[Senate Hearing 110-234]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-234
EXPLORING A COMPREHENSIVE STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND
COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 6, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, statement....... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Frazer, Hon. Jendayi, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden,
Jr......................................................... 60
Hess, Hon. Michael, Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID,
Washington, DC................................................. 14
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Menkhaus, Dr. Ken, professor of political science, Davidson
College, Davidson, NC.......................................... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Morrison, Dr. J. Stephen, executive director, Africa Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. 49
Prepared statement........................................... 51
Shinn, Hon. David, adjunct professor of international affairs,
George Washington, University, Washington, DC.................. 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Sununu, Hon. John E., U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
(iii)
EXPLORING A COMPREHENSIVE STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND
COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room SD-628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russ Feingold
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold, Cardin, Webb, Coleman, and
Sununu.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR
FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Good morning. The hearing will come to
order.
On behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
African Affairs, I welcome all of you to the hearing of this
subcommittee in the 110th Congress.
Before we begin, I want to offer a warm welcome to my
friend Senator Sununu in his new capacity as the ranking member
of this subcommittee. I'm excited to have such a dedicated and
hardworking Senator as a ranking member, and look forward to
working with him on the full range of pressing issues facing
the Continent of Africa. And even though the Senator has not
been here for many years, I have had many good opportunities to
work with him and find him to be an excellent person to work
with.
As members of this subcommittee know, there are few issues
that we deal with here that are partisan or ideological. On my
recent trip to Ethiopia and Kenya, where we were focusing on
this Somalia issue, I told everybody that this subcommittee's
always been a place where there hasn't been partisan divides,
and it's a good example of what can be done. And that was very
well received by everybody in the African countries we visited.
We all want to end violence and promote democracy, defend human
rights and reduce poverty, and improve security in a continent
beset with challenges but bestowed with almost limitless
potential.
So, welcome, Senator Sununu, I look forward to working
closely with you.
With that said, I think it's only right that we start the
110th Congress off with a hearing that addresses one of the
biggest challenges we face in Africa today, and that is
Somalia. We have entitled today's hearing ``Exploring a
Comprehensive Stabilization, Reconstruction, and
Counterterrorism Strategy for Somalia.'' I look forward to
today's conversation with the administration and expert
witnesses about how to address the persistent, ongoing, and
dangerous instability in Somalia and throughout the Horn of
Africa.
This subcommittee, under the chairmanship of both
Republicans and Democrats, has, for years, been pushing the
executive branch to develop a comprehensive strategy to address
instability in Somalia, as well as the security and
humanitarian concerns that have resulted from almost two
decades of instability there. As I and my other colleagues have
argued in the past, Somalia actually represents the new types
of challenges that face our country and our friends and allies
around the world. It represents the complex threats that the
U.S. Government must learn to identify and contain combat in
the post-9/11 world. It is challenging the way our Government
is organized, and is pressing us to make changes to the way we
deal with lawlessness and weak governments, corruption, and
humanitarian tragedy.
It is also forcing us to reevaluate how our Government
works to eliminate terrorist safe havens and what tools we have
available to not only defeat terrorists, but also to defeat the
conditions that allow the terrorists to plan, train, recruit,
and ultimately attack the United States or others. If we have
learned anything since
9/11, it is that we can no longer ignore instability in places
like Somalia. Unfortunately, after traveling to the region,
extensive study, conversations with the administration,
briefings and hearings, it is clear to me that we have yet to
effectively organize our Government to deal with these
challenges. I hope that this hearing will help clarify a new
strategy for going forward that will seize the current
opportunity to help the Somali people dig themselves out of
almost two decades of chaos.
To that end, I urge our witnesses, and particularly those
on our first panel, to focus on what we've learned as a
government, what we're doing differently and what we expect to
get done in the coming weeks, months, and years. I know that
both of our first witnesses are working hard on this very
difficult issue.
Let me tell you why I'm so concerned about the progress our
Government is making on Somalia. I chaired a hearing on this--
by this subcommittee exactly 5 years ago, on February 6, 2002,
on this exact topic. During that hearing, we discussed policy
options, we discussed terrorism and al-Qaeda, we discussed the
absence of a transitional government, we discussed the need for
a more farsighted, comprehensive U.S. Government policy. Most
importantly, and most troubling to me now in today's context,
we also discussed how important Somalia was to our national
security in a post-9/11 context and how it needed to do more.
Walter Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa at
that time, began his opening statement by pointing out, ``that
it is far easier to prevent failure than to cope with its
consequences.'' He then admitted on the record, ``Somalia has
not been on the U.S. Government's radar screen since, really,
about 1994.''
Now, following the capture of Mogadishu by the Islamic
Courts Union last summer, the subcommittee met again on this
very same issue. Under the leadership of then-Chairman
Martinez, we brought together most of the witnesses who sit
before us again this morning to get a sense of the
administration's plan for responding to that major development.
In her testimony, Assistant Secretary Frazer assured us,
``President Bush and Secretary Rice have made it a priority to
confront the ongoing turmoil in Somalia with a multilateral
coordinated strategy.''
Now, we took this statement seriously; so seriously, in
fact, that we legislated on the issue. As you know, Secretary
Frazer, I obtained the support of a bipartisan coalition of
colleagues, including my friend from Minnesota, Senator
Coleman, to include an amendment in the FY07 defense
authorization bill that required the administration to devise
and share with Congress a comprehensive stabilization and
reconstruction strategy for Somalia, as you outlined in your
testimony in front of the committee last July. The 90-day
deadline for receipt of this report passed last month, with no
sign of the report and no sign of a strategy. We received no
sign or call or letter suggesting that the administration was
any closer to not only complying with the law, but creating a
comprehensive plan for addressing the urgent interrelated
challenges we face in Somalia and throughout the Horn of
Africa.
In other parts of the world, we've seen what happens when
decisions are made and executed without the benefit of a long-
term comprehensive strategy backed by sufficient resources and
political commitment. I want our Government to avoid making bad
or rash decisions, or no decisions at all, and I want to ensure
that our approach to Somalia takes into consideration the
complex nature of the problem and the need to view Somalia
comprehensively, not just through a counterterrorism lens.
Unfortunately, we have only a very limited amount of time to
establish the conditions that will lead to political stability
in Somalia, and that window is closing fast.
Before I turn to my colleague Senator Sununu, let me note
that my colleagues, both Senator Coleman and Klobuchar of
Minnesota, have joined me today in introducing a bill that
addresses these major challenges and authorizes significant
resources to ensure that this multilateral endeavor to
stabilize and secure Somalia is more successful than the last.
The bottom line is that, unless the United States works
aggressively with Somalis, regional actors, and the
international community to create stability in Somalia, that
country will remain what it has been since the early 1990s, a
haven for terrorists and warlords and a source of instability
in a critical region. That is why this hearing is so critical.
Whether and how we respond to the issues at hand will have a
profound and long-lasting impact on the people of Somalia, on
stability in the region, and, above all, on our national
security.
With that said, let me also introduce our two panels before
I turn to Senator Sununu.
On our first panel, we have two witnesses from the United
States Government. We have Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Dr. Jendayi Frazer, and Mr. Michael Hess, the
Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict,
and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for
International Development. We've asked each of them to address
current U.S. Government efforts relating to Somalia and to
discuss key challenges, resource requirements, and the detailed
components of the administration's strategy for Somalia. To the
extent possible, we'd like to avoid general talking points or
generic outlines and hope this can be a frank and detailed
conversation.
We're very glad that you're both here today, and we
appreciate your willingness to testimony. Thank you, and
welcome.
Our second panel will feature a range of individuals that
are well qualified to speak on the unique challenges related to
this complex country and the impact that developments there
have on neighboring nations in the volatile Horn of Africa, as
well as on U.S. national security.
We're privileged to welcome Dr. David Shinn back to the
subcommittee. Ambassador Shinn was a U.S. Ambassador to
Ethiopia between 1996 and 1999. He has testified in front of
this committee a number of times and always provides a
pragmatic and balanced view of the situation in the region. He
currently serves as an adjunct professor of international
affairs at George Washington University.
We look to you, Mr. Ambassador, for analysis of the
regional and international dynamics relating to developments in
Somalia, as well as your opinion of how the United States and
international community can most effectively address the
challenges we faced here.
After him, we'll hear from Dr. Ken Menkhaus, also no
stranger to the Senate. Professor Menkhaus is a professor of
political science at Davidson College and has written
extensively on the political and security dynamics in Somalia.
We look to you, Professor, to help paint a detailed picture
of dynamics on the ground and the conditions that have emerged
as a result of recent developments. We hope that your analysis
will help this committee have a better sense for the
complexities we need to address.
And finally, we welcome back Dr. Steve Morrison, who's the
executive director of the Center for Strategic International
Studies Africa Program. We've asked Dr. Morrison to speak to
Somalia-related developments here in Washington, and we hope
that he'll lay out the challenges and requirements for
developing an effective strategy to address instability in
Somalia and throughout the Horn.
I'd like to extend a special welcome to each of you this
morning. I know I speak for my colleagues when I tell you how
much we appreciate your coming here today. Your insights will
inform and guide our discussion of immediate actions with
serious, lasting implications for the Somali people, for the
Horn of Africa, and for the United States and international
security, and I'm looking forward to hearing from you.
And it is now my pleasure to turn to the distinguished
ranking member, Senator John Sununu.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Sununu. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. And
welcome to our witnesses today. I appreciate the very kind
comments in your opening, and look forward to working with you
on this subcommittee, the importance of which I think you've
outlined very effectively in your opening statement.
I ask consent to submit a more formal written statement for
the record.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
Senator Sununu. But I do want to make a few points. And one
is to underscore how complex the situation in Somalia is. And
that doesn't mean that it--those complexities are an excuse for
not making more progress or not being clearer about our
approach to the situation, but it means that we can learn a
great deal about dealing with complex situations. The economic,
political, religious, and civil society issues that have to be
dealt with in Somalia have few parallels anywhere else in the
world, and we need to understand that. Of course, this hearing
is a small part in developing a better picture of these
complexities. But if we develop better methodologies for
addressing the failures and the weaknesses in these areas, then
I think we'll have a framework that can be applied elsewhere in
the world.
And that brings me to the second point, which is the need
to develop a better framework and organizational structure, as
you described, for addressing failed states around the world,
because of the natural implications that this can have for
national security. There's been a great deal of discussion
about both organizational and policy changes within State and
other organizations in the Federal Government to better equip
those organizations for addressing these problems and the
security consequences that can flow from a failed state. And I
hope that our discussions today might help illuminate the kinds
of organizations, emphasis, focus that might come from our
Government and other governments, in order to be more
effective, not just in Somalia, but in other parts of the world
where we see the breakdown of economic structures, judicial
structures, government structures, necessary for stability.
And the third point I'd want to make is how important it is
to develop a regional approach. You mention this in your
remarks. But all of the players in the region have both a
responsibility and an interest in addressing this situation in
Somalia, they have different roles to play. And, while it's
true that there are competing interests in the region, I think
all of the regional players are affected by a lack of security,
movement of militias, weapons, financing for terrorism, and the
instability that results. So, I think there's an opportunity
for the United States to take the lead in this effort, but
there's also a very real opportunity for regional players to
become a more significant part of the solution.
So, again, I thank you for putting the hearing together--
thrilled to be a part of this subcommittee and look forward to
the witnesses' testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Sununu follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John E. Sununu, U.S. Senator From New
Hampshire
Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this important
hearing in order to explore a comprehensive stabilization,
reconstruction, and counterterrorism strategy for Somalia.
The Horn of Africa and especially the country of Somalia have been
plagued with violence for a number of years, and attempts to quell the
terror have had limited success. Since the early 1990s, there have been
over a dozen conferences, supported by countries in the Horn, the
United Nations, and others to try and bring peace to the region. As the
United States and other countries around the world are engaged in
another theatre, the issues that have plagued Somalia, while not
overlooked, have been somewhat overshadowed.
The United States should continue to stay engaged in efforts to
combat terrorism and bring about a lasting peace in Somalia. I applaud
the steps taken by the State Department toward building a strategy for
stabilization, reconstruction, and counterterrorism operations in
Somalia, and it is my hope that they continue these worthwhile efforts.
Achieving peace is vial to the interests of Somalia, the Horn of
Africa, and the United States.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to explore such a
timely and important issue, and as this is the first hearing of the
Subcommittee on African Affairs, I look forward to working with you on
many more important issues throughout the 110th Congress. Finally, I
would like to thank the witnesses for taking time out of their busy
schedules to join us here today.
Thank you.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Senator Sununu.
And now, I'd like to turn to Senator Coleman, who has shown
a strong interest in leadership in this area, for any remarks
he has.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Coleman. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to thank you for your leadership. I am very,
very grateful for the leadership that you have consistently
displayed on this issue. The legislation that we talked about,
just introduced, that--which you championed, will hopefully
help us do those things that have to be done to bring some
stability to the region, including, you know, pushing for a
special envoy. We've got to move Somalia up on the radar
screen. We've talked about that with State Department, but this
is a way to do that.
So, I simply want to say thank you. Thank you for this
hearing, thank you for your strong voice, thank you for your
consistent efforts. I'm pleased to join with you. We estimate
there may be 70,000 Somalians in Minnesota. This is personal
for me. This impacts a lot of folks in my community.
If I--just one bit of optimism, with the challenges we
face, understanding that Somalia is on the front line in the
war on international terrorism today, what happens there does
have an impact. With the recognition that you've talked about,
that we need to approach this with a broad-range plan--it's not
an isolated piece. We'd have to have a strategy that--a
comprehensive plan to deal with Somalia, but there is great
diversity of the Somalian community back in Minnesota, and I
have seen folks come together on this. And so, if a diverse
community back home can come together with a--the goal, the
commitment being greater stability, peace in the region, then
we should figure out a way to work with them to make that
happen.
So, again, I ask unanimous consent to submit a more
detailed formal statement, but I do want to thank you for your
leadership on this issue.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Coleman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Norm Coleman, U.S. Senator From Minnesota
I am privileged to represent the State of Minnesota, which is home
to the largest community of Somalis outside of Somalia. It is estimated
that there may be up to 70,000 Somalis back home, and this thriving
community has enriched the fabric of our State through its vibrant
culture. It is through my friendship with our Somali community that I
have become familiar with the harsh realities of the situation on the
ground in Somalia, and the tragic implications this has had on the many
families that have ultimately sought refuge in our State. It is my
hope, and the hope of our Somali community, that we can help to one day
establish a peaceful and stable environment in their homeland. And
while I understand that the challenges we face are very large, the
commitment of our Somali Community here in the United States to work
for stability in Somalia provides me with hope that we can make
progress if we all work together.
I have worked to be a voice of the Somali community in Washington,
DC, as I believe the United States should be actively involved in
helping Somalia overcome many years of neglect and civil strife. And I
am very happy to participate in this hearing today with my
distinguished colleague, Senator Feingold, who has demonstrated great
compassion and leadership on the issue of Somalia.
Over the past year, we have witnessed a great deal of instability,
conflict, and even natural disasters in Somalia. As we will hear from
our witnesses today, this situation stems from a variety of factors,
not the least of which include a lack of functional institutions,
economic opportunity, and the involvement of neighbors in its internal
affairs. It has long been my belief that the magnitude of the
humanitarian crisis in Somalia, which cannot be underestimated, should
compel the United States to be more involved in the country's affairs.
Additionally, however, the United States has vital national security
interests at stake in Somalia. A Somalia without a functioning
government poses a grave risk to its neighbors as well as the
international community. As we saw in the case of Afghanistan, states
without a functioning government can become a haven for terrorists and
destabilize an entire region.
It is for these reasons that I am currently working with my
colleague, Senator Feingold, on legislation addressing Somalia. This
legislation not only seeks to focus greater resources on dealing with
this very critical situation, but also works to shape our overall
policy into one that will address the root causes of instability. As
Senator Feingold and I have pointed out repeatedly, we are long overdue
for a comprehensive U.S. strategy that aligns all of our objectives in
Somalia, which include political, economic, development, and
counterterrorism. Indeed, Somalia has served as a clear example of the
dangers involved in policies that are too narrowly focused on one
objective.
While the events that have unfolded in Somalia over the past year
have been extremely unfortunate, I only hope that at the very least
they will serve to spark the United States and international community
toward greater concerted action in Somalia.
I greatly admire the leadership of Senator Feingold on this issue,
and am grateful that he has organized this timely hearing. I look
forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses.
Senator Feingold. I thank the Senator from Minnesota.
I'd just point out that some of the Somalis that lived in
Minnesota have had the wisdom to move to Wisconsin, so----
[Laughter.]
Senator Coleman. Must be a warmer climate over there.
[Laughter.]
Senator Feingold. Yeah. Not today. [Laughter.]
Anyway, thanks to both of you. And now, we'll turn to the
first panel.
Secretary Frazer.
STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Frazer. Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Feingold,
Ranking Member Sununu, Senator Coleman.
At this first hearing of the Africa Subcommittee, I would
like to congratulate both Senator Feingold and Senator Sununu
on your new positions. I look forward to working closely with
you and other members of this subcommittee during the 110th
Congress.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling a hearing on this
timely and important issue, and for your focus on Africa, more
generally.
With your permission, I would like to submit my written
testimony for the record.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
Dr. Frazer. Thank you.
I'm pleased to have this opportunity to publicly discuss
U.S. policy and engagement with Somalia and the Horn of Africa.
Somalia occupies a unique space, both geographically and
strategically. The country sits at the crossroads of sub-
Saharan Africa and the Near East. The region's overall security
is directly affected by Somalia's internal situation. And, for
the first time in 16 years, Somalis have a real opportunity to
rebuild their nation. We will assist Somalis to realize this
opportunity by restoring effective governance that is
representative of the full spectrum of Somali society.
A lot has happened, and significant diplomacy has been
undertaken since I last appeared before this subcommittee in
July 2006. At the time, the United States was encouraged by the
June 22, 2006, agreement between the Somali Transitional
Federal Institutions and the then-Union of Islamic Courts. The
United States supported this agreement, which came to be known
as the Khartoum Declaration, including the points of mutual
recognition and cessation of hostilities.
While negotiations initially offered great promise, by late
July the actions of the Islamic Courts (CIC) were beginning to
run counter to the spirit and the reality of dialog.
Immediately after the Khartoum Declaration, the Union of
Islamic Courts was renamed the Council of Islamic Courts, and
Hassan Dahir Aweys, designated by both the United States and
United Nations as a terrorist, was elected to be the chairman
of the CIC Consultative Council. During the following months,
extremist elements within the CIC, particularly the radical al-
Shabaab organization, hijacked the broader Court's movement,
driving the CIC toward an agenda of military expansion and
aggression.
Despite international efforts to encourage dialog between
the CIC and the TFIs, the CIC chose to repeatedly violate the
terms of the Khartoum Declaration, due to the September 18,
2006, terrorist bombing attack on the Parliament building in
Baidoa, the takeover of Kismaayo on September 25, and military
buildups around Baidoa and Puntland. These were decisive
moments. Ultimately, the CIC miscalculated in its decision to
pursue a military agenda and to refuse to join the governance
process and the TFIs through peaceful dialog. When the
Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopia launched a
counteroffensive against the CIC in December, the CIC's
structure disappeared rapidly, driven in large part by the
withdrawal of support from the Somali population. The
extremists within the CIC very clearly did not reflect the will
of Somalis, as represented by civil society and their
government.
In the last 2 months, I have traveled to the region twice,
conveying the strong commitment of President Bush and Secretary
Rice to the people of Somalia. The most striking lesson I took
away from my trip to the region in early January is this, the
Somali people are ready for peace and tired of war. While the
TFIs are not yet ready to stand entirely on their own, they
offer a promising vehicle forward for Somalia.
At this moment of opportunity, we are proceeding
purposefully. We are pursuing a strategy to establish
stability, move forward with a process of inclusive dialog and
reconciliation, and begin reconstruction in Somalia. Under my
leadership and that of President Bush's Special Assistant for
Africa, Mr. Bobby Pittman, there is a growing interagency team
working together to advance the United States policy objectives
in Somalia. That interagency policy team is part of our broader
strategy working with the International Contact Group on
Somalia multilaterally and very much coordinating with our
regional partners, especially Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti,
but also with Ghana, Yemen, and Tanzania.
While the overall U.S. policy goals remain consistent--to
eliminate the threat of terrorism and improve regional
stabilities by supporting the reestablishment of effective
governance and respond to the humanitarian needs of the Somali
people--the changing dynamics inside Somalia require us to
constantly adapt to ensure that our engagement remains
effective.
To take advantage of the current window of opportunity
available in Somalia, our immediate policy priorities are:
Encourage inclusive dialog among Somali stakeholders; mobilize
support to build the governance capacity of the TFIs; provide
development and humanitarian assistance to the Somali people;
achieve deployment of an African stabilization force; and
continue to track the terrorists to prevent Somalia remaining a
safe haven for terrorism. These goals are also shared by our
partners in the international community.
The United States believes that the key to long-term
stability in Somalia now lies in a process of inclusive dialog
and reconciliation within the framework of the transitional
federal charter. The United States has encouraged the
leadership of the TFIs to make clear, through statements and
actions, that they are committed to an inclusive process of
dialog and reconciliation. We have been clear. We see a role in
the future of Somalia for all those who renounce violence and
extremism, and we strongly believe that the TFG must reach out
to groups that have previously been marginalized from the
political process.
In addition, we remain deeply troubled that foreign
terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda have succeeded in
establishing a safe haven in Somalia. Somalia's continued
exploitation by terrorist elements threatens the stability of
the entire Horn of Africa region. We will, therefore, continue
to take measures to deny terrorists' safe haven in Somalia, as
well as the ability to plan and operate from Somalia.
The United States Government remains committed to
neutralizing the threat that al-Qaeda poses to all Americans,
Somalis, and citizens in neighboring Horn of Africa countries.
The administration will continue working with Somalis,
regardless of clan, religious, or secular affiliation, to
eliminate this common threat.
As we look ahead to the next 2 years, Somalia's assistance
needs may look overwhelming. To support our policy objectives
and help achieve a lasting solution in Somalia, the United
States has identified three priority areas for U.S. or foreign
assistance: Security and stabilization, No. 1; second,
political dialog and reconciliation; and, third, service
delivery and governance capacity.
Sufficient funding is required to enable the United States
to successfully and adequately pursue these three important
policy goals.
Under the first objective of security and stabilizations,
funds would be used to support the deployment of the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), security sector reform, and
post-conflict stabilization activities.
Under the second objective, of political dialog and
reconciliation, funds would be used to support reconciliation
and dialog through support for conflict mitigation, civil
society, and media freedom.
Last, under our third foreign assistance priority, funding
would be used to improve the ability of the Transitional
Federal Institutions to provide social services and build the
government's capacities, other TFIs, at the local, regional,
and national level.
To help achieve these objectives, the administration has
included a request for $60 million for Somalia in the
President's supplemental funding request for FY 2007. That $60
million figure includes $20 million in humanitarian assistance
and $40 million to support a peacekeeping operation. We are
working to identify additional resources for these efforts,
which includes the $40 million that Secretary Rice announced in
January, bringing our total FY07 to $100 million for Somalia.
However, post-conflict institution-building is ultimately a
locally led enterprise. If international donor support is to be
effective, these resources must be linked to progress made by
Somalis in achieving broadbased political dialog and
reconciliation on the part of clans, religious leaders,
business people, civil society activists, women's leaders, and
other political groups. Along with our African and
international partners, the United States will remain engaged
in supporting this much-needed process of inclusive dialog,
while also attending to the humanitarian needs of the Somali
people.
The situation inside Somalia has changed a great deal since
July, when I last testified before this body about Somalia. The
United States, along with our African regional partners and
international partners, have made significant progress toward
supporting the TFIs and moving toward the rapid deployment of a
peacekeeping force since last July. Work remains to be done,
but the political process is going to be inclusive and
successful. One important factor continues to work strongly in
our collective favor: The Somali people are tired of war and
yearn for what the TFIs offer--namely, stability, security, and
governance. Our comprehensive strategy for Somalia is already
showing promise, and we are likely to see more progress in the
coming months.
Thank you, and I would be happy to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Frazer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
introduction
Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Feingold and Ranking Member
Sununu. At this first hearing of the Africa Subcommittee, I
congratulate you both on your new positions. I look forward to working
closely with you and the other members of this subcommittee during the
110th Congress. Thank you for calling a hearing on this timely and
important issue. I am pleased to have this opportunity to publicly
discuss U.S. policy and engagement with Somalia and the Horn of Africa.
Mr. Chairman, given your longstanding interest in Somalia, I am not at
all surprised that this is the subject of the subcommittee's first
hearing.
Somalia occupies a unique space, both geographically and
strategically. The country sits at the crossroads of sub-Saharan Africa
and the Near East. The overall security of the region is affected by
Somalia's continued lack of internal stability. In this regard, U.S.
interests in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa region are to promote
and support regional stability and representative government, to
eliminate any platform for al-Qaeda or other terrorist operations, to
provide humanitarian assistance in the wake of drought, flooding, and
16 years of near-constant conflict in southern and central Somalia, and
to work with governments in the region to transform the countries
through investing in people and good governance and promoting economic
growth.
For the first time in 16 years, Somalis face the prospect of
rebuilding their nation. We have a real opportunity to help Somalis
restore effective governance that is representative of the full
spectrum of Somali society. We are pursuing a strategy to help
establish stability, move forward with a process of inclusive dialog
and reconciliation, and begin reconstruction within Somalia. Under my
leadership, there is a growing interagency team working together to
advance our policy objectives in Somalia.
decisive moments
A lot has happened since I last appeared before this subcommittee
in July 2006. At the time, the United States was encouraged by the June
22, 2006, agreement between the Somalia Transitional Federal
Institutions (TFIs) and the then-Union of Islamic Courts. The United
States supported this agreement, which came to be known as the Khartoum
Declaration, including the points of mutual recognition and cessation
of hostilities.
While negotiations initially offered great promise, by late July
the actions of the Islamic courts were beginning to run counter to the
spirit and the reality of dialog. Immediately after the Khartoum
Declaration, the Union of Islamic Courts was renamed the Council of
Islamic Courts (CIC) and Hassan Dahir Aweys, designated by both the
United States and the United Nations as a terrorist, was elected to be
the chairman of the CIC Consultative Council. On July 19, 2006, the CIC
attempted to provoke Ethiopia into a broader conflict by advancing
toward the interim capital of Baidoa. During the following months,
extremist elements within the CIC--particularly the radical al-Shabaab
organization--hijacked the broader courts movement, driving the CIC
toward an agenda of military expansion and aggression. Despite
international efforts to encourage dialog between the CIC and the TFIs,
the CIC chose to repeatedly violate the terms of the Khartoum
Declaration through the takeover of Kismaayo, the September 18, 2006,
terrorist bombing attack on the Parliament building in Baidoa, and
military buildups around Baidoa and Puntland.
These were decisive moments. Ultimately, the CIC miscalculated in
its decision to pursue a military agenda and to refuse to join the
governance process and the TFIs through peaceful dialog. When the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopia launched a
counteroffensive against the CIC in December, the CIC structure
disappeared faster than anyone had anticipated. However, they were also
weakened immensely by the withdrawal of support from the Somali
population. The extremists within the CIC very clearly did not reflect
the will of Somalis, as represented by civil society and their
government.
a hopeful moment in time
Following these developments, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
sent me back to the region to conduct regional diplomatic efforts. My
trip included visits to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen in support
of broader efforts to achieve lasting stability in Somalia.
The most striking lesson I took away from my early January trip to
the region is this: Somalis are ready. Somalis are ready for peace;
they are tired of war. While the TFIs are not yet ready to stand
entirely on their own without international support, they offer a
promising vehicle forward for Somalia. While developments on the ground
have maintained a frenetic pace, there are many reasons to be hopeful.
In an effort to make the most of this moment of opportunity, we
have engaged in conversations and negotiations with Somalia's various
stakeholders and regional governments. This approach is in keeping with
Secretary Rice's Transformational Diplomacy approach. I have met with
my counterparts in African countries and regional organizations, and I
have been seeking the advice and counsel of African officials and
diplomats to resolve this situation.
During my trip at the turn of the year, I participated in a series
of high-level diplomatic meetings, conveying the United States
Government's position on various issues. I spoke with President
Museveni of Uganda and representatives of the African Union in
Ethiopia. I also met with the leadership of the TFIs, including
President Abdullahi Yusuf, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi, and former
Parliament Speaker Shariff Hassan Sheikh Adan, and representatives of
Somali civil society.
On January 5, Kenyan Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju, Norway's Deputy
Foreign Minister Raymond Johansen, and I cochaired a meeting of the
International Contact Group on Somalia. This gathering demonstrated the
depth of the international community's commitment to supporting a
sustainable political solution in Somalia through broad-based national
dialog and providing appropriate development, security, and
humanitarian assistance.
The Contact Group issued a communique at the meeting's end that
recognized the historic opportunity now within the grasp of the Somali
people, as they seek a sustainable political solution based on the
framework of the Transitional Federal Charter. Further, the Contact
Group affirmed the importance of inclusive governance and additionally
emphasized that funding to facilitate the deployment of a stabilization
force in Somalia, based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1725,
remains urgent. This communique and the other sentiments expressed by
members of the Contact Group that day demonstrate the unity and common
priorities of the international community on Somalia. These themes
continued during my consultations and bilateral meetings on the margins
of the January 29-30 African Union Summit in Ethiopia.
political dialog
The United States strategy for Somalia includes three major
priorities in Somalia. First, encourage inclusive political dialog
between the leadership of the TFIs and other key Somali stakeholders.
Second, mobilize international support to help build the governance
capacity of the Transitional Federal Institutions and provide
development and humanitarian assistance for the Somali people. And
third, although perhaps most urgent, move forward with the deployment
of an African stabilization force in Somalia.
These objectives remain consistent with the objectives that I
articulated to this subcommittee in July 2006. While the United States
does not believe that the now-defunct Council of Islamic Courts should
be reconstituted in order to engage in dialog with the TFIs, the United
States believes that the key to long-term stability in Somalia now lies
in a process of inclusive dialog and reconciliation leading to the
formation of an inclusive government of national unity within the
framework of the Transitional Federal Charter.
To a great extent, this process will rely on the government's
willingness to reach out and create an inclusive political process.
This remains the greatest challenge. The leaders of the TFIs must serve
as symbols and architects of this process. The statement that President
Yusuf made to the Contact Group regarding his intention to engage with
Somali stakeholders was a positive step. He further announced at the
African Union Summit the intention of the TFIs to convene a national
reconciliation conference inside Somalia involving all key stakeholders
in an inclusive process of dialog.
In recent months, the United States has encouraged the leadership
of the TFIs to make clear through statements and actions that they are
committed to an inclusive process of dialog and reconciliation. We have
been clear--we see a role in the future of Somalia for all those who
renounce violence and extremism, and we strongly believe that the TFG
must reach out to groups that have previously been marginalized from
the political process.
The TFIs must reach out to key groups inside Somalia, including:
Clan leaders, business and civil society, women's groups, and religious
leaders, among others. These groups, particularly those in Mogadishu,
must also demonstrate their willingness to engage with the TFIs and to
work together constructively. Additionally, this means that we suggest
that the leadership of the TFIs reach out to religious authorities,
including the diverse range of local, organic courts affiliated with
various clans. The courts' members were, of course, also a
heterogeneous group from the outset, so there are moderate individuals
who could be drawn into the larger, official political process.
This is not an either/or proposition. The security and political
components of the policy I have just described must function as two
simultaneous efforts, progressing toward the same end point.
security and stability
This dialog must move forward very quickly to reach a sustainable
solution, on the basis of the Transitional Federal Charter, in order to
stabilize the situation in Mogadishu and allow all components of the
TFIs to relocate to the country's capital. Rapid deployment of an
African stabilization force in Somalia will help create a secure
environment in which this political process can move forward and will
help instill confidence in the Somali people that the peace process is
moving forward.
The United States is working closely with the African Union (AU),
as they prepare for the deployment of a stabilization force to help
provide a secure environment for political inclusiveness and
transition. On January 19, the AU Peace and Security Council endorsed
the deployment of this force. Several AU member-states have expressed
their desire to contribute troops or provide logistical support for
this effort. Uganda came forward first, offering to deploy 1,500 troops
based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1725. Ugandan
President Museveni's initial offer has since been followed by other
countries, including Ghana, Nigeria, and Burundi, expressing a desire
to provide troops for this effort.
As a crucial component of our strategy in Somalia, the United
States is actively supporting the deployment of this force,
particularly the Ugandan contingent, which requires support with
strategic transportation, equipment, and other logistics. Immediate
U.S. support includes $2 million for strategic transportation and $8
million for equipment for the Ugandan force, as well as technical
assistance. With our help, and following approval by the Ugandan
Parliament, we anticipate that the Ugandans can deploy to Somalia as
early as this week.
This remains very much an AU-led and AU-coordinated effort. The
United States and other donor partners are working closely with the AU,
which recently selected Ghana's President John Kufuor as its chair. The
AU is already working on plans to strengthen the Ugandan deployment
with further troop deployments, and Kenyan Foreign Minister Tuju
traveled to several African countries last month to solicit additional
troop contributions.
Africans have developed a strong record of conflict resolution and
peacekeeping in recent years. As Nigeria took the lead in Liberia and
South Africa did in Burundi, we are hopeful that Africans will once
again help what President Mbeki has called one of their ``sister
countries'' move beyond strife and toward reconciliation.
However, it is the Somali people who must be responsible for local-
level security without resorting to the warlordism of the past. We have
advised the TFIs to make development of a civilian police force a
priority, and ultimately the political process should lead to the
formation of a unified military representative of all of Somalia's
clans. For that reason, the United States has supported the call of the
International Contact Group on Somalia to quickly ``establish local-
level stability throughout Somalia, effective Somali security forces,
including a civilian police force.'' These efforts will be supported by
the deployment of the stabilization force to Somalia, which will
provide a secure environment in which a political process can move
forward and effective security institutions can be developed.
In addition, we remain deeply troubled that foreign terrorists
associated with al-Qaeda have succeeded in establishing a safe haven in
Somalia. Somalia's continued exploitation by terrorist elements
threatens the stability of the entire Horn of Africa region. We will
therefore take strong measures to deny terrorists safe haven in
Somalia, as well as the ability to plan and operate from Somalia. In
this regard, the United States continues to work with East African
countries to build their capacity to counter terrorism and criminality
that originates in Somalia. The United States Government remains
committed to neutralizing the threat that al-Qaeda poses to all
Americans, Somalis, and citizens in neighboring Horn of Africa
countries. The administration will continue working with Somalis,
regardless of clan, religious, or secular affiliation to eliminate this
common threat.
supporting the transitional federal institutions
Developments in Somalia remain highly fluid. The fragile, nascent
TFIs are only beginning to function and are only beginning to control
territory, while spoilers and extremists continue to undermine
stability.
U.S. engagement seeks to support the TFIs and encourage
reconciliation among key Somali stakeholders. Given the absence of
functioning governance institutions in Somalia for over 15 years, the
rebuilding of governance and security institutions will largely be
starting from scratch and will require significant external assistance.
It is critically important that the United States help enhance the
governance capacity of the TFIs, as well as support efforts to build
governance capacity at the local and regional level. In this regard,
U.S. assistance aimed at supporting short-term quick impact and high
visibility, will be a critical element in building support for the TFIs
and demonstrating to the Somali people that the TFIs offer a means of
improving their overall quality of life.
At the January 5, 2007, meeting of the International Contact Group
on Somalia, I signaled the administration's intention to take concrete
steps to assist Somalia. We are providing $40.5 million in new
assistance for Somalia. This contribution is a reflection of our
commitment to, and engagement with, Somalia's revitalization. As
announced by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on January 4, this
total includes $16.5 million in humanitarian assistance and $24 million
that will be used to support both deployment of a peace support mission
and provide development assistance for the Somali people. We are also
requesting $60 million in FY 2007 supplemental funding for Somalia,
including $40 million for peacekeeping and $20 million in humanitarian
assistance for those affected by the current humanitarian crisis in
Somalia.
We have signaled clearly that the United States intends to remain
engaged for the long term in Somalia. Other donor partners have also
agreed to identify additional resources for Somalia. However, post
conflict institution-building is ultimately a locally led enterprise.
If international donor support is to be effective these resources must
be linked to progress made by Somalis in achieving broad-based
political dialog and reconciliation on the part of clans, religious
leaders, business people, civil society activists, women's leaders, and
other political groups.
We understand that this is an ongoing process, and that we have not
reached the end. Along with our African and international partners, the
United States will remain engaged in supporting this much-needed
process of inclusive dialog, while also attending to the humanitarian
needs of the Somali people.
conclusion
The situation inside Somalia has changed a great deal since July.
The United States, along with our international partners, have made
significant progress toward supporting the TFIs and moving toward the
rapid deployment of African peacekeeping forces.
Work remains to be done, if the political process is going to be
inclusive and successful. While we welcome the positive statements from
Somali leaders and encourage them to take positive action, we are
cognizant of the challenges we face--which could include a lack of
political will from some elements of the TFIs to engage in such a
process.
One important factor continues to work strongly in our collective
favor. The Somali people are tired of war and yearn for what the TFIs
offer--stability, security, and governance. Our comprehensive strategy
for Somalia is already showing promise, and we are likely to see more
progress in the coming months.
Thank you, and now I would be happy to take your questions.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your
remarks.
And now, we turn to Mr. Hess.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE,
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hess. Hopefully this is on.
Thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Sununu, and
Senator Coleman. It is an honor to appear before you today to
discuss the U.S. Government assistance and a way forward in
Somalia.
With your permission, sir, I will submit my written
statement for the record.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
Mr. Hess. Having just returned from a trip to the Horn of
Africa, where we have a Disaster Assistance Response Team
monitoring the needs in Somalia, in the Somalia region of
Ethiopia and the Kenya/Somalia border, I plan to give you a
picture today of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and a
sense of how our humanitarian and development partners on the
ground regard the situation. I will also discuss what we see as
a way forward and what USAID is going to assure that the way
forward brings peace and stability to a population that has
suffered more in 1 year than most do in a lifetime.
In July, when I addressed this subcommittee, I spoke about
the disastrous toll that the drought had taken on central and
southern Somalia, and the 1.7 million agropastoralists and
pastoralists whose lives and livelihoods had benefited from the
robust U.S. Government humanitarian response and the generosity
of the American people. Since July, these same Somalis have
experienced some of the worst flooding they can remember.
Although the death toll has been minimal, 255,000 people were
displaced, crops were destroyed, and livestock were lost.
Flooding has seriously hindered the delivery of humanitarian
assistance, particularly food, to the region. During my trip to
the region, I had the opportunity to visit Dadaab camp. It's a
refugee camp 80 kilometers inside the Kenya/Somali border,
where I heard firsthand from Somalis about the situation in
their home country. The camp hosts some 170,000 refugees, 98
percent of whom were Somalis who have fled the country.
However, in the last year, when the Islamic Courts were making
advances in Somalia, nearly 35,000 additional people crossed
over from Somalia and are--now reside in that camp.
There are two points I would like you to remember about
this camp. First, it has been there for 16 years and has a
global acute malnutrition rate of 22 percent, which is 7
percent over the emergency level, even though the people in
these camps receive a full ration. Points out the challenges
that we face and what Fred Cuny taught us a long time ago, that
it's more than just food that prevents malnutrition.
Second, the families with whom I spoke, particularly the
women, were not willing to return to Somalia when peace
returned. That is a striking comment, and one on which we'll
have to work in the future.
Across the border in Somalia, our partners estimate that
the most recent round of conflict has displaced 40,000 people
in south and central Somalia. Almost all of those have returned
to their homes, and a number of people estimate that the acute
food crisis has dropped by more than half. However, as the
rains and floodings begin to ease, our partners are prepared
for an increase in water and mosquito-born diseases, such as
cholera, dysentery, and malaria, which pose a particularly
serious threat to children under the age of 5, the elderly, and
the populations already compromised by undernourishment.
Livelihoods are also at risk. In addition to human disease,
animal disease is a threat. Rift Valley fever is suspected in
hundreds of recent animal deaths and several human deaths in
southern Somalia, where conflict has made it difficult to
collect and transport samples for confirmation. Rift Valley
fever can disseminate herds of cattle and sheep, and it poses a
serious health threat to the human--weakened human population.
It is also a potential--disastrous potential economic effect on
Somalia and its neighbors. Our U.N. partners and NGO partners
are working together with the Transitional Federal Government
to identify the fever and treat humans and animals.
So far, in fiscal year 2007, the U.S. Government has
provided nearly $16 million to mitigate the impacts of the
drought, floods, and conflict resulting in the displacements in
Somalia and across its borders. This assistance builds on a
carryover of resources from $92 million in 2006. The
availability of these resources permitted our partners to
respond immediately and robustly to the flood emergency in the
fall and ensured a strong food pipeline through the first
quarter of this fiscal year.
USAID's ongoing humanitarian programs are targeted in the
drought- and flood-affected areas of southern and central
Somalia and addresses food insecurity, nutrition, health,
water, sanitation, and hygiene. Our partners have well-
established programs and a thorough knowledge of the local and
regional issues affecting the populations they serve. It is
this experience that has enabled them to continue to serve
beneficiaries and implement programs throughout the political
turmoil of the past year.
While in Nairobi, I met with our partners. I was uniformly
impressed with their dedication and the knowledge each one
brings to their work. None of the groups felt that the conflict
occurring around the withdrawal of the courts had dramatically
increased humanitarian needs, but they all stressed the need to
continue support of drought and flood victims.
Access appears to be improving in many parts of Somalia.
The Government of Kenya has pledged to soon reopen its borders
for humanitarian deliveries into Somalia, and most of our NGO
partners are back in Somalia.
I also met with the United Nations country team for
Somalia. They have an impressive team. The head of the UNDP,
which returned to Mogadishu--had just returned from Mogadishu,
where he led a U.N. delegation to assess the possibility of the
return of U.N. personnel. It is clear that the United Nations
regards the next few months as a window of opportunity to
support Somalis to achieve peace and security in their country.
The U.N. country team outlined a set of priorities for the
next 6 months which bridge humanitarian, stabilization, and
initial reconstruction efforts. These priorities also include
building the capacity of key Transitional Federal Institutions,
strengthening the security sector, and assisting the
Transitional Federal Institutions in jump-starting urgent basic
social services, particularly in education and health. In
addition, they will ensure that the livelihood and job
creations launched earlier in this year will be community-based
activities.
Our own priorities are much the same as these, since we
helped them draft the plan. Last year, we programmed $7.9
million in FY06 development assistance to strengthen the
capacity of civil society, support conflict mitigation, address
basic education needs, including distance learning and teacher
training, to increase access to water through rehabilitation of
urban water systems, and development of rural water services.
Also, while I was in Nairobi I met with Admiral Hunt,
commander of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, with
whom we have been working very closely throughout the entire
Horn. I am optimistic with--that with the coordination
established between the State Department, USAID, and CJTF-HOA,
and the Somalia working group in Nairobi, we are creating a
coordination model capable of serving both our national
security interests and the interests of the people of Somalia
and the Horn of Africa.
I would like to outline for you our priorities over the
next 90 days.
First, we will continue to respond to humanitarian
contingencies which may arise in this volatile area.
Second, we will identify opportunities to increase training
and capacity-building in our current emergency programs,
particularly in nutrition, health, and water services, jump-
starting long-term efforts addressing the delivery of critical
public services.
Third, we will develop a post-conflict Somalia livelihoods
recovery strategy similar to the lessons learned in the
pastorals recovery and alternative livelihood programming we
have been doing in Ethiopia and Kenya and other parts of
Africa.
Fourth, support the efforts made on the part of the United
Nations and our nongovernmental partners to ensure that the
ongoing emergency response provides a foundation for recovery
and reconstruction.
Fifth, ensure that the protection of humanitarian space
becomes part of the diplomatic dialog with the Transitional
Federal Government.
In closing, I want to remind the committee of the dire
situation on which I reported last July, and that, for the
people of Somalia, the situation has only gotten worse. But we
are here today talking about a window of opportunity, when it
may be possible to help Somalia find a pathway out of political
chaos, hunger, and suffering. Seizing this opportunity will
increase the chances that the region, as a whole, finds its way
to a stable, peaceful, and productive future. The approaches
that I have outlined today are our best efforts at maximizing
this opportunity, and we look forward to working with you and
the interagency to make sure that these opportunities are not
lost.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you, again, for having me back to
talk about Somalia and what we hope to accomplish there. I look
forward to responding to any questions you or members of this
subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hess follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael E. Hess, Assistant Administrator,
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S.
Agency for International Development, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is
an honor to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Government
assistance and the way forward in Somalia.
background
Having just returned from a trip to the Horn, where we have a
Disaster Assistance Response Team monitoring needs in Somalia, the
Somali region of Ethiopia and the Kenya-Somalia border, I hope to be
able to give you a good picture of what the humanitarian situation
currently is in Somalia and a sense of how our humanitarian and
development partners on the ground regard the situation. I will also
discuss what we see as a way forward and what USAID is doing to assure
that the way forward brings peace and stability to a population that
has suffered more in one year than most do in a lifetime.
In July, when I last addressed this subcommittee, I spoke about the
disastrous toll that drought had taken on central and southern Somalia,
and of the 1.7 million pastoralists and agro-pastoralists whose lives
and livelihoods have benefited from a robust USG humanitarian response
and the generosity of the American people.
Since July, these same Somalis have experienced some of the worst
flooding they can remember. Although deaths were minimal, 255,000
people were displaced, crops were destroyed, and livestock was lost.
The worst of it occurred in November and December, but as recently as
last week flooding displaced 1,000 people in the Lower Shabelle valley.
Flooding has seriously hindered the delivery of humanitarian
assistance--particularly food assistance--with entire convoys being
mired for weeks at a time.
dadaab
During my trip I had the opportunity to visit Dadaab refugee camp--
80 km from the Kenya-Somalia border--and hear first-hand about the
situation in Somalia. The camp hosts some 170,000 refugees, 98 percent
of whom are Somalis fleeing their country. The majority of them have
been there since 1991. The protracted refugee situation is testimony to
the longstanding chaos in Somalia. Just last year, when the Islamic
courts were making advances in Somalia, nearly 35,000 people crossed
over to Kenya into the refugee camps. Owing to security concerns, Kenya
closed its border to new asylum-seekers on January 3 and forcibly
returned several hundred from the border transit center. Acknowledging
shared security concerns, the USG has pressed the Kenyan Government to
reopen the border to legitimate asylum-seekers.
At the Dadaab camp, I witnessed a food aid distribution--supported
in part through our Food for Peace program--and met with some of the
newer arrivals. The severe flooding that hit Somalia also hit
northeastern Kenya, including the refugee camps where the State
Department and Department of Defense worked to support UNHCR's flood
relief efforts with U.S. military airdrops. In the section for new
arrivals, in sparse vegetation and sandy soil, refugees had made homes
out of branches and plastic sheeting. They rely completely on the
international community for their survival. Aid agencies admit that
they have not been able to get water services out to the new arrivals
area that has received tens of thousands of people in the last year,
and women now living there asked that I look into the situation.
Digging wells is a difficult job in Dadaab. Water is some 150 meters
below the sandy soil, requiring technical expertise that is not easily
found. Emergency refugee funding made available by the State Department
will help alleviate the pressures caused by increased refugee numbers.
Standing among the women and children gathered in the new arrivals
area, I could only imagine the difficult journeys these families had
made to get to this desolate place--most had come from the Juba River
Valley or Gedo Region--hundreds of kilometers away--and the long, hard
road that lies ahead for them. When I spoke to these women, they talked
of insecurity, uncertainty, and threats. They spoke of family members
they had left behind in Somalia. They spoke of the hardships they had
fled and their fear of having to return.
new threats and opportunities
Across the border in Somalia, our partners estimate that the most
recent round of conflict displaced 40,000 people in south and central
Somalia. In contrast, almost 90 percent of those displaced by flooding
have been able to return home, and the number of people estimated to be
in an ``acute food security crisis'' has dropped by more than one half.
However, as the rains and flooding begin to ease, our partners are
preparing for an explosion of water and mosquito borne diseases such as
cholera, dysentery, and malaria, which pose a particularly serious
threat to children under 5, the elderly and the population already
compromised by undernutrition.
Livelihoods are also at risk because, in addition to human disease,
animal disease is also a threat. Rift Valley Fever is suspected in
hundreds of recent animal deaths and several human deaths in southern
Somalia, where conflict has made it difficult to collect and transport
samples for confirmation. Rift Valley Fever (RVF) can decimate herds of
cattle and sheep, and it poses a serious health threat in weakened
human populations. Its potential economic impact on Somalia and its
neighbors is significant: An outbreak in Somalia in 1997 led to a ban
on imports of livestock from all Somali ports to the Persian Gulf
States and the loss of as much as $100 million in revenue within 2
years. To curb rumors of RVF, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
recently announced new regulations regarding the identification and
treatment of the disease in Somalia. Our U.N. and NGO partners have the
capacities and resources to assist in controlling the spread and
mitigating the impact of the disease; but in order to do so they will
require the ability to collect and share information and test results
in a transparent, proactive fashion.
So far in fiscal year 2007, the USG has provided nearly $16 million
to mitigate the impact of drought, floods, conflict, and resulting
displacement within Somalia and across its borders. This assistance
builds on carryover resources from $92 million provided in fiscal year
2006. The availability of these resources permitted our partners to
respond immediately and robustly to the flood emergency in the fall,
and ensured the existence of a strong food pipeline in the first
quarter of this fiscal year.
USAID's ongoing humanitarian programs are targeted in the drought
and flood affected areas of south central Somalia and address food
insecurity, nutrition, health, water, sanitation, and hygiene. Our
partners have well-established programs and a thorough knowledge of
local and regional issues affecting the populations they serve. It is
this experience that has enabled them to continue to serve
beneficiaries and implement programs throughout the political turmoil
of the past year.
partner perspectives
While in Nairobi in mid-January of this year, I had the opportunity
to meet with all of our partners. I was uniformly impressed with the
dedication and knowledge each one is bringing to their work. None of
the groups I met with felt that the conflict occurring around the
withdrawal of the courts had dramatically increased humanitarian needs,
but they all stressed the need for continued support of drought and
flood victiDr. After the withdrawal of the Islamic courts, our NGO
partners took a cautious, ``wait and see'' attitude. Access appears to
be improving in many parts of Somalia, the Government of Kenya has
pledged to soon reopen its border for humanitarian deliveries into
Somalia, and most of our NGO partners are back in Somalia. However,
they made clear that as we move forward, humanitarian space will need
to be protected, and they ask that this become a part of our diplomatic
dialog with the Transitional Federal Government.
I was very impressed with the United Nations Country Team for
Somalia, which includes the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA), the World Health Program, UNHCR, the World Food
Program, the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNICEF, and the U.N.
Development Program (UNDP). They are completely engaged, and they
talked openly about the challenging and critical issues they are
currently facing on the ground. The head of UNDP had just returned from
Mogadishu, where he led a U.N. delegation to assess the possibility of
a return of U.N. personnel. It is clear that the United Nations regards
the next few months as a window of opportunity to support Somalis to
achieve peace and security in their country. The U.N. Country Team has
outlined a set of priorities for the next 6 months which bridge
humanitarian, stabilization, and initial reconstruction efforts. These
priorities also include building the capacity of key Transitional
Federal Government Institutions, strengthening the security sector, and
assisting the Transitional Federal Government jump-start urgent basic
social services--particularly in education and health. In addition,
they will ensure that livelihood and job creation be launched early in
these community-based recovery activities.
usaid priorities
Our own priorities are much the same. Last year we programmed $7.9
million in FY06 development assistance to strengthen the capacity of
civil society, support conflict mitigation, address basic education
needs--including distance learning and teacher training--and increase
access to water through the rehabilitation of urban water systems and
development of rural water services. In 2007--in accordance with USG
policy aimed at strengthening the capacity of governing institutions--
development assistance is planned to reinforce the capacity of
executive, legislative, and local authorities. Our assistance will also
reinforce the TFG's capacity to deliver integrated social services--
particularly in the areas of health, water, and education--thereby
enhancing its credibility among diverse constituencies. Through support
for ongoing reconciliation programming, we are facilitating the broad-
based, inclusive participation of diverse civil society actors in
Somalia's social, political, and economic decisionmaking. Through these
venues, our development assistance programming serves to mitigate the
underlying threats and conditions that encourage extremism,
instability, and terrorism.
While I was in Nairobi, I had the opportunity to meet with Admiral
Hunt, commander of our Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-HOA) in the
Horn. He reports that coordination and collaboration between the task
force and USAID staff--both in the Horn and here in the United States
prior to his deployment to Djibouti--has been invaluable to the task
force's civilian-military operations. From a USAID perspective, we feel
that the best and most efficient use of USG resources in the Horn is
likely to come from good coordination and a mutual understanding of the
roles, responsibilities, capacities and strengths of our respective
agencies and operating units. Over the past 12 months, USAID, State and
the Department of Defense have worked hard to operationalize an
approach in Somalia and the region that truly reflects the three Ds--
Diplomacy, Development, and Defense. Defined as pillars to our national
security in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, the elevation of
development--as a key pillar--is seen as reinforcing diplomacy and
defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping
to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies. I am optimistic
that with the coordination established between USAID, State, and CJTF-
HOA in the Somalia Working Group in Nairobi, we are creating a
coordination model capable of serving both our own national security
interests and the interests of the people of Somalia and the Horn.
next steps
I'd like to share with you USAID's priorities over the next 90
days. Over this period we will use the resources available to us to:
Respond effectively to humanitarian contingencies which may
arise in this very volatile situation;
Identify opportunities to increase training and capacity-
building in our current emergency programs--particularly in
nutrition, health, and water services--jump-starting longer
term efforts addressing the delivery of critical public
services;
Develop a post-conflict Somalia livelihood recovery
strategy, using lessons learned in recent pastoralist recovery
and alternative livelihood programming in Ethiopia and Kenya
and in post-conflict programming in other parts of Africa;
Support efforts made on the part of the United Nations and
our nongovernmental partners to ensure that ongoing emergency
response provides a foundation for recovery and reconstruction;
Ensure that the protection of humanitarian space becomes
part of the diplomatic dialog with the Transitional Federal
Government.
I'll close by sharing with you something that has been in the back
of my mind ever since I received the invitation to provide testimony
today.
On July 11 of last year, I presented a picture of a people who were
on the edge of a precipice, with years of chaos and conflict,
catastrophic drought, disease, malnutrition, and a staggering loss of
livestock resulting in the near collapse of an entire livelihood
system. That was a true picture, and had anyone asked me that day to
imagine that this same, beleaguered population would have to withstand
months of devastating floods followed by renewed conflict, I would have
found it nearly impossible to do. It is still hard for me to do,
despite knowing that this is exactly what has happened since July.
But we are here today talking about a window of opportunity when it
may be possible to help Somalia find a pathway out of political chaos,
hunger, and suffering. Seizing this opportunity will increase the
chances that the region as a whole finds its way to a stable, peaceful,
and productive future. The approaches that I have outlined today are
our best efforts at maximizing this opportunity, and we look forward to
working with you and the Interagency, to make sure that these
opportunities are not lost.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for having me back to talk about
Somalia and what we hope to accomplish there. I look forward to
responding to any questions that you and members of the subcommittee
may have.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Hess. And thank you, to
the panel, for your testimony.
I'll begin the questioning in a minute, but first I want to
say how pleased I am that Senator Webb has joined us--not only
today, but that he has asked, and has become a member of this
subcommittee. He's already made the effort to meet with me to
talk about the work of the subcommittee, and I'm extremely
pleased to have his expertise.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to
be a member of the subcommittee, and I look forward to working
with you on all the issues under its jurisdiction.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator.
And I'll start up with--we'll do a 10-minute round.
Secretary Frazer, can you tell us why the administration
has failed to comply with the requirement in law that it
provide a report on Somalia, including a strategy for dealing
with instability in Somalia?
Dr. Frazer. Should I just take that question, or are you
going to ask a number of questions?
Senator Feingold. Well, I'm going to ask you a lot of
questions, but first I'm----
Dr. Frazer. Well, can I just----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Asking you why you haven't
complied with the law.
Dr. Frazer. Sorry, no; I'm used to----
Senator Feingold. I thought I'd start off with that one.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Frazer. I'm used to getting five or six questions at
once.
Senator Feingold. Oh, you'll get some of that, but I----
Dr. Frazer. But I----
Senator Feingold. This one, I want to hear what you have to
say right away.
Dr. Frazer. Well, let me just say, sir, that we haven't
failed to comply with the law. What we're trying to do is to
develop, as you have asked, and that Congress has asked, a
comprehensive strategy. Let me just state that part of
developing a comprehensive strategy is actually responding to
the events on the ground and actually implementing the strategy
that we have in place. And I know that we've spent quite a lot
of time dealing with very fast-moving events in the Horn of
Africa, building the multilateral approach that you in our
consultations, private and public, have called for, and
building the coalition with our regional partners. And so, I
think that the spirit of the request from the Congress is to
have effective impact on the Horn of Africa, and I think that
we've demonstrated that over the past year.
And so, we certainly are working on trying to get that
strategy paper to you, but we're also very much focused on
implementing an effective strategy, which I think that we have
seen in the results that are taking place in Somalia today.
When you requested that strategy, the Transitional Federal
Government was isolated and sitting in Baidoa; today, it's in
Mogadishu. And so, I think we've got to do both things, and
we're trying to manage both things.
Senator Feingold. Well, I--you know, I understand that. I
am concerned, though, about, essentially, the lack of
communication about not following the law. I look at it as
putting the cart before the horse. Without the benefit of a
shared and coordinated vision, I think it's difficult to make
tactical or daily decisions and respond to the changing
environment. So, this report, which should have been in by now,
would hopefully provide the general goal, the objectives, the
tasks, and the contingencies involved in pursuing our interests
in the region. It should take into account the changes on the
ground and the fluid nature of the situation.
Look, Secretary, the Congress passed a law and expressed
its desire to understand how the administration was going to
deal with instability in Somalia, about how it addressed the
terrorist safe havens there, and it troubles me, obviously, as
a Senator and somebody who was involved in passing that law,
that the administration would sort of put this to the side
without any real communication.
So, I will urge you, Madam Secretary, to take immediate
action to comply with the law that was passed and signed by the
President.
Now let me turn to the current situation on the ground. You
and I have talked about this before, and I'd like an update.
What is the status of the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops on the
ground?
Dr. Frazer. The Ethiopian troops have started their
withdrawal, Senator. They started withdrawing forces in
January. And, as you know in your discussions, having traveled
to Ethiopia and met, yourself, with Prime Minister Meles, and
in my discussions with him, as well, and in Secretary Rice's
discussions, Prime Minister Meles said that he wanted to be out
of Somalia within 2 weeks. More than 2 weeks have passed. Many
in the international community have urged him to slow down that
timeline because of fear that there would be a vacuum created
by the too-rapid withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. So, the
withdrawal has started, but it hasn't been completed. We would
expect it to be a phased process, as we phase in the African
peacekeeping forces.
Senator Feingold. What percentage of the troops--Ethiopian
troops--have been withdrawn?
Dr. Frazer. Well, you'd have to have a concrete number of
how many were there in the first place to decide on that
percentage, and that number has varied. Some people have said
2,000, some people have said up to 8,000 forces. So, I don't
know what the----
Senator Feingold. Is it your sense that most of the troops
have been withdrawn, or just a small percentage?
Dr. Frazer. It's not my sense that most of the troops have
withdrawn at this point, no.
Senator Feingold. Will the AU peacekeeping force be
deployed before the last Ethiopian troops are withdrawn from
Somalia?
Dr. Frazer. That is the idea. And we would hope to soon
have the Ugandan battalion--in particular. President Museveni
has promised to put in 1,500 troops, and we've been working
with them. Right now, the Ugandan Parliament has to approve
that and the Minister of Defense put a motion before Parliament
on January 31. They take 3 working days to decide. Their
opposition was out, so they're trying to give opposition time
to actually consider the deployment of those Ugandan forces. As
soon as that Parliament approves the decision, we will be
prepared to help them deploy.
Senator Feingold. And I know it's your strategy to support
the TFG, but what happens if the TFG is unable to create the
political agreements and the consensus needed to govern the
country effectively? I know it's hard to discuss this, because
that's not what we want to happen. But, given this country's
history, I think we need to be prepared for the possibility.
So, would you talk a little bit about what that strategy might
be?
Dr. Frazer. Well, we're planning for the TFG to be able to
build the consensus necessary, and we think that they have made
good progress in that regard in a very short period. We
continue to see the Prime Minister reaching out to the various
clans. The TFG President at the African Union Summit announced
a reconciliation conference that would include all
stakeholders. They've made appointments of the mayor to
Mogadishu, and the deputy mayor, that have been broadly
accepted and supported. So, we will continue to work with them
to actually accomplish inclusive governance.
Senator Feingold. I'm pleased----
Dr. Frazer. That's going to be----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. To hear that, but what's the
backup plan if they can't?
Dr. Frazer. That's not going to be easy, as you said,
because they actually are going against the trends of the last
16 years.
Senator Feingold. But what's the backup plan if they can't?
Dr. Frazer. Well, I'm getting to that, Senator, because I
think that the backup plan is based in the effort to actually
try to achieve the inclusive dialog. We would expect that if
that's not going to happen, the analysis is that it would
probably be a very narrow community--two communities that would
create a counter to this inclusive dialog. That's a particular
sub-sub clan which needs to be brought into the dialog, and
that's remnants of the Islamic Courts and foreign terrorists.
So, what would happen? We expect to be able to reach out to
that sub-sub clan and deny those foreign terrorists that
support of the community. If it doesn't work, it's very likely
going to be because of outside influence, it's going to be
because of outside support for terrorists. And we would hope to
have, as you know, a peacekeeping force there----
Senator Feingold. Yeah.
Dr. Frazer [continuing]. That would help to provide some of
the stability while they create the space to drain the swamp,
essentially, of----
Senator Feingold. All right. One--and----
Dr. Frazer [continuing]. Those foreign terrorist elements.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. And on that point, of
draining the swamp--in December, shortly before the Ethiopian
incursion, you stated that the Council of Islamic Courts was,
``controlled'' by al-Qaeda in East Africa. And this
characterization implicitly compared the CIC to the Taliban,
the last regime to be under the control of al-Qaeda. However,
DNI head Negroponte was quoted in the Washington Post, saying,
``I don't think there are hard-and-fast views,'' on the
question. Asked whether the CIC was the next Taliban, he
stated, ``I don't think I've seen a good answer.'' And in
January, DIA Director General Maples testified to the Senate
Intelligence Committee that, ``al-Qaeda is assessed to be
assisting the radical Islamist elements of the CIC with
leadership and training, with hopes of establishing a future
Taliban-like state.''
Now, that testimony would seem to contradict your assertion
that al-Qaeda had already asserted control of the CIC. Would
you like to take this opportunity to revisit your earlier
statement?
Dr. Frazer. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify my
earlier statement and to say that quotes from the newspapers
are hardly quotes at all, because, certainly, people change
what one has actually said to them when they write it in
newspapers. But what I specifically said was that the Council
of Islamic Courts was a heterogenous group which had been
hijacked by terrorist elements, people like Hassan Abdullah al-
Turki, designated under U.S. Executive Order 13224 of the
United Nations Security Council 1267. What I said was it is led
by Dahir Aweys, designated under U.S. Executive Order 13224 and
under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267. What I
said was that the al-Shabaab militia specifically was of the
extremist order and was led by individuals like Aden Hashi
Ayro, who was trained by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan prior to 2001,
and that those individuals had hijacked what was a heterogenous
Islamic Courts. And so, I was much more specific than what----
Senator Feingold. All right.
Dr. Frazer [continuing]. Was quoted in the Washington Post.
Senator Feingold. All right. I hope to get back to this in
another round, but thank you for that. And, since I'm running
out of time here, I do want to at least ask a question of Mr.
Hess.
And thank you for your patience. After your recent travel
to the region, can you give us a sense for what impact the
ongoing humanitarian challenges are having and will have on the
political efforts in Mogadishu?
Mr. Hess. Yes, sir. We feel that the humanitarian community
is pulling together with the United Nations, as well, to take
this opportunity to work with the TFIs and the TFG to build
capacity in service delivery. And so, this humanitarian
assistance that's being provided will assist in building that
capacity and delivering services to the people who need it the
most, especially in terms of education, health, and water and
sanitation.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Hess, I hope to return to
you, but now I'll turn to the ranking member, Senator Sununu.
Senator Sununu. Thank you very much.
And let me pick up the questioning. Mr. Hess, could you
speak, with a little bit more detail, about the activities of
the Disaster Recovery Team, the DART team, that is operating?
What's the size of the group? You know, what activities have
they prioritized at the highest level? And what are the
weaknesses of a DART group like this? You know, what areas are
they not ideally suited to address? And, obviously, therefore,
these are areas that we should, you know, find other ways to
complement their efforts.
Mr. Hess. Yes, sir. We looked at--we don't take the
formation of a Disaster Assistance Response Team lightly. When
you create one of these, as you know, it sends a signal and a
message, which was exactly what we were trying to do. We were
concerned about the humanitarian situation starting in
December, and the fact that it might deteriorate as people were
on the move during a bad time.
Senator Sununu. When was the response team first put
together?
Mr. Hess. In the end of December, sir----
Senator Sununu. OK, December----
Mr. Hess [continuing]. During the holiday.
Senator Sununu [continuing]. Of 2006, so that it's only----
Mr. Hess. 2006.
Senator Sununu [continuing]. Been in place for a couple of
months. And the----
Mr. Hess. Absolutely.
Senator Sununu [continuing]. And the size?
Mr. Hess. Right now, it's about eight members.
Senator Sununu. OK.
Mr. Hess. But it varies. One of the members is sitting
behind me now. So, they rotate occasionally.
In terms of what they're focusing on, we look at the
primary basic humanitarian needs. We are concerned about the
global acute malnutrition rates in south-central Somalia, where
we have seen rates of 22, 23, some places high as 30 percent of
global acute malnutrition rate, in the Gedo region. Again, we
can't address that specifically with food, but food insecurity
is a large part of that. And certainly, we look at food as a
big component of that. And our partners--World Food Program and
CARE--are doing a good job of distributing food. But we also
have to look at water sanitation, and they are focused at
working--the team is focused very closely on working with our
partners who are rehabilitating wells, digging new bore holes.
And the flooding, unfortunately, especially in the lower Juba
region, disrupted a lot of the work we had been doing on water
and sanitation, so that was a problem. We're also worried about
the health situation from the Rift Valley fever, malaria,
mosquito-born diseases, diarrhea, and cholera, which we were--
we saw some minor outbreak of that--but, again, working with
the Disaster Assistance Response Team, had the ability to
respond quickly to cordon off the area where the cholera
initially broke out.
The areas where we'd like to see some more work, where we
are looking at, is how we can facilitate more directly the
capacity-building of the government. And we have--our Office of
Transition Initiatives has a member on that Disaster Assistance
Response Team looking for the opportunity to get in and
directly facilitate the building of that capacity along with
UNDP.
Senator Sununu. Are--do any of the response team personnel
work directly in Somalia, or are they primarily located in
Kenya--or----
Mr. Hess. They are----
Senator Sununu [continuing]. Exclusively located in Kenya?
Mr. Hess [continuing]. All in Kenya. They have not been
able to get in yet.
Senator Sununu. You said that the--most of our NGO partners
are back operating again in Somalia. What level of
effectiveness have they reached? And is there more capacity
that they can build, or that we can help them build within the
country?
Mr. Hess. The points that we tried to make with the--with
our NGO partners is building local capacity at the same time
that they try to deliver the assistance. As you can imagine,
most of what they do is through local partners, but we're
trying to build up that capacity so that they can carry on
through the challenging period, if you will. And we want to
make sure that they have that capacity specifically on the
monitoring side, because if--we're concerned about this global
acute malnutrition rate, we're concerned about the spread of
Rift Valley fever and other mosquito-born diseases. And if we
can build that monitoring capacity on the local side, we'll be
a lot further ahead.
Senator Sununu. How is the team's relationship with the
Government of Kenya and/or Government of Ethiopia? Either
intentionally or not, have those governments--or do those
governments have anything in place that acts as a restriction
on our ability to have the positive impact?
Mr. Hess. It's a good point. We have a good working
relationship with both governments, because we've had teams and
we have had missions in the area for a long time. One of the
areas which we are working very closely with the Kenyan
Government on now is the Dadaab camp. As I pointed out, the
global acute malnutrition rate is pretty high. One of the
things that we're looking at is using area around the camps to
increase alternate livelihood development there. What we're
looking at is the planting of alternate crops so that we can
vary the diet of the people in the camps, and also to drill
some more wells in the region. But, as you know, when you're
talking about a water table that is vulnerable to begin with,
that's a problem. The Government of Kenya worked very closely
with us during the flooding of the Dadaab camp. As you
remember, one of the sub-camps, Ifo, was wiped out. And the
Kenyan Government worked very closely with us to help alleviate
that situation. So, they have a good working relationship with
the government.
Senator Sununu. Thank you.
Assistant Secretary Frazer, you mentioned the negotiations
that are expected to take place at the end of February and some
of the outreach of the contact participation that needed to
take place at the sub-clan level. What other participants are
important to the success of those negotiations? And are there
any parties that have been reluctant to participate?
Dr. Frazer. Yes; thank you, Senator. Specifically, the
inclusive dialog is already taking place, with the Prime
Minister and the President reaching out to various
stakeholders. The key stakeholders would be, I believe, the
Somalia business community, the business leaders, which
provided financing for the courts in the past and will be an
important part of providing the assistance and support for the
Transitional Federal Government. Also, it's very clear that the
Ayr sub-sub clan, in the past, had been a base of support for
the Islamic Courts, and that there are some concerns about
trying to make sure that they feel that they are adequately
represented, or represented--that they have their own
representatives as part of the Transitional Federal Government
and part of the inclusive dialog. So, I think that those are
two key sectors.
Somali women are extremely strong and, I think, very much,
reaching out to the women's groups, and civil society groups
will be key to building that inclusive dialog.
Senator Sununu. But you expect each of these groups to be
effectively represented in the February discussions?
Dr. Frazer. Yes. I think you're talking about the National
Reconciliation Conference. I would expect them to be
represented, most certainly, as well as the Somali diaspora.
Senator Sununu. You spoke a little bit about the troops
committed by Uganda; 1,500 troops under the African Union. What
other commitments have been made for troop participation? And
what does the United States do--or what can the United States
do--what have we offered to do to support the logistics and
deployment of those troops?
Dr. Frazer. For the Ugandan troops, we've offered--we have
military planners working in Uganda with the Ugandan chief of
defense forces and chief of general staff. We will do contract
airlift for the Ugandan forces. We also have planners at the
African Union working at headquarters on command-and-control
systems. The Nigerians have also offered a battalion. The
Burundians have offered a battalion of about a thousand troops,
as well. And Malawi originally was reported to have offered
them, but I think that they need to go through their
parliamentary system, as well, to get the final approval.
Other countries, like Rwanda, Tanzania, have offered to
train the Transitional Federal Government's national army, and
we are hoping that South Africa will provide some type of
assistance. Algeria has also offered to provide airlift to
AMISOM. And so, they're still in the process of finalizing the
troop contributors and the way in which they will contribute,
but we can provide planners. The Ghanaians have offered a few
hundred troops, as well. They've asked us for planners to go to
Ghana, to Accra, and to work with their military to prepare
them for deployment. We would provide some equipment, contract
airlift, some sustainment support.
Senator Sununu. When do you expect deployment to take
place? And at what numbers do you expect will be achieved?
Dr. Frazer. Well, the first deployment that we're hoping
for is of the Ugandan forces, and we're on standby waiting for
their Parliament to decide. We can deploy them a day after
their Parliament decides. We also know that they have teams
right now in Mogadishu and in Addis, coordinating their
planning within the AU structure. And so, we're ready to assist
its--the timing, I'm hoping--I keep hoping, in the next week or
two.
Senator Sununu. And the total number that you hope to
attain?
Dr. Frazer. For that first deployment, we're talking
about----
Senator Sununu. But in the aggregate, including the other
commitments that you've referenced.
Dr. Frazer. The AU has said that they want a force of about
8,000. They feel that they have commitments right now for
actual forces----
Senator Sununu. They think they can----
Dr. Frazer [continuing]. Of about----
Senator Sununu [continuing]. Reach that.
Dr. Frazer [continuing]. 4,000.
Senator Sununu. OK, thank you.
Last question, Assistant Secretary Frazer, what should the
status of Somaliland be? And what is the official interaction
between the U.S. Government and the governing organizations in
Somaliland?
Dr. Frazer. I think we in the administration, agree with
the sense of Congress that the status of Somaliland should be
held off right now. We have always said that we will follow the
lead of the African Union, and I think that the African Union
also feels that now is not the time to push for decisions on
Somaliland. They have been invited to be part of the National
Reconciliation Conference that President Yusuf announced. I
don't know whether they'll take up that offer. We meet with
representatives of the Somaliland Government. They have a
representative here. We have met with them. When I was at the
African Union Summit, I met, on the margins of the African
Union Summit, with the Foreign Minister of Somaliland, and have
done so in my travels to the region in the past.
Senator Sununu. Thank you.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Sununu.
I'm also very pleased to see Senator Cardin here, who is a
new member of the subcommittee and the Senate, but obviously no
stranger to these issues, as a long-time distinguished member
of the House. Welcome.
And normally we would rotate and go to Senator Cardin now,
but, out of courtesy, he has deferred to Senator Coleman, who
has been here for some time.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Senator Cardin.
Let me first talk a little bit about the resources we have
focused--are dealing with, with this issue. How many State
Department folks do we have in Nairobi who are focused on
Somalia, just Somalia? What kind of complement do we have
there?
Dr. Frazer. There are currently six people, full time,
working on Somalia in Nairobi, including a Somalia coordinator,
a senior Foreign Service officer, Ambassador John Yates. He is
leading that Somali working group under the leadership of,
obviously, our Ambassador Rannenberger, who I'm not including
among the six.
Senator Coleman. In addition, we've talked about the global
nature of the war on terrorism and the concerns about Somalia
and being a base for expanded terrorist activity. Is the Bureau
of Near East Affairs--are they--how globally are we looking at
dealing with this situation in Somalia?
Dr. Frazer. Yes, they are involved, and we work closely
with them. I sometimes feel that a lot of it is them suggesting
that I travel to countries in their region, but certainly
Assistant Secretary David Welch raises the Somalia issue, our
Ambassadors in the region are constantly reporting, meeting
with officials in their countries, and sending in those
reports. We have reports in significant interaction with Yemen,
but also from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, from the Arab League. We're
engaging all of them.
Senator Coleman. Senator Feingold, the chairman, talked
about legislation that was introduced today, which myself and
Senator Klobuchar cosponsors. One of the parts of that
legislation talks about a special envoy to Somalia and lays out
very specific duties: Direct U.S. Government efforts to
establish a credible, capable government of national unity,
provide detailed assessments of challenges and progress on the
ground in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, to pursue a truly
comprehensive and sustainable peace in Somalia. What is the
administration's position in regard to the appointment of a
special envoy to Somalia?
Dr. Frazer. Well, as I said, we have Ambassador Yates as
our Somalia coordinator. He took up his position, based in
Nairobi, January 2007, and we would expect for him to play the
role of the special envoy that--as outlined, to work in the
region to develop that diplomatic engagement in the region
itself.
Senator Coleman. Does he have the authority--the recognized
authority to do what a special envoy--does he have the leeway,
the independence to be able to do what a special envoy would be
called upon to do?
Dr. Frazer. Well, in--yes, Senator, in the context of--the
lead on our foreign policy is, as you very well know, Secretary
Rice, and she's very much in the lead on our Somalia policy.
She convenes her team, she has been part of this development of
the strategy with the National Security Advisor within the
context of the interagency. So, yes, indeed; like our other
Ambassadors who have authority in their countries as chief of
missions, he is empowered with helping us to develop that
strategy and to implement the strategy.
Senator Coleman. And my concern would not be necessarily
from above, in terms of that, I just want to know that folks on
the ground--I want to know that folks in the Embassy, folks in
other areas, would recognize that he has, then, the ability to
pull things together, to get information to help put in place a
plan. That's my concern. Is it recognized that he's going to
have those abilities that we would expect a special envoy to
have?
Dr. Frazer. Senator Coleman, yes, indeed. Ambassador
Rannenberger is our chief of mission with responsibility in the
region overall to coordinate our policy in the region, and he
does so by convening conference calls with the regional
Ambassadors, their chief of mission. Ambassador John Yates
works very closely with Ambassador Rannenberger to help us
implement that strategy. So yes, he has the authority, but line
authority belongs, in the region, to our chiefs of mission, and
we hold that and guard that very closely. And, obviously, in
Washington, the Secretary of State leads our foreign policy.
Senator Coleman. And I recognize that. I mean, my concern
is that the bureaucracy recognize that we've got--that we're
focusing resources or we're putting somebody in position to
pull things together. It's tough working within a system if
people don't recognize--that's my concern. We've talked about a
special envoy rather than, I'd say respectfully, just a
bureaucrat. I want somebody out there who's able to say, ``This
is important, this is''--the--we--both witnesses talked about
this window of opportunity. There's a window of opportunity
now, but if we don't seize it, if we don't direct the
resources, if we don't say that this is important, then I don't
know if we'll seize that window of opportunity. So, that's
really where I'm getting to in this line of questioning.
Dr. Frazer. And I understand it, Senator. And I appreciate
it. And I've said that I think that the Ambassador has all of
the authority necessary to do that. But you're hearing me
hesitate because I don't understand why we would want to take--
or suggest that the Secretary of State, who is actively
engaging and involved on a daily basis on Somalia, and is a
senior diplomat for our Government--why we would suggest that
she not stay in that lead role. Why would we devolve, in some
ways, the authority away from the line responsibility for it,
if it's being carried out. If it's not being carried out, a
special envoy, I think, can help to manage, but when the line
authorities are managing the policy, I'm left puzzled, frankly,
by the desire to put another person into that line command.
Senator Coleman. Well, in part, because the Secretary--
we'll talk about the Secretary of State, because the Secretary
of State is involved in trying to get support in the region for
our efforts in Iraq. The Secretary of State is involved with
trying to deal with the situation of the--preventing the
rearmament of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Secretary of State is
involved with the very delicate negotiations dealing in six-
party talks with North Korea, because the Secretary of State--
and I could go on and on--in Venezuela, the Secretary of State,
in the Sudan, in Darfur. And so, my concern----
Dr. Frazer. Somalia.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. Is--and Somalia--and that's
my concern, that there are all these critical areas and issues
that we face today. And I just want to make sure that we are
putting the focus, the attention, and the resources with the
kind of independence that allow people to do what has to be
done, knowing that the Secretary of State's attention is going
to be diverted by a whole range of other critical issues. This
is also important. And I don't want to minimize that importance
when--and recognizing that there are other things going on the
world today that are going to take her attention and her focus.
Dr. Frazer. The Secretary of State has prioritized Somalia
on her range of issues that she's dealing with. Anytime we need
to go to see the Secretary of State, she leads our policy on
Somalia, she's one who decided to give us the $40 million in
January, when we went to the International Contact Group. She's
the one who blessed and decided on the regional strategy.
Senator Coleman. OK.
Dr. Frazer. So, it's a priority for her.
Senator Coleman. And I appreciate that.
Mr. Hess, I'd like to look a little bit at the resources. I
think in the President's budget request talked about--was it--
$9 million was the figure for development assistance for
Somalia in 2008. Does this represent all the assistance that
we're providing Somalia to accomplish all the objectives that
you mentioned?
Mr. Hess. No, sir. We have a--we have more money than that.
As you know, in the supplemental there was an increase of $20
million that was asked for. We have additional food aid
resources that will be available as needed. We have 41,000
metric tons on the ground right now. We did a call forward for
another 18,500 tons in January. So, the pipeline's in good
shape there. But we have funds available if we need more food
resources. We're looking at nonfood items, particularly on the
water sanitation side, rehabilitation of wells. We have asked
our partners to look particularly at those areas, and also on
education.
Senator Coleman. Do we have a figure as to what your--what
the total costs will be? What do we need to make a difference
in Somalia, understanding that we have a whole range of
humanitarian crisis--in flooding, malnutrition, et cetera, et
cetera?
Mr. Hess. It's hard to estimate exactly what that number is
right now, but we're looking at anywhere from $20 to $60
million. But we need our partners on the ground to come back to
us after they've done a thorough assessment, because you don't
want to attach a number to that right now without an accurate
assessment. We need to look primarily at the damage that was
done by the flooding on the wells that we had dug during the
drought last year.
Senator Coleman. Are you satisfied with the level of
international cooperation that we're getting to deal with the
situation in Somalia?
Mr. Hess. Yes, sir. I've met with the donors when we were
out there. That's a very good question. I met with all the
donors. They're very seized with the issue. ECHO and the
European Union have done a very good job of coordinating the
effort. DFID, our U.K. partners, are very much engaged in the
area, and they meet on a weekly basis to ensure--because what
we're talking about here are gaps and where the gaps exist, and
we want to make sure that those gaps are covered, and we work
very closely with them to ensure that we don't have those gaps.
And that's also the role of that U.N. Team, OCHA, U.N. Office
of Coordination for Humanitarian Assistance, has done a very
good job on the coordination role. They've got a good team
player out there, and he's doing a great job, as well.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Feingold. Let me turn to Senator Cardin, but, just
before I do, I want to thank Senator Coleman for the remarks he
just made in the context of special envoy. I know the Secretary
indicated she's puzzled by our request for a special envoy, but
I'm puzzled that you would be puzzled. I mean, let's face it,
in Sudan we had a special envoy, in John Danforth, to try to
resolve the dispute between the north and the south. We
currently have a special envoy with regard to Darfur,
Ambassador Natsios. And presumably Secretary Rice is engaged in
those matters. I know she is, I know she cares about them. It's
just a question of: How much can one person do with such an
incredible range problems, which Senator Coleman just
identified, post-9/11? It's essentially impossible.
So, you know, I'm loathe to just call for a bunch of
special envoys, but we're in a very unusual situation.
Ambassador Rannenberger, an excellent Ambassador who I had a
chance to work with in Kenya, is obviously doing Somalia part-
time, because Kenya is a very important country, and it
requires an enormous amount of his attention. John Yates is a
retired temporary appointment. So, this is about authorities,
in part, you're correct about that, but it's also about
capacity. Just how much can people do, given the resources? I
mean, we had Newt Gingrich, of all people, come before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and say that it had been a
mistake to cut back on our State Department people, and he
advocated a significant increase in State Department staff. I
mean, this is the symbol of the Contract with America admitting
that he was wrong to do that. So, we are in a different era.
And it is not necessarily an attack on your authority or
Secretary Rice's authority to say, in this particular
situation, it may be necessary to have a special envoy. I hope
we can continue the discussion of this special envoy issue in
that context and in that spirit.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And let me concur in your comments. Somalia is very important
to U.S. interests and I think a special envoy is appropriate,
and certainly we need the resources if we're going to be able
to be effective.
Administrator Hess, thank you for being here. Secretary
Frazer, appreciate both of your testimonies.
As I understand your testimony, Secretary Frazer, the
mission--or our priorities in Somalia, I think, are without
dispute: To encourage political dialog between leadership with
the stakeholders; to mobilize international support to build
the governance capacity clearly for credibility, and we need
the international community working with us; and deployment of
an African stabilization force in order to deal with the
humanitarian circumstances. I think all that is--are goals that
we agree with.
I want to concentrate, if I might, on the issue of
terrorism within Somalia and the mission--the air strikes that
the United States participated in, beginning of January. Can
you just give us the status of those air strikes--the targets
and how successful we were?
Dr. Frazer. Yes, Senator; I can try my very best. There
were two A-130 air strikes, as you said. They were targeting
convoys. They were in a remote area in Somalia, near the
border, between Somalia and Kenya. We don't have full
information on the results at this point. I think that probably
my colleagues from DOD might be able to help, but I think that
there's also an issue of the fog of war, and we need greater
clarity. We're fairly certain that some of the terrorists that
were targeted have been captured or killed, but I think that
probably time will tell and we'll be better able to know
exactly who has been killed in those attacks and who has
escaped.
Senator Cardin. Well, I'm certainly interested in that, and
perhaps we'll follow up with DOD. I'm also interested what
impact it has on the other goals. It's been reported that the
Europeans were not very pleased with these air strikes. Maybe
you could give us a little more information about how the
stakeholders have responded to American air strikes.
Dr. Frazer. Senator, the key stakeholders that we've been
focusing our strategy on are the Africans themselves,
particularly those in the region who have some leverage and
whose interests are most threatened by these terrorists who are
operating in Somalia. We've worked very closely, as I said,
with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. We've shared intelligence
with them to try to track these terrorists. We will continue to
work with them.
I think that everyone wants to work in coordination and
cooperation, and so, we have to maximize that, but I think that
we have a shared goal to try to track these guys and our
cooperation with the key partners, being those neighbor--the
countries in the neighborhood, has not been undermined by the
strikes, the two air strikes.
Senator Cardin. Well, I certainly agree with us doing what
is necessary against terrorism. My question is a little
broader, as to what impact that's having on our overall
strategies in Somalia as it relates to our diplomatic efforts.
Dr. Frazer. Our diplomatic efforts continue strong. The
International Contact Group on Somalia is a focal point for our
diplomatic multilateral efforts. We continue to have key
institutions and member countries--key institutions being the
African Union, the United Nations, the European Union, the Arab
League, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development--that
are involved, as well as key countries, like Norway, the United
States, Tanzania, and others. There has been no diminishing of
that multilateral effort. In fact, more countries have asked to
join the International Contact Group on Somalia.
Senator Cardin. But do you anticipate that additional air
strikes will be necessary?
Dr. Frazer. That's really an operational question, sir. It
is clearly tracking these terrorists who continue to threaten
American lives, the Somalis themselves, and their neighbors, is
a key priority for the United States, but that is really an
operational question of the combatant commanders in the field.
Senator Cardin. I'm trying to get from you, but I'm not
succeeding, as to whether this is having any significant impact
in our discussions with our international partners on the goals
that you have articulated in Somalia.
Dr. Frazer. Clearly, the issue of what actions the United
States takes, in terms of tracking these terrorists, all of our
actions--sharing information, air strikes, putting forces on
the ground, if we should do that--are part of the dialog that
we have, especially with Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, our
regional partners but also more broadly. But our focus on the
diplomatic effort is to ensure that whatever we do is
coordinated with those key countries around Somalia that have
the greatest leverage over it. Secondary is working and making
sure that we remain coordinated with countries throughout
Africa. We do that most effectively through the African Union
(AU). I had dialog with Chairman Konare at the AU. It was good
dialog. I think we're still latched up. And then, from there,
obviously the international partners, working with the European
Union and especially with Norway, who cochairs the
International Contact Group on Somalia. So, what I'm saying----
Senator Cardin. It would seem to me, though, that it--that
part of the diplomatic effort is to work with our European
friends and have a greater understanding on the use of our air
support to deal with terrorism. Was that done?
Dr. Frazer. Frankly, this just wasn't--in my interaction
with the Europeans--an issue high on the agenda. It came up in
one of my conversations with one European country. All of the
others were focused on the question of conditioning aid
specifically to the AMISOM force and its deployment, whether
the EU position, that until the TFG did more on dialog, would
hold up funding for AMISOM. That was really the focus of
attention and the major diplomatic issue that we were
addressing on Somalia at the African Union Summit, in which I
had consultations broadly with the European countries. Maybe
it'll come up at the International Contact Group on Somalia,
which will meet on February 9. It didn't come up at the last
one, because, in December--or January, when we had that
meeting, the air strikes took place after the meeting was over.
Senator Cardin. It just seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we
would be in a stronger position in carrying out the goals that
are--Madam Secretary, you have announced--if there was a
broader involvement in decisions made in regards to the
terrorist activities in Somalia and what we need to do in order
bring that under control.
I thank the chairman for the time.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin, for
your participation.
And we do need to get to the next panel soon, but I do want
to take a little more time to ask some questions, Secretary
Frazer. And thank you for your patience here.
Thinking more broadly, can you explain how the U.S.
Government is working to eliminate the conditions that have
allowed the terrorists to use Somalia as a safe haven for so
long? We--as you've indicated, we've known that al-Qaeda
affiliated individuals have been in Somalia for years. So, what
are we doing differently now?
Dr. Frazer. Well, what we're trying to do is, as I said, of
course, working very closely with the region to share
information about the movement of these terrorists. We're not
going to completely eliminate terrorists in Africa--in the Horn
of Africa, or anywhere else around the globe, unless we work in
close partnership with countries themselves--strong, capable
countries that can monitor their own borders. We will continue
to work with the United Nations, and we're doing so in the
Security Council, to try to track terrorist financing. We also
very much work in partnership with the neighboring countries.
Obviously, also building a capable, inclusive government in
Somalia will be a large part of trying to prevent terrorists
from maintaining safe haven there. And I think that we saw that
most dramatically with the CIC and how the Somali people
withdrew their support from the CIC helped it to collapse. And
so, building those strong governance institutions on an
inclusive basis, I think, is part of a longer term strategy,
and even a medium-term strategy, of preventing terrorists from
taking hold in Somalia.
Senator Feingold. And then, what is the state of play with
the Islamic Courts right now? Do they actually pose any
security risk to the TFG? Are you confident that the TFG, with
international support, will be able to change the very
conditions that led to the rise of the warlords and then the
Islamic Courts in the first place?
Dr. Frazer. I think the situation is still very dynamic.
We're clearly working to try to make sure that they don't. I've
heard, in my consultations, two different analyses of the
continued insecurity in Somalia. One is that it's coming from
certain sub-sub clans that feel that they are not sufficiently
part of inclusive dialog. Then they're making--they're
attacking to indicate, ``Bring us in.'' Second, I've heard
that--analysis that it's remnants of the Council of Islamic
Courts; as the leadership withdrew, they left behind certain
fighters, they handed out weapons, and it may be those remnants
that are trying to start an insurgency and reconnect with the
reconstituted leadership of the CIC.
Senator Feingold. Well, and this relates to one of the
really tough questions, which is--obviously, we want this TFG
to be as inclusive as possible for it to work, but are there
any specific red lines or specific groups or individuals that
should not be part of the process? And how do you determine
that?
Dr. Frazer. We've stated very broadly that those who
renounce violence and terrorism should be part of the process.
The Transitional Federal Government has drawn the lines a bit
more narrowly. They have said that those who have invited
terrorists into their country should not be part of an
inclusive dialog.
Senator Feingold. But we do not share that narrow view,
apparently.
Dr. Frazer. Well, it's a sovereign country; and so, we work
with them, and we advise and consult, but they have to make the
decisions for their own government, and how they're going to
govern. But our statement has been fairly broad, which is that
those who renounce violence and extremism should be eligible to
be part of the process. Having said that, I must say that many
of our partners have advised us to be careful, and that people
say things, but intend to do something very different. And so,
we're trying not to micromanage the process of inclusiveness,
but to state broadly what is necessary for that longer term
stability.
Senator Feingold. Well, I can see this is one of the
hardest questions here and in other places. I mean, who can we
actually deal with? Who is irreparably an enemy of the United
States? And who is sort of in between? This is one of the
toughest parts of this job, and I recognize that.
A couple of quick questions on the African Union
stabilization force. We're all optimistic and hopeful about the
deployment of the AU-led stabilization force, but let me ask
you to be as frank as you can. Is this force going to be
deployed in a timely manner? And, more specifically, as you in
the international community plan to support this deployment,
what are the major challenges and shortfalls and gaps that have
to be considered?
Dr. Frazer. Well, I think that we're hopeful that it will
be in a timely manner. Frankly, I think we're a little bit
behind the timetable that we, the U.S. Government, had hoped
for. We had hoped that that deployment would take place in
early January, but other governments have to go through their
own national process.
We expect that the AMISOM force will eventually transition
into a U.N. operation and that, say, within 6 months, that
transition could occur--that UNDPKO would be prepared to take
over, to sustain this force over time, and to build it. And so,
the AU force would be an immediate insertion into Mogadishu to
prevent that security vacuum from occurring as the Ethiopians
withdraw, but that it would then get the broader international
support of the U.N. Security Council, and they're working on a
resolution to that effect now.
Senator Feingold. Have any of the nations that have pledged
forces suggested that they'll only be involved for a certain
period of time?
Dr. Frazer. No.
Senator Feingold. Well, thank you both for your patience.
We'll now move to the second panel.
[Pause.]
Senator Feingold. All right, let us begin with the second
panel.
Dr. Shinn, would you begin, please?
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID SHINN, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Shinn. Thank you very much, Chairman Feingold,
for inviting me again to speak to this committee about Somalia.
And if I may submit a longer statement for the record, I
would----
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
Ambassador Shinn. OK.
I want to look briefly at the issue of the neighbors of
Somalia. There are three now, if you include Somaliland, which
declared its independence unilaterally from Somalia in 1991.
Fortunately, the TFG wisely has avoided a confrontation with
the authorities in Hargeisa as it tries to consolidate power in
the former Italian Somalia. The other two neighbors with very
long borders are Kenya and Ethiopia, and there's a longstanding
problem here involving irredentist claims by Somalia concerning
the resident Somali populations in Ethiopia and Kenya, which,
in the case of Ethiopia, includes about one-quarter of its land
area. Unfortunately, this issue was revived during the period
of the Islamic Courts, when at least one senior member of the
Islamic Courts, Hassan Dahir Aweys, who was chairman of the
Shura of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts, on more than one
occasion claimed Ethiopia's Ogaden as part of Somalia, although
others in the Courts did not subscribe to this view.
Ethiopia appears, almost from the beginning of its recent
military operation, to have planned a brief campaign--one,
because of the high cost of the operation; and, two, I think
the fact that even Ethiopia understood that a continuing
presence in Somalia would incite Somalia nationalism against
Ethiopia and lead to further problems.
The dilemma today for the Transitional Federal Government,
as we have already heard this morning, is that the early
departure of the Ethiopians leaves a potential power vacuum in
Somalia. The TFG has not yet shown a capacity to maintain
control on its own in the country. And although there have been
numerous press reports about various warlords and others
turning over their arms and weapons to the TFG, frankly I would
take those with a grain of salt. Somalia remains awash in small
weapons. And even though there may be some control over the
larger weapons, you can be assured that there are plenty of
handcarried weapons to go around for years to come, and they're
not going to be turned over to any authority.
Ethiopia clearly prefers to have a moderate, friendly
national government in Mogadishu. On the other hand, I think
Ethiopia could live with a return to numerous fiefdoms ruled by
individual warlords if that were the other option. Obviously,
they do not want a return to extremist rule coming from any
element of the Islamic Courts.
As the Islamic Courts gained power last year, Kenya joined
Ethiopia in strong support of the TFG, but Kenya has now more
recently turned to a more neutral role on this question. Kenya
remains the chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development, IGAD. During the past year, IGAD members have been
deeply divided on the best way to deal with Somalia. Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Uganda strongly supported the TFG. Eritrea strongly
supported the Islamic Courts. Djibouti began 2006 as a
supporter of the TFG, but shifted its sympathy to the Islamic
Courts after they took control of Mogadishu. Sudan almost
certainly sympathized with the Islamic Courts. Because of these
past and continuing divisions in IGAD over Somalia, there's
little prospect the organization can play a leading role in
resolving the ongoing differences over the short term. Over the
medium/longer term, perhaps IGAD can return to a useful role.
Looking at the wider region beyond IGAD, Yemen has
legitimate interests in Somalia, because a large number of
Somali boat people continue to make their way to Yemeni shores.
Egypt has longstanding historical interests along the Somali
coast, and is always concerned about developments involving
Ethiopia, which is the source of 86 percent of the Nile water
which reaches the Aswan dam.
Dubai and the UAE serve as the financial center for both
Somalia and Somaliland. There's been a history of money from
Saudi sources and government-supported Islamic charities
finding its way to both legitimate and illegitimate Islamic
causes in Somalia. And then you have Libya and Iran that just
seem to meddle because it's an opportunity.
Looking at the African Union and the Arab League, the
primary role of the African Union has been to deploy an African
Union mission in Somalia, AMISOM, which has been referred to
this morning, for a period of 6 months. The AU envisages that
AMISOM will consist of nine infantry battalions of 850
personnel each, supported by maritime, coastal, and air
components, appropriate civilian personnel, and a police
training team. This mission is expected to evolve into a U.N.
operation, after 6 months, that will support the long-term
stabilization of post-conflict reconstruction in Somalia. Most
of the contributing countries seem to have attached conditions,
such as approval only after ratification of its legislative
body. So far, I'm not aware that any country's legislative body
has approved participation.
Estimates suggest that AMISOM will cost $34 million each
month. The United States has promised $14 million to support
the force and the airlift of African troops to Somalia. As we
heard this morning from Assistant Secretary Frazer, the United
States is prepared to pledge another $40 million for this
purpose. The European Union has already released 15 million
euros, or about $20 million, for the same purpose.
There is still no date for the arrival of the first troops,
and it is apparent most potential African troop-contributing
countries are concerned about the situation on the ground and
whether they will be entering a friendly or a hostile
environment. The Arab League had an opportunity to make a real
contribution to the establishment of peace in Somalia, which is
an Arab League member, but, with the defeat of the Islamic
Courts, the Arab League seems to have largely abdicated
responsibility for Somalia.
Let me just conclude with a couple of comments about the
United Nations and the international community.
U.N. Resolution 1725 on Somalia, adopted by the Security
Council on 6 December 2006, has been largely overtaken by
events as a result of the Ethiopian and Transitional Federal
Government military victory. The 19 January 2007 AU communique
has effectively replaced the U.N. resolution. The U.N. Security
Council, on February 2, urged the AU to send peacekeepers to
Somalia quickly so that Ethiopia could withdraw its forces. The
enormous amount of energy being devoted by the African Union
and the international community to the raising of a
peacekeeping force for Somalia would be better spent in
convincing, maybe demanding, that the TFG and other parties
begin, immediately, a serious process that leads to power-
sharing. This should be the highest priority of the
international community, including the United Nations, African
Union, Arab League, European Union, and United States. If
meaningful talks--and I underscore ``meaningful''--get underway
soon, it will reduce the likelihood of conflict or violence and
increase the possibility that African troops can enter the
country peacefully.
Yesterday, there was a beginning of a precursor effort to
move forward with this reconciliation conference in Mogadishu.
It's not clear who attended, but it does appear as though the
moderate elements of the Islamic Courts were not invited.
The outcome of this reconciliation effort may well result
in a restructuring of the Somali Parliament and Ministries,
which are far too numerous, somewhere in the vicinity of 50,
and will certainly involve power-sharing with some elements of
Somali society that are poorly represented in the TFG. The
alternative will be a phantom peacekeeping force that arrives
too late to achieve any real purpose in Somalia. In any event,
the TFG probably envisages AMISOM as tantamount to a praetorian
guard to keep it in power. The TFG must prove to the Somali
people that it is prepared to win their respect and support.
Only then will there be a meaningful role for AMISOM, and only
then will the TFG be in a position to create a national
government that has long-term prospects for survival. The
beginning of a meaningful reconciliation process should serve
as the signal to the international community to increase
substantially its humanitarian and development assistance to
Somalia.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Shinn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David H. Shinn, Former U.S. Ambassador to
Ethiopia and State Department Coordinator for Somalia; Adjunct
Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington
University, Washington, DC
I thank the subcommittee and Chairman Feingold for inviting me to
participate in this hearing. This is the third occasion in 5 years that
I have had the opportunity to present my views on Somalia before the
subcommittee. On this occasion, I have been asked to discuss the
current diplomatic state of play with a focus on both regional and
international players.
the immediate neighbors
Somaliland was previously known as British Somaliland and from 1960
until it unilaterally declared its independence in 1991 the
northwestern region of the Somali Republic. That part of Somalia now
controlled by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has since 1991
had three neighbors--Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somaliland--and a long Indian
Ocean coastline. The TFG claims Somaliland, which has not been
recognized by any state, but has wisely avoided a confrontation with
the authorities in Hargeisa as it tries to consolidate its power in the
former Italian Somalia. Once there is a national government in
Mogadishu that is widely accepted and clearly in control of the country
there inevitably will be discussions between Mogadishu and Hargeisa on
the future of their relationship. In the meantime, it is advisable for
the TFG to focus on more immediate challenges and leave the question of
Somaliland, which is doing just fine on its own, for another day.
Somalia's two other neighbors are Kenya and Ethiopia. It was the
policy of the Somali Republic beginning in 1960 to encourage the
incorporation into Somalia of those parts of Kenya and Ethiopia
inhabited by the Somali people. In the case of Ethiopia, this included
about one-fourth of its land area in southeastern Ethiopia known as the
Ogaden and Haud that borders Somalia and Somaliland. It also included
the Northeastern Frontier District in Kenya that borders southern
Somalia. These irredentist claims led to war on several occasions
between Somalia and Ethiopia and considerable conflict along the Kenya-
Somalia border. Following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in
Somalia in 1991 and the absence of an effective national Somali
Government, Somali calls for incorporation of this land ended.
Extremist elements in the Islamic Courts that seized power in
Mogadishu last summer and then consolidated control throughout about 50
percent of the former Somali Republic revived the irredentist policy.
Hassan Dahir Aweis, Chairman of the Shura of the Somali Council of
Islamic Courts, on more than one occasion claimed Ethiopia's Ogaden as
part of Somalia. Others in the Islamic Courts did not subscribe to
these views by Aweis. His public statements on Somali-inhabited parts
of Kenya were more ambiguous, but left the impression this territory
should also become part of Somalia. Combined with a call by the Islamic
Courts for jihad against Ethiopia, which had sent military personnel
into Somalia in support of the TFG based in Baidoa, Ethiopia became
increasingly concerned about the situation in Somalia. No one in the
TFG has publicly suggested that Somali-inhabited land in Ethiopia be
turned over to Somalia.
Following attacks by the Islamic Courts militia against the TFG and
Ethiopian forces in the vicinity of Baidoa, the TFG requested and
Ethiopia agreed to send significant numbers of troops into Somalia to
defeat the Islamic Court militias. We all know the outcome of the
Ethiopian intervention. Ethiopia appears from the beginning to have
planned a brief campaign because of the high cost of the operation and
the fact that a long Ethiopian presence in Somalia would further incite
Somali nationalism against Ethiopia. I believe both of these reasons
explain Ethiopia's desire to remove its forces quickly from Somalia or,
at a minimum, pull them back to the Ethiopian-Somali border area.
The dilemma today for the TFG and the Ethiopians is the possibility
of a power vacuum, especially in Mogadishu, if the Ethiopian troops
leave too soon. The TFG has not yet shown it has the capacity to
maintain control of the capital on its own. There is a continuing or
potential threat from the remnants of Islamic Court militias, Somali
warlords with personal agendas, and ordinary-armed Somalis who have for
years survived as hired guns or used their weapons to loot for personal
gain. I would take with a grain of salt the numerous reports that
warlords and others have turned in their weapons to the TFG or joined
the TFG. Somalia remains awash in hand-carried weapons even if some
control has been obtained over the larger pieces of military equipment.
Ethiopia is no doubt weighing carefully requests from the TFG that
it remains in Somalia until the arrival of an African Union ``peace
support'' mission. (Actually this is a euphemism for a Chapter Seven
peacekeeping mission.) For the reasons already noted, Ethiopia is not
likely to be very sympathetic to these requests. In fact, Ethiopia
probably believes that it has accomplished what it set out to do--the
removal from power of the Islamic Courts and especially the destruction
or scattering of armed extremists among them. Although Ethiopia clearly
prefers to have a moderate, friendly, national government in power in
Mogadishu, it can, if necessary, live with a return to numerous
fiefdoms ruled by individual warlords. Ethiopia has an especially close
relationship with TFG Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi.
Kenya has traditionally tried to play a neutral role in the Somali
conflict and for years was the designated member of the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to mediate the
dispute. As the Islamic Courts gained power last year, Kenya joined
Ethiopia in support of the TFG but made clear that it would not send
Kenyan troops into Somalia. As Ethiopia became more involved militarily
in Somalia, Kenya began to return to its more neutral role. After the
military defeat of the courts, President Mwai Kibaki was one of the
leaders, however, in efforts to identify troop contributors for an
African peacekeeping force.
Because of the swiftness of the Ethiopian and TFG military victory
over the Islamic Courts, the number of Somali refugees that might
normally head toward Kenya has been mercifully small. Unless the
security situation deteriorates significantly or there is a return to
severe drought and/or floods, Kenya may escape a humanitarian disaster
inside and along its border with Somalia. Kenya will do what it can
quietly to support the TFG. It does not want to see a return to power
of extremist elements of the Islamic Courts. In order to minimize
refugee movements into Kenya, it prefers the creation of a moderate,
Somali Government that exercises firm control over the entire country.
the intergovernmental authority on development
In addition to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, members of IGAD
include Uganda, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Sudan. During the past year,
IGAD members have been deeply divided on the best way to deal with
Somalia. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda strongly supported the TFG.
Ethiopia and Uganda continue their support while Kenya seeks to be an
honest broker.
Eritrea strongly supported the Islamic Courts, primarily because
the courts posed the biggest threat to Eritrea's enemy, Ethiopia. In
fact, Eritrea sent an undetermined number of military personnel to
train and support members of the Islamic Court militias. The U.N.
Monitoring Group on Somalia placed the number of Eritrean military
personnel in Somalia last fall at 2,000. This figure appears to be
exaggerated; a couple of hundred is probably closer to the actual
figure. Eritrea also provided substantial quantities of military
equipment to the courts. Even today, there are unconfirmed reports that
Eritrea continues to support remnants of the Islamic Court militias.
Djibouti, an overwhelmingly Muslim country, began 2006 as a
supporter of the TFG but shifted its sympathy to the Islamic Courts
after they took control of Mogadishu. It received a number of
emissaries from the courts and urged the courts and the TFG to resolve
their differences in a process chaired by Sudan as current chair of the
Arab League. Djibouti seems now to be reassessing the Somali situation
but should have no difficulty supporting the TFG if it can establish
security throughout the country.
Sudan played its Somali cards close, in part because it was the
designated mediator between the TFG and the Islamic Courts. Khartoum
presided over one promising meeting last June when the courts and the
TFG agreed to recognize each other, cease military operations, and meet
again to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement. That was the end of
progress in the Khartoum process. Sudan almost certainly sympathized
with the Islamic Courts and made clear that it was not prepared to
contribute troops to an African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia.
Because of these past and continuing divisions in IGAD over
Somalia, there is little prospect the organization can play a leading
role in resolving ongoing differences over the short term. If the
situation clarifies in Somalia, there will be a tendency for IGAD
members to mitigate their internal differences. This may allow IGAD to
reengage usefully in the issue.
the wider region
There were numerous reports last year that a variety of countries
in the wider region were supporting one side, usually the Islamic
Courts, or the other in Somalia. If they did not actually take sides,
they showed unusual interest in a problem that, except for Yemen, was
far from their borders. In addition to Yemen, engaged countries
included Libya, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE).
Yemen has legitimate interests in Somalia because of the large
number of Somali boat people who make their way to Yemen's shores.
Potentially, Yemen is in a position to help bring competing Somali
groups together. Egypt has longstanding historical interests along the
Somali coast and is always concerned about developments involving
Ethiopia, which is the source of 86 percent of the Nile water reaching
the Aswan Dam. Dubai in the UAE serves as the financial center for both
Somalia and Somaliland. Before the defeat of the courts, Qatar may have
been trying to play a mediating role. There has been a history of money
from Saudi private sources and government-supported Islamic charities
finding its way to both legitimate and illegitimate Islamic causes in
Somalia. Libya and Iran just seemed to be meddling because Somalia
offered an opportunity.
With the defeat of the Islamic Courts, most of these countries with
the notable exception of Yemen and the UAE, which continues to serve as
a Somali financial center, have shown less engagement in Somali
affairs. The involvement last year of all these countries illustrates,
however, the potential to return to Somali affairs quickly if they find
it in their interest or just want to meddle.
the african union and the arab league
The primary role of the African Union (AU) has been an effort to
deploy an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for a period of 6
months. A 19 January 2007 communique of the AU Peace and Security
Council reiterated the AU's commitment to the unity, sovereignty and
the territorial integrity of Somalia. It called for an all-inclusive
and genuine process of dialog and reconciliation. The African Union
envisages that AMISOM will consist of nine infantry battalions of 850
personnel each supported by maritime coastal and air components,
appropriate civilian personnel, and a police training team. This
mission is expected to evolve into a U.N. operation after 6 months that
will support the long-term stabilization of post-conflict
reconstruction in Somalia. The model for the operation is the AU
mission in Burundi. The African Union urged the U.N. Security Council
to consider authorizing a U.N. operation in Somalia that would take
over from AMISOM at the expiration of its 6-months mandate. The United
Nations seems inclined to oblige.
Each day there are new press accounts about African countries that
have committed, are considering or rejected the contribution of troops
for the standing up of AMISOM. Most of the contributing countries seem
to have attached conditions such as approval only after ratification by
its legislative body. Malawi's Defense Minister reportedly promised
troops only to have the President rescind the announcement. It is not
clear at this writing which countries are irrevocably providing troops
for AMISOM, although contingents from Uganda and Nigeria seem the most
promising. Estimates suggest AMISOM will cost $34 million each month.
The United States has promised $14 million to support the force and the
airlift of African troops to Somalia. It is not clear if the cost of
airlifting troops will come out of the $14 million. The European Union
has released 15 million euros to finance the peacekeeping operation.
There is still no date for the arrival of the first troops and it
is apparent most potential African troop-contributing countries are
concerned about the situation on the ground and whether they will be
entering a friendly or hostile environment. The bad experience of the
much larger and better equipped U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF) in
1992-1993 and the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), which took
over from UNITAF and remained until 1995, has not been lost on African
troop contributors. It is not realistic to expect there will be a fully
equipped and staffed AMISOM on the ground anytime soon. The African
Union deserves considerable credit for what it is trying to accomplish
in Somalia, but it must also face reality.
The Arab League had an opportunity to make a real contribution to
the establishment of peace in Somalia, an Arab League member. Under the
chairmanship of Sudan, the Arab League started well with the June 2006
agreement in Khartoum between the Islamic Courts and the TFG. But as
the courts gained power and extended their authority in Somalia, the
Arab League seemed to lose interest in the reconciliation process. If
the Arab League had pressed the Islamic Courts harder to engage in
meaningful dialog with the weak TFG, it might have been possible to
avoid a war and to create a government of national unity that included
both the TFG and the courts. Admittedly, this would have left open the
possibility of extremists, some of whom have ties to internationalism
terrorism, remaining in positions of authority. There is obviously no
room for extremists or supporters of terrorism in a Somali Government.
Close collaboration between the TFG and the moderates in the Islamic
Courts might have been able, however, to solve this dilemma. With the
defeat of the Islamic Courts, the Arab League seems to have abdicated
responsibility for Somalia.
the united nations and the international community
U.N. Resolution 1725 on Somalia adopted by the Security Council on
6 December 2006 has been largely overtaken by events as a result of the
Ethiopian and TFG military victory. The resolution urged dialog between
the TFG and the Islamic Courts and authorized IGAD and the AU to
establish a protection and training mission in Somalia known as IGASOM.
The 19 January 2007 AU communique has effectively replaced the U.N.
resolution. The African Union, the United Nations, and the
international community are now supporting the establishment of AMISOM,
which has replaced IGASOM. Presumably the U.N. Security Council will
propose a new resolution on Somalia that takes account of the very
different situation on the ground and the more recent AU communique.
The U.N. Security Council on 2 February 2007 urged the AU to send
peacekeepers to Somalia quickly so that Ethiopia could withdraw its
forces. It also supported the deployment of a U.N. technical assistance
mission to Somalia to make recommendations on security needs.
The non-African parties most engaged in efforts to find a solution
to the situation in Somalia have been the European Union and the United
States. Both the European Union and the United States, but especially
the European Union, have emphasized the need for creation of a broad-
based Somali Government and reconciliation with disaffected elements of
Somali society, including moderate elements of the Islamic Courts and
civil society organizations. TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf has agreed
to the holding of a reconciliation conference, although no place or
date has been set. There are also unsettling reports from other
elements of the TFG that raise questions about its commitment to this
objective.
The enormous amount of energy being devoted by the African Union
and the international community to the raising of a peacekeeping force
for Somalia would be better spent in convincing, no demanding, that the
TFG and other parties begin immediately a serious process that leads to
power sharing. This should be the highest priority of the international
community, including the United Nations, African Union, Arab League,
European Union, and United States. If meaningful talks get underway
soon, it will reduce the likelihood of conflict or violence and
increase the possibility that African troops can enter the country
peacefully. This should be a Somali-driven reconciliation process that
ideally takes place in Mogadishu. There is no longer a time or place
for another Somali peace conference in three-star hotels in foreign
countries. The outcome may well result in a restructuring of the Somali
Parliament and Ministries, which are far too numerous, and will
certainly involve sharing power with some elements of Somali society
that are poorly represented in the TFG.
The alternative may well be a phantom African peacekeeping force
that arrives too late to achieve any real purpose in Somalia. In any
event, the TFG probably envisages AMISOM as tantamount to a praetorian
guard to keep it in power. The TFG must prove to the Somali people that
it is prepared to win their respect and support. Only then will there
be a meaningful role for AMISOM and only then will the TFG be in a
position to create a national government that has long-term prospects
for survival. Its ability to govern will be sharply limited and its
longevity highly doubtful if it remains dependent on the presence of
foreign troops.
The beginning of a meaningful reconciliation process should serve
as the signal to the international community to increase substantially
its humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia. The United
States has been especially generous in providing humanitarian aid while
the European Union has been somewhat more forthcoming with development
and reconstruction activities. U.N. specialized agencies such as the
World Food Program, UNDP, and UNICEF have done most of the heavy
lifting in recent years. Real progress on Somali reconciliation should
result in much more effort by all international partners.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Doctor, for a very clear and
helpful presentation.
Dr. Menkhaus.
STATEMENT OF DR. KEN MENKHAUS, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
DAVIDSON COLLEGE, DAVIDSON, NC
Dr. Menkhaus. I'd like to thank the subcommittee members
and Chairman Feingold for the opportunity to participate in
this timely hearing on Somalia.
And, with your permission, I'd like to submit my written
testimony.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
Dr. Menkhaus. Also, with your indulgence, I'd like to speak
loosely off of my notes, rather than read them, in the interest
of avoiding duplication of what other speakers have had to say.
I've been asked to provide a brief analysis of Somalia's
recent political developments as a point of departure for
discussion of the development of a U.S. strategy toward
Somalia, and I'd like to begin by discussing the dramatic
events in 2006.
Many of those events have already been touched on, but just
to refresh our memory, after 15 years of complete political
paralysis and state collapse in Somalia, we had quite an
eventful year, starting with the TFG Parliament reconvening
unexpectedly after being moribund for over a year. At the same
time, an Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and
Counterterrorism, a group of U.S.-backed militia leaders and
businessmen formed a coalition. That alarmed the ascendant
Islamist movement in Mogadishu. A 4-month war ensued in
Mogadishu, which culminated in a dramatic victory on the part
of the Islamists. They consolidated control not only over all
of Mogadishu, but quickly expanded their authority through most
of south-central Somalia, leaving the TFG, at that point in
time, precariously perched in a transitional capital in Baidoa
and holding a few other hinterland areas, but really looking
like they were on the verge of collapse.
It's important to remind ourselves, too, that the Union of
Islamic Courts, or the CIC later, provided Mogadishu with a
level of rule of law, public order, and governance that it--the
city had not seen in 15 years, and that earned the CIC a fairly
strong measure of public support in Mogadishu.
We also know that--over time, that the CIC, as Assistant
Secretary Frazer pointed out, became increasingly radicalized.
Its most reckless policies were those directed toward Ethiopia.
And to put that set of policies in perspective, I think it's
worth pointing out that hard-liners in this broad umbrella saw
fit to mobilize for jihad against Ethiopia as a way of
conflating their Islamist ideology with pan-Somali nationalism
and anti-Ethiopianism to increase their base of support,
marginalize the moderates. In the short term, this was highly
effective. In the long term, that bought them a war, a
disastrous war, with the largest standing army in sub-Saharan
Africa.
Dialog during that time between the Council of Islamic
Courts and the TFG was attempted. The United States and other
governments sought to bring them together to negotiate a
government of national unity. All agreed that that was the best
window of opportunity at the time. All were disappointed with
the lack of progress. And I think as we look back, we'll see
that intransigence on both sides was very much to blame. The
TFG feared negotiating from a position of weakness, feared
losing key positions. Ethiopia was not entirely sure it wanted
to support a process that could lead to Islamists essentially
taking over the TFG as a Trojan horse. And many of the hard-
liners in the Islamist movement saw no reason to revive a TFG
that they thought they were about to defeat from within, in a
matter of weeks or months.
Finally, in late 2006, we had the war. The Ethiopian
offensive occurred. Again, the details of that have been
provided already, but, just to reinforce what Assistant
Secretary Frazer said, one of the things that was remarkable
about that war was the extent to which the CIC was not
defeated, but was dissolved internally. The loss of support
from inside Mogadishu signaled to many of us that the hard-
liners had gone too far. It's not entirely sure that they
actually sought a war with Ethiopia, they may have just sought
mobilization for war--were playing brinksmanship, and lost. But
a broad section of the Mogadishu population was very angry at
them--that included clan elders, it included the business
community, and it included moderate Islamists--for drawing them
into an unnecessary war, forcing the Islamist leaders to flee
southward toward the Kenyan border or melt back into Mogadishu.
That culminated with Ethiopia occupying Mogadishu, another
very unexpected development, and the TFG's arrival as a
fledgling administration in the capital.
Where do we stand today? The situation in Mogadishu is
tense, it's fragile, and it's deteriorating. Ethiopia is
intending to partially withdraw its troops to avoid a quagmire.
The good news with that is that, if they withdraw their forces,
they are eliminating the main target that an insurgency would
attack. The downside, as has been pointed out, is that runs the
risk of leaving a vacuum if the African Union forces are not
able to deploy in a timely manner.
The TFG itself still remains very, very weak. It is not
providing basic administration in the capital. The population
there compares now the kind of public security that they earned
under the Council of Islamic Courts to the TFG, and the
comparison is not flattering. The public response to the TFG
inside Mogadishu ranges from tepid and opportunistic support to
outright hostility and rejectionism.
Criminal lawlessness is up dramatically in the city.
Warlords have returned and reassumed their place in their
fiefdoms. There is a rise in sporadic violence targeting both
Ethiopian troops and Transitional Federal Government
installations and officials, including the beginnings of what
looks like another dirty war, such as we had in 2004-05, a rise
of political assassinations. It's important to point out, I
think, that that is not, at present, an insurgency, as we would
normally define it. The violence is a combination of criminal
violence, of clan-based resistance, of warlord opportunism, and
some Islamist violence directed at Ethiopia and the TFG, as
well.
In the midst of this deteriorating situation in Mogadishu,
we have an international response that's based on three pillars
that have already been described. That is, first, mustering and
deploying an African Union peacekeeping force to replace the
departing Ethiopians; second, generating revenue, the funding
and support to build the governance capacity of the TFG; and
then, third, the promotion of political dialog to make the
Transitional Federal Institutions more inclusive, to make
Mogadishu population stakeholders in the TFG, as opposed to
opponents.
Political dialog is not going particularly well. The fact
is, when you take the temperature in Mogadishu, the sense is
that the TFG leadership is seeking a victor's peace, it is
engaged in a variety of policies that seem designed to alienate
and marginalize its key opponents, rather than bring them into
the government. Even the reconciliation conference that has
been called for by the President appears designed more to bring
people in who already support the TFG, rather than the key
opponents to the Transitional Government.
Both sides are responsible for the impasse, at this point.
The TFG has certainly done its part in seeking this victor's
peace. But, on the other side, the Mogadishu opponents seem
committed, at this point, to rendering Mogadishu ungovernable.
They don't have to defeat the TFG. All they have to do is play
for a draw, and then run the clock out while the TFG has only
2\1/2\ years left on its mandate. And they appear perfectly
capable of doing this. They don't need outside help to foil the
TFG's progress. All they need is a base support in Mogadishu
from the population and from some political elites, and they
have that in abundance, at this point.
To the three pillars. In my view, the deployment of
African----
Senator Feingold. I'm going to have to ask you to conclude
pretty soon so we can hear----
Dr. Menkhaus. OK.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. From Dr. Morrison.
Dr. Menkhaus. Very good.
I would say that, of the three pillars that we are pursuing
in support of peace and reconciliation in Somalia, dialog has
to be privileged. If African Union peacekeepers are sent in the
absence of dialog toward a more inclusive government, they will
be viewed as enemies in Mogadishu, and they are likely to be
targeted. If they aren't targeted, they are likely to have to
pay for their own protection. Likewise, state-building funds,
if they are provided to the TFG in the absence of dialog, are--
were going to be perceived by opponents of the TFG as having
taken sides.
Just as a final point: What happens if we get to that
worst-case scenario, where the TFG, in fact, is not able to
bring together a large consensus and a government of national
unity?--the question that you asked----
Senator Feingold. Yes.
Dr. Menkhaus [continuing]. Earlier this morning. And I
think one of the scenarios that we have to start looking at is:
Can we assist the Transitional Federal Institutions to move
forward on the key aspects and functions of the transition,
which is to say, deliberating over a constitution, setting up a
referendum, and setting up elections to end the transitional
process and bring in a full-fledged government in Somalia, even
if it has not been able to govern most of the country. That may
sound like an absurd scenario, but, in fact, we've seen that
already in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the
government was essentially paralyzed throughout the entire
time, and yet, it muddled through, thanks to a strong national
electoral commission and robust external support. That's
important, because what that does is, it would send a signal to
the potential spoilers that, ``You can block the government's
capacity to govern in Mogadishu, but if you don't join the
Transitional Institutions, and they're the only game in town,
you lose out on a voice in the final dispensation of the
country.''
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Menkhaus follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Ken Menkhaus, Professor, Political Science,
Davidson College, Davidson, NC
I would like to thank the subcommittee members and Chairman
Feingold for the opportunity to participate in this timely hearing on
Somalia.
The task of crafting a comprehensive strategy for Somalia which
harmonizes different, sometimes competing U.S. policy priorities in the
country will stand a much better chance of success if grounded in
accurate analysis of the nature of both the crises and opportunities
posed by Somalia. To that end, I have been asked by the subcommittee to
provide a brief analysis of Somalia's recent political developments as
a point of departure for discussions of U.S. strategy toward Somalia.
the seismic changes of 2006
After 10 years of political paralysis and state collapse, Somalia
experienced a dramatic series of political changes in 2006. These
developments began with the establishment in February 2006 of a U.S.-
backed Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism in
Mogadishu. That alliance brought together a group of rival militia and
business leaders with whom the U.S. Government was partnering in an
attempt to monitor terrorist activity in Mogadishu. U.S. concern over
possible misuse of Somalia as a safe haven for foreign al-Qaeda
terrorists focused on a small number of individuals implicated in the
1998 terrorist attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam, as well as a bombing of a Mombasa resort in 2002 and a failed
attempt to take down an Israeli chartered flight leaving Mombasa. Those
``high value targets'' were enjoying safe haven in Mogadishu under the
protection of a small group of hard-line Somali Islamists who held top
positions in the umbrella group known at the time as the Supreme
Council of Islamic Courts, later renamed the Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC).
The establishment of the counterterrorism alliance inadvertently
triggered an extraordinary chain of events. The Islamists, alarmed at
what they viewed as an alliance set up to attack them, launched
preemptive attacks against the alliance militias. The 4-month war which
ensued culminated in a decisive victory for the Islamists in June. The
UIC quickly imposed effective control over Mogadishu, bringing
dramatically improved rule of law to the city, earning a measure of
``performance legitimacy'' and enjoying widespread support from Somalis
both inside and out of the capital. By July, the UIC expanded its
control across most of south-central Somalia, and emerged as the most
powerful and popular political force in the country. Its principal
rival, the Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG),
retained nominal control over the provisional capital, Baidoa, and some
other regions in the hinterland, but was in a position of grave
weakness and appeared vulnerable to internal collapse.
External actors, including the U.S. Government, urged the TFG and
moderates within the UIC leadership to engage in political dialog with
the aim of creating a more inclusive transitional government which
would be accepted in Mogadishu. Talks held in Khartoum yielded little,
however, and tensions quickly arose. For their part, the TFG leadership
appeared unwilling to engage in serious power-sharing discussions, and
Ethiopia was unwilling to risk allowing the Islamists to use the TFG as
a Trojan horse. Ethiopia increased its troop presence in and around
Baidoa, inflaming the Islamists. As for the UIC, hard-liners in the
umbrella movement appeared intent on stoking hostilities with Ethiopia,
in large part to mobilize support and marginalize moderates within the
movement. Islamist hard-liners such as Hassan Dahir Aweys repeatedly
invoked jihad against Ethiopia, called for Ethiopians to rise up
against the Meles regime, and made irredentist claims on Somali-
inhabited territory in eastern Ethiopia. The UIC also forged close
links to Ethiopia's rival Eritrea, and funneled arms to two armed
insurgencies inside Ethiopia, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden
National Liberation Front. In the short term, the call for jihad
against Ethiopia proved to be a very effective political tool for
Aweys. By conflating Islamism, pan-Somali nationalism, and anti-
Ethiopianism, he won broad support from Somalis at home and in the
diaspora, including many who did not subscribe to the increasingly
draconian Islamist rule imposed on residents of Mogadishu. In the long
run the tactic bought Aweys and his supporters a disastrous war against
sub-Saharan Africa's largest and most seasoned standing army.
The UIC's slide toward radicalization in the latter half of 2006
made war with Ethiopia likely if not inevitable, and eventually led
many external observers to conclude that the many moderates in the UIC
movement were too weak to redirect the movement's increasingly reckless
policies. The position of the U.S. Government shifted toward greater
emphasis on the UIC's alleged al-Qaeda links and Ethiopia's legitimate
security concerns, a signal that some observers construed as amounting
to American ``tacit support'' of an Ethiopian offensive against the
UIC. That Ethiopian offensive was launched in late December, and
produced not only a decisive victory in initial battles in the open
countryside but also an unexpected internal collapse of the UIC back in
Mogadishu. There, hard-liners were confronted with widespread
defections by clan militias, businesspeople, and moderate Islamists.
Local clan and business leaders also refused to allow the UIC to
conduct a guerrilla war in Mogadishu, on the grounds that that would
produce devastating loss of life and damage to property. Residual UIC
forces and leaders, including an undisclosed number of foreign
jihadists who had joined the UIC in 2006, were forced to flee southward
to Kismayo, where they were again blocked by local residents from using
the city as a base. The remnants of the UIC forces either melted back
into Mogadishu, sought to cross the Kenyan border, or remained hidden
in the inaccessible forested areas along the coastal Kenyan-Somali
border area. At least two aerial attacks were launched by American AC-
130 gunships at convoys suspected of containing the three foreign al-
Qaeda suspects sought by the United States. There is no evidence that
those high-value targets were hit in the attacks; U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer reported that eight members of the
Somali jihadist militia known as the shabaab were killed in one attack.
The UIC's sudden collapse led to the subsequent Ethiopian
occupation of the capital and the arrival of the TFG leadership to the
capital. Despite efforts by the TFG to create a police force and name a
local administration, the capital quickly slid into lawlessness and
armed criminality. Militia leaders deemed ``warlords'' by many
Mogadishu residents returned to their neighborhoods and reclaimed their
militias. By January 2007, armed attacks against Ethiopian forces and
TFG installations increased, raising the specter of a complex
insurgency by a loose combination of Islamists, warlords, armed
criminals, and clan-based militias. Determined to avoid being drawn
into a quagmire, Ethiopia announced intent to withdraw its forces
within weeks and appealed to the African Union to send replacement
protection forces into Somalia.
the current situation
As of early February 2007, the situation in Somalia is precarious.
Efforts to encourage the TFG leadership to engage in dialog with
Mogadishu-based leaders, including moderate elements of the dissolved
UIC, have met with frustration. The TFG coalition remains narrow, and
is deeply resented by most Mogadishu groups. Top TFG leaders appear
committed to imposing an elusive victor's peace on Mogadishu. Armed
attacks against TFG personnel and buildings are on the rise. Efforts to
deploy an AMISOM (African Mission in Somalia) peace enforcement force
to Somalia remain the subject of intensive diplomatic energies, but it
is not yet clear that those forces will be mustered in a timely manner,
if at all. Somali jihadists have issued threats to kill foreign
peacekeepers should they be deployed.
The mood in Mogadishu is, by all accounts, weary, sullen, and
angry. Anti-American sentiment is high. Rightly or wrongly, the United
States is held indirectly responsible for the collapse of public order
in Mogadishu. Though most residents are said to be desperate for a
return to rule of law and public order, most expect a return to wider
violence. Those with the means have relocated their families abroad.
The price of ammunition and small arms has shot up in local markets in
anticipation of troubles.
The TFG has made almost no progress in providing improved public
security or other government services in the capital. This record
stands in stark contrast to the performance of the UIC administration,
the standard against which the TFG is now being judged by impatient
Mogadishu residents.
Ironically, the end result of the seismic changes of 2006 is to
some extent a return to the status quo ante bellum. Somalia in early
2007 looks very much like Somalia of 2005, featuring a weak and
unpopular TFG facing resistance from a loose coalition of clans,
Islamists, and other interests in Mogadishu, in a context of de facto
state collapse.
assessment and analysis
The best hope for Somalia at present is initiation of sustained
political dialog which yields a more inclusive transitional
government--one which empowers and reassures key constituencies in
Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. Anything less than that will leave
important segments of the Mogadishu population inclined to play the
role of spoiler. To date, neither the TFG nor the loose coalition of
interests in Mogadishu opposing the TFG have made genuine efforts to
pursue political dialog. The TFG leadership has embarked on a series of
policies seemingly intended to alienate its rivals, including ill-
advised and unfeasible calls for forcible disarmament of Mogadishu.
Most Mogadishu opposition to the TFG appears intent on pursuing a
strategy of making Mogadishu ungovernable as a means of blocking the
TFG. The TFG's opponents do not need to defeat the TFG; they only need
to play for a draw, prevent the TFG from extending an administration
across key part of the country while waiting for the clock to run down
on the TFG's remaining 2\1/2\-year mandate.
Every effort is being made to simultaneously promote
reconciliation, muster, and deploy AU peacekeepers, and generate funds
and support to improve the governance capacity of the TFG. Ideally,
these three goals will be advanced in tandem. But there are real
dangers if they do not proceed in unison. In particular, if ANISOM
forces are deployed and robust capacity-building measures are provided
to the TFG in the absence of political dialog, Mogadishu constituencies
will view these external policies as a form of aggression against them,
by empowering a government they reject. In that event, the AU forces
will either be subjected to attacks and kidnappings, or will be forced
to pay protection money to local militias to insure their own safety--a
practice that occurred frequently in the ill-fated UNOSOM operation of
1993-94. For this reason, promotion of political dialog and other
measures designed to make Mogadishu clans and constituencies
stakeholders in the transitional government must be afforded top
priority. Dialog needs to be considered a precondition for, not a
complement to, state-building and peacekeeping initiatives.
The TFG leadership has understandably made passionate appeals to
the international community for substantial foreign aid to enable it to
build an effective governmental capacity, and many sympathetic external
observers have come to equate robust foreign aid to the TFG with
commitment to state-building in Somalia. The relationship between
foreign aid and state-building in Somalia is actually more complex. In
the wrong circumstances; high levels of foreign aid has redirected the
energies of political elites away from the onerous task of governance
toward controlling and diverting foreign aid. It also tempts political
leaders to use cash to play divide and rule, playing off and splitting
rivals, rather than engaging in the more direct but more sustainable
task of real reconciliation and power-sharing. It is worth noting that
the three instances of impressive state-building in Somalia since
1991--the secessionist state of Somaliland, the autonomous state of
Puntland, and the UIC's 6-month administration of Mogadishu and
surrounding areas--were all achieved with minimal external assistance.
What this suggests it that external insistence on a few preconditions
for foreign aid--real political dialog, and genuine efforts to begin
basic government services--is vital to ensure the success of the TFG.
In the event that AMISOM forces cannot be deployed in adequate
numbers to replace the Ethiopian troops, the TFG is unlikely to
maintain a meaningful presence in Mogadishu. Security incidents
directed against the TFG will increase, and its leaders will pull back
to the town of Baidoa or go on extended foreign trips. The result will
be a divided Somalia and a paralyzed TFG. Recent actions and statements
by Somali figures make this an unfortunate but increasingly likely
scenario, one for which policymakers in the international community
must develop contingency plans. A withdraw or collapse of the TFG need
not coincide with a rise of armed conflict, though it may. External
efforts to promote a ``soft landing'' in Mogadishu, assisting local
authorities to revive at least some semblance of local governance
structures from the past, would protect the capital from a free-fall
into armed anarchy and might earn a small measure of goodwill from a
Mogadishu population that harbors deep anger at the outside world--and
the United States in particular--for its perceived support of an
Ethiopian offensive which destroyed a political order that brought
public security to the city for the first time in 15 years.
At present, the growing levels of armed violence in Mogadishu do
not amount to an insurgency. The Ethiopian withdraw is depriving would
be insurgents of their principal target, and the TFG is not enough of a
threat to require an organized insurgency. The current violence is an
admixture of armed criminality, sporadic clan-based resistance to the
TFG, warlord adventurism, and Islamist resistance. Of these, the latter
two will be most difficult to contain. The warlords have a vested
interest in creating lawlessness and blocking the TFG; the Islamists
have a vested interest in blocking the TFG before setting up their own
administration again, at which point their alliance of convenience with
the warlords will again turn into an armed rivalry.
The dissolution of the UIC as an organization should not be
confused with the fate of political Islam in Somalia. Political Islam
remains an ascendant and diverse movement in the country and will play
a role in any future political dispensation in Somalia. Treating all
Somali Islamists as radicals or al-Qaeda associates would be a serious
error.
The unexpected internal collapse of the UIC revealed deep fissures
in the movement between moderates and radicals, and exposed the extent
to which hard-liners lost support of their core constituencies by
pursuing confrontation and jihad with Ethiopia. The fact that business
and clan leaders in Mogadishu insisted that the Islamists not wage a
destructive insurgency in Mogadishu offers hope that Mogadishu-
based groups are keen to protect investments there and avoid war, and
may as a result be more open to dialog. The failure of the hard-line
Islamists offers lessons about the fate of any political authority in
Somalia that opts to embrace authoritarianism, concentrates power in
the hands of a few, and is noninclusive.
One of the most important questions emerging from the UIC's
collapse in December 2006 is whether and in what form the Islamist
movement is likely to regroup. In the past, setbacks to Islamist
movements in Somalia have led them to assimilate back into the local
community and remain a loose network of ``alumni'' until conditions
improve. In current conditions, however, the worry is that remnants of
the jihadist militia known as the shabaab will regroup in cells and
launch terrorist attacks and assassination attempts both inside Somalia
and against soft western targets in the region. It is impossible to
know if many or any of these radicalized young shabaab members will
engage in terrorist acts. But we have learned in Somalia that a small
number of committed jihadists have the potential to produce an enormous
amount of fear and instability.
Aside from a handful of warlords, state collapse is not in anyone's
best interest in Somalia. Most Somali households and businesses would
obviously benefit from revived central government; Ethiopia and Kenya
would prefer to have a moderate and functional government on their long
borders with Somalia; and the United States would prefer to have an
effective government partner to monitor and prevent terrorist
activities inside Somalia. But while state collapse is no one's first
choice for Somalia, it is almost everyone's second choice. Ethiopia,
the United States, and many Somali businesses and political leaders
have learned to cope with and adapt to a condition of state collapse in
Somalia. This is dangerous, because it means that if efforts at
reconciliation and state-building become too onerous or risky, many
interested parties will be willing to walk away and allow Somalia to
revert to a state of collapse.
This latter point has special implications for the subcommittee's
stated aim in this hearing, the promotion of a comprehensive strategy
for Somalia. In the past, U.S. counterterrorism activities and its
stated aim of promoting state-building in Somalia tended to be delinked
and at times even worked at cross-purposes. Though calls to
``deconflict'' state-building and counterterrorism policies were made,
the two remained largely separate enterprises until recently. Since
revival of an effective state authority in Somalia is an essential
component of our long-term efforts to combat terrorism in the country,
this really amounts to a tension between short-term versus long-term
counterterrorism measures. Our short-term measures--working through
nonstate actors to monitor and apprehend foreign terror suspects in
Somalia--were questionable in their effectiveness, and in the process
created incentives for militia leaders to block state-building efforts
that would in effect put them out of business. If the TFG fails to
consolidate control over Mogadishu, the United States will again face
worrisome short-term threats that the city could provide a safe haven
for foreign terrorists, and will be tempted again to contract with
local nonstate partners in the capital. I would submit to the honorable
members of the subcommittee that progress toward a comprehensive
strategy for Somalia must find a way to resolve this tension between
short-term and long-term counterterrorism goals.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Doctor, for that
excellent, if troubling, report.
Dr. Morrison, thank you for your tremendous patience and
for your work in this area. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. J. STEPHEN MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Morrison. Thank you very much, Senator.
I would request that my full statement be entered into the
record.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
Dr. Morrison. I'm going to speak briefly, drawing on the
January 17 conference that we organized with the U.S. Institute
of Peace and with the Council on Foreign Relations, at which
you, Senator, honored us by kicking that off.
The most fundamental challenge, it seems to me, for U.S.
policy right now is how to proceed with realism and caution and
patience, and how to blend or integrate the hard
counterterrorism equities that we have there with the softer
equities that we have in getting a broadened compact negotiated
for governance in Somalia, for meeting the dire humanitarian
needs and beginning some reconstruction.
Right now, there is no clear vision, and there is no strong
interagency process that brings those two pieces of the hard
and soft together. There's quite a bit of imbalance in the
approach. And there's quite a bit of confusion and suspicion,
within the region and beyond, around U.S. intentions. So, in
terms of defining a strategy and a policy, this is, I believe,
the core challenge before us.
There are a couple of other key dimensions that I think
need highlighting. One is, not only is establishing a viable
governing system the sine qua non of progress, and has to be
the top priority, but we need to consciously and systematically
prepare for at least an interim failure in the near term. This
is a--you know, the probabilities are so strong in that regard.
Second is, we should not allow ourselves to become obsessed
with chasing after an 8,000-person AU force, when the signs are
all there that, at best, we're going to see a modest deployment
that will probably be concentrated in and around Mogadishu.
Third, we need to move quickly to strengthen U.S.
diplomatic capacities and to enlarge the leadership that we can
exercise, particularly in the Security Council.
On the key findings that we have identified, that I think
should guide policy, one is that there is great uncertainty
surrounding what is happening on the ground and within the
region with respect to the Islamist movement. That means we
need to intensify our analyses and engagement.
Second, the TFG continues to lack capacity and legitimacy,
and has a high probability of folding.
Third, the TFG has, thus far, failed to enlarge its
governing coalition, and is moving in that direction, and our
leverage on that score, we need to reexamine and be much more
creative in how we can move the TFG.
Fourth, the Mogadishu security has deteriorated since the
removal of the security network provided by the Islamist
Courts, and we have to assume that that trend line will
continue.
Fifth, the Ethiopians are withdrawing. They are a lightning
rod within Mogadishu. And their withdrawal will create gaps and
will stimulate a spike in violence within Mogadishu.
Sixth, Islamism remains popular and legitimate. It is a--it
has a strong hand. It is fundamental to whatever governing
coalition is going to emerge. And it can wait out the failures
of current leadership.
Seventh, our counterterrorism strikes have put us into a
strong strategic embrace with Ethiopia and the TFG. If we're
going to counteract and distance ourselves from that, we need a
diplomatic strategy that consciously seeks to do that.
Our recommendations are that, first of all, we--and this is
consistent with what David and Ken have said--intensify the
pressures upon the TFG to enlarge the governing coalition, make
use of our access in Yemen and Kenya and elsewhere to the
Islamist Court remnants, be very realistic about what we can
achieve from an AU peacekeeping operation, intensify the
Security Council engagement. And I would add there, the Chinese
were very helpful in the early phase of putting through 1725,
and can be, I believe, helpful in that regard, if we were to
turn to the Security Council to intensify its involvement. We
should ensure that we have a robust and sustainable funding
flow. And you've put forward, Senator, the idea of a trust
fund. I think that's a laudable idea. I hope that can be moved
forward. But key to our leverage and our ability to really move
forward is getting much higher and more sustainable and
predictable forces--flows of resources.
Fifth point, that we can--we have institutional capacities
that we are expanding--the humanitarian operations we've heard
a lot about today--and those are very laudable. We can add to
those expanded work in health and education, in making greater
use of the combined joint task force of the Horn of Africa, for
a number of constructive operations, and by intensifying our
analytic capacities.
I agree that we need--have a need for a senior-level figure
to manage the interagency and ride the circuit at a senior
level within the region and in Europe. This person can
complement and greatly augment our capacities. I would add also
that Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte can play a very
important role here in making Somalia a part of his portfolio
as he begins his work.
Last point is that we can encourage, within the United
States, greater unity among the Somalia diaspora community.
That community has been very exuberant, but remains divided. It
is seeking to unify itself this month. It is making a
significant play in that regard. Remittances are estimated at
as high as $1 billion per year to Somalia from the diaspora.
This is an influential, highly gifted and talented community,
which is moving toward unity, and we should be very strategic
in how we make use of that.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Morrison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. J. Stephen Morrison, Executive Director,
Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC
introduction
Senator Feingold, Africa Subcommittee chairman, and Senator Sununu,
ranking minority, I commend you both for holding this timely hearing,
and I thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the discussions
here today.
When we last gathered here, on July 11, 2006, it was to discuss
what the U.S. strategy should be toward Somalia, after the Islamist
courts had routed the U.S.-backed warlord coalition in May 2006. Six
months later, we are gathered to consider what strategy makes sense now
that the courts have been vanquished by the Ethiopians, with U.S.
support.
The wheel has certainly turned, and U.S. engagement has been
enlarged conspicuously on several fronts, following a fallow period of
virtual nonengagement dating back to the spring of 1994.
Diplomatically, Secretary Rice has herself weighed in directly at
key moments, while Assistant Secretary Frazer has been very active in
Washington, in the Horn of Africa, and in Europe. Materially, the
administration put on the table a $40 million assistance package for
Somalia that for the first time in over 12 years reintroduces U.S.
commitments to peacekeeping, reconstruction, and development in
Somalia. On the security front, U.S. forces have been engaged directly
in the air and on the ground in targeting terror suspects implicated in
the August 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and
the November 2002 attacks on an Israeli tourist hotel and airliner. In
combination, these constitute a dramatic shift in the U.S. posture
toward Somalia.
We also see heightened interest in Somalia in other settings.
Congress, thanks in no small measure to your leadership, Senator
Feingold, has become very active on a promising bipartisan basis in
support of expanded U.S. leadership on Somalia. The U.S. media and the
U.S.-based Somali diaspora community have each become highly engaged.
Here in Washington, the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
in partnership with the U.S. Institute for Peace and the Council on
Foreign Relations, launched in the fall of 2006 a very active Working
Group on Somalia, as a direct outgrowth of the SFRC African
Subcommittee July 2006 hearing, and with the support of your able
staff, Grey Frandsen.
The CSIS Working Group's January 17 conference, at which Senator
Feingold, Assistant Secretary Frazer, several prominent Mogadishu and
Kenya-based experts spoke, was attended by over 200 and widely reported
in the media. Its success hinged also on the contributions made by my
colleagues at CSIS, most notably John Hamre, Jennifer Cooke, and David
Henek, and generous input from David Smock, U.S. Institute for Peace,
Princeton Lyman, Council on Foreign Relations, and Howard Wolpe,
Woodrow Wilson International Center. The body of my testimony today is
a distillation of what was learned at the January 17 conference.
Before I turn to the January 17 conference, I wish to emphasize
that in several important respects, what was needed in July 2006 in
terms of a U.S. strategy is still very much needed today. What is
different is the visibility and urgency of what is required.
Most fundamentally, the United States continues to be under
pressure to define a coherent strategy that is grounded in realism,
caution, and patience. It continues to lack a clear vision backed by a
functioning interagency process that bridges the United States ``hard''
counterterrorism equities with its ``soft'' power interests in
promoting a negotiated, broadened compact for governing Somalia,
meeting dire humanitarian needs, and beginning reconstruction efforts.
As in other parts of the world where U.S. counterterrorism interests
are strongly at play, it is becoming clear in the Somalia context just
how operationally difficult it is to integrate effectively the ``hard''
and ``soft'' dimensions of U.S. influence and to explain how those fit
within multilateral processes. Much more can, and should be done in
this critical sphere. So long as integration between ``hard'' and
``soft'' is lacking, there will be substantial confusion in the region
and beyond regarding U.S. intentions.
Similarly, we continue to confront the profound weaknesses of the
internal parties in Somalia and the urgent need to systematically test
the Transitional Federal Government and to engage and test
representatives of the Islamic courts. Establishing viable governance
within Somalia remains the sine qua non for future progress. Our
diplomatic presence inside Somalia is nil, but we do have important
access to Somali leaders, including Islamists in Kenya and elsewhere,
and we have the ability to lay out how U.S. support can be structured
to support improved governance.
Although there is very active planning and discussion around the
possible future deployment of an African Union 8,000 person force to
replace the Ethiopian military, the picture today is not substantially
different from July. There is simply little prospect that an external
African Union force will enter Somalia soon that will be able to shape
the security situation on the ground substantially. We need to think
and focus our actions on priorities such as security in and around
Mogadishu, and avoid chasing an unrealizable goal that distracts us
from what is really feasible and urgently required.
As in July, the United States continues to need stronger U.S.
diplomatic capacities and enhanced leadership in multilateral channels,
especially the U.N. Security Council. An integral part of that
continues to be the need for a broad and aggressive diplomatic effort
aimed at expanding the Somali Contact Group and pressuring Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, the Emirates, Egypt, and Eritrea to curb materiel and
financial support to radical Islamists and warlords.
outcomes of the january 17 conference at csis
On January 17, 2007, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, in collaboration with the Council on Foreign Relations, the
U.S. Institute of Peace, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center,
hosted a major conference in Washington, DC, titled ``Somalia's Future:
Options for Diplomacy, Assistance, and Peace Operations.'' The
conference brought together expert observers from Mogadishu, senior
U.S. policymakers, representatives from humanitarian assistance
organizations, and regional analysts to convey to a U.S. audience the
current situation in Somalia and lay out the challenges before the
United States and the broader international community.
Conference participants agreed there is a window of opportunity for
the United States, in collaboration with Somalis and the broader
international community, to effect positive change in Somalia, but that
this window may close in the near future. After 12 years of policy
disengagement that followed the failed U.S. military intervention of
1993, the United States has an opportunity to forge a forward-looking,
comprehensive strategy to address immediate security concerns and the
longer term threat of regional instability. In your opening speech at
the conference, Senator Feingold, you summarized the challenge: ``We
cannot allow our past to overshadow the pressing security concerns we
face in the [Horn of Africa] today. We have an opportunity to help the
Somali people dig themselves out of almost two decades of chaos and to
strengthen U.S. national security at the same time. But if our
government does not move quickly and aggressively on all fronts, we can
be sure Somalia will continue to be a haven for terrorist networks and
a source of instability that poses a direct threat to the United
States.''
key findings: the situation in mogadishu
1. Great uncertainty persists. Regional experts and speakers from
Somalia described the great uncertainty that currently pervades
Mogadishu and the highly tenuous position of the newly empowered
Transitional Federal Government. Major unknowns include the possible
emergence of a dual insurgency, emanating at once from alienated clan
militias and from ideologically driven ``jihadi'' fighters, remnants of
the radical core of the defeated Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Unclear
also is the nature of links between the UIC's radical leadership, now
dispersed in southern Somalia, Kenya, and the Saudi Peninsula, and
Islamist networks within Mogadishu.
2. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) continues to lack
capacity and legitimacy. It is unpopular and fragile, and today sits
precariously in Mogadishu, installed and protected by Ethiopian
military forces, who have indicated their intent to withdraw within
weeks and reportedly begun that process in earnest. The conditions that
allowed the Islamic courts to emerge and win local support in
Mogadishu--notably the alienation of the Hawiye clan from the
structures of the TFG and the utter lack of security and basic
services--today remain very much intact.
3. The TFG has thus far failed to enlarge its governing coalition.
It is internally fractured, and has sent decidedly mixed signals on its
willingness to broaden its base of support and legitimacy. Its
leadership has held some consultations with clan elders, members of
civil society, and former Somali Presidents, and TFG President
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed has recently committed to a national
reconciliation conference, but there is little evidence that these
consultations have resulted in an enlarged governing coalition.
The dismissal on January 17 of Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan
Sheikh Adan, who opposed Ethiopia's military intervention and called
for talks with former leaders of the UIC, does not bode well for unity
and tolerance within the TFG or broader reconciliation with remnants of
the Islamist movement. The TFG's imposition of martial law, temporary
closure of media outlets, and forceful disarmament of local residents,
has left Mogadishu residents uncertain and nervous. As yet the
government has not made a clear distinction between those among the UIC
leadership whom it considers criminal and the many residents of
Mogadishu who supported the courts for their security and services they
provided.
4. Mogadishu's security has deteriorated since the removal of the
security network created by the Islamic courts. Targeted killings,
abductions, and revenge killings are reportedly on the rise. Mogadishu
residents, their expectations raised by the success of the courts in
providing local security, now look to the TFG for an equivalent level
of order. The TFG is currently incapable of providing security, and,
until it can forge some agreement with local Mogadishu groups, must
rely on Ethiopian or other external forces who may be introduced in the
future to replace departing Ethiopian troops. The greatest potential
flash point for conflict remains in Mogadishu, and success or failure
of stabilization efforts there will determine Somalia's future.
5. Ethiopian forces have not created the basis for security. They
are a lightning rod. The presence of Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu is
highly divisive, and even if they currently provide some level of
security, the longer they remain in large numbers, the more they will
generate popular antagonism and resentment. Ethiopia, having
successfully eliminated its principal security threat by vanquishing
the UIC, has little stake in the longer, more difficult task of
stabilizing Mogadishu. Given Ethiopia's eagerness to leave and the
difficulty of quickly mustering adequate numbers of African Union
troops, the handover of security operations will be fraught with risk
and difficulty.
6. Islamism remains popular and legitimate, and will be essential
to any stable governing arrangements. Although the UIC as a political
entity has dissolved, political Islam remains very much alive and will
need to be accorded a role in deciding Somalia's future political
dispensation. Islamic charities, businesses, and networks remain among
the most robust and enduring. Mogadishu clan and business networks
could become significant spoilers in the reconciliation process, but
could also become powerful allies in restoring basic core services and
local authority.
7. U.S. counterterror strikes and the U.S. embrace of Ethiopia are
highly controversial and have high costs at the popular level within
Somalia and across the region. Still at large are the three ``high-
value'' al-Qaeda associates accused of organizing the 1998 Embassy
bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the 2003 hotel and airline
attacks in Mombasa, Kenya. The three were allegedly given shelter by
UIC leadership and were the principal targets of two successive U.S.
air strikes in southern Somalia in January 2007. The status of current
U.S. efforts to track down these three individuals and their supporters
is unclear, but the air strikes have confirmed in the minds of many
Somalis and regional actors that a close strategic alliance exists
among the United States, Ethiopia, and the TFG, and that U.S. security
interests predominate, at the expense of ``soft'' interests such as
reaching a negotiated internal compact, and addressing humanitarian and
reconstruction needs. For this reason, U.S. air strikes remain highly
controversial, both in Somalia and among European partners, and feed
regional suspicions of U.S. intentions, motives, and commitment to
long-term stability. An aggressive U.S. diplomatic strategy will be
essential to counteract these sentiments.
priority recommendations for u.s. policy
High risks of regression. The United States, in concert with other
Western, African, and Middle East powers, will need to act quickly to
avert worst case scenarios: An absolute vacuum of authority in
Mogadishu; a dual insurgency led by clan militias and ``jihadi''
extremists; a worsening humanitarian catastrophe; and regional
destabilization. But the United States will also need to be cautious in
sequencing and calibrating actions for greatest effect.
Humility and overcoming constraints. Further, the United States
will need to approach Somalia with a degree of humility. After a decade
of disengagement,
the United States operates from a tremendous deficit, in terms of
policy, institutional capacities, credibility, and leverage over key
players. It lacks real-time knowledge and enduring relationships on the
ground, and has no full-time senior-level leadership in Washington or
the region charged with directing policy. Beyond humanitarian
assistance, which has averaged $90 million annually and sustains
approximately 700,000 Somalis, the U.S. Government has lacked serious
funding to leverage its aims in Somalia, although the commitment by
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for an initial downpayment of $40
million to support security operations, humanitarian assistance, and
state development is a promising opening for expanded engagement and
high-level attention.
Priorities for U.S. policy in the near term will be to:
1. Press the Transitional Federal Government to resolve its internal
differences and to begin immediately a genuine process of
dialog and reconciliation
A first priority must be to create internal governing structures
that have some prospect of hope and legitimacy. The United States and
its international partners must make clear that confidence in--and
support for--the TFG will hinge on a demonstrated commitment to build
and broaden its base of support, and begin a process of reconciliation
with those groups who have been alienated and excluded. There are local
authorities within Mogadishu--the business community, clans, local
Islamic courts and charities--who can assist the TFG in rebuilding
security and basic services and reassuring local residents. The TFG
cannot afford to alienate these groups and should make every effort to
earn their cooperation.
U.S. leverage resides not only in its promise of institutional and
security support for the TFG, but also in U.S. access and ongoing
dialog with Nairobi-based elements of the UIC leadership, in particular
Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, former chair of the Executive Council of
Islamic Courts. The U.S. Government has made clear to the TFG that it
considers Sheik Sharif a moderate who can play a vital role in
reconciling Somali factions.
2. Maintain realistic expectations of an African-Union-led peacekeeping
operation
No amount of external peacekeeping forces will have a chance of
success in Mogadishu unless a genuine and credible process of
reconciliation and political dialog is under way. Mogadishu's best hope
for security hinges on the TFG's success in winning cooperation from
local clans and business networks to provide a modicum of authority and
order. In the absence of clearly defined conditions or a genuine
political dialog by the TFG, African Union forces will fuel popular
resentment and possibly feed an incipient insurgency. Even a full
contingent of 8,000 AU troops will be spread very thin in Mogadishu and
will be at strong risk of failure and attack. The international
community must remain highly sensitive to this fact as it urges African
countries to contribute personnel.
Mounting an adequate AU peacekeeping force will not happen quickly,
even in the best of circumstances, and the international community
should be prepared for the possibility of a sharp spike in violence in
Mogadishu, should there be a gap between Ethiopian withdrawal and AU
deployment. The African Union, the international community, and the
Somali people will need a clear and common understanding of the
mandate, mission, and scope of the operation, which must be achievable
both militarily and politically. The African Union is not likely to be
able to muster the full 8,000 personnel any time soon, and even with
the full contingent will need to set clear and achievable priorities
for deployment. Efforts must be centered in Mogadishu, and within the
city may have to be limited to protecting critical infrastructures.
3. Urge the U.N. Security Council to elevate Somalia as a priority and
identify an overarching diplomatic structure that can convene
all relevant international players
The United States should urge the U.N. Security Council and U.N.
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to refocus its attention on Somalia,
elaborating the commitments outlined in U.N. Resolution 1725,
reenergizing the Somalia Panel of Experts, and making clear to the TFG
its expectations for dialog and governance. The United States should
also urge the expansion of the International Contact Group for Somalia
to bring in international partners who have the necessary clout,
commitment, and neutrality to be helpful. A number of Arab countries,
notably Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, have
considerable leverage in Somalia and longstanding engagement in the
social services sector. Currently Tanzania is the only African member
of the International Contact Group, and both the African Union and
League of Arab States have observer status. International efforts will
need careful coordination, and the United States for the time being
will need to play a discreet but transparent role.
4. Ensure robust and sustainable resources to back expanded U.S.
engagement
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has committed an initial $40
million for Somalia, a small amount in the context of Somalia's
requirements, but nonetheless a strong signal that the United States is
overcoming a decade of entrenched aversion and is prepared to actively
reengage. Over time, however, there will be a need for reliable and
secure funding flows in order for the U.S. Government to leverage its
long-term policy aiDr. Senator Feingold has suggested a Somalia ``trust
fund'' to support disarmament and demobilization efforts,
infrastructure projects, capacity-building and jobs creation. This
model could help ensure a sustained and predictable support flow for
Somali reconstruction that will endure beyond the current spike in
public and administration attention to Somalia.
5. Build U.S. institutional capacities
Policymakers should take advantage of the current resurgence of
interest in Somalia and the convergence of opinion between the State
Department and Congress to build U.S. capacities for a sustained and
comprehensive approach to Somalia. A first step should be to
significantly expand Somalia-specific analytic and reporting capacity
in the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. The United States should engage the
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa in training, security sector
reform, capacity-building, police training and maritime security,
although clearly this will need to be done carefully and in close
coordination with other U.S. agencies and international partners. The
United States can increase its humanitarian flows and work to enhance
the coordination of international humanitarian efforts, leveraging the
enduring networks, legitimacy, and community reach of a number of
operating agencies. Finally, the United States can increase its
investment in longer term institution-building: In health, education,
local authorities, and those elements of the TFG that demonstrate some
commitment to inclusivity and service delivery.
6. Appoint a senior-level figure to coordinate U.S. policy efforts
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer,
has devoted considerable attention and energy to the crisis in Somalia,
as has U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger. Their efforts and
energy are to be commended and should be bolstered by the appointment
of a senior-level figure to manage U.S. interagency efforts and
cooperation with international partners on a day-to-day basis. The
stakes for U.S. interests are sufficiently high, and the diplomatic
circumstances more than adequately complex to warrant the appointment
of a fully empowered and resourced coordinator who will report to the
Assistant Secretary. Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte, should
add the Horn of Africa to his priority regions for engagement and
transformational diplomacy.
7. Encourage unity within the U.S. Somali diaspora
The Somali diaspora within the United States is well-placed and
eager to play a significant role in rebuilding a stable and secure
Somalia. Some sources estimate that remittances to Somalia from the
diaspora community worldwide may be as high as $1 billion annually. And
as demonstrated at the CSIS conference, the diaspora community remains
highly engaged and passionate about Somalia's future. In many ways clan
divisions in Somalia are reflected in U.S. diaspora communities. But
many Somali Americans clearly grasp that no one clan or grouping can
dominate the Somali political scene for long and that only through
broad-based coalitions is there the possibility of sustained peace.
There are a number of efforts currently under way to bridge the
divisions among diaspora communities. Should the Somali diaspora
community come together behind a common set of priorities and goals,
they could prove a powerful force in moving and sustaining effective
U.S. engagement in Somalia.
Senators Feingold and Sununu, I am grateful for the opportunity to
share these thoughts with you today, and am grateful for the leadership
and interest you have shown on this important matter. Somalia and the
Horn of Africa matter significantly in multiple ways to U.S. national
interests, and Congress is well-positioned to help enhance the good the
United States can achieve in the Horn, and to avoid the mistakes of the
past. I hope my comments have been helpful, and look forward to
continuing to collaborate closely with you and your staff.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Dr. Morrison.
I've attended a lot of hearings of this subcommittee in 15
years. This is one of the most useful and best panels I've
heard, and I thank you.
Let me ask a couple of questions, although the hour is
late.
You know, Dr. Morrison, you basically anticipated the first
question that I want all three of you to answer. I take you as
having essentially just endorsed the idea of a special envoy
for Somalia. Let me ask Dr. Shinn and Dr. Menkhaus their
response on that, in light of Secretary Frazer's comments
today.
Ambassador Shinn. Thank you, Senator. I strongly support
the idea. I know John Yates personally. He's a good personal
friend of mine. We joined the Foreign Service together. He's a
very fine officer. The fact is, though, that he is not a
special envoy. And, as I understand it, and listening to
Assistant Secretary Frazer this morning, he reports to
Ambassador Rannenberger, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, who is
preoccupied with Kenyan affairs. So, you do not, in fact, have
someone who is independently, or semi-independently, engaged
full time on Somali affairs. And I think this is an ideal
location to do just that. Normally, I'm not enthusiastic about
special envoys, because they tend to conflict with Ambassadors
on the ground. But, in this case, you have no State Department
personnel in Somalia, and there is no prospect for conflict.
Senator Feingold. Excellent.
Dr. Menkhaus.
Dr. Menkhaus. I agree.
Senator Feingold. OK. Dr. Shinn, where do U.S. and EU
objectives and priorities in Somalia overlap? And what are the
most significant areas of divergence?
Ambassador Shinn. I think, in a general sense, they pretty
much overlap. I think where the divergence comes is that the
European Union, as Assistant Secretary Frazer implied, has been
much stronger on pushing the idea on the Transitional Federal
Government that they must be more all-encompassing in terms of
whom they bring inside that government. And at one point, the
European Union said it would not provide any funding to the TFG
unless the TFG did engage in a reconciliation process.
President Abdullahi Yusuf said that he would start a
reconciliation effort. He has done that. But it remains to be
seen whether it's meaningful or not. That's the key. It's one
thing to go through the motions; it's quite another to be
serious about power-sharing, about revamping, if necessary,
Parliament, reducing the number of Ministries from some-50 to
what probably ought to be about a dozen for Somalia, and making
sure that you have technically competent people in the jobs.
Senator Feingold. So, you implied that the African Union
peacekeeping force, as currently envisioned and authorizes, is
unrealistic. What do you see as the minimum level of resources,
mandate, and deployment timetable necessary to stabilize
Somalia in the short and medium term? And do you think this
minimum can be achieved? By when? What needs to happen?
Ambassador Shinn. Short of creating a broadbased
Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, I, frankly, don't
see it working. I think that's the bottom line. The first step
is to have a government that is all-encompassing. Once you have
that, then the rest, I think, will flow naturally, and I think
you will have much less resistance from the Ayr sub-sub clan of
the Habr Gedir sub-clan and the Hawiye clan. I think you will
have less resistance from the warlords who still have a power
role in Mogadishu. I think you will have more enthusiasm from
the businessmen in Mogadishu to support such a government. But
I'm not sure that there is any number of AMISOM troops that is
going to be able to secure all of Somalia. At the height of
UNITAF, the American-led operation, there were 25,000 troops
there. Some of them, admittedly, were offshore. Even UNOSOM had
far more than 8,000. And we all know the difficulties that they
had. They had the most highly sophisticated equipment known to
military forces around the world. We're asking African units,
fairly lightly armed, to go in and do something that both
UNITAF and UNOSOM had a great difficulty doing.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Doctor.
Dr. Menkhaus, you've written that, ``The United States must
not allow support for counterterrorism efforts abroad to
become''--and I appreciate your blunt language--``a meal ticket
for leaders in failed states.'' How can we prevent this in
Somalia and the larger Horn of Africa region, where corruption
and the lack of transparency are obviously common?
Dr. Menkhaus. Well, for starters, again, by pushing for
more accountable, transparent good governance in these
governments, including the TFG. There has been a tendency to
use the counterterrorism card to try to solicit our
unconditional support. And I think one of the messages in the
panel today is that support to the TFG does very much have to
be conditional.
Beyond that, there is an interesting and important problem
that we haven't spoken about directly, related to
counterterrorism and our partners in counterterrorism,
monitoring on the Horn of Africa, and that is to say that we
all agree that a strong, robust state as a partner in
counterterrorism is essential as a long-term goal. But we also
know that that state-building capacity will take a long time to
build up. In the meantime, we'll have a transitional phase in
which this government is weak, in which it will be easily
penetrated, in which, ironically, foreign terrorists will
probably be able to better exploit Somalia, rather than less
able to exploit Somalia. The fact is, Somalia today, as a more
or less de facto collapsed state, is not a very conducive
environment for many terrorist activities. They actually prefer
Mombasa or other places in the region.
We have to have a strategy that will simultaneously allow
us to build up that state capacity to monitor criminal and
terrorist activities in the country while preventing terrorists
from exploiting that transition period. And I think the answer
in Somalia is community policing. Somalis, at the community
level, know what's going on in their neighborhoods, they know
what's going on in their districts. They often know before we
do where we're driving, because our driver knows. They're--it's
difficult to keep secrets there, but that presumes that the
community feels that it's a stakeholder in counterterrorism
monitoring, and that it has a functional relationship with the
state. And that's been what's been missing for a long time.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. What was your reaction to
Secretary Frazer's answers to my questions about how to define
the Islamic Courts and about who should or should not be part
of the political reconciliation process?
Dr. Menkhaus. Political Islam is ascendant in Somalia, and
if we demonize or criminalize all of them, if we imply that
they're all linked to al-Qaeda, as some members in the TFG have
tried to do, we run the very strong risk of eliminating a very
important and potentially constructive force in Somalia.
We've really been talking--in terms of the foreign al-Qaeda
suspects that we have been worrying about, those high-value
targets, we're talking about a very small number of people.
Three is the number that most often comes to mind. And the
handful of Somalis that we've designated as terrorists are also
very small. We have to be careful about the lack of
proportionality in our policies in pursuit of that small number
of people. A lot of pottery was broken in the pottery barn in
Mogadishu over the past--over the past few months. A very
effective government was overturned in Mogadishu. And we are,
rightly or wrongly, held responsible by the Mogadishu community
for that.
So, I would argue that we need to, first of all, allow
Somalis to make that determination of who represents them in
their political fora. We have to recognize that will take on
more of an Islamist flavor. And, again, as long as they
renounce violence and terrorism, I see no reason not to allow
them to participate.
Senator Feingold. Well, I think that's a thoughtful answer.
And clearly if anybody is al-Qaeda, we have to pursue them, and
have to pursue them vigorously. But let us not overdefine the
characteristics of somebody in a way that would prevent us from
reaching out to people who may not be committed to that course
at all. I think this is one of the most important questions
internationally, and Somalia is a great example.
Dr. Morrison, how has the security threat or threats that
Somalia poses to the United States changed since your last
testimony, in July? Has the situation improved, worsened, or
just changed?
Dr. Morrison. Well, the advent of the courts--when we were
last together in July, it was at the front end, and it wasn't
clear which direction they were moving. The formation and
dominance of the Shabaab in the intervening period, and the
escalation of its rhetoric, vis-a-vis the surrounding region,
and the threats toward the Ethiopians, the provocations, and
the like, and the reports that came forward in the fall around
the amalgam of seven or eight sovereign countries, along with
Hezbollah, that were professing their support, materially and
financially and diplomatically, of the hardcore jihadi elements
within the Islamist Courts--these developments were very
serious ones. And I think they accounted for the response of
the Ethiopians, and drove much of the response of the United
States, in partner--in this strategic partnership.
The Shabaab, it would seem to me, has been decimated and
scattered. The threat within the boundaries on the soil of
Somalia is uncertain, but I do not see it as grave and
resurgent. I think it bears careful watching. I emphasized in
my comments that there's considerable uncertainty around the
nature of the--of an Islamist insurgency and the possibility of
a resurgent jihadi element. Also within the region, in Yemen,
in Saudi Arabia, in Eritrea, and elsewhere, there are elements
there which have every incentive to seek to strike new deals
with al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliated organizations. And that is
a serious consideration, and one that bears very close watch
here.
Senator Feingold. Finally, could you go into further detail
about the impact that the AC-130 attacks in Somalia could have
on the broader political efforts in Mogadishu? Does it impact
our credibility and our work throughout the region?
Dr. Morrison. Well, I--it creates a very strong hostility--
a broaden--it has had the impact of broadening this--the
suspicion and hostility toward the United States. Whether this
was fully warranted or not, that has been one of the impacts.
And in some ways that was predictable. The legacy of the U.S.
engagement in the early 1990s, and the abrupt withdrawal after
the debacle of October 1993, there was a sense of abandonment.
There's a sense now within the general population that the
interest in counterterrorism and arms strikes by air and on
land dominate the U.S. set of concerns at the expense of
concerns with reconstruction, with political accommodation,
with the humanitarian response. And that's what I mean about
the need for a counterbalance or a recalibration of the
approach that would integrate the hard and soft. Our
counterterrorism equities are real in this part of the world,
and are going to continue to be real, and are going to continue
to require a response and systematic strategy. But we also have
to much better manage what the fallout is, and protect the
softer side of the agenda, which remains integral to getting
Somalia out of its current mess.
Senator Feingold. Well, I thank all of you for your
expertise and your patience. This has been a long, but, I
think, very worthwhile, hearing.
And that concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer to Questions Submitted
by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question. You mentioned in your testimony that there were six
people at Embassy Nairobi working solely on Somalia full time. When did
each of them arrive in Nairobi? How many of them are there on temporary
duty assignments? What are the exact responsibilities of each of them?
Answer. There are four full-time American employees and two Foreign
Service Nationals working on Somalia at Embassy Nairobi. Since January
2007, retired Ambassador John Yates has served as Counselor for Somali
Affairs and as the head of Embassy Nairobi's Somalia Unit in close
coordination with Ambassador Ranneberger. The three other American
employees working on Somalia are mid-level officers, including an FS-02
Political Officer. The two remaining permanent mid-level Foreign
Service positions, including an FS-02 Public Diplomacy Officer and an
FS-03 Political/Economic Officer, have been established and these new
officers are scheduled to arrive in summer 2007.
As a temporary measure until these new officers arrive, two other
officers are on temporary duty assignments that began in January 2007.
The Foreign Service National employees working on Somalia include one
specializing in Public Affairs and another responsible for Political
Affairs.
Question. Secretary Rice announced $40 million in assistance for
Somalia last month, $14 million of which, Congress is told, will be
used for peacekeeping. You mentioned in your testimony that the
administration is seeking an additional $40 million for peacekeeping in
Somalia as part of the FY07 emergency supplemental. How much does the
administration project the African Union peacekeeping mission in
Somalia will cost per month? How long will the AU mission be in place
before the United Nations will take over? How much more will we be
contributing to the mission?
Answer. The African Union is in the process of developing their
plan for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The AU is still soliciting
Troop Contributing Countries, developing their concept of operations
and identifying exact tasks they are going to accomplish. Without more
information, it is difficult to estimate the costs for conducting the
mission. Our rough initial estimated costs are $50 million for the
first 6 months and between $150 and $200 million for the first year of
operations.
On February 20, 2007, the United Nations Security Council adopted
UNSC Resolution 1744 to authorize the African Union to conduct
peacekeeping operations in Somalia. As a part of that resolution the
UNSC requested the U.N. Secretary General to send a Technical
Assessment Mission to the African Union and Somalia. The Technical
Assessment Mission will report back to the UNSC within 60 days with a
recommendation for U.N. involvement, including a possible U.N.
Peacekeeping Operation. The African Union has stated that it intends to
conduct a 6-month mission before transitioning to a U.N. mission.
The Department has identified $19.6 million in PKO and GPOI funding
($5.6 million above $14 million previously announced) to support the
African Union in its initial deployment. Additionally, the Department
of State has requested an additional $128 million for the PKO account
in the FY07 emergency supplemental for peacekeeping and stability
operations in Somalia and Chad, of which an estimated $40 million would
be used for Somalia. The Department has requested that these be 2-year
funds with transferability to the Contributions for International
Peacekeeping Activities account to provide the necessary flexibility to
pay the assessed costs of U.N. peacekeeping missions should they be
established in Somalia and/or Chad.
Question. During your testimony you stated that the United States
is ready to assist the Ugandans with deployment as soon as the Ugandan
Parliament approves sending troops to Somalia. What contingency plans
has the African Union made should the troops deployed under Phase I
need to be evacuated or reinforced? Have we committed to helping
evacuate Ugandan troops if need be? Are the military advisors we have
in Kampala going to deploy to Somalia with the Ugandan troops?
Answer. The African Union (AU) has not yet finalized the plans for
the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), including any contingency plans
should AU troops require evacuation. However, we expect contingency
evacuation to be a part of the eventual plan. Neither the African Union
nor Uganda has requested U.S. assistance in providing evacuation, and
we are not committed to evacuating Ugandan troops at this time. There
are no plans for U.S. military advisors to deploy to Somalia.
Question. How, if at all, will the need for troops to serve as part
of the mission in Somalia affect the ability of the African Union to
garner additional troops for deployment to Darfur, Sudan?
Answer. In our efforts to resolve conflicts across the African
Continent, the task of generating peacekeeping forces has become
increasingly difficult. Several countries already involved in
peacekeeping operations across Africa, such as South Africa, have said
that they will not be able to provide troops for the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) due to existing peacekeeping commitments.
However, the United States continues to urge the African Union to reach
out to potential troop contributing countries and to galvanize support
for much-needed equipment, training assistance, and funding for
operational sustainment. We are working within the Department to
coordinate outreach to potential troop contributing countries for
various African peacekeeping missions, including Darfur and Somalia. In
this regard, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
(ACOTA) program is a critical part of our strategy to expand the number
and capabilities of African peacekeepers.
The deployment of a robust peacekeeping operation to Darfur remains
a central policy priority for the Department. In Sudan, we continue to
work with the United Nations, African Union, and international partners
to press for a transition from an African Union mission to a hybrid AU/
U.N. force. As part of a hybrid force, countries from outside of the
African Continent will be able to contribute troops, thereby
alleviating somewhat the need for African troop contributions.