[Senate Hearing 110-284]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-284
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 27, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN CORNYN, Texas
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the
United States
february 27, 2007
Page
McConnell, VADM John M., USN (Ret.), Director, National
Intelligence; Accompanied by Thomas Fingar, Ph.D., Deputy
Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, and Chairman,
National Intelligence Council.................................. 5
Maples, LTG Michael D., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 21
(iii)
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor,
Webb, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Graham, Cornyn, Thune,
and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell,
professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and
Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M.
Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Micah H.
Harris, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Joseph Axelrad and
Sharon L. Waxman, assistants to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Richard Kessler and Darcie Tokioka, assistants to Senator
Akaka; Sherry Davich and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator
Bill Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew
Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Lauren Henry, assistant
to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator
Webb; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Arch
Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter,
assistant to Senator Collins; Adam G. Brake, assistant to
Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Stuart
C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh,
assistant to Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. First we would
like to welcome our witnesses to today's hearing, and
congratulate Director McConnell on his confirmation, and note
this is the first time that he will be testifying as the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Of course, we are also
glad to have General Maples from the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) appearing here again, and also Dr. Tom Fingar, who
is the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis as
well as the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.
We have asked our witnesses to address current and longer-
term threats and intelligence challenges around the world. This
committee has a special responsibility to the men and women of
our Armed Forces to be vigilant on intelligence programs
because decisions on whether or not to use military force and
the planning for military operations depend so heavily on
intelligence.
At the same time the Intelligence Community (IC) bears this
heavy responsibility, it is burdened by skepticism about the
accuracy of its assessments due to poor performance and
manipulation of intelligence on Iraq prior to the invasion.
The conflict in Iraq is consuming a large share of our
intelligence capabilities, diminishing the ability of the IC to
support diplomacy, monitor threats, and prepare for other
contingencies. Regarding Iraq, we need a thorough understanding
of the extent to which the Iraqi government is living up to its
commitments to support the President's surge plan, including
achieving political reconciliation, and the IC's assessments of
the prospects for success in Iraq.
We also need to know what are the IC's assessments
concerning sources of outside support for the contending
parties in Iraq, for the Sunni insurgents as well as the Shiite
militias; what countries are providing weapons, funding, and
personnel to the insurgency; who is organizing, receiving, and
using this assistance; and on the Shiite side what is the
nature and extent of Iranian al-Quds Force involvement in Iraq.
Administration officials have stated that coalition forces
have taken some al-Quds Force officers into custody. What were
these people doing in Iraq? If they were engaged in threatening
activities, have they nonetheless been released? Who do we
believe is approving the transfer of weapons to Iraqi Shiite
militia forces?
Turning to Iran's nuclear program, we need to know the IC's
current estimate for when Iran could acquire a nuclear weapons
capability and its assessment of the circumstances under which
Iran might give up its weapons program.
In Afghanistan, the resurgence of the Taliban, the
deteriorating security situation, and the flourishing sanctuary
across the border in Pakistan drive home the fragile hold that
we have in this volatile region. In the short-term, the Afghan
government and coalition forces must steel themselves for a
Taliban spring offensive. Long-term prospects for eliminating
the Taliban threat appear dim so long as the sanctuary remains
in Pakistan and there are no encouraging signs that Pakistan is
eliminating it.
Pakistan is an ally in the war on terrorism, but, as
Director McConnell's prepared statement emphasizes, it is a
major source of Islamic extremism, it is a sanctuary for al
Qaeda, the Taliban, and extremists operating against India over
Kashmir, and a past and potential future source of dangerous
nuclear proliferation.
We are pleased with the progress of the Six-Party Talks on
North Korea's nuclear disarmament, although it is equally clear
that there is a long way still to go before we can be confident
that we are even on the road to a real resolution of this
longstanding crisis. Just one illustration of the distance not
yet traveled: the Department of State acknowledges that nothing
has been conceded by North Korea about the uranium enrichment
program that was the immediate cause for the Bush
administration's abandonment of the Clinton administration's
Agreed Framework, which successfully froze North Korea's
plutonium-based weapons program for an extended period.
Secretary of State Powell declared at the beginning of the
Bush presidency that North Korean nuclear policy would build on
the foundation left by President Clinton, only to be famously
rebuked by the White House. The return to diplomacy is welcome,
but the ideologically-driven interlude resulted in a dramatic
expansion of North Korea's nuclear potential.
I want to remind all of my colleagues that we have arranged
for a closed session in S-407 of the Capitol following this
open session, if that is necessary. I would also note that our
committee will be holding a hearing a week from today on the
conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is very important that this committee address
the situation at Walter Reed. I was privileged to go out there
on Friday, at which time the Secretary of Defense, Secretary
Gates, addressed the situation. I felt that he did that with
unusual candor and was quite open to not only congressional
oversight, but to correct these tragic situations very quickly.
So I compliment the chair and the ranking member for arranging
that hearing.
Chairman Levin. I join you, Senator Warner, in your
compliment of Secretary Gates. I thought he was very direct and
nondefensive.
Senator Warner. Now, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of Senator
McCain, I join you in welcoming our witnesses today. I would
particularly like to welcome Admiral McConnell, whom I have
known for many years, as far back as when I was privileged to
be Secretary of the Navy and you were a young officer staying
as far away from the Navy Secretary as you possibly could.
Admiral McConnell, I also want to recognize your return to
government service and your willingness to take on one of the
most important and difficult positions in the entire Federal
Government. I wish you and your lovely family good luck.
I would like to thank the other witnesses for their long
and distinguished service to our Nation and to convey to you my
personal commendation and deep admiration for the dedicated men
and women of your intelligence services. Yesterday I had the
privilege to have a meeting with General Maples and his top
team surveying the situation in Iraq and to some extent
Afghanistan, and I thank you, General, for that opportunity.
Their efforts are vital to our homeland defense, to the
protection of our national interest, and to the men and women
in uniform who are deployed the world over in harm's way. Our
Nation has never asked more from its intelligence agency than
it does today. Our witnesses and all members of the IC know
this clearly and understand that they are truly the first line
of our Nation's defense.
The attacks on September 11 were a massive intelligence
failure, which remind us all too clearly of the significance
intelligence can and should play. The IC has come a long way
since September 11 and we are all aware of the work it takes to
strengthen and reform the IC while in the midst of one of the
most challenging chapters in the national security history of
our Nation and indeed the entire world.
These intelligence reforms require, among other changes,
greater collaboration between the various agencies and their
subordinates, not only within the IC but with our foreign
partners as well. In addition, we will need more and better
human intelligence (HUMINT) capacity, improved language
abilities and cultural awareness--underline ``cultural
awareness.'' How clearly that has come to the forefront in our
struggle to understand the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We are not at war with the Muslim community. It is only a
minor fraction of that community who have abandoned all their
precedents, all of the teachings of the Koran, and are
promulgating terror in many places in the world.
In addition, we need more and better cooperation, as I say,
with our allies, and I hope that that can be strengthened.
As the fight continues in Iraq and Afghanistan, one
understands the role that rapid, accurate, and detailed
intelligence plays in combat operations. Intelligence is
essential to the conduct of any form of warfare. It is the
force multiplier that can make the difference.
We will ask our witnesses to give us their estimate of the
threats our forces face in Iraq and Afghanistan, and their
assessment of the progress in those two countries and elsewhere
in the world. In addition, the witnesses should be prepared to
discuss the adequacy of our intelligence capabilities in Iraq
and Afghanistan and the aspects of today's global struggle that
extend beyond the borders of these two countries.
We must not, however, lose sight of other threats to our
Homeland and national interests. These symmetric and asymmetric
threats include: rising regional hegemonies; emerging peer
competitors; the proliferation and use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD); new missile technologies; threats to our
space-based systems; humanitarian crises; natural disasters;
and the activities of violent extremists around the world.
While vigilance is imperative and excellence in terms of
results is vital, so too is your candor, not only to Congress
but to the executive branch and the American people. You must
speak the truth to decisionmakers and policymakers. Tell them
what you know and what you do not know, so long as we do not
compromise sources and other means of collection. President
Reagan accurately said, ``The goal of our intelligence analysts
can be nothing short of the truth, even when that truth is
unpleasant and unpopular.''
I wish you luck. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Admiral McConnell.
STATEMENT OF VADM JOHN M. McCONNELL, USN (RET.), DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED BY THOMAS FINGAR, Ph.D.,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ANALYSIS, AND
CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
Admiral McConnell. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator
Warner, and distinguished members of the committee: It is an
honor to appear before you today and I appreciate the
opportunity to offer my assessment of the threats facing our
Nation in my first testimony as the DNI. In my confirmation
hearing I committed to consulting with Congress often, seeking
your counsel when appropriate, and taking your advice
seriously. I am pleased to begin that dialogue today.
This morning I am joined by Lieutenant General Michael
Maples, Director of the DIA, and Dr. Tom Fingar, the Deputy DNI
for Analysis.
We come here in a week rich with history for the United
States IC. 60 years ago today, or 60 years ago yesterday,
President Truman submitted to Congress legislation that would
become the 1947 National Security Act, the foundation for
today's American intelligence structure. Then, like now, our
leaders were face-to-face with historic challenges. Recovering
from World War II while the Cold War loomed, our Nation
established an infrastructure to guard against catastrophic
surprise. Those leaders knew, as we know today, the necessity
of putting accurate intelligence in the right hands at the
right time.
We are a community shaped by our past, proud of the work
done by our brave men and women, and mindful of the continued
and developing threats that we face today. I will briefly
highlight the principal threats facing our Nation and I have
submitted a detailed statement for the record that addresses
more of the issues at greater depth.
Terrorism remains the preeminent threat to the Homeland, to
our security interests globally, and to our allies. Al Qaeda
continues to be the terrorist organization that poses the
greatest threat. Nevertheless, in the last year we have
developed a deeper understanding of the enemy that we face. Our
community has worked hard to discover and to disrupt terrorist
intentions and, while many of al Qaeda's senior leadership have
been killed or captured, its core elements are resilient. They
continue to plot attacks against the Homeland and other targets
with the aim of inflicting mass casualties. Indeed, al Qaeda
along with other terrorist groups continues to seek chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons or materials.
Al Qaeda also is forging stronger operational connections
that radiate outward from their camps in Pakistan to affiliated
groups and networks throughout the Middle East, North Africa,
and Europe.
In addition to al Qaeda and other Sunni jihadists,
Hezbollah, the Shiite-based organization backed by Iran and
Syria, remains a source of serious concern. Last summer's
hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah have increased
Hezbollah's self-confidence.
We know particularly since September 11 that countering
terrorist threats depends on good intelligence and broad and
effective international cooperation. Our success to date
against al Qaeda and other terrorists, along with our ability
to prevent attacks abroad and at home, have been aided
considerably by cooperation from many foreign governments,
among them Iraq, United Kingdom, Australia, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, where the United States military
is engaged in combat, we face challenges that are exacerbated
by terrorism. Earlier this month, the IC delivered to Congress
a national intelligence estimate (NIE) on Iraq. It is a
thorough and detailed assessment of a complex, dynamic
situation, but here I will summarize the four principal
judgments presented in the NIE.
First, the current security and political trends in Iraq
are moving in a negative direction. Particularly after the
February 2006 bombing of the mosque at Samarra, sectarian
violence has become self-sustaining. Unless efforts to reverse
these conditions gain real traction during the 12- to 18-month
timeframe of this estimate, we assess that the security
situation will continue to deteriorate at a rate comparable to
the latter half of 2006.
Second, success by the stronger and more loyal Iraqi
security forces, supported by the coalition, in reducing
violence could give Iraqi political leaders breathing space to
pursue political compromise needed for progress and stability.
But even if the violence declines, the current level of
sectarian animosity will make political reconciliation
difficult over the next 12 to 18 months.
Third, if coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during
the timeframe of this estimate, we judge that this almost
certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and
scope of sectarian conflict, intensify Sunni resistance to the
Iraqi government, and have adverse consequences for national
reconciliation. In addition, al Qaeda would be likely to use
Anbar Province to plan for increased attacks.
Fourth, while outside actors are not likely to be a major
driver of violence or the prospects of stability, Iranian
lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shiite militants
clearly intensifies the conflict in Iraq. Additionally, Syria
continues to provide safe haven for expatriate Iraqi Baathists
and to take less than adequate measures to stop the flow of
foreign jihadists into Iraq.
As in Iraq, Afghanistan's leaders face a pivotal year
ahead. They must build central and provincial government
capacity, confront perverse drug cultivation and trafficking,
and, with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the
United States, arrest the resurgence of the Taliban. The
Taliban was successful in increasing the level of violence in
2006. Progress in Afghanistan will not come easily. There is a
chronic shortage of resources and of qualified, motivated
government officials. Once more, although the insurgency
probably does not now directly threaten the government, it is
deterring economic development and undermining popular support
for President Karzai.
The drug trade contributes to endemic corruption and
undercuts public confidence. In addition, a dangerous nexus
exists between drugs, the insurgents, and warlords, who derive
funds from cultivation and trafficking.
Terrorism is not the only threat we face. The IC judges the
efforts by both state and non-state actors to develop or
acquire dangerous weapons and delivery systems constitute the
second greatest threat to our Nation and to our allies. Iran
and North Korea are of particular concern and these regimes
have pursued nuclear programs in defiance of United Nations
Security Council restrictions.
We assess that Tehran seeks to develop nuclear weapons and
has shown greater interest in drawing out the negotiations
rather than in reaching an acceptable diplomatic solution. This
is a very dangerous situation as a nuclear Iran could prompt
destabilizing countermoves by other states in this volatile
region. While our information is incomplete, we estimate Iran
could produce a nuclear weapon by early to mid next decade.
Regarding North Korea, the February 13 Six-Party Talks in
Beijing resulted in an agreement intended to lead to a
declaration of all North Korean nuclear programs and disabling
all existing nuclear facilities. The agreement is in the
initial step in the denuclearization process and will be
closely observed as we watch for its implementation.
As we assess threats to U.S. security interests, Iran is of
concern beyond the reasons of nuclear aspirations. The fall of
the Taliban and Saddam, increased oil revenues, Hamas's
electoral victory, and Hezbollah's perceived success in
fighting against Israel all extend Iran's influence in the
Middle East. This disturbs our Arab allies, who are concerned
about worsening tensions between Shiite and Sunni Islam.
Iran's growing influence has coincided with a generational
change in Tehran's leadership. Under the Ahmadinejad
government, staffed largely by hardliners who are deeply
distrustful of the United States, Iran is growing its ability
to project military power, with the goal of dominating the Gulf
region.
Iran is also working to disrupt the operations and
reinforcement of United States forces in the region, thereby
raising the political, financial, and human cost of our
presence. To this end, Tehran views its mounting inventory of
ballistic missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter
and, if necessary, retaliate against forces in the region, to
include United States forces.
Tehran believes its capability to project power abroad,
including through terrorist operations, helps safeguard its
regime by deterring U.S. or Israeli attacks, distracting and
weakening Israel, enhancing Iran's regional influence through
intimidation, and helps to drive the United States from the
region.
Central to Iran's terrorism strategy is the Lebanese
Hezbollah. This group shares Iran's world view and receives
budgetary support, military equipment, and specialized training
from Tehran. While Hezbollah is focused on its agenda in
Lebanon and supporting anti-Israeli Palestinian terrorists, it
could decide to conduct attacks against U.S. interests if in
the event it feels its survival is threatened or if Iran, its
sponsor, is threatened.
Syria has also reinforced its ties with Iran, while growing
more confident in its regional policies. This stems primarily
from what Syria sees as vindication of its support to Hezbollah
and Hamas, coupled with the perception of success in overcoming
international attempts to isolate the regime. Damascus has
failed to stem militant infiltration into Iraq and continues to
interfere inside Lebanon. Indeed, Lebanon remains in a
politically perilous situation while Damascus, as well as
Hezbollah and other pro-Syrian groups, endeavor to topple the
government of Prime Minister Siniora.
The situation in the Palestinian territories is equally
delicate. Since the establishment in March 2006 of the Hamas-
led Palestinian Authority government, inter-factional violence
has intensified in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Absent
success in implementing a national unity government, this
violence threatens to escalate further. Hamas continues to
reject recognition of Israel, renunciation of armed resistance
in Israel, and acceptance of Palestinian Liberation
Organizations and international agreements. Hamas continues to
maintain that Israel should not exist.
I turn next to the world's fastest growing humanitarian
crisis, the situation in Darfur, where more than 200,000 people
have been killed, 1.85 million have been internally displaced,
and another 234,000 have taken refuge in neighboring Chad.
Multiple rebel groups who feel that the existing peace
agreement does not meet their security, power-sharing, or
compensation concerns are continuing to fight against the
government. The Sudanese military, unable to force the rebels
to sign the peace accord and with the help of local militia, is
attacking civilian villages suspected of harboring the rebels.
Chadian and Central African Republic rebel groups have also
become entangled in the Darfur crisis. The spillover of
violence in the past 10 months threatens to destabilize an
already weak regime in both of those countries.
In Somalia, the rapid collapse of the Council of Islamic
Courts and the arrival of the Trans-Federal Government (TFG);
in Mogadishu has shifted the political landscape. The obstacles
confronting the TFG are many of the same problems that have
kept any one group from forging a viable government in Somalia
since the country's collapse in 1991. Somali society is divided
into numerous clans and sub-clans and none want to see one
group rise above the others. If the TFG is to be successful in
winning the support of the population and restoring order, it
will need to be more inclusive and make some successful strides
toward governance.
Without mechanisms to replace the temporary Ethiopian
presence with an internationally supported Somali solution,
more turmoil could enable extremists to regain their footing.
At the same time, al Qaeda remains determined to exploit the
situation in Somalia.
In Latin America, the gradual consolidation of democracy
has remained the prevailing tendency. While some have spoken of
a lurch to the left in the region, last year's numerous
elections reveal no dominant ideological bent. Moderate
leftists who promote macroeconomic stability, poverty
alleviation, and the building of democratic institutions fared
well. So did able right-of-center leaders.
At the same time, individuals critical of free markets won
the presidency in two of Latin America's poorest countries,
Ecuador and Nicaragua. In Venezuela, Chavez is using his
popularity to undercut the opposition and eliminate checks on
his authority. He is among the most strident anti-American
leaders anywhere in the world and will continue to try to
undercut U.S. influence in Latin America and internationally.
In Mexico, President Calderon of the ruling National Action
Party was inaugurated on December 1 after a razor-thin victory
over his closest opponent, the leftist populist Obrador. The
July election illustrated the country's polarization along
socioeconomic lines, but the new government has initiated steps
to address the problems that affect both Mexican and U.S.
security interests, including drug smuggling, human
trafficking, and associated violence.
In Cuba, this year will mark the end of the long domination
of that country by Fidel Castro. Significant positive change
immediately following Castro's death is unlikely. The long
period of transition following Fidel's operation in July 2006
has given his brother Raoul the opportunity to solidify his
position as Fidel's successor.
In 2006, Chinese leaders moved to align Beijing's foreign
policy with the needs of domestic development. In doing so,
they are identifying opportunities to strengthen economic
growth, gain access to new sources of energy and markets, and
mitigate what they see as potential external threats to social
stability. At the same time, China places a great priority on
positive relations with the United States while also
strengthening ties outside the region, to include the European
Union, Russia, Africa, and Latin America.
The People's Republic of China leaders continue to
emphasize development of friendly relations with the states on
China's periphery, in hopes of assuring peaceful borders and to
avoid perceived containment by any other power. In the past
year, China achieved notable success in improving relations
with Japan under newly elected Prime Minister Abe.
Additionally, prospects for cross-straits conflict with Taiwan
diminished. In addition to establishing strong bilateral ties,
Beijing actively engages with many multilateral organizations,
including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
As Beijing continues its rapid rate of military
modernization, which began in 1999, we assess that its
aspirations for great power status and its security strategy
will drive the modernization effort even if the Taiwan problem
were resolved. The Chinese are developing more capable long-
range conventional strike systems and short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles with terminally guided maneuverable warheads
able to attack land targets and U.S. carriers at sea.
China faces an array of domestic and economic problems.
Some prospects for its financial system are unhealthy, with
state-owned banks maintaining large balances of nonperforming
loans. Nonetheless, we see low risk of severe financial crisis
over the next 5 years. China is introducing market measures to
its financial sector and has massive foreign exchange reserves,
current and capital account surpluses, and low exposure to
short-term foreign currency debt.
We have entered a new era in which energy security will
become an increasing priority for the United States, the West,
and the fast-developing major energy consumers, like China and
India. Oil prices have fallen by more than 25 percent since
their peak last July, while spare production capacity has grown
to more than 2 million barrels per day. But escalating demand
for oil and gas has resulted in windfall profits for some
producer nations that are openly hostile to our interests. Iran
and Venezuela fall into that category.
Russia now sees itself as an energy superpower, a status
with broad ramifications that include strong-arm tactics in its
relations with neighboring states.
Today in my remarks I have summarized some of the
challenges that we face. In a world marked by ever more rapidly
changing and more widely reverberating events, and while events
anywhere can and often do affect us, it is the responsibility
of the IC to sort through this swirl of emerging trends.
Indeed, we sort and as needed we shift to focus on the events
which most affect this Nation and our allies and our safety.
Senators, that concludes my opening remarks. I look forward
to your questions and I thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Admiral McConnell follows:]
Prepared Statement by VADM J. Michael McConnell, USN (Ret.)
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the
committee, thank you for the invitation to offer my assessment of
threats to our Nation.
I am joined today by LTG Mike Maples, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency and Dr. Tom Fingar, the Chairman of the National
Intelligence Council.
REFORMS PROMOTE INFORMATION SHARING, SENSE OF COMMUNITY
The judgments I will offer the committee are based on the efforts
of thousands of patriotic, highly skilled professionals, many of whom
serve in harm's way. I am proud to lead the world's best Intelligence
Community and pleased to report that it is even better than it was last
year as a result of reforms mandated by the President and Congress.
These reforms promote better information sharing, the highest standards
of analytic rigor, the most innovative techniques of acquiring
information, and a stronger sense of community across our 16 agencies.
DIVERSITY OF THREATS/GLOBALIZATION MANDATE GLOBAL COVERAGE
We know that the Nation requires more from our Intelligence
Community than ever before because America confronts a greater
diversity of threats and challenges than ever before. Globalization,
the defining characteristic of our age, mandates global intelligence
coverage. Globalization is not a threat in and of itself; it has more
positive than negative characteristics. But globalization does
facilitate the terrorist threat, increases the danger of weapons of
mass destruction proliferation, and contributes to regional instability
and reconfigurations of power and influence--especially through
competition for energy. Globalization also exposes the United States to
mounting counterintelligence challenges. Our comparative advantage in
some areas of technical intelligence, where we have been dominant in
the past, is being eroded. Several nonstate actors, including
international terrorist groups, conduct intelligence activities as
effectively as capable state intelligence services. A significant
number of states also conduct economic espionage. China and Russia's
foreign intelligence services are among the most aggressive in
collecting against sensitive and protected U.S. targets.
This array of challenges to our national security is shaped by
dramatic advances in telecommunications, technology, new centers of
economic growth, and the consequences of crises within traditional
cultures.
NON-STATE ACTORS AND HOSTILE STATES ASSAULT INTERNATIONAL ORDER
As a result of these and other challenges exacerbated by
globalization, many nation states are unable to provide good governance
and sustain the rule of law within their borders. This enables non-
state actors and hostile states to assault these fundamental building
blocks of international order, creating failed states, proxy states,
terrorist safehavens, and ungoverned regions that endanger the
international community and its citizens. More to the point, it
threatens our national security and support for freedom and democracy,
notably in Iraq and Afghanistan, where our troops and those of our
allies are helping to defend freely elected governments and sovereign
peoples against determined insurgents and terrorists.
TERRORIST THREATS--THE PRE-EMINENT CHALLENGE
Terrorist threats to the homeland, to our national security
interests, and to our allies remain the pre-eminent challenge to the
Intelligence Community, operationally and analytically. Working closely
with our international partners, we have scored remarkable successes
and disrupted terrorist plots aimed at murdering thousands of U.S. and
allied citizens. Despite these successes, we must maintain maximum
vigilance, flexibility, and operational aggressiveness to counter the
constant evolution and adaptive capability of our enemies. To support
these efforts, we must understand the enemy, his intentions, and his
capabilities. Much of what the Intelligence Community has learned in
the past year underscores its previous judgments; but we now have a
deeper understanding of the enemy we face.
AL QAEDA--THE GREATEST THREAT
Al Qaeda is the terrorist organization that poses the greatest
threat to U.S. interests, including to the homeland. We have captured
or killed numerous senior al Qaeda operatives, but we also have seen
that al Qaeda's core elements are resilient. They continue to plot
attacks against our homeland and other targets with the objective of
inflicting mass casualties. They continue to maintain active
connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders'
hideout in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, northern
Africa, and Europe.
CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES MOST PROBABLE AL QAEDA ATTACK
Use of conventional explosives continues to be the most probable al
Qaeda attack scenario. The thwarted U.K. aviation plot last summer and
the other major threat reports that we have been tracking all involve
conventional bombs. Nevertheless, we receive reports indicating that al
Qaeda and other groups are attempting to acquire chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear weapons or materials.
HIZBALLAH THREAT
In addition to al Qaeda, its networks and affiliates, I mention the
terrorist threat from Hizballah, which is backed by Iran and Syria. As
a result of last summer's hostilities, Hizballah's self-confidence and
hostility toward the U.S. as a supporter of Israel could cause the
group to increase its contingency planning against U.S. interests.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
We know from experience since September 11 that countering
terrorism depends on unprecedented levels of international cooperation.
Our successes so far against al Qaeda and other jihadists--and our
ability to prevent attacks abroad and at home--have been aided
considerably by the cooperation of foreign governments, among them
Iraq, the U.K., Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and many
others. They, too, are targets of terror. As illustrated by al Qaeda's
plots in the U.K., Kurdish separatist attacks in Turkey, and the recent
bombings in Algeria, terror is a worldwide scourge.
MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS
It is important to note our shared successes, with a focus, not on
taking credit, but on demonstrating results. I will highlight four
major accomplishments.
In the U.K., as noted earlier, a plot to perpetrate
the worst terrorist slaughter of innocent civilians since
September 11 was thwarted.
And in Pakistan Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir and Abu Bakr
al-Suri, two of al Qaeda's top bomb makers were killed last
April.
We eliminated al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) murderous
leader, Abu Musab al'Zarqawi.
Also in Iraq, we have severely damaged Ansar al
Sunna's leadership and operational capacity.
Again, let us emphasize that we, the United States, do not and
could not accomplish our counterterrorism mission unilaterally. Our
role varies from situation to situation. What does not vary is our
requirement for good intelligence and committed partners, which we have
in all parts of the world--because terrorists have killed far more non-
Americans than Americans and far more Muslims than non-Muslims.
IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND PAKISTAN
The two countries where the United States military is engaged in
combat--Iraq and Afghanistan--face challenges that are significantly
exacerbated by terrorism but not exclusively attributable to it. And
Pakistan, despite its ongoing efforts, continues to face terrorism's
many challenges, while that country also raises other concerns for us.
IRAQ--SECTARIAN DIVISIONS, SECURITY FORCES
In Iraq, sectarian divisions are widening but the multiparty
government of Nuri al-Maliki continues to seek ways to bridge the
divisions and restore commitment to a unified country. The effort to
build a ``moderate front'' of major parties from the country's three
ethno-sectarian groups has underscored moderates' interest in bridging
the gaps between Iraq's communities by appealing to non-violent actors.
Iraqi security forces have become more numerous and more capable since
last year. Six division headquarters, 30 brigades, and more than 90
battalions have taken the lead in their operational areas, have battled
insurgents on their own, and have stood up to the militias in some
cases.
IRAQ AT A PRECARIOUS JUNCTURE
Despite these positive developments, Iraq is at a precarious
juncture. Communal violence--accelerated by AQI's attack on the Samarra
mosque in February 2006--and scant common ground between Shias, Sunnis,
and Kurds have polarized politics. Indeed, the term ``civil war''
accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the
hardening of ethnosectarian identities, a sea change in the character
of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population
displacements.
Prime Minister Maliki's national reconciliation agenda is still at
its initial stages. The Iraqi security forces are struggling to
complete preparations for Operation Peace and Security in Baghdad. The
various parties have not yet shown the ability to compromise
effectively on the thorny issues of de-Baathification, constitutional
reform, federalism, and central versus regional control over
hydrocarbon revenues. Provision of essential public services is
inadequate; oil output remains below pre-war levels; hours of
electrical power available have declined and remain far below demand;
and inflationary pressures have grown since last year.
With political reconciliation stalled, Iraqis increasingly resort
to violence. The struggle among and within Iraqi communities over
national identity and the distribution of power has eclipsed attacks by
Iraqis against the coalition forces as the greatest impediment to
Iraq's future as a peaceful, democratic, and unified state.
IRAQ--PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY AND KEY ISSUES
As the Intelligence Community states in the recent National
Intelligence Estimate, the current security and political trends in
Iraq are moving in a negative direction. Particularly after the
February 2006 bombing of the mosque in Samarra, sectarian violence has
become self-sustaining.
Unless efforts to reverse these conditions gain real traction
during the 12-18 month timeframe of the estimate, we assess that the
security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to
the latter half of 2006.
But with reduced violence and a window created for political
compromises, increased stability in Iraq would then depend on how
several issues evolve. Among them:
The ability of the Iraqi government to establish and
nurture effective national institutions that are based on
national rather than religious or ethnic interests; and within
this context, the willingness of the security forces to pursue
extremist elements of all kinds.
The extent to which the Shiite feel sufficiently
secure in their political position: despite their recent
electoral victories and overall political ascendancy, the
Shiite at present remain deeply insecure about their hold on
power. This insecurity is manifested in the Shiites refusal to
make real concessions to the Sunnis on a range of issues, such
as easing of de-Baathification and clamping down on radical
Shiite militias.
The extent to which Arab Sunnis develop trust and
participate in the new political order: now, many remain
unwilling to accept their minority status, continue to resist
violently this new political order, and distrust the Shiite-led
government and its commitment to their security.
The extent to divisions within the Shiite and the
Sunni are addressed: profound intra-group divisions among the
Shiite and Sunnis complicate the situation, because no single
leader can speak for or exert control over these groups.
The extent to which extremists--most notably AQI--are
suppressed: these groups continue to conduct high-profile,
often mass casualty attacks that are effective accelerants for
the self-sustaining sectarian struggle between Shiite and
Sunnis.
Lastly, the extent to which Iraq's neighbors can be
persuaded to stop the flow of militants and munitions across
their borders: Iran's lethal support for select groups of Iraqi
Shiite militants clearly exacerbates the conflict in Iraq, as
does Syria's continued provision of safehaven for expatriate
Iraqi Ba'thists and less-than-adequate measures to stop the
flow of foreign jihadists into Iraq.
REGIONAL CONCERNS
Indeed, our friends in the region are concerned about the
consequences of growing instability in Iraq. Many are increasingly
apprehensive about ethno-sectarian strife spilling out of Iraq and
infecting their minority populations and all in the region are nervous
about the growing role of radical Islamists.
AFGHANISTAN--RESURGENCE OF THE TALIBAN
As in Iraq, 2007 will be a pivotal year for Afghanistan. Afghan
leaders must build central and provincial government capacity, confront
pervasive drug cultivation and trafficking, and, with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United States, arrest the
resurgence of the Taliban. At present, the insurgency probably does not
directly threaten the government, but it is deterring economic
development and undermining popular support for President Karzai.
DRUG TRADE AND CORRUPTION
Afghan leaders also face critical challenges in building central
and provincial government capacity and in confronting pervasive drug
cultivation and trafficking. Neither task will be easy. The country
faces a chronic shortage of resources and of qualified and motivated
government officials. Further, the drug trade contributes to endemic
corruption at all levels of government, undercutting public confidence.
A dangerous nexus exists between drugs and the insurgents and warlords
who derive funds from cultivation and trafficking.
Many of our most important interests intersect in Pakistan, where
the Taliban and al Qaeda maintain critical sanctuaries. As I noted
earlier, Pakistan is our partner in the war on terror and has captured
several al Qaeda leaders. However, it is also a major source of Islamic
extremism.
PAKISTAN--ELIMINATING THE TALIBAN SAFEHAVEN
Eliminating the safehaven that the Taliban and other extremists
have found in Pakistan's tribal areas is not sufficient to end the
insurgency in Afghanistan but it is necessary. We recognize that
aggressive military action, however, has been costly for Pakistani
security forces and appreciate concerns over the potential for sparking
tribal rebellion and a backlash by sympathetic Islamic political
parties. There is widespread opposition among these parties to the U.S.
military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. With elections expected
later this year, the situation will become even more challenging--for
President Musharraf and for the U.S.
PROLIFERATION: STATES OF KEY CONCERN
After terrorism, the ongoing efforts of nation-states and
terrorists to develop and/or acquire dangerous weapons and delivery
systems constitute the second major threat to the safety of our Nation,
our deployed troops, and our friends.
TRACKING DANGEROUS TECHNOLOGIES
The time when only a few states had access to the most dangerous
technologies has been over for many years. Dual-use technologies
circulate easily in our globalized economy, as do the scientific
personnel who design and use them. As a consequence, it is more
difficult for us to track efforts to acquire, for nefarious purposes,
these widely available components and technologies.
IRAN ASSESSED AS DETERMINED TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Iran and North Korea are the states of most concern to us. The
United States' concerns about Iran are shared by many nations,
including Iran's neighbors. We assess that Tehran is determined to
develop nuclear weapons--despite its international obligations and
international pressure. It is continuing to pursue uranium enrichment
and has shown more interest in protracting negotiations than reaching
an acceptable diplomatic solution. This is a grave concern to the other
countries in the region whose security would be threatened by Iranian
nuclear weapons.
NORTH KOREAN THREAT
North Korea's threat to international security is also grave. In
July, Pyongyang flight-tested missiles and in October it tested a
nuclear device. We remain concerned it could proliferate these weapons
abroad. Indeed, it has a long history of selling ballistic missiles,
including to several Middle Eastern countries. If its nuclear weapon
and missile programs continue, North Korea threatens to destabilize a
region that has known several great power conflicts over the last 100
years and now includes some of the world's largest economies.
On 13 February, the Six-Party Talks in Beijing resulted in an
agreement on steps intended to lead to a declaration of all Democratic
People's Republic of Korea nuclear programs and a disablement of all
existing nuclear facilities. The agreement is the initial step in the
denuclearization process, and we will be looking closely at
implementation.
Should additional countries in Northeast Asia or the Middle East
seek nuclear weapons in reaction to Iran's or North Korea's nuclear
programs, the global nonproliferation regime could unravel. We are
watching several states for signs of nuclear weapons aspirations, in
part because of reporting of past contact with A.Q. Khan and his
network when it was active. We also are concerned about rogue or
criminal elements willing to supply materials and technology--alone or
with a network--without their government's knowledge.
REGIONAL CONFLICTS, INSTABILITY, AND RECONFIGURATIONS OF POWER AND
INFLUENCE
As noted at the outset of this statement, globalization is
contributing to conflicts, instability, and reconfigurations of power
and influence. These consequences of globalization manifest themselves
most clearly at the regional level, although at times we can see the
effects across regions. Again, the attempt by states or non-state
actors to co-opt, dominate, turn into proxies, or destroy other nation
states is our primary concern. This is the explicitly stated goal of al
Qaeda's leadership vis-a-vis Iraq and the Levant, and it is an accurate
appraisal of the foreign policy aims of states like Iran. However they
occur, violent conflicts in a given state--as we see in Africa today--
can swiftly lead to massive humanitarian tragedies and, potentially,
regional wars.
THE MIDDLE EAST--AN EMBOLDENED IRAN
In the Middle East, Iran and its neighbors see a strategic shift:
Iran's influence is rising in ways that go beyond the menace of its
nuclear program. The fall of the Taliban and Saddam, increased oil
revenues, HAMAS's electoral victory, and Hizballah's perceived recent
success in fighting against Israel all extend Iran's shadow in the
region. Our Arab allies fear Iran's increasing influence, are concerned
about worsening tensions between Shite and Sunni Islam, and face
heightened domestic criticism for maintaining their decades-old
strategic partnerships with Washington.
Iran's growing influence has coincided with a generational change
in Tehran's leadership. Iranian President Ahmadinejad's
administration--staffed in large part by second-generation hardliners
imbued with revolutionary ideology and deeply distrustful of the U.S.--
has stepped up the use of more assertive and offensive tactics to
achieve Iran's longstanding goals.
IRAN--ETHNIC UNREST
However, Ahmadinejad's supporters suffered setbacks in the recent
Assembly of Experts and local council elections. Moreover, ethnic
tensions in Iran's Baloch, Kurdish, and, to a lesser extent, Arab and
Azeri areas continue to fester, creating concern in Tehran about the
potential for broader ethnic unrest to generate large-scale anti-regime
activity. While record oil revenues and manageable debt suggest that
Iran is capable, for now, of weathering shocks to the economy,
inflationary pressures, exacerbated by Ahmadinejad's expansionary
fiscal and monetary policies, are harming Iran's consumer and
investment climates and causing employment opportunities to decline.
IRAN--ACTIVE IN IRAQ
Regarding Tehran's regional policies, Iran continues to be active
in Iraq, seeking to influence political, economic, religious, and
cultural developments to ensure a nonthreatening, cooperative, and
Shiite-dominated regime to its west.
Iran uses radio, television, and print media to
influence Iraqi public opinion and help promote pro-Iranian
individuals in the Iraqi government at all levels. It has
offered financial and other support to its political allies in
the United Iraqi Alliance, but its electoral impact appears to
have been marginal, given the likelihood that Shiite voters
would have voted for the unified Shiite ticket anyway.
IRANIAN MILITARY POWER
Iranian conventional military power threatens Persian Gulf states
and challenges U.S. interests. Iran is enhancing its ability to project
its military power--primarily with ballistic missiles and naval power--
with the goal of dominating the Gulf region and deterring potential
adversaries. It seeks a capacity to disrupt the operations and
reinforcement of U.S. forces based in the region--potentially
intimidating regional allies into withholding support for U.S. policy--
and raising the political, financial, and human costs to the U.S. and
our allies of our presence in Iraq. Tehran views its growing inventory
of ballistic missiles (it already has the largest inventory of these
missiles in the Middle East), as an integral part of its strategy to
deter--and if necessary retaliate against--forces in the region,
including U.S. forces.
IRAN--TERRORISM AND HIZBALLAH
We assess that Iran regards its ability to conduct terrorist
operations abroad as a key element of its national security strategy:
it considers this capability as helping to safeguard the regime by
deterring U.S. or Israeli attacks, distracting and weakening Israel, as
enhancing Iran's regional influence through intimidation, and as
helping to drive the U.S. from the region.
At the center of Iran's terrorism strategy is Lebanese Hizballah,
which relies on Tehran for a substantial portion of its annual budget,
military equipment, and specialized training. Hizballah is focused on
its agenda in Lebanon and supporting anti-Israeli Palestinian
terrorists, but, as I indicated earlier, it has in the past made
contingency plans to conduct attacks against U.S. interests in the
event it feels its survival--or that of Iran--is threatened.
SYRIA'S REGIONAL POLICIES
Syria has strengthened ties with Iran and grown more confident
about its regional policies, largely due to what it sees as vindication
of its support to Hizballah and HAMAS and its perceptions of its
success in overcoming international attempts to isolate the regime.
Damascus has failed to crack down consistently on militant infiltration
into Iraq and continues to meddle in Lebanon. Lebanon remains in a
politically dangerous situation as Damascus, Hizballah, and other pro-
Syrian groups attempt to topple the government of Prime Minister
Siniora.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES/HAMAS
In the Palestinian territories, inter-factional violence, which has
intensified in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank since the establishment
of the HAMAS-led Palestinian Authority (PA) government in March,
threatens to escalate further absent success in forming a national
unity government. HAMAS has continued to reject Quartet and Israeli
demands for exp licit recognition of Israel, renunciation of armed
resistance to Israeli occupation, and acceptance of previous
Palestinian Liberation Organization and international agreements.
TURMOIL IN MAJOR AFRICAN STATES
In sub-Saharan Africa, the picture is mixed. We see the
consolidation of democracy in some countries and the persistence of
political crises and violent conflict in others. Many of Africa's past
and present crises have occurred in countries run by entrenched regimes
with little to no real democratic foundations and weak control of areas
outside the capital. Sudan and Somalia are cases in point. Turmoil and
conflict threaten large portions of the sub-Saharan region, stretching
from the Horn of Africa in the east to Nigeria in the west.
DARFUR CONFLICT
The Darfur conflict is the world's fastest-growing humanitarian
crisis, with more than 200,000 people killed, 1.85 million internally
displaced and another 234,000 refugees in neighboring Chad. Internally
divided rebel groups continue to fight against the government because
the existing peace agreement fails to provide security and power
sharing. The Sudanese military has been unable to force the rebels to
sign the peace accord and, with assistance from local militia, is
conducting a dry season campaign against civilian villages suspected of
harboring the rebels.
SUDANESE FEARS
Already facing the prospect that its southern region will choose to
secede in a referendum scheduled for 2011, the Sudanese government
fears that additional concessions to the Darfur rebels and the
deployment of U.N. peacekeepers to the region would lead to further
disintegration of Sudan. Chadian and Central African Republic (CAR)
rebel groups have become entangled in the Darfur crisis, and the
spillover of violence in the past 10 months threatens to destabilize
already weak regimes in both countries.
SOMALIA TURMOIL
The rapid collapse of the Council of Islamic Courts and arrival in
Mogadishu of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has altered the
political dynamics in southern Somalia. The TFG faces many of the same
obstacles that have kept any single group from establishing a viable
government in Somalia since the country collapsed in 1991. Somali
society is divided into numerous clans and sub-clans that are reluctant
to see one group rise above the others. To win the confidence and
support of the population and have any chance of restoring order, the
TFG will need to be more inclusive and demonstrate effective
governance. More turmoil could enable extremists to regain their
footing absent mechanisms to replace the temporary Ethiopian presence
with an internationally-supported Somali solution. Al Qaeda remains
determined to exploit turmoil in Somalia.
NIGERIA--DANGER OF DEMOCRATIC COLLAPSE
Nigeria's fragile democratic transition is in danger of collapsing
in the coming months due to a lack of preparations for elections
scheduled for April. Tensions are rising over concerns that President
Obasanjo is manipulating the process to maintain his political
influence after his term officially ends. The government's
institutional foundations are hollow from decades of neglect and
corruption and will continue to make the country susceptible to
recurring crises in the coming years. Abuja has been unable to stem
rising lawlessness and insecurity in its oil-producing region, and the
Nigerian population is increasingly demoralized from worsening living
conditions in the face of much publicized improvements in the country's
macroeconomic indicators. Major political unrest in Nigeria would
threaten other countries in the region.
LATIN AMERICA--GRADUAL CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
Gradual consolidation of democracy remained the prevailing tendency
in Latin America over the election-packed year that concluded in
December, despite the challenge to core democratic tenets in a few
countries. Although some commentators spoke of a ``lurch to the left''
in the region, the election results point to no dominant ideological
trend. Moderate leftists who promote macroeconomic stability, poverty
alleviation, and the building of democratic institutions fared well, as
did able right of center leaders. Indeed, the overall health of Latin
American democracy is reflected in the results of a recent survey by a
reputable Latin America polling organization: 58 percent of the
respondents said that democracy is the best system of government. This
number is up 5 percentage points, compared to results from the same
poll in 2005.
At the same time, individuals who are critical of free market
economics and have friend ly relations with Venezuela's President
Chavez won the presidency in two of Latin America's poorest countries,
Ecuador and Nicaragua--both after Evo Morales' victory in Bolivia in
December 2005.
STRONG SHOWING OF LEFTIST CANDIDATES
The strong showing of presidential candidates with leftist populist
views in several other countries speaks to the growing impatience of
national electorates with the failure of incumbent governments to
improve the living standards of large elements of the population.
Public dissatisfaction with the way democracy is working is especially
troubling in the Andes, most notably in Ecuador and Peru.
VENEZUELA--STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. ``IMPERIALISM''
Democracy is most at risk in Venezuela and Bolivia. In both
countries, the elected presidents, Chavez and Morales, are taking
advantage of their popularity to undercut the opposition and eliminate
checks on their authority.
In Venezuela, Chavez has reacted to his sweeping victory on
December 3 by increasing efforts to deepen his self-described
Bolivarian Revolution while maintaining the struggle against U.S.
``imperialism.'' He has announced plans to prevent a leading opposition
television station from continuing to broadcast and moved to
nationalize the country's main telecommunications enterprise and
largest private electric power company. Chavez is among the most
stridently anti-American leaders anywhere in the world, and will
continue to try to undercut U.S. influence in Venezuela, in the rest of
Latin America, and elsewhere internationally.
CHAVEZ'S WEAPONS PURCHASES
Chavez's effort to politicize the Venezuelan Armed Forces and to
create a large and well-armed Territorial Guard and military Reserves
is another sign that he is breaking with the trend in the region toward
more professional and apolitical militaries. His purchase of modern
military equipment from Russia, including 24 SU-30 advanced fighter-
bombers, and moves toward developing his own weapons production
capability are increasingly worrisome to his neighbors. These weapons
purchases could fuel an arms race in the region.
Fidel Castro's Cuba continues to be Venezuela's closest ally.
Castro's physical debilitation will deprive Chavez of a valued mentor
and strategic adviser. The post-Castro transition in Cuba has begun.
Key drivers in influencing events in post-Fidel Cuba will be how
cohesive the governing elite will remain in the absence of Cuba's
iconic leader, how astute Raul Castro proves to be as his brother's
successor, and how much pressure the population will exert on the
government in seeking economic and political reforms. This year is
likely to mark the end of Fidel Castro's domination of Cuba; but
significant, positive change is unlikely immediately following his
death: the period following his July 2006 operation afforded Raul
Castro the opportunity to solidify his own position as successor.
MEXICO--NEW PRESIDENT
In Mexico, President Felipe Calderon of the ruling National Action
Party (PAN) was inaugurated on December 1 after a razor-thin margin of
victory over his closest opponent, leftist populist Andres Manuel Lopez
Obrador of the Party of the Democratic Revolution. The July election
illustrated the country's polarization along socioeconomic lines. The
new government has initiated steps to address problems that affect both
Mexican and U.S. security concerns, including drug smuggling, human
trafficking, and associated violence.
CROSSCURRENTS IN ASIA
The rise of China and economic prosperity more generally--except
for North Korea--are changing Northeast Asia in unprecedented ways.
Trade and investment, driven by China's successful integration into the
world economy through the World Trade Organization framework, is
rapidly bringing the countries of this region closer together; but it
still lacks mature, integrating security mechanisms, beyond the U.S.
security treaties with Japan and South Korea.
CHINA--BEIJING'S FOREIGN POLICY
In 2006, Chinese leaders increasingly moved to align Beijing's
foreign policy with the needs of domestic development, identifying
opportunities to strengthen economic growth, gain access to new sources
of energy, and mitigate what they see as potential external threats to
social stability. At one and the same time, China places a priority on
positive relations with the United States while strengthening ties to
the other major powers, especially the European Union and Russia.
The Peoples Republic of China leaders continue to emphasize
development of friendly relations with the states on China's periphery
to assure peaceful borders. In the past year, China achieved notable
success in improving relations with Japan under newly elected Prime
Minister Abe and prospects for cross-straits conflict with Taiwan
diminished. In addition to establishing strong bilateral ties, Beijing
actively engages with many multilateral organizations, including ASEAN.
CHINA--RAPID MILITARY MODERNIZATION
Beijing continues its rapid rate of military modernization,
initiated in 1999. We assess that China's aspirations for great power
status, threat perceptions, and security strategy would drive this
modernization effort even if the Taiwan problem were resolved. The
Chinese are developing more capable long-range conventional strike
systems and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with terminally
guided maneuverable warheads able to attack U.S. carriers and airbases.
CHINA--MAINTAINING DOMESTIC STABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Maintaining domestic social stability remains one of Beijing's top
priorities. Rural discontent, which has erupted in an increasing number
of local demonstrations and riots, could undermine continued rapid
economic growth if not addressed. Hu Jintao's ``harmonious society''
program is an attempt to address these concerns by enhancing
environmental protection, social service, and rule of law, while
strengthening the Communist Party's position. The 11th 5-Year Plan
enacted in 2006 seeks to put economic growth on a more secure footing
by attempting to address rural complaints and extending economic
prosperity to more disadvantaged segments of Chinese society.
Implementation of this program would require a major shift of resources
to the countryside, greater accountability of provincial leaders to
Beijing, and stronger efforts to root out local corruption.
Lastly, some aspects of China's financial system are unhealthy,
with state-owned banks maintaining large balances of non-performing
loans. We nevertheless see a low risk of severe financial crisis over
the next 5 years; China is introducing market measures to the financial
sector, and has massive foreign exchange reserves, current and capital
account surpluses and low exposure to short-term foreign currency debt.
INDIA--ECONOMIC GROWTH AND REGIONAL ROLE
We expect that India's growing confidence on the world stage as a
result of its sustained high rates of economic growth will make New
Delhi a more effective partner for the United States but also a more
formidable interlocutor in areas of disagreement, particularly in the
WTO.
New Delhi seeks to play a role in fostering democracy in the
region, especially in Nepal and Bangladesh, and will continue to be a
reliable ally against global terrorism, given the fact that India is a
major target for jihadists in part because of the insurgency in
Kashmir.
INDIA-PAKISTANI RELATIONS
The 3-year peace process between India and Pakistan has lessened
tensions in the region and both sides appear committed to improving the
bilateral relationship. New Delhi's threshold for responding militarily
to terrorist attacks has apparently increased since the two countries
last approached the brink of war in 2002. The Mumbai train bombings
last year disrupted but ultimately did not derail the composite
dialogue and a mechanism for exchanging information on terrorist
attacks has been established. Yet, the prospect of renewed tensions
between the two remains despite these improved relations, and we are
mindful that Pakistan was a major source of nuclear proliferation until
our efforts disrupted A.Q. Khan's network.
Nonetheless, New Delhi's concerns about Pakistan's tolerance, at a
minimum, of terrorist attacks on Indian soil remains a dominant theme
in relations, and risks derailing rapprochement. An attack on a high-
profile target might lead New Delhi to take action to curtail militant
capabilities in Pakistan or Pakistani Kashmir and punish Islamabad for
its continued support to Pakistan-based militants. We remain concerned
about the potential that such a conflict could escalate.
Although both New Delhi and Islamabad are fielding a more mature
strategic nuclear capability, they do not appear to be engaged in a
Cold War-style arms race based on a quest for numerical superiority.
PAKISTAN--TERRORISM AND LEADERSHIP ISSUES
For its part, as noted previously, Pakistan is a frontline partner
in the war on terror. Nevertheless, it remains a major source of
Islamic extremism and the home for some top terrorist leaders. The
prospect of renewed tensions with nuclear-armed India remains despite
improved relations, and Pakistan had been a major source of nuclear
proliferation until the disruption of the A.Q. Khan's network.
Meanwhile, democracy has not been fully restored since the Army took
power in 1999. With elections expected later this year, Musharraf
continues to be criticized for remaining both the President and Chief
of the Army Staff, but there are no political leaders inside the
country able to challenge his continued leadership. Musharraf's secular
opponents are in disarray, and the main Islamic parties continue to
suffer from internal divisions and an inability to expand their support
base.
EURASIA IN FLUX
Fifteen years after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., post-Soviet
Eurasia remains in a state of flux--more so than even a year ago--but
increasingly subject to Russian assertiveness.
RUSSIA--SUCCESSION MANEUVERING
As Russia moves toward a presidential election in March 2008,
succession maneuvering has intensified and increasingly dominates
Russian domestic and foreign policy. Against that backdrop, the last
year has seen expanded Kremlin efforts to stifle political opposition
and widen state control over strategic sectors of the economy. Those
trends are likely to deepen as the succession draws closer.
Meanwhile, high energy prices and abundant oil and gas Reserves
continue to fan Kremlin aspirations for Russia to become an energy
super-power. A flush economy and perceived policy successes at home and
abroad have bolstered Russian confidence, enabled increased defense
spending, and emboldened the Kremlin to pursue foreign policy goals
that are not always consistent with those of Western institutions.
Indeed, Russia is attempting to exploit the leverage that high energy
prices has afforded it, increasingly using strong-arm tactics against
neighboring countries.
RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. AND THE WORLD
Russian assertiveness will continue to inject elements of rivalry
and antagonism into U.S. dealings with Moscow, particularly our
interactions in the former Soviet Union, and will dampen our ability to
cooperate with Russia on issues ranging from counterterrorism and
nonproliferation to energy and democracy promotion in the Middle East.
As the Litvinenko murder demonstrates, the steady accumulation of
problems and irritants threatens to harm Russia's relations with the
west more broadly.
OTHER EURASIAN STATES AND BALKANS
Ukraine's political situation is also unsettled. The power struggle
between President Yushchenko and recently re-installed Prime Minister
Yanukovych continues to buffet Ukrainian politics and national policy.
UKRAINE'S ORANGE REVOLUTION
Ukraine's Orange Revolution brought lasting changes,
including greater media freedom and a strengthened role for
civil society. Improvements to the political process resulted
in free and fair parliamentary elections in March 2006.
However, Yanukovych's re-emergence after his party won that
election increased cynicism in the region about the promise of
``colored'' revolutions, bolstered Russia's position in the
region and leaves Georgia isolated as virtually the only former
Soviet republic fully-committed to Euro-Atlantic integration.
The future development of the Caucasus is likely to be intertwined
with what may happen outside the region in Kosovo. If Kosovo gains
independence this year--as seems likely--Russia has signaled that it
might respond by recognizing breakaway regions in Georgia, a risky
step.
CENTRAL ASIA--AMERICAN INTERESTS
American interests in Central Asia also face increasing challenges.
Of the five countries in the region, three--Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and
especially Uzbekistan--are authoritarian; another, Kyrgyzstan, is semi-
authoritarian and increasingly fearful of losing control; and the last,
Turkmenistan, a dictatorship whose new leader is still consolidating
power. All view our democratization agenda with suspicion. The
repression, leadership stasis, and corruption that tend to characterize
these regimes provide fertile soil for the development of radical
Islamic sentiment and movements, and raise questions about the Central
Asian states reliability as energy and counterterrorism partners.
There is no guarantee that elite and societal turmoil across
Central Asia will stay within the confines of existing
autocratic systems. In the worst, but not implausible case,
central authority in one or more of these states could
evaporate as rival political factions, clans, or regions vie
for power--opening the door to a dramatic expansion of
terrorist and criminal activity along the lines of a failed
state.
ENERGY SECURITY AND COMPETITION FOR SUPPLIES
Energy resources have long been a critical element of national
security but globalization, unprecedented increases in demand, and the
interactive effects of energy and other issues have both magnified and
broadened the significance of developments in the global energy system.
Oil prices have fallen by more than 25 percent since their peak last
July and spare production capacity has grown to more than 2 million
barrels per day. Nevertheless, we have entered a new era in which
energy security has become an increasing priority not only for the U.S.
and the West, but also rapidly developing economies like China and
India that are becoming major energy consumers.
This means that developments in the energy arena, narrowly defined,
have significant and often multiple consequences in other areas. For
example, high and surging demand for oil and gas fueled by 5 years of
unusually robust world economic growth have resulted in higher prices
and windfall profits for producers. Producer nations benefiting from
higher prices, and the potential political, economic, and even military
advantages include several countries that are hostile to U.S.
interests.
INTELLIGENCE READINESS AND GLOBAL COVERAGE
Each of these national security challenges is affected by the
accelerating change and transnational interplay that are the hallmarks
of 21st century globalization. Globalization has transformed the way we
communicate and conduct business, but it has also transformed the way
we think about challenges and opportunities and in the way we define
and confront our foes. Indeed, it is not too much of a stretch to say
that events anywhere can--and often do--affect our interests and the
security of our Nation and our people. As a result, the Intelligence
Community must maintain global coverage and the highest level of
readiness to anticipate challenges and respond to them.
INTELLIGENCE TRANSFORMATION EXAMPLES
Therefore, I offer a few examples that demonstrate the extent to
which the Intelligence Community is transforming the way we work with
one another and are achieving a higher level of intelligence readiness
than was the case before September 11.
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
The first example is a strengthened National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC), which in last 2 years has fully assumed its central role
in our Nation's efforts against global terrorism worldwide.
The key agencies involved are physically present and
integrated into NCTC's work.
NCTC draws on 30 different networks in performing its
analytic and information-sharing functions.
NCTC convenes all the key players in our counterterrorism
intelligence mission three times a day to ensure complete
coordination and face-to-face communication.
INFORMATION SHARING
The second improved readiness example is the impact of our
information sharing reform initiatives. Nothing improves intelligence
readiness faster than information sharing with the right authorities,
friends, and allies. Under the new Senate-confirmed Chief Information
Officer and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing
Environment, we have:
Implemented a classified information sharing initiative with
key U.S. allies.
Established the Unified Cross Domain Management office with
the Department of Defense to oversee development and
implementation of common technologies that enable highly
classified networks to share information with users and systems
that have lower or no clearances;
Developed and rolled out ``blue pages'' that provide contact
information for all agencies with counterterrorism
responsibilities in the U.S. Government;
Released the Information Sharing Environment Implementation
Plan and Privacy Guidelines, which provide the vision and road
map for better information sharing within the Intelligence
Community and with our fellow Federal, State, local, and tribal
counterparts, as well as with the private sector; and
We are nearing completion of a significant simplification of
``Sensitive but Unclassified'' rules for the U.S. Government,
which should further improve information sharing with State and
local partners.
COVERAGE OF SUDDEN FLARE-UPS, EMERGING CRISES
A third example of our intelligence readiness addresses the
critical question of global coverage and dealing with sudden flare-ups.
We have developed a new model for assessing and then tasking
Intelligence Community organizations to ``lift and shift'' collection
resources in response to emerging crises.
Application of this process in support of intelligence
efforts against the summer 2006 Lebanon/Hizballah/Israel crisis
proved very effective in focusing community efforts.
The same model is being used against the ongoing Darfur
crisis and in Somalia.
MISSION MANAGERS
Finally, we have established Mission Managers for Terrorism, Iran,
North Korea, Counterproliferation, Counterintelligence, Cuba and
Venezuela. These are senior executives, empowered to act across the
Intelligence Community, to achieve full coordination, synergy, and
cooperation. In two cases cited earlier--Iraq and China--where the
United States has, justifiably, the largest intelligence investment,
and where I will join the most senior Intelligence Community members in
being deeply and directly engaged as a team.
CONCLUSION
This requirement for readiness and global coverage does not mean
that all places and problems are equally important at a given point in
time. We must and do accord greater attention to those that are most
dangerous, most difficult, and most important to the policymakers,
warfighters, and first responders who depend on information and
insights from the Intelligence Community. The challenge we face is not
catching up to globalization or getting ahead of globalization--it is
recognizing the degree to which our national security is inextricably
woven into the fabric of globalization.
In intelligence, our focus on the military, foreign,
counterintelligence, and domestic dimensions of the threat must be all
of a piece, seamlessly integrated to thwart attacks, prevent surprises,
and provide policymakers with the time and insight they need to make
decisions that will keep Americans safe. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Director.
General Maples.
STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Maples. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator Warner,
and members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to
testify today and for your continued support to our Armed
Forces and to the DIA. My testimony, which I have submitted for
the record, outlines our assessments of the state of the
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the current threat from
global terrorism, and proliferation of WMD. It also addresses
defense-related developments in states and regions of concern
and other transnational issues. As you requested, I will
summarize a few of these issues.
The situation in Iraq will remain an extremely complex and
challenging security environment, as the conflict remains
fundamentally a sectarian struggle for power and the right to
define Iraq's future identity. We have seen recent positive
developments, including continued development and increased
capability of Iraq security forces, efforts to address problems
associated with de-Baathification, and increased cooperation
between the Sunni Arab tribes and the government in al-Anbar
Province.
Prime Minister Maliki has made gestures to the Sunni
minority such as offers to reinstall some Saddam-era military
leaders and the issuance of arrest warrants for Ministry of
Interior personnel accused of abuses. Sadrist members of the
Council of Representatives ended their boycott of the Council
and the Council passed a national budget. The Government of
Iraq seems committed and is making initial efforts to move
forward with the Baghdad security plan.
Despite these developments, significant challenges to U.S.
and coalition forces remain. The Sunni Arab-based insurgency
remains fundamentally strong, adaptable, and capable despite
ongoing security operations, some limited progress in the
political arena, and some improvements in the Iraqi security
forces.
We have noted a change in the character and the dynamics of
the conflict. The perception of unchecked violence is creating
an atmosphere of fear, hardening sectarianism, empowering
militias and vigilante groups, and undermining confidence in
government and security forces. Conflict in Iraq is in a self-
sustaining cycle in which violent acts increasingly generate
retaliation. Insecurity rationalizes and justifies militias, in
particular Shiite militias, which increases fears in the Sunni
Arab community. The result is additional support or at least
acquiescence to insurgents and terrorists such as al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI). Shiite militants, most notably Jaysh al-Mahdi, also
are responsible for the increase in violence.
Attacks by terrorist groups account for only a limited
portion of insurgent violence. Yet the high profile nature of
their operations and tactics have a disproportionate impact.
AQI is the largest and most active of the Iraq-based terrorist
groups. AQI's attacks against Iraqi government targets and
coalition forces continue with a particular intent to
accelerate sectarian violence and to destabilize Baghdad. AQI
will continue to attempt to dominate the news cycle with
sensational attacks.
The situation in Iraq is complex and difficult, involving
counterinsurgency operations, counterterrorism, stability
operations, and nation-building. In this tenuous environment,
DIA judges that continued coalition presence is the primary
counter to a breakdown in central authority. Such a breakdown
would have grave consequences for the people of Iraq, stability
in the region, and U.S. strategic interests. No major political
figure in Iraq has endorsed the notion of civil war or
partition and most political and religious leaders continue to
restrain their communities.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban-led insurgency is a capable and
resilient threat to stability, particularly in the Pashtun
south and east. Despite absorbing heavy combat losses in 2006,
the insurgency has strengthened its military capabilities and
influence with its core base of rural Pashtuns. Overall attacks
doubled in 2006 from the previous year and suicide attacks
quadrupled from 2005. Large-scale operations increased
significantly as well.
DIA assesses that the Taliban-led insurgency will remain a
threat in 2007 and its attacks will increase this spring. Al
Qaeda remains the most dominant terrorist organization and the
most significant threat to U.S. interests worldwide. Despite
being forced to decentralize its network, al Qaeda retains the
ability to organize complex mass casualty attacks and to
inspire others. Al Qaeda's increasing cooperation with like-
minded groups has improved its ability to facilitate, support,
and direct its objectives.
AQI is the largest and the most deadly of the Iraq-based
terrorist groups. It conducts the most provocative anti-Shiite
attacks in Iraq, a hallmark of its strategy since 2003. It has
instigated cycles of sectarian violence by characterizing its
operations as defending Sunni interests. AQI continues to pose
a regional threat and aspires to become a global threat.
Pakistan's direct assistance has led to the elimination or
capture of numerous al Qaeda terrorists. Nevertheless, the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border area remains a haven for al Qaeda's
leadership and other extremists.
After global terrorism, the proliferation of WMD remains
the most significant threat to our Homeland, deployed forces,
allies, and interests. Increased availability of information
together with technical advances have the potential to allow
additional countries to develop nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons, and this is an area of increasing concern.
North Korea's October 2006 detonation of a nuclear device
marked its first nuclear test and an attempt to win
international recognition as a nuclear power after a decades-
long program to develop these weapons. Iran also continues to
develop WMD capabilities. Although Iran claims its program is
focused on producing commercial capabilities, DIA assesses with
high confidence that Iran remains determined to develop nuclear
weapons.
DIA expects China's nuclear weapons stockpile to grow over
the next 10 years as new ballistic missile systems reach
operational status. We also believe China has produced
sufficient weapon-grade fissile material to meet its military
nuclear weapons requirements for the immediate future.
We expect Russia to meet strategic nuclear warhead limits
mandated by the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty.
Russia's nuclear warhead and material security programs have
improved. However, we continue to be concerned with internal
threats, potential of terrorist attack, and a commitment to
maintaining security improvements.
Ballistic missiles remain a threat to U.S. interests. North
Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program
and has exported missiles and missile technology to other
countries. On July 4 and 5, 2006, North Korea conducted seven
missile launches. The Taepodong 2 space launch vehicle and
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was flight tested for
the first time and failed shortly after launch. Despite the
failure of the Taepodong 2, North Korea successfully tested six
theater ballistic missiles.
Iran's ballistic missile forces continue to train
extensively in highly publicized exercises. These exercises
enable Iranian ballistic missile forces to hone wartime
operations skills and test new tactics. Iran is fielding
increased numbers of theater ballistic missiles.
In conventional military forces, North Korea's military
continues to suffer the consequences of the North's economic
decline. Nevertheless, they remain capable of initiating an
attack on South Korea. North Korea's large force provides the
regime with an effective deterrent and a basis to employ
threats to further its national security goals.
Iran's armed forces intend to rely on asymmetric tactics,
using ballistic missiles, naval attacks in the restricted
waters along its coasts, and possibly a strategic terror
campaign.
The Peoples Republic of China is in the midst of a more
than decade-long military modernization program. China's
leaders remain focused on improving the quality of military
personnel and developing or acquiring long-range precision
strike missiles, modern fighter aircraft, a blue-water navy,
and improved amphibious forces.
Russian leaders view a strong military as a necessary
component to return their country to great power status. In
general purpose forces, training activity within units of the
permanently ready force which form the backbone of Russia's
conventional capability is at the highest post-Soviet level.
Modernizing the country's outdated equipment and planning
conversion to all-contract manning remain significant
challenges despite increased defense spending.
Non-U.S. global defense spending grew in real terms by 2.5
percent in 2006, amounting to an estimated $738 billion. China
ranked first with estimated spending of $80 to $115 billion and
Russia was second at about $90 billion. Russia is a leading
arms exporter, with major sales of advanced weapons and
military-related technology to China, India, Iran, and
Venezuela.
Russia and China continue to be the primary states of
concern regarding developing military space and counter-space
programs. However, as the availability of space technology and
services continue to increase, other nations can be expected to
acquire military and commercial space-based assets.
Over the past few years the DIA, like the rest of the IC,
has made major strides to improve our capabilities in
intelligence collection, all-source analysis, and information
management. Much has been accomplished. However, much more
needs to be done. With your continued support, I am confident
we will achieve greater levels of security for our citizens and
for our national interests.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Maples follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Michael D. Maples, USA
INTRODUCTION
Good afternoon Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the
committee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify today and your
continued support to the dedicated men and women of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). Our Nation faces a variety of complex
national and transnational threats and challenges. My testimony will
outline the state of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
current threat from global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). Finally, I will discuss defense related
developments in states and regions of concern and other transnational
issues.
CONFLICT IN IRAQ
The situation in Iraq will remain an extremely complex and
challenging security environment as the conflict remains fundamentally
a sectarian struggle for power and the right to define Iraq's future
identity. We have seen recent developments that give hope for progress.
These include efforts to address problems associated with de-
Baathification and increased cooperation between Sunni Arab tribes and
the government in al Anbar Province. Prime Minister Maliki has made
gestures to the Sunni minority such as offers to reinstall some Saddam-
era military leaders and the issuance of arrest warrants for Ministry
of Interior personnel accused of abuses. Sadrist members of the Council
of Representatives ended their boycott of the council and the council
passed a national budget. Some rogue elements from Muqtada al-Sadr's
movement have also been expelled from his organization. Finally, the
Government of Iraq seems committed and is making initial efforts to
move forward with the Baghdad Security Plan.
We note the continued development and increased capability of the
Iraqi security forces (ISF) and police. The ISF will meet initial
manning, training, and equipment milestones, improving unit
capabilities. Nevertheless, the ISF will remain dependent on coalition
support. ISF units continue to struggle with sectarian militia
influence and instilling discipline in their formations to gain
legitimacy with the population.
Despite these positive developments, significant challenges to U.S.
and coalition forces remain. As the recent Iraq National Intelligence
Estimate noted, Iraqi society's growing polarization, the persistent
weakness of the security forces--and the state in general--and all
sides' ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase
in violence. Unless efforts at reversing these conditions show
measurable progress in the next 12 to 18 months, the security situation
will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to late 2006.
The Sunni Arab-based insurgency remains fundamentally strong,
adaptable, and capable despite ongoing security operations, some
limited progress in the political arena and some improvements in the
ISF. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) use increased in 2006 and was
responsible for roughly 60 percent of coalition casualties. Greater
insurgent emphasis on anti-helicopter tactics is responsible for
downing approximately eight coalition and contractor helicopters in the
past month. Insurgents also began combining toxic industrial chemicals,
such as chlorine gas, with their IEDs. Overall attacks averaged
approximately 180 per day in January 2007, equal to the previous high
in October 2006. The daily average of attacks against ISFs in January
remained consistent with recent months averaging approximately 30 per
day. Daily attacks on civilians in January averaged almost 50 per day,
up from the previous high in October 2006 of approximately 40 per day.
We have noted a change in the character and dynamics of the
conflict. The perception of unchecked violence is creating an
atmosphere of fear, hardening sectarianism, empowering militias and
vigilante groups, hastening a middle-class exodus, and shaking
confidence in government and security forces. The sectarian violence,
an inexperienced and weak central government, immature institutions,
problems in providing basic services, and high unemployment are
encouraging more Iraqis to turn toward sectarian groups, militias, and
insurgents for basic needs, threatening the unity of Iraq. Moreover,
robust criminal networks act as insurgent and terrorist force
multipliers. Many Sunni Arabs, motivated by fear, financial incentive,
perceptions of marginalization, and exclusion from Iraqi government and
security institutions, act as insurgent sympathizers, capable of
supporting the insurgency.
Since 2003, the fight to define post-Saddam Iraq has been primarily
an intra-Arab conflict to determine how power and authority will be
distributed. We note that conditions for the further deterioration of
security and stability exist within this ongoing struggle. Although a
significant breakdown of central authority has not occurred, Iraq has
moved closer to this possibility because of weak governance, increasing
security challenges, and the lack of a national compact.
Conflict in Iraq is in a self-sustaining cycle in which violent
acts increasingly generate retaliation. Insecurity rationalizes and
justifies militias, in particular Shiite militias and increases fears
in the Sunni Arab community. The result is additional support, or at
least acquiescence, to insurgents and terrorists such as al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI). Shiite militants, most notable Jaysh al-Mahdi, account for
some of the increases in violence.
Baghdad is the center of the Shiite and Sunni Arab conflict as both
groups fight for territory and political influence. Sectarian attacks
constitute most of the violence in mixed-ethnic areas in and around the
capital, while coalition forces remain the primary target in the Shiite
south and Sunni west.
ISF, particularly the Ministry of Interior forces, are infiltrated
and influenced by members of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution
in Iraq's Badr organization and Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi. The
Jaysh al-Mahdi often operates under the protection or approval of Iraqi
police. Many Sunnis view the ISF as a Shiite led tool of oppression.
Some Jaysh al-Mahdi cells may operate outside Sadr's direct guidance
and conduct independent operations.
Attacks by terrorist groups account for only a fraction of
insurgent violence, yet the high-profile nature of their operations and
tactics have a disproportionate impact. AQI is the largest and most
active of the Iraq-based terrorist groups. AQI's attacks against Iraqi
government targets and coalition forces continue with a particular
intent to accelerate sectarian violence and destabilize Baghdad. AQI is
one of the most visible perpetrators of anti-Shiite attacks in Iraq and
has capitalized on the current cycle of sectarian violence by
increasing perceptions its operations are in defense of Sunni
interests. AQI will continue to attempt to dominate the news cycle with
sensational attacks. Ansar al-Sunna, the second most prominent
terrorist group in Iraq, also poses a threat to stability in Iraq;
however its longstanding ties to AQI are increasingly strained. Hard
numbers for foreign fighters in the Iraq insurgency are unavailable.
DIA judges less than 10 percent of insurgents are foreign fighters. The
majority of these individuals are used as suicide bombers.
The building, training, and deploying of ISF and police is
progressing, although politicization of the security ministries remains
a challenge. The ISF are meeting the initial manned, trained, and
equipped milestones, have improved unit capabilities, and are
increasingly taking the lead in security operations. They remain
generally dependent on coalition support. We judge the ISF are
presently unable to stand alone against Sunni insurgents, AQI and
Shiite militias.
Iraqi government officials continue attempts to achieve national
reconciliation, but attacks against civilians, a key driver of ethno-
sectarian conflict, also continue. Political leaders' inability to
resolve key issues such as federalism, de-Baathfication, amnesty for
insurgents, and militia integration also contribute to continued Sunni
Arab discontent, fueling support for terrorist and insurgent groups.
Sectarian differences limit the effectiveness of government as groups
maintain hard-line stances on contentious issues.
The Iraqi economy has experienced moderate growth despite the
security situation, which continues to impede and increase overall
costs of reconstruction. However, the inability to realize significant
improvements in the oil and fuels sector and in electricity production
and distribution creates drag on the economy while undermining the
average Iraqi citizen's support for the central government and
coalition.
The situation in Iraq is complex and difficult, involving
counterinsurgency operations, counterterrorism, stability operations,
and nation building. In this tenuous environment, DIA judges that
continued coalition presence is the primary counter to a breakdown in
central authority. Such a breakdown would have grave consequences for
the people of Iraq, stability in the region, and U.S. strategic
interests. No major political figure in Iraq has endorsed the notion of
civil war or partition, and most political and religious leaders
continue to restrain their communities. Although leaders across the
political spectrum who are participating in the government continue to
talk and search for a positive way forward, the challenges to bringing
stability and security with a cohesive, unified, and effective
government remain significant.
CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN
The Taliban-led insurgency is a capable and resilient threat to
stability in Afghanistan, particularly in the Pashtun south and east.
Despite absorbing heavy combat losses in 2006, the insurgency
strengthened its military capabilities and influence with its core base
of rural Pashtuns. Overall attacks doubled in 2006 from the previous
year. Suicide attacks quadrupled from 2005 levels and large-scale
operations--those involving 50 or more fighters--increased
significantly as well. A sustained international military and Afghan
security presence in the volatile Pashtun south and east alongside
credible civil administration is essential for solidifying central
government control. Otherwise, the Afghan government may find itself in
a stalemate with insurgents where it maintains control over cities and
insurgents retain freedom of movement in the Pashtun dominated
countryside.
Al Qaeda's strategic objectives--re-establishing the Islamic
caliphate, unified by a common ideology rooted in a violent rejection
of apostasy and characterized by fervent opposition to Western
influence in traditionally Islamic countries--compel al Qaeda's
commitment to the Afghan jihad, help shape its strategy there, and help
to recast Afghanistan as a critical battleground in a broader battle
against the West and apostate regimes. In a July 2005 letter, Ayman al-
Zawahiri framed the jihad in Afghanistan as a vanguard for ultimately
establishing an Islamic state in the Levant, Egypt and neighboring
states in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq; multiple public statements by
Zawahiri have since repeated this point.
The Afghan government is maintaining generally favorable and stable
relations with most, but not all, of its neighbors. Afghanistan's
relations with Pakistan are strained due to continued Taliban reliance
on safe-haven in Pakistan.
In 2006, efforts by the government and provincial governors
resulted in the greatest poppy eradication in 4 years. However, the
Afghan drug trade remains a major source of revenue for insurgents and
is a corrupting influence over government officials. Poppy cultivation
will continue unless improved alternative livelihood programs, law
enforcement, and judicial reform are implemented.
President Karzai's administration has been struggling to improve
its performance and expand its presence. Although the Afghan government
has established national-level political institutions by drafting a new
constitution, holding a legitimate presidential election, and creating
a democratically elected National Assembly, local governments receive
limited resources from Kabul and struggle to provide effective
governance. Additionally, the Afghan National Army and Police have been
unable to effectively promote security, particularly in the volatile
south and east. They remain hindered by a shortage of skilled
personnel, tribal and ethnic rivalries, and corruption.
Nearly 5 years after the Taliban's fall, many Afghans expected the
situation to be better by now and are beginning to blame President
Karzai for the lack of greater progress. These unrealized expectations
contributed to an erosion of support for his administration.
Nevertheless, President Karzai is still the most powerful political
figure in Afghanistan. President Karzai will need to secure successes
in the months ahead to convince Afghans that his administration can
counter and eventually defeat the Taliban. DIA assesses the Taliban led
insurgency will remain a threat in 2007 and its attacks will increase
this spring.
WAR ON TERRORISM
Al Qaeda and Sunni Extremists
Developments over the last year have highlighted the continuing
threat posed by terrorism to the security of the United States. The
United States and its allies achieved major successes against al Qaeda
and its associated movement, including the elimination or capture of
key leaders and the disruption of major plots. These achievements
unfortunately highlight the resiliency of these groups and resonance of
their message. In June 2006, Canadian authorities detained 17
individuals who were planning a series of attacks in Ontario province
to include bombings, seizing Canadian Parliamentary buildings and a
broadcast center, and taking hostages. Also, documents captured in a
raid on an AQI safehouse in Iraq revealed AQI was planning terrorist
operations in the U.S. The disrupted plots underscore both the
accomplishments achieved in union with our partners in the war on
terrorism and the continuing danger posed by al Qaeda. Despite being
forced to decentralize its network, al Qaeda retains the ability to
organize complex, mass-casualty attacks and inspire others.
Al Qaeda remains the most dominant terrorist organization and the
most significant threat to U.S interests worldwide. In 2006, al Qaeda
remained a loose network, broadly defined by the strategic objective of
re-establishing their version of an Islamic caliphate, and unified by a
common ideology rooted in the violent rejection of Western influence,
especially in traditionally Islamic countries. Al Qaeda has
consistently recovered from losses of senior leadership. Despite the
deaths and capture of key operatives, new but less experienced leaders
step forward and remain committed to transnational terrorist
operations, including in the United States. Additionally, al Qaeda's
increasing cooperation with like-minded groups has improved its ability
to facilitate, support, and direct its objectives. For example, in his
2006 September 11 anniversary video, Zawahiri announced that the
Algerian Group for Salafist Preaching and Combat formally aligned
itself with al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda senior leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan remain under
pressure from U.S. and our global war on terrorism partners' military
and intelligence efforts, hindering their ability to direct global
operations. The increased number of statements issued last year by al
Qaeda leadership, in particular Ayman al-Zawahiri, indicate the
continuing strategic role Osama bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri seek to play
despite their isolation. This rhetoric is designed primarily to provoke
Arab and Islamic audiences to undertake militant activities, regardless
of locale or affiliation, in order to broaden and deepen their
perceived global struggle; it is also designed to maintain influence
over that struggle, to maintain recruitment and morale, and to place
local insurgencies into the context of the wider global struggle.
AQI is the largest and most deadly of the Iraq-based terrorist
groups. It continues to target Iraqi government interests and coalition
forces. AQI conducts the most provocative anti-Shiite attacks in Iraq--
a hallmark of its strategy since 2003. It has instigated cycles of
sectarian violence by characterizing its operations as defending Sunni
interests. Furthermore, AQI continues to pose a regional and a desire
to become a global threat. Seized documents and interrogations reveal
AQI's intent to continue external attack planning.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism
Some terrorist groups see employing chemical, biological, or
radiological materials as low-cost, high-impact options for achieving
their goals. Even an inefficient dissemination of these materials, or a
hoax incident, could have a substantial psychological and economic
impact. Reporting continues to indicate that non-state actors,
specifically al Qaeda, continue to pursue chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) options. Osama bin Laden has openly
declared his interest in such materials since the 1990s. The recent
press claim made by the AQI leader asking for nuclear scientists to
make `germ' and `dirty' weapons reinforces al Qaeda's interest and
desire to acquire CBRN materials. CBRN-related information is widely
available, and if terrorists were to use unconventional materials in an
attack, we believe they likely would use low-level biochemical agents
such as ricin, botulinum toxin or toxic industrial chemicals such as
cyanide. In addition to these low-level biochemical agents, al Qaeda
exhibited an interest in anthrax, mustard, and sarin prior to Operation
Enduring Freedom. We also judge that al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups have the capability and intent to develop and employ a
radiological dispersal device. At this time, we do not believe that al
Qaeda has a nuclear weapon capability, although acquisition remains a
goal; the acquisition of sufficient weapons usable nuclear material
remains al Qaeda's key obstacle to an improvised nuclear capability.
Other Terrorist Groups
Lebanese Hizballah continues training Iraqi Shiite militias.
Hizballah also continues to provide support to Palestinian terrorist
elements to facilitate attacks in Israel. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps-Qods Force has the lead for its transnational terrorist
activities, in conjunction with Lebanese Hizballah and Iran's Ministry
of Intelligence and Security.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continues to view
U.S. Government and DOD personnel as legitimate targets in Latin
America. The FARC has held three U.S. DOD contractors hostage since
2003. The possibility of the FARC targeting U.S. interests and persons
will remain as long as we are directly involved in Colombian
counterdrug and counterterrorism efforts.
Islamic World
Favorable opinion of Sunni extremists is waning among Muslims
worldwide. Muslim casualties in the 2005 Amman bombings accelerated the
decline that began in response to al Qaeda's attacks against Iraqi
civilians. In a summer 2006 multi-country poll conducted by a U.S.
nongovernmental organization, approximately 25 percent of Jordanians
expressed a lot or some confidence in Osama bin Laden compared to 60
percent the year before. In Pakistan, approximately 38 percent of
respondents stated they had some level of confidence in Osama bin
Laden, compared to 51 percent in May 2005.
Opinions of the west remain low in many Muslim countries. The
caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad eroded the good will gleaned from
U.S. relief efforts. Many Muslims believe the cartoons were deliberate
insults and part of a western besiegement of Islam. Muslim public
opinion will continue to be sensitive to perceived affronts to Muslim
values.
The Sunni-Shiite divide remains largely a vehicle for Muslim power
politics. Sunni and Shiite governments will continue cooperation
through their surrogates when presented with a common enemy, such as
the coalition in Iraq or Israel. Where the sponsors' interests
diverge--as with their spheres of influence in Iraq or on the African
periphery of the Islamic world--conflict will increase as competition
for influence intensifies.
Islamic extremist groups will continue to attempt to gain popular
support by exploiting governments' shortcomings in governance,
corruption, economic development, and provision of critical services.
Extremism in Europe remains more a secular issue than a religious
one. Many within Europe's burgeoning Muslim population increasingly
voice discontent through extremism and violence with Europe's
integration attempts. Extremism throughout the West will continue to be
spread primarily through radical clerics, the Internet, and in prisons.
Egypt
Egypt is generally supportive of U.S. goals and objectives. Most
recently, President Mubarak's government has tried to mediate between
HAMAS and Israel to secure the release of a captured Israeli soldier.
Egypt's overall security environment is generally stable although
susceptible to terrorist attacks as demonstrated by the April attacks
on the Multinational Forces and Observers mission and on civilian
targets in the Sinai Peninsula.
Other Persian Gulf States
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are stable, but leaders are
concerned that instability in Iraq, the threat of terrorism, and a more
aggressive Iran will directly affect them. Counterterrorism cooperation
is improving, with pledges being made to increase regional
effectiveness in the war on terrorism. There has also been progress in
developing legal frameworks for the prosecution of terror planners and
facilitators, although prosecution in the courts remains difficult.
Despite GCC-wide acknowledgement of the Sunni extremist threat, two
Sunni regimes with substantial Shiite minorities--Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait--and one with a Shiite majority--Bahrain--have a fear of their
Shiite population's ability to threaten internal stability; a concern
likely related to their fear of Iranian hegemony.
Pakistan
Pakistan's direct assistance has led to the death or capture of
numerous al Qaeda terrorists. A series of counterterrorism successes
earlier this year delayed al Qaeda attack planning and temporarily
diminished leadership resources. Nevertheless, the Afghanistan Pakistan
border area remains a haven for al Qaeda's leadership and other
extremists. In a September accord with the Pakistan government, North
Waziristan tribes agreed to curtail attacks into Afghanistan, cease
attacks on Pakistani forces, and expel foreign fighters. However, the
tribes have not abided by most terms of the agreement. Al Qaeda's
network may exploit the agreement for increased freedom of movement and
operation.
The Pakistan government remains at odds with Afghanistan over the
Taliban's presence in Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistan-based militants
continued attacks against India undermine Pakistan's ability to make
lasting peace with its neighbor.
Southeast Asia
Thailand continues to struggle with entrenched Muslim separatist
unrest in its southern-most provinces. Approximately 400 individuals
were killed in shootings, arson attacks, and bombings in 2006--
approximately the same number as 2005--although we cannot confirm that
all such incidents were insurgency related. The insurgency is home
grown, although local Muslim extremists have sought to emphasize
solidarity with ``oppressed'' Muslims worldwide in order to incite
hatred against Thailand's Buddhist majority. The government, installed
following the September coup, has adopted a conciliatory approach that
it hopes will ease tensions; but the insurgency is a decentralized
movement and many younger militants appear intent to continue the
struggle.
Separatist unrest elsewhere in Southeast Asia has been largely
contained, in part, through government reconciliation efforts.
Indonesia continues to successfully advance last year's historic peace
accord that ended the 29-year conflict in the Aceh province, with
elections on December 11. Sporadic separatist violence in Indonesia's
Papua province poses no serious security threat. The Philippines also
achieved success sustaining a ceasefire in its Muslim south with the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, although a risk of resumed fighting
persists in the absence of an agreement. Elsewhere in the south,
Philippine military operations since August have increased pressure on
the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah operatives on Jolo
Island. These groups nonetheless are intent on continuing attacks,
posing a persistent threat to American interests.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
NBC Weapons
After global terrorism, the proliferation of WMD remains the most
significant threat to our Homeland, deployed forces, allies, and
interests. Increased availability of information together with
technical advances has the potential to allow many new countries to
develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. This is an area of
increasing concern.
North Korea continued to develop its WMD capability in 2006. North
Korea's October detonation of a nuclear device marked its first nuclear
test and an attempt to win international recognition as a nuclear power
after a decades-long program to develop these weapons. North Korea
could have produced several nuclear weapons from plutonium produced at
its Yongbyon facilities. While North Korea may agree to give up
plutonium production, major uncertainties surround the conditions under
which the North would entirely abandon its nuclear weapons capability
or of the likelihood of the North transferring nuclear weapons-related
technology abroad. North Korea's resources include a biotechnical
infrastructure that could support the production of various biological
warfare agents. DIA believes North Korea has had a longstanding
chemical weapons stockpile of nerve, blister, blood, and choking
agents.
Iran also continues to develop its WMD capabilities. Although Iran
claims its program is focused on producing commercial electric power,
DIA assesses with high confidence Iran remains determined to develop
nuclear weapons. In 2007, DIA expects further progress including
completion of a nuclear reactor Fuel Manufacturing Plant and
installation of additional centrifuges at Natanz. Iran has a growing
biotechnology industry, significant pharmaceutical experience, and the
overall infrastructure that could be used to support a biological
warfare program. DIA believes Iran is pursuing development of
biological weapons. Iran has a large and growing commercial chemical
industry that could be used to support a chemical agent mobilization
capability.
DIA expects China's nuclear weapons stockpile to grow over the next
10 years as new ballistic missile systems reach operational status. DIA
also believes China has produced sufficient weapon-grade fissile
material to meet its military nuclear weapons requirements for the
immediate future. DIA believes China continues to maintain some
elements of an offensive biological weapons program. China possesses a
sufficiently advanced biotechnology infrastructure to allow it to
develop and produce biological agents.
Russia maintains a full compliment of nuclear weapons. Although
thousands of warheads have been dismantled, Russia relies on nuclear
weapons as its primary means of deterrence and will continue to
maintain and improve its forces and warheads. While we expect Russia to
meet strategic nuclear warhead limits mandated by the 2002 Strategic
Offensive Reduction Treaty (Moscow Treaty), we also believe they will
continue to maintain a relatively large stockpile of non-strategic
nuclear warheads. Russia's nuclear warhead and material security
programs have improved. However, we continue to be concerned with the
insider threat, terrorist attacks, and Russia's commitment to
maintaining security improvements. We judge Russia also continues
research and development that could support its chemical and biological
warfare programs.
India and Pakistan are building larger stockpiles of fission
weapons and are likely to work on advanced warhead and delivery system
designs to increase the effectiveness of these weapons. Both nations
have the infrastructure to support biological and some aspects of their
chemical warfare programs.
Syria has pursued development of a strategic deterrent principally
based on ballistic missile, chemical, and, to a limited extent,
biological warfare programs, as a means of countering Israel's
conventional force superiority. Syria's biotechnical infrastructure is
capable of supporting limited biological agent development. DIA
assesses Syria has a program to develop select biological agents. Syria
has had a chemical weapons program for many years and already has a
stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, which can be delivered by aircraft
or ballistic missiles.
Ballistic Missiles
North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program
and has exported missiles and missile technology to other countries,
including Iran and Pakistan. North Korea continues to develop the Taepo
Dong 2, which could reach parts of the United States and is capable of
carrying a nuclear payload. On 4-5 July 2006, North Korea conducted
seven widely-published launches. The Taepo Dong 2 space launch vehicle/
intercontinental ballistic missile was flight-tested for the first time
and failed shortly after launch. Despite the failure of the Taepo Dong
2, North Korea successfully tested six theater ballistic missiles,
demonstrating the capability to target U.S. forces and our allies in
South Korea and Japan. North Korea is also developing a new
intermediate-range ballistic missile and a new short-range, solid-
propellant ballistic missile. Export of North Korea ballistic missiles
will continue to be a concern.
Iran's ballistic missile forces continue to train extensively in
highly publicized exercises. These exercises enable Iranian ballistic
missile forces to hone wartime operations skills and new tactics. Iran
continues its efforts to develop and acquire ballistic missiles capable
of striking Israel and central Europe. It is fielding increased numbers
of theater ballistic missile, and claimed it has incorporated anti-
missile defense tactics and capabilities into its ballistic missile
forces.
China continues to modernize and expand its ballistic missile
forces to improve survivability and conventional war-fighting
capabilities. It also continues to field a large number of conventional
short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan and is currently
developing a number of new mobile conventional medium range systems.
Beyond increasing the capabilities of its theater ballistic missile
force, China continues to develop and test three strategic long-range
missile systems--the DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and the JL-2 Submarine-Launched Ballistic
Missile (SLBM). China remains committed to developing conventional
ballistic missiles capable of targeting U.S. and allied military assets
in the region to deter intervention in a Taiwan crisis.
Russia remains committed to maintaining formidable strategic
nuclear forces as a credible nuclear deterrent and symbol of great
power status. Russia began fielding its new road-mobile SS-27
intercontinental ballistic missile in 2006 and fielding silo-based
variants is ongoing.
Cruise Missiles
Advances in anti-ship cruise missiles, land-attack cruise missiles,
and armed unmanned aerial vehicles will continue to threaten deployed
U.S. forces and our allies. The number of systems achieving operational
status, exports, and the sale of dual-use technology continues to fuel
this threat. Advancements in anti-ship cruise missiles including the
capability for land-attack will present a challenge in countering these
missiles.
China's development of a Tomahawk-class ground-launched land-attack
cruise missile continues and will enable it to execute strikes in the
Asian theater. Iran continues to pursue development and production of
improved anti-ship cruise missiles. During the conflict with Israel,
Lebanese Hizballah became the first non-state actor to launch an anti-
ship cruise missile. In several unsuccessful attacks, Hizballah also
launched probable Iranian-supplied unmanned aerial vehicles; at least
one was armed with explosives. Pakistan continues flight-testing
indigenous land-attack cruise missiles. The Indian Navy has begun
taking delivery of the ship-launched version of the Russian/Indian
Brahmos supersonic anti-ship cruise missile.
Major Exporters
North Korea and entities in Russia and China continue to sell
technologies applicable to WMD and missiles for revenue and diplomatic
influence. Russian entities continue to support missile programs and
civil nuclear and biotechnology projects in other countries. Some of
these projects can have weapons applications.
Chinese entities continue to supply key technologies to countries
with WMD and missile programs, though it appears to be living up to its
1997 pledge to limit nuclear cooperation with Iran.
North Korea remains committed to selling missiles and related
technologies. Although sales have declined to most customers due to its
increasing international isolation, North Korea's relationship with
Iran and Syria remain strong and of principal concern.
Nongovernmental entities and individual entrepreneurs remain a
concern. Past revelations regarding the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation
network demonstrate how a complex network of suppliers with the
requisite expertise and access to the technology, middlemen, and front
companies can successfully circumvent international controls and
support multiple nuclear weapons programs. Other examples of WMD-
related supplier networks include those headed by Chinese national Q.C.
Chen, which operated various supplier organizations over the past
several years. Chen has been subjected to U.S. sanctions in violation
of the Iran Non-Proliferation Act.
OTHER STATES AND REGIONS OF CONCERN
North Korea
North Korean military forces continue to suffer the consequences of
the North's economic decline. Nevertheless, they remain capable of
initiating an attack on South Korea. Its large force provides the
regime with an effective deterrent against the prosperous and modern
South and the self-perceived option of employing threats to further
North Korean national security goals.
No immediate prospect of regime collapse is evident. Kim Jong Il
continues to maintain tight control over the military, government, and
communist party. North Korea's pervasive ideological indoctrination has
helped foster extreme nationalism which contributes to the strength of
the regime.
Levant Conflict
The Israel Defense Forces damaged some of Hizballah's arsenal and
many of its buildings, but Hizballah's leadership remains unscathed and
probably has already replenished its weapons stockpiles with Iranian
and Syrian assistance. Lebanon was compelled to deploy the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) to the south, though the LAF has not moved to disarm
Hizballah. Additionally, the Lebanese government has now been told it
is accountable for what occurs on all Lebanese territory as a result of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701.
Hizballah leaders claimed victory and grew more assertive in their
political demands as demonstrated by opposition demonstrations in
Beirut. Hizballah is currently focused on asserting political dominance
in Lebanon. Iran and Syria remain committed to Hizballah's survival.
Israeli defense officials have publicly opined that due to the fluid
situation, the conflict could reignite during the summer of 2007.
Iran
Iran continues to push for a reduced U.S. military presence in the
Persian Gulf and Central Asia and weakened ties between the U.S. and
its key Arab allies. Iran does not expect to militarily defeat any US-
led coalition in the event of a conflict. Rather, it seems intent on
imposing greater costs than western leaders and publics are willing to
bear. As shown in its highly publicized Noble Prophet exercises, Iran
intends to rely on asymmetric tactics, using its ballistic missiles,
naval attacks in the restricted waters along its coast against U.S.
forces, and possibly a strategic terror campaign to disrupt U.S. war
plans. Iran has sought to improve its capabilities through equipment
upgrades, procurement, and exercises. Iran may be in the process of
receiving the SA-15 air defense system from Russia, adding to its
short-range air defense capability. Iran may also eventually acquire
other advanced defense systems. Anti-ship cruise missiles, a small boat
fleet, sea mines, and submarines comprise Iran's efforts to contest
access to the Persian Gulf.
Meanwhile, Iran is attempting to expand its own regional influence.
Iran seeks to bring Iraq into its sphere of influence and is providing
economic aid to both win Iraqi hearts and minds and to gain an economic
foothold. Iran is assisting Iraq's infrastructure needs; it recently
agreed to supply kerosene to Kurdish areas, and intends to build a gas
pipeline and rail lines between the two countries. Iran is also
providing lethal aid to some Shiite elements.
Iran probably is pursing a dual-track policy in Afghanistan of
publicly promoting Afghan stability, while possibly supporting some
insurgent groups. This approach reflects Iran's intent to maximize
political influence, hedge against uncertainty in Afghanistan by
building relationships with several groups, and maintain pressure on
U.S. forces.
Iran also continues to support Hizballah for countering Israeli and
U.S. efforts in the region, especially after Hizballah's perceived
success against Israel during clashes in July 2006.
Syria
Syria continues to support and help arm Hizballah to protect Syrian
interests in Lebanon and provide leverage against Israel, which it
continues to view as its greatest threat. Syrian interference in
Lebanon is likely to continue, aimed at influencing Lebanon's policies
on Hizballah, Israel, and the U.N. investigation of the assassination
of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri.
The Syrian leadership is trying to balance a complex mix of
objectives in Iraq. These include preventing U.S. success in Iraq and
encouraging our eventual withdrawal, while at the same time improving
relations with the Baghdad government, supporting a unified Iraq, and
avoiding a full-blown Iraqi civil war. Syria remains the primary
insurgent gateway into Iraq due to corruption, smuggling networks, and
cross-border tribal ties.
Syria continues to make minor improvements to its conventional
forces. It did not make any major weapons acquisitions in 2006,
continuing a trend begun in the mid-1990s. Instead, the Syrian military
has focused its limited defense procurement dollars on low cost-high
impact weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles, advanced tactical
surface-to-air missiles like the SA-24, and upgrades to existing
platforms. Syria also maintains an active chemical weapons program.
We judge the regime is generally stable with no cohesively
organized opposition supported by a domestic constituency. The regime
considers Islamic extremism its greatest internal threat.
China
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is in the midst of a more-
than-decade-long military modernization program. The program's
announced defense budget in 2006 was approximately $35 billion--a 14
percent increase from 2005--but we assess actual spending to be higher.
PRC leaders remain focused on improving the quality of military
personnel and developing or acquiring long-range, precision-strike
missiles, modern fighter aircraft, a blue-water navy, and improved
amphibious forces. China took delivery of the final three SS-N-27B-
capable Kilo-class submarines over the past year, completing its
contract with Russia for eight of these submarines. China continued
fielding its first indigenously built fourth-generation F-10 fighters.
In addition, China remains focused on counterterrorism, domestic
security, and maritime deployments, which hone its ability to respond
to domestic instability and tensions in the East China or South China
Seas.
China's strategic course appears to focus primarily on internal
issues, and its foreign policy is driven by several related internal
concerns: continuing economic development, maintaining communist party
control, and safeguarding internal stability. Recent PRC publications
assert China's commitment to peaceful development. However, a major
driver of Chinese foreign policy is the acquisition of adequate
supplies of resources and materials for its development. China's energy
demands, particularly petroleum, have risen sharply. China is the
world's second largest consumer and third largest importer of oil,
importing over 40 percent of its needs. China's continued search for
energy may become a point of contention between itself and the West,
potentially affecting its policy towards Iran, a key Chinese energy
supplier.
Unification with Taiwan remains a long-term national goal. China's
cross-strait policy through the Taiwan Presidential Elections in 2008
is to ``prevent Taiwan independence.'' As long as Taiwan takes no
further action toward independence, we judge China--assessing long-term
military, economic, and diplomatic trends favors its interests--will
not try to force unification. Also, recent political difficulties by
Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian probably reassured China's leaders
over the course of its present policy.
China remains committed to resolving North Korea's nuclear issue
through the Six-Party Talks and voted in the UN Security Council to
support international sanctions on the Kim Jong Il regime after North
Korea's provocative nuclear weapons test and multiple missile launches.
The talks produced an agreement in February 2007 on initial actions to
implement the September 2005 Joint Statement on denuclearizing the
Korean Peninsula.
Russia
Presidential succession politics will preoccupy Russia over the
next 2 years. As the end of President Putin's second term draws near in
2008, the battle for power and property will take increasing precedence
over policymaking. We judge defense policy will not be a significant
issue in the campaign and, whichever candidate is elected, it will not
likely result in significant changes in Russian defense policy the
first year in office.
Russian leaders view a strong military as a necessary component to
return their country to great power status. They believe Russian
strategic and non-strategic nuclear capabilities are key factors in
deterring aggression. To meet future mission requirements,
modernization initiatives are ongoing, with primary emphasis on the SS-
27 ICBM and Bulava SLBM strategic systems. In the general purpose
forces, training activity within units of the Permanently Ready Force
(PRF), which form the backbone of Russia's conventional capability, is
at their highest post-Soviet level. In 2006, Russian military
participation in exercises with foreign militaries increased by over 50
percent over the 2005 level. No 2006 exercise rose to the significance
of the 2005 Russo-Chinese exercise, although additional Russian naval
exercises in the Black Sea and an increased number of air/ground
exercises with Central Asian and European countries were notable.
Modernizing the country's outdated equipment and planning conversion to
all-contract manning remain significant challenges despite increased
defense spending. Converting the PRF to an All-Volunteer Force is
likely to take longer than planned, since Russia is having significant
problems in both attracting new and retaining already-signed
contractees. Dissatisfaction comes primarily from perceived low pay,
hostile service conditions, inadequate housing, poor family support,
and other unfulfilled government promises.
Russia has made progress in suppressing North Caucasus separatists
by employing more effective counterinsurgency operations and co-opting
insurgents to fight former compatriots. Although weakened, small
insurgent groups continue attacks on Russian targets in the region.
Russia opposes closer integration of former Soviet countries with
the west. It has been especially adamant that Georgia abandon its
western-leanings and has condemned the Georgian government for its
``anti-Russian'' policies. Russia remains steadfast in its peacekeeping
commitments in the Georgian separatist area of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, although its presence there is a source of contention between
Russia and Georgia.
Russia opposes comprehensive sanctions on Iran, in part to protect
its own economic interests with Iran. Russia continues to press Iran to
cease uranium enrichment activities, if only temporarily, and tone down
its inflammatory rhetoric.
Russia's primary focus on the North Korean nuclear issue is to
prevent an escalation to war. It stresses the necessity of the Six-
Party Talks to resolve the conflict in a peaceful way. Russia viewed
North Korea's October 2006 nuclear test as a blow to the
nonproliferation regime.
Latin America
Nearly a dozen presidential elections in 2006 produced winners
ranging from pro-business center-right to market-friendly social
democrats and radical populists. Venezuela's President Chavez won re-
election and is following his mentor, Cuban President Fidel Castro, and
President Chavez's vision for the continent. Venezuela cooperates with
Cuban projects abroad. Key to this ideology is President Chavez's
agenda to neutralize U.S. influence throughout the hemisphere. Regional
military spending is increasing, Venezuelan purchased weapons and
services from Russia, Iran, and China. Since 2005, Venezuela signed
contracts with Russia for 24 Su-30MK2 advanced fighter aircraft, 50
transport and attack helicopters, and 100,000 assault rifles. President
Chavez found allies in the newly-elected presidents of Bolivia and, to
a lesser extent, Ecuador and Nicaragua.
In Cuba, Raul Castro is firmly in control as Cuba's acting
president and will likely maintain power and stability after Fidel
Castro dies, at least for the short-term. Raul Castro has widespread
respect and support among Cuban military leaders who will be crucial in
permanent government succession.
Africa
While there has been progress towards democracy and the diplomatic
resolution of conflict in much of Africa, such advances remain fragile.
In Sudan, despite a peace agreement that ended a 21-year long civil war
between the north and south, violence and human insecurity in Darfur,
Sudan are the worst since 2003-2004. Sudan is pursuing a military
solution, using Arab ``Janjaweed'' militias to attack rebels and
civilians. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) lacks the capacity
to contain the violence, but the Sudanese government continues to
oppose converting AMIS into a U.N. force. Since 2003, fighting has
displaced over 2.2 million people, resulted in over 200,000 deaths, and
contributed to instability in neighboring Chad and Central African
Republic. Finally, statements from senior al Qaeda leaders have
advocated attacks against U.N. or North Atlantic Treaty Organization
peacekeepers if deployed to Darfur, creating an additional threat to
Western forces.
In Nigeria, upcoming presidential elections will test the strength
of the fledgling democracy as the public prepares for the first
civilian-to-civilian transfer of power since independence. The
potential for violence remains high as candidates from the
predominantly Muslim north and Christian south compete for office.
Among the leading issues is administration of Nigeria's oil wealth.
Violence over control and access to oil in the Niger Delta has resulted
in the kidnapping of oil workers, destruction of oil facilities, and a
25-percent reduction in oil production over the past year. Nigerian
security forces have been unable to secure the vast oil infrastructure
from militant attacks. Some oil companies warn that continued violence
may prompt them to curtail future operations.
Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is attempting to
establish its legitimacy, and provide security and governance in
Mogadishu. Somali nationalists and reorganizing remnants of the former
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) are initiating insurgent-style attacks
to undermine the TFG and drive Ethiopian forces out of Somalia. We
assess members of East Africa al Qaeda (EAAQ) and former CIC forces
fled south to Kismayo and Ras Kamboni on the Kenyan border with
Ethiopian forces in pursuit, intending to eliminate senior EAAQ leaders
and their training camps before withdrawing. In January, the Ethiopian
government announced it achieved its goals in Somalia and began
redeploying a major portion of its combat forces to Ethiopia.
TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES
Insurgencies
Insurgencies continue in other parts of the world. The only major
insurgency in Latin America is the FARC. Its power and scope has waned
under President Uribe's counterinsurgency efforts and that trend is
expected to continue in 2007. Additionally, President Uribe may reach a
peace agreement with the National Liberation Army, Colombia's second
largest insurgent group. Colombia will also continue efforts to
complete the complex paramilitary demobilization. In Sri Lanka,
fighting between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) intensified since last summer. The situation is likely to
remain unstable, marked by flare-ups of fighting and LTTE bombings and
assassinations. Clashes between government and rebel forces in Eastern
Chad continue. The looting of the U.N. humanitarian key supply point in
Abeche during the most recent attacks has impeded international
humanitarian efforts in eastern Chad. Recent government successes
against rebels have diminished insurgent violence in eastern Chad and
reduced the prospects of an imminent rebel attack toward N'djamena.
Inter-tribal violence between black African and Arab tribes continues
fueling tensions along the Chadian-Sudanese border.
Global Defense Spending
Non-U.S. global defense spending grew in real terms by 2.5 percent
in 2006, amounting to an estimated $738 billion. China ranked first
with spending of $80-115 billion, according to DIA estimates. Russia
was second at about $90 billion. The top 10 countries account for
almost two-thirds of total spending, or $480 billion. Of the top ten
spenders, China and South Korea increased spending in real terms the
most, by 9.6 percent and 9.9 percent respectively. Surging economies
allowed Russian defense spending to grow an estimated 6.4 percent and
Indian by 4.2 percent. Defense spending by oil exporters, Iran and
Venezuela, grew 6.7 percent and 12.5 percent respectively. We judge
these trends will continue in 2007.
China and India are major buyers of advanced weapons systems and
military technology, with acquisitions for the past 2 years of $3.4
billion and almost $12 billion, respectively. When combined with joint
doctrine, increased training, and supported by adequate logistics,
these advanced systems have the ability to significantly improve
military capabilities. Venezuela emerged as a major arms buyer with
acquisitions valued at $4.3 billion for the past 2 years. Venezuela has
turned to Russia for hi-tech weaponry, including multi-role fighters
with advanced air-launched missiles. Pakistani and Iranian purchases
also have grown in the past 2 years, with Pakistan signing arms
contracts worth almost $3 billion and Iran almost $1.7 billion.
Russia and China are of particular note as proliferators of
conventional weapons. Russia is a leading arms exporter, with major
sales of advanced weapons and military-related technology to China,
India, Iran, and Venezuela. Items include multi-role fighter aircraft,
ground equipment, major surface combatants and submarines, advanced air
defense systems, and sophisticated communication and radar systems.
Chinese sales declined to approximately $500 million in 2006 after
surging to over $2 billion in 2005. China is a leading supplier to sub-
Saharan Africa.
International Crime
Some terrorist organizations, primarily the FARC and the Taliban,
derive income from opiates and stimulants in drug-producing regions,
like Afghanistan, South America, and Asia. In addition to direct
profits from drug sales and the distribution of opiates and narcotics,
some groups, like the Taliban, derive income from taxation along the
drug trafficking route. For the FARC, the drug-trade is an integral
source of revenue. Some South American based supporters of Lebanese
Hizballah are suspected of sending a portion of their profits from
narcotics trade to the group in Lebanon.
Space and Space-Denial Capabilities
Russia and China continue to be the primary states of concern
regarding military space and counterspace programs. As the availability
of space technology and services continues to increase, other nations
already possessing capabilities in key areas will acquire military and
commercial space-based assets. Increasing levels of international
cooperation, along with the growing number of commercial space
consortia, is allowing the proliferation of advanced satellite
technologies and knowledge of space systems operations to become
available to nations lacking a domestic space capability. These
developments provide some countries new or more capable communications,
reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities as most space systems have
dual-use, military-civilian applications.
Several countries continue to develop capabilities that have the
potential to threaten U.S. space assets, and some have already deployed
systems with inherent anti-satellite capabilities, such as satellite-
tracking laser range-finding devices and nuclear-armed ballistic
missiles. A few countries are seeking improved space object tracking
and kinetic or directed energy weapons capabilities. Earlier this year
China successfully tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon system that
destroyed an old Chinese weather satellite in orbit. This successful
test demonstrates China's capability, should it choose, to eventually
deploy an ASAT system that could threaten U.S. satellites. However,
developing these technologies is financially taxing, and most countries
other than China assessed to be pursuing these capabilities are not
expected to acquire them within the next few years. Other states and
non-state entities are pursuing more limited and asymmetric approaches
that do not require excessive financial resources or a high-tech
industrial base. These efforts include denial and deception, electronic
warfare or signal jamming, and ground segment physical attack.
Information Operations (IO)
Information technology (IT) is integral to virtually all aspects of
U.S. national and economic security. IT also is a truly global
industry, and the U.S. is growing ever more dependent on foreign
suppliers in order to maintain our political, military, and economic
position. The increasing role of international companies and foreign
individuals in information technologies and services used by U.S.
critical infrastructures raises the specter of persistent, stealthy
subversion, particularly by hostile foreign intelligence and military
services with computer network operations (CNO) capabilities, but also
by international terrorist or criminal organizations. The exclusion of
foreign-origin products from sensitive networks or applications will
become increasingly difficult to implement or verify.
Russia has the most highly developed, capable, and well-resourced
IO capability among potential foreign adversaries. Russian foreign and
military intelligence, as well as the Russian Security Service, have
active offensive and defensive CNO programs. Assessed capabilities
include insider recruitment, cryptology, viruses, software and hardware
attacks, and remote penetration.
China has developed an apparent large scale CNO program, including
military exercises to refine and implement concepts. China's robust
presence in the global IT hardware and software supply chain enhances
its technical expertise and IO capability. China is the number one IT
hardware provider for U.S. consumers, accounting for 42 percent of U.S.
IT hardware imports in 2005. As such, U.S. dependence on China for
certain items critical to the U.S. defense industry and the waning of
U.S. global IT dominance are valid concerns that demand vigilance.
Public Health Security
The uncontrolled spread of disease remains a significant
international health concern. A nation's inability to control or
contain diseases within its borders can have a negative impact
worldwide. Conversely, rapid and effective responses enhance
international safety. Thailand recently limited the spread of the H5N1
avian influenza by rapidly controlling outbreaks among poultry.
Indonesia's continued struggle to control H5N1 raises the risk for an
international pandemic. H5N1 remains a serious threat, with
approximately 110 human infections and 80 deaths in 2006. H5N1 is only
one of many potential infectious threats.
Damage to industrial or hazardous material storage facilities
during armed conflict also poses catastrophic health risks. During
Hizballah missile attacks in July 2006, Israel moved significant
amounts of potentially hazardous materials from the Haifa area to
prevent the potential release of toxic industrial chemicals. Trans-
boundary environmental issues also pose health and security threats. In
2006, in Cote d'Ivoire, the illegal dumping of hazardous waste shipped
from other countries resulted in 10 deaths and triggered mass
demonstrations.
Underground Facilities
The rising importance of hardened or deeply buried facilities to
potential adversarial nations and non-national organizations is
becoming more apparent each year. Whether those nations and non-
government organizations are classified as rogue, major, or emerging
powers, or terrorist groups, their critical military, leadership and
national security assets are increasingly protected by these
facilities. The growth and sophistication of hard and deeply buried
targets is especially significant among countries whose support for
terrorism and potential possession of WMD constitute threats to world
peace and U.S. security. Of concern is what these countries have
learned from U.S. military successes over the last decade in the
Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Their new and modified facilities
incorporate features that make them more survivable against known U.S.
weapons. Moreover, these countries are exporting underground
construction techniques, and construction equipment.
CONCLUSION
Our Nation is engaged in a long war against terrorism and violent
extremism. We are faced with a multitude of issues and events that
affect our national security. The intelligence professionals of the DIA
will continue to provide critical information to our warfighters,
defense planners, and national security policymakers. In concert with
our fellow Intelligence Community members and allies, we are supporting
our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines engaged in combating
insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan and terrorists globally. This effort
remains our first priority. We are also focusing considerable resources
to prevent or counter the proliferation of WMD. Finally, we are
carefully monitoring states of concern and other transnational issues.
Over the past few years, the DIA, like the rest of the Intelligence
Community, has made major strides to improve our core business
processes of intelligence collection, all-source analysis, and
information management. With your support, the DIA has expanded our
human and technical collection. Our human intelligence collectors are
better trained, supported, and integrated with their Intelligence
Community counterparts and our own military forces across the globe. In
all-source analysis, we have increased the number of analysts with
advanced and technical degrees. Those analysts are equipped with better
IT systems and more rigorously trained in the use of cutting edge
analytic techniques. Improvements in our information management systems
and procedures are critical to achieving the information sharing
environment mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act. Today analysts, collectors, and our customers, to
include national security policymakers, warfighters, the weapons
acquisition community, law enforcement agencies, and our coalition
partners, are better connected and have greater access to our
information and all-source analysis. Much has been accomplished;
however, more needs to be done. With your continued support, I am
confident we will achieve greater levels of security for our citizens,
our national interests, and those of our allies. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
Dr. Fingar, do you have a statement?
Dr. Fingar. I do not, Senator. I contributed to Mr.
McConnell's statement.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
Why don't we try a 6-minute round for our first round.
Director McConnell, let me first note that in your opening
statement you made the following point, that, ``as the IC
states in the recent NIE, the current security and political
trends in Iraq are moving in a negative direction.'' I am
wondering, General Maples, whether you agree with that
assessment.
General Maples. Sir, I do agree with that assessment.
Chairman Levin. Director, there has been a number of
statements made by just about every one of our military
leaders, our civilian leaders, that without a political
settlement in Iraq there will not be an end to the violence in
Iraq. Do you agree with that assessment?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, I do agree with that.
Chairman Levin. The Prime Minister of Iraq has said that
the failure of political leaders in Iraq to reach a political
settlement is the main cause for the continuance of the
bloodletting in Iraq. Is that something you agree with?
Admiral McConnell. I would agree that the failure to reach
national reconciliation is a major cause and the sectarian
nature of the various parties causes such deep distrust that it
will make it very difficult to achieve that reconciliation over
the next year or so.
Chairman Levin. General Maples, the testimony of the
Director is that the ``term `civil war' accurately describes--
key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of
ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of
the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population
displacements.'' Do you agree with that assessment?
General Maples. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I would like to ask you next, Director,
about the Iraqi view of what our commitment is. The President
of Iraq has said following his meeting with our President that
President Bush assured him that we will remain in Iraq until
the Iraqis ask us to leave. President Bush indeed himself has
said that we will remain in Iraq until or as long as needed or
until the Iraqis ask us to leave, words to that effect.
Does that continue to be the Iraqi appraisal of what our
commitment is? Does it continue to be that open-ended in their
mind?
Admiral McConnell. I would believe that that continues to
be their understanding. However, I would highlight that we are
seeing now some questions and some comments about various
players. I think publicly, officially that is their announced
policy, but we do see questions.
Chairman Levin. Questions in their minds?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, the New York Times reported on
February 23 that in the first few days of the operation 2,500
American troops took part, but only about 300 Iraqi forces
participated. That is very different from what the expectation
was when the surge was announced. My question is, is it your
understanding, Director, that Iraqi troops are taking the lead
yet or is it still U.S. forces that are acting as the tip of
the spear?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, my understanding is that they are
in the process of taking the lead. One of the problems was
having fully manned units when they arrived in Baghdad to take
up defensive positions. So it is a work in progress is how best
to describe it.
Chairman Levin. As of this point, have they taken the lead
yet?
Admiral McConnell. In some places, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. In Baghdad?
Admiral McConnell. In some places in Baghdad, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Would you let us know for the record what
those places are where the Iraqis have taken the lead in
Baghdad?
Admiral McConnell. All right.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Chairman Levin. What is Sadr's position on the surge? We
have read different things in the past 2 days actually as to
whether he opposes the surge, whether he opposes the United
States' increased number of troops, which is what was in the
press yesterday. Today in the media it suggests that maybe he
does not oppose it. What is Sadr's position?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, the answer to the question is I do
not know what Sadr's position is. We have seen a variety of
reporting in one direction or the other, so I would be guessing
if I gave you a definite answer. We have seen it both ways.
Chairman Levin. I would like to ask you about the weapons
that are coming into Iraq. What terms would you use to
characterize the IC's confidence that the weapons that are
going to the Shiite militias, which are the most deadly type of
explosive weapons, are coming with the knowledge of the top
Iranian government officials?
Admiral McConnell. I would answer it at three levels,
Senator. First of all, we know there are Iranian weapons
manufactured in Iraq. We know that Quds Forces are bringing
them into Iran. Now, if the question is, is there a direct link
from Quds Forces delivering weapons to the most senior
leadership in Iran, we do not have evidence that there is or
there is not. My assessment would be that that would be the
awareness, with the awareness, of the knowledge. But there is
not a direct link that we can point to.
Chairman Levin. Without a direct link, would it be not your
assessment that it is probable that the top leaders in Iran
would know of that activity?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, exactly. I would phrase it as
probable, but again no direct link.
Chairman Levin. Because that is very different from what
the White House was saying the other day, where they were just
simply saying we do not have a direct link, but without being
apparently willing to characterize the likelihood of leadership
knowledge in Iran of those deliveries as probable. But you do
not have reluctance to do that, and I, by the way, must tell
you I am not surprised by your assessment. But you apparently
do not have a reluctance. You are confident or you are
comfortable saying it is probable?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, I am comfortable saying it is
probable, and I took part in some of those discussions and so
we looked at the evidence, did we have a clear direct link that
we could point to, and high-confidence intelligence was not
there. So that the sense was we could conclude, since these are
Iranian weapons, this is an official Iranian body, it would be
unlikely that they would be coming in without senior awareness.
Chairman Levin. Has Iran's influence in Iraq grown since
the fall of Saddam?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, it has.
Chairman Levin. Would you say it has increased
significantly?
Admiral McConnell. I would agree with the word
``significantly,'' yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, what assistance is flowing from Iraq's
neighbors to the Sunni insurgents, including funding, weapons,
and recruits?
Admiral McConnell. Less defined. The information is less
clear. But I would say in all those areas there is some flow to
the Sunni side in terms of funding and weapons and recruits.
Chairman Levin. What countries are those weapons coming
from?
Admiral McConnell. Weapons could come from a variety of
countries. Syria probably is one of the major places. There is
very close cooperation between Iran and Syria with regard to
providing arms to Hezbollah. So there are a number of channels
that it could come from around Iraq.
Chairman Levin. What countries other than Syria could
either weapons or funding for the Sunni insurgents come from?
Admiral McConnell. I do not have any direct information to
tell you that we have clear evidence that it is definitely
coming from any one particular government. But there are
indications that it could be a variety of countries around
Iraq, and also from private donors, as opposed to----
Chairman Levin. What other countries besides Syria?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, I do not have----
Chairman Levin. You said a number of countries.
Admiral McConnell. Private donors that live--
Chairman Levin. Oh, no, not donors; countries. You said
that there is evidence that weapons or money for weapons is
coming from a number of countries. The one you singled out was
Syria, but what other countries?
Admiral McConnell. Maybe I misspoke, Senator. What I was
attempting to say is donors from countries around the area. One
would be inside Saudi Arabia, as an example.
Chairman Levin. What is your assessment as to the
likelihood that Iraq will make the political compromises that
are essential in everybody's mind on the sharing of power,
particularly on de-Baathification, on a militia law, and on the
provincial election law, those four items? There has apparently
been progress now on the petroleum revenue divisions, that has
now been cabinet-approved. But on those other four critical
political issues, what is your assessment as to the likelihood
that those political issues will be resolved this year?
Admiral McConnell. Senator, I think it would be a very
difficult challenge to get them all closed out with a
reconciliation that would meet the compromise interests of each
party. If I could expand on that just for a second, the Shiites
in my view are not confident of their position and their
majority, and are worried that the Sunnis may come back and
dominate the country. The Sunnis in fact are not yet willing to
admit that they are no longer in charge and are going to be
hard-pressed to meet an agreement in a government of
reconciliation.
My view is the Kurds are participating and biding their
time to protect Kurdish interests, and it could happen, but it
will be fraught with difficulty.
Chairman Levin. Is it your assessment that pressure is
useful to be placed on the Iraqi political leaders in order to
achieve those political compromises?
Admiral McConnell. I think the Iraqi political leaders have
close to impossible tasks. One, the sectarian violence on the
one hand; and two, pressure to make progress. The question is
will leadership emerge and be capable of taking the country to
the next level.
Chairman Levin. Is it useful that there be pressure placed
on them to make compromises?
Admiral McConnell. Pressure in any situation is always
useful, sir, to keep people focused on the objective and moving
forward.
Chairman Levin. I am going to call on Senator Warner.
Although I do not have my blue card, I think I must be way over
because I have a sense of the clock usually.
Senator Warner. Do not forget you are now chairman. I would
not worry about it. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. I am going to follow your lead, Senator
Warner, and worry about my colleagues the way you always did.
Senator Warner. I want to pick up on the chairman's
observation with regard to the active participation now or the
nonparticipation now of the Iraqi forces in this Baghdad
campaign referred to as the surge. Some of us have expressed
concerns about the addition of 21,500 new American forces in
this campaign. I speak for myself. My concerns are that the
American GI does not have the experience to understand the
cultural differences between the Shiite and the Sunni; and why
some individuals go forth with their wanton killing activities
after we have, as a Nation together with our partners,
sacrificed so much life, blood, and treasure to give that
nation sovereignty. It is highly perplexing.
So my question goes back to the President's statement on
January 10 in which he said: ``Now let me explain the main
elements of this effort. The Iraqi government will appoint a
military commander and two deputy commanders for their capital.
The Iraqi government will deploy Iraqi army and national police
brigades across nine districts. When these forces are fully
deployed, there will be 18 Iraqi army and national police
brigades committed to this effort, along with the local police.
These Iraqi forces will operate from local police stations--
conducting patrols and setting up checkpoints, and going door-
to-door to gain the trust of the Baghdad residents.''
Next paragraph. Now he refers to the American troops: ``Our
troops will work alongside the Iraqi units and be embedded in
their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission:
to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help''--I
repeat, ``to help them protect the local population, and to
help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of
providing the security Baghdad needs.''
Now, I have been working as hard as I know how to get a
better picture of this situation since this program is well
under way. I hope I am wrong, and that the operation will
succeed, but I do not see strong evidence that the Iraqi forces
are measuring up in any amount to what the President laid down
on January 10, and then subsequently the President as Commander
in Chief ordered our troops to go in.
There are brave, very brave journalists embedded with our
troops who are a good source of information. The New York Times
on February 23 reported as follows: ``For the first few days of
the operation, 2,500 American troops took part, compared with
about 300 Iraqi forces and a mix of police and army personnel.
The original plan called for Iraqis to work with the United
States troops throughout the night to enforce curfews and
otherwise ensure that gains of the previous day were not lost.
But the Iraqis were shifted to buttress a day force.''
Then on February 26, the Washington Post reported:
``Obviously, the soldiers lacked the necessary information
about where to look and whom to look for, said the government
engineer,'' talking about our troops there. ``But U.S. troops,
Iraqi soldiers, and officials in Baghdad say the plan is
hampered because security forces cannot identify, let alone
apprehend, the elusive perpetrators of the violence. Shiite
militiamen in the capital say they are keeping a low profile to
wait out the security plan. U.S. commanders have noted
increased insurgent violence in the Sunni-dominated belt around
Baghdad and are concerned the fighters are shifting their focus
outside the city.''
One of our officers called up the Iraqi commander and he
would not even answer the telephone. I do not see that level of
participation as going forward.
Again, another quote from the Washington Post: ``U.S.
troops, Iraqi soldiers, and officials in Baghdad say the plan
is hampered because security forces cannot identify, let alone
apprehend, the perpetrators. U.S. commanders have noted
increased insurgent violence,'' and so forth.
I do not find where the plan as laid down by the President,
clearly delineating what the Iraqi forces should be doing, is
carrying forward. I hope you can correct this, General Maples.
You should have a good understanding of what the Iraqis are
doing and not doing as a part of this surge plan today,
tomorrow, in the immediate future. General?
General Maples. Senator, I believe we are in the early
stages of the implementation of the Baghdad security plan, and
we are in transition right now. The first thing that you
mentioned was the appointment of a commander, and in fact
General Abboud has been appointed as the commander. He is
taking charge. He has been very active, and he apparently is
demonstrating a very level approach to his command. That is, he
is not showing a sectarian bias in his approach to the command.
His subordinate commanders have been appointed. His command
post has been established and the command and control
architecture is starting to be put into place.
Senator Warner. Why didn't we start the program after these
components were in place, before we put U.S. forces in harm's
way? That is my question. Do you have any further facts to
share with this committee and Congress about the participation
today of the Iraqi forces?
General Maples. Sir, the Iraqis have moved two of the three
brigades they said they would move into Baghdad.
Chairman Levin. But they showed up with half force levels,
did they not?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, the range that I have seen in the
battalion manning is between 43 and 82 percent of manning in
those battalions.
Chairman Levin. I will ask you to amplify this question for
the record, because I think it is extremely important.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Chairman Levin. Admiral McConnell, do you see any linkage
in the Iranian activities in the Iraqi arena? First we have
this information about weapons that seem to be manufactured in
Iraq coming in, and they are among the most lethal weapons,
rendering the utilization of some of our heaviest and most
vital equipment somewhat precarious, and other activities. Is
there any linkage between that and our effort jointly with the
security council partners to bring about a cessation of Iran's
capability to manufacture nuclear weapons?
In other words, are these two actions related in any way?
Admiral McConnell. First of all, Senator, I do not see any
direct linkage from Iran dictating events inside Iraq. Now,
that said, the fact that Iran could contribute weapons,
particularly weapons that can penetrate armored vehicles and so
on, raises the cost to the United States. So I do believe there
is a connection. I believe Iran because of a variety of
reasons--the potential for nuclear weapons, increased oil
revenues, pain for the United States--is seeing itself in a
different light.
So I think there is a connection in that the weapons
inflict pain on U.S. forces and potentially Iraqi forces, but
not directly tied to nuclear weapons.
Senator Warner. I read carefully the testimony of both
witnesses on North Korea. You recognize that on February 13 the
Six-Party Talks resulted in an agreement. What does our
intelligence show that the North Koreans will likely carry out
this agreement? Do you have any consensus at this time that
this first step--which I applaud the administration for taking
and I think it is a concrete first step--that the successive
steps will take place?
General Maples?
General Maples. Sir, we are seeing the North Koreans take
the initial steps to comply with the agreement, particularly
with respect to the inspection of the Yongbyon reactor. There
are a number of successive steps, as you have noted, that we
are going to pay very close attention to. As the chairman
mentioned, there are parts of this nuclear program that we have
to pay a lot of attention to to see if we have the kind of
disclosure and the inspection capabilities that we are looking
for.
Senator Warner. Do we have in place the intelligence
infrastructure to deliver on this information, Admiral
McConnell, in North Korea?
Admiral McConnell. Not at the level we would like, sir. We
can verify many of the conditions from external observation,
but not at the level you are asking about in terms of detail.
There are some open questions, but so far the indications are
in the positive direction.
Senator Warner. Remember the old phrase, ``Trust but
verify.''
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. I am stunned by the candor of the
Admiral and the General and want to thank you for this candor,
the likes of which has been lacking enormously in the past by
previous witnesses.
I am enormously gratified to the chairman and Senator
Warner for the directness of their questions. It has led this
Senator to the conclusions which you have corroborated, that
these additional troops are not going to work until there is a
political settlement. Now, as a follow-up to questions that you
have already postured, let me ask you about Iran. Do we know
how many Iranian agents are operating in Iraq?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, I have some information in a
general sense. Let me ask Dr. Fingar, who would have more of
the details and may have a more precise number than I do.
Dr. Fingar. Senator, unfortunately we do not have a good
number. The Iranians have been active in Iraq since the Saddam
era. They have supported members of the Shiite coalition,
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and now
support the Sadrists. We know they have many channels of
influence. We do not have a good estimate on how many and
precisely where they are.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let us go back to Iran. Admiral,
General, give us a sense of President Ahmadinejad's power base
in Iran. Is he likely to lose power to some of the moderate
forces, and what is the prospect that those moderate voices
would start to be heard in the Iranian government?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, I took a look at this question just
recently because of interest as I am coming up to speed as the
new DNI. Unfortunately, I did not like what I found. He remains
popular. He has staffed the cabinet and those around him with
hard-liners.
The economy is strong because of the oil revenues. There
are inherent systemic problems in the economy, but oil revenues
are making the programs work at some level.
He is promising in a populist way to alleviate poverty and
do training and so on. The long-range plan he cannot execute,
but in the short-range he is currently popular and those around
him have the reins of power.
I would ask General Maples if he has additional
information.
General Maples. I agree with that assessment.
Senator Bill Nelson. Back to Iraq. In response to the
leaders' questions, you mention that the Iraqi units reporting
in Baghdad are manned at the rates from 43 to 82 percent. That
of course is quite to the contrary of what we had been told,
not only on this committee but in the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence (SSCI) and in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, that indeed they were going to be fully manned and
that the ratio was going to be much more Iraqis, some 60 to 65
percent, to 40, to 35 percent of American forces going in to a
particular area.
Now, given your testimony that they are only manned
somewhere between 43 and 82 percent, the question is the
quality of that capability, the reliability of that capability,
would the two of you please give your assessment to that
question?
General Maples. Sir, the first comment I would make is
there is another piece of this, of course, in the security plan
and that is the national police, the Iraqi national police, and
the Iraqi police, who are also a part of the equation in the
Baghdad security plan and will be counted in the overall
numbers, because they will be involved in the security process.
Back to your specific question, the units that were chosen
to move to Baghdad were based on the leadership of the units,
the cohesion of those units, and the loyalty of those units. So
the assessment by those who are embedded with the units and our
commanders on the ground is that the units that are moving into
Baghdad are in fact capable units. There are some limitations
associated with that and in fact two of the three brigades are
Kurdish brigades and so you have some issues associated with
language, with cultural understanding, and with serving in an
area in which the individuals were not recruited, and that will
be an issue that has to be worked through.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, what I would add is, having watched
it from afar, I had an interest, an inside interest, in the
problem years ago when I served on the Joint Staff during the
First Gulf War, so I had some awareness. As I attempted to come
up to speed now, the way I would assess it is they are better
today than they were a year ago, but they are still not where
we need them to be. So I would expect in time they will get
better.
But it is not unusual for an Iraqi force to be normally
manned at about 75 percent. They would plan for having 25
percent on leave or away or something else. So the numbers can
be a little bit confusing. I have seen in a couple of cases
where they planned for one brigade, they just put two, just to
get closer to the manning levels that we would be familiar
with.
Senator Bill Nelson. There is a report out that there are
14,000 U.S.-provided small arms that are missing in Iraq. What
do you know about where these weapons are going and who is
using them?
General Maples. Sir, I do not have any knowledge of that.
Admiral McConnell. I have no knowledge of it. I can take
the question and see if we can get something.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Bill Nelson. Would you, please?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first of all just ask a couple of things. I have had
occasion to be in the area of responsibility I believe 12 times
now and so I have watched it as the years have gone by and the
months have gone by. One of the things most recently that I
heard when I was over there from some of our people and the
Iraqis is that they are starting to come up with more usable
intelligence about the insurgency than they were before. Do you
see a trend in this direction, the Iraqis' capability in
gathering intelligence?
General Maples. Yes, sir, I think both on the national
basis and on a military basis their intelligence capabilities
are growing.
Senator Inhofe. Then also, Senator Warner was talking about
getting a lot of his information from some of the embedded
journalists. Frankly, I get most of mine from our embedded
troops that are working with the Iraqis. All the way from the
marines up in Fallujah down through Baghdad and elsewhere, up
until the time of the bombing of the Golden Mosque, which was
about a year ago, I guess now, I was on regular trips getting
better and better information in terms of the amount of the
burden that is being assumed by the Iraqis and their
capabilities, not--I think we all tend to try to compare them
to our troop capabilities and they are not there and they will
not be there. But they were improving.
I can remember talking to Mr. Jassim and Dr. Rubae the
first week that they were in office and they gave stories about
how, yes, we are offering the support, but they are on the tip
of the spear and they are growing.
Did you see that up until I believe it was February 2006,
the bombing of the Golden Mosque, that we were making a lot
more progress and that we took a real hit in terms of utilizing
their capability at that time?
General Maples. Sir, I think they have continued to grow in
capability, in particular in organizational capability. It is
different when you train individuals and when you train an
organization, a battalion or a company, to conduct operations
and you get that kind of cohesion in the organization. Our
trainers who are working with the Iraqi security forces on a
regular basis are coaching and mentoring and training those
organizations to be more effective, and when we gave them more
responsibility they began to develop in a much greater way in
the last year.
Senator Inhofe. That is what I have gotten consistently
from our troops working with them.
Let me ask you another thing and, General Maples, I have
talked to you about this in my office many times. My concern
has always been, my great concern has been China. During our
drawdown of the 1990s of our military, China increased its
military procurement by about 1,000 percent. We have problems
with not just their nuclear capability and the potential WMD
capability, but also their conventional forces.
It is my understanding that al Qaeda is attempting to get
biological, radiological, chemical, and nuclear capability. Do
you think that China is aiding them or is helping in our
efforts against it? Where is China in all of this?
General Maples. I do not see any evidence that China is
supporting al Qaeda in developing WMD capabilities. China has
their own issues in terms of terrorists, particularly with the
Uighars within China, that is of concern to them.
Senator Inhofe. I know that is true. Admiral, I think we
also know that China is competing with us out there. I spend
quite a bit of time in Africa in these oil nations. They are
our chief competitor there and I have been very much concerned
about that.
Each one of you was in a position and will remember my
predecessor, David Boren. I promised David I would ask this
question. When I took over his seat in 1994 when I came from
the House to the Senate, we had a long visit. We had been good
friends for a long time. He was chairman of the SSCI when he
left. He said: ``We have an area where I have really failed and
I would like to have you become aware of it.'' He was talking
about the various intelligence groups that are not
communicating to each other and all of this.
We saw that an attempt was made to correct that. I would
like to know--and I think, Admiral, in your opening statement
you addressed this, that our increased capability of working
with each other, all the different intelligence organizations--
could the three of you assess where you think we are right now
and are we making a lot of progress in that? Can I report back
to former Senator Boren that we are making some progress after
all these years?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, I would start off by saying we are
making progress. Quite frankly, one of the reasons I agreed to
come back into government was to focus on that issue, to see if
we could make more and better progress. I have a game plan for
attempting to change the culture. We grew up in a time of
legitimate reason for need to know and protecting and not
sharing information in the context of the Cold War and that
came to be known as ``need to know.'' What I want to try to do
is transform this culture so that we think of it in terms of
responsibility to provide.
Now so if you think about it, if you have a customer, you
have capability, you have a responsibility to provide, then by
definition you have to collaborate with those who are
collecting information and so on. So I think we are making
progress. I think the things that have been done have started
us and positioned us in the right way. But I think we need to
stay the course and bear down very hard to get the
transformation.
I would make a comparison. What the Goldwater-Nichols bill
did for the Department of Defense (DOD), we need to have a
similar transformation in this community.
Senator Inhofe. I saw an improvement, going all the way
back to Bosnia and seeing up in Tuzla, working together that I
had not seen before.
When you were talking about Central America, Mexico, South
America, you mentioned Chavez and Castro. You did not say
anything about Ortega. Where do you think he figures into this?
He was out of office for 15 years. He is back now, they say,
and a lot of people think that he is a different person now, he
has gone through a conversion. What do you think?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, I think the jury is still out. We
know where he came from and knew what he stood for, so watch
him closely. But he is making some of the right statements. The
jury is still out is probably the best way to answer that one.
Senator Inhofe. I hope it comes in.
Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was recessed and the
committee proceeded to other business, then reconvened at 11:56
a.m.]
Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
join you in welcoming General Maples and Dr. Fingar, and I want
to thank you for your service to our country, for your
leadership as well, and for being here today with us. We know
with you that strong and reliable intelligence information is
one of our most important weapons in both protecting and
securing our country and fighting the global war on terror.
Admiral McConnell, in your testimony you mention that there
are growing threats to American forces in the Middle East by
Iran's increasing military capability. Could you please comment
on Iran's missile development. Specifically, the 2002
unclassified intelligence assessment stated that Iran is
unlikely to achieve a successful test of an ICBM before 2015.
Is that still the IC's judgment?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, let me give a general statement on
it and then my colleagues will probably have better details
than I have because, as I mentioned, I am still coming up to
speed.
Let me speak to their ability to restrict movement of
forces into the area. They put a great deal of concentration
into things like submarines and cruise missile-equipped patrol
boats that could go out to sea to be able to attack naval
forces that might be approaching. They have also recently
acquired surface to air missiles in the country to be able to
repel an attack on the country.
Ballistic missile development has been a focus. I am aware
of missiles that can reach as far as Israel, but an ICBM, my
awareness, I do not know of one. Let me turn to my colleagues
if they have better, more complete information.
General Maples. Sir, that is our assessment still, that
they are continuing to develop an ICBM. 2015 is still our
target date that we would expect to see that. We are seeing
them develop some space launch capability and you have heard
that recently. They recently did launch a sounding, what we
believe was a sounding rocket, that reached sub-orbit. So they
have not gone to the space level yet.
But as they continue to develop that technology, it could
change our assessment on their ability to deliver the ICBM.
They are investing very heavily in ballistic missile
capabilities that pose a regional threat and, as Director
McConnell mentioned to you, a capability to reach Israel is
well within their means.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Fingar, do you have any comments?
Dr. Fingar. No. That is still our assessment. There is an
estimate in process looking at this question, but our current
assessment is the same.
Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, I share your concern that
Iraq's internal conflict may adversely impact the Middle East.
As you noted, many of our Arab allies are concerned about
Iran's increasing influence in the region as a result of the
support of Iraqi Shiites. My question to you, is there any
indication that our allies, specifically Saudi Arabia, have
been providing financial support for some of the Sunni militias
in Iraq, including the militias that American forces are
fighting?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, I have no awareness at this point
that there is any direct flow. Now again, I do not know
everything that I need to know yet, so I am still coming up to
speed. But let me turn to my colleagues to see if there is
something that they are aware of which I am not.
Senator Akaka. General Maples?
General Maples. Sir, Director McConnell mentioned earlier
that there are charitable organizations that appear to be
providing financial support. Do not know about the linkage of
those organizations to governments in the area, in particular
within Saudi Arabia. But there are charitable organizations
that we do see funding coming from.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Fingar?
Dr. Fingar. Yes. It is important to distinguish between
national governments and people resident in them, Saudi Arabia
and some of the other Gulf states. We judge that Saudi Arabia
as a government is not providing funding, that the Saudis are
doing more and are better at stopping the flow of funding
through charitable private means, but they still do flow to
some extent.
Sir, I would add just as an awareness, there has been
dialogue about increasing that pressure and from what I have
been able to observe, the Saudis, for example, are stepping up
their efforts to prevent that sort of thing from happening.
Senator Akaka. Let me turn to chemical weapons. Admiral
McConnell, recent media reports discuss the use of chlorine gas
in attacks in Iraq. While these incidents were only partially
successful, they demonstrate an enemy capable of experimenting
and learning from their mistakes. I am very concerned about
this issue, especially since we know that there were a number
of Iraqi scientists experienced in WMD.
Admiral, do we know who these scientists are and where they
are now? Have any of these scientists disappeared or have some
of them joined al Qaeda or militia groups?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, I am unaware if any have joined al
Qaeda. I knew at one time we had good tracking and
understanding of--again, let me turn to my colleagues to see if
they have any more precise information to answer your question.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Fingar?
Dr. Fingar. This is one, Senator, I think is best discussed
in the closed session.
Admiral McConnell. I think what Dr. Fingar is saying is he
knows something I do not know yet, so we will take it in closed
session.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. We will wait for that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka, thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, in your testimony you describe Iran and North
Korea as the states of most concern to us. Both are determined,
it appears, to pursue nuclear capability. We hope that the
recent agreement with North Korea will help in that regard. You
have described Iran as, ``determined to develop nuclear
weapons.'' Do you have evidence that North Korea is assisting
Iran in developing its nuclear capabilities?
Admiral McConnell. No, ma'am, I am not aware of anything.
Let me turn to my colleagues if they are. I do not know of any
connection between the two.
Senator Collins. General?
General Maples. No, Senator.
Dr. Fingar. No, ma'am.
Senator Collins. The reason I ask is there was a
Congressional Research Service report that was issued back in
October of last year that says the evidence suggests that North
Korea has had extensive dealings with Iran on missiles and
other weapons. General?
General Maples. That is correct, they have had extensive
interaction on the development of missile systems and Iran in
fact has purchased missiles from North Korea.
Senator Collins. But there is no concern that North Korea
may be helping Iran develop nuclear capabilities?
General Maples. There is a concern, but we have not seen
that.
Senator Collins. But no evidence to support it?
Dr. Fingar. No, that is correct, Senator.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Admiral, your predecessor described President Chavez as
``among the most stridently anti-American leaders anywhere in
the world.'' You talked in your testimony that Chavez purchased
a large amount of modern military equipment from Russia, and
there is evidence that he is developing his own weapons
production capability. What is the IC's assessment of Chavez's
intentions in going forward with this sizable military
purchase?
Admiral McConnell. First of all, his intentions with regard
to positioning and so on, I think he sees himself as
potentially the replacement for Castro in terms of leading a
block that would be opposed to the United States. That said,
his power base is oil revenue and from having looked at that
question fairly close, the current path he is on is starting to
degrade and denigrate the ability to extract oil inside
Venezuela. So on a long-term basis he is going to have
difficulty sustaining the current path he is on.
With regard to his military buildup, I think it is a show
of force and flexing muscles. I am not aware of any specific
threat to countries around him, but I think he wants to build
up a large inventory. Now, years ago we used to talk about
building up such an inventory in a place like Venezuela; once
they would build it, they would not be competent in maintaining
it and operating it, so it would tend to be imported, shown,
and then just sit.
Dr. Fingar. I would add, Senator, that one objective is to
free himself of dependence on American-supplied weaponry and
systems by buying one that is self-standing and can obtain the
parts, the maintenance, the training, without U.S. approval.
A second would be to arm the militia, the Bolivarian
Circles within Venezuela, the idea of a citizen militia, some
similarities to what Tito did in former Yugoslavia.
The third I would judge is to have them available in some
numbers on the shelf should they become useful in assisting
allies elsewhere in the hemisphere, sort of trading material, a
means of exerting influence.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Webb is next.
Senator Webb. I am surprised, Mr. Chairman, being all the
way down here at the end of the pipeline.
Chairman Levin. The early bird.
Senator Webb. Gentlemen, I am struck actually listening to
the testimony and the questions that have come out of it, with
how much of it is unfortunately being focused on the situation
in Iraq, unavoidably but unfortunately. I was among a number of
people who were saying before we went into Iraq that in terms
of the actual threat to the United States it was probably at
best maybe fifth on the priority list. North Korea, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iran, al Qaeda come to mind in no particular
order.
But here we are in basically a strategic mousetrap, where
we have had so much of our resources and national energy tied
into one situation that we are going to have to find a way to
get out of it.
I will join the parade here. What is your evaluation of the
scope of influence of the current Iraqi government? What I mean
by that is how much control do you really believe it has in
terms of implementing the requirements that we are attempting
to put on it?
Admiral McConnell. Senator, I do not think they yet have
the kind of scope and influence that we would hope they would
have or that they could be successful in the short-term.
Senator Webb. Would you compare the situation to, say, the
situation in Lebanon?
Admiral McConnell. Going back in time, I would compare it
to Lebanon, yes, sir, primarily because of such deep divisions
within the country with regard to the sectarianism and one
force, Sunni on Shiite, Shiite on Sunni. I tried to go back
after I had worked this problem years ago to understand it a
little bit better and I did have the opportunity to live in
that region for a couple years, so I got to know a number of
the Sunni and Shiite population to understand how they were
thinking about it and so on.
The biggest fear on the part of the Shiite is they are not
sure of their position and they feel like they must dominate,
and the Sunnis are so concerned that they will be overwhelmed
and not a part of the government. So when you set up a
condition like that, there is suspicion and strife.
Senator Webb. As in the NIE, it breaks down even further
than that in terms of competition among the different sectarian
groups. To me it is very similar to what I saw in Lebanon in
1983 as a journalist over there, with a weak central government
and factions that had military power all around them, and it is
not even realistic to assume in the short-term you are going to
be able to disarm these militias, as people keep talking about,
because there is no trust factor with the central government.
That seems to me to be the reality.
Would you agree with that?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, I would agree with that and I think
that is the objective of the current effort, is to see if we
cannot allow them to rise to the next level so that they would
have enough confidence to in fact have a central government
that would govern across the whole state of Iraq.
Senator Webb. I am curious, having been in Afghanistan as a
journalist embedded--I was in nine different places. You get a
different look than, obviously, I am going to be able to get as
a Senator going on one of these trips over there. I was struck
in the different places I went with the extent of the opium
production. This was in 2004. I am wondering to what extent you
believe the insurgency in Afghanistan right now is being fueled
by the drug lords, not simply by the Taliban, or how you view
their connection.
Admiral McConnell. Sir, let me turn to my colleagues for
that first. I have a point of view, but I think they probably
have better information.
Dr. Fingar. Despite the Taliban having cracked down quite
far on opium production when they were in control of the
country, they now are enmeshed with opium producers with
local--your term--warlords, local power brokers. The production
and the sale of opium is a major source of revenue. Some of
that is going to the Taliban for its purposes. It goes to
regions that cannot be reached by the central government in
Kabul, so it may be less important as a direct source of
support to Kabul than it is filling a vacuum where the writ of
the central government simply does not reach.
The extent of opium production, as you noted, in 2004 was a
very, very wide area. This year's production, although a
smaller area, is higher.
Senator Webb. Like my colleague from Oklahoma, I had a
great concern about China over the years. I have written about
it many, many times. I have two questions I hope I can get out
today.
The first is, I am always struck when we start comparing
the United States military budget with other countries, that we
do not do a better job of breaking down things like manpower
costs in the United States budget compared to these other
countries. I do not know how we could realistically do that,
but when you talk about China's 2006 budget being $35 billion,
there is a huge portion of their manpower costs that do not
directly correlate when we are trying to compare what they are
doing to what we are doing.
Do you have a way to level that or help people understand
that this disparity is not as great as it appears?
General Maples. Sir, we would have to go back and work that
piece, but I think you are exactly right, because the
investment in our Armed Forces in manpower is a very high cost,
and we see very direct investments on the part of the Chinese
military in hardware and capability.
Senator Webb. The way we account our manpower budget is
different. Retirement costs, we pay in advance and on an
accrual basis on our retirement in the programs, where these
other systems, those are totally separate from the way they
compile their military costs and the wages that they pay for
their military people, et cetera.
There ought to be a better way to break that out so that
people in this country can understand that these disparities
are not as great as they appear on paper. I would encourage you
to do that.
The other question I have, and I am not sure how this
relates to your function, is when we are defining strategic
threat, we should be also taking into account the vulnerability
that we have when we have the inequality of economic systems in
terms of balance of payments and trade deficits and the ability
of countries such as China to take the trade deficits that are
in place, take the trade surplus in place, and invest in places
like Africa and in our own continent.
Do you take these things into account when you are judging
a strategic assessment?
Dr. Fingar. Yes, sir, we do. As you indicate, this is both
very important and very tricky. Using your China example, a
very large trade surplus that they have, the largest way in
which they are investing it is in our own country, in U.S.
Treasury bonds and so forth. That makes it of course very
tricky to assess mutual hostage, mutual vulnerabilities.
Investments in Latin America to buy raw materials, the profits
of which are then used to buy products from the United States--
it is both highly important and very difficult to make the kind
of net assessment, but it is necessary to try.
Senator Webb. Just to finish the thought, we are in my view
squandering our national wealth in Iraq, while they are taking
this trade surplus and these sorts of things and increasing
their leverage around the world in trade deals.
My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director McConnell, if the United States decides to adopt
the policy of withdrawing troops from Iraq before it is secure,
do you believe that Iraq will become a failed state?
Admiral McConnell. I think that is a very, very likely
possibility, at least the way we think of Iraq today, yes, sir.
Senator Thune. Has the IC wargamed the possibility of Iraq
as a failed state, the opportunity that that will create for
Islamic extremists, the role other Middle Eastern states will
have to play, given the rising tension between the Sunni and
the Shiite, Iranian nuclear ambitions, and the increasing
legitimacy of sub-national groups like Hamas and Hezbollah?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, we have not wargamed it the way you
described it, but the analytical process is ongoing to address
just those kinds of questions; yes, we are.
Senator Thune. What is being done to increase tactical
intelligence collection to benefit individual units that are
operating at that neighborhood level in Baghdad? Are there
steps being taken to improve that or increase that?
Admiral McConnell. Let me provide an overview and I will
turn to General Maples to get more specific detail because he
would know more of the details.
There was an effort several years ago to put more focus
into tactical intelligence. It used to be handled by the
Services, spread across the various Services, and there was an
attempt inside the DOD to create a unified program called the
Military Intelligence Program. It was to get more focus and
attention to the tactical systems that you would need to
provide support.
In addition to that, the program I am responsible for, the
national intelligence program, is looking at ways that we
harness national sensors in support of tactical operations. I
am very pleased to report to you that there are many situations
now where from Washington with national sensors we are in
contact with, talking to, forces on the ground, and sometimes
actually helping them as they proceed through a neighborhood or
a compound to complete their actions.
So let me turn it over to General Maples for more details.
General Maples. Actually, exactly right. At the lower
tactical level, tactical HUMINT is critically important. One of
the approaches the Army has taken, every soldier is a sensor,
and so everything that is observed, everything that is learned,
has to be a part of our intelligence process. In addition to
that, we have pushed tactical HUMINT teams down to the lowest
tactical level to try to enable obtaining the information that
will make our units successful at that level.
We are also looking for tools that will help them at that
lower tactical level, whether they are translation tools that
will enable them to get by the language issue, biometric tools
that we can put into their hands so they can identify
individuals and record those individuals. We have tools that we
can get in the hands of our soldiers to help enable them.
Senator Thune. It seems like for the success of this
mission that is going to be critically important.
Congress is likely later this year to take up the issue
once again of immigration and border control. I think that
immigration has arguably moved from being simply a domestic
issue to a national security issue. Can you share with the
committee the threat posed to the United States by our southern
border and is there any intelligence to verify that Islamic
extremists are going to try and capitalize on that border issue
and get people into the country that way.
Admiral McConnell. Sir, we know that they are aware of it
and we know that they talk about it. There is not any specific
evidence that I am aware of now--and I will turn to my
colleagues if they are aware of something that I am not. But it
is something that is in their planning. So as I come up to
speed looking at the various organizations doing their
planning, they are looking to any avenue into the United States
and the southern border would be one that would be a potential
for them.
Dr. Fingar. I would agree on both the desire of the
terrorists to consider all avenues of entrance into the United
States, including illegal entry through our southern border or
through the northern border with Canada; that there of course
is good reason for concern. If drugs can be smuggled across,
weapons can be smuggled across. The number of illegal aliens
that come through, it is not hard to imagine terrorists or
others who would do more than seek economic opportunity coming
through.
As Director McConnell noted, the important development of
the new government in Mexico working on problems in the border
area that affect Mexican security as well as our own is a very,
very welcome development.
Senator Thune. I appreciate that and look forward to
working with you. I think homeland security and national
security and this border issue are all very closely related.
Last year I had the opportunity to travel to Latin America
and, while I know that many Americans are aware of the threat
that militant Islam poses in the Middle East, I think that they
are probably less aware of the increasing activities undertaken
by Hezbollah and Hamas in the triborder area of Argentina,
Paraguay, and Brazil. I guess I am wondering in open session if
you might be able to comment on what the IC is observing in the
triborder area?
Dr. Fingar. Very briefly because it is in open session, the
triborder area has a certain ungoverned character to it--
smuggling and lack of controls. A number of those involved in
grey area or illicit activities are of Middle East extraction.
Some of them have relations with Hezbollah. It is a base that
we watch carefully and with concern.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral McConnell, the NIE did not evaluate the effect in
Iraq of a phased redeployment of American forces, is that
accurate?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, I am sure that is accurate,
and Dr. Fingar was the coordinator for that, so we can go
specifically to your question.
Senator Reed. Why was that not done, Dr. Fingar?
Dr. Fingar. The estimates, Senator, do not look at U.S.
policy or military options. We were looking for those factors,
those drivers, that would have to be taken into consideration
in the development of any policy or any military strategy, and
we bounded that with the military presence, the coalition
presence, as it existed when we were doing the estimate.
Because it had been hypothesized that the presence of coalition
troops was in itself a major cause of violence in an effort to
expel the occupying nation and so forth, the estimate said,
what if we take them out of the equation.
When we tested that hypothesis, we came to the conclusion
that if they were not there the level of violence would
actually go up.
Senator Reed. Taking them out precipitously, as you
injected into the NIE, is different than taking them out in a
phased manner, leaving residual forces to do missions.
Dr. Fingar. I will ask General Maples to correct me if I am
wrong, but the rapid withdrawal within the period of the
estimate, which was 12 to 18 months, to move that number of
troops and equipment safely out of Iraq we estimated would take
the entire period of the estimate.
Senator Reed. So that approach was driven, not by any sort
of strategic sense, but simply by the time limits that you
self-imposed on the estimate?
Dr. Fingar. Correct.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Some recent reports suggest, Admiral McConnell--and if
anyone has insights, please feel free--that al Qaeda is
reconstituting itself in Pakistan, beginning to show enhanced
operational capability, not only within Pakistan but outside
the region. Most disturbing is that there are indications that
the recent operations in Europe had some linkage back into
Pakistan, which seems to be, as in the immortal words of Yogi
Bera, ``deja vu all over again.'' It is not Afghanistan, now it
is Pakistan.
It was there, not Iraq, that the attack on September 11 was
originated or at least encouraged. Are we in danger of
repeating the mistakes that led to September 11?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, I have taken a hard look at what we
know and what we believe with regard to al Qaeda in Pakistan,
because I was trying to come up to speed to understand the
various issues. Let me summarize it this way. I was asking
myself the question, are they more capable or powerful today
than they were before September 11? I sat down with some of the
analysts and tried to work through this to understand the facts
and then where could we go from the fact base that we had.
First of all, just let me say that al Qaeda leadership as
it existed prior to September 11 and prior to going into
Afghanistan, somewhere in the neighborhood of three-quarters of
the leadership have been killed or captured. Now, does that
mean that those members have not been replaced? Yes, they have
been replaced.
The down side from the terrorists' point of view is they
have been replaced, but they do not have the experience. That
said, they are no less committed to the kind of heinous acts
that were carried out on September 11. The camps that have been
established in Pakistan are in an area that has never been
governed by any power, a state, or outside power in that
region, because it is such rugged country and fierce individual
tribal interests. So to the best of our knowledge, the senior
leadership, number one are there and number two, they are
attempting to reestablish and rebuild and to establish training
camps.
Now, when I looked at--prior to going into Afghanistan
there were literally thousands of those forces in training,
with multiple camps. That is gone. They are attempting to
rebuild in the northwest frontier of Pakistan. The numbers are
not the same, but there are volunteers who are attempting to
reestablish it. So it is something we are very worried about
and very concerned about.
Senator Reed. It seems that the scale of possible
operations that would confront us here in the Homeland does not
involve the thousands of potential trainees that they had in
Afghanistan, just small groups. In fact, there is increasing
concern of individual operatives coming in, being able to use
the Internet for instructions and coordination, and coming in,
and likely not coming from Iraq or places where they would be--
obviously have cultural difference there, but from Great
Britain, from other countries.
So it seems, unfortunately, that this capability still
exists, and it might have taken on an even more sinister aspect
with the use of individual operatives and sophisticated
communications. Is that a concern?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, it is a concern. I would say
first and foremost these are very committed individuals and
they are very smart and adaptive. I think what we are seeing is
we inflicted a major blow, they retreated to another area, and
they are going through a process to reestablish and rebuild,
adapting to the seams or the weak spots as they might perceive
them.
I am aware in our effort to focus on this with great
intensity there are a number of plans and activities that have
been shut down or disrupted or interrupted, and the intent on
our part, of course, is to do that more and more and better and
better, and hopefully at some point either killing or capturing
the senior leadership.
Senator Reed. This of course raises the question that the
huge efforts that are undertaken today in Iraq, 140,000
American troops, billions of dollars a year, are tangential to
these operations or this activity in Pakistan. Is that a fair
comment?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, that is a fair comment, and a
variety of the members of the panel would have perhaps a
different point of view on that.
Senator Reed. What is your point of view, Admiral?
Admiral McConnell. What is the question, sir?
Senator Reed. The question would be, if you had to
establish the probability of a successful attack being
organized and directed against the United States, would it
emanate from Pakistan with this newly revised al Qaeda
leadership or would it come out of Iraq?
Admiral McConnell. Two ways, two lines of reasoning to
answer that. First of all, Iraq is a cause celebre for the
jihadists in creating forces. My belief is the attack most
likely would be planned and come out of the leadership in
Pakistan.
However, that said, there are al Qaeda elements in Iraq and
in Syria and other places, and even in Europe, and our
information tells us they also are planning. Many would think
of this as a command and control, global net controlled from
Pakistan. It is not. There is some central planning and control
and funding and so on, but individual home-grown elements that
are inspired by that vision are also a big problem for us.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
My time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Director McConnell, just following on
that line of questioning, I guess the common denominator to al
Qaeda's opportunity is ungovernable areas.
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, that is in fact true.
Senator Martinez. Sir, you earlier discussed the issue of
Venezuela and their activities of weaponry and the capacity to
manufacture weapons. I was wondering if you viewed it as an
offensive capability as opposed to what they would need for
their own national defense?
Admiral McConnell. It goes significantly beyond what they
would need for their own national defense, yes, sir, that is in
fact true.
Senator Martinez. So it is clearly an effort on the
Venezuelan government's part to project into the region,
particularly militarily?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, I would agree with that.
Senator Martinez. One of the things that--and I believe
this may have been Dr. Fingar--I just want to clarify is that
my understanding is that the Venezuelans do provide sanctuary
to the Revolutionary Armed Forces Colombia (FARC) as they cross
from the border between Colombia and Venezuela, and that they
do find sanctuary in Venezuela, from where they then regroup,
resupply, and go back into Colombia.
Dr. Fingar. Yes, sir.
Senator Martinez. So in that way, Venezuela is already
projecting their presence and in fact meddling in their
neighbor's affairs in a very direct and military way.
Dr. Fingar. I do not disagree with that assessment,
Senator. But the nature of border areas in many parts of the
world in the area around Colombia, FARC, National Liberation
Army, the paramilitaries that have spread over into Ecuador,
sometimes into Brazil, into Venezuela--I do not disagree with
the point that the Chavez government appears to have turned a
blind eye more so than others. But there is a difficult
situation along all of these border areas.
General Maples. Sir, could I comment?
Senator Martinez. Yes.
General Maples. I think we do see Venezuela projecting
military capability in terms of trainers and advisers in the
region, and influencing other countries in that way. The arms
that they are purchasing, the multi-role aircraft, utility
helicopters, attack helicopters, patrol boats, largely----
Senator Martinez. Rifles.
General Maples. Yes, sir, and I will get to the rifles in a
second.
Senator Martinez. Okay.
General Maples. But largely, those kinds of capabilities
could be seen largely as self-defense or immediate area, not
offensive in a larger sense, I do not think. However, the
assault rifles and the ability to produce assault rifles in
large numbers provides a very difficult capability that could
affect other nations in the region, as Director McConnell
mentioned, could be used to affect other nations and other
causes in the region.
Admiral McConnell. Sir, if I could just add to that, one of
the things that struck me since I have come back and had more
focus on this is the rhetoric from Chavez, which you can read
in the press, but then the activities where he is using his
influence and money to control or influence events in other
countries, attempting to land more allies for his vision of
anti-Americanism.
Senator Martinez. I would agree with you completely, and
also suggest that perhaps while Mr. Ortega's rhetoric may have
implied some of the right things, I do believe that there is a
great deal of influence both emanating from Cuba, Venezuela,
and to Nicaragua as well. So I do believe that that is of some
concern.
The other area in which there seems to be cooperation is
between Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba; for some time there has been
some political alliance. I am wondering if that in your mind or
in anything that you can see through our intelligence also
translates into a budding military alliance, beyond the
political? To any one of you.
Dr. Fingar. If so, it is at a very, very nascent stage. One
of the characteristics of the three countries that you
mentioned is that rhetoric is often somewhat excessive in
comparison to the reality, and Hugo Chavez has depicted, in my
view, the military and political and other dimensions of the
relationship with Iran, with North Korea, as if it had more
content than it yet does.
On the military dimension, though, there appears to be a
very concrete reason in turning to the Iranians for help in
maintaining U.S.-provided weaponry, which would increase the
capability of the Venezuelan forces. I think at this stage we
are watching it, we are concerned about it, but it has not
moved very far.
General Maples. I agree.
Senator Martinez. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, Admiral McConnell, General Maples, Dr. Fingar. I
wanted to make a statement at the beginning which in some
sense, I think, Admiral McConnell, is directed towards you, in
welcoming you to this new position. I do not think I am telling
you anything you do not know. It seems to me that the reaction
that our intelligence--the credibility of our IC has been
affected both by the disputes about pre-Iraq war intelligence
and about the excessive partisanship in the conduct of and
debate of our foreign policy.
It leads to events that are recurring in our history, such
as when the NIE on Iraq came out, each side on the war, whether
you are for it or against it, chose the part of the report that
they would like to embrace and the part that argued against
their position to debunk. That will happen, and the result of
that really depends on the strength of the report. I thought
that was an excellent report.
I thought that the reaction to the briefing first given in
Baghdad and then later here about Iranian involvement in Iraq
showed two danger points. The first was that a lot of people
responded, both in government, in Congress, and in the media,
with a suspicion to the intelligence that came out, that I
thought was unwarranted.
We give a lot of money to the IC, taxpayer money, every
year. You are on our side. It does not mean you are flawless.
We make mistakes. We have seen that over our history. But I
would not start with suspicion toward what you are
recommending, and I thought we had that there.
The other part of it was also troubling, which was what
Senator Levin referred to before, the reluctance of people in
the administration to draw a conclusion that I would call
highly probable, in other words a kind of defensiveness--I dare
not call it timidity--based on previous criticism of
conclusions drawn from intelligence.
So what I am saying more specifically is that the
intelligence, our intelligence, has shown, at least to the
extent that I have read about it in the paper, but I have been
briefed on it, with a high certainty that at least 170
Americans in uniform in Iraq have been killed as a result of
weapons that we know with a reasonable certainty have been
supplied by the al Quds Force of Iran and those weapons have an
Iranian origin.
Then the question is, does Ayatollah Khameini know about
it. That is where there was reluctance. That is why I greatly
appreciated Senator Levin's question when he said, you do not
have, I gather, direct intelligence in which you see Ayatollah
Khameini, the Supreme Leader of Iran, saying to the al Quds
Force: ``Bring these weapons into Iraq to kill American
soldiers.'' But when Senator Levin asked you, ``is it not
probable that he knew about it,'' you said yes, and to me it is
highly probable, because do we not know that the Quds Force
reports to Ayatollah Khameini? Is that not right, General
Maples?
General Maples. That is correct.
Senator Lieberman. So it would be to me shocking if the
Quds Force was carrying out this mission in Iraq without
Ayatollah Khameini knowing it. I just think we have to count on
you at moments like that to tell us what may not be certain,
but is highly probable based on everything we know.
Having made that statement, I would ask one more question
if you are able to answer this in open session, which is, do we
have evidence that the Iranians are training Iraqi militia or
extremists or terrorists in the use of these weapons outside of
Iraq? General Maples?
General Maples. Yes, sir, we do.
Senator Lieberman. We do, and some of that training is
occurring in Iran?
General Maples. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Am I right, because I have heard
reports, that some may be occurring in Lebanon in Hezbollah
training camps?
General Maples. We believe that Hezbollah is involved in
the training as well.
Senator Lieberman. To me that is very important evidence.
No one wants to see another major military involvement by the
U.S. against Iran, but if Iran is training Iraqi militants in
the use of Iranian weapons, which are then being used to kill
Americans in Iraq, I think that is a very serious act and one
that we ought to consider taking steps to stop in defense of
our soldiers who are there.
I am not going to invite any response, but I thank you for
your answers.
I want to go to another point. General Maples, I want to
read from your testimony on page 5: ``AQI's attacks against
Iraqi government targets and coalition forces continue, with a
particular intent to accelerate sectarian violence and
destabilize Baghdad.'' That is on page 5. On page 9 you say:
``AQI is the largest and most deadly of the Iraq-based
terrorist groups that continues to target Iraqi government
interests and coalition forces. AQI conducts the most
provocative anti-Shiite attacks in Iraq, a hallmark of its
strategy since 2003. It has instigated cycles of sectarian
violence.''
So my question is, is it not correct that we have concluded
that one of the major goals of AQI is to stimulate the
sectarian violence that some describe as a civil war? Is that
correct?
General Maples. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Lieberman. Admiral McConnell?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, I would agree with that. There
has been some evidence that those in Pakistan and those in Iraq
had some disagreements, but I would agree with exactly the way
you described it, that the major effort is to prompt sectarian
violence, to keep the violence at an increasing level going
forward.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate it.
My time is up. I would say that I asked the question
because I know some of our colleagues are contemplating
attempting to limit the American mission in Iraq to
counterterrorism, to get us out of the middle of the civil war.
I am quoting there, and I understand. I think the motivations
are well-intentioned, but in my opinion, based on your
testimony, the answers you have given, it is impossible to
separate counterterrorism from the civil war because one of the
main motives of the terrorists, AQI, is to stimulate the
sectarian violence that some call civil war. Is that correct?
General Maples. Yes, sir.
Admiral McConnell. That is correct.
Senator Lieberman. I thank you.
I thank the chair.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. I just want to thank the panelists and
thank Senator Lieberman for noting that you are on our side.
When I have traveled around and had the opportunity to meet our
intelligence officers, and you think about they are at personal
risk, they are out meeting with people that could provide
danger to themselves, they are out there because we ask them to
be. They never credit themselves and they are never mentioned
in the paper unless something were to go wrong. Then when
something is not found, you are always criticized for not
telling us.
So I think we need to affirm those men and women, thousands
of them, that are all over the globe right now, at great risk
often times, serving our country in a way that could avoid war
and help us achieve legitimate goals for the United States and
the world without war.
Admiral McConnell. Thank you, sir.
Senator Sessions. Admiral McConnell, with regard to al
Qaeda, I just want to mention a couple questions, just briefly.
Is it not true that for over a decade they have plotted and
overtly talked about a declaration of war against the United
States and have set about long before September 11 in their
efforts to attack the United States?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, that is true.
Senator Sessions. So this is not something new, that they
would attempt to reconstitute themselves after we have
destroyed their bases in Afghanistan, captured what, two-thirds
or three-fourths of their leadership, and put them on the run.
But they certainly have not reconstituted a training base, I do
not think, in this border area that would compare with what
they had in Afghanistan before September 11, is it?
Admiral McConnell. That is correct, sir.
Senator Sessions. Is it not true that the American people
need to be aware that for decades this entity is going to be
there or something like it, that poses a threat to our country,
and every day we have to figure out what they are doing and how
they are doing it and try to work to counter it?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, that is in fact true, and the
current leadership goes back to observations of the bombing of
the Marine barracks in 1983 as a way to inflict mass
casualties, and if you track it over time that has been
consistent in attacking embassies, attacking the U.S.S. Cole,
and so on. So it goes back over an extended period of time.
Senator Sessions. There is some suggestion that if we had
not invaded Iraq that we would not have al Qaeda. This group is
out there and they are serious.
Let me ask this, and I do not want any overly optimistic
views. I really want the truth. Senators Warner, Levin, Pryor,
and I were in al-Anbar in October, early October of last year.
The Marines gave us an honest and realistic briefing that was
very troubling, frankly. General Conway a few weeks ago
indicated that this area where al Qaeda is most active, where
the Sunni base is and so much of the violence has occurred, has
made some progress.
General Maples, would you share with us, is that true and
what can we say about what has happened in al-Anbar?
General Maples. Sir, it is true that we have made progress
in al-Anbar. We see levels of violence that are going down.
Most importantly, we see cooperation out of the Sunni tribal
leaders, the sheiks, who have taken an opposite stance to al
Qaeda in al-Anbar, largely for tribal reasons, but also to our
benefit. In doing that, they have encouraged young men to join
the Iraqi police forces, the national police, and to come on
board as a part of the security elements there.
So I think there are some very positive developments in
that regard in al-Anbar. Now, I say that, and in the last week
I have started to see some trends that start to trouble me now,
that some things are starting to move in the other direction,
because for that action there is a counter-action. So I am
starting to see some things happen that give me a little cause
for concern. But I do think we have made progress in al-Anbar.
Senator Sessions. Now we have a new strategy, a
substantially increased number of United States and Iraqi
forces in Baghdad. They are striving to have a much higher
degree of coordination and effectiveness in the overall
strategy for the city, an enhanced partnership and embedding
relationship among those units. Would you say we ought to give
that new strategy a chance before we precipitously discuss some
withdrawal?
General Maples. Sir, I think we are in the very early
stages of the implementation of that strategy and the
transition to the kind of force structure that is envisioned in
the Baghdad security plan. We are seeing some successes. We are
seeing some other things that are not going according to the
plan. But the structure is just now going into place. The
forces are just now arriving. So it is going to take time for
the Baghdad security plan to be implemented.
I have been looking at statistics also, both in Iraq and in
Baghdad, and I am not seeing any trends yet. Too soon to see
any trends. In some areas I see a reduction in the
ethnosectarian violence. On the other hand, the number of
attacks are at the same level that are going on. So it is too
soon to really understand what is happening, I think.
Senator Sessions. You would not have expected a significant
change this early in the operation at any rate, would you?
General Maples. No, sir, not at this point.
Senator Sessions. I thought after this--I got somewhat
troubled, frankly, with that Marine briefing, and now that
things have made some progress I thought, why would I want to
bet against the American soldier? Why would I want to doubt
their capability? I believe General Petraeus and his team does
have a realistic chance to change the dynamics in Baghdad and
that can be a critical event in the stabilization of Iraq.
I will submit some written questions to you about Iran and
North Korea and the missile systems, the potential threat to
Europe, the need for a European site, which I think the
Europeans are indicating they are more amenable to or it seems
good. I believe that we need to think about a national missile
defense site in Europe. I think it would be important for them
as well as to the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions. We will have
an executive session following this session. We are not sure
where it is going to be yet. We are trying to arrange for it to
be in Hart, but it may have to be in S-407 of the Capitol.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country. I
would like to begin with a comment and then a question. Dr.
Fingar, I think it would be for you. Nothing is more important
to our Nation's security than the credibility of our
intelligence services. It is not helpful, to say the least,
when the motivation of our analyses are questioned or
suggestions of political motivations creep into the public
dialogue. It is just not very helpful.
Dr. Fingar, I think you know that some of that has
surrounded at least part of the NIE. I refer to the question
that Senator Reed asked you. There are several members of the
SSCI that are upset about the fact that the hypothetical of a
precipitous withdrawal was posited in the NIE, but other
hypotheses which in fact were more likely were not considered
in the NIE. There are Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
analysts who participated in authoring the draft who will say
that they were ordered to include that hypothesis even though
they felt it to be very unlikely.
Now, I understood your answer to Senator Reed to be that it
was included because it was out there that the presence of our
troops was perhaps contributing to the problem, so you had to
entertain the thought of, what if the American troops were not
there. But that does not get to the way in which they are
withdrawn. There are a lot of options other than ``precipitous
withdrawal'': partial withdrawal, gradual withdrawal,
withdrawal to other parts of the country, things along those
lines.
So I would like to ask you to respond to that, and I would
encourage you strongly that in the future if you are going to
consider hypotheticals you at least consider those that are
more likely than less likely. No one is to my knowledge, at
least very few people suggesting a ``precipitous withdrawal.''
Dr. Fingar. ``Precipitous withdrawal'' is not the
terminology used in the estimate, Senator. It was ``rapid
withdrawal.''
Senator Bayh. We will not argue about the distinction
there.
Dr. Fingar. Let me begin by repeating the answer to a
question I had in the open SSCI hearing, questions about were
we under political pressure to shape this estimate, were we
advised to have a certain outcome. The answer is unquestionably
and categorically we were not. This estimate is the product of
the IC.
As I responded to Senator Reed, the purpose of the estimate
is not, has not been, to evaluate options for United States
policy or for----
Senator Bayh. Then why did you consider rapid withdrawal?
Dr. Fingar. As I explained, the effort was to both bound
the problem and situation, with the coalition presence and what
happens if the coalition is not there. Since, again, when the
estimate was undertaken there was the argument that violence in
Iraq was substantially a function of the presence of coalition
targets, if the targets were not there----
Senator Bayh. I heard your answer to Senator Reed. I am
just telling you the way in which the estimate was done has
opened you up to this kind of critique.
Dr. Fingar. It was unanticipated that we would be subjected
to that critique. Again, I will invite General Maples to
correct me if he thinks I am wrong, that in choosing the term
of a ``rapid withdrawal'' over the period of this estimate,
which was 12 to 18 months, that under General Landry's
guidance, who was working this part of the estimate, that to
remove entirely the coalition presence within the period of
this estimate would by definition be rapid.
Senator Bayh. Look, I do not want to just devote all my
time to this, but I am--very few people are suggesting that the
entire coalition presence be removed in that timeframe. Perhaps
our combat role, that sort of thing, changing our role to
training troops and a variety of other things, hunting al Qaeda
operatives, that sort of thing.
But my point simply is that if your position is you do not
consider policy options, you put one policy option on the
table, and I think in fairness to avoid these kinds of
critiques you ought to put other policy options on the table,
particularly those that more people are espousing than fewer.
So that is just my observation.
I am concerned about--I want to be fair about this. I am
not criticizing your bona fides, but I do care about the
credibility of your work product. I know you do, too. When you
start down that slippery slope you just get into these kind of
arguments. So enough said about that.
Admiral, I would like to ask you about our situation in the
world today compared to a year or 2 ago. As I understand your
testimony, I think the words that you used were we are moving
``in a negative direction.'' You said this in response to a
question--in Iraq, I am talking about Iraq now. We are moving
in a negative direction.
I think you also said--I think all of you indicated that
Iraqi political developments were ultimately the key for a
positive resolution in that country; is that correct?
Admiral McConnell. That is correct.
Senator Bayh. I think the direct quote you used is that the
Iraqi leader faced a ``close to impossible task.'' I wrote
those words down when you spoke them. Is that a correct
transcript?
Admiral McConnell. With 20-20 hindsight, I probably would
have said very difficult task. But difficult nonetheless.
Senator Bayh. I think ``very difficult'' was the wording of
the NIE. So my question is, if the political situation in Iraq
is the key, if the Iraqi leaders face a ``close to impossible
task'' or ``very difficult task,'' how then do you characterize
our task?
Admiral McConnell. Our task with regard to----
Senator Bayh. Iraq.
Admiral McConnell.--stability? My reading of this,
Senator--and I talked with Ambassador Negroponte as I relieved
him in this process, and I was trying to understand the timing
and why did we choose the options you were just asking Dr.
Fingar about. When we started that estimate we had a set of
conditions and as we worked through the estimate our strategy
in fact changed and the options considered by this body started
to change. So we were at a point in time where we were trying
to do an estimate.
Now, that said, your question to me is our task.
Senator Bayh. You have been very candid here and I would
associate myself with Senator Nelson's remarks and compliment
you for your openness and your forthrightness. It just seems to
me that if the Iraqi political situation is the key to this and
they face either a ``very difficult task'' or a ``close to
impossible task,'' we need to be honest with the American
people and say that our task then logically it must follow is
somewhat similar.
Admiral McConnell. Our task is similar in that it is very,
very difficult. The key to the situation now is stability
because we could not make progress without some level of
stability, and that is the question.
Senator Bayh. But this difficulty that we are experiencing
in Iraq I would assume has not occurred overnight. It has been
in the process for some time now, the better part of a year or
maybe longer. Is that a fair assessment?
Admiral McConnell. I would agree with that, yes, sir.
Senator Bayh. So if someone indicated in the last 4 months
or so, let us say, that we were absolutely winning in Iraq,
that is a mistaken assessment?
Admiral McConnell. I would not agree that we were winning.
I think the conditions in 2006 were where it became most
dramatically evident that the strategy was not being successful
and my sense is that is why there were adjustments made to the
strategy.
Senator Bayh. Based upon your understanding today, if in
the last couple of months someone came to me and said that we
had absolutely had enormous successes in Iraq, what would your
response to that be?
Admiral McConnell. Enormous successes in previous years?
Senator Bayh. That the bottom line in Iraq was that we had
had enormous successes.
Admiral McConnell. Sir, as we said in the estimate, it was
going in a negative direction and sectarian violence was
increasing. My view is that is why the policy changed.
Senator Bayh. I would encourage you to communicate, and I
am sure you will, forthrightly with the higher reaches of our
government. Those statements were made by both the President
and the Vice President of the United States in the last 4
months.
Chairman Levin. Senator Bayh, thank you very much.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For the record, I would like to acknowledge Admiral
McConnell's South Carolina roots. We are very proud of you.
Admiral McConnell. Thank you, sir.
Senator Graham. To build upon Senator Bayh's questions
here, what would winning be in Iraq? What is winning?
Admiral McConnell. In my view, sir, winning would be a
stable situation that would allow the government to mature to
the point where they could have a national reconciliation to
have a nation.
Senator Graham. They would be an ally in the war on terror?
Admiral McConnell. If that came to pass the way I described
it, yes, sir, I believe that.
Senator Graham. The biggest impediment to political
reconciliation is the violence, do you agree with that
statement?
Admiral McConnell. I agree with that.
Senator Graham. Political will has to be mustered, but with
the level of violence it is very difficult to put political
coalitions together?
Admiral McConnell. That is correct.
Senator Graham. In terms of the surge, General, are the
Iraqis meeting their end of the bargain more or less?
General Maples. Yes, sir, they are.
Senator Graham. So your comment regarding the Iraqi
participation militarily, politically, and economically is that
they are meeting their end of the bargain?
General Maples. At this point, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, Admiral?
Admiral McConnell. I do, sir. It is early in the stage, but
trends are going in the right direction.
Senator Graham. I believe you were asked by Senator Thune
that there had been no wargaming of a failed state in Iraq; is
that correct?
Admiral McConnell. Not that I am aware of, sir. There may
have been.
Senator Graham. Can I suggest that we do one?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir. We would be happy to do that.
Senator Graham. Thanks.
Would Turkey stand on the sidelines and watch an
independent Kurdistan be formed in the north without going to
war?
Admiral McConnell. In my opinion, no, sir.
Senator Graham. Would the Sunni Arab states sit on the
sidelines and watch an all-out slaughter of the Sunni minority
in Iraq without getting involved?
Admiral McConnell. I think they would be involved.
Senator Graham. So we are beginning to war plan here.
Now, Iran. What is the Iranian goal when it comes to Iraq?
Admiral McConnell. Ultimately Iran, in my view, would like
to have a Shiite state dominate in Iraq.
Senator Graham. So it is not the Iranian goal to have a
functioning democracy on their border, would you agree with
that, where all groups live in peace?
Admiral McConnell. Absolutely not their goal to have a
functioning democracy.
Senator Graham. The reason it is not their goal, it would
be a threat to their own theocracy; is that correct?
Admiral McConnell. That is correct, sir.
Senator Graham. So can we say with a degree of certainty,
as long as we are trying to create a functioning democracy
where different religious groups can live in peace, Iran will
be a problem?
Admiral McConnell. I would agree with that statement.
Senator Graham. Syria. Is it Syria's goal to see a
functioning democracy emerge in Iraq?
Admiral McConnell. It is not Syria's goal to see a
functioning democracy in Iraq.
Senator Graham. One of the biggest nightmares for the
Syrian regime, which is a police state, is to have a
representative government on their border, whether it be
Lebanon or Iraq; do you agree with that?
Admiral McConnell. I would agree with that.
Senator Graham. Do you think it is an accident that Syria
is trying to interfere with Lebanese democratic efforts?
Admiral McConnell. Not an accident.
Senator Graham. Do you believe Iran wants a nuclear weapon?
Admiral McConnell. Yes.
Senator Graham. Do you think they are lying when they say
they do not?
Admiral McConnell. I do believe they lied.
Senator Graham. Is it true that the leader of Iran, the
president, has denied the Holocaust exists?
Admiral McConnell. It is true that he denied that.
Senator Graham. So the world has this dilemma: Should we
allow a person who denies the Holocaust exists have nuclear
materials? Is that the dilemma the world faces?
Admiral McConnell. Indeed.
Senator Graham. So if someone came to the United Nations
requesting a nuclear program and the application said, does
your leader deny the existence of the Holocaust, should we go
to the next question?
Admiral McConnell. I think we should.
Senator Graham. So my statement is that anybody that wants
a nuclear program, for whatever purpose, if the leader of your
nation denies the Holocaust exists, you do not get it. Is that
an unreasonable request?
Admiral McConnell. It sounds reasonable to me, Senator.
Senator Graham. Good.
Economically, could we affect--if the world came together
and put sanctions on Iran, could it work to change their
behavior?
Admiral McConnell. It could have significant impact. I
think it might have dramatic impact.
Senator Graham. Has that been done yet?
Admiral McConnell. It has not been done.
Senator Graham. The Iranians depend on gasoline coming
outside their country because they do not have refining
capacity?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Graham. So to the world, if you would like to
change the behavior of the Iranian regime, you believe economic
sanctions properly applied could work?
Admiral McConnell. Would have a very dramatic impact.
Senator Graham. If Iran developed a nuclear weapon, what is
the likelihood they would use it against Israel?
Admiral McConnell. They have stated that they would
consider that, that Israel should not exist, should be wiped
off the map. I do not know that I would conclude that they
would use it in a prescribed period of time, but certainly the
risk would be there.
Senator Graham. Can you tell me they would not?
Admiral McConnell. No.
Senator Graham. Can you tell the state of Israel they would
not?
Admiral McConnell. No.
Senator Graham. If you were the Israeli prime minister,
what would you do?
Admiral McConnell. I would react in a way to protect my
country.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Senator Graham for those great questions,
excellent as always, great content.
Senator Graham has touched on a lot of extremely important
issues, as other Senators have. So let me change gears and
change the focus just for a moment. I would like to ask about
the greater Horn of Africa. There has been a lot of discussion
about this. It is lower level in terms of visibility, but it
may be just as great of a challenge as we see in other parts of
the world. We all know the history in Somalia. We can look at
countries like Ethiopia and Eritrea and other nations there
that have had either involvement in other countries, proxy
wars, et cetera, funding various things, and maybe even some of
these nations being involved in attacking other countries in
one way or another.
Anyway, we do not have to go through all that today. But I
would like to get the panel's thoughts if I could on the
region. Some of the news, when you read it, it sounds pretty
bleak out of Africa, especially the greater Horn of Africa. My
sense is that instability means opportunity for terrorists and
terrorism.
So if I could, I would just like to ask, how can we more
effectively address the growing threat that is coming out of
the greater Horn of Africa? Whoever wants to go first, go
ahead.
Admiral McConnell. Sir, let me start. I lived in that
region for a period of my life and visited a number of those
countries. My view is both stability and cultural--let me just
use Somalia as an example--tribal, clans, sub-clans. As I
mentioned in my remarks, one group would rather suffer than see
another group prevail. So there are inherent difficulties in
the Horn of Africa.
But the current level of stability and strife and poverty
and so on just foments additional problems for us. So in my
view, if we have a way to establish a level of stability there
may be a path then to rebuild the nation.
Senator Pryor. Anybody else want to comment?
General Maples. I think it remains an area of concern, in
particular in the sense that we talked earlier about ungoverned
spaces, and the fact that there is no control just provides the
opportunity for al Qaeda or al Qaeda affiliates and East
African al Qaeda to operate from there, to plan from there, and
to create instability in the rest of Africa.
Dr. Fingar. I would echo that. The region as a whole, even
those areas that are not currently affected by the kind of
violence we see in Somalia and Sudan, are fragile. The tribal
character spilling across the borders, the ungoverned spaces,
the fragility; the danger of the instability and therefore the
ungoverned spaces expanding is very high. As General Maples
said, we know that al Qaeda has been involved with the Islamic
Courts. We judge that some of those responsible for the attacks
on the American embassies were present in Somalia, had a degree
of safe haven.
It is very easy to make a long list of the maladies, the
dangers in the region. It is much more difficult analytically
to say precisely what would be most effective in redressing
those difficulties.
Senator Pryor. Let me follow up on that if I may. General
Maples, you mentioned that this area remains an area of
concern. How high a priority, though, is it in the IC? Are we
allocating enough resources on the intelligence side for that
region of the world?
General Maples. I believe from a military standpoint that
we are, and in those times when we need to increase that we are
taking the appropriate actions to support the commander, who
has a focus on this area right now, the Central Command
commander.
Senator Pryor. Admiral McConnell, do you agree with that?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, what I was going to observe from
long years of experience in this, there have been times when we
tried to be clairvoyant, to pick the places to focus our
attention, and more often than not we focused in one area and
we had a problem somewhere else. We have a new process now
called our national intelligence priorities framework. What we
do with that is engage with the policymakers on a regular basis
to get them to validate where we focus and so on.
So I think we are better than we were. We have reasonable
focus on the area, but in all candor, given the focus on Iraq
and al Qaeda and other places, it probably is not as robust as
we would all like it.
Dr. Fingar. I would actually go a little further than that,
the area that we, the Office of the DNI, have chosen to focus
on for rebuilding capability is Africa, where the drawdown of
capability occurred in order to shift analysts to higher
priorities, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, later Iran
and Iraq. We really have a rebuilding challenge here, because
the level of expertise required to get arms around the
religious, tribal, ethnic, and economic cleavages in the
region, to understand and identify the more capable leaders
with whom one might work, to devise strategies, we do not have
the analytic expertise that we need.
We have launched an effort to rebuild it. So we are able,
as General Maples indicated, to move short-term stopgap, to
answer very immediate questions, but this is an area that as a
function of higher priorities over a decade or more has the
fewest analysts, the most junior analysts, and the ones with,
the nature of it, the least experience on the ground.
Senator Pryor. That is very concerning, what you are
saying. I would just encourage you to work with us to try to
get the proper amount, the proper level of resources and
attention on that area, because I think, not right now, but in
the future, this is going to be a major problem for the United
States.
Dr. Fingar. Senator, I would be happy to meet with you with
my Africa staff to explain the initiative we have and seek your
help.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral McConnell, the annual threat estimate characterizes
Iran as determined to obtain nuclear weapons. In response to
the series of questions from my colleague, Senator Graham, you
obviously agree with that assessment. I want to ask it a little
bit differently. What is the best estimate of the U.S. IC for
how long it would take for Iran to develop nuclear weapons and
the capacity to deliver them, and what degree of confidence do
you have in that estimate?
Admiral McConnell. The earliest they could produce a
nuclear weapon would be early next decade, more likely mid-next
decade.
Senator Clinton. By mid-next decade, are we talking 2015?
Admiral McConnell. We would be talking 2015.
Senator Clinton. When that date is reached, 2015, which is
the earliest that they could produce a nuclear weapon, would
they then have the capacity to deliver that nuclear weapon?
Admiral McConnell. It depends on how they develop their
program. If they were to start the program for delivery
consistent with the development of a nuclear weapon, they could
match and marry up in the same timeframe. Normally it would
take a little longer to have a delivery capability.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Admiral McConnell.
General Maples, in 2005 Admiral Jacoby told me in testimony
before this committee that North Korea had the ability to arm a
missile with a nuclear device. I think it was the first time
that testimony had ever been given in public. Last year,
General Maples, you told me that North Korea is ``in the
process of developing an ICBM capable of delivering a nuclear
warhead, but they have not done so yet, nor have they tested
it.''
Given the July 2006 missile test, would you revise your
assessment of whether North Korea has developed an ICBM capable
of delivering a nuclear warhead to the United States? If not,
how many more years before North Korea has this capability?
General Maples. I believe they have the technical
capability, as we saw by the Taepodong, but they have not
successfully tested it yet.
Senator Clinton. I just want to be clear that when we are
talking about the technical capability we are talking about a
missile launched from North Korea that could reach California.
General Maples. That is correct.
Senator Clinton. With your assessment, do you have any best
estimates as to how many more years before they would have a
deliverable capability?
General Maples. I would probably estimate it is not a
matter of years, but in fact they will have learned from the
Taepodong launch of this last summer and gone back to try to
make corrections to whatever the failure was and apply that to
the missile systems that they already have.
Senator Clinton. I would like to ask Dr. Fingar, because I
understand you are an expert in China, and also General Maples.
In your written statement that was submitted to the committee
regarding China's military modernization, you state that you
assess ``China's aspirations for great power status, threat
perceptions, and security strategy would drive China's
modernization efforts even if the Taiwan problem were
resolved.'' is that correct?
Dr. Fingar. That is correct.
Senator Clinton. Your written statement, however, fails to
mention China's January 11 anti-satellite test. So perhaps this
goes more to General Maples, but obviously I would be pleased
to hear from anyone on the panel. Given China's recent anti-
satellite test and the Chinese government's professed
opposition to the weaponization of space, what explains, in the
opinion of any of you, the government's decision to permit the
military to conduct such a test? Do you believe that the
leadership, either civilian or military, was aware of the
potential negative implications in terms of U.S. diplomatic and
potential military response? Or was there some other motive at
work?
General Maples, Dr. Fingar?
General Maples. I would just start. I believe the Chinese
and the Russians to some extent will continue to pursue space
and counterspace capabilities, as they demonstrated by the
launch of the SC-19.
Senator Clinton. Do you see that as fitting into your
assessment that they are going to continue to modernize
regardless of any other factor that is going on, including the
status of Taiwan?
General Maples. I believe they will continue to modernize,
yes, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. Let me ask each of you to briefly respond.
In your opinion, under what circumstances would China become a
military threat to the United States?
Admiral McConnell. China today could be a military threat.
They have ICBMs, nuclear warheads, and so on. So it is a matter
of their building their military, in my view, to reach some
state of parity with the United States. So in a threat sense,
it becomes intentions. So they are a threat today. They would
become an increasing threat over time.
Senator Clinton. Dr. Fingar?
Dr. Fingar. They've certainly had the capability for
decades. But they have appeared to have decided that we are not
an enemy, that they require a peaceful international
environment in order to proceed with their own efforts for
economic modernization in order to address their very severe
social problems. But they are a country with a history of, in
their view, having been victimized by stronger external powers
and they take national defense, including lessons learned out
of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, to heart.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate your comments and perhaps
this is an issue that we can explore further, because obviously
both within their government as well as within ours there is a
debate occurring as to how to view each other. I personally
think it is one of the most important debates for us to get
right.
Finally, Dr. Fingar, in response to a series of questions
about the NIE on Iraq, do you have an opinion about the impact
on Iraq's potential for stability and security of a phased
redeployment versus a rapid withdrawal?
Dr. Fingar. Senator, I do not. It is not a question that I
have looked at or that we have looked at.
Senator Clinton. I think that is important, and I
appreciate your candor on that issue, because clearly the
conclusion some are drawing from the NIE would suggest that
there was an opinion and that you had such an opinion, and I
appreciate your response to my question.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Just a very brief second round, perhaps a couple minutes
each.
Admiral, I think that your statement that China will be an
increasing threat is not really what you intend, but if it is,
so be it. Did you not really mean that they will have an
increasing capability?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, better stated. What I was
attempting to say was they will improve their capability over
time. My view, the greater threat to us as a Nation is internal
issues in China. They have a growth plan that they have to meet
or they will have internal strife. So capability growing.
Threat is more internal; it could be a problem for us.
Chairman Levin. Could be, but you did not----
Admiral McConnell. I misstated it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now, in terms of the weapons coming in from Syria, those
weapons which you have described as coming in from Syria and
perhaps other Sunni neighbors are killing our troops. Do we
have a plan to address the Syrian weapon source of killings of
our troops?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, I know the military is working that
border area to close it down from not only weapons but
jihadists coming in.
Chairman Levin. That is more than just--we are trying to
close down the Iranian border area, too.
Admiral McConnell. Yes.
Chairman Levin. The problem is that these weapons are
coming from a state which does not recognize Israel either,
just like Iran does not. We have to try to stop weapons coming
into Iraq from any source that are killing our troops. I agree
with the comments about trying to stop them coming in from
Iran, but I think we have to try to stop them that are going to
the Sunni insurgents as well as to the Shiite. I am just
wondering, does the military have a plan to, if necessary, go
into Syria to go to the source of any weapons coming from Syria
that are going to Sunni insurgents, that are killing our
troops? General or Admiral, either one?
Admiral McConnell. There is an attempt to stop the flow of
any traffic across that border, but most of the weapons that
are being used inside Iraq are there now. It is not a matter of
resupply. It is just the stocks that were there from the Saddam
era are huge.
Chairman Levin. I understand that, but there also are
weapons, you have testified, coming in now from Syria. Is that
true?
Admiral McConnell. Some, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I think we ought to take action on all
fronts, including Syria and any other source of weapons coming
in. Obviously, Iran is the focus, but it should not be the sole
focus.
The economic sanctions answer that you gave is a very
significant answer, as to whether or not economic sanctions, if
applied against Iran, could stop them from pursuing any nuclear
program. Your answer was, as I understand it, yes, that strong
economic sanctions could have an effect. Is that what your
testimony is?
Admiral McConnell. My answer was that strong economic
sanctions would have dramatic impact. Now, whether it would
change or not, that is to be determined.
Chairman Levin. Unless their policy might change, their
direction might change, what is the relevance of the impact?
That is the source of it.
Admiral McConnell. It would make them be more mindful of
continuing a policy that causes sanctions, because
international economic sanctions that were significant would
cause them stress and pain.
Chairman Levin. Might that have an impact on whether they
continue to pursue a nuclear program?
Admiral McConnell. It could have impact, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. I will defer to my colleague from South
Carolina since I am going to stay for the entire second round.
Chairman Levin. We are going to meet in S-407 of the
Capitol, by the way, immediately after this second round.
Senator Warner. I just have one question.
Chairman Levin. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The point about economic sanctions I think--I do not think
anyone here wants to have another engagement with another
country in the Middle East unless we have to. The point is, at
what point do we have to? It goes back to Senator Clinton's
question: What time period do we have left reasonably speaking
before Iran procures a nuclear weapon, if we all agree they are
trying? To me, the first thing we have to come to grips with,
is it the intent of the regime to develop a nuclear weapons
program in your opinion, not a nuclear power program?
Admiral McConnell. My opinion is they are pursuing a
nuclear weapon, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. So the intent is there for this country to
have a nuclear weapon, we believe?
Admiral McConnell. In my judgment.
Senator Graham. So we have several alternatives to stop
that. Do you believe it is in the world's best interest for
Iran not to have a nuclear weapon?
Admiral McConnell. I would agree with that.
Senator Graham. It would be one of the most destabilizing
events in modern times, is that correct?
Admiral McConnell. Particularly in this part of the world.
Senator Graham. It could create potentially an arms race in
the Mideast?
Admiral McConnell. Could be.
Senator Graham. So we have a window of time left here. Now,
you answered Senator Clinton's question some time between now
and 2015 is our best guess as to when they would have a nuclear
weapon?
Admiral McConnell. Early to mid next decade.
Senator Graham. Now, the Israelis have a different view of
that. Do you know why?
Admiral McConnell. I do not know why, sir. I know they
think it may be a little earlier.
Senator Graham. Can you go down and talk?
Admiral McConnell. We do.
Senator Graham. Good, because to be wrong here is to be
wrong big time.
Now, getting back to the economic sanctions. I do believe
they could work. I just do not believe they have been tried
yet. Do you agree with that statement?
Admiral McConnell. The United Nations and the IC have not
applied the kind of economic sanctions you are describing, sir,
no.
Senator Graham. So would you agree that economic sanctions
are the last best hope short of military action to prevent a
nuclear weapons program from occurring in Iran?
Admiral McConnell. Sir, that goes to a policy level
question. I am making the judgment based on what I have
observed in other situations that it would have a dramatic
impact.
Senator Graham. Fair enough, okay.
Redeploying. Regardless of the timeframe, if it is
perceived by the militants of the region and al Qaeda in
particular that we left Iraq because we were driven out, what
effect would that have on the overall war on terror?
Admiral McConnell. It would certainly encourage those that
are inside Iraq who are stimulating sectarian violence.
Senator Graham. Do you believe the outcome in Iraq is part
of the overall war on terror?
Admiral McConnell. A stabilized Iraq would be in our
interest in terms of fighting the overall global war on terror.
Senator Graham. Do you believe that Iraq is a central
battlefront in the overall war on terror?
Admiral McConnell. The outcome of Iraq makes it so today,
based on where we are today.
Senator Graham. Does al Qaeda believe that the outcome in
Iraq is part of their overall strategy?
Admiral McConnell. I would not go so far as to say al Qaeda
would necessarily believe that. Al Qaeda may have designs----
Senator Graham. Have they not said that?
Admiral McConnell. They want to reestablish their base and
their objective could be in Afghanistan.
Senator Graham. Okay, so you do not think al Qaeda sees
democracy in Iraq as a threat to their agenda?
Admiral McConnell. You described al Qaeda as one large
organization. There are elements of AQI and----
Senator Graham. I do not want to use any more. The bottom
line is if we withdraw to Kuwait what is the likelihood that al
Qaeda-type elements would follow us to Kuwait?
Admiral McConnell. Unlikely.
Senator Graham. Unlikely? Is it not the stated policy as an
organization to drive us out of the region and to destroy
Israel?
Admiral McConnell. It is.
Senator Graham. Why would they not likely follow us to
Kuwait?
Admiral McConnell. In time they would try to do that. But
the way you were framing your question, if we withdrew to
Kuwait would they just follow right on, I do not----
Senator Graham. No, I am saying that----
Admiral McConnell. In time.
Senator Graham. I guess, General Maples, maybe just end it
with this: The big picture is, I believe if we withdraw from
Iraq, whether it is a year, 6 months, 2 years, whatever number
you want to pick, that if it is seen by the militant groups
within the Mideast, no matter where we go in the Middle East,
they are coming after us. Am I wrong?
General Maples. It is our presence in the Middle East that
they are concerned about.
Admiral McConnell. They have already attacked inside Saudi
Arabia, as an example. So, yes, they will come wherever we are.
Senator Graham. Is there any safe place for us to go in the
Mideast without being attacked?
Admiral McConnell. I cannot think of one.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Admiral McConnell, we all recall about 6
years ago when the administration essentially took apart the
Agreed Framework with North Korea. The major rationale at the
time was the discovery of a highly enriched uranium (HEU)
program beyond the plutonium that had been capped, was being
inspected by the IAEA. Now we have another agreement, looks
somewhat like the Framework, maybe not entirely correct. But
the question remains what of the HEU program?
Several possibilities exist. One, it was never really a
real program. Or something has happened in the interim to
change the program. Can you shed any light on the HEU program
and why now we can enter into an agreement with the North
Koreans?
Admiral McConnell. No, sir, I cannot personally shed any
light. But perhaps my colleagues can. I know that the primary
focus in the current timeframe was on the plutonium in the
reactor. I do not personally know and have not yet caught up to
that intelligence if it exists with regard to the HEU.
Senator Reed. I would be happy to have you defer to
someone.
Dr. DiTrani. Sir, I would only--I would add on that, sir--
--
Chairman Levin. Would you identify yourself, please?
Dr. DiTrani. Joseph DiTrani. I am the mission manager for
North Korea with the Office of the DNI.
Chairman Levin. If you could stand up and talk real loud.
Senator Reed. Or take the mike from Dr. Fingar.
Dr. DiTrani. If I might, sir, on the uranium enrichment
program, in October 2002 we confronted the North Koreans in
Pyongyang with information that they were acquiring material
sufficient for a production-scale capability of enriching
uranium, which was in violation of the North-South
Denuclearization, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and also
the spirit of the Agreed Framework.
They were confronted with that information in October 2002
and at that time they admitted to having such a program, and
immediately thereafter that is when they pulled out of the NPT,
they asked the IAEA to leave, and so forth. The United States
persists in our negotiations with them saying that we need a
declaration that speaks to acquisitions, that addresses a
production-scale uranium enrichment capability.
My understanding is of the February 13 agreement, this
agreement speaks of all nuclear programs. Indeed, the North
Koreans are very aware that when we speak of all nuclear
programs we are also including their acquisitions of materials
necessary for production-scale uranium enrichment program, and
indeed which they were making in the late 1990s through the
early 2000s. We still see elements of that program.
So the short answer to your question, sir, is that is still
on the table and North Korea still must address the issue of
their acquisitions of materials, to include centrifuges, that
even President Musharraf in his book speaks to a few dozen
centrifuges, P1s and P2s, that were in violation of all those
agreements. They need to address that issue as part of the
denuclearization process.
Senator Reed. How different is that from 2002, when we
confronted them and asked them to detail their experiments,
their acquisition of centrifuges? It seems to be equivalent.
Dr. DiTrani. We have never walked away from that issue,
sir. We are still looking for them to----
Senator Reed. But we walked away from the Agreed Framework.
Dr. DiTrani. They pulled out of the NPT, they asked the
IAEA to leave, after admitting to having made those
acquisitions, sir. That is why the Six-Party Talks kicked in
after the three parties met in April 2003.
Senator Reed. Do you have any further indication of whether
that program has progressed in the last 6 years, 1, or 2, the
evidence, the credibility of the evidence that we had initially
suggesting they had a program rather than aspirations?
Dr. DiTrani. Sir, we had high confidence. The assessment
was with high confidence that indeed they were making
acquisitions necessary for, if you will, a production-scale
program, and we still have confidence that the program is in
existence at the mid-confidence level, yes, sir, absolutely.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, that was a very impressive bit of testimony.
Do we have in our record the gentleman's name and his
portfolio?
Chairman Levin. We have his name and his portfolio.
Senator Warner. All right, fine. Let's make sure the record
reflects it.
Chairman Levin. We asked him to state that for the record.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much.
Admiral McConnell, you were asked a question by my
colleague from South Carolina, whether if the initiatives of
the Security Council with regard to trying to restrain Iran
from moving towards a nuclear weapon failed, then the next step
would be a military action. I think you very carefully answered
that that was a policy question.
I have over the past year or 2, tried to draw the
attention, both here and abroad, of those dealing with this
problem, to the success that we had in containing the Soviet
Union with NATO and indeed the concept of deterrence. I think
there is another step between, say, the failure of this round
of Security Council efforts, which I suggest at this time
hopefully will be fruitful and that there will be a body of
sanctions that will bring about the end result we desire. But
failing that and if Iran continues to doggedly persist, then I
would suggest we begin to think about the model of how we dealt
with the Soviet Union, the NATO concept, that we would ask
other nations to join us in a consortium of nations, since it
is in their interest not to have this happen, and put offshore,
primarily in naval platforms and others, such power as can be
brought to bear at any time the region or indeed other parts of
the world felt threatened by Iraq's nuclear program. So I just
bring that forward as a suggestion.
Chairman Levin. It is such an important question. I wonder
if we could not ask the Admiral to respond. I happen to agree
with what you said. I think it is very significant, that there
is a deterrence possibility if economic sanctions fail. I think
the question is so properly and strongly phrased, I would hope,
Admiral, that you would respond in agreement. But nonetheless,
I think it is important that you respond.
Admiral McConnell. Sir, I promised to speak with all candor
when I am appearing before you, but you have taken me now to a
policy question. It is a fundamental policy issue of difference
of opinion. Might it work? It could. It worked with the
Soviets. But it is a policy question of whether we would pursue
that goal or not.
Senator Warner. Fair enough. But you will be sitting around
the policy roundtable if we have the misfortune of having to be
cast into that posture, where all efforts of the United Nations
and the Security Council and indeed free nations fail, Germany
has taken quite an active and strong role in this, in addition
to the Permanent 5, and it is an option I think that not only
the United States, but indeed the United Nations and others,
should consider. We would just set up a separate framework, not
to call it NATO, just some other framework.
I want to turn to Russia. It is interesting, Mr. Chairman,
when you and I came to the Senate some 29 years ago, we were
always consumed with the Soviet Union and Russia. I would like
to get the Admiral's views with regard to what President Putin
had to say the other day.
In your testimony, you said ``Russian assertiveness will
continue to inject elements of rivalry and antagonism in U.S.
dealings with Moscow, particularly our interactions in the
former Soviet Union, and will dampen our ability to cooperate
with Russia on issues ranging from counterterrorism and
nonproliferation to energy and democracy promotion in the
Middle East.''
We had all been hopeful that Russia, as opposed to the
former Soviet Union, would begin to bring itself into a
stronger partnership with the free world to pursue these things
like nonproliferation and the questions before the world with
regard to Iran. It is not in Russia's interest in my judgment
to see that Iran becomes a nation with a certain measure of
capability utilizing nuclear WMDs.
President Putin went to the Wehrkunde Conference this year.
I have been to Wehrkunde in years past, but I cannot remember a
more astonishing performance at Wehrkunde. We all know of one
of the Russian presidents who came over and banged his shoe on
the table before the United Nations and the world. Putin's
performance was sort of a second cousin to banging the shoe.
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir. Sir, quite frankly, it
surprised a number of us that have been observers of the old
Soviet Union and the current Russia. When we looked at the
speech, there was not anything dramatically new in the speech.
It was just the first time it was put together that way and
stated that way. So we were admittedly surprised.
One of the lines of thought was Putin was leaving there to
go to the Middle East to visit places he had never been before,
and perhaps he was setting himself up for that particular
visit. I have noticed that since that speech a number of public
statements in Russia have walked away from it a bit, to back it
back off just a bit.
But that said, it stimulated me, because I used to focus on
this area so much, to understand a little bit more about it.
What I have learned so far is the march to democracy has taken
a back step and now there are----
Senator Warner. In Russia?
Admiral McConnell. In Russia.
Senator Warner. Regrettably.
Admiral McConnell.--arrangements to control the process and
the populace and the parties and so on, to the point of picking
the next leader of Russia. I do not know that that has been
done with 100 percent surety, but in fact we are seeing
behavior that would take them down that path.
They are doing a few things----
Senator Warner. In other words, they may depart from their
structure of laws with regard to the succession of Putin, which
is to take place in the next 6 or 8 months?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir, I think it is this year. I
think it is this calendar year.
Senator Warner. That is correct, and that they might just
deviate and crown someone?
Admiral McConnell. One way to think about it would be if
you select your successor and put him in position and work the
arrangements, might that successor be beholding to you? So that
is my worry, is the march toward democracy the way we
understood it now being controlled in a way that is less of a
democratic process.
They are doing some things to alleviate pressure. They set
up a body that takes a look at extreme cases where the
government had overreacted or it had conducted some activity
that would not stand public opinion, and that allows a little
bit of pressure relief. But by and large it is still a very
controlled state.
Senator Warner. We have this issue before us, which is a
first cousin to this problem of our plans to put a missile
defense system in Poland. Now you hear all these bellicose
statements coming out of various areas of the Russian hierarchy
on this. Do you think that is part of this problem?
Admiral McConnell. Yes, sir. What I tried to do was get a
little better understanding of the advice and counsel going to
Putin. What I have been able to figure out so far is that those
that he is listening to are extremely conservative and very
suspicious of the United States and interpret things through a
lens that portrays Russia as the downtrodden, or we are trying
to hold them back, to the advantage of the United States. My
reading of that is they are not interpreting the lens
correctly. But they have renewed energy and vigor because of
the high price of oil.
Senator Warner. They are using that almost as a tool of
their diplomacy now.
Admiral McConnell. Exactly.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Admiral. Bringing to the table
your vast experience in this area will be very helpful.
Admiral McConnell. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I think it would be useful to have the
committee staff look into the chronology of the activities
surrounding our statement back in 2002 about North Korea's HEU
program. My recollection was that we stopped sending fuel oil
before North Korea pulled out of the NPT and dismissed the IAEA
inspectors. But I think this is very important because we have
learned some lessons. I think we have learned some lessons
about what not to do in dealing with serious threats such as
that posed by a nation like North Korea and others obtaining
nuclear weapons.
But if we could get that chronology. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. The committee staff will do that. By the
way, my recollection is the same as yours, that we did stop
sending the heavy fuel oil to North Korea before they withdrew
from the Framework and left the IAEA. But we will have the
staff doublecheck that.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Vice President Cheney was in Pakistan yesterday and from
the news reports it appears that he delivered what is referred
to as a stiff message, a stiff private message, to the
Pakistani government to crack down more effectively on the
Taliban and al Qaeda inside Pakistan. I assume, Admiral
McConnell, that Vice President Cheney was briefed in an up-to-
date way about whatever intelligence assessments were
attributed to our understanding of Pakistan before he went; is
that correct?
Admiral McConnell. That is correct, and in fact he was
accompanied by the Deputy Director of CIA to ensure he had all
the current information.
Senator Clinton. So I just want to ask you therefore, based
on that and based on Vice President Cheney's apparent mission
there, is it the assessment of our IC, number one, that
Pakistan is capable of doing more with respect to Taliban and
al Qaeda than they currently have done; and number two, that
President Musharraf's hold on power within Pakistan is firm
enough for him to take such additional steps?
Admiral McConnell. One, we believe they could do more. The
issue of being elected for the next term is the issue that in
my view the president of Pakistan is wrestling with. He signed
the agreement with the tribal leaders in the frontier area, as
you are aware, last fall. The question was, he was taking
casualties for going into those areas attempting to chase al
Qaeda. The President of Pakistan believed that he could be more
effective by signing this peace agreement. From our point of
view, capabilities of al Qaeda for training and so on
increased. Therefore, the Vice President's visit and others'
visit to make the case that we have to be more aggressive in
going after al Qaeda in Pakistan.
The balancing act, of course, is the president's standing
in that country with an election coming up this fall.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
We will now adjourn to S-407 of the Capitol. We are not
sure how long that will last. It should be fairly brief, but we
will go immediately, those of us who are able to go, to S-407
of the Capitol.
Thank you all very much for your testimony. We stand
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions submitted by Senator Carl Levin
STABILITY IN IRAQ
1. Senator Levin. Admiral McConnell, Senator Thune asked you the
following question: ``If the United States decided to adopt the policy
of withdrawing troops from Iraq before it is secure, do you believe
that Iraq will become a failed state?'' You answered Senator Thune as
follows: ``I think that's a very likely possibility, at least the way
we think of Iraq today--yes, sir.'' I have a number of follow-up
questions.
President Bush's plan is for the surge of U.S. forces to be
temporary, followed by a withdrawal of forces. If, during the surge,
the violence subsides, and then the planned withdrawal begins, would
you also expect the result to be a failed state?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
2. Senator Levin. Admiral McConnell, suppose the United States
begins a phased redeployment of its troops as a way of pressuring the
Iraqis to reach a political settlement, since there is a consensus that
the sectarian violence won't end and the insurgency won't be defeated
without a political settlement, and the Iraqis achieve a political
settlement which results in major progress in ending the violence, do
you also expect the result to be a failed state?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
3. Senator Levin. Admiral McConnell, suppose Iraq begins to make
progress on political reconciliation without the pressure of a U.S.-
phased redeployment and starts to become more secure as a result. If
the United States begins a phased withdrawal of forces, would your
answer be the same?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
4. Senator Levin. Admiral McConnell, is there a difference between
Iraq as a ``failed state'' and Iraq in a condition of civil war? If so,
what is the difference? If the main difference is that in the case of a
failed state, terrorist groups like al Qaeda in Iraq would have an
uncontested sanctuary, would it not be possible to address that problem
by keeping a sufficient force in the area to conduct operations against
terrorists like al Qaeda in Iraq?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
5. Senator Levin. Admiral McConnell, what do you mean by ``the way
we think of Iraq today?''
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
REPORTS TO CONGRESS
6. Senator Byrd. Admiral McConnell, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L. 109-364) called for two
key reports on Iran: an updated, comprehensive National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on Iran, and a report on the objectives of U.S. policy
on Iran and the strategy for achieving those objectives. The deadline
for those reports has already been passed--they were due to Congress by
mid-January. As administration officials continue to make public claims
about Iran's interference in Iraq, its contribution to attacks on our
soldiers, and its progress toward a nuclear weapons capability, it is
all the more critical that Congress be given the information required
in these reports. Why has there been a delay in delivering them, and
what date will they be transmitted?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
AL QAEDA IN IRAQ
7. Senator Byrd. Admiral McConnell, during your testimony you noted
that the preeminent challenge facing the United States is terrorism,
and al Qaeda is the greatest threat. Does the Intelligence Community
(IC) believe that the U.S. invasion of Iraq has diminished the capacity
of al Qaeda to conduct terrorist attacks against U.S. interests?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
8. Senator Byrd. Admiral McConnell, does the IC believe that
continued U.S. occupation of Iraq is constraining the strength of
terrorist and extremist groups like al Qaeda, or contributing to it?
Please respond in unclassified form to the extent possible.
Admiral McConnell. The IC views the war in Iraq as one of several
factors fueling the spread of the global jihad movement, which includes
al Qaeda and numerous like-minded groups. The Iraq conflict has become
a rallying point for the movement, breeding resentment of U.S.
involvement in the Islamic world and feeding into fears of Western
domination--sentiments that jihadists exploit to broaden their appeal
and spur recruitment. Like previous jihads such as the one against the
Soviets in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq is shaping a new generation of
terrorists, providing rank-and-file operatives with indoctrination,
training, and combat experience, and giving new leaders an opportunity
to prove themselves. Although fewer foreign jihadists appear to be
participating in the Iraq war than in the Afghan-Soviet conflict, the
nature of their experience in Iraq--in particular, a greater emphasis
on urban warfare, terrorist techniques, and anti-U.S. targeting than in
Afghanistan--could make them a greater threat over the years to come.
The ultimate impact of the war in Iraq on the terrorist threat will
depend on the conflict's resolution. Should jihadists leave Iraq after
concluding they failed to defeat the coalition, while Iraqis move
toward establishing a stable political and security environment, we
judge that fewer fighters will be motivated to continue the struggle
elsewhere. However, if they perceive success in expelling the coalition
from Iraq, many will be inspired to carry on the fight and will attempt
to transform portions of the country into bases for training and attack
plotting. In a letter captured in 2005 and subsequently released by the
U.S. Government, Osama bin Ladin's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, told AQI
leader Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi that once coalition forces withdrew from
Iraq, al Qaeda intended to use the country as a base to destabilize
neighboring governments and launch attacks against U.S. interests
further abroad.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
9. Senator Byrd. Admiral McConnell, you noted that the second-
greatest threat facing us is nuclear proliferation and the possibility
that nuclear weapons could be used against us. We have focused a great
deal on Iraq, and I am concerned that other threats have been neglected
as a result. Do you believe that we are adequately responding to the
risk of nuclear materials being smuggled from the former Soviet Union
and elsewhere?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Byrd. Admiral McConnell, do you believe that India is
prepared to increase its production of fissile material, and if so,
could that constitute a greater risk of proliferation or lead to a
nuclear arms race?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
INTELLIGENCE SHARING
11. Senator Byrd. Admiral McConnell, you have discussed the need
for the IC to move from a ``need to know'' to a ``responsibility to
provide'' culture. Beyond the improvements already achieved, which you
noted in your testimony, do you have further plans for operationally
accomplishing that fundamental change of mind-set? Are you supportive
of the intelligence-sharing directives in S.4, the ``Improving
America's Security Act'' of 2007?
Admiral McConnell. The February 27, 2007, testimony reflected my
initial plans for intelligence sharing; ODNI also recently notified the
committee of reorganization plans, which include transferring
responsibility for Strategy, Plans, and Policy to the Deputy Director
of National Intelligence (Customer Outcomes). The reorganization is
designed, in part, to improve communications and information sharing
between elements of the IC.
As noted in the Statement of Administration Position on S.4, the
administration opposes the bill's State, local, and regional Fusion
Center provisions. These provisions do not recognize or capitalize on
the substantial progress that the administration has made in creating
the government-wide information sharing environment established by the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. These
provisions would upset the coordinated government-wide approach to
information sharing mandated by Congress and currently being
implemented by the executive branch at the President's direction. By
eschewing government-wide responsibility for information sharing, the
proposed provisions would undermine the fundamental premise of
information sharing reform--coordination among all Federal entities
with counterterrorism responsibilities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
12. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, General Maples, and Dr.
Fingar, there are many different threats against our security in the
world today, and you have discussed quite a number of them in your
statements. These threats come at us from a number of different sources
and from different angles of attack. There are threats from different
nations, different terrorist organizations, and threats to our economic
security. Some threats may even be indirect, in that they may be caused
by actions taken by our allies. Please list what you believe are the
top five threats to our national security today, and why you believe
that your choices are the most important threats plaguing our Nation.
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. My testimony outlined the most critical threats and
challenges to our Nation's security. These can be broken down into both
near-term focus as well as long-term concern. The insurgencies in Iraq
and Afghanistan will remain our first priority and both situations
reflect, to varying degrees, the threats and challenges listed below.
a. Global Terrorism. Developments in this decade have
highlighted the continuing threat terrorism poses to the
security of the United States. Many of the root causes remain
in place, and the trend lines most likely will continue beyond
2010. Despite our best efforts at mitigation, the resiliency of
these groups and resonance of their extremist message foster
conditions that promote and sustain terrorist activity. The
failure of governments to adequately address key economic and
social issues such as systemic corruption and repression,
quality of life and economic security, perceptions of
injustice, and opposition to perceived apostate regimes and
Western-dominated globalization remain the key drivers in
global terrorism.
b. Weapons of Mass Destruction. After global terrorism, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remains the
most significant threat to our Homeland, deployed forces,
allies, and interests. Increased availability of information
together with technical advances has the potential to allow
many new countries to develop nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons. States such as North Korea and Iran remain convinced
of the perceived deterrent capabilities and international
stature that come with WMD programs and proliferation.
Individuals and groups can exploit this increased availability,
and the nexus of terrorism and WMD is a growing concern.
Acquisition of precursor chemicals, starter cultures, and
weapons-grade nuclear material remains the chief inhibitor to
this threat, though false flag or hoax operations could achieve
desired psychological results in targeted populations.
c. Regional Instability. In my testimony, I express our
concern over the situation in a number of states and regions.
In part this is driven by systemic destabilizing factors. The
long-term net effect of this instability provides a drain on
economic resources and increasingly taxes local and regional
security. The Middle East, Africa, and South Asia will remain
the most prone to these conditions. Poor or inadequate
government management of demographic stress, access to goods
and services, and the political process will continue to
undermine states in these regions. Over the next decade, the
speed and pervasive influence of globalization will continue to
overrun the capacity of some states to transform or stabilize.
d. Technology Advancements and Surprise. Selected
applications of evolving technologies and in some cases
existent technology most likely will emerge as threats and
challenges to the United States. As with WMD, the increased
availability of information together with technical advances is
promoting future enhancements to weapons characteristics and
performance such as I described in ballistic missiles. In my
testimony, I also addressed our judgments on foreign
improvements in space capabilities and information operations.
This trend is largely driven by rapid advancements in
technology. China, in particular, continues to improve its
ability to acquire, adapt, and develop new technologies
supported by its rapid economic development. The capabilities
of terrorist and international criminals also have been
significantly improved by the availability of advanced
technologies.
e. Cultural and Religious Conflict. Globalization is the most
important driver of cultural and religious conflict. Political,
ethnic, and cultural groups with limited means to adapt are
increasingly left disenfranchised. The increased movement of
people--largely seeking labor--has caused a collision of
economics and culture. Tensions can and will result in
conflict. Oppressive governments and the persecution of
minority groups also remain key drivers, particularly in key
regions such as the Middle East. Although cultural and
religious violence and conflict often work in tandem with
regional instability, they have manifested themselves in
relatively stable states. This violence and conflict
increasingly are proving to be a drain on local and regional
security resources.
Dr. Fingar. [Deleted.]
13. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, General Maples, and Dr.
Fingar, of those threats, which are challenges that you feel are best
addressed by our military?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. From a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) viewpoint
all of these threats are of concern and will remain a focus of our
collectors and analysts. The application of national power is best
addressed from a policy perspective.
Dr. Fingar. [Deleted.]
14. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, General Maples, and Dr.
Fingar, which should be addressed by diplomatic methods?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. From a DIA viewpoint all of these threats are of
concern and will remain a focus of our collectors and analysis. The
application of national power is best addressed from a policy
perspective.
Dr. Fingar. [Deleted.]
15. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, General Maples, and Dr.
Fingar, which should be addressed by other means such as through
improved security measures here in the United States, or through
economic sanctions?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. From a DIA viewpoint all of these threats are of
concern and will remain a focus of our collectors and analysis. The
application of national power is best addressed from a policy
perspective.
Dr. Fingar. [Deleted.]
FOREIGN NUCLEAR FACILITIES
16. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, General Maples, and Dr.
Fingar, an article in the Sydney Morning Herald last week stated that
``Intelligence on Iran's nuclear facilities provided to United Nations
inspectors by U.S. spy agencies has mostly turned out to be unfounded,
diplomatic sources in Vienna say.'' The article says that most of the
tip-offs have led to dead ends when investigated by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, and that there has been no sign
of ``banned'' nuclear activities being conducted by Iran. Can you
please comment on the accuracy of these statements?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
Dr. Fingar. [Deleted.]
17. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, General Maples, and Dr.
Fingar, the administration recently announced a breakthrough agreement
with North Korea concerning its nuclear program in which the North
Koreans agreed to disable its plutonium-producing nuclear program in
return for heavy fuel oil. Our chief negotiator--Chris Hill--in his
statements seems to indicate that the North Koreans may not be as far
advanced as the administration previously indicated in its covert
uranium enrichment program. Please clarify for the record what your
assessment is concerning the North Korean uranium enrichment program,
and how advanced is it?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
Dr. Fingar. [Deleted.]
U.S. STRATEGY IN IRAQ
18. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, the war in
Iraq has cost the U.S. taxpayers over $350 billion to date. Congress is
currently considering a $100 billion supplemental funding package for
fiscal year 2007. We have had over 3,000 American troops killed, and
tens of thousands more have been seriously wounded or injured. The
families of our deployed troops have suffered great hardship during the
war. All of this to attack a nation that had nothing to do with
September 11, and that the 9/11 Commission has told us had no
operational ties with al Qaeda. Last year's NIE for Iraq included a key
finding that said that ``The Iraq conflict has become the ``cause
celebre'' for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement
in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist
movement.'' You are both military officers and intelligence experts.
You are, therefore, uniquely qualified to talk about the strategy for
fighting the war on terror. For the moment, please forget about the
debate on whether we should stay in Iraq or leave. My question to you
is this: Looking forward, is the Iraq war really the model we want to
use for fighting the global war on terror?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
19. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, could we
use our resources more efficiently? Please give us your thoughts on the
Iraq conflict as a model for the war on terror.
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
20. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, is it
fair, in your opinion, that intelligence analysis be used as the basis
for pre-emptive wars against other nations, especially since the data
may be subject to different interpretations? Would it be more efficient
to utilize intelligence to focus our resources on selective strikes to
disrupt specific terrorist operations?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
U.S. INTERPRETERS IN IRAQ
21. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, it is my
understanding that part of our difficulties in Iraq stems from the fact
that we do not have enough U.S. military personnel who are proficient
in the different dialects in the Middle East. In all of the different
military conflicts that the United States has been involved in, the use
of interpreters has been a vital piece to success. Given the fact that
the United States does not have sufficient numbers of interpreters, do
you believe that our efforts in Iraq are somewhat compromised? What
efforts are underway to address this deficiency?
Admiral McConnell. I respectfully recommend that you submit your
question to the Department of the Army, United States Central Command,
or the Department of Defense senior leadership for discussions on this
operational issue.
General Maples. DIA does not have information concerning
interpreter support to U.S. forces in Iraq. This is an operational
matter. The DIA has sufficient interpreters to conduct our intelligence
collection operations in Iraq.
CHINESE ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS
22. Senator Akaka. Dr. Fingar, on a visit to Australia last week,
the Vice President said that China's recent anti-satellite weapons test
and rapid military buildup were ``not consistent'' with its stated aim
of a peaceful rise as a global power. The Vice President raises an
interesting point, and his remarks raise the question as to why they
are doing it. In your opinion, what is behind the Chinese test and do
you expect them to continue improving their capability?
Dr. Fingar. [Deleted.]
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
23. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, on February 13, North Korea
reached an agreement with China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the
United States on initial steps towards North Korea abandoning all
nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA
safeguards. This is an important agreement that probably could have
been reached much earlier if the administration had been willing to
negotiate rather than dictate conditions for talks. Have you been asked
to make an intelligence assessment as to what negotiating strategy we
could use if we were to engage Iran and Syria in order to convince them
to, first, end their interference in Iraq and, second, to end their
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
24. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, what do you believe these
countries would want from the United States in order to get them to
shut down the programs or activities that are of concern to our Nation?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
25. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, in your statement to this
committee, you stated that the IC continues to ``receive reports
indicating that al Qaeda and other groups are attempting to obtain
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons or materials.''
Who are these ``other groups''? From where are these groups attempting
to obtain these weapons? What can we do to further reduce the
possibility that these weapons fall into the wrong hands?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, recent media reports discuss
the use of chlorine gas in attacks in Iraq. While these incidents were
only partially successful, they demonstrate an enemy capable of
experimenting and learning from their mistakes. I am very concerned
about this issue especially since we know that there were a number of
Iraqi scientists experienced in WMD. Do we know who these scientists
are and where they are now?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
27. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, have any of these scientists
disappeared or have some of them joined al Qaeda or militia groups?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
28. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, I chair the Oversight of
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of
Columbia Subcommittee in the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee. One of my major concerns has been workforce recruitment,
retention, and training. In your testimony you cite as a success a
strengthened National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). I am concerned
about staffing shortages not only at the NCTC but throughout the IC.
Since September 11, we have experienced a significant increase in
demand for intelligence professionals and a shortage of trained
personnel. Do you have any suggestions or recommendations on how we can
do a better job of recruiting, training, and retaining these
professionals?
Admiral McConnell. The business of intelligence is all about
people. The DNI's June 2006 Strategic Human Capital Plan outlines a
comprehensive strategy to fulfill the DNI's statutory responsibility
under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
which charged the DNI with recruiting, developing, and retaining an IC
workforce sufficiently talented, trained, diverse, and ``joint'' to
accomplish our critical national security mission. My 100-Day
Integration and Collaboration Plan also includes human capital
initiatives; both the Strategic Plan and the 100-Day Plan include
initiatives specifically designed to make the IC an ``employer of
choice,'' and recruit, train, and retain the professionals needed to
execute the IC's national security mission.
ODNI will develop a strategy to recruit and retain more first- and
second-generation Americans from heritage communities--individuals
whose native language skills and cultural experiences are indispensable
to current and future national security challenges. We have already
established a centrally-funded IC ``corporate'' recruiting strategy,
executed annually by multi-agency recruiting teams that travel to
target campuses and professional conferences; we have deployed an IC
recruiting Web site; and we have established an IC-wide resume-sharing
database that allows all IC elements to share and consider highly
qualified applicants.
Furthermore, we have more than doubled the number of minority-
serving institutions participating in the innovative Centers for
Academic Excellence program, which provides financial and technical
assistance to these institutions, with the objective of attracting
those who complete a course of study under the program to high-demand
IC positions. We also have expanded IC-wide diversity recruiting and
outreach initiatives directly through campus visits with recruiting
teams visiting 45 historically black colleges and universities. ODNI
plans to publish the IC Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity
Cross Cutting Emphasis Area Plan during the 100-Day Plan to give these
efforts further impetus.
ODNI believes strongly a modern performance management and
compensation system is key to recognizing, rewarding, and retaining the
best and brightest employees. ODNI is on track to complete the final,
detailed design of a common pay-for-performance system for IC civilians
by mid-2007. The system eventually will replace the General Schedule
with a more market- and performance-sensitive pay system to recruit and
retain mission-critical IC talent. The foundation for that system--a
new, IC-wide performance management system--is in final agency
coordination, and represents a critical milestone in the 100-Day Plan.
It will include a 360-degree assessment process that, beginning with
senior executives, will dramatically strengthen IC collaboration and
teamwork.
Competitive benefits also are an important part of the IC's
recruiting and retention equation. We must provide our employees with
benefit options that address our unique requirements and build a sense
of community. Last year, the DNI extended the CIA's health insurance
program to all IC civilian employees, as well as access to its
complementary life, accident, income replacement, and long-term care
coverage plans. This year, we extended the FBI's health care plan for
special agents to all IC employees. We have also approved a plan to
give IC employees access to insurance and investment options now
offered only to NSA employees under its Government Employee Benefit
Association plan.
The IC's groundbreaking civilian Joint Duty program will be a
critical training and professional development opportunity for the IC's
future leaders. The 100-Day Plan makes the Joint Duty program one of my
top priorities. ODNI recently issued the implementing instructions and
an aggressive timetable for the program. In so doing, civilian joint
duty is an essential part of becoming (and being) a senior leader in
the IC. Joint duty assignments are strictly voluntary, but some form of
``joint'' experience will be mandatory for promotion to almost all
senior IC positions. A directive establishes policies and procedures
for identifying, applying for, serving in, and receiving credit for,
joint duty assignments. The requirement for joint duty experience will
be phased in over time, starting with the top echelons of our
organizations. In addition, ODNI is completing an inventory of all
senior IC positions, as well as ``feeder'' positions outside of the
ODNI, that provide such experience, so that we can then develop
appropriate career paths and leadership succession plans for employees
who seek such experience.
We have also established a National Intelligence Reserve Corps
(NERC) to re-employ retired IC professionals with critical skills to
augment the workforce. We are hoping to draw retirees back to the
workforce where they will be able to mentor and train new employees.
These programs and initiatives are indicative of the high
importance that the ODNI places on recruiting, training, and retaining
IC professionals, and we will build the future IC workforce on these
programs.
29. Senator Akaka. Admiral McConnell, could you provide for the
record your current staffing levels at the Directorate of National
Intelligence (DNI) and NCTC, and your anticipated needs in those areas?
Admiral McConnell. The attached document provides a detailed
outline, by ODNI component, of the current staffing levels of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). In summary:
Full Time Permanent Staff*................................. 565
Part Time Staff (non-count)................................ 18
Detailees (reimbursable)*.................................. 604
Detailees (non-reimbursable)............................... 54
Assignees (non-reimbursable)............................... 89
------------
Total Employees.......................................... 1,330
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorized Ceiling......................................... 1,539
Total Count Employees (sum of * above)..................... 1,169
Total Vacant Positions..................................... 370
Each of the directorates, centers, and mission managers continue to
aggressively recruit and hire staff to meet mission requirements. The
NCTC is anticipating receipt of 117 new positions from the CIA
effective fiscal year 2008 to enhance their analytic efforts.
IRAQI SECURITY
30. Senator Akaka. General Maples, in your testimony you state that
``recent developments [in Iraq] give hope for progress'' and you note
that attacks against Iraqi security forces and civilians have gone down
recently. How would you characterize attacks against coalition forces,
mainly American forces? Have those attacks shown any decline?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
31. Senator Akaka. General Maples, you also characterize the
conflict as a ``sectarian struggle for power'' while Admiral McConnell
more clearly suggests it is a ``civil war.'' Please elaborate on this
matter.
General Maples. The term ``civil war'' is not a recognized U.S.
military or U.S. Government term with a fixed definition and set of
necessary criteria, and the Joint Staff Dictionary of Military
Terminology does not mention the term. Accordingly, what constitutes a
civil war is subjective, and that lack of precision is why I have tried
to avoid using it. Moreover, no consensus exists on when ethno-
sectarian violence reaches a threshold that crosses into a civil war.
I concur with the IC assessment in the recent Iraq NIE that
although the term ``civil war'' could describe key elements of the
Iraqi conflict, it does not adequately capture the complexity of the
conflict.
______
Questions submitted by Senator John McCain
CHINESE ANTI-SATELLITE TEST
32. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, when
China destroyed one of its own satellites in January 2007, it
demonstrated the growing prowess of its space program as well as a
capability to defend against satellite observation. What is the IC's
assessment of this anti-satellite missile test?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
33. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, what was
China's rationale for conducting this test and what are the
implications for U.S. satellite capabilities?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
34. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, what
other space capabilities does China have?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
35. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, how
concerned are you about this action by the Chinese?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
36. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, are we
headed for an arms race in space?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
37. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, what
other countries are developing capabilities that have the potential to
threaten U.S. space assets?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
IRAQ WITHDRAWAL
38. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, there
have been proposals to withdraw our forces from Iraq by a specific
date, as a way to force the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own
governance and security. What is your assessment of what would happen
if we completely pulled out our forces over the next 6 months?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
VENEZUELA
39. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples,
Venezuela's arms spending has risen to $4.3 billion in the last 2
years. It spends more on arms than Pakistan ($3 billion) or Iran ($1.7
billion). Venezuela's purchases include 24 Russian fighter jets, 50
helicopters, and 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles. What are the
implications of Chavez's military buildup?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
40. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, how would
you rate Venezuela's military power in the region?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
SADR
41. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, on
February 25, a New York Times headline read ``Iraq Rebel Cleric Reins
in Militia; Motives at Issue'' and yesterday the New York Times
headline was ``Militant Iraqi Shiite Cleric Denounces Security Push.''
How would you characterize Sadr's activities in recent weeks?
Admiral McConnell and General Maples. The answer to this question
was returned to the National Intelligence Council and the DIA for
revision based on recent events. They will respond to this question
under separate correspondence. [Deleted.]
42. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, has Sadr
repudiated the security plan or has he allowed the arrest of his own
militiamen?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
43. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, what
reporting do we have about the activities of Sadr's militia?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
44. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, is Sadr
in Iran? Can you describe Sadr's relationship with the regime in
Tehran?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
45. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, how much
support does Sadr receive from Iran?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
46. Senator McCain. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, what
position, if any, has the Grand Ayatollah Sistani taken on the new
Baghdad security plan?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
INSURGENCY TACTICS AND AL QAEDA IN IRAQ
47. Senator McCain. General Maples, there was recently an attack by
foreign jihadists and Sunni militants against a U.S. combat outpost
north of Baghdad. There also appears to be a more coordinated effort to
shoot down U.S. helicopters. Insurgents have also equipped car bombs
with chlorine canisters which disperse toxic gas when exploded. Do you
see this as part of an evolutionary tactical change?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
48. Senator McCain. General Maples, how has al Qaeda in Iraq
changed since the death of Zarqawi in June 2006?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
49. Senator McCain. General Maples, how many al Qaeda associated
operatives are part of the insurgency in Iraq?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
50. Senator McCain. General Maples, do Osama bin Ladin and Ayman
al-Zawahiri continue to play a crucial role in inspiring jihadists to
go to Iraq?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
51. Senator McCain. General Maples, how much influence do bin Laden
and Zawahiri play in operations in Iraq?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
52. Senator McCain. General Maples, is there any recent evidence
that al Qaeda in Iraq intends to use Iraq to launch attacks outside of
Iraq's territorial borders?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
AFGHANISTAN
53. Senator McCain. General Maples, there has been speculation in
the press that the Taliban is positioning itself for a large offensive
in the spring. What is the IC's assessment of the Taliban's plans in
the near-term?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE AND SPACE CAPABILITIES
54. Senator Sessions. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, both of
you note in your written testimony that Iran continues its efforts to
develop and acquire ballistic missiles capable of striking Israel and
Central Europe. You also note that Tehran views its growing inventory
of ballistic missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter, and
if necessary retaliate, against forces in the region--including U.S.
forces. What is your assessment of current and future Iranian
capabilities to strike European countries with intermediate-range
ballistic missiles?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
55. Senator Sessions. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, when
does the IC estimate Iran will test a ballistic missile capable of
reaching the United States?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
56. Senator Sessions. Admiral McConnell and General Maples, when
does the IC estimate Iran will develop a space launch capability and
the ability to target U.S. satellites in low earth orbit?
Admiral McConnell. [Deleted.]
General Maples. [Deleted.]
[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee adjourned.]