[Senate Hearing 110-201]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-201, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1547
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
----------
MARCH 28; APRIL 11, 19; MAY 2, 2007
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008--Part 7 STRATEGIC FORCES
S. Hrg. 110-201 Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1547
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
__________
MARCH 28; APRIL 11, 19, MAY 2, 2007
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
39-441 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN CORNYN, Texas
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Replublican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Strategic Forces Programs
march 28, 2007
Page
Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command........................................................ 5
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Acting Administrator, National
Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.......... 38
Burg, Maj. Gen. Roger, USAF, Director of Strategic Security in
the Air, Space, and Information Operations, Headquarters,
United States Air Force........................................ 53
Johnson, RADM Stephen E., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
Programs, Naval Systems Command................................ 57
Green, Brian R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategic Capabilities, Department of Defense.................. 59
Ballistic Missile Defense Programs
april 11, 2007
Obering, Lt. Gen. Henry A., III, USAF, Director, Missile Defense
Agency......................................................... 91
Campbell, LTG Kevin T., USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Space
and Missile Defense Command/U.S. Army Forces Strategic Command
and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense........................................................ 103
McQueary, Dr. Charles E., Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of
Defense........................................................ 110
Francis, Paul, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management,
United States Government Accountability Office................. 113
Green, Brian R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategic Capabilities, Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Department of Defense.......................................... 122
Military Space Programs
april 19, 2007
Sega, Hon. Ronald M., Under Secretary of the Air Force........... 176
Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command. 184
Shelton, Maj. Gen. William L., USAF, Commander, Joint Functional
Component Command for Space, United States Strategic Command... 196
McArthur, VADM James D., Jr., USN, Commander, Naval Network
Warfare Command................................................ 198
Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office................... 201
Department of Energy Atomic Energy Defense Programs
may 2, 2007
Rispoli, Hon. James A., Assistant Secretary of Energy for
Environmental Management....................................... 257
Podonsky, Glenn S., Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer,
Department of Energy........................................... 281
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Reed, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Sessions, and Thune.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; and Thomas K.
McConnell, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; Jill L. Simodejka, research assistant; Robert M.
Soofer, professional staff member; and Kristina L. Svinicki,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Jessica L.
Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Caple,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; and M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator
Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Bill Nelson. Good morning, everybody. The group in
the back is a school from Cape Coral, FL, who I have just
visited with. I have invited them for the few minutes that they
have to come in and see what this is like up here in
Washington, DC. We are going to be getting into some pretty
heavy stuff this morning. You students, I want you to know that
we have--look at all the stars on his shoulders. This is
General Cartwright and he is the head of the Strategic Command
and he is going to be the first witness. He is going to present
an overview of the Strategic Command and the challenges that it
faces.
Then on the second panel we are going to discuss various
strategic programs. We are going to hear from Tom D'Agostino,
Acting Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), and Major General Burg, Director of
Strategic Security in the Air, Space, and Information
Operations. We are going to hear from Rear Admiral Johnson,
Director of the Strategic Systems Programs in the Navy, and
Brian Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategic Capabilities.
Our hearing is going to be complicated because they are
going to call a vote at 11 o'clock. So we are going to just go
as much as we can and then we will have to adjourn and go vote.
We want to have a discussion today about the Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW), bombers, land-based Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), prompt global strike, and future
nuclear weapons stockpiles. All of the witnesses have submitted
written testimony and so what we want to do is have a
conversation. The written testimony will be entered in the
record and made a part of the record, and so we want to have a
conversation interspersed by lots of questions.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
Good morning. Welcome General Cartwright. It is a pleasure to have
you with us on the first panel of our strategic programs hearing. We
will have two panels today. During the first panel we will hear from
General James Cartwright, the Commander of the Strategic Command.
General Cartwright will present an overview of the Strategic Command
and the challenges that it faces.
The witnesses on the second panel will discuss the various
strategic programs under the subcommittee's jurisdiction. On the second
panel, we will hear from Tom D'Agostino, the Acting Deputy
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA);
Lieutenant General Carrol Chandler, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force
Operations, Plans and Requirements; Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson,
Director Strategic Systems Programs, Naval Sea Systems Command; and
Brian Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic
Capabilities in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy.
In the event that it is necessary, we have made provision for a
closed session following the second panel, in room SR-222.
We look forward to a good discussion today on a wide range of
topics including the Reliable Replacement Warhead, bomber aircraft,
particularly the B-52, the land-based ICBMs, prompt global strike, and
the future nuclear weapons complex.
All of you who have submitted written statements, these statements
will be included in the record. Also, we will keep the record open for
3 days for members to submit questions for the record. We would
appreciate it if each witness could promptly answer these questions.
Thank you.
Again, welcome.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I enjoyed our
time on this committee together when I was fortunate to be
chairman. You were a tremendous ranking member who contributed
so much and I enjoy working with you a great deal, and I look
forward to trying to be as helpful to you as you have been to
me.
This hearing is an opportunity to stress the progress our
Nation has made toward adapting our strategic forces and
deterrence doctrine to a new security environment characterized
by unpredictable threats posed by terrorist groups and rogue
nations armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). While
much of the public debate on strategic forces seems to focus on
the role of nuclear weapons and the size of our nuclear
arsenal, I believe we need to look also at the broader question
of whether our Nation is acquiring all the types of strategic
forces necessary to deal with today's new and various threats.
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) called on the United
States to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons while placing
greater emphasis on advanced conventional weapons and defenses
to deter and defend against new threats to our security.
Consistent with this, President Bush announced in 2001 that the
United States is ``committed to achieving a credible deterrent
with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent
with our national security needs, including our obligations to
our allies.''
Under the NPR framework, we have begun the drawdown of our
nuclear forces to what will be in 2012 the lowest level since
the dawn of the nuclear age and have begun to provide limited
protection for our Nation and forces against ballistic missiles
of all ranges.
So if we agree as a Nation, as I believe we do, that we
will continue to rely on some number of nuclear weapons for our
strategic posture, then we must also examine seriously the need
to make sure those weapons are safe and reliable.
Finally, if we are truly committed to reducing our nuclear
weapons then we must reach agreement on prompt long-range
conventional strike weapons capable of thwarting the most
dangerous threats to our security.
I will ask, Mr. Chairman, that the balance of my remarks be
made a part of the record and I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
We meet today to receive testimony from two panels on strategic
forces programs in review of the National Defense Authorization Request
for Fiscal Year 2008 and the Future Years Defense Program. For the
first panel, we welcome General James Cartwright, who as Commander of
U.S. Strategic Command, is responsible for tailoring U.S. strategic
forces and policy to the new, post Cold War security environment. The
second panel will provide an opportunity to delve more deeply into the
various service plans and programs for strategic forces as well as
examine plans for revitalizing our nuclear infrastructure. Witnesses on
the second panel include: Major General Roger Burg, USAF; Rear Admiral
Stephen Johnson, USN; the Honorable Thomas D'Agostino, Acting
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration; and
Brian Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic
Capabilities.
This hearing is an opportunity to assess the progress our Nation
has made toward adapting our strategic forces and deterrence doctrine
to a new security environment characterized by unpredictable and
perhaps undeterrable threats posed by terrorist groups and rogue
nations. While much of the public debate thus far seems to focus on the
role of nuclear weapons and the size of our nuclear arsenal, I believe
the focus should be on whether our Nation is building the types of
strategic forces necessary to deal with today's new threats.
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) established a conceptual
framework for thinking about deterrence in this new strategic age, and
serves as a useful guide for understanding the relationship between
offensive and defensive strategic forces, as well as the relationship
between nuclear and conventional weapons--all of which must play a role
in deterring strategic attacks against the United States, its forces,
and its friends and allies.
The NPR calls on the United States to reduce reliance on nuclear
weapons while placing greater emphasis on advanced conventional weapons
and defenses to deter and defend against new threats to our security.
Consistent with this reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, President
Bush announced in 2001 that the United States is ``committed to
achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of
nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including
our obligations to our allies.''
How well have we done in drawing down our nuclear forces while
simultaneously improving our conventional strike capabilities, fielding
missile defenses, and securing a responsive nuclear infrastructure that
hedges against future changes? That, I believe, is the central question
before us. My initial assessment is mixed.
With respect to the nuclear drawdown, we appear to be well on the
way toward meeting our commitment under the Moscow Treaty to reduce
operationally-deployed warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200, which will
be the lowest level of nuclear weapons deployed by the United States
since the Eisenhower administration. By the end of 2007, we will meet
an interim reduction milestone of 3,800 deployed warheads. In addition,
the U.S. has decommissioned all 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, and has removed 4
ballistic missile submarines from strategic service--a further
reduction of 96 missile launchers from the strategic force. The United
States has permanently denuclearized the B-1 bomber force and the
administration recommends a reduction in the size of the B-52 force
from 94 aircraft to 56, a reduction in the Minuteman ICBM force from
500 to 450, and the retirement of 460 nuclear armed Advanced Cruise
Missiles.
While the nuclear-drawdown appears to be proceeding in good order,
the same cannot be said about the fielding of the advanced conventional
strike capabilities necessary to reduce reliance on nuclear strike
forces. The Department of Defense has made progress in developing and
fielding short-range precision guided conventional munitions, but such
forces may not be in position to interdict fleeting targets, such as
mobile ballistic missile launchers or high-value terrorist targets,
that could inflict strategic blows against the United States and its
interests. We lack today the capability to deliver prompt, conventional
strikes against these targets at extremely long ranges. The development
of this capability, sometimes referred to as ``prompt global strike,''
has lagged due to a lack of consensus between Congress and the
administration on how best to proceed. I plan to make it a priority
this year to find a path that will permit the Department of Defense to
develop and field this important new strategic capability before the
end of the decade.
Perhaps the most impressive change in our strategic posture since
the NPR lies in the area of missile defense. In 2001, we could count
only upon our Patriot batteries to provide limited missile defense
protection against short range ballistic missiles. Today, we have over
a dozen ground-based interceptors deployed for the defense of the
United States against long-range North Korean ballistic missiles; a
similar number of SM-3 missiles are available for deployment on some
seven Aegis BMD ships to defend against short- to medium-range
ballistic missiles; and the Army deploys hundreds of improved Patriot
PAC-3 missiles to defend our forces against short-range threats.
Supporting these interceptors is a global system of upgraded early
warning and tracking radars and the command and control system
necessary to link together these multiple sensors and interceptors. In
just a few short years, our missile defense capabilities have moved
from purely research and development to operational fielding, such that
we were prepared to defend our Nation and our regional allies should it
have been necessary during the July 2006 North Korean ballistic missile
tests.
The NPR also called for a threat and capabilities-based approach in
the area of nuclear weapons. Specifically, the NPR called for a
transition from a nuclear stockpile with large numbers of deployed
warheads to a smaller stockpile augmented with a responsive
infrastructure which would be capable of responding to emerging threats
and to changes in the global security environment. This smaller
stockpile eventually was targeted at 1,700 to 2,200 weapons by 2012. It
is important to remember, however, that the development of a responsive
infrastructure was intended to be an essential precursor to these
reductions, to provide the confidence that pursuing these reductions
would not harm our security posture, no matter what possible futures
lay ahead.
The subcommittee is interested to learn what progress is being made
in developing this responsive infrastructure over the past 5 years,
since the NPR. When I became the chairman of this subcommittee 2 years
ago, a ``responsive infrastructure'' was defined in terms of meeting
key performance metrics for the Department of Defense, such as the
ability to design, develop, and field new capabilities within a certain
number of months, or to resolve technical issues regarding the
stockpile in a timely manner. I would note that the most recent
``Stockpile Stewardship Plan Overview'' (November 2006) includes
guidelines for responsive infrastructure such as the following:
``support the current stockpile''; ``execute the Reliable Replacement
Warhead program''; and ``provide opportunities for a smaller
stockpile.''
While I don't criticize the desirability of these ``guidelines,'' I
believe that we need to continue to drive improvements in the execution
of the nuclear weapons program through a set of measurable performance
goals--agreed upon between the Secretaries of Energy and Defense. The
program should also have defined goals for budget and schedule
performance. It has been 5 years since the NPR called for a responsive
infrastructure. Only in the past year did the Department of Energy
embark upon an analysis of alternatives for what is now called
``complex transformation''. I hope to explore why it has taken 5 years
to get to this point; what performance objectives are we laying out in
order to judge the various alternatives; and, what cost objectives
might be appropriate in order to make this nuclear enterprise run more
like a business.
I conclude by welcoming the call by many of my colleagues in
Congress for a debate concerning the future role of nuclear weapons.
But I would also remind my colleagues, and the public, that for over 5
years now, we have been operating under a new strategic framework that
seeks to adapt our strategic capabilities and deterrence doctrine to
address the most pressing new threats of our time: terrorists and rogue
nations armed with weapons of mass destruction. Under that framework,
we have begun the drawdown of our nuclear forces to the lowest levels
since the dawn of the nuclear age, and have begun to provide limited
protection for our Nation and forces against ballistic missiles of all
ranges. If we agree as a Nation--as I believe we do--that we will
continue to rely on some number of nuclear weapons for our security,
then we must also examine seriously the need to make sure those weapons
are safe and reliable. Finally, if we are truly committed to reducing
our reliance on nuclear weapons, then we must reach agreement on
alternative long-range conventional strike weapons capable of thwarting
the most dangerous threats to our security.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, now we are going
to treat this as a conversation, so you just start off, but we
are going to interrupt and ask questions. Thank you for your
service to our country. Thank you for the leadership that you
are giving. You are doing an outstanding job and that is well-
noticed and we appreciate that.
Senator Sessions. I agree.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Cartwright. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this
a conversation. I will just take a very few minutes at the
front end to set the context for the conversation, but there is
no way that my remarks will cover all the mission space, and I
would rather have you take me where you want to go and then we
can discuss it.
But at the front end, as Senator Sessions alluded to in his
remarks, the change in the strategy to acknowledge the fact
that the threat has proliferated, that it is a very different
character than what we faced in the Cold War, and that it is
advantaged by the information age. The access to technology,
the access to information, has proliferated. We are dealing
with nation states that we can consider peers, we are dealing
with what has been termed rogue nation states. We have
extremist groups and we have terrorists.
When you look across that spread of threat, we have to have
a different strategy to deter that wide range of threat. The
intent was to build a tailored strategy, to have a balance
between offense and defense that would allow regional combatant
commanders the flexibility to apply the appropriate deterrence
in a credible way to each of the nations in their area, each of
the threats and challenges that they face.
As was stated by Senator Sessions, in the 2001-2002
timeframe we entered into an agreement with the Russians to
start to drastically reduce our nuclear stockpile and to start
to move away from mutual assured destruction as the singular
strategy that we were pursuing. 2007 is the halfway point for
both us and the Russians. There were goals set for the halfway
point. We have compared notes. We are both on track, ahead of
schedule, and moving towards that 2012 target.
Part of what 2007 was to do for the United States was to
review the emergence of the other capabilities that would
replace mutual assured destruction in the nuclear stockpile as
we understood it. The key is understanding that our intent is
to move to the smallest number of nuclear weapons necessary to
ensure national security.
The emergence of missile defense over the past year,
particularly in light of the testing that occurred from North
Korea on the 4th of July, has lent to ballistic missile defense
a credibility and a capability that has been demonstrated now,
that is having an effect globally. We are starting to be able
to devalue things like short, medium-range and ICBMs in a way
that we were not able to do in the past. You can see that in
the embracing that is going on with our Japanese partners, with
our South Korean partners in that theater, the things that are
happening in Europe and the Middle East, and the partnerships
that are beginning to develop around this collective defense
capability against what is emerging as a key threat, which are
the ballistic missiles.
So to me that piece has started to mature at a rate that is
commensurate with the drawdown of the nuclear weapons that we
have experienced between 2001 and 2007.
In addition, we talked about offensive capabilities. On the
general purpose force side of the equation, the emergence of
the J-coded weapons, the global positioning system (GPS)-guided
gravity bombs, the new cruise missiles that have been fielded
both from the Navy and from the Air Force, air and sea, have
given us a capability that we did not have before. It has
changed how we are using the force. Regional combatant
commanders are today using bombers to do close air support, and
do it credibly, in a way that we never would have imagined that
those vehicles could be used, lending a new value to their
capability.
Many of the targets that we have held at risk with only
nuclear weapons in the past we can now credibly hold at risk
with conventional weapons. The one piece that is still an
outlier for us and a challenge is prompt global strike weapons.
The alternative conventional capability when nuclear is
inappropriate or we have at least a choice between nuclear and
conventional alternatives, and we can talk more about that.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, go back on that statement
just before. Give me an example of what can you do now with a
conventional weapon that you used to have to do with a nuclear
weapon?
General Cartwright. We used cruise missile-delivered
nuclear weapons to hold at risk integrated air defenses
targets/weapons. We really do not need to do that with nuclear
weapons any more. The conventional cruise missiles that we have
are survivable, they are precise. They can address these
targets. So we have been able to offload some of those targets,
and that has allowed us to stay on track in the reduction of
operationally-deployed nuclear weapons.
Senator Bill Nelson. Give us an example of those targets.
General Cartwright. Integrated air defenses? In the case of
Russia, they have those along the coastlines. They are used to
defend the country against penetrating bombers or other
airborne type targets. Other countries have the same
capabilities, whether they be large countries like China or the
rogues like North Korea or Iran.
So integrated air defenses have now a conventional way we
would go at them, that renders the use of a nuclear weapon
against that target as possible, but we have a choice. It may
be that you do not want to use a nuclear weapon in that case.
It may be proximity to a border of a friendly nation. It could
be just the inappropriateness, of wanting to control escalation
driving it down rather than up. Any of those are reasons why a
conventional warhead may be preferred in the strategy over a
nuclear warhead.
Senator Bill Nelson. You were starting with the RRW.
General Cartwright. RRW. For us the nuclear strategy is not
zero today. It is the least number necessary to ensure national
security. If we are to have these weapons, the attributes that
I would like to have on those weapons is that they be the
safest they can be for the people who must handle them, both in
the Department of Defense (DOD) and in the manufacturing of
these weapons--the maintenance and upgrades, reviews, life
cycle type activities.
You also want to ensure that they are the most secure that
they can be. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, we put these
weapons together without the technologies that we have today
for safety and security. We have learned a lot. We use this
example of the 1966 Mustang. Sure, I would like to have it, but
I am not sure I want to give it to my teenager or grandson
without disc brakes, seat belts, air bags, et cetera.
We have the technologies today readily available to make
these safe and secure. The third attribute that we generally
talk about in the RRW is reliability. The more reliable, the
lower the number against any given target that we have to send
to that target, number of times we have to revisit that target
with either a manned or an unmanned presence. That helps us
draw that stockpile down.
But I think the fourth piece here that is often missed is
that the RRW offers the opportunity to completely change the
way we manage operational and technical risk. By having this
warhead, we have the opportunity to move into the manufacturing
processes that we have today versus the ones that we had in the
1960s. In the 1960s we managed operational and technical
surprise with inventory. We built more and more different kinds
in order to ensure that if we needed it and we found a genetic
flaw or something started to appear as a misoperating part in
the complex, that we would just substitute another class of
warhead.
That led us to very large numbers of weapons in the active
stockpile, but also, not addressed in the treaty, in the
inactive stockpile. RRW allows us to move to component
commonality, not to manage end items, but to manage it at the
component level. We introduce technologies and diversity into
the stockpile that allows us to drastically reduce the number
of operationally deployed and inactive warheads. That probably
will be the single greatest factor in reducing the number of
these weapons that we have in our inventory. That attribute in
and of itself is something worthy to consider for the
committee.
Senator Sessions. What was the first point you made on
reliable?
General Cartwright. Safe. We want to introduce those types
of attributes, particularly in the package itself.
Senator Sessions. I was thinking there was something before
that.
General Cartwright. Particularly in the package itself,
using components that are safe to handle and if they are
intruded upon are safe. The Navy has moved to this type of
activity over the years. The Air Force is moving. Why not
introduce it into the whole stockpile? We have ways of making
these explosives safe.
Senator Bill Nelson. By the way, I want to mention to you
and Ben, we are going to try to put together a committee trip
to the three labs. A good time for me is right after the 4th of
July, when we are still in that break, July the 5th; go to
Lawrence Livermore and then to Sandia and then to Los Alamos,
where then we will get briefed on specifically what the General
is talking about and where you can see it for yourself.
Tell us, General, now, you have made a good case. Why are
the Russians not going to think what we are doing is building
more and powerful and therefore lessen their incentive to
reduce?
General Cartwright. One, we have publicly made the
information available so that they can see what we are doing,
and I have talks military-to-military to reinforce that
activity. Two, we are not changing any of the delivery
vehicles. We call this form-fit-function. It has to go into the
same slot that it came out of, talking to the RRW. No new
delivery vehicles, actually a great reduction in the number of
delivery vehicles necessary for the stockpile.
That has been relatively transparent. Too, we are really
trying to follow the lowest risk pathway here. So one of the
prerequisites is that we will do this without testing. So what
we are doing has a legacy in the former test program, but it
also has the characteristics in volume. The laws of physics are
going to stay relatively constant for us. They understand the
volumes we are dealing with, they understand the delivery
vehicles. This is all stuff that we have verified in treaties
in the past. They have a good understanding and we have a good
understanding of each other's capabilities.
I do not think that the issue of whether or not the physics
package is distinctly different, is a wide variation on what we
did, has really been an issue. We have made that transparent.
We have done it both openly in the exchanges and privately in
our military-to-military discussions.
Senator Sessions. They are modernizing theirs already,
regardless of what we do; is that not correct?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir. They are more focused on the
delivery platforms and how they are modernizing their delivery
platforms. But they are working on their weapons.
Senator Sessions. On the question of the NPR, it talked
about responsiveness, responsive nuclear infrastructure. What
does that mean, that we want to have a responsive nuclear
infrastructure, and how does that affect what you are doing?
General Cartwright. For me there are a couple of components
here. We talked about modularity so that the infrastructure can
produce just what it is as a module rather than an entire end
item to solve the problem. That is point one. Point two is that
it is an infrastructure--we learned this with the J-coded
weapons on the conventional side, including artillery shells.
If we could get to precision, if we could start to build these
with a warm production line rather than building 100,000 of
them, shutting down the factory, sending everybody home, then
when it was time to build the next generation discarding all
that we had and starting all over again with an infrastructure
that was not warm, we had lost the intellectual capital and the
manufacturing capabilities to do that.
So what we are looking for is a warm industrial capability,
one that takes advantage of the best practices in the civilian
sector, one that acknowledges the fact that we are dealing with
something that is very dangerous here. But if we keep those
people trained and if we keep the production activity
responsive, so that we are not doing it with inventory, we are
doing it with the manufacturing capability to the best extent
possible, then that becomes a responsive infrastructure.
I think if you take the trip one of the first things that
you will see is the attitude of the people. If you were there a
year or 2 in the past versus what you would see today or in the
near future, I think that Tom D'Agostino would tell you and I
certainly will tell you as I go visit those labs, the attitude
of those people see it and understand how to bring modern
technology to their job, the security and the safety that that
provides them, the environmental responsibility that is
associated with it, you would see a very different attitude in
those labs.
[The prepared statement of General Cartwright follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: This is my third
opportunity to appear before you as Commander of United States
Strategic Command. As such, let me first thank you for the time,
attentiveness, and professionalism of your staffs as we have worked
through some of the difficult challenges we face. The men and women of
Strategic Command have performed superbly over the last year,
demonstrating honor and dedication through long hours and deployments.
We continued to transform our organization and capabilities over the
past year, to better deal with traditional, irregular, catastrophic,
and disruptive contingencies. As the national security environment
continues to shift, we see other challenges on the horizon. We seek to
adapt to the shifting national security environment by refining and
fielding a ``New Triad'' of capabilities. Today I will outline how we
intend to address the challenges we face and ask for your assistance.
CONTINUING TRANSFORMATION
When we met a year ago, we talked of progress toward transforming
Strategic Command in the midst of conflict. We spoke of new
functionally aligned organizations designed to improve our operational
speed and progress toward a New Triad of capabilities. Finally, we
attached particular importance to the threat posed by non-state actors,
the need to tailor deterrence and focus on effects rather than kinetic
solutions.
One year later, our functional components for intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), network warfare, global network
operations, information operations, integrated missile defense and
combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are each at or nearing full
operational capability. In light of disturbing trends in the space
domain, we further refined our components by splitting Joint Functional
Component Command--Space and Global Strike into two individual
components, focusing on global strike and integration, and space
operations. These functional components are also progressing rapidly
and producing significantly enhanced operational results. This year the
Joint Information Operations Warfare Command completed the stand up of
four joint centers to facilitate the planning and execution of
Information Operations. The Joint OPSEC Support Center, Joint Mission
Support Center, Joint Electronic Warfare Center and Joint Strategic
Communications Support Center were established to improve Information
Operations throughout the combatant commands. We made progress in
restructuring our legacy nuclear deterrent force in compliance with the
Moscow Treaty. On the less positive side, we have debated, but made
little gain in, filling a gap in our prompt global strike capability.
confronting traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive threats
The 21st century opened with a violent attack on American soil
reminiscent of our experience more than six decades ago at Pearl
Harbor. Unlike Pearl Harbor, the attack of 2001 was unique in one
important way; military combatants were not involved. Civilians and the
image of America were the targets of calculating and fanatical
terrorists. Unlike the past, attribution for this attack would not be
credited to a single state or alliance of states. Rather, it would be
attributed to non-state actors who were empowered by their ability to
operate and leverage technology in a flattened world and were not
deterred by the military tools with which we deterred others for the
last 50 years.
As a world power, America's conventional and nuclear military
capabilities remain second-to-none in deterring traditional threats,
but our adversaries are predictably positioning themselves to avoid our
strengths and exploit our vulnerabilities. Moreover, we live in a world
in which traditional nation-states and alliances are asymmetrically
challenged by adversaries who are unconstrained by geographic
boundaries or internationally shared societal and legal norms.
We are therefore preparing for immediate, potential and unexpected
contingencies driven by these diverse adversaries who threaten America
and its deployed forces, friends, and allies. These adversaries are
pursuing the means for sudden and catastrophic strikes using WMD-armed
ballistic missiles, or with little or no warning using WMD delivered by
irregular means. They can also execute disruptive attacks in
milliseconds using readily available, web-enabled communications and
technologies from computers located anywhere on the globe.
SHIFTING NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGE
While we continue to focus on the need to deter non-state actors
through effects-based operations and remain vigilant with regard to
those nations that possess large inventories of nuclear weapons, recent
events in Iran, Lebanon, North Korea, and China, if unchecked,
foreshadow future critical challenges.
Daily cyberspace intrusions into civil, military, and commercially
networked systems; the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea, in
open disregard of broad international opinion; the firing of rockets
and cruise missiles from Lebanon and Gaza into Israel by Hezbollah and
Hamas; the unannounced and irresponsible launch of North Korean
missiles in the vicinity of Japan; and China's controversial launch of
an anti-satellite missile, which has subsequently endangered routine
use of space, demonstrate the range of challenges facing America.
Today, we live in an Information Age where communication through
cyberspace has forever changed and flattened our world. Free and open
use of cyberspace has become an essential tool of the global economy
and connects people throughout the world to each other. In fact, most
Americans can no longer imagine a world without instant communications
and the freedom to access goods, services, and information at will.
However, not unlike the targets of pirates or train robbers of the
past, America is under widespread attack in cyberspace. Our freedom to
use cyberspace is threatened by the actions of criminals, terrorists,
and nations alike. Each seeks their own form of unique advantage, be it
financial, political, or military, but together they threaten our
freedom to embrace the opportunity offered by a globally connected and
flattened world. The magnitude of cost, in terms of real dollars
dedicated to defensive measures, lost intellectual capital and fraud
cannot be overestimated, making these attacks a matter of great
national interest. Unlike the air, land and sea domains, we lack
dominance in cyberspace and could grow increasingly vulnerable if we do
not fundamentally change how we view this battlespace.
Ballistic missile proliferation is a concern to free nations and
will continue to pose a challenge to national security around the
world. Introduction of nuclear weapons to the situation, particularly
in the hands of regime leaders who openly seek to threaten or coerce
their neighbors, presents an untenable threat to U.S. national security
interests. It is clear that we must exhaust all possible diplomatic and
economic avenues to solve the problem, but in the end, the DOD could be
called upon to deter, reduce, or eliminate a critical threat to the
security of America, its forces, friends, and Allies.
America's defense strategy relies upon layers of capability that
offer policymakers maximum political-military flexibility. The first
layer is our emergent missile defense system. This system, when mature,
will not be an impenetrable shield, but it will reduce the likelihood
of successful attack. Successful tests have thus far demonstrated our
ability to overcome technical challenges and we have gained
international credibility, but more work remains as we turn our
attention to defense of Europe and regional threats in Southwest Asia.
Our second layer of defense is offensive strike--defeat the threat.
Policymakers will first seek to employ forward deployed general-purpose
forces, normally available in 3-5 days, given sufficient warning and
range. Some conventional global strike forces are capable of reducing
or eliminating threats within 1-2 days, but if the threat is sudden or
fleeting our only existing prompt global strike capability employs
nuclear ballistic missile systems. While America possesses dominant
conventional capabilities second-to-none, we lack the capability to
respond promptly to globally dispersed or fleeting threats without
resorting to nuclear weapons. As good as they are, we simply cannot be
everywhere with our general-purpose conventional forces and use of a
nuclear weapon system in prompt response may be no choice at all.
Intentional interference with space-based ISR, navigation, and
communication satellites, while not routine, now occurs with some
regularity. America's ever increasing appetite for space-based
technical solutions for global positioning, communications, and weather
among others, if not properly managed could become our Sword of
Damocles--we must not become trapped in this vulnerable position. Space
is now a contested domain where, without adjustments to our strategy,
we may not be able to count on unfettered access to space-based systems
should others persist in their course of developing counter-space
weapons. Strategic Command believes that if we are to ensure our
freedom to operate peacefully in space, we must rely upon a balanced
acquisition strategy that employs a mix of some highly specialized
space-based systems and other less elegant but more responsive space-
based systems, and a global system of distributed terrestrial networks
to help avoid this undesirable trap and properly mitigate the risk we
currently face.
adapting to the shifting security environment--fielding the new triad
The diverse challenges facing America necessitate a mature strategy
that reaches well beyond the blunt, cost-imposition approach of Cold
War planners. This strategy must be equally adept at denying the
benefits our adversaries might seek to gain and encouraging restraint
even in conflict. We understand well that policy-makers will consider a
range of options including diplomatic, military and economic. The
Department of Defense (DOD) will in turn consider options spanning
offense and defense, kinetic and nonkinetic, conventional and nuclear,
as appropriate to the political-military context. Strategic Command has
multiple roles to play in peacetime and conflict, not the least of
which is providing sufficient intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance upon which decisionmakers will act. We must ensure U.S.
freedom of operation in space and cyberspace, connectivity sufficient
to exercise global command and control, integrated missile defense, and
upon order, provide kinetic or nonkinetic global strike. Central to
this strategy is the New Triad, which remains the foundation for our
strategic approach to global deterrence.
The New Triad is comprised of integrated offensive and defensive
capabilities enabled by persistent global command and control, robust
planning and intelligence, and a responsive defense infrastructure. The
New Triad, when mature, will provide improved agility and flexibility
in dealing with a wider range of contingencies. Our goals are to avoid
undesirable competition, discourage proliferation, assure allies and
deter aggression, particularly from WMD-armed adversaries, by
maintaining sufficient strategic margin and flexibility vis-a-vis our
competitors.
While the vision of the New Triad concept is sound and we have made
progress, the shift in the global environment threatens to outpace the
implementation timeline. Our ability to seamlessly integrate defensive
and offensive capabilities requires the more mature set of capabilities
we are working toward. The remainder of this statement will outline the
important roles of our various mission areas and highlight those needs
we see as essential to meeting our goals.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Our Joint Functional Component Command--ISR has achieved full
operational capability and begun adjusting our transactional model. Our
current ISR capabilities and allocation processes were designed to
focus on nation-states possessing traditional military capabilities and
supporting infrastructure. Today we face adversaries who avoid our
strengths and seek to attack through nontraditional means. Our ISR
enterprise, designed to confront the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact, is not optimized for either collection against, or analysis of,
these new adversaries. Our initial assessment reveals that although we
have increased the volume of collection, disparate sensor and
requirement management procedures have resulted in redundant
collections and system-wide inefficiencies, further stressing an
overburdened ISR enterprise. These inefficiencies inundate our
analytical teams with volumes of data, rather than providing the right
information at the right time. As a Department, we effectively meet
less than one third of our combatant commanders' warfighter information
needs through these outdated systems. At the same time, the National
Reconnaissance Office manages collection of national-level intelligence
requirements for the Director of National Intelligence. We have
invested significant energy in strengthening this partnership with the
National Reconnaissance Office in an effort to streamline and better
integrate collection management.
Our objective is to optimize use of the Department's ISR resources
by eliminating requirements and collection redundancy, streamlining the
process to deploy ISR assets, and conducting genuine assessment of
those operations. Our goal is an efficient global ISR enterprise,
focused on achieving persistent collection capabilities against legacy
and emerging threats through enhanced global sensor management of U.S.
and coalition capabilities. We seek your support to improve our global
situational awareness, and analytical capability to model and simulate
the system of collection systems, spanning national, DOD, and coalition
collection. Enhanced situational awareness and modeling and simulation
capabilities will advance our ability to more effectively employ the
assets we possess and move us closer to fully exploiting the data we
collect.
Integrated Missile Defense
Because the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missile
technology and cruise missiles is serious, a credible missile defense
capability is now an essential element of America's national security
strategy. Even at this early stage of maturation, missile defense
systems influence our adversaries' perception of the economic and
political cost they must incur to pursue ballistic missile
technologies. While missile defense as a defensive shield is important,
its value as a dissuasive force or deterrent is proving far greater.
Our integrated ballistic missile defense program had an excellent
year. Within a 90-day period we successfully intercepted ballistic
missiles at low and high altitudes; in mid-course and terminal phases;
and, in endo- and exo-atmospheric environments. We increased the
numbers of our AEGIS tracking and engagement ships, ground-based
interceptors in Alaska, and gained confidence through testing and
deployment of the Forward-Based X-Band-Transportable and Sea-Based X-
Band radars to Japan and Alaska respectively. At the same time,
Sentinel radars and Avenger Air Defense systems participated in a
combined Northern Command-North American Aerospace Defense training
exercise in July 2006 to test our ability to rapidly deploy sensors and
joint air defense systems to defend key assets against cruise missile
attack.
The July 4, 2006, North Korean missile launches spurred a limited
operational activation of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
and, as a result, helped us streamline our plans, tactics and
procedures. We learned that the BMDS, procedures, and personnel
performed well, and demonstrated a credible operational missile defense
capability for homeland defense. An initial investment by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization in construction of a BMD command and
control system along with growing interest by countries throughout the
world in hosting both radar and interceptor bases are testaments to
this credibility. Japan has accelerated and expanded its cooperation
program with the United States for ballistic missile defense, and South
Korea recently committed to developing short-range ballistic missile
defenses. We expect discussion of forward deployment of radars and
interceptors in Europe to continue with our Allies as attention on the
emerging threat in Southwest Asia grows.
As we move forward in the next year, more work remains. We must
integrate air and cruise missile defenses with our growing ballistic
missile defense system. Continued progress also requires further
research, development, test and evaluation of individual components and
end-to-end testing to validate sensor and shooter integration.
Partnering with the Missile Defense Agency and the other DOD Service
Components, we expect to further evolve the BMDS by adding new elements
to the integrated sensor network. These elements will include cruise
missile defense capabilities and extant intelligence collection sensors
that will contribute to our situational awareness and overall
integrated missile defense capability. In addition, the first two Space
Tracking and Surveillance System satellites will be placed on orbit to
demonstrate our ability to protect avenues of approach that can't be
protected by other means. We also plan to increase the effectiveness of
our system by improving target discrimination capability through
integration of advanced algorithms in the Forward-Based X-Band-
Transportable and Sea-Based X-Band radars.
Information Operations
We made progress in growing Information Operations Capabilities
into core military competencies. We will continue to develop these and
related Strategic Communications planning capabilities to ensure that
all Joint Force Commanders gain and maintain the information advantage
over our adversaries throughout the entire spectrum of regional and
trans-regional engagement. As our capability centers, specifically for
Electronic Warfare and Strategic Communications planning support, reach
maturity, we will be able to provide trans-regional planning and
integration support and strategic effects assessments responsive to the
demands of the new Triad.
Cyberspace Operations
Earlier in this statement we noted that attacks in cyberspace are a
matter of great national interest. Cyberspace has emerged as a
warfighting domain not unlike land, sea, and air, and we are engaged in
a less visible, but none-the-less critical battle against sophisticated
cyberspace attacks. We are engaging these cyberspace attacks offshore,
as they seek to probe military, civil, and commercial systems, and
consistent with principles of self defense, defend the DOD portion of
the Global Information Grid at home.
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace describes cyberspace as
the nervous system of our country and as such, essential to our economy
and national security. It describes a role for all Federal departments
and agencies, state and local government, private companies and
organizations, and individual Americans in improving cyber-security.
The National Security Strategy to Secure Cyberspace lays out a
framework that seeks to deter our adversaries and assure our freedom of
action in cyberspace. Fundamental to this approach is the integration
of cyberspace capabilities across the full range of military
operations.
Strategic Command is charged with planning and directing cyber
defense within DOD and conducting cyber attack in support of assigned
missions. To date, our time and resources have focused more on network
defenses to include firewalls, anti-virus protection, and vulnerability
scanning. While generally effective against unsophisticated hackers,
these measures are marginally effective against sophisticated
adversaries. History teaches us that a purely defensive posture poses
significant risks; the ``Maginot Line'' model of terminal defense will
ultimately fail without a more aggressive offshore strategy, one that
more effectively layers and integrates our cyber capabilities. If we
apply the principles of warfare to the cyber domain, as we do to sea,
air, and land, we realize the defense of the Nation is better served by
capabilities enabling us to take the fight to our adversaries, when
necessary to deter actions detrimental to our interests. Our
adversaries seek to operate from behind technical, legal, and
international screens as they execute their costly attacks. If we are
to take the fight to our adversaries, we will need Congress' help to
find solutions to penetrate these screens.
Space Operations
Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as
freedom to operate in the air and sea. In order to increase knowledge,
discovery, economic prosperity, and enhance the national security, the
United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space-based
capabilities. The United States considers space systems to have the
right to pass through and peacefully operate in space without
interference, not unlike that of transit through international waters.
Consistent with this principle, the United States views purposeful
interference with its space systems as an infringement on its rights,
and furthermore considers space capabilities, including the ground and
space segments and supporting links, as vital to its national
interests. Recent events make it clear others may not share these
values. Platforms costing billions of dollars to replace and the lives
of astronauts from many nations are now at risk from debris left by
China's recent ill-advised anti-satellite test.
Historically, space situational awareness (SSA) was focused on the
cataloging, tracking, and monitoring of objects in space via the space
surveillance network. Today it is clear we must have better space
detection, characterization, and assessment tools. We require
capabilities that enable rapid threat identification and attribution,
facilitate a defensible architecture and provide fundamental shifts in
space awareness. To this end, Strategic Command has created the Joint
Space Operations Center (JSpOC) to ensure a more focused global command
and control of our space operations and systems. We are in the process
of colocating and consolidating the Space Control Center and the JSpOC
at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.
We have provided, through the Secretary of Defense, a recommended
plan for the establishment of an Operationally Responsive Space Office.
The overall goals are to strengthen the Nation's space leadership and
ensure that space capabilities are available in time to further U.S.
national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives.
Our recommended guidelines were to increase and strengthen interagency
partnerships to ensure a focused and dedicated unity of effort.
Interagency partnerships provide opportunities to jointly identify
desired effects, capabilities, and strategies. Departments and agencies
will capitalize on opportunities for dynamic partnerships--whether
through collaboration, information sharing, alignment, or integration.
To minimize the threat to our space capabilities now and in the future,
we need continued support of programs that enhance our SSA, space
protection capabilities, and satellite operations in order to preserve
unfettered, reliable, and secure access to space.
Global Strike
The devastating attack in September 2001 made it clear that we must
engage our enemies offshore, or suffer further damage at home. To do
so, we require a robust mix of capabilities tailored to a wider range
of potential adversaries and spectrum of challenges than yesterday. The
DOD has aggressively pursued this wider range of capabilities over the
last decade by pursuing a highly effective mix of advanced conventional
systems designed to take the fight to our adversaries with sufficient
precision to enhance the credibility of our warnings and effectiveness
of our strikes.
However, while the DOD deploys and when necessary employs these
expeditionary forces around the globe, it is unlikely we can or will
have forces in every place we need them at the crucial moment when we
have an opportunity to deter or respond to an attack, be it
conventional or otherwise. A timely response will be possible using
these conventional forces if they are properly equipped and positioned
in near proximity to the emerging threat. If our forces can't be in
position to respond rapidly, it is prudent to have the ability to
defeat attacks or eliminate high value or fleeting targets at global
ranges rather than suffering the consequences of an attack. We have a
prompt delivery capability on alert today, but it is configured with
nuclear weapons, which limits the options available to our
decisionmakers and may reduce the credibility of our deterrence.
The capability we lack is the means to deliver prompt, precise,
conventional kinetic effects at intercontinental ranges. Several
analytical efforts are underway or have been completed to assess mid-
term options. For example, Air Force Space Command is developing a
promising concept for a continental United States-launched conventional
strike missile, which capitalizes on the maneuverability and precision-
to-prompt-effects offered by maneuvering flight technology to produce
effects at global distances. Army Space and Missile Defense Command is
actively working thermal protection and management solutions that can
be effectively used across the range of potential advanced PGS
solutions.
Unfortunately, the threat we face is more virulent and arrived at
our shores earlier than expected. Because the threat has outpaced our
search for solutions, we have examined many plausible alternatives and
believe a near-term solution to deploy a precision global strike
missile within 2 years of funding is essential to adequately defend the
Nation offshore. This near-term capability should be part of a larger
strategy to explore, test and field other land, sea, or air-launched
alternatives to produce effective mid (2013-2020) and long-term (2020
and beyond) solutions.
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
For more than half a century we lived in a world in which the few
major powers possessing nuclear weapons walked a cautious path of
mutual deterrence. For years we have encouraged those nations retaining
chemical and biological weapons to disavow them as the major powers did
long ago. To its credit, Libya has raised its profile within the
international community by divesting itself of WMD that did not and
could not guarantee its security; it is too soon to know for North
Korea.
Strategic Command's role is to integrate and synchronize DOD
efforts in support of national efforts to combat WMD, on a global
scale. Strategic Command is therefore actively engaged with the
national laboratories, the Director of National Intelligence, National
Counterproliferation Center, National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Department of Homeland
Security, regional combatant commanders, and others to better
coordinate, integrate, and synchronize our collective response to the
threat. We provide support to Nonproliferation Treaty initiatives, the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and the Proliferation Security
Initiative. We recently completed a WMD Elimination Concept of
Operations, and will soon activate a Joint Elimination Coordination
Element to serve as the core of a Joint Task Force-Elimination, should
such a force be required.
We ask for your continued support in helping us build on the
successes realized through programs like the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction Initiative. Resources that enable us to scale the
attributes of existing programs to a global level, will provide global
combating WMD capabilities by building global partnerships, using a
global perspective, with the tools and metrics to judge value, and
allow individual or regional WMD interdiction and elimination by host
nation-state process owners. This process focuses on enabling ``nation
self help,'' where empowered nations are stakeholders and active
participants in the fight to interdict and eliminate the threat of WMD.
By participating with these nations, our actions reinforce their status
as a sovereign state, elevate their standing, reinforce their status,
and are a positive step forward for America as our partners develop and
possess resident counterproliferation capabilities, providing advanced
threat reduction and attribution forward from our shores while
demonstrating a consolidated front to the threat.
National Command and Coordination Capability
The world is fundamentally more complex than it was when our
current point-to-point nuclear command and control system was developed
more than 50 years ago. This single-purpose aging command and control
system, while adequate to meet our nuclear mission, is not adequate to
meet our broader national objectives. As we seek to sustain the
essential core nuclear command and control system, we see an
opportunity to transform this 1950s Cold War capability into a
government-wide national communications capability. To do so, we must
take advantage of modern networked architectures.
At the outset, our strategy was two-fold, first to sustain our
legacy nuclear command and control system and second to expand its
capability to address a broader scope of military challenges. These
investments would better integrate all elements of national power and
increase our ability to quickly respond across a broader spectrum of
military threats. However, our national experience in Hurricane Katrina
made it clear that America needed more and we expanded the scope of our
effort to improve the Nation's ability to support civil authorities
following disasters or other domestic events. The President has
subsequently provided guidance to develop a robust, enduring, secure,
survivable National Command and Coordination Capability (NCCC) that
integrates our legacy nuclear command and control functions into a net-
centric NCCC. In support of these objectives, we have developed
partnerships with the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, and
Director of National Intelligence.
The goal is to create a NCCC that not only meets national command
and control requirements, but can become the versatile and stable
backbone of a nationally distributed network to meet other important
homeland security requirements. Through an integrated and adaptive
approach, NCCC will enable a responsive, universally collaborative and
virtual environment for all users. We are well on the way to realizing
this vision. Actions to date include modernizing our airborne
components, distributing our ground components, and increasing network
capacity.
Safety, Security, and Reliability of the Nuclear Stockpile
The NNSA and the DOD share responsibility for the safety, security,
reliability, and effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear warhead
stockpile and for the quality and responsiveness of the enterprise
necessary to sustain it.
During the last decade, our Nation invested in increasing our
scientific understanding and extending the life of weapons designed and
produced during the Cold War. To date, these efforts have successfully
ensured the reliability of our weapons without the need to conduct
nuclear tests. While this strategy has served the Nation well, we
recognize the current path of indefinitely relying on legacy nuclear
designs refurbished through a series of life extension programs entails
accepting significant future risks and potentially large costs, to
reliability/performance, safety, security, and responsiveness points of
view. For this reason, we support a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)
program as the best path forward to improve nuclear weapon safety,
security, and reliability and advance our goal of the lowest possible
stockpile levels consistent with national security.
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review described a need for a responsive
production infrastructure, capable of responding to a strategic
surprise, as part of its comprehensive nuclear strategy. The
combination of the RRW program and responsive infrastructure investment
are key elements of our overall strategy to further reduce our nuclear
warhead stockpile to the lowest level consistent with national security
requirements and move the Nation from an inventory-based to a
capability-based risk management strategy. As the comprehensive
strategy for the nuclear enterprise matures, the RRW program will
replace extant nuclear warheads with increasingly modular and
interoperable warheads that are safer, more secure, and highly
reliable, as one element of a broader strategy to reduce our reliance
upon nuclear warheads and more aggressively reduce our non-deployed
stockpile. RRW designs will incorporate a broad suite of enhanced
safety and security features that cannot be attained through the life
extension process. Modularity and interoperability remain top
warfighter priorities for the RRW concept. These attributes will
significantly increase the operational flexibility and responsiveness
of the nuclear weapons stockpile and improve our ability to introduce
new technologies and respond to technological and/or geopolitical
surprise. We ask for your continued support of the RRW program as an
integral part of the Nation's comprehensive strategy to meet national
security requirements and encourage Congress to continue investing in
the transformation of our aging nuclear infrastructure; it is a key
element in the sustainment of a credible nuclear deterrent for the 21st
century.
CONCLUSION
United States Strategic Command is engaged in a wide-ranging
campaign to provide support to all elements of the DOD, assure our
allies, dissuade undesirable competition, deter our adversaries, and if
called upon to defend our Nation and defeat our enemies. We take this
role very seriously and today present you with carefully thought out
recommendations. Once again, thank you for your time, insight, and
attentiveness to our views.
Senator Bill Nelson. To Ben and Jack: Any questions while
we are on this RRW? Then we will move on to other topics.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
General Cartwright, as we realign our nuclear capabilities
are we or are the Russians together with what we are doing
mixing the message we are sending to Iran and North Korea? In
other words, are we giving them an argument against what we are
asking them to do, and that is to denuclearize at a time when
we are realigning our nuclear capabilities?
General Cartwright. Certainly a fair question. We have
tried to be as transparent, and the Russians have also tried to
be as transparent as possible. We are reducing the stockpiles
in ways and in measures that are far greater than anything we
have ever done in the past, moving in a direction that retains
the minimum number possible, and demonstrates the responsible
stewardship of safety and security of these weapons, making
sure that they are only used for the appropriate mission.
Senator Ben Nelson. So you think the transparency of what
we are doing will not send a mixed message, although we know
they will jump on anything that they can? But we are not
sending a mixed message because of transparency and what we are
doing with the realignment?
General Cartwright. I believe that we have taken all steps
that we should and could to keep from doing that. You always
have to make sure that you go back and sample your audience: Am
I getting through? Do you understand what we are doing? We try
to do that regularly.
That is why we held a 2007 review on both countries' parts,
to make sure we were doing the right things, that the message
we were sending was appropriate, and that people understood the
direction we were heading.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have to go to the Rules
Committee markup to make the quorum.
I had one other question I would like to ask, General. We
worked hard not that long ago to try to get the retrofitting of
the Trident submarine so that we can have the non-nuclear
capability on those submarines for what you described earlier,
the more appropriate response or more appropriate reaction to
what is going on. Are you still of the opinion that we ought to
continue to do that and do you have any suggestions about what
we might try to do?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir. I know that we will go into
this in more depth here later.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Sessions and I teamed up on
that.
Senator Bill Nelson. We are going to go into that in
detail.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay. I just want to continue to add my
support for making the retrofitting of the Trident submarine
for non-nuclear capabilities.
General Cartwright. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. Thank you, General.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. General, thank you. Just a few specific
questions.
Based on the reviews done to date and reviews that will be
done by NNSA and the laboratories, you have confidence that the
RRW design will be able to be certified without testing?
General Cartwright. That is a priority in the activity. We
have done the first step or the first phase in a developmental
activity. This is kind of an exploration. To understand the
risks, is there feasibility in moving forward? One of the key
criteria was that we had to have high confidence that it would
not require testing.
This next phase that we are asking authorization for will
get into more engineering detail to confirm that attribute.
Senator Reed. If it becomes clear at some point that it is
not possible to certify without testing, would you support
terminating the effort?
General Cartwright. I would come back to this committee and
tell you why we got to that position and what the criteria
were, what the detail was behind that, and then we would have
that discussion. But it would be a criteria. We would have to
seriously consider whether we would want to move forward at
that point.
Senator Reed. If successful, the RRW will be a significant
improvement in safety, security, and reliability compared with
the current?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Also, it will give increased confidence in
the stockpile and enable substantial reductions in your view?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir. If it is coupled up with the
responsive infrastructure, then you have an opportunity here,
particularly on the inactive side, where we have large
inventories, to drastically reduce those inventories.
Senator Bill Nelson. Convince us of that. For example, the
life-extended W-76, is it going to be retired in favor of the
RRW, what Jack asked?
General Cartwright. The approach here is a three-phased
approach. We have a life extension program associated with the
76 and we have the inventory that is deployed. We will continue
that life extension program with the intent of phasing it out
as RRW comes on line and is deployable. So what you are trying
to do here is not put all of your eggs in one basket that RRW
will come on a certain date. You start the management of
extending the life of the existing warheads. You carry that
until you have confidence that the new weapon can replace it
and then you phase out that life extension approach to
business.
The other piece that is important to understand is the way
we tend to manage risk today. We have more than one warhead for
each delivery vehicle. So if the 76 were to come up with some
sort of flaw, we have other warheads that we could use instead.
RRW allows you to do component replacement and get diversity,
the ability to replace a component, rather than having to have
an entire stockpile of a different weapon.
Does that make sense?
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes.
Senator Reed. Just a final question, General. The Nuclear
Weapons Council has decided to study the feasibility of the RRW
and not to manufacture or deploy the RRW; is that correct?
General Cartwright. That is correct. The next phase is an
engineering level of detail on the feasibility.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Tell us about the cost. Are we going
to actually be able to get some cost savings in here, even
though we are going to develop the new weapon by retiring all
of the life extension programs on the old ones?
General Cartwright. This is always hard because what you
add into the cost will drive this. But in the transition RRW
from where we are, let us take the 76 as an example today, to
the RRW, the intent was that the resources available would
remain reasonably flat and we would just transition the
resources from one activity to the next.
Senator Sessions. By resources you mean money?
General Cartwright. I do mean money, I do. I also mean
infrastructure, people, and intellectual capital. All of those
are in the equation. But it is the dollars and cents side of
this equation.
In the drawdown of several of the classes of weapons that
we did between 2001 and 2007. We also took the savings on the
DOD side and partnered with DOE to ensure seed money was
available that was realized from standing down some of these
weapons and delivery systems. That was to get this activity
going, do the engineering work, start to understand a logical
way forward, and present the case. So we have taken some of the
savings from standing down weapons and delivery systems, used
that in order to move forward here, but kept up the W-76 life
extension program until we had a high confidence that we could
replace it.
So we are trying to stay within the resources that have
been programmed and do that across the stockpile. Now, as you
have to replace infrastructure, that is where we are trying to
understand how quickly that can be done, and can you stay
inside the programmed resources or do we have to come back and
ask for additional resources.
Senator Bill Nelson. Any more questions on RRW?
Senator Sessions. One thing I would like to ask. In your
position you have to think about these things. If we went to
zero nuclear weapons, it seems to me that would encourage a lot
of nations to the belief that they could in fact obtain
military superiority over the United States by simply building
a relatively modest number of nuclear weapons. Likewise, if we
brought the number so low, even a rogue nation might see it
within their grasp to be a peer competitor of the United
States.
Are those reasons why we need to be cautious about not
going too low in our numbers and would you agree with that
general philosophy?
General Cartwright. I agree with the philosophy. I tend to
look at it as how credible is your deterrent and credible to
who. If on the conventional nonkinetic side, we are able to, as
we have done, say with missile defense, start to be credible,
then the level of requirement for nuclear weapons can be drawn
down against some of the adversaries. Against adversaries, you
may have a different equation where mutual assured destruction
is a balance that they are comfortable with. This allows us to
reach a point of credibility between two nations that would
allow us to have a basis of dialogue, a basis of warning, an
ability to know when the other has encroached and be able to
say, hey, you are making me nervous, I am going to have to
start posturing if you do not change.
But what am I posturing with and is it credible? Today we
still need nuclear weapons to balance that equation. The number
we need is drastically less than it has been in the past.
Senator Sessions. But a nation like Iran, when they
consider their nuclear program, I am convinced at this point in
history whether or not we are building a RRW, whether we have
1,000 or 3,000 nuclear weapons, that is not the factor driving
them to build their nuclear program. Would you agree with that?
General Cartwright. I would agree with that.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have a couple questions on the Moscow Treaty,
General. Under the treaty, we have committed to have no more
than 1,700 to 2,200 deployed nuclear missiles by 2012. But what
are the number of reserve missiles that you are planning to
meet that level of deployed missiles?
General Cartwright. In the inactive or not deployed
stockpile?
Senator Reed. Yes.
General Cartwright. I cannot give you the number, Senator.
I will go find that for you. What we are hoping is that through
RRW we can go well below that. I do not know that we were
mandated to any level in those particular stockpiles. What I
have been trying to say is that one of the values that you can
get from RRW is to go after that part of the stockpile, which
is still very large.
Senator Reed. Do you have kind of a rough order of
magnitude, like two to one, three to one, four to one?
General Cartwright. Let me give you that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Moscow Treaty does not mandate any specific level for the
reserve (not deployed) stockpile which consists of warheads for
augmentation, reliability replacements, logistics spares, and
surveillance. Today, the ratio of reserve stockpile warheads to the
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads is greater than one
to one. With planned weapon retirements and a responsive infrastructure
facilitated by the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, we are
confident the ratio will be significantly less than one to one.
Senator Reed. Okay, that is fair.
Is it possible to reach these levels prior to 2012, the
deployed levels, to reduce them to that?
General Cartwright. Yes.
Senator Reed. Is that contemplated?
General Cartwright. We are certainly open to it. Part of it
will depend on the engineering level work in RRW. Is 2012
realistic for RRW to come on line, which is a challenge
technically, but is it far enough along that we have gained
confidence that we can start to reduce, inventories and have
capabilities like missile defense come on board with a proven
credibility as a deterrent factor to start to influence the
deterrence equation?
Those factors will all contribute to us being able to
drawdown faster. We are ahead of schedule now. We are on a
glide path that would put us before 2012 to make the deadlines.
But we are watching each year and updating. 2007 is very
important.
Senator Reed. As I understand the treaty, the deadline
comes in 2012 and then it expires in 2012. It is not a
permanent treaty.
General Cartwright. Right.
Senator Reed. Would you be supportive of a permanent treaty
or making Moscow permanent?
General Cartwright. My crystal ball for 2012 is probably no
better than anybody else's. I think we ought to go look at it
as we approach that treaty, to look at what has emerged as
capability, what are the threats, what are the threats to our
Nation versus what are the threats to the Russians. The
equation may change, but I think you want to keep a dialogue
like this treaty going and you want to keep it, to the extent
possible, binding and keep us on a glide slope towards the
fewest number necessary.
Senator Reed. We had a hearing last week which was very
interesting. Some of the witnesses suggested that we really
could go down to a deployed force of 500 missiles and a reserve
of 500--warheads, rather. Others suggested 850 to 1,100
deployed, much lower than the Moscow goal. Is that feasible or
possible, desirable?
General Cartwright. It is based on the assumptions. Again,
what is the world that we are really living in, what is the
ability of our infrastructure to say, gosh, the world was not
what we thought it was going to be, we need to go up. I do not
want to go in that direction, but are you comfortable that you
could recover if you misjudged? That is the risk that you take
as you get down to the small numbers.
It does not mean that it is not plausible. It certainly
does not mean that that number of warheads is not capable of
being a deterrent. The question is how much risk do you want to
take that you may have misjudged, and that ought to be a debate
and a discussion.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Since the Moscow Treaty was more of a
goal of 1,700 to 2,200 deployed nuclear weapons, are the
Russians going to meet that goal by 2012?
General Cartwright. They are certainly on a path, as we
are, to be able to make it actually ahead of schedule if they
judge the world the same way we are judging it right now.
Senator Bill Nelson. Jeff, any more on this?
Senator Sessions. A different subject.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, what subject do you want to go
to next?
General Cartwright. I will go anyplace you want to go, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead, Jeff.
Senator Sessions. We spend a lot of money on ICBMs, on the
aircraft capability, the triad, our basic triad of delivery of
nuclear weapons. How do you see that as we drawdown these
numbers? What capabilities is it wise for us to maintain and
not weaken or not adjust much and what others may there be some
capabilities of saving in?
General Cartwright. I think in general the old triad of the
nuclear forces is a sound construct.
Senator Sessions. Explain the triad?
General Cartwright. It is the combination of sea-based
ballistic missiles launched from our nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine, the land-based ICBMs that are launched from
the missile fields in the United States; and then the bomber
capability.
Senator Sessions. The theory of that in the Cold War was
that at least one of those capabilities would be effective to
deter any attack on the United States.
General Cartwright. Right. An adversary focused on one, you
had the other two. We generally thought of the ICBMs, the
ground-based, being the most responsive, available quickly if
needed; the submarine-based as the type of weapon that had the
most resilience and survivability, so if we were caught unaware
they were survivable; and then the bombers gave us the
flexibility of the man in the loop and the ability to go to the
adversary and approach him from an air domain, so to speak.
So we were approaching from three different ways, which is
to some extent a cost-imposing strategy. It forces the
adversary to defend in three different ways. That has been the
philosophy as we move towards the new triad, which accepted the
old triad but incorporated defensive capabilities and
conventional capabilities in aggregate.
So the question here is can we change the balance of the
old triad as we draw down these weapons. We have reduced
substantially the number of bombers committed to this activity,
the number of sea-launched ballistic missiles that are
committed to this activity, and the number of land-based
ballistic missiles committed to the triad. Last year we took
the last Peacekeeper out of the hole. That weapon system is no
longer part of the inventory. We have reduced down to 500 the
number of ICBMs and that is going lower here in the next month.
We have made notification and we are going to drawdown there.
The number of submarines committed and obviously then
correspondingly the number of missiles associated with those
submarines, the gravity bombs, the number of bombers that we
have committed, the number of weapons associated with them,
whether they be cruise missile in type or gravity in type, have
all been reduced substantially.
Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead, Jack.
Senator Reed. Are we going to join the debate about the
precision global strike now?
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, we are going to.
Senator Sessions. I think we should talk about that.
Senator Bill Nelson. We are going to discuss every subject
you want.
Senator Reed. Despite the great efforts and enthusiasm of
Senator Sessions and Senator Ben Nelson, at least, last
Congress there was some concern about modifying the
Conventional Trident Missile (CTM) to carry kinetic non-nuclear
warheads. The Navy has $175 million in the fiscal year 2008
budget request for CTM.
This is a rear guard action perhaps. But anyway, rather
than continuing this debate, does it not make some sense to
look for alternatives to accomplish the prompt global strike
mission other than putting conventional weapons on what is a
nuclear platform at the moment? In that vein, would this be a
more appropriate defense-wide account, to look at global, new
ways to strike within your required short period of time
without engaging in this debate about Trident? What is your
opinion, sir?
General Cartwright. The Trident modification was designed
to be a hedge for a threat that we believed had emerged, to
give us the time to develop more appropriate systems for global
strike that could address any number of attributes that were of
concern. In other words, one of the keys was ambiguity, being
able to discern what the profile equated to, much as we have
done with bombers and cruise missiles in the past and other
types of delivery systems that had both conventional and
nuclear capabilities.
The intent with the CTM was to be able to emerge in 2 years
with a hedge capability, hold that hedge capability until in
particular Air Force and Navy were able to move forward with a
program of record to give us the attributes with a global
strike capability in the conventional arena that we felt were
appropriate for that activity--speed, range, ambiguity, notice,
all of the types of things that you would like to have, A; B,
also be credible on the deterrence side of the equation in that
they could hold targets at risk credibly and deter somebody
from either pursuing a tactic such as using strategic depth to
hide their resources or hide their offensive capabilities where
we could not reach them with other than a missile or long-range
prompt activity.
The other piece here was to also start to impose on the
adversary, just as Senator Sessions has alluded to here, a type
of offensive capability that would force them to build a unique
defensive capability in order to address that threat, much as
the old triad had done with three different ways of attacking
the problem.
Can we move forward into the future field of options, as
you say, to a more regularized, more appropriate global strike
capability? We believe we can. We believe that the Navy and the
Air Force are on a path to do that. They are working with the
labs. They are working actually with the Army. The Army has
some pretty interesting ideas in this area. Even though they do
not intend to move into this area, they are helping us on the
technical side.
So we believe that could start to appear around the 2012 to
2014 timeframe to replace the need for the hedge. Now, what we
do get out of the hedge activity separate from putting the
warhead on the missile, is the work necessary to do the
technical research on heat management, navigation, warhead,
design conventional warhead, development that would be placed
on these longer-term programs. So there is a mixture in that
$175 million between production type money which would move us
on a path to in 2 years field the hedge and the science and
technology or research and development necessary to field this
next generation of capability.
So can we split that apart? Can we do this differently? Can
we discuss whether or not the threat has emerged and whether or
not we need to do this with CTM or whether we can wait until
2012? That is why we are here and in this debate.
Senator Reed. Congress--and again, this was not an issue
that was not without differences of opinion, but the conclusion
was that this opens up the proverbial can of worms when you are
putting a conventional missile on a Trident nuclear submarine.
I do not think we dispute or debate the issue of trying to
strike in a short time across the globe. I guess my sense is it
would be better to try to accelerate these efforts you are
talking about than having a hedge which could jeopardize the
deterrence and send conflicting signals, not just to the
terrorists who have a secret enclave someplace with weapons,
but nation states that have missile systems that they are not
going to put at risk or other assets they are not going to put
at risk.
General Cartwright. It is a judgment call. The regret
factors associated with not having it today if a target,
particularly a weapon of mass destruction, emerged and we
wanted to get to it quickly and we had no other way, that is
the extreme in the opposite direction.
Senator Reed. I understand that. I do not want to belabor
the point, but just to clarify in my mind. We have nation state
adversaries with WMD which we use Trident submarines with WMD
and other means, the triad, to deter and, if not deter, then to
successfully retaliate. We are really talking about--and
correct me if I am wrong--non-state actors.
General Cartwright. No, sir.
Senator Reed. Well then, or--give me a scenario that we
would have to----
General Cartwright. Let me, without going classified, there
are many targets that are out of the reach of our bombers,
conventional forces, strategic depth in large countries--the
question would be, as an example, how many satellites would we
be willing to lose before we went to a nuclear alternative
because the only thing we have to reach those targets is
nuclear.
Senator Reed. But you are positing a situation where a
nation state could engage in behavior like shooting down
satellites deliberately.
General Cartwright. I am only trying to say that it is not
just the terrorists, a terrorist target, but it is a broader
threat spectrum. This is why eventually we want to get to
something that is easily understood and can reach out and start
to deter those types of targets. The question is do we need a
hedge between now and availability of a more regularized
capability.
Senator Reed. I know Senator Sessions wants to comment, but
this goes to basic deterrence theory, and that is one of the
advantages of dealing with a nation state is that you have
other levers rather than a nuclear attack.
General Cartwright. Yes, and you want to use all of them
before you ever go offensive.
Senator Reed. One of the issues and I think the context
that this issue came up is in those cases where the adversary
is nondeterrable. They have to be preempted.
General Cartwright. I guess there is a class of targets
exactly as you describe, where you would want to be preemptive
and you do not necessarily want to escalate immediately to
nuclear. There is also, on the other side of the equation, the
desire to control escalation in a conflict that might have
started, and in both cases you might add value.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sessions. We had a good battle about that last
year. First we had hearings on it, and I concluded that the
concerns with the conventional Trident launched from an
existing nuclear-capable submarine were not likely to be
confusing or place us at risk. But I have to tell you, when we
voted we did not win that vote. Senator Reed is correct.
I had also discussed last year and over the last couple of
years that there are alternatives that are in development and
research today, and I know there could be a regret factor if we
do not have this capability right now. But have you given any
thought to accelerating and giving more emphasis to some of the
alternatives that might allay the concerns of our colleagues
that any launch would be misinterpreted as a nuclear attack?
How far away? What are your thoughts about going in that
direction? You have a good bit of money in there after last
year's vote and after last year's election I do not think we
are going to get any more votes this year, frankly. So what is
the practical solution to this? There are alternatives, I
think.
General Cartwright. There are. First, I want to thank the
committee for allowing us to have that debate. I think it
informed a lot of us and a lot of those who we serve and
allowed them to at least see and understand what the issues
were. I may have made your life a little more difficult, but I
think we served our constituency well by having that debate,
and we ought to continue those kinds of debates.
The Air Force and the Navy both have programs that they are
embarking upon to bring us to a technical solution that is
informed by last year's debate. They are much smarter about
what is going to be, let us say, appropriate and what can we
match technology with. The question now is could you make it go
faster. I do not believe technically you could. You could throw
more money at it, but I do not believe that you could
accelerate the science that we need to have here. We are seeing
steady good progress in reducing what we call technical risk as
we move forward. But we are also opening doors in technology
that we did not understand before and are now making themselves
available to you, and I will let the Air Force and the Navy in
their opportunity talk a little more about that.
But there are opportunities now. I do not think you can
accelerate this. I think you would be challenged to have an
initial capability by 2012--other than CTM--and then start to
move forward from that in a block approach to get us to where
we want to go. I think you ought to let the programs lay out
that technology.
But a lot of the work that we did at the behest of this
committee on bringing together the Army, the Air Force, the
Navy, the national labs to start to focus on this problem,
start to understand the technical challenges and match them up
with what we were discovering in our dialogue has occurred over
the last year and a half. That has started to move forward. So
I think we have credible ways forward. We have to see, does
that technology really mature at the rate that we think we can
make it mature and do we have the right investment profile for
all of the things that you will have an opportunity to take a
look at.
Senator Sessions. Just to sum up, I guess, I had expressed
concern that maybe we should just try to leap ahead with the
new technology, and politically we do not have the votes, it
did not look like, in Congress to proceed. But I just would ask
you, you are saying that in your opinion, based on your
responsibilities, that you do need this before it is likely
that this program could be completed, a new type weapons system
that Congress would presumably accept is on line? Explain to us
how deeply you feel about it, in short.
General Cartwright. I believe that we ought to have a hedge
capability until we can field a program of record, that is an
entire program, whether it be Air Force or Navy or both, but a
capability. I believe this threat has emerged, based on what
you have charged me to worry about and to watch. That is why I
was so passionate about this discussion last year. I am no less
passionate this year. We have moved a year closer to 2012. How
long and how quickly do you want to have this capability? It is
a judgment call as to whether or not this threat is something
we want to have a prompt global strike capability for now. Or
we are willing to wait a number of years between 2007 and 2012
to see a full-fledged capability fielded.
Having what we would call a time to field of 2 years is
still something you have. Even if we do not fund this year, in
2 years if we waited a year and said, gee, we might have
misjudged this, you say go and the Department of the Navy here
along with us could field this in 2 years. Is that cushion, is
that safety net, big enough or would you like it shorter or
would you like to have the hedge fielded right now? That is the
negotiating space--that is the wrong way to say it----
Senator Sessions. If new technology were to come on in 2012
and we approve this money for the Conventional Trident, when
would the Conventional Trident be fielded?
General Cartwright. Probably 2009-2010.
Senator Sessions. So you have a couple years of padding
there.
I see targets that could occur. You could have maybe some
sort of attack on our satellites ready to be launched; WMD, you
could see intelligence that a nation was about to launch a
missile that could be stopped before the launch; or terrorist
cells and top terrorist leaders plotting an attack.
There are a number of targets I think that are not
academic, but could be very real, hopefully not, but could be
very real. So that is why I supported this. But it is not
faring very well at the moment. You need to know that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Some of the flip side of those
arguments are that, as Jack said, if a nation state were to
suddenly start attacking our satellites that is an act of war,
and that would bring into the full array of the defense
posture. Then there are the questions that we need to
understand the answers to about the alternatives to this as
measured against the cost, because we do not really know the
cost. Is it going to be $100 million a shot? Is it going to be
$5 million a shot? What is it going to be?
General Cartwright. For the future systems? For CT?
Senator Bill Nelson. For the prompt global strike.
General Cartwright. Oh, for prompt global strike.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask you on this CTM, would you
want to locate this account in a military Service or in a
defense-wide account?
General Cartwright. For CTM, I would put it in a Service
account, a Navy program. For the broader capability of prompt
global strike, that might be more appropriate for a defense
account.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Any more questions on this
subject area? [No response.]
All right. Shall we go to national missile defense? Is that
all right with you?
Senator Sessions. Okay.
Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead.
General Cartwright. I had some opening remarks that
addressed the missile defense capability. Let me just add a
couple of comments to where I think we are. One, the testing
has been very successful thus far. Two, the key issues that are
in front of us, at least as a commander are expanding and
bringing in the Southwest Asia threats and whether or not we
want to have that capability, which we believe we are going to
need, to devalue the proliferation of ballistic missiles in
that region.
The second, that is very important to me, is the expansion
of the system beyond long-range ICBMs. We must address those
threats that hold at risk our forward-deployed forces, our
allies, and our friends. Those are the short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles, things that Patriot, the Standard Missile
(SM) 2 and 3 will be able to address, and Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). Starting to bring and integrate
that system together so that we do have an ability to have a
collective defense with allies and the ability to have a global
capability against short, medium, and the ICBMs. Those focuses
I think are where we want to be heading as we move forward.
We have a pretty good understanding of the science. We are
demonstrating, particularly with the SM-3 and Patriot and
THAAD, the broad range of capability of layered and collective
defenses and sensor integration now on a global scale. We need
to expand that out and bring credibility to it, allow the
Services now to field these systems as indigenous organic
capabilities, but allow them to mix and match without regard to
Service lines. So an Aegis destroyer ought to be able to guide
to terminal a Patriot and a Patriot battery radar or a land-
based radar ought to be able to guide to conclusion a sea-
launched missile.
The reason you want to do that is most of our missiles far
exceed the capability of their sensors, and so you want to take
advantage of that range, broaden yourself out from just a point
defense to an area capability. As an example, a THAAD battery
can cover the entire peninsula of South Korea, one battery.
That is the kind of area capability we need to bring to the
equation to defend those forces against short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles, which are the ones that are really
proliferating out there.
I will leave it at that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Which one of you needs to go first? If
you have a time problem go ahead, Jack.
Senator Sessions. I am going to be here.
Senator Reed. Let me just follow up on the major point you
made, General, which is I presume it is the view of your
combatant commanders and also you have done some joint
capabilities force mix studies that it is these short and
intermediate missiles, PAC-3, Aegis, BMD, that really more are
needed than less; is that fair?
General Cartwright. From an inventory standpoint?
Senator Reed. Inventory standpoint.
General Cartwright. Yes, but again SM-3 has mobility, which
is a great attribute. Patriot has some mobility, but they are
for terminal point defense. They have a very small footprint on
the ground. So as you can see, whenever there is a conflict
brewing people want more of them than exist, and you will never
have enough to cover say the entire coast of a country or
something. So you need an area asset. That is why THAAD is so
important to us.
But yes, in general short- and medium-range are the ones
that are proliferating. They are the challenge right now.
Senator Reed. That is what you are hearing from your
combatant commanders?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir. That is what they are asking
for.
Senator Reed. More PAC-3s.
General Cartwright. Get us something like THAAD, that has
this large area, because as you move to chemical munitions and
things like that the ability to keep them away from the forces
is critical to the commanders.
Senator Reed. As we increase both the technology and the
number of our missile defense capabilities, other countries
will take notice of this. There is one area in particular, the
Chinese, who are beginning to make improvements in their
missiles. Do you believe that this will produce a reaction on
the part of the Chinese? Will they feel that they have to
increase their strategic capacities to negate our missile
defense system? Not only our missile defense system, we are
talking to the Japanese, we are talking to many others, where
if it was sold in our own control they might be more sanguine.
General Cartwright. There is generally an axiom, at least
for the military, that you can only go so far on a defensive
capability and you hit diminishing returns very quickly. You
have to have it balanced with an offensive capability to be
credible. The capability that we are fielding does not hold at
risk a large nation state on the defensive side.
There has been a substantial dialogue with the Russians
about the European site. But 10 interceptors do not really
change the calculus on the number of offensive weapons that a
country like Russia has. But it is something that has to be
discussed and to just sit silently is inappropriate for them.
So we have to have this discussion, as we did in the Cold War:
What makes you the most uncomfortable? Is it the time to react?
Is it the proximity? We need to understand these issues and
then adjust in a way that retains the credibility, but also
allows them to understand what we are doing.
Senator Reed. Let me ask a final question. You say in your
prepared remarks we need a credible missile defense capability,
and at what used to be called the theater missile defense area
we certainly have made progress there in terms of the systems
we have talked about. The national missile defense system is
still not yet operational, I think. Is that fair?
General Cartwright. We took it operational for the 4th of
July when we had the Korean missile launches. The reason that
we are not operational today in principle is that the command
and control suite is one that is either configured for test or
configured for operations, and we have elected until we have
one that can do both, to bias that to test and development.
Senator Reed. But at this point, it is not an operational
system? It is still a testing system?
General Cartwright. From that standpoint, yes. It has a
certain number of hours to recall it.
Senator Reed. The point I think is that it will become
credible when it is fully operational; is that axiomatic?
General Cartwright. Sir, I actually believe that it has
become credible already, but it certainly will add to it when
it is operational and people see that it does in fact stand the
test of time.
Senator Reed. Now, we went operational at the point at
which the North Koreans--remind me, what did they do to make us
go operational?
General Cartwright. This was a launch. It occurred on the
4th of July. We started to prepare for it much earlier than
that. It was the Taepodong 2 along with some short- and medium-
range missiles that they launched at the same time. So we had
the system configured in an operational way based on an
inadequate understanding of North Korea's intent and ambiguity
in their actions.
With the Russians and the Chinese, we generally exchange
information about what we are going to do, we close down air
space. So we know what is going on, and then if something
deviates you can react. We did not have that kind of dialogue
with the North Koreans. It left a lot of ambiguity in the
discussion.
Senator Reed. But we had enough intelligence that they were
preparing for a test missile launch that the determination was
to ``make this operational''?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. But we are in a very strange world, where
post-operational systems, once they are made operational, stay
operational because you have done all the testing or most of
the testing, or what you are going to do is little add-ons.
Here we still have some significant systems to test, radars to
deploy, to fully implement the systems.
General Cartwright. As I testified last year, we have a
thin line capability. In other words, we have a command and
control, a weapon, and a sensor layer. What we are trying to do
now is build redundancy into that system along with scale for
both an east and a west capability. That is what we are focused
on right now.
At the same time, as you alluded to, the adversary is not
sitting still. So there will always be an ongoing activity of,
do I need to improve this? Is it justified to go in and spend
the money to improve it because the adversary did something
new.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Bill Nelson. Jeff.
Senator Sessions. General Cartwright, I remember recently
we had a hearing and Senator Thune asked Admiral Keating, who
would be the user or deployer, I guess, user of the national
missile defense, do you have confidence in our missile system
today, our defense system? He replied: ``I do have confidence
in the system, Senator. We were prepared to deploy that
system.'' That was on the Korean July 4 launch.
He also noted about the September 1 successful test of last
year after that, ``further reinforced my confidence in the
system and I appear before you today as confident as I know how
to be in the employability and efficacy of that system.''
Do you share that view and do you believe that we have a
system in place now that has really altered in some significant
way our strategic capabilities?
General Cartwright. I do. I have equal enthusiasm to this
as Admiral Keating demonstrated. It has affected our
adversaries. The dialogue has been in the open press, but also
in the performance and the actions of our allies in
contributing to and starting to develop indigenous capabilities
and trying to find ways to integrate with our capability.
There has to be some way to start to devalue particularly
these short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. They are
proliferating too quickly and they are removing the opportunity
to have a debate because they act so quickly. There is no
warning. You have to find some way to devalue this, and missile
defense at least makes your adversary think twice before they
would use those types of weapons.
Senator Sessions. I think it is important both for our
actual physical defense and to devalue a perceived advantage an
adversary may have with a small number of missiles that might
reach the United States. I think they could consider that they
have a very substantial leverage, threat capability, and
intimidation capability against the United States. That could
lead them to be overconfident in what they do, to take actions
that are reckless and could lead us into a situation of great
peril, whereas if they have to know that there is a very
realistic chance if they launch an attack it would be defeated
and knocked down by a missile defense system, that they would
be then further subject to very great attack in return, they
can add the situation up.
So I think that is good.
I am very interested in and believe it is quite significant
what is being discussed about a European site. Would you share
with us your thoughts about that, what strategic benefit if we
create a GMD site in Europe with, say, 10 interceptors?
General Cartwright. The activity associated with Europe
when you look at it in comparison to the Pacific activity, we
prioritized the Pacific first and we built our capability in
the Pacific. History will only tell what effect it really has
had in the theater and how much of it was negotiation versus
posture versus a credible defense, credible offense, but what
is occurring in North Korea is not something that any of us
would have predicted. What has occurred amongst our allies in
using missile defense as a credible way to deter combat rather
than encourage it has been significant.
Senator Sessions. You are talking about our Pacific allies?
General Cartwright. The Pacific. So the question is can you
take those attributes and move them to Southwest Asia, Europe,
and is there a need for that? I would say that, particularly as
you look at Iran, who is fielding and testing and flying short-
and medium-range ballistic missiles with a desire to move on to
the ICBMs and space, et cetera, and couple that with their
ambitions for nuclear capabilities, that we have a significant
threat emerging there. Iran is certainly already a threat to
their neighbors, and on a path by their own admission to be
able to reach intercontinental ranges.
Do we wait until a threat emerges to put this capability in
place or do we go now and see if we can start to influence it
before it happens? To me this is significant. We ought to be
trying to inhibit this activity sooner rather than later.
Missile defense is but one venue by which we ought to be trying
to do that, and certainly the Nation is approaching this
through all of the elements of national power. But we have to
bring this into check and get this into a balance that is more
appropriate than the current path that we are on, which
threatens neighbors and eventually brings WMD into the
equation.
Senator Sessions. The North Koreans attempted to send us a
message on July 4. I have expressed before I hope the Iranians
do not attempt to do that in Europe on Bastille Day or some
such day, but it certainly got our attention as a people, the
American people. I also believe that the same principles will
apply in Europe as you suggested are applying in the Pacific.
I have one other specific question, but you can go.
Senator Bill Nelson. Just on this very subject, NATO has
not decided that it wants missile defense of its population and
territory, has it?
General Cartwright. As a body it has not.
Senator Bill Nelson. Which would be prerequisite for us
locating such missiles in Europe?
General Cartwright. In NATO, in a NATO environment, that is
incorrect.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is that correct?
General Cartwright. That is incorrect per OSD Policy, NATO
permission is not required in order to proceed with missile
defense in Europe.
Senator Bill Nelson. Tell me, does a national missile
defense system, does it have to be operationally effective to
be credible?
General Cartwright. The balance here is interesting. If you
are on a path that is credible, and we are a relatively open
society, so people watch tests, they watch and openly debate
whether things work or did not work, but as you gain momentum
and credibility in your test program, you may well start to
influence deterrence before you are operational. That has, to
some extent, occurred with missile defense.
There is more than one side to this equation. We had an
adversary in this case who is positioned in the area where we
were developing missile defense. They, around July 4, decided
to fire off some missiles. We had capability, that was
discussed very openly. The dialogue went back and forth. All of
that has lended to credibility in deterrence ahead of the
actual operational capabilities we intend to field, but
certainly recognizes where they are going and that there is
credibility in the vector that missile defense is on.
Does that help you?
Senator Bill Nelson. That is a fair statement. Now, in
order to be operationally effective, what point in our testing
do we have to reach before we know it is operationally
effective?
General Cartwright. I will let program managers speak to
their side of the equation. From an operational commander's
perspective, I want to know that we have a dedicated command
and control system that is always available, along with a
sensor and weapon grid that is available and does not have to
be taken off line for large periods of time in order to do R&D.
We believe we will reach that somewhere towards the end of this
year.
Senator Bill Nelson. We are going to get into detail on
this with General Obering, but from what you have observed do
you have the confidence in the system through the testing that
has occurred thus far?
General Cartwright. Both for the short- and medium-range
forward-deployed capabilities, the SM-3, the Patriot, and as
the THAAD starts to emerge, and very definitely with the
ground-based interceptor system that defends against the long-
range intercontinental, I, like Admiral Keating, believe that
the test profile is on a positive vector, that we are very
comfortable operationalizing that capability when we have the
redundant command and control and sensor grids, which we should
have this year.
Senator Bill Nelson. But looking not at the layers--we have
lots of layers that work. Looking at the rockets in the ground
in Alaska, you as a combatant commander, do you think when they
fire at an incoming ICBM if one were launched from Russia today
that we would hit it?
General Cartwright. One, it is focused on the rogue nation,
so it is focused on a less sophisticated threat than Russia or
China.
Senator Bill Nelson. You are talking about North Korea.
General Cartwright. Right.
Senator Bill Nelson. If it were North Korea, we could hit
it down with those other layers.
General Cartwright. Not necessarily. It depends on the type
of missile that we are going after here. With TD-2 and an ICBM,
you are not going to have those capabilities with the shorter-
range missiles. You are going to have to have the ground-based
interceptor. The missiles that are in the silos in Alaska and
California are going to have to be the ones that go after that
type of missile.
Senator Bill Nelson. You think in a less sophisticated
system like North Korea that we could knock it down?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you think we could knock down a
Russian ICBM?
General Cartwright. I believe there would be a lower
probability of engagement success against a sophisticated
threat.
Senator Bill Nelson. We just want to get your perspective
as a combatant commander. We are going to grill General Obering
about this, because what we have not gotten up to this point is
accurate information about the testing regime of this whole
thing. We want it to be successful, but we want to know that it
is successful, not with some just hope that it is successful.
General Cartwright. Hope is not a good strategy. It does
not lead to a credible defense or deterrent capability. I agree
with you, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. I have never understood how you could
deploy something that had not been completely tested.
General Cartwright. We have done that many times to stay on
the cutting edge of technology against an adversary. A
different case would be the Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS).
Senator Bill Nelson. JSTARS, that is one thing, to get up
in a platform, in a Boeing 707, looking down at a battlefield,
which we did very successfully in the first Gulf War. It is
another thing to hit an incoming warhead in outer space in a
testing program.
General Cartwright. It is incredible what they have been
able to do, but between myself and Admiral Keating when he was
North Command (NORTHCOM) and is now Pacific Command (PACOM),
and Admiral Fallon at the time, working with this program,
working with the people that work it, we believe that it can
work.
Senator Bill Nelson. The Chinese have shown us that they
can hit a less challenging target now that they have done an
ASAT. Tell us what you think about that?
General Cartwright. The ASAT test by the Chinese, one, was
not a surprise. This was their third attempt. What was, for us,
impressive was that in three attempts they made significant
changes each time and were able to come to a successful
intercept on their third attempt. It was impressive science and
the engineering that went into that activity to get them to
that level of capability.
Having said that, direct ascent ASATs in and of themselves
are a relatively expensive and inefficient way to address a
space threat. We came to that conclusion. The Russians came to
that conclusion a while back. I personally believe that the
Chinese will come to the same conclusion. But they have
undertaken a very disciplined and comprehensive continuum of
capability against space, our space capabilities, all the way
from temporary and reversible effects, examples would be GPS
jamming, things like that, communications jamming all the way
through direct ascent ASAT. Eventually they will probably be
looking at co-orbital, and then the one that you really worry
about is introducing WMD into space on a missile.
But they have demonstrated the capability across the
continuum. On the lower end of the spectrum, they have not only
demonstrated it; they have fielded it into their forces. To me
that demonstrates, one, that they have a very comprehensive
look at what they want to be able to do as a nation in their
region. Does that require from our standpoint that we do in
kind the same type of activity? In other words, do we need to
now think about weapons in space and ASAT type capabilities, et
cetera? We have the technical capability. My belief right now
is, knowing what we believe we know about this threat after the
demonstration, that it is premature to start thinking about an
arms race in space. There are, as you said earlier, many other
ways to address a threat. We do not have to have a space
response to that threat.
Now, having said that, I do believe it is prudent to
improve our posture and situation awareness in space. Who is
doing what, why are they doing it, where are they, attribution,
a disciplined way to know when there is an anomaly going on in
space, and be able to then challenge as to why it is an
anomaly, and what is the intent behind the owner of that
particular craft?
Those are things that we have to spend some time on. We
have been and I believe we are on a good path in that area.
Number two is what do we need to do about the assets that
we have on orbit that are associated with national security?
What kind of defensive postures do we want to have for them,
mostly associated with being able to recognize when they are
being threatened, be able to take rudimentary passive type
defenses--close shutters, open gates, turn off, whatever is
appropriate. You are not going to move a very large satellite
which, sir, is the size of a bus out there. That is not going
to outrun a Jaguar that is coming on a direct ascent ASAT. But
it can tell what is happening, particularly in the lower end of
the spectrum in jamming and RF type activities, and in
proximity, when something is near it that we did not intend to
be near. It can alert us. It can start to give us an
understanding of what is going on.
Our first activity ought to be, gee, is this something we
planned to have happen, is this something normal in the course,
can we explain this? If not, can we react inside of the
decision cycle of our adversary to safe that satellite and
engage in something other than forceful response to try to stop
anything that would harm that asset?
I want to get to a point where we know what is going on out
there and we have more choices than just the kinetic option.
Senator Bill Nelson. The initial reports are that they will
have the capability with enough production of these ASATs by
2010 to basically knock out most of our satellites in low earth
orbit. So you, as a combatant commander, look at alternative
programs. We understand that. But what are you advising us that
you need in order that we would not go blind from low earth
satellites?
General Cartwright. Prompt global strike.
Senator Bill Nelson. What else?
General Cartwright. I need the ability to change our sensor
capabilities, from one of cataloguing to one that is proactive.
It does not require new sensors. It just requires thinking
about how you use them differently so that you are predictive
in nature and can understand threats that are emerging rather
than reacting.
Senator Bill Nelson. The prompt global strike would give
you the strike in order to do what? What, knock out the launch
vehicle that they are going to launch the ASAT on?
General Cartwright. There are any number of nodes in the
system in order for them to be able to knock out satellites.
There are sensor nodes, there are command and control nodes,
there are certainly the launch nodes. Then there is the flight
en route. Any of those nodes should be available and we ought
to explore alternatives to stop a conscious strike that would
take out all of our low earth orbit satellites, and we ought to
apply all venues of our national power to intervene on all of
those nodes rather than setting yourself up for just one silver
bullet, so to speak.
Senator Bill Nelson. Jeff.
Senator Sessions. General Cartwright, just briefly on this
I would like you to comment on the fact that the
Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) has
been pushed back another year. We plan three AEH satellites and
then we need the fourth satellite, which was going to be the
TSAT. Do you believe, since there has been a delay in the TSAT,
that we should proceed with an Advanced Extremely High
Frequency (AEHF) satellite to be the fourth one to complete the
coverage, or do we need to wait on the TSAT?
General Cartwright. AEHF provides the Nation with those
survivable communications that we need when we are stressed,
when we are under attack or when other communications have been
knocked out for whatever reason. As you can imagine, our
appetite for communications and command and control has grown
in this information age. So that constellation of satellites is
critical to us. We cannot afford a gap in that capability.
If the transition between what is believed to be the next
generation, which is based in laser communications in space,
which is this TSAT if that is going to be delayed, then we have
to fill that gap. Whether that is a fourth AEHF that is exactly
like three or whether it has some of the capabilities of TSAT
and some of the capabilities of what AEHF-3 had is something
that we ought to talk about, or whether we are not comfortable
with the technical risk and we just build a clone of AEHF-3.
The program managers have to convince me of the approach. But I
as a commander cannot stand a gap in that capability.
Senator Sessions. I am not exactly sure what the budget
request calls for, but we are going to need to answer that
question. For us it is the money now.
General Cartwright. For you it is the money. For me it is
the capability. I would be very uncomfortable with any kind of
gap in that satellite's capability.
Senator Bill Nelson. We have another panel that we are
going to have to move to. Senator Thune, do you want to ask of
General Cartwright or you want to ask in the next panel? We
have three votes that are coming at 11:45.
Senator Thune. I would prefer General Cartwright.
Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate, General Cartwright, your being here. Homeland
security obviously is our highest priority and so it is
important that we act in a timely and coordinated fashion to
deter and defeat threats.
In the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year
2007, it was stated that an organizational structure for
effective management, coordination, and budgeting for the
development and procurement of unmanned systems, including an
assessment of the feasibility and advisability of designing a
single department or other element of the DOD to act as
executive agent for the Department on unmanned systems.
At the hearing last week I asked Admiral Keating, who is
the Commander of NORTHCOM, whether he agreed that unmanned
systems should be established under a single department and he
answered in the affirmative. I would like to ask you that same
question. Do you think that establishing a single department to
act as executive agent for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
would enhance coordination, promote unity of effort, and reduce
the uncertainty and the overlap of responsibilities in the
event of a natural or manmade disaster?
General Cartwright. I am trying to distinguish here and
just make sure that I get the right question, but this is
talking agency to agency, DOD, Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)?
Senator Thune. Correct.
General Cartwright. Okay. Yes, I would agree with Admiral
Keating. It would help us in moving in a direction to be able
to provide the services to whatever agency needed them and to
be able to provide surge capability. The advantage of DOD,
quite frankly, is that we can plan surge, ability to have
platforms that are multifunctional and have multiple customers.
DOD could use it, DHS could use it, Justice could use it. That
capability then would allow the Nation to have depth. If each
agency bought them they would buy the best business case, there
would be no surge. You would buy exactly the number of hours
you desired for Border Patrol or whatever you would use it for.
Having a single agency provide that--STRATCOM opinion--
would allow you to have the attributes that you laid out: unity
of command and effort and all those other things.
Senator Thune. I also posed the following question to
Admiral Keating at last week's hearing and he answered the
question affirmative. On March 5 of this year the Air Force
Chief of Staff, General Moseley, sent a memo to each of the
Services as well as the commanders of the combatant commands,
which recommends that the Air Force be the executive agency of
report medium and high altitude UAVs. I guess the question I
would ask of you is, since the existing role of the Air Force
is to conduct joint interdependent warfare from the air and
through space and cyberspace, and since they have a proven
record of providing vital air space and cyberspace capabilities
for the Services, would the Air Force be the best choice to be
the executive agent for fielding and integrating and operating
UAVs?
General Cartwright. I know the people that wear this
uniform may not agree with me, but you are exactly right.
Senator Thune. I suspect you are probably right, too. I
appreciate the answer to that.
I know you are a little pressed for time here, Mr.
Chairman. But I wanted to ask as well: You said in your
prepared testimony that we lack the capability to respond
promptly to globally dispersed or fleeting threats without
resorting to nuclear weapons, but then go on to say that your
use of a nuclear weapons system in prompt response may be no
choice at all.
General, what challenges do you face in establishing a
conventional ballistic missile that can take out a globally
dispersed or a fleeting threat within minutes, and what other
alternatives could we explore that would allow us to have the
capability to respond promptly to globally dispersed or
fleeting threats without resorting to nuclear weapons?
General Cartwright. We have gone through the conventional
prompt global strike discussion earlier, but to cut to the
chase, there probably is not another capability that can reach
out and touch, say, whether we go back to the ASAT example or
we talk about terrorist camps or someone producing WMD. Our
first choice would be conventional forces that were near the
problem, and that should solve a large percentage of the
activity.
The next issues are those targets where we are not based in
theatre. A lot of our adversaries make sure that they do not
attack us where we are, so to speak. They go where we are not,
look for our seams, things like that. So how many of those
targets are there? Of what regret would they be if we allowed
them to just have 5 or 6 days free time, so to speak? Which
targets can we not reach no matter what we try to do
conventionally, deep strategic depth in large countries, places
and things like that, where you are not going to drive a bomber
or a tank into?
Those are the targets you have to focus on. Which of those
targets can we get with the prompt global strike capability
that we have today? That was the hedge of the Trident, to
increase the credibility of deterrence and keep people from
developing threats because we could hold them at risk, and
where do we want to be in the future? What did we learn out of
the debate last year? What would be the attributes of a prompt
global strike system that does not over fly a third party, is
much less ambiguous about what its capability is and where it
is going, those types of questions.
We believe that we can take those attributes that emerged
out of this debate over the past year and bring them into a new
system. The Air Force and the Navy are both proposing systems
along those lines.
Senator Thune. I appreciate that. I know that some of the
ground has been covered already and I have a question, Mr.
Chairman, that you may have already had him answer regarding
space systems, but I will submit that for the record in the
interest of time.
So thank you, General, for your service and continue to
fight the good fight. Thanks.
Senator Bill Nelson. Jeff.
Senator Sessions. Just briefly on Senator Thune's line of
questioning. I think you are not leading combat ground troops
in Iraq at this very moment and I think those uniformed
personnel may not agree with you. In Fallujah right after the
big battle there, the marines had a private contract with a
company to provide their UAV coverage. This was of course
several years ago.
I have for 4 or 5 years really been concerned that the
ground soldier is not getting sufficient resources and
attention. We have this magnificent Global Hawk and other
things that the Air Force has produced that are extremely
valuable. I have no doubt that it is. But it also is by far the
most expensive. So right now every day we have soldiers on the
ground that could benefit from higher resolution, more and
cheaper UAVs, and I am frustrated that they are not there.
So as we go through this thing, Senator Thune, we do not
want to be bureaucratic about who gets to be the lead and all
of that, but there is a very real concern of mine that if we
use this fabulous technology that we have we could produce a
better UAV to help our Army and our Marines, who are in very
difficult circumstances right now. That is just my two cents
worth.
General Cartwright. My comment referenced the Air Force
Executive Agency question for medium and high UAVs, not to take
away the tactical systems. The Services are going to be able to
field their tactical systems. This is for the high altitude
systems.
Senator Sessions. I am not sure how much they do not--the
same technologies. I have always been frustrated. We are
getting these stovepipes and situations in which we are not
having a common vision. So how we achieve that, I do not know.
I do agree that it is an important issue. We need to move
forward with it. The Air Force has gotten the lion's share of
the money and that is not going to change. But I do want to be
sure that the ground soldier at this point in our Nation's
history is getting a lot of attention and their needs are being
met.
General Cartwright. You will never find me advocating
against supporting the ground soldier or marine.
Senator Sessions. I know.
General Cartwright. By the same token, we have the paradigm
of trust, that the definition has been over the years I own it
and therefore I can trust it and that is the only way that I
can accomplish my mission. I am saying, similar to what the
Senator is saying, that we cannot afford that. We have to think
of better integrated systems that give the ground combatants
the capabilities and the information they need when they need
it, where they need it, rather than dedicating to each
individual transaction a dedicated resource. We just cannot
afford that any more.
Senator Sessions. My inexpert opinion is that we have not
had sufficient, aggressive, committed attention to providing
that resource to the ground soldier, and I would like to see us
do better, however we come out on the issue.
Senator Bill Nelson. We are going to have to move on. Just
one other question. We have an experimental satellite up there
called TACSAT-2 and the sensor has not been turned on. What is
going on?
General Cartwright. The sensors are both turned on. There
are two sensors on that package. They have had challenges. It
probably would be easier for me to take you to a closed session
to discuss it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let us do that.
General Cartwright. But it is a wonderful asset and both
sensors are in fact operating now. They have not operated as
quickly as we wanted them.
[The information referred to follows:]
The TACSAT-2 has two sensors and they were both turned on in
January of this year. Currently both the imager and the signals
intelligence payload are being calibrated and fine tuned. We expect the
imager fine tuning and the target indicator experiment (TIE-signals
intelligence payload) calibration to last into May, with both sensors
to be ready for use during a combatant command exercise in mid- to
late-June.
Senator Bill Nelson. We would like to know the answer to
that, so if you can get with us on that, I appreciate it.
Thank you, General Cartwright, and would the next panel
please come up. [Pause.]
Your full statements are, of course, included in the
record. As you can see how we are conducting this conversation,
we do not want you to read any testimony. We are just going to
have a conversation, and we are going to interrupt you with
questions as we go. We are going to have to be mindful that in
30 minutes three votes are called. So let us see how far we get
on this. Senator Sessions and I want to welcome all four of
you. So, Mr. D'Agostino, would you please start.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
appreciate the opportunity to come talk to you today about RRW
and our Complex 2030 vision. General Cartwright talked a lot
about the RRW and the attributes and features that it can
provide. There is an element that we probably should talk about
a little bit more and that is the impact on our nuclear weapons
complex, which needs to be brought out. I think it is very
important for you to understand that.
Our complex is a Cold War complex. It was largely put
together over the last 50 years. In many cases we have
buildings that we are still using that are over 50 years old,
using production and manufacturing techniques that we used 50
years ago. We know a lot more today than we did in the past
about our impact on the environment, how to make things better,
how to use materials and clean technologies that have less of
an impact on the workforce.
I believe we are really at a crossroads here. In addition
to the transformational aspects of the warhead itself, which I
would be very happy to answer questions about, there is an
element that does not get talked a lot about, and that is what
I would say the hidden legacy costs of doing things the way we
used to do them. There is, to my understanding, a fairly
significant sized budget in the Department of Labor to pay for
and take care of our energy employees that have become sick as
a result of work that they have done over the last 50 years. I
think that budget is about $1.4 billion. We do not talk a lot
about that, but it is important when we consider that when we
look at the nuclear weapons stockpile of the future.
My intent is not to replicate the past with respect to how
we have done things. I want a much smaller nuclear weapons
complex. I want a complex that recognizes and takes account for
and designs in less of an impact on the environment. I want a
complex that has a reduced impact on our workforce and
increases workforce safety. I want, of course, all the
attributes that General Cartwright talked about, and there are
some classified details of that and I would welcome the
opportunity to come brief the committee on those as well.
I think when we factor all of those things in, and
particularly the impact on our workers, that we will recognize
that we are really at a crossroads here because the Nation, in
order to maintain a deterrent--it is not only about maintaining
warheads--it is about maintaining the people, the buildings,
the tools, the techniques, to be able to respond and provide
future governments the opportunity to move as the Nation needs.
I do not know what is going to happen 20 years from now,
but I do know I want to preserve the flexibility of Congress
and those future Presidents to be able to respond.
So as we go from 70 million square feet, where we were at
the end of the Cold War, to the reduction to 35 million square
feet in our complex, and I think we can actually reduce it down
to about 24 to 25 million square feet with RRW. I think that
drives us in the right direction--smaller, more efficient,
cleaner, less of an impact on our workforce, and reduce those
hidden legacy costs that our taxpayers are paying for right now
and that we do not spend much time talking about.
Without reading my oral statement, I think that is one of
the points I am passionate about and that I would like to move
forward with.
[The prepared statement of Mr. D'Agostino follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss nuclear weapons policies and programs. My remarks
today focus on the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program and our
planning for the future nuclear weapons complex infrastructure--we call
it Complex 2030. This is my first appearance before this committee as
the acting Department of Energy (DOE) Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security and Acting Administrator for the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) and I want to thank all of the Members for their
strong support for critical national security activities.
My testimony today will focus on the broad strategic context for
our nuclear weapons program and, more specifically, describe how the
experiences gained and lessons learned over the past 15 years have
shaped where we are today and where we are heading in our efforts to
``transform'' the nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting
infrastructure. I will do this by addressing the following questions:
What is the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold
War era?
What was our original strategy for sustaining the
stockpile and supporting infrastructure?
Why do we need to adjust that strategy and why now?
Where do we want to be in 2030?
How is our RRW strategy consistent with
nonproliferation and arms control?
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA?
The policies guiding our nuclear weapons programs, and our
strategic capabilities more generally, evolve from the 2001 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR), the follow-on Strategic Capabilities Assessment
(which led to the dramatic reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile
approved by the President and announced in May 2004), the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review, and the efforts of the Nuclear Weapons
Council leading up to the RRW design selection announcement earlier
this month.
The totality of this work has resulted in a number of conceptual
breakthroughs in our thinking about nuclear forces--breakthroughs that
have enabled concrete first steps in the transformation of our nuclear
forces and capabilities. The recognition of a more dynamic and
uncertain geopolitical threat environment but one in which Russia does
not pose an immediate threat, the broad reassessment of the defense
policy goals that we want nuclear forces to serve, and the evolution
from a threat-based to a capabilities-based strategic force posture
have enabled dramatic reductions in the nuclear force as well as
reductions in operationally-deployed strategic warheads that were
codified in the Moscow Treaty. This has also led to the deep reduction
in the total nuclear warhead stockpile required to support
operationally-deployed forces.
In response to the new and changing global environment, the United
States has appropriately reduced its reliance on nuclear forces.
Precision conventional strike and missile defenses are playing a
relatively larger role in our overall security strategy and help
strengthen deterrence by providing the President with a broader range
of response options that can convince adversaries that any aggressive
plans would not succeed. But nuclear weapons are still an important
component of our security. Moreover, as we continue to draw down
nuclear forces, we intend to rely more on a nuclear weapons research
and development (R&D) and manufacturing infrastructure that can respond
in a timely manner and decisively to any new threats that do emerge.
The concept that in an uncertain threat environment we can achieve
defense policy goals by relying less on ``inventory'' and more on
``capability to produce'' was a profound outcome of the NPR.
What then is the role of nuclear weapons? Why, after the Cold War,
are we retaining any nuclear weapons at all? Why are we retaining the
number we plan to retain? All are fair questions. The last one is, of
course, a work in progress--the President has said that he seeks the
lowest number of weapons consistent with our Nation's security and has
moved aggressively to that end since taking office. He has authorized a
reduction in the stockpile by nearly a factor of two since assuming
office. (Details about this reduction, and the rationale for the size
and composition of the remaining stockpile were provided in the
classified May 2004 Report to Congress on the Revised Nuclear Warhead
Stockpile Plan.) As a result of this and earlier reductions, the
stockpile today is one-quarter its size at the end of the Cold War.
Several nations currently possess nuclear, chemical, and/or
biological weapons, and the means to deliver these weapons, and have
given no indication they are willing to give them up. But the rationale
for our own nuclear forces is broader. Quite simply, U.S. nuclear
weapons:
Deter nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) threats against the U.S., its forces, and its allies.
This implies an ability to hold at risk those elements of power
that a potential adversary values. While we should not expect
that our nuclear weapons will deter terrorist WMD threats, they
can deter transfer of nuclear weapons and other WMD from rogue
states to terrorist groups.
Deter large-scale wars of aggression against the U.S.
or its allies.
Dissuade potential adversaries from trying to match or
exceed our nuclear capabilities or from engaging in strategic
competition. This requires that we maintain a combination of
forces and infrastructure so that a future competitor seeking
to gain some nuclear advantage would conclude that its buildup
could not occur more quickly than the U.S. could respond.
Assure allies of our continuing commitment to them and
of our ability to make good on that commitment--the implication
is that nuclear forces must be effective and reliable. This
strengthens our ties with allies and also serves our
nonproliferation objectives because those allies with the
capability to develop nuclear weapons can continue to forego
doing so, safe in the knowledge of the reliability of the U.S.
nuclear umbrella.
More broadly, nuclear forces are the Nation's ``insurance policy''
for an uncertain future and remain a key element of U.S. national
security strategy. As a result, NNSA must continue to assure the safety
and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and, consistent with the
President's direction to continue a nuclear test moratorium, do so
without nuclear testing.
WHAT WAS OUR ORIGINAL STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINING THE STOCKPILE AND
SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE?
What post-Cold War, post-nuclear testing strategy did we decide
would best sustain the stockpile and supporting infrastructure? In the
years following the end of the Cold War, budgets for nuclear weapons
programs were in ``free fall''--funding was simply not available to
sustain both R&D and production capabilities. A strategic decision was
made to sustain and strengthen weapons program scientific and technical
activities in order to ensure a future capability to certify the
stockpile. While this was a reasonable decision given the limited
resources at that time, in effect we mortgaged the present to ensure
the future.
That future was seen as science-based stockpile stewardship and
life extension of our Cold War legacy warheads.
When the U.S. stopped nuclear testing in 1992, it sought to replace
this critical tool with a Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) that
emphasized science and technology coupled with a vigorous experimental
program as a means to understand better the physics and chemistry of
nuclear weapons and their operation, and provided enhanced warhead
surveillance tools so that we would have a much better chance of
detecting the onset of problems in the stockpile.
The goal of the SSP has been to predict the effects of aging in our
warheads so that we could replace aging components before they degraded
overall system reliability. The end of the Cold War provided this
opportunity--our focus was no longer on a continuous cycle of fielding
new warheads to provide new military capabilities, but on sustaining
existing nuclear capabilities.
We call this ``life extension''--the process of observing the aging
of individual components of warheads and replacing them before they
fail. Consider this challenge. Your 1965 Ford Mustang, which you
maintain as a collector's item, has been sitting in your garage for 40
years. You monitor it for such items as a clogged carburetor, corrosion
in the engine block, battery discharge, etc. and you replace parts when
you deem it necessary. But you don't get to start the engine and take
it for a test drive. The trick is to assure that if you do need it
right away that it would work with certainty. That's what we have to do
in a nuclear weapons life extension program (LEP).
By the mid-1990s we had embarked on a program to acquire the new
tools of stockpile stewardship--advanced computing, high energy density
physics capabilities, modern diagnostics facilities, enhanced
surveillance, etc.--that would provide the best available alternative
to nuclear tests to assure continued confidence in stockpile safety and
reliability. Since then, we have made good progress in acquiring and
employing these new capabilities.
In 2001 when this administration took office, it thus inherited:
A strong science base and surveillance program.
A safe and reliable, but aging stockpile, with serious
questions about the future.
A plan for warhead life extension (but no new
development programs underway).
But, it also inherited a deteriorating or nonfunctioning
manufacturing complex characterized by:
Protracted underfunding
Idled production capabilities
Inability to produce plutonium parts
Inability to produce/extract tritium
Key facilities not being maintained
Overly risk averse culture
Aging workforce
To be fair, some declining production capabilities were not needed
at that time to support the stockpile. We were able, after several
years delay, to rebuild components for the W87 LEP which commenced in
the 1990s and completed in 2004. While we couldn't produce tritium, we
didn't need to then because the large reductions in the stockpile at
the end of the Cold War ensured adequate tritium reserves for an
extended period for remaining warheads. Nonetheless, by not maintaining
some key production capabilities, we ran additional risks in terms of
not being responsive to unanticipated events.
Despite problems with the production infrastructure, follow-on
efforts to the 2001 NPR led to a substantial reduction in the size of
the nuclear stockpile. But, because we couldn't produce warheads when
and if they were needed--to hedge technical problems in the stockpile
or adverse geopolitical changes--we still had to maintain a larger
stockpile than desired.
As a result, and in response to the NPR's call for a more
responsive defense R&D and manufacturing infrastructure, we began to
restore a balance in the overall program by:
Continuing to fund R&D and aggressive stockpile
surveillance,
Implementing comprehensive stockpile life extension
programs, and
Restoring lost production capabilities and modernizing
others as required.
The NPR was instrumental in our receiving additional resources to
restore this balance. Indeed, over the past few years we have made
substantial progress including initial steps to achieve the Complex
2030 vision for modernizing the nuclear weapons infrastructure.
Specifically, we
Restored tritium production and extraction from
irradiated assemblies in TVA reactors,
Restored key uranium operations at Y-12 in time to
meet demanding LEP schedules,
Recruited/retained strong workforce with the right
skills for the mission,
Are recapitalizing facilities suffering from years of
deferred maintenance,
Are implementing plans to ramp up to an interim
plutonium pit production capacity of 30-50 pits per year at Los
Alamos by 2012,
Are reducing the number of sites with Category I/II
special nuclear materials (SNM) and consolidating such material
within the remaining sites,
Are dramatically accelerating dismantlement of retired
warheads, and
Are streamlining and improving business practices
including managing risk more effectively (e.g., recent success
in increasing throughput at our Pantex facility).
But we have a ways to go including defining the right path to
restore our ability to produce plutonium components in sufficient
quantity to support the long-term needs of the stockpile.
WHY DO WE NEED TO ADJUST THAT STRATEGY AND WHY NOW?
In 2003 we ``took stock'' of 10 years of the SSP and came to some
important conclusions. Let me first reemphasize that the SSP is
working--today's stockpile remains safe and reliable and does not
require nuclear testing. This assessment is based on a foundation of
past nuclear tests augmented by cutting edge scientific and engineering
experiments and analysis including improved warhead surveillance. Most
importantly, it derives from the professional (and independent)
judgment of our lab directors advised by their weapons' program staffs.
As we continue to draw down the stockpile, however, we have become
concerned that our current path--successive refurbishments of existing
warheads developed during the Cold War and to stringent Cold War
specifications--may pose an unacceptable risk to maintaining high
confidence in system performance over the long-term.
Specifically, the directors of our national laboratories raised
concerns about their ability to assure the reliability of the legacy
stockpile over the very long-term absent nuclear testing.
The evolution away from designs certified with underground nuclear
tests, resulting from inevitable accumulations of small changes over
the extended lives of these highly-optimized systems, is what gives
rise to the concerns.
While we are confident that the stockpile stewardship program is
working and that today's stockpile is safe and reliable, it is only
prudent to explore alternative means to manage risk in seeking to
ensure stockpile reliability over the long-term.
This is, in part, the impetus for our work on RRW: to ensure
sustainment of the military capabilities provided by the existing
stockpile, not develop warheads for new or different military missions.
A second major driver was the realization after September 11 that
the security threat to our nuclear warheads had fundamentally changed.
The security features in today's stockpile are commensurate with
technologies that were available during the Cold War and with the
threats from that time. Major enhancements in security are not easily
available via retrofits in the legacy stockpile.
Specifically, the RRW program is examining the feasibility of
providing replacement warheads for the legacy stockpile. Relaxing Cold
War design constraints that sought maximum yield in a minimum size/
weight package will allow design of replacements that are easier and
less costly to manufacture, are safer and more secure, eliminate
environmentally dangerous materials, and increase design performance
margins, thus ensuring long-term confidence in reliability.
RRW, therefore, also offers a means to transform to a much more
efficient and responsive, much smaller, and, we believe, less costly
nuclear weapons R&D and production infrastructure.
In 2005, an RRW design competition was initiated involving two
independent teams from our nuclear weapons design labs--Lawrence
Livermore and Los Alamos, both working with Sandia. A competition of
this sort has not taken place in more than two decades, and the process
has provided a unique opportunity to train the next generation of
nuclear weapons designers and engineers.
Last November, the joint DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Council concluded
that RRW was a feasible strategy to sustain the nuclear stockpile over
the long term.
In March 2007, the NNSA and DOD jointly announced the results of
the design competition. The Lawrence Livermore/Sandia design was
selected, and an integrated design team led by those two labs will head
up joint efforts to develop a replacement warhead for a portion of the
Nation's sea-based nuclear deterrent. I want to emphasize that this
announcement addressed selection of a baseline design for RRW in order
to develop a detailed cost, scope and schedule; it was not a decision
to begin engineering development of a warhead.
The need to start RRW now is driven by two basic reasons. First,
the introduction of the RRW system provides the benefit of additional
diversity in the Nation's sea-based nuclear force. RRW will replace a
portion of W76 warheads deployed on the Trident SLBM system. That
particular warhead comprises a very high percentage of our planned
future strategic nuclear deterrent force under the Moscow Treaty and an
even larger fraction of the force available on a day-to-day basis.
Although we have not uncovered any problems with the W76, it is prudent
to hedge against a catastrophic failure of that system by introducing a
genetically-diverse warhead design into the SLBM force. Our ability
over the next 15 years to produce new plutonium parts for the RRW is
very limited--the sooner we start the sooner we can achieve this
diversity.
Second, the RRW effort has provided a critical opportunity to
ensure the transfer of nuclear design skills from the generation that
honed these skills with nuclear testing to the generation that will
replace them. In 5 years, nearly all of that older generation will be
retired or dead. Without this opportunity coming at this time (and not
5 years hence), we would not be able to sustain and transfer the key
knowledge and skills necessary to maintain the nuclear stockpile.
Finally, our decision to embark on the path to an RRW does not
result from a failure of the stockpile stewardship program, as some
have suggested, but is a reflection of its success. The SSP has
revealed the need to pursue this approach. Moreover, aggressive pursuit
of the new scientific tools currently in use and being developed under
the SSP is essential, not only to sustain existing warheads for as long
as they are needed, but to our efforts to design, develop and produce
replacement warheads that are safer, more secure, more reliable, and
cost-effective over the long-term without the need for nuclear testing.
WHERE DO WE WANT TO BE IN 2030?
We seek a Complex 2030 infrastructure that can respond on needed
timescales to technical problems in the stockpile or emerging
geopolitical threats. Such an infrastructure will provide, sustained
long-term confidence in stockpile reliability, enhanced stockpile
safety and security, a smaller stockpile with reduced likelihood of
requiring future underground nuclear tests, excellence in weapons-
related science and R&D, a modernized, fully capable, warhead
manufacturing facilities with a production capacity of about 100
warheads per year (not the 2,000 warheads per year capacity we had
during the Cold War), and periodic exercise of key nuclear design
capabilities that have lain dormant for two decades.
With such an infrastructure we believe that we can achieve reduced
DOE and DOD ownership costs for nuclear forces over the long term. A
smaller stockpile means a lower overall cost to certify, remanufacture,
refurbish, and dismantle warheads. A complex in which we consolidate
nuclear materials in fewer locations will help contain ever-increasing
resources devoted, post-September 11, to physical security. Finally, we
will continue to reduce costs by more efficient business practices,
including better management of the safety and security risks inherent
to our work.
HOW IS OUR RRW STRATEGY CONSISTENT WITH NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS
CONTROL?
The RRW strategy itself has positive implications for
nonproliferation.
These warheads, by design, will not provide a new role for nuclear
weapons or new military capabilities but will help sustain the military
capabilities of the existing nuclear arsenal.
Because these warheads would be designed with more favorable
performance margins, and be less sensitive to incremental aging
effects, they would reduce the possibility that the United States would
ever be faced with a need to conduct a nuclear test to diagnose or
remedy a stockpile reliability problem. This supports overall U.S.
efforts to dissuade other nations from conducting nuclear tests.
In fielding RRWs, we will not be increasing the size of the
stockpile. These warheads will replace existing warheads on at most a
one-for-one basis.
Once a transformed production complex demonstrates that it can
produce replacement warheads on a timescale in which geopolitical
threats could emerge or respond in a timely way to technical problems
in the stockpile, then we can go much further in eliminating spare
warheads--further reducing the nuclear stockpile and, along with a host
of other activities, demonstrating our commitment to Article VI of the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
Our near-term strategy also includes an increased rate for
dismantling warheads that are retired from the stockpile. Warhead
dismantlements ensure that stockpile and infrastructure transformation
is not misperceived by other nations as ``restarting the arms race.''
A safe, secure and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent, credibly
extended to allies, supports U.S. nonproliferation policy because
allies that are confident in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence
guarantees will not be motivated to develop and field their own nuclear
forces. This nonproliferation role of U.S. nuclear weapons is often
underestimated.
Finally, we should not forget that the human capital and technical
expertise built up over decades to support nuclear weapons programs are
the same resources that support nonproliferation, arms control and
threat reduction efforts. The linkages and synergies among these
programs enhance overall security.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by summarizing my basic message:
To meet its own security needs and those of its
allies, the United States will need a safe, secure, and
reliable nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. We will
achieve this with the smallest nuclear stockpile consistent
with our Nation's security.
We see increased risk, absent nuclear testing, in
assuring the long-term reliability of today's stockpile--i.e.,
the legacy warheads left over from the Cold War--that undergo a
continuous process of aging, and refurbishment of aging
components, and consequently accumulate small changes away from
the original tested and certified designs.
Today's nuclear weapons complex is not sufficiently
``responsive'' to technical problems in the stockpile or to
possible adverse geopolitical change.
Our task is to work to ensure that the U.S. nuclear
weapons enterprise, including the stockpile and supporting
infrastructure, meets long-term national security needs.
Our approach is to develop and field replacement
warheads for the legacy stockpile as a means to transform both
the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure.
These warheads will have enhanced safety and security
features.
We intend to accomplish all of this in a manner fully
consistent with our obligations under the NPT and without
requiring underground nuclear tests.
I am confident that NNSA is headed in the right direction in the
coming fiscal year. The budget request will support continuing our
progress in protecting and certifying our Nation's strategic deterrent,
transforming our nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure, reducing
the global danger from proliferation and WMD, and enhancing the force
projection capabilities of the U.S. nuclear Navy. It will enable us to
continue to maintain the safety and security of our people,
information, materials, and infrastructure. Taken together, each aspect
of this budget request will allow us to meet our national security
responsibilities during the upcoming fiscal year and well into the
future.
Our fiscal year 2008 budget request for weapons activities follows
along with a statistical appendix that contains the budget figures
supporting our request. I look forward to answering any questions on
the justification for the requested budget.
Senator Bill Nelson. General?
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROGER BURG, USAF, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC
SECURITY IN THE AIR, SPACE, AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS,
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
General Burg. Thank you, Senator. It is a pleasure to be
here representing the Air Force.
You can see in our budget submission this year that there
is a lot of attention paid to strategic forces. There is
modernization efforts in the bomber force, in the ICBM force,
with reductions being taken in both at the same time. You will
see a significant amount of money applied to programs that
might lead to a conventional strike capability to support
General Cartwright's capability gap for prompt global strike.
You will see some very significant reductions in the overall
nuclear force, this year principally in the cruise missile area
of our nuclear force.
I will open with that and I am happy to answer any
questions or discuss any aspects of that with the committee.
[The prepared statement of General Burg follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. Roger Burg, USAF
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our
Strategic Nuclear posture.
Your Air Force is fully engaged around the world fighting terrorism
and insurgents in the global war on terror and fulfilling our roles as
airmen for the joint team. Simultaneously, we stand prepared for rapid
response to conflict around the globe as our Nation's Strategic
Reserve. Air forces succeed when they anticipate and are allowed to
shape the future strategic environment and develop the capabilities for
the next fight. Air forces succeed when they remain focused on their
primary mission as an independent force that is part of an
interdependent joint team. We fly, fight, and dominate in three
warfighting domains--air, space, and cyberspace--giving our Nation
sovereign options to employ military force like no other nation.
II. WE ARE AT WAR
Supporting U.S. Central Command and the global war on terror is
just a portion part of what your Air Force does for our Nation's
defense. Your Air Force has responded (or been prepared to respond)
across the entire spectrum of conflict--from rapid humanitarian aid to
major combat operations.
Fighting and winning the global war on terror is our number one
priority; however, it is important that we maintain focus on protecting
our Nation from other potential enemies, both traditional and
nontraditional. Currently, your Air Force has over 27,000 airmen, or
about 5 percent of the Total Force deployed in support of global
operations. We also have approximately 213,000 personnel, or about 40
percent of the total force, on-line supporting the combatant commands
(COCOMs) daily. This number includes airmen supporting Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), missile warning and space control, the
satellite control network, strategic bombers, Special Operations, and
combat search and rescue forces. It also includes steady-state
rotational forces performing a global mission but not necessarily under
the direct control of a COCOM Commander or assigned to a particular
area of operation. Examples include Air Expeditionary Force (AEF)
postured continental U.S. fighters and theater airlift forces, base-
level support troops, Air Force Major Command staffs, forces outside
the continental U.S. assigned to Pacific Air Forces and U.S. Air Forces
in Europe, global support, and strategic forces. Clearly airmen needn't
be deployed to be employed.
Today's strategic forces deliver uncompromising defense to our
Nation, no differently than they have accomplished for 60 years. Since
the beginnings of the Cold War, airmen continue to stand silent sentry
around the clock to protect and defend our national security, and
respond to any adversary should deterrence fail.
III. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
As the Secretary of the Air Force stated in his response to
concerns regarding the Minuteman III (MMIII) force reduction, ``the
ICBM force has provided a rapid-reaction nuclear deterrent capability
since the 1960s. Today, the MMIII is the Nation's only operational
ICBM.'' During the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Defense
Department agreed with U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
recommendation to reduce the ICBM force from 500 to 450.
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007
mandated that the Air Force modernize MMIII ICBMs in the United States
inventory as required to maintain a sufficient supply of launch test
assets and spares to sustain the deployed force of such missiles
through 2030. The Air Force has ongoing Life Extension Programs
designed to extend ICBM service life beyond 2020. Additionally, the Air
Force is currently analyzing MMIII missile and ground systems to
determine what activities are required to sustain the force through
2030.
The Air Force plans to use an incremental approach to field an ICBM
follow-on system that will address aging components while supporting
COCOM requirements. The Office of the Secretary of Defense Land-Based
Strategic Deterrent Overarching Integrated Product Team will review an
initial system assessment in August 2007. The USAF Land-Based Strategic
Deterrent Initiative will be addressed in the fiscal year 2010 Program
Objective Memorandum (POM). The AF will complete the concept refinement
and pre-Milestone A activities this year.
ICBM Demonstration Validation
Responsive infrastructure is a key component of the New Triad and
serves as a backstop that allows us to reduce the nuclear arsenal
without compromising our strategic deterrent posture. A comprehensive
and aggressive demonstration validation program adds to the deterrent
value of the force. The ICBM Demonstration Validation Program is at the
core of our efforts to preserve our ballistic missile capability. It
allows us to respond to emerging issues in the Minuteman fleet while
identifying methods to reduce life-cycle costs and improve nuclear
safety and surety. The unique capabilities exercised by this Program
are essential to keep the Minuteman weapon system operationally viable
through 2030.
ICBM Life Extension Programs (LEPs)
The MMIII ICBM is undergoing major LEPs of components from the
nozzle to the nose-tip, extending MM III service life through 2020 and
beyond. All programs are currently on budget and on schedule.
Modifications include:
1. Guidance Replacement Program: Replaces guidance set
electronics on MMIII and improves reliability on the ground and
in flight. A total of 440 sets have been delivered and the
program will be complete with the delivery of the final 32
guidance sets in fiscal year 2007.
2. Propulsion Replacement Program: Extends booster life
through 2020 by re-pouring stages one and two, and re-
manufacturing stage three. A total of 311 boosters have been
delivered. The program will be complete with the delivery of
the final 56 booster sets in fiscal year 2008.
3. Propulsion System Rocket Engine Program: Refurbishes seven
components and assemblies in the liquid propulsion post-boost
vehicle. A total of 72 kits have been installed and we will
purchase 96 additional kits in fiscal year 2008.
4. Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle: Enables MMIII to carry
the more advanced Peacekeeper MK 21 Reentry Vehicle (RV) while
retaining the powerful MMIII MK 12A RV multiple independently
re-targetable RV (MIRV) capability. Retirement of the older MK
12 RV is now possible, allowing us to avoid a costly $1 billion
LEP. A total of 20 kits have been installed and we will
purchase an additional 120 kits in fiscal year 2008.
5. Environmental Control System: Modernizes cooling system
equipment in the Minuteman Launch Facilities and Missile Alert
Facilities. Five kits have been installed and we will purchase
112 kits in fiscal year 2008. We are not planning to modify the
facilities assigned to the 564th Missile Squadron at Malmstrom
Air Force Base (AFB), MT as a result of the planned reduction
in the MMIII ICBM force.
6. ICBM Security Modernization Program: This three-part
program consists of concrete enhancements, a fast-rising
secondary personnel access hatch, and a Remote Visual
Assessment (RVA) camera. This comprehensive program began in
fiscal year 2004. Our fiscal year 2008 program includes the
purchase of 100 fast-rising hatches which will allow responding
Security Forces adequate time to deny access to our launch
facilities. Our fiscal year 2008 program also purchases 60 RVA
units. We are not planning to modify facilities assigned to the
564th Missile Squadron at Malmstrom AFB, MT as a result of the
planned reduction in the MMIII ICBM force.
Helicopters
The primary Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) helicopter mission is
to provide our security forces with a continuous contingency response
capability for the national ICBM complex. However, the Bell UH-1N is
not capable of meeting current security requirements. It does not meet
Key Performance Parameters for speed, endurance, range, or payload. UH-
1Ns are not armed with offensive weapons, have no defensive
capabilities or countermeasures, and cannot operate in a chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) environment.
Our average Air Force UH-1N airframe is 38 years old. The original
design life for this aircraft was 2,500 flying hours, although some
aircraft in the inventory have over 13,000 hours. The UH-1N fleet is
showing its age with fatigue-related cracks in the tail boom and is
currently undergoing its second tail boom replacement enabling it to
meet flight safety standards.
The Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) is an Air Force
effort to replace the UH-1N. The CVLSP was originally envisioned as a
variant of CSAR-X. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council directed
that the efforts be separated and then directed AFSPC to conduct a
separate CVLSP Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The CVLSP AoA is now
complete and is in coordination at the Air Staff. CVLSP is sixth on the
Air Force's Unfunded Priority List.
The AFSPC team is considering four CVLSP options:
1. CSAR-X platform
2. Rebuild Air Combat Command service life extension program-
modified HH-60G aircraft
3. Develop a new aircraft
4. Continue using the UH-1N aircraft
Nuclear Cruise Missiles
The Air Force analyzed current and future roles for nuclear cruise
missiles during the 2005 QDR and the fiscal year 2007 Amended POM
(APOM). The Defense Department issued guidance on 20 December 2005
directing USSTRATCOM and the Air Force to study the nuclear cruise
missile force structure, including the Air-to-Ground Missile (AGM) -86
Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise
Missile (ACM). The guidance also directed us to build a retirement
schedule for the missiles.
The resulting study recommended that the Air Force retire all ACMs,
reduce the ALCM force to 528, retire all excess ALCMs, consolidate the
ALCM force at Minot AFB, and retain ALCMs in the inventory through at
least 2020, possibly 2030. On 12 April 2006, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense accepted the study recommendations. On 23 June 2006, the
Commander, USSTRATCOM sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense
supporting the study findings and advocating adoption of the ALCM/ACM
force structure recommendations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Security Council endorsed most of the study recommendations. On 17
October 2006 the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to retire
the ACM and reduce the ALCM fleet to 528 missiles.
The Air Force intends to remove from service, demilitarize and
destroy all ACMs and the excess ALCM missile bodies. The remaining
nuclear cruise missile force will be consolidated at Minot AFB, North
Dakota. As of this date, the Air Force has taken no irreversible
actions as it seeks final congressional approval to demilitarize and
destroy these missile bodies. These cruise missile force structure
changes are part of a balanced force reduction that supports both
Presidential direction to reduce the active nuclear stockpile, as well
as the United States' obligation under the 2002 Moscow Treaty to reduce
the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to
1,700-2,200 warheads.
Strategic Bombers
We have no plans to change the current force of B-1 and B-2
aircraft. Our strategy for the future bomber fleet includes a three-
phased modernization plan. The first phase of the modernization
strategy includes plans for us to divest 38 B-52s while modernizing the
remaining legacy systems. President's budget fiscal year 2008 funded a
B-52 force structure consisting of 56 B-52 Total Aircraft Inventory
(TAI). This inventory included 32 Combat Coded (CC), 11 Training (TF),
4 test, and 9 backup B-52s. Following submission of the fiscal year
2008 POM to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Congress mandated
that the Air Force ``not retire more than 18 B-52s (fiscal year 2007
retirements) and maintain 44 B-52s as Combat Coded.'' The Headquarters
Air Force, Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Air Force Reserve Center
are working together to abide by this restriction while meeting the Air
Force need to recapitalize aging aircraft. ACC is finalizing a plan to
recode 11 TF B-52s and 2 test B-52 which would result in a total of 44
combat coded B-52s. The 20 B-52s the Air Force plans to retire in
fiscal year 2008 will be stored on the ramps at Barksdale AFB and Minot
AFB in XJ status, which means that the Air Force will keep these
aircraft in a serviceable condition but not in a common configuration
(i.e. no capability upgrades) with the other 56 aircraft.
The fiscal year 2008 President's budget reflects the Air Force
position. A fleet of 56 TAI B-52s with 32 coded for combat meets Air
Force requirements while supporting the need to recapitalize. The NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2007 mandated that no funds ``be obligated or expended
for retiring any of the 93 B-52H bomber aircraft in service in the Air
Force as of the date of the enactment of this act until 45 days after
the date on which the Secretary of the Air Force submits a Bomber force
structure report prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses.'' The
Air Force expects the report to be finished by the end of 2007.
The second and third phases of the modernization strategy include
fielding a next-generation long-range strike capability by 2018 and
fielding an advanced technology system with increased speed, range,
precision, connectivity and survivability by 2035.
Reliable Replacement Warhead
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) designs incorporate a broad
suite of enhanced safety features which increases efficiency and cost-
effectiveness as well as improved security features to prevent
unauthorized use by terrorists, rogue nations or criminal
organizations. These designs will replace 1970s-era technologies with
modern components which will help minimize future safety and security
uncertainties and can be managed using the improved computational and
experimental tools developed by the Stockpile Surveillance Program. An
all-RRW force is sustainable well into the future providing our
combatant commanders with high confidence while managing risk.
In November 2006 the Nuclear Weapons Council commissioned an RRW-2
Phase 1 Study. The purpose of the year-long study is to define concepts
for a replacement warhead to existing and future air-delivered systems.
The study group is analyzing preliminary concept assessments,
identifying delivery systems, recommending nuclear weapon trade-offs,
and proposing an initial program schedule.
IV. CLOSING
We are building an Air Force prepared to dominate in the 21st
century--strategically, operationally, and tactically. Air Force
Strategic forces, the bulwark of our strategic deterrent capability,
give us the means to ensure Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global
Power, and worldwide Expeditionary Combat Support. These capabilities
are essential to the joint fight and are a critical component of the
future joint force. The Air Force is committed to advancing strategic
capabilities to fully support the joint team. In order to maintain our
strategic dominance, the Air Force must recapitalize and also be
allowed to divest itself of outdated, excess platforms. Divesting
excess platforms will provide the means to shift vital funds to
recapitalization and modernization of our Air Force and to maintain a
strategic deterrent second to none. We appreciate your continued
support in turning our vision into an operational reality. Our nation
must invest today to ensure tomorrow's air, space, and cyberspace
dominance.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Admiral?
STATEMENT OF RADM STEPHEN E. JOHNSON, USN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, NAVAL SYSTEMS COMMAND
Admiral Johnson. Good morning, Senator. It is a privilege
to be here with you today representing the sailors and the
marines and the men and women of the Strategic Systems
Programs. Our biggest priority in the budget that we have
presented to you is the life extension of the Trident weapon
system to match that of the ship, which has already been
extended. To do that, we will refresh the electronics and
produce the rocket motors that we need to go to 2042.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement by RADM Stephen Johnson, USN
Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you to discuss the Navy's efforts to maintain the credibility of
our strategic deterrent forces. Strategic Systems Programs is
responsible for maintaining our currently deployed Trident II forces
and to develop capabilities which will support future requirements of
our combatant commanders.
The Navy's operational strategic deterrent fleet continues to
provide a credible and affordable deterrent against nuclear war. Our
Trident II weapons system, comprised of 14 submarines, 6 in the
Atlantic fleet and 8 in the Pacific fleet, is maintaining a reliable
sea based deterrent for our National leadership. Two of our submarines
are undergoing engineering refueling overhauls (ERO). Along with U.S.S.
Alabama (SSBN-731), which began her overhaul last year at Puget Sound
Naval Shipyard, U.S.S. Alaska (SSBN-732) has commenced her ERO at
Norfolk Naval Shipyard. Three SSGNs have returned to operation, U.S.S.
Ohio (SSGN-726), U.S.S. Florida (SSGN-728) and U.S.S. Michigan (SSGN
727). U.S.S. Georgia (SSGN-729), the fourth SSGN, is expected to
complete her conversion in September 2007.
D5 LIFE EXTENSION
Trident II (D5) Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Life Extension
(LE) program will redesign and replace aging missile electronics and
guidance systems. Under this program, 108 additional missiles will be
procured in order to meet long-term inventory requirements associated
with the life extension of the Ohio class SSBN. Redesign of missile
electronics and guidance components is in progress, and procurement of
new D5 LE missiles begins in fiscal year 2008. The Trident II (D5)
missile has been operational since 1990, providing the backbone of
America's strategic deterrence. The low-rate production continuity
procurement strategy has been extensively reviewed and approved by the
Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress, and has been in execution for
nearly 15 years.
This procurement strategy has been proven successful, based on the
demonstrated performance of the Trident II D5 weapon system. The Navy
submitted a report to Congress in December 2002 that detailed the
impact of alternative full-funded procurement strategies and
recommended continuation of current production. Continued production of
critical components represents the best balance of cost and risk to
extend the life of the D5 missile.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY
One of our most important responsibilities is maintaining security
over the ships and missiles in the Trident Program. Our budget submit
includes elements to improve this security posture, including sensored
perimeter fencing, waterfront intruder detection systems, and hardened
security force facilities and vehicles, as well as a secure command and
control network. The roadmap to implement these nuclear weapons
security elements over the Future Years Defense Program was recently
briefed to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, and execution is underway.
The SSBN Transit Protection Program extends the security umbrella
to cover SSBNs transiting between piers and dive points.
RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD
The Navy and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
have recently started a joint program to design a replacement warhead
for a portion of the Nation's sea-based nuclear weapons used in
submarine launched ballistic missiles. This replacement warhead will
not require underground testing. Other key aspects of this program
include designing replacement warheads that are more efficient to
manufacture, are safer and more secure, elimination of environmentally
hazardous materials, and increased design performance margins, thus
ensuring long-term confidence in reliability. The Nuclear Weapon's
Council, a joint body including the Department of Energy and DOD,
endorsed NNSA's recommendation for the Lawrence Livermore/Sandia design
as the baseline for the RRW-1 program. However, several features of the
Los Alamos/Sandia design are of great interest and they will be
developed in parallel to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
effort. If sufficiently mature, these design enhancements will be
incorporated into the baseline design at the appropriate development
step.
The selection of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's
baseline design was the first step toward detailed design of a reliable
replacement warhead. NNSA and the Navy will now work together to
develop a detailed RRW project plan and cost estimate for developing
and producing the system. The RRW Project Officer Group, led by the
Navy, will present the results of a design definition and cost study to
the Nuclear Weapons Council for approval later this year, at which time
authorization to proceed to detailed design and system development will
be requested.
CONVENTIONAL TRIDENT MODIFICATION
The Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) is the only near-term
solution which can provide prompt, precise, conventional kinetic
effects at intercontinental ranges. Given the requested resources, we
can deliver the initial capability early in 2010, much earlier than any
other alternative approach.
CTM adapts the Trident II (D5) missile system to deliver
conventional (non-nuclear) effects at global ranges. The Trident Weapon
System and the D5 missile are well suited for this role by virtue of
the long-range and payload capacity of the D5 missile, and the
responsiveness and survivability of the Trident Weapon System.
Responsive, survivable and persistent, CTM will defeat a diverse set of
unpredictable threats without visible presence or risk to U.S. forces,
and with little or no warning prior to strike. CTM implements the New
Triad envisioned by the Nuclear Posture Review and is an evolution of
deterrence toward conventional weapons. CTM concept of operations have
been developed by U.S. Strategic Command.
CTM will use existing D5 missiles, MK4 reentry bodies equipped with
aerodynamic controls, global positioning system (GPS)-aided terminal
guidance, and a conventional warhead. Advanced error-correcting reentry
vehicles with GPS-aided Inertial Navigation Systems have been flight
proven in a previous D5 test program. Total time from decision to
weapons-on-target is about 1 hour. CTM technology can be rapidly
developed and deployed within 24 months.
The fiscal year 2008 funding request for CTM is $175 million. We
have frontloaded the funding profile to provide the capability to the
warfighter as quickly as possible. The bulk of the request is $126
million for research and development to proceed with warhead
development efforts required to achieve initial operating capability by
early 2010. The additional $49 million is procurement funding that is
required for reentry body component long lead materials and shipboard
systems and trainer modifications.
SSGN
Three of our SSGNs have already returned to service and the fourth
will rejoin the fleet in about 7 months. Operational tests are in
progress and the first patrol is anticipated before year's end.
These SSGNs are already demonstrating a transformational war
fighting capability, carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles and supporting
special operating forces. They have enhanced communication and improved
masts and antennae for network centric operations. We are forging new
relationships within the Department of the Navy and DOD in order to
ensure that these submarines be used to maximum advantage in the war on
terror.
SUMMARY
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I
thank you for your continued support of Strategic Systems Programs and
our operational fleet in particular. Our strategic force remains a
credible and reliable deterrent today. It is our goal to ensure that
the Nation is protected through efforts to maintain the safety,
reliability, and surety of our deployed systems. Thank you again for
this opportunity to appear today to speak on behalf of Navy Strategic
Systems Programs.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Green?
STATEMENT OF BRIAN R. GREEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Green. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
I appreciate it. I will keep my opening remarks very brief
also. We are in the fifth year of trying to implement the NPR,
the recommendations of that review in 2002. Certainly from our
perspective the strategic vision that was offered in that
review remains valid. It outlined a very new and different
strategic environment, a broader range of contingencies, a
broader range of potential adversaries that would require a
broader range of capabilities to address them, including
offensive strike systems, both nuclear and non-nuclear,
defenses active and passive, and a responsive infrastructure.
I think over the past 5 years we have made some progress in
trying to implement that vision. We have made progress in
deploying missile defenses. We have made progress in reducing
our nuclear force structure. We have initiated the RRW program,
which I think is an important step.
I think the significant gap that we see remaining, and
there is more than one, but the most significant gap that we
see remaining is the prompt long-range precision global strike
mission. We have had a substantial conversation about that
already this morning with General Cartwright. I will not
belabor some of the points that he has made. I will be
available to answer your questions.
I think the one point that I would like to make is that the
predominant concern that Congress has expressed is the
ambiguity about the near-term solution that the DOD has
identified, the conventional Trident modification, that might
be misconstrued by Russia as a nuclear attack and they would
respond in kind. Certainly from our perspective that risk is
extremely low. We have a very long history with Russia. We have
launched over 1,300 ballistic missiles throughout the course of
the Cold War and the 1990s. They have never reacted badly to
those launches. We have had a couple of instances where there
has been a possibility that things could have been
misconstrued. There was a launch of a rocket in the mid-1990s
out of an area north of Norway that the Russians saw. They were
concerned about it. They did not overreact.
There is very little in the history and very little in the
Russian reactions to past events and very little in the Russian
doctrine that leads us to believe that ambiguity poses a
significant risk. That said, we take all risks seriously in
this area and we have developed a comprehensive set of
confidence-building measures that we think would drive that
already very low risk even lower.
Senator Bill Nelson. How about China?
Mr. Green. Without going into classified session, I do not
think I can address China completely. But certainly at an
appropriate time and an appropriate place, we would take into
account Chinese sensibilities.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have the same degree of
confidence with regard to the Chinese response as you do with
the Russians?
Mr. Green. Absolutely. The Chinese nuclear forces are not
on high alert. We have no reason to believe that the Chinese
would overreact in this kind of circumstance as well.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]
Prepared Statement by Brian R. Green
I. OPENING REMARKS
Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee: I welcome the opportunity to describe our progress in
transforming the Nation's strategic capabilities to meet 21st century
security challenges. You understand the importance of this undertaking,
and recognize the need to field a New Triad better suited to the new
security environment. I want to thank the members of the committee for
their support. Successful transformation of our capabilities will
require a sustained partnership between the Department of Defense (DOD)
and Congress.
II. THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2001 put in motion a major
change in the role of nuclear forces in our deterrent strategy. The NPR
emphasized the need for a broader range of deterrent options and
capabilities and established a New Triad composed of offensive strike
systems (nuclear, non-nuclear, and non-kinetic); defenses (both active
and passive); and a revitalized defense infrastructure--all supported
by adaptive planning, command and control, and Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities. The New Triad is
intended to reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons and improve our
ability to deter attack in the face of proliferating weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).
The rationale behind the NPR's findings remain valid: the Cold War
Triad of nuclear strike systems is not adequate to support the full
range of potential challenges and threats in the new security
environment. An array of capabilities, including prompt conventional
Global Strike, is ultimately necessary to address the new security
risks the United States faces.
That said, nuclear capabilities possess unique properties and
provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats,
including WMD use. Nuclear weapons will continue to play a vital role
in assuring allies of U.S. security commitments, deterring WMD threats,
and holding at risk adversary assets and capabilities that cannot be
countered through non-nuclear means. The U.S. will continue to honor
its extended deterrence commitments to allies--a critical part of our
national security and an important tool in our non-proliferation
efforts. Extended deterrence, in turn, requires long-term confidence in
the reliability and safety of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, and the
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program is essential to achieving
that end. In short, the United States will retain a credible nuclear
deterrent at the lowest level of weapons consistent with U.S. and
allied security. In transitioning to a New Triad, however, these
weapons must be integrated with new non-nuclear strategic capabilities
to provide an appropriate range of options.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE NPR
We have made some progress in implementing the NPR over the past 5
years:
1. We have deployed an initial missile defense capability to
protect our Nation, deployed forces, friends and allies, and
are expanding that capability through evolutionary development
and international cooperation.
2. We are on schedule to reduce U.S. nuclear forces to 1,700-
2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by
2012. In addition, we have retired the last Peacekeeper
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and DOD plans to
retire 50 of the 500 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs and 38 of the
94 B-52 bombers. We will use the savings to provide for a
robust Minuteman III test program as well as to help sustain
and modernize the remaining bomber fleet.
The remaining Minuteman III ICBM force is being sustained
through a life-extension program. The program will keep this
element of the New Triad's offensive leg operational and
effective into the foreseeable future. DOD is also examining
future approaches to a follow-on land-based long-range nuclear
strike capability.
3. We have selected a lead national lab to conduct the
engineering and design work on a RRW to replace a portion of
our sea-based deterrent. The RRW program is vital to assuring
long-term confidence in our nuclear deterrent and improving our
responsive infrastructure.
4. We are also making improvements to our intelligence and
planning capabilities.
IV. GLOBAL STRIKE
Our progress, however, has been uneven. We have not provided the
broader range of conventional strike options that both the NPR and the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for in order to engage high-
value or fleeting enemy targets located in access-denied areas; nor
have we closed the gap in prompt, long-range conventional (non-nuclear)
strike capabilities that the QDR identified.
The 2006 QDR considered the new security environment and
underscored the need for prompt Global Strike capabilities to address a
range of challenges. The QDR identified the following objectives for
Global Strike's operational and enabling capabilities:
Provide the President and the warfighter with a
broader range of conventional response options to deter
aggression or coercion;
Attack fleeting enemy targets rapidly;
Fuse intelligence and operations to exploit time-
sensitive intelligence;
Find and precisely target enemy capabilities in denied
areas;
Deter, defend against, and respond in an overwhelming
manner to WMD attacks; and
Shape and defend cyberspace.
DOD has strengthened its conventional strike capabilities with the
introduction of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and
the Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM) cruise missile. These missiles offer
stealthy (in the case of JASSM), standoff capabilities that can be
employed in substantial numbers to destroy high-value, well-defended,
and/or relocatable targets. Testing has begun on the JASSM Extended
Range (JASSM-ER), which will possess more than double the range of the
JASSM (over 500 nm, vice 200 nm). JASSM-ER also will be able to loiter
and transmit in-flight imagery to planners. TACTOM possesses many of
the same traits as JASSM-ER but also can also be retargeted in flight.
In addition, the DOD has nearly completed reconfiguring four
strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) into guided-
missile submarines (SSGNs). The first three SSGNs have completed their
conversion with the final conversion to be completed in late fiscal
year 2007. Two of the SSGNs will become operational in fiscal year 2007
and two more in fiscal year 2008. Each SSGN can carry up to 154
Tomahawk cruise missiles and deliver special operations teams.
However, analysis conducted during the 2006 QDR also highlighted an
important gap in prompt, long-range conventional (non-nuclear) strike
capabilities. Specifically, the QDR found that existing conventional
forces, such as fighter and bomber aircraft and surface ships, could
take hours to days to deploy and strike a target. The new TACTOM and
JASSM, although valuable additions to conventional forces, do not fully
address this gap. Today, only nuclear-armed ballistic missiles are
available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to engage distant, fleeting
targets promptly (within about an hour from the time of an execution
decision). Without a portfolio of prompt conventional Global Strike
capabilities--able to generate timely effects, anywhere, anytime--
America's adversaries will retain substantial freedom of action and
potential safe havens from which to operate.
Prompt Global Strike capabilities may be needed for time-sensitive
operations such as interdicting the transfer of WMD from rogue states
to terrorists, preventing a rogue state from launching a ballistic
missile armed with a WMD payload, or disrupting or delaying such
actions before other U.S. forces arrive on scene. In addition, prompt
conventional Global Strike capabilities have the potential to suppress
follow-on launches of ballistic missiles against the United States, its
forces and allies, and this capability can work effectively in concert
with ballistic missile defenses to help mitigate the growing long-range
missile threats the United States will face in the future. In order to
hold these types of targets at risk, the 2006 QDR called for a
portfolio of prompt Global Strike capabilities.
V. CONVENTIONAL TRIDENT MODIFICATION
The 2006 QDR determined that a program designated Conventional
Trident Modification (CTM) was the best low-cost, low-risk, near-term
solution to begin closing the current gap in prompt conventional global
strike capabilities. In fiscal year 2007, DOD requested funding to
modify two Trident II D5 missiles on each of the 12 deployed strategic
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and replace their nuclear
warheads with non-nuclear warheads. CTM would provide a unique
conventional capability to respond to fleeting, time-sensitive, high-
value targets virtually anywhere in the world. The President's budget
for fiscal year 2008 seeks $175 million for this initial Prompt Global
Strike system.
Although DOD determined CTM to be the best near-term option for
conventional prompt Global Strike, the Department is considering other,
longer-term solutions, both sea- and land-based, to broaden the
portfolio of prompt, non-nuclear capabilities. The additional concepts
include sea- and land-based conventional ballistic missiles and
advanced technologies, such as hypersonic glide vehicles, employing
precision guidance, advanced conventional weapons, and propulsion.
While these concepts promise to provide expanded Global Strike
capabilities, for the most part they generally lack the technological
maturity to achieve full operational status before 2015.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS
Congress raised concerns about CTM last year, and directed that DOD
provide a Report to Congress in consultation with the Department of
State. A classified report, signed by both Secretary Gates and
Secretary Rice, was transmitted earlier this month. I commend the
report to you; it addresses the critical need for Conventional Trident
and the concerns. While the concerns raised were posed in terms of CTM
they apply to many of the other prompt Global Strike capabilities that
may be available in the mid- to long-term.
The most frequently cited concern is that a CTM launch could be
misinterpreted as a nuclear attack, prompting Russian retaliation. The
CTM report states that the risk is extremely low and can be managed
effectively. Few states have the sophisticated technology required to
detect and track a ballistic missile launch. However, the Russian
Federation has these detection and tracking systems and is generally
able to evaluate quickly a ballistic missile's flight path and
determine within tens of miles the missile's aimpoint. In that respect,
if Russian sensors detected and tracked a CTM launch, the Russian
command would quickly identify it as non-threatening. Moreover, the
Russian command would readily distinguish between a CTM launch and a
massive nuclear first strike.
Historically, the Russian Federation has not over-reacted to an un-
notified or unannounced U.S. or Chinese missile launch. Furthermore,
the United States and the Russian Federation now have a more
cooperative and less adversarial relationship than during the Cold War,
and this new relationship provides a much-changed context in which any
launch of a ballistic missile would be understood.
Nevertheless, the United States takes the possibility of
misinterpretation seriously. While the risk is extremely low, DOD has
developed a comprehensive assurance strategy consisting of confidence-
building and operational measures, promoting a high degree of
transparency into CTM operations. Engagement of Russia at senior levels
is ongoing.
Another concern is that prompt Global Strike, and CTM in
particular, may not be well-supported by intelligence capabilities. As
with all military operations, CTM operations would require actionable
intelligence that is both accurate and timely and provides a high level
of situational awareness. Existing intelligence assets can support
planning and operations of prompt Global Strike systems like CTM, DOD
continues to improve its global intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities. Indeed, current efforts to achieve more
persistent collection capabilities against both legacy and emerging
threats would be maturing as the Conventional Trident Modification
becomes operational. They would be available to support key decision-
makers and planners involved with employment of future prompt Global
Strike capabilities. During time-sensitive crises the speed and range
attributes of prompt Global Strike systems, like CTM, actually would
provide increased time for senior decisionmakers to evaluate and refine
intelligence before making a decision to employ force.
There is also some concern for CTM's status under existing arms
control treaties. CTM is fully compliant with all U.S. treaty
obligations. A complete analysis of this issue is available in the
Report to Congress on Conventional Trident Modification. In summary:
START:
CTM is not a new type of SLBM or new kind of
Strategic Offensive Arm.
CTM will remain accountable and subject to
START's many provisions for as long as START remains in
force. These provisions include:
Data updates
Re-Entry Vehicle On-Site Inspections
Transit notifications
Launch notifications
Telemetry exchange for test launches
CTM will have the same number of warheads
attributed to it as to the nuclear-armed Trident D5 (8
warheads).
Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement:
Notification of CTM flight test launches will
continue to be provided; and
Moscow Treaty:
CTM's conventional warheads will not
count against the 1,700-2,200 limit on
operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads.
VII. CONCLUSION
DOD strongly believes that conventional prompt Global Strike is
critical to meeting evolving U.S. security needs in the 21st century.
The joint DOD-State Department Report to Congress presents a compelling
assessment of the need for CTM and a clear strategy for mitigating the
already low risks associated with its use. In the report, Secretary
Gates and Secretary Rice agreed:
There is a critical need for CTM to respond promptly
to potentially grave dangers with conventional means--including
high-value or fleeting targets such as terrorists or rogue
states armed with WMD that may be in hard-to-reach or highly
defended areas;
CTM is the best and only near-term, low-cost, low-risk
option to fill an existing capability gap;
The risk of misinterpretation is extremely low and can
be readily managed;
Development and deployment of a Conventional Trident
is needed to achieve a near-term prompt conventional global
strike capability; and
The substantial benefits of CTM far outweigh any
risks.
A sustained partnership between DOD and Congress will be needed if
we are to succeed in transforming our Nation's strategic capabilities
to meet the uncertainties and challenges ahead. In particular, we need
to continue the progress on missile defense, revitalize the nuclear
infrastructure with the RRW programs, and address the need for
conventional prompt Global Strike. The Conventional Trident is the
near-term solution, with advanced technologies to expand the range of
effects in the longer term. The Department will require your continued
support to replace the legacy Cold War force posture with a New Triad
that is better suited to the new security environment.
Senator Bill Nelson. We will explore that further.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Green, welcome to your committee.
Mr. Green. Thank you, sir.
Senator Sessions. I am interested that the Department
persists in the Trident modification, the conventional Trident.
I had suggested that perhaps we better be going forward with
something else after our last vote. But I give you a chance.
Can you briefly, succinctly tell us the strategic rationale for
the prompt global strike?
Mr. Green. Certainly. Right now we have the ability to
reach out globally and promptly, but only with nuclear weapons.
We have the ability to reach out promptly with conventional
weapons, but only if you have tactical forces properly placed,
if they are in the right place at the right time. We can also
reach globally with conventional weapons, but it is not timely.
That would be in the bomber force and the long-range bomber
force can take many, many hours, days in fact, to reach its
target.
The gap that we see is that prompt global precision
conventional strike. There are a collection of--we prefer
actually in our shop not to talk about specific scenarios, but
a set of attributes that targets have that we may well want to
think about that kind of capability, that prompt global strike
capability, to address. Those attributes are time-urgent, very
distant, perhaps highly defended or in other ways access denied
for the United States; high value targets, high regret factor
for not striking a target; and potentially an interest in low
collateral damage.
It is those kinds of targets, targets with those sorts of
attributes, that make us think that this particular kind of
capability is very valuable.
Senator Sessions. At our hearing we went through this in
some detail. But would you explain for us why the cruise
missile is not an adequate global strike?
Mr. Green. The cruise missile, of course, flies
subsonically. They are almost always quite a distance away from
a target. They have to fly a long way to get there. When you
look at a map and plot out how long it takes to get to a target
and how responsive it can be, simply in terms of distance and
time it does not have the same kind of responsiveness that a
system like a long-range ballistic missile, wherever it is
fired from, would have.
The goal with the conventional Trident is to be able to
strike a target within about an hour from the decision time to
move ahead. If you use the same metric for a cruise missile,
you would be talking many hours before you could strike the
target.
Senator Sessions. Who has the lead in the DOD for
evaluating the various alternatives for prompt global strike
and who is the advocate in the Department for this capability?
Mr. Green. Certainly OSD-Policy, the part of the Department
that I represent, is an advocate for this kind of capability.
In terms of the specific systems involved, that gets into the
technical detail and the engineering analysis, and Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics takes a look at that. Certainly the
warfighter gets involved in the discussion about the kinds of
capabilities.
Senator Sessions. You are making me nervous. There are a
lot of people you are mentioning.
Mr. Green. Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is one
organization, I should note.
Senator Sessions. There needs to be somebody that is
looking at this really hard, because I think it is an important
capability. I agree with you that there is virtually no chance
of a misinterpretation of a single launch. But we have a lot of
concern about that in Congress, primarily that and perhaps
other issues.
Mr. D'Agostino, could you briefly describe the design
features of an RRW that is to the extent that is not
classified, and discuss the concerns that some scientists and
engineers have over the reliability of the existing stockpile
and perhaps the concerns some have expressed about a new
untested weapon and whether or not it would be reliable? That
is three questions. You have 3 minutes.
Mr. D'Agostino. That will be a challenge in and of itself.
Senator Sessions. We do not have to vote yet.
Mr. D'Agostino. I may need one of those supercomputers to
pull that off.
We will start off with the RRW question first, the features
that I feel are important, which are unclassified. We will not
discuss the classified details, of course, I would be very
happy to come to the committee and talk to you about, because
they do support my unclassified statements.
One element which goes to the case material that is being
proposed--I cannot say none of the material itself, but the
processes and the material that are being proposed for the RRW
will allow us to get rid of a complete processing line down at
Y-12, a fairly significant processing line that we will not
need any more in the future. It is a line that generates a
tremendous amount of wastes. It is a waste that we have to deal
with and pay for and will pay for out into the future, and it
is a waste stream that I would like to get off the books, if
you will, and not build it into our legacy as we move forward
in determining what the smaller nuclear weapons complex needs
to be.
There is another material in the--it is called interstage
material, also known as Fogbank, but the chemical details of
course are classified. That is at a facility that we currently
have right now. It is a very complicated process. I use that to
support the Navy's program. It takes a tremendous effort to
operate this facility. It is dealing with toxic materials
hazardous to our workforce, but it is required. It is the way
we did things back in the Cold War.
The RRW will allow us to not have to develop and maintain
that capability, and that is very important because that has a
long-term cost and it has an impact on our workforce, just like
the case material.
There are some features associated with the explosive
material that we use for the proposed RRW design, the design we
are going to spend some more time on, and in fusing insensitive
high explosives versus conventional high explosives. An
insensitive high explosive, for one thing, is a type of
material that you can hit with a hammer, throw into a
fireplace, do a lot of things to it; it will not start to
chemically react and explode.
That provides a tremendous amount of flexibility in our
manufacturing process, is one; but two, safety. Clearly it is a
much safer way to do business, and there is a legacy cost not
just for the Department of Energy (DOE), but for the DOD as it
moves these warheads around in their storage facilities, on the
submarines, or in the silos, how we do things in the Air Force.
So this is just a sampling, if you will, in the interest of
time.
Senator Sessions. It really has the potential to not be
more costly, in fact to actually save money, we hope. That
would be your challenge.
Second, there are some other--I see one of the things on
your web site, NNSA web site, about safety. You are confident
they would be considerably more safe.
Mr. D'Agostino. I am very confident in that. We have not
built it yet, but this is--we have systems out in our current
stockpile that have certain attributes that we have talked
about, insensitive high explosives and the like, but putting
them together in this format allows us to maximize and take
advantage of all of the features that we have tested before in
the past. So I am very confident that as we transition the
stockpile, as the President said, into the lowest possible
number necessary and change the size and composition and
character of our workforce, of our nuclear deterrent, that in
the long run as we have an RRW stockpile it will drive costs
down significantly.
I know I can point to specific projects within the NNSA
that I will not have to build, liabilities I take off the books
right now and I will not have to program in, as a result of the
features this proposed warhead design brings to the table.
Senator Sessions. I think that is good. Just very briefly,
the reliability of the aging system. Is there some question
that is raised about that by reliable scientists, and would we
lose deterrent effect if people thought that the new one that
is untested could not work? How do we handle those two
questions?
Mr. D'Agostino. First I would like to emphasize that it is
safe and secure. We would like to make it safer and more
secure. I think, given how as the General described where we
were in the Cold War and how we are in a constant mode of
bringing on new systems as we learned about problems, we have
the advantage now, where it has been 20-plus years as we have
gone through this type of a design effort, to bring all those
new features to the table.
What we are concerned about is sustainability over the
long-term, continuing to do life extensions, which take a Cold
War system off the table, replace certain components and parts
that we think are aging, and sticking it back out. Over time we
are concerned that these changeouts will introduce small
variabilities in manufacturing processes that have evolved
since the last time we have done it, and that over time will
cause some questions into our ability to certify over the long-
term these very low-margin systems. These are very high-
performance systems.
We want a design and we believe we have a proposed design
that is much more robust from the standpoint of performance
margins. We are much further away from the need to ever conduct
a test because of the margin on the primary associated with
this system.
There is a bit of a fallacy that we have always tested a
warhead before we have introduced it into the stockpile. That
is absolutely not true. In a closed session I could talk to you
about specific systems that you might find interesting, or in a
brief, I can go over specific systems that have been deployed
without testing, and the variations. We have a very strong test
pedigree associated with this proposed design. We know a lot
about this primary, which is the pit. It is also known as the
plutonium pit. This is a pit design that has been tested and it
is a minor variation of a pit design that is currently in our
stockpile right now. We have a lot of data on that pit and we
have a lot of information on that secondary. So we are very
confident.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. I have a number of questions for the
record and we have about 6 minutes, so let me just go through
these questions.
Mr. D'Agostino, the NNSA has requested $88.8 million for
the RRW for 2008. At the time the budget request was submitted
to the Nuclear Weapons Council, it had not approved the
decision to study the feasibility of the RRW. Now that it has
approved the feasibility study, will the 2008 funding be used
to finish the phase 2A study and begin the phase 3 study?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. I posed a number of
questions to General Cartwright and I would pose a number of
those questions to you. The proposed RRW design would be a new
warhead, yes or no?
Mr. D'Agostino. The design is new. The warhead is the same.
It is the same form, fit, and function. It is a new design to
replace an existing weapon that we have in our stockpile.
Senator Bill Nelson. This new warhead would fit into an
existing delivery system, which in the case of the first RRW
design would be the Mark 5 reentry vehicle for the D-5 missile?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. The first RRW would replace the W-76
in whole or in part and would meet the same military
requirements met by the W-76?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do we know for sure that the RRW could
be certified and placed in the stockpile at this point and that
the purpose of the studies that the NNSA will conduct for the
next 3 years will determine that?
Mr. D'Agostino. That is right, Mr. Chairman. We are working
on that path. At this point right now I am very confident.
Senator Bill Nelson. Based on reviews done to date by the
NNSA laboratories, do you have the confidence that the RRW
design will be able to be certified without testing?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. If it becomes clear at some point that
it would not be possible to certify the RRW without nuclear
testing, would you support terminating it effort?
Mr. D'Agostino. I would say that because it is one of the
most significant criteria that we had to proceed down this
path, we would have to examine that. We would have to say, why
would we go forward in continuing with this effort without
that.
Senator Bill Nelson. If successful, the RRW would provide
increased confidence in the stockpile and enable substantial
reductions in it overall size of the stockpile?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Particularly in the size of the
reserve?
Mr. D'Agostino. That is right, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. The Nuclear Weapons Council decided to
study the feasibility of the RRW and not to manufacture or
deploy an RRW?
Mr. D'Agostino. That is right.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Johnson, assuming that the RRW
is a feasible replacement for the W-76, what is the right mix
of RRWs and W-76 warheads in the inventory?
Admiral Johnson. As General Cartwright pointed out, we
first continue with the 76 life extension. That is the Nation's
deterrent. Once we go into initial production and then followed
by full production of the RRW, it becomes a one-for-one
replacement. The 76-1, those warheads that are life extended to
the 2040, 2045 region, I would think it would be in the
Nation's interest then to time the production line for best
value. So rather than give you a direct number for something
that is 10 years away or so, it is a one-for-one replacement.
Senator Bill Nelson. Can you give us a percentage?
Admiral Johnson. In the early production run we expect to
make about 50 per year. So in the first 5 years, it would be
250 weapons. Then depending on what DOE does with their ability
to increase production, we could stay at that rate. As the
inventory went down, we could catch that. Or if Congress chose
to increase the production capability, then it would be an
accelerated one-for-one replacement.
Senator Bill Nelson. All the rest of the ones in reserve at
that point? What would happen?
Admiral Johnson. The need for reserve is expected to be
reduced, as every member of the panel has said.
Senator Bill Nelson. What is the down side of delaying the
W-76 life extension to see if the RRW is feasible?
Admiral Johnson. That would be a serious error in my
opinion. 76 is the bulk of the deployed sea-based warheads. It
is our Nation's deterrent. We are ready to go into production
on the life-extended warhead this year and we should proceed
with that.
RRW is not designed. In fact, we are only at the beginning
of that design, laying out the baseline, coming back to you
with a proposed cost and schedule that you will see later in
the year.
Senator Bill Nelson. A variation on my previous question.
If the RRW is feasible, will the Navy be able to reduce the
combined number of RRWs and W-76 life-extended warheads to less
than the total of the number of W-76 warheads today? I am
talking about the Navy only. In the stockpile.
Admiral Johnson. With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, the
requirement for numbers is really General Cartwright's to
provide to me. I meet that requirement. My expectation is that
those numbers will continue to go down.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the NNSA fiscal year
2008 pit manufacturing and certification campaign budget
request includes funds for both the RRW pits and the W88 pits.
How much of the $281 million for pit manufacturing is for RRW
pits?
Mr. D'Agostino. I would like to take that for the record,
but provide also a response if I could. The actual number,
percentage-wise, I will get for the record if I could. It is
important that right now our 88 pit effort is to focus on our
commitment on making 10 pits per year. This will be the first
year. It is a fairly significant milestone to support the Navy.
We will do that over the next 2 to 3 years in order to meet
what we think jointly with the Department of the Navy we need
to maintain.
After that, what we want to do is shift our production
capability to thinking towards the future, using this RRW
process, which we feel is going to reduce the processing steps
by 20 to 30 percent on how we used to build pits. The actual
number, I would have to take that for the record if I could,
please.
[The information referred to follows:]
The portion of the budget estimate associated with reliable
replacement warhead (RRW) pit development planning is $13 million,
however, other elements of the pit campaign also support our planning
for RRW.
The purpose of the pit campaign is to make war reserve pits for the
stockpile (currently the requirement is focused on for pits for the W88
and RRW) and to increase the pit manufacturing capacity (i.e., the
number of pits/year) of the nuclear weapons complex to that needed to
support the nuclear weapons requirements of the Department of Defense.
The efforts in the campaign are divided into four categories: W88
pit production; RRW pit development planning; plutonium experimentation
to enhance certification confidence and to address stockpile issues;
and technology development and planning to increase pit manufacturing
capacity for whatever pit type is required. Within those four
categories, the $281 million in the fiscal year 2008 request is
associated as follows: W88 production $142 million; RRW pit development
planning $13 million; plutonium experimentation to enhance
certification confidence and address stockpile issues $34 million; and
technology development and planning to increase pit manufacturing
capacity $92 million.
Senator Bill Nelson. So the 10 per year are W88 pits?
Mr. D'Agostino. That is right, Mr. Chairman. For the next 2
to 3 years we will be building up a reserve of pits that will
allow us to--as part of our surveillance, what we do is every
couple of years we take a W88 warhead pit out of the stockpile
and we do destructive testing on that pit. What that ends up
doing, because the Nation does not have a long-term or
maintainable pit production capability, is that it reduces our
W88 pits by one and it eats into the reserve warheads.
So we want to build up a couple of years worth of
production capability. The exact number is classified, but in
closed session we could tell you. A couple years of production
capability, that will give the Navy as well as the DOE
confidence that we will be able to do surveillance work on the
pits for the life of the expected warhead, well out on the W88
warhead over the next 2 decades or so.
Senator Bill Nelson. So the question you are going to
answer for the record is, how much of the $281 million
requested will actually go for the manufacture of RRW pits?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
It also includes $24.9 million for the consolidated
plutonium center. How is that going to be used?
Mr. D'Agostino. The $24.9 million for the consolidated
plutonium center is what we call process development steps. As
we look forward into the future at our Nation's need to put
together a pit manufacturing capability, whether it is 50 pits
per year or 125 pits per year is something we will work out
with the DOD. That is an important distinction because it
drives us in a couple of different directions.
What we are looking at with that money is to do the process
steps, and to try to figure out what type of equipment we would
need in this consolidated plutonium center. It helps us with
those types of studies needed to continue the studies for what
we are in the process of doing right now, which is a National
Environmental Policy Act activity to get to a record of
decision on a long-term pit capability. So it will allow us to
do the analysis on the different options that we are currently
working on right now in a very public process.
Senator Bill Nelson. The requirement for a security force
at the NNSA facilities has increased rather dramatically.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. More physical requirements, more
sophisticated weaponry to meet more stressing design basis
threats. These are all contractors and are managed differently
at each site. The guards certainly put their lives in jeopardy
to protect thousands of nuclear weapons and tons of weapons-
grade materials.
So what about taking a more uniform approach to managing
and training the guard force? Have you considered federalizing
this force under a single contract? Have you looked at managing
the force more like a law enforcement entity?
Mr. D'Agostino. Studies have been done in the past which
have looked at federalizing, consolidating into one large
contract, or leaving things as we currently have it, which is
largely defining the performance characteristics that we have,
as a way to lay out essentially a bar that has to be met, and
then going out and doing independent assessments. I have not
reopened the past studies which once looked at federalizing
this activity. I am aware of our efforts in essence to look at
how do we drive consistency across our guard force and as part
of that what we have done is we have worked with our HSS, which
is the Office of Health, Safety, and Security, under part of
our Department, and to simplify our security requirements and
set up independent teams to go out and look at that.
I do not know if this is the right time actually to relook
at that study and to drive consistency. But I will say that one
of the things we are trying to do is not increase the size of
the guard force. One of the elements of our Complex 2030 vision
is to have fewer sites with special nuclear materials and have
fewer locations within sites for special nuclear materials. I
expect that to drive our guard forces numbers down and shift
quite a bit.
It is much easier to drive things down and shift a bit with
contracts rather than a Federal workforce. It is just something
that is in the back of my mind as I look to try to stabilize
and level off at the right level on our security budget,
because it does go up significantly between 2007 and fiscal
year 2008.
Senator Bill Nelson. What you might do is look at a uniform
standard among all your different contracts.
Mr. D'Agostino. I believe we do have that uniform standard
in our DOE orders, but what we have to do is be consistent in
how we evaluate our different contractors. There are multiple
contractors out there for security contracts.
Senator Bill Nelson. This is one we cannot mess up.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, during the deliberations on
the 2007 year it became clear that the Air Force could not meet
its requirements with the reductions in the B-52 bomber fleet
first proposed in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). So
Congress approved a reduction of up to 18 bombers from the
current fleet of 93 B-52s. The authorized reduction was
predicated on completion of a report that would analyze all
aspects of the overall bomber fleet, including the requirements
and the modernization plans.
Now it is our understanding that the report will not be
completed and submitted to Congress until at least the end of
this fiscal year. As a result of the reduction of the 18
bombers--therefore, they will not be reduced until fiscal year
2008. So does it make sense to authorize more reductions prior
to receiving the report from last year, as the questions are
the same?
So what has changed since the 2007 authorized retirement of
only 18 bombers, rejecting the request in the QDR to a
transition to 56 bombers?
General Burg. Yes, sir. Senator, the overall management of
the fleet of aircraft the Air Force has been charged to be
responsible for is a big challenge, and I think you have
already heard from our chief in terms of managing that fleet to
try to get the best capability for the investment that you are
making in that bomber force. We in the Air Force believe that
we can reduce the number of B-52s in the bomber fleet while
retaining the B-1s and B-2s and maintain the bomber capability
that the combatant commanders require to support their war
plans.
We recognize that Congress is very interested in the
overall numbers of the B-52 remaining and that we have specific
directions to retain the bomber force or the B-52 force at its
current level until this study is complete and Congress gets a
chance to review those results.
We agree that the study completion will probably be later
this fall and it will not be available to you in time to inform
the 2008 budget decisions.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would the Air Force retire all of the
18 B-52s authorized to be retired in 2008?
General Burg. The Air Force would like to have the
authority to retire those bombers that are awaiting the results
of that study, and our budget submission submits a program line
that would retire those aircraft.
Senator Bill Nelson. What are the changed circumstances
that would persuade Congress to authorize the retirement of any
additional B-52 bombers?
General Burg. Sir, I would answer that the circumstances
are still roughly what they were prior to this report being
requested by Congress, that the combatant commanders have told
us what their needs are for a bomber force, and we feel we can
meet those needs with the B-2, B-1, and the reduced B-52 force;
that there are still questions from Members of Congress on
whether that is an adequate bomber force for the future. But
the Air Force believes that it is an adequate bomber force with
the reductions that we had programmed to take in the 2007
submission.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, what is the minimum number of
B-52 bombers needed to protect all the plans and requirements?
General Burg. We believe that the number that we have
proposed in the 2008 budget, 56 total aircraft inventory of B-
52s, is the adequate number for the B-52 when combined with the
B-1 and B-2 force to provide for the combatant commanders'
requirements. Now, we recognize that there is some risk in that
force. If you have two major contingencies at the same time,
you accept some risk. But if you believe that your future
requirements will be based on a single major combat operation
activity, that bomber force with the reduced B-52 numbers meets
the combatant commanders' requirements.
Senator Bill Nelson. In that authorization bill from the
2007 year, it directed the Air Force to maintain 44 combat
coded B-52 bomber aircraft, which would require a total of 74
in the inventory. The 44 coded aircraft was a minimum to meet
requirements. Does the fiscal year request mean that the 44
combat coded aircraft can be met within the 56 B-52 bombers?
General Burg. Sir, we recognize the same requirement that
you have stated, 44 combat coded B-52s, and we are studying the
ability to make 44 combat coded B-52s available with the force
of 56 total aircraft inventory. We do not have an answer for
you right now on whether that is easy to do or how challenging
it is to do in terms of resources required. It becomes more
expensive to maintain more combat coded aircraft.
The answer is still not available to us right now.
Senator Bill Nelson. So the answer is we do not know if you
can maintain 44 combat coded within the 56?
General Burg. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. A review of the various modernization
programs indicates that the Air Force could support somewhere
between 65 and 70 B-52 bombers, but only if the outyear funding
for the CONECT program was to be extended. How much would it
cost to modernize all 76 B-52s?
General Burg. Sir, I would appreciate the opportunity to
take that question for the record and get you a very specific
answer. We feel that we have the adequate resources in the
modernization programs supporting the B-52 to field up to 72
aircraft with the modernized capabilities that we are building
into the B-52. But that uses spares that we had anticipated or
components that we had anticipated using as spares to support a
56-aircraft force.
[The information referred to follows:]
In order to modernize the current fleet of 76 B-52s, the fiscal
year 2008 APAF funding required would be $19.02 million. Below are the
breakout costs of modernizing the B-52s (costing in millions):
[In millions of dollars]
Advanced Weapons Integration............................... $5.51
MLR-2020 (ILS receiver).................................... 1.41
Electronic Countermeasure Improvement (ECMI)............... 3.80
Avionics Midlife Improvement (AMI)......................... 0
Enhanced Data Link......................................... 1.76
Digital Stability Augmentation Components.................. 6.54
Fiscal year 2008 funding does not complete the following two
modification efforts:
ECMI: Additional funding required to complete installation--fiscal
year 2009 ($2.7 million) and
AMI: Additional funding required to support 76 AMI configured B-52s--
fiscal year 2010 ($3.1 million).
Senator Bill Nelson. The Air Force already decided, did it
not, to terminate two other modernization programs, the AMI and
the ECMI, before they had purchased all the necessary upgrade
kits? So you would have to restart the manufacturing line.
General Burg. Yes, sir, we would need to restart the line
to purchase more kits, and I can give you specific costs for
the requirement there. We think it is about a $216 million bill
to maintain 76 aircraft fully capable as you have described, as
opposed to 56 aircraft.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, let me ask you. I understand
that the Air Force is thinking about using parts of the
Peacekeeper to develop a conventional ICBM that would be
launched from Vandenberg. Is this a violation of the START
treaty?
General Burg. Sir, if I could clarify some aspects of what
you just asked. We do have a program that would use the first
segment and third stage of a Peacekeeper missile, which was a
nuclear ballistic missile. But it would use those stages in a
way that is not a ballistic missile. The missile follows a
trajectory that is not ballistic. The difference is very
significant in terms of how you describe the capability and how
other nations might view that capability.
We recognize the concerns of Congress in terms of
conventional ballistic missiles being confused with their
nuclear ballistic predecessors. But this is a significantly
different capability. It flies in a trajectory that is 90
percent lower than a ballistic missile. It flies on a boost-
glide trajectory. But it is a fact that we would plan to use
the first three stages of a Peacekeeper missile to support this
new conventional strike capability. We do not believe it is a
violation of the treaty and the treaty is open to different
ways to describe these kinds of capabilities not as former
nuclear missiles.
Senator Bill Nelson. We need a briefing on that particular
system as to what you plan to do with it and so forth.
General Burg. Sir, we would be very happy to bring that
forward to you.
Senator Bill Nelson. For the General and for the Admiral:
The military Services each submit unfunded priority lists
(UPLs). Can you briefly, because they just called the vote,
discuss the items on the respective lists that fall into your
areas? Let us go with you, Admiral.
Admiral Johnson. I do have an item on the UPL and if my
good associate in the Air Force will go first I might recover
it in time.
Senator Bill Nelson. General?
General Burg. Sir, unfunded requirements cover a broad
spectrum. For the specifics of how we would use your inputs on
the UPL, I would like to answer that for the record if that is
acceptable and give you very specific numbers and places where
we have capabilities in my portfolio.
[The information referred to follows:]
Below is a listing of Air Force programs of interest to the Senate
Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee that have been
submitted on our unfunded priority list.
ICBM Remote Visual Assessment (RVA) $13.5 million:
Adds funds to purchase 90 additional RVA kits in fiscal year 2008.
This completes RVA deployment at one intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) wing to improve security forces' situational awareness. The RVA
program sends visual signals from remote, unguarded Minuteman launch
facilities to security force control facilities. The added visual
information allows the security controllers to prioritize and tailor
the responding security forces. In total, the 3 ICBM wings have missile
launch facilities scattered across 44,600 square miles.
Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) $4.2 million:
Funds Research and Development to select replacement for 50 UH-1Ns
(25 AFSPC, 6 AETC, and 19 AFDW) with 54 CVLSPs (28 AFSPC, 6 AETC, 20
AFDW).
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral?
Admiral Johnson. Sir, on the UPL there are two 87-foot
cutters to be used in the transit security program as we escort
our vessels in and out of port. We would like to accelerate
those purchases, if possible. Those ships are bought through
the Coast Guard, right off the Coast Guard production line.
They are identical in every respect to a Coast Guard vessel. We
arm them slightly differently, but other than that, and those
are easily changed, they are identical vessels.
Senator Bill Nelson. These are not the same Coast Guard
ships that they are suddenly having manufacturing problems
with, are they?
Admiral Johnson. No. Those are a different ship, no, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Jeff, do you have anything?
Senator Sessions. No. I would just say, Mr. Green, I am a
little concerned about an article from ``The Parliamentarian''
in the Czech Republic that was concerned about the United
States' negotiating tactics with regard to the European site. I
think that it is important that we stay on top of that and make
sure that we are handling that in a way that is acceptable to
them, because I think that is an important thing for the whole
world and for Europe.
I will ask you for the record, Mr. Green, about the 2006
bill. The National Defense Authorization Act required a
commission on the implementation of the new strategic posture
of the United States. That has not been stood up yet, I
understand, and I would like you to respond as to why that has
not.
[The information referred to follows:]
Implementation of the Strategic Posture Commission (SPC) has faced
several hurdles, most notably the absence of any appropriations for the
commission. Initial estimates were that the SPC would need $4.25
million to conduct its work, but no funds were provided by Congress in
the fiscal year 2006 budget. The Department of Defense (DOD) sought
funds for this purpose in its fiscal year 2006 reprogramming request,
but Congress reduced the funds available for all DOD commissions. As a
result, the SPC received no funding. Congress added four new unfunded
commissions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, but only $6.7 million was appropriated for all DOD commissions in
fiscal year 2007. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget requested
additional funds for commissions, but Congress cut most of the request,
citing ``excessive growth'' in boards and commissions. DOD submitted a
fiscal year 2007 reprogramming request that would shift funds to
support statutory and discretionary commissions.
In addition to funding issues, there is also the matter of filling
the commission positions. Of the 12 individuals selected by the
Secretary of Defense in consultation with Congress, only 9 accepted the
invitation to serve. We have been working with the SPC chairman to
develop a list of alternate candidates for the Secretary's selection
and approval in consultation with Congress.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you all for your participation
today. You have been very kind and this hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD AND THE W-76
1. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Johnson, what modifications will
the Navy have to make on the Mark 5 re-entry vehicle to accommodate the
first Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) design?
Admiral Johnson. Modifications to the war reserve aeroshell and
antenna systems are expected to be minimal. Changes to Reentry Body
(RB) and Release Assembly (RA) cable assemblies and the likely addition
of a new RA connector are required to support the new surety options.
That being said, however, a new warhead Arming, Fuzing, and Firing
(AF&F) system jointly funded by National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) and Navy will have to be developed and produced
for the RRW design.
2. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Johnson, assuming that the RRW is a
feasible replacement for the W-76, what is the right mix of RRWs and W-
76 warheads in the inventory?
Admiral Johnson. NNSA production capability of RRW is the limiting
element. The minimum number needed of W-76-1 is the planned fiscal year
2012 submarine outload. The planned RRW build, limited by available RRW
production rate and planned production time of 10 years will produce a
number of RRWs far short of the needed inventory. If W-76-1 is produced
in quantities to supply the minimum submarine outload in fiscal year
2012, then the RRW can replace the end of production of W-76-1
production requirement with minimum risk to the deterrent.
3. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Johnson, what is the downside of
delaying the W-76 life extension to see if the RRW is feasible?
Admiral Johnson. If the RRW is delayed or has significant problems,
the W-76-0 will age out and Navy will have no replacement capability.
If W-76-1 is produced in quantities to supply the minimum submarine
outload in fiscal year 2012, then the RRW can replace the end of
production of W-76-1 production requirement with minimum risk to the
deterrent.
4. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Johnson, would the Navy work on a
new arming, firing, and fuzeing system for the RRW 1 take place as part
of phase 2A or phase 3?
Admiral Johnson. For all systems, the fuze is an integral part of
the design and must be addressed during each phase of the development.
Work defining top-level fuze requirements, operational modes, and
preliminary designs occur in Phase 2. These requirements, operational
concepts, and designs are further refined during Phase 2A in support of
cost studies and in the development of acquisition and qualification
strategies. Detailed design of the AF&F will take place in phase 2A
since there was no specific Navy funding for the AF&F in fiscal year
2007. Phase 3 begins the engineering and manufacturing development
phase where component-level requirements and subsystem designs are
refined, and prototype hardware is produced for qualification and
optimization for manufacture. The beginning of Phase 3 marks the real
commitment to an effort which will be reflected in the need for
resources.
B-52 BOMBER
5. Senator Bill Nelson. General Burg, what has changed since the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007
authorized retirement of only 18 B-52 bombers, rejecting the request in
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to transition to 56 B-52 bombers?
General Burg. There has been no significant change to the combatant
commanders' conventional strike requirements or the overall security
environment within the last year. However, the Air Force has been
moving forward to enhance its long-range strike capability by
implementing a comprehensive three-phased strategy which addresses
near-term issues and prepares for future operational needs.
Phase I of this strategy is to modernize the remaining legacy
bomber force. The B-1, B-2, and B-52 will undergo upgrades focused on
sustainability, lethality, responsiveness, and survivability that
enhance their capabilities to provide combat power for the combatant
command (COCOM). For instance, in President's budget 2008 (fiscal year
2008-fiscal year 2013) the B-52 has the following enhancements
programmed: Avionics Midlife Improvement (AMI), Advanced Weapons
Integration (AWI), Combat Network Communication Technology (CONECT),
Electronic Countermeasures Improvement (ECMI), and Miniature Air
Launched Decoys (MALD). These upgrades will allow the B-52 to carry and
employ the LITENING II advanced targeting pod, rapidly re-target J-
series weapons in-flight, increase communications capability and
connectivity, and provide enhanced capability against enemy threat
systems. As well, the B-1 and B-2 are programmed to receive similar
upgrades that will result in increasingly capable aircraft. In the
near-term, the Air Force will present a more capable bomber force to
the combatant commanders for their employment.
This modernized legacy bomber force will serve to mitigate the risk
until Phase II of our long-range strike strategy fields the next
generation bomber in 2018. Additionally, the Bomber Force Structure
Study directed by Congress to be accomplished by the Institute for
Defense Analyses is underway and we expect initial findings to be
available by August 2007.
6. Senator Bill Nelson. General Burg, what are the changed
circumstances or new information that would persuade Congress to
authorize retirement of any additional B-52 bombers?
General Burg. There has been no significant change to the combatant
commanders' conventional strike requirements or the overall security
environment within the last year. However, the Air Force has been
moving forward to enhance its long-range strike capability by
implementing a comprehensive three-phased strategy which addresses
near-term issues and prepares for future operational needs.
Phase I of this strategy is to modernize the remaining legacy
bomber force. The B-1, B-2, and B-52 will undergo upgrades focused on
sustainability, lethality, responsiveness, and survivability that
enhance their capabilities to provide combat power for the COCOM. For
instance, in President's budget 2008 (fiscal year 2008-fiscal year
2013) the B-52 has the following enhancements programmed: AMI, AWI,
CONECT, ECMI, and MALD. These upgrades will allow the B-52 to carry and
employ the LITENING II advanced targeting pod, rapidly re-target J-
series weapons in-flight, increase communications capability and
connectivity, and provide enhanced capability against enemy threat
systems. As well, the B-1 and B-2 are programmed to receive similar
upgrades that will result in increasingly capable aircraft. In the
near-term, the Air Force will present a more capable bomber force to
the combatant commanders for their employment.
This modernized legacy bomber force will serve to mitigate the risk
until Phase II of our long-range strike strategy fields the next
generation bomber in 2018. Additionally, the Bomber Force Structure
Study directed by Congress to be accomplished by the Institute for
Defense Analyses is underway and we expect initial findings to be
available by August 2007
7. Senator Bill Nelson. General Burg, would the Air Force retire
all 18 B-52s authorized to be retired in fiscal year 2008?
General Burg. The fiscal year 2007 program of record retired 18 B-
52s, including 1 aircraft on loan to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress
restricted the retirement of 17 of these aircraft until 45 days after
the Secretary of the Air Force submits a bomber force structure study
conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to Congress. Only
the aircraft on loan to NASA has not been restricted from retirement
pending the IDA study. The IDA study should be briefed to the Air Force
in August 2007, with formal report delivery to Congress by the end of
fiscal year 2007. The 45-day waiting period pushes the earliest B-52
retirement into fiscal year 2008. As a result, the Air Force intends to
retire all 17 aircraft during fiscal year 2008 following submission of
the IDA study to Congress and the subsequent 45-day waiting period.
8. Senator Bill Nelson. General Burg, the B-52 draw down is part of
a broader effort to reposition the B-52 aircraft between the two bases,
one in Louisiana and one in North Dakota, and consolidate bomber
delivered nuclear weapons. This is a long-term project. What is the
likelihood that reductions and repositioning beyond the 18 would occur
in fiscal year 2008, even if authorized?
General Burg. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 language limited the
Air Force to retiring not more than 18 B-52s and maintaining 44 B-52s
as Combat Coded.
The Air Force has requested to divest 20 B-52s in the fiscal year
2008 President's budget, reducing the Total Active Inventory (TAI) to
56 B-52s. This program is based first on the ability of 56 TAI to meet
any single COCOM requirement; second on the assessment that the
operational risk associated with the retirements is acceptable; and
third the need to recapitalize as a part of the Air Force's three-phase
long-range strike (LRS) plan.
If Congress authorizes the divestiture of 20 B-52s in fiscal year
2008, the Air Force plans to reposition the aircraft as expeditiously
as possible per the program of record. To remain in compliance with
NDAA 2007 language while maintaining 56 aircraft TAI, the Air Force
will place the 20 aircraft in ``Excess to Command'' status.
9. Senator Bill Nelson. General Burg, what is the minimum number of
B-52 bombers needed to meet all plans and requirements?
General Burg. The B-52 program of record as presented in the fiscal
year 2008 President's budget, retires 18 excess-to-need attrition
reserve aircraft in fiscal year 2007 and another 20 aircraft in fiscal
year 2008 for a Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI) of 56. The B-52 force
structure of 56 TAI satisfies any single COCOM requirement, meets
requirements for two near-simultaneous Major Combat Operations with
swing of forces and enables recapitalization as part of the Air Force's
three-phase LRS plan.
10. Senator Bill Nelson. General Burg, what is the utilization rate
for the 74 non-attrition reserve B-52 bomber aircraft?
General Burg. The standard utilization (UTE) rate for the B-52 is
5.8 for the Active-Duty and 5.0 for the Reserves. UTE is calculated
using programmed Primary Aircraft Inventory (PAI) and not Backup
Aircraft Inventory (BAI). The Active Duty has 37 PAI and the Reserves 8
for a total of 45 aircraft; two other aircraft (also PAI) are with Air
Force Materiel Command for test purposes. PAI and BAI total 54
aircraft. Fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 standard UTE rates are
identical.
ACC
PAI..................................... 37
BAI..................................... 6
AR (Attrition Reserve).................. 2
Reserve
PAI..................................... 8
BAI..................................... 1
AFMC
PAI..................................... 2
Totals
PAI..................................... 47
BAI..................................... 7
AR...................................... 2
-----------------------------
56
The figure of 74 aircraft is based on the fiscal year 2006
President's budget force structure; an Air Force corporate decision,
PBD 720, reduced that number to 56 as of the fiscal year 2007
President's budget.
11. Senator Bill Nelson. General Burg, what requirement for LRS
aircraft is not being met by the current fleet of B-52, B-1, and B-2
bombers?
General Burg. Proliferation of advanced threat systems such as the
SU-27, SU-30, SA-20, and S-400 are presenting survivability challenges
for our legacy platforms and will eventually limit their capability to
respond and persist in the high threat battle space of the future. The
Next Generation Long-Range Strike (NGLRS) aircraft, which will be
fielded in 2018, will provide a stealthy, persistent, responsive
capability that can attack deep, heavily defended, fixed and mobile,
high-value targets.
12. Senator Bill Nelson. General Burg, the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2007 directed the Air Force to maintain 44 combat coded B-52 bomber
aircraft, which would require 74 total B-52 aircraft in inventory. The
44 combat coded aircraft was the minimum to meet requirements. Does the
fiscal year request mean that the 44 combat coded aircraft can be met
with only 56 B-52 bombers? What happened in the past 6 months to make
this possible?
General Burg. The Air Force is requesting to reduce the number of
B-52 aircraft in order to divest legacy aircraft for the purpose of
modernization and recapitalization. The Air Force's Air Combat Command
(ACC) has stated that they can provide 44 Combat Coded (CC) aircraft
with 56 TAI. There has been no significant change to the combatant
commanders' conventional strike requirements or the overall security
environment within the last year. With a reduced B-52 force, the Air
Force will still retain the ability to meet any COCOM requirement from
a total force perspective. The bomber's ability to swing from one AOR
to another and the ability to introduce different force structures to
provide the same effect will allow the Air Force to provide the forces
to the COCOM to meet their requirements.
The fiscal year 2008 President's budget includes the planned
retirement of 20 B-52s in fiscal year 2008. The NDAA for Fiscal Year
2007 language limited the Air Force to retiring not more than 18 B-52s
and maintaining 44 B-52s as CC. To remain in compliance with NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2007 language while maintaining 56 aircraft TAI, the Air
Force will place the 20 aircraft in ``Excess to Command Status.''
13. Senator Bill Nelson. General Burg, a review of the various B-52
modernization programs indicates that the Air Force could support
somewhere between 65 and 70 B-52 bombers with the current modernization
funding and then only if the out-year funding for the Connect program
were to be extended. How much would it cost to modernize all 76 B-52s?
General Burg. In order to modernize the current fleet of 76 B-52s,
the fiscal year 2008 APAF funding required would be $19.02 million.
Below are the breakout costs of modernizing the B-52s (cost in
millions):
[In millions of dollars]
Advanced Weapons Integration............................... $5.51
MLR-2020 (ILS receiver).................................... 1.41
Electronic Counter Measure Improvement (ECMI).............. 3.80
Avionics Midlife Improvement (AMI)......................... 0
Enhanced Data Link......................................... 1.76
Digital Stability Augmentation Components.................. 6.54
Fiscal year 2008 funding does not complete the following two
modification efforts:
ECMI: Additional funding required to complete installation--fiscal
year 2009 ($2.7 million) and
AMI: Additional funding required to support 76 AMI configured B-52s--
fiscal year 2010 ($3.1 million).
HELICOPTERS FOR ICBM FIELDS
14. Senator Bill Nelson. General Burg, the helicopters that the Air
Force uses to support the vast expanse of intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) fields are Vietnam-era and need to be replaced. What are
the requirements for new helicopters and what are the plans to replace
the old helicopters, including the estimated cost of the replacement?
General Burg. The UH-1N does not meet requirements directed in
Nuclear Weapon Security Manual (Department of Defense (DOD) S-5210.41-M
dated 22 November 2004), and it cannot be modified to meet Key
Performance Parameters in speed, lift, range, and capacity. The Air
Force safely maintains and operates the UH-1N and plans to continue to
do so until a replacement program is fielded. The Air Force is pursuing
the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) as a replacement
effort. CVLSP is currently unfunded; it is currently number six on the
Air Force Chief of Staff's Unfunded Priority List (UPL). The Air Force
has conducted a CVLSP Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to study
replacement options. The AoA Final Report is currently with OSD (PA&E)
for sufficiency review. No reliable cost data is available because the
replacement platform(s) have not been selected.
15. Senator Bill Nelson. General Burg, has the Air Force selected a
replacement helicopter for the ICBM fields?
General Burg. The Air Force has not selected a replacement for the
UH-1N. The CVLSP is an unfunded effort to replace the UH-1N. It is
currently number six on the Air Force Chief of Staff's UPL. Air Force
Space Command completed an AoA for the CVLSP. The AoA team evaluated 12
different material solutions and mixed fleet possibilities. The CVLSP
AoA Final Report is currently with OSD (PA&E) for a sufficiency review.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
GLOBAL INNOVATION AND STRATEGY CENTER
16. Senator Ben Nelson. General Cartwright, the Global Innovation
and Strategy Center (GISC) is a facility to bring together, in a
cooperative effort, members of the public and private sector and to
leverage the expertise of the participating members to provide global
strategies, timely courses of action, and new operational tools and
analyses in support of the Strategic Command (STRATCOM) mission. What
is the current status of the GISC and are there accomplishments yet?
General Cartwright. The GISC became operational in September 2006
and has completed over 38 diverse projects. For example, the GISC
successfully teamed with the State of Nebraska and the University of
Nebraska in the development of a pandemic influenza predictive modeling
and vaccine distribution program. The program was adopted by Nebraska
and is under review by the Centers for Disease Control for
applicability nationwide. Additionally, the GISC teamed with Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab to develop software that
leverages the national satellite systems to produce actionable
intelligence that previously may have gone unnoticed. This information
was supplied to the Commander, Pacific Air Forces and successfully
transitioned to the Air Force for integration into the Distributed
Common Ground System. The GISC is also working on projects to help
redefine global deterrence in the 21st century that have already proven
useful. We view these example projects and more as accomplishments.
17. Senator Ben Nelson. General Cartwright, can you describe the
collaborations with the university community in Nebraska as well as the
private sector?
General Cartwright. In addition to collaborating with the
University of Nebraska community on pandemic influenza modeling, the
GISC implemented an intern study program. This USSTRATCOM ``first''
leverages the academic rigor of a small, cross-disciplinary University
of Nebraska academic team to take a fresh, unclassified look at tough
issues confronting the Command and the Nation. The GISC recently
completed its first intern study project, which looked at
communications transmission in the Pan Sahel of Africa. Furthermore two
intern study groups will begin in the fall, leveraging academic teams
from the University of Nebraska Omaha and the Peter Kiewit Institute.
Eventually the GISC will leverage national and international academic
teams to evaluate similar timely issues. The GISC recently hosted a
first of its kind Global Leadership Conference bringing private sector
CEOs together with the military to gain a perspective on collaborating
and working future issues. Our objective is to utilize cross
organization and disipline collaboration to develop new strategies for
our most difficult problems. This peering, self-organized effort
bypasses vertical closed approaches, and physical and regional
artificial boundaries to generate innovation.
18. Senator Ben Nelson. General Cartwright, obviously, GISC is
still evolving; what do you foresee for the future?
General Cartwright. Globalization has given us unique challenges
but it has also given us opportunities to access information that will
enable us to have new knowledge discovery by using the latest
technologies, large network bandwidth, and a global approach. This
structure allows the GISC to think and act globally; break down
artifical closed, vertical, physical, regional boundaries; create
peering relations; and foster self-organized functional activites. The
GISC is an organization where Government, industry, and academia can
come together and tackle the Nation's toughest problems in an
environment that is conducive to information sharing with an innovative
global perspective.
19. Senator Ben Nelson. General Cartwright, the February 6, 2006,
QDR assigned STRATCOM lead responsibility to operate and protect the
Department's Global Information Grid (GIG). That's a part of STRATCOM's
Information Operations (IO) mission. Can you describe what that means--
``operate and protect'' the GIG?
General Cartwright. Defending the GIG implies only defending the
DOD. We defend the Nation by layered defense off shore in partnership
with Homeland Security on shore. Operating and defending the GIG means
providing the framework, policy, guidance, and supervision to all users
on the DOD's networks to ensure we are protecting our greatest
resource: information. Employing an overall strategy of defending the
GIG and the information it contains, USSTRATCOM employs a proactive
preventive capability and flexible, rapid, and aggressive response
actions. Our concept of Computer Network Defense (CND) depends upon
situational awareness of the network environment, predictive warning of
impending attacks, defensive tools, and measures to defeat attacks when
they occur. Out intent is to assure timely and secure net-centric
capabilities in support of DOD's full spectrum of warfighting,
intelligence, and business missions. Operating and defending the GIG
means employing a defense-in-depth approach that is routinely validated
and enhanced through rigorous full-dimensional exercises across the
DOD. Over the last 2 years, we've made tremendous headway in deterring
and reducing the number of intrusions.
20. Senator Ben Nelson. General Cartwright, Barksdale Air Force
Base has a brand new Global Cyberspace Innovation Center. What is the
relationship between the GIG and those activities?
General Cartwright. Eighth Air Force, headquartered at Barksdale
Air Force Base, is the Numbered Air Force Component assigned to provide
Air Force cyber and global strike capabilities to USSTRATCOM. Barksdale
Air Force Base hosts the Air Force Network Operations Center and
STRATCOM's Air Operations Center. The local Shreveport-Bossier
community established a ``Cyberspace Innovation Center'' to organize
local industry and academia cyberspace efforts and integrate them into
the nationwide network of innovation centers of excellence. The focus
areas of the Cyberspace Innovation Center are cyber research and
development, public law and policy, and training and education. The
Center will take advantage of existing state-of-the-art resources such
as the Louisiana Consortium for Education, Research, and Technology and
the Louisiana Optical Network Initiative to provide very high
bandwidth, virtual collaboration between partners.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES
21. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, our missile defense system
is an important response to the challenges of ballistic missile
proliferation. How do we extend deterrence or enhance defenses against
the ballistic missile threat for our deployed forces and allies?
General Cartwright. Global integration of regional missile defense
capabilities with our allies is crucial to enhancing and extending
global deterrence. We continue to rely on the Patriot missile system
for defense of deployed forces while we work to build additional
capabilities. The Missile Defense Agency, with essential warfighter
input, is developing and testing additional ground- and sea-based
systems that complement this system and will provide the robustness and
redundancy we require to defend our allies and deployed forces. Allies
are also active participants in providing protection against ballistic
missile threats as they continue to expand cooperative programs with
the U.S. Government. Japan's purchase and fielding of missile defense
systems and the desire of European countries to host forward deployed
radars and interceptors provide evidence of ally aspirations to protect
their homeland. Active defense forces are but one piece of the
solution; we also look to attack operations, passive defense, and
nonkinetic options to meet the threat.
22. Senator Pryor. Mr. D'Agostino, it is imperative to national
security to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of our
nuclear stockpile. How do we validate the reliability of new modular
and interoperable nuclear warheads under the RRW program?
Mr. D'Agostino. The NNSA design laboratories (with Lawrence
Livermore as the lead laboratory) will employ the same broad approach
used to verify the continued performance of existing warheads. The
laboratories will conduct integrated experiments, develop models, and
use computational analysis to quantify performance margins and assess
uncertainties.
The designers have identified and understand the key performance
parameters for RRW would be designed utilizing archived nuclear test
data. The RRW will be designed so that these key performance parameters
arc farther away from failure points (have greater margin) than the
current Cold War warheads designed for high yield to weight. This
approach would give designers higher confidence in their ability to
certify the design without underground nuclear tests. Years of
experience studying materials and manufacturing processes, and with
capabilities developed as part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program,
combined with past nuclear test data, provide a basis for designers to
address known areas of uncertainty. Improved warhead performance
margins that would be incorporated into the replacement warhead design
will reduce uncertainty due to aging, and reduce the likelihood that
underground nuclear testing will be required in the future to resolve a
technical problem in the stockpile. The quantification of margins and
uncertainties (QMU). for key performance parameters would aid in
understanding the limits of the performance and be the basis for the
laboratory directors' certification of a RRW design.
23. Senator Pryor. Mr. D'Agostino, the NNSA has said that the
acquisition of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capabilities, technologies, and expertise by rogue states or terrorists
stands as one of the most potent threats to the United States and
international security. What is your plan to address these threats?
Mr. D'Agostino. The overall strategy to protect the United States
from rogue state and terrorist nuclear weapons threats has seven
components:
Determine intentions, capabilities, and plans to
develop or acquire nuclear weapons;
Deny access to nuclear materials, expertise, and
technologies required to develop nukes;
Detect and disrupt attempted movement of nuclear
materials, weapons, personnel;
Deter nuclear attack;
Prepare for and respond to nuclear attack;
Define the nature and source of a terrorist-employed
nuclear device; and
Disarm and dispose of a terrorist nuclear device.
Prevention is the key to an effective strategy. The NNSA is working
intensively to assist overall U.S. efforts to prevent acquisition of
nuclear devices and fissile materials by rogue states and terrorists
by:
Strengthening physical security of U.S. nuclear
weapons and weapons usable materials;
Providing assistance to Russia to strengthen
protection, control, and accounting of its nuclear weapons and
materials;
Working with friends and allies to secure weapons-
usable nuclear materials worldwide, and to strengthen security
at civil nuclear facilities; and
Taking more aggressive steps to interdict illicit
trafficking in weapons-usable nuclear materials and related
technologies via strengthened export controls, cooperation with
other countries through Second Line of Defense and MegaPorts
programs, and the Proliferation Security Initiative.
Attribution, or the capability to rapidly characterize and identify
the source of a nuclear warhead or weapons usable nuclear materials
either before or after an attack, is a vital component of our overall
strategy to deter nuclear terrorism. This is for the reason that it is
far less likely that a stale will provide nuclear weapons to terrorists
if it knows that there is a strong likelihood that we will attribute
the weapon to that state, and that we are fully able to retaliate on
the source. During the period of nuclear testing NNSA developed a
national capability for technical nuclear forensics to support its own
test program and to understand the nature of non-U.S. nuclear tests.
This capability, developed over a period of decades during the Cold
War, is critical to attribution of terrorist nuclear threats. Among
other things, the NNSA is developing a concept of operations to assess
origin of an interdicted nuclear device; and is also working to ensure
that the capabilities exist at our national laboratories for pre- and
post-detonation forensics assessments.
Through its national laboratory system the Department of Energy
(DOE) deploys highly-trained learns of experts to search for
clandestine nuclear materials or warheads and to disarm and dispose of
a terrorist nuclear device. These teams work in concert with elements
of the DOD, DHS, and the FBI to provide the total national response to
nuclear terrorism.
24. Senator Pryor. General Burg, how do we reduce our ICBM nuclear
arsenal without compromising our strategic deterrent posture?
General Burg. On 16 March 07, the Air Force provided a detailed
report on ICBM force modernization in response the guidance contained
in section 139 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L. 109-364). We are
forwarding through classified channels an excerpt from this report that
addresses the United States' strategic deterrent posture.
25. Senator Pryor. Admiral Johnson, nuclear propulsion plays a
vital role in our Navy's effective forward presence throughout the
world. How can we ensure their continued safe, reliable, and long-lived
operation?
Admiral Johnson. The Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program,
has statutory authority for oversight and direction of all aspects of
naval nuclear propulsion. U.S. nuclear-powered warships have safely
operated for more than half a century without experiencing any reactor
accident or any release of radioactivity that had an adverse effect on
human health or the quality of the environment. The program has
consistently limited personnel radiation exposure more stringently than
the civilian nuclear power industry or other Government nuclear
programs. No civilian or military personnel in the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program have ever exceeded the Federal lifetime radiation
exposure limit or the Federal annual limit in effect at the time.
Naval reactors' safety standards are mainstreamed across all
organizations in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, from
headquarters to equipment suppliers, contractors, laboratories,
shipyards, training facilities, and the fleet. Continued safe and
reliable operation is ensured through the long-term, deliberate
investment in the material, design, and operational standards that
characterize the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
RESPONSIVE NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE
26. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright, the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) called for the development of a ``responsive nuclear
infrastructure.'' Have the DOD and the DOE ever formalized a definition
of ``responsive''?
General Cartwright. The June 2004, Report to Congress, A Revised
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan for 2012, submitted by the Secretary of
Defense and Secretary of Energy defines ``responsive'' as, ``. . . the
resilience of the nuclear weapons enterprise to unanticipated events or
emerging threats, and the ability to anticipate innovations by an
adversary and to counter them before our deterrent is degraded all the
while continuing to carry out day-to-day activities in support of the
stockpile.'' The DOD continues to work with the DOE on quantitative
metrics.
27. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright, what performance metrics
are used to measure ``responsiveness''?
General Cartwright. The June 2004, Report to Congress, A Revised
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan for 2012, submitted by the Secretary of
Defense and Secretary of Energy defines responsive nuclear
infrastructure. The DOD continues to work with the DOE on quantitative
metrics to include:
1) Time to fix stockpile problems;
2) Time to adapt weapons by modifying or repackaging existing
warheads;
3) Time to design, develop, and begin production of a new
warhead;
4) Production capacity levels;
5) Force augmentation service levels; and
6) Test readiness posture.
28. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright, how often is the
performance of the nuclear weapons complex assessed against these
metrics and by whom? To whom is the performance reported?
General Cartwright. Through the Nuclear Weapons Council, DOD and
NNSA constantly and jointly monitor progress toward meeting
responsiveness objectives. In fact, NNSA provides quarterly reports to
the Nuclear Weapons Council.
29. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright, is cost effectiveness, or
delivering products for a predicted cost target, one of the measures of
performance?
General Cartwright. Cost is a measure of performance for program
execution. Infrastructure responsiveness impacts cost and schedule. One
of the responsiveness objectives is to ensure an economically
sustainable nuclear weapons enterprise.
30. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright, in your view, what
progress has been made in the last 5 years on the development of a
``responsive'' infrastructure?
General Cartwright. The NNSA has begun to transform the nuclear
weapons complex. In 2006, NNSA developed the Complex 2030
Transformation Plan and established the Office of Transformation to
transform the nuclear weapons complex. Recent accomplishments include:
initiating tritium extraction operations, increasing throughput at
Pantex and Y12 plants, starting modernization and construction projects
for critical scientific and production facilities, and creating a
systems integration structure to improve efficiency and responsiveness.
The completion of the detailed cost and design study for the first RRW
is another critical milestone for transformation. We support NNSA's
nuclear complex transformation efforts but recognize much work remains
to be done.
COST OF RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD VERSUS THE CURRENT PATH
31. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, is the DOE preparing a
detailed analysis of the cost differential between the development and
deployment of a stockpile based on the RRW versus the cost of
continuing with life extension programs into the foreseeable future?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. We are using computer models of the nuclear
weapons complex enterprise to bound probable costs for a variety of
different scenarios that include a comparison of Life Extension Program
(LEP) and RRW stockpiles. The models indicate long-term economic
benefits for an RRW-based stockpile. However, because we are in the
early stages of finalizing the RRW and facility designs the detailed
costs associated with RRW development and deployment. Utilization of
the RRW design enables the elimination of certain hazardous operations
and a reduced suite of production capabilities that would have to be
retained and refurbished to support an LEP stockpile strategy. The RRW
Phase 2A will provide the baseline cost of a first design but it will
not be completed before the end of fiscal year 2008.
32. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, when will this analysis be
completed and presented to Congress?
Mr. D'Agostino. Assuming we are authorized and appropriated by
Congress to continue design definition and detailed RRW cost analysis,
Phase 2A, we should be able to present the detailed cost differential
between the different stockpile scenarios in late 2008.
33. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, do you think pursuit of the
RRW might be the less expensive option and, if so, why?
Mr. D'Agostino. Based upon the enterprise modeling results we have
now, we expect a stockpile option based on RRW concepts to be less
expensive than a LEP stockpile option over the next several decades.
Since a primary objective of RRW development is to increase design
margins in order to ensure warhead reliability while reducing the
potential need for an underground nuclear test, we intend to pursue
RRWs in a manner that makes them easier to manufacture, certify, and
maintain, as well as decrease the need for large numbers of
augmentation warheads. The RRW strategy is also intended to take
intrinsic safety and warhead security to a level that is not possible
to incorporate into an existing Cold-War design. All of these are
expected to reduce long-term costs.
COMPLEX 2030 ALTERNATIVES
34. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, how confident are you that
the range of alternatives being considered under the Complex 2030 plan
encompasses the full range of downsizing or facility consolidation that
will be appropriate for the nuclear weapons complex of the future--one
which supports a much smaller stockpile?
Mr. D'Agostino. I am quite confident that we are considering the
full range of reasonable downsizing or facility consolidation
alternatives as part of our complex transformation planning. For
example, we are evaluating alternatives ranging from no action to a
consolidated nuclear production center (CNPC) in our Complex
Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
and supporting business case analyses. A CNPC would consolidate all
nuclear component manufacturing and weapon assembly/disassembly
operations to one site. In addition, we are considering intermediate
nuclear production alternatives that range from downsizing-in-place at
three sites to consolidating to two sites. We are also analyzing the
impacts of a smaller stockpile in the event that national security
requirements are revised.
35. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, do you think the ``tough''
decisions about the future of some of these facilities can really be
made without an external body, such as a Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) Commission, doing an evaluation?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, I believe that we will be able to make the
tough decisions. NNSA is evaluating all reasonable alternatives and
using external groups that include officials who have BRAC experience.
With the support of Congress, I anticipate making a number of tough
decisions. Given the age of the NNSA production complex, and the
associated high maintenance and security costs, we need to transform
expeditiously. Our analyses show that delay is costly. It does not seem
likely that a BRAC could be authorized, organized, and complete its
evaluations in sufficient time to provide benefits that outweigh the
cost and risk of delays.
BUSINESS PRACTICES OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX
36. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, do you think there would be
value in having an independent group or commission review the business
practices of the nuclear weapons complex to search for efficiencies and
other improvements to the way business is conducted in the complex?
Mr. D'Agostino. Several independent groups have already conducted
reviews of various operations within the nuclear weapons complex to
include the business practices. These groups include the Secretary of
Energy Advisory Board's Recommendation for the Nuclear Weapons Complex
of the Future, the National Research Council, the DOE Inspector General
and the Government Accountability Office. From these reviews, we have
identified certain business areas to focus on for further efficiencies
and improvements. As an example, NNSA has implemented the Supply Chain
Management Center to consolidate and streamline procurement actions
across the complex. Improvements in program and project management and
cost estimating practices are also of particular interest. Further
external, independent reviews of these practices may be beneficial
after implementation, when results have been achieved.
37. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, many corporations have been
able to improve their operations through such reviews--such as Lean Six
Sigma, quality process improvement, and other corporate initiatives. Do
you have any such reviews currently ongoing? If so, do you have any
results that you can share with the committee?
Mr. D'Agostino. In the Nuclear Weapons Complex, several reviews and
initiatives have been conducted to improve processes and business
practices. Examples of some major improvement initiatives are the
Pantex Throughput Improvement Plan (PTIP) and the Y-12 Throughput
Improvement Plan (YTIP). Both quality process improvement plans takes a
fresh look at nuclear production operations and then changes those
practices that are considered unnecessary and inefficient. Specific
accomplishments have enabled increasing the weapon dismantlement rates
more than 146 percent over previous year's rate. Quality improvement
methods have also been applied in other areas such as non-nuclear
production at the Kansas City Plant, warhead disassembly and inspection
at Pantex, and neutron generator production at Sandia National
Laboratories (SNL). By applying Lean Six Sigma techniques, SNL has
increased capacity by 67 percent, reduced inventory by 55 percent, and
realized cycle time reductions of up to 75 percent. In the business
area, NNSA has optimized its procurement and spend management by
implementing corporate initiative of the Supply Chain Management Center
in fiscal year 2007. By applying industry best business practices of
strategic sourcing and eProcurement, NNSA will deliver procurement
process efficiencies and cost avoidances (estimated at 1 percent of
annual contractor spend or $30 million annually).
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
38. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, the fiscal year 2008 budget
request seeks $395 million for the salaries, benefits, and other
administrative costs of the Federal operations of the NNSA, an increase
of $54 million over fiscal year 2007. Could you please describe the
justification and purpose of this increase?
Mr. D'Agostino. The $54 million increase is the difference between
the fiscal year 2008 President's budget and the initial fiscal year
2007 appropriation of $341 million under the fiscal year 2007 year-long
Continuing Resolution. The current fiscal year 2007 level in this
account has been increased by an appropriation transfer of $17 million,
to a total of $358 million, so the increase to the fiscal year 2008
President's budget request is actually $37 million.
Receiving the full fiscal year 2008 budget request level of $395
million is essential for NNSA to recover a viable operations level
following the severe funding constraints during fiscal year 2007. Over
70 percent of the total request is for Federal salaries and benefits,
and over half of the fiscal year 2008 increase is in this area to cover
increase in benefits costs, including the Federal Cost-of-Living
adjustment. The President's budget request will allow NNSA to lift the
hiring freeze and begin to again acquire critical skill personnel to
support rapidly expanding mission programs, including Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation. Achieving this increase is vital at this time so that
NNSA can expand hiring to position the overall organization to replace
large numbers of managers and senior staff expected to begin NNSA's
retirement ``bow wave'' in the next 18 months.
The remaining 30 percent of the President's request is for ``non-
payroll'' costs. This would restore a prudent level--about 5 percent
growth--in travel needed to support expanding international program
work. Funding for support services contracting would stay essentially
flat with the levels achieved in fiscal year 2007, with internal
reprioritization to meet emerging mission program needs. Funding at the
President's request level will allow us to fully fund departmental
assessments for space, occupancy, and corporate systems, meet increased
requirements and costs for Federal information technology equipment and
systems, and continue to fund our commitments to the Historically Black
Colleges and Universities programs that had to be ``gapped'' because of
funding shortages during fiscal year 2007.
Because of the severe funding constraints in this account in fiscal
year 2007, Federal employment levels are currently slightly below
projections, and with funding at the President's request and aggressive
hiring, NNSA can return to the hiring curve needed to address the
current and future needs of the national security enterprise.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL NUCLEAR FORENSICS
39. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, the fiscal year 2008 budget
requests funding for a new initiative called National Technical Nuclear
Forensics (NTNF). This funding will establish a capability to support
post-detonation activities in the event of a nuclear WMD attack and
will enhance technical nuclear forensics capabilities. What
capabilities would be developed with this funding that do not already
exist at the nuclear weapons labs?
Mr. D'Agostino. NTNF provides information that is critical to the
larger issue of attribution. Post-detonation nuclear forensics is
directed by National Security and Homeland Security Presidential
Directives: ``Maintain nuclear materials and weapons expertise and
nuclear forensics capabilities including nuclear device, IND, and RDD
concept and design information through appropriate restricted data
nuclear weapon data controls as appropriate.'' With the additional
funding requested for fiscal year 2008, NNSA will enhance its
radiochemistry analytical capabilities to be able to provide more
quickly the information that is essential for determining a device's
design and the source of the materials used. These capabilities include
expanding laboratory capacity (to handle more samples more quickly),
improving laboratory processes (to achieve, for example, streamlined
analyses), enhancing device modeling capabilities, improving knowledge
management of the technical information contained in materials
databases, and providing better attribution tools.
PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE
40. Senator Sessions. Admiral Johnson, you note in your prepared
statement the $175 million request to provide an initial capability for
the Conventional Trident in 2010. Is the Navy examining other long-
range conventional strike capabilities that could be employed on a
surface ship or submarine?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, the Navy is examining other conventional
strike solutions to provide CDRSTRATCOM with Prompt Global Strike
capability. Congress provided funds in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year
2006 which allowed the Navy to demonstrate new low-cost solid rocket
motor technology for a smaller scale ``intermediate'' range ballistic
missile. Leveraging this work, the Navy has been studying a concept for
a longer range ( 3500 nm) Global Strike Missile that could be deployed
initially on the four SSGN submarines, and considered for later
deployment in the SSBN fleet alongside the D5 system. The conceptual
Submarine Launched Global Strike Missile (SL-GSM) is one of several
alternatives currently being assessed under the Air Force lead Prompt
Global Strike (PGS) Analysis of Alternatives. Both the intermediate
range ( 1500 nm) and global range ( 3500 nm) missile concepts are only
being assessed for employment from submarines. Other surface ship
strike options are available for shorter `tactical' ranges (<1000 nm).
The Conventional Trident Modification is the only `long-range' (>4000
nm) conventional strike capability that could be rapidly developed and
deployed to deliver Prompt Global Strike.
41. Senator Sessions. Admiral Johnson, I understand these options
cannot be fielded as quickly as the conventional trident missile (CTM).
What other options might be available?
Admiral Johnson. The Conventional Trident Modification is the only
conventional strike system that could be rapidly developed and deployed
to deliver Prompt Global Strike capability. The Submarine Launched
Global Strike Missile (SL-GSM) concept could not be developed and
fielded as quickly as the CTM capability. Initial studies indicate a
SL-GSM system could be developed, tested, and deployed on the SSGN in
approximately 5 years from initial funding. The SL-GSM concept delivers
a terminally-guided large single warhead to 3500 nm with a range of
kinetic effects including penetrating capability to defeat hard and
deeply buried targets. While formal budget quality numbers are still
being developed, an SSGN only capability is estimated to cost
approximately $2.5-3.0 billion to develop, test, procure, and deploy
SL-GSM on all SSGN submarines.
UNITED KINGDOM NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION
42. Senator Sessions. Admiral Johnson, the United Kingdom plans to
spend $40 billion to modernize its nuclear deterrent by creating a new
generation of nuclear submarines to carry American-supplied Trident
missiles. The current force of 4 Vanguard-class submarines each carry
16 Trident long-range ballistic missiles with British nuclear warheads.
What role, if any, will the United States play in the United Kingdom's
modernization effort?
Admiral Johnson. The 7 December 2006 exchange of letters between
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair reaffirmed the United States
commitment to support the missile system and associated equipment
deployed by the United Kingdom. President Bush confirmed the United
States will support the United Kingdom participation in the life-
extension program for the Trident II D5 missile and associated
equipment, under the continuing framework of the Polaris Sales
Agreement and the 1982 Exchange of Letters.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:12 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Reed,
Inhofe, Sessions, and Thune.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
William G.P. Monahan, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Gregory T. Kiley,
professional staff member; and Robert M. Soofer, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Benjamin L.
Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: David E. Bonine,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator
Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; M.
Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; and Stuart C.
Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Bill Nelson. This Subcommittee meets to hear from a
very distinguished panel. Our witnesses are Lieutenant General
Obering, Lieutenant General Campbell, Dr. Charles McQueary,
Brian Green, and Paul Francis.
All of you have prepared statements. They will be entered
in the record and we will keep the hearing record open for 3
days to allow members to submit statements or questions for the
records.
We're going to discuss several key issues. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has raised a number of important
acquisition issues related to improved oversight and
accountability of our missile defense programs and we want to
see how we can improve these programs.
Last year, Congress enacted a provision of law that
requires the Department of Defense to place a priority on the
development, testing, fielding, and improvement of effective
near-term missile defenses. We want to learn how the Department
has implemented that requirement.
There are many questions about a proposed deployment in
Europe of long-range interceptors and associated radars and we
need to explore those questions. Since we all want our missile
defense systems to work in an operationally-effective and cost-
effective, and suitable manner, we need to discuss some of the
important testing issues.
So, we're going to dig into this in detail. My preference
is that since we have your prepared statements already entered
into the record, there's no sense for you to sit there and re-
read it to us. So, we want you to talk to us.
I turn to our ranking member, Senator Sessions.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
Good afternoon. The subcommittee meets this afternoon to consider
the ballistic missile defense programs of the Department of Defense.
Our witnesses today are:
Lieutenant General Henry Obering, U.S. Air Force,
Director of the Missile Defense Agency;
Lieutenant General Kevin Campbell, U.S. Army,
Commander of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command, and
Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command Joint Force Component
Command for Integrated Missile Defense;
The Honorable Dr. Charles McQueary, Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation, an independent organization at
the Pentagon;
Brian Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategic Capabilities, within the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy; and
Paul Francis, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing
Management at the Government Accountability Office (GAO), who
directed the recent GAO report on missile defense acquisition
strategy.
All the witnesses have submitted prepared statements and, without
objection, your prepared testimony will be entered into the record in
full. We will keep the hearing record open for 3 days to allow members
to submit statements or questions for the record.
There are several key issues we want to discuss today:
The GAO has raised a number of important acquisition issues related
to improved oversight and accountability of our missile defense
programs, and we want to see how we can improve those programs.
Last year, Congress enacted a provision of law that requires the
Department of Defense to place a priority on the development, testing,
fielding, and improvement of effective, near-term missile defenses. We
want to learn how the Department has implemented that requirement.
There are many questions about a proposed deployment in Europe of
long-range interceptors and associated radars, and we need to explore
those questions.
Since we all want our missile defense systems to work in an
operationally-effective, cost-effective, and suitable manner, we need
to discuss some important testing issues.
We want to have a good discussion today about missile defense, so I
would ask the witnesses to provide very brief oral summaries,
highlighting just a few key points of their testimony. There is a
possibility of a closed session, if we need to discuss classified
matters.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Nelson, and for your
leadership. I've enjoyed working with you on this subcommittee
and you understand these issues and care about them, committing
the kind of time and efforts necessary for us to fulfill our
responsibilities.
I want to welcome our witnesses and thank them for their
service to our country. We've come a long way on missile
defense over the past few years and we have these gentlemen and
others ahead of you and working under you now, to thank for the
progress that's been made.
If you look back just 3 years ago, we only had the Patriot
anti-missile system to provide defense, only against short-
range missile threats like we utilized that Patriot system in
Israel against SCUDs. Today, our homeland, deployed forces, and
allies enjoy a limited measure of protection against the full
range of short and long-range ballistic missile threats. We're
making some good progress indeed, in a few years. Many thought
it could never be done.
Mr. Chairman, in reviewing the press that's leading up to
this year's deliberations, I get the sense that there may be
three significant issues that we will need to discuss this
year.
First, how much are we going to spend on overall missile
defense programs? Second, what is the proper balance between
testing and fielding additional capabilities? Third, whether to
proceed with plans to field a ground-based interceptor (GBI)
site in Central Europe?
On the issue of spending, the budget, as submitted by the
administration, is already tight. I would point out that the
fiscal year 2008 request of $8.9 billion for the full panoply
of missile defense programs is almost $500 million below last
year's appropriated level. It also represents the development,
testing, fielding, and sustainment of not just our single
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System that we talked a
lot about and gets the most publicity, but a number of systems
based on land, on our ships at sea, and in the air, which are
capable of defending against a broad spectrum of short-,
medium-, and long-range ballistic missile threats.
Seen in this light, the budget request compares I think,
favorably with the full suite of aircraft, for example, being
acquired by the Department of Defense. There is some concern
expressed that missile defense undergo adequate testing before
deployment, particularly the GBI.
While I support rigorous testing, we must remember why
Congress approved close to simultaneous fielding and testing
GBIs. It was because of our total vulnerability to long-range
ballistic missiles. The North Korean ballistic missile test
last July, coupled with Iran's ballistic missile development,
and a launch of a sounding rocket in November, confirmed the
wisdom, I think, of that approach.
Furthermore the successful intercept test on the GMD system
last September, in addition to similar successful tests of the
Patriot, SM-3, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
systems--all in this, included in this funding request--suggest
there's no reason to curtail planned fielding efforts even
while we rigorously operationally test these systems.
Finally, some in Congress have questioned--I don't know on
this side--but have questioned strategic rational for a GBD
site in Europe, which will provide protection for most of
Europe and the United States against the growing long-range
ballistic missile threat by Iran. I ask my colleagues to
consider this initiative in the broader context of our defense
strategy, and would note that just last month, Iran held 15
British citizens hostage. With ballistic missiles armed with
weapons of mass destruction, Iran could hold entire cities,
even nations hostage. A European continent vulnerable to
Iranian ballistic missile threats could weaken the west's
resolve in what is shaping up to be a clash of wills with Iran.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for your leadership, your
courtesy to me, and all of us on this subcommittee, and I look
forward to the hearing.
[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also welcome today's witnesses and thank
them for their service on behalf of the country. We have come a long
way on missile defense over the past few years and we have these
gentlemen and the men and women whom they represent to thank. If we
look back just three years ago, we had only the Patriot anti-missile
system to provide defense against short-range missile threats. Today,
our homeland, deployed forces, and allies enjoy a limited measure of
protection against the full range of short- to long-range ballistic
missile threats. We are making very good progress, indeed.
Mr. Chairman, in reviewing the press leading up to this year's
deliberations, I get the sense there may be three significant issues to
address this year: First, how much are we going to spend overall on
missile defense programs; second, what is the proper balance between
testing and fielding additional capabilities; and third, whether to
proceed with plans to field a ground-based interceptor site in Central
Europe?
On the issue of spending, I would point out that the
fiscal year 2008 request of $8.9 billion is almost $500
million below last year's appropriated level and represents the
development, testing, fielding, and sustainment of not just a
single missile defense weapon system, but a number of systems
based on land, at sea, and in the air--and capable of
defending against the broad spectrum of short-, medium-, and
long-range ballistic missile threats. Seen in this light, the budget
request is not unreasonable and compares favorably with, say, the full
suite of aircraft being acquired by the Department of Defense.
Some of my colleagues insist that missile defenses undergo adequate
testing before deployment, particularly the ground-based interceptor.
While no one argues against rigorous testing, we must remember why the
Administration, with Congressional approval, chose to simultaneously
field and test ground-based interceptors--it was because of our total
vulnerability to long-range ballistic missiles. The North Korean
ballistic missile tests last July, coupled with Iranian ballistic
missile development and the launch of a sounding rocket in November,
confirm the wisdom of this approach.
Furthermore, the successful intercept test of the ground-based mid-
course defense system last September, in addition to similar successful
tests of the Patriot, SM-3, and THAAD systems, suggests there is no
reason to curtail planned fielding efforts even while rigorous
operationally realistic testing continues.
Finally, some in Congress are beginning to question the strategic
rationale for a ground-based interceptor site in Europe to provide
protection for most of Europe and the United States against the growing
long-range ballistic missile threat posed by Iran. I ask my colleagues
to consider this initiative in the broader context of NATO's diplomatic
and military strategy for dealing with Iran. Last month, Iran held 15
British citizens hostage; with ballistic missiles armed with weapons of
mass destruction, Iran could hold entire cities hostage. A European
continent vulnerable to Iranian ballistic missile threats could weaken
the West's resolve in what is shaping up to be a clash of wills with
Iran.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and
working through these issues with you as we approach mark-up.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering?
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING, III, USAF, DIRECTOR,
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
General Obering. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Sessions, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I'm
honored to have this opportunity. I ask that my written
statement be entered into the record and this afternoon I would
like to summarize very briefly four key points.
First, ballistic missile threats are real and growing. Now
is not the time to cut back America's efforts to defend our
homeland, our deployed forces, our allies, and friends from
these threats.
Second, the integrated layered missile defense system that
thousands of Americans have been developing, fielding, and
deploying, works, and is having an operational impact.
Third, we are developing and fielding missile defense
capability at an unprecedented pace within our budget
constraints.
Fourth, we are gaining widespread international support and
cooperation. In the last year we have seen aggressive ballistic
missile development and test efforts in North Korea and Iran,
as well as the terrorist use of ballistic rockets in attacks
against Israel. So far this year the pace of foreign ballistic
missile testing is about twice that of last year. This reflects
a determination to acquire these valuable weapons, a value
that's generated by historic lack of deployed forces against
them.
Therefore, it is critical that we continue to develop,
produce, and deploy missile defenses to devalue these weapons.
Last summer when the North Koreans launched several missiles
capable of striking our allies and deployed forces in the
Pacific and an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
believed to be capable of striking the United States, we were
able to provide the President an option. An option to activate
an integrated missile defense system, a system that I am
confident would have worked. This confidence is borne in our
test program, which accounts for almost $2 billion per year,
now.
We have taken on the challenge of realistically testing a
complex system that covers 10 time zones and that intercepts
warheads in the atmosphere, and in space. The Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and I have approved an
Integrated Master Test Plan, which includes criteria for
operational realism.
In particular, this past September we conducted a long-
range interceptor flight test that involved the use of
operational crews, operational fire control, and fielded
software. We used operational sensors and an operational
interceptor launched from an operational missile field.
Over the past year the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has
conducted more than 35 major tests and successfully met our
primary test objectives in 15 of 16 flight tests. Overall since
2001 we have built a record of 26 successful hit-to-kill
engagements in 34 attempts. Our test schedule remains very
aggressive and for the remainder of this year we plan to
conduct two long-range intercept flight tests, four Aegis
flight tests, three more THAAD flight tests, one Israeli Arrow
test, and dozens of ground tests.
We've also been successful in the unprecedented fielding
and deployment of capability to the warfighter thanks to an
underlying acquisition approach that gives us the flexibility
to manage risk, while continuing to upgrade the system. As a
result, in just over 30 months, since June 2004, we have in
place 17 long-range interceptors in Alaska and California.
We've modified 16 Aegis ships for missile tracking with 7 able
to launch the 20 sea-based interceptors that we've fielded.
We've upgraded three land-based early warning radars, delivered
two transportable radars, and one massive Sea-Based X-Band
(SBX) radar, and fielded command and control capabilities in
Hawaii, Alaska, Colorado, Nebraska, Washington, DC, and the
United Kingdom.
Using our approach, we have achieved in 2\1/2\ years what
would have taken two or three times longer with a standard
process.
Our acquisition flexibility has allowed us to implement
numerous cost-saving measures. We have reduced unneeded
overhead by approximately $1.8 billion from fiscal years 2006
to 2011. More specifically, we saved enough money in the GMD
program alone, to purchase four more GBIs.
The inclusion of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and
other combatant commands in our development, test, training,
and fielding activities has been another key to this success.
We've worked with them and the Services from defining and
prioritizing new requirements, to transition and transfer plans
for operations and support.
Based on this solid foundation, we are now requesting $8.9
billion for fiscal year 2008 with more than 75 percent of these
funds, or $7.1 billion, going to near-term capabilities and the
remainder, or $1.8 billion allocated to develop defenses
against the threats that may loom tomorrow. This budget
reflects a three-part strategy.
First, we seek $5.9 billion to maintain and sustain an
additional capability that includes the fielding of up to 44
long-range interceptors in Alaska and California, deployment of
up to 132 sea-based interceptors on 18 ships, and deployment of
2 mobile THAAD fire units with 48 interceptors and, expanding
our critical command, control, battle management, and
communications (C2BMC) element. Sustaining this overall
capability is approaching $1 billion per year.
Second, we seek $1.6 billion to close gaps and improve our
capability to keep pace with the growing threats. This
objective includes the fielding of 10 long-range interceptors
and a mid-course radar in Europe to defend our deployed forces
and our allies in that theater, as well as providing additional
protection to the United States. We have entered into
discussions with Poland and the Czech Republic to host these
assets and we've been engaged with our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) partners and the Russians.
Finally, we request $1.4 billion for the third component of
our strategy, to develop options for future threats. Options
which include boost phase defenses and the ability to provide
persistent, space-based, global detection and tracking.
Missile defense is global in nature, and we have an
increasing number of allies and friends joining us in our
efforts. Japan remains one of our closest partners in missile
defense. Together, we have successfully flight-tested new nose-
cone technologies, and agreed to co-develop a larger version of
the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3).
We are working closely with the United Kingdom and Denmark
to upgrade existing early-warning radars. We have also signed
cooperative agreements with Australia and Italy, and continue
to work with Israel on both medium- and short-range missile
defenses. We have begun collaborating our missile defense with
many, many other nations.
In closing, I want to emphasize that the threat we are
facing from ballistic missiles is real and growing. We have
overcome setbacks and technical hurdles, but thanks to the
support from Congress, we are succeeding at our mission, and we
have absolutely no reason to slow down. As we look to the
gathering clouds of threat on the horizon, now is not the time
to cut back on support for missile defense, but we think, to
advance it.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Obering follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering III, USAF
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. It is an honor to present the Department of Defense's
fiscal year 2008 missile defense program and budget.
I am pleased to report that 2006 was a year of significant
accomplishment for all aspects of our missile defense program. We made
substantial progress in developing, testing and fielding an integrated,
layered Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to defend the United
States, our deployed forces, and our allies and friends against
ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of their flight.
Of the $8.9 billion we are requesting in fiscal year 2008, we will
allocate $7.1 billion for near-term efforts and $1.8 billion for
longer-term programs. In the near-term, we seek to build on, and
sustain, our current capability to defend the homeland against limited
long-range ballistic missile threats and protect allies, friends and
deployed forces against short- to medium-range threats. To achieve this
goal, we intend to complete the fielding of up to 44 Ground-based
Interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska and California; enhance our early warning
radars in Alaska, California and the United Kingdom; integrate the Sea-
based X-band (SBX) radar into the BMD system; deploy up to 132 sea-
based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors on 18 Aegis engagement
ships; and expand our command, control and battle-management network by
establishing three new command and control suites at U.S. Strategic
Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Northern Command.
In the near-term we also seek to close gaps and improve our
capability to defend against a growing Iranian threat. We will continue
the initiative we began this year to field 10 long-range interceptors
and a midcourse radar in Europe. This initiative is essential for a
robust, layered defense of the homeland against long-range threats from
the Middle East. It will also extend this defense to our deployed
forces, allies and friends in the region who currently have no defense
against longer-range ballistic missiles. To improve our capabilities to
defeat more complex threat suites, our Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV)
program will allow us to engage multiple warheads and countermeasures
with a single interceptor launch. Delivering this volume kill
capability is important to the warfighter and is one of our top
priorities.
For the longer-term, we are developing the Space Tracking and
Surveillance System to provide a persistent, near-real-time global
detection, tracking and fire control capability. This system will
significantly increase the BMD system's agility and flexibility to
respond to future worldwide emerging threats. We also continue to
pursue boost-phase intercept capabilities in order to increase the
``depth'' of our integrated, layered system. Boost-phase defenses
promise to increase our intercept opportunities and destroy enemy
ballistic missiles when they are most vulnerable. The Airborne Laser
(ABL) remains our primary boost-phase program. Based on the Defense
Science Board's recommendation, we're continuing the high-acceleration
Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) booster development effort as an
option in the event ABL does not meet critical knowledge points in its
test program. The U.S.-Japanese cooperative development of a follow-on
SM-3 interceptor to give the Aegis system an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) intercept capability, a robust Sea-Based Terminal
capability to defeat shorter-range threats, a modest experimental Space
Test Bed, and our continuing advanced technology efforts all support
the goal of closing capability gaps in the system.
THE EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
This past 4th of July, millions of Americans were made aware of
just how real the threat from ballistic missiles is and how vital the
missile defense program is to our national security. With the launches
of the short-, medium- and long-range missiles by North Korea, missile
defense became an urgent matter overnight. Because of the efforts of
thousands of Americans dedicated to this program, we were able to
activate a missile defense system to protect the United States had a
threat emerged.
In November 2006 and January 2007 Tehran conducted several short-
and medium-range ballistic missile and rocket launches. In the November
exercises Iran demonstrated for the world its offensive capabilities
via televised broadcasts.
North Korea and Iran dedicate significant resources to acquiring
ballistic missiles, to include new medium- and intermediate-range
systems capable of reaching forward-deployed United States forces and
our allies and friends. North Korea continues to work on
intercontinental-range systems capable of reaching the United States.
In addition, our intelligence community assesses that Iran would be
able to develop an ICBM before 2015 if it chose to do so. With the
missile firings over the past year, they have also demonstrated the
ability to conduct coordinated launch operations. But they are not
alone.
In 2006 there were about 100 foreign ballistic missile launches
around the world. This year to date, the pace of testing is about twice
that of last year--a trend reflecting the determination of many
countries to acquire these capabilities.
The actions of North Korea and Iran this past year demonstrate the
determination of these rogue regimes to achieve this capability and
potentially weapons of mass destruction to further aggressive ends.
With the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, we expect to be
surprised by unexpected and more robust threats. The missile defense
development program recognizes that we must stay a step ahead of a
dynamic threat.
U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES--A REPORT CARD
In January 2002, just a little more than 5 short years ago, the
Secretary of Defense directed the agency to restructure the missile
defense program to deal with the urgency, enormity, and complexity of
developing, testing, and building a missile defense system. This bold
initiative required the adoption of an evolutionary acquisition
strategy to be executed by a single agency, a strategy that relies on
continual assessments of the threat, available technology, and what can
be built and fielded to provide a militarily useful capability in an
urgent manner.
Having capitalized on our steady progress since the 1980s, the
dedicated men and women of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and our
industrial partners delivered to the combatant commanders in 2004 an
initial missile defense capability to defeat the near-term long-range
missile threat. Supported by an extensive command, control, battle
management, and communications (C2BMC) infrastructure, we connected
additional system elements to the fire control system and put in place
trained system operators, the logistics support infrastructure and
support centers required for this limited operational system.
To date, we have made significant, and in many ways, unprecedented
strides to deliver a capability where none existed before. Since 2002
we have fielded and completed the initial integration of land- and sea-
based interceptors, mobile and fixed sensors and C2BMC suites to
deliver one of the most complex and comprehensive defensive
capabilities ever envisioned. We did so while sustaining an aggressive
development program that continues to feed new technologies into the
system.
Mr. Chairman, the missile defense investments of 4 administrations
and 11 Congresses are paying off. With the initial deployment of a
limited missile defense capability, the era of absolute vulnerability
of our country to a long-range missile attack came to a close. This is
important, because I believe a capability against even a single reentry
vehicle has significant military utility. The modest long-, medium-,
and short-range defensive capabilities we have today can help reduce
the more immediate threats to our security and enhance our ability to
defend our interests abroad.
Long-Range Defenses
As part of our strategy to protect the United States from ballistic
missiles launched from North Korea or Iran, we have emplaced high-
performance interceptors in missile fields at two sites and integrated
them into the system. The system's GBIs use hit-to-kill technologies to
destroy intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile warheads in
space, in the midcourse phase of flight. These are the only weapons we
have available today to defeat longer-range threats once they have been
launched. By the end of April, we expect to have 16 GBIs in silos at
Fort Greely, Alaska, and 2 more at Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California. We plan to increase interceptor inventories at these sites
to up to 24 by the end of this year.
The system today will receive a cue from Defense Support Program
satellites or from 1 of 16 long-range surveillance and track Aegis
destroyers that could be stationed near the threat region. These
satellites and ships can pass detection or cueing data across
communications lines into BMD system communication and battle manager
nodes located in Fort Greely and Colorado Springs. Today we stand ready
to locate and track threats coming out of East Asia using the Cobra
Dane radar in the Aleutians and the upgraded early warning radar at
Beale Air Force Base, California.
Powerful X-band radars located on a mobile platform in the Pacific
Ocean and at Shariki, Japan can provide precise tracking and
discrimination to increase the probability we will destroy any lethal
target. A 2006 independent assessment concluded that the SBX radar,
which deployed to the Pacific at the end of 2005, is sufficiently
rugged to operate in the rough seas of the northern Pacific. These
conditions were validated this past winter when the SBX experienced
extremely hazardous weather with negligible impact. Also in 2006, we
deployed the first forward-based X band radar to Japan, accelerating
its deployment and supporting C2BMC equipment to its operational
location in Shariki Japan, achieving partial mission capability in
October 2006.
Short- to Medium-Range Defenses
Since 2004 we have expanded and improved terminal and midcourse
defenses to defeat short- and medium-range threats from land and sea.
Aegis ships have been periodically put on station in the Sea of Japan
to provide long-range surveillance and tracking data to our battle
management system. We began fielding SM-3 interceptors in 2004,
evolving to a more capable interceptor. With our growing inventory of
SM-3 interceptors on Aegis ships, we can provide a flexible sea-mobile
capability to defeat short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles in
their midcourse phase. In 2005 we upgraded the first Aegis cruisers for
the engagement mission. Today we have available three Aegis BMD
engagement cruisers and four engagement destroyers.
Having successfully transitioned the Patriot Advanced Capability-3
(PAC-3) to the U.S. Army in March 2003, we continue to maintain
configuration control and work with that Service to improve and upgrade
PAC-3 and Medium Extended Air Defense System performance. Today, PAC-3
fire units are being integrated into the forces of our allies and
friends, many of whom face immediate short- and medium-range threats.
Integrating the System
For the BMDS to work effectively, all of its separate elements must
be integrated across several combatant commands. This capability allows
us to mix and match sensors, weapons, and command centers to
dramatically expand detection and engagement capabilities over what can
be achieved by the system's elements operating individually. Combatant
commanders can use the C2BMC infrastructure to enhance planning,
synchronize globally dispersed missile defense assets, and manage
weapon inventories. These capabilities also can provide our senior
government leadership situational awareness of ballistic missile
launches and defense activities. Today we have in-place a planning
capability within U.S. Strategic, Northern, and Pacific Commands.
Supporting the Warfighter
This past year we continued work with U.S. Strategic Command and
other combatant commands to train missile defense crews at all
echelons, ensuring that they can operate the BMDS if called upon to do
so. We established a BMD Operations Watch Officer to provide real-time
BMD situational awareness, operational status, and coordinate the
configuration of the system and have executed a series of exercises,
which involve temporarily putting the system in a launch-ready state.
We have set up a process to collaborate with the combatant
commanders and the military Services to define and prioritize
requirements as the system evolves. For example, we did not have a sea-
based terminal layer planned for the program until the Commander of
U.S. Strategic Command identified this as a desired capability. Once
this need was identified, we worked with the Navy to define and budget
for near- and far-term programs for a Sea-Based Terminal defense. We
also have worked closely with the Services and the Office of Secretary
of Defense on transition and transfer activities to address operations
and support of the system elements. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
identified lead military departments for eight elements of the BMDS,
and the Navy has just agreed to take on lead service responsibility for
the SBX Radar. We have developed Transition and Transfer Plans with the
Services and the combatant commands. These plans capture both
agreements and the roles and responsibilities associated with evolving
operations and support activities. This collaboration with the
warfighter includes training, testing, wargaming, and conducting
exercises and simulations, all of which help demonstrate and improve
the capability and reliability of the missile defense system.
BMD System On Alert
As I stated earlier, when the North Koreans conducted their
launches last summer, for the first time in the history of the United
States, we had the capability to defend our people against a long-range
missile had it been necessary. Working closely with U.S. Strategic
Command's Joint Functional Component Commander for Integrated Missile
Defense, we successfully took the system out of the development mode
and handed it over to the warfighter for operation. This activation of
the system last June helped us to refine procedures and taught us
invaluable lessons about system operations.
Alert activities included activation of the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense and the deployment of a missile defense capability to the Sea
of Japan. We had Aegis long-range surveillance and track ships
stationed east and west of Japan during the missile firings. Data
collected from these sensors would have helped identify whether the
long-range launch was a ballistic missile or a space launch vehicle and
would have provided tracking data to the system. The C2BMC situational
awareness displays were operational and being monitored at the various
commands.
We also accelerated the capability of the forward-based X-band
radar in Japan for data collection. The SBX radar was stationed off
Hawaii and similarly standing by for data collection. At the time, the
forward-based radar and the sea-based radar were not integrated into
the system. Given these events from last summer and our ability to
bring the system on line and prepare it for emergency use, I am very
confident that the system would have operated as designed had the Taepo
Dong-2 threatened the United States.
We have an operational system today because of the capability-based
acquisition approach we have followed since 2002. This approach
leverages collaboration with the warfighter community throughout
development and testing to the point where we transition or transfer
capabilities to the operators. Some have asserted that our
nontraditional approach lacks discipline, transparency, and/or
accountability. I do not agree. I think the progress we have made to
date in fielding a missile defense capability speaks for itself and
justifies the continuation of this approach. Had we followed the
traditional acquisition approach, we would not have had an operational
capability to respond to the potential threat from North Korea. Had we
followed the traditional approach, I believe we truly would have
``delivered less at a higher cost.''
The missile defense program is highly scrutinized by the Department
of Defense, the Congressional Budget Office, the Government
Accountability Office, and Congress. In 2004, Congress required the MDA
to submit a cost, schedule and performance baseline for each block
configuration of the BMDS being fielded. We have complied with this law
every year, describing our baseline in terms of 2-year increments of
capability called fielding blocks. From an acquisition process
perspective, I understand that we are blazing new trails, and the
information we provide is therefore different from what people are used
to seeing. I understand the onus is on us to clearly convey to Congress
that we are fielding ballistic missile defense capability in a
responsible and transparent manner, and I am committed to doing that. I
have therefore directed my staff to complete a review of our current
approach and look at ways to better describe our baseline program.
BUILDING CONFIDENCE THROUGH SPIRAL TESTING
Testing under operationally realistic conditions is an important
part of maturing the system. We have been fielding test assets in
operational configurations in order to conduct increasingly complex and
end-to-end tests of the system. While the BMD system is a developmental
system, it is available today to our leadership for activation to meet
real world threats. Given this dual function of the test bed, the
Operational Test Agencies and the warfighting community are very active
in all phases of our test planning, execution, and post-test analysis.
Using criteria established by the Agency's system engineers and our
warfighters, all system ground and flight tests provide data that we
and the operational test community use to verify the system's
functionality and operational effectiveness. Our flight tests are
increasing in operational realism, limited only by environmental and
safety concerns. Each system test builds on the knowledge gained from
previous tests and adds increasingly challenging objectives, with the
downstream goal of devising scenarios that test elements of the system
from end-to-end. This spiral test approach increases knowledge of, and
confidence in, the system performance while maintaining safety and
minimizing artificiality.
Last year I explained that we had several concerns with quality
control and reliability that led to two successive Ground-based
Midcourse Defense test aborts, problems that we have since
comprehensively addressed. The independent review team concluded that
the deficiencies in systems engineering, ground qualification testing,
flight test readiness certification, contractor process control and
program scheduling were not systemic and did not compromise initial
defensive capabilities. I testified last year that I did not view the
failures as major technical setbacks.
Coming off the very successful fly-out of the operational
configuration long-range interceptor in December 2005, we conducted a
long-range intercept flight test last September that exceeded our
objectives. That complex test involved an operational interceptor
launched from an operational silo at Vandenberg Air Force Base,
operational sensors, and operationally trained crews manning
operational fire control consoles. The test demonstrated the
functionality of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle and the ability to
engage a threat-representative target using the Upgraded Early Warning
Radar at Beale Air Force Base in California. After the kill vehicle
acquired the target launched out of the Kodiak Launch Complex in Alaska
nearly 3,000 km away from the engagement zone, it successfully
intercepted it. While it was not hooked into the system, we also
demonstrated the powerful contributions the SBX radar can make in the
areas of tracking and discrimination. This was our most operationally
realistic, end-to-end test of the system involving the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense element to date.
Over this past year the MDA conducted more than 35 major tests and
successfully met our primary test objectives in 14 out of 15 flight
tests. In fact, during a 90-day period last summer, we achieved
successful hit-to-kill intercepts in the lower atmosphere with the PAC-
3, in the upper reaches of the atmosphere with the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense element, and in space with the Aegis SM-3 and the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense elements. Including tests of the PAC-3,
we achieved seven hit-to-kill intercepts of ballistic missile targets
in eight attempts in 2006. Since 2001, we have built a record of 26
successful hit-to-kill engagements in 34 attempts. Our test plans for
2007 and 2008 will continue to use more complex and realistic scenarios
for system-level flight tests.
We plan three more long-range interceptor flight tests by the end
of this year that continue to push the edge of the envelope in testing
complexity. All tests will continue to use operationally trained crews
and the operational launch site at Vandenberg. We plan to integrate the
SBX radar into the system for the intercept test in late summer as we
continue to expand the number of sensors available to us to cue the
system and engage targets.
On June 22 of last year, we successfully used a U.S. Navy Aegis
cruiser to engage a separating target carried on a threat-
representative medium-range ballistic missile. As we had done in the
past three flight tests, we did not notify the operational ship's crew
of the target launch time, and they were forced to react to a dynamic
situation. The role of the crew is an important part of our ability to
engage hostile missiles, and last December we increased test complexity
by attempting a simultaneous engagement of aerial and ballistic targets
and by using operator-selectable parameters to allow for automatic
identification of targets. A crew member changed the ship's doctrine
parameters just prior to target launch. This modification prevented the
ship's fire control system from conducting the planned ballistic
missile and aerial target engagements. The primary target was a very
short-range ballistic missile, and thus there was insufficient time for
manual engagement. When the SM-3 interceptor failed to launch, we
aborted the launch of the SM-2 interceptor. This is another example of
why we conduct tests--to expose flaws in the system and wring out
operational procedures. We are working to resolve the problem we
experienced in the test last December and expect to conduct it again
this spring.
We plan four more Aegis intercept flight tests in 2007. We will
again demonstrate the integration of the Aegis BMD weapon system into
the overall BMD system and evaluate the ship crew's performance in
executing an operationally realistic BMD mission. Early this summer, we
will attempt an intercept of a separating, medium-range target using
the SM-3 Block IA interceptor. Later this year, we will demonstrate the
ability to engage two near-simultaneous short-range unitary targets.
Also late in 2007, as part of our growing partnership with Japan, a
Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force Kongo-class ship will attempt to
engage a medium-range ballistic missile separating target using the
Block IA SM-3 interceptor. This will be the first such firing by a
maritime ally. In 2008 we will engage a separating intermediate-range
ballistic missile target using off-board sensor information to launch
the interceptor. We will also attempt a second sea-based intercept test
with our Japanese partners.
As I mentioned earlier, flight-testing involving the redesigned
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor continued last
July with a successful engagement of a unitary target high in the
atmosphere. In September we again sought to demonstrate the performance
of the new missile and the ability to integrate it into the BMD system,
but we were unable to do so following the failure of the target
missile. This past January and earlier this month, we again
successfully destroyed short-range targets. These endo-atmospheric
engagements were the first such tests of the THAAD interceptor at the
Pacific Missile Range Facility. To demonstrate the capability of the
THAAD fire unit to intercept at different altitudes in the atmosphere
and in low exo-atmosphere, we plan one more intercept test in space
later this year against a unitary target. In 2008 we plan to
demonstrate interceptor capabilities against more stressing targets. We
will conduct two intercept tests involving the THAAD interceptor, one
against a separating target in space, and the other against a
separating target high in the atmosphere. Further, the first test in
2008 will include the launch of two THAAD interceptors. The MDA will
also participate in Patriot combined developmental/operational tests as
well as Air Force Glory Trip flight tests.
In 2007 we will continue with our successful ground testing, which
involves warfighter personnel and test hardware and software in the
integrated system configuration to demonstrate system connectivity and
interoperability. Upcoming tests will verify integration of the sea-
based, forward-based, and Fylingdales radars. The funds we are
requesting will support additional capability demonstrations and
readiness demonstrations led by the warfighting community. We currently
cannot test and train on the system while it is in full operational
mode. To address this problem, we are developing a capability to
support continued research, development, test, evaluation, and
maintenance while concurrently sustaining operational readiness.
Based on the many tests we have conducted to date, we maintain our
confidence in the BMD system's basic design, its hit-to-kill
effectiveness, and its inherent operational capability. We continue to
work closely with the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation,
Operational Test Agencies, and combatant commanders to characterize the
effectiveness and readiness of the system at every stage in its
development and fielding. We are developing the capability to conduct
concurrent test, training, and operations, which will allow combatant
commanders to keep the system in operational mode while we test, train,
and make improvements to the system.
BMD SYSTEM FIELDING PLANS
Maintaining and Sustaining the Capability
The top priority of the MDA is to maintain and sustain the deployed
initial capability to stay ahead of the North Korean and Iranian
threats. This means improving long-range capabilities for homeland
defense and moving forward with initial defenses to protect allies and
U.S. interests abroad against shorter-range ballistic missiles.
Our program strategy completes the fielding of GBIs in Alaska and
California. We will begin construction in 2007 of a third missile field
at Fort Greely and accelerate delivery of interceptors. We also will
begin increasing the number of interceptors available at Vandenberg Air
Force Base from two to four. An additional fifth silo at Vandenberg
will be dedicated to testing. We will have up to 30 long-range
interceptors deployed by the end of 2008. For midcourse capability
against the long-range threat, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
element budget request for fiscal year 2008 of about $2.5 billion will
cover continued development, ground- and flight-testing, fielding and
support.
To address short- to intermediate-range threats, in 2006 we added
one Aegis engagement cruiser, for a total of three, and three Aegis
engagement destroyers. As we convert destroyers this year to add the
engagement capability, the number of long-range surveillance and track
ships will fall from 10 at the end of 2006 to 7 and our total number of
fully BMD-capable Aegis engagement ships (cruisers and destroyers) will
climb to 10. By the end of 2008, we plan to have 13 Aegis engagement
destroyers and 3 engagement cruisers and 40 interceptors in inventory.
System tests will involve further demonstrations of the sea-based
interceptor, and we will continue enhancing the system's discrimination
capability. For fiscal year 2008, we are requesting approximately
$1.044 billion to continue Aegis BMD development and testing.
To supplement the Cobra Dane and Beale radars, we will finish the
integration work on the Royal Air Force Fylingdales early warning radar
in the United Kingdom. It will be fully operational by the end of this
year. This radar will provide coverage against Middle East launches
against the United States and our allies in Europe. Our fiscal year
2008 budget request for BMD radars is $758 million. These funds will
continue forward-based radar integration work and complete construction
of a permanent basing site at Shariki Air Base. We will also have
available for deployment a second forward-based X-band radar.
With this year's budget request of $247 million for the C2BMC
activity, we will continue to use spiral development to incrementally
develop, test, and field hardware and software improvements leading to
a robust, net-centric missile defense capability that fights as a
system. We have made incredible progress in this area despite
decrements in funding over the past couple of years. Our ability to
defend against highly lethal threats or operate in a very complex,
stressing battle environment spanning multiple theaters requires all
missile defense elements, which may be spread over thousands of miles,
to work together as a ``team.'' Today we can do that. I am very proud
of what our national team for integration has achieved. We will press
on with the development of the Global Engagement Manager at the Pacific
Air Operations Center and integrate into the system the forward-based
radar in Japan, the SBX radar, and the Fylingdales radar. We plan to
install additional planning and situational awareness capabilities to
facilitate executive decisionmaking in the European Command and the
Central Command by 2009.
Closing Capability Gaps
Our long-term strategy is to make the system more robust, reliable,
and flexible in order to close gaps in our missile defense
capabilities. In line with our multilayer approach, the missile defense
program in fiscal year 2008 and beyond will expand terminal defense
protection, upgrade and improve midcourse discrimination and firepower,
strengthen the capability of the BMDS to defeat coordinated attacks,
and place increasing emphasis on boost phase defenses.
The missile defense program will improve coverage of the United
States and, for the first time, extend coverage to Europe against
longer-range ballistic missiles. We have agreed with Poland and the
Czech Republic to begin focused discussions on the deployment of long-
range interceptors and a midcourse discrimination radar. If
negotiations are successful, we plan to modify the X-band radar
currently located on the Kwajalein Atoll and relocate it to a site in
the Czech Republic. The deployment of this X-band radar in Europe will
complement sensor assets deployed in the United Kingdom and Greenland.
In addition to increasing the number of long-range interceptors
emplaced at missile fields in Alaska and California, we are hopeful
that successful completion of negotiations with the Government of
Poland will allow us to start emplacing 10 GBIs in Poland beginning in
2011.
We also are developing the MKV system to upgrade long-range
interceptor performance by attaining a volume kill capability to defeat
multiple reentry vehicles and midcourse countermeasures. We have
restructured the MKV program to develop land- and sea-based interceptor
payloads by the middle of next decade. Besides bringing several kill
vehicles to the fight, the MKV system will provide critical tracking
and discrimination information to other system sensors and interceptors
and assist with kill assessment. We have requested $265 million for
this work in fiscal year 2008.
This budget submission also continues the upgrade of the Thule
early warning radar in Greenland and its integration into the system by
2009. Together with the radars in California, Alaska, and the United
Kingdom, the Thule radar will ensure full coverage of the United States
against threats from the Middle East. We will also continue to enhance
additional forward-based X-band radar capabilities in Japan and other
operating locations to meet warfighter needs.
We also will bolster defenses against short- to medium-range
threats by increasing the inventory of Aegis BMD sea-based interceptors
from 86 to 132 by 2013. Upgrades to the SM-3 include improvement of the
Divert and Attitude Control System and discrimination performance. We
also will provide a full upgrade of the Aegis BMD Weapon System to
improve its ability to detect, acquire, and intercept more diverse,
longer-range threats. At the end of the decade we will integrate Aegis
BMD with the Navy-developed Open Architecture system to remain
compatible with Navy ships following modernization.
We will field 2, and future plans call for 4, THAAD fire units,
which consist of radars and 96 interceptors. THAAD will provide
transportable terminal protection for our troops and areas along the
U.S. coasts or on the territories of our allies. The first unit will be
fielded in 2009, with subsequent units fielded by 2012. We are
requesting $858 million in fiscal year 2008 for THAAD development and
fielding.
DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
We do, of course, need to address far-term threats. In simplest
terms, that means managing a program that balances initial, near-term
fielding of system elements with long-term development. I continue to
be a firm believer in the balanced program, because it neither
compromises our security in the present nor short-changes our future
safety. This approach recognizes the urgency of fielding capabilities
to address threats we face today and the necessity of continuing
support for vigorous development activities to prepare for tomorrow's
ballistic missile challenges to our security.
I am in strong agreement with the members of the House Armed
Services Committee, who recently concluded that the country's missile
defense program ``must be scalable in response to the evolution of the
threat.'' \1\ The MDA plans to develop options for incrementally
fielding elements of the BMDS. We will do this by leveraging a key U.S.
strength, our technological advantage, and by building with our allies
a foundation of global access and response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ House Armed Services Committee, Committee Defense Review
Report, December 2006, p. 104.
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In executing our program we continue to follow a strategy of
retaining alternative development paths until capability is proven--a
knowledge-based funding approach. That means we are setting specific
targets, or knowledge points, that the development efforts have to
reach to demonstrate a specific capability.
There are several important development efforts funded in this
budget. A significant part of missile defense investment has been
devoted to the development of terrestrial boost phase defenses to
supplement currently fielded midcourse and terminal defenses. An
operational ABL could provide a valuable boost phase defense capability
against missiles of all ranges. We restructured the KEI activity to
focus on development of a high-acceleration booster, one that is more
capable than any booster we currently have in inventory. Either ABL or
the kinetic energy booster will be selected as the primary boost phase
program upon completion of critical knowledge points before 2010.
Over the past 2 years we have demonstrated in ground tests the
power and reliability of the ABL high energy lasers. We also have
tested the command and control and passive target detection systems in
flight. In 2006 we refurbished the high energy laser optics and
completed integration and ground testing of the low-power tracking and
beacon illuminator lasers. This year we will flight test the beam
control and atmospheric compensation against a cooperative airborne
target. Earlier this month, we reached an important milestone in this
program when we conducted the first in-flight test of the laser
targeting system, successfully demonstrating a technology that will
help track a boosting ballistic missile and identify the most
vulnerable sections on the rocket motor case to be hit by the high
energy laser. We recently completed major structural modifications to
the Boeing 747 aircraft to support installation of the high energy
laser, which will continue in 2008. The $516 million we request in
fiscal year 2008 will complete integration of the high energy laser
modules with the modified aircraft as we prepare for a lethal shootdown
of a ballistic missile target in 2009. Despite the continued technical
challenges we face, I remain optimistic that we can produce an
operationally effective directed energy capability.
We have made good progress in our high-acceleration booster
development effort. This past year we successfully conducted the first
static firings of the first and second stage boosters and demonstrated
overhead non-imaging data fusion processing within the prototype fire
control component. This high acceleration booster also would enhance
the performance of the currently deployed GBI. Within the restructured
program we will maintain options to develop a land-mobile launcher and
fire control system as well as an option for a sea-based capability. We
are requesting $214 million in fiscal year 2008 for this activity.
We plan to develop space-based sensors to provide a persistent
identification and global tracking capability. A small constellation of
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites will enable
operation of the missile defense system worldwide, independent of
terrestrial-based sensors along the threat trajectory. These sensors
will be able to detect and track enemy ballistic missiles and payloads
through all phases of flight and close the system fire control loop
globally. We are on track to launch two demonstration satellites in
November 2007. Next year, following on-orbit check-out, these
demonstration satellites will perform live target acquisition, tracking
and handover. We are requesting approximately $319 million in fiscal
year 2008 to execute the STSS activity.
We have learned a great deal from the ground-testing of the STSS
Block 2006 sensors in representative, thermal vacuum conditions. We
have proven that this class of sensor will achieve the necessary
sensitivity to support intercepts. Given the long design timelines for
space systems, we are requesting funding in fiscal year 2008 to begin
work on the follow-on constellation. Postponing the start of this phase
of the program will delay our ability to achieve a necessary global
sensor and fire control capability.
Later this month we are launching a satellite, the Near Field
Infrared Experiment (NFIRE), to collect high resolution infrared
phenomenology data from boosting targets. Following preparation of the
satellite once it is on-orbit, in August and October 2007, we will
conduct tests using live ballistic missile targets. The data from NFIRE
will be fed into simulation models and contribute to the future sensor
designs.
We will continue work with Japan to increase SM-3 range and
lethality. The development of the 21-inch M-3 Block IIA interceptor
will increase our capability to engage longer-range ballistic missiles
from Aegis BMD platforms and help close a capability gap around 2015.
We have requested $74 million in fiscal year 2008 as part of our
cooperative work with Japan to purchase long-lead items required for
the development of this interceptor.
Another capability gap exists in terminal defense against short-
and medium-range ballistic missiles. For the past 2 years, the Navy and
the MDA have collaborated on plans for a Sea-Based Terminal defensive
layer. In May 2006 we demonstrated the feasibility of developing a
limited near-term capability against a short-range ballistic missile
using a modified SM-2 Block IV interceptor. Based on this
demonstration, we are upgrading the Aegis weapon system, and the Navy
is upgrading the SM-2 Block IV missile, the goal being to install a
terminal engagement capability on 18 Aegis BMD ships beginning in 2009.
We also are examining with the Navy options for developing a far-term
improved capability to address short- and medium-range threats. Our
fiscal year 2008 request for Sea-Based Terminal development work is $75
million.
The next generation of C2BMC capability will be essential if we are
to close gaps in our command seams. As we deliver more sensor and
interceptor capability into the hands of the warfighters, they are
faced with several more options to defend their areas of
responsibility. We must continually refine our C2BMC capability to
allow the warfighters to rapidly process all of the available options,
plan for the employment of BMDS assets, and globally manage the
execution of the system on tight timelines. The battlefield effect is
that the integrated BMD system can defend against more missiles
simultaneously, reduce risk of missiles leaking through our defenses,
conserve more interceptor inventory, and defend a larger area.
Finally, I am deeply concerned about future threat uncertainty and
worldwide ballistic missile proliferation. I believe the performance of
the BMD system could be greatly enhanced by an integrated, space-based
layer. Space systems could provide on-demand, near global access to
ballistic missile threats, minimizing the limitations imposed by
geography, absence of strategic warning, and the politics of
international basing rights. A space layer would apply pressure on
launches from land or sea, depriving the adversary of free rides into
midcourse with advanced countermeasures. While deployment of such a
system must be preceded by significant, national-level debate, that
debate must be informed by science. To that end, we are ready to begin
a focused investigation of the feasibility of having an integrated
space-based layer, and I am requesting $10 million for fiscal year 2008
to begin concept analysis and preparation for small-scale experiments.
These experiments will provide real data to answer a number of
technical questions and help the leadership make a more informed
decision about adding this capability.
We have had to restructure some development activities and cancel
others as a result of congressional and departmental reductions in the
MDA budget. The following program activities have been delayed:
delivery of the first operational STSS satellite has slipped from 2012
to the 2016-2017 timeframe, prolonging the time we will be without a
capability to integrate the system globally; and the scope of the KEI
activity has been reduced to focus on booster development and delay
work on system integration, battle management, and fire control. The
reductions also have impacted work in the area of innovative technology
development. I regret that we have had to cancel the advanced
technology development work associated with our micro-satellite
activities and eliminate funding for the High Altitude Airship beyond
fiscal year 2007.
INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION
The global nature of the threat requires that we work closely with
our allies and friends to develop, field, and operate missile defenses.
I am pleased to report that many governments share our vision for
missile defense. This past year we continued to build on a very
successful program to involve more countries and forge international
partnerships. Without the participation of our allies and friends, the
BMDS would look very different.
The Government of Japan remains solidly behind missile defense and
has even accelerated its program to field multilayered missile defenses
that are interoperable with the U.S. system. Japan continues to upgrade
its Aegis destroyers and acquire SM-3 interceptors. In March 2006 we
successfully flight-tested new nosecone technologies developed in
cooperation with Japan. Additionally, the MDA and Japan have agreed to
co-develop a Block IIA version of the SM-3, which will improve our
defensive capabilities against longer-range missiles. Japan also is
upgrading its Patriot fire units with PAC-3 missiles and improved
ground support equipment. In 2008 Japan is expected to begin co-
production of the PAC-3 missile.
The upgraded Royal Air Force Fylingdales radar in the United
Kingdom will undergo operational testing this year. Once we certify the
radar, it will provide the system critical early warning, tracking and
cuing data needed to defeat threat missiles coming out of Iran. We are
working closely with Denmark to upgrade the Thule early warning radar
in Greenland to improve its capability to detect and track ballistic
missiles.
Later this year we will conduct satellite-to-ground and satellite-
to-satellite communication experiments with a German-built Laser
Communications Terminal installed in the NFIRE satellite. Together with
an identical terminal on a German satellite, the United States and
Germany will perform joint experiments to validate the use of laser
technology for high speed space communications.
The United States and The Netherlands have been working together to
modify Dutch frigates with a combat system to enable ballistic missile
detection and tracking. An upgraded air command and defense frigate
from The Netherlands successfully detected and tracked the targets in
the December 2006 Aegis ballistic missile defense flight test.
We are continuing work with Israel to implement the Arrow System
Improvement Program and enhance its capability to defeat longer-range
ballistic missile threats emerging in Iran. We are also conducting a
feasibility study on a joint development program called David's Sling
for shorter-range missile defense.
We continue to support our North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) partners in advancing the dialogue on the political-military
implications of defending European population centers against longer-
range missile threats. The MDA is supporting the NATO Active Layered
Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense Program Office to develop a
capability to protect deployed forces by 2010.
I am also pleased to announce that this past February we put in
place a Framework Memorandum of Agreement with Italy and we can now
begin to develop opportunities for missile defense technology sharing,
analysis, and other forms of collaboration. We have other international
interoperability and technical cooperation projects underway, for
example with Australia, and are working to establish formal agreements
with other governments.
CLOSING
Mr. Chairman, in closing, some have said that the Defense
Department's investments in missile defense are misdirected, that other
threats are more pressing. Others have said we are spending too much
money on missile defense and that it is too expensive. Still others
have claimed that we should slow down fielding activities until the
technologies are more mature.
I disagree with these critics, Mr. Chairman. We must meet the
rising threats posed by ballistic missiles. We have seen rogue nations
test these weapons in the past year. Ballistic missile defense is
expensive, but the dollar investment in this nation's security pales in
comparison to the overwhelming price this nation would pay in lives,
social dislocation, and economic devastation from a single missile
impacting an American metropolitan area. Indeed, the success we have
seen in our comprehensive test program indicates that there is no
reason to slow down.
In less than 3 short years, thanks to the dedication of thousands
of men and women across this country and a first-class, cutting-edge
defense industry, we have deployed missile defenses to protect our
homeland, our troops deployed to dangerous regions around the world,
and our allies and friends. But we have a long way to go. So now is not
the time to cut back missile defense. Now is the time to accelerate it.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Campbell?
STATEMENT OF LTG KEVIN T. CAMPBELL, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL,
U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/U.S. ARMY FORCES
STRATEGIC COMMAND AND JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR
INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE
General Campbell. Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for having us here
today. We appreciate your support.
I'm going to address four aspects of my role, the role as
the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense under General Cartwright at STRATCOM. The assessment of
the capabilities that we have today, the role of the warfighter
in the development process, and finally, my role as the Army's
senior Space and Missile Defense Commander (SMDC).
In our role as the Joint Component, we plan, integrate and
coordinate global ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations.
This includes developing plans and concepts, it includes
planning exercises and executing exercises that cut across all
of the Combatant Commanders--European Command, Northern
Command, as well as Pacific Command, and STRATCOM.
Starting in July 2006, when the North Koreans had several
missile test flights, we successfully placed this system on
alert, and it demonstrated, in my view, our ability to operate
the system on a sustained basis, and also to dynamically plan
across three separate combatant commanders in their real time.
So, it validated that our procedures were very good at that
point in time.
I think our success is related to two particular
activities, one is the exercise program, and the second is the
MDA's test program, which we participate in. In the past 12
months, we've had three major exercises across the three
combatant commanders, and we've participated in several of the
GMD tests in which soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen
operate their systems. These tests and exercises have enabled
us to improve our efficiency, both at staff levels, as well
down at the individual soldier level.
My assessment, in terms of the near-term, I think we're
very limited. The principal limiting factor is typically
missile inventory, although in the lower tiers, we do need more
Patriot Systems, and I think we're going to solve this when we
bring THAAD, when we bring on additional Aegis BMD capability.
I think that the potential expansion into Europe with the GMD
system, which we think is essential, will thicken our defense
for the homeland, and expand it to our allies and forward-
deployed forces.
In our warfighter role, in terms of advocacy, we have a
very deliberate and disciplined process within USSTRATCOM,
which gathers all of the inputs from the combatant commanders
and we present those to General Obering at the MDA. We've been
able to work a number of issues, we've seen improvements in
fielded systems, and we've made recommendations that they
pursue systems, such as the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV), which
we think is important for future threats.
In my role as the Army SMDC, we ensure that our forces have
those capabilities necessary to handle the theater-level
missile threats. We're transforming that force, we're taking it
from separate systems, integrating those systems into a system
of systems so such systems as Patriot, THAAD, the surface-
launched medium-range missile, and the elevated sensor are the
type systems that we're netting together. I think when we do
this, a combatant commander then can take those capabilities
and better tailor and scope them to his needs in his particular
theater.
So, with your help, we're going to continue forward
progress in this endeavor, in fielding an integrated missile
defense for our homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies,
and I thank you again for having us, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Campbell follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Kevin T. Campbell, USA
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for your ongoing support of our military and
for the opportunity to appear before this panel. In my view, this
committee is a strong ally of the Army and the missile defense
community, particularly in our continuing efforts to field missile
defense forces for the Nation and our allies. I consider it a privilege
to be counted in the ranks with my fellow witnesses as an advocate for
a strong global missile defense capability.
My current responsibility entails two roles. The first is as the
Army's senior commander for space and missile defense. The second role
is as a soldier on the Joint Missile Defense Team and Commander of the
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, a
part of the U.S. Strategic Command. In this role, I serve as the Joint
user representative working closely with the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA), other Services, and combatant commanders to ensure that our
national goals of developing, testing, and deploying an integrated
missile defense system are met in an operationally sound configuration.
Chairman, as proven during last year's July 4th North Korean
missile launches, Army Soldiers are trained and ready to operate the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Element of the Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) at Fort Greely, Alaska, and the Joint National
Integration Center at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado. These
Soldiers, as part of the Joint team, continue to serve as our Nation's
first line of defense against a rogue nation's launch of an
intercontinental ballistic missile toward our shores. I am proud to
represent them along with the other members of the Army and Joint
integrated missile defense community.
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND JFCC-IMD
The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense (JFCC-IMD) was established in January 2005 as one element of
the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and reached full operational
capability early in 2006. The JFCC-IMD is manned by Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps, and civilian personnel. This joint-manning
arrangement and our strong partnership with our collocated MDA team
enable us to execute the integrated missile defense mission by
leveraging the existing robust infrastructure.
USSTRATCOM, through the JFCC-IMD, continues to aggressively execute
its mission to globally plan, integrate, and coordinate missile defense
operations. Through stressing operational scenarios, integrated missile
defense has experienced robust growth and maturity and has improved its
ability to defend this nation. Although, there is much work yet to be
done, JFCC-IMD continues to lead the Department's transformation toward
more robust integrated missile defense capabilities. The soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians of this joint warfighting
organization execute our mission to plan, integrate, and coordinate
global missile defense operations and support by operationalizing new
capabilities from MDA, developing global missile defense plans in
collaboration with the geographical combatant commanders, and
conducting cross-geographical combatant commander exercises to
eliminate seams and gaps to maintain a strong defense against changing
threats. Execution of the essential mission includes providing warning
of missile attack to other combatant commanders and providing
assessment of missile attack. In all, JFCC-IMD continues to build
operational competence of the integrated missile defense capability and
warfighter confidence in executing our mission.
Ballistic Missile Defense System Progress
This past year has been a year of operational achievement for
integrated missile defense as we successfully placed the BMDS on alert
in response to a credible ballistic missile threat from North Korea.
This limited defense capability marked the beginning of global missile
defense as warfighters from three combatant commands and allies
integrated respective assets and personnel toward a single mission
against a common threat. The scale of this integration is
unprecedented--non-missile defense assets were integrated with legacy
and state-of-the-art technologies to provide a shield to protect our
homeland. Additionally, we achieved unparalleled integration of the
Department's intelligence capabilities to enable timely and responsive
indications and warning to support missile defense readiness. We expect
the warfighting capability provided by such integration of assets,
platforms, doctrine, and personnel to continue to grow in coming years.
The North Korean incident last summer also underscored the growing
maturity of the cross-JFCC integration within USSTRATCOM in executing
its global mission. JFCC-IMD collaborated closely with the JFCCs for
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) and Space
(JFCC-Space) to integrate the intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and space assets for the missile defense missions. This
effort afforded the use of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
and space assets that previously had not been included in the missile
defense mission. Similarly, JFCC-IMD collaborated closely with JTF-
Global Network Operations to maximize availability of a robust
communication network to link the decisionmakers in Washington with
commanders across the globe. We have also integrated our planning
efforts with the JFCC for Global Strike and Integration (JFCC-GSI) to
ensure we integrated both offensive and defensive capabilities into
potential courses of action. Our approach today for a missile defense
contingency is designed to examine and integrate a broader array of
capabilities into our planning and execution. In short, JFCCs are
maturing in a deliberate and coordinated pace to extend the New Triad
in its global mission.
JFCC-IMD's readiness demonstrated during last summer's incident is
a testimony to the robust warfighter exercise and test program. During
the past year, we planned and conducted three major combatant command-
level exercises involving U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Northern Command
and U.S. Strategic Command. These exercises enabled combatant
commanders to exercise concepts of operations and tactics, techniques,
and procedures, and improve our planning and execution of missile
defense operations. These activities enhance warfighter competence in
prosecuting a global missile defense capability. JFCC-IMD's global
missile defense exercise program also extended to our coalition
partners. These international exercises further bolstered our allies'
resolve in conducting combined missile defense operations and extending
partnership into co-development of future capabilities.
Warfighter Contributions to System Development
Warfighters participate in key BMDS tests to build confidence in
its capabilities. JFCC-IMD led warfighter participation in the first
distributed ground tests on the operational BMDS, geographically
distributed from Colorado to Alaska, and Washington to Japan. This test
demonstrated the growing sophistication and complexity of BMDS
assessments that are increasingly operationally relevant. Furthermore,
warfighters collaborated with MDA to successfully conduct key flight
tests to bolster our Nation's confidence in the effectiveness of the
integrated missile defense capabilities.
Within a 90-day period, we successfully intercepted ballistic
missiles at low and high altitudes; in midcourse and terminal phases;
and, in endo- and exo-atmospheric environments with the Patriot
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), the AEGIS Standard Missile-3, the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and our long-range Ground-
Based Interceptor. Conducting these system-level flight and ground
tests required the use of operational assets, the very assets that
would be used to defend this nation against a possible North Korea
missile attack. JFCC-IMD worked closely with the Combatant Commanders
and MDA to coordinate the availability of these assets to ensure
sustained operational readiness during the conduct of the system-level
tests.
The JFCC-IMD was able to balance the requirements of both
operations and tests, but this period of robust achievements
underscored the warfighter's requirement to expedite development and
deployment of a concurrent testing, training, and operations
capability. Concurrent test, training and operations will permit
developers and operators to maintain full operational mode of the BMDS
while simultaneously developing, testing, or training on the system.
The need for the concurrent test, training and operations capability is
especially pronounced for the one-of-a-kind assets that are shared
between the warfighter, developer, and trainer communities.
Absent a mature concurrent test, training and operations
capability, JFCC-IMD aggressively conducts an asset management process
to ensure the highest level of operational readiness during conduct of
materiel development and tests. Supported by an indications and warning
system, the asset management process has been the key enabler to
operationalize new capabilities, perform operationally relevant tests,
and conduct system-wide upgrades. During the past year, the asset
management process facilitated warfighters and materiel developers in
optimizing the use of the deployed elements while fielding additional
assets. In addition, warfighter participation in the flight and ground
testing increased our confidence in the system's performance.
Increasing the Capability of the System
JFCC-IMD, in partnership with MDA and the Services, has integrated
additional missile defense sensors and shooters to enhance theater and
strategic mission capabilities. We have increased the robustness of our
sensor capability by deploying a mobile sensor in Japan, increasing the
number of AEGIS ships enabled with the long range search and tracking
capability, and are deploying a midcourse discrimination sensor in the
waters of Alaska. We have continued deployment of the Navy's Ballistic
Missile Defense AEGIS Standard Missile-3, Patriot Advanced Capability-3
missiles, and increased the number of Ground-Based Interceptors.
Additionally, in my role as the JFCC-IMD Commander, I have been in
discussion with European Command to build a stronger partnership with
our Allies and to host a midcourse radar and interceptor site to
counter the Iranian threat.
The Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications System
is an essential evolutionary component of the BMDS that greatly
enhances both planning and execution capabilities. The command and
control system contributes to all phases of integrated missile defense
from optimizing planning to synchronizing the automated execution of
the BMDS. During the past year, upgrades to the command and control
system have extended situational awareness, planning, and sensor
management capability to key components of U.S. Strategic Command, U.S.
Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command. Additionally, critical
command and control system situational awareness nodes are utilized by
the White House, National Military Command Center, and Secretary of
Defense Executive Support Center.
As we move forward in the next year, much work remains to be done.
We will continue to integrate and conduct cross-geographic combatant
commander planning and exercises, deploy new capabilities, and increase
allies' involvement in global missile defense. We will continue to
advocate for system improvements that close capability gaps and improve
system performance. Fielding more capable command and control systems,
sensors, and kill vehicles, such as the Multiple Kill Vehicle, will
provide the warfighter with a system capable of addressing a broad
range of threats. Our continuing goal is to develop a seamless missile
defense system, that integrates all available capabilities, to deter
and dissuade the proliferation of missile threats, and if necessary,
defeat them to protect our Nation, deployed forces, friends, and
allies.
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE--AN OVERVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2008 ARMY
BUDGET SUBMISSION
In addition to deploying the BMDS, MDA, the Services, and the
combatant commanders continue to focus on improving theater air and
missile defense capabilities. Both the GMD and Theater Air and Missile
Defense Systems are vital for the protection of our homeland, deployed
forces, friends, and allies. Air and missile defense is a key component
in support of the Army's core competency of providing relevant and
ready land power to combatant commanders.
As you are aware, real world events over the past year have
increased the relevance, urgency, and importance of theater air and
missile defense as well as cruise missile defense. Medium and short-
range ballistic missile and cruise missile threats continue to grow,
especially in light of increased proliferation of missile defense
technology. These threats, combined with Iran's and North Korea's
increased interest in nuclear capabilities, are of particular concern.
As highlighted in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, a number of
potentially hostile states possess or seek weapons of mass destruction.
This is especially troubling when considered along with ballistic and
cruise missile proliferation. For these states, weapons of mass
destruction--particularly nuclear weapons--provide the means to assert
regional domination and intimidate others. As such, the Quadrennial
Defense Review specifically highlighted the need for integrated
defenses against short-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-range
ballistic and cruise missile systems.
The House Armed Services Committee Defense Review Report, released
in December 2006, concluded that the U.S. force structure must expand
and U.S. capabilities must improve to reduce the risk to the security
of the American people to an acceptable level and noted that a robust
BMDS is critical to defeat strategic threats to the United States and
its allies. The report also noted that Operation Enduring Freedom and
Operation Iraqi Freedom are consuming key missile defense capabilities,
leaving other worldwide commitments under-resourced.
In light of these reports and their findings, the Army, in concert
with the Department of Defense and MDA, is taking the necessary steps
to ensure that the U.S. homeland, allies and deployed forces are
provided the necessary protection from these threats. With that as a
background, I would now like to focus on the Army's fiscal year 2008
budget submission for air and missile defense systems. The President's
budget, presented to Congress on February 5, includes approximately
$1.75 billion with which the Army proposes to execute current Army air
and missile defense responsibilities and focus on future development
and enhancements of both terminal phase and short-range air and missile
defense systems. In short, the Army is continuing major efforts to
improve the ability to provide warning, acquire, track, intercept, and
destroy theater air and missile threats.
The Army, as part of the joint team, continues its transformation
of air and missile defense forces to meet the increasingly
sophisticated and asymmetric threat environment encountered by the
joint and allied warfighter. The air and missile defense force will
meet this threat by adhering to the following imperatives:
One seamless integrated force
Advanced engagement concepts
Defense in depth
360-degree defense
Early and continuous engagements
Assure friendly use of airspace
Support information dominance
Integrated Air and Missile Defense
In order to fulfill these imperatives, the Army is transforming its
air defense force from its current separate systems architecture to a
component-based, network-centric, Integrated Air and Missile Defense
system of systems. The Integrated Air and Missile Defense Program
focuses on systems integration, common battle command and control,
joint enabling networking, and logistics and training to ensure
operational requirements, such as force lethality, survivability,
transportability and maneuverability, are achieved. Benefits of
developing and fielding such a capability include:
Expanded defended areas against the full-spectrum of
threats
Integrated defense design which eliminates single
nodes of failure
Flexibility in choice of interceptors
Ability to battle manage weapons, sensors, and
inventories
Seamless training adjustments for battle managers
across the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Force
Closing current capability gaps
The Integrated Air and Missile Defense Program employs an
evolutionary acquisition strategy that leads to the objective net-
centric system of systems plug-and-fight capability. The approach calls
for a restructuring of current Army air and missile defense systems
into components of sensors, weapons, and battle management command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence with a standard
set of interfaces among the components using a standardized
communications network. This modularization of missile defense
capabilities will allow Joint Forces Commanders to scale and tailor
assets and forces based upon the specific operating environment in
which they are employed.
Technology insertions to the Integrated Air and Missile Defense
will continue throughout each increment as high-payoff technologies
mature and are ready for integration. Incremental development of the
program allows the Army to more quickly field new and improved
capabilities to the warfighter. The proposed fiscal year 2008
President's budget supports the evolution of an Integrated Air and
Missile Defense capability.
Air and Missile Defense Organizational Structure
As part of air defense transformation, the Army has created
composite air and missile defense battalions. These battalions address
capability gaps, permitting us to defeat cruise missiles and unmanned
aerial vehicles while maintaining our ability to defend critical assets
from the ballistic missile threat. Composite air and missile defense
battalions will capitalize on the synergies of two previously separate
disciplines: short-range air defense and high-to-medium altitude air
defense. Additionally, the Army no longer provides an organic air
defense artillery battalion to its Divisions. Instead, divisional air
defense artillery battalions are pooled at the theater-level to provide
air and missile defense protection based on situation and mission
requirement. The pool of Army air and missile defense resources will
address operational requirements in a tailored and timely manner. This
pooling concept supports the Army's effort to move to modular designs
that allow force tailoring of units better sized to meet the combatant
commanders' needs and homeland security and defense requirements.
Within the context just provided, allow me to briefly discuss the
three main component areas of the Army's air and missile defense
construct: Terminal Phase Ballistic Missile Defense, Cruise Missile
Defense, and Force Protection.
TERMINAL PHASE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES
The Patriot/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) capability
is designed to counter theater ballistic missile threats in their
terminal phase in addition to cruise missiles and other air-breathing
threats. Combining these systems with the Terminal High Attitude Area
Defense System capability being developed by MDA with a planned
fielding in fiscal year 2009, brings an unprecedented level of
protection against missile attacks to deployed U.S. forces, friends,
and allies well into the future.
Patriot/PAC 3 Overview
Chairman, since the combat debut of the Patriot Air and Missile
Defense System during Operation Desert Storm, the Army has continued to
implement a series of improvements to address the lessons learned.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, we saw the debut of the improved
Patriot Configuration-3 system, including the effective use of the
Guidance Enhanced Missile and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
missile. PAC-3 is the latest evolution of the phased materiel
improvement program to Patriot. Combining developmental testing and
operational data, this program enables the development and deployment
of a new high-velocity, hit-to-kill, surface-to-air missile with the
range, accuracy, and lethality necessary to effectively intercept and
destroy more sophisticated ballistic missile threats. Today's Patriot
force is a mixture of PAC-2 and PAC-3 configured units. To maximize the
full advantage of the PAC-3 capabilities, the Chief of Staff of the
Army has directed the Army to pure-fleet the entire Patriot force to
the PAC-3 configuration. In response to combatant commanders'
requirements, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army directed the creation
of two additional Patriot battalions to help relieve the stress on the
Patriot force and increase the Army's strategic responsiveness in the
area of terminal ballistic missile defense. These directives underscore
the importance of Patriot to the Nation's overall National Military
Strategy and are necessary to maximize the capabilities for protecting
the security interests of both the United States and our allies.
While Patriot saved many lives defending against Iraqi ballistic
missile attacks during Operation Iraqi Freedom, there were some
operational deficiencies. The Army has undertaken steps to correct them
and address lessons learned. The Army has pursued two thrusts--
identification and execution of a $41.6 million program for nine
specific Operation Iraqi Freedom fixes and continued aggressive
participation in joint interoperability improvements in situational
awareness. The development, testing, and materiel release for the nine
enhancements is on schedule to be completed by the end of this fiscal
year. Several enhancements have already completed fielding. The
remaining enhancements are either currently being fielded or are
planned to start this spring. Based on the current fielding schedule,
all remaining Operation Iraqi Freedom fixes will complete fielding to
the units by fiscal year 2009.
The Patriot system remains the Army's mainstay Terminal Air and
Missile Defense System and our Nation's only deployed land-based short-
to-medium range BMDS capability. The current PATRIOT force must be
sustained and recapitalized until MEADS is completely fielded. Fielding
of MEADS is scheduled to begin in 2015 and be completed by 2028.
Combined Patriot/MEADS Approach
With the approval of the Defense Acquisition Executive, the Army
embarked on a path that merged the Patriot and MEADS programs,
establishing the Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program with the
objective of achieving the MEADS capability through incremental
fielding of MEADS major end items into Patriot. Patriot/MEADS Combined
Aggregate Program is an important capability that will operate within
the BMDS. It is, in fact, a top Army priority system for defense
against short- and medium-range tactical ballistic missiles and air
breathing threats. The Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program will be
an integral part of the Integrated Air and Missile Defense System of
Systems and capable of operating within a Joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational interdependent operational
environment. It will provide wide-area protection at strategic,
operational, and tactical levels.
The Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program will also provide
battle management command and control in accordance with the IAMD
provided common battle command system, introduce lightweight deployable
launchers, upgrade the PAC-3 missile, and eventually provide the full
MEADS capability to the entire force. By establishing the Patriot/MEADS
Combined Aggregate Program, the Joint integrated air and missile
defense architecture will become more robust in key ways. First, MEADS
enhancements are integrated into the existing system. Second, as
lessons are learned from the present missile defense capability, they
will be incorporated into the MEADS follow-on system.
MEADS is a cooperative development program with Germany and Italy
to field an enhanced ground-mobile air and missile defense capability.
The MEADS program, which supports the President's goal for
international cooperation in missile defense, will enable the joint
integrated air and missile defense community to operate more
effectively on future battlefields. MEADS will provide theater level
defense of critical assets and continuous protection of a rapidly
advancing maneuver force as part of the Joint integrated air and
missile defense architecture. Major MEADS enhancements include 360-
degree sensor coverage and a strategically deployable and tactically
mobile air and missile defense system that can be deployed and
controlled as part of the integrated air and missile defense
architecture. The PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement is currently under
development and will be integrated into the MEADS program. The Missile
Segment Enhancement Missile will provide a more agile and lethal
interceptor that increases the engagement envelope. We are confident
that this path will provide our service members, allies, friends, and
our Nation with the most capable air and missile defense system
possible.
Terminal High Attitude Area Defense System Overview (THAAD)
The Department of Defense is committed to fielding an advanced
capability to defend against tactical ballistic missiles as soon as
possible. THAAD is designed to provide critical defense against short
and medium range ballistic missiles. As a result, MDA is funding and
manufacturing four THAAD fire units for the Army in an accelerated
fielding that will begin in 2009. This investment represents an initial
THAAD capability for the warfighter and the next major step towards a
comprehensive, layered theater ballistic missile defense. Follow-on
THAAD upgrades are planned in future budgets to meet an ever increasing
and evolving threat.
CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE
In the world today, there exists a real and growing threat from
land attack cruise missiles. Cruise missiles are inherently very
difficult targets to detect, engage, and destroy because of their small
size, low detection signature, and low altitude flight characteristics.
When armed with a weapon of mass destruction warhead, the effects from
a cruise missile could be catastrophic. The Army's Cruise Missile
Defense Program is an integral piece of the Joint cruise missile
defense architecture. Critical Army components of the Joint cruise
missile defense architecture are provided by the Joint Land Attack
Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System, the Surface-
Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, the Patriot Missile
Segment Enhancement Missile, and an integrated fire control capability
inherent in the Integrated Air and Missile Defense System of Systems.
We are also working closely with the Joint community to assure
development of doctrine that synchronizes our military's full
capabilities against the cruise missile threat.
The Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
System brings a critically needed capability to detect, track, and
identify cruise missile threats. The system will support engagements
using the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile,
the Navy Standard Missile, and the Patriot/MEADS weapon systems by
providing precision tracking and 360-degree wide-area and over-the-
horizon surveillance of land-attack cruise missiles. The Surface-
Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile will provide maneuver
forces with a critical, beyond line-of-sight engagement capability to
counter the cruise missile threat, as well as unmanned aerial vehicle
threats, over an extended battlespace. The Surface-Launched Advanced
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile uses the existing Joint Advanced
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile currently used by the Air Force and the
Navy, thereby capitalizing on Joint commonality on the battlefield.
FORCE PROTECTION
A significant danger in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom is posed by insurgents employing indirect-fire tactics
of quick-attack, low-trajectory, urban-terrain-masked rocket,
artillery, and mortar strikes against U.S. forward operating bases in
Iraq. To combat this threat, the Army developed Counter-Rocket,
Artillery, Mortar (CRAM), an integrated solution of capabilities to
provide warning and intercept of rocket, artillery, and mortar threats.
CRAM provides a holistic approach to this emerging menace. Horizontal
integration across the core functions--command and control, shape,
sense, warn, intercept, respond and protect--is providing an integrated
modular and scalable capability. This capability provides timely
warning of mortar attacks, intercept and defeat of incoming rounds, and
accurate location of insurgent mortar crews, enabling a rapid, lethal
response. CRAM takes advantage of existing systems and capabilities,
combining them in a system of systems architecture to support the
warfighter on today's battlefield. The current CRAM solution is truly
Joint, in that it uses fielded systems from the Army, Navy and Air
Force along with a commercial off-the-shelf system. To date, CRAM has
been supported solely through supplemental appropriations. Recognizing
the enduring nature of the rocket, artillery, and mortar threat, the
Army is exploring ways, to include the use of directed energy, to
enhance this capability across all of the core functions, thereby
making it even more relevant to the future modular force.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, the Army, a fully contributing member of the Joint
team, is relevant and ready, fighting the war on terrorism, and
deterring aggression throughout the world, while transforming to meet
future threats. With its responsibilities for GMD, THAAD, and PAC-3/
MEADS Combined Aggregate Program, the Army is an integral part of the
joint team to develop and field an integrated missile defense for our
Nation, deployed forces, friends, and allies. In my role as the Joint
Functional Component Commander for Integrated Missile Defense, I will
continue the development of a Joint BMDS capability to protect our
Nation, deployed forces, friends, and allies. The Army has stepped up
to the land-attack cruise missile defense challenge by aggressively
developing the Joint, integrated, and networked sensor-to-shooter
architecture necessary to defeat the emerging threat. The fiscal year
2008 budget proposal continues the transformation of the Army's air,
space, and missile defense force to support the Army's future force,
the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense System, and our global
BMDS. Transformation will continue to define the characteristics of the
emerging air, space, and missile defense force and determine how it can
best support the future force operating in a Joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational environment.
I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important
matters and look forward to addressing any questions you or the other
committee members may have.
Senator Bill Nelson. I notice three ladies standing up in
the back, I would invite some of the gentlemen to offer their
seats to the ladies, otherwise, would the ladies come up here
and sit up here?
Would the gentleman give the lady a seat? Ma'am, there's a
seat right in the back. [Laughter.]
Okay, Dr. McQueary?
STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES E. McQUEARY, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL
TEST AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. McQueary. Chairman Nelson and Senator Sessions, thank
you very much for the opportunity to be here with the other
distinguished members of the panel.
I have four brief points that I'll make that I'll summarize
in more detail in my prepared remarks. But, the four points
that I wish to touch upon--I'll briefly give you my view of the
test accomplishments that MDA has had in this past year.
Second, I'll give you my current assessment of how we look at
the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and its successes.
Third, we'll talk about the implementation of the DOT&E
recommendations, which is one of the points that you had made
in your letter to me, and the fourth, I'll give you my current
view as to where we are on being able to fulfill the Block 2006
assessment requirements that were placed on us in the National
Defense Authorization Act of 2006.
First of all, I just will summarize by saying that MDA has
had a good year in 2006, as well as the beginning of 2007.
General Obering touched upon a number of things that were
accomplished during that time period, so there's no point in my
repeating any of that, and I won't do so.
I will say that MDA's test program has been a robust
program, it's been disciplined, and has demonstrated capability
both in ground tests, as well as in flight tests that the
system can work in certain scenarios.
My assessment, the second point I wanted to make is the
assessment; DOT&E had points of view that were raised in the
hearings that were held in 2005 and 2006, but what I can tell
you today is that the, in my view, that BMDS has demonstrated a
limited capability against a simple foreign threat, and that's
the important step forward in the development of such a system.
Coupled with the other successes that MDA has had, I think, as
well as the integrated ground test, I think BMDS is definitely
maturing in a satisfactory way, and the picture looks good.
So, the third point I'd like to make, Mr. Chairman is to
review the recommendations very briefly. I will not go into
specifics of what they are, but MDA has been very responsive to
the inputs we have. We had 26 recommendations that were made in
2005, and all but four of those have been fully implemented
based upon our recommendations, and MDA has specific plans in
place to address the other four.
In 2006, we had made 15 new recommendations, and of course
a report just came out early in the year, but MDA has been
working with us, in order to implement plans and test programs
that would be responsive to those.
So, in summary, I am very satisfied with the responsiveness
of General Obering and his staff in working with us, and being
responsive to the descriptions of what we believe from an
independent operational test evaluation standpoint needs to be
done.
My only role--the role that DOT&E has for MDA, in
particular--is to advise what should be done, but I will say
that General Obering and his staff have been as responsive as
any other program elements that we deal with in our overall
responsibilities at DOT&E. So, from my standpoint, being
relatively new in the job, I found it very satisfying.
Then the fourth issue is the one on the challenges of being
able to do the Block 2006 assessment. There were two failures
back in 2005, and the program had to go through a re-evaluation
of what the structure should be for testing. I think that has
been a good test program. However, due to the limited nature of
actual testing that has been done to date, it will be very
difficult for DOT&E to provide an analytical, complete
assessment of what is needed for the Block 2006. We'll have
much better insight into that as we get farther into the year,
and see the additional testing that is being done.
So, in summary, I think that MDA has had a good year, I
believe the organization has been very responsive to DOT&E's
requests, and I'm very pleased with what I have seen so far,
although, as indicated, we do have some recommendations as to
what can be done to improve the program, we believe, and I look
forward to your questions, so we can get into and probe this in
more detail.
[The prepared statement of Dr. McQueary follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Charles E. McQueary
Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, good afternoon. I am pleased to have this opportunity to
speak to you about the testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS). I will briefly cover four areas.
First, I will review what I believe are the major Missile Defense
Agency's test accomplishments during the past year.
Second, I will give you my current assessment of the capability of
BMDS.
Third, I will provide a review of the implementation of DOT&E
recommendations made to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).
Fourth, I will discuss the factors that will limit my ability to
provide a thorough Block 6 assessment as required by the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.
FIRST: THE RESULTS
MDA had a good year of testing in 2006.
For the first time in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program,
MDA successfully intercepted a ``simple'' threat-representative target
with an operational booster carrying an operational kill vehicle. Also,
for the first time, MDA used data from an operational radar to generate
the weapon task plan sent to the interceptor by the fire control
system.
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense was two for two in intercepts of
medium-range separating targets. Using Aegis cruisers, operational
connectivity, and simulated targets, MDA demonstrated simultaneous
ballistic missile defense and ship self-defense capabilities in
preparation for a live flight test in 2007.
From November 2005 through January 2007, the Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense was four for four on successful flights of the production
interceptor. Two of these test flights involved intercept of targets,
and both of those intercept flight tests were successful hits.
MDA's ground test program was active, robust, and disciplined,
demonstrating BMDS capability and interoperability.
SECOND: MY ASSESSMENT
At the 2005 hearing, DOT&E reported that the integrated ground test
results indicated the test bed had the potential to defend against a
limited attack, under certain conditions. However, difficulties in the
flight test program delayed confirmation of that capability.
During the 2006 hearing, DOT&E reported that the results of the
ground tests demonstrated that integration, interoperability, tactics,
doctrine, and procedures, were adequate to increase confidence in these
aspects of the system. The MDA testing program during 2005 was adequate
and appropriate to the developmental maturity of the BMDS.
Today, I can state that the BMDS has demonstrated a limited
capability against a simple foreign threat. Coupled with the success of
other element-level testing and MDA's integrated ground tests, the BMDS
is definitely maturing.
My assessment is bolstered by the fact that MDA is increasing the
operational realism of each successive test.
THIRD: THE RECOMMENDATIONS
Mr. Chairman, in your invitation to address the committee, you
asked me to provide an assessment of MDA's implementation of DOT&E
recommendations made to the agency. I will do that now.
There were 26 recommendations in the fiscal year 2005 annual
report. Only 4 recommendations are still open, and MDA is acting on
each of them. Two involve ongoing data collection, one involves the
future test schedule, and one deals with the test planning process.
There are 15 new recommendations in the fiscal year 2006 annual
report. Many of these new recommendations involve demonstrations of
specific capabilities during actual intercept tests. MDA is actively
considering these recommendations, and has already added several to its
test schedule.
I only advise MDA on its developmental test program. I am satisfied
with MDA's response to the recommendations in our annual reports. I am
pleased that General Obering and his staff recognize the value of our
suggestions and recommendations. A more capable BMDS is our mutual
goal.
FOURTH: THE CHALLENGES
Despite these successes, BMDS is still maturing as a system which
makes it difficult for me to assess Block 06 capability as required by
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.
First, to be confident in my assessment of effectiveness I need
validated models and simulations for the BMDS. They don't exist today
because MDA doesn't have enough flight test data to anchor them. MDA,
the multi-service BMDS Operational Test Agency team, and DOT&E
personnel are working together to solve this problem. However, there
may be insufficient time to fix this problem before we finalize the
Block 06 report.
While these models and simulations will be essential to proving the
operational capability of BMDS, we cannot use models and simulations as
substitutes for live testing. Both General Obering and I agree on this
important issue. MDA's testing must be sufficient to have high
confidence that the models and simulations are valid representations of
the actual performance and capability of the BMDS.
Second, I will have difficulty assessing suitability. BMDS has not
operated long enough to gather statistically significant data on its
reliability, availability, and maintainability, although the tests to
date are very encouraging. MDA and the warfighters are collecting the
data, but the amount may be insufficient to reach any confident
conclusions about the suitability of BMDS.
In conclusion, MDA experienced a good year with its ground and
flight test programs. Individual element successes indicate their
capabilities. Integrated ground testing of the BMDS is demonstrating
that the warfighters understand and can operate the system confidently
and effectively. There is still a long way to go, but MDA's disciplined
and principled approach to flight and ground tests is starting to pay
real dividends.
This concludes my remarks and I welcome your questions.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Francis?
STATEMENT OF PAUL FRANCIS, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING
MANAGEMENT, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Francis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good afternoon.
Good afternoon, Mr. Sessions, and Mr. Inhofe.
I'd like to start out today by saying that what I bring to
the discussion is not superior technical knowledge of missile
defense, but rather a broad knowledge base that includes many
weapons systems, to include missile defense. I also look at
large systems like the Army's Future Combat Systems, and Navy
shipbuilding, and I have a fair amount of history with
acquisition policy and best practices.
I want to recognize at the outset the accomplishments of
the missile defense program, and the dedication and hard work
that General Obering and his staff have put in to deliver this
system.
I'm going to focus on the rather un-glamorous topic of
value for money. By statute, we're required to prepare annual
assessments of MDA's progress in the areas of cost, schedule
and performance. Our March 2007 report is our fourth such
assessment.
Yet, each year, while we can report on what MDA
accomplished and what it costs, we can't reconcile this with
the budget that you approved. I can tell you that costs have
gone up for Blocks 2004 and 2006, and that the scope of work
has been reduced for each. However, I can't tell you the cost
of the work that was deferred, or to what extent you may have
to provide funds again for something that has already been
funded.
Here's why--MDA reduces a block's scope when work is
deferred to cover cost increases. When work is deferred from
one block, the cost of that work moves to the next block.
However, each block is estimated anew, so that the baseline is
reset to zero, and prior work is grandfathered into the new
block. When work travels from one block to another, the
connection between the actual work done and the amount of work
used to justify budget requests is weakened.
Normally, individual programs, like the elements, would
capture the cost consequences of deferred work. However, in
MDA, the elements do not have total cost estimates. Thus, they
do not reflect the cost consequences of deferrals, because
totals are not calculated. Total costs also enable one to
calculate unit costs. These calculations are not possible on
the MDA elements, nor can one readily track the actual cost of
an item, like a missile, and compare it with the estimated
budget costs for that item.
The reason for this is that MDA has the flexibility to
change scope and move funding around to provide what it
believes is the most capability. The advantages of management
systems, is that you can make decisions that cross program
lines, giving you more options and more agility to make
tradeoffs. MDA has this, and more. The director is vested with
the collective responsibilities of the program manager, the
service acquisition executive, and the milestone decision
authority.
MDA has the latitude to change scope and goals after funds
have been appropriated, without having to seek DOD or
congressional approval. Because missile defense has not
formally entered the system development and demonstration phase
of acquisition, it is not subject to statutes like Nunn-
McCurdy, that govern baselines, cost reporting and independent
cost estimates.
Also, MDA funds its entire budget with research and
development (R&D) monies. MDA can thus move money with
comparative ease between activities, such as technology, system
development, production and support. MDA can also fund the
production of operational assets incrementally, that is, to
spread their costs over several years, unlike the full funding
of assets that Congress requires of other programs.
These flexibilities were consciously given to MDA, and have
helped facilitate tradeoffs and to field the capability
quickly. We do not question the need for, or the efficacy of,
these decisions. However, the consequence is that it is hard to
reconcile value with money. This is important for a couple of
reasons.
First, missile defense is the largest weapon system in the
budget. The program has funded between $8 billion and $10
billion each year, and for the foreseeable future, we're going
to fund at this level.
Second, each of the military Services is also planning
large investments over the next 5 to 10 years, and these are
going to increase the competition for funds. These include the
Air Force purchases of F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter, the
Navy's plan to double its shipbuilding budget over the next few
years, and the Army's looking for additional funds for its
Future Combat Systems (FCS). We have to know what kind of
return we're getting on these investments, because overruns or
scope reductions represent opportunity costs for other
activities that could be undertaken by DOD.
We've made several recommendations to improve the
accountability and transparency of missile defense. We believe
changes need to be made to the block construct, and that the
individual elements should comply with the statutes that ensure
accountability of other programs. We also believe MDA should
use procurement funds when it's buying operational assets.
MDA is concerned that an over-emphasis on elements will
weaken the integration of the missile defense system of
systems. We believe changes can be made in such a way that
preserve the director's ability to make decisions across
program lines, without creating unreasonable delays in
decisionmaking.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, I'll be happy to
answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Francis follows:]
Prepared Statement by Paul Francis
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be
here today to discuss the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) strategy for
acquiring a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and its progress in
developing and fielding Block 2006--the second iteration of BMDS.
MDA's mission is to develop and field an integrated, layered BMDS
capable of defending the United States, its deployed forces, allies,
and friends against enemy ballistic missiles launched from all ranges
and during all phases of the missiles' flight. To carry out its
mission, MDA is fielding missile defense capabilities in 2-year
increments known as blocks. The first block--Block 2004--fielded a
limited initial capability that included early versions of Ground-Based
Midcourse Defense (GMD); Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD); Patriot
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3); and Command, Control, Battle Management,
and Communications (C2BMC). Each of these components is an element of
the integrated BMDS. During calendar years 2006 and 2007, MDA is
focusing Block 2006 to enhance and field four BMDS elements--GMD, Aegis
BMD, Sensors, and C2BMC. Block 2006 is not only expected to field
additional assets, but it also continues the evolution of Block 2004 by
providing improved GMD interceptors, enhanced Aegis BMD missiles,
upgraded Aegis BMD ships, a Forward-Based X-Band Transportable radar,
and enhancements to the C2BMC software.
The National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2002 and
2005 mandate that we prepare annual assessments of MDA's ongoing cost,
schedule, testing, and performance progress. We issued our most recent
report on March 15, 2007.\1\ My statement today will focus on the
issues covered in that report, specifically:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy
Generates Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost, GAO-07-387
(Washington, DC: Mar. 15, 2007).
MDA's progress toward developing the Block 2006
configuration of the BMDS,
the flexibility granted to MDA and its effect on
oversight and accountability, and
the status of MDA's efforts to improve its quality
processes.
SUMMARY
MDA continues to make progress on missile defense, but costs have
grown and less work is being completed than planned. The fielding of
additional assets and the first end-to-end test of GMD were notable
accomplishments in fiscal year 2006, as was being able to put BMDS on
alert status. Yet, MDA will not meet its original Block 2006 cost,
fielding, or performance goals. MDA will field fewer assets than
planned, which will cause a commensurate decrease in performance.
Although scope has been reduced, costs are expected to increase by
about $1 billion. There is no baseline against which to measure cost.
For several reasons, we cannot be precise about the actual cost of
Block 2006. MDA defers work from block to block and counts the cost of
deferred work as a cost of the block in which the work is performed
even though that work benefits the original block. For example, work
deferred from Block 2004 is counted as a cost of Block 2006. Element
program offices report costs inconsistently, with most underreporting
costs. The cost of Block 2006 may change further because MDA may defer
other work from Block 2006 until Block 2008 to cover $478 million in
fiscal year 2006 budget overruns experienced by element prime
contractors. We could not assess whether MDA is likely to achieve its
revised performance goal because too few tests have been completed to
have confidence in the models and simulations used to predict
performance. Overall, the block approach has had advantages for
fielding capabilities incrementally, but it has not proven to be a good
construct for reconciling actual cost and performance with the
justifications that MDA submits to support its budget request.
Because the BMDS program has not formally entered system
development and demonstration, application of laws that are designed to
facilitate oversight and accountability of Department of Defense (DOD)
acquisition programs has effectively been deferred. This gives MDA
unique latitude to manage the BMDS. Specifically, the BMDS cost,
schedule, and performance baseline does not have to be approved by
anyone outside MDA. MDA is not yet required to obtain independent
assessments of each configuration's cost or test results. Unlike other
programs, MDA is permitted to use research and development funds to
incrementally fund all activities, including the purchase and support
of operational assets. MDA keeps others informed, but it does not need
their approval. Collectively, this flexibility enables MDA to be more
agile in its decisionmaking. By the same token, MDA can revise its own
baseline to field fewer assets than planned, defer work to a future
block, and increase planned cost. Over time, it becomes difficult to
reconcile cost and outcomes against original goals and to determine the
value of the work accomplished. Ultimately, Congress may know that it
is getting less than expected for its investment, but it will not
necessarily know the cost of what it did receive or whether it is being
asked to again appropriate funds for work that had been scheduled in a
prior block but could not be completed because its funding was diverted
to pay for other activities. The foregoing does not mean that MDA has
acted inconsistently with the authorities it has been granted. Rather,
MDA has the sanctioned flexibility to manage exactly as it has. It
could be argued that without this flexibility, the initial capability
fielded last year and put on alert would not have been possible. Yet,
the question remains as to whether this degree of flexibility should be
retained for a program that is planning to spend on the order of $10
billion a year for the foreseeable future.
MDA auditors report that quality deficiencies are declining and on-
time deliveries are improving as corrective measures are implemented.
For example, MDA quality audits show that one key supplier has
decreased open quality issues by 64 percent, reduced test failures by
43 percent, and increased on-time deliveries by 9 percent. The
mechanisms being used to improve quality assurance processes include
the development of a teaming approach to restore reliability in key
suppliers, conducting regular quality audits, adjusting award fee plans
to encourage contractors to maintain a good quality assurance program
and implement industry best practices, and continuing to incorporate
key quality provisions into the agency's prime contracts.
In our March 2007 report, we recommended that MDA establish firm
baselines for those elements considered far enough along to be in
system development and demonstration, and report against those
baselines; propose an approach for those same elements that provides
information consistent with the acquisition laws that govern baselines
and unit cost reporting, independent cost estimates, and operational
test and evaluation; include in blocks only those elements that will
field capabilities during the block period and develop a firm block
baseline that includes the unit cost of its assets; request and use
procurement funds, rather than research, development, test, and
evaluation funds, to acquire fielded assets; and conduct an independent
evaluation of the Airborne Laser (ABL) and Kinetic Energy Interceptor
(KEI) elements prior to making a decision on the future of the
programs.
DOD partially concurred with the report's first three
recommendations, but did not agree to use procurement funds to acquire
fielded assets or to conduct an independent evaluation of the ABL and
KEI elements. In partially agreeing, DOD recognized the need to provide
greater program transparency and committed to providing information
consistent with acquisition laws that govern baselines and unit cost
reporting. However, DOD objected to the element-centric approach
recommended, believing that this would detract from managing the BMDS
as a single, integrated system. DOD also stated that reporting at the
BMDS-level in accordance with our third recommendation would appear to
be inconsistent with reporting at the element level. We continue to
believe that all recommended changes are needed to provide a better
balance between MDA's flexibility and BMDS program transparency.
Because DOD awards contracts and requests funding by individual
elements that compose the BMDS, we believe that the element approach is
the best way to achieve increased program transparency. However, a
BMDS-level baseline derived from the capabilities that individual
elements yield is needed to describe and manage a BMDS-wide capability.
We also believe that the use of procurement funds contributes to
program transparency by making clear at the outset the size of the
investment being requested in fielded assets. Finally, we continue to
believe that an independent assessment of the ABL and KEI capabilities
can provide a transparent basis for making decisions on the future of
the programs, but we did revise the recommendation to specify that the
assessment should follow key demonstrations in 2009.
BACKGROUND
Missile defense is important because at least 25 countries now
possess or are acquiring sophisticated missile technology that could be
used to attack the United States, deployed troops, friends, and allies.
MDA's mission is to develop and field an integrated, layered BMDS
capable of defending against enemy ballistic missiles launched from all
ranges and during all phases of the missiles' flight. DOD has spent and
continues to spend large sums of money to defend against this threat.
Since the mid-1980s, about $107 billion has been spent, and over the
next 5 years, another $49 billion is expected to be invested. While the
initial set of BMDS assets was fielded during 2004-2005, much of the
technical and engineering foundation was laid by this prior investment.
DOD also expects to continue investing in missile defense for many more
years as the system evolves into one that can engage an enemy ballistic
missile launched from any range during any phase of the missile's
flight.
To enable MDA to field and enhance a missile defense system
quickly, the Secretary of Defense, in 2002, directed a new acquisition
strategy. The Secretary's strategy included removing the BMDS program
from DOD's traditional acquisition process until a mature capability
was ready to be handed over to a military service for production and
operation. Therefore, development of the BMDS program is not segmented
into concept refinement, technology development, and system development
and demonstration phases, as other major defense acquisition programs
are. Instead, MDA initiates one development phase that incorporates all
acquisition activities and that is known simply as research and
development. MDA also has approval to use research and development
funds, rather than procurement funds, to acquire assets that could be
made available for operational use.
To carry out its mission, MDA is fielding missile defense
capabilities in 2-year increments known as blocks. The first block--
Block 2004--fielded a limited initial capability that included early
versions of GMD, Aegis BMD, PAC-3, and C2BMC. This was the capability
that was put on alert status in 2006. MDA formally began a second BMDS
block on January 1, 2006, that will continue through December 31, 2007.
This block is expected to provide protection against attacks from North
Korea and the Middle East. During the 2-year block timeframe, MDA is
focusing its program of work on the enhancement and fielding of
additional quantities of the GMD, Aegis BMD, and C2BMC elements, as
well as fielding a Forward-Based X-Band radar that is part of the
Sensors element. When MDA defined the block in March 2005, shortly
after submitting its fiscal year 2006 budget request to Congress, it
also included three other elements--ABL, Space Tracking and
Surveillance System (STSS), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD)--that are primarily developmental in nature. According to MDA,
these elements were included in the block even though they were not
expected to be operational until future blocks because the elements
offered some emergency capability during the block timeframe. In March
2006, MDA removed THAAD from Block 2006. According to MDA, this action
better aligned resources and fielding plans. The development of two
other elements--Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) and KEI--also continued in
fiscal year 2006, but these elements were not considered part of Block
2006 because, according to MDA officials, the elements provide no
capability--emergency or operational--during the block.
The bulk of the funding that MDA requests for the BMDS each fiscal
year is for the development, fielding, and sustainment of BMDS
elements. For example, in fiscal year 2006, funding for the nine BMDS
elements collectively accounted for 72 percent of MDA's research and
development budget. MDA requests funds for each of these elements, with
the exception of C2BMC and THAAD, under separate budget line items. In
addition, MDA issues separate contracts for each of the nine elements.
Prior to beginning each new block, MDA establishes and submits
block goals to Congress. These goals present the business case for the
new block. MDA presented its Block 2006 goals to Congress in March
2005, shortly after submitting its fiscal year 2006 budget. At that
time, MDA told Congress that the agency expected to field the following
assets: up to 15 GMD interceptors, an interim upgrade of the Thule
Early Warning Radar, a Forward-Based X-Band radar, 19 Aegis BMD
missiles, 1 new Aegis cruiser for the missile defense mission, 4 new
Aegis destroyers capable of providing long-range surveillance and
tracking, and 8 Aegis destroyers upgraded for the engagement mission.
MDA's cost goal for the development of the six elements that compose
the block, the manufacture of assets being fielded, and logistical
support for fielded assets was $19.3 billion.\2\ MDA also notified
Congress of the Block 2006 performance goals established for the BMDS.
These goals were composed of numerical values for the probability of
engagement success, the land area from which the BMDS could deny a
launch, and the land area that the BMDS could defend.\3\ Fiscal year
testing goals were also established by element program offices, but
these goals were not formally reported to Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ We have adjusted the cost goal reported to Congress to reflect
MDA's removal of the THAAD element and its future development cost from
Block 2006.
\3\ Specifics of the BMDS performance goals are classified and
cannot be presented in an open forum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We examined numerous documents and held discussions with agency
officials. In determining the elements' progress toward Block 2006
goals, we looked at the accomplishments of six BMDS elements--ABL,
Aegis BMD, BMDS Sensors, C2BMC, GMD, and STSS--that compose the Block
2006 configuration. Our work included examining System Element Reviews,
test plans and reports, production plans, and Contract Performance
Reports. We also interviewed officials within each element program
office and within MDA functional offices. In assessing whether MDA's
flexibility impacts BMDS oversight and accountability, we examined
documents such as those defining MDA's changes to Block 2006 goals,
acquisition laws for major DOD programs, and BMDS policy directives
issued by the Secretary of Defense. We examined the current status of
MDA's quality assurance program by visiting various contractor
facilities and holding discussions with MDA officials, such as
officials in the Office of Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance. We
performed our work from June 2006 through March 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards
MDA HAS MADE PROGRESS WITH BLOCK 2006, BUT SCOPE HAS BEEN REDUCED AND
COSTS HAVE GONE UP
MDA made progress during fiscal year 2006, but it will not achieve
the goals it set for itself in March 2005. One year after establishing
its Block 2006 goals, the agency informed Congress that it planned to
field fewer assets, reduce performance goals, and increase the block's
cost goal. It is also likely that in addition to fielding fewer assets,
other Block 2006 work will be deferred to offset growing contractor
costs. MDA is generally on track to meet its revised quantity goals,
but the performance of the BMDS cannot yet be fully assessed because
there have been too few flight tests conducted to anchor the models and
simulations that predict overall system performance. Several elements
continue to experience technical problems that pose questions about the
performance of the fielded system and could delay the enhancement of
future blocks. In addition, the Block 2006 cost goal cannot be
reconciled with actual costs because work travels to and from other
blocks and individual element program offices report costs
inconsistently.
During the first year of Block 2006, MDA continued to improve the
BMDS by enhancing its performance and fielding additional assets. In
addition, the BMDS elements achieved some notable test results. For
example, the GMD element completed its first successful intercept
attempt since 2002. The test was also notable because it was an end-to-
end test of one engagement scenario, the first such test that the
program has conducted. Also, the Aegis BMD element conducted a
successful intercept test of its more capable Standard Missile-3 design
that is being fielded for the first time during Block 2006.
In March 2006, soon after the formal initiation of Block 2006, MDA
announced that events such as hardware delays, technical challenges,
and budget cuts were causing the agency to field fewer assets than
originally expected. MDA's goal now calls for fielding three fewer GMD
interceptors; deferring the upgrade of the Thule radar until Block
2008, when it can be fully upgraded; producing four fewer Aegis BMD
missiles; upgrading one less Aegis destroyer for the engagement
mission; and delivering three C2BMC Web browsers rather than the more
expensive C2BMC suites. With the exception of the GMD interceptors, MDA
is on track to deliver the revised quantities. The GMD program planned
to emplace eight interceptors during calendar year 2006, but was only
able to emplace four. Program officials told us that the contractor has
increased the number of shifts that it is working and that this change
will accelerate deliveries. However, to meet its quantity goal, the GMD
program will have to more than double its interceptor emplacement rate
in 2007.
MDA also reduced the performance expected of Block 2006
commensurate with the reduction in assets. However, insufficient data
are available to determine whether MDA is on track to meet the new
goal. Although the GMD test program has achieved some notable results,
officials in DOD's Office of the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation told us that the element has not completed sufficient tests
to provide a high level of confidence that the BMDS can reliably
intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles. Further testing is
needed as well to confirm that GMD can use long-range tracking data
developed by Aegis BMD to prepare--in real time--a weapon system task
plan for GMD interceptors.
Delayed testing and technical problems may also impact the
performance of the current and future configurations of the BMDS. For
example, the performance of the Block 2006 configuration of the Aegis
BMD missile is unproven because design changes in the missile's solid
attitude and divert system and one burn pattern of the third stage
rocket motor were not flight-tested before they were cut into the
production line. The current configuration of the GMD interceptor also
continues to struggle with an anomaly that has occurred in each of the
element's flight tests. The anomaly has not yet prevented the program
from achieving its primary test objectives, but neither its source nor
a solution has been clearly identified or defined. The reliability of
some GMD interceptors remains uncertain as well because inadequate
mission assurance/quality control procedures may have allowed less
reliable or inappropriate parts to be incorporated into the
manufacturing process. Program officials plan to introduce new parts
into the manufacturing process, but not until interceptor 18. MDA also
plans to retrofit the previous 17 interceptors, but not until fiscal
year 2009. In addition to the performance problems with elements being
fielded, the ABL element that is being developed to enhance a future
BMDS configuration experienced technical problems with its Beam
Control/Fire Control component. These problems have delayed a lethality
demonstration that is needed to demonstrate the element's leading-edge
technologies. ABL is an important element because if it works as
desired, it will defeat enemy missiles soon after launch, before decoys
are released to confuse other BMDS elements. MDA plans to decide in
2009 whether ABL or KEI, whose primary boost phase role is to mitigate
the risk in the ABL program, will become the BMDS boost phase
capability.
While MDA reduced Block 2006 quantity and performance goals, it
increased the block's cost goal from about $19.3 billion to
approximately $20.3 billion.\4\ The cost increases were caused by the
addition of previously unknown operations and sustainment requirements,
realignment of the GMD program to support a successful return to
flight, realignment of the Aegis BMD program to address technical
challenges and invest in upgrades, and preparations for round-the-clock
operation of the BMDS. Although MDA is expected to operate within its
revised budget of $20.3 billion, the actual cost of the block cannot be
reconciled with the cost goal. To stay within its Block 2004 budget,
MDA shifted some of that block's work to Block 2006 and is counting it
as a cost of Block 2006, which overstates Block 2006 cost. In addition,
MDA officials told us that it is likely that some Block 2006 work will
be deferred until Block 2008 to cover the $478 million fiscal year 2006
budget overruns experienced by five of the six element prime
contractors. If MDA reports the cost of deferred work as it has in the
past, the actual cost of Block 2006 will be complicated further.
Another factor complicating the reconciliation of Block 2006 cost is
that the elements report block cost inconsistently. Some elements
appropriately include costs that the program will incur to reach full
capability, while others do not.\5\
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\4\ Specific details regarding the cost increase can be found in
GAO-07-387.
\5\ An element has reached full capability if it has completed all
system-level testing and has shown that it meets expectations. At this
state, all doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership,
personnel, and facilities are in place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MDA'S FLEXIBILTY MAKES OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MORE DIFFICULT
Because the BMDS has not formally entered the system development
and demonstration phase of the acquisition cycle, it is not yet
required to apply several important oversight mechanisms contained in
certain acquisition laws that, among other things, provide transparency
into program progress and decisions. This has enabled MDA to be agile
in decisionmaking and has facilitated fielding an initial BMDS
capability quickly. On the other hand, MDA operates with considerable
autonomy to change goals and plans, making it difficult to reconcile
outcomes with original expectations and to determine the actual cost of
each block and of individual operational assets.
Over the years, a framework of laws has been created that make
major defense acquisition programs accountable for their planned
outcomes and cost, give decisionmakers a means to conduct oversight,
and ensure some level of independent program review. The application of
many of these laws is triggered by a program's entry into system
development and demonstration. To provide accountability, once major
defense programs cross this threshold, they are required by statute to
document program goals in an acquisition program baseline that as
implemented by DOD has been approved by a higher-level DOD official
prior to the program's initiation. The baseline provides decisionmakers
with the program's best estimate of the program's total cost for an
increment of work, average unit costs for assets to be delivered, the
date that an operational capability will be fielded, and the weapon's
intended performance parameters. Once approved, major acquisition
programs are required to measure their program against the baseline,
which is the program's initial business case, or obtain the approval of
a higher-level acquisition executive before making significant changes.
Programs are also required to regularly provide detailed program status
information to Congress, including information on cost, in Selected
Acquisition Reports. In addition, Congress has established a cost-
monitoring mechanism that requires programs to report significant
increases in unit cost measured from the program baseline.\6\
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\6\ 10 U.S.C. 2433, known as Nunn-McCurdy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other statutes provide for independent program verifications and
place limits on the use of appropriations. For example, 10 U.S.C. 2434
prohibits the Secretary of Defense from approving system development
and demonstration unless an independent estimate of the program's life-
cycle cost has been conducted by the Secretary. In addition, 10 U.S.C.
2399 requires completion of initial operational test and evaluation
before a program can begin full-rate production. These statutes ensure
that someone external to the program examines the likelihood that the
program can be executed as planned and will yield a system that is
effective and suitable for combat. The use of an appropriation is also
controlled so that it will not be used for a purpose other than the one
for which it was made, except as otherwise provided by law. Research
and development appropriations are typically specified by Congress to
be used to pay the expenses of basic and applied scientific research,
development, test, and evaluation. On the other hand, procurement
appropriations are, in general, to be used for production and
manufacturing. In the 1950s, Congress established a policy that items
being purchased with procurement funds be fully funded in the year that
the item is procured. This is meant to prevent a program from
incrementally funding the purchase of operational systems. Full funding
ensures that the total procurement costs of weapons and equipment are
known to Congress upfront and that one Congress does not put the burden
on future Congresses of deciding whether they should appropriate
additional funds or expose weapons under construction to uneconomic
start-up and stop costs.
The flexibility to defer application of specific acquisition laws
has benefits. MDA can make decisions faster than other major
acquisition programs because it does not have to wait for higher-level
approvals or independent reviews. MDA's ability to quickly field a
missile defense capability is also improved because assets can be
fielded before all testing is complete. MDA considers the assets it has
fielded to be developmental assets and not the result of the production
phase of the acquisition cycle. Additionally, MDA enjoys greater
flexibility than other programs in the use of its funds. Because MDA
uses research and development funds to manufacture assets, it is not
required to fully fund those assets in the year of their purchase.
Therefore, as long as its annual budget remains fairly level, MDA can
request funds to address other needs.
On the other hand, the flexibilities granted MDA make it more
difficult to conduct program oversight or to hold MDA accountable for
the large investment being made in the BMDS program. Block goals can be
changed by MDA, softening the baseline used to assess progress toward
expected outcomes. Similarly, because MDA can redefine the work to be
completed during a block, the actual cost of a block cannot be compared
with the original cost estimate. MDA considers the cost of deferred
work, which may be the delayed delivery of assets or other work
activities, as a cost of the block in which the work is performed even
though the work benefits or was planned for a prior block. Further, MDA
does not track the cost of the deferred work and, therefore, cannot
make adjustments that would match the cost with the block that is
benefited. For example, during Block 2004, MDA deferred some planned
development, deployment, characterization, and verification activities
until Block 2006 so that it could cover contractor budget overruns. The
costs of the activities are now considered part of the cost of Block
2006. Also, although Congress provided funding for these activities
during Block 2004, MDA used these funds for the overruns and will need
additional funds during Block 2006 to cover their cost. Planned and
actual unit costs of fielded assets are equally difficult to reconcile.
Because MDA is not required to develop an approved acquisition program
baseline, it is not required to report the expected average unit cost
of assets. Also, because MDA is not required to report significant
increases in unit cost,\7\ it is not easy to determine whether an
asset's actual cost has increased significantly from its expected cost.
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\7\ Because the BMDS or its major elements have not been designated
by MDA as being in system development and demonstration, no acquisition
program baseline is required under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2435. Thus there is
no basis for determining unit cost under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2433 (also
known as Nunn-McCurdy), which requires calculation of unit cost from
the baseline. Further, for the same reason, only limited Selected
Acquisition Reports to Congress on program status are generated (10
U.S.C. 2432(h)) that do not include unit costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, using research and development funds to purchase fielded
assets further reduces cost transparency because these dollars are not
covered by the full-funding policy as are procurement funds. Therefore,
when a program for a 2-year block is first presented in the budget,
Congress is not necessarily fully aware of the dimensions and cost of
that block. For example, although a block may call for the delivery of
a specific number of interceptors, the full cost of those interceptors
is requested over 3 to 5 years. Calculating unit costs from budget
documents is difficult because the cost of components that will become
fielded assets may be spread across 3 to 5 budget years--a consequence
of incremental funding.
MDA AUDITS SHOW IMPROVEMENT IN QUALITY PROCESSES
During Block 2004, poor quality control procedures caused the
missile defense program to experience test failures and slowed
production. MDA has initiated a number of actions to correct quality
control weaknesses, and the agency reports that these actions have been
largely successful. Although MDA continues to identify quality
assurance procedures that need strengthening, recent audits by MDA's
Office of Quality, Safety, and Mission Assurance show such improvements
as increased on-time deliveries, reduced test failures, and sustained
improvement in product quality.
MDA has taken a number of steps to improve quality assurance. These
include developing a teaming approach to restore the reliability of key
suppliers, conducting regular quality inspections to quickly identify
and find resolutions for quality problems, adjusting award fee plans to
encourage contractors to maintain a good quality assurance program and
encourage industry best practices, as well as placing MDA-developed
assurance provisions on prime contracts. For example, as early as 2003,
MDA made a critical assessment of a key supplier's organization and
determined that the supplier's manufacturing processes lacked
discipline, its corrective action procedures were ineffective, its
technical data package was inadequate, and personnel were not properly
trained. The supplier responded by hiring a Quality Assurance Director,
five quality assurance professionals, a training manager, and a
scheduler. In addition, the supplier installed an electronic problem-
reporting database, formed new boards--such as a failure review board--
established a new configuration management system, and ensured that
manufacturing activity was consistent with contract requirements.
During different time periods between March 2004 and August 2006, MDA
measured the results of the supplier's efforts and found a 64-percent
decrease in open quality control issues, a 43-percent decline in test
failures, and a 9-percent increase in on-time deliveries. MDA expanded
its teaming approach in 2006 to another problem supplier and reports
that many systemic solutions are already underway.
During fiscal year 2006, MDA's audits continued to identify both
quality control weaknesses and quality control procedures that
contractors are addressing. During 2006, the agency audited six
contractors and identified 372 deficiencies and observations.\8\ As of
December 2006, the 6 contractors had collectively closed 157, or 42
percent, of the 372 audit findings. MDA also reported other signs of
positive results. For example, in 2006, MDA conducted a follow-on audit
of Raytheon, the subcontractor for GMD's exoatmospheric kill vehicle. A
2005 audit of Raytheon had found that the subcontractor was not
correctly communicating essential kill vehicle requirements to
suppliers, did not exercise good configuration control, and could not
build a consistent and reliable product. The 2006 audit was more
positive, reporting less variability in Raytheon's production
processes, increasing stability in its statistical process control
data, fewer test problem reports and product waivers, and sustained
improvement in product quality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Deficiencies are considered more serious and are recognized
when contractors do not comply with a contractual or internal procedure
requirement. On the other hand, observations are made when a contractor
fails to employ an MDA or industry best practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACTIONS RECOMMENDED IN OUR RECENT REPORT
In our March 15, 2007, report, we made several recommendations to
DOD to increase transparency in the missile defense program. These
included:
Develop a firm cost, schedule, and performance
baseline for those elements considered far enough along to be
in system development and demonstration, and report against
that baseline.
Propose an approach for those same elements that
provides information consistent with the acquisition laws that
govern baselines and unit cost reporting, independent cost
estimates, and operational test and evaluation for major DOD
programs. Such an approach could provide necessary information
while preserving the MDA Director's flexibility to make
decisions.
Include in blocks only those elements that will field
capabilities during the block period and develop a firm cost,
schedule, and performance baseline for that block capability,
including the unit cost of its assets.
Request and use procurement funds, rather than
research, development, test, and evaluation funds, to acquire
fielded assets.
DOD partially agreed with the first three recommendations and
recognized the need for greater program transparency. It committed to
provide information consistent with the acquisition laws that govern
baselines and unit cost reporting, independent cost estimates, and
operational test and evaluation. DOD did not agree to use elements as a
basis for this reporting, expressing its concern that an element-
centric approach to reporting would have a fragmenting effect on the
development of an integrated system. We respect the need for the MDA
Director to make decisions across element lines to preserve the
integrity of the system of systems. We recognize that there are other
bases rather than elements for reporting purposes. However, we believe
it is essential that MDA report in the same way that it requests funds.
Currently MDA requests funds and contracts by element, and at this
time, that appears to be the most logical way to report. MDA currently
intends to modify its current block approach. We believe that a
management construct like a block is needed to provide the vehicle for
making system-of-system decisions and to provide for system-wide
testing. However, at this point, the individual assets to be managed in
a block--including quantities, cost, and delivery schedules--can only
be derived from the individual elements.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Mr. Green?
STATEMENT OF BRIAN R. GREEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES, OFFICE OF THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
STRATEGIC FORCES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Green. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and
members of the subcommittee, it's a pleasure to appear before
you today to discuss the policy and strategic rationale
underpinning the fiscal year 2008 missile defense budget
request.
In 2001, President Bush directed us to field an initial
missile defense capability by 2004, and to improve it over time
to meet the changing threat, and to take advantage of emerging
technology. He also directed us to extend the benefits of
missile defense to our friends and allies.
I would like to discuss today our progress in meeting this
direction, and focus on an effort that is key to enabling us to
meet these goals, the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in
Europe.
Missile defense continues to be one of the administration's
highest priorities, driven by rapidly-evolving missile threats.
Aggressive and unpredictable adversaries such as Iran and North
Korea, continue to challenge our notions of deterrence and
defense. Surprise --strategic, tactical, and technical--is an
expected feature of the post-Cold War strategic environment. In
this environment, we can no longer rely solely on offensive
capabilities to deter our adversaries. We must have other
options, including missile defenses, that both reinforce
deterrence, and hedge against its potential failure.
I'm pleased to report that we've made substantial and rapid
progress in meeting the President's direction to deploy missile
defense capabilities. These have been well-described by General
Obering.
My colleagues seated with me at the table today who
represent the developers, the testers and the warfighters,
deserve the Nation's gratitude, and I would be remiss if I
didn't thank Congress and this Committee for its support as
well.
We're also making progress in missile defense cooperation
with our allies and our friends. Today, 15 additional
countries, including 9 NATO nations alone, are engaged in
missile defense efforts of some kind, whether by hosting key
facilities or assets on their territory, or actively discussing
this possibility, or pursuing R&D programs, examining options
in technical working groups, signing cooperative agreements
with the U.S., or maintaining capabilities.
In January of this year, President Bush directed us to
proceed with negotiations to base U.S. long-range missile
defenses in Europe. These defenses are intended to counter the
increasing Middle Eastern missile threat. Our intelligence
community assesses that Iran would be able to develop an ICBM
capability before 2015, if it chose to do so, and we must start
now in order to address this threat in a timely manner.
The current plans call for basing 10 GBIs in Poland similar
to those currently deployed in Alaska and California, and a
midcourse radar in the Czech Republic.
The deployment of these U.S. missile defense assets in
Europe will have many benefits. They would be capable of
intercepting not only ICBMs, but also intermediate-range
ballistic missiles launched out of the Middle East. The U.S.
goal is to optimize the defensive coverage of both Europe, and
the U.S. It would provide a second layer of defense for the
United States.
With the protection afforded by these U.S. defensive
capabilities in Europe, NATO member-states could resist
attempts by hostile states to intimidate or coerce the alliance
or its members from taking actions in a coalition.
Strengthening our European allies and the NATO alliance, in
turn, enhances U.S. security.
The defense of Europe against longer-range threats, similar
to those which the United States is defending itself, will be
important to keep U.S. and NATO security tightly coupled. Such
defenses would provide additional decision space for national
leaders, including the President, for example, by allowing them
to delay or defer resorting to offensive responses to an
attack.
Missile defenses provide another avenue for burdensharing,
and strengthening relationships with important allies. When
negotiations are successfully concluded, Poland and the Czech
Republic will be providing a significant contribution to the
collective security of the NATO alliance by hosting BMD assets.
I also want to comment briefly on the benefits derived
specifically from the basing mode that we've chosen to pursue,
that is, ground-basing interceptors and silos. Many of our
missile defense, assets such as Aegis and PAC-3, are mobile or
transportable. The advantage of mobility is flexibility. We can
move assets into place as circumstances warrant.
There's also an advantage to ground-based silos, and that
advantage is persistence. If we field long-range interceptors
and silos in Europe, we will have a capability that is always
there--before and during a crisis. With our allies and
potential adversaries, we'll know with certainty that a missile
defense capability is in place. These missile defense assets,
then, will be able to both assure allies, and to deter and
dissuade adversaries at all times, once they're fielded.
While we see many benefits from a deployment in Europe,
some in Russia have expressed their opposition, contending that
our limited missile defenses constitute a threat to the
strategic balance. I would say, first and foremost, that we no
longer look at Russia as a strategic adversary, and therefore,
there is no strategic balance to disturb. Furthermore, physics
and geography prove that ground-based missile defense
interceptors and a X-band radar for a mid-course tracking and
discrimination of warheads, located in Central Europe, would
have no capability against an ICBM launched out of Russia at
the United States in a one-on-one engagement.
Finally, 10 interceptors in Europe are simply not a threat
to Russia, and cannot diminish Russia's deterrent of hundreds
of missiles, and thousands of warheads. Providing Russia
transparency and predictability in our missile defense policy,
plans, and programs is certainly in the interest of the United
States. We've provided this in the past, and are continuing to
keep Russia informed about the status of our programs and
decisions. We will also explore the possibility of additional
confidence-building measures, and we seek opportunities to
cooperate in missile defense in the future. President Bush
recently underscored that point to President Putin.
I mentioned previously that a European interceptor site
will provide long-range missile defense coverage to many NATO
allies. Missile defense has been a topic of discussion and
debate at NATO for quite some time, and the U.S. plan to begin
fielding missile defense elements in Europe has served to focus
and intensify those discussions.
The Alliance has already taken several important steps
demonstrating its support for missile defense. With its Active-
Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) Program, the
Alliance has decided to develop a capability to defend its
deployed forces from shorter-range missile attack.
Recognizing a growing threat to NATO territory, the
Alliance agreed at the 2002 Prague Summit to initiate the NATO
Missile Defense Feasibility Study to examine the defense of
alliance territory and population centers from ballistic
missile attack. This study was completed and presented to the
2006 Riga Summit. At Riga, the Alliance endorsed the study's
conclusion that defense of alliance territory and population
centers is technically feasible.
We are continuing to consult extensively with NATO to
ensure that all of our allies understand the contribution
missile defense can make to alliance security and solidarity.
Although the alliance has yet to make the collective decision
to pursue continental defense, a number of allies have
demonstrated support for long-range missile defense. Poland and
the Czech Republic have expressed interest in hosting long-
range missile defense assets, the United Kingdom agreed to an
upgrade to the Fylingdales radar, and Denmark has agreed to a
similar upgrade of the early-warning radar at Thule, Greenland.
In conclusion, we have made great progress in meeting the
goals the President set for us over 4 years ago, and we
continue to press forward with the proposed deployment of U.S.
missile defenses in Europe.
That concludes my statement. Thank you for your attention.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]
Prepared Statement by Brian R. Green
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today. I am here to
discuss missile defense in the context of national defense strategy and
to review our progress in carrying out the President's ballistic
missile defense policy.
NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Ballistic missile defense remains a top priority of the
administration. This priority is driven by needs defined by the new and
evolving strategic environment, and continues to be validated by recent
events.
Our national security focus changed in the early 1990s with the
demise of the Soviet Union. We realized that we faced a broader range
of threats from a broader range of aggressive and unpredictable
adversaries. Threats posed by nations, such as Iran and North Korea,
and transnational non-state actors, such as al Qaeda, continue to
challenge our notions of deterrence and defense. Surprise--strategic,
tactical, and technical--is an expected feature of the security
landscape. While deterrence remains the cornerstone of our strategy, we
recognize an increased risk that deterrence may fail. Under such
circumstances, missile defenses are highly desirable because they both
reinforce deterrence and hedge against its failure.
Potential adversaries see ballistic missiles armed with weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) as low-cost, high impact asymmetric options to
counter other U.S. military advantages. WMD and ballistic missile
delivery vehicles have become the weapon of choice for countries
seeking to coerce their neighbors and limit U.S. freedom of action. LTG
Michael Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said
earlier this year that ``after global terrorism, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction remains the most significant threat to our
homeland, deployed forces, allies and interests.''
The threat from the increasing numbers and capabilities of
ballistic missiles is pronounced. This threat is highlighted by
proliferation of ballistic missiles by countries such as North Korea
and China, and secretive weapons proliferation networks, such as the
one run by A.Q. Khan, selling nuclear technology and expertise. Not
only is the threat from the numbers and capabilities of ballistic
missiles increasing, but the group of countries possessing ballistic
missiles includes some of the world's most threatening and least
responsible regimes, such as North Korea and Iran.
As LTG Maples recently testified before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence in unclassified session, ``North Korea has an ambitious
ballistic missile development program and has exported missiles and
missile technology to other countries, including Iran and Pakistan.
North Korea continues to develop the Taepo Dong 2, which could reach
parts of the United States and is capable of carrying a nuclear
payload. On 4 July 2006, North Korea conducted seven widely-publicized
missile launches. The Taepo Dong 2 space launch vehicle /
intercontinental ballistic missile was flight-tested for the first time
and failed shortly after launch. Despite the failure of the Taepo Dong
2, North Korea successfully tested six theater ballistic missiles,
demonstrating the capability to target U.S. forces and our allies in
South Korea and Japan. North Korea is also developing a new
intermediate-range ballistic missile and a new short-range, solid-
propellant ballistic missile. Export of North Korea ballistic missiles
will continue to be a concern.''
Turning to the Middle East, Iran represents a dangerous nexus,
combining a vigorous ballistic missile program, a nuclear program that
we assess also reflects a desire to develop nuclear weapons, and a
history of support for international terrorism. Terrorism has been part
of Tehran's arsenal for decades. In fact, before the September 11
attacks, more Americans had been killed by Iranian-backed terrorists
like Hezbollah than by any other terrorist group. Iran has made
ballistic missiles an important part of its defense strategy. As former
Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, testified last
year, ``The danger that it will acquire a nuclear weapon and the
ability to integrate it with the ballistic missiles Iran already
possesses is a reason for immediate concern. Iran already has among the
largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and Tehran
views its ballistic missiles as an integral part of its strategy to
deter--and if necessary retaliate against--forces in the region,
including U.S. forces.''
In this environment, recent statements by Iranian President Ahmadi-
Nejad threatening the United States and its friends in the region, most
notably Israel, are of particular concern. In October 2005, Ahmadi-
Nejad declared that ``Israel should be wiped off the map. God willing,
with the force of God behind it, we shall soon experience a world
without the United States and Zionism.'' He also said that ``anybody
who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation's
fury.''
Iran also continues to develop ballistic missiles of increasing
range and sophistication that may one day be able to deliver a nuclear
weapon. Lt. Gen. Maples recently testified before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence that Iran continues its efforts to develop
and acquire ballistic missiles capable of striking Israel and Europe.
Iran's ballistic missiles already cast a shadow over U.S. friends and
allies, and our deployed forces, in the Middle East. Moreover, the
Intelligence Community assesses that Iran would be able to develop an
ICBM before 2015 if it chose to do so. The addition of nuclear warheads
and an ICBM that could reach the U.S. would further extend Iran's
ability to coerce others and threaten the U.S.
Iran has also claimed it is pursuing a space-launch capability.
Although space launch vehicles can be used for peaceful purposes, if
Iran were to achieve such a capability, it would also be demonstrating
the key technologies needed to deliver payloads at intercontinental
ranges.
OVERALL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND U.S. DEFENSE GOALS
Ballistic missile defenses remain an important part of our overall
defense strategy. Last year, the Department of Defense released the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR recognized U.S.
superiority in traditional warfare, but stressed that improvements are
needed in non-traditional warfare. The QDR identified a number of
priorities to operationalize the National Defense Strategy, including:
1) defending the homeland in depth; 2) shaping the choices of countries
at strategic crossroads; and 3) preventing hostile states and non-state
actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. Ballistic
missile defenses can make important contributions to each of these
priorities. They can be part of a layered defense against the use of
ballistic missiles to attack the population and territory of the U.S.,
its deployed forces, or its friends and allies. They can also help
dissuade countries from choosing to compete militarily with the U.S by
increasing the cost of competition and decreasing the certainty that a
ballistic missile attack will succeed.
The 2001 QDR outlined four broad defense policy goals: to assure,
dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defend and defeat. Missile defenses
support these goals in the following ways:
Assure allies and friends that threats by nations armed with
ballistic missiles will not be able to deter the U.S. from
fulfilling its security commitments, coerce our allies, or
undermine a coalition;
Dissuade potential adversaries from investing in or
developing ballistic missiles by reducing the value of such
weapons;
Deter ballistic missile attacks and threats by reducing an
adversary's confidence in the success of an attack; and
Defeat missile attacks against the United States, its
deployed forces, and its friends and allies in the event that
deterrence fails.
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTION
Upon taking office, President Bush embarked on a bold new course
for strategic deterrence and defense. The President issued NSPD-23,
National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense. The President directed us
to field an initial missile defense capability in 2004 consisting of
ground- and sea-based interceptors, additional Patriot units, and
sensors on land, at sea, and in space. The initial capability was only
a starting point. Using an evolutionary acquisition approach, we are
improving these capabilities over time to meet the changing threat and
to take advantage of emerging technology. We must continue a robust
research and development effort, in addition to fielding adequate
quantities of interceptors.
As technology changes over time, so will the composition of our
missile defense force. There will be no fixed, final force structure.
We will change the number and locations of our missile defenses to
counter emerging threats and to take advantage of geographic
opportunities. Some threats, like Libya, may recede, while others, like
Iran, will grow. Our missile defenses must have global reach to counter
threats wherever they may appear.
The U.S. is making steady progress in meeting these goals. We now
have ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska and California; sea-
based interceptors available for deployment aboard Aegis Cruisers and
Destroyers; more Patriot units; sensors on land, at sea and in space;
an evolving command and control system to tie it all together; and
trained warfighters on station.
INTERNATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION
International cooperation is one of the cornerstones of our
national policy on ballistic missile defense. In 2002, the President
directed that missile defense cooperation will be a feature of U.S.
relations with close, longstanding allies, and an important means to
build new relationships with new friends. The U.S. has made progress in
carrying out this direction, with cooperative efforts underway with
many countries. Today, 15 countries (including 9 in NATO alone) are
engaged in missile defense efforts of some kind, whether by hosting key
facilities or assets on their territory or actively discussing this
possibility, pursuing R&D programs, signing cooperative agreements with
the U.S., or maintaining capabilities. In addition to the U.S., the
list includes Australia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, Israel, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Taiwan,
Ukraine, and the U.K. I would point out that Russia clearly believes in
the value of missile defense as it continues to maintain a missile
defense system around its major population center, Moscow, and has
developed defenses against shorter-range missiles.
Let me briefly describe some of these allied efforts.
North Korean ballistic missiles pose a direct and
immediate threat to Japan. This threat encouraged Japan to seek
closer cooperation with the U.S. The Japanese are now one of
our pre-eminent missile defense partners.
Japan is deploying a multi-layered system
comprised of upgraded Aegis ships with Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors, Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 (PAC-3) systems, new and refurbished
warning radars and an upgraded command and control
system.
Japan and the U.S. are co-developing the SM-3
Block IIA, the next-generation sea-based interceptor.
This larger, more capable interceptor will enable Aegis
ships to intercept longer-range missiles.
Japan agreed to host a U.S. forward-based X-
band missile defense radar.
Four U.S. Aegis engagement ships are forward-
deployed to Japan, along with several more missile
defense surveillance and tracking ships.
We deployed a U.S. PAC-3 battalion to Japan
last year.o We are also deepening coordination of our
missile defense operations and to share missile defense
information.
We are cooperating with Israel on the Arrow System
Improvement Program. The Arrow System is now deployed and
protecting Israeli citizens and territory.
Germany, Italy, and the U.S. are co-developing the
Medium Extended Air Defense System, a replacement for Patriot
systems in the next decade.
We have upgraded and are testing the early warning
radar at Fylingdales, U.K. this year; a second early warning
radar in Thule, Greenland, is scheduled to be upgraded and
tested in a few years.
NATO is developing the Active Layered Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense system, a command and control
backbone for member countries' theater missile defenses. In
addition, the NATO Feasibility Study released in 2005 confirmed
that missile defenses to protect European citizens are, indeed,
feasible.
We have concluded agreements with the U.K., Japan,
Australia, Israel, Italy, and Denmark to facilitate government-
to-government and industry-to-industry missile defense
cooperation. We are also holding discussions or working on
technology efforts with Germany, India, the Netherlands, Spain,
Ukraine, and France.
In his 2002 direction, the President specifically called for
cooperation to build new relationships with other nations, like Russia.
While that prospect at times seems remote, there are positive
developments to report. We are continuing negotiations on a Defense
Technical Cooperation Agreement with Russia to facilitate both
government-to-government as well as industry-to-industry missile
defense cooperation, and we continue to seek practical areas of
cooperation with Russia on a bilateral basis as well as in the NATO-
Russia context.
U.S. MISSILE DEFENSES IN EUROPE
In January of this year, President Bush directed us to proceed with
negotiations to base U.S. long-range missile defenses in Europe. These
defenses are intended to counter the increasing threat from Iranian
missiles. Iranian press claims Tehran currently has a 2,000 km range
ballistic missile capability, which could reach parts of Eastern
Europe. While our intelligence community assesses that Iran would be
able to develop an ICBM before 2015 if it chose to do so, we must start
now in order to address this threat in a timely manner.
Current plans call for basing in Poland ten Ground-Based
Interceptors similar to those currently deployed in Alaska and
California, and a midcourse radar in the Czech Republic. An existing
midcourse radar at the Reagan Test Range will be refurbished and moved
to the Czech Republic. Negotiations are ongoing and, pending a
successful outcome, work is planned to begin at the sites in 2008.
These missile defense assets would be integrated with existing radars
in Fylingdales, U.K., and Thule, Greenland, as well as the U.S. Ground-
based Midcourse Defense system.
The deployment of U.S. missile defense assets in Europe has many
benefits:
They would be capable of intercepting not only
intercontinental ballistic missiles but also intermediate-range
ballistic missiles launched out of the Middle East. The U.S.
goal is to optimize the defensive coverage of both Europe and
the U.S.
They would provide a second ``layer'' of defense for
the U.S.
With the protection afforded by these U.S. defensive
capabilities in Europe, NATO member states could resist
attempts by hostile states to intimidate or coerce the Alliance
or its members from taking actions in a coalition.
Strengthening our European allies and the NATO Alliance in turn
enhances U.S. security.
They would provide additional decision space for
national leaders, including the President, for example, by
allowing them to delay or defer resort to offensive responses
to an attack.
Missile defenses provide another avenue for burden
sharing and strengthening strategic relationships with
important allies. When negotiations are successfully concluded,
Poland and the Czech Republic would be providing a significant
contribution to the collective security of the NATO Alliance by
hosting BMD assets.
I also want to comment briefly on benefits derived specifically
from the basing mode we have chosen to pursue, that is ground basing
interceptors in silos. Many of our missile defense systems, such as
Aegis and PAC-3, are mobile or transportable. The advantage of mobility
is flexibility--we can move assets into place as circumstances warrant.
But there's also an advantage to ground-based silos. That advantage is
persistence. If we field long-range interceptors in silos in Europe, we
will have a capability that is always there--before and during a
crisis. Both our allies and potential adversaries will know for certain
that a basic missile defense capability is in place. These missile
defense assets, then, will be able both to assure allies, and to deter
and dissuade adversaries at all times once they are fielded.
CRITICISM FROM RUSSIA
While we see many benefits from a deployment in Europe,
unfortunately some in Russia have expressed their opposition,
contending that our limited missile defenses constitute a threat to the
strategic balance. I would say first and foremost, that we do not
regard Russia as a strategic adversary; hence, there is no strategic
balance to disturb. These systems are not directed against Russia.
Furthermore, physics and geography prove that ground-based missile
defense interceptors and an X-band radar for midcourse tracking and
discrimination of warheads located in central Europe would have no
capability against an ICBM launched out of Russia at the United States
in a one-on-one engagement. Finally, ten interceptors are simply not a
threat to Russia and cannot diminish Russia's deterrent of hundreds of
missiles and thousands of warheads.
Some in Russia also claim that we have not consulted with them and
answered all of their questions. Yet, we have been transparent with
Russia regarding our plans for and capabilities of the proposed U.S.
European missile defense deployment. Senior State, Defense, and MDA
officials have frequently briefed senior Russian counterparts, as well
as their experts, in Washington, DC, Moscow, Brussels, and elsewhere.
Russian officials understand the European-based assets would have no
capability against Russian ICBMs launched at the United States, and
that these assets would be optimized for engaging ballistic missile
threats launched out of the Middle East.
Providing Russia transparency and predictability in our missile
defense policy, plans, and programs is certainly in the interest of the
United States. We will continue to keep Russia informed about the
status of our programs and decisions, explore the possibility of
additional confidence-building measures, and seek opportunities to
cooperate on missile defense in the future.
CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO
I mentioned previously that a European interceptor site will
provide long-range missile defense coverage to many NATO Allies.
Missile defense has been a topic of discussion and debate at NATO for
quite some time, and the U.S. plan to begin fielding missile defense
elements in Europe has served to focus and intensify these discussions.
The Alliance has already taken several important steps
demonstrating its support for missile defense. With its Active Layered
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Program, the Alliance has decided to
develop a capability to defend its deployed forces from shorter-range
missile attack. The program office, established in 2005, is headed by a
Frenchman, and his deputy is an American. Recognizing that there is
also a growing threat to NATO territory, the Alliance agreed at the
2002 Prague Summit to initiate a NATO Missile Defense Feasibility Study
to examine the defense of Alliance territory and population centers
from ballistic missile attack. This study was completed and presented
to the 2006 Riga Summit. At Riga, the Alliance endorsed the Study's
conclusion that defense of Alliance territory and population centers is
technically feasible.
Although the Alliance has yet to make the collective decision to
pursue a continental defense, a number of individual Allies have
demonstrated support for long-range missile defense. For example,
Poland and the Czech Republic have expressed interest in hosting long-
range missile defense assets, the United Kingdom has agreed to an
upgrade of the Fylingdales Early Warning Radar, and Denmark has agreed
to a similar upgrade of the Early Warning Radar at Thule, Greenland.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have made great progress in meeting the goals the
President set over 4 years ago. Missile defenses are an essential
element of our overall national security strategy to dissuade and deter
nations from acquiring or using ballistic missiles and to protect our
citizens from the threat of terrorist attack. As the threat of
ballistic missiles and WMDs increases, more allies and friends are
choosing to work with us on missile defense projects. Given these
results, we will continue the current policies. Subject to your
questions, this concludes my statement.
Senator Bill Nelson. As a courtesy to our colleagues, I
will defer my questions.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator
Sessions for allowing me to jump in a little bit earlier here.
In your opening statement, Senator Sessions, you talked
about something that I was concerned about and I would kind of
like to pursue that a little bit.
If you're looking at Iran, and some of the things, what
they were willing to do with their hostages just a week ago,
what would they do if they had the capability of some kind of a
missile? I can't help but think that they've demonstrated
pretty clearly that they would be willing to, if they can hold
one country hostage with hostages, then what could they do if
they had that capability, to an entire country? Whether it's
Israel or someone else.
Now, our GMD system, you talked about, I think it was you,
Mr. Green--no, it was you, Dr. McQueary--talked about it's
coming along, we are doing testing right now, but didn't we
have 15 out of the last 16 tests, weren't they successful on
the use of that GMD system?
General Obering. Sir, I could probably answer that better.
The 15 of 16 flight tests included more than just the ground-
based system. But we clearly had a good test with the GMD
system last September. We've now flown the booster three times,
and we had the successful intercept in September. Prior to that
in 2000-2001, we had four or five successful intercepts. So,
when we get this kill vehicle into the terminal box, so to
speak, it does take care of the job.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I guess my thinking is this--even
though--I know, we always want to have everything tested and
running perfectly and all of that, but if you have something
that's been--that is effective, maybe needs a little bit more
testing, why wouldn't it be a good idea to place such a system
someplace, so that if you had someone like--we're not dealing
with normal people when we're talking about North Korea and
Iran. If they knew that we had something that very likely could
knock it down, wouldn't that be a deterrent to them?
General Obering. Sir, you've hit on a key point, and it's
probably one of the biggest differences in the way that we are
doing business than the rest of the department. It feeds into
much of the flexibility that Mr. Francis talked about.
But what we're doing is, as opposed to being risk-adverse,
we are managing risk. So, what we do, is we do sufficient
testing to understand that we have a warfighting capability,
and we begin to deploy that and get it in the hands of the
warfighter. We continue to improve, and continue to develop it
over time, and continue to test it, and that's also what
General Campbell was talking about in this idea of the
interaction between the warfighter and the developer.
So, it's not waiting until you have every ``t'' crossed or
every ``i'' dotted. You do sufficient testing to get that in
the hands of the warfighter quickly, because frankly,
personally speaking, I think we lost a little bit of a sense of
urgency in the Department during the Cold War, in terms of
getting that capability out the door to the warfighter.
Especially in a mission area where we historically had no
defense. I think it's critical that we get this out as quickly
as we can, with sufficient testing to understand the behavior.
Senator Inhofe. I think our intelligence is good, and you
guys, I know, are pretty aware of the risk that's out there.
I'm looking at your MDA book here, showing what North Korea
has, for example, that they have capable right now. I've always
been a believer that if North Korea has it, it wouldn't be too
long before Iran would have it. So, I've been concerned about
this.
Now, Mr. Green, I appreciate what you said about some
places in Eastern Europe maybe being ideal for location of
these defense systems, and would you all agree, generally agree
with him that the Czech Republic or Poland, or someplace like
that, would be a good place for this?
General Obering. Were you asking me, Senator?
Senator Inhofe. Anybody. Mr. Green has already responded. I
just wondered if, do you agree with Mr. Green?
General Obering. We would agree with Mr. Green. As I
mentioned in my opening statement, we've already worked the
problem on the western side of our country--North Korea, and it
makes no sense to me to leave the door open on the eastern side
now, coming out of Europe. We have a threat that's in a sprint,
from what I can tell, in developing short-range and medium-
range missiles.
So, although our intelligence will tell us we have a
certain amount of time, I think we need to move now to close
that door.
Senator Inhofe. I would think that when you're looking at
the missile defense budget, it's a half billion dollars below
where it was in the previous year, or is right now. This
concerns me, does this--do you think you can stay on track
with, by reducing, effectively reducing the budget? Then, of
course, you heard Mr. Francis talk about, in the years to come,
it's going to be between 8 and 10, so it sounds to me like it's
going to be a continual reduction. Do you think that's
adequate?
General Obering. Sir, we've certainly gone to great extents
to try to make it a balanced budget, to try to----
Senator Inhofe. Yes, that's what, the hand you're dealt. Do
you need a better hand?
General Obering. Sir, we could always use more money in
this regard, because I think we could--it goes back to what I
said previously--we could get more capability out quickly, into
the hands of the warfighter.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, if this were a hearing on the
Joint Strike Fighter or FCS, I'd say the same thing. Because,
you can't take it out of systems right now, that are
underfunded, and that's kind of what we are dealing with.
I have another, just, kind of unrelated thing, Mr.
Chairman, I'd like just to throw out there the--on January 11,
the Chinese used a modified ICBM to knock down one of their own
weather satellites, and this to me, this demonstration was, I'm
not sure what the motive was, but I fear the motive was to let
us know their capabilities, because the same orbit that is used
for a weather satellite that is owned by the Chinese, is what
we would have for intelligence, for reconnaissance.
I guess my question is, if they can hit their own satellite
in the same orbit, couldn't they hit ours too? No-brainer?
General Obering. Sir, if they have demonstrated the ability
to hit a satellite in low-earth orbit, than it's just a matter
of targeting at that point.
Senator Inhofe. So, they could.
General Obering. Yes, sir, I've----
Senator Inhofe. And they did.
General Obering. As for demonstrating all of the building
blocks, they've demonstrated that.
Senator Inhofe. In this particular area, we're talking
about China there, you have the South China Sea, you have the
Taiwan Straits. If they were to blind us in the middle of
something, what's the, kind of the worst-case scenario you
could think of? We'd be sitting there without any way of seeing
what's going on?
General Obering. The worst case would be if their intent
was actually to take action against Taiwan, we might find that
they'd have their invading force on the island before we could
react.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. I know that we have other
capabilities, we talked about the UAVs, and--but anything else
that is currently a capability on reconnaissance is going to be
easier to take out than one of the satellites in orbit, I think
you'd agree with that, wouldn't you? In which case, what are we
looking at to take care of that problem, now that we have seen
what happened on January 11? Are we looking at new technology?
General Obering. Sir, we in the MDA have not been assigned
a mission to do counter-anti-satellite (ASAT). It is certainly
true that much of the technology that we are developing is
directly applicable to that, and frankly is fairly
straightforward in terms of application, but we have not been
given that mission.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator, we've been trying for 2
months to have a hearing on the China ASAT test. We just
haven't been able to get the witnesses when they're in town so
that we could do that.
Senator Inhofe. This is something that really does concern
me, because it's so obvious what they could do to knock out our
ability of reconnaissance. I would hope that we are looking at
technology right now, whether it's you or somebody else, and
when you have this hearing, I'd like to get a little advance
notice, because I'm very much concerned about it. I know there
are other companies out there that are working toward
suborbital reconnaissance solutions, and I'd like to pursue
this to be sure they are, if they're not.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Green, just to clarify the status of the proposed
deployment in Eastern Europe--10 GBIs perhaps in Poland, and a
radar in the Czech Republic--this is not a final proposal yet,
in terms of the administration or the governments in Poland or
the Czech Republic, it is still at the discussion stage?
Mr. Green. Senator, we have exchanged diplomatic notes,
both governments have expressed a willingness, a desire to go
into negotiations on these facilities, we are starting those
negotiations and we expect to pursue those vigorously over the
next several months.
Senator Reed. But there's not a final agreement even at the
governmental levels as far as location and responsibilities.
That's still all to be negotiated?
Mr. Green. There are several parts of the negotiating
process, one of them would be a main missile defense agreement
that would define in great detail the obligations and
responsibilities of both parties, and that is what we'll be
negotiating over the next several months.
Senator Reed. Would those agreements have to be approved by
the parliaments of the respective countries, Poland and Czech
Republic?
Mr. Green. Those would be subject to parliamentary
approval, yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Were they subject to approval by the United
States Congress?
Mr. Green. We treat those as executive agreements, so we
would not, they're not considered to be treaties, so they
wouldn't be submitted to the Senate.
Senator Reed. So, they would be submitted to the Polish
Congress, and the Czech Congress, but not the United States
Congress?
Mr. Green. That's correct.
Senator Reed. There is a possibility, of course, that even
as the negotiations take place that the Polish and Czech
Congress could reject them. That's a possibility?
Mr. Green. There's always that possibility, Senator.
Obviously, we have entered into these negotiations with a very
high expectation of success, and the governments of both Poland
and the Czech Republic have also entered them in that
expectation.
Senator Reed. I guess one of the advantages, perhaps, since
they're parliamentary governments, that the majority party and
the Prime Minister are very closely aligned, that might be one
difference, Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. I would never speak ill of our form of
government.
Senator Reed. No, I know. [Laughter.]
Having had your hand in it. [Laughter.]
General Obering, two DOD boards were established in 2002 to
provide oversight over MDA, the Senior Executive Committee and
the Missile Defense Support Group. Reportedly, they have not
met for several years, is that correct?
General Obering. Sir, they were very active when we first
stood up the MDA in 2002. They had, I think, eight meetings the
first year, if I'm not mistaken, and things got off to a pretty
good bang. What we did is we altered that, and we went to a
direct oversight with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The Missile Defense
Support Group and the Senior Executive Committee have now been
replaced with the Ballistic Missile Executive Board, and that
reconstitutes that oversight. It will have standing
subcommittees that report to that, and that charter was just
signed here, recently, and we will kick that off with the first
meeting of that, I think, in the next 3 weeks or so.
Senator Reed. So, the BMDS Executive Board is just
beginning now? It hasn't really started, but it will?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. So, essentially, what outside entities beyond
MDA have been looking over your shoulder, and giving you
advice?
General Obering. Sir, you name it. We've had quite a few.
Senator Reed. Who do you have to listen to?
General Obering. First of all, we have quarterly execution
reviews with my boss, directly, the equivalent of a Defense
Acquisition Board, where we go through all of the programs, we
go through the performance. We also report, I go to the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, I brief up what the incremental
improvements, the changes in our baseline--we do report changes
in our baseline, by the way, to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) and to Congress through the SAR activities, and
we've done that now for the past several years.
We have been audited, of course, by the GAO, very robustly,
and now there's a standing--I think it's an annual mandate that
they have to come in and look at all of our programs----
Senator Reed. What about the Program Analysis and
Evaluation (PA&E)?
General Obering. PA&E were part of the Missile Defense
Support Group that lasted for a year or so, about 18 months,
and then they are now part of the standing committee that will
be part of the Executive Board.
Senator Reed. Let me change subjects slightly, and that is,
according to the budget data, the GBIs 21 through 30 were
incrementally funded over 3 years. Interceptors 31 to 40 were
incrementally funded over 4 years, and then the GBIs 41 to 50
were incrementally funded over 5 years. Why are we increasing
the incremental funding for these interceptors?
General Obering. Sir, what we do, and Mr. Francis referred
to it--is we try to adjust the scope of our activities based on
the realities of what we're faced with. So, in that timeframe
that you just talked about, we have adjusted to some of the
realities of the program. If you recall, there was a chemical
systems division explosion at our plant in San Jose,
California, that took out one of our entire configurations of
our GBI boosters, that we had to not only recover in terms of
finding additional vendors and suppliers for that, but recover
those boosters' interceptors.
When we had the two aborts that occurred in December 2004
and February 2005, as you also probably recall, I stood up an
Independent Review Team to take a look to make sure that those
were just technical glitches, that they were not systemic
problems, et cetera, and we stopped deployment, at that time,
of the interceptors.
I also made a decision in the 2003-2004 timeframe that we
would fund the logistic support costs for these interceptors,
along with the other things that we produce. The reason is I
thought it was a proper behavior to generate on the part of
developers, that they need to pay attention to support costs,
and if that came out of our budget, it came out of those
programs, they would have to take that into account. We've also
done some other things with respect to concurrent test and
operations, et cetera. So, we added scope in some areas, and we
had to stretch out scope in other areas to be able to
accommodate those changes.
It's part of a flexible portfolio management approach that
the GAO recommends, and I think some of the things we are going
to talk with the GAO about are the recommendations that are
coming out of that particular report, and how they relate to
some of the recommendations that they have in our report.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Francis, right now the entire BMD System is considered
a single major defense acquisition program. Can you give us
your views on reporting on this very, very large program?
Benefits? Advantages? Would it be better if there were some
type of dis-aggregation or some type of more focused approach?
Mr. Francis. Sure, Senator. We think the advantage of
managing a system of systems is, it does provide a portfolio,
which General Obering then can make decisions across program
lines, so that you don't have each program stove-piped. So, he
can make decisions to move money to places where they're
needed. He could also, if he wanted to, meet a threat, he could
move requirements around to the system best able to do that.
That's the real advantage of a portfolio like that.
The disadvantage comes from an oversight perspective,
because typically the elements within MDA would be individual
programs that you would have oversight over and be budgeting
for and reconciling costs with. In a system of systems, you
lose that granularity, because you don't necessarily see what's
going on in each system. So that part's difficult; it's true,
for any system of systems.
So, it's something--if that's where we're going to go in
the future, we need to think about oversight mechanisms that
give us visibility to the elements while providing the
flexibility to make trades at the system level.
Senator Reed. From the GAO's perspective, do you feel
comfortable that you have sufficient access and granularity?
Details?
Mr. Francis. Yes, I think we have sufficient access. We do
have difficulty, if you will, chasing some of the numbers. You
brought the example up of the incremental funding--that's
something that is made possible by the whole budget being R&D
funds, so that you can pay for something over time. In another
program, you would require procurement funding, so if you were
going to buy 10 interceptors, for example, all 10 would have to
be funded in a budget, and then you would track those costs.
So, what becomes difficult for the accountant, if you will,
is when costs are tracked over 5 years, you kind of lose the
audit trail, and then to try to compare actual costs back with
what was budgeted, we can't go back and reconcile, ``Okay, we
were going to pay this much for 10 interceptors, we paid this
much more--why did that happen, and what's the Government's
recourse?''
Senator Reed. Thank you, and for the record,
``granularity.'' I think. [Laughter.]
Dr. McQueary, and General Obering, one of the issues that
is perennial is very realistic operational testing. Where do
you think we are in terms of that, particularly with the GMD
system?
Dr. McQueary?
Dr. McQueary. As I indicated in my opening remarks, we
would say that based upon the test that was conducted--I don't
have all of the numbers properly--but the test that was
conducted with the interceptor, they have demonstrated a
capability to intercept a simple foreign threat. So, that does
not imply that we're finished, or anything at all. But that
demonstration has been done.
Senator Reed. So, we're still somewhat removed from
engaging what likely would be shot at us by a hostile----?
General Obering. No, sir, I don't agree.
Senator Reed. Okay.
General Obering. There's nothing that says that we might
not be faced with simple threats in the near-term, against the
rogue nations that we are gearing this system torward. We have
planned this year to add more and more capability into these
tests with respect to sensors, like the SBX Radar, the forward-
based deployed radar, as well, to begin to run some of our
capabilities to begin to address more complex threats, as well.
So, we have a path that we have laid out ahead. Sometimes we
hear, ``Well, if it can't handle very complex countermeasures,
it's not worth deploying,'' and frankly, we don't agree with
that. We think that there are many situations where we will not
be faced with complex countermeasures, and it is worth
deploying.
Senator Reed. So, if you were deploying a fighter aircraft,
you'd feel very comfortable deploying it against the least
capable threat in the air, saying that it's operational and
it's good enough?
General Obering. If it was the most likely threat, sir. If
you had no defense against that threat, then I think I would be
inclined to do so.
Senator Reed. What's your premise of the most likely
threat? I don't want to belabor this, but one of the issues
here is, it's a race. To develop the very sophisticated anti-
missile system that you're trying to do, versus deploying
things like balloons, and decoys, et cetera. There are some
that would argue that it's a lot easier to deploy decoys or
things like that, than it is to knock one of those things down,
kinetically.
General Obering. Well, fortunately, because we have had the
support of Congress, we've been able to get a large step up in
that race, so to speak. With the fielding of the SBX Radar,
with the advanced radar algorithms that will be placed in that,
this year, along with the forward-deployed radar, we have a
tremendous leg up.
By the way, countermeasures are not as easy as they are
being described, sometimes. We have probably the Nation's
leading countermeasure experts in the MDA, or under contract to
us. We actually flight test these. We flight test them in front
of these radars, we understand the characteristics and we
understand the behavior so that we can program those into the
radar, so, we're trying to keep up with that very threat.
Senator Reed. I understand that, sir.
Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions?
Senator Sessions. General Obering, let's just discuss that
a little bit more. Based on what we understand, for example, on
the launches that the North Koreans attempted, what can you
tell us about your expectation of their ability to have complex
countermeasures or decoys? Is that classified?
General Obering. Yes, sir. It would be classified. Suffice
it to say that I believe that my statements stand that we would
have a capability against those threats.
Senator Sessions. But there's no difficulty, and in fact,
it's part of your strategy that while these systems are in
place now that are capable of defending against, as Dr.
McQueary said, a simple missile launch, that you will continue
to make them more sophisticated through R&D.
General Obering. Yes, sir, as well as fielding. We actually
have a program, in addition--as I said--to the deployment of
these algorithms in the radars, we have a program called MKV
that will allow each one of our interceptors to be able to
handle what we call ``credible objects''--more than one. So
that means that we don't have to be precise to understand what
is the warhead, and what's not. We can actually take out
everything that's in that particular cluster of a threat sweep.
Senator Sessions. That assumes that the attacking missile
has multiple decoys.
General Obering. Yes, sir. Yes sir, exactly.
Senator Sessions. But even in that system, I assume you've
attempted to design it to make sure it does not go after the
decoys, but hopefully will go for the----?
General Obering. Yes, sir. We actually go through a staged
process, a layered process, just like everything else, to try
to make sure we focus as much as we can on the warheads.
Senator Sessions. How do you see the status of the MKV
program? How's that funding, and do we have problems there?
General Obering. If there was any program that I have that
I would like to accelerate, it would be that one. In terms of
being able to move that back to the left. That would require
additional money, additional funds.
Senator Sessions. As I was listening, ``move to the
left''--what does that mean? That makes me nervous. [Laughter.]
General Obering. Sir, not politically, but scheduling.
Senator Sessions. Good.
So, Dr. McQueary, you talked about that the test program
being robust and disciplined, I believe, and that it has
limited capability against a simple threat--which I think gives
us some confidence. General Obering, you used a phrase in your
opening remarks that a good missile defense system would
``devalue'' the assets of the enemy--what do you mean by that?
General Obering. Sir, if you'll bear with me one second, I
view missile defense as part of a spectrum that includes
deterrence, arms control, and missile defense as well. At one
end you have enemies--countries that can be deterred, and we've
seen that in our history and it's worked very well. You have
other nations against whom you can use arms control measures,
both positive and negative sanctions or incentives, to try to
get their behavior modified.
But, I think that as we enter this century and we get into
it, we understand that we're in a world in which we may face
organizations, countries, what I call the nation-state
equivalent of suicide bombers, that are not deterrable and are
not affected by arms control.
So, it would be nice to have another option that we can
provide to the President and the American people to protect
them. So, as we roll out missile defense capabilities and as
they become more widely known as being effective, then it
begins to take away the value of these missiles from countries
like Iran and North Korea. Because historically we've had no
deployed defense against them--they view that as a great
equalizer with the United States or with the West, as being put
on an even par with us, and therefore they can leverage that
against our allies and our friends. So, if we say, ``If you
deploy those weapons or try to use them, they're not going to
be any good, because we will shoot them down,'' then they have
to go through the investment decisions, do they want to do
that, do they want to continue to invest in these weapons? We
think that if we are able to show an effective missile defense,
collectively, along with our allies, it begins to devalue those
weapons in the eyes of some of these countries.
Senator Sessions. I think that's a good explanation and I
think maybe other nations that might be thinking on developing
an offensive missile system would, might add the cost up
thinking that we--even if they completed and spent hundreds of
millions, maybe billions of dollars on that, it still wouldn't
be effective because we have a good system against it.
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Would that be true also?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. General Obering, you've been given, as
Mr. Francis said and as GAO's report discusses, flexibility to
both deploy and develop at the same time.
He raised some points about some cost overruns or spending
above what we've projected. Tell me, in your view, how you
would evaluate this? First of all, there is value to the United
States that we have this system in place today.
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. A very great value. But, in terms of the
actual cost of this program, we've gone faster, sometimes
faster saves money. Tell me how you would evaluate, honestly,
for this Congress and the American people who may listen,
whether or not this flexibility you've been given and the more
rapid deployment than a lot of systems would allow, has
impacted the actual cost of the program.
General Obering. Well Senator, as I said in my opening
statement, we've come a long way in 30 months since 2004 with
the flexibility that we've been given. We've been able to
rapidly develop and field and deploy these capabilities.
If we look aggregately at what we have done from a block-
cost perspective, we are roughly 4 percent or less for Block
2004 or Block 2006, in terms of what we anticipated the cost of
the block to be. As Mr. Francis referred to, in some cases we
had to defer content, and I'll give you a couple of examples,
but then we catch back up.
So for example, as a result of the activities in the 2004-
2005 timeframe, we lost six of the GBIs in the explosion that I
talked about in California. I also redirected four GBIs as a
result of the launch aborts back in December 2004 or February
2005 as well, into our ground test program, that were going to
go in to be deployable.
We have now been able to catch back up to where--way back
in 2002, we had anticipated that we would have 30 GBIs in the
silo by the end of this year. We will now have 24, as opposed
to the 30, and those are the 6 that we lost in the explosion.
We should be able to catch back up with the original target for
Block 2008, based on the funding profile that we've been given
and how we're managing the program.
Again, a lot of the flexibility we've been given also
allows us to do things like the savings that we took from the
GMD program. We discovered that we had some overhead
infrastructure that we no longer needed in the program. We were
able to reduce that and turn that money into GBIs to help us
catch that up again.
Senator Sessions. To follow up, even if we had the
traditional procurement system, even, that I think Mr. Francis
will agree, when we've had that, we've had cost overruns,
sometimes far more than this. So, I don't know that because
there's some cost overrun, indicates that the program, this new
technique is less effective in managing the money. I see some
potential, as you've indicated, that it's allowed us to deploy
much sooner, and even save some money, and delay costs money.
The longer these programs stretch out and all this money that
goes in sustaining it and maintaining it before you even get
the system there, to me is a cost that's often not properly
counted.
Is that fair to say Mr. Francis?
Mr. Francis. I think so, Senator. I guess what I would
bring up is, right now I think Block 2006, by our calculations,
is about $1 billion over what it was expected. We've reported
another $478 million in 2006 contract overruns that may defer
additional work.
Now, I haven't done the calculation on the percents, but
even if it were 4 percent, when we talk about regular weapons
systems and we say, ``Gee, they're 30, 40 percent over cost.''
That's generally over the life of the program, a 10-year
program. So, 4 percent annually sounds like a small amount, but
if we're going to do it for 10 years, it's a big number when
you get out there.
The question I would ask is, is there a way to get the best
of both systems? In other words, can we preserve the
flexibility and not change how General Obering makes decisions,
but provide more visibility on the cost consequences of the
decisions he does make?
Senator Sessions. Presumably, you think the answer is yes?
Mr. Francis. I think so, yes.
General Obering. Yes, sir----
Senator Sessions. Briefly, as my time----
General Obering. Yes, sir----
Senator Sessions. Briefly, if you want to respond.
General Obering. Just that the numbers that Mr. Francis
quoted, they are over more than just a 1-year period. They're
longer than that, with respect to that.
If you look at the individual program performance, we're
doing very well. For most of our programs we're down, below 10
percent for the total contract value of 8- to 10-year contracts
with these programs. The only one that we have exception with
the GAO on is our STSS. We have a factual disagreement on some
assumptions that were made by the GAO, and that's okay. I think
we're going to work through that. That's not a big issue. When
you take that out of the equation, we're down below 10 percent
for our program performance for the life of the contracts,
including the GMD program. It would be running around 12
percent as part of that average.
So, I think this program, and I think GAO--I don't want to
put words in their mouth, but I think they see the value in
this in some of their other recommendations on how they do
portfolio management. Now, what we have to do is take a real-
life portfolio management example that we have had now for the
past several years, compare that to what the GAO is
recommending for the future of the Department, and see if
there's a marriage that we can make there that would make
sense.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman?
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Francis, your report recommends a
number of changes in the acquisition approach, including the
use of procurement funds for buying operational assets. Would
you discuss how you would recommend such changes be
implemented?
Mr. Francis. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We think that right now,
the way the budget is requested is through elements but the way
we account in MDA is through blocks. So, we think the starting
point would be by program element. You would baseline an
element using a knowledge-based approach--which I could
discuss, but then having laid out that element that way--and by
the way, this is how that report that we have on portfolios
deals with that. When you're managing a system of systems, you
do know the total cost of every system in there, and it does
have a business case.
So, we think the elements need to be baselined for cost,
schedule, and performance. Then those that are considered far
enough along to be in system development and demonstration, you
would then track those costs, just like you would a regular
program. You would use procurement funding for those assets
that are going to be operational assets. I think we would
expand that to operations and support as well.
That does a couple of things for you. One is, it does give
you control over the procurement funding and you can then fully
fund your assets in 1 year, which provides visibility to you.
It does provide some better contracting opportunities for the
Government because R&D contracts are, by definition, best
effort contracts where the Government does bear a fair amount
of the risk.
We also think that you could--and the way we wrote our
recommendation was that--to have DOD propose a way to do this.
Because one of the downsides is, if you did put those elements
into system development and demonstration, and baseline them,
and subject them to the laws that apply to other systems if you
have a cost increase that breaches a certain threshold, then
DOD has to come back and certify to you that things are okay
before they can proceed, which could slow decisionmaking.
So, some of the things that we're thinking about is, you
could have those triggers in place to say, ``Hey, we have a
cost increase.'' But, the requirement might only be that MDA
inform Congress, rather than have to stop and recertify.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would you work with our staff to try
to implement those changes?
Mr. Francis. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, in your prepared
testimony, you place emphasis on proceeding with the proposed
deployment in Europe of 10 GBIs and associated radars. That
proposal is one of two options included in the budget request
submitted to Congress.
The budget request seeks funds to install 10 Interceptors
at a third missile site--either at Fort Greely, Alaska, or in
Europe. The budget request overview states that the U.S. is
entering into more detailed discussions with Poland and the
Czech Republic in 2007 regarding the possible basing of missile
defenses in their countries.
So, as I understand it, your budget request to us is that
there are two options for the planned deployment of 10
additional Interceptors--one at Fort Greely and one in Europe.
Is that correct?
General Obering. Sir, what that was meant to do was to try
to address this idea of risk management and timing. That is, if
Congress were to appropriate money for us to buy the GBIs, as
part of this package, the long-lead items, the initial items
that we need for that. If there were to be hiccups or stumbling
blocks in the ongoing negotiations and in the movement for the
third site, that would not be wasted money. We could use those
GBIs in the Fort Greely situation.
But, it does not provide additional coverage, if we were to
do that, for all the reasons we stated before to our European
allies or our deployed forces in Europe, nor does it provide
redundant coverage of the United States because we would have
to put them back in Fort Greely, Alaska.
Senator Bill Nelson. Your proposal is you want them in
Europe?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Then why would you propose to put them
in Fort Greely?
General Obering. I think we were answering a concern if we
were to receive the long-lead money for these GBIs and things
did not work out with the European site, would that be money
that we could not use.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is it correct that no final decisions
have been made with regard to the possible basing of missile
defenses in Europe?
General Obering. I think that Mr. Green mentioned that
earlier, Senator. We haven't got a final agreement, per se, but
we are well on a track to reach an agreement, I believe with
both the Poles and the Czechs.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, so if there is no decision by
those governments, or an agreement is not reached to deploy the
10 GBIs in Europe, then you have the preplanned option of
deploying them at Fort Greely. Is that correct?
General Obering. We would then divert those, if need be.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, the answer to that is yes.
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Mr. Green. Again, Senator, we entered into these
negotiations with a very high expectation of success, as did
the Government of Poland and the Government of the Czech
Republic.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have an indication, Mr. Green,
that you have the approval of NATO?
Mr. Green. Well, approval is an interesting word. The first
point I would make is that we are going into this activity with
a very, very strong NATO context. It's a programmatic context,
a NATO technical and operational context, and a political
context.
There are a number of NATO nations that are currently
engaged in missile defense activities. Five NATO nations,
including the United States, are engaged in long-range missile
defense activities. A number of others are heavily engaged in
the development and deployment of short-range and medium-range
missile defenses.
In terms of the technical operational aspects of this, the
activity that we're involved in now, the potential deployment
of long-range missile defenses in Europe will defend against a
long- or intermediate-range threat to our European allies. That
leaves the southern tier of Europe, so to speak, which is not
subject to that long-range missile threat, but is subject to a
short- and medium-range threat. They will need defenses of that
sort and that's the kind of defense that European nations are
working on.
There's a natural complementarity between what we're doing
and what NATO is doing. I mean, we would certainly expect as
NATO fills out those short- and medium-range defenses that
would be compatible with, complementary to--our long-range
defenses.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is it----
Mr. Green. In terms of political interaction we have also
pursued very robust consultations with NATO and we are
continuing to do that. We've consulted with them multiple
times. We're going over again next week. We've had multiple
trips over to the Capitals to consult in a bilateral sense and
we're continuing that effort.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is it the administration's position
that you would proceed on this if you got Poland's and the
Czech Republic's approval, but not NATO's approval?
Mr. Green. We are pursuing bilateral negotiations with the
Czech Government and the Polish Government. We certainly
recognize the value of NATO in this context and we're
continuing to work with NATO, but it is a bilateral negotiation
between the Czech Government and the U.S., and the Polish
Government and the United States.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, the answer is yes. You would
proceed if you got the country's agreements, but not NATO's
agreement.
Mr. Green. Again, there is, there are, I guess nuances here
of approval and agreement. There is no legal requirement for
approval by NATO, but we're obviously very interested in making
sure that NATO allies understand the benefits of this system,
how it operates, what it does, how it benefits the NATO
Alliance, and I think, increasingly, we're getting an
understanding from NATO nations about the nature of the threat
that's posed and how this system would help defend against
those threats, and increasing acceptance that this system is
designed against those threats and will be effective.
Senator Bill Nelson. I'm just trying to find out, do you
intend to seek NATO's approval or not?
Mr. Green. If by approval, you mean turning this into a
NATO-funded effort----
[Disruption in the audience.]
Senator Bill Nelson. The committee will, and I'm----
Ma'am, I'm the one that got you a seat. [Laughter.]
Mr. Green. Senator, I honestly am trying to answer your
question.
If by approval you mean turning this into a NATO-funded
effort, a NATO effort to develop and deploy long-range missile
defenses, that is not our intent. We have developed the system
and we're entering into those bilateral negotiations with the
Czechs and the Poles.
But again at the same time, I would emphasize that this is
a very strong NATO context, and we are certainly very
interested in trying to make sure that all of our allies are
accepting and approving, though not through a formal approval
process. Most NATO capabilities are not developed by NATO.
Almost all NATO capabilities are developed by individual
nations or groups of nations within NATO.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Green, what would happen if you
got the approval of one of those countries, but not both?
Mr. Green. Well again, we certainly anticipate the approval
by both. We have not speculated about what would happen if we
got approval from one and not from the other and we don't
anticipate that circumstance to arise.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, let's talk about the
missile--or to be technically correct--the rocket that you want
to put in Europe. It's a two-stage variant of the three-stage
GBI, which is the one that's in Alaska and California. Are you
in the process of developing this new rocket?
General Obering. Yes, sir. It's not a new rocket, Senator,
it's a different configuration of what we currently have. It
allows us to maximize what we call the battle-space there, in
terms of being able to get into a kill vehicle mode quickly.
That's the advantage of it. It is not a significant change in
terms of the things that you have to do to make that work. We
have actually used this technique in other programs within the
BMDS.
Senator Bill Nelson. There are different things that you
have to do.
General Obering. Yes, sir, there are. We have that on
contract.
Senator Bill Nelson. Repackaging the booster avionics?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. The shrouding venting has to be
modified?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. The guidance and control software has
to be updated?
General Obering. Right.
Senator Bill Nelson. You're going to operate in a new
flight environment?
General Obering. That will be tested. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. You have to upgrade to provide nuclear
hardening?
General Obering. That is something that we're going to do.
In fact, that is something that we're doing overall for the
fleet.
Senator Bill Nelson. You have to improve ability to execute
the full fly-out maneuvers?
General Obering. Yes, sir. Actually, we already have those
programs in the three-stage maneuver, the three-stage version
as well. We have those capabilities.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have a schedule acceleration?
General Obering. I don't know what you mean by a schedule
acceleration, but it is part of what we have put on contract.
Senator Bill Nelson. Now, isn't that part of developing a
new system?
General Obering. Again sir, it's part of what we consider
to be a different configuration of what we have. So, there are
new capabilities, but we are always looking at and developing
new techniques for these interceptors. Frankly, that's one
reason why we prefer the R&D test and evaluation money, that
allows us that flexibility to be able to do that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you plan to test it?
General Obering. Yes, sir, in 2010.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, you want us to authorize and
appropriate funds to deploy this interceptor that would be
tested in the future, as it's not yet been put together in the
development package.
General Obering. It goes back to what I've said previously.
We are managing risk, we're not trying to avoid it. We don't
consider what you described to be very high-risk items based on
what we know now of the GBI, the booster, the fly-outs. We
believe that the longer items that are going to have to take
place are the site preparation, the site clearing, the
construction activities etc. So, we are pursuing those
concurrently and in parallel.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let's go back to my earlier question.
Suppose you decided you were not going to deploy them in
Europe, these 10 GBIs, you were going to deploy them at Fort
Greely. Would you deploy more of the three-stage GBIs, or would
you use the newly developed two-stage GBI?
General Obering. It depends on what we would like to do at
that time with respect to Fort Greely and what capability the
warfighters may want to have. So, I would defer that decision
until that time, until we can think through that. But clearly,
we could add the third-stage back like we have with the ones
that we currently have in the ground in Alaska and California.
Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary, you're the man who is
the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. Would you have
high confidence that a missile, such has been described--that
is, as General Obering has said, is being developed and not
been tested--would perform as operationally effective,
reliable?
Dr. McQueary. I think this is an area in which the DOT&E
organization needs to have further discussion with General
Obering. I will react in the following way though--he is taking
an approach that I believe is a lower risk approach, by using
proven components in order to be able to build this new rocket.
So, that gets the technology readiness issue, which I think is
very important.
But, I do think we need further discussions on what kind of
testing needs to be done in order to satisfy us from an
independent operational test evaluation standpoint, what would
need to be done with that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, you have to advise us----
Dr. McQueary. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. --because we're in the----
Dr. McQueary. I agree.
Senator Bill Nelson. --position of, the question is, do we
authorize this, and do we fund it?
Dr. McQueary. Well, I think the issue is, it's, with the
funding approach that MDA has, and I'm in an area in which I'm
not the expert, so please bear with me. By using R&D funds,
such as has been done, that this approach is not inconsistent
with what has been done in other areas.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, when are you going to have an
answer to that question?
Dr. McQueary. Well, this is a relatively new program. We
are aware what the plans are and I have people in our
organization who have had discussions with MDA. But I can't
offer an answer to your question directly. I'll certainly be
happy to provide you an answer, if I may, for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
There are added risks anytime a system's working design is changed.
In the case of the two-stage variant of the ground-based interceptor
(GBI), I agree with the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) seven
developmental risk areas. I believe the most significant risk is with
the software changes and integration that MDA must make not only in the
interceptor, but also in the Command and Launch Equipment and the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Fire Control to optimize the
interceptor's new performance envelope. There is commonality between
the two-stage and three-stage variants of the GBI booster. MDA gained
experience when it converted a three-stage Minuteman II into a two-
stage Minuteman II. However, I cannot make an assessment on
effectiveness, reliability, or suitability on a two-stage design that
has not yet been built or tested. Through MDA's Integrated Master Test
Plan, I will approve the combined developmental/operational flight
testing of the two-stage interceptor, and my office and the joint
operational test team will participate in all aspects of this testing.
Senator Bill Nelson. Will that come soon? Because we're
talking about a markup in a few weeks.
Dr. McQueary. I don't know whether we can do--we certainly
will not have the data with which to be able to say whether we
think the new system will be effective and suitable because the
data would simply not be there.
We can advise you as to whether we think the approach that
the MDA is proposing to take, or is taking would likely result
in a satisfactory solution if it is properly implemented. We
could certainly do that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Can you provide that in a few weeks,
before the markup?
Dr. McQueary. Yes sir, we can do that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
Senator Thune, I still have some more, and I see you are
back here. So, go ahead and ask your questions and then I'll
finish up.
Senator Thune. Okay. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before the subcommittee
today.
Missile defense is an issue of increasing importance for
our strategic requirements. North Korean and Iranian missile
programs are clear evidence of both the advancement and
proliferation of missile technology. Furthermore, increases in
Russian and Chinese military capabilities are also a matter of
concern. China's successful ASAT test and Russia's boast to
overwhelm our defenses are indicators that we should not take
lightly. I believe we must be committed to missile defense to
ensure that our security and the security of our allies is not
taken for granted.
General Obering, I want to ask you a question about the
Airborne Laser (ABL) program. It's, in my view, critical to our
ability to shoot down enemy ballistic missiles during the boost
phase. The capability to overcome missile defense
countermeasures like multiple decoy warheads is one of the many
reasons that I believe the importance of the ABL cannot be
overstated. I guess the question I have is, could you describe
what testing is ongoing for the ABL and what are the prospects
of this system for the future?
General Obering. Yes, sir. I'd be happy to. First of all, I
would like to recycle back about 2\1/2\ years, very briefly.
The ABL, we believe, got on the right path in December 2004
when they were able to demonstrate that they could fire that
high-energy laser in a 747 mock-up at Edwards Air Force Base.
They were able to achieve the synchronization and we actually
fired that laser over 70 times since that initial firing in
November 2004.
We also flew the heavily modified 747 in December 2004. We
demonstrated, first of all, the airworthiness of the aircraft,
and we demonstrated the initial checkout of the optical train
with respect to jitter control and that type of thing onboard
the aircraft.
Since that time we've made significant progress. In fact,
there are actually three lasers that go on the aircraft. There
is a tracking laser that we use to precisely track an enemy
missile. There's an atmospheric compensation laser that then
goes out and measures the distortion in the atmosphere, and
feeds that information back to the fire control system. Then
there's the high-energy laser that actually shoots down the
boosting missile.
As we sit here today, we have the tracking laser and the
atmospheric compensation laser loaded on the aircraft and we
have a surrogate of the high-energy laser on there. We went
into flight testing several weeks ago and, in fact, we will be
going back up tonight. We attempted to do a full-blown test of
the tracking and the beam illumination laser last night. We
will try again tonight. We ran into problems that had nothing
to do with the aircraft. It was just a range availability kind
of thing. So I'm very pleased with the progress that they've
been making so far.
We have some key knowledge points coming up. We do use
knowledge points in all of our development programs, and the
ABL has to demonstrate that it can actually track a target, it
can actually close a fire control solution, it has to be able
to compensate for the atmosphere by firing that beam
illumination laser and then compensating with the surrogate
high-energy laser, all against a flying target, which is what
we're doing right now. So, we should gain some significant
knowledge in the next several weeks with that program.
Senator Thune. With those knowledge points coming in and
the scheduled shoot-down for 2009, why has the MDA removed over
the past 3 years $1.1 billion in funding from the program, if
it shows as much promise as you suggest today?
General Obering. First of all, we are constantly being
aware of what money we need when, to do what. That is the best
way I can describe it. When the ABL--even though they have made
steady progress, it has taken longer than we anticipated in
some cases--and there were things planned that we could defer
or move out. We did that to take advantage--it gets back to the
tradeoffs that Mr. Francis talked about, what we are eligible
to do. Also, we had to get under some of our budget reductions
overall for the entire program.
We've taken significant budget reductions going back to the
President's budget of 2004, where what we had planned to do, in
terms of our work, was not what we were funded to do. We had to
go back and readjust that work. So, that's part of that
calculation.
Senator Thune. In the layered missile defense scheme,
besides the ABL, are there any other stand-alone platforms that
don't need to rely on satellites for tracking enemy missiles?
General Obering. Well sir, it depends on what kind of
defended area you're talking about, and, it depends on what the
situation is. But, for example, the Aegis weapon system can
detect and track and engage threat missiles. We do the same
thing--the ABL has that autonomous capability, and THAAD does,
as well, for that matter. What we like to do though, is while
we can rely on that if we have to, we like to be able to extend
that capability. So, by being able to cue the ABL from an off-
board sensor, satellite, or a ground-based radar for that
matter, depending on the scenario, we can greatly expand its
capabilities. The same thing is true with THAAD, with Aegis,
and with all of our capabilities, including the GMD program.
Senator Thune. I share a concern that's echoed I guess, by
some of my colleagues, concerning funding levels for missile
defense. I guess a follow-up question is: if we continue or
reduce funding for missile defense, are we going to push these
advancements further out into the future, and are we creating a
gap in our defenses because we are starving missile defense?
General Obering. If we continue to push the options for the
future, and ABL is included in that category, along with KEI
and others, then as I said in the opening statement, it makes
us susceptible to the future in terms of what the threats may
be, and what we may be faced with.
To give you an analogy, if we had been overly focused on
near-term capabilities back in the mid-1990s, and we had only
looked at what we could push out the door in the next several
years, we probably would only have, by the turn of the decade,
we would probably only have Patriot, maybe some THAAD
capability, and maybe some sea-based interceptor capability,
but probably not necessarily the SM-3. We would have had no
system to turn on last summer when the North Koreans executed
those missile launches.
So, we always have to keep in mind this balance between
what we are doing today, and getting out the door, and what we
need to be paying attention to for the future.
Senator Thune. Thank you, I appreciate your answers.
Actually, Mr. Chairman, I do have one question I'd like to
submit for the record.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
Senator Thune. If that's okay.
Senator Bill Nelson. Certainly.
Senator Thune. Thanks.
Senator Bill Nelson. You mentioned ABL. It's currently
projected to cost $5 billion for the R&D through fiscal year
2009. Last year, there were additional delays, and the planned
shoot-down flight test was delayed from 2008 to 2009.
If the technology does seem to work or prove to work, could
this be an unaffordable system?
General Obering. Part of our knowledge points are to
include affordability information, Senator. While we did have
some delays in the program over the past year, based on some of
the hard technical issues they're challenging--and they're
tackling those challenges--we did slip the program about 6
months, it was December 2008 to about mid-2009 right now. When
we come to our shoot-down in 2009, we look at all of the
factors that go into that, and affordability is certainly one
of those.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, the question of affordability
would be held out there in the future?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. On deploying such a system as that?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary's testimony indicates
that your MDA is acting on all of their recommendations. It
also indicates that there are 15 new DOT&E recommendations
under consideration.
Do you know of any reason why you would not act on all of
those 15 recommendations?
General Obering. Senator, the short answer to that is no, I
don't see any reason why not. In terms of working together with
Dr. McQueary, we've been establishing a strong partnership
already in that regard. It doesn't mean that we agree all the
time, it does mean that we are breaking new ground here with
respect to how we move forward, and not think in that vein. I'd
be very positive in that regard.
Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary, the THAAD flight test
program was reduced by three flight tests for budgetary
reasons. Now, the program is apparently going to try to
accomplish all of the objectives of those three tests by adding
them to other tests, and add a number of critical factors,
issues, for each of those tests. Then it increases for each
test. Do you believe that removing those tests adds risk to the
program? Or, does it reduce the risk if those three tests
should be conducted?
Dr. McQueary. That's a very complex question, but let me
try to keep my answer as simple as I can.
We have examined the test program for THAAD in detail, and
of course they had a successful--or what appears to be--a
successful test last week, making it five out of five tests
conducted most recently. It is our view that the testing
program as laid out, with the reduction in the missiles, is
adequate to prove out the operation of THAAD. With the
following ``however''--if there were to be a failure, then it
means we'd have to go back and re-examine the test program to
see whether we have learned the things that are necessary.
So, there is some increased risk should there be a failure.
If the success of the program continues as we have seen in the
last five, then we believe there would be adequate collection
of information in order to be able to demonstrate that that
system does work.
Senator Bill Nelson. In the testing, a lot of models and
simulations are used to predict the performance of the system.
Have there been instances that you know of where the models of
the GMD program--or other programs--did not correctly predict
the performance of the system?
Dr. McQueary. I do not know the answer to that question,
directly. If I may put a slightly different turn to the
question on modeling and simulation, I believe very strongly
that good modeling and simulation is an essential part of this
program, because the battlespace in which the system has to
operate is very large and multi-faceted.
In my judgment, the country will not be able to afford to
test every single possibility as to what one would do. The way
one develops high confidence, and the way such a complex system
as this would operate, would be to develop good modeling and
simulation, use the testing that is done to prove that modeling
and simulation does accurately represent what happens. I
believe General Obering is on a path that will let us do that.
We do not have a ``BMDS'' model at this point in time that
we can point to and say, ``Let's exercise this'' to do what
I've described. But MDA does have a program to try to get us to
the point where we can do what I've described, because I don't
know of any other way to be able to gain high confidence that
the system will work because the testing is quite expensive, as
we all know.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, the ideal is to model and test,
and then flight test.
Dr. McQueary. Yes, sir. In fact, I'm a believer that you
should use your modeling to predict what is going to happen in
a test, in advance, and then measure how that actually comes
out in the real test. Because that's an important way of
helping to determine that the model itself is indeed a valid
model for what is happening.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, if there was a problem in the
modeling and the simulation, you'd find it out when you did the
flight test?
Dr. McQueary. That's right. These two things need to go
hand-in-glove, if you will, in order to provide an effective
set of data and information that can be used in judging the
efficacy of the system.
Mr. Francis. Mr. Chairman, if you go back in history and
look at the THAAD program, before it became part of missile
defense, that was, in fact, the case--there was modeling and
simulation to predict its performance, and it's been a while,
but there were probably seven, eight, or nine flight tests
before they could use the flight test data to correct the
model. So, it takes quite a bit of time before the model is a
good predictor, if you will.
Senator Bill Nelson. In your opinion--and that was with
regard to THAAD----
Mr. Francis. Yes.
Senator Bill Nelson. In your opinion, with regard to the
GMD system--where are we there?
Mr. Francis. I think right now we haven't had enough of the
data to say we know the model works. I know MDA is working on a
more sophisticated model. So I would say that, in terms of
confidence level, the jury is still out on that.
General Obering. Sir, if I could add to that, Senator?
It's good to be precise here. We have models of the way the
interceptor will perform, the way the radars will perform, the
fire-control system will perform, that we predict. I will say--
and we'd have to go into a more detailed session, obviously--
that we get very good correlation between what the anticipated
performance of that is, and what we see in our flight testing.
Where we have disconnects with what the models predicted, and
what actually happened in the flight test, is sometimes where
you have a failure.
For example, we never modeled that the interceptor wasn't
going to fly out of the silo at Kwajalein back in December
2004. When you have component failure like that, then that's
not an indicator that you have a bad model, that just means
that you had a component failure, you had a reliability problem
that you had to go back and address. So, we see very good
correlation with what we predict to be the performance in the
flight, as well as the testing that we've done on the ground,
as well.
So, the challenge now, and we're working with Dr.
McQueary's folks, is to take those very user-unfriendly
engineering models, that are very accurate and high-fidelity,
and transform those into models that the operational test
community can use, models that are much more user-friendly, and
represent that level of fidelity that they need to do their
job. That's what we're committed to do.
Senator Bill Nelson. For both of the Generals here, General
Cartwright was here a few weeks ago, and he told us it's ``very
important'' to him to expand our missile defense system
``beyond long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles to
start to address those that hold at threat our forward-deployed
forces, our allies, and our friends.'' Continuing the quote,
``those are more in the short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles, things such as the Patriot, the Standard Missile-2
and Standard Missile-3 will be able to address, and THAAD as it
comes on.''
Do you all agree with General Cartwright? He's your boss.
[Laughter.]
General Campbell. He's not here, though. [Laughter.]
I do agree with him. I mean, specifically, I can cite an
example with the Patriot system. Today the Army has committed
to building an additional two Patriot battalions to address
specifically the problem that you've described. The work that
MDA's doing to add the SM-3 missiles, and bring on four THAAD
fire units, instead of two, recognizes that we know that
there's a gap in that particular regime. So, I agree
wholeheartedly with his assessment, we need to move in that
direction.
General Obering. Yes, sir, and in fact, it was General
Cartwright's input and the combatant commander's input that we
move forward on the THAAD program, adding more fire units, as
General Campbell said, also adding, I think, about 48 more of
the SM-3 sea-based interceptors to the program, being able to
also add a sea-based terminal capability that also is geared
toward the protection of deployed forces and embarkation
points, that type of thing. So, we are paying very close
attention to that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, we're planning a total of 96
THAAD missiles, and about 140 SM-3 interceptors. Do you think
that protecting our forward-deployed forces and meeting the
combatant commanders operational requirements will require more
of those systems than currently planned?
General Campbell. We've done some study to a Joint
Capabilities Mix, this is an initial look, but that study would
tell us that we should nearly double the quantities of both SM-
3 and the THAAD.
Senator Bill Nelson. The number three unfunded priority of
the Army Chief of Staff is the PAC-3 Pure Fleet Initiative,
General Campbell. This would upgrade all of the Patriot
battalions to the latest and most capable PAC-3 configuration.
The Army is working on finding funds to start that process.
But, we're going to have to find more funds to complete it.
Can you tell us what kind of capability this Pure Fleet
Initiative will provide, and give us your opinion if it is the
cost-effective way to improve our regional missile defense
capabilities?
General Campbell. To address the first part of that
question, I do think this is the right approach to continue to
buy more of the PAC-3 system. The capabilities it will bring
will be increased lethality against the targets we expect to
face, and those that carry weapons of mass destruction, we'll
be able to address those targets at longer ranges, and higher
altitudes. We'll be able to protect more ground area, so you
basically expand the capability of the system by having that
PAC-3 configuration.
So, in my view, it is a proven system. We've used it now in
two wars, and it would be a prudent way to go forward into the
future, with a proven system, and a proven PAC-3 capability
that we have right now in the battalions that we have
configured to PAC-3.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, if funds were made available to
support this system, you would support its implementation for
the Pure Fleet Initiative?
General Campbell. Absolutely, and the Army is committed to
doing that. They're looking at a reprogramming action right now
for this fiscal year which is up at OSD for their
consideration, and we're looking ahead to next year to look at
Grow the Army funding, to support the additional funds we'll
need to complete the Pure Fleeting of 13 battalions.
Senator Bill Nelson. Does any of the staff have any
questions? [No response.]
Thank you all, you've been very kind, very patient. Thank
you for the quality of your testimony. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
FORWARD-BASED X-BAND TRANSPORTABLE EUROPEAN OPTION
1. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, if a decision were made to
not deploy the 10 interceptors in Poland and the midcourse
discrimination radar in the Czech Republic, would it still make sense
to deploy a Forward-Based X-band Transportable (FBX-T) radar--or more
than one--to Europe?
General Obering. Yes, an AN/TPY-2 (formally known as the FBX-T)
located within 1,000 kilometers of the threat launch points, would
provide early tracking of an Iranian threat and would provide
additional capability against potential countermeasures. The addition
of another radar (e.g., the European Midcourse Radar) in Europe
improves continuous tracking of the threat complex for trajectories
into U.S. and Europe.
The AN/TPY-2 and the European Midcourse Radar combined with the
interceptors at Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB)
provides more confidence and performance margin in the defense of the
U.S. and will allow for protection of the Thule Radar against stressing
threat trajectories.
However, Europe cannot defend against intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM)/intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats
without a European interceptor site (EIS).
COMPARATIVE COSTS OF THIRD SITE OPTIONS
2. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, given that there are two
options for the planned deployment of the final 10 Ground-Based
Interceptors (GBIs)--either at Fort Greely, or in Europe--presumably
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has analyzed the comparative cost of those
two options. An MDA budget chart indicates the cost of the proposed
European deployment of interceptors and radars would be over $4 billion
through fiscal year 2013. How much would it cost to deploy the 10
additional missiles at Fort Greely?
General Obering. The Department's plan is to deploy GBIs 45-54 at
the EIS and MDA's fiscal year 2008 President's budget request includes
resources that support this plan.
It would be possible to deploy these interceptors at Fort Greely
and the cost difference would be $1,461 million less than deploying
them at the EIS. The total cost of the EIS site is $2,298 million which
includes: $442 million to procure the 10 interceptors; $617 million for
silos, launch support equipment and interceptor emplacement; $1,011
million for construction activities of the missile field, mission and
supporting facilities; $130 million for interceptor and satellite
communications systems; and $98 million for noninfrastructure security.
The total cost of deploying the 10 interceptors to Fort Greely is $837
million which includes: $442 million to procure the 10 interceptors;
and $395 million to provide a missile field in which to emplace them
(including a Mechanical Electrical Building, 10 sets of silos and
launch support equipment and all software upgrades needed to the Fire
Control and Command Launch Equipment to support the 2-stage GBIs).
Therefore, the cost of deploying these 10 interceptors at Fort Greely
would be $2,298 million^$837 million = $1,461 million less than
deploying them at the EIS.
However, while the emplacement of these 10 GBIs at Fort Greely
would cost less, these interceptors would not provide the same
defensive capability from this location as compared to the European
site. The purpose of emplacing 10 GBIs at the European site is to
enhance protection of the U.S homeland from emerging long range Middle
Eastern threats, as well as extend missile defense coverage to our
friends, allies and deployed forces in Europe from intermediate range
Middle Eastern threats. This defensive capability could not be
accomplished by emplacing these 10 GBIs at Fort Greely.
COVERAGE OF PLANNED SYSTEM
3. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Secretary General referred to different classes of
NATO countries based on differing defensive coverage. Is it correct
that the planned deployment of 10 interceptors in Poland and a mid-
course discrimination radar in the Czech Republic would not provide
protection for all of NATO European territory?
General Obering. The percentage of NATO territory defended by the
proposed deployment of the EIS, the AN/TPY (formally know as FBX-T) and
the European Midcourse Radar, is 100 percent of those that are
threatened by long range missiles from Iran.
Against ICBM class threats, only 20 of the 24 European NATO
countries or 80 percent are vulnerable to these missiles from Iran.
With the EIS and AN/TPY-2 in place, all 20 of these are defended. The
four remaining countries, Turkey and portions of Greece, Bulgaria and
Romania are too close to Iran's borders to be threatened by ICBM class
threats.
Approximately 85-90 percent, or 23 of the 24, of the European NATO
countries are vulnerable against Iranian IRBM class missiles and the
EIS and AN/TPY-2 can defend all of these countries against this class
of threat.
Those countries that are vulnerable to attack against the shorter
range threats from Iran could be defended by deploying other U.S.
missile defense forces, such as Patriot PAC-3. U.S. missile defense
forces such Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) (supported by an AN/TPY-2) could be deployed in a
crisis to fill any coverage gaps. NATO missile defense forces do not
now exist. The only NATO owned equipment is the Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS). Other equipment ownership is retained by the
member nations and is counted as part of their contribution to the NATO
Military Budget. This allows NATO, as an alliance or as individual
countries, to focus on the deployment of the more affordable shorter
range defensive systems.
4. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, what percentage of NATO
territory would NOT be defended by the proposed deployment, and what
NATO nations would not be completely covered?
General Obering. The percentage of NATO territory defended by the
proposed deployment of the EIS, the AN/TPY (formally know as FBX-T) and
the European Midcourse Radar, is 100 percent of those that are
threatened by long range missiles from Iran.
Against ICBM class threats, only 20 of the 24 European NATO
countries or 80 percent are vulnerable to these missiles from Iran.
With the EIS and AN/TPY-2 in place, all 20 of these are defended. The
four remaining countries, Turkey and portions of Greece, Bulgaria and
Romania are too close to Iran's borders to be threatened by ICBM class
threats.
Approximately 85-90 percent, or 23 of the 24, of the European NATO
countries are vulnerable against Iranian IRBM class missiles and the
EIS and AN/TPY-2 can defend all of these countries against this class
of threat.
Those countries that are vulnerable to attack against the shorter
range threats from Iran could be defended by deploying other U.S.
missile defense forces, such as Patriot PAC-3. U.S. missile defense
forces such Aegis SM-3 and THAAD (supported by an AN/TPY-2) could be
deployed in a crisis to fill any coverage gaps. NATO missile defense
forces do not now exist. The only NATO owned equipment is the AWACS.
Other equipment ownership is retained by the member nations and is
counted as part of their contribution to the NATO Military Budget. This
allows NATO, as an alliance or as individual countries, to focus on the
deployment of the more affordable shorter range defensive systems.
5. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, is it possible that other
missile defense systems, including PAC-3, Aegis ballistic missile
defense (BMD) and THAAD could provide defensive coverage of uncovered
portions of Europe against future ballistic missile threats?
General Obering. Yes, other BMD systems could provide defensive
coverage of those countries that are not threatened by longer-range
Iranian missiles, but remain vulnerable to shorter range Iranian
threats. Patriot PAC-3 could be deployed, or Aegis SM-3 and THAAD
(supported by an AN/TPY-2) could be deployed in a crisis to fill any
coverage gaps. The number of ship locations and THAAD or PAC-3
batteries required will depend on the threat missile class type (i.e.
IRBM or shorter range class threat) and the sensor architecture used.
These gaps could also be covered with a combination of U.S. and
NATO, or indigenous defensive capabilities. NATO missile defense forces
do not now exist. The only NATO owned equipment is the AWACS. Other
equipment ownership is retained by the member nations and is counted as
part of their contribution to the NATO military budget. This allows
NATO, as an alliance or as individual countries, to focus on the
deployment of the more affordable shorter range defensive systems.
DEFENSIVE COVERAGE OF THE UNITED STATES
6. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, is it correct, as you have
indicated, that the ground-based midcourse (GMD) system currently
deployed in Alaska and California would provide defensive coverage of
the United States against a potential future Iranian ICBM threat?
General Obering. Yes, the ground based interceptors, currently
deployed in Alaska and California, provide defensive coverage of the
United States against potential Iranian ICBMs. This coverage is
dependent on both the Fylingdales radar in the United Kingdom and the
Thule radar in Greenland.
The addition of a forward based radar and Eurpoean Midcourse Radar
located, combined with the interceptors in Alaska and California, adds
confidence and performance margin in the defense of Alaska and provides
a hedge against threat uncertainty.
The defense of the Fylingdales radar requires a EIS or another
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) asset with capability to defend
against ICBM and IRBM class threats.
NEAR-TERM, EFFECTIVE SYSTEMS
7. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, last year Congress enacted
legislation, section 223 of Public Law 109-364, that requires the
Department to place a priority within the missile defense program on
the development, testing, fielding and improvement of effective, near-
term missile defense capabilities, specifically including the GMD
system, the Aegis BMD system, the Patriot PAC-3 system, and the THAAD
system, as well as their associated sensors. Can you tell us how the
Department has implemented this requirement, and what changes were made
to comply with this provision? In your answer, please indicate the
fiscal year 2008 funds requested for these near-term capabilities.
General Obering. The development, fielding, testing and improvement
of effective near-term missile defense capabilities is a priority
within the MDA and about $7.1 billion out of our total fiscal year 2008
President's budget request of $8.9 billion is allocated for this
purpose. In the near-term, we seek to maintain and sustain an initial
capability to defend the homeland against limited ICBM threats and
protect friends and allies and deployed forces against short- to
medium-range threats. To achieve this goal, over the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) we intend to complete the fielding of up to 44
GBIs in Alaska and California; enhance our early warning radars in
Alaska, California and the United Kingdom; field the Sea-based X-band
(SBX) radar in the Pacific; field the first transportable THAAD fire
units; deploy up to 132 sea-based SM-3 interceptors on 18 Aegis
engagement ships; and expand our command, control and battle-management
network by establishing three new command and control suites at U.S.
Strategic Command, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Northern Command.
In the near-term we also seek to close gaps and improve our
capability to keep pace with growing threats. Accomplishing this
objective requires the fielding of up to 10 GBIs and an associated GMD
radar in Europe. We have also allocated resources which support
continued development work that will improve these initial missile
defense assets, and we continue to fund an increasingly operationally
realistic testing program.
The following chart provides funding details. Note that funds for
procurement of PAC-3 missiles are included in the Army budget and the
following chart shows MDA resources used for continued development of
PAC-3.
KNOWLEDGE-BASED APPROACH
8. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Francis, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) has recommended that the MDA should use a ``knowledge-
based'' acquisition approach for all its programs. Apparently MDA has
only partially implemented your ``knowledge-based'' recommendation and
has a different understanding of that concept. Can you describe what
you mean by a ``knowledge-based'' acquisition strategy, and how it
differs from what you understand the MDA approach is?
Mr. Francis. Much of what MDA has written about knowledge-based
acquisition agrees with GAO's definition. However, we have not seen MDA
put into practice an entirely knowledge-based strategy. Instead, it has
implemented some aspects of the strategy. MDA defines knowledge points
as those times within a program that data is obtained from discrete
tests, demonstrations, or processes. This data is used to confirm
earlier estimates or predictions and is to be linked with an explicit
decision. The decision could involve money, schedule, performance
requirements, or proceeding to the next stage of development. These
knowledge points are program-specific, and MDA will measure actual
performance for an individual program, like Airborne Laser, against the
knowledge points it has set for that program.
We identify three key points in a program when specific knowledge
is important to success. These points represent aggregations of
knowledge that can be judged against objective standards for
acceptability. They correspond to the points at which a program is
making investment decisions. These knowledge points and associated
indicators are defined as follows:
Knowledge point 1
Resources and needs match. This point occurs when a sound
business case is made for the product--that is, a match is made
between the customer's requirements and the product developer's
available resources in terms of knowledge, time, money, and
capacity. Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the
start of system development is an important indicator of
whether this match has been made. This means that the
technologies needed to meet essential product requirements have
been demonstrated to work in their intended environment.
Knowledge point 2
Product design is stable. This point occurs when a program
determines that a product's design is stable--that is, it will
meet customer requirements, as well as cost, schedule, and
reliability targets. A best practice is to achieve design
stability at the system-level critical design review, usually
held midway through development. Completion of at least 90
percent of engineering drawings at the system design review
provides tangible evidence that the design is stable.
Knowledge point 3
Production processes are mature and the design is reliable.
This point is achieved when it has been demonstrated that the
company can manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and
quality targets. A best practice is to ensure that all key
manufacturing processes are in statistical control--that is,
they are repeatable, sustainable, and capable of consistently
producing parts within the product's quality tolerances and
standards--at the start of production. Demonstration of a
prototype that meets reliability and performance requirements
prior to the production decision can minimize production and
post-production costs.
We have not seen MDA gather all of the knowledge discussed
above before deciding to move forward in the acquisition cycle.
For example, MDA made the decision to produce and field the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense System before it tested the
element using production-representative hardware, in addition,
MDA produced interceptors for operational use when it had not
completed a successful intercept test in 2 years. Another
example is MDA's establishment of the MKV program office and
appointment of a program manager before technologies critical
to the capability desired were mature and before it could
prepare a knowledge-based estimate of developmental cost.
MDA USING FUNDS FOR PURPOSES NOT AUTHORIZED
9. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Francis, you noted in your report that
funding for an element of the BMD system is authorized to cover a range
of activities and that if the MDA runs into problems with one activity,
it can defer work on another activity to cover the cost of the
problems. This sometimes means that funding authorized for one activity
is used for another purpose. Do you have any thoughts as to how
Congress might ensure that the funding it authorizes is used for the
purpose for which it was authorized?
Mr. Francis. To effectively manage the BMDS, MDA may need some
flexibility to use funds for purposes other than those for which the
funds were appropriated. For example, a more pressing need for the
funds may arise or the agency may want to speed-up the development of
an element that is maturing faster than expected. However, in instances
where Congress has a special interest in knowing that funds are being
used for their intended purpose, it could set dollar thresholds for
moving funds within a budget program element that would trigger a
report to Congress should that threshold be breached. We think this can
be done in such a way that the MDA Director maintains his ability to
make such decisions expeditiously, but at the same time providing
Congress transparency into the consequences of those decisions.
Congress might also consider designating certain funds as ``special
interest'' and requiring that the use of any of the funds for any other
purpose be reported.
MDA could provide increased transparency of deferred work in a
couple of ways. First, it could report the cost of deferred work as a
cost of the block that it benefits. For example, work deferred from
Block 2004 until Block 2006 could be accounted for and reported as a
cost of Block 2004, regardless of when the work is performed.
Alternatively, when MDA requests funds during a subsequent block to pay
for deferred work, the agency could notify Congress that it is
requesting funds for this purpose. The notification could include an
identification of the block in which the work was originally planned
and the amount of funding needed to pay for the deferred work.
10. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Francis, would requiring that MDA
notify Congress when it reprograms funding within a program element be
a useful management process?
Mr. Francis. Yes. By notifying Congress when it reprograms funds
within an element, MDA would improve the transparency of its actions.
An individual element can cover a full range of activities, including
technology development, system development, production, fielding, and
support. I think it is a reasonable expectation, given MDA's
flexibility to move funds between these activities, that MDA notify
Congress when it is doing so. However, notifying Congress may not
necessarily have to mean obtaining prior approval, as discussed in the
answer to question 11.
11. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Francis, another option would be to
require prior approval by Congress of certain proposed reprogramming
actions, as is frequently done with other programs. In your view, could
that be a useful oversight tool?
Mr. Francis. MDA is required to report all reprogramming actions
that result in $10 million or more being moved from one budget program
element to another. There are benefits in terms of control in expanding
MDA's reporting requirement to include some intra-program element
reprogramming actions. For example, it may be worthwhile to report
actions that involve the movement of funds from one activity to another
within a program element if an established cost threshold is breached
or if MDA plans to use funds appropriated for an activity in which
Congress has a special interest for some other purpose. However, this
amount of control must be weighed against the potential loss of
flexibility that MDA currently has to manage its system of systems. For
example, if prior approval were required before moving funds from one
activity to another within a program element, the decisions would take
longer. Alternatively, Congress could consider requiring notification
of such reprogramming without necessarily requiring prior approval.
This would preserve MDA's flexibility while providing Congress
transparency into the reprogramming decisions.
INDEPENDENT LIFE-CYCLE COST ESTIMATE
12. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Francis, your report notes that the
MDA is not required to obtain an independent life-cycle cost estimate
of the BMD System or its elements, as other major defense acquisition
programs are required to do. From a standpoint of oversight and
accountability, do you believe it would be useful to have an
independent life-cycle cost estimate for the BMD System and its
elements?
Mr. Francis. Yes, increments of elements that have effectively
entered system development and demonstration should be able to produce
the information needed to estimate the life-cycle cost of that
increment and to enable the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) to
independently verify that estimate. As we pointed out in our March 2007
report, independent verification of a program's cost estimate allows
decision makers to gauge whether the program is executable given other
budget demands and it increases the likelihood that a program can
execute its plan within estimated costs. However, we note that an
element program office may have some ongoing efforts whose cost cannot
be estimated. For example, a program could have one increment in system
development and demonstration, but it could also be developing the
technology important to a future increment. In such instances, the
element program office would only estimate and have the CAIG validate
the life-cycle cost of the increment whose technology is being
integrated into a complete product. Studies of the best practices of
leading commercial developers have shown that until all technologies
critical to a desired capability are mature managers cannot make good
cost, schedule or performance estimates. This is because technology
development is a time of discovery that cannot be scheduled, whose
outcome cannot be predicted, and whose cost cannot be accurately
estimated.
ELEMENT-LEVEL REPORTING
13. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Francis, your report recommends that
the BMD program should report on cost, schedule, and performance at the
individual missile defense element level, rather than at the entire BMD
System level. Can you explain why, and why you think that should happen
now?
Mr. Francis. In our opinion, MDA should report on cost, schedule,
and performance at both the BMDS level and the element level. Element-
level reporting is needed because since 2002, MDA has achieved its
primary mission of developing, fielding, and supporting an integrated
BMDS through the efforts of individual BMDS elements. Most of the
agency's budget is requested by the elements and a significant amount
of the agency's work is accomplished through element contracts. For
example, over 73 percent of MDA's fiscal year 2005 budget and 72
percent of the agency's fiscal year 2006 budget was devoted to the
support of the nine BMDS elements. It makes sense to report in the same
manner that funds are budgeted. The elements provide the individual
assets and capabilities that help comprise the overall BMDS capability.
This does not mean that the BMDS has to be managed in a stove-
piped, element-centric manner, however. I believe MDA should continue
to manage BMDS as a system-of-systems versus as a byproduct of
individual elements. A system-of-systems construct, like blocks, is
useful for defining and managing the increments of an integrated BMDS.
Moreover, it provides more latitude to make tradeoffs among individual
requirements, costs, and capabilities while preserving the integrity of
the overall BMDS. The block baseline should also be consistent with the
baselines of the individual elements.
The cumulative information gained from both element-level and BMDS-
level baselines would allow decision makers to better assess the value
that the missile defense program delivers for the investment being
made. Determining the value for money is likely to become increasingly
important as cost growth in entitlement programs decrease discretionary
spending and as defense budgets are squeezed by mounting expenses to
support the conflict in Iraq.
CONFIDENCE IN TWO-STAGE GBI
14. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary, at the hearing I described a
two-stage variant of the GBI being developed by the MDA for possible
deployment in Poland. The MDA has identified seven development risk
areas it is working to mitigate on this missile, which has not
completed development and has never been tested. My question to you was
whether you have high confidence that this undeveloped and untested
missile will perform in an operationally effective, reliable, and
suitable manner. What is your current assessment?
Dr. McQueary. There are added risks anytime a system's working
design is changed. In the case of the two-stage variant of the GBI, I
agree with MDA's seven developmental risk areas. I believe the most
significant risk is with the software changes and integration that MDA
must make not only in the interceptor, but also in the Command and
Launch Equipment and the GMD Fire Control to optimize the interceptor's
new performance envelope. There is commonality between the two-stage
and three-stage variants of the GBI booster. MDA gained experience when
it converted a three-stage Minuteman II into a two-stage Minuteman II.
However, I cannot make an assessment on effectiveness, reliability, or
suitability on a two-stage design that has not yet been built or
tested. Through MDA's Integrated Master Test Plan, I will approve the
combined developmental/operational flight testing of the two-stage
interceptor, and my office and the joint operational test team will
participate in all aspects of this testing.
INACCURATE MODELS
15. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary, at the hearing, I asked you
whether you knew of instances when models had not accurately predicted
the performance of the BMD System or its elements. You indicated you
did not remember any specific examples. For example, did the GMD model
predict that the GBI would not launch in IFT-13C, or predict the so-
called ``Track Gate Anomaly''?
Dr. McQueary. While models can provide useful predictions of system
or component performance, they generally are not designed to predict
hardware failure modes or software malfunctions. The GMD model did not
predict the software timing problem that aborted the launch in IFT-13C.
Even when software malfunctions are discovered during test, and the
models are modified or developed to account for these malfunctions,
they still may not accurately predict their severity or frequency. The
``Track Gate Anomaly'' is a good example. The GMD model did not
initially predict ``Track Gate Anomaly''. Models of statistical
occurrence which MDA developed for the ``Track Gate Anomaly'' did not
accurately predict the frequency of occurrence during a recent flight
test.
16. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary, can you check your agency's
records to see if there are any specific examples and, if so, provide
them and describe their significance?
Dr. McQueary. MDA's experience with models is no different than the
experiences of other acquisition programs in the Department of Defense
(DOD). Some models do a good job of predicting or replicating
capability and performance, and some don't. There are several examples
where MDA's models did not match or predict system capabilities:
[Deleted.]
FLIGHT TESTS REQUIRED TO VALIDATE MODELS
17. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary, your prepared testimony says
that for you to have confidence in your assessment of the operational
effectiveness of the BMD System, you need ``validated models and
simulations,'' which you say ``don't exist today because MDA does not
have enough flight test data to anchor them.'' Can you explain what you
mean by validating and anchoring models and simulations, and why it's
crucial to your assessment?
Dr. McQueary. One of the purposes of testing is to gather the data
necessary to validate that the models accurately represent the
performance of the system under test. The process is simple. The model
is used pre-test to predict the performance expected during the test.
The test is run and the performance data is collected. A post-test
reconstruction is accomplished to compare the actual performance to the
predicted performance. The model is then adjusted to better predict
system performance. It is an iterative process through which the
model's fidelity continually improves. Once I am satisfied that the
models are validated, I can use them to assess system capability. This
is especially important in assessing capability at the edges of the
system's performance envelope where peacetime, safety, and fiscal
constraints usually apply.
In the case of the BMDS, there are BMDS-level models and there are
element-level models. I need both, correctly and efficiently working
together, to accurately assess capability. Generally, the element-level
models are more mature, have detailed validation plans, and are
progressing toward validation through ground and flight testing. The
BMDS-level models are not ready for use in my assessments, but should
be ready to assess the FTG-04 pre and post test events and the Block 06
BMDS in October 2007. I am working with MDA to understand the details
and the timelines associated with development, integration, and
validation of the BMDS-level models. The only way MDA can validate that
these models accurately predict BMDS performance is to ``anchor'' them
to flight test data.
18. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary, why would you not accept
models and simulations as a substitute for flight tests?
Dr. McQueary. We need the flight tests to validate that the models
and simulations accurately reflect the performance of the system under
test. Once they have been validated through flight test, they can be
used confidently to predict system performance.
OPERATIONALLY REALISTIC GMD SALVO TESTING
19. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary, everyone seems to agree on
the need for operationally realistic flight testing as the best means
to have confidence in the operational capability of the BMD system.
Since the GMD system firing doctrine is premised on being able to fire
two interceptors at each target, do you agree that it would be
important to test and demonstrate that capability in flight testing, as
we are doing with other systems?
Dr. McQueary. The ability of the GMD element of the BMD system to
launch and guide two interceptors on a single target is an important
capability that MDA must demonstrate to validate warfighter firing
doctrine. The Patriot element has demonstrated this capability. Both
the Aegis BMD and THAAD elements plan future tests to demonstrate this
capability. It is logical that GMD should do so also. However, this
test will require additional investment in the test infrastructure at
Vandenberg AFB including the temporary modification of an operational
silo into a test silo.
MULTIPLE TARGET GMD TESTING
20. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. McQueary, the GMD system is designed
to defeat a small number of relatively simple targets. Do you believe
it would be valuable to demonstrate that capability with flight testing
of the system against multiple targets, so we have confidence in its
capability? Would that be operationally realistic given the GMD
mission?
Dr. McQueary. Yes, but to do so within the capabilities of
peacetime range and safety limitations will require sizeable investment
in infrastructure (telemetry and flight safety systems) and more
extensive coordination. A GMD flight test involving multiple targets
and interceptors would be operationally realistic and, if successful,
confidence building. Patriot has already demonstrated this capability.
Aegis BMD recently demonstrated the capability to manage near
simultaneous engagements of a ballistic missile and a cruise missile
threat.
JOINT CAPABILITIES MIX STUDY
21. Senator Bill Nelson. General Campbell, the Joint Force
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) conducts
studies and analyses on missile defense capabilities, needs, and force
structure. What are results of the Joint Capabilities Mix Study with
respect to desired or required force structure of our regional missile
defense systems, namely Patriot/PAC-3, Aegis BMD, and THAAD?
General Campbell. The Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) Study is an
iterative opportunity for the joint communities of interest (including
combatant commanders, Services, and the MDA) to explore weapons and
sensor mixes to counter the expected threats in three major operation
areas across three epochs (2012, 2015, 2020). JCM I, concluded in April
2006, influenced MDA programmatic decisions to increase the number of
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) firing units and
interceptors, increase SM-3 interceptors, and start the Sea-Based
Terminal program. JCM II has just concluded and results are being
staffed and briefed through the Joint Requirements Oversight Commission
process. The findings provide a recommendation of the number of upper-
tier (THAAD and SM-3) interceptors required for certain contingencies.
Additional study will be required to further refine the analysis.
22. Senator Bill Nelson. General Campbell, do we have enough force
structure today to satisfy combatant command operational plans, and are
we planning and budgeting for enough in the FYDP? If not, which systems
would we need more of to meet their operational plans?
General Campbell. Requests for land and sea-based capabilities have
emerged which significantly exceed the near-term worldwide inventory.
The MDA has increased the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
equipment buy. The Army has requested an increase in force structure to
man the additional THAAD equipment and has requested additional Patriot
battalions as part of its plan to Grow the Army. For missile inventory,
MDA has increased its THAAD and SM-3 buy. The Army continues to
purchase and build the PAC-3 inventory, and is preparing to transition
to the new PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhanced missile in fiscal year 2010.
This new missile will significantly increase the Patriot battlespace
and provide capability against a larger threat set. We continue to
refine force structure requirements through additional analysis and
inform MDA of future combatant command capability needs through the
Prioritized Capability List.
MILITARY UTILITY ASSESSMENT
23. Senator Bill Nelson. General Campbell, I understand that the
JFCC-IMD has performed several military utility assessments of the GMD
system for General Cartwright. How many of the assessments have been
conducted and what have been the general conclusions for each of them?
General Campbell. Strategic Command has conducted three military
utility assessments. This annual assessment has been consistent in
concluding that the BMDS provides a ``thin line'' of capability against
the threat. The MDA has delivered additional capability each year,
adding greater confidence in the operation of the BMDS.
UPGRADED/EVOLVED THAAD MISSILE
24. Senator Bill Nelson. General Campbell, the missile defense
system is intended to be a spiral development program. There is an
opportunity to upgrade the THAAD missile to have far greater capability
against missiles of greater range and complexity. Do you support
increasing the capability of the THAAD missile to provide enhanced
defensive capability?
General Campbell. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
is an emerging capability for area defense. There are potential
opportunities to develop more robust enhancements to the THAAD missile
in future years. However, the increase in cost to field these
enhancements is dramatic, even when compared to what is currently
programmed. The planned THAAD program will provide a terminal upper
tier capability that complements our midcourse and lower tier systems.
We should continue to build a balanced BMDS as currently planned. We
should examine THAAD's potential for growth and determine if the cost
of the additional capability allows us to sustain a balanced program.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
WHICH MISSILE FOR DEPLOYMENT?
25. Senator Levin. General Obering, if the decision were made to
deploy GBIs 41-50 at Fort Greely, rather than in Europe, would you
deploy more of the existing 3-stage interceptors, or use the new
developmental 2-stage version?
General Obering. If the decision were made to deploy GBI's 45-54 at
Fort Greely rather than in Europe, more of the existing 3-stage
interceptors would be used. The 2-stage configuration GBI is being
developed specifically for the EIS. Its shorter minimum engagement time
is better suited to engage threat ranges in the European Theater. The
EIS, combined with a forward-based radar, provides considerable
redundant coverage of the U.S. and, depending on the threat, defends
Western and Central Europe and most of Eastern Europe. Neither three-
stage nor two-stage interceptors at Fort Greely and Vandenberg AFB can
defend Europe.
26. Senator Levin. General Obering, since the budget request seeks
funds for the possible deployment of GBIs 41-50 at Fort Greely, does
the funding requested in the fiscal year 2008 budget request for
interceptors 41-50 permit the production of 10 more three-stage GBIs?
General Obering. Yes, funding requested for OBV-2 stage (GBIs #45-
54) could be diverted and used to acquire 3-stage GBIs in full, and
emplacing these interceptors at Fort Greely would provide additional
capability for the BMDS. However, The Department's plan is to deploy
the OBV-2 stage at the EIS and the resources requested in MDA's fiscal
year 2008 President's budget support this plan. The purpose of
emplacing these interceptors at the European site is to enhance
protection of the U.S homeland from emerging long range Middle Eastern
threats, as well as extend missile defense coverage to our friends,
allies and deployed forces in Europe from long-range and intermediate-
range Middle Eastern threats. This defensive capability could not be
accomplished by emplacing three-stage GBIs at Fort Greely.
RESULTS OF SEPTEMBER GMD FLIGHT TEST
27. Senator Levin. General Obering, the flight test of the GMD
system last September (FTG-02) was considered a success. However, I
understand that there were some technical issues with the interceptor
that caused a 4-month delay in the next test of the system. Please
describe those technical issues and the status of the corrections for
them.
General Obering. [Deleted.]
POLISH CONCERN
28. Senator Levin. Mr. Green, the former Polish Minister of
Defense, Radek Sikorski, who is now a member of Poland's parliament,
recently wrote in the Washington Post that the U.S. proposal to place
GMD interceptors and a radar in Europe ``could provoke a spiral of
misunderstanding, weaken NATO, deepen Russian paranoia, and cost the
United States some of its last friends on the continent.'' If that were
the result of the proposed deployment in Europe, do you believe that
would be in our national security interest, and would you support such
a deployment?
Mr. Green. If these outcomes were likely, we would reconsider our
plans to deploy U.S. missile defenses in Europe. However, in light of
recent events, I believe such results are unlikely.
NATO ministers met at the North Atlantic Council meeting on April
19 and, according to Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, ``agreed
that the threat of missile attacks is real and that NATO is the right
framework for discussions on missile defense.'' Rather than indicating
that missile defense initiatives would divide and weaken the Alliance,
NATO members expressed ``a shared desire that any U.S. system should be
complementary to any NATO missile defense system'' and that ``the
principle of indivisibility of security should apply.'' Moreover, NATO
recently decided to assess the full political/military implications for
the Alliance of the U.S. missile defense proposal and prepare a report
by February 2008.
U.S. Government representatives have consulted with and briefed
numerous European government and European Union representatives on U.S.
plans for basing missile defenses in Europe. These officials
appreciated the U.S. efforts to apprise them of its plans, and they
left the meeting with a better understanding of U.S. intentions.
Although a few officials expressed reservations, most have responded
positively.
With regard to Russia, U.S. officials have met with the Russians
repeatedly to explain that limited U.S. missile defense deployment in
Europe is not directed at Russia and that it does not constitute a
threat to Russian strategic forces. A detailed list of missile defense
cooperation opportunities has also been presented to the Russians,
which they agreed to discuss in technical expert meetings. President
Putin did offer to drop Russian objections to the U.S. proposal to
place missile defense assets in Poland and the Czech Republic if the
U.S. would agree to use the Russian-controlled radar in Gabala,
Azerbiajan in lieu of a new radar in the Czech Republic. Secretary
Gates said he was pleased that the Russians acknowledge the threat of
Iranian ballistic missiles and that action is necessary to counter this
threat. He also said that although the U.S. is still firmly committed
to bilateral negotiations with the Czech Republic, we look forward to
discussing the Russian proposal at technical expert meetings in the
future.
WHO PAYS FOR DEFENSE OF NATO?
29. Senator Levin. Mr. Green, NATO has a long-standing tradition of
having financial burden-sharing arrangements with the United States in
which NATO pays for a share of the military capabilities that provide
its protection and security. How much of this proposed $4 billion
missile defense system intended to defend Europe will NATO be paying
for under a NATO burden-sharing agreement?
Mr. Green. The U.S. Government has made a proposal to deploy U.S.
missile defense assets in Poland and the Czech Republic that will help
defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. forces in Europe from long-range
threats from Iran. The U.S. missile defense site also will be capable
of defending much of Europe. We are not asking NATO to contribute
financially to the cost of this deployment;
NATO missile defense contributions come in other forms. To address
short and medium range missile threats, NATO has allocated 800 million
(about $1 billion) for the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile
Defense, a command and control backbone for NATO member countries'
missile defense systems. If negotiations are successfully concluded
with Poland and the Czech Republic, they will contribute significant
``in-kind'' resources in allowing U.S. systems to be deployed on their
territory. The U.K. and Denmark agreed to allow the U.S. to upgrade
early warning radars on their territories for BMD use.
Other NATO allies already have or are pursuing short and medium
range missile defense capabilities, including acquiring/upgrading
Patriot PAC-2/3 systems, and co-developing Medium Extended Air Defense
System. Several of our European allies have expressed interest in
acquiring sea-based midcourse interceptors for use on their Aegis-
equipped ships.
HOW MANY FLIGHT TESTS NEEDED FOR CONFIDENCE?
30. Senator Levin. Dr. McQueary, your prepared testimony says that,
because there have not been enough flight tests, you don't have
validated models and simulations needed to give you confidence in the
performance of the BMD System. How many additional successful flight
tests must MDA conduct before you will have high confidence in the
performance predictions of BMD System models and simulations?
Dr. McQueary. I cannot give you that number today. We evaluate each
flight test and associated ground test campaign to assess the
confidence in the predictions of the models. Last fall I told General
Obering that I would need validated models and simulations to assess
the capability of the BMDS. He agreed and took action to develop the
plan to get the data to support validation. Although the element-level
models are acceptable for performance assessment, they don't integrate
well with the less mature BMDS-level models. Element and BMDS models
have to work together to accurately predict BMDS performance; they do
not at this time. The interfaces are different, the software languages
are different, the hardware is different, and the communications links
are different. Once they work together, MDA must validate that they
correctly and accurately represent BMDS performance. This requires both
validation plans and test data. MDA is working on both. I am working
with MDA to understand the details and the timelines associated with
development, integration, and validation of these models. Once MDA
finalizes its plans and provides them to me, I should be able to give
you an estimate of the number of flight tests required to validate the
BMDS models and simulations.
31. Senator Levin. Dr. McQueary, how long do you expect it will
take until those flight tests are conducted?
Dr. McQueary. I will not be able to give you that estimate until I
get the validation plans from MDA that define the number of flight
tests required. However, it is imperative that General Obering continue
to follow the prudent test-analyze-fix-test approach to flight testing
that he adopted following the reviews of the December 2004 and January
2005 flight test failures, and I am confident he will do so.
32. Senator Levin. Dr. McQueary, for each of the near-term BMDS
weapon elements (GMD, Aegis BMD, THAAD), how many more successful
flight tests would be required for you to have confidence that the
element will perform in an operationally effective and suitable manner
under operational conditions?
Dr. McQueary. Fiscal constraints will likely make it impossible to
achieve statistical confidence in the operational effectiveness and
suitability of the BMDS. For example, to achieve 80 percent confidence
that an element can perform its mission successfully 80 percent of the
time (80/80), the element would have to complete 10 consecutive,
successful flight tests using the same geometry, scenario, and
hardware/software configuration. For higher confidence/success, the
number of consecutive, successful tests is even higher: 90/80-13, 80/
90-21, and 90/90-28. Therefore, assessing the operational effectiveness
and suitability for each element is going to be a combination of flight
tests and modeling and simulation. If I have validated models and
simulations, the currently planned flight test programs for Aegis BMD
and THAAD should be adequate for me to assess operational effectiveness
and suitability for their current spiral development phases. This
assumes no further reductions in their currently planned flight test
programs. On the other hand, the current GMD flight test program is
early in its developmental phase and still recovering from the two
failures in December 2004 and February 2005. General Obering is
following a prudent ``test-analyze-fix-test'' approach which, when he
finds problems, results in testing delays. The current FTG-03 delay is
a good example. At the same time, MDA must validate its models, a
process directly related to flight testing. As a result, at this time
it is impossible for me to estimate the number of successful flight
tests I will need to assess GMD operational effectiveness and
suitability.
OPERATIONAL TESTING
33. Senator Levin. Dr. McQueary, is it correct that there is still
no operational testing planned for the GMD system and other MDA
elements? If so, why is that?
Dr. McQueary. At the present time, the only operational testing MDA
plans and is conducting for GMD and the other BMDS elements is combined
developmental/operational testing. My office works closely with MDA to
develop the parameters of these tests. Current Department policy
relieves MDA from conducting operational testing until it declares an
element ready for transition to a Service with that Service planning
for a production run. Congressional direction allows MDA to accomplish
limited fielding using RDT&E funds.
34. Senator Levin. Dr. McQueary, do you believe there is still a
need for operational testing of the GMD system and other elements of
the BMD System?
Dr. McQueary. Over the years, we have seen the value of operational
testing. Every time we get the warfighters operating the systems in
their intended environments and roles, we learn both the strengths and
the limitations of these systems. Operational testing can take several
forms. It can be the classic title 10 U.S.C. ``stand alone''
operational testing, or it can be combined developmental/operational
testing. Following current Department policy, MDA has developed a
combined developmental/operational test program for the BMDS. Using the
congressionally-mandated and Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E)/MDA-developed Operational Realism criteria, we have
seen increasing operational realism in MDA's combined developmental/
operational test program. This approach is not perfect, but it is
working. As MDA gains confidence in the BMDS, it allows more
operational realism in each succeeding test.
UNCLASSIFIED REPORTS
35. Senator Levin. Dr. McQueary, most of the material in your last
two missile defense reports appears to be unclassified, even though the
reports themselves are classified. Would it be possible for your next
annual BMD report to be unclassified, with a classified annex?
Dr. McQueary. We are looking at the possibility of publishing an
unclassified BMDS report with a classified annex. Since the 2007 report
will be a report on the BMDS Block 2006 capability (required by
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006) rather than a
report on the 2007 test program (required by National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002), more of the report may be
classified than in the past. We'll make the determination as we begin
putting the report together. Our intent will be to make as much of the
report unclassified as we can while maintaining appropriate security.
USE OF NON-RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDS
36. Senator Levin. Mr. Francis, MDA is asking Congress to extend
its authorization to use exclusively research and development funds to
procure and deploy operational assets. In your recent report, you
recommend that future operational missile defense assets should be
purchased with procurement funds. Can you comment on whether you would
also recommend that MDA should request operations and maintenance
funding to provide support for fielded assets, and military
construction funds to build operational missile defense facilities, and
if you do, why?
Mr. Francis. Yes, I recommend that MDA use operations and
maintenance funds to support fielded assets, as well as military
construction funds to build operational missile defense facilities.
First, requesting money according to the purpose for which it is to be
used would put MDA's budget on the same basis and terminology as that
of other programs. Second, because MDA's budget already identifies the
funds it plans to use to operate and maintain assets in the field, it
would not be difficult for MDA to formulate a request for operations
and maintenance funds. Third, using the correct appropriation to
request funds would improve transparency and accountability as funds
could not be moved between appropriations without congressional
approval. In addition, because military construction projects must
provide for full funding of the complete cost of construction, Congress
will be aware of the full cost of a project at the time funds are
requested and future Congresses will not be in the position of having
to provide additional funds to ensure a usable end item.
COMPARING ACQUISITION FLEXIBILITY
37. Senator Levin. Mr. Francis, are there other major defense
acquisition programs that have been given the same level of acquisition
flexibility as has been granted to the BMD program? If so, do you see
the same issues with program transparency, accountability, and
oversight in those programs as you see in the missile defense program?
Mr. Francis. I am not aware of any other acquisition program that
has been granted as much flexibility as MDA. DOD has allowed other
programs some limited flexibility. For example. DOD has allowed the
Future Combat Systems program more fluidity in establishing
requirements and less stringent milestone exit criteria. However, the
program does operate within the traditional acquisition framework that
makes programs accountable for their planned outcomes and cost. MDA on
the other hand is not yet required to apply several important oversight
mechanisms that, among other things, provide transparency into program
progress and decisions. For example, MDA is not expected to comply with
user-established requirements, operational requirements documents, an
approved program baseline, independent cost estimates, or milestone
decisions.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
IMPROVED TRANSPARENCY REPORTING
38. Senator Reed. General Obering, in its March 2007 report, the
GAO recommended that to improve the transparency of the BMD program,
MDA should establish cost, schedule, and performance baselines for
those elements effectively in the ``system development and
demonstration'' phase, and report against those baselines. MDA
partially concurred with this recommendation, but was concerned that an
element-centric approach would detract from its efforts to develop a
single integrated BMD System. GAO continues to support its
recommendation because the element-centric reporting approach reflects
the way MDA requests funding and contracts for development of the BMD
System. What reporting basis would MDA recommend to provide a similar
level of transparency as reporting against element baselines would
provide?
General Obering. We understand the GAO's desire for traceability.
However, we are convinced that the element-centric reporting approach
that GAO prefers is not the best way, nor the only way to achieve its
objectives. As indicated in the DOD response to the GAO, the single
integrated development approach for the BMDS has afforded the MDA the
opportunity to make both technical and programmatic trades; thus
enabling us to rapidly make prototype and test assets available for
operational use. We stated our intent to modify our current biennial
block approach to improve our reporting against the system-level
baselines in accordance with section 234 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. We have not yet worked out the
details of a new reporting basis, but we intend to work with both the
GAO and your staff as we proceed with this effort over the coming
months. We believe the result of this effort will be a reporting system
that will provide appropriate transparency to satisfactorily address
GAO's concerns.
39. Senator Reed. General Obering, would MDA adjust its budget
requests and contracts to match its reporting approach?
General Obering. Because we have not worked out the details of a
revised block approach, I cannot answer your question directly at this
time. I do not anticipate that we would adjust budget requests or
contracts to fit the reporting requirements. As I see it, the
definition of the work to be done determines how we structure our
budget requests and our contracts. Reporting must be adapted to reflect
accurate and meaningful information. Reporting requirements must not be
allowed to dictate how we structure our program. Sound management
practice must remain focused on desired program investment outcomes;
reporting is important and necessary in that context, but should not
become more important than successfully fielding BMDS capability.
IMPROVED ACCOUNTABILITY INFORMATION
40. Senator Reed. General Obering, in commenting on GAO's March
2007 report, MDA partially concurred with GAO's recommendation to
provide program element information that is consistent with the
acquisition laws that govern baselines and unit cost reporting.
However, MDA did not fully concur because it was concerned that
element-level reporting would have a potentially fragmenting effect.
The agency did, however, agree to provide additional information to
Congress to promote accountability, consistency, and transparency. What
kinds of information does MDA plan to provide that will make the
missile defense program more accountable and transparent?
General Obering. We have not yet worked out the specific details of
a new reporting approach. However, we will work with GAO to establish a
reporting system that will satisfactorily address their concerns, but
does not adversely affect the BMDS program by focusing on the parts to
the detriment of the whole.
JAPAN AGREEMENT ON MULTIPLE KILL VEHICLE
41. Senator Reed. General Obering, you have decided to pursue a
Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program for the Standard Missile -3, Block
2 interceptor that the United States is developing with Japan. Has
Japan agreed to pursue only a MKV, and to forego the planned unitary
kill vehicle?
General Obering. MDA has not made a final decision on when to
pursue an MKV program for the SM-3 Block IIA. MDA has presented
briefings on the MKV program and an U.S.-only analysis plan during
meetings with Japanese officials since December. Japan reaffirmed its
desire to continue with the current SM-3 Blk IIA Cooperative
Development project. Japan also said that it understands that the
threat is evolving and given sufficient justification would consider
cooperating on MKV as a separate program. The Japanese representatives
stressed the necessity of receiving from the U.S. information on the
evolving threat to help develop a consensus within the MOD on how best
to proceed. Next steps are for the U.S. to report the results of its
U.S.-only analysis in May and for the U.S. to encourage Japanese
leadership to begin a joint analysis in June.
42. Senator Reed. General Obering, what will you do if Japan does
not agree to your plan for MKV?
General Obering. We have just begun discussions with Japan on the
MKV concept and hope that our U.S.-only analysis encourages Japanese
leadership to begin a joint analysis in June. We look forward to
further discussions with Japan on this subject throughout the year.
43. Senator Reed. General Obering, what is your backup plan if MKV
technology does not work?
General Obering. The MKV provides considerable capabilities to
engage multiple warheads and overcome countermeasures that the single
kill vehicles cannot address. However, if the MKV technology does not
work, the alternative is to use a single kill vehicle (or kinetic
weapon) variant of the MKV payload.
NEED FOR MORE TESTING ON C2
44. Senator Reed. Dr. McQueary, the nerve system and brain of the
BMD is its Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications
system. It is an incredibly complex system with many sensors with
different views of activities at different times, all of which must be
fused together to form one common, coherent, and integrated picture to
help decisionmakers understand what is happening and provide the
ability to manage and control the system under stressing conditions. If
the Command and Control system fails, the system could fail, or at
least fail to perform optimally. Do you believe there is a need to do
more testing of the Command, Control and Battle Management system to
better understand its capabilities and limitations, and to help improve
it? If so, what additional testing do you believe would be necessary or
useful, and why?
Dr. McQueary. Last year MDA adopted a year long ``campaign''
approach for testing the Command and Control, Battle Management, and
Communications (C2BMC). It is a ``crawl-walk-run'' approach that builds
up to a fully-distributed test of all the ground hardware and
communication links in the BMDS. This is a logical way for MDA to
incrementally add and test C2BMC capability. Last year's campaign, the
Ground Test 01 series, was very successful. MDA is well into this
year's campaign, the Ground Test 02 series. As MDA adds operational
realism to the individual flight tests, it is doing more and more
testing of the C2BMC capability to fuse data to form one common,
coherent, and integrated picture. C2BMC testing at various levels and
complexity is nearly continual now. Overall system performance
improvements are limited primarily by the speed at which the software
in this massive system can be improved, modified, tested, and
integrated. I am satisfied with the level of testing that MDA is
currently pursuing.
IS ONE FLIGHT TEST ENOUGH?
45. Senator Reed. Dr. McQueary, if an element of the BMD system has
one successful flight test, is that enough to give you confidence that
it will work in an operationally effective and suitable manner, or do
you need to conduct multiple flight tests using different operationally
realistic and complex scenarios to provide confidence in system
performance?
Dr. McQueary. Other than Patriot, I'm not ready to state that any
element of the BMDS is operationally effective and suitable.
Repeatability is a very important element of operational effectiveness
and suitability. One successful test doesn't demonstrate operational
effectiveness or generate enough data to determine suitability.
Additional testing in multiple realistic and complex scenarios will
increase confidence, but will be restricted by peacetime safety and
fiscal constraints. The tests that MDA does accomplish will help anchor
the models and simulations which we can then use to evaluate capability
in much more of the performance envelopes of the various elements of
the BMDS.
STILL A LONG WAY TO GO
46. Senator Reed. Dr. McQueary, your prepared testimony says,
``There is still a long way to go'' with respect to testing of the BMD
system. What do you mean by that, and what else remains to be done?
Dr. McQueary. The BMDS is probably the largest, most complex combat
system in the DOD. The many components--sensors, shooters, and C2BMC--
are at different levels of development and maturity. The many sensors,
ground and satellite based, are in various aspects of development,
modification, and testing. Patriot is fully operational and fielded.
Aegis BMD has a capability primarily limited by the number of modified
cruisers. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system is still early
in its developmental test program but is showing rapid progress. The
GMD system has had one flight test of the production booster and kill
vehicle that ended with an intercept of a threat-representative target.
C2BMC is still in the early stages of development. Many more tests of
these elements and their integration into the BMDS must be accomplished
to demonstrate repeatability, anchor models and simulations, and build
confidence. That's why I stated ``There is still a long way to go''
with respect to testing the BMDS.
STATUS OF PREVIOUS GAO RECOMMENDATIONS
47. Senator Reed. Mr. Francis, your report states that DOD has not
implemented all your previous recommendations on missile defense
acquisition. Which recommendations has DOD not implemented, and what
effect do you believe that has had?
Mr. Francis. From March 2005 through the issuance of our latest
missile defense report in March 2007, we made nine recommendations and
MDA has not yet implemented them. These recommendations propose that
MDA:
adopt a knowledge-based acquisition strategy
consistent with those called for in DOD acquisition
regulations,
assess whether a 2-year block strategy is compatible
with a knowledge-based acquisition strategy,
clarify and modify block policy to align cost and
fielding goals,
adopt more transparent criteria for identifying and
reporting significant changes in MDA's goals,
develop baselines for all elements effectively in the
system design and demonstration phase of the acquisition cycle,
provide information to Congress that is consistent
with the spirit of acquisition laws that govern baselines, unit
cost reporting, independent cost estimates, and operational
test and evaluation,
include in blocks only elements that will field
capabilities during the block,
request procurement funds to acquire operational
assets, and
conduct an independent evaluation of the Airborne
Laser and Kinetic Energy Interceptor programs prior to deciding
their futures.
Our recommendations were meant to make the Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) program's decisions and actions more transparent, to hold
the program more accountable for the funds it receives and the actions
it takes, and to enable better oversight. Without change, we continue
to see the same problems. The scope of a block is not firm but changes
annually, making it difficult to determine what each block will
deliver. Cost issues make it impossible to compare the value of a block
to its cost. For example, block costs cannot be determined because work
that cannot be completed during one block is pushed into a future
block, along with its cost. Neither can an operational asset's unit
cost be identified because assets are being acquired piecemeal over a
number of years. Additionally, unit cost growth is hidden since a unit
cost estimate is not established at the time funds are first requested
and there is no base with which an asset's actual cost can be compared.
We also continue to see MDA stray from the knowledge-based approach
that allows successful developers to deliver, within budget, a product
whose performance has been demonstrated. Instead, MDA continues to
field assets before their capability is known.
MDA BLOCK SCHEDULE SYSTEM
48. Senator Reed. Mr. Francis, the MDA's 2-year block management
approach is confusing, and doesn't seem to have clear meaning,
especially since MDA can change the scope and schedule of what is in
any given block. From your standpoint, does MDA's 2-year block
structure help or hurt from an accountability and oversight standpoint?
Mr. Francis. MDA's 2-year block management approach does reduce
program accountability and make oversight more difficult. MDA has found
that 2 years is not always enough time to complete all of the work
planned for a block. For example, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) element reported at the end of Block 2004 that not all planned
work was completed. According to GMD officials, this work was deferred
until Block 2006 and its cost is being recognized as a cost of Block
2006. However, the officials could not tell us how much of the Block
2006 budget is attributable to the deferred work. The result is that
the cost of Block 2004 is understated and the cost of Block 2006 is
overstated. In addition, if MDA delays Block 2006 work until Block
2008, as expected, Block 2006 cost will become more difficult to
compare with its originally estimated cost as the cost of the deferred
work will no longer be considered a Block 2006 cost. While the block
concept is a useful construct for harvesting and fielding capability
incrementally, it is a muddy concept for accountability. Additionally,
as work travels from one block to another, the connection between the
actual cost and scope of work completed and the estimated cost and
scope of work used to justify budget requests is weakened, making it
difficult for decision makers to determine the value of the investment
being made in missile defense. The block management approach does focus
management on the system-of-systems level, which facilitates making
decisions that cross traditional program lines. This makes it possible
for MDA to have more options as to how to meet a requirement, and could
reassign a requirement from one element to another if conditions
warranted. We believe that this system-of-systems or portfolio
perspective for managing and making decisions is good. However, we also
believe that this perspective can be maintained while at the same time
providing the same or nearly the same level of transparency,
accountability, and oversight as other major weapon system programs.
This has been the aim of our recommendations for the revisions being
considered for MDA's block approach.
PATRIOT PURE FLEET INITIATIVE
49. Senator Reed. General Campbell, I understand that the Army
Chief of Staff included the Patriot PAC-3 Pure Fleet initiative as a
high priority on his fiscal year 2008 Unfunded Priorities List
submitted to Congress. I gather that implementing the Patriot Pure
Fleet initiative would provide all Patriot battalions with the latest
PAC-3 capabilities. Can you provide a description of the benefits of
upgrading all Patriot battalions to this enhanced PAC-3 configuration?
General Campbell. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) provides
significant increase over Configuration-2 in every key measurable
capability-increased range and fidelity for surveillance and target
identification, increased probability of kill, and larger defended
area. The Configuration-3 Radar provides substantial surveillance
improvement. The Configuration-3 Radar can detect a ``basketball size''
object versus a ``pick-up truck size'' object for the Configuration-2
Radar. The Configuration-3 Radar is able to discriminate debris and
decoys from actual targets which equates to higher probability of kill
and less missile expenditure. The PAC-3 Launcher uploads 4 times the
number of missiles and fires the PAC-3 missile which provides increased
lethality through Hit-to-Kill technology able to defeat submunitions
and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Configuration-3 also provides a
7-fold increase in battlespace resulting in a greater defended area and
allows remote launch capability three times farther than Configuration-
2 and significantly extends the Tactical Ballistic Missiles footprint.
Pure Fleeting the Patriot force will increase the size of the pool of
deployers and increase our Nation's strategic flexibility against the
Tactical Ballistic Missile threat.
50. Senator Reed. General Campbell, if fiscal year 2007 and fiscal
year 2008 funds are approved for this initiative, what capability
enhancements to missile defense capabilities would be realized?
General Campbell. Yes. Patriot is our Nation's only fielded ground-
based tactical BMD weapon and is a strategic asset with implications in
multiple theaters overseas. Improving our Nation's tactical BMD
capability is needed to support the combatant commanders. The Army is
committed to funding the PAC-3 Pure Fleeting of the remaining three
Configuration-2 capable battalions. The current strategy involves a
combination of reprogramming from the fiscal year 2007 main budget to
complete the pure fleeting action. Additionally the Army intends to
utilize ``Grow the Army'' funds to create two additional PAC-3
battalions. At end state, Patriot Pure Fleet and growth of the PATRIOT
force will provide 15 PAC-3 battalions enabling greater strategic
flexibility of our Nation's missile defense forces while reducing the
stress on the Patriot force.
51. Senator Reed. General Campbell, as the Army's senior missile
defense commander, do you support additional funding for the Patriot
PAC-3 Pure Fleet initiative?
General Campbell. Yes. Patriot is our Nation's only fielded ground
based Tactical BMD weapon and is a strategic asset with implications in
multiple theaters overseas. Improving our Nation's tactical BMD
capability is needed to support the combatant commanders. The Army is
committed to funding the PAC-3 Pure Fleeting of the remaining three
Configuration-2 capable battalions. The current strategy involves a
combination of reprogramming from the fiscal year 2007 main budget to
complete the pure fleeting action. Additionally the Army intends to
utilize ``Grow the Army'' funds to create two additional PAC-3
battalions. At end state, Patriot Pure Fleet and growth of the Patriot
force will provide 15 PAC-3 battalions enabling greater strategic
flexibility of our Nation's missile defense forces while reducing the
stress on the Patriot force.
CURRENT NATO POSITION ON MISSILE DEFENSE
52. Senator Reed. Mr. Green, the NATO Secretary General indicated
that NATO has decided to pursue missile defense for its deployed
military forces, but not its territory and its population. Is that
correct, that NATO has not decided to defend its territory or its
population?
Mr. Green. NATO has taken no decision on whether to pursue
territorial missile defenses against long-range ballistic missiles but
has been examining the feasibility of such defenses. The focus of NATO
and NATO Allies to date has been on missile defenses to address the
shorter-range ballistic missile threat. NATO agreed to develop and
deploy the active Layered Theater BMDS, where Alliance members' theater
missile defense systems will be integrated using the NATO Air Command
and Control System as the command and control backbone for deployed
terminal missile defense systems, resulting in a financial commitment
by the Alliance of approximately $800? million. NATO completed a study
in 2006 on the feasibility of a NATO defense for European population
and territory from long range missile attack. This study concluded that
such a defense is feasible. As a result of the 2006 feasibility study,
NATO is currently assessing the political and military implications of
such a defense. It recently modified this effort to account for the
deployment of U.S. missile defense assets in Europe.
53. Senator Reed. Mr. Green, so in that context, is it accurate to
say that the U.S. proposal to deploy a territorial missile defense
system in Europe goes beyond the current NATO position?
Mr. Green. NATO has not made a decision yet to pursue a NATO-funded
defense against long range ballistic missile threats. However, NATO, to
a large degree, has a common understanding of the growing ballistic
missile threat. NATO recognizes and accepts the U.S. approach of
negotiating bilaterally with Poland and the Czech Republic. NATO also
accepts missile defense as a reasonable approach to the missile threat,
as evidenced in their efforts to field missile defense to address short
and medium range threats. NATO demonstrated that it recognizes and
accepts the reality of the U.S. missile defense deployment in Europe by
agreeing recently to consider the U.S. site in its ongoing study.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
MISSILE DEFENSE TESTING
54. Senator Pryor. General Obering, the MDA uses the integration of
technologies to create an overwhelming advantage against enemies who
would use ballistic missiles to threaten the national security of the
United States. The recent missile defense intercept test (April 6) for
the THAAD interceptor successfully demonstrated beyond-line-of-sight
communications and radar tracking/target discrimination objectives.
While I'm sure you would agree with me that the missile defense program
is quite expensive, costing $2 billion a year to operate, what further
benchmarks are there in the future to validate the operational
capability of the program? What challenges still lie ahead?
General Obering. In partnership with DOT&E and the warfighters, MDA
continues to test the operational capability of the BMDS using a
campaign of digital simulation, ground tests (Hardware-in-the-Loop) and
flight tests. Our test program characterizes existing fielded
capability, integrates and demonstrates new capabilities, and allows
warfighters to test and validate their tactics, techniques, and
procedures in a near-operational environment.
In the first category of characterizing existing fielded
capability, MDA's fiscal year 2007 test program will demonstrate
(benchmark) the BMDS:
GMD end-to-end intercept engagement that uses the operational
system hardware and software;
Aegis BMD's operational capability as both a sensor
supporting homeland defense and its engagement capability to
defend deployed forces, friends and allies;
Deployed AN/TYP-2 X-band radar (formerly Forward Based X-band
Radar) at Shariki, Japan, to support defense of the homeland,
our deployed forces and the country of Japan;
Integrated capability of the SBX radar to support homeland
defense against missile attack from North Korea;
Defense of Fylingdales Upgraded Early Warning Radar against a
possible Iranian missile attack.
In 2008 MDA will begin testing the THAAD element of BMDS in its
fielded configuration, testing advanced discrimination algorithms for
our forward-based radars, software upgrades to the BMDS Battle
Management and GMD components to optimally use multiple sensor data
inputs, and a new capability to concurrently perform developmental
tests, operator training, and maintain an operational capability. As
the BMDS continues to grow in complexity and inventory with additional
operating locations for sensors and shooters and an evolving threat,
the MDA test program will keep pace through a disciplined process that
validates fielded capability and provides the data needed to guide the
continued development of our capability to defend against ballistic
missile attack.
The magnitude of managing a complex test program and integrating
the operational components into the BMDS is the MDA's greatest
challenge. Years before the actual test can take place each test must
be planned both at the Element level and the BMDS level: target
requirements must be developed and targets must be procured, test
objectives must be defined and the test itself must be designed with
pre-test analysis performed by a dedicated test organization composed
of system and test engineers. In conjunction, current year test
programs must be conducted and the results analyzed and compared with
system specifications. Based on the analysis, decisions on possible
system changes must be made and the information on the operating BMDS
passed to the warfighter. The MDA has developed an effective process
that enables efficient management of the established benchmarks that
will validate the operational capability of the program.
55. Senator Pryor. General Obering, on March 15, a modified Boeing
747-400F carrying a YAL-1A Airborne Laser (ABL) successfully test fired
its target illuminator laser against a NC-135E test aircraft, verifying
its ability to identify, track, and intercept an airborne target in the
boost phase of flight. Could you better clarify this boost phase
defense segment?
General Obering. The ABL is the primary Boost Defense Segment of
the MDA's integrated and layered BMDS. The MDA will design, build, and
test an air-based laser system to acquire, track, and kill ballistic
missiles during the boost phase of missile flight. The boost phase
typically includes the first 60-300 seconds of missile flight and
concludes at altitudes between 20-450 kilometers.
Adding the ABL to the BMDS significantly increases the overall
defensive capability by reducing the number of targets faced by
successive defenders and by addressing certain threats that may be
difficult to counter. By destroying the missile in boost ABL also
negates the threat prior to their ability to deploy multiple reentry
vehicles, submunitions, or countermeasures. Additionally, warheads and
engagement debris do not reach the intended target areas. Furthermore,
there is a high probability that the threat missile debris will fall
within the hostile country's own territory, serving as a deterrent and
reducing the possible affect the debris has on protected areas and
assets.
Secondary missions, for an operational ABL, will be to provide
additional threat protection through early ballistic missile launch
warning, launch site prediction, cueing to BMDS, and impact point
prediction. Detecting and tracking a missile during its boost phase
significantly improves accurate estimation of the launch point location
and therefore will enhance the probability of a successful
counterstrike against an aggressor's missile launchers. ABL's sensor
capabilities further increase the robustness of the BMDS by enhancing
the performance of other elements.
In addition, the unique, revolutionary capabilities of ABL's
mobility and speed-of-light directed energy weapon present adversaries
with additional complexities when trying to develop or employ threat
missile countermeasures that will provide a credible deterrent and a
lethal defense against a rapidly evolving ballistic missile threat. ABL
adds unique deployment flexibility to quickly deploy to areas of
interest arriving in theater ready to provide an initial deterrent and
defensive capability for the United States and/or allied forces.
Without ABL, MDA would have to address in much less viable ways both
the further proliferation of threats that is expected and the likely
adversary counters to the other BMDS elements.
56. Senator Pryor. General Obering, how does a 747-400F tactically
anticipate and respond to an adversarial launch?
General Obering. The ABL responds to an adversarial launch by
detecting the launch with its on-board Infrared Search and Track (IRST)
sensors, autonomously or with the assistance of cues from other BMDS
sensors (e.g., satellites). The IRSTs detect the unique heat signatures
emitted by the exhaust plumes of boosting missiles, and provide the
information needed to point the turret and engage the threat missile
with its High-Energy Laser. ABL is able to operate autonomously,
however in normal operation it will interact with C2BMC, which will
determine which shots are to be taken by ABL. ABL's concept of
operations involves flying a combat air patrol pattern near a
predetermined area of interest, detecting threat launches anywhere
within its 360-degree field of regard, and rapidly engaging and
destroying threat missiles. In addition, ABL's forward-deployed
location will allow it to provide critical early launch warning to the
rest of the BMDS.
57. Senator Pryor. General Obering, what significance does this
test have on the overall missile defense program?
General Obering. This test was part of a critical series of in-
flight tests of the ABL's laser targeting system and showed ABL's
ability to identify, track and lock onto an airborne target precisely
enough to hit it with the Tracking Illuminator Laser (TILL). The TILL
is a kilowatt-class solid-state laser that is intended to track a
boosting ballistic missile and identify the most vulnerable location on
the missile in preparation for the eventual firing of the High Energy
Laser, which will use directed energy to burn through the rocket motor
case of a hostile missile.
This test was an important step toward our next goal of determining
atmospheric distortion between ABL and the target, compensating for
that distortion, and engaging the target with a Surrogate High Energy
Laser by this summer. In terms of the entire missile defense program,
adding the ABL to the Boost Defense Segment of the BMDS significantly
increases the overall defensive capability of the BMDS by reducing the
number of targets faced by successive defenders and by addressing
certain threats that may be difficult to counter during later stages of
flight. Moreover an operational ABL, will be able to provide additional
threat protection through early ballistic missile launch warning,
launch site prediction, cueing to BMDS, and impact point prediction.
Detecting and tracking a missile during its boost phase significantly
improves accurate estimation of the launch point location and therefore
will enhance the probability of a successful counterstrike against an
aggressor's missile launchers. ABL's sensor capabilities further
increase the robustness of the BMDS by enhancing the performance of
other elements.
58. Senator Pryor. General Obering, the PAC-3 surface-to-air
missile is manufactured at the world class, highly-automated production
plant in Camden, Arkansas. In 2006, this facility won the Arkansas
Institute for Performance Excellence Governors Award and was named one
of the ``10 best'' plants in America for its outstanding track record
of on-time, on-budget deliveries of quality systems. What significance
has the PAC-3 had on the Integrated BMDS and how important is the PAC-3
manufacturing and depot facility in Camden?
General Obering. I will defer to the Army to address the importance
of the PAC-3 manufacturing and depot facility in Camden. My role is to
manage configuration updates to ensure they are fully integrated and
interoperable with the BMDS.
As a fielded system, PAC-3 is already a significant contributor to
the protection of U.S. Forces, friends and allies for the Combatant
Commanders. In the future, we expect the Army's PAC-3 to continue these
roles as other systems introduce additional layers of protection to our
integrated BMD.
59. Senator Pryor. General Obering, on January 11 of this year,
China launched a successful strike against its own Feng Yun (FY-1C)
polar orbit weather satellite using a Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite
weapon. What impact has this action made on our strategic capabilities
posture?
General Obering. [Deleted.]
PROTECTION FROM THEATER THREATS
60. Senator Pryor. General Campbell, in your statement you note
that ``Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom are
consuming key missile defense capabilities, leaving other worldwide
commitments under-resourced.'' What steps are we taking to ensure the
U.S. homeland and our troops deployed in combat are protected from
theater air and missile threats?
General Campbell. The MDA has increased fielding of GBIs in Alaska
and other capabilities, and is developing a European-based capability.
For deployed forces, Strategic Command provides input to the Global
Force Management Board to optimize distribution of limited air and
missile defense forces around the globe. Of course, we understand that
the threat to the homeland is from long range or intercontinental
missiles, while our deployed soldiers are facing threats from short or
intermediate range missiles. The systems we have deployed are effective
against these particular threats. We are continuing to evolve our
existing systems and field new systems such as the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) which will enhance our capabilities
against the full range of missile threats.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
61. Senator Pryor. General Campbell, what are your thoughts on our
functional components for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR)? Do we have adequate ISR ground, naval, and
airborne platforms supporting the global war on terrorism and
intelligence gathering efforts worldwide?
General Campbell. As a Department, we effectively meet less than
one third of our combatant commanders' warfighter information needs. We
do not have sufficient capabilities or capacity to meet the Nation's
demand for intelligence. There are two ways to approach this. First,
better integrated and focused investments to alleviate gaps and
shortfalls in ISR near- and far-term. Today we face adversaries who
avoid our strengths and seek to attack through nontraditional means.
The current ISR enterprise, designed to confront the former Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact, isn't optimized for either collection
against, or analysis of, these new adversaries. Second, assess how we
as a nation are running the ISR Enterprise today and aggressively make
the changes required to improve efficiency and effectiveness.
DETERRENCE CAPABILITY
62. Senator Pryor. Mr. Green, our Nation's global deterrence
capability enables the United States to have decisive kinetic combat
effects through the application of worldwide space and global strike
operations. Meanwhile, the threat of global terrorism, highlighted by
ballistic missile proliferation from countries like North Korea and
Iran, poses a great challenge to our national security. With the threat
from the numbers and capabilities of ballistic missiles increasing,
what is our overall strategy to defend and counter this proliferation?
Mr. Green. The U.S. Government has a number of initiatives underway
to halt or counter the proliferation of ballistic missiles. We use
multilateral frameworks, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime,
to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. We also
apply rigorous export controls and, where necessary, sanctions to keep
ballistic missiles out of the hands of dangerous regimes. We place a
high priority on dissuading or stopping potential adversaries from
obtaining ballistic missile technology in the first place.
Should regimes evade our efforts, we rely on the full array of
deterrent capabilities, including missile defenses. Missile defenses
devalue an adversary's investment in ballistic missiles and complicate
the enemy's strategic calculations by increasing the uncertainty that a
ballistic missile attack will be successful. When combined with U.S.
offensive strike capabilities, U.S. leaders have a range of options for
deterring, defending against and defeating potential missile attacks.
__________
Question Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
MISSILE DEFENSE TESTING AND CONTINUED FIELDING
63. Senator Sessions. Dr. McQueary, MDA plans to emplace four new
GBIs in fiscal year 2008, and six new interceptors each year from
fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2012. Based on your assessment of
the testing program thus far, is there any reason why these GBI
emplacements should not go forward?
Dr. McQueary. There is obvious risk in producing new interceptors
while the test program is ongoing. Following the two consecutive GMD
flight test failures in December 2004 and February 2005, General
Obering stopped testing and fielding until the results of several
independent reviews he commissioned were complete. He then adopted a
deliberate ``test-analyze-fix-test'' philosophy that I fully support.
Although the August 2006 GMD flight test was a success, it is only one
test. Repeatability is a very important element of a successful
program. The next two GMD flight tests, if successful, will bolster my
confidence that GMD can repeatedly demonstrate capability in
increasingly more demanding scenarios. At this time, I see no reason to
stop emplacing interceptors at Fort Greely or Vandenberg AFB.
[Whereupon, at 5:01 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 19, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Inhofe,
Sessions, and Thune.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff member present: Robert M. Soofer,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Micah H.
Harris.
Committee members' assistants present: Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; and Stuart C. Mallory and Jason
Van Beek, assistants to Senator Thune.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Bill Nelson. Good afternoon, thank you for coming.
We have a number of witness so I'm going to make some very
brief remarks, and when Senator Sessions gets here, I will
interrupt the proceedings and ask him to make his comments.
We are here on the occasion that the Department of Defense
(DOD) certainly relies on a lot of space systems. We're in the
process of modernization and replacement and it is putting a
strain on the budget as well as the technical and management
skills of the Services and the contractors. While some of these
programs have made progress in resolving some of the schedule
and budget issues, a lot of work remains. So we want to dig
into that.
We have a star-studded cast, literally and figuratively.
I'm just going to curtail my comments there. I will interrupt
when Senator Sessions gets here, but your statements will be
made a part of the record. What I would like to do, instead of
your reading a statement to me, which we can, of course, read
that for ourselves, is to have a conversation.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
Good afternoon and welcome to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
hearing on military space systems. We have an excellent panel of
witnesses today, Dr. Sega, Under Secretary of the Air Force and the
Executive Agent for Space for the Department of Defense (DOD); General
Chilton, Commander, Air Force Space Command; General Shelton,
Commander, Joint Forces Component Command for Space, U.S. Strategic
Command; Vice Admiral McArthur, Commander, Navy Network Warfare
Command; and Cristina Chaplain from the Government Accountability
Office. Thank you all for being here. We look forward to a good
discussion of military space programs.
DOD is heavily reliant on space systems, as is the United States in
general. Currently, all of the DOD military space systems are in the
process of modernization and replacement, which is putting a strain on
the budget as well as the technical and management skills of the
Services and the contractors. While some of these programs have made
progress resolving some of the schedule and budget issues, a lot of
work remains, particularly in technically challenging programs such as
T-sat. On the other hand, there is good progress in the Operationally
Responsive Space program and even the Space-Based Infrared Satellite
program.
Programs dealing with space situational awareness, an area
generally under-appreciated and perpetually under-funded, are back in
the spotlight as a result of the Chinese test of a kinetic anti-
satellite weapon. While it is it not clear if China will or will not
deploy such a weapon, the test, which created thousands of pieces of
space debris, was at a minimum, a loud wake-up call.
Another critical element of the national security space programs is
space launch. It is important that we continue to maintain and
modernize the launch ranges to ensure reliable access to space.
We have a large number of witnesses this afternoon and you all have
submitted prepared statements, which, without objection, will be
included for the record. In order to make the best use of our time I
will limit my opening remarks and now turn to Senator Sessions for any
opening remarks that he may have.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, Mr. Secretary, we'll start with
you.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD M. SEGA, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE
Dr. Sega. I'm appearing before you today as both the Under
Secretary of the Air Force and the Executive Agent for Space.
When we talked last year, we talked about three themes that
we were going to work on: integration across space, as well as
across functions and organizations, not only within the DOD,
but with agencies outside, as well as industry, universities,
and Congress. We also talked about a back-to-basics approach
toward acquisition and a block approach to organize ourselves
so that we would be reducing risk in our acquisition programs
to deliver to the warfighter on time and on cost. The third
area was workforce.
In addition to that, I want to talk a little bit about
continuity of service that we think is very, very important for
several of the activities we're engaged in. One of those is
missile warning. We can not afford to have a gap in our sensing
capability for missile warning for the United States. The
second is strategic communications. The third is position,
navigation, and timing--our Global Positioning System (GPS).
We've also endeavored to increase our activities as we go
forward in both space situational awareness and operationally
responsive space (ORS), and recall, and I'll refer to this
chart in the back, how we have organized.
As we look at the acquisition process, we're looking at it
in four stages. At the top of the charts is our System
Production Stage. There, we are lowering the risk, shortening
the acquisition cycle-time that is indicated by these arrows
block one to block two, et cetera, we go horizontally.
The next generation out from that is Systems Development.
We want to be maturing the technology so when it reaches the
System Production phase, it is mature; do the systems
engineering correctly; look at the requirements--make sure they
are identified clearly; apply the resources; and then, go from
there. One generation still further out is Technology
Development, and one further out, is Science and Technology.
As an example of how we would go through this: in our
budget, we have submitted GPS III for funding throughout the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). GPS IIIA follows on GPS
IIF. It enhances the capability in two major ways: one is
adding a new frequency, L1C, for the civil community and
something our Nation says we're going to do--it's also
compatible with Galileo. It also adds additional power that our
warfighters, through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC), say is very important. So, we will have 10 times the
power over our GPS IIF signal strength in GPS IIIA.
We're also anticipating where we need to go for IIIB and
IIIC. We're adding a growth-path requirement into the building
of IIIA. This has been done through the JROC process. We
understand the requirements--the technologies are matured--and
we're going forward on IIIA.
Along with that, we want to be anticipating IIIB. The major
piece of technology and capability for IIIB is cross-links--
higher rate cross-links that tie the system together to improve
accuracy. So, we need to be working on that in a systems
development phase, and bring that to at least a TRL Level 6
capability.
We also know, after IIIB, that we're going to be looking at
IIIC. That would include a spot beam, but that's less mature at
this time. We need to be working on the technology development
for a spot beam, so in time, it moves up to Systems Development
and finally can add to the GPS capability and become GPS IIIC.
We're investing in science and technology (S&T) in such things
as advanced clocks for our GPS system.
So, we have an ``investment portfolio'' established, not
only in what we are building today, but also in what we have in
the future to continue to enhance the capability. That's
consistent with the rate of change of the 21st century--
continuing to bring on technology improvements for the new
needs of the warfighter. But, it will be done in blocks. It is
a more disciplined approach, requiring more adherence to
systems engineering, and to standards. Our folks are more in
plant now and working with the user from day one. So, that's
how this back-to-basics and block approach works for the GPS
III satellite.
If we go on to the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
Satellite that supports missile warning--we need a continuity
of service capability plan for warning. After we complete the
SBIRS Geo-satellite--what is next? In our budget is the
Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS). Focal plane
technology is increasing, it's the 21st century way of staring
and getting the information from space in the infrared spectrum
we need. This information supports not only missile warning,
but also missile defense, technical intelligence, and battle-
space characterization. So, that's why we have AIRSS also in
the budget, as well as SBIRS GEO.
This last year, we were pleased to report the SBIRS HEO
payload was on orbit and exceeding our expectations. That's
been a good thing.
We're also focusing on mission assurance from day one. One
example of that is launch. On March 8, we witnessed our 50th
consecutive, successful, medium or heavy national security
launch--a great job from the team that has put that together.
But, for each one, we have to keep our eye on the ball and make
sure attention to detail is maintained.
I do want to highlight for that particular launch, there
were five firsts. Not only was it the 50th, but it was the
first Air Force and DOD Atlas V mission; the first multiple
payload mission; the first Centaur-3 burn mission; first flight
of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) secondary
payload adapter, allowing smaller satellites the opportunity to
fly; and the first flight of a dual orbit trajectory that went
off first at 44 degrees inclination and then over to 35 degrees
inclination. So, I really think that's important.
The final point is that of workforce. We put forward a
National Defense Education Program 3 years ago. We doubled the
money that was in that last year and we ask, once again, to
double the funds this year. This program focuses on science,
math, engineering, and some foreign language for the critical
skills that we need for clearable people. So, its focus is on
the pipeline coming forward.
General Chilton and company have worked hard on the
National Security Space Institute (NSSI), which you may hear
about later. Our workforce is key and foundational to us being
successful going forward. I just want to thank this committee
for your support of what we're doing in National Security
Space.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sega follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Ronald M. Sega
INTRODUCTION
It is an honor to appear before this committee as the Under
Secretary of the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD)
Executive Agent for Space, and discuss with you our National Security
Space (NSS) activities. As the DOD Executive Agent for Space, my role
is to ``develop, coordinate, and integrate plans and programs for space
systems and the acquisition of DOD space Major Defense Acquisition
Programs to provide operational space force capabilities to ensure the
United States has the space power to achieve its national security
objectives.''
On August 31, 2006, the President signed a new National Space
Policy, which highlights the importance of space to the Nation and
presents goals for our country's space activities. Today, I would like
to discuss the importance of space to our warfighters; the progress
that we have made over the last year; and some of our future plans for
DOD space programs. One key tenet, which you will see throughout this
testimony, is that we must ensure the continuity of service of several
key capabilities, such as: Strategic Communications; Missile Warning;
and Position, Navigation, and Timing. Last year, we presented three key
areas of emphasis that remain the focus of our space activities:
integration across NSS as well as with air, land, sea, and cyberspace;
getting ``Back to Basics'' in our approach to space acquisition; and
the importance of ensuring the viability and proficiency of our space
professionals and science and engineering workforce. Over the last
year, we have made progress in these three focus areas and are starting
to see the benefits of this approach.
The U.S. relies upon space capabilities not only to meet the needs
of Joint operations worldwide, but to support our Nation's diplomatic,
informational, and economic efforts as well. Because of this, it is
important that NSS and our space professionals are integrated into all
aspects of peacetime and wartime operations--providing robust and
responsive space capabilities around the globe. At the tactical level,
space is also playing a crucial role; for example, during Search and
Rescue missions, U.S. Air Force, Army, and some Navy personnel in
theater are using Combat Survivor Evader Locator radios, incorporating
global positioning system (GPS) and satellite communications (SATCOM).
Government and commercial communications satellites are also
providing direct support to our warfighting forces. Our most recent
data shows commercial vendors are providing over 80 percent of the
SATCOM used in U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility. Though
transparent to many, space capabilities continue to make a difference
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world.
America's citizens also rely on the access and use of space
capabilities in many areas of everyday life. From our banks and
financial institutions employing GPS timing to synchronize their
encrypted computer networks to forecasting severe weather, America is
increasingly dependent on capabilities from space. The space community
continues to provide continuity of service in key areas, while
simultaneously working to modernize and recapitalize our aging space
fleet and infrastructure. Today, we do not have the luxury of
``depots'' to upgrade and maintain our space systems the way our air
and ground forces do. Thus, in order to maintain our space
capabilities, we must replace the aging systems and upgrade with new
systems.
Globally, the rate of change of technology in the 21st century and
the number of nations directly engaged in space continues to increase.
The capacity to contest space operations and capabilities is also
growing. Space can no longer be considered a ``safe haven'' or
``sanctuary.'' The recent foreign testing of a kinetic anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapon demonstrated an ability to challenge, disrupt, or destroy
space assets and capabilities. This testing has also raised global
concerns over space debris and this debris' potential to collide with
space assets in, or traversing through, Low Earth Orbit. Thus, space
situational awareness (SSA) has become increasingly important, enabling
us to gain a better understanding of activity in space; and we must
continue to work on protection for our space capabilities in a
potentially hostile environment.
We must also continue to emphasize integration, ``Back to Basics''
acquisition and workforce development. Before updating you on these
three initiatives, I want to share some progress the NSS community has
made over the last year.
UPDATE ON SPACE
In addition to implementing ``Back to Basics'' reforms, several
achievements occurred across the DOD space portfolio over the last
year.
Launch
On March 8, 2007, we accomplished our 50th consecutive, successful
NSS operational launch--a national record. This event was also the 15th
successful operational launch of an evolved expendable launch vehicle
booster. We need to remember, however, that this remarkable achievement
is only possible due to our continuing commitment to Mission Assurance,
and exacting attention to detail.
Missile Warning
Over the last year, we also made significant progress on the Space
Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program, which supports four mission
areas: missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and
battlespace awareness. The first Highly Elliptical Orbit-1 SBIRS
payload was successfully launched last year, and it has met or exceeded
all on-orbit performance expectations. Several key tests were also
conducted on the first SBIRS Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO-1) payload
and spacecraft, in preparation for launch in 2008. Our funding request
allows the procurement of the first two GEO spacecraft plus the
necessary long lead items for a potential third GEO spacecraft, two
additional hosted SBIRS sensors in Highly Elliptical Orbit, plus the
necessary ground elements.
Communications
We are moving ahead with near-term improvements to our SATCOM
capabilities. The first Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) space vehicle (SV)
completed final assembly and integration and most of the system level
testing required in preparation for launch, projected for summer 2007.
In February 2006, the Air Force awarded a contract for the second block
(Block II) of WGS satellites (SVs 4-5), with even higher bandwidth/
throughput than the Block I satellites (SVs 1-3). The Advanced
Extremely High Frequency program, the follow-on to MILSTAR,
successfully completed its first end-to-end communication test with
legacy MILSTAR terminals in June 2006, and is on track for first launch
in 2008. Also, the Transformational SATCOMs (TSAT) program continued to
mature key technologies with both contractors passing independent
evaluations.
Position, Navigation, and Timing
Two GPS IIR-M satellites were successfully launched in 2006,
bringing us to three GPS IIR-Ms now on orbit. These satellites provide
a new military signal (M-Code), which is more resistant to jamming, and
a new civil signal (L2C). After the remaining five GPS IIR-M satellites
are launched, we will begin to launch the GPS IIF series of twelve
satellites, which are all now under contract, following a thorough
Integrated Baseline Review last year.
Operationally Responsive Space
In 2006, the Air Force established the new Space Development and
Test Wing, headquartered at Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB), New Mexico,
located next to the Air Force Research Lab's Space Vehicles
Directorate, to focus on the development and testing of smaller
satellites/orbital assets, with the goal of increasing innovation and
speed, to rapidly transition ideas to fielded capabilities. One of the
Wing's key responsibilities is support of the Operationally Responsive
Space (ORS) effort. This ORS focus includes the ability to launch,
activate, and employ low-cost, militarily useful satellites to provide
surge capability, reconstitute or augment existing constellations, or
provide timely availability of tailored or new capabilities.
INTEGRATION
We continue to emphasize integration and collaboration across the
NSS community; across functional areas such as intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and among DOD entities, other
government agencies, industry, academia, and Congress. Integrating
architectures also become increasingly important as systems become more
capable of dynamic tasking and mutual cueing, and protection of our
space capabilities become even more important.
Last year, the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) signed an agreement, which established new personnel policies and
mechanisms for better developing and managing Air Force space
professionals. Subsequently, an Air Force Major General was assigned as
the Deputy Director of the NRO, while retaining Program Executive
Officer responsibilities for space radar under the Air Force
Acquisition Executive for Space. A new NRO position was also
established, as the Deputy Director of Air, Space, and Information
Operations at Air Force Space Command.
The Space Partnership Council, with membership from organizations
across the national security and civil space communities, is helping to
share best practices, avoid duplication, and support integration of
space activities. For example, last year we agreed to establish a GPS
Metric Tracking requirement for launches from both the eastern and
western launch ranges beginning January 1, 2011.
Additionally, on July 19, 2006, U.S. Strategic Command announced
the establishment of the Joint Functional Component Command for Space,
headed by the 14th Air Force Commander at Vandenberg AFB. This action
provides a single commander, with a global perspective, enhancing
functional integration for the command and control of the Nation's
space-based assets.
Our acquisition approach also emphasizes integration and
collaboration among interested parties in all stages of the acquisition
process. Our goal is to create partnerships within the space community,
which are critical to this community's success. The military should
provide well-coordinated requirements, vetted through operators,
acquirers, and logisticians. The government acquisition community,
working with industry, must assure that technology is mature and that
systems engineering and manufacturing capabilities are in place to
deliver requirements--on cost and on schedule--with appropriate funding
stability. A military-industry-congressional partnership is also
essential.
Over the last year, we have facilitated collaboration between Air
Force product centers and laboratories with the establishment of the
Space and Missile Systems Center's Space Development and Test Wing,
located just across the street from the Space Vehicles Laboratory on
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, as mentioned previously. Additionally, one
recent collaborative effort involved the Air Force, Army, Navy, and
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) working closely to
develop and launch the ``TacSat'' Experimental Satellite (TacSat-2)
last December from the NASA facility on Wallops Island, Virginia.
``BACK TO BASICS'' IN SPACE ACQUISITION
We continue to refine and implement the ``Back to Basics''
initiative that we discussed last year, and it remains a key element of
our plan to improve space acquisition. This initiative promotes a
renewed emphasis on increased discipline in the development and
stabilization of requirements and resources; engineering practices; and
management, as well as a more deliberate acquisition planning strategy.
We have established a goal of funding to a cost estimate at the 80
percent confidence level, to help ensure space program success.
This ``Back to Basics'' approach focuses on ``mission success'' in
our space acquisition programs. ``Acquisition'' links technology with
operations--turning ideas into real, tangible items and delivering
those items to the field. It can be viewed as a continuous process with
four distinct but interrelated stages. The first stage is science and
technology (S&T), where we conduct basic research and explore the
possibilities of new technologies. In the second, Technology
Development, we evaluate the utility of discoveries made in the S&T
stage. The third stage is Systems Development. Here, we take the most
promising technologies and mature them to higher readiness levels so
they can be integrated into operational platforms in the fourth stage,
System Production. Thus, technology is matured through the four stages
to move from the lab bench, to the test range, to operations. We are
emphasizing early technology development to ensure mature technology is
available for our production systems.
For most space systems, the ``Back to Basics'' approach will be
implemented using a block approach acquisition strategy that is focused
on delivering capability through discrete, value-added increments. This
concept is consistent with current policy specifying ``evolutionary
acquisition as the preferred strategy'' for DOD acquisitions. Specific
capability increments are based on a balance of capability, delivery
timeline, technology maturity, risk, and budget. Well-defined
increments help reduce many of the potential instabilities in
requirements, budget, and workforce. An overarching goal is increased
confidence, both in terms cost and schedule, for our space acquisition
programs.
Though ``Back to Basics'' is not a quick-fix solution to space
acquisition, we have begun to realize the benefits of using this
approach. Adhering to its key principles (e.g., systems engineering;
proper management of requirements, risks, and resources) yields
dividends, but this is a continuing process that requires our continued
commitment. In the fiscal year 2007 President's budget request, the Air
Force applied the block approach to the TSAT program, which is critical
to maintaining continuity of service in Strategic Communications. The
``Back to Basics'' philosophy and block approach are also now being
applied to several other needed capabilities: Missile Warning systems
(e.g., SBIRS and the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS));
SSA (e.g., Space-Based Surveillance System (SBSS)); and Position,
Navigation, and Timing (e.g., GPS III). Thus, programs with defined,
executable block strategies should reduce production risk, deliver
incremental capabilities to the warfighter sooner, and maintain
continuity of service.
Missile Warning
Space-based infrared sensing capability (e.g., missile warning,
missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace
characterization) remains a critical requirement. In addition to the
current SBIRS-High program previously mentioned, we are working on an
AIRSS. AIRSS is a critical program for developing a range of options to
ensure the Nation's missile warning capability is both sustainable and
responsive. AIRSS is developing Wide Field-of-View (WFOV) focal plane
array-based options for the ``SBIRS-type'' missions. The technical
progress on the basic elements of this program would provide confidence
that a near-term WFOV option could be made available and, with further
development of this technology, could reduce cost and improve
performance for the next generation missile warning system after SBIRS-
High.
Ensuring technology maturation occurs before transitioning from
development to production is a key part of the ``Back to Basics''
philosophy. Entering a system production phase with mature technology
reduces schedule and cost risk, puts needed capability into the
warfighters' hands sooner, and ensures we deliver what we promise on
schedule, supporting continuity of service. Each operational capability
area, such as missile warning, should have an investment strategy and
portfolio that goes beyond the current program of record, to include
needed work to support successive generations of technical capability,
both for space and ground elements.
Communications
Last year, we also applied the ``Back to Basics'' approach to
Strategic Communications programs, particularly for the
Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) and the TSAT
program. The TCA supports interoperability through the use of community
standards and is comprised of four segments: space vehicles, terminals,
terrestrial infrastructure, and network management & operations.
TSAT will provide internet protocol-based communications with laser
crosslinks in space, and extend the Global Information Grid to deployed
and mobile users, providing internet-like connectivity. The first TSAT
satellite launch is now scheduled for 2016, which will maintain
continuity of communications support to strategic users and meet the
warfighters' needs during the transition to net-centric operations.
Position, Navigation, and Timing
Continuity of position, navigation, and timing (PNT) capability is
critical for military, civil, and commercial applications, and GPS is
the world's standard for space-based PNT. Using GPS, military and
civilian users can access highly accurate, real-time, all-weather,
position, navigation, and timing data--24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Assured GPS capability is crucial to the success of many missions, from
humanitarian relief to weapons employment, and the Air Force is
committed to continuity of this critical service. To that end, we will
continue to make improvements to the constellation; including new civil
signals, more jam-resistant military code, new receivers, and increased
accuracy. In 2006, interagency coordination was strengthened through an
active national PNT Executive Committee (EXCOM), co-chaired by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Transportation,
and the stand-up of the National PNT Coordinating Office.
The Air Force is meeting the warfighters' PNT needs through
increased power and signal improvements to 8 GPS IIR-M satellites (3 on
orbit and 5 awaiting launch), 12 GPS IIF satellites, their ground
control system, and associated user equipment. Together, these actions
will deliver higher power and improved anti-jam capability. At the same
time, the Air Force is developing the GPS III satellites to continue to
satisfy warfighter requirements in the future.
Through a comprehensive review process and Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) validation, GPS III requirements were
developed, and include: increased power beyond GPS IIF, an L1C signal,
enhanced crosslinks, and spot beam capability. These capabilities will
enhance our current GPS capability, and we plan to deliver these
capabilities incrementally. The first block, GPS IIIA, will incorporate
GPS IIF capabilities plus a tenfold increase in signal power, a new L1C
civil signal compatible with Galileo, and a growth path to future
blocks. GPS IIIB will then incorporate enhanced crosslinks capability,
and GPS IIIC will provide spot beam capability. In the case of GPS
IIIA, we will carry both contractors through Key Decision Point B, so
that we can leverage ongoing risk-reduction activities. The JROC
validation of the GPS Block IIIA initial Capability Development
Document addendum supports this block approach strategy for GPS III.
Operationally Responsive Space
ORS also utilizes the ``Back to Basics'' approach. As defined in
this year's Air Force Posture Statement, ``ORS includes the ability to
launch, activate and employ low-cost, militarily useful satellites to
provide surge capability, reconstitute damaged or incapacitated
satellites, or provide timely availability of tailored or new
capabilities.'' A broader view of ORS is a tiered capability consisting
of spacecraft, launch vehicles, and ground segment to deliver a range
of space effects to the warfighter. Additionally, this broader view
combines existing, ready-to-field, and emergent systems that are
focused on reducing development and deployment costs and schedule. The
fiscal year 2008 funding request for the ORS program element (narrower,
small-satellite construct) supports an increased ability to transition
rapidly from experiment to operational capability.
Our first on orbit Tactical Satellite Experiment (TacSat-2) was
successfully launched in December 2006, and two more experimental
``TacSats'' are planned for launch in 2007. The TacSat-2 satellite was
developed quickly and cost effectively--carrying several experiments to
test cutting-edge capabilities to support the warfighter. The TacSat-2
team demonstrated ``responsive'' capabilities by efficiently
integrating the satellite and launching on a Minotaur booster
(Minuteman derivative) within 7 months of ordering the booster.
Space Situational Awareness
SSA includes systems such as the Rapid Attack Identification
Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS) program, the Space Fence, and
SBSS.
RAIDRS develops ground-based systems that rapidly detect, locate,
characterize, identify, and report interference with DOD-owned and DOD-
used space assets, and it is being developed via a block approach.
Block 10 should provide initial capabilities in fiscal year 2007 that
detect and geo-locate SATCOM interference via fixed and mobile ground
systems, whereas Block 20 is planned to provide automated data access/
analysis, data fusion, and decision support capabilities.
The Space Fence is planned to replace the aging Air Force Space
Surveillance System (AFSSS) with a system of three sites worldwide and
use a higher radio frequency to detect and track smaller sized space
objects. It would expand the terrestrial-based detection and tracking
capability, supporting SSA while working in concert with other network
sensors. A block approach acquisition strategy for the program will be
developed in fiscal year 2007-2008 with a development contract to
follow after a full and open competition.
Building upon the success of the Space-Based Visible (SBV)
technology demonstration, the Space-Based Surveillance System (SBSS)
program is planned to deliver optical sensing satellites to search,
detect, and track objects in earth orbit, particularly those in
geosynchronous orbit. Surveillance from space will augment our ground
sensors with 24-hour, all-weather search capability. SBSS is also being
acquired via a block approach, with Block 10 to be fielded in fiscal
year 2009 as a pathfinder capability to replace the aging SBV sensor.
Block 20 is then scheduled to provide increased worldwide space
surveillance.
SPACE PROFESSIONALS/SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING WORKFORCE
The foundation for our future space capability continues to be our
space professionals in the military, civil service, and industry. Some
of our experienced personnel will soon be eligible to retire, so we are
working hard to attract and retain technically skilled people to ensure
that the appropriate technical foundation and essential skill sets are
available to accomplish our space missions. We are also working to
develop better cross-functional assignment practices, to more
effectively match individual competencies and experiences with position
requirements.
The importance of space as a force multiplier underscores the
necessity to ensure we have a strong industrial base that will be able
to satisfy our requirements, both now and in the future. The Space
Industrial Base Council, co-chaired by Dr. Kerr and myself, is a forum
to address space industry issues and bring together stakeholders from
across government to provide coordinated attention and action on space
industrial base issues. We have also taken steps to include industry
and academia to help inform and implement our initiatives.
Our focus has been to ensure that our space cadre is comprised of
the most highly qualified personnel possible. The National Security
Space Institute (NSSI) continues to be a DOD Center of Excellence for
Space Education and serves a diverse multiservice and governmental
agency population. Student capacity for the NSSI's Space ``200'' and
``300'' courses has also been expanded and work has begun on
development of an additional Advanced Course for Military SATCOM.
Additionally, the NSSI, Air Force Institute of Technology, Naval
Postgraduate School, and other academic organizations continue to
develop new Distance Learning courses, making coursework available to a
larger audience, and allowing students to work and study
simultaneously.
The significance of having a high-quality workforce will only grow
as the global development of space expands. Just as the block approach
provides a path for the development and maturity of technology, it also
provides the opportunity to develop our future space leaders through
experience gained with increasingly complex systems. For example, by
allowing hands-on experiences with ORS and small satellites, our people
are rapidly gaining critical skills in building, launching, and
operating spacecraft. These efforts help develop technical instincts,
which should prove valuable in our space professionals' future
endeavors, such as program management.
The National Defense Education Program (NDEP) also continues to
provide additional opportunities for scholarships in math, science,
engineering, and foreign language, with a focus on critical skills for
clearable people. The NDEP was funded at $10 million in fiscal year
2006, $20 million in fiscal year 2007, and we are requesting $44
million in fiscal year 2008. We are working with our laboratories and
product centers to help sponsor the students and we ask for your
continued support.
CONCLUSION
Our Nation depends on its space capabilities as an integral part of
its military power, industrial capability, and economic vitality. We
must continue to ensure continuity of services in critical areas such
as Missile Warning, Strategic Communications, and Position, Navigation
and Timing. We have continued to focus on: integration of America's
space efforts; a ``Back to Basics'' approach to Space Acquisition; and
a continuing emphasis on strengthening America's space professionals
and our Science and Engineering workforce. Initial application of our
strategy over the past year has shown promising results, as we continue
toward securing our Nation's space capabilities for the future.
I look forward to continuing to work with the committee and thank
you for your continued support of NSS.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
General Chilton?
STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
SPACE COMMAND
General Chilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
member of the subcommittee. I really appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you today. It's a great opportunity.
Senator Sessions, thank you as well. It's a privilege for
me to be here, just to be here and visit with you all. But,
also to represent the nearly 40,000 men and women of Air Force
Space Command, who today are in the fight globally, supporting
the global war on terror and also providing for the national
security of this country, day-in and day-out. Those wonderful
folks are out every day, 365 days a year, delivering critical
space and nuclear deterrent capabilities to us.
If I could share with you, just briefly, the four
priorities that we have in Space Command that were the backbone
for our program this year, and as we look to the future.
First, we want to make sure that we preserve and expand the
critical capabilities that we bring to the joint warfighter.
Preserve means take care of what you have, fund it correctly,
and develop the space situational awareness we know we will
need for the future to preserve our capabilities. Expand was
detailed by Dr. Sega, as we are recapitalizing, along with the
Chief's vision, every single one of our key constellations in
this program, I'm very proud of that.
I don't think we can say it often enough, that we don't do
things in space just for the Air Force. Everything we do is in
support of the joint warfighter and I'm very proud of that.
Our second priority is to make sure we provide a safe and
secure nuclear deterrent for the United States of America. I
tell my team, we juggle a lot of balls everyday, most of them
are tennis balls. One of them is a crystal ball and that's our
nuclear responsibilities. We cannot afford to take our eye off
that ball or to drop it. We take it very seriously and you'll
see that in the recapitalization and refurbishing of our
Minuteman III fleet from nose cone to rocket nozzle. We're
preparing to extend that fleet to 2030.
The third priority for us is to make sure that we develop,
mature, and field and sustain, on time and on cost, the
capabilities we'll need for the future. In Air Force Space
Command, we uniquely have the acquisition arm, the Space and
Missile Center, out in Los Angeles assigned to this operational
command. So, we take that responsibility very seriously. I'm
proud to announce that General Hamel and his team out there
have done a great job, I think, in turning the ship on
acquisition for our space business. In fact, taking us where we
need to go into the future.
Last, but certainly not least, our priority is to make sure
we attract, train, and retain the expertise we're going to need
for the 21st century as we move forward into a more complicated
environment in space and in warfighting. So, we're very focused
through not only institutions like the NSSI, but we're taking a
hard look at policies for recruiting. We're taking a hard look
at how we raise people to key leadership positions for the
future. We want to make sure we do that with malice and
forethought, as we grow our space leaders within the Air Force
for the future.
These are our four priorities and they've shaped this
budget submission to you.
Again, sir, I thank you for the opportunity to be here and
I look forward to your questions and questions from the
subcommittee.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Chilton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a
great privilege and an honor to appear before you today representing
the nearly 40,000 men and women of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).
Thank you for your interest in and continued support of our Air Force's
space capabilities. Your leadership has focused resources towards
maintaining the asymmetric advantage that our airmen deliver to,
through and from space to the joint fight. I am honored to share this
stage with my distinguished colleagues, all great leaders of our
National Security Space team.
Today, I am pleased to report our United States Air Force's space
capabilities have never been more impressive. Each day AFSPC airmen
demonstrate they are the Nation's experts in operating our Air Force's
space systems by providing critical support to every one of our
combatant commanders in the form of Missile Warning; Missile Defense;
Space Surveillance; Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT);
Environmental Monitoring; Strategic Deterrence; Satellite
Communications (SATCOMs), Space Launch and Counterspace capabilities.
As we reflect on the contributions the airmen in AFSPC delivered over
the past year, it is clear we are now operating in an era where space
provides an unparalleled advantage for our armed forces.
This unmatched advantage that enables our joint, interagency and
coalition operations must be protected. For that reason, our Air Force
has laid out a strategy to support recapitalization efforts, while
assuming some risk in our operations, maintenance and personnel
accounts. Just as our Chief of Staff, General Moseley, testified, ``Air
Forces fail when they do not correct slowly declining relative
capabilities.'' Our space capabilities are too integral to the fight to
let our forces down . . . or let an adversary eclipse our advantage. We
realize the importance of investing today to get what we need for
tomorrow.
This 2007 posture statement articulates our Nation's critical
reliance on space capabilities. At the birth of our command 25 years
ago, space capabilities were in their infancy. Today, combatant
commanders depend on integrated space effects to successfully execute
their missions. To keep our radar locked on meeting those growing
demands, our command developed a vision and a set of four focused
priorities through which we will achieve future success.
VISION AND PRIORITIES
The foundation of our command was built by pioneers like the
``Father of Air Force Space,'' General ``Bennie'' Schriever and the
first Commander of AFSPC, General James Hartinger. The long line of
great leaders up through my predecessor, General Lance W. Lord, (Ret.),
have all contributed to the success of our Nation's military space
program today. Learning from our heritage, but with our eyes on the
horizon, we crafted a vision that recognizes the important
contributions of the past while also paving our path to future success.
Our vision is to become the:
Acknowledged Experts and Leaders in Fielding, Launching, and
Employing Space Power for the 21st Century
The space effects we provide to the combatant commanders are
second-to-none, due in large part to the bank of knowledge and spirit
of innovation that keeps AFSPC on the cusp of the technological bow
wave. Our Nation's and our allies' armed forces, our private citizens
and millions of people around the globe, benefit today from
capabilities provided by AFSPC. Every thing we do in this command is
focused on enabling the joint fight, to win the war we are in today,
and just as importantly, to ensure we are prepared to win decisively in
the future. Our active duty, Guard, Reserve, government service, and
contractor team are the best in their fields, and we want to leave no
doubt in anyone's mind: when you have a question about America's
military space and missile capabilities, the nearly 40,000
professionals of AFSPC hold the answer. To help make this vision a
reality, we have crafted four strategic priorities:
1. Preserve and Expand our Ability to Deliver Space Effects
to the Joint Fight
2. Provide Safe and Secure Strategic Deterrence
3. Develop, Field, and Sustain Dominant Space Capabilities on
Time and on Cost
4. Attract, Develop, and Retain People with the Expertise
Necessary to Meet the Challenges of the Future
We have our sights set on these priorities. They serve to guide our
focus in the way we operate today and to underpin the investments we
need to make for our future.
PRESERVE AND EXPAND OUR ABILITY TO DELIVER SPACE EFFECTS TO THE JOINT
FIGHT
To achieve our first priority, we must do two things. First, we
must preserve our ability to deliver space effects in today's fight.
This means we must properly organize our forces, train them for
success, and equip them with the tools necessary to protect our
asymmetric advantage in space. Second, we must expand the capabilities
we provide by always looking for ways to more efficiently operate our
current systems while investing in the systems we will need tomorrow.
Preserve our Advantage in Space
Preserving our advantage in space is a prerequisite for everything
else we do. To achieve this, we first require the ability to
effectively surveil the space domain with the goal of answering, in as
near to real-time as possible, the questions of ``who, what, when,
where, how, and why?'' that are so vitally important to the commander
responsible for operations in any domain. We refer to this as Space
Situational Awareness (SSA). Breaking this down further we arrive at
the key ingredients necessary to achieve the SSA we need. First, we
must establish the right organizational command construct. Second, it
is vital for us to maintain and field the correct mix of space
surveillance capabilities along with the ability to rapidly fuse,
analyze, and display the data we collect in a fashion that will inform
timely decisionmaking by our commanders. Next, we must be able to
effectively command and control our forces. Finally, our ability to
preserve our advantage in space will only succeed if we have assured
access to the domain through highly dependable and responsive launch
vehicles. In 2006, AFSPC made progress in all of these areas.
We solidified our support to United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) with their assignment of Major General Willie Shelton, our
14th Air Force Commander, as USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component
Commander for Space (JFCC-SPACE). That one organizational change,
coupled with the establishment of the Joint Space Operations Center
(JSpOC) at Vandenberg AFB, CA, aligned warfighter functional
responsibilities with Air Force space capabilities and expertise. This
is a good news story in the leveraging of Air Force people and assets
to lead in the joint space environment. Ultimately, this change
produced unity of command in delivering joint space capabilities for
the combatant commanders.
In the past year, this organizational construct was central to the
delivery of over 18,000 mission essential products to regional
combatant commanders supporting Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring
Freedom, and Noble Eagle. In the Central Command (CENTCOM) alone, in
the Combined Air and Space Operations Center in Southwest Asia, the
Director of Space Forces received direct support from Major General
Shelton's JSpOC and the airmen under his command operating the Defense
Support Program satellite constellation. Together, they evaluated more
than 2,100 infrared signatures in the CENTCOM AOR, enhancing
battlespace awareness and force protection efforts for our Nation's
deployed soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
Today, AFSPC's worldwide space tracking and surveillance network
provides positional data on over 16,000 space objects. Our expert team
of orbital analysts used this data for satellite collision avoidance
with space debris as well as with other satellites. This analysis, in
turn, helped safeguard over $50 billion in U.S. space assets which are
vital to our Armed Forces, as well as interagency, coalition partners
and the American economy. However, recent events like the Chinese ASAT
test, which added over 1,600 new pieces of debris to our previous count
of 14,000, only serve to highlight the need for us to further enhance
our ability to surveil the space domain.
Today, our surveillance, analysis and data-sharing capabilities do
not adequately support our future needs to rapidly identify and
understand the threats to our space systems. Given that limitation, we
are working hard to make the most of every dollar spent in this area to
optimize our surveillance function and give the Commander, USSTRATCOM,
a better understanding of our space operating picture. These efforts
include working in close cooperation with the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) to upgrade our early warning radars, examining alternatives for
funding upgrades to a vital Space Surveillance Network radar at Eglin
AFB, FL, and sustaining the Mid-course Space Experiment (MSX)
satellite, our sole space-based space surveillance (SBSS) system. On
the heels of MSX are the SBSS Block 10 (launching in fiscal year 2008)
and Block 20 satellites which will provide critical enhancements to our
need to surveil objects beyond Low Earth Orbit. Finally, we have begun
a clean sheet look at requirements for how we should best surveil the
space domain in the future.
The need for SSA increases exponentially as our joint forces become
more dependent on space. With our Nation's dependency on our space
capabilities, in the future it will be even more essential for us to
definitively identify the cause of any interruption in the delivery of
our space-provided or space-enabled capabilities. Just as importantly,
we must also be able to attribute who or what caused any interruption.
Meeting this requirement puts our SSA needs on par with the air, land,
and sea domains. In every one of these domains, our combatant
commanders can obtain a solid picture of the threat, allowing them to
produce, in a timely manner, a wide range of response actions. This is
even more critical in the space arena where the response time can be
significantly shorter for commanders to make decisions which will
impact the lives of thousands of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines. Furthermore, these threats to our space capabilities do not
just exist in the space domain. We are staying equally focused on the
other two critical elements of any space system; our ground stations
and the communications links between the satellite, the ground station
and the user. Without high fidelity and timely SSA, our national
leaders will not have the key information needed to determine the range
of available political, economic or military options to deter or
counter future threats. Providing the Joint Functional Component
Commander for Space (JFCC-SPACE) with the SSA he requires to
effectively plan, operate, and fight is our top concern.
To address this concern, we are driving towards several significant
milestones. In fiscal year 2008, we will create an Integrated SSA
program. Part of this effort entails creating a Space High Accuracy
Catalog and replacing our 1991 vintage Space Defense Operations
Computer with a net-centric, services-oriented architecture that will
provide the combatant commanders and national users with actionable
information on launches, satellite breakups, maneuvering objects and
reentries. Additionally, the Rapid Attack Identification and Reporting
System Block 20 program will better integrate and fuse space data
(space intelligence, surveillance and space environmental monitoring)
enabling JFCC-SPACE to better protect and defend critical space assets
and respond to new and emerging threats, whether hostile or
environmental. Each of these programs will help us meet our SSA needs.
While SSA is the foundation for all operations, Space Command and
Control (C2) is what links the JFCC-SPACE to the joint fight.
Commanders in every domain require a basic C2 capability over their
forces, and the same holds true in space. Effective Command and Control
allows us to deliver flexible, agile and responsive effects to the
battlespace, be it land, sea, or air. To accomplish this, we are
developing a suite of enhanced command and control tools to synchronize
space and air effects and improve support to joint/combined forces and
national partners. For example, we are working hard to develop robust
space C2 applications enabling the Joint Functional Component Commander
for Space to rapidly process and satisfy space support requests from
the regional combatant commanders. Major General Shelton and his team
are doing an outstanding job, but to reach their maximum capability
they simply must have state of the art equipment on-par with our other
air and space operations centers. The tools currently under development
will give the JFCC-SPACE a better understanding of the space
environment and permit continuous collaboration with joint, national
and coalition partners and make us more agile and responsive to the
complex environment in which our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
operate.
The final element of preserving our ability to deliver space
effects to the joint fight is safely and reliably delivering payloads
into orbit. The most critical portion of any spacecraft's life is
launch. Today, due to the hard work of our men and women of the Space
and Missile Systems Center, 14th Air Force, our two launch wings and a
second-to-none contractor team, we stand at 50 successful national
security payload launches in a row and have a 100 percent record of
success with our new Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) class of
vehicles (15 for 15 operational launches). In total, eight National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, seven Department of Defense
(DOD), one commercial, and six Space Test Program (STP) launches lifted
off from our east and west coast launch and test ranges in 2006. Our
most recent launch on 8 March 2007 successfully carried the STP-1
mission with six individual spacecraft on board. The impressive list of
firsts for this mission include: the first launch of an Air Force
payload on an Atlas V, the first Air Force mission with six unique
spacecraft, the first dedicated EELV mission for the STP and the first
Atlas V to carry multiple satellites to two distinctly different Low-
Earth Orbits. This highly successful STP mission carried satellites
from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, the U.S. Naval Academy, and the U.S. Air Force Academy. In
2007, we will continue this pattern of excellence, continuing to prove
nobody knows spacelift better than AFSPC.
As we work towards preserving our ability to deliver space effects
we also remain cognizant of the fact there is no downtime for us, as
our mission and training continue 24/7, 365 days a year. Each day we
maintain a laser-sharp focus on expanding our ability to deliver space
effects to our Armed Forces, Nation, allies, and coalition partners.
Expanding our Ability to Deliver Space Effects
Expanding our ability to deliver space effects to the joint fight
entails both sustaining and enhancing our on-orbit position, navigation
and timing; communications, environmental monitoring, and missile
warning constellations, as well as investing in new capabilities and
systems to increase our responsiveness to warfighter needs.
Our current on-orbit constellations are the best in the world,
including our flagship, the Global Positioning System (GPS). GPS
continues to perform as the world's premier space-based positioning,
navigation and timing system. GPS capabilities are integrated into
nearly all facets of U.S. military operations and give the American and
coalition warfighter an unparalleled advantage. GPS is integral to
numerous battlefield innovations, including the Small Diameter Bomb,
the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) and Joint Precision
Air Drop System. We have also delivered nearly 100,000 advanced
handheld GPS receivers to the field. US and coalition warfighters
navigating with GPS across trackless deserts and employing GPS-guided
munitions are testimony to the awesome effect GPS has on precision
attack. Additionally, the increased accuracy of GPS-guided munitions
has saved lives and reduced collateral damage.
GPS also plays a major role supporting day-to-day business
activities within our global commercial economy. Our satellites enable
accurate directions to any mapped location, safe and efficient air
travel, navigable oceans and waterways, as well as more efficient use
of maritime resources, emergency and rescue services and precise timing
data for communication systems, electrical power grids, and financial
networks. GPS has literally become a household name.
Efforts are well underway to sustain and modernize this global
space-based navigation system, to ensure we meet the future needs of
military and civilian users. We now have the first three of eight
Modernized (IIR-M) GPS satellites on-orbit, a significant step towards
offering new signals for military and civil users. First, the military
signal (M-code) with enhanced encryption, will be transmitted on two
distinct frequencies to improve anti-jam capabilities. Second, an
additional civil signal will provide improved accuracy for civil,
commercial, and scientific users. The next series of advanced GPS
satellites (IIF), scheduled to launch in 2008, will have an extended
design life of 12 years, faster processors with more memory, a new
civil signal on a third frequency (L5) and increased power to reduce
vulnerability to signal jamming. We are also making GPS easier to
operate and maintain, by upgrading the GPS ground station control
system from a mainframe system that is over 20 years old and becoming
cumbersome to operate and repair, to a distributed architecture.
We just released the Request for Proposal (RFP) on the next
generation GPS ground segment and look forward to releasing the GPS III
space segment RFP, bringing us an improved space and ground segment
intended to assure reliable and secure delivery of enhanced position,
navigation, and timing signals. The GPS III Block A satellites will
transmit a significantly higher-powered military signal. Other features
will be a new fourth civil signal (interoperable with Europe's Galileo
and Japan's Quasi-Zenith Satellite System). We are also developing next
generation military GPS user equipment that will take advantage of the
modernized military signal.
We have demonstrated time and time again that GPS is the world
standard for PNT. No other system comes close to delivering the proven
performance of the GPS constellation.
The demand for SATCOM continues to grow by leaps and bounds. Our
fully operational Milstar and Defense Satellite Communications System
(DSCS) constellations are the Combatant Commanders' workhorses. The
increased capabilities of the Command and Control-Consolidated ground
system are paying huge dividends. Engineering and contractor teams
continue developing innovative tactics, techniques and procedures for
maximizing bandwidth and increasing satellite life span.
Yet another capability available to the warfighter is the AFSPC-led
Global Broadcast System (GBS). Via fixed and mobile injection points we
provide worldwide, high-capacity, one-way transmission of classified
and unclassified high-speed multimedia communications and information
flow for on-the-move or garrisoned forces. GBS is used to transmit
everything from near real-time UAV sensor feeds to critical
intelligence data. One Army intelligence team providing support to
Coalition-Joint Task Force 76 used GBS to download between 80 and 120
images of Afghanistan every day. It is akin to our very own satellite
broadcast network and the reviews are phenomenal.
Clearly, the joint warfighter appreciates and depends on the
capabilities we provide from and through space.
Looking ahead, SATCOM will continue to be an area of focus for us.
In 2007, we will launch the first Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS)
satellite. We are excited about this launch because this one satellite
will have more bandwidth capacity than the entire DSCS constellation
(nine satellites) currently on orbit. Adding satellites 2 and 3, both
fully built and undergoing testing and integration, will further
improve warfighter SATCOM capability.
The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) SATCOMs System is on
schedule for launch in early 2008. Brigadier General Ellen
Pawlikowski's joint service team at the Space and Missile Systems
Center is completing the first satellite, with the second satellite
scheduled for testing in July 2007 and the third satellite experiencing
on-time progress as well.
Development of the Transformational SATCOMs System (TSAT) is a high
priority. Technology risk reduction efforts on the laser communications
and the next generation processor router are going well. As Lt. Gen.
Frank Klotz testified to last year, the TSAT constellation will enable
``communications on the move'' and will transform the Services' net-
centric architectures including the Army's Future Combat System, the
Navy's ForceNet, the Marine Corps' X-Net concept and the Air Force's
Global Information Grid initiative. TSAT is an integral part of our
Armed Force's future concept of military operations. Today, an 8
10 image takes 2 minutes to transmit over Milstar. With
TSAT, the same image will be transmitted in less than 1 second. A UAV
image, which takes up to 12 minutes to send via Milstar, will be sent
in less than 1 second with TSAT. We are working towards a System Design
Review in April 2007 and ultimately a space segment contract award at
the end of this year.
Despite this progress, Military SATCOM (MILSATCOM) is an area for
concern. We have reached the point in time where further schedule slips
potentially affect both protected communications on the battlefield and
the command and control of our strategic forces. It is critical for us
to successfully launch every satellite in the pipeline and to meet all
current program timelines. Any significant reduction in resources, an
AEHF or WGS launch failure or another slip to the TSAT program, could
create gaps in our MILSATCOM coverage--something our Combatant
Commanders cannot afford.
Another space capability entrusted to us is environmental
monitoring. We launched our newest weather satellite, DMSP-17, in
November 2006. DMSP-17 replaced a satellite that had been operational
since 1995. What is amazing about that old satellite is that it had a
design life of 3 years. Eleven years later it was still delivering
critical support to the joint fight. Our dedicated professionals
managed to extend the replaced satellite's lifespan by almost a decade!
This is a true testament to our AFSPC/contactor design, operations and
sustainment teams.
Many of our space systems have far-reaching capabilities that
provide information for strategic and tactical users simultaneously. A
legacy system from the Cold War, our Defense Support Program has shed
its singular role in the Strategic Deterrent mission to become a
critical ingredient in the combatant commanders' toolkit as a theater
asset. With our pending final DSP launch, this constellation has
exceeded all original expectations. This year we began a new era with
the launch and on-orbit operational testing of the first asset of the
next-generation of warning systems--the Space Based Infrared System
(SBIRS). To date, SBIRs testing has exceeded all expectations and we
are confident that the SBIRS constellation will be as revolutionary to
missile warning as GPS has been to PNT.
It has been more than 5 years since an Air Force satellite suffered
a major capability failure before reaching its intended design life.
Every system in our portfolio has exceeded its potential and provided
more robust utility to the Combatant Commanders through improved and
upgraded features as well as through innovations in the operation of
each constellation. However, new threats and new battlefield
requirements dictate our continued vigilance in preserving and
expanding our ability to deliver space effects to the joint fight both
today and in the future.
Along these lines, we are currently analyzing ways to develop space
systems to deliver the following capabilities: 1) could rapidly augment
current surveillance, reconnaissance, and communication platforms in
response to the needs of a combatant commander; 2) could rapidly
replace space assets disabled by attack or natural phenomenon, and 3)
could rapidly deploy systems to support our SSA needs. Dubbed
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), this concept is centered on the
rapid development, building, launch and activation of new and likely
smaller satellite systems.
We have begun to experiment with smaller satellites with the launch
of Tactical Satellite (TACSAT)-2 on 16 December 2006. Once testing is
complete, the spacecraft will be used in a series of joint
demonstrations collecting data to make a recommendation of military
utility. TACSAT-2 will participate in Exercises Talisman Saber 07,
Empire Challenge 07, Valiant Shield, and Ulchi Focus Lens 07. TACSAT-2
along with TACSAT-1, 3, and 4 will allow us to answer key questions on
what capabilities we should focus on in the future to meet
augmentation, replenishment or surveillance needs. Ultimately, any ORS
system that requires the launch of a new satellite will require
leadership of the integrated effort, from the booster, to the bus, to
the payload, to C2 and data delivery architectures. The Air Force and
AFSPC are uniquely populated with the expertise across these
disciplines to develop and field these capabilities.
Providing leadership over these programs is a key responsibility of
AFSPC and we are pleased to have the opportunity to currently lead
vital aspects of ORS to include requirements validation, TACSAT
Military Utility Assessments and ORS Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)
efforts. The planned standup of the ORS Office at Kirtland AFB, NM, is
a giant step forward in supporting future operational satellite
development and procurement for this emerging mission area. The
connection with our Space Development and Test Wing is also critical in
the early years of the program to capitalize on best practices in
emerging technologies.
The Commander, USSTRATCOM has identified a need to strike promptly
and precisely against global targets using conventional kinetic
effects. To this end, we are advancing a technology demonstration
program to evolve, mature, and integrate critical technologies for a
continental United States (CONUS)-based Conventional Strike Missile
capability. This vision for a mid-term (fiscal years 2014/2015)
capability will address the Nation's prompt conventional global strike
requirement. To ensure there is no misinterpretation of intent, a
multi-faceted package of mitigating measures will be added to the
operational concept. Elements of this package could include: Coastal
basing which is geographically separate from ICBM bases; associated on-
site inspections/verification; unique and distinguishable trajectories
and flight paths; avoiding overflight of nations of concern; and
strategic dialogue that provides a window into U.S. thinking.
Additionally, we are conducting an AoA to examine potential prompt
global strike capabilities for the long-term (fiscal year 2020 and
beyond).
PROVIDE SAFE AND SECURE STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
Of all the missions with which we are entrusted, Strategic
Deterrence has the least margin for error. Thankfully, this Nation has
the men and women of 20th Air Force and the leadership of Major General
Tom Deppe to rely on.
Providing safe and secure strategic deterrence depends on the
modernization of our current force and the infrastructure which
supports it. To this end we have embarked on an aggressive Minuteman
III modernization program. These efforts encompass modernizing every
stage of the missile, the launch silos, and the command and control
centers to meet our deterrence mission beyond 2025. Additionally, we
remain actively engaged in efforts to replace an aging, but vital, UH-
1N helicopter fleet to support ICBM security requirements.
MM III Modernization
Our Air Force team is modernizing the Minuteman III missile from
nose to tail. The first Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle modification
kit was installed in October 2006 enabling use of the MK 21 reentry
vehicle from the deactivated Peacekeeper missile on our Minuteman III
missiles. More importantly, this modern warhead provides USSTRATCOM
planners with increased targeting flexibility and enhanced safety.
In the year ahead, we will continue modernization of all of our
Minuteman III missiles with a sustainable schedule calling for
Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP) upgrades for 96 missiles. The PRP
upgrade replaces aging motors and propellant as well as environmentally
unsafe materials and components. To date the program has completed 52
percent of its production run with 312 deployed in the field. In 2007,
73 Minuteman IIIs will complete Guidance Replacement Program upgrades
which will replace some of the 1960s generation electronics in the
guidance system, further extending the missile's operational life. This
program has completed 69 percent of its production run and 442 are
deployed in the field. Additionally, we have fielded more than 65
Propulsion System Rocket Engine (PSRE) upgrades across the fleet,
accounting for 13 percent of the total production run. These PSRE
upgrades replace components originally produced in the 1970s with a 10-
year design life. Finally, we are excited about the improvements built
into the future Reliable Replacement Warhead. This replacement warhead
will make use of the best security technology available and allow for a
credible nuclear deterrent with the smallest nuclear weapons stockpile
needed for national security purposes. While upgrades to the missile/
warheads are critical, it is only one piece in a larger system.
Modernization of Launch Facilities
At our launch silos we remain focused squarely on improving
security. Our ICBM Security Modernization Program contains three
synergistic elements. First, concrete enhancements have been completed
at all but one of our ICBM squadrons, ensuring our Nation's nuclear
arsenal is safe and secure. The second security upgrade (the fast-
rising B-plug) enables security forces to rapidly close an open missile
silo in the case of an impending security breech. We began the first
installation of this technology at Minot AFB, ND, in February. Finally,
20 AF is capitalizing on technology by deploying a Remote Visual
Assessment (RVA) capability to enhance physical security. RVA employs a
remote video camera to provide situational awareness at unmanned launch
silos, enabling our security forces to tailor and accelerate response
force actions to deny unauthorized access. In addition, this upgrade
allows us to more efficiently use our most precious but limited
resource, our airmen.
Building on Previous Accomplishments
In addition to the upgrades in progress, we are proud to have
completed (last year) the 4-year deployment of the $114 million Rapid
Execution and Combat Targeting Service Life Extension Program, the
heart of our ICBM command and control element. This command and control
upgrade provides increased responsiveness and gives planners additional
flexibility to meet rapidly changing world situations and evolving
mission requirements. When combined with the previously completed
Minuteman Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network
modernization of our communications links, we have achieved a
tremendous leap forward in technology and operational C2 throughout
20th Air Force.
Equally impressive is the work we have accomplished, in partnership
with the Wyoming National Guard, at the Nuclear and Space Security
Tactics Training Center at Camp Guernsey, WY. Not only are we providing
our security force warriors, maintainers and operators a much needed
place to exercise their combat skills but we are also preparing airmen
for deployment with our Air Expeditionary Forces.
When we factor in all the upgrades to the Minuteman III weapon
system we will have effectively reset the force to continue to provide
unmatched deterrence through the third decade of the 21st century.
UH-1N Helicopter Replacement
Even with of all these upgrades, we can not lose sight of one final
and critical piece of the ICBM puzzle, our UH-1N helicopter fleet. This
aircraft is our fastest and only way of rapidly responding to potential
missile field security breeches. The Air Force is examining
alternatives for replacement helicopters and we are working within the
budget process to secure replacements. As we replace equipment that is
war-battered from overseas deployments, it is important to recognize
that our aged UH-1N fleet is flying as hard as ever, right here within
our own borders.
DEVELOP, FIELD, AND SUSTAIN DOMINANT SPACE CAPABILITIES ON TIME AND ON
COST
In the last year, we made great strides in acquisition and ushered
in a new era with the opening of the Space and Missile Systems Center's
Schriever Space Complex. Under the leadership of Lieutenant General
Mike Hamel, we continue to make progress in developing, fielding and
sustaining dominant space capabilities on time and on cost. Through a
dynamic acquisition strategy, the sustainment of current systems, and
the development of future dominant space capabilities AFSPC will
achieve our goal of becoming the acquisition model for DOD.
Acquisition Strategy
The cornerstone of our acquisition strategy lies in our ``back to
basics'' approach to systems development, acquisition and sustainment.
We understand just how important space capabilities are to the
warfighter and we know the acquisition recipe that achieves results.
Our comprehensive plan to get ``back to basics'' is already showing
results in putting programs back on track and leading to a new
generation of transformation and innovation based on solid systems
engineering.
We continue our commitment to risk mitigation across the entire
space portfolio. As Dr. Sega has outlined, one of the key ingredients
is our ``walk before you run'' strategy. Past acquisition failures can
be traced to over-optimistic estimates of the maturity of key
technologies and misunderstanding the challenges associated with system
complexity. Our block development approach changes that, enabling us to
gradually introduce new technology as it matures.
Holding our leaders accountable is the key to the future success of
this strategy. We are entrusting our top acquisition leaders with the
authority they deserve but, at the same time, demanding results. We cut
down functional stovepipes and are horizontally integrating key
processes across programs by better reorganizing functions like
engineering, program management, finance, logistics, developmental
planning, and contracting. We are excited about the year ahead, as we
continue ``turning the corner'' in space acquisition. We have always
developed, fielded and sustained dominant space capabilities and we are
confident we will go beyond that by producing tomorrow's space
capabilities on time and on cost.
Develop, Field, and Sustain Dominant Space Capabilities
With our strategy in place we turn our attention to developing,
fielding and sustaining dominant space capabilities. Our new and
upgraded systems have already begun delivering transformational
results. The capabilities we enable for the combatant commanders will
only increase as these systems gain traction and momentum. Later this
year, we expect to begin payload assembly, integration and testing on
the first SBSS sensor. Also vital to the joint warfighter, our AEHF
satellite program is back on track to deliver positive results in the
near future. As previously stated, the first WGS will lift off this
year, providing an exponential leap in bandwidth availability. Meeting
these, as well as all of our program commitments, will help ensure the
asymmetric advantage of space is available to future generations of
joint warfighters.
One of these absolutely critical programs is SBIRS. With the launch
of the SBIRS HEO-1 payload, we demonstrated the SBIRS program is on the
path to success. Not only is HEO-1 on-orbit, but as stated earlier, its
sensor is exceeding performance specifications and providing truly
revolutionary results. This is good news for the upcoming SBIRS GEO
satellite, which shares common sensors. The first GEO satellite is
undergoing integration testing for its launch in 2008. As we close out
a proud chapter in our history with the last DSP launch, we will open a
new chapter with the delivery of the first SBIRS geosynchronous payload
(GEO-1) for integration with its space vehicle this year.
Our GPS constellation remains healthy with 30 satellites on-orbit,
but increased dependence on this system requires us to push ahead with
developing and fielding improvements. In 2007, we project the
completion of thermal vacuum testing on the newest block of satellite,
the GPS IIF. Again, this advanced satellite will provide tremendous
advances in our PNT capability, making GPS more jam-resistant on the
battlefield while delivering increased accuracy for civil customers.
As was previously mentioned, in 2006 we launched a Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program weather satellite. After a picture-
perfect launch, the space vehicle was checked out and placed into
operational service in record time, another true success story in
developing, fielding, and sustaining dominant space capabilities.
While we sustain and modernize our on-orbit assets, we also remain
committed to updating an aging infrastructure. The EELV's unprecedented
record of initial successes literally translates into millions of
dollars in savings. We continue to aim for 100 percent mission success
with the new United Launch Alliance (ULA) initiative while implementing
the ``Buy 3'' contracts. Recently, my vice commander, Lieutenant
General Frank Klotz and I had the opportunity to visit the ULA plant in
Decatur, AL, and were both impressed with the facility and the ULA
team.
Another aging piece of infrastructure, the Air Force Satellite
Control Network (AFSCN), had its last major modernization in the late
1980s with the installation of 286 computers. The current system is
heavily impacted by obsolete, vanishing parts and reduced numbers of
vendors. Currently, AFSPC is undergoing a cost-effective modernization
of the AFSCN legacy system with off-the-shelf control and status
equipment and new antennas that allow a more integrated and
interoperable satellite network to support U.S. Government satellite
operations.
The AFSPC launch and test ranges are modernizing infrastructure to
upgrade radar, telemetry and data systems for reliable and responsive
access to space through our Range Standardization and Automation
Program. We are taking steps toward space-based range through the use
of GPS to track boosters and efforts to explore future flight
termination and data relay technologies.
We are also partnering with the MDA to upgrade and field missile
defense capabilities and enhance the defense of our homeland and our
allies against ballistic missile threats. In 2007, we will enhance
capabilities at two Upgraded Early Warning Radar sites: first at Royal
Air Force Fylingdales, United Kingdom, followed by Beale Air Force
Base, California. The next upgrade is in coordination for Thule Air
Base, Greenland, with an anticipated completion in fiscal year 2010.
SBIRS has already established a fully-integrated Missile Defense
capability and continues to improve burn-out tracking and projected
impact prediction performance. Our efforts to achieve these
capabilities are conducted on a non-impact basis to our primary mission
of strategic missile warning supporting our Nuclear Command and Control
System as directed in National Security Presidential Directive0928.
Additionally, we are providing significant support to many MDA flight
tests and the necessary security for the operational ground-based
interceptors at Vandenberg AFB, CA.
We have shown we can get ``back to basics'' with our space
acquisition programs, and in the near future we will be providing
incredible new capabilities that will accompany every single soldier,
sailor, airman, or marine into battle. We have a tremendous
responsibility to support our warfighters, and it's through the amazing
people of AFSPC that I know we will succeed.
ATTRACT, DEVELOP, AND RETAIN PEOPLE WITH THE EXPERTISE NECESSARY TO
MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE FUTURE
Our fourth and final strategic priority is to attract, develop, and
retain people with the expertise necessary to meet the challenges of
the future. Our Air Force Chief of Staff recognized this when he made
the development of world-class professionals one of his top priorities.
One of our greatest future challenges is recruiting people equipped
with the right skills to succeed in a much more dynamic and
technologically challenging environment. Accordingly, we have placed
increased emphasis on sustaining ongoing force development and
voluntary off-duty degree programs at each of our bases to facilitate
career-long education opportunities. In 2006, using AF tuition
assistance, airmen in AFSPC completed 22,000 college-level enrollments,
earning 66,000 advanced education credits, resulting in 1049 job
enhancing degrees (associates to masters). Reinvesting in our human
capital like this runs in parallel with recapitalization of our
infrastructure. In the upcoming year, we will also increase the focus
on recruiting cadets from the Air Force Academy and the Nation's other
top colleges and universities into space-related career fields within
the Air Force.
Our requirement for a highly educated and technical workforce
places additional demands on our professional development efforts. We
must strengthen the technical foundation of our people, and match those
with technical degrees against specific job requirements. The National
Security Space Institute addressed this demand by expanding education
and training opportunities, further cementing itself as the go-to place
for space education. In the past 18 months, we've introduced the Space
Integration Course (Space 300), offering it twelve times in fiscal year
2007. We also offered 19 Space Application (Space 200) Courses, and
continue to meet expanding needs by developing a Distance Learning
version of our Space 200 curriculum which will reach a broader group of
students including our traditional reservists. In addition, two Naval
Operations (NAVOPs) Advanced Courses and the first-ever Missile Warning
and Defense Advanced Course were taught. In anticipation of modern
warfighter demands, we are developing a SATCOM Advanced Course which
will have its initial offerings within 12 months. We are poised to
continue to offer NAVOPS and SATCOM Advanced Courses and to answer
requests for a Space Superiority Advanced Course and a Rendezvous/
Proximity Operations course as funds are made available. The surging
demand for these courses has been remarkable, to include interest from
many of our allies. Through all of these efforts we already see the
benefit of our education programs with the outstanding job our airmen
are doing both from CONUS and in theater.
One airman who has taken full advantage of the many educational
opportunities is Major Toby Doran, a graduate of Space 100, the USAF
Space Weapons Instructor Course and the Air Force Institute of
technology (degree in space operations). In 2006, Major Doran deployed
from AFSPC (as part of a Joint Space Support Team, Camp Fallujah, Iraq)
and helped identify a required modification in the Army's GMLRS weapon
system. The problem was the GLMRS system used old GPS data under
certain conditions. Major Doran ascertained that if stale ephemeris
data was passed to a rocket prior to launch, it could cause an error in
the rocket's impact point. Major Doran, in coordination with our GPS
Operations Center (GPSOC) and Director of Space Forces, engineered
procedures to ensure soldiers employing GLMRS in Iraq and Afghanistan
received immediate notification of GPS outages from the JSpOC and
GPSOC. This is just one example of many where AFSPC airmen used their
education, technical training and operational experience to take
responsibility for the combat effects we provide through space.
To maintain our momentum, we began an extensive effort to make it
easier to earn advanced technical degrees. At our ICBM Launch Control
Centers, we have fielded something we call Netlink. For the first time
ever, our missile combat crews are able to access the internet and
complete distance learning courses while on-alert, underground. We also
developed a pilot, five-course academic certificate program with the
Space Education Consortium through the University of Colorado at
Colorado Springs to further increase the technical knowledge of our
space professionals. This consortium is comprised of 10 universities
and 2 institutes throughout the United States, including an
international member in Strasbourg, France. In fact, the first class of
the certificate program, Systems Engineering, met in January 2007 with
20 AFSPC airmen (officers and enlisted) providing glowing feedback
about the program. Most of the course work is completed via distance
learning, and the members of this initial cadre will complete a space
certificate program they can apply to a Master's degree in:
Space Operations (Master of Engineering),
Systems Engineering (Master of Engineering),
Engineering Management (Master of Engineering), and
Business Administration (with space emphasis).
With your support, we can expand this pilot program to make it
available to all of our airmen. The Air Force Institute of Technology
and Naval Postgraduate School have also developed dynamic new
certificate and degree programs aimed at the development of our airmen.
We are excited about these programs, and the additional opportunities
they provide for building the next generation of space leaders.
Ultimately, our young men and women will hold the keys to the future
success of our Nation's ``invisible force.'' My promise in the year
ahead is to further codify our space professional development efforts
and produce a more robust and challenging program for our Nation's
space professionals. In addition, we will continue to work across
service boundaries and with the National Reconnaissance Office to get
the right person with the right expertise in the right position to
lead. We know that ultimately our most important job is to grow the
future air and space leaders who will step into our shoes and make the
next 25 years even better than the last.
CONCLUSION
This year our Air Force celebrates its 60th anniversary and AFSPC
turns 25 years old. The force we built over the last 25 years is truly
remarkable and the investments we made together are paying off on the
battlefield. However, success in the next 25 years will require the
same level of commitment. There is no doubt in our minds that our
ability to operate in space is critical to our Nation, and so we must
improve our investment in areas like SSA and C2.
Every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine benefits from the
capabilities provided by our space forces. Recapitalizing our space
systems will ensure we have even better capabilities for our forces in
the future. While you cannot see or touch many of our space
capabilities, the combatant commanders know they are there and rely
heavily upon them. The effects we deliver via the space domain will no
doubt be an integral part of every future military operation. The men
and women of AFSPC are your ``go to'' experts for space, and with
Congress' support, we will deliver what this Nation needs to ensure the
asymmetric advantage our space forces bring to the fight today will be
even more dominant in the future.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I sincerely
apologize for being tied up after that vote we just finished.
First I'd like to thank this distinguished panel. You
represent leadership in some of the most complex,
technologically challenging and important parts of our defense
establishment, and we appreciate that.
The Air Force has been faced with the difficult challenge
of modernizing military space systems in virtually every
mission area. Strategic missile warning, assured
communications, navigation, and intelligence and surveillance.
We've explored in this subcommittee previously that many of
these programs have suffered substantial problems with regard
to cost, schedule, and technical performance.
But, thanks to a new Air Force leadership, practices that
you all have worked on, I believe we may be turning the corner
on some of those worst problems. I think progress has been made
and I'd like to inquire a little bit more about it, but my hope
is that the new back-to-basics approach in conjunction with new
emphasis on ORS, will expedite delivery of capabilities to the
warfighter in a cost-effective manner.
Our budget, the $8.1 billion budget request for space
modernization in fiscal year 2008, is up from the fiscal year
2007 appropriated amount of $6.7 billion, but it falls $400
million short of what the Air Force had planned to spend, so we
need to look at those expenditures and whether or not we're
meeting the needs that are out there.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to say a few
words and I'll look forward to hearing from the panel.
[The prepared statement by Senator Sessions follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
Mr. Chairman, I would like to welcome today's witnesses and thank
them, and their organizations, for their hard work and contributions to
our Nation's security. While the recent anti-satellite test conducted
by China has raised the visibility of space programs, we both realize
that the Department of Defense has been working hard to ensure that our
space capabilities are second to none.
The Air Force has been faced with the difficult challenge of
modernizing military space systems in virtually every mission area:
strategic missile warning. assured communications, navigation, and
intelligence and surveillance. For reasons that this subcommittee has
explored previously, many of these modernization programs have suffered
substantial problems with regard to cost, schedule, and technical
performance.
Thanks to new Air Force Space leadership and practices, I believe
we may be turning the corner on the worst of these problems. It is my
hope that the new ``back to basics'' approach, in conjunction with the
new emphasis on Operationally Responsive Space, will expedite delivery
of capabilities to the warfighter in a cost-effective manner.
Mr. Chairman, there is something that troubles me. While the
Department of Defense and the Air Force clearly acknowledge the
critical importance of space programs as an enabler for virtually every
defense mission area, it has nevertheless reduced the planned growth in
space funding that was presented to Congress last year.
Although the $8.1 billion request for space modernization in fiscal
year 2008 is up from the fiscal year 2007 appropriated amount of $6.7
billion, the request falls $400 million short of what the Air Force
planned to spend in fiscal year 2008.
As we will explore during the course of this hearing, this funding
shortfall has serious implications for several key modernization
programs in the area of space communications and space control.
In light of recent Chinese space activities, and the growing
importance of space for United States national security, I think we
need to look carefully at whether the budget request for space
modernization, which is 21 percent of total Air Force modernization, is
adequate.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and look forward to hearing from the
witnesses.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
General?
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF, COMMANDER,
JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE, UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, it's a pleasure for me to be here with you today.
I wear two hats. I'm the 14th Air Force Commander, but I'm
also Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) Joint Functional Component
Commander for Space. It's in that latter role that I appear
before you today. I look forward to your questions. So, I'll be
looking at the operational perspective of STRATCOM.
[The prepared statement of General Shelton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. William L. Shelton, USAF
Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and members of the subcommittee:
I am honored to be here today alongside distinguished members of the
panel: Under Secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Ron Sega; General Kevin
Chilton, Commander of Air Force Space Command; Vice Admiral James
McArthur, Jr., Commander of Naval Network Warfare Command; and Cristina
Chaplain, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government
Accountability Office. This is my first opportunity to appear before
you as United States Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) Commander of the
Joint Functional Component Command for Space (CDR JFCC SPACE), and it's
a pleasure to be able to address you on our space posture.
I know this subcommittee is fully aware of the growing importance
of space capabilities to our national security, as well as to our
overall economic prosperity. Today, I will provide you an update on our
efforts to efficiently and effectively employ our vital space
capabilities, highlighting our top priorities, and identifying the
challenges we face in fulfilling both national and combatant commander
objectives.
EMPLOYMENT OF SPACE CAPABILITIES
In July 2006, General Cartwright, the Commander of USSTRATCOM, in
coordination with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, directed the
creation of JFCC SPACE, and assigned the Commander, 14th Air Force, the
dual role of CDR JFCC SPACE. While I serve in both roles, it's in the
CDR JFCC SPACE position that I am designated as the single point of
contact for military space operational matters. Additionally, JFCC
SPACE is responsible for providing tailored, responsive, local, and
global space effects to supported combatant commanders. My USSTRATCOM-
delegated authorities include Global Space Coordinating Authority,
which empowers me to be the primary interface with supported commanders
for operational-level planning and execution of space forces in support
of combatant commander objectives. CDR JFCC SPACE is also assigned
Operational Control and Tactical Control authorities for designated,
worldwide space operations and missile warning forces. Finally, JFCC
SPACE supports the Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) by providing the missile warning and space surveillance
capabilities necessary to fulfill the U.S. commitment to the NORAD
Agreement. By establishing the CDR JFCC SPACE, USSTRATCOM provides a
single commander, with a global perspective, to enhance functional
integration of space capabilities for the joint warfighter and the
Nation.
Just in the last year, two significant world events have galvanized
our thinking by highlighting both the importance and the potential
fragility of our Nation's space capabilities. The first event occurred
during our initial month of operation--the July 2006 North Korean
launch of a Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile. The second event was the
January 2007 Chinese test of a hit-to-kill anti-satellite (ASAT)
capability. Interesting enough, this test occurred 6 years to the day
after the publication of the 2001 Space Commission Report, which had
warned of growing threats to our space capabilities. In both events,
JFCC SPACE coordinated pre-launch indications and warning campaigns,
then provided space-based tracking of the boosters during flight, which
helped shape the national response. We worked closely with our
USSTRATCOM global mission partners and various agencies to ensure space
capabilities were available to support potential contingencies and
courses of action. For the ASAT test, we tracked the resultant debris,
and we continue to assess the additional risk posed by the debris to
our satellites and the International Space Station. These events
foreshadow a future that appears increasingly challenging. Our near-
term priorities, which include increasing our Space Situational
Awareness (SSA) capabilities and strengthening and formalizing
departmental and interagency relationships, are certainly informed by
our experience from these two events.
One of our most important lessons learned was that our current
systems processing such events are not sufficiently dynamic.
Outstanding people overcame these limitations by arranging manual data
and voice workarounds, but clearly, this should not be how we conduct
space command and control operations in the future.
Strengthening unity of command and unity of effort is critical in
executing timely actions to preserve space effects for the Nation.
Organizationally, we are taking steps to gain better access to limited
resources. Among these include dual-hatting the Deputy Commander of
JFCC SPACE (DCDR JFCC SPACE) with the National Reconnaissance Office's
Deputy Director for Mission Support (NRO/DDMS). This designation will
help strengthen the bonds between NRO space operations and Department
of Defense (DOD) space operations. We are constantly searching for
opportunities to synergize efforts and leverage existing resources in
the employment of space capabilities. Unity of effort in tactics,
techniques, and procedures, underpinned by a net-centric system
designed to provide both enhanced SSA and operational-level command and
control, will strengthen JFCC SPACE operations.
To ensure USSTRATCOM, through JFCC SPACE, can deliver persistent
space effects in support of both national and combatant commander
objectives, we rely on the Services, under the able coordination and
direction of the DOD Executive Agent for Space, Dr. Sega, to acquire
the space systems we need to maintain our tremendous advantage in
space. I thank Dr. Sega for his leadership in our Nation's space
capability development. Through his efforts, and those of our talented
sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines, we are able to enhance the
quality of current space effects and ensure continuity of services in
our position, navigation, and timing (PNT), missile warning, satellite
communications, and environmental monitoring capabilities.
CHALLENGES
Our Nation's growing dependence on space-based capabilities creates
a corresponding potential vulnerability. Therefore, preserving our
space-based capabilities against intentional and unintentional events
will be a growing challenge as more entities gain access to the space
domain.
We currently track over 16,000 artificial objects in space, to
include everything from active satellites to launch-related debris.
Although this is certainly a large number of objects, there are many
more that are too small for our space surveillance sensors to track. As
the number of objects increases, so does the potential for a
catastrophic collision in space. The addition of over 1,600 pieces of
trackable debris from the Chinese ASAT test further complicates the
problem.
Along with the growing debris population, there are many other
current and developing threats to our space capabilities. To fully
understand the potential threat to national assets, DOD payloads,
commercial space satellites, and manned space systems, we depend on
both ground- and space-based space surveillance sensors.
Every commander strives for the best situational awareness possible
before he/she engages in operational activity. For space operations,
this imperative is especially true, given our investment in space, our
dependence on space capability, and the difficulty of replacing assets
following an unexpected loss. As the threats to our space assets grow,
our ability to provide robust SSA must grow commensurately. We will
become increasingly dependent; on the availability of a persistent,
predictive, dynamic SSA capability. The success of our space operations
will hinge on a decisionmaker's ability to quickly answer the ``who,
what, when, where, how, and why'' questions, as he/she determines a
course of action to support our national security objectives. We must
have thorough, decision-quality, knowledge of all constituent parts of
SSA: the space environment conditions, the space debris situation, the
status of blue forces, and the intelligence picture, which includes
enhanced information on potential adversary space capabilities and
intent.
An increasingly threatened, dynamic environment will drive us to
highly automated, net-centric capabilities. Machine-to-machine
interfaces will enhance decisionmakers' ability to quickly and
accurately assess emerging space capabilities and threats. The net-
centric data sharing that will occur will allow much easier integration
of disparate data, enhancing the overall situational awareness of the
warfighter. I thank General Chilton for his strong leadership and
commitment to making SSA a top priority within Air Force Space Command.
He is driving hard toward vastly improved SSA to provide that crucial
underpinning for JFCC SPACE operations.
CONCLUSION
Space operations are changing rapidly. Dynamically taskable
satellites, increasing threats to the space environment, and the
dependence on space, are all key factors that drive our decisions on
the future of operational command and control in JFCC SPACE. It's an
exciting time to be in the space business, and I am privileged to
command the men and women who employ these great space capabilities for
our Nation. I thank you for your time and attention, and for your
assistance in preserving the vital space capabilities for our national
security.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral?
STATEMENT OF VADM JAMES D. McARTHUR, JR., USN, COMMANDER, NAVAL
NETWORK WARFARE COMMAND
Admiral McArthur. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, I'm
Vice Admiral Jim McArthur from Naval Network Warfare Command.
Our responsibilities are to provide C4 systems, information
operations, and space affects to Navy component commanders
arrayed globally. We're also a functional component of U.S.
STRATCOM. The Navy's had a long history in space, both as a
consumer and an operator. We feel like maritime security,
maritime domain awareness, and force net will continue to rely
on that.
In fact, the interdependency will grow enormously. I look
forward to discussing those interdependencies with you. We need
assured and responsive space, space effects, and fortunately
those are being provided today with the component of U.S.
STRATCOM.
It's an honor to appear before you, and I look forward to
the questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral McArthur follows:]
Prepared Statement by VADM James D. McArthur, Jr., USN
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, as the
Commander of Naval Network Warfare Command, I am honored to appear
before you today to address Navy space activities. Naval Network
Warfare Command is responsible for providing operational network,
information operations, and space effects, as a supporting commander to
Navy component and joint commanders.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) pointed out our two unique Navy
attributes--global reach and persistent presence--during his 23 March
2007 fiscal year 2008 posture hearing. This means we as a Navy must be
prepared to conduct major combat operations, address asymmetric
threats, as well as provide maritime security in a variety of ways in
an ever changing world. The value that the Navy brings in terms of
regional security, global stability, and anti-access capabilities is
undeniable. All of this requires space capabilities that are rapid,
dynamic and assured. Space can be viewed as a classic inter-dependency;
Naval component commanders depend on U.S. Strategic Command to provide
Department of Defense (DOD) and national space effects, essential for
successful naval operations. I will share with you what we are doing as
part of the joint space team.
SPACE SUPPORT TO THE NAVY WARFIGHTER
Warfare today and in the future will be about speed and having
superiority in the information domain--acting quickly in the global
commons of the seas, space, and cyberspace before an adversary
saturates or penetrates our defenses. It will also be about
persistence--having the duration and vantage point to find threats and
counter them with precision. Space capabilities are a critical enabler
for maritime operations. They provide the foundation through which data
is rapidly collected, fused, correlated and disseminated to build
Maritime Domain Awareness and support the National Strategy for
Maritime Security. In general, naval warfighters need global coverage,
wide-area active and passive surveillance capabilities, robust jam-
resistant communications, and position, navigation and timing
information for core Navy warfighting competencies, deterrence
missions, and stability operations.
NAVAL SPACE CAMPAIGN PLAN
The Naval Space Campaign Plan is my blueprint for operationalizing
space support to the maritime warfighter. As we implement and execute
the plan, we are breaking new ground in the Fleet's operational
employment of space effects. NETWARCOM's NetOps, IO, and Space Center
(NIOSC) functions as a true reachback staff element for deployed Strike
Groups and forward Maritime Headquarters. The space planners in the
NIOSC broker maritime operational and exercise space needs with the
Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base and assist
the theater Space Coordinating Authorities as they develop the space
support requests for their AORs. This insures that the desired DOD and
national technical space effects are delivered in support of fleet
activities. Concurrently, NETWARCOM is formalizing the fleet's training
and exercise play. By advancing the fleet's space systems knowledge
through regular staff training sessions and standardizing the way the
fleet trains during FRTP to fight in an environment with mature threats
to our space systems, we are ensuring our strike groups and staffs are
equipped to fully leverage and integrate joint and national space
capabilities and operate against a regional space peer.
THE NAVY'S INVESTMENT
The Navy's space investment portfolio reflects our partnership with
the Department of Defense's Executive Agent for Space and the rest of
the National Security Space community--as well as our maritime
responsibilities. We recognize our reliance on the Air Force and
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to acquire most of the major space
platforms. The Navy's Space Cadre works closely with them to
collaborate on meeting maritime requirements. We also take the lead in
tackling maritime challenges through our participation in the science
and technology (S&T)/research and development (R&D) process. Our
Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities office works closely
with the NRO to develop new technologies and techniques to collect and
exploit against emerging naval threats, including developing
operationally responsive payloads.
In addition to our major space segment responsibility for
narrowband satellite communications (SATCOM), which I will talk about
more specifically in a moment, my organization is leading change in two
key areas that will make our Navy more capable of fully leveraging
space capabilities. First, we are using a combination of military and
commercial satellite capabilities to increase available bandwidth. In
conjunction with this effort, we are investing in the dynamic
management of existing bandwidth (i.e., Automated Digital Network
System, new modems, etc). Together, these strategies will be used to
deliver our warfighting requirements, enabling the Naval Operating
Concept vision of ``distributed network operations.'' These increased
capabilities will further enhance education and training opportunities
available at sea and support other quality of service aspects expected
by the Millennium Generation. Second, we are breaking the link between
software and hardware by moving to an open architecture approach.
Through strong governance and fiscal discipline, we are developing a
Service Oriented Architecture to enable lower cost upgrades, reduce
equipment costs, and rapidly insert new technology. Our goal is to
ensure the capacity and flexibility to rapidly integrate space, as well
as capabilities from other platforms, into our architecture.
MOBILE USER OBJECTIVE SYSTEM
The Navy's major space segment responsibility to the joint
community is the narrowband satellite communications constellation.
Today it consists of Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-on (UFO) and
Fleet Satellites (FLTSATs) which will begin to be replaced by the
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) in 2010. MUOS will provide
communications-on-the-move, through double canopy foliage and in urban
environments to small antennas used by disadvantaged users (handhelds,
aircraft, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), remote sensors) in
stressed environments (foliage, urban environment, high sea state).
MUOS is the common denominator for command and control providing the
capability to communicate from tactical to theater levels, to allies
and coalition partners, and between defense and nondefense agencies.
MUOS will allow a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to
regional engagement, providing the capability to synchronize efforts
with other Services, agencies, and allied nations.
MUOS is critical to satisfying the demand for tactical satellite
communications. During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom,
UFO, FLTSAT, and LEASAT 5 were only able to support 80 percent of the
narrowband tactical UHF satellite communication requirements.
Additionally, in the 2010 timeframe, LEASAT 5 will reach its end of
service life, and the UFO constellation, based on new analysis after
the premature UFO 9 failure, is expected to reach an unacceptable level
of availability in May 2008. We have a mitigation plan to minimize the
operational impact of a potential gap in capability (seven operational
satellites vice the required eight) before MUOS is operational. It
includes the use of commercial bandwidth and the dynamic management of
existing bandwidth as mentioned previously. Today, UFO supports
approximately 500 simultaneous accesses worldwide. Based on evolving
future war fighting concepts in support of the Defense Planning
Guidance, UHF SATCOM access requirements are expected to grow by at
least a factor of four and MUOS, as designed, will be able to support
that requirement.
Since last year the MUOS program successfully completed the Key
Decision Point (C) milestone and the Critical Design Review phase. The
program is currently on schedule and within budget to meet an On-orbit
Capability in 2010 and is fully funded in the President's 2008 Budget
to meet all threshold requirements. The MUOS program is currently
preparing for the October 2007 Build Decision (for satellites 1 and 2).
MUOS will bring a 4-fold increase in the number of accesses (1997 vice
500) and a 20-fold increase in throughput (39.2 Mbps, total system
capacity vice 2 Mbps) worldwide while providing improved communications
on the move to disadvantaged platforms (hand held terminals, aircraft,
missiles, UAVs, remote sensors) at higher data rates (up to 64 kbps per
access). This capability can only be realized with the fielding of MUOS
capable Joint Tactical Radio System terminals or by upgrading existing
UHF legacy software programmable terminals.
SPACE ENVIRONMENT
Navy depends on space capabilities now and expects the demand for
space capabilities in the future, especially for SATCOM, to increase.
We, like the rest of the Nation's leadership, were concerned by China's
recent anti-satellite test, not only for its primary purpose of
demonstrating a capability against spacecraft, but for the collateral
effects of the debris created. That said, we recognize that all space
capabilities are vulnerable to both low and high technology threats,
including communication and data link jamming, attempts to exploit or
disrupt computer systems, attacks against the sensors, and physical
attack against the ground infrastructure. Although space threats can
not be completely eliminated, Navy is embarking on a multi-pronged
approach to minimize their potential impact on naval operations. We
started with an internal study on space vulnerabilities in 2005 and
have identified opportunities for action. First, Navy will have
multiple communications paths available, including extremely high
frequency (EHF), UHF, and super high frequency, as well as commercial
systems. While we eagerly await the leap in communications capability
that the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) will bring, the requested
funding for an additional Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite
will improve protected communication capability in the near-term. Also,
for our battlespace and maritime domain awareness needs, we will
leverage a variety of sensors, including airborne and space based, and
ensure a balance between sea and shore based intelligence analysis and
processing capabilities. Finally, we are examining nonmaterial
solutions, such as planning and training for degradation of space
capabilities. As I've already mentioned, the NIOSC is currently
providing focused space support to the Eisenhower, Stennis, and Bataan
Strike Groups as part of the Naval Space Campaign Plan, with the goal
of providing tailored space capabilities to improve the mission
effectiveness of the fleet.
The Navy is working with U.S. Strategic Command to ensure
comprehensive space intelligence is provided and appropriate means of
protection are addressed systematically as space systems and their
concept of operations are being developed. We communicated to Strategic
Command the need for a balanced Space Control portfolio to ensure
appropriate emphasis on protection and space situational awareness. As
both the Secretary of the Navy and CNO have noted, we cannot allow
ourselves to be fixated on one threat alone. Therefore, our collective
efforts must take a broad-based perspective on the threat to space
capabilities.
OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE
Navy supports Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) because maritime
forces need the flexibility that ORS offers to augment and reconstitute
critical warfighting capabilities in order to counter increasingly
agile adversaries. Navy actively participated in the congressionally
directed 120-day ORS study and will be an integral part of the ORS
organization once a joint office is established. Building on over 50
years of small satellite experience, Navy is working closely with the
Services, combatant commands (COCOMs), and the Intelligence Community
to develop key elements of ORS through the TacSat series of
experiments. We realize that ORS is more than just smaller, rapidly
developed satellites and requires an end-to-end examination to develop
the agility and capabilities needed to rapidly adapt to the ever
evolving threat environment facing our Joint Force Commanders (JFC).
As part of the joint TACSAT and ORS effort, the Office of Naval
Research (ONR) is investing $15 million of S&T funds each year in
moderate-to-high-risk projects that result in significant prototypes
through the Space Innovative Naval Prototype program. Investments are
focused on naval capability gaps that space can fill such as ship
tracking, data exfiltration from buoys, communications-on-the-move,
submarine detection, cueing, and littoral characterization. TACSAT-2
was launched on 16 December 2006 and is undergoing testing. Commander
Strike Group-8 is interested in leveraging one of its secondary
payloads, built by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), for ship
tracking and input into maritime domain awareness. We are looking
forward to launching TACSAT-1 later this year after SpaceX gives the
go-ahead for launch on its Falcon-1 rocket. NRL also built a secondary
payload for TACSAT-3 that provides a basic IP-based data exfiltration
capability. NRL is leading TACSAT-4 for the joint community with ONR
funding the UHF Communications payload to support comms-on-the-move and
data exfiltration. TACSAT-4 uses a prototype spacecraft bus resulting
from a broad government-industry team effort to develop and mature bus
standards for increased modularity. The spacecraft should be completed
by the first half of next year and will be launched into a highly
elliptical orbit to provide long dwells over theater. The TACSAT series
of experiments reflect the partnerships that need to be developed
between the Services, COCOMs, and Intelligence Community to innovate
solutions and leverage the best talent available across the national
security space community to solve warfighting challenges. NRL is
managing the ORS Payload Technology initiative for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. This initiative jointly evaluated 75 industry
proposals and awarded 14 which are being developed by industry now and
over the course of the next year.
The ORS attributes of flexibility and agility not only impact the
current operational environment but also have the potential of
positively affecting the space industrial base. The shorter project
cycles should provide a broader base of rapid response experience for
the space industry and space cadre, and will establish a faster
acquisition rhythm in the long run.
SUMMARY
Our mission of keeping the air and sea lanes open and ensuring the
security of our citizens at home and abroad requires a global reach and
persistent presence. We must be constantly ready, whether it is to
deliver on a mission of mercy or more lethal measures to respond to a
specific threat. Our ability to respond, as well as work with our
coalition and other maritime partners, will depend on space
capabilities for the necessary flexibility and speed to support our
worldwide responsibilities. To deliver the required space capabilities
to the warfighter and represent the Navy's interest in space, we will
continue to invest in our most valuable resource, our people, the Navy
Space Cadre.
The Navy remains committed to shaping space system capabilities and
fully integrating those capabilities into maritime operations. We look
forward to participating in ORS, as well as delivering MUOS for the
joint warfighter.
Thank you for the opportunity to share our efforts with you today.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Admiral.
Ms. Chaplain?
STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Chaplain. Thank you for inviting me here today.
The Government Accountability Office's (GAO) reviews for
the past several years have painted a pretty bleak picture of
space acquisitions. We've seen cost increases in billions of
dollars, schedule delays in years, and performance risks.
Today, the picture is a bit different, and I would like to
comment on that.
On the plus side, we have some of the legacy programs,
namely the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite
and Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) overcoming the bulk of
their technical problems and are on track to meet revised
targets. Also, more important, the Air Force is adopting what
we see as best practices for space radar and the
Transformational Satellite (TSAT). By that, I mean they're
incorporating mature technologies before the program officially
begins. They're deferring more ambitious technology efforts to
the S&T environment and they're spending time defining
requirements before the program starts. This is not a trivial
effort.
I would like to comment that most every space program we've
reviewed for the past decade has started with fairly immature
technologies and has had problems setting requirements and
sticking to them.
On the minus side, there's still several legacy programs at
high risk for problems. They include SBIRS High, National
Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS), and GPS IIF. Just looking at SBIRS High, for example,
we already found that shortly after restructuring, the program
is starting to diverge from some cost and schedule targets and
management reserve is being depleted at a much faster rate than
anticipated.
We also looked at this new program, the AIRSS, and we had a
lot of concerns about what the true purpose of the system is,
whether it's to serve as an insurance policy for the SBIRS High
or be the follow-on program. Our concerns are rooted into a lot
of concerns that were transmitted to us from people within DOD.
There were also a lot of concerns within DOD about schedule
risks for that program. So, I think those two issues need to be
addressed before that moves forward.
I just want to end by making the point that in the larger
context, the environment is still not very conducive for
sustaining the good practices we see being adopted in space
radar and TSAT. The top three obstacles that we see are one,
workforce capacity, which has already been mentioned here. GAO
studies and DOD studies have identified deficiencies in program
management skills, business skills--particularly in cost
estimating--and technical skills--particularly in systems
engineering. Programs like TSAT express concerns that they may
not have the technical people they need in the next year or so.
Policy is another longstanding concern of ours. The space
acquisition policy, as it currently stands, does not mandate
that best practice levels of knowledge be achieved before
starting the program. So, we would like to see this back-to-
basics policy be integrated into the formal acquisition policy
so that the good practices being started now, stay beyond the
tenures of current leadership.
The last obstacle, of course, is always funding. There's a
lot of funding pressures throughout the whole weapons system
portfolio and a lot of GAO work that has been done tells us
that programs really need to be prioritized for funding and
best practices for investment, like portfolio management, need
to be adopted across the Department, so that programs like TSAT
and space radar are not incentivized to produce overly
optimistic reports.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Cristina T. Chaplain
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be
here today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD) space
acquisitions. Each year, DOD spends billions to acquire space-based
capabilities to support current military and other government
operations as well as to enable DOD to transform the way it collects
and disseminates information, gathers data on adversaries, and attacks
targets. In fiscal year 2008 alone, DOD expects to spend over $22
billion to develop and procure satellites and other space systems,
including nearly $10 billion on selected major space systems.\1\
Despite its growing investment in space, however, DOD's space system
acquisitions have experienced problems over the past several decades
that have driven up costs by hundreds of millions, even billions of
dollars; stretched schedules by years; and increased performance risks.
In some cases, capabilities have not been delivered to the warfighter
after decades of development.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estimates of fiscal year 2008 spending on procurement and
research, development, test, and evaluation are based on DOD's fiscal
year 2007 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) plan. The fiscal year
2008 FYDP plan was not available to us at the time we developed this
testimony.
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In view of these problems, the Air Force, DOD's primary space
system acquirer, has been attempting to instill best, practices in two
newer space programs--Space Radar and the Transformational Satellite
Communications System (TSAT). These steps can help better position the
two programs for success, but they will not work without adhering to
commitments to delay milestone decisions if there are still gaps
between requirements and resources, and to use more robust tools to
analyze risks, costs, and schedule. Moreover, other space programs--new
and old--are still facing setbacks, reflecting problems in technology
development or design, problems in managing contractors, and more
broadly, funding shifts needed to sustain the larger space portfolio.
Such setbacks--common among all weapons acquisitions--continue to
hamper the Air Force's ability to provide resources and support needed
to deliver capabilities within cost, schedule, and performance targets.
My testimony today will highlight our findings on space acquisitions as
well as actions needed to address persistent, acquisition problems and
to build on best practice approaches being adopted in Space Radar and
TSAT.
SPACE ACQUISITIONS CONTINUE TO FACE COST AND SCHEDULE INCREASES
The majority of major acquisition programs in DOD's space portfolio
have experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven
up cost and schedules and increased technical risks. Several programs
have been restructured by DOD in the face of delays and cost growth. At
times, cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100 percent, causing
DOD to nearly double its investment in the face of technical and other
problems without realizing a better return on investment. Along with
the increases, many programs are experiencing significant schedule
delays--as much as 6 years--postponing delivery of promised
capabilities to the warfighter. Outcomes have been so disappointing in
some cases that DOD has had to go back to the drawing board to consider
new ways to achieve the same. or less, capability. Some programs have
been able to work through the bulk of technical problems they were
facing and are on track to meet revised targets, albeit at higher costs
and with delayed deliveries. Others, however, continue to face
setbacks.
The following chart compares original cost estimates and current
cost estimates for the broader portfolio of major space acquisitions
for fiscal years 2007 through 2012. The wider the gap between original
and current estimates, the fewer dollars DOD has available to invest in
new programs.
The next two figures reflect differences in unit costs and total
costs for satellites from the time the programs officially began to
their most recent cost estimate. As the second figure notes, in several
cases, DOD has had to cut back on quantity and capability in the face
of escalating costs. For example, two satellites and four instruments
were deleted from National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS) and four sensors are expected to have fewer
capabilities. This will reduce some planned capabilities for NPOESS as
well as planned coverage. Likewise, the Space Based Infrared System
(SBIRS) High missile detection program deferred capabilities, such as
mobile data processors for the Air Force and the Army and a fully
compliant backup mission control facility, and it pushed off a decision
to procure the third and fourth satellites, which will not meet SBIRS
High requirements for coverage. Despite such measures, unit, costs for
both programs are still considerably higher than originally promised.
In addition to SBIRS High and NPOESS, the programs featured in the
figures include the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
satellites, the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) and the Mobile User
Objective System (MUOS), which are all communications satellites, and
the Global Positioning System (GPS) II.
The next chart highlights the additional estimated months needed to
complete programs. These additional months represent time not
anticipated at the programs' start dates. Generally, the further
schedules slip, fee more DOD is at risk of not sustaining current
capabilities. For this reason, DOD began an alternative infrared system
effort, known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS), to
run in parallel with the SBIRS High program.
Some programs, such as AEHF and WGS, have worked through the bulk
of technical and other problems that were causing large schedule
increases and cost delays. For example, the AEHF program, which has
been in the final stages of development for almost 3 years, resolved
issues related to its cryptographic equipment and is on track to meet a
revised date for first launch. The WGS program completed rework on
improperly installed Fasteners, and contractors have redesigned
computers to rectify data transmission errors. The program expects a
first launch in June 2007. As noted in our figures, the MUOS program,
which began more recently than AEHF and WGS, is generally meeting its
targets, though it has yet to enter into the more difficult stages of
satellite production, integration and test.
By contrast, the SBIRS High program still faces considerable risks.
Recent GAO work for this subcommittee, for example, shows that the
program is diverging from cost and schedule targets just months after
rebaselining due to problems related to assembly, integration, and
testing and that the contractor's estimates for addressing these issues
are overly optimistic. Defense Contract Management Agency reports also
show that software development efforts are behind schedule--by as much
as 32 percent. In addition, the contractor has already spent about 28
percent, or $66 million, of its management reserve from April 2006 to
November 2006. This reserve is designed to last until 2012, but at the
current rate, is likely to be depleted by May 2008. If this trend
continues, $500 million in additional reserve will be needed. As noted
earlier, DOD initiated an alternative effort--AIRSS--to ensure it would
have continued capabilities. However, we have questions as to whether
AIRSS is being pursued as a ``plan B'' program, as originally
envisioned. Rather than seek to maintain continuity of operations, the
program is focused on advancing capabilities because program managers
believe there are no viable alternatives. We also found that there was
disagreement among DOD stakeholders as to whether there were
alternatives or not, and there was concern that the AIRSS schedule may
he too compressed. Our analysis also found that there was a high degree
of concurrency in the program's schedule, which may be limiting DOD's
ability to gain knowledge from planned demonstrations and increased the
potential for costly rework further in the program.
The GPS Block IIF program is also al a high risk of cost increases
and schedule delays. Since our last, annual assessment of the GPS Block
IIF program, the program has revised its acquisition program baseline
to account for cost increases and schedule delays, and requested an
additional $151 million to cover these costs. The number of IIF
satellites to be procured was reduced from 19 to 12. Further, the
launch date of the first IIF satellite continues to slip. The original
baseline showed an initial launch availability date of December 2006,
but DOD's current baseline shows July 2009--a slip of about 2.5 years.
The program also learned that the contractor's earned value management
reporting system was not accurately reporting cost and schedule
performance data. A DOD report also recently found that development of
user equipment has not been synchronized with the development of
satellites and control system, increasing the risk of substantial
delays in realistic operational testing and fielding of capabilities.
GPS is taking measures to address these problems. For example, this
year, it did not award its contractor $21.4 million in award fees. In
December 2005, GAO recommended that DOD improve its use of award fees
for all weapon system contracts by specifically lying them to
acquisition outcomes. A review of a sample of programs, including SBIRS
High, found that this was generally not done.
The NPOESS program is also still at risk of more cost increases and
schedule delays. In June 2008, DOD certified the NPOESS program to
Congress, and with agreement from its program partners, DOD
restructured the program. Now the NPOESS program acquisition costs are
estimated to be about $11.5 billion--an increase of about $3 billion
over the prior cost estimate. Before the contract was awarded, in 2002,
the life cycle cost, for the program was estimated to be $6.6 billion
over the 24-year period from the inception of the program in 1995
through 2018. The delivery of the first two NPOESS satellites has been
delayed by roughly 4 and 5 years, and as noted earlier, the number of
satellites to be produced has been reduced from six to four. In
addition, the number of instruments was reduced from 13 (10 sensors and
3 subsystems) to 9 instruments (7 sensors and 2 subsystems), and 4 of
the remaining sensors will have fewer capabilities. The NPOESS program
will incorporate any number of the deleted instruments if additional
funding is provided from outside the NPOESS program. The program
restructure will result in reduced satellite data collection coverage,
requiring dependence on a European weather satellite for coverage
during mid-morning hours. Although the program has reduced the number
of satellites it will produce, the cost per satellite is more than 150
percent above the original approved program baseline. The NPOESS
program is now updating the cost, schedule, performance baselines, and
acquisition strategy, and coordinating the changes with the three
agencies. The program expects these documents to be approved later this
year. While work is continuing on key sensors, the program still faces
potential problems in their development.
The Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) system--not featured on
the charts above because it is not yet a formal acquisition program--is
also encountering problems. The SBSS system is to replace an aging
sensor on an orbiting research and development satellite and improve
the timeliness of data on objects in geosynchronous orbit. As currently
planned, the initial block will consist of a single satellite and
associated command, control, communications, and computer equipment.
Subsequent SBSS efforts will focus on building a larger constellation
of satellites to provide worldwide space surveillance of smaller
objects in shorter timelines. In late 2005, an independent review team
found that the program's baseline was not executable; that the
assembly, integration, and test plan was risky; and that the
requirements were overstated. The SBSS program was restructured in
early 2006 due to cost growth and schedule delays. The restructuring
increased funding and schedule margin; streamlined the assembly,
integration, and test, plan; and relaxed requirements. The launch of
the initial satellite was delayed to April 2009--a delay of about 18
months. Cost growth due to the restructure is about $130 million over
initial estimates.
Last, additional cost increases are expected for the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, but for reasons that are
different than the ones being experienced on the satellite programs, hi
recent years, program cost, has risen 79 percent, with a cost per unit
increase of 136 percent,. A chief reason for cost increases is a
decline in the commercial launch market upon which the program's
business ease was based. Cost increases are also a result of additional
program scope, including mission assurance, assured access to space,
and earned value management systems reporting. In addition, satellite
vehicle weight growth and satellite launch delays have contributed to
cost increases. In December 2006, Boeing and Lockheed Martin Initiated
a joint venture (United Launch Alliance (ULA)) that will combine the
production, engineering, test, and launch operations associated with
U.S. Government launches of Boeing Delta and Lockheed Martin Atlas
rockets. Though the EELV program office expects long-term savings to be
achieved through this arrangement, the cost per launch under a recently
negotiated Buy III acquisition strategy will be higher than under Buy
I. According to the Air Force, this is because the contractors will
incur additional costs to allow the government, to perform the
necessary oversight not required under Buy I. (Exact estimates of the
new cost per launch have not been finalized by the program office yet.)
Under the new strategy, EELV will be transitioning from a fixed-price
arrangement, where launches were essentially procured as a service, to
a combination of a cost-plus and fixed-price contracts. The arrangement
will allow the government to exercise more oversight, and to
incentivize contractors through the use of award fees. But to realize
these benefits, the Air Force will need to ensure it has resources
(skills, expertise, and tools) to begin accumulating and analyzing
detailed cost, schedule, performance, design, and technical data. In
addition, it will be important to assess progress in achieving longer-
term savings envisioned under ULA as well as to ensure that the
combined assets of the contractors are adequately protected.
UNDERLYING REASONS FOR COST AND SCHEDULE GROWTH
Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost
growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First,
on a broad scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford,
creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost estimating,
optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing of bad news, and, for
space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess
potentially better alternatives. Programs focus on advocacy at the
expense of realism and sound management Invariably, with too many
programs in its portfolio, DOD is forced to continually shift funds to
and from programs--particularly as programs experience problems that
require additional time and money to address. Such shifts, in turn,
have had costly, reverberating effects.
Figure 5 illustrates the negative cycle of incentives that come
when programs compete for funding. Table 1 highlights specific areas
where we found the original cost estimates of programs to be optimistic
in their assumptions.
Note: This table was developed as part of a larger review on
DOD's space cost-estimating function. Information was derived
from discussions with program and contractor officials and GAO
analysis. In some cases, programs may have ultimately
experienced problems related to one of the categories, but we
did not have evidence to show that the original assumptions
were optimistic.\2\
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\2\ ``GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to
Address Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems, GAO-07-96,
(Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 2006).
Second, as we have previously testified and reported, DOD has
tended to start, its programs too early, that is before it has the
assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within
available resources and time constraints. This tendency is caused
largely by the funding process, since acquisition programs attract more
dollars than efforts concentrating solely on proving technologies.
Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend technology invention into
acquisition, programs experience technical problems that require large
amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover, when the approach is
followed, cost estimators are not well positioned to develop accurate
cost, estimates because there are too many unknowns. Put more simply,
there is no way to estimate how long it would take to design, develop,
and build a satellite system when critical technologies planned for
that system are still in relatively early stages of discovery and
invention.
A companion problem for space systems is that programs have
historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step,
regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies
necessary to achieve the full capability. Increasingly, DOD has
preferred to make fewer but heavier, larger, and more complex
satellites that perform a multitude of missions rather than larger
constellations of smaller, less complex satellites that gradually
increase in sophistication. This has stretched technology challenges
beyond current capabilities in some cases and vastly increased the
complexities related to software--a problem that affected SBIRS High
and AEHF, for example.
In addition, several of the space programs discussed above began in
the late 1990s, when DOD structured contracts in a way that reduced
government oversight and shifted key decision-making responsibility
onto contractors. This approach--known as Total System Performance
Responsibility (TSFR)--was intended to facilitate acquisition reform
and enable DOD lo streamline a cumbersome acquisition process and
leverage innovation and management, expertise from the private sector.
However, DOD later found that this approach magnified problems related
to requirements creep and poor contractor performance. In addition,
under TSPR, the government decided not to obtain certain cost data, a
decision that, resulted in the government having even less oversight of
the programs and limited information from which to manage the programs.
Further, the reduction In government oversight and involvement led to
major reductions in various government, capabilities, including cost-
estimating and systems-engineering staff. The loss of cost-estimating
and systems-engineering staff in turn led to a lack of technical data
needed to develop sound cost estimates.
DOD IS IMPLEMENTING BEST PRACTICES ON TWO NEW EFFORTS
Over the past decade, GAO has examined successful organizations in
the commercial sector to identify best practices that can be applied to
space and weapon system acquisitions. This work has identified a number
of practices, which we have recommended that DOD adopt. Generally, we
have recommended that DOD separate technology discovery from
acquisition, follow an incremental path toward meeting user needs,
match resources and requirements at program start, and use quantifiable
data and demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next
phases. DOD is making efforts to instill these practices on two
programs reviewed this year: the TSAT and the Space Radar program.
Specifically:
Successful organizations we have studied ensure that
technologies are mature; that is, proven to work as intended
before program start. Both TSAT and Space Radar are attempting
to do this. According to their plans, critical technologies
should reach at least a Technology Readiness Level (TKL) 6 by
program start, meaning the technologies have been tested in a
relevant environment. This stands in sharp contrast to previous
programs, which have started with immature technologies, such
as SBIRS and NPOESS, and it reflects the implementation of a
``back to basics'' policy advocated this past year by the Under
Secretary of the Air Force. If these programs adhere to the TRL
6 criteria, they will greatly reduce the risk of encountering
costly technical delays, though not completely. There are still
significant inherent risks associated with integrating critical
technologies and with developing the software needed to realize
the benefits of the technologies. Moreover, the best practice
programs we have studied strive for a TRL 7, where the
technology has been tested in an operational environment, that
is, space.
Successful organizations defer more ambitions
technology efforts to corporate research departments
(equivalent to science and technology (S&T) organizations in
DOD) until they are ready to be added to future increments.
Both programs have deferred more ambitious technology
development efforts to the S&T environment. TSAT, for example,
deferred the wide-field of view multi-access laser
communication technology, and is contributing about, $16.7
million for ``off-line'' maturation of this technology that
could be inserted into future increments. It has laid out
incremental advances in other capabilities over two increments.
Space Radar has deferred lithium-ion batteries, more efficient
solar cells, and onboard processing for its first increment,
and like TSAT, is contributing toward their development by S&T
organizations. At this time, Space Radar has not defined
details of an increment beyond the first one.
Successful organizations extensively research and
define requirements before program start to ensure that they
arc achievable, given available resources, and that they do not
define requirements after starting programs. Both programs have
also employed systems engineers to help determine achievability
of requirements. The TSAT program has reached agreement on
requirements with its users--primarily in terms of what will be
included in the first, several blocks of the program and what
will not be included. The Space Radar program has instituted
several processes designed to achieve consensus on requirements
across a range of diverse users. It still needs to formalize
agreement related to these processes and also identify key
performance parameters. This is important because Space Radar
is to be shared by the military and Intelligence Communities--
each with different specific needs for the system and very
specific roles and responsibilities with regard to the data
being produced by Space Radar and its users. It has been
reported recently that conflicts in roles and responsibilities
have arisen on dissemination of data being produced by a small
tactical satellite (TACSAT 2) recently launched by DOD for use
by military commanders.
It remains to be seen whether TSAT and Space Radar will take
additional steps that successful organizations take lo position
programs for success. For example:
The organizations we have studied do not go ahead with
program start milestone decisions if there are still gaps
between requirements and resources. TSAT and Space Radar have
indicated that they intend to do the same, but there are
external pressures on both programs to provide needed
capabilities.
The organizations we have studied hold program
managers accountable for their estimates and require program
managers to stay with a project to its end. We have made
recommendations to DOD to instill similar practices department-
wide, but these have yet to be implemented. Further, there are
still incentives in place to keep program managers' tenures
relatively short. Promotions, for example, often depend on
having varied management experience rather than sustained
responsibility for one program.
The organizations we studied have developed common
templates and tools in support data gathering and analysis and
maintain databases of historical costs, schedule, quality,
test, and performance data. Cost estimates themselves are
continually monitored and regularly updated through a series of
gates or milestone decisions that demand program assess
readiness and remaining risk within key sectors of the program,
as well as overall cost and schedules. We saw indications that
TSAT and Space Radar were using more robust tools to analyze
risks, costs, and schedule than programs have done in the past.
However, it remains to be seen how these practices will be
reflected in official cost estimates. In the past, we have
found space program estimates were simply too optimistic and
that independent estimates produced by DOD's Cost Analysis
Improvement Group were not being used. DOD agreed with our
findings and asserted it was taking actions to address them.
actions needed to sustain commitment to improvements
The Air Force's continued efforts to instill best practices on
Space Radar and TSAT are good first steps forward addressing
acquisition problems in the space portfolio. They represent significant
shifts in thinking about how space systems should be developed us well
as commitment, from senior leadership. But sustaining these reforms
will not be easy. The programs are not immune to funding pressures that
have encouraged too much optimism. They are also being undertaken as
DOD is addressing shortfalls in critical technical, business, and
program management skills. Further, processes and policies key to
sustainment and broader use of best practices have not been changed to
further reflect the kinds of changes taking place on Space Radar and
TSAT.
First, new programs still must compete for limited funding. As DOD
seeks to fund Space Radar and TSAT, it will be (1) undertaking other
new, costly efforts, including GPS III, SBSS, and AIRSS; (2) addressing
cost overruns associated with programs like SBIRS High and GPS; and (3)
facing increased pressures to increase investments in assets designed
to protect space systems. In total, these efforts will increase DOD's
investment for all major space acquisitions from $5.31 billion to $9.22
billion, or about 46 percent over the next 3 years. Mare may be needed
if technical, software, and other problems on current programs worsen.
At the same time, investment needs for other weapon systems are also on
the rise, while long-term budget forecasts indicate that considerably
fewer dollars will be available for discretionary spending in coming
years rather than more.
In prior reports, we have stated that, as long as too many programs
compete for too few dollars in DOD, programs will be incentivized to
produce optimistic estimates and suppress bad news. They will view
success as seeming the next installment of funds versus delivering
capability within cost and schedule goals. We have recommended that DOD
guide its decisions to start space and other weapons acquisition
programs with an overall investment strategy that would identify
priorities for funding so that space systems that are expected to play
a critical role in transformation, such as Space Radar and TSAT, could
be prioritized along with other legacy and transformational systems.
Let me take a moment to illustrate why an investment strategy is
critical. We have reported in the past that DOD and the Air Force have
waited too long to establish priorities or make trade-off decisions. We
have also reported that frequent funding shifts have hurt programs that
were performing well or further damaged troubled programs. We have also
reported cases where DOD and the Air Force have walked away from
opportunities to save costs in lot buys or leverage knowledge already
gained in legacy programs in favor of starting new programs that
promise much more advanced capability but have little knowledge to back
up that promise. Today, DOD is on track to cut short the AEHF program
in order to pursue TSAT. It has stated it may also do the same for
SBIRS to pursue AIKSS. In both cases, DOD would be forgoing savings
that it bad already negotiated for lot buys and in effect, paying
significantly more for nonrecurring engineering. While these decisions
have the potential to enable DOD to obtain advanced capability sooner
(provided best practices are followed on the new programs), they should
have been made much earlier and more strategically in order to stem
investment losses.
DOD's own reports recognize that investment planning needs to be
instilled in weapon acquisitions. A February 2007 report, in response
to a requirement, in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007, outlines steps that. DOD is taking to better
prioritize and fund programs.\3\ The initiatives include: (1)
establishing anew concept decision review to provide decisionmakers
with an early opportunity to evaluate trade-offs among alternative
approaches to meeting a capability need; (2) testing portfolio
management approaches in selected capability areas to facilitate more
strategic choices about how to allocate resources across programs; and
(3) capital budgeting as a potential means to stabilize program
funding. While these developments are promising, we recently reported
that such initiatives do not fundamentally change DOD's existing
service-centric framework for making weapon system investment
decisions.\4\ Moreover, it will take some time to determine their
success in enabling more effective funding prioritization.
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\3\ Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition Transformation
Report to Congress (Washington, DC, 2007).
\4\ GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management
Approach to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition
Outcomes, GAO-07-388 (Washington DC; March 30, 2007).
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Second, space programs are facing capacity shortfalls. These
include shortages of staff with science and engineering backgrounds as
well as staff with program management and cost estimating experience.
During our review this year, the TSAT program cited shortages of space
acquisition personnel as a key challenge that increases risk for the
program. Due to broader Air Force cuts in workforce, the program did
not expect to be able to fill technical positions needed to accompany
plans to ramp up spending. During our review of DOD's space cost
estimating function, Air Force space cost estimating organizations and
program offices said that they believed their cost-estimating resources
were inadequate to do a good job of accurately predicting costs.
Because of the decline in in-house cost-estimating resources, space
program offices and Air Force cost-estimating organizations are now
more dependent on support contractors. At 11 of 13 program offices we
informally surveyed, contractors accounted for 64 percent of cost-
estimating personnel. This reliance raised questions from the cost-
estimating community about whether numbers and qualifications of
government personnel were sufficient to provide oversight of and
insight into contractor cost, estimates. In addition to technical and
cost estimating skills, DOD and GAO studies have also pointed to
capacity shortfalls in program management. According to DOD's Young
Panel report, government capabilities to lead and manage the space
acquisition process have seriously eroded, in part because of actions
taken in the acquisition reform environment of the 1990s. During our
2005 review of program management, we surveyed DOD's major weapon
system program managers and Interviewed program executive officers, who
similarly pointed to critical skill shortages in program management,
systems engineering, and software development. The Air Force and DOD
recognize these shortfalls and are taking actions to address them, but
these will take time to implement. It is important that, in the
interim, the Air Force identify and take steps to grow or retain skill
sets that should be organic, such as highly specialized knowledge of
certain military space technologies. During both our cost estimating
and space system reviews, program officiate noted that it can take
several years for new technical staff to build knowledge and skills
unique to military space.
Our past work has also pointed to capacity shortfalls that go
beyond workforce. For example, in 2006, we reported that cost
estimation data and databases are incomplete, insufficient, and
outdated. In our testimony last year, we pointed to limited
opportunities and funding for space technologies, and the lack of low-
cost launch vehicles. It is our understanding that the Air Force and
DOD are working to address all of these shortfalls. Budget plans show,
for example, an increase of nearly $11 million in funding for the space
test program beginning in 2009--about 23 percent.
Last, policies that surround space acquisition need to be further
revised to ensure best practices are instilled and sustained. For
example, DOD's space acquisition policy does not require that programs
such as TSAT and Space Radar achieve a TRL 6 or higher for key
technologies before being formally started (KDP B). Instead, it is
suggested that TRL 6 be achieved at preliminary decision review (KDP C)
or soon after. Given that there are many pressures and incentives that
are driving space and other weapon programs to begin too early and to
drive for dramatic rather than incremental leaps in capability, DOD
needs acquisition policies that ensure programs have the knowledge they
need to make investment decisions and that DOD and Congress have a more
accurate picture of how long and how much it will lake to get the
capability that, is being promised In addition, although the policy
requires that independent cost estimates be prepared by bodies outside
the acquisition chain of command, it does not require that they be
relied upon to develop program budgets. Officials within the space cost
estimating community also believed that the policy was unclear in
defining roles and responsibilities for cost estimators. We continue to
recommend changes be made to the policy--not only to further ingrain
the shift in thinking about how space systems should be developed, but
to ensure that the changes current leaders are trying to make can be
sustained beyond their tenure.
In closing, we support efforts to instill best practices on
programs like Space Radar and TSAT. They are critical to enabling DOD
to break the cycle of space acquisition problems by matching resources
to requirements before program start. We encourage DOD to build on this
momentum by extending a best practice approach to its entire space
portfolio. For newer efforts, such as AIRSS, this means reexamining
requirements and alternative means of satisfying those requirements and
clarifying the true purpose of the program. For current programs, such
as SBIRS, this means continuing to track risks and dedicating resources
necessary to mitigate those risks, leveraging management tools such as
earned value management, analyses, and finding ways to incentivize
contractors to perform well. For the broader portfolio, this means
ensuring programs have all the right resources to enable success. These
include adequate levels of funding accompanied by short- and long-term
investment plans, adequate skills and capabilities, as well as data,
policy, and processes, accountability and leadership support.
Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, why don't you comment on
that critique?
Dr. Sega. I can comment, Mr. Chairman, from the time that I
have been the Under Secretary of the Air Force, which is since
August 2005. We did see many of the characteristics that have
been highlighted by the last set of comments from the GAO. I
think we've made progress on those issues across the front. In
the case of GPS IIF, for example, as we dug into GPS IIF in the
fall of 2005--I wasn't happy with how that program was
proceeding. But, with Government and industry working together,
we addressed the technical, management, and financial issues in
and around the IIF program. Changes were made.
We had, actually at my request, extended the fixed price
option time deadline for satellites 10 through 12 from December
2005 to March 2006 and then to June 2006. By the time we had
gone through this extensive work, Government and industry had
completed a thorough Integrated Baseline Review from May into
June 2006. At that time, I was satisfied we were on track and
we executed the fixed-price options for satellites 10 through
12. It took a lot of work. That is one example where we have
looked at it in detail--at the Work Breakdown Structure Level--
and did it rigorously and in a disciplined way to see ourselves
through to the end.
IIF is now on track. You have to pay attention, though,
every step of the way. It was not designed from the beginning
with a back-to-basics approach. We're working hard on events
that are going to occur in 2007, in terms of thermo-vacuum
tests and things that are upcoming for that particular
satellite as we go forward. It is on track, but there are many
things to watch as we go forward--you pay attention to those
milestones.
SBIRS High was a similar situation. Our last review with
Secretary Krieg on March 20 of this year out in Sunnyvale,
California, looked through some of the SBIRS activities. There
was a bit of erosion in the areas that were highlighted--but
not any what I would consider show-stoppers there. It did not
have an engineering development unit that we are now enforcing
in our programs, or a starting point upon which you build the
flight unit that has more fidelity in it.
However, at this point we think we, once again, are at a
point where we have to pay attention and go through some of the
additional testing. Clearly, the management reserve is divided
into two parts: some of it is in the contractor's line, and
some of it is in the Government's line. The Government line of
management reserve, actually, ends up kicking in, in fiscal
year 2009 and out. But, we're paying attention to that and so,
yes, there are some challenges, but not something that can't be
overcome and dealt with for an approximately on-schedule launch
of the SBIRS GEO-1 satellite. So, I agree.
The ``back-to-basics'' approach is succeeding (we
instituted this plan going forward) to add additional
discipline into our systems. Some of the systems that were
begun principally in the 1990s are those that we have to work
hard on to get them to the point where they'll fly and deliver
that needed capability.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. As a courtesy to Senator Thune
and Senator Inhofe, we're going to flip it to you, let you go
on and ask your questions.
Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate
that very much. I do have some conflicts.
Let me thank you, both of you, General Chilton and
Secretary Sega, for coming up to the office and talking about
some things. You probably have a pretty good idea what my
concerns are and what I'd like to ask you and get on the
record.
Without getting into something that you'd have to go into a
closed session, I expressed to you my concern as to what
happened when the Chinese knocked down one of their own weather
satellites last January, in the same orbit that we would have
our reconnaissance satellites.
I'd like to, first of all--even though I think I know what
your answer is--ask any of you what you think the motivation
was to do that? Why?
General Chilton. Sir, we talked about this yesterday. I do
not know why. It would be purely speculative for me to do that
at this point.
Senator Inhofe. Any other comments on that?
Admiral McArthur. Yes, sir. I would like to add, first of
all, it was totally irresponsible of the Chinese to do that.
But second, there's a strategic message involved with this.
They're seeking parity in space in that particular region.
They're challenging us in information operations. They
understand that the information domain is the primary domain of
the battle space. They wanted to exhibit and demonstrate their
capabilities.
Senator Inhofe. Their capability that if something should
happen, like in the Taiwan Straits, that we would not have the
capability of seeing what is going on there?
Admiral McArthur. There is that, some potential of
degradation of our systems. But, we have a multi-pronged
approach to overcome, or at least to counter that. It may incur
more risk for our forces, but without a doubt they understand,
particularly in the Navy, our dependence on space.
Senator Inhofe. All right. I was shown a picture I didn't
have when you were in my office yesterday. This shows
apparently a 10 percent increase in space junk as a result of
this little exercise they did.
Would you explain to us what threat that is or how that
might affect us adversely?
General Shelton. Senator, space is vast to start with. So,
there's a lot of things that are there, but this certainly
increases the risk to all space-faring nations. So, as this
debris is created, there's some that went higher than the orbit
that the engagement occurred at, there's some that's lower, but
it will take decades for that debris to, literally, rain down
out of those orbits and enter the earth's atmosphere. So, even
though the probabilities, the estimated probabilities may look
fairly low, when the event occurs, the probability is one. So,
I don't take a whole lot of solace in the fact that the
estimates say that it's----
Senator Inhofe. When those of us who are not as well-
informed looked at how infinite space is, you wonder if that
can be a problem. But, apparently some do believe it could be.
Then, just some of the statements that were made yesterday,
it was in one of the newspapers, written by Edith Linder, that
a senior Chinese official predicts weapons will be deployed in
space. You hear these things all the time. Any of you in an
open meeting want to comment as to some of these statements
that keep resurfacing over and over again?
General Chilton. Sir, I'd just comment that it's curious
that when you read these statements from the Chinese, including
statements of their interest in participating, for example, in
the International Space Station Program, and you hear those
words--and then you observe their activities of actually
increasing debris in the orbital altitudes where the
International Space Station operates at, what we're hearing
doesn't sync up with actions. The actions, I would agree with
Admiral McArthur, don't make sense and are irresponsible.
Senator Inhofe. Lastly, let me just ask you the question as
to how incremental funding would help you in the situation that
you're facing right now, probably you, Mr. Secretary.
Dr. Sega. I'd be glad to address that.
Some of our systems, as we go forward, are very large,
expensive, and take some time to build. Others, as we go
forward in operationally responsive space are on the smaller
side, and take less time to build.
I'd like to focus on some of the larger satellites.
In our current rules, in terms of what we need to follow,
the first two satellites can be built with research and
development (R&D) types of dollars. But, after that satellites
must have full funding. So, the large, expensive satellites and
those that we're not going to build very many of, fall in this
category. I would like Congress to consider the approval for
incremental funding of those satellites.
Now, these capabilities that I mentioned--in terms of
missile warning, strategic communications, and position
navigation and timing--we are going to do those for the
foreseeable future. If we had the opportunity for incremental
funding, in that larger type of satellites--the more expensive
satellites--those that we're going to build fewer of--then we
could smooth out the funding and have greater efficiencies--in
my belief--in terms of how we develop our investment portfolio
in those capabilities, develop a rhythm of delivery to the
warfighter, and delivery of production, and not perturb another
part of our acquisition program that we also want to have
investments.
For example, as we are looking at a decision going forward
on SBIRS GEO-3 to be made this summer, in the event that it is
decided to do that program, then we're looking at almost a full
cost bill of about $1 billion in fiscal year 2009, even though
it will take some time to actually build it. Now, the authority
for incremental funding is present at the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) for similar satellites. It's
present in our NPOESS system that we are doing in conjunction
with the Department of Commerce, and it's present for our
carriers in the Navy. So, it's in that class of satellite that
we would appreciate considerations for incremental funding.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I'm glad we had a chance to bring this
up. I was going to ask the next question about the NRO, since
they can do it, which probably is more appropriate, if you ask
me the question. If they can do it, why can't you?
Ms. Chaplain, do you have any thoughts about that
incremental funding?
Ms. Chaplain. I would comment that if this kind of approach
were adopted, that there should be other mechanisms in place to
help assess investment progress and what's happening with it on
an annual basis. For example, you could be asking the Air Force
each year to identify the cost overruns, the causes for cost
overruns, what's being done to address cost overruns, and
trades that could be made within the portfolio or outside the
portfolio to address funding gaps. So, you would have this
other measure that would help smooth out funding, but you still
need some tools to have insight into what's being spent, what
may need to be addressed in terms of cost overruns and things
like that.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this is
something we may want to look at ourselves. Because what you're
talking about, Dr. Sega, is not any more money, it's how it
comes out, what you're getting for it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Sega. That is correct, sir. I think the management of
that will be beneficial from delivering capability, efficiency,
and cost.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Inhofe, while you're still
here I want you to hear the answer to this question.
General Chilton, the Administrator of NASA, in a hearing in
front of another subcommittee that I chair, minimized his
answer on the threat of the debris from the Chinese ASAT test.
Would you give us your opinion?
General Chilton. Yes, Senator. I'm in line with General
Shelton's answer. If you look at this purely statistically, one
might minimize, from a mathematical perspective, the impact of
this.
I think also, you have to consider, maybe the context of
Dr. Griffin talking about the International Space Station,
which was shielded much more heavily than any of the satellites
we would put up or the space shuttle, which goes up for a
smaller period of time and is exposed to the threat less than
the International Space Station. But in fact, this was over a
10 percent increase in the amount of debris that was on orbit.
Dr. Sega and I were on orbit together, or actually this is
2 years before we were on orbit together, in 1994 there were
about 8,000 pieces of debris that General Shelton's
organization was tracking. We're over 15,000 now, and so space
debris is a problem.
The United States has worked very hard with the
international community, with the Russians for example, to take
measures to mitigate the amount of debris we create on routine
launches by putting vent valves on our upper stages so there's
less risk of them exploding once they've done their mission and
are left on orbit and turning into thousands or hundreds of
little pieces as opposed to just one you can track.
So, it is significant, in my mind, that a country would go
off and intentionally increase the debris field in an orbital
regime, where not only humans operate in, but critical national
security space assets for the United States operate in,
commercial assets operate in, like Iridium Constellation and
other communications satellite. To test and demonstrate that
capability, one has to ask, are they considering deploying that
and fielding that? Because if you go down that path, and with
intent to use, you're not going to be going after a small
weather satellite, but some larger satellites and some other
satellites that will further exacerbate the problem.
So, I am concerned, absolutely concerned, about the
activities that the Government of China conducted with regard
to this test.
Senator Bill Nelson. This Senator thinks it's absolutely
inexcusable for China to have done this and multiplied the
amount of debris. Generally, in all of your private
conversations with other users of space, be it American
commercial, be it international commercial, be it partners in
space, what have they said to you privately about this fact of
a 10 percent increase?
General Chilton. Sir, I have not had conversations with
commercial users with regard to that increase. I can tell you,
though, that my experience shared by you on orbit, is that
manned space flight is not interested in operating in
environments with increased debris. Because what General
Shelton can see with his sensors, we closely coordinate with
NASA to make sure they can maneuver and avoid.
What worries me most is what we can't see. On every single
space shuttle flight I was on, the three, after landing we had
to replace windows in the space shuttle orbiter from hitting
very, very, very small pieces of debris, paint fleck size
pieces of debris. They cause enough damage to damage the
thermal-pane outer window on the space shuttle, which is not a
big cross-section to be dragging through space.
So, I can't emphasize enough my concerns about the
increasing debris in this regime.
Senator Bill Nelson. If a paint chip will do that much
damage to the window, what would a bolt do, coming at a 90-
degree angle?
General Chilton. It certainly has the capability of
destroying a satellite.
Senator Bill Nelson. General?
General Shelton. We're concerned about anything, probably
in about the three centimeter size or larger being catastrophic
to our space craft. We are tracking 1,700 pieces, roughly, from
the Chinese ASAT test right now. Our modeling says there are
tens of thousands of pieces larger than one centimeter. So, if
you look at orbital velocities and even those small mass
objects, they cause catastrophic damage if they occur at the
angles that you talked about. It's all dependent on geometries
and orbital velocities, but that's the potential.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do the commercial users of space have
an appreciation for this subject?
General Shelton. Yes, sir. Again, only the objects we can
track. But, of those objects we can track, we are tracking the
potential collisions between pieces of debris and all the
satellites that are in the things that we have in our space
catalogue. When it appears that we will have one of these
conjunction opportunities, we call that commercial provider and
we tell them that it's going to be this close by our estimates.
Senator Bill Nelson. Where is the outrage among the
commercial users as a result of this spreading of debris?
General Shelton. Senator, the outrage is there. It may not
have become public. As you go to various symposia, you hear it
from the operators. They are very concerned.
Senator Bill Nelson. Anybody else want to comment on this?
Okay.
Senator Sessions. General Shelton, how much of a burden has
been put on you to track those additional debris pieces?
General Shelton. It's not the tracking, Senator. It's
really analyzing the tracking data, and predicting those
conjunction opportunities. That's a tremendous burden on our
people. Our systems aren't automated enough that it just spits
that out for us in a routine way. It takes an analyst to take
the data offline and look at it very closely. So, it is a
burden.
Senator Sessions. I thank the chairman for raising this
directly, because I just don't think it's a good citizen act by
the Chinese Government, I think we should be forceful and clear
about our concerns and I thank you for expressing that.
Senator Bill Nelson. The Chinese have put up two
Taikonauts. They're at risk too and that's human, not even to
speak of their government assets that they have up there, so I
think it's time for some of us to start speaking out and making
it really clear to the Chinese just what a dastardly act that
they've done. They can do their ASAT stuff and show their
technological prowess, but when you start messing around,
completely polluting space, that it becomes a hazard for both
man and machines, then it's a different thing.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome the panel before us today. Thank you for
your very important service to our Nation.
We are a Nation, of course, that's heavily dependent upon
our satellite system, not only for the day-to-day capabilities,
communicating instantaneously around the globe, but even
providing driving directions to our cars so that we can get
places instead of getting lost. There have been a lot of
advantages, obviously, and few things are more important,
however, than the tremendous capabilities and advantages our
satellites provide to our military and intelligence
communities. As such, they're very important to the national
security of the United States.
As has already been touched on, we now know that these
capabilities are held at risk after the Chinese test of an
anti-satellite missile and have to work even harder to preserve
and expand our space programs. I think this hearing is
important in that regard because it will help us better
understand what those challenges are and how to overcome them.
I appreciate Chairman Nelson and Senator Sessions for having
the hearing today.
Dr. Sega, you mentioned in your opening statement that one
of your key priorities was not having a gap in missile defense
capabilities. When the Airborne Laser (ABL) becomes
operational, it will be an Air Force asset. One of the unique
aspects of the ABL is its ability to engage in the missile
defense fight without the help of satellites. It is a stand-
alone platform that can track and destroy all classes of
ballistic missiles, and can also communicate with other defense
platforms that do rely on satellites. So, I guess the question
is, as the Under Secretary for the Air Force and the Executive
Agent for Space, can you comment on the usefulness of having
that kind of an autonomous, highly mobile platform available
that would bring to flight, given its capability to operate
independently and operate with other platforms if we had a
problem or attack on our missile defense satellites?
Dr. Sega. Senator, I'll start it in terms of the
capabilities, then I'll hand it off here to my left. We're
trying to provide options, going forward, and in an uncertain
world we think that's important. One of the characteristics
that we do know about the 21st century is the rate of change of
technology will increase. So, as we build satellites, we're not
building them in isolation, nor are we with our airplanes, but
rather we are looking at how they complement each other. How in
this sensing realm, we can mutually cue one sensor on one
satellite and then pass to other systems that may take action.
I think there is a value in having robustness and options
as we go forward. But, the specifics, with respect to how that
would fit into an operational construct, I will pass it over to
General Chilton.
General Chilton. Senator Thune, thank you. I don't mind
being corrected 100 percent on this, but I think that just like
every one of our other missile defense systems, I think ABL
will require the initial tipping and cueing that is provided by
our space-based sensors, like the DSB Constellation and the
SBIRS Constellation, which can see a launch of a missile
anywhere on the planet, which is so cued to first get sensors
looking in the right direction. So, warning, launch in this
direction, this azimuth, turn and look, and I think that is
where ABL can be brought to bear. But, I'll follow-up on that
to make sure I'm 100 percent right on that, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
To follow-up on my answers concerning the Airborne Laser (ABL), I
provide the following comments to correct the record. The ABL does not
require any off-plane cueing; it is equipped with infrared sensors that
will detect and track a boosting missile a full 360 degrees around the
airplane. In fact, it can provide cueing to other platforms for
missiles not within range or not engaged.
General Chilton. The other thing about ABL, if we can prove
that technology, it's a tremendous capability that could
revolutionize the way we think about protecting air space,
either from missile attack or other forces. So, it's an
interesting technology that's being pursued there by the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA).
Senator Thune. One of the things that's a question that's
always raised, and the Congressional Budget Office--as part of
their recommendations of places that you can save money--was to
do away with the program. But, it seems like, from the types of
capabilities that it has in accordance with some of our other
assets that it could really be a useful tool. If you have some
information, my understanding was that it could operate
independently of satellite.
General Chilton. I'll follow-up on that, Senator.
Senator Thune. Yes, I'd be curious to know if that's in
fact true.
General Chilton. Sure.
[The information referred to is mentioned above.]
Senator Thune. So, I guess it seems like, from the Air
Force's standpoint, from a national security standpoint, it
would make sense to continue to provide funding. It is, I think
in the testing phase, obviously they've had a lot of success
with it so far. Dr. Sega, could you comment on, with regard to
whether or not that's something you believe we ought to
continue to look for a way to fund?
Dr. Sega. I believe that's in the MDA budget at this point.
I don't know the trades they are making or if they had to fund
one versus another. From the responsibility I have to help
oversee some of the R&D activities in the Air Force--
previously, I was Director of Defense Research and
Engineering--we want to advance technologies, to advance
options going forward, but I'm not sure exactly where they are
in terms of their budgets and trades that they were making.
Senator Thune. Anybody else?
General Shelton. Just from a STRATCOM perspective, sir, ABL
is very interesting technology and STRATCOM wants to see it
succeed.
Senator Thune. That has been my impression. I know these
become hard decisions when you have to figure out one platform
or weapons system versus another in a tight budget. I'm of a
mind that we need to increase the overall budget for the
military because I don't think we're going to be able to
maintain superiority in some of these areas if we do fall
behind. I would hate to see programs like this be sacrificed
because of budgetary considerations.
Just one other question, if I might. I think as a general
proposition, we have to continue to look to exploit and expand
the advantages that we have in technology when it comes to
defeating our adversaries. But, one of the criticisms that's
often mentioned since September 11, is that we rely too much on
technology to gather intelligence and focus too little of our
energy and resources on gathering human intelligence. I guess
because we rely so heavily on our space capabilities, we've
become incredibly vulnerable from an intelligence and military
perspective, if those capabilities are destroyed. Obviously,
the Chinese anti-satellite missile test underscores that
vulnerability, and I guess I'd be interested in just your
comments or response to that criticism. Dr. Sega, and anybody
else on the panel who would like to chime in about their
perspective on that, should we be focusing on ways to rely less
upon our space capability?
Dr. Sega. Senator, I'll approach it in terms of the
robustness that we are moving toward developing, and then turn
it over to others for the trade space and operations.
One of our initiatives going forward is operational
responsive space. There's an aspect of using current
capabilities in a better way with the ground segments. There's
also the development of smaller satellites launched on smaller
boosters that can be done more quickly, not only to meet new
needs, but potentially to reconstitute a capability after a
satellite is no longer working for a variety of reasons, or to
augment a constellation and improve the revisit time--you would
have more constellations or more satellites in a particular
orbit, therefore you would have less time between revisits.
If I could return to this chart here just for a second. If
a new idea comes out in this area of S&T, the question is how
do you quickly get it to the system production phase, so that
it comes on orbit for the warfighter.
[The information referred to follows:]
What we did last year--Congressman Reyes and Congressman
Everett were there at the time--was to stand up a wing at
Albuquerque called the Space Development and Test Wing, out of
the Space and Missile Systems Center. That's the product
center--they do systems development and systems production
activities. It's right across the street from the Air Force
Research Laboratory Space Vehicles Directorate--they do S&T and
technology development. We're bringing together these entities
so we can accelerate going from an idea to a fielded system; so
we are doing things in a way that we can be more efficient,
more responsive to these new needs; potentially also, testing
these systems in space--and perhaps incorporating them in
larger systems--so you actually check the technologies out in
space.
One example of that, is in December we launched our first
tactical satellite experiment, TACSAT 2, on a Minotaur booster.
We ordered the launcher 7 months prior to actually launching.
The goal in that program is to have the satellite actually
doing its job after just a couple times around the Earth, being
a responsive payload.
We invested in these kinds of capabilities. From 2001 to
2005, we doubled the S&T investment in space-related activity
and now we're starting to bring it on orbit. So, the ability to
reconstitute, to at least have some capability--may be not as
good as the original but not have zero--is one of the goals or
one of the options that we're bringing forward. So, we're
looking at the road ahead and seeing again what options we
could have to bring forward to the warfighter.
General Chilton. Senator, I would hesitate to comment on
how the Director of National Intelligence balances portfolios
for collecting the intelligence we need for our fights between
human technical sides. However, I would, if I could, comment on
intelligence related to space and that within the Air Force
portfolio.
I believe we were in a better position to analyze and
examine the capabilities of potential adversaries before 1991
than we are today, because we had a real threat in the Soviet
Union, who was investing heavily in counter-space and space
technologies that mattered if we ever were to come into the
conflict with them that we so dreaded.
When they collapsed in the early 1990s, we no longer had
that need. What you saw is a decrease in the human capital
side, those who paid attention to that. It was probably
appropriate during that decade that we do that. But, now as we
look to the future, it's no longer just us and another country
in the domain. It's multiple countries in the domain that are
increasing and accelerating in their capabilities. China is a
classic example. We are focusing in the Air Force in the A-2
Directorate under General Deptula, and in Space Command we're
encouraging him along the way to increase that human capital
investment and make sure we're looking to the future and
developing the intelligence analysts and specialists we'll need
at institutions like North American Air Sovereignty
Intelligence Capability as we go into the future.
So, thank you, sir.
General Shelton. Senator, I just wanted to comment on the
ASAT test directly and the response to that. There's a two-
pronged approach you can take. To deal with the ASAT threat
directly, and we're certainly looking at that, but then also to
look at preserving the capability that is threatened by the
ASAT. That runs the spectrum of capabilities that we have,
airborne collection, both manned and unmanned, ground-based
collection capability, ship-based collection capability. So,
we're looking at all those things to ensure that we don't have
all of our eggs in one basket, so that one cheap shot wouldn't
hurt us.
Admiral McArthur. Sir, to offer a different perspective on
this, the Navy feels like the National Strategy for Maritime
Security is a mandate for us developing and deploying
capabilities and affects. A big part of that is maritime domain
awareness. Maritime domain awareness, the architecture to
support that important element is space sensors. Not only space
sensors, but communications to be able to reach back to
databases and analysts who develop that operational picture.
There is a balance in terms of space and other systems, but
without a doubt, space is essential to us for maritime domain
awareness. Part of that will be provided by ORS and we're
looking at the Automatic Identification System (AIS), which
contributes to maritime domain awareness as part of the TACSAT
Program that Dr. Sega briefed. So, important to us, essential,
and again, a critical interdependency from Navy to the joint
space community.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Sega, you mentioned operational responsive space in a
7-month timeframe, what's your goal in terms of being able to
launch a system to fill a need in years to come, in the near
future, let's say?
Dr. Sega. I'll approach the first part and then hand it
over again. From a technical point of view, if you had a more
common bus structure and parts that were available, then going
from a need to the assembly of that system should take less
time. If you could anticipate a satellite that you would want
to have ready for orbit, you could actually be able to build it
and store it and have it available.
The launcher that we used for the TACSAT 2 experiment out
at Wallop's Island was actually part ICBM Minuteman III-based.
A Minuteman III's response time is very fast. If you already
have the spacecraft on the booster, then it's a matter of
minutes and one could launch--if that was your goal. So, we
will bring the technical capability and the acquisition
approach to respond faster, and look at smaller satellites
being able to accomplish the job.
Now, the actual experimentation that we're doing, not only
includes the technical result, but also how it fits into the
operations. So, we're exploring that as well. With that, I'd
like to turn to the operational impact that could be presented
by a TACSAT type of capability.
General Shelton. Yes, sir. Senator, one of the things we're
experimenting with here, is giving a combatant commander direct
access to tasking rather than going through the National
Intelligence Community for tasking assets, giving them direct
access for tasking, and then they get direct reports back for
the data as well. So, a very interesting experiment, much like
we do with airborne intelligence surveillance reconnaissance
today, we're just taking that concept up to space and seeing if
it will be effective.
Senator Sessions. But, you're getting serious consideration
and working to develop a system by which we can replace a
missing capability in short order with the least cost. Is that
the overall concept of this program?
General Chilton. Senator, that's what the combatant
commander and I don't want to put words in your mouth, General
Shelton, so correct me here, but as I said, they're looking at
two fundamental areas. That's what we're exploring. The ability
to augment if we need additional information or additional
capability, even in peace time or in times of heightened
tensions, or replace critical assets. That's in the TACSAT
Program, right now, that we're executing. I think it's
important because we're being able to answer the military
utility question of these types of satellites.
What I would like potential adversaries to understand if
we're successful in this area, is that even if they go after
capabilities that are on orbit today, we will be responsive
enough, either through responsive launch capabilities or
perhaps other capabilities that General Shelton referred to,
air breathing or other, that they will still lose in a
conflict. That in itself can be a deterrent to going after what
we have on orbit today.
If I could just comment on one other thing, because the
operational responsive moniker often gets under some folks'
skin and we, perhaps, could have thought of a better thing, and
will. Because we've never put out a requirement, either myself
or Dr. Kerr, that said, would you please build me a non-
responsive space system. Every one of our space systems that
are on orbit today are responsive and I salute the people, both
in the NRO and in our organizations and Space Command, and
General Shelton wearing his warfighter hat, are always looking
for ways to milk every ounce more capability out of them.
What we're talking about in this construct, is can we build
capabilities in less than 10 years? Can we get a booster that
we don't have to order 2 years in advance? Can we get a system
on orbit that takes less than 6 months to check out, such that
at the end of the day it meets the needs of the warfighter, the
Joint Force Commander in the regions around the world? That's
the way I contextualize this responsive desire of the combatant
commander and that's what we're focused on developing right now
in Air Force Space Command.
Senator Sessions. I think it is a valuable capability and
it made sense to me from the beginning, but I think it's a real
need and needs to be as quick as we can make it.
Dr. Sega, why did the Air Force reduce the planned funding
for space by $400 million? What are the higher priorities that
caused you to redirect that? How do we keep the Air Force from
raiding, again, the space budget?
Dr. Sega. The space budget this year--I'll present it in a
couple of ways. In terms of the percentage of the modernization
accounts from the Air Force, in 2007, as we submitted the
budget request, space represented roughly 17 percent of the Air
Force's modernization account. In 2008, space represents
roughly 21 percent of the Air Force modernization accounts.
Also in our budget, there is the move of funding from one part
of the Air Force budget that's reflected in the numbers that
have the space radar moved to the Defense Reconnaissance
Support Activity account. So, there are two pieces, in terms of
the monies.
Now, in terms of the programs whose funding moved up and
down. One of those, in addition to the radar line being
removed, was the TSAT, and in that line the satellite launch
date was moved approximately 1 year, to 2016. So there was a
reduction there.
Increases occurred to provide the missile warning piece and
some of the early items that may be needed for SBIRS GEO-3, and
SBIRS HEO-3 and -4. There's a lot of money in front-end loading
of that acquisition and that's where the incremental funding
would help. So, we put money in there as well, and also
increased money into AEHF. There were other adjustments, but
those were some of the major ones.
General Chilton. Senator Sessions, if I could comment as
well, sir, on the concept of the Air Force raiding the space
budget. I'm the Air Force Space Command Commander and I fight
in the corporate process alongside the other Major Commanders
for how we invest in our various programs.
Senator, I can tell you that I have not seen better support
in the last few years that I've been in, both the programming
world as the Air Force programmer or in the space business,
than I've seen in this past year. The fact that our Air Force
is challenged with recapitalization in its air-breathing fleet
and our ancient aircraft that we're continuing to fly and need
to replace. When I look at those challenges our Air Force has
and then I look at our recapitalization needs in the space
business, we are nowhere in the problem that we are in the air-
breathing side because we have invested well. The Air Force has
taken hold of their responsibilities to make sure there's
uninterrupted--not only uninterrupted missile warning GPS,
precision navigation and timings, communications, and weather--
but, we're even investing on advancing the ball on those and
improving the capabilities.
Senator Sessions. While you suggest that, presumably we've
thought differently.
General Chilton. I'm sorry?
Senator Sessions. Presumably we've thought differently
about the aircraft issue and space and the critical need to
keep our space capabilities the way we want them to be. So, I'm
not sure that I would buy that, but it's a point I'm sure
others agree with you on.
But, we are going to see some move, it looks like, close to
$9 billion by 2009. Is that the figure I have? For the
transformational satellites, space-based infrareds, space
tracking, space radar, polar operating, polar orbiting
operational environmental satellite systems, will be increasing
substantially in the years to come. We think that should be the
policy of the Government. I think that's what we have put
forth.
Let me ask you this. Tell me about the acquisition
workforce. I guess we're talking about an Air Force that's
working hard like so many businesses are doing to be as lean as
it possibly can be and we're talking about maybe a 40,000-
person reduction in workforce. That can be a real billpayer for
some of the things we like, if you can achieve that without
damaging the Air Force and the responsibilities we have.
Dr. Sega, General Chilton, let me ask you, how can we
ensure that we retain the workforce needed to successfully
deliver on these programs, including systems of engineers,
program managers, and technical experts, as I think there's a
growing consensus in Congress and, actually, in DOD that we
need more in-house expertise as we seek to manage in a cost
efficient way the development of new programs?
General Chilton. Senator, if I could comment on that human
capital that the GAO commented on too, and I don't disagree
with the issue that we're concerned with. I think we got off
the track and I think we've admitted this and we understand
this, not just in the space business, but in all acquisition
business in the late 1990s with our total systems performance
approach to doing business. We stepped back, abrogated our
responsibilities on the Government side, and what we created in
doing that was a bathtub of expertise in middle management at
the major and lieutenant colonel year group levels right now in
our Air Force. A lot of those people looked uphill at the end
of the 1990s and said, ``I don't see a future here with this
management program,'' and they went to industry or left our Air
Force.
So, we recognize that as a challenge, and unfortunately we
can't make those people overnight. You have to grow them.
That's why we're so focused on, as we move to the future, how
we, not only recruit, because I think there's talent out there
that we're, I know there's talent, we'll compete with industry
for coming out of the universities. But, then also, grow and
mature people so that 5, 10 years from now, when I go looking
for a GPS Program Manager to go work at SMC or someone to work
the development of a next major program, I've raised them and
given them that expertise they need to lead in that area.
But, your concerns are valid and they're ones that we are
focused on addressing and that is that core middle management
that left our Air Force at the end of the last year.
Senator Sessions. Have you formed an opinion about what
percentage and how we should strengthen that capability of
management of programs, with regard to uniformed personnel and
civilian personnel?
General Chilton. It's interesting to look at the balance in
that area. We are looking at some military to civilian
conversions out at SMC to boost the number of civil servants we
have in the programs and try to recruit and bring in some of
that mid-level talent in those areas, that will provide some
stability and leadership in the interim. We're about 50/50 in
our civil servants and military workforce out at SMC.
If you go look at ASC, the aeronautical side or the
electronic side, it's quite a substantial difference. There is
a much higher civilian workforce out there. So, we're taking a
look at that balance and how we can leverage the authorities
we've been given to go convert some military to civilian
positions and grow that, and recruit, I should say as opposed
to grow, but recruit the civilian expertise to help us get
through these times that we're in right now. But, we are taking
the long view too here, Senator, in how we raise and develop
people for the future.
Dr. Sega. Yes, Senator Sessions, I absolutely agree with
your points and your concern. I failed to mention in answering
Senator Nelson's question he asked me with regard to Cristina
Chaplain's comments on the acquisition plans going forward, how
it has actually been implemented and institutionalized, it's in
the right direction. I did send out a letter to the DOD with
regard to back-to-basics and the block approach in space
acquisition. In that letter, one of the sentences is: ``The
foundation of this disciplined acquisition approach is an
experienced, high-quality, technically educated Government
workforce actively engaged in all aspects of the enterprise.''
So, I believe it is the foundation going forward.
One of the approaches here, as we mature technology, is
also to take a similar approach for at least a fraction of our
acquisition workforce, and have a workforce development plan.
General Chilton has done that on an individual basis in their
database of space professionals. We look at how they get their
hands on experience in the early years of their career, say in
S&T, and then build up knowledge in terms of their experience
toward the complexity of systems that they will have in the
future. In this way, they will have developed a technical
instinct, as well as management skills, and financial acumen.
Senator Sessions. How would you describe that in terms of a
change in the way we've done business, how big of a change does
that reflect? Anybody, we've heard this talk, we need to go
back to more in-house management, the systems will come out
better in the long run. You seem to agree with that. How
significant of a change are we executing now on your part?
Dr. Sega. Sir, in my view, the change, from what I
understand, happened in the mid-1990s, in terms of having those
responsibilities for the systems be placed outside of
Government to contractors. What we're doing now is very
different. The responsibility of these Government activities
needs to be done by Government folks. They are supported by
contractors and Federally Funded Research and Development
Centers (FFRDCs) and so forth, but that expertise in Government
is key. We have more in-plant presence, for example, in some of
these programs that you heard of earlier today and that's
making a difference. So, I think that discipline includes the
workforce on the Government's side having those necessary jobs
and experiences so they will be successful in our future.
Senator Sessions. I just would say this. We've not been
happy with our contracting procedures. Too many things have
gone over in terms of cost and time and other things, GAO has
pointed this out repeatedly. I do think your back-to-basics,
and the other steps that you're taking seem to already be
paying dividends. I really believe you're committed to this
personally and I think that's why things are moving. Without
your personal leadership, it probably would not. You have to
clear the way for General Chilton sometimes too, so he can do
the things they'd like to do.
Ms. Chaplain, would you want to comment on any of those
subjects?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes, I have several comments. I appreciate
the actions DOD and Air Force are taking on workforce, but we
have concerns about the very near-term workforce that, I think,
need to be addressed very soon. You can't wait for these long-
term efforts.
Just to give you a couple of examples, we visited the EELV
office this year, and learned that 15 people will be retiring
in the very near-term, so EELV's transitioning to a new kind of
contract, it's trying to do a lot of things with those
programs. Does it have the kind of people it needs to manage
that effort?
When we visited the TSAT office, we saw considerable
turnover from the year before, and a lot of people within that
program are just trying to come up to speed. In several of the
space program offices and others weapons programs offices, we
found that the service-type of contractors, they're helping
manage the programs, and the FFRDC's personnel had more
knowledge than the Government personnel, they were the ones
with the institutional knowledge about the program.
I visited a Navy program office earlier this year, where
the program manager told me that he had one guy in the whole
Navy who knew about a particular technology regarding sonar
caps. He lost that guy to retirement, he hired him back as a
contractor. I asked him, ``What are you going to do when he
goes? Do you have a new sonar cap guy?'' He didn't. Finally,
the Navy Lab had recognized that, and were going to grow
somebody new, but that takes several years. As I understand in
space, it takes several years to grow new personnel, so that's
on one side where we see immediate needs to address workforce
issues.
We also have concerns about the growing reliance on
contractors in programs to manage those programs. Issues like,
who is really making decisions on the programs come to mind.
How is oversight being executed? How is the Government dealing
with potential conflicts of interest? So, we have a two-sided
concern with workforce that is still on the table.
Senator Sessions. Okay, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I'm glad
you're back, and I did have a question about the $500 million
funding reduction and how that will impact the TSAT and what
delays we'll be looking. Maybe we can submit that for the
record. I'm finished.
[The information referred to follows:]
The hearing transcript also indicates a question from Senator
Sessions about a funding reduction and how that will impact the
Transformational Satellite program. Dr. Sega stated that an immediate
impact of the reduction would be a 1-year delay in the satellite launch
date. We have not assessed the impact of the reduction in detail, but I
would add that unanticipated funding reductions may also affect
procurement of long-lead items and the ability to obtain and retain
critical technical and business skills within the program. As
emphasized in our testimony, the Air Force and Department of Defense
could reduce the need for funding shifts in space programs by
prioritizing its investment decisions and obtaining long-term funding
commitments.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, I have a few questions, and then
what we'll do is recess and we will reconvene in a closed
session in Russell 222. Jeff, are you going to meet us over
there?
Senator Sessions. Yes.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
There's been much criticism of the late 1990s of the
policies that let 40,000 people go. Does space, does it need to
have an exemption from reduction? For instance, the Air Force
reduction that had 40,000 people there?
General Shelton. Senator, the reduction at the Air Force is
on a glide path floor for about 40,000 of end strength from
360,000 down to the vicinity of 320,000, is one that--those
reductions were asked to be put in, and laid into the program
across the FYDP, and Air Force Space Command took a real hard
look at that last year when we were asked to put our share in,
because this was divided up across the entire Air Force. We
looked at it very carefully, and we believe there are
reductions that we will take, are ones that we can continue to
sustain our operations and development programs, and that they
are reasonable reductions.
I would also point out though, Senator, that our Chief and
Secretary have said that given the proposed growth and end
strength of the Army, and potential Marine Corps is being
considered, I know, by Congress, that the Air Force is going to
stop and take a look at future reductions beyond 2009 for the
FYDP, and ask the question, if that growth occurs, does that
require growth in the Air Force as well, as part of the Joint
Team? So, I know the Chief and Secretary have testified that
they intend to look at that this summer as they go forward, and
perhaps re-address the reductions in 2009.
Senator Bill Nelson. Why do you think the National Security
Space Initiative funding is substantially reduced in fiscal
year 2008?
General Shelton. Senator, I think there were competitions
for funds, always, and we're focusing on recapitalizing all of
our key constellations. It's an area we could use additional
help in, I don't mind saying, sir, in two-fold areas.
One, is we're currently renting a facility in downtown
Colorado Springs that doesn't have the capacity for this
institution, and I would like to see us get on with the
military construction of the facility on Peterson Air Force
Base where I can alleviate force protection concerns, but also
grow the facility to meet the demands. It's been so successful,
that the United States Army certifies every one of their FA-
40s, their Space Officers, comes through our Space 200 course
that's taught at the Nonproliferation and National Security
Institute.
The additional funding we could use in this area would also
improve not only the seats that we could accommodate, and put
through the school, but also the quality of our Space 200 and
300 courses, which I have asked the institute to raise the bar
on, to make them a little more challenging, a little more
encompassing.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, will the Air Force
complete and have approval of the TSAT requirements by July of
this year?
Dr. Sega. Mr. Chairman, I believe that on the TSAT program
we have a system review that's coming up in conjunction with an
ICE that's also being done, and that process will go on and be
completed by this calendar year. Our target is by the end of
the summer, but I'll say that this work on TSAT will be done by
the end of the calendar year.
Senator Bill Nelson. So there is some delay, why is that
delay?
Dr. Sega. I don't anticipate a significant delay. The
system is in review, and it is important for us to identify on
a more detailed level the TSAT program status. The testing that
was done on two of the very important technologies--the laser
cross-link, and the next-generation process router--took place
here in the last couple of months, and they have been
successful. So, both contractor teams have passed on those
critical technologies, where they needed to be to go forward.
So, our goal is, by the end of this summer, to have that in
place. The SDR, and moving toward a review of the cost in the
ICE so we're in a better position to go forward.
The first stop is technology maturity, requirements, SDR,
and the cost estimation.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, do you think those critical
technologies will be done by October?
Dr. Sega. Sir, what we had required going up to the SDR, by
and large, are complete now.
Senator Bill Nelson. What would be demonstrated by October?
Dr. Sega. In terms of the design work, we went through a
series of testing events that occurred at Lincoln Laboratory.
On the S&T key technologies, the next-generation processor
router and the laser communications, over the last couple of
months. That was rigorous testing, and that was our principle
look in terms of the technology going forward. Obviously,
there's more work to do, but those hurdles were done in the
Phase I and Phase II and are nearly complete.
Senator Bill Nelson. What is the backup plan if the fourth
AEHF is not reinstated?
Dr. Sega. Our plan is to complete the work on AEHF I, II,
and III, to do the risk-reduction--which we are doing on TSAT--
the design, and go forward on the TSAT program with the back-
to-basics block approach. We've reduced some of the
requirements for the Block I than we had in the full program,
so we've reduced some of that risk to increase our confidence
that it will be delivered on time, and in our date which we are
anticipating launch, on this schedule, with 80 percent
confidence after CDR, is 2016. That should not have a gap in
capability, and I would refer to General Chilton and General
Shelton on that. We're going to need to have synchronization
with other needs, as well as continuity of strategic
communications. That should be maintained with a launch in
2016. I believe the convergence--the synchronization rate--is
approximately 2018.
General Chilton. That's correct, Senator. As you mentioned,
you see in this program the initial launch date of a TSAT
system is moved to 2016 from 2015. We took a hard look at
actual need dates, and the sweet spot, if you will, on the
schedule that was based on user equipment purchases, Army
requirements with regard to FCS, space radar requirements with
regard to bandwidth, and then also the risk Dr. Sega talked
about with regard to gapping critical communications
capability, and the sweet spot is 2018. I'm comfortable with a
2016 launch of the first TSAT, I'm not comfortable with the
2017, because it classically takes several months for a first
satellite to be tested and checked out, and I think we're right
at my comfort limit right now for a launch date of 2016 for
that system.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, how important is AEHF, and
TSAT to the Navy?
Admiral McArthur. Sir, TSAT is most important to the Navy,
and the capacity that it will provide, essentially 10 times of
what we see in the AEHF, the fact that it's protected
communications, which we have others, but it's still
protected--but most importantly it's the speed at which you can
pass data with our ISR systems. Our expectation is 2016, we'll
follow through on. We're synchronizing our other programs, the
ground segment, the user segment, the ISR systems that, advance
systems that we expect to come on board--we're synchronizing
them with that date and are satisfied with 2016, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, what's your assessment
of the progress of TSAT?
Ms. Chaplain. We believe the practices that TSAT is
adopting do give you more schedule certainty. But there are
still risks in the program, especially down the road when it
comes to software that needs to be developed, and integration.
So, obviously, the lower-risk investment is to continue with
the AHF buy, if you had to make a choice. Ideally, you'd be
funding both, and just to keep things on an even keel, and I
don't like abdicating cutting a program that's doing well, and
trying to adopt best practices, but if you looked at it just
from a risk perspective, continuing the AHF would be the lower-
risk approach.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary and General Chilton, the
news recently indicates there is a debate going on between the
Intelligence Community and the military community with regard
to the NRL sensor on the TACSAT 2, and that the sensor is not
turned on, and the issues is still not solved. How does this
issue get resolved, so that the sensor can get tested?
General Chilton. Senator, I think the issue is a discussion
on title 10 and title 50 authorities and responsibilities. I
look at the question the same way I would look at a U2 air-
breathing intelligence collecting platform, the U2 Dragon Lady
that the Air Force operates.
It does optical and radar reconnaissance that supports both
the title 50 community, as well as the Joint Forces Commander
in the theater that that airplane is operating in. It does the
same with regard to signals collection, which can support both
the title 50 community, as well as the Title 10 joint
warfighter. I don't see an issue that we can't work through
about developing space capability along the lines of these
TACSATs, or ORS, eventually, when we start talking about an
augmentation or a replacement capability that cannot be treated
in a similar fashion as we treat our U2s, as we treat our RC-
135s which do both title 50 and title 10 work.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is this silly turf-fighting?
General Chilton. Sir, I wouldn't call it that, I would say
there are folks used to authorities and how they operated in
the past, and this is really new ground in the space domain. It
is something we have worked through in the air domain many
years ago, so maybe some folks were surprised by the payloads
on TACSAT, we certainly didn't hide those, but this debate is
coming up, I think it's one that can be easily resolved.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are we about to miss testing a sensor
as a result of this in-fighting?
General Chilton. Senator, I was not aware about the not
being turned on portion that you briefed, I knew there was an
issue. So, I might have to defer to General Shelton on that. I
know the imagery sensor, which takes photographs, is turned on
and is going through test and checkout, so I will defer this to
General Shelton.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is there a problem, General Shelton?
General Shelton. Yes, sir, there is. AIS is the sensor that
Admiral McArthur referred to earlier, and that has been
problematic, and we'll continue to work this, and as General
Chilton said, I'm confident we can work through it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is there this turf battle between the
Intelligence Community and military community?
General Shelton. Again, I wouldn't characterize it as a
turf battle, I would characterize it as a new, first out-of-
the-box kind of capability where what has been the sole purview
of the National Intelligence Community from space is now going
into the DOD in a space-based capability. So, working through
the authorities, working through the law that exists, it's just
going to take some time. So, there are plenty of lawyers
involved helping us with this one.
Admiral McArthur. Sir, I would like to say, though, that
the Navy is anxious to experiment with a new doctrine and new
tactics and techniques and procedures. We made references
earlier to combatant commander tasking of sensors, and that's
reflected in the initial concept of operations of U.S. STRATCOM
for ORS.
We're working within the Joint Space community, with the
Intelligence Community to resolve these doctrine of the past,
to transform to a new way of doing business. We have forces
that are deployed today, standing by to task that AIS sensor
when we clear a couple of hurdles. Thank you, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Does this need to be drawn to the
attention of the head of the Central Intelligence Agency and
General Hayden?
Admiral McArthur. No, sir, the resolution of previous
doctrine and policy is underway today. We have leadership
within the Intelligence Community and the DOD that are working
to change and transform. So, we're again, looking forward to
experimenting with a new doctrine.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, if you all resolve this, this is
going to take care of future TACSATs?
General Shelton. Senator, that would be our design, is that
we get this resolved, and we move forward.
Senator Bill Nelson. If you need a little help, let me
know.
Senator Sessions. Senator Nelson also runs the Intelligence
Committee, too.
Admiral McArthur. This discussion should be helpful enough.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let's talk about iGPS. Tell us, are
you all familiar with that concept?
Dr. Sega. iGPS is one of several proposed options for
augmentation of GPS. Augmentation takes many forms around the
planet in terms of getting additional accuracy--it's done in
agriculture--it's done in a variety of other ways. We do it in
different ways on the defense side, and iGPS would be one
technique toward an augmentation. So it's important to keep our
eyes open and look at different options for augmentation, but
it's one of a variety of augmentation approaches.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are the GPS terminals, are they going
to be compatible with the iGPS?
General Chilton. Sir, I don't know the answer to that
question, I have received a briefing on the iGPS concept, and
which is, I think, Dr. Sega described accurately, but I'd like
to take that for the record, Senator, and bring you an answer
back on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
I do recall from an iGPS briefing that iGPS leverages the Iridium
Constellation and the Department of Defense supported the President's
budget to develop iGPS capabilities. If you accept this path, then you
look at a need to reconstitute the Iridium Constellation, which is not
in the current program.
Specifically, to answer your previous question, I submit the
following information:
To review, the iGPS industry concept proposes a regional
augmentation of GPS that includes the communications capability of
Iridium. iGPS envisions use of low-flying Iridium satellites (in 500NM
orbits), new reference stations situated in the AOR, as well as iGPS
user equipment to deliver improved accuracy, availability, anti-jam
resistance, and two-way communications.
Current GPS military user equipment is not compatible with the iGPS
concept. New user equipment would have to be designed and fielded, a
requirements definition and developmental engineering process taking
several years before this capability would be available for the
military.
To employ this concept would require building new iGPS reference
stations, most likely overseas, where there is force protection and
basing issues. The number of reference stations required would depend
on the iGPS coverage needed.
The Air Force has not studied the overall iGPS costs; however, the
cost of reconstituting the Iridium Constellation is likely to be on the
order of $5 billion. User equipment costs would depend on the number
and variety of users requesting iGPS service. There are also unknown
costs related to modification of the control segment, development,
basing and force protection of the additional iGPS reference stations,
and an annual service fee.
The time required to operationalize iGPS and its useful life would
be contingent on its final scope and concept of operations. The sense
of the GPS community is that the GPS IIIB era will be on hand (fiscal
year 2016) by the time iGPS would be a fully operational military
system. While we have examined iGPS only as a military augmentation
system, properly equipped civil and commercial users could benefit if
they were in a coverage area.
Though iGPS is a great example of ingenuity, it would only provide
military users some additional limited capabilities for a few years.
iGPS presents unquantifiable costs with respect to Iridium's LEO orbit
with increased vulnerability to counter-space action and increased
overseas footprint. Lastly iGPS does not remove the necessity for GPS
III, which independent of iGPS, shall meet the full set of military and
civil user requirements.
Senator Bill Nelson. I understand there is a problem, and
also additional ground antennas or relays would also be needed
to make it functional, and of course we'd like to know the cost
of the concept, who would use it, when it would be operational,
and how long it would be usable?
General Chilton. Senator, I'd be happy to provide the
answers for the record for that. One thing I do recall from the
briefing on iGPS is that it leverages the Iridium
Constellation, and if you go down that path, then you look at a
need to reconstitute that constellation, which of course, is
not in the current program.
Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, there are rumors going
around that the terminal programs are lagging behind the
satellite programs, and that there is also a shortage of
terminals. If that's the case, how does it get fixed?
Ms. Chaplain. We've just started looking at this issue
ourselves, and we do have questions about the synchronization
of the acquisitions, at least in the GPS area, and I know
there's a few more programs that we have questions about. How
you fix it requires a lot more coordination between the two
efforts, and balanced funding to make sure that they march down
the same path. If the terminals lag too far behind, you're
missing opportunities to extract new capabilities, and in
essence, wasting investments in these new satellites if you
can't use them with the ground equipment. So, it's something
we're going to be looking at more this year.
Senator Bill Nelson. For example, you can't even utilize
the M Code on the GPS satellite, because there are no fielded
terminals.
Ms. Chaplain. Yes.
Senator Bill Nelson. What do you think about that, General
Chilton?
General Chilton. Sir, we're just starting to field the M
Code on the II-RM satellites right now, we just have three of
those up, I believe----
Dr. Sega. That's correct.
General Chilton.--five more to follow. So, you're exactly
right, Christina, there is a balance that we have to manage
between fielding terminals and satellite capability because you
don't want to waste capability on orbit.
I'd say, also, the other thing we need to keep our eye on,
Senator, is not only the terminals that the user uses, which
are classically fielded and paid for by the individual Services
that are buying those, in the GPS case, but in our Command and
Control element for GPS. This is an area, the AEP program, and
the OCX programs that we're very focused on in Space Command to
make sure we get that transition to new Command and Control
architecture on GPS safely done this summer, and then manage
into the future, so that when you have the satellites on orbit,
you can even turn on the new capabilities, and make sure we can
command and control it. So, it's a multiple-pronged issue that
is exactly on mark that we stay synchronized, not only building
the satellite element, but the ground element that goes with
it, and the user equipment.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you. We will recess the
subcommittee, and we will reconvene in Russell 222 for a closed
session. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
CHINA ANTI-SATELLITE TEST
1. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, and General
Shelton, in January, the Chinese conducted a successful test of a
kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. What are the implications for our
space programs and what capabilities do we need to improve?
Dr. Sega. Given the critical importance of our space assets, we
must improve our ability to detect space objects and characterize them
as quickly as possible. To help accomplish this, the Air Force is
currently pursuing upgrades and new capabilities to improve Space
Situational Awareness (SSA), such as the Space Fence and Space-Based
Space Surveillance (SBSS). Additionally, the Department of Defense
(DOD) is expanding its ongoing emphasis on new technology and tactics,
and working to develop a surge, augmentation, and reconstution
capability through the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program.
General Chilton. Today, our surveillance, analysis, and data-
sharing capabilities do not adequately support our emerging needs to
rapidly identify and understand the threats to our space systems. We
must improve our ability to detect the threat and characterize it as
soon as possible--preferably before launch--to give ourselves maximum
time to avoid or at least mitigate the risk using all available
instruments of national power. We also must improve our capability to
detect and evaluate the risk from all debris, man-made and natural. Our
analysts did an incredible job quickly characterizing the debris cloud,
but they are constrained by an antiquated computer system, a Cold War-
era communications structure, and a patchwork of surveillance systems
that were not designed from the ground up to provide the type of SSA we
now require.
To that end, we have programs in place which will improve existing
capabilities. Space Based Infrared System and Space Tracking and
Surveillance System will help us characterize launches and identify
potential threats more quickly. Integrated Space Situational Awareness
(ISSA) will provide increased accuracy and improved processing over the
1980s-era Space Defense Operations Center computer system. The Rapid
Attack Identification and Detection Reporting System (RAIDRS) will
enable us to not only detect and assess threats but will suggest
potential courses of action to the Joint Functional Component Commander
for Space (JFCC SPACE). The Space Command and Control (C2) program will
enable JFCC SPACE to respond to threats and execute protective
operations while there is still time to defend our systems. The Space
Fence, Space Surveillance Telescope, and other Space Surveillance
Network (SSN) recapitalization programs will enable us to characterize
a debris cloud or other potential threats and assess risk to other on-
orbit systems in a fraction of the time it takes today.
Lastly, the ability to posture our space capabilities and effects
during and after an event is paramount to maintaining space
superiority. We are focused on delivering, deploying, and employing
operationally responsive technologies, systems, and associated tactics
to augment, recover, and replenish space capabilities for combatant
commanders and national defense.
General Shelton. Implications of the successful Chinese ASAT test
include increased risks to manned and unmanned space assets for all
space-faring nations. We need to improve the persistent and predictive
nature of SSA capabilities (sensing and analyzing), and combine this
with command and control capabilities in a timely and relevant fashion
to enhance a decisionmaker's ability to determine and execute
appropriate courses of action. Deploying and employing responsive space
elements to exploit new technologies and operational capabilities, as
well as augment or reconstitute existing capabilities, strengthens the
perseverance of space effects and provides the flexibility to respond,
when and where needed.
2. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, and General
Shelton, the Air Force unfunded priorities list includes funding for
SSA activities. Could you address the need for additional SSA
capability and why is it important?
Dr. Sega. SSA is an increasingly important component of space
operations. It includes the ability to surveil the space domain with
the goal of identifying and classifying objects in space, in as near
real time as possible. The fiscal year 2008 President's budget includes
funding for the first SBSS satellite which is scheduled to launch in
fiscal year 2009, and should improve our ability to rapidly find, fix,
and track orbiting objects. In the future, satellite ``self awareness''
capabilities will also become increasingly important.
General Chilton. Preserving our advantage in space is a
prerequisite for everything we do. SSA is the foundation for all space
operations but in particular for space defense. We can't protect our
critical space systems and can't respond to emerging threats without
knowing what might threaten them. SSA allows us the ability to
effectively surveil the space domain with the goal of answering, in as
near- to real-time as possible, the questions of ``who, what, when,
where, how, and why?'' The answers to these questions are vital to the
commander responsible for operations in any domain.
Today, we are reaching the limits of what our computer system was
designed to handle so we need to invest in new system like ISSA. ISSA
will handle the growth anticipated in on-orbit population as well as
provide the increased accuracy demanded by today's users. Our SSN is a
combination of Cold War-era systems and most of the systems are decades
old and our surveillance network is in drastic need of modernization or
replacement. We have a critical space surveillance sensor gap in the
southern hemisphere. We must continue to sustain our current systems
while we invest in the Space Fence program and the SBSS. The Space
Fence program will give us a quantum leap in being able to detect and
track small objects like micro-satellites, combined with deploying
sites overseas. The SBSS will give us unprecedented abilities to ensure
we can maintain custody of objects in orbit. These two programs will
fill key shortfalls in our abilities today.
Even as we try to find a way to recapitalize the SSN, we must take
better advantage of the information and systems that we have. We need
to be able to monitor, collect, fuse, and exploit information from the
SSN, missile defense sensors, and many other sources to provide near-
real time global awareness to our commanders so that they can make
well-informed, timely decisions. We must continue to sustain our
existing systems to avoid gaps while delivering new transformational
capabilities.
General Shelton. Current SSA methods are focused on reactive
measures designed to identify, track, analyze, and assess objects
within the space environment. The need for additional proactive SSA
capabilities enabled by advanced net-centric architectures that
integrate data sources and are predictive are necessary to defend our
freedom of action in space. The escalating number of objects in, and
threats to, our space capabilities, places our national and manned
space assets at increased risk. SSA modernization will provide the
foundation required to anticipate and respond to the pending
accidental, environmental, or intentional threats posed to our space
systems.
SPACE DEBRIS
3. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, and General
Shelton, the Air Force maintains a catalogue of space debris--the
Chinese test created thousands of new pieces of space debris. How does
that debris affect U.S. military and commercial space programs?
Dr. Sega. Some of the debris generated from the Chinese ASAT test
will remain in orbit for decades and is in the same orbital regime as
many United States space assets. Because of this, there is a potential
that tracked and/or untracked debris pieces too small to track could
collide with an on-orbit satellite. The Joint Functional Component
Command for Space (JFCC SPACE) at Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California, monitors trackable space debris closely and continues to
accomplish conjunction assessments on a daily basis. In this way, they
can determine close approaches between the trackable debris and U.S.
space assets and recommend these assets be maneuvered, if necessary.
General Chilton. The debris generated from the Chinese ASAT test
will present a risk of collision for decades to come. The pieces of
debris created by the Chinese are in the same orbit regime as many U.S.
space assets and as such there is a threat that tracked and/or
untracked debris pieces could collide with an on-orbit satellite. JFCC
SPACE monitors the situation closely and continues to accomplish
conjunction assessments on a daily basis to determine close approaches
from the debris with U.S. assets.
General Shelton. Increased space debris creates a tremendous burden
on the space professionals tasked with analyzing and predicting
conjunction opportunities. Insufficient automation and processing
requires an analyst to individually review the data closely once an
object has been identified as a possible threat to a space asset
regardless of whether it is a commercial or military platform. Post
event modeling indicates that the probability of a low earth orbit
satellite being hit by debris increased 10-40 percent over a 5-year
period. Given the extensive de-orbit timeline for this newly created
space debris, its impact on military and commercial systems will be
felt for years to come.
4. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, and General
Shelton, DOD relies heavily on commercial satellite capabilities as
does the U.S. economy, will the Air Force continue to provide
notification of debris location to the commercial space industry? There
is some ongoing confusion about whether funding is available in fiscal
year 2008 to do this.
Dr. Sega. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) provides space
surveillance data to non-U.S. Government entities through its pilot
program ``Support to Commercial, Foreign Entities (CFE),'' as
authorized in the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year
2004.
Satellite position data, as well as debris data, is made available
through the CFE Web site to any registered user. CFE is not funded as a
separate line item by Congress, but AFSPC has, to date, funded the 3-
year pilot program which is scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal
year 2009. Additionally, the Joint Space Operations Center provides
notification to U.S. commercial satellite operators when potential
collisions with the debris are predicted.
The Air Force currently intends to fund the program in fiscal year
2008 and keep the Web site operational. AFSPC could evolve the existing
CFE pilot program from a basic Web site to an improved operational
capability that provides advanced services (conjunction assessment,
launch screening, anomaly resolution, et cetera) to a wide variety of
customers, to include commercial, allied, public, and foreign
interests. However, resources are currently not available within the
budget for full implementation of the program.
General Chilton. The National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal
Year 2004 (signed 24 Nov 03) allows the Secretary of Defense to carry
out a pilot program to determine feasibility and desirability of
providing non-United States Government entities space surveillance
tracking services, data, and analysis. This pilot program is called
Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) and has been re-delegated from
SECAF to AFSPC. The primary goal of the pilot program is to enhance DOD
SSA and to meet DOD objectives by providing timely, accurate, and
state-of-the-art surveillance services to commercial and foreign
entities, as resources permit; and to normalize the processes used to
provide this support. Satellite position data, as well as debris data,
are made available through the CFE Web site to any registered user.
This pilot program is unfunded; however, AFSPC will continue to seek
funds to keep the Web site operational for fiscal year 2008.
General Shelton. AFSPC provides space surveillance data to non-U.S.
Government entities through its pilot program ``Support to CFE.'' No
specific ``debris notification'' is proactively issued to commercial
space industry, but ephemeris data is made available through the CFE
Web site to any registered user. CFE is not funded as a separate line
item by Congress. AFSPC has voluntarily funded the 3-year pilot program
scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2007. Fiscal year 2008
funding is undetermined at this time. USSTRATCOM would like to see the
Air Force continue this program and mature its capabilities, while
preserving operational security of ongoing space operations.
5. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, General Shelton,
and Admiral McArthur, continuing with how to respond to the debris
issue, do you believe it is time to look at additional international
solutions to controlling and mitigating debris?
Dr. Sega. The existing legal regime, including treaties, adequately
addresses the issue of orbital debris. The United States is taking a
leadership role in international fora to encourage foreign nations and
international organizations to adopt policies and practices aimed at
debris minimization. The United States also seeks to minimize the
creation of orbital debris by its own government and non-government
operations in space, as is outlined in the President's National Space
Policy.
General Chilton. The existing legal regime, including treaties,
adequately addresses the issue of orbital debris and new legal
solutions are not necessary. The United States is taking a leadership
role in international fora to encourage foreign nations and
international organizations to adopt policies and practices aimed at
debris minimization. Of course, the United States also seeks to
minimize the creation of orbital debris by its own government and non-
government operations in space, as is mentioned in the President's
National Space Policy.
General Shelton. Yes. Controlling, minimizing, and mitigating space
debris is beneficial to all space fairing nations and global users of
space products. National Space Policy directs that ``The United States
shall take a leadership role in international fora to encourage foreign
nations and international organizations to adopt policies and practices
aimed at debris minimization and shall cooperate in the exchange of
information on debris research and the identification of improved
debris mitigation practices.'' Consistent with this policy, the United
States should pursue international solutions incorporating allied or
U.N. involvement through diplomatic and/or technical solutions.
Admiral McArthur. Yes. Controlling, minimizing, and mitigating
space debris are beneficial to all space-faring nations and global
users of space products. National Space Policy directs that ``The
United States shall take a leadership role in international fora to
encourage foreign nations and international organizations to adopt
policies and practices aimed at debris minimization and shall cooperate
in the exchange of information on debris research and the
identification of improved debris mitigation practices.'' Consistent
with this policy, the United States should pursue international
solutions incorporating allied or U.N. partnerships to influence the
global space community in this area through diplomatic and/or technical
and scientific channels.
OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE
6. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, General Chilton, and General
Shelton, I am glad to see that the Air Force has included funding for
ORS. The three main elements of ORS are launch, satellite buses, and
sensors. How should we think about dividing time, attention, and
funding among these three pieces of ORS? Is the fiscal year 2008 budget
request balanced appropriately?
Dr. Sega. Yes, the fiscal year 2008 ORS budget request is an
appropriately balanced request. The request includes funding for the
launch of tactical satellite (TACSAT) experiments demonstrating new
sensor capabilities; the beginning of the development of an operational
series of spacecraft; and the purchase of launch vehicles, while
providing funds to examine the ground infrastructure necessary to fully
use the spacecraft. This budget request is intended to be complemented
by research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) resources from
organizations such as the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL), the Naval
Research Lab (NRL), and the Army's Space and Missile Defense Command
(SMDC). Flexible funding arrangements are also critical to dynamically
balance resources to meet urgent needs.
General Chilton. The ORS budget is an appropriately balanced
request and is detailed as follows:
[In millions of dollars]
Operational TACSAT Block 1................................. $21.600
Operational launch vehicle multi-vehicle buy............... 34.000
Operational capability development and integration......... 3.500
Ground processing, dissemination, and command and control.. 3.600
TACSAT-4 launch vehicle and operations..................... 18.215
Perform analysis and assess alternative concepts/ 4.300
requirements and program support..........................
TACSAT-3 and -4 Launch..................................... 1.817
The request includes funding for the launch of TACSAT experiments
demonstrating new sensor capabilities, the beginning of the development
of an operational series of spacecraft, purchase of launch vehicles,
and provides funds for examining the ground infrastructure necessary to
fully use the spacecraft. This budget request is supported by the RDT&E
requests from the AFRL, NRL, and the Army's Space and Missile
Development Center which funds the development of new sensors. Flexible
funding arrangements are critical to dynamically balance resources to
meet urgent needs.
General Shelton. ORS is a broader concept than improving the
responsiveness of spacelift (to include ranges), satellites, and
sensors. ORS will enable improved integration through rapid deployment/
employment of new, pre-planned, or existing capabilities. It will link
operational, acquisition, industry partners, and science and technology
communities to rapidly exploit emergent capabilities to fill
operational gaps. ORS will generate warfighting effects for operational
and tactical use in response to urgent or unanticipated needs. The
focus is on responsiveness. Tasked by a Joint Force Commander (JFC), it
will be timely and targeted to the need, while enhancing survivability
and adversary deterrence.
The budget is balanced appropriately. There is sufficient funding
to standup the ORS office, investigate what the office should initially
focus on, and buy some long lead item components to make ORS a reality
for the warfighter. Funding concerns exist relative to resources in the
out years and support from Congress going forward will be critical to
continued success.
7. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral McArthur, what is the Navy vision
for ORS and what is the Navy's role in ORS?
Admiral McArthur. The Navy vision for ORS is to provide a more
affordable way to get beyond the line of sight of communication
capabilities, rapid-reaction ISR sensors, and other tactically and
operationally significant payloads, on orbit, in a tactically relevant
timeframe to respond to asymmetric challenges and hedge against
uncertainty. Navy supports ORS because maritime forces need the
flexibility that ORS offers to augment and reconstitute critical
warfighting capabilities in order to counter increasingly agile
adversaries.
Navy's role in ORS is to be a partner in a truly joint effort to
build on the TACSAT series of experiments and deliver an operational
capability to the JFC. We realize that ORS is more than just smaller,
rapidly developed satellites and requires an end-to-end examination to
develop the agility and capabilities needed to rapidly adapt to the
ever evolving threat environment facing our JFCs.
8. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral McArthur, how should the joint ORS
office be structured, funded, and staffed?
Admiral McArthur. Navy actively participated in the congressionally
directed 120-day ORS study and supports its findings. This study report
titled ``Plan for Operationally Responsive Space'' was provided to
Congress at the end of April and lays out the structure, funding, and
staffing plan for the joint ORS office. To obtain the depth and breadth
of expertise in both space systems and joint warfighting, with
reachback to the entire National Security Space (NSS) community, the
office should be staffed with trained personnel from all Services,
agencies, and the Intelligence Community. We need to build on the
TACSAT series of experiments to reflect the partnerships that need to
be developed among the Services, COCOMs, and Intelligence Community to
provide innovative solutions and leverage the best talent available
across the NSS community to solve warfighting challenges. The ORS
office should be a truly joint office with the military departments and
agencies nominating candidates for the director and top leadership
positions to the ORS Executive Committee and DOD Executive Agent (EA)
for Space for review and selection.
As described in the ``Plan for Operationally Responsive Space,''
responsibility for funding joint ORS capabilities belongs to the DOD EA
for Space through the Program Elements listed in the report. As part of
the joint TACSAT and ORS effort, Navy, through the Office of Naval
Research (ONR), is investing $15 million of S&T funds each year in
moderate-to-high-risk projects that result in significant prototypes
through the Space Innovative Naval Prototype program. Investments are
focused on naval capability gaps that space can fill such as ship
tracking, data exfiltration from buoys, communications-on-the-move,
submarine detection, cueing, and littoral characterization. NRL led
development of a ship tracking payload for TACSAT-1 and a secondary
payload on TACSAT-2. ONR is providing a secondary payload for TACSAT-3
that provides a basic IP-based data exfiltration capability. NRL is
leading TACSAT-4 for the joint community with ONR funding the UHF
Communications payload to support comms-on-the-move and data
exfiltration. TACSAT-4 uses a prototype spacecraft bus resulting from a
broad government-industry team effort to develop and mature bus
standards for increased modularity. The spacecraft should be completed
by the first half of next year and will be launched into a highly
elliptical orbit to provide long dwells over theater. NRL is managing
the ORS Payload Technology initiative for OSD. This initiative jointly
evaluated 75 industry proposals and awarded 14 which are being
developed by industry now and over the course of the next year.
9. Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, from the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) perspective, what are the most important
elements in keeping ORS responsive and inexpensive?
Mr. Chaplain. ORS represents a collection of efforts designed to
deliver space-based capabilities to warfighters more efficiently and
effectively. They encompass development of small-size tactical
satellites, cheaper and smaller launch systems, standardized satellite
components, as well as efforts that are exploring new design techniques
and ways to better protect space-based equipment. There are a variety
of ways ORS can help to improve the way satellites are acquired in
DOD--for example, by providing opportunities and resources to test out
future sensors and software; reducing pressure to satisfy al! war
fighting requirements in a single, large program; and developing common
approaches to design and production.
At your request, we are initialing a review that will focus on
progress DOD is making in implementing these initiatives as well as a
strategy on managing and coordinating these efforts. Our past work,
however, has already identified elements that need to be in place to
make ORS a success. Figure below highlights these.
Within the science and technology (S&T) community, for example,
there needs to be effective prioritizing of investments between ORS
projects and non-ORS projects, so that DOD can ensure that critical
technology development efforts, such as the development of advanced
batteries, are adequately funded. There also needs to be effective
coordination among S&T organizations, industry, and the acquisition
community, so that lessons learned from ORS can be effectively
integrated into the larger acquisition programs and ultimately
engrained in the organizational culture. Our past work has generally
found that efforts are not adequately coordinated nor are S&T
investments strategically balanced and prioritized.
Likewise, within the acquisition community, there needs to be a
sustained commitment to using best practices and a willingness to
examine alternatives in technologies, design and development
techniques, and different ways to satisfy requirements. Our testimony
noted that while current leadership has embraced adopting best
practices, there was no guarantee that this commitment could be
sustained until DOD changed its policies and processes surrounding
space acquisitions.
Finally, our best practice work has identified elements that need
to be in place to ensure a smooth transition between projects that have
been a success in the S&T community to the acquisition community. They
include transition plans and agreements; managers to guide the
transition process; measures focused on feasibility, relevance, and
readiness; and a gated review processes to ensure that the right
progress is being made and enlist product line commitment. Leading
commercial companies use these techniques for successfully developing
and transitioning technologies, with the basic premise being that
technologies must be mature before transitioning to the product line
side. At present, however, DOD lacks the breadth and depth of these
techniques, and it routinely accepts high levels of technology risk at
the start of major weapon acquisition programs. These shortcomings
contribute significantly to DOD's poor cost and schedule outcomes.
Our ORS review will assess whether these elements are in place and
it will seek additional input from the S&T community and others on what
additional tools can enable success. We look forward to reporting on
the results of our review early next year.
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE OFFICE
10. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shelton and Dr. Sega, following
the decision to have the director of the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) be separate from the Under Secretary of the Air Force, the
Director of the NRO pulled out support, both money and people, from the
National Space Security Office (NSSO). The NSSO was created to be a
independent think-tank essential to address, work, and resolve
crosscutting issues within all of the space community. In your views,
should the NRO continue to support NSSO?
General Shelton. The NRO should continue to support the NSSO for
planning, programming, and defense acquisition processes. This will
support DOD-wide efforts to provide information sharing, alignment,
and/or integration. This will result in optimizing government resources
and leveraging expertise. It is important that the DOD and the
Intelligence Community work closely together in order to provide
transparency and leverage space activities across NSS. This
collaboration will improve situational awareness for both the black and
white space communities. The critical element is that there is
collaboration, not that it comes solely from the DOD EA for Space's NSS
Organization.
Dr. Sega. The NSSO continues to develop coordinated, synchronized,
and integrated capabilities to support the DOD and the Intelligence
Community. The NSSO does this through NSS architectures, strategies,
and the NSS Plan. NRO support is important and the NRO continues to
fund some NSSO led studies.
TACSAT-2
11. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, could you provide an update on
TACSAT-2, including the various sensors and how they are operating,
including the solar panels and the resolution of the NRL sensor and the
impact of this issue for future TACSATs?
Dr. Sega. Consistent with the event-driven check-out/testing
process, one experiment, the Miniaturized Vibration Isolation
Experiment (MVIS), remains to be activated. The remaining 11
experiments are performing well and the detailed status of each will be
provided in a separate briefing to your staff.
The power from TACSAT-2's main solar arrays is sufficient to power
all satellite/experiment requirements. Additionally, there are two
experimental solar arrays on the satellite. One experimental array has
fully deployed and is producing approximately 50 percent of expected
output power. The second experimental array has not been able to be
fully deployed and is not producing power. Attempts will be made to
redeploy this array.
The TACSAT-2 experiment team is working with appropriate government
agencies to address intelligence oversight and data handling processes
associated with data gathered by the experimental payloads. As lessons
are learned from the TACSAT-2 experiment, they will be transitioned to
other experimental programs.
12. Senator Bill Nelson. General Chilton, General Shelton, and
Admiral McArthur, do you see operational interest in the various
sensors on TACSAT-2 or any residual operational capability?
General Chilton. Two of the experiments aboard TACSAT-2 are
receiving operational interest, the Imager and the Target Indicator
Experiment which collects radio, radar, and handheld communication
signals and will monitor the automated identification signal now
required on large ocean-going vessels. The Air Force and NRLs are
performing checkout and calibration of both of these sensors. The
spacecraft is planned to participate in a series of exercises through
the summer to evaluate the potential military utility of these sensors.
At the completion of that process, the capabilities of the spacecraft
will be well-understood, and if appropriate, made available for
operational use.
General Shelton. TACSAT 2 satellite signals intelligence and
imagery payloads are in test and checkout by the NRL and AFRL. A
Military Utility Assessment will commence with exercise Talisman Saber
(18-30 June 2007). This exercise will confirm the military utility of
the two primary sensors and will provide insights for process
improvements and more timely distribution of data directly to the
requesting warfighter in theater. If our expectations for TACSAT-2 are
realized, we will make plans for residual operations.
Admiral McArthur. Absolutely. TACSAT-2 was successfully launched on
16 December 2006 and the Navy has already lost several experimentation
opportunities over the last months for the Target Indicator Experiment
(TIE), which brings with it an AIS-based ship tracking capability.
Another such opportunity could be lost, an experiment that could show
cross-mission ELINT geolocation during upcoming exercise Talisman
Saber. Additionally, NRL will likely be hard-pressed to complete the
ACTD requirements in a timely manner given the fact that this payload
will now be competing with the other 12 payloads for limited power,
downlink time, and general attention. Assuming that suitable, alternate
exercise and experimentation venues can be identified, the current
delay associated with TACSAT-2 is also eating into any residual
operational capability that may exist. Navy is anxious to experiment
with the STRATCOM ORS CONOPS after the ACTD and MUA requirements have
been met. Progress is being made to resolve the issues currently
hindering experimentation and testing of the TIE and imagery payloads,
and we are hopeful that viable interim solutions will be in place
soonest as everyone works toward a long-term solution. The potential
operational impact of these experimental payloads cannot be overstated
and would be effectively utilized by Navy as we conduct global
operations and continue to build regional and global Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA).
STARFIRE OPTICAL RANGE
13. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega and General Chilton, could you
please explain the full purpose of the Starfire Optical Range (SOR) in
New Mexico?
Dr. Sega. SOR is part of the AFRL and is located on Kirtland Air
Force Base, NM. For over 20 years, SOR has been the premier DOD site
for the development of atmospheric compensation technologies and
related advanced optical and beam control technologies. The principal
activities of the SOR include improving SSA research and development,
and the understanding of laser propagation through various atmospheric
conditions.
General Chilton. The SOR is the U.S. premier research facility on
adaptive optics and ground-based imaging research, and developing new
ways to detect, track, and identify objects in space. It is an AFRL
facility and is not funded by AFSPC. AFSPC works closely with the SOR
to help evaluate emerging technologies for potential integration into
operational SSA missions. The activities at SOR which interest AFSPC
are active tracking, small object detection, low earth orbit object
characterization and deep space imaging. The integration of adaptive
optics and low power solid state lasers, enables SOR to measure the
turbulence in the atmosphere and ``adapt'' the optics within the
telescope to collect very good, high resolution imagery of space
objects from the ground. This imagery can be used for anomaly
resolution, low earth orbit characterization and small/dim threat
detection (such as micro-satellites). Historically, the SOR (and its
sister site at Maui) have been limited to operating when the site is in
the dark and the objects are lit by the sun. This limited timeframe
severely limits the amount of satellite passes the SOR (or Maui) can
track or image. Today, the SOR is working to develop new imaging
technologies which could pioneer good quality day and night imaging and
tracking data, giving the United States its only 24/7 ground-based
optical SSA mission. AFSPC hopes to transition these efforts in the
near future.
14. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega and General Chilton, is the SOR
laser being developed for possible use as a laser weapon to damage,
disable, or destroy satellites?
Dr. Sega. No, the lasers located at the SOR are low power lasers
used for tracking space objects and in developing advanced beam control
technology for imaging applications. This equipment does not generate
enough energy for weapons class applications. SOR also has an extensive
Predictive Avoidance System to ensure it is operated in a safe manner.
General Chilton. No, the lasers located at SOR are low power lasers
used for tracking space objects and correcting for atmospheric
turbulence while tracking or imaging. This equipment does not generate
enough energy for weapons class applications. Even so, SOR has an
extensive Predictive Avoidance System to ensure it is operated in a
safe manner. There is no existing weapon system and there are no plans
to build one using the SOR equipment.
15. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega and General Chilton, are the
adaptive optics being used to increase the power of the laser?
Dr. Sega. Adaptive optics are used to remove distortions in the
optical path resulting in a more uniform phase front and sharper image.
General Chilton. The current SOR equipment configuration does not
propagate either of the low power tracking or atmospheric compensation
lasers through the adaptive optics system. Transmitting a laser through
an adaptive optics system would require significant modification to the
optics beam train and the facility itself. It is important to add a
technical note: adaptive optics would not increase the power of the
laser in any case. The adaptive optics system could increase the amount
of energy transmitted by correcting for atmospheric turbulence, but the
power of the laser is fixed upon installation.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
CHINESE ANTI-SATELLITE TEST
16. Senator Pryor. General Chilton, I found our conversation in my
office recently very interesting, specifically the issues surrounding
the kinetic ASAT test conducted by China earlier this year. I am
extremely concerned about the implications this test has had toward our
national security, particularly given the fact that many of our
military and weather satellites are operating in the same low earth
orbit as the destroyed Chinese weather satellite. What are your
concerns and how are we responding to this incident?
General Chilton. My top priority is providing Maj Gen Shelton,
Commander of JFCC-SPACE, with the SSA he requires to effectively
operate and protect our space systems. With our Nation's growing
dependency on capabilities provided from all orbital regimes, it
becomes increasingly important that we identify, characterize, and
defeat any threat to our space systems. Equally important, we must
attribute who or what caused any interruption or loss of capability.
Without adequate SSA, key leaders are denied the information they need
to employ the full range of political, economic, or military options to
deter or counter space threats.
To address this concern, we are advancing key programs. In fiscal
year 2008, we begin development on an ISSA program, replacing our 1990s
vintage Space Defense Operations Computer with a net-centric, services-
oriented architecture that will provide the combatant commanders and
national users with actionable information on launches, satellite
breakups, maneuvering objects, and reentries. The RAIDRS Block 20
program will fuse and exploit ISSA data, enabling JFCC-SPACE to better
protect critical space assets and respond to emerging threats.
SPACE DEBRIS
17. Senator Pryor. General Chilton, we also talked about the unique
implications of space debris. I understand the significance a piece of
debris, even the size of a penny, has on orbiting satellites or even
space operations. Is there any international governing body that
monitors these debris fields, and what kind of reprisal, if any, may be
levied upon a country that irresponsibly contributes to the pollution
of space?
General Chilton. There is no international governing body that
monitors debris. Only the United States and the Russian Federation have
debris catalogues. The U.S. system is superior to the Russian's. The
European Space Agency is considering proposals to develop its own
monitoring system and catalogue, but has not done so. Many space-faring
countries have individual sensors that are able to detect or track
debris, but do not have a continuous or comprehensive system for debris
cataloging. The Interagency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) is an
international body with representatives from all the major space-faring
countries. The IADC created guidelines that help mitigate the debris
problem, but the IADC does not have the mandate or the resources to
monitor debris.
There are no enforceable legal mechanisms in place to deter
countries from creating large debris fields. The existing legal regime
could, under certain circumstances, result in a country being liable
for damage it causes in outer space, but only if there was some
negligence or fault. The act of creating debris, by itself, is not
specifically regulated by existing international law, including
treaties, governing activities in outer space. In June 2007, the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the United
Nations' body that makes recommendations to the General Assembly
concerning activities in space, will consider a report proposing non-
binding debris-mitigating measures. One of the measures suggests
avoiding intentional destruction of space objects, and when necessary,
conducting those activities only at very low altitudes to limit the
lifetime of the debris.
UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND RETENTION
18. Senator Pryor. Dr. Sega, I can imagine the United States Space
Command requires unique and specifically qualified personnel with the
appropriate technical foundations to effectively carry out the mission.
What challenges do you have with recruitment and retention?
Dr. Sega. Attracting and retaining good people is a continuing
focus of the NSS community. The Space Professional Oversight Board
(SPOB) provides the overall DOD oversight and includes participation of
organizations outside of the DOD. Additionally, the National Defense
Education Program (NDEP) provides scholarship opportunities in math,
science, and engineering to support the development of a technical
workforce in critical disciplines across the DOD.
The Commander of Air Force Space Command (General Chilton) is the
Space Professional Functional Authority (SPFA) for the Air Force, and
is responsible for the health of the Air Force Space Professional
Community. He has also established a SPFA Advisory Council, which
provides recommendations on policy and guidance that directly impact
space personnel development. Assignment policies are currently being
reviewed with a focus on accurate placement of technically qualified
officers in positions that effectively use their skills in challenging
jobs throughout their careers. Also, educational opportunities are
being expanded through the National Security Space Institute (NSSI) and
military/civilian institutions to enhance individual competencies and
help Air Force Space Professionals achieve educational and training
goals.
FUNDING SPACE OPERATIONS
19. Senator Pryor. Dr. Sega, could you explain your request for
incremental funding for space operations?
Dr. Sega. The Air Force would like the flexibility to implement an
alternative funding approach for its major space systems that require
uninterrupted continuity of service. Incrementally funding the
procurement for major space programs in areas such as missile warning;
strategic communication; and position, navigation, and timing, is one
approach to achieving better budget stability across the space
portfolio. Another viable solution could be to increase the number of
satellites that can be developed using RDT&E funding.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE
20. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, with regard to ORS, I wanted to ask
you about the role that you envision for the Army. The Army is the most
intensive user of space-based capabilities. I am concerned because the
Army's definition of ``operationally responsive'' is likely to be
different from that of the Air Force. Without Army engagement early in
the process, ORS may produce capabilities that are too slow or
otherwise not sufficiently focused on the needs of warfighters on the
ground. I want to make sure that the ORS program remains true to the
mission of supporting the joint tactical warfighter and not evolve into
a strategic gap filler. Does the recently prepared DOD report on ORS
include a discussion of the Army's role, specifically the role of the
Army SMDC?
Dr. Sega. Yes, the Army SMDC has been heavily involved in ORS
efforts, highlighted in the ``Plan for Operationally Responsive Space''
submitted to Congress on April 17, 2007, which states, ``The TACSAT
Demonstration Program, with participation from the AFRL, NRL, the
Army's SMDC, and AFSC is the principal test bed for proving out the
technologies required to develop and field future ORS space
capabilities.'' The SMDC provides planning, integration, control, and
coordination of land forces' exploitation of space capabilities. SMDC
will contribute a land component warfighting perspective essential to
guiding the choices for ORS and ensuring emerging capabilities are
relevant and suitable to ground troops.
The DOD, with participation from all Services and multiple
government agencies, has defined ORS as the ability to rapidly develop
and field space capabilities that satisfy the needs of the JFC.
On May 21, 2007, a joint ORS Office was stood up at Kirtland Air
Force Base, New Mexico, to engage with Services early in the
acquisition process and to produce solutions tailored to the
warfighters. The plan is for joint participation, from all the
Services, organizations involved in space development activities, and
users of space capabilities in ORS.
21. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, what conclusions did the report
team reach?
Dr. Sega. A joint/interagency team prepared the ``Plan for
Operationally Responsive Space,'' which was signed out by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense to Congress on April 17, 2007. This plan
highlighted several points that are important in establishing a common
understanding of steps necessary to implement ORS. Some of these
highlights are:
A community-wide effort is essential to develop and execute a
comprehensive plan for ORS. This includes defense,
intelligence, and civil agency participation with perspectives
from warfighters, operators, scientists, developers, and
acquirers.
The stand-up of the ORS office and the acquisition of ORS
capabilities must champion the intent to develop, acquire,
field, and employ space capabilities in shortened timeframes in
more affordable ways that are directly focused on the end
users. Additionally, the ORS office must be more than a program
office and should take on the role of integrator of ORS efforts
throughout the community.
The scope of ORS is more than rapid launch and small
satellites, and should emphasize a tiered approach to improving
responsiveness. This approach first employs existing
capabilities; second, deploys field-ready capabilities; and
third, develops new capabilities.
ORS initiatives must be complementary to existing space
systems and capabilities.
22. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, how are you going to ensure that
ORS is a joint program?
Dr. Sega. Leadership and oversight are critical to ensuring ORS is
a joint program. We are developing the ORS office, which stood up at
Kirtland Air Force Base on May 21, 2007, as a joint organization and we
will also have a structure, the ORS Executive Committee (EXCOM), to
provide continuing joint/interagency advice on how to best execute our
ORS program. ``The Plan for Operationally Responsive Space'' (submitted
to Congress on April 17, 2007) states that within the ORS office ``the
positions will be staffed with trained personnel from all Services,
agencies, and the Intelligence Community and the Reserve components.''
23. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, specifically, how are you going to
ensure balanced leadership and participation across the Services?
Dr. Sega. We developed ``The Plan for Operationally Responsive
Space'' (submitted to Congress on April 17, 2007) as a joint
undertaking, with participation across the Services and several other
organizations--inclusive of all interested stakeholders throughout the
defense, intelligence, and civil space communities.
The joint ORS office will be manned by representatives from across
the Services and agencies. The success of the ORS concept is critically
dependent on Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps involvement, as
well as a balanced mix of expertise across the operations, science and
technology, and acquisition communities.
We are also implementing an ORS EXCOM, made up of senior leaders
from across the NSS community, to include the Services and other
government agencies, to provide ``strategic guidance and the senior-
level commitment required for success'' (reference ``The Plan for
Operationally Responsive Space''). The EXCOM will be led by the
Commander, United States STRATCOM) and the DOD EA for Space and will
provide recommended ORS priorities for joint ORS efforts.
24. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, the Army has requested that an Army
officer be named as Deputy Director of the newly-established ORS
Program Office. Do you expect that this request will be accepted?
Dr. Sega. The ORS office was activated on May 21, 2007 and is
currently in the process of staffing the organization's initial cadre.
Once staffed, there will be a minimum of one Deputy Director within the
office. As the ORS effort matures, there may be multiple Deputy
Directors selected for the ORS office to achieve objectives, to balance
the office's community representation, and to capture the breadth of
expertise across the NSS community.
We encourage each of the Services to nominate qualified candidates
for the Deputy Director positions. These positions, along with all the
military and civilian positions in the ORS office, are being defined
this summer and detailed position descriptions are being written. In
fact, the Army is actively participating in the effort to define the
full-up ORS office staffing requirements, and will remain an important
partner in improving the responsiveness of space capabilities to
address the needs of our troops on the ground.
25. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, who will ultimately decide how ORS
roles, missions, and budgets are divided among the Services?
Dr. Sega. From ``The Plan for Operationally Responsive Space''
(submitted to Congress on April 17, 2007):
The ORS EXCOM will provide senior-level recommendation for
the ORS Director concerning personnel and resources from across
the NSS agencies, while providing strategic guidance and the
senior level commitment required for success.
The DOD EA for Space will provide direct oversight of the ORS
Office and serve as the Service Acquisition Executive for the
Office's efforts. The DOD EA for Space will also convene the
ORS EXCOM in coordination with the Commander of the U.S.
STRATCOM (CDRUSSTRATCOM).
The CDRUSSTRATCOM will provide operational oversight for all
ORS activities consistent with the UCP and other applicable
authorities.
The responsibility of the ORS Director will be to serve as
the head of the Office and provide authority, direction, and
control over the personnel and resources in the ORS office. The
ORS Director will report to the DOD EA for Space.
26. Senator Sessions. Dr. Sega, how will the ORS program office
ensure that joint resources are made available for the other Services
to develop concepts, technologies, sensors, and platforms?
Dr. Sega. We intend that the requested ORS program budget, which
will be augmented by funding from each of the Services and several
other government agencies, will be used to fund the development,
demonstration, acquisition, and deployment of ORS capabilities. We
intend to use the entire NSS community to help develop concepts and
solutions and then to execute this work using highly-qualified
organizations. Additionally, an EXCOM, consisting of representatives
from the Services and agencies involved in ORS, will provide senior-
level recommendations concerning how best to apportion resources to
support identified priorities.
[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 2, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Sessions,
and Thune.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; and Kristine L. Svinicki,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Jessica L.
Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Caple,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Todd Stiefler, assistant to
Senator Sessions; and Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator
Thune.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Bill Nelson. Good afternoon. We originally had this
hearing scheduled in April, but we had to move it because of
the Senate schedule at the time. Secretary Bodman was to be one
of the witnesses, but he cannot be here today. He has
graciously agreed to respond to any questions for the record
that we want to submit.
Welcome to James Rispoli, Assistant Secretary of Energy for
Environmental Management, and Glenn Podonsky, the Chief Health,
Safety, and Security Officer. Each of you has a prepared
statement and it will be part of the official record. We are
going to have a conversation here, so we do not want you
reading testimony to us.
Mr. Secretary, we look forward to hearing from you about
the waste treatment plant project in Hanford, Washington, as
well as the overall status of the Department's efforts to clean
up and safely dispose of radioactive and other hazardous
wastes.
Mr. Podonsky, you head the newly created office with
oversight responsibilities covering safety, security, and
health, and we want to discuss some of the security issues
today.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
Good afternoon. This hearing was originally scheduled for April 27,
but because of the Senate schedule we had to move the hearing to today.
Secretary Bodman was to be one of the witnesses, but unfortunately his
schedule was unable to accommodate the new date. His prepared statement
will be included in the record. Secretary Bodman has also graciously
agreed to respond to any questions for the record that members might
have.
It is a pleasure to welcome James Rispoli, Assistant Secretary of
Energy for Environmental Management, and Glenn Podonsky, the Chief
Health, Safety, and Security Officer today.
I note that each of you, has a prepared opening statement, and
without objection, they will also be included in the hearing record.
Secretary Rispoli, we look forward to hearing from you about the
Waste Treatment Plant project at the DOE site in Hanford Washington, as
well as the overall status of the Department's efforts to clean up and
safely dispose of the radioactive and other hazardous wastes from the
Cold War.
Mr. Podonsky, you head a newly created office with significant
oversight responsibilities, covering safety, security and health. Among
other issues we would like to specifically discuss some of those
security issues today.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an
important hearing for a lot of reasons. One is the cost that we
will be spending through the Department of Energy (DOE) for
defense programs.
I welcome our witnesses today and thank you for your
service. I would just note that in the Department's most recent
financial statements as of September 30, 2006, life cycle cost
of the environmental management (EM) program was reported as
$173 billion over 30 years of work. I cannot express how
frustrating it is to read this statement contained in Secretary
Bodman's written testimony for this hearing.
He said: ``The environmental management program has
experienced setbacks. At the core of these setbacks are
optimistic planning assumptions that have not materialized,
combined with new scope and requirements that were not
anticipated. As a result, EM estimates the life cycle cost of
the program could increase by $50 billion.''
This is a staggering cost increase. If any other defense
program under the jurisdiction of this committee reported a
cost increase of this magnitude, Senator Nelson would melt
down, I suspect. In the world of nuclear environmental issues,
however, we do not seem to be able to confront these issues
effectively.
Let us think about what even $10 billion in defense funding
could buy. $10 billion is more than the entire annual budget of
the Missile Defense Agency. With $10 billion the United States
Navy could buy 40 Littoral Combat Ships, and 45 next generation
refueling tankers.
So I do not mean this totally in this fashion, but to
blithely spring on Congress a $50 billion increase for a
cleanup program is shocking to me. I believe we need to
evaluate this fundamentally. I believe it is a policy debate
also, not just a technical debate.
The reality is that most of these sites will be locked away
and inaccessible on Federal reservations for the foreseeable
future. We have to deal with it. We have to have a cleanup
program, and certainly rivers and bodies of water cannot be
polluted. But I think we need to ask ourselves real carefully
how we can manage such a huge financial cost.
I will be asking some questions as we go forward about how
the Department and the Secretary can challenge these numbers
and rethink maybe what we are doing and see if we cannot bring
down these costs substantially.
There are a lot of other important issues, but that was one
that was in my craw a bit. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
I would like to join Senator Nelson in welcoming our witnesses this
morning. I appreciate the accommodation you both have made in
rescheduling this hearing from last week. Although Secretary Bodman is
not able to be here at this time, I understand that his testimony will
be accepted for the record and members will be able to submit questions
to him in writing.
Today, the subcommittee will hear from two witnesses regarding
significant elements of the Department of Energy (DOE). From Assistant
Secretary James Rispoli, we will hear about the cleanup of DOE sites
across the Nation through the Department's Environmental Management
program. Mr. Podonsky will address the cross-culling issues and
challenges he oversees as the Chief Health, Safety, and Security
Officer of the Department.
Assistant Secretary Rispoli, I appreciated the discussion we began
in your appearance before the subcommittee last year, where we explored
the cost and regulatory pressures within which you must address the
environmental contamination and eventual cleanup of DOE sites. This is
a tough challenge, from many different aspects, and the cost control on
these projects has not been what many of us would desire. I am deeply
concerned about the statement contained in Secretary Bodman's written
testimony that the life cycle cost of the Environmental Management
program may increase by approximately $50 billion due to ``optimistic
planning assumptions that have not materialized combined with new scope
and requirements that were not anticipated.'' This is a staggering cost
increase. Let's think about what even $10 billion in defense funding
could buy. Ten billion dollars is more than the entire annual budget of
the Missile Defense Agency. With $10 billion, the U.S. Navy could buy
40 Littoral Combat Ships, 45 next-generation refueling tankers, or even
2 Nimitz-class aircraft carriers.
I will continue to explore my concerns about the cost of this
program, both in our hearing today, and as we proceed with the National
Defense Authorization Bill. I hope your testimony will provide further
information about this matter.
Mr. Podonsky, you are the head of a newly formed organization
within the Department, or perhaps more accurately, a new office which
pulls together many existing health, safety and security functions
within the Department. As I understand it, the objective in standing up
this new office was to provide the Secretary of Energy with a more
coherent view of the performance of his Department from the standpoint
of safety, security, and worker health. I look forward to hearing your
perspectives on whether this new organization is meeting the goals set
out for it.
When Secretary Bodman appeared before the full Armed Services
Committee last year to testify on the DOE budget, I outlined a pretty
hard-hitting assessment of the manner in which the Department was
carrying out the programs assigned to it, and the improvement I thought
was needed. After reflecting on my assessment, Secretary Bodman replied
that he would agree with many of my criticisms--that the Department can
and must do better. I appreciate that the Department has been working
to improve its management and execution of projects by, for example,
increasing the training and capability of project managers and
contracting officers working at DOE. In my view, however, substantial
challenges remain.
I am still concerned about the cost and expectations for the DOE
environmental cleanup program. In Washington State, the Environmental
Protection Agency recently fined the Department of Energy over $1
million in a regulatory dispute over the cleanup at Hanford. We have
one part of the Federal Government fining another, and at the end of
the day, it is all the same taxpayer money. We need to keep in mind
what exactly the objectives for this cleanup really arc.
Although Secretary Bodman could not be here today, his written
testimony addresses the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. I believe
that Congress should approve the next evaluation phase of the program,
but I believe that DOE should examine the cost of this program very
closely. In my view, this program should not be a vehicle for
recreating a laboratory complex sized for Cold War missions. The
Federal Government has a long history of pursuing weapons development
programs that--we are told--are going to ``save money'' and then the
savings get lost somewhere along the way.
Let me again join our chairman in thanking our witnesses for their
service and for appearing here today. I look forward to their testimony
on these important matters.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Bodman follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Samuel W. Bodman
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to be with you this afternoon to present the
President's fiscal year 2008 budget proposal for the Department of
Energy (DOE).
With programs such as the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), Mixed
Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), Hanford Waste Treatment Plant
and other defense related activities, the fiscal year 2008 budget seeks
to meet the DOE's responsibilities in national security and
environmental cleanup. Before I discuss these further I would like to
take a moment to briefly mention the President's energy initiatives
announced during the State of the Union. President Bush has called on
this country to reduce gasoline usage by 20 percent in the next 10
years. We have named this our ``Twenty in Ten'' plan and I urge you to
support this ambitious proposal. America's oil dependence leaves us
more vulnerable to hostile regimes as well as terrorists who target oil
shipments to harm our economy.
America will reach the President's ``Twenty in Ten'' goal by
requiring the use of 35 billion gallons of renewable and alternative
fuels by 2017, while also reforming the Corporate Average Fuel Economy
standards for cars and extending the current light truck rule. In 2017,
the combined savings of these measures are projected to reduce annual
gasoline use by 20 percent.
The President's plan eases threats posed to energy security by
encouraging alternative fuels and environmentally sensitive domestic
oil production, while also insuring against disruptions by doubling the
current capacity of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to 1.5 billion
barrels by 2027.
Coupled with the Advanced Energy Initiative and the American
Competitiveness Initiative, which were launched a year ago, these
proposals offer a strong plan to enhance America's future security, and
I encourage members of the committee to join us in pursuing these
proposals.
highlights of the fiscal year 2008 department of energy budget
The President's fiscal year 2008 budget reflects the Department's
commitment to protect the United States as stewards of our Nation's
nuclear weapons stockpile and to environmental cleanup. To highlight,
the fiscal year 2008 budget for the DOE emphasizes investments that
will:
Transform Our Nuclear Weapons Complex. The fiscal year
2008 budget reconfirms the DOE's steadfast commitment to the
national security interests of the United States through
stewardship of a reliable and responsive nuclear weapons
stockpile and by advancing the goals of global
nonproliferation. Through the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), the Department directs $6.5 billion in
this request for Weapons Activities, a $103 million increase
from the fiscal year 2007 request, to meet the existing
requirements for stewardship of the Nation's nuclear weapon
stockpile, technologies and facilities, as well as to continue
to revitalize the nuclear weapons complex with the goal of a
much smaller size by 2030. To do so, we developed a
transformation concept and vision, the cornerstones of which
are ``Complex 2030'' and the RRW. We are moving forward to
implement this strategy now, bringing us closer to achieving an
even smaller stockpile that is not only safer and more secure,
but one that also reduces likelihood of United States
underground nuclear testing. Ultimately, this approach enables
a much more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure.
Reduce the Risk of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Worldwide. The fiscal year 2008 budget provides $1.7 billion
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, for a comprehensive set
of programs to meet our commitment to detect, prevent, and
reverse the proliferation of WMD in close cooperation with our
partners around the world. This program is an administration
priority and while the funding amount shows a 3 percent
decrease, this reflects accelerated completions in fiscal year
2007. Further, the request provides significant out-year growth
to fulfill our international agreements and accelerate our work
to reduce the risk of WMD threats. Among many advances, the
fiscal year 2008 budget for example will further our work in
the Megaports program by initiating the installation of
radiation detection equipment at the Port of Hong Kong.
Because keeping terrorists from acquiring materials will be
easier if we limit enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of
spent fuel, the President proposed in 2004 a new initiative,
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which would
provide nations which refrain from developing or deploying
enrichment and reprocessing technology assured access to the
benefits of nuclear power.
Meet Our Commitments to Public Health and Safety and
the Environment. During my first days at the DOE, I announced
safety as my top priority and the number one operating
principle of the Department. To implement this vision, we
created a new Office of Health, Safety, and Security. As I said
at the time, ``As Secretary of Energy, ensuring the safety of
workers across the DOE complex is my top priority and this new
office will go a long way in strengthening our safety and
security organization. We must be world class not only in how
we carry out our mission, but in the safe, secure, and
environmentally responsible way in which we manage operations
at our facilities across the country.'' The organization's
fiscal year 2008 budget request of $428 million, builds on a
number of actions the Department has taken over the past 2
years to increase safety of DOE workers.
The fiscal year 2008 budget includes $5.4 billion for
defense-related Environmental Management (EM) programs to
protect public health and safety by cleaning up hazardous,
radioactive legacy waste left over from the Manhattan Project
and the Cold War. Past investments have resulted in the
completed clean up of 81 sites through the end of fiscal year
2006, including Rocky Flats, Colorado, and a total of 86 sites
by the end of fiscal year 2007, including the Fernald site in
Ohio, which was completed in January 2007. This budget allows
the program to continue to make progress towards cleaning up
and closing sites and focuses on activities with the greatest
risk reduction.
As the Department continues to make progress in completing
clean up, the fiscal year 2008 budget request of $159 million
for Legacy Management (LM) supports the Department's long-term
stewardship responsibilities and payment of pensions and
benefits for our former contractor workers after site closure.
In light of the increased number of sophisticated cyber
attacks directed at all facets of our communities, from
military to civilian to private users, the Department is taking
significant steps to secure the virtual pathways and mitigate
the threat from cyber intrusions. Implementing these steps will
be seamless and will not interrupt the availability of
information systems resources while preserving the
confidentiality and integrity of the information and their
contents. A budget request of $170 million in fiscal year 2008
supports the Department's efforts to defend against emerging,
complex cyber attacks. Through these efforts, the Department
will be in a better position to effectively manage and monitor
cyber risk across the complex. In fiscal year 2008, DOE will
increase support on a Department-wide basis to deploy new
cybersecurity tools and cybersecurity management activities to
detect, analyze, and reduce the threat across the complex.
ENSURING AMERICA'S NUCLEAR SECURITY
The President, in his first days in office, was faced with the new
and challenging realities of national security in the 21st century. The
war on terror has substantially and fundamentally reshaped the national
security programs and activities in the Department. This budget of
$24.3 billion for the Department is an important component of the
President's strategy to address some of these very important issues
facing our Nation. Within the $24.3 billion request in fiscal year
2008, $9.4 billion or 39 percent is proposed to support DOE's
contribution to the Federal Government-wide effort to ensure the
security of our Nation.
The NNSA continues significant efforts to meet administration and
secretarial priorities leveraging science to promote national security.
The fiscal year 2008 budget proposes $9.4 billion to meet defense and
homeland security-related objectives. The budget request maintains
current commitments to the nuclear deterrence policies of the
administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). To implement those
policies for the long-term, NNSA has established a new planning
scenario, ``Complex 2030'', to guide the transformation of the complex.
The fiscal year 2008 budget also continues to fund a high profile
strategy to mitigate throughout the world the threat of weapons of mass
destruction, and provides for the nuclear propulsion needs of the U.S.
Navy. Key investments include:
Transforming the nuclear weapons stockpile and
infrastructure while meeting Department of Defense (DOD)
requirements, through the RRW and other Complex 2030
initiatives;
Conducting innovative programs in the Nations of the
former Soviet Union and other countries to address
nonproliferation priorities;
Supporting naval nuclear propulsion requirements of
the U.S. Navy;
Maintaining comprehensive security for facilities,
employees and information implementing and sustaining upgrades
throughout the complex;
Providing nuclear emergency response assets in support
of homeland security;
Reducing the deferred maintenance backlog and
achieving facility footprint reduction goals; and,
Providing corporate management and oversight for NNSA
programs and operations.
The United States continues a fundamental shift in national
security strategy to address the realities of the 21st century. The
administration's NPR addressed a national security environment in which
threats may evolve more quickly and be less predictable and more
variable than in the past. The NPR recognizes the need to transition
from a threat-based nuclear deterrent with large numbers of deployed
and reserve weapons, to a deterrent consisting of a smaller nuclear
weapons stockpile with greater reliance on the capability and
responsiveness of the DOD and NNSA infrastructure to respond to
threats. The NNSA infrastructure must be able to meet new requirements
in a timely and agile manner while also becoming more sustainable and
affordable. The DOE has created a plan for a revitalized nuclear
weapons complex called ``Complex 2030''. This significantly more agile
and responsive complex will allow further reductions in the nuclear
stockpile by providing an industrial hedge against geopolitical or
technical problems and will reduce security costs by consolidating
nuclear materials. The fiscal year 2008 President's budget contains
some of the resources required for transformation of the complex in
ongoing base program activities that are already underway and
contributing to Complex 2030 objectives. The administration is still
studying plans and funding projections for other parts of the effort.
The fiscal year 2008 budget request of $6.5 billion for Weapons
Activities includes all programs to meet the immediate needs of the
stockpile, stockpile surveillance, annual assessment, and life
extension programs. On November 30, 2006, the Nuclear Weapons Council
determined that the RRW program was feasible as a means for sustaining
the long-term safety and reliability of the Nation's nuclear deterrent
force. This shift in strategy from a Life Extension Program to a RRW
program will require substantial planning and resource realignments by
the DOD and DOE. The campaigns are focused on long-term vitality in
science and engineering and on research and development (R&D)
supporting current and future stockpile stewardship and DOD
requirements. A number of these NNSA programs and facilities also
support scientific research users from other elements of the
Department, Federal Government, and the academic and industrial
communities. Within the Nuclear Weapon Incident Response programs, a
new National Technical Nuclear Forensics R&D and operations program is
established, as well as a stabilization program through leveraged
render safe R&D development of first generation equipment in support of
homeland security. NNSA's Safeguards and Security activities are also
encompassed within the request for Weapons Activities. The Defense
Nuclear Security program supports the physical security needs at NNSA
sites. These activities increase by 17 percent to sustain base program
increases associated with the fiscal year 2003 design basis threat
(DBT) upgrades, and a revised schedule for 2005 DBT implementation at
NNSA sites. Cybersecurity activities, protecting information and
information technology infrastructure, increase by over 15 percent.
This will provide for the first step in a major 5-year effort focused
on revitalization, certification, accreditation, and training across
the NNSA complex.
Preventing weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands
of terrorists and rogue states is one of this administration's top
national security priorities. The fiscal year 2008 request of $1.67
billion for nuclear nonproliferation activities strongly supports the
international programs that are denying terrorists and rogue states the
nuclear materials, technology and expertise needed to develop or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. NNSA continues unprecedented efforts
to protect the U.S. and our allies from threats, including $265 million
for cutting-edge nonproliferation R&D for improved technologies to
detect and monitor nuclear proliferation and nuclear explosions
worldwide. There are additional major efforts focused on potential
threats abroad. For example, in the area of nuclear material protection
and cooperation the program has completed security upgrades for Russian
navy nuclear fuel and weapons storage at the end of fiscal year 2006
and will complete security upgrades for Rosatom facilities by the end
of fiscal year 2008. Also by the end of fiscal year 2008, the program
will complete security upgrades at the nuclear warhead sites of the
Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and the 12th Main Directorate. To help
complete the shutdown of three Russian nuclear reactors still producing
1.2 metric tons of plutonium per year and to replace them with
conventional fossil fuel power plants, this budget request includes
$182 million for the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production
program.
Moreover, the RRW approach reinforces our nonproliferation
commitments and objectives. Designed with more favorable performance
margins that are less sensitive to incremental aging effects, these
warheads would reduce the necessity of nuclear tests for the United
States to diagnose or remedy a stockpile reliability problem. This will
bolster efforts to dissuade other countries from testing. Furthermore,
once a transformed production complex demonstrates that it can produce
replacement warheads on a timescale to meet emerging geopolitical
threats, or timely respond to technical problems in the stockpile, then
we can eliminate many spare warheads and further reduce the nuclear
stockpile. The RRW strategy will allow us to increase our warhead
dismantlement rate, sending a strong message to the world that we are
taking meaningful steps towards further stockpile reductions.
Additionally, increased confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent will
assure allies and obviate their need to bolster nuclear forces.
Finally, the improved security features of RRW will prevent
unauthorized use should a warhead ever fall into the hands of
terrorists.
The budget request includes $609 million to support Fissile
Material Disposition activities. Of this amount, $334 million is
requested for the U.S. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant project at
DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina. This facility will dispose
of 34 metric tons of U.S. surplus plutonium and facilitate complex-wide
consolidation of nuclear material. On April 11, the Deputy Secretary
approved CD-2, the performance baseline, and CD-3, the start of
construction, August 1, 2007, for the MFFF project at Savannah River
Site. As per the restriction in the revised fiscal year 2007 Continuing
Resolution (Public Law 20-110-5), no construction activities will be
initiated prior to August 1, 2007, under the authorized limited
preconstruction activities.
Various programs funded by NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
appropriation support the President's Bratislava Nuclear Security
Cooperation initiative (about $293 million) including security upgrades
at Russian nuclear warhead sites, and also support the Global
Partnership against the Spread of WMD ($537 million) to meet the U.S.
commitment to the G8 nations. In coordination with the Office of
Nuclear Energy, the budget request also includes $10 million to support
the GNEP, which is focused on advanced safeguards technology
development that is crucial to the ultimate success of the GNEP
initiative.
NNSA continues to support the United States Navy's nuclear
propulsion systems. The fiscal year 2008 request of $808.2 million is
an increase of 1.6 percent over the fiscal year 2007 request level. The
funding increase assists the Naval Reactors program to ensure the safe
and reliable operation of reactor plants in nuclear-powered submarines
and aircraft carriers and fulfills the Navy's requirements for new
nuclear propulsion plants that meet current and future national defense
requirements.
protecting the environment by providing a responsible resolution to the
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION
The Federal Government must address the legacy of our past and our
responsibility to the American taxpayers to provide a clean, safe, and
healthy environment to live in. A total of $6.34 billion is dedicated
in fiscal year 2008 to support the three key pillars that set the
framework for the Department to reach that goal. The first pillar is to
continue our environmental cleanup ($5.4 billion) of contaminated Cold
War sites across the country. The second pillar is to continue to
provide site post-closure management and to carry out our
responsibilities ($194 million) to our former contractor workers. The
third pillar completes the framework by working to construct a
permanent nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain ($494.5 million)
to address long-term nuclear waste disposal and for authorization of
which the Department will submit a License Application to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission not later than June 30, 2008. It goes without
saying that my core principle of safe operations throughout the
Department will be applied with vigor within this framework.
To deliver on the Department's cleanup obligations stemming from 50
years of nuclear research and weapons production during the Cold War,
the EM program continues to focus its resources on the highest health,
safety, and environmental risks, such as treatment of over 90 million
gallons of radioactive liquid waste stored in decades old tanks;
disposition of thousands of metric tons of special nuclear material
(surplus weapons-grade uranium and plutonium), spent nuclear fuel, and
solid waste stored in older facilities that do not meet today's
environmental requirements; and remediation of contaminated soil and
groundwater. Up through fiscal year 2007, DOE will have completed
cleanup of 86 of 108 legacy nuclear waste sites, with another three
site cleanup completions--the Pantex Plant in Texas; Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory--Site 300 in California, and the Inhalation
Toxicology Lab in New Mexico--planned for completion in fiscal year
2008.
In fiscal year 2008, the budget includes $5.4 billion to continue
cleanup, giving priority to those activities that offer the greatest
risk reduction while staying focused on completing cleanup and closing
sites. This is a reduction from the fiscal year 2007 request of $173
million, which in part reflects completion of some sites, but also
reflects hard choices that must be made. Safety remains the utmost
priority. EM is committed to applying my safety principles and will
continue to maintain and demand the highest safety performance to
protect the workers and the communities where EM operates.
In keeping with the principles of reducing risks and environmental
liabilities, the fiscal year 2008 request of $5.4 billion will support
the following priority activities:
Stabilizing radioactive tank waste in preparation for
treatment (about 37 percent of the fiscal year 2008 request);
Storing and safeguarding nuclear materials and spent
nuclear fuel (about 19 percent of the fiscal year 2008
request);
Dispositioning transuranic, low-level and other solid
wastes (about 16 percent of the fiscal year 2008 request);
Remediating major areas of our sites and
decontamination and decommissioning excess facilities (about 19
percent of the fiscal year 2008 request).
One of the significant cleanup challenges the EM program faces is
the construction of the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization
Plant (WTP), which will treat highly radioactive tank waste at Hanford.
WTP has encountered significant technical and project management
problems, which have caused the project to slow down while the problems
were addressed. With the help of senior professionals from private
industry, academia and other Government agencies, EM has undertaken an
intensive review scrutinizing key elements of the project, including
the technology, cost and schedule, project management, project
controls, and earthquake seismic criteria. In December 2006, the
Department approved a revised, validated baseline of $12.3 billion for
WTP. The Department believes WTP is now back on a sound technical and
project management footing, and is ready to move forward.
Despite numerous accomplishments and successfully accomplishing
site completions, the EM program has experienced setbacks in achieving
its vision of accelerated cleanup. At the core of these setbacks are
optimistic planning assumptions that have not materialized, combined
with new scope and requirements that were not anticipated. As a result,
EM estimates the lifecycle cost of the program could increase by $50
billion. EM continues to take steps to address challenges and improve
the effectiveness and efficiency of its operation. The Department
remains committed to completing this important and necessary mission.
After the EM program completes cleanup of closure sites, with no
further DOE mission, post closure stewardship activities are
transferred to the Office of LM. Post closure stewardship includes
long-term surveillance and maintenance activities such as groundwater
monitoring, disposal cell maintenance, records management, and
management of natural resources at sites where active remediation has
been completed. At some sites the program includes management and
administration of pension and benefit continuity for contractor
retirees. In fiscal year 2008, $194.2 million is requested to carry out
legacy management functions at both civilian and defense-related sites.
The majority of the funding is for long-term stewardship activities and
pension and post-retirement benefits for former contractor employees at
the Rocky Flats, Colorado, and the Fernald, Ohio, closure sites.
CONCLUSION
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to present the
fiscal year 2008 budget proposal for the DOE. I will be happy to take
any questions that members of the subcommittee may have.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary?
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. RISPOLI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
ENERGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
Mr. Rispoli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I interpreted that
you would prefer we not read our oral statements and that is
fine. So I thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Sessions, for
having us here today to go over our program.
Let me just start by addressing the overall program, if I
may, and both your point on the waste treatment plant and
Senator Sessions' point on the overall cleanup status.
If I may, I can start by assuring you that it is not
business as usual and it is not business as before. We, too,
are very concerned with the cost of the program. We are doing
some things that have never been done before. For example, we
are independently auditing with both the technical and
financial people the cost of all the projects that make up our
program. Never been done before, 56 percent of our program has
passed that independent audit.
This helps us to ensure that the assumptions and the costs
that we use are reasonable, and I can----
Senator Sessions. 56 percent passed?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir, have been passed. Now, more than 56
percent have been looked at, but we are still working to answer
questions and issues on others, because part of our problem has
been in the past that we have made unreasonable assumptions,
and if those assumptions do not come true the costs go up, or
in other cases the estimates are too high and we have to adjust
them to the right amount. So this is one element that has never
been done before, taking the entire EM program and subjecting
it to an independent audit by outsiders that have no play in
the game. They are not the normal stable of contractors. These
are totally independent groups that go in and look at our
projects.
On the management side, once we believe we have a handle on
the costs--and again, that is a major effort, to do that--we
have instituted a much more rigorous management focus using
project management techniques that are standard in the country.
This has not been done before. The types of elements that are
in this are monthly reporting with oversight by a separate
office not in my organization. A separate office looks at
monthly reports and reports to my boss, the deputy secretary,
on whether they think we are managing our projects well or not.
I get those reports, too. I do a quarterly face-to-face
review with all of our people in the field. They either come to
the headquarters for the most part or we tie them in by video
teleconference, and we review each one of our projects. It is
an extensive effort once a quarter. It takes the better part of
2 weeks with huge blocks of time to review these, to make it
clear to our people in the field that we have a tight rein on
the way we execute these projects.
Related to that, we are currently in the midst of doing a
competency assessment of our own people in the field, because
our own people, although we have worked at getting them
certified as project managers, they still are missing some of
the competencies that we believe they need. We are in the midst
of assessing that so that we can provide that type of on-site
assistance to them, for example cost control or schedule
control. If they do not have those things we want to provide
that.
So this is not an inspector general (IG) type of a review.
This is a review to provide better staffing for the feds at the
site to provide better, more robust oversight of the
contractors.
So the first element is the independent audits. The second
is the more intense project management focus. The third is, as
you might be aware, we have created a new organization for
acquisitions in the Department at headquarters so that we can
do a better job of writing these contracts with better
incentives for the contractors to come in under budget or below
cost.
So it is not business as before. All of these are major
focus areas for us. They are all with the purpose of getting
better cost estimates to start with and then have more credible
management as we go forward.
That is for the overall program. If you like, I can address
the waste treatment plant as well, which is our largest single
project. As you know, its estimate as validated by the Army
Corps of Engineers independent review is $12.2 billion. That
$12.2 billion clearly makes it the Department's largest capital
project. It is an extensive plant that is designed to empty and
treat liquid tank wastes in 177 tanks at the Hanford
Reservation.
It costs us over $200 million a year just to manage those
tanks and keep them safe. So it is not a good long-term answer,
because the worry always is, of course, that the tanks may leak
over time and put this radioactive liquid waste into the
ground. But also, in order to once and for all end the problem,
the plan is that we would process all of that waste through
this plant that is under construction. It is about 30 percent
complete at this time.
The plant will basically take the high-level fraction and
vitrify it into glass logs that would go to Yucca Mountain, and
the low activity waste fraction would also go into glass logs,
for on-site disposal. So there is an element here that would
remain on the site, which will save the taxpayers a great
amount of money. But the amount of radioactivity left on the
site would be minimized by separating the waste into the high-
level waste fraction and the low activity waste fraction.
As I mentioned, that plant is now 30 percent done. It has
been reviewed by the Army Corps of Engineers. We are still
working through a number of technical issues, but we have had
an independent team of what we call the best and brightest
experts review the technical aspects of the plant. They have
told us in writing that they believe the plant will work.
We are still working through some of the issues they
identify, but none of them are considered to be show-stoppers.
I would say that at this point in time we are a world away from
where we were last year when we were in the same cycle for the
budget; I mentioned only two, but when these reviews had not
yet been done.
There have been many more reviews of that plant, but I will
tell you that we have a high degree of confidence that we can
build this plant for the price tag attached to it. I will also
tell you that $12.2 billion has a very large amount of
contingency in it because the project is so long.
So the idea would be that there is enough room in there to
bring it in for less than $12.2 billion, because about $3
billion of that is contingency. The idea being, again, that we
want to be sure that we have enough room to solve the remaining
issues, or even unknown issues should they arise, and deliver
this plant as committed to in our budget to Congress.
So that is an overview of the waste treatment plant. I
would be happy to answer any more detailed questions you might
have on any aspect of that.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rispoli follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. James A. Rispoli
Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson and members of the subcommittee. I
am pleased to be here today to address and answer your questions on the
President's fiscal year 2008 budget request for the Department of
Energy's Environmental Management (EM) program. I want to thank the
subcommittee for its support of the EM program.
The EM mission was undertaken to address the safe and successful
cleanup of the Cold War legacy brought about from five decades of
nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy
research. This mission, as I pointed out last year, is both inherently
challenging and innately beneficial to the American people. As this
subcommittee knows the EM program has solved several cleanup
challenges, including Rocky Flats and Fernald, that at one time seemed
insurmountable. We are also making progress on the many other complex
challenges that the program still faces. Since I last appeared before
this committee, EM has been able to achieve notable results by
addressing these challenges through a risk reduction and prioritization
strategy and a judicious use of the resources that Congress entrusts to
us. EM is implementing this prioritized, risk reduction strategy
supported by the crucial tenets of safety, performance, cleanup, and
closure.
The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request will allow this
prioritized work on these important cleanup and closure projects to
continue across the complex. For the EM program, the President's budget
request for fiscal year 2008 is $5.4 billion for defense EM activities.
We've been able to achieve a decrease of $26 million from the fiscal
year 2007 request by employing a thoughtful balance of reducing risk
and completing cleanup for the EM program. About half of our budget
request will go towards our highest risks activities in stabilizing
tank waste, nuclear materials, and spent nuclear fuel, and another
quarter is going to clean up contaminated soil, groundwater, and unused
facilities. With this request, we are continuing on our strategic
course to address high-priority tank waste treatment and radioactive
waste disposition while preserving our site completion and closure
drive. Under this strategy, we anticipate meeting 90 percent of the
approximately 210 scheduled compliance agreement milestones for fiscal
year 2008. The Department remains committed to meeting its regulatory
milestones and will continue to identify ways to better manage its
cleanup activities. Our agreements have provisions for renegotiation of
milestones and we are working with our regulators to provide the best
benefit to the environment.
With this budget request, the Defense Waste Processing Facility at
the Savannah River Site (SRS), the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment
Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and the Toxic
Substance Control Act Incinerator at the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR)
will continue to operate. Design and construction will continue at the
Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at Hanford, the Sodium-
Bearing Waste Treatment Plant at INL, and the Salt Waste Processing
Facility (SWPF) at SRS. Tank farm operations will continue at Hanford,
INL, and SRS along with spent nuclear fuel receipt, storage, and
cleanup. I would like to update you regarding two of these important
tank waste projects.
The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant at Hanford is the
Department's largest capital project. Over the past 18 months, the
Department has retained a broad range of external, senior professionals
from private industry, academia, and other government agencies to
thoroughly review the management issues, technical approach and
remaining challenges, adequacy of the design to meet the seismic
criteria, and the cost and schedule elements of the WTP project. The
results of these reviews, together with implementing the many
recommendations, provide the Department with the assurance that the WTP
can be built and commissioned as designed to treat and immobilize the
high-level waste, and can be executed within the revised cost and
schedule baseline.
Also related to the WTP, the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, section 3120, included a
limitation on availability of funds, pending the certification by the
Secretary of Energy that the Defense Contract Management Agency has
recommended for acceptance the earned value management system used to
track and report costs of the WTP. This limited obligation or expense
of no more than 90 percent of the funds available.
A review of the earned value management system was conducted in
November 2006 and eight issues were identified. In February 2007, the
WTP contractor submitted corrective actions and those actions should be
acceptable to resolve seven issues with only minor revisions. The last
issue has proved harder to resolve and, as a result, the certification
of the earned value management system by the end of the fiscal year may
be in jeopardy.
Salt Waste Processing Facility will provide the high capacity
treatment capability necessary for removal of actinides, strontium and
cesium from the more than 33 million gallons of salt waste stored in
aging underground waste tanks at the SRS. SWPF operation is critical to
meeting Federal Facility Agreement commitments to remove waste from the
49 remaining SRS tanks, including the 22 tanks that do not meet modern
requirements for full secondary containment and leak detection. The
schedule for the project design has been slowed to address seismic
issues, which should be resolved in early May. In parallel, the
contractor will complete baseline development and that baseline will be
validated upon satisfactory completion of an external independent
review. This baseline development and validation will support a Fall
2007 Critical Decision 2 (CD-2), which will establish formally the
project schedule and cost estimate, against which we report our
progress, and provide approval to proceed to final project design.
At the SRS, this request will support ongoing nuclear material
processing in H-Canyon and design of the plutonium vitrification
project to support ultimate disposition. At Hanford, it supports
consolidation of plutonium and unirradiated category 1 and 2 nuclear
fuel to an off-site location, pending a consolidation decision.
Consolidation of enriched uranium from INL to an off-site location, and
design and long-lead procurement for the U-233 disposition project at
the ORR are also supported in this request.
This request enables transuranic (TRU) waste projects to continue
with priority for INL and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) TRU
waste. Other contact and remote-handled TRU shipments to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are also supported. Low-level radioactive
waste and mixed low-level radioactive waste activities will be
supported at Hanford, the Nevada Test Site (NTS), INL, SRS, and ORR.
The request will allow high-priority waste retrieval, soil and
groundwater remediation, and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D)
of excess facilities at Hanford, INL, SRS, ORR, and other sites. In
addition, the request supports targeted technology development and
deployment in support of high-level waste, soil and groundwater, and
facility D&D.
With this budget request, EM will achieve our goals for risk
reduction and cleanup completion at:
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Site 300,
California
Pantex Plant, Texas
Sandia National Laboratory, New Mexico (calendar year
2008)
As cleanup work is completed at these sites with continuing
missions, EM will transfer long-term surveillance and monitoring
activities to the NNSA.
The fiscal year 2008 budget request will allow the EM cleanup
program to reduce risk, honor commitments and produce results worthy of
the investment of the American people. We are committed to ensuring
strong management of this complex cleanup work to secure safe and
efficient progress that protects the public, our workers, and the
environment. We have shown we can deliver meaningful results. Your
continued support will allow us to deliver results important for today,
as well as for generations to come.
RISK REDUCTION RESULTS
Recently, we celebrated another success at the completion
ceremonies for the Fernald, Ashtabula, and Columbus sites. It is the
latest demonstration of our progress following the earlier completion
of cleanup at Rocky Flats in Colorado, the Kansas City Plant in
Missouri, and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--Main Site in
California. All these completions should be recognized as results that
have been borne from partnerships founded on mutual respect and
collaboration.
EM has also made other significant progress:
Stabilizing and packaging for disposition all
plutonium residues, metals, and oxides (SRS and Hanford);
Producing well over 2,000 cans of vitrified high-level
waste from radioactive tank liquid wastes;
Retrieving and packaging for disposal over 2,100
metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from the K-Basins on the
Hanford site to protect the Columbia River;
Characterizing, certifying, and shipping close to
37,000 cubic meters of TRU waste from numerous sites to WIPP
for permanent disposal;
Disposing of more than 965,000 cubic meters of legacy
low-level waste and mixed low-level waste (contaminated with
hazardous chemicals); and
Eliminating 11 out of the 13 high-risk material access
areas through material consolidation and cleanup.
In addition, on a site-specific level, we have:
Completed disposal at WIPP of all legacy drummed TRU
waste from SRS;
Completed demolition of the 232-Z facility at Hanford;
Completed cleanup at the Melton Valley area; and
Completed the first remote-handled TRU waste shipments
to the WIPP from INL.
SOLVING THE CHALLENGES
First and foremost, safety is our top priority. We will continue to
maintain and demand the highest safety performance. We have taken
measures to fully integrate safety into our project designs at an
earlier stage while assuring our line project teams have the necessary
experience, expertise, and training. Safety will remain a cornerstone
in the execution of our mission objectives.
We are actively engaged, both within the Department and externally
with our regulators and stakeholders, in identifying issues that impact
our mission objectives. We have been challenged by lower than expected
performance levels, increased scope, and unrealized planning
assumptions. As we identify issues that could affect future performance
and regulatory commitments, we are taking significant steps to improve
our operations in planning and executing our work. We are applying
lessons learned to help prevent future occurrences that will impact our
planning and commitments.
One of my goals as Assistant Secretary is that at least 90 percent
of our ``projectized'' portfolio will meet or exceed our cost and
schedule targets. We have begun the process of integrating our
management tools into our business processes. Over the past year, I
have personally conducted Quarterly Performance Reviews of all EM
projects with our leadership team. I report to you that we have showed
progress, but we have yet to realize the full potential of implementing
our management systems and better applying risk management principles--
that is, identifying project uncertainties and developing mitigation
measures. Some of our projects have fallen short of expected
performance, but we are engaging our field management contractors with
state-of-the-practice project management methods.
Over the last year, it has become apparent that we have not yet
attained our full potential in our procurements, and in our execution
of projects. We have instituted measures to strengthen our emphasis on
program execution. This multi-year objective already is producing
results that should provide more effective management in the future.
This initiative is being coupled with additional training for Federal
managers and staff to enhance project management and acquisition
skills. This integrated approach will deliver dividends for our
managers in the long-term.
We are improving our ability to ensure that proper procurement
vehicles are available to meet our acquisition strategies. We are
taking a new look at contract types and fee structures within our
contracts. EM must acquire the best services including those of small
business, to meet our business objectives and to become a top-
performing organization.
I have asked my senior leadership at Headquarters and in the field
to take immediate actions to ensure that everyday operating processes
reflect lessons learned. Lastly, in conjunction with the National
Academy of Public Administration, EM has undertaken a review of our
organization and its associated functions and authorities. To date, the
process has identified areas for improvement, along with some
refinements of our organizational alignment. During the next few
months, EM will be implementing the resulting recommendations to ensure
we have an organizational structure that will enhance our ability to
respond to the needs of the mission.
THE FISCAL YEAR 2008 BUDGET REQUEST
The Department's fiscal year 2008 budget request for defense EM
activities totals $5,364 million. The fiscal year 2008 budget request
reflects safety as its utmost priority. EM is committed to our safety
principles and to maintaining the highest safety performance to protect
the workers, the public and the environment.
The budget request reflects prioritizing program work to balance
the goals of risk reduction; completing ongoing work to achieve
completion at sites; and meeting our environmental commitments. For
fiscal year 2008, EM's funding priorities are listed in order of risk,
to best address our cleanup challenges:
Requisite safety, security, and services across EM
cleanup sites;
Radioactive tank waste storage, treatment, and
disposal;
Spent nuclear fuel storage, receipt, and remediation;
Other transuranic, low-level, and mixed low-level
wastes treatment, storage, and disposal;
Special nuclear materials storage, processing, and
disposition;
Soil and groundwater remediation; and
D&D of contaminated facilities.
Examples of milestones and planned activities for fiscal year 2008
by site-specific categories are:
Hanford
Richland
Consolidate, package, and remove spent nuclear fuel
and other radioactively-contaminated materials within the K
Basins (K-East and K-West).
The K Basins project is a high priority, risk reduction
activity due to its close proximity to the Columbia River. The
goal of this project is removal of all spent nuclear fuel,
radioactive sludge, contaminated K Basin water, and radioactive
debris from the K Basins. The endpoint of the K Basins cleanup
will mean the removal of more than 55 million curies of
radioactivity that pose a threat of leakage to the surrounding
environment, including the Columbia River.
Amplify River Corridor remediation activities for
Reactor Areas D, F, and H.
The River Corridor Closure Project will complete remediation
of contaminated waste sites; the D&D and demolition of
facilities that are adjacent to the Columbia River; and
placement of eight reactors into an interim safe storage
condition. The work performed within the River Corridor Closure
Project includes digging up contaminated soil, constructing
interim safe storage (cocooning) of the reactors, demolishing
facilities in the old reactor complexes and facilities in the
300 Area, disposing of waste in the Environmental Restoration
Disposal Facility, and constructing surface barriers or caps
over contaminated sites.
Continue retrieval of contact-handled suspect
transuranic waste and scheduled shipments to WIPP.
The Hanford Site contains thousands of containers of suspect
transuranic waste, low-level, and mixed low-level wastes. The
end point of this project will include the retrieval of
contact-handled suspect transuranic waste in the low-level
burial grounds, the treatment of mixed low-level waste, the
disposal of low-level waste, and certification and shipment of
transuranic waste to WIPP.
Continues groundwater/vadose zone remediation activities.
Due to 40 years of weapon production processes, Hanford's
groundwater has been contaminated with carbon tetrachloride,
chromium, technetium-99, strontium, and uranium plumes. EM is
dedicated to preventing the potential for contaminates reaching
the groundwater by: decommissioning an additional 100 unused
groundwater wells; monitoring 700-plus wells for contaminants
of concern above drinking water standards; and, commencing
design of final remediation actions to address carbon
tetrachloride and technetium plumes.
Office of River Protection
Sustain tank farm closure processes and maintain the
tanks in a safe and compliant condition.
The radioactive waste stored in Hanford tank farms has been
accumulating since 1944. Due to the age of the tanks, a number
have leaked in the past into surrounding soil and groundwater.
In order to reduce the risk of future tank leaks into the
environment, the overall objectives of this project include the
stabilization of radioactive waste stored underground in tanks,
including retrieval, treatment, disposal, and closure of the
facilities.
Progress on path forward for the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant.
The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) is
critical to the completion of the Hanford tank waste program by
providing the primary facility to immobilize (vitrify) the
radioactive tank waste at the Hanford Site. The WTP complex
includes five facilities: the Pretreatment Facility, the High-
Level Waste Facility, the Low-Activity Waste Facility, the
Balance of Facilities, and the Analytical Laboratory. In fiscal
year 2008, the WTP project team plans to complete: close-in of
the Annex building in the Low-Activity Waste Facility;
installation of roofing and completion of the building shell
for the Analytical Laboratory; construction of the water
treatment building in the Balance of Facilities; and renewal of
construction for the High-Level Waste Facility and the
Pretreatment Facility.
Idaho
Transfer spent nuclear fuel from wet to secure dry
storage.
Promote the safe and secure receipt, dry storage, and
packaging and future transfer of the spent nuclear fuel to a
Federal geologic repository at Yucca Mountain.
Continue shipments of transuranic waste to the WIPP.
Maintain program activities that support waste
characterization, packaging, and transportation of remote-
handled transuranic waste to WIPP that lead to reduced
surveillance and operation costs.
Pursue ongoing sodium-bearing waste treatment facility
construction, including efforts to gain necessary regulatory
approvals for sodium bearing waste treatment and disposal.
The overall objective of this project is treatment and
disposal of the sodium-bearing tank wastes, closure of the tank
farm tanks, and performance of initial tank soils remediation
work. Construction and operation of the sodium-bearing waste
facility will reduce potential risk to human health and the
environment by preventing the potential migration of
contamination into the Snake River Plain Aquifer, which is a
sole-source aquifer for the people of Southeastern Idaho.
LANL
Characterize, certify, and ship above-grade
transuranic waste inventory.
The Solid Waste Stabilization and Disposition Project
includes the treatment, storage, and disposal of legacy
transuranic and mixed low-level waste generated between 1970
and 1999 at LANL. Final disposal of the legacy transuranic
waste from LANL will reduce risk to workers, as well as reduce
security costs associated with transuranic waste.
Promote soil and water remediation and monitoring.
The LANL Soil and Water Remediation Project's objective is to
identify, investigate and remediate, when necessary, areas with
chemical or radiological contamination attributable to past
Laboratory operations.
In fiscal year 2008, in order to fulfill the objective of
protecting and monitoring the regional aquifer, as well as
long-term surveillance and monitoring to provide necessary
safeguards and protection for surface and ground waters, the
following activities are planned:
Perform groundwater monitoring at all major
watersheds: LA/Pueblo; Mortandad; Canon de Valle;
Sandia; and in close proximity to the major waste
sites;
Conduct stormwater sampling and implement
erosion control measures;
Install and monitor four wells in Pajarito and
Bayo canyons; and
Complete construction of 260 Outfall
Corrective Measures for alluvial and surface water
treatment system.
Oak Ridge
Continue design of U-233 down-blending project and
begin Building 3019 modifications
Down-blending the Building 3019 inventory for disposition is
in accordance with the national nonproliferation goals by
making the U-233 material unsuitable for use in weapons and
reducing security costs at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Ship contact-handled transuranic waste to WIPP.
Process 250 cubic meters of contact-handled transuranic
debris and 170 cubic meters of remote-handled transuranic
debris with shipments to the WIPP; and continue to dispose of
low-level/mixed low-level waste at the NTS.
Complete the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment fuel salt
removal remediation project.
Upon completion of active remediation, surveillance and
maintenance activities of the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment
facility will be provided until decontamination and
decommissioning of the site has occurred.
Savannah River Site
Consolidate on-site Plutonium to K Area.
In order to meet the Department's Design Basis Threat
criteria, plutonium at SRS is being consolidated into one
Category 1 Special Nuclear Materials Storage Facility. The
receipt, storage, and disposition of these special nuclear
materials at the SRS allows for deinventory and shutdown of
other DOE complex sites, while providing substantial risk
reduction and significant mortgage reduction savings to the
Department.
Ship all legacy transuranic waste to WIPP and treat
low-level waste and mixed low-level waste.
In fiscal year 2008, SRS plans to dispose of transuranic
waste previously characterized as mixed low-level waste;
dispose of low-level waste and newly generated waste, including
soil, groundwater and decontamination and decommissioning
wastes; dispose of mixed low-level waste inventory and newly
generated waste; and dispose of hazardous waste inventories,
thus reducing potential exposure to project workers.
The end-state for this project is the shipment of all legacy
transuranic waste to the WIPP, the treatment of PUREX waste,
and the elimination of all legacy inventories and disposition
of newly generated low-level waste, mixed low-level waste, and
hazardous waste.
Continue groundwater corrective actions across the
Site.
SRS is working to prevent the spread of contamination into
adjoining groundwater aquifers and nearby surface waters.
Existing contamination in vadose zones, groundwater and surface
water sediments are currently being cleaned up, thereby
reducing the risk to site workers, the public and the
environment.
Treat, stabilize, and dispose legacy radioactive waste
stored in underground storage tanks.
The continuation of the design and construction of the Salt
Waste Processing Facility will aid the Defense Waste Processing
Facility in the process of safely disposing of the liquid tank
wastes. The Salt Waste Processing Facility will separate the
high-activity fraction from the low-activity fraction of the
salt waste stored in the underground tanks at the SRS. The
completion of the Salt Waste Processing Facility will support
the mission of SRS in meeting its Federal Facilities Agreement
commitments for waste tank disposition.
WIPP
Operate the WIPP in a safe manner to support disposal
capabilities for transuranic waste.
The WIPP in Carlsbad, New Mexico, is the Nation's only mined
geologic repository for the permanent disposal of defense-
generated transuranic waste. All of the defense-generated
transuranic waste from eligible generator sites must come to
WIPP for receipt, handling, and disposal.
CONCLUSION
The fiscal year 2008 budget request enables risk reduction to
continue. Challenges lie ahead but we are focused on our objectives and
our strategy. Safety, performance, cleanup, and closure underpin our
actions and initiatives. We are committed to work with all interested
parties to resolve issues. We look forward to continuing to work with
this subcommittee and Congress to address your concerns and interests.
Our success relies on our effective partnerships with our regulators,
the communities, and our contractors to produce progress in
accomplishing meaningful results for the American public.
I look forward to a continuing dialog with you and the
subcommittee. This concludes my formal statement for the record. I will
be pleased to answer any questions at this time.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me just ask you. You have been
reviewing the earned value management system and the Defense
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) has changed its valuation
methods, so there is a new approach. Now, if this new approach
were to be applied to the waste treatment project then there
would be another delay. So can you explain what is the problem
and is there a way to resolve the situation with the DCMA?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have visited with the
director of the DCMA and your information that they have
changed their approach is, in fact, true. They have essentially
ratcheted up their interpretation of how to implement the
American National Standards Institute criteria. There are 32
criteria for earned value management systems.
The DOD has ratcheted up, to their credit, the way they
interpret that those criteria should be established, and their
approach is geared more towards a weapons system, like an
airplane or a ship. They do not do a lot of reviews of
construction projects. In fact, when we asked them to give us
an example of another construction project that met their
expectation, they could give us no example.
I should back up a moment. This committee sponsored
language last year in statute that requires the DCMA to certify
our earned value management system. We are still working toward
that end. Meanwhile, the Department has brought in another
contractor separate from EM, separate from my organization that
does this as part of their business, reviews earned value
management systems.
In fact, they have been recognized, this company has been
recognized, by the Defense Department as being preeminent in
their field. I can share that with you after the hearing if you
would like, the web site that shows that.
We are using that company to give us an independent look at
the earned value management system at the project. They are out
there this week, in fact. They have been there all week for
their second visit.
So we are taking, you might say, a dual track approach. One
is to continue to work with the DCMA to see if we can satisfy
their concerns about the way they interpret the criteria,
meanwhile going to this other company that is also recognized
by the Defense Department as a preeminent expert in the area to
see what they think about our earned value management system.
The earned value management system is one of several
project management tools that we rely on to gauge the success
and the health of a project as it goes forward. That is why
this is an important element of what we look at, the earned
value management system.
Senator Bill Nelson. What is the name of that company?
Mr. Rispoli. The name of that company is Tecolote. They are
based in Santa Barbara, California, and, as I indicate, they
are one of the preeminent companies identified by the
Department of Defense (DOD) as being expert in their field.
Senator Bill Nelson. The DCMA was close to completing its
review of the Bechtel earned valve management (EVM) system when
it changed its approach. The current law requires them to make
a recommendation to the Secretary on the EVM system. In the
absence of the DCMA, would you have some outside review of the
EVM system?
Mr. Rispoli. Our intent, Mr. Chairman, is to keep your
staff apprised of the progress of our activities with both the
DCMA and this company called Tecolote, and as we go forward
you, this committee through your staff, will know how we are
doing on both fronts, both with the DCMA and with Tecolote. Of
course, it would be within your purview to change the
requirement that there be independent certification, without
that certification necessarily being the DCMA.
I can assure you that we want the same thing. We want
assurance that the system that we are using and relying on is
legitimate. So by bringing in Tecolote--the Department chose
them, not my organization. But they are a recognized front-
runner in this field, and again I can share that information
with your staff.
Senator Bill Nelson. Jeff, you jump in.
Senator Sessions. The waste treatment plant, the design has
been approved and the contract is in the course of being
executed, is that correct?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir, that is true.
Senator Sessions. You have an extra $3 billion contingency
money there?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Sessions. Well, my experience is if the contract is
everybody thinks there is a $3 billion contingency there, some
of it might get used. Are you confident that you are going to
do everything possible to preserve every penny of that $3
billion?
Mr. Rispoli. Senator Sessions, our intent is, we are in the
midst now of renegotiating that contract. The Government is
preparing its position and our intent is to provide strong
incentives. You, I am sure, are aware of the Rocky Flats
contract, where we delivered 14 months early and quite a bit
below the Government's estimate. We would use the same lessons
learned as we negotiate this contract to provide a very strong
incentive for the contractor to deliver both early and under
budget. So that would be our intent.
I would also point out that if you take away the $3 billion
in contingency from the $12.2 billion, the actual hard cost
estimate this time is based upon nearly 80 percent design. So
the estimate was, for the most part, a bottoms-up cost
estimate. It took the Army Corps of Engineers a year to review
the contractor's cost estimate with 30 people on site. It is a
huge project.
So we have a great degree of confidence that the estimate
this time is much more sound than it was years ago when the
estimate was based upon very immature engineering. This time,
as I say, we are nearly 80 percent designed and the project has
gone through an intense review by the Army Corps.
Senator Sessions. That part of it is sort of a done deal. I
mean, that contract is let and it is going forward. Then the
additional cost will come as the waste liquid is brought in and
processed, is that right?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Let me just say, I remember in Alabama at
the Anniston Army Depot, when we went through the destruction
of poison gas. There were serious differences of opinion. There
was a chemical reaction where it could be poured, a chemical
could be poured over, and this was supposed to neutralize the
gas, or burning, and we went through that. I am not sure how
smart we were, but it was all discussed.
Have there been any other suggestions? Has any effort been
made to ascertain if some other sharp person could develop a
different way of handling this waste, rather than something
that is going to cost us $173 billion, to be sure that all the
other options--when you talk about that big a commitment, I
think it is incumbent on us to ask ourselves rigorously, is
there any other option to this.
Mr. Rispoli. The answer to that is, I believe, Senator
Sessions, that when the choice was made to go with this
vitrification process for both the high level and the low
activity waste, there was a very significant scrub, if you
will, of what options were available. I have been in this
position since August 2005 and I have heard of no suggestion
that any other technology would work better.
The reason is that we have experience with vitrification
both at West Valley, New York, where we built a plant, operated
it, and then closed it down because it finished its job on a
much smaller scale, and the one in Savannah River in South
Carolina is still operating reliably after a number of years,
at least 5 that I am aware of.
So we are confident that the technology is proven and
reliable and that we can use it to process the waste.
Senator Sessions. It is proven and reliable, I do not
dispute. But it is expensive. What about the effort in Savannah
River? Senator Graham is a member of this committee. He was
very pleased. As I recall, South Carolina worked with the DOE
and a plan was developed that was substantially less expensive
than some of the earlier estimates. Are you aware of that
history?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. How much difference did it turn out to
be? I have forgotten how much it saved. Do you know how many
billion dollars less it turned out to be?
Mr. Rispoli. I do not know how much that initial
vitrification plant cost. As I indicated, it has been operating
for a number of years. But that vitrification plant in South
Carolina will only handle 3 million out of 37 million gallons
of waste at that site. So there is other construction in design
today, not yet built, that has already been presented to
Congress and it is well known as an upcoming project, to build
what I would call the balance of the plant needed, to kind of
duplicate what is at Hanford. But because it is a much smaller
number of gallons to go through it, the plant will be smaller
and it does not have to be sized as big or as robust.
Senator Sessions. Well, let us just pursue that. Are you
saying that the net cost per gallon of product processed is
going to be equal in South Carolina to the Hanford site?
Mr. Rispoli. I do not know the net cost per unit. I can get
that to you. I could take that question.
[The information referred to follows:]
The cost per unit is reflected on the chart on page 279.
Senator Sessions. In addition to that, of course, just
processing the liquid, then you have to do things, you have to
consider what to do about the site itself, correct?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Can you give us an estimate of how much
goes into processing the liquid and how much would be in
processing and cleaning up the site, as planned in this
project?
Mr. Rispoli. At Hanford, after the plant is built and fully
operational, which is in around the 2019 timeframe, we are
envisioning operating all the way into the 2030s with that
plant. So it will be many years of operation of that plant to
process the waste out of the 177 tanks.
Now, we are already taking waste and concentrating it so
that we can try to get some tanks, the higher risk tanks,
empty----
Senator Sessions. Is there a cost figure on that processing
the liquid waste and then a cost figure on cleanup of the site
in addition? Are there additional funds to be spent on that?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, there is. But again, I would have to get
that to you for the record. You mean the life cycle cost to
clean up the Hanford site. Senator, I will get you that for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Life Cycle Cost to Clean Up Hanford
The life-cycle cost estimate for processing the 53 million gallons
of high level waste at Hanford is $56.5 billion which includes
construction of the Waste Treatment Plant ($12.3 billion) and tank
waste retrieval, treatment operations, storage of the high-level waste
canisters, onsite disposal of the low activity waste canisters,
decommissioning and decontamination of the Waste Treatment Plant, and
closure of the 177 high level waste tanks ($44.2 billion *).
The life-cycle cost includes costs beginning in 1997 through 2042. From
1997 through 2007 the Department has expended $8.6 billion; $4.8
billion for the Waste Treatment Plant construction and $3.8 billion for
tank farm operations and infrastructure improvements, demonstration of
tank waste retrieval systems, and construction of a high-level waste
canister storage facility. The cost to complete the remaining work
includes $7.4 billion to complete construction of the Waste Treatment
Plant; $10.4 billion for waste processing; $25.5 billion for tank farm
operations, waste retrieval, high-level waste canister storage, and low
activity waste disposal; $1.1 for decommissioning and decontamination
of the Waste Treatment Plant; and $3.4 billion for closure of the 177
high level waste tanks.
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\*\ The Deputy Secretary of Energy approved an increase in the
life-cycle cost from $26.2 billion to $44.2 billion for this project
baseline summary, ORP-0014 Tank Farm Operations, subsequent to the
submittal of the fiscal year 2008 Congressional Budget Request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The life-cycle cost estimate for cleaning up the remaining portion
of the Hanford reservation is $29.6 billion which includes $12.5
billion for nuclear facility decontamination and demolition, $11.8
billion for nuclear material, spent nuclear fuel and solid waste
stabilization, $2.1 billion for soil and ground water remediation, $2.3
billion for safeguards and security, and $0.9 billion for other support
activities. $8.8 billion has been expended on these activities through
2007.
A table summarizing the life-cycle cost for each portion of the
Hanford Site cleanup is provided below.
Senator Sessions. Could you explain to me what Senator
Lindsey Graham meant last year when he said that South Carolina
worked with the DOE and they agreed on a cleanup method that
saved a considerable sum of money? What was he talking about?
Mr. Rispoli. I presume that he was talking about the
project that is now under construction, that will enable us to
take the remaining low-activity waste and dispose of it on
site. This committee itself was the instrumental committee in
the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act that gave us
authority for the Secretary to make a waste determination to
leave low activity waste on site. That determination is called
section 3116 of the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act and
it applies to South Carolina and to Idaho.
So what this committee did, and Senator Graham was one of
those instrumental in it, was give us the authority for the
Secretary to make a determination, in consultation with the
NRC, that we could leave the low activity waste on site in
South Carolina.
Senator Sessions. Is that planned in Hanford?
Mr. Rispoli. The current plan at Hanford is that we will
leave the low activity waste on site, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. In the same fashion?
Mr. Rispoli. It will be vitrified, but it will be on site,
yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Is that the same fashion as South
Carolina did it?
Mr. Rispoli. The waste form is different in that. It is
going to be a grout waste form in South Carolina and a glass
waste form in Hanford. But it is the same outcome in that we
are leaving low----
Senator Sessions. Is that a factor in the different cost?
Mr. Rispoli. I will get that for you, and I will reduce it
to per unit so that you can see per unit.
[The information referred to follows:]
The cost per unit is reflected on the chart on page 279.
Senator Sessions. I would just say to you, $173 billion is
almost what it costs to fight the Iraq war for 2 years. It is a
lot of money.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask about Savannah River. So
are you saying there are plans for moving materials outside of
Idaho or South Carolina?
Mr. Rispoli. The statute that was originated with this
committee enables us to leave--to make a determination to leave
low activity waste on site. At Savannah River site, that low
activity waste determination that we have already made would
actually put it into on-site vaults in a grout form. In the
future we would expect to be using that authority to also grout
the empty tanks, which is the same intent at Hanford, that we
would grout the empty tanks once they are emptied.
So the overall approach is very similar. The difference is,
and you picked up on this, is that the low activity waste at
Hanford will be vitrified. The low activity waste at Savannah
River will be put into a saltstone form, which is a grout, and
into vaults. But yes, the answer is the low activity waste will
be left on site in both. That is the intent. The intent also is
that the tanks once emptied would be grouted to protect the
public and the environment, so that the tanks are one
monolithic entity from that point forward.
Senator Bill Nelson. The high activity waste eventually
would be encased in glass and sent to----
Mr. Rispoli. Yucca Mountain.
Senator Bill Nelson. --Yucca?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, Mr. Chairman. At all three--at West
Valley, New York, at the Savannah River site, and also at
Hanford.
Senator Bill Nelson. You just need Congressional
authorization to send it to Hanford?
Mr. Rispoli. Actually, we are okay. We meet all of the
acceptance criteria for sending the waste to Yucca. Yucca in
its present legal limit of how much it can accept already can
accept all the waste from the Savannah River site. In its
present legal limit, not physical limit, it would not be able
to accept all the waste from the Hanford site. Physically, it
could, but there is a legal cap on how much could go to the
Yucca Mountain site.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do not worry, Mr. Podonsky; we are
getting to you.
Mr. Podonsky. I am waiting patiently.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, on this consolidation of the
materials, tell us what is the status of the effort to complete
the nuclear materials consolidation study?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, Mr. Chairman. In 2005 the Department
established an across-the-Department committee, you might say a
crosscutting committee, to look at for all elements that have
nuclear materials, such as plutonium, what could be done to
consolidate that material. The committee has basically
presented an approach that would in fact consolidate all of
that special nuclear material, most of it, to the Savannah
River site, with the intent of actually running it through a
disposition process at the Savannah River site, such that it
could either go through the MOX plant, which would make it
usable as a nuclear reactor fuel, or disposition it in some
other way.
So we have already announced what the intent would be. Now,
there is more work to be done; we would have to still finish
all of the other requirements, such as the National
Environmental Policy Act--but the intent would be that the
special nuclear materials at Hanford, for example, would be
taken out of Hanford, which would save the Department an
enormous amount of money, both initial capital construction to
enhance the security, to meet the required security parameters,
as well as the extra guns and guards that would have to
continue to protect that material at Hanford if we did not move
it.
So from our programmatic perspective, we are very eager to
implement this consolidation approach, to get that special
nuclear material out of Hanford, to save the money at that
site.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is plutonium 239?
Mr. Rispoli. Yes, sir, all plutonium and also some uranium
materials.
Senator Bill Nelson. When will that material be shipped
from Hanford?
Mr. Rispoli. It would all hinge on the final approval of
the overall plan, because there is another Federal statute that
basically provides that until the Department can demonstrate a
disposition path for all the plutonium that would go into South
Carolina, we cannot bring the material into South Carolina.
Right now we are awaiting the ability to begin construction at
the MOX plant, which is not in my program. It is in the Nuclear
Nonproliferation side of the house. We would then be able to
demonstrate the ability to disposition all this material.
I might mention that only today, a report was delivered to
the appropriate committees here in Congress, including yours, a
business case analysis that shows the approach for
dispositioning this material at the Savannah River site. I do
not think you would have had a chance to, or your staff, to
digest it, but I have a copy that I could leave if your staff
would like it after the hearing.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Podonsky, is that going to be
safe, to move it from Harford to Savannah River?
STATEMENT OF GLENN S. PODONSKY, CHIEF HEALTH, SAFETY, AND
SECURITY OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Podonsky. We would be happy to inspect Mr. Rispoli's
activities to let you know whether they are safe or not. But
that is part of what we do, independently assess the
performance of the Department in a number of areas.
If I might, Mr. Chairman----
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, please.
Mr. Podonsky. --I would like to first, of course, thank
you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Sessions, for inviting me to
testify.
I think it is important to just take a moment, if you will
allow me, to talk about the Health, Safety, and Security
Office. It was just created 7 months ago by Secretary Bodman to
incorporate a new way of doing management within the
Department, especially in the two biggest areas of what we call
the mortgage payment of the Department, safety and security.
Within my office, we are responsible for establishing the
policy for the entire Department for environment, safety,
health, and security including the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). We also do independent oversight,
independent of the line. So in other words, we inspect Mr.
Rispoli as well as all the other assistant secretaries that
have facilities in the Department. We inspect them for their
performance with the standards and requirements from the
Department in all the areas of environment, safety, health,
safeguards, security, cybersecurity, and emergency management.
Our office is also responsible for technical assistance to
the field in areas where they are having difficulties in all of
the areas I just mentioned, as well as we have the Office of
Classification. We also are responsible for training. We have a
training center out in Albuquerque that does the professional
training for safety and security professionals.
The other part that we also have, which is very important,
is the enforcement function, which enforces the civil penalties
for DOE Orders 824, which is on security, the worker health and
safety rule, 851, and also the Price-Anderson, nuclear saf