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(III)
CHAD AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: THE REGIONAL IMPACT OF THE DARFUR CRISIS

TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold and Obama.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. The committee will come to order, and I want to thank everyone for being here. On behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, I welcome all of you to the second hearing of this subcommittee in the 110th Congress.

I want to especially express my gratitude to my colleague, Senator Sununu, who I expect will be here at some point, who has already demonstrated a dedicated commitment to Africa in his first couple of months as ranking member of this subcommittee.

By now we are all aware of the tragedy unfolding in the Darfur region of Sudan. More than 2½ years ago, my colleagues and I were among the first to condemn the atrocities in Darfur as genocide, and since then Congress has appropriated more than $1.5 billion to ease the suffering of innocent Darfurians. The U.S. Government and many other concerned states, acting alone as well as through the United Nations and the African Union, have intervened with diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, and development assistance efforts driven in large part by effective grassroots activism, to which I give great credit.

Despite these ongoing and well-intentioned efforts, however, today in Darfur millions remain displaced and at least 200,000 people are dead. Humanitarian space continues to shrink, and peacekeepers, aid workers, and human rights actors are increasingly the target of violent crimes. Perhaps most worrisome is the Sudanese Government’s growing denial of the crimes and crisis in the west.

This morning I woke up and turned on the Today Show and watched Sudanese President Bashir claim that rape “doesn’t exist; we don’t have it.” He went on to allege that the United States was fabricating evidence of atrocities in Darfur just as it had before in-
vading Iraq, implying that the Americans have ulterior motives in seeking to end the violence in Darfur.

In the meantime, we are seeing the brutal tactics of Darfur and their tragic consequences transferred across the porous border into eastern Chad and the Central African Republic. Even before the recent outbreak of hostilities in the north, the Central African Republic was suffering extreme poverty and deemed by the U.N.’s Office of Humanitarian Assistance as “one of the world’s most neglected emergencies.”

Similarly, I visited the Iriba refugee camp in eastern Chad in January 2005, and was struck even then by the rising inflow of Darfurian refugees. During that same visit to Chad, I also noted the growing disillusionment with President Deby’s government and the lack of democratic space for political change.

My conclusion from this trip was that Chadians outside the government were preoccupied with the problems of poverty and rural development, but it worried me that this was not a major concern of the Government of Chad, nor was it at the top tier of the United States-Chad bilateral relationship. Political unrest in Chad has sparked violence that has displaced more than 100,000 citizens of Chad, adding to refugees from Sudan and the Central African Republic in crowded camps, and it has created a downward spiral of security in humanitarian conditions throughout the region.

Last month Senator Sununu and I introduced a resolution to highlight the destabilizing impact of the ongoing violence in the Darfur region of Sudan on neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic. Each of these countries is struggling to cope with security and humanitarian challenges of their own, but the spillover of rebels, weapons, and brutal tactics, along with the flood of refugees and internally displaced persons that such violence creates across Sudan’s western border, has exacerbated these emergencies.

As long as these conflicts persist, the crisis in Darfur will be prolonged, and vice versa. No effort to restore peace and stability to this bloody region in the heart of Africa can succeed unless we commit ourselves to a coordinated, comprehensive approach. Tribal rivalries are not constrained by national boundaries, so neither should we pursue localized solutions to what has become in fact a regional conflict.

That was the motivation for our bipartisan resolution calling on the U.S. Government and the international community to promptly develop, fund, and implement a comprehensive regional strategy to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian operations, contain and reduce violence, and contribute to conditions for sustainable peace in eastern Chad, the Central African Republic, and western Sudan. Today this hearing will explore the need for an integrated approach to peace in this region.

With that said, let me introduce our two distinguished panels. On our first panel we have Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. Jim Swan. In addition to having previously served as Director of Analysis for Africa in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Mr. Swan has devoted most of his professional life as a career Foreign Service officer to various African countries facing complex political transitions.
I hope he’ll be able to draw upon this experience to give us some insights into the current situations in Chad and the Central African Republic. We look forward to a review of recent developments in U.S. policy in this region, including the administration’s priorities as well as its strategies and allocated resources toward achieving these ends. Mr. Swan, I would also appreciate your assessment of the impact you believe the United States is having in each of these countries in addressing both the immediate needs and long-standing grievances of the affected populations.

Following Mr. Swan, on our second panel we will hear testimony from two respected individuals representing the humanitarian and academic communities, respectively. Both Ken Bacon and John Prendergast have firsthand experience with these conflicts and their victims, and both have written extensively and even testified before Congress on these and related foreign policy issues.

Ken Bacon is the president of Refugees International, an advocacy organization based in Washington, but with operations that serve forgotten or neglected populations in crisis all over the world, including Chad and the Central African Republic. To learn more about the needs of internally displaced people and what can be done to reduce attacks on civilians in these areas, Refugees International recently sent an assessment mission to visit IDP camps in eastern Chad as well as the extremely isolated and nearly inaccessible conflict zones in northeast and northwest CAR. We are fortunate to be privy to this on-the-ground update, and I hope Mr. Bacon will also share his perspective on both the successes and failures of existing efforts to ease and resolve the conflicts in this troubled region and what more needs to be done.

John Prendergast has worked on crisis issues in Africa for the past two decades, and is currently a senior advisor to the International Crisis Group and cofounder of the recently launched ENOUGH campaign that aims to end ongoing crimes against humanity and prevent future mass atrocities. We look to you, Mr. Prendergast, for analysis of the internal political situations in Chad and the Central African Republic, as well as the regional dynamics that bind these conflicts with the Darfur crisis. Additionally, the subcommittee would appreciate your insights into what you believe is needed at the national, regional, and international levels in the short, medium, and long term, to ease and resolve the interrelated challenges of this troubled region.

We’re very glad that you’re all here today, and we appreciate your willingness to testify. Thank you and welcome. The information and insights you share with us this morning will help my colleagues and myself better understand these complex conflicts and the role we can play in resolving them through a coordinated, comprehensive result.

I will now start the testimony of Mr. Swan. When Senator Sununu arrives, we’ll ask him to speak as the ranking member. Mr. Swan, would you proceed with your testimony?
STATEMENT OF JAMES SWAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. SWAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much for the invitation to testify this morning on instability in Chad and the Central African Republic and their links to regional instability, particularly the ongoing crisis in Darfur.

Before I begin, I would like also to acknowledge you, Senator, as well as your colleagues, Senators Sununu and Levin, for your introduction of a resolution calling for a comprehensive strategy to protect civilians, reduce violence, and contribute to a lasting peace in the region. Your efforts have brought attention to an oft-forgotten part of the world, and for this we are appreciative.

I will be restricting my remarks today to Chad and the Central African Republic, since I understand that the President's Special Envoy will be addressing you on Sudan in the coming weeks, but of course I do want to underscore the regional dimension of the issues that I will be addressing as well.

I have some prepared testimony which, with your permission, Senator, I would like to introduce into the record.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Mr. SWAN. Thank you, and I will summarize the key points of this paper.

Chad and the Central African Republic have a long history of instability and war that can be attributed to a combination of domestic and regional factors. Neither country has a record of good governance, rule of law, or democracy, and this makes both countries vulnerable to external interference, and it limits their options for peaceful resolution of internal problems. Over time, each of these countries has both generated and hosted substantial numbers of refugees, including from each other.

U.S. priorities in Chad and CAR include limiting the regional impact of the Darfur conflict, fostering stability, protecting civilians, refugees, internally displaced persons, and humanitarian workers, and promoting political reform and good governance.

Since you have already in your remarks, Senator, described briefly the general context of the situation, I'd like to skip ahead and focus primarily on the U.S. response to current developments. Thank you, sir.

Overall, the United States Government is taking a holistic approach to addressing stability and security in Chad and CAR, an approach that takes into account both regional and domestic dynamics. I'd like to start first with the issue of regional stability, and on this our primary focus at this point is in supporting a robust United Nations peacekeeping operation for Chad and the Central African Republic that would focus on both protecting civilians and also deterring cross-border attacks.

We believe that the presence of such a mission, and particularly the execution of its civilian protection and monitoring mission, would lead to a reduction in violence. Our focus on a U.N. mission also underscores our commitment to work multilaterally and with key Western and African partners as we try to address the situations in Chad and CAR.
With respect to the proposed U.N. military or police peacekeeping operation, we have consistently encouraged the Chadians to accept such a mission, and we were disappointed by the Chadian Government’s recent indications of concern over the military component of the proposed mission and specifically the deployment of an advance mission. We are continuing to engage President Deby to convince him to accept a military force as part of this package.

We have also consulted with other key allies and influential players, including France, the United Kingdom, NATO partners, and others about how to obtain Chadian acceptance for the peacekeeping operation, and we’re going to continue to work with both our African and our Western partners on this issue.

With respect to the Central African Republic, President Bozize has already announced his willingness to accept a robust peacekeeping force in northeastern Chad. With respect to this force, we are committed to generating the most robust force possible for the operation, and we have already approached several governments with requests for troop contributions.

We recognize, however, that with already some 100,000 international peacekeeping troops currently deployed worldwide, that force generation for the Chad/CAR mission is going to be a challenge. Therefore, if it becomes necessary, we are willing to consider alternative options, including those that might involve a slight decrease in the number of troops in exchange for greater logistical support and equipment, including helicopters, that would keep the force agile and still muscular.

So the core of our focus now in terms of the regional stability element of our policy is proceeding with the deployment of this peacekeeping operation. A second key element of our policy is promotion of democracy and good governance. This is obviously, and as you indicated, Senator, in your opening remarks, inextricably linked to the stability questions because we recognize that poor governance is a major cause of Chadian instability.

Consequently, we have emphasized the importance of democratic reform, respect for human rights, dialog, and transparent governance in our communications with Chadian officials at all levels. This message has been delivered directly by Secretary Rice to President Deby in writing. It’s delivered on a near-daily basis in our working level interactions with Chadian officials in N’Djamena and in our contacts with their diplomatic representation here. We have also consulted with our European Union, French, and U.N. colleagues on their programs to reform the electoral process, and we look forward to funding a census project that would complement their efforts.

Overall, our human rights and democracy policy in Chad has focused on strengthening the institutions that are necessary for stable democracy, such as effective civil society and a free, fair, and professional press. Among other programs and activities designed to protect human rights, the United States supports legal assistance for victims of human rights abuses through local human rights NGOs.

With regard to good governance, including transparent collection and expenditure of the government’s oil revenues, the Treasury Department has provided technical assistance to Chad’s oil revenue
management oversight body, and we continue to urge the Chadian Government to live up to its commitment to spend 70 percent of its budget on priority sectors for poverty reduction.

Another program that has cross-cutting regional stability and democratization impact is the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership. This is an interagency initiative in which Chad participates, through which we seek not only to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities and enhance cooperation among the region’s security forces, but also to promote democratic governance as a means to discredit terrorist ideology.

Turning to the CAR and its governance challenges, poor governance here also is at the heart of instability in CAR, and as in Chad, we engage regularly with Central African Republic officials about the need for democratic reform, increased respect for human rights, and good governance. We are encouraged by the CAR’s upcoming political dialog under the auspices of the Central African Republic’s Council of Wise Men, a group of respected officials tasked with mediating Central African Republic’s political disputes.

Our efforts overall to support democracy and human rights in the Central African Republic have focused on strengthening the free media and the Parliament, which is composed largely of inexperienced legislators and remains susceptible to executive branch pressure.

Let me turn now to the third key element of our policy, in addition to regional stability and democracy governance, and that is responding to the humanitarian situation. The United Nations estimates there are some 230,000 Sudanese refugees in Chad, 20,000 Chadian refugees in Darfur/Sudan, and 50,000 Central African Republic refugees in southern Chad. In addition to that, there are up to approximately 110,000 internally displaced persons in eastern Chad, and their numbers have doubled in the last 5 months, and many of them have suffered secondary displacement after their initial displacement.

With respect to the CAR the United States estimates that a total of some 280,000 Central Africans have been displaced, most of these, some 212,000, internally displaced, but some 20,000 refugees in Cameroon, and again the 50,000 refugees now in southern Chad.

We too are very much concerned with an issue that you raised, that is, the shrinking humanitarian space for aid workers, attacks on civilians are widespread in both Chad and the Central African Republic, and we have had repeated opportunities to hear from humanitarian organizations of the difficulties that they are having operating, particularly in the Chadian environment.

With respect to what the United States is doing on the humanitarian front, again I would first of all stress the essential nature of improved security to providing humanitarian relief to these populations. This is why again we believe that deployment of this peacekeeping operation will be critical not only to providing for monitoring of the border, but also and most essentially to protection of civilians.

We continue to be the largest single humanitarian donor in the region. In Chad a concerted effort focused on Darfur refugees in the eastern part of the country in 2004 has brought conditions in what are now 12 refugee camps close to international humanitarian
standards, despite extremely difficult logistical challenges in these areas. However, the assistance provided to some other refugee and displaced populations have not been as significant as that provided to these 12 camps.

Overall, our humanitarian funding in fiscal year 2006 for Chad was approximately $74 million, and among the largest shares of this total were $45 million in support for refugee and IDP camps and some $24 million in emergency food assistance.

In fiscal year 2006 in Central African Republic, the assistance in the humanitarian sector was approximately $900,000. We expect these numbers to increase significantly in fiscal year 2007. We are also very much encouraged that a number of international humanitarian organizations, nongovernmental organizations, have begun returning to Central African Republic and beginning to establish programs there.

To look ahead at what we may be able to do additionally on the humanitarian side, in January and February of this year assessment teams from USAID traveled to conflict-affected areas in both Chad and CAR to assess conditions for IDPs, analyze humanitarian capacity, and determine potential program areas. These teams have made a number of recommendations about how to improve humanitarian assistance, including through improved donor coordination, prepositioning of essential relief supplies, expanding emergency water and sanitation interventions, and bolstering food aid programs, and we are now in the process of determining how to move ahead in using available resources to implement these recommendations.

So, to conclude, the United States is committed to doing our full part to protect civilians in Chad and the Central African Republic and to mitigating factors that are related to regional instability. Both the proximate and the institutional causes of instability are complex, and are going to require that we work closely with the rest of the international community as well as with the governments of Chad and CAR themselves.

I also would like to let you know that I personally will be traveling to CAR and Chad beginning next week, March 27 to April 2, and I look forward to following up directly on the issues that have been raised in this hearing and concerns that are presented by you, Senator, or by other panelists who present later today.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Swan follows:]
Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), like many of their neighbors, have a long history of instability and war that can be attributed to a combination of domestic and regional factors. Neither country has a record of good governance, rule of law, or democracy, making both vulnerable to external interference and limiting options for peaceful resolution of internal problems. Over time, each has both generated and hosted substantial numbers of refugees, including from each other.

The United States priorities in Chad and CAR include limiting the regional impact of the Darfur conflict, fostering stability, protecting civilians, refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and humanitarian workers, and furthering transformational diplomacy by promoting political reform and good governance.

Since achieving independence in 1960, Chad has been subject to several power struggles. The country suffered through an almost continuous civil war from 1965 to 1993, when current President Déby initiated a national reconciliation process. The current rebel movements, including the United Front for Change (FUC), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), and the Rally of Democratic Forces (RAFD) gained strength in late 2005 and 2006, in part due to defections of high-ranking civil and military officers, including members of Déby’s ethnic group. Many of these groups appear to enjoy support from the Government of Sudan. In recent months, Chad has also experienced a rise in intercommunal violence that is not directly related to the rebellion. However, the various causes of insecurity tend to become mutually reinforcing—something of a “perfect storm” of violence.

CAR also has a history of violence and unrest. It has experienced four coups, additional failed coup attempts, and many years of undemocratic rule since its independence in 1960. Rebels, including some members of the political opposition, emerged in the northwestern part of the country in late 2005. Still other groups with alleged links to Sudan took over four northeastern towns in October and November 2006. After being defeated by government forces with French support, the northeastern rebels attacked again in early March 2007, but were quickly pushed back.

The recent increase in violence in Chad has endangered the lives of civilians, who are subject to attack by rebel groups, government forces, and ethnic militias, and has reduced the number of secure humanitarian corridors. As a result, international and nongovernmental organizations (IOs and NGOs) have cut staff by approximately 50 percent, limiting the ability of NGOs to provide non life-saving support activities, such as education, in refugee camps and to IDPs. At present staffing levels, the humanitarian community would be hard-pressed to accommodate new IDP populations or new refugee inflows from Darfur. In CAR, which up until recently has not garnered much international attention, insecurity has limited the ability of humanitarian groups to travel to parts of the northwest and northeast in order to assess needs. Recent travelers to the region describe a grave humanitarian crisis.

**FACTORS AFFECTING STABILITY**

Deficiencies in democracy, good governance, and the rule of law have contributed greatly to instability in Chad. The country’s history of recurrent conflict has weakened the rule of law and undermined peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms. As a result, Chad is ill-equipped to remain immune to spillover from regional conflicts. Chad and Sudan have a complex relationship in which national loyalties are often subordinate to tribal or clan loyalties or the competition for resources. In eastern Chad and in western Sudan, which were once part of the same “kingdom,” limited access to water and arable land leads to conflicts between pastoralists and agriculturalists on both sides of the border. Familial and ethnic ties can exacerbate economic tensions.

Chadian rebels have a long history of using Sudan as a base for attacks into Chad, sometimes with Sudanese Government complicity. Both Chadian President Déby and his predecessor, Hissene Habré, assumed power through military campaigns based in Sudan, thus establishing enduring connections with Sudanese actors. President Déby continues to accuse the Government of Sudan of providing support to Chadian rebels.

Tribal loyalty appears to be at the heart of Chadian support for Sudanese rebel groups, including those that have not signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. President Déby and many members of the Chadian elite belong to the Zaghawa tribe, which dominates some Darfur rebel groups, including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). This loyalty appears to work both ways, with JEM elements reportedly fighting alongside the Chadian military (ANT) against Chadian rebels.

Interethnic fighting, which is indirectly related to the rebel activity, has increased considerably as well in eastern Chad. Communal tensions have grown in recent
years due to conflict over land and natural resources, particularly water, in an area of environmental extremes. This rise in communal tensions, coupled with a security vacuum (due to the Chadian military’s engagement with the Chadian rebels), has left local populations vulnerable to attacks by ethnic militias that engage in violence to settle scores, loot villages, and raid cattle and livestock. Some of the violence is perpetrated by Sudanese Janjaweed, but most seems to be conducted by Chadian Arabs. In response, several ethnic groups have formed self-defense militias, leading to a proliferation of weapons and exacerbating the cycle of violence. Even the security and neutrality of refugee camps risk being compromised.

In Central African Republic, threats to stability include domestic factors such as a weak central government, widespread impunity amongst the country’s armed forces, and several rebel movements, including the Popular Army for the Reconstruction of the Republic and Democracy (APRD), which operates in the northwestern part of the country, and the Union of Democratic Forces for Rally (UFDR), which has conducted attacks in the northeast.

CAR President Bozize, who resided in Chad while in exile, has strong links to Chadian President Deby, who provides Bozize with armed guards and significant support. Throughout CAR, it appears that the country’s rebels are linked with their Chadian counterparts. The rebels and general population in northwestern CAR do not appear to have direct ties to Sudan, while the population in northeastern CAR does have ethnic, familial, and commercial links to the Sudanese population residing across the border. While there is no irrefutable evidence that northeastern CAR rebels enjoy support from the Sudanese Government, there are reports that these rebels have operated out of, and been supplied through, Sudan, and President Bozize accuses the Government of Sudan of fueling instability in CAR. Furthermore, Chadian rebels have traversed northern CAR to attack N’djamena from bases in Sudan, and may do so again in the future. Most of CAR’s territory is ungoverned space, which makes it extremely unstable and, therefore, attractive to rebel groups looking for either refuge or unobserved transit points. For example, there are reports that the Lord’s Resistance Army is planning on shifting its operations to CAR, especially if it is forced out of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

**U.S. Government Efforts to Promote Stability**

The U.S. Government has taken a holistic approach to address stability and security in Chad and CAR, one that takes into account both regional and domestic dynamics. We have publicly and privately supported a robust United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operation in Chad and CAR that will focus on both protecting civilians and deterring cross-border attacks. While the proposed mission will not have an express mandate to secure the Chad-Sudan and CAR-Sudan borders, we believe that its presence and execution of its civilian protection and monitoring mission will lead to a reduction in violence.

We have consistently encouraged the Chadians to accept a robust military mission and were disappointed by the Chadian Government’s recent rejection of the military component of the proposed mission and the deployment of the advance mission. We will continue to engage with President Deby to convince him to accept a military force. We have also consulted with other allies, including France, the United Kingdom, NATO partners, and others about how to obtain Chadian acquiescence to the operation and will continue to work with both our African and non-African partners on this issue. President Bozize has announced his readiness to accept a robust peacekeeping force in northeastern CAR.

We are committed to generating the most robust force possible for the operation and have approached several governments with requests for contributions. We understand, however, that with approximately 100,000 international peacekeeping troops currently deployed worldwide, force generation for the Chad-CAR mission will be a challenge. Therefore, if necessary, we will urge the Security Council to consider options that may decrease the number of troops in exchange for greater logistical support or equipment, such as helicopters, that will keep the force agile and robust.

There have been a number of efforts, both bilateral and based on third parties in the region, to either police the Chad-Sudan border or to commit Presidents Deby and Bashir to avoid interference in the other’s country. None of these have borne fruit, and our position remains that U.N. peacekeeping forces in Darfur, eastern Chad, and northeastern CAR remain essential. We will continue to monitor these alternative efforts, however, and may find opportunities to support them as complements to U.N. efforts.

To address concerns that the force has been dispatched to bolster unpopular regimes or could be viewed as belligerent by local populations and rebels, we antici-
pate developing a public diplomacy campaign to explain to the Chadian and Central African people our goals of protecting civilians and promoting regional stability.

The United States has repeatedly condemned efforts by Chadian rebels to take power by force and urges both Sudan and Chad not to engage in support for rebels in the other country.

Because we recognize that poor governance is a major cause of Chadian instability, we have emphasized the importance of democratic reform, respect for human rights, dialogue, and transparent governance in our communications with Chadian officials. This message has been delivered at every level, from Secretary Rice to President Deby down to our working-level interactions. We have consulted with our European Union, French, and U.N. colleagues on their programs to reform the electoral process, and intend to fund a census project to complement their efforts. We have also encouraged President Deby to consider how best to ensure a peaceful and democratic handover of power when his current term of office expires in 2011. In addition, our human rights policy in Chad has focused on strengthening the institutions necessary for a stable democracy such as civil society and a free, fair, and professional press. Among other programs and activities designed to protect human rights, the United States supports legal assistance for victims of human rights abuses through local human rights NGOs.

Good governance includes the transparent collection and expenditure of the government’s oil revenues, and to this end, the Treasury Department has provided technical assistance to Chad’s oil revenue management oversight body. We continue to encourage the Chadian Government to fight corruption, spend its revenues transparently, and to implement poverty reduction programs as recommended by the International Financial Institutions. We have also urged the Chadian Government to live up to its commitment to spend 70 percent of its budget on priority sectors for poverty reduction. Fulfillment of these conditions is the key to unlocking substantial debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country and G–8 (Multilateral Debt Relief0 Initiatives.

Under the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), an interagency initiative to which Chad belongs, the United States seeks not only to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities and enhance cooperation among the region’s security forces, but also to promote democratic governance as a means to discredit terrorist ideology. TSCTP activities, which include strengthening of local governments, conflict management, and small scale infrastructure projects in targeted regions, not only help deter terrorism, but also promote domestic stability. In fiscal year (FY) 2006, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) development assistance for Chad totaled $1.35 million. The Department of Defense contributed another $501,000 in humanitarian assistance activities in the education and water sectors.

As in Chad, poor governance is at the heart of instability in CAR. As in Chad, we engage regularly with CAR officials about the need for democratic reform, increased respect for human rights, and good governance. We support CAR’s upcoming political dialogue under the auspices of the CAR’s Council of Wise Men, a group of respected officials tasked with mediating CAR’s political disputes. U.S. efforts to support democracy and human rights in the CAR have focused on strengthening the media and the Parliament, which is composed of largely inexperienced legislators and remains susceptible to pressure from the executive branch, as well as on providing voter education.

In international fora, the United States has announced its support for the mandates of the U.N. Peace-Building Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) and of the Multinational Force of the Central African Monetary and Economic Community (also known as FOMUC) in order to promote stability in CAR. Both BONUCA and FOMUC, while constrained by their small sizes and budgets, have contributed considerably to the pursuit of peace in CAR.

Our military training (IMET) programs in Chad and CAR, which are vital to promote long-term institutional military reform were funded at $342,000 in FY 2006 for Chad, and at $105,000 in FY 2006 for CAR. The IMET program focuses on security sector reform, professionalization of the military, and civil-military relations with the goal of providing better security for the people of both countries. Our Chad military assistance is coupled with a demining program, intended to make more of Chad’s arable land available to the population, which concluded earlier this year.

Force professionalization is badly needed in CAR, particularly in the northwest where members of the military and presidential guard, in addition to the rebels, commit human rights violations with impunity and therefore contribute greatly to instability. We also support responsible forest management and good governance through the Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE). Because CARPE divides its budget based on transborder biodiversity landscapes in-
stead of countries, we don’t have an exact estimate of CARPE funding for CAR, however, we estimate that CAR receives several hundred thousand dollars as part of the program and that CARPE represents our greatest nonemergency assistance to CAR.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

The United Nations estimates that there are 230,000 Sudanese refugees in Chad, 20,000 Chadian refugees in Darfur, and 50,000 CAR refugees in southern Chad. There are up to 110,000 IDPs in eastern Chad; their numbers have doubled in the last 5 months and they have suffered secondary displacement. The United Nations estimates that approximately 280,000 Central Africans are displaced, of whom 212,000 are IDPs, 20,000 are refugees in Cameroon, and the remaining are refugees in southern Chad. The majority of these refugees are from the northwestern part of the country.

Attacks on civilians are widespread in both Chad and CAR and have left thousands of civilians without livelihood, shelter, or food. Scorched earth tactics are becoming common. Because of limited staff and insecure humanitarian corridors, providing services to civilians has become increasingly difficult.

There are fewer reports of interethnic violence in CAR, though it should be noted that the northeast part of the country is ethnically distinct and geographically cut off from the rest of the country. The bulk of attacks on civilians seem to occur in the northwest part of the country, and perpetrators include the CAR military, presidential guard, military deserters, bandits, and rebel groups.

U.S. EFFORTS TO ADDRESS HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

Security is the sine qua non for humanitarian access and adequate response to the protection and assistance needs of civilian populations, including refugees and IDPs. The international peacekeeping force envisioned for Chad and CAR will have the protection of civilians, including by use of force if necessary, as its primary mandate. As discussed above, the United States is actively engaged to make this force a reality.

The United States has continued to facilitate the work of human rights organizations and NGOs working to protect refugees in Chad. Through regular meetings with high-level officials in Chad and the CAR, we also continue to raise concerns about the deteriorating security situation and human rights abuses committed by government security forces, particularly abuses against the displaced and other vulnerable populations.

The USG is the largest single humanitarian donor in the region. A concerted focus on the Darfur refugees in eastern Chad starting in 2004 brought conditions in what are now 12 camps close to international humanitarian standards under extremely difficult logistical conditions in a large area where finding water has been very challenging. The gains of the last 2 years are threatened by the current instability. The CAR refugees in southern Chad have not received the same level of international support. Only within the past year have the needs inside the CAR begun to gain necessary international attention.

Humanitarian funding for FY 2006 for Chad included $4 million for emergency supplies, relief commodities, programs to address food insecurity, water and sanitation programs, income generation activities, and nutrition assessments for Chadians affected by the presence of refugees and for IDPs; $23.8 million in emergency food assistance (in addition to the $2.7 million in nonemergency food assistance that we provide), $610,000 for humanitarian radio programs, and $45 million to support refugee and IDP camps and programs and to provide security for the refugee camps.

Humanitarian funding for FY 2006 for CAR includes $565,000 in emergency food assistance and $350,000 for programs to respond to the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) supplemental 2006 appeal for conflict victims. PRM support for ICRC and UNHCR programs in Africa will have also benefited those in CAR.

We expect these numbers to increase significantly in FY 2007.

In January and February of 2007, assessment teams from USAID traveled to conflict-affected areas in Chad and CAR to assess conditions for IDPs, analyze humanitarian capacity, and determine potential program areas. The teams made several recommendations on how to improve humanitarian assistance, including increasing donor coordination with other bilateral and multilateral donors, prepositioning essential relief stocks, expanding emergency water and sanitation interventions, and bolstering food aid programs. We are now determining how best to utilize available resources to implement these recommendations.

The United States is committed to doing our full part to protect civilians in Chad and the Central African Republic and to mitigating factors leading to regional insta-
bility. There are no easy solutions. Both the proximate and institutional causes of instability are complex and require that we consult closely with the rest of the international community as well as the governments of Chad and CAR, which we have committed to do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for your interest and for giving me the opportunity to brief you on this very important matter.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Swan, very much for your testimony and your interest in this area. My office and I will be very interested in your further input and will be very engaged in this.

Let me ask you some questions. I noted when I was in Chad in January 2005, the rather small United States Government presence in Chad, and I understand our presence is similarly limited in the Central African Republic. What is the size and nature of the United States Government presence in Chad and the CAR at this point?

Mr. SWAN. Both are relatively small missions, Senator. I don’t have the exact numbers of staff for those missions. I know that in the case of Central African Republic I believe it’s around five people that we have there.

We have recently assigned a new political economic reporting officer to the Central African Republic mission, to our mission in the Central African Republic, and we are looking forward to some additional coverage of developments in the country on that basis. We also are looking to expand somewhat the size of that operation during the course of this summer with additional staff who will be arriving at post.

With respect to Chad, I do not know the exact numbers of our staff there. It is significantly higher than the numbers for the Central African Republic, and staff has, in fact, been supplemented by some additional personnel who have been sent on a temporary duty basis to ensure that we have additional coverage that’s necessary.

Senator FEINGOLD. Do you know how many additional people have joined that mission?

Mr. SWAN. I don’t know exactly, but we can certainly get that precise figure for you, Senator.

Senator FEINGOLD. And I take it the addition of the person in the Central African Republic and the additional staff in Chad relate to the deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions, or were there other reasons for this scaling up of U.S. personnel?

Mr. SWAN. It’s about all of our interests, obviously, in those two countries, but certainly, as I have mentioned, the importance of the humanitarian situation will mean that we’re going to want to have as close coverage of those issues as we can.

I would like to add, if I might, Senator——

Senator FEINGOLD. Yes; I would like you to follow up with the specifics on Chad if you——

Mr. SWAN. Yes; I will be happy to. And in specific, with respect specifically to the humanitarian situation, two very experienced humanitarian assessment teams were dispatched to Chad in January, and then to Central African Republic in February, including some of our senior Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance personnel with tremendous experience in the region. So while we have quite small missions in these two countries, we are looking for opportunities to bolster their capability with other assessment teams as needed.
Senator FEINGOLD. You started talking about the funding levels. I wonder if you could go over again the levels of United States assistance to eastern Chad and the CAR, and relative to the resources allocated to Darfur.

Mr. SWAN. For fiscal year 2006, on the humanitarian side, specifically with respect to Chad the total is approximately $74 million. This includes $4 million—this was for fiscal year 2006—$4 million for emergency supplies, relief commodities, and programs to address food and security; approximately $24 million in emergency food assistance; $610,000 for humanitarian radio programs; and $45 million to support refugee and IDP camps.

In CAR the figure was $565,000 in emergency food assistance and $350,000 for programming through the International Committee of the Red Cross. We believe that the totals are, in fact, somewhat higher than that because there are some regional programs funded through the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration that would likely benefit CAR as well, but we are not able to break that out, specifically, to know the exact figures for CAR, but it would probably be slightly higher than the amount I just cited.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, what's the Darfur number?

Mr. SWAN. I do not know the total Darfur number. We have—I know that Special Envoy Natsios has repeatedly indicated a total figure of—I believe it's $2.7 billion.

Senator FEINGOLD. In the last 2 years.

Mr. SWAN. That's correct, 2005 and 2006.

Senator FEINGOLD. How do you explain this enormous disparity in U.S. assistance between these three troubled areas?

Mr. SWAN. I think that, in part, it is a reflection of the horrific humanitarian tragedy in Darfur, including the perhaps hundreds of thousands of people killed in that conflict, that has, of course, led to a heavy focus of attention on that region and on that area.

With respect to Chad and CAR, certainly in terms of responding to the humanitarian situation and indeed in terms of our presence in general in the Central African Republic, this is a country that's gone through many years of instability. There has been a small international presence there for a number of years. And so I think we are at a point, in the aftermath of the 2005 elections, of beginning now to reestablish a more normal relationship in terms of our presence, both on a bilateral level but also in terms of our response to the humanitarian situation.

Senator FEINGOLD. I would just suggest that this kind of disparity was, at least, understandable before people understood the interrelationship between the situation in Sudan and Darfur and the Central African Republic and Chad, but it really can't be justified at this point.

When I went to see the refugees, we went to Chad, and I understand there's an emphasis on Darfur refugees and IDPs, while displaced Chadians receive far less attention and assistance. As I said in my opening statement, the national boundaries really don't matter here. So this is the point of this hearing: To try to develop a comprehensive approach to addressing this regional challenge, and our funding will have to begin to reflect that.
What other countries have been the major providers of assistance to Chad and the CAR, and what kind of support are they sending?

Mr. SWAN. The European Union is an important provider to both of those countries. I don’t know, specifically, what their programs involve. And of course both have close relationships with France and have been historic bilateral partners of the French.

Senator FEINGOLD. What role do you foresee the United States playing in motivating, facilitating, and/or enforcing the peace processes that are going to have to take place within each of these countries?

Mr. SWAN. We already maintain a very active program of outreach to political opposition groups, civil society organizations, and others in both the Central African Republic and Chad, in terms of trying to encourage greater dialog and contacts between the government and between opposition figures.

I’ve spoken over the past couple of days with both our Chargé in Bangui and also our Ambassador in N’Djamena. And in N’Djamena I know that our Ambassador is convening frequently informal meetings that bring together Chadian Government officials, opposition figures, to stress the need for a more active reconciliation process, and we would certainly continue to do that.

Senator FEINGOLD. That’s what we’re doing now, but what do you foresee as our future role? Are we going to be the primary facilitators of this? Are we going to be doing it in conjunction with others? How do you foresee the peace process unfolding?

Mr. SWAN. I think we will be doing it in conjunction with others, as I indicated.

Senator FEINGOLD. And those others in particular would be?

Mr. SWAN. I think we would be looking at certainly the U.N. officials. There is already the U.N. office in the Central African Republic that convenes regular meetings with both other members of the diplomatic community and figures within the Central African Republic leadership, in terms of trying to encourage greater dialog, and I think we would want to continue to work with that. If there is a——

Senator FEINGOLD. What about external from the region?

Mr. SWAN. Yes, indeed——

Senator FEINGOLD. What other countries would be involved?

Mr. SWAN. Well, I think we would want to again work with our European Union partners, and the French, of course, play a critical role in both these countries, and it will be important to ensure that we are on a similar wave length in terms of how to proceed.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. What’s your analysis of the root causes driving these homegrown insurgencies in both Chad and the Central African Republic?

Mr. SWAN. These are countries that have a long history of instability. This is not a new phenomenon in these countries. Neither Chad nor the Central African Republic has an established history of rotation in office through democratic change.

Fundamentally, these are deeply insecure and undeveloped countries in terms of their levels of food insecurity, in terms of physical insecurity of their populations. They are plagued by poor governance, and as a consequence, key elements of their populations feel that they are not receiving benefits from the central government.
They feel they’re not receiving, particularly in the case of Chad, the wealth that is emerging from their oil sector. And as a consequence some of these groups have begun to take up arms against the leadership elements in these countries.

Certainly in the case of Chad there is also a significant ethnic element to this, inasmuch as you have some splits within President Deby’s own Zaghawa community, with certain elements even within his own family challenging him for leadership and power positions within the country. But in addition to that you have other groups that also believe that they are being marginalized by the current leadership, and that as a consequence they need to assert through force of arms their political interests.

Senator Feingold. I don’t know if this is historically accurate, but the sense I got in January 2005 was that these external problems, particularly coming over from Sudan and Darfur, were perhaps heightening the intensity of the insurgency. Is that accurate, or is that just an impression I have?

Mr. Swan. Yes; I think your impression is absolutely correct, Mr. Chairman, that there are both internal factors and external factors. The internal factors range, frankly, from traditional intercommunal conflict, oftentimes pitting herders against cultivators in these resource-strapped areas of particularly eastern Chad. But in addition to that, you have politically motivated domestic rebel groups whose interests are primarily to challenge President Deby for power in N’Djamena.

But they are indeed benefiting from certainly refuge in Sudan, and I think there are strong indications that some of these groups have also received direct assistance in terms of their activities and their military activities in Chad.

I would point out, if I might, sir, that this is a historical pattern in Chad. Both President Deby and his predecessor, Hissene Habre, took power in N’Djamena based on an internal rebellion they developed that benefited extensively from safe haven and support within Sudan, so there’s a certain repetition of history here. But it’s a volatile cocktail that includes——

Senator Feingold. I’m pleased you brought out the external aspect as well, because I think that’s an important part of the story.

The Feingold-Sununu resolution also calls for the appointment of a U.N. regional envoy charged with overseeing and coordinating humanitarian access and assistance in Darfur, eastern Chad, and the northern Central African Republic. Does the administration support the appointment of such an envoy? And what steps is the administration taking, or will it take, to support such an appointment?

Mr. Swan. We are at a stage now, with respect to the upcoming peacekeeping operation for eastern Chad, of consulting with our Security Council partners. Obviously, a portion of that peacekeeping operation is going to involve protection of civilians. It’s going to involve support to humanitarian organizations to improve and ensure humanitarian corridors.

So I think we will be looking at the issue of any new envoys or new individuals who would be playing a regional role in the context of looking at both that peacekeeping operation and, obviously, the ongoing discussion with respect to an operation for Darfur. But I
can't tell you today that we would specifically support or not support the creation of such an envoy.

Senator FEINGOLD. I would ask you to put that as high on your agenda as you can, to give me an idea of what your position is on it. I do appreciate your testimony today, Mr. Swan. Thank you.

Mr. SWAN. Thank you very much.

Senator FEINGOLD. I'd like to ask the other panel to come forward.

Thank you for coming up. I welcome the second panel, and we'll begin with Mr. Bacon.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH H. BACON, PRESIDENT, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BACON. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. I want to thank you and Senator Sununu and the subcommittee for holding this important and timely hearing. The central African region where the borders of Chad, Sudan, and the Central African Republic intersect is one of the poorest, least stable areas of the world, and as a result the area is filled with refugees and displaced people.

You are correct to see security and humanitarian challenges there in regional terms. I applaud the three-country focus of Senate Resolution 76, and I appreciate the call for greater U.S. leadership and international involvement in resolving the security, human rights, and humanitarian problems in the region.

My organization, Refugees International, has spent considerable time in these countries. In fact, two of my colleagues have just returned from Chad and the CAR, and I think they're going to meet with your staff later this week or early next week. Based on our time in the region, I want to summarize several points at the very beginning.

First, insecurity, poverty, political and ethnic tensions, and displacement are all interrelated, yet each country has different problems which must be addressed separately.

Second, the key to resolving the problems is political, not military. Even if the United States or other countries were prepared to commit troops, and we are not, or the United Nations could deploy large peacekeeping forces, troops would be no more than a palliative until the underlying political differences are resolved.

Third, as you pointed out, the humanitarian response has been very uneven. Huge resources are going to help the people in Darfur, with much less effective responses in the Central African Republic and Chad. Working bilaterally or through the United Nations, we need to fix this disparity by increasing aid to the Central African Republic and Chad. In fact, I believe that a relatively modest humanitarian investment in the Central African Republic now could forestall or avoid a much more costly emergency response later.

Perhaps the fastest way to appreciate the magnitude and complexity of the problems in the region is to look at the populations of refugees and displaced people. Mr. Swan touched on some of this. But while doing this I would also like to comment on the humanitarian responses to the displacement.
In Sudan, a 4-year civil war in Darfur, characterized by our Government as genocide, has displaced about 2.2 million people internally and driven 234,000 refugees to Chad. There has been a huge humanitarian operation in response to this, and it has been quite successful. But, sadly, that response is currently in danger. Stepped-up violence and harsh government treatment, ranging from harassment to attacks, even including the rape of humanitarian workers, are driving international staff from Darfur and complicating the delivery of food and supplies on which the population now depends.

In addition, there are some 14,000 refugees from Sudan in the Central African Republic. They went there during the 21-year civil war between north and south Sudan. That war, which displaced over 4 million south Sudanese, officially ended 2 years ago with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which was brokered by your former colleague, Senator John Danforth.

The Khartoum government has violated significant parts of the CPA already, with little or no public objection from the United States. We need to be resolute in pushing for the full implementation of that agreement. For south Sudan to fall back into conflict would be devastating for peace in the region, and a diplomatic setback for the United States.

Chad not only hosts 234,000 refugees from Darfur but also about 60,000 refugees from the Central African Republic. And in addition, as Mr. Swan pointed out, fighting in the eastern region has displaced about 120,000 Chadians, and that number has increased dramatically in the last half year.

Although the United Nations is working to improve humanitarian services for refugees from Darfur, aid for the internally displaced populations in eastern Chad has been completely inadequate. And I’ve submitted for the record a recent report from one of my colleagues on eastern Chad that goes into this in considerable detail.

In the Central African Republic, the number of people who have fled their homes to avoid fighting between government and rebel forces in the northwest corner of the country has reached 212,000, up more than fourfold in the last year. Government forces are responsible for much of the displacement. Just last week my colleagues visited a village in northwest Central African Republic that had been burned by government troops. I have also submitted that report for the record.

I congratulate the subcommittee for focusing on the CAR. The growing humanitarian crisis there has received very little attention. Partially as a result, the response of aid agencies has been slow and limited. Much more needs to be done. For example, a $10 million investment in seeds and tools now, a month or two before the rainy season, would enable displaced farmers to plant crops this season, reducing the risk of future starvation.

The porous borders of the three countries make it easy for refugees to move back and forth. The unmonitored borders also make it easy for militias and bandits to move at will, and they do, killing, stealing, destroying, and destabilizing.

Obviously, a U.N. force along the Chad-Darfur border would help protect civilians and stabilize the region, if the force had enough
manpower, enough mobility, and the proper mandate. According to recent reports, the President of Chad opposes such a force. The United Nations, working through France and other member-states, needs to put pressure on Chad to accept a U.N. force that can succeed in helping to protect people in a vast, unruly area.

Even though the key to ending strife and displacement in the region lies in reaching political settlements in each of the three countries, the border area needs to be secure. Senate Resolution 76 addresses the security force issue. Let me list several other things the United States should do, by country.

Sudan. There are three urgent challenges: Getting the government and rebel groups in Darfur to begin comprehensive, good-faith peace negotiations that will stop what President Bush and Congress correctly have called genocide. The second point: Maintaining the humanitarian operation, now the world’s largest, in Darfur with sufficient resources and security, and as I said, this is becoming increasingly difficult because of the actions of both the rebels and the government forces. And three: Bolstering and supplementing the current African Union force in Sudan so that it can provide greater protection to civilians, particularly the women, who risk rape every time they venture out of their camps.

Currently, the United States policy toward Sudan is failing. Sudanese and government-backed forces continue to attack civilians and humanitarian workers with impunity in Darfur, and some fear they may be preparing to do so in the south again as well.

For several years, United States efforts to change Sudanese behavior have been all talk and no action. That may be changing with the imposition of stiffer financial sanctions on Khartoum. Until it is clear to Sudan that it will pay a painful price for its state-sponsored death and displacement, the war will continue unabated.

Moving to Chad. An end to the war in Darfur would enable refugees to return home and reduce current cross-border attacks, alleviating some of the pressure on Chad. But intertribal attacks in eastern Chad and the fighting between rebel groups and the government would likely continue.

So far, the government has refused to begin good faith negotiations with rebel groups, some of whom are supported by Sudan. Until the sides can address their grievances, peace and stability will be elusive. France, which maintains troops in Chad and provides crucial support to the government, may be able to exert more pressure on all sides to start negotiations.

The second major issue in Chad today is the dearth of humanitarian services in the eastern area, where internal displacement is growing rapidly. In a report to the U.N. Security Council just last month, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon admitted that “direct assistance to internally displaced persons has thus far been insufficient.” Insufficient, he said. He praised the government for doing more to help internally displaced people in the area, but it’s clear that the United Nations needs to boost its presence and its programs in the region.

Finally, the Central African Republic. Despite growing displacement in the northwest region, there is not yet a humanitarian emergency there. Both the United Nations concludes that, I think...
our government concludes it, and my colleagues have concluded that. But conditions could turn dramatically worse if the fighting continues and the United Nations doesn’t begin to respond more effectively to growing humanitarian problems. As I mentioned earlier, quick support packages to farmers now could fend off a future emergency.

Actions, including the burning of houses, by government troops are responsible for much of the displacement. So there has to be more pressure on the government from donors to end such human rights abuses.

There also has to be greater international involvement in the peace process. Some of the issues are economic, and it’s possible that these could be resolved in the context of comprehensive peace negotiations.

Progress toward peace in the central African triangle of instability has not been and will not be easy. But the key to progress is increased engagement by the United Nations and by countries like the United States, France, India, and China, with an interest in stability in the region.

I want to thank you again for your interest in this and for the Senate resolution. My only specific comment on that resolution is, it focuses a lot on the peacekeeping force. I would like to see a greater focus also on political engagement and getting peace processes going in each of the countries.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bacon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH H. BACON, PRESIDENT, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL, WASHINGTON, DC

I want to thank Senator Feingold, Senator Sununu, and the subcommittee for holding this important and timely hearing. The central African region where the borders of Chad, Sudan, and the Central African Republic intersect is one of the poorest, least stable areas of the world. The region is filled with refugees and displaced people.

The subcommittee is correct to see security and humanitarian challenges there in regional terms. I applaud the three-country focus in Senate Resolution 76, and I appreciate the call by its sponsors, Senators Feingold, Sununu, and Levin, for greater U.S. leadership and international involvement in resolving the security, human rights, and humanitarian problems in the region.

Refugees International has spent considerable time in these three countries. Over the last year we have made two assessment missions to each country, and two of my colleagues have just returned from Chad and the Central African Republic. Based on our time in the region, I want to make several points, which I will summarize at the outset.

First, insecurity, poverty, political and ethnic tensions, and displacement are all interrelated, yet each country has different problems which must be addressed separately.

Second, the key to resolving the problems is political, not military. Even if the United States or other countries were prepared to commit troops—and we are not—or the United Nations could deploy large peacekeeping forces, troops would be no more than a palliative until the underlying political differences are resolved.

Third, the humanitarian response has been uneven. Huge resources are going to help the people in Darfur, with much less effective responses in the Central African Republic and Chad. Working bilaterally or through the United Nations, we need to fix this disparity by increasing aid to the CAR and Chad. In fact, a relatively modest humanitarian investment in the Central African Republic now could forestall or avoid a much more costly emergency response later.

Perhaps the fastest way to appreciate the magnitude and complexity of the problems in the region is to look at the populations of refugees and displaced people. While doing this, I will also comment on humanitarian responses to the displacement.
In Sudan, a 4-year civil war in Darfur, characterized by government-sponsored militia attacks on civilians, has displaced about 2.2 million people internally and driven 234,000 refugees into Chad. Now, because of increased fighting in eastern Chad, some Chadians are seeking refuge in Darfur, so the refugees are beginning to move both ways. The internally displaced population in Darfur is sustained by a huge international aid operation that has been so successful that the nutritional condition of camp residents is often better than the population as a whole. Sadly, that successful response is currently in danger. Stepped up violence and harsh government treatment—ranging from harassment to attacks—of aid workers is driving international staff from Darfur and complicating the delivery of food and supplies on which the population depends.

In addition, there are some 14,000 refugees from south Sudan in the Central African Republic. They went there during the 21-year civil war between north and south Sudan. That war, which displaced over 4 million south Sudanese, officially ended 2 years ago with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was brokered by your former colleague, John Danforth. While the focus of this hearing is mainly on the intersection of Darfur, Chad and the Central African Republic, it is important to keep an eye on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Khartoum government has violated significant parts of the CPA already, with little or no public objection from the United States. We need to be resolute and aggressive in pushing for full implementation of that important agreement. For south Sudan to fall back into conflict would be devastating for peace in the region and a diplomatic setback for the United States.

Chad, not only hosts the 234,000 thousand refugees from Darfur, but also about 60,000 refugees from the Central African Republic. In addition, fighting in eastern Chad—some tribal and some the depredations of militias from Darfur—has recently displaced about 120,000 Chadians. They are, essentially, internal refugees. Although the United Nations has worked hard to improve humanitarian services and security for the refugees from Darfur, aid for the internally displaced populations in eastern Chad has been completely inadequate. I would like to submit for the record a recent Refugees International assessment of conditions in eastern Chad.

In the Central African Republic, the number of people who have fled their homes to avoid fighting between government and rebel forces in the northwest corner of the country has reached 212,000, up more than four-fold in the last year. In addition, as I mentioned earlier, another 60,000 are seeking refuge in Chad. Government forces are responsible for much of the displacement. Just last week, my colleagues visited a village in northwest CAR that had been burned by government troops. I would also like to submit that report for the record.

I congratulate the subcommittee for focusing on the Central African Republic. The growing humanitarian crisis there has received very little attention. Partially as a result the response of aid agencies has been slow and limited. Much more needs to be done. For example, a $10 million investment in seeds and tools now, a month or two before the rainy season, would enable displaced farmers to plant crops this season, reducing the risk of future starvation.

The porous borders of the three countries make it easy for refugees to move back and forth. The unmonitored borders also make it easy for militias and bandits to move at will, and they do—killing, stealing, destroying, and destabilizing. Late last year, the then-Secretary General Kofi Annan gave this description to the U.N. Security Council: “The Darfur conflict has already spilled over into Chad with serious consequences for the country and beyond, while in the Central African Republic, the government asserts that Sudan is backing the rebels in the northeast. At the same time, it is clear that the northeast of the Central African Republic has been used by Chadian rebel groups as a route to bypass the Darfur-Chad border. . . . The porosity of the borders is attested to by the numerous reports of infiltrations, incursions and cross-border activities by tribal and Janjaweed militias, as well as the regular forces and rebels of each of the three countries, except the Central African Armed Forces.

Obviously, a U.N. force along the Chad-Darfur border could help protect civilians and stabilize the region—if the force had enough manpower, enough mobility, and the proper mandate. According to recent reports, the President of Chad opposes such a force, even though it would help protect his own people as well as refugees in Chad. The United Nations, working through member states, particularly France, needs to put pressure on Chad to accept a robust U.N. force that can succeed in helping to protect people in a vast, unruly area.

Even though the key to ending strife and displacement in the region lies in reaching political settlements in each of the three countries, the border area needs to be secure. Senate Resolution 76 addresses the security force issue. Let me just list several other things the United States should do, by country.
Sudan. There are three urgent challenges:

- Getting the government and the rebel groups in Darfur to begin comprehensive, good-faith negotiations toward a political settlement that will stop what President Bush and the Congress correctly have called genocide.
- Maintaining the humanitarian operation—now the world's largest in Darfur with sufficient resources and security.
- Bolstering and supplementing the current African Union force in Sudan so that it can provide greater protection to civilians—particularly the women who risk rape every time they venture out of the camps for the displaced.

Currently, the U.S. policy toward Sudan is failing. Sudanese and government-backed forces continue to attack civilians and humanitarian workers with impunity in Darfur, and, some fear, may be preparing to do so in south Sudan again as well. For several years, U.S. efforts to change Sudanese behavior have been all talk and no action. That may be changing with the imposition of stiffer financial sanctions on Khartoum. Until it is clear to Sudan that it will pay a painful price for its state-sponsored death and displacement, the war will continue unabated.

Chad. An end to the war in Darfur would enable refugees to return home and reduce current cross-border attacks, alleviating some of the pressure on Chad. But intertribal attacks in eastern Chad—and the fighting between rebel groups and the government would likely continue. So far the government has refused to begin good-faith negotiations with rebel groups, some of whom are supported by Sudan. Until the sides can address their grievances, peace and stability will be illusive. France, which maintains troops in Chad and provides crucial support to the government, may be able to exert more pressure on all sides to start negotiations.

The second major issue in Chad today is the dearth of humanitarian services in the eastern area, where internal displacement is growing rapidly. In a report to the U.N. Security Council last month, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon admitted that “direct assistance to internally displaced persons has thus far been insufficient.” He praised the government for doing more to help internally displaced people in the area, but it’s clear that the United Nations needs to boost its presence and its programs in the region.

Central African Republic. Despite growing displacement in the northwest region, where government and rebel forces are fighting, there is not yet a humanitarian emergency. But conditions could turn dramatically worse if the fighting continues and the United Nations doesn’t begin to respond more effectively to growing humanitarian problems. As I mentioned earlier, quick support packages to farmers now could help fend off a future emergency.

Actions, including the burning of houses, by government troops are responsible for much of the displacement, so there has to be more pressure on the government from donors to end such human rights abuses.

There also has to be greater international involvement in the peace process. Some of the issues are economic, and it’s possible that these could be resolved in the context of comprehensive negotiations.

Progress toward peace in the central African triangle of instability has not been and will not be easy, but the key to progress is increased engagement by the United Nations and by countries—like the United States, France, India, and China—with an interest in stability in the region.

REPORT FROM REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL BY RICK NEAL AND JOEL CHARNY

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: ARMY HOUSE BURNINGS CONTINUE IN TENSE NORTHWEST

On Sunday afternoon, March 11, Central African regular army troops burned at least 20 houses along a stretch of Regional Route 6 between Lia and Voh, approximately 30 kilometers south of Paoua in the tense northwest region of the country. Three civilians, including a baby, were killed in the crossfire and another one was seriously wounded in an encounter between the army and the rebel Armée Populaire pour la restauration de la république et la démocratie (APRD).

The violence belies assurances given to Refugees International by senior Central African military personnel that house burnings would cease under direct orders from the President and their commander in Bangui, the capital.

House burning, a tactic first used by the notorious Garde Présidentiel, has been rampant in the northwest as the Central African army, the FAC, confronts the APRD. On an extensive visit to the prefectures of Ouham and Ouham-Pendé, Refugees International confirmed that tens of burned villages remain empty, their residents having fled to safety in rough settlements in the scrub land near their fields.
Approximately 250,000 Central Africans have been displaced in successive waves of violence since 2003.

Eyewitnesses to the March 11 attacks told Refugees International that the violence started as a confrontation in Lia between a small contingent of rebels, who move easily among the population, and a Central African army contingent moving up to Paoua from Bangui as part of a normal troop rotation. During an exchange with the rebels, Central African soldiers began shooting indiscriminately, and two civilians were killed in the crossfire, with one other individual seriously wounded.

The FACA troops got down from their vehicles and began walking through the village, setting fire to two houses using lighters. Rural houses in the CAR almost all have thatch roofs, and in the dry season they burn in a matter of minutes when the thatch catches fire.

The troops then continued up the road through four additional villages, setting fire to more houses. In Leourou, a stray bullet killed a baby on its mother's back. The mother survived.

The rampage ended in Voh, where at least 10 houses were burned. Several civilians tried to shelter their bicycles and motorcycles in the church, but the soldiers removed them from the church and burned them.

Refugees International was able to visit Voh and assess the damage to the village. While the walls of the mud brick houses were no longer hot to the touch, up to three inches of fine ash remained in the burned houses, suggesting that the burning occurred recently. Metal cooking pots were randomly strewn among the ashes. The RI team also saw the charred remains of a bicycle and a motorbike. Further fighting along the road to Voh on March 14 prevented the RI team from going as far as Lia to assess the damage where the fighting started.

House burning is a clear violation of international humanitarian law, as it targets the assets of civilian noncombatants. It is an especially devastating tactic in Central Africa because poor villagers keep almost all their worldly possessions in their homes. When asked to cite their losses, the few residents of Voh who had not fled into the bush listed their stores of peanuts, corn, and cassava, as well as money, hand tools, plates, and other basic household items. They now face the coming planting season with virtually no resources.

House burning produces displacement by driving the occupants of the village into the fields to find shelter and escape the depredations of the FACA. But they have an additional ripple effect in neighboring villages, as people gather their belongings and head to the bush as a preventive measure. During its assessment of the northwest, RI saw many villages that were abandoned without any evidence of burning.

The house burnings are especially disturbing because under increasing international awareness and scrutiny, the Central African authorities maintained that they were prepared to reduce the harshness of their counter-insurgency tactics in the northwest. Two high-ranking Central African military officials based in the region had told RI unequivocally that house burnings were forbidden.

Just before learning of the incident, the RI team was having lunch in the market in Paoua and discussing the overall situation with local residents. They were aware that a new group of soldiers was rotating in, replacing the previous contingent that had been there for 18 months during some of the most extensive violence and attacks on civilians. They expressed optimism that the presence of new soldiers would represent a new era in relations between the FACA and residents of the region. These hopes appear to be misplaced.

Refugees International was unable to see the regional commander in Paoua to present its findings on this incident as he was out of the regional center. The commander must investigate this incident, discipline the perpetrators, and confirm the illegality of this tactic with the troops under his command.

International presence in Paoua is extremely thin, with only the International Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins sans Frontières, and COOPI, an Italian NGO, based in this important regional center with large numbers of people in distress. The absence of the United Nations in Paoua is painfully obvious. It is essential that the United Nations push forward with its previously announced plans to establish a U.N. regional office in Paoua, which would bring together key humanitarian response agencies of the U.N. system, including the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, the World Food Program, and the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Bacon, for that suggestion which we’ll take seriously, for your leadership on this issue, and for your testimony. We do appreciate it.
Now I'm pleased to turn to Mr. Prendergast, who has been before this committee many, many times. It's good to see you again.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, SENIOR ADVISOR, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. Prendergast. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, especially for the invite to dig a little deeper into what I think is the deadliest conflict cluster in the world today. And thank you, adding my thanks to Mr. Bacon's, for your ongoing commitment to these issues. Without you, and without a few of your colleagues, nothing. The pulse would simply be dead in Washington on these issues.

I would like to add just a couple of footnotes to what Mr. Bacon has said in his excellent testimony and provide a policy framework, a conceptual framework, for how we can move forward more effectively.

The dynamic between the three countries is multifaceted, but there are three drivers—since I think I'm the academic on the panel, so we always use "drivers" in our terminology—at the core of the violence.

The first driver is cross-border attacks sponsored by the Government of Sudan, using the Janjaweed, into southeastern Chad and across the border into the CAR. These forces have joined—these Janjaweed forces have joined forces with Chadian militias, as we know, and are pursuing the same scorched earth policies that lit up Darfur from 2003 to late 2004, pursuing those same policies in Chad against non-Arab villages. We've seen, of course, intercommunal fighting, interethnic fighting, as a result of this, which is precisely the intention of Khartoum's divide and destroy policy.

The second driver is cross-border support for insurgent groups. The Government of Sudan has openly admitted to supporting the Chadian rebels opposed to President Deby, and Deby is fairly transparent in his support for rebels going back across the border, the Darfurian rebels, into Darfur. The level of Sudanese support for rebels in the CAR, in the northeastern part of CAR, is less clear, but there are Sudanese fighters amongst their ranks, and some have actually received military training inside Sudan.

The third driver is noninclusive governance in all three countries. And to be more specific, we all know the Sudan case, but Chad and CAR, just to reinforce what both Mr. Swan and Mr. Bacon have said, each has an internal political crisis independent of all the violence that we are seeing emanating from Darfur. Both governments in Chad and CAR came to power militarily, they pay lip service to democracy, and they fail to provide basic services to their citizens.

Again reinforcing Mr. Bacon, there must be political solutions in Chad, Darfur, and CAR, but I think these solutions will require unraveling the cross-border nature of the conflicts and putting negotiations back within their domestic contexts.

In Darfur you've got disunity among the rebels, uncoordinated and infrequent international diplomacy, and a failure to effectively pressure the Government of Sudan—effectively pressure the Government of Sudan—which has led to this status quo which we've seen dragging on and on for the last year and a half now, unless the international community, led by the United States,
agrees on a plan, a much more robust plan of action, and pursues it aggressively.

In Chad you’ve got rampant corruption and mismanagement, causing wages to go unpaid for months. These are the kind of things you see in so many countries which are precursors to serious coup attempts. And we have seen the collapse of the few social services that had existed. In the absence of any international pressure—particularly from the French, which are sitting on the sidelines on these internal issues—on Deby’s government to crack down on corruption and really share power with rivals, the root causes of insurrection in Chad will simply continue unabated.

In the Central African Republic, divisive ethnic politics has been the norm, mixing with poverty and underdevelopment, a proliferation of small arms. I think Jim Swan called it a cocktail, a deadly cocktail. It’s a combustible mix. I think we’ve only seen the tip of the iceberg of conflict in the CAR. Neighboring countries will continue to exploit these structural weaknesses in CAR, and even the LRA, as you might have heard, has sent forces into CAR, a couple hundred of them recently, to explore whether that might be a better safe haven than the Garamba National Park has been for them for the last year in Congo. So we’ve got a serious problem, obviously, continuing to brew in the CAR.

Now, going straight to solutions. U.S. policy to contain and end, U.S. policy focused on ending this spiraling crisis I think needs to pursue a three-track policy. We call it the three Ps of crisis response: Peacemaking, protection, and punishment.

Very quickly in each one of them. Peacemaking is obvious. Your subcommittee, you and the ranking member particularly have been strong on solutions beginning with regional diplomacy, and that is absolutely correct. While U.S. diplomats like Deputy Assistant Secretary Swan and military officials and humanitarian assessment teams all have made trips to Chad and CAR in recent months, the level of U.S. engagement has to be expanded, I think exponentially, and coordinated much more multilaterally to achieve any headway in ending the violence.

The United States should establish a conflict resolution cell in the region that focuses not only on this conflict cluster but the other one, damaging one that involves the Congo and northern Uganda and Southern Sudan. And thankfully Mr. Bacon has brought up the implications of Darfur for Southern Sudan, which, of course, has cost five times as many lives as have been lost in Darfur during that war, so we have to keep an eye on that and do much more on that. So we think that, and we’re trying to put numbers together, how much would it really cost, and it isn’t that much, to deploy such a cell to really do the work that we need to do. We need to lead diplomatically in the region.

So that’s the peacemaking P. The second P is protection, and we’ve heard a lot about it. It’s what we’ve seen a lot of action on. Of course we’ve got to get those 20,000 forces into Darfur under their hybrid. Work is intensive, I think, internationally on that. But I think we need to look at a couple other things.

The first one is, we’ve got to more transparently begin to plan militarily for nonconsensual options for deploying a force to Darfur. And in the absence of that kind of nonconsensual planning, Khar-
toum is not going to take us seriously. We have to be seen to be moving forward on an agenda that would actually provide serious sticks if compliance is not forthcoming eventually. Yes; continue the diplomacy. Yes; ramp up the economic measures. But I think putting some work in NATO, and again transparently sending senior officials and generals to NATO to talk about these kinds of things, would actually send a message to Khartoum that would help affect calculations.

The third P—so we’ve got peacemaking, we’ve got protection—the third P is punishment, and this is really the key. If we’re going to get protection deployed to the region, if we’re going to have a chance of securing peace deals that will address the fundamentals of conflict in Darfur and Chad and CAR, there has got to be accountability.

We’ve got to start ramping up the tools that we have at our disposal, the financial and economic tools we have at our disposal, and those include—we know what they are—increased targeted sanctions. My understanding is, the Bush administration is going to announce three new people to be sanctioned within the Darfur context—three. There are so many officials that we know, we have reams of evidence, have been directly implicated in crimes against humanity.

These people at the very least should be prohibited from traveling internationally, and their accounts should be frozen. We can do that tomorrow if we want to, at no cost. There are other economic and financial instruments that we need to be ramping up, and there again has to be a demonstrable intent to upgrade and expand these measures if we’re going to have any chance of influencing the calculations of Khartoum and the regimes in the other two countries.

In some, as Deputy Assistant Secretary Swan already indicated, the United States does indeed have a holistic approach to dealing with these three things: Protection, peacemaking, and punishment. The problem is, the administration isn’t doing enough in each of these three policy baskets to really get a change in the situation on the ground. We need to ramp up our diplomatic involvement. We need to accelerate military planning for nonconsensual options. And we need to expand and implement the sticks that we already have at our disposal, to increase leverage for achieving our peace and protection objectives.

Hundreds of thousands of lives, in conclusion, hang in the balance in this subregion this year. I’ve been there six times now in the last 4 years, into Chad and across the border into rebel-held areas of Darfur. There’s no question, with the access eroding as rapidly as it is, we’re getting to a situation—genocide is bad enough. Adding famine to genocide, watch out. That’s when we really start to see mortality jump.

And you have more and more populations who are not receiving assistance, whose access has been restricted because of the actions of the militias out in the field and because of government’s, the Sudan’s restrictions of humanitarian access. We’re going to see famine in pockets and then expand, and then we’re going to see a real situation develop there that we don’t want to see.
If the United States, though, leads regional efforts, multilateral efforts to deal with this regional contagion whose primary cause is in the Presidential palace in Khartoum, then the escalating crisis can be reversed. And it’s going to require, I think, fairly aggressive advocacy on the part of this committee and citizen activists to get the attention of the Bush administration to actually do what’s necessary to end the crisis.

Thanks very much for the opportunity.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, SENIOR ADVISER TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Senator Sununu, and members of the subcommittee, for this opportunity to discuss the U.S. strategy for ending the crisis in Darfur which is now spilling over into Chad and the Central African Republic.

In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, my colleague Colin Thomas-Jensen and I argue that the interlocking conflicts in Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic (CAR) represent a conflict cluster that is tearing the region apart. The evidence for this assertion is clear. Violence in Darfur, eastern Chad, and CAR has escalated dramatically in recent months. Armed groups commit mass atrocities against civilian populations with grim regularity, and the increased displacement of civilians is stretching relief operations to the limit. Just yesterday (March 19, 2007), the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Darfur are almost at full capacity, and at least 700,000 conflict-affected civilians in Darfur are beyond the reach of relief agencies.

The dynamic between Sudan, Chad, and CAR is multifaceted, but there are three drivers at the core of the violence:

- Cross-border attacks against civilians in southeastern Chad by Sudan-backed Janjaweed militias—Sudanese Janjaweed have joined forces with Chadian militias and are pursuing the same scorched-earth policies against non-Arab villages as in Darfur. Intercommunal and interethnic fighting is then a product of this, which is precisely the intention of the Khartoum regime’s divide and destroy policy.
- Cross-border support for insurgent groups—The government of Sudan has openly admitted to supporting Chadian rebels opposed to President Idriss Deby in response to Deby’s fairly transparent support for rebels in Darfur. The level of Sudanese support for insurgents in northeastern CAR is less clear, but there are Sudanese fighters among their ranks and some have received military training inside Sudan.
- Noninclusive governance in Sudan, Chad, and CAR—Chad and CAR each has an internal political crisis independent of the violence emanating from Darfur. Both governments came to power militarily, pay lip-service to democracy, and fail to provide basic services to their citizens.

While this conflict is certainly a full blown regional crisis—fomented principally by the Sudanese Government—the fulcrum for conflict in the Chad basin remains Darfur. Without a political settlement and an effective peacekeeping force to protect civilians in Darfur, Chad, and CAR will continue to burn.

U.S. policy to contain and end this spiraling regional crisis must pursue a three-track approach following the “3Ps” of peacemaking, protection, and punishment.

- Peacemaking: Any solution must begin with aggressive regional diplomacy. While U.S. diplomats, military officials, and humanitarian assessment teams have made trips to Chad and CAR in recent months, the level of U.S. engagement must be increased exponentially and coordinated multilaterally to achieve any headway in ending the violence. The United States should establish a conflict resolution cell in the region staffed by full-time senior diplomats to work toward a comprehensive agreement to end violence in Darfur and political processes in Chad and CAR to address the lack of political inclusiveness that fuels internal unrest. Most important is striking a deal between the Sudanese regime and Darfur rebels, which will require much more sustained and concerted efforts by the United States and broader international community than is presently being expended.
**Protection:** The United Nations must work in close coordination with the African Union to line up the forces necessary to reach the 20,300 troops for Darfur agreed upon by the African Union, the United Nations, the Arab League, and international donor countries. The international community must also accelerate its planning and increase its preparedness for military action without Khartoum’s consent. Concurrently, the United Nations should deploy a peacekeeping force under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to protect civilians and relief operations in eastern Chad and CAR and to monitor and deter cross-border attacks and arms flows. This force must be closely linked to the peacekeeping operation in Darfur, as authorized by the Security Council in Resolution 1706. Troop generation will be a major problem, so the primary emphasis must remain on deploying the hybrid force with a protection mandate to Darfur.

**Punishment:** As the International Crisis Group has long argued, the Government of Sudan will continue to reject a durable peace deal and a robust peacekeeping force until the international community changes the cost-benefit analysis of the regime. The international community, with strong U.S. leadership, must alter the calculations of Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP—formerly the National Islamic Front (NIF)) by working multilaterally to impose punitive measures—such as targeted sanctions and economic pressures—against senior NCP officials and the companies they control. The United States must also share declassified intelligence with the International Criminal Court to help accelerate the preparation of indictments against more senior Sudanese regime officials implicated in the perpetration of mass atrocities.

The ENOUGH campaign, an initiative that Crisis Group has recently launched with the Center for American Progress, applies this 3P approach to crises in Darfur, northern Uganda, and Congo, and encourages activists to press this agenda with policymakers.

**CHAD AND SUDAN—BAD NEIGHBORS**

As the Darfur situation has deteriorated, hostilities between Chad and Sudan have increased. Chadian rebels and Janjaweed militias operating out of Sudan have launched increasingly frequent incursions into eastern Chad since October 2005. President Idriss Deby has blamed Khartoum for supporting these armed groups, declared a “state of belligerence” with Sudan and sought to strengthen his ties to the Darfuri rebels, who are spending increasing amounts of time in N’Djamena. Chad’s last two Presidents came to power in military campaigns launched from Darfur, so Deby has reason to watch his eastern border. But the Darfur crisis has also exacerbated Chad’s domestic political woes.

Over the 4 years of the Darfur conflict, Chad and its people have seen their humanitarian, economic, political, and security situations decline. The country shares many of the same political and cultural fault lines as Sudan—Arab/non-Arab, Christian/Muslim, farmer/nomad, north/south—and hosts many of the same tribes affected by the fighting in Darfur. Bilateral relations have gradually worsened since 2003.

Though President Deby historically enjoyed good relations with Khartoum, the heavy presence of his Zagha and tribesmen in the Darfur rebel groups placed him in a difficult situation. He initially tried to strike a balance by formally cooperating with Khartoum while turning a blind eye to Zagha within his army helped the two main rebel groups: The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The balance proved unsustainable, particularly as Deby came under fire from key constituents for not doing enough to support the Darfur rebels, and Chadian rebels organized inside Sudan. As Deby has strengthened his ties with the Darfur rebels, relations between the neighbors degenerated into proxy war.

The most obvious consequence of the Darfur war has been the influx of more than 220,000 refugees into eastern Chad and cross-border Janjaweed incursions that have displaced some 100,000 Chadians. I have traveled to eastern Chad and rebel-held areas of Darfur six times since 2003, and it is one of the poorest regions of one of the world’s poorest countries. Although many border region inhabitants are from the same tribes as the refugees, the latter receive more support and services than the internally displaced Chadians. Unlike Darfur, displaced Chadians are not congregating in large numbers and, therefore, difficult to assist. Relief workers on the ground have told us that they are struggling to cope with the growing numbers of displaced.

A second consequence has been an increase in insecurity in eastern Chad and a weakening of the army, which has lost both men and weapons to the Darfur rebels as well as to other armed groups in Darfur. JEM in particular recruited heavily
able to increasing attacks by rebel groups and the predations of the Janjaweed and consolidated its positions in main towns, leaving civilians in the countryside vulnerable to buying off the numerous internal threats to his regime. The Chadian military has established a Greater Zaghawa State over large swathes of Darfur, Chad, and Libya. The Zaghawa are responsible for the war in Darfur and suggesting their goal is to remove a summit in Tripoli on 10 February 2006 that brokered an accord between Presidents Deby and Bashir to halt support to each other’s rebels. Although the agreement laid the foundation for a peacekeeping force to monitor the border, neither side took the accord seriously. Bilateral relations worsened dramatically in the second half of 2005 as Khartoum welcomed all opponents of Deby, who dropped his veneer of neutrality to support the Zaghawa-based rebel groups in Darfur. Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party and its military and security structures appear determined to topple Deby’s regime and thereby weaken the Darfur rebels. A wave of defections of high-level Zaghawa, a spate of hit-and-run attacks by Sudan-backed rebels in eastern Chad, and an attack on an armory in N’djamena all occurred in the last 3 months of 2005.

The situation exploded in December 2005 when the Sudan-backed RDL (Rally for Democracy and Liberty), led by Khartoum’s hand-picked Chadian dissident Mahamat Nour, attacked the town of Adre. The core of the RDL included elements which had been fighting beside Khartoum-supported Arab militias in West Darfur, where the Chadian Arab presence is particularly high thanks to a history of displacement from Chad’s civil wars and Arab migration and settlement since the 1970s. With Sudanese support, Nour pulled together an array of smaller rebel groups under a larger umbrella called the FUCD (United Front for Democracy and Liberty). While other rebel groups included dissidents from the inner circles of power and Deby’s Zaghawa people who seek to distance themselves from Deby’s costly failures and to maintain their prominence in the country’s leadership, the FUCD appears determined to remove Zaghawa influence in Chad altogether.

The RDL was defeated badly at Adre, but even more embarrassing than the loss was the exposure of Khartoum’s direct involvement. Chad went public with its allegations reportedly because it had captured and killed Sudanese Army personnel. It is said to have presented the evidence to Libya, which led President Qaddafi to convene a summit in Tripoli on 10 February 2006 that brokered an accord between Presidents Deby and Bashir to halt support to each other’s rebels. Although the agreement laid the foundation for a peacekeeping force to monitor the border, neither side took the accord seriously.

In April 2006, FUC forces led an offensive against N’Djamena that was beaten back from the city’s outskirts with heavy losses. The French Government provided intelligence and airlift capabilities to help Deby fend off the attack, and JEM fought side by side with Deby’s forces. Crisis Group’s interviews with Sudanese Government officials indicated that the coup attempt was backed strongly by members of Sudanese military intelligence.

Hard-liners in the Sudanese Army, other security forces, and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) share the FUC objective of undermining Zaghawa power because of Chadian support for the Darfur rebels. Khartoum, therefore, allowed FUCD to build its forces in West Darfur during the months before the April attack. In turn, Deby and his entourage encouraged the SLA faction of Minni Minawi and JEM, in which Sudanese Zaghawa dominate, to coordinate military and political action under an alliance launched in January 2006. Several serving and former Sudanese Government officials are involved in stoking a virulent hate campaign, alleging the Zaghawa are responsible for the war in Darfur and suggesting their goal is to establish a Greater Zaghawa State over large swathes of Darfur, Chad, and Libya. Since repelling the attack on N’Djamena, President Deby has focused on defeating or buying off the numerous internal threats to his regime. The Chadian military has consolidated its positions in main towns, leaving civilians in the countryside vulnerable to increasing attacks by rebel groups and the predations of the Janjaweed and among Chadian soldiers early in the conflict, buying mercenaries as well as weapons. Informal Chadian support has also flowed to the Zaghawa elements of the SLA and JEM in North Darfur.

The third and most dangerous repercussion has been the division within the Chadian Zaghawa community over Deby’s Darfur policy. Deby, a Zaghawa, came to power in 1990 by overthrowing Hissene Habre in a military campaign emanating from Darfur, where he was supported by the Sudanese Zaghawa. At the outset of the Darfur war, Deby worked closely with Khartoum, even ordering 800 troops into Darfur to fight the rebels in April 2003. This discouraged but did not stop support flowing to the rebels from Zaghawa in the Chadian military. Though his policy was divisive, Deby understood the danger of protracted war in Darfur and the threat from Khartoum if he did not cooperate. In August 2003 he organized the first negotiations, culminating in the ill-fated September 2003 Abeche cease-fire, which collapsed 3 months later, just before a massive government offensive.

The May 2004 coup attempt by senior Zaghawa military commanders was primarily driven by discontent over Deby’s lack of support to the Darfurian Zaghawa and his cooperation with Khartoum. The affair was managed peacefully, in part to avoid divisions within the tribe to the rest of the country. Yet, those divisions have continued to grow, encouraged by Deby’s decision to alter the constitution so he could run for a third term and grumblings over domestic issues such as unpaid salaries.

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other Khartoum-backed militias. Moreover, the Chadian military has been guilty of human rights abuses against civilians it accuses of supporting Chadian rebels.

Chad’s relationship with Darfur rebels—particularly JEM and other groups under the umbrella National Redemption Front (NRF) formed by groups that refused to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement—has deepened considerably in recent months. Before late 2005 Deby had worked with Khartoum to undermine JEM, believing them a rival Zaghawa group and a threat to his regime. However, on a recent trip to the strategic town of Abeche in eastern Chad, Crisis Group researchers described the Chadian military and JEM rebels as “indistinguishable.” The NRF relies on Chad for sanctuary and support, and in return they assist Deby with internal security issues.

In January 2007, Deby reconciled with Mahamat Nour, reportedly through large cash payments, and in early March Nour became Defense Minister. With the RDL now largely in his pocket, President Deby’s principal concern right now is the Union of Forces for Democracy (UFDD), led by Khartoum’s latest proxies Mahamat Nouri and Acheikh Ibn Omer. While not strong enough to threaten N’Djamena, the UFDD took control of Abeche for 24 hours in November 2006. Humanitarian operations for eastern Chad are based in Abeche, and the attack prompted a withdrawal of many international staff. Since the attack, humanitarian access has been severely limited by insecurity along the roads and the threat of rebel attacks.

The risks of an outright war between Chad and Sudan would be high for both countries but it is likely that relations will deteriorate further regardless, as both governments position themselves for an expanded proxy conflict. Sudan wants to cut NRF supply lines and end Chadian support but it is unlikely it could decisively defeat the Chadian Army when it has been struggling with the Darfur rebels for years. Consequently, it will likely content itself with the current chaos in Darfur and not risk a dramatic change by open war with its neighbor.

Deby benefits from highlighting the external threat and Sudan’s support for Chadian rebels because that distracts attention from the domestic issues which are driving opposition to his regime. Full-scale war would seem suicidal for his smaller army, which already faces major challenges at home. And while Deby focuses on shoring up his military strength to fend off internal enemies, he rejects international calls for a robust U.N. peacekeeping force and Chadian citizens bear the brunt of escalating violence.

THE DARFUR-CHAD-CAR AXIS

The instability in Darfur has fostered linkages between armed groups in Darfur, Chad, and CAR. The movements of CAR and Chadian rebel groups in the region are interrelated, and weapons flow easily across porous borders.

Impoverished, conflict-prone, and poorly governed, CAR is easily affected by violence in the region. CAR was a safe haven for the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA) during its 22-year civil war with successive governments in Khartoum, while Sudanese Armed Forces used CAR as a staging ground for attacks against the SPLA in Southern Sudan. At least 36,000 Southern Sudanese refugees fled to CAR, and repatriation of these refugees back to Sudan is ongoing.

Outside the capital Bangui, CAR is largely ungoverned. CAR President Francois Bozize took control of CAR in a 2003 military coup with strong support from Deby, and, like Deby, his government is focused principally on remaining in power. Bozize retains a personal Chadian security force and enjoys strong support from the French Government, which participates in attacks against CAR rebels who move too close to Bangui. In addition, 380 peacekeepers from the regional organization CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa) provide additional security for the regime.

Rebel groups in CAR are fighting on two fronts, in the northwest and the northeast. In the northwest of the country, clashes between rebel groups and the CAR Armed Forces have forced 150,000 civilians to flee their homes. Some 50,000 refugees have crossed into Chad and another 30,000 into Cameroon. Atrocities have been committed by both sides and the CAR Armed Forces has systematically burned the homes of villagers it accuses of sheltering the rebels.

The situation in northeastern CAR is more closely linked to violence in Darfur and eastern Chad. The principal rebel group in the northeast is the UFDR (Union of Democratic Forces for Unity), a recently formed alliance of smaller rebel factions that decries Bozize’s corruption, allege state discrimination against Muslims, and demand that Bozize step down or share power.

The dangerous axis between northeastern CAR, eastern Chad, and Darfur was fully exposed in April 2006, when the Chadian FUC rebels led by Mahamat Nour launched their attack on N’Djamena through CAR’s ungoverned northeast.
ollowing the failed coup, reports surfaced that aircraft crossing from Sudan into northeastern CAR landed and offloaded military hardware and some 50 uniformed fighters. In October 2006, UFDR rebels captured several towns, stealing supplies from CAR Armed Forces caught off guard by the well-planned attacks. In late November, CAR forces, with strong support from the French military, retook the towns in late November. Bozize insists that the UDFR is backed by Sudan. Both UDFR and Sudan deny such claims, but cross-border support for armed groups in CAR furthers Khartoum’s agenda to regionalize the crisis to stifle a coherent international response.

CONTAINING AND ENDING THE CRISIS

There must be political solutions in Chad, Darfur, and CAR, but these solutions will require unraveling the cross-border nature of the conflicts and putting negotiations back within their domestic contexts.

• In Darfur, disunity among the rebels, uncoordinated and infrequent international diplomacy, and a failure to effectively pressure the Government of Sudan has led to the dangerous status quo that will drag on indefinitely unless the international community agrees on a plan of action and pursues it aggressively.
• In Chad, rampant corruption and mismanagement caused wages to go unpaid for months and led to the collapse of the few social services that existed. In the absence of international pressure—particularly by the French—on Deby’s government to crack down on corruption and share power with rivals, the root causes of insurrection in Chad will continue.
• In CAR, divisive ethnic politics, poverty, underdevelopment, and a proliferation of small arms has created a combustible mix. Neighboring countries will continue to exploit structural weaknesses in CAR until the international community invests more heavily in extending state control beyond Bangui and establishing a more inclusive government.

As argued above, the way forward demands a coordinated and multilateral effort to implement the 3Ps: Building peace through diplomacy; protecting civilians through military deployment; and creating leverage through punitive action.

Peacemaking: Bringing the Darfur rebel groups and the Government of Sudan back to the negotiating table will not be easy. The rebels are too divided right now to negotiate effectively, and the Khartoum regime has demonstrated no interest in stabilizing Darfur or in negotiating a fair political agreement, preferring to pursue its policies of divide and destroy. Since the conflict began in 2003, the two original rebel movements have splintered into at least eight different factions. International efforts to help forge rebel unity have been uncoordinated, sporadic, and are unlikely to work until the United States and its partners aggressively pursue a joint strategy.

The formation late last year of a new U.N./AU mediation team is an important development. Newly appointed U.N. Special Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Chief Mediator Salim Ahmed Salim are spearheading an effort to restart negotiations, but the peace process will not move forward until the rebels agree on a common negotiating position and the international community applies significant pressure on the government to return to the table. Despite the Sudanese Government’s promises to allow rebel unification conferences to go forward, Sudanese bombers have attacked the locations of the last two planned meetings.

Chadian President Deby and CAR President Bozize have demonstrated no commitment to addressing the root causes of instability in their respective countries, and they are unlikely to do so until they are compelled by their allies.

The United States and European Union should assemble a team of diplomats based in the region to work intensively on unifying the Darfur rebel groups. The United Nations and African Union must immediately begin to build their capacity to reconvene negotiations between the government and the rebels. Concurrently, governments with leverage over Deby and Bozize—particularly the United States and France—should press them to begin an internationally supported political process to deal with internal rebel groups.

Protection: The international community has agreed on a three-phase process to deploy a hybrid AU/U.N. peacekeeping force to Darfur, which Khartoum had initially agreed to. It is essential that the eventual hybrid force have the mandate and equipment necessary to protect civilians. The Sudanese Government now resists elements of the hybrid force related to the deployment of U.N. troops to Darfur. Consequent pressure on the Sudanese Government is necessary to compel Khartoum to accept such a force.
The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations must work in close coordination with the African Union to line up the forces necessary to reach the 20,300-troop level agreed upon by the African Union, the United Nations, the Arab League, and international donor countries. The international community must also accelerate its planning and increase its preparedness for military action without consent from Khartoum.

The United Nations should also begin planning for deployment of peacekeepers to protect civilians and humanitarian operations in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, but the deployment of protection forces should occur in conjunction with genuine political dialogue between the governments of these countries and their internal opposition groups. Concerted multilateral pressure is needed to convince Deby that a robust force is necessary to protect civilians. This force should be mandated to protect the camps and humanitarian convoys, and monitor and deter cross-border attacks and arms flows. This will require air capability (attack helicopters and aircraft) and satellite imagery. The French are well placed to help with such a mission, though they’ve been resistant thus far.

The second benefit of such a force will be on the situation inside Darfur. A force in Chad should be linked to a Darfur mission. A U.N. presence in Chad and CAR was first authorized in U.N. Security Resolution 1706, and that link should remain. A large force in Chad can act as a deterrent to further forces in Darfur, and should operate as a partner force to African Union forces and the AU/U.N. hybrid force that is supposed to be deployed.

The international community must also accelerate its planning and increase its preparedness for military action even in the absence of consent from Khartoum. If the situation continues to deteriorate in Darfur, the Security Council should authorize NATO to enforce a no-fly zone over Darfur and have plans in place to deploy ground forces with a mandate to stop the killing. Although the international community’s appetite for this type of military action is small, the Sudanese Government must understand that all options remain on the table. A credible planning process will in itself be a point of leverage in pressing primary objectives forward.

Punishment: Specific to Darfur, immediate multilateral punitive action is needed to change the cost benefit analysis of the Sudanese Government.

Until the international community rebuilds its leverage over the Sudanese Government by enacting punitive measures, both the government and the rebels will continue to fight it out in the sands of Darfur, while the Janjaweed and other armed groups continue to kill, rape, maim, and loot with impunity. The United States must back up its rhetoric by demonstrating leadership in forging multilateral consensus.

First, the United States should lead the international community in imposing targeted sanctions through the United Nations Security Council against senior regime officials, as authorized in previous Security Council resolutions, and called for in multiple reports from the Council’s Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts. Currently the United States and United Kingdom have different lists of officials that should be sanctioned. One list should be produced and broadened so that the Security Council can rapidly expand targeted sanctions to demonstrate international seriousness.

Second, the United States should take the lead in passing a U.N. Security Council resolution establishing a Panel of Experts to quickly ascertain where the assets of the largest Sudanese companies owned by ruling party officials are located, and quickly move to freeze the assets of those companies, as well as build a coalition of states willing to impose measures that the United States is contemplating as part of its “Plan B” threats referenced above, and implement these measures multilaterally with as wide an international support base as possible. Ideally, these measures would be implemented through the U.N. Security Council.

Third, the United States should work with its international partners to freeze the assets of the Government of Sudan and related commercial entities of the government—such as the main oil consortium—that pass through their banking systems. The U.S. Department of Treasury has compiled such a list, and the administration should work assiduously to ensure that these assets are frozen domestically and by our allies, which would require significant additional staff and resources.

Fourth, the United States should work with other countries to develop a coalition that would notify international banking institutions that if they choose to continue conducting business with the Government of Sudan or companies affiliated with the ruling party, by a predetermined date, they will be cut off from the financial systems of participating countries. The United States has recently imposed similar unilateral measures on banks doing business with the regimes in North Korea and Iran, and they have had a direct impact.
Finally, the United States and other concerned nations should provide information and declassified intelligence to the International Criminal Court to expedite arrest warrants for the principal architects of the Sudanese Government’s scorched-earth campaign against its own citizens.

Hundreds of thousands of lives in the subregion hang in the balance. If the United States leads multilateral efforts to address this regional contagion, whose primary root is in the Presidential Palace in Khartoum, then the escalating crisis can be reversed. But such a forward leaning, robust, proactive policy will require significant congressional pressure and advocacy and continuing citizen activism. Without these critical ingredients, I fear the drift in the Bush administration’s engagement will continue, with hope and rhetorical demands being the main instruments of a failing policy.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Prendergast. As I suspected, this was a very good panel, which is precisely why I wanted to hold this hearing—so people could hear what these experts have to say.

In a minute I’d like to start asking you some questions, but I’m just delighted that Senator Obama has joined us. He had been very active on this subcommittee, and I’d ask him if he has any remarks he’d like to make.

Senator OBAMA. I just want to thank both of you for the good work that you are doing on this issue. I had the opportunity to visit one of the refugee camps in Chad after the Sudanese Government had been reluctant to give me a visa last summer. You know, I think at this point anybody who is paying attention recognizes the urgency of the situation, Mr. Chairman, and the question is: What powerful actions are we willing to take?

I have said publicly, and I’ll repeat, that the administration has actually been better on this issue than some other countries, including the Europeans, but that’s a very low bar. And I think it’s unfortunate that we have used so much political capital in other areas of the world, that it seems as if we don’t have the time to stick with this issue, and we have very little leverage internationally to mount the kinds of efforts that are needed.

Nevertheless, I’d like to see us make additional efforts. I hope that this committee becomes activated around this issue during the course of this year, and I’m looking forward to additional guidance from this panel in terms of how we should proceed.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator. Yes; the efforts in the last few years have been many. But I would like to acknowledge that Senator Obama’s activity on the Darfur crisis, both on the committee and publicly, has really helped keep a focus on this issue, and I appreciate that.

Mr. Bacon, we have all seen horrifying images of the refugee and IDP camps in Darfur, so I was a little surprised to hear you say that the nutritional condition of camp residents is often better than the population as a whole, although I did hear that concern raised when I was at the refugee camp in January 2005. We didn’t just visit the camp, we went and visited a townhall down the road, and there was a little bit of concern about that.

Could you compare the living standards of residents in the refugee and IDP camps in Chad and the CAR to those in Sudan, as well as to the general population?

Mr. BACON. Sure. Starting with Darfur, the only advantage of moving 2 million people into camps—or close to that number, because not all of the internally displaced live in camps—but moving people into huge camps, the largest one has 135,000 people in it,
is that it’s easy to mobilize humanitarian response and get food and medical care there and focus it. And that’s, in fact, what has happened in Darfur.

But I want to stress again what John Prendergast said. This is very fragile now. It’s increasingly fragile, the humanitarian lifeline in Darfur, and we could see a tragedy of unprecedented proportions if the humanitarian lifeline stops. If the World Food Programme can’t get food in, if humanitarian workers pull out because it’s too unsafe, we could start seeing tens of thousands of people starve in relatively small amounts of time. Because the aid has been focused in the camps, the mortality rate has fallen quite dramatically. It’s lower than it is for the population as a whole now in Darfur.

In Chad, it took a while for the United Nations to build up its humanitarian response in the camps, but as you pointed out and I think Mr. Swan also pointed out, the humanitarian conditions have improved in Chad in the camps in recent times. But there is still this growing number of internally displaced people, and one of the things my colleagues found over the last couple of weeks is that humanitarian response has been really light, inexcusably light, in eastern Chad.

In fact, there was a reluctance to begin a significant humanitarian response for fear that it would attract more displaced people. Now I think the United Nations has gotten over that, and they have begun to orchestrate more of a response, but they need better management there than they have.

And in the CAR it’s not an emergency yet. There has been a lot of displacement and it’s increasing dramatically. It could become an emergency but it isn’t yet, and there isn’t the type of starvation that we saw several years ago in Darfur, so there is time to work there, and I think time to respond to the problems.

Senator FEINGOLD. And on your third point, that the humanitarian response to these three conflicts has been uneven, have the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic appealed for more humanitarian assistance? What steps have they taken to facilitate humanitarian access and ensure the security of aid workers in those two places?

Mr. BACON. Well, Chad has actually made some contribution of $8 million itself recently, which doesn’t sound like a lot of money, but is money to help the 120,000 displaced people in the eastern area. So Chad is responding, and yes; they have been appealing for more funds, Chad and the CAR.

The Government of Sudan makes episodic responses to help the internally displaced, but I don’t think they are living up to what President Bashir said on the “Today Show” today. You were probably as stunned as I was, that he said he felt every death personally. He hasn’t been acting that way, so there’s a lot more that the government could do in Darfur to protect its own people.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

Mr. Prendergast, could you summarize the interests of Libya, France, China, and other countries that are key players in the region, and discuss how they are contributing to the resolution of these conflicts, and what more could they do?

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thanks very much. If I can parenthetically begin by just addressing something that Senator Obama said in his
introduction about leverage, he’s absolutely right, we’ve lost so
much internationally, but we still have all this potential leverage
with the Sudanese Government, and it’s the scarlet letter and the
wallet.

Imagine the incredible leverage we would have if all of the intel-
ligence that we have collected over the last 4 years about who has
been responsible at the highest levels of the Sudanese Government
for authorizing the atrocities that have been committed in Darfur,
that are being discussed in The Hague, if we brought portfolios to
the senior officials in Khartoum in question and said, “It’s your
choice. We turn these things in, we declassify and turn these
things in, and you’re going to be hunted for the rest of your life.
Yes; we won’t catch you right away. There aren’t enforcement
mechanisms for the ICC. But if you want to live the rest of your
life like Milosevic and some of these other guys in the former Yugo-
slavia, running and hiding, or in a hole like Saddam Hussein, if
your government ever changes power, it’s your choice. We’ve got
the information here. Do you want to play ball or not?” That’s the
scarlet letter.

And the wallet, if we furiously worked with our allies to go after
the assets, these guys have made so much money over the last dec-
ade since the advent of oil exploitation in Southern Sudan, and
they have put money into companies that are invested all over Eu-
ropе, the Middle East, and Asia. Of course they’re not in the
United States because the Clinton and now the Bush administra-
tion have restricted bilateral trade. So we have enormous leverage
if we choose to build it and use it, and we’re not doing that, and
that’s what I think is at the crux of what I would say.

On the question of the three countries you mentioned, Libya, re-
ional influence is its objective. It has always been an influence
peddler, and it switches sides so often, its schizophrenic regional
policy undermines its credibility. Of course they can bring people
together. Of course people will show up for meetings because they
pay them to come. They provide money and arms. “If you come and
show up, we’ll have these wonderful meetings, press and photo op-
portunities.”

People agree to all kinds of wonderful things about stopping
cross-border insurgencies and support for insurgencies, et cetera, et
cetera. Not one iota of implementation ever, have we ever seen, so
it’s almost a nonfactor. They can throw a little gasoline on the fire
in occasional places by throwing arms into the mix, but they then
change sides, so it’s neutralized.

France supports Deby and Bozize, as we know, very well, not
only just economic aid, not only military, but military action
through the provision of intelligence and actual military support on
the ground when rebels in both countries were advancing last year.
So they’re willing to do what it takes to protect the two regimes
in their two client states there in central Africa, but they’re very
divided about what to do about Darfur. France is all over the place.
One day they’re supporting the ICC resolution in the Security
Council. The next day they’re obstructing further measures. They
have, of course, fairly significant economic interests in Southern
Sudan, and that complicates their policy.
They are doing nothing to address the internal political problems in CAR and Chad, and I think you were asking Mr. Swan, you know, what are we going to do? Who is the key external actor? It’s France. We’ve got to be working very closely with them at the highest level of government, not at these working levels. It doesn’t mean anything to them.

OK; and on China, of course, that’s the big elephant in the living room. Now a small factor, a new factor, has crept into the picture. They have invested now in Chad’s oil sector, so they have a new reason to want better relations between Chad and Sudan so they can exploit this oil, so they will be a partner with us in support for that kind of reduction in cross-border tensions. We need to use that. Again, high level engagement is going to be key.

But to expect them to ever be a positive player in Sudan with the depth of their commercial relationship, it is almost an ideal scenario right now for China. They have a dictatorship, basically a commercial partner in Sudan that’s willing to maintain that exploitation of resources by any means necessary, including genocide in the west and ethnic cleansing in the south, and that’s a pretty good deal for them right now. That pretty much assures that they will get that oil for now, and so they’re not going to be a positive player. We just have to engage them heavily to neutralize their being a negative actor on the scene, particularly in the Security Council.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much.

Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. In terms of us applying leverage, there was a Washington Post article that appeared in February, in which the Bush administration leaked to the media that they were going to implement a plan for the Treasury Department to aggressively block U.S. commercial bank transactions connected to the Government of Sudan, including oil revenues. According to the press, this plan was supposed to start in the first of January. We’re in April. We haven’t seen any movement.

Do people have any comments about the potential effectiveness of the so-called plan B approach? Is it your estimation that a legislative approach should be tried?

Mr. PRENDERGAST. I think the Post leak was overstated. I think there was a bit of bluff involved. You know, you use these kind of tools in foreign policy to try to influence your adversary across the table. They were trying to do that with the Sudanese.

It seems not to have yet been decided to undertake as robust an effort as was described in that Post article. They have decided on expanding targeted sanctions against certain companies, but the way it was described in the Post goes beyond what was decided, I think, by the Principals Committee and by the President.

Now, if they did what they said in that article, I think it would have an impact, but it would have to be very clearly tied to a series of actions. In other words, this wouldn’t be the one-time thing. Plan B wouldn’t be, “Here’s our one thing we’re going to do, and that’s it.” Because the Sudanese can weather this one. I mean, they can find alternative uses for their money and stuff like that, and ways of undertaking their commercial transactions. There has to be a series of actions that brings to bear pressure and, probably more importantly, we have to work multilaterally.
Up until now, much of what the United States has done has been internal, within the Government, while we determine what unilateral measures we're going to take. And as you know, around the world this kind of unilateral push just leaves us open to a number of negative repercussions and doesn't have the full effect that if we work together, either through the Security Council or with a group of allies and interested countries, we could have much more influence.

So I think plan B has a tremendous potential because it would shift, possibly, a move of our policy from constructive engagement, which simply has failed in the last 4 years in Darfur, to one of harder, pressure-based strategy that looks to try to influence the calculations of the government through punitive measures. That's the right direction we need to go. It's just that we have got to have enough sticks in that basket for the Sudanese to take us seriously enough to change their calculations and thus their behavior.

Mr. BACON. If I could just add two things, first of all, no one has done more work on this than John Prendergast in the International Crisis Group and his colleagues there, in sort of examining the mix of financial and other sanctions that could hurt the government. And the point he made about releasing intelligence is a very profound point. I think it would have a huge impact on the government.

But, second, your committee might ask in another hearing for government officials to come up and talk about what financial options are available. For example, we've seen in the last several months that the application of section 311 under the U.S. Patriot Act has had a big impact on North Korea. For years we have thought North Korea was impervious to this type of pressure, but, in fact, the financial pressure put on through the banking system had a relatively rapid impact on the North Korean regime.

Could that section be applied to Sudan? It's a money-laundering section, but it has been interpreted very broadly and it has been used quite aggressively by our Treasury. So I would ask if maybe this committee would look into that and try to put a little pressure on the administration to look more imaginatively at the tools it already has at its disposal to put more pressure on Sudan.

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Chairman, just a quick followup, if you don't mind.

Obviously a lot of this has to do with how we can structure the application of any of these sticks in a way that's not deemed one more unilateral action by the United States. And so, you know, when I was referring to leverage earlier, the problem is that right now we've got a bad reputation around the world in terms of our capacity to pull together a multilateral effort.

So I'm wondering, from your vantage point—you are both following the issue closely, you are, I'm sure, privy to conversations that are taking place in the United Nations and around the world—I'm wondering whether we have seen any improvement—progress—in terms of our potential European allies showing concern on this issue. Has the African Union been clear in terms of these concerns? We talked about Libya, but I guess I'm also interested in sort of more broadly Arab nations.
The question I have is: Setting China aside, what capacity do we have at this point to actually forge an international coalition that would leave China isolated and force them to take action or support action? Or is this predominantly a phenomenon that’s of interest to the grassroots and some legislators in the United States? It’s getting a little bit of attention in Europe, not much elsewhere, and so it’s hard to muster the kind of international coalition that might be necessary for punitive actions to be effective.

Mr. PRENDERGAST. I would just say, Senator, that the United Nations Security Council is the key. The Brits are going to table a resolution that will put forward a few of these financial measures. I believe, and I think many of us in the activist community believe and the NGO community believe that they could do a lot more in that first resolution that signals the break from constructive engagement to more punitive measures.

The French will probably go along. They have indicated pretty much that they don’t want to act through the EU but they will act through the Security Council. And I believe China and Russia, when you play chicken with them on this issue, they will ride off the road. They don’t want to be isolated.

They don’t want to, particularly China does not want to use its veto. Unless we’re talking about an embargo of Port Sudan or something that directly attacks their economic—their vital economic interests—they will abstain, and they have demonstrated that when the referral of the case of Darfur to the ICC, when the Sudanese Government was sure that Beijing was going to veto, and they stepped aside and said, “We just don’t want to stand up on behalf of this regime in that way.”

The EU is totally divided. Many of the countries in the EU, in their lowest common denominator foreign policy, have deferred to the diplomatic effort and said, “We’ve just got to give it more time.” Particularly the Secretary General of the United Nations has said the same thing, unfortunately.

The AU, I wouldn’t rely on the AU to take the lead on this kind of thing because they have put the soldiers on the line and they are undertaking, they are effectively in the lead on the diplomatic track. We’re not going to see them, I think, take the aggressive track that needs to give leverage to the peace and protection initiatives.

So the engine really is right here in Washington. If the United States decides, “Let’s push forward, let’s work as multilaterally as possible, but push forward through the United Nations Security Council,” I think we can create a set of punitive measures that will influence the Government of Sudan in its calculations and to change its policy in Darfur.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Obama.

Mr. Bacon, thank you for raising the point about the measure that was effective vis-a-vis North Korea. I think there’s some talk about this among some Senators, but I think your push on that may be helpful at a critical time.

Again, thank you. Let me just ask one more question; I want to get this on the record. The resolution that Senator Sununu and I introduced last month calls for the appointment of a U.N. regional envoy, as you heard, charged with overseeing and coordinating hu-
manitarian access and assistance in Darfur, eastern Chad, and northern CAR. Could each of you offer your opinion of this proposition?

Mr. Bacon.

Mr. BACON. I think that would be a step up. I would, to the extent possible, expand this mandate to include political negotiations working toward a peace agreement. There is now a U.N. deployment—diplomatic deployment in the CAR, trying to work toward a peace negotiation. I don’t think it has had much success yet, but there is much more that we can do there. And by combining it with humanitarian assistance, I think it gives it more clout.

Senator FEINGOLD. Very good. Mr. Prendergast.

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thanks. I agree, it has got to be expanded to peacemaking. Having just the humanitarian brief is not enough. There has to be a division of labor, then, if we’re going to press for that, and I think you should, between current Special Envoy Natsios and the new person, so one is focused like a laser beam on a peace deal for Darfur and the other looks at the wider regional dimensions.

And again it’s an argument for a regional cell. We need more diplomats out there. In this transformational diplomacy or whatever we want to call it, we’ve got to have more people in the region working these cases full time. We can’t have part-time professors going out when they can, when their schedule permits. We’ve got to have full-time people, professionals who work this account 24/7, because the Sudanese are working it 24/7 to destabilize the region.

Thanks.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. That’s exactly the note I wanted to end this hearing on. I thank both of you and all our witnesses, and that concludes the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 11:23 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JAMES SWAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Question. A nearly $1 billion windfall will come to the Chadian Government from oil sector tax revenues this year, in addition to normal oil royalty payments (estimated at $254 million for 2007).

• What is being done to ensure these funds are not used to fuel the growing conflict in eastern Chad/Darfur, or to increase arms purchases and Chadian military spending above their current levels?
• What mechanisms are in place to track arms traffic in Chad, the Central African Republic and Sudan?
• Are there any measures being taken to monitor the relationship between the precipitous growth in Chad’s budget (due to oil production) and arms sales to/flows into Chad?

Answer. Years of civil and external conflict have led to the proliferation of traffic in small arms across Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan. Many organizations, including the United Nations and the African Union, attempt to assess small arms and light weapons flows in this region of Africa. Our embassies in the region also report on observable trends. The illicit nature of this traffic makes it difficult to track with precision.

The U.S. Department of State through the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) has been engaged in Sudan with Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/LW) destruction to eliminate illicit SA/LW from circulation. Since FY05, the
The United States (through WRA) has begun a dialogue with the Government of the Central African Republic with the goal of establishing a bilateral NADR-funded program to strengthen the government's physical security and stockpile management practices and to destroy any surplus and obsolete SA/LW.

The United States supports World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) efforts to ensure that Chad's increased oil revenues are focused on priority social sectors instead of on the military. This includes supporting the preparation of the Government's new Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which will provide the framework for government spending over the next several years to promote broad-based growth and poverty reduction. The United States engages regularly with the Chadian Government to reinforce the message that Chad's oil revenues would best promote stability if used to address some of the long-term drivers of instability. We also engage with Chadian Government officials at all levels to urge them to cease any support of Sudanese rebel groups.

Question. The influx of refugees from the Darfur region is placing pressure on social infrastructure and on local populations.

- What are the nonsecurity priorities of the Chad Government as exhibited by their expenditures?
- Does the Chadian public budget reflect increased expenditure on health and social services in the east and south of Chad?
- Have any donors prioritized funds for Chadian communities impacted by the growing crisis on the border?

Answer. Under the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Chad and the World Bank, the Chadian Government pledged to spend 70 percent of its entire budget on health, education, rural development, and other social sector programming in fiscal year 2007. The government also pledged to pay particular attention to Chad's southern oil-producing region.

While official data on Chad's spending has not yet been released, it appears that the Chadian Government will not meet its 70 percent target this year. Social sector spending, however, seems to have increased significantly since 2005. Anecdotal evidence suggests that much of this funding has been spent on infrastructure, health, and education.

As a result of oil receipts, Chad's national budget has increased significantly from previous years. Consequently, there has been increased spending throughout the country. While Chad does not publish its budget annually, it is not clear whether there is greater emphasis on projects in the south and eastern regions. In January, the Chadian Government publicly committed to fund 44 percent of a joint urban development project with the World Bank. Of the five cities selected for the project (N'Djamena, Abeche, Doba, Sarh, and Moundou), four are in the southern and eastern parts of the country. We continue to press for greater social investment throughout the country.

Going forward, the Government, in consultation with civil society, the World Bank, the IMF and other development partners, is preparing a new Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to promote broad-based growth, reduce poverty, and provide the framework for government spending over the next several years.

Donor assistance for the eastern Chadian population is provided mostly through international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Those segments of the population that are internally displaced receive humanitarian assistance from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations agencies, and NGOs. As in other parts of the world, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partner organizations provide assistance for host communities affected by the presence of refugees.

In Chad, activities for host communities include projects to improve coordination, increase access to clean water, improve food security through agricultural support, and provide informal education and conflict resolution training through radio programming for Chadians and refugees. In addition to U.S. Government support for UNHCR and partner organizations ($43 million in FY06) in Chad, the United States, through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department, will provide food and nonfood assistance for internally displaced persons and for host communities. Other donors, including the European Community and the United Kingdom, have also provided funding specifically for affected Chadians.

Question. What are the amounts of assistance provided to Chad, and to CAR, from the international community, broken out by country and international organization?
Answer. According to the United Nations (U.N.), the Central African Republic (CAR) received $25 million in humanitarian assistance in 2006. The largest portion of this assistance, approximately $5.5 million, or 21.3 percent, was granted by the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Other U.N. funds contributed at least an additional 10 percent of the total. The United States was the largest bilateral donor, contributing approximately $3.6 million in humanitarian assistance, or 14.1 percent of the total. France contributed approximately $2.9 million dollars, while Japan, Ireland, and Sweden each contributed over $1 million dollars.

In 2007, the international community has already pledged over $10 million in humanitarian assistance to CAR. One-third of this assistance is funded by the CERF, while Ireland and the United States have each provided approximately one-fourth. We expect that funding levels will increase significantly throughout 2007. The United Nations has requested approximately $50 million in humanitarian funding in its Consolidated 2007 Appeal for CAR.

The international community provided $186.77 million in humanitarian assistance to Chad in 2006. The United States was by far the largest donor, providing nearly $70 million, including $63.4 million toward the U.N. appeal. The European Commission was the second largest donor, providing approximately $20 million, followed by the U.N., which provided $9.4 million through the CERF and $9.9 million via general accounts. Much of the assistance provided to Chad in 2006 was to support Sudanese and CAR refugees.

The United Nations has requested $170 million in humanitarian funding in its Consolidated 2007 Appeal for Chad. Of this, almost $50 million have been provided thus far. The United States continues to be the largest contributor of humanitarian funding, having provided nearly $40 million, including $30.1 million toward the appeal. The U.N. has contributed $7.3 million via the CERF mechanism.

While statistics for overall development assistance (ODA) for 2006 have not yet been released, statistics indicate that CAR received $95 million in ODA in 2005. This assistance equaled approximately 7.1 percent of CAR’s gross national income (GNI). France was by far the largest contributor, providing approximately 40 percent of all assistance in 2004–05. The European Commission provided approximately 22 percent during the same time period, while the United States provided approximately 14 percent.

Chad received approximately $380 million in ODA in 2005. 2004–05 averages indicate that the International Development Association of the World Bank provided approximately 23 percent of assistance, followed by the European Commission (20 percent), the United States (16 percent), and France (15 percent). Overall development assistance includes emergency assistance as well as debt relief and other forms of assistance.

**Question.** What foreign assistance is intended to be provided to Chad, and to CAR, by the United States in FY 2007, broken out by purpose/category?

**Answer.** While the nature of emergency humanitarian funding, which is the bulk of the funding that we provide to Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), makes it difficult to predict precise funding levels, we expect that overall humanitarian assistance to both Chad and CAR will increase significantly from 2006 levels. In CAR, we anticipate providing the following assistance (all amounts in U.S. dollars):

- Cancellation of bilateral debt with an approximate face value of $3,600,000 and rescheduling of remaining $1,800,000 of debt, in keeping with the terms of the multilateral agreement CAR is expected to negotiate with the Paris Club in mid-April 2007. These estimates for fiscal year 2007 are based on the initial debt treatment normally offered to countries advancing toward full participation in the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative;
- $4,200,000 in Public Law 480 Title II (P.L. 480) emergency food assistance;
- $1,314,215 in International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA) funding for emergency supplies and nutrition and for food security, water, and sanitation projects;
- $500,000 in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for a pilot land tenure project that will help to bring alluvial-mined diamonds into the Kimberley Process chain of custody;
- $500,000 in Development Assistance (DA) funding for biodiversity/sustainable use projects as part of the Central African Regional Program for the Environment;
- $96,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) for civil-military relations, human rights, and professionalism training for members of the CAR military; and
Unearmarked contributions to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for their Africa-wide budgets that are used to assist conflict victims, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in CAR, as well as to assist CAR refugees in Chad and Cameroon.

In Chad, we anticipate providing the following assistance:

- $37,500,000 in Refugee and Migration Assistance (RMA) to support refugees and IDPs;
- $27,500,000 in Public Law 480 emergency food assistance (including contributions to the World Food Program) for refugees and IDPs;
- $10,062,000 in Department of Defense Title 10 assistance to support Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahara (OEF–TS), the military component of the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP);
- $5,000,000 in IDFA funding for relief commodities, food security, protection, humanitarian coordination, water and sanitation projects;
- $1,802,000 in DA and ESP for development projects to support TSCTP;
- $1,798,000 in Public Law 480 Title II nonemergency food assistance;
- $595,000 in Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) assistance for antiterrorism training as part of TSCTP;
- $283,000 in IMET for civil-military relations, human rights, and professionalization training;
- $272,000 in Department of Defense European Command (EUCOM) funding to support Exercise Related Construction (ERC);
- $207,000 in Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program funding (DHAPP) for HIV/AIDS activities in Chad;
- $20,000 in NADR for demining activities;
- $179,000 in Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance (HA) activities; and
- $121,000 in Department of Defense general operation funds for the Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP).

**Question.** France is a former colonial power and still occupies an important role in the region.

- Characterize the French role in the region and specifically in Chad and CAR.
- What are France's goals and how does it work to achieve them?
- How does the United States engage France in achieving its objectives in the region?

**Answer.** As the former regional colonial power, France has a unique relationship with both Chad and Central African Republic (CAR), as well as with most of their neighbors. French President Jacques Chirac has a close personal relationship with Chadian President Idriss Deby Itno. CAR President Francois Bozize also enjoys a good relationship with the French Government, likely developed while he lived in France in exile.

In both Chad and CAR, France's primary goals are achieving domestic and regional stability. As part of the European Union, France is engaged in long-term civil reconstruction and democratic reform projects in both countries. These projects have been formulated to address long-term drivers of instability.

France plays a significant role in the security sector in both Chad and CAR. There are approximately 1,200 French troops in Chad as part of Operation Epervier. The troops are stationed in Chad to protect French nationals and to provide logistical support to the Chadian forces. In Central African Republic, there are approximately 300 troops as part of Operation Boali, an operation charged with helping to restructure the local armed forces and supporting FOMUC, a regional peacekeeping force led by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and funded by the European Union.

The roles of the two forces are quite distinct. France and CAR have entered into a defense agreement that allows the French forces to provide operational assistance and air support in internal and external conflicts. French aircraft have directly engaged Central African rebels and have helped the Bozize government maintain its tenuous hold on the northeastern parts of the country, particularly those near the Sudan border.

France's agreement with Chad, however, is a military cooperation agreement and only allows the French to provide logistical support to the Chadian Government.

United States and French Governments discuss our initiatives in the region regularly in Washington, DC, and in Paris, as well as in Bangui, N'djamena, and at the United Nations. Our Ambassador in Chad and our Chargé d’affaires in CAR both
enjoy good relations with their counterparts. We have also supported many French initiatives vis-a-vis Chad and CAR in international fora.

**Question.** The World Bank has had a significant impact on the prospects of Chad oil resource flows. What role does the World Bank play, and are they capable of being a positive influence, upon the Chad and CAR governments actions in the region?

**Answer.** In January 2006, the Chadian Government changed the law governing use of oil revenues for priority social sectors in order to cover an increasing need for military expenditures. Because this action violated the 1999 agreement with the World Bank, the Bank suspended all loans to Chad in protest of the decision. The suspension and international pressure compelled the Government of Chad (GOC) to sign a July 2006 agreement with the World Bank in which the government agreed to spend 70 percent of its total budget, not just oil revenues, on priority sectors, such as health education, and infrastructure. While critics of the agreement note that it does not address the GOC’s elimination of a future generations fund and that an increased portion of direct oil revenues could be used for military spending, proponents note that projected priority sector spending would increase. The agreement also signals that the World Bank can still be a positive influence in Chad. Although it does not appear as though the government will meet the 70-percent target outlined for this year, spending on priority poverty-reduction sectors has increased significantly since 2005. The government has also made progress on strengthening public financial management, as also agreed with the World Bank.

In Central African Republic (CAR), the World Bank and other international financial institutions have played a very positive role as the country attempts to undertake fiscal and monetary reforms. Prime Minister Elie Dote, himself a veteran of the African Development Bank, is implementing reforms of the customs service and has begun a campaign to eliminate ghost workers from the civil service.

In addition to providing the impetus for fiscal reform, the World Bank can provide much-needed technical assistance to two countries where the financial management capacity is very low.

**Question.** What has the United States done to consolidate the diplomatic effort in this region and through what organizations has the USG engaged to leverage its influence for positive effect?

**Answer.** The United States has engaged on the issue of the regional impact of the Darfur crisis, particularly on Chad and the Central African Republic, at every level. In the field, our missions enjoy good working relationships with their bilateral and multilateral colleagues and participate in donor meetings where they impress upon both governments the importance of democratic reforms and respect for human rights to address the long-term drivers of the conflict.

In New York, we have worked with other United Nations (U.N.) Security Council members and with U.N. officials to ensure that the regional impact of the Darfur crisis is part of the international agenda. As a result, U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1706 instructed the U.N. to address regional security issues, particularly in Chad and the Central African Republic. We also expect these issues to be addressed in the context of the deployment of a U.N.-African Union hybrid force in Darfur. Moreover, we have pressed for the deployment of a separate peacekeeping mission in Chad and CAR. We regularly consult with our international partners on the deployment of such a mission.

Finally, the United States continues to support the mandates of the U.N. Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) and of POMUC, the regional peacekeeping force of the Central African Monetary and Economic Community. Both organizations have contributed to security in CAR.