[Senate Hearing 110-205]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-205
NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC POLICY OPTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 21, 2007
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN CORNYN, Texas
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Replublican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Nuclear and Strategic Policy Options
march 21, 2007
Page
Drell, Sidney D., Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Professor
Emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford
University..................................................... 5
Payne, Keith B., Professor and Department Head, Graduate
Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State
University..................................................... 54
Gallucci, Robert L., Dean, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service, Georgetown University................................. 76
(iii)
NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC POLICY OPTIONS
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:37 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Reed, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Sessions, and Thune.
Committee staff member present: John H. Quirk V, security
clerk.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; Jill L. Simodejka, research assistant; Robert M.
Soofer, professional staff member; and Kristine L. Svinicki,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Jessica L.
Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple and Caroline Tess,
assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; and Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator
Thune.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Bill Nelson. Good morning, and thank you all for
coming. You all are specialists in the area that we want to
examine.
Dr. Drell, I want to particularly thank you for coming all
the way from California to be with us.
Dr. Drell, Dean Gallucci, and Dr. Payne, you all have
prepared statements. We're going to put them in the record, and
I'm going to ask if you all would just talk to us. That'll save
a lot of time and we can have a conversation.
We are here today for a much-needed discussion on nuclear
and strategic policy. We are on the verge of several key
decisions with respect to nuclear weapons and the nuclear
weapons complex, and it's going to have a huge impact on the
direction that our country is going to take.
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was the
last nuclear weapons treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, is going to expire in 2009 unless both sides agree to
extend all or part of it. It's been 15 years since the end of
the Cold War, and the executive branch is now proposing to
begin a new nuclear warhead program and to consolidate and
modernize the nuclear weapons complex. So, it's time for us to
have new ideas and to ask, do we need to modernize? If so, how
and by how many?
[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
Good Morning. I would like to welcome our witnesses this morning. I
would also like to thank you all for being here this morning. None of
you are government witnesses and as a result you are all volunteers
taking time out of your real jobs to share your thoughts with us. Dr.
Drell, I particularly want to thank you for coming from California to
be here this morning.
Dr. Drell, Dean Gallucci, and Dr. Payne, I know that you all have
prepared statements and Dr. Drell, you have an article that you would
like included in the record, and without objection we will include
those documents. Dr. Payne, in your prepared statement you mentioned
that you also had an article that you would like included in the
record. If you have a copy of that article, we would be happy to
include that as well.
We are here today to have a long delayed, but much needed
discussion on nuclear and strategic policy. The United States is on the
verge of several key decisions with respect to nuclear weapons and the
nuclear weapons complex, which will have an impact for many years to
come.
Today we stand at something of a crossroad. The Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty, the last nuclear weapons treaty between the United
States and the Soviet Union, now Russia, will expire in 2009, unless
both sides agree to extend all or part of that treaty. It has been more
than 15 years since the end of the Cold War, and the executive branch
for the first time since then is proposing to begin a new nuclear
warhead program, and to consolidate and modernize the nuclear weapons
complex.
It is time to start afresh and ask what are nuclear weapons for and
how many is enough?
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions, any opening
comments?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do think you're correct. I do believe that we're in a
different strategic situation than we were during the Cold War,
and we're making some decisions--some of those are being
executed today--about our capacity and strategic weaponry. So,
we need to continue to work on that.
We used to think of strategic weapons as silo-based
missiles, submarines, and B-52 bombers, and the nuclear weapons
they contained. Today, those strategic forces must not only be
thought of as nuclear in capability, I believe, but as a broad
array of capabilities intended to deal with today's new
threats, which tend to be unpredictable, politically
undeterrable, sometimes, and extremely violent.
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) established a
conceptual framework for today's strategic posture. That new
posture is predicated on the belief that deterrence concepts
and force structure of the Cold War must now be tailored to fit
the reality of today's strategic environment.
While the NPR recognized that our new relationship with the
former Soviet Union made possible a significant reduction in
the size of our nuclear arsenal, it also pointed out the need
to bolster our strategic capabilities by adding conventional
strike forces, missile defenses, and responsive nuclear
infrastructure.
So, I would just conclude and note that, by the time we
achieve compliance with our Moscow Treaty obligations in 2012,
we will have the smallest nuclear stockpile we've had since the
Eisenhower administration. I'll be interested to learn from our
witnesses whether or not they believe our current strategic
posture of reducing weapons has caused aggressive states to
reduce or delay implementing their own nuclear program, and how
the reality is perceived out there, how the world is actually
acting, in a real way, to our actions.
So, Mr. Chairman, this is a time for a good, thoughtful
discussion. We have a good panel, and I look forward to it.
[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Jeff Sessions
We meet today to receive testimony from Dr. Keith Payne. Dr. Sidney
Drell, and Ambassador Robert Gallucci on the future of United States
Strategic Policy. During the Cold War, the term ``strategic forces''
almost always meant silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range B-52 bombers--all
armed with nuclear weapons. The purpose of these forces was to help
contain the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and, ultimately, to deter
Soviet nuclear weapons use against the United States and its allies.
Today, however, strategic forces must no longer be thought of only
as nuclear deterrents, but as a broad array of capabilities intended to
deal with today's new threats--which tend to be unpredictable,
potentially undeterable, and extremely violent. If the Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact threat helped define both the mission and the force
structure of our Cold War strategic capabilities, what are the central
new threats to the United States and its allies that should help guide
today's strategic forces? It's a reasonable question to ask, because
without a clear understanding of the nature of the strategic threats we
face, we risk sustaining or building strategic capabilities that will
not serve us well, if at all.
NEW STRATEGIC THREATS
Arguably, the preeminent threat today is terrorism--fostered by
violent Islamic radicalism--followed closely by the ongoing development
of dangerous weapons and delivery systems by states that either support
this ideological movement or believe they can benefit from the
disruption to regional or global stability caused by these extremists.
These new, unprecedented threats to the United States are further
complicated by the concern that we are just not certain whether
traditional deterrence strategies will work against these potential
enemies. Will the threat of punishment make a terrorist think twice?
Can we stop a rogue state from blackmailing us if they are, ultimately,
able to strike us--or our allies--with nuclear weapons? The point is,
we need to plan as if deterrence will not work, and therefore acquire
strategic capabilities able to eliminate these threats before they can
be used against us--or defend against those threats should deterrence
fail.
This was the logic of the Bush administration's 2001 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) which, while recognizing that nuclear forces
remain a bedrock of our deterrence capabilities, emphasized the
importance of improving our ability to counter post-Cold War threats
by, among other things, adding conventional strike capabilities and
missile defense to our arsenal of ``strategic capabilities.'' The NPR
also mandated significant reductions in the level of U.S. nuclear
warheads down to 1,700-2,200. By the time we achieve compliance with
our Moscow Treaty obligations in 2012, we will have the smallest
nuclear stockpile we have had since the Eisenhower administration.
PROMPT CONVENTIONAL LONG-RANGE STRIKE
The ability to hold at risk high value targets in the war against
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction caches, and mobile ballistic
missile launchers is a capability any commander in chief should want to
have in this day and age. We might be able to interdict these types of
threats with covert operatives, strike aircraft, or cruise missiles,
but this assumes we have the necessary forces in place and that they
can reach the target in time. What if this were not the case, or the
target was heavily defended? Wouldn't we want the capability to strike
this target from afar using a non-nuclear weapon that would reach the
target in hours, rather than days? Long-range prompt conventional
strike capabilities also could be used early in a crisis or conflict to
deter aggression, or stop aggressors in their tracks until other forces
can be brought to bear. Non-nuclear strategic forces could be
particularly useful for demonstrating U.S. and allied resolve during a
crisis, and thereby act as a deterrent to further escalation.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Recent ballistic missile testing by North Korea and Iran, coupled
with the use of over 4,000 short-range rockets by Hezbollah against
Israel, suggests that unfriendly regimes continue to view ballistic
missiles, and their shorter-range variants, as a means to off-set the
conventional superiority of adversaries--making them potential weapons
of influence, blackmail, and terror.
The U.S. ballistic missile defense program is designed to thwart
this potential terror weapon, and thereby strengthen U.S. diplomatic
and deterrence options for dealing with these new threats to our
security. Over the past 12 months, the United States has demonstrated
through realistic testing the ability to shoot down short-,
medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles using interceptors based on
land and at sea, to include a September 8, 2006, intercept of a long-
range ballistic missile warhead by the ground-based midcourse defense
system. These new missile defense capabilities now contribute to the
mix of policy options available to the President in his conduct of
foreign policy.
This is why U.S. plans to deploy a ground-based midcourse defense
(GMD) site in Europe are so important. By providing protection for NATO
nations on both sides of the Atlantic against long-range ballistic
missiles, plans for a GMD site in Europe support NATO's ongoing
diplomatic efforts to end Iran's nuclear weapons program. Should Iran
nevertheless develop the capability to place nuclear weapons on its
ballistic missiles, NATO will be glad it has in place another means for
deterring this potential threat--and to defend against it should
deterrence fail.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
While we address these emerging threats and develop capabilities in
response, we continue to maintain our current nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, it has become apparent that this work is carried out in
a nuclear weapons complex that is neither responsive in its
capabilities, nor sized appropriately. As we develop, and fund at
significant expense, the scientific tools to understand and certify the
safety and reliability of our legacy weapons in the absence of nuclear
testing, the Nuclear Weapons Council is examining whether limits may
exist in our ability to extend perpetually the life of current
warheads.
Earlier this month, the Council approved a design for a joint
program between the Department of Energy and the U.S. Navy to provide a
replacement warhead for a portion of the Nation's sea-based nuclear
weapons. Although this announcement does not represent a decision to
deploy a replacement warhead, it does mean that the military and
scientific experts charged with the stewardship of our nuclear weapons
are now evaluating whether our current path is sustainable over the
long-term.
The Department of Energy is also evaluating options for the future
of the nuclear weapons infrastructure through its Complex 2030
Environmental Impact Statement. The objective of Complex 2030 is a
nuclear weapons complex that is sized appropriately for the smaller
stockpile of the future and that has the capabilities to support that
stockpile. The evaluation is still in its early stages, but I am
concerned that the options being evaluated will modernize the complex
we have now. I am not yet convinced that the Department of Energy is
genuinely considering the realignment, consolidation, or closure of
facilities that are excess to mission need. I will be pursuing this
issue in other hearings the subcommittee will hold this spring.
CONCLUSION
In closing, I might note that during the Cold War, we built
strategic nuclear forces that we hoped would never be used--because if
they were to be used, we risked unimaginable destruction. Today,
however, while we must maintain nuclear strategic forces that
contribute to deterrence on a daily basis through the fact of their
existence, we must also build non-nuclear strategic forces that we
surely intend to use, because if we don't use them, it might mean that
an adversary could inflict upon us blows of unimaginable consequences--
perhaps far worse than the events of September 11.
I look forward to hearing the views of our witnesses on these and
other important strategic forces issues.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. I would say to my colleagues,
I'm going to defer my questions until the end, so that you all
can have a chance to have your questions.
Dr. Drell, why don't you start first, and then Dr. Payne
and Dean Gallucci.
Dr. Drell?
STATEMENT OF SIDNEY D. DRELL, SENIOR FELLOW, HOOVER
INSTITUTION, PROFESSOR EMERITUS, STANFORD LINEAR ACCELERATOR
CENTER, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Dr. Drell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senators, for the
opportunity to be here.
We are here, in my mind, at a dangerous time. I view us on
the precipice of entering a new and more dangerous nuclear era,
with the spread of technology, which means that, in particular,
the enrichment of uranium, which makes it possible for more
societies to enter the nuclear club and that raises a danger of
nuclear weapons getting in the hands of terrorist groups,
others unrestrained by the norms of civilized behavior, as we
know it; and, therefore, these weapons become more likely to be
used.
I think that, in these circumstances, reliance on nuclear
weapons for deterrence--which was so essential during the Cold
War--is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly
effective as the prospect of proliferation of nuclear weapons
grows increasingly ominous.
In terms of the size of the stockpile, we still have, as a
result of the START, although the Cold War has ended, something
like 5,000 nuclear warheads in each of our arsenals, the United
States and Russia, with approximately--close to, anyway--2,000
on ballistic missiles, many on prompt-launch procedures, which
present risks of accidental or unauthorized launch. Why we're
retaining such a force of that type is not clear to me.
I see this situation as presenting us with two major
challenges. The first one is the immediate one, to develop a
strategy to try and head off the loss of the nonproliferation
regime, and to save the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The
longer-term one is perhaps fanciful, but, I believe, important,
and that is to try to rekindle the vision, the bold vision, of
Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev when they came to their
remarkable summit at Reykjavik in 1986 to seek to rid the world
of nuclear weapons and to escape from the nuclear deterrence
trap. As far as the immediate problem, and preserving the NPT
in force since 1970, this requires supplementing that treaty
with intrusive inspection measures so that we can make sure of
compliance with its provisions.
Important agreements have been reached in this regard, and
we're trying to bring into practice things like the additional
protocols and the Proliferation Security Initiative to monitor
these kinds of actions. I think it's also true to say that the
nuclear weapons states, as we seek these more intrusive
measures, have to be careful to offer incentives and to show
restraints in our own programs to the non-nuclear countries
with whom we need to cooperate in order to have an effective
inspection regime and enforcement of the NPT.
Now, to my view, the two recent proposals by the United
States to build new nuclear weapons were not wise. They were
reviewed, globally, as counter to the efforts to strengthen the
nonproliferation regime. I'm talking about the proposed high-
yield bunker-buster for destroying deeply buried, hardened,
underground targets. The second was the so-called very low-
yield new-concept weapon to destroy deadly biological and
chemical agents in shallow underground bunkers without
dispersing their deadly effect. Fortunately, from my point of
view, both proposals were rejected by Congress after careful
independent analyses showed that their potential military value
was quite limited, and marginal, in fact, and less compelling
than the likely harmful effect that those new programs would
have on the nonproliferation regime and our overall security
thereby.
You are now debating, as you mentioned in your opening
remark, the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program designed
to transform our aging nuclear complex, and also some of the
weapons themselves in the current stockpile. There is, in my
mind, a need to modernize parts of the complex that date back
to World War II, for reasons of safety, efficiency, and
flexibility. As long as the United States has nuclear weapons,
which is likely to be for some time, we do need to be able to
maintain them in our shrinking stockpile, to be safe and
reliable. However, a clear decision on our long-term nuclear
policy, which you alluded to our needing, is needed in order to
decide the appropriate size and scope of that new complex. I
think this does call for a fresh look at the role of nuclear
weapons in our defense planning, and similarly for the
Russians. We are the two countries with more than 90 percent of
the nuclear weapons in the world. We are formally, now,
declared to be allies against terrorism, the new threat we both
face, and not adversaries, as we were in the Cold War.
On this point of a new look, former Ambassador James Goodby
and I analyzed this question of, ``what are nuclear weapons
for?'' in a report of that same title, which I have submitted
for the record of these hearings. We considered present and
prospective threats, and concluded that the strategic arsenal
required by the United States can be reduced considerably to
smaller numbers, carefully assuming that the Russians come down
in a similar way that we do. In fact, as a first step, we
recommended reducing our force structure to 500 operationally-
deployed nuclear warheads, plus 500 in a responsive force. I
can go into the details of that in the conversation. But this
is a cooperative venture on both sides.
Turning to the other part of the RRW, and that is the
transformation of the weapons, the stated goal of RRW is to
increase confidence in their long-term reliability, safety, and
use control--that's very important--and to do that without
requiring underground explosive tests. That's the legislation.
This presents, to my mind, a daunting technical challenge, to
determine whether design changes or modifications to meet those
ambitious goals can be certified and deployed without
underground explosive testing. I believe that, at present, we
do not know the answer to that question, but I do believe it is
a worthwhile question to try to answer.
I think a sensible approach to it would have three
elements:
The first one is to proceed carefully with research on
proposed changes, subject to independent outside scrutiny, to
determine whether it is possible to build a strong consensus
and confidence that the proposed changes are mutually
compatible and have the appropriate pedigree from our past test
program. It is not a question of changing an individual
component that'll work. It is a question of putting together a
complicated system, and having system reliability.
The second point, I would say, is to recognize there is no
time-pressing urgency in implementing the changes. The legacy
stockpile is strong and reliable, in my judgment. The pace of
the work on RRW should not consume human and budgetary
resources to the extent of savaging the important ongoing,
highly successful stockpile stewardship and life- extension
program.
The third point is to recognize the importance of being
clear about the limited goal of what we intend to do with the
RRW Program, so as to avoid potentially harmful impact on our
nonproliferation goals.
We have to recognize that many non-nuclear weapon states,
whose cooperation we require, remain concerned about the
seriousness of the commitment of nuclear powers to limit their
nuclear efforts, and they are restive under the discriminatory
features of the treaty.
Let me just very briefly close with a remark about--with
the second challenge, or opportunity, that I mentioned, and
that is to rekindle the bold vision that President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik in 1986 to rid
the world of nuclear weapons and escape the deterrence trap.
They came close, with that summit, but they failed. However,
they did succeed in turning the arms race on its head at
Reykjavik. They initiated steps leading to significant
reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear
forces, including the removal of an entire category, the
intermediate nuclear forces, from Europe. To mark that event,
former Secretary of State George Shultz, who was with President
Reagan at Reykjavik, and I organized a conference at Stanford's
Hoover Institution on the 20th anniversary, last October, and
we reviewed the impact of Reykjavik and its relevance for
today's world. We came out with a list of 10 steps, which we
thought were practical, to define a path for accomplishing
progress toward that goal, steps which, in and of themselves,
will help reduce the nuclear danger. Those steps appear in the
Wall Street Journal piece published January 4, with four
headline signatories: Secretary Shultz, former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger, former Defense Secretary William Perry,
and former chairman of this committee, Sam Nunn. I've
introduced that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Dr. Drell. Let me end my short time by saying, I think that
intensive work with leaders of other countries with nuclear
weapons to make this a joint venture would be an important step
forward. The steps themselves, you can read about or we can
discuss. Let me end just by saying that the advantage of having
that vision, reasserting a vision of a world free of nuclear
weapons; and taking practical measures toward achieving the
goal, could have, I believe, a profound positive impact on the
security of future generations. Without that bold vision, the
actions that we recommend, and the steps that one takes to
reduce nuclear danger, will not be perceived as fair or urgent;
they will still be viewed as retaining the discriminatory
nature of the nuclear world as it is now. Also, without the
vision, the actions will not actually be very practically
achieved in any timeframe.
So, thank you for allowing me to express my views.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Drell follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Sidney D. Drell
The existing international regime, grounded in the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) for preventing new nuclear weapon states,
reducing existing nuclear arsenals, and controlling the spread of
nuclear technology and material, is seriously endangered.
The spread of technology, particularly uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing technology for civilian energy, creates the
danger of more states with nuclear arms and fissile material. In turn,
it provides more opportunities for theft or sale to terrorist groups or
other societal units unrestrained by accepted norms of civilized
behavior, thereby increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be
used.
Beyond North Korea and Iran more than 40 nations already have taken
substantial steps forward in nuclear technology. Even more have
indicated interest in developing such technology for civilian power.
Once you can enrich uranium for a civilian power reactor--you are well
on the way. Without a change of course, the United States and the world
soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more
precarious and economically costly than was Cold War deterrence.
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining
international security because they were a means of deterrence. Sixteen
years ago the Cold War ended with the demise of the Soviet Union, and
with it, the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence became
obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many
states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on
nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and
decreasingly effective as the prospect of nuclear proliferation grows
increasingly ominous.
Nevertheless U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles remain bloated. In
2012, more than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
United States and Russia, each, will still have approximately 5,000
nuclear bombs and warheads in their arsenals, close to two thousand of
which will be deployed on ballistic missiles, many on prompt launch
procedures presenting unnecessary risks of an accidental or
unauthorized launch. Why are we still retaining such large nuclear
arsenals as a legacy of the Cold War? What are these weapons for?
This situation presents us with two major challenges--and
opportunities. The first is to develop a strategy for dealing with the
world as it is today, starting with steps to prevent the further spread
of nuclear weapons. The second is to rekindle the bold vision that
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev brought to their
remarkable summit at Reykjavik in 1986: ridding the world of nuclear
weapons and escaping from the nuclear deterrence trap. Although they
failed in the end, they did succeed in turning the arms race on its
head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in
deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the
elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles--the INF
missiles in Europe.
Can we rekindle their vision? Can we escape from the nuclear
deterrence trap before it is too late?
To face the first challenge, and deal with the world as is, we must
save and strengthen the nonproliferation regime based on the NPT of
1970. In view of the continuing spread of nuclear weapons technology,
the NPT will need to be supplemented with intrusive new inspection
rights for monitoring compliance with its provisions and detecting
covert efforts by a would-be proliferator to evade them. Important
agreements have already been reached to bring such provisions into
practice.
It is not necessary to look abroad for challenges to the present
nonproliferation regime. Nonnuclear weapon states repeatedly emphasize
their concerns about the ongoing weapons programs of the nuclear
powers. We are urged to honor the NPT by formalizing the current
moratorium on underground bomb testing into a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT); reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons; and
substantially decreasing their numbers more rapidly. Recent efforts by
Washington to build two new nuclear warheads for new military missions
were viewed widely as counter to global efforts to strengthen the
nonproliferation regime. One new warhead was a high-yield bunker buster
for destroying deeply buried, hardened underground targets, and the
second was a very low yield ``new concept'' weapon to destroy deadly
biological and chemical agents stored in shallow underground bunkers
without dispersing them. Fortunately both proposals were rejected after
several years of debate in Congress. Rejection was based on a judgment
that benefitted from careful independent technical analyses that
concluded their potential military value was marginal and less
compelling than their likely harmful impact on the nonproliferation
regime and U.S. overall national security. It was also a ringing
rejection of the dangerous idea of lowering the threshold for using
nuclear weapons in limited military strikes.
Currently Congress is debating whether or how to proceed with a
Reliable Replacement Warhead Program designed to transform both our
aging nuclear infrastructure and the weapons in our current stockpile.
There is a need to modernize parts of the complex that date back to
World War II for reasons of safety, efficiency, and flexibility. As
long as the United States has nuclear weapons, we need to be able to
maintain the warheads in the shrinking stockpile to be safe and
reliable. But a clear decision on our long-term nuclear policy goals is
needed in order to decide on the appropriate size and scope of the new
complex. This calls for a fresh look at the role of nuclear weapons in
U.S. defense planning. The United States and Russia have now officially
adopted a policy of cooperation against the new threats, faced by both
nations, of terrorists and unstable or irresponsible governments
acquiring nuclear weapons. This replaces the former adversarial
relationship of nuclear deterrence based on mutual based destruction.
As stated in the Joint Declaration of Presidents Bush and Putin of
November 13, 2001: ``The United States and Russia have overcome the
legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other as an enemy
or threat.'' What then are the anticipated missions and targets for the
thousands of nuclear warheads remaining in their arsenals?
Ambassador James Goodby and I analyzed this question of ``What Are
Nuclear Weapons For'' in today's world in a recent report\1\ that I
have submitted for the record. Based on our analysis of the present and
prospective threats that define missions for U.S. nuclear weapons we
conclude that the strategic arsenal required by the United States can
be reduced to considerably lower numbers. We recommend as a first step
reduction to a U.S. force structure of 500 operationally-deployed
nuclear warheads, plus 500 in a responsive force. The United States and
Russia should cooperate to achieve this in the coming decade, engaging
the other nuclear powers for proportionate reductions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ S. Drell and J. Goodby: ``What Are Nuclear Weapons For?''
(Report for the Arms Control Association, April 2005). It is published
on their website and reprinted in ``Nuclear Weapons, Scientists, and
the Post-Cold War Challenge'' by S. Drell (World Scientific Press,
Singapore, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As to the transformation of the weapons with the stated goal to
increase confidence in their long-term reliability, safety, and use
control, we still face a daunting technical challenge to determine
whether new designs to meet those ambitious goals can be certified and
deployed without underground explosive testing. I don't believe that,
at present, we know the answer to that question. But I do believe it is
worthwhile to try to answer. A sensible approach to it should:
1. Proceed carefully with research on modifications or a new design
that meet the stated requirements, before moving ahead to development
and manufacture. Necessary are detailed analyses subject to fully
independent scrutiny to determine whether it is possible to gain
confidence and build a strong consensus that the proposed changes are
mutually compatible and have the appropriate test pedigree from our
previous work. It is not a question of the individual components
working, but of the system--in fact a system of systems--being
reliable.
2. Recognize that there is no pressing urgency in implementing
changes--the legacy stockpile is strong--the pace of the work should
not consume human and budgetary resources to the extent of savaging the
important ongoing and highly successful Stockpile Stewardship and Life
Extension Program.
3. Recognize the importance of being clear about the limited goals
of what we are doing so as to avoid potentially harmful impacts on the
nonproliferation goals of this country and beyond, globally. Concerns
by the many nonnuclear weapon states, whose cooperation we require,
about the seriousness of the commitment of the nuclear powers to limit
their nuclear efforts in accord with the NPT cannot be ignored, denied,
or dismissed as irrelevant. They registered such concerns strongly in
negotiations at the U.N. on continuing the NPT into the indefinite
future, and called on the nuclear powers to restrain their nuclear
programs and ratify a CTBT.
An important action to address these concerns would be a commitment
by the United States to face the second challenge: to rekindle the
vision of Reykjavik and develop a strategy to achieve it. This was
addressed at a conference that George Shultz, who participated at
Reykjavik as President Reagan's Secretary of State, and I organized at
Stanford University's Hoover Institution this past October marking the
20th anniversary of that remarkable summit. Ever since Hiroshima at the
dawn of the nuclear era a number of studies and conferences have
addressed the challenge of ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
Renewed interest in achieving this goal has been generated by the
realization that the world is approaching the precipice of the new and
even more dangerous nuclear era with the spread of nuclear technology
that is threatening the nonproliferation regime. Moreover at present we
lack a global strategy and vision commensurate with the tremendous
dangers ahead.
At the Stanford/Hoover Conference we reviewed the impact of
Reykjavik and its relevance for today's world. We formulated what we
considered a set of practical steps to define a path for accomplishing
the goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. Our conclusions and
recommendations were summarized in a recent article that appeared in
the Wall Street Journal \2\ on January 4, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``A World Free of Nuclear Weapons'' signed by George Shultz,
William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, and endorsed by the
conference participants who also signed on.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First and foremost, intensive work with leaders of the countries in
possession of nuclear weapons will be required to turn the goal of a
world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise, and create a
working mechanism for accomplishing this goal. Such a joint enterprise
would lend additional weight to efforts already under way to avoid the
emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran.
Specific actions were also proposed:
Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear
weapons to increase warning time and thereby reduce the danger
of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.
Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear
forces in all states that possess them.
Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be
forward-deployed.
Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate,
including understandings to increase confidence and provide for
periodic review, to achieve ratification of the CTBT, taking
advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure
ratification by other key states.
Providing the highest possible standards of security
for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and
highly-enriched uranium everywhere in the world.
Getting control of the uranium enrichment process,
combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear power
reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International
Atomic Energy Agency or other controlled international
reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation
issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing
electricity.
Halting the production of fissile material for weapons
globally; phasing out the use of highly-enriched uranium in
civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from
research facilities around the world and rendering the
materials safe.
Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional
confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear
powers.
Addressing the requirements for effective measures to
impede or counter any nuclear related conduct that is
potentially threatening to the security of any state or
peoples.
Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and
practical measures toward achieving that goal could have a profoundly
positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold
vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without
the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Dr. Drell.
Dr. Payne?
STATEMENT OF KEITH B. PAYNE, PROFESSOR AND DEPARTMENT HEAD,
GRADUATE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, MISSOURI
STATE UNIVERSITY
Dr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a privilege to be
here this morning, and I thank you for the invitation to speak
here.
I'm happy to shorten my prepared statement and enter the
full statement for the record.
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, all of the statements are entered
in the record, so, if you would just talk to us, that would be
great.
Dr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Payne. During the Cold War, deterrence was typically
considered an easy matter, posing a nuclear retaliatory threat
to the Soviet Union and Soviet targets. Unfortunately, today,
most of what we believed we knew about deterrence during the
Cold War is of extremely limited value.
Today, there are no certainties about deterrence. Our
traditional deterrent may not work against opponents who are
willing martyrs, desperate gamblers, incommunicado,
miscalculating, or self-destructive. The painful contemporary
truth, I'm sorry to say, is that confident assertions about how
deterrence will work, and how many forces will ensure
deterrence, are guesses. No one knows whether, or how,
deterrence is going to work across the spectrum of opponents we
now face and the spectrum of contexts in which we now want to
deter.
That particular conclusion doesn't suggest that we discard
deterrence. Far from it. It does, nevertheless, explain why our
deterrence focus needs to change from that of the Cold War with
regard to: to whom is our deterrent directed, how do we deter,
and with what do we try to deter?
In some cases, nonmilitary options may be best for
deterrence. In other cases, conventional, or even nuclear,
threats may be necessary for deterrence. In some cases, we may
simply have opponents, or confront components, who are beyond
deterrence, whatever capability we might bring to the table.
To understand which is the case, we need, first, to
understand the opponent's mindset and behavioral style. I
believe that deterrence now, in this post-Cold War era, is,
first and foremost, a matter of intelligence. It requires a
much more focused and dedicated intelligence effort for this
purpose than was typical in the past. There is simply no
substitute now for trying to understand the specific hows and
whys of opponents' decisionmaking. That's true whether the
opponent is a state leadership or the leadership of a terrorist
organization.
With regard to the deterrence of terrorists--this is an
important new topic--let me note that I strongly disagree with
the common notion that all terrorists are undeterrable. The
historical record on terrorists, anarchists, and other
extremist groups is sufficient for us to conclude that they may
be deterrable, depending on the context and circumstances.
That's all we can say about state leaderships, as well.
What are the implications of this new uncertainty of
deterrence in the post-cold-war period? First, I think, and
foremost, is that defensive capabilities--the ability to limit
damage to the United States, our allies, our friends, and our
forces--takes on a much higher priority. Why? Simply because we
can no longer rely on deterrence working reliably to provide
that protection. A popular line during the Cold War was that
defenses are unnecessary and useless, because our ``assured
destruction'' capability would provide deterrence and perfect
protection. It needs to be recognized now, in the post-Cold War
period, that deterrence can, and probably will at some point,
fail unpredictably, and our only option in that case will be to
defend, as well as possible, our society, our forces, our
friends, and our allies. This is why I believe that various
forms of strategic defensive capability, particularly against
weapons of mass destruction, have become such an important
priority, more so than during the Cold War.
The Bush administration's 2001 NPR sought to assess how the
dramatic geopolitical changes since the Cold War should
transform how we think and how we practice deterrence. I've
included, for the record, a short article on the goals of the
NPR, which, I'm sorry to say, still remains widely
misunderstood. But with regard to nuclear weapons, the NPR
concluded that they, in fact, remain essential to any prudent
approach to deterrence, but that nuclear weapons alone are
unsuited for many of the type of deterrence contingencies that
we are going to confront in the 21st century. Having a broader
array of deterrent threats, particularly including non-nuclear
capabilities, should better enable us to adapt our deterrence
to a whole range of different opponents and contexts.
Consequently, one of the thrusts of the NPR was to reduce our
reliance on nuclear weapons and to place greater reliance and
emphasis on non-nuclear capabilities.
The NPR also concluded that the immediate requirement for
U.S. nuclear weapons could be met with far fewer deployed
nuclear forces, and that the requirement for deployed nuclear
forces may recede further as our advanced conventional forces
mature and as our defenses mature. That conclusion, by the way,
was a basis for the deep reductions of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.
The NPR also focused on the need to assure allies,
particularly through the extended U.S. nuclear umbrella. Most
recently, some very close allies have openly questioned whether
the longstanding U.S. ``nuclear umbrella'' commitment for their
security remains credible and viable. A 2006 study, for
example, led by former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone,
concluded that Japan should study the nuclear issue to be
prepared in the event of tremendous future change. Former Prime
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone noted that Japanese security is
dependent on U.S. nuclear weapons, and that the future of the
U.S. extended nuclear deterrent is uncertain. Such Japanese
concerns are obviously understandable given the North Korean
nuclear and missile programs. I should note that allies and
friends in the Middle East are expressing similar concerns as
Iran moves towards a nuclear capability and expands its missile
arsenal.
What's the implication of that set of circumstances? What's
the significance of that? Well, first, it's to note that our
extended nuclear deterrent is perhaps the most important, and
the least recognized nuclear nonproliferation tool in
existence. To risk understatement, nuclear proliferation will
accelerate dramatically if our close allies continue to lose
confidence in the U.S. extended nuclear guarantee. This point
has been made explicit by Japanese officials in recent
conversations.
As various nuclear reduction and disarmament proposals
emerge, I think we need to be conscious of this continuing
importance of our nuclear forces for extended nuclear
deterrence and, in effect, for nonproliferation.
There are three contemporary strategic programs that I
believe are particularly important for the future of
deterrence, extended deterrence, and the assurance of U.S.
allies. Let me briefly mention these. One is the RRW, which Dr.
Drell has mentioned already. The second program, or set of
programs, are strategic and regional ballistic missile defense
capabilities. The third is a new capability for non-nuclear
prompt global strike.
The RRW Program is intended to provide safety and security
improvements in the nuclear arsenal, provide the potential for
long-term increased confidence without nuclear testing, cost
savings, the potential for long-term cost savings, and to
sustain the U.S. nuclear, technical, and engineering
communities.
Let me add that there is some urgency with regard to this
particular program because as we look at the retirement rate
for people who have been involved in the design of nuclear
weapons, it's estimated that the vast majority of them will
have retired within the next 5 years. If we want to be able to
have that group of experienced weapon designers offer their
experience to a new cadre, a new generation, of weapon
designers, we need to move forward in this program, I think,
speedily.
The RRW will also support the U.S. extended nuclear
deterrent, and, thus, our nonproliferation goals, by helping to
sustain the confidence that our allies have had in our nuclear
umbrella.
Also, second, in the era of deterrence uncertainty,
strategic and regional ballistic missile defense are important
for our own protection and for the assurance of our allies and
friends who are subject to these emerging nuclear threats and
missile threats.
During the Cold War, many considered ballistic missile
defense and deterrence to be mutually incompatible. Now they
are fully compatible, and continued support, particularly for
sea-based defenses, the multiple kill vehicle program, and a
new third site in Europe, I believe to be very important.
Finally, progress toward a non-nuclear strategic capability
for prompt global strike has been slow, and, in general,
progress towards non-nuclear strategic capabilities has been
slow. At this point, the only U.S. global strike option now
available is nuclear. The U.S. capability to strike with non-
nuclear forces against high-value or fleeting targets is very
important. I believe it would make a significant contribution
to deterrence, and, again, the assurance of our allies, and
also to counterproliferation.
In conclusion, there's been a significant shift away from
the Cold War balance-of-terror concept and the policies that
were aligned with that. That shift is important and makes sense
because of the dramatically different geopolitical environment
we find ourselves in. It is true that all the details of that
shift have not been worked out, and its implementation is not
mature. But let me note that it took us 25 years of intense
debate before we came to a consensus on our Cold War strategic
policies. We probably don't have 25 years of safety to reach a
consensus on our post-Cold War policies. So, my final comment
is that we need to move forward thoughtfully, but also quickly,
towards that consensus.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Payne follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Keith B. Payne
The rise of hostile rogue states, new terrorist threats, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have all highlighted our
continuing need to deter attack. The importance of deterrence has
survived the Cold War. The fundamental question now is how to deter new
threats in a new strategic environment?
During the Cold War, deterrence typically was considered a
relatively easy matter of posing a nuclear retaliatory threat to Soviet
targets. Many officials and commentators mechanistically equated
deterrence to our ``Assured Destruction'' nuclear capability. We hear
echoes of this today, confident claims about deterrence linked to some
specific number of weapons.
Unfortunately, most of what we believed we knew about deterrence
during the Cold War now is of limited value. Today, there are no
certainties about deterrence. Our traditional deterrent threat may not
work predictably against opponents who are willing martyrs, desperate
gamblers, incommunicado, misinformed, miscalculating, self-destructive,
or motivated by unalterable, intangible goals such as honor, or
ideological or religious devotion.
The list of provocations and opponents we now hope to deter has
expanded, and the contexts within which we hope to deter them are far
more variable. But the painful contemporary truth is that confident
assertions about how deterrence will operate are guesses, usually
poorly informed; no one knows whether or how deterrence will work
across a wide spectrum of opponents, stakes and contexts.
This conclusion does not suggest that we discard deterrence. It
does, however, explain why our Cold War views of deterrence
``stability'' based on offensive nuclear forces must be reconsidered.
Our deterrence focus now must be broadened with regard to whom, how and
with what we try to deter. In some cases, non-military approaches to
deterrence may be adequate, in others, conventional or nuclear threats
may be necessary; and in some cases, opponents may simply be ``beyond
deterrence'' regardless of our threats.
To understand which may be the case for any contingency, we need
first to understand the opponent's mind-set and behavioral style, and
the different ways opponents can perceive and respond to our deterrence
threats. Deterrence now is first and foremost a matter of intelligence.
It requires a much more focused, dedicated intelligence effort for this
purpose than has been the case in the past. There is no substitute for
understanding the specific how's and why's of opponents'
decisionmaking; we no longer can presume to know the boundaries of
their possible behavior. This is true whether we seek to deter the
leadership of a rogue state or a terrorist organization.
With regard to the deterrence of terrorists, I strongly disagree
with the common notion that all terrorists are undeterrable. The
historical record on terrorists, anarchists, and other extremist groups
is sufficient to conclude that they may be deterred, depending on the
context and circumstances, which is all that can be said of state
leaders.
Defensive capabilities must take on a new, higher priority when
deterrence is recognized to be uncertain. Why? Because we can no longer
rely on deterrence working reliably to provide protection. A popular
Cold War line was that defensive capabilities were unnecessary and
useless because deterrence was ensured by our ``Assured Destruction''
offensive nuclear threat. It should be recognized now that deterrence
can fail unpredictably, and our only option may be to defend as well as
possible our society, our expeditionary forces, and our allies. This is
why various forms of strategic defensive capability against mass
destruction weapons are now so important. President Bush's decision to
deploy strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD) against limited
offensive missile threats was a reflection of this shift away from the
old balance of terror deterrence policy. Much more remains to be done
in this regard.
The Bush administration's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) sought
to assess how the dramatic changes since the Cold War should transform
how we think about deterrence. This can be seen in its emphasis on
having a much broader range of deterrent threat options than we
inherited from the Cold War, and having the flexibility and knowledge
of opponents necessary to tailor our deterrent efforts to a range of
contingencies and opponent. I have included for the record a short
article on the goals of the NPR, a document that remains widely
misunderstood.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Keith B. Payne, ``The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the
Record Straight,'' The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer
2005), pp. 135-151.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With regard to nuclear weapons, the NPR concluded that they remain
essential in any prudent approach to deterrence; but, nuclear weapons
alone may be unsuited to many of the deterrence contingencies of the
21st century. Having a broader range of threats, including non-nuclear
options, should better enable us to adapt our deterrence policies to a
much wider range of opponents and contexts. Consequently, a major
thrust of the NPR was to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and place
greater weight on non-nuclear capabilities.
The NPR also concluded that the immediate requirement for U.S.
nuclear weapons could be met with far fewer deployed nuclear forces,
and that our nuclear requirements may recede further as advanced
conventional weapons and defenses mature. That conclusion was a basis
for the deep nuclear reductions of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.
The NPR also focused on the need to assure allies, including via
the extended U.S. ``nuclear umbrella.'' Most recently, some close
allies have openly questioned whether longstanding U.S. extended
deterrence guarantees remain credible. A 2006 Japanese study headed by
former Prime Minister Nakasone, for example, concluded that Japan,
``should study the nuclear issue to be prepared in the event of
tremendous future change. . .'' Mr. Nakasone noted that Japanese
security is dependent on U.S. nuclear weapons, but that the future of
the U.S. extended deterrent is unclear. Such Japanese concerns are
understandable given North Korean nuclear and missile programs. Allies
and friends in the Middle East increasingly express similar concerns as
Iran moves toward a nuclear capability and expands its missile arsenal.
Immediately following North Korea's nuclear test in October 2006,
Secretary of State Rice traveled to Tokyo to reaffirm the U.S. nuclear
commitment to Japan. Our extended nuclear deterrent is perhaps the most
important and least recognized nuclear nonproliferation tool in
existence. To risk understatement, nuclear proliferation will
accelerate dramatically if close allies continue to lose confidence in
the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. This point has been made
explicitly in recent conversations with Japanese officials. As various
nuclear disarmament proposals emerge, we need to be conscious of this
continuing importance of our extended nuclear deterrent.
Despite the NPR's call for more diverse U.S. capabilities to meet
the needs of a new geopolitical environment, much remains to be done.
There are three contemporary strategic programs that are particularly
important to deterrence, extended deterrence and the assurance of U.S.
allies: these are the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW); strategic and
regional BMD; and, a new capability for non-nuclear, prompt global
strike.
The RRW Program is intended to provide safety and security
improvements in the nuclear arsenal, the potential for increased long-
term confidence without nuclear testing, long-term cost savings, and to
sustain the U.S. nuclear technical and engineering communities. It will
also support the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent and thus our
nonproliferation goals by helping to sustain the confidence of our
allies in our nuclear umbrella.
In an era of deterrence uncertainty, strategic and regional BMD are
important for our own protection and for the assurance of key allies
increasingly subject to emerging nuclear and missile threats. During
the Cold War, many considered deterrence and BMD to be incompatible.
Now, they are fully compatible, and continued support for our sea-based
defenses, the multiple kill vehicle, and a new defensive site in Europe
are particularly important.
Finally, progress toward non-nuclear strategic capabilities has
been slow; the only prompt, U.S. global strike options now available
are nuclear missiles. The U.S. capability to strike with non-nuclear
weapons against high value or fleeting targets at global ranges could
contribute significantly to deterrence, the assurance of allies, and
directly to counterproliferation. I agree strongly with General
Cartwright that it is important to move forward on a non-nuclear
capability for prompt global strike.
In conclusion, there has been a significant shift away from the
Cold War balance of terror concept consistent with a dramatically
different geopolitical environment. It is true that all the details of
this shift in thinking about deterrence and its implementation are not
mature. But, recall that it took 25 years of intense debate before we
achieved a working consensus on our Cold War strategic policies. We may
not have 25 years of relative security to achieve a new working
consensus this time around; we need to move forward thoughtfully and
quickly.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Dr. Payne.
Dr. Gallucci?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, DEAN, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL
OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Dr. Gallucci. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
to join this discussion of the future of our strategic nuclear
forces.
Mr. Chairman, let me start by providing what I think is my
bottom line, and then work backwards to it. I think the bottom
line for me is that the lower the level of our strategic
forces, the better. The fewer, the better. If we can avoid
qualitative augmentation of our forces, that would be better,
too, for at least three reasons:
The lower the number of nuclear weapons and delivery
systems we have, the cheaper; the easier it is to secure these
forces, the less likely we'll have a case of unauthorized or
accidental use. This is all assuming that the reductions are
accomplished together with the Russians, as Dr. Drell said.
Second, if we can, in fact, lower force levels, we, and
others who are nuclear weapons states, will more easily meet
our obligations under the Nuclear NPT to engage in serious
disarmament, and that is good for our efforts to discourage the
spread of nuclear weapons.
Third, and most important, and it is a theme for me, if we
can continue to lower, to the absolute lowest levels, our
nuclear forces, and avoid qualitative augmentation, we send a
signal of delegitimizing nuclear weapons as an element in our
force structure. That, over the long-term, is, in fact, I
think, the most important thing that we can do.
Let me go to the question of what we might use nuclear
weapons for these days, because these days are different than
past days. If I had two boxes, and in one box, I were going to
put the threats that come from nuclear weapons, and then
another box, threats that come from other sources that might
require the use of our nuclear forces, let me say that, in the
first box of nuclear threats, I can think of three, in
descending order of importance, that you ought to consider. The
first is the possibility that some terrorist group would
acquire a nuclear weapon and use it against an American city.
The second is that there might be an accidental or unauthorized
launch of a nuclear weapon at the United States or an American
ally. Third, that there might actually be the premedicated
attack on the United States or an ally by a nuclear weapons
state. Those are the three threats that I would propose to
address.
The first, the most likely, is that a terrorist group, al
Qaeda or an al Qaeda cousin, would acquire a nuclear weapon and
introduce it into the United States. It seems to me that that
is a threat against which we have neither a defense nor a
deterrent. It is unlikely that we'll, either now or in the near
future, develop much confidence in our ability to interdict the
unconventional delivery of a nuclear weapon crossing our
border--by a shipping container, a truck, or a boat--that we
will have that kind of control over our borders seems
implausible to me. So, interdiction is unlikely.
Deterrence, if your enemy values your death more than his
life, is very difficult. So, neither defense nor deterrence
seems like a way to deal with the most likely threat we
confront over the next 10, 20, or more years. Therefore, we
should be putting a lot of resources and energy into figuring
out how to prevent these groups from getting either a
manufactured nuclear weapon or the fissile material to produce
one.
That seems to me to lead us in a direction not only of
trying to secure fissile materials, but also trying to figure
out what we might use our nuclear forces for in connection with
this threat.
It seems to me that it is possible, if we are able to do
two things--one is to attribute a nuclear weapon, either before
it is detonated or after it is detonated, to its source--the
weapon, or, more likely the fissile material--then we have the
possibility of trying to persuade or convince any state that
might consider providing that material not to do it, in order
to avoid retaliation from the United States.
Now, there are two scenarios that immediately occur in this
connection, and one is that the material was actually
transferred by a country that decided to sell or transfer it.
Candidates might be North Korea or, in the future, Iran. The
other case, perhaps more likely, is where there's not actually
an intentional transfer, where there is what you might call
``leakage.'' Material comes out of Russia, or it comes out of
Pakistan. These cases present different sorts of problems.
In the first case, I think a good old-fashioned classical
deterrent threat is in order. That is to say that if we
discover that a country has purposefully transferred fissile
material or a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group, we ought to
be telling them in advance that we will treat them as though
they were the one who launched the attack, and they should
expect devastating retaliation. In the other case, it's a bit
more difficult, but I would suggest, as a matter of policy,
that we say, if a country is found to have been the source of
the material, even if it did not purposefully transfer it, but
if it had, in a negligent way, failed to secure that material,
that we will do the same thing; that is to say, to treat it as
though it had launched the attack. The objective here is
obviously to provide a little bit more incentive for that
country to secure those materials.
In neither case would I suggest we be promising a nuclear
retaliatory response, but that response ought to be available
to the President of the United States, and it ought to be
credible.
One more point on this most difficult case, and that is
that it suggests the possibility that we might want to, at some
point, consider a pre-emptive or preventive strike. Now, unlike
retaliation, I don't believe--if we get into the world of
needing to strike in a pre-emptive or preventive way--I don't
believe that the use of a nuclear weapon would be appropriate.
I think we ought to have a conventional force structure that
permits us to launch such a strike in a conventional way. Even
then, of course, it should be as truly a last resort. The first
case.
The second case, which I regard as not very likely, but
plausible, is an accidental launch or an unauthorized launch.
All I would say about that is that we should work harder in
order to increase the amount of time it takes to launch a
strike, to, in other words, change the alert status of our
deployed forces so that this unauthorized or accidental launch
becomes even less likely.
The third case is the one that we typically use to size our
forces and that is the need to have a deterrent to deal with
the possibility of a premedicated strike on the United States
or one of its allies. It is, to me, a very unlikely
development, because I do believe deterrence has worked, and
will work. All I will really say about this is that I would
associate myself with Dr. Drell's comments. It seems to me hard
to understand why we could not reduce our strategic nuclear
forces to maybe half of what right now is the bottom number
under the START arrangement with the Russians, which--I believe
that number is 1,700--why some hundreds of nuclear weapons
deployed aboard submarines, while maybe reducing the
fractionation of the individual missiles to increase the
survivability of the submarines even further, and continuing to
maintain the ICBM force at lower levels, and continuing to
maintain a bomber force, with both ALCMs and gravity bombs, and
the Reserve Force comparably configured and sized, wouldn't be
enough for this mission; and it would then go in the direction
that I initially suggested would be good for lots of reasons,
which is to say, to reduce substantially the amount of forces
that we actually deploy.
If it's the other box, though--if those are the three
nuclear threats, there are other threats which this
administration has alluded to in various statements and
publications, and they go to other threats that the United
States may be subjected to, particularly with WMD, that are
non-nuclear--in other words, the biological or chemical weapons
threats--where the United States might wish to use nuclear
weapons.
I am quite suspicious of this argument. I find all this
suspect as an argument. Before one would use a nuclear weapon
for these missions, one would have to have extraordinary
confidence in our intelligence about these facilities and their
status. After more than 20 years in government, focusing on
just these problems, I rarely saw such a thing. I wonder
whether we will, in fact, see such a thing.
Then there's the question of why we would want to have
special-effects weapons beyond those low-yield weapons which we
now have. Presumably, we would want to have them, because they
would enhance the credibility of our use, because an enemy, if
I understand this correctly, would, in a sense, be trying to
figure out our tolerance for collateral damage. The less
collateral damage we anticipated, the more likely they would
conclude it would be that we would use these weapons;
therefore, the more credible the threat, if I have all this
right. This seems quite a reach, to me. It is a reach, in a
number of ways, about whether we could, in fact, develop
smaller-yield nuclear weapons that meet both tests--i.e., do
better at the destruction of these sites than do our current
small-yield weapons--and which still do not produce the
collateral damage that we would find so politically and
ethically unacceptable.
Now, on balance, when I look at the arguments, I am not
persuaded that it is worth the cost to us, politically, in
fielding new special-effects weapons. The costs in having us
move away from the de-emphasis on nuclear weapons and move in a
direction of trying to demonstrate to the world that they are,
in fact, quite usable, if you're lucky enough to legitimately
own them. That's not, in my view, a very good message to send.
Finally, with some reluctance, I do want to make a comment
or two about the idea of developing a new RRW.
As I've understood this, this goes to the question of the
durability of our confidence in the reliability of the current
stockpile. It is, based upon my experience, passing strange
that we would propose to improve this confidence by deploying a
warhead, which we have not tested, to replace those warheads
which we have tested. Now, if there are components that need to
be replaced, and, therefore, the system, as Dr. Drell said,
would not have been tested with the new component, I can
understand that, to some degree. But I do ask the question of
when, in fact, these components need to be replaced, and I do
wonder what this program that we have spent so much money on,
which I had understood was designed to put us in a position to
have confidence in our stockpile in a no-test environment,
actually accomplished.
If, ultimately, we deploy a weapon that we have not tested
and would find necessary to test to have adequate reliability,
then I do believe we would have the worst of all worlds, and we
would have demonstrated that we wished to, again, put a
special-effects weapon, in a sense, in our inventory, and we
would have to consider the prospect of testing, which I think
would be truly damaging to the message which is most important
to convey. I say again, that message is that we wish to de-
legitimize the use of nuclear weapons, the possession of
nuclear weapons, and that message is something that we should
seek to preserve.
Thank you, Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gallucci follows:]
Prepared Statement by Robert L. Gallucci
I want to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to address
some of the issues related to policy options for the future strategic
nuclear force posture of the United States. I would like to begin by
addressing three types of threats from nuclear weapons, in descending
order of importance, that confront our country: first, the threat of a
nuclear weapon delivered by a terrorist group and detonated in an
American city; second, the threat of an accidental or unauthorized
strike on the United States by a nuclear weapons state; and third, the
threat posed by a pre-meditated attack on the United States or one of
its allies by a nuclear weapons state.
The most likely threat comes from a terrorist group such as al
Qaeda. If al Qaeda could acquire a nuclear weapon, few doubt that it
would try to use it. Since it would deliver such a weapon by
unconventional means--such as a boat, truck, or shipping container--we
should not have much confidence in our ability to interdict this kind
of a border crossing now or in the near future. Since al Qaeda members
are known for valuing our death more than their life, neither should we
expect to deter them. Lacking either defense or deterrence against this
threat, we should put our energy and resources into preventing al Qaeda
from acquiring either a manufactured nuclear weapon or the fissile
material to make one. This means that we must persuade those countries
with nuclear weapons or fissile material to secure them against
unauthorized transfer--which we might call ``leakage''--and deter them
from any authorized sale or transfer.
For a variety of reasons, when it comes to leakage, we ought to be
particularly concerned about Russia and Pakistan, and when it comes to
intentional transfer, two different countries appear most worrisome,
North Korea and, eventually, Iran. The question, then, is what policies
should we adopt to persuade some countries to secure nuclear weapons
and materials to our standard, and deter others form deciding to sell
such weapons or materials. The first part of the answer is that we must
develop the capability to identify the source of a nuclear weapon or
the fissile material at its core, whether we should find it before
detonation or have only the debris it produces to analyze after
detonation. If we can accomplish this attribution with high confidence,
through a combination of scientific forensic analysis and intelligence
collection and analysis, and we can convince other countries that we
can do this, then we can take the next step in persuasion and
deterrence, that is, making a credible threat of retaliation. For those
states that would intentionally transfer a nuclear weapon or fissile
material, the deterrent threat is relatively straight forward, that is,
to treat those countries as though they had launched the attack and to
pose to them the prospect of devastating consequences, without
excluding the use of nuclear weapons, if the United States or one of it
allies should be the victim of a nuclear attack.
For those states that we are concerned might leak a nuclear weapon
or fissile material to a terrorist group, and fail to take actions that
we regard as reasonable and prudent to secure their weapons and
material, we should warn them also that we will treat them as though
they were negligent and thus as though they had launched the attack.
The American public would demand no less. In neither the case of
transfer nor leakage would our response necessarily involve nuclear
retaliation, but in both cases the President should have the option of
a precise nuclear response with as little collateral damage as
possible. Obviously, if we are to gain the advantage of what may be
called ``expanded deterrence'' to prevent leakage, countries such as
Russia and Pakistan must be told that we have adopted this posture.
Beyond the missions of deterrence and expanded deterrence, we
should also consider the force requirements of pre-emption and
preventive war to deal with this threat. In contrast to a retaliatory
strike, there is no reason to create the option to use a nuclear weapon
to strike another country in order to prevent the transfer of fissile
material or a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group, or to stop a country
from even acquiring the capability to accumulate such weapons or
material. But there is every reason to maintain the capability for pre-
emptive or preventive strikes in our conventional force structure, even
though we should see such options as a last resort.
This brings us to the second type of threat posed by nuclear
weapons, that from the accidental or unauthorized launch of a nuclear
weapon against the United States. Although this threat may arise from
more countries in the future, for now it is almost exclusively one that
is posed by Russian strategic nuclear systems. The best way for the
United States to reduce the risk of such a launch would be to seek
agreement with Moscow to measures that would, for both countries,
reduce the alert status of our delivery systems, increasing the time
required to launch strategic nuclear weapons.
The third type of threat, a pre-meditated nuclear attack on the
United States or one of its allies by another nuclear weapons state, is
the least likely event, but the one which guides our thinking in
determining the basic size and character of our nuclear forces, just as
it did decades ago when we confronted a hostile Soviet Union with tens
of thousands of nuclear weapons. Today, and for the foreseeable future,
the only country against which our deterrent could conceivably be
tested is Russia, and neither that country's intentions nor
capabilities would seem to require the number of warheads and delivery
systems which we plan to deploy and hold in Reserve in the future in
order to maintain a high level of confidence in our deterrent
capability. It is hard to understand why it would not be enough to have
some hundreds of warheads on deployed systems--Trident submarines, with
a reduced number of warheads per missile in order to increase range and
survivability, silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and
bomber aircraft with gravity bombs and air-launched cruise missiles--in
addition to Reserve Forces of comparable size and composition. In
short, this classic threat would arguably require less than half the
1,700 warheads permitted by the lower end of the range of deployed
strategic nuclear warheads allowed under the Strategic Offensive
Reduction Treaty. Those who argue that more is required of our
strategic forces for this mission should be made to justify the
assertion, without reference to any additional missions for our
strategic nuclear forces.
None of the three nuclear threats just identified justify increases
in our nuclear forces, and indeed I am suggesting that they may be
accomplished at lower levels of forces. If we can substantially reduce
force levels, there are real benefits to the national security to be
realized, particularly if matched by Russia, and eventually by others.
Let me identify three such benefits. First, the fewer the warheads and
delivery systems that are deployed and maintained in Reserve, the
easier it would be to secure them against theft and against accidental
or unauthorized launch, and the less the need for fissile material to
field them. Second, if nuclear forces can be reduced, it would help
address the obligation of the United States and other nuclear weapons
states party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to engage in
serious disarmament. Third, and most important, lowering the level of
nuclear forces demonstrates a reduced dependence on nuclear weapons to
achieve legitimate security objectives, which in turn contributes to a
critical international norm of de-legitimatizing the acquisition of
nuclear weapons.
The other missions that have been identified for our nuclear forces
are meant to improve our ability to deal with rogue states or terrorist
groups and, particularly their intention or ability to attack the
United States with chemical or biological weapons. The idea seems to be
that we can better deter attacks on us by having new, smaller yield
(and thus more credibly usable) nuclear weapons to use against these
states or groups, and that we can better defend against attacks by
having special effects nuclear weapons that are more capable of
destroying an enemy's buried chemical or biological weapons facilities.
Both these propositions are suspect. First, we already have small yield
nuclear weapons in our inventory to impress rogues and terrorists, if
indeed they care about what we may regard as acceptable collateral
damage. Second, serious questions have been raised about our ability to
produce a nuclear weapon whose ability to destroy underground weapons
production or storage facilities significantly exceeds that which can
be achieved with existing nuclear or conventional weapons--without
producing politically and ethically unacceptable collateral damage. In
short, given the incentives to avoid additions to our nuclear force, a
convincing case for nuclear weapons designed to attack these targets
has yet to be made.
If neither nuclear nor non-nuclear threats would require additions
to our nuclear forces, and there are good reasons to try to reduce
those forces, are there other reasons to consider augmenting our force
posture? There are at least two more reasons that should be considered.
One is a unique mission that is neither a case of classic deterrence
nor defense; the other is the more general need to maintain confidence
in the reliability of our nuclear forces without resorting to nuclear
weapons testing.
We have until now considered nuclear and non-nuclear threats to the
national security that might require nuclear weapons for deterrence or
defense. There is, in addition, at least one scenario in which we might
wish to threaten the first use of nuclear weapons, or actually launch a
first strike, in order to forestall the use of conventional forces
against U.S. interests: it is the Taiwan contingency. It is possible,
at some future date, that China will seek to resolve the status of
Taiwan by the use of force and the United States would then want to
prevent this outcome without engaging in a massive conventional war so
far from America's shores and so close to China's. In such a scenario,
the threat to escalate to the strategic nuclear level by launching a
disarming first strike against Chinese strategic nuclear forces might
be an option the United States would want to preserve or create.
Indeed, current Chinese plans for modernizing its strategic nuclear
forces are at least in part aimed at increasing their survivability
against just such a first strike, that is, at creating a deterrent. Our
current plans to deploy even a thin defense against ballistic missiles
aimed at the United States further complicate China's plans for such a
deterrent.
The most prudent way to assess this scenario is in the larger
strategic and political context. From such a perspective, it is
profoundly in America's interest to maintain a nuclear force posture
and a conventional force structure designed to meet our national
security needs without ever resorting to the first use of nuclear
weapons. While this proposition is relevant to some of the other
missions envisioned for our forces mentioned earlier, it is most
critical to addressing the China-Taiwan scenario because it bears
directly on the motivation for Chinese calculations about their own
strategic nuclear force requirements. In sum, our choice of policies
for our strategic nuclear forces might some day be sensitive to Chinese
strategic nuclear force deployments, but our legitimate defense and
deterrent needs with respect to China can be met now and for the
foreseeable future, at existing or substantially lower force levels.
Finally, there is the issue of whether or not it is necessary to
develop and deploy a new nuclear warhead so that we will be able to
maintain confidence in the reliability of our nuclear forces for a
longer amount of time than we otherwise might. Now, if such a new
nuclear warhead were to be introduced to replace our existing, nuclear
warheads, without first testing it, a serious question arises about why
we would think it more reliable than the well-tested warheads to be
retired. On the other hand, if the replacement warhead would eventually
require testing in order to sustain the confidence we have in the
reliability of our stockpile, then we should consider the implications
of resumed nuclear weapons testing for our national security. Suffice
it to say, that while many continue to argue against the benefits of
our future adherence to a treaty banning further nuclear weapons
testing--arguments which I do not accept--the disadvantages of
eventually resuming the testing of nuclear weapons are undeniable. If
there is a theme that runs through this presentation, it is that our
Nation's security is best served by taking steps that de-emphasize the
relevance and utility of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons testing
undermines that proposition.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, to all three of you.
Now, what we want to do is just have a conversation here.
Senator Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Well, I think we have our other
colleagues here, and I'll be here a while, and they might have
other----
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
Senator Sessions.--things. So----
Senator Bill Nelson. Let's see, who came first?
Senator Ben Nelson?
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. The other part of the full Nelson.
[Laughter.]
Senator Ben Nelson. Just down the hall from the other
Nelson.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Dr. Drell, you commented in your written testimony, and you
said it, as well, in your oral testimony, that over 40
countries are pursuing nuclear technology. Now, in many cases,
we believe--believe, and I emphasize that--it's for civilian
power. But we all understand that once uranium has been
enriched for peaceful purposes, it can, and is probably being
harnessed for other uses that don't correspond with our desire
for security. You argue that the both the U.S. and the Russian
Federation should reduce their stockpiles. Of course, I think
many would say that, in a world with so many countries desiring
to join what you call the nuclear club, we shouldn't be
reducing our stockpiles. So, where we have some people saying,
as you are, that perhaps mutually reducing stockpiles would be
beneficial, and others are now saying that's not the case.
We know that we don't need a Cold War II, even though Cold
War I is over, but how do you--what is the response that you
really make to those who don't want us to reduce our stockpile
because they believe we're really going to need this, with 40
countries developing and no real capability, short of perhaps
some sort of a launch against their locations, that we really
do need to have a strong and robust stockpile?
Dr. Drell. Thank you. My first comment is that the urgent
need we have, at the moment, is to develop a process for
gaining control of the enrichment process. When I say 40
countries, I'm saying there are countries with nuclear
reactors; they've bought them or they're using them. There are
not 40 countries that can enrich uranium. So, the efforts which
this administration has put forward, that President Putin has
put forward, that the International Atomic Energy Agency, under
Dr. ElBaradei has put forward, to gain control of the
enrichment process, to try to guarantee a fuel for the reactors
for peaceful research, but not have them develop indigenously
the capacity to enrich uranium, so--in fact, the whole fuel
cycle would be one that would be controlled. The mechanism has
to be worked out politically, to what extent it's IAEA, to what
extent it is nuclear nations. That is to be worked out. But the
fact is--the key is to maintain control of the enrichment
process, because without that, then, indeed, we are in great
trouble. But----
Senator Ben Nelson. Well----
Dr. Drell.--then, for instance, when it comes to turning
back--again, the question is, when we start reducing numbers,
you have to ask how many targets there are for you--
Senator Ben Nelson. Right.
Dr. Drell.--because when you're talking about a country
just beginning to develop an enrichment capacity or a few
weapons, that doesn't present you with hundreds or thousands of
targets. So, a careful balance of how many targets you have,
and, therefore, how many warheads you would need. In our study
that I mentioned, Dr. Goodby and I looked at the Russian
problem; if they were to come down, and we looked at the
targets of military control, political control, and of weapons
that were mentioned in the NPR, we said, there, that there
aren't more than a few hundred targets. That's how we came up
with 500 deployed and 500 reserves. It's a quantitative
question.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, that certainly would apply to,
perhaps, the current situation with respect to the former
Soviet Union, and particularly Russia, but, with other
countries having the capability of enriching in the future,
what does that say? How could we--if we reduce the stockpile,
under what terms do we find that we might need to increase it,
if, in 10 years or 20 years, the rest of the world, these other
countries, are now into enrichment? I agree, controlling
enrichment is a good part of it, but enriched uranium can still
be sold, purchased, and get into the wrong hands. How will we
be sure that we have enough stockpiled?
Dr. Drell. Dr. Payne said it very well, we need a better
intelligence system on these things. The intelligence challenge
now is greater than it was during the Cold War.
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.
Dr. Drell. So, the number--and one of the reasons I said we
have to maintain an infrastructure--it's called Stockpile
Infrastructure 2030 or something like that--is because we have
to be able to respond, if the need arises, because the
enrichment process gets out of control.
So, there are a number of things we have to do. Have good
intelligence, have the political process, with the cooperation
of all the Nations that have signed the NPT--that's all but
four Nations in the world, after all--have them cooperate with
us in this effort to prevent the spread of the material with
the additional verification requirements that we are working on
to bolster the NPT. We have to maintain the weapons for
deterrence. If the danger grows, if our effort to constrain the
spread of the nuclear weapons material and enrichment capacity
fails, indeed, we're going to have a larger stockpile.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, but won't we be violating
agreements that we've entered into with others? Can we do that
unilaterally?
Dr. Drell. We hope to have agreements. At the moment, our
agreements stand that by 2012 we will have between 1,700 and
2,200 deployed strategic forces, and there's still a large
number in back. I used a number of about 5,000. There is no
specified number, but that seems to be the kind of number
that's talked about and that both Russia and the United States
have in the stockpile. Five thousand is an awful large number,
when you consider the number of targets.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay. One further question, Mr.
Chairman.
Dr. Payne, in your written testimony, you commented on
deterrence, and especially your views on non-nuclear
capabilities, like prompt global strike. I appreciate those
comments very well. I also agree with General Cartwright, who
is the Commander of a Combatant Command of Strategic Command
and Space Command, that we need this capability of prompt
global strike. Senator Sessions and I worked, last year, on
converting the Trident submarine to having non-nuclear
capabilities, recognizing that time to act is short, and access
may be denied or difficult. So, we really do have to be in a
situation that requires a quick strike on a mobile ballistic
missile launcher, for a high-value target, or whatever the
situation may be, We do need that. We were unable to get it
accomplished last year. If we don't convert Trident missiles
for a prompt global strike, how long are we away from a
strategic non-nuclear response, without that?
Dr. Payne. General Cartwright has mentioned in testimony--
and I'll just use the numbers that he's presented--that, under
normal circumstances, we would be 2 to 3 days away from having
a non-nuclear capability, under the current situation; if we
were very fortunate and had forces generated and in the area,
we might be as little as a day away. So, the distinction in the
timelines is fairly important. If there is a fleeting target or
a very urgent target that needs to be addressed in a timeframe
shorter than 1 to 3 or 4 days, then this capability is
essential.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dean Gallucci, when you were discussing the hardest cases,
some type of terrorist getting hold of material, what we have
to do, and what would be helpful, is if we could identify the
source of that material, which leads to this issue of the
forensics of the nuclear material. Is it possible to catalog
the source of nuclear material, from a technical sense, so
that, at least conceptually, we could identify, and then,
having identified, be able to attribute that to a nation-state
or some entity that we could deter or at least retaliate? Is
that possible?
Dr. Gallucci. Senator, what I think I know about this is
that the answer is pretty clear, that we have some signatures
we have collected over decades that would allow us, for
example, in the first instance, if you don't have an unexploded
weapon, but you're essentially in the business of analyzing
debris, you could tell whether it was a plutonium core or
whether it was a uranium core. If it was a uranium core, you
might be able to quickly tell whether the uranium was enriched
in a diffusion process or a centrifuge process. If it was
plutonium, you might be able to, through an analysis of the
ratios of the isotopes, figure out what kind of reactor, and
maybe even which reactor, the plutonium was produced in. So,
there are a lot of ifs here, but you might be able to get to
the point of identifying the source of the material. It did not
help that A.Q. Khan played Johnny Appleseed with a particular
kind of centrifuge and spread it hither and yon so that you
would get a similar kind of signature from that uranium. But
the bottom line here is, our laboratories are working on this.
They're prepared to do this, if necessary. We have some chance
of this, and we have begun to talk about this, because, if we
want to gain deterrence, the bad guys need to know that they
might get caught.
Senator Reed. So, I assume that your view would be this
would be a very worthwhile effort to pursue internationally, to
try to develop a regime in which the producers of nuclear
material are, either by self- declaration or inspection, sort
of, list the products on the label so that if something goes
off, we know.
Dr. Gallucci. Yes. The idea of an inventory would, of
course, have a lot of benefits to it. We'd have to worry about
spoofing in the course of doing that. But, yes, I think
everything we could do to be able to trace material back would
be of benefit.
Senator Reed. Is this bought--supported outside the United
States? I mean, are there international agencies and other
countries who say, ``We understand this is important, let's do
it''?
Dr. Gallucci. I'm sorry, Senator, I really don't know that.
That probably is knowable, but I just don't know it.
Senator Reed. Right, okay. Very good. I don't know if
anyone else has a comment, but----
Let me turn to the Moscow Treaty, which is mentioned by Dr.
Drell and others. It does call for a reduction by 2012, but the
treaty is nonbinding, there's no duration, it's nonverifiable.
Each side's free to determine when something's nonoperational,
operational, and the question is, should the treaty be
modified? Also, is it possible, within the scope of the treaty,
to accelerate the reduction of the deployed nuclear weapons? I
mean, this is one of those things that was announced with great
fanfare a few years ago, and then suddenly it's ancient
history. So, Dr. Drell, and then Dr. Payne, if you'd comment?
Dr. Drell. It is an unusual feature of that treaty that it
has no verification requirements written into it. On one hand,
you can say that shows an evolution from a Cold War
confrontation with an adversary to treating the Russians, now,
more like England and France. You have to ask how far you want
to go that way. I'm always comfortable when one has crisp,
specific verification procedures, I have to say. How the
evolution to a more cooperative relation should go
politically--I'm a physicist, and I leave the strategic
political judgment on how the governments are getting along to
Washington. I have a little feeling that it's progress if we
have a relation with Russia that does allow a certain element
of trust. But, the bottom line, you have to verify.
We certainly could make more rapid the implementation of
the Treaty of Moscow provisions. We could, for example,
deactivate weapons that are being decreased out of the line. We
could agree that, of the weapons that are in the 5,000, but not
the deployed 1,700 to 2,200, we could agree that we don't need
that many of them. We could look at the remaining battlefield
weapons, the tactical weapons, forward deployed in Europe, and
decide whether those couldn't go. That really is a basis--a
matter of political judgment of how our strategic relations
with the Russians are going. Are they working cooperatively as
our partner, as they seem to be onboard in North Korea and now
in the Iranian discussion, or are there problems? I'm not an
expert there.
Senator Reed. Dr. Payne?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. The treaty is binding between the two
parties. It's not a nonbinding treaty. The requirement to
reduce, by approximately two-thirds, the number of deployed
nuclear forces is in the treaty, and will have to be abided by
2012.
The question about accelerating reductions, the answer is,
yes, sir, reductions can be accelerated. In fact, that was
mentioned specifically by the U.S. in 2002. Indeed, part of the
presentation of the NPR showed periodic assessments of the
situation, the geopolitical situation, so that if the
geopolitical situation was such that those reductions could be
accelerated, we could go ahead and pursue that.
Another question, another factor, as to whether those
reductions could be accelerated was how well the United States
was doing with regard to the development and deployment of
advanced conventional forces and defensive capabilities. If we
were progressing and maturing smartly towards advanced
conventional and defensive capabilities, the thought was there
may be enough mitigation of risks so that those reductions
could be accelerated.
Another factor is the political condition. Looking out over
10 years, at that time, no one felt comfortable that their
crystal ball was good enough to be able to predict what the
geopolitical relationship would be like 10 years down the line.
So, again, the idea was that we would have periodic assessments
of the situation so that those reductions could be accelerated
if the political conditions called for it.
The last point, I guess, of the question had to do with
verification. Let me note, because it wasn't noted earlier,
that the verification regime was to be derived from the
existing START regime, with extensive verification provisions.
That, then, really leads to the question that was brought up
earlier this morning, and that is, what about START after
2009?--because the verification provisions for the Moscow
Treaty are embedded in START. So, the real question isn't that
there's no verification. There's considerable verification for
the Moscow Treaty. The question is, what happens to START after
2009, and to those pertinent verification provisions?
Senator Reed. That would suggest, when START expires, in
2009, we could think about modifying the existing treaty, the
Moscow Treaty.
But one of the problems, I think, with the Moscow Treaty is
that there's no timetable, there's no necessity to reduce any
single weapon until, I presume, 2012, when the term of the
treaty expires. So, literally we could be sitting, at 11:59 on
the last day and, I guess, announce that we're reducing all our
weapons, but then, the next day, the treaty's expired, and
there's no legal binding requirement to make this reduction. In
other words, it's a rather odd arms-control treaty. Also, my
sense is that nothing is really taking place. I don't notice
any action between the United States and Russia to begin
serious discussions to--even a symbolic reduction of weapons.
So, it is somewhat troubling.
Let me just go back to one question that was raised
previously by Senator Nelson, and that is the discussion about
taking conventional weapons and putting them on Trident
submarines. Dean Gallucci, do you have a notion about that?
Dr. Gallucci. Senator, I think everybody knows that there
are two contending values here. One is that I, like everybody
else, would like to have the capability--be able to accomplish
this mission of a prompt conventional strike against a
fleeting, but important target. Then the other good is, of
course, never to plan to do anything that--to accomplish that
first mission--that might be misconstrued as the initial launch
of a first strike from a strategic system. So, I come to this
with enormous skepticism, and would want to be completely
persuaded that in no such circumstance would we be attempting
to do this and running any risk of being misunderstood. I think
there are political disadvantages to it, too, but I am, if you
can catch the tenor of my voice here, hesitant about this. I
guess, at this moment, I would say I am still unconvinced, but
that may be because of my own ignorance. I worry a great deal
that we not get into a situation in which a submarine on
station and from a particular box launches a strike which now
the Russians, later the Chinese, view as a pre-emptive strike,
depending, of course--this all depends upon what the context
is--for example is it a crisis context, a context that goes
beyond the target state to other states? It is just such an
enormous concern that it has to be addressed. If it is
absolutely put aside, and there is no downside, from that
perspective, then, of course, as a mission, I would like us to
have that capability.
Senator Reed. Dr. Drell?
Dr. Drell. May I make a short comment on that?
Clearly, there are some needs for prompt global strike in
the world. I would make three technical comments.
The first one, and most important, is what Bob Gallucci
just said, there must be no ambiguity that the system is non-
nuclear. So, the idea of mixing the loadings of a Trident sub
seems to me the worst possible danger. If you can do it
clearly--this is a non-nuclear system--I think that's
essential.
But there are two other technical points which I think need
to be looked at. We're talking about something that's prompt.
We're going to get it in less than a day. We're going to get it
in an hour or so. That means we must be able to locate it, at
all times if a mobile target, with precision, because a
conventional warhead, a few hundred pounds of high explosive
does not have a very large kill radius, and you're talking
about sending something thousands of miles, and getting very
precisely accurate. One has to be sure that the target position
location can be, in realtime, established that way. I think one
wants to, but that's not an easy order. That's not impossible.
It's not an easy order. It's a technical demand that has to be
addressed and understood before one thinks one has anything.
The other thing is, the United States is a global power
with bases around the world, and there are other technologies,
including drones and other systems, that are nearby. Again, one
has to ask the alternative advantages and disadvantages.
So, I think these are legitimate questions. They're hard
questions. But the lack of ambiguity in what we're doing, non-
nuclear, is, to me, overwhelming.
Senator Reed. Dr. Payne?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. Let me just comment briefly on the
concern over the possible Russian response to an at-sea launch
of the conventionally-armed Trident, because this question was
thought through at great length, with, I think, reasonable
provisions to mitigate the possibility of a Russian
misinterpretation.
But with regard to that question, let me just mention that
the United States has, according to all the unclassified
sources, over 1,100 at-sea launches of submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBM) in the test program over the years.
Through 1988, we had no notification provisions to the Soviet
Union. After 1988, we had notification provisions established,
and we carried through with those notifications to the Soviet
Union that we would be launching a SLBM in the appropriate
timeframe, in the appropriate direction. So, there's a long,
long history of U.S./Soviet and now U.S./Russian relations with
regard to notification for the safe launching of non-nuclear
ballistic missiles, and there's been no problem, there's been
no misinterpretation, there have been no problems such as folks
have mentioned with regard to a possible Russian
misinterpretation.
I wouldn't be as confident in this, other than I look back,
with 1,100 launches, open-sea launches of SLBMs, and we have
provisions, since 1988, of notifying the Russians--Soviets
then, Russians now--in that regard, as do the British have
provisions for notifying the Russians with regard to their at-
sea launches. So, I understand the concern. I agree we need to
absolutely minimize the concern of a Russian misinterpretation.
I'm also confident that we've already gone a long way towards
that over the last 40 years.
Senator Reed. I thank you. Just a final comment. You've
been most kind, Mr. Chairman. Given the emergency circumstances
where a missile like this would be launched, and particularly
not in a designated range where these other tests have taken
place, it might be very difficult to notify even our senior
command of this decision, let alone the Russians. It would be
unusual, by definition, and I'm not as sanguine about the
record of test launches and ranges. I went on a D-5 shoot off
of Cape Canaveral, which the--you could tell--and it's
boilerplate, and the Russians have seen it for years and years
and years. This would be, I think, something much, much
different, probably a surprise to many people in the Department
of Defense, not only the Russians.
Mr. Chairman?
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, assuming that you could get over
that threshold of it being understood that this was not a
nuclear launch, the question left hanging is the question of,
does it offer a deterrence to a state or a nonstate actor?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. I believe that a prompt global strike,
the conventional Trident or an alternative, could provide
enormous deterrent advantages, including for extended
deterrence. Let me give you a couple of reasons why.
First, one of the factors that contributes to the assurance
of our allies is the notion that the United States can be
promptly involved if, in fact, they suffer from an attack. This
capability would certainly signal very quickly, that the United
States was involved in their security on their behalf, and the
anticipation of that should have a deterring effect on
opponents, foes of our friends and allies, who think that the
United States might be able to either stay out entirely, might
stay out entirely, or might be out long enough for them to
create a fait accompli. So, I see this prompt global strike as
being very helpful with regard to deterrence, particularly
extended deterrence.
In addition, we know that, for example, the PRC sees
conventional ballistic missiles as what they call their
``pocket of excellence,'' an area they excel in. For the United
States not to be involved in the capability that they put so
much store on is, in a sense, an incentive to move forward in
that direction for folks that we might prefer to move in other
ways.
So, I see the prompt global strike being useful for
deterrence, being useful for now what's called dissuasion,
trying to suggest to folks that they not move in those
directions, because it's not an open avenue for them to have a
pocket of excellence.
Senator Bill Nelson. What do the other two of you think
about that, the question of the deterrence?
Dr. Gallucci. I don't think, even if we were completely
free of our concern about the ambiguity of a strategic nuclear
strike by using a Trident submarine for the launch, that I
would be doing this for deterrent reasons. I think that I'd be
doing it for strike reasons. We might get some deterrence out
of it; and the promptness is something that we would value. In
certain circumstances, we might be able to do this with
deployed forward forces, with cruise missiles. I think we
shouldn't overstate how much we're going to get from this. I
don't think countries that are thinking of developing secret
nuclear facilities or moving something from here to there are
going to decide not to do it because there's a submarine
somewhere on the planet that might strike them. I just think
we're asking a little too much of this to do that.
Dr. Drell. I find it mainly a strike weapon, not a
deterrent weapon. There are not many targets I can think of
that are so important you have to get them within an hour, as
opposed to a day. I think if we go--move to a world where we're
all going to have 30-minute strike capabilities halfway around
the world from each other, it's not really the world I'd like
to see us trying to develop. I would rather see us realizing
that there is certain--value in time to think things through.
But----
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions?
Dr. Drell.--I'm not enamored with this weapon.
Senator Sessions. I get worried about all these things.
I'll tell you what troubles me. So, in the next 5 years, we're
going to have reduced the size of our nuclear stockpile down to
numbers we haven't seen in 50 years, at the beginning of the
Cold War. But I--the critics say, ``That's not enough, we ought
to go down to 500, or maybe less.'' Strategic Command develops
a proposed substitute, non-nuclear global strike capability to
substitute for nuclear strike capability, with the conventional
Trident modification. The critics say, ``No, that's risky.''
The Nuclear Weapons Council approves continuing study of a
replacement warhead that would be safer, more reliable, and
more secure. We could replace aging warheads with the same
capability, because they're more reliable, perhaps have fewer
of them. But critics are saying, ``Well, we should stay out of
the business of manufacturing warheads.'' We observed China
take out one of its own satellites. We worry about strategic
vulnerability of our space assets. It would seem to make sense
to study whether defensive capabilities could be deployed on
satellites to protect them. The critics decide that defensive
capabilities look too much like offensive capabilities, and so
we shouldn't have weapons in space, and they oppose that. I
would just say to our witnesses, we have a lot of challenges
out there. The objective of reducing nuclear dangers has a--and
the number of weapons, certainly has an appeal. We would like
to do that. But, continuing forward, as the ``Caucus of No''
would say, does not, in my view, advance our national security.
I think I would just ask you, maybe, to comment on that,
and to comment on whether or not the reduction of our own
stockpile and our self-imposed restraints--that are very costly
financially, too, on occasion--are actually causing other
nations not to develop nuclear weapons, or to reduce their
capability, or cause nations not to develop a nuclear
capability at all. Is that helping in any way? My time is
short, I've rambled on. But, I mean, that's the fundamental
question, to me, as a person who feels a responsibility to
defend this country. Where are we heading, Dr. Gallucci?
Dr. Gallucci. When you read that litany of charges,
essentially, I want to immediately leap and say, ``Please do
not confuse me with an advocate of unilateral disarmament or a
pacifist.'' I spent my career in government service, in
political/military affairs of various kinds, and I'm----
Senator Sessions. I would just say that we voted down--
Congress voted down the penetrator--actually, research on the
penetrator, and they voted down the prompt global strike non-
nuclear system last year. So, we're in a deal here.
Dr. Gallucci. But, having said what I said, I have argued
here for the lowest appropriate levels of forces, which is to
say half of the 1,700 might do, and Professor Drell was talking
about 500 deployed, 500 reserved--that's still a lot of nuclear
weapons, with a lot of capacity for destruction. It has been
classic for the United States to be worried about how much is
enough. So, I think we can all be in that game of trying to
assess how much is enough--trying to puzzle out what's
appropriate and look at what missions we want these weapons
for. I think that's what we're doing here.
I think suspicion of a particular weapon innovation really
has to do with the instinct, which I really want as my takeaway
from today from me, and that is instinct that we do not wish to
call attention, internationally, unnecessarily, to nuclear
weapons as an essential portion of a legitimate national
defense establishment. We need nuclear weapons now--first and
foremost, as a deterrent, so that others do not use them. If
you ask all three of us, ``is it a terrific idea to absolutely
promise we will never use nuclear weapons first?'' I don't
think any one of us want to say, ``we'll promise that,'' but we
want to get to the point where we're able to accomplish our
missions through the use of conventional forces, and the
nuclear weapon is for a deterrent, and it's for retaliation for
the use of a nuclear weapon, and that's it.
So, I think in each or many of the points that are made in
the statement you made, Senator, my reaction is that we ought
to be looking very carefully at the RRW. A lot of this is quite
technical, and questions of when, in fact, components of the
existing nuclear weapons may deteriorate and reduce our
confidence and reliability--how much time do we have? Is this
weapon actually going to increase our confidence if it is for
all time, an untested weapon? I have no way, independently, of
assessing that, but I know that, in the end, I want us to get
to a point where we do not need to test, that we're confident
in the reliability of our systems without testing, so that we
can comfortably adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
because of what that would mean politically as, again, a signal
that we wish to de-emphasize the use of nuclear weapons for
purposes other than deterrence.
So, this all goes, I think, to one's body posture. If there
is a critique of what the administration has been putting
forward in its various initiatives, it is the embrace of
nuclear weapons for new missions, when we are looking to move
away from the use of nuclear weapons to accomplish those
missions. I think----
Senator Sessions. Well----
Dr. Gallucci.--that's the rub.
Senator Sessions.--I think body posture is--may be a factor
that we certainly ought not to lose sight of, but I believe
these nations are deciding, for their reasons. Iran is
deciding, not on our body posture, but on--they've been working
for a long time to have a nuclear weapon. Iraq was, had they
not been stopped during the first Gulf War. Saudi Arabia, what
are they going to do if Iran gets weapons? What about Egypt?
What about Turkey? What about other countries? So, I'm not sure
all that's happening because of how we handle ourselves.
But, Dr. Drell and Dr. Payne, if you'd just briefly respond
to that. I know my time is a bit short.
Dr. Drell. Senator, I have devoted a lot of my life to
concern about American security. I'm not a disarmer, I'm not a
``no-first-use-er,'' but I want to say, as a technical person,
we have to make the right choices. First we have to do what's
practical, and, second, we have to see how what we do may be
interpreted elsewhere.
When I looked at the earth-penetrator discussion, and I
commented on it, to me the value of an earth penetrator was
extremely limited militarily. If I want to get a deep
underground target, I have to know where it is. Precision and
accuracy of location and delivery means much more than just
penetrating and then getting an order of magnitude more of the
energy. We have big weapons that can get underground. We have a
number of big weapons. We didn't need that weapon, and it
wouldn't do us much good. It would, however, affect how our
efforts at maintaining a nonproliferation regime are going to
be seen, not by Iran or North Korea, but by the 185 nations who
signed the NPT and have said, when they extended it into the
indefinite future, ``We have to, ourselves, accept some of the
restraints. We have to work toward the comprehensive test ban.
We have to work towards reduction,'' because that's embedded in
the treaty we have to use for their cooperation in trying to
prevent this spread.
When I talked about the RRW, I said, ``We need an
infrastructure to be able to respond and maintain nuclear
weapons,'' but I said, ``Don't go ahead and build an RRW, when
you don't know''--and I don't believe any technical person can
honestly say that we can make a safer, more reliable, more
effective weapon without testing it. Until you know that you
can do that, it's a waste of money and it's a politically
provocative thing to do. I want to--and I recommend--let us get
a serious consensus built among the weapons labs. There's a
report coming out, headed by a former weapons-lab leader, Dr.
Tarter, which has been discussed--it's not fully released--
saying exactly what I said.
So, I am not a disarmer, but I believe we have to do
sensible things. I think it's important that we look at what
other countries do, because I think getting rid of nuclear
weapons as part of our policy is important, and I haven't given
up on that.
I remember President Eisenhower saying so movingly, ``the
United States is determined to help solve the fearful atomic
dilemma, to devote its entire heart and mind to finding the way
by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be
dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.''
President Reagan, the most extreme nuclear abolitionist who
was ever President of this country, said, before he was
President, during his presidency, and after, he said--he called
for the abolishment of all nuclear weapons, which he
considered--I'm quoting him--``totally irrational, totally
inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of
life on Earth and civilization.''
To my mind, we have to make the right technical decisions,
and I support them, but we also have to be careful how the
political effort that you gentleman make are going to be seen
around the world, and help push forward a nonproliferation
regime.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Payne?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. I agree with Dean Gallucci, that the
lowest number of nuclear weapons compatible with security
should be our goal. In fact, that's the goal----
Senator Sessions. I'm pretty frugal. I agree with that,
too. I don't----[Laughter.]
Dr. Payne. In fact, that's the----
Senator Sessions. From a money point of view; I'm not sure
it's going to affect the psyche of some other nation, but--
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. That's, in fact, the same goal that
the President gave to us, in the Department of Defense, as we
were pursuing the NPR, the lowest number compatible with
national security.
So, then the question becomes, What's that lowest number?
Let me just make a couple remarks in that regard.
First, with regard to President Reagan's vision of
denuclearization, let's not forget what the other half of his
vision was. That is, the condition of excellent, outstanding
defensive capabilities for the United States, its friends, and
its allies. It wasn't nuclear--a nuclear-free world in the
absence of those defenses; it was a potential for a nuclear-
free world in the context of those defenses. So, as we think
about these visions of moving forward, let's not get out of
sync if we're going to use President Reagan as the model of how
we want to talk about this.
Second point concerns the notion that the lower we go with
regard to nuclear weapons, the more capable you are of de-
legitimizing nuclear weapons for others; that's essentially the
notion that we've talked about. Let me just note--and I tried
to represent this in my prepared remarks--that if lowering
numbers of nuclear weapons de-legitimizes our--the credibility
of our extended deterrent, then that's going to promote
proliferation. It's not going to prevent proliferation, it's
going to promote proliferation, because our extended deterrent,
as I mentioned earlier, is, I believe, the single most
important nonproliferation tool in existence. To maintain the
credibility of our extended nuclear deterrence is the single
most important thing we can do to contribute to
nonproliferation. The example that I used earlier is the
concern that the Japanese now have over the threat that they
face and the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. Japanese
representatives have now been explicit with regard to what that
means for them and the possibility that they might be
interested in a nuclear weapon. So, that connection between our
extended nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation is profound,
and its importance for our nonproliferation goal, I think,
cannot be overstated.
Let me suggest the next point, and that is, I don't
believe, for a moment, that lowering our levels of nuclear
weapons is going to have a positive effect on so-called rogue
states and their desire for nuclear weapons. Remember, when we
think about trying to engage in nuclear nonproliferation,
trying to get states that don't want to have nuclear weapons in
the first place, or cannot have nuclear weapons isn't the hard
problem; the hard problem is trying to move states who want
nuclear weapons away from having them. Those, in the
contemporary world, look like Iran and North Korea. Those are
the states of concern. They don't want nuclear weapons because
we have nuclear weapons. They don't mimic us, in that sense.
They want nuclear weapons for lots of reasons of their own.
Whether we have an arsenal that looks like 1,000 weapons or
4,000 weapons, I don't think is going to have a bit of an
effect on the desire for--by either Iran or North Korea to have
nuclear weapons.
Senator Sessions. If we had negotiations with North Korea,
and we cut our numbers down to 500, and they had 300 or 250,
wouldn't that change the tenor of those negotiations?
Dr. Payne. Sir, remember that the----
Senator Sessions. Then, if they got to 500, wouldn't that
be somewhat different, also?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir, it would. If you look at the reason
why they want nuclear weapons, to the extent that they discuss
it, it has much more to do with our conventional prowess, which
is second to none in the world. They want nuclear weapons, in a
sense, to be able to trump our conventional capability. It has
nothing to do with the nature of our nuclear arsenal.
Then, lets just conclude--and I appreciate the time, sir--
it is that we don't know the future. One of the reasons to be
careful about nuclear reductions is because we don't know the
future. If we give up force structure now, it's going to be
extremely hard, and extremely expensive, to ever get that force
structure back. If my crystal ball were good enough to say it's
going to be a benign future, we know Russia's going to move in
a good direction, we know China's going to move in a good
direction, then we could commit to these kind of reductions
that are being discussed. But no one's crystal ball's that
good, and, in a sense, we need to retain the force structure
now to be able to reconstitute if the future moves in a less
benign direction, because if we give up that force structure
now, as I said, it'll be very expensive and very hard to ever
get it back.
Senator Sessions. I think those are good comments. I
certainly would like to keep our numbers down. But I don't want
a major misconception to occur in the world that somehow this
country lacks the will to use the power we have to defend this
Nation, and that anybody that steps over a certain line is
subject, in itself, to assured destruction. I mean, I think
that's just where we are. We need to have that. I worry a
little bit that everything that's proposed in the strategic
area is opposed, and we have a hard time passing it.
I would note that we really are reducing our weapons. You
go out to the Pantex plant in Texas, and there are warehouses
and warehouses and bins of dismantled and destroyed warheads.
We're melting down those things. We really are making a
historic move. I would note, for the record, that there's no
special-effects nuclear-weapons proposals to develop that now.
The robust nuclear earth penetrator was not funded. Congress
did not accept that. The RRW conceptual design selected is very
similar to the historical designs, and has a connection
pedigree to hundreds of nuclear weapons tests conducted in the
1950s and 1960s. So, I think we probably could do that without
testing.
But I would just say, Mr. Chairman, I think it's a healthy
discussion. It is a healthy discussion. I would maybe ask, with
a follow-up written question--my time is limited--but, what
about the Triad? How much of that is still necessary today, the
money that's spent there? Is there some better utilization of
that for our national defense?
[The information referred to follows:]
I believe that the current Department of Defense (DOD) strategy for
the nuclear triad makes sense. The DOD has reduced the size of each of
the legs of the nuclear triad and is making the remaining force
structure more flexible. For example, since the beginning of this
administration, the DOD has reduced the number of deployable ballistic
missile submarines from 18 to 12 (4 have been converted to cruise
missile submarines, 2 will typically be in overhaul and unavailable for
deployment). To add flexibility to the remaining ballistic missile
submarine force, DOD has proposed developing and deploying precision
conventional warheads on some Trident missiles on each of the deployed
submarines. The size of the long-range bomber force has also been
reduced. The size of the remaining bomber force is based on needs for
conventional weapon roles in major combat contingencies. In addition,
the ICBM force has been reduced in size; all Peacekeeper missiles have
been retired. Only one type of ICBM--the Minuteman III--remains. A
nuclear triad at much lower combined force levels than existed during
the Cold War makes sense. But the many good reasons for maintaining a
nuclear triad remain. For example, the existence of a triad helps to
ensure that no existing or potential opponent can envisage a successful
competition in nuclear arms or a practicable strategy of eliminating
the U.S. deterrent via offensive operation. These are potentially
critical contributions to U.S. and allied security. As I stated
earlier, we must be careful as we consider further reductions in the
triad force structure so that we don't cut the force too deeply and
find ourselves in an unintended position of weakness that invites
challenges and provocations.
Senator Sessions. I'd just ask one question for our
experts, briefly, if you would. Can a nation today--let's say a
closed, or even an open nation today--develop a nuclear weapon
without us knowing it? I mean, how hard is it for a country to
develop, secretly, a nuclear weapons program?
Dr. Gallucci?
Dr. Gallucci. I think the answer is certainly yes to that
question, depending on the Nation. If the Nation already has
fissile-material production facilities--in other words, it's
separating plutonium, particularly if it's a certain kind of
reactor that's producing the plutonium, if it has an enrichment
facility, then the possibility of producing the weapon secretly
is there. This could be an advanced country, or it could be a
country that is not so advanced if it has those facilities.
While I have the floor, Senator, so that I don't have a
really terrible afternoon, let me say that at no point did I
wish to convey that our decisions, or your decisions, about
what we do with our force posture are going to have a
particularly important effect on decisions that are made in
Pyongyang or Tehran or these hard cases. But this discussion
today, this hearing, was really about our broad force posture,
as I understood it, and, when we're thinking about something
like that, we have to think that there are 9 nuclear-weapon
states in the world, the 5 declared and the other 4, and there
are not 90. But there are 189 countries out there, and we'd
like to continue to have to worry about what North Korea and
Iran are doing, and not 40 or 50 other countries. So, I think,
while the body-posture issue--argument I was making is really,
you're quite right, irrelevant to the few hard cases who are
going to make these kinds of regional decisions of their own,
there are a lot of other countries out there which have decided
not to acquire nuclear weapons, that could acquire them. I
associate myself with Dr. Payne's comment here, that our
ability to extend deterrence is absolutely critical, and that
has to be on the list of missions that our weapons need to be
able to accomplish. So, I believe that's true. I don't believe
we are particularly suspect with respect to extended
deterrence, but I do believe that he is absolutely correct that
that is something that we need to sustain.
Thank you.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is there unanimity in the panel on the
proposition that less nations having nuclear weapons is a good
thing? [Nodding of heads.]
Okay. Is there unanimity in the panel that less weapons
possessed by the United States and Russia is a good thing?
Dr. Drell. To a point.
Dr. Gallucci. To a point.
Senator Bill Nelson. To a point.
Dr. Payne. With conditions, yes.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. For the record, state,
Doctor, what does ``to a point'' mean? Dr. Payne, state what
``with conditions'' means.
Dr. Drell. I said ``to a point.'' If I don't know--it
depends upon the--how big the band of uncertainty is about what
other countries have. I want to have a deterrent. I want to
have extended deterrence. I want to have deterrence. It depends
upon, again, the uncertainties out there. I don't want to be
the weak one.
Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Payne?
Dr. Payne. I agree, we don't want to give up deterrence, we
don't want to give up extended deterrence, we don't want to
give up the assurance that the nuclear weapons provide, or the
dissuasive effect that nuclear weapon provide. With regard to
the conditions, I mentioned the--just briefly ago, that one of
the conditions associated with moving down to variable levels
of nuclear weapons should very effective defenses. Although the
NPR called for the United States to move toward very effective
defenses against--at least against limited threats, I should
say we're not there yet.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Well, on the flip side of
this, those other countries are asking the same thing. Do their
nuclear weapons deter us? I would take it that certainly what
we've seen in North Korea is that they think that they're going
to get something from the fact that they have developed nuclear
weapons. So, do their nuclear weapons deter the U.S.?
Dr. Gallucci. Senator, from what? The issue with deterrence
is--one of the issues is what you are hoping to deter. I think
we could be pretty confident, unless one drew the conclusion
that there was clearly irrationality and insanity in the
leadership, we could be pretty confident that we will not be
attacked--the United States of America will not be attacked by
North Korea. But there are so many other consequences of the
North Korean nuclear weapons program which threaten our
security, and that of our allies, that engaging in a
negotiation to try to get rid of those weapons is very
sensible. But the particular concern that they will mate these
weapons with their extended-range ballistic missile and
directly attack the United States of America isn't high on my
list of things to worry about. There are many more things that
come from this that I'm more concerned about.
Senator Bill Nelson. That's, of course, what most of us
feel. I'm trying to look at it from the other side. The idea
goes to the legitimization of nuclear weapons. When is the idea
of a nuclear strike not feasible? Is deterring the United
States a motivator on smaller nations, other than Russia and
China?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir, I believe it is. A motivator for them
to want nuclear weapons? Is that the question?
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes.
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. I believe that seeking a deterrent
capability is a motivator for both Iran and North Korea, for
example.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Then, that being the case, what
is the greatest incentive that we can give to them for not
having nuclear weapons?
Dr. Payne. The greatest incentive that we could have, sir,
would be to do away with our conventional forces that are the
basis for their desire to have a nuclear capability to deter
us. That would be the greatest thing we could do. I suspect
that it would be a mistake to do that.
Dr. Gallucci. Wait. No, wait. But if we can----
Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci?
Dr. Gallucci.--carry on this conversation. I believe that
both the North Koreans and the Iranians are interested in
having a nuclear capability, for a variety of reasons. One of
the reasons is to be able to deter the United States from using
its conventional forces, either in the region or directly
against them. But that's not all. I would put forward the
proposition that the Iranians are truly interested in a
hegemonic political position in the Gulf, and the acquisition
of nuclear weapons would help them achieve that political
objective, so that they are not simply interested in deterring
us. That's why I believe they are a harder negotiating target
than is North Korea. I do believe that North Korea is
principally interested in regime survival, and is looking to
deal with us, as a possible advocate of regime change in North
Korea, and a negotiation that persuaded them that their
security needs could be met through a relationship with the
United States might lead them to give up these weapons. Iran, I
regard as having a slightly more challenging set of objectives.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right, let's talk about the RRW.
If we agree that, generally, with the conditions that you've
placed on it, that it is desirable for us to reduce the number
of nuclear weapons that we have, along with Russia, since we
have plenty to blow ourselves up with, is the RRW--number one,
is it safer? Are its component parts safer, so that it lessens
the possibility of an accident? Is its reliability sufficient
so that all of these nuclear weapons that we have in reserve,
because we're not sure of the reliability, since they're
degrading over time, that we would be able to significantly
reduce our arsenal with the new RRW? Let's discuss that.
Dr. Drell. I believe that point has yet to be made. But let
me say, my starting position is, our weapons are safe. In 1990,
I led a study for the House Armed Services Committee, backed by
the Senate Armed Services Committee, with Johnny Foster and Dr.
Townes, the inventor of the laser--there was a three-man
committee, and we came to the conclusion that the weapons to be
in our enduring stockpile meet all the official safety criteria
that are in our policy.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. I think everybody feels
that that's the case. Now, are they reliable?
Dr. Drell. I'm coming. Since the moratorium on testing
started, in 1992, first by President George H.W. Bush, and then
continued by President Clinton, we have had a very extensive
multifaceted stockpile stewardship program that has gone into
understanding the scientific--underlying processes in our
weapons. We didn't do that to the full extent during the
buildup of the first 50 years, because we were always changing
the weapons, improving them, until we got to a point where the
weapons really were quite robust. We now understand those
weapons better, we have done extensive surveillance, extensive
forensics, pulling them apart year by year, and we have, in my
mind, increased our confidence in the reliability of the
stockpile, at least mine, as a scientist who's worked these
issues, because we understand them better, we know what to look
for, and we have, in my mind, better confidence that if
something's going wrong, the bells will ring, and we'll hear
them. There have been findings--there are always findings when
you build a weapon, because there are mistakes made in the
production, there are birth defects that we discover. We've
found them. I believe it is a fair statement that there is no
significant aging of the weapons that has been found. I believe
the stockpile, currently, is safe and reliable, and is not
aging.
Now, that doesn't mean one can be complacent. One would
like to improve them. In particular, in the world of terrorism,
where a bad guy may get his hands on one of these weapons, if I
can do anything to give them better use control, meaning that a
bad guy getting one of my weapons cannot use it against me, I
want to do that. But I believe firmly, as I said in my
testimony, and based upon not just opinions, but work, that the
ability to improve any one of these three categories has to be
rigorously understood. Can we do it and have greater
confidence? We have a stockpile which is built on a thousand-
plus tests. To think it's easy to have greater confidence when
you make some changes in a system like this, without testing,
that's quite a statement, and I think that has to be--that's
the statement where I say: I don't know the answer to your
question, but we'd better find out before we go down the road,
because clearly if we go down that road and we're building new
weapons, and we give the impression that it's important for us
to continue to modernize and improve, that does not, in my
mind, help our nonproliferation goals. I think they are
important.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do either of you know the answer? Is a
replacement warhead that isn't going to be tested--is that
reliable? Do either of you have the answer to that?
Dr. Gallucci. No, Senator, I don't.
Dr. Payne. No.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, that's a question we have to
answer.
Dr. Drell. I think it has to be answered, and I think
that's going to be a very important part of the debate here in
Congress. First of all, it's a very important part of the
weapons establishment and those of us involved in seeing that
that question gets the highest attention and that we come back
to Washington with an answer in which we are confident and has
a consensus. Because I see no reason not to make the weapons
safer, if I can with confidence, or more reliable, if I can
with confidence, or with better use control. I don't see that's
a vice.
Senator Bill Nelson. But if it were not reliable and had to
be tested, the opinion would be you don't go to an RRW. Is
that----
Dr. Drell. Unless we found some deficiency from our
surveillance and life extension program which demands a change.
That's why I said, don't savage those programs in pushing the
RRW. Maintain the high quality that they have had for the last
decade.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, until we know whether this whole
thing is feasible, how much life extension should we go
through?
Dr. Drell. We have to--for the weapons that are in the
stockpile, we have to keep our eyes on the ball ,and we have to
say that the W-76, the W-88, the W-87, that these weapons,
which are part of our deterrent, however much we want that
deterrent to be, they are reliable, period. We don't give up on
that, in my mind.
Senator Bill Nelson. In your opinion, if we determine that
they are reliable with this life extension, then we can reduce
the existing stockpile.
Dr. Drell. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Senator Bill Nelson. Any different opinions there? [No
response.]
Since you all are the experts, is there any kind of rush
going on to complete this feasibility study on the RRW?
Dr. Drell. I--well, I'll stop talking in a minute, but let
me just say--I don't see the signal yet that appears that
there's an aging signal that's of concern. In fact, it was
widely reported that the weapons labs reassessed the lifetime
of the plutonium pits, and the Jason Group did its own
independent work, which I was involved with. We now know that
that concern about plutonium aging, because of the radioactive
environment and its impact on the pits, is not a problem that
can't be handled. It's--the lifetime now is of the order of a
century. It was thought to be less so, I don't see any aging
problem, and we are doing--we are--we're doing things--have
been, for 15 years, in making the weapons more robust as we've
gone along.
Dr. Payne. I can mention, in that regard, Senator, that my
understanding is that the last generation of designers and
engineers with direct test experience will largely be
retiring----
Dr. Drell. Yes.
Dr. Payne. --within the next 5 years. So, I think there is
a near-term opportunity, perhaps a fleeting opportunity, to
transfer the knowledge from these experienced scientists with
direct test knowledge and experience to the next generation of
designers. I think that could be important.
Dr. Drell. Let--if I may comment on that, because----
Senator Bill Nelson. Certainly.
Dr. Drell.--I think it's very important that we maintain
experts who know what they're doing in the labs. I think that
if you look at the money that's been invested in the program
over the last 15 years, with new instruments for much more
detailed surveillance and analysis, simulations, the best
computers, the possibility of doing underground subcritical
tests in Nevada, where you don't generate a chain reaction, but
in which you study the effects of explosives on plutonium
prepared in different ways, these are all part of a very
multifaceted program that is challenging to the scientists.
There are--there is something visceral about saying, ``I'm
going to blow out the side of a mountain.'' We all know that.
But I think, in terms of scientists learning the trade, the
ability to do the detailed new codes, high-fidelity, three-
dimensional explosion codes, with the world's best
supercomputers, now having the National Ignition Facility--it's
going to give us data, where these codes can be tested in areas
they've never been tested before, much more like bomb
material--there is a good program, and I think attention is
being paid to get very good scientists, and mentor them. I
don't think that is a detonation of a new bomb is necessary,
but it is necessary to have the management of the labs pay good
attention to the problem that Dr. Payne raises. It is a
concern. I think it's being addressed properly.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let's talk about numbers of weapons.
Should the numbers in the arsenal be determined by specific
targets?
Dr. Payne. I don't believe so, sir. There was the Cold War
approach to looking at the numbers required typically had to do
with the number of targets in the Soviet Union. What that meant
was that we defined ``deterrence'' in a numbers game. We also
then defined our strategic requirements from that same numbers
game. But, as I mentioned earlier, the relationship of numbers
to deterrence, and deterrence effect, is something now that's
very uncertain. The role of our strategic nuclear forces is
well beyond deterrence. So, if we want to think about the
numbers in general, if there's a--if there were a diagram to
how we think about numbers, it wouldn't have so much to do with
the number of targets, per se--that's, in a sense, the way we
looked at it in the Cold War--but it would be the numbers that
we think are important for dissuasion, for assurance,
particularly extended nuclear deterrence, and the numbers that
we think, then, are also associated with deterrence, as well as
we can know them. So, it really isn't any longer just a numbers
game. We treated it that way during the Cold War, and,
fortunately, deterrence didn't fail. But we need to think about
it much more broadly now.
Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead, Dr. Gallucci.
Dr. Gallucci. I've never built a SIOP, so I don't have any
hands-on experience in this. But I would be surprised if
numbers were not still very important--first, for the mission
which I think is the most critical, which is the deterrent
mission. I'm really unclear and unsteady and concerned about
Dr. Payne's reference to the ``other missions.'' That's what I
tried to address in my remarks earlier. I'm comfortable with an
absolute insistence that whatever capability exists,
independent of Russian intentions, but whatever capability
exists in Russia by the usual standards, that we do the
counting and we figure that we have a secure, survivable,
second-strike deterrent. So, I'm still up for those numbers.
Additional missions for these nuclear weapons, I think my
view is generally that they are the lesser and included cases--
that we have small-yield weapons to accomplish some other
missions, which I think are really, for me at least, very
limited. I am not interested in using nuclear weapons in a
first-strike mode to go after some hard targets. I do believe
that the deterrent mission after an attack, even by a
terrorist, where you wanted to gain the deterrent advantage
against that country that might have transferred the material,
is sort of a new mission. But my thinking still is that,
fundamentally, we are looking at a secure deterrent, and one
that is credible for the purpose of extended deterrence. I
think I'm still there.
Dr. Drell. Just very briefly, I think whatever deterrent
value our weapons have against the terrorists, if they see us
with 20 weapons, I don't know if they'll be deterred. But I
don't think the difference between 20 and 500 matters that much
to the terrorists. To other states who have--want to survive, I
look at what 20 weapons would do to 20 cities in this country,
and I feel very comfortable that if we had 500, we'd have one
helluva deterrent. So, there is a point where numbers get
important, but I don't think we're near that yet, the large----
Senator Bill Nelson. All right, you're saying 500 instead
of 5,000.
Dr. Drell. That's right.
Senator Bill Nelson. Right.
Dr. Payne. Sir, could I comment? Because I don't want to be
misinterpreted here. First, I don't think that numbers are
unimportant. I think the numbers can be important. The point I
was trying to make is that they don't tell the whole story. The
additional missions that I was referring to have nothing to do
with the tactical, or otherwise, use of nuclear weapons, per
se. What I was talking about are the broad defensive goals of
dissuasion and assurance, assuring our allies that--of our
commitment, so they aren't interested in pursuing nuclear
weapons, themselves, for example. So, when you look at the type
of methodology that we want to pursue when we're thinking about
numbers, it shouldn't just be tied back to deterrence and
specific target numbers. That's what I meant. It needs to be
broadened out, looking at all of these functions that nuclear
weapons can help provide--and, again, not for a moment talking
about pre-emption or tactical use of nuclear weapons. That's
not what I was referring to.
Senator Bill Nelson. What about the concept of the Triad,
as we have used it--submarines, ICBMs and airplanes--as a
deterrent; multiple means of delivering nuclear weapons?
Dr. Drell. I believe in the value of diversity. Absolutely,
I wouldn't give it up.
Dr. Gallucci. I agree.
Dr. Payne. Absolutely.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, let's assume that we proceeded
down this road that we were going to have a SLBM that would be
non-nuclear. Should all of the submarine-launched ballistic
missiles be non-nuclear?
Dr. Gallucci. Since my principal concern is of the
ambiguity of a launch from a strategic platform, like a
Trident, there are various things that we could do to try to
reduce that concern, and I'd start by designating a particular
submarine as conventional, and not mixing. I mean, that's where
I'd start. I don't know that that would do the trick, but
that's where I'd start.
Dr. Drell. I have no higher confidence in any part of our
defense than I do in the Navy's Trident program. That naval
nuclear program has been the outstanding program through its
history. But I feel a lot better with just no mix on the same
boat, nevertheless.
Dr. Payne. Yes, I certainly wouldn't convert the entire
SLBM force to conventional weapons.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you all very much. It's been an
engaging discussion, and thank you for lending your expertise
to us.
Again, Dr. Drell, thank you for coming all the way from
California.
Dr. Drell. Thank you for the opportunity, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. May I ask one further question? Would
you all be willing to accept some additional questions that
would be answered for the record?
Dr. Payne. Sure.
Dr. Gallucci. Yes, sir.
Dr. Drell. Sure.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Thank you very much. The hearing
is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
DETERRENCE
1. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
during the Cold War, both the United States and Soviet Union had
nuclear arsenals that ranged in the tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons. The large numbers were predicated on the mutual ability to
ride out a massive attack and mount a massive attack or counter
attacks. Multiple warheads were needed for each of the thousands of
targets. Mutually assured destruction (MAD) kept the two of us from
entering in a war with one another. Thankfully, MAD is gone but
deterrence theory remains. Does the idea of deterrence still drive the
U.S. requirement for nuclear weapons?
Dr. Gallucci. The principal requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons
remains deterrence. Although the political context has changed over the
last 20 years, particularly with respect to our assessment of the
intentions of the leadership in Moscow and Beijing, we must be certain
that we have the nuclear forces to deter a nuclear attack from Russia
or China. If we can do that, all other plausible missions for our
forces will fall into the category of ``lesser included cases.''
Dr. Drell. The answer seems to be yes. The only rationale I know
for our retaining between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed strategic forces,
according to SORT, or the Treaty of Moscow negotiated in 2002, plus
several thousand more in Reserve, is to deter an equal number still
retained by Russia. They also may be viewed as a deterrent against the
use of nuclear weapons by the other nuclear powers not closely allied
to us, namely China and perhaps Pakistan and India; and soon, if not
already, North Korea. In these cases the numbers could be an order of
magnitude smaller, given their own limited forces.
Dr. Payne. The four defense goals that contribute to U.S. strategic
force requirements are deterrence, assurance, dissuasion, and defeat.
2. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
whom are we deterring with nuclear weapons, countries or terrorists?
Dr. Gallucci. I do not see a way that we can directly deter
terrorists from attacking the U.S. by threatening a nuclear strike.
However, we may be able to deter a nation from transferring a nuclear
weapon or fissile material to a terrorist group by threatening to treat
that nation as the attacker if a terrorist uses a weapon or material
from that nation in an attack on us.
Dr. Drell. It is difficult to think that terrorists are deferrable
by nuclear weapons. They operate with standards that differ from that
of the civilized world in general, and are even suicidal in many
actions. Also the number of targets they present is so small that
anything beyond a force of only a few nuclear weapons is irrelevant. So
I would suggest that it is nations, and in particular the ones
mentioned in question 1, that one may think we are deterring.
Dr. Payne. We hope to deter the leaderships of hostile countries
and terrorist organizations.
3. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
what states pose serious threats of a nuclear attack and can they be
deterred?
Dr. Gallucci. I do not think any nation currently poses a serious
threat of a nuclear attack on the United States. Both Russia and China
have the capability, but neither has the intention. Intentions, though,
can change more quickly than capabilities.
Dr. Drell. They are Russia, and China which presently has only a
handful or two of long range nuclear weapons that can reach U.S.
territory, but is building more. I find it difficult to see a role for
our nuclear forces in deterring India or Pakistan. One can argue that
perhaps, if it were not for our nuclear forces, North Korea might view
taking aggressive military actions without fear of nuclear reprisal,
despite our overwhelming conventional strength. The same goes for Iran.
Dr. Payne. Countries with self-expressed hostility toward the
United States, a plausible flashpoint, and nuclear capabilities include
most prominently North Korea and China. The potential for an escalating
crisis with North Korea or China appears now to be most plausible.
4. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, is
the idea of deterring a specific state or entity valid or should we
look at a nuclear capability to deter an unknown actor?
Dr. Gallucci. We should first be certain of our ability to deter
Russia and China--specifically taking account of the size and character
of their forces. If we can do that, we will be able to deter any
conceivable rising power in the Middle East or Asia.
Dr. Drell. I think the idea of deterring a nuclear power has merit
still in today's world, but for an unknown actor I believe strong
conventional forces are more relevant.
Dr. Payne. The goal of attempting to deter specific states or
entities is valid and necessary. We also must recognize that
international relations are highly dynamic and we may in the future
need to deter opponents not currently identified as such.
5. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
nuclear deterrence must be part of a much larger package of
conventional military capabilities, diplomatic initiatives, economic
and trade relationships, and many other tools to ensure security. Is it
possible to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence and
security?
Dr. Gallucci. We have been reducing the role of nuclear weapons in
security strategy by responding to the changing political context and
reducing the size of nuclear forces. In theory, we could eliminate
nuclear weapons, if others did likewise. In practice, we can and should
continue to reduce the number of nuclear weapons we deploy as Russia
does the same. The less we depend upon nuclear weapons to achieve our
security objectives, the more credible and effective will be our
efforts to limit the acquisition of nuclear weapons by others.
Dr. Drell. I think it is in our interest to reduce the role of
nuclear weapons in deterrence and security. Diplomatic incentives and
our overwhelming conventional strength remain quite relevant, and our
non-nuclear military forces should remain strong and capable of meeting
our foreign policy and national security goals. Given the danger of the
spread of nuclear weapons and the spread of technology making more
countries capable of acquiring that knowledge and entering the nuclear
club, we should be working on trying to escape the nuclear deterrence
trap. A more constructive way to view the problem would be for the
United States to work to rekindle the vision of the 1986 Reykjavik
Summit, as expressed by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary
Mikhail Gorbachev, and take steps toward working to rid the world of
nuclear weapons. These are outlined in my testimony.
Dr. Payne. The deterrence role for U.S. nuclear weapons is
determined in large part by the context of a crisis, the character and
goals of opponents, and U.S. deterrence goals. Each of these factors is
likely to change depending on the context and opponent. Consequently,
the value of nuclear weapons for deterrence is not static or entirely
predictable. In some past cases, U.S. nuclear weapons were essential
for deterrence, it would be optimistic to believe that they will not
continue to be so in some future occasions.
CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE
6. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, can
the United States deter others with conventional weapons?
Dr. Gallucci. Deterrence means dissuading others from doing
something they would otherwise do by threatening unacceptable
consequences if they do it. We can never be sure when it works--only
when it fails.
I think U.S. unconventional forces often deter adversaries from
action. We have used our conventional forces many times in past
decades, and have thus demonstrated our credibility to act when our
interests are threatened.
Dr. Drell. The answer I believe is yes, except perhaps for Russia
and China in today's world.
Dr. Payne. In some plausible cases, non-nuclear deterrence threats
are likely to be adequate and more credible than nuclear threats. In
other plausible cases, U.S. nuclear capabilities are likely to he
necessary for deterrence.
7. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, are
countries deterred with conventional weapons?
Dr. Gallucci. Countries may be deterred by threat of a conventional
strike, depending on the stakes and the credibility of the threat.
Dr. Drell. Except for Russia and China the answer I believe is yes.
I believe terrorists can be deterred with conventional weapons when
they understand that the United States is willing to use such weapons
to prevent them from carrying out terrorist or aggressive actions
against our allies and our interests. They must know that the use of
conventional force to protect our interests and our security is a
policy we are committed to and will enforce. In contrast, for nuclear
weapons the highest goal is to prevent their use.
Dr. Payne. See above.
8. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, are
terrorists, even though viewed to be nondeterrable, ever deterred with
conventional weapons?
Dr. Gallucci. It is not unreasonable to think that terrorists will
limit their operations out of a concern that they might suffer an
effective conventional counterstrike.
Dr. Drell. Yes, if they know we will use them to prevent them from
achieving their goals; and they fear our ability to destroy them if
they try.
Dr. Payne. Over the past 200 years there have been numerous cases
in which terrorists have been deterred with conventional weapons. In
other eases, terrorists have not been directly deferrable, but they
have been deterred indirectly via pressure on their sponsors. There is
at least one reported case of this indirect deterrence of terrorists
via nuclear threats.
CONVENTIONAL TRIDENT
9. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, the
administration has proposed development of a conventional Trident
missile to support a notion of prompt global strike--the ability to
strike anywhere on the earth in less than 60 minutes. Assuming that the
issues associated with nuclear ambiguity could be resolved, in other
words not mistaking a conventional Trident for a nuclear Trident, does
this type of capability deter a state or a non-state actor?
Dr. Gallucci. On the assumption of the elimination of nuclear
ambiguity, this type of capability could deter a state or non-state
actor from some activities.
Dr. Drell. I believe prompt global strike has a potential role
against a target that can be located very accurately within the small
kill radius of a conventional explosion, even if it is mobile. That
capability may prevent or deter a hostile act of great consequence.
This is likely to be most effective against a terrorist within a state
that does not have full control over its territory, but also against a
rogue state willing to take aggressive actions against our interests
and to suffer the consequences.
Dr. Payne. It is literally impossible for anyone to predict with
precision what will or will not deter an unspecified opponent, in an
unspecified context, over unspecified stakes. There certainly are
plausible scenarios in which conventional Trident could contribute to
deterrence.
10. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
would any Prompt Global Strike capability have any deterrent effect?
Dr. Gallucci. See response to question 9.
Dr. Drell. It is not inconceivable that it would complicate a
possible action if the perpetrator felt that self survival is not
assured. To that extent it would have a deterrent effect, but I think
the overall deterrent effect would not be very large.
Dr. Payne. Please see the response to question 9 above.
TAILORED DETERRENCE
11. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, a
new concept to come out of the National Security Strategy and the 2001
Nuclear Posture Review is ``tailored deterrence.'' DOD joint operating
concept documents define tailored deterrence as the development of
strategies, plans, and operations that are tailored to the perception,
values, and interests of specific adversaries. Do nuclear weapons play
a role in tailored deterrence?
Dr. Gallucci. If the concept would require re-emphasizing nuclear
weapons by producing special effects weapons, the benefit of being
``tailored'' would not outweigh the costs of asserting the utility of
nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterrence.
Dr. Drell. I believe deterrence must be restricted to preventing
the use of nuclear weapons against us and our interests. The form of a
threat that we want to deter cannot be accurately predicted, and
therefore a certain degree of flexibility is needed. Among other things
the deterrent must be capable of a wide range of strike intensities and
locations. That is what ``tailored deterrence'' means to me.
Dr. Payne. Certainly. For opponents who are highly cost- and risk-
tolerant, U.S. nuclear deterrence may be a necessary part of defining
an approach to deterrence that has a reasonable chance of ``working''
as we would hope. This conclusion is not simply speculation; it is
supported by historical evidence.
DISSUASION
12. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
the December 2001 Nuclear Posture talks about nuclear dissuasion--what
is the difference between deterrence and dissuasion?
Dr. Gallucci. I have no idea.
Dr. Drell. Dissuasion means to discourage planning for potential
actions not in our interest, such as an opponent trying to build up
military forces and strength equal to, or greater than, our own. This
can be done diplomatically or by undertaking our own build-up to a
point that it sets a level very difficult to match. Deterrence I view
as preventing an attack, particularly by nuclear weapons if we are
talking nuclear deterrence, by making clear that the attack cannot
achieve its goal and that damage caused by our retaliation will make it
not in the interest of the would-be attacker to proceed. As quoted in
the Bush administration's National Security Strategy: ``[o]ur forces
will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a
military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the
United States.''
Dr. Payne. The goal of dissuasion is different than deterrence.
Dissuasion attempts to prevent crises and challenges before they emerge
by discouraging opponents over the long-term from choosing broad
courses of weapon acquisition and foreign policy that might put them in
conflict with U.S. interests. Deterrence typically involves the
prevention of more specific actions over a shorter timeline.
13. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, is
dissuasion a valid theory?
Dr. Gallucci. See response to question 12.
Dr. Drell. Dissuasion is a policy goal to be achieved through
diplomacy, backed by strength. It may succeed or, oppositely, stimulate
an arms race. I have not seen any convincing implementation of a policy
of nuclear dissuasion that was achieved by a nuclear build-up.
Dr. Payne. Yes. in principle, it precedes the goal of deterrence on
a timeline and. if successful, eases the challenges to deterrence.
OTHER COUNTRIES
14. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
what is the role of Russia in United States nuclear policy?
Dr. Gallucci. Russian nuclear forces should still be the basis for
decisions about the size and character of our strategic nuclear forces.
Dr. Drell. On December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush stated
``the greatest threats to both our countries come not from each other,
or from other big powers in the world, but from terrorists who strike
without warning, or rogue states who seeks weapons of mass
destruction.'' The joint statement of a new relationship between the
United States and Russia signed by Presidents Bush and Putin on
November 13, 2001 stated that `The United States and Russia have
overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other
as enemy or threat.'' He went on to call for ``the creation of a new
strategic framework to ensure the mutual security of the United States
and Russia and the world community.'' In the note announcing U.S.
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on December 13, 2001, the President said
``We have entered into a new strategic relation with Russia that is
cooperative rather than adversarial.'' These are examples of a number
of statements during 2001 and 2002 in which the United States and
Russia marked the formal end of the era of mutual nuclear deterrence
between the two countries. Clearly that has not yet been fully
implemented as a policy.
Dr. Payne. The United States must be in a position to deter Russia
if it chooses a future course of hostility and competition. Whether
Russia will choose this course or a more cooperative, benign future is
an open question. The United States must encourage the former and be
prepared for the latter. Pan of that preparation is maintaining a
flexible nuclear base that can adjust as necessary to meet future
threat developments.
15. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
what is the role of China?
Dr. Gallucci. We should be certain that the nuclear forces needed
to deter Russia will also deter China.
Dr. Drell. It would appear that deterrence remains a basis of U.S./
China policy although the disparity in numbers of their weapons is very
large. It is generally viewed that our nuclear weapons are a deterrent
against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Dr. Payne. It is important that the United States be able to deter
the expressed Chinese willingness to use force, e.g.. nuclear weapons
in a crisis over Taiwan, to assure U.S. Asian allies who feel
vulnerable to Chinese nuclear threats, including Japan, and to dissuade
China from choosing the course of nuclear arms competition. U.S.
nuclear capabilities and nuclear infrastructure may be critical to each
of these deterrence and dissuasion goals.
16. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
what are the roles of France and Great Britain?
Dr. Gallucci. I do no think that French and British nuclear forces
remain important to their defense, to ours or to the NATO Alliance.
Dr. Drell. I believe the roles of France and Great Britain are to
maintain a seat at the table of the nuclear powers with their nuclear
forces, and to provide an independent NATO deterrent against invasion
from the east.
Dr. Payne. The French and British independent nuclear deterrents
arc in the process of being modernized and upgraded and may contribute
to the U.S. goals of deterrence, assurance and dissuasion.
17. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell and Dr. Payne,
what are the roles of India, Pakistan, and Israel as non-parties to the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or any future states that might pull out
of the NPT?
Dr. Gallucci. India, Pakistan, and Israel had been the only
countries with nuclear weapons, apart form the original five countries
recognized in the NPT. North Korea claims to have withdrawn from the
Treaty, but plausibly will rejoin if the agreement of 13 February 2007
holds. India will receive special status and legitimatizing if the
administration's proposed deal is accepted by New Delhi.
The India deal could turn out to be the biggest foreign policy
mistake of the Bush administration. Intended to recognize India's
strategic importance to the United States, the deal could end up
legitimatizing nuclear weapon status for former NPT parties who are
otherwise generally responsible countries. Candidates are: Japan, South
Korea, Argentina, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia; others would follow.
Dr. Drell. India, Pakistan, and Israel retain nuclear weapons
because of regional instabilities which affect them directly. It is
presumed they will stay that way so long as the mutual hostilities
between India and Pakistan, and Israel and the Arab world, remain high
on the security agenda of these countries.
Dr. Payne. These countries illustrate that the international
nuclear nonproliferation regime cannot prevent the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by leadership that believe their countries to be at
risk, and who believe that nuclear weapons are necessary to address
that risk and to realize their national aspirations.
18. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
what about India and Pakistan in their role as regional nuclear weapons
states?
Dr. Gallucci. If a nuclear weapon is going to be used in a conflict
between two states, it will be used by India and/or Pakistan. As they
build their arsenals--now with an American blessing--they create the
possibility of a truly horrendous catastrophe.
Dr. Drell. See response to question 17.
Dr. Payne. See response to question 17.
19. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
what about North Korea, which might have a few weapons, 8-10 according
to some estimates, but which may be on the brink of giving up its
program?
Dr. Gallucci. North Korea's nuclear program if unchecked would
provoke Japan and South Korea to nuclear weapons acquisition. Even more
worrisome would be the sale of fissile material to a terrorist group by
this resource starved country.
Dr. Drell. It would seem to be North Korea's deterrent against
perceived threats of U.S. aggressive action, including regime change;
also a bargaining chip for economic aid and cooperation. The future of
North Korea's program is critical because if North Korea is able to
establish that it has a deliverable nuclear threat, which it has not
yet done, it will have a serious implication for a broader
proliferation of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. It would
undoubtedly encourage Japan, South Korea, and perhaps even Taiwan to go
nuclear. Such changes certainly would drive up the level of nuclear
armaments in China by a big amount. The ongoing 6 power negotiations
arc of utmost importance in an effort to prevent that from happening
and to protect the nonproliferation regime in that part of the world.
Dr. Payne. In light of North Korean nuclear capabilities, it is
critical that the United States possess sufficient nuclear forces to
extend nuclear deterrence coverage, i.e., the ``nuclear umbrella'' to
allies in the region, e.g., South Korea and Japan. In the absence of
credible U.S. nuclear assurance for Japan, there will be mounting
pressure on Tokyo to consider becoming a nuclear state itself.
20. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell and Dr. Payne,
what about Iran, which is enriching uranium at laboratory scale
currently, claims to want nuclear technology for civilian purposes
only, but continues to defy the International Atomic Energy Agency?
Dr. Gallucci. A full court diplomatic press, emphasizing carrots,
should be made to persuade Iran to suspend construction of its
enrichment facility. Sticks, in the form of sanctions, will have to be
developed with Russia aboard if they are to have any hope of working.
Ultimately, if Iran is found to be moving to enrich uranium to high
levels, and if the character of the regime has not changed, the use of
military force in the form of air strikes will have to be considered.
Dr. Drell. Iran poses a very serious threat. Its program for
enriching uranium in order to fuel reactors for civilian power, which
is its stated goal, will make it into a latent nuclear weapons country.
The technology for the one puts a nation well on the road to
accomplishing the second of those two goals. A nuclear Iran would
create even graver instabilities, not only vis-a-vis Israel, but with
the rest of the Arab world, and would most likely stimulate
proliferation among many nations in the Mideast. It is the gravest
threat that I know at the moment to the Nonproliferation Treaty and the
nonproliferation regime.
Dr. Payne. At this point, Iran appears determined to complete its
longstanding efforts to develop nuclear weapons. This will increase the
pressure for broadened extended U.S. nuclear deterrence to friends and
allies in the region who may otherwise seek their own nuclear
deterrent.
21. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
what about allies who don't have nuclear weapons, such as Japan, and
who have not developed nuclear weapons, because the U.S. deterrence
umbrella covered them?
Dr. Gallucci. I do not think the credibility of our nuclear
umbrella, the extended deterrent threat, is serious questioned.
Dr. Drell.. My main concern was expressed in the answer to question
19. Japan is a latent nuclear power that could become an explicit one
in a very short order if they doubted the U.S. deterrence umbrella or
if North Korea displayed an effective nuclear capability. This is an
example of the kind of concern that motivates the thinking expressed in
my testimony calling on the United States to try to rekindle a vision
of a nuclear free world, and to implement the set of steps spelled out
in my testimony toward achieving the conditions to make that possible.
That will be the only long-term resolution to this dilemma.
Dr. Payne. It is critical that key allies such as Japan continue to
have confidence in the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. If they loose
that confidence, according to their own statements they may feel
compelled to seek their own nuclear capabilities. This could set off a
``cascade effect'' of nuclear proliferation globally, The U.S. extended
nuclear deterrent is our single most important nonproliferation tool.
22. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
what about countries who might desire nuclear weapons but don't have a
nuclear weapons program?
Dr. Gallucci. There remains great virtue in limiting the
availability of facilities that produce fissile material, reprocessing
plants and enrichment facilities.
Dr. Drell. There are some 40 nuclear capable countries, that is
countries with reactors for civilian purposes. With the spread of
technology and the growing reluctance to accept a two-tiered world in
which there are discriminatory differences between nuclear and
nonnuclear states, I fear many of these countries will seek to develop
indigenous nuclear programs unless we and other nuclear powers
demonstrate our commitment to the goals stated in the Nonproliferation
Treaty. This calls for reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, working
toward ratifying a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and eventually toward
elimination of the weapons. I think that now becomes an urgent and
serious goal for U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy.
Dr. Payne. One of our goals is to assure those non-nuclear allies
and friends oft he U.S. commitment to their security, and thereby to
contribute to their continuing choice to remain non-nuclear. Another
goal is to dissuade those who are hostile from choosing to develop or
acquire nuclear weapons. We know that credible U.S. strategic nuclear
capabilities contribute to the assurance goal: they probably also
contribute to dissuasion as well.
TERRORISTS
23. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
conventional wisdom is that nuclear weapons don't deter terrorists. Do
you agree?
Dr. Gallucci. See response to question 2.
Dr. Drell. I believe that nuclear weapons in large numbers have
nothing to do with deterring terrorists. The existence of a small
number may make them think harder about taking aggressive hostile
actions, but their behavior so far pretty much indicates to me that
terrorists are not deterred by nuclear weapons. They are bent on
suicidal actions and willing to take actions that defy the norms of
civilized behavior as we know them.
Dr. Payne. No. Nuclear weapons may contribute to the deterrence of
terrorist organizations indirectly through their state sponsors. There
is some pertinent historical evidence demonstrating precisely this form
of indirect deterrence.
24. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
are countries who might either supply a terrorist with nuclear
materials deterred from providing such materials by U.S. nuclear
weapons?
Dr. Gallucci. See response to question 2.
Dr. Drell. I see no clear evidence of this. However diplomacy can
be valuable in providing incentives for restraints against such
actions. I think the seriousness of our diplomatic efforts to address
terrorism and at the same time reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons
will be an effective approach.
Dr. Payne. I believe U.S. nuclear capabilities are critical to the
deterrence of North Korea, which may be such a state.
A DETERRED UNITED STATES
25. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, do
nuclear weapons deter the United States? If so, under what
circumstances?
Dr. Gallucci. One could imagine the United States deciding against
the invasion of a country possessing nuclear weapons.
Dr. Drell. I recognize that nuclear weapons played a big role in
deterring potential U.S. actions during the Cold War. At present I can
speculate that measures the U.S. might initiate against countries, such
as regime change or use of preventive offensive military force, might
not be considered against countries who have nuclear weapons, even in
small numbers, that could cause harm to us. This is what makes it
urgent for the United States to make clear that our policy and
potential uses of force are such as not to give them cause to feel the
need to deter us by getting nuclear weapons.
Dr. Payne. The United Stales is susceptible to both nuclear and
non-nuclear deterrence threats. The complete vulnerability of the U.S.
civilian population to attack contributes to this susceptibility.
26. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, do
United States nuclear weapons or policy drive others to attain nuclear
weapons or impact decisions about the number of nuclear weapons they
have? If yes, what impact does or should this phenomenon have on U.S.
nuclear policy?
Dr. Gallucci. Clearly the Russians are sensitive to U.S. nuclear
weapons decisions, and we ought to take account of their possible
responses when we make such decisions. Over the long-term, if we
emphasize the utility of nuclear weapons for our security, other states
are more likely to consider such weapons for their security. That is
one reason why we should try, with the Russians, to reduce the size of
nuclear forces and avoid deploying new nuclear systems.
Dr. Drell. I think a U.S. commitment to honor the provisions of the
Nonproliferation Treaty as mentioned earlier and to reduce its
discriminatory features by reducing our nuclear arsenal, and its
relevance in our policies, will contribute to reducing interests in
other countries becoming nuclear. It is difficult to preach the virtues
of a nonproliferation regime and of staying nonnuclear if we ourselves
continue improving our nuclear arsenal and retaining large numbers.
That is why, how we limit and justify our Reliable Replacement Warhead
(RRW) program is so important, as I have testified.
Dr. Payne. In many cases, the number and type of U.S. nuclear
weapons and U.S. nuclear force policy will have no impact on decisions
to acquire nuclear weapons. The exceptions to this rule of thumb are
those countries that have been under the U.S. ``nuclear umbrella.'' If
that umbrella becomes incredible, they will feel increasing pressure to
acquire their own nuclear capabilities.
HOW MANY NUCLEAR WARHEADS
27. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, we
have talked about deterrence and that nuclear weapons play a role in
deterrence, how effective a deterrent against what types of actors will
continue to be a point of debate, but now let's talk about how many we
need. How many total weapons do we need, how many deployed, by when and
for how long?
Dr. Gallucci. I addressed numbers in my prepared statement, but I
am generally attracted to Dr. Drell's assessment.
Dr. Drell. Responses to these two questions are contained in my
study with former Ambassador James Goodby entitled ``What Are Nuclear
Weapons For?--Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear
Forces,'' published in April 2005 by the Arms Control Association. This
report has been submitted for inclusion in the record of these
hearings. I quote several relevant paragraphs from it: ``First, as to
the number of potential targets, we assume that Russian nuclear forces
will decrease in numbers comparable to what we are proposing for the
U.S. force. For reasons having as much to do with historical and
political baggage as with military requirements, this assumption will
be a major determinant of the size of the U.S. operationally-deployed
force, as it appears to be today. . . .''
``We estimate that a U.S. strategic force of some 500
operationally-deployed warheads would be more than adequate for
deterrence. Borrowing the notion of the Nuclear Posture Review, this
force level would be enough to provide a degree of flexibility in a
fluid security environment. This number is large enough to deal with
the targets described generically in the Nuclear Posture Review as
instruments of political control and military power . . . leadership
and military capabilities, particularly weapons of mass destruction,
military command facilities and other centers of control and
infrastructure that support military forces.' We estimate these
military targets, under the conditions we postulate, to number between
200 and 300, and we have sized the operationally-deployed force of
strategic warheads at a larger number of 500 for reasons of operational
conservatism. The excess allows for force readiness concerns, multiple
targeting where needed, and the possibility of very sudden and
unexpected surprises from Russia, for example, a breakdown in its
military command and control caused by technical failures or a takeover
by renegades. As Russia and the United States move farther away from
the nuclear deterrent trap in which they are still ensnared, the sizing
of their stockpiles would depend on other concerns and could be further
reduced. The 500 operationally-deployed warheads would be augmented by
those from the Responsive Force, which would be configured in two
parts, the first able to respond to a rapidly building crisis--a Ready
Responsive Force--and a second able to respond to strategic warning
signals on a timescale of a year or more--a Strategic Responsive Force.
This use of the Responsive Force underscores the need for sustaining an
infrastructure for supporting it as well as the need to provide this
force with appropriate hardening and concealment. As we look ahead a
few years into the future, the total Responsive Force should have 400-
500 warheads, a number comparable to the operationally-deployed one.
This number would be adequate to target roughly 200 additional Russian
sites, for example, those affecting industrial recovery--the major
nodes in the electric power grid and air, ground, and rail
transportation systems, as well as major industrial sites. These
targets and the forces to attack them may be viewed, we hope, as only
temporary remnants of the Cold War policy of assured destruction that
may be discarded before long in the dustbin of history. In time,
nuclear deterrence might be maintained entirely with a Responsive Force
without an operationally-deployed force.''. . .
``Potential Chinese targets are likely to cover the same generic
list as for Russia, cited above, including their strategic strike
forces, command and control centers, major military bases, and ports in
the vicinity of Taiwan. With China's long-range nuclear forces
remaining at anything like their present levels, the target list would
be considerably smaller than the 200-300 estimated for Russia. This
list would not generate U.S. force requirements in addition to the
numbers we have proposed for hypothetical emergencies involving Russia.
The same warhead can be targeted against multiple designated ground
zeros. Yet, if there were drastic changes in the worldwide strategic
picture that led the United States to simultaneous major nuclear
confrontations against Russia and China, the United States would
evidently begin a major buildup of its own. This would take time, but
so would a major Chinese buildup. The force configuration of
``500+500'' that we propose provides a ready basis for such U.S.
action.''. . . .
``Regarding potential targets in North Korea or Iran, the list
presumably would be much shorter because the territories are smaller,
and the numbers of defense-related installations are much fewer than in
Russia and China. That list would very likely be limited to single
digits in each country.''
Dr. Payne. There is no set specific number of deployed nuclear
weapons that can be identified as being required for deterrence for a
set point-in-time or length of time because deterrence requirements are
dynamic, and because U.S. force requirements are also affected by
assurance and dissuasion goals. That is why the 2001 NPR recommended
flexibility and the range of 1,700-2,200 operationally-deployed nuclear
weapons.
28. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
are the numbers driven by specific targets, and countries, or by
capabilities?
Dr. Gallucci. Our numbers should be sensitive to the targets of the
various kinds we identify to create the most credible deterrent threat.
Dr. Drell. See response to question 27.
Dr. Payne. The appropriate range of numbers and the need for
flexibility can be affected by each of these variables, which are not
mutually exclusive, and also by the requirements for assurance and
dissuasion.
29. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
what understanding should guide the decision to study the RRW and how
do the numbers influence the nuclear weapons complex of the future?
Dr. Gallucci. Please see my prepared statement.
Dr. Drell. The RRW program has two parts. The first is to transform
the nuclear complex, and the second, to change the designs of the
nuclear weapons in the arsenal. Concerning the first part, the nuclear
complex needs serious attention as I testified. Parts of it date back
to WWII and need to be updated in order for us to maintain the safety
and reliability of the warheads in the stockpile as their numbers
decrease. However the U.S. needs a clear statement of its long-term
nuclear weapons policy goals which will determine the roles and
missions of our nuclear forces, and their overall numbers, before we
can determine the appropriate size and scope of the modernized
infrastructure. It might be anywhere from 500 warheads to the present
total of roughly 5,000, with between 1,700 and 2,200 actively deployed,
as negotiated in the Treaty of Moscow. The second part of the program,
to design new warheads, depends upon the answer to the key question of
whether the goals of the RRW program for enhanced long-term confidence,
safety, and use control can be achieved without underground explosive
testing, a restriction that is in the legislation creating RRW. This
question is worthy of study but has yet to be answered
Dr. Payne. We should proceed with the RRW knowing that any
contemporary estimate of the nuclear force characteristics and size
needed for the decades ahead is likely to require adjustment as the
future unfolds. It is likely that we will be surprised by events that
transpire over time. We should avoid actions that would significantly
constrain the ability of the U.S. to adjust our forces lo changing
national security needs. Instead we should anticipate surprise and
focus on how best to protect a range of options for the future in an
affordable, prudent manner.
30. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, is
there a rush to complete the feasibility study of the first RRW design?
Dr. Gallucci. I cannot comment.
Dr. Drell. I believe not. The current stockpile is strong and
stable. Its safety and reliability have been confirmed by the ongoing
vigorous and successful stockpile stewardship and life extension
program which has revealed no significant evidence of aging problems.
Dr. Payne. Two areas of concern seem to warrant proceeding without
delay on the RRW. The first concern is the vulnerability of the planned
stockpile and deployed force to a systemic failure of the W76 warhead--
the most numerous of the warhead types in the stockpile. The RRW
program will initially provide replacement warheads for the W76 and
reduce the high degree of reliance on the W76 warhead. The second area
of concern is that of the workforce on which the nation will depend for
decades to come to make decisions on how best to sustain a safe,
reliable nuclear stockpile. Proceeding without delay on the RRW will
allow remaining experienced designers and engineers to work closely
with those that will shortly take their places as the senior managers
at nuclear weapon laboratories and plants.
31. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
the U.S. will continue the life extension program for some time, in
order to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the current
stockpile. Before we know if the RRW is feasible, how many warheads of
any specific type should go through life extension?
Dr. Gallucci. I cannot comment.
Dr. Drell. I think the first order of business is to establish a
scientific and technical consensus as to whether the LLNL led effort to
design the first RRW can achieve its goal of enhanced long-term
confidence, safety, and use control relative to our current stockpile
weapons, without underground explosive testing, before moving on to
additional designs. The first design was chosen, as announced by NNSA,
as a relatively conservative design and therefore should be in the
strongest position to face up to the challenge of satisfying those
criteria but this has yet to be established, and doing so will take
time.
Dr. Payne. The RRW concept has not yet begun engineering
development, and the RRW concept, while promising, is still unproven. 1
recommend against significant cut backs an planned warhead lift
extension programs at this time. Significant reductions in life
extension programs would be warranted after laboratory officials
conclude that the RRW can be developed and certified without nuclear
testing and have demonstrated that the country can produce replacement
quantities of the RRW.
32. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
will the stockpile size vary if the RRW design is feasible?
Dr. Gallucci. I cannot comment.
Dr. Drell. A nuclear policy decision clarifying what are the
missions and targets for our nuclear weapons will have a major impact
on the size of the stockpile. This could cause a swing of an order of
magnitude in their numbers, as discussed in the report that I mentioned
earlier and submitted for the record (Drell and Goodby ``What Are
Nuclear Weapons For?,'' ACA report, April 2005).
Dr. Payne. I anticipate that, for a specific force structure and
operationally-deployed nuclear force, the total size of the nuclear
warhead stockpile needed will differ significantly depending on whether
or not RRW is feasible, and developed and deployed. The stockpile with
RRW warheads should be significantly smaller in number and with fewer
warhead types.
33. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, do
you think that the RRW alone will allow substantial reductions in the
total size of the stockpile, not just the number of warheads deployed?
Dr. Gallucci. I cannot comment.
Dr. Drell. It is hard to predict whether the RRW alone would allow
substantial reductions in the total size or cost to the stockpile since
the current, so-called legacy, stockpile meets current high standards
of safety and lifetime stability. However the infrastructure, when
modernized, may have a significant effect by achieving improved
efficiency with consolidation of many sites and modem technology. I
think a more important factor in this case will be the modernized
infrastructure.
Dr. Payne. I expect that development and production of RRW warheads
will result in a substantial reduction in die total size of the
stockpile of nuclear warheads. Risk of reliability failures in the
operationally-deployed force is currently managed by retaining an
inventory of backup warheads in storage. With an operating nuclear
warhead infrastructure that is responsive to unanticipated warhead
problems, the need for a large inventory of back up warheads would no
longer exist.
first use
34. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
first use of nuclear weapons is an ambiguous element of U.S. nuclear
policy. Should it remain ambiguous?
Dr. Gallucci. Yes.
Dr. Drell. I believe it should remain ambiguous to the extent that
we say that first use of nuclear weapons would be determined by a
policy of ``defensive last resort.'' I do not support an explicit
statement of ``no first use,'' although I can think of no circumstance
now which would clearly call for first use. However I don't have
confidence that I can anticipate all possible circumstances and
therefore I think one should be clear that we view these as weapons
only for ``defensive last resort.'' Statements stronger than that have
the deficiency at anticipating how one would behave in extreme
circumstances. That is hazardous and I wouldn't be confident that an
adversary would stick by such a pledge either.
Dr. Payne. U.S. policy is not ambiguous nor should it be so. The
United States retains the first use option for the purposes of
deterrence and assurance.
35. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
are there credible scenarios in which the United States would use a
nuclear weapon in the first instance?
Dr. Gallucci. There are scenarios, but they are not particularly
credible. The threat from the Warsaw Pact is no more, but one could
just barely imagine a conventional conflict in Asia involving China in
which we could not defend our allies or our forces without using or
threatening to use a nuclear weapon first.
Dr. Drell. I can think of no credible scenario at this time in
which the United States would initiate first use of a nuclear weapon.
Dr. Payne. There are plausible scenarios. For example, with very
limited U.S. defensive capabilities and in the continuing absence of
non-nuclear capabilities for long-range prompt global strike, upon
tactical warning of a WMD missile launch, the only option for
preventing a WMD strike against U.S. cities could be first use against
the enemy's missile launch sites.
36. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
would first use escalate or de-escalate a conflict?
Dr. Gallucci. This is unknowable, but the hope would be that by
having escalation dominance, it would de-escalate.
Dr. Drell. This would be such an historically unprecedented move
that there is no previous experience to give guidance to trying to
answer that question. My greatest fear is that, in the confusion of a
conflict where not all data is accurately determinable, an exchange
could escalate due to faulty information about the size, number, and
impact of the first events. The initial shock might also paralyze any
further action. I just don't know but I wouldn't bet on it.
Dr. Payne. Either is possible, depending on the circumstances. The
risk of escalation would have to be compared to the risk of American
cities being destroyed if the U.S. chose to await the opponent's first
use.
NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCE
37. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, a
longstanding United States policy has been not to attack with nuclear
weapons a non-nuclear weapon state unless that non-weapons state aligns
with a state that attacks the United States with a nuclear weapon. Is
this negative security assurance still a valid policy doctrine?
Dr. Gallucci. Yes.
Dr. Drell. Yes.
Dr. Payne. The statement is incorrect. The Clinton administration
rightly claimed the right of U.S. ``belligerent reprisal'' in the event
of an attack against the United States involving a non-nuclear state's
use of chemical or biological weapons. This Clinton administration
position was and remains prudent.
MOSCOW TREATY
38. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
under the Moscow Treaty the United States and Russia agreed to
operationally deploy no more than 1,700-2,200 nuclear weapons by 2012.
But the Treaty is non-binding, as it has no duration, and is non-
verifiable. Each side is free to determine when a weapon is
operationally-deployed. Should the Treaty be modified? For example,
should it be modified to be durable?
Dr. Gallucci. The treaty should be made a treaty as we have
understood such treaties, that is, with specific numbers to be achieved
well within the duration of the treaty, with important ambiguities
resolved, and with verification provisions.
Dr. Drell. Yes. The verification provisions for the Moscow Treaty
rely on START II which expires in 2009. These provisions should be
extended beyond that date, and should be made more specific in terms of
which systems are being counted, and including restraints on the non-
deployed Reserve Forces, that currently number perhaps up to twice as
many as the deployed ones.
Dr. Payne. The statement again is incorrect. The Moscow Treaty is
binding and is as verifiable as other treaties with the applicable
verification provisions of START I. The Treaty's ceilings or further
reductions could be made to extend beyond 2012. Whether this would be
prudent or imprudent will depend on the geopolitical conditions at the
lime and their outlook for the future.
39. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, is
it possible to accelerate the reductions in deployed nuclear weapons
under the Treaty?
Dr. Gallucci. I cannot comment.
Dr. Drell. Yes, and I recommend that reductions proceed along the
lines discussed in my answers to questions 27 and 28, and more fully in
my article with Goodby ``What Are Nuclear Weapons For?'', where we
spell out a specific deployment scheme.
Dr. Payne. Yes, in principle. The NPR called for periodic
assessments of the geopolitical and technical conditions pertaining in
the future to help determine whether these conditions would permit the
prudent acceleration of reductions or not.
40. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
when the Senate was considering the Moscow Treaty, administration
witnesses testified that verification provisions were not needed in the
Moscow Treaty because the provisions of the START could be used. The
START expires in 2009, before the Moscow Treaty goes into effect in
2012. Should the START be extended?
Dr. Gallucci. Yes.
Dr. Drell. Yes, for reasons above.
Dr. Payne. I believe that portions of the START I verification
provisions should be extended.
41. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
the Moscow Treaty talks about the number of warheads deployed, what
about the number of warheads not deployed. Currently there are about
four warheads in reserve for every warhead deployed. What will enable a
reduction in the ratio of deployed to reserve warheads?
Dr. Gallucci. I cannot comment.
Dr. Drell. In order to reduce the ratio of Reserve to deployed
warheads one would need to add verification provisions including
transparency measures. In answer to an opposite question to reduce the
ratio deployed to Reserve Forces, one could remove prompt launched
procedures from the warheads on the actively deployed systems. One
scheme for this was spelled out in Drell and Goodby, referred to
earlier, which suggested working toward a force structure with Reserve
warheads only, numbering 500. Many measures have been discussed such as
removing warheads from the ICBMs, in the same way that bombs have been
removed from the bomber force which is no longer on standing alert.
Many other schemes have been proposed. All would require greater
transparency in dealing with the Russians in order to make sure that
reciprocal actions are taken in parallel.
Dr. Payne. Most obviously, the timely development and deployment of
the RRW.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
AGING-RELATED ISSUES IN THE ENDURING STOCKPILE
42. Senator Sessions. Dr. Drell, your testimony during the hearing
seemed to indicate that because recent reviews of plutonium aging
concerns have projected longer pit lifetimes, aging-related issues will
not manifest in the stockpile and are not a matter of urgency. Were
your comments exclusive to plutonium aging concerns or did you mean to
indicate that you are not aware of any aging-related concerns bearing
on any of the warhead components or materials?
Dr. Drell. I know of no significant aging affects showing a
deterioration of the warheads over time, but we must be vigilant in
looking for such effects. I believe we must continue a strong stockpile
stewardship and life extension program that maintains detailed scrutiny
for unanticipated aging effects showing up. We must be prepared to see
any warning signs of aging that may arise, and to respond to them as
needed, in order to retain confidence in our nuclear deterrent.
[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]