request? Where will they be located?
Answer. The additional personnel overseeing the Central American
portion of the request will be located at the embassies in the region.
The majority would be foreign national staff filling financial
management (accounting, voucher examination) and logistics support
capacities, but would also include several personal services contract
(PSC) personnel focusing on contract and project management, project
oversight, and financial and contacts audits. As many as 18 staff could
be required in the Central America region out of total 75 personnel.
Question 21. You testified that you regret that you were unable to
engage in consultations with Congress prior to the announcement of this
aid proposal. Why were such consultations not undertaken?
Answer. Our intention was to provide the Congress a credible
security cooperation package that reflected the best efforts and work
of our interagency community, including conversations with our Mexican
and Central American counterparts. We believe we have prepared such a
package and we commit to work closely with the Congress to craft a
security cooperation relationship with Mexico and Central America that
will meet our national security interests and take full advantage of
the historic opportunity we now have.
Question 22. It has been reported that the Central American
countries are concerned that the robust $500 million request for Mexico
and only $50 million earmarked for all seven Central American countries
would shift drug trafficking operations from Mexico to Central America.
Do you believe there are sufficient resources allocated to Central
America to prevent this from occurring? What specific steps are being
taken to ensure that such a shift does not happen? What funding
requests within the initiative would help Central America fight against
any increased trafficking in its countries as a result of what we hope
will be disrupted drug flow in Mexico?
Answer. Drug trafficking and criminal violence are very serious
problems in Central America. The $50 million request for Central
America is part of a continuing assistance program. The Central America
portion of the package was formulated to support the regional security
strategy developed by the Central American Integration System (SICA).
The requested $50 million would directly respond to their identified
training and material shortfalls as we continue to define more
effective joint approaches and measures to address transnational
threats.
As the Merida Initiative was developed, we discussed internally, as
well as with Central American governments, the possibility of
traffickers using alternative routes through Central America if the
proposed programs are successful in Mexico. Our goal is to develop a
substantive, mutually beneficial security partnership with our Central
American neighbors that will improve the security of the region as a
whole.
The Merida Initiative's Central American component was designed as
a regional approach. For example, the package includes training and
equipment for port, airport, and border security in Central America;
upgraded maritime interdiction assets (Costa Rica); expansion of
sensitive investigation police units focused on counternarcotics; and
enhanced information-sharing and collection, such as upgrading crime
and fingerprint databases.
We intend to use this program to build a the stronger political
will among SICA member states to work with each other, as well as with
Mexico and the USG.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon to Questions Submitted
by Senator Robert Menendez
Question 1. You continually said in the hearing that you, ``regret
that you were unable to consult Congress over this package.''
a. Why were you unable to consult with Congress?
Answer. Our intention was to provide the Congress a credible
security cooperation package that reflected the best efforts and work
of our interagency community, including conversations with our Mexican
and Central American counterparts. We believe we have prepared such a
package and we commit to work closely with the Congress to craft a
security cooperation relationship with Mexico and Central America that
will meet our national security interests and take full advantage of
the historic opportunity we now have.
Question 2. The situation in Mexico has grown increasingly complex.
In addition to violence and corruption, Mexico has become a drug
producing country itself. Also, Mexico now also faces a growing problem
with drug consumption.
a. Do you recognize these two developments as threats in
Mexico?
b. What specifically in the packages addresses these two
threats?
Answer. The increase in drug production and consumption is a threat
in Mexico, and along the U.S. border. The Government of Mexico
recognizes this threat and has taken decisive actions to address it.
The Merida Initiative proposes to increase U.S. support and
cooperation in interdiction activities, information-driven operations,
and enhanced law enforcement cooperation. For example, the proposed
inspection equipment and canine units will help Mexico deter production
and inhibit the transport of drugs and drug precursors, including those
used to produce methamphetamines. The advanced IT equipment will help
facilitate law enforcement information-sharing and expedite crime scene
analysis to target major drug production centers; and the support for
institution-building will help strengthen Mexico's judicial and law
enforcement institutions' capacity to dismantle Mexico's criminal
organizations and have a real impact on drug production and
trafficking.
The programs proposed as part of the Merida Initiative, however,
are only supplemental to the leadership Mexico has taken in addressing
organized crime and drug production, which includes combined efforts on
interdiction, eradication, public awareness campaigns, and economic
development. In addition to our cooperation on interdiction, we have
supported Mexico's efforts against domestic production and its internal
demand.
On demand reduction, we propose to support Mexico's considerable
efforts in drug addiction treatment and prevention by providing $15.157
million of communications technology. This will be used to build a
nationwide network to link the over 300 centers to reduce drug
consumption and enable the delivery of Mexican Government drug
addiction prevention and treatment programs throughout the country. In
September, the Government of Mexico announced the creation of 300
specialized treatment medical units nationwide (70 ready in 2007) and
64 new Community Centers for Comprehensive Addiction Treatment. The
Government of Mexico has an annual budget of $110 million for
prevention and treatment of addictions. Approximately $27 million
supports the Youth Integration Centers and $14.5 million is directed
toward the prevention and treatment of addictions. Mexico's asset
forfeiture law requires that 33 percent of assets seized be used for
demand reduction programs.
Question 3. Despite having brought up Central American gang
violence policy recommendations in a hearing over 2 years to solve a
problem that has plagued Central America for well over 2 years, we now
see this request in an emergency supplemental. And this is true for the
$500 million to Mexico. I'm concerned over how this will affect future
Latin American foreign assistance.
a. How will this package affect overall U.S. Foreign
Assistance to Latin America in the FY09 budget?
b. Will this package continue to be paid for over the
existing level or do you predict some sort of cuts?
Answer.
3a. The FY 2009 budget is still under discussion with OMB. We look
forward to reviewing it with you once it is finalized. The Merida
Initiative is a high priority, as is existing funding to the
hemisphere; however, we are unable to predict future funding levels.
3b. On July 18, at the inaugural, U.S.-SICA Security Dialogue, I
announced the U.S. Strategy to Combat Gangs from Central America and
Mexico. Under this comprehensive strategy, the United States is working
with partner countries to combat transnational and other gangs that
commit crimes in Central America, Mexico, and the United States. The
U.S. Gang Strategy focuses efforts in five areas: Diplomacy,
repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention.
Work has begun under all five pillars. In addition to work being
done throughout the interagency to confront the gang issue in Central
America, at the July meeting, the U.S. Government committed $3 million
for prevention efforts and we have recently reprogrammed $16 million
that will help fund portions of the gang strategy also.
The Merida Initiative, if funded, would permit us to fully
implement the gang strategy. The package contains elements to improve
law enforcement capabilities in Central America as well as increased
funding for prevention programs, including funding for community
policing and reintegration programs.
Question 4. The $50 million in assistance for the Central American
States is one-tenth of that slated for Mexico.
a. Is not the problem of drug trafficking and criminal
violence just as serious in those countries?
b. Are there plans to increase funding to Central America in
the future?
c. When will those proposals be presented to Congress?
Answer. Drug trafficking and criminal violence are very serious
problems in Central America. Like the funds requested for Mexico, the
$50 million request for Central America is a first step. We expect to
request additional funds in support of the Merida Initiative as a part
of the regular budget cycle.
The Central America portion of the package was formulated to
support the regional security strategy developed by the Central
American Integration System (SICA). The targeted assistance at this
time would directly respond to their request as we seek to define more
effective joint approaches and measures to address transnational
threats. On November 20, a technical team traveled to Guatemala to hold
consultations and continue our dialog on deepening security
cooperation. Additional teams will travel to Central America later this
month.
Question 5. Documents provided to this committee this week indicate
that some $11 million of the $50 million requested--over 20 percent of
the request--is for equipment for the police for the nations of Central
America. The allocations to the individual countries have not been
determined.
a. What assessments have been conducted to determine the
amount of assistance required?
b. When do you expect to determine these country
allocations?
c. Why should Congress provide this assistance when the
administration has not even engaged in such basic allocations
between countries?
Answer. To ensure the most effective use of resources, it was very
important for us to consult with the Central American countries to
determine their police equipment needs before allocating funding to
individual countries. With that information, the United States will be
able to provide underequipped Central American countries with the
equipment that will best allow civilian law enforcement forces to
respond to the most pressing threats they deal with on a daily basis.
We have identified initial funding levels, but we are still in the
process of confirming these amounts. We have and continue to work
closely with our embassies and personnel on the ground to assess and
determine individual countries' law enforcement needs. In response to
our November 20 request during USG consultations with the Central
American Integration System (SICA) on the Merida Initiative, we have
received lists of prioritized nonlethal equipment needs from each
Central American Government. We are using this information, together
with that provided by our experts in the region, to refine our
decisions. Additionally, expert teams will travel to the region in mid-
January to conduct further assessments. Once we have a complete picture
of the requirements, we will work with Congress to allocate funds to
individual countries.
Question 6. In the hearing you mentioned that you will vet
agencies/units who would receive U.S. funding to make sure that the
funding will not be used to suppress human rights or any crimes.
a. How exactly does this vetting process work?
b. What safeguards are proposed to ensure that the proposed
assistance is used for its intended purpose and to ensure that
our partners are not cooperating with the drug cartels?
Answer. The Embassy vets Mexican Government officials from law
enforcement agencies who attend USG-sponsored training or receive other
direct benefits, in accordance with the provisions of the Leahy
amendment, to determine whether they, or the units of which they are
members, are known to have been involved in any past human rights
abuses. This process involves name checking through databases at the
Embassy and in Washington.
The proposed support will be provided in the form of equipment and
training. The Embassy has in place end-use monitoring systems to ensure
that the elements provided are used for their intended purposes. The
programs will be overseen by Foreign Service Officers staffing the
Narcotics/Law Enforcement Affairs Sections (NAS) in our Embassies in
Mexico and the Central America countries; these individuals are
supported in Washington by Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) subject and country experts, as well as
budget and management experts. For example, INL regularly sends in-
house experts to inspect NAS offices throughout the world, conducting
Management Assessment Visits that review NAS policies and procedures
for internal management controls, property management (including end-
use monitoring), contracting and procurement, financial management, and
human resources management.
Each NAS monitors the condition and maintenance of commodities
provided to the recipient agency of the host governments. They use this
information to produce an end-use monitoring report which forms part of
a comprehensive annual report to Congress. The State Department
considers end-use monitoring one of the critical management tasks for
which field offices are responsible.
Additionally, the Mexican Government is undertaking great efforts
to monitor the reliability of its own staff. Mexican law enforcement
agencies are developing their own vetting systems that include the use
of polygraphs to weed out corrupt officers. USG law enforcement
agencies train the Mexican personnel who administer these tests in the
proper use of the polygraph.
On November 16, 2007, 22 new Mexican Federal Police (SSP) polygraph
examiners graduated from a course given by the Texas Department of
Public Security (DPS) Police Academy in Austin, TX, that was organized
by the FBI and financed by NAS/Mexico. During this intensive 10-week
training course, the DPS and the FBI also provided a 1-week inservice
``Senior Polygraph Examiners'' training course to the SSP's existing 15
seasoned (and vetted) polygraph staff, so that they could serve as
mentors to the new recruits and train other entrants.
Question 7. The joint statement notes that Mexico has increased its
security spending aimed at drug trafficking networks to $2.5 billion
annually.
a. What is Mexico contributing from its budget?
Answer. Out of an approximate overall security budget for 2007 of
$7 billion (depending on exchange-rate variations), the Government of
Mexico is dedicating approximately $2.4 billion to the fight against
organized crime and drug trafficking. It is important to remember that
the states and municipal governments expend far greater amounts on
security and law enforcement, since they have primary jurisdiction.
According to the Embassy of Mexico, the Federal budget for 2007
includes funding directed to the fight against organized crime in the
following areas, in millions of dollars:
National Council Against Addictions............................... 78.6
Ministry of Communications and Transport.......................... 10.2
Customs........................................................... 11.7
Financial Intelligence Unit....................................... 5.1
Ministry of the Interior.......................................... 277.7
Ministry of National Defense...................................... 131.8
Ministry of the Navy.............................................. 21.1
Office of the Attorney General.................................... 36.5
Public Security Support Fund (FASP)............................... 459.3
Ministry of Public Security....................................... 1,255
Federal Preventive Police--(433.7)
Prevention and Social Rehabilitation--(222.5)
Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System--
(106)
Other areas (including Security Council and Minors Council)--
(492.8)
______
Total....................................................... 2,386
7b. Has it committed to this level of funding--or even
increased funding--for the next 2 or 3 years?
Answer. President Calderon has publicly stated that restoring
public safety and security is the top priority of his administration.
As such, he has committed to taking those steps necessary to ensuring
this priority.
7c. In Colombia, an additional tax was imposed to fund
programs for ``Plan Colombia.'' Is Mexico seeking additional
revenue sources domestically to pay for increased security
efforts?
Answer. According to published Government of Mexico (GOM) figures,
spending for 2008 on the Ministry of Public Security will increase by
39.4 percent, for the Ministry of Defense by 4.6 percent, for the Navy
by 2.1 percent, for the Office of the Attorney General by 6 percent,
and the Secretariat of the Interior by 28 percent. More detailed
breakdowns for component agencies and specific projects are not yet
available.
GOM revenues for 2008 will increase by 1.2 percent of GDP, or
approximately USD 11.7 billion, as a result of tax changes in the
Public Finance Reform legislation, which was approved September 2007.
Question 8. My concern is that by attacking the supply side and not
the demand side, we will only squeeze the cartels, drug trafficking and
violence to a different region. The Caribbean, and specifically Haiti,
are likely new destinations.
a. What is in this package to prevent that from happening?
b. What are our current efforts to prevent that from
happening?
Answer. This package focuses on improving the capacity of the
Mexican and Central American governments to meet their security and law
enforcement challenges, and does not provide for increased assistance
to Caribbean governments. Nevertheless, we are cognizant of the
possibility that success in Mexico and Central America may force drug
trafficking and other organized criminals to seek new routes and
methods.
Current U.S. counternarcotics assistance, administered by the
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
provides training, equipment, travel, and technical assistance for a
number of law enforcement and drug demand-reduction efforts in the
Caribbean. The primary purpose is to improve the capacity of law
enforcement agencies to target trafficking organizations and conduct
more efficient interdiction operations. INL assistance often supports
specialized units, such as canine detection and vetted investigative
units. INL funding also supports demand reduction programs,
participation in interoperability conferences, and in some cases
participation in the Container Security Initiative. In the Eastern
Caribbean, INL assistance also supports restoration and ongoing
maintenance of interdiction patrol boats. In Haiti, U.S.
counternarcotics and security assistance focuses on reform of the
Haitian National Police (HNP) and the Haitian Coast Guard. USG-provided
equipment and technical assistance is aimed at transforming the HNP
into an effective law enforcement institution. In addition, the U.S.
Coast Guard supports Haitian Coast Guard operations with leadership and
technical courses and visits by Mobile Training Teams on such areas as
boat maintenance, law enforcement techniques, and port security
operations.
In addition to the counternarcotics assistance provided INL,
several Caribbean countries are participating in Operation Enduring
Friendship, a maritime security program designed to help defend the
southern approaches of the United States by increasing the maritime
domain awareness and interdiction capabilities of the participating
countries. While Operation Enduring Friendship is intended to help
protect the United States and the region from the full range of
maritime threats, its improvements to regional maritime cooperation and
interdiction will help to deter illegal trafficking in the region.
It should also be noted that since the heyday of Caribbean
trafficking, the U.S. and its regional partners have taken several
important steps to make illegal trafficking through the region more
difficult. The aforementioned programs as well as Operation Bahamas,
Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), an interagency counternarcotics operation in
cooperation with the Commonwealth of The Bahamas, provide striking
examples. A 2005 GAO report noted that improved intelligence, better
regional maritime cooperation, and the use of armed helicopters against
go-fast boats, have combined to make the Caribbean a more dangerous
environment for drug traffickers. The result was a string of
recordbreaking years for drug seizures and disruptions in the drug
transit zone from 2000-2005. The same report emphasized the importance
of the 25 Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements between
the U.S. and regional governments.
We believe that our assistance programs, excellent regional
cooperation, and support for USG agencies such as Joint Inter-Agency
Task Force South, will deter illegal trafficking organizations from
moving the bulk of their activity to the central and eastern Caribbean.
However, we will be in close contact with the intelligence and law
enforcement communities, as well as our partners in the region, looking
at any indications that such a transition is underway.
Question 9. The State Department Human Rights Report for 2006
(issued in March 2007) states that ``a deeply entrenched culture of
impunity and corruption persisted'' in Mexico, ``particularly at the
state and local level.'' Among the human rights problems reported were
unlawful killings by security forces; kidnappings, including by police;
torture; arbitrary arrests and detention; corruption, inefficiency, and
lack of transparency in the judicial system.''
a. What measures will be taken as part of this assistance
program to improve the human rights record of Mexico's security
forces?
b. What is being done in Mexico to address the widespread
use of torture in the public security and criminal justice
systems, the same institutions that are primary recipients of
U.S. assistance under the President's proposal?
Answer.
a. The protection of human rights is an integral part of all USG
training programs, both in the course curriculum and in the selection
and vetting of the individuals and units to be trained. The Merida
Initiative includes $3.5 million specifically for human rights training
of security forces and support for NGOs and other civil society groups
involved in human rights and citizen participation activities.
The Merida Initiative includes funding to help strengthen and
expand the office of inspector general at the Attorney General's
Office, the Office of Professional Responsibility, which has authority
to investigate both police and civilians, the Secretariat of the Public
Function, which has governmentwide investigative authority, civilian
complaint centers, and support for civilian watchdog organizations.
These tools will help maintain public accountability of law enforcement
and justice sector institutions, and those within the Mexican
Government are strongly supported by the Calderon administration
already, which has recognized the need to enhance their functions. In
late September 2007, in response to allegations of human rights abuses,
the Mexican military accepted all of the recommendations of Mexico's
National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH). Mexico's Army, SEDENA,
affirmed its commitment to collaborating with CNDH on outstanding
investigations. In October, a civilian court sentenced 8 soldiers up to
41 years in prison for raping 16 women in June 2006 in Coahuilla. This
represented the first time that troops have been tried in a civilian
court.
b. Recent Mexican governments have taken steps to reduce the use of
torture and coerced confessions. In 2003, the Mexican Government
promulgated guidelines that require prosecutors and other law
enforcement personnel to receive training on human rights and police
practice according to the Manual on the Effective Investigation and
Documentation of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, known as the ``Istanbul Protocol,'' adopted by
the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations. Mexican law
prohibits torture and does not allow the use of coerced confessions. It
establishes assessment, investigation, and reporting guidelines and
procedures in accordance with international human rights standards and
international instruments. The move to an oral judicial system will
also have the added benefit of lessening the possibility of coerced
confessions by police investigators and/or prosecutors.
Question 10. The most recent National Drug Threat Assessment issued
by the National Drug Intelligence Center indicated that the trafficking
of drugs in the eastern Pacific increased substantially in the last
couple of years. That suggests a need for significant assets in
maritime interdiction. Yet the request is for only two maritime patrol
aircraft (CASA 235) that cost $50 million apiece.
a. What other measures are we taking or planning to take?
Will Mexico purchase any of these aircraft with its own funds?
Answer. In order to deny the use of the eastern Pacific and western
Caribbean to transnational criminal organizations and terrorists, the
Government of Mexico (GOM) has requested that the USG provide it with
two CASA 235 maritime patrol aircraft to complement the existing seven
CASA 212 aircraft currently operated by the Mexican Navy (SEMAR.) This
support would complement purchases to be made by the Government of
Mexico of additional aircraft and sea craft; it also standardizes with
equipment utilized by the U.S. Coast Guard, providing for greater
interoperability. Mexico's short-term objective is to build a fleet of
six CASA 235s and seven CASA 212s to enable it to conduct maritime
surveillance over the eastern Pacific and the western Caribbean. In
addition, SEMAR has stated its intentions to increase its fleet of
naval patrol vessels.
The addition of CASA 235 maritime patrol aircraft will further
enhance the ability of SEMAR to conduct long-range maritime patrols.
This will improve Mexico's maritime domain awareness and, together with
other Mexican enhancements to their interdiction capabilities, should
result in increased seizures, ultimately reducing the use of Mexico's
littoral waters by transnational criminals and terrorists.
Question 11. A recent report by the Government Accountability
Office noted the United States and Mexico have cooperated on maritime
interdiction in recent years but that the two countries have not agreed
to a bilateral maritime cooperation agreement to allow U.S. law
enforcement personnel to board and search Mexican-flagged vessels
without asking the Government of Mexico for authority to board on a
case-by-case basis. At present, the process requires a time-consuming
effort to obtain permission from the government in such cases.
a. Are we seeking such an agreement that would provide
authority to board in advance, and what obstacles are there to
achieving such an agreement?
Answer. The Calderon administration has been noticeably more
responsive to U.S. requests to board suspect Mexican-flagged vessels
than were previous administrations. While there is currently no formal
maritime agreement between the United States and Mexico, Government of
Mexico (GOM) permission to board a Mexican-flag vessel is accomplished
by approaching the GOM on a case-by-case basis, pursuant to article 17
of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988.
Question 12. In March 2007, the Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs issued a fact sheet stating that the Inter-American convention
against Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms will ``make
the citizens of the hemisphere safer.'' But just a month earlier, in a
letter to this committee setting forth its priorities for treaties in
the 110th Congress, the Department stated that it did not support
Senate action on this convention.
a. If the convention will make the citizens of the
hemisphere safer, and the Government of Mexico is asking for
our help in reducing firearms trafficking, why does the
administration not support Senate action on this convention?
Answer. The Department of State continues to believe that the
Inter-American Convention against the illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related
Materials (CIFTA) will make the citizens of the hemisphere safer by
helping shut down the illicit transnational arms market that fuels the
violence associated with drug trafficking, terrorism, and international
organized crime. We share your interest in the CIFTA and appreciate the
importance you attach to it, and are in dialog with the interagency
community, industry, and civil society on the importance we attach to
ratification of this convention.
Question 13. The administration's proposal included $37 million in
program support, including U.S. personnel costs.
f. How many additional U.S. personnel will be needed to
support the proposal in Mexico?
g. Will there be an increase in U.S. law enforcement agents
in Mexico?
h. Will contractors be used?
i. If so, how?
Answer. The estimated program support costs for the Merida
Initiative are based on an evaluation of support and oversight
requirements in light of current programs in the Western Hemisphere
Area (WHA) region and oversight initiatives implemented for the Iraq
and Afghanistan programs.
Such funds would be used primarily for personnel costs (some direct
hire, but mostly contract U.S. and foreign national staff); additional
office and residential space; International Cooperative Administrative
Support Services (ICASS) costs; and other administrative expenses for
program planning, design, and implementation.
The program support funds will also encompass a proposed management
support group to ensure compliance with U.S. Government internal
controls for financial management, contract oversight, end-use
monitoring while providing a platform dedicated to quality assurance,
monitoring, and evaluation of the individual country programs.
Initial personnel estimates indicate that providing the full level
of program support and oversight functions will require up to 75
additional personnel in Mexico and Central America. The majority would
be foreign national staff filling financial management (accounting,
voucher examination) and logistics support capacities, but would also
include several personal services contract (PSC) personnel focusing on
contract and project management and oversight.
Question 14. How specifically will success be measured?
Answer. The fight against organized crime and drug trafficking in
Mexico and Central America is tough, complex, and long term. The
commitment made by these countries is significant, and their
democratically elected governments will be held to account by voters.
The metric used by the citizens of Mexico and Central America will be
palpable and reflect their individual experiences: Can they win back
control of their communities and institutions, and build lives free of
intimidation and fear?
Our role in this great struggle is specific and immediate. In the
short term, we will determine the effectiveness of the Merida
Initiative by:
Increased arrests of drug traffickers and gang members, and
the harrassment and dismantling of organized crime syndicates;
Increased interdiction of illegal drugs and weapons;
Improved effectiveness of the national judicial systems,
leading to a reduction in criminal case backlogs, a reduction
in the average length of trials, and increased confidence in
the courts;
Improved law enforcement cooperation across institutional
and national boundaries, leading to greater coordination of
police action, and the ability to pursue and arrest criminals
throughout Mesoamerica.
In the long term, we will measure the effectiveness of the Merida
Initiative by its ability to transform the tone and substance of our
bilateral and regional cooperation. The Merida Initiative represents a
new and innovative method to address shared responsibilities and shared
challenges. Its success, or failure, will shape the future of our
relationships.