[Senate Hearing 110-429]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-429
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
Department of Homeland Security
Nondepartmental witnesses
__________
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__________
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont TED STEVENS, Alaska
TOM HARKIN, Iowa ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
PATTY MURRAY, Washington MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota LARRY CRAIG, Idaho
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
JACK REED, Rhode Island SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
BEN NELSON, Nebraska LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
Charles Kieffer, Staff Director
Bruce Evans, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Department of Homeland Security
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland TED STEVENS, Alaska
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
PATTY MURRAY, Washington PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey LARRY CRAIG, Idaho
BEN NELSON, Nebraska LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
Professional Staff
Charles Kieffer
Chip Walgren
Drenan E. Dudley
Tad Gallion
Christa Thompson
Rebecca Davies (Minority)
Carol Cribbs (Minority)
Katie Batte (Minority)
C O N T E N T S
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Tuesday, March 4, 2008
Page
Department of Homeland Security.................................. 1
Nondepartmental Witnesses........................................ 159
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009
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TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye presiding.
Present: Senators Inouye, Leahy, Murray, Lautenberg,
Nelson, Cochran, Stevens, Specter, Craig, and Alexander.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE
Senator Inouye. Mr. Secretary, welcome, sir. Chairman Byrd
plans to be back here in the Senate on Thursday, and he has
asked me to chair this hearing today.
This week, as you may know, Mr. Secretary, marks the fifth
anniversary of the establishment of your Department. Since the
Department was created, Senator Byrd and other members of this
Committee have pressed the President and the Congress to
provide the Department with the resources it needs to fulfill
its critical mission.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for appearing before the
subcommittee today. You manage a Department that employs more
than 195,000 dedicated men and women. These workers serve on
the frontlines, securing our ports, our waterways, securing our
borders, enforcing our immigration laws, protecting over 700
million airline passengers using our airports each year, and
responding to disasters.
And on behalf of the committee, I wish to commend them for
their dedication and their service to preserving our freedoms
and securing our homeland.
While we have had many issues with the administration over
its commitment to providing the resources necessary to get the
job done, I hope you will work with the committee to find a way
to properly fund the Department's efforts to achieve this
primary mission.
Last month, as you are well aware, the Director of National
Intelligence released the Annual Threat Assessment. The
Director confirmed that al-Qaeda has regrouped in Pakistan, and
that terrorists continue to pose significant threats to the
United States. According to this assessment, terrorists are
likely to continue to focus on prominent infrastructure
targets, with a goal of producing mass casualties and
significant economic aftershocks. In addition, the Department
continues to believe that the aviation sector is at a high risk
of attack.
Based on this assessment, I believe I speak for the
committee in saying that we are disappointed that the President
proposed a flat budget for your Department. The President seeks
discretionary funding of $37.6 billion, the same as fiscal year
2008. I'm also disappointed that funding approved by the
Congress 9 months ago for hiring air cargo inspectors,
deploying more K-9 teams, and purchasing explosive-detection
systems remains unspent, sitting in the Treasury.
In your testimony, Mr. Secretary, you assert that the
President proposes an increase of 7 percent in fiscal year
2009. However, in this calculation, you exclude the $2.7
billion in the emergency funding for border security that the
Senate passed by a vote of 76 to 17, and the President signed
into law.
Most of this funding was not one-time funding. Your own
budget for 2009 assumes that most of the emergency funding was
not one-time funding. Securing our borders is a requirement
that is not going away.
Mr. Secretary, in light of the administration's latest
threat assessment, a flat budget simply is not satisfactory.
Senator Byrd related to me that he is particularly troubled by
the President's proposal to cut first-responder grants by $2
billion, or 48 percent.
Hurricane Katrina proved that our communities are not
prepared to respond to a major disaster. Dramatically cutting
funds for police, fire, and emergency medical personnel, and
for emergency planning, is not a solution.
It is equally troubling that the Department has not
requested sufficient resources to fully implement 9/11 act
requirements, such as expansion of the Surface Transportation
Security Program, and increase screening of air cargo. Further,
the Port Security Grant Program is cut by $190 million, and
there are no funds requested to develop interagency operation
command centers for the maritime domain, as mandated under the
Safe Port Act.
When the Senate Appropriations Committee, under Chairman
Byrd's leadership, marks up the Homeland bill, I'm certain we
will restore the ill-considered cuts in this first responder
funding, while providing a robust budget for border security,
for the Coast Guard, for aviation security, and for other
efforts to respond to an evolving threat.
The President has already stated that he will veto any
appropriation bill that exceeds his request. When we send such
a bill to the President, I urge you to put the security of the
American people above the President's agenda.
And without objection, I will insert the full statement of
Chairman Byrd in the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Robert C. Byrd
Welcome Secretary Chertoff. This week marks the fifth anniversary
of the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. As you
know, I opposed creating the Department. But, since it was created, I
have pressed the President and the Congress to provide the Department
with the resources that it needs to fulfill its critical missions.
Mr. Secretary, I thank you for appearing before the subcommittee
today. You manage a department that employs over 195,000 dedicated men
and women. These workers serve on the front lines, securing our ports
and waterways, securing our borders, enforcing our immigration laws,
protecting the 700 million flyers using our airports each year, and
responding to disasters. I commend them for their dedication and their
service to preserving our freedoms and securing our homeland.
While I have had many issues with the administration over its
commitment to providing the resources necessary to secure the homeland,
I have appreciated working with you in support of your agencies'
missions. I thank you for your dedication and your service.
Last month, the Director of National Intelligence released the
Annual Threat Assessment. The Director confirmed that al-Qaeda has
regrouped in Pakistan and that terrorists continue to pose significant
threats to the United States. According to the threat assessment,
terrorists are likely to continue to focus on prominent infrastructure
targets with the goal of producing mass casualties and significant
economic aftershocks. The Department continues to believe that the
aviation sector is at a high risk of attack.
Based on this assessment, I am disappointed that the President
proposes a flat budget for your Department. The President seeks
discretionary funding of $37.6 billion, the same as fiscal year 2008. I
am also disappointed that funding that Congress approved 9 months ago
for hiring air cargo inspectors, deploying more canine teams, and
purchasing explosives detection systems remains unspent, sitting in the
Treasury.
In your testimony, you assert that the President proposes an
increase of 7 percent for fiscal year 2009. However, in this
calculation, you exclude the $2.7 billion of emergency funding for
border security that passed the Senate by a vote of 76-17 and was
signed into law by the President. Most of this funding was not one-time
funding. Your own budget for 2009 assumes that most of the emergency
funding was not one-time funding. Securing our borders is a requirement
that is not going away.
Mr. Secretary, in light of the administration's latest threat
assessment, a flat budget is simply not satisfactory. I am particularly
troubled by the President's proposal to cut first responder grants by
$2 billion or 48 percent. Hurricane Katrina proved that our communities
are not prepared to respond to a major disaster. Dramatically cutting
funds for our police, fire, and emergency medical personnel and for
emergency planning is not a solution.
When we mark up our bill, we will restore ill-considered cuts in
first responder funding, while providing a robust budget for border
security, for the Coast Guard, for aviation security, and for other
efforts to respond to an evolving threat. The President has already
stated that he will veto any appropriations bill that exceeds his
request. When we send such a bill to the President, I challenge you to
put the security of the American people above the President's apparent
political agenda.
Senator Inouye. And now, I wish to turn to my good friend
and able colleague, Senator Thad Cochran, following any remarks
that Senator Cochran may have. We look forward to your
testimony. Senator Cochran.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
convening this hearing, and we appreciate very much the
attendance of the Secretary of Homeland Security to discuss the
budget request submitted by the President.
Mr. Secretary, we appreciate you're being here and sharing
your insights with us about how the Department of Homeland
Security will continue to deal with the threats to the security
of our homeland.
The fiscal year 2009 budget has a total discretionary
appropriations request for the Department of $37.6 billion.
It's roughly the same as the Department's appropriations level
for this fiscal year, including an additional $2.7 billion in
emergency appropriations for border security. And, we are
pleased to see that the Department is on track now to meet the
hiring targets that were funded in the last 3 years, in regular
and supplemental appropriations bills.
It's been a big challenge, we know, and we commend you for
the hard work that's been done by the Department to achieve
these goals. I think it's important to note that the budget
request proposes resources to pay for the border initiatives
that were funded over the past 3 years as well.
Approval of this request will enable us to meet the goal of
having 20,000 agents at the border by the end of fiscal year
2009.
Senator Inouye. May I recognize Senator Specter.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr.
Secretary.
I would like to focus this morning on the high cost of
illegal aliens who have been convicted of serious crimes of
violence, high cost in terms of public welfare, national
security, and a drain on the budgets of the Federal, State, and
local levels.
We have, at the present time in the United States, 74,000
illegal aliens in local jails, 49,000 criminal aliens in State
facilities, at a total cost in the range of $2.6 billion. The
most serious aspect of the problem is that once they have been
convicted and are released to be deported to their native
country, they are not deported. And that under court rulings,
they are released in 180 days, and pose an enormous problem in
public safety, with a recidivism rate showing that they are
likely to commit as many as eight additional crimes.
There are procedures which could be used to deport them to
their native country, if the native country would take them
back. I've written to you about this, and there are statutes
which would require the Secretary of State not to grant visas
to countries which do not take back illegal aliens.
But when the countries do not take back illegal aliens, and
they are on the street, it is a problem of overwhelming
significance. Under our system of laws, once the jail sentence
has been served, you can't detain them any further. And if the
native country will not take them back, they are left to roam
the streets of the United States as dangerous criminals--
something you and I know something special about, having been
prosecutors of violent crime.
And I believe we have to move in a number of directions to
find ways to deport these illegal aliens who are violent
criminals, or to find some way legally, constitutionally, to
detain them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye. I thank you very much. And may I now
recognize Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BEN NELSON
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, again,
Mr. Secretary.
We already spoke this morning. Thanks for the call. And I
appreciate you're responding to my correspondence relating to
the question of the disallowance or ignoring of a statutory
requirement for the homeland security process for the 100
largest metropolitan areas. I appreciate you're stepping in and
keeping the bureaucracy of the Department of Homeland Security
from thinking it's the fourth branch of government, and I
appreciate very much you're doing that. We look forward to
continuing to work with you on this project, as well as others.
Securing our borders has become one of the most important
things to the people of our country, because they recognize
that it's not simply about protecting our borders from people
who want to come across for a better opportunity of life, but
it also has been open to those who would come across to do
harm, whether it's the meth scourge that we see today, or the
drug dealers coming across the border, or passing their drugs
across the border, or whether it's the criminals or members of
gangs that come across for their own purposes.
I know you've worked very diligently to get border security
in place. Obviously, part of the border security is hard and
concrete, but otherwise a fence wall approach that is a
hardened barrier. I know there are other areas that are open
to, if you will, a softer approach in terms of surveillance,
but nevertheless, something that can also be effective, and
that is the technology that we are seeking to have for certain
areas, the whole purpose being not to prevent people from
coming across the border, but to slow them down to the point
where they get caught and are returned.
But I am very concerned about what Senator Specter has
pointed out, and that is the challenge that we have with those
who are here, who have violated the law, that we are unable to
return. And I would hope that we would work very diligently,
whether it's denying visas or whether it's working with our
Government at some other level to overcome that.
I cannot imagine that the United States would not accept
back a citizen from another country who would be in the process
of being deported. That's unacceptable. And I hope that, as we
move forward, your office can come up with some suggestions as
to how we might go about doing that, because it's something
that we are going to have to face at some point.
The whole question about amnesty or legalization or what do
you do with the people who are here begs for an answer, but
part of that answer is going to be, ``What do you do with the
people who have violated the laws who are here and continue to
do us harm?'' If we can't solve that question, it seems to me
the other questions go begging, as well. So thank you, Mr.
Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. And I recognize
Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, I'm here to hear the
Secretary, and I don't have an opening statement.
Senator Inouye. Thank you, sir. Senator Lautenberg.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG
Senator Lautenberg. Yeah. Secretary Chertoff and I come
from the same State. It's a small State, but it has enormous
security concerns. And I welcome the Secretary. I hear he's
done a fantastic job since being sworn into this position, with
crowding homeland's 160,000 people in various departments. And
I think that time has, thank goodness, been on our side, and
you've had a chance, Mr. Secretary, to mold the departments
into the operating units as you want to see them functioning.
My concern is--and this by way of a statement, not really
my first question--but the cuts that are in the various of the
grants, and not the least of which is State homeland security,
which is cut $750 million from a top of $950 million last year.
So the 2009 request is down to $200 million--port security cut
in half, rail security cut by more than half, and emergency
management cut by a third.
All of these, even assistance to firefighters, Mr.
Secretary, is painful, because as it is, most of the
communities have problems financing their firefighting needs,
and a lot of them have volunteers where they'd like to have
professionals. That's cut $415 million.
So while I pat you on the back for a job well done, Mr.
Secretary, as you know, around here, you never take a
compliment until the last word has been said, and we'll have
more to talk about in a few minutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Senator Leahy.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I leave, I am
going to be leaving questions. I know the GAO report says that
the Custom and Border Protection staffing allocation needs up
to several thousand additional CBP officers. Of course, the
budget that Secretary Chertoff is backing allows for only 234
additional officers at land borders, and 295 for radiation
monitoring.
We have, I saw in Vermont, where they say we need 60,
Assistant Commissioner Thomas Winkowski said that, ``Well, we
get eight. We won't get the 60, but we'll get 8.'' Of course,
we haven't even gotten those.
So it's a concern. You go--it's almost as though it doesn't
make a difference whether they say we need 50, 60, 70, if we're
not going to get any, anyways. It's a nice study to read, but
while we have all of that shortage, DHS established a temporary
checkpoint on Interstate 91 in Hartford, Vermont in December
2003 to May 2005.
I wondered how you could spend this kind of money so far
from the border. Even people like former Republican Speaker of
the House Newt Gingrich said this is unnecessary government
intrusion. If it made us safer, it'd be one thing. But, of
course, there are about 20 parallel two-lane roads that go down
there. And the checkpoint picked up a couple of lazy people
with drugs, but mostly just ticked off everybody.
So I'd asked about that at my last hearing, because we'd
heard that the parliament is quietly conducting a feasibility
study to see whether they would build a permanent checkpoint
there, 100 miles from the border. I finally got a response 5
months after I'd asked the question. You said the results of
the study--any decisions on project advancement would be shared
with your office through the Office of Congressional Relations.
Well, then, now I see in the President's budget, we have a
$4 million request installation of permanent border
checkpoints--and that's plural--in Vermont. Again, all on
interstate highways where everybody knows they're there, all of
them with dozens of roads that parallel the interstate highway.
So while I was told we would hear if there's going to be
more, obviously that was Form Letter 12, because we never heard
until we saw the President's budget. And I'm worried only
because we don't have the adequate number of people on the
border. We sometimes have hours--hours' wait just for tourists
to go across that border. And it'll become worse once they
start having to require more paperwork, because many of the
lanes aren't open. They're short of people there, but somehow
we can put symbolic checkpoints 100 miles from the border.
It's interesting. I went through one of those symbolic
checkpoints in the State of New York, driving back here. It was
about 125 miles from the border. And a car with license plate
``1'' on it, from Vermont, and little letters underneath that
says, ``U.S. Senate,'' stopped, ordered to get out of the car,
and prove my citizenship.
I said, ``What authority are you acting on?'' And they--one
of your agents points to his gun, and he says, ``That's all the
authority I need.'' An encouraging way to enter our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Senator Alexander.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAMAR ALEXANDER
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
thank you for being here. With a Department as big as yours,
there's always probably something to fix every hour, so I want
to make two comments, but the first falls under the category of
``find the good and praise it,'' which my late friend, Alex
Hailey, always used to say.
I refer specifically to the February 5 and 6 storms and
tornadoes in Tennessee, and the reaction to it by FEMA, by the
Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, by the President, by the
Governor, by the local officials. I've been involved with
various disasters and tragedies over the last 30 years in our
State, as Governor and the university president, and now having
been here, and living there.
And I've never seen a more effective response to a major
tragedy or disaster than I saw on February 5 and 6 by our local
officials, by Governor Bredesen, and by President Bush and his
team.
I've visited in the Macon County area, north of Nashville,
where a tornado hit the ground and stayed on the ground for 21
miles, causing many deaths, tearing up house after house down
in Jackson, which is better known because of the Union
University problems there. I was there.
What I was impressed was--just a few of the things--one,
for example, the local planning--and some funding is important
in this--the local planning efforts in Jackson, Tennessee
permitted the local agencies not only to warn people hours
ahead of time that a storm might be coming, it was as specific
as saying over the television that, ``10 minutes from now, if
you live on the north side of I-40, you should expect a Level 3
tornado.''
And it came in 10 minutes, and as a result of that warning,
Union University--which has over 3,000 students--didn't lose a
single life, even though most of the dormitories were
destroyed. So that local planning money for local agencies, as
I heard from the local people, is being used pretty well to
make sure they can respond to that. That was very helpful.
Then, in the case of Macon County, the tornado hit at about
9:30 at night, and you had people from the Atlanta office, and
Chattanooga on the Tennessee border, by midnight of the same
night, and disaster recovery centers open the next day at dawn,
when the people came out with nothing to eat.
And within days, everybody had a phone number, people were
beginning to get money. I won't go into all the details, but I
think the bottom--we hear so much about Katrina that I think it
may infect our view of everything else. On a scale of zero to
10, this was a 10-plus.
So your staff played a big role in that, as well as
Governor Bredesen's staff, and I think when that happens, it
needs to be pointed out.
Now, let me shift gears a little bit. Something I'm not as
pleased about, and not really your fault, when the REAL ID
legislation passed, I objected to it. I thought it was
inappropriate for Congress to create a de facto national
identification card without the Senate even holding a hearing,
and especially because it would seek to impose huge amounts of
costs on States' governments.
And, as a former Governor, I hate nothing more than
unfunded Federal mandate where somebody in Washington comes up
with a big idea, makes it a law, and then sends the bill to the
Governors. And then, usually, that politician goes home and
makes a speech at the Lincoln or Jackson Day Dinner about local
control.
So I'm sort of conditioned to be opposed to unfunded
mandates, and this is a very serious one. I object really to
the law itself, because while I've come reluctantly to the
conclusion that we need a national ID card, I prefer that we
would think about what ID card. I would prefer a secure work
card, for example, which I think would be more appropriate, and
which we could have figured out if we'd had a hearing about all
this.
But we didn't. They just sort of stuck the REAL ID card
into a must-pass appropriations bill, and we all--and the
Senate voted for it. I said at the time, and I still believe,
that--well, let me put it this way. There are now 46 States who
have responded to what I think is a sensible and commendable
effort by you to give a waiver to states, so that by May of
this year, when they're supposed to have all of this ready,
they don't have to have it ready. They've got another 3 years.
But there are still four States--Maine, Montana, New
Hampshire, and South Carolina--that haven't asked for a waiver.
And we're in sort of a game of chicken between those four
States and the Federal Government. And I think what we ought to
do is send the home phone number of every Senator and
Congressman who voted for the REAL ID law to everybody in
Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, and South Carolina.
And when they're not allowed to board an airplane, they can
call us and tell us what they think about it. But in the
meantime, I plan to offer an amendment that prevents--at least
for the 1 year of the appropriations bill, if it should pass--
your Department from enforcing REAL ID mandates until the
Federal Government provides full funding for the
implementation.
I'll wrap up my comments with this, Mr. Chairman. The
overall estimated cost to States is about $4 billion. We're
talking about 245 million drivers in this country who are going
to have to go one way or another and get new identification. So
far, $90 million has been appropriated by Congress of the $4
billion that it's expected to cost, and $6 million has been
distributed to States.
So there is at least one other former Governor on this
subcommittee, and what I am suggesting here is that without
arguing whether this is a good law or a bad law, the second
question is, should we have a big unfunded Federal mandate? And
I don't think the States should be required to implement the
REAL ID law until Congress demonstrates that it's willing to
reimburse the States for the cost of this mandate.
So that will be the point of my amendment when the time
comes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, sir. And now, Mr.
Secretary.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF
Secretary Chertoff. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Inouye.
Thank you, Senator Cochran, and other members of the
subcommittee, for the opportunity to appear to discuss the
President's 2009 budget.
I believe this is my fourth appearance at a budget hearing
since I came onboard in 2005. As you've observed, this is the
fifth anniversary of the Department's existence, and I'm happy
to say that the budget the President has proposed for fiscal
year 2009 is, I think, a sound budget.
I think it's fiscally responsible. I think it does advance
the Department's critical priorities, although like with any
other budget, it does require some tradeoffs. I think it
focuses resources on the greatest risks and gives our 208,000
employees the tools that they need in order to serve and
protect the American people.
I would echo the observations of the Director of National
Intelligence concerning the strategic threat that we face. In
some ways, we have had concerning developments from a strategic
standpoint. In some ways, we've seen some positive
developments.
As you noted, Senator, the developments in the frontier
area of Pakistan and the creation of some safe havens there is
a concerning element in terms of the strategic picture. At the
same time, I'd have to say that what is going on in Iraq, with
al-Qaeda in Iraq being repudiated by the Sunni population that
I believe al-Qaeda hoped would be supportive, I think that
repudiation and the losses that al-Qaeda in Iraq have suffered
are a positive development, and I suggest that there are some
hopeful signs in the future.
I would say this, of course, with respect to the budget in
general. The security of the American people is, in fact, the
President's agenda, and it's number one on his agenda. And to
that end, if we look at our total funding proposed for fiscal
year 2009, we're requesting $50.5 billion, which is a 6.8
percent increase over the previous year's base budget, and a 62
percent increase since the Department's creation over 5 years
ago.
Now, I know that those of you experienced in budget matters
are also well aware there was emergency funding in the 2008
budget. Of course, emergency funding by definition is not
supposed to be base funding. It's supposed to be emergency
funding. So when we make our comparisons, we compare with the
base.
Obviously, you have a lot of individual questions, but I'd
like to focus on a few key elements of the budget in the time
that I have allotted to me.
First, let me begin with the issue of protecting our
country at the borders. That is a critical element of this
Department's mission, and it's one that's pursued by most of
our components, whether it be Customs and Border Protection,
ICE, the Coast Guard, or TSA.
Let me start with the border between the ports of entry. As
of February 21, we have constructed approximately 303 miles of
pedestrian and vehicle fencing. Senator Nelson and I have
actually constructed a little bit of that fencing ourselves. We
welded at the border last year.
And we are on track to hit our objective of 670 miles of
fencing along the Southwest border by the end of this calendar
year. We currently have over 15,500 Border Patrol agents sworn
into duty, compared to about 9,000-some-odd agents when the
President took office. That includes a dramatic increase in the
last 18 months, and again, we are on pace to hit our goal of
18,000 by the end of the calendar year.
About a 1\1/2\ ago, we announced that we were going to end
what was the pernicious practice of catch-and-release at the
border, where people were caught at the border entering
illegally but were released because we did not have the
capability to remove them in a timely way or to detain them.
And we sustain--we did end that 18 months ago, and we
sustained that moving away from catch-and-release up to the
present day. We currently have a policy of catch, detain, and
return along the border.
I agree with the observation of Senator Specter that a key
element of that is the ability to repatriate illegal aliens to
their home countries. The good news is many countries work with
us on that. The countries of Latin America and Central America,
for example, have by and large been very cooperative with us in
expediting the process of removing people who are here
illegally, including criminal aliens.
Some countries--a minority, but some countries--are not
cooperative with us. In some instances, we have had to threaten
sanctions, and I would be eager to work with this committee to
come up with alternative ways we might continue to press
countries that do not accept their illegal aliens back.
China happens to, frankly, be the worst offender in this
regard. We have probably around 50,000 people who are under
orders of removal that we cannot remove, because the pace of
processing them back to China is volatile, if I can use that
word.
Nevertheless, if you look at the entire picture, what we've
done with tactical infrastructure, what we've done with
interior enforcement, we have seen positive developments and a
decrease in flow across the borders, measured not only by a
drop in apprehensions, but by other metrics, such as
stabilization or a drop in remittances, increased costs for
coyotes smuggling across the border, and measures of activity
south of the border.
For fiscal year 2009, we're requesting $3.5 billion for the
Border Patrol, which includes about a $500 million increase
that by the end of next September 2009 would get us to over
20,000 agents. We are also requesting $775 million, which would
get us to a--for SBI, sorry--the Secure Border Initiative
Technology Program, which would provide over $2 billion in
fiscal year--total in fiscal year 2009.
That would be used not only for tactical infrastructure,
like fencing, but for things like unmanned aerial system
sensors, cameras, and other important tools such as that.
Let me take the opportunity to address an issue that has
been subject of, I would say, some inaccurate reporting in the
news, and that is the so-called mothballing or demise of
SBInet. To paraphrase Mark Twain--and I'm always very careful
when I quote or paraphrase to credit the source--so this is
Mark Twain's original thought, the reports of the death of SBI
are grossly exaggerated.
Let me explain what SBInet is, for the record, and let me
explain what we have done and what we intend to do. SBInet is a
total technology program that is designed to deploy technology
across the southwest border, and ultimately the northern
border.
It is not a one-size-fits-all program. It does not envision
the same lay down of technology in every square mile of the
border. It includes, among other things, unmanned aerial
vehicles, and we have just taken delivery of the fourth
unmanned aerial vehicle in the last couple of weeks.
It includes ground-based mobile radar sensing systems. I've
seen them myself. We have about a half a dozen now. We are
planning to have about 40 by the end of the year. It includes
individual sensors laid down across various parts of the
border, and we expect to be at 7,500 of those by the end of the
year.
One element of SBInet, but only one element, is what we
call P28 or Project 28. This was a prototype project contract
for $20 million that was awarded to Boeing to actually road
test an integrated system of radar and cameras along 28 miles
of Tucson Sector in Arizona.
The purpose of the program was to determine whether it is
possible to integrate a system like that in a workable fashion.
This program is one element of the total strategy of SBInet. It
is not, however, all of SBInet. I liken it to the fact that you
may have a cruiser in the Navy, but the cruiser is not the
entire fleet. It is merely one element of the fleet.
Now, what is the report on SBInet? Last summer, we were
disappointed in the performance of some of the individual
equipment items which Boeing had laid down at the border, and
which Boeing had attempted to integrate at the border.
I had what I would describe as a candid and unvarnished
conversation with the CEO of Boeing, in which I explained that
I was unhappy with what they had produced for us, and in which
I made it very clear to him that I was not wedded to this
particular approach, because we were pursuing other approaches
as well.
To his credit, he changed the team that was working on the
program, and a lot of progress was made by the end of last year
in correcting virtually all of the technical problems that had
arisen at the P28 prototype site. Accordingly, we conditionally
accepted the P28 lay down, and we then began to work with it
operationally as a precondition to final acceptance, which
occurred in the last couple of weeks.
With respect to any remaining defects, they were either
immaterial, and therefore resulted in a credit to the United
States Government, or they were fixed before we did final
acceptance. I might also say that whatever the additional cost
of fixing the problem was eaten by Boeing, as it should have
been.
So the bottom line is we were tough consumers. I think we
did a good job about being critical. And now, we're at the
stage of taking what we have accepted and moving it to the next
level, in terms of operational value and optimizing its value.
I look at the members of the Border Patrol who were
involved in the project: the Project Manager, the Border Patrol
Chief, the head of Customs. I looked them in the eye.
And I said to them, ``The bottom-line question for me is,
does this particular approach here on this 28 miles, does this
add value? If it doesn't add value, I'm perfectly happy to go
to use the other tools that we're using. If it does add value,
then I want to work to increase the value that it adds.''
And the uniform response which I got is that it does add
value, and that the Border Patrol does want to move to it now.
You might call it ``P28-1.5'' to take it to the next level. I
want to emphasize, as I've said consistently, this will not be
applied across border uniformly. It was never intended to be
applied uniformly.
My expectation is that it will be applied in other places--
in Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors--and that we will begin
some of these other applications during this year, 2008.
Having addressed that issue, let me talk briefly about the
other element of border security, which is progress in the
interior. Last year, fiscal year 2007, we had a record 863
criminal arrests as a result of our Work Site Enforcement
Operations, including 92 people who were in the supervisory
chain of the employers.
We are requesting this year $1.8 billion--an increase of
about a $250 million--to help ICE expand its custody
operations, adding beds to a total of 33,000 beds, which will
be a 78 percent increase from where we were just a couple of
years ago.
We're asking for a $300 million increase, for a total of $3
billion, for ICE interior enforcement-related activities. I
might observe to you that, last year, we had 140 percent
increase in our criminal alien removal program. That is the
program that Senator Specter mentioned that takes criminal
illegal aliens and makes sure they are returned to their own
country.
In 2006, we removed about 70,000. Last year, it was about
164,000. And using 2-year money that was appropriated last
year, we are building a strategy that will allow us to remove
even more on an annualized basis.
We're requesting $100 million for our E-Verify automated
system, so that we can keep pace with employer demand for this
very important tool for verifying the legal status of
employees. We now have about 53,000 employers who are using the
system, and it's increased by between 1,000 and 2,000 new users
every single week. That is a very positive development.
Let me turn to a second issue I know that concerns the
committee. That is protecting our Nation from dangerous goods.
Five years ago, we scanned none of the containers that came
into this country for radiation.
Currently, as--after last year, we are at the point that we
scan 100 percent of containers that enter our southern border,
virtually 100 percent of those that come in at our maritime
border, and over 90 percent at our northern border. And we will
be close to 100 percent at our northern border at the end of
this calendar year.
We've expanded our Overseas Container Security Initiative
to 58 foreign ports, and we've begun overseas radiation
scanning in the ports with this Congress's Safe Ports Act at
three pilot ports, including one in Pakistan.
To continue to build upon this radiation scanning
capability, we're requesting $67 million in additional funding,
for a total of $157 million for our Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office to allow us to continue to deploy very important
technology.
And for protecting our critical infrastructure, we're
requesting $1.3 billion in total--that's an increase of $359
million--for Department-wide efforts to counter IED threats.
This includes over a billion dollars for TSA Explosives
Detection Technology, $50 million for science and technology
development, $30 million for training transportation security
officers, and $9 million for our Office of Bombing Prevention.
We have, as you know, issued our final regulations with
respect to chemical security. We have hired and are continuing
to build on our program of behavioral detection officers. We
have increased money that we're requesting for our mobile
detection and response teams that we put into train stations
and airports all over the country, with dogs, in order to help
us detect explosives.
And we've also requested $293 million for our National
Cyber Security Division, as part of the President's new cyber
security strategy, which we have recently unveiled. All of
these are positive developments, building on an enormous amount
of investment already made in protecting our critical
infrastructure.
With respect to emergency response, I want to thank Senator
Alexander for his kind words about FEMA's response in Tennessee
and other parts of the Midwest. I happened to be there at Union
University. I saw the devastation. I also saw the remarkable
cooperation at all levels, which happily led to no loss of life
in that institute of higher education.
I think FEMA also has performed commendably with respect,
for example, to the wildfires that we had last year in
California, the floods we had in the Midwest, and a host of
other national disasters.
This is not an accident. It reflects very hard work that
was undertaken by the leadership of FEMA, and by the Department
as a whole, to make sure that we built capabilities we've never
had before to deal with natural disasters.
We want to continue to build on that, by requesting $164
million in 2009, an increase of $64 million, for FEMA's Vision
initiatives. That will among other things build upon its
ability to use information technology to track and deploy
emergency supplies, and will convert what was a part-time
reserve disaster assistance workforce into a permanent
workforce that is fulltime on the job, fulltime trained, and
can be a much more effective cadre in terms of supporting our
disaster relief when we do have to surge.
Finally, with respect to FEMA, I'm quite sure we'll have an
opportunity to address the issue of grants. But I will say
this. The grants we have requested this year equal or exceed
the grants that the administration asked for last year.
I've been around long enough to know that there's a little
bit of a tennis match that occurs where Congress always ups the
number of grants, and we come in at the prior request. We have
taken note of Congress' actions in a number of respects.
We continue, for example, our proposal in last year's
budget to break out separately port security grants, rail
transportation security grants, and other transit grants, as
opposed to lumping them in a single infrastructure program.
We are seeking an increase in urban-area security
initiative grants, which are risk-based funds. What I said when
I testified before the authorizers, I will say here as well. No
doubt one can always come up with viable ways to spend
additional grant money, and I know at a time that States are
feeling their own budget pinch, it would be welcomed if we
could pick up a lot of the responsibility.
But the money has to come from somewhere. And there are
some things that only the Federal Government can do. And if we
take the money out of those functions and give it to the States
as part of the grants, we will not be doing the jobs we have to
do with the Coast Guard or with Customs and Border Protection
or ICE.
So I think we've made some tough tradeoffs. I think those
of you who have been Governors understand what that's like when
you have to balance your own budgets. But I do think we are--we
have built a disciplined and effective investment in our State
and local governments, totaling $23 billion over the life of
this Department. That is a lot of money.
Finally, let me conclude by making one request. Last year,
the one disappointment we had in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act was the denial of any money for the
consolidation of Coast Guard headquarters, DHS headquarters,
and component mission functions in one campus at St.
Elizabeth's.
This year, we're going to request $120 million, and GSA
will make a cognate request so that we can begin the process of
consolidating the Department. This is an investment which will
yield dividends in the future, in terms of morale, in terms of
efficiency, and in terms of better management.
Sometimes bricks and mortar investments are not as popular
as investments in grants or investments in new equipment. But
in the long run, if we want to avoid some of the problems we
have with acquisition management or IT that are the source of
recurrent complaints, we have to invest in the basic guts of
the Department and allow it to be managed and operated
effectively.
PREPARED STATEMENT
So with that, I want to thank this committee for its
support. I look forward to constructively engaging on this
budget and the whole issue of homeland security. Much of what
we have accomplished over the last 5 years is a tribute to our
good working relationship with Congress, and the importance
that we all place on the issue of securing our homeland against
all threats, whether they be manmade or natural.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Chertoff
Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, and Members of the Subcommittee: Let
me begin by saying thank you for the strong support you have
consistently shown the Department, and I look forward to working with
you to make certain that we make the most effective and efficient use
of our resources and capabilities to protect the homeland and the
American People. While we have had many successes, there are numerous
challenges that still remain. I am here today to ask for your
partnership and support as we face these challenges. We may not see eye
to eye on all issues, but we certainly agree that our interests are
best served when we work together to achieve our common goal of
securing this great Nation.
I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee today to highlight
some of our key accomplishments of the last year and to present
President Bush's fiscal year 2009 Budget Request for the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).
This year, as DHS embarks on our 5 year anniversary, we continue to
protect the Nation from dangerous people and goods; to protect critical
infrastructure; to build a nimble, effective emergency response system
and a culture of preparedness; and to strengthen the Department's
operations and management. The Department has made tremendous progress
in achieving effective control of the border, screening passengers,
protecting critical infrastructure, responding to emergencies, and
enforcing our immigration laws. In fiscal year 2007, we invested
significant time and effort to implement the requirements of the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, to focus our efforts on the
greatest risks, to be nimble in our response to changing threats, and
to be disciplined in our use of resources as we build a Department
ready to meet future challenges seamlessly with State and local
leadership, first responders, the private sector, our international
partners, and most certainly, the public.
It is no accident that we have not suffered a major terrorist
attack on U.S. soil since September 11, 2001. It is the result of the
President's leadership, the support of Congress, and the hard work and
constant vigilance of hundreds of thousands of men and women--including
the employees at DHS--who are working tirelessly both at home and
overseas to protect our country. Under the
President's leadership, the Department will continue to effectively
carry out its critical mission and will leave a strong foundation for
the future.
fiscal year 2009 budget request
Six years after September 11, 2001, we are moving beyond operating
as an organization in transition to a Department diligently working to
protect our borders and critical infrastructure, prevent dangerous
people and goods from entering our country, and recover from natural
disasters effectively. The total fiscal year 2009 budget request for
DHS is $50.5 billion in funding, a 7 percent increase over the fiscal
year 2008 enacted level excluding emergency funding. The Department's
fiscal year 2009 gross discretionary budget request is $40.7 billion,
an increase of 8 percent over the fiscal year 2008 enacted level
excluding emergency funding. Gross discretionary funding does not
include mandatory funding such as the Coast Guard's retirement pay
accounts and fees paid for immigration benefits. The Department's
fiscal year 2009 net discretionary budget request is $37.6 billion,
which does not include fee collections such as funding for the Federal
Protective Service and aviation security passenger and carrier fees.
In pursuit of the five priorities we established in 2007, the
Department continues to efficiently align resources to lead a unified
national effort in securing America. Those five priorities are:
Goal 1.--Protect our Nation from Dangerous People
Goal 2.--Protect our Nation from Dangerous Goods
Goal 3.--Protect Critical Infrastructure
Goal 4.--Build a Nimble, Effective Emergency Response System and a
Culture of Preparedness
Goal 5.--Strengthen and Unify DHS Operations and Management
We have made great progress in each of these areas, and with the
fiscal year 2009 Budget, we will continue that momentum. Let me
highlight some of our key accomplishments along with initiatives and
ongoing programs in our fiscal year 2009 Budget Request.
GOAL 1: PROTECT OUR NATION FROM DANGEROUS PEOPLE
We will continue to protect our Nation from dangerous people by
strengthening our border security efforts and continuing our efforts to
gain effective control of our borders. The Department's main priority
is to prevent additional terrorist attacks against our country. DHS has
worked to prevent the entry of terrorists while facilitating the
legitimate flow of people.
Key Accomplishments
--More Fencing at the Border.--By the end of calendar year 2007, 287
miles of pedestrian and vehicular fencing was in place at the
border. By the end of 2008, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) will have constructed a total of 670 miles of fencing,
which will include roughly 370 miles of pedestrian fencing and
300 miles of vehicular fencing. CBP also took conditional
possession of the prototype Project 28 development of nine
towers equipped with radar and communications systems and
automated ground sensors linked to a command and control center
and border patrol vehicles. A new task order was issued to
design, develop and test upgraded Common Operating Picture
software for the systems.
--Increased Air and Marine Support.--CBP opened its fourth new air
branch in North Dakota this past September and is on track to
begin operations at the last northern border air branch in
Michigan this spring. Delivery of a fourth DHS Unmanned
Aircraft System (UAS) will enable the Department to operate
three UASs along the southwest border and to deploy one UAS to
the northern border this spring. The fiscal year 2009 request
supports the hiring and training of 24 new UAS pilots and the
establishment of a joint CBP/U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) UAS
program office for the development of a maritime variant of the
Predator B. It also supports the continuation of an aggressive
service life extension program for the Department's P-3
maritime patrol aircraft that are so critical to intercepting
drug traffic in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific and
countering the increasing threat posed by the cartels' use of
semi-submersible vessels.
--Secure Documentation Standards.--Compliance with secure
identification requirements for air travel under the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) has exceeded 99 percent
since implementation in January 2007. A Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for WHTI land and sea requirements was issued in
June 2007 and final rule implementation is expected in June
2009.
--Enhanced Driver's Licenses.--The Department signed agreements with
the States of Washington, Vermont, New York, and Arizona to
enhance the security of their State driver's licenses and to
potentially satisfy REAL ID requirements or serve as
alternatives for entry at land and sea borders.
--Better Biometrics.--Ten-fingerprint collection from international
visitors has been deployed by CBP at nine ports of entry, and
will be implemented at 278 other ports of entry by the end of
2008. This upgrade from two- to ten-fingerprint collection will
enhance security and fingerprint matching accuracy, improving
the ability to compare visitors' fingerprints against latent
fingerprints collected from known and unknown terrorists around
the world. US-VISIT, the Science and Technology Directorate
(S&T) and the Coast Guard have partnered on a pilot fingerprint
collection at sea program near Puerto Rico, resulting in 114
prosecutions and a 53 percent reduction in migrant flow.
--Record-Breaking Law Enforcement.--U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) removed roughly 240,000 illegal aliens, and
made 863 criminal arrests and fined or seized more than $30
million following worksite investigations. Its Border
Enforcement Security Task Forces made more than 500 criminal
arrests and 1,000 administrative arrests, and seized roughly
$2.5 million in cash as well as significant amounts of
narcotics and weapons. Further, ICE ACCESS was launched to
foster collaboration between its agents and State and local
leaders to identify crime-fighting priorities.
--Enhanced Aviation Security.--The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) increased by more than 175 percent the
number of personnel trained in techniques to identify
potentially high-risk passengers in airports. Furthermore, TSA
required that holders of airport-issued identification
credentials be subjected to regular vetting against the
Terrorist Screening Database. It also harmonized the 3-1-1
Liquids Rule with the European Union and many other countries,
and published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in August to take
over watch-list checks from the airlines under the Secure
Flight program in 2010.
--Connecting the Dots.--The Department renewed a Passenger Name
Record (PNR) agreement with the European Union to share advance
information on passengers arriving in and departing from the
United States. PNR data has helped frontline personnel to
identify scores of dangerous people and deny them entry into
the country.
--Protecting United States and World Leaders.--The U.S. Secret
Service (USSS) continues to meet unprecedented challenges of
protecting domestic and world leaders. In addition, protection
of presidential candidates has resumed and comprehensive plans
for securing the 2008 presidential campaign are being
implemented.
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request
--Border Patrol Agents.--Funding of $442.4 million is requested in
the President's Budget to hire, train and equip 2,200 new
Border Patrol Agents and appropriate support. The additional
agents represent the fiscal year 2009 increment of the
President's goal of adding 6,000 new Border Patrol Agents by
the end of the first quarter of fiscal year 2009. This request
would increase the Border Patrol to over 20,000 agents by the
end of September 2009, more than double the amount in 2001.
--Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.--A total of $140.0 million is
requested for CBP's implementation of infrastructure and
technology in support of the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative (WHTI). These funds will complete the infrastructure
improvements at the top 39 Land Ports of Entry, covering 95
percent of the land border arrivals.
--E-Verify.--Total funding of $100 million is requested for E-Verify.
This U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) program
allows employers to use an automated system to verify name,
date of birth, and Social Security Number, along with
immigration information for non-citizens, against Federal
databases to confirm the employment eligibility of both citizen
and non-citizen new hires. USCIS will deploy additional staff
covering information status verification, compliance, and
monitoring. It is important that Congress reauthorize the
program so that these employers can continue to benefit from E-
Verify and not have to play detective when hiring new
employees.
--Vetting Infrastructure Improvements.--An increase of $30 million is
requested to support TSA's Vetting Infrastructure Improvements,
providing screening and credentialing of individuals requiring
special access to U.S. transportation and other critical
infrastructure. These funds will enhance and stabilize the
infrastructure necessary to perform vetting operations on
populations that access our most critical infrastructure.
--Secure Flight.--The Budget requests an increase of $32 million that
will accelerate the Secure Flight Program by replacing the
current airline managed passenger vetting program with a
government-operated program in 2010. In addition to using
improved technology, the Secure Flight Program will alleviate
the variability in performance of the current system and reduce
the risk for compromised watch list data.
--Additional Bedspace and Staffing.--An increase of $46 million is
requested to help provide 1,000 additional beds, staffing, and
associated removal costs required to meet current demand and
demand generated by increased immigration enforcement
activities. Of the 1,000 beds, the addition of 275 will be
funded through projected increases in collections.
--Automation Modernization of Information Technology Systems.--The
Budget includes $57 million for ICE to acquire secure and
interoperable tactical communications equipment, a biometric
detainee location tracking module, and to develop and integrate
an enhanced Investigative Case Management system. These
improvements promote officer safety, emergency response
coordination, and case management efficiencies.
--Federal Law Enforcement Training.--An increase of $10 million is
requested for the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
(FLETC) to provide training to meet increases in border
security and law enforcement hiring levels.
--US-VISIT.--A total of $390.3 million is requested for US-VISIT.
This funding will complete the transition from two-print to
ten-print collection. Taking all ten fingerprints will improve
accuracy and allow us to increase the number of matches from
latent prints captured all over the world. This funding also
allows US-VISIT to continue to provide biometric identity
services to law enforcement and intelligence, and it will help
complete interoperability between US-VISIT and FBI databases.
--Command 21 and Situation Unit Watchstanders.--The Budget includes
$7.3 million to support continued development of Command 21 and
additional watchstanders at USCG Command Centers to meet
increasing operational demands and support additional vessel
monitoring, information collection, and interagency
coordination capability provided by Command 21. These
initiatives will provide information sharing and situational
awareness tools required to close the gap between current port
and coastal surveillance capabilities and the need for greater
Maritime Domain Awareness in an all-hazards, all-threats
operating environment.
GOAL 2: PROTECT OUR NATION FROM DANGEROUS GOODS
We have also made much progress in protecting our Nation from
dangerous goods. As a part of its risk-based approach, the Department
is expanding its programs to identify, track, and intercept nuclear and
radiological components and systems at ports of entry and in
transportation systems within U.S. borders. We are intensifying our
efforts to bolster capabilities to reduce the risk of a biological
attack in the United States.
Key Accomplishments
--Overseas Radiation Scanning.--100 percent of shipping containers
bound for the United States from three foreign ports--Port
Qasim (Pakistan), Port Cortes (Honduras), and Port Southampton
(United Kingdom)--are now scanned for radiological and nuclear
materials prior to departure. Scanning equipment is also being
deployed to Port Busan (South Korea), Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Salalah (Oman).
--Comprehensive Radiation Detection.--The Department has deployed
more than 1,000 radiation detection devices to the Nation's
land and sea ports of entry. Today, 100 percent of cargo
containers crossing the southern border are scanned for
radiation, 91 percent at the northern border, and more than 98
percent of cargo containers are scanned at our seaports.
--Improving Import Safety.--The Office of Health Affairs (OHA)
engaged in the President's Import Safety Working Group to
develop a comprehensive action plan with short- and long-term
recommendations that better protect consumers and enhance the
safety of imported goods.
--Expanded Container Security Initiative.--CBP expanded the Container
Security Initiative to 58 ports screening 86 percent of
maritime containers bound for the United States.
--Record-Breaking Narcotics Seizures.--USCG seized more than 350,000
pounds of cocaine at sea this year--a record-breaking 160
metric tons--worth an estimated street value of more than $4.7
billion. CBP frontline personnel seized more than 3.2 million
pounds of narcotics at and between ports of entry.
--Southwest Border Drug Strategy.--The Office of Counternarcotics
Enforcement co-chaired the creation of the first-ever National
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy and Implementation
Plan, which identifies major goals, objectives, and resource
requirements for closing gaps in U.S.-Mexico counternarcotics
capabilities at the southwest border.
--Reducing Risk from Small Vessels.--USCG worked with small boat
manufacturers, industry groups and the public on mitigating the
security risks posed by small vessels. Thirteen Maritime Safety
and Security Teams, part of a 3,000 person Specialized Deployed
Forces Command, are stationed at strategic ports nationwide
with unique training to counter the small boats threat. The
Coast Guard and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)
are collaborating with local authorities on a pilot program in
Puget Sound and San Diego waterways on small vessel radiation
detection.
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request
--Nuclear Detection Research, Development, and Operations.--The
Budget Request includes $334.2 million to support DNDO's
Research, Development and Operations program which provides
resources for the development and evolution of the global
nuclear detection architecture. Included in this research are
development of an Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) suitable
for examining cargo containers, trucks and privately-owned
vehicles, and development of Human Portable Radiation Detection
Systems (HPRDS) to provide handheld and `relocatable' equipment
to be used as primary detection tools by Customs Officers,
Border Patrol agents, and USCG personnel.
--Next Generation BioWatch.--The Budget includes $111.6 million, an
increase of $34.5 million, for OHA's Next Generation BioWatch.
Funding will begin to procure BioWatch automated detection
sensors and initiate deployment activities of the automated
sensor system to existing BioWatch jurisdictions. Automated
detection will enhance the capabilities of the BioWatch
environmental monitoring system designed for early warning of
bioterrorism incidents.
--Aviation Security.--The Budget addresses the need to upgrade
checked baggage screening equipment deployed immediately after
September 11, which is exceeding its useful life. The screening
equipment is used to screen 100 percent of the 1.8 million
checked bags passengers travel with every day. The Budget also
speeds the rollout of inline systems at all major airports in 6
years by allowing a more flexible approach to funding these
projects. To support this activity, legislative authorization
is required for a temporary surcharge to the current $2.50
passenger fee--$0.50 added to each leg of a trip capped at
$1.00. The surcharge is proposed to begin in fiscal year 2009
and sunset in fiscal year 2012. It will generate an additional
$426 million in revenue in fiscal year 2009 and approximately
$1.7 billion over 4 years, nearly doubling previously planned
annual resources for checked baggage explosive detection
systems. The increased revenue will be added to the existing
$250 million annual Aviation Security Capital Fund which is
targeted exclusively for checked baggage explosive detection
systems.
GOAL 3: PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The Department aims to protect critical infrastructure and key
resources, essential government operations, public health and welfare,
and the country's economic and national security interests. Efforts to
bolster the resiliency and protection of our Nation's critical
infrastructure and key resources helps to mitigate potential
vulnerabilities and to ensure terrorist plans are not successful.
Key Accomplishments
--Setting Chemical Security Standards.--NPPD established national
guidelines for chemical facility security in a comprehensive
set of regulations to protect chemical facilities from attack
and prevent theft of chemicals that could be used as weapons.
--Assessed Impacts of Chemical Attacks.--S&T conducted the first
comprehensive chemical threat risk assessment across a broad
range of toxic chemicals that better focuses interagency
priorities accordingly to risk.
--Released Sector Specific Plans.--NPPD released 17 sector-specific
infrastructure protection plans, creating a comprehensive risk
management framework of national priorities, goals, and
requirements to protect critical infrastructure and key
resources.
--Launched Improvised Explosives Device Awareness Campaign.--DHS has
undertaken a national Improvised Explosives Device (IED)
Prevention and Awareness Campaign, working with Federal, State
and local agencies and stakeholders to boost participation in
the TRIPwire and National Capabilities Analysis Database
information-sharing portals.
--Increasing Cyber Security.--NPPD continued deploying EINSTEIN
systems, which find malicious patterns in Federal computer
network traffic, and will expand systems this year. The United
States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) issued over
200 actionable alerts on cyber security vulnerabilities or
incidents in fiscal year 2007 from its 24-hour watch center.
Finally, the Secret Service currently maintains 24 Electronic
Crimes Task Forces to prevent, detect, mitigate and
aggressively investigate cyber attacks on our Nation's
financial and critical infrastructures.
--Greater Information Sharing.--The Office of Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A) has deployed 22 personnel to State and Local
Fusion Centers across the country. DHS has also deployed
networks such as the Homeland Secure Data Network, a system for
securely communicating classified information, to 18 centers
and anticipates deploying to many more centers this year.
--Credentialing Port Workers.--Since October more than 70,000 port
workers have enrolled in the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) biometric credential program.
More than 750,000 longshoremen, truck drivers, port employees
and others requiring unescorted access to secure areas of ports
will also be required to obtain a TWIC card.
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request
--Protective Terrorist Countermeasures.--Total funding of $19 million
is requested for USSS Protective Terrorist Countermeasures.
This program provides the latest state-of-the-art equipment
that will be used in the event of an explosive, chemical,
biological, or radiological attack. As new threats evolve and
are identified, it is critical the Secret Service has the means
to address them.
--Chemical Security Compliance Project.--An increase of $13 million
is included for NPPD's Chemical Security Compliance Project.
The Department issued regulations establishing risk based
performance standard for security of chemical facilities.
Additional funding is requested to increase the staff of this
regulatory program and to provide tools and systems to collect
and analyze vulnerability information, review plans, support
and manage inspections activity, issue decisions, address
appeals, and support compliance enforcement.
--Explosives Research.--$96 million is requested to support S&T in
developing the technical capabilities to detect, interdict, and
lessen the impacts of non-nuclear explosives used in terrorist
attacks against mass transit, civil aviation and critical
infrastructure. Of these funds, $50 million will address
critical capability gaps in the areas of deterring, predicting,
detecting, defeating, and mitigating the use of IEDs in the
United States. The Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device/
Suicide Bomber Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED/SBIED)
program will allow S&T to improve large threat mass detection
in such areas as the transit environment, special events and
other large areas.
GOAL 4: BUILD A NIMBLE, EFFECTIVE EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEM AND A
CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS
Improving our Nation's ability to respond to disasters, man-made or
natural, is a top priority for the Department. Incorporating lessons
learned from Hurricane Katrina, other disasters, and the 9/11
Commission Recommendations, the Department is improving its
capabilities and preparing those who respond to acts of terror and
other emergencies.
Key Accomplishments
--Responded to 68 Major Disasters.--During fiscal year 2007, Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) responded to over 130 events
that resulted in 68 Major Disaster Declarations, 9/11 Emergency
Declarations, and 54 Fire Management Assistance Declarations,
including tornadoes in Florida and Kansas, floods in the
Midwest and Tropical Storm Erin.
--Supporting Local Security Plans.--The Office of Infrastructure
Protection's Protective Security Advisors worked in State and
local Emergency Operations Centers providing expertise and
support to local authorities, the Principal Federal Official
and the Federal Coordinating Officer during major domestic
incidents including the Virginia Tech shootings in Blacksburg,
Virginia; the Chevron Refinery Fire in Pascagoula, Mississippi;
the I-3 5W bridge collapse in Minneapolis, Minnesota; and the
Florida and California Wildfires.
--Improved Interagency Coordination.--The Office of Operations
Coordination (OP S) led Federal prevention, protection, and
response activities to all-hazard threats during several
incidents in 2007, specifically the recent outbreaks of Foot
and Mouth Disease in the United Kingdom and the vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device attacks in the United Kingdom.
--Building Stronger Response Partnerships.--DHS engaged State and
local leadership, first responders and stakeholders on
developing the National Response Framework, which outlines how
our Nation responds to all-hazard disasters across all levels
of government and community sectors.
--New Operations Capabilities.--USCG established the Deployable
Operations Group which aligns all deployable, specialized USCG
forces under a single, unified command in adaptive, tailored
force packages for rapid response to national threats.
--Saved Over One Million Lives.--The Coast Guard reached a remarkable
milestone this year, saving more than 1 million lives
throughout its 217-year history.
--Awarded Public Safety Interoperable Communications Grants.--DHS
administered over $968 million in Public Safety Interoperable
Communications Grants which will help support the establishment
of Statewide Communications Interoperability Plans for improved
first responder communication during major disasters, and fund
State and local projects aligned with those plans.
--Realizing Interoperable Communications.--S&T published results of
the National Interoperability Baseline Survey--a nationwide
survey of first responders across all jurisdictions and
disciplines that assesses progress in achieving interoperable
communications. By providing a clear representation of national
capacities, these survey findings are helping emergency
response leaders and policy makers make informed decisions
about strategies for improving interoperability. The Department
also established the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC)
to consolidate several interoperability programs and address
new responsibilities including the development of the National
Emergency Communications Plan.
--Strategic Planning for Catastrophic Disasters.--The Incident
Management Planning Team continued to draft Federal interagency
strategic plans that coordinate resources and capabilities to
prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from major
disasters and other catastrophic emergencies.
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request
--Grant Programs.--The Budget requests $2.2 billion to support FEMA's
State and Local Programs and Assistance to Firefighters Grants,
just above the amount provided in the President's fiscal year
2008 Budget Request. These important grant programs help
prepare State and local governments to prevent, protect
against, or respond to threats or incidents of terrorism and
other catastrophic events. The Budget will support the existing
Homeland Security Grant Program, Port and Transit Security
Grants, and Emergency Management Performance Grants, and also
proposes a new discretionary grant program targeted towards
high priority security initiatives including REAL ID
implementation.
While Congress chose to provide an additional $2 billion in the
fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, the Department is
requesting approximately the same level as the fiscal year 2008 Budget
Request.
The fiscal year 2009 Budget requests $200 million for the State
Homeland Security Grants and increases funding for the Urban Area
Security Initiative to $825 million. The $300 million funding request
for the Assistance to Firefighter grants is identical to the
President's fiscal year 2008 Budget Request.
Over a 6-year period from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year
2007, grant recipients have drawn down $12.7 billion of the $19.8
billion made available since the Department's inception. On February 1,
2008, the Department announced an additional $3.0 billion in grants to
be provided this year. Including Congressional approval of the fiscal
year 2009 request, a total of $13.0 billion would be in the pipeline
for State and local homeland security needs.
--FEMA Vision--Phase II.--The Budget requests a total of $164.5
million to support FEMA's Vision--Shape the Workforce program.
Phase II of FEMA's transformation will strengthen that agency's
ability to marshal an effective national response, deliver
service of value to the public, reduce vulnerability to life
and property, and instill public confidence. The Budget also
requests a total of $209 million to support FEMA's disaster
workforce, including transitioning 4-year Cadre On-Call
Response Employees (CORE) from temporary to permanent full-time
personnel to achieve the level of readiness and response
capability required in response to Presidentially declared
major disasters and emergencies.
--Disaster Readiness and Support.--The Budget includes $200 million
in a new Disaster Readiness and Support Activities account.
This account will fund advanced readiness initiatives that
assist FEMA in preparing for future disasters and will allow
FEMA to perform critical administrative functions that support
the timely delivery of services during disasters.
GOAL 5: STRENGTHEN AND UNIFY DHS OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT
A cohesive and operationally efficient organization is essential to
the rapid implementation of homeland security priorities, policies, and
objectives. As such, the Department has aligned its resources into
areas that will most effectively accomplish its mission. Successful
mission performance is driven by human capital development, executing
efficient procurement operations,
and possessing state-of-the-art information technology resources.
We continue to improve systems for intelligence and information
sharing.
Key Accomplishments
--Continued Integration.--DHS was created 5 years ago to serve as the
unifying core for the vast national network of organizations
and institutions involved in securing our nation. Over the past
year, DHS has further integrated core management functions and
systems throughout headquarters and the components, achieving a
more cohesive and unified Department.
--Enhanced Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties.--The Privacy
Office and the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties have
worked to enhance privacy and civil rights and civil liberties
through the Department's work in cyber security, the use of
satellite technology, airport screening protocols, and
partnerships with Muslim-American communities.
--Increased Responsiveness to Congressional Inquiries.--DHS improved
responsiveness and adherence to Congressional deadlines. This
included the on-time submission of over 3,000 Congressional
Questions for the Record (QFR). Average response time to
Congressional correspondence has dropped from 5-6 weeks to an
average of 2.5 weeks, and average response time to
Authorization QFRs has dropped from 6 months or more to an
average of 35 business days.
--Consolidation of Information Technology Network Sites.--The
Department has consolidated more than 1,780 IT network sites
into a single network that allows transparent monitoring of
system performance and activity, prioritization of traffic, and
vastly improved security posture.
--Strengthened Business Processes and Technology.--USCIS launched a
new fee schedule designed to bring decades-old systems into the
21st century and improve customer service.
--Record-Setting Levels of Federal Law Enforcement Training.--FLETC
trained a record-setting 60,458 students from all three
branches of the Federal Government, as well as international,
State, local, campus, and tribal law enforcement agencies.
--Improved Recruitment and Hiring.--DHS decreased the average time it
takes to hire new DHS employees, 4 days shorter than the Office
of Personnel Management targets. DHS also exceeded targeted
goals by hiring more than 2,300 protection officers; 11,200
transportation security officers; and 412 immigration
enforcement agents.
--Record FEMA Staffing Levels.--For the first time in a decade, FEMA
attained a 95 percent staffing level and strengthened regional
capability through the creation of over 100 new positions in
FEMA's ten regional offices.
--Enhanced Employee Training and Communication Tools.--DHS recently
launched new training and communications tools including
DHSCovery, a state-of-the-art online training system.
--Increased Border Patrol and Field Operations Staffing.--CBP
increased Border Patrol agent staffing by an unprecedented 21
percent since its inception in March, 2003, growing to 14,923
agents at the end of fiscal year 2007. In addition, CBP Office
of Field Operations hired 2,156 new officers and 340
agriculture specialists.
--Streamlined Acquisition Processes.--The Coast Guard created an
innovative and centralized acquisition directorate in July
2007, significantly improving program execution, contracting
practices, research and development, and industry oversight.
--Enhanced Training to Prevent and Investigate Cyber-related
Crimes.--The Secret Service developed a National Computer
Forensics Institute in Hoover, Alabama. This cyber crimes
training facility provides State and local law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, and judges with training, equipment, and
expertise in computer forensics and digital evidence analysis.
Fiscal year 2009 Budget Request
--Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.--A total of $1.65 million is
requested for the first ever Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review (QHSR). Funding is required to research, organize,
analyze, and develop the QHSR. This document will recommend
long-term strategy and priorities of the Nation for homeland
security and comprehensively examine programs, assets, budget,
policies, and authorities required to provide the United States
with strong, sound and effective homeland security capabilities
in the decades ahead. The Office of Policy requests $1.5
million and the remaining $0.1 50 million is requested in the
Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO).
--Transformation and Systems Consolidation.--An increase of $15.5
million is requested for OCFO to continue implementation of the
Transformation and Systems Consolidation (TASC) project. One of
the main objectives of DHS at its formation was to consolidate
the support systems of the component agencies to realize cost
savings and operational efficiencies. OCFO aims to reduce the
number of DHS financial systems, and ensure the manual
processes for internal controls are integrated with these
financial systems. DHS will begin migrating OHA, S&T, DHS
Headquarters, NPPD, CIS, and ICE's financial systems to the TSA
Oracle Shared Baseline.
--DHS- Wide Acquisition Workforce Intern Program.--The Budget
includes an increase of $3.1 million for the Office of the
Chief Procurement Officer. DHS will enhance the Acquisition
Intern Program which recruits, trains, certifies, and retains
an appropriate workforce of acquisition professionals. In
fiscal year 2009 the intern cohort will be raised to 100
people.
--Office of the Inspector General Auditors.--An increase of $6.4
million is requested for the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) to expand staff oversight of DHS preparedness programs,
through audits of preparedness grant programs, science and
technology programs, and Department-wide programs that
establish the Department's baseline preparedness efforts. The
additional funds will strengthen OIG oversight of DHS border
security and enforcement programs through a proactive program
of audits and on-going oversight of the policies, initiatives
and funds to secure the Nation's borders.
--State and Local Fusion Center Program.--Funding for I&A's State and
Local Fusion Center program is to create a web of
interconnected information nodes across the country ensuring
information is gathered from all relevant operations and fused
with information from the Homeland Security Stakeholder
Community. The Budget requests funds to assist in producing
accurate, timely, and relevant actionable intelligence products
and services in support of the Department's homeland security
missions.
--Vigilant Watch Over America.--OPS carries out its unified mission
to secure America by maintaining the National Operations Center
(NOC) and by providing 365/24/7 incident management
capabilities to ensure seamless integration of threat
monitoring and information flow. To improve technological
capabilities within the NOC, the Budget requests funding to
provide improved data infusion, the auto-ingestion of data from
multiple sources, and the creation of a consolidated,
centralized data repository. In addition, funds are requested
for the Principal Federal Official (PFO) program. As mandated
by Presidential directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security
is the Principal Federal Official responsible for coordination
of all domestic incidents requiring multi-agency Federal
response. Funding will provide a standing organizational
structure to plan, train, exercise, deploy and support the PFO
program.
--Create DHS Counterintelligence Program.--Under the leadership of
the Chief Intelligence Officer, I&A and the Office of Security
will develop a new DHS-wide counterintelligence program to
analyze threats posed by foreign intelligence entities
collecting against the Department, support risk management
decisions, and enhance operations and implement strategies and
policies to unify the Department's counterintelligence mission.
CONCLUSION
I am sure you will recognize that with the support of Congress, the
Department has had many successes. I have outlined many of them in my
testimony today and how they relate to the Department's five priority
goals. As we move forward to face the many challenges ahead, we are
keeping in mind past experiences and lessons learned that will be at
the core of our planning and implementation efforts.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I look
forward to answering your questions and to working with you on the
fiscal year 2009 Budget Request and other issues.
PROJECT 28
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Secretary Chertoff,
for your excellent statement. You spoke much on the P28 Virtual
Fence Project. I'm asking this question on behalf of Senator
Byrd.
Based on your experience with the P28 Pilot Program, do you
have any estimate as to how long it will take to test and
deploy this improved version of the new system?
Secretary Chertoff. I think our expectation is that we will
begin the next phase of deployment, which involves both
retooling and improving what we are currently doing in this 28
miles, and then moving to the next part of the Tucson sector
that we're going to deploy in.
We're going to begin that process this year, 2008, and that
phase ought to be done in 2009. I think we will begin Yuma
sector probably in 2009. And I would expect that to be finished
in about a year. And then, I would expect the next phase, which
is what we have in our current plan, to begin maybe in--to be
deployed maybe in 2010.
Here, I have to be a little more hesitant, because we
continue to reserve the right to modify the plan. If it turns
out that the value add counts as for doing a little bit less,
we might wind up doing a little bit less. We may wind up
substituting more in terms of some of the other tools. But I
would say that we should be underway in all the places we
currently envision by 2010. That's my estimate.
Senator Inouye. I thank you very much, sir. I will be
submitting, on behalf of Senator Byrd, several questions that
he would want you to respond to. And we'll place it in the
record.
TSA SURCHARGE
The administration's proposed fee increase to fund the so-
called Explosive Detective System. Now, I'm certain you're well
aware that Congress has rejected similar proposals in the past.
Doesn't your department have unobligated funds that can carry
this project out?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, Senator, I am aware, having lived
through this with a couple of earlier budget cycles, that using
fees to plug our operating budget needs has been frowned upon
by Congress. We have abandoned that kind of approach.
This is a very specific and narrow request with respect to
fees. It is for a particular capital investment that would
allow us to begin the process of moving: (a), to a better level
of technology at the airport, which would be more efficient and
more, frankly, customer friendly; and (b), to begin the process
of replacing equipment that is really now becoming obsolete.
I think in talking about it, particularly with the
airports, there was a fair amount of sentiment supporting this,
and it's simply a way to accelerate the process of getting this
equipment in. If we were not to have a fee dedicated to this
particular function, and the idea is that it would be dedicated
specifically to this function, we would have to fund the
retooling process through the ordinary budget process.
That is going to wind up, frankly, making it a longer
process. I think it's part of a larger set of challenges that
we have when we deal with very substantial investments in high
technology, and it raises the question as to whether our whole
method for financing this kind of approach ought to be looked
at carefully.
You know, whether the Federal Government ought to buy
equipment that becomes obsolete in a number of years, as
opposed to leasing it or contracting for a service in which the
service provider has to provide the equipment, I think that is
a subject that we might profitably spend some time talking
about.
But the bottom line is that this is meant to be a dedicated
fee for a particular purpose that will actually benefit the
airports by making their processes more efficient, and
ultimately, therefore, should be in their interest.
Senator Inouye. Several airports have funded the
installation of this system on the assumption that they would
receive funding through a letter of intent arrangement. Would
these airports be eligible to receive accelerated funding that
you are proposing?
Secretary Chertoff. It's hard, Senator, for me to answer
that question without knowing specifically what the facts and
circumstances of the airport's position would be. I don't know
that we're envisioning this as a retroactive repayment. There
was a letter of intent program that I--if I'm not mistaken, has
expired.
What would be covered by funding under this fee or not, I'm
not sure I can answer you right now without having some
specific knowledge of exactly what an airport's application
would be. We'd certainly look at the applications if Congress
approves this fee, and that idea is that we would begin a
forward-moving replacement and enhancement program.
USCG WORKFORCE
Senator Inouye. Mr. Secretary, I understand the Coast
Guard's active duty personnel is roughly the size of the New
York City Police Department, and has not had a significant
increase in 50 years. Do you think this is an appropriately
sized workforce, to adequately enforce maritime security and
safety along 95,000 miles of coastline, and 3.36 million miles
of U.S. exclusive economic zone, not to mention the force
protection in Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, let me say, first, I don't know
how big the New York City Police Force is. No question that the
Coast Guard's mission has expanded in the wake of 9/11. The
issue of force protection remains really a much more urgent
requirement now than it was prior to 9/11.
We do have some forces deployed over in Iraq, and I was
privileged to visit them last year. What we're trying to do,
obviously, and again, to manage the budget, is to equip the
existing Coast Guard with the best possible tools to leverage
their mission. That's why we do have money in this budget for
continuing with the National Security Cutters, and for other
essential retooling elements that the Commandant advised me is
important in order to make sure that the men and women of the
Coast Guard have the best possible tools.
Again, difficult tradeoffs. You can always benefit from
having additional personnel. We also need additional personnel
at the border. We have other missions. And within a budget that
is expanded, but is nevertheless finite, I think we've struck a
good balance in terms of these various missions.
Senator Inouye. Do you believe that the funds are
sufficient?
Secretary Chertoff. Having consulted with the Commandant, I
do believe they're sufficient.
Senator Inouye. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have a whole
bundle of questions I'd like to submit for your consideration.
And now, may I recognize Senator Cochran?
GULF COAST RECOVERY EFFORTS
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr.
Secretary, I've noticed that today's New Orleans Times-Picayune
newspaper carries an editorial praising Donald Powell for the
great job he has done as the Gulf Coast Recovery Coordinator
since November of 2005.
He has been one of the most diligent and thoughtful
coordinators or people serving in a position like this that I
have encountered, and I wanted to add publicly my personal
appreciation for the good job he did coming down to Mississippi
and Louisiana and the other areas devastated by Hurricane
Katrina to help coordinate and communicate with the local
officials, the Governors, and all of us who were involved in
trying to deal with that terrible disaster.
And I know that you worked closely with him, and he was in
touch with you all along the way, too. Again, I don't think
anybody can express sufficiently the heartfelt appreciation
that we had in our State for the response we received from the
Federal officials in key positions like yours and Don Powell's,
and many others. But, thank you, and I want to be sure that Don
Powell hears about compliments, as well.
He tried to call people the other day. I know I was out of
town and didn't receive his call, but I've called him back, and
I will talk to him personally.
Secretary Chertoff. I'll convey your remarks. He did a
magnificent job, and a difficult job, and I think he richly
deserves the thanks that he got in the newspaper.
Senator Cochran. We're still in the process of recovering
and rebuilding, as you well know, and I was pleased to attend
an event this weekend where the Administrator of the General
Services Administration was personally there, with the Under
Secretary of the Department, to participate in a groundbreaking
ceremony for the retirement home and facilities for retired
military persons, which was virtually destroyed in Hurricane
Katrina.
And to see that that facility is going to be rebuilt, a
modern facility there in the Gulf Port area, is very
reassuring, not only to the retired servicemen and women who
will be able to come and live there and take advantage of that
retirement community, but to the general population, which is
pleased to be a host site for a facility of that kind.
There are many other things that are going on still,
through FEMA and other agencies, and with your Department, to
deal with problems that exist as a result of that tragic
disaster. Contamination in some of the trailers has been
identified as formaldehyde. People are worried that if they've
been in those trailers, are they going to have illnesses. What
can they do about it? Looking for alternative facilities for
housing continues to be a problem. And, the support of the
Department of Homeland Security for all of these efforts is
deeply appreciated.
NATIONAL BIO AND AGRODEFENSE FACILITY
I also wanted to mention that we have a new facility that's
going to be built, the National Bio and Agrodefense Facility.
It's a facility designed to protect the country's agriculture
and public health interests. It's a replacement for the Plum
Island Animal Disease Center that will have to be selected and
fully funded. It will be designed, we are told, to be a state-
of-the-art biological and agriculture defense facility, to
carry out the complementary missions of the Department of
Homeland Security and Agriculture.
I hope that our committee will approve the request that's
included in this budget. For fiscal year 2008, there was $11
million approved for this facility. For fiscal year 2009, the
budget request includes $35.3 million for initial design. Is
that facility still on track? And is it the intention of the
Department to proceed with the construction of a facility to
replace the Plum Island facility?
Secretary Chertoff. Yes. It is on track, and we have
narrowed down the final lists, and we're in the process over
the next few months of having the experts do the site visits
and the final analysis. And we envision an award or a decision
by the end of the year.
DEBRIS REMOVAL
Senator Cochran. We note, also, in connection with debris
removal, issues regarding public assistance funds from the
disaster relief fund available for debris clearance, removal,
and disposal operations that continue to be needed as a result
of Hurricane Katrina.
This is being handled by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency. We hope we can work with you and your officials in the
Department to be sure that this is resolved at an early date.
Secretary Chertoff. We look forward to doing that. Also, if
I, Senator Inouye, if I can just come back to your Coast Guard
question, I omitted to mention--I'm reminded--that our 2009
budget does seek 658 additional FTEs for the Coast Guard, so we
are actually seeking--it'll be an increase, not just a level,
and will get us up to about almost 49,000 FTEs.
DHS HEADQUARTERS
Senator Cochran. And I remember in earlier discussions that
we have had about the Department's responsibilities, the
headquarters remains a problem that needs to be addressed, and
I hope that our committee can respond to the request the
administration has made for $120 million.
That sounds like an awful lot of money, but it needs to be
done. We know you've got people scattered all around
Washington, DC, in different buildings, and that's inefficient
and is a big problem and a big challenge, and I hope the
committee will be responsive to your request on that.
Secretary Chertoff. I appreciate that. And, of course, it
should not go without notice that while we are occupying other
buildings, we're paying rent. So it's not like that's cost-
free. I think, in the long run, the money for St. Elizabeths
would be a wise investment.
Senator Cochran. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Senator Specter.
IMMIGRATION CONTROL
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, at
the outset, I compliment you on the tremendous work you did,
and Secretary Gutierrez, on our effort for comprehensive
immigration reform. A group of Senators will be introducing
legislation tomorrow, which will be focusing on the priorities
of border control and employer verification. And whatever we
may ultimately seek to do with the 12 to 20 million
undocumented immigrants, I think there is a unanimity that
violent criminals who are here illegally ought to be deported
to their home countries.
I'd like to reference three letters for a moment or two
before going on to the core question which I want to deal with
you.
I wrote to you on February 15 of this year, relating to the
matter of the visas, to deny another country having their
citizens come here on visas if they do not repatriate the
convicted criminals. These statistics that I have, as of
February 11, eight countries alone are refusing to repatriate a
total of over 139,000 aliens. And I know you haven't had a
chance to look at it so far, but take a look at the letter, and
examine the asylum procedure or the visa procedure, and see if
there are other items which we could utilize.
I now want to reference the letter which I am sending to
the Egyptian President Mubarak about a particularly troublesome
Egyptian national who is in a Pennsylvania prison at a cost of
$250,000 a year, because he has to be force-fed. And it's
complicated to establish whether he is an Egyptian, but we
think the evidence points that way, and I'm asking President
Mubarak to cooperate with us on this.
And what I'd like you to consider, whether there are any
circumstances where you would recommend withholding foreign
aid, or utilizing some other remedy available to the United
States in addition to the visa matter, to try to get these
convicted criminals repatriated.
The third item that I want to call to your attention is a
letter that I sent to you just a few days ago on February 28,
which involves a provision in Article 3 of the U.N. Convention
against torture, which obligates the United States not to
return a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.
But the Congress, in enacting this matter, specified that
``to the maximum extent consistent with Article 3, the
regulation shall exclude from the protection of such
regulations aliens who are security risks, such as terrorists
or those who have been convicted of a particularly serious
crime, such as an aggravated felony carrying a 5 year prison
sentence.''
Ninety-six percent of these petitions are rejected, but
they take an enormous amount of time. And I ask you to take a
look at the regulation and see if you can, in the first
instance, deal with it within your Department.
REPATRIATION OF CRIMINAL ALIENS
Now, I want to come to what I consider to be the really
serious problem. And that is the projection that in 2007 some
300,000 illegal aliens convicted of crimes will be released
without going back to their native country. They just can't be
sent back there for one reason or another. And the Supreme
Court has created a presumption that 180 days is the maximum
amount of time you can hold someone.
Well, these alien criminals, violent criminals, are
recidivous an average of six to eight repeat crimes. Now, we
know the basic principles of criminal law. Someone has served a
sentence, a maximum, and you can't keep them in jail any
longer.
The person is a danger and a menace, based upon the
individual's prior record. We can't send them back to their
native country, because the native country won't accept them.
And there are hundreds of thousands of them on the streets of
America, posing a much greater problem for this country on
public safety and the $2.5 billion it costs, and also a
national security problem.
If you have mentally ill people, and you can show in court
on an appropriate petition that the individual is a danger to
himself or herself, or to the community, they can be detained.
We have preventative detention provisions, under circumstances
notwithstanding a presumption of innocence, where there's a
preliminary finding of danger that people can be held without
bail.
And what I'm candidly struggling for, and would ask your
assistance, we're doing research to see if there are some legal
constitutional way we can detain these convicted alien
criminals, who are recidivous, who are released on our streets.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I think it's a very important
issue to address. I should just mention in passing, it's not
unique to this country. When I go overseas to Europe, one of
the burning issues that my counterparts in Europe is the same
problem. They are--people come into their countries, they
commit crimes, they're violent, they're dangerous, and you
can't return them, because the country from which they come
doesn't want to take them back, understandably, because they're
dangerous and bad people.
And so, then you wind up in the worst of all worlds, which
is releasing them. I would be very happy to work with you and
the Senate to see whether there is legislation that would
enable us, with appropriate safeguards--if there is somebody
who is in the country illegally and they cannot be returned--to
detain them for a longer period than the 6 months currently
allowed.
If I remember the Supreme Court case in question correctly,
it didn't quite shut the door on that, particularly when you're
dealing with violent offenders and terrorists. I'd certainly be
willing to give it as good a try as I could, because I agree,
everybody is dismayed at the notion of the worst of the worst
getting released because we can't get them back, they've served
their terms, they're here illegally, but we're not allowed to
detain them anymore. So I'd be happy to work on that with you.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman, I
ask that the correspondence that I referred to be included in
the record.
Senator Inouye. Without objection, so ordered.
Senator Stevens.
Letter From Senator Arlen Specter
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Michael Chertoff,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 3801 Nebraska Ave. NW,
Washington, DC 20528.
Dear Secretary Chertoff: I am troubled that thousands of deportable
criminal aliens who have been convicted of crimes in the United States,
sometimes violent crimes, remain in the United States because their
native countries refuse to repatriate them. Moreover, most of these
aliens are released back into the population, as extended detention is
untenable due to a lack of resources and the Supreme Court's Zadvydas
decision.
Many of these recalcitrant nations receive substantial U.S. aid,
and their citizens are regularly issued U.S. visas. The Congress has
already attempted to address this problem, in section 243(d) of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act, and I am curious as to why it is
not utilized to greater effect. According to the statute, upon
notification from the Attorney General that a country denies or
unreasonably delays repatriation (such notification is now provided by
the Secretary of Homeland Security), the Secretary of State ``shall''
suspend visa issuances until notified by the Attorney General that the
country has accepted the alien.
This tactic is potent in theory, and was successful in practice
when applied against Guyana several years ago. While I appreciate that
foreign relations is a delicate affair involving balancing numerous
interests, surely public safety in the United States is a priority of
the highest order. Not only does refusal to repatriate often put
convicted criminals with no right to be here back on the street, but
drawn out repatriation negotiations divert scarce Federal resources
away from identifying and deporting other criminal aliens--as many as
300,000 of whom were incarcerated in 2007 and will be released rather
than deported at the conclusion of their sentences.
It seems incongruous for the United States to continue admitting
the citizens of an uncooperative country that refuses to take back
those who are convicted criminals. Why then are we not more aggressive
in our use of section 243(d) to ensure prompt repatriation,
particularly of criminal undocumented aliens? I would appreciate your
views on the efficacy of this provision and any obstacles to its
utilization.
In a related development, this week, DHS noticed a proposed rule to
prohibit H-2A visas for nationals of countries which refuse to
repatriate. This is a welcome step, but why did DHS not instead
dispense with time consuming rulemaking, which ultimately will provide
only limited leverage, and simply notify the State Department
immediately of the non-cooperating countries?
I look forward to your response and your thoughts on this important
issue. To aid the analysis, I would appreciate it if you could include
a list of the notifications you have forwarded to the State Department
pursuant to section 243(d) in the last 5 years, any actions upon them
(e.g., suspension of non-immigrant visas), and whether they were
ultimately successful in securing repatriation.
Sincerely,
Arlen Specter,
U.S. Senator.
S6621_
Letter From Senator Arlen Specter
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Michael Chertoff,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 3801 Nebraska Ave. NW,
Washington, DC 20528.
Dear Secretary Chertoff: I am informed that large numbers of
removable criminal aliens, particularly aggravated felons for whom
there is no other reprieve, invoke without justification Article 3 of
the U.N. Convention Against Torture (UNCAT) in order to obstruct
removal proceedings. I am curious as to whether UNCAT necessarily
condones such dilatory tactics.
Article 3 of UNCAT obligates the United States not to ``return . .
. a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.''
However, in implementing UNCAT, Congress specified that, ``[t]o the
maximum extent consistent with'' UNCAT obligations, ``the regulations .
. . shall exclude from the protection of such regulations'' aliens who
are security risks, such as terrorists, or those who have been
convicted of ``a particularly serious crime,'' such as an ``aggravated
felony'' carrying a 5-year prison term. (See INA 241(b)(3)(B).)
Notwithstanding this clear exclusion, DHS's regulations currently
reflect no such exception for very dangerous aliens, and thus appear to
leave aggravated felons eligible for deferral of removal. In contrast,
Canada, another UNCAT signatory with a proud human rights record,
maintains just such an exception in section 115(2) of its Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act.
Without this exception, dangerous criminal aliens in the United
States are able to abuse the laudable protections offered by UNCAT,
burying worthy cases beneath a mountain of meritless claims. Even
though 96 percent of UNCAT petitions are ultimately denied, the
litigation can take years, during which time limited resources and
decisions such as Zadvydas and Nadarajah may require release.
Protracted UNCAT litigation puts convicted criminals with no right to
be in the U.S. back on our streets. It also diverts scarce Federal
resources away from identifying and deporting other criminal aliens--as
many as 300,000 of whom were incarcerated in 2007 and will be released
rather than deported at the conclusion of their sentence.
I would like to know if DHS has issued or plans to issue any
regulations to implement the express Congressional intent to exclude
certain dangerous aliens from UNCAT protection. If not, I would
appreciate your view of what the obstacles are and what might be done
to remove them.
Sincerely,
Arlen Specter,
U.S. Senator.
______
Letter From Senator Arlen Specter
U.S. Senate,
Washington DC.
His Excellency Mohammed Hosni Mubarak
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Cairo, Egypt.
Dear President Mubarak: I seek your assistance in repatriating a
criminal alien currently in custody in my home State of Pennsylvania. I
recognize that, as a rule, Egypt is quite cooperative in repatriation
efforts and that, in this case, the source of the problem is the
prisoner's refusal to cooperate in obtaining travel documents.
Nevertheless, I am hopeful we might work together to overcome the
obstacles and secure his prompt return.
Mr. Abdel Fattah entered the United States on a fraudulent
Portuguese passport. He was convicted in 2002 of an aggravated felony
and is now serving his sentence at the Pennsylvania State Correctional
Facility in Camp Hill. Because he has already served the required
minimum sentence, he is now eligible for repatriation. Accordingly, the
administrative body responsible for overseeing repatriation,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), requested travel documents
from the Egyptian consulate in New York in early October of 2005. That
request included form I-217, which contained substantial biographical
information. In 2006, ICE augmented the filing with formal proof that
Mr. Fattah's Portuguese passport was fake.
However, as part of the repatriation process and because Mr. Fattah
does not have an Egyptian passport, he was required to fill out a
passport request form in Arabic. In 2006, the Egyptian consulate
advised ICE that the information Mr. Fattah provided in his passport
request was insufficient. Mr. Fattah was asked to correct the problems
and after some further communication, the final version was resubmitted
on June 28, 2007. In August, the consulate informed ICE that Mr. Fattah
had again improperly completed the form, filling it instead with
gibberish and expletives, and that consequently travel documents would
not issue unless ICE could produce an existing Egyptian passport
belonging to Mr. Fattah.
Based on its research, ICE is confident that Mr. Fattah is an
Egyptian national. Indeed, in a 2001 letter from prison, Mr. Fattah
asked immigration authorities to let him ``serve the time in my country
Egypt.'' Nevertheless, I fully understand Egypt's desire to satisfy
itself of that fact before it repatriates him. Although the ordinary
methods of confirming nationality--either via an existing passport or a
valid passport application--are not feasible in this case, I am hopeful
we may find an alternative way to verify Mr. Fattah's status.
I could, for example, arrange for a visit to the prison by Egyptian
experts who could then conduct an extensive background interview of Mr.
Fattah in Arabic. If that is inconvenient, the prison has video
conferencing equipment and could make Mr. Fattah available for remote
interviews by your officials in New York, Washington or Egypt.
Alternatively, if there is another arrangement your government would
prefer I stand ready to assist.
Ordinarily, I might not intervene in such a matter, especially
given Egypt's well-established cooperation in repatriation, but Mr.
Fattah's detention cost over $250,000 last year and is draining scarce
local resources. I would appreciate anything you can do to speed his
return. You can reach me in my office at 202-224-9011 and my staff is
prepared to assist you. Thank you very much.
Sincerely,
Arlen Specter,
United States Senator.
ICEBREAKERS
Senator Stevens. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I
have several questions to ask you, but I would ask that you
respond to the questions that I'm going to submit for the
record.
And the first question pertains to the Coast Guard. We're
hearing all sorts of rumors about predictions that the ice in
the Arctic disappear in the summertime. We are really behind
the curve as far as icebreakers. As a matter of fact, we've had
to lease some from foreign countries lately.
I note that you do not have money to construct a new
icebreaker. We thought there would be one.
Secretary Chertoff. I believe that there--I think that the
budget for icebreakers is in the National Science Foundation.
Senator Stevens. I know that. But if you've got the Coast
Guard and the National----
Secretary Chertoff. Yeah.
Senator Stevens [continuing]. Science Foundation has the
vessels, then they're not going to request it, because they
don't like them there in the first place.
Secretary Chertoff. Yeah.
Senator Stevens. So I would hope that you would take a look
at that, because we're just going to be--if the predictions are
true, we should have more icebreakers, and we should have them
very quickly, and I don't see--we'll ask them, too, but I don't
see any indication that they have any interest at all in the
management of those icebreakers.
They didn't want them, and I don't think we should have
given them to them.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I'm just saying, Senator, as I
think I mentioned to you, I'm actually going to go up this
summer and look at the Arctic. I've talked to the Commandant
about this issue, and I do think that the whole question of
whether we are adequately protecting our interests in the
Arctic--particularly as we may find other countries now seeking
to expand their exploration for petroleum resources, I think we
have to take a serious, strategic look at that. So I agree with
you about it.
Senator Stevens. Well, people have the feeling that this is
all going to--well, they're talking about summer ice, in the
first place. I hope you'll take the time to go to the
International Arctic Research Center in Fairbanks. It has a
different view than the IPCC on the question of this ice.
DISASTER ASSISTANCE FOR ALASKA
So let me shift to FEMA. About the time that Katrina
happened, there was a typhoon up off of the northwest coast of
Alaska, and the net result was a whole series of villages on
barrier islands were very seriously damaged. That's 4 years
ago.
We're still making plans now to try and help them. FEMA has
really poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the Katrina
area. We have seen very little assistance of FEMA in terms of
any recovery. I note there's $200 million in this budget
disaster readiness and support activities account. Now, I take
it that's to prepare for new disasters. What are you going to
do about the disasters that have already occurred in Alaska?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, you know, that is usually covered
through Disaster Relief Fund. I don't know--frankly, I don't
know right now exactly what the status is in terms of whether a
Disaster Declaration was requested or whether it was granted.
I'll find out about it, though.
Senator Stevens. Well, I had an interesting meeting several
weeks ago when I was at home, with the State and with FEMA and
with the various echelons of the Federal and State government
to try and help these people. They are Alaska Natives. They're
on barrier islands. They've been there for centuries. They
don't want to move, but--they don't want to move, but they may
have to move, but there's very little help forthcoming from the
Federal Government for them.
And I think it's one of the national shames, because
they're out there on those islands, there's not many of them,
they're not in a voting center like New Orleans, but they've
been just completely ignored. And I hope that you'll take time
to go to the barrier islands, and not just go look where the
ice isn't.
PASSENGER VESSELS SERVICE ACT RULE
Thirdly, let me ask you about the matter of the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection, in terms of the interpretation
of the Passenger Vessels Services Act, and I've raised this
with you before. That publication in the Federal Register was
under the heading of ``Hawaii Coast Wise Cruisers.'' It's under
the Vessels Services Act that came out of a Congress Committee
that Senator Inouye and I have been on for so long.
We were very surprised when it was published that it
applied to cruisers along the Alaska coast, originating in
Seattle. As a matter of fact, if that regulation is adopted,
none of the cruisers this summer can go to Alaska, because they
all stay in Alaska waters for longer than 48 hours. The net
result would be that all of the cruise ships would move to
Vancouver, where they could stay in Alaska as much as they
want.
Now, this is getting very close. It's 2 months ago, now,
that I raised this with your people, when you first published
it. When is the Department going to make a decision on whether
or not they made an error in publishing that with regard to
Alaska Coast Wise Cruisers?
Secretary Chertoff. I can tell you that after our
discussion, I spoke to the Commissioner of Customs and Border
Protection about this. I have to be a little careful, because
we're in a regulatory process, and if I say the wrong thing,
we're going to wind up getting sued.
But we've certainly seriously taken onboard the issues that
you pointed out. I believe that a final version of this is
being presented to the Commissioner for him to review and make
a judgment on it. I will personally look at it before it goes
out.
Senator Stevens. Well----
Secretary Chertoff. I can't tell you what we're going to
do, because if I do it, I might as well just show up in the
courthouse and----
Senator Stevens. Well, respectfully, all you need to do is
tell them to withdraw that proposed rule.
Secretary Chertoff. I----
Senator Stevens. It's not necessary for Hawaii. Hawaii
doesn't need any ruling for over there. The act was meant to
apply to Hawaii only, and yet these proposed rules are out
there, scaring the death out of all these people.
Secretary Chertoff. I--I----
Senator Stevens. Reservations are not being made on the
cruise lines, because this is a common known thing, all the way
along the west coast.
Secretary Chertoff. I will make sure this thing gets out
quickly. I think we've taken--as I said, I took onboard your
view on this. I've communicated that to the Commissioner. I
think we will get this resolved very quickly.
Senator Stevens. All right. I hope so, because I think that
the bell is tolling on cruise ship activity for Alaska. That is
substantially what's left of our economy in southeastern
Alaska. The government closed down all harvesting of timber.
The mines have been protested by extreme environmentalists.
There is no economy left in Southeastern Alaska except tourism.
And they all come in on these cruise ships. I can't think
of anything--but my last comment----
Senator Inouye. Well, Senator, you----
Senator Stevens. Yes?
Senator Inouye. I just wanted the record to show I support
you.
Senator Stevens. Thank you. I support Hawaii's coverage on
this, and we had--did in the committee.
Secretary Chertoff. My understanding is that you're----
FEMA GRANT FUNDING
Senator Stevens. I'm about ready to run over--let me just
mention to you this. I note that there's a State and local
program reduction of $1.46 billion, Assistance to Firefighters
Grant $450 million--it looks like we're nationalizing
national--all this concept of security. And not using the
people who are in the local governments, and particularly State
governments, the way we should.
Why would the budget be reduced there?
Secretary Chertoff. I think that if you look at what we do
on the first responder grants, we have generally kept our
requests at the same level. Actually, I think the position that
we take is precisely what you're saying, that the Federal
Government should not generally be in the business of paying
salaries for local firefighters. That would truly nationalize
local firefighting. What we----
Senator Stevens. Well, you're--no. You're bringing all the
authority into Washington when you don't help them.
Secretary Chertoff. Oh, actually, we're trying to do quite
the reverse. We don't want to actually run local fire
departments or have the authority. We do propose money for----
Senator Stevens. Well, respectfully, Mr. Secretary, the
local governments are not going to put up money for national
security. They will help you, if you give them the money to
help you.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, and that's why I say for--we do
have----
Senator Stevens. Help them, I mean. To help them.
Secretary Chertoff. We do have $300 million we're
requesting for fire grants, which are for equipment and the
kinds of capabilities that would have national significance.
Where we typically have not requested money, although Congress
has granted it, is on the SAFER grants, which are basically
payroll. It's individual salaries.
We view that as principally a local firefighting function.
And I agree with you, we do not want to nationalize that. Local
firefighters, whether they be volunteer or professional, ought
to be hired, trained, and paid for by local governments. That's
the way we did it when I grew up, and that's what we want to
continue to do.
Senator Stevens. Well, respectfully, again, I'm over time,
but that's not what that money was spent for. That money was
spent to help them get equipment, to help them train, to make
them able to help you, not to put them--the firefighters are
going to be paid locally. What this is, is training, equipment,
and integration of their systems into yours.
Instead, you're bringing all that money into Washington.
Sorry, Mr. President--Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I noted that the
Senator from Alaska just gave you an increase in stature here
to Mr. President.
Senator Stevens. What did I call him?
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. President.
Senator Stevens. Well, that fits with him.
Senator Lautenberg. All right. Should we vote it here, and
get done with the--no time. This is no time for humor.
Senator Stevens. I would appreciate it. Thank you very
much. A little humor would be good in my life right now.
AMTRAK SECURITY FUNDS
Senator Lautenberg. I can't help, but I'd like to--Mr.
Secretary, we look at the budget for the recommendations for
2009 for the grants programs, and the cuts are enormous. It
comes down to almost $2 billion worth of cuts, and the most
important areas, State homeland security, port security, rail
transit security.
And these are going to be very, very difficult for the
communities to absorb. And, for one thing, in fiscal year 2008,
Congress appropriated $25 million for Amtrak security needs.
Now, FEMA and TSA are now requiring that Amtrak provides a non-
Federal match in order to use this money.
Now, I don't know where the authority was granted to do
that, but when we're looking at Amtrak carrying more than 26
million people a year right now, and initially the funds
weren't that great, but now to cut it further and impose a
restriction that causes Amtrak to furnish double the money that
it used to have--that it would have had.
So what can we do about that, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Chertoff. I have to say, I don't--as I sit here,
I don't know exactly what that decision relates to. I'll find
out what the Amtrak----
Senator Lautenberg. If you would see, because Amtrak needs
$60 million for security, it's estimated, in fiscal year 2009,
and yet there's no money for this in the budget. And while
you're looking at the question of Amtrak, please try to find
out for me why the President eliminated that kind of funding.
Isn't the rail security a high priority at this time?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, it is, and let me say in addition
to requesting $175 million, which is what we requested last
year, we put additional what I would call in-kind assets into
rail transportation. We've asked for an increase in our TSA
budget to put these mobile teams that actually go into the
train stations and actually do patrolling. They have dogs so
that they can do explosive detection.
So our support for rail transportation security is not
limited to grants. It also includes in-kind contributions that
we use by deploying our personnel.
AIRPORT SCREENING PROCESSING TIME
Senator Lautenberg. If they were only more kind, Mr.
Secretary, we'd be better off. I saw a story in the New Jersey
paper about the airport screeners being told to speed it up,
push for 18 second searches, and it concerned some security
experts. Now, I led the fight in Congress to remove the
artificial cap of the number of screeners that could be hired
by the agency. It was set at 45,000.
And currently, there's just about that number. Now, the
law, which passed as part of the 9/11 recommendations bill last
year, specifically allowed TSA to hire as many screeners as
needed for safe operations. So why would we now ask for a
faster review, and not be concerned about the fact that it
might not be sufficient when we are looking for 18 second
searches? It doesn't sound like a long time.
The 200-person-per-hour goal has never been widely
publicized, and it was a surprise to contend that 18 seconds of
screening just isn't enough time. So may I have your thoughts
on that?
Secretary Chertoff. Sure. I don't know--I didn't see the
story. I don't--I can't vouch for the story. The issue for
screening, of course, reflects a balance between doing a proper
job and also making sure that we try to make it as efficient as
possible. We are seeking additional money to hire behavior
detection officers, travel document checkers, and we do
appreciate the removal of the cap, which did it make it tougher
for us to manage the workforce.
We have some other constraints we operate under. The
architecture of an airport sometimes influences things. In
other words, no matter how many screeners you have, if
everything funnels down into a narrow portal, it's going to
create a clog-up in terms of passengers moving through.
I will say that I've asked the head of TSA over the next 30
to 45 days to come to me with some what I would call out-of-
the-box ideas for how we might reengineer what we do with TSA,
in terms of airport screening. We have elevated the security
measures in a lot of respects, and that always causes me to ask
the question, ``Now is there something that we've done in the
past that we might eliminate or modify?'' Because now we've
reduced the risk, and something that originally had a purpose
may no longer have a purpose.
So I can tell you that TSA is constantly looking at a way
to increase--at ways to increase efficiency. But they always
treat the issue of security as the paramount priority, and it
doesn't get subordinated to just moving the traffic through.
Senator Lautenberg. You know, there has been talk in the
past about giving additional modern screening equipment to the
TSA staff, so that they could do a more thorough job. Now,
Newark, which is one of the busiest airports in the country,
doesn't have the most modern screening equipment. So are you
aware of any shortages in that, or things that you would prefer
that we get into place at the airports to help speed the
process?
Secretary Chertoff. I'd say a couple of things. First, one
of these goes to the issue of this fee, which would allow us to
dedicate additional money to the process of actually getting
and deploying more of this equipment, which I think in the long
run would actually be a positive thing for the airlines and the
airports.
We are currently testing technology that will be better and
more efficient than what we currently have deployed in most
airports. There's something called millimeter-wave, which we
are testing, I think, in Phoenix. And if that turns out to be
good, then that's the kind of equipment we're going to start to
deploy elsewhere.
We are also doing some non-equipment changes, including
behavioral detection officers and travel document checkers,
which add additional layers of security. And I think some of
those are operating in Newark, as well as in other airports.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman, just one last record
request, and that is, Mr. Secretary, can you furnish me with a
report on the number of items recovered over the last 5 years,
let's say, that represent some risk or some danger there? And
if it's embargoed, will it acknowledge that?
Secretary Chertoff. I'll do my best. Yeah.
[The information follows:]
TOTAL PROHIBITED ITEMS: 2002-2007
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prohibited Item Type 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Grand Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ammunition and gunpowder................ .............. 10,729 25,672 24,404 16,052 14,185 91,042
Box cutters............................. 3,992 21,348 22,430 21,319 15,999 11,908 96,996
Clubs, bats, and bludgeons.............. 3,521 25,522 28,998 20,531 12,296 9,443 100,311
Dangerous objects....................... 6,957 29,225 28,293 14,099 13,146 7,708 99,428
Disabling Chemicals and Other Dangerous .............. 8,133 34,013 40,989 25,985 22,473 131,593
Items..................................
Explosive Materials..................... .............. 3,808 14,298 6,950 5,145 3,089 33,290
Explosives.............................. 358 1,088 335 2,776 1,768 505 6,830
Firearms................................ 153 638 254 .............. .............. 1,416 2,461
Fireworks............................... .............. 3,828 9,336 8,195 3,551 1,768 26,678
Flammable Items......................... 13 44,772 301,819 443,290 335,164 250,161 1,375,219
Flammables/Irritants.................... 62,853 485,055 697,271 371,711 92,329 73,165 1,782,384
Knives and blades (3 inches or more).... 143 142,565 64,608 57,963 56,902 51,171 373,352
Knives and blades (less than 3 inches).. 320,673 1,822,457 1,990,796 1,764,929 1,550,221 1,005,491 8,454,567
Lighters................................ 1,551 62 178 9,420,991 11,616,688 5,124,344 26,163,814
Loose Ammunition........................ .............. .............. 28,497 27,701 18,748 16,600 91,546
Replica Weapons......................... 20,057 27,990 17,260 12,641 8,473 6,719 93,140
Sharp objects........................... 540,298 3,020,984 3,409,888 3,276,941 163,419 101,386 10,512,916
Tools................................... 67,516 560,957 808,776 889,904 158,838 106,786 2,592,777
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand Total....................... 1,028,085 6,209,161 7,482,722 16,405,334 14,094,724 6,808,318 52,028,344
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much. Thanks, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Senator Leahy.
CBP STAFFING ALLOCATION
Senator Leahy. Mr. Secretary, we discussed--I discussed a
couple of these things earlier, and I'd like to go back to the
GAO Report. It says that Customs and Border Protection staffing
allocation needs several thousand additional CBP officers and
agriculture specialists at ports of entries. Your budget
includes not a budget for the several thousand, but 234 at land
borders and 295 positions for radiation portal monitoring
staff.
That's about two additional officers at each air and land
seaport. When Assistant Commissioner Thomas Winkowski came to
Vermont last August, he said at least eight new agents would be
assigned to Vermont. We're somewhat disappointed, because the
estimate was we needed 60. But I guess it doesn't make an awful
lot of difference, since we didn't get any.
Any chance we might get any by the--anywhere between one--
or anywhere between none and the 60 that's been requested?
Secretary Chertoff. I will certainly--I'll get back you
specifically with respect to Vermont. I can tell you that in
fiscal year 2007, we budgeted and we received money for 1,131
additional CBP officers. This fiscal year, we got money for 679
additional ones, and we're asking for 539 next year. So that
would get us up to about 2,300.
Senator Leahy. Yeah. Well, that's all well and good, but--
--
Secretary Chertoff. That's all----
Senator Leahy [continuing]. What about Vermont?
Secretary Chertoff. Right. I will get back to you
specifically----
Senator Leahy. We've been promised--we need 60. We've been
promised eight. We've gotten none.
Secretary Chertoff. I'll find out exactly what the plan for
Vermont is.
[The information follows:]
Planned Customs Officer Staffing--State of Vermont
The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) plans to deploy
seven new CBP officers to Vermont ports of entry (POE) and 15
CBP officers to the Williston Vetting Center in Williston, VT,
in fiscal year 2008.
In addition, there are six new CBP officers planned to be
deployed to POEs in Vermont with funding from the fiscal year
2009 President's Budget. The fiscal year 2009 plans are
preliminary and will be reassessed at the time of funding
distribution to ensure operational needs are met.
CBP monitors and tracks the ever-evolving staffing needs at
ports of entry and facilities to adequately carry out its
diverse mission. CBP determines the appropriate staffing level
at ports of entry by analyzing a variety of criteria such as:
volume, processing times, facility constraints and expansions,
number of terminals and booths, as well as an assessment of
various threat and risk factors. CBP continues to assess its
staffing needs throughout the year, based in part upon
information that obtained from CBP Field Offices. These
submissions, combined with national and local initiatives, all
play a role in how personnel is allocated throughout the
country within CBP's financial resources.
Three employee town hall meetings were conducted by the
Director of Field Operations, Boston at the Port of Derby Line
and the Williston Vetting Center on September 26 and 27, 2007,
to discuss with CBP employees the staffing needs at POEs in
Vermont and to address other employee concerns.
NORTHERN BORDER
Senator Leahy. And what about on the northern border? DHS
promised a target of Border Patrol agents on the northern
border by--what they promised, they missed it by about 100. How
are we doing on that?
Secretary Chertoff. I think what we're requesting in the
budget, we expect to have 1,500 in fiscal year 2009, which is I
think what we committed to doing.
Senator Leahy. Are we going to get them?
Secretary Chertoff. Pardon?
Senator Leahy. Are we going to get them?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, if we get the budget request, we
will get them.
Senator Leahy. Well, that----
Secretary Chertoff. I mean, that is what is built into the
budget for fiscal year 2009.
Senator Leahy. All right.
Secretary Chertoff. It would get us up to 1,500.
Senator Leahy. All right. But we put money in for these in
the past, and nothing's ever happened. That's why I asked.
Let's go about this temporary checkpoint, so-called
temporary checkpoint. And you said that, when I'd asked this,
100 miles from the border, along a road that's paralleled by
dozens of other roads that people could take if they wanted to
avoid the checkpoint. I realize that it would keep our fear
factor going, and it doesn't seem to stop anybody.
You said you would let me know about this, and yet we now
have it in the budget. Is this going to be a case of building
them, and then you tell us?
Secretary Chertoff. Let me say this. First of all, Senator,
let me----
Senator Leahy. Invite us to a ribbon-cutting or something?
Secretary Chertoff. Let me first correct one thing. We're
going to be at 1,500 Border Patrol agents in the northern
border by the end of this fiscal year. So it'll be by the end
of September.
Senator Leahy. All right.
Secretary Chertoff. So we have that funded already.
Senator Leahy. That's good news.
CHECKPOINTS
Secretary Chertoff. On the issue of the checkpoints, I
don't know as we sit here what the plans are with respect to
the checkpoint in Vermont. I can tell you generally----
Senator Leahy. But you've got a $4 million----
Secretary Chertoff. For the northern border----
Senator Leahy [continuing]. Request for----
Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. Checkpoints.
Senator Leahy [continuing]. The Vermont checkpoints. And
this is in the so-called Swanton sector, which is the northwest
part of our State. The other one is in the northeastern part of
the State. Actually, they're getting down to the southern part
of the State.
Secretary Chertoff. Yeah.
Senator Leahy. Are we going to have permanent checkpoints
or not?
Secretary Chertoff. In terms of the specific plan for
Vermont, I can't tell you as I sit here. I can tell you in
general what our view on checkpoints is, and to be honest, I'm
probably most familiar with it in the southern border, but the
concept is the same.
Checkpoints do serve a valuable function in intersecting--
--
Senator Leahy. Well, wait a minute. The concept is the
same? Are you saying that the situation on crossing our
northern border is the same as our southern border?
Secretary Chertoff. No. I'm saying that concept----
Senator Leahy. I know you've got that----
Secretary Chertoff. No. I'm----
Senator Leahy [continuing]. Millions of dollars being spent
on a virtual fence that doesn't work on the southern border----
Secretary Chertoff. I'm saying----
Senator Leahy [continuing]. But are we doing the same thing
here on the northern border?
Secretary Chertoff. No. I'm saying the concept of using a
checkpoint that is not at the border is basically the same
concept. It's the recognition that there will be people who
will get through the border that you can stop secondarily at a
checkpoint.
Senator Leahy. Well, of course you can, but when you've got
this thing sitting out there, and you've got a whole lot of
roads that go around, and we are not talking about a border
where there's that much of a need to come across it. I mean,
the Canadians, their dollar--because our dollar has slipped so
badly, their economy is booming, they've got their dollar's
worth, some days, more than ours.
They're not rushing across to get jobs. It's not the----
Secretary Chertoff. I don't think it--I agree. It's not
illegal--the issue in the Canadian border is not a big flow of
illegal migrants. I----
Senator Leahy. Well, the reason I ask is you got border--
Derby Line that stands at Quebec. This is a town that--it's two
different names, but----
Secretary Chertoff. Yeah.
Senator Leahy [continuing]. It's one town. Half is in the
province of Quebec, but half is in Vermont. They want to put
barriers up so that if the person in Vermont wants to ask the
high school kid who lives across the street to come and baby
sit for 3 hours, they can't do it. We don't--and we're told
that we don't have the Border Patrol--enough people to do that.
And we're going to start sticking people 100 miles away?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, let me just make it clear. The
purpose of having the checkpoints in the northern border isn't
that we think there's a large flow of illegal migrants. It's
other kinds of smuggling that we worry about, drug smuggling
and things of that sort.
I mean, I've asked the Border Patrol about this. Their
experience is--and I have to credit their experience, because
they have the years on the ground--is that the checkpoint
serves as an additional layer of protection against smuggling.
Now, I agree with you, we need to----
Senator Leahy. Okay. You get an occasional smuggler. You
get an occasional--some kid with pot in his car. And that's
great. And you're stopping all these law-abiding people going
back and forth. I mean, I mentioned the thing with--where I'm
told by an officer pointing to his gun, ``That's all the
authority I need.''
Secretary Chertoff. Yeah. And that's improper. So, I mean,
certainly I don't--I'm not going to condone an officer saying
that to anyone.
Senator Leahy. I understand. But I mean--and that's fine. I
can--when the superior officer walked up and saw me there, he--
I don't pretend to be a lip-reader, but I'm certain of what I
could understand when they saw the situation.
But it should be the same if it was Patrick Jones.
Secretary Chertoff. Oh, sure. Absolutely. It's completely--
--
Senator Leahy. I mean, it's just--it----
Secretary Chertoff. Let me be really----
Senator Leahy. You get the impression sometimes, and I hear
this from foreign visitors all the time, that we treat
everybody as an enemy, and we start treating our own people as
an enemy. Mr. Secretary, if I had any hair, I'd be tearing it
out. I'm sure that's something you can appreciate.
But, I mean, this is crazy.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, let me say this. First, let me
say that on the checkpoint, I gather we have not completed a
site selection assessment for the permanent checkpoint yet. So
that still hasn't been decided.
On the border issue you raised, I'm in violent agreement
with you. I periodically hear complaints, at the airport or
whatever it is, about people who have been treated rudely or
mistreated by somebody in the Government. You know, I have----
Senator Leahy. I've seen it done. I've seen it.
Secretary Chertoff. Right. I have 208,000 employees in this
Department. The people at the ports of entry process millions
of people a year. I have no doubt, statistically, that some
small number are rude and inconsiderate. I wish I could root it
out.
I've spoken to the head of Customs and Border Protection.
They are working hard to send a message that courtesy is an
important element of the job. My experience with human nature,
including a lot of years--and you were a prosecutor, too--is
that you will always get some small number of people who when
you give them a badge and a gun will take it as a license to be
discourteous and rude.
All I can tell you is, to the very best of our abilities,
our policy is to send a message that everybody, whether they're
a foreigner or an American citizen, ought to be treated
politely at port of entry or during any interaction.
And to the extent that people violate that stricture, I
regret it and I apologize for it. You know, I wish I could make
everybody be courteous. I haven't yet found the magic key to
doing that, but we'll continue to try.
CBP CUSTOMS OFFICER LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER (LEO) STATUS
Senator Leahy. And I will submit for the record a question
on whether you're going to bring into effect the Custom and
Border Protection agents LEO, the CVP, which is supposed to go
in effect on July 6, 2008, and this is one I'm not asking you
to comment on. But we'll submit it for the record.
But it is granting Federal law enforcement status to
Customs and Border Protection agents, something we put in to
try to stem the number who are retiring. And you and I should
chat about these checkpoints.
Secretary Chertoff. All right.
CHECKPOINTS
Senator Leahy. Maybe come up and take a ride with me in
Vermont, and I'll show how to--how easy it is to just avoid
that.
Secretary Chertoff. I'm happy to chat with you about it,
but I mean, we've got the same argument that was presented to
us in Arizona. But I have to tell you, it shouldn't just be me.
I should bring----
Senator Leahy. Those are different situations. We don't
suddenly--we don't have thousands of Canadians rushing down
here----
Secretary Chertoff. Senator----
Senator Leahy [continuing]. Because they like our
healthcare system or our economy better than theirs.
Secretary Chertoff. I should bring--if we're going to do
that, I'll bring the Border Patrol up with me, so they can tell
you what their own experience is. I mean, I've----
Senator Leahy. Yes.
Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. I have not been a border
agent, but I've talked to them and----
Senator Leahy. I have, too.
Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. And they have----
Senator Leahy. I have, too.
Secretary Chertoff. It's not--I don't have a--I'm not--I
don't have a kind of--I'm not wedded to it in any particular
place. I'm open-minded. But I do--I am wedded to the idea that
if the Chief of the Border Patrol looks me in the eye and says,
``I need this,'' I'm inclined to defer to him.
But I'm happy to pursue the discussion with you.
Senator Leahy. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Senator Craig.
SECURE BORDERS
Senator Craig. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Secretary
Chertoff, let me join with Senator Specter in thanking you once
again, along with Secretary Gutierrez, as we spent a lot of
quality time together last year. And I must tell this
committee, in the 28 years I've been here, I don't know of any
other two Secretaries who spent as much time on the Hill,
trying to effectively design and work with us in the design of
a comprehensive immigration bill.
We failed. One of the reasons we failed is in part because
of America's concern about secure borders. There's no doubt
about that. It's a total package of issues out there, as we now
understand it probably a little better than we did a year ago.
And there are a combination of factors that cause people to
react, as it relates to the security of our borders and
illegals, and the immigration issue.
And as we struggle to get it all right, our borders are
going to be critical in being able to say to the American
public, ``Now that we've got this corrected, will you work with
us in building the second boundary, if you will, and that's
good law that denies illegals access to the labor market in our
country.''
NATIONAL GUARD AT SOUTHERN BORDER
Having said that, I was one of the early advocates of
taking our National Guard to our southern border, or
southwestern border, to supplement and do all of that as it
related to just these phenomenal distances that we border
States. Senator Leahy is one, obviously. Senator Murray is
another border State. I'm a border State.
My question of you, Mr. Secretary, how much longer do you
envision us needing to have the National Guard at our southern
boundary?
Secretary Chertoff. I think the plan--first of all,
Senator, thank you for your comments, and it was a pleasure
working with you and the other Members of the Senate on the
bill, which I do think, even though it didn't pass, I think
it's a very constructive----
Senator Craig. We all learned a lot.
Secretary Chertoff. I think we did.
Senator Craig. Didn't we?
Secretary Chertoff. And I think people will return to it.
Senator Craig. Yes.
Secretary Chertoff. On the issue of the National Guard, I
think the plan is this summer to have them all back to their
original missions. We have always traditionally had some
National Guard training at the border, even prior to this
operation, but we will draw down to the traditional level this
summer, because we have now added a lot of Border Patrol.
Senator Craig. Okay. I know you're doing that. You're
hiring out in our area, and I've also been an advocate. And I
think I have told you that once you put Guard on the border,
one of your natural points to go recruit, the people have
already had experience and some training, is right there.
Young men and women who served their time in the Guard that
might find life as a Border Patrol as an extension of their
presence, so I hope your recruitment goes well.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, Homeland Security,
you're steadily moving toward full implementation of the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. However, as has been
mentioned, Congress mandated that full implementation cannot
take place until DHS certifies that it is ready to handle
implementation or the June 2009, whichever comes first.
As of now, is DHS planning on taking until June 2009 before
full implementation? Or do you believe that you will be ready
to certify to Congress at an earlier date? What is your
timeline?
Secretary Chertoff. I think we would be ready to certify at
an earlier date. This is a fight I lost. I think we're obliged
to wait until June 2009 for full implementation under the law,
although I would have liked to have seen us be able to
implement it earlier.
But in the meantime, we'll make use of the additional time.
The State of Washington is now issuing enhanced driver's
licenses that will satisfy the requirement. New York is going
to be doing it. Arizona is going to be doing it. I think
Michigan has just agreed to do it, or is close to agreeing.
So we'll use the time to achieve market saturation in terms
of these different kinds of documentation, which will make it
easier. But as far as I can tell, we will be ready at the
earliest legally authorized date to make it fully implemented.
Senator Craig. Okay. Certainly Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative was designed to secure our borders and allow us to
know who is coming across our borders. However, both our
northern and our southern borders are simply so very vast, it
is, in my opinion, impossible to line them with people. And
we've all had the frustration about physical structures, and
how much should you build and can you build.
BORDER SECURITY TECHNOLOGY
And I applaud the other effort that's utilizing
technologies, like UAVs and other emerging technologies. While
I recognize that the virtual border fence or Project 28 has
received some negative reporting from GAO, what does the future
look like for this type of virtual monitoring and inspection
for use along our northern borders?
Also, what other steps are being done right now to ensure
that we are able to track people coming across the border by
foot, ATVs, and other means, whereby they can avoid--and I
think some of that conversation went on between you and Senator
Leahy--checkpoint concepts and all of that? And in all of that,
a sense of friendship and positive relation?
Secretary Chertoff. At the northern border, obviously,
there's going to be a somewhere different lay down of
infrastructure than at the southern border. I don't envision
we're going to do a lot of fencing in the northern border.
Obviously, we've talked--there's been some discussion of some
barriers in a couple of locations, but we're really looking at
technology.
One of the unmanned aerial systems that I talked about is
going to go up to the northern border. It's going to be
available to do surveying there. What we currently have is a
combination of infrared and seismic sensors, which are
underground, remote mobile video surveillance systems, and
then, of course, at the ports of entry, we have radiation
monitoring devices.
The flow between the ports of entry, particularly out west,
has been only a very small fraction of what we see at the----
Senator Craig. Yeah.
Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. Southern port of entry.
Senator Craig. Oh, yeah.
Secretary Chertoff. But we do--you know, we are mindful of
drug smuggling, to be honest. We had a big operation out in
Washington about a year or 2 ago, where there was a lot of
drugs being flown in. So we are going to have technology at the
northern border, but it's going to be a different array than we
have at the southern border. But we will move a UAV up there
pretty soon.
Senator Craig. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Senator Murray.
DISASTER AID FOR WASHINGTON STATE
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Secretary, thank you for being here. Before I ask my questions,
I wanted to extend a word of thanks to many people who work in
your Department.
As you may remember in December, we had some very serious
flood and winds out of my State. Six people died, thousands of
people moved out of their homes, and really millions of dollars
in economic and property loss, and I have toured the vast area
many times, and over and over, people are thanking me for the
Coast Guard plucking people off of their roofs in the middle of
the night, and for our FEMA officials who you sent out there,
who've been on the ground, and have really spent hundreds of
hours working with people who have been very devastated.
And I think, oftentimes, we forget those soldiers out on
the ground that have just done a tremendous job. And I wanted
to extend a word to you, and to those people, as well, and
thank you very much for that.
2010 OLYMPICS PREPARATION
The first question I had that I wanted to bring up today
was the 2010 Olympics and the Department's planning for that.
You're well aware the Winter Olympic Games are going to be held
in Vancouver, British Columbia, just over the border from
Washington State. We've got 7,000 athletes and 80 countries
coming, 10,000 reporters, it's going to be obviously very huge,
and it is going to have a significant impact on Washington
State and our border counties.
Washington State is going to be providing key
transportation access for millions of people who are--or
thousands of people who are flying in, and we have been working
closely with DHS on this, the Department, your representatives,
Customs and Border, Immigration and Customs, Secret Service,
FEMA, they've all been working with our State and local
officials on planning for this.
I think you know that the Committee has identified some key
needs for that. An Olympics Coordination Center, interoperable
communications, training, and exercises.
What is disconcerting to me is that the President's budget
has zero funding for any of that, and I wanted to ask you since
that 2010 Olympic Planning Committee has identified $16 million
in direct 2010-related needs, what strategy DHS has for
actually providing those funds that are going to be required?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, of course, for the fiscal year
2009 budget, we do have in the CBP budget money that the CBP
anticipates spending current resources from its base budget to
cover some of its expenditures in connection with the planning
and the run up to the Olympics.
We also have a Federal Coordinator who has been designated,
who's going to be working more closely with State officials. I
would also envision that because we will have Homeland Security
grant funds made available in 2009, some of those may be
available and attributable for security-related measures, as it
relates to this particular Olympics.
So I think there will be a number of sources of funds, even
though there's not a specific line item that's dedicated to the
Olympics as a grant program or something else, but there will
be sources of funds within the Department.
Obviously, when the 2010 budget is proposed, and we get
into the actual period of time----
Senator Murray. But actually, the 2009 budget----
Secretary Chertoff. Well, 2009 will take you into, I guess,
the--I guess it'll take you over into winter of 2009/2010. I
guess as we get closer, if there are some specific needs that
can't be funded out of the particular budget, you know, monies
that we have in the individual components, we can address those
later. But I think at this point, we expect that the Federal
share of this will be taken care of by monies already allocated
to the relevant components, and I think the exact needs in
terms of the Coordination Center, what the cost would be, is
something that's a work in progress.
Senator Murray. Well, can you tell me exactly who's in
charge for this? Because it's my understanding that the DHS
Operations Coordinator is going to be the lead entity, but----
Secretary Chertoff. Correct.
Senator Murray [continuing]. We have also heard that they
are only in a supporting role for Customs and Border
Protection. Can you clarify that?
Secretary Chertoff. Yes. Mark Beaty is the Federal
Coordinator. He's from CBP. CBP is the lead component in the
Federal agencies.
Senator Murray. So the Coordinator will be working
underneath CBP?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, he's a CBP person. He will be the
person who is responsible on the ground. And generally, when we
have a coordinator working on a multiagency issue, that person
will communicate directly with our DHS Operations Coordination
Center, and through them, directly to the Secretary.
PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY
Senator Murray. Okay. Thank you. I also wanted to ask you,
because I think you're aware that Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, PNNL, is in my home State, and they have a sizable
portfolio of research at PNNL, your Department does, that
touches on every aspect of the Department's priorities, from
cargo import security to border security.
They're doing radiation portal monitors, high explosives
research, support DNDO Radiation Test Center in Port of
Tacoma--a lot of work going on there, and we're very concerned
about the impact on that as we build and modify the facilities
at the 300 area at Hanford.
In recognition of that, DHS and S&T signed a memorandum of
understanding, I'm sure you're well aware, with DOE and
National Nuclear Security Administration. Last year, your
Agency was obligated to pay $25 million under that MOA, but the
President's budget contained nothing.
Now, working with our chairman and ranking member, we got
$15 million of that to cover that, so there wouldn't be any
delays. Last December, I met with Jay Cohen, who's the Director
of DHS Science and Technology, so we could avoid a similar
budget crisis this year, and he assured me that DHS would live
up to its obligation.
But this year, according to the MOU, DHS is supposed to
budget $15 million, but the President's budget only included
10.
Secretary Chertoff. Right.
Senator Murray. So I need to know what your agency is going
to do under that MOA, or we are going to lose the critical
infrastructure that your agency is relying on.
Secretary Chertoff. As you know, obviously, our Department
typically funds two-thirds of this. All I can tell you,
Senator, is this, I mean, this is--when we sat down and did the
budget, there were a whole host of things that had to be--even
with an increased budget--had to be traded off and pruned in
order to fit within the budget----
Senator Murray. Well, because of that, other agencies are
having to fill in what your Agency isn't doing, and there's a
lot of discontent about that.
Secretary Chertoff. I think it's--I understand it's a very
tough budget circumstance all around, particularly because
there being--obviously, with the subprime mortgage issue and
the money that was put into that, there have been some perhaps
unanticipated budgetary impacts from a total budget standpoint.
Senator Murray. Will support additional funding from this
committee to fulfill the obligation----
Secretary Chertoff. I would need----
Senator Murray [continuing]. Of DHS?
Secretary Chertoff. Yes. If someone were to come to me and
say, ``Put $5 million into this,'' I would have to take it from
something. And as I sit here now, I cannot tell you what I
would take it from. I would have to take it from something
else. Something else wouldn't get $5 million. Maybe a grant
program wouldn't get $5 million.
So I can go back and look at it again, and if someone comes
to me and says, ``Well, we really want the $5 million for
this,'' I will have to cut someone else's $5 million. I can't
tell you as I sit here who that would--who would suffer that
loss.
Senator Murray. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I do have a
number of other questions, and I would like to continue that
conversation with you. These are critical infrastructure
pieces, and this committee is going to have to come up with a
way to fund it, and we'll need your support to do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
PASSENGER VESSEL SERVICES ACT (PVSA) RULE
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, in
order to clarify an exchange that we had, for the record, on
the Passenger Vessel Services Act, PVSA, I do not support
withdrawing or repealing or cancelling out the rule, but I am
in favor of modifying the rule so that it applies to the Hawaii
Cruise Ship Vessel Program.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Secretary Chertoff. I think--I appreciate that. I think I
was aware from prior conversations that that's--was your
position, and I'm well aware of the issue. It is--the points
made have been taken onboard. I can't say more than that. I
will press the bureaucracy to issue forth with its final
resolution of this as quickly as possible.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
departmental management and operations
Management Efficiencies
Question. The request proposes to cut $378 million in critical
homeland security dollars in what is termed as ``management
efficiencies.'' The budget does not identify specific initiatives nor
quantify exact savings associated with these cuts. Provide specific
examples of how the Department will achieve $378 million in savings in
fiscal year 2009. If specific examples cannot be identified, please
inform the subcommittee of how many fewer border patrol agents will be
hired, or how many fewer Coast Guard personnel will be available to
secure our ports and enforce our immigration laws?
Answer. The expectation is that all DHS components should
continually review how they execute their programs and look for ways to
achieve savings for the U.S. taxpayer. We believe these savings can be
achieved without adversely impacting our ability to achieve the
Department's mission. Examples of these efficiencies include such
things as re-competing contracts and reducing dependence on contractor
support by hiring additional Federal staff where it is cost effective
to do so.
Financial Management
Question. The Inspector General reported that the majority of the
department's material weaknesses in internal control are attributable
to conditions existing at the Coast Guard. The Commandant recently
testified that corrective action plans are in place to remedy ongoing
material weaknesses. Are the Coast Guard's plans adequate to improve
these weaknesses and if not, what further action should the Coast Guard
be taking?
Answer. The Department's Chief Financial Officer (CFO) requested
the Inspector General conduct performance audits aimed at assessing the
Department's and U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) corrective action efforts.
These audits have proved invaluable in ensuring the Department's
corrective action efforts will be effective. The performance audits
noted areas where USCG's corrective action plans could be improved and
the DHS CFO will continue to support the USCG in strengthening their
corrective action plans.
Progress on remediating USCG's financial weaknesses represents a
long term challenge, highly dependent on financial management systems
improvements and strengthening the USCG control environment. To support
the USCG, the Department's CFO conducts monthly corrective action
meetings with Senior Management and weekly working group meetings with
Senior Staff. During fiscal year 2008 DHS and USCG will develop:
--An audit readiness strategy for USCG that paints a clear picture of
the critical path to a clean audit opinion.
--A strategy to accelerate the remediation of the posting logic and
other gaps in the USCG's Core Accounting System (which prevent
USCG from supporting assertions for transactions that flow
through the current USCG financial systems).
Headquarters Consolidation
Question. DHS is requesting $120 million in fiscal year 2009 for
its Consolidated DHS Headquarters project. What is the schedule for key
construction milestones, DHS's progress on meeting these milestones,
and how these impact the budget request?
Answer. The current schedule for fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year
2009 key construction milestones is included in the chart below and is
based on Congressional approval of the President's fiscal year 2009
Budget Request. The lack of funding in fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year
2008 has had an adverse impact on the schedule because it removes from
General Services Administration (GSA) and DHS a legitimate argument for
an urgent and compelling need to complete consultations with the
planning and preservation community and to expeditiously complete the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and Master Planning processes.
Fiscal year 2008--2009 Estimated Construction Milestones (subject
to appropriations):
Transition
Question. What is DHS's overall strategy for transition regarding
order of succession, cross government collaboration and transition
guidance?
Answer. DHS is engaged in activities at five levels to ensure
operational continuity of Homeland Security responsibilities in view of
the January 2009 administration change.
Operational continuity is addressed first through robust succession
planning. An August 2007 White House Executive Order specifies the
order of succession for the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security. Furthermore, Delegations of Authority, including orders of
succession, signed by the Secretary in October 2007 specify the
succession order for DHS Component Leader positions. Second, the
Department's internal succession planning efforts identify positions
critical to Homeland Security and mitigate their succession risk.
Additionally, DHS has engaged the National Academy of Public
Administration to conduct a study of DHS senior staffing and provide
recommendations. Third, a DHS-focused inter-agency collaboration
approach centers on structured, deliberate processes that engage key
groups and individuals to build relationships. The plan is to deliver
table top exercises before, during and after the transition period for
career senior officials and incoming appointees. This effort will build
DHS employees' knowledge of national security protocols and interfaces
with other departments as well as State and local governments and
ensure preparedness of DHS employees should a crisis arise, whether
natural or man-made. Fourth, the overall transition effort includes
seeking recommendations from bodies such as the Homeland Security
Advisory Council, which formed an Administration Transition Task Force.
The Task Force's report, delivered in January 2008, identifies
transition best practices. Fifth, the Department is developing
transition guidance to address the ``nuts and bolts'' of the
Department's operations. Furthermore, the Department is providing
improved processes to equip new appointees with the tools they need and
the information and relationships required to be effective in their
jobs.
To further elaborate on the third area of transition preparation,
in addition to the table top exercises mentioned above, the Department
is conducting briefings and exercises to prepare its senior career
officials and appointees for the Presidential administration
transition.
From February 19-21, 2008, DHS hosted a two-and-a-half-day
conference that brought together the Department's top career and non-
career leadership from all components, including field-based employees.
The attendees participated in a Federal Emergency Management Agency
exercise, as well as briefings on the Department's major initiatives,
with a focus on execution in the field.
From May 13-15, 2008, the Department will host another training and
exercise event at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in
Georgia. This training will engage senior career employees from all DHS
components in a series of briefings, scenarios and response exercises
to reinforce integrated operational preparedness and execution
throughout the Department.
Question. Is DHS planning an Operations Coordination and Planning
group to better coordinate the department's operational components in
the event of a major incident? Have DHS components expressed concern
that this group could have command and control responsibilities? What
is the status of this initiative and under what office will this group
be located?
Answer. Yes. This construct, tentatively described as the
Operations Coordination and Planning Group (OCPG), is similar to that
used by the Joint Staff to coordinate operations and planning across
the service branches of the military. To support this effort, an OCPG
working group has been created to develop recommendations regarding the
implementation and integration of this capability across DHS.
The efforts of the OCPG working group support the ongoing efforts
to improve current capabilities to coordinate operations and plan for
emergent, non-routine situations that may require multi-component
action, in order to enhance senior-level decision-making and an
integrated DHS response. This working group is comprised of
representatives from operational components within the Department who
provide the expertise necessary to ensure that the requirements of the
stakeholders are accounted for in the examination. The efforts of the
OCPG working group are still under development and have not yet been
reported to departmental leadership.
The Department has made significant efforts to strengthen the joint
coordination of operations and planning within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). This effort is intended to enhance the current
capability that supports internal operational decision-making by
departmental leadership. This construct, tentatively described as the
Operations Coordination and Planning Group (OCPG), is similar to that
used by the Joint Staff to coordinate operations and planning across
the service branches of the military. To support this effort, an OCPG
working group has been created to develop recommendations regarding the
implementation and integration of this capability across DHS.
The efforts of the OCPG Working Group support the ongoing efforts
to improve current capabilities to coordinate operations and plan for
emergent, non-routine situations that may require multi-component
action, in order to enhance senior-level decision-making and an
integrated DHS response. This working group is comprised of
representatives from operational components within the Department who
provide the expertise necessary to ensure that the requirements of the
stakeholders are accounted for in the examination. The efforts of the
OCPG Working Group are still under development and have not been
reported to departmental leadership. I will be happy to provide you
with an update once the working group has presented its
recommendations.
The OCPG, located under the office of Operations Coordination, is
still under development. The OCPG working group, established to develop
recommendations regarding the implementation and integration of the
capability across the Department, has not yet presented its findings to
departmental leadership. I will be happy to provide you with an update
once the working group has presented its recommendations.
Question. What will be the role of the Operations Coordination and
Planning group vis-a-vis command and control responsibilities?
Answer. Thank you for the opportunity to update you on the efforts
to strengthen the joint coordination of operations and planning within
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This effort is intended to
enhance the current capability that supports internal operational
decision-making by departmental leadership. This construct, tentatively
described as the Operations Coordination and Planning Group (OCPG), is
similar to that used by the Joint Staff to coordinate operations and
planning across the service branches of the military. To support this
effort, an OCPG working group has been created to develop
recommendations regarding the implementation and integration of this
capability across DHS.
The efforts of the OCPG Working Group support the ongoing efforts
to improve current capabilities to coordinate operations and plan for
emergent, non-routine situations that may require multi-component
action, in order to enhance senior-level decision-making and an
integrated DHS response. This working group is comprised of
representatives from operational components within the department who
provide the expertise necessary to ensure that the requirements of the
stakeholders are accounted for in the examination. The efforts of the
OCPG Working Group are still under development and have not been
reported to departmental leadership. I will be happy to provide you
with an update once the working group has presented its
recommendations.
Working Capital Fund (WCF)
Question. Over $47 million for headquarters procurement operations
is proposed to be funded through the WCF. Other than highlighting how
much each component pays for procurement services, what benefits or
efficiencies are gained from this funding mechanism compared to a
direct appropriation to the DHS Chief Procurement Office?
Answer. Funding the procurement operations through the WCF promotes
the management of total cost visibility and full cost recovery of
support services. The WCF provides goods and services in exchange for a
set price/rate. In support of this, the WCF cost allocation methodology
is designed to recover the costs by billing customers/components for
the provision of goods and services. The WCF components/customers'
charges are equal to the cost of providing the service and are based on
the component's demand or level of service.
Question. The request includes a general provision to modify the
WCF. With regard to carryover authority, what is a reasonable operating
reserve? How is the corpus remaining from DHS start-up funds used to
maintain liquidity in WCF operations? The general provision would allow
for transfer authority between WCF programs, projects, and activities
(PPAs). Provide a list of all PPAs in the WCF.
Answer. We have not determined a reasonable operating reserve
threshold for the Working Capital Fund (WCF). We are researching other
Federal agencies' rationale and determination of reasonable operating
reserves to assess the DHS WCF financial and management reserve
requirements.
Although the remaining corpus is available for obligation, these
resources are generally not obligated, but utilized to allow
flexibility for the WCF to continue to maintain a positive balance.
This practice ensures that obligations do not exceed resources in order
to remain solvent and allow for continued operations.
The key WCF activities are organized under the five activity
categories
--Fee for Service Activity
--This type of activity earns income from the provision of services
and has characteristics typical of a business enterprise. The
costs for operating the ``business'' are recovered by billing
customers for the provision of goods and services, through pre-
approved rates designed to recover its operating costs.
--GSA RENT
--Consolidated Subscriptions (Library of Congress)
--Financial Management (Finance & Acctg. Shared Services)
--Financial Statement Audit
--Financial Management DOB
--Bankcard Program
--TIER
--Internal Control Audit
--NFC Payroll Services & Reporting
--HQ Human Capital Services
--(HCBS) Payroll Service Ops
--DHS EXEC. LEAD. (SES CDP, Sec Conf)
--HQ Executive Lead. Dev (TEI, SES Forum, Gen. Workforce
Training)
--Employee Assistance Program
--CIO/DHS Infrastructure Transfer Program
--NCR Infrastructure Operations
--Software Enterprise Licenses--Microsoft
--Flexible Spending Plan
--Procurement Operations
--Tri-Bureau Service Activity
--The WCF Tri-Bureau Service activity supports selected
administrative services provided by Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and the Department of Justice (DoJ). These
services include human resources, services provided by CBP, and
IT services supplied by DoJ to a limited number of customers.
--Tri-Bureau Human Resources Shared Services
--Data Center Services from DOJ
--Government-Wide Mandated Service Activity
--Government-Wide Mandated Service Activity accounts consist of
accounts that are established by Congress in benefiting the
Government agencies and the public in consolidating services or
web-sights. These activity costs and pricing policies/
algorithms are usually determined by OMB. These costs are
billed through the WCF to facilitate the administration of the
Government-Wide Mandated Activities.
--Interagency Council Funding
--Recruitment One-Stop
--e-Training
--Enterprise HR Integration (EHRI)
--Business Gateway
--e-Rulemaking
--e-Travel
--Case Management Line of Business
--e-Grants.gov
--e-Authentication
--Human Resources Line of Business
--e-govBenefits
--Financial Management Line of Business
--Geospatial Line of Business
--IT Infrastructure Line of Business
--Budget Formulation and Execution Line of Business
--e-gov. Integrated Acquisition Environment
--e-gov. Disaster Management (DisasterHelp.gov)
--DHS Crosscutting Activity
--The DHS Crosscutting Activity accounts are those accounts that
provide a benefit in whole or in part to DHS and approved by
the Secretary in accordance with Public Law 108-90. These
accounts capture actual costs of the service provided and
redistribute the cost based on the discretionary budget,
staffing or some other fair and equitable basis to each DHS
organizational element.
--Capital Planning and Investment
--Ready Campaign (Ready.gov)
--Strategic Sourcing
--CPO Shared Reporting
--Working Capital Fund (WCF) Management Activity
--The WCF operation provides policy, procedures, budget
formulation, execution and customer resolution services in
managing the WCF. Services are provided to the activity
managers as well as customers across DHS.
DHS Acquisitions
Question. The request includes another installment of acquisition
interns to help retain an appropriate workforce of acquisition
professionals. In light of the job market shortage of experienced
contracting professionals, what other initiatives, such as hiring
retired annuitants, is DHS pursuing to establish an appropriate
acquisitions workforce?
Answer. The Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) is
moving out in several areas to ensure a good strategic succession plan
for the acquisition workforce. The first step we have taken is to
establish a baseline, using parametric measuring tools (in addition to
our ``cost-to-spend'' model) to help us identify what DHS' long term
personnel numbers should be. DHS is also making full use of the re-
established direct hire authority and successfully implementing the
recently granted re-employed annuitant program. OCPO is also working to
identify and effectively implement all flexibilities offered, such as
student loan repayment, recruitment and retention bonuses, time off
awards and recognition awards, etc. Establishing and executing a DHS
centralized acquisition training program is another initiative the
Department is pursuing that will aid the acquisition professionals in
reaching their full potential.
Question. The department's investment review process has been under
revision for several years; in your view what is the appropriate role
for department level oversight of its major investments and why have
previous efforts not provided sufficient oversight? How do you plan to
address this issue before the next administration?
Answer. The appropriate role for Department-level review of major
investments is to ensure that Department leadership is provided with
the following:
--Investment requirements that support the Department's strategic
objectives in parallel with being executable by DHS program-
contractor teams;
--Timely periodic assessment/review of program development/
production/fielding/life cycle support execution, using
standard, practical metrics, including (but not be limited to)
financial, systems engineering, earned value (where applicable)
and testing metrics;
--Sufficient reaction time for Department leadership, as a result of
program assessments, to successfully mitigate program risks or
successfully leverage program opportunities
Previous oversight has been limited by the lack of standard
Department-wide processes for requirements development/approval, and
wide variance across DHS in program assessment/review processes. Both
of these areas are actively being strengthened by cross-Department
teams led by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Office of Strategic
Plans in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy for
requirements, and by the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer for
program assessment and review. While much progress has been ongoing
during the Department's maturation, we continue to improve and
integrate our existing processes. Currently, the Department is
developing and piloting an integrated requirements planning process.
This process will provide a predictable and enduring way of identifying
key Departmental requirements and ensuring they are appropriately
prioritized and resourced. It will inform the Department's Annual
Integrated Planning Guidance document, which will guide future
decisions on major DHS investments. The process will be an integral
part of the Department's way of doing business.
In the requirements area, a team lead by the Assistant Secretary
for Policy is developing a requirements process which will be piloted
this summer on several program groups. Based on the pilot results,
modifications to the process will be made to resolve any issues
identified, and the process will begin implementation across DHS later
this year.
In the program assessment/review area, a team led by the Office of
the Chief Procurement Officer, and collaborating with other DHS senior
leadership and DHS program owners, is developing an Investment Review
process to replace the current MD 1,400 process. Currently,
implementation of this replacement process is planned to start in the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2008.
Question. Given longstanding concerns about the Department's
Investment Review Process and issues with major acquisitions such as
Deepwater and SBInet, what have you done to ensure that department's
acquisitions stay within cost, on schedule, and perform as intended?
Answer. In order to ensure that the Department's acquisitions stay
within cost, remain on schedule, and perform as intended, DHS has taken
the following actions:
--Establishment of a Senior Executive Service-level Acquisition
Program Management Directorate to provide oversight and support
for DHS acquisition programs (August 2007).
--Development of a periodic reporting metric-based system to
proactively monitor and track program performance.
--Implementation of a new process that will strengthen each program's
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB).
--The APB is the execution contract between the program, its
component, and Departmental leadership.
--Re-engineering of the Department's Investment and Acquisition
Management Review Process.
--This process is planned for implementation in the fourth quarter
of 2008.
Question. Given DHS's extensive reliance on contractors, what do
you believe is the appropriate role for contractors in supporting major
acquisitions, and how do you plan to ensure they are used properly in
these roles?
Answer. Across the board, contractors bring a wealth of
information, experience, technical and management skills with them to
cost-effectively meet specific Homeland Security requirements. This is
as true in the use of contractors to perform mission or mission support
requirements as it is in the preparation, review and administration of
the often highly technical contracts themselves. Within DHS, we are
very careful not to allow private sector contractors to perform
inherently governmental contract administrative functions while
building our internal capabilities, nor have we allowed contractors to
determine contract requirements. At DHS, for example, all warranted
Contracting Officers and all Contracting Officers Technical
Representatives (COTRs) are considered inherently governmental. These
capabilities are then supplemented by qualified contractors that have
been cleared of potential conflicts-of-interest and may provide limited
performance and technical inspection services, data and financial
management support services.
An example provided is the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The
organization was not fully staffed in the program or procurement
offices, when the requirement to develop the SBInet acquisition was
being planned. Examples of some areas where contractor support was used
follows:
--Program management
--Systems engineering, requirements, and other research/documentation
for the investment review process
--Logistics support to assist with the ``Due Diligence'' process
--Professional and administrative support in assembling, maintaining
and scheduling access to the on-line and physical ``Due
Diligence'' libraries
--Receiving and coordinating classified solicitations
--Use of other Government agencies, such as the Defense Contract
Audit Agency to conduct audits to use in cost and price
analyses of the proposals
--Support for ``Industry Day'' to record the presentations and
assemble the continuous streaming
--Contractor support from companies with auditing backgrounds to
document the cost analyses, questions and answers, supporting
documentation and recordation of such actions
The Mitigation Division of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) requires contractor support for business process management,
workforce realignment, and performance-based management as applied to
national government programs. The contractor may be tasked to provide
assistance to FEMA program management teams in program management and
planning activities such as: (1) strategic, acquisition and program
planning; (2) recommending and reviewing performance concepts and
metrics, including Earned Value analyses; (3) assisting in the
development and tracking of the balanced scorecard; (4) recommending
and reviewing concepts of operations; (5) working with the regions to
assist in implementing the program management procedures established by
Headquarters; (6) training staff; (7) providing financial management
analyses; (8) documentation management; (9) assisting with implementing
the governance structure; (10) providing performance management
support; (11) communication management; (12) assisting with HAZUS
Integration; and (13) Support to the Map Mod COTR. The contractor may
also be tasked to provide support to assist with the development and
maintenance of capital planning control documents i.e. OMB Exhibit 300
business case and related assessments in accordance with OMB Circular
A-11, Preparation, Submission and Execution of the Budget, and related
regulations and guidelines.
DHS Component Heads of Contracting Activity have been advised of an
increased expectation for monitoring the nature and manner of
contractor personnel activity in our blended workforce. It is more
important than ever for DHS contracting officers to be vigilant in
avoiding the inclusion of ``inherently governmental'' functions in
performance work statements and, absent specific authority,
establishing personal services contracts. It is also very important to
direct special management attention to contracts that have a pronounced
potential for influencing the authority and accountability of
Government officers.
When the Government uses a contractor, Organizational Conflict of
Interest is addressed in the respective contract. The individual
contractor does not work with his/her home office on any potential
contracts in which that company may plan to bid or participate either
as the prime or as a subcontractor. In those cases, the issue is
addressed at a level necessary and acceptable to the contracting and
legal community. Contractors designate a supervisor who handles all
personnel matters. The contractor staffs sign non-disclosures.
Contractor personnel also recuse themselves from participating in
acquisitions involving their employer or subsidiaries and their
competitors. Also, the contractor staffs do not sign any binding
documents or represent themselves as an agent of the government.
Further, the contractor does not work on Government holidays or outside
business hours.
DHS Component Heads of Contracting Activity have been advised of an
increased expectation for monitoring the nature and manner of
contractor personnel activity in our blended workforce. With the growth
of the ``blended'' or ``multi-sector'' workforce, it is more important
than ever for DHS contracting officers to be vigilant in avoiding the
inclusion of ``inherently governmental'' functions in performance work
statements and, absent specific authority, establishing personal
services contracts. It is also very important to direct special
management attention to contracts that have a pronounced potential for
influencing the authority and accountability of government officers.
DHS contracting officers shoulder a heavy responsibility for avoiding,
neutralizing or mitigating any occurrences of organizational conflicts
of interest that may occur due to increased contractor participation in
agency operations. In a memorandum distributed by the Chief Procurement
Officer in July 2007 regarding performance-based acquisition
requirements, the Component Heads of Contracting Activity were advised
that requirements for services must be clearly defined with appropriate
performance standards and, to the maximum extent practicable,
structured as performance-based. This applies also to contracts for
services that involve the ``blended workforce.'' Components should
avoid using an acquisition strategy involving time and material or
labor hours for service-type requirements where less risk-prone
contract types are more appropriate.
Unvouchered Funds
Question. Describe in detail the use of unvouchered funds for
accounts displayed in the Office of Management and Budget's December
22, 2007, unvouchered expenditures report. (if necessary in classified
form). Accounts identified: Office of Inspector General, Salaries and
Expenses; Coast Guard, Operating Expenses; Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Office of Investigations Operating Expenses; and U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, Salaries and Expenses.
Answer. Law Enforcement Sensitive. A response will be forthcoming
under separate cover.
Congressional Justification Discrepancies for the Analysis and
Operations (A&O) and the Under Secretary for Management (USM)
Budget Requests
Question. The fiscal year 2009 budget appendix does not match the
congressional justification tables. The budget appendix, which is the
official request, is $1.635 million below the amounts referenced in the
congressional justifications. There is a $1.376 million difference in
USM and a $259,000 difference in A&O. If the congressional
justifications are correct, please send a budget amendment for the
additional amounts. If the congressional justifications are incorrect,
please send replacement pages with a justification for the decrease.
Answer. Law Enforcement Sensitive. A response will be forthcoming
under separate cover.
chief information officer
Question. Given the current rate of transition, when will the
current build-outs of the Stennis and EDS data centers be fully
utilized?
Answer. Funding permitting, Stennis and EDS data centers will be
fully utilized by second quarter of fiscal year 2011. The following
migration schedule supports this utilization plan.
TABLE 1.--DATA CENTER MIGRATION SCHEDULE
Question. Would it make sense to use the Working Capital Fund to
provide resources to move and consolidate centers?
Answer. Yes, using the Working Capital Fund (WCF) as a partial
funding resource to provide funds to move and consolidate the data
centers makes sense. In fact, DHS has sought, and the fiscal year 2009
President's Budget Request includes, provisions for new WCF authorities
(retaining unused funds and reprogramming authorities) which are
intended to facilitate much more efficient collections of these funds
from components through the WCF to provide the DHS Chief Information
Officer with access to the resources needed to migrate systems to
Stennis and EDS over the next 3 to 4 years. Information Technology
development, operations, and maintenance funding, some of which would
be directed to data centers, is embedded in appropriations to the DHS
components for program growth and new hiring. Leveraging a WCF will
provide components with the oversight they need to ensure requirements
are being fulfilled while at the same time enabling the Department to
deploy and oversee the data centers more efficiently.
Question. Is information/cyber security within DHS a top priority
or mid-level priority? If it's a top priority, what are the bench
marks, goals and budget enhancements for achieving those goals? When
will you be able to report that DHS information systems are secure?
Answer. Information security and cyber security are top priorities
for the Department of Homeland Security. Since its inception, the
Department has been working to implement the President's National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, strengthen situational awareness and
monitoring of Federal and Critical Infrastructure systems, and enhance
the Government's cyber operational response capabilities. The
Department established a number of programs and initiatives to
coordinate efforts with other Federal departments and agencies and
critical infrastructure owners and operators to improve cyber security.
These programs focus on enhancing situational awareness, increasing
collaboration across Federal, State, local, private sector, and
international operational security teams, mitigating cyber incidents,
and coordinating response activities during a cyber event. Most
recently, the Department has been involved in an interagency Cyber
Initiative. To underscore the Department's efforts in this area,
Secretary Michael Chertoff identified cyber security as one of the top
priorities for the Department for 2008.\1\ The President's fiscal year
2009 budget request for DHS includes an increase over the fiscal year
2008 enacted level to continue funding necessary investments in the
Department's information/cyber security priorities.
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\1\ Link to ``Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff on 2007 Achievements and 2008 Priorities'': http://
www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1197513975365.shtm.
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One of the Department's top priorities is to protect critical
infrastructure and key resources, essential government operations,
public health and welfare, and the Nation's economic and national
security interests. Robust cyber security programs are essential to
address these priorities, and the Department is driving a number of
programs and initiatives to coordinate efforts with Federal departments
and agencies to improve cyber security. Programs such as the Trusted
Internet Connections (TIC) initiative and the Einstein program reflect
the Department's interest in taking deliberate action to reinforce and
build on those efforts.
The TIC initiative is a multifaceted plan to improve the Federal
Government's security posture by significantly reducing the number of
Federal network external gateways, including Internet points of
presence. Currently, there are several thousand Federal external
connections. The existence of such a large number inhibits the Federal
Government's ability to implement standardized security measures
effectively. The TIC initiative aims to reduce and consolidate the
number of external connections to create a more clearly defined ``cyber
border.'' Fewer external connections will enable more efficient
management and implementation of security measures and reduce avenues
for malicious attacks. Once fully implemented, the TIC initiative will
facilitate security standardization for access points across the
Federal Government.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) announced \2\ the TIC
initiative to the heads of Federal Government departments and agencies
in November 2007, subsequently outlining the specific steps departments
and agencies should take as part of the initiative, including compiling
a comprehensive inventory of each department and agency's existing
network infrastructure. Each department and agency is required to
develop a Plan of Actions and Milestones (POA&M) to reduce and
consolidate the number of external connections with a target completion
date of June 2008. The National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) is in
the process of reviewing initial POA&Ms submitted to NCSD, via the
Information Systems Security Line of Business (ISS LOB), for review to
ensure completeness and alignment with the goals and objectives of the
TIC initiative. In addition, US-CERT and the ISS LOB created an
interagency technical working group to establish, for OMB's approval, a
list of requirements and standards for the implementation of each TIC.
Once approved, these requirements will be passed to each agency for
implementation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The TIC was announced in OMB Memorandum 08-05.
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NSCD has identified activities and milestones necessary for
completion of the TIC initiative, and progress is being measured by
execution of the following activities and milestones:
--OMB approves TIC technical requirements; target completion date is
March 2008.
--OMB releases a list of TIC providers; target completion date is
April 2008.
--Departments and agencies develop a Plan of Actions and Milestones
(POA&M) to reduce and consolidate the number of external
connections; target completion date is June 2008.
--External connections are reduced and consolidated; target
completion date is June 2008.
The Einstein program is another important element in our efforts to
increase cyber security across Federal departments and agencies.
Einstein is a collaborative information-sharing program that was
developed in response to increasingly common network attacks on and
disruptions to Federal systems. The program was initially established
to help departments and agencies more effectively protect their systems
and networks and to generate and report necessary IT-related
information to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-
CERT). Einstein enhances situational awareness of the Federal
Government's portion of cyberspace, allowing US-CERT and cyber security
personnel to identify anomalies and respond to potential problems
quickly. Einstein is currently deployed at 15 Federal agencies,
including the Department of Homeland Security, and US-CERT is in the
process of deploying Einstein across all Federal departments and
agencies. In the last year NCSD deployed an additional 39 Einstein
sensors, increasing overall deployment by 243 percent. With the TIC
initiative providing a reduced number of external connections, Einstein
will be able to monitor activity across Federal Government networks
more effectively.
Additional funding has been requested in fiscal year 2009 to deploy
our Einstein system further on Federal networks to protect against
cyber threats and intrusions. This includes additional funding for
enhancing the US-CERT's ability to analyze and reduce cyber threats and
vulnerabilities, disseminate warning information, and coordinate
incident response.
NSCD has identified milestones for the Einstein implementation.
Progress will be measured by US-CERT deployment of 50 Einstein sensors,
with a target completion date by the end of 2008.
By deploying the TIC and Einstein Government-wide, the Department
is helping to enable strategic, cross-agency assessments of irregular
or abnormal Internet activity that could indicate a vulnerability or
problem in the system. These programs enhance Federal Government cyber
security by providing more robust security monitoring capabilities to
facilitate the identification and response to cyber threats and
attacks. They contribute to the improvement of network security,
increasing the resilience of critical electronically delivered
government services and enhancing the survivability of the Internet.
The Department's IT infrastructure supports a user population of
more than 208,000 Federal employees and contractors and consists of
approximately 610 major operational systems, both unclassified and
classified. Additionally, the DHS infrastructure extends to a number of
contractor-operated systems and to systems operated by other Federal
agencies under service level agreements.
The Department has several major IT initiatives underway to
consolidate and streamline enterprise functions across the Department.
We have standardized on a single, integrated email system including
enterprise directory services, and we are also in the process of
migrating multiple, redundant wide-area networks (WAN) into a single,
robust core capability. As part of the WAN consolidation effort, we are
also realigning a large number of Internet connections into a few
enterprise connections. These enterprise connections are fully aligned
with the Federal Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) initiative, and the
DHS TICs have been architected specifically to enhance security
capabilities based on current threats. Additionally, we are relocating
numerous mission and support applications that currently reside in
different locations, to two major data-centers. In this way we are
significantly enhancing systems' availability for key applications
systems supporting various missions of the Department.
The Department is also improving our security operations
capability, by implementing a common framework for incident response
across the Department. We are aggressively growing our analytical
capability for assessing threats, to include those posed from counter-
intelligence activities.
Due to the complexity of our infrastructure, the persistent
evolution of threats, and the proliferation of ``bad actors,''
including well-funded organizations and nation-states, it is impossible
to state with absolute certainty that any large IT infrastructure is
completely secure. For this reason, the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 takes a risk-based approach for securing
information technology systems, and the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) ``FISMA Implementation Project'' implements this
approach with mandatory standards and guidance, including a
comprehensive set of security controls. In DHS, our primary goal is to
provide a secure computing environment in support of mission
operations, including information sharing. This primary goal is also
balanced around accessibility to DHS systems by Federal, State Local,
Tribal and public entities. To this end, securing the infrastructure is
a continual process involving information security professionals,
system owners, and senior executives making informed risk management
decisions, and we continue to take an aggressive approach toward
implementing the NIST risk-based framework for all IT systems in use in
the Department. Specifically we have instituted:
--Strong information security policies--DHS 4300 series of policy
directives govern the information security implementation,
operation, and user responsibilities related to all DHS and
affiliated IT systems
--A comprehensive Certification & Accreditation process--provides for
system owners to identify and mitigate risks within operational
systems
--A defense-in-depth strategy--incorporates multiple layers of
security throughout system design, implementation, and
operation
--Risk-based metrics--provides monthly reports to key leaders across
the Department concerning status of compliance. Metrics are
updated annually, and the most recent update is outlined in the
DHS Fiscal Year 2008 Performance Plan
--Security architecture reviews in support of the Enterprise
Architecture Board (EAB)--ensures that systems comply with
security architecture standards and protocols
--Acquisition reviews in support of the mandated IT Acquisition
Review (ITAR) process--ensures that the government has clear
authority to oversee and monitor contractor security compliance
--Continuous monitoring--DHS Security Operation's Center (SOC) and
affiliated Component SOCs provide 24-hour monitoring of the DHS
IT infrastructure, and regularly report incidents to the United
States Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) and
coordinate mitigation activities to ensure effective
remediation
Question. I was surprised to learn that the Health and Human
Services Office of Emergency Preparedness has no access to the Homeland
Secure Data Network. Why is that? &
Answer. The Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) was established as
a fee for service program. Core operating costs are funded by
appropriation, but additions to the network are funded by the
organizations with the mission requirements. Mission owners must
contact the HSDN Program Office at DHS to request and fund HSDN
services.
The HSDN Program Office was contacted by Office of Preparedness and
Response at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on
January 24, 2008.
HSDN systems engineers coordinated HHS's requirements with Mr.
Murad Raheem, Chief of Electronics and Communications Branch at HHS.
The HSDN Program Office provided HHS with the estimated cost to satisfy
those requirements on February 22, 2008.
Department of Health and Human Services has not yet responded or
funded the installation of the HSDN network at HHS Headquarters. Once a
response is provided, it will be memorialized by a Memorandum of
Understanding between DHS and HHS.
The HSDN deployment team is continuing to plan and prepare for the
HHS installation while funding is pending. Once the funds are released
and technical direction is issued to execute the installation, the
deployment will take approximately 45 days.
ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONS
Intelligence Sharing
Question. Your testimony highlights, ``greater information
sharing'' as a key accomplishment of the Department. Yet, according to
the February 26, 2008 edition of the Wall Street Journal, an internal
DHS report concluded that the Department is not providing State and
local officials with useful or timely intelligence information. DHS has
spent $69 million over the last 5 years on the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN) to share sensitive intelligence information
with emergency responders, police, and the private sector. Your budget
indicates that 62 percent of HSIN users don't even access the system
for information.
Information sharing is a core homeland security responsibility. I
fear that the $69 million investment has been wasted.
What steps are you putting in place to improve the quality and
accessibility of information shared with State, local, and private
sector partners?
Answer. We recognize the shortfall in the quality and accessibility
of shared information. The HSIN technology and associated software for
information sharing and collaboration does not provide the level of
trust and security required by some communities, such as Intel,
Critical Sectors, and Law Enforcement. These communities have a large
number of persons from the State, local, and private sector. We have
implemented an aggressive plan to remedy this shortfall.
The steps that follow have been taken to implement the plan:
--We have engaged the HSIN Advisory Council (HSIN AC) for advice and
recommendations to aid us in reaching the State, local, and
private sectors. The HSIN AC met for 2 days in February on this
very topic. They produced several recommendations that will
assist us in this outreach effort.
--We have engaged the HSIN Mission Coordination Council (HMCC) as an
instrument in gathering the requirements from HSIN communities
to ensure that we can upgrade HSIN effectively to meet
missions. The HMCC members were instructed to reach back to
their community membership. For example, Critical Sectors
submitted approximately 1,000 requirements after engaging the
membership of their 17 Sectors. These requirements were
consolidated and incorporated into the HSIN upgrade, known as
Next Generation. Intel was another community that has been
actively engaged in the requirements determination.
--An aspect of information sharing that is needed is a vastly
improved data access process. HSIN Next Generation will have a
robust data management capability. It will have much stronger
HSIN user identification and authentication processes along
with multi-level security access by roles. The Intel community
and others require this capability. In large part their low
usage is due to the lack of depth of this capability in current
HSIN.
--We have moved up our acquisition schedule to award HSIN Next
Generation May 15, 2008. Our previous schedule was late summer
to early fall. The Request for Proposal has been prepared and
the DHS Procurement Office will soon be releasing the final
RFP. Representatives from across our HSIN communities will be
engaged in the selection process. Due to sensitivity of the
acquisition information, I am unable to expound upon this
statement.
We have made tremendous effort to address the quality and
accessibility of information shared with State, local, and private
sector partners. HSIN Next Generation will give us that capability.
Implementing the 9/11 Act
Question. The Under Secretary for Intelligence, Charlie Allen,
recently testified that ``the DHS intelligence program be adequately
resourced to fulfill the laudable objectives of the 9/11 Act.'' The
subcommittee has asked on several occasions for a status of
intelligence requirements in the 9/11 Act and how they are being
resourced. However, IA never responded to these requests. Provide a
list of all 9/11 Act requirements for IA, the amount necessary to fund
each requirement, the amount of base funding dedicated for each
requirement, and additional amounts necessary to fulfill each
requirement. The table should highlight if the fiscal year 2009 budget
includes additional resources to address unfunded requirements.
Answer. Classified. The answer to this question is classified and
will be forthcoming under separate cover.
Principal Federal Officials
Question. For fiscal year 2009, the Operations Directorate requests
an increase of $1.8 million for PFO program management, training, and
integration of PFOs into regional activities. What is the base budget
for these supporting functions and why is the increase necessary? What
is current size of the PFO cadre? How many are active? How many
additional PFOs does the Operations Directorate project will be
designated in fiscal year 2008? Provide projections for fiscal year
2009. For active and planned PFO's what specifically are their
responsibilities and for what types of disasters? How do they
coordinate with other components responsibilities? Does the Department
plan to designate PFO's for no-notice events [such as terrorism or a
man-made disaster] in fiscal year 2008? If so, provide a legal
interpretation of why this is not in violation of section 541 of Public
Law 110-161, since the disaster is likely to be a President-declared
disaster in accordance with the Stafford Act?
Answer. For fiscal year 2008, DHS is seeking Congressional approval
for a $1.2 million reprogramming within OPS' Management and
Administration PPA to fund the PFO as a new start. The $1.2 million
requested would fund an 8 month level of effort for PFO program
management support, PFO Cadre training, equipment refreshment and
maintenance support, and other deployment-related travel expenses for
OPS personnel. Funding for the reprogramming request would derive from
one-time OPS savings resulting from internal budget restrictions
implemented during the Continuing Resolution on FTE hiring levels, new
starts, travel, supplies, and training.
There is no available fiscal year 2009 base funding for the PFO
program as it would be funded with one-time non-reoccurring savings in
fiscal year 2008. The $1.8 million requested in fiscal year 2009 would
fund a 1 year level of effort for PFO program management support, PFO
Cadre training, equipment refreshment and maintenance support, and
other deployment-related travel expenses for OPS personnel.
When PFO program management responsibilities transferred from DHS/
NPPD to DHS/OPS on October 1, 2007, OPS inherited a cadre of
approximately 90 PFOs. OPS has since conducted an administrative audit
of the PFO cadre, resulting in the reduction of 15 PFOs, putting the
current size of the cadre at approximately 75 active PFOs. OPS'
ultimate goal is to streamline the PFO cadre to a smaller number that
will allow us to continue to conduct the PFO's all-hazards mission.
For fiscal year 2008, there have been 19 PFOs designated by the
Secretary (17 for Pandemic Influenza (PI) who remain active and 2 for
State of the Union (SOTU)). In fiscal year 2008, OPS projects that the
Secretary will designate 18 additional PFOs (12 All-hazards Incident
Management who may be designated for no-notice event including
terrorism/man-made disasters, 2 for the Democratic National Convention,
2 for the Republican National Convention, and 2 for the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA)). Since the PFO is a collateral duty position
and all PFOs have other full-time responsibilities with their agencies,
OPS uses the remaining 38 non-designated PFOs to maintain a cadre of
trained PFOs to step into the role of any of the PFOs previously
identified if their normal responsibilities preclude them from
continuing as active PFOs. In addition, OPS coordinates PFO assignments
with each PFO's parent agency.
For fiscal year 2009, OPS projects that approximately 75 PFOs will
be supported by the $1.8 million request for PFO program management,
training, and integration of PFOs into regional activities. In fiscal
year 2009, OPS projects that 37 PFOs will be designated by the
Secretary (17 for PI, 12 for All-Hazards Incident Management who may be
designated for no-notice events including terrorism/man-made disasters,
plus 2 PFOs each for Inauguration, Super Bowl, SOTU, and UNGA).
Through Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), the
President designated the Secretary of Homeland Security as the
principal Federal official for domestic incident management. The
Secretary may delegate this authority to a PFO who is responsible for
coordinating Federal operations in order to prevent, protect, respond,
and recover from terrorist attacks, man-made or natural disasters. This
designation recognizes the fact that certain incidents involving
Federal activities across the range of mission areas--including
prevention, protection, response and recovery--require additional
coordination measures to ensure unity of effort by Federal departments
and agencies in meeting the needs of State, local, territorial and
tribal governments. The term ``incident management'' is not defined in
statute or by HSPD-5. The National Response Framework provides that
incident management ``refers to how incidents are managed across all
homeland security activities, including prevention, protection, and
response and recovery.'' Similarly, DHS defines ``incident management''
as the management and coordination of prevention, protection, and
emergency management activities associated with a specific threat, or
an actual occurrence.
Consistent with General Provision 541 of Public Law 110-161; the
PFO will serve as the lead Federal official for non-Stafford Act
disasters, including non-Stafford Act responses that may include a
Stafford Act component, acting on the Secretary's behalf to execute the
HSPD-5 authorities in order to maximize the effectiveness of the
Federal incident management.
The PFO does not direct or replace the incident command structure
at the incident. Nor does the PFO have directive authority over a
Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) or other members of a unified
command group. Rather, the PFO promotes collaboration among and between
entities that have specific statutory authority, to include the FCO,
for large scale catastrophic incidents and, if necessary, resolves any
Federal interagency conflict that may arise.
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL COORDINATOR FOR GULF COAST REBUILDING
Question. When can the subcommittee expect the OFCGCR expenditure
plan as required in the fiscal year 2008 Homeland Security Act Joint
Explanatory Statement? Does the OFCGCR anticipate requesting a
reprogramming for additional funding as outlined in the statement? Is
there any reconsideration of the President Budget request which
proposed to close the Office? If so, will a budget amendment be
submitted? If not, what measurable accomplishments can the Department
provide that proves the Gulf Coast area no longer needs rebuilding
coordination?
Answer. The Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast
Rebuilding (OFCGCR) submitted an initial fiscal year 2008 expenditure
plan to the Committees on Appropriations on March 14, 2008. At this
time, OFCGCR does not anticipate a need for additional funds in fiscal
year 2008.
OFCGCR was established by Executive Order 13390 (dated November 1,
2005), which will terminate 3 years from the date of the order. The
White House has announced an intention to extend the Executive Order
through the remainder of the administration. Provisions for funding the
Office have not yet been determined.
INSPECTOR GENERAL
Question. What are the effects, impact and consequences of the
President's budget request (roughly $8 million reduction) on the Office
of Inspector General's activities?
Answer. We are in the process of determining the impact and
consequences of the reduction in the OIG budget. We will report back to
the Committee once we have completed our assessment.
Question. Program Integrity: What is the most effective number of
people to be allocated to CBP, ICE, TSA and CIS to look at integrity
issues within these component agencies given the significant hiring
increase and mission creep over the past couple of years? What is the
appropriate number of OIG people to look at these issues?
Answer. We have not studied this issue and believe it would not be
appropriate to speculate. We believe each component is in the best
position to respond to this question.
Question. Describe the impact of the $124 million request.
Answer. A breakdown of the $124 million is as follows:
[in millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2008 appropriation.......................... 92.7
Disaster Relief Fund transfer........................... 16.0
Carryover............................................... 11.0
Cost of living increases................................ 4.0
---------------
Total appropriation............................... 123.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security, Enforcement, and Investigations
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
Border Security
Question. For several years, I have raised a concern that as we
secure our land border, illegal aliens and drug runners will try to get
into the country via our coastal borders. Recently, there have been
reports of stranded or captured submarines and submersibles near the
border. What funds are requested in the fiscal year 2009 budgets for
Border Patrol and the Coast Guard to deter illegal immigration and drug
running on or under the water?
Answer. Funding for enforcement of immigration and drug laws ``on
or under the water'' is part of the budget for Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP's) Office of Border Patrol and Office of Air and
Marine Interdiction. The cost of Border Patrol and Air and Marine
staffing and operations with a water nexus is not tracked separately;
however the President's fiscal year 2009 Budget request contains four
specific items, both aircraft and vessels, that are essential if CBP is
to effectively counter the threats posed by terrorist activity, drug
running, and illegal immigration. The P-3 maritime patrol aircraft is
currently the only long-range capability available to detect, track,
and coordinate the interception of contraband and illegal immigration
along the Caribbean and eastern Pacific transit zones leading to our
shores. CBP has 4 of its 16 P-3 aircraft operating against surface and
sub-surface craft engaged in illegal activities. CBP Air and Marine
(A&M) has initiated a service life extension program (SLEP) that will
eventually provide the CBP P-3s with an additional 15,000 flight hours
(roughly 18-20 years of continued service). To date, Congress has fully
supported the P-3 SLEP and the President's Budget requests an
additional $56.0 million in fiscal year 2009 to continue this critical
A&M program.
To enhance long duration patrol operations in the Caribbean and
eastern Pacific, CBP A&M is conducting a demonstration of a maritime
version of the Predator B unmanned aircraft system (UAS) from Tyndall
AFB, FL, from March 17-28. Based on the results of the demonstration, a
joint CBP/U.S. Coast Guard UAS Program Office will be formed for the
purpose of developing the requirements for a maritime variant of the
Predator B. With the Predator's 3,000 mile range and 30 hour operating
time, it will greatly enhance the Department's capability to detect,
track, and intercept suspect vessels transiting to U.S. waters. The
President's request includes $29.6 million for the development of the
Predator B maritime variant, enhancements to its software integration
laboratory, and logistic support.
CBP A&M seeks to replace its aging C-12 patrol aircraft, and fill
the gap left by the closure of the DHC-8 patrol aircraft production
line, by introducing a new multi-role enforcement aircraft (MEA) during
the later part of fiscal year 2008. This aircraft is expected to be
truly multi-role and have capabilities to operate over land and water.
It will operate over the Great Lakes and will augment Caribbean and
Pacific Ocean operations in littoral waters off the United States and
off the shores of our international partners. The fiscal year 2009
request contains $35.6 million for two of these aircraft.
The fiscal year 2009 request also contains $10.1 million for
additional marine vessels. Chief among these will be a new class of
coastal interceptors, capable of out-pacing the fastest drug vessels
and arrayed with greatly enhanced sensors and communications equipment.
CBP A&M plans to acquire a prototype interceptor in fiscal year 2008
for test and evaluation. Based on its evaluation of the prototype, A&M
would use the funding requested for fiscal year 2009 to begin
purchasing the new interceptors and to start retiring CBPs aging and
less capable Midnight Express vessels.
Combined with the $6.7 million Congress provided in the fiscal year
2008 Appropriation for airborne sensors, the investments described
above will give CBP the capabilities it needs to accomplish its vital
maritime surveillance and interdiction mission, and to partner with the
U.S. Coast Guard for the greatest benefit to the public's security.
CBP Law Enforcement Retirement Benefit
Question. At a Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee hearing last month, you responded to a Senator's inquiry as
to why the President is seeking to repeal the new retirement program
for Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers by saying that it is
purely a budget issue and that this program is not a budget priority
for the Department.
Contrary to the President's position, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) has testified before Congress and stated that ``CBP data
shows that, on average, 52 CBP Officers left the agency each 2-week pay
period in fiscal 2007 . . . CBP Officers are leaving the agency to take
positions at other DHS components and other Federal agencies to obtain
law enforcement officer benefits not authorized to them at CBP.'' (See
GAO-08-219, page 34.)
Since the Omnibus Appropriations law containing this law
enforcement retirement benefit for CBP Officers was enacted, there been
reports of CBP Officers pulling their retirement and transfer papers
and of law enforcement officers from other Federal agencies seeking to
transfer to open CBP Officer positions. Funding priorities need to be
addressed and maintaining a strong presence at the ports of entry is a
priority of Congress. This law benefits our national security.
There have been reports that forms needed to implement this program
have been embargoed by OMB. Is this correct? Is DHS moving forward with
implementation of Section 535 so that it is in effect for all CBP
officers on July 6, 2008 as authorized by Congress? CBP shall inform
the subcommittee of any delays in approving the forms or other steps
necessary to effectively execute the law.
Answer. To the contrary, CBP is currently working with the Office
of Personnel Management to roll-out the implementation of this statute;
this includes the preparation and dissemination of materials and
election forms.
CBP is moving forward to implement Section 535 so that it is in
effect for all eligible CBP Officers on July 6, 2008. To date, CBP has
completed significant work in that respect; and will continue to do so.
We have not experienced any delays in getting forms approved; in
fact, the forms have been vetted and approved by the Office of
Personnel Management.
CBP Officer Staffing
Question. Despite CBP's own staffing allocation models and a GAO
report (GAO-08-219 ) that on page 31 States that CBP needs ``up to
several thousand additional CBP Officers and Agricultural Specialists
at its ports of entry'' (POEs), the President's budget includes funding
for only 234 additional CBP positions at land border POEs and 295
positions for Radiation Portal Monitoring staffing. The staffing
increase requested would essentially add fewer than two new CBP
Officers at each air, land and seaport.
What steps does the Department plan to address the CBP Officer
staffing shortages outlined in CBP's port-by-port staffing allocation
models? When does CBP expect to have full staffing of the 326 official
U.S. Ports of Entry as specified in its staffing allocation models?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) must balance CBP's staffing needs against the
agency's ability to hire, train and deploy CBPOs in a timely manner.
Staffing needs at the ports of entry are determined based on workload
volume, training capacity at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center (FLETC), the constraints of the current facilities and
infrastructure, the current number of terminals or lanes at the port of
entry, and threat assessment.
The President's fiscal year 2009 Budget requests funding for 539
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officers (CBPOs). In addition,
Congress funded an additional 1,195 CBPOs in the fiscal year 2007
Supplemental and the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriation Act.
CBP continues to do everything in its capacity to hire, train and
deploy the 1,195 CBPOs funded with the supplemental and annual
appropriation. Throughout the country, CBP has rolled out aggressive
recruitment and hiring campaign to attract qualified candidates to
apply for the CBPO position. CBP has also worked to streamline the
hiring process by initiating the medical examination and background
investigation for tentatively selected individuals, while they wait for
openings. For those selected for the position, the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) has utilized, at times, moved a 6-
day training schedule, to accommodate staffing increases. However,
current facility constraints at CBP's ports of entry constrain how many
CBPOs can be brought onboard and placed on-duty at our ports of entry.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) must balance CBP's staffing needs against the agency's
ability to hire, train and deploy CBPOs in a timely manner. Staffing
needs at the ports of entry are determined based on workload volume,
training capacity at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
(FLETC), the constraints of the current facilities and infrastructure,
the current number of terminals or lanes at the port of entry, and
threat assessment.
The President's fiscal year 2009 Budget Request includes funding
for 539 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officers (CBPOs) (including
205 CBPOs for the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative). In addition,
Congress funded an additional 1,195 CBPOs in the fiscal year 2007
Supplemental and the fiscal year 2008 Omnibus Appropriation Act.
CBP continues to do everything in its capacity to hire, train and
deploy the 1,195 CBPOs funded with the supplemental and annual
appropriation. Throughout the country, CBP has rolled out aggressive
recruitment and hiring campaign to attract qualified candidates to
apply for the CBPO position. CBP has also worked to streamline the
hiring process by initiating the medical examination and background
investigation for tentatively selected individuals, while they wait for
openings. For those selected for the position, the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) has utilized, at times, moved a 6-
day training schedule, to accommodate staffing increases. However,
current facility constraints at CBP's ports of entry constrain how many
CBPOs can be brought onboard and placed on-duty at our ports of entry.
Secure Border Initiative
Question. I am one of the strongest supporters in the Congress of
efforts to secure our borders and prevent entry of terrorists and
illegal aliens. In fact, I led the bipartisan effort 3 years ago with
my colleagues Senators Judd Gregg and Larry Craig, to add funds to the
fiscal year 2005 Supplemental Appropriations Act to hire more Border
Patrol Agents and build fencing and other necessary border security
infrastructure. I have consistently urged this administration and your
Department to move as aggressively as possible to achieve our shared
goal of a secure border.
Therefore, I was deeply troubled to learn that the Office of
Management and Budget had unilaterally decided to withhold $225 million
in additional border security funding for ``future fiscal years,'' when
the clear intent of the Congress was to use these funds to expedite
border security activities, including fencing, tactical infrastructure,
and communications equipment.
I am sure that it is no coincidence that the $225 million that OMB
deferred is the amount that Congress added to the President's request.
DHS personnel believe that the full $1.2 billion appropriation can
effectively be obligated for deploying fencing, vehicle barriers, and
other assets on the border. When you submit the expenditure plan, will
it include a plan for obligating the full $1.2 billion this fiscal
year?
Answer. The 2008 SBI BSFIT Expenditure Plan includes plans for
obligating the full $1.2 billion this fiscal year.
CBP--Tactical Communications
Question. It is my understanding that CBP is upgrading its wireless
communications in the various Border Patrol sectors and the ports of
entry under the umbrella of the Secure Border Initiative. I am told
that this upgrade will provide better coverage and will also allow for
better agent safety because the new radios will be fully encrypted and
will allow agents to be located via GPS.
How quickly can you accelerate this upgrade so that all sectors
will be covered and at what cost?
Answer. The CBP OIT Enterprise Networks and Technology Support
(ENTS) Tactical Communications Modernization Project was established to
modernize tactical communications infrastructure and subscriber units
for the Office of Border Patrol (OBP), Office of Field Operations
(OFO), and CBP Air and Marine in 20 sectors nationwide. The
modernization will replace legacy land mobile radio (LMR) systems with
state-of-the-art Project 25 (P25) digital LMR systems with advanced
encryption standard (AES) encryption and improved coverage,
interoperability capabilities, and GPS data.
As such, the project directly supports two goals from the 2005-2010
CBP Strategic Business Plan:
--CBP Strategic Goal 2.2.--Maximize Border Security along the
northern, southern, and coastal borders through an appropriate
balance of personnel, equipment, technology, communications
capabilities, and tactical infrastructure.
--CBP Strategic Goal 6.4.--Maintain a reliable, stable, and secure IT
infrastructure and an array of technical support services,
including laboratory and scientific services, tactical radio
communications, field equipment/maintenance, and 24/7 customer
service.
Project management is working with OIT, OBP, OFO, Air and Marine,
and SBInet to develop a long-term funding strategy to complete the
nationwide upgrade.
The Tactical Communications Modernization Project faces several key
external dependencies that would have to be overcome were the schedule
to be accelerated further:
--Receipt of approval on frequency applications from the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). This
is currently a lengthy and cyclical process.
--Creation of radio frequency site leasing agreements (or agreement
on modifications to existing leases) pose a significant
schedule risk due to the potential difficulty negotiating with
site owners or obtaining local permits for upgrade work;
potential requirement for a NEPA analysis or structural
analysis on the tower; and the potential re-negotiation of
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or Inter-Government Agreements
(IGA) with other site users.
--Site access on the Northern Border is restricted between October
and March due to weather conditions. This hinders the ability
to conduct RF site preparation and equipment installation
during approximately half of each year.
CBP--Interoperable Communications Border Pilots
Question. Section 302 of the Improving America's Security Act of
2007 (Public Law 110-53) authorizes six international border community
interoperability communications demonstration projects. What steps is
the Department taking to conduct these pilots, at which locations, and
using what funds?
Answer. This question appears to refer to section 302(a) of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
(Public Law 110-53), which calls for the creation of an International
Border Community Interoperable Communications Demonstration Project.
DHS's Office of Emergency Communications (OEC), NPPD, in coordination
with the Federal Communications Commission and the Secretary of State,
has the responsibility for implementation of this requirement.
Although CBP is not engaged in that particular undertaking, CBP
continues to engage in efforts to address interoperability along both
the Northern and Southern borders to best support the needs of CBP
agents and officers, and their jurisdictional partners, in the field.
Specifically, OIT ENTS Enterprise Wireless Program (EWP) is currently
supporting the following projects:
Northern Border Technology Demonstration project--IBET
In an effort to address interoperability along the Northern Border,
OIT ENTS EWP is currently collaborating with the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP). OIT, OFO, OBP and RCMP representatives met in March 2008
to discuss partnership opportunities in initiating a Cross-Border
interoperability pilot project.
The year long pilot project at the Sweetgrass, Montana port of
entry, expected to begin in August 2008, will enable CBP-RCMP Cross-
Border communications. The RCMP will be leading and funding the pilot
effort, however CBP will provide the IP circuit connectivity that will
establish the communications link between the two agencies. This IP
link currently exists and will not require additional costs to be
incurred by CBP. Additionally, CBP is working closely with the RCMP to
help identify requirements, develop standard operating procedures, and
identify the associated risks for this pilot. Finally, OIT has fully
committed to provide any engineering and operations support needed to
initiate this Cross-Border communications pilot.
Southern Cross Border Communications--Microwave
The OEC has initiated the Cross Border Microwave Project, which
intends to provide interoperable communications between the Office of
Border Patrol (OBP) and Mexican law enforcement in situations that
require cross-border coordination. The current proposed solution is a
series of microwave shots at six locations along the border: Nogales,
McAllen, El Paso, San Luis, Laredo, and San Diego. ENTS is contributing
technical and domain knowledge regarding the technical feasibility.
Border Funding
Question. In response to a question during staff briefings on the
fiscal year 2009 CBP budget request, your staff replied in part with
this:
In a joint statement by Secretary Chertoff and Secretary Gutierrez
on August 10, 2007, the administration noted that in addition to being
committed to the following they would also work to ensure that 1,700
more Border Patrol Agents and an additional UAV are added in 2009.
--18,300 Border Patrol agents
--370 miles of fencing
--300 miles of vehicle barriers
--105 camera and radar towers
--Three additional UAVs
Question. Does the Department's fiscal year 2009 budget request
fully fund these activities? Please indicate the amount requested for
each item.
Answer. Funding requested in the fiscal year 2009 President's
Budget, as well as funding provided in prior years, will allow for a
border patrol agent staffing of 20,019, completing 370 miles of fencing
and 300 miles of vehicle fence (barriers), additional camera and radar
towers, and four additional UAS systems.
The fiscal year 2009 President's budget requests $3.440 billion for
Border Security and Control between the ports of entry which includes
funding to support 20,019 border patrol agents.
Fiscal year 2008 funding received for Border Security Fencing,
Infrastructure and Technology will be used to complete the 370 miles of
fencing and 300 miles of vehicle fence (barriers). Funds received in
fiscal year 2007, and prior years, were also used for constructing the
fencing and vehicle barriers.
The fiscal year 2009 President budget contains $29 million for the
UAS program. With the Development and Deployment funding requested for
Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology in the fiscal
year 2009 President's budget, the focus will be on providing tactical
infrastructure, technology and surveillance packages to additional
southwest border sectors.
CBP--Replacement of Non-intrusive Inspection Equipment (NII)
Question. CBP has been procuring NII for use at the borders and
ports of entry for many years. Why have these purchases been treated as
one-time events rather than building replacement of this equipment into
your base budget?
Answer. CBP recognizes that NII imaging systems at port of entry
are reaching the end of their life cycle, and will require replacement
in the coming years. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget includes
an additional $4 million for maintenance of the existing large-scale
systems and $6 million for replacement of small-scale systems. CBP will
continue to monitor the service life of its existing systems and will
include funding in future budgets to replace equipment that has reached
the end of its life cycle.
CBP--Container Examinations
Question. In the chart on ``National Container Examinations''
provided in response to an inquiry during staff budget briefings, it
shows that total ``vessel containers full and empty examined'' declined
from 5.5 percent in fiscal year 2003 to only 3.8 percent in fiscal year
2007. What accounts for the decrease in examinations?
Answer. To meet the priority mission of preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) has developed a multi-layered process to target
high-risk shipments while simultaneously facilitating legitimate trade
and travel. People, technology, automation, electronic information and
partnerships are concepts that underpin CBP port security and anti-
terrorism initiatives. These concepts expand our borders and reinforce
the components of CBP's layered defense. Using its layered enforcement
process, it is the goal of CBP to thoroughly screen and ultimately
examine 100 percent of the shipments that pose a security risk to our
country.
In April 2007, CBP made the decision to refine its targeting
methodology, as part of our efforts, to focus on and increase the
effectiveness of anti-terrorism selectivity process while also
facilitating the flow of legitimate trade. This decision was made based
on our operational experience and knowledge of our anti-terrorism
selectivity process and the need to better focus our resources. One of
the consequences of this focus was that there were fewer selectivity-
based examinations conducted than in previous years.
This does not mean that our Officers have not been conducting other
anti-terrorism activity. Our Officers have been conducting significant
enforcement actions relative to protecting our borders.
CBP has spent much time and effort to ensure that a large
percentage of all arriving sea-borne containerized cargo/conveyances
are scanned for illicit radiological and nuclear materials. Fiscal year
2006 began and concluded with our CBP Officers scanning 21 percent and
leading up to 77 percent of all arriving sea-borne containerized cargo
with radiation portal monitors. (Note: Approximately 65 percent of
these radiation portal monitor deployments occurred in the third and
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2006). Fiscal year 2007 began and
concluded with our CBP Officers at our seaports scanning 77 percent and
close to 98 percent of all arriving sea-borne containerized cargo with
radiation portal monitors.
Beginning February 2004 (when CBP deployed its first seaport
radiation portal monitor) through September 2007, our CBP Officers had
scanned over 27.2 million sea-borne containers exiting our seaports
with radiation portal monitors and resolved over 774,000 radiation
alarms. During fiscal year 2007, our CBP Officers had scanned
approximately 13.4 million scans sea-borne containers and resolved over
391,000 radiation alarms--accounting for nearly half of all alarms
since the program's inception; while in fiscal year 2006, CBP Officers
had scanned only 9.37 million sea-borne containers and resolved over
274,000 radiation alarms.
CBP--Land Ports of Entry
Question. For the first time since the creation of the Department
in 2003, funds are being requested in your budget to begin assessing
the future repair and construction requirements of the 43 CBP-owned
facilities. Why was this activity not begun earlier?
Answer. CBP has been maintaining the facilities it owns since the
creation of the agency in fiscal year 2004, allowing for current
operations to be sustained. However, because the need for renovation of
these facilities has arisen, in fiscal year 2009 CBP plans to deploy
targeted proto-type modernization solutions that will allow CBP to
determine how to best proceed with improvements at the remaining
locations.
CBP--Ports of Entry
Question. Similar to the priority listing you have provided for the
top 20 GSA-owned or leased facilities requiring funding, what are the
highest priority CBP-owned ports of entry in need of renovation/
reconstruction?
Answer. Of the 43 CBP-owned ports, the highest priority locations
in need of renovation and/or reconstruction are the following (in
priority order):
--Antelope Wells, NM
--Frontier, WA
--Scobey, MT
--Boundary, WA
--Los Ebanos, TX
--Sarles, ND
--Morses Line, VT
--Forest City, ME
--Cannons Corner, NY
--Churubusco, NY
--Pinnacle Road, VT
--Hansboro, ND
--Pittsburg, NH
--Hannah, ND
--Hamlin, ME
--Morgan, MT
--Bridgewater, ME
--Easton, ME
--Whitetail, MT
--Monticello, ME
CBP--Highest Priority Needs for GSA-owned Ports of Entry
Question. In response to a question raised during staff briefings
on the fiscal year 2009 budget request, you provided a list of the top
20 facilities owned or leased by the General Services Administration
(GSA) which require funding for renovation or reconstruction. Have
evaluations and surveys been conducted on these facilities to determine
the funding requirements? What discussions with GSA have you had in
regard to starting to address and, if possible, accelerate these
requirements?
Answer. As a critical step in the Capital Improvement Process
(CIP), CBP conducted the Strategic Resource Assessment (SRA), which is
a needs assessment process that incorporates internal and external
stakeholders input, a review of existing facility conditions, workload
and personnel forecasts, space capacity analyses, and recommended
options to meet current and future space needs. From these SRAs, a
national list identifying and prioritizing capital projects for the 163
land port of entry inspection facilities was developed, including an
estimated funding requirement based upon the U.S. General Services
Administration's (GSA) cost-benchmarking process. More refined cost
estimates are available on a facility by facility basis depending on
their position in GSA's design or construction prospectus submission
process.
Beginning in late 2006, CBP partnered with GSA to work together to
fully recapitalize the current inventory of inspection facilities.
CBP--Officer Integrity
Question. You have stated that since October 1, 2004, 22 CBP
officers and 22 Border Patrol agents have been charged with corruption.
What percent of the total number of employees for these two categories
does this represent? How does this percentage compare with corruption
charges of other Federal law enforcement agencies? Have the number of
corruption cases increased significantly during the past fiscal year?
Answer. As of March 12, 2008, 25 CBP Officers and 23 Border Patrol
Agents have been charged with corruption during the time period since
October 1, 2004. With a current on board strength of approximately
15,500 Border Patrol Agents and approximately 19,000 CBP Officers, this
represents .13 percent of CBP Officers and .15 percent of Border Patrol
Agents.
Relating to corruption charges of other Federal law enforcement
agencies, that information is considered sensitive, and although we
have attempted to obtain it, it has not been made available to us by
the other Federal law enforcement agencies.
The number of corruption cases has not increased significantly
during the past fiscal year. In fiscal year 2007, 8 CBP Officers and
Border Patrol Agents were charged with corruption. As of the second
quarter of fiscal year 2008, 5 CBP Officers and Border Patrol Agents
have been charged with corruption.
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
ICE--Detention Beds
Question. In testimony before the House Homeland Security
Appropriations Subcommittee, Assistant Secretary Meyers stated that
33,000 detention beds--the fiscal year 2009 request--will be sufficient
(``it's not an issue'') given the increase in Customs and Border
Protection and Border Patrol hiring and the increased participation in
the 287(g) program by States and localities. Do you support this
assertion?
Answer. Answer. Yes, the fiscal year 2009 request is sufficient to
maintain the end of catch and release at our nation's borders. As
Assistant Secretary Myers shared with the House Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, the referrals from CBP to
ICE have dropped from 180,000 in fiscal year 2005 to less than 50,000
in fiscal year 2007. This demonstrates the substantial deterrent value
of our efforts not only at the border, but also in the interior of the
United States.
ICE--Federal Protective Service
Question. On April 19, 1995, the Federal building in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma was bombed. In that tragic event, 168 people--Federal
employees, ordinary citizens, even children at the day care center--
were killed. On September, 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 people, including
many Federal employees, were killed when the World Trade Center was
attacked. Federal buildings clearly are targets of terrorist attacks.
On any given day, the Federal Protective Service is responsible for
protecting nearly 9,000 Federal facilities and over 1.5 million people.
In testimony last month before a subcommittee of the House Committee on
Transportation, the Government Accountability Office stated that, ``The
Federal Protective Service is experiencing difficulties in fully
meeting its facility protection mission and that, these difficulties
may expose Federal facilities to a greater risk of crime or terrorist
attack.''
Mr. Secretary, for several years, the administration has been
downsizing the Federal Protective Service. This policy was not a result
of any reduction in the threat to Federal employees. Nor was it a
result of a careful review of the FPS mission and resources. Instead,
the decision to reduce the number of personnel protecting Federal
personnel and property was the result of a failure by the Office of
Management and Budget to understand the true cost of the mission when
it was transferred to the new Department 5 years ago. Apparently for
OMB, meeting their erroneous budget calculation was more important than
protecting Federal employees.
In response, the fiscal year 2008 Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, signed into law by the President on December 26, 2007, requires
you and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to certify
to the Committee that FPS receives sufficient resources from Federal
agencies to support a staff of 1,200 employees, including at least 900
Police Officers, Special Agents, and others. It also requires you to
adjust security fees charged by FPS as necessary to meet this mandate.
On February 28, 2008, 2 months after the law was signed, Secretary
Chertoff wrote the subcommittee expressing his intent to meet the
requirements of the law. Yet, 2 months after the President signed the
law, no additional security personnel have been hired, and you have not
issued a letter to agency heads directing them to provide the
additional resources necessary to hire the personnel.
Mr. Secretary, the increase in agency fees required in the law is
not voluntary. Do you have a commitment from the OMB Director that the
security fees will be adjusted? Can you commit to me today that you
will collect those fees, publish the job notices, and start the hiring
and training process right away?
Answer. The security fee increases identified in my February 28,
2008, letter to the Appropriations Committees have been reviewed by the
Office of Management and Budget. On March 12, 2008, the Chief Financial
Officer (CFO) of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement sent
notification letters to the Chief Financial Officers of all agencies
receiving security services from FPS (Executive, Legislative, and
Judicial Branches) advising them of the security fee increases in
fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 required to hire the additional
FPS law enforcement officers mandated by Congress.
My commitment to collecting those fees, publishing the job notices,
and starting the hiring and training process is outlined in my February
28, 2008, letter to the Appropriations Committee regarding the funding
of the Federal Protective Service under the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2008.
ICE--Modernizing the Criminal Alien Program
Question. The Criminal Alien Program identifies illegal aliens
currently incarcerated in Federal, State, and local prisons and begins
removal proceedings so that when the alien's prison term ends, he or
she can be immediately taken and removed from this country, instead of
disappearing back into society. In 2006, your Inspector General
estimated that over 600,000 aliens were incarcerated, but few of them
were deported when released from prison. There is no excuse for
allowing people who are in this country illegally and found guilty of a
crime, including violent crimes, to remain in this country after they
are released from prison.
In the fiscal year 2008 Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
Congress added $200 million to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
budget to modernize the Criminal Alien Program. I understand that work
is progressing on developing this new program. I want to see it
succeed.
However, there are some in Congress who think that this program
should be the only tool for identifying and removing illegal aliens. I
think it should be one of many tools and activities that your officers
and agents use to apprehend and remove illegal aliens.
Mr. Secretary, as this new Criminal Alien Program is developed--I
want your commitment that you will continue to pay attention to other
effective programs, such as worksite enforcement and fugitive
operations teams.
In fiscal year 2002, there were only 25 criminal arrests and 485
administrative arrests in worksite enforcement actions. Last year, with
your leadership, those numbers jumped to 863 criminal arrests and 4,077
administrative arrests. And, with the increase in the number of
fugitive operations teams, there has been a 41 percent increase in
fugitive arrests since the beginning of fiscal year 2006. That is real
progress. However, much of the resources for these increased
enforcement efforts were not requested by the President and were added
by Congress. The President's fiscal year 2009 budget is essentially
flat for worksite enforcement.
Do I have your commitment that for the remainder of the
administration you will continue the progress made over the last 2
years in worksite enforcement and fugitive operations?
Answer. While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a whole
has committed significant resources to preventing aliens from illegally
entering the United States, significant resources have also been
committed to arresting immigration law violators within the interior.
Our immigration enforcement cannot begin and end at our borders and
ports of entry. Effective immigration policing must also include robust
interior law enforcement efforts to help ensure the safety and security
of all Americans. You have my commitment that we will continue the
progress made over the last 2 years not only in worksite enforcement
and fugitive operations, but also in critical program areas to continue
to keep our Nation safe and secure.
ICE--FPS Performance Metrics for Federal Buildings
Question. In response to an inquiry raised during staff briefings
on the fiscal year 2009 budget request, you provided a spreadsheet
detailing what are considered performance metrics for incidents at
Federal buildings. In fiscal year 2004, there were a total of 63,473
``Offences/Incidents.'' That number decreased each year and in fiscal
year 2007, 38,453 of these events were reported. What accounts for this
significant decrease? Is this a result of a decrease in Federal
Protective Service staff able to respond to and investigate these
offenses?
Answer. Crime statistics, with the exception of narcotics related
offenses, have similarly decreased collectively across the nation. The
GSA inventory of owned and leased buildings varies slightly from year
to year as do the tenants. Due to the activities of some tenants and
the volume of that activity, there is a proportional increase or
decrease in incidents.
Increases and or decreases in reportable incidents may be
attributed to many factors. Prioritization of certain crimes or
predetermined surges to aggressively address a certain type of incident
or location may also have a quantifiable effect. An example may be a
targeted enforcement against illegal drug use in a park or abandoned
building. FPS is unable to determine a correlation between reportable
incidents and staffing at this time.
ICE--New Bedford Worksite Enforcement Action
Question. On March 6, 2007, a worksite enforcement action resulted
in the apprehension of 361 illegal aliens. To date, how many of those
aliens have been removed from the United States? Of those that remain
in the United States, please detail why there are still here and what
impediments you are experiencing in removing them.
Answer. There is a pending criminal case before District Judge
Douglas P. Woodlock. On March 20, 2008, Judge Woodlock issued an order
preventing the parties from discussing this case any further. In order
to comply with Judge Woodlock's order, I cannot answer your questions
on this matter at this time.
Treasury Enforcement Communication System/Homeland Security
Communication System (TECS/HECS)
Question. Provide an agency-by-agency breakout of the fiscal year
2009 budget requests/contributions to the modernization of TECS/HECS.
Answer. As per OCIO the breakouts are as follows:
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICE................................................. 15.7
CBP................................................. 49.876
-------------------
Total fiscal year 2009........................ 71.176
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICE--Special Interest Alien Arrests
Question. In fiscal year 2007, CBP arrested 122 people determined
to be from ``special interest'' countries at the Northern border and
297 at the Southern border. What happened to them? Were they detained,
immediately returned to their home countries, or what?
Answer. For any person taken into Border Patrol custody from a
Special Interest Country, at a minimum, the following actions are
taken:
--Sector Communications is contacted for the initial record checks.
--The National Targeting Center is contacted for additional record
checks.
--The Joint Terrorism Task Force is contacted for follow up
interviews.
--The Station and Sector Intelligence Units are contacted for follow
up interviews.
--Any ``pocket trash'' is copied or scanned for possible intelligence
value.
--A Significant Incident Report is generated and submitted to the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Situation Room.
--If any intelligence is developed, complete and forward an
Intelligence Report through proper channels.
--Enroll all aliens who are amendable to Removal Proceedings into the
ENFORCE, IDENT and IAFIS computer database systems.
After sufficient interviewing, intelligence gathering, and
processing procedures, Special Interest Aliens will be processed for
Removal Proceedings and deported from the United States.
ICE--Overstays Identified by US-VISIT
Question. On average, US-VISIT says that it turns over to ICE for
follow-up action, information on 250 ``overstays.'' What happens when
this information comes to ICE? How many are found? How many are
detained, prosecuted, and/or removed from the country on average? What
percentage of ICE's monthly removals is a result of this information
being provided by US-VISIT?
Answer. Law Enforcement Sensitive. Responses to how many are found,
detained, prosecuted, and or removed will follow under separate cover.
Approximately 3 percent of the cases that US-VISIT refers to ICE are
ultimately placed into removal proceedings. Not all of these are
ultimately ordered removed, however, if all were ordered removed, these
cases would represent less than 1 percent of ICE's total monthly
removals.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Proposal to Increase Air Passenger Fees
Question. The President has proposed to significantly increase the
amount of mandatory spending for explosives detection systems at
airports through a 20 percent hike in security fees passengers pay for
airline tickets. The proposal is estimated to generate an additional
$426 million in revenue.
Similar proposals have been presented to Congress in prior years,
but the Congress rejected them.
The fiscal year 2009 request includes only $154 million in
discretionary spending (excluding fee increase proposal) for EDS
procurement and installation, 48 percent below the enacted level of
$294 million.
A recent baggage screening investment report, in which TSA
participated, concluded that airports need $4 billion for explosives
detection screening systems.
If the fee proposal is not enacted, will the President submit a
budget amendment to address the shortfall?
Answer. The President does not intend to submit a budget amendment
for Explosives Detection System (EDS) procurement and installation. The
targeted, temporary surcharge is markedly different from the air
passenger fee proposals in prior years. With the support of Congress,
the fee will generate more than $1.7 billion over 4 years and fully
fund optimal EDS systems. This represents a 6 year project acceleration
and substantial savings as noted.
The increase of $104 million to the President's Request in fiscal
year 2008 and $285 million in supplemental funds in fiscal year 2007,
when combined with $404 million requested in fiscal year 2009, provide
a substantial increase to the $440 million planning factor assumed in
the EDS Strategic Plan.
EDS Procurement and Installation
Question. What is the total cost to achieve optimal screening
solutions at the top 250 commercial airports?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
Electronic Baggage Screening Program Strategic Plan contained an
estimate of slightly over $3.5 billion to deploy optimal screening
solutions to 250 airports. TSA currently plans to include all 277 Cat X
through Cat III airports in the deployment schedule.
Question. How many years will it take TSA to complete these
projects at levels proposed in the budget (with fee increase)?
Answer. The surcharge would allow the Transportation Security
Administration to accelerate the funding for in-line systems by up to 6
years. This acceleration will not take place without the proposed
surcharge. The proposed passenger security fee surcharge will generate
sufficient funding to complete optimal systems as soon as 2012
dependent on readiness of construction designs.
Question. How many years will it take TSA to complete these
projects if the fiscal year 2008 level of $544 million is continued in
fiscal year 2009?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not
modeled the deployment of optimal systems at the $544 million funding
level. However, this funding level is approximately $100 million above
the program baseline established in the Electronic Baggage Screening
Program Strategic Plan. The most recent analysis of the baseline
funding, published in the Baggage Screening Investment Study Report,
indicated program completion in 2024. TSA estimates increasing the
baseline to $544 million would reduce the timeline by 2 years. However,
please note that this estimate can vary based on the assumptions used.
Question. How many years will it take TSA to complete these
projects if the request level of $404 million (minus fee increase) is
provided in fiscal year 2009?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not
modeled the deployment of optimal systems at the $404 million funding
level. However, this funding level is approximately $30 million below
the program baseline established in the Electronic Baggage Screening
Program Strategic Plan. The most recent analysis of the baseline
funding, published in the Baggage Screening Investment Study Report,
indicated program completion in 2024. With the supplemental funds
provided in fiscal year 2008, TSA estimates a similar timeframe based
on assumptions in the BSIS Report. However, please note that this
estimate can vary based on the assumptions used.
Question. How many ``in-line'' projects does $829.92 million
(including fee increase) support? How many will $544 million support?
How many will $404 million support?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration estimates
approximately 22 in-line projects are funded at the fiscal year 2009
requested funding level of $830 million; approximately 16 in-line
systems could be supported at the $544 million level; and approximately
13 in-line projects could be supported at the $404 million level.
However, please note that these estimates can vary based on the
assumptions used.
Unspent Supplemental Funding for Aviation Security
Question. The fiscal year 2007 emergency supplemental included $365
million for the Transportation Security Administration to ramp up the
purchase and installation of explosives detection systems at airports,
hire air cargo inspectors, and deploy bomb detecting canine teams.
Today, more than 9 months after those funds were appropriated, $346
million remains unobligated. For air cargo security, none of the 170
new bomb sniffing dog teams funded have been deployed, and only 70 of
the 150 new air cargo inspectors funded are on-board today.
Why have these critical funds been delayed?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
aggressively pursuing the execution of the supplemental funding. Delays
in execution resulted from spend plan development, security partner
negotiations for some programs, and the development and execution of
hiring and training plans to fully implement the programs. Progress
made thus far includes:
--Checkpoint.--Of the $25 million appropriated, nearly $21 million
has been obligated or committed.
--Explosives Detection Systems (EDS).--Congress should expect to see
a revision of the EDS funds allocation in the near future;
however, it will include alternate airports previously
submitted that TSA is moving forward with.
--Air Cargo.--TSA has developed hiring plans to fill all of the
canine handler and inspector positions this spring to meet the
goal of having the entire workforce onboard by the end of
summer 2008. The National Explosives Detection Canine Training
Program is in the process of expending training capacity.
Question. The aviation sector has been operating under high alert
since August of 2006.
These funds were appropriated to enhance security, not sit in the
Treasury. This is not a good record. I would like you to update the
subcommittee in 1 month on progress made to obligate these funds.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration will provide an
update on progress as requested.
Airport Screening
Question. The Secretary testified that he has directed TSA to
review current screening procedures at airports and requested
recommendations within 30 to 45 days. Please update the Committee with
recommendations on any changes TSA proposes. In the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as well as subsequent
legislation, TSA has been directed to submit to Congress a strategic
plan for checkpoint technologies. TSA has not submitted such a plan.
Why has TSA not been able to develop and submit a strategic plan for
checkpoint screening technologies, and when does the agency expect to
submit it?
Answer. This recently announced review is currently underway. The
Transportation Security Administration will update the Committee with
recommendations when the final review has been completed.
A report entitled ``Report to Congress: Detection Equipment at
Airport Screening Checkpoints'' was provided to Congress on August 9,
2005 to satisfy the requirements of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. In September 2007, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) submitted to Congress a report entitled
``Development of a Passenger Checkpoint Strategic Plan.'' In compliance
with direction provided by Congress in the fiscal year 2008
Consolidated Appropriations Act, TSA intends to deliver a final
strategic plan to Congress during summer 2008.
Question. How many machines have been deployed to date that can
effectively detect liquid explosives? How many are planned for fiscal
year 2008? Fiscal year 2009? What percent of airport screening
checkpoint lanes are covered by such technology today? Planned for
fiscal year 2009?
Answer. To date, 200 Bottled Liquid Scanner units have been
deployed to airports. A total of 700 Bottled Liquids Scanner units are
expected to be procured and deployed in fiscal year 2008. This amount
includes 200 already purchased and deployed from fiscal year 2007
Supplemental funds and an additional 500 not yet purchased. One hundred
Bottled Liquid Scanner units are planned for procurement in fiscal year
2009.
Bottled Liquids Scanners (BLS) were not deployed on a per lane
basis. Instead, consideration of the overall checkpoint utilization
rates and passenger throughput were used to determine allocations. The
72 airports where 200 BLS units were deployed contain a total of 1,416
lanes, which corresponds to 28 percent coverage on a per lane basis.
Question. TSA's budget includes over $320 million for Behavioral
Detection Officers, Bomb Appraisal Officers, the Aviation Direct Access
Screening Program, and Visible Intermodal Protection and Response
Teams. How is TSA determining the effectiveness of these initiatives?
Answer. The Behavioral Detection Officers (BDO) program, the
Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP), and the Visible
Intermodal Protection and Response Teams (VIPR) all provide the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) with critically needed
layers of security in aviation security and, in the case of VIPR teams,
in surface transportation security as well. TSA appreciates the strong
support the Committee has provided to these important programs.
The BDO program provides a means to identify potentially high-risk
individuals based on involuntary physical and physiological reactions.
For the BDO program, each airport conducting the Screening Passengers
by Observation Techniques (SPOT) inputs daily referrals into a web-
based SPOT database that provides important information to leadership
and allows us to perform metrics and trend analysis. Additionally, the
SPOT Program conducts annual standardization visits at each airport to
evaluate procedures, methodology, reporting, training, and
effectiveness,
Data to date shows that the program at 63 airports has resulted in
over 100,000 referrals to referral screening, with over 90 percent of
those resolved by BDOs. Of the 10 percent referred to law enforcement,
about 1 percent resulted in some type of an arrest.
The Bomb Appraisal Officer (BAO) program supplies highly skilled
individuals who have undergone training in the detection and disposal
of explosive ordnance. BAOs interact with and train Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs) to increase their ability to recognize
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and IED components. The program has
developed three metrics: BAO response to perform advanced alarm
resolution procedures; the delivery of IED-related training to TSOs;
and the delivery of IED-related training to airport first responders.
During calendar year (CY) 2007 BAOs responded to 1,156 calls for
advanced alarm resolution of suspected threat items at 90 airports,
thereby preventing over 1,103 hours of potential terminal disruptions.
BAOs provided 19,030 hours of IED-related training to over 66,696 TSOs
and provided similar training to over 1,790 other personnel (law
enforcement officers, other agencies, among others).
For CY 2008, as of March 1, 2008, BAOs have responded to 356 calls
for advanced alarm resolution of suspected threat items, thereby
preventing 420 hours of potential terminal disruptions. BAOs have
provided 970 hours of IED-related training to 6,467 TSOs and 386 hours
to other personnel.
The ADASP allows TSA to randomly screen more airport and airline
employees, thus closing a critical security gap. The ADASP has been
successful in identifying security threats at access points to secure
areas of the airport, including airport employees carrying weapons and
other prohibited items, employees with expired access badges, and items
identified through specific intelligence information. A critical
indication of the success of ADASP is the initiative's value as a
deterrent to behavior that creates security vulnerabilities.
The Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) initiative is
inherently a deterrent effort that is accomplished through the
deployment of TSA personnel and equipment, in a highly visible posture,
with the goal of deterring, detecting, disrupting, and defeating
potential terrorist or criminal actions taken against the Nation's
transportation system. TSA created the Joint Coordination Center (JCC)
to act as the TSA Assistant Secretary's focal point for VIPR
deployment. The JCC takes into account a number of factors when
deciding what locations will conduct VIPR operations, such as trend
analysis, randomness, specific and non-specific intelligence, and
locally generated VIPR operations. In addition, After Action Reports
are generated at the completion of every VIPR deployment. These reports
are examined for best practices and lessons learned and then
incorporated into future planning and execution protocols.
Question. The budget maintains level funding for 297 Bomb Appraisal
Officers (BAO's) in fiscal year 2009. Provide a BAO deployment chart by
airport. What are the benefits of this program? Is 297 the end state
for BAO's? If not, provide an optimal number for BAO's.
Answer. The information requested in this Question for the Record
cannot be provided in this public setting as the response has been
deemed to include Sensitive Security Information. The Transportation
Security Administration can certainly provide the Committee with this
information via a briefing or other non-public forum.
The Transportation Security Administration is in the process of
hiring to the level of 297 Bomb Appraisal Officers and has not made a
determination of the requirement, if any, beyond that level.
Question. The fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act
included half-year funding for TSA to hire 660 behavior detection
officers and 1,028 full-time/part-time TSO's for the Aviation Direct
Access Screening Program (ADASP). Provide current on-board data for
these new positions and projected hires by the end of fiscal year 2008.
Positions filled by an existing TSO should not count as a new on-board
position.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently
has approximately 1,300 Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) onboard and
will continue to hire BDOs to reach a level of 2,400 by the summer.
Similarly, TSA is on pace to hire the Transportation Security Officers
needed to add 375 Aviation Direct Access Screening Program Full-Time
Equivalents (FTE) to the current workforce allocation of 904 FTE.
Air Cargo
Question. The Government Accounting Office recently testified that
TSA ``has not developed an inspection plan that included performance
goals and measures to determine whether air carriers transporting cargo
into the United States were complying with security requirements.'' Is
TSA developing such a plan? What is the timeline for implementation?
Identify necessary resources to complete and implement the plan.
Answer. Yes, the Transportation Security Administration formed an
International Cargo Working Group to develop inspection prompts in the
Performance and Results Information System. These prompts will serve as
the performance goals against which compliance can be measured.
Following the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) March,
2007, recommendation that the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) ``[d]evelop and implement an inspection plan that includes
performance goals and measures to evaluate foreign and domestic air
carrier compliance with inbound air cargo security requirements,'' TSA
developed inspection prompts in the Performance and Results Information
System (PARIS) to guide International Cargo Transportation Security
Inspectors (I-CTSI) in their inspections of the various air cargo
operations. The data that is entered into PARIS enables TSA to evaluate
both foreign and U.S. air cargo operators departing from foreign
locations to the United States to determine whether the cargo operators
are in compliance with TSA security requirements and to determine any
station or systematic vulnerabilities for immediate corrective action.
TSA implemented the PARIS inspection prompts relating to inbound air
cargo in February 2008.
Ten International Cargo Transportation Security Inspectors are
based out of four field offices for international matters in Los
Angeles, Dallas Fort Worth, Miami, and Frankfurt, Germany. These
inspectors will examine cargo operations at last points of departure to
the United States using inspection prompts in the Performance and
Results Information System to serve as the performance goals against
which compliance can be measured.
Question. The request reduces the air cargo base by $17.2 million
in fiscal year 2009 for non-recurring funds? What are these non-
recurring funds?
Answer. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, (Public Law 110-
161) provided $17 million above the President's request for the air
cargo program. These funds are not requested to recur in fiscal year
2009 and will be used for one-time infrastructure investments.
Question. Of the $80 million provided in the fiscal year 2007
supplemental for air cargo security, $25 million was identified by TSA
to deploy technologies appropriate for screening air cargo. Why doesn't
TSA continue or request funds for the purchase of technology to screen
air cargo?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
establishing the Certified Cargo Screening Program to push the
screening of air cargo throughout the supply chain. TSA is working with
indirect air carriers and other security partners on a pilot basis to
identify the most effective processes and technologies to screen air
cargo. TSA will also identify approved technologies for industry
screening of air cargo as it moves through the supply chain. Therefore,
TSA has not identified a requirement to invest in technology to screen
air cargo.
Question. What is the status of TSA-S&T efforts to develop and
pilot test various technologies that may have applicability to
screening air cargo? What technologies have shown promise, if any?
Could any technologies be used for air cargo screening in the near
future?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
supporting air cargo security goals and objectives by testing,
evaluating, and qualifying technology to detect explosives and
stowaways, as well as ensure the integrity of the supply chain. TSA
plans to both optimize currently available technologies and provide
cargo specific screening procedures coupled with protocols to support
these technologies in the operational environment.
The Department of Homeland Security Office of Science and
Technology (S&T) is about to conclude the congressionally directed Air
Cargo Explosives Detection Pilot Program and will soon begin an
analysis of the results of that pilot. TSA will be conducting an
operational test at some airports, domestic and international, to
develop requirements, specifications, and testing protocols to qualify
a Carbon Dioxide (CO2) monitor. The CO2 monitor
is expected to be qualified in fiscal year 2009. S&T concluded
Heartbeat Monitors are susceptible to environmental factors at the
airports. S&T will address this issue in future research efforts before
these are qualified by TSA for use by the cargo freighters. TSA has
deployed certified checked baggage screening technologies into actual
air cargo screening operations, at about twelve different sites, to
determine all the integration, training, and operational issues. TSA
has also initiated pilot tests to study ways to integrate counter-to-
counter air cargo into the existing airport checked baggage screening
infrastructure using Explosives Detection Systems and Explosives Trace
Detection screening equipment.
The technologies showing promise in the near-term are existing or
slightly modified explosives detection screening technologies such as
Explosives Detection Systems (EDS), Cargo Optimized EDS, Explosives
Trace Detection, and dual energy, multi-view Advanced Technology X-ray
technologies. Carbon dioxide monitors for detecting stowaways also
showed promise during pilot programs.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will work with
industry to pilot screening technologies in the near term, although
they will not yet be certified in the air cargo environment. This will
continue our efforts with the Department of Homeland Security Science &
Technology directorate to evaluate existing and emerging screening
technologies to determine effectiveness in detecting threats in air
cargo. TSA has piloted, or is planning to pilot, several technologies
such as Explosives Detection Systems (EDS), Cargo Optimized EDS,
Explosives Trace Detection, and dual energy, multi-view Advanced
Technology X-ray technologies. Carbon dioxide monitors are also being
considered for detecting stowaways. TSA will determine whether these
screening technologies, along with other promising technologies, will
be certified for use in the air cargo environment once they are fully
evaluated.
Secure Flight
Question. The Government Accountability Office recently criticized
TSA's life-cycle cost estimates for Secure Flight, concluding that
``TSA has not fully followed best practices for developing a reliable
and valid life-cycle cost estimate.'' In light of the fact that the
fiscal year 2009 request includes a 64 percent increase for the Secure
Flight program, what steps are being taken by TSA to address these
issues?
Answer. The Secure Flight life cycle cost estimate was developed
using Department of Homeland Security best practices. The
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) believes that the life
cycle cost estimate is accurate for the current scope and requirements
of the program. TSA is currently analyzing the 12-step process outlined
in the Cost Assessment Guide recently provided by the Government
Accountability Office and will work to demonstrate the program's
alignment with best practices detailed in the guide.
Law Enforcement
Question. Has there been a decrease in the aviation threat to
warrant a reduction for critical flight coverage by Federal Air
Marshals in fiscal year 2009?
Answer. The threat to aviation remains a primary target for
terrorists and is expected to continue. The U.S. threat level remains
High, or Orange, for all domestic and international flights. However,
TSA as a whole employs twenty layers of security creating a much
stronger, formidable system of security that ensures the security of
the traveling public and the Nation's transportation system.
Question. What is the status of the Advanced Route Evaluation
System being developed by the FAMS?
Answer. The Advanced Route Evaluation System (ARES) is currently in
development. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Science &
Technology (S&T) funded the development of ARES to determine a means
for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to incorporate
overflights of critical infrastructure into the TSA risk-based approach
to scheduling. TSA expects delivery of an initial ARES capability this
summer for testing. Test results are expected in the September 2008
timeframe.
Question. What is TSA doing to develop a biometric system to track
law enforcement travel? The 9/11 Act mandated such a system be in place
by January 2009. Such a system is necessary to accurately identify law
enforcement officers flying aboard commercial aircraft and to verify
their authorization to carry weapons aboard an aircraft. What is the
timeline for developing such a system? Does the fiscal year 2009 budget
include funds for such a system? If so, how much?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has formed
a team comprised of subject matter experts from the Office of
Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC) and the
Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS) to
develop a concept of operations for a National registered armed Law
Enforcement Officer (LEO) program which will help determine program
goals and resource requirements. In March 2008, OLE/FAMS hosted a
meeting of Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies
from around the country to better understand their respective
credentialing systems and duty requirements, as well as discuss
procedural and operational challenges associated with the integration
of a common credential for this population, which TSA estimates at a
potential pool of over 800,000 sworn law enforcement officers
nationwide. This meeting provided valuable information in advancing TSA
developmental goals.
Concurrently, TSA will be initiating an E-LEO pilot program at
Washington Dulles International Airport which will provide
Transportation Security Officers a more suitable environment to verify
the identity and improve the tracking of LEOs seeking to fly armed
through the use of a dedicated checkpoint lane. Operating in
conjunction with the Transportation Security Operations Center, the
pilot program will allow TSA to more readily react to emergencies in
the air or on the ground by identifying whether a flight has an armed
law enforcement officer other than a Federal Air Marshal.
Although the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) intends
to leverage prior experience with other credentialing initiatives, the
size and nature of this population necessitates rigorous planning to
ensure the security objectives of Section 1615 of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 are met. The
implementation of a national registered armed Law Enforcement Officer
program is a significant undertaking which will require extensive
consultation with thousands of Federal, State, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies which issue credentials to an even larger
population of law enforcement officers. The national law enforcement
officer population exceeds 800,000 sworn law enforcement officers
representing over 18,000 different law enforcement agencies at the
Federal, State, tribal, and local level. It is, therefore, premature to
estimate a timeline for rulemaking and any acquisition related
activities at this time.
The President's fiscal year 2009 budget does not include specific
funds for this system.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has formed a team
comprised of subject matter experts from the Office of Transportation
Threat Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC) and the Office of Law
Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS) to develop a concept
of operations for a National registered armed Law Enforcement Officer
(LEO) program which will help determine program goals and resource
requirements. In March 2008, OLE/FAMS hosted a meeting of Federal,
State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies from around the
country to better understand their respective credentialing systems and
duty requirements, as well as discuss procedural and operational
challenges associated with the integration of a common credential for
this population, which TSA estimates at a potential pool of over
800,000 sworn law enforcement officers nationwide. This meeting
provided valuable information in advancing TSA developmental goals.
Concurrently, TSA will be initiating an E-LEO pilot program at
Washington Dulles International Airport which will provide
Transportation Security Officers a more suitable environment to verify
the identity and improve the tracking of LEOs seeking to fly armed
through the use of a dedicated checkpoint lane. Operating in
conjunction with the Transportation Security Operations Center, the
pilot program will allow TSA to more readily react to emergencies in
the air or on the ground by identifying whether a flight has an armed
law enforcement officer other than a Federal Air Marshal.
Although the Transportation Security Administration intends to
leverage prior experience with other credentialing initiatives, the
size and nature of this population necessitates rigorous planning to
ensure the security objectives of Section 1615 of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 are met. The
implementation of a national registered armed Law Enforcement Officer
program is a significant undertaking which will require extensive
consultation with thousands of Federal, State, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies which issue credentials to an even larger
population of law enforcement officers. The national law enforcement
officer population exceeds 800,000 sworn law enforcement officers
representing over 18,000 different law enforcement agencies at the
Federal, State, tribal, and local level.
Question. What are the fiscal year 2007/2008 levels for
international programs--both funding and FTE. Provide FTE summary by
function areas, i.e. TSA Representatives (TSAR's) and International
Principal Security Inspectors (IPSI's) and International Aviation
Security Inspectors (IASI's)? How many foreign airport assessments were
conducted in fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008? How many will be
covered in fiscal year 2009? Provide the same data for foreign airport
inspections. What is the rationale for inspecting foreign carriers up
to two times annually and assessments once every 3 years? How many
airports worldwide have air carriers that fly to the United States?
What is the total number of air carrier stations worldwide that service
the United States? How many are inspected by TSA on an annual basis?
Answer. The funding level for the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) International Programs in fiscal year 2007 was
approximately $29 million. The funding level in fiscal year 2008 is
approximately $29.4 million.
The fiscal year 2007 Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) levels were as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FTE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transportation Security Administration Representatives 22
(TSARs)................................................
International Aviation Security Inspectors (IASIs)...... 46
International Principal Security Inspectors (IPSIs)..... 16
International Air Cargo Inspectors...................... 10
Foreign Repair Station (FRS) Employees.................. 15
Capacity Development Training Team members.............. 8
Employees supporting TSA's international mission located 36
at various locations including headquarters, overseas
and domestic locations.................................
---------------
Total............................................. 143
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fiscal year 2008 FTE levels were increased slightly due to the
reorganization of TSA's international programs which now comprise TSA's
Office of Global Strategies. The fiscal year 2008 FTE levels are as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FTE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSARs................................................... 22
Transportation Security Specialists (TSSs), formerly 46
IASIs..................................................
International Industry Representatives (IIRs), formerly 6
IPSIs..................................................
International Air Cargo Inspectors...................... 10
FRS Employees........................................... 15
Capacity Development Training Team members.............. 8
Employees supporting TSA's international mission located 39
at various locations including headquarters, overseas
and domestic locations.................................
---------------
Total............................................. 146
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Transportation Security Administration conducted 125 foreign
airport assessments in fiscal year 2007 and 25 to date in fiscal year
2008. TSA plans to conduct 118 foreign airport assessments in fiscal
year 2009.
TSA conducts both foreign airport assessments and foreign air
carrier inspections, but not foreign airport inspections. TSA conducted
221 foreign air carrier inspections in fiscal year 2007. To date, TSA
has conducted 111 foreign air carrier inspections in fiscal year 2008
and anticipates completing an additional 156, for a total of 267, by
the end of fiscal year 2008. TSA forecasts that it will conduct
approximately 300 foreign air carrier inspections in fiscal year 2009.
Foreign airport assessment and foreign air carrier inspection
scheduling is governed by a risk-based methodology that determines the
frequency of visits. Currently, all air carriers are inspected once
annually unless they have a high ``Airport Vulnerability'' rating. This
rating is used to determining the frequency of assessment and
inspection planning based on the outcome of threat, vulnerability, and
consequence analysis. This methodology allows the Transportation
Security Administration to efficiently utilize its workforce by
visiting airports with a higher likelihood of being a target for
criminal or terrorist acts, while taking into account analysis of the
protective measures in place and the potential impact for loss.
The number of international airports that service the United States
is determined by the active last point of departure. Currently, the
total number of active last point of departure airports worldwide is
268. An international airport may have several air carrier operations
offering service to the United States, but because they all depart from
the same airport, it only counts as one point of departure. As an
example, Munich, Germany International airport has various destinations
to the United States and currently has five air carrier station
operations: United Airlines, Inc.; Delta Arlines, Inc.; US Airways;
Deutsche Lufthansa AG; and Lufttransport Unternehem GmbH. Although
Munich serves various destinations to the United States, the airport
was counted as only one point of departure operation to the United
States. Three of these carrier operations service the United States.
Each air carrier station counts as an independent operation.
The total number of air carrier stations worldwide that operate to
the United States is 810. An international airport may have multiple
independent air carrier stations operations providing service to the
United States. Each of these stations counts has a single operation.
The Transportation Security Administration conducted 748 air carrier
station inspections in fiscal year 2007 and anticipates conducting 952
in fiscal year 2008.
Attrition Rates
Question. TSA attrition rates continue to be high compared to the
government-wide average. Total attrition actually increased from 20.9
percent in fiscal year 2006 to 21.2 percent in fiscal year 2007. What
is the status of TSA's pilot program to provide full-time health
benefits to part-time workers? Since the April 20, 2007, report to the
Committee on efforts to reduce attrition rates, provide information on
the success of those efforts.
Answer. TSA continues to make progress in reducing both full-time
and part-time attrition. In fact, when viewed separately, the rates for
both full-time and part-time have declined for the third straight year.
Full-time attrition declined from 16.5 percent in fiscal year 2006 to
14.4 percent in fiscal year 2007; part-time attrition declined from
45.8 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 44.6 percent in fiscal year 2007.
The increase in total attrition is due to the fact that this
combined rate includes an increased percentage of part-time
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) who have a higher attrition
rate than full-time TSOs.
In an effort to increase retention of part-time workers, the Part
Time TSO Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) program was
implemented in September 2006 at six pilot airports. Due to TSA's
success in reducing attrition, the pilot program was expanded
nationwide in October 2007 and full-time TSO health benefits coverage
(with reduced premium costs) was extended to all part time TSOs.
The successful initiatives that TSA has introduced in the past year
include:
--Recruitment, Relocation, and Retention Incentives instituted at
hard-to-staff/high cost-of-living airports;
--TSO Pay for Performance system--Performance Accountability and
Standards System (PASS);
--TSO incentives for conversion from full-time to part-time
employment, for service, and for retention;
--TSO career progression and the creation of the E band position
(resulted in over 20,000 TSO promotions);
--Expanded opportunities for new training and skill sets involving
additional job duties and specialized security functions;
--Enhanced minimum and maximum of TSA pay bands (affects all non-
Senior Executive (TSES) employees);
--TSO work schedule optimization (includes greater use of full-time
split-shift employment and development of a new form of premium
pay--the split-shift differential);
--Reduced health insurance premiums for all part-time TSOs;
--Job Swap (allows employees, primarily TSOs, to swap positions and
working locations); and
--Development of a TSO referral program.
Privatized Screening
Question. The screening partnership program budget anticipates a $2
million need for future federalizations. The amount reserved in fiscal
year 2008 was substantially higher at $6.5 million. Why is there such a
dramatic decrease?
Answer. The $6.5 million referenced above was an estimate for the
use of projected Screener Partnership Program (SPP) program carryover
into fiscal year 2008. In fiscal year 2008, that carryover will be used
to fund airports that transitioned into the SPP in fiscal year 2007--
Key West International Airport, Charles Schultz Sonoma Airport, Gallup
Municipal Airport, and Roswell Industrial Airport. It will also be used
for the continued fiscal year 2008 implementation of new security
programs, including the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program and
Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques, as well as the travel
document checking responsibilities assumed from airline contractors in
June 2007. Base resources were realigned in fiscal year 2009 to account
for these airports that recently joined the SPP, and for the new
security programs and responsibilities, such that $2 million of
anticipated carryover into fiscal year 2009 should be adequate to meet
the needs of future federalizations.
General Aviation
Question. The fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act
included $14 million for the development of technical and information
infrastructure required to determine risk of pilots and crews operating
in the general aviation domain. The fiscal year 2009 budget does not
continue funding for this effort. Why? The fiscal year 2008 budget
assumption assumed funding for an additional 10 FTE's. What is the
status of this effort? From what account and funding allocation are the
10 FTE paid for in fiscal year 2009?
Answer. The $14 million is 2-year funding and will be split between
fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 to support ongoing, and commence
new, general aviation security initiatives that align with the agency's
multi-layered approach to security. Approximately $8 million will be
obligated in fiscal year 2008 and the remaining $6 million in fiscal
year 2009.
TSA is currently developing a program to assist the agency in
continuing its threat based, risk management approach to security. The
10 positions provided in the fiscal year 2008 budget will be funded
over the next 2 years, thereby eliminating the need for additional
funding in the fiscal year 2009 budget. Once implemented, the program
will support TSA's layered approach to security by enhancing security
measures and providing improved situational awareness of the general
aviation security environment.
In fiscal year 2009, 10 Full-Time Equivalents will be funded from
the Aviation Regulation and Enforcement Program, Project, Activity in
the Aviation Security Appropriation using planned carry forward from
the fiscal year 2008 appropriation.
Question. When the proposed transfer of VIPR and canine teams is
backed out, the number of aviation inspectors is lower than budgeted in
fiscal year 2006. Why is TSA reducing the number of ASI's when
responsibilities have increased?
Answer. The Aviation Security Inspector (ASI) workforce was
budgeted for 681 positions in fiscal year 2006. The fiscal year 2006
appropriation was insufficient to sustain this level, however, so the
workforce was reduced to 657 in fiscal year 2007. The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has maintained this position level since
fiscal year 2007 and TSA's fiscal year 2009 budget request includes
funding for 657 ASI positions (not counting Visible Intermodal
Protection Response and canine teams).
Risk-Based Security
Question. TSA trumpets the 19 different security layers in place to
protect the traveling public. Has there been an independent (non-DHS)
assessment of these security layers to determine if they are adequate
and that resources are properly distributed among them? If not, does
TSA plan to undertake such an assessment?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has had a
host of independent analyses of the security layers and associated
resources. In particular, the Government Accountability Office's
analyses over the years were most recently summarized and provided on
February 28, 2008, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland
Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. TSA
has not arranged any additional independent assessments.
COAST GUARD
Staffing
Question. The Coast Guard Commandant recently stated that, ``there
is a limit to what the Coast Guard can do with a workforce that has not
changed in 50 years, except to be reduced on occasion.''
Coast Guard responsibilities have exploded since 9/11, but a
constrained workforce has limited its ability to fully accomplish its
mission.
--Over the last 10 years, the number of Coast Guard marine inspectors
decreased by 1 percent while foreign vessel arrivals increased
by 61 percent.
--The Coast Guard fails to make required checks on critical
infrastructure 33 percent of the time due to a shortfall of
boats, crew, and training.
--The Coast Guard fails to make required escorts of high capacity
passenger vessels 42 percent of the time due to a shortfall of
boats, crew, and training.
--The Coast Guard's capital budget has grown three-fold since 1998 to
$1.2 billion with almost no increase in acquisition staffing.
--Nearly 20 percent of the Coast Guard workforce is unable to use
accumulated leave due to workload demands.
The fiscal year 2009 request would grow the Coast Guard's workforce
by less than 1 percent--just 344 new positions. Provide recommendations
to increase staffing and necessary resources (by functional area) in
fiscal year 2009 to ensure that all Coast Guard sectors have the
personnel and resources to secure our ports, while enforcing our
immigration, drug and environmental laws, and responding to
emergencies. Provide a multi-year plan to address this staffing
shortage.
Answer. Effective growth of the Coast Guard requires a managed
approach. We are currently evaluating the number and characteristics
(e.g., military vice civilian) of a right-sized force. The 2009 Budget
provides for well-defined needs and does not constrain future human
resource solutions.
Relating to a multi-year plan to address this staffing shortage,
the Coast Guard has not yet completed the necessary human resource
requirements analysis to enable projections at this time.
Security of Dangerous Cargo
Question. Last year, the Government Accountability Office concluded
(GAO-08-141) that the Coast Guard lacks the necessary resources to meet
requirements for protecting vessels and waterside facilities that
contain hazardous substances, like Liquefied Natural Gas. In fiscal
year 2008, Congress added $29.4 million for additional staff and small
boats to address this shortfall. GAO concluded that the Coast Guard is
stretched too thin ``to meet its own self-imposed security standards,
such as escorting ships carrying dangerous cargo.''
Are you confident that all Coast Guard sectors have the necessary
personnel and resources to secure dangerous cargoes as they enter our
ports? Does the fiscal year 2009 request allow the Coast Guard to meet
its own self-imposed security standards for vessels carrying dangerous
cargo?
Answer. Not every Coast Guard Sector has all of the resources
required to meet Coast Guard's certain dangerous cargo (CDC) vessel
security requirements, or all other critical infrastructure protection
requirements under the Maritime Transportation Security Act; although
resources are allocated through risk-based decisionmaking and the Coast
Guard did meet its primary performance measure for its Ports, Waterways
and Coastal Security mission. Funding provided in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2008 will help mitigate some of these resource
gaps, but projected increases in the number of CDC vessels entering
U.S. ports will increase the importance of risk management as Sectors
struggle to meet increasing CDC vessel security demands.
The funding provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008
and Fiscal year 2009 request would allow the Coast Guard to maintain
its current level of certain dangerous cargo (CDC) vessel security
capabilities.
During recent testimony, the Commandant said there are alternatives
other than the Coast Guard to protect vessels containing dangerous
cargo entering U.S. ports. Is the Coast Guard required by law,
executive order, or another mandate to protect these vessels? Provide
details on alternatives for protection. What is the Department's
position on this matter? Is the Department considering a shift in
responsibility to local governments or contracted security?
Answer. The Coast Guard is not required by law to protect any
specific vessel or class of vessel. Coast Guard efforts to provide
security escorts for certain dangerous cargo (CDC) vessels are self-
imposed requirements, put in place in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. CDC
vessel security remains a shared responsibility with industry and under
33 CFR 6.19-1, the primary responsibility for CDC vessel and facility
security belongs to vessel masters, owners, operators, and agents.
There is both potential and precedent for non-Coast Guard
protection of vessels containing dangerous cargoes both during the
vessels' transit and pier side at certain dangerous cargo (CDC)
facilities. Escorts of CDC vessels during port transits are often
provided by the Coast Guard, from other Federal, State, or local
agencies, or a combination of available governmental assets.
When a vessel is moored at a facility, protection at the terminal
need not always be in the form of waterborne patrols and DHS believes
shoreside forces should provide protection. Depending on the location
and geographic constraints of the facility, protection may conceivably
be provided through a combination of boat barriers (to demark a limited
access area and prevent attack via Waterborne Improvised Explosive
Device), cameras (for monitoring), and/or armed vessel response,
provided by an appropriate combination of either government or private
security forces.
Further examination and implementation of protocols and regulations
would be required to ensure the proper use-of-force authority is
established and there is a thorough de-confliction between Coast Guard
and non-Coast Guard forces conducting security operations in close
proximity to the port. We are commencing a dialogue with industry and
other stakeholders to inform future national approaches to CDC
security.
The Department's position is in accordance with 33 CFR 6.19-1,
industry retains primary responsibility for the protection and security
of such vessels or waterfront facilities. This position is supported by
the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, which requires vessel
and facility owner/operators to prepare and submit security plans for
deterring Transportation Security Incidents. While the Coast Guard and/
or other government agencies have a role in protecting certain
dangerous cargo (CDC) vessels, it is not the government's exclusive
responsibility, and private industry must carry out their security
responsibilities in accordance with 33 CFR 6.19-1.
The Department intends to continue to work with local governments
and industry to maintain shared responsibility for certain dangerous
cargo vessel security. We are committed to generating a national
dialogue on the issue and believe the Coast Guard is best suited to
coordinate development of recommendations for the way ahead.
Port Security Operational Requirements
Question. Provide a list of ports not meeting specific security
requirements set forth in Operation Neptune Shield (such as harbor
patrols and vessel escorts).
Answer. Operation Neptune Shield (ONS) requires the Coast Guard
Sector Commander in each of the 55 ports to report on the degree to
which ONS standards are met in up to 17 different types of operational
activities (e.g., patrols, boardings, escorts, military outload
support, as applicable to each port). In order to reach this perfect
attainment level, support from other government agencies was required
in six out of the seven ports. ONS is revised regularly. The most
recent change to ONS allows the Operational Commander to focus on
activities which mitigate the greatest risk.
Based on Operation Neptune Shield Scorecard data from CY 2007,
seven of the 55 militarily and economically strategic ports reported
100 percent attainment for every ONS activity. The following 48 out of
the 55 ports were not able to meet all ONS requirements:
Anchorage, AK
Apra Harbor, Guam
Baton Rouge, LA
Boston, MA
Buffalo, NY
Charleston, SC
Chicago, IL
Cincinnati, OH
Cleveland, OH
Corpus Christi, TX
Detroit, MI
Duluth, MN
Galveston, TX
Honolulu, HI
Houston, TX
Huntington, WV
Jacksonville, FL
Lake Charles, LA
Los Angeles/Long Beach, CA
Louisville, KY
Memphis, TN
Miami, FL
Mobile, AL
Morehead City, NC
Morgan City, LA
New Haven, CT
New London, CT
New Orleans, LA
New York/New Jersey
Norfolk, VA
Panama City, FL
Pascagoula, MS
Pensacola, FL
Philadelphia, PA
Pittsburgh, PA
Port Arthur, TX
Port Canaveral, FL
Portland, OR
Providence, RI
San Francisco, CA
San Juan, PR
Savannah, GA
Seattle/Tacoma, WA
St. Louis, MO
Tampa, FL
Toledo, IL
West Palm Beach, FL
Wilmington, DE
Alternatives Analysis
Question. What are the Coast Guard's plans for examining
recommendations contained in the Integrated Deepwater Systems
Alternatives Analysis (AA), which was completed in February 2008? The
AA made specific recommendations pertaining to the NSC, OPC, FRC, MRS,
VUAV, and C4ISR.
Answer. The Coast Guard has examined the recommendations provided
in the AA and has developed a Balanced Plan of Action (BPOA) to manage
cost, schedule and performance risk. All three alternatives recommended
(i.e., Baseline, Modified Baseline, and Managed Risk) support
continuing current Coast Guard plans for the National Security Cutter
(NSC), Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), Fast Response Cutter (FRC), and
Medium Range Surveillance (MRS). The Coast Guard will therefore
continue ongoing procurements of the NSC, FRC (contract selection
ongoing) and MRS. Requirements for the OPC are being refined, with
design work and analysis for this ship planned to begin in fiscal year
2009. The Coast Guard will also, as recommended, review the performance
of the FRC-B and procure additional FRC-Bs once their actual
capabilities are fully developed.
The Managed Risk Alternative recommended elimination of the
Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VUAV) to reduce cost while also
recognizing a significant decrease in system performance. The Coast
Guard will continue an ongoing study of VUAV/UAS (Unmanned Aircraft
System) alternatives to determine the best approach to meet the VUAV
maritime surveillance requirements. The Coast Guard considers the VUAV/
UAS essential for optimum mission performance, and concurs with the AA
that the Navy's Fire Scout VUAV project may be applicable to its needs.
The AA also recognized a range of Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
alternatives. The Coast Guard Acquisition Directorate, as it assumes
more of the lead systems integrator responsibilities, is working to
identify the most efficient and effective path forward in terms of
interoperable land, sea and air C4ISR systems. The Coast Guard agrees
with the AA in that both near-term and long-term strategies are needed
(in C4ISR and logistics) to integrate both legacy and new Coast Guard
assets.
Deepwater Budget
Question. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act for fiscal year
2008, the Coast Guard received $783 million for the Deepwater program,
and in the fiscal year 2009 budget the Coast Guard requested an
additional $990 million for Deepwater. What assurances do we have that
the Coast Guard can properly manage that large increase in requested
fiscal year 2009 funds given the management challenges Deepwater has
faced?
Answer. The Coast Guard is confident it is on the right course and
positioned to manage the increase in funding for the Deepwater program.
Deepwater is making significant progress in program execution through
use of approximately $1.2 billion obligated in fiscal year 2007.
Last summer, the Commandant enacted a reorganization of the Coast
Guard's major acquisitions, which involved standing up the new
Acquisition Directorate. This important initiative coupled with the
implementation of program and oversight management reforms recommended
by the Defense Acquisition University (as codified in the Coast Guard
Blueprint for Acquisition Reform) are moving the Coast Guard forward in
achieving real improvements in acquisition management. Working closely
with the DHS Undersecretary of Management and Chief Procurement
Officer, the Coast Guard is hiring top-notch professionals and
improving training and certification.
The Coast Guard is applying its Major Systems Acquisition Manual
guidelines to all projects falling under the Deepwater program and is
seeing tangible results. Over the past year and a half, these
acquisition program changes have resulted in the following significant
accomplishments:
--The USCGC BERTHOLF (WMSL 750), the first of eight NSC's to be
built, has successfully completed machinery and builders trials
leading to delivery this spring. The Commandant states this
will be the most capable cutter the Coast Guard will have ever
commissioned. USCGC WAESCHE (WMSL 751) is nearly 50 percent
complete, and the Coast Guard will cut steel for the third
ship, USCGC HAMILTON (WMSL 752), this summer.
--The Coast Guard will be completing (note the date of this hearing
is before the acceptance on 10 MAR 2008) Developmental Test and
Evaluation (DT&E) of the Mission System Pallet for the first
fully-missionized HC-144 Ocean Sentry maritime patrol aircraft
this month and has five more under construction to add to the
three already delivered. The Coast Guard has nearly upgraded
the entire fleet of HH-65C helicopters with more powerful
engines, and in January 2008, replaced the prior HITRON
helicopters with these new assets equipped with airborne use of
force (AUF) capability.
--The Coast Guard added new sensors and communication systems aboard
35 of the legacy medium endurance cutters last year and will do
the same to five more if they receive the fiscal year 2009
request. The mission effectiveness project to sustain and
refurbish their legacy fleet of 110-foot patrol boats and both
classes of medium endurance cutters is on schedule, and they
have actually reduced the time to complete each patrol boat at
the Coast Guard Yard by approximately 3 months. The first of
six newly-missionized C130J long range surveillance aircraft
just successfully completed DT&E last week, and will enhance
capabilities once it completes operational testing this year.
The Department has every confidence in Admiral Allen and his Chief
Acquisition Officer, Rear Admiral Gary Blore, and their staff. The
addition of three SES's to the Coast Guard's acquisition corps, the
majority of whom come from the Department of Defense with years of
experience, has helped them move leaps and bounds in the right
direction. As I said earlier, the best indicators are the Deepwater
assets serving in the Coast Guard air and sea fleets today. The
contract awards of NSC #4 Long Lead Time material, additional HC-144A,
and the Fast Response Cutter B will be very public and visible evidence
of continued progress this summer.
Additionally, we're measuring progress in improving the Deepwater
program through several strategies:
--Receiving the Deepwater Alternatives Analysis report, an example of
a third-party review of a major acquisition program, that
confirms that their basic procurement strategy remains valid
for meeting mission requirements;
--Use of Earned Value Management (EVM) policies documented in the
Coast Guard Major Systems Acquisition Manual (MSAM) for monthly
analysis and reporting for oversight; internal review of
financial data tracking to ensure data is accurate, complete,
timely, and reliable; and
--Converting the Deepwater Performance Management System (DPMS) to
the Acquisition Performance Management System (APMS), and the
integration of the three USCG accounting systems into a
complete Acquisition, Construction, and Improvement (AC&I) data
set.
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 budget was made with the
awareness of what they can properly manage and obligate, moving
Deepwater forward and continuing to provide the Coast Guard men and
women with the assets they need to perform their critical missions.
The Department expects that continued progress will be made in
Coast Guard acquisition management and I want to reiterate that we are
confident the Coast Guard will appropriately, effectively and
efficiently manage funding received.
Marine Safety Program
Question. Last year, the Coast Guard announced significant
improvements to the Marine Safety Program. With regard to resources
necessary to implement the enhancements, the Coast stated that it is
currently developing the associated resource strategy. The budget
includes a $20 million increase for marine inspectors. What is the base
budget for marine safety? What are the long-term needs for staffing and
resources to fully address the Coast Guard's shortfall in this area?
Answer. The Coast Guard uses a tool known as the Mission Cost Model
(MCM) to estimate budget authority allocations by mission program. The
Coast Guard estimates approximately 8.7 percent or $501.8 million of
actual Operating Expense appropriation expenditures supported the
Marine Safety mission in fiscal year 2007. This is the most accurate
available estimate of program cost.
This amount does not include the Coast Guard's Marine Environmental
Protection and Aids to Navigation missions.
The Coast Guard has developed a strategy that provides a vision and
roadmap for improving the effectiveness, consistency, and
responsiveness of the Coast Guard Marine Safety program to promote
safe, secure, and environmentally sound maritime commerce. The Coast
Guard will reinvigorate industry partnerships, improve mariner
credentialing services, bolster inspector and investigator capacity,
improve technical competencies, and expand rulemaking capability to
ensure that we meet current and future industry needs. Budgeted
resources will be directed to:
--Improve the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Capacity and Performance
--Increase marine inspector and investigator capacity.
--Strengthen marine inspection and investigation consistency
through addition of civilian positions.
--Increase accessions from U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and
maritime institutions.
--Strengthen Marine Safety career paths.
--Expand professional Marine Safety training and education.
--Expand opportunities for maritime industry training.
--Enhance engineering capacity for plan review, policy and
standards development.
--Enhance Service Delivery to Mariners and Industry Customers
--Establish Centers of Excellence.
--Improve information technology systems.
--Increase rulemaking capacity to meet regulatory implementation.
--Improve credentialing through greater efficiency, transparency
and capacity.
--Expand Outreach and Advisory Mechanisms for Industry and
Communities.
--Establish Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and
Stewardship.
--Establish a national council of maritime advisors for the
Commandant.
--Exercise leadership at international, national, regional, State,
and local safety, security, and environmental committees.
Foreign Port Inspections
Question. According to recent GAO testimony, Coast Guard officials
said they don't have the resources or authority to directly assist
countries with more in-depth training or technical assistance to
improve security. Please describe resource shortfalls. What is the
Coast Guard doing to address this problem?
Answer. Section 70109(b) of title 46, United States Code, directs
the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating,
in cooperation with the Secretary of State, to provide a port security
training program in foreign countries that are found under 46 U.S.C.
70108 to lack effective anti-terrorism measures.
Based on the first round of the assessments, the Coast Guard is
authorized to provide training to seven countries that were found to
have ineffective anti-terrorism measures. A finding on effective
antiterrorism measures is pending for seven additional countries.
Presently, the Coast Guard has both adequate personnel and authority to
provide such training in all foreign countries that are found under 46
U.S.C. 70108 to lack effective anti-terrorism measures.
Interagency Operational Centers
Question. The SAFE Port Act called for the creation of interagency
operational centers (IOCs) at high-priority ports. The fiscal year 2008
Consolidated Appropriations Act included $60 million to begin the
process of establishing these centers. The Coast Guard has estimated
the full cost of these centers Coast Guard wide to be $260 million. Why
doesn't the budget include funds for IOCs in fiscal year 2009 or in the
capital out-years budget?
Answer. The President's Request for fiscal year 2009 seeks funding
for Command 21, the Coast Guard acquisition program to establish
Interagency Operations Centers (IOC) capability at Coast Guard Sector
Command Centers in ``high priority'' ports.
Additionally, the fiscal year 2009-13 Capital Investment Plan for
Acquisition, Construction, & Improvement, included in the fiscal year
2009 President's Request, reflects the following outyear funding
estimates for Command 21:
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Command 21 ------------------------------------------------------- Total Complete
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AC&I CIP........................... 1 9 10 10 10 ( \1\ ) ( \1\ )
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Total Acquisition Cost and Estimated Completion is under development with our Acquisition Program Baseline
and will be provided as soon as approved by DHS.
The Coast Guard intends to administer Command 21 and Interagency
Operations Centers as a consolidated acquisition project in future
years.
Small Vessel Security
Question. According to the budget, the Coast Guard and DNDO are in
the early stages of deploying preventive radiation/nuclear detection
(PRND) capabilities in the ports of Seattle and San Diego to detect
radiation on small vessels. Provide more details on how these pilot
projects will work. How much funding is being dedicated to these pilots
from DNDO and Coast Guard? In what fiscal year were the funds for these
pilots appropriated? When does DHS expect results from these pilots?
Are there plans to expand these capabilities to other ports? If so,
provide a schedule and port locations. Does the fiscal year 2009 budget
include funds to continue or expand these pilots?
Answer. The pilot program is a 3-year effort to design, field and
evaluate a radiation detection architecture that reduces the risk of
radiological and nuclear threats that could be illicitly transported on
recreational craft or small commercial vessels. The pilot is being
organized and coordinated through each port's Area Maritime Security
Committee (AMSC), in close coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO).
The pilot program explores the installation of advanced fixed-
position sensors as well as methods of deploying human-portable and
boat-mounted radiation and nuclear detection equipment with public
safety forces during routine public safety and enforcement operations.
There are four phases to the pilot project:
--Initial Architecture Analysis
--Engineering Design
--Delivery of Capability/Initial Training and workshops,
--Assess & Document Lessons Learned
We can provide a briefing if further information is requested.
The pilots are funded by DNDO as follows:
--Fiscal year 2007--$1.1 million
--Fiscal year 2008--$4.1 million (estimated)
--Fiscal year 2009--$11.4 million (requested)
Initial funds were provided to DNDO through the ``Research,
Development and Operations'' appropriation in fiscal year 2007.
There are four phases to this pilot project in each port, and the
pilot is currently in the Engineering Design phase in Puget Sound and
Initial Analysis phase in San Diego. The fourth phase, Assess &
Document Lessons Learned, will culminate in fiscal year 2010; however
workshops and exercises will be conducted intermittently throughout the
project.
There is one particular lesson readily apparent from the efforts
that are underway in both Puget Sound and San Diego. There needs to be
greater awareness about the potential threat of a small vessel
smuggling weapons of mass destruction, and the vulnerability of these
ports to radiation/nuclear smuggling or a direct attack. This pilot
project, along with other Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel
Security initiatives, is an important step in expanding the education
of, and communication and coordination with, the small vessel community
and local public safety officials.
There is currently no intention to conduct additional pilot
projects beyond the existing scope of Puget Sound and San Diego. The
fiscal year 2009 President's Budget Request for DNDO includes $11.412
million to continue these pilots.
Financial Management
Question. The Inspector General reported that the majority of the
department's material weaknesses in internal control are attributable
to conditions existing at the Coast Guard. The Commandant recently
testified that corrective action plans are in place to remedy ongoing
material weaknesses. What steps are being taken by the Coast Guard's to
improve these weaknesses?
Answer. The Coast Guard's plan to achieve financial statement audit
readiness, per Admiral Allen's testimony on March 5, 2008, will be
delivered to the appropriations committee in April 2008.
Polar Icebreakers
Question. In a speech to the Surface Navy Association's annual
conference on January 16, 2008, Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen
called for a national dialogue on U.S. national security interests in
the Arctic. Two of the three Coast Guard icebreakers are well beyond
their expected mission life. The POLAR STAR is in caretaker status and
the POLAR SEA has approximately 7-10 years of service life remaining.
The budget includes no funding to bring the POLAR STAR out of caretaker
status nor does it request funds to build a new icebreaker. Given that
it would take approximately 10 years to build a new icebreaker, what is
the President's policy for replacing or maintaining the Coast Guard's
aging icebreakers?
Answer. The administration is currently conducting a review of our
national Arctic policy. A national policy must precede a mission needs
statement and any investment in existing or new icebreakers. POLAR
SEA's recent overhaul is expected to extend her service life through
2014. POLAR STAR remains available for reactivation from caretaker
status.
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
Question. The Secret Service has developed respectable competencies
with regard to cyber crime and security. It is surprising that no
additional funding was requested for Secret Service efforts, given the
current threat. Why were no additional resources requested?
Answer. The fiscal year 2009 budget also allows the Secret Service
to continue to vigorously pursue criminals who engage in counterfeiting
and financial and electronic crimes. The Agency will maximize the use
of the agency's resources, particularly during the presidential
campaign and post-election activities, and continue to investigate
cases that have a significant impact on our communities and on those
that pose the greatest risk to our Nation's critical financial
infrastructure. Over the years, the Secret Service has established a
national network of 24 Electronic Crimes Task Forces and 29 Financial
Crimes Task Forces in major metropolitan areas across the United
States. These task forces leverage the combined resources of our
Federal, State, and local law enforcement partners, as well as
technical experts from academia and private industry, in an organized
effort to combat threats and effectively investigate crimes directed at
our critical infrastructure. Collaboration between law enforcement and
the private sector is critical to the Secret Service's preventative
approach to financial and electronic crimes. The Secret Service also
builds partnerships with academia to ensure that the agency's workforce
is on the cutting edge of technology by leveraging the research and
development capabilities of teaching institutions.
To provide its special agents with the advanced skills needed to
identify and address cyber vulnerabilities, the Secret Service
established the Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program (ECSAP) in
1987. Agents trained through ECSAP are computer specialists, qualified
to conduct network intrusion investigations and forensic examinations
of various types of electronic evidence, including computers, personal
data assistants (PDAs), telecommunications devices, electronic
organizers, and other electronic media. As of the end of fiscal year
2007, the Secret Service had approximately 770 ECSAP-trained agents
assigned to more than 85 offices worldwide.
Recognizing the value of this program, the Secret Service expects
to have over 1,000 ECSAP-trained agents by the end of fiscal year 2008.
Further, the Secret Service will have a key role in the implementation
of the administration's cybersecurity initiatives, as outlined in the
recent Presidential directive addressing the administration's
cybersecurity policy.
Question. Secret Service has encountered cyber criminals who have
assembled vast databases of credit card numbers and other financial
information. Are you concerned that terrorists or hostile nations could
leverage this criminal activity to attempt to destabilize our banking
system?
Answer. The Secret Service is currently conducting numerous
undercover cyber investigations based in Eastern Europe that target
suspects involved in various illegal activities to include the
manufacturing, purchase, sale, and exploitation of various financial
instruments and personnel identification information. Eastern European
hackers currently pose the biggest threat to the U.S. banking system
and financial infrastructure. To date, these hackers have been content
to steal information at a pace which does not destabilize our banking
industry; however, these hackers can cause significant financial damage
to thousands of individuals in a short amount to time.
In mid-2007, one such Secret Service investigation resulted in the
identification and arrest of a foreign national who was a large-scale
trafficker of stolen identities and financial account information. This
individual routinely conducted sales of hundreds of thousands of stolen
account numbers. Through this investigation, another foreign national
was identified as a primary co-conspirator and supplier of stolen
information and account numbers. Evidence indicated that this second
foreign national was actively involved in multiple data breaches
involving millions of credit card accounts.
Based on this information, and through ongoing Secret Service
investigations, indictments were issued for the second target.
Recently, this second individual was arrested with the cooperation of
international law enforcement authorities. Extradition proceedings have
commenced for this individual who has been linked to intrusions
resulting in losses exceeding $100 million.
On a larger scale, though not for financial gain, Russia-based
hackers used a worldwide botnet of approximately 1 million hijacked
computers to flood Estonian private industry and government websites
and e-mail systems with hits and messages. The cumulative effect of
this malicious botnet, which was launched to make a political
statement, was an information overload and temporary shutdown of
Estonia's computer networks.
As these examples show, it is possible that Eastern European
hackers could unite and attempt a coordinated attack on the U.S.
banking system. This attack could have severe short-term consequences
such as the disruption of financial services and a drop in consumer
confidence in the security of financial transactions.
While Asian-based hackers have been targeting U.S. government
computer networks for years, the Secret Service has also seen interest
from these hackers in infiltrating the U.S. banking system. This
potential threat should be closely monitored and a swift response
should be taken if evidence shows that these hackers start to
aggressively target any part of the U.S. financial infrastructure.
Question. What agency is/would be responsible for studying and
mitigating such a potential threat? What percentage of credit card
activity is estimated to be fraudulent? What percentage of debit card
activity is estimated to be fraudulent?
Answer. The Secret Service has taken a lead role in investigating
and dismantling international networks of online cyber criminals with a
focus on its core jurisdictions of investigating financial crimes, to
include access device fraud, computer fraud, and identity theft.
The Secret Service has adapted its traditional investigative
techniques into the virtual world of cyber space, which has no
international boundaries or time constraints. The Secret Service
protects the financial infrastructure of the United States by
investigating offenses involving identity theft (18 USC 1028), access
device fraud (18 USC 1029) and computer crimes (18 USC 1030).
In areas of concurrent investigative jurisdiction with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (e.g., access device fraud, identity
fraud, computer crime), the Secret Service and the FBI abide by a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). As stated in the purpose section of
the MOU, ``The intention of this agreement is to promote efficiency of
operation, prevent the overlapping and duplication of investigative
responsibilities and to avoid confusion . . . concerning the
appropriate agency to contact regarding possible violations of
respective statutes.'' Secret Service investigators work in partnership
with State and local law enforcement agencies. While a mutual interest
and benefit exists for all agencies involved, the work is not
duplicative because the Secret Service and State and local agencies
consult with one another to investigate a case once, instead of
multiple agencies investigating the same case(s) simultaneously.
Due to the complexity and reluctance of reporting internal fraud
losses that are sustained by financial institutions, credit card
companies, and retail corporations that issue credit cards,
ascertaining an accurate percentage of fraudulent credit card activity
has proven to be difficult. As a result, a reportable percentage is not
available.
In fiscal year 2007, the Secret Service arrested over 4,300
suspects for financial and electronic crimes violations. These suspects
were responsible for approximately $690 million in actual fraud loss to
individuals and financial institutions, with an estimated potential
fraud loss of $4.35 billion.
For debit cards and for the same reasons discussed in the response
to the previous question, ascertaining an accurate percentage of
fraudulent debit card activity is also difficult. However, despite this
difficulty, and based on the evidence gathered in access device fraud
investigations, it is fair to say that credit card account information
and debit card account information is stolen with similar ease. In
other words, a consumer is not more vulnerable to the theft of account
information using a credit card as opposed to a debit card, or vice
versa. The vulnerability of the consumer lies in the source of the
funds to which an identity thief is given access with the stolen
account information, such that, with debit card account information, an
identity thief can directly deplete a consumer's checking account.
Question. What efforts, if any, are underway to avoid this?
Answer. Investigative efforts of the Secret Service focus on
education, prevention, detection, mitigation, and aggressive
investigation of cyber attacks on our Nation's financial payment
systems and critical infrastructures.
The Secret Service has responsibility within the DHS to conduct
cyber and electronic crimes investigations. To protect the United
States financial infrastructure from cyber threats, the Secret Service
operates the following programs:
--Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program (ECSAP)
--Electronic Crime State and Local Program (ECSLP)
--Electronic Crimes Task Forces (ECTF)
--Criminal Intelligence Section (CIS)
ECSAP agents are trained to respond to network intrusions and
conduct forensic examinations on electronic evidence obtained from
computers, personal data assistants, electronic organizers,
telecommunications devices, and other forms of electronic devices.
The Electronic Crime State and Local Program (ECSLP) was designed
to train State and local officers as certified computer forensic
specialists and network intrusion responders.
The ECTF program focuses on the prevention, detection, mitigation,
and aggressive investigation of cyber attacks on our Nation's critical
infrastructure and financial payment systems. ECTFs identify and
address potential cyber vulnerabilities before the criminal element
exploits them. This proactive approach has successfully prevented cyber
attacks that otherwise would have resulted in large-scale financial
losses to U.S. based companies or disruptions of critical
infrastructure.
CIS collects, analyzes and disseminates data in support of Secret
Service investigations, domestically and overseas, and generates new
investigative leads based upon this intelligence. The CIS penetrates,
disrupts, and dismantles online criminal networks.
Question. The budget proposes earmarking protection for the Vice
President once he leaves office. Protection for the former Vice
President is important, but why is this earmark necessary given every
modern Vice President has received such protection in the past without
a similar carve out?
Answer. Secret Service protection for former vice presidents is not
without precedent. There were time limited (up to 6 months) provisions
for extended protection for former Vice Presidents Gore, Quayle,
Mondale, Rockefeller, Agnew, and Humphrey. In some cases, protection
was extended for spouses and children. The method for extending Secret
Service protection in these cases was Executive Memoranda or a Joint
Resolution of Congress.
The Secret Service is not currently authorized to extend protection
to vice presidents. The provision to extend protection for the current
Vice President and Mrs. Cheney, and future vice presidents and their
spouses, was included in the President's fiscal year 2009 budget in an
effort to be transparent about the need for such authority.
Question. Why weren't resources included in the request to cover
such protection?
Answer. No resources were requested because no authority existed at
the time for providing post-term protection to the Vice President.
Also, because of the pre-existing practice of protecting former Vice
Presidents, this activity was already budgeted for in Base resources.
Question. Where would the Department propose to make up any
shortfall caused by the earmark?
Answer. The current budget does provide funding for protection of
the former Vice President. However, depending on the amount of time
protection is provided to the Vice President after he leaves office,
providing this protection may or may not create any budgetary problems
for the Secret Service. To the extent that it did cause significant
funding problems, it may require a reprogramming of funds--either
within the Secret Service or elsewhere within the Department.
Question. Why does the Department earmark resources for the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children? This is a worthy
cause and I support earmarks of this nature, but the administration has
made quite a fuss about earmarking and it is unclear why this is an
exception. Why is this an exception? Would it not make more sense to
compete this grant?
Answer. The provision of resources for the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children has been done for the past 12 fiscal
years. It began with the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of
1997 when the Congressional Appropriations Committees provided
$1,400,000 to the Secret Service from the Violent Crime Trust Fund to
be available for a grant for activities related to investigations of
missing and exploited children. The Conference Report accompanying this
appropriations act indicated that, ``. . . of this amount, $400,000 is
for two additional full time employees within the Secret Service to
target child exploitation and pornography; $765,000 is dedicated for a
grant to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC)
to establish an Exploited Child Unit, and $235,000 is provided to
support the training of additional volunteers through NCMEC's Project
ALERT. The conference agreement assumes funds of $1.2 million through
the Secret Service Salaries and Expenses appropriation for the 2nd and
3rd years of operating the Exploited Child Unit at the NCMEC.''
As indicated, the appropriations language for the Service's
Salaries and Expenses appropriation for fiscal year 1997 contained
verbiage indicating, . . . of which $1,200,000 shall be available as a
grant for activities related to the investigations of missing and
exploited children and shall remain available until expended.''
In the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998,
the Congressional Appropriations Committees placed resources for
investigations of missing and exploited children in the funding
provided to the U.S. Secret Service from the Violent Crime Reduction
Trust Fund: ``For activities authorized by Public Law 103-322, to
remain available until expended, which shall be derived from the
Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund, as follows: (1) As authorized by
section 190001(e), of which . . . $2,571,000 for forensic and related
support of investigations of missing and exploited children, of which
$571,000 shall be available as a grant for activities related to the
investigations of exploited children and shall remain available until
expended''. The Conference Report stated accompanying this
appropriation stated: ``In fiscal year 1997, the Committees provided
start up costs for the operation of the Exploited Child Unit at the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children as well as
sufficient funds for the operation of this unit through fiscal year
1999. The Committees have had the opportunity to review the work of
this Unit and are pleased with the progress being made in the
integration of investigations of exploited children with investigations
being conducted through the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children in recovering missing children. The conferees wish to express
continued support for the work of this Center as well as the
cooperation being provided by the Secret Service through the use of
forensic technologies. The conferees provided an additional $571,000
for the operation of the Exploited Child Unit of the National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children and encourages (sic) the Center to
provide the Committees with periodic status reports of its
investigative efforts.''
Similar language was included in both the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, and the Treasury and
General Government Appropriations Act of 2000, also with the funding
coming from the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund, and with the grant
amounts set at $1,196,000 and $2,200,000, respectively. The Conference
Report for the fiscal year 1999 appropriation stated: ``Of the amounts
provided for missing and exploited children, the conferees agree to
provide $1,196,000 for the continued operations of the Child
Exploitation Unit at the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children.'' Likewise, the Conference Report for the fiscal year 2000
appropriation indicated that the funding provided includes ``$2,200,000
for grant assistance for the Exploited Child Unit of NCMEC.''
In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, the verbiage
providing grant funding was returned to the appropriations language for
the U.S. Secret Service, and read as follows: `` of which $3,633,000
shall be available as a grant for activities related to investigations
of exploited children and shall remain available until expended,''. The
House and Conference Committee reports were silent on the funding for
investigations of missing and exploited children; however, the Senate
Report indicated ``The Committee has included $3,196,000 for the
Service's operation costs of the exploited child unit, associated with
its continued efforts with the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children, including $1,196,000 for activities related to
investigations of exploited children.''
Likewise, similar verbiage has been included in the appropriations
language for the Secret Service, and the Conference Reports
accompanying these appropriations for fiscal year 2002 through fiscal
year 2007, with the following amounts in grant funding specifically
provided by the Congress for the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children:
--Fiscal year 2002--$3,009,000
--Fiscal year 2003--$4,583,000
--Fiscal year 2004--$5,000,000
--Fiscal year 2005--$5,000,000
--Fiscal year 2006--$5,500,000
--Fiscal year 2007--$6,000,000
Protection, Preparedness, Response and Recovery
NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE
Question. Last year, the President signed into law new authority
for the Department of Homeland Security to regulate ammonium nitrate.
To date the Department has not notified the Committee of any actions it
might take to enforce the new law, nor does the Department request
resources in fiscal year 2009 to do so. Does the Department intend to
regulate this chemical? If so, when might the Committee expect to see
an implementation plan, including resource requirements to do so?
Answer. This requirement is found in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008, Division E--Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2008, Title III--Protection, Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery, under Infrastructure Protection and Information
Security and is related to a request in the Joint Explanatory Statement
to Accompany Consolidated Appropriations Amendment report. The request
in the Joint Explanatory Statement includes:
``. . . statutory provision establishing a registration system for
producers, sellers, and purchasers of ammonium nitrate, as proposed by
the Senate. Within 60 days of enactment of this act, the Deputy Under
Secretary for Protection and Programs is directed to provide the
Committees on Appropriations a plan to implement this new provision,
including an analysis of the resources required to do so, and a
proposal for reallocating funding within the National Protection and
Programs Directorate budget to fund this initiative.''
DHS is working on a preliminary informational document to provide
the scope of effort and the estimated resource requirements. Additional
time is required to complete a more detailed concept of operations and
an implementation strategy to establish a national level registration
system for Ammonium Nitrate.
Question. To date, the Department has taken no action to change its
chemical site security regulations to reflect that preemption is no
longer assumed, even though President Bush signed this clarification
into law on December 26, 2007. When can I expect to see a change in the
regulation to reflect the law?
Answer. The Department does not plan to change the Chemical
Security regulation. The rule itself establishes a process to receive
requests for opinions on preemption questions.
Question. I see in your written statement that one of the
Department's key accomplishments was establishing the new National
Computer Forensics Institute in Hoover, Alabama. This administration
earmark had surprised many of us in Congress, particularly since the
earmarked resources hadn't been specifically requested. Are there any
other facilities or programs the Department intends to earmark through
administrative policy in fiscal year 2008 or fiscal year 2009?
Answer. The establishment of the National Computer Forensics
Institute (NCFI) and the agreement with the City of Hoover, was not an
earmark. The placement of NCFI in Hoover was initiated only after
internal analysis and cost-benefit review showed that other Federal
locations and options could not meet the requirements for the
Institute. The facility was not an administration earmark, and by
policy the administration has not earmarked facilities or programs in
either fiscal year 2008 or 2009.
Question. According to the 9/11 Commission, information sharing is
a critical to the success of defending the Nation from terror. I
support the fostering of information sharing. I note there are a number
of technologies and infrastructures that have been built and are
proposed for construction that will putatively aid information sharing,
however; it is unclear how these technologies fit together and whether
they truly aid rather than overwhelm end users.
Please provide a copy of any Department-wide information sharing
strategic planning documents.
Answer. DHS is the process of finalizing an Information Sharing
(IS) Strategy for the Department of Homeland Security, a copy of which
will be provided upon its completion. The strategy is designed to
provide high level guidance for all DHS information sharing efforts. A
critical capstone document, it sets forth a transformation statement
and outlines the guiding principles, critical challenges, objectives,
information sharing standards and security, performance measures, and
communications for improving information sharing. The strategy will
help implement the ``One DHS'' vision and priorities for information
sharing. It supports and reinforces the National Strategy for
Information Sharing released in October 2007, the updated 2007 National
Strategy for Homeland Security, and the November 2006 Implementation
Plan of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment.
A copy of the Secretary's memorandum establishing ``One DHS'' for
information sharing follows:
MEMORANDUM
February 1, 2007.
MEMORANDUM TO: All Department of Homeland Security Components
FROM: Secretary Michael Chertoff
SUBJECT: DHS Policy for International Information Exchange and Sharing
In order to promote a united, Department-wide information-sharing
environment, it is critical that each DHS component gives the highest
priority to the sharing of potential terrorism, homeland security, law
enforcement, and related information.\1\ DHS personnel must have timely
access to all relevant information they need to successfully perform
their duties. Therefore, absent any legal prohibitions as set forth by
the Department's General Counsel, information shall be shared within
DHS whenever the requesting officer or employee has an authorized
purpose for accessing the information in the performance of his or her
duties,\2\ possesses the requisite security clearance, and assures
adequate safeguarding and protection of the information. Furthermore,
all DHS components are considered part of one ``agency'' for purposes
of the Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(a)(1), (b)(1). No DHS component
should consider another DHS component to be a separate agency for
information-sharing purposes.
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\1\ Terrorism information'' means all information relating to the
existence, organization, capabilities, plans intentions,
vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of
foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals, domestic
groups or individuals involved in terrorism, to threats posed by such
groups or individuals to the United States, United States persons, or
United States interests, or to those of other nations, or to
communications between such groups or individuals, and to information
relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting
or associating with them.
\2\ In some circumstances, DHS personnel will have ``an authorized
purpose for accessing the information in the performance of [their]
duties'' if their responsibilities necessitate access to an individual
piece of information. In other circumstances, DHS personnel will have
the requisite authorized purpose if their responsibilities necessitate
access to an entire class or category of information.
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The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis is the DHS
official responsible for assessing and analyzing all terrorism,
homeland security, and related law enforcement and intelligence
information received by the Department. As such, I direct that each
component conduct an immediate review of its existing information-
handling procedures and ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place
to provide the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) with access to
all potential terrorism, homeland security, law enforcement, and
related information, including foreign intelligence information.\3\
Like all DHS components, I&A likewise is under an obligation to share
information in its possession appropriately across the Department. To
facilitate this and other homeland-security-related information-sharing
activities, each component's information sharing action officer should
be prepared to work with I&A and the coordinating principals of the
Offices of Policy and Operations, as well as the Chief Information
Officer, which shall constitute the DHS Information Sharing Governance
Board.
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\3\ ``Terrorism information'' is defined in footnote 1. ``Homeland-
security information'' has the same meaning as in Section 892(f)(1) of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002. As used in this directive, ``law
enforcement information'' refers to law enforcement information
relating to terrorism or the security of our homeland. ``Foreign-
intelligence information'' means information relating to the
capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or
elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or
international terrorist activities.
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Additionally, I direct all DHS components, with the Chief
Information Officer, to ensure that each DHS employee has access to all
information pertinent to his or her responsibilities. DHS must move to
standardize the technology used to describe, access, exchange, and
manage information in our automated systems, so that we and our
partners can easily locate and effectively use the most current and
complete data available in support of our vital missions.
No component of DHS shall promulgate information-handling
guidelines or enter into agreements that are inconsistent with any
aspect of this policy, unless otherwise and expressly authorized by the
Secretary. The presumption is that information will be shared, not
hoarded. Furthermore, each internal or external information-sharing
agreement to which any DHS component already may be a party, even if
entered into prior to the Department's creation, shall be interpreted
consistent with this policy, to the extent the terms of the agreement
permit such an interpretation. As such, I direct all components, in
coordination with the Office of the General Counsel, to take immediate
steps to amend any existing agreement, procedure, or guideline that is
not capable of being interpreted consistent with this policy, or that
otherwise does not facilitate the sharing of information with other
components. From this point forward, information-access and -sharing
agreements with outside entities will be negotiated and entered into on
behalf of the Department as a whole, not on behalf of an individual DHS
component.
In order to establish a central repository of all such agreements,
each DHS component is directed to provide copies of all information-
access and -sharing agreements, including and indicating those
referenced in the previous paragraph, to the DHS Executive Secretariat
by February 15, 2007. With each submission, the component shall clearly
indicate whether it believes the agreement is compliant or non-
compliant with this policy and, if compliant, with which other
components the information is shared.
It is critical to the security of our Nation that we share
information in an environment that is free of unnecessary limitations
or constraints. But while doing so, we must ensure the integrity of
ongoing law enforcement and intelligence investigations. We must also
ensure that DHS's information-sharing practices are conducted in a
manner consistent with the law, including Federal privacy and civil
rights laws. To that end, the Office of General Counsel, the Privacy
Office, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and the
Information Sharing Governance Board will continue to work closely with
DHS components and monitor their information-management processes to
ensure that privacy, civil rights and civil liberties, and other legal
protections are fully respected.
Finally, if any components experience data-access denials or delays
which they are unable to resolve, they are to bring the matter to the
attention of the Information Sharing Governance Board, Deborah Draxler
(I&A) at 202-282-8516, or Jonathan Frenkel (Policy) at 202-282-8478.
Further direction will be forthcoming on the implementation of the
policies, programs, and procedures described herein, including those
relating to the Information Sharing Governance Board.
______
Question. How are information sharing requirements between agencies
and Departments coordinated and prioritized?
Answer. Information sharing requirements can be categorized into
two groups: tactical data-centric standards, protocols, and design
principles; and information sharing business needs.
The detailed, data-centric requirements and standards for
information sharing are coordinated through the DHS/Chief Information
Officer's Enterprise Data Management Office EDMO and Enterprise
Architecture (EA) Program Office, the Office of Intelligence &
Analysis's (I&A's) Information Sharing and Collaboration (IS&C) Branch,
and a number of cross-agency and cross-Departmental working groups such
as the National Information Exchange Model Program Management Office (a
partnership between the Department of Justice and DHS) to define
Federal information exchange standards and processes. These
requirements are then prioritized and incorporated into the DHS EA
through the Enterprise Architecture Center of Excellence and ultimately
the Enterprise Architecture Board.
The process for coordination and prioritization of information
sharing to meet DHS business needs is maturing. DHS has established a
three-tiered information sharing governance structure to identify
information sharing gaps and be the decision making and action body for
all information sharing issues. The governance structure is comprised
of the Information Sharing Governance Board (ISGB), an executive
steering committee, the Information Sharing Coordinating Council
(ISCC), an action body, and Integrated Project Teams, formed to
research specific issues. The ISGB is chaired by the Under Secretary
for Intelligence & Analysis, who has been given the authority for
information sharing across the Department. The ISCC, which is chaired
by the Chief, I&A/IS&C, is comprised of action officers representing
all DHS components and offices on information sharing issues.
Supporting the ISGB and the ISCC, are Shared Mission Communities
(SMCs). SMCs are cross-departmental forums that address barriers and
requirements for information sharing for missions that span multiple
DHS components (e.g. law enforcement).
A major responsibility of this information sharing governance
structure is the identification and resolution of information sharing
requirements--both internal to DHS and between DHS and other
departments and agencies. ISGB actions focus on needed policy changes
and the establishment of Information Sharing and Access Agreements
(ISAAs) to promote and implement information sharing. For information
sharing requirements which require information technology investment
decisions, the process is under development for the ISGB to provide
prioritized input into DHS program, budget, and acquisition decision
processes.
Question. What are the major information sharing gaps currently
identified (and which planning body has made this identification)?
Answer. The Performance Budget Overview ISAA Measure identifies the
percentage of component-to-component relationships documented through
ISAAs. In 2007, DHS Components confirmed that 116 of 166 critical
component-to-component information sharing relationships were
documented with agreements (70 percent). The information sharing
governance structure is currently working with individual DHS
components to develop ISAAs, where needed, to promote better
information sharing.
The SMCs (described above) are currently being established and will
be the focus for identifying information sharing gaps both within DHS
and with external departments and agencies. The Law Enforcement Shared
Mission Community (LE-SMC) is the first SMC to be established. It is
currently working to identify information sharing gaps specific to law
enforcement. Once identified, the LE-SMC will make recommendations to
the ISCC and the ISGB on changes in policy, processes, and/or
information technology required to address these gaps. Other potential
SMCs which have been identified include Critical Infrastructure & Risk,
Intelligence Enterprise, Incident Management, Border Security, and
Transportation. Similar to the LE-SMC, these SMCs will be responsible
for identifying information sharing gaps in their specific mission
areas and make recommendations on any needed changes in policy,
processes, and information technology to the ISCC and ISGB.
Question. How does the proposed National Command and Control
Capability address any identified gaps in these planning documents?
Answer. NCCC Initial Operating Capability (IOC) will provide
classified and unclassified, mobile and fixed communications capability
such as video teleconferencing (VTC) as well as basic information-
sharing tools such as email and phone directories, web browsing, and
access to government portals such as the Homeland Security Information
Network. The National Command and Coordination Capability (NCCC) uses
existing programs to connect the White House, Federal agencies and key
Federal operations centers, and State decision makers. In addition to
Federal locations, the goal is to put the NCCC in 56 Governors'
offices, 56 State Emergency Operations Centers, and key State fusion
centers as part of the IOC.
NCCC IOC will also provide assured secret level and sensitive but
unclassified reliable voice and data in the mobile environment to the
91 principals, the President, and Vice President of the United States.
Question. What will the total cost of the National Command and
Control Capability be when it has achieved its final operational
capability?
Answer. The objective of the National Command and Coordination
Capability (NCCC) Full Operational Capability (FOC) is to improve key
decision makers' crisis-management ability at all levels of government.
The projected 8-year cost estimate (fiscal years 2007-2014), which will
complete Initial Operating Capability (IOC) phase of the project and
establish FOC capabilities is approximately $400 million. However, it
should be noted that other Federal agencies will absorb the cost of
NCCC deployment within their base budgets and that DHS will seek
funding solely for its internal deployment, system operation and
maintenance and deployment to State locations. The FOC goal of
providing better tools and access to information for key decision
makers will be accomplished by collaborating across the various levels
of government to identify existing applications (e.g., Department of
Defense [DOD] crisis management situation awareness tools) that can
augment the IOC capability; and leveraging the Director of National
Intelligence, DOD, and Department of Homeland Security data strategies
to make more information available to all levels of government. Further
definition of FOC will be based on future budget cycles and approved
user requirements.
Question. Cyber security has taken on enhanced importance in view
of the increased threat. According to the unclassified, Annual Report
to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage--
2005, prepared by the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive. Foreign collection efforts have hurt the United States in
several ways. The technology losses have:
--Eroded the U.S. military advantage by enabling foreign militaries
to acquire sophisticated capabilities that might otherwise have
taken years to develop.
--Undercut the U.S. economy by making it possible for foreign firms
to gain a competitive economic edge over U.S. companies.
Meanwhile, DHS defensive efforts appear solely aimed at helping
secure government networks. Also, much of the information regarding the
threat is classified.
Does the Department believe that those responsible for defending
private infrastructure, such as the banking and finance sector, have
all the information they need to appropriately defend themselves
against the cyber threat?
Answer. Security partners responsible for defending critical
infrastructure and key resources (CIKR), including private-sector
owners and operators and government departments and agencies, are
increasingly receiving information on cyber threats and vulnerabilities
to defend their networks more effectively. As part of the National
Cyber Security Division's (NCSD's) collaborative engagement with
private-sector owners and operators, we conduct regular quarterly
meetings with Information Technology Sector security partners to
develop, review, and exchange strategic and tactical intelligence
information and improve processes for sharing information. In addition
to these regular meetings, NCSD conducts ad-hoc meetings with security
partners across the critical infrastructure sectors as needed to share
actionable information.
For example, in late November 2007, the United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) issued both a Critical
Infrastructure Information Notice (CIIN) and a similar Federal
Information Notice (FIN) that alerted industry and Federal partners to
ongoing cyber attacks intended to compromise their systems. These
notices included indicators of cyber threats that, if detected, could
be used to identify and track malicious cyber activity targeting
networks and data. Following the CIIN and FIN release, NCSD coordinated
meetings at both the classified and unclassified levels with multiple
security partners to discuss the threat, including cyber CIKR security
partners through the Cross-Sector Cyber Security Working Group
(CSCSWG). The CSCSWG includes private- and public-sector security
partners with cyber security expertise from each of the 17 CIKR
sectors. The group was established under the Critical Infrastructure
Partnership Advisory Council following development of the Sector
Specific Plans to facilitate further the identification of systemic
cyber risks and mitigation strategies for the Nation's CIKR sectors.
NCSD has had several Federal, State, and private-sector organizations
report that they were able to detect intrusions to their networks based
on the information provided. In January 2008, we also shared a Cyber
Intelligence Note from the Department's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis discussing cyber attacks on control systems overseas.
These two examples highlight the Department's ongoing commitment to
sharing timely and actionable cyber intelligence information with our
security partners. Our efforts have improved information sharing in the
last year, and we need to continue to enhance our capabilities to
provide useful information and to expand our reach to more partners
that manage the security of our networks.
Question. How is that information being shared if it is classified?
Answer. The National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) regularly
conducts meetings with cleared information technology and cross-sector
cyber security partners to share classified information. In addition to
these meetings, we maintain a ``read-file'' of current classified
documents in a secure facility, which cleared security partners can
access and review by scheduling time with NCSD counterparts. The read-
file, which was established in November 2007, currently contains eight
classified documents and 14 ``For Official Use Only'' documents. To
share classified information beyond the Washington, DC, metropolitan
area, we have conducted classified teleconferences and secure video
teleconferences, and we are continually exploring additional
mechanisms. These mechanisms are only effective if appropriate policy
and operational decision makers have the necessary clearances to
receive the information they need to protect their networks. As such,
the Department also sponsors clearances for select sector security
partners under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan Sector
Partnership Framework.
Question. What is the ``end game'' or target environment envisioned
by the completion of the cyber initiative? How are you measuring to
know when you achieve it? What are the interim steps to achieving the
target environment and how will you measure incremental progress?
Answer. It is essential that we take proactive measures to enhance
the security and resiliency of the information technology systems and
networks on which our economy, critical infrastructure, and national
security rely. The global threats to our cyber infrastructure are
increasing through the exploitation of vulnerabilities facilitated by
the widespread availability of tools, techniques, and information.
These threats and activities are growing more sophisticated, more
targeted, and more prevalent.
The Cyber Initiative is a coordinated Federal effort to defend the
Nation's critical networks and systems. The Cyber Initiative, which
calls for programs such as the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC)
initiative and enhancements to the Einstein program, enables strategic,
cross-agency cooperation to engage in activities to improve Federal
Government cyber security. These activities will increase capabilities
to monitor, detect, and address cyber threats, and help to improve
network security, the resilience of critical electronically delivered
government services, and the survivability of the Internet.
First, the reduction of external connections through the TIC
initiative will provide the ability to establish a central oversight
and compliance function. Current data show that Federal networks have
more than 4,000 access points. The central management function that the
TIC initiative provides will benefit Federal systems security by
facilitating the implementation of standardized information security
architectures. In addition, the TIC will improve 24-hour network
monitoring capabilities across the Federal Government and enable faster
and more effective response to cyber incidents.
The TIC will also enable a more efficient rollout of Einstein, an
intrusion detection system, across Federal networks to provide better
situational awareness, earlier identification of malicious activity,
and, overall, a more comprehensive network defense. Einstein is
currently deployed at 15 Federal agencies, including the Department of
Homeland Security, and the United States Computer Emergency Readiness
Team (US-CERT) is in the process of deploying Einstein across all
Federal departments and agencies. In the last year NCSD deployed an
additional 39 Einstein sensors, increasing overall deployment by 243
percent.
The TIC initiative is a multifaceted plan to improve the Federal
Government's security posture by significantly reducing the number of
Federal external connections. Currently, there are several thousand
Federal external connections, which inhibit the Federal Government's
ability to implement standardized security measures effectively. The
TIC initiative aims to reduce and consolidate external connections to
create a more clearly defined ``cyber border.'' Fewer external
connections will enable more efficient management and implementation of
security measures and reduce avenues for malicious attacks. Once fully
implemented, the TIC initiative will facilitate security architecture
standardization for access points across the Federal Government.
Enhancing the Einstein program is another critical element in our
efforts to enhance cyber security across Federal departments and
agencies. Einstein is a collaborative information-sharing program that
was developed by US-CERT in response to increasingly common network
attacks on and disruptions to Federal systems. The program helps
departments and agencies protect their systems and networks more
effectively by reporting information technology security-related
information to the US-CERT. Einstein enhances situational awareness of
attacks across the Federal Government's portion of cyberspace, allowing
US-CERT and cyber security personnel to identify anomalies and respond
to potential problems quickly. With the TIC initiative reducing the
number of external connections, Einstein will be able to more
effectively and efficiently monitor activity across Federal Government
networks.
Einstein reduces the time it takes to gather and share critical
data on computer security risks from an average of 4 to 5 days to an
average of 4 to 5 hours. Rapid notification results in the Federal
Government being able to respond to incidents and mitigate potential
problems more efficiently and effectively. Government-wide deployment
of Einstein will further enhance US-CERT's ability to gain a more
comprehensive view of Federal systems, increasing US-CERT's analytic
capabilities and augmenting the extent and quality of US-CERT's
information-sharing activities. Together with the TIC, broad deployment
of Einstein will increase our ability to address potential threats to
our Federal systems in an expedited and efficient manner.
Government-wide deployment of the TIC and Einstein will enhance
Federal Government cyber security by providing more robust security
monitoring capabilities to facilitate the identification and response
to cyber threats and attacks.
The Department of Homeland Security and its interagency partners
are committed to measuring progress against the Cyber Initiative goals.
The Department has established performance measures to assess the
effectiveness and efficiency of implementation of key Cyber Initiative
activities such as the Trusted Internet Connections initiative and
enhancements to the Einstein Program. The Department measures progress
based on items such as:
--The development of detailed plans for the reduction and
consolidation of Federal external access points, including
Internet access points;
--The reduced number of Federal Internet access points;
--The establishment and maintenance of a consistent set of controls
on Internet access points;
--Increased identification of attacks and malicious activity on
Federal networks;
--Reductions in response time to mitigate potential problems; and
--Percent of planned Einstein sensors deployed annually throughout
the Federal Government.
As the Cyber Initiative continues to evolve, additional metrics
will be developed.
Question. Does DHS's role as the focal point for critical
infrastructure protection, particularly having many cybersecurity-
related roles and responsibilities, such as developing and enhancing
national cyber analysis and warning capabilities, change under the
President's initiative?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) role as the
focal point for critical infrastructure protection does not change
under the Cyber Initiative. The Department aims to protect critical
infrastructure and key resources, essential government operations,
public health and welfare, and the Nation's economic and national
security interests, and the Cyber Initiative aligns with our current
capabilities and programs. The Department is committed to securing
cyberspace by working collaboratively with public, private, academic,
and international entities to enhance awareness and preparedness, as
well as to ensure that the cyber elements of the critical
infrastructure are resilient enough to withstand attacks without
incurring catastrophic damage, responsive enough to recover from
attacks in a timely manner, and resilient enough to sustain nationally
critical operations. The Office of Cybersecurity and Communications
within the Department will continue to fulfill our role as the Sector
Specific Agency (SSA) for the Information Technology (IT) and
Communications sectors, as well as our cross-sector cyber security
responsibilities in collaboration with the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP) Sector Partnership Model, and the Department's
Office of Infrastructure Protection.
The Department's Critical Infrastructure Protection Cyber Security
(CIP CS) Program reduces cyber risk and enhances cyber security under
the NIPP framework as both a cross-sector cyber element that involves
DHS, SSAs, and private-sector owners and operators and as a major
component of the IT Sector's responsibility. Within the cross-sector
cyber security role, CIP CS assists SSAs and other security partners
with improving the cyber security of their respective CIKR cyber
assets. We provide cyber functional expertise, guidance, and
methodologies to sectors to assist them in mitigating cyber risk
(including cyber infrastructure vulnerabilities) and in developing
effective and appropriate protective measures. This support includes:
--Contributing cyber elements to the NIPP;
--Delivering cyber CIP guidance to SSAs and Sector Specific Plan
(SSP) authors to help them enhance the cyber aspects of their
risk management efforts;
--Providing cyber expertise and content to various DHS risk
assessment methodologies (e.g., Risk Analysis and Management
for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) and the Comprehensive
Review Program);
--Meeting with SSAs to inform the development of their 2008 Sector
Annual Reports (SAR) and SSP updates, facilitating their access
to the information and resources needed to effectively fulfill
their requirements, and ensuring that the appropriate cyber
security criteria is addressed across all sectors;
--Developing and piloting a methodology for identifying cyber assets;
and
--Reviewing SSPs and SARs to ensure sectors' CIP efforts address
cyber assets and risks.
Question. What is the purpose and status of the new program
management office related to cybersecurity that has been created under
the NPPD Under Secretary of DHS? What role does the Assistant Secretary
for Cyber Security and Communications have in this effort?
Answer. The cyber program management office is a coordinating body
that helps coordinate across the Department and its interagency
partners to manage the planning, development, and implementation of the
Cyber Initiative.
The Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications has
been and will continue to be engaged in the Cyber Initiative throughout
its duration. The Assistant Secretary has responsibility for the
National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) and NCSD's United States
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). NCSD/US-CERT is deeply
involved with the Trusted Internet Connections initiative and the
Einstein program, two areas that are essential to the success of the
Cyber Initiative. The Assistant Secretary is working to ensure that
those two programs are successfully implemented.
Question. Regarding the cyber initiative, can you elaborate on its
total cost and the number of years it will take to implement? How was
this total cost estimated?
Answer. The Cyber Initiative includes a significant breadth and
depth of investments within more than 20 Federal departments and
agencies. The Cyber Initiative will take several years to reach the
full operating capability outlined in the Cyber Initiative budget and
planning documents and will require sustained investment to maintain a
technological advantage over the Nation's cyber adversaries. This
breadth and depth of investments, combined with the need for continued
investment to keep pace with the evolution of technology, makes it
difficult to calculate the life-cycle cost of the initiative. While the
Cyber Initiative is not a one-time investment, participating agencies
have made a concerted effort to fund the highest cyber security
priority activities within the first several years of the plan. The
fiscal year 2009 DHS budget request includes $197 million for this
effort, and $1.39 billion is estimated in the Department's fiscal year
2009-2013 Future Years Homeland Security Program to augment and enhance
current DHS Cyber Security activities.
The Cyber Initiative budget plans were constructed through broad-
based participation by the many agencies sharing the cyber security
mission space. All levels of the Executive Branch were involved in its
formulation, from operational end users of cyber technologies on the
``front lines'' of the Nation's cyber security effort, to policy,
legal, civil liberties, and privacy officers. Through careful, end-to-
end examination of technologies, systems, processes, and operations,
the Federal cyber security community created a comprehensive plan. To
maintain robust protection of Federal networks, the Federal cyber
security community must keep pace with the evolution of technology by
sustaining its development and deployment through and beyond the Cyber
Initiative.
Question. Why do you propose to move eLORAN to NPPD? What value
will NPPD add to this system?
Answer. Loran-C was used for many years in an ``unofficial''
capacity to disseminate Stratum 1 frequency stability for
telecommunications providers. USCG also operated Loran-C overseas in
support of Department of Defense Cold War operations for this very
purpose--to provide a stable frequency reference for timing.
With the advent of the Global Positioning System (GPS), the
majority of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) users shifted to
the improved capabilities afforded by GPS. New techniques that were
wholly dependent upon the advanced capabilities of GPS began to emerge
in all aspects of transportation and critical infrastructure. GPS
eventually grew into an ``enabling'' critical infrastructure in its own
right.
GPS is easily jammed or interfered; hence, the need for a systemic
complementary backup (eLORAN) to secure the continued operation of our
transportation systems and critical infrastructure in the face of a
loss of GPS PNT services.
With the evolution of LORAN-C to eLORAN, a more appropriate steward
needed to be found. eLORAN provides high navigation accuracy for
maritime and first responders, high signal integrity for aviation non-
precision approach, and precise time and frequency for timing users
across the entire Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources spectrum.
eLORAN will serve as an independent, dissimilar, complement to GPS. It
allows GPS users to retain the security benefits even when satellite
services are disrupted. NPPD has a broad scope of responsibility for
securing the national infrastructure against disruption.
The National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) will
provide the appropriate leadership vision and planning necessary to
ensure the transition from LORAN-C to eLORAN and the development of a
robust eLORAN capability to support the critical infrastructures of the
Nation. NPPD's expertise in telecommunications, cyber security, and
critical infrastructure protection will provide a reliable foundation
as eLOREN evolves.
US-VISIT
US-VISIT--Air Exit
Question. What are the pros and cons of using the Transportation
Security Administration security lines for conducting the ``exit''
function at airports?
Answer. Competing and hybrid alternatives that satisfy the
biometric air exit requirement produce numerous pros and cons depending
on the specifics of the alternative. Some of the pros of using
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security lines and
checkpoints to conduct the exit function at airports include:
--The Government would control data at all times, which may be
perceived by some as providing better security and privacy of
the data.
--The collection point is closer to the gate than pre-secure area
collection solutions and, therefore, makes it more noticeable
if a passenger leaves the airport without actually taking the
flight out of the United States. Airline confirmation that
biometrics have been collected at the gate may provide
flexibility.
--Current technology systems could be used to support singular
builds, reducing the need for airlines to build multiple
individual systems.
--It is a lesser-cost or no-cost solution for the airlines and would
be far less likely to be challenged politically or legally.
Some of the cons of using the Transportation Security
Administration security lines for conducting the exit function at
airports include:
--Checkpoints and airport configurations change frequently. TSA space
is Government-controlled, but the space available is often very
limited and varies by airport.
--There will be a need for additional space in airports and seaports
for Government storage of equipment and back-up procedures.
--TSA may need a n increase in staff to allow for biometric
collection by mobile device or will require additional space,
controls, and some staff to deploy exit by kiosk.
--Airlines would be required to mark each individual's boarding pass
to indicate the need for collecting biometrics, or TSA
screeners would have to become familiar with a large array of
travel documents (which they are not currently required to
understand or necessarily use). Airline identification of US-
VISIT-covered passengers during check-in may provide
flexibility.
OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS
Question. The Department has recognized that nuclear terror, while
improbable, is unique in the scale of its consequences. For this reason
the Department established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and
has proposed for fiscal year 2009 $564 million towards detecting a bomb
before it enters the country. Other Federal agencies have related
detection efforts underway, which account for hundreds of millions of
more dollars each year. Despite many doubts that such efforts would be
successful in detecting a bomb before it could do us harm,
administration is planning for success. However, there seems to be
little preparation should those efforts fail. In fiscal year 2007, $5.5
million was provided to OHA for nuclear event public health assessment
and planning and it appears some of that planning may soon come to
fruition. It was disappointing that no follow-on funding was requested
for fiscal year 2009.
Does the Department believe that the current level of planning to
mitigate the consequences of a nuclear attack is sufficient?
Answer. Yes. DHS is pursuing a very comprehensive approach to
planning for our response to the consequences of a nuclear attack.
However, our understanding of this catastrophic threat is constantly
evolving and the associated approaches and processes to plan for
response to an attack are improving. Therefore, we expect to enhance
and strengthen our planning even more in the coming months and years.
As the Committee has noted, the majority of the Department's
funding for addressing a nuclear attack is directed at the prevention
pillar of the overall homeland security strategy, in accordance with
the administration's priorities. DHS is the lead Federal agency for
coordinating the implementation of all-hazards preparedness in the
United States, and there are number of ongoing planning efforts to
address nuclear incident response and consequence management. In that
role, DHS leads the Federal interagency community in the development
of:
--the National Preparedness Guidelines that help define what it means
to be prepared for all incidents;
--an integrated planning system that includes plans to address
nuclear incidents;
--a National Exercise Program to ensure that exercises at all levels
of government are coordinated and integrated with effective
evaluation and dissemination of lessons learned; and
--a comprehensive program to coordinate Federal preparedness training
to eliminate duplication and address training gaps identified
through exercises and responses to real world incidents.
The Department conducts coordinated planning activities with the
Federal interagency community at the strategic national level as well
as at the operational level, and works with its State, local and
private-sector partners to ensure all parties are aware of their roles
and responsibilities should a major incident strike, including an
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) DHS, through FEMA, has responsibility
for maintaining and updating the National Response Framework (NRF) and
the relevant annexes that outline roles and responsibilities of
departments and agencies associated with responding to these types of
incidents. The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (scheduled for
completion in spring, 2008) is a key element of the Department's
overall planning effort for a nuclear attack.
The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex provides an organized and
integrated capability for a timely, coordinated response by Federal
agencies to incidents involving nuclear or radioactive materials,
including acts of terrorism. The annex describes how Federal agencies
respond to nuclear/radiological incidents. FEMA is responsible for
maintaining and updating the annex and accomplishes this through the
Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC) which
comprises members from approximately 18 Federal departments and
agencies. Annex I to HSPD-8 established a new national planning system
called the Integrated Planning System or IPS that will ultimately
produce a comprehensive suite of incident/scenario-specific plans by
DHS that are strategic, operational, and tactical. Full implementation
of IPS may ultimately alter or restructure the NRF's existing Incident
Annexes and CIS and other relevant planning, operational and strategic
documents. However, until HSDP-8 Annex I is fully evolved, the Nuclear/
Radiological and Catastrophic Incident Annexes and other relevant
documents utilized in response to a nuclear device or event are in full
effect.
In addition, the Office of Operations Coordination (OPS) is
responsible for coordinating Department-wide incident management
activities. The Secretary's Crisis Action Team (CAT) is responsible for
conducting national-level crisis action planning and strategic
operations coordination, maintaining and communicating national-level
situational awareness, and providing decision support for the Secretary
and Director of OPS. In association with this responsibility, the
Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT) is developing a nuclear
incident response concept plan based on National Planning Scenario #1
(nuclear attack). Also, the DHS Office of Health Affairs is gathering
data and performing analyses on likely health impacts resulting from a
nuclear attack to inform the development of medical response plans.
Finally, DHS has been a key member of the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy-led Nuclear Defense Research and
Development (NDRD) Subcommittee. The NDRD Subcommittee has developed a
roadmap establishing the high level objectives for response to a
nuclear attack and identified the critical needs in nuclear/
radiological preparedness, response and recovery research and
development (report to be released soon). DHS believes that these R&D
Roadmaps plot an aggressive path forward for science to support
incident response planning and consequence management and thus to
support the operational needs to respond to a nuclear attack.
Question. How does the Department balance its request for funding
for detection efforts with mitigation efforts?
Answer. This is a very complex question in several ways. The first
is the degree to which DHS has responsibility for the solution.
Detecting and interdicting radiological or nuclear material at an
official Port of Entry (POE) or in transit within the United States is
a mission that is accomplished almost solely by DHS. This
responsibility is clearly articulated in the SAFE Port Act of 2006, as
well as in HSPD-14/NSPD-43 that established the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO). In contrast, DHS' responsibilities with
respect to nuclear emergency incident response and long term recovery
are shared with other Federal, State, and local governments and the
private sector according to the National Response Framework. Therefore,
it is important to assess the funding requests across the various
Departments and Agencies to understand how funding is directed for this
effort. For instance, the development and provision of medical
countermeasures and mass casualty care is the purview of the Department
of Health and Human Services. Similarly, decontamination and clean-up
expertise lies largely within in the Environmental Protection Agency.
The next is the question of the exclusive use of a specific
capability. The actual deployment and use of nuclear detection
capabilities managed by DNDO is focused on pre-detonation
implementation (with the exception of their nuclear forensics studies).
However, the advances that DNDO is making may be leveraged to develop
the detection technologies that will be critical for assessing the
post-detonation environment.
Finally, even though a large scale nuclear attack certainly
requires some unique response and recovery tools, the Nation will
leverage many of the same capabilities developed and deployed to
address other large scale catastrophes. The resources that have been
afforded to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would be
utilized to their fullest. So all of the resources applied to creating
a robust National Response Framework, including supplying required
resources and assets defined in the targeted capabilities list must
also be factored into the equation.
The balance is difficult, and the Department has indeed focused on
prevention at this early stage because of the catastrophic risk
associated with a radiological or nuclear attack. As our planning and
prevention systems mature in close coordination with our many partners
in the NRF, we expect continued development across all areas:
prevention, protection, response, and recovery.
Question. If it is estimated that detection efforts would have a
50/50 chance of succeeding against nuclear smugglers, wouldn't it seem
that equal funding should go to mitigating the possible consequences?
Answer. The administration and the Secretary has assessed that, in
the circumstances surrounding a nuclear attack, the greatest degree of
risk reduction can be obtained by preventing the attack. Therefore, the
funding requests associated with nuclear defense are heavily
concentrated on reducing this risk through a variety of activities
including, nonproliferation, detection, and interdiction activities.
The intent of the resulting activities is build a comprehensive layered
defense that combats the threat of nuclear terrorism. The defense calls
for:
--expanded intelligence efforts, so we can get a better picture of
the capabilities and intentions of terrorist groups seeking
nuclear or radiological weapons and the information we need to
disrupt those efforts;
--focused interdiction, to deny terrorists access to the nuclear
material, expertise, or other capabilities they seek by
disrupting their efforts to acquire them;
--declaratory policy to put the terrorists and those who might
support them on notice of how we will respond if attacked and
to deter those who might be tempted to transfer or facilitate
the transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists;
--expanded efforts to prevent nuclear material or nuclear weapons
from being moved into U.S. territory;
--strengthened nuclear forensics capabilities, so if the worst should
happen, and a nuclear attack should occur on U.S. soil, we
would be able to identify those responsible quickly and
accurately;
--robust, effective response and recovery plans, so that again, if
the worst should happen, we would be able to respond quickly to
minimize casualties and help impacted communities rebuild.
In addition, many of the capabilities required to respond to a
nuclear event are operational rather than technological. As noted above
in question 191, funding for operational and communications is
accomplished through both general capacity building for any major
catastrophic event as well as for more the more specific national
planning scenarios, such as Planning Scenario 1, which represents a
10kt nuclear incident. As our planning and prevention systems mature in
close coordination with our many partners in the NRF, we expect
continued development across all our efforts to prevent, protect
against, respond to and recover from a nuclear attack.
Question. What is the timeline for spending the $5.5 million
provided in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental?
Answer. The timeline for spending the $5.5 million provided in the
fiscal year 2007 Supplemental is as follows:
The Nuclear Event Assessment Supplemental Spend plan was submitted
to Congress on 10/22/2007. As such, funding became available for
obligation on 10/22/2007.
Following inter-Departmental coordination with the DHS CFO and
coordination with OMB, funds were loaded in the financial management
system and became available for execution on 12/19/2007.
--DHS executed a contract with the National Academy of Sciences on
12/21/2007 for the amount of $500,000 to convene an ad hoc
committee with experts in emergency medical response and
treatment, medical and public health preparedness, health
sciences research, and nuclear medicine to organize a workshop
and prepare a summary on the medical preparedness for a nuclear
event. The workshop will feature presentations and discussions
that assess the overall emergency response activities, and
available healthcare capacity (including shelter, evacuation,
decontamination, and medical infrastructure interdependencies)
to treat the affected population; treatments available for
pertinent radiation illnesses; efficacy of medical
countermeasures; the likely capability of the Federal, State
and local authorities to deliver emergence response activities
in a timely enough way to be effective; and the overall
expected benefit of available countermeasures and those in the
development pipeline.
--OHA executed an IAA for the amount of $4.480 million with S&T on
02/28/2008 to provide services under this IAA encompass the
following tasks:
--National Laboratory Science and Technical Activities-DHS Science
& Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) will provide modeling
updates of a 0.1, 1.0 and 10 kiloton nuclear explosion on
each Tier One Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) city
(six cities). DHS S&T will meet the milestones and
deliverable table to assist in integrating all efforts with
the Homeland Security Institute and any other performers
for this effort.
--Federal Response Plan Analysis--Analyze existing Federal nuclear
response planning doctrine, policy and content; assess
interagency assets; and initiate facilitation and
interagency coordination required to develop an appropriate
national strategy to prepare for and respond to a nuclear
detonation in a U.S. city. As part of this activity, HSI
will reach out to other Federal Departments and Agencies
who have done research and analysis in this area. When
necessary, OHA will facilitate contacts with other Federal
entities.
--Responder and Citizen Action Recommendations--Outreach to both
first responders and Tier One City public affairs and
leadership to identify their respective health preparedness
and communication issues from a nuclear detonation,
utilizing technical and scientific analyses and guidance to
be provided by the National Laboratories. Stakeholder
workshops--at least 2--will be utilized to obtain input.
--Public Communications Strategy--Develop a public communications
strategy and messaging for response to a nuclear
detonation. All of the technical data generated in A, B,
and C above will be utilized to develop requirements,
messages, and strategies for communicating with the public.
--As requested by the sponsor, provide subject matter expertise--
primarily Federal response plan analysis acquired during
Task A and Tier One health preparedness and communication
issues--to Office of Health Affairs and the Department of
Energy Laboratories. In addition, similar subject matter
expertise will be provided upon request of the sponsor to
assist with the development of the nuclear public
communications strategy.
--Assess, recommend and facilitate program development and
implementation activities--As requested by the sponsor,
provide research and analysis related to nuclear event
planning and response activities. Specific topics to be
identified by the sponsor as required.
--Establish liaison and contacts with regional and other State,
local and tribal entities--As requested by the sponsor,
expand stakeholder activities to include regional, State,
local and tribal entities.
--DHS executed a contract with the Spry Methods Inc. (8a Small
Business set-aside procurement) for the amount of $178,000
on 01/31/2008 to provide financial support services for the
execution of funds related to the Spend Plan for Nuclear
Event Public Health Assessment and Planning. Services
include: (1) financial management systems analysis (2)
financial accountability to include the development, input,
and tracking of General Ledger accounting data; and
optionally, (2) budget formulation support, including but
not limited to: development of out-year budget forecasts,
as necessary to all programs/offices within the OHA.
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Question. Host Community Guidance. Senate Report 110-84 directs
FEMA to issue guidance to assist communities in planning to shelter and
provide for the critical needs of evacuees of disaster areas. What is
the status of this guidance? What measures has FEMA taken to work with
State and local communities in the development of this guidance? How
specifically are the needs of potential host communities accounted for
in the distribution of State and Local Programs funding?
Answer. FEMA is implementing the Mass Evacuee Support Planning
initiative, which focuses on developing strategies and guidelines for
support of displaced disaster victims through development of planning
guidance and a Host-State Evacuee Support Plan template. These planning
efforts will enhance operational effectiveness to provide recovery
assistance to individuals and households, as well as public assistance
to State and local governments in the event of an extraordinary or
catastrophic disaster. Additionally, FEMA has conducted several
catastrophic planning projects which address evacuation, shelter, and
host community issues. The results of these efforts are aiding in the
development of full planning guides. FEMA will be releasing within 45
days guidance on both the development of emergency operations plans and
on planning for special needs populations. Additional guides will
follow which address other aspects of the evacuation, shelter, and host
community planning requirements.
To ensure the guidance and template prepared under the Mass Evacuee
Support Planning initiative mentioned above realistically address State
concerns and operational perspectives, the Host-State template will be
created and refined from host-State evacuee support plans developed in
select States. The Host-State evacuee support plans are developed
through workshops that employ catastrophic scenarios and consequence
estimates which drive discussion and planning, and ultimately the
creation of functional, integrated evacuee support plans. The States
which are participating in development of initial model plans include:
Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee, and Oklahoma--all of these States
provided significant evacuee support following Hurricane Katrina. Two
States have held Evacuee Support Planning Workshops: Georgia, Aug 1-3,
2007; and Arkansas, Sept 11-13, 2007 (held in conjunction with the New
Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic Planning Workshop). Tennessee's
workshop is being held the week of March 17, 2008.
FEMA's State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Areas
Security Initiative (UASI) programs (subcomponents of the overarching
Homeland Security Grant Program) have historically been very broad and
far-reaching for which responder communities may choose to focus their
homeland security investment efforts. Grantees are allowed to spend
funds (in accordance with the program guidance) towards planning,
organization, equipment, training, and exercise activities. An
allowable focus area within these categories does include mass care,
which incorporates both sheltering and the provision of critical needs
for evacuees. In addition, one of the priorities of the Homeland
Security Grant Program, as stated in the fiscal year 2008 HSGP grant
guidance is to address the need to strengthen preparedness planning and
to fix short comings in existing plans, including ``mass evacuation and
shelter with particular emphasis on special needs populations and
citizen preparedness.'' For both SHSP and UASI, States are required to
ensure that at least 80 percent of funds received are distributed to
local units of government, thereby ensuring that the majority of funds
will directly benefit those local first responder communities.
Additionally, the Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG)
specifically identifies supporting States' efforts to address
evacuation planning, which includes alert/warning, crisis
communications, mass care, and sheltering.
Regional Office Interoperability Personnel
Question. In accordance with the fiscal year 2008 Homeland Security
Appropriations Act--Joint Explanatory Statement: please describe the
personnel in each FEMA Regional Office who have an understanding of the
technical and administrative issues surrounding interoperability. How
are these personnel facilitating regional interoperability?
Answer. As part of its responsibilities to support national
emergency response communications operations and assist Federal, State,
tribal, and local governments achieve communications interoperability,
DHS has established nation-wide emergency communications objectives.
Furthermore, the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006
(PKEMRA) required DHS to establish an Office of Emergency
Communications (OEC) and further assigned responsibilities for various
aspects of emergency communications to both FEMA and OEC. More
specifically, FEMA is responsible for conducting a Disaster Emergency
Communications (DEC) State Planning Initiative to better integrate
Federal communications response and recovery support to State and local
governments. This Initiative is producing individual Disaster Emergency
Communications State Annexes aligned to each of the corresponding FEMA
Regional Emergency Communications Plans. In developing these
communications Annexes, the focus is on four planning areas:
--communications risk assessment and mitigation planning,
--communications operability and interoperability,
--communications availability, integration and coordination of
Federal resources, and
--pre-positioning of communications resources.
Ultimately, this effort will provide FEMA and Federal responders
with the ability to deliver emergency communications support promptly
and effectively following a request for assistance from an affected
State, and provide greater assurance of effective emergency
communications coordination prior to and immediately following a
disaster event. FEMA and OEC are closely coordinating emergency
communications activities.
At the present time, FEMA has three staff members in the Regions
who possess a full understanding of the technical and administrative
aspects of communications interoperability, operability, risk
assessment, and survivability at the State, regional, and local level
and within the first responder community. Recognizing the importance of
FEMA's responsibility to ensure communications interoperable
capabilities, FEMA Regional staff have assumed additional
responsibilities, to the extent possible, to help meet this
responsibility until additional staff can be hired. This staff has
taken steps to help coordinate State and local communications planning;
coordinate the Regional Emergency Communications Coordination group
activities required in Section 1805 of the Post Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act; coordinate cross-jurisdictional interoperability
and intercommunications planning; identify gaps; assist in
interoperability grant preparation; and support emergency
communications planning for potential Federal responses.
It is critical that FEMA staff who are assigned to work in this
area are knowledgeable about these issues and can effectively
interpret/apply the guidance and provide the support that is needed to
facilitate first responders and their supporting organizations in
achieving effective interoperable/intercommunications capabilities. To
provide even greater focus and expertise, FEMA has added 10 FTE (five
in fiscal year 2007 and five in fiscal year 2008) targeted specifically
to augmenting existing emergency communications interoperability-
related activities and capabilities in the Regions. The five fiscal
year 2007 FTEs were advertised last year but unfortunately, there were
no qualified applicants. The hiring process for all ten FTE is
currently underway and we hope to have all ten positions filled within
the next 6 months. The new staff will greatly enhance FEMA's ability to
support first responders and State and local organizations achieve the
capability to interoperate/intercommunicate. It is important to note,
however, that as the new staff come on board in the Regions and engage
with the first responder community and State and local organizations,
additional interoperability requirements may be identified that will
also need to be addressed.
Preparedness and Mitigation Incentives
Question. Senate Report 110-84 encouraged FEMA to work with
organizations to propose incentives for State and local governments to
focus on mitigation and preparedness through existing programs. How is
FEMA pursuing this effort?
Answer. FEMA's Mitigation mission is to protect lives and prevent
property loss--helping States and communities reduce their
vulnerability before hazards strike. Mitigation is the cornerstone of
emergency management by reducing potential for disaster, destruction
and distress, facilitating effective response, and promoting faster
recovery. One critical challenge FEMA constantly faces is to generate
an understanding and create a commitment to this long-term premise. In
conjunction with its many private and public partners, FEMA Mitigation
educates communities about the risks they face and provides the tools
they need to make sound planning, land-use, and building decisions to
make our communities less vulnerable. FEMA Mitigation continually seeks
to leverage partners through incentives to meet these objectives.
FEMA works to provide incentives to reward those States,
localities, and individuals who are taking initiative to break the
cycle of development, damage, and redevelopment at Federal expense and
instead build their own capability to manage hazards and resources in a
sustainable manner. FEMA's role has generally been not that of
``doing'' the planning and implementation of projects, but one of
fostering the development of State and local capabilities and programs
to reduce risk and costs through incentives.
In many instances, for example, Mitigation's Federal role has been
to (1) provide leadership, through existing laws, executive orders, and
programs to create an effective framework for flood loss reduction
throughout the Nation; (2) provide information, including developing
and/or setting criteria for collection, maintenance, and archiving of
data, including flood maps, (3) provide for flood insurance, and (4)
facilitate, by wielding appropriate incentives and consequences to
encourage individuals, communities, States, and the private sector to
take appropriate actions and decisions to reduce losses.
Two key partners that FEMA's Mitigation Directorate (Mitigation)
works with to both assess program effectiveness and develop incentives
for State and local governments to focus on mitigation are the
Association of State Floodplain Managers (ASFPM) and the National
Emergency Management Association (NEMA).
ASFPM has 6,500 national and chapter members representing local,
State and Federal Government agencies, citizen groups, private
consulting firms, academia, the insurance industry, and lenders. The
ASFPM brings attention to broad policy or programmatic issues that
identified by its members. As key stakeholders in the implementation of
mitigation programs, the ASFPM and its members provide Mitigation with
useful input and feedback on how programs are working or not working at
the State and local community level. Mitigation regularly participates
in ASFPM meetings and conferences, makes presentations regarding
emerging mitigation programs and issues, and regularly attends meetings
of ASFPM's Mitigation Committees.
Some of the ASFPM's contributions have included development and
promotion of the ``No Adverse Impact'' approach to local floodplain
management; pioneering flood hazard mitigation strategies and non-
structural and flood-proofing alternatives; support of a Community
Rating System; promotion and support of multi-objective planning for
floodplains; and advocating the modification of Federal policies that
inhibit floodplain management or encourage unwise decisions by
individuals and government.
FEMA's other key partner, The National Emergency Management
Association (NEMA), is an association dedicated to enhancing public
safety by improving the Nation's ability to prepare for, respond to,
and recover from all emergencies, disasters, and threats to our
Nation's security. The State directors of emergency management are the
core membership of NEMA, along with the State Hazard Mitigation
Officers. Membership categories also exist for key State staff,
homeland security advisors, Federal agencies, nonprofit organizations,
private sector companies, and concerned individuals. NEMA's goals
include providing an information and support network among State
directors of emergency management and interfacing with other national
and regional organizations involved in emergency management and State
government policy. Like the ASFPM, NEMA also provides Mitigation with
valuable input and feedback on program performance at the State and
local community level
Several examples of existing programs that FEMA has worked with
these partners to provide incentives for State and local governments to
focus on mitigation include:
--Our Community Rating System (CRS) also reflects this common sense
approach to incentives--flood insurance rates commensurate with
risk; or in the case of CRS--reduced rates for reduced risk.
The CRS of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was
established by FEMA as an incentive mechanism aimed at
recognizing and encouraging exemplary community floodplain
management that exceeds minimum NFIP standards. Flood insurance
premiums for residents of communities participating in the
Community Rating System are lowered to reflect the reduced
flood risk that is a result of community activities that meet
the three goals of the Community Rating System: reducing flood
losses; facilitating accurate insurance rating; and promoting
the awareness of flood insurance. The 1,088 communities that
participate in the Community Rating System today represent
about 66 percent of all NFIP policyholders nationwide.
Policyholders in Community Rating System communities receive
premium discounts ranging from 5 to 45 percent. (One community
has achieved a rating entitling its policyholders to a 45
percent discount.) The Community Rating System is a good
example of a Mitigation program that offers incentives to
localities for undertaking floodplain management activities. It
has been shown to be effective in encouraging new local
initiatives and maintaining existing ones.
--Flood Insurance.--There are over 20,300 communities across the
Nation protecting their risk reduction efforts and investments
with flood insurance, with over $1 trillion in insured assets,
more than 5 million policyholders, and over $2 billion in
premiums and fees collected annually. The National Flood
Insurance Program's (NFIP) land-use management and building
code foundation helps people and communities recover faster,
while protecting their investments with a financial backstop. A
model of public-private teamwork and flexibility--the NFIP
extends beyond insurance by uniting FEMA's other mitigation
elements into a functional, cohesive strategy. It is estimated
that approximately 3 million buildings have been built in
accordance with these floodplain management regulations and
over $1.2 billion in flood damages are prevented annually
through these regulations.
--The Community Assistance Program-State Support Services Element
(known as CAP) is a cooperative agreement between FEMA and the
States, supported by NFIP funds. Through CAP, FEMA provides
funding to the appropriately designated State agencies charged
with NFIP oversight. These agencies (designated by individual
governors) receive a 75 percent Federal 25 percent State cost-
shared fund to help communities achieve and maintain compliance
with the NFIP. The availability of CAP funds for States
provides incentives to continue to build capability at the
State and local levels.
--Hazard mitigation planning is the process State, local, and tribal
governments use to identify risks and vulnerabilities
associated with natural disasters, and to develop long-term
strategies for protecting people and property in future hazard
events. The process results in a mitigation plan that offers a
strategy for breaking the cycle of disaster damage,
reconstruction, and repeated damage, and a framework for
developing feasible and cost-effective mitigation projects.
Under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-390),
State, local and tribal governments are required to develop a
hazard mitigation plan as a condition for receiving certain
types of non-emergency disaster assistance. For example, local
jurisdictions are required to have a FEMA-approved hazard
mitigation plan in order to receive Pre-Disaster Mitigation
(PDM) or Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) project grant
funding. The availability of grant dollars provides incentives
for States and local jurisdictions to develop hazard mitigation
plans that lead to mitigation project grants. Mitigation
Planning has taken hold, and Hazard Mitigation grant activities
are underway--making communities stronger and saving the Nation
$4 for every dollar spent.
In summary, the most significant national impact will be realized
through millions of individual decisions and actions rather than
through a handful of government decisions and actions. While incentives
do play a significant role for State and local governments to focus on
mitigation, experience indicates that the best local programs take
place where there are strong State programs. The Mitigation experience
of using incentives to build State and local capability and resources
is an effective way to achieve national goals.
Funding Level for United States Fire Administration (USFA)
Question. The fiscal year 2009 budget proposes moving USFA into the
Operations, Management and Administration Appropriation and reduces the
total amount appropriated to USFA by $2.3 million. Please provide a
break down of how $2.3 million in savings is derived?
Answer. FEMA is proposing the realignment of the United States Fire
Administration's separate appropriation into, and as a discrete,
PPAcategory of FEMA's OMA budget for fiscal year 2009. This has several
administrative benefits to both FEMA as a whole and USFA in particular.
First it allows FEMA to more effectively streamline the management and
budget operations of all of FEMA's directorates and offices. It allows
FEMA to better consolidate budget tracking and support activities. It
allows FEMA to better support USFA and the entire Emmitsburg Campus
from an Agency wide perspective. The Administrator is keenly aware of
past concerns that FEMA would remove funding from USFA to achieve other
agency priorities. FEMA has no intention of doing so now or in the
future which is why we wish it to continue as a PPA category. We do
however wish to be able to also invest in the Emmitsburg Campus and the
activities of USFA that are shared jointly with the Emergency
Management Institute on the same facility, such as support for shared
distance learning platforms, student registration systems, campus
maintenance and facility upgrades and to more effectively manage FEMA's
appropriated operating budget.
Measuring capabilities
Question. OMB recently stated, ``Although efforts are underway to
measure the extent to which grant-funded projects improve national
capabilities, no such system exists.'' How does the Department
currently provide the preparedness assessment and evaluation required
by the President in HSPD-8 and by Congress in Section 649 of Subtitle C
of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act? Why has the
Department consistently chosen not to invest in measuring the national
capacity for preparedness and response? How will FEMA ensure this
analytical capability is implemented in fiscal year 2009? Given the
void of this analysis capability how did the Department determine that
our first responders have made such dramatic improvements in homeland
security efforts, that it proposed to cut State and local programs
funding by 48 percent?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made
considerable advancement and investment in measuring the national
capacity for preparedness and response and will continue to refine
these efforts to measure the Nation's preparedness and response
capacity and capabilities. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) consistently invests in the development and implementation of
programs and efforts that offer assessments of emergency preparedness.
Under the coordinated control of DHS and FEMA, these programs measure
the extent to which national preparedness objectives have been achieved
across all jurisdictions and capabilities.
The programmatic realignments required under the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) established a comprehensive
preparedness system, including the requirement for a preparedness
assessment system. The PKEMRA-mandated organizational consolidation of
FEMA and the former DHS Preparedness Directorate brought together a
variety of measurement systems, creating the opportunity to
institutionalize a comprehensive capability for identifying,
consolidating, analyzing, and reporting on preparedness data. These
systems are now under detailed review, and FEMA is working with
Federal, State, and local stakeholders to determine the best aspects of
each to improve and integrate current assessment efforts. These efforts
include:
--Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).--Since
2003, the HSEEP has provided a standardized means of assessing
exercises and improving preparedness nationwide. It is a
capabilities and performance-based exercise program that
provides a standard policy, methodology, and language for
designing, developing, conducting, and evaluating exercises.
HSEEP also provides guidance, training, technology, and direct
support.
--The Corrective Action Program The Corrective Action Program (CAP)
System is a Web-based application that allows Federal, State,
and local emergency response and homeland security officials to
track, implement, and resolve corrective actions following
exercises, policy discussions, and real world incidents. The
DHS National Exercise Program (NEP) has developed the CAP
System as part of a larger effort to systematically translate
NEP outputs including findings, identified problems,
recommendations, lessons learned, and best practices into
meaningful inputs for homeland security plans, programs, and
budgets.
--National Incident Management System (NIMS).--First released in
March of 2005, the NIMS is as an overarching National Priority,
is considered a broad measure of capability. NIM provides a
unified approach to incident management and is the principal
tool used to establish and set standards and credentialing.
Beginning in fiscal year 2007, FEMA began assessing the Federal
Interagency and State and local jurisdictions to determine NIMS
compliance. In fiscal year 2007, all 56 States and territories
and many Federal departments and agencies reported successes in
implementing NIMS within their respective areas of
responsibility. The NIMS doctrine and related guidance
documents provide standard command and management structures as
well as emphasis on preparedness, mutual aid and resource
management. NIMS illustrates the need for cooperation and
coordination among responders from different jurisdictions and
disciplines.
--National Response Framework (NRF).--Thanks to the tireless efforts
of the hundreds of stakeholders from across the Nation, the
National Response Framework (NRF) is now complete and became
effective March 22, 2008. The NRF establishes a comprehensive
all-hazards approach to managing domestic incidents. As with
NIMS, FEMA promotes and regularly assesses compliance with the
NRF and its supporting annexes. The plan incorporates best
practices and procedures from incident management disciplines
and integrates them into a unified structure. It forms the
basis of how the Federal Government coordinates with State,
local and tribal governments and the private sector during
incidents.
--Nationwide Plan Review.--On February 10, 2006, and June 16, 2006,
Phases 1 and 2 of the Nationwide Plan Review were presented to
Congress by DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff. The Nationwide Plan
Review evaluated existing emergency operations plans for States
and urban areas. The Review also recommended Federal Government
actions to improve and coordinate planning. Conducted in all 56
States and territories and 75 urban areas over 6 months, the
Nationwide Plan Review was the most comprehensive assessment of
emergency operations plans to date. Reviewers examined nearly
2,800 emergency operations plans and related documents with
participation from more than 1,000 emergency managers and
homeland security officials.
--State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program (SHSAS).--
In July 2003, the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP)
launched SHSAS to serve as a planning tool for State and local
jurisdictions and to assist ODP and its partners in better
allocating Federal resources for homeland security. The
assessment examined threats, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and
needs related to State and local jurisdiction preparedness for
WMD incidents in light of post-9/11 realities in order to
inform them of the development of State and urban area homeland
security strategies.
--State Preparedness Reports (SPR).--DHS Secretary, Michael Chertoff,
extended the reporting date for States to provide their fiscal
year 2007 State Preparedness reports until March 31, 2008. At
this time, FEMA is collecting and reviewing early submittals on
the States' self-assessments of current, target capability
levels, and the resources (monetary and non-monetary) estimated
to achieve these targets. The SPRs require States to
demonstrate their previous accomplishments in implementing
target capabilities for each of the National Priorities. States
are currently in the process of developing and submitting their
SPRs. When all SPR information is collected, the data set will
inform the assessment of national preparedness.
--Target Capabilities List (TCL).--Released in September 2007, the
TCL provides the basis for assessing preparedness, planning,
measuring operational performance during actual events or
exercises, identifying deficiencies and gaps, and improving
preparedness investment and strategy decisions. The document
guides the implementation of State and local homeland security
strategies by defining the specific capabilities required to
accomplish the four homeland security mission areas of
prevention, protection, response, and recovery.
--Federal Preparedness Report (FPR).--Although incomplete at this
time, the FPR represents an ongoing effort to prepare a
comprehensive assessment of national preparedness at the
Federal, State, and local levels. The report is based on
sections 644, 649, 651 and 652 of the Post Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006 and contains preparedness
assessments and data drawn from sources at all levels of State
government and from across the Federal Interagency.
--Gap Analysis Program (GAP).--In use in fiscal year 2007, the GAP
collects quantifiable data on State, local, and nongovernmental
resources that States and localities plan to use to respond to
major incidents. Gaps are identified based upon projected
requirements for specific scenarios. Once gaps are identified,
all stakeholders work to identify and pursue corrective
actions. GAP data indicates the preparedness of participating
States to execute critical response missions (e.g., evacuation,
debris removal).
--Comprehensive Assessment System (CAS).--Although the CAS is still
in development, it will allow jurisdictions and agencies at all
levels to assess, the implementation of planning, training,
equipment, exercises/evaluations and teams within each Target
Capability. The CAS will integrate the best practices of the
existing preparedness assessments including the NIMS compliance
tool, the Pilot Capabilities Assessment, the GAP program, and a
development assessment known as the National Preparedness
System (NPD). Once successfully integrated, the system will
replace the existing assessments and provide the basis for the
State Preparedness Reports.
--Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP).--FYHSP is an
internal DHS system used to track performance data for major
DHS programs, including those for preparedness and response.
Data is collected to inform regularly reported performance
measures, which are approved and tracked by the White House
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
--Analysis of Federal Requirements (AFR).--This report was conducted
and briefed to FEMA leadership on October 11, 2007. The report
was commissioned internally to ensure that (DHS/FEMA) is being
responsive to the State emergency management and homeland
security agencies preparedness programs needs. This report
includes an inventory and analysis of the State programs and
associated requirements and their impacts on State EM/HS
agencies. Additionally, this report contains recommendations
that will shed unnecessary processes, enhance customer service
and improve the program model.
--Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP) Scorecards.--The
tactical interoperable communications scorecard assesses the
maturity of tactical interoperable communications capabilities
in 75 urban/metropolitan1 areas. These scorecards were
developed by subject matter expert panels that reviewed
documentation on current communications plans, exercises, and a
self-assessment to arrive at consensus findings and
recommendations for each region on how to best improve that
region's communications capabilities. Overall, the scorecard
results show that urban/metropolitan areas have come a long way
in improving their tactical interoperable communications
capabilities.
Since 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has awarded
over $19 billion in grants to strengthen the Nation's preparedness and
response capabilities. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
(PKEMRA) consolidated grant-making efforts and transferred
responsibility for allocating and managing all preparedness related
grants to FEMA in 2006. To better steward these funds, FEMA is
embarking on a Grants Cost-to-Capability initiative to determine the
relative impact of grant programs in terms of capability gains.
The Grants Cost-to-Capability initiative will provide decision
makers with data analyses to:
--Determine the relative value of grant programs;
--Guide the strategic allocation of funds towards new or existing
grant programs; and
--Support policy, budgetary, and investment-related decisions.
This initiative takes a stepwise approach to evaluating capability
gains across the portfolio of grant programs, beginning with
preparedness grants data gathered between 2003 and 2007. Available data
from FEMA grant financial systems will be analyzed to determine the
investment patterns of States and local recipients in support of the
National Preparedness Guidelines. Focusing on the highest investment
areas, FEMA will evaluate the gains achieved in improving the capacity
and capabilities of the recipient communities. In addition, FEMA will
evaluate its programs' effectiveness in shaping the investment
priorities of State and local governments. The resulting analysis will
be used to guide the strategic allocation of funds and investment in
new or existing grant programs.
In parallel with this effort, FEMA will explore the feasibility of
a dynamic model that relates funding, projected capability gains, and
national priorities to support investment decisions at various levels.
Measuring the return on investment and impact on risk of our grant
programs have had is key to our national preparedness. The likelihood
and consequences of terrorist attacks change over time and are
influenced by counterterrorism strategies implemented by DHS and its
partners. This dynamic aspect of terrorism risk poses challenges for
estimation, measurement, and allocation of resources. FEMA's National
Preparedness Directorate is developing a comprehensive assessment
system that capitalizes on and reconciles previous efforts that were
being done both in FEMA and the former Preparedness Directorate to meet
the requirements established in Sec. 648 of PKEMRA. This system will
gauge the impact all preparedness initiatives have on the current state
of preparedness. The Grants Programs Directorate is embarking on a
Grants Cost-to-Capability initiative to determine the relative impact
of grant programs in terms of capability gains.
As DHS continues to move forward and develop measures to capture
the impact of these grant programs, it is important to note that
Congress has appropriated over $23 billion in grants from fiscal year
2002 to fiscal year 2008. When including the President's fiscal year
2009 request, this total exceeds $25 billion.
As a practical matter, and in view of our Nation's current fiscal
challenges, it seems reasonable and constructive to suggest a
moderation in the funding stream. The President's fiscal year 2009
budget request of $2.2 billion for State and local grants contains
detailed justifications reaffirming the value of these grants as
investing in the preparedness of State and local governments to
prevent, prepare for and respond to acts of terrorism, natural and
other man-made disasters. The level of the request should not be viewed
as a weakening of support for State and local grants, but an earnest
desire to discuss how best to meet our shared objectives to ensure the
safety and security of the homeland.
Each State and Territory receives a minimum allocation. The
Department has adopted a risk formula to help determine the final
allocation amounts, with the intended purpose of using limited Federal
funds to ``buy-down'' the areas at greater risk of terrorist attack.
The Department evaluates the potential risk of terrorism faced by a
given area and the impact an attack could have on people, critical
infrastructure, and the economy. The result of that risk analysis is
the key driver in final funding determinations. However, risk is
dynamic, and over time we can expect to see changes in relative risk
ranking as threats change and populations shift. All States and
Territories are also required to submit Investment Justifications
regarding their intended use of funds. These Investments are reviewed
by a panel of peers and recommendations regarding the anticipated
``effectiveness'' of the Investments are also factored into final
allocation amounts.
In fiscal year 2008 and continuing in the fiscal year 2009 budget,
DHS is putting increased emphasis in the homeland security grant
program on planning activities, which supports the pending
implementation of an integrated planning system directed by Annex I to
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8. This effort is
targeted at modernizing planning for increasingly interrelated, complex
challenges. Operational planning will be synchronized with building
prevention, protection, response and recovery capabilities, which
continue as allowable activities in many of our programs. Planning
modernization through an integrated planning system focuses efforts
with our State, local and tribal partners on maximizing the
effectiveness of capabilities either on hand or in the developmental
pipeline.
The President's Budget is consistent with the fiscal year 2008
Budget request, supports PKEMRA requirements, and addresses key
priorities necessary to secure the homeland and address complex,
interrelated challenges.
Technical Assistance Priorities
Question. What is the fiscal year 2008 distribution of Technical
Assistance funding? What priorities did FEMA use to determine how to
award this funding? What are the Technical Assistance priorities for
fiscal year 2009?
Answer. This distribution for fiscal year 2008 Technical Assistance
includes 37 percent for Planning activities, including support for the
Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program; 36 percent for
Prevention/Protection activities, including Fusion Center Process and
Port/Mass Transit Assessments; 15 percent for Equipment-related
technical assistance; 8 percent for Planning Support, Technical
Assistance Request and Tracking system, and administrative costs; and 4
percent to enhance Grant Management Capabilities of grantees.
FEMA considered several drivers to determine how to award the
fiscal year 2008 priorities, including the implementation of Homeland
Security Presidential Directives 5 and 8, the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act, the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant
Program, the Secretary's Goals and Priorities and the National Strategy
for Homeland Security.
The focus of Technical Assistance/Direct Support for fiscal year
2009 will include the following:
--Planning.--Technical Assistance will continue to enhance State and
local planning capabilities through the development of planning
guidance and the conduct of planning workshops. This will
primarily focus on catastrophic events and regional planning.
--Prevention/Protection.--Technical Assistance will continue to work
with all Federal partners on the integration of Fusion into the
State and local apparatus, as well as support for protection
activities as appropriate.
--Mission Area Integration.--Working with State and local officials
to integrate planning and preparedness activities across
prevent, protect, respond and recover mission areas.
NetGuard
Question. What is the status and funding level of the NetGuard
program?
Answer. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law
107-296), Section 224, the Secretary of Homeland Security ``may
establish a national emergency technology guard, to be known as ``NET
Guard'', comprised of local teams of volunteers with expertise in
relevant areas of science and technology, to assist local communities
to respond and recover from attacks on information systems and
communications networks.'' To date, DHS and FEMA have conducted scoping
reviews with stakeholders and potential partners, developed an initial
concept plan, designed a competitive grant process for testing the
concept through local pilots, and identified initial training
requirements. Based on these planning efforts, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) has
submitted notification pursuant to Section 503 of Division E of Public
Law 110-161, the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, to
administer and fund the NET Guard program development and
implementation as part of the Community Preparedness Division's (CPD)
Citizen Corps Program.
The fiscal year 2008 CPD spend plan includes $400,000 for NET
Guard. FEMA's Citizen Corps program will conduct a competitive grant
solicitation to select several local pilots to further validate the NET
Guard concept, test its application in a variety of jurisdictions, and
develop plans that are consistent with the FEMA Citizen Corps'
integrated approach to establishing locally-based affiliated volunteer
teams. Initial training and other tools will be developed during the
pilot phase with flexibility for updates based on the needs identified
through pilot implementation.
It should be noted that current Homeland Security Grant Program
(HSGP) guidance permits use of funds for supporting community
preparedness efforts that could include the NET Guard concept. Starting
in fiscal year 2009, CPD/Citizen Corps would promote the NET Guard
program concept and tools to State and local governments as a program
that may be supported through funding from the Homeland Security Grant
Program.
Wildfire Prevention
Question. In fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 (if available),
how many applications have been submitted and how many awarded to
address wildfire issues through the Assistance to Firefighters Grants
fire prevention program?
Answer. Fiscal year 2008 applications are scheduled to be accepted
in September of 2008. We are supplying, however, data from fiscal year
2007, the awards for which are presently ongoing, and fiscal year 2006.
Please note that these applications and awards are focused on
prevention. The Assistance to Firefighter Grants (also known as the
FIRE Grants) provides support for equipment, training and apparatuses
(e.g., brush trucks) to attack wild fires.
Wildland Mitigation.--FP&S.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Apps submitted Apps awarded
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2006........................ 55 2
Fiscal year 2007........................ 49 ( \1\ )
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fiscal year 2007 FP&S awards are commencing the week of 3/21.
Flood Maps
Question. How many communities are using maps that do not require
re-engineering the map? What is the estimated percentage of communities
that will need maps re-engineered regularly and how often will they
need to be re-engineered? How many maps need re-engineering to be up-
to-date?
Answer. Map Modernization will result in modernized maps for 92
percent of the Nation's population. FEMA anticipates 30 percent of the
Nation's stream miles--covering roughly 40 percent of the population--
will have new, updated, or validated engineering at the completion of
the Map Modernization program. Unmet engineering needs for the
remaining areas have been documented as the maps are brought onto the
GIS platform. FEMA proposes to begin addressing the unmet coastal
engineering needs through the requested fiscal year 2009 budget. (FEMA
tracks these data on percent of population, stream miles, or coastal
miles rather than number of maps or communities because of varying
scales of the maps.) Keep in mind, even new engineering requires
upkeep. FEMA assesses the engineering need on a rolling 5-year cycle
(42 USC 4101(e)). In some instances, especially where there has been no
building development, the existing engineering data may be sufficient.
In other cases, some updates or new engineering will be required.
Further, not dissimilar to the Nation's transportation infrastructure,
the data on the flood hazard maps decay (that is to say that the maps
no longer reflect the actual conditions on the ground) and require on-
going assessment and upkeep. The NFIP assesses maps on a 5-year cycle.
In each assessment cycle, the data shown on the maps that was once
considered sufficient may no longer show the actual conditions on the
ground and require new engineering studies.
Open Disasters
Question. How many disaster declarations, by fiscal year and type
of disaster, are still open? For disasters that happened over 3 years
ago--why are they still open and what is needed to close them?
Answer. Below is a listing of the disaster declarations, by fiscal
year and type of disaster, which are still open as of March 18, 2008. A
disaster remains ``open'' until all grants and financial matters with
regard to the disaster have been resolved and the FEMA-State agreement
is closed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
QTY FY DECLARED PROG TYPE TOTAL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1987.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 1
1987 Total.................. .................... 1
1989.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 1
1989 Total.................. .................... 1
1990.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 2
1990 Total.................. .................... 2
1992.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 9
1992 Total.................. .................... 9
1993.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 4
1993 Total.................. .................... 4
1994.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 6
1994 Total.................. .................... 6
1995.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 5
1995 Total.................. .................... 5
1996........................ DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 9
1996 Total.................. .................... 9
1997.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 15
EM-EMERGENCY........ 1
---------------
1997 Total.................. .................... 16
===============
1998.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 25
EM-EMERGENCY........ 2
---------------
1998 Total.................. .................... 27
===============
1999.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 30
EM-EMERGENCY........ 5
---------------
1999 Total.................. .................... 35
===============
2000.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 30
EM-EMERGENCY........ 2
FS-FIRE SUPPRESSION. 1
---------------
2000 Total.................. .................... 33
===============
2001.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 47
EM-EMERGENCY........ 4
FS-FIRE SUPPRESSION. 3
---------------
2001 Total.................. .................... 54
===============
2002.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 41
EM-EMERGENCY........ 1
FS-FIRE SUPPRESSION. 14
---------------
2002 Total.................. .................... 56
===============
2003.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 60
EM-EMERGENCY........ 11
FM-FIRE MANAGEMENT.. 9
---------------
2003 Total.................. .................... 80
===============
2004.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 63
EM-EMERGENCY........ 6
FM-FIRE MANAGEMENT.. 26
---------------
2004 Total.................. .................... 95
===============
2005.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 45
EM-EMERGENCY........ 51
FM-FIRE MANAGEMENT.. 13
---------------
2005 Total.................. .................... 109
===============
2006.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 53
EM-EMERGENCY........ 3
FM-FIRE MANAGEMENT.. 90
---------------
2006 Total.................. .................... 146
===============
2007.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 68
EM-EMERGENCY........ 11
FM-FIRE MANAGEMENT.. 53
---------------
2007 Total.................. .................... 132
===============
2008.............................. DR-MAJOR DISASTER... 19
EM-EMERGENCY........ 6
FM-FIRE MANAGEMENT.. 22
---------------
2008 Total.................. .................... 47
===============
Grand Total................. .................... 867
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A disaster is considered closed when all projects are approved and
all programmatic decisions are finalized. Programmatic work continues
until all projects are completed. A disaster is considered financially
reconciled when all work has been completed, all accounts reconciled,
and the Governor's authorized representative has requested that the
FEMA-State Agreement be terminated for the disaster. These accounts
include disaster programs, mission assignments, disaster contracts and
grants. It is at this point that the FEMA-State agreement is closed.
Regulations and other unique circumstances for closing out the Public
Assistance and Individual Assistance programs are listed below.
--Public Assistance.--Prior to closure (financial reconciliation) of
a disaster grant, all projects must be completed and all funds
expended. For Public Assistance Grants, closure is governed by
completion of the project rather than the expenditure of funds.
Public Assistance Grants for major civil works such as roads
and bridges, water supply systems, and sewage treatment plants
can take a considerable time to complete. These projects
generally require in-depth design and analysis and may require
extensive Environmental Review. The Environmental Review
process, including public comment periods, can potentially add
years to large civil projects in sensitive areas. After the
competitive bid process, other factors such as a short
construction season in the northern tier States, come into
play. For major civil projects, it is not uncommon for a
project to take 3 years to get to the construction phase.
Public Assistance Grants are considered closed when all program
decisions have been made and all projects are funded. Once a project is
identified and eligibility is established, estimated funding for the
project is obligated. At that point, the project is identified as
Programmatically Closed. There may be various adjustments to the
project scope of work or funding level, but the basic project and
funding level remain constant. Most Public Assistance Grants are
considered Programmatically Closed within 3 years of the declaration.
By regulation, the performance period for Public Assistance grants
can be modified by the State to allow a construction project to take 4
years to complete. Extensions beyond 4 years must be approved by FEMA.
--Individual Assistance.--For Individual Assistance programs in
disasters the programs are typically closed in 21-24 months
after declaration. This timeframe is determined by the 18 month
period of assistance prescribed in the law for Federal
assistance to Individuals and Families and then another 90 days
to reconcile and close out the programs. The timeframe to close
out the program can be longer if the President extends the
period of assistance which is frequently required when direct
housing programs (manufactured home) are implemented in a
disaster. A direct housing program is implemented when there
are no other traditional housing resources available to house
those affected by disasters as the housing stock is being
repaired or rebuilt.
The components of the Individual Assistance programs that take the
longest to reconcile and close out are acquisition contracts for
technical assistance and grant programs that are administered by
another agency such as the U.S. Departments of Labor and Health and
Human Services. The grant programs must first be reconciled by the
administering agency and then reconciled with FEMA to ensure proper
accounting of funds. The acquisition contract task orders need to be
reconciled with the contractor before being closed in the FEMA
accounting systems. It is not unusual for the close out of these
components to take 12-18 months which would put the overall closeout of
the Individual Assistance programs to around 30-36 months from the
disaster declaration.
There are occasional instances when closing out a grant to a State
(Crisis Counseling or Other Needs Assistance) may take a while to
ensure that all items are reconciled but these instances are rare. Most
Individual Assistance programs should be closed out 21-24 months after
the disaster declaration except in periods of catastrophic events when
the Regional resources are engaged in program delivery at the risk of
reduced program closeout activity.
Identifying Emerging Health Issues
Question. What system has FEMA put in place to quickly identify and
address emerging health issues among disaster victims using housing
assistance provided by FEMA?
Answer. The health and safety of the residents of temporary housing
units provided to disaster victims is of paramount importance to FEMA.
Through FEMA's toll free help-line as well as interaction with FEMA
field staff, FEMA responds to the questions, concerns and needs of
those who are receiving disaster assistance from FEMA. FEMA is
committed to responding as expeditiously as possible to concerns raised
by disaster victims. For instance, following the release of the Center
for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) formaldehyde testing
results, FEMA took the following actions to safeguard the health and
well-being of disaster victims:
--Delivered flyers to occupants of FEMA-supplied manufactured housing
units outlining test results and options for relocation, unit
testing, and support services for individuals with health
related questions and concerns;
--Conducted joint FEMA/CDC community workshops in Louisiana and
Mississippi to provide public information on testing results,
relocation options, and respond to health related questions and
concerns;
--Offered free indoor air testing for formaldehyde levels to any
resident of a FEMA-supplied travel trailer or mobile home;
--Established a team to identify and catalog currently available
Federally financed rental resources across the Nation. These
listings are in turn used by caseworkers providing relocation
assistance to manufactured housing occupants.
--Established a toll-free hotline staffed with CDC Specialists to
respond to individuals with health-related concerns; and
--Established a toll-free hotline staffed with FEMA employees to
discuss available housing options and track requests for unit
formaldehyde testing.
Contracts
Question. What contracts does FEMA have in place for known disaster
needs? Are there any contracts FEMA believes it will need to use a
sole-source method of contracting for during disasters? If so, why
would this be necessary?
Answer:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Actual or Target
Acquisition Name Description Awardee Procurement Vehicle Award Award Date
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Integrated Public Alert and PMO and acquisition Booz Allen Hamilton.. Contract............. Awarded............. 13-Apr-07
Warning System (IPAWS) Program support services for the
Services. IPAWS program.
Presidential Integrated Public Support services for the CACI Federal Inc..... Contract; Awarded............. 6-Feb-07
Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) National Continuity Modification to
Support. Program Office in Existing Contract.
preparation for the
fiscal year 2007
Hurricane Season.
Integrated Public Alert and Public outreach initiative URS Group............ Contract............. Awarded............. 6-Apr-07
Warning System (IPAWS) Pilot and conference on IPAWS
Public Education, Conferences and program and emergency
Website. alerting systems.
Mobile Disaster Recovery Center Satellite airtime enables On Call Contract............. Awarded............. 4-May-07
(MDRC) Satellite Airtime MDRC communication and Communications, Inc.
(Service). access to FEMA networks
and communications for
disaster operations.
Interactive Voice Response (IVR) FEMA requires the ability Nortel Government Contract............. Awarded............. 13-Jun-07
Modifications for Disaster to react quickly and Solutions
Specific Professional Services. efficiently to changes in Incorporated.
its Contact Center
environment. This
contract provides
professional services for
the NPSC to develop and
modify IVR applications,
training, and disaster
recovery capabilities.
Disaster Satellite Communications Access rights and time to AT&T Government Mod to FFP Contract.. Awarded............. 28-Dec-07
(Access to Transponder on a KU a Transponder on a KU Solutions.
Band Satellite System for MERS). Band Satellite System. It
was/is used for Mobile
Emergency Response
Support (MERS).
Integrated Public Alert and Additional funding for Cubic Applications Contract; Awarded............. 14-Aug-07
Warning System (IPAWS) Economic Cubic to continue Incorpora- ted. Modification to
Assessment. assessment work and cover Existing Contract.
economic aspects of full
IPAWS deployment.
Uniform Federal Accessibility An IDIQ acquisition to Murillo Modular Group Contract............. Awarded............. 5-Mar-07
Standards (UFAS) Two Bedroom Park purchase disability- LTD.
Model. equipped trailers for
group sites. This action
is complete as 100 such
trailers were purchased.
Housing Inspection Services (HIS). The Nation-wide Housing Alltech, Inc., PaRR.. IDIQ Contract........ Awarded............. 1-Mar-07
Inspection Services
contract provides damage
inspection services in
affected disaster areas
in support of claims for
damaged homes.
Individuals and Households Program Disaster Assistance Mail Bravera Corporation.. Contract............. Awarded............. 1-Oct-06
(IHP) Incoming Mail Processing. Services processes
incoming mail
communications and claims
from disaster victims.
Individual Households Program Disaster Assistance Mail Xerox Corporation.... Contract............. Awarded............. 1-Oct-06
(IHP) Outgoing Mail Processing. Services provides
outgoing mailed Agency
responses to claims.
National Commercial Bus The purpose of this CUSA GCT, LLC........ Modification to Awarded............. 29-Sep-07
Transportation (Evacuation) Phase procurement is to acquire Existing Contract.
I. commercial services for
bus transportation in
response to Presidential-
declared emergencies and
natural disasters within
the United States, its
territories and
possessions.
Uniform Federal Accessibility An IDIQ acquisition to KETA Group........... Contract............. Awarded............. 23-Jan-07
Standards (UFAS) Group and purchase disability-
Exclusive Site Retrofits. equipped trailers for
group sites. This action
is complete as 100 such
trailers were purchased.
Public Assistance (PA) Technical The three (3) contracts FLUOR Enterprises.... Contract; Exercising Awarded............. 1-Jun-07
Assistance Contract (TAC) II 2nd for the 2006 PA TACs were ERPMC Inc............ Option.
Year Readiness. awarded for a period of 5 NISTAC-D.............
years. M&A activities
prepare the TACs to
support FEMA, meeting the
Agency's objectives of
providing Public
Assistance in a timely,
efficient, effective and
consistent manner.
Web Caching, Site Accelerator, This is a contract for a Akamai Technologies, Contract............. Awarded............. 16-May-07
Load Balancing, Secure Tunnel-- service that allows for Inc..
Long Term. surge in users accessing
the fema.gov site or any
related web site during a
disaster. FEMA can also
use the service when FEMA
has large numbers of
users taking web-based
training. The service
allows for large surges
in users, which are
common to FEMA. The
service also provides an
additional layer of
security when disaster
victims apply for
assistance over the
Internet.
Cyber Security.................... Task orders to existing Verizon Federal Inc.. Contract; Task Order Awarded............. 29-Jan-07
contract. Fiscal year to Existing Contract.
2008 procurement #420.
Hotel Authorization (Intake This existing contract Corporate Lodging Contract; Exercising Awarded............. 23-Jul-07
Management). allows FEMA to use the Consultants Inc. Option.
services of Corporate
Lodging Consultants to
manage the placement of
disaster victims into
hotels in the event of
mass evacuations. Fiscal
Requirements: fiscal year
2007 $1.49 million,
fiscal year 2008 $1.49
million, fiscal year 2009
$1.49 million.
Regional Commercial Ambulance Gulf/ Provide ambulance services American Medical Contract............. Awarded............. 1-Aug-07
East Coast States. to support disaster Response Inc.
requirements in the Gulf
Coast region (Zone 1) and
Atlantic (Zone 2).
Readiness and Surge Staffing...... This contract includes Alutiiq Global Contract; Exercising Awarded............. 27-Jul-07
logistics support to FEMA Solutions, LLC. Option.
in the form of CDL
drivers, Total Asset
Visibility asset tracking
specialists, and Mobile
Emergency Response
Support (MERS)
specialists, as well as
pharmacy technicians
supporting the National
Disaster Medical System
(NDMS) until fiscal year
2008 via a FEMA/NDMS IAA
as well as other
personnel located at FEMA
headquarters, Berryville,
Virginia and Logistics
Centers in Frederick,
Maryland and Atlanta,
Georgia.
Total Asset Visibility (TAV), This acquisition includes ..................... Blanket Purchase Awarded............. 25-May-07
Phase 1a and 1b. Operations and Agreement.
Maintenance (O&M),
training and provisions
for surge support
personnel. Phase 1b
acquisition is for
software to enable order
visibility to all Regions
and performance
(reporting) capabilities.
Support e-Tasker and
Intelligent Road/Rail
Information Server
(IRRIS) programs.
Rail Transportation Support to This action provides rail National Railroad Contract............. Awarded............. 17-Jul-07
Evacuation. service to support a NOLA Passenger
evacuation for the 2007 Corporation (Amtrak).
Hurricane Season.
Warehousing, Shipping and The scope of this contract Metro Mail Services.. Contract; Exercising Awarded............. 26-Jul-07
Receiving of Mail Equipment and includes the storage, Option.
Meters. shipping, and maintenance
of mail equipment in
support of disaster
operations. This
equipment includes mail
meters, scales, and
supplies to support the
equipment. The warehouse
is located in Jessup,
Maryland.
Telecommunication Services........ Facilities................ Verizon Federal Inc.. Contract; Task Order Awarded............. 20-Aug-07
Equipment, supplies and to Existing Contract.
services
Systems engineering
Network security support
services
Alabama Warehouse................. GSA Lease procurement of a ..................... Contract............. Awarded............. TBD
large warehouse facility
to preposition and store
logistical supplies in
preparation for potential
future Gulf Coast
Disasters. GSA building
lease is under FEMA
control but needs utility/
infrastructure upgrades.
Switch On Wheels (SOWs) and Mobile Acquisition to obtain FIVE RIVERS LLC...... Contract............. Awarded............. 27-Sep-07
Radio Station, per Executive support for deployable
Order 13407. cellular assets
including: engineering,
maintenance, and deployed
support as well as
provide a mobile radio
station.
Individual Identity Verification This is a service used to CHOICEPOINT, INC..... FFP Contract......... Awarded............. 28-Sep-07
Service. verify and authenticate
the identity of personnel
applying for disaster
assistance to prevent
duplicate or fraudulent
applications for
assistance. Verification
determines that the
person exists.
Authentication determines
that the person applying
for assistance is who he
or she says he is, and is
not using a stolen
identity.
Base Camp Support--Large (300- The scope includes Rapid Deployment, Contract............. Awarded............. 28-Sep-07
2,000 beds). providing two base camps, Deployed Resources,
large and small, to Disaster Management
support services for Group, Brookstone.
responders inclusive of
mobilization, site
preparation,
installation, base camp
management and operation,
and demobilization as set
forth in task orders.
Contractor services
include: base camp
design, site preparation,
installation and
maintenance of all
contractor provided
equipment, and all
services necessary to
effectively and
efficiently manage and
operate the base camp.
Disaster Operations Warm Cell..... This is a budget (not VARIOUS.............. VARIOUS.............. Awarded............. VARIOUS
necessarily a single
acquisition) that
includes a variety of
expenses and procurement,
but primarily covers the
costs associated with
maintaining ad-hoc
assembly and network of
experts/specialists
organized to manage and
prepare for emergency
operations. The Warm Cell
is also responsible for
preparing and
implementing IAAs with
other government agencies.
JFO Web EOC....................... Services to build a web- ALL POINTS LOGISTICS Contract............. Awarded............. 26-Sep-07
based interface to WebEOC INC.
(Emergency Operations
Center), a commercial
incident information
management software that
enables personnel from
multiple agencies at
State, local and Federal
levels to interact and
share information. The
system is compliant with
the ICS and NIMS
protocols.
Geographic Information System This is the services of a NEW LIGHT Contract............. Awarded............. 29-Sep-07
Support to Joint Field Offices. contractor to maintain TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
and repair Geographic
Information System (GIS)
kits for deployment to
joint field offices
during disasters. The
contractor may also
deploy when disasters
occur and train field
personnel on the use of
the GIS services.
Implementation of Disaster Relief This project will support IBM GLOBAL BUSINESS Blanket Purchase Awarded............. 23-Aug-07
Fund Assessment Recommendations. development and SERVICES. Agreement.
validation of a standard,
nationally applicable and
non-proprietary cost
estimation model for
making quantitative
assessments of the
potential economic and
social losses from
catastrophic hurricane
damage and potentially
other hazards.
Private Sector Call Center Contractor support to ICF INCORPORATED..... Contract............. Awarded............. 27-Sep-07
Assessment (RDT) for all NPSCs.. conduct a comprehensive
assessment that analyzes
FEMAs current operations
and surge response
capabilities with respect
to registration intake
and explores innovative,
efficient and cost
effective alternative
methods to respond to
surge RI requirements.
Staffing Support and Services for Facility and grounds TMI Management Contract............. Awarded............. 27-Sep-07
Emergency Housing (EH) Program. maintenance and repair Systems, Inc.
staffing support and
services for the
Cumberland, MD emergency
housing (EH) program. TMI
is the current contractor.
IA-TAC II......................... Housing operations support Shaw Environmental, Contract; Task Order Awarded............. 8-Aug-06
Site assessments for Inc; Fluor to Existing Contract.
temporary housing Corporation; Path
placement. LLC Post, Buckley,
Install, deactivate, and Schuh & Jernigan;
remove housing. Bechtel National,
Temporary housing for Inc.; CH2M Hill.
disaster workers and/or
applicants.
Maintenance of temporary
housing.
Web Surge Processing and Helpdesk This is a contract for ELECTRONIC DATA Contract............. Awarded............. 14-Sep-07
IT Support. managed services to host SYSTEMS CORPORATION.
the information
technology equipment and
software that allows
disaster victims to
register for assistance
online. The service
allows FEMA to accept
applications from a
larger number of users
than could be
accomplished with
equipment and software
housed at FEMA alone. The
service also allows for
uninterrupted capability,
should the FEMA site
become non-operational.
The contract also
provides help desk
service for applicants
regarding the mechanics
of registration over the
Internet.
Registration Capability at The new Housing COMPUTER WORLD ..................... Awarded............. 21-Sep-07
Shelters. Inspections Services SERVICES CORP.
(HIS) contracts require
remote registration
intake capability at
shelters and other free
standing locations. This
procurement will add
3,000 laptop computers to
the contract inspection
firm's computer inventory
to perform this task.
Fiscal Requirements:
fiscal year 2007 $2.25
million, fiscal year 2008
$.675 million, fiscal
year 2009 $.675 million.
Systems Engineering and Technical Services of Booz Allen Hamilton.. Contract; Task Order Awarded............. 26-Mar-07
Assistance (SETA) Communications telecommunications to Existing Contract.
Planning. engineers and planners
who support FEMA
personnel in working with
State emergency
operations personnel to
develop plans for
telecommunications plans
during a disaster.
Bulletin News, Media Monitoring... The services monitor media Bulletin News Contract; Exercising Awarded............. 30-Mar-07
reports pertaining to the Network, Inc. Option.
Agency and emergency
incidents.
Remedial Action Management Program Contractor to provide day- Creative Computing Contract............. Awarded............. 28-Jun-07
(RAMP). to-day program management Solutions.
and web-based application
support for the Remedial
Action Management Program
(RAMP). RAMP is an
internal program (process
and web application)
that: a) facilitates the
identification, vetting,
and remediation of issues
identified during
disaster operations and
operational training
exercises, and b) allows
for the communication of
smart practices and
lessons learned
throughout the
organization.
Integrated Financial Management Hands-on system operations ..................... Contract; Task Order Awarded............. 29-Jan-07
System (IFMIS) Software by systems administrators. to Existing Contract.
Management.
Intelligent Road/Rail Information Services to develop and Gannett Fleming FFP Contract......... Awarded............. 15-Jun-07
System (IRRIS), Access Web-Based provide detailed, timely, Incorporated.
Geographic Information System. and relevant information
about road conditions,
construction, incidents
and weather that might
interfere with the
movement of people and
goods between storage
depots and strategic
points for disaster
relief.
PRISM Implementation Project Services contract to International Contract............. Awarded............. 17-Oct-07
Management Support Services. support PRISM contract Business Machines
writing system replaces Corporation.
the existing contract
system to improve
processing and control of
GCR acquisition
operations.
PRISM Implementation--Product/ The PRISM contract writing International Contract; Exercising Awarded............. 13-Mar-07
Application Implementation and system replaces the Business Machines Option.
User Costs. existing contract system Corporation.
to improve processing and
control of GCR
acquisition operations.
Web Automated Deployment Database This is the web-enabling GOVWORKS/U.S. DEPT OF Contract............. Awarded............. 16-May-07
Applications Development. of the Automated INTERIOR.
Deployment Database, used
to roster and track all
FEMA employees for
disaster deployments.
Wireless Telephone................ Provide wireless telephone Verizon Federal Inc.. Contract; Task Order Awarded............. 13-Jul-07
services to emergency to Existing Contract.
responders. Task orders
to existing contract.
Fiscal year 2008
procurement #422.
Strategic Positioning Analysis.... The Logistics Strategic ..................... Contract; Exercising Awarded............. 7-Sep-07
Positioning and Analysis Option.
study evaluates and
assesses current
warehousing and makes
recommendations for the
Agency to strategically
position equipment and
facilities to improve
disaster response in the
future.
Web-Services Development.......... The grants management REI SYSTEMS INC; Contract............. Awarded............. 6/29/2007,
function for the National NET.AMERICA 9/18/2007,
Emergency Management CORPORATION; 2/12/2004
Information System GOVWORKS (DOI).
(NEMIS) is being replaced
by the Emergency
Management Mission
Integrated Environment
(EMMIE). Funding is
needed for PA to
contribute to the IT
contract vehicle that
will move the program
from NEMIS to EMMIE.
Fiscal Requirements:
Fiscal year 2007 $5.71
million, fiscal year 2008
$1.96 million.
GIS Web Interface Development..... Services to produce an MICHAEL BAKER JR INC. Task Order........... Awarded............. 17-Sep-07
internet mapping system
and web interface for
geographic visualization
of shelter data for the
National Shelter system.
Logistics Management The purpose of this International Blanket Purchase Awarded............. 28-Sep-07
Transformation Initiative procurement is to obtain Business Machines Agreement.
Assessment. expert consulting Corporation.
services that will assist
the FEMA Logistics
Directorate's efforts in
providing support to our
Nation. The services
required include the
establishment of a
Logistics Program
Management Organization
(PMO) and the
reengineering of the FEMA
Logistics Directorate's
supply chain by
establishing a Third
Party Logistics (3PL)
Supply Chain Organization.
GAP Analysis (Planners)........... .......................... GSA IT Solutions..... Interagency Agreement Awarded............. 28-Dec-06
Upgrades for IA at NPSCs to This initiative is to CACI INC FEDERAL..... ..................... Awarded............. 20-Sep-07
Increase Capability. upgrade the network
architecture used to
support IA applications
such as registration,
direct housing (mobile
home) missions, helpline
and processing
operations. The upgrades
are required to meet the
service level expected by
IA, which requires the
system to support 12,000
registrars and helpline
workers, and 5,000 case
processors at the same
time. Fiscal
Requirements: fiscal year
2007 $2.93 million,
fiscal year 2008 $5.3
million, fiscal year 2009
$.88 million.
IA Program Upgrades............... This initiative is General Services Blanket Purchase Awarded............. 5-Sep-07
intended to double the Administration IT Agreement.
available staff of Solutions.
Individual Assistance
(IA) developers for the
National Emergency
Management Information
System (NEMIS), FEMA's
system of record for
registrations and
applicant processing.
Doubling the staff is an
IA priority due to the
significant NEMIS changes
that are required to
support GovBenefits, post
Katrina legislation, and
other critical upgrades
to NEMIS in order to
support catastrophic
disasters. Fiscal
Requirements: fiscal year
2007 $2.7 million, fiscal
year 2008 $2.7million,
fiscal year 2009 $2.7
million.
Hosting for Environment for Mass Support the facility and To be completed in ..................... Target.............. Fiscal year 2008
Care. service to host these fiscal year 2008.
publicly used systems.
Fiscal Requirements:
fiscal year 2007 $2.54
million, fiscal year 2008
$2.77 million, fiscal
year 2009 $3.13 million.
Portals for Disaster Housing...... Funding is needed to make To be completed in ..................... Target.............. Fiscal year 2008
NEFRLS, NSS, and the fiscal year 2008.
Disaster Housing portal
functional and meet DHS
IT standards. Hardware
and Oracle (software)
licenses need to be
purchased to support
these systems. Fiscal
Requirements: fiscal year
2007 $4.64 million,
fiscal year 2008 $.63
million, fiscal year 2009
$.691 million.
Mobile Disaster Recovery Centers Post Katrina, the MDRC/ ON CALL Contract............. Awarded............. 7-Aug-07
(MDRC) Support (Phase II) and MRIC program was COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Mobile Registration Intake initiated and FEMA now
Centers Upgrades. has 60 RV units that have
been modified to provide
an office environment for
a mobile disaster
recovery center and/or
can easily be tasked as
needed for use as a
mobile registration
intake center.
Driver Support and Fleet This contract supports the To be completed in Contract............. Target.............. Targer Award: TBD
Management Systems. requirement for fiscal year 2008.
additional contract
support drivers over the
next 5 years. DOT will
provide funding.
National Shelter System Provide development To be completed in ..................... Target.............. Target Award: 1-May-
Development. support for the National fiscal year 2008. 08
Sheltering System
database mandated by DHS.
This database is needed
in order to meet the
comprehensive applicant
tracking requirement. The
acquisition represents
the estimated 3 year
service contract required
to develop and support
the new database. Fiscal
Requirements: fiscal year
2007 $.205 million,
fiscal year 2008 $.750,
fiscal year 2009 $.287
million.
National Bus Contract............. .......................... To be completed in ..................... Target.............. Target Award: 1-June-
fiscal year 2008. 08
AMTRAK Contract................... .......................... To be completed in ..................... Target.............. Target Award: 1-June-
fiscal year 2008. 08
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The only known requirement at this time that may need to be sole
source is Ground Support at Airports. Market research is completed and
FEMA continues working with impacted and receiving States to further
identify and define any ground support needs of airports that could be
affected. If it is determined that there is a need for Ground Support
at Airports, FEMA will begin a competitive procurement. Since it is
unlikely that this requirement will be completed by the start of
hurricane season, any need for ground support prior to the completion
of the procurement process may be issued on a sole-source basis.
research and development, training, and services
united states citizenship and immigration services
FBI Name Checks
Question. What value to national security has USCIS determined is
added by the FBI name check process? Has USCIS performed an analysis on
this issue? If so, please share this analysis with the Committee. Do
naturalized citizens have a higher crime rate than natural-born
citizens? What about Green card holders and Green card applicants?
Answer. USCIS relies on the FBI name check as part of a suite of
background security checks. The FBI name check provides USCIS with a
unique source of data that may be pertinent to the decision making
process associated with immigration benefit applications and which is
not necessarily available through other background checks (e.g. IBIS
and FBI fingerprint checks).
USCIS has conducted FBI name checks for many years, including over
5 million checks in the last 3 fiscal years alone (fiscal year 2005-
fiscal year 2007). While no formal report has been prepared, USCIS has
empirical evidence based on the results of millions of name checks, and
the agency also has the benefit of ICE's experience with FBI name
checks conducted on aliens in removal proceedings. USCIS, working
together with ICE and the DHS Office of Screening Coordination,
continues to review USCIS security check screening processes, including
FBI name checks, to ensure that adjudicators have access to relevant
information in a timely manner.
With respect to the crime statistics for naturalized and natural-
born citizens, USCIS respectfully suggests that you contact the
Department of Justice for information relating to crime rates for any
class of individuals.
With respect to the crime statistics for naturalized and natural-
born citizens, USCIS respectfully suggests that you contact the
Department of Justice for information relating to crime rates for any
class of individuals.
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER
Question. Are there are any agencies that are not paying their full
``tab''? If so, which agencies apply to this situation and how much are
they not paying?
Answer. FLETC has a shared funding arrangement with all of its
customers wherein the travel and per diem is funded by the agency while
the basic student is in training and FLETC covers the tuition and
miscellaneous overhead costs for training. The only agency that has a
different funding arrangement is the Capitol Police. In the
appropriation language for the Capitol Police it States, `` . . . That,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the cost of basic training
for the Capitol Police at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
for fiscal year 2008 shall be paid by the Secretary of Homeland
Security from funds available to the Department of Homeland Security.''
Based on this language the FLETC also covers the per diem cost for all
Capitol Police basic students while they are in training at the Glynco,
GA center. The following is the funding history for the Capitol Police:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Tuition Misc. Meals Lodging Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002............................ $330,928 $207,864 $150,253 $156,280 $845,325
2003............................ 625,906 329,235 248,327 231,009 1,434,477
2004............................ 176,715 165,453 124,785 342,822 809,775
2005............................ 128,771 135,700 83,548 83,602 431,621
2006............................ 44,819 103,232 57,365 102,055 307,471
2007............................ 139,552 229,304 126819 253,926 749,601
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Question. Given the current concerns about cyber security, it is
interesting that no additional resources for this recognized threat
have been requested within S&T.
Which Federal agency is the lead research agency for the cyber
security threat?
Answer. While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the
overall lead for cyber security, cyber security research and
development (R&D) remains an interagency effort. There are many
agencies with difference expertise across the Federal Government (e.g.,
National Science Foundation, Department of Defense, Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Activity, Department of Energy, National
Institute of Standards and Technology) that have R&D programs in this
area and they coordinate research activities regularly via inter-agency
working groups. Cyber security R&D has been, and will continue to be, a
priority in the Department of Homeland Security and in the S&T
Directorate's Command, Control and Interoperability Division.
Question. What is that Federal agency's base fiscal year 2008
funding for cyber security and how much has it been increased in the
fiscal year 2009 request?
Answer. Fiscal year 2008 funding for cyber security R&D withing DHS
is $19.9 million. The President's fiscal year 2009 cyber security R&D
funding request is $18.2 million--a decrease of $1.7 million.
Question. Is this increase sufficient to address the threat?
Answer. Yes. The S&T Directorate in coordination with the DHS
Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Communications, has
developed a focused 2009 Budget that addresses the Nation's critical
cyber security research needs where the government can have the
greatest impact.
DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE
Question. You mentioned during your hearing that 100 percent of
containers crossing the Southern Border are screened for radiation. I
believe you may be mistaken, as I note that U.S. Customs and Border
Protection does not screen containers carried by rail from the Southern
Border. If this is so, what is the actual percentage of containers
screened?
Answer. The ``containers screened'' metric is often mentioned and,
while useful, the terminology can be confusing. Screening is a visual
or automated review of information about goods, including manifest or
entry documentation accompanying a shipment being imported into the
United States. Screening cargo before it enters the United States is a
cornerstone of the DHS layered enforcement strategy. CBP screens 100
percent of all containers entering the United States and assesses each
one for risk. Containers identified as high risk receive further
attention such as, for example, a physical inspection by a CBP officer.
In addition to 100 percent screening, another layer in DHS's
strategy is to scan containers for radiation. Scanning may be performed
with radiation portal monitors and may also include non-intrusive
imaging (NII) technology. CBP scans 100 percent of all truck cargo
containers entering the United States from Mexico for illicit
radiological and nuclear materials with radiation portal monitors
(RPMs). CBP does not currently have the technical capability to scan
rail cargo along the Southern border; however, efforts are underway to
establish technical and operational requirements for equipment that
could scan rail cargo. When current truck and rail volume is combined,
the actual percentage of cargo containers scanned with RPMs along the
Southern border is 85 percent.
Question. The containers screened metric is often mentioned. It is
handy to be sure, but perhaps misleading. If Americans believe 100
percent of containers coming across the southern border are screened,
they'll be inclined to believe the job is done. However, this neglects
the fact that containers are only a fraction of the cargo total. Also
the caveat that it does not account for rail-borne containers is often
over looked.
Do you believe this simple metric is more helpful than it is
misleading?
Answer. While cargo coming into the United States does face
multiple threats, the vulnerability of cargo containers continues to be
of concern to the public and Congress, as illustrated by congressional
mandates in recently enacted legislation. Reporting on DHS's progress
in screening and scanning containers for radiological and nuclear
threats, as well as progress in other areas, is an important way for
the Department to keep the public and Congress informed of our broad
range of efforts to secure goods entering our country.
Question. Is a new metric being developed? What percent of cargo is
screened by tonnage or volume?
Answer. Currently, CBP and DNDO are refining the Joint Deployment
Strategy for Radiation Portal Monitors. Recent technological advances
such as the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP), if certified, may
provide DHS with opportunities to re-evaluate the current state,
including measures of progress. The Joint Deployment strategy will
define our national strategy with regard to all cargo (break bulk,
containerized cargo, roll-on-roll-off, and bulk), and, in its
development, DNDO and CBP will consider multiple options for
programmatic metrics. This fully revised document is expected to be
completed in fiscal year 2008.
CBP does not utilize tonnage or volume, as these metrics do not
meaningfully reflect the scope of work being conducted by CBP at all
ports of entry. While the use of such metrics as tonnage, volume,
value, or line items may provide another means of measuring success,
the uniform nature of containers provides a much simpler and clearer
comparative measure.
The percentage of all containers (truck and rail, full and empty)
scanned with RPMs along the southern border is 85 percent.
Question. As I mentioned rail containers aren't screened and may be
an effective way to haul a nuclear weapon into this country. What would
you judge to be the riskiest pathway into the Nation and what efforts
will you take to close that pathway?
Answer. The Global Nuclear Defense Architecture (GNDA), and its
layered defense strategy, drives DNDO efforts to look at all potential
pathways into the United States; including land border crossings,
seaports, rail crossings, aviation pathways, maritime craft, and other
non-authorized modes of entry. Because establishing fully instrumented
layers all at once is untenable, an approach based both on risk and
capability is being employed.
Based on analysis conducted in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year
2006, DNDO identified several pathways of concern, including general
aviation and small maritime craft. Since that time, the Department has
begun efforts to address both of these pathways. International general
aviation flights entering in the United States are now scanned for
radiological and nuclear threats upon arrival. The West Coast Maritime
pilot in the Puget Sound and San Diego regions is a 3-year effort to
design, field and evaluate a radiation detection architecture that
reduces the risk of radiological and nuclear threats that could be
illicitly transported on recreational craft or small commercial
vessels.
Question. What is the long term plan for Securing the Cities? How
many cities will be covered?
Answer. Presently, the Securing the Cities initiative is entirely
based in the New York City (NYC) region, with a projected conclusion of
the engagement at the end of 2009. An assessment of the NYC regional
implementation will occur through 2008 and 2009. Part of the assessment
will estimate the degree to which State and local law enforcement and
emergency responders can take on the preventive radiological and
nuclear detection mission area. The result of this assessment will help
determine if these types of engagements are constructive and worth
continuing.
Risk and threat criteria will drive any potential future efforts
for determining what cities will be covered.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Aviation: Checkpoint Screening Technology
Question. What are the primary factors that have contributed to the
limited progress in deploying new technologies to screen airline
passengers? What can Congress do to expedite these efforts?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security appreciates the support
that Congress has provided thus far with regard to this issue. It would
be very helpful if Congress can continue to support the Transportation
Security Administration's (TSA's) efforts to improve overall lifecycle
management and operational integration of new technologies. This will
enable TSA to detect a greater range of threats more quickly and with
greater accuracy.
Surface Transportation Security: Amtrak Grants
Question. Please explain why the Department is requiring a non-
Federal match from Amtrak in order to use the $25 million provided
under the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act when no such
requirement exists in the Appropriations Act or the authorizing section
in the 9/11 Act?
Answer. Section 1513(g) of the Implementing Recommendation of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53) calls for a match study
on the feasibility and the appropriateness of a match requirement for
railroad carriers, including Amtrak. While this study is not final, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determined that at least a non-
DHS cost share, rather than a non-Federal cost share, is feasible and
appropriate for Amtrak. A match requirement was also portended in the
fiscal year 2007 Transit Security Grant Program Supplemental. This
requirement is also consistent with the Department's other homeland
security grant programs.
Question. The administration's fiscal year 2009 budget request
proposes to eliminate dedicated funding for Amtrak security and return
to the fiscal year 2007 practice of apportioning some amount of grant
funds to Amtrak out of the general rail and transit security grant
program, likely leading to a reduction of security funds for Amtrak.
What is your rationale for this?
Answer. The transportation sector is a system of systems and must
be considered as such when determining how to apply funds against the
greatest risks in terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequences.
Amtrak intersects with several other transit agencies and regions
across the Nation and should be considered in parallel with, not
separate from, those other systems. This approach encourages regional
collaboration to utilize multiple funding sources in order to mitigate
risks and improve overall security.
Question. Doesn't Amtrak deserve special focus as the Nation's only
Nation-wide intercity passenger railroad, especially given that it is a
quasi-Federal entity?
Answer. The transportation sector is a system of systems and must
be considered as such when determining how to apply funds against the
greatest risks in terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequences.
Amtrak intersects with several other transit agencies and regions
across the Nation and should be considered in parallel with, not
separate from, those other systems. This approach encourages regional
collaboration to utilize multiple funding sources in order to mitigate
risks and improve overall security.
The risk-based approach implemented by the Department of Homeland
Security and the Transportation Security Administration recognizes the
significance of Amtrak and its security profile. Targeted awards under
the former Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program and the
current Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) have facilitated
improvements in security infrastructure and operations. Amtrak has
received the following allocation of funds under the TSGP:
--$13.4 million allocated in fiscal year 2007;
--$7.2 million allocated in fiscal year 2006; and
--$6.4 million allocated in fiscal year 2005.
In fiscal year 2008, Amtrak will receive $25 million in funds under
the TSGP to address risk-based security enhancement priorities.
The consolidated security grant programs provide the allocation of
funds for projects having the greatest risk mitigation across transit
and rail systems.
Surface Transportation Questions
Question. The 9/11 Act tasks your agency with many new and
important responsibilities for surface transportation security. For
rail security alone, the Act requires some 12 new rulemakings, reports,
and assessments. If the Department is truly committed to increasing its
focus on surface transportation, what is your explanation for how you
plan to implement the new surface transportation security provisions of
the 9/11 bill without any increased funding for the upcoming fiscal
year?
Answer. The 9/11 Act's requirements, in many cases, build upon
existing security enhancement programs and initiatives pursued by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). In the freight rail mode,
prior to passing the 9/11 Act, TSA had begun the development and
implementation of programs that met some of the security provisions of
the 9/11 Act such as a Tank Car Vulnerability Study and a tracking
program focused on reducing the risk associated with the transportation
of toxic inhalation hazard materials. Additionally, TSA has conducted
vulnerability assessments of high population areas throughout the
freight rail network.
In the passenger rail mode, TSA has set as strategic priorities six
Transit Security Fundamentals:
--Protection of high-risk underwater/underground assets and systems
--Protection of other high-risk assets that have been identified
through system-wide risk assessments
--Use of visible, unpredictable deterrence
--Targeted counter-terrorism training for key front-line staff
--Emergency preparedness drills and exercises
--Public awareness and preparedness campaigns
To a substantial degree, these priorities align with the actions
directed under the 9/11 Act. As such, security enhancement programs and
resource allocations, notably under the Transit Security Grant Program,
were already in place prior to the enactment of the legislation.
Additionally, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 provided
$30 million for implementation efforts related to the requirements of
the 9/11 Act. TSA will apply these resources to increasing capabilities
to implement a number of the requirements of the 9/11 Act, including
rulemakings, reports, and assessments, among others.
Question. Although you have moved all of your canine units and VIPR
teams under aviation security, you indicate that a large portion of
these resources will still be used for surface transportation purposes.
What percentage of the canine units and VIPR teams will be solely
allocated to surface transportation?
Answer. Out of the more than 780 explosives detection canine teams
included in the fiscal year 2009 President's budget, 82 teams (10.5
percent) will be solely allocated to surface transportation. In
addition, support from the other explosives detection canine teams will
augment these efforts as needed.
Since the program's inception in 2005, the Visible Intermodal
Protection and Response (VIPR) deployments have been conducted in both
the aviation and surface transportation areas. VIPR resources are not
allocated in advance by transportation mode, but rather are utilized
based on intelligence and/or threats, or through the direction of
senior security managers. Historically, approximately half of all
deployments have been focused in the aviation domain and it is
reasonable to assume a similar allocation unless intelligence dictates
otherwise. The Transportation Security Administration's request to
consolidate VIPR resources into the Aviation Security Appropriation
under the Law Enforcement Program, Project and Activity is intended to
simplify management of resources and better reflect management of VIPR
as a single program entity.
Coast Guard: Interagency Operation Command Center (IOCC's)
Question. How does the Department intend to satisfy the
Congressional mandate to establish Coast Guard Interagency Operation
Command Centers for the maritime domain by fiscal year 2009 as required
under the SAFE Port Act when the administration has requested no
funding to do so?
Answer. The Coast Guard intends to merge the acquisition project
called Command 21 with the Interagency Operations Center (IOC) the to
meet the Safe Port Act requirements to establish interagency command
centers in 24 Coast Guard Sectors in the Nation's highest priority
ports. Additionally, the Coast Guard is currently finalizing a spend
plan for the $60 million provided in fiscal year 2008 which will
support three major components of the IOC capabilities: facilities,
information management and sensors in order to satisfy the
Congressional mandate. All three of these components are critical to
establishing the information sharing and interagency coordination
necessary to ensure we meet our obligation under the SAFE Port Act.
The first priority of the IOC project will be to develop the
information management suite that will provide the Coast Guard's
existing Sector Command Centers with Interagency Operation Center
capability. WatchKeeper is the information management tool that will
deliver this capability; it will be deployed to all 35 Sector Command
Centers. WatchKeeper will tie-in directly with our port partners and
facilitate information fusion and sharing as well as provide a tactical
situational awareness tool for operational coordination. Moreover, the
Coast Guard will continue to use the collaboration and integration
provided through the Area Maritime Security Committees to maximize
outreach and coordination efforts.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
2010 Olympics
Question. Mr. Secretary, in your response regarding fiscal year
2009 funding for 2010 Olympics-related costs, you identified three main
sources of funding: fiscal year 2009 funds within Customs and Border
Protection, fiscal eyar 2009 funds from other DHS components and grant
funding. With regards to CBP, you stated, ``Well, of course for the
fiscal year 2009 budget . . . we do have in the CBP budget money that
CBP anticipates spending from its base budget current resources to
cover some of its expenditures in connection with the planning and the
run-up to the Olympics.''
What are the accounts within Customs and Border Protection that you
anticipate these funds will come from?
Answer. CBP anticipates spending $1.74 million within the Salaries
and Expenses account in fiscal year 2009 on 2010 Olympic related
expenses. The account breakout follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspections, Trade and Travel Facilitation at POEs:
Seattle Field Office................................ $589,460
Vancouver/Victoria Preclearance..................... 567,058
Between the Ports:
Office of Border Patrol............................. 585,210
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What amounts do you anticipate could be used for 2010
Olympics-related costs out of fiscal year 2009 funds?
Answer. CBP anticipates spending $1.74 million in fiscal year 2009
on 2010 Olympic related expenses. The related costs are broken out
below:
Overtime: $765,974.
TDY: $948,454.
Canine (kennel, vet): $27.300.
Question. In your response regarding fiscal year 2009 funds from
other components of the Department, you stated, ``But I think at this
point we expect that the Federal share of this will be taken care of by
moneys already allocated to the relevant components.'' What other
components do you expect will contribute to 2010 Olympics-related costs
out of fiscal year 2009 funds?
Answer. The Department has sent a request for information to its
various components to determine the cost estimates and any identified
sources of funds associated with the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic games.
Once that information is collected, the Department will determine which
estimates are specific to the games, and will identify potential
sources of funding or a future funding request.
Question. Mr. Secretary, you also stated that homeland security
grant funding could be available. Specifically, you stated, ``I would
also envision that because we will have--it'll be Homeland Security
grant funds made available in 2009, some of those may be available and
attributable for security-related measures as it relates to this
particular Olympics.'' Given the 80-percent pass through requirement
for State Homeland Security Grant funds and that this event occurs
outside of a UASI-eligible area, what grants did you anticipate could
be used for these purposes?
Answer. The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) supports the
development and implementation of State Homeland Security Strategies to
address the identified planning, organization, equipment, training, and
exercise needs for acts of terrorism and other catastrophic events.
Washington State and its local jurisdictions can use their SHSP funding
to support activities in preparation for this event in the areas of
planning (including operational planning), training and exercises. In
addition, Washington can use up to 15 percent of their SHSP funds for
overtime costs for personnel to participate in information,
investigative, and intelligence sharing activities specifically related
to homeland security. This includes activities such as anti-terrorism
task forces, JTTFs, Area Maritime Security Committees, DHS Border
Enforcement Security Task Forces, and Integrated Border Enforcement
Teams. Washington can also hire new staff and/or contractor positions
to serve as intelligence analysts to enable information/intelligence
sharing capabilities within the designated primary Statewide Fusion
Center. In order to be hired as an intelligence analyst, staff and/or
contractor personnel must meet at least one of the following criteria:
Successfully complete training to ensure baseline proficiency in
Intelligence Analysis and Production within 6 months of being hired;
and/or, previously served as an intelligence analyst for a minimum of 2
years either in a Federal intelligence agency, the military, or State
and/or local law enforcement intelligence unit.
Question. You indicated that Mark Beaty is the Federal Coordinator
for the planning for the 2010 Olympics.
Assuming that Mr. Beaty does not have authority to budget funds for
2010 Olympics-related costs, authorize spending of funds, or authorize
the movement of personnel, could you please describe the mechanisms or
process the Department uses to act on his recommendations that the
Department agrees should be implemented?
Answer. The Federal Coordinator for planning of the 2010 Olympic
and Paralympic Games will provide guidance in financial matters related
to the games but does not have budgetary or execution authority over
funding. The financing of requirements necessary to support the games
will be provided by the appropriate DHS component, who will utilize the
normal flexibility granted to them within their existing budgets. If
additional budgetary authority is required, the Department will work
with the component to request the necessary authority through the
appropriate funding mechanism.
Question. Which component of DHS would make the decision on which
recommendations to act upon?
Answer. The determination as to which recommendations of the
Federal Coordinator for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic games to act
upon will come from the Secretary of the Department and the leadership
of the component that has the expertise and authority to act on the
recommendation.
Question. Which agency within DHS will have lead responsibility for
2010 Olympics domestic security coordination and budget coordination
among the different DHS components?
Answer. The Office of Operations Coordination will provide the
Department with overall direction and guidance for the 2010 Olympic and
Paralympic games. The DHS CFO will provide assistance in budget
coordination and financial matters. Individual components will be
responsible for the budgeting and execution of operations and programs
within their respective areas of expertise and authority.
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)
Question. Mr. Secretary, in your response to my question why PNNL
was not adequately included in the Fiscal Year 2009 Homeland Security
budget, you responded, ``It's a very tough budget circumstance all
around, particularly because there have been, obviously, with the
subprime mortgage issue and the money that was put into that. There
have been some unanticipated budgetary impacts from the total budget's
standpoint.''
Could you please clarify what affect the subprime mortgage issue
had on DHS budgeting for fiscal year 2009?
Answer. To clarify, the subprime mortgage issue did not directly
impact the Department's ability to fund the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL).
What were the other unanticipated budgetary impacts that affected
DHS' budgeting for PNNL?
Answer. The administration seeks $10 million for a PNNL replacement
facility in the fiscal year 2009 budget request. However, the
Department continues to believe that splitting funds between DOE and
DHS for the PNNL replacement project has not proven the best method for
efficient management of the endeavor. We continue to support that all
PNNL replacement funding be directed to the Department of Energy.
DHS Science and Technology signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the Department of Energy Office of Science and the National
Nuclear Security Administration that delineated each department's
financial obligation to provide ``a predictable funding profile,
critical to finishing this project [PNNL Capability Replacement
Laboratory] on schedule and within budget.''
Question. DHS Science and Technology signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with the Department of Energy Office of Science and
the National Nuclear Security Administration that delineated each
department's financial obligation to provide ``a predictable funding
profile, critical to finishing this project [PNNL Capability
Replacement Laboratory] on schedule and within budget.''
When developing the Department's budget, could you please describe
how the Department considers such MOUs?
Answer. The draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) laid out the
desired split of funding for Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
(PNNL). The MOU stated that ``the parties recognize that specific
amounts will depend on OMB and Congressional action. It is understood
that, to the extent funding is appropriated and available, the Parties
shall adhere to this profile.'' Funding for MOUs is evaluated along
with all other competing priorities in budget development.
Question. Could you please identify similar situations in which the
Department has a memorandum of understanding with one or more other
Federal agencies to budget in a certain year an amount for a project or
program and had to reduce the amounts it had obligated itself to
through the MOU?
Answer. The S&T Directorate has no other similar Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) that it had to reduce the amounts it had obligated
itself to through the MOU.
Homeland Security Grants
Question. The Homeland Security Budget does include $200 million
for State Homeland Security Grants and $200 million for Emergency
Management Performance Grants. Given this recognition that these grant
programs have some purpose, what makes you believe that this amount is
appropriate to meet the needs?
Answer. The requested amount is appropriate to meet the needs.
Before the fiscal year 2008 grant cycle began, the Department took
several steps towards 9/11 Act compliance, including a directed review
of risk data for each of the 100 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas
to aid in the development of the fiscal year 2008 list of eligible
urban areas; outreach by members of the Department's Homeland
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) with every
State and most cities to provide them with their State threat
assessment; as well as the data call by HITRAC to the State Homeland
Security Advisors (HSA) to assemble the Tier 1 and Tier 2 lists of
critical infrastructure used in the eligibility determinations.
FEMA used open and official sources for all other information
(e.g., Census data) or the only authoritative source available (such as
Defense Industrial Base information from Department of Defense). In
addition, all formulas, models, spreadsheets, and data have been
provided to GAO in advance of grant release for their annual risk
report to the Hill.
Moving forward, the Department has sent letters to the senior
elected official in each of the 100 MSAs, in order to review their
individual risk scores and the overall risk allocation methodology, as
well as how that methodology applies to their MSA. This process will be
ongoing until April 1, 2008, at which time DHS senior leadership will
consider the results of this data.
Port Security
Question. Mr. Secretary, can you report on some of the lessons you
and the Department have learned from the Secure Freight Initiative
during this past year?
Answer. The ``Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act
of 2006'' required that three foreign ports pilot 100 percent scanning
of United States-bound maritime containers using both radiation
detection and imaging equipment. On October 12, 2007, the ports of
Southampton, U.K.; Qasim, Pakistan; and Cortes, Honduras, became fully
operational and now attempt to scan 100 percent of containerized cargo
destined for the United States. The SAFE Port Act also requires a
report to Congress in April 2008, and every 6 months thereafter, to
evaluate the successes and challenges of 100 percent scanning. In order
to provide a robust report to Congress, the Departments of Homeland
Security (DHS) and Energy (DOE) will also test, although in a more
limited capacity, scanning systems in four additional ports: Hong Kong
(now fully operational); Busan, Korea; Salalah, Oman; and Singapore.
The 9/11 Act, requiring 100 percent scanning by 2012, places a premium
on the data gathered by these pilots and these reports will serve as a
foundation for moving towards a goal of 100 percent scanning of all
United States bound maritime containers.
SFI is already learning from the challenges and seeing a number of
successes of the three operational ports. For example, extreme heat in
Pakistan and flooding in Honduras adversely affects the scanning
equipment. Solutions such as shading and better drainage can ensure
that the systems continue to work even in challenging climates. Also
the proximity of radiation detection and imaging equipment can alter
the accuracy of each machine. As such, ``blanking codes'' were
installed to make sure that there is no interference with the radiation
and imaging equipment.
To note some successes, the scanning systems are not adversely
affecting port operations and in no instance has a container missed its
vessel. Also, a trade facilitation benefit is also apparent with
containers leaving Port Qasim. In just over 1 month, almost 1,400 scans
took place with only 13 alarms and of those 13 alarms, none were re-
examined in domestic ports. By giving domestic targeters access to the
radiation signature and image gathered in an SFI port, they can more
efficiently adjudicate alarming containers in the United States and
ensure the quick entrance of legitimate goods into the United States.
Question. The administration has recognized the role the Federal
Government has in helping our ports to improve the security of our
Nation and included port security grants in its budget request. As a
senator from a State with two of the largest ports in the Nation at
Seattle and Tacoma to very small ports, how would the Department
improve the security of our smaller ports to prevent harmful materials
from entering our country?
Answer. U.S Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has developed a
multi-layered process to target high-risk shipments while
simultaneously facilitating legitimate trade and travel. People,
technology, automation, electronic information and partnerships are
concepts that underpin CBP port security and anti-terrorism
initiatives. These concepts expand our borders and reinforce the
components of CBP's layered defense.
In response to your question, the focus will be on technology
deployed to the State of Washington.
An integral part of CBP's comprehensive strategy to combat nuclear
and radiological terrorism is to scan all arriving conveyances,
containers, airfreight, mailbags, and express consignment packages with
radiation detection equipment for illicit radiological/nuclear material
prior to release.
As part of CBP's Radiation Detection Program, CBP has deployed 77
Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) to 3 ports of entry and 1 mail facility
in the State of Washington; however, all ports of entry in the State of
Washington that process personally owned vehicles, truck and sea cargo
will receive RPMs or other radiation detection technology (commensurate
with workflow). There are 9 additional (smaller) ports of entry in the
State of Washington that are currently in various stages of design and
planning to receive RPMs. In addition, CBP has 11 large-scale imaging
systems deployed in the State of Washington, as of March 14, 2008 and
there are 2 additional large-scale imaging systems scheduled for
deployment to ports of entry in the State of Washington by the end of
this fiscal year.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nelson
FEMA--Urban Area Security Initiative
Question. What is the Department's plan for conducting the process
of allowing the 100 eligible metropolitan statistical areas, as defined
by the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act,
Public Law 110-53 (the 9/11 Act), going forward as the Fiscal Year 2008
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant award process continues?
Answer. Before the fiscal year 2008 grant cycle began, the
Department took several steps towards 9/11 Act compliance, including a
directed review of risk data for each of the 100 largest Metropolitan
Statistical Areas to aid in the development of the fiscal year 2008
list of eligible urban areas; outreach by members of the Department's
Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) with
every State and most cities to provide them with their State threat
assessment; as well as the data call by HITRAC to the State Homeland
Security Advisors (HSA) to assemble the Tier 1 and Tier 2 lists of
critical infrastructure used in the eligibility determinations.
FEMA used open and official sources for all other information
(e.g., Census data) or the only authoritative source available (such as
Defense Industrial Base information from Department of Defense). In
addition, all formulas, models, spreadsheets, and data have been
provided to GAO in advance of grant release for their annual risk
report to the Hill.
Moving forward, the Department has sent letters to the senior
elected official in each of the 100 MSAs, in order to review their
individual risk scores and the overall risk allocation methodology, as
well as how that methodology applies to their MSA. This process will be
ongoing until April 1, 2008, at which time DHS senior leadership will
consider the results of this data.
Question. What is the Department's plan to conduct the fiscal year
2009 UASI process in a manner consistent with the 9/11 Act?
Answer. Further outreach over the summer is an integral step toward
implementation of the 9/11 Commission Act within the fiscal year 2009
grant cycle. In this process, it is vital to the Department that each
city within the top 100 MSAs understands and exercises their
opportunity to thoroughly review and amplify information relative to
their individual threat, vulnerability and consequence factors.
Going into the fiscal year 2009 cycle, the Department will ensure
that the UASI process is in full compliance with the 9/11 Act, which
calls for the FEMA Administrator to conduct an initial assessment of
the relative threat, vulnerability and consequences from acts of
terrorism faced by each eligible metropolitan area. This assessment
will be done by FEMA, in conjunction with our partners from DHS' I&A,
as well as the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center
(HITRAC). The FEMA Administrator will then provide each eligible
metropolitan area with the information that is believed to be relevant
to the determination of threat, vulnerability and consequence as faced
by acts of terrorism. The eligible metropolitan area will have the
opportunity to review the risk assessment and remedy any erroneous or
incomplete information.
I have been informed that the data and sources used in the State
Homeland Security Grant Program and UASI risk formulas, in calculating
the economic index, rely on different data sources for the gross State
product than for the gross metropolitan product. The U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis publishes data on both State and on metropolitan
product, but it appears the BEA's numbers were not used in some cases.
Question. I have been informed that the data and sources used in
the State Homeland Security Grant Program and UASI risk formulas, in
calculating the economic index, rely on different data sources for the
gross State product than for the gross metropolitan product. The U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis publishes data on both State and on
metropolitan product, but it appears the BEA's numbers were not used in
some cases. Can you explain what sources were used for calculating the
economic index for both SHSGP and UASI and why?
Answer. For the fiscal year 2008 UASI program, the Department did
not have the advantage of using BEA's analysis of GDP by metropolitan
area, as this is a novel BEA product whose inaugural publication was
not made until September 2007, which was after DHS had completed the
fiscal year 2008 UASI risk analysis. For the fiscal year 2009 UASI
analysis, DHS intends to use BEA's metropolitan GDP numbers.
For the fiscal year 2008 analysis, DHS used the ``Gross
Metropolitan Product'' estimates prepared by the consulting firm
``Global Insight'' on behalf of the United States Conference of Mayors
and The Council for the New American City (http://usmayors.org/
metroeconomies/). DHS used the most recent version of the report
available to us at the time, which was published in January 2007, and
reported on GMP for 2005.
For the urban areas in Puerto Rico, which were not covered in the
Global Insight report, we used the total 2005 PR GDP (from the CIA
World Factbook: www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook),
and divided it into the constituent municipalities according to the
percentage of total non-farm employees (available from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics: http://stats.bls.gov/eag/eag.pr.htm and links
therein). We were not aware of a more authoritative (i.e., U.S.
Government) source for the Gross Economic Products of the Puerto Rico
MSAs.
DHS did not compute the gross economic product (GEP) for either the
SHSP or UASI programs. For SHSP, we used the BEA estimates for 2006
(``2006E'') GDP, as they were published on the BEA web site (http://
www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp_state/gsp_newsrelease.htm) in
June of 2007, when the data used in the fiscal year 2008 analysis was
collected. We use the ``Current-Dollar GDP by State'' rather than
``Real GDP by State'', because we are interested in the differences in
total economic product from State to State in a single year, not in
year to year growth, breakdowns by industry or quantities produced.
Since Real GDP is derived from current-dollar GDP, we assume the
systematic errors are smaller for current-dollar GDP.
For the territories not included in BEA's analysis, we used the CIA
World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook ),
as of July 2007. We use the ``GDP (purchasing power parity)'' rather
than the ``GDP (official exchange rate)'' in cases where both are
given, because we believe that metric more closely resembles the GDP
methodology of BEA. For cases in which an earlier year than 2006 is
provided, we crudely scale up to 2006 dollars by multiplying by the
ratio of BEA's estimate of the U.S. GDP in 2006 to its estimate in the
year of interest. Although the territories' economies may not grow at
exactly the same rate as the U.S. economy, most do share some economic
ties with the U.S. economy.
Border Security
Question. GAO reports that Border Patrol agents were given a
``minimal role'' in developing Project 28. Is this an accurate
description and, if so, what was the Department's reasoning for
limiting agent involvement? And, are there specific plans to give
agents a more prominent role in the government's efforts to secure the
border?
Answer. Regarding your concern about limited input from Border
Patrol Agents, agents have had significant involvement and leadership
in developing and deploying the SBInet solution, including P-28. Border
Patrol agents were fully involved in the selection of the SBInet prime
contractor. Furthermore, they were included in the source selection
process for the master contract, including evaluation of the initial
task order awarded under the program, P-28. Border Patrol Agents
participated in the project development gate reviews for P-28
including: preliminary design reviews, critical design reviews, and the
test readiness reviews. These reviews allowed for agent input and
concerns to be voiced as the system moved through the development
process.
Since November 2006, Border Patrol Agents have been involved in
routine status meetings and have been providing feedback and guidance
on system operational issues. This approach allowed CBP to keep Boeing
accountable for Project 28 delivery and ensure the government not incur
additional costs.
Border Patrol Agents were involved from the very beginning and
through the source selection process. We selected P-28 as a prototype
and wanted to get something fielded early in our design process that we
could learn from and use to explore concepts of operation. Boeing took
all of the agents' input, made changes based on some of it and used it
in the development of the first operational configuration. As a
demonstration project, we anticipated the outcome would stimulate
feedback from agents to further define our operational requirements.
In its report, GAO acknowledged SBI's efforts to incorporate
operator input in the development of SBInet requirements. The report
stated: ``For example, officials from the Border Patrol, CBP Air and
Marine, and the CBP Office of Field Operations reported that
representatives from their offices were involved in the development of
requirements for SBInet technology as early as October 2006 and on an
ongoing basis since then.''
Question. Reports indicate that DHS is planning to ``scale back''
its plans for the virtual fence, including a shift away from the tower-
mounted sensors. Are these reports accurate? If so, where or how
specifically is DHS shifting its focus? Are there additional costs or
other, different challenges associated with this shift?
Answer. No. There have not been changes to DHS's overall plan to
deploy a tower-based integrated sensor and common operating picture
concept. DHS is confident that this type of technology solution will be
used in other selected border locations where it makes sense. Along
with other tools and techniques, this solution will contribute to CBP's
efforts to secure our Nation's borders. P-28 was always a pilot project
to demonstrate the feasibility of such a concept. It was never intended
to be our final operational configuration.
Question. What are the lessons learned from Project 28 that will be
applied as Boeing attempts to address current software problems and as
DHS prepares for phase II deployment of the virtual fence?
Answer. In its current state, Project 28 provides operational
technology in an area that was not previously supported by such
resources, giving Border Patrol Agents improved situational awareness
of operations in the field. Project 28 is a force multiplier in a
location where CBP previously had a limited personnel assets on the
ground.
DHS and CBP will now take the valuable lessons learned and focus on
the transformation of the future SBInet solution to improve
accountability and implementation of technology. As a matter of fact,
lessons learned from Project 28 have already been incorporated into the
next iteration of the SBInet integrated system design including
improved sensors, software and communications. These improvements will
further CBP's ability to fully integrate detection, identification, and
classification of border incursions within a common operating picture
and will be implemented as part of the Calendar Year (CY) 2008
deployments in Arizona. One critical lesson learned that led to the
deceleration of the deployment schedule is the need for a Systems
Integration Lab (SIL) to evaluate new hardware being introduced into
the operational environment. The lab will help determine the
effectiveness of the hardware within our system of towers, sensors,
communication, common operating picture hardware and software prior to
fielding across the U.S. border.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
HEADQUARTERS CONSOLIDATION PROJECT
Question. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget includes $120
million within the Department of Homeland Security request and $331
million within the General Services Administration request for the St.
Elizabeths DHS headquarters project. What are the day-to-day effects on
the workings of the Department without an accessible and properly sized
headquarters campus?
Answer. The lack of an accessible and adequately-sized consolidated
Headquarters campus has an adverse impact on DHS operations and
integration on a daily basis. The DHS mission is to lead a unified
national effort to secure America. The lessons learned from Hurricane
Katrina and Secretary Chertoff's Second Stage Review reinforces the
critical requirement that DHS operate with increased integration to
prepare for and respond to natural disasters and/or terrorist attacks.
Our mission demands this approach to all hazards. Yet, the Department's
legacy facilities are currently dispersed over about 40 locations and
70 buildings throughout the National Capital Region, sometimes with
sub-optimal security protections and routinely impacting adversely
critical communication, coordination, and cooperation across DHS
components.
This extreme dispersion imposes significant inefficiencies in daily
operations; problems that are magnified considerably at the most
important moments--when the Department must act as a nimble and
integrated team responding to significant natural disasters or
terrorist threats. To support the incident management and command-and-
control requirements, the Department clearly needs to consolidate the
mission execution functions of executive leadership, operations
coordination, policy and program management in a secure setting.
The current dispersed housing portfolio also results in increased
costs through the duplication of common services that could otherwise
be shared at a consolidated campus including increased transportation,
mail handling, security and other support services costs. Further,
these physical barriers impede the progress towards functional
integration and unification of the Department operationally,
administratively and culturally.
When DHS was created, it was appropriately built with dispatch. Now
is the time to make a commitment to the Department's future by fully
funding the President's fiscal year 2009 Budget Request to commence
construction of the DHS Consolidated Headquarters Campus at St.
Elizabeths, needed to support DHS operations and integration.
Question. What are the long-term consequences of the lack of a
consolidated headquarters for the Department?
Answer. The long term consequences of the lack of a consolidated
Departmental Headquarters are a substantial worsening of the current
dispersed housing portfolio that stands today at 40 locations and 70
buildings, with increasingly adverse impacts on critical communication,
coordination, and cooperation across DHS components.
To put this in context, consider that DHS currently has
approximately 40 space requests pending with the General Services
Administration (GSA) to accommodate existing requirements within the
National Capital Region (NCR) that already exceed the capacities of the
Department's real estate portfolio. This has the potential to expand
the portfolio to 80 locations and 110 buildings in the NCR. Without
consolidation, as organizations mature and new program requirements
develop, space requests will continue to be addressed with limited
opportunities for strategic realignments and leveraging of existing
locations in a highly competitive real estate environment. Instead of
reducing the number of locations, buildings and the proximity of
components to each other, the net result will be an expansion of
buildings, and locations with increased dispersion. This will have an
adverse impact on individual components or offices and a corresponding
impact on interdepartmental coordination.
This extreme dispersion of components across the NCR will continue
to impose significant inefficiencies in operations, problems that are
magnified considerably at the most important moments--when the
Department must act as a nimble and integrated team responding to
significant natural disasters or terrorist threats. The lessons learned
from Hurricane Katrina clearly demonstrated that DHS needs to operate
with increased integration in the preparation for and response to
threats or natural disasters. A single unified Headquarters bringing
together component leadership, operations coordination, policy and
program management at St. Elizabeths is a fundamental management tool
necessary to support DHS operations and is critical to the Department's
long term ability to effectively perform our mission.
In addition, the Department will not realize the strategic
imperative to unify DHS operationally, administratively, and
culturally, nor remove the physical barriers that impact unity of
purpose and effort. This will further hamper the Department's effort to
obtain the fundamental management tools necessary to support DHS
operations and integration. A single unified headquarters bringing
together component leadership, operations coordination, policy and
program management is critical to the Department's long term ability to
effectively perform our mission.
The lack of a consolidated DHS Headquarters will also have long
term total ownership cost consequences. GSA previously determined that
consolidation of up to 4.5 million gross square feet of office space at
St. Elizabeths will result in a revised estimate of approximately $743
million Present Value savings over a thirty year period, as compared to
individually replacing leases without any consolidation (based on
fiscal year 2008 funding of the project, which was not appropriated by
the Congress). This projected savings included DHS specific tenant
costs. In addition to the loss of direct real estate savings of $743
million, DHS will not be able to achieve further savings/cost
avoidances at the consolidated headquarters campus through reduction of
administrative overhead, elimination of redundancies and sharing of
common campus services.
INTELLIGENCE SHARING
Question. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal (2/25/08)
reports that a consulting firm, in a report commissioned by the
Department, has indicated that the Department is ``stumbling in its
efforts to coordinate and share domestic intelligence'' with State and
local law enforcement. More specifically, that its intelligence reports
are tailored for Washington officials and don't provide State and local
officials the intelligence they need. Please comment on the findings of
this report, their accuracy, and what the Department is doing to share
useful timely and accurate intelligence with State and local law
enforcement.
Answer. The original report that was featured in the Wall Street
Journal article (2/25/08) was the result of an internal pilot project
designed to review our processes for sharing domestic intelligence.
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Charlie Allen
launched the SLFC Pilot Project over 6 months ago based on his
conviction that State and Local consumers were as critical a recipient
of I&A intelligence products as was the DHS leadership, National
Intelligence Community, and the Washington policy community. Mr. Allen
firmly believes there cannot be true security of the Homeland until the
partnership between the Federal Government, especially DHS, and State
and Local authorities is fully developed. Sharing intelligence with our
State, Local, and Tribal partners is essential to cementing this
partnership.
Initial progress toward this goal was achieved by assigning I&A
representatives to the State and Local Fusion Centers. These onsite
representatives serve as a direct liaison between the State and DHS I&A
headquarters. Information began to flow but intelligence support to
SLFCs was not progressing as quickly as Mr. Allen would like, nor was
support focused on the unique needs of individual SLFCs. Equally
important was his concern that since the number of SLFCs was
increasing, he needed to bolster support to them immediately.
To help the Under Secretary bring rapid improvement to the DHS
relationship with State and Local partners, he engaged the services of
Centra, a contractor with broad experience across government and a long
time, valued relationship with DHS. Mr. Allen asked them to make
recommendations for his consideration on the most important things I&A
could do to have maximum impact on support to SLFCs. He also designated
six fusion centers as the focus for the pilot project, gave the
contractor full access to I&A personnel, and alerted the State and
Local leadership of his intentions.
The pilot focused on what Mr. Allen believes to be the most
important areas of concern regarding I&A interaction and partnership
with the SLFCs:
--SLFCs ability to request and receive support from DHS requests for
information (RFIs) and other requests for assistance and
interaction);
--Understanding the unique information needs of SLFCs so that I&A and
the Intelligence Community can better serve those needs (their
Priority Information Needs);
--SLFC requirements for DHS information and intelligence support
during critical incidents (i.e., London/Glasgow, etc.); and
--SLFCs ability to exploit open source information in furtherance of
their responsibilities (Open Source training, tools, and data).
Unlike other such efforts, Mr. Allen instructed the pilot to not
only identify the problem areas and make suggestions for moving
forward, but demanded the contractor and I&A staff put actual fixes and
solutions in place during the course of the pilot project. He is
pleased to report that the pilot did exactly that, and that he now has
a better understanding of the issues and a full set of near and long
term suggestions to consider. All six pilot sites report that tangible
progress has been made in improving DHS support.
Specifically, responses to SLFC RFIs from DHS headquarters have
improved significantly in both quality and timeliness, and all six
sites have increased their interaction with DHS I&A. This interaction
fostered the creation of a state-specific set of Priority Information
Needs (PINS) at each pilot site and has begun to structure analytic
output that responds to the State's specific needs. SLFC leadership has
told Mr. Allen that this will contribute significantly to mission
success.
The extensive ``menu'' of SLFC preferences for DHS support in times
of critical incidents such as London/Glasgow will be validated with the
broader SLFC community. Additionally, I&A now has a solid handle on
SLFC needs regarding Open Source Intelligence and has already provided
training to four of the six pilot sites. I&A is developing a formal
training curriculum that can be offered to SLFCs nationwide.
The pilot report cited in the Wall Street journal had just been
issued to Mr. Allen. He, in turn had just shared it with the I&A staff.
In the weeks ahead, Mr. Allen will determine which of the suggestions
should be implemented immediately. Mr. Allen intends to keep the
momentum he has established with the SLFCs and will ensure that the
responsiveness developed during this pilot study will continue.
Intelligence sharing with State and Local authorities remains a top
priority; I&A will continue to engage in frank self-evaluation to drive
process improvement.
Question. The Department established a State and Local Fusion
Center Program in June 2006. To what extent has this program enabled
the Department to create partnerships with State and local governments
to improve information flow?
Answer. The State and Local Fusion Center Program has been very
successful in improving the information flow between the Federal
Government and the States where we have assigned intelligence officers.
We are routinely producing joint intelligence products with the fusion
centers, and have opened a robust conduit for the States to articulate
their intelligence requirements to the Federal Government. Information
from the States is also beginning to be used by the national
intelligence community to help inform national decision makers.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR CRITICAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
Question. The fiscal year 2008 Appropriations Act provides $72.3
million for data centers to allow the Department to store and process
critical information in a more efficient and secure manner. Does the
Department face any obstacles to consolidation of its data storage
capabilities? Can you give the subcommittee some insight into the
current progress and future plans in this effort?
Answer. Section 547 of the Report of the Committee on Rules to
accompany H. Res. 878 States that ``None of the funds provided in this
Act under the heading ``Office of the Chief Information Officer'' shall
be used for data center development other than for the National Center
for Critical Information Processing and Storage until the Chief
Information Officer certifies that the National Center for Critical
Information Processing and Storage is fully utilized, to the maximum
extend feasible, as the Department's primary data storage center at the
highest capacity throughout the fiscal year.''
This restriction does not support best practice for data center
redundancy. The long-range plan for the National Center for Critical
Information Processing and Storage (NCCIPS) remains the same. NCCIPS is
one of two enterprise data centers into which smaller component-
operated data centers are being consolidated. The Department is fully
committed to the use of NCCIPS as evidenced by the alacrity with which
space has been utilized and the importance of the systems installed.
However, NCCIPS alone will not meet the Department's continuity of
operations (COOP) needs. It is essential that both NCCIPS and the
second enterprise data center be simultaneously populated. The Section
547 restriction has a chilling effect on migration activity by limiting
the Department's ability to address component COOP needs.
Additionally, the U.S. Navy, who holds and operates the NCCIPS
facility, is poorly suited to serve DHS needs due to their differing
mission priorities their lack of fee-for-service business processes.
The lower priority focus and business process issues have caused delays
which are reflected in the weeks, and often months, required to
negotiate and effect the installation of systems. Facility ownership
and operation is a complex arrangement among NASA, the U.S. Army, the
U.S. Army facility contractor, the Commander, Naval Meteorology and
Oceanography Command and Naval Facilities Engineering Command. DHS
would be better served by a landlord with a clear focus on DHS facility
needs.
Thirty-nine applications/systems have been relocated to the NCCIPS
facility consuming approximately half of the available space. The
Department's updated migration plans, funding permitting, bring
facility to maximum use by second quarter in fiscal year 2011. See the
following table for a migration schedule:
TABLE 1.--DATA CENTER MIGRATION SCHEDULE
Question. What resources are in the fiscal year 2009 request to
transition systems to the National Center for Critical Information
Processing? Does the Department have any further funding challenges in
fiscal year 2009 that are not addressed by the budget request?
Answer. The fiscal year 2009 request includes $23,830,000 for data
center development that is intended to support transition to both the
National Center for Critical Information Processing and the
Department's second enterprise data center. The fiscal year 2009
request fully supports the center development and data migration
activities anticipated for 2009 with new resources and base funding.
Question. What is the long-range strategic plan for using the
National Center for Critical Information Processing?
Answer. The long-range plan for the National Center for Critical
Information Processing (NCCIPS) remains the same. NCCIPS is one of two
enterprise data centers into which smaller component-operated data
centers are being consolidated. The Department is fully committed to
the use of NCCIPS as evidenced by alacrity with which space has been
utilized and the importance of the systems installed. However, NCCIPS
alone will not meet the Department's Continuity of Operations needs. It
is essential that both NCCIPS and the second enterprise data center be
simultaneously populated.
Question. What funding do you project will be necessary in fiscal
year 2009 and each future fiscal year to carry out the strategic plan
for the National Center for Critical Information Processing?
Answer. We estimate that an investment of approximately $500
million is needed to achieve the schedule below. In addition to funds
requested specifically for this project ($23,830,000 in fiscal year
2009), a major portion of the funding for both center development and
data migration will be derived from direct appropriations to the
Department's CIO and collections by the Working Capital Fund.
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
BORDER PATROL SUPPORT STAFFING
Question. Operation Jumpstart placed 6,000 National Guard troops on
the Southwest border. That deployment was complete in July of 2006. The
Department is currently engaged in the phased withdrawal of that
support. This Committee has been concerned about the pace of hiring
support positions for the Border Patrol to fill that gap. It is support
personnel who must be on hand to take up many of the tasks being
performed by the National Guard. What more can be done to place a
priority on getting the support positions for the Border Patrol filled?
Does U.S. Customs and Border Protection have a plan in place to quickly
fill these positions?
Answer. Although CBP is making progress, we are not satisfied with
the pace of the operational support hiring to date. The main challenge
has been prioritizing this effort compared to the need to hire several
thousand new Border Patrol Agents. CBP has taken several steps to
improve our ability to meet both needs. For example, CBP is re-
organizing and adding personnel to both the Human Resources and
Internal Affairs organizations so they can better accommodate their
increased workload. They have provided authority for waivers so that
CBP can hire employees on a conditional basis in advance of a full
background investigation. In addition, CBP is beginning to conduct
regular management reviews with the contractor to increase the focus
and pace of their hiring efforts of contract employees to fill those
operational support positions.
CBP has approved hiring plans for filling the positions. The plans
include the use of contracted support personnel as well as government
FTE positions. The plans also include in hiring of new support
personnel to replace personnel attrition. The goal for CBP is to
complete the hiring for at least 80 percent of the new fiscal year 2008
positions by the end the calendar year.
NORTHERN BORDER AND MARITIME SECTOR
Question. Significant resources have been added to the Southwest
border in the last 3 years. Small numbers of Border Patrol agents and
Customs and Border Protection Officers have been added to the Northern
border during that same time. Mr. Secretary, you have talked publicly
about the significant threats on our Northern border. Are the right
levels of resources on the Northern border to counter that threat?
Answer. DHS and CBP have taken many steps to improve security on
the Northern border. To address known as well as potential threats at
the northern border, we are creating a stronger, more proactive and
capable presence at and between ports of entry. CBP has created a
unified command model in each of the two northern border enforcement
environments--the Border Patrol between the ports of entry and the
Office of Field Operations at the ports of entry. This command
structure, which encompasses 13 States stretching from the Pacific
Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean, ensures that appropriate resources can be
rapidly brought to bear on any threat, and that Field Commanders have
the authority to direct operations in the most comprehensive manner.
CBP is overseeing the increased staffing and resourcing of air and
marine assets within each of the Border Patrol sectors along the
northern border. These assets will be geographically located in a
manner that matches the aviation asset to the dynamic of the threat as
well as to the mission and capability of the asset. Already, CBP
through the Office of Air and Marine has established the following five
air wings on the northern border: Bellingham, Washington; Plattsburgh,
New York; Great Falls, Montana; Grand Forks, North Dakota; and Detroit,
Michigan. In addition, the North Dakota Air Branch in Grand Forks was
chosen to provide a strategic, centrally located air branch at the
Northern Border that will have an expanded role, and is currently under
review to certify its operational readiness as a base for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems operations.
Border Security Deployment Program (BSDP) was initiated in 2001 as
part of the northern border port hardening initiative. This system
configuration has been installed at all northern border land ports and
to limited portions of the southern border. BDSP provides an integrated
surveillance and intrusion detection system, which delivers critical
security infrastructure, motion detection, and remote monitoring
capabilities to the U.S. Land Ports of Entry (LPOE). The BSDP
components include perimeter and interior camera systems connected via
the CBP Wide-Area Network (WAN) to remote monitoring stations called
Customs Area Security Centers (CASC). These centralized command centers
house digital video recorders augmented with analytic software designed
to alert the watch officer of a detected alarm or intrusion event
within a port facility and archive the event for use as evidence in
subsequent prosecutions. The National Targeting Center, HQ Situation
Room, and ICE Internal Affairs maintain similar remote viewing
capabilities.
CBP is also working to fully implement, along with DOS, the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). WHTI will require all persons
seeking to enter or depart the United States to present a passport or
other acceptable document that denotes the bearer's identity and
citizenship. Consistent with a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission,
the primary goal of WHTI is to strengthen security. It will reduce the
opportunities for fraud or misrepresentation of one's true identity,
and improve national security and entry into the United States by
standardizing a limited number of approved documents required for all
travelers entering the United States.
In early 2007, CBP redirected a portion of the SBInet focus to the
Northern Border, specifically in the Detroit, Michigan area, after
Congress asked CBP for a redirection of $20 million from fiscal year
2007 funds to begin addressing northern border vulnerabilities. This
Northern Border Demonstration is tasked to deploy an SBInet solution to
a section of the U.S./Canada border in a maritime environment in the
Detroit sector area that may be the basis for future SBInet northern
border maritime technologies.
The success of many of our initiatives depends on leveraging
intelligence and partnering with Federal, State, local, and tribal
governments, as well as with Canada. A key component of the partnership
efforts among law enforcement entities on the Northern Border is the
Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET). The mission of IBET is to
enhance border integrity and security by identifying, investigating and
interdicting persons or organizations that pose a threat to national
security or are engaged in other organized criminal activity. IBET's
incorporate a mobile response capability and consists of six core
Canadian and U.S. agencies with law enforcement responsibilities at the
border.
DHS, and specifically CBP, continuously work with our partners in
the intelligence and law enforcement communities, both domestically and
internationally, to monitor potential threats as decisions on the
deployment of personnel and resources are being made.
Recently there has been a significant increase in the number of
semi-submersible vessels used for smuggling into the United States.
Question. Recently there has been a significant increase in the
number of semi-submersible vessels used for smuggling into the United
States. Do Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have the
right resources available to combat this method of smuggling?
Answer. CBP and USCG believe the fiscal year 2009 request includes
the right resources to combat this method of smuggling.
Question. What increased resources are proposed in the fiscal year
2009 budget request for securing the Nation's northern and maritime
borders?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2009 Budget request contains
four specific items, both aircraft and vessels, that are essential if
CBP is to effectively counter the threats posed by terrorist activity,
drug running, and illegal immigration. The P-3 maritime patrol aircraft
is currently the only long-range capability available to detect, track,
and coordinate the interception of contraband and illegal immigration
along the Caribbean and eastern Pacific transit zones leading to our
shores. CBP has 4 of its 16 P-3 aircraft operating against surface and
sub-surface craft engaged in illegal activities. CBP Air and Marine
(A&M) has initiated a service life extension program (SLEP) that will
eventually provide the CBP P-3s with an additional 15,000 flight hours
(roughly 18-20 years of continued service). To date, Congress has fully
supported the P-3 SLEP and The President's Budget requests an
additional $56.0 million in fiscal year 2009 to continue this critical
A&M program.
To enhance long duration patrol operations in the Caribbean and
eastern Pacific, CBP A&M is conducting a demonstration of a maritime
version of the Predator B unmanned aircraft system (UAS) from Tyndall
AFB, FL, from March 17-28. Based on the results of the demonstration, a
joint CBP/U.S. Coast Guard UAS Program Office will be formed for the
purpose of developing the requirements for a maritime variant of the
Predator B. With the Predator's 3,000 mile range and 30 hour operating
time, it will greatly enhance the Department's capability to detect,
track, and intercept suspect vessels transiting to U.S. waters. The
President's request includes $29.6 million for the development of the
Predator B maritime variant, enhancements to its software integration
laboratory, and logistic support.
CBP A&M seeks to replace its aging C-12 patrol aircraft, and fill
the gap left by the closure of the DHC-8 patrol aircraft production
line, by introducing a new multi-role enforcement aircraft (MEA) during
the later part of fiscal year 2008. This aircraft is expected to be
truly multi-role and have capabilities to operate over land and water.
It will operate over the Great Lakes and will augment Caribbean and
Pacific Ocean operations in littoral waters off the United States and
off the shores of our international partners. The fiscal year 2009
request contains $35.6 million for two of these aircraft.
The fiscal year 2009 request also contains $10.1 million for
additional marine vessels. Chief among these will be a new class of
coastal interceptors, capable of out-pacing the fastest drug vessels
and arrayed with greatly enhanced sensors and communications equipment.
CBP A&M plans to acquire a prototype interceptor in fiscal year 2008
for test and evaluation. Based on its evaluation of the prototype, A&M
would use the funding requested for fiscal year 2009 to begin
purchasing the new interceptors and to start retiring CBPs aging and
less capable Midnight Express vessels.
Combined with the $6.7 million Congress provided in the fiscal year
2008 Appropriation for airborne sensors, the investments described
above will give CBP the capabilities it needs to accomplish its vital
maritime surveillance and interdiction mission, and to partner with the
U.S. Coast Guard for the greatest benefit to the public's security.
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
VISA WAIVER PROGRAM
Question. Recently, Mr. Secretary, you were quoted as saying that
one of the biggest threats to U.S. security may come from within
Europe. What needs to be done to counter this threat?
Answer. Countering this threat is the driving motivation for
several initiatives the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
pioneered in recent years and is pursuing now. Air Marshals help secure
international airliners. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers
help screen international air travelers in select European airports in
a program called the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP). CBP officers
also help screen shipping containers in European seaports under the
Container Security Initiative. Enhanced information sharing--for
example, in the 2007 U.S.-European Union Passenger Name Records (PNR)
Agreement--is another pillar in our strategy of countering threats from
Europe. As recently as March 11, Secretary Chertoff, joined by Attorney
General Mukasey, initiated a ground-breaking watch list and fingerprint
sharing agreement in Berlin. This new agreement will deepen counter-
terrorism cooperation with Germany, where last September, United States
and German officials together dismantled a serious terrorist plot.
In addition to the European Union PNR Agreement, DHS conducts other
information sharing and partnership activities with our European
counterparts to address security concerns of mutual interest. DHS and
Interpol have worked together to enable U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) screening of Advance Passenger Information System
manifests against Interpol's Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database.
This real-time sharing capability went online first at New York's John
F. Kennedy International Airport in October 2007, and has since been
expanded to eleven additional major international airports. DHS plans
to continue to expand the availability of this resource to strengthen
the ability to identify and interdict illicit and mala fide travel
documents and the travelers who use them. DHS also engages with EU
entities such as the Centre for Information, Discussion, and Exchange
on the crossing for Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI), which collects
information on legal immigration, illegal immigration, unlawful
residence, use of falsified documents, etc. DHS dispatched a
representative from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL) to Brussels to brief CIREFI on
successes and lessons learned as part of Operation WINGCLIP. Operation
WINGCLIP is a joint ICE-FDL-CBP operation for detecting, deterring, and
targeting terrorist and criminal organizations that exploit
international mail and express consignment services to ship travel and
identity documents to facilitate members' illicit travel throughout the
world. DHS views this kind of interaction and collaboration as
essential to enhancing and advancing our approaches to security threats
that may come from Europe.
Another key initiative designed to counter the potential threat
from Europe is our transformation of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) from
a program that looked for security threats solely on a country-by-
country basis into one that can now also screen for risks on an
individual passenger basis. As required by Section 711 of the
``Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007'' (9/11
Act), the governments of the 22 European countries that participate in
the VWP will be required to enter into more robust data sharing
arrangements with the United States with respect to both passenger
information and reporting of blank and issued lost and stolen
passports. These information sharing provisions have been at the
forefront of national and international initiatives to combat crime and
terrorism throughout the world, and will provide our operators and
analysts with new tools to secure the United States as well as help
prevent terrorist and criminal activities in VWP partner Nations.
European countries participating in the VWP will also be required to
repatriate their citizens, to enhance aviation and airport security,
and to improve the standards for national travel documents. All of the
above security measures will be taken into consideration during the
statutorily mandated VWP initial and continuing designation reviews DHS
conducts.
These new security frameworks will facilitate transatlantic travel
for the vast majority of travelers who pose no security or law
enforcement risks but make it increasingly difficult for terrorists and
other criminals. Another critical tool for substantially strengthening
the security of the VWP, and therefore countering any potential threats
from European countries, is the Electronic System for Travel
Authorization (ESTA). ESTA, which is also required by the 9/11 Act,
will provide DHS with the capability to conduct enhanced advance
screening of VWP travelers. Under ESTA, VWP travelers will be required
to electronically submit biographic and other information that is
largely the same as that currently collected via the I-94W Nonimmigrant
Alien Arrival/Departure Form (I-94W) to DHS prior to their departure
for the United States. ESTA applications will then be queried against
appropriate law enforcement databases and watch lists, enabling DHS to
make a determination on each individual's eligibility to travel to the
United States under the VWP. Travelers denied an ESTA will be referred
to the U.S. embassy or consulate to apply for a non-immigrant visa.
ESTA counterbalances known VWP vulnerabilities that may be exploited by
those with malicious intent by providing an additional layer of advance
scrutiny that illicit travelers must overcome prior to boarding a
carrier en route to the United States.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
CRIMINAL ALIENS
Question. The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office
of Detention and Removal estimates that of the total prison population
in the United States, 605,000 are foreign-born and that at least half
of those individuals may be eligible for deportation. Even though these
convicted criminals are held in Federal, State, and local custody, ICE
has not yet developed a comprehensive approach to identify incarcerated
aliens, review the crimes of which they have been convicted, track the
location of their incarceration, or monitor the time remaining prior to
their release. ICE must prioritize the removal of those who have
demonstrated the willingness and ability to commit violent and harmful
crimes. The fiscal year 2008 Homeland Security appropriations Act
includes $200 million to modernize the process used to identify and
remove criminal aliens from the United States. Have U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement's plans for the $200 million been briefed to
and approved by the Department leadership?
Answer. Department leadership has been briefed and provided
approval for plans which were submitted to Congress on March 25, 2008.
ICE is now working to revise and finalize the plan based on
Congressional feedback.
Question. Does the Department agree with and support ICE's plans
for modernizing the criminal alien program?
Answer. The plans were submitted to Congress with approval from the
Department.
Question. What assurances can the Department provide that while
this critically important effort is underway, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement will not lose focus on its other critical areas of
responsibility, such as trade enforcement and worksite enforcement?
Answer. You have my assurance that ICE will continue to make
progress, not only in trade enforcement and worksite enforcement, but
also in critical program areas to continue to keep our Nation safe.
NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE
NATIONAL COMMAND AND COORDINATION CAPABILITY
Question. The National Command and Coordination Capability program
objective of improving the Nation's crisis management capability
appears to overlap somewhat with other initiatives ongoing within the
Department to improve communications in an emergency, both nationally
and locally. How is this program being coordinated across the
Department?
Answer. The NCCC MCO, located within the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS's) National Protection and Programs Directorate, is an
office performing the integration activity to align Federal, State, and
local initiatives to ensure that end-to-end interoperability and
performance is achieved. In fiscal year 2008, the NCCC MCO is
establishing a requirements baseline, a functional decomposition, and
an enterprise architecture to define the scope and scale of the future
NCCC. This includes mapping existing systems and capabilities to the
NCCC Functional Decomposition to begin identification of gaps and
overlaps, beginning with programs across several DHS components and
offices. This work is coordinated with the Office of the Chief
Information Officer (OCIO), Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the Office
of Infrastructure Protection, and the Office of Emergency
Communications (OEC).
Through these activities, the NCCC MCO is identifying systems
already fielded at NCCC user sites. To increase the Nation's capability
to conduct collaborative decision making during times of crisis, the
NCCC MCO will initially deploy new secure mobile services to key
Federal leaders and governors, and will upgrade Federal and State fixed
sites to provide enhanced video conferencing and collaboration
capabilities. Site surveys conducted as part of this Initial Operating
Capability (IOC) deployment will identify gaps in capabilities and
identify redundancies. This will allow DHS to develop and implement a
transition plan to phase in new capabilities to address gaps and phase
out existing equipment and nodes to reduce redundancy.
The NCCC MCO is leading Integrated Project Teams (IPT), which are
creating program requirements documentation and system design
documentation to ensure that the program's IOC and Full Operating
Capability can provide the robust and assured communications
connectivity necessary to support information sharing and decision
making for the President and Vice President, and situational awareness
with the 35 Federal principals and 56 State and territorial governors.
The IPTs include representation from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, OEC, the National Communications System, DHS's Science and
Technology Directorate, DHS OCIO, DHS Operations Directorate (National
Operations Center), DHS I&A, as well as non-DHS entities such as the
National Guard Bureau, National Military Command Center, Program
Manager--Information Sharing Environment, White House Military Office,
White House Communications Agency, the Department of Defense (including
representatives from Homeland Defense, U.S. Strategic Command,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration, Defense Information Systems Agency, and Global Information
Grid Technical Foundation Global Network Operation), the Federal Bureau
of Investigations, and the National Security Agency.
Through these integration activities and the IPT partnerships, the
NCCC MCO will ensure that all programs contributing to crisis-
management capabilities are aligned and interoperable in support of the
enhanced crisis-management capabilities needed for the future.
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
DEBRIS REMOVAL
Question. Two and a half years after Hurricane Katrina, several
Mississippi counties and other entities remain in multi-million dollar
disputes with the Federal Emergency Management Agency regarding debris
removal reimbursement. In most cases, Federal Emergency Management
Agency officials were on the ground with local officials providing
advice and assistance as to what activities would qualify for
reimbursement. Considering the magnitude of this event and the good
faith efforts of local officials to clean up as quickly as possible,
what level of discretion do you feel is appropriate as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency reviews these cases?
Answer. FEMA leadership in Mississippi has sought every opportunity
to fully reimburse applicants for their debris removal costs,
consistent with the Stafford Act, 44 CFR regulations and FEMA policy
guidelines. To date, FEMA has obligated $713,338,001 for debris removal
operations for eligible applicants state-wide in addition to the
$975,000,000 in direct mission assignment expenditures for these
operations. FEMA project officers and debris specialists have worked
tirelessly with applicants to ensure their contracting and field
operations are consistent with Stafford Act and 44 CFR regulations.
Currently, we are reviewing 10 first appeals and one second appeal
requesting approximately $23 million. Among the issues raised are those
concerning non-competitive contracts that resulted in unreasonable
costs, ineligible debris, and discrepancies between claimed amounts and
field verifications. Although FEMA may have provided advice to
applicants on debris operations, in some cases that advice was not
always followed resulting in denied funding. FEMA's discretion is
limited by the Stafford Act requirement that all work must be related
to the declared disaster, and regulations that require reasonable costs
and adherence to competitive contracting procedures. However, in
reviewing these cases FEMA will attempt to assure that each applicant
receives all eligible reimbursement.
After Hurricane Katrina, there was a wide degree of variability in
estimation of debris from the storm and surge. This created tremendous
confusion in response and recovery efforts and severely impacted
efforts of local, State, and Federal response agencies. The ongoing
appeals of these estimations are costing taxpayers millions of dollars
as officials from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and
local officials continue to count tree stump samples and estimate by
eye from atop piles of debris.
Question. After Hurricane Katrina, there was a wide degree of
variability in estimation of debris from the storm and surge. This
created tremendous confusion in response and recovery efforts and
severely impacted efforts of local, State, and Federal response
agencies. The ongoing appeals of these estimations are costing
taxpayers millions of dollars as officials from the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and local officials continue to count tree
stump samples and estimate by eye from atop piles of debris. Does FEMA
currently make use of geospatial technologies that have been proven to
provide highly accurate estimates of debris? Do you support continued
development and implementation of these capabilities?
Answer. Not for decision-making, as we have yet to achieve the
necessary level of confidence that any geospatial technology can
provide an accurate estimate of debris. However, we have tasked USACE
to validate its debris-estimating model and make appropriate
adjustments to improve the quality of its estimates. USACE is also
developing a protocol for ground reconnaissance to supplement its
model. We believe that, over time, we can improve the accuracy of
debris estimates using geospatial technology and on-site inspections.
We believe that, over time, we can improve the accuracy of debris
estimates using geospatial technology and on-site inspections. FEMA
supports initiatives to improve this technology.
FORMALDEHYDE IN FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TRAILERS
Question. I understand the challenges presented by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention's recent findings regarding formaldehyde
in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) trailers. I was pleased
that FEMA began efforts to remedy the concerns almost immediately. Have
the results of the Alternative Housing Pilot Program grants awarded in
fiscal year 2007 shown any promise regarding alternative temporary
housing? Do you foresee any further consideration by FEMA of modular
housing technologies?
Answer. FEMA thanks the committee and actually began an aggressive
effort to find alternate housing for all travel trailer occupants
beginning last fall, ahead of CDC testing. We have been moving since
September an average of 800 families per week to other types of housing
including apartments. All of these efforts are dependent on housing
becoming available in the region. The Alternative Housing Pilot Program
grants have been awarded to Mississippi (2 projects), Alabama,
Louisiana, and Texas based on a competitive process conducted between
September 15, 2006 and October 20, 2006. The projects are the
Mississippi Cottage and Eco-cottage ($281,318,612), the Alabama Safe
Harbor Estates ($15,667,293), the Louisiana Katrina and Carpet Cottage
($74,542,370), and the Texas Heston home ($16,471,725).
The Mississippi program, managed by the Mississippi Emergency
Management Agency (MEMA), is furthest along. As of March 13, 2008 they
have 2,012 units ready for occupancy and 1,870 occupied. The Alabama
program is proceeding with site development. The Louisiana program is
working on site selection. The Texas program is now underway.
FEMA has asked HUD to evaluate building performance and the impact
of these projects on occupants' quality of life. Those studies are in
the early stages. The first published results will be available in
April of 2010, after the units have been lived in for some time.
Early indications suggest that the Mississippi One Bedroom Cottage
(Park Model) may be a viable option for housing disaster victims. Given
sufficient inventory and suitable sites, this model is rapidly
deployable. In addition, MEMA surveys and interviews of occupants have
resulted in positive feedback, with some residents already asking how
they can purchase the units. Based on the designs and high degree of
State involvement, we anticipate promising results from each of the
grantees.
In June 2006, FEMA established the Joint Housing Solutions Group
(JHSG) to evaluate temporary housing units, including modular designs,
for housing displaced occupants during a disaster. The JHSG conducted
outreach to more than 125 housing providers and identified 71 providers
with the potential to meet FEMA's disaster housing requirements. Of
this number, the JHSG conducted site visits to 41 providers, 29 of
which were modular home manufacturers. The JHSG continues to identify
and assess viable temporary housing alternatives and anticipates
piloting the most promising alternative housing units in the current
calendar year.
The JHSG has also coordinated closely with FEMA's Alternative
Housing Pilot Program (AHPP). The AHPP is a competitive grant program
created to support the identification and evaluation of housing
alternatives in the Gulf Coast. Four Gulf Coast States--Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas--are currently piloting alternative
manufactures, modular, and panelized housing units under this program.
The performance of AHPP units will be jointly evaluated by the JHSG and
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Evaluation results
will be used to identify high performing units for use on future FEMA
housing missions as appropriate.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY
Question. The President's Budget request for fiscal year 2009
indicates that the final decision on the site for the National Bio and
Agro-defense Facility will be made in October 2008. Given the national
importance of this project, can you ensure to this Committee that you
are doing everything to expedite the process and that this decision
will be made no later than October 2008?
Answer. As of March 2008, the schedule for the National Bio and
Agro-defense Facility (NBAF) is on target for final site selection in
October 2008. An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is being prepared
to determine the impacts of construction and operation of the proposed
NBAF at six sites. The draft EIS is scheduled to be issued in May 2008
and final EIS in September with a Record of Decision (selecting a
single site) in October 2008.
Question. The President's Budget request for fiscal year 2009
includes $35.6 million to begin the detailed design of the National Bio
and Agro-defense Facility. What are the total projected design costs
for the project?
Answer. The total projected design cost is $55 million. To date, $3
million has been spent for non-site specific design and site
characterization studies
Question. Could additional design, site preparation, or
construction funds be used in fiscal year 2009? If yes, how much and
for what purposes?
Answer. At this time, we anticipate the available and requested
funds to be sufficient for National Bio and Agro-defense Facility
(NBAF) activities in fiscal year 2009.
Question. Please provide the projected project schedule, by fiscal
year, including a cost breakdown and dates for initiation and
completion of each phase of the project.
Answer. Project schedule details, including costs and dates by
project phase, are given below.
--Fiscal year 2008--Planning, Conceptual Design, Site Selection and
Environment Impact Statement (including Siting Studies and Cost
Analysis)
--Milestone: Site Selection--October 2008
--Cost: $12 million
--Fiscal year 2009-fiscal year 2010--Site-specific Design
--Milestone: Completed Design--Spring 2010
--Cost: $50 million
--Fiscal year 2010-fiscal year 2014--Construction (4 years)
--Milestone: Groundbreaking--Spring 2010
--Milestone: Complete Construction--Summer 2014
--Cost: $588 million \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Note: The total preliminary cost estimate is being revised to
include site specific infrastructure and utility plant, IT/Security
requirements, appropriate levels of commissioning, contingency, and
fees. In-kind contributions have been requested from the consortiums to
off-set the site infrastructure costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
FEMA Erosion Funding
Question. I would like to commend FEMA for creating a new program
that I believe will be an important tool in aiding many of Alaska's
native villages suffering from severe erosion. I am pleased to see that
the budget includes $200 million for the Disaster Readiness and Support
Activities Program to assist FEMA in working with State and local
partners in preparing for future disasters. In past hearings and
discussions FEMA has stated that their hands are tied when it comes to
preparing in advance of a disaster. FEMA could only come to the
assistance of communities when a storm had almost arrived, or after the
storm hit. I'm hoping these funds will create a more common-sense
approach to disaster preparation, and will likely be a more efficient
use of Federal dollars by being proactive rather than merely reactive.
Will these funds be used to help villages in Alaska prepare before
a storm hits, rather than spending more money reacting after the storm
has already caused serious damage, including very serious erosion which
threatens the very existence of these villages? What other programs
does FEMA intend to use to help these villages?
Answer. The Disaster Readiness and Support Activities (DRSA)
appropriation is to directly support FEMA's disaster response readiness
capability in the form of pre-positioning and management of critical
commodities, managing the movement of those assets, stand-by support
contracts for technical assistance and inspection services, and some
administrative support costs for fixed disaster processing facilities.
In doing so, DRSA will facilitate FEMA's efforts to respond to
disasters as quickly as possible. This funding supports FEMA's costs
and are not available to State or local governments directly, but the
preparedness grant programs also administered by FEMA are directly
related to State, tribal and local planning and preparedness needs. As
noted above, the DRSA is intended to support FEMA disaster readiness
and logistic efforts. The Pre-Disaster Mitigation program is available
to provide technical assistance and competitive grant funding for pre-
disaster mitigation efforts by States.
Seafood Inspection
Question. How much of the funding that DHS is requesting for
Customs and Border Patrol will be devoted to improving the inspection
of seafood imports? How can CBP use these funds to decrease the amount
of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fish coming into the United
States?
Answer. Although Customs and Border Protection (CBP) plays an
essential role in ensuring the safety of all types of imported goods,
including seafood, CBP does not track the resources dedicated to
specific imports. Funding for import safety is part of CBP's Border
Security Inspections and Trade Facilitation funding category, which
totals $2.273 billion in fiscal year 2009.
To further enhance enforcement efforts, CBP initiates ``special
operations'' on an as-needed basis to focus on specific threats or
areas of concern. These special operations are more intense efforts
which focus on specific commodities, perhaps from specific countries
and/or importers/shippers/manufacturers during defined periods of time.
In the coming months, CBP plans to undertake special operations that
involve seafood.
High Seas Fishery Enforcement
Question. How much of the funding that DHS is requesting for the
Coast Guard will be used to improve to high seas fisheries enforcement?
How will the Coast Guard use this funding to improve its high seas
fisheries enforcement programs?
Answer. The Coast Guard does not budget nor allocate funding by
mission, but rather by Congressionally-established Appropriations. The
Coast Guard's appropriation structure supports multi-mission
requirements by allowing the service to surge and shift resources
across all missions. Coast Guard Operational Commanders use risk-based
decision plan operations, apportion constrained resources, and align
mission priorities. This level of resource flexibility is critical to
successful mission execution in a dynamic, demand-driven operational
environment. It is difficult to definitively predict a particular
mission's future ``level of effort.'' The fiscal year 2009 President's
Budget contains several initiatives that will support all Coast Guard
missions, including recapitalization of our operating assets,
sustainment of our aging infrastructure, improvement of our command and
control capabilities; and establishment of comprehensive intelligence
and awareness regimes.
High Seas Fisheries Enforcement is a component of the Coast Guard's
``Other Law Enforcement'' mission. This mission includes prevention of
illegal foreign fishing vessel encroachment in the U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) and enforcement of international agreements to
suppress damaging high seas illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
fishing. The following table provides an estimated percentage breakout
of Coast Guard Operating Expenses for the ``Other Law Enforcement''
mission based on operational data from fiscal year 2005 through 2007.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
-----------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Actual amount................................................... $56,516 $68,952 $90,714
Actual percent.................................................. 1.1 1.3 1.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fiscal year 2009 President's Budget includes several
initiatives that support all Coast Guard missions. These include
recapitalization and sustainment of the Coast Guard's major cutter and
maritime patrol aircraft fleets; significant shore infrastructure
projects; improvements to our command and control capabilities; and
establishment of comprehensive intelligence and awareness regimes.
Compliance with international fisheries agreements such as the U.N.
Moratorium on large-scale high seas driftnet operations in the North
Pacific remains a priority for Coast Guard living marine resource
enforcement efforts. Coast Guard Operational Commanders will conduct
risk-based decision making to determine the appropriate level of
``Other Law Enforcement'' mission effort based on finite total
resources. Examples of the Coast Guard's recent significant domestic
and international fisheries enforcement actions are detailed in the
following Congressional reports:
--Annual Living Marine Resources Law Enforcement Summary--fiscal year
2007, March 2008.
--Report on Foreign Fishing Vessel Incursions into the United States'
Exclusive Economic Zone, January 2008.
We can provide copies of these reports as a briefing if helpful.
Cutter Acushnet
Question. It is my understanding that the Coast Guard plans to
decommission the Cutter Acushnet in 2009. If this vessel is
decommissioned how will this impact the operational capability of the
Coast Guard to perform its safety and fishery enforcement missions,
including Maritime Boundary Line patrols, in the Bering Sea and
Aleutian Islands?
Answer. The Coast Guard is committed to providing continued service
in the Bering Sea and Alaska AOR. The majority of CGC ACUSHNET's
patrols are conducted in the Bering Sea, along the Maritime Boundary
Lines and the Aleutian Chain. In advance of CGC ACUSHNET's planned
decommissioning, the Coast Guard has adjusted cutter in-port,
maintenance and patrol schedules to ensure there is no negative impact
to the Coast Guard's operational capability to perform safety and
fishery enforcement missions in the Bering Sea. As emerging operational
requirements dictate, additional patrols may be added using legacy WHEC
378s.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Arlen Specter
Question. Most hospitals do not have the ability to handle large
numbers of casualties--so called ``surge capacity.'' I have long-
supported grants to States and cities, through the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), for planning, coordination and
facility needs related to surge capacity. These Hospital Emergency
Planning Grants have been steadily reduced from approximately $515
million in fiscal year 2004 to $423 million in fiscal year 2008, and
only $361 million is proposed for fiscal year 2009. I remain concerned
that hospitals do not have the resources they need to be prepared for a
terrorist attack. In Washington, DC, for example, I am advised that
there are fewer than 3,000 beds. In light of HHS funding cuts and the
existing need to ensure our hospital facilities are prepared, what can
the Department do to ensure that there is adequate surge capacity
available to respond to an attack or emergency situation?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to work
with the HHS in developing a unified approach for planning,
coordination and facility needs related to ``surge capacity.'' The DHS
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) program, as part of the
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), provides funding to designated
localities to assist in maintaining and updating plans, delivering
training, purchasing equipment and pharmaceuticals, and conducting
exercises. The mission of MMRS is to enhance local medical incident
management's ability to coordinate and respond to a mass casualty event
during the crucial first hours, until significant external resources
arrive and become operational. One of the goals of the MMRS program in
fiscal year 2008 is to ``increase collaboration with the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, specifically the Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) Hospital Preparedness
Program and the Healthcare Facilities Partnership Program.'' In
addition to the MMRS Program, the State Homeland Security Program
(SHSP) and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) can also support
planning, coordination, and facility needs related to ``surge
capacity.'' In addition, the fiscal year 2008 MMRS Guidance provides
guidance to the 124 eligible MMRS jurisdictions to give priority
attention to improving Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment
capability within the Target Capabilities List.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
Question. Mr. Secretary, America has about 200 land ports of entry,
and it has been more than 20 years since we launched a major effort to
upgrade infrastructure at those ports. We took an important step
towards addressing that problem in last year's Homeland Security
Appropriations bill, when we required your Department and GSA to report
to Congress on our land port of entry needs and vulnerabilities at
least every other year.
Where is your Department in preparing this assessment?
Answer. CBP plans to refresh its inventory assessment, and to
submit the bi-annual report as required by January 31, 2009.
Specifically, beginning in 2004, to ensure CBP land ports of entry
(LPOEs) continue to meet the critical dual mission of protecting our
Nation's borders and facilitating lawful international trade and
travel, CBP has implemented a comprehensive Capital Investment Planning
(CIP) process to identify and prioritize captial projects on a national
basis. The CIP includes strategic resource assessments (SRAs), a
capital project prioritization method, portfolio planning tools, and a
5-year investment strategy. A critical step in the CIP is the SRA, a
needs assessment process that incorporates internal and external
stakeholders input, a review of existing facility conditions, workload
and personnel forecasts, space capacity analyses, and recommended
options to meet current and future space needs. The goal of the SRA is
to gather and present data to support the prioritization of facility
projects on a national level within CBP. CBP plans to refresh and build
upon this assessment during 2008.
Question. How does your Department's fiscal year 2009 budget
request address our land port of entry needs?
Answer. The fiscal year 2009 budget request includes $75 million in
Federal Buildings Fund appropriations for the U.S. General Services
Administration (GSA) to complete Phase 1 improvements at the Nation's
busiest land port of entry--San Ysidro, CA--and to address critical
needs at the Portal, ND land port of entry. The fiscal year 2009 budget
request also includes $10 million that will enable CBP to begin to
address requirements at outdated CBP-owned land ports of entry.
Question. Mr. Secretary, I was concerned and dismayed to read last
week that plans to build a virtual border fence are being scaled back
and delayed for years. We must get control of our borders, and these
problems, on top of the failure of the America's Shield Initiative, are
unacceptable.
What is the Department doing to quickly address the problems
recently discovered with the virtual fence in Arizona?
Answer. DHS has been forthcoming about the technical deficiencies
identified in the P-28 module. As good stewards of taxpayers' money,
DHS held Boeing accountable for all contract deliverables, resulting in
the delay in acceptance of P-28. After a period of operational testing,
additional deficiencies were identified and subsequently corrected to
DHS's satisfaction. DHS is building upon lessons learned to develop a
new border-wide architecture that will incorporate upgraded software,
mobile and fixed surveillance systems, unattended ground sensors and an
improved communication system to enable better connectivity for overall
performance.
Question. How does your Department's fiscal year 2009 budget work
to rectify these problems?
Answer. It is important to clarify that P-28 was the initial
demonstration of the feasibility of SBInet's integrated technology
concept. As such, P-28 was designed to be an operational prototype that
could be tested, evaluated, serve as the initial building block for the
system's future technology and provide valuable lessons learned. It was
not intended to be a final operational configuration. P-28 provides
operational technology in an area that did not have these resources and
has increased CBP's effectiveness in this area along the Arizona-Mexico
border.
DHS and CBP will now take the valuable lessons learned and focus on
the development of the future SBInet solution. As a matter of fact,
lessons learned from P-28 have already been incorporated into the next
iteration of the SBInet integrated system design including improved
sensors, software and communications. These improvements will further
CBP's ability to fully integrate detection, identification, and
classification of border incursions within a common operating picture
and will be implemented as part of the Calendar Year 2008 deployments
in Arizona. One critical lesson learned that led to the deceleration of
the deployment schedule is the need for a Systems Integration Lab (SIL)
to evaluate new hardware being introduced into the operational
environment. The lab will help determine the effectiveness of the
hardware within our system of towers, sensors, communication, common
operating picture hardware and software prior to fielding across the
U.S. border.
Even as a technology demonstrator, P-28 provides agents with a much
greater degree of constant surveillance and a shared situational
awareness of operations in the field. CBP personnel in the command
center now receive additional alerts and notifications of potential
illegal activity cued by radar and then further examined by the
integrated cameras before deploying agents to respond. Agents deployed
in the field using vehicle mounted Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs) have an
improved picture of the location of ``blue and red forces'' in their
vehicle. P-28 uses a variety of technologies including cameras and
radar to give agents the information they need to make deployment and
interdiction decisions in their area of responsibility. Today, P-28 is
providing operational value which has assisted in the apprehension of
over 2,500 illegal aliens and smugglers since late September 2007.
DHS is building upon lessons learned to develop a new border-wide
architecture that will incorporate upgraded software, mobile and fixed
surveillance systems, unattended ground sensors and an improved
communication system to enable better connectivity for overall
performance. There have not been changes to DHS's overall plan to
deploy a tower-based integrated sensor and common operating picture
concept. DHS is confident that this type of technology solution will be
used in other selected border locations where it makes sense. Along
with other tools and techniques, this solution will contribute to CBP's
efforts to secure our Nation's borders.
Question. Are you considering revising your request to provide more
funding for actual border fencing because of problems with virtual
fencing?
Answer. No. Requests for additional funding are based on
operational requirements for additional fence, which are based on
traffic trends and patterns provided by OBP.
Much of the land on the New Mexico/Mexico international border is
Federal land. In the last 2 years, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
has received a $2.5 million increase to its Law Enforcement budget and
has requested an additional $1 million increase in its Hazardous
Materials Management budget to address border issues and environmental
degradation associated with illegal immigration on its lands in the
Southwest.
Question. What type of support and funding is your Department
providing BLM and other agencies that manage Federal lands for their
work associated with illegal immigration and border security matters
such as conducting NEPA studies for the construction of border fencing?
Answer. CBP/OBP does not fund BLM or other Federal agencies for
their costs for environmental remediation resulting from illegal
immigration and border security matters. CBP/OBP works closely and
cooperatively, with Federal agencies, State agencies and tribes in the
region regarding environmental aspects of border security efforts
within each agency's own mission, legal and budget authorities. CBP
does pay for environmental costs directly related to Tactical
Infrastructure in compliance with applicable environmental laws. Also,
under the Economy Act, CBP reimburses the BLM and other Federal
agencies for their services provided to CBP. These reimbursement
arrangements are pre-negotiated and defined--typically using
interagency agreements.
Question. How are funding and responsibilities on these issues
divided between your Department and the Departments that have
responsibilities for Federal lands?
Answer. CBP funds direct costs for construction of the fence and
associated costs for mitigating environmental impacts such as testing
and protecting archeological sites within the construction corridor and
mitigation costs for impacts to endangered species. In addition, CBP
funded USFWS to provide direct support to CBP regarding ESA compliance
for the SBInet programs. This included funding toward a web based
planning tool to assist CBP sectors to streamline planning for projects
and potential impacts to endangered species.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
Question. The Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) at Fort
McClellan, in Anniston, Alabama, is the cornerstone of our Nation's
emergency responder training facilities and the only civilian live-
agent training facility in the country. The CDP is one of several
facilities across the country where we are training our Nation's first
responders in a variety of disciplines. This year it is expected that
CDP will train approximately 75,000 people through on-site, mobile and
train the trainer programs. In the President's Budget request, the
Center for Domestic Preparedness' base budget is reduced by $15.5
million from the enacted level of $62.5 million in fiscal year 2008 to
$47 million for fiscal year 2009. This reduction brings about several
questions:
Why are you proposing such a drastic decrease in funding? Please
give me a detailed justification for this change.
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) fully recognize the importance of
the training conducted at the Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP).
CDP is a key member of the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium
(NDPC) and the only Federal chartered weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
training facility.
CDP's budget has undergone continuous review since the facility was
transferred to FEMA from DHS last year. That review has resulted in the
detailed examination of redundancies in the collective training offered
by the CDP and its fellow NDPC and FEMA training centers, while
simultaneously reaffirming the importance of the CDP core mission of
providing live chemical agent training at its Chemical, Ordnance,
Biological, and Radiological Training Facility (COBRATF). As a result,
FEMA believes that CDP will be able to meet its core program
requirements and goals with the President's $47 million request. FEMA
is dedicated to continuing to look for ways to effectively manage the
resources provided to CDP, as well as all other training facilities, to
gain the greatest advantages for training partners and the taxpayer.
Question. Does this reduction in funding reflect a trend within the
administration toward reducing preparedness training?
Answer. Please see previous response.
Question. The Center for Domestic Preparedness is a unique
facility. It is the only live agent training program in the country. A
training center like this could not be built today. This budget in
effect reduces funding for a critical piece of our first responder
training that cannot be done anywhere else in the country. Please
explain to me why the President's budget in effect calls for the
curtailing of live agent training?
Answer. The fiscal year 2009 Presidents budget provides the Center
for Domestic Preparedness with $47 million to fund its operations. DHS
and FEMA continue to review CDP spending since transferred to FEMA this
past year. We have provided enhanced management, in the process of
streamlining contracts with vendors and training contractors, providing
greater oversight of expenditures and stipends and believe that this
request is adequate to support CDP's requirements for fiscal year 2009.
FEMA continues to look for ways to effectively manage the resources
provided to CDP to gain the best advantage for our training partners
and the taxpayer.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Larry Craig
Question. Mr. Secretary, the use of National Guard members on the
border in my opinion has been a big help in assisting our border patrol
agents secure parts of our border. Although they do not play an active
role in detaining illegals crossing the border, they are certainly
playing a major role in deterrence. Although I am not in favor of
permanent Guard duty on the border, there is certainly a need right
now. How much longer do you envision us needing to have National Guard
on our southern border?
Answer. The end of Operation Jump Start should not be associated
with an end to the partnership between the Border Patrol and the
National Guard. This partnership pre-dates Operation Jump Start and is
expected to continue. Operation Jump Start was intended as a short term
``bridge'' to fill the gap until the Border Patrol could hire
additional agents and put additional tactical infrastructure in place.
Operation Jump Start was originally staffed with over 6,000
National Guard members. On June 15, 2007, these forces were reduced to
3,000. The force reduction was a smooth transition and had little
impact on operations. As the National Guard begins to transition out of
Operation Jump Start, the National Guard will continue to support the
Border Patrol through ``counter-drug'' missions and by participating in
annual training projects that are mutually beneficial.
Question. DHS is steadily moving towards full implementation of the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. However, as has been mentioned,
Congress mandated that full implementation cannot take place until DHS
certifies that it is ready to handle implementation of June of 2009,
which ever comes first. As of now, is DHS planning on taking until
June, 2009 before full implementation or do you believe that DHS will
be able to certify to Congress it is ready for full implementation
before then? If before then, what timeframe are you looking at for
certification?
Answer. In the most recent Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Congress delayed the WHTI implementation, mandating that WHTI not be
implemented until at least June 1, 2009. The Department is complying
with the Act by not implementing WHTI before that date. DHS and CBP
anticipate meeting all the requirements for certification this summer.
Question. Certainly the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative was
designed to secure our borders and allow us to know who is coming
across our borders. However, both our northern and southern borders are
simply too vast to man with border patrol agents alone. I applaud DHS
for utilizing new technologies such as UAV's (unmanned aerial vehicles)
and other emerging technologies. While I recognize that the virtual
border fence, or Project 28, has received some negative reporting from
the GAO, what does the future look like for this type of ``virtual''
monitoring and inspection for use along our northern border? Also, what
other steps are being done now to ensure that we are able to track
people coming across the border by foot, atv's or other means whereby
they can avoid going through border crossings?
Answer. As part of the fiscal year 2007 Appropriations Act,
Congress directed that $20 million be used ``to begin addressing needs
along the northern border.'' A demonstration project was planned and
has been approved to achieve the following objectives:
--Develop a prototype that demonstrates an integrated air, land, and
maritime security solution in an area of the northern border;
areas selected is the St. Clair River/northern Lake St. Clair
border zone in the Detroit Sector;
--Improve situational awareness and increase target detection with an
integrated air, land, and maritime tactical picture; and
--Improve Port of Entry (POE) security by integrating existing
cameras and installing additional security fencing to funnel
pedestrian traffic into the POE.
Although successful completion of these objectives may improve
operational capabilities and provide technical insight for a final
SBInet solution, the Northern Border Demonstration is not meant to
uncover the final solution for the Detroit Sector or for the rest of
the northern border, provide 24/7 surveillance or total situational
awareness of the AOR, or enable operational control of the AOR. The
project will demonstrate the technology that will enable coordinated
CBP A&M and BP operations for control of the northern maritime border.
The demonstration will include integrating sensors and air assets with
a C2 Center to create a COP for improved situational awareness. This
demonstration, combined with the requirements analysis and system
engineering being conducted in Program Management Task Order (PMTO) and
its follow-on task order, will be used to update the system-level
requirements to address the northern border challenges.
The project will be managed in phases, called spirals. Each spiral
will develop capabilities and test those capabilities over time with
agents and officers in the field. This approach reduces risk and allows
time for the system to mature and better meet the operational needs of
the people using it.
Current plans are to deploy the SBInet integrated technology
solution to two locations in Arizona by the end of CY 2009, barring any
major shifts in the cross-border threat. CBP has completed technology
requirement assessments of the Yuma and Tucson Sectors and will look to
fill those needs first as they are presently the highest threat areas.
But expanding the integrated tower-based system is not all CBP is doing
in the interim for technology between our ports of entry. For example,
CBP currently has 4 Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS) in operation and
plans to deploy an additional 36 MSS this year to the Southwest brder
to serve as primary detection platforms. While some MSS will eventually
be replaced by a more cost-effective, integrated radar/camera tower
under SBInet the highly mobile MSS units can be used to ``fill gaps''
of surveillance coverage, temporarily replace a sensor tower down for
maintenance, or rapidly deploy to a ``hot'' area needing extra
coverage. By October, 2,500 new unattended ground sensors will replace
and add to our existing numbers, for a total of nearly 8,500 sensors
deployed across our Southwest and Northern Borders.
Question. The 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program places IED
prevention at a top priority but provides little specific guidance for
equipment purchases and other eligible expenditures (training, plan
development, etc.). How does DHS intend to ensure that the funds do not
get spent on large dollar items (i.e. operations center software,
communications systems, GIS, etc.) and instead are used to enhance the
capabilities of bomb-squads? Is the Department going to task the Office
for Bombing Prevention and FEMA to issue specific guidance out on what
equipment should be a priority for purchase under this program?
Answer. DHS employs a number of monitoring and tracking systems and
protocols in order to help ensure that Federal homeland security funds
are expended in accordance with our grant guidance. With the fiscal
year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), DHS is requiring
grantees to spend a portion of their funds towards three priorities,
including IED prevention. Grantees will be able to identify proposed
funding investments relative to IED as part of their grant application
process. A rigorous peer review component is part of the HSGP
application process that helps to ensure projects, including those for
IED prevention, are sound investments. Once awards are made, grantees
will be required to input their funding activities into the
Department's Grants Reporting Tool (GRT). The Department will review
GRT data inputs in order to ensure that grantees are in compliance with
the IED spending priorities identified in fiscal year 2008 HSGP.
Each State is directly monitored on an annual basis (and each UASI
biannually) to ensure compliance with grants guidance regulations and
also to gauge the overall progress of activities undertaken with
Federal homeland security funds. Monitoring systems and protocols will
be updated to ensure that the DHS personnel engage in discussions with
grantees and systematically track progress (both ongoing and achieved)
relative to IED deterrence, prevention, and response capabilities.
FEMA and OBP will be closely engaged at all levels of monitoring to
ensure both coordination and transparency and measurable outcomes.
DHS's Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) is using its National
Capabilities Analysis Database, which gathers and analyzes State and
local IED security capabilities, to support FEMA and its grantees in
identifying investments that will improve needed capabilities. In
addition, OBP has, since 2003, been working directly with the National
Bomb Squad Commanders' Advisory Board to assess operational gaps and
develop roadmaps for technology development to meet those gaps.
In addition, OBP and FEMA are working in concert to develop
supplemental guidance which will provide the emergency response
community with a comprehensive approach to strengthening the
capabilities needed to deter, prevent against, and respond to the
threat of improvised explosive devices (IED). Specifically, the
supplemental guidance will identify appropriate planning, organization,
equipment, training, and exercise activities that address counter-IED
capability gaps. DHS expects the supplemental guidance to be released
within the next few weeks.
Question. DHS has stopped the training programs previously provided
by the Officer for Bombing Prevention; we have heard from many first
responders that the training was important and well received. Is
another part of the Department providing this training now? If so, how
many courses have been taught since the programs were transferred? What
is the level of funding dedicated to this training?
Answer. Two advanced training courses that were sponsored by the
Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) are now sponsored by the State of
California: Weapons of Mass Destruction/Improved Explosive Device
Electronics and Underwater Hazardous Device Search. These courses are
listed in the catalogue of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--
approved, State-sponsored training courses, and funding for first
responders associated with accessing this training is available through
FEMA's Homeland Security Grant Program.
Furthermore, OBP created the Underwater Terrorism Prevention
Program (UTPP), which frequently incorporates the Underwater Hazardous
Device Search course as part of its planning activity. The UTPP has
been transferred to the U.S. Coast Guard and is ongoing.
Question. A large amount of money has gone into research and
development for explosives detection for TSA and other DHS components;
however there seems to be little effort underway to develop and field
equipment for bomb squads and other local responders that may have to
deal with the potential of a wave of bombings in the homeland. Can you
tell the committee what specific efforts are underway to develop and
field equipment to non-Federal entities such as bomb squads; what is
the dollar value of those efforts; what specific pieces of equipment
have been fielded? Does the Department have a process for identifying
technology requirements of local bomb squads and other responders based
on an operational gap analysis and technology roadmap?
Answer. Beyond providing State and local governments and private-
sector partners with the information and knowledge to meet the
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is investing heavily in developing technologies and
building capabilities. This year alone, more than $1.7 billion is
available through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA's)
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), which has identified IED
preparedness as one of its three funding priorities. These funds will
support State and local authorities in purchasing advanced equipment,
such as robotic platforms, diagnostic tools, and render-safe
technologies, as well as communications and protective equipment needed
for a safe and effective response. HSGP funds, along with funding from
the Transit Security Grant Program, can also be used to build detection
capabilities, such as training and deploying additional explosives
detection canine teams or other detection technologies.
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Office for Bombing
Prevention (OBP) is using its National Capabilities Analysis Database
(NCAD), which gathers and analyzes State and local Improvised Explosive
Device (IED) security capabilities, to support the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and its grantees in identifying investments that will
improve needed capabilities. NCAD uses a task-based capability analysis
and assessment methodology that is aligned with the Universal Task List
and Target Capabilities List. In addition, OBP has been working
directly with the National Bomb Squad Commanders' Advisory Board since
2003 to assess operational gaps and develop roadmaps for technology
development to meet those gaps.
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) has been designated to lead the Federal
effort to develop domestic counter-IED technologies. S&T has set up a
special Counter-IED Integrated Product Team (IPT), co-chaired by OBP
and the Secret Service, to leverage existing multi-agency research and
investments to deter, predict, detect, defeat, and mitigate the impact
of IED attacks. The IPT process links customers, such as State and
local first responders, with industry and academic research to ensure
that needed technologies are being developed and that those
technologies meet the requirements of their customers. S&T and OBP are
also working with the Department of Defense to transfer technologies
developed for the international counter-IED fight to domestic
applications. In fiscal year 2007, $2.5 million was allocated to the
Technical Support Working Group to develop technologies to deploy to
State and local bomb squads. Technologies developed with these funds
include robotic platforms, electronic countermeasures (ECM) kits, and
tool characterization. Over the past year, S&T has accelerated and
bolstered its research and development of counter-IED technologies and
products. Counter-IED innovations under development and deployed
include ECM; vehicle-borne IED render-safe tools; blast-mitigation
protective measures; IED, homemade explosives, and hostile-intent
detection technologies; and explosives-neutralization methodologies.
Question. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has proposed a rule
to require certain information from general aviation international
flights and this information must be electronically transmitted to CBP.
Many pilots--including many in Idaho--fly to and from remote areas with
no internet access.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has proposed a rule to require
certain information from general aviation international flights and
this information must be electronically transmitted to CBP. Many
pilots--including many in Idaho--fly to and from remote areas with no
internet access. How does CBP and the Department plan to address this
issue? Have you met with the general aviation community to address this
problem? When does CBP plan to issue a final rule?
Answer. The proposed rule published in the Federal Register on
September 18, 2007, requires the pilot to submit information
electronically no later than 60 minutes before an arriving private
aircraft departs from a foreign location and no later than 60 minutes
before a private aircraft departs the United States for a foreign port
or place. The pilot may authorize another party with internet access to
submit the information on their behalf. In addition, while the pilot
must submit the information no later than the 60 minutes prior to
departure, there is no maximum time frame for submission. Thus, a pilot
may submit the required information to CBP days, even months in advance
of travel. This would allow the pilot to file the required information
from less remote locations with internet access well in advance of
traveling to, or returning from, remote locations that may lack
internet access.
CBP has met with the general aviation community to discuss this
issue. A total of 2,907 comments were received in response to the
proposed rule, published on September 18, 2007, in the Federal
Register, during the comment period. CBP is working to address these
concerns.
CBP will not issue a final rule regarding Advance Information on
Private Aircraft Arriving and Departing the United States until the
rule is reviewed and cleared by the Department of Homeland Security and
the Office of Management and Budget. As the rule is still undergoing
review, CBP at this time does not have an anticipated publication date.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, on
behalf of the committee, I thank you very much for your
presence, and for your testimony, and your responses.
[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., Tuesday, March 4, the hearing
was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009
----------
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
[The following testimonies were received by the
Subcommittee on Homeland Security for inclusion in the record.
The submitted materials relate to the fiscal year 2009 budget
request for programs within the subcommittee's jurisdiction.]
Prepared Statement of the American Public Transportation Association
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony
to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security on the
security and safety of public transportation systems. I appreciate your
interest in improving security for the millions of Americans who use
transit daily, and look forward to working with the subcommittee as it
develops the fiscal year 2009 appropriations bill for the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). I offer this testimony to request $750 million
in transit security funding in the fiscal year 2009 Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations bill and provide our comments on DHS's
2008 Transit Security Grant Program guidance.
ABOUT APTA
The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a
nonprofit international association of more than 1,500 public and
private member organizations, including transit systems and commuter
rail operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms;
product and service providers; academic institutions; transit
associations and State departments of transportation. APTA members
serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical
transit services and products. More than 90 percent of the people using
public transportation in the United States and Canada are served by
APTA member systems.
FUNDING REQUEST
Mr. Chairman, public transportation is a critical component of our
Nation's infrastructure. Americans take more than 10.3 billion transit
trips each year. People use public transportation vehicles more than 34
million times each weekday. This is eighteen times the number of daily
boardings on the Nation's domestic airlines.
Both the Administration and Congress have fully acknowledged that
terrorist threats to transit agencies are real, and have not
diminished. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a 2002
report which said ``about one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide
target transportation systems, and transit systems are the mode most
commonly attacked.'' On February 29, 2008, the Office of Intelligence
of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) released a report
concluding that public transportation in America remains vulnerable to
terrorist attack. The report States, ``The volume of previous attacks
and recent plotting against mass transit systems overseas demonstrates
continued strong terrorist interest in targeting this sector.'' The
report further States that, ``Previous rail attacks in Madrid, London,
and Mumbai could inspire terrorists to conduct similar attacks in the
United States.''
Safety and security have always been the top priority of the public
transportation industry. Since 9/11, transit systems have taken many
steps to further improve security. Public transit agencies with State
and local governments, have invested billions of dollars on security
and emergency preparedness programs. While we are pleased that Congress
recognizes the importance of investing in the safety of public
transportation, Federal investment in transit security has been minimal
when compared to other transportation modes. For example, since 9/11
the Federal Government has spent over $24 billion on aviation security
and only $898 million for transit security.
In 2004, APTA surveyed U.S. transit agencies to determine what
actions were needed to improve security for their customers, employees
and facilities. In response to the survey, transit agencies around the
country identified in excess of $6 billion in transit security
investment needs. State and local governments and transit agencies are
doing what they can, but it is important for the Federal Government to
increase support for transit security.
Last August, President Bush signed into law H.R. 1, the 9/11
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007. The legislation authorizes $3.4
billion in transit security funding over a four year period. We ask
that Congress provide $750 million in the Homeland Security
Appropriations bill, consistent with the authorized level for fiscal
year 2009 in H.R. 1. We are extremely disappointed that the
Administration proposed only $175 million for transit security in the
fiscal year 2009 DHS budget proposal, which would be a cut of $225
million from the $400 million that Congress appropriated for transit
security for fiscal year 2008, and significantly less than the $750
million authorized in H.R. 1. Federal funding for transit security
needs should provide for both hard and soft costs as described below
and be separate from investments in the Federal transit capital
program.
In addition, we urge Congress to provide $600,000 to maintain and
operate the Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC).
Funding for this program was authorized under the 9/11 Commission bill
under Section 1410(d), which provides for the sharing of security
information between transit agencies and DHS. The ability to share
vital information is crucial in preventing and mitigating potential
terrorist attacks.
We also urge Congress to provide $500,000 to DHS for the APTA
security standards program. APTA is recognized as a Standards
Development Organization (SDO) for the public transportation industry.
H.R. 1 requires that DHS work with the transit industry. We are
applying our growing expertise in standards development to transit
industry safety and security, best practices, guidelines and standards.
Over the last several years, APTA has worked closely with the
Department of Transportation (DOT), DHS and industry leaders to develop
standards that help transit agencies use available resources as
effectively as possible. We request $500,000 in the DHS Appropriations
bill to continue this important work.
FISCAL YEAR 2008 TRANSIT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM GUIDANCE
Last year, Congress enacted H.R. 1, the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations Act of 2007. That law authorizes significant increases
for transit security grants, and gives specific instructions on how DHS
must distribute funds. APTA was pleased to have the opportunity to form
a working group among our members to help the Administration deliver
grants in the most efficient manner, while fully complying with the
intent of the statute. Regrettably, DHS failed to consider our input.
In fact, the current distribution process not only ignores the
industry's recommendations, but in many cases violates the statute.
First, H.R. 1 included conference report language directing DHS to
distribute grants directly to transit agencies. However, DHS has chosen
to ignore this directive. Instead, DHS has distributed transit security
funds to States who continue to administer the program and retain 3
percent in management and administrative costs while providing no
additional value in the distribution of the grant program.
In addition, the new guidance requires a local cost share. For
operational costs, the maximum Federal share is 66 percent of the total
cost. The fiscal year 2009 guidance reduces the Federal share to 50
percent. The guidance also imposes a 25 percent local match for the
purchase of equipment, management and administration activities. As you
know, there is no local cost share requirement authorized in H.R. 1.
Furthermore, the new grants guidance specifically excludes items in
H.R. 1 that should be considered for funding such as chemical-
biological detection, and redundant Operation Control Centers. We
appreciate the flexibility that H.R. 1 provided in allowing a broad
range of items for consideration of funding, yet DHS is ignoring this
legislative language and restricting the use of Federal funds.
APTA appreciates the challenges that DHS faces in implementing the
new authorizing statute, and hopes that the agency will fully consider
the transit industry's recommendations in the future. We look forward
to working with Congress in the upcoming year to ensure that the grants
distribution process complies with H.R. 1, and allows transit agencies
maximum flexibility to implement the transit security improvements.
SECURITY INVESTMENT NEEDS
Mr. Chairman, since the events of 9/11, the transit industry has
invested billions of its own funds for enhanced security measures,
building on the industry's already considerable efforts. At the same
time, our industry conducted comprehensive reviews to determine how we
further improve on existing security practices. This effort has
included a range of activities, which include research, best practices,
education, information sharing in the industry, and surveys. As a
result we have a better understanding of how to create a more secure
environment for our riders and of the most critical security investment
needs.
Our survey of public transportation security identified
enhancements of at least $5.2 billion in additional capital funding to
maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security functions to
meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in increased costs
for security personnel, training, technical support, and research and
development have been identified, bringing total additional transit
security funding needs to more than $6 billion.
Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for
which they required additional Federal investment for security
improvements. Priority examples of operational improvements include:
--Funding current and additional transit agency and local law
enforcement personnel
--Funding for over-time costs and extra security personnel during
heightened alert levels
--Training for security personnel
--Joint transit/law enforcement training
--Security planning activities
--Security training for other transit personnel
Priority examples of security capital investment improvements
include:
--Radio communications systems
--Security cameras on-board transit vehicles and in transit stations
--Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas
--Automated vehicle locator systems
--Security fencing around facilities
Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a
priority need for Federal capital funding for intrusion detection
devices.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Homeland Security issued directives
for the transit industry in May 2004 which would require that transit
agencies beef up security and to take a series of precautions to set
the stage for more extensive measures without any Federal funding
assistance. Transit agencies have already carried out many of the
measures that Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has called
for, such as drafting security plans, removing trash bins and setting
up procedures to deal with suspicious packages. The cost of these
measures and further diligence taken during times of heightened alert
is of particular concern to us. We look forward to working with you in
addressing these issues.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, in light of the Nation's heightened security needs
since 9/11, we believe that increased Federal investment in public
transportation security is critical. The public transportation industry
has made great strides in transit security improvements since 9/11 but
much more needs to be done. We need the Federal Government to increase
its support for transit security grants that help transit systems
address the $6 billion in identified transit security investment needs.
We urge this subcommittee to provide $750 million in the fiscal year
2009 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill. We urge
Congress to fund the Public Transit ISAC and the APTA security
standards program as previously described. We urge Congress to include
legislative language to correct the DHS's implementation of the fiscal
year 2008 grant program guidance to reflect the authorization law.
We have also found that investment in public transit security
programs, resources and infrastructures provides a direct benefit in
preparation and response to natural disasters as well. We look forward
to building on our relationship with the Department of Homeland
Security and Congress to better address these needs. We thank you and
the subcommittee for allowing us to provide testimony on these critical
issues and look forward to working with you to improve safety and
security for the millions of people who use transit every day.
______
Prepared Statement of the Association of State Floodplain Managers
The Association of State Floodplain Managers (ASFPM) and its 26
State Chapters represent over 11,000 State and local officials as well
as other professionals engaged in all aspects of floodplain management
and hazard mitigation. This includes floodplain management, mapping,
engineering, hydrology, flood mitigation, forecasting, water resources,
planning, community development, emergency response and insurance. All
ASFPM members are concerned with reducing our Nation's flood-related
losses. Our State and local officials are the Federal Government's
partners in implementing flood mitigation and flood insurance programs
and working to achieve our shared objectives. Our State members head
offices that are designated by the State governors to coordinate the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) with local jurisdictions.
In general, the Association of State Floodplain Managers is pleased
with the funding requested for an on-going flood mapping program and
with the funding requested for the repetitive flood loss grant programs
that are funded under the National Flood Insurance Program. We would
urge the Committee to fully fund the Flood Mitigation Assistance grant
program at its authorized level of $40 million. In addition, we urge
that the Pre-Disaster Mitigation grant program under the Stafford Act
be funded at a level significantly higher than the budget request of
$75 million.
flood mitigation assistance program (sec. 1366)
The budget request includes $35.7 million from the National Flood
Insurance Fund for the regular Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA)
program. The program was authorized at $40 million in the Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 2004 to incorporate an enhanced capability to
mitigate repetitive flood loss properties in addition to its support of
local mitigation planning and other projects.
In the past, FEMA had determined that FMA could be funded only from
Federal policy fee income rather than from premium income and funds
were provided by transfer from the National Flood Insurance Fund to the
Flood Mitigation Assistance Fund. The explanation for funding the
program at $34 million in fiscal year 2008 referenced the amount
available from fee income. For fiscal year 2009, the budget proposes to
eliminate the FMA Fund and to fund the program directly from the NFIF.
This would appear to provide for funding from premium income, in
the same manner that the two repetitive loss mitigation programs are
funded (Sections 1361A and 1323 of FIRA 2004). The rationale for
limiting FMA because of the availability of fee income seems to be no
longer valid.
ASFPM urges the Committee to provide the full authorized amount of
$40 million for the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program.
FLOOD MAPPING
The budget request includes $150 million in appropriated funds and
funds derived from Federal policy fees for a total mapping program
level of approximately $248 million in fiscal year 2009, thus
approaching the fiscal year 2008 funding level.
ASFPM is very pleased that the budget request includes provision
for a substantial on-going mapping program. The final funding year for
the 5 year Map Modernization Initiative was fiscal year 2008. While the
Map Modernization effort made a major contribution to improving the
Nation's flood risk maps, much mapping work remains to support FEMA's
risk identification and risk reduction (mitigation) responsibilities
for working with States and localities to reduce flood losses. Many
areas require new engineering (hydrology and hydraulics) studies; many
areas have yet to be mapped; and risk identification in many areas is
being affected by decertification of levees. Keeping flood maps current
is a dynamic process since the hazard changes due to development,
natural events and other topographic changes. Flood insurance reform
legislation pending in the Congress would add additional mapping tasks
to FEMA's risk identification activities. It is critical to the
National Flood Insurance Program and to Federal, State and local flood
risk reduction efforts that FEMA continue its mapping activities at a
robust level.
ASFPM strongly supports the requested funding level for flood risk
mapping.
PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANTS
ASFPM is concerned about the reduced funding of $75 million
requested for fiscal year 2009 for the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant
program (PDM). The program was funded at $114 million in fiscal year
2008 and up to $150 million in some prior years. FEMA reports that this
nationwide, multi-hazard competitive program regularly draws
applications that represent needs much greater than the available
funding can address. There is demonstrated need for much more
mitigation activity than this program can support, even at $150
million.
The Congressionally requested report of the Multi-Hazard Mitigation
Council (MMC) of the National Institute of Building Sciences released
in 2006 found an overall benefit-to-cost ratio of 4 to 1 for mitigation
investment. The ratio was 5 to 1 for flood mitigation projects. The
Pre-Disaster Mitigation grant program generates local mitigation
funding through its cost-share. It is evident that mitigation is a wise
investment and good public policy.
A significant number of applications submitted each year cannot be
approved due to lack of funds. These applications are a product of
focused work at the local level, often with State involvement, to
develop projects that are consistent with local and State hazard
mitigation plans and meet the many other important program eligibility
requirements. FEMA has developed, and then refined, an evaluation
process for grant applications that is rigorous and involves mitigation
officials from all over the country participating in review panels.
The process of developing hazard mitigation plans and of working
locally to put together mitigation grant applications has the important
corollary benefit of building local commitment to risk reduction.
Utilizing a significant portion of limited PDM funds in funding
directives outside of the competitive grant application process can
have the unfortunate effect of reducing impetus to utilize that
awareness and commitment building process at the local level. We urge
the Committee to avoid use of funding directives and instead to
encourage the local planning and project development that leads to
local commitment to hazard mitigation and to the most cost effective
mitigation projects.
To enhance the development of eligible and good quality grant
applications from the many jurisdictions that do not necessarily have
mitigation expertise locally or the funds to hire such expertise, the
Committee may wish to consider setting aside a portion of PDM funds for
allocation to States to support technical assistance to communities.
Many communities nationwide could improve their hazard mitigation
activities with even minimal technical assistance
ASFPM urges increased funding for Pre-Disaster Mitigation grants;
urges encouragement of local mitigation awareness and commitment by not
funding projects through directives and suggests consideration of a
set-aside for allocations to States so that hey can provide technical
assistance to communities.
OTHER
FEMA has been working collaboratively with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers on assessment of flood control structures (usually levees)
and the reflection of that work on FEMA's flood maps. ASFPM notes that
the interagency collaboration is most effective and important.
FEMA has embarked on a unification of requirements and applications
procedures for its five mitigation grant programs. ASFPM supports this
effort as it will very likely simplify and streamline the grant
application process for States and communities.
______
Prepared Statement of the International Association of Emergency
Managers
Chairman Byrd, Ranking Member Cochran, and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for allowing IAEM the opportunity to
provide testimony on fiscal year 2009 Appropriations for the Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
I am Larry Gispert, and I serve Hillsborough County on the West
Coast of Florida as Director of Emergency Management--a position I have
held for 14 of my 27 years in the field. I have the privilege of
serving nearly 1.2 million folks who call Hillsborough County and the
City of Tampa home. I am currently serving as the President of the
International Association of Emergency Managers.
I want to express my sincerest gratitude to this subcommittee for
your support for increasing the funding for the Emergency Management
Performance Grant Program--the major source for building State and
local emergency management capacity--and for reforming the Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
IAEM has over 4,000 members including emergency management
professionals at the State and local government levels, tribal Nations,
the military, colleges and universities, private business and the
nonprofit sector in the United States and in other countries. Most of
our members are U.S. city and county emergency managers who perform the
crucial function of coordinating and integrating the efforts at the
local level to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and
recover from all types of disasters including terrorist attacks. Our
membership includes emergency managers from large urban areas as well
as rural areas.
Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG)
We urge that EMPG funding be increased to $487 million to address
the historically documented shortfall as indicated by the NEMA biennial
report; the program be maintained as a separate account; and bill
language indicate the funding is for all hazards and can be used for
personnel. We urge you to reject the explanatory language which stated
EMPG was for State and urban areas.
The entire emergency management community is grateful to this
committee for recognizing the importance of building basic emergency
management capacity at the State and local level. The major source for
this capacity building is funding from the Emergency Management
Performance Grant program. We are grateful for your $50 million
supplemental in fiscal year 2007 and for the increase to $300 million
in fiscal year 2008 to begin addressing the shortfall. We appreciate
the fact that you recognize that EMPG is different from the entire host
of post September 11, 2001 Homeland Security grants. Specifically, EMPG
has existed since the 1950s. It was created to be a 50-50 cost share
program to ensure participation by State and local governments to build
strong emergency management capability, and it is a performance grant.
We are certainly pleased that 50 Senators signed a letter to the
committee recommending that EMPG be funding at $487 million.
Principal Federal Official (PFO)
We urge the committee to include bill language prohibiting the
funding of any position designated as a Principal Federal Official
(PFO) or Senior Federal Official in a Presidentially declared disaster
or emergency.
We appreciated the Conferees including such language in the fiscal
year 2008 Act. IAEM has consistently opposed the appointment of PFOs.
It leads to confusion. Instead, our members want the Federal
Coordinating Officer (FCO) to have unambiguous authority to direct and
manage the Federal response in the field. It is absolutely critical for
State and local officials to have one person empowered to make
decisions and coordinate the Federal response in support of the State.
Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM)
IAEM supports both pre and post hazard mitigation. The PDM program
will sunset on September 30, 2008. We will be working with the
authorizing committees to encourage the continuation of the program,
and we respectfully request this committee to fund PDM at an
appropriate level. For the fiscal year 2008 cycle 446 subapplications
were received from 43 States, 1 territory, and 5 federally recognized
Indian tribal governments which would have totaled over $317 million
for the Federal share. However, only approximately $52 million was
available to fund grants in the competitive program.
Emergency Management Institute (EMI)
We urge the Committee to establish a separate line item for EMI in
the FEMA budget so that EMI can have a consistent funding stream. We
would also urge you to engage in discussions with FEMA on the funding
needed to develop new courses and update the current ones. We believe
an estimate would be a minimum of $2,200,000 annually.
We strongly support the Emergency Management Institute (EMI)--once
the ``crown jewel'' of the emergency management profession. More
recently, however, it has fallen on hard times. For decades, EMI was
charged with establishing and promoting the principles and doctrine of
the comprehensive emergency management approach. Lack of funding and a
loss of focus on the primary objectives of the Integrated Emergency
Management System (IEMS) have left EMI adrift without an up-to-date,
cohesive, professional EM curriculum
EMI's Emergency Management Higher Education Project
We urge the Committee to provide additional funding to the Higher
Education Project for two additional positions and a minimum of an
additional $400,000 annually for course development, the Higher
Education Conference, and related activities.
The Emergency Management Higher Education Project although
consistently under funded has produced significant improvements in the
preparation of professional, college educated, emergency managers who
represent the future of effective disaster policy and practice at the
over 130 colleges and universities now offering emergency management
degrees. The financial resources to accomplish these worthy goals are a
prudent investment in the development of our emergency management
system.
Post Katrina Reform Act Implementation
We remain concerned about the role of FEMA within DHS, whether FEMA
truly has been given all the responsibility for preparedness and
managing disaster response as the law requires, and whether DHS has
truly ``bought'' into the all hazards doctrine which is so vital.
Congress in the Post Katrina Act tried to empower and strengthen FEMA
within DHS. It bears watching to be certain that this is not undercut
by Presidential directives not in keeping with the law.
Congress made it clear when the Post Katrina Reform Act was passed
that they want a strong FEMA with an Administrator with clear authority
for managing all aspects of disasters and emergencies. Some specific
examples from the Act which we believe are not being followed include:
--Section 611(12)(B) is of particular importance. This amended the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 by ``striking the matter
preceding paragraph (1)'' which contained the language, ``the
Secretary acting through . . .'' and inserted instead the
following language. ``In General.--The Administrator shall
provide Federal Leadership necessary to prepare for, protect
against, respond to, recover from or mitigate against a natural
disaster, act of terrorism and other man-made disaster
including . . . managing such response. ``Congress acted
intentionally to transfer these responsibilities from the
Secretary to the Administrator.
--Section 503 Federal Emergency Management Agency
--(b)(2) Specific Activities--In support of the primary mission of
the Agency, the Administrator--
--(A) Lead the Nation's efforts to prepare for, protect against,
respond to, recover from, and mitigate against the risk of
natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made
disasters, including catastrophic accidents.
--(H) develop and coordinate the implementation of a risk-based,
all hazards strategy for preparedness that builds on those
common capabilities necessary to respond to natural disasters,
acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters while also
building the unique capabilities necessary to respond to
specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk to our
Nation
--Section 503(c)(4)(A) In General.--The Administrator is the
principal advisor to the President, the Homeland Security
Council, and the Secretary for all matters relating to
emergency management in the United States.
--Sec. 503(c)(5) Cabinet Status--
--(A) In General.--The President may designate the Administrator to
serve as a member of the Cabinet in the event of natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters.
--(B) Retention of Authority.--Nothing in the paragraph shall be
construed as affecting the authority of the Secretary under
this Act.
We believe that DHS frequently and mistakenly quotes Section
502(c)(5)(B) regarding the authority of the Secretary and the
Administrator as being applicable across the entire act when, in fact,
it is limited in scope only to paragraph (5).
We strongly request the committee to provide continual oversight of
DHS on these matters to ensure they are following the clear and direct
law on these issues.
Congress also rejected the DHS Stage 2 Reorganization and clearly
and unambiguously moved all Preparedness functions and personnel to
FEMA. IAEM believes that Section 506(c)(1) and (2) of the Homeland
Security Act as amended by the Post Katrina Reform Act clearly
prohibits the transfer of any asset, function or mission from FEMA
without a specific Act of Congress. A major function of FEMA is to
rebuild relationships with State and local officials. Therefore, the
Intergovernmental Affairs function assumes a much higher level of
importance. Despite the clear prohibition on moving this function from
FEMA, we understand there are 17 positions performing this vital role
still under the National Protection and Programs Directorate (outside
of FEMA) on a non-reimbursable detail. We urge this committee to insist
that these positions and funding should be immediately transferred to
FEMA for intergovernmental.
Another of our areas of our concern focuses on the Office of
Operations Coordination--which was created after the Post Katrina
Reform Act, was signed into law--and whether the role this office will
perform is consistent with the implementation of the Post Katrina
Reform Act. Subtitle C of the Post Katrina Reform Act clearly assigned
the FEMA Administrator responsibility for the National Preparedness
System, including the National Planning Scenarios and the planning
system yet these functions appear to have been placed under the
authority of the Office of Operations Coordination.
Yet another area of potential concern is a growing internal
discussion within DHS regarding the perceived differences between
Incident Management and Emergency Management. Emergency Management is
the broader, overarching and systematic approach to the issue of
dealing with all disasters and emergencies, whether natural,
technological, or homeland security. Incident management, while
important, is a much more narrowly focused sub-element of response, one
of the four phases of emergency management (mitigation, preparedness,
response and recovery). To insist otherwise is to ignore the evidence
of reality--and, a tacit acknowledgement on the part of DHS that they
fail to understand the broader implications of the overall emergency
management system. We urge the committee to reject what appears to be
``sleight of hand'' by DHS in moving functions clearly and
unambiguously assigned to FEMA by law outside of FEMA.
Perspectives
IAEM realizes there are differences in the way we approach things
based on our perspectives--that of the DHS /OMB view from 50,000 feet
and that of the local government view from our boots on the ground. An
example is in the EMPG program. The Guidance for fiscal year 2008
appears to be overly restrictive by requiring 25 percent devoted to
planning. The failures manifested during Hurricane Katrina were not
entirely rooted in a lack of planning. Many would say the failure was
due to a lack of execution of existing plans. EMPG is authorized by the
Stafford Act and the authorization is broad for a reason--because one
size does not fit all.
We are concerned about the National Planning Scenarios which are
narrowly focused, primarily on terrorism. As a result, they don't
reflect the full range of threats to which we are subject. The solution
to this situation is not to develop more scenarios, but to use the
scenarios properly--in the development of a single Emergency Operations
Plan identifying the functions and capabilities common to all
emergencies as well as the roles and responsibilities of government.
Utilizing a multi-plan military-style approach is great--if you are the
military and funded and equipped with the resources of the military.
State and local governments do not have that luxury.
It bears watching to be certain that what is important to be done
to truly improve capacity to respond and recover at the local level is
not undercut by overly restrictive one-size-fits-all policies, overly
complex systems and emphasis on things that can be counted.
Conclusion
In summary, we urge the committee to continue to build emergency
management capacity by increasing EMPG to $487 million. We urge the
committee to continue to insist on the appropriate implementation of
the Post Katrina Act, to protect and strengthen FEMA and to empower its
Federal Coordinating Officers. We urge continuing support for EMI and
the vitally important Higher Education Project.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Emergency Management Association
Introduction
Thank you Chairman Byrd, Ranking Member Cochran, and distinguished
members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity to provide you
with a statement for the record on the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) fiscal year 2009 budget. In my statement, I am
representing the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA),
whose members are the State emergency management directors in the
States, the U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia. NEMA's
members are responsible to their Governors for emergency preparedness,
homeland security, mitigation, response, and recovery activities for
natural, man-made, and terrorist caused disasters.
In 2007, FEMA declared 63 major disasters; 13 emergency
declarations; and 60 fire management assistance declarations. Overall,
40 States and one territory were impacted. The multi-hazards emergency
management system continues to be the means to practice and exercise
for devastating acts of terrorism, while at the same time preparing the
Nation for hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, hazardous materials
spills, and floods. We respectfully ask for your serious consideration
of additional Federal support for the only all-hazards Emergency
Management Performance Grant (EMPG) to build State and local emergency
management capacity. EMPG is the only State and local matching grant
program supporting preparedness efforts.
The Department of Homeland Security budget provides critical
support to State and local emergency management programs. NEMA would
like to address three critical issues regarding the proposed Federal
budget for the Department of Homeland Security:
--Concern for addressing the shortfall and total need for the
Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) level while
requirements increase for State and local governments;
--Federal support for the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC); and
--Significant deficits for improving State and local Emergency
Operations Centers (EOCs).
emergency management infrastructure funding
EMPG is the Only Program for All-Hazards Preparedness
Natural disasters are certain and often anticipated. Every State
must be able to plan for disasters as well as build and sustain the
capability to respond. EMPG is the only source of funding to assist
State and local governments with preparedness/readiness activities
associated with natural disasters. At a time when our country is
continuing to recover from one of the largest natural disasters in
history and making strides to improve the Nation's emergency
preparedness/readiness, we cannot afford to have this vital program be
cut or just maintained. EMPG is the backbone of the Nation's all-
hazards emergency management system and the only source of direct
Federal funding to State and local governments for emergency management
capacity building. EMPG is primarily used to support State and local
emergency management personnel who are responsible for writing plans;
conducting training, exercises and corrective action; educating the
public on disaster readiness; and maintaining the Nation's emergency
response system.
The State and local government partnership with the Federal
Government to ensure preparedness dates back to the civil defense era
of the 1950s, yet increased responsibilities over the last decade have
fallen on State and local governments. NEMA's 2006 Biennial Report
shows that the shortfall in EMPG funding has reached $287 million.
State and Local Match
EMPG is the only all-hazards preparedness program within the
Department of Homeland Security that requires a match at the State and
local level. The 50/50 match is evidence of the commitment by State and
local governments to make public safety and security a top priority.
According to the NEMA 2006 Biennial Report, States were continuing to
over match the Federal Government's commitment to national security
protection through EMPG by $96 million in fiscal year 2005, which is an
80 percent State and 20 percent Federal contribution.
Appropriate Support Needed to Strengthen Program
We appreciate all of the efforts of members of Congress and the
Administration to allow for increases to the EMPG program; however,
adjusted over the last fifteen years the increases have not kept pace
with inflation at a time when capacity is supposed to be increasing.
Continued funding increases are necessary to make up for over a decade
of degradation of funding and increased state and local commitments.
The increased flexibility of EMPG is offset by funding shortfalls
estimated in the NEMA 2006 Biennial Report to be over $287 million for
all 50 States. The current total need is $487 million. The 9/11
Implementation Act authorized EMPG at $535 million for fiscal year
2009.
EMPG as a Separate Account
The President's budget proposal for fiscal year 2009 suggests
combining the EMPG account with the other accounts in the State and
local account. NEMA strongly disagrees with this approach, as EMPG must
be maintained as a separate line item account as Congress has affirmed
since fiscal year 2003. Congress agreed at that time that the EMPG
account needed to be visible and easy to find in the budget because of
the importance of the program. The separate account is critical because
the EMPG program is the only all-hazards grant program being
administered through the DHS/FEMA Grants Office to emergency management
agencies. Additionally, NEMA suggests that Congress maintain the method
of distribution for EMPG, similar to the language in the fiscal year
2006 appropriations; however continuing to allocate the funding through
the State Administrative Agencies (SAAs) continues to cause delays in
some States. NEMA supports language that would expressly restore the
direct allocation and administration of the EMPG grants to State
emergency management agencies. This will facilitate the process of
expediting funding to State and local emergency management agencies
without adding unnecessary steps.
The fiscal year 2008 Grant Guidance made several changes to the
EMPG program that are not consistent with the Congressional intent for
the program. While we have been successful in making sure the grants
can be used retroactively to the start of the Federal fiscal year, the
grant guidance still limits the use of EMPG funds for emergency
operation centers improvements, and requires 25 percent for planning
purposes. Additionally, another change to the EMPG program last year is
the 3 percent allowable for management costs. Previously, States could
use up to 5 percent of the grants to manage the program. This means the
State has to make a larger contribution to the match to just manage the
program. We urge Congress to consider these issues when completing work
on the fiscal year 2009 appropriations bills and to be very specific on
how FEMA should administer the EMPG program.
buiding our nation's mutual aid system through emac
The response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita resulted in the largest
deployment of interstate mutual aid in the Nation's history through the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). EMAC deployed personnel
comprised of multiple disciplines from all member States to respond to
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas. The process
enabled National Guard, search and rescue teams, incident management
teams, emergency operations center support, building inspectors, law
enforcement personnel, and other disciplines to immediately assist the
requesting States in need of support. In October 2006, Congress, under
The Post-Katrina FEMA Reform Act authorized FEMA to appropriate up to
$4 million annually in grants in fiscal year 2008 to support EMAC
operations and coordination activities, but no funds were appropriated.
EMAC has a five year strategic plan to put lessons learned into
practice. The After-Action process from Hurricane Katrina allowed EMAC
to examine how to improve the system after unprecedented disasters and
an unparalleled growth in the use of the system.
Examples of improvements to be made with current and future funding
as a result of lessons learned are outlined below:
--NEMA has been working with first responder disciplines to provide
EMAC educational and training materials. This includes training
on integration with State Emergency Operations Centers,
Incident Command Systems, resource typing, and credentialing;
--NEMA has established an EMAC Advisory Group that is working to
better integrate mutual aid partners into the EMAC system
before future disasters occur. The group includes
representatives from State and local government associations,
the National Guard Bureau, emergency responder associations,
public utility associations, the private sector, DHS/FEMA, and
the Centers for Disease Controls and Prevention. The
discussions and interactions of this group serve to assist in
adding local government assets to the scope of resources and
other disciplines that can be readily plugged into the system;
--EMAC has evolved in the tracking of resources through
administrative management through NEMA. EMAC is working towards
an integrated system to allow for swifter approvals from the
requesting and responding States, which will ultimately allow
for improved tracking and faster response to requests for
assistance; and
--EMAC will also be providing briefings and managing coordination
activities for the Federal Government through the National
Response Coordinating Center, Federal Coordinating Officers,
Principal Federal Officials, and Emergency Support Functions.
While Emergency Management Performance Grants and homeland security
grants are helping to build capabilities, the National Strategy for
Homeland Security counts on the fact that mutual aid is going to be put
to use in a disaster. The support of EMAC is critical to helping offset
the costs of disasters and building costly infrastructure at the
Federal level that could sit unused until a disaster. In order to meet
the ever-growing need for and reliance on interstate mutual aid, NEMA
is seeking reauthorization at $4 million annually for 2009 and beyond
and an annual $2 million line item for building EMAC capabilities and
our Nation's mutual aid system.
improving state and local emergency operation centers
During emergencies and disasters, emergency operations centers
(EOCs) serve as the nerve center for State and local coordination.
Federal agencies as well use these facilities to act as a central point
for communication during response and recovery phases. After the 2001
terrorist attacks, Congress provided some funding to States to update
their EOCs. Additionally, Congress temporarily changed the state-local
cost share from 50-50 to 75-25 for these funds.
States continue to require more monies to enhance State primary and
alternate EOCs. According to data in the NEMA 2006 Biennial Report, it
is estimated that almost $393 million would be needed to build,
retrofit and upgrade the facilities. For local EOCs, that number
increases to $1.1 billion, for a total of almost $1.5 billion. This
includes the costs to upgrade equipment and software, train personnel,
and conduct operations during emergency and non-emergency situations.
We appreciate Congress' recognition of the need for EOC improvements
through a $15 million appropriation in the fiscal year 2008
appropriations. The fiscal year 2008 investment is a down payment
towards addressing this critical shortfall.
A separate line item is needed in the budget for EOC improvements.
We respectfully request that Congress should make a $160 million
commitment to upgrading EOCs as a downpayment to address the
significant deficits.
As mentioned earlier, the fiscal year 2008 grant guidance
eliminated the ability to continue to use EMPG funds for EOC
improvements, despite the Congressional intent. While the investment in
EOCs is appreciated in the separate program, Congress must be clear to
continue to allow EMPG to be used for EOC improvements as well. With so
many State and local governments who are likely to compete for the $15
million, EMPG can and should be used as previously allowed for
retrofits, equipment purchase, renovations, and updates of existing
EOCs. Maintaining the flexibility of EMPG and having the separate
program continue as priorities for emergency management.
CONCLUSION
Congress has affirmed their support for ensuring preparedness for
our Nation's continuous vulnerability against all-hazards with
additional investments to EMPG, EMAC, and emergency operations centers
improvements. We must continue to build national preparedness efforts
with a multi-hazard approach. In this year's appropriations process,
Congress will make critical decisions that shape the future of
emergency management in this country. As you consider these matters, we
ask you to recognize the importance of adequately funding the EMPG
program in building capacity through personnel resources at the State
and local level for all disasters. I thank you for the opportunity to
testify on behalf of NEMA and appreciate your partnership.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Treasury Employees Union
Chairman Byrd, Ranking Member Cochran, distinguished members of the
Subcommittee; I would like to thank the Subcommittee for the
opportunity to provide this testimony. As President of the National
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), I have the honor of leading a union
that represents over 22,000 Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Officers and trade enforcement specialists who are stationed at 327
land, sea and air ports of entry (POEs) across the United States. CBP
employees make up our Nation's first line of defense in the wars on
terrorism and drugs. In addition, CBP trade compliance personnel
enforce over 400 U.S. trade and tariff laws and regulations in order to
ensure a fair and competitive trade environment pursuant to existing
international agreements and treaties, as well as stemming the flow of
illegal contraband such as child pornography, illegal arms, weapons of
mass destruction and laundered money. CBP is also a revenue collection
agency, expecting to collect an estimated $29 billion in Federal
revenue next year according to fiscal year 2009 revenue estimates.
First, NTEU would like to thank the Committee for including
language in its fiscal year 2008 Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Appropriations bill that provides an enhanced retirement benefit to all
eligible CBP Officers to address the concern that CBP was losing
valuable law enforcement personnel to other agencies due to the
disparity in retirement pay. The final funding bill included $50
million to cover the fiscal year 2008 costs associated with this
enhanced retirement benefit. Nothing that the Committee has done since
the creation of the Department has had a more positive effect on the
morale of the CBP Officer.
NTEU was alarmed that the President in his fiscal year 2009 budget
request sought to repeal this new law and rescind the $50 million
appropriated in fiscal year 2008 to begin this new program. NTEU
members are grateful that, despite the President's request, Congress
remains firmly committed to this new program and fully supportive of
funding it.
funding for dhs human resources management system
NTEU continues to have concerns about funding priorities at DHS.
The President's 2009 Budget request includes an increase of $29.3
million for the Office of Chief Human Capital from $18.8 million in
fiscal year 2008 to $48.1 million in fiscal year 2009 to fund the DHS
personnel system. In a number of critical ways, the personnel system
established by the Homeland Security Act and the subsequent regulations
issued by DHS have been a litany of failure because the law and the
regulations effectively gut employee due process rights and put in
serious jeopardy the agency's ability to recruit and retain a workforce
capable of accomplishing its critical missions.
When Congress passed the Homeland Security Act in 2002 (Public Law
107-296), it granted the new department very broad discretion to create
new personnel rules (5 U.S.C. 9701). It basically said that DHS could
come up with new systems as long as employees were treated fairly and
continued to be able to organize and bargain collectively. The
regulations DHS came up with were subsequently found by the Courts to
not even comply with these two very minimal and basic requirements. In
July 2005, a District Court ruled illegal the labor relations portion
of the proposed DHS personnel regulations. The Appellate Court rejected
DHS's appeal of this District Court decision and DHS declined to appeal
the ruling to the Supreme Court.
Title 5, Sec. 9701(h) states that, after passage of 5 years
following the completion of the ``transition period,'' DHS/OPM will
have no authority to issue regulations pertaining to the new human
resource management system (formerly called MaxHR) authorized by Sec.
9701, including regulations that would modify, supersede, or terminate
any regulations that were already issued. In other words, the
regulations in place at the end of the 5-year period would stay in
place and no new regulations could be issued without new statutory
authority.
Right now, DHS drafted regulations are in place for adverse
actions, appeals, performance management, and pay and classification.
Assuming nothing changes between now and the end of the 5-year period
(January 2009), the adverse action, appeals, performance management,
pay, and classification regulations would be frozen in place and remain
applicable.
NTEU has the following concerns about the remaining MaxHR
regulations and requests that no funding be appropriated to implement
any part of the regulations promulgated pursuant to Title 5, Section
9701.
Classification, Pay, and Pay Administration (Subparts B and C)
Classification, Pay, and Pay Administration (Subparts B and C)
--Secretary has final say over allocation of pay between performance
based pay and across-the- board General Schedule pay;
--Pay-for-performance schemes entail significant risk of
discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act;
--Proposed pay system is vague and extremely subjective and will
undermine employee morale.
Performance Management (Subpart D)
--DHS' proposed Performance Management regulations abandon Title 5,
Chapter 43's requirement that a reasonable performance
improvement period (PIP) be provided before imposing an adverse
action based on unacceptable performance;
--A PIP provides employees with a chance for rehabilitation and, if
successful, obviates the need for the employer to incur the
time and expense of hiring and training a replacement.
Adverse Actions and Appeals (Subparts F and G)
--Proposed regulations unnecessarily extend the current 1 year
probationary period;
--Includes no independent review of Mandatory Removal Offenses--
Secretary appoints panel;
--Unreasonably shortens response time for adverse action appeals;
--Includes mitigation standards that are impossible to meet, but have
been ruled ``unripe'' by the District Court.
Despite Congress' clear intent to stop implementation of the failed
DHS Human Resources Management System, DHS persists in seeking funds to
implement these personnel regulations. NTEU urges the Appropriations
Committee to ensure that no funding can be expended in fiscal year 2009
to implement this failed, discredited personnel program.
CBP STAFFING AT THE PORTS OF ENTRY
CBP Officer and CBP Agriculture Specialists Staffing.--CBP's own
staffing model, completed and delivered to Congress last summer,
concludes that the agency needs to hire 1,600 to 4,000 more CBP
Officers and CBP AS positions (Washington Post, November 6, 2007) in
order to perform its dual anti-terrorism and trade and travel
facilitation mission. The President, however, requested funding to hire
only 539 additional CBP Officers and no additional CBP AS hires in his
fiscal year 2009 Budget, far short of the 4,000 additional hires
needed.
Also, according to GAO (GAO-08-219, page 31), CBP's staffing model
``showed that CBP would need up to several thousand additional CBP
Officers and agriculture specialists at its ports of entry.'' And GAO
testimony issued on October 3, 2007 stated that, ``as of mid-August
2007, CBP had 2,116 agriculture specialists on staff, compared with
3,154 specialists needed, according to staffing model.'' (See GAO-08-
96T page 1.) This is unacceptable. CBP needs to dramatically increase
Agriculture Specialist staffing levels.
NTEU also recommends that Congress, through oversight and statutory
language, make clear that the agricultural inspection mission is a
priority and require DHS to report to them on how it is following U.S.
Department of Agriculture procedures on agriculture inspections. The
report should include wait times for clearing agricultural products and
what measures could be implemented to shorten those wait times.
NTEU calls on the Committee to fund staffing levels for CBP
Officers and CBP Agriculture Specialists at the ports of entry as
specified in CBP's own workforce staffing model.
CBP Trade Operations Staffing.--Section 412(b) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) mandates that ``the Secretary
[of Homeland Security] may not consolidate, discontinue, or diminish
those functions . . . performed by the United States Customs Service .
. . on or after the effective date of this act, reduce the staffing
level, or reduce the resources attributable to such functions, and the
Secretary shall ensure that an appropriate management structure is
implemented to carry out such functions.''
In Section 402 of the SAFE Port Act, Congress mandated CBP to
prepare a Resource Allocation Model (RAM) to determine optimal staffing
levels required to carry out the commercial operations of CBP,
including commercial inspection and release of cargo. The RAM was
delivered to Congress in July 2007 and proposes increases from the
current floor of 2,263 customs revenue function employees, which
includes Fine, Penalty and Forfeiture Specialists, Import Specialists,
International Trade Specialists, Customs Attorneys, Customs Auditors,
Chemists and CBP Technician positions, but notes that the Model is not
tied to any specific budget request and does not reflect the
Department's, CBP's, or the President's funding priorities.
Customs revenues are the second largest source of Federal revenues
that are collected by the U.S. Government. The Committee depends on
this revenue source to fund Federal priority programs. The Committee
should be concerned as to how much CBP trade enforcement staffing
shortages cost in terms of revenue loss to the U.S. Treasury.
NTEU urges the Committee to ensure that CBP trade enforcement
personnel is increased to staffing levels sufficient to ensure
effective performance of customs revenue functions as determined by CBP
in its own July 2007 Trade Resource Allocation Model.
ONE FACE AT THE BORDER
In 2006, Congress requested that the Government Accountability
Office(GAO) evaluate the ``One Face at the Border'' initiative and its
impact on legacy customs, immigration and agricultural inspection and
workload. GAO conducted its audit from August 2006 through September
2007 and issued its public report, Border Security: Despite Progress,
Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry
(GAO-08-219). An unredacted version of this report is available only to
Congress.
The conclusions of the public report echo what NTEU has been saying
for years--CBP needs several thousand additional CBP Officers and
Agriculture Specialists, staffing challenges force ports to choose
between port operations and providing critical training necessary for
employees to do their jobs, and not having sufficient staff contributes
to morale problems, fatigue, and safety issues for CBP Officers and CBP
Agriculture Specialists. It is clear that CBP sees its ``One Face at
the Border'' initiative as a means to ``increase management
flexibility'' without increasing staffing levels.
NTEU again calls for Congress to end the failed One Face at the
Border experiment and ensure that expertise is retained with respect to
customs, immigration, and agriculture inspection functions.
Each year, with trade and travel increasing at astounding rates,
CBP personnel have been asked to do more work with fewer personnel,
training and resources. The American public expects its borders and
ports be properly defended. Congress must show the public that it is
serious about protecting the homeland by fully funding the staffing
needs of the CBPOs at our 327 POEs. Thank you for the opportunity to
submit this testimony to the Committee on their behalf.
LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PREPARED STATEMENTS
----------
Page
Alexander, Senator Lamar, U.S. Senator From Tennessee, Statement
of............................................................. 7
American Public Transportation Association, Prepared Statement of 159
Association of State Floodplain Managers, Prepared Statement of.. 162
Byrd, Senator Robert C., U.S. Senator From West Virginia:
Prepared Statement of........................................ 2
Questions Submitted by....................................... 51
Chertoff, Hon. Michael, Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 1
Prepared Statement of........................................ 15
Statement of................................................. 9
Cochran, Senator Thad, U.S. Senator From Mississippi:
Questions Submitted by....................................... 138
Statement of................................................. 3
Craig, Senator Larry, U.S. Senator From Idaho, Questions
Submitted by................................................... 154
Domenici, Senator Pete V., U.S. Senator From New Mexico,
Questions Submitted by......................................... 152
Inouye, Senator Daniel K., U.S. Senator From Hawaii:
Opening Statement of......................................... 1
Questions Submitted by....................................... 130
International Association of Emergency Managers, Prepared
Statement of................................................... 163
Lautenberg, Senator Frank R., U.S. Senator From New Jersey,
Statement of................................................... 5
Leahy, Senator Patrick J., U.S. Senator From Vermont, Statement
of............................................................. 6
Murray, Senator Patty, U.S. Senator From Washington, Questions
Submitted by................................................... 132
National:
Emergency Management Association, Prepared Statement of...... 166
Treasury Employees Union, Prepared Statement of.............. 169
Nelson, Senator Ben, U.S. Senator From Nebraska:
Questions Submitted by....................................... 136
Statement of................................................. 4
Shelby, Senator Richard C., U.S. Senator From Alabama, Questions
Submitted by................................................... 153
Specter, Senator Arlen, U.S. Senator From Pennsylvania:
Letters From.................................................31, 32
Question Submitted by........................................ 151
Statement of................................................. 4
Stevens, Senator Ted, U.S. Senator From Alaska, Questions
Submitted by................................................... 149
SUBJECT INDEX
----------
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Page
Additional Committee Questions................................... 51
Airport Screening Processing Time................................ 37
Amtrak Security Funds............................................ 37
Analysis and Operations.......................................... 63
Border:
Patrol Support Staffing...................................... 142
Security Technology.......................................... 47
CBP:
Customs Officer Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) Status......... 44
Staffing Allocation.......................................... 41
Checkpoints......................................................42, 45
Chief Information Officer........................................ 59
Coast Guard...................................................... 84
Criminal Aliens.................................................. 146
Debris Removal..................................................28, 147
Departmental Management and Operations........................... 51
DHS Headquarters................................................. 28
Disaster:
Aid for Washington State..................................... 48
Assistance for Alaska........................................ 34
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office................................ 129
Federal Emergency Management Agency............................105, 147
Grant Funding................................................ 35
Law Enforcement Training Center.............................. 128
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request.................................. 15
Formaldehyde in Federal Emergency Management Trailers............ 148
Gulf Coast Recovery Efforts...................................... 27
Headquarters Consolidation Project............................... 138
Icebreakers...................................................... 33
Immigration:
And Customs Enforcement...................................... 146
Control...................................................... 29
Inspector General................................................ 65
Intelligence Sharing............................................. 139
National:
Bio and Agro-Defense Facility...............................28, 149
Center for Critical Information Processing................... 141
Command and Coordination Capability.......................... 146
Guard at Southern Border..................................... 46
Protection and Programs Directorate.........................93, 146
Northern Border.................................................. 42
And Maritime Sector.......................................... 143
Office of:
Health Affairs............................................... 102
The Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding............ 65
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory............................ 49
Passenger Vessels Service Act Rule...............................34, 50
Planned Customs Officer Staffing--State of Vermont............... 41
Project 28....................................................... 25
Protection, Preparedness, Response and Recovery.................. 93
Repatriation of Criminal Aliens.................................. 30
Research and Development, Training, and Services................. 128
Science and Technology.........................................128, 149
Secure Borders................................................... 45
Security, Enforcement, and Investigations........................ 66
Transportation Security Administration........................... 75
Surcharge.................................................... 25
2010 Olympics Preparation........................................ 48
U.S.:
Citizenship and Immigration Services......................... 128
Customs and Border Protection...............................66, 142
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.........................72, 145
Secret Service............................................... 90
US-VISIT......................................................... 101
USCG Workforce................................................... 26
Visa Waiver Program.............................................. 145
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative............................. 46
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