    [Senate Hearing 110-205]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 110-205

                      NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC POLICY OPTIONS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                                     of the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 21, 2007

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
    HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York     ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
    MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              JOHN CORNYN, Texas
    JIM WEBB, Virginia                   JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

                       Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

                 Michael V. Kostiw, Replublican Staff Director

                                     ______

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

                         BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman

    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
    MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              JOHN THUNE, South Dakota

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                   __________

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

                      Nuclear and Strategic Policy Options

                                 march 21, 2007

                                                                       Page

    Drell, Sidney D., Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Professor
      Emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford
      University.....................................................     5
    Payne, Keith B., Professor and Department Head, Graduate
      Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State
      University.....................................................    54
    Gallucci, Robert L., Dean, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
      Service, Georgetown University.................................    76

                                     (iii)

                      NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC POLICY OPTIONS

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2007

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:37 a.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
    Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Reed, E.
    Benjamin Nelson, Sessions, and Thune.
        Committee staff member present: John H. Quirk V, security
    clerk.
        Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
    member; Jill L. Simodejka, research assistant; Robert M.
    Soofer, professional staff member; and Kristine L. Svinicki,
    professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Jessica L.
    Kingston.
        Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King,
    assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple and Caroline Tess,
    assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
    Senator Ben Nelson; and Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator
    Thune.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Bill Nelson. Good morning, and thank you all for
    coming. You all are specialists in the area that we want to
    examine.
        Dr. Drell, I want to particularly thank you for coming all
    the way from California to be with us.
        Dr. Drell, Dean Gallucci, and Dr. Payne, you all have
    prepared statements. We're going to put them in the record, and
    I'm going to ask if you all would just talk to us. That'll save
    a lot of time and we can have a conversation.
        We are here today for a much-needed discussion on nuclear
    and strategic policy. We are on the verge of several key
    decisions with respect to nuclear weapons and the nuclear
    weapons complex, and it's going to have a huge impact on the
    direction that our country is going to take.
        The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was the
    last nuclear weapons treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet
    Union, is going to expire in 2009 unless both sides agree to
    extend all or part of it. It's been 15 years since the end of
    the Cold War, and the executive branch is now proposing to
    begin a new nuclear warhead program and to consolidate and
    modernize the nuclear weapons complex. So, it's time for us to
    have new ideas and to ask, do we need to modernize? If so, how
    and by how many?
        [The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson

        Good Morning. I would like to welcome our witnesses this morning. I
    would also like to thank you all for being here this morning. None of
    you are government witnesses and as a result you are all volunteers
    taking time out of your real jobs to share your thoughts with us. Dr.
    Drell, I particularly want to thank you for coming from California to
    be here this morning.
        Dr. Drell, Dean Gallucci, and Dr. Payne, I know that you all have
    prepared statements and Dr. Drell, you have an article that you would
    like included in the record, and without objection we will include
    those documents. Dr. Payne, in your prepared statement you mentioned
    that you also had an article that you would like included in the
    record. If you have a copy of that article, we would be happy to
    include that as well.
        We are here today to have a long delayed, but much needed
    discussion on nuclear and strategic policy. The United States is on the
    verge of several key decisions with respect to nuclear weapons and the
    nuclear weapons complex, which will have an impact for many years to
    come.
        Today we stand at something of a crossroad. The Strategic Arms
    Reduction Treaty, the last nuclear weapons treaty between the United
    States and the Soviet Union, now Russia, will expire in 2009, unless
    both sides agree to extend all or part of that treaty. It has been more
    than 15 years since the end of the Cold War, and the executive branch
    for the first time since then is proposing to begin a new nuclear
    warhead program, and to consolidate and modernize the nuclear weapons
    complex.
        It is time to start afresh and ask what are nuclear weapons for and
    how many is enough?

        Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions, any opening
    comments?

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I do think you're correct. I do believe that we're in a
    different strategic situation than we were during the Cold War,
    and we're making some decisions--some of those are being
    executed today--about our capacity and strategic weaponry. So,
    we need to continue to work on that.
        We used to think of strategic weapons as silo-based
    missiles, submarines, and B-52 bombers, and the nuclear weapons
    they contained. Today, those strategic forces must not only be
    thought of as nuclear in capability, I believe, but as a broad
    array of capabilities intended to deal with today's new
    threats, which tend to be unpredictable, politically
    undeterrable, sometimes, and extremely violent.
        The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) established a
    conceptual framework for today's strategic posture. That new
    posture is predicated on the belief that deterrence concepts
    and force structure of the Cold War must now be tailored to fit
    the reality of today's strategic environment.
        While the NPR recognized that our new relationship with the
    former Soviet Union made possible a significant reduction in
    the size of our nuclear arsenal, it also pointed out the need
    to bolster our strategic capabilities by adding conventional
    strike forces, missile defenses, and responsive nuclear
    infrastructure.
        So, I would just conclude and note that, by the time we
    achieve compliance with our Moscow Treaty obligations in 2012,
    we will have the smallest nuclear stockpile we've had since the
    Eisenhower administration. I'll be interested to learn from our
    witnesses whether or not they believe our current strategic
    posture of reducing weapons has caused aggressive states to
    reduce or delay implementing their own nuclear program, and how
    the reality is perceived out there, how the world is actually
    acting, in a real way, to our actions.
        So, Mr. Chairman, this is a time for a good, thoughtful
    discussion. We have a good panel, and I look forward to it.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Senator Jeff Sessions

        We meet today to receive testimony from Dr. Keith Payne. Dr. Sidney
    Drell, and Ambassador Robert Gallucci on the future of United States
    Strategic Policy. During the Cold War, the term ``strategic forces''
    almost always meant silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles,
    submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range B-52 bombers--all
    armed with nuclear weapons. The purpose of these forces was to help
    contain the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and, ultimately, to deter
    Soviet nuclear weapons use against the United States and its allies.
        Today, however, strategic forces must no longer be thought of only
    as nuclear deterrents, but as a broad array of capabilities intended to
    deal with today's new threats--which tend to be unpredictable,
    potentially undeterable, and extremely violent. If the Soviet Union and
    Warsaw Pact threat helped define both the mission and the force
    structure of our Cold War strategic capabilities, what are the central
    new threats to the United States and its allies that should help guide
    today's strategic forces? It's a reasonable question to ask, because
    without a clear understanding of the nature of the strategic threats we
    face, we risk sustaining or building strategic capabilities that will
    not serve us well, if at all.

                             NEW STRATEGIC THREATS

        Arguably, the preeminent threat today is terrorism--fostered by
    violent Islamic radicalism--followed closely by the ongoing development
    of dangerous weapons and delivery systems by states that either support
    this ideological movement or believe they can benefit from the
    disruption to regional or global stability caused by these extremists.
    These new, unprecedented threats to the United States are further
    complicated by the concern that we are just not certain whether
    traditional deterrence strategies will work against these potential
    enemies. Will the threat of punishment make a terrorist think twice?
    Can we stop a rogue state from blackmailing us if they are, ultimately,
    able to strike us--or our allies--with nuclear weapons? The point is,
    we need to plan as if deterrence will not work, and therefore acquire
    strategic capabilities able to eliminate these threats before they can
    be used against us--or defend against those threats should deterrence
    fail.
        This was the logic of the Bush administration's 2001 Nuclear
    Posture Review (NPR) which, while recognizing that nuclear forces
    remain a bedrock of our deterrence capabilities, emphasized the
    importance of improving our ability to counter post-Cold War threats
    by, among other things, adding conventional strike capabilities and
    missile defense to our arsenal of ``strategic capabilities.'' The NPR
    also mandated significant reductions in the level of U.S. nuclear
    warheads down to 1,700-2,200. By the time we achieve compliance with
    our Moscow Treaty obligations in 2012, we will have the smallest
    nuclear stockpile we have had since the Eisenhower administration.

                     PROMPT CONVENTIONAL LONG-RANGE STRIKE

        The ability to hold at risk high value targets in the war against
    terrorism, weapons of mass destruction caches, and mobile ballistic
    missile launchers is a capability any commander in chief should want to
    have in this day and age. We might be able to interdict these types of
    threats with covert operatives, strike aircraft, or cruise missiles,
    but this assumes we have the necessary forces in place and that they
    can reach the target in time. What if this were not the case, or the
    target was heavily defended? Wouldn't we want the capability to strike
    this target from afar using a non-nuclear weapon that would reach the
    target in hours, rather than days? Long-range prompt conventional
    strike capabilities also could be used early in a crisis or conflict to
    deter aggression, or stop aggressors in their tracks until other forces
    can be brought to bear. Non-nuclear strategic forces could be
    particularly useful for demonstrating U.S. and allied resolve during a
    crisis, and thereby act as a deterrent to further escalation.

                           BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

        Recent ballistic missile testing by North Korea and Iran, coupled
    with the use of over 4,000 short-range rockets by Hezbollah against
    Israel, suggests that unfriendly regimes continue to view ballistic
    missiles, and their shorter-range variants, as a means to off-set the
    conventional superiority of adversaries--making them potential weapons
    of influence, blackmail, and terror.
        The U.S. ballistic missile defense program is designed to thwart
    this potential terror weapon, and thereby strengthen U.S. diplomatic
    and deterrence options for dealing with these new threats to our
    security. Over the past 12 months, the United States  has  demonstrated
     through  realistic  testing  the  ability  to  shoot  down  short-,
    medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles using interceptors based on
    land and at sea, to include a September 8, 2006, intercept of a long-
    range ballistic missile warhead by the ground-based midcourse defense
    system. These new missile defense capabilities now contribute to the
    mix of policy options available to the President in his conduct of
    foreign policy.
        This is why U.S. plans to deploy a ground-based midcourse defense
    (GMD) site in Europe are so important. By providing protection for NATO
    nations on both sides of the Atlantic against long-range ballistic
    missiles, plans for a GMD site in Europe support NATO's ongoing
    diplomatic efforts to end Iran's nuclear weapons program. Should Iran
    nevertheless develop the capability to place nuclear weapons on its
    ballistic missiles, NATO will be glad it has in place another means for
    deterring this potential threat--and to defend against it should
    deterrence fail.

                                NUCLEAR WEAPONS

        While we address these emerging threats and develop capabilities in
    response, we continue to maintain our current nuclear weapons.
    Unfortunately, it has become apparent that this work is carried out in
    a nuclear weapons complex that is neither responsive in its
    capabilities, nor sized appropriately. As we develop, and fund at
    significant expense, the scientific tools to understand and certify the
    safety and reliability of our legacy weapons in the absence of nuclear
    testing, the Nuclear Weapons Council is examining whether limits may
    exist in our ability to extend perpetually the life of current
    warheads.
        Earlier this month, the Council approved a design for a joint
    program between the Department of Energy and the U.S. Navy to provide a
    replacement warhead for a portion of the Nation's sea-based nuclear
    weapons. Although this announcement does not represent a decision to
    deploy a replacement warhead, it does mean that the military and
    scientific experts charged with the stewardship of our nuclear weapons
    are now evaluating whether our current path is sustainable over the
    long-term.
        The Department of Energy is also evaluating options for the future
    of the nuclear weapons infrastructure through its Complex 2030
    Environmental Impact Statement. The objective of Complex 2030 is a
    nuclear weapons complex that is sized appropriately for the smaller
    stockpile of the future and that has the capabilities to support that
    stockpile. The evaluation is still in its early stages, but I am
    concerned that the options being evaluated will modernize the complex
    we have now. I am not yet convinced that the Department of Energy is
    genuinely considering the realignment, consolidation, or closure of
    facilities that are excess to mission need. I will be pursuing this
    issue in other hearings the subcommittee will hold this spring.

                                   CONCLUSION

        In closing, I might note that during the Cold War, we built
    strategic nuclear forces that we hoped would never be used--because if
    they were to be used, we risked unimaginable destruction. Today,
    however, while we must maintain nuclear strategic forces that
    contribute to deterrence on a daily basis through the fact of their
    existence, we must also build non-nuclear strategic forces that we
    surely intend to use, because if we don't use them, it might mean that
    an adversary could inflict upon us blows of unimaginable consequences--
    perhaps far worse than the events of September 11.
        I look forward to hearing the views of our witnesses on these and
    other important strategic forces issues.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. I would say to my colleagues,
    I'm going to defer my questions until the end, so that you all
    can have a chance to have your questions.
        Dr. Drell, why don't you start first, and then Dr. Payne
    and Dean Gallucci.
        Dr. Drell?

          STATEMENT OF SIDNEY D. DRELL, SENIOR FELLOW, HOOVER
     INSTITUTION, PROFESSOR EMERITUS, STANFORD LINEAR ACCELERATOR
                      CENTER, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Drell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senators, for the
    opportunity to be here.
        We are here, in my mind, at a dangerous time. I view us on
    the precipice of entering a new and more dangerous nuclear era,
    with the spread of technology, which means that, in particular,
    the enrichment of uranium, which makes it possible for more
    societies to enter the nuclear club and that raises a danger of
    nuclear weapons getting in the hands of terrorist groups,
    others unrestrained by the norms of civilized behavior, as we
    know it; and, therefore, these weapons become more likely to be
    used.
        I think that, in these circumstances, reliance on nuclear
    weapons for deterrence--which was so essential during the Cold
    War--is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly
    effective as the prospect of proliferation of nuclear weapons
    grows increasingly ominous.
        In terms of the size of the stockpile, we still have, as a
    result of the START, although the Cold War has ended, something
    like 5,000 nuclear warheads in each of our arsenals, the United
    States and Russia, with approximately--close to, anyway--2,000
    on ballistic missiles, many on prompt-launch procedures, which
    present risks of accidental or unauthorized launch. Why we're
    retaining such a force of that type is not clear to me.
        I see this situation as presenting us with two major
    challenges. The first one is the immediate one, to develop a
    strategy to try and head off the loss of the nonproliferation
    regime, and to save the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The
    longer-term one is perhaps fanciful, but, I believe, important,
    and that is to try to rekindle the vision, the bold vision, of
    Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev when they came to their
    remarkable summit at Reykjavik in 1986 to seek to rid the world
    of nuclear weapons and to escape from the nuclear deterrence
    trap. As far as the immediate problem, and preserving the NPT
    in force since 1970, this requires supplementing that treaty
    with intrusive inspection measures so that we can make sure of
    compliance with its provisions.
        Important agreements have been reached in this regard, and
    we're trying to bring into practice things like the additional
    protocols and the Proliferation Security Initiative to monitor
    these kinds of actions. I think it's also true to say that the
    nuclear weapons states, as we seek these more intrusive
    measures, have to be careful to offer incentives and to show
    restraints in our own programs to the non-nuclear countries
    with whom we need to cooperate in order to have an effective
    inspection regime and enforcement of the NPT.
        Now, to my view, the two recent proposals by the United
    States to build new nuclear weapons were not wise. They were
    reviewed, globally, as counter to the efforts to strengthen the
    nonproliferation regime. I'm talking about the proposed high-
    yield bunker-buster for destroying deeply buried, hardened,
    underground targets. The second was the so-called very low-
    yield new-concept weapon to destroy deadly biological and
    chemical agents in shallow underground bunkers without
    dispersing their deadly effect. Fortunately, from my point of
    view, both proposals were rejected by Congress after careful
    independent analyses showed that their potential military value
    was quite limited, and marginal, in fact, and less compelling
    than the likely harmful effect that those new programs would
    have on the nonproliferation regime and our overall security
    thereby.
        You are now debating, as you mentioned in your opening
    remark, the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program designed
    to transform our aging nuclear complex, and also some of the
    weapons themselves in the current stockpile. There is, in my
    mind, a need to modernize parts of the complex that date back
    to World War II, for reasons of safety, efficiency, and
    flexibility. As long as the United States has nuclear weapons,
    which is likely to be for some time, we do need to be able to
    maintain them in our shrinking stockpile, to be safe and
    reliable. However, a clear decision on our long-term nuclear
    policy, which you alluded to our needing, is needed in order to
    decide the appropriate size and scope of that new complex. I
    think this does call for a fresh look at the role of nuclear
    weapons in our defense planning, and similarly for the
    Russians. We are the two countries with more than 90 percent of
    the nuclear weapons in the world. We are formally, now,
    declared to be allies against terrorism, the new threat we both
    face, and not adversaries, as we were in the Cold War.
        On this point of a new look, former Ambassador James Goodby
    and I analyzed this question of, ``what are nuclear weapons
    for?'' in a report of that same title, which I have submitted
    for the record of these hearings. We considered present and
    prospective threats, and concluded that the strategic arsenal
    required by the United States can be reduced considerably to
    smaller numbers, carefully assuming that the Russians come down
    in a similar way that we do. In fact, as a first step, we
    recommended reducing our force structure to 500 operationally-
    deployed nuclear warheads, plus 500 in a responsive force. I
    can go into the details of that in the conversation. But this
    is a cooperative venture on both sides.
        Turning to the other part of the RRW, and that is the
    transformation of the weapons, the stated goal of RRW is to
    increase confidence in their long-term reliability, safety, and
    use control--that's very important--and to do that without
    requiring underground explosive tests. That's the legislation.
    This presents, to my mind, a daunting technical challenge, to
    determine whether design changes or modifications to meet those
    ambitious goals can be certified and deployed without
    underground explosive testing. I believe that, at present, we
    do not know the answer to that question, but I do believe it is
    a worthwhile question to try to answer.
        I think a sensible approach to it would have three
    elements:
        The first one is to proceed carefully with research on
    proposed changes, subject to independent outside scrutiny, to
    determine whether it is possible to build a strong consensus
    and confidence that the proposed changes are mutually
    compatible and have the appropriate pedigree from our past test
    program. It is not a question of changing an individual
    component that'll work. It is a question of putting together a
    complicated system, and having system reliability.
        The second point, I would say, is to recognize there is no
    time-pressing urgency in implementing the changes. The legacy
    stockpile is strong and reliable, in my judgment. The pace of
    the work on RRW should not consume human and budgetary
    resources to the extent of savaging the important ongoing,
    highly successful stockpile stewardship and life- extension
    program.
        The third point is to recognize the importance of being
    clear about the limited goal of what we intend to do with the
    RRW Program, so as to avoid potentially harmful impact on our
    nonproliferation goals.
        We have to recognize that many non-nuclear weapon states,
    whose cooperation we require, remain concerned about the
    seriousness of the commitment of nuclear powers to limit their
    nuclear efforts, and they are restive under the discriminatory
    features of the treaty.
        Let me just very briefly close with a remark about--with
    the second challenge, or opportunity, that I mentioned, and
    that is to rekindle the bold vision that President Reagan and
    General Secretary Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik in 1986 to rid
    the world of nuclear weapons and escape the deterrence trap.
    They came close, with that summit, but they failed. However,
    they did succeed in turning the arms race on its head at
    Reykjavik. They initiated steps leading to significant
    reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear
    forces, including the removal of an entire category, the
    intermediate nuclear forces, from Europe. To mark that event,
    former Secretary of State George Shultz, who was with President
    Reagan at Reykjavik, and I organized a conference at Stanford's
    Hoover Institution on the 20th anniversary, last October, and
    we reviewed the impact of Reykjavik and its relevance for
    today's world. We came out with a list of 10 steps, which we
    thought were practical, to define a path for accomplishing
    progress toward that goal, steps which, in and of themselves,
    will help reduce the nuclear danger. Those steps appear in the
    Wall Street Journal piece published January 4, with four
    headline signatories: Secretary Shultz, former Secretary of
    State Henry Kissinger, former Defense Secretary William Perry,
    and former chairman of this committee, Sam Nunn. I've
    introduced that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Dr. Drell. Let me end my short time by saying, I think that
    intensive work with leaders of other countries with nuclear
    weapons to make this a joint venture would be an important step
    forward. The steps themselves, you can read about or we can
    discuss. Let me end just by saying that the advantage of having
    that vision, reasserting a vision of a world free of nuclear
    weapons; and taking practical measures toward achieving the
    goal, could have, I believe, a profound positive impact on the
    security of future generations. Without that bold vision, the
    actions that we recommend, and the steps that one takes to
    reduce nuclear danger, will not be perceived as fair or urgent;
    they will still be viewed as retaining the discriminatory
    nature of the nuclear world as it is now. Also, without the
    vision, the actions will not actually be very practically
    achieved in any timeframe.
        So, thank you for allowing me to express my views.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Drell follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Dr. Sidney D. Drell

        The existing international regime, grounded in the nuclear
    Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) for preventing new nuclear weapon states,
    reducing existing nuclear arsenals, and controlling the spread of
    nuclear technology and material, is seriously endangered.
        The spread of technology, particularly uranium enrichment and
    plutonium reprocessing technology for civilian energy, creates the
    danger of more states with nuclear arms and fissile material. In turn,
    it provides more opportunities for theft or sale to terrorist groups or
    other societal units unrestrained by accepted norms of civilized
    behavior, thereby increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be
    used.
        Beyond North Korea and Iran more than 40 nations already have taken
    substantial steps forward in nuclear technology. Even more have
    indicated interest in developing such technology for civilian power.
    Once you can enrich uranium for a civilian power reactor--you are well
    on the way. Without a change of course, the United States and the world
    soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more
    precarious and economically costly than was Cold War deterrence.
        During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining
    international security because they were a means of deterrence. Sixteen
    years ago the Cold War ended with the demise of the Soviet Union, and
    with it, the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence became
    obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many
    states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on
    nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and
    decreasingly effective as the prospect of nuclear proliferation grows
    increasingly ominous.
        Nevertheless U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles remain bloated. In
    2012, more than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
    United States and Russia, each, will still have approximately 5,000
    nuclear bombs and warheads in their arsenals, close to two thousand of
    which will be deployed on ballistic missiles, many on prompt launch
    procedures presenting unnecessary risks of an accidental or
    unauthorized launch. Why are we still retaining such large nuclear
    arsenals as a legacy of the Cold War? What are these weapons for?
        This situation presents us with two major challenges--and
    opportunities. The first is to develop a strategy for dealing with the
    world as it is today, starting with steps to prevent the further spread
    of nuclear weapons. The second is to rekindle the bold vision that
    President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev brought to their
    remarkable summit at Reykjavik in 1986: ridding the world of nuclear
    weapons and escaping from the nuclear deterrence trap. Although they
    failed in the end, they did succeed in turning the arms race on its
    head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in
    deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the
    elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles--the INF
    missiles in Europe.
        Can we rekindle their vision? Can we escape from the nuclear
    deterrence trap before it is too late?
        To face the first challenge, and deal with the world as is, we must
    save and strengthen the nonproliferation regime based on the NPT of
    1970. In view of the continuing spread of nuclear weapons technology,
    the NPT will need to be supplemented with intrusive new inspection
    rights for monitoring compliance with its provisions and detecting
    covert efforts by a would-be proliferator to evade them. Important
    agreements have already been reached to bring such provisions into
    practice.
        It is not necessary to look abroad for challenges to the present
    nonproliferation regime. Nonnuclear weapon states repeatedly emphasize
    their concerns about the ongoing weapons programs of the nuclear
    powers. We are urged to honor the NPT by formalizing the current
    moratorium on underground bomb testing into a Comprehensive Test Ban
    Treaty (CTBT); reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons; and
    substantially decreasing their numbers more rapidly. Recent efforts by
    Washington to build two new nuclear warheads for new military missions
    were viewed widely as counter to global efforts to strengthen the
    nonproliferation regime. One new warhead was a high-yield bunker buster
    for destroying deeply buried, hardened underground targets, and the
    second was a very low yield ``new concept'' weapon to destroy deadly
    biological and chemical agents stored in shallow underground bunkers
    without dispersing them. Fortunately both proposals were rejected after
    several years of debate in Congress. Rejection was based on a judgment
    that benefitted from careful independent technical analyses that
    concluded their potential military value was marginal and less
    compelling than their likely harmful impact on the nonproliferation
    regime and U.S. overall national security. It was also a ringing
    rejection of the dangerous idea of lowering the threshold for using
    nuclear weapons in limited military strikes.
        Currently Congress is debating whether or how to proceed with a
    Reliable Replacement Warhead Program designed to transform both our
    aging nuclear infrastructure and the weapons in our current stockpile.
    There is a need to modernize parts of the complex that date back to
    World War II for reasons of safety, efficiency, and flexibility. As
    long as the United States has nuclear weapons, we need to be able to
    maintain the warheads in the shrinking stockpile to be safe and
    reliable. But a clear decision on our long-term nuclear policy goals is
    needed in order to decide on the appropriate size and scope of the new
    complex. This calls for a fresh look at the role of nuclear weapons in
    U.S. defense planning. The United States and Russia have now officially
    adopted a policy of cooperation against the new threats, faced by both
    nations, of terrorists and unstable or irresponsible governments
    acquiring nuclear weapons. This replaces the former adversarial
    relationship of nuclear deterrence based on mutual based destruction.
    As stated in the Joint Declaration of Presidents Bush and Putin of
    November 13, 2001: ``The United States and Russia have overcome the
    legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other as an enemy
    or threat.'' What then are the anticipated missions and targets for the
    thousands of nuclear warheads remaining in their arsenals?
        Ambassador James Goodby and I analyzed this question of ``What Are
    Nuclear Weapons For'' in today's world in a recent report\1\ that I
    have submitted for the record. Based on our analysis of the present and
    prospective threats that define missions for U.S. nuclear weapons we
    conclude that the strategic arsenal required by the United States can
    be reduced to considerably lower numbers. We recommend as a first step
    reduction to a U.S. force structure of 500 operationally-deployed
    nuclear warheads, plus 500 in a responsive force. The United States and
    Russia should cooperate to achieve this in the coming decade, engaging
    the other nuclear powers for proportionate reductions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ S. Drell and J. Goodby: ``What Are Nuclear Weapons For?''
    (Report for the Arms Control Association, April 2005). It is published
    on their website and reprinted in ``Nuclear Weapons, Scientists, and
    the Post-Cold War Challenge'' by S. Drell (World Scientific Press,
    Singapore, 2007).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As to the transformation of the weapons with the stated goal to
    increase confidence in their long-term reliability, safety, and use
    control, we still face a daunting technical challenge to determine
    whether new designs to meet those ambitious goals can be certified and
    deployed without underground explosive testing. I don't believe that,
    at present, we know the answer to that question. But I do believe it is
    worthwhile to try to answer. A sensible approach to it should:
        1. Proceed carefully with research on modifications or a new design
    that meet the stated requirements, before moving ahead to development
    and manufacture. Necessary are detailed analyses subject to fully
    independent scrutiny to determine whether it is possible to gain
    confidence and build a strong consensus that the proposed changes are
    mutually compatible and have the appropriate test pedigree from our
    previous work. It is not a question of the individual components
    working, but of the system--in fact a system of systems--being
    reliable.
        2. Recognize that there is no pressing urgency in implementing
    changes--the legacy stockpile is strong--the pace of the work should
    not consume human and budgetary resources to the extent of savaging the
    important ongoing and highly successful Stockpile Stewardship and Life
    Extension Program.
        3. Recognize the importance of being clear about the limited goals
    of what we are doing so as to avoid potentially harmful impacts on the
    nonproliferation goals of this country and beyond, globally. Concerns
    by the many nonnuclear weapon states, whose cooperation we require,
    about the seriousness of the commitment of the nuclear powers to limit
    their nuclear efforts in accord with the NPT cannot be ignored, denied,
    or dismissed as irrelevant. They registered such concerns strongly in
    negotiations at the U.N. on continuing the NPT into the indefinite
    future, and called on the nuclear powers to restrain their nuclear
    programs and ratify a CTBT.
        An important action to address these concerns would be a commitment
    by the United States to face the second challenge: to rekindle the
    vision of Reykjavik and develop a strategy to achieve it. This was
    addressed at a conference that George Shultz, who participated at
    Reykjavik as President Reagan's Secretary of State, and I organized at
    Stanford University's Hoover Institution this past October marking the
    20th anniversary of that remarkable summit. Ever since Hiroshima at the
    dawn of the nuclear era a number of studies and conferences have
    addressed the challenge of ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
    Renewed interest in achieving this goal has been generated by the
    realization that the world is approaching the precipice of the new and
    even more dangerous nuclear era with the spread of nuclear technology
    that is threatening the nonproliferation regime. Moreover at present we
    lack a global strategy and vision commensurate with the tremendous
    dangers ahead.
        At the Stanford/Hoover Conference we reviewed the impact of
    Reykjavik and its relevance for today's world. We formulated what we
    considered a set of practical steps to define a path for accomplishing
    the goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. Our conclusions and
    recommendations were summarized in a recent article that appeared in
    the Wall Street Journal \2\ on January 4, 2007.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ ``A World Free of Nuclear Weapons'' signed by George Shultz,
    William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, and endorsed by the
    conference participants who also signed on.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        First and foremost, intensive work with leaders of the countries in
    possession of nuclear weapons will be required to turn the goal of a
    world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise, and create a
    working mechanism for accomplishing this goal. Such a joint enterprise
    would lend additional weight to efforts already under way to avoid the
    emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran.
        Specific actions were also proposed:

             Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear
            weapons to increase warning time and thereby reduce the danger
            of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.
             Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear
            forces in all states that possess them.
             Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be
            forward-deployed.
             Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate,
            including understandings to increase confidence and provide for
            periodic review, to achieve ratification of the CTBT, taking
            advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure
            ratification by other key states.
             Providing the highest possible standards of security
            for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and
            highly-enriched uranium everywhere in the world.
             Getting control of the uranium enrichment process,
            combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear power
            reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from
            the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International
            Atomic Energy Agency or other controlled international
            reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation
            issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing
            electricity.
             Halting the production of fissile material for weapons
            globally; phasing out the use of highly-enriched uranium in
            civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from
            research facilities around the world and rendering the
            materials safe.
             Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional
            confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear
            powers.
             Addressing the requirements for effective measures to
            impede or counter any nuclear related conduct that is
            potentially threatening to the security of any state or
            peoples.

        Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and
    practical measures toward achieving that goal could have a profoundly
    positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold
    vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without
    the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Dr. Drell.
        Dr. Payne?

      STATEMENT OF KEITH B. PAYNE, PROFESSOR AND DEPARTMENT HEAD,
    GRADUATE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, MISSOURI
                            STATE UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a privilege to be
    here this morning, and I thank you for the invitation to speak
    here.
        I'm happy to shorten my prepared statement and enter the
    full statement for the record.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, all of the statements are entered
    in the record, so, if you would just talk to us, that would be
    great.
        Dr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
        Dr. Payne. During the Cold War, deterrence was typically
    considered an easy matter, posing a nuclear retaliatory threat
    to the Soviet Union and Soviet targets. Unfortunately, today,
    most of what we believed we knew about deterrence during the
    Cold War is of extremely limited value.
        Today, there are no certainties about deterrence. Our
    traditional deterrent may not work against opponents who are
    willing martyrs, desperate gamblers, incommunicado,
    miscalculating, or self-destructive. The painful contemporary
    truth, I'm sorry to say, is that confident assertions about how
    deterrence will work, and how many forces will ensure
    deterrence, are guesses. No one knows whether, or how,
    deterrence is going to work across the spectrum of opponents we
    now face and the spectrum of contexts in which we now want to
    deter.
        That particular conclusion doesn't suggest that we discard
    deterrence. Far from it. It does, nevertheless, explain why our
    deterrence focus needs to change from that of the Cold War with
    regard to: to whom is our deterrent directed, how do we deter,
    and with what do we try to deter?
        In some cases, nonmilitary options may be best for
    deterrence. In other cases, conventional, or even nuclear,
    threats may be necessary for deterrence. In some cases, we may
    simply have opponents, or confront components, who are beyond
    deterrence, whatever capability we might bring to the table.
        To understand which is the case, we need, first, to
    understand the opponent's mindset and behavioral style. I
    believe that deterrence now, in this post-Cold War era, is,
    first and foremost, a matter of intelligence. It requires a
    much more focused and dedicated intelligence effort for this
    purpose than was typical in the past. There is simply no
    substitute now for trying to understand the specific hows and
    whys of opponents' decisionmaking. That's true whether the
    opponent is a state leadership or the leadership of a terrorist
    organization.
        With regard to the deterrence of terrorists--this is an
    important new topic--let me note that I strongly disagree with
    the common notion that all terrorists are undeterrable. The
    historical record on terrorists, anarchists, and other
    extremist groups is sufficient for us to conclude that they may
    be deterrable, depending on the context and circumstances.
    That's all we can say about state leaderships, as well.
        What are the implications of this new uncertainty of
    deterrence in the post-cold-war period? First, I think, and
    foremost, is that defensive capabilities--the ability to limit
    damage to the United States, our allies, our friends, and our
    forces--takes on a much higher priority. Why? Simply because we
    can no longer rely on deterrence working reliably to provide
    that protection. A popular line during the Cold War was that
    defenses are unnecessary and useless, because our ``assured
    destruction'' capability would provide deterrence and perfect
    protection. It needs to be recognized now, in the post-Cold War
    period, that deterrence can, and probably will at some point,
    fail unpredictably, and our only option in that case will be to
    defend, as well as possible, our society, our forces, our
    friends, and our allies. This is why I believe that various
    forms of strategic defensive capability, particularly against
    weapons of mass destruction, have become such an important
    priority, more so than during the Cold War.
        The Bush administration's 2001 NPR sought to assess how the
    dramatic geopolitical changes since the Cold War should
    transform how we think and how we practice deterrence. I've
    included, for the record, a short article on the goals of the
    NPR, which, I'm sorry to say, still remains widely
    misunderstood. But with regard to nuclear weapons, the NPR
    concluded that they, in fact, remain essential to any prudent
    approach to deterrence, but that nuclear weapons alone are
    unsuited for many of the type of deterrence contingencies that
    we are going to confront in the 21st century. Having a broader
    array of deterrent threats, particularly including non-nuclear
    capabilities, should better enable us to adapt our deterrence
    to a whole range of different opponents and contexts.
    Consequently, one of the thrusts of the NPR was to reduce our
    reliance on nuclear weapons and to place greater reliance and
    emphasis on non-nuclear capabilities.
        The NPR also concluded that the immediate requirement for
    U.S. nuclear weapons could be met with far fewer deployed
    nuclear forces, and that the requirement for deployed nuclear
    forces may recede further as our advanced conventional forces
    mature and as our defenses mature. That conclusion, by the way,
    was a basis for the deep reductions of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.
        The NPR also focused on the need to assure allies,
    particularly through the extended U.S. nuclear umbrella. Most
    recently, some very close allies have openly questioned whether
    the longstanding U.S. ``nuclear umbrella'' commitment for their
    security remains credible and viable. A 2006 study, for
    example, led by former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone,
    concluded that Japan should study the nuclear issue to be
    prepared in the event of tremendous future change. Former Prime
    Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone noted that Japanese security is
    dependent on U.S. nuclear weapons, and that the future of the
    U.S. extended nuclear deterrent is uncertain. Such Japanese
    concerns are obviously understandable given the North Korean
    nuclear and missile programs. I should note that allies and
    friends in the Middle East are expressing similar concerns as
    Iran moves towards a nuclear capability and expands its missile
    arsenal.
        What's the implication of that set of circumstances? What's
    the significance of that? Well, first, it's to note that our
    extended nuclear deterrent is perhaps the most important, and
    the least recognized nuclear nonproliferation tool in
    existence. To risk understatement, nuclear proliferation will
    accelerate dramatically if our close allies continue to lose
    confidence in the U.S. extended nuclear guarantee. This point
    has been made explicit by Japanese officials in recent
    conversations.
        As various nuclear reduction and disarmament proposals
    emerge, I think we need to be conscious of this continuing
    importance of our nuclear forces for extended nuclear
    deterrence and, in effect, for nonproliferation.
        There are three contemporary strategic programs that I
    believe are particularly important for the future of
    deterrence, extended deterrence, and the assurance of U.S.
    allies. Let me briefly mention these. One is the RRW, which Dr.
    Drell has mentioned already. The second program, or set of
    programs, are strategic and regional ballistic missile defense
    capabilities. The third is a new capability for non-nuclear
    prompt global strike.
        The RRW Program is intended to provide safety and security
    improvements in the nuclear arsenal, provide the potential for
    long-term increased confidence without nuclear testing, cost
    savings, the potential for long-term cost savings, and to
    sustain the U.S. nuclear, technical, and engineering
    communities.
        Let me add that there is some urgency with regard to this
    particular program because as we look at the retirement rate
    for people who have been involved in the design of nuclear
    weapons, it's estimated that the vast majority of them will
    have retired within the next 5 years. If we want to be able to
    have that group of experienced weapon designers offer their
    experience to a new cadre, a new generation, of weapon
    designers, we need to move forward in this program, I think,
    speedily.
        The RRW will also support the U.S. extended nuclear
    deterrent, and, thus, our nonproliferation goals, by helping to
    sustain the confidence that our allies have had in our nuclear
    umbrella.
        Also, second, in the era of deterrence uncertainty,
    strategic and regional ballistic missile defense are important
    for our own protection and for the assurance of our allies and
    friends who are subject to these emerging nuclear threats and
    missile threats.
        During the Cold War, many considered ballistic missile
    defense and deterrence to be mutually incompatible. Now they
    are fully compatible, and continued support, particularly for
    sea-based defenses, the multiple kill vehicle program, and a
    new third site in Europe, I believe to be very important.
        Finally, progress toward a non-nuclear strategic capability
    for prompt global strike has been slow, and, in general,
    progress towards non-nuclear strategic capabilities has been
    slow. At this point, the only U.S. global strike option now
    available is nuclear. The U.S. capability to strike with non-
    nuclear forces against high-value or fleeting targets is very
    important. I believe it would make a significant contribution
    to deterrence, and, again, the assurance of our allies, and
    also to counterproliferation.
        In conclusion, there's been a significant shift away from
    the Cold War balance-of-terror concept and the policies that
    were aligned with that. That shift is important and makes sense
    because of the dramatically different geopolitical environment
    we find ourselves in. It is true that all the details of that
    shift have not been worked out, and its implementation is not
    mature. But let me note that it took us 25 years of intense
    debate before we came to a consensus on our Cold War strategic
    policies. We probably don't have 25 years of safety to reach a
    consensus on our post-Cold War policies. So, my final comment
    is that we need to move forward thoughtfully, but also quickly,
    towards that consensus.
        Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Payne follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Dr. Keith B. Payne

        The rise of hostile rogue states, new terrorist threats, and the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have all highlighted our
    continuing need to deter attack. The importance of deterrence has
    survived the Cold War. The fundamental question now is how to deter new
    threats in a new strategic environment?
        During the Cold War, deterrence typically was considered a
    relatively easy matter of posing a nuclear retaliatory threat to Soviet
    targets. Many officials and commentators mechanistically equated
    deterrence to our ``Assured Destruction'' nuclear capability. We hear
    echoes of this today, confident claims about deterrence linked to some
    specific number of weapons.
        Unfortunately, most of what we believed we knew about deterrence
    during the Cold War now is of limited value. Today, there are no
    certainties about deterrence. Our traditional deterrent threat may not
    work predictably against opponents who are willing martyrs, desperate
    gamblers, incommunicado, misinformed, miscalculating, self-destructive,
    or motivated by unalterable, intangible goals such as honor, or
    ideological or religious devotion.
        The list of provocations and opponents we now hope to deter has
    expanded, and the contexts within which we hope to deter them are far
    more variable. But the painful contemporary truth is that confident
    assertions about how deterrence will operate are guesses, usually
    poorly informed; no one knows whether or how deterrence will work
    across a wide spectrum of opponents, stakes and contexts.
        This conclusion does not suggest that we discard deterrence. It
    does, however, explain why our Cold War views of deterrence
    ``stability'' based on offensive nuclear forces must be reconsidered.
    Our deterrence focus now must be broadened with regard to whom, how and
    with what we try to deter. In some cases, non-military approaches to
    deterrence may be adequate, in others, conventional or nuclear threats
    may be necessary; and in some cases, opponents may simply be ``beyond
    deterrence'' regardless of our threats.
        To understand which may be the case for any contingency, we need
    first to understand the opponent's mind-set and behavioral style, and
    the different ways opponents can perceive and respond to our deterrence
    threats. Deterrence now is first and foremost a matter of intelligence.
    It requires a much more focused, dedicated intelligence effort for this
    purpose than has been the case in the past. There is no substitute for
    understanding the specific how's and why's of opponents'
    decisionmaking; we no longer can presume to know the boundaries of
    their possible behavior. This is true whether we seek to deter the
    leadership of a rogue state or a terrorist organization.
        With regard to the deterrence of terrorists, I strongly disagree
    with the common notion that all terrorists are undeterrable. The
    historical record on terrorists, anarchists, and other extremist groups
    is sufficient to conclude that they may be deterred, depending on the
    context and circumstances, which is all that can be said of state
    leaders.
        Defensive capabilities must take on a new, higher priority when
    deterrence is recognized to be uncertain. Why? Because we can no longer
    rely on deterrence working reliably to provide protection. A popular
    Cold War line was that defensive capabilities were unnecessary and
    useless because deterrence was ensured by our ``Assured Destruction''
    offensive nuclear threat. It should be recognized now that deterrence
    can fail unpredictably, and our only option may be to defend as well as
    possible our society, our expeditionary forces, and our allies. This is
    why various forms of strategic defensive capability against mass
    destruction weapons are now so important. President Bush's decision to
    deploy strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD) against limited
    offensive missile threats was a reflection of this shift away from the
    old balance of terror deterrence policy. Much more remains to be done
    in this regard.
        The Bush administration's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) sought
    to assess how the dramatic changes since the Cold War should transform
    how we think about deterrence. This can be seen in its emphasis on
    having a much broader range of deterrent threat options than we
    inherited from the Cold War, and having the flexibility and knowledge
    of opponents necessary to tailor our deterrent efforts to a range of
    contingencies and opponent. I have included for the record a short
    article on the goals of the NPR, a document that remains widely
    misunderstood.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Keith B. Payne, ``The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the
    Record Straight,'' The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer
    2005), pp. 135-151.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        With regard to nuclear weapons, the NPR concluded that they remain
    essential in any prudent approach to deterrence; but, nuclear weapons
    alone may be unsuited to many of the deterrence contingencies of the
    21st century. Having a broader range of threats, including non-nuclear
    options, should better enable us to adapt our deterrence policies to a
    much wider range of opponents and contexts. Consequently, a major
    thrust of the NPR was to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and place
    greater weight on non-nuclear capabilities.
        The NPR also concluded that the immediate requirement for U.S.
    nuclear weapons could be met with far fewer deployed nuclear forces,
    and that our nuclear requirements may recede further as advanced
    conventional weapons and defenses mature. That conclusion was a basis
    for the deep nuclear reductions of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.
        The NPR also focused on the need to assure allies, including via
    the extended U.S. ``nuclear umbrella.'' Most recently, some close
    allies have openly questioned whether longstanding U.S. extended
    deterrence guarantees remain credible. A 2006 Japanese study headed by
    former Prime Minister Nakasone, for example, concluded that Japan,
    ``should study the nuclear issue to be prepared in the event of
    tremendous future change. . .'' Mr. Nakasone noted that Japanese
    security is dependent on U.S. nuclear weapons, but that the future of
    the U.S. extended deterrent is unclear. Such Japanese concerns are
    understandable given North Korean nuclear and missile programs. Allies
    and friends in the Middle East increasingly express similar concerns as
    Iran moves toward a nuclear capability and expands its missile arsenal.
        Immediately following North Korea's nuclear test in October 2006,
    Secretary of State Rice traveled to Tokyo to reaffirm the U.S. nuclear
    commitment to Japan. Our extended nuclear deterrent is perhaps the most
    important and least recognized nuclear nonproliferation tool in
    existence. To risk understatement, nuclear proliferation will
    accelerate dramatically if close allies continue to lose confidence in
    the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. This point has been made
    explicitly in recent conversations with Japanese officials. As various
    nuclear disarmament proposals emerge, we need to be conscious of this
    continuing importance of our extended nuclear deterrent.
        Despite the NPR's call for more diverse U.S. capabilities to meet
    the needs of a new geopolitical environment, much remains to be done.
    There are three contemporary strategic programs that are particularly
    important to deterrence, extended deterrence and the assurance of U.S.
    allies: these are the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW); strategic and
    regional BMD; and, a new capability for non-nuclear, prompt global
    strike.
        The RRW Program is intended to provide safety and security
    improvements in the nuclear arsenal, the potential for increased long-
    term confidence without nuclear testing, long-term cost savings, and to
    sustain the U.S. nuclear technical and engineering communities. It will
    also support the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent and thus our
    nonproliferation goals by helping to sustain the confidence of our
    allies in our nuclear umbrella.
        In an era of deterrence uncertainty, strategic and regional BMD are
    important for our own protection and for the assurance of key allies
    increasingly subject to emerging nuclear and missile threats. During
    the Cold War, many considered deterrence and BMD to be incompatible.
    Now, they are fully compatible, and continued support for our sea-based
    defenses, the multiple kill vehicle, and a new defensive site in Europe
    are particularly important.
        Finally, progress toward non-nuclear strategic capabilities has
    been slow; the only prompt, U.S. global strike options now available
    are nuclear missiles. The U.S. capability to strike with non-nuclear
    weapons against high value or fleeting targets at global ranges could
    contribute significantly to deterrence, the assurance of allies, and
    directly to counterproliferation. I agree strongly with General
    Cartwright that it is important to move forward on a non-nuclear
    capability for prompt global strike.
        In conclusion, there has been a significant shift away from the
    Cold War balance of terror concept consistent with a dramatically
    different geopolitical environment. It is true that all the details of
    this shift in thinking about deterrence and its implementation are not
    mature. But, recall that it took 25 years of intense debate before we
    achieved a working consensus on our Cold War strategic policies. We may
    not have 25 years of relative security to achieve a new working
    consensus this time around; we need to move forward thoughtfully and
    quickly.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Dr. Payne.
        Dr. Gallucci?

     STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, DEAN, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL
               OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Gallucci. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
    to join this discussion of the future of our strategic nuclear
    forces.
        Mr. Chairman, let me start by providing what I think is my
    bottom line, and then work backwards to it. I think the bottom
    line for me is that the lower the level of our strategic
    forces, the better. The fewer, the better. If we can avoid
    qualitative augmentation of our forces, that would be better,
    too, for at least three reasons:
        The lower the number of nuclear weapons and delivery
    systems we have, the cheaper; the easier it is to secure these
    forces, the less likely we'll have a case of unauthorized or
    accidental use. This is all assuming that the reductions are
    accomplished together with the Russians, as Dr. Drell said.
        Second, if we can, in fact, lower force levels, we, and
    others who are nuclear weapons states, will more easily meet
    our obligations under the Nuclear NPT to engage in serious
    disarmament, and that is good for our efforts to discourage the
    spread of nuclear weapons.
        Third, and most important, and it is a theme for me, if we
    can continue to lower, to the absolute lowest levels, our
    nuclear forces, and avoid qualitative augmentation, we send a
    signal of delegitimizing nuclear weapons as an element in our
    force structure. That, over the long-term, is, in fact, I
    think, the most important thing that we can do.
        Let me go to the question of what we might use nuclear
    weapons for these days, because these days are different than
    past days. If I had two boxes, and in one box, I were going to
    put the threats that come from nuclear weapons, and then
    another box, threats that come from other sources that might
    require the use of our nuclear forces, let me say that, in the
    first box of nuclear threats, I can think of three, in
    descending order of importance, that you ought to consider. The
    first is the possibility that some terrorist group would
    acquire a nuclear weapon and use it against an American city.
    The second is that there might be an accidental or unauthorized
    launch of a nuclear weapon at the United States or an American
    ally. Third, that there might actually be the premedicated
    attack on the United States or an ally by a nuclear weapons
    state. Those are the three threats that I would propose to
    address.
        The first, the most likely, is that a terrorist group, al
    Qaeda or an al Qaeda cousin, would acquire a nuclear weapon and
    introduce it into the United States. It seems to me that that
    is a threat against which we have neither a defense nor a
    deterrent. It is unlikely that we'll, either now or in the near
    future, develop much confidence in our ability to interdict the
    unconventional delivery of a nuclear weapon crossing our
    border--by a shipping container, a truck, or a boat--that we
    will have that kind of control over our borders seems
    implausible to me. So, interdiction is unlikely.
        Deterrence, if your enemy values your death more than his
    life, is very difficult. So, neither defense nor deterrence
    seems like a way to deal with the most likely threat we
    confront over the next 10, 20, or more years. Therefore, we
    should be putting a lot of resources and energy into figuring
    out how to prevent these groups from getting either a
    manufactured nuclear weapon or the fissile material to produce
    one.
        That seems to me to lead us in a direction not only of
    trying to secure fissile materials, but also trying to figure
    out what we might use our nuclear forces for in connection with
    this threat.
        It seems to me that it is possible, if we are able to do
    two things--one is to attribute a nuclear weapon, either before
    it is detonated or after it is detonated, to its source--the
    weapon, or, more likely the fissile material--then we have the
    possibility of trying to persuade or convince any state that
    might consider providing that material not to do it, in order
    to avoid retaliation from the United States.
        Now, there are two scenarios that immediately occur in this
    connection, and one is that the material was actually
    transferred by a country that decided to sell or transfer it.
    Candidates might be North Korea or, in the future, Iran. The
    other case, perhaps more likely, is where there's not actually
    an intentional transfer, where there is what you might call
    ``leakage.'' Material comes out of Russia, or it comes out of
    Pakistan. These cases present different sorts of problems.
        In the first case, I think a good old-fashioned classical
    deterrent threat is in order. That is to say that if we
    discover that a country has purposefully transferred fissile
    material or a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group, we ought to
    be telling them in advance that we will treat them as though
    they were the one who launched the attack, and they should
    expect devastating retaliation. In the other case, it's a bit
    more difficult, but I would suggest, as a matter of policy,
    that we say, if a country is found to have been the source of
    the material, even if it did not purposefully transfer it, but
    if it had, in a negligent way, failed to secure that material,
    that we will do the same thing; that is to say, to treat it as
    though it had launched the attack. The objective here is
    obviously to provide a little bit more incentive for that
    country to secure those materials.
        In neither case would I suggest we be promising a nuclear
    retaliatory response, but that response ought to be available
    to the President of the United States, and it ought to be
    credible.
        One more point on this most difficult case, and that is
    that it suggests the possibility that we might want to, at some
    point, consider a pre-emptive or preventive strike. Now, unlike
    retaliation, I don't believe--if we get into the world of
    needing to strike in a pre-emptive or preventive way--I don't
    believe that the use of a nuclear weapon would be appropriate.
    I think we ought to have a conventional force structure that
    permits us to launch such a strike in a conventional way. Even
    then, of course, it should be as truly a last resort. The first
    case.
        The second case, which I regard as not very likely, but
    plausible, is an accidental launch or an unauthorized launch.
    All I would say about that is that we should work harder in
    order to increase the amount of time it takes to launch a
    strike, to, in other words, change the alert status of our
    deployed forces so that this unauthorized or accidental launch
    becomes even less likely.
        The third case is the one that we typically use to size our
    forces and that is the need to have a deterrent to deal with
    the possibility of a premedicated strike on the United States
    or one of its allies. It is, to me, a very unlikely
    development, because I do believe deterrence has worked, and
    will work. All I will really say about this is that I would
    associate myself with Dr. Drell's comments. It seems to me hard
    to understand why we could not reduce our strategic nuclear
    forces to maybe half of what right now is the bottom number
    under the START arrangement with the Russians, which--I believe
    that number is 1,700--why some hundreds of nuclear weapons
    deployed aboard submarines, while maybe reducing the
    fractionation of the individual missiles to increase the
    survivability of the submarines even further, and continuing to
    maintain the ICBM force at lower levels, and continuing to
    maintain a bomber force, with both ALCMs and gravity bombs, and
    the Reserve Force comparably configured and sized, wouldn't be
    enough for this mission; and it would then go in the direction
    that I initially suggested would be good for lots of reasons,
    which is to say, to reduce substantially the amount of forces
    that we actually deploy.
        If it's the other box, though--if those are the three
    nuclear threats, there are other threats which this
    administration has alluded to in various statements and
    publications, and they go to other threats that the United
    States may be subjected to, particularly with WMD, that are
    non-nuclear--in other words, the biological or chemical weapons
    threats--where the United States might wish to use nuclear
    weapons.
        I am quite suspicious of this argument. I find all this
    suspect as an argument. Before one would use a nuclear weapon
    for these missions, one would have to have extraordinary
    confidence in our intelligence about these facilities and their
    status. After more than 20 years in government, focusing on
    just these problems, I rarely saw such a thing. I wonder
    whether we will, in fact, see such a thing.
        Then there's the question of why we would want to have
    special-effects weapons beyond those low-yield weapons which we
    now have. Presumably, we would want to have them, because they
    would enhance the credibility of our use, because an enemy, if
    I understand this correctly, would, in a sense, be trying to
    figure out our tolerance for collateral damage. The less
    collateral damage we anticipated, the more likely they would
    conclude it would be that we would use these weapons;
    therefore, the more credible the threat, if I have all this
    right. This seems quite a reach, to me. It is a reach, in a
    number of ways, about whether we could, in fact, develop
    smaller-yield nuclear weapons that meet both tests--i.e., do
    better at the destruction of these sites than do our current
    small-yield weapons--and which still do not produce the
    collateral damage that we would find so politically and
    ethically unacceptable.
        Now, on balance, when I look at the arguments, I am not
    persuaded that it is worth the cost to us, politically, in
    fielding new special-effects weapons. The costs in having us
    move away from the de-emphasis on nuclear weapons and move in a
    direction of trying to demonstrate to the world that they are,
    in fact, quite usable, if you're lucky enough to legitimately
    own them. That's not, in my view, a very good message to send.
        Finally, with some reluctance, I do want to make a comment
    or two about the idea of developing a new RRW.
        As I've understood this, this goes to the question of the
    durability of our confidence in the reliability of the current
    stockpile. It is, based upon my experience, passing strange
    that we would propose to improve this confidence by deploying a
    warhead, which we have not tested, to replace those warheads
    which we have tested. Now, if there are components that need to
    be replaced, and, therefore, the system, as Dr. Drell said,
    would not have been tested with the new component, I can
    understand that, to some degree. But I do ask the question of
    when, in fact, these components need to be replaced, and I do
    wonder what this program that we have spent so much money on,
    which I had understood was designed to put us in a position to
    have confidence in our stockpile in a no-test environment,
    actually accomplished.
        If, ultimately, we deploy a weapon that we have not tested
    and would find necessary to test to have adequate reliability,
    then I do believe we would have the worst of all worlds, and we
    would have demonstrated that we wished to, again, put a
    special-effects weapon, in a sense, in our inventory, and we
    would have to consider the prospect of testing, which I think
    would be truly damaging to the message which is most important
    to convey. I say again, that message is that we wish to de-
    legitimize the use of nuclear weapons, the possession of
    nuclear weapons, and that message is something that we should
    seek to preserve.
        Thank you, Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Gallucci follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Robert L. Gallucci

        I want to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to address
    some of the issues related to policy options for the future strategic
    nuclear force posture of the United States. I would like to begin by
    addressing three types of threats from nuclear weapons, in descending
    order of importance, that confront our country: first, the threat of a
    nuclear weapon delivered by a terrorist group and detonated in an
    American city; second, the threat of an accidental or unauthorized
    strike on the United States by a nuclear weapons state; and third, the
    threat posed by a pre-meditated attack on the United States or one of
    its allies by a nuclear weapons state.
        The most likely threat comes from a terrorist group such as al
    Qaeda. If al Qaeda could acquire a nuclear weapon, few doubt that it
    would try to use it. Since it would deliver such a weapon by
    unconventional means--such as a boat, truck, or shipping container--we
    should not have much confidence in our ability to interdict this kind
    of a border crossing now or in the near future. Since al Qaeda members
    are known for valuing our death more than their life, neither should we
    expect to deter them. Lacking either defense or deterrence against this
    threat, we should put our energy and resources into preventing al Qaeda
    from acquiring either a manufactured nuclear weapon or the fissile
    material to make one. This means that we must persuade those countries
    with nuclear weapons or fissile material to secure them against
    unauthorized transfer--which we might call ``leakage''--and deter them
    from any authorized sale or transfer.
        For a variety of reasons, when it comes to leakage, we ought to be
    particularly concerned about Russia and Pakistan, and when it comes to
    intentional transfer, two different countries appear most worrisome,
    North Korea and, eventually, Iran. The question, then, is what policies
    should we adopt to persuade some countries to secure nuclear weapons
    and materials to our standard, and deter others form deciding to sell
    such weapons or materials. The first part of the answer is that we must
    develop the capability to identify the source of a nuclear weapon or
    the fissile material at its core, whether we should find it before
    detonation or have only the debris it produces to analyze after
    detonation. If we can accomplish this attribution with high confidence,
    through a combination of scientific forensic analysis and intelligence
    collection and analysis, and we can convince other countries that we
    can do this, then we can take the next step in persuasion and
    deterrence, that is, making a credible threat of retaliation. For those
    states that would intentionally transfer a nuclear weapon or fissile
    material, the deterrent threat is relatively straight forward, that is,
    to treat those countries as though they had launched the attack and to
    pose to them the prospect of devastating consequences, without
    excluding the use of nuclear weapons, if the United States or one of it
    allies should be the victim of a nuclear attack.
        For those states that we are concerned might leak a nuclear weapon
    or fissile material to a terrorist group, and fail to take actions that
    we regard as reasonable and prudent to secure their weapons and
    material, we should warn them also that we will treat them as though
    they were negligent and thus as though they had launched the attack.
    The American public would demand no less. In neither the case of
    transfer nor leakage would our response necessarily involve nuclear
    retaliation, but in both cases the President should have the option of
    a precise nuclear response with as little collateral damage as
    possible. Obviously, if we are to gain the advantage of what may be
    called ``expanded deterrence'' to prevent leakage, countries such as
    Russia and Pakistan must be told that we have adopted this posture.
        Beyond the missions of deterrence and expanded deterrence, we
    should also consider the force requirements of pre-emption and
    preventive war to deal with this threat. In contrast to a retaliatory
    strike, there is no reason to create the option to use a nuclear weapon
    to strike another country in order to prevent the transfer of fissile
    material or a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group, or to stop a country
    from even acquiring the capability to accumulate such weapons or
    material. But there is every reason to maintain the capability for pre-
    emptive or preventive strikes in our conventional force structure, even
    though we should see such options as a last resort.
        This brings us to the second type of threat posed by nuclear
    weapons, that from the accidental or unauthorized launch of a nuclear
    weapon against the United States. Although this threat may arise from
    more countries in the future, for now it is almost exclusively one that
    is posed by Russian strategic nuclear systems. The best way for the
    United States to reduce the risk of such a launch would be to seek
    agreement with Moscow to measures that would, for both countries,
    reduce the alert status of our delivery systems, increasing the time
    required to launch strategic nuclear weapons.
        The third type of threat, a pre-meditated nuclear attack on the
    United States or one of its allies by another nuclear weapons state, is
    the least likely event, but the one which guides our thinking in
    determining the basic size and character of our nuclear forces, just as
    it did decades ago when we confronted a hostile Soviet Union with tens
    of thousands of nuclear weapons. Today, and for the foreseeable future,
    the only country against which our deterrent could conceivably be
    tested is Russia, and neither that country's intentions nor
    capabilities would seem to require the number of warheads and delivery
    systems which we plan to deploy and hold in Reserve in the future in
    order to maintain a high level of confidence in our deterrent
    capability. It is hard to understand why it would not be enough to have
    some hundreds of warheads on deployed systems--Trident submarines, with
    a reduced number of warheads per missile in order to increase range and
    survivability, silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and
    bomber aircraft with gravity bombs and air-launched cruise missiles--in
    addition to Reserve Forces of comparable size and composition. In
    short, this classic threat would arguably require less than half the
    1,700 warheads permitted by the lower end of the range of deployed
    strategic nuclear warheads allowed under the Strategic Offensive
    Reduction Treaty. Those who argue that more is required of our
    strategic forces for this mission should be made to justify the
    assertion, without reference to any additional missions for our
    strategic nuclear forces.
        None of the three nuclear threats just identified justify increases
    in our nuclear forces, and indeed I am suggesting that they may be
    accomplished at lower levels of forces. If we can substantially reduce
    force levels, there are real benefits to the national security to be
    realized, particularly if matched by Russia, and eventually by others.
    Let me identify three such benefits. First, the fewer the warheads and
    delivery systems that are deployed and maintained in Reserve, the
    easier it would be to secure them against theft and against accidental
    or unauthorized launch, and the less the need for fissile material to
    field them. Second, if nuclear forces can be reduced, it would help
    address the obligation of the United States and other nuclear weapons
    states party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to engage in
    serious disarmament. Third, and most important, lowering the level of
    nuclear forces demonstrates a reduced dependence on nuclear weapons to
    achieve legitimate security objectives, which in turn contributes to a
    critical international norm of de-legitimatizing the acquisition of
    nuclear weapons.
        The other missions that have been identified for our nuclear forces
    are meant to improve our ability to deal with rogue states or terrorist
    groups and, particularly their intention or ability to attack the
    United States with chemical or biological weapons. The idea seems to be
    that we can better deter attacks on us by having new, smaller yield
    (and thus more credibly usable) nuclear weapons to use against these
    states or groups, and that we can better defend against attacks by
    having special effects nuclear weapons that are more capable of
    destroying an enemy's buried chemical or biological weapons facilities.
    Both these propositions are suspect. First, we already have small yield
    nuclear weapons in our inventory to impress rogues and terrorists, if
    indeed they care about what we may regard as acceptable collateral
    damage. Second, serious questions have been raised about our ability to
    produce a nuclear weapon whose ability to destroy underground weapons
    production or storage facilities significantly exceeds that which can
    be achieved with existing nuclear or conventional weapons--without
    producing politically and ethically unacceptable collateral damage. In
    short, given the incentives to avoid additions to our nuclear force, a
    convincing case for nuclear weapons designed to attack these targets
    has yet to be made.
        If neither nuclear nor non-nuclear threats would require additions
    to our nuclear forces, and there are good reasons to try to reduce
    those forces, are there other reasons to consider augmenting our force
    posture? There are at least two more reasons that should be considered.
    One is a unique mission that is neither a case of classic deterrence
    nor defense; the other is the more general need to maintain confidence
    in the reliability of our nuclear forces without resorting to nuclear
    weapons testing.
        We have until now considered nuclear and non-nuclear threats to the
    national security that might require nuclear weapons for deterrence or
    defense. There is, in addition, at least one scenario in which we might
    wish to threaten the first use of nuclear weapons, or actually launch a
    first strike, in order to forestall the use of conventional forces
    against U.S. interests: it is the Taiwan contingency. It is possible,
    at some future date, that China will seek to resolve the status of
    Taiwan by the use of force and the United States would then want to
    prevent this outcome without engaging in a massive conventional war so
    far from America's shores and so close to China's. In such a scenario,
    the threat to escalate to the strategic nuclear level by launching a
    disarming first strike against Chinese strategic nuclear forces might
    be an option the United States would want to preserve or create.
    Indeed, current Chinese plans for modernizing its strategic nuclear
    forces are at least in part aimed at increasing their survivability
    against just such a first strike, that is, at creating a deterrent. Our
    current plans to deploy even a thin defense against ballistic missiles
    aimed at the United States further complicate China's plans for such a
    deterrent.
        The most prudent way to assess this scenario is in the larger
    strategic and political context. From such a perspective, it is
    profoundly in America's interest to maintain a nuclear force posture
    and a conventional force structure designed to meet our national
    security needs without ever resorting to the first use of nuclear
    weapons. While this proposition is relevant to some of the other
    missions envisioned for our forces mentioned earlier, it is most
    critical to addressing the China-Taiwan scenario because it bears
    directly on the motivation for Chinese calculations about their own
    strategic nuclear force requirements. In sum, our choice of policies
    for our strategic nuclear forces might some day be sensitive to Chinese
    strategic nuclear force deployments, but our legitimate defense and
    deterrent needs with respect to China can be met now and for the
    foreseeable future, at existing or substantially lower force levels.
        Finally, there is the issue of whether or not it is necessary to
    develop and deploy a new nuclear warhead so that we will be able to
    maintain confidence in the reliability of our nuclear forces for a
    longer amount of time than we otherwise might. Now, if such a new
    nuclear warhead were to be introduced to replace our existing, nuclear
    warheads, without first testing it, a serious question arises about why
    we would think it more reliable than the well-tested warheads to be
    retired. On the other hand, if the replacement warhead would eventually
    require testing in order to sustain the confidence we have in the
    reliability of our stockpile, then we should consider the implications
    of resumed nuclear weapons testing for our national security. Suffice
    it to say, that while many continue to argue against the benefits of
    our future adherence to a treaty banning further nuclear weapons
    testing--arguments which I do not accept--the disadvantages of
    eventually resuming the testing of nuclear weapons are undeniable. If
    there is a theme that runs through this presentation, it is that our
    Nation's security is best served by taking steps that de-emphasize the
    relevance and utility of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons testing
    undermines that proposition.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, to all three of you.
        Now, what we want to do is just have a conversation here.
        Senator Sessions?
        Senator Sessions. Well, I think we have our other
    colleagues here, and I'll be here a while, and they might have
    other----
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
        Senator Sessions.--things. So----
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let's see, who came first?
        Senator Ben Nelson?
        Senator Ben Nelson. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The other part of the full Nelson.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator Ben Nelson. Just down the hall from the other
    Nelson.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
        Dr. Drell, you commented in your written testimony, and you
    said it, as well, in your oral testimony, that over 40
    countries are pursuing nuclear technology. Now, in many cases,
    we believe--believe, and I emphasize that--it's for civilian
    power. But we all understand that once uranium has been
    enriched for peaceful purposes, it can, and is probably being
    harnessed for other uses that don't correspond with our desire
    for security. You argue that the both the U.S. and the Russian
    Federation should reduce their stockpiles. Of course, I think
    many would say that, in a world with so many countries desiring
    to join what you call the nuclear club, we shouldn't be
    reducing our stockpiles. So, where we have some people saying,
    as you are, that perhaps mutually reducing stockpiles would be
    beneficial, and others are now saying that's not the case.
        We know that we don't need a Cold War II, even though Cold
    War I is over, but how do you--what is the response that you
    really make to those who don't want us to reduce our stockpile
    because they believe we're really going to need this, with 40
    countries developing and no real capability, short of perhaps
    some sort of a launch against their locations, that we really
    do need to have a strong and robust stockpile?
        Dr. Drell. Thank you. My first comment is that the urgent
    need we have, at the moment, is to develop a process for
    gaining control of the enrichment process. When I say 40
    countries, I'm saying there are countries with nuclear
    reactors; they've bought them or they're using them. There are
    not 40 countries that can enrich uranium. So, the efforts which
    this administration has put forward, that President Putin has
    put forward, that the International Atomic Energy Agency, under
    Dr. ElBaradei has put forward, to gain control of the
    enrichment process, to try to guarantee a fuel for the reactors
    for peaceful research, but not have them develop indigenously
    the capacity to enrich uranium, so--in fact, the whole fuel
    cycle would be one that would be controlled. The mechanism has
    to be worked out politically, to what extent it's IAEA, to what
    extent it is nuclear nations. That is to be worked out. But the
    fact is--the key is to maintain control of the enrichment
    process, because without that, then, indeed, we are in great
    trouble. But----
        Senator Ben Nelson. Well----
        Dr. Drell.--then, for instance, when it comes to turning
    back--again, the question is, when we start reducing numbers,
    you have to ask how many targets there are for you--
        Senator Ben Nelson. Right.
        Dr. Drell.--because when you're talking about a country
    just beginning to develop an enrichment capacity or a few
    weapons, that doesn't present you with hundreds or thousands of
    targets. So, a careful balance of how many targets you have,
    and, therefore, how many warheads you would need. In our study
    that I mentioned, Dr. Goodby and I looked at the Russian
    problem; if they were to come down, and we looked at the
    targets of military control, political control, and of weapons
    that were mentioned in the NPR, we said, there, that there
    aren't more than a few hundred targets. That's how we came up
    with 500 deployed and 500 reserves. It's a quantitative
    question.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Well, that certainly would apply to,
    perhaps, the current situation with respect to the former
    Soviet Union, and particularly Russia, but, with other
    countries having the capability of enriching in the future,
    what does that say? How could we--if we reduce the stockpile,
    under what terms do we find that we might need to increase it,
    if, in 10 years or 20 years, the rest of the world, these other
    countries, are now into enrichment? I agree, controlling
    enrichment is a good part of it, but enriched uranium can still
    be sold, purchased, and get into the wrong hands. How will we
    be sure that we have enough stockpiled?
        Dr. Drell. Dr. Payne said it very well, we need a better
    intelligence system on these things. The intelligence challenge
    now is greater than it was during the Cold War.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.
        Dr. Drell. So, the number--and one of the reasons I said we
    have to maintain an infrastructure--it's called Stockpile
    Infrastructure 2030 or something like that--is because we have
    to be able to respond, if the need arises, because the
    enrichment process gets out of control.
        So, there are a number of things we have to do. Have good
    intelligence, have the political process, with the cooperation
    of all the Nations that have signed the NPT--that's all but
    four Nations in the world, after all--have them cooperate with
    us in this effort to prevent the spread of the material with
    the additional verification requirements that we are working on
    to bolster the NPT. We have to maintain the weapons for
    deterrence. If the danger grows, if our effort to constrain the
    spread of the nuclear weapons material and enrichment capacity
    fails, indeed, we're going to have a larger stockpile.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Well, but won't we be violating
    agreements that we've entered into with others? Can we do that
    unilaterally?
        Dr. Drell. We hope to have agreements. At the moment, our
    agreements stand that by 2012 we will have between 1,700 and
    2,200 deployed strategic forces, and there's still a large
    number in back. I used a number of about 5,000. There is no
    specified number, but that seems to be the kind of number
    that's talked about and that both Russia and the United States
    have in the stockpile. Five thousand is an awful large number,
    when you consider the number of targets.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Okay. One further question, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Dr. Payne, in your written testimony, you commented on
    deterrence, and especially your views on non-nuclear
    capabilities, like prompt global strike. I appreciate those
    comments very well. I also agree with General Cartwright, who
    is the Commander of a Combatant Command of Strategic Command
    and Space Command, that we need this capability of prompt
    global strike. Senator Sessions and I worked, last year, on
    converting the Trident submarine to having non-nuclear
    capabilities, recognizing that time to act is short, and access
    may be denied or difficult. So, we really do have to be in a
    situation that requires a quick strike on a mobile ballistic
    missile launcher, for a high-value target, or whatever the
    situation may be, We do need that. We were unable to get it
    accomplished last year. If we don't convert Trident missiles
    for a prompt global strike, how long are we away from a
    strategic non-nuclear response, without that?
        Dr. Payne. General Cartwright has mentioned in testimony--
    and I'll just use the numbers that he's presented--that, under
    normal circumstances, we would be 2 to 3 days away from having
    a non-nuclear capability, under the current situation; if we
    were very fortunate and had forces generated and in the area,
    we might be as little as a day away. So, the distinction in the
    timelines is fairly important. If there is a fleeting target or
    a very urgent target that needs to be addressed in a timeframe
    shorter than 1 to 3 or 4 days, then this capability is
    essential.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Dean Gallucci, when you were discussing the hardest cases,
    some type of terrorist getting hold of material, what we have
    to do, and what would be helpful, is if we could identify the
    source of that material, which leads to this issue of the
    forensics of the nuclear material. Is it possible to catalog
    the source of nuclear material, from a technical sense, so
    that, at least conceptually, we could identify, and then,
    having identified, be able to attribute that to a nation-state
    or some entity that we could deter or at least retaliate? Is
    that possible?
        Dr. Gallucci. Senator, what I think I know about this is
    that the answer is pretty clear, that we have some signatures
    we have collected over decades that would allow us, for
    example, in the first instance, if you don't have an unexploded
    weapon, but you're essentially in the business of analyzing
    debris, you could tell whether it was a plutonium core or
    whether it was a uranium core. If it was a uranium core, you
    might be able to quickly tell whether the uranium was enriched
    in a diffusion process or a centrifuge process. If it was
    plutonium, you might be able to, through an analysis of the
    ratios of the isotopes, figure out what kind of reactor, and
    maybe even which reactor, the plutonium was produced in. So,
    there are a lot of ifs here, but you might be able to get to
    the point of identifying the source of the material. It did not
    help that A.Q. Khan played Johnny Appleseed with a particular
    kind of centrifuge and spread it hither and yon so that you
    would get a similar kind of signature from that uranium. But
    the bottom line here is, our laboratories are working on this.
    They're prepared to do this, if necessary. We have some chance
    of this, and we have begun to talk about this, because, if we
    want to gain deterrence, the bad guys need to know that they
    might get caught.
        Senator Reed. So, I assume that your view would be this
    would be a very worthwhile effort to pursue internationally, to
    try to develop a regime in which the producers of nuclear
    material are, either by self- declaration or inspection, sort
    of, list the products on the label so that if something goes
    off, we know.
        Dr. Gallucci. Yes. The idea of an inventory would, of
    course, have a lot of benefits to it. We'd have to worry about
    spoofing in the course of doing that. But, yes, I think
    everything we could do to be able to trace material back would
    be of benefit.
        Senator Reed. Is this bought--supported outside the United
    States? I mean, are there international agencies and other
    countries who say, ``We understand this is important, let's do
    it''?
        Dr. Gallucci. I'm sorry, Senator, I really don't know that.
    That probably is knowable, but I just don't know it.
        Senator Reed. Right, okay. Very good. I don't know if
    anyone else has a comment, but----
        Let me turn to the Moscow Treaty, which is mentioned by Dr.
    Drell and others. It does call for a reduction by 2012, but the
    treaty is nonbinding, there's no duration, it's nonverifiable.
    Each side's free to determine when something's nonoperational,
    operational, and the question is, should the treaty be
    modified? Also, is it possible, within the scope of the treaty,
    to accelerate the reduction of the deployed nuclear weapons? I
    mean, this is one of those things that was announced with great
    fanfare a few years ago, and then suddenly it's ancient
    history. So, Dr. Drell, and then Dr. Payne, if you'd comment?
        Dr. Drell. It is an unusual feature of that treaty that it
    has no verification requirements written into it. On one hand,
    you can say that shows an evolution from a Cold War
    confrontation with an adversary to treating the Russians, now,
    more like England and France. You have to ask how far you want
    to go that way. I'm always comfortable when one has crisp,
    specific verification procedures, I have to say. How the
    evolution to a more cooperative relation should go
    politically--I'm a physicist, and I leave the strategic
    political judgment on how the governments are getting along to
    Washington. I have a little feeling that it's progress if we
    have a relation with Russia that does allow a certain element
    of trust. But, the bottom line, you have to verify.
        We certainly could make more rapid the implementation of
    the Treaty of Moscow provisions. We could, for example,
    deactivate weapons that are being decreased out of the line. We
    could agree that, of the weapons that are in the 5,000, but not
    the deployed 1,700 to 2,200, we could agree that we don't need
    that many of them. We could look at the remaining battlefield
    weapons, the tactical weapons, forward deployed in Europe, and
    decide whether those couldn't go. That really is a basis--a
    matter of political judgment of how our strategic relations
    with the Russians are going. Are they working cooperatively as
    our partner, as they seem to be onboard in North Korea and now
    in the Iranian discussion, or are there problems? I'm not an
    expert there.
        Senator Reed. Dr. Payne?
        Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. The treaty is binding between the two
    parties. It's not a nonbinding treaty. The requirement to
    reduce, by approximately two-thirds, the number of deployed
    nuclear forces is in the treaty, and will have to be abided by
    2012.
        The question about accelerating reductions, the answer is,
    yes, sir, reductions can be accelerated. In fact, that was
    mentioned specifically by the U.S. in 2002. Indeed, part of the
    presentation of the NPR showed periodic assessments of the
    situation, the geopolitical situation, so that if the
    geopolitical situation was such that those reductions could be
    accelerated, we could go ahead and pursue that.
        Another question, another factor, as to whether those
    reductions could be accelerated was how well the United States
    was doing with regard to the development and deployment of
    advanced conventional forces and defensive capabilities. If we
    were progressing and maturing smartly towards advanced
    conventional and defensive capabilities, the thought was there
    may be enough mitigation of risks so that those reductions
    could be accelerated.
        Another factor is the political condition. Looking out over
    10 years, at that time, no one felt comfortable that their
    crystal ball was good enough to be able to predict what the
    geopolitical relationship would be like 10 years down the line.
    So, again, the idea was that we would have periodic assessments
    of the situation so that those reductions could be accelerated
    if the political conditions called for it.
        The last point, I guess, of the question had to do with
    verification. Let me note, because it wasn't noted earlier,
    that the verification regime was to be derived from the
    existing START regime, with extensive verification provisions.
    That, then, really leads to the question that was brought up
    earlier this morning, and that is, what about START after
    2009?--because the verification provisions for the Moscow
    Treaty are embedded in START. So, the real question isn't that
    there's no verification. There's considerable verification for
    the Moscow Treaty. The question is, what happens to START after
    2009, and to those pertinent verification provisions?
        Senator Reed. That would suggest, when START expires, in
    2009, we could think about modifying the existing treaty, the
    Moscow Treaty.
        But one of the problems, I think, with the Moscow Treaty is
    that there's no timetable, there's no necessity to reduce any
    single weapon until, I presume, 2012, when the term of the
    treaty expires. So, literally we could be sitting, at 11:59 on
    the last day and, I guess, announce that we're reducing all our
    weapons, but then, the next day, the treaty's expired, and
    there's no legal binding requirement to make this reduction. In
    other words, it's a rather odd arms-control treaty. Also, my
    sense is that nothing is really taking place. I don't notice
    any action between the United States and Russia to begin
    serious discussions to--even a symbolic reduction of weapons.
    So, it is somewhat troubling.
        Let me just go back to one question that was raised
    previously by Senator Nelson, and that is the discussion about
    taking conventional weapons and putting them on Trident
    submarines. Dean Gallucci, do you have a notion about that?
        Dr. Gallucci. Senator, I think everybody knows that there
    are two contending values here. One is that I, like everybody
    else, would like to have the capability--be able to accomplish
    this mission of a prompt conventional strike against a
    fleeting, but important target. Then the other good is, of
    course, never to plan to do anything that--to accomplish that
    first mission--that might be misconstrued as the initial launch
    of a first strike from a strategic system. So, I come to this
    with enormous skepticism, and would want to be completely
    persuaded that in no such circumstance would we be attempting
    to do this and running any risk of being misunderstood. I think
    there are political disadvantages to it, too, but I am, if you
    can catch the tenor of my voice here, hesitant about this. I
    guess, at this moment, I would say I am still unconvinced, but
    that may be because of my own ignorance. I worry a great deal
    that we not get into a situation in which a submarine on
    station and from a particular box launches a strike which now
    the Russians, later the Chinese, view as a pre-emptive strike,
    depending, of course--this all depends upon what the context
    is--for example is it a crisis context, a context that goes
    beyond the target state to other states? It is just such an
    enormous concern that it has to be addressed. If it is
    absolutely put aside, and there is no downside, from that
    perspective, then, of course, as a mission, I would like us to
    have that capability.
        Senator Reed. Dr. Drell?
        Dr. Drell. May I make a short comment on that?
        Clearly, there are some needs for prompt global strike in
    the world. I would make three technical comments.
        The first one, and most important, is what Bob Gallucci
    just said, there must be no ambiguity that the system is non-
    nuclear. So, the idea of mixing the loadings of a Trident sub
    seems to me the worst possible danger. If you can do it
    clearly--this is a non-nuclear system--I think that's
    essential.
        But there are two other technical points which I think need
    to be looked at. We're talking about something that's prompt.
    We're going to get it in less than a day. We're going to get it
    in an hour or so. That means we must be able to locate it, at
    all times if a mobile target, with precision, because a
    conventional warhead, a few hundred pounds of high explosive
    does not have a very large kill radius, and you're talking
    about sending something thousands of miles, and getting very
    precisely accurate. One has to be sure that the target position
    location can be, in realtime, established that way. I think one
    wants to, but that's not an easy order. That's not impossible.
    It's not an easy order. It's a technical demand that has to be
    addressed and understood before one thinks one has anything.
        The other thing is, the United States is a global power
    with bases around the world, and there are other technologies,
    including drones and other systems, that are nearby. Again, one
    has to ask the alternative advantages and disadvantages.
        So, I think these are legitimate questions. They're hard
    questions. But the lack of ambiguity in what we're doing, non-
    nuclear, is, to me, overwhelming.
        Senator Reed. Dr. Payne?
        Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. Let me just comment briefly on the
    concern over the possible Russian response to an at-sea launch
    of the conventionally-armed Trident, because this question was
    thought through at great length, with, I think, reasonable
    provisions to mitigate the possibility of a Russian
    misinterpretation.
        But with regard to that question, let me just mention that
    the United States has, according to all the unclassified
    sources, over 1,100 at-sea launches of submarine-launched
    ballistic missiles (SLBM) in the test program over the years.
    Through 1988, we had no notification provisions to the Soviet
    Union. After 1988, we had notification provisions established,
    and we carried through with those notifications to the Soviet
    Union that we would be launching a SLBM in the appropriate
    timeframe, in the appropriate direction. So, there's a long,
    long history of U.S./Soviet and now U.S./Russian relations with
    regard to notification for the safe launching of non-nuclear
    ballistic missiles, and there's been no problem, there's been
    no misinterpretation, there have been no problems such as folks
    have mentioned with regard to a possible Russian
    misinterpretation.
        I wouldn't be as confident in this, other than I look back,
    with 1,100 launches, open-sea launches of SLBMs, and we have
    provisions, since 1988, of notifying the Russians--Soviets
    then, Russians now--in that regard, as do the British have
    provisions for notifying the Russians with regard to their at-
    sea launches. So, I understand the concern. I agree we need to
    absolutely minimize the concern of a Russian misinterpretation.
    I'm also confident that we've already gone a long way towards
    that over the last 40 years.
        Senator Reed. I thank you. Just a final comment. You've
    been most kind, Mr. Chairman. Given the emergency circumstances
    where a missile like this would be launched, and particularly
    not in a designated range where these other tests have taken
    place, it might be very difficult to notify even our senior
    command of this decision, let alone the Russians. It would be
    unusual, by definition, and I'm not as sanguine about the
    record of test launches and ranges. I went on a D-5 shoot off
    of Cape Canaveral, which the--you could tell--and it's
    boilerplate, and the Russians have seen it for years and years
    and years. This would be, I think, something much, much
    different, probably a surprise to many people in the Department
    of Defense, not only the Russians.
        Mr. Chairman?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, assuming that you could get over
    that threshold of it being understood that this was not a
    nuclear launch, the question left hanging is the question of,
    does it offer a deterrence to a state or a nonstate actor?
        Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. I believe that a prompt global strike,
    the conventional Trident or an alternative, could provide
    enormous deterrent advantages, including for extended
    deterrence. Let me give you a couple of reasons why.
        First, one of the factors that contributes to the assurance
    of our allies is the notion that the United States can be
    promptly involved if, in fact, they suffer from an attack. This
    capability would certainly signal very quickly, that the United
    States was involved in their security on their behalf, and the
    anticipation of that should have a deterring effect on
    opponents, foes of our friends and allies, who think that the
    United States might be able to either stay out entirely, might
    stay out entirely, or might be out long enough for them to
    create a fait accompli. So, I see this prompt global strike as
    being very helpful with regard to deterrence, particularly
    extended deterrence.
        In addition, we know that, for example, the PRC sees
    conventional ballistic missiles as what they call their
    ``pocket of excellence,'' an area they excel in. For the United
    States not to be involved in the capability that they put so
    much store on is, in a sense, an incentive to move forward in
    that direction for folks that we might prefer to move in other
    ways.
        So, I see the prompt global strike being useful for
    deterrence, being useful for now what's called dissuasion,
    trying to suggest to folks that they not move in those
    directions, because it's not an open avenue for them to have a
    pocket of excellence.
        Senator Bill Nelson. What do the other two of you think
    about that, the question of the deterrence?
        Dr. Gallucci. I don't think, even if we were completely
    free of our concern about the ambiguity of a strategic nuclear
    strike by using a Trident submarine for the launch, that I
    would be doing this for deterrent reasons. I think that I'd be
    doing it for strike reasons. We might get some deterrence out
    of it; and the promptness is something that we would value. In
    certain circumstances, we might be able to do this with
    deployed forward forces, with cruise missiles. I think we
    shouldn't overstate how much we're going to get from this. I
    don't think countries that are thinking of developing secret
    nuclear facilities or moving something from here to there are
    going to decide not to do it because there's a submarine
    somewhere on the planet that might strike them. I just think
    we're asking a little too much of this to do that.
        Dr. Drell. I find it mainly a strike weapon, not a
    deterrent weapon. There are not many targets I can think of
    that are so important you have to get them within an hour, as
    opposed to a day. I think if we go--move to a world where we're
    all going to have 30-minute strike capabilities halfway around
    the world from each other, it's not really the world I'd like
    to see us trying to develop. I would rather see us realizing
    that there is certain--value in time to think things through.
    But----
        Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions?
        Dr. Drell.--I'm not enamored with this weapon.
        Senator Sessions. I get worried about all these things.
    I'll tell you what troubles me. So, in the next 5 years, we're
    going to have reduced the size of our nuclear stockpile down to
    numbers we haven't seen in 50 years, at the beginning of the
    Cold War. But I--the critics say, ``That's not enough, we ought
    to go down to 500, or maybe less.'' Strategic Command develops
    a proposed substitute, non-nuclear global strike capability to
    substitute for nuclear strike capability, with the conventional
    Trident modification. The critics say, ``No, that's risky.''
    The Nuclear Weapons Council approves continuing study of a
    replacement warhead that would be safer, more reliable, and
    more secure. We could replace aging warheads with the same
    capability, because they're more reliable, perhaps have fewer
    of them. But critics are saying, ``Well, we should stay out of
    the business of manufacturing warheads.'' We observed China
    take out one of its own satellites. We worry about strategic
    vulnerability of our space assets. It would seem to make sense
    to study whether defensive capabilities could be deployed on
    satellites to protect them. The critics decide that defensive
    capabilities look too much like offensive capabilities, and so
    we shouldn't have weapons in space, and they oppose that. I
    would just say to our witnesses, we have a lot of challenges
    out there. The objective of reducing nuclear dangers has a--and
    the number of weapons, certainly has an appeal. We would like
    to do that. But, continuing forward, as the ``Caucus of No''
    would say, does not, in my view, advance our national security.
        I think I would just ask you, maybe, to comment on that,
    and to comment on whether or not the reduction of our own
    stockpile and our self-imposed restraints--that are very costly
    financially, too, on occasion--are actually causing other
    nations not to develop nuclear weapons, or to reduce their
    capability, or cause nations not to develop a nuclear
    capability at all. Is that helping in any way? My time is
    short, I've rambled on. But, I mean, that's the fundamental
    question, to me, as a person who feels a responsibility to
    defend this country. Where are we heading, Dr. Gallucci?
        Dr. Gallucci. When you read that litany of charges,
    essentially, I want to immediately leap and say, ``Please do
    not confuse me with an advocate of unilateral disarmament or a
    pacifist.'' I spent my career in government service, in
    political/military affairs of various kinds, and I'm----
        Senator Sessions. I would just say that we voted down--
    Congress voted down the penetrator--actually, research on the
    penetrator, and they voted down the prompt global strike non-
    nuclear system last year. So, we're in a deal here.
        Dr. Gallucci. But, having said what I said, I have argued
    here for the lowest appropriate levels of forces, which is to
    say half of the 1,700 might do, and Professor Drell was talking
    about 500 deployed, 500 reserved--that's still a lot of nuclear
    weapons, with a lot of capacity for destruction. It has been
    classic for the United States to be worried about how much is
    enough. So, I think we can all be in that game of trying to
    assess how much is enough--trying to puzzle out what's
    appropriate and look at what missions we want these weapons
    for. I think that's what we're doing here.
        I think suspicion of a particular weapon innovation really
    has to do with the instinct, which I really want as my takeaway
    from today from me, and that is instinct that we do not wish to
    call attention, internationally, unnecessarily, to nuclear
    weapons as an essential portion of a legitimate national
    defense establishment. We need nuclear weapons now--first and
    foremost, as a deterrent, so that others do not use them. If
    you ask all three of us, ``is it a terrific idea to absolutely
    promise we will never use nuclear weapons first?'' I don't
    think any one of us want to say, ``we'll promise that,'' but we
    want to get to the point where we're able to accomplish our
    missions through the use of conventional forces, and the
    nuclear weapon is for a deterrent, and it's for retaliation for
    the use of a nuclear weapon, and that's it.
        So, I think in each or many of the points that are made in
    the statement you made, Senator, my reaction is that we ought
    to be looking very carefully at the RRW. A lot of this is quite
    technical, and questions of when, in fact, components of the
    existing nuclear weapons may deteriorate and reduce our
    confidence and reliability--how much time do we have? Is this
    weapon actually going to increase our confidence if it is for
    all time, an untested weapon? I have no way, independently, of
    assessing that, but I know that, in the end, I want us to get
    to a point where we do not need to test, that we're confident
    in the reliability of our systems without testing, so that we
    can comfortably adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
    because of what that would mean politically as, again, a signal
    that we wish to de-emphasize the use of nuclear weapons for
    purposes other than deterrence.
        So, this all goes, I think, to one's body posture. If there
    is a critique of what the administration has been putting
    forward in its various initiatives, it is the embrace of
    nuclear weapons for new missions, when we are looking to move
    away from the use of nuclear weapons to accomplish those
    missions. I think----
        Senator Sessions. Well----
        Dr. Gallucci.--that's the rub.
        Senator Sessions.--I think body posture is--may be a factor
    that we certainly ought not to lose sight of, but I believe
    these nations are deciding, for their reasons. Iran is
    deciding, not on our body posture, but on--they've been working
    for a long time to have a nuclear weapon. Iraq was, had they
    not been stopped during the first Gulf War. Saudi Arabia, what
    are they going to do if Iran gets weapons? What about Egypt?
    What about Turkey? What about other countries? So, I'm not sure
    all that's happening because of how we handle ourselves.
        But, Dr. Drell and Dr. Payne, if you'd just briefly respond
    to that. I know my time is a bit short.
        Dr. Drell. Senator, I have devoted a lot of my life to
    concern about American security. I'm not a disarmer, I'm not a
    ``no-first-use-er,'' but I want to say, as a technical person,
    we have to make the right choices. First we have to do what's
    practical, and, second, we have to see how what we do may be
    interpreted elsewhere.
        When I looked at the earth-penetrator discussion, and I
    commented on it, to me the value of an earth penetrator was
    extremely limited militarily. If I want to get a deep
    underground target, I have to know where it is. Precision and
    accuracy of location and delivery means much more than just
    penetrating and then getting an order of magnitude more of the
    energy. We have big weapons that can get underground. We have a
    number of big weapons. We didn't need that weapon, and it
    wouldn't do us much good. It would, however, affect how our
    efforts at maintaining a nonproliferation regime are going to
    be seen, not by Iran or North Korea, but by the 185 nations who
    signed the NPT and have said, when they extended it into the
    indefinite future, ``We have to, ourselves, accept some of the
    restraints. We have to work toward the comprehensive test ban.
    We have to work towards reduction,'' because that's embedded in
    the treaty we have to use for their cooperation in trying to
    prevent this spread.
        When I talked about the RRW, I said, ``We need an
    infrastructure to be able to respond and maintain nuclear
    weapons,'' but I said, ``Don't go ahead and build an RRW, when
    you don't know''--and I don't believe any technical person can
    honestly say that we can make a safer, more reliable, more
    effective weapon without testing it. Until you know that you
    can do that, it's a waste of money and it's a politically
    provocative thing to do. I want to--and I recommend--let us get
    a serious consensus built among the weapons labs. There's a
    report coming out, headed by a former weapons-lab leader, Dr.
    Tarter, which has been discussed--it's not fully released--
    saying exactly what I said.
        So, I am not a disarmer, but I believe we have to do
    sensible things. I think it's important that we look at what
    other countries do, because I think getting rid of nuclear
    weapons as part of our policy is important, and I haven't given
    up on that.
        I remember President Eisenhower saying so movingly, ``the
    United States is determined to help solve the fearful atomic
    dilemma, to devote its entire heart and mind to finding the way
    by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be
    dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.''
        President Reagan, the most extreme nuclear abolitionist who
    was ever President of this country, said, before he was
    President, during his presidency, and after, he said--he called
    for the abolishment of all nuclear weapons, which he
    considered--I'm quoting him--``totally irrational, totally
    inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of
    life on Earth and civilization.''
        To my mind, we have to make the right technical decisions,
    and I support them, but we also have to be careful how the
    political effort that you gentleman make are going to be seen
    around the world, and help push forward a nonproliferation
    regime.
        Senator Sessions. Dr. Payne?
        Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. I agree with Dean Gallucci, that the
    lowest number of nuclear weapons compatible with security
    should be our goal. In fact, that's the goal----
        Senator Sessions. I'm pretty frugal. I agree with that,
    too. I don't----[Laughter.]
        Dr. Payne. In fact, that's the----
        Senator Sessions. From a money point of view; I'm not sure
    it's going to affect the psyche of some other nation, but--
        Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. That's, in fact, the same goal that
    the President gave to us, in the Department of Defense, as we
    were pursuing the NPR, the lowest number compatible with
    national security.
        So, then the question becomes, What's that lowest number?
    Let me just make a couple remarks in that regard.
        First, with regard to President Reagan's vision of
    denuclearization, let's not forget what the other half of his
    vision was. That is, the condition of excellent, outstanding
    defensive capabilities for the United States, its friends, and
    its allies. It wasn't nuclear--a nuclear-free world in the
    absence of those defenses; it was a potential for a nuclear-
    free world in the context of those defenses. So, as we think
    about these visions of moving forward, let's not get out of
    sync if we're going to use President Reagan as the model of how
    we want to talk about this.
        Second point concerns the notion that the lower we go with
    regard to nuclear weapons, the more capable you are of de-
    legitimizing nuclear weapons for others; that's essentially the
    notion that we've talked about. Let me just note--and I tried
    to represent this in my prepared remarks--that if lowering
    numbers of nuclear weapons de-legitimizes our--the credibility
    of our extended deterrent, then that's going to promote
    proliferation. It's not going to prevent proliferation, it's
    going to promote proliferation, because our extended deterrent,
    as I mentioned earlier, is, I believe, the single most
    important nonproliferation tool in existence. To maintain the
    credibility of our extended nuclear deterrence is the single
    most important thing we can do to contribute to
    nonproliferation. The example that I used earlier is the
    concern that the Japanese now have over the threat that they
    face and the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. Japanese
    representatives have now been explicit with regard to what that
    means for them and the possibility that they might be
    interested in a nuclear weapon. So, that connection between our
    extended nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation is profound,
    and its importance for our nonproliferation goal, I think,
    cannot be overstated.
        Let me suggest the next point, and that is, I don't
    believe, for a moment, that lowering our levels of nuclear
    weapons is going to have a positive effect on so-called rogue
    states and their desire for nuclear weapons. Remember, when we
    think about trying to engage in nuclear nonproliferation,
    trying to get states that don't want to have nuclear weapons in
    the first place, or cannot have nuclear weapons isn't the hard
    problem; the hard problem is trying to move states who want
    nuclear weapons away from having them. Those, in the
    contemporary world, look like Iran and North Korea. Those are
    the states of concern. They don't want nuclear weapons because
    we have nuclear weapons. They don't mimic us, in that sense.
    They want nuclear weapons for lots of reasons of their own.
    Whether we have an arsenal that looks like 1,000 weapons or
    4,000 weapons, I don't think is going to have a bit of an
    effect on the desire for--by either Iran or North Korea to have
    nuclear weapons.
        Senator Sessions. If we had negotiations with North Korea,
    and we cut our numbers down to 500, and they had 300 or 250,
    wouldn't that change the tenor of those negotiations?
        Dr. Payne. Sir, remember that the----
        Senator Sessions. Then, if they got to 500, wouldn't that
    be somewhat different, also?
        Dr. Payne. Yes, sir, it would. If you look at the reason
    why they want nuclear weapons, to the extent that they discuss
    it, it has much more to do with our conventional prowess, which
    is second to none in the world. They want nuclear weapons, in a
    sense, to be able to trump our conventional capability. It has
    nothing to do with the nature of our nuclear arsenal.
        Then, lets just conclude--and I appreciate the time, sir--
    it is that we don't know the future. One of the reasons to be
    careful about nuclear reductions is because we don't know the
    future. If we give up force structure now, it's going to be
    extremely hard, and extremely expensive, to ever get that force
    structure back. If my crystal ball were good enough to say it's
    going to be a benign future, we know Russia's going to move in
    a good direction, we know China's going to move in a good
    direction, then we could commit to these kind of reductions
    that are being discussed. But no one's crystal ball's that
    good, and, in a sense, we need to retain the force structure
    now to be able to reconstitute if the future moves in a less
    benign direction, because if we give up that force structure
    now, as I said, it'll be very expensive and very hard to ever
    get it back.
        Senator Sessions. I think those are good comments. I
    certainly would like to keep our numbers down. But I don't want
    a major misconception to occur in the world that somehow this
    country lacks the will to use the power we have to defend this
    Nation, and that anybody that steps over a certain line is
    subject, in itself, to assured destruction. I mean, I think
    that's just where we are. We need to have that. I worry a
    little bit that everything that's proposed in the strategic
    area is opposed, and we have a hard time passing it.
        I would note that we really are reducing our weapons. You
    go out to the Pantex plant in Texas, and there are warehouses
    and warehouses and bins of dismantled and destroyed warheads.
    We're melting down those things. We really are making a
    historic move. I would note, for the record, that there's no
    special-effects nuclear-weapons proposals to develop that now.
    The robust nuclear earth penetrator was not funded. Congress
    did not accept that. The RRW conceptual design selected is very
    similar to the historical designs, and has a connection
    pedigree to hundreds of nuclear weapons tests conducted in the
    1950s and 1960s. So, I think we probably could do that without
    testing.
        But I would just say, Mr. Chairman, I think it's a healthy
    discussion. It is a healthy discussion. I would maybe ask, with
    a follow-up written question--my time is limited--but, what
    about the Triad? How much of that is still necessary today, the
    money that's spent there? Is there some better utilization of
    that for our national defense?
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I believe that the current Department of Defense (DOD) strategy for
    the nuclear triad makes sense. The DOD has reduced the size of each of
    the legs of the nuclear triad and is making the remaining force
    structure more flexible. For example, since the beginning of this
    administration, the DOD has reduced the number of deployable ballistic
    missile submarines from 18 to 12 (4 have been converted to cruise
    missile submarines, 2 will typically be in overhaul and unavailable for
    deployment). To add flexibility to the remaining ballistic missile
    submarine force, DOD has proposed developing and deploying precision
    conventional warheads on some Trident missiles on each of the deployed
    submarines. The size of the long-range bomber force has also been
    reduced. The size of the remaining bomber force is based on needs for
    conventional weapon roles in major combat contingencies. In addition,
    the ICBM force has been reduced in size; all Peacekeeper missiles have
    been retired. Only one type of ICBM--the Minuteman III--remains. A
    nuclear triad at much lower combined force levels than existed during
    the Cold War makes sense. But the many good reasons for maintaining a
    nuclear triad remain. For example, the existence of a triad helps to
    ensure that no existing or potential opponent can envisage a successful
    competition in nuclear arms or a practicable strategy of eliminating
    the U.S. deterrent via offensive operation. These are potentially
    critical contributions to U.S. and allied security. As I stated
    earlier, we must be careful as we consider further reductions in the
    triad force structure so that we don't cut the force too deeply and
    find ourselves in an unintended position of weakness that invites
    challenges and provocations.

        Senator Sessions. I'd just ask one question for our
    experts, briefly, if you would. Can a nation today--let's say a
    closed, or even an open nation today--develop a nuclear weapon
    without us knowing it? I mean, how hard is it for a country to
    develop, secretly, a nuclear weapons program?
        Dr. Gallucci?
        Dr. Gallucci. I think the answer is certainly yes to that
    question, depending on the Nation. If the Nation already has
    fissile-material production facilities--in other words, it's
    separating plutonium, particularly if it's a certain kind of
    reactor that's producing the plutonium, if it has an enrichment
    facility, then the possibility of producing the weapon secretly
    is there. This could be an advanced country, or it could be a
    country that is not so advanced if it has those facilities.
        While I have the floor, Senator, so that I don't have a
    really terrible afternoon, let me say that at no point did I
    wish to convey that our decisions, or your decisions, about
    what we do with our force posture are going to have a
    particularly important effect on decisions that are made in
    Pyongyang or Tehran or these hard cases. But this discussion
    today, this hearing, was really about our broad force posture,
    as I understood it, and, when we're thinking about something
    like that, we have to think that there are 9 nuclear-weapon
    states in the world, the 5 declared and the other 4, and there
    are not 90. But there are 189 countries out there, and we'd
    like to continue to have to worry about what North Korea and
    Iran are doing, and not 40 or 50 other countries. So, I think,
    while the body-posture issue--argument I was making is really,
    you're quite right, irrelevant to the few hard cases who are
    going to make these kinds of regional decisions of their own,
    there are a lot of other countries out there which have decided
    not to acquire nuclear weapons, that could acquire them. I
    associate myself with Dr. Payne's comment here, that our
    ability to extend deterrence is absolutely critical, and that
    has to be on the list of missions that our weapons need to be
    able to accomplish. So, I believe that's true. I don't believe
    we are particularly suspect with respect to extended
    deterrence, but I do believe that he is absolutely correct that
    that is something that we need to sustain.
        Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is there unanimity in the panel on the
    proposition that less nations having nuclear weapons is a good
    thing? [Nodding of heads.]
        Okay. Is there unanimity in the panel that less weapons
    possessed by the United States and Russia is a good thing?
        Dr. Drell. To a point.
        Dr. Gallucci. To a point.
        Senator Bill Nelson. To a point.
        Dr. Payne. With conditions, yes.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right. For the record, state,
    Doctor, what does ``to a point'' mean? Dr. Payne, state what
    ``with conditions'' means.
        Dr. Drell. I said ``to a point.'' If I don't know--it
    depends upon the--how big the band of uncertainty is about what
    other countries have. I want to have a deterrent. I want to
    have extended deterrence. I want to have deterrence. It depends
    upon, again, the uncertainties out there. I don't want to be
    the weak one.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Payne?
        Dr. Payne. I agree, we don't want to give up deterrence, we
    don't want to give up extended deterrence, we don't want to
    give up the assurance that the nuclear weapons provide, or the
    dissuasive effect that nuclear weapon provide. With regard to
    the conditions, I mentioned the--just briefly ago, that one of
    the conditions associated with moving down to variable levels
    of nuclear weapons should very effective defenses. Although the
    NPR called for the United States to move toward very effective
    defenses against--at least against limited threats, I should
    say we're not there yet.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Well, on the flip side of
    this, those other countries are asking the same thing. Do their
    nuclear weapons deter us? I would take it that certainly what
    we've seen in North Korea is that they think that they're going
    to get something from the fact that they have developed nuclear
    weapons. So, do their nuclear weapons deter the U.S.?
        Dr. Gallucci. Senator, from what? The issue with deterrence
    is--one of the issues is what you are hoping to deter. I think
    we could be pretty confident, unless one drew the conclusion
    that there was clearly irrationality and insanity in the
    leadership, we could be pretty confident that we will not be
    attacked--the United States of America will not be attacked by
    North Korea. But there are so many other consequences of the
    North Korean nuclear weapons program which threaten our
    security, and that of our allies, that engaging in a
    negotiation to try to get rid of those weapons is very
    sensible. But the particular concern that they will mate these
    weapons with their extended-range ballistic missile and
    directly attack the United States of America isn't high on my
    list of things to worry about. There are many more things that
    come from this that I'm more concerned about.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That's, of course, what most of us
    feel. I'm trying to look at it from the other side. The idea
    goes to the legitimization of nuclear weapons. When is the idea
    of a nuclear strike not feasible? Is deterring the United
    States a motivator on smaller nations, other than Russia and
    China?
        Dr. Payne. Yes, sir, I believe it is. A motivator for them
    to want nuclear weapons? Is that the question?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Yes.
        Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. I believe that seeking a deterrent
    capability is a motivator for both Iran and North Korea, for
    example.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Then, that being the case, what
    is the greatest incentive that we can give to them for not
    having nuclear weapons?
        Dr. Payne. The greatest incentive that we could have, sir,
    would be to do away with our conventional forces that are the
    basis for their desire to have a nuclear capability to deter
    us. That would be the greatest thing we could do. I suspect
    that it would be a mistake to do that.
        Dr. Gallucci. Wait. No, wait. But if we can----
        Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci?
        Dr. Gallucci.--carry on this conversation. I believe that
    both the North Koreans and the Iranians are interested in
    having a nuclear capability, for a variety of reasons. One of
    the reasons is to be able to deter the United States from using
    its conventional forces, either in the region or directly
    against them. But that's not all. I would put forward the
    proposition that the Iranians are truly interested in a
    hegemonic political position in the Gulf, and the acquisition
    of nuclear weapons would help them achieve that political
    objective, so that they are not simply interested in deterring
    us. That's why I believe they are a harder negotiating target
    than is North Korea. I do believe that North Korea is
    principally interested in regime survival, and is looking to
    deal with us, as a possible advocate of regime change in North
    Korea, and a negotiation that persuaded them that their
    security needs could be met through a relationship with the
    United States might lead them to give up these weapons. Iran, I
    regard as having a slightly more challenging set of objectives.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right, let's talk about the RRW.
    If we agree that, generally, with the conditions that you've
    placed on it, that it is desirable for us to reduce the number
    of nuclear weapons that we have, along with Russia, since we
    have plenty to blow ourselves up with, is the RRW--number one,
    is it safer? Are its component parts safer, so that it lessens
    the possibility of an accident? Is its reliability sufficient
    so that all of these nuclear weapons that we have in reserve,
    because we're not sure of the reliability, since they're
    degrading over time, that we would be able to significantly
    reduce our arsenal with the new RRW? Let's discuss that.
        Dr. Drell. I believe that point has yet to be made. But let
    me say, my starting position is, our weapons are safe. In 1990,
    I led a study for the House Armed Services Committee, backed by
    the Senate Armed Services Committee, with Johnny Foster and Dr.
    Townes, the inventor of the laser--there was a three-man
    committee, and we came to the conclusion that the weapons to be
    in our enduring stockpile meet all the official safety criteria
    that are in our policy.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right. I think everybody feels
    that that's the case. Now, are they reliable?
        Dr. Drell. I'm coming. Since the moratorium on testing
    started, in 1992, first by President George H.W. Bush, and then
    continued by President Clinton, we have had a very extensive
    multifaceted stockpile stewardship program that has gone into
    understanding the scientific--underlying processes in our
    weapons. We didn't do that to the full extent during the
    buildup of the first 50 years, because we were always changing
    the weapons, improving them, until we got to a point where the
    weapons really were quite robust. We now understand those
    weapons better, we have done extensive surveillance, extensive
    forensics, pulling them apart year by year, and we have, in my
    mind, increased our confidence in the reliability of the
    stockpile, at least mine, as a scientist who's worked these
    issues, because we understand them better, we know what to look
    for, and we have, in my mind, better confidence that if
    something's going wrong, the bells will ring, and we'll hear
    them. There have been findings--there are always findings when
    you build a weapon, because there are mistakes made in the
    production, there are birth defects that we discover. We've
    found them. I believe it is a fair statement that there is no
    significant aging of the weapons that has been found. I believe
    the stockpile, currently, is safe and reliable, and is not
    aging.
        Now, that doesn't mean one can be complacent. One would
    like to improve them. In particular, in the world of terrorism,
    where a bad guy may get his hands on one of these weapons, if I
    can do anything to give them better use control, meaning that a
    bad guy getting one of my weapons cannot use it against me, I
    want to do that. But I believe firmly, as I said in my
    testimony, and based upon not just opinions, but work, that the
    ability to improve any one of these three categories has to be
    rigorously understood. Can we do it and have greater
    confidence? We have a stockpile which is built on a thousand-
    plus tests. To think it's easy to have greater confidence when
    you make some changes in a system like this, without testing,
    that's quite a statement, and I think that has to be--that's
    the statement where I say: I don't know the answer to your
    question, but we'd better find out before we go down the road,
    because clearly if we go down that road and we're building new
    weapons, and we give the impression that it's important for us
    to continue to modernize and improve, that does not, in my
    mind, help our nonproliferation goals. I think they are
    important.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do either of you know the answer? Is a
    replacement warhead that isn't going to be tested--is that
    reliable? Do either of you have the answer to that?
        Dr. Gallucci. No, Senator, I don't.
        Dr. Payne. No.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So, that's a question we have to
    answer.
        Dr. Drell. I think it has to be answered, and I think
    that's going to be a very important part of the debate here in
    Congress. First of all, it's a very important part of the
    weapons establishment and those of us involved in seeing that
    that question gets the highest attention and that we come back
    to Washington with an answer in which we are confident and has
    a consensus. Because I see no reason not to make the weapons
    safer, if I can with confidence, or more reliable, if I can
    with confidence, or with better use control. I don't see that's
    a vice.
        Senator Bill Nelson. But if it were not reliable and had to
    be tested, the opinion would be you don't go to an RRW. Is
    that----
        Dr. Drell. Unless we found some deficiency from our
    surveillance and life extension program which demands a change.
    That's why I said, don't savage those programs in pushing the
    RRW. Maintain the high quality that they have had for the last
    decade.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, until we know whether this whole
    thing is feasible, how much life extension should we go
    through?
        Dr. Drell. We have to--for the weapons that are in the
    stockpile, we have to keep our eyes on the ball ,and we have to
    say that the W-76, the W-88, the W-87, that these weapons,
    which are part of our deterrent, however much we want that
    deterrent to be, they are reliable, period. We don't give up on
    that, in my mind.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In your opinion, if we determine that
    they are reliable with this life extension, then we can reduce
    the existing stockpile.
        Dr. Drell. Absolutely. Absolutely.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Any different opinions there? [No
    response.]
        Since you all are the experts, is there any kind of rush
    going on to complete this feasibility study on the RRW?
        Dr. Drell. I--well, I'll stop talking in a minute, but let
    me just say--I don't see the signal yet that appears that
    there's an aging signal that's of concern. In fact, it was
    widely reported that the weapons labs reassessed the lifetime
    of the plutonium pits, and the Jason Group did its own
    independent work, which I was involved with. We now know that
    that concern about plutonium aging, because of the radioactive
    environment and its impact on the pits, is not a problem that
    can't be handled. It's--the lifetime now is of the order of a
    century. It was thought to be less so, I don't see any aging
    problem, and we are doing--we are--we're doing things--have
    been, for 15 years, in making the weapons more robust as we've
    gone along.
        Dr. Payne. I can mention, in that regard, Senator, that my
    understanding is that the last generation of designers and
    engineers with direct test experience will largely be
    retiring----
        Dr. Drell. Yes.
        Dr. Payne. --within the next 5 years. So, I think there is
    a near-term opportunity, perhaps a fleeting opportunity, to
    transfer the knowledge from these experienced scientists with
    direct test knowledge and experience to the next generation of
    designers. I think that could be important.
        Dr. Drell. Let--if I may comment on that, because----
        Senator Bill Nelson. Certainly.
        Dr. Drell.--I think it's very important that we maintain
    experts who know what they're doing in the labs. I think that
    if you look at the money that's been invested in the program
    over the last 15 years, with new instruments for much more
    detailed surveillance and analysis, simulations, the best
    computers, the possibility of doing underground subcritical
    tests in Nevada, where you don't generate a chain reaction, but
    in which you study the effects of explosives on plutonium
    prepared in different ways, these are all part of a very
    multifaceted program that is challenging to the scientists.
    There are--there is something visceral about saying, ``I'm
    going to blow out the side of a mountain.'' We all know that.
    But I think, in terms of scientists learning the trade, the
    ability to do the detailed new codes, high-fidelity, three-
    dimensional explosion codes, with the world's best
    supercomputers, now having the National Ignition Facility--it's
    going to give us data, where these codes can be tested in areas
    they've never been tested before, much more like bomb
    material--there is a good program, and I think attention is
    being paid to get very good scientists, and mentor them. I
    don't think that is a detonation of a new bomb is necessary,
    but it is necessary to have the management of the labs pay good
    attention to the problem that Dr. Payne raises. It is a
    concern. I think it's being addressed properly.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let's talk about numbers of weapons.
    Should the numbers in the arsenal be determined by specific
    targets?
        Dr. Payne. I don't believe so, sir. There was the Cold War
    approach to looking at the numbers required typically had to do
    with the number of targets in the Soviet Union. What that meant
    was that we defined ``deterrence'' in a numbers game. We also
    then defined our strategic requirements from that same numbers
    game. But, as I mentioned earlier, the relationship of numbers
    to deterrence, and deterrence effect, is something now that's
    very uncertain. The role of our strategic nuclear forces is
    well beyond deterrence. So, if we want to think about the
    numbers in general, if there's a--if there were a diagram to
    how we think about numbers, it wouldn't have so much to do with
    the number of targets, per se--that's, in a sense, the way we
    looked at it in the Cold War--but it would be the numbers that
    we think are important for dissuasion, for assurance,
    particularly extended nuclear deterrence, and the numbers that
    we think, then, are also associated with deterrence, as well as
    we can know them. So, it really isn't any longer just a numbers
    game. We treated it that way during the Cold War, and,
    fortunately, deterrence didn't fail. But we need to think about
    it much more broadly now.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead, Dr. Gallucci.
        Dr. Gallucci. I've never built a SIOP, so I don't have any
    hands-on experience in this. But I would be surprised if
    numbers were not still very important--first, for the mission
    which I think is the most critical, which is the deterrent
    mission. I'm really unclear and unsteady and concerned about
    Dr. Payne's reference to the ``other missions.'' That's what I
    tried to address in my remarks earlier. I'm comfortable with an
    absolute insistence that whatever capability exists,
    independent of Russian intentions, but whatever capability
    exists in Russia by the usual standards, that we do the
    counting and we figure that we have a secure, survivable,
    second-strike deterrent. So, I'm still up for those numbers.
        Additional missions for these nuclear weapons, I think my
    view is generally that they are the lesser and included cases--
    that we have small-yield weapons to accomplish some other
    missions, which I think are really, for me at least, very
    limited. I am not interested in using nuclear weapons in a
    first-strike mode to go after some hard targets. I do believe
    that the deterrent mission after an attack, even by a
    terrorist, where you wanted to gain the deterrent advantage
    against that country that might have transferred the material,
    is sort of a new mission. But my thinking still is that,
    fundamentally, we are looking at a secure deterrent, and one
    that is credible for the purpose of extended deterrence. I
    think I'm still there.
        Dr. Drell. Just very briefly, I think whatever deterrent
    value our weapons have against the terrorists, if they see us
    with 20 weapons, I don't know if they'll be deterred. But I
    don't think the difference between 20 and 500 matters that much
    to the terrorists. To other states who have--want to survive, I
    look at what 20 weapons would do to 20 cities in this country,
    and I feel very comfortable that if we had 500, we'd have one
    helluva deterrent. So, there is a point where numbers get
    important, but I don't think we're near that yet, the large----
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right, you're saying 500 instead
    of 5,000.
        Dr. Drell. That's right.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Right.
        Dr. Payne. Sir, could I comment? Because I don't want to be
    misinterpreted here. First, I don't think that numbers are
    unimportant. I think the numbers can be important. The point I
    was trying to make is that they don't tell the whole story. The
    additional missions that I was referring to have nothing to do
    with the tactical, or otherwise, use of nuclear weapons, per
    se. What I was talking about are the broad defensive goals of
    dissuasion and assurance, assuring our allies that--of our
    commitment, so they aren't interested in pursuing nuclear
    weapons, themselves, for example. So, when you look at the type
    of methodology that we want to pursue when we're thinking about
    numbers, it shouldn't just be tied back to deterrence and
    specific target numbers. That's what I meant. It needs to be
    broadened out, looking at all of these functions that nuclear
    weapons can help provide--and, again, not for a moment talking
    about pre-emption or tactical use of nuclear weapons. That's
    not what I was referring to.
        Senator Bill Nelson. What about the concept of the Triad,
    as we have used it--submarines, ICBMs and airplanes--as a
    deterrent; multiple means of delivering nuclear weapons?
        Dr. Drell. I believe in the value of diversity. Absolutely,
    I wouldn't give it up.
        Dr. Gallucci. I agree.
        Dr. Payne. Absolutely.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, let's assume that we proceeded
    down this road that we were going to have a SLBM that would be
    non-nuclear. Should all of the submarine-launched ballistic
    missiles be non-nuclear?
        Dr. Gallucci. Since my principal concern is of the
    ambiguity of a launch from a strategic platform, like a
    Trident, there are various things that we could do to try to
    reduce that concern, and I'd start by designating a particular
    submarine as conventional, and not mixing. I mean, that's where
    I'd start. I don't know that that would do the trick, but
    that's where I'd start.
        Dr. Drell. I have no higher confidence in any part of our
    defense than I do in the Navy's Trident program. That naval
    nuclear program has been the outstanding program through its
    history. But I feel a lot better with just no mix on the same
    boat, nevertheless.
        Dr. Payne. Yes, I certainly wouldn't convert the entire
    SLBM force to conventional weapons.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you all very much. It's been an
    engaging discussion, and thank you for lending your expertise
    to us.
        Again, Dr. Drell, thank you for coming all the way from
    California.
        Dr. Drell. Thank you for the opportunity, Senator.
        Senator Bill Nelson. May I ask one further question? Would
    you all be willing to accept some additional questions that
    would be answered for the record?
        Dr. Payne. Sure.
        Dr. Gallucci. Yes, sir.
        Dr. Drell. Sure.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Thank you very much. The hearing
    is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

                                   DETERRENCE

        1. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    during the Cold War, both the United States and Soviet Union had
    nuclear arsenals that ranged in the tens of thousands of nuclear
    weapons. The large numbers were predicated on the mutual ability to
    ride out a massive attack and mount a massive attack or counter
    attacks. Multiple warheads were needed for each of the thousands of
    targets. Mutually assured destruction (MAD) kept the two of us from
    entering in a war with one another. Thankfully, MAD is gone but
    deterrence theory remains. Does the idea of deterrence still drive the
    U.S. requirement for nuclear weapons?
        Dr. Gallucci. The principal requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons
    remains deterrence. Although the political context has changed over the
    last 20 years, particularly with respect to our assessment of the
    intentions of the leadership in Moscow and Beijing, we must be certain
    that we have the nuclear forces to deter a nuclear attack from Russia
    or China. If we can do that, all other plausible missions for our
    forces will fall into the category of ``lesser included cases.''
        Dr. Drell. The answer seems to be yes. The only rationale I know
    for our retaining between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed strategic forces,
    according to SORT, or the Treaty of Moscow negotiated in 2002, plus
    several thousand more in Reserve, is to deter an equal number still
    retained by Russia. They also may be viewed as a deterrent against the
    use of nuclear weapons by the other nuclear powers not closely allied
    to us, namely China and perhaps Pakistan and India; and soon, if not
    already, North Korea. In these cases the numbers could be an order of
    magnitude smaller, given their own limited forces.
        Dr. Payne. The four defense goals that contribute to U.S. strategic
    force requirements are deterrence, assurance, dissuasion, and defeat.

        2. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    whom are we deterring with nuclear weapons, countries or terrorists?
        Dr. Gallucci. I do not see a way that we can directly deter
    terrorists from attacking the U.S. by threatening a nuclear strike.
    However, we may be able to deter a nation from transferring a nuclear
    weapon or fissile material to a terrorist group by threatening to treat
    that nation as the attacker if a terrorist uses a weapon or material
    from that nation in an attack on us.
        Dr. Drell. It is difficult to think that terrorists are deferrable
    by nuclear weapons. They operate with standards that differ from that
    of the civilized world in general, and are even suicidal in many
    actions. Also the number of targets they present is so small that
    anything beyond a force of only a few nuclear weapons is irrelevant. So
    I would suggest that it is nations, and in particular the ones
    mentioned in question 1, that one may think we are deterring.
        Dr. Payne. We hope to deter the leaderships of hostile countries
    and terrorist organizations.

        3. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    what states pose serious threats of a nuclear attack and can they be
    deterred?
        Dr. Gallucci. I do not think any nation currently poses a serious
    threat of a nuclear attack on the United States. Both Russia and China
    have the capability, but neither has the intention. Intentions, though,
    can change more quickly than capabilities.
        Dr. Drell. They are Russia, and China which presently has only a
    handful or two of long range nuclear weapons that can reach U.S.
    territory, but is building more. I find it difficult to see a role for
    our nuclear forces in deterring India or Pakistan. One can argue that
    perhaps, if it were not for our nuclear forces, North Korea might view
    taking aggressive military actions without fear of nuclear reprisal,
    despite our overwhelming conventional strength. The same goes for Iran.
        Dr. Payne. Countries with self-expressed hostility toward the
    United States, a plausible flashpoint, and nuclear capabilities include
    most prominently North Korea and China. The potential for an escalating
    crisis with North Korea or China appears now to be most plausible.

        4. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, is
    the idea of deterring a specific state or entity valid or should we
    look at a nuclear capability to deter an unknown actor?
        Dr. Gallucci. We should first be certain of our ability to deter
    Russia and China--specifically taking account of the size and character
    of their forces. If we can do that, we will be able to deter any
    conceivable rising power in the Middle East or Asia.
        Dr. Drell. I think the idea of deterring a nuclear power has merit
    still in today's world, but for an unknown actor I believe strong
    conventional forces are more relevant.
        Dr. Payne. The goal of attempting to deter specific states or
    entities is valid and necessary. We also must recognize that
    international relations are highly dynamic and we may in the future
    need to deter opponents not currently identified as such.

        5. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    nuclear deterrence must be part of a much larger package of
    conventional military capabilities, diplomatic initiatives, economic
    and trade relationships, and many other tools to ensure security. Is it
    possible to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence and
    security?
        Dr. Gallucci. We have been reducing the role of nuclear weapons in
    security strategy by responding to the changing political context and
    reducing the size of nuclear forces. In theory, we could eliminate
    nuclear weapons, if others did likewise. In practice, we can and should
    continue to reduce the number of nuclear weapons we deploy as Russia
    does the same. The less we depend upon nuclear weapons to achieve our
    security objectives, the more credible and effective will be our
    efforts to limit the acquisition of nuclear weapons by others.
        Dr. Drell. I think it is in our interest to reduce the role of
    nuclear weapons in deterrence and security. Diplomatic incentives and
    our overwhelming conventional strength remain quite relevant, and our
    non-nuclear military forces should remain strong and capable of meeting
    our foreign policy and national security goals. Given the danger of the
    spread of nuclear weapons and the spread of technology making more
    countries capable of acquiring that knowledge and entering the nuclear
    club, we should be working on trying to escape the nuclear deterrence
    trap. A more constructive way to view the problem would be for the
    United States to work to rekindle the vision of the 1986 Reykjavik
    Summit, as expressed by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary
    Mikhail Gorbachev, and take steps toward working to rid the world of
    nuclear weapons. These are outlined in my testimony.
        Dr. Payne. The deterrence role for U.S. nuclear weapons is
    determined in large part by the context of a crisis, the character and
    goals of opponents, and U.S. deterrence goals. Each of these factors is
    likely to change depending on the context and opponent. Consequently,
    the value of nuclear weapons for deterrence is not static or entirely
    predictable. In some past cases, U.S. nuclear weapons were essential
    for deterrence, it would be optimistic to believe that they will not
    continue to be so in some future occasions.

                            CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE

        6. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, can
    the United States deter others with conventional weapons?
        Dr. Gallucci. Deterrence means dissuading others from doing
    something they would otherwise do by threatening unacceptable
    consequences if they do it. We can never be sure when it works--only
    when it fails.
        I think U.S. unconventional forces often deter adversaries from
    action. We have used our conventional forces many times in past
    decades, and have thus demonstrated our credibility to act when our
    interests are threatened.
        Dr. Drell. The answer I believe is yes, except perhaps for Russia
    and China in today's world.
        Dr. Payne. In some plausible cases, non-nuclear deterrence threats
    are likely to be adequate and more credible than nuclear threats. In
    other plausible cases, U.S. nuclear capabilities are likely to he
    necessary for deterrence.

        7. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, are
    countries deterred with conventional weapons?
        Dr. Gallucci. Countries may be deterred by threat of a conventional
    strike, depending on the stakes and the credibility of the threat.
        Dr. Drell. Except for Russia and China the answer I believe is yes.
    I believe terrorists can be deterred with conventional weapons when
    they understand that the United States is willing to use such weapons
    to prevent them from carrying out terrorist or aggressive actions
    against our allies and our interests. They must know that the use of
    conventional force to protect our interests and our security is a
    policy we are committed to and will enforce. In contrast, for nuclear
    weapons the highest goal is to prevent their use.
        Dr. Payne. See above.

        8. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, are
    terrorists, even though viewed to be nondeterrable, ever deterred with
    conventional weapons?
        Dr. Gallucci. It is not unreasonable to think that terrorists will
    limit their operations out of a concern that they might suffer an
    effective conventional counterstrike.
        Dr. Drell. Yes, if they know we will use them to prevent them from
    achieving their goals; and they fear our ability to destroy them if
    they try.
        Dr. Payne. Over the past 200 years there have been numerous cases
    in which terrorists have been deterred with conventional weapons. In
    other eases, terrorists have not been directly deferrable, but they
    have been deterred indirectly via pressure on their sponsors. There is
    at least one reported case of this indirect deterrence of terrorists
    via nuclear threats.

                              CONVENTIONAL TRIDENT

        9. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, the
    administration has proposed development of a conventional Trident
    missile to support a notion of prompt global strike--the ability to
    strike anywhere on the earth in less than 60 minutes. Assuming that the
    issues associated with nuclear ambiguity could be resolved, in other
    words not mistaking a conventional Trident for a nuclear Trident, does
    this type of capability deter a state or a non-state actor?
        Dr. Gallucci. On the assumption of the elimination of nuclear
    ambiguity, this type of capability could deter a state or non-state
    actor from some activities.
        Dr. Drell. I believe prompt global strike has a potential role
    against a target that can be located very accurately within the small
    kill radius of a conventional explosion, even if it is mobile. That
    capability may prevent or deter a hostile act of great consequence.
    This is likely to be most effective against a terrorist within a state
    that does not have full control over its territory, but also against a
    rogue state willing to take aggressive actions against our interests
    and to suffer the consequences.
        Dr. Payne. It is literally impossible for anyone to predict with
    precision what will or will not deter an unspecified opponent, in an
    unspecified context, over unspecified stakes. There certainly are
    plausible scenarios in which conventional Trident could contribute to
    deterrence.

        10. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    would any Prompt Global Strike capability have any deterrent effect?
        Dr. Gallucci. See response to question 9.
        Dr. Drell. It is not inconceivable that it would complicate a
    possible action if the perpetrator felt that self survival is not
    assured. To that extent it would have a deterrent effect, but I think
    the overall deterrent effect would not be very large.
        Dr. Payne. Please see the response to question 9 above.

                              TAILORED DETERRENCE

        11. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, a
    new concept to come out of the National Security Strategy and the 2001
    Nuclear Posture Review is ``tailored deterrence.'' DOD joint operating
    concept documents define tailored deterrence as the development of
    strategies, plans, and operations that are tailored to the perception,
    values, and interests of specific adversaries. Do nuclear weapons play
    a role in tailored deterrence?
        Dr. Gallucci. If the concept would require re-emphasizing nuclear
    weapons by producing special effects weapons, the benefit of being
    ``tailored'' would not outweigh the costs of asserting the utility of
    nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterrence.
        Dr. Drell. I believe deterrence must be restricted to preventing
    the use of nuclear weapons against us and our interests. The form of a
    threat that we want to deter cannot be accurately predicted, and
    therefore a certain degree of flexibility is needed. Among other things
    the deterrent must be capable of a wide range of strike intensities and
    locations. That is what ``tailored deterrence'' means to me.
        Dr. Payne. Certainly. For opponents who are highly cost- and risk-
    tolerant, U.S. nuclear deterrence may be a necessary part of defining
    an approach to deterrence that has a reasonable chance of ``working''
    as we would hope. This conclusion is not simply speculation; it is
    supported by historical evidence.

                                   DISSUASION

        12. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    the December 2001 Nuclear Posture talks about nuclear dissuasion--what
    is the difference between deterrence and dissuasion?
        Dr. Gallucci. I have no idea.
        Dr. Drell. Dissuasion means to discourage planning for potential
    actions not in our interest, such as an opponent trying to build up
    military forces and strength equal to, or greater than, our own. This
    can be done diplomatically or by undertaking our own build-up to a
    point that it sets a level very difficult to match. Deterrence I view
    as preventing an attack, particularly by nuclear weapons if we are
    talking nuclear deterrence, by making clear that the attack cannot
    achieve its goal and that damage caused by our retaliation will make it
    not in the interest of the would-be attacker to proceed. As quoted in
    the Bush administration's National Security Strategy: ``[o]ur forces
    will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a
    military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the
    United States.''
        Dr. Payne. The goal of dissuasion is different than deterrence.
    Dissuasion attempts to prevent crises and challenges before they emerge
    by discouraging opponents over the long-term from choosing broad
    courses of weapon acquisition and foreign policy that might put them in
    conflict with U.S. interests. Deterrence typically involves the
    prevention of more specific actions over a shorter timeline.

        13. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, is
    dissuasion a valid theory?
        Dr. Gallucci. See response to question 12.
        Dr. Drell. Dissuasion is a policy goal to be achieved through
    diplomacy, backed by strength. It may succeed or, oppositely, stimulate
    an arms race. I have not seen any convincing implementation of a policy
    of nuclear dissuasion that was achieved by a nuclear build-up.
        Dr. Payne. Yes. in principle, it precedes the goal of deterrence on
    a timeline and. if successful, eases the challenges to deterrence.

                                OTHER COUNTRIES

        14. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    what is the role of Russia in United States nuclear policy?
        Dr. Gallucci. Russian nuclear forces should still be the basis for
    decisions about the size and character of our strategic nuclear forces.
        Dr. Drell. On December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush stated
    ``the greatest threats to both our countries come not from each other,
    or from other big powers in the world, but from terrorists who strike
    without warning, or rogue states who seeks weapons of mass
    destruction.'' The joint statement of a new relationship between the
    United States and Russia signed by Presidents Bush and Putin on
    November 13, 2001 stated that `The United States and Russia have
    overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other
    as enemy or threat.'' He went on to call for ``the creation of a new
    strategic framework to ensure the mutual security of the United States
    and Russia and the world community.'' In the note announcing U.S.
    withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on December 13, 2001, the President said
    ``We have entered into a new strategic relation with Russia that is
    cooperative rather than adversarial.'' These are examples of a number
    of statements during 2001 and 2002 in which the United States and
    Russia marked the formal end of the era of mutual nuclear deterrence
    between the two countries. Clearly that has not yet been fully
    implemented as a policy.
        Dr. Payne. The United States must be in a position to deter Russia
    if it chooses a future course of hostility and competition. Whether
    Russia will choose this course or a more cooperative, benign future is
    an open question. The United States must encourage the former and be
    prepared for the latter. Pan of that preparation is maintaining a
    flexible nuclear base that can adjust as necessary to meet future
    threat developments.

        15. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    what is the role of China?
        Dr. Gallucci. We should be certain that the nuclear forces needed
    to deter Russia will also deter China.
        Dr. Drell. It would appear that deterrence remains a basis of U.S./
    China policy although the disparity in numbers of their weapons is very
    large. It is generally viewed that our nuclear weapons are a deterrent
    against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
        Dr. Payne. It is important that the United States be able to deter
    the expressed Chinese willingness to use force, e.g.. nuclear weapons
    in a crisis over Taiwan, to assure U.S. Asian allies who feel
    vulnerable to Chinese nuclear threats, including Japan, and to dissuade
    China from choosing the course of nuclear arms competition. U.S.
    nuclear capabilities and nuclear infrastructure may be critical to each
    of these deterrence and dissuasion goals.

        16. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    what are the roles of France and Great Britain?
        Dr. Gallucci. I do no think that French and British nuclear forces
    remain important to their defense, to ours or to the NATO Alliance.
        Dr. Drell. I believe the roles of France and Great Britain are to
    maintain a seat at the table of the nuclear powers with their nuclear
    forces, and to provide an independent NATO deterrent against invasion
    from the east.
        Dr. Payne. The French and British independent nuclear deterrents
    arc in the process of being modernized and upgraded and may contribute
    to the U.S. goals of deterrence, assurance and dissuasion.

        17. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell and Dr. Payne,
    what are the roles of India, Pakistan, and Israel as non-parties to the
    Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or any future states that might pull out
    of the NPT?
        Dr. Gallucci. India, Pakistan, and Israel had been the only
    countries with nuclear weapons, apart form the original five countries
    recognized in the NPT. North Korea claims to have withdrawn from the
    Treaty, but plausibly will rejoin if the agreement of 13 February 2007
    holds. India will receive special status and legitimatizing if the
    administration's proposed deal is accepted by New Delhi.
        The India deal could turn out to be the biggest foreign policy
    mistake of the Bush administration. Intended to recognize India's
    strategic importance to the United States, the deal could end up
    legitimatizing nuclear weapon status for former NPT parties who are
    otherwise generally responsible countries. Candidates are: Japan, South
    Korea, Argentina, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia; others would follow.
        Dr. Drell. India, Pakistan, and Israel retain nuclear weapons
    because of regional instabilities which affect them directly. It is
    presumed they will stay that way so long as the mutual hostilities
    between India and Pakistan, and Israel and the Arab world, remain high
    on the security agenda of these countries.
        Dr. Payne. These countries illustrate that the international
    nuclear nonproliferation regime cannot prevent the acquisition of
    nuclear weapons by leadership that believe their countries to be at
    risk, and who believe that nuclear weapons are necessary to address
    that risk and to realize their national aspirations.

        18. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    what about India and Pakistan in their role as regional nuclear weapons
    states?
        Dr. Gallucci. If a nuclear weapon is going to be used in a conflict
    between two states, it will be used by India and/or Pakistan. As they
    build their arsenals--now with an American blessing--they create the
    possibility of a truly horrendous catastrophe.
        Dr. Drell. See response to question 17.
        Dr. Payne. See response to question 17.

        19. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    what about North Korea, which might have a few weapons, 8-10 according
    to some estimates, but which may be on the brink of giving up its
    program?
        Dr. Gallucci. North Korea's nuclear program if unchecked would
    provoke Japan and South Korea to nuclear weapons acquisition. Even more
    worrisome would be the sale of fissile material to a terrorist group by
    this resource starved country.
        Dr. Drell. It would seem to be North Korea's deterrent against
    perceived threats of U.S. aggressive action, including regime change;
    also a bargaining chip for economic aid and cooperation. The future of
    North Korea's program is critical because if North Korea is able to
    establish that it has a deliverable nuclear threat, which it has not
    yet done, it will have a serious implication for a broader
    proliferation of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. It would
    undoubtedly encourage Japan, South Korea, and perhaps even Taiwan to go
    nuclear. Such changes certainly would drive up the level of nuclear
    armaments in China by a big amount. The ongoing 6 power negotiations
    arc of utmost importance in an effort to prevent that from happening
    and to protect the nonproliferation regime in that part of the world.
        Dr. Payne. In light of North Korean nuclear capabilities, it is
    critical that the United States possess sufficient nuclear forces to
    extend nuclear deterrence coverage, i.e., the ``nuclear umbrella'' to
    allies in the region, e.g., South Korea and Japan. In the absence of
    credible U.S. nuclear assurance for Japan, there will be mounting
    pressure on Tokyo to consider becoming a nuclear state itself.

        20. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell and Dr. Payne,
    what about Iran, which is enriching uranium at laboratory scale
    currently, claims to want nuclear technology for civilian purposes
    only, but continues to defy the International Atomic Energy Agency?
        Dr. Gallucci. A full court diplomatic press, emphasizing carrots,
    should be made to persuade Iran to suspend construction of its
    enrichment facility. Sticks, in the form of sanctions, will have to be
    developed with Russia aboard if they are to have any hope of working.
    Ultimately, if Iran is found to be moving to enrich uranium to high
    levels, and if the character of the regime has not changed, the use of
    military force in the form of air strikes will have to be considered.
        Dr. Drell. Iran poses a very serious threat. Its program for
    enriching uranium in order to fuel reactors for civilian power, which
    is its stated goal, will make it into a latent nuclear weapons country.
    The technology for the one puts a nation well on the road to
    accomplishing the second of those two goals. A nuclear Iran would
    create even graver instabilities, not only vis-a-vis Israel, but with
    the rest of the Arab world, and would most likely stimulate
    proliferation among many nations in the Mideast. It is the gravest
    threat that I know at the moment to the Nonproliferation Treaty and the
    nonproliferation regime.
        Dr. Payne. At this point, Iran appears determined to complete its
    longstanding efforts to develop nuclear weapons. This will increase the
    pressure for broadened extended U.S. nuclear deterrence to friends and
    allies in the region who may otherwise seek their own nuclear
    deterrent.

        21. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    what about allies who don't have nuclear weapons, such as Japan, and
    who have not developed nuclear weapons, because the U.S. deterrence
    umbrella covered them?
        Dr. Gallucci. I do not think the credibility of our nuclear
    umbrella, the extended deterrent threat, is serious questioned.
        Dr. Drell.. My main concern was expressed in the answer to question
    19. Japan is a latent nuclear power that could become an explicit one
    in a very short order if they doubted the U.S. deterrence umbrella or
    if North Korea displayed an effective nuclear capability. This is an
    example of the kind of concern that motivates the thinking expressed in
    my testimony calling on the United States to try to rekindle a vision
    of a nuclear free world, and to implement the set of steps spelled out
    in my testimony toward achieving the conditions to make that possible.
    That will be the only long-term resolution to this dilemma.
        Dr. Payne. It is critical that key allies such as Japan continue to
    have confidence in the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. If they loose
    that confidence, according to their own statements they may feel
    compelled to seek their own nuclear capabilities. This could set off a
    ``cascade effect'' of nuclear proliferation globally, The U.S. extended
    nuclear deterrent is our single most important nonproliferation tool.

        22. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    what about countries who might desire nuclear weapons but don't have a
    nuclear weapons program?
        Dr. Gallucci. There remains great virtue in limiting the
    availability of facilities that produce fissile material, reprocessing
    plants and enrichment facilities.
        Dr. Drell. There are some 40 nuclear capable countries, that is
    countries with reactors for civilian purposes. With the spread of
    technology and the growing reluctance to accept a two-tiered world in
    which there are discriminatory differences between nuclear and
    nonnuclear states, I fear many of these countries will seek to develop
    indigenous nuclear programs unless we and other nuclear powers
    demonstrate our commitment to the goals stated in the Nonproliferation
    Treaty. This calls for reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, working
    toward ratifying a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and eventually toward
    elimination of the weapons. I think that now becomes an urgent and
    serious goal for U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy.
        Dr. Payne. One of our goals is to assure those non-nuclear allies
    and friends oft he U.S. commitment to their security, and thereby to
    contribute to their continuing choice to remain non-nuclear. Another
    goal is to dissuade those who are hostile from choosing to develop or
    acquire nuclear weapons. We know that credible U.S. strategic nuclear
    capabilities contribute to the assurance goal: they probably also
    contribute to dissuasion as well.

                                   TERRORISTS

        23. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    conventional wisdom is that nuclear weapons don't deter terrorists. Do
    you agree?
        Dr. Gallucci. See response to question 2.
        Dr. Drell. I believe that nuclear weapons in large numbers have
    nothing to do with deterring terrorists. The existence of a small
    number may make them think harder about taking aggressive hostile
    actions, but their behavior so far pretty much indicates to me that
    terrorists are not deterred by nuclear weapons. They are bent on
    suicidal actions and willing to take actions that defy the norms of
    civilized behavior as we know them.
        Dr. Payne. No. Nuclear weapons may contribute to the deterrence of
    terrorist organizations indirectly through their state sponsors. There
    is some pertinent historical evidence demonstrating precisely this form
    of indirect deterrence.

        24. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    are countries who might either supply a terrorist with nuclear
    materials deterred from providing such materials by U.S. nuclear
    weapons?
        Dr. Gallucci. See response to question 2.
        Dr. Drell. I see no clear evidence of this. However diplomacy can
    be valuable in providing incentives for restraints against such
    actions. I think the seriousness of our diplomatic efforts to address
    terrorism and at the same time reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons
    will be an effective approach.
        Dr. Payne. I believe U.S. nuclear capabilities are critical to the
    deterrence of North Korea, which may be such a state.

                            A DETERRED UNITED STATES

        25. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, do
    nuclear weapons deter the United States? If so, under what
    circumstances?
        Dr. Gallucci. One could imagine the United States deciding against
    the invasion of a country possessing nuclear weapons.
        Dr. Drell. I recognize that nuclear weapons played a big role in
    deterring potential U.S. actions during the Cold War. At present I can
    speculate that measures the U.S. might initiate against countries, such
    as regime change or use of preventive offensive military force, might
    not be considered against countries who have nuclear weapons, even in
    small numbers, that could cause harm to us. This is what makes it
    urgent for the United States to make clear that our policy and
    potential uses of force are such as not to give them cause to feel the
    need to deter us by getting nuclear weapons.
        Dr. Payne. The United Stales is susceptible to both nuclear and
    non-nuclear deterrence threats. The complete vulnerability of the U.S.
    civilian population to attack contributes to this susceptibility.

        26. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, do
    United States nuclear weapons or policy drive others to attain nuclear
    weapons or impact decisions about the number of nuclear weapons they
    have? If yes, what impact does or should this phenomenon have on U.S.
    nuclear policy?
        Dr. Gallucci. Clearly the Russians are sensitive to U.S. nuclear
    weapons decisions, and we ought to take account of their possible
    responses when we make such decisions. Over the long-term, if we
    emphasize the utility of nuclear weapons for our security, other states
    are more likely to consider such weapons for their security. That is
    one reason why we should try, with the Russians, to reduce the size of
    nuclear forces and avoid deploying new nuclear systems.
        Dr. Drell. I think a U.S. commitment to honor the provisions of the
    Nonproliferation Treaty as mentioned earlier and to reduce its
    discriminatory features by reducing our nuclear arsenal, and its
    relevance in our policies, will contribute to reducing interests in
    other countries becoming nuclear. It is difficult to preach the virtues
    of a nonproliferation regime and of staying nonnuclear if we ourselves
    continue improving our nuclear arsenal and retaining large numbers.
    That is why, how we limit and justify our Reliable Replacement Warhead
    (RRW) program is so important, as I have testified.
        Dr. Payne. In many cases, the number and type of U.S. nuclear
    weapons and U.S. nuclear force policy will have no impact on decisions
    to acquire nuclear weapons. The exceptions to this rule of thumb are
    those countries that have been under the U.S. ``nuclear umbrella.'' If
    that umbrella becomes incredible, they will feel increasing pressure to
    acquire their own nuclear capabilities.

                           HOW MANY NUCLEAR WARHEADS

        27. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, we
    have talked about deterrence and that nuclear weapons play a role in
    deterrence, how effective a deterrent against what types of actors will
    continue to be a point of debate, but now let's talk about how many we
    need. How many total weapons do we need, how many deployed, by when and
    for how long?
        Dr. Gallucci. I addressed numbers in my prepared statement, but I
    am generally attracted to Dr. Drell's assessment.
        Dr. Drell. Responses to these two questions are contained in my
    study with former Ambassador James Goodby entitled ``What Are Nuclear
    Weapons For?--Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear
    Forces,'' published in April 2005 by the Arms Control Association. This
    report has been submitted for inclusion in the record of these
    hearings. I quote several relevant paragraphs from it: ``First, as to
    the number of potential targets, we assume that Russian nuclear forces
    will decrease in numbers comparable to what we are proposing for the
    U.S. force. For reasons having as much to do with historical and
    political baggage as with military requirements, this assumption will
    be a major determinant of the size of the U.S. operationally-deployed
    force, as it appears to be today. . . .''
        ``We estimate that a U.S. strategic force of some 500
    operationally-deployed warheads would be more than adequate for
    deterrence. Borrowing the notion of the Nuclear Posture Review, this
    force level would be enough to provide a degree of flexibility in a
    fluid security environment. This number is large enough to deal with
    the targets described generically in the Nuclear Posture Review as
    instruments of political control and military power . . . leadership
    and military capabilities, particularly weapons of mass destruction,
    military command facilities and other centers of control and
    infrastructure that support military forces.' We estimate these
    military targets, under the conditions we postulate, to number between
    200 and 300, and we have sized the operationally-deployed force of
    strategic warheads at a larger number of 500 for reasons of operational
    conservatism. The excess allows for force readiness concerns, multiple
    targeting where needed, and the possibility of very sudden and
    unexpected surprises from Russia, for example, a breakdown in its
    military command and control caused by technical failures or a takeover
    by renegades. As Russia and the United States move farther away from
    the nuclear deterrent trap in which they are still ensnared, the sizing
    of their stockpiles would depend on other concerns and could be further
    reduced. The 500 operationally-deployed warheads would be augmented by
    those from the Responsive Force, which would be configured in two
    parts, the first able to respond to a rapidly building crisis--a Ready
    Responsive Force--and a second able to respond to strategic warning
    signals on a timescale of a year or more--a Strategic Responsive Force.
    This use of the Responsive Force underscores the need for sustaining an
    infrastructure for supporting it as well as the need to provide this
    force with appropriate hardening and concealment. As we look ahead a
    few years into the future, the total Responsive Force should have 400-
    500 warheads, a number comparable to the operationally-deployed one.
    This number would be adequate to target roughly 200 additional Russian
    sites, for example, those affecting industrial recovery--the major
    nodes in the electric power grid and air, ground, and rail
    transportation systems, as well as major industrial sites. These
    targets and the forces to attack them may be viewed, we hope, as only
    temporary remnants of the Cold War policy of assured destruction that
    may be discarded before long in the dustbin of history. In time,
    nuclear deterrence might be maintained entirely with a Responsive Force
    without an operationally-deployed force.''. . .
        ``Potential Chinese targets are likely to cover the same generic
    list as for Russia, cited above, including their strategic strike
    forces, command and control centers, major military bases, and ports in
    the vicinity of Taiwan. With China's long-range nuclear forces
    remaining at anything like their present levels, the target list would
    be considerably smaller than the 200-300 estimated for Russia. This
    list would not generate U.S. force requirements in addition to the
    numbers we have proposed for hypothetical emergencies involving Russia.
    The same warhead can be targeted against multiple designated ground
    zeros. Yet, if there were drastic changes in the worldwide strategic
    picture that led the United States to simultaneous major nuclear
    confrontations against Russia and China, the United States would
    evidently begin a major buildup of its own. This would take time, but
    so would a major Chinese buildup. The force configuration of
    ``500+500'' that we propose provides a ready basis for such U.S.
    action.''. . . .
        ``Regarding potential targets in North Korea or Iran, the list
    presumably would be much shorter because the territories are smaller,
    and the numbers of defense-related installations are much fewer than in
    Russia and China. That list would very likely be limited to single
    digits in each country.''
        Dr. Payne. There is no set specific number of deployed nuclear
    weapons that can be identified as being required for deterrence for a
    set point-in-time or length of time because deterrence requirements are
    dynamic, and because U.S. force requirements are also affected by
    assurance and dissuasion goals. That is why the 2001 NPR recommended
    flexibility and the range of 1,700-2,200 operationally-deployed nuclear
    weapons.

        28. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    are the numbers driven by specific targets, and countries, or by
    capabilities?
        Dr. Gallucci. Our numbers should be sensitive to the targets of the
    various kinds we identify to create the most credible deterrent threat.
        Dr. Drell. See response to question 27.
        Dr. Payne. The appropriate range of numbers and the need for
    flexibility can be affected by each of these variables, which are not
    mutually exclusive, and also by the requirements for assurance and
    dissuasion.

        29. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    what understanding should guide the decision to study the RRW and how
    do the numbers influence the nuclear weapons complex of the future?
        Dr. Gallucci. Please see my prepared statement.
        Dr. Drell. The RRW program has two parts. The first is to transform
    the nuclear complex, and the second, to change the designs of the
    nuclear weapons in the arsenal. Concerning the first part, the nuclear
    complex needs serious attention as I testified. Parts of it date back
    to WWII and need to be updated in order for us to maintain the safety
    and reliability of the warheads in the stockpile as their numbers
    decrease. However the U.S. needs a clear statement of its long-term
    nuclear weapons policy goals which will determine the roles and
    missions of our nuclear forces, and their overall numbers, before we
    can determine the appropriate size and scope of the modernized
    infrastructure. It might be anywhere from 500 warheads to the present
    total of roughly 5,000, with between 1,700 and 2,200 actively deployed,
    as negotiated in the Treaty of Moscow. The second part of the program,
    to design new warheads, depends upon the answer to the key question of
    whether the goals of the RRW program for enhanced long-term confidence,
    safety, and use control can be achieved without underground explosive
    testing, a restriction that is in the legislation creating RRW. This
    question is worthy of study but has yet to be answered
        Dr. Payne. We should proceed with the RRW knowing that any
    contemporary estimate of the nuclear force characteristics and size
    needed for the decades ahead is likely to require adjustment as the
    future unfolds. It is likely that we will be surprised by events that
    transpire over time. We should avoid actions that would significantly
    constrain the ability of the U.S. to adjust our forces lo changing
    national security needs. Instead we should anticipate surprise and
    focus on how best to protect a range of options for the future in an
    affordable, prudent manner.

        30. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, is
    there a rush to complete the feasibility study of the first RRW design?
        Dr. Gallucci. I cannot comment.
        Dr. Drell. I believe not. The current stockpile is strong and
    stable. Its safety and reliability have been confirmed by the ongoing
    vigorous and successful stockpile stewardship and life extension
    program which has revealed no significant evidence of aging problems.
        Dr. Payne. Two areas of concern seem to warrant proceeding without
    delay on the RRW. The first concern is the vulnerability of the planned
    stockpile and deployed force to a systemic failure of the W76 warhead--
    the most numerous of the warhead types in the stockpile. The RRW
    program will initially provide replacement warheads for the W76 and
    reduce the high degree of reliance on the W76 warhead. The second area
    of concern is that of the workforce on which the nation will depend for
    decades to come to make decisions on how best to sustain a safe,
    reliable nuclear stockpile. Proceeding without delay on the RRW will
    allow remaining experienced designers and engineers to work closely
    with those that will shortly take their places as the senior managers
    at nuclear weapon laboratories and plants.

        31. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    the U.S. will continue the life extension program for some time, in
    order to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the current
    stockpile. Before we know if the RRW is feasible, how many warheads of
    any specific type should go through life extension?
        Dr. Gallucci. I cannot comment.
        Dr. Drell. I think the first order of business is to establish a
    scientific and technical consensus as to whether the LLNL led effort to
    design the first RRW can achieve its goal of enhanced long-term
    confidence, safety, and use control relative to our current stockpile
    weapons, without underground explosive testing, before moving on to
    additional designs. The first design was chosen, as announced by NNSA,
    as a relatively conservative design and therefore should be in the
    strongest position to face up to the challenge of satisfying those
    criteria but this has yet to be established, and doing so will take
    time.
        Dr. Payne. The RRW concept has not yet begun engineering
    development, and the RRW concept, while promising, is still unproven. 1
    recommend against significant cut backs an planned warhead lift
    extension programs at this time. Significant reductions in life
    extension programs would be warranted after laboratory officials
    conclude that the RRW can be developed and certified without nuclear
    testing and have demonstrated that the country can produce replacement
    quantities of the RRW.

        32. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    will the stockpile size vary if the RRW design is feasible?
        Dr. Gallucci. I cannot comment.
        Dr. Drell. A nuclear policy decision clarifying what are the
    missions and targets for our nuclear weapons will have a major impact
    on the size of the stockpile. This could cause a swing of an order of
    magnitude in their numbers, as discussed in the report that I mentioned
    earlier and submitted for the record (Drell and Goodby ``What Are
    Nuclear Weapons For?,'' ACA report, April 2005).
        Dr. Payne. I anticipate that, for a specific force structure and
    operationally-deployed nuclear force, the total size of the nuclear
    warhead stockpile needed will differ significantly depending on whether
    or not RRW is feasible, and developed and deployed. The stockpile with
    RRW warheads should be significantly smaller in number and with fewer
    warhead types.

        33. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, do
    you think that the RRW alone will allow substantial reductions in the
    total size of the stockpile, not just the number of warheads deployed?
        Dr. Gallucci. I cannot comment.
        Dr. Drell. It is hard to predict whether the RRW alone would allow
    substantial reductions in the total size or cost to the stockpile since
    the current, so-called legacy, stockpile meets current high standards
    of safety and lifetime stability. However the infrastructure, when
    modernized, may have a significant effect by achieving improved
    efficiency with consolidation of many sites and modem technology. I
    think a more important factor in this case will be the modernized
    infrastructure.
        Dr. Payne. I expect that development and production of RRW warheads
    will result in a substantial reduction in die total size of the
    stockpile of nuclear warheads. Risk of reliability failures in the
    operationally-deployed force is currently managed by retaining an
    inventory of backup warheads in storage. With an operating nuclear
    warhead infrastructure that is responsive to unanticipated warhead
    problems, the need for a large inventory of back up warheads would no
    longer exist.

                                   first use
        34. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    first use of nuclear weapons is an ambiguous element of U.S. nuclear
    policy. Should it remain ambiguous?
        Dr. Gallucci. Yes.
        Dr. Drell. I believe it should remain ambiguous to the extent that
    we say that first use of nuclear weapons would be determined by a
    policy of ``defensive last resort.'' I do not support an explicit
    statement of ``no first use,'' although I can think of no circumstance
    now which would clearly call for first use. However I don't have
    confidence that I can anticipate all possible circumstances and
    therefore I think one should be clear that we view these as weapons
    only for ``defensive last resort.'' Statements stronger than that have
    the deficiency at anticipating how one would behave in extreme
    circumstances. That is hazardous and I wouldn't be confident that an
    adversary would stick by such a pledge either.
        Dr. Payne. U.S. policy is not ambiguous nor should it be so. The
    United States retains the first use option for the purposes of
    deterrence and assurance.

        35. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    are there credible scenarios in which the United States would use a
    nuclear weapon in the first instance?
        Dr. Gallucci. There are scenarios, but they are not particularly
    credible. The threat from the Warsaw Pact is no more, but one could
    just barely imagine a conventional conflict in Asia involving China in
    which we could not defend our allies or our forces without using or
    threatening to use a nuclear weapon first.
        Dr. Drell. I can think of no credible scenario at this time in
    which the United States would initiate first use of a nuclear weapon.
        Dr. Payne. There are plausible scenarios. For example, with very
    limited U.S. defensive capabilities and in the continuing absence of
    non-nuclear capabilities for long-range prompt global strike, upon
    tactical warning of a WMD missile launch, the only option for
    preventing a WMD strike against U.S. cities could be first use against
    the enemy's missile launch sites.

        36. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    would first use escalate or de-escalate a conflict?
        Dr. Gallucci. This is unknowable, but the hope would be that by
    having escalation dominance, it would de-escalate.
        Dr. Drell. This would be such an historically unprecedented move
    that there is no previous experience to give guidance to trying to
    answer that question. My greatest fear is that, in the confusion of a
    conflict where not all data is accurately determinable, an exchange
    could escalate due to faulty information about the size, number, and
    impact of the first events. The initial shock might also paralyze any
    further action. I just don't know but I wouldn't bet on it.
        Dr. Payne. Either is possible, depending on the circumstances. The
    risk of escalation would have to be compared to the risk of American
    cities being destroyed if the U.S. chose to await the opponent's first
    use.

                          NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCE

        37. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, a
    longstanding United States policy has been not to attack with nuclear
    weapons a non-nuclear weapon state unless that non-weapons state aligns
    with a state that attacks the United States with a nuclear weapon. Is
    this negative security assurance still a valid policy doctrine?
        Dr. Gallucci. Yes.
        Dr. Drell. Yes.
        Dr. Payne. The statement is incorrect. The Clinton administration
    rightly claimed the right of U.S. ``belligerent reprisal'' in the event
    of an attack against the United States involving a non-nuclear state's
    use of chemical or biological weapons. This Clinton administration
    position was and remains prudent.

                                 MOSCOW TREATY

        38. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    under the Moscow Treaty the United States and Russia agreed to
    operationally deploy no more than 1,700-2,200 nuclear weapons by 2012.
    But the Treaty is non-binding, as it has no duration, and is non-
    verifiable. Each side is free to determine when a weapon is
    operationally-deployed. Should the Treaty be modified? For example,
    should it be modified to be durable?
        Dr. Gallucci. The treaty should be made a treaty as we have
    understood such treaties, that is, with specific numbers to be achieved
    well within the duration of the treaty, with important ambiguities
    resolved, and with verification provisions.
        Dr. Drell. Yes. The verification provisions for the Moscow Treaty
    rely on START II which expires in 2009. These provisions should be
    extended beyond that date, and should be made more specific in terms of
    which systems are being counted, and including restraints on the non-
    deployed Reserve Forces, that currently number perhaps up to twice as
    many as the deployed ones.
        Dr. Payne. The statement again is incorrect. The Moscow Treaty is
    binding and is as verifiable as other treaties with the applicable
    verification provisions of START I. The Treaty's ceilings or further
    reductions could be made to extend beyond 2012. Whether this would be
    prudent or imprudent will depend on the geopolitical conditions at the
    lime and their outlook for the future.

        39. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, is
    it possible to accelerate the reductions in deployed nuclear weapons
    under the Treaty?
        Dr. Gallucci. I cannot comment.
        Dr. Drell. Yes, and I recommend that reductions proceed along the
    lines discussed in my answers to questions 27 and 28, and more fully in
    my article with Goodby ``What Are Nuclear Weapons For?'', where we
    spell out a specific deployment scheme.
        Dr. Payne. Yes, in principle. The NPR called for periodic
    assessments of the geopolitical and technical conditions pertaining in
    the future to help determine whether these conditions would permit the
    prudent acceleration of reductions or not.

        40. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    when the Senate was considering the Moscow Treaty, administration
    witnesses testified that verification provisions were not needed in the
    Moscow Treaty because the provisions of the START could be used. The
    START expires in 2009, before the Moscow Treaty goes into effect in
    2012. Should the START be extended?
        Dr. Gallucci. Yes.
        Dr. Drell. Yes, for reasons above.
        Dr. Payne. I believe that portions of the START I verification
    provisions should be extended.

        41. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne,
    the Moscow Treaty talks about the number of warheads deployed, what
    about the number of warheads not deployed. Currently there are about
    four warheads in reserve for every warhead deployed. What will enable a
    reduction in the ratio of deployed to reserve warheads?
        Dr. Gallucci. I cannot comment.
        Dr. Drell. In order to reduce the ratio of Reserve to deployed
    warheads one would need to add verification provisions including
    transparency measures. In answer to an opposite question to reduce the
    ratio deployed to Reserve Forces, one could remove prompt launched
    procedures from the warheads on the actively deployed systems. One
    scheme for this was spelled out in Drell and Goodby, referred to
    earlier, which suggested working toward a force structure with Reserve
    warheads only, numbering 500. Many measures have been discussed such as
    removing warheads from the ICBMs, in the same way that bombs have been
    removed from the bomber force which is no longer on standing alert.
    Many other schemes have been proposed. All would require greater
    transparency in dealing with the Russians in order to make sure that
    reciprocal actions are taken in parallel.
        Dr. Payne. Most obviously, the timely development and deployment of
    the RRW.
                                     ______

                  Question Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

                 AGING-RELATED ISSUES IN THE ENDURING STOCKPILE

        42. Senator Sessions. Dr. Drell, your testimony during the hearing
    seemed to indicate that because recent reviews of plutonium aging
    concerns have projected longer pit lifetimes, aging-related issues will
    not manifest in the stockpile and are not a matter of urgency. Were
    your comments exclusive to plutonium aging concerns or did you mean to
    indicate that you are not aware of any aging-related concerns bearing
    on any of the warhead components or materials?
        Dr. Drell. I know of no significant aging affects showing a
    deterioration of the warheads over time, but we must be vigilant in
    looking for such effects. I believe we must continue a strong stockpile
    stewardship and life extension program that maintains detailed scrutiny
    for unanticipated aging effects showing up. We must be prepared to see
    any warning signs of aging that may arise, and to respond to them as
    needed, in order to retain confidence in our nuclear deterrent.

        [Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]