[Senate Hearing 110-218]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-218
THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: SHORTCOMINGS AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 26, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hicks, Peggy, global advocacy director, Human Rights Watch, New
York, NY....................................................... 24
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Melia, Thomas O., deputy executive director, Freedom House,
Washington, DC................................................. 15
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement.. 1
Schaefer, Brett D., Jay Kingham Fellow in International
Regulatory Affairs, the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC.... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Silverberg, Hon. Kristen, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC..... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Feingold......... 42
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, prepared
statement...................................................... 42
(iii)
THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: SHORTCOMINGS AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
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THURSDAY, JULY 26, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Operations
and
Organizations, Democracy and Human Rights,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Nelson, Menendez, and Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM
FLORIDA
Senator Bill Nelson. Good afternoon. Unfortunately our
member of the committee, Senator Coleman's father has died. And
so he, obviously, is not going to be here. This just happened,
and Senator Coleman will be issuing a statement for the record,
which of course will become part of the record.
Senator Menendez, did you have an opening statement?
Senator Menendez. I will wait for questions.
Senator Bill Nelson. I want to welcome everybody. And we're
going to be looking into the United Nations' new human rights
body. And the Assistant Secretary, I appreciate you being here.
We look forward to your testimony and also a distinguished
panel of experts from the nongovernmental community.
In March 2006, the United Nations General Assembly
disbanded the former Human Rights Commission. It was a
Commission that had been widely criticized for many things,
including inclusion of human rights abusers as members. The
General Assembly created a different body: The Human Rights
Council. This new, leaner body was intended to improve the
quality of the membership, making Member States accountable and
subject to periodic investigations of their human rights
records.
By elevating the Council to report directly to the General
Assembly, reformers hope to be able to take swifter action in
dire circumstances. But a year later, after its creation, we
now find ourselves examining the record of a Council that is
supposedly devoted to promoting human rights all over the
world, which nonetheless, the record shows, has failed to take
any action on grave crises, such as the Sudan. Has failed to
renew the mandates of the Special Rapporteurs for Cuba and
Belarus, and has regularly passed one-sided resolutions,
singling out Israel. Eleven such measures criticizing Israel to
date. And what about North Korea? What about Burma?
When I raised these concerns privately with the Secretary
General of the United Nations, he shared my concern regarding
the unmet expectations of the new Council. He spoke favorably
of the Council's strong commitment, not to politicize its
activities. And he told me he would continue to urge the
Council to proceed with its system of universal periodic
reviews. These investigations, intended to shed light first on
the 47 members of the Council, has not begun.
I am a supporter of the United Nations. I'm a great admirer
of people like the Secretary General and his efforts to reform
the United Nations and for people like him who have dedicated
their lives to world peace.
I also believe that we should treat each other with mutual
respect and with truth and candor. Speaking in Geneva last
month, the Secretary General emphasized, himself, the
importance of considering all situations of possible human
rights violations and considering them equally.
The U.N. Human Rights Council, in my opinion, has yet to
demonstrate its commitment to all of the countries of the
world--dealing fairly with them, dealing quickly, and dealing
justly, with regard to human rights abuses, whenever they may
occur--in order to protect the world's most vulnerable
citizens.
So, the questions before us are, if we are not there yet,
is this Council at least headed in the right direction? Is it,
or will it be, any better than what we had before? And if not,
what do we do about it? We have already reformed the U.N.'s
human rights apparatus once and the result has been called
seriously flawed recently, by a State Department spokesperson.
There are those who will argue strongly in favor of
continued engagement to achieve progress in human rights. I
look forward to hearing from our participants today on whether
such participation is warranted and to what extent the United
States should support the Human Rights Council. How can we
affect positive change?
Senator Vitter, I have just concluded my statement. Did you
have a statement before we go to our Assistant Secretary
Silverberg?
Senator Vitter. I do not. I'm anxious to hear from our
distinguished guests and witnesses and certainly follow up with
questions.
Senator Bill Nelson. Madame Assistant Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. KRISTEN SILVERBERG, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Silverberg. Mr. Chairman, Senators, thank you for
convening this hearing. I'd like to offer the Department's
condolences to Senator Coleman and his family. I know, of
course, his strong interest in these issues so I will look
forward to following up with him when he returns.
Since the founding of the United Nations, the United States
has worked to make that body a champion for people living under
oppressive governments. We've worked for the United Nations to
negotiate international treaties on human rights, to provide
technical assistance and training to governments and NGOs, and
when necessary, to condemn the actions of governments who
seriously commit human rights violations. Governments like
Burma and Cuba and North Korea and Sudan.
And so we have viewed the failures of the Human Rights
Council with significant sadness. We see a great need for a
strong and effective multilateral fora on human rights and we
are deeply skeptical that the U.N.'s Humans Rights Council
will, at least in the near future, play a constructive role in
those efforts.
You are all well aware of the sordid history of the
Commission on Human Rights, the Council's predecessor, as you,
Mr. Chairman, laid out. Kofi Annan characterized that body as a
shadow on the United Nations. And so we helped lead the effort
in the General Assembly to replace the Commission with a
Council. When those negotiations fell victim to--in our view--
G-77 politics, and also a lack of political will by some
democratic states, we voted against the resolution creating the
Council and did not run for a seat on the Council that May.
Nevertheless, in the first year of the Council we remained
actively involved in Geneva.
Secretary Rice, Under Secretary Burns, Assistant Secretary
Lowenkron, and I, along with our regional Assistant Secretary
counterparts, raised the Human Rights Council with our foreign
counterparts. Assistant Secretary Lowenkron and I--along with
our Deputies and Ambassador Joseph Rees--traveled to capitals
to raise Human Rights Council issues. And of course, our
delegation in Geneva, led by Ambassador Warren Tichenor,
remained actively involved in Human Rights Council matters.
Despite our best efforts in this regard, the Council has
been remarkably a step backward, in our view, from its
predecessor. It has passed 13 anti-Israel actions and some weak
noncondemnatory actions on Sudan, and it has done nothing of
note on Belarus, Burma, Cuba, North Korea, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, or Zimbabwe. We were especially dismayed by the
final session of the Council's first year, which was focused on
completing the institution-building package; the rules and the
systems that would define the Council's operations. At the end
of this session, in a back-room deal, concluded in the dark of
night without agreement from the full Council, a small group of
members decided to push through a final agenda that singled out
Israel as the only country subject to a permanent agenda item
and to eliminate the Special Rapporteurs on human rights for
Cuba and Belarus, giving those undeserving governments a
victory before the Council had acted to address other critical
issues.
I should note that throughout these discussions, Canada--
which has been a stalwart defender of human rights--and a few
select allies remained firm in their principled opposition to
this deal. We think there are a number of reasons for the Human
Rights Council's failure in this first year.
One is the makeup of the Council. Twenty-eight of the
Council's forty-seven seats are held by members of the Non-
Aligned Movement, a group that typically supports economic and
social and cultural rights over civil and political rights.
Seventeen of the NAM members are also members of the
organization--the Islamic Conference. And the decision of this
membership to make Israel-bashing a priority of the Council
hasn't done much to enhance its credibility.
We think that the failure of the Council is a failure of
Member States, rather than a failure of the United Nations as
an organization. I'd like to quote one former Ambassador to the
United Nations, who said that, ``blaming the United Nations for
what happens inside the tall palaces on the East River is like
blaming Madison Square Garden for a poor showing by the New
York Knicks.'' Ambassadors who show up in Geneva are there with
instructions from their capitals, and those instructions are
what will determine whether this Council is a success or a
failure. This is a responsibility of the Member States who make
up the Council.
Some of our traditional allies have correctly pointed out
that there are some positive outcomes from Geneva. One is the--
or I should say potentially positive outcomes from Geneva--the
universal periodic review, which you mentioned, where the
Council will evaluate the human rights records of each United
Nations Member State. We think this has potential to do good,
but there are some real risks involved in the process. No
special importance will attach to particular governments' human
rights, no matter how unaccountable or abusive they've been in
the past. So, Sudan will get the same scrutiny as Norway. And
there's a real danger that this universal periodic review
produces reports that suggest that because we all have human
rights issues, we're all equally bad.
We hope, of course, to be wrong in our skepticism about the
Council. We hope that Council members will rise to the
occasion; will stand up for our shared values of the Council.
However, we're not optimistic, to be honest. We therefore think
we need to redouble our efforts in other multilateral fora.
There are many important ways for the United States to engage
on human rights issues, promoting direct technical assistance
to strengthen institutions in developing countries. And so, to
that end, we've supported doubling the resources of the Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
We've supported the U.N. Secretariat's Electoral Assistance
Division, which does good work worldwide in election monitoring
and training. They lent logistical and strategic support to
over 20 elections in the last year. We remain very hopeful that
the U.N.'s General Assembly's Third Committee can play a
constructive role. We had good success in both 2005 and 2006,
passing some strong resolutions condemning the world's worst
violators and we'll continue to do that in the following year.
And finally, we'll work to strengthen coalitions with our
allies, as well as encourage better regional partnerships.
With the ministerial level conference being held in Mali in
2007, the Community of Democracies has potential to become a
more robust organization. We are deeply engaged in helping to
promote the human rights efforts of other organizations like
the OECD, the OAS. We've increased outreach to the African
Union on human rights issues and we are in the initial stages
of establishing an exciting new forum for Asian countries to
focus on democracy promotion.
So with that, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Silverberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kristen Silverberg, Assistant Secretary for
International Organization Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing to discuss the
U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC) at the end of its first year. I
appreciate the opportunity to present the Department's views.
U.S. AND MULTILATERAL HUMAN RIGHTS WORK
Since the founding of the United Nations, the United States has
worked to make that body a champion for people living under oppressive
governments. The United States has worked through the United Nations to
negotiate international treaties on Human Rights, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. We have worked through the United Nations to provide
technical assistance and training. For example, we are today the
largest funder of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
And, when necessary, we have worked through the United Nations to
condemn the actions of governments who have committed serious human
rights violations, such as Burma, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan.
Although we remain committed to supporting human rights in the
multilateral system through the United Nations, we are deeply skeptical
that the U.N.'s Human Rights Council will, in the near future, play a
constructive role in our efforts. I am grateful for the opportunity to
talk with you about the problem as we see it and to discuss with you
some of the options for addressing it.
HISTORY OF THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights was founded in 1947
to be the global body for the protection and promotion of human rights.
By the start of this decade, however, the Commission had become a
highly politicized refuge for serial abusers, such as Sudan, Zimbabwe,
and Syria, who sought to use membership in the body to protect
themselves from international scrutiny. In 2001, Sudan won a seat on
the Commission while the United States, a member since the body's
inception in 1947, failed to win reelection. After 2003, when Libya was
elected President, Kofi Annan characterized the body as ``a shadow on
the United Nations.'' In the 2005 U.N. 60th anniversary World Summit
Outcome Document, the United States led the call in the General
Assembly for a new body to replace the Commission. To ensure the body
would be credible and effective, we said that membership should require
elections by a two-thirds majority and that nations under U.N. Security
Council sanctions for terrorism and human rights-related reasons should
be excluded from membership.
NEGOTIATING THE CREATION OF THE HRC
Throughout the negotiations to create the Human Rights Council we
confronted expected resistance from antidemocratic states, but we were
disappointed that many democratic countries with strong human rights
traditions were willing to compromise on the final outcome, making it
impossible to agree even on the most modest safeguards against the
problems that led to the Commission's loss of credibility. Because of
our deep dissatisfaction with the Council's structure and rules, we
voted against its creation in March 2006 and did not run for a Council
seat that May. However, we decided to stay actively engaged as an
observer at the Council.
In this first year, we have worked actively with our allies and
other democratic countries in order to help the Council meet its
mandate to protect and promote human rights. Secretary Rice, Under
Secretary Burns, Assistant Secretary Lowenkron and I, along with
regional Assistant Secretaries as necessary, raised Human Rights
Council issues with our counterparts. Assistant Secretary Lowenkron,
his Deputies, and I, along with Senior Advisor Ambassador Joseph Rees,
traveled to capitals to raise Human Rights Council issues. And of
course, our delegation in Geneva, led by Ambassador Warren Tichenor,
remained actively involved in Human Rights Council matters.
Unfortunately, despite our best efforts, the Council has been worse
than its predecessor. It has passed 13 anti-Israel actions and 3 weak,
noncondemnatory actions on Sudan, and it has done nothing on Belarus,
Burma, Cuba, North Korea, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, or Zimbabwe. We
were especially dismayed by the most recent and final session of the
Council's first year, which was focused on completing the
``institution-building'' package, the rules and systems that define the
Council's operations. At the end of the session, in a back room, in the
dark of night, without a vote, a small group of Council members decided
to push through a final agenda that singled out Israel as the only
country subject to a permanent agenda item and to eliminate the Special
Rapporteurs on human rights in Cuba and Belarus, giving those
undeserving governments a victory before the Council had acted to
address other critical cases.
We found it troubling that some of the most democratic members of
the Council supported these measures in order to achieve consensus on
the seriously flawed institution-building package. We were particularly
disturbed that the decision was made to deny Canada and other allies
their procedural rights to call for a vote on the package.
REASONS FOR THE HRC'S FAILINGS
The Commission was a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social
Council and the regional distribution of its 53 seats reflected that
organization's slight Latin American, Eastern Europe, and Western Group
majority. The Human Rights Council, however, is a subsidiary of the
General Assembly, and its geographic distribution mirrors the
substantial Asian and African membership of its parent body. In its
first year, 28 of the Council's 47 seats were held by members of the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a group that typically supports economic,
social, and cultural rights over civil and political liberties.
Seventeen of the NAM members were also members of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference. The decision of the NAM-dominated membership to
make Israel the primary focus of the Council's scrutiny has done much
to undercut its credibility. The Council's membership includes some
members that routinely violate the rights of their citizens, such as
Cuba. We have been clear from the beginning that the credibility of the
Council would depend on its ability to act on the most egregious cases
of human rights abuse globally--to make a difference for the victims of
abuse. We are deeply disappointed in the Council's failure to act to
hold to account governments that systematically abuse their people.
We believe that the primary responsibility for these failures of
the Human Rights Council lies with Member States, rather than the
United Nations as an institution. In the words of one former U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations, ``Blaming the United Nations for what
happens inside the talk palaces on the East River is like blaming
Madison Square Garden for a poor showing by the New York Knicks.'' The
United Nations deliberative bodies reflect the views of Member States
who send their ambassadors instructions.
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW PROCESS
As one positive outcome of this first year, some of our traditional
allies have correctly pointed to the Universal Periodic Review, during
which the Council will evaluate the human rights record of each United
Nations Member State. However, there are some real risks that this
process will not work as intended. The cumbersome review process will
take at least 4 years for the Council to review all Member States, and
no special importance will be attached to reviewing the governments
with the worst human rights records. Norway will be as high a priority
as Sudan. Even more important, the quality of the review process and
the final decisions that will result from the reviews will be
constrained by the extent to which HRC members are committed to putting
human rights principles above international politics.
NEXT STEPS
We hope to be wrong in our skepticism about the Council's future.
We hope that Council members, especially the nearly one-half of the
members that are democracies with good domestic human rights records,
will stand up for our shared values at the Council and work to set it
on the right track. However, based on what we have seen to date and the
underlying structural flaws in the way the Council was created, we
cannot be optimistic. We believe the United Nations should take a
leading role in human rights work, but we have serious questions about
the Human Rights Council's ability to contribute materially to such
work.
We therefore need to redouble our efforts in other multilateral
fora. There are many important ways for the United States to engage in
multilateral human rights through the United Nations. Among them are
direct technical assistance to strengthen institutions in developing
countries and human rights monitoring and training. We have supported
increased resources for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights to increase cooperative technical assistance to Member States.
It can be far more cost-effective to provide support for fieldwork
rather than for a Geneva-based bureaucracy. For example, the U.N.
Secretariat's Electoral Assistance Division has done good work
worldwide in election monitoring and training. U.N. officials lent
logistical and strategic support to over 20 elections in the last year
and a half alone, including in Afghanistan, the Palestinian Authority,
Iraq, and Burundi.
We also remain hopeful that the General Assembly's Third Committee
can play a constructive role. In both 2005 and 2006, the Committee
passed strong resolutions condemning some of the world's worst
violators. We will work with allies to focus on key priorities, in
particular on abuses the Council has failed to address.
Additionally, we will strengthen coalitions with our allies as well
as encourage better regional partnerships. With the ministerial-level
conference being held in Bamako, Mali, in 2007, the Community of
Democracies has the potential to become a more robust organization. The
United States is deeply engaged in the human rights work of
organizations such as the Organization of Security and Cooperation in
Europe and the Organization of American States Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. This year we increased outreach to the
African Union on human rights issues. And, we are in the initial stages
of establishing a similar forum for Asian countries to focus on
democracy promotion.
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the Human Rights Council is a troubled
organization that increasingly appears unable to carry out its mandate
to promote and protect human rights around the world. We must redouble
our efforts to work in effective fora on behalf of the world's
vulnerable people.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madame Secretary, thank you for your testimony.
I have to be honest with you. It's amazing to me that not
just the Council--but where is our diplomacy? I agree, I think
you said the Knicks, right? All right, I just want to make sure
it's not the Nets. [Laughter.]
Senator Menendez. I would be upset if it was the Nets.
The, you know, where is our diplomacy? As you say, it's the
member countries at the end of the day that are going to have
their Ambassadors reflect those votes. And I look at, for
example, what happened with the Council and the Special
Rapporteurs on Cuba and Belarus being eliminated. And it seems
to me that it is an abdication by Mexico, and what I had
thought was its commitment to human rights, that moves in a
different way. But where was our engagement and our advocacy
from government to government with Mexico? Where was our
engagement from government to government with a whole host of
these other countries?
You know, if you are languishing in Castro's jails in Cuba,
the elimination of the Special Rapporteur is not welcome news.
If you are one of the human rights activists trying to create
civil society inside of Cuba, you are not welcoming the
Council's action. If you are one of the political independent
journalists or economists or political dissidents inside of
Cuba, often who are jailed for their activity, you are not
welcoming the Council's actions.
So, you know, I look at Mexico and Chairman de Alba and I
wonder, where were we, though, in that respect? I wonder
whether we are taking the right role in simply criticizing--
although it is certainly--it is more than meritorious of
criticism, the Council's actions--but where is the leadership?
Where is the leadership of the democratic countries in the
world, in this respect?
And I look at it and it seems that Israel, in addition to
getting rid of the Special Rapporteur--Israel is reserved as
the only--the only country in which we have established one
permanent and special agenda item. It's beyond amazement;
beyond amazement.
And then finally, the process here, you know, to herald
that we're going to have all of the countries go through a
review, and suggest that that's a victory. Well, as you suggest
that, in fact, everybody is the violator at the end of the day,
and we will judge it on equal terms. But beyond that, it also
seems to me that that whole process is yet to be defined as to
how it's going to take place. And that can be totally
manipulated as well.
And so I--yes; there's plenty to condemn in my mind, big
time, about the Council. And I think this Council, so far from
what I see, is no more promising than the Commission. And I
don't see this as reform. But what really bothers me is: Where
is our leadership in this regard? It seems to me to be, to have
been subverted to a whole host of other things. And maybe it is
that we don't have the ability, for so long as we're bogged
down in Iraq and other places, to lead. I would hope that we
can. But where's our leadership? Where were we with the
Mexicans? Where were we with the others in trying to move this
agenda in a different direction, even if we had decided not to
be a Council member?
Ms. Silverberg. Senator, thank you.
I agree with you entirely that U.S. leadership is
essential, it's critical. The United Nations will not act on
human rights issues without a strong U.S. hand pressing these
agenda items. We repeatedly raised this issue with the Mexicans
throughout Chairman de Alba's time in the chair. We raised it
in Geneva, in fact, Ambassador Tichenor on this final night
when the decision was made in the back room--illegitimately, in
our view--as in the negotiations until midnight. Our
Ambassadors in capitals--not just in Mexico City, but really
for all the Council members--are very accustomed to getting
requests from me to deliver demarches, noting our strong
concern with some of these agenda items. Secretary Rice raised
it personally with her Mexican counterpart and Canadian
counterpart in their last meeting.
I've traveled personally on these issues, and Ambassador
Rees--sitting behind me--has been getting a lot of frequent
flier miles on his trips to Latin America, to Africa, and to
Asia to press Human Rights Council's issues. Barry Lowenkron
did as well.
So, I think there was no question in the mind of any Human
Rights Council member where the United States priority was on
keeping the Cuba and Belarus mandates. I think if not for our
engagement, we would not have been able to persuade the member
governments who were prepared to raise objections to this final
agenda item. I think that our lobbying, in that regard, made a
big difference.
But as I said, at the end of the day there was major
procedural irregularity that denied those countries the right
to object. There was a circumvention of the Human Rights
Council rules. And I've raised our concerns directly with the
Mexican Government on their representative's role in that.
Senator Menendez. Now, what was their response?
Ms. Silverberg. They stated, I think correctly, that a
chairman of a committee has a responsibility to try to
negotiate a deal and we didn't object to him trying to reach a
consensus agreement. But there wasn't, at the end of the day, a
consensus. And so, our objection was that the Canadians and
others should have been allowed to call for a vote.
You know, the Mexican Government is one of our closest
partners on these issues. We've worked so constructively with
them on a range of issues. So really, to us, it was a
disappointment, partly because we think it was a violation, it
was an abandonment of their priorities and values, to agree to
this final deal.
Senator Menendez. Well, maybe if we keep building walls,
things will improve.
Let me ask you this: What's our role now? I mean, to be
very honest with you, it sounded like we are impotent at the
end of the day. That's what, I mean, I hear about your
demarches and the participation, but it didn't produce very
much. It didn't even produce the ability to achieve a success
on a procedural vote. Where are we at in terms of pursuing an
aggressive human rights policy, as it relates to the Council?
I mean, we have a third of the way this is structured with
these regional entities deciding who goes on, for example.
Maybe the reason that Israel is the only country in the world
that has a permanent agenda item is because a third of the
entire Council comes from the membership of the Islamic
Council. That might be a reason.
Ms. Silverberg. I think--I do not think the United States
is impotent on these issues. I still think we have a lot of
levers we can use to press human rights concerns
multilaterally.
And just to give you some examples: Security Council in a
way the United States has not frequently done so, to help bring
human rights issues that have a connection to threats to
international peace and security into the Council. We've done
that over the objection of some of our allies on the Council,
but we've really tried to use that opportunity selectively and
strategically.
President Bush's engagement with human rights dissidents
around the world and Mrs. Bush's engagement as well, has been a
way that we can help drive our U.N. agenda, bringing some
attention to issues that would otherwise fall off the radar
screen. We've had a very ambitious agenda in the U.N.'s Third
Committee to help pass condemnatory resolutions on North Korea
and Burma and Belarus and Iran.
So I think there's a lot we can do. But I do think we need
to be realistic about the shortcomings of this body. I do think
we need to focus U.S. attention where it's likely to be the
most effective. And I think it's not an admission of impotence
to say that many times Member States will not take their
guidance from us. They will cast their votes according to what
they see as their national interest.
One important thing we can do, and one important role that,
I think, Congress has to play in helping to drive our agenda,
is to let countries know that their votes on human rights
issues will be a factor in our bilateral relationship. That
we're keeping an eye on how countries act in Geneva and New
York and other multilateral fora. And so, and I think that's
something that Members of Congress can help us do very
effectively.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to belabor my
time, I will just close on it, and I appreciate the Chair's
indulgence.
Let me just say, I appreciate your urging Congress to do
something, I think the administration needs to make it very
clear in its bilateral relationships that this--this question
of human rights--is a major threshold, and significant part of
the equation of how this administration will look at other
countries. Unless it happens there--since the primary promotion
of foreign policy ultimately comes through the President--
unless it happens there, we can do in Congress all of these
other things, but I just don't think that we've had, that we've
had that attention. I don't think that we've had that message.
I don't think that we've created that threshold. I don't think
we've made it as intricate a part of our policies as it's been
in the past.
And I think the results are what we're beginning to see.
And it is going to undermine other key issues that we are
concerned about, above and beyond human rights, as it relates
to countries who now will believe that they can largely act
with impunity, because we have a system that, No. 1, doesn't
work, and No. 2, because we don't make it a significant enough
issue, and therefore with a wink and a nod, we say other things
are more important to us. That is a dangerous slope to begin to
go on, and that's where, I fear, we're headed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madame Secretary for your work. I'm glad you
mentioned our colleague, Senator Coleman. As you know, he has a
bill that this committee has approved, that would end U.S.
funding to the Human Rights Council, and I certainly support
that.
In light of everything you've said, I would argue that it's
so bad, that we need to go beyond where we are, of not running
for membership, and say, ``This is just beyond the pale; this
is a kangaroo court,'' if you will, and withhold our funding. I
realize our funding is not going to stop the operations of the
Council dead in its tracks, but I think that's a darn
significant step that we should take. Why shouldn't we do that?
Ms. Silverberg. I think, Senator, we'd certainly share the
sentiment behind the Coleman legislation, this really profound
frustration with the Council, in fear that it's doing harm to
our human rights agenda.
The one thing we would--we want to make clear, though, is
that we would not expect the legislation to result in a
decrease in the resources available to the Human Rights
Council. It might have a valuable symbolic message, but it's
unlikely to actually decrease the amount of resources available
to the Council. The Human Rights Council, as you pointed out,
is funded out of the U.N. regular budget. Because money is
fungible, the United Nations can redirect its resources, and
even if we withhold our, roughly, $3 million a year, it can
redirect resources to cover that.
Senator Vitter. Well, just to be clear, I understand that,
and I tried to say that in my question. But, why shouldn't we
do that, for the very clear message it sends about what an
utter farce we think the whole enterprise is?
Ms. Silverberg. I think it might send an important symbolic
message, I don't think that withholding legislation along these
lines would undermine our efforts in the United Nations, but I
do think we have a general position at the State Department,
that we should pay our U.N. dues, I think it's very important
that I, as Assistant Secretary, call on Congress to fully pay
our dues to the United Nations, but I cannot tell you that it
would injure our agenda at the United Nations.
Senator Vitter. And maybe that's the logical conclusion of
where we're heading, because I really think when things get so
out of hand, and so ridiculous, in terms of actions at the
United Nations, including this, but not limited to this, we
need to consider those other options.
I share a lot of members' concerns about the actions and
votes of some members of the Council, who are supposed to be
some of our closest allies. For instance, on at least one vote,
Canada was the only member to vote against a decision to make
Israel a permanent item on the Council's agenda. To take that
instance--what did we do, in terms of responding to our other
allies, who voted outrageously in the other direction? What did
we do before, and after that?
Ms. Silverberg. We lobbied very heavily in advance of the
adoption of this permanent agenda item. Primarily focused on
our European allies, where we thought there really was an
opportunity to persuade them to draw a hard line. When, as I
said, in Geneva, we were very active in the negotiations,
raising our objections at every turn. We persuaded both Canada,
and some other Member States to raise objections in Geneva.
When all of that failed, we had both from me, but all the
way up to the Secretary, we had discussions with Council
members--especially our allies--about our disappointment with
their behavior, in the final decisionmaking package.
Senator Vitter. Let me ask this bluntly: Did we do anything
after the fact, besides express our displeasure?
Ms. Silverberg. Our primary response has been to express
our displeasure. Secretary Rice has done it, directly. And I
think that point was taken by Member States. I called in
Ambassadors to discuss our concerns----
Senator Vitter. No other concrete action besides saying,
``Gee, we don't like this''?
Ms. Silverberg. Well, I think the appropriate response is
to express our strong displeasure at Member States, and their
conduct.
Our real disappointment in this case was with the
Europeans, and other governments that have a strong commitment
to human rights. This is the kind of thing we would have
expected from some other members of the Council, it's not the
kind of thing we would have expected from our strongest allies.
Senator Vitter. And finally, I just want to bring up a
related farce, related to North Korea and the U.N. Development
Program, and the fact that there have been all sorts of abuses
there--abuses of the U.N.'s own rules that are clear; that are
set in place. For instance, the Development Program hired North
Koreans designated by the North Korean Government, gave them
control over project resources on site activity, paid them in
hard foreign currency--all of that completely contrary to the
rules. And we even think maybe $107 million may have been
diverted to the North Korean regime. What can we do to ensure
that that sort of flagrant abuse of the U.N.'s own rules
doesn't happen over and over again? Oil for food, North Korea,
et cetera?
Ms. Silverberg. We don't know the figure that was diverted
to the North Korean regime, so I cannot tell you that it was
$100 million, or any other figure. These are all allegations,
but we really don't know the exact facts.
What we did in this case was shut down the UNDP Program in
North Korea, precisely because we don't have the confidence,
and other board members don't have the confidence that we can
protect this kind of----
Senator Vitter. But, if I can interrupt?
Ms. Silverberg. Yes.
Senator Vitter. I know--and I'll acknowledge--I know the
$100 million is a suspicion. We do know that all of those other
rules were broken, with regard to hiring North Koreans, giving
them access to hard currency, et cetera, et cetera--that's
pretty much confirmed, correct?
Ms. Silverberg. Yes. Senator, you're right--the preliminary
audit from UNDP confirmed that UNDP had violated the U.N. rules
in terms of both how staff was supplied, limited access in
terms of monitoring, provision of hard currency. We've also had
some eyewitness allegations that money that was provided from
UNDP was provided to the North Koreans for some dual-use items,
that would have been a cause for concern from the United
States. And we've had allegations that money that was provided
to North Korea was diverted for unintended uses, including some
real estate acquisitions and other things. We have raised some
very serious concerns.
We fought in the Board for a decision to shut down the
North Korea program while we uncovered the rest of the facts.
And what we've been working on is, basically, some provisions
that would give us greater transparency over all of UNDP's
activities, and really the activities of the full U.N. system.
Senator Vitter. Let me go to that, and ask in another way,
besides after-the-fact audits--which are obviously limited
impact, because they're after the fact--what can we do before
the fact, before the next fact, to prevent this? And, is there
any progress with regard to that?
Ms. Silverberg. I think that all of our transparency
initiatives are things that would give us indications while
some illicit activity was happening. I think they are good
things that can actually flag something before the violation.
Senator Vitter. And, to what extent are they being adopted?
Ms. Silverberg. The UNDP actually has adopted a number of
our changes, with regard to access to internal documents. We're
now trying to take that to the full U.N. system. The Secretary
General has been helpful in this regard, because he called for
a U.N. systemwide audit of activities in North Korea, so that
we know where the risks and opportunities for violations are.
So, I can't say we're at the answer yet; there's still a
lot of information we don't have about what happened in North
Korea, and a lot information we don't have about how other U.N.
organizations are conducting their activities, but this is
something that we're raising with the Secretary General and
Kamal Dervis on a regular basis.
Senator Vitter. OK, thank you.
That's all I have, Mr. Chairman, but thank you for your
work.
Senator Bill Nelson. Madame Secretary, can you help us
understand what would be going through the minds of the Council
members, when they renew the mandates of the Special
Rapporteurs, but don't for Cuba and Belarus? Those two
countries were lost in what's been called a ``horse trade.''
Help us understand what's going on in the minds of the Council
members.
Ms. Silverberg. I suspect, Mr. Chairman, although I am
speculating from here, that a couple of things were going on.
One is that there's this strong predilection from a lot of
Member States this--that interference in the internal affairs
of a particular country ought to be off limits. So, there's a
view from many Member States, that the United Nations ought to
do things, such as cooperative, technical assistance, that are
done with a government, but that the United Nations should not
take action to condemn governments. These were two Special
Rapporteurs who were condemnatory, who were there without
support of the governments. And so, for a lot of Member States,
it was really pushing on an open door, I think, to say, ``You
ought to get rid of them.''
In addition, you had--opposing these Special Rapporteurs--
some governments that are very effective, and powerful in the
United Nations system--Cuba and Russia--supporting their
elimination. So, I think that probably added to the equation.
And then, to add to all of that, there was a belief by some
European governments, even from some NGOs that have the
strongest records on these issues, that at the end of the day,
they needed to cut a deal. That, basically, we need to come to
some consensus agreement at the Council, that we couldn't risk
a vote, that would cause the entire final agreement to
collapse. And so, that we had what was in some cases, a
tactical disagreement about whether it was better to call for a
vote, to make countries take a stand, or whether it was better
to accept what we thought was just a fundamentally flawed
compromise.
Senator Bill Nelson. And all the time, we, the United
States, are sitting there as an observer.
Ms. Silverberg. Mr. Chairman, most of these negotiations
were taking place in side rooms, and discussions throughout
Geneva, and we were very actively engaged in every case.
We are also particularly active in foreign capitals,
helping to make the case for a strong package. I think there
was, really, no confusion at all, either about our views, about
the importance we attached to the Special Rapporteurs--I think
that part was very clear in Geneva.
Senator Bill Nelson. I've talked--as I indicated in my
opening comments--with the Secretary General privately about
this, and he's even said publicly, as I quoted in my opening
comments, his concern with the operation and the functioning of
this Council. And, when a Council issues and does such work
that is so violative of what is common sense, it seems that
it's time for us--especially since we're paying 27 percent of
the tab--that it's time for us to let our displeasure be known,
and to do something about it. And that's the whole reason that
I called this hearing.
So, why don't you tell us--I heard your previous answer to
previous questioners, but let's state it very clearly for the
record--given the reservations and the apprehension that you
have about the Human Rights Council, should we continue to fund
it?
And I know what you said about, it comes out of the General
Fund, but you know, a 27-percent cut of that $3 million would
be a fairly significant placement of a marker.
Ms. Silverberg. Sir, whatever happens with the Coleman
legislation, we will inevitably continue to fund this Human
Rights Council. And the reason is that our payment--in this
case, 22 percent of the Human Rights Council budget--comes out
of the U.N. regular fund. And so, even if we withhold the $3
million, they can still take funds that come from the U.S.
Government, and other countries, and redirect the same amount
of resources to the Human Rights Council as they would
otherwise.
So, this is not to express opposition to Congress' very
understandable desire to express a strong view about the
failures of the Human Rights Council, it's only to say that the
Human Rights Council will have the same amount of resources, in
all likelihood, at the end of the day.
In this case, the $3 million might help send an important
symbolic message, but it's unlikely to impact the Council.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, stay the course?
Ms. Silverberg. No, sir. I think we should not stay the
course. I think we have a number of options that can help keep
the U.S. leadership position on human rights, that can help
maximize our chances of being able to actually affect the lives
of people living under oppressive governments. Some of those
things, I think, involve focusing on other fora. And that
means, the Third Committee, the General Assembly, it means
technical assistance with the Office of the High Commissioner,
and I think it means looking at some non-U.N. opportunities,
including the ones I mentioned--OAS, and OECD.
Senator Bill Nelson. We--of course, there are members of us
on this committee who, with our 22-percent contribution to the
United Nations, think that that should go to more realistically
reflect the United Nations, the United States obligation. Which
is, I think, somewhere in the range of 25 percent. And, of
course as we try to make that happen, it's hard to make that
happen when you have a rogue Council like this, running around,
doing such things that are violative of common sense.
Ms. Silverberg. Yes, sir. I share that concern, and I think
that was an important point that you made to the Secretary
General, to let him know that this really is casting a shadow
on the larger body.
We have been very supportive of a range of U.N.
activities--U.N. peacekeeping in places like Darfur, in places
like the Congo. And this kind of thing makes it harder to make
the case--both to you, to Members of Congress, and also to the
American public--that the United Nations really can be a
valuable partner in the U.S. foreign policy agenda.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you, personally, know of anything
that the Council has done about Darfur?
Ms. Silverberg. The Council passed, what we thought, were
some pretty feeble actions on Darfur. One resolution in
particular was weaker than a resolution we opposed in 2004,
because it was too feeble. Sudan is the one example where the
Council has taken some country-specific action on a country
other than Israel. But in our view, it really was much weaker
than is appropriate, given the circumstances.
Senator Bill Nelson. Did it say that the Sudan ought to be
condemned for all of the rape and mayhem and murder and
starvation that has occurred in Darfur?
Ms. Silverberg. No, sir; the language was not that strong.
I would have to check the exact resolution, but I think it was
along the lines of expressing concern. But no, it did not
include the kind of language we would have supported, along
those lines.
Senator Bill Nelson. No action with regard to some of the
similar kind of activities in Eastern Chad within the last
year?
Ms. Silverberg. No, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, thank you very much for your
testimony. We want to shine the spotlight on this problem, and
it is a problem, because there are members up here who are
supportive of our position of supporting the United Nations,
because it's the right thing to do, that nations should be
talking to each other, and working out their differences. And I
am one among those supporters. But, it sure makes our job a lot
harder when you have a rogue activity, such as this Council,
going off in all kind of--as we say in the South, cockamamie--
positions that defy the common sense of human rights.
Thank you, Madame Secretary, we appreciate it.
And we'd like to ask up the next panel, please.
Mr. Thomas Melia, who is deputy executive director of the
Freedom House, Ms. Peggy Hicks, the global advocacy director of
the Human Rights Watch, and Mr. Brad Schaefer, Kingham Fellow
in International Regulatory Affairs at the Heritage Foundation.
So, we will just take you all in the order that I called
you, and what we'd like--your written testimony will be part of
the record, I don't want you to sit there and read it back to
us; I want you to talk to us. And then we'll get into some
questions.
So, Mr. Melia, thank you for coming.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS O. MELIA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
FREEDOM HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Melia. Thank you, Chairman Nelson, and thank you for
inviting Freedom House to be here today, and I do ask that my
complete testimony be submitted.
Senator Bill Nelson. It already has been.
Mr. Melia. Thank you, sir.
You know that Eleanor Roosevelt was not only the first
chairperson of the Human Rights Commission, and in that
capacity presided over the drafting of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, but that she was a founder of
Freedom House. When we got started, we focused on the founding
of the United Nations, and all of the work that's gone on for
these last 60 years. So we come to this discussion today with
an inherited predisposition to think that it is possible to
build an international order, based on the rule of law, and
respect for human rights.
We did not disagree with the position of the Bush
administration last year that the Council was flawed at its
creation in 2006, the view that led the U.S. Government to cast
one of just four votes against the enabling resolution in March
2006. Yet, we thought that it was possible that, with vigorous
American diplomacy, and concerted action by the democracies of
the world, the new basis for election to the Council, in which
the entire General Assembly would choose members, rather than
leave it in the hands of the regional groups, could result in a
credible body of states, seriously interested in fulfilling the
mandate of the Council.
The Council has now concluded its first year of operation,
and a second election has been conducted. Our assessment is
that the Council does not, at this point, constitute an
improvement over its predecessor.
The dictatorships of the world take this Council very
seriously. They see it as a serious threat, and they work
assiduously to thwart those who want to see it succeed. And, up
to this point, they're winning more often than the defenders of
human rights are winning.
We all remember that great line from Yates, ``The best lack
all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate
intensity.'' We see that at the U.N. Human Rights Council, the
worst are very intense. The United States, however, ought to be
engaged on human rights with comparably passionate intensity,
and ought to be engaged in mobilizing our allies to see things
in the same way.
I won't go through the litany of the record of the last
year. You know about the Special Rapporteurs and that half the
portfolio that was inherited from the Commission has been
abolished. You know about the Israel-bashing, and the overfocus
on that one situation. No other country-specific resolutions
were adopted, other than the watered-down one that was just
discussed about Darfur. Nothing on Burma. Nothing on Cuba.
Nothing on North Korea. Nothing on Uzbekistan or Zimbabwe or
Iran. Not any of the situations that we describe as the ``Worst
of the Worst'' in our annual publication on human rights.
Interestingly, however, the U.N. General Assembly's Third
Committee--it was mentioned previously, and briefly--was more
successful than the Human Rights Council in this past year, at
condemning specific countries for human rights violations. It's
composed of all 192 Member States of the United Nations. The
Third Committee, in December, passed resolutions, sanctioning
Belarus, Burma, Iran, and North Korea for human rights
violations.
This means that we've now arrived at the curious place
where the equilibrium on human rights standards--that
collective understanding of what constitutes a violation
serious enough to warrant public comment and condemnation--is
lower in the Human Rights Council than it is in the U.N.
General Assembly.
At the Human Rights Council, important democracies such as
India, South Africa, and Brazil, among others, have failed to
exercise the leadership that the world needs from them now, and
it would bolster their contentions that they belong among the
world's leading powers, as permanent members of the U.S.
Security Council.
Assistant Secretary Silverberg made this very clear as she
talked about all the administration's efforts to try to improve
the Council--there has been an extensive bilateral series of
meetings that she talked about. Yet, one is left wondering, as
Senator Menendez asked, whether this is well-focused, or
efficient, or successful enough.
Clearly, the absence of U.S. leadership at the Council has
not improved the Council's functioning in this first year. At
the same time, it has been shown, when the United States is
engaged, we can make a difference, as in the Third Committee.
As in the diplomacy that surrounded the recent elections to the
second year of the Council the United States engaged very
vigorously to thwart Belarus' bid to become a member of the
Council--and it worked. Because the United States was engaged
and enlisted allies.
Unfortunately, the United States did not invest similar
diplomatic energy, and try to thwart other not-qualified
countries in their efforts to get onto the Council. Freedom
House put out a report in April that said that Angola, Egypt,
and Qatar, were among those candidate countries who were
clearly not qualified to be members. And, while the United
States worked energetically to thwart the bid by Belarus,
nothing was done really, as far as we know, to thwart the bid
by Egypt. And certainly, Egyptian human rights activists are
dismayed that their government was elevated to the Human Rights
Council. Nineteen human rights groups in Egypt had appealed to
the United Nations not to overlook what they described as
Egypt's ``consistent contempt for human rights.'' And,
unfortunately, Egypt is now a member of the Council, and will
probably do more damage than Belarus would have done, because
Egypt is an influential regional power.
You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.
We believe that he needs to be engaged, and encouraged to lead
in this critical area. His statement on June 20, when he voiced
regret that the Council had singled out Israel for repeated
condemnation to the exclusion of addressing so many other
urgent cases, was a good, important, straightforward statement.
The rebuke that he received, just yesterday, in Geneva from
the Pakistani Ambassador, speaking there on behalf of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, confirms that Secretary
General Ban will need the support of the United States and
other democracies to confront the threat to the Council
represented by the OIC.
The heightened effort to pervert the Council does not take
place in isolation there. It is an integral part of a resurgent
global rise in influence and confidence, by a motley collection
of increasingly autocratic states--Russia, China, Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, Cuba--countries that do not have much in common,
except a shared interest in diminishing the power of the
Council, and eviscerating the language of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights.
To walk away now from that battle, just as it is commencing
in earnest, would be a remarkable declaration of failure for
the country that is largely responsible for articulating the
values, and establishing the institutions of the United
Nations.
The late Daniel Patrick Moynihan, before he became our
Ambassador to the United Nations, and before he commenced his
illustrious career here in the U.S. Senate, told us what to do
when a democratic nation comes to be isolated in the world
body. In 1975 he wrote, ``This is our circumstance, we are a
minority. We are outvoted. This is neither an unprecedent, nor
an intolerable situation. The question is: What do we make of
it? So far we have made little, nothing, of what is, in fact,
an opportunity. We go about saying that the world has changed;
we toy with the idea of stopping it, and getting off. We think
that, if only we are more reasonable, perhaps they will be more
reasonable. But they do not grow more reasonable.''
We need to mobilize the democracies of the world, of which
there are many more in the world than there were in 1975, and
strengthen the democratic faction in the United Nations, and in
the Human Rights Council.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Melia follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas O. Melia, Deputy Executive Director,
Freedom House, Washington, DC
Chairman Nelson, Senator Vitter, thank you for inviting Freedom
House to testify today on the critical subject of the U.N. Human Rights
Council, its shortcomings, and the prospects for reform.
As you know, the U.N. Human Rights Council was created last year in
an extraordinary response to the disgrace that the U.N. Human Rights
Commission had become. Populated with envoys from Saudi Arabia, China,
Cuba, Eritrea, and Sudan, the Commission was even chaired by Libya's
Ambassador during the 2003 session. It had become a disgrace to the
entire U.N. system. Kofi Annan and many others sought a fresh start.
Freedom House has been focused on how the U.N. system defends and
advances human rights virtually since our founding by Eleanor Roosevelt
and Wendell Willkie as a bipartisan voice for informed American
engagement in the world in support of human rights and democracy. You
know that Eleanor Roosevelt was first chairperson of the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, and in that capacity presided over the drafting of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the
General Assembly in 1948. We at Freedom House come to this discussion,
therefore, with an inherited predisposition to believe that an
international order can be constructed based on norms of civilized
behavior, including principally respect by governments for the
fundamental rights articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; with the firm belief that the political security and economic
interests of the United States would be enhanced in such a world; and
with the realization that, practically speaking, this can only be done
with strong leadership from the United States.
During the months of negotiation to determine the structure of the
new Council, we expressed a number of serious reservations about the
lack of stringent membership requirements that might prevent the most
notorious human rights abusers from gaining membership on the Council,
as they had with the Commission. We did not disagree with the position
of the Bush administration that the Council was thus flawed at its
creation--a view that led the U.S. Government to cast one of just four
votes against the enabling resolution in the U.N. General Assembly on
March 15, 2006. Yet we also thought it possible that, with vigorous
American diplomacy and concerted action by the democracies of the
world, the new basis for election to the Council--in which decisions
were taken out of the hands of the regional groups and placed in the
U.N. General Assembly as a whole--could result in a credible body of
states seriously interested in fulfilling the mandate of the Council.
As the enabling resolution states, the Council--
Shall be responsible for promoting universal respect for the
protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all, without distinction of any kind and in a fair and equal
manner; . . .
The Council should address situations of violations of human
rights, including gross and systematic violations, and make
recommendations thereon.
We urged the administration to reengage with the Council,
notwithstanding its understandable reservations. As Freedom House
Executive Director Jennifer Windsor testified before the House
International Relations Committee last September, shortly after the
Council had held its inaugural session: ``While we continue to have
serious concerns, Freedom House believes that the potential for the
Council's success is not yet lost. We believe that the U.S. Government
and other democratic countries should make every effort to strengthen,
not weaken, their engagement with the Council and to work together more
effectively to ensure that the United Nations regains its leadership in
protecting and advancing human rights and freedom.''
Today, 10 months later, the Council has now concluded its first
year of operations, the U.N. General Assembly has conducted elections
for the second year and our assessment is that the Council does not at
this point constitute an improvement over its disgraced predecessor.
Our optimism has been tempered not only by the consistent inability of
the Council to address serious human rights violations occurring around
the world, but more importantly, by the recurring success of the
nondemocracies in undermining the mandate of the body by stonewalling
action on the most urgent situations, and by diverting energy and time
of all the Member States to discussion of structural innovations
intended to further hobble the Council. The dictatorships of the world
take this Council as a serious threat, they work assiduously to thwart
those who want it to succeed and, up to this moment, they are winning
more often than the defenders of human rights are winning.
Mr. Chairman, it matters who engages in the world, and on what
issues, and how vigorously, especially when the diplomatic going gets
tough. I am reminded of the passage from W.B. Yeats' poem, ``The Second
Coming'':
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
The United States ought to be engaged on human rights with ``passionate
intensity.''
Last November, Freedom House issued a report card evaluating the
body's efforts to address some of the most critical issues. The report
also focused on the actions of members of the U.N. Democracy Caucus and
the U.S. Government both of which need to step up to the plate if the
Council is ever to succeed. Grades in the report card, though low, were
still mixed. We noted that ``key processes determining the Council's
future are still in formation, the track record is not promising.'' We
have taken the opportunity today to update the report card.
Naming and Shaming. The most important element of the former
Commission, as of any multilateral human rights body, is its ability to
identify and expose specific, urgent human rights abuses. The Council
has several mechanisms--Special Rapporteurs, country-specific
resolutions, and the new Universal Periodic Review--that allow it to
``name and shame'' those countries committing egregious abuses against
their citizens. Once such a diplomatic record is thus established, the
United Nations itself or individual countries may take specific actions
to isolate or punish offending states. In free societies, in
particular, popular and political debate on how governments ought to
react can be informed by such diplomatic documentation. However, this
first year has shown that the Council is largely unwilling to use the
tools at its disposal. Even more problematic is the fact that some
members are actively trying to undermine the usefulness of these
mechanisms, now and in the future.
Special Rapporteurs. Country-specific ``Special Rapporteurs''--
independent individuals tasked with monitoring and reporting on human
rights abuses in specific countries--had constituted one of the old
Commission's only mechanisms that genuinely functioned to promote and
protect human rights. The credible and accurate reports that they often
provided are still one of the most vital components of an effective
Council.
In the final session of its first year, however, Council members
proposed ending the mandates of 11 Special Rapporteurs--all of the
country-specific Special Rapporteurs, save the one assigned to Israel.
Ultimately, a compromise was reached between members of the European
Union and those countries that wanted to do away with all of the
Special Rapporteurs, allowing for the elimination of only two, those
assigned to Cuba and Belarus. However, as only 4 of the 12 country-
specific Special Rapporteurs monitored the very worst human rights
abusing countries in the world, the elimination of two of the four
country-specific Special Rapporteurs inherited by the newly created
Council is an enormous loss. It is appalling that this occurred in what
was widely touted as a ``compromise measure,'' with only Canada's
delegate dissenting, that the European and other democracies would
decide that losing half of the existing stable of Special Rapporteurs
was an acceptable outcome underscores how far the world's standards
have fallen.
Country-Specific Resolutions. In the Council's first year, country-
specific resolutions were passed addressing only two situations.
Israel's behavior in the Occupied Territories and in Lebanon was
sanctioned repeatedly: At least one resolution on the topic was passed
at each of the Council's five sessions, and Israel was the principal
subject of three out of the body's four special sessions. In fact, as
Israel has now been added as one of the Council's ``permanent agenda
items,'' many more resolutions censuring that country are sure to come.
The distortion this represents, when one considers the range and scope
of human rights problems in the world today, is breathtaking. To date,
the only condemnatory resolutions adopted by the Council in its first
and second years--11 of them now--have been directed at Israel.
In contrast, addressing the genocidal human rights abuses occurring
in the Darfur region of Sudan has been the subject of constant
political maneuvering. Negotiations over wording between members of the
European Union and the African group delayed passage of a resolution.
Eventually, a weak initiative ``welcoming the cooperation established
by the Government of the Sudan'' (as if there had been any such
cooperation) was finally approved, and a high-level mission headed by
Nobel Peace laureate Jody Williams was dispatched to the region.
However, a hearing of the report was blocked by Sudan's allies on the
Council, and only after international outcry was the report finally
presented. Since then, the Council has convened a group to work with
the Government of Sudan and assist in monitoring the human rights
situation on the ground.
However, no other country-specific resolutions were passed in the
past year. None.
Not for Burma, where a wide range of human rights violations
against political activists, journalists, and members of ethnic
and religious minority groups continued unabated throughout the
year;
Not for Cuba, where the unauthorized assembly of more than
three persons is punishable by law with up to 3 months in
prison and a fine, and peaceful civic activists imprisoned 3
years ago languish in prison;
Not for North Korea, the country with perhaps the most
stunning systematic nationwide repression, a land where more
than 200,000 people are imprisoned in a vast gulag and
punishment against three generations of families is used to
respond to even trivial utterances seen as disloyal to Kim
Jong-Il;
Not for Uzbekistan, where the massacre at Andijon remains
unacknowledged and unexamined by a regime that has turned
traditional neighborhood organizations into an official system
of public surveillance of private discussion;
Not for Zimbabwe, where, this year, the government expanded
its crackdown on the country's few remaining independent media
outlets, escalated the physical assaults against peaceful
demonstrators against the gross mismanagement of the country;
and
Not for any of the situations described on the recent
Freedom House publication, ``The Worst of the Worst,'' which
describes the 20 worst places in the world in terms of civil
liberties and political rights.
No member of the Council even proposed resolutions on these topics.
All democratic diplomatic hands were apparently mobilized to manage the
retreat from the underwhelming portfolio of the failed Commission. Nor
was any discernable effort made to expand the frontier by creating
additional Special Rapporteurs, given the largely successful resistance
offered by Sudan regarding Darfur.
Instead, in March the Council passed a resolution justifying
suppression of unpopular speech. Under the guise of discouraging
``defamation of religions,'' the resolution challenges freedom of
expression, and gives rights to religions, rather than individuals.
Many--too many--democratic countries voted for the resolution.
Just as alarmingly, a number of countries have spoken out
throughout the year against the very notion of country-specific
resolutions, as if the most egregious human rights violations in the
world were happening somehow outside the boundaries or beyond the
control of the very governments that were often responsible for
assaults on their own citizens.
During the last week of the Council's first year, as a final
package of institution-building mechanisms was being debated, China
proposed a rule that would require that passage of any country-specific
resolutions be contingent on a two-thirds majority of the Council. The
initiative was never formally proposed as a resolution, yet by all
accounts, it acquired considerable support among members and was
thwarted only on the last day of the session.
Intriguingly, another body, the U.N. General Assembly's Third
Committee, was more successful than the Human Rights Council at
condemning specific countries this past year. Composed of all 192
Member States of the United Nations, the Committee passed resolutions
in November sanctioning Belarus, Burma, Iran and North Korea for human
rights violations. This means that we have now arrived at the curious
place where the equilibrium on human rights standards--the collective
understanding of what constitutes a situation grave enough to warrant
public comment and condemnation--is lower in the Human Rights Council
than in the United Nations at large.
Universal Periodic Review. In lieu of stronger country-specific
resolutions or an increased number of Special Rapporteurs, the
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) was envisioned as a tool that could
potentially highlight human rights abuses in every U.N. Member State,
and thus provide a recurring opportunity in this global forum for
discussion of solutions. Because the procedure has not yet been
implemented, it is not yet clear how effective it will be. However, a
number of elements that could have contributed to a stronger UPR were
watered down prior to its final passage by the Council; the result is a
procedure that stresses intergovernmental consensus and inclusiveness
over rigorous standards and specificity.
For instance, while Freedom House and other human rights
organizations had pushed for a panel of independent experts to oversee
this review process, most governments--including the United States,
apparently had pressed for a panel composed of representatives from
Member States' delegations who would conduct the reviews. The result is
that the review will be conducted by three representatives of Member
States, rather than by independent human rights experts. Of the
documents used as a basis for the review, 20 pages of text can be
submitted by the country in question, while the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights can submit 10 pages and ``other relevant
stakeholders'' can provide another 10. Whether these stakeholders
include NGOs based inside or outside the country is still unclear.
The Role of Democratic Governments. Although 79 percent of Council
members during its first year were members of the Community of
Democracies (and this also includes members of the U.N. Democracy
Caucus, created in 2004) they have never voted as a group in the
Council. Today's hearing is not the forum for a discussion on the
Community of Democracies per se (Freedom House has long been concerned
that too many nondemocracies are included in this gathering of Foreign
Ministers). But it should be clear to anyone who peruses the roster of
states currently members of the Human Rights Council and examines the
vote totals that led to their election by the General Assembly that (a)
many democracies obviously voted to send conspicuous dictatorships to
the Council; and (b) even so, there are enough democratic states on the
Council that it should be able to muster a working majority of
democracies to determine outcomes much of the time. Instead, Member
States are far more likely to attach greater value to regional
solidarity than to human rights considerations. This enables China and
Russia, while suppressing the rights of Muslims in their own countries,
to build alliances with the Organization of the Islamic Conference,
with its reach into the Africa and Asia groups, to form a blocking
majority. Important democracies such as India, South Africa, and Brazil
and among others, have failed to exercise the leadership that the world
needs from them now--and that would bolster their contentions that they
belong among the world's leading powers as permanent members of the
Security Council.
Other countries, including some that do not lay claim to be
regional or global leaders, have stood more unambiguously on the side
of freedom. Look at the vote on the defamation resolution in March.
While Guatemalans can be proud that theirs was the only one of eight
Latin American countries to cast a vote for free expression, five
others abstained, and--alarmingly--Mexico joined with Cuba to vote yes
for suppression of free speech.
Canada is deserving of special recognition as the only country that
stood up during the final week of the Council's first year to decry the
loss of Special Rapporteurs for Cuba and Belarus, as well as Israel's
placement as a permanent agenda item. Canada was not, however, joined
by other democracies, and the resolution containing these points
passed, officially by consensus--notwithstanding the Canadian
objection.
The United States. U.S. Government officials have said that
improving the Council is a priority, and a few key officials have
worked hard to reach out to allies and promote higher standards at the
Council. Worthy of special recognition are the concerted efforts of
then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Lagon, recently confirmed
by the Senate as Ambassador-at-Large and Director of the Office to
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. He worked closely with
Assistant Secretary Kristen Silverberg and others in the Department,
such as Deputy Assistant Secretary Erica Barks-Ruggles in DRL, and
energetically strove for a stronger and more effective Council.
Yet, overall, one is left to wonder if the U.S. Government truly
did all that it could to improve the Council. There appear to have been
several occasions when the administration passed up opportunities to
make a difference. For example, the U.S. Government chose not to
present itself as a candidate for a seat on the Council last year, and
did not send Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to speak at the high-
level opening of the Council's first session, though more than 100
countries dispatched heads of state or Foreign Ministers to the event.
Although Freedom House urged the Bush administration to appoint a
special envoy to the Council, whose only job would be to engage
diplomats in Geneva--and, importantly, in foreign capitals around the
world--to strengthen human rights standards, the administration
declined. Earlier this year, the United States decided again this year
not to run for a seat on the Council.
The absence of U.S. leadership at the Council has clearly not
improved the body's functioning. On the contrary, those times that the
United States has pushed for higher standards for human rights at the
United Nations over the past year have shown that our engagement can
make the difference. For example, the United States actively pressed
for passage of the resolutions condemning Burma, Belarus, Iran, and
North Korea in the General Assembly's Third Committee last November.
The effort was successful, in large part because of U.S. diplomatic
leadership.
In May, when the membership of Belarus as one of the two new
Eastern European members was emerging as a real possibility--because
other countries were not willing to be candidates--the United States
joined in a concerted diplomatic effort to encourage Bosnia and
Herzegovina to run for a seat, as well. In the final week prior to
elections, Bosnia officially declared its candidacy, and Belarus was
ultimately defeated.
Unfortunately, the U.S. Government did not invest comparable
diplomatic energy in the elections that took place in the African or
Asian group. Interestingly, the nondemocratic candidates for election
there, ones that Freedom House had assessed, along with Belarus, to
``not qualified'' for membership on the Council--Angola, Egypt, and
Qatar--are countries with whom the United States has, well, more
complicated relations than it does with Belarus. The United States
worked energetically to thwart the bid by Belarus, though one can make
the case that Egypt will be more damaging to the work of the Council
because it is more influential. Certainly, Egyptians are dismayed by
their government's elevation to the Council. Nineteen Egyptian human
rights groups had appealed to the United Nations not to overlook what
they described as Egypt's ``contempt for human rights, since Egyptian
history is replete with grave human rights violations, carried out on a
large scale and over long periods of time.'' The Egyptian Government,
meanwhile, boasted that Egypt's selection to the Council is proof of
the esteem and respect in which Egypt is held by the international
community. And, unfortunately, these events lend credence to the
impression that the United States is willing to utilize its diplomatic
prowess to oppose hostile states of little strategic consequence, but
not to exercise its influence with others who equally do not belong on
the Council.
It is also not clear that the U.S. Government brings other
countries' performance at the Council into our bilateral relationships.
Are Algeria and Egypt challenged in Algiers and Cairo for their
behavior at the Council? How are South Africa or India enlisted to step
up to their responsibilities as key Third World democracies? How many
performance evaluations of U.S. ambassadors or political officers, or
embassy mission plans, will include a reference to the U.N. voting
records of the countries to which they are assigned? The most important
work in this regard is not necessarily to be done in those countries
that are the main human rights abusers; it is to be done in those
democratic states that have yet to incorporate into their own diplomacy
a principled engagement on these issues. The U.S. Government can work
much harder than it currently does to energize our allies and partners
to promote human rights in Geneva.
The United States should be congratulated for amply funding the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. However, though the
High Commissioner's office provides critical technical assistance for
human rights work around the world, it is not a substitute for the
Human Rights Council.
Related U.N. Institutions. The High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Louise Arbour, has recently sought to distance her office from the
Council and to downplay expectations that the U.N.'s human rights
Secretariat has much ability to influence events at the Council. The
Council, she recently wrote, ``. . . is a political body made up of its
Member States and its decisions and actions are the result of
negotiations among those members. The OHCHR provides Secretariat
support to the Council but does not in any way determine the Council's
decisions, resolution, recommendations, or actions.'' Coming from the
United Nations's most prominent institutional champion of human rights,
this is dismaying. The world needs her, a distinguished international
jurist of some renown, to speak clearly on these issues and to make
clear that she knows when the Council has strayed. It is also
interesting that she has had rather little interaction with anyone in
the U.S. Government, other than the Ambassador to the United Nations in
Geneva. What are we to infer from the fact that Ms. Arbour just made
her first visit to the United States, and that our Government has
reached out so little to her?
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon needs to be engaged and
encouraged to lead in this critical area, utilizing the immense respect
of his office and, as importantly, utilizing his private encounters
with governments at the highest levels. His work already on Darfur
shows that he has a clear sense of the world body's responsibility to
act on grievous situations. His statement on June 20, when he voiced
regret that the Council has singled out Israel for repeated
condemnation to the exclusion of addressing other urgent cases, was a
good one. The rebuke he received just yesterday in Geneva, from the
Pakistani Ambassador speaking on behalf of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, confirms that Secretary General Ban will need the
support of the United States and the other democracies to confront the
threat to the Council represented by the OIC. This, too, needs to be a
plank in the American diplomatic platform--encouragement and
facilitation for the Secretary General to strengthen the Council.
The Future. The Human Rights Council is clearly a flawed
institution, though it is less clear what might be the best way to fix
it. The year just begun at the Council is the first ``normal'' year for
the body, now that institutions and mechanisms have been established.
Standing by, watching and waiting for the Council to fail, in hopes
that the international community will invent something better when the
present Council's mandate expires in a few years--apparently the
preferred approach of some people in the current administration--is
untenable. Jumping in at the last moment to suggest changes will have
very little effect, as the United States discovered last year in the
negotiations about the present Council. Given the ongoing human rights
abuses that are occurring in the world, and the tremendous damage that
continuation of the current situation will have on the credibility of
the entire United Nations, it is time for reinvigorated diplomacy
rather than retreat. If the United States genuinely wants a better
Council in 4 years, it must be more engaged now in a sustained effort
to influence other countries and to work with others to develop
meaningful reforms.
This is a challenge worthy of the best diplomatic talent of the
United States of America, working in tandem with an attentive,
informed, and engaged Congress, which this hearing today suggests it
is. This will be difficult to do, not least because our Government
seems not to have grasped the enormity of the challenge. As daunting as
it appears to be, it will only become more so in the near term.
The heightened effort to pervert the Council is not taking place in
isolation. It is an integral part of a resurgent global rise in
influence and confidence by a motley collection of increasingly
autocratic states. Increasingly, the only pluralism reflected in many
governments around the world is in the diversity of despotism they are
developing. Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Cuba. They do not
have much in common except a shared interest in diminishing the power
of the Council, the meaning of the U.N. Charter and eviscerating the
language of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. To walk away now
from the battle, just as it is commencing in earnest, would be a
remarkable declaration of failure for the country that is largely
responsible for articulating the values and establishing the
institutions of the United Nations.
Eleanor Roosevelt would not have been surprised at what is
happening now in the Human Rights Council. She anticipated it. In Paris
at the Sorbonne, in September 1948, she said: ``We must not be deluded
by the efforts of the forces of reaction to prostitute the great words
of our free tradition and thereby to confuse the struggle. Democracy,
freedom, human rights have come to have a definite meaning to the
people of the world which we must not allow any nation to so change
that they are made synonymous with suppression and dictatorship.''
Almost three decades later, and three decades ago, at a very low
point of American prestige and influence in the world (not terribly
dissimilar to the present moment in some ways), sentiment for
withdrawal from the United Nations was mounting, as the United States
found itself increasingly outmaneuvered in the United Nations. The late
Daniel Patrick Moynihan--before he became our Ambassador to the United
Nations and before he commenced his illustrious career in the U.S.
Senate--told us what to do when a democratic nation comes to be
isolated in the world body. Writing in Commentary magazine, in March
1975, in an article entitled ``The United States in Opposition,'' he
declared: ``This is our circumstance. We are a minority. We are out-
voted. This is neither an unprecedented nor an intolerable situation.
The question is what do we make of it. So far we have made little--
nothing--of what is in fact an opportunity. We go about dazed that the
world has changed. We toy with the idea of stopping it and getting off.
We rebound with the thought that if only we are more reasonable perhaps
`they' will be . . . But `they' do not grow reasonable. . . .''
He told us then, and soon thereafter he showed us how, to take the
United Nations seriously and to use our voice to tell the truth and to
seek to persuade others to join ranks with us. During the three decades
since, there has been a growing consensus among democratic states that
protecting human rights is a vital shared interest of humanity--and
that it is possible to band together and to do something about it.
There are more democratic states in the world than there were in 1975--
a lot more.
Yet there is hesitation and confusion about whether to mount a
serious diplomatic campaign. This hesitation is misplaced. Democratic
governments have an obligation to speak up for those who are being
silenced, jailed, and in some cases murdered by their own governments.
Current conditions may demand new strategies, but on the universal
value of freedom, there should be no second thoughts, no apologies, and
no hesitation.
The United States cannot afford to ignore--nor to lose--the debate
on freedom that is currently occurring in and around the Human Rights
Council. We need to take it seriously and be more strategic in
combating the trend. Human rights activists in many of these countries
look to the Council to give voice to, and defend, their concerns; they
believe that what happens in Geneva matters, and so should we. More
energetic high-level diplomacy on the several fronts I have described
is necessary, not less.
Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Hicks, we're going to have to
suspend, there is a vote in progress, we're down to 5 minutes
to vote. So, I'm going to go run and vote; I'll be right back.
The meeting will stand in recess until the call of the Chair.
[Recess.]
Senator Bill Nelson. The committee will resume.
Ms. Hicks.
STATEMENT OF PEGGY HICKS, GLOBAL ADVOCACY DIRECTOR, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, NEW YORK, NY
Ms. Hicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting us to
testify, and for your attention to the Human Rights Council.
As has already been emphasized, the Human Rights Council in
its first year, failed to act on human rights crises in a
variety of places, ended the mandates of experts on Belarus and
Cuba, and rolled back its consideration of Iran and Uzbekistan.
At the same time, it focused disproportionately on Israel,
and did so in a way that was likely to be ineffective, because
it fails to look comprehensively at the situation, including
the responsibilities of Palestinian authorities, and armed
groups.
On these points, all of us agree. But on the key questions
of why the Council has disappointed, and to your question, Mr.
Chairman, of whether it's headed in the right direction, there
are many different opinions.
In addition to its unimpressive membership, which we've
already discussed, we believe that two factors help explain the
Council's weak performance.
Mr. Chairman, this committee is well aware of the larger
problems the United States faces in advancing its interests
across the globe today, and Senator Menendez has referred to
them as well. The war in Iraq, Guantanamo, secret prisons,
torture, and unlawful rendition have reverberated worldwide.
The U.S. loss of moral authority and influence has had an
impact on every issue the U.S. pursues, in every forum, and the
Human Rights Council is no different.
The Organization of the Islamic Conference has been
successful in harnessing ill-will toward Bush administration
policies, to pursue an agenda aimed more at protecting than
condemning human rights abusers. States that might have been
expected to play a strong human rights role, like South Africa,
have found it convenient to play to tensions between the
developed, and developing world. The absence of the United
States from the Council's membership has created a leadership
imbalance that the European Union has been unable to remedy.
The Council's shortcomings in its first year also reflect
the poor performance of human rights supporters. States
friendly to human rights routinely fail to invest the political
capital and resources necessary to make the Council work.
Senator Menendez asked Assistant Secretary Silverburg regarding
this point, and we looked at the extent to which the United
States has failed to extend full, high-level, sustained
advocacy, and that's not just a problem with the United States,
but within other human rights supporters, as well.
Human Rights Watch and other NGOs called for a special
envoy to be appointed to demonstrate a real commitment to
pushing these issues forward, and to do so in a sustained way--
that simply didn't happen.
Given the Council's record so far, what hope is there of
continuing engagement will improve the picture?
Mr. Chairman, the Council may not be moving in the right
direction yet, but getting the Council on the right track can
be done. Beginning this year, the Council will scrutinize all
states human rights records in the new Universal Periodic
Review.
It is exactly because this process will counter the
selectivity that discredited the Commission, and has already
damaged the Council, that this process can have a real impact
on human rights.
In addition, the Council's systems of human rights experts,
including ones who will continue to work on Burma and North
Korea, has been maintained, and will continue to put pressure
on governments to respond to their findings and
recommendations. These experts have helped develop indicators,
that should help hold the Sudanese Government to account for
ongoing abuses in Darfur.
With support from states such as the United States, this
system of human rights experts can be maintained and
strengthened. In looking at what the Council has done, we need
to look at results, not just rhetoric.
In looking, for example, at the Sudan and Darfur, a
question that you raised, Mr. Chairman, Assistant Secretary
Silverberg pointed to the fact that there have been three so-
called ``weak'' or ``feeble'' resolutions on Darfur. Of course,
it's always nice to have a condemnatory resolution. But I think
we, as human rights supporters, need to look at what is the
impact of resolutions on the ground. The three resolutions on
Darfur in Sudan led to a fact-finding mission headed by a Nobel
Laureate that resulted in a thorough and compelling report on
abuses of human rights in Darfur, including addressing, in
detail, all of the issues you raised, Mr. Chairman, and those
resolutions also created an experts group that is engaged,
right now, in hands-on work to address violations in Darfur.
Counting the lives saved due to the work of institutions
like the Human Rights Council is never easy, but one example
provides hope. In 2005, the possibility that the Commission on
Human Rights might adopt a resolution on Nepal, helped convince
the Nepalese Government to agree to a U.N. human rights
monitoring mission, a step that contributed to a dramatic
improvement in human rights. Using that model, we are pushing
the Council to take up the situation of Sri Lanka this year,
where a monitoring mission could save lives, now.
In deciding the Council's fate, we need to consider our
options. We've already heard a bit about the work that could be
done in the Third Committee, but that simply is no substitute
for the work that a year-round body, like the Council, could
do.
Election of the Council's members by universal vote also
adds to the potential legitimacy and effectiveness of the
institution, and allows us a lever to improve the membership of
the Council, as well.
Given these facts, deciding to cut off funding for the
Human Rights Council may succeed in signaling dismay over the
Council's record, but it does nothing to help human rights
victims. And, I would say, we disagree with the Assistant
Secretary's view that this would not undermine the work of the
United States at the Council.
But working for a better Council can pay off, as it did
this May in the crucial vote on Belarus, which my colleague has
already described. Mr. Chairman, proponents of human rights in
the U.S. Congress should continue to express their
dissatisfaction with the Council's shortcomings.
But those complaints should not be the end of the story.
Writing off the Council, with no reasonable alternative in
sight, would send a devastating signal to human rights victims
throughout the world.
This human rights body is, as has been said, a political
body made up of States, and its success or failure depends on
how those States perform. Instead of blaming the Council, the
United States should hold bad performers accountable, including
allies like India, Pakistan, and South Africa, and push for
action on priority issues, such as Sri Lanka, where the Council
could make a real difference in the coming year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hicks follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peggy Hicks, Global Advocacy Director, Human
Rights Watch, New York, NY
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting me to testify at
this hearing and for your attention to the U.N. Human Rights Council.
In its first year, the Human Rights Council has failed to take
action regarding countries facing human rights crises such as Burma,
Colombia, Somalia, Turkmenistan, and Zimbabwe, ended the mandates of
human rights experts on Belarus and Cuba, and rolled back its
consideration of the deteriorating situations in Iran and Uzbekistan.
At the same time, it focused disproportionately on Israel's human
rights record and worse still, did so in a manner doomed to be
ineffective because it failed to look comprehensively at the situation,
including the responsibilities and roles of Palestinian authorities and
armed groups. On these points, all of those testifying before you today
are likely to agree. But on the two crucial questions of why the
Council has disappointed, and what are the prospects for improving its
performance, opinions differ widely. I hope to shed some light on those
points in this testimony.
Of course, the Council's troubling performance was in some ways
unsurprising. The United States, which was one of only four states that
voted against the Council's creation, did so because the General
Assembly resolution creating the Council contained insufficient
guarantees to keep states with poor human rights records off the body.
The United States can hardly play the hero in this drama however. Under
then-U.N. Ambassador John Bolton, the United States managed both to
neglect the negotiations to establish the Council and to push pet
proposals that detracted from the goal of building a stronger body. The
United States undermined its demands for rigorous membership criteria,
for instance, by its own failure to ratify core human rights treaties,
such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. And the U.S. push
for a smaller council backfired dramatically when reducing the body's
size led to a redistribution of seats that took seats away from the
regional groups most friendly to human rights (``Western Europe and
Others'' and ``Latin America and the Caribbean'').
But the Council's membership is only part of the story. By most
measures, the percentage of states in this new body that can be
expected to support human rights is slightly improved. The number of
Council members counted by Freedom House as ``free'' increased from 45
percent of the Commission to 55 percent of the Council; the number of
members of the Community of Democracies increased from 62 percent to 76
percent. Yet human rights supporting states in the Council have clearly
been on the defensive, and have been able to successfully push for
action on only one country situation--Sudan's abuses in Darfur--in the
past year. Two other important factors help explain the Council's weak
performance.
The Council's failures reflect the disturbing state of the global
political environment. The war in Iraq, Guantanamo, secret prisons,
torture and unlawful rendition have reverberated worldwide, including
at the Human Rights Council.
Mr. Chairman, this committee is well aware of the larger problems
the United States faces in advancing its interests across the globe
today. The U.S. loss of moral authority and influence has had an impact
on every issue the United States pursues in every forum, and the Human
Rights Council is no different.
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the only active
cross-regional coalition at the Council, has been successful in
harnessing ill-will toward Bush administration policies to pursue an
agenda aimed more at protecting than condemning human rights abusers.
The divide between the ``northern'' developed states and the
``southern'' developing world has never been greater, and infects all
policy debates within the Council. States that might have been expected
to push a strong human rights agenda at the Council, like South Africa,
have found it convenient to play to those tensions, and have refused to
take even small steps that could be seen as criticizing another
developing country. While the United States has played a relatively
active role as an observer at the Council, the absence of the United
States from the Council's membership has created a leadership imbalance
that the European Union has been unable to remedy.
The Council's shortcomings in its first year also reflect the poor
performance of human rights supporters. Despite expressing their
commitment to building a strong Council, such states routinely failed
to invest the political capital and resources necessary to make that
goal a reality. Making the Council a priority would have meant
bolstering the staff of Geneva missions which were ill-equipped to deal
with a body that now meets year-round and had a dual-track agenda
involving both institution-building and its regular business, as well
as appointing senior envoys who could engage in an effective and
sustained manner in capitals.
Given the Council's weak record so far, what hope is there that
continuing engagement will improve the picture?
Mr. Chairman, despite the international political landscape and the
limitations inherent in any intergovernmental body such as the Human
Rights Council, intensified engagement by human rights supporters in
the Council could still make a difference. Beginning this year, the
Council will scrutinize for the first time the human rights situations
in all U.N. Member States through the new Universal Periodic Review.
This process is the greatest innovation in the Council, and will
counter the selectivity that discredited the Commission on Human Rights
and has already damaged the Council. Of course, some states have
already revealed that they would prefer a whitewash to an effective
review. But this review provides an unprecedented opportunity for
public scrutiny of states' human rights records, which could be a
valuable lever to encourage governments to take concrete steps on human
rights abuses, if the process is properly supported.
In addition, the human rights experts appointed by the Council to
address both thematic and country situations could also push the
Council forward in the coming year. The Council has for the first time
afforded these experts a real opportunity to present their findings and
recommendations, a step that increases the pressure upon governments to
respond. These experts have also come together to address urgent
issues--including Darfur, where an expert group has developed
indicators that should help hold the Sudanese Government to account for
ongoing abuses. But the Council's human rights experts face continuing
attacks from states with poor human rights records, a testament to the
fact that the experts are indeed seen as a threat. Those states
succeeded in ending the mandates for experts on Cuba and Belarus, but
failed in their efforts to eliminate the system of country experts
altogether. Without continuing engagement by human rights supporters,
these experts face threats to their independence and existence. With
support from states such as the United States, this system of human
rights experts can be maintained and strengthened.
States do not change their abusive practices lightly, and when they
do they rarely acknowledge that they are responding to pressure from
outside. Counting the lives that have been saved or the abuses that
have been ended due to the work of an institution like the Human Rights
Council will never be easy. But one example from the Council's
predecessor, the Commission on Human Rights, provides hope that the
Council could have such an impact in the coming year. In 2005, the
possibility that the Commission would adopt a resolution on Nepal led
the Nepalese government to agree to deployment of a U.N. human rights
monitoring mission, a step that contributed to a dramatic improvement
in the human rights situation in that country.
Today, organizations like Human Rights Watch are pushing the Human
Rights Council to take up the situation in Sri Lanka, where we believe
a human rights monitoring mission could make a real difference. In the
Council's first year, the situation in Sri Lanka took a backseat to
reaching agreement on a package of measures on the Council's working
methods and agenda. In the coming year, states that are committed to
human rights have the opportunity to identify a limited number of
priorities, including Sri Lanka, where engagement by the Council could
save lives.
The Council's detractors have been vocal in identifying its many
shortcomings. What is missing from those critiques, however, is an
analysis of the alternatives. The Council is an intergovernmental body
that is not surprisingly subject to all the flaws inherent in
policymaking by a group of states with disparate interests and agendas.
In deciding about the Council's fate, we need to be realistic about the
options, if we agree that some sort of international human rights body
is useful. The advantage of the Human Rights Council is that it
represents all regions of the world and allows states to engage peer-
to-peer, including with human rights abusers. Election of the Council's
members by a universal vote adds to the Council's legitimacy, and hence
to its potential for effectiveness. An institution made up
overwhelmingly of northern, developed countries would be more likely to
adopt resolutions on human rights abuses, but would be substantially
less able to influence governments perpetrating human rights abuses and
stop those violations from happening.
The only other institution that could leverage the condemnation of
peers to address human rights abuses is the U.N. General Assembly. But
the General Assembly hardly presents an appealing alternative. The
General Assembly suffers from the same shortcomings as constraints as
the Human Rights Council, and its record gives little hope that it
would be more willing to take action on human rights abuses than the
Council. The Council's membership can be improved by intensified
efforts in yearly elections, while the General Assembly's universal
membership offers no such prospect. Giving the General Assembly
exclusive jurisdiction over human rights issues would mean eliminating
the Council's system of human rights experts, and abandoning the
process of universal periodic review before it has begun. The General
Assembly would be able to devote only a fraction of the time and
resources to human rights that a specialized body meeting year round
can.
Given these facts, deciding to cut off funding for the Human Rights
Council may succeed in signaling dismay over the Council's record, but
does nothing to help human rights victims. If the United States truly
wants a stronger human rights body, it should stop distancing itself
from the Council and instead work harder to improve this new body. Such
efforts can pay off.
This May, Belarus--a state with an appalling human rights record--
failed in its bid to become a Council member, largely because of a
determined campaign by a few states, including the United States, and a
group of NGOs, including Human Rights Watch. Yet in the same elections,
only two candidates competed for Latin America's two open seats:
Bolivia and Nicaragua. Surely the United States has the ability to
encourage stronger human rights partners from this region to contend
for Council membership. The Africa group again insisted on putting
forward a ``clean slate'' with only as many candidates as the number of
seats available, composed of Angola, Egypt, Madagascar, and South
Africa. If the United States cannot convince its allies in Africa to
stop this practice, it should at least be able to encourage human
rights supporters in Africa to insist on a better slate of candidates.
The Human Rights Council is a political body made up of states, and
its success or failure depends on how those states perform. Instead of
holding the Council itself responsible for its disappointing first
year, the United States should consider directing its attention to
allies like South Africa, India, and Pakistan which played leading
roles in pushing the Council onto the wrong track (and which voted in
favor of every resolution adopted by the Council on Israel).
Mr. Chairman, proponents of human rights in the U.S. Congress
should continue to express their dissatisfaction with the Council's
shortcomings. But those complaints should not be the end of the story.
Writing off the Human Rights Council with no reasonable alternative in
sight would send a devastating signal to human rights victims
throughout the world. Instead, human rights supporters should focus
their attention on holding bad performers at the Council accountable,
and pushing for action on priority issues such as Sri Lanka.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Ms. Hicks.
Mr. Schaefer.
STATEMENT OF BRETT D. SCHAEFER, JAY KINGHAM FELLOW IN
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AFFAIRS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Schaefer. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing me with the
opportunity to come and testify this afternoon.
You have asked the panelists today to give their assessment
of the prospects for reforming the U.N. Human Rights Council.
The very question is a telling indictment of how difficult it
is to achieve reform within the United Nations system. The
Council is actually the disappointing result of a reform
process. Only 1 year ago the General Assembly passed a
resolution creating the Council to replace the discredited U.N.
Commission on Human Rights.
After the U.N. General Assembly passed that resolution,
Council supporters like U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
Louise Arbour were quick to declare that the new body
represented a ``dawn of a new era,'' in promoting human rights
at the United Nations. Perhaps they should have been a little
more cautious, considering that well-known human rights
abusers, Burma, China, Cuba, Sudan, Syria, Zimbabwe, and
others, all voted in favor of the new Council. The United
States was one of four countries to vote against the
resolution. It cast its vote out of concern that the new
Council would lack the safeguards against the problems that
afflicted the Commission. Looking back at the deplorable
performance of the Council in its first year, the concern has
proven to be very well-founded.
The election process for the new Council resulted in only
minor improvement in the quality of Council membership, over
the discredited Commission. Some countries did decide not to
run for election, but a number of states with dismal human
rights records ran and won seats in 2006, including Algeria,
Cuba, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Russia.
The 2007 election actually saw a decline in the quality of
membership in the Council from 2006. The only significant
victory was blocking Belarus from winning a seat and that was
only accomplished due to extensive efforts by the United States
and human rights groups to persuade Bosnia and Herzegovina to
run. The United States and these groups cannot apply similar
pressure in every single instance when human rights abusers run
for a seat on the Council. There are simply too many.
The small victory of keeping Belarus off the Council, was
overshadowed by the election of Angola, Egypt, Qatar, and
Bolivia--all states with dismal human rights records. Worse, we
have seen a return to the practice of regions presenting clean
slates for elections to the Council, by only offering as many
candidates as there are open seats. This undermines the purpose
of having the General Assembly elect members to the Council in
the first place.
In its first year, the Council, just like the discredited
Commission, has exhibited an obsessive discriminatory focus on
Israel while ignoring far worse human rights abuses around the
world. In its first year the Council has held 3 special
sessions focusing on Israel, and passed 10 harsh condemnatory
resolutions and 4 decisions focusing on Israel. Moreover,
Israel is singled out as the only country subject to a
permanent agenda item.
By contrast, the Council has held only one special session
on Sudan and the issue of Darfur--widely considered the most
serious human rights crisis in the world, involving the
genocide of up to, of at least 200,000 individuals. The Council
passed only one soft, noncondemnatory resolution and four mild
decisions expressing ``concern'' about the situation, and
failing to condemn the Sudanese Government. The Council even
thanked Sudan for its cooperation, even though it denied access
to Darfur by the very study group sent there by the Council.
The Council has not passed a single resolution condemning
human rights abuses in 19 of the 20 Worst of the Worst--the
worst repressive human rights situations as identified by
Freedom House--as mentioned earlier in the panel.
Sadly, the Council has done even worse than ignore human
rights abuses. It's ended existing scrutiny of human rights
practices inherited from the Commission. It has discontinued
consideration of human rights situations in Iran and Uzbekistan
under the confidential 1503 procedures. The Council eliminated
experts focused on Belarus and Cuba, despite extensive evidence
of ongoing violations. And many countries plainly hope to
eliminate all country specific experts in the near future, with
the notable exception of Israel, again singling that country
out.
The Council has also adopted new rules and procedures,
including a new code of conduct to pressure, influence, and
intimidate independent experts. Under the new procedures, a
committee appointed by the Council will appoint these experts
from a roster of precleared qualified candidates. Restrictions
under the code of conduct offer ample opportunities for
countries to dispute, block, and otherwise criticize reports by
the experts.
The new universal periodic review will assess human rights
practices in all Member States, a much-heralded improvement
over the Commission. However, the proposed procedures for the
review are very weak and virtually assure a Milquetoast
outcome. The review for every country, whether it's Sweden or
Sudan, is limited to 3 hours. The review will be a country-led
process in which the country--``the country under review will
have, shall be fully involved in the outcome,'' and requires
the review to take, ``into account the level of development and
specificities of the countries.'' Input from nongovernmental
organizations will be minimal and moreover, the reviews will
only occur every 4 years.
As summarized by the U.S. Department of State, these
institution-building procedures are seriously flawed and make
the problems of the Council even worse. Quite simply, the
actions of the Council are not worthy of an organization
considered to be the world's premier human rights body. It has
continued the worst aspects of the Commission and has become a
platform for human rights abusers to deflect criticism rather
than holding them to account.
The United States chose not to run for a seat on the
Council in 2006 and in 2007. This was the right decision.
Winning a seat on the Council would not necessarily give the
United States a greater voice or influence. Any U.N. member can
comment on and speak to issues before the Council and the
United States has frequently expressed its support or
opposition to various resolutions and decisions. Because
membership is based on geographic representation, even if the
United States won a seat on the Council, it would simply
displace one of the seven countries representing Western Europe
and other states in that particular region, which already
largely vote as the United States would vote.
In numerous votes over the past year, the Council has
adopted resolutions over the objection of 11 or 12 nations.
U.S. membership on the Council would not change that situation
at all. The gain from the United States being on the Council
would be marginal at best. Until the Council approves, the
United States should not lend its credibility to the flawed
body by seeking a seat.
The Council could, potentially, improve if members of the
Council and the General Assembly decide to support strong
resolutions or elect credible members to the Council.
Unfortunately, the actions of the Council over the past year
indicate that most members of the Council and in the General
Assembly do not care to support a stronger more effective
Council. On the contrary, they are perfectly happy with the
dreadful record of the Council over the past year and oppose
reform. The United States and other states that want to improve
the Council simply don't have the votes to force change in the
face of this resistance.
In my opinion, the Council will continue to hinder rather
than help protect and advance human rights.
In closing, I want to congratulate the House of
Representatives and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for
expressing their displeasure with the Council, by supporting
legislation to withhold U.S. funding. While this action will
have little direct impact on the budget of the Council and the
behavior of the Council, it sends a powerful signal of
displeasure.
This concludes my oral statement, Mr. Chairman, and I look
forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schaefer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brett D. Schaefer, Jay Kingham Fellow in
International Regulatory Affairs, the Margaret Thatcher Center for
Freedom, the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing me with the opportunity to
testify on how the new United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) has
performed in its first year and the prospects for reform. With
permission, I would like my full written statement submitted for the
record.
Since the birth of the United Nations, protecting and advancing
fundamental human rights has been one of the organization's primary
objectives. The drafters of the U.N. Charter included a pledge by
Member States ``to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women.'' \1\ U.N. treaties and conventions, such as the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, which the General Assembly passed in 1948,
form the core of international standards for human rights.
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\1\ Charter of the United Nations, preamble, at www.un.org/aboutun/
charter/index.html (May 24, 2007)
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Yet the U.N.'s recent record in promoting fundamental human rights
is riddled with failure and inaction. For nearly six decades, the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) epitomized this failure as the premier
U.N. human rights body charged with reviewing the human rights
performance of states and promoting human rights around the world.\2\
Sadly, the Commission devolved into a feckless organization that human
rights abusers used to block criticism and a forum for attacks on
Israel.\3\ The Commission's disrepute grew so great that even former
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged, ``We have reached a
point at which the Commission's declining credibility has cast a shadow
on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole, and where
piecemeal reforms will not be enough.'' \4\
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\2\ United Nations, ``UN in Brief,'' chap. 3, at www.un.org/
Overview/uninbrief/chapter3_
humanrights.html (May 24, 2007).
\3\ See Brett D. Schaefer, ``The United Nations Human Rights
Council: Repeating Past Mistakes,'' Heritage Foundation Lecture No.
964, September 19, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/WorldwideFreedom/
upload/hl_964.pdf (May 24, 2007).
\4\ Kofi Annan, ``Secretary General's Address to the Commission on
Human Rights,'' Office of the Spokesman for the U.N. Secretary General,
April 7, 2005, at www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1388 (May 24,
2007. See also Mark P. Lagon, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State, ``The UN
Commission on Human Rights: Protector or Accomplice?'' testimony before
the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International
Operations, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of
Representative, April 19, 2005, at www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/44983.htm
(May 24, 2007).
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After lengthy deliberations and negotiations, the U.N. General
Assembly voted to replace the Commission with a new Human Rights
Council in March 2006.\5\ Regrettably, during the negotiations, the
General Assembly rejected many basic reforms and standards that had
been proposed to ensure that the Council would not repeat the mistakes
of the Commission.\6\ For instance, the United States wanted a much
smaller body than the 53-member Commission to enable it to act more
easily; a high threshold for election to the Council (a two-thirds vote
of the General Assembly); and a prohibition on electing nations to the
Council that are under U.N. Security Council sanction for human rights
abuses.
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\5\ Press release, ``Explanation of Vote by Ambassador John R.
Bolton, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the
Human Rights Council Draft Resolution, in the General Assembly,'' U.S.
Mission to the United Nations, March 15, 2006, at www.un.int/usa/
06_051.htm (May 24, 2007).
\6\ See Schaefer, ``The United Nations Human Rights Council.''
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Negotiators produced a 47-member Council that is only marginally
smaller than the Commission. The HRC has no hard criteria for
membership other than quotas for each of the regional groups in the
United Nations and a requirement that Council members be elected by a
simple majority of the General Assembly (currently 97 of 192 votes). No
state, no matter how poor its human rights record, is barred from
membership. Even states under Security Council sanction for human
rights abuses may become members.
The resolution, instead, instructs U.N. Member States that ``when
electing members of the Council, [they] shall take into account the
contribution of candidates to the promotion and protection of human
rights.'' \7\ Candidates are also asked to submit ``voluntary pledges
and commitments'' on their qualifications for the Council based on
their past and future adherence to and observance of human rights
standards. The toothlessness of this instruction quickly became evident
when notorious human rights abusers Algeria, Cuba, China, Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Russia ran for election, asserting their
strong commitment to human rights and pledging their commitment to such
standards in the future.\8\
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\7\ U.N. General Assembly, ``Human Rights Council,'' Resolution A/
RES/60/251, 60th Sess., April 3, 2006, at www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
hrCouncil/docs/A.RES.60.251_En.pdf (May 24, 2007).
\8\ For pledges and candidates for election to the Human Rights
Council in 2006, see U.N. General Assembly, ``Human Rights Council,''
at www.un.org/ga/60/elect/hrc (May 24, 2007). for pledges and
candidates for election to the Human Rights Council in 2007, see U.N.
General Assembly, ``Human Rights Council Election,'' May 17, 2007, at
www.un.org/ga/61/elect/hrc (May 24, 2007). See also Brett D. Schaefer,
``Human Rights Relativism Redux: UN Human Rights Council Mirrors
Discredited Human Rights Commission,'' Heritage Foundation WebMemo No.
1069, May 10, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/
InternationalOrganizations/wm1069.cfm.
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Because of these weaknesses, the United States voted against the
resolution creating the HRC and announced that it would not run for a
seat on the Council, but would consider running in the future if the
Council proved effective.\9\ ``Absent stronger mechanisms for
maintaining credible membership, the United States could not join
consensus on this resolution,'' explained then-U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, John Bolton. ``We did not have sufficient confidence in
this text to be able to say that the HRC would be better than its
predecessor.'' \10\ Ambassador Bolton's statement has proven prophetic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Press statement, ``The United States Will Not Seek Election to
the UN Human Rights Council,'' U.S. Department of State, April 6, 2006,
at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/64182.htm (May 24, 2007).
\10\ U.N. General Assembly, ``General Assembly Establishes New
Human Rights Council.''
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Less than half of the old Commission's members in 2005 were
considered ``free'' by Freedom House. China, Cuba, Egypt, Pakistan,
Sudan, and Zimbabwe--some of the world's worst human rights abusers--
routinely used their positions on the Council to block scrutiny of
their own practices and to launch spurious attacks on other countries
for political reasons (e.g., Israel) or for speaking openly about their
human rights violations (e.g., the United States).
The May 2006 election showed that simply creating a new Council had
not convinced the General Assembly to spurn the candidacies of human
rights abusers. Overall, the Council's membership in 2006 was only
marginally better than the Commission's membership in 2005. The first
Council election in 2006 produced a Council in which 25 out of 47
members (53 percent) were ranked ``free'' by Freedom House. Some of the
more disreputable human rights abusers--Burma, North Korea, Sudan, and
Zimbabwe--did not run for seats. Iran and Venezuela ran for seats but
were unsuccessful, although Venezuela received enough votes (101) to
win a seat if other states had not won more support.\11\
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\11\ See Human Rights Watch, ``Human Rights Council: Latin America
& Caribbean States: 8 Seats, 11 Declared Candidates,'' at www.hrw.org/
un/elections/lac/lac.htm (May 24, 2007).
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Despite these minor successes, a number of states with dismal human
rights records won seats, including Algeria, Azerbaijan, Cameroon,
Cuba, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Russia.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Schaefer, ``Human Rights Relativism Redux'' and ``The United
Nations Human Rights Council.''
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All Council members pledge their commitment to human rights
standards when they run for election. As a Council member, a country is
supposed to ``uphold the highest standards in the promotion and
protection of human rights.'' \13\ This requirement did not translate
into better promotion and protection of human rights at the HRC. On the
contrary, the Council's actions reveal a profound lack of commitment to
human rights. Council decisions reveal that the bulk of its membership
has declined to scrutinize major violators of human rights and has
instead focused disproportionately on censuring Israel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ U.N. General Assembly, ``Human Rights Council.''
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In its first year, the Council failed to address ongoing repression
in Belarus, China, Cuba, North Korea, and Zimbabwe and many other dire
human rights situations around the world. Nor did the HRC censure the
Government of Sudan for its role in the genocide in Darfur. Instead, it
held one special session on Darfur and adopted one mild resolution and
four mild decisions expressing ``concern'' regarding the human rights
and humanitarian situation in Darfur, dispatching a ``High-Level
Mission to assess the human rights situation in Darfur and the needs of
the Sudan in this regard.'' \14\ However, the Council did find the time
to hold 3 special sessions on Israel and pass 10 resolutions condemning
Israel and another 4 decisions on Israel's human rights record.\15\
More than 70 percent of the Council's country-specific resolutions and
decisions have focused on Israel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ U.N. Human Rights Council, ``Decision 1/115: Darfur,''
November 28, 2006, at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/decisions/A-
HRC-DEC-2-115.doc (May 24, 2007), and ``Decision S-4/101: Situation of
Human Rights in Darfur,'' December 13, 2006, at www.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/hrCouncil/specialsession/4/docs/Dec_S_4_101_en.doc (May 24,
2007).
\15\ Eye on the UN, ``Statistics on the UN Human Rights Council's
First Year of Operation June 2006-June 2007,''EyeontheUN.org, at
www.eyeontheun.org/view.asp?l=11&p=330 (July 25, 2007); UN Watch,
``Dawn of a New Era?''; and press release, ``Irregularities, Old Habits
Plague UN Human Rights Council Transition: Canada Ignored, Israel
Censured, Darfur Atrocities Dismissed,'' UN Watch, June 20, 2007, at
www.unwatch.org/site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=
bdKKISNqEmG&b=1316871&ct=3983453 (July 25, 2007).
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Even the discredited Commission had a better record. Over a 40-year
period, only 30 percent of its resolutions condemning specific states
for human rights violations focused on Israel.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ This figure increased over time. In 2005, the commission
adopted four resolutions against Israel and four resolutions against
all other countries. UN Watch, ``Dawn of a New Era?''
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Some of this disappointing performance can be blamed on the
negligible difference in quality between the Council's membership and
the Commission's membership. The situation is aggravated by the shift
in proportional representation of regions. The Commission had greater
representation of Western democracies, while Africa and Asia control a
majority of the Council. This has dramatically increased the influence
of groups like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC). Members of the NAM also held a majority
of seats in the Council's first year. The OIC held 17 seats, more than
the one-third (16 seats) required to call a special session.
Unsurprisingly, both groups have repeatedly used their influence to
attack Israel and to protect abusive states from Council scrutiny.
However, the most frustrating aspect of the Council's first year
has been the reluctance of free, democratic states, including South
Africa and India, to support human rights efforts on the Council. A
U.N. Watch analysis of significant actions taken by the Council during
its first year concluded that only 13 of the Council's 47 members were
net positive contributors to its human rights agenda. Four free
democracies--Indonesia, Mali, Senegal, and South Africa--were among the
countries with the worst record.\17\
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\17\ UN Watch scored 20 ``key actions'' of the HRC in its first
year. The positions taken by countries on these key actions were
assigned a value: 1 point for taking a positive position for human
rights in the HRC, 0 points for taking a neutral position, and -1 point
for taking a negative position. Ibid., pp. 5-8 and 26-27.
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PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
The topic of today's hearing is the prospects for reform of the
Human Rights Council. Based on the past year's record in the Council,
the 2007 membership, and the record of the General Assembly, the
prospects for reform or improvement are dim.
The prospects for improved performance by the Council depend
entirely on the members of the HRC who set and adopt the agenda, rules,
procedures, and resolutions and on the General Assembly that elects the
Council membership and could reform the body in the future.
The resolution creating the Council requires the General Assembly
to review the status of the Council within 5 years, or by 2011.
However, many Member States have clearly indicated that they are
pleased to have a dysfunctional Council and support for strengthening
the body in the General Assembly cannot be counted on.
An illustration of this is the May 2007 election of members to the
Council. The 2007 election marked a regression from 2006.\18\ The
number of ``free'' countries on the Council according to Freedom House
rankings declined, and the number of ``not free'' countries increased.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ The resolution calls for one-third of the HRC to be elected
annually. The 47 members elected in 2006 were randomly assigned terms
of 1, 2, or 3 years to set the stage for this process. Each member
elected in 2007 will hold its term for the full 3 years. For a list of
members and their terms, see U.N. Human Rights Council, ``Membership of
the Human Rights Council,'' at www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrCouncil/
membership.htm (May 24, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The only significant victory was blocking Belarus from winning a
seat. Yet until about a week before the election, Belarus and Slovenia
were the only two candidates for the two open Eastern European seats.
Only enormous pressure from human rights groups and the United States
persuaded Bosnia and Herzegovina to run, narrowly denying Belarus a
seat on the Council.\19\ However, Angola, Egypt, Qatar, and Bolivia--
states with dismal human rights records--were elected easily.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ According to one news report, Bosnia and Herzegovina decided
to run only after the U.S. strongly implied to other European countries
that the U.S. would run for a Council seat next year if Belarus did not
win a seat. If true, this is a perverse and shortsighted strategy that
would undermine America's principled position not to run for a seat
until the Council proves its merit in return for only a one-time defeat
of Belarus. Maggie Farley, ``U.S. Appears Willing to Joint U.N. Human
Rights Panel,'' Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2007, at www.latimes.com/
news/printedition/asection/la-fg-rights18may18,1,2886241.story (May 24,
2007).
\20\ See Anne Bayefsky, ``The Oppressors' Club,'' National Review,
May 18, 2007, at http://article.nationalreview.com/
?q=NDM2NTQ2ODZmNDU3MTA2ZTBiNDFiNGExZWRjMWM2YjQ (May 24, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An additional concern is that, unlike the robust competition for
seats in the 2006 election, only two regions--Eastern European States
and the Western Europe and Other States--offered more candidates than
the number of available seats in the 2007 election.\21\ The decision of
the African, Asian, and Latin American and Caribbean regions to offer
only enough candidates to fill their open seats marked a disturbing
return to the practices of the Commission and defeated the purpose of
competitive elections in the General Assembly, which were supposed to
offer a larger choice of possible candidates in order to select the
best possible members for the Council.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ For a list of the candidates for the Human Rights Council in
2007, see U.N. General Assembly, ``Human Rights Council Election.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nor do the Council members seem inclined to strengthen the body. On
the contrary, the Council made a series of decisions in its 5th session
that significantly weakened its ability to objectively advance and
advocate human rights or fall far short of the expectations of the
United States and most human rights groups.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See Sean McCormack, ``Conclusion of the UN Human Rights
Council's Fifth Session and First Year,'' U.S. Department of State,
June 19, 2007, at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/jun/86802.htm (July
25, 2007); Anne Bayefsky, ``The First Year of the Human Rights Council:
A Human Rights Catastrophe,'' Eye on the UN, at www.eyeontheun.org/
view.asp?l=11&p=334 (July 25, 2007); Human Rights Watch, ``UN: Rights
Council Ends First Year With Much To
Do,'' June 19, 2007, at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/06/18/
global16208.htm (July
25, 2007; and press release, ``Castro and Lukashenko to Celebrate at UN
Human Rights Council,'' UN Watch, June 18, 2007, at www.unwatch.org/
site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=
bdKKISNqEmG&b=1316871&ct=3970325 (July 25, 2007).
Universal Periodic Review. The Council, as required in the
General Assembly resolution creating the body, adopted a
``universal periodic review'' of the human rights situation in
all U.N. Member States. This step is welcome, but the proposed
procedures for the review are very weak and virtually assure a
milquetoast outcome. The review for every country, whether it
is Sweden or Sudan, is limited to 3 hours. The review will be a
country-led process in which the ``country under review shall
be fully involved in the outcome'' and requires the review to
``take into account the level of development and specificities
of countries.'' \23\ Input from nongovernmental organizations
will be minimal. Moreover, reviews will occur every 4 years
regardless of circumstances in the country and only after
exhausting ``all efforts to encourage a state to cooperate with
the UPR mechanism'' would the Council ``address, as
appropriate, cases of persistent noncooperation with the
mechanism.'' \24\ In other words, a genocide or massive
political crackdown could occur in Sudan, China, Venezuela, or
some other country and the Council could wait 4 years or more
before examining whether a country has addressed the human
rights concerns raised during the review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ U.N. Human Rights Council, ``Report to the General Assembly on
the Fifth Session of the Human Rights Council,'' U.N. General Assembly
Document A/HRC/5/L.11, June 18, 2007, p. 5, at www.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/hrCouncil/docs/5session/a_hrc_5_l11.doc (July 25, 2007).
\24\ Ibid, p. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Independent Experts. The Council decided to maintain the
system of independent experts charged with thematic human
rights issues, such as freedom of opinion and expression,
torture, the right to food, but weakened their ability to
investigate and report their findings. Under the new
procedures, a committee appointed by the HRC will appoint these
experts from a roster of ``qualified'' candidates. This process
increases opportunities for the Council to directly pressure
and influence the experts.
New Code of Conduct. Moreover, the experts will be subject
to a new Code of Conduct designed to restrict the independence
of the human rights experts and the sources for their reports.
For instance, experts are required to ``show restraint,
moderation, and discretion'' when implementing their mandate,
avoid using ``unfounded or politically motivated''
communications or ``abusive'' language, and not rely on
``reports disseminated by mass media'' or nongovernmental
organizations or persons unless they are the ``victim of
violations . . . and claim[] to have direct or reliable
knowledge of those violations substantiated by clear
information.'' \25\ These restrictions offer ample
opportunities for countries to dispute, block, and otherwise
criticize reports by experts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Ibid, pp. 49-55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Country-Specific Experts. A majority of the Council sought
to eliminate all experts focused on investigating human rights
abuses in specific countries. The effort failed when European
countries threatened to walkout. However, the Council did
eliminate the experts focused on Belarus and Cuba, despite
extensive evidence of ongoing violations. The Council chose to
maintain experts for Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Liberia, North Korea, Somalia,
and Sudan, but many countries plainly plan to eliminate them in
the near future through a ``review'' process. As with the
thematic experts, the country experts will also have to abide
by the Code of Conduct and will be selected by the committee
appointed by the Council.
Israel. In a disappointing repetition of one of the
Commission's most egregious discriminatory practices, the
Council voted to keep Israel as the sole country assigned a
permanent expert charged with investigating ``the situation of
human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since
1967.'' \26\ While it sounds as if this mandate might cover
possible human rights abuses by Palestinians and Israelis in
the territory, this is not the case. John Dugard, the special
rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied
Palestinian territory, said ``it was understood that his
mandate was limited to investigate human rights violations by
Israelis and not by Palestinians.'' \27\ Moreover, the mandate
is one-sided and presumes Israel's guilt through language on
the duration of this mandate, which extends ``until the end of
the occupation.'' \28\ Unsatisfied with the efforts to condemn
Israel in earlier sessions or with the successful effort to
permanently install a blatantly discriminatory mandate focused
solely on Israel, the Council passed an additional two
resolutions condemning Israel in June.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Human Rights Council, ``Report to the General Assembly on the
Fifth Session of the Human Rights Council,'' p. 41.
\27\ U.N. General Assembly, Department of Public Information,
``Third Committee Approves Draft Resolutions on Human Trafficking,
Literacy, Ageing, Crime Prevention, Kidnapping; Continues Consideration
of Human Rights Issues,'' General Assembly Document GA/SHC/3858,
October 19, 2006, at http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/
eed216406b50bf6485256ce10072f637/b5567a93f841d5b28525720d00737d57 (July
25, 2007.)
\28\ Human Rights Council, ``Report to the General Assembly on the
Fifth Session of the Human Rights Council,'' p. 38.
\29\ Press release, ``Human Rights Council Adopts Three Resolutions
on Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territory and Darfur,'' U.N. Human
Rights Council, June 20, 2007, at www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/
view01/04C68E89E3B992D7C1257300004D2901 (July 25, 2007).
As summarized by the U.S. Department of State, these institution-
building procedures are ``seriously flawed'' and will make the many
problems of the Council ``even worse, by terminating the mandates of
the U.N. Rapporteurs on the Governments of Cuba and Belarus, two of the
world's most active perpetrators of serious human rights violations,
and singling out Israel as the only country subject to a permanent
agenda item.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Sean McCormack, ``Conclusion of the UN Human Rights Council's
Fifth Session and First Year.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some have suggested that the performance of the Council would be
improved if the United States had been a member of the Council or could
be improved if the United States sought a seat on the Council in the
future. This is very unlikely. Winning a seat on the Council would not
necessarily give the United States greater voice or influence. Any U.N.
Member State can comment on and speak to issues before the Council, and
the United States has frequently expressed its support of or opposition
to various resolutions and decisions.
Because membership is based on geographic representation, even if
the United States won a seat on the Council, it would simply displace
one of the seven countries representing the Western Europe and Other
States region, which already vote largely as the United States would
vote. In numerous votes over the past year, the Council has adopted
resolutions over the objection of 11 or 12 Western nations.\31\ U.S.
membership on the Council would not change this situation. The gain
from a U.S. vote on the Council would be marginal at best.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ For instance, the July resolution on Israel and Palestine
passed by a vote of 29 to 11 with five abstentions, the August decision
on the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon passed by a vote of 27 to
11 with 8 abstentions, and the November decision on Darfur passed by a
vote of 25 to 11 with 10 abstentions. Canada, the Czech Republic,
Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Ukraine,
and the United Kingdom voted against these resolutions. Switzerland and
Japan voted for at least one. Press release, ``Human Rights Council
Decides to Dispatch Urgent Fact-Finding Mission to the Occupied
Palestinian Territories,'' U.N. Human Rights Council, July 6, 2006, at
www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/
6382E27860145DA7C12571A3004D1F19 (May 24, 2007); press release,
``Second Special Session of Human Rights Council Decides to Establish
High-Level Inquiry Commission for Lebanon,'' U.N. Human Rights Council,
August 11, 2006, at www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/
(httpNewsByYear_en)/F16C6E9AE98880A0C12571C700379F8C (May 24, 2007);
and press release, ``Human Rights Council Notes with Concern Serious
Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation in Darfur,'' November 28, 2006,
at www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/
62C6B3F928618CCEC12572340046C4BB (May 24, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, the U.S. experience over the past year would likely mirror
that of Canada. Over the past year, Canada has assumed the traditional
U.S. role of raising controversial resolutions and demanding votes.
Canada's admirable actions have not been successful. On the contrary,
they have resulted in retaliation and--in one remarkable instance--
blatant and willful distortion of the record when the HRC declared that
the new procedures were adopted by consensus despite Canada's
insistence that it never gave its consent or even received a copy of
the resolution text. Bizarrely, the Council voted 46 to 1 that Canada
had indeed agreed to the consensus.\32\ As noted by the United States,
the procedural maneuvers to obtain consensus on the resolution violated
both the spirit and letter of the rules of the Council: ``We are
concerned about the procedural irregularities employed last night
denying Council members the opportunity to vote on this agenda. The
Human Rights Council was intended to be the world's leading human
rights protection mechanism. Its proceedings should be a model of
fairness and transparency. Instead, in the interest of political
expediency, procedural irregularities denied members the right to an
up-or-down vote on principled human rights concerns--a right guaranteed
by the rules of the institution.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ UN Watch, ``Consensus Declared--Whether Canada Consented or
Not,'' View From Geneva, June 20, 2007, at www.unwatch.org/site/
c.bdKKISNqEmG/b.1317481/k.96E7/View_From_
Geneva/apps/nl/newsletter2.asp (July 25, 2007).
\33\ Sean McCormack, ``Conclusion of the UN Human Rights Council's
Fifth Session and First Year.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is no reason to expect that the United States would be
treated differently than Canada by the human rights abusers that have
successfully used the Council to undermine human rights rather than
protect them.
CONCLUSION
Hopes that the Human Rights Council would rectify the poor record
of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in holding human rights abusers
to account have proven illusory. The Council ultimately reflects the
quality of its membership. The General Assembly simply did not
incorporate the protections and standards for membership that would
have lead to a more effective body. Predictably, human rights abusers
are running the Council agenda in the same manner they did with the
Commission.
The United States should not be satisfied with the status quo.
Congress and the administration should continue their efforts to
improve the HRC's membership, procedures, mechanisms, and institutions.
However, we must also be realistic in recognizing that most members of
the General Assembly and the Council do not want an effective Council
and that America's best efforts will likely fall short.
As a result, the United States should refuse to lend the Council
the credibility of U.S. membership or the symbolic support of U.S.
contributions until such time as the Council takes its responsibilities
seriously by censuring major human rights abusers, exposing their
reprehensible actions to public scrutiny, and eschewing its
disproportionate focus on Israel.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ The HRC is funded throught the U.N. regular budget, so the
U.S. cannot directly withhold funding. Instead, it could withhold an
amount equal to the U.S. portion of the Council's budget (the U.S. pays
22 percent of the HRC budget estimated at $12.9 million to $14.1
million per biennium, or about $1.5 million per year) from the U.N.
regular budget. This withholding would have little direct effect on the
Council's budget because the withholding would be spread across all
U.N. activities funded through the regular budget, but it would clearly
signal U.S. displeasure with the Council.
Senator Bill Nelson. Did any of you disagree with any of
the other panelists on any of the testimony?
Yes ma'am, Ms. Hicks.
Ms. Hicks. Senator Nelson, I would like to point out, Mr.
Chairman, that the issue of the Universal Periodic Review has
been talked about quite a bit here, and it could either be the
worst thing to happen or the best thing to happen based on some
of the views expressed.
My colleague from the Heritage Foundation talked about the
fact that the text virtually assures a Milquetoast outcome and
that the input from NGOs in process will be minimal. Neither of
those statements, in my view, is correct.
First, a Milquetoast outcome is assured only if states like
the United States and allies at the U.N. Human Rights Council
do not engage actively in making this process work. The terms
of reference for this process are sufficient for a real
outcome. And as a human rights group, I have to tell you that
we're very excited about the fact that there will be a chance
for every country to be put under the spotlight in this way.
The process gives NGOs equal access, basically, by allowing a
10-page summary of their input to be made the same way that the
HRC will have a 10-page summary from the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights of U.N. information. So it's a
fair process.
Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you think the universal periodic
review can be a deterrent on the abuses if the United States is
an active participant?
Ms. Hicks. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
No country likes to have its human rights record review,
and our experience has been that when human rights reviews of
that sort happen, states take action. They often adopt
legislation, they release prisoners, they move things on the
ground for human rights. This may not, as I said earlier, be as
satisfying as a condemnatory resolution, but it can be a
process that can change the reality on the ground.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Melia.
Mr. Melia. I would agree with Ms. Hicks, that there's
potential for the universal review to be meaningful and for it
to be, at least, one chance, one bite at the apple, for some of
these countries that won't otherwise be subjected to scrutiny.
I'm not sure that it's a good use of the limited time and
resources of the Council to do it on every country in the
world, however. I do not think the world needs an extensive
review of Finland and Iceland and Costa Rica and some of these
other countries. We really need to have the Council focus on
the problem places in the world. And it is not a mystery which
places those are.
So, there's potential value to the Universal Review. I
think it's--we're concerned it's going to divert resources that
could be better spent otherwise. But most importantly, it
depends on what kind of review it is and how we and others take
advantage of this opening to do some of these reviews.
Senator Bill Nelson. Does the observer status of the United
States hinder its opportunity to work with NGOs?
Mr. Schaefer. In my opinion, it does not. The United States
has a very strong presence in Geneva. It works closely with the
Council. It works closely with other Member States that have
seats on the Council and regularly offers comment on
resolutions, decisions, and matters before the Council. It
engages frequently with NGOs. In fact, I was just at the
session this past March and I witnessed the negotiations
between the U.S. delegation and the various NGOs that were
present that day. They were extensive and continuous throughout
the day. In fact, they continued through virtually the entire
discussion. The United States worked with them very closely and
it continues to do so.
Ms. Hicks. Could I comment on that as well?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I'm probably the only
person in the room who has actually attended the last four
sessions of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, so I have a
good sense of the U.S. role there. It certainly has been able
to engage and has done so in a constructive fashion with NGOs
and otherwise.
But, anyone who has visited there as well, would repeat the
refrain from our allies, that they need the United States at
the table. Observer status is not enough. We simply do not have
the influence we would if we were a voting member of the
Council. And our U.S. leadership can play an important role.
That is something you hear routinely from allies in Latin
America and in Europe.
When you look at the decision of the United States, for
example, not to run for a seat on the Council, this was a
question that was asked routinely in Geneva. The U.S. decision
was a grave disappointment and, I think, set back the efforts
of the U.S. delegation to do its job. When that decision came
through, people in Geneva questioned, ``Well, if you're not
willing to even run for a seat, what do your opinions matter in
the context of this body?'' raising an understandable concern
in my view.
Senator Bill Nelson. Did the United States think that it
wasn't going to get elected? Is that why it didn't run?
Ms. Hicks. That's not the stated reason for the U.S.
decision not to run. They've said that they haven't run because
of the lack of credibility of the body. But in fact, of course,
by being at the table, they have a greater propensity to affect
the credibility and effectiveness of the Council.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do either of the two of you disagree
with that?
Mr. Schaefer. I have no idea whether the United States
would have won a seat or not, if it sought one. I do know that
it would have been a difficult process to get the number of
votes necessary to win a seat. I think that the United States
wisely chose to focus its efforts on, in the past case of
electing Bosnia and Herzegovina over Belarus, trying to get
better membership on the Council rather than getting itself
elected.
If you take a look at the Western European and Others
group, you have European countries that largely share the U.S.
values and vote when pressed on those issues, in many cases,
the way the United States would. Instead of trying to replace
one of those countries, which would have had a marginal affect
on the outcome of votes, it instead focused on preventing
countries like Belarus from being elected.
I think this has a much stronger effect overall on the
membership of the Council, even though it's still an uphill
battle.
The number of members who regularly supported strong
prohuman rights resolutions over the past year on the Council
was, unfortunately, small. It's about 13 countries. Thirteen
countries out of 47 countries is about 28 percent of the
Council. Senator, if you can imagine yourself as part of a 28-
Member minority in the Senate. Ask yourself, how effective
could you be? How strongly could you advocate your positions,
and how successful would you be in advancing those positions?
And that's exactly the situation that the United States and
other like-minded countries face in the Council. Considering
the regional allocation of the seats on the Council and the
unwillingness of developing world democracies like India and
South Africa to support human rights and stand by those
principals, instead yielding to pressures from the regional
voting blocks, the situation's not going to change in the
future, regardless of whether the United States is on the
Council or not.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Melia.
Mr. Melia. The challenge the United States faces is
precisely that of being in the minority position. I guess it
depends on what your disposition would be to how to address
being in the minority. Would you walk away if you're in the 20-
percent minority in the legislative body? Would you not show up
or would you use your seat at the table to make statements,
define your position, create a position that others could
gravitate toward in the future? That's what we need to be doing
at the U.N. Human Right Council.
There's been discussion about the symbolism attached to
potentially withholding some dues to the United Nations. Well,
there's some symbolism attached to being present at the table.
You have to play to win. If you want to build a political
movement, if you want to build a larger coalition, you have to
be engaged in it, you have to be visible, articulating the
standards to which you want others to repair. And that's what
the United States has not done adequately.
I think there has been some vigorous diplomacy by this
administration. Ms. Silverberg and her colleagues, Mark Lagon
and Barry Lowenkron and Erica Barks-Ruggles, they have done
what they were talking about. They have gone to capitals. But
they have to go to more capitals and they have to really make
it part of our bilateral relationship with that second tier of
democracies; not just with the Western Europeans who are always
going to vote right. We need the Western Europeans to use their
influence with other democracies. We need them to use their
influence in Latin America and Africa. We haven't done that
yet; we haven't really stepped up our diplomacy to really try
to build a coalition that is a minority's only chance to build
a majority.
Mr. Schaefer. Mr. Chairman, look back at the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights. The United States was a paying
member of the Commission for decades. The United States worked
hard in the Commission to make it work. The United States
worked hard to get various resolutions and country-specific
mandates passed in the Commission. Yet, the Commission was
condemned by Secretary General Kofi Annan as a discredited
institution that cast a shadow on the United Nations system as
whole.
Simply being at the table and being part of the process
isn't enough. It's not enough to overcome the entrenched
resistance by a number of Member States that simply seek to use
that institution to block scrutiny of themselves and to use it
as a platform for attacking Israel and other countries. That is
the situation that we're dealing with and simply having the
United States at the table is not going to change that.
I do agree that the United States needs to continue to
press to try and make the institution better, but we need to
deal in reality and the reality is that the numbers are stacked
against the United States and like-minded states in the
Council.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well Mr. Schaefer, do you agree that
the present course where the Council is condemning Israel, but
is doing nothing about atrocities in Lebanon or, and the
atrocities in the Sudan. Do you think that that's out of
kilter?
Mr. Schaefer. Absolutely.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Well, then does the United
States get engaged? In what way, Mr. Schaefer, since you don't
think that it makes any difference for the United States to be
a member of the Council? What do you think about the observer
status?
Mr. Schaefer. I think that the United States should
continue to press for good resolutions. The United States
should continue to support good Member States for seats on the
Council and should try and make the Council better. But that
doesn't mean that it should seek to be elected to what has
turned out to be an illegitimate and utterly ineffective
organization for preserving, protecting, and advancing human
rights. The U.S. membership on the Council is something that
many states desperately want and it's one of the cards that we
can play by saying, ``If you live up to the standards for the
Council that are in the resolution creating this institution,
at that point the United States would join this institution.
And it will not join it until it meets those standards.''
You're setting a threshold for behavior and you're setting a
standard--a principle. And at that point, if the Council lives
up to that standard, then it should seek a seat.
Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Hicks.
Ms. Hicks. Mr. Chairman, I'm surprised by the skepticism by
my colleague from the Heritage Foundation about the numbers
within the Human Rights Council. If we use the same numbers
that my colleagues have used and look to the Freedom House
analysis, 55 percent of the Council are countries that are
considered free. Seventy-six percent are members of the
Community of Democracies. Now, of course those states don't
always vote the right way at the Council, but to say that we're
in a minority and that we can't get anything done at the
Council simply belies the numbers. There is a working majority.
We saw it take action, actually, on Sudan and Darfur, and it
can be used--as it was with Belarus at the General Assembly--if
the United States and other countries were to make it so.
And turning to the HRC elections, which both of my
colleagues have referred to, the United States worked and made
sure that Belarus didn't get elected. But at the same time, the
Latin America slate had room for two countries, and those two
slots were taken up by Nicaragua and Bolivia. Surely the United
States has enough influence in that region of the world to work
with its allies, to put forward a better slate of candidates.
The same can be said for Africa where, as has already been
noted, Egypt and Angola were among the countries elected. We
can work with human rights supporters in Africa, we can improve
the membership, and we can get things accomplished even with
the membership as it currently exists.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I want to thank you all for your
participation. We are going to continue to shine the light on
this matter because something isn't right. And we've talked a
lot about process and membership and the degree of
participation and all of that, but underlying all of this is
that something's not running right. And we've got to get it
right. For a country that values the rights of humans being
upheld, we can do no less.
I'm very grateful to you for your participation today. I
apologize for the interruption, but that is an occupational
hazard around here. When we vote, we vote, and you have to go
vote.
So thank you and the meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Norm Coleman, U.S. Senator From Minnesota
Last year, a call for reform led the United Nations to replace the
discredited Human Rights Commission, which had included the likes of
Libya and Sudan as members, with a new Human Rights Council. The Human
Rights Council celebrated its 1-year anniversary last week, but
unfortunately this anniversary was nothing to celebrate. Despite
concerns about the structure of the new Council when it began
operating, no one anticipated that within 1 year it would be possible
to gut the intended agenda of the Council and make a mockery of its
stated purpose on the scale that the Human Rights Council has managed
to do.
In short, after five regular sessions and four special sessions,
the Council has proved that it is nothing more than a platform to
launch vitriolic attacks against one country--Israel. Despite the fact
that the Human Rights Council is tasked with monitoring the human
rights situation of all 192 members of the U.N., the only country that
has been directly condemned through country-specific resolutions is
Israel--which has been subject to nine resolutions, or 75 percent of
all resolutions passed by the Council. In keeping with this selective
focus, the Council has called three special sessions--which are
intended only to address the most egregious and urgent human rights
situations--on Israel. And for anyone that remains unconvinced about
the blatant bias of the Council, when the decisions were adopted last
week on the governing rules of the ``Program of Work'' were established
with only one country-specific agenda item--the human rights violations
of Israel in the Palestinian territories. The sad irony was that this
decision was adopted while Hamas carried out murderous attacks against
fellow Palestinians in Gaza.
Only three noncondemnatory measures were adopted last year on the
human rights situation in Sudan despite its perpetration of a genocide,
and beyond that there was zero consideration of human rights in all of
the remaining 190 U.N. Member States. In its annual report of the state
of freedom in the world, Freedom House lists 19 of the ``worst of the
worst'' human rights violators, none of which were given any
consideration by the Council except for the feckless gestures passed on
Sudan. In other words, the response of the Council to the state-
sponsored brutality in countries such as North Korea, Burma, Zimbabwe,
and Belarus was a deafening silence.
The truth is that members of the Council are too busy trying to
protect themselves from criticism for their own human rights abuses and
taking political shots at Israel. And they are succeeding--this past
week when the governing rules were passed, the mandates of the special
rapporteurs for human rights in Cuba and Belarus were eliminated. This
should come as no surprise when there are not even minimal requirements
for democracy or respect for human rights to run for membership on the
Council. Predictably, less than half of the states on the 47-member
Council qualify as free democracies and current members include
countries like Cuba, Azerbaijan, Angola, and Saudi Arabia.
I could go on and on about the outrages of the Human Rights
Council, but I think the point has been made. At the very least, the
performance of this Council has been a profound disappointment and I
believe this body must make a statement to that effect. That is why I
introduced a bill that prohibits U.S. funding to support the U.N. Human
Rights Council, S. 1698. I would note that this bill does not cut off
U.S. contributions to the U.N., but it makes it U.S. policy that the
contributions we give to the U.N. are not to be used for supporting the
Council. I would urge my colleagues to join me in expressing their
disappointment with the Council by supporting this bill.
Thank you very much.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Kristen Silverberg to Questions
Submitted by Senator Russell Feingold
Question. It appears that the administration is continuing to
refrain from engaging with the U.N. Human Rights Council (Council). We
all know that it is not working well. What is the administration's
strategy for improving the Council, or--failing that--working toward
the development of an alternative structure to address the issues the
Council has not addressed?
Answer. The United States has been actively engaged in the
Council's first year. We have not yet made any formal decisions on our
participation with the Council. We are concerned about the Council's
performance and are discussing ways to strengthen human rights through
other fora. We continue to look for ways to positively affect
developments in the Council and hope to see an improvement in its
outcomes.
We intend to continue our work on human rights matters in a variety
of fora, including the U.N. General Assembly's Third Committee, the
Security Council, when appropriate, other U.N. bodies, and in regional
organizations. We will continue to provide support for technical
assistance to promote human rights and democracy through the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, the U.N. Democracy Fund, U.N. bodies,
regional organizations, and by our direct support for civil society
initiatives around the world.
We are focusing our efforts to achieve our human rights goals in
venues other than the Council and in which we can make a measurable
difference on the ground and bring attention to the world's most
pressing human rights concerns.
Question. Seventy-seven percent of the new Council members belong
to the Community of Democracies, but they tend not to vote as a group.
Human rights advocates have said that the United States is the only
government that could potentially bring together democratic governments
on the Council to vote in favor of human rights promotion, possibly
with the help of a U.S. Special Envoy to the Council. If you agree,
what is the rationale for not being more engaged with the Council?
Answer. In the Council's first year, despite intensive diplomatic
efforts by the United States, the Human Rights Council fell back into
some of the unfortunate patterns of its predecessor, the Human Rights
Commission, including making decisions based on regional group or other
bloc loyalties rather than on the merits of promoting and protecting
rights.
We have worked hard to try to encourage all members of the Council
to be committed to protecting and promoting human rights--both
domestically and internationally. Weaknesses in the resolution
establishing the Council, including its failure to include any
prohibition on membership in the Council by states that systematically
abuse the rights of their people, is one of the reasons why we voted
against the resolution. While 77 percent of the HRC members belong to
the Community of Democracies, there remains a substantial portion that
do not. We are actively supporting the Community of Democracies, and
are working to strengthen its capacity to work as a caucus in
multilateral fora.
Question. In accordance with the General Assembly resolution
establishing the Council, when electing members of the Council,
countries are supposed to be reviewed under the Universal Periodic
Review mechanism during their term. How many Council members have
undergone a review of their own human rights record?
Answer. The working guidelines for the Universal Periodic Review
process are still under development and will probably be formalized
within the next year. Thus far, no country has yet had its human rights
record reviewed.