[Senate Hearing 110-201]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-201, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1547
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
----------
APRIL 11 AND 25, 2007
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008--Part 5 EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
S. Hrg. 110-201 Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1547
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
__________
APRIL 11 AND 25, 2007
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
39-439 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN CORNYN, Texas
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Replublican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
E. BENAJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana JOHN CORNYN, Texas
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs at the National Nuclear Security
Administration and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the
Proliferation Security Initiative at the Department of Defense
april 11, 2007
Page
Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, U.S. Senator from the State of Texas...... 3
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from the State of Indiana... 4
Nunn, Hon. Sam, Co-Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative........... 10
Tobey, Hon. William H., Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration,
U.S. Department of Energy...................................... 37
Benkert, Hon. Joseph A., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Global Security Affairs, Department of Defense..... 45
Efforts to Improve the Department of Defense's Language and Cultural
Awareness Capabilities
april 25, 2007
Scales, MG Robert H., Jr., USA (Ret.), President, Colgen, Inc.... 69
McGinn, Hon. Gail H., Deputy Under Secretary for Plans,
Department of Defense.......................................... 77
Van Tilborg, Hon. Andre, Ph.D., Deputy Under Secretary for
Science and Technology, Department of Defense.................. 86
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS AT THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION AND THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM AND THE
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in
Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Reed, E. Benjamin
Nelson, Warner, Collins, and Dole.
Other senators present: Senators Levin and Chambliss.
Committee staff member present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Jessica L.
Kingston.
Committee Members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; David E. Bonine, assistant to
Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Benjamin Rinaker, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Mark J.
Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to
Senator Dole; and John L. Goetchius, assistant to Senator
Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN
Senator Reed. Good morning. First let me welcome our
witnesses this morning, Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Richard
Lugar. Thank you both. I don't know if we can fully appreciate
the contributions you've made to securing the world and
protecting people from the worst possible situation through
your efforts as United States Senators, and your continuing
effort, Senator Nunn, in leading the way for sensible
nonproliferation policy.
I have a statement that I'd like to put in the record, just
simply mentioning that we'll have two panels. We'll have
Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar on one panel. Then on the second
panel, we'll deal with the implementation issues with Will
Tobey, the Deputy Administrator for Nuclear Nonproliferation at
the National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of
Energy (DOE); and Joseph Benkert, the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs.
At this point, I invite my colleagues, to make brief
opening statements. I know we're all very much interested in
listening to Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar.
[The prepared statement of Senator Reed follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jack Reed
Good morning, it is a pleasure to welcome all of our witnesses here
this morning. Senator Nunn, it is an honor to welcome you back to the
Armed Services Committee and Senator Lugar it is always good to have
you with us. We can never know what disasters were averted by your
shared wisdom and prescience in setting up the Nunn-Lugar program to
secure materials and keep scientists in the former Soviet Union
gainfully employed in the early days following the collapse. Your
continued support and dedication to the programs to secure nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction materials and technologies and to
destroy the corresponding delivery systems has been unfailing. I think
all my colleagues join me in thanking you for raising, and never
letting us forget, the threats posed by unsecured nuclear, biological,
and chemical, materials and weapons.
We look forward to your thoughts on future proliferation threats
and your views on the next steps for the Nunn-Lugar and
nonproliferation programs at the Departments of Defense and Energy.
Our second panel this morning will focus on those programs and
their implementation. We look forward to a good discussion with Will
Tobey, the Deputy Administrator for Nuclear Nonproliferation at the
National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, and
Joseph Benkert, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Global
Security Affairs.
All of our witness have submitted prepared opening statements and
without objection those will be included in the hearing record.
To allow more time for discussion with both panels, and because
Senator Lugar has to meet an obligation in another committee, I will
forgo any further opening remarks.
Senator Reed. Senator Dole.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly want to
join you in welcoming all of our witnesses this morning, but
especially, Senator Lugar, Senator Nunn--the founding fathers
of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. We
appreciate so much all of the work through the years, and your
continuing concern, and look forward to hearing this morning
how you size up the 15 years, whether the program has met the
expectations at the time that it was authorized in 1992. Also,
your recommendations with regard to what more the United States
government might do to address the threat of proliferation in
the post-September 11 world.
I have a statement which I'll submit for the record, but in
the interest of time, let me just again welcome you, and say
what a privilege it is to have the opportunity to work with you
on these vitally important issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Dole follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Elizabeth Dole
I would like to join Senator Reed in welcoming our witnesses this
morning. It is a special honor to have with us today Senator Lugar and
Senator Nunn, the founding fathers of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program.
I look forward to hearing your assessments of whether the CTR
program has fulfilled the expectations you had when you first created
it in 1992. We welcome your recommendations regarding what more the
United States Government might do to address the threat of
proliferation in the post-September 11 world.
The threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) getting into the
hands of terrorists remains the pre-eminent threat to our country and
our allies, as the Director of National Intelligence confirmed in
testimony before the Armed Services Committee just a few weeks ago,
The programs and missions for which Mr. Benkert and Mr. Tobey are
responsible--the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy
(DOE)--are aimed at reducing that threat, and managing the consequences
should such weapons ever gel into the wrong hands or be utilized. These
programs are indeed vital to our national security.
The CTR program is well known to many of us. Perhaps less well-
known is the fact that DOE also has an impressive and growing array of
nonproliferation programs, including Megaports and the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative. The plutonium disposition program, however, faces
challenges in both Russia and the United States. We look forward to a
dialogue with Mr. Tobey about the way forward on that program. More
generally, we are interested in our witnesses' assessments of the
progress made to date, and your vision and recommendations regarding
how these programs in both departments should proceed in the future.
The fiscal year 2008 DOD and DOE budget requests demonstrate the
administration's continuing commitment to threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs. However, I note that the budget profile for
CTR has been declining over the past few years, while the DOE budget is
robust.
I would be interested in the testimony of our witnesses today as to
whether the fiscal year 2008 and future years budget, reflects the
proper prioritization and sufficient resources and authorities for
addressing the continuing threat we face. I believe that we in Congress
must maintain and strengthen our support for these vital
nonproliferation programs in the future.
Let me again join our chairman in thanking our witnesses for their
service and for appearing here today.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Dole.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. I have no opening statement.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
We're joined by Senator Chambliss, who is not a member of
the panel, but specifically wanted to be here this morning and
participate. Thank you for joining us, Senator.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF TEXAS
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
letting me participate on this panel.
I'm particularly pleased to be here because of Senator
Lugar, who has been a great friend during my years in the
House, and now in the Senate, being such a leader on this
issue.
But, most significantly, to be here to welcome my longtime
dear friend, my constituent, formerly my Senator, Senator Sam
Nunn. He is such a great American, such a great guy, and a guy
who I don't get to spend enough time with, but who from time to
time, I still use as a great resource. He's very generous with
his time with me.
I'm particularly pleased that he's here today to talk about
an issue that he and Senator Lugar had been at the forefront on
for decades. This is a very complex world that we live in
today, and we're looking at countries today who are developing
nuclear weapons that we never imagined would develop those
weapons in years' past. These two gentlemen have been at the
forefront of trying to make sure that we remove the opportunity
from any bad guy--terrorist or potential terrorist, or
countries who potentially might use those weapons in the wrong
way--they have really provided a pathway to trying to make sure
that the bad guys never got those weapons in their hands, by
not having the ability to develop those weapons.
So, I do thank them for being here, I thank them for their
leadership on these issues, and I look forward to their
testimony today, and continuing to work very closely with both
Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar to make sure that we continue
down the path of removing the capability of the terrorist world
from ever being able to develop nuclear weapons or nuclear
material for the wrong reasons.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Lugar, I understand that you have to be at another
hearing at 10 o'clock. We'll begin with your testimony and then
we'll go to Senator Nunn.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Dole, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It's a very
real pleasure to be here with my friend, Sam Nunn.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was,
and remains, the number one national security priority facing
the United States, and the international community. Fifteen
years ago, Sam Nunn and I determined that our Government had to
address the threats posed by the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. As political and military leaders backed away from a
Cold War posture, the arsenals they had developed to threaten
and deter each other remained capable of killing the entire
American population, and rendering our country a wasteland.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the new nations of
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan emerged as the third-, fourth-
, and eighth-largest nuclear powers in the world. Amidst
disarray in the Soviet political system, and threats from
Moscow, Kiev, Minsk and Almaty, debated whether they should
remain nuclear powers, or abandon the costly and dangerous
Soviet-made weapons system.
Sam and I challenged the United States, and our former
enemies, to work together on a programmatic response to the
threat. The Nunn-Lugar Program was the answer. The program
helped convince the three new nuclear powers to remove all of
their nuclear weapons from their territories. In addition, it
became the primary tool to which the United States would work
with Russia, to destroy its mass of nuclear, chemical, and
biological warfare capacity.
I have with me today the Nunn-Lugar scorecard, which is off
to my right. My office systematically tracks the elimination of
each warhead, missile, bomber, and submarine. To date, the
program has destroyed more weapons than the combined arsenals
of the United Kingdom, France, and China. The successes notated
on these charts were never a foregone conclusion. Even after 15
years, creativity and constant vigilance are required to ensure
that the Nunn-Lugar Program is not encumbered by bureaucratic
obstacles, starved by inadequate funding, or undercut by
political disagreements.
Through the ups and downs of the U.S.-Russian relationship,
the Nunn-Lugar Program has been a constant. Today, while
bilateral relations are strained in other areas, the program
continues its important mission. But we still have a lot of
work to do in the former Soviet Union.
Mr. Chairman, Sam and I could relate story after story
accumulated over 15 years as we watched the progress of
safeguarding and destroying these weapons proceed. But, these
successful efforts still face two challenges. First, we
continue to complicate our own efforts to destroy WMD through
self-imposed bureaucratic red tape. Second, more resources are
needed to capitalize on opportunities to advance the threat
reduction process.
In 1991, concerns surrounding Russian intent led some
Members of Congress to include in the original Nunn-Lugar
legislation a requirement that the President certify annually
that each recipient is ``committed to'' meeting six conditions.
While well-intentioned, these certification requirements have
sometimes delayed or complicated efforts to destroy WMD. In
some years, more than half the fiscal year passed before the
certification process was completed for that year.
This restricted Nunn-Lugar funds and delayed some weapons
dismantlement projects for months. The certifications have also
wasted hundreds of man-hours. Instead of interdicting WMD
shipments, or identifying the next A.Q. Khan, our
nonproliferation experts spend their time assembling
certification, or waiver, determinations.
The certification requirements are counter-intuitive
because they imply that the value of Nunn-Lugar activities
diminishes when our differences with Moscow are amplified. In
my judgment, the opposite is true. The benefits of verifiable
destruction of WMD in Russia and of steady Nunn-Lugar contacts
become even more valuable when other aspects of the U.S.-
Russian relationship are experiencing friction. The bottom line
is that safeguarding and eliminating WMD in cooperation with a
willing government will almost always be in the national
security interests of the United States and the burden of proof
should be on those who believe otherwise.
The Senate agrees with this proposition. In 2005, the
Senate approved an amendment that I offered to eliminate these
certification requirements by a 78-19 vote. Last year, the
Senate adopted a similar amendment by unanimous consent.
Unfortunately, these provisions were not included in the
relevant conference agreements. I'm pleased that Secretary Rice
and National Security Advisor Hadley have endorsed my efforts.
I have, again, introduced this legislation, and urged the Armed
Services Committee to adopt it and serve as a strong advocate
during conference with the House.
The second major impediment to Nunn-Lugar Program realizing
its full potential is money. While not the subject of as many
cinematic thrillers, the threat posed by proliferation of
deadly pathogens rivals the more popularized ``loose nuke''
threat. A large number of pathogens and disease strains remain
scattered in various locations, often with poor security.
Without a substantial funding increase, important
biological projects will go unfunded, and dangerous pathogens
such as anthrax, plague, smallpox, hemorrhagic fever, and avian
influenza will be left unprotected and vulnerable to theft or
diversion.
I've written to Chairman Levin and Senator McCain urging
them to add $100 million to the program's budget to respond to
these threats. With these funds, we could begin projects in
seven additional countries. Under the current funding request,
no work will get underway in those countries for years. A $100
million investment is a small amount when compared to the
deaths and economic costs that would result from a biological
weapons attack, pathogen outbreak or disease pandemic.
Mr. Chairman, while the program continues its important
work addressing threats to the former Soviet Union, new
challenges are emerging. The world has watched closely as the
Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program have
proceeded. Ambassador Chris Hill still has difficult diplomatic
spade work ahead, but we must begin to plan for the next step.
If negotiations yield agreement with Pyongyang to eliminate its
WMD and their means of delivery, the Nunn-Lugar Program has
ready expertise to do this work. It will not be the only
program employed, but it's a unique tool that may be available
to the President.
In 2003, Congress approved and the President signed the
Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act. It authorized $50 million in Nunn-
Lugar funding to be used outside the former Soviet Union. This
authority has already been put to the use in Albania, where a
new government turned to the United States to help deal with
the previous government's secret 16 tons of chemical weapons,
stored under minimal security.
The Albanian experience reinforced that the Nunn-Lugar
Program should have the flexibility to adjust to unforeseen
contingencies. We should remove the $50 million limit on work
outside the former Soviet Union. We should also give the
Secretary of Defense the authority to implement Nunn-Lugar
projects in difficult political and strategic environments
without the risk that operations could be suspended because of
unintended consequences of executive or legislative action.
Today the $30 million Non-proliferation and Disarmament
fund at the Department of State is the only U.S. non-
proliferation program that operates with so-called
``notwithstanding authority.'' The Nunn-Lugar Programs should
have similar flexibility. This authority would not preclude a
congressional decision to adjust or limit the Nunn-Lugar
Program's work and given causes. But, we should ensure that the
potential for the work is not circumscribed unintentionally.
Mr. Chairman, the Nunn-Lugar Program track record is
impressive. Sam and I have traveled with the Program's experts
extensively. They are committed, as we are, to protecting this
country. We must continue to find ways to help them do their
job better, and reduce the burdens we impose upon them.
Governments around the world are seeking our assistance
with dangerous weapons issues. For example, the Program could
provide assistance to nations in Southeast Asia to secure
pathogens and viruses. The secret chemical stockpile in Albania
will not be the last WMD that is discovered. We must be
prepared to go anywhere in the world, at anytime, with the
resources necessary to eliminate those threats.
Over the years, I've described Nunn-Lugar work to address
threats posed by WMD as a window of opportunity. We never know
how long that window will remain open. We should not let any
opportunity pass to reduce the number of nuclear warheads, or
to enhance our verification regimes. Our Government has the
expertise and the capabilities to dramatically benefit this
country's security. We must ensure that we have the political
will and the resources to implement those programs devoted to
these ends. I thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, and members of the subcommittee, it is
a pleasure to be here today with my good friend, Sam Nunn.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was and
remains the number one national security threat facing the United
States and the international community. Fifteen years ago, Sam Nunn and
I determined that our Government had to address the threats posed by
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As political and military leaders
backed away from a Cold War posture, the arsenals they had developed to
threaten and deter each other remained capable of killing the entire
American population and rendering our country a wasteland.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the new nations of Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan emerged as the third, fourth and eighth largest
nuclear powers in the world. Amidst disarray in the Soviet political
system and threats from Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, and Almaty debated whether
they should remain nuclear powers or abandon the costly and dangerous
Soviet-made weapons systems.
Sam and I challenged the United States and our former enemies to
work together on a programmatic response to the threat. The Nunn-Lugar
Program was the answer. The program helped convince the three new
nuclear powers to remove all of the nuclear weapons from their
territory. In addition, it became the primary tool through which the
United States would work with Russia to destroy its massive nuclear,
chemical, and biological warfare capacity.
I have with me today the Nunn-Lugar scorecard. My office
systematically tracks the elimination of each warhead, missile, bomber,
and submarine. To date, the program has destroyed more weapons than the
combined arsenals of the United Kingdom, France, and China. The
successes notated on these charts were never a foregone conclusion.
Even after 15 years, creativity and constant vigilance are required to
ensure that the Nunn-Lugar Program is not encumbered by bureaucratic
obstacles, starved by inadequate funding, or undercut by political
disagreements.
Through the ups and downs of the U.S.-Russian relationship, the
Nunn-Lugar Program has been a constant. Today, while bilateral
relations are strained in other areas, the program continues to do its
important work. But we still have a lot of work to do in the former
Soviet Union.
Mr. Chairman, Sam and I could relate story after story accumulated
over 15 years as we watched the process of safeguarding and destroying
these weapons proceed. But these successful efforts still face two
challenges. First, we continue to complicate our own efforts to destroy
WMD through self-imposed bureaucratic red tape. Second, more resources
are needed to capitalize on opportunities to advance the threat
reduction process.
CERTIFICATIONS
In 1991, concerns surrounding Russian intent led some members to
include in the original Nunn-Lugar legislation a requirement that the
President certify annually that each recipient is ``committed to''
meeting six conditions. While well intentioned, these certification
requirements have sometimes delayed or complicated efforts to destroy
WMD. In some years, more than half the fiscal year passed before the
certification process was completed. This restricted Nunn-Lugar funds
and delayed some weapons dismantlement projects for months. The
certifications also have wasted hundreds of man-hours. Instead of
interdicting WMD shipments or identifying the next A.Q. Khan, our
nonproliferation experts spend time assembling certification or waiver
determinations.
The certification requirements are counterintuitive because they
imply that the value of Nunn-Lugar activities diminishes when our
differences with Moscow are amplified. In my judgment, the opposite is
true. The benefits of verifiable destruction of WMD in Russia and of
steady Nunn-Lugar contacts become even more valuable when other aspects
of the U.S.-Russian relationship are experiencing friction. The bottom
line is that safeguarding and eliminating WMD in cooperation with a
willing government will almost always be in the national security
interest of the United States, and the burden of proof should be on
those who believe otherwise.
The Senate agrees with this proposition. In 2005, the Senate
approved an amendment I offered to eliminate these certification
requirements by a 78 to 19 vote. Last year, the Senate adopted a
similar amendment by unanimous consent. Unfortunately, these provisions
were not included in the relevant conference agreements. I am pleased
that Secretary Rice and National Security Advisor Hadley have endorsed
my efforts. I have, again, introduced this legislation and urge the
Armed Services Committee to adopt it and serve as a strong advocate
during conference with the House.
FUNDS
The second major impediment to the Nunn-Lugar Program realizing its
full potential is money. While not the subject of as many cinematic
thrillers, the threat posed by the proliferation of deadly pathogens
rivals the more popularized ``loose nuke'' threat. A large number of
pathogens and disease strains remain scattered in various locations,
often with poor security.
Without a substantial funding increase, important biological
projects will go unfunded and dangerous pathogens such as anthrax,
plague, smallpox, hemorrhagic fever, and avian influenza will be left
unprotected and vulnerable to theft or diversion.
I have written to Chairman Levin and Senator McCain urging them to
add $100 million to the program's budget to respond to these threats.
With these funds, we could begin projects in seven additional
countries. Under the current funding request, no work will get underway
in those countries for years. A $100 million investment is a small
amount when compared to the deaths and economic costs that could result
from a biological weapons attack, pathogen outbreak, or disease
pandemic.
THE FUTURE
Mr. Chairman, while the program continues its important work
addressing threats in the former Soviet Union, new challenges are
emerging. The world has watched closely as the Six Power Talks on North
Korea's nuclear weapons program have proceeded. Ambassador Chris Hill
still has difficult diplomatic spade work ahead, but we must begin to
plan for the next step. If negotiations yield an agreement with
Pyongyang to eliminate its WMD and their means of delivery, the Nunn-
Lugar Program has ready expertise to do this work. It will not be the
only program employed, but it is a unique tool that must be available
to the President.
In 2003, Congress approved and the President signed the Nunn-Lugar
Expansion Act. It authorized $50 million in Nunn-Lugar funding to be
used outside the former Soviet Union. This authority has already been
put to use in Albania, where a new government turned to the U.S. to
help deal with the previous government's secret: 16 tons of chemical
weapons stored under minimal security.
The Albanian experience reinforced that the Nunn-Lugar Program
should have the flexibility to adjust to unforeseen contingencies. We
should remove the $50 million limit on work outside the former Soviet
Union. We should also give the Secretary of Defense the authority to
implement Nunn-Lugar projects in difficult political and strategic
environments without the risk that operations could be suspended
because of unintended consequences of executive or legislative action.
Today, the $30 million Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund at the
Department of State is the only U.S. nonproliferation program that
operates with so-called ``Notwithstanding Authority.'' The Nunn-Lugar
program should have similar flexibility. This authority would not
preclude a congressional decision to adjust or limit the Nunn-Lugar
program's work in given cases. But we should ensure that the potential
for Nunn-Lugar work is not circumscribed unintentionally.
Mr. Chairman, the Nunn-Lugar Program's track record is impressive.
Sam and I have traveled with the program's experts extensively. They
are committed, as we are, to protecting this country. We must continue
to find ways to help them do their job better and reduce the burdens we
impose upon them.
Governments around the world are seeking our assistance with
dangerous weapons issues. For example, the program could provide
assistance to nations in Southeast Asia to secure pathogens and
viruses. The secret chemical stockpile in Albania will not be the last
WMD that is discovered. We must be prepared to go anywhere in the
world, at any time, with the resources necessary to eliminate the
threat.
Over the years, I have described Nunn-Lugar work to address threats
posed by WMD as a ``window of opportunity.'' We never know how long
that window will remain open. We should not let any opportunity pass to
reduce the number of nuclear warheads or to enhance our verification
regimes. Our Government has the expertise and the capabilities to
dramatically benefit the country's security. We must ensure that we
have the political will and the resources to implement programs devoted
to these ends.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar.
Senator Nunn, please?
STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, CO-CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR THREAT
INITIATIVE
Senator Nunn. Mr. Chairman, thank you. It's good to be back
home, and to see old friends, and particularly to see the staff
people who are still here, and the young lady sitting in back
of you, Madelyn Creedon, is one of the best. It's very good to
see Madelyn.
It's also great to be able to see here and I didn't know he
was coming, Jim Reed. We pass laws, but the people have to
execute them. That's where the hard work comes in and Jim Reid
has been one of those in charge of the Nunn-Lugar Program for a
long time. Of course, we travel with him, we've gotten the
benefit of his advice and counsel, and he has an excellent team
of people.
Jim, I know that Senator Lugar joins me in thanking you and
your group for getting out there and getting the job done.
It's great to be back again with colleagues, Senator Reed,
Senator Dole, my old friend, Senator Warner, and my good friend
from Georgia, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Nelson, it's good to be with you, and I hope you
express my greetings and appreciation to all of the other
members of the committee, as well as the subcommittee.
So, I'm honored to be here. I particularly want to endorse
everything Senator Lugar said. I know he has to run in just a
moment, but I want to emphasize the certification issue, and
the fact that the very fundamental part of this program is,
it's not foreign aid, it's in our security interest. The
certification, as Senator Lugar said, is counter-intuitive,
because it says, in effect, that if countries are on their good
behavior, we'll help them, but when they're not on their good
behavior is probably when we need to attend to the problems
even more urgently. So, this is not foreign aid, it's
fundamental in the security interests of the United States, and
that's an important point.
The other point I'd like to underscore that he made, was
the importance of dangerous pathogens, the bio-threat. We
haven't talked as much about that, that's been part of the
Nunn-Lugar Program from the beginning. We haven't made nearly
as much progress on that. The Russians' in my view and personal
judgment, illegal behavior under the biological treaty during
the Soviet Union days--they know more about the biological
dangers than almost anyone, because they created a great deal
of biological capability.
I think we have to have a breakthrough in that regard. We
haven't had it yet. We don't get as much cooperation on bio as
we need to get from Russia, but we need to help them in their
country, in the former Soviet Union on the bio-threat. They
need to be partners with the United States all over the world.
If you looked at the paper, Global Security Newswire, in
the last 2 days, I don't know whether it was today or
yesterday, Denmark just came up with an internal report, this
is not part of the former Soviet Union, this is of course, a
Western Democracy, and a great country. That said, a very large
number of their labs handling very dangerous pathogens were
basically insecure.
I'm afraid we'd find that right here in this country, too.
I think it's a major, major problem, and one of these days it's
going to hit us, and we're going to have another report that
says the failure of anticipation, and the failure of
imagination. So, I hope that the words of Senator Lugar on the
bio-threat will be given careful attention.
In 1948, at the dawn of the nuclear age, General Omar
Bradley said, and I'm quoting him, ``The world has achieved
brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. Ours is a
world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We know more about
war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know
about living.''
If he were alive today, I believe it would surprise General
Bradley to know that we've made it 62 years since Hiroshima and
Nagasaki without the use of a nuclear weapon. But the fact that
we have made it this far should not give us any false sense of
comfort, or confidence, that we're going to make it the next 62
years, or maybe even the next 20 years.
We have important efforts underway, without any doubt, we
have some successes--Senator Lugar has made that very clear
here this morning--including the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction
Programs, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the G8
Global Partnership--where the words are perfect, the
implementation, in my view, is sadly lacking--the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, or the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), the rollback of Libya's nuclear
program, which was very important, and U.N. Resolution 1540,
which has all the right words, but we have a long, long way on
a global basis, to have much implementation of Resolution 1540.
President Bush has said we must do everything in our power
to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons out of the
hands of terrorists. The 9/11 Commission called for a maximum
effort to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD, but, at the
end of 2005, gave the Government a D for its progress in this
area. In my view, the risk of a nuclear weapon today is
growing, not receding.
Countries like North Korea, and Iran, as we well know, are
pushing international will to the brink by developing nuclear
weapons technology, and in the case of North Korea, are
unfortunately developing nuclear weapons themselves. A number
of additional countries are considering developing the capacity
to enrich uranium, to use as fuel for nuclear energy.
I consider this a real tipping point. This gives those
countries--if they do it--greater capacity to move quickly to a
nuclear weapon program if they choose to do so. Now, it's
perfectly legitimate to enrich. But, the difficulty is, under
today's regimes, we cannot tell when someone moves from low
enrichment to high enrichment, and that's the difference
between making electricity and making deadly weapons.
Stockpiles of loosely-guarded nuclear weapons materials are
scattered around the world, offering inviting targets for theft
or sale. We are working very hard on this, but we have a long
way to go. In my view, if you look at the threat and you look
at the response, and you look at the danger and you look at the
response, I think the threat is outrunning our response.
Because of an explosion of knowledge and information
throughout the world, the know-how and expertise to build
nuclear weapons and biological weapons is far more available.
Terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons for the same reason that
terrorists seized airplanes on September 11--to use them to
inflict on the world the greatest possible human suffering,
economic loss and geo-political chaos.
Some nations that have had nuclear weapons since the
signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are now increasing
their reliance on nuclear weapons. Not exactly an example we
need in the nonproliferation quest.
Some nations that have gained nuclear weapons outside the
Nuclear NPT seek to legitimize their nuclear status.
Now, there is good news. The good news is that the
potential for conflict between the major powers, and in
particular, between the United States and Russia, has
dramatically declined. Though both countries, for strange
reasons to me, at least, seem reluctant to act on it, we do
share many security concerns.
The bad news is that there still remains a potentially
deadly nuclear threat between the United States and Russia.
Both countries still deploy thousands of nuclear warheads on
ballistic missiles that can hit their targets in less than 30
minutes--a short warning time, hair trigger, prompt-launch
capability that increases the risk of an accidental, mistaken
or unauthorized nuclear missile launch.
Mindful of these rising threats, and eroding confidence in
deterrence as we've known it, recently George Shultz, Bill
Perry, Henry Kissinger and I published an article in the Wall
Street Journal, I believe it was early January. We believe that
we've arrived at a dangerous tipping point in the nuclear era,
and we advocate a strategy for improving America, security,
American security, and global security. Both nuclear ``have''
nations, and ``have not'' nations must think anew, if we are to
prevent a nuclear nightmare.
Whether the world recognizes it or not--and I don't think
the world recognizes it--we are in a race between cooperation
and catastrophe. Those of us who wrote and endorsed the Wall
Street Journal piece--and there were a number of others, former
Government officials who endorsed it--believe that in order to
deal effectively with this new and dangerous era, the United
States and the international community must embrace the vision
of a world free of nuclear weapons, and pursue critical
measures toward that goal.
We believe that without the bold vision, the actions will
not be perceived as fair or urgent, and without the actions,
the visions, of course, will not be perceived as realistic or
possible.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, Senator Warner, members of the
subcommittee, we recommend the following, specific steps. What
Senator Lugar has already talked about is number one on our
list--we must secure nuclear weapons and materials around the
globe to the highest possible standards, and this requires
tremendous leadership, tremendous cooperation, and this goes
far beyond the former Soviet Union.
Number two, we should eliminate short-range tactical
nuclear weapons, the bombs most likely to be targeted for theft
or purchase by terrorists. In my view, this is not going to be
easy. I think we should start with quiet discussions with
Russia about transparency and accountability of these weapons,
between the United States and Russia. If we don't know how many
there are--and I think we do in our inventory, but if they
don't--and I'm not sure about that--then they don't know when
one's missing. These are the weapons that would be a
terrorist's dream.
Number three, nuclear weapons should be reduced
substantially in all states that possess them, and of course,
we are embarked on that, to a degree, in the Moscow Treaty.
Number four, we must get control of the uranium enrichment
process for civil nuclear fuel production, halt the production
of fissile material for weapons, and phase out the use of
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in civil commerce all over the
globe. That latter item will take time, but we need to embark
on the journey. Last September in Vienna, on behalf of our
Foundation, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), and with the
support of Warren Buffett, I advanced a proposal for
establishing an international fuel bank.
Legislation has been introduced in Congress in support of
this concept on the House side, by Congressman Lantos, and I
hope the committee, the members of this committee will take a
look at it, and encourage it and support that. Because, it's
certainly not the overall answer, but it is a major part of the
answer of a backup fuel bank so that we can say to countries
all over the globe, ``You're going to have assurance of fuel
supply. If everything else fails, the International Atomic
Energy Association (IAEA) will have an international fund of
fuel, low-enriched uranium (LEU), and you will be eligible for
that if you are not enriching, and if you are not
reprocessing.'' So this one, I think, is very important. It has
to be joined with other tiers of guarantees, but it is the
last, best hope.
Number five, we must redouble efforts to resolve regional
confrontations and conflicts. Now, as this committee well
knows, this will not be an easy task, but it is an essential
one if we are to stem the incentive for acquiring nuclear
weapons in places like the Middle East, Southwest Asia, as well
as the Korean Peninsula. These are not simply regional
conflicts, they create tensions and confrontations that shape
global world security, and America has a huge stake in each of
those regions.
Number six, we should work to bring the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force, in the United States and in other
key states. I would urge the committee to go back and take a
look at the reasons that people opposed that ratification back
a number of years ago, and review those, and look at what's
happened since then, look at the stewardship program, look at
the simulation capabilities, look at the technology that we can
now use to ease some of the concerns that were legitimate at
the time that was debated. I believe that the report of the
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John
Shalikashvili, a year or two after that was debated, I think
that ought to be reviewed again by the committee, and by the
Senate. That the safeguards he recommends as a roadmap to
ratification should be updated and taken very seriously. I
think that's very important in terms of the United States
leadership in the world. When we don't ratify the CTBT, it's
often hard to lead from a position of moral authority
throughout the world. I know we have to deal with the problems,
but I think they can be dealt with.
I would note, Mr. Chairman, that former President
Gorbachev, who recently published his own essay in support of
the Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, Nunn essay in the Wall Street
Journal, has advocated ratification of the CTBT, and removing
nuclear weapons from hair trigger status as two crucial steps
that should be taken without delay by the United States and
Russia, and other members of the nuclear club. I think the
world should take President Gorbachev up on his challenge.
The United States and Russia should also, in my view, move
to change the Cold War posture of their deployed nuclear
weapons to greatly increase warning time in both countries, and
ease our fingers away from the nuclear trigger.
Mr. Chairman, we could talk a long time about this, but I
just pose this simple--but, I think, pretty important
question--is it in the United States national security interest
for the President of Russia to have only a few minutes to
decide whether to fire his nuclear weapons, or lose them in
response to what could be a false warning? Is that in our
interest? I think the answer is clearly, no. I would hope that
this question would be asked, in reverse, in Russia, and that
we would begin to ask it together.
Last, but perhaps, most importantly, I believe that we must
enhance our verification capabilities--policies as well as
technical agreements, once again restoring and elevating
President Reagan's maxim, ``Trust but verify'' as an essential
component of our National security policy. In my view, we
should put at least as much effort into verification as we do
into missile defense. I'm not talking about necessarily money,
I'm talking about effort, policies, procedures, thoughts and
guidelines. It's going to take a lot of verification to deal,
not only with the nuclear, not only with something like a
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty if we ever get one, but also
going back and finding out how we can do a lot better job of
verifying the biological treaty, which has no verification, and
which may be--in the long run, one of our greatest dangers.
It's going to require U.S. leadership. Accomplishing all of
these steps is going to require a great deal of cooperation,
and it's going to require, not only leadership from the nuclear
nations, but also those nations that do not have nuclear
weapons. The bottom line, I believe, is that we need a
strategic reassessment of the roles and purposes of nuclear
weapons in the 21st century, and an urgent change in direction
with both the vision and the steps. This new direction will
require Presidential leadership, and a consensus judgment in
Congress to sustain it. As this subcommittee well understands,
the discussion is just beginning.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the vision and the
actions must go together. We cannot defend America without
taking these actions, and I think if you look at the list, you
will agree with, I believe, all of them, but at least most of
them. We cannot take these actions without the cooperation of
other nations. We cannot get the cooperation of other nations
without embracing the vision of a world free of nuclear
weapons, which every President from Richard Nixon to George W.
Bush has reaffirmed through our Nation's agreement to Article
VI of the NPT, which is the law of the land.
This cannot happen overnight. It will take a long process,
it has to be done in stages. The United States must have its
nuclear weapons as long as other nations do, no doubt about
that. But we will be safer and the world will be safer if we
are working toward the goal of de-emphasizing nuclear weapons,
and ultimately ridding our world of them.
Nearly 20 years ago, Ronald Reagan was asked to identify
the most pressing need in international relations. In response,
President Reagan asked his audience to imagine that, quoting
him, ``All of us discovered that we were threatened by power
from outer space, from another planet.'' The President then
asked, quoting again, ``Wouldn't we come together to fight that
particular threat?'' After letting that image sink in for a
moment, which he was so good at doing, President Reagan came to
his point, ``We now have a weapon that can destroy the world.
Why don't we recognize that threat more clearly, and then come
together with one aim--how safely, sanely and quickly can we
rid the world of this threat to our civilization and our
existence?''
Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, Senator Warner, Senator Levin,
and members of the committee, if we want a safer world for our
children and grandchildren, I think our generation must begin
to answer President Reagan's question.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Nunn follows:]
Prepared Statement by Former Senator Sam Nunn
Mr. Chairman, I commend you, Senator Dole, and your subcommittee
for your efforts to stimulate a thoughtful discussion over how we can
improve our security and reduce nuclear threats to our Nation and the
world. I also want to thank Senators Levin, Warner, McCain, Byrd, and
Kennedy and my other former colleagues for their important work in this
area over many years on the Armed Services Committee. I especially want
to thank my friend, Senator Lugar, who is providing outstanding
leadership in the Senate to reduce nuclear dangers, and I am honored to
be with him today. I thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to
discuss with you today the issue of U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
In 1948, at the dawn of the nuclear age, General Omar Bradley said,
``The world has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without
conscience. Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We
know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than
we know about living.''
If he were alive today, it might surprise General Bradley to know
that we have made it 62 years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki without the
use of a nuclear weapon. But that fact should not give us a false sense
of confidence that we will make it the next 62, or even the next 20
years.
We have important efforts underway and some successes--including
the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Programs, the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative, the G8 Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism, the PSI, the rollback of Libya's nuclear program and
U.N. Resolution 1540.
President Bush has said we should do ``everything in our power'' to
keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons out of terrorist hands.
The 9/11 Commission called for a ``maximum effort'' to prevent
terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, but at the end
of 2005 gave the government a ``D'' for its progress in this area. In
my view, the risk of a nuclear weapon being used today is growing, not
receding.
Countries like North Korea and Iran are pushing
international will to the brink by developing nuclear weapons
technology and--in the case of North Korea--nuclear weapons.
A number of additional countries are considering
developing the capacity to enrich uranium to use as fuel for
nuclear energy--giving them greater capacity to move quickly to
a nuclear weapons program if they choose to do so.
Stockpiles of loosely guarded nuclear weapons
materials are scattered around the world, offering inviting
targets for theft or sale. We are working on this, but I
believe that the threat is outrunning our response.
Because of an explosion of knowledge and information
throughout the world, the know-how and expertise to build
nuclear weapons is far more available.
Terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons for the same
reasons terrorists seized airplanes on September 11--to use
them to inflict on the world the greatest possible human
suffering, economic loss, and geopolitical chaos.
Some nations that have had nuclear weapons since the
signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are
increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons.
Some nations that have gained nuclear weapons outside
of the Nuclear NPT seek to legitimize their nuclear status.
The good news is that the potential for conflict
between the major powers, and in particular between the United
States and Russia, has dramatically declined. Though both
countries seem reluctant to act on it, we share many security
concerns. The bad news is that there still remains a
potentially deadly nuclear threat: both countries still deploy
thousands of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles that can
hit their targets in less than 30 minutes--a short warning
time, ``hair trigger'' prompt launch capability that increases
the risk of an accidental, mistaken or unauthorized nuclear
missile launch.
Mindful of these rising threats and the eroding confidence in
deterrence as we have known it, George Shultz, Bill Perry, Henry
Kissinger, and I published an article in January in the Wall Street
Journal. We believe that we have arrived at a dangerous tipping point
in the nuclear era, and we advocate a strategy for improving American
security and global security.
Both nuclear ``have'' and ``have not'' states must think anew if we
are to prevent a nuclear nightmare. Whether the world recognizes it or
not--we are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe.
Those of us who wrote and endorsed the Wall Street Journal piece
believe that in order to deal effectively with this new and dangerous
era, the United States and the international community must embrace the
vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and pursue crucial measures
toward achieving that goal. We believe that without the bold vision,
the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the
actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.
We recommend actions by the five nuclear weapon states that are
parties to the Nuclear NPT; actions by those states with nuclear
weapons outside the NPT; and actions by nations who may have the
capability--although hopefully not the intent today--to produce nuclear
materials or nuclear bombs.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, and members of the committee, we
recommend the following specific steps:
1. We must secure nuclear weapons and materials around the
world to the highest standards;
2. We should eliminate short-range ``tactical'' nuclear
weapons, the bombs most likely to be targeted for theft or
purchase by terrorists. In my view, we should start with
transparency and accountability of these weapons between the
United States and Russia.
3. Nuclear weapons should be reduced substantially in all
states that possess them.
4. We must get control of the uranium enrichment process for
civil nuclear fuel production, halt the production of fissile
material for weapons and phase out the use of highly enriched
uranium in civil commerce.
a. Last September in Vienna, on behalf of the Nuclear
Threat Initiative and with the support of Warren
Buffett, I advanced a proposal for establishing an
international fuel bank. Legislation has been
introduced in Congress to support the establishment of
such a bank, which I hope members of this committee
will encourage and support.
5. We must redouble efforts to resolve regional
confrontations and conflicts. As this committee well knows,
this will not be an easy task, but it is an essential one if we
are to stem the incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons in
places like the Middle East, southwest Asia and the Korean
peninsula. These are not simply regional conflicts. They create
tensions and confrontations that shape world security.
6. We should work to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
into force--in the United States and in other key states. I
believe that we should use the report by former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili and the safeguards
that he recommends as a roadmap to ratification here at home.
a. I would note that former President Gorbachev, who
has recently published his own essay in support of our
Wall Street Journal piece, has advocated ratification
of the CTBT and removing nuclear weapons from hair
trigger alert as two crucial steps that should be taken
without delay by members of the nuclear club. I believe
that the world should take up President Gorbachev's
challenge.
7. The United States and Russia should move to change the
Cold War posture of their deployed nuclear weapons to greatly
increase warning time in both countries and ease our fingers
away from the nuclear trigger.
a. To accomplish this step, I urge the two Presidents
to order the military and defense officials of each
country to present to them a set of options to increase
warning time on both sides. I believe that a front
burner option should be to remove all nuclear weapons
from hair trigger status, which would greatly increase
warning time and reduce the danger of an accidental or
unauthorized missile launch.
b. These officials should jointly determine which
threats justify keeping thousands of nuclear weapons on
hair trigger status, and then recommend steps to
eliminate those threats and thus end the justification
for deploying nuclear forces in this posture. Other
prudent ways to increase warning time for both
countries should be developed by our defense leaders
and presented for consideration.
c. The Presidents, in close consultation with
Congress and the Duma, should then jointly adopt an
approach and a timetable to get the job done, and
challenge other nuclear nations to follow this lead.
d. This increased warning time would improve the
security of the United States and the security of
Russia, and would set a powerful example for the world.
e. Chairman Reed, Senator Dole, and members of the
committee, each day we should ask ourselves: ``Is it in
the United States' national security interest for the
President of Russia to have only a few minutes to
decide whether to fire his nuclear weapons or lose them
in response to what could be a false warning?'' I would
hope that this question would be asked in reverse in
Russia and that we would begin to ask it together.
8. I believe that we must enhance our verification
capabilities, policies and agreements, once again restoring and
elevating President Reagan's maxim of ``trust but verify'' as
an essential component of our national security policy. In my
view, we should put at least as much effort into verification
as we do into missile defense.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, and members of the committee,
accomplishing these steps will require intensive work with leaders of
the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a
world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise. This will
require U.S. leadership.
I believe that we need a strategic reassessment of the role and
purposes of nuclear weapons in the 21st century and an urgent change in
direction with both vision and steps. This new direction will require
Presidential leadership and a consensus judgment in Congress to sustain
it. As this subcommittee well understands, this discussion is just
beginning.
In closing, I believe that the vision and actions must go together.
We cannot defend America without taking these actions; we cannot take
these actions without the cooperation of other nations; we cannot get
the cooperation of other nations without embracing the vision of a
world free of nuclear weapons--which every president from Richard Nixon
to George W. Bush has reaffirmed through our Nation's commitment to
Article VI of the NPT.
This cannot happen overnight. It will be a long process, done in
stages. The United States must have its nuclear weapons as long as any
other nations do. But we will be safer, and the world will be safer, if
we are working toward the goal of deemphasizing nuclear weapons and
ultimately ridding our world of them.
Nearly 20 years ago, Ronald Reagan was asked to identify the most
pressing need in international relations. In response, President Reagan
asked his audience to imagine that ``all of us discovered that we were
threatened by a power from outer space--from another planet.'' The
President then asked: ``Wouldn't we come together to fight that
particular threat?'' After letting that image sink in for a moment,
President Reagan came to his point: ``We now have a weapon that can
destroy the world--why don't we recognize that threat more clearly and
then come together with one aim in mind: How safely, sanely, and
quickly can we rid the world of this threat to our civilization and our
existence.''
Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, and members of the committee: If we
want a safer world for our children and grandchildren, our generation
must answer President Reagan's question.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Nunn.
We've been joined, as you pointed out, by Senator Levin,
Senator Warner, and Senator Collins. We'd like to do about 6-
minute rounds of questioning.
So, let me first thank you and Senator Lugar for your very
compelling testimony, but not only that, for your work over
several decades now, which ranks--I believe, along with the
Marshall Plan--as laying out a vision for this country, based
upon not just altruism, but reality and realism, to help make
this a much more secure and safer world. So thank you for your
continued interest.
I will go ahead and begin the questioning, and then turn to
my colleague, Senator Dole.
Currently, you and Senator Lugar both have been able to
inspect the chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia,
that we're building, and it appears that the Department of
Defense (DOD) is going to curtail their expenditures to about
$1.04 billion, essentially, give the Russians $200 million more
and say, ``finish it, and run it.'' My question, Senator Lugar
and Senator Nunn is, are those, in your mind, will that be an
adequate way to resolve the situation, to finish the facility
and to continue to do what we want to do, which is to have them
actively destroy their chemical weapons?
[The information referred to follows:]
I have visited the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at
Shchuchye on three occasions. On one occasion, as Senator Nunn
described in his testimony, he and I toured the chemical weapons
stockpile stored at a nearby, military base. The facility is made up of
14 old wooden warehouses. Some have broken windows covered over with
chicken wire. The high fence and the military guards are the only hint
of what is inside--one of the world's largest stockpiles of deadly
nerve gas, nearly 2 million easily portable artillery shells and
missile warheads filled with lethal sarin, soman, and VX. It's enough
to kill the world's population 20 times over.
These chemical weapons, part of a massive Soviet-era arsenal that
totals more than 40,000 metric tons, must be eliminated before they
fall into the hands of terrorists. The U.S. and Russia, along with 153
other countries, approved the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), each
country committed to ban the production of chemical weapons and destroy
our huge stockpiles that were built during the Cold War. It is clearer
than ever that our own national security is bolstered by a vigorous
international campaign to contain and destroy all chemical weapons
stockpiles.
With the world threatened by global terrorists seeking weapons of
mass destruction, it is hard to overstate how serious this problem is.
A single 85mm artillery shell from Shchuchye can be concealed in a
briefcase, but carries enough poison gas to kill up to 100,000 people.
A disgruntled insider could smuggle one out, or a determined group of
well-armed terrorists could penetrate the installation's defenses.
There is plenty of blame to go around for the delays we have
encountered in destroying the chemical weapons munitions at Shchuchye.
In the past, Moscow was unable to pay its share of destruction costs
and was suspicious of providing information on its weapons programs.
For 3 years, funds from the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
program designated for Shchuchye were blocked by some in Congress who
asserted that Russia's failure to comply with its CWC obligations
requires the suspension of joint chemical weapons destruction efforts.
Although Congress granted the president temporary waiver authority
to get the money flowing again, the United Slates lost valuable time on
an urgent project. We are in a race to rid the world of these dreadful
weapons before terrorists get their hands on them, and we shouldn't let
self-imposed bureaucratic hassles slow us down. Some in Congress and in
the administration ask why we should spend money to clean up the
Russian mess: 'They made their bed, now they can lie in it.' The
trouble is, in the meantime terrorists could steal weapons of mass
destruction, and use them against our Armed Forces, the United States,
or our allies.
Despite the strong support from the President and the
administration, Congress continues to place six conditions on U.S.
assistance to the chemical weapons destruction program at Shchuchye.
Current law requires that the President certify that Russia has met
each of these six conditions. Absent such a certification, funds cannot
be obligated and cannot be expended until or unless the Administration
certifies that cooperation is ongoing or a waiver is put in place. In a
number of circumstances, they cannot certify that these conditions are
being met and consequently, they have to request waiver authority so
that the conditions can be waived and funding can go forward. As I
indicated in my testimony these certification requirements need to be
eliminated. While well intentioned, these conditions delay and
complicate efforts to destroy weapons of mass destruction. As recently
as 2003, Shchuchye funding was not available for expenditure until more
than half of the fiscal year had passed before the bureaucratic process
was concluded. None of these certifications justifies stopping the
destruction of the stockpile at Shchuchye. We must eliminate, not
preserve, mechanisms that slow down our work.
During the past 2 years, our efforts at Shchuchye have been
frustrated by what I suspect is the intentional manipulation of the
U.S. contracting process. In what is believed to be one of the final
contracts, the U.S. Government, through our main contractor, the
Parsons Company, has submitted two separate requests for proposals to
install the destruction equipment in one of two destruction buildings.
Unfortunately, despite our best intentions and meticulous cost analyses
and evaluations none of the bids that have been received have been
consistent with U.S. estimates. In each of the two subcontractor
bidding processes, early estimates provided by some Russian companies
were considered responsible and accurate. Unfortunately, each bidder on
each occasion dramatically increased their proposed cost estimate days
before the awarding of a contract. Nunn-Lugar staff from the Pentagon
and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency suspect intentional and
organized contract manipulation.
After the Nunn-Lugar Program's third such experience, the program
decided to take a new path. The program is currently in negotiations
with the Russian Government on a way forward. As Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, Joseph
Benkert, testified earlier today the Pentagon expects ``to amend the
agreements and add the final contracts and funding to complete this
project very soon.''
Today the project at Shchuchye is approximately 50 percent
complete, planning is more than 99 percent complete. I know that
Senator Reed expressed concern about the direction this project will
ultimately take. I am also concerned. My number one goal is to ensure
that the weapons at Shchuchye are eliminated as quickly as possible.
They pose a dangerous threat to U.S. and international security.
I had hoped that the project at Shchuchye could have been completed
in the same contracting and oversight fashion that it started.
Unfortunately this does not appear to be possible. I believe the United
States must maintain a strong role in the process independently or
through the Parsons Company. Transparency remains a critical component
of the Nunn-Lugar Program. We must be able to prove to the American
people that these investments are in US national security interests.
In sum, each of us shares the same goal and that is the elimination
of a potential threat. I am hopeful that a solution will be worked out
soon that will allow the facility at Shchuchye to get started
destroying these dangerous weapons. I plan to visit Shchuchye this
August, and will be happy to share with this committee my findings and
thoughts about the future of the project.
Senator Nunn. I'm going to defer to Senator Lugar, and I
assure you he could answer that question for the record in
terms of the update, but my impression of that destruction
facility is that it has required a great deal of investment,
the Russians have put a good bit in it, we've put an enormous
amount of money in it and it's extremely important.
The times I've visited the chemical weapons storage
facility, basically you go in the buildings, you put on gas
masks, you go in and you see these stacks, as high as this
roof, almost as high as this ceiling, here, of one artillery
tube after another, full of chemical weapons. We had a
mathematician, Ash Carter, with us when we visited, and he
computed--I'll assume he was correct--we had enough, they had
enough chemical weapons in that facility to kill everybody on
the face of the Earth three or four times over, if it was
disseminated in an efficient way. Of course, it wouldn't be,
chemicals aren't, but that shows you the magnitude--each one of
those artillery tubes--and they would fit in a briefcase--could
basically kill thousands and thousands and thousands of people.
The other thing that impresses you is, there are holes in
the roof. People could actually climb in those buildings.
Unless you're suicidal, it wouldn't make much sense, unless
you're trying to steal them, but that's the problem. I was not
at all satisfied with the security there, though it's been
dramatically improved, with our help, but there's also a time
problem, because the land is very wet, and it is, in effect,
gradually sinking. So, I think there's some urgency in getting
rid of those. The thing is, Mr. Chairman, I'd have to be
updated on the program to give you a precise answer of what
Russia has done lately, but it's in--very much in Russia's
interest to get these weapons destroyed.
We're working in good faith to get our chemical weapons
destroyed. My impression of that program is, we're not quite on
schedule--the Russians are way behind schedule but it's
fundamentally in both countries' interest to get on with the
job.
It's also in the interest of our European friends, and this
is where some of these European nations in the G8 have signed
up to help on chemical weapons destruction. So, I think it's an
urgent priority, in terms of the exact procedure of how to deal
with Russia and the obstacles right now, I'm going to have to
defer to my colleague on that.
Senator Reed. We'll follow up with Senator Lugar, thank
you, Senator Nunn.
In recent articles, you've expressed your concern that the
United States has lost leadership to address these nuclear
issues and other issues, and what must we do to regain this
credibility and this leadership? Because, I think we all feel
that without strong American leadership that this endeavor will
not work.
Senator Nunn. I think we have to basically announce to the
world that we are serious about Article VI of the
Nonproliferation Treaty, reiterate what we are already doing
with the Moscow Treaty, and the time schedule.
I believe one of the most profound statements we could make
would be to join with Russia in saying that we have a goal in
the next few years of getting all of our weapons off hair
trigger alert. There is no need--15 years after the Cold War--
for both nations to be able to destroy each other within an
hour or two. Is is right for the President of Russia to have
only a few spare--a few very crucial minutes to decide whether
a false warning is in play, or whether we really are attacking?
The condition of their satellites and radars have gone down
since the Cold War, they're not as good with warning as they
were. That's fundamentally against our interests, because we
don't want them to make a mistake. So, getting weapons off of
hair trigger alert, basically working with Russia on that,
getting tactical nuclear weapons with some degree of
accountability and transparency, and I'm sure that's not going
to be made public by Russia for a long time, but I think we
could exchange data on that.
Greatly accelerating the securing of nuclear materials all
over the world, and getting Russia to be a partner, not just
simply a supplicant for funds, but a partner, in not only the
former Soviet Union, but elsewhere. Because there are over 40
countries that have enough HEU to make a weapon. Once that gets
away from the source, Mr. Chairman, it's like a needle in a
haystack--protecting at the source, securing at the source, and
eventually destroying at the source, or in some facility near
the source is the best way, and the most efficient way to deal
with that.
So, all of those are, I think, important ways that we could
lead. I also believe that if the Senate of the United States
took a real lead in looking, again, at the CTBT it would be to
our advantage. I think you'll find that some of those concerns
we've already dealt with, that were legitimate back then. I
think it's time for a fresh look, I think it would send a
totally different signal to the world. The way I see it, the
vision of getting rid of all nuclear weapons is a very high
mountain, but I think we ought to have that vision.
I believe if we look at the scorecard now, we're not--we,
being Russia, the United States, all the nuclear powers and the
world, the big ``we''--we're not heading up the mountain, we're
heading down the mountain. I've listed a lot of those concerns.
We have to turn around, we have to show the world that we're
heading up the mountain, and that we need people to go with us.
We have to look for trails that lead up, and some of the things
I've mentioned, I think, do lead up that mountain, and we have
to get other people to go with us.
That's a big job, but the stakes are the future of the
world.
Senator Reed. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
One final question, Senator Nunn, that is, there's been
some concern about the relevancy of the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) today, and I wonder if you have
any quick thoughts about changes in the NPT that would be
helpful to make this climb up the hill?
Senator Nunn. Well, certainly the additional protocol that
has been pushed by the IAEA and by the United States and
others, would help on the inspections. But, when you look at
countries like India and Pakistan and Israel that are not under
the NPT; when you look at the NPT in terms of permitting
fissile material to be made, but only to the low-enriched
level, but you don't have the inspection regime to make sure it
doesn't go from low-enriched to high-enriched; when you look at
the number of countries that are now lining up, saying they are
about to go into production of fissile material--last count I
had, it was seven additional countries; when you look at Iran
and North Korea--all of that means that we have to, I think,
strengthen the NPT, but it can't be the only thing, it's not a
strong enough foundation to, basically, carry this load. That's
why this vision and these actions, we're painting a much
broader picture that includes strengthening a NPT, but it is
not in any way limited to that. It's much broader.
We have to have countries like India and Pakistan and
Israel participating in this much broader vision, and in these
steps. We have to have countries that don't have nuclear
weapons, but have nuclear materials, and HEU--they have to be
stewards that are just as conscientious about this material as
we are about our weapons.
The way I view it, Mr. Chairman, we were diligent during
the Cold War--we and the Russians--in making sure we did
everything possible to be safe. We've made sure we didn't
escalate conflicts when we could avoid them, and we never had a
nuclear exchange, or even a war between the United States and
the Soviet Union, and between the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact.
But, we've also been--in addition to diligent--we've been
lucky. You look back at the number of instances we've had where
it could have been Armageddon. The first time I visited NATO, I
came to the conclusion that we were going to be faced with our
commanders in NATO asking for release authority of their
battlefield nuclear weapons at the very beginning of any
conflict. That wasn't our official position, but that was what
you found out when you talked to people at night, over dinner,
and that would have been the President of the United States, if
we had had a conflict in Europe, we would have been faced with
a very quick decision about whether to use our battlefield
nuclear weapons or whether to lose them.
So, we've been very lucky. You have to ask yourself, if you
get 10, 15, 20 countries with nuclear capability, are they
going to be as diligent, and lucky--all of us are going to be
as diligent and lucky in the next years as we have been in the
past years? I don't think so. I think the odds are very much
against that. We don't have to just be diligent and good and
lucky one time, we have to be diligent and good and lucky every
time there's an incident. That's multiplied, I think, in many
ways, much more than geometrically, when you get additional
countries.
We're on the tipping point of having, not only Iran and
North Korea, but a number of other countries that are moving
to--under their legal right--to enrich uranium. When they get
that enrichment capability, and if we do not have a stronger
inspection and verification regime, internationally, then you
have a lot of potential nuclear powers that are lurking right
around the corner. So, it's a concern that, I think, is shared
by Shultz and Kissinger and Perry and a lot of other people
that we really, I think, have to pay attention to.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Nunn.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Senator Nunn, when you first authorized the
CTR Program back in 1992, you had the wisdom and the foresight
to not only focus on elimination of WMD, but also to provide
for helping scientists who might be tempted to sell their
knowledge, their expertise, because of the difficult economic
conditions at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Now, I'm interested in how you see that aspect of the
success of that aspect of the CTR Program? Also, I'm concerned
today that the same situation may be occurring in Iraq. We have
scientists there who have left the country, obviously, many
scientists have worked on the chemical weapons program, prior
to 1991, and I'm interested in your views as to what more we
might possibly be doing there? The DOE had a small-scale
program to help with employment for scientists in Iraq, but I
understand that, because of security considerations, that has
not progressed aggressively. Do you think that the United
States, other members of the international community should be
doing more in this respect? If you could just share your
thoughts on this aspect of the CTR and how you see it applying
to the Iraqi situation?
Senator Nunn. Senator Dole, I think you put your finger on
the part of the Nunn-Lugar Program that has concerned me the
most. We have done some very good things. The science and
technology centers in Ukraine and Russia, I think, have
employed thousands of scientists back in the early nineties,
mid-nineties, and even late nineties, that otherwise would not
have had employment. They had nuclear knowledge, but not
employment, no way to feed their families. So, I think it's
done an enormous amount of good.
But it has not been anywhere near complete, and it is a
tremendous danger that a lot of those people could have gotten
out of the net, and ended up in countries that would use that
nuclear knowledge and paid them money for it.
We don't know what we don't know. I don't know what has
happened. I don't know how many scientists have ended up in the
wrong place, but I know that a lot less than there would have
been without the Nunn-Lugar Program.
Now, what do we do now? What I've tried to do in my
conversations on college campuses with research universities,
is encourage those universities to reach out and employ these
people around the globe who have this nuclear knowledge and may
be going through tremendous stress, in terms of a country like
Iraq, or back in the nineties, a country like Russia. I think
our energy labs, such as Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and
others, could employ more of these, but we have to separate the
security side of that, we have to be very conscious of the
security side.
What I'm hoping is, we don't let the security on labs
obscure the need for the labs to reach out to other scientists
around the globe. These labs are our home for the most
knowledge and expertise, and these are the kind of people that
can reach out to scientists around the globe. I think there
ought to be a way we can handle security, by having our
laboratories reach out, and cooperating with them on projects
that are of peaceful intent, and making sure that those people
have support from their colleagues, making sure they have
meaningful occupations.
I think that's something the laboratories could be given,
but it has to be separated from the security. If we get so
paranoid about the security of the labs, though, that we close
out that cooperation with people like the Russians, like the
Chinese, and like the Iraqi scientists coming, or perhaps in
the future, Iranians or North Koreans, then I think we'll be
missing a great opportunity. Because these are the people, that
if terrorist groups got weapons material, and they got hold of
a couple of scientists like this, we'd have a very bad
situation.
Senator Dole. In your opening statement, you referred to
your proposal for establishing an international nuclear fuel
bank that would prevent proliferation, while still ensuring
that there would be success with regard to civil nuclear power
for countries that want it. Would you elaborate on your concept
with regard to a fuel bank, and how it would work? I'm
interested in whether your proposal has received support from
the United States Government, and other key countries?
Senator Nunn. On the latter question, we discussed this
very thoroughly with a number of people in the current
administration, and we were encouraged by their response. It
was not specifically endorsed as a governmental position, but
the Department of State and the DOE were very complimentary of
the proposal. There were speakers at the conference in Vienna,
representing the U.S. Government right after I spoke and made
the proposal to the international body, that basically had very
warm words to say about it.
Of course, the challenge we put up, we basically said,
``We'll put up $50 million if the world will match us with 2-
to-1.'' So, we were saying that, we need $150 million to get it
started, it will take more than that later on as the demand for
nuclear power grows--and I'm for nuclear power, I think we have
to have nuclear power in the world, but it has to be safe and
secure--but as that demand grows, this fuel bank is going to
have to grow.
This fuel bank is sort of the last insurance policy. There
has to be a tier of guarantees of adequacy of fuel supply.
First, the market itself, which so far, works pretty well.
Second, the nuclear suppliers are coming or working towards an
agreement where if one supplier defaulted, the others would
step in and ensure the country that was needing nuclear fuel
that they would have it. Third, the Russians have proposed a
proposal that would have a nuclear fuel bank in their country
with Russian fuel backup, in joint venture with Kazakhstan, our
Government is talking to them.
So, the IAEA is trying to sort all of this out, and I
visualize a tiered approach, where you have different steps and
guarantees. Insurance companies could play a role in this, the
commercial market could play a role in this. But, I think that
our proposal, hopefully, will kick off that kind of discussion.
Right now, I would say the status is that IAEA Director El
Baradei and his staff are working very hard on this. They are
having meetings with the Russians and the United States, our
Government's involved, I would like to see our Government take
a stronger leadership position than they have taken so far.
I would like to see the Lantos bill, or something like
that, pushed in the Senate and the House, because that would be
the United States matching--or a portion of the match--I don't
think it ought to all be U.S., but I think it ought to be
partially U.S.--I'd love to see the United States and Russia
jointly step up and say, ``We'll match the $50 million,'' and
that would get it up to $150 million. We need more than $150
million, but that's, we thought, a start.
So, we gave a 2-year window, so we have another 16, 17
months to go, and I'm encouraged by the response thus far, but
there are a lot of obstacles, and it's going to take a lot of
leadership.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Dole.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Nunn for being here today, and thank
Senator Lugar for his commitment to this very important project
that's continued over the years.
I wonder, in light of the number of countries that are
showing an interest in nuclear capabilities in one degree or
another, if there's a level that you truly are comfortable with
in having a nuclear response capability that would be
appropriate as these other countries re-gain nuclear
capability? In other words, as others are gaining in their
knowledge, we have the risk of trying to convert them to not
become nuclear powers, with the nuclear powers that are there,
but if we are slow to succeed, or don't succeed--what level of
risk are we at that we ought to be protecting ourselves
against?
Senator Nunn. The United States and Russia have a force
that is vastly superior to any other nuclear powers on earth,
nobody else comes close to the United States and Russia, and
Russia----
Senator Ben Nelson. But it's aging.
Senator Nunn. Yes, that's true, but we've had more tests
than any other countries, too, by far, so our nuclear forces
are more up-to-date in terms of calibrated with tests than
almost any in the world. Maybe Russia has as much. So, I don't
think we have a gap that's going to close any time soon.
I would defer to those of you who get classified briefings,
because I haven't had one in quite awhile, but the Chinese for
many years did not have their missile and their warheads
matched. They had them in separate places. That's what I call,
not having a hair trigger. What I hope is the United States and
Russia, in that regard, would get more like China, before China
gets more like we are.
Because, the more countries that have weapons that can be
fired in 30 minutes, that means warning times are all-
important. It means that decisionmaking by human beings becomes
less and less relevant. Not irrelevant, but less and less
relevant. When you have to decide something in 2 or 3 minutes,
you have to rely on machines, in effect, you have to rely on
computers. Now, human judgment always has to be in here, but
the more warning time we get, the better off we're going to be.
Even if you have a world that has nuclear weapons forever,
it would be, in my view, that our goal with Russia ought to be
to increase the warning time. Let's just assume--and I'm sure
it's classified, I don't even remember what it is, the exact
minutes, it doesn't matter--but let's assume that the President
of the United States has about 10 minutes to make a decision.
Let's assume that the Russian President has less than that,
because they're more vulnerable to a first strike, by far now,
than we are. Let's say he has 5 minutes. Can you imagine all of
the things that have to happen in that 5-minute period for the
two leaders to make those decisions? I mean, the deeper you get
into this, in the classified sense, I can assure you, the more
concern you're going to get.
Now, our people will say, ``Yes, we have these safeguards,
we have these safeguards, we have these safeguards.'' I urge
you to go back and look at the Jeanne Kirkpatrick Commission,
and what they discovered a few years ago. Senator Warner, you
and I helped stimulate that report, because we went over and
talked to Secretary Cheney, and he got them to do it. They
found some--and I think it's classified--they found some stuff
that had to be changed, let's put it that way. Alarming.
In an age of computers, in an age of hackers, in an age of
systems being vulnerable, even some of the most--supposed--
secure systems are vulnerable to interception, and even
takeover. I think we ought to get this stuff off of automatic.
Now, our people will say, ``We have this procedure, and
this procedure and this procedure,'' but ask them the
question--how about the Russians? How confident are you that
their warning systems are going to be accurate? What are the
chances of mistake? The most recent mistake I know about was in
1995, when we launched a satellite off of Norway, and we had
given them notice. We had told them it was going to be
launched--which we're supposed to do under the Risk Reduction
Program, Senator Warner, that you and I helped create, back
years ago in the Reagan administration. So, that notice was
given, but they lost it. They didn't know it. So, when the
satellite went up, they thought it was a U.S. missile coming.
They went to a higher stage of alert, I'm told, than they did
during the entire Cold War.
Now, they pulled it down, it didn't happen, but you
multiply that by 7, 8, or 10 other countries out there, all of
them having to be right every time--we have a dangerous world.
At the very least, we ought to set an example of not having
these things on hair trigger.
I'd also ask you to ask the question now, what is it now
that requires us to be able to fire our weapons within 30
minutes? Ask them the question. What is the contingency that we
need, whatever it is--again, I'm not, I haven't been briefed--
but let's say 2,000 weapons? Why do we need 2,000 weapons fired
in 30 minutes? Why wouldn't 2 hours do? What is it that's going
to happen in that period of time?
But, the United States and Russia both have concerns about
survivability. Russia has a lot more concern about
survivability now. If it were up to me, if I were President of
the United States, I would sit down with Mr. Putin, and I would
say, ``Let's get our two military commanders together. Let's
get our top military people together. You tell--your people
tell us what gives you so much concern that you have to be on
hair trigger, and we'll tell you why we're on hair trigger, and
let's start working these problems, so we don't have to be able
to fire that rapidly.''
I think it's absurd, 15 years after the Cold War that we
still are in this posture. I think it is absolutely absurd that
the United States existence as a Nation depends on the warning
systems the Russians have concerns about being accurate. Their
existence depends on us. I don't think this is the way we ought
to go in the future.
Again, Director El Baradei said that it's very hard to get
somebody not to start smoking, if you're chain-smoking
yourself. So, we have to look at the example we're setting. I
think that this example of hair trigger is particularly
applicable, if we could ever bring ourselves to do it with
Russia, and get, let's say, 2 hours warning time. That'd be a
big change. It would be applicable to Pakistan and India. If
there's anyplace that needs more warning time, it's there. But
again, it's hard to lead, if we're still in the same posture
that we were in during the Cold War.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thanks, Senator Nelson.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sam, you've done more work in this area both as a public
servant, as well as now, you work with the NTI in the private
sector. You probably know more about the capabilities of those
that possess nuclear weapons than anybody I can think of off
the top of my head.
But, what concerns me is, that as much work as you've done,
as much as you've highlighted the issue of the fact that there
is absolutely no reason, either offensively or defensively for
anybody to possess a nuclear weapon, the proliferation of
nuclear weapons is growing rather than diminishing.
You've been gone from the Senate about 10 years now and
when you left here there were ``x'' number of countries that
had that capability, nuclear capability, and just look what's
happened in the 10 years that you've been gone. Where have we,
where have we failed as a leader on this issue? What have we
not done right that we can improve on, and what incentives--
you've delineated some there--but what other incentives are
there out there that we can utilize to try to make sure that
additional countries don't move down the direction that North
Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran have moved and that folks act more
like Libya?
Senator Nunn. Of course, that is a really good question and
it, I don't want to take too much time in answering it, but if
I give us--and this is totally subjective judgment, I couldn't
give you an analytical backup for these judgments--but let me
just run down, because I jotted down this morning what I call
the ``scorecard.'' If I looked at the scorecard of what we've
done in the last 15 years, since Nunn-Lugar, and then look at
what's missing, I think that may be one way to frame it.
On the Nunn-Lugar program in the former Soviet Union on the
nuclear side, if 10 is a perfect score, I'd say we're at about
five. So, we have a ways to go, but we've made progress. Maybe
we're at six now.
On the GTRI, which is getting--this is a program started in
2004 by Secretary Abraham, which is a very good program, to get
nuclear materials, HEU weapon-grade material, weapon-useable
materials around the globe under security--and, there are 40
countries that have them, at least. But, on that one, I'd say
we're somewhere between 3 and 4 out of 10 in terms of progress.
We need to get other countries to join that.
On the bio-challenge in the former Soviet Union, I think
we're about 2 out of 10. We have a long way to go. The Russians
are not very cooperative on that.
In looking at the bio-problem worldwide and the lack of
security, not only in other countries, but in our own country,
on dangerous pathogens, I'd say we're about 1 out of 10. In
looking at chemical destruction, somewhere around 4 out of 10.
On a very important subject, that Senator Lugar mentioned
this morning, there were four nuclear countries after the
breakup of the Soviet Union. They went from four to one--
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, all got rid of their weapons. I
give us a 10 out of 10 on that one. That was a big, big
accomplishment in the early 1990s.
The Global Partnership, the effort led by President Bush to
get the G8 signed up to a non-proliferation agenda and a
cooperative-type program, getting them to help on what we call
the Nunn-Lugar Program. In terms of words on that one, I would
give them something like a 10. They said all the right words,
but in terms of deeds I give them a two. Most of the countries
that signed up, except for us, have not put up anything like
the money they said they would.
In terms of securing non-weapon grade material, but
radiological material, I think we are about where we are on the
biological materials. I think that is a huge job. A
radiological weapon--unless we're better prepared for than we
are right now, is going to have some of the psychological
effect that a nuclear weapon would have even though it will not
kill that many people. But, it could be a psychological blow,
and a blow to the nuclear power industry too, which I happen to
believe is very important now.
Then I would say that blending down the U.S.-Russia HEU--
which has been one of the ways we helped the other countries
get rid of their nuclear weapons in the 1990s--we're about
halfway through that program and it's been very successful.
One of the things a lot of people don't realize, with that
program--20 percent of our electricity in this country is
nuclear power, 50 percent of the fuel burned to create that
nuclear power in our nuclear power plants around this country
comes from former warheads that have been dismantled, HEU,
blended down to LEU. So, 1 out of 10 of these light bulbs right
here, in this room, theoretically come from material that was
aimed at us during the Cold War, until about 1990, 1992. So,
we've made some progress.
In terms of what do we do now? I mean, obviously all those
areas need work. I mean, the gaps need to be filled. We may
never get to 10 in some of those, we're not going to have
perfect risk reduction. But, we have to come as close to it as
we possibly can. I think we need to increase the funding
worldwide, which Senator Lugar mentioned. I think this needs to
be not only nuclear, but bio needs to be a front-burner issue
with the United States and Russia. At every Summit Conference
this ought to be a very big percentage of the discussion
between President Bush and President Putin. I don't think it
has been, but it should be.
I think the United States and Russia need to be worldwide
partners in not only the nuclear arena, but the bio arena. I
think we still need to help them with money, but I think they
need to step up to the plate with more of their own funds, and
with leadership, and with time, and with expertise, in both the
nuclear and biological area, around the world.
I think we need an international type Nunn-Lugar program
with other countries stepping up. The G8 pledges were along
that line, but the deeds are far from satisfactory. I think we
need a full-time high-level individual that's in charge of this
in the executive branch of Government. We had that in the
original Nunn-Lugar proposal. It still hasn't been done through
both Republican and Democratic administrations. There has to be
a good reason for it, but they've never told me what it was in
15 years. We need somebody in charge, and we do not have that.
We need to, as Senator Lugar said this morning, eliminate
the certification requirements. If this is in our security
interest, we shouldn't have the certification. If it's not in
our security interest, we shouldn't do it. I mean, that's what
it amounts to. The DOD and DOE need more flexibility. Jim Reed
and his team need to be able to shift funds in a way with full
reporting to Congress, but they shouldn't be bound without
being able to have flexibility. You have a lot of opportunities
that come up, and they need to be able to do that. We need to
get them out of the paperwork business--that's the
certification--and get them full time out in the field.
Congress, in my view, needs to pay more attention to the
GTRI, the DOE program. That's a vital part of our security
efforts, just as important as what's being done at DOD. We
need, I think, a whole tier of defense. I mean, I'm all for the
PSI program, but I think security has to be the most
fundamental and never letting the material get out of where it
is now. Because once it gets out, the people who run the PSI
program will tell you it's really, really hard to find it once
it gets out.
I think the IAEA needs more funding not just from us, but I
think the other countries need to do that. The security side of
IAEA, when we first started our NTI Foundation, I don't know
what their total budget was but, we gave them $1.5 million and
we said match it. They got it matched 10 times over and the
U.S. Government stepped up and helped. But, they're still
woefully underfunded in terms of the job we expect them to do.
Everybody points fingers and said, ``They aren't doing this and
that.'' Nobody ever looks at the budget they have, and it's
woefully inadequate.
I think--and I'll stop in a minute--but I think we need
global best practices on all power plants and all facilities
that have weapon-grade material and handle them, commercial or
otherwise. There are a lot of legitimate uses for this
material, but we need to have, not only the weapon grade, but
also the radiological material secured. There needs to be a
best practices peer-review kind of organization globally. A lot
of that's going to be private sector, but I think the
Government could help there.
Last but not least, as I discussed a moment ago, the
international fuel bank that we have proposed, it needs a lot
of help and a lot of work and I think the United States can
take a real lead there. As I said, the State Department and the
DOE have both been, I would say maybe not, enthused may be a
little strong, but they've been, they've warmly received that
proposal. Let's put it that way. I'd like for them to do more,
but encouragement from Congress would help a great deal there.
So, Senator Chambliss, that's more than you asked for, but
that's a list.
Senator Chambliss. It's a big job and it's not going to
end. We're not going to be able to wrap it up and say, ``Boy,
it's done, we're now safe.'' This is ongoing. This is going to
be with us as long as we live. We're going to have to keep
working this problem and the biological effort is where nuclear
was 20 years ago.
The real difficult part of it is getting all these
countries that we don't know are out there today who are going
to develop nuclear weapons that you didn't----
Chairman Levin. Your last answer to Senator Chambliss's
question was the kind of presentation which is so overwhelming
in a way, your mastery of the subject. I only wish we could
have you here full-time.
I think we're going to need your help in legislating those
parts of this proposal, which need to be drafted, and there are
some at least, which we could both fund and urge the, encourage
the administration to do like the CTBT, which we could
encourage them, at least, to present to us for the reasons that
you give. We can't vote on ratification without a treaty in
front of us, but we could at least prod the administration.
Have you, by the way, had any conversations with them about
presenting the CTBT to us?
Senator Nunn. I have made speeches on it and had op-eds on
it. I haven't had a direct conversation with them.
Chairman Levin. We will raise it with them again because--
--
Senator Nunn. I suspect the administration, even if there
were people and I hope there are, that would want to move in
that direction--I think there probably are some--they would
probably feel that there would be too much hostility in the
Senate, so as a chicken and egg and what goes first, I think
there has to be some dialogue. I think if they were encouraged
some of them might take a look at it.
The conditions have changed, I mean, we're in a different
situation than we were when that was considered before. I think
people who voted against it before and were very much against
it could easily say to their constituents, ``Things have
changed, we're going to take another look.''
Chairman Levin. Yes, they have changed and if the President
got behind it, I think it would easily, not easily, but could
be confirmed, or ratified.
Your idea on the international fuel bank, creative ideas
always, what's the likelihood you think if we could put such a
bank in place that Iran could be reigned in, and use it instead
of what they're doing?
Senator Nunn. There's an interesting possibility there. I
haven't pretended that this is a solution to the uranium
problem because there's so many complexities there and there's
so much nationalism and it goes way back to the Shah, in terms
of the program.
But, it could, it could apply and what Russia and
Kazakhstan are working on, with the cooperation of the United
States, of having a fuel bank in Russia and then this backup
fuel bank might be combined with that. Because the backup fuel
bank would be totally under IAEA control, not by any nation.
What these countries that don't have production of nuclear
material capability, that want nuclear power, really fear is a
political cut-off. So, the fact that Russia or the United
States or any of the nuclear suppliers say, ``We're going to
guarantee it''--that's not sufficient because they say, ``Look
at the number of times you've cut off this country or that
country, embargoed this, that, and the other,'' to the United
States, in particular.
So, it has some of it, some backup has to be in
international control, but a lot of it can be national with
cross-guarantees. Some of it can be commercial and insurance.
I'm encouraged that there's the possibility of getting that
done. I think the U.S. has to lead and Russia has to lead for
it to happen, but I think it could happen.
Chairman Levin. Would you recommend that we act
legislatively either in terms of funding or otherwise to bring
that into being? Should we take the initiative on that or
should we----
Senator Nunn. I think it would be very helpful if the
United States were to say to the IAEA, ``We'll step up for
``x'' amount of the funding.'' Because we required specifically
a $100 million match for the Buffett money, NTI money to be put
up. If the United States would say, ``We'll take $50 million of
that, and we'll ask Russia to take $50 million.'' I think that
would be enormously helpful.
Chairman Levin. Is that what the Lantos bill does? You
mentioned the Lantos bill. Was that in relation to this
particular----
Senator Nunn. That's right.
Chairman Levin. Is that what they do? They would authorize
funding conditioned upon others putting up money?
Senator Nunn. That's my understanding. I'm going to study
that bill. I haven't studied it yet, but Congressman Lantos has
asked me to come over and visit with him and testify on that.
I'll be doing that next month.
Chairman Levin. We'll also look into it. Any further
thoughts on that, or any of these other subjects, you have
would be----
Senator Nunn. Right.
Chairman Levin. Most welcome.
One of the NPT requirements is that the countries that have
nuclear weapons, in good faith, get rid of their nuclear
weapons. Should we be destroying weapons instead of warehousing
them?
Senator Nunn. I believe we ought to get rid of the maximum
number of weapons we can, and then I think we ought to, as a I
mentioned a few minutes ago, I think we ought to define a
nuclear-free world as the top of the mountain and recognize
we're heading down, as Senator Chambliss said, we're not
heading up.
We ought to try to turn around the direction, not only of
our country, but the world and start finding trails that lead
up the mountain. So, that perhaps one of these days, at some
point in the future our children can at least see the top, or
our grandchildren.
Chairman Levin. Would one of the ways to do that be to
dismantle and destroy weapons, instead of to just simply put
them in the stockpile or in the warehouses? I guess the Moscow
treaty did?
Senator Nunn. That's right. Of course, I think it's
important for that example, too. Because we may be able to
safely store those weapons, but if other countries follow our
example there, that just means there's a lot more inventory out
there.
Chairman Levin. On the hair trigger issue, how do you
address the submarine problem, number one?
Senator Nunn. The, what problem?
Chairman Levin. Having subs, I mean, how do you separate
warheads from missiles in our subs?
Second, how do you deal with the issue, that if the time
came you wanted to, you got nervous and wanted to marry them,
mate them back together again, that that would be a
destabilizing action? Third, if you'd comment on the proposal,
if you're familiar with it, to have a conventional Trident, so
that we'd be in a position where we'd have a Trident boat with
either nuclear or conventional weapons--which would be
confusing, in some of our minds at least--it would create
uncertainty on the part of others as to whether a Trident was a
conventional Trident weapon or a nuclear Trident weapon. Are
you familiar with that proposal of the administration?
Senator Nunn. Yes, yes.
Chairman Levin. How does that, it's not quite a hair
trigger issue, but it, nonetheless is a very destabilizing idea
in the minds of many of us.
Senator Nunn. Well, let me start with the conventional
Trident.
I've talked to General Cartwright about this a couple of
times and I've gotten his case. He makes a very good case that
he needs the capability of a prompt launch with conventional
weapons for long distance. We have it with cruise missiles. We
have one submarine, I believe Senator Warner, that has cruise
missiles on it, one Trident, former Trident. But, when you do
it, when you move to the prompt-launch missile, you're in
another dimension, because you get into warning time and you
get into what the Russians capability is. First of all, do they
know the difference and will we be able to assure them, have we
had enough discussions with them to assure them that when we
launch a conventional Trident, and this doesn't have a nuclear
weapon on it, and it may have the original azimuth heading that
way, that it's not a nuclear weapon? I'm not aware that we've
had that detailed discussion with them. Obviously, they're
concerned about it.
Then I'd ask the question about Chinese warning. What are
their warning systems? Can they tell the difference? What about
France and Great Britain? What about Pakistan, India, ahd all
the other nuclear nations? I think there's some profound
questions here.
Then you have the question of, we're trying to discourage
long-range missiles, anyway, under the Missile Technology
Control Regime. What questions come up in regard to that? How
much does this compete with that goal? So, I'd say there are a
lot of big questions on this.
If we were able, if we went a different atmosphere, if we
were heading up the mountain, if we were moving in different
direction and we had a lot more credibility and confidence
around the globe in this overall, if we had a lot more
cooperation, you might examine this in a different prism, but
right now I would have to say that I think Congress put up a
caution light last year. I would, right now, keep that caution
light up.
Even though it's a paradox because, I say that even though
the move from nuclear to conventional is the way we want to go.
But long-range ballistic missiles are in a category of their
own. I really do worry about warning systems and accuracy and
mistakes.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Nunn. The other two questions, Senator Levin. Let's
say you take certain parts of missiles off so that you have
more warning time or you separate the warheads. There are a lot
of different ways you can do this and it needs very careful
thought if you remove from hair trigger. It has to be discussed
with Russia and it has to be military to military, in my view,
discussion.
But, I don't think, I think the escalation problem is
entirely manageable. I really believe that that is something
that, it gives us concern, but we already have escalation
problems. I mean, what do you do when you go to DEFCON-1? What
do the people do, then? If it's going to take several hours to
perform an escalation instead of several minutes, is that more
danger than we have now? I don't think so. I know that the
military has some concern about this and I think it has to be
carefully considered, but I think that we can deal with that.
In terms of subs, that's a special challenge, but I would
leave that to the technical experts and I would not, if I gave
you my recall on some briefings I've had about how that can be
done, it would be inadequate today. I would just say that that
is a question that's serious, that is more difficult. I think
some on-site type of verification would be necessary on all
sides. But, I'm very concerned that we have to deal with this
submarine problem anyway. Because Senator Warner, you and I
worried about this a long time ago. I still worry about it. We
have a proliferation of submarines, too. A proliferation of
diesel submarines that are a lot quieter than they used to be.
You have a proliferation of countries that could fire missiles
off those submarines.
How good are the warning systems around the world in
detecting if there was a submarine that pulled off Russia and
launched--let's say hypothetically China did--launched a
missile, nuclear weapon against a Russian city. Would they know
it wasn't us? Would they know it wasn't the United States?
I think there's a lot of work that still needs to be done
in that area. I think that a lot of military to military
discussions need to take place, not just between the U.S. and
Russia, but U.S., Russia, and China. India has subs now. Israel
has subs now. I'm not sure about the nuclear capability of
those, but those are questions that really need to be asked.
So, the submarine issue is a real issue in terms of hair
trigger, but it's even more profound in the other arena of
accurate detection and real time and not making a mistake.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This testimony this morning has been a very moving
experience for me. I thank you for your personal references. We
did work a lot together.
Do you realize that you're sitting at a spot in this room,
where that table was, for breakfast that morning, that you--and
you'd consulted with me the night or two before--we brought in
the Senators on the committee and some others and showed them
this plan, which eventually became Nunn-Lugar. Do you remember
that?
Senator Nunn. I do.
Senator Warner. Right where you're sitting now with one
round table and we started at that breakfast.
Senator Nunn. I certainly do. I certainly do.
Senator Warner. I can see their faces now when you said,
and, here in the Cold War atmosphere, ``We have to take money
from our defense budget and give it to the Soviet Union to
dismantle.'' That was a heavy task, but you skillfully managed
that. This country, and indeed much of the world, has a great
debt to you, personally, for you foresight and your tenacity to
stick with this subject through these years. I thank you.
Senator Nunn. Thank you, Senator Warner. You've been a
partner for a long time in many of these endeavors so I'm
grateful to you, also.
Senator Warner. Well, and then our good chairman down
there, Senator Levin, are you listening to what I'm saying now
or are you down there looking----
Chairman Levin. No, I'm listening to every word.
[Laughter.]
There's a few, I must say my eyes are a bit moist, but I'm
listening to----
Senator Reed. I've somehow----
Senator Nunn. I hope you don't go along with Levin anymore
than you used to go along with me, though.
Senator Warner. I have a little trouble getting his
attention now that he's the chairman.
But before we go to my questions, you dramatically said--
and you amplified it in response to Senator Chambliss's very
insightful question--if we had 8 or 10 nations with the nuclear
capability, the fragility of the war, world today--because when
we, set about, I say we and many others, many others set about
working on these problems years ago--it was basically the
United States and the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War
there was a certain sense of confidence, both in the United
States and the Soviet Union, that the most competent people
were in the chain of decision should we ever reach a
confrontation.
We do not have that today, with some of these companies,
countries--notably Iran--a sense of confidence in their
hierarchy, that they could carefully make a decision should
they ever possess--and I hope they don't--this weapon.
It leads me, to the first question, you said in there we
still need to help the Soviet Union financially. They're awash
in oil money today. How are we going to, I'll fight hard as we
have, always, to get the funds for the CTR program as it
relates to Russia today. But their cash position is pretty
strong. I'm just wondering, what are the arguments we use to
take our cash to help them?
Senator Nunn. I think it gets harder as they become more
prosperous. That's the bad news. The good news is as they get
more prosperous they have the capability of doing more for
themselves. So, I think it's a carefully calibrated weaning. I
think they need to step up more. I think we need to gradually
have less money, but I think the two of us need to step up our
efforts together, not just in the former Soviet Union, but
around the globe.
I hope Russia will step up on this fuel bank. We've talked
to them a good bit about it. I went over there before we ever
proposed it and met with some of the top Russian officials.
They, like our Government, greeted it with interest and with a
degree of receptivity, but less than a full, ``Yes, we'll sign
up.''
I think your point is well made. But even if they have the
funds, the question is, given all the challenges in Russia, and
they still have mammoth challenges, mammoth economic problems,
tremendous areas of their country that are in abject poverty,
and you have to ask, ``Would they give this as high a priority
as we would want them to?''
Senator Warner. Well, let me go to your fuel bank and I
confess not to know a great deal about it, but suddenly, as I
listen, the idea has a lot of appeal. But, I'm concerned about
the--let's put it bluntly, the command and control of who gets
the fuel, and how do they get it and when? Would we be faced
with something like a regime that has a veto authority, like
the Security Counsel now? One nation could veto the
distribution of fuel to others?
You look at the enormity of the capital investment to build
a nuclear plant, and yet you're putting that capital at risk to
someone who has to make the decision, do you or do you not get
fuel? How are you going to do the command and control and keep
it separate from the reality that nations that could be
participants in the fuel bank could be in an adversarial
relationship? They exercise through third parties or something,
some control over that person that has the levers to who gets
the fuel and when they get it.
Senator Nunn. Senator Warner, I think all of those
questions have to be worked and that's what the IAEA is looking
at now. The governance is going to be a real challenge, how you
govern and who makes the decision. But, I think when you look
at, here's the road we're heading down right now: Seven or
eight countries are about to go into enrichment, in the next
year or two, I think, maybe as many as 10 and, if Iran, builds
a weapon, more. If these countries go into enrichment we have a
bad, bad, we have already a hard problem. It's going to get a
lot worse. So, we have to find a way to give assurances that
legitimate power-burning LEU is going to be available.
The first resource is the market. The marketplace works
pretty well out there and as long as it works, right now
countries really, unless they're going to build a huge number
of power plants, the economics don't favor them going into
enrichment. So, they're doing something, if they go into
enrichment, that's against their economic interest,
fundamentally. So, that tells you something. Now, it tells you
that they might be doing it for illegitimate purposes or it
tells you they don't have the political confidence that the
suppliers are going to be faithful to the contract or that the
marketplace is going to work.
So, we have to augment the marketplace. It's not, in any
way, substituting for the marketplace. There are going to have
be tiers of guarantees. This fuel bank, the $50 and we hope a
$100, that's $150. That's nowhere near adequate to be a backup
supply. It's the final backup. It's not anywhere near the
adequate, it's going to have to be one tier, among others.
That's what Russia is talking about now and that's what the
United States has proposed, Germany and others have also made
proposals.
Senator Warner. One last question, if I may, my former
chairman that you were in those years. You did a wonderful job
for this committee, and you came in after your most
distinguished colleague from Georgia, Dennis Jackson, and all
those giants that taught us our lessons. You handled your
chairmanship very well.
Clearly there needs to be a greater international awareness
of the problems that you have eloquently described today with
our colleague, Senator Lugar. If you had the opportunity to sit
down with our President, how would you speak to him in terms
of, ``Let's jump start the international recognition of the
seriousness of this problem,'' to see what we could do to bring
about some advancements, climbing back up that mountain again?
Would you suggest the United States, maybe in partnership with
the Russians, convene an international conference on this
subject alone?
Senator Nunn. I believe what I would do is start with the
President's own quotes. He said back during the campaign when
he first ran that he thought we had thousands of weapons on
hair trigger alert on both sides and that that was unacceptable
and he was going to tackle that problem. That problem's still
here. He also said that, on a number of occasions including
when he was debating Senator Kerry on television, both of them
said the number one security problem facing America was to keep
weapons and material----
Senator Warner. That's fine, that rhetoric's out there.
What would you do if this afternoon you had the opportunity to
sit down with him? What initiative would you recommend that he
take?
Senator Nunn. I would start by telling him those two
identifications were absolutely right, but the meat isn't on
the bones. We're not doing nearly enough. I would say, ``Mr.
President, you have a great relationship with President Putin.
The United States and Russia have a unique responsibility and
obligation to lead because we are the leading nuclear powers by
far. We have thousands of weapons on hair trigger alert. Why
don't you talk to President Putin about both of you getting
your military leaders to sit down for 6 months or whatever it
would take and come back with a list of things we can do to
greatly reduce the chances of any kind of accident, increase
warning time? The second thing, why don't you talk to President
Putin about a partnership between the United States and Russia
to deal with nuclear materials all over the globe, so, that we
take their expertise--and hopefully increasingly, as you
observed--their money, and help get this material under
control, not just in the former Soviet Union, but all over the
world.''
The third thing on my list would be bio. I would say, ``Mr.
President, if the Soviet Union were going to use bio-weapons
against us, they would have done it back in the old days. Why
in the world can't we have transparency and accountability on
the biological research efforts going on, on the defensive
side? Because we think your defensive side is offense. You
probably think our defensive work is offense. But, that's the
perception we're battling. Let's have transparency, the two of
us to begin with and then broaden it.''
Those would be three things right on the top of the list,
hair trigger, securing material, bio-transparency. If I made
progress, I would go on from there. But, that might be all the
President would want to hear in one meeting.
Senator Warner. I thank you very much, Senator Nunn, for
your work and my best to you and your family.
Senator Nunn. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Senator Nunn, thank you for your testimony and for your
leadership and we look forward to working together with you for
many, many years. Thank you, sir.
Senator Nunn. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I look forward to
helping any way I can.
Chairman Levin, congratulations also in your new role and I
look forward to seeing great things come from this committee
under your leadership.
Chairman Levin. I appreciate that. We'll be calling on you.
Senator Nunn. Senator Warner will help you in every way.
Chairman Levin. He always has.
Senator Warner. Yes, right.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Now let me call up our second panel, the Honorable William
H. Tobey and Joseph A. Benkert.
Thank you very much for joining us, gentlemen. Your
statements will be made fully part of the record, so if you'd
like to summarize your written statements, that would be
perfectly fine. Tthen we'll engage in at least one round of
questioning.
We'll begin with Mr. Tobey.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. TOBEY, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Tobey. Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the President's 2008 budget request for
the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.
Before I start, I certainly want to acknowledge the fact
that I'm mindful that we were following--both in terms of order
of appearance and more importantly in terms of doing the
important work of nonproliferation--giants in the field. I
certainly very much respect the work of both Senators Lugar and
Nunn and all that they've made possible for us to do.
I also very much appreciate the support of this committee
for the work that we do, of which I'm proud and I believe is
extremely important for U.S. national security.
The fiscal year 2008 budget request for $1.67 billion
reflects both our progress in securing nuclear sites worldwide,
as well as continuing challenges we face in accomplishing our
mission. The request is for funding necessary to meet the goals
of the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative on time, to
secure or dispose of as much nuclear material possible for the
fiscal year 2008, and to adapt our nonproliferation strategy to
meet new challenges.
In February 2005, in Bratislava, Presidents Bush and Putin
agreed to focus and accelerate cooperative nuclear security
work in order to keep fissile materials out of the hands of
terrorists. Under the resulting Bratislava joint statement, we
have made remarkable progress with Russia to protect its
nuclear weapons and materials. Meeting our commitment to
include security upgrade activities at Russian nuclear sites by
the end of 2008 will be our chief priority in fiscal year 2008.
Although, your direct upgrade efforts are drawing to a close
after over a decade of work, we will endeavor to continue to
work with Russia to ensure the long-term sustainability of the
systems and procedures that we have implemented.
The fiscal year 2008 budget reflects both the near-
completion of security work in Russia and our transition to
long-term sustainability. Additionally, our work in fiscal year
2008 under the Bratislava Initiative will include the
conversion of HEU reactors to reactors that use LEU. We will
also return Russian-origin HEU from eight countries to secure
facilities in Russia for disposition.
Our efforts to secure or dispose of as much nuclear
material as we can in fiscal year 2008 are not limited to the
Bratislava effort. We're working with Russia, and we are
scheduled to shut down at least two of the last three weapons-
grade plutonium-producing reactors by December 2008. The
remaining reactor is scheduled to be shut down by December
2010.
Our efforts to return U.S.-origin HEU from research
reactors worldwide will also continue. The fiscal year 2008
budget request includes funding for U.S.-Russia Plutonium
Disposition Program. Disposing of surplus plutonium in the
United States and Russia will assure that this material can
never again be used for nuclear weapons.
We are taking aggressive steps to interdict weapons-useable
nuclear materials, and to prevent dissemination of nuclear-
related technology via strengthened export controls and
improved international cooperation. Our Second Line of Defense
and Megaports programs work to enhance our foreign partners'
ability to interdict illicit nuclear materials. Under these
programs, we deploy radiation detection systems at high-risk
land border crossings, airports, and seaports, increasing the
likelihood of interdiction of diverted nuclear materials
entering or leaving the country.
Additionally, our research and development efforts provide
the National Nuclear Security Administration and other agencies
with cutting-edge technology to detect and monitor nuclear
weapons, production, proliferation and nuclear explosions
worldwide.
To meet the threat from the international terror networks
and rogue states, we must engage the international community.
We are working to implement United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1540, which establishes a requirement to criminalize
proliferation involving non-State actors and encourages States
to strengthen export control laws and improve enforcement.
Because keeping terrorists or rogue States from acquiring
materials will be easier if we limit enrichment of uranium or
reprocessing of spent fuel, the President proposed in 2006 the
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), under which nations
would have assured access to the benefits of nuclear power
without the need to develop sensitive capabilities to enrich or
reprocess fuel indigenously.
The risk of nuclear terrorism is certainly not limited to
the United States and the success of our efforts to deny access
to nuclear weapons and material is very much dependant on
whether our foreign partners share a common recognition of the
threat and a willingness to combat it. Last July, just before
the G8 summit, Presidents Bush and Putin announced the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. To strengthen
cooperation worldwide on a broad range of related issues from
nuclear material security, to detection, to enforcement and
prosecution. Paired with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540,
we now have both the legal mandate and the practical means for
concrete actions to secure nuclear material against the threat
of diversion. These diplomatic efforts will extend and multiply
the efforts of my organization to detect, secure, and dispose
of dangerous nuclear material.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to discuss our budget,
and I'd be happy to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tobey follows:]
Prepared Statement by William H. Tobey
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the President's fiscal
year 2008 budget request for the National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program. This
is my first appearance before this committee as the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and I want to thank
all of the Members for their strong support for our vital national
security missions.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program mission is to detect,
prevent, and reverse the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Our nonproliferation programs address the danger that hostile
nations or terrorist groups may acquire weapons-usable material, dual-
use production or technology, or WMD capabilities. The fiscal year 2008
request for these programs totals $1.673 billion, a slight decrease
from the fiscal year 2007 operating level. This reduction is the result
of NNSA achieving and approaching important milestones in our nuclear
security work in Russia, including the completion of major security
upgrades at several sites under the International Nuclear Materials
Protection and Cooperation (MPC&A) program and the anticipated end of
construction of a fossil fuel plant in Seversk by the end of calendar
year 2008 under the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production
(EWGPP) Program.
Acquisition of nuclear weapons, WMD capabilities, technologies, and
expertise by rogue states or terrorists stands as one of the most
potent threats to the United States and international security. The
continued pursuit of nuclear weapons by terrorists and states of
concern underscores the urgency of NNSA's efforts to secure vulnerable
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials, to improve
capabilities to detect and interdict nuclear weapons or materials, to
halt the production of fissile material, and ultimately, to dispose of
surplus weapons-usable materials. The fiscal year 2008 budget request
will enable NNSA to continue the activities that support these crucial
threat reduction initiatives.
Preventing access to nuclear weapons and material has many
dimensions. Our highest priority is to keep these dangerous materials
out of the hands of the world's most dangerous actors. Absent access to
sufficient quantities of key fissile materials, there can be no nuclear
weapon. Much of our emphasis has focused on Russia because that is
where most of the poorly secured material was located. We have made
remarkable progress cooperating with Russia to strengthen protection,
control, and accounting of its nuclear weapons and materials. Meeting
our commitment under the Bratislava Joint Statement to conclude
security upgrade activities at Russian nuclear sites by the end of 2008
will be our chief priority in fiscal year 2008. As a result of our
efforts to accelerate this work in the wake of September 11 and the
momentum created by the Bratislava process, we are well-positioned to
reach this significant milestone on schedule. Although our direct
upgrade efforts are drawing to a close after over a decade of work, we
will continue to work cooperatively with Russia to ensure the long-term
sustainability of the systems and procedures we have implemented.
Not all nuclear material of concern is located in Russia. We are
working with other partners to secure weapons-usable nuclear materials
worldwide and to strengthen security at civil nuclear facilities. One
area of concern is research reactors, which often use a highly enriched
uranium (HEU) fuel suitable for bombs. Our Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI) seeks to convert research reactors worldwide from HEU
to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and further to repatriate U.S. and
Russian-supplied HEU from these facilities to its country of origin. A
major accomplishment was the return of 268 kilograms of Soviet-origin
HEU from Germany to Russia, where it will be down blended to LEU fuel.
This repatriation operation represents the largest shipment of Soviet-
origin HEU conducted to date under the GTRI.
We are taking aggressive steps to interdict weapons-usable nuclear
materials and to prevent dissemination of nuclear related technology
via strengthened export controls and improved international
cooperation. As a complement to improving physical security, the Second
Line of Defense (SLD) Program works to enhance our foreign partners'
ability to interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Under
this program, we deploy radiation detection systems at high-risk land-
border crossings, airports and seaports, increasing the likelihood of
interdiction of diverted nuclear materials entering or leaving the
country.
The Megaports Initiative, established in 2003, responds to concerns
that terrorists could use the global maritime shipping network to
smuggle fissile materials or warheads. By installing radiation
detection systems at major ports throughout the world, this initiative
strengthens the detection and interdiction capabilities of our partner
countries.
To prevent the diffusion of critical technologies, we are training
front line customs officers around the world. We are working to
implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, which establishes a
requirement to criminalize proliferation involving non-state actors and
encourages states to strengthen export control laws and improve
enforcement. Because keeping terrorists from acquiring materials will
be easier if we limit enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of spent
fuel, the President proposed in 2006 a new initiative, the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which would provide nations which
refrain from developing or deploying enrichment and reprocessing
technology assured access to the benefits of nuclear power.
These are critical steps but they alone cannot address the problem.
Indeed, there is enough fissile material in the world today for tens of
thousands of weapons. An integral part of our strategy, therefore, has
been to induce other states to stop producing materials for nuclear
weapons, as the United States did many years ago. We recently submitted
a draft treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to do just
that. We also supplement international diplomatic efforts with
bilateral programs. For example, Russia still produces weapons-grade
plutonium, not because it needs it for weapons, but because the
reactors that produce it also supply heat and electricity to local
communities. We are replacing these reactors with fossil fuel plants.
By 2008, two of the existing three plutonium-producing reactors in
Russia will shut down permanently, with the third shut down by 2010.
As previously indicated, there are a number of effective synergies
between NNSA's weapons activities and our nuclear nonproliferation
objectives. For example, we are disposing of the substantial quantities
of surplus weapons grade material that resulted from the thousands of
warheads that we have dismantled by down-blending it to lower
enrichment levels suitable for use in commercial reactors. We are also
working with Russia to eliminate Russian HEU. Under the HEU Purchase
Agreement, nearly 300 metric tons of uranium from Russia's dismantled
nuclear weapons--enough material for more than 11,000 nuclear weapons--
has been down-blended for use in commercial reactors in the United
States. Nuclear power generates 20 percent of American electricity and
half of that is generated by fuel derived from Russian HEU. As a
result, one-tenth of the U.S. electrical energy need is powered by
material removed from former Soviet nuclear weapons. In addition to the
efforts on HEU, the United States and Russia have each committed to
dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus weapon-grade plutonium.
If we are to encourage responsible international actions, the
United States must set the example. We have dramatically improved
physical security of U.S. nuclear weapons and weapons usable materials
in the years since the attacks of September 11. We recently withdrew
over 200 metric tons of HEU from any further use as fissile material in
nuclear weapons: a portion of this will be devoted to powering our
nuclear navy for the next 50 years, obviating the need over that period
for high-enrichment of uranium for any military purpose. Seventeen tons
will be blended down and set aside as an assured fuel supply as part of
global efforts to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
technology.
The risk of nuclear terrorism is not limited to the United States
and the success of our efforts to deny access to nuclear weapons and
material is very much dependent on whether our foreign partners share a
common recognition of the threat and a willingness to combat it. Last
July, just before the G-8 summit, Presidents Bush and Putin announced
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to strengthen
cooperation worldwide on nuclear materials security and to prevent
terrorist acts involving nuclear or radioactive substances. Paired with
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, we now have both the legal
mandate and the practical means necessary for concrete actions to
secure nuclear material against the threat of diversion.
FISCAL YEAR 2008 NNSA BUDGET REQUEST OVERVIEW
The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request for NNSA totals
$9.4 billion, an increase of $306 million or 3.4 percent over the
fiscal year 2007 operating plan. We are managing our program activities
within a disciplined 5-year budget and planning envelope, and are
successfully balancing the administration's high priority initiatives
to reduce global nuclear danger as well as future planning for the
Nation's nuclear weapons complex within an overall modest growth rate.
The NNSA budget justification contains information for 5 years as
required by section 3253 of P.L. 106-065. This section, entitled Future
Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP), requires the Administrator to
submit to Congress each year the estimated expenditures necessary to
support the programs, projects and activities of the NNSA for a 5-year
fiscal period, in a level of detail comparable to that contained in the
budget.
The fiscal years 2008-2012 FYNSP projects $50.0 billion for NNSA
programs though 2012. This is an increase of about $1.5 billion over
last year's projections in line with the administration's strong
commitment to the Nation's defense and homeland security. The fiscal
year 2008 request is slightly smaller than last year's projection;
however, the outyears are increased starting in 2009. Within these
amounts, there is significant growth projected for the Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation programs to support homeland security, including new
initiatives and acceleration of threat reduction programs and increased
inspection of seagoing cargoes destined for ports in the United States.
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM AREAS
Global Threat Reduction Initiative
The administration's fiscal year 2008 request of $120 million for
the GTRI is an increase of $4 million over the fiscal year 2007
operating plan. The GTRI reduces the risk of terrorists acquiring
nuclear and radiological materials for an improvised nuclear or
radiological dispersal device by working at civilian sites worldwide
to: 1) convert reactors from the use of WMD-usable HEU to LEU; 2)
remove or dispose of excess WMD-usable nuclear and radiological
materials; and 3) protect at-risk WMD-usable nuclear and radiological
materials from theft and sabotage until a more permanent threat
reduction solution can be implemented. Specific increases in the GTRI
budget reflect, for example, the serial production and delivery of 27
100-ton casks for transportation and long-term storage of 10,000 kg of
HEU and 3,000 kg of plutonium removed from the BN-350 reactor site in
Kazakhstan.
International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation
NNSA's International MPC&A fiscal year 2008 budget request of $372
million is a decrease of $101 million from the fiscal year 2007
operating plan. This decrease reflects the successful completion of
nuclear security upgrade work at Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and
Russian Navy sites. International material protection work continues in
other areas, including the continuation of security upgrades at a
significant number of sites within the Russian nuclear complex,
including those operated by the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom),
and the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. Security
upgrades for Russian Rosatom facilities will be completed by the end of
2008--2 years ahead of the original schedule, consistent with the
Bratislava Initiative.
The MPC&A Program is also focused on reducing proliferation risks
by converting Russian HEU to LEU and by consolidating weapons-usable
nuclear material into fewer, more secure locations. In fiscal year
2008, we will eliminate an additional 1.2 metric tons of HEU for a
cumulative total of 10.7 metric tons.
Our SLD Program, a natural complement to our efforts to lock down
vulnerable nuclear material and weapons, installs radiation detection
equipment at key transit and border crossings, airports and major ports
to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and
radioactive materials. During fiscal year 2008, the SLD Program plans
to install detection equipment at an additional 51 strategic overseas
transit and border sites. Under the Megaports Initiative, we have
deployed radiation detection and cargo scanning equipment at six ports
to date in Greece, the Netherlands, Bahamas, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and
Spain. During fiscal year 2008, we plan to install detection equipment
at three additional large ports: the port of Antwerp in Belgium, the
port of Caucedo in the Dominican Republic, and the port of Salalah in
Oman.
Additionally, we are joining elements of the Megaports Initiative
and the Container Security Initiative (CSI) under a new maritime
security initiative, the Secure Freight Initiative Phase I. This new
initiative is a partnership between host governments, commercial
container shipping entities and the U.S. Government that serves to
increase the number of containers physically scanned for nuclear and
radiological materials and to create a detailed record of each U.S.-
bound container. Data from radiation detection equipment provided by
NNSA and from non-intrusive imaging equipment provided by the
Department of Homeland Security will enhance the identification of
high-risk containers and facilitate the prompt resolution of potential
nuclear or radiological threats.
Nonproliferation and International Security
While the thrust of GTRI and MPC&A is to secure nuclear sites,
convert reactors, and repatriate fuel from reactors worldwide, NNSA's
Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (ONIS) provides
technical and policy expertise in support of U.S. efforts to strengthen
international nonproliferation arrangements (e.g., the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism). The ONIS staff also
fosters implementation of global nonproliferation requirements through
engagement with foreign partners and the redirection of WMD expertise,
and helps develop and implement mechanisms for transparent and
verifiable nuclear reductions. The fiscal year 2008 budget request for
the ONIS is $125 million. This request includes funds for providing
technical support to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards system and supports programs to improve foreign governments'
export control systems. This request will augment U.S. nonproliferation
cooperation with China and India, and enhance transparency and
scientist redirection activities with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
Libya, and Iraq.
The budget request also supports activities to build up the
nonproliferation component of the GNEP initiative. While GNEP is a
long-term vision for the future of expanded use of nuclear power, NNSA
plays an important role by providing leadership and technical expertise
in the areas of safeguards technology, safeguards cooperation, and fuel
supply arrangements to mitigate the proliferation risks that otherwise
might accompany the expansion of nuclear power around the world
envisioned by GNEP.
Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production
Turning to programs that focus on halting the production of nuclear
materials, the EWGPP Program staff are working toward completing the
permanent shutdown of two of the three remaining weapons-grade
plutonium production reactors in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk, Russia. The
fiscal year 2008 budget request of $182 million is a decrease of $44
million from the fiscal year 2007 operating plan, reflecting the
planned completion of the fossil fuel heat and electricity facility at
Seversk. The budget request provides the funding required to shut down
these reactors permanently and to replace the heat and electricity
these reactors supply to local communities with energy generated by
fossil fuel plants by December 2008 in Seversk and by December 2010 in
Zheleznogorsk. The reactors will be shut down immediately once the
fossil-fuel plants are completed, eliminating the annual production of
more than one metric ton of weapons-grade plutonium.
Fissile Materials Disposition
In addition to curbing the production of dangerous nuclear
materials, NNSA is working to reduce the existing stockpiles of nuclear
materials in both Russia and the U.S. To that end, the fiscal year 2008
Fissile Materials Disposition budget request of $610 million will
contribute to the elimination of surplus U.S. and Russian weapon-grade
plutonium and surplus U.S. highly-enriched uranium. Of this amount,
$480.8 million will be allocated toward disposing of surplus U.S.
plutonium, including $333.8 million for the Mixed Oxide Fuel
Fabrication Facility and $60 million for the Pit Disassembly and
Conversion Facility (PDCF) and the Waste Solidification Building. Of
the remaining amount, $66.8 million will be devoted to the disposition
of surplus U.S. HEU and $20.2 million will be focused on supporting
activities common to both programs.
This budget request also provides funding for ongoing efforts to
dispose of surplus U.S. HEU, including down blending 17.4MT of HEU in
support of establishing the Reliable Fuel Supply Program, available to
countries with good nonproliferation credentials that face a disruption
in supply that cannot be corrected through normal commercial means.
This initiative marks the first step towards a key GNEP policy aim of
creating a reliable nuclear fuel mechanism, providing countries a
strong incentive to refrain from acquiring enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities.
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $265 million for
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development. This effort
includes a number of programs that make unique contributions to
national security by researching the technological advancements
necessary to detect and prevent the illicit diversion of nuclear
materials. Within the Proliferation Detection Program, fundamental
research is conducted in fields such as radiation detection, which
supports national and homeland security agencies. It also advances
basic and applied technologies for the nonproliferation community with
dual-use benefit to national counterproliferation and counterterrorism
missions. Specifically, this program develops the tools, technologies,
techniques, and expertise for the identification, location, and
analysis of the facilities, materials, and processes of undeclared and
proliferant WMD programs. As the sole provider for the science base to
the U.S. national nuclear test monitoring system, the Nuclear Explosion
Monitoring Program produces the Nation's operational sensors that
monitor from space the entire planet to detect and report surface,
atmospheric, or space nuclear detonations. This program also produces
and updates the regional geophysical datasets enabling operation of the
Nation's ground-based seismic monitoring networks to detect and report
underground detonations.
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) Support
A research and education partnership program with the HBCUs and the
Massie Chairs of Excellence was initiated by Congress through earmarks
in the Office of the Administrator Appropriation in fiscal year 2005,
fiscal year 2006, and fiscal year 2007. The NNSA has implemented an
effective program to target national security research opportunities
for these institutions to increase their participation in national
security-related research and to train and recruit HBCU graduates for
employment within the NNSA. The NNSA goal is a stable $10 million
annual effort. In fiscal year 2008, the Office of the Administrator
appropriation will provide continued funding of $1 million to support
certain HBCU activities. The programs funded in the Weapons Activities
Appropriation will provide approximately $4 to $6 million of support to
HBCU programs. In addition, the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appropriation will provide approximately $2 to $3 million to this
program. Lastly, the Naval Reactors Program will fund approximately $1
million of HBCU programs in fiscal year 2008.
CONCLUSION
I am confident that NNSA is headed in the right direction in the
coming fiscal year. The budget request will support continuing our
progress in protecting and certifying our Nation's strategic deterrent,
transforming our nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure, reducing
the global danger from proliferation and WMD, and enhancing the force
projection capabilities of the U.S. nuclear Navy. It will enable us to
continue to maintain the safety and security of our people,
information, materials, and infrastructure. Taken together, each aspect
of this budget request will allow us to meet our national security
responsibilities during the upcoming fiscal year and well into the
future.
A statistical appendix follows that contains the budget figures
supporting our Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Request. I look forward
to answering any questions on the justification for the requested
budget.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Tobey.
Mr. Benkert?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH A. BENKERT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, it's an honor to appear before
you to discuss the CTR Program and the PSI. It is a particular
honor to have been preceded at this table by Senators Nunn and
Lugar. Their legislative foresight, as has been well-described
here this morning, forms the basis for the authority that we
now use to help combat the threat of WMD and related
infrastructure.
Clearly, Senator Nunn has remained a leading voice to
maintain public awareness of the WMD threat, and Senator Lugar
has been a tireless advocate for nonproliferation activities,
both within the Senate, with the Department of State and in
partnership with the Armed Service Committee, and has been a
key steward and mentor of the program that he helped found. I
also want to thank the members of this subcommittee for their
strong support of DOD programs that serve to combat the
proliferation of WMD.
Last year, we in DOD issued a national military strategy to
combat WMD, which provides the overarching guidance to focus
our military efforts, and our efforts in the Defense Department
in support of the President's vision for National security. The
strategy divided this complex mission area into eight types of
activities: offensive operations, elimination, interdiction,
active defense, passive defense, WMD consequence management,
security cooperation, and threat-reduction cooperation.
CTR and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which we
will discuss this morning, are two important components in our
tool kit for carrying out several of these activities in
support of the strategy.
The traditional mission of CTR, seeks to halt the threat of
WMD at its source, by destroying stockpiles and delivery
systems. In cases where elimination was not possible, the next
option was to safeguard the material from theft, or from
diversion, through the installation of modernized security
measures. Now, CTR--with its Proliferation Prevention
Initiative--has gone beyond those two traditional areas, to
help establish, in coordination with DOE, Department of State,
and others, an outer ring of defense. A step away from the
source, to stop WMD on the move, in transit.
In a complementary fashion, PSI works with allies and like-
minded nations on means to stop WMD and missile-related
shipments bound to and from non-state actors and in the states
of concern. It does this by developing operational concepts for
interdiction, by organizing a program of interdiction
exercises, sharing information about national legal authorities
to interdict WMD and related materials, and pursuing
cooperation with industry sectors that can be helpful in the
interdiction mission.
CTR celebrates its 15th anniversary this year. During this
time, the CTR policy and implementation teams have developed a
unique set of skills to deal with very dangerous materials in
remote parts of the world. They still have much work to do
related to existing CTR projects and agreements, but there will
also be opportunities for new uses of CTR authorities.
We would welcome this committee's support, to make CTR a
more nimble and agile tool for the long-term. In this regard, I
would just note Senator Lugar's and Senator Nunn's testimony
this morning. I would command to the committee's attention,
Senator Lugar's proposal, introduced in S. 198 in January of
this year, which seeks to streamline CTR's internal processes,
by removing certification requirements.
Similarly, any flexibility the committee might provide for
using CTR in areas outside the states of the former Soviet
Union would position the program to be more responsive to
emergent requirements, and to the evolving threat.
Let me mention, briefly, our fiscal year 2008 funding
requests. From the standpoint of funding, the traditional CTR
programs, largely located in Russia, are winding down. The
capital-intensive construction projects, such as the chemical
weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'yv and security
installations at Russian nuclear weapons sites will be
completed within the next 2 years. Construction of the chemical
weapons destruction facility is now about 50 percent complete.
We expect to amend the agreements and add the final contracts
and funding to complete this project very soon.
In nuclear weapons storage security, what remains to be
done is to provide--in conjunction with the DOE, an indigenous
Russian capability to sustain the modernized systems our two
Departments will have installed by the end of 2008. This will
be a multi-year effort, but the levels of funding required will
be considerably lower than what was needed at the height of the
effort to install the upgrades themselves.
Our Department remains involved in transporting warheads to
dismantlement and to centralized storage, while concurrently
procuring over the next several years, new, safer and more
secure rail cars in which the Ministry of Defense can transport
these weapons. We continue to eliminate strategic offensive
arms, but long familiarity with the processes and excellent
cooperation from the Russian executive agent have led to
greater efficiency in this area, so that we are, in fact, doing
more with less.
As these projects are completed, the focus of the CTR
effort is slowly moving away from its initial concentration on
legacy Soviet stockpiles, and turning South and West towards
Central Asia, the caucuses in the Ukraine. For fiscal year 2008
we have doubled our request for funding for the Biological
Threat Reduction Program, and I point that out, particularly in
view of the case that both Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn made,
about the need to provide additional funding for dealing with
the bio-threat.
The initiatives in the CTR program in this area include
working to consolidate and secure dangerous pathogens,
strengthening the ability to detect, diagnose, and respond to
bio-terror attacks, and potential pandemics. We concluded
agreements with the Governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, and we are implementing
bio-programs in those countries.
Threat agent detection and response involves selectively
locating in each of these countries, a network of
epidemiological monitoring stations, capable of performing
rapid diagnosis of disease outbreaks, with a secure, central
reference laboratory where the initial diagnoses can be
confirmed. Currently, one central lab, reference lab, is under
construction in Georgia and network designs in the other
countries are nearing completion.
The WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative funding remains
steady at about $40 million. Currently, this is working in four
countries of the former Soviet Union--Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. It seeks to develop in-depth WMD
interdiction and detection capabilities over the long-term.
The development of these projects is labor-intensive,
implementation can be costly, particularly in the maritime
domain, and the geographic areas in which we work--particularly
the Caspian and Black Seas--are challenging and complex.
Now, in the 5th year of this Proliferation Prevention
Initiative Program, we're examining what we've accomplished,
how we've complemented other border security efforts by other
agencies, and where we'll go in the future.
Mr. Chairman, the eight missions that we identified in the
National Military Strategy to combat WMD, represent a
continuing challenge. CTR and PSI are important tools in our
tool kit for addressing this challenge. These programs can
evolve to meet the evolving threat. We look forward to working
with you toward that end. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my
statement and I'm prepared to take any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Benkert follows:]
Prepared Statement by Joseph A. Benkert
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear
before you to discuss the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program
and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It is a particular
honor to have been preceded at the witness table by Senators Nunn and
Lugar, whose legislative foresight forms the basis of U.S. Government
authorities to combat the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and related infrastructure. In private life, Senator Nunn has remained
a leading voice to maintain public awareness of the WMD threat. Senator
Lugar has been a tireless advocate for nonproliferation activities
within the Senate and the Department of State, and in partnership with
this committee has been a key steward and mentor of the CTR Program. I
want also to thank the members of the committee for their strong
support of Department of Defense (DOD) programs that serve to combat
the proliferation of WMD.
Since DOD last testified on these subjects in March 2006, we
believe much has been accomplished and we look forward to a productive
year ahead for both CTR and PSI. The President has requested $348
million for fiscal year 2008 CTR activities; there is also a small
request to support COCOM PSI-related exercises included in the Defense-
Wide O&M section of the President's request. The Department urges your
support for these requests. Appended to my prepared statement is a
detailed description of the fiscal year 2008 CTR Program request.
COMBATING WMD
The first line of defense in combating WMD is international
cooperation. We do this through bilateral working relationships,
activities and agreements, and also through multilateral treaties and
regimes. It is important that such agreements not be viewed as a
panacea for the threat of WMD. The simple truth is that the worst
proliferators tend not to sign up to treaties, and some nations that do
sign up cheat. However, we also should not discount the value, in a
layered defense strategy, of promoting norms of behavior and raising
the bar for responsible behavior among nations that perceive an
interest in strong relations with the United States and like-minded
nations regarding proliferation of WMD. In this regard, DOD continues
to play its role in interagency support for the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and
the Wassanaar Arrangement, as well as the Nonproliferation Treaty, CWC,
and Biological Weapons Convention. DOD also helped draft and table at
the Conference on Disarmament the U.S. proposal for a Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). This effort has allowed the U.S. to move the
discussions forward on an FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament and
with allies.
As two examples of international cooperation, CTR and PSI are
important components of DOD's ``toolkit'' for the combating WMD mission
area. However, this toolkit is much broader, and is detailed in the
Secretary's National Military Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction, issued in February 2006. This was the first DOD-wide
strategy document addressed specifically at the combating WMD mission
area. It followed the identification of combating WMD as one of four
priority issues through which the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was
conducted. The National Military Strategy for Combating WMD divided
this complex mission area into eight discrete types of activities:
offensive operations, elimination, interdiction, active defense,
passive defense, WMD consequence management, security cooperation/
partner activities, and threat reduction cooperation. CTR and PSI are
elements of two of those mission areas. I think it is important that
the committee keep the broader range of combating WMD activities in
context, however. Our success in addressing this threat is a function
of how well we do across the full spectrum of mission areas, not merely
in two of them.
CTR and PSI are certainly among the most complex elements of the
eight mission areas, and I am pleased to have the opportunity to focus
on them in detail.
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
The CTR Program is well-known to this committee, and we appreciate
the active participation of you and your staff in guiding the program.
The following comments review developments since this subcommittee last
received testimony on CTR. In addition, I will outline our view for
CTR's future.
PROGRESS
The past year has been very productive for CTR. Let me note a
number of important accomplishments:
We broke ground for a key bio-security facility in
Tbilisi, Georgia, and are working closely with the government
of Azerbaijan to do the same in Baku within the next year. Both
of these governments have been very supportive as we jointly
pursue improved WMD security, and we welcome their continuing
cooperation. The bio-security facilities we have begun in these
capitals are planned beginnings of a regional ``constellation''
of facilities that will give the U.S. and cooperating
governments new insight into potential bio-weapons threats in
the region.
We finalized procedures for accelerated warhead
security assistance in the Russian Federation. This project has
been moving forward on schedule for completion in 2008 at the
initiative of Presidents Bush and Putin at the 2005 Bratislava
Summit. We appreciate Congress's $44.5 million supplemental
appropriation for fiscal year 2006, which was essential to
accelerate the project.
In ongoing activities, CTR supported elimination of 70
silo-based and mobile missiles; secure transportation of 52
railcars of nuclear warheads to non-alert locations; completion
of security upgrades at 11 nuclear weapons storage sites, and a
variety of other activities.
We extended for 7 years the CTR Umbrella Agreements
with the Russian Federation and Ukraine. These agreements are
the backbone supporting all CTR activities in those countries
and represent an important political commitment to continued
cooperation in the area of nonproliferation.
CTR continued to meet expectations regarding its
financial management. In the past, the program was criticized
for running high unobligated balances and we have worked
diligently to address these criticisms. CTR funds are
appropriated with a 3-year life, and the program is run on a
capital-budgeting basis. Thus, it is not only impossible, but
counterproductive for CTR to spend its annual appropriation
fully in the year of appropriation. CTR projected that its
unobligated balance at the end of fiscal year 2006 would be
well under $100 million. At the end of fiscal year 2006, our
unobligated balance was in fact $72 million--continued evidence
of improved fiscal stewardship of the program. In fact,
congressional restrictions on CTR spending require a
substantial carryover in order that first fiscal-quarter bills
can be paid.
CTR has also continued to refine its business
practices at both the policy and implementation levels. In
August 2006, the Office of Management and Budget gave CTR top
honors for DOD with respect to its Program Assessment Rating
Tool process. Of the 16 DOD ``Service Asset and Service
Acquisition Programs'' assessed by OMB during the summer 2006,
the CTR Program received the highest score (92 out of 100) and
was 1 of only 2 programs to receive an overall rating of
``Effective,'' which was the highest rating available.
CTR also faced some challenges in the past year.
Construction of the ``Shchuch'ye'' chemical weapons
destruction facility in Russia continued to present very
difficult challenges to U.S. requirements for transparent
program management. The facility is now fully funded at $1.039
billion--the final appropriation was for fiscal year 2007.
However, over the past year there were significant problems
ensuring that final contract awards could be accomplished
transparently for prices that had a reasonable relation to the
work proposed to be accomplished. After detailed negotiations,
we are now poised to sign an agreement with Russia which will
allow us to pull the Shcuch'ye project across the goal line
within the U.S. budget. If that budget turns out to be
insufficient, we expect to have Russia's commitment to fund
whatever is necessary to complete the project.
I want to emphasize DOD's commitment to completing the
Shchuch'ye project. Over the past year, concerns have been
expressed that we are somehow trying to walk away from
Shchuch'ye. This is not correct. The United States has invested
nearly $1 billion so far in this project, which is intended to
eliminate the most dangerous type of chemical weapons--nerve
agent--in their most proliferable form--small artillery shells
and rockets. For CTR's threat reduction mission, and for the
integrity of the program, it is important that Shchuch'ye be
completed. However, DOD can not do so where we cannot validate
that the U.S. is receiving appropriate value for its investment
to ensure that the mission is achieved. We believe our Russian
partners understand our position clearly, share our concerns
about managing costs, and are ready to sign an agreement that
will lead to successful commissioning of Shchuch'ye.
Cooperation among some Central Asian partners has been
uneven. In some cases we have experienced inappropriate
government scrutiny of our foreign-national subcontractors or
interlocutors. In other cases, we have faced bureaucratic
challenges getting CTR assistance exempted from local taxes.
Despite the strenuous efforts of the Department of State and
U.S. embassies to address these challenges, they continue to
constrain the many good things CTR can do for U.S. and partner-
country interests.
LOOKING FORWARD
The next few years will see several milestones for CTR, offering an
opportunity to look farther ahead for the program. We expect to
complete the Bratislava warhead security initiative in 2008, and the
Shchuch'ye nerve agent elimination project in early 2009. In addition
to continued progress in our missile elimination work in Russia,
completion of these two very important and complex projects will mark
several key changes for CTR.
First, we expect that this will be the first time in CTR's history
that the level of effort outside the Russian Federation, as measured by
program funding, will exceed the level inside Russia. This represents a
significant array of accomplishments for the program managers, action
officers and contractors in the U.S. and Russia who have spent over a
decade seeking to secure the legacy of Soviet WMD production, and its
related infrastructure.
The trend toward more CTR activity outside Russia reflects the
realities of today. The Russian Federation finds itself in a much
different position today than it was 15 years ago when CTR began. At
that time, Senators Nunn and Lugar and their Russian counterparts had
the foresight to understand the threat from unsecured, Soviet-era WMD
across the states of the former Soviet Union. An enduring achievement
of CTR is that it supported the secure repatriation to Russia of the
Soviet Union's nuclear warheads located in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and
Belarus. These countries also became CTR partners. Today, the Russian
Federation has both the revived organizational capability as well as
the resources to secure weapons of mass destruction inside its borders,
and President Putin has committed to doing so. Thus, it is not
surprising that CTR's level of effort in Russia is projected to
decline. Indeed, with narrow exceptions, we anticipate that CTR will
fulfill contracts and commitments already made in Russia, but not
undertake any new work in the foreseeable future.
CTR conducts its work where partner nations request its
assistance--it functions only in permissive environments. Russia has
not asked CTR for new assistance, with narrow exceptions, for some
time. If Russia believes that CTR can bring a special capability to
bear on a WMD problem, we would always be willing to discuss it.
Moreover, the nature of the WMD threat has changed. When CTR began,
the focus of the program was to eliminate or secure WMD at its source.
This continues to be our preferred approach: the only way to have 100
percent confidence that WMD or related infrastructure does not
constitute a threat, is to get rid of it. However, we only have access
to such stockpiles when the possessor state identifies them and
requests assistance for elimination. Many of those known stockpiles or
infrastructure were in the states of the former Soviet Union, including
Russia, and CTR assistance has been requested to address them in many
cases. Much of that assistance has already been provided. If WMD are
found elsewhere, CTR is ready to provide security or conduct
elimination operations, provided that doing so is consistent with U.S.
policy and resource availability.
The threat from large stockpiles of WMD ``at its source'' and from
related infrastructure continues. However, terrorists do not need large
amounts of WMD to carry out their missions. After September 11 this
administration sought to address WMD on the move, as well as at the
source. The purpose of this revised approach was to help meet the
challenge posed by non-state actors, who are not tied to large
stockpiles or infrastructure. For CTR, this resulted in the Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative, which is intended
to improve partner nations' WMD border security capacity. It also
resulted in the Threat Agent Detection and Response (TADR) initiative,
under CTR's Biological Threat Reduction Program. TADR is intended to
improve partner nations' capacity to detect, characterize , and share
information about biological threats and trends related to dangerous
pathogens. This attention to capacity building, in addition to
addressing ``WMD in place,'' will help keep CTR current with the
threats it is intended to address.
CTR is one of several tools in our nonproliferation toolkit. Some
have said that because the CTR budget request is declining, the
administration intends to declare victory and close the program. This
is incorrect. The budget has declined in part because expensive,
infrastructure-heavy projects such as Shchuch'ye, warhead security and
missile elimination are all nearing completion or well beyond the half-
way mark; and because new opportunities to use CTR's capabilities, in
the type of circumstance the CTR model requires, are still being
developed. Thus, the measure of CTR's health or its future is not how
much money is being requested. Indeed, one of the key lessons we have
learned is to measure our success by the nonproliferation return we
receive on an expenditure and by accomplishment of the mission, not
merely by how much equipment we supply to a partner. It may well be
that CTR's budget request will need to rise in the future. Some
capacity building is costly: the TADR program, which we have already
begun to execute in several nations, involves providing some very
complex facilities to accomplish its mission.
The CTR policy and implementation teams have developed a unique set
of skills to deal with very dangerous materials in very remote parts of
the world. They still have much work to do related to existing CTR
projects and agreements, but there will be opportunities for new uses
of CTR. No one should think that the program is being shut down.
Indeed, we would welcome the committee's support to make CTR a more
nimble tool for the long term. In this regard, I would commend to the
committee's attention the provisions of S.198, introduced on January 8,
2007 by Senator Lugar which seek to streamline CTR's internal
processes. Similarly, any additional flexibility the committee might
provide for using CTR outside the states of the former Soviet Union
would position the program to be more responsive to emergent
requirements and the evolving threat I described, should the need
arise. However, any expansion of CTR to new regimes or for new purposes
will need to be considered carefully in light of the full array of WMD
tools available and in view of CTR's core business activities--
elimination, security, and capacity building to address the threat of
WMD and related infrastructure and delivery systems. We believe we have
the right models in place for these activities, and that staying
focused on them is the key to keeping the program running correctly.
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
The United States continues to work with other governments on the
PSI, which President Bush launched in May 2003. Through the PSI, the
United States collaborates with like-minded countries on how to stop
WMD/missile-related shipments bound to and from non-state actors and
states of concern while also working to enhance our individual and
collective WMD interdiction tools.
Since Assistant Secretary Flory last testified before this
Subcommittee in March 2006, the number of countries that have endorsed
the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles has increased to over 80.
The United States plays a leading role in the the PSI Operational
Experts Group (OEG), which meets on behalf of all PSI participants to
discuss and advance PSI objectives. The OEG brings together 20
countries and their experts from the military, law enforcement,
intelligence, legal, and diplomatic arenas. These experts develop new
operational concepts for interdiction; organize a program of
interdiction exercises; share information about national legal
authorities; and pursue cooperation with industry sectors that can be
helpful to the interdiction mission. Through these efforts, OEG
participants raise the level of collective and national interdiction
capabilities. New Zealand recently hosted the 14th OEG meeting in
Auckland in March 2007. Greece will host the next OEG meeting in
October 2007.
DOD is responsible for leading the OEG process, the locus of
operational aspects of PSI. To date, PSI partners have had 25 PSI OEG
exercises that have explored all modes of transportation: ground, air,
and sea. These exercises have brought to bear the expertise and
operational assets of both the military as well as law enforcement
agencies, reflecting the cooperative and multi-dimensional forms that
real-world interdictions can take. These exercises have also been
hosted by a range of countries around the world, and they provide an
opportunity for nations that yet to endorse PSI to observe the
operational aspects of PSI. Over 50 PSI participants have participated
in or sent observers to these 25 exercises, while about another 20 non-
PSI participants have sent observers.
PSI exercise Leading Edge, hosted by the United States and Bahrain
in October 2006, was the first to be conducted in the Persian Gulf. In
addition to six nations that sent operational assets (Australia,
France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Bahrain and the United States), the
United Arab Emirates, Japan, Spain, South Korea, Pakistan and Qatar
sent observers . The United States continues to help plan or
participate in a range of upcoming PSI exercises planned for 2007.
In addition to exercises, table-top games and simulations have also
helped participants work through interdiction scenarios, and they have,
in many cases, improved the way participating governments organize to
conduct interdictions. To this end, the United States will host another
PSI game for OEG states at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode
Island in June 2007.
We have seen other concrete benefits from the PSI. Participation in
PSI has helped countries improve their internal interagency processes,
communication with counterparts in foreign countries, understanding of
international and domestic legal authorities, and understanding of
applicable resoures and assets. All of these improvements have in turn
helped countries in other areas, such as in fulfilling their
obligations to implement United Nations Security Council Resolutions
(UNSCR) 1718 (DPRK sanctions) and 1737/1747 (Iran). In discussions of
UNSCRs 1718, 1737, and 1747 in the last two OEG meetings, a number of
countries have cited that their work on PSI has helped lay the
groundwork and develop the processes or mechanisms that they need to
implement these chapter VII resolutions.
The PSI has been and remains an invaluable nonproliferation
activity, and we will continue to work close with our PSI partners to
maximize its potential.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, the eight missions identified in the National
Military Strategy to Combat WMD represent a continuing challenge for
us. They are complex because the threat is complex; the next edition of
this strategy document could change in important ways, because the WMD
threat will change. As it does, we are prepared to make changes in
programs like CTR. The same is true for PSI, though this activity is
still new enough that we ought not begin speaking of significant
changes just yet. The WMD threat is significant, and PSI and CTR are
important tools that should be considered to fight that threat. We look
forward to working closely with Congress toward that end.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
I presume we can do at least two rounds of 6 minutes, so
let me begin, and let me begin with Mr. Tobey.
My first focus is on the Mixed-Oxide (MOX) Fuel Program. We
know that's been an episodic process on both sides of the
ocean, both the Russians and the United States.
Specifically, will DOE go forward with the MOX Program,
with or without a Russian commitment to finish their project?
Mr. Tobey. We believe that the MOX Program is in the U.S.
interest, regardless of what the Russians do. However, we
intend fully to hold the Russians to the 2000 Plutonium
Disposition Agreement, and we actually think that the chances
are better that we will be able to hold the Russians to that
agreement, if we proceed with our program.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Tobey.
Are there any alternatives to MOX that you're considering?
Mr. Tobey. Mr. Chairman, over the last, I think, well,
maybe more than a decade, a decade or so, many alternatives
have been discussed. I think that some three dozen were
initially discussed, in the original origins of the program.
This has been narrowed down over time, and I think DOE last
reported on three possible alternatives at the request of
Congress: the MOX Program, vitrification, or storage. Storage--
or simply doing nothing, but continuing to secure the material,
using 50-year life cycle costs, turns out to be the most
expensive alternative. Of course, at the end of the 50 years,
something must be done with the material at that point. During
all of that time, it still remains material that could--at
least theoretically--be used for nuclear weapons and, so we
don't accomplish our nonproliferation goals.
Vitrification is also a possibility. The estimated costs
were not found to be substantially different than the MOX
program, however, there's a great deal more technological, and
therefore, financial risk. We're probably at least several
years--perhaps as many as 8, years of research and development
away from even beginning a vitrification effort. I would point
out, the MOX program, the facility is actually 85 percent
complete with its design.
Senator Reed. Well, I understand and appreciate your
commitment to completing it is in our interest, even without a
Russian factor. But, there are some issues in timing, and one
issue is that the plant will not be completed in 2011, but you
want to start initial construction immediately, is that the
case?
Mr. Tobey. My understanding of the continuing resolution
that was passed, prohibits us from starting construction
activities until August 1, but we would like to start
construction as soon as possible thereafter.
Senator Reed. But the design phase will go much beyond
that, design phase stretches to 2011, is that our impediment to
a good, solid project?
Mr. Tobey. The design is basically, well, it's somewhat
greater than 85 percent complete. I think it's actually now,
the last time--since that figure was formulated, and I think
we've gone a little bit further.
Some of design makes sense to do as you're doing the--as
you're constructing the plant. As you probably know, Senator,
the plant wouldn't be finished until 2015. So, some of that
design work can go on as construction occurs.
Senator Reed. We're going to spend at least $5 billion to
build and start up the plant. For 14 years, dispose of only the
agreed-upon 34 tons of plutonium, which begs the question--what
happens to the additional excess U.S. plutonium? Shouldn't we
design and build a plant that could fully-convert all of this
plutonium?
Mr. Tobey. Our view is that we should try and use the plant
for as much of the material as possible. Some of the material
may not be suitable for use in light-water reactors, because of
contaminants within the material. But, it would be our
objective to use it as much as possible. We're committed to
using the plant for the 34 metric tons, as you noted.
There's up to 13 additional metric tons that would be
disposed of through other disposition paths. But, the phrase,
``up to'' is key there. It would be our intent to put as much
as possible through the MOX program.
I'd also note that if there are further declarations of
plutonium as excess to defense needs, that would likely be run
through the MOX process. As well, we're looking into the
possibility that the MOX plant could be used to produce driver
fuel for fast reactors that might be pursued under the GNEP.
So, we're trying to use the plant for as many purposes as
possible.
Senator Reed. This is my final question. The last National
Defense Authorization Act required an independent cost estimate
be conducted by DOE, and in lieu of an independent cost
estimate, I'm told you have conducted an independent cost
review. Is this accurate, and why is the independent cost
estimate not being done?
Mr. Tobey. I must admit, Senator, I'm not familiar with the
exact distinction of, what the technical distinction between
the two terms. I know that Burns & Rowe did look at the cost of
the MOX plan. As a result of that, the total project cost was
increased, the Reserves were increased as a result--it was a
comprehensive study that cost roughly $1 million. But, I'd be
happy to get back to you on that----
Senator Reed. I think it would be helpful. Again, this is
this sort of a distinction that is important, but, I think,
should be clarified. So, if you could clarify the distinction
and let us know, because the legislation called for this cost
estimate, not just a review.
Mr. Tobey. Certainly, sir.
Senator Reed. I'd appreciate that.
[The information referred to follows:]
An independent cost estimate (ICE) of the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel
Fabrication Facility (Project 99-D-143) was prepared by the Jupiter
Corporation on March 6, 2001, for the Department of Energy's Office of
Engineering and Construction Management (OECM). Subsequently, delays
caused by a liability impasse with Russia, constrained funding in the
outyears and a partial redesign of the MOX facility to accommodate
quantities of impure plutonium resulting from the cancellation of the
immobilization project all have contributed to further delays in the
MOX project schedule and increases to its total project cost. In 2006,
in preparation for Critical Decision 2 (approval of performance
baseline) approval, the MOX project cost estimate was updated to
reflect current year dollars, escalation and risk contingency,
including cost and schedule impacts associated with the liability
impact, constrained funding and the MOX redesign. This cost estimate
was again independently reviewed and validated by the engineering firm
of Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc. as part of OECM's external
independent review (EIR) process. A report containing the review
criteria, details of areas reviewed, findings, and DOE corrective
actions was provided to Congress on April 4, 2007.
In contrast to an ICE, in which only cost is evaluated, an EIR is
much broader, taking into consideration 13 other essential project
management elements such as, program and design requirements, results
of design reviews, integrated resource loaded project schedule, project
execution plan, risk management plan and the procurement and
acquisition plans, all which are essential to the execution phase of
the project. As part of the EIR, Burns and Roe evaluated the
contractor's basis of estimates, including cost of materials and labor,
structural and equipment installation unit rates, escalation, technical
and programmatic risks, schedule and cost uncertainty, as well as
project risk contingency associated with completing the design,
construction and cold startup scope of work. Related construction work
packages, projected resources and integrated project schedule
activities were also reviewed as part of this effort. As a result, an
additional $359 million was added to estimates proposed by DOE's
contractor to reflect increases in the cost of some the construction
activities, escalation rates, and contingency.
Senator Reed. Mr. Benkert, again, thank you for your
testimony. As you've pointed out, the committee's been very
supportive of the CTR Program's effort to expand into
biological security. Even though funding from this expansion
plan was not included in the fiscal year 2008 budget request, I
understand that you would like to get additional resources in
the 2009 request. Could you briefly set out what work you'd
like to do and where, with respect to biological initiatives?
Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I think as I said, we have
substantially expanded the funding in the 2008 request,
specifically for bio, to do work in the five countries that I
mentioned. I think we are looking at the possibility in future
years for expanding this work to other countries, but also what
additional work we need to do to follow up on the work we've
started in the countries of concern.
So, for example, we have a set of things that we are doing,
which involve a series, a network of epidemiological stations
to--which will be able to detect biological agents or extremely
dangerous pathogens. Then a central reference laboratory to do
diagnosis and other kinds of work.
So, I think our view is, at this point, that we have
adequate funding for what we have set out to do, and we are
looking at what we might do to expand the program. I think our
caution would be that, I mean, we are doubling the size of the
program, in terms of funding, in this coming year, and we
would, I think, be reluctant to put much more money into the
program until we make sure that we can manage what we have,
given the fact that it's about to double in funding.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Benkert, let me begin with you and ask, I understand
that our troops have found some stocks of old, this would be
pre-1991 Gulf War chemical weapons in Iraq. They're stored in
bunkers that are under our guard, and they pose a safety and an
environmental hazard. If they were to get into the wrong hands,
of course, they could pose a threat to coalition troops, and to
the Iraqi civilian population. Is there consideration being
given to using CTR assistance to help Iraq destroy these old
chemical weapons? If so, what factors is the administration
looking at? What are they considering as this decision is being
weighed?
Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Senator Dole.
As you said, there are old chemical weapons in Iraq, in a
variety--we discover them, occasionally the insurgents discover
them as well, and then there are certain areas where there are
stockpiles of these.
We have, in fact--we are in fact looking at the possibility
of the use of CTR funds to help to assist the Iraqis in
destroying these weapons. I think the issue that we have, of
course, is--referring to Senator Lugar's point, that we are
limited in our ability to use CTR outside of the former Soviet
Union by the current restrictions of $50 million annually, and
a requirement for a Presidential determination. So, I think it
would be useful to us, if there were greater flexibility, it
would provide us some greater flexibility to look at what we
might do in Iraq. I think, part of this also is, will be tied
to Iraq's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and
their declarations to the OPCW, which will then put them in a
position where they're obliged to start destroying these
weapons. But, yes, we are looking at how we could help them do
that.
Senator Dole. Let me visit with you about Shchuchye for a
few moments. Of course, this is the last large CTR construction
project in Russia, and we understand that DOD has recently
negotiated with Russia to have Russia assume responsibility for
completing the construction, using U.S. funds that have already
been provided and allocated to the project.
DOD does not plan to provide any additional funding, as
you've indicated, for this facility. But, given the large U.S.
investment in this facility, and the sensitivity of its
function--destroying chemical weapons, it's important that the
United States have high confidence that the facility will
operate properly and safely once it's turned over to the
Russians.
Has DOD pared back the scope of its work on systemization
of this facility, and the training of the Russian operators as
a result of this development? If so, can you assure us that the
facility will operate as designed, and that the Russian workers
will be adequately trained, so that we can be confident in the
safe operations of this, largely U.S.-funded facility?
Mr. Benkert. Senator Dole, I can assure you that we are
committed to seeing this project through to its completion to
ensure that this important facility does, in fact, function as
designed, and is able to destroy the weapons.
I mean, we completely share the views--I think, again,
expressed here this morning by Senator Nunn, of the importance
of this work. This is the largest stockpile in the world of
probably the most dangerous chemical weapons in the world. So,
I can assure you that we are committed to seeing it through. I
think we have had some issues in contracting in order to get
this program completed, I think we have arrived at an
effective, and also I think, creative way of structuring the
contracts for the remaining work, so that we can do this within
the budget that we have been given, and do it at a reasonable
price.
We will be watching this very carefully as it progresses,
to make sure that, in fact, that the work does what it's
supposed to do.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Mr. Tobey, we're all watching cautiously to see whether the
agreements reached at the Six-Party Talks will be honored in
North Korea, whether North Korea will ultimately make good on
its commitment to shut down, and eventually to dismantle--with
verification--its nuclear weapons program.
What role is DOE playing in helping to assess the accuracy
of the North Korean declaration regarding its nuclear programs,
and what role is DOE possibly playing here, with regard to
helping to develop a reliable verification system.
Mr. Tobey. Senator Dole, DOE's been an active participant
in the negotiations, I actually participated myself in three
rounds of the talks while I was at the National Security
Council. But while I was there, there was a colleague from the
DOE, now one of our people continues to go to those talks. So,
we're participating in the negotiations, advising Ambassador
Hill on the technical aspects of what would be required for
verifiable dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program.
We've also been an active participant in interagency
discussions on, what would be required for verifiable
dismantlement of the North Korean program. As you probably
know, we haven't yet received a declaration from North Korea,
but we would expect to be active participants in analysis of
that declaration. When the time came, and while no roles have
yet been determined among the parties, I would expect that if
the United States takes a leading role in verifying the
dismantlement of the program, that the DOE would be actively
involved in that.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Earlier, I raised a question about the Iraqi scientists.
I'd like to have you elaborate on where we stand there.
In 2004, DOE launched an initiative, as I understand it, to
provide employment opportunities for these Iraqi scientists,
but because of security considerations, that program did not
advance rapidly.
But, I'm interested in how many scientists may have
participated, and in your view, if this program were to be
expanded and extended, the number of scientists who might want
to take advantage of such an opportunity. Could you just update
us regarding the status and the progress of this program?
Mr. Tobey. Sure, it's a difficult issue. Because, as you
noted, the security situation is difficult. We did work in--
directly in Iraq, early on, and there were programs aimed at
both bettering the Iraqi people, and also making use of the
scientific expertise that was resident within Iraq.
We've concentrated more recently on programs that are
located outside of Iraq, where we can bring Iraqis to be
trained, and those programs do continue, they're not large, but
we're continuing to train Iraqis. I will have to get back to
you on the exact number of participants that have been through
this.
[The information referred to follows:]
Scientist engagement is carried out by NNSA's Global Initiatives
for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program. This program, established
in 2005, combined existing scientist redirection programs that targeted
the Former Soviet Union and expanded the mission of these programs to
meet emerging challenges, such as Libya and Iraq.
In Iraq, GIPP currently sponsors 13 projects involving 41 Iraqi
scientists. Many of these projects directly contribute to the
reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure, such as water purification
techniques. Other projects have potential medical or pharmaceutical
applications. GIPP projects are approved to maximize participation by
scientists with weapons of mass destruction skills and expertise in
nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, weapons safety, weapons design, and
explosives. None of these scientists is employed or trained in the
United States under these projects.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Dole. Let me
leave with a couple of additional questions, and recognize
Senator Dole again.
DOE is responsible for a lot of research and development,
which is critical to nonproliferation--forensic
identifications, and all of that which is going to be
increasingly important as we see more and more nations begin to
develop nuclear energy programs, and perhaps worse.
I'm just wondering, with respect to both DOE and DOD, do
you think you have adequate resources for the kind of research
programs that are necessary, Mr. Tobey?
Mr. Tobey. Yes, Senator. Although, as you note, it is a
very high priority. In our case, because we are among the few
that provide funds for basic research, as opposed to applied
research, I think those dollars are very critical, not only to
the work of DOE, but as support for other agencies.
Senator Reed. Are there any areas that you feel are under
funded, in terms of this research? That are absolutely
important going forward, but are not receiving adequate
resources?
Mr. Tobey. No, sir.
Senator Reed. If you think of some, don't be shy about
letting us know.
Mr. Tobey. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Mr. Benkert, in terms of DOD research, to the
extent that you have sort of a window on that, are there any
areas of concern that you have the research dollars aren't
there for these, to support the counterproliferation programs?
Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I think again, in terms of the
nuclear issues, primarily to DOE on this, but I think you hit
upon an important topic, which is this ability--the forensic
ability to determine where materials come from.
I think the observation I would make is that in terms of
nuclear materials, there has been much progress, and I think
probably we are in reasonably good shape. In terms of being, if
the forensic capabilities, if chemical weapons were used, or
biological weapons, probably not so. I would have to get back
to you on the specifics of whether we have adequate funds
invested in those areas or not, but I think clearly it's the
case that more needs to be done there.
Senator Reed. I think so. Because, again, without the
telltale irrefutable link back to a source, deterrence doesn't
work.
Mr. Benkert. Right.
Senator Reed. You're left with pre-emption, or you're left
with, just fingers crossed and hoping for the best, and I don't
think we want to be in that position. So, this effort going
forward of adequate research, and particularly when it comes to
forensics of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is
absolutely critical, and I'd appreciate your thoughtful
response in this regard.
The final question I have is that, we seem to have reached
some significant milestones with respect to the initial vision
of the Conference for Threat Reduction. We have facilities in
place to destroy chemical weapons that we're seeing come online
and we are looking, dealing with transferring plutonium into
MOX. The question, I think, now, is what's the next thought
about programmatically, geographically--where do we go now?
Sort of, the CTR II? Mr. Tobey?
Mr. Tobey. Mr. Chairman, when I took this job last August,
I talked about three priorities. The first was to get
Bratislava done on time, or if possible, early. I think we're
winding down that effort, we're on a track to getting our work
complete by the end of 2008. The second was good program
management, because I know that's been an issue at DOE, and we
deal with complicated, expensive programs, and that's
important. The third, though, was to make sure that our
strategy met the evolving threat that we face. That, I think,
is a particularly important problem. I think as we begin to
complete our work in the former Soviet Union, and move from
control of material to sustaining those efforts, we also need
to turn our attention elsewhere.
A couple of areas have been mentioned already by the first
panel and others in the room, and I agree with those
sentiments. I think that while we all hope that the agreement
with North Korea holds, until we're certain that that program
is fully dismantled, I think we have to attend to the
possibility that there could be proliferation from North Korea,
given its record as a proliferator of missile equipment and
other dangerous military technology.
I think also in South Asia, there are some proliferation
concerns. I would hope that the full suite of the activities
that we undertake--both in terms of second line of defense and
best practices--could be applied to those areas.
In that regard, I'm very much encouraged by the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. That was an initiative
that was started by Presidents Bush and Putin at St. Petersburg
last year. The model for the membership is like the PSI, it
started with a small group, the G8, plus four other nations--
Australia, China, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. Since then, Morocco
has joined, and the group has set out, first, a set of
principles to guide their action, and then that was done in
Rabat last fall, and in January in Ankara, Turkey, they adopted
a work program, and then in June, we're hopeful that the
membership of the organization will greatly expand.
I regard this as particularly promising, because what we
can do is take the lessons that we've learned in the former
Soviet Union and elsewhere, and take the legal mandate of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540, and in doing so, gather the
resources in terms of personnel and national power and
financial resources of other countries, and apply them to the
nonproliferation problem. So, it's no longer the United States,
and perhaps portions of the G8 that are bearing this burden
alone, it becomes the responsibility of every nation to fight
the proliferation problem. I think that's the way we will best
meet the emerging threats that we're facing.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Benkert, your thoughts?
Mr. Benkert. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would
wholeheartedly endorse what Mr. Tobey just said about the
Global Initiative to counter nuclear terrorism. We have, in
CTR, over the last 15 years, developed a great base of
knowledge on practices, procedures, how to go about eliminating
and destroying nuclear weapons, how to go about securing sites,
developing the hardware and the procedures to do that.
I think, one of the things we want to do is to be able to
apply this knowledge outside Russia and the former Soviet
Union. The Global Initiative that Presidents Bush and Putin
launched, I think, is a good vehicle for doing that. There may
be others, as well, that we want to do, but I think one thing
that it is, one area that we want to pursue is how we use this
base of knowledge and experience that we have developed over
the last 15 years, in Russia and the former Soviet Union, in a
broader context.
The second is, the two relatively new components of CTR are
the Proliferation Prevention Initiative which is the attempt to
develop the capability to stop WMD and related materials on the
move, for example, though border security initiatives. I think
this is--we think this is particularly promising since, I
think, in the future, one cannot assume that we will be able to
get at weapons at their source, and we need to be able to stop
them en route.
Then, of course, as we've discussed before, the biological
piece of this, which I think is an area that deserves a great
deal of attention, and we are providing attention to that.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Just one further question for Mr. Tobey. In
March 2003--or 2005, I believe it was--DOE launched the GTRI,
and it aims to identify secure radiological materials around
the world against diversion for use in radiological dispersion
devices. What is the status of this very important anti-
terrorism initiative? Has the Department developed a strategy
for prioritizing activities under this initiative, so that the
material that poses the highest risk is dealt with and
addressed first?
Mr. Tobey. Senator Dole, this is a very important program,
and our work there has been accelerating. We've taken to heart
some of the advice we've received from outside of the
Department. In terms of sites that have been secured over the
last several years, in fiscal year 2003, we secured 8, in
fiscal year 2004, it was 61, in 2005, 174, and 2006 it was 257.
Cumulatively, we've secured over 520 sites. So, the work there
is not only continuing, but accelerating, and I do believe it
is fundamentally important.
We have developed a prioritization, and that's based on the
type of material, how easily attainable it might be to a
terrorist group, and also its proximity to assets that we care
about the United States, or our allies or our friends. We use
that prioritization to guide our efforts worldwide.
We are also working with the IAEA because they engage in
similar work, to try and come up with prioritization that would
be harmonized with ours. It may not be perfectly the same, but,
in other words, to guide their practices as well. Because,
you're certainly right that prioritization of the work is
important.
Then, finally, this is an area where I think the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism can also play a role,
because we can take this prioritization, present it to other
nations, and hope to engage their efforts on this work, as
well.
Senator Dole. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Dole. Let me thank you for
your participation. As always, your thoughtful questions and
your insightful remarks.
I want to thank both Mr. Benkert and Mr. Tobey for your
testimony. The record will remain open for 3 days for
additional questions, which any of the panel might have for you
gentlemen.
Thank you very much, and the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL
AWARENESS CAPABILITIES
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m. in
room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Reed, Akaka, Warner,
and Dole.
Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
member; and Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Jessica L.
Kingston, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator
Warner; and Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN
Senator Reed. If I could have your attention. First, let me
thank all the exhibitors for a very interesting and informative
exhibition and demonstration. It is quite impressive. I thank
you all.
We will now call the hearing to order and I would begin my
statement, but also indicate that Senator Akaka will be joining
us. He has several other responsibilities, so I will suspend
and recognize him immediately, with the kind concurrence of
Senator Dole.
Today we meet to consider efforts to improve the Department
of Defense (DOD) language and cultural awareness capabilities.
I would like to welcome our witnesses. Our first witness is
General Robert Scales, who is currently the President of
Colgen, Inc. General Scales served for 30 years in the Army and
is an outspoken advocate of language and cultural awareness in
the military.
Representing the DOD is Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Plans, Gail McGinn. Secretary McGinn is responsible for the
development and implementation of the DOD's language policies.
Joining Secretary McGinn is Dr. Andre Van Tilborg, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology. In this
position, Dr. Van Tilborg has oversight over many of the DOD's
important research efforts, including those in language,
translation, and cultural awareness.
I also want to thank everyone from the various service
agencies and commands who worked on the technology
demonstration that we have here in the hearing room today. Some
of these systems are related significantly to improving our
capability in addressing operational shortfalls in the short-
term, while we strive to more comprehensively improve the DOD's
capabilities in this arena.
I want to especially thank the subcommittee staff
assistant, Jessica Kingston, for her efforts in coordinating
the demonstration and exhibits today. Jessica, you did a great
job. I encourage all of our members, witnesses, and attendees
to take the opportunity to examine some of these devices and
learn about the ongoing research efforts.
At this point, it is appropriate in my text to stop and,
Senator Akaka, if you would like to make your opening statement
we would be more than willing to recognize you.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for this opportunity to present my statement. I want to thank
Senator Dole for giving me this opportunity, too. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to speak briefly on this matter.
I need to leave to chair a Veterans Affairs Committee hearing
at 2 o'clock.
I applaud your leadership in holding today's hearing, Mr.
Chairman, on the DOD's language and cultural awareness
capabilities. This is a critical issue for national security
and I appreciate your allowing me to participate here. As
chairman of the Senate Oversight of Government Management
Subcommittee and the Armed Services Readiness and Management
Support Subcommittee, I have been very interested in how the
Federal Government as a whole and DOD in particular are meeting
their needs in both the short- and long-term. While DOD has
made great strides to address this issue, more work needs to be
done.
One issue I want to discuss is how DOD coordinates with
other Federal agencies, industries, and stakeholders to address
its language needs. In 2004, DOD held a national language
conference and issued a White Paper summarizing the
recommendations of the conference. The number one
recommendation called for naming a senior Government official
to lead the Government's foreign language education effort and
establishing a council representing the broad spectrum of
stakeholders to report on the Nation's language needs and
propose actions to address them.
The White Paper also noted that all interested parties must
be involved, as all sectors--government, industry, and
academia--have a need for language-proficient individuals and
no one sector has all of the solutions.
Last year the administration announced the National
Security Language Initiative (NSLI) to coordinate efforts among
the intelligence directorate and the Departments of Defense,
Education, and State to address our national security language
needs. However, NSLI and the National Security Education
Program failed to address key recommendations made in the White
Paper, namely ensuring that this effort can be sustained,
taking in the advice of all Federal agencies, stakeholders, and
addressing our common security needs, which also impacts our
national security.
In January I chaired a hearing of the Senate Oversight of
Government Management Subcommittee on the Federal Government's
language strategy. Testimony from academia and foreign language
groups said that there is a lack of coordination between NSLI
partners and stakeholders. One witness commented that if there
is a Federal language strategy, it is not well known.
Last year Senator Cochran and I were able to secure $1
million for DOD to implement the recommendations of the White
Paper. As reflected in my language, the National Foreign
Language Coordination Act, S. 4051, I am pleased that DOD is
set to hold several regional summits to address language needs
at the State and local level, as outlined in my bill. It is key
that DOD is taking action, but more, again, more needs to be
done.
I firmly believe that it is only through a cooperative plan
of action and long-term leadership that we will address the
Nation's language needs.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to
participate today and to speak briefly on this issue. I do have
a few questions that I will submit for the record.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka. We all
recognize your leadership role in several committees on these
issues of language preparation, not just for the DOD, but for
the Government as a whole. Thank you.
Let me conclude my statement and then recognize the ranking
member, Senator Dole.
The December 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap
asserts in the introduction that: ``Post-September 11 military
operations reinforce the reality that the DOD needs a
significantly improved organic capability in emerging languages
and dialects, a greater competence in regional area skills in
those languages and dialects, and a surge capacity to rapidly
expand its language capabilities on short notice.''
I am glad that the DOD recognizes this need, but wonder why
it came about 4 years after September 11. Moreover, 6 years
after September 11 and midway into the implementation of that
roadmap, I am concerned that we still hear comments such as,
``I am appalled at the Army's inability, and the Marine Corps
also, to get language training.'' General Barry McCaffrey made
that comment last week before this committee.
I understand that the DOD's investment in language
capabilities has increased exponentially from what was being
budgeted before September 2001 to what is being budgeted for
the current fiscal year. If that is true, what have we gained
from this investment and what level of investment is the
Department planning to make to develop future capability?
I hope that at this hearing we can examine the shortfalls
of the DOD's current approach to language and cultural
awareness and that we can come away with some proposals about
what additional steps the DOD should take and what programs or
initiatives Congress should support.
I would like to hear from witnesses on their views
regarding the role that research and development can play in
enhancing our capabilities. I know that technology can play a
big role in this, but I also know that it is not a silver
bullet. I would like to explore how much of an emphasis we
should be placing on these efforts, relative to other avenues
as we seek to improve our operational capabilities.
The goal of all of us here is to ensure that our troops
have the appropriate cultural and language skills to prevail,
not just in the current fight against Islamic terrorism, but
also in executing other military activities, including
peacekeeping, military cooperation, training, and exchanges
with foreign militaries, and deterrence of unneeded warfighting
with a potential conventional enemy.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here. I look
forward to a very engaging hearing. Now I would like to
recognize Senator Dole.
Senator Dole.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE
Senator Dole. I certainly would like to join Senator Reed
and Senator Akaka in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon. I
would also like to thank everyone who has been involved in
bringing us the great technology exhibits that we had a chance
to view earlier. It truly helps us better understand the fruits
of our science and technology (S&T) investments when we can
view and touch the equipment and talk to the operators to hear
how these devices help fulfill their missions.
The security environment since September 11 has reinforced
the long-held principle that the United States must effectively
use all instruments of national power to achieve our national
security objectives. That means not only military capability,
but it also means that diplomacy, foreign assistance, and
economic tools are critical to our future security. Similarly,
since September 11 we have relearned the lesson that to be
effective the U.S. military must be skilled not only at
conducting combat operations, but also at helping to prevent
conflict and helping to transition from conflict situations to
sustained peace and stability.
These activities require skills that are different from
traditional warfighting skills. In the past few years, numerous
Defense Science Board studies, outside experts, and DOD
planning documents, including the 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), have called for greater focus on creating and
sustaining DOD's capabilities in stability, security,
transition, and reconstruction operations. The critical element
in those capabilities is the human factor, the ability of our
military personnel to understand the environment in which they
operate or are seeking to shape, to speak the language spoken
in areas around the globe where they are deployed, and to
understand the cultural norms of the people with whom they will
be interacting in both friendly and hostile situations.
Today's hearing will focus on the efforts that DOD is
making to improve the capabilities of its personnel in language
and cultural awareness skills. The testimonies of General
Scales, Mrs. McGinn, and Dr. Van Tilborg, regarding the DOD's
requirements in these areas and how well the DOD is doing in
identifying, prioritizing, and meeting those requirements are
very important contributions to this discussion. Also, the
degree to which S&T can help to meet the needs and compensate
for shortfalls that exist today in the linguistic and cultural
awareness fields that our military men and women need as they
are deployed around the globe, particularly in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Your testimony will also help this subcommittee to
determine if the proposed fiscal year 2008 and the future years
defense budget reflect sufficient priority, resources, and
authorities for this important capabilities.
Thank you all for your appearance today and for your
service.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Dole.
Let me state that all of your statements have been included
in the record. You may feel free to summarize. In fact, I would
encourage you to summarize. At this point I would like to
recognize General Scales.
General Scales.
STATEMENT OF MG ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., USA (RET.), PRESIDENT,
COLGEN, INC.
General Scales. Thank you, Senator Reed, and thank you,
Senator Dole. I will take the hint and be uncharacteristically
brief.
I think we can all agree that most of our shortcomings in
recent wars have been human and not technological, and the list
is long: cultural awareness, the ability to influence and shape
opinions, indeed soldier conduct, information operations--the
list goes on. What we have learned I guess, Senator, is that
wars today are won as much by creating alliances and leveraging
nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust,
affecting opinions, and managing perceptions.
All of these demand an exceptional ability to understand
people, their culture, and their motivations. My concern is
that today's military has become so overstretched that it might
become too busy to learn, in a time when the value of learning
has never been greater for our military.
You asked me last week, Senator, to expand on this subject
a little bit, approaching it from a strategic direction, and I
would like to do that because I believe the problem is larger
than merely learning language. I believe it is going to require
a real transformation in how the DOD views war, that we move
from a technocentric view of warfare to a culture-centric view
of warfare, and that the human behavior, cognitive, and
cultural aspects of warfare become as much a part of our
lexicon, our research and development, training and education,
as learning how to operate the machines is today.
So let me go down these very quickly. Cultural awareness.
Language is important, but it is not the only important
component to cultural awareness. Soldiers have to be able to
move comfortably among alien cultures to establish trust and
cement relationships with others. The point, Senator, I'd like
to make is not all will be fit for this kind of work. Some
soldiers and marines remain committed to fight in any battle,
and yet there are others, Senator, that I have seen in my many
years that seek to have this cultural sense, this innate
ability to sublimate ego, to communicate with alien cultures,
even those who do not even speak the language, who have these
special skills. We are seeing that play out every day in Iraq
and in Afghanistan.
So language is important, but a culturally-aware military
cannot achieve its goals merely by offering courses.
The other point I would make to you, Senator, is that
militaries are by their nature oriented on merit. Those things
which reward a soldier, a soldier will pay attention to. So I
recommend that we reward those, find means to reward those who
exhibit these special cultural skills. I do not believe an
officer should be commissioned who has not had at least 2 years
of language and cultural training. I do not believe any officer
should be promoted to the grade of colonel unless he or she can
demonstrate a working knowledge of a language.
One of the most important tasks that we face in the future
is the ability to build alien armies and alliances. It is
interesting because in the military we have always been very
good at this. We have a remarkable, since the end of World War
II, track record for building armies in places like Korea,
Greece, Vietnam, El Salvador, and now Iraq.
But back on my point about merit, Senator, we do not reward
those who have performed brilliantly as advisers and trainers
and I think this must change. I think officers who have proven
to be particularly effective as advisers should be promoted
very early and selected for advance civil schooling to build on
those skills that they have demonstrated while training foreign
armies. I think a certain number of general officer billets
must be reserved for them as they begin to progress through the
ranks.
I believe that we must cultivate, amplify, research, and
inculcate these skills in military and civilian educational
institutions, perhaps institutions that are reserved
specifically for that purpose.
The other issue deals with perception-shaping. Perception-
shaping is an art, not a science, and in many ways the enemy
does this better than we do. I believe that these are special
skills--the ability to affect will and shape perceptions. I
believe this is a task that is too big for the DOD. I believe
it must be a national effort, superintended by distinguished
academics and practitioners of the human, not the technological
sciences.
One of the things we are learning is that, whereas when I
was a lieutenant we expected colonels and generals to perform
these tasks, what we are learning in Iraq and Afghanistan is we
expect privates and corporals to be culturally aware. So I
believe that we have to do a better job of inculcating
knowledge and wisdom and teaching young men and women how to
exhibit the indirect forms of leadership that are so important
in performing these tasks.
The young man or woman walking point in a place like
Baghdad needs to have this special training, not just in the
language, but in the ability to communicate and understand
alien cultures. I believe psychological and physiological
tuning is important for these functions. Again, some people can
do them, some cannot. With only 16 weeks of basic training, we
have to put the instruments in place, the scientific
instruments in place, to find those and carefully select them
who have these innate human, rather than technological skills.
I think we have to develop not just soldiers, but small
units, that are good at this. The Marines have a great
reputation for establishing these small civic action teams in
places like Iraq, and also in Vietnam. So we have to be able to
train small units to work in villages for prolonged periods of
time, to commune with the people and be effective at that.
I think leadership and decisionmaking have to be addressed.
It is not just being able to operate your weapon. It is also
the ability to make key decisions, life-changing decisions,
when you see a person standing on the end of a street corner to
differentiate between an insurgent and a young Iraqi just out
walking on the street.
I believe there is a higher element involved as well,
Senator, and that is this idea of intuitive battle command. One
of the mistakes, one of the shortcomings in this war, has been
a rush to a kinetic solution. This is a problem in the chain of
command, in the planning sequences, and in battle command. So I
think issues like gut feel and intuition should replace the
hierarchical and the old linear processes that you and I--that
we have been operating under.
I think the ability to share information and to command by
discourse rather than by formal orders are skills that we have
to learn. I believe that we ought to build into our military
not just the ability to go to the National Training Center and
learn how to use our weapons at the brigade and battalion
level; I believe that we ought to deal with the individual and
the unit level as well, that we ought to have simulators that
teach small unit leaders and soldiers how to make quick, split
moment, split second decisions, that test the sort of intuitive
right stuff, this gut feel ability to intuit the person's
intentions. All these are very human, not technological skills.
Let me end by a brief recommendation. In fact, as you and
others have said, so much of the human, cultural, and cognitive
skills are scattered, not only throughout the DOD but
throughout the government.
I really believe that we need an agency, a sort of social
science corollary to something like the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency (DARPA), that can bring together not
just the language part of cultural awareness, but the social,
scientific, and the cognitive and behavioral aspects of it as
well. I believe we need to bring together the best and the
brightest from academia, the military and science institutions,
corporations, Army Special Forces and Marine operating forces
together. I think they ought to have the authority to conduct
field experiments and studies in human performance using
operational forces. I believe that they need to provide
recommendations regarding selection, promotion, and schooling
policies to the Secretary of Defense.
Just as the Defense Science Board holds annual summer
studies to look at the physical sciences, I think this
organization ought to hold similar studies to look across the
board at the human, cultural, and cognitive sciences to be
applied to the art of war.
I think they ought to have the same budgeting authority,
directly from Congress, and would submit an annual assessment
to Congress on the human, cultural, and cognitive aspects of
the Services. I believe they ought to have a broad charter, and
I believe that they ought to be able to establish criteria for
language training, and I believe they ought to have an
influence on how young officers are educated in alien cultures,
language, and the art and science of war. I think this ought to
be directed in nature, in the sense that they should be
responsible for building this sort of new generation of
officers that have these special human, cultural, and cognitive
skills.
Finally, I believe they ought to affiliate with a major
university with a solid reputation in the human and the social
sciences.
Senator, thank you so much for the opportunity to talk to
you.
[The prepared statement of General Scales follows:]
Prepared Statement by MG Robert H Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.)
Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that successful
prosecution of the ``Long War'' is far more dependent on an intimate
knowledge of the enemy's motivation, intent, will, tactical method and
cultural environment than the deployment of smart bombs, unmanned
aircraft and expansive bandwidth. Success rests with the ability of
leaders to think and adapt faster than the enemy and for soldiers to
thrive in an environment of uncertainty, ambiguity and unfamiliar
cultural circumstances. Yet the military still remains wedded to the
premise that success in war is best achieved by creating an
overwhelming technological advantage. Our fixation on technology--our
very technological success--has led us to believe that the soldier is a
system and the enemy is a target. Soldiers are now viewed, especially
by this U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), as an ``overhead expense,''
not a source of investment.
Viewing war too much as a contest of technologies, we have become
impatient and detached from those forms of war that do not fit our
paradigms. Techno-centric solutions are in our own cultural DNA. Thus
it is no wonder that transformation has been interpreted exclusively as
a technological challenge. So far we have spent billions to gain a few
additional meters of precision, knots of speed or bits of bandwidth.
Now we must commit resources to improve how the military thinks and
acts in an effort to create a parallel transformational universe based
on cognition and cultural awareness.
Reflective senior officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan have
concluded that great advantage can be achieved by out thinking rather
than out equipping the enemy. They are telling us that wars are won as
much by creating alliances, leveraging non military advantages, reading
intentions, building trust, converting opinions and managing
perceptions, all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand
people, their culture and their motivation. Yet these same commanders
lament that they are obliged to subordinate learning about war to the
practical and more pressing demands of routine day-to-day operations.
In a word, today's military has become so overstretched that it may
become too busy to learn at a time when the value of learning has never
been greater.
What follows is a partial list of initiatives that collectively
will cost little but if taken together will increase American combat
proficiency far out of proportion to its cost. Implementing only a few
of these initiatives will go a long way to creating an environment
conducive to fighting an enemy in this emerging era of culture-centric
warfare.
CULTURAL AWARENESS
In Iraq, a curtain of cultural ignorance continues to separate the
good intentions of the American soldier from Iraqis of good will.
Inability to speak the language and insensitive conduct become real
combat vulnerabilities that the enemy has exploited to his advantage.
The military of the future must be able to go to war with enough
cultural knowledge to thrive in an alien environment. Empathy will
become a weapon. Soldiers must gain the ability to move comfortably
among alien cultures, to establish trust and cement relationships that
can be exploited in battle. Not all are fit for this kind of work. Some
will remain committed to fighting the kinetic battle. But others will
come to the task with intuitive cultural court sense, an innate ability
to connect with other cultures. These soldiers must be identified and
nurtured just as surely as the Army selects out those with innate
operational court sense.
Social science can help select soldiers very early who possess
social and cultural intelligence. Likewise, scientific psychology can
assist in designing and running cultural immersion institutions that
will hasten the development of culturally adept soldiers and
intelligence agents. Cultural psychology can teach us to better
understand both common elements of human culture and how they differ.
An understanding of these commonalities and differences can help gain
local allies, fracture enemy subgroups, avoid conflicts among allies,
promote beneficial alliances, and undermine enemy alliances.
A culturally aware military cannot be achieved just by offering
language courses. Language ability is a means to an end to be sure. But
the goal of a program designed to enhance cultural awareness must focus
on identifying and rewarding those who exhibit these special cultural
skills. No officer should be commissioned who has not had at least 2
years of language training. No officer should be promoted to colonel
unless he or she can demonstrate a working knowledge of language spoken
by peoples who inhabit threatened regions of the world. The fitness or
efficiency reports of the services must be amended to include an
assessment of these special talents.
BUILDING ALIEN ARMIES AND ALLIANCES
The Long War will be manpower-intensive. The U.S. cannot hope to
field enough soldiers to be effective wherever the enemy appears.
Effective surrogates are needed to help us fight our wars. The Army has
a long tradition of creating effective indigenous armies in such remote
places as Greece, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, and now Iraq. But almost
without exception, the unique skills required to perform this complex
task have never been valued, and those who practice them are rarely
rewarded. Today's soldiers would prefer to be recognized as operators
rather than advisers. This must change. If our strategic success on a
future battlefield will depend on our ability to create armies from
whole cloth--or, as in Iraq, to remove an army that has been part of
the problem and make it a part of the solution--then we must select,
promote and put into positions of authority those who know how to build
armies. Officers who have proven to be particularly effective as
advisors in Iraq should be promoted very early and selected for
advanced civil schooling. When these officers advance to senior rank a
specific number of general officer billets must be reserved for them.
We must cultivate, amplify, research and inculcate these skills in
military and civilian educational institutions reserved specifically
for that purpose.
PERCEPTION SHAPING AS ART, NOT SCIENCE
People in many regions of the world hate us. They have been led to
these beliefs by an enemy whose perception-shaping effort is as
brilliant as it is diabolical. If the center of gravity in the Long War
is the perception of the people, then perhaps we should learn how the
enemy manipulates the people. Information technology will be of little
use in this effort. Damage is only amplified when inappropriate,
culturally insensitive or false messages are sent over the most
sophisticated information networks. Recent advances in the social
psychology of leadership and persuasion can help train soldiers to win
acceptance of local populations and obtain better intelligence from
locals. Recent cognitive behavioral therapy has documented remarkably
effective techniques for countering fear and abiding hatred such as we
see in the Middle East. Our challenge is to create a human science
intended specifically for shaping opinions, particularly among alien
peoples. This task is too big for a single service or event for the
DOD. It must be a national effort superintended by distinguished
academics and practitioners in the human sciences who understand such
things, rather than by policymakers who have proven in Iraq that they
do not.
INCULCATE KNOWLEDGE AND TEACH WISDOM
In Iraq and Afghanistan, junior soldiers and marines today are
asked to make decisions that in previous wars were reserved for far
more senior officers. A corporal standing guard in Baghdad or Fallujah
can commit an act that might well affect the strategic outcome of an
entire campaign. Yet the intellectual preparation of these very junior
leaders is no more advanced today than it was during World War II.
However, the native creativity, innovativeness and initiative exhibited
by these young men and women belie their woeful lack of intellectual
preparation.
Learning to deal with the human and cultural complexities of this
era of war will take time. Leaders, intelligence officers, and soldiers
must be given the time to immerse themselves in alien cultures and
reflect on their profession. Yet in our haste to put more soldiers and
Marines in the field, we risk breaking the intellectual institutions
that create opportunities to learn. Today, we are contracting out our
need for wisdom by hiring civilians to teach in military schools and
colleges. Educational science has long understood that reading and
listening are the least effective means for retaining or increasing
knowledge. Teaching is at least an order of magnitude more effective,
while researching and writing are far better still. Thus the Services
must change assignment and promotion policies to make learning and
teaching professionally rewarding.
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE
The value of tactical intelligence--knowledge of the enemy's
actions or intentions sufficiently precise and timely to kill him--has
been demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. Killing power is of no use
unless a soldier on patrol knows who to kill. We should take away from
our combat experience a commitment to leverage human sciences to make
the tactical view of the enemy clearer and more certain, to be able to
differentiate between the innocents and the enemy by reading actions to
discern intentions.
The essential tools necessary to make a soldier a superb
intelligence gatherer must be imbedded in his brain rather than placed
in his rucksack. He must be taught to perceive his surroundings in such
a way that he can make immediate intuitive decisions about the
intentions of those about him. His commanders must be taught to see the
battlefield through the eyes of his soldiers. He must make decisions
based on the gut feel and developed intuition that come from an
intelligence gatherer's ability to see what others cannot. There is a
growing science of intuition and gut feeling, and these capabilities
might be enhanced by this new capability and its allied technology.
Machines and processes might make intelligence easier to parse and
read. But knowing the enemy better than he knows us is inherently a
psycho-cultural rather than a technological, organizational, or
procedural challenge.
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL TUNING
Life sciences offer promise that older, more mature soldiers will
be able to endure the physical stresses of close combat for longer
periods. This is important because experience strongly supports the
conclusion that older men make better close-combat soldiers. Scientific
research also suggests that social intelligence and diplomatic skills
increase with age. Older soldiers are more stable in crisis situations,
are less likely to be killed or wounded and are far more effective in
performing the essential tasks that attend to close-in killing.
Experience within special operations units also suggests that more
mature soldiers are better suited for fighting in complex human
environments. Science can help determine when soldiers are at their
cognitive peak. Psychological instruments are available today to
increase endurance and sustained attention on the battlefield. Today,
conditioning science has succeeded in keeping professional athletes
competitive much longer than even a decade ago. These methods should be
adapted to prepare ground soldiers as well for the physical and
psychological stresses of close combat.
DEVELOP HIGH PERFORMING SOLDIERS AND SMALL UNITS
Close combat has always been a personal and intimate experience.
Close combat is the only skill that cannot be bought off the street or
contracted out. In all of our world wars, success of campaigns has been
threatened by a shortage of first rate, professional infantrymen.
Inevitably, a protracted campaign drains the supply of intimate
killers. Many infantrymen are sent into close combat with about 4
months' preparation. What little social science the research and
development community has devote to understanding the human component
in war has not been spent on close-combat soldiers. We know far more
about pilot and astronaut behavior than we do about those who in the
next world war will do most of the killing and dying, the close-combat
soldiers. If dead soldiers constitute our greatest weakness in war,
then we should, as a matter of national importance, devote resources to
making them better.
The enemy has drawn us unwillingly into fighting him at the
tactical level of war where the importance of technology diminishes in
proportion to the value of intangibles. Thus, winning the Long War will
require greater attention to the tactical fight. Technology will play a
part, to be sure. Our small units, squads, and platoons should be
equipped with only the best vehicles, small arms, sensors, radios, and
self-protection. But more important to victory will be human
influencers such as the selection, bonding, and psychological and
physical preparation of tactical units.
As the battlefield expands and becomes more uncertain and lethal,
it also becomes lonelier and enormously frightening for those obliged
to fight close. Most recent American campaigns have been fought in
unfamiliar and horrifically desolate terrain and weather. Modern social
science offers some promising solutions to this problem. Recently, we
have learned that soldiers can now be better tuned psychologically to
endure the stresses of close combat. Tests, assessments, role-playing
exercises, and careful vetting will reduce the percentage of soldiers
who suffer from stress disorders after coming off the line.
Cognitive sciences can be leveraged to enhance small-unit training
in many ways, from speeding the acquisition and enhancing the retention
of foreign languages to training soldiers in command decisionmaking
simulators to sharpen the ability to make decisions in complex tactical
situations. Cognitive sciences can be employed in the creation of
highly efficient and flexible training programs that can respond to the
ever-changing problems. Models of human cognition can also be used to
diagnose performance failures during simulated exercises. These
measures can assist in training soldiers to attend to hidden variables
and to properly weigh and filter the many factors that determine
optimal performance in complex decisionmaking tasks.
But the social sciences can accelerate the process for building
great small units only so much. The one ingredient necessary for
creating a closely bonded unit is time. The aging of a good unit, like
that of a good wine, cannot be hurried. Platoons need at least a year
to develop full body and character. Because the pipeline will be so
long and the probability of death so great, the ground services must
create many more close-combat units than conventional logic would
demand. The lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan is clear: In future wars
we can never have too many close-combat units. The performance of small
ground units will be so critical to success on the World War IV
battlefield that we should replace Cold War methods of mass producing
small units and treat them more like professional sports teams with
highly paid coaching and dedicated practice with the highest quality
equipment and assessment methods.
LEADERSHIP AND DECISIONMAKING
The Long War will demand intellectually ambidextrous leaders who
are capable of facing a conventional enemy one moment, then shifting to
an irregular threat the next moment before transitioning to the task of
providing humanitarian solace to the innocent. All of these missions
may have to be performed by the same commander simultaneously.
Developing leaders with such a varied menu of skills takes time.
There are precedents for developing these skills. In Vietnam, the
air services developed ``Top Gun'' and ``Red Flag'' exercises as a
means of improving the flying skills of new pilots bloodlessly before
they faced a real and skilled opponent. Recent advances in the science
of intuitive decisionmaking will give the ground services a similar
ability to improve the close-combat decisionmaking skills of young
leaders. Senior commanders will be able to use these tools to select
those leaders with the intuitive right stuff. Over time, leaders must
be given the tools to measure and assess improvements in their ability
to make the right decisions in ever more complex and demanding combat
situations. They should also have access to coaches and mentors who
will pass on newly learned experiences with an exceptional degree of
accountability and scientific precision.
INTUITIVE BATTLE COMMAND
The Army and Marine Corps learned in Afghanistan and Iraq that
operational planning systems inherited from the Cold War would no
longer work against an elusive and adaptive enemy. They were forced to
improvise a new method of campaign planning that emphasized the human
component in war. Gut feel and intuition replaced hierarchical, linear
processes. They learned to command by discourse rather than formal
orders. Information-sharing became ubiquitous, with even the most
junior leaders able to communicate in real time with each other and
with their seniors.
Dedicated soldier networks have fundamentally altered the
relationship between leaders and led and have changed forever how the
Army and Marine Corps command soldiers in battle.
Developing new and effective command-and-control technologies,
doctrine and procedures will do no good unless we educate leaders to
exploit these opportunities fully. We have only begun to leverage the
power of the learning sciences to battle command. Teaching commanders
how to think and intuit rather than what to think will allow them to
anticipate how the enemy will act. Convincing commanders to leave Cold
War-era decisionmaking processes in favor of nonlinear intuitive
processes will accelerate the pace and tempo of battle. The promise is
enormous. But we will only achieve the full potential of this promise
if we devote the resources to the research and education necessary to
make it happen.
CULTURAL AND COGNITIVE TRANSFORMATION
The relationship between the military and human and behavioral
scientists has, to date, been one of antipathy and neglect. Academics
and behavioral practitioners have rarely violated the turf of the
soldier. Many are turned off by the prospects of relating their
professions to war. But most take the war against terrorism seriously.
If the Army and Marine Corps give them the opportunity, they will
gladly turn the best of their sciences to the future defense of our
Nation.
We are in a race, and the times demand change. The Long War can
only be won by harnessing the social and human sciences as the
essential amplifiers of military performance, just as the physical
sciences were the amplifiers of past world wars. Such a shift in how
the defense community approaches war will require a fundamental shift
in military culture.
There is an old saying that the Navy and the Air Force man the
equipment and the Army and Marine Corps equip the man. Surely those
services that focus on the man rather than the machine should receive a
disproportionate share of future defense budgets. Unfortunately, the
ground services are far too committed and engaged in fighting this war
to prepare adequately for the next. They need help. We can open a new
cognitive and cultural transformational front by establishing a Human,
Cultural and Cognitive Agency that will:
Become a social science corollary and be similar in
structure and purpose to The Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA).
Be headed by a person credentialed and esteemed in the
human, cultural, and cognitive scientific communities.
Bring together the best and brightest from academia,
the military human science institutions, corporations and the
Army, Special Forces and Marine Corps operational forces.
Have authority to conduct field experiments and
studies in human performance using operational forces.
Provide recommendations regarding selection,
promotion, and schooling to Secretary of Defense.
Hold an annual summer study similar to the Defense
Science Board in which members from corporations, the Services,
and academia would meet to offer advice to the Secretary of
Defense on issues related to the human sciences.
Have distinct budgeting authorities directly from
Congress and would submit an annual assessment to Congress on
the human, cultural and cognitive performance of the services,
particularly the ground services.
Be given a broad charter that would include: cultural
awareness training and education; perception and opinion
shaping; in extremis decisionmaking in war; small unit and
individual performance; intelligence analyst training and
education; intuitive battle command; individual combat
performance assessment and measurement; psychological tuning
and hardening; language science, among many other subjects and
initiatives.
Establish criteria for, fund and manage a program of
advanced civil schooling in cultural awareness and the art of
war for officers in the ground services. Officers selected for
cultural and cognitive degrees would come principally from the
operational forces and upon completion of study would be
utilized principally in command and staff billets in Marine and
Army fighting units. Officers completing these degrees would
gain full joint credentialing through the grade of colonel.
Affiliate and locate with a major university with a
solid reputation in human and social science.
We cannot expect the scientific and bureaucratic institutions that
won two world wars and the Cold War by exploiting the physical sciences
to easily embrace a social and human sciences approach to the same
challenges. But the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly prove that a
human approach to future wars is now our most glaring shortcoming and
greatest challenge. Transformation in the human dimension will take
resources and time. The shortest commodity is time. We must begin
immediately to put in place the structures that will optimize what
little time we have available.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General, for your always
thoughtful and important remarks. Thank you very much, sir.
Secretary McGinn?
STATEMENT OF HON. GAIL H. McGINN, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
PLANS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mrs. McGinn. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to
appear today to discuss the DOD's efforts to improve our
capability in foreign language and regional expertise. The
subcommittee's interest in this topic is very much appreciated.
My colleague, Dr. Van Tilborg, will cover matters relating to
technology, so I will discuss the human aspect of the defense
language program.
We welcome the advances that technology brings us, but we
do not think that technology will overcome the need for people
with knowledge of languages, regions, and cultures. For the
past 5 years we have been actively engaged in coming to
understand our foreign language needs and have been working to
address those needs.
The DOD has always required people to be interactive in
foreign languages, but today's needs are very different from
those of the Cold War. At that time language needs were
predictable and we focused on languages like Russian and
German. Today's emphasis on irregular warfare, building
partnerships with foreign countries, development of capability
and stability operations, not to mention the effort of the long
war, bring the need for foreign language proficiency to the
fore, and not just foreign language proficiency, but regional
and cultural expertise as well.
We must be able to react quickly and globally and provide
our forces with the capabilities they need. Indeed, these
things must become core competencies of the force.
As noted in my written statement, we are actively pursuing
three courses of action to meet our competency needs in foreign
language and regional expertise. First, we are moving to find,
build, and manage a foundational corps of servicemembers with
language ability. We are assessing every servicemember to
ascertain language skills. In so doing, we have discovered a
wealth of languages that we did not know we had in the force,
including indigenous languages of Africa and significant
numbers of Chinese speakers.
We have reoriented and upgraded the training we offer at
Defense Language Institute (DLI)-Foreign Language Center to
ensure that we are teaching the right languages to the right
proficiency levels. Indeed, we have dramatically increased
their funding so they can increase the proficiency levels of
the students they graduate there to meet today's needs.
We have increased the language focus of our military
academies and are beginning to move it into Reserve Officer
Training Center (ROTC). We are providing language and cultural
training to deploying forces. The goal is to have on hand a
robust foundation that can deploy quickly, with the right
clearances, the right proficiency, and the right languages.
Second, since we cannot have a standby force of sufficient
size to handle all the language needs that might occur, we are
improving our ability to surge to support operational
requirements. The Army as our executive agent manages a
contract to supply linguists to deployed forces.
We also use reach-back capabilities for translation and we
are exploring these capabilities for interpretation as well. In
the future, we will also be relying on our language corps, a
corps of Americans who have agreed to come and help with their
language skills when called. We have just awarded a contract to
begin building this corps, which is also included in the
President's NSLI.
Third, we need to build a cadre of individuals with high
levels of language proficiency, who are better able to function
in today's environment and interact with our foreign partners.
We are especially proud of the work the military
departments have done to expand our foreign area officer
program. The foreign area officers are our uniformed experts
who possess a combination of strategic focus, regional
expertise, cultural awareness, and high level foreign language
proficiency. We currently have 1,600 foreign area officers
active or in training, principally from the Army and the Marine
Corps. The Air Force and the Navy are building this capability
and will add significant numbers to our overall count in the
years to come. Together the Services will bring on 995 new
foreign area service officers by 2012.
In addition, I would like to highlight our DLI-Foreign
Language Center. That is the centerpiece of our foreign
language program. The DLI teaches basic language instruction to
4,000 servicemembers a year. It used to be focused on providing
training for cryptolinguists for the Intelligence Community,
but has evolved in recent years to provide strong support for
our warfighters by deploying mobile training teams to conduct
pre-deployment training and providing training materials for
use by deploying forces.
Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not mention that
increasing foreign language capability is not just a DOD issue,
it is a national issue as well. As a Nation we have not
enthusiastically accepted the value of foreign language as an
important competency for Americans to possess. At the DLI, we
bring in high school graduates who may never have spoken a
foreign language and teach them to be fairly proficient in
Arabic in 63 weeks. We could do much better if they came to us
already having studied any language.
As Senator Akaka stated, we have joined with the Department
of Education, the Department of State, and the Director of
National Intelligence in the implementation of the NSLI for
strategic languages in America. We view this as a high priority
initiative in support of our overall program and intend to
continue our efforts to highlight the importance of knowing
other languages and cultures, not just because it matters to
us, but frankly because it matters to our country in the global
economy.
We have done a lot, but much remains to be done. We need to
sustain momentum and build on past progress. We are very much
appreciative of your interest and support.
That concludes my statement.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. McGinn follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Gail H. McGinn
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to speak on this very important topic.
Today, the Department of Defense (DOD) is engaged in two very
important efforts. We are transforming how the DOD values, employs, and
deploys foreign language capability and regional expertise. During the
planning phase, we identified the need for a deeper national language
talent pool from which we can recruit and exploit during times of
surge. In an effort to respond to the growing need for language and
regional expertise, we are supporting the National Security Language
Initiative (NSLI), launched by President Bush in January 2006.
Foreign language and regional expertise, which includes cultural
awareness, are emerging as key competencies for our 21st century Total
Force. The Active-Duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilian
personnel, along with our supporting contract personnel, understand
that these essential skills are needed for mission accomplishment. We
have overcome many obstacles and made good progress, and the
transformation that has occurred is apparent across the entire DOD, but
there is still work to be done.
Language skills are not easily acquired and, once acquired, are not
universally applicable to all regions within a country or situation.
Regional expertise requires continuous learning to stay current in an
ever-changing world environment. As judicious planners and good
stewards, we constantly assess the relevance of what we are doing today
with what we might be called to do in the future.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE
Current military operations demand different skills than those that
were mastered to win the Cold War. Today's operations increasingly
require our forces to operate with coalition and alliance partners and
interact with foreign populations, in a variety of regions, with
diverse languages and cultures. Our enemies blend in with the local
population, making identification and achieving victory more difficult.
To be effective in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction
operations, as well as other counterinsurgency measures and to prevail
in the long war, we must be able to understand different cultures and
communicate effectively in order to gain the support of the local
people.
We have responded to this shifting paradigm with a shift in
strategy. Operational lessons learned and studies stressed the need for
the DOD to create and maintain language capabilities within the force
and have the ability to surge on demand to meet unexpected challenges.
The Strategic Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2006 through 2011
directed development of a comprehensive roadmap to achieve the full
range of language capabilities necessary to carry out national
strategy. The result was the 2005 DOD Language Transformation Roadmap
(DLTR) that continues to be the pivotal document for our
accomplishments today.
Leadership has continued to reinforce the importance of foreign
language and regional expertise within the 21st century Total Force.
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provides approximately $430
million through the Future Years Defense Program, with $66.7 million in
the fiscal year 2008 President's budget request for initiatives to
strengthen and expand our Defense Language Program. These initiatives
span across technology, training, education, and recruitment and
include the Army Heritage Speaker (09L) Program, Service Academy
Language Training Programs, Foreign Language Proficiency Pay, Reserve
Officer Training Center (ROTC) Language Training Grants, Accession
Screening Program, the Language Corps, National Security Education
Program (NSEP), and the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language
Center (DLIFLC).
The Strategic Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2008 through 2013
outlines the national commitment to developing the best mix of
capabilities within the Total Force and sets forth a series of roadmaps
that support the goals of the DLTR.
MANAGING CHANGE
The DLTR, signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on February 14,
2005, is our management guide for building language skills and regional
proficiency into today's force. The roadmap provides broad goals that
will ensure a strong foundation in language, regional and cultural
expertise, a capacity to surge to meet unanticipated demands, and a
cadre of language professionals.
To ensure oversight, execution, and direction for this
transformation, the Deputy Secretary assigned the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness responsibility for the Defense
Language Program. The Deputy Secretary then directed the appointment of
Senior Language Authorities in the military departments, the defense
and joint staffs, defense agencies, and defense field activities at the
Senior Executive Service, and general and flag officer ranks to ensure
senior-level involvement and oversight. We established the Defense
Language Steering Committee, consisting of the Senior Language
Authorities, to act as an advisory board and guide the implementation
of the roadmap. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness appointed me as the DOD Senior Language Authority and Chair
of the Defense Language Steering Committee. We revised the DOD
Directive for the Defense Language Program and established the Defense
Language Office to ensure oversight and execution of the DLTR and to
institutionalize the DOD's commitment to these critical competencies.
CREATE FOUNDATIONAL EXPERTISE: BUILDING COMPETENCIES FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY TOTAL FORCE
A critical initiative of the DLTR involved determining what
capabilities and resources were needed. The combatant commands,
military Services, defense agencies, and defense field activities began
identifying the language and regional expertise requirements necessary
to support their operational and contingency planning and day-to-day
requirements.
The military Services and Joint Staff initiated reviews of all
relevant doctrine, policies, and planning guidance to ensure that they
incorporated language and regional expertise to include cultural
awareness. These documents help us outline the approach for developing
and, more importantly, employing these warfighting and peacekeeping
competencies.
There had been no accurate assessment of what languages and
proficiency levels existed within the total force. The DOD is now
conducting a self-assessment of in-house language capability and we
have learned that we have a significant capability not apparent to our
management systems. Even though our assessment is not yet complete, as
of the beginning of the current fiscal year, the DOD had 141,887
Active-Duty component; 77,319 Reserve component; and 38,246 civilian
members of the Total Force who reported having foreign language skills.
We now have policies in place so that individuals are routinely
screened as part of the military accession and civilian hiring process.
In order to encourage servicemembers to identify, improve, and
sustain language capability, we implemented a revised Foreign Language
Proficiency Pay (FLPP) policy, and, with the support of Congress,
increased the proficiency bonus from $300 maximum per month, up to
$1,000 maximum per month for uniformed members. We are currently
finalizing the DOD Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB) policy to
align payment for Reserve and Active-Duty components by increasing
Reserve proficiency pay ceiling from $6,000 to $12,000, consistent with
section 639 of Public Law 108-163, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006. DOD policy for civilians assigned to non-
intelligence positions allows FLPP of up to 5 percent of an employee's
salary when duties require proficiency in a foreign language identified
as necessary to meet national security concerns and the employee is
certified as proficient in that language. The use of FLPP for civilians
is also available within the Intelligence community and the National
Security Personnel System (NSPS). Intelligence career field personnel
and civilian personnel covered by NSPS may receive up to $500 per pay
period provided the language proficiency facilitates performance of
intelligence duties or is deemed necessary for national security
interest.
Building A ``Learning'' Organization To Strengthen The Foundation
Of the many occupational skills taught to our personnel, language
and regional expertise are among the more difficult to address in a
systematic manner. Learning a foreign language is not easy and
proficiency deteriorates, if not maintained. The strategic languages we
seek, such as Arabic, are some of the most difficult and take a long
time to develop.
Regional expertise involves understanding complex issues in areas
such as political, military/security, economic, sociological to include
history and religion, scientific/technical, the geographic terrain,
and, most importantly the cultural norms of a region. It takes time and
continuous study to ensure current and relevant knowledge as countries
and regions change over time. We must fully understand how to identify
and catalog our regional expertise capability as we have with language.
Regardless, of the challenge, we do know that every warfighter needs
fundamental language skills and cultural awareness with a cadre of
experts needing higher levels of proficiency, depending on the jobs and
missions being performed.
In addition, there are risks associated with selecting the
languages and regions that should be taught or emphasized. Unlike other
primary job skills, language and regional expertise do not necessarily
transfer from one theater of operation to another. It is impossible to
foresee with certainty where we will operate in deployment or
contingency operations in the future and we must cultivate the
capability of responding quickly to the unexpected, such as we did when
Operation Enduring Freedom required a rapid development of curriculum
in Dari and Pashto.
To acquire and sustain these capabilities, the DOD must commit to
building and sustaining a ``learning organization'' that offers
mission-focused instruction to all personnel at the appropriate times,
with the appropriate delivery method such as deploying training
technology, to support our people in maintaining and enhancing these
hard won skills. This learning begins even before potential recruits
join the Total Force.
Pre-Accession Language Training
Pre-accession language training focuses the DOD's effort on
building language skills in future officers prior to commissioning. The
three Service Academies enhanced their foreign language study programs
to develop pre-accession language and cultural knowledge. They expanded
study abroad, summer immersion and foreign academy exchange
opportunities; and added instructor staff for strategic languages. The
United States Military Academy and the United States Air Force Academy
now require all cadets to complete two semesters of language study; and
the United States Naval Academy requires its non-technical degree-
seeking midshipmen to take four semesters of language study. Language
study programs have regional information such as socio and geo-
political considerations and key aspects of culture embedded in the
course of study. The United States Military Academy and the United
States Air Force Academy also established two new language majors of
strategic interest, specifically in Arabic and Chinese. The United
States Naval Academy, for the first time in history, will offer
midshipmen the opportunity to major in a foreign language, including
Arabic and Chinese beginning with the class of 2010. In fiscal year
2007, $25.57 million was directed to the Service Academies to develop
and implement their language programs, including curricular development
and hiring of staff and faculty to teach more strategic languages.
President's budget request for fiscal year 2008 is for $16.95 million.
The Academies are aggressively pursuing increased opportunities for
their cadets and midshipmen to study abroad to reinforce both their
acquired language and culture knowledge, and currently have programs
available in 40 countries. Four-week summer language immersion programs
are offered as well as semester exchanges with foreign military
academies. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
allows the Academies to expand these exchanges from 24 exchanges to 100
exchanges per academy per year, and this congressional support is
greatly appreciated.
ROTC cadets and midshipmen also have expanded opportunities to
learn a foreign language. The Air Force and Navy have ROTC students
accompany their academy counterparts during familiarization and
orientation travel opportunities. Of the 1,321 colleges and
universities with ROTC programs, 1,148 offer languages as noted on this
chart. Significantly, many of the languages we need for current
operations are not widely offered at this time.
The DOD has just awarded four grants to colleges and universities
with ROTC programs. This is a pilot program started this year to
provide grants to select colleges and universities with established
ROTC programs to expand opportunities for ROTC cadets and midshipmen to
study languages and cultures critical to national security. Increasing
the number of less commonly taught languages in college curricula
remains a challenge in which we are actively engaged.
Primary Skills Language Training
There are dramatic changes in how the DOD is training members who
require language skills to perform their primary jobs. The DLIFLC's
budget climbed from $77 million in fiscal year 2001 to $203 million in
fiscal year 2007 to better respond to these changes. The Institute has
an enrollment of 4000 students a year. Since the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, we have redirected training toward the strategic
languages, such as Arabic, Chinese and Persian Farsi. One of the major
programs implemented in fiscal year 2006 by DLIFLC is the Proficiency
Enhancement Program (PEP). PEP is designed to graduate students at
increased proficiency levels. Changes include reducing the student-to-
instructor ratio, increasing the number of classrooms, creating
improved expanded curricula, and expanding overseas training. Cultural
awareness has also been added to every language course.
A critical component of our effort to improve the language
capability is to validate and deliver tools for measuring language
proficiency. We have taken steps to strengthen our Defense Language
Testing System by updating test content and delivery. The Services and
Defense Agencies are taking the same test, thus we are able to use the
test scores to calculate a Language Readiness Index and determine the
gaps. We can then target our recruiting, training, and other
interventions to reduce these gaps. Delivering these tests over the Web
is greatly increasing the availability and accessibility of these tests
to Defense military and civilian language professionals worldwide, and
the use of advanced technology to store and track proficiency test
scores is providing us with the capability to use this information for
national security planning. Currently we have delivered over 11,000
web-delivered tests to date.
Supporting Deploying Forces
The DOD recognizes that not all personnel will be able or required
to demonstrate intermediate or advanced level language skills and
regional expertise; as technology can help meet some of these demands.
As directed in the DLTR, and in my role as the DOD Senior Language
Authority, I am working with the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to establish a
coherent, prioritized, and coordinated DOD multi-language technology
research, development, and acquisition policy and program. This
technology, such as machine translation tools, will aid in bridging the
gaps when the desired capability is not available. However, regardless
of how advanced the technology, it cannot replace the need for
servicemembers to personally acquire the language skills and cultural
knowledge to effectively interact with the local people and leaders.
Department policy, therefore, requires that military units deploying
into, or in transit through foreign territories shall be equipped, to
the greatest extent practicable, with an appropriate capability to
communicate in the languages of the territories of deployment or
transit and to operate with an appropriate knowledge of the cultural
norms.
The Services have taken great efforts to prepare members to achieve
optimum outcomes by understanding the regions in which they deploy and
being culturally aware. All the Services have incorporated regional and
cultural information within Professional Military Education (PME)
curricula. The Services established Centers of Excellence to oversee
and standardize training and impart essential and mission-targeted
cultural training to their members. The Army Training and Doctrine
Command Culture Center, the Navy Center for Language Regional Expertise
and Culture, the Air University Cultural Studies Center, and the Marine
Corps Center for Advance Operational Culture and Language all focus on
offering the training that best supports their deployment model and is
compliant with Joint Professional Military Education guidelines. Since
Service missions differ, this approach is logical and effective.
We will host a DOD-wide Culture Summit this summer. This forum will
serve as the foundation to develop operationally relevant cultural
policies and synchronize efforts across all the Services.
Getting the right information to deploying personnel in time to be
useful, but not so early that it is forgotten before they arrive, is
``just-in-time'' training. We have significantly improved our means of
providing language and regional familiarization training to units
during their deployment cycles. The DLIFLC's foreign language and
cultural instruction extends beyond the classroom to servicemembers and
civilians preparing for deployment by offering mobile training teams,
video teletraining, language survival kits, and online instructional
materials. Since 2001, the DLIFLC dispatched 300 mobile training teams
to provide targeted training to more than 32,000 personnel. Deploying
units received over 200,000 Language Survival Kits (mostly Iraqi, Dari,
and Pashto). Field support modules outlining the geo-political
situation, cultural facts, and fundamental language skills, key phrases
and commands are available for 19 countries in 17 languages on the
DLIFLC website. There are 31 on-line language survival courses.
Computer-based sustainment training is available as well via the Global
Language On-line Support System, which supports 12 languages and 6 more
language sustainment courses are available on the DLIFLC LingNet Web
site.
Heritage Recruiting
Ensuring that we have a strong foundation in language and regional
expertise involves reaching out to personnel who already possess these
skills into our Total Force. All of our military Services have
developed heritage-recruiting plans to bring personnel into the force
with key language skills and regional expertise. These plans focus on
reaching out to our heritage communities and their children who possess
near-native language skills and knowledge of the culture.
One particularly successful program is the Army's 09L Interpreter/
Translator Program. The Army launched this pilot program in 2003 to
recruit and train individuals from heritage Arabic, Dari, and Pashto
communities to serve in the Individual Ready Reserve and support
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The program was so successful that
in 2006, the Army formally established the 09L Translator Aide as a
permanent military occupational specialty with a career path from
recruit through sergeant major. More than 317 heritage speakers have
successfully graduated and deployed; an additional 175 personnel are
currently in the training pipeline. The Army continues to expand and
develop the program in response to the positive feedback from the
commanders and warfighters in the field. The QDR provides $50 million
over a 5-year period, from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2011, to
further expand this program.
Additionally, we have embedded recruitment of key language skilled
individuals into our civilian recruiting efforts, thereby recruiting
individuals with DOD critical sets to include languages to serve in
mission critical occupations. We have developed a comprehensive
outreach program with colleges, universities and professional and
heritage associations; reenergized our branding and marketing
materials; and revamped our ``Go Defense'' recruitment Web site to
attract individuals to DOD as the ``Employer of Choice.'' Our recently
updated website include vignettes of current DOD employees in mission
critical occupations, including language, who discuss their work and
the satisfaction they realize from it as well as the benefits of
working for the DOD.
Attracting and hiring individuals with high proficiency language
skills from heritage communities and graduates of the DOD-sanctioned
education programs presents security clearance challenges. We have
partnered with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) to develop and are implementing a number of important initiatives
to help reduce these barriers. Within the DOD, we are also conducting a
scrub of all civilian positions coded for language to validate
clearance level requirements; establishing a pilot to expedite hiring;
and, promulgating best practices from the hiring pilot.
Security clearances are particularly challenging for our 09L
members. Current security requirements mandate that only U.S. citizen
can obtain a security clearance and many of our 09Ls are legal resident
aliens. The Army issued a ``limited access authorization'' allowing
non-citizens in the 09L program to take a polygraph. Upon passing the
polygraph, the member can then handle classified material while in
theater. This accommodation enables 09L to handle classified material
while in theatre awaiting citizenship or granting of security
clearance.
Ensuring Surge Capability--Generating Competencies to Meet the
Unexpected
As we evaluated our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was
obvious that we did not have sufficient language capability within the
force to meet demands. The Army, as the executive agent is coordinating
contract linguist support. As a result, highly proficient contract
linguists have been made available to commanders in theater. This is
one example of how we can generate a surge capability harvesting
language resources from the talent pool within and outside our country.
We are also developing appropriate processes to maintain contact with
our military and civilian retirees and separatees. The goal is to build
a personnel database with language and regional experience information
that would allow us reachback capability for voluntary recall. While
current surge capability is obviously focused on ongoing operations, we
are also looking beyond for potential or emerging areas in which the
total force might be called upon to operate.
Building Professionals
Post-September 11 military operations reinforce the reality that
the DOD needs an improved capability in languages and dialects of
strategic interest. A higher level of language skill and regional
expertise, to include cultural awareness, across all the Services are
necessary to build the internal relationships required for coalition/
multi-national operations, peacekeeping, and civil/military affairs. In
2005, the DOD began building a cadre of language specialists possessing
high-level language proficiency (an Interagency Language Roundtable
(ILR) Proficiency Level 3 in reading, listening, and speaking ability
or 3/3/3) and regional expertise. We are working with the DOD
components to identify the tasks and missions that will require 3/3/3
proficiency and determine the minimum number of personnel needed to
provide this language capability. Managing the Professionals
The Department has spent a great deal of effort in managing its
cadre of uniformed regional experts--the Foreign Area Officers. DOD
Directive 1315.17, ``Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs,'' updated in
April 2005, established a common set of standards for FAOs. Most
importantly, the new policies require the Services to establish FAO
programs that ``deliberately develop a corps of FAOs who shall be
commissioned officers with a broad range of military skills and
experiences; have knowledge of political-military affairs; have
familiarity with the political, cultural, sociological, economic, and
geographical factors of the countries and regions in which they are
stationed; and, have professional proficiency in one or more of the
dominant languages in their regions of expertise.'' The purpose of this
approach to the FAO Program is to build an FAO Corps capable of
operating in a joint environment with similar training, developmental
experiences, and expertise.
All FAOs must be qualified in a principal military specialty.
Studies undertaken by the DOD have confirmed that qualification in a
principal military specialty must be an absolute prerequisite for FAOs
to be successful, regardless of service. In fiscal year 2007, there are
approximately 1,600 FAOs designated, qualified or are in training.
Sustaining and Supporting Special Forces
The U.S. Special Operations Command has recognized the need and
value of language and regional expertise. They require each member to
possess not only strong military skills but also regional and language
skills. Special Operations Forces' policies ensure that their personnel
are regionally trained and that their expertise and contributions are
increased through consistent assignment in their region. Special Forces
requirements are for speakers at a level one on the Interagency Level
Roundtable. Level one is described as a functional, but limited
language proficiency level. Special Forces members can take the Defense
Language Proficiency Test 5, but prefer the Oral Proficiency Interview,
since the majority of their requirements focus on the speaking
modality. We are working to increase the availability of Oral
Proficiency Interviews to meet U.S. Special Operations Command needs.
OUR EFFORTS ARE NOT ENOUGH
We recognized that in order to increase language capability in the
Department and achieve higher levels of language proficiency among our
language professionals, we had to assume a more proactive role in
promoting and encouraging language education in the American
population. We need to be able to identify and recruit individuals who
have the language skills and regional expertise we need. In June 2004,
we convened a National Language Conference to begin dialog and
stimulate thinking to this end. The conference led to the development
of a white paper published by the Department outlining a number of key
recommendations.
In January 2006, the President announced the NSLI. The NSLI was
launched to dramatically increase the number of Americans learning
critical need foreign languages such as Arabic, Chinese, Russian,
Hindi, and Farsi. The Secretary of Defense joined the Secretaries of
State and Education, and the DNI to develop a comprehensive national
plan to expand opportunities for U.S. students to develop proficiencies
in critical languages from early education through college. The White
House provides ongoing coordination as partner agencies work to
implement this plan.
The focal point for the Department's role in the NSLI is the NSEP.
NSEP represents one of the national security community's most important
investments in creating a pipeline of linguistically and culturally
competent professionals into our workforce. NSEP provides scholarships
and fellowships to enable U.S. students to study critical languages and
cultures in return for Federal national security service. NSEP has
partners with universities, providing grants for the development and
implementation of National Flagship Language programs, specifically
designed to graduate students at an ILR level three (3/3/3) language
proficiency (in reading, listening and speaking modalities) in today's
critical languages. These programs provide a major source of vitally
needed language expertise in the national security community. As part
of the DOD contribution to the NSLI, the NSEP has expanded the National
Language Flagship Program to establish new Flagship programs in Arabic,
Hindi, and Urdu and to expand the Russian Flagship to a Eurasian
program focusing on critical Central Asian languages.
The Flagship effort serves as an example of how NSLI links Federal
programs and resources across agencies to enhance the scope of the
Federal Government's efforts in foreign language education. For
example, the Flagship program is leading the way in developing model
pipelines of K-12 students with higher levels of language proficiency
into our universities. I am very proud to tell this committee that we
launched the Nation's first fully articulated K-16 program -- a Chinese
pipeline with the University of Oregon/Portland Public Schools. While
focusing on early language learning, this effort has already succeeded
in enrolling ten students, as freshmen, from the Portland high schools
in an experimental advanced 4-year Chinese program at the University of
Oregon. We have also awarded a grant to the Chinese Flagship Program at
Ohio State University to implement a statewide system of Chinese K-16
programs. Finally, we awarded a grant to Michigan State University to
develop an Arabic K-16 pipeline project with the Dearborn, Michigan
school district, announced in conjunction with a Department of
Education Foreign Language Assistance Program grant. We hope Congress
will approve the Department of Education's request for the NSLI, which
will significantly expand on the K-12 model that NSEP has established.
Our second commitment to the President's NSLI is the launching of
the Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps pilot program, now renamed The
Language Corps. Authorized by Congress, this effort will identify
Americans with skills in critical languages and develop the capacity to
mobilize them during times of national need or emergency. The Language
Corps represents the first organized national attempt to capitalize on
our rich national diversity in language and culture. We just awarded a
contract to assist us as we begin a 3-year pilot to meet our goal of
1,000 Language Corps members.
In spring 2006, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness invited the Federal Chief Human Capital Officers to join the
DOD in building the Language Corps. We will continue to engage the
Federal community as we proceed with the 3-year pilot.
The Department's contributions to the NSLI reflect the significant
amount of coordination among DOD staff, our NSLI partners, other
Federal agencies, and State government and local education systems. The
NSLI was built so that programs proposed by the Departments of State,
Education, Defense, and National Intelligence, when funded and
executed, would improve the national language capacity.
Finally, the Department is coordinating a series of regional
summits to engage state and local governments, educational
institutions, school boards, parents, and businesses at the local level
in addressing foreign language needs. The NSEP reached out to the
expertise of its three Flagship Universities--in Ohio, Oregon, and
Texas to convene these summits and to develop action plans that reflect
an organized and reasonable approach to building the infrastructure for
language education at the State and local level. These summits will
take place later this spring and action plans will be produced by the
fall 2007.
CONCLUSION
Thank you for the opportunity to share our current and future
language and regional expertise transformation efforts. I hope to leave
you with the understanding that building foreign language capability
and regional expertise within the DOD is serious business. We have
taken actions to ensure that our efforts are institutionalized in our
recruitment efforts, compensation rules, plans, policies, training, and
doctrine. We have made great progress and the Defense leadership
commitment to the development of this important competency has been
unwavering. However, we have not yet reached the finish line. Your
continuing support of our efforts through legislation and
appropriations is appreciated. The journey has just begun, but we must
do it right as our Nation, and our national security depends on
successful strategy and sustained execution.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Secretary McGinn, for
your testimony.
Dr. Van Tilborg?
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDRE VAN TILBORG, Ph.D., DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Van Tilborg. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you to discuss the DOD's S&T
investments in the areas of language translation devices and
cultural awareness training. I will use this opportunity to
summarize a few of the DOD's current capabilities in language
translation research, some of which I know you have had an
opportunity to see here in the exhibits this afternoon. I will
also briefly describe some of the planned future work on human,
social, cultural, and behavioral understanding that supports
our warfighters' need for interaction with unfamiliar cultures.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin, though, by
acknowledging the strength and resolve of one of this Nation's
great educational institutions, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University. As we speak about S&T here today, I ask
that we all reflect on the students and faculty at one of
America's foremost institutions of S&T who perished in a
senseless rampage only a week ago, and I ask that we recognize
the thousands of Hokies who through their commitment to
learning and knowledge will surely honor the sacrifice of their
friends and colleagues by reaching for a deeper understanding
of nature, the arts, and the world in which we live.
Mr. Chairman, there are four main take-aways from my
testimony, as follows: Number one, the DOD's S&T enterprise
recognizes that the abilities to understand and even converse
in the languages of indigenous populations and to appreciate
local cultures and social mores are important in military and
stability operations.
Number two, the DOD's S&T program has been at the forefront
of research in language technology for many decades, enabled by
providing a stable base for long-term research.
Number three, promising language translation and cultural
understanding technologies have emerged from these DOD-
sponsored efforts.
Number four, cultural awareness S&T is still in its
infancy, but the DOD has conducted a concerted effort to
develop a coordinated research and investment strategy that
ranges from basic research to prototyping.
Language is a deceptively simple, yet a maddeningly
intricate subject. It is known surprisingly well by toddlers,
who sometimes can learn even more than one language. Yet,
paradoxically, generations of brilliant researchers with the
world's most powerful supercomputers have struggled to produce
even rough automated translations in everyday environments. The
value of knowing languages and being able to translate among
them is self-evident in this globalized economy for the
business person, the tourist, and the diplomat. As has been
mentioned, for the U.S. military one of the great challenges is
to operate unpredictably in regions of the world where we
cannot converse with the local population nor read local
written materials, such as newspapers, road signs, and
handbills, nor understand radio, television, and Internet
communications.
Not surprisingly, our commanders in the field have called
for help in dealing with the diverse and unfamiliar language
and cultural terrain in their areas of responsibility. Not only
counterinsurgency environments, but also humanitarian crisis
relief operations have forced the military to confront a
situation in which all personnel need some ability to operate
effectively in settings where they must have skills to work in
novel language and cultural dimensions.
Not only is it desirable to communicate in their language
with the indigenous population, but also with non-English-
speaking allied forces in our coalition operations.
There are approximately 7,000 spoken languages in the
world. Sixty percent of the world's population speaks one of
the top 30 languages as their native tongue. I can personally
vouch for having a modest grasp of three of those top 30
languages, including English. About 200 languages claim at
least one million native speakers each. The ability to converse
and translate seamlessly between English and at least a
substantial fraction of these languages could potentially add
greatly to the capabilities of a combatant commander.
The microelectronics and software revolutions have brought
us to the brink of compact machines that can plausibly
translate among natural languages. You have seen some of the
impressive results this morning in the exhibition here today.
I would also like to impress upon you how difficult the
problem of automated language translation is, as the S&T guy
here today. Let me read you a portion of a statement from
International Business Machines (IBM), and this will surprise
them here, regarding their efforts in language translation
technology, which illustrates how difficult the problem is. On
January 8, IBM issued a press release describing the successful
results of an experiment in automatic translation of Russian to
English. In that press release, a researcher is quoted as
saying: ``Those in charge of this experiment now consider it to
be definitely established that meaning conversion through
electronic language translation is feasible and that perhaps 3
years hence interlingual meaning conversion by electronic
processes of several languages may be an accomplished fact''--
that is, language translation.
I would say that a problem that requires 3 years for the
legendary technical minds at IBM to solve is certainly a
difficult one. However, when I mentioned that this press
release was issued on January 8th, I neglected to tell you that
that was January 8, 1954, and the electronic computer involved
was the first IBM Model 701, IBM's first commercially available
computer with an electronic memory. Fifty three years later,
the natural language research community, including IBM,
continues to make steady progress.
Fundamentally, automated language translation is extremely
difficult because it cannot be achieved solely by mapping back
and forth between words and dictionaries. Many decades of
research sponsored by DOD's various research agencies and, I
might say, the National Science Foundation have reinforced the
critical idea that successful language translation depends on
the concept of meaning. That is, it is not good enough to know
that certain words and phrases have counterparts in other
languages into which they should be translated. The translator,
whether he be human or machine, must understand the meaning in
the material to be translated.
Many different techniques have been discovered for
extracting meaning from language, representing that meaning in
a form that can be digitally stored and manipulated, and
generating translated text and speech from those intermediate
representations. You have seen a variety of examples here
today.
A simple example illustrates the point about meaning. If I
say the two-word sentence ``Time flies'' in English and ask
that it be translated into another language, you probably must
ask me, what do I mean? Do I mean that time moves swiftly
forward, or do I mean that time has wings, or do you want me to
use a stopwatch to measure flying insect maneuvers or for
determining the hang time of a baseball hit by a batter? All
those meanings are plausible when I say ``Time flies.'' The
translation depends on an understanding of meaning, which is
still very hard for computers and software to do.
Nevertheless, the DOD's research investments have yielded
some impressive results, some of which have entered utility
assessments and operational military assessments. I would like
to mention just a few of the ones that are on exhibit here
today. As you have seen, the largest speech-to-speech
translation research program in DOD is DARPA's Spoken Language
Communication and Translation System for Tactical Use
(TRANSTAC). TRANSTAC has developed PC-based translation systems
that allow speech-to-speech translation between English and
variants of Arabic.
The program has contributed to the development and fielding
of a number of products such as you have seen here today, the
Phraselator and IBM's MASTOR system. The Phraselator is a
relatively simple device that enables one-way translation of
speech inputs into translated phrases that have been pre-
recorded and stored in the device. For example, when the user
speaks an English phrase the Phraselator searches its memory
for the closest matching pre-recorded phrase in the target
language and speaks that phrase. Translation success is
improved by grouping related phrases into pluggable modules
oriented toward specific functional domains, such as for
example first aid or hospital operations or security
checkpoints.
There are currently over 2,000 of these devices in the
field in Iraq. A similar device is called the Voice Response
Translator, which is also on display here today.
Another promising system, developed jointly by DARPA and
IBM, is the Multi-Lingual Automatic Speech-to-Speech
Translator, called MASTOR. MASTOR combines cutting edge
technologies in automatic speech recognition, understanding,
and synthesis. In contrast to Phraselator, it is intended for
use with bidirectional, unconstrained, free form natural speech
in multiple domains.
MASTOR incorporates many extremely sophisticated algorithms
and processing techniques, yet is capable of operating on
laptop computers. Several dozen of these units are in
experimental use in Iraq.
Other impressive DOD-sponsored systems that tackle various
aspects of language understanding and translation have been
developed by companies, such as SRI International, BDM
Technologies, Speech Gear Incorporated, Integrated Wave
Technologies, and CACI, among others. Varying quantities of
experimental devices have been fielded to units, such as the
18th Airborne Corps, 1 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), 1 MEF,
the Army's III Corps, and the 25th I.D., for example.
The DOD's largest investment in text-to-text translation,
as opposed to speech, is DARPA's Global Autonomous Language
Exploitation (GALE) program. The program's goal is to translate
and distill foreign language material, such as television shows
and web sites and streaming video, in near-real time and
highlight salient information to produce targeted query
responses. The program is intended to deliver a capability to
translate both structured and unstructured text and speech.
Several system are currently fielded in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, to summarize this aspect of my testimony, the
DOD's S&T investment in language translation automation, I
would tell you that much progress has been achieved through
steady research investments, but that the goal of robust
translation capability, able to handle spontaneous,
unstructured, unconstrained input in a noisy background,
comparable to what a human being would be able to do, has not
yet been reached.
Shifting gears quickly now to the area of cultural
awareness training, the need for improved cultural awareness
training is broadly recognized in DOD and in an emerging sense
in our DOD S&T program. The Joint Force needs some of the same
cultural awareness competencies that our Special Operations
Forces have traditionally maintained. Military operations in
complex multicultural environments require an awareness and
knowledge that can be applied to improved operator interactions
and shape the outcome of the interactions. The ultimate goal is
to achieve an acceptable baseline for cultural competency
across our forces.
From a technology perspective, the first generation
capabilities in this area are being derived from the best
academic and professional subject matter experts, providing
schoolhouse content. The next generation will likely be
computer-mediated training and mission rehearsal in relevant
venues. The third generation will be embedded within a more
immersive dynamic environment.
There are several S&T efforts currently being pursued in
the DOD's S&T program related to this area. There is a program
called Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation that
is available for viewing I believe here in the exhibit hall, in
the hearing room.
Senator Reed. Doctor, are you near the conclusion?
Dr. Van Tilborg. Yes, I am very close.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Dr. Van Tilborg. Another system is DARPA's Tactical
Language and Cultural Training System, which was designed to
provide our warfighters with basic cultural proficiency with
only limited computer laptop training. This system is currently
available in Iraqi, Arabic, and Pashtun, and provides basic
language and cultural awareness skills.
However, I would tell you, though, Mr. Chairman, that the
S&T in this area of cultural awareness is at an earlier stage
of maturity than is language technology, and in recognition of
that fact the DOD conducted, working with the military
components, conducted an extensive survey of the research areas
related to human, social, cultural, and behavioral
understanding in 2006 and identified 75 areas of research, in
which approximately a very large fraction are currently not
being invested in.
To address these gaps, the DOD has formulated a human,
social, cultural, and behavioral modeling initiative that we
call HSCB, in which we plan to invest approximately $210
million over the Future Years Defense Program starting in
fiscal year 2008 to develop the required scientific base to
field mature technologies.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I would like to reiterate the
main points: one, the DOD S&T enterprise recognizes that the
ability to understand and converse in languages of indigenous
populations is important in military and stability operations.
The DOD's S&T program has been at the forefront of research in
that language technology, which is a very difficult problem.
Promising language translation technologies have begun to
emerge from these efforts and, although cultural awareness S&T
is still in its infancy, the DOD has stood up a plan for
investments in S&T in this arena.
That concludes my statement. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Van Tilborg follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Andre Van Tilborg
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of
Defense's (DOD) science and technology (S&T) investments in the areas
of language translation devices and cultural awareness training. I will
use this opportunity to describe the DOD's current capabilities in
translation devices and cultural awareness training, the challenges in
these areas, and some of the planned future work that supports our
warfighters' needs for interaction with non-western cultures. I am also
pleased to have the chance to highlight in this hearing some of the new
and expanded initiatives we are hoping to undertake in these areas to
address the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
I have organized this testimony into two sections, one dealing with
language technology devices and the other with cultural awareness
training. There is obviously some linkage between these two areas, but
many of the research challenges in translation devices or socio-
cultural awareness training are unique to each. For these areas, there
is a clear need for increased skills and capabilities for all of the
Combatant Commands (COCOM), and there are specific needs statements
from at least two COCOMs, Central Command (CENTCOM), and Special
Operations Command (SOCOM). The language and cultural terrain of each
COCOM's Areas of Responsibility (AOR) define the technical challenges.
However, we do recognize that the solutions are not solely technical in
nature, and the Department must also address Manpower, Personnel, and
Training as part of the solution sets.
I will address language translation devices research and
engineering first. The global war on terror, and, more generically,
Irregular Warfare (IW)/counterinsurgency environments have forced the
military to confront a situation in which all personnel need some
abilities to operate effectively in settings where they must have
skills to work in novel language and cultural dimensions. The
requirement for a deeper understanding of the human environment in an
AOR is now relevant, not just for Special Operations Units, but for all
soldiers and marines who are deploying. At the strategic level, the
global war on terror has created the need not only to have the ability
to communicate with indigenous peoples from diverse cultures, but also
to be able to understand their written and media communications. The
sheer volume of written text and other media (i.e., television
broadcasts, internet postings) makes using individual human translators
untenable. Given the realities on the ground in the CENTCOM AOR and the
scale of the global war on terror, it is evident that for our current
and future forces we need to discover, develop and field technologies
to augment our existing translation capabilities at the strategic,
operational and tactical level, for multiple languages and dialects,
and for users that span a broad language skill level (novice to
linguist). Some of the capability needs and technical challenges and
the efforts to meet these challenges and field viable products to our
forces are described below. The work listed below does have application
to the general purpose force, to planners and operators, and to the
Intelligence Community (IC). However, the IC has their own specific,
unique use scenarios that require linguistic capabilities to support
intelligence analysis. In this testimony I will intentionally focus on
DOD specific investments. However, please recognize that we are
cognizant of the development being done in the IC, have numerous links
to the IC linguists, and our investments complement their work.
LANGUAGE TRANSLATION DEVICES
From a technical perspective, there are some common underlying
capabilities that serve both text and speech translation. However, each
has unique features that make fielding operational devices difficult.
The commercial sector has developed translation capabilities and
technologies that meet some of the needs of the operational forces, and
the pedigree of this technology (i.e., IBM's MASTOR) includes a history
of DOD funding. However, many of these available products are not
robust enough to meet the scale, breadth, and tempo required for the
mission areas/needs of deployed forces. The threshold for effective use
of speech to speech translation in the business world is lower than in
the military, there is a need for `street' level communication that
accounts for unstructured/colloquial speech, varied sub-dialects, noisy
environments, the need for hand's free communication, and the need for
increased accuracy in real-time, tactical translation. Text and media
translation has additional challenges that include bandwidth
limitations in operational environments, and degraded signals such as
smudged and handwritten text translation. Lastly, the military needs
access to a large volume of spoken and/or written language to create
the databases, scalable models, and training materials for some of the
more obscure languages and dialects that occur across the globe. There
are approximately 7,000 distinct languages/dialects in the world. Many
of the places we may operate have hundreds of subcultures and
languages. The commercial technology investments are not focused on
providing translation in these types of niche markets. DOD investments
in this area are concentrated on improving existing technology to reach
the translation accuracy necessary for our forces, and on expanding the
reach of these tools to the socially and linguistically diverse regions
in which the DOD operates. What follows is a description of the most
significant technology developments in the area of language. It should
be evident from the descriptions below that the ongoing and planned
programs within the services and other organizations, such as the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), are truly
complementary.
Speech-to-Speech Translation
The major speech-to-speech translation systems have taken advantage
of previous commercial successes in translation. The largest program
today is DARPA's Spoken Language Communication and Translation System
for Tactical Use (TRANSTAC). TRANSTAC has developed PC-based
translation systems that allow speech-to-speech translation between
English and Baghdadi Arabic. Its current accuracy, in controlled noise
environments, is between 70-80 percent. The TRANSTAC system is being
field tested in Iraq for specified use domains (i.e., medical care,
vehicle checkpoint, and joint Iraqi coalition force missions). The
program has had early successes and has contributed to the development
and fielding of a number of products such as the Phraselator system and
IBM's Mastor system. The Mastor system recently made headlines when IBM
offered to donate over 10,000 software licenses and 1,000 devices to
the DOD. The TRANSTAC program is attempting to develop and field hands-
free two-way speech to speech translation systems that can provide
accurate translation in urban military environments. A secondary goal
is to expand the domains and accuracy of the existing system. Other
programs, such as the Instant Language Translation project under the
Office of Naval Research, are expanding the capability of portable
translation systems by including multi-mode inputs (spoken, written,
images) and additional languages and dialects from other regions of the
world such as Korea and Somalia.
Text-to-Text and Media-to-Text
The largest DOD S&T investment in text-to-text translation is
DARPA's Global Autonomous Language Exploitation (GALE) program. The
program's goal is to translate and distill foreign language material
(e.g. television shows and websites) in near real-time, highlight
salient information, and produce targeted query responses. The program
will deliver the capability to translate both structured and
unstructured text and speech, with a goal of delivering an accuracy of
95 percent for text and 90 percent for speech. Other investments
include improvements in tactical document translation system accuracy
and capabilities. It should be noted that the media-speech to text is
working in a domain where the speech is controlled with rather
predictable vocabulary. The GALE program has already accomplished much
in the way of improved accuracy in translating text (55 to 75 percent
accuracy) and media (35 to 65 percent accuracy), but they are
continuing to improve the technology to a maturity level to deliver the
capability to translate both text and speech at 90-95 percent accuracy.
Language Databases
The current method to support developing new language modules for
existing translation devices is costly and time consuming, requiring
the collection, transcription and translation of large amounts of
training data (written and spoken language). The Air Force Research
Laboratory has an ongoing project that will provide a rapid turnaround
on developing linguistic data sources for new languages and domains of
interest. The goal is to use innovative techniques to take languages
and dialects in which we have limited data, with less than 10 hours of
speech data or 20,000 words or less of text, and produce useful spoken
or written translations.
Fielded Technology
Three of the technologies described above are in use by military
units. The Phraselator, handheld one way speech to speech device,
provides tactical level communication for soldiers within specific
domains, such as checkpoint and medical operations. The device was
originally developed as part of a DARPA Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) effort. There are currently over 2,000 Phraselators in
the field in Iraq. The DOCEX system provides the capability to process
and exploit captured documents for actionable intelligence within
tactical time scales. The DOCEX was developed as part of a Director of
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration project, transitioned to the National Ground Intelligence
Center and fielded. There are systems currently deployed in Iraq.
Finally, the GALE program transitioned structured text/media
translation technologies to 12 U.S. Government organizations, and 2
systems are currently fielded in Iraq.
CULTURAL AWARENESS TRAINING
The need for improved cultural awareness training was identified in
the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It was realized that the
general Joint Force needed some of the same cultural awareness
competency that our Special Operations Forces have traditionally
maintained. Military operations in complex, multicultural environments
require more than just being culturally sensitive to the do's and
don'ts of a society. Such operations also require an awareness and
knowledge that can be applied to improve operator interactions and
shape the outcome of the interactions. Each of the Services have
established cultural awareness training centers that are developing
content, sharing this content, and have begun training their personnel
on the specific knowledge necessary to support their military missions.
Fortunately, these centers have access to the extensive on the ground
experiences of the soldiers and marines returning from Iraq, combined
with the relatively well-known academic knowledge of Iraq's religious
and sectarian history. Providing the same level of `understanding' and
training for data-poor, less studied socio-cultural environments, such
as the mountainous tribal regions of Afghanistan or the multicultural
regions of Indonesia is much more difficult.
The ultimate goal is to achieve an acceptable baseline for cultural
competency across our forces. As mentioned above, the first generation
capabilities in this area are being derived from the best academic and
professional subject matter experts providing schoolhouse content. The
next generation will likely be computer-mediated training and mission
rehearsal in relevant venues. The third generation will be embedded
within more immersive, dynamic environments. Methodologies to collect,
package, and understand knowledge of cultural landscapes will be needed
to support the generation of content that will fill these curricula and
training systems. What follows is a description of the current
technology developments in the area of culture awareness training for
second and third generation capabilities and planned future investment
in the area of socio-cultural understanding.
Ongoing Efforts
The Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office's Technical
Support Working Group is developing training support packages that
focus on the operational and tactical applications of cultural
awareness, with a specific focus on Indonesia. The training material is
being developed in coordination with SOCOM and the U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command.
A number of SBIR and Small Business Technology Transfer Projects
have begun in the area of cultural awareness. They include projects to
train at the tactical and strategic level and all are focused on
developing computer-based awareness training. Again, at the tactical
level, an SBIR project will develop a system that will train how to
read Middle Eastern non-verbal cues and develop an understanding of
what those cues say about a person's intentions. Another will create
more accurate and realistic non-U.S. entities that can be used in
convoy commander and ground troop training simulations. At the
strategic level, there are two new projects. One will support the
training of planners and senior leaders in developing and assessing
metrics for effects based operations in complex conflict environments.
The second project will develop a computer-based tool to support leader
training on interagency goals and progress in non-western conflict
environments. All of these have been initiated under the new Human
Social, Culture, and Behavior (HSCB) Modeling Initiative led by DDR&E.
The HSCB initiative has sprung from the lesson learned in the
ongoing global war on terror. That lesson learned is that the DOD has
capability gaps in software tools and decision aids that will allow
U.S. commanders to better understand different cultures. The QDR
highlighted these lessons in stating that current and future military
operations will require enhanced capability to understand social and
cultural ``terrains'' as well as various dimensions of human behavior.
The HSCB initiative will develop the required scientific base and will
field matured technologies that support human terrain understanding and
forecasting across a span of missions and geographic regions. The DDR&E
staff worked with the military components and intelligence community in
2006 to identify capability needs in 75 areas; there were gaps in
roughly 70 of these areas. The HSCB initiative will address these gaps
and integrate complex human factors into the pre-planning, planning and
execution cycle of military operations. HSCB modeling is focused on
filling capability gaps within data collection/infrastructure and
knowledge management, and then developing the models to forecast
societal and cultural behaviors. In addition to delivering software
modules that are fully integrated into DOD command and control systems,
the HSCB effort will help to create the infrastructure (simulations and
content (data, models and theories)) to support tactical through
strategic training, mission rehearsal, and experimentation using valid
cultural entities and models.
Fielded Technology
DARPA's Tactical Language and Culture Training system was designed
to provide our warfighters with some basic spoken language and cultural
proficiency with only limited (2 weeks) laptop computer training. The
system is currently available in Iraqi Arabic and Pashto and provides
basic language and cultural awareness skills training for troops. There
are currently 800 copies of the software installed in bases here in the
U.S. as well as in theater. Over 6,000 troops have used the system for
initial skills training.
In conclusion, the need for a robust DOD S&T program in language
and cultural awareness and associated capabilities is a central element
to fighting the global war on terror. The ongoing and future efforts of
Defense S&T will support the training and equipping of today's force,
tomorrow's force, and the future's force. We believe these efforts are
meeting this challenge, and we truly appreciate the continued support
of this committee in providing us the tools and resources to carry out
this vital mission.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Doctor. Thank you also,
very much, for recognizing Virginia Tech. We all share your
very important sentiment about their sacrifice, but also their
extraordinary contribution to education and technology. So,
thank you. That was very thoughtful.
Let me follow up with some questions to you initially, Dr.
Van Tilborg. You mentioned several devices that are being used
today in Iraq and Afghanistan. With respect both to translation
devices and cultural awareness devices, what are the
limitations that you see?
Dr. Van Tilborg. I think some of the primary limitations
are in their, what I will call, robustness, meaning their
ability to be useful in contexts for which they were not
explicitly developed. That is, if sentences or words or
concepts are presented to these devices that the designers and
developers did not program, if you will, into these devices,
then these devices can fail miserably. So that is a very
difficult problem and needs to be dealt with.
Senator Reed. How do you engage in feedback? Is there an
ongoing process where you or your colleagues are interviewing
people coming out of the field, lining up reports? Is there
some formal mechanism or a combination. . .
Dr. Van Tilborg. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there is quite a bit of
feedback. There are these experimental versions of many of
these products that are in theater that are being used by
various units, and individuals from those units do communicate
back with research managers here at our agencies.
In fact, I saw today just here in the hearing room today a
young Army soldier who has used these units in theater and is
actually here with us today, speaking to people about his
experience with them. So there is quite a bit of interaction
and feedback.
Senator Reed. Are there formal mechanisms and informal
mechanisms? People send an e-mail message to you and there is a
requirement to evaluate these, and you look at them?
Dr. Van Tilborg. Yes. I would say I am not well enough
informed to know how formal the process is, but I know there is
extensive informal communication.
Senator Reed. How do you use that information to shape your
research plans and your budgets going forward?
Dr. Van Tilborg. I think that the experience of the users
is critically important. So for example, issues related to form
factor, the user interface of a device, how it displays its
information--you can theorize as much as you would like, but
the most important input is to hear from an actual user who has
been out on point, as they say, from that individual, what
works and what does not work.
Through our research agencies, such as DARPA and the Office
of Naval Research and various other agencies that do this work,
they can adjust or tailor their continued work in this area.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me just move right along and talk to Secretary McGinn
about a couple of things. First, you mentioned the language
corps and that is an intriguing idea. I wonder how much
structure there is at this juncture in the language corps. Is
the concept where folks are putting the names down that we can
call and they might come? Or is this something where you
anticipate some day being able to take people, skilled
linguists, call them up, to use the term of art, and put them
someplace that they might not necessarily want to go?
Mrs. McGinn. We are looking at both of those options. One
is to have a corps of people that we can actively nurture and
attach to an organization that can be used and can be called
for. The other is to, indeed, create a roster of people that we
might call and find out if they were interested, if the need
for them arose.
I must say that on this score we are really at the very
beginning. It is a pilot and we just awarded the contract. We
are very hopeful. We did do some marketing and found that--in
fact, we changed the name from the ``Civilian Linguist Reserve
Corps'' to ``the Language Corps'' because of our marketing
studies. We found a great deal of interest actually among the
heritage communities for helping us out with their language
skills.
Senator Reed. One of the things that I mentioned in my
opening remarks, Madam Secretary: Everyone is working very
hard, making a lot of effort, but it has been 5-plus years and
we recognized the need upfront, but we are still in some cases
in the initial stages. We have such a wealth of Americans with
language skills from the native speaker communities. We have
academics that teach these languages that are experts. We have
not been able to mobilize them. It is a source, I think, of
frustration probably to you also.
But as you go forward, I think we probably have to be more
aggressive in this regard. I presume that at some point you
might consider legislation, particularly if this is going to be
something more than a voluntary corps list. Is that correct?
Mrs. McGinn. We do not know yet because we are in the pilot
stages. I would like to address your concern about how things
are 5 years later, because we really did not wait after
September 11.
Senator Reed. No.
Mrs. McGinn. There were a series of steps--budgetary
increases, curriculum changes at DLI, and a bunch of things
that we did prior to the publication of the roadmap. So we were
actively moving out in many of these areas. One of them was the
establishment of our own language corps, Heritage Americans
recruited for their skill in Kurdish, Dari, and Pashtun, that
we have now. The pilot program was very successful. There are
now about 500 who are deployed or in training, getting rave
reviews from commanders in the field as to their capabilities.
So there is a very, very rich community to reach out to, and we
very much appreciate their patriotism, because that is what we
need.
Senator Reed. Fine. Let us talk for a moment about DLI. The
budget in fiscal year 2001 was $77 million and in 2007 it will
go up to $230 million. So there has been a huge investment, I
think, appropriately so. If you can just talk about the role of
DLI, particularly, since there are many other universities and
organizations that do essentially the same thing. There is
always the question, do you have a government entity that you
invest in and develop or do you go out and partner? Can you
talk about your concept of the DLI mission?
Mrs. McGinn. The unique thing about the DLI mission is
that--and I do not think you find this anywhere--they take high
school graduates basically and put them through intensive
language training in some of the very difficult languages, and
also with an eye toward the wider community, toward the skills
that they need to carry forward in their career.
But DLI has evolved into this really critical mass of
language expertise for us, that has created pre-deployment
training, has created curriculums for difficult languages that
we can pull off and teach at a moment's notice, and has created
DVDs and portable things that servicemembers can take with
them, language survival kits. So they have really become a
critical mass of language expertise for the DOD. They have
evolved into that. It is really quite an impressive operation
and they have asked me to invite you to come and visit.
Senator Reed. Oh, very good. They are in Monterey,
California?
Mrs. McGinn. Yes.
Senator Reed. That will not influence my decision, but
point acknowledged.
I understand that the intelligence analysts that go with
DLI, they are tested in their writing and their reading, since
verbal proficiency is not necessary, and DLI does the testing
and they set the standards. The question that arises is, what
is the reality check or quality check on that process? Are you
aware?
Mrs. McGinn. Yes. We actually have, they actually get
tested in listening and reading.
Senator Reed. Yes.
Mrs. McGinn. We do have a Defense Language Testing Advisory
Board comprised of testing experts from around the country that
looks at tests, it looks at our testing process, and gets back
to us.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me just turn to General Scales for a couple of
questions. First, I would be interested, General, since you
have been a practitioner and you have used graduates of DLI,
what is your impression right now of DLI, its role, your
general impression?
General Scales. Generally, their knowledge is very basic. I
have had a lot of experience with DLI graduates in Korea when I
was assistant division commander and you can rely on them to do
a lot of the decryption and interpretation. I have found there
are great linear translators, in other words, but, to use
Andre's point about the meaning and the subtleties of the
language, they did not have it. So generally we had to rely on
native-born Korean speakers to be able to provide us those
subtleties that you need when you are trying to determine
second and third order meaning.
So I guess the way to put it is DLI is basic training, and
you do not take an infantryman out of 6 weeks of basic training
and make him to company commander. So that would be the analogy
I give you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
Let me follow up on your testimony, which I thought was
very thought-provoking, and which is that have to move from a
technocentric to a culture-centric approach, that most of the
problems we have seen in the last several years have not been
technical failures, but this lack of cultural awareness, the
lack of linguistic ability. Can you point to the key problems
in Iraq and Afghanistan to underscore your point that, perhaps,
if we had a better cultural sensitivity or linguistic ability
we could have found a better road out?
General Scales. Sure. That is a great question, Senator.
Let us go back to the early days, 2003 and 2004 in Mosul. In
the early days the ability of young soldiers to communicate on
the street with Iraqis was pretty good, simply because of the
innate, I do not know, ``goodness'' I guess is the word I would
use, of the American soldier, the ability of soldiers of
goodwill to communicate with Iraqis of goodwill.
But it was flat. What should have followed, I believe, is a
very intensive human-centered approach to continuing this type
of dialogue, this type of interaction with the Iraqi citizens.
But that did not happen in many ways, because of our penchant
to find technological solutions, as I said, to problems.
I think just looking at the back of the room is
illustrative of that. Here you are and we are in Iraq, trying
to solve a human problem, trying to communicate, to break
through cultural barriers and solve a political, military
problem through human interaction and the application of social
sciences, and everything behind me is a computer.
So I guess my question is, great that we apply computer
sciences to solving human problems, but I suggest that the
lesson from Iraq is we should have started earlier and we
should have applied human sciences to solve the human problem.
This is just part of our culture. We Americans view wars as
science projects and we tend to find technological solutions.
I will give you another couple examples: improvised
explosive device (IED) detection. One of the things that I
learned early in my trips to Iraq is that there were some
soldiers who could really do it. It is interesting. Some squads
never got ambushed, some squads always managed to avoid IEDs.
They had this sixth sense, this intuition about it.
So you ask the question, why did second squad never get
ambushed and third squad did? There was something about those
leaders, some human quality that they had that gave them that
sixth sense. The same thing with small unit tactics. Some
squads do better than others in places like Fallujah and
elsewhere.
So my question is, it is great that we are spending a lot
of computer money to solve different problems, but why do we
not do a better job of mining the psychology, the sociology,
the human intuitive, and cognitive aspects of these sorts of
things to get to human solutions to human problems. My sense
and my frustration, I think the reason you invited me here
today, is that there is a real break within the DOD in getting
what in essence is an institution that has won wars with
chemistry, physics, information technology, and computers and
ask them suddenly to turn around tomorrow and apply the laws of
human sciences to solve this.
It would be like asking Joe Gibbs to coach hockey. A great
guy, a terrific coach, and a wonderful human being, but I do
not think he would know much about working on the ice.
So what I am suggesting to you, Sir, is that as you look
into the future and try to solve this problem, let us take the
human sciences to solve the human problems and leverage the
physical sciences as appropriate. There are some wonderful
opportunities there, but I would suggest that we find
historians, political scientists, sociologists, psychiatrists,
and psychologists and all these other human sciences and find a
mechanism to bring them together to solve problems.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General Scales.
We are joined by Senator Warner. Senator, I believe we are
going to begin votes at 3 p.m., but we have some time and the
floor is yours.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I am
sorry I was not here a little earlier. I really enjoy the work
of this subcommittee.
But I want to pick up on the general's comments. We had our
friend, General McCaffrey, up before the committee the other
day. I am going to read a little something that he had to say
here that impressed me greatly. In testimony before the Armed
Services Committee last week, General McCaffrey stated that
military personnel should be sent to a 90-day course at the DLI
in Monterey, California, or similar institution to get some
fluency in the language.
I am all in favor of advancements in the sciences here and
the ability of these computers, these very wonderful people who
have risen to the necessity to help us through the technology.
But I remember my father was in World War I. He was a doctor
and in his tunic he carried with him everywhere a French
dictionary. He was quite fluent in French, but he was highly
dependent as a medical doctor because often he had to treat the
Frenchmen.
I have some recollection in my own modest career when we
went to Korea, we had to strap around and figure out some sign
language because very often on patrol duty and so forth, we
were out and we were literally on our own, and trying to get
from the local population some information and so forth.
Where are we in the concept that we have now recognized
that a certain knowledge of the language is as important as
some of our military skills, and we may not always have the
benefit of the technology with us. We may have just what is in
the rucksack and that is about it. So I realize now, on the
turn-around particularly, which my colleague and I are
concerned about, rotating these people back into the area of
responsibility for combat, there is not any time to send them
to Monterey for 90 days. But we should be looking ahead and
maybe integrating more of this into the syllabus, in hopefully
a less stressful time in terms of our overseas commitments.
Anybody want to tackle that?
Mrs. McGinn. Senator Warner, one of the things that we have
done in that regard is we started with the officer corps,
believing that as you lead the officer corps so you lead the
DOD. We are beefing up pre-accession language training and
regional culture training. The Air Force Academy and the
Military Academy now require foreign language training. The
Navy Academy requires it for nontechnical leaders. We are
advancing into ROTC. We have the QDR gives grants to colleges
and universities with ROTC programs, to develop ROTC programs.
We are about to announce four of those that we have just
awarded.
As a follow-on to that, all of the Services have embedded
into their professional military education regional and
cultural expertise, not only for their officers but also for
their enlisted personnel. In many cases that also includes
language sustainment.
So we have really started to move forward towards saying
this is a competency that the DOD needs to have. It is a major
change, and so it is not easy, but we are moving in that
direction.
Senator Warner. When we integrate our young people into the
military today, we assess their skills in many ways. I am quite
certain that some of these young people have some language
skills that were taught in school. Is that put into their
record so that we can access them in times that we need them?
I remember in my generation of school I had to take 5 years
of Latin. That did not do me a lot of good, but it did help me
because it was the root language of others, and I learned what
modest language skills I had, which were very modest, I might
add.
Mrs. McGinn. We are screening everyone now upon accession
for their language ability. We are also screening those members
who are currently in the force, since we found a lot of
language capability in the force we did not know we had.
Senator Warner. So that is in a database somewhere?
Mrs. McGinn. Yes, sir, we have a database. We are also
moving out to administer the Defense Language Aptitude Battery,
which measures how well you may learn a language, so that when
we need to teach people languages we can reach out to those who
have a propensity for it.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I do believe those votes are
about to start. I may have one or two questions for the record,
but thank you very much, and I thank the panel of witnesses.
Nice to see you again, General Scales.
Senator Reed. General Scales, I think you had a comment
with regard to one of Senator Warner's questions?
General Scales. Just very briefly, Senator. All these
things are terrific, and I spent my last 3 years in the
military superintending this. But at the end of the day
officers will pay attention to and do best at those things
which will achieve success, which will get them promoted.
I am sorry, that is just the way our culture is, and until
we change our military culture to reward those who are good at
this, who learn the language, are good at training and doing
the advisory functions in Iraq and Afghanistan, until we
reserve a place, until we reward them with advanced civil
schooling where they can go back to a name university and learn
more about the culture and be better at the language, and until
the institutions, the Army, the Marine Corps, and the other
Services, reserve special places and offer special rewards for
these special skills, it is going to be a long, hard uphill
climb.
Senator Warner. It is interesting. When I was in the
building many years ago, I noticed--and I had to do a lot of
work at that time internationally in my capacity as the Navy
Secretary, so I traveled a lot. I got to know the attaches, a
very interesting lot, and I learned, to my chagrin, that that
was the end; O-6 was it and you were out.
But at that point in time I had the authority to work the
system and I finally got some stars and other things put on
those people to give them recognition. Today I think it is a
little better. There is a promotion chain through there to some
extent; is that correct?
General Scales. Not to my knowledge. I think the gentleman
who we all look up to as our model is Karl Eikenberry, who is a
Foreign Affairs Officer (FAO). Senator, he is a China FAO. His
wife is Chinese and he is terrifically effective in
Afghanistan. So language ability, but also the ability to
really get along with people, to sublimate your ego and bond
with people in a special way is as much an important talent as
is the ability to speak the language.
As far as I am concerned, I look for the day when promotion
to three stars, two and three stars, one of the serious
considerations is not just how good a corps commander he was,
but how good an attache was he and how good a FAO was he, and
how well he ran a military advisory group.
Senator Warner. I think we may recommend you be recalled.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Warner.
This is an important panel. I want to take some time and
ask questions, so I will ask a question or two. Senator Warner,
if you would like to join me afterwards that would be helpful.
But let me go back. Madam Secretary, you talked about the
Heritage Corps. One issue we have heard was the difficulty
sometimes in getting security clearances for some of these
individuals--particularly if they have relatives overseas.
Second, that if the individual is a second generation American
they may have to take a lie detector test, whereas if they are
some 15th generation American from small-town USA they do not
take the same test.
Can you comment on this as an impediment?
Mrs. McGinn. I can. I am not an expert at security issues
here, but I will tell you my observations, Mr. Chairman. It is
difficult for them to get security clearances. We have been
working with the Director of the Office of National
Intelligence and with our own Under Secretary for Intelligence
on some initiatives to do some changes to the adjudicators desk
reference. In some cases, those who adjudicate these clearances
in my opinion do not understand the cultures that people are
coming from, and we have approached graduate schools to see if
they would have people on call to talk to adjudicators so they
can say: If this individual is from Lebanon, is this what I
should expect or is this an aberration?
The lie detector tests are given to the linguists that we
want to have handling classified information since many of them
are not citizens and it takes a long time to process a Secret
clearance. That is our way of getting them limited access
authorization and getting them to work.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
Dr. Van Tilborg, let me ask the question and then I will
also ask the question of the Secretary. If more resources were
available to you, where would you put these resources with
respect to the language technology and cultural awareness?
Dr. Van Tilborg. I think there is quite a bit of work that
needs to be done in the development of what we call databases
for both of those areas, the language technologies and the
cultural awareness technologies, databases on, roughly
speaking, understanding of those languages and those cultural
facts and behaviors. I would put substantial resources to
prototyping and experimentation. I think a lot of this work
needs to be grounded in actual prototypes and trying things
out, testing these devices, playing around, retrying them, and
experimentation. Those would be the main areas, Senator, I
would invest in.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Madam Secretary, a similar question.
Mrs. McGinn. I would just like to say first of all that we
were very successful in getting just about everything we wanted
in the 2008 budget request. The DOD has been very supportive of
funding these initiatives. I think the ways, the places that we
need to go in the future, we need to do more work with the
cultural and regional aspects of this, understanding who has
those skills, cataloguing those skills. We need to better equip
ourselves to be able to respond quickly to areas of the world
that have languages that we are not ready for right now in
terms of having curriculums or capability, and we need to
continue work on our new testing system.
Senator Reed. General Scales talked in terms of incentive
structures that were going to produce these leaders at every
level, senior noncommissioned officers to senior officers who
are culturally aware, linguistically sophisticated. One basic
incentive structure is pay. I understand that there is no
language proficiency pay until you reach category 3-3. Is that
correct, or can you explain that?
Mrs. McGinn. No, no, it is at level 2, the foreign language
proficiency pay. The Special Forces and the United States
Marine Corps are very interested in starting to do proficiency
pay at level 1, Special Forces because they put that in as a
requirement. The Marine Corps is hoping that if they start
paying people at level 1 they will want to get to level 2. So
our policies did allow for that, for the Services to do that.
Senator Reed. Are you considering a broader, much more
deliberate approach with proficiency pay to induce people not
only to learn a language, but to progress, and for retention
purposes, too? Because I suspect one of the problems you face
is we have some 20-year veterans, majors, great language
skills, et cetera, but they are going out to do other things.
Is that being considered?
Mrs. McGinn. Oh, absolutely. Legislative changes in the
last couple of years have allowed us to increase our language
proficiency pay from $300 a month to $1,000 a month. Now, not
everybody gets $1,000 a month, but as you progress in
proficiency and as you are learning the more difficult
languages, yes, you can get that.
It is very important for the purposes you mentioned, but
also for people to self-identify, because there is a reward
there for them if they self-identify and they test at those
levels.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
General Scales, you have talked about some of the
incentives you would like to see, which is recognition in
evaluations and promotions, et cetera, and I think you have
also made the point that this technology is very, very
important, in fact, I would say essential, but it cannot be the
be-all and end-all. That raises the question--we grew up in an
age where we see these devices and it is rudimentary, and 2
years later this is fantastic--can you give me any kind of
idea, from the scientific standpoint, Dr. Van Tilborg, when
these laptop computers have been reduced to devices that you
can wear on your belt? Are we talking about a system that
within 20 years will get to the point where you can have two-
way translation constantly in a deployable mode?
Dr. Van Tilborg. Senator, my personal view is that, 20
years that is a safe bet that we will be able to do that,
despite the fact that it has taken more than 50 years to get to
where we are now. I believe that the rate of acceleration is
increasing. As you can see, there is really some spectacular
results that are already being demonstrated.
I think it is also very important to recognize that
technology is important because there are lots of languages,
and if we are going to have our forces be trained with
language, it is very hard to train a language and one does not
know whether we are going to be operating in area A, B, C, D,
or E. Technology can be that multiplier, if you will, that
allows large numbers of our forces to quickly gain adequate
ability in a given language without having to go through the 6-
month long or longer type of training.
So it is very critical, I believe, to do the technology.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. General?
General Scales. You talked about simulators and training
devices. It is important to be able, sir, to do that for
language. But I also believe we need to measure behavior. David
Petraeus told me a great story when he was in Mosul. He said
that he had a certain number of his battalion and brigade
commanders, he said, ``They just would not sit down and drink
tea with sheiks. There is nothing I could do to make them do
that.''
My suggestion to you is we not only improve our proficiency
with the physical sciences, but with the human sciences. We are
in a point now where we can predict behavior, we can anticipate
the human reactions to different sets of external stimuli. I
would argue that we do not do a good job of that right now.
Perhaps as part of this simulation experiment there be some
sort of immersive environment from which we could anticipate,
from the grade of private through colonel, who has these
particular skills.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General, Madam Secretary, and Dr.
Van Tilborg. It has been a very useful hearing and it has been
an interesting demonstration. We might have additional
questions, so we will make them available to you, not just
myself but my colleagues, and we would ask you to respond
promptly to the questions. Thank you all, and I think I would
conclude basically that we all recognize that this technology
is necessary. We hope it gets better faster. We hope it gets
more all purpose and robust. It is necessary, but I think, as
General Scales points out, it is not sufficient to the task.
There is the human element which I think will always be with
us. In fact, without that I would be out of a job.
So thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
INTERAGENCY LANGUAGE STRATEGY
1. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, is this language roadmap tied to an
interagency strategy for improving language and cultural awareness
capabilities? If not, why? If so, what is that strategy and who is
charged with enforcing its implementation?
Mrs. McGinn. The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (DLTR) is
not tied to an interagency strategy, but it establishes a foundation
that supports interagency collaboration. The purpose of the DLTR was to
ensure foreign language capability and regional expertise development
and employment.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
(USD(P&R)) is the Department of Defense (DOD) lead for language and
cultural awareness. Examples of interagency initiatives by DOD include:
In conjunction with the development of the Roadmap in June
2004, the Department began an interagency dialog by hosting the
National Language Conference, in partnership with the Center
for Advanced Study of Language at the University of Maryland.
Attendees at this conference included representatives from
other Federal agencies as well as academia, language
organizations, State and local governments, industry, and
foreign countries that routinely teach their citizens more than
one language.
The USD(P&R) hosts sessions with the Chief Human Capital
Officers to provide a forum for interagency discussions and
coordination on language and other issues.
The DLTR supports the National Security Language Initiative
(NSLI), announced in January 2006. This initiative is an
interagency partnership with the Department of State,
Department of Education, and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence to develop a comprehensive national plan
to expand U.S. foreign language education. As a result, we have
expanded our Flagship language programs, providing grants to
universities to graduate students at higher levels of
proficiency. We also started working on a pilot to establish
the Language Corps and initiated three K-16 programs in Chinese
and Arabic.
LANGUAGE INCENTIVES
2. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, are you working with the Services to
ensure that all Services offer proficiency incentives for personnel
from the very beginning, when they reach Level 1 proficiency? If not,
why? If so, when will all Services provide incentives at Level 1?
Mrs. McGinn. We are working with the Services and have published
policy that provides the flexibility and option to provide a Foreign
Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB) at Level 1 to meet mission
requirements. However, we do not believe that all personnel should be
provided a bonus at that level, as it represents very limited
proficiency. Rather, it should be applied in a targeted manner as
determined by the Service involved, in conjunction with components they
support.
DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE AND LANGUAGE TESTING
3. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, is Defense Language Institute (DLI)
the only language training institute available to the DOD? If not, what
other institutions can train DOD personnel in languages?
Mrs. McGinn. No, the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language
Center (DLIFLC) is not the only language training institute available
to the DOD. However, DLIFLC is the primary training source that
provides standards which meet the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR)
guidelines. DLIFLC's Washington office provides additional training to
meet DOD needs.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), United States, John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School develops Special Operations Language
Training instructional/training materials for classroom, Web-based, and
self-paced courseware to proficiency Levels 1 and 2. The Center is
transforming language training for Special Forces operators by weaving
language training throughout the Special Forces Qualification Course
with a graduation requirement of 1/1/1.
Additionally, the Joint Language Training Center (JLTC), Ogden,
Utah, serves the language refresher and maintenance training needs of
primarily Navy Reserve Cryptologic Technicians Interpretive (CTIs),
with Active Duty CTIs and other Services/agencies on a space available
basis. The classes are designed to provide a high-quality, intense
language learning experience in a relatively short period of time. All
JLTC classes are designed to fit Reserve annual training schedules, and
the training needs of the current Reserve CTI population.
DOD can and does contract with other universities and organizations
which provide ILR standards for language training. Through the National
Security Education Program, we have partnerships with the University of
Maryland, Georgetown University, University of Texas, Michigan State
University, Brigham Young University, Ohio State University, University
of Oregon, American Councils for International Education, University of
California at Los Angeles, and the University of Hawaii at Manoa.
4. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, can DOD contract with universities
and other organizations for language training?
Mrs. McGinn. The DOD can and does contract with other universities
and organizations, which provide ILR standards, for language training.
Through the National Security Education Program we have partnerships
with the University of Maryland, Georgetown University, University of
Texas, Michigan State University, Brigham Young University, Ohio State
University, University of Oregon, American Councils for International
Education, University of California at Los Angeles, and the University
of Hawaii at Manoa.
Additionally, the DOD contracts with universities, commercial
language schools, and other organizations to develop course materials,
teach, develop tests, conduct research, and oversee language immersion
programs, in support of its language training mission for military and
civilian personnel. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA)
contracts with Middlebury College to teach Slavic and Arabic languages,
Washington State University for Central Asian languages, and Ohio State
University for Asian languages. NSA also uses Diplomatic Language
Services to provide training in African, South Asian, and Central Asian
languages.
The Department purchases online commercial language training
products and services for individuals who are deployed, wish to learn a
language, or would like to maintain their language skills outside the
traditional classroom setting. Defense organizations frequently look to
universities for advanced language training in less commonly taught
languages. Defense contracts with commercial language schools to
provide tailored language training in specific languages or dialects,
modalities, and levels for specific defense mission requirements that
may be difficult to find in a traditional university, semester-bound
program.
5. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, before and after language training is
provided by the DLI to intelligence analysts and others, the trainees
are tested to check their reading and writing proficiency. These tests,
I understand, are written and administered by DLI instructors. Is that
correct, and if so, can one say that DLI has essentially developed the
test of its own effectiveness? If so, what can be done to have other
individuals or groups responsible for evaluating DLI students?
Mrs. McGinn. The DLIFLC tests students for reading, listening, and
speaking. These tests are developed by a testing staff separate from
the DLI. Moreover, DLIFLC is sensitive to the issue of independent
testing and evaluation. This is the reason that proficiency tests at
DLIFLC are designed, developed, validated, administered, and monitored
by the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (E&S). In addition
to the grade point average (GPA) as a graduation criterion, students
must achieve a specified level of proficiency on a Defense Language
Proficiency Test (listening and reading) and on an Oral Proficiency
Interview (OPI) in order to graduate. In essence, DLIFLC has two
independent testing systems, one conducted by the faculty and one
conducted by E&S, which is separate from and independent of the
faculty. At DLIFLC, as in all institutions of higher learning, the
faculty grades students on the basis of classroom performance, homework
assignments, and test performance. The student's GPA is derived from
this assessment. As noted, to graduate, the student must then achieve a
specified score on the proficiency tests. These proficiency tests serve
as a check on the performance-based GPA.
6. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, does the Department currently test
oral language proficiency? If so, who is responsible for this testing?
If not, why, and what steps, if any, will you take to test language
proficiency, and how soon?
Mrs. McGinn. The Department has an oral proficiency testing program
conducted by the Evaluations and Standardization Directorate at the
DLIFLC. Through in-house resources and contractual relationships with
the American Council of Teachers of Foreign Languages and the State
Department's Foreign Service Institute, the Directorate offers OPIs in
a total of 121 languages and dialects. DLIFLC is investigating the
possibility of conducting such interviews via the internet and
computer-based testing in order to increase the magnitude of its test
capacity.
7. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, what is the role of the DLI?
Mrs. McGinn. The DLIFLC is the Department's premier language
training institution. DLIFLC provides foreign language education,
training, evaluation, and sustainment at ILR standards for DOD
personnel in order to meet the Department's language needs.
DLIFLC performs the critical role of providing basic, intermediate,
and advanced language training to more than 7,600 military students
(resident and non-resident personnel). Many of the students are crypto-
linguists, interrogators, and Foreign Area Officers.
8. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, does DLI support the Services, as
well as the SOCOM?
Mrs. McGinn. The DLIFLC supports and responds to all identified and
emerging needs of SOCOM. Evidence of this support includes the dramatic
shift in the types of education and training materials provided by
DLIFLC to deploying members in response to identified needs. Examples
of these innovations are DLIFLC-provided Mobile Training Teams (MTTs),
Video Tele-training, Language Survival Kits, and online instructional
materials. Since 2001, DLIFLC dispatched 300 MTTs to provide targeted
training to more than 32,000 personnel. Deploying units received over
200,000 Language Survival Kits (mostly Iraqi, Dari, and Pashto). Field
support modules outlining the geo-political situation, cultural facts,
fundamental language skills, key phrases, and commands are available
for 19 countries in 17 languages on the DLIFLC's Web site. There are
currently 31 online language survival courses. In addition, computer-
based sustainment training is available via their Global Language
Online Support System. All online support is available to all
servicemembers.
DLIFLC offers a variety of training programs to support SOCOM basic
and advanced language training demands. DLI has a permanent liaison in
the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and
School at Fort Bragg, NC, to coordinate curriculum and testing
development, and has established permanent Language Training
Detachments at Little Creek, VA, and Coronado, CA, supporting the
Navy's Special Warfare Groups.
9. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, what are you doing to help meet
SOCOM's needs?
Mrs. McGinn. As the DOD Senior Language Authority and Chair of the
Defense Language Steering Committee (DLSC), I am personally involved in
providing senior level oversight of language needs throughout the
Department.
At our monthly DLSC meetings, which include general/flag officers
and Senior Executive Service representatives from the Services, Office
of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff, combatant commands, and
SOCOM, we discuss DOD language issues and needs.
One example of a SOCOM requirement addressed was the need for
increased numbers of OPIs. We are looking at technology as a possible
solution to respond to SOCOM's need to deliver large numbers of OPIs in
a short time period. We anticipate that ongoing OPI automation research
initiatives will offer the ability to provide the tests on demand, as
well as offer student diagnostics and screening for potential language
candidates. The systems we are exploring include the Versant computer-
based testing with either speech recognition software or human scorers
grading the tests, and OPI computerized tests.
Additionally, I have ensured that appropriate funding is provided,
and as a result, the DLIFLC has increased their faculty of certified
OPI testers from 288 to 398. We will continue to monitor these
initiatives to ensure SOCOM's and the Services' requirements are met.
CRITICAL LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES
10. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, in your opening statement you noted
that, at the beginning of fiscal year 2007, DOD had ``141,887 Active
component; 77,319 Reserve component; and 38,246 civilian members'' who
reported having foreign language skills. Of those reporting language
skills, how many have skills in critical languages such as Arabic,
Chinese, Russian, Hindi, or Farsi?
Mrs. McGinn. Our current self-reported capability is outlined
below. Please note that these are self-reports and not tested
proficiency.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Language Capabilities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arabic.................................................... 8,674
Chinese................................................... 5,530
Russian................................................... 8,118
Farsi..................................................... 1,863
Hindi..................................................... 933
------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, what percentage of those critical
language speakers has more than basic language skills--that is, they
can engage confidently in complex conversations on a broad range of
topics or conduct translations with a high degree of accuracy?
Mrs. McGinn. Personnel who tested or professed to have skills at
ILR skill Level 2 or above possess more than basic language skills.
Those who tested or professed at ILR skill Level 3 or above are
considered professionally qualified, i.e., they can engage confidently
in complex linguistic transactions. Of the total 25,118 people claiming
a capability in Arabic, Chinese, Russian, Farsi, and Hindi, 13,815 (55
percent) have tested and/or self-professed at Level 2 or above. Our
current capability at Level 3 or higher is 4,672 (18.6 percent) of the
total population that reported a capability in such critical languages.
SPENDING ON CONTRACTORS
12. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, what is the total number of
linguists that DOD currently has under its various contracts and what
is the total sum of money spent on these contracts?
Mrs. McGinn. As Executive Agent, the Army is authorized to contract
up to 10,000 linguists, and will spend less than $900 million during
fiscal year 2007.
LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL SKILL RETENTION--SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
13. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, I understand that when Army
personnel get assigned to the SOCOM most of them (aside from the
Rangers) become ``Special Operations Forces (SOF) for life'' and for
the Army Special Forces, they are focused on one region, so that any
investment in language or other training by SOCOM is retained with
these individuals by the command. However, Naval Special Warfare
Command personnel do not necessarily focus exclusively on one region
for their careers. The Marine Corps and Air Force do not have permanent
Special Operations Forces personnel. What is the impact of this
difference among the Services, and what would be the advantage of
having Marine Corps and Air Force personnel who are ``SOF for life''
from the perspective of language and cultural awareness training and
retention?
Mrs. McGinn. Language expertise and cultural familiarity are
enhanced by multiple assignments in units focused on a specific region.
Although ``SOF for Life'' is not an official program or a term that
directly applies to regionalization, it is true that Army and Navy
forces spend a higher percentage of their careers in SOF units. Army
SOF is particularly well-organized to ensure that its enlisted force
gains regional expertise through repetitive assignments. The Marine
Special Operations Advisory Group requires regionalization and is
maturing on the Army model. Regionalization is less important to Air
Force units, except for a squadron that specializes in training foreign
forces. ``SOF for Life,'' as a concept for ensuring repetitive
assignments in Special Operations units, irrespective of regional
orientation, is inherently desirable. The advantage is recoupment on
the investment in SOF training and SOF operational experience.
HERITAGE RECRUITING--SECURITY CLEARANCE OBSTACLES AND DISCRIMINATION
14. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, as you mentioned, the DOD is now
planning to make a concerted effort to recruit the ``heritage'' first-
and second-generation American citizens with foreign language expertise
to serve in positions requiring language proficiency. However,
committee staff are informed that there will be special requirements
placed on these recruits--specifically, that they will have to take
polygraph examinations that non-``heritage'' speakers will not have to
take. Is this true? If so, what is the rationale for this requirement?
Mrs. McGinn. There are no requirements for United States citizens
who are recruited as ``heritage'' speakers to take a Counter
Intelligence (CI) Scope Polygraph, unless they are serving in positions
requiring special security clearances.
Non-United States citizens who enlist are usually not placed in
military occupational specialties requiring security clearances. An
exception to this policy is for non-United States citizen accessions
under the 09L Interpreter/Translator program. 09L personnel may be
granted limited access to classified information in order to bridge the
gap between restrictive security clearance guidelines for non-United
States citizens and the necessary utilization of these personnel. To do
this, they are administered a CI Scope Polygraph as part of satisfying
the conditions for the exception to policy (DOD 5200.2-R, Personnel
Security Program), approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, dated June 5, 2006.
15. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, if these citizens joined the
military like any other citizen, and served in positions that do not
require language expertise, would they be subjected to polygraph
examinations? If not, why this special treatment for linguists?
Mrs. McGinn. There are no requirements for United States citizens
who are recruited as ``heritage'' speakers to take a CI Scope
Polygraph, unless they are serving in positions requiring special
security clearances.
Non-United States citizens who enlist are usually not placed in
military occupational specialties requiring security clearances. An
exception to this policy is for non-United States citizen accessions
under the 09L Interpreter/Translator program. 09L personnel may be
granted limited access to classified information in order to bridge the
gap between restrictive security clearance guidelines for non-United
States citizens and the necessary utilization of these personnel. To do
this, they are administered a CI Scope Polygraph as part of satisfying
the conditions for the exception to policy (DOD 5200.2-R, Personnel
Security Program), approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, dated June 5, 2006.
16. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, what is the Department doing to
address the backlog of applicants with language ability who are
awaiting security clearances, including--amazingly--individuals for
whom the intelligence community has provided the funding through the
National Security Education Program to live in foreign countries and
study foreign languages?
Mrs. McGinn. The Department recognizes the compelling need to
address the obstacles involved in gaining security clearances for
applicants who have studied extensively overseas. We recognize, working
in close concert with our colleagues in the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI) that too often the current system screens
out or delays the successful processing of highly-qualified candidates,
with considerable backgrounds in regional areas and languages, who have
studied extensively overseas. This also includes highly qualified
candidates who represent ``heritage learner'' populations in the United
States. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, together with the Office of the Under Secretary for
Intelligence, has teamed with ODNI to develop and implement a number of
important initiatives:
Expand the Adjudicator's Desk Reference (ADR). We are
providing additions to the ADR guide with explanations about
NSEP. These changes were reviewed by a working group meeting in
January 2007 and retraining has started.
Establish subject matter expertise consultation availability
to adjudicators for cultural background information during the
adjudication phase.
Expand the current DOD Adjudicator Training Course to capture
changes made to the ADR.
Issue a memorandum to components and DOD agencies apprising
them of these initiatives.
Establish a code to identify NSEP individuals as a priority
at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). We will be seeking
to negotiate with Central Adjudication Facilities to adjudicate
these investigations on a priority basis.
Propose additional questions for OPM investigators to ask
NSEP candidates.
In addition to these specific security-related efforts, we are
investigating, in close coordination with the Assistant Director, DNI/
Chief Human Capital Officer, opportunities to begin processing NSEP
Scholars and Fellows for security clearances earlier in the process so
that the gap between degree completion and hiring can be substantially
shortened. Executive Order #12968 (Access to Classified Information,
Section 1.1e) defines employees eligible for security clearances to
include ``grantees of an agency.'' We believe that, given the federally
mandated service requirement associated with NSEP awards, NSEP Scholars
and Fellows are eligible for security clearances as ``grantees of the
DOD.'' We are working with our Office of General Counsel to seek ways
in which this definition can allow us to begin the security clearance
process immediately after the individual receives an award.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
NATIONAL LANGUAGE CONFERENCE WHITE PAPER
17. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, the White Paper issued by the DOD
summarized the recommendations of the 2004 National Language
Conference. According to testimony from DOD Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness Michael Dominguez at a
hearing before the Senate Oversight of Government Management
Subcommittee in January, DOD worked with other Federal agencies to
develop the White Paper to spark public consideration. What Federal
agencies worked with DOD on the White Paper?
Mrs. McGinn. The White Paper is a result of the 2004 National
Language Conference, which brought together over 300 leaders and
practitioners from Federal, State, and local government agencies,
academic institutions, business and industry, foreign language interest
groups, and foreign nations. Among the agencies participating were the
Departments of Commerce, Labor, Justice, State, Education, Homeland
Security, and Health and Human Services, as well as the Central
Intelligence Agency.
18. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, DOD's White Paper was extremely
effective in laying out the critical steps needed to address the
Nation's shortfall in language skills. The first recommendation calls
for strong and comprehensive leadership, specifically, a national
language strategy to be developed and implemented by a National
Language Director and for a Coordination Council to coordinate
implementation of the strategy. Have the NSLI partners laid out a 5- to
10-year strategy to address the Nation's foreign language needs? If so,
please provide.
Mrs. McGinn. When the NSLI was launched by the President in January
2006, it was understood that the actions of the four partners were only
the beginning of a decades-long thrust to build language capacity
within our Nation. The NSLI is designed to develop foreign language
capability in critical need languages for the long-term, and
fundamentally change the way foreign language competence is taught and
valued in the United States. In some cases, the NSLI specifically
targeted goals to be achieved by the end of the decade. For example,
the Department of Education's proposed Language Teacher Corps was
designed to have 1,000 new foreign language teachers in our schools by
the end of the decade. Increasing the number of foreign language
teachers is critical to the success of the NSLI.
19. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, is there a leadership structure in
place today that mirrors that recommended by the White Paper? If so,
what steps are being taken to sustain and institutionalize continued
leadership in language education in future administrations?
Mrs. McGinn. At the present time, leadership for NSLI is provided
by the White House through the Domestic Policy Council (DPC), with
leaders from the agencies involved. As NSLI becomes fully-funded and
gains momentum, the programs should become institutionalized to
continue into the future.
20. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, I understand that DOD is working
with the Departments of Labor and Commerce to coordinate regional
language summits this summer. What Federal agencies have been involved
in NSLI? Please describe how each of those agencies have participated
in NSLI.
Mrs. McGinn. When the NSLI was first launched, the DPC lead invited
numerous Federal agencies to meetings with the four major partners:
Department of State, Department of Education, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, and the DOD. Additionally, several
of those agencies joined the frequent conference calls among the major
partners.
The USD(P&R) invited the Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCOs) of 12
Federal agencies to review the proposed model for the Language Corps
and to begin the process of identifying their language needs. The
Language Corps is one element of the NSLI. It was a productive meeting,
with the CHCOs agreeing to a mutually beneficial way ahead. The
Language Corps should prove to be a strong contribution of the NSLI,
and will continue to have interagency involvement as we execute the
pilot program.
NATIONAL SECURITY LANGUAGE INITIATIVE STAKEHOLDERS
21. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, according to testimony received by
the Senate Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee in January,
there is a lack of coordination among the NSLI partners and
stakeholders outside of the government. One witness said that if there
is a Federal Government strategy for addressing the shortfall in
foreign language skills, it isn't very well known. How are DOD and the
NSLI partners working with language associations and other stakeholders
to develop a strategy and coordinate activities?
Mrs. McGinn. The DOD is delighted that the Departments of Commerce
and Labor have joined us in sponsoring the Language Summits this
summer. The Flagship Universities in Oregon, Ohio, and Texas are
hosting the State-level summits with multiple stakeholders, including
the local business and corporate sectors. The end result should be an
action plan to address the demand for language skills in each State's
future workforce. We hope to promulgate these action plans as best
practices for other States.
22. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, how often have the NSLI partners
meet with each other since the beginning of the year?
Mrs. McGinn. The DPC lead and the previous Department of Education
coordinator conducted frequent telephone conferences this year, to keep
the partners updated on status of the NSLI and to develop outreach
strategies.
23. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, how often have the NSLI partners
met with stakeholder groups this year?
Mrs. McGinn. While I can only speak for the DOD, I'm sure you will
find a similar level of activity at Departments of State and Education,
and at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
The complex efforts behind the Defense Language Transformation, the
conduct of the National Security Education Program, and launchings of
the three language pipelines and Language Corps keeps DOD in regular
dialogue with university and college presidents; Oregon, Michigan, and
Ohio K-12 school systems; language associations; heritage communities;
and other Federal agencies.
An obvious gap is outreach to the business community. We will begin
to rectify this gap this summer. With our Department of Labor and
Commerce partners, we will sponsor three State-level language summits
in Oregon, Ohio, and Texas. Invited stakeholders include local business
and State corporate employers. The outcome of the summits should be an
action plan that the States can implement to build the language
capacity they need in their future workforce.
24. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, who is the NSLI point of contact
for foreign language stakeholder groups?
Mrs. McGinn. The DPC took the lead for the NSLI in 2006. The
current DPC point of contact is Ms. Kelly Scott.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mel Martinez
DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
25. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, the DOD is taking several steps
to expand language training, including initiatives at the Service
Academies and within ROTC programs. The DLI is still the DOD's premier
for teaching foreign languages to U.S. service men and women. The DLI
mission is more critical now than ever. While I note the increase in
funding for DLI from $77 million in fiscal year 2001 to $203 million in
fiscal year 2007, its capabilities remain limited. In light of the
current demand placed on language qualified personnel, is DLI the right
size?
Mrs. McGinn. The DLIFLC currently trains all student load
requirements at the capacity required by the DOD. DLIFLC has proven its
capability to surge and increase student throughput since 2001. As the
DOD Senior Language Authority, I recognize that DLIFLC is a critical
training source, and as the Chair of the DLSC, we conduct an Annual
Program Review to provide oversight and ensure capacity and capability
to respond to DOD requirements.
26. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, what changes are being
contemplated (if any) to expand the size and capacity of DLI?
Mrs. McGinn. As the Chair of the DLSC and the DOD Senior Language
Authority, I provide oversight of the DLIFLC to ensure that it has the
resources, capability, and capacity to respond to current and emerging
needs.
DLIFLC currently trains all student load requirements at the
capacity required. The DLSC contemplates DLIFLC size and capacity
issues through a comprehensive annual performance review meeting.
DLIFLC military construction is currently programmed to add three
general instruction buildings and renovate two existing structures
beginning in fiscal year 2008 (available for occupancy beginning in
fiscal year 2011). These new facilities, along with several ongoing
renovation projects and leasing actions, will add 202 classrooms (with
accompanying faculty offices and other administrative spaces).
27. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, is the current enrollment
(approximately 4,400) at its peak?
Mrs. McGinn. Due to the increased need for language, we expect to
see continued expansion of the DLIFLC's mission in the area of language
familiarization, post-basic enhancement, and basic acquisition. The
DLIFLC student population for fiscal year 2007 is approximately 4,100,
which represents a 65 percent increase over fiscal year 2001,
approximately 3,700 of whom are resident at the Presidio of Monterey.
The other 400 represent an average daily attendance in a nonresident
program. Over the next 4 years, increased projections will bring the
student population to approximately 4,800 per year.
28. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, should we look more to the other
sources of language training you outlined to meet language training
requirements?
Mrs. McGinn. As part of my oversight role for the Defense Language
Program, we are constantly evaluating whether we are meeting Service
language training requirements. The Services have included other
sources of training to meet their needs, such as online learning and
other ``just-in-time'' training sources.
Language training requirements are complex. For basic language
instruction designed to achieve mission capable levels of proficiency,
the programs through the DLIFLC and the language programs of SOCOM are
the best sources, and both meet basic training load requirements. Other
language training, such as pre-deployment training, is conducted by the
military departments.
In addition, we continue to seek and build basic language
competence in our Officer Corps. The Services stress the importance of
foreign language skill acquisition in Service Academies and in their
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs. The military
departments built recruiting plans that include recruiting students
with foreign language skills and heritage backgrounds into their ROTC
programs. They implemented various incentive programs to encourage ROTC
cadets and midshipmen to study foreign languages in order to increase
the number of ROTC cadets and midshipmen graduating with at least two
semesters of foreign language studies prior to commissioning.
The three Service academies have enhanced their foreign language
study programs to develop pre-accession language and cultural
knowledge. They have expanded study abroad, summer immersion, and
foreign academy exchange opportunities, and added instructor staff for
strategic languages. The United States Military Academy and the United
States Air Force Academy now require all cadets to complete two
semesters of language study. The United States Naval Academy requires
its nontechnical degree-seeking midshipmen to take four semesters of
language study.
29. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, in your testimony you outline
several courses of action/options available to react to an unexpected
surge in the requirement for a set of languages (based on an emerging
contingency), including calling on personnel within the ranks and
accessing contract linguists. Does DLI also have the capacity to shift
gears and place emphasis on new language capability requirements?
Mrs. McGinn. The DLIFLC has the capacity to respond to unexpected
surge requirements and shift gears to meet new language requirements.
DLIFLC is establishing an emerging language plan to meet unexpected
surge requirements. This plan includes four phases:
(1) Developing tests to measure current capabilities;
(2) Providing distance learning through web-delivered
materials for maintaining and enhancing skills;
(3) Offering resident short courses for sustaining and
increasing the existing proficiency of members; and
(4) Creating on-the-shelf, initial skills, resident training
programs for students with no previous exposure to the needed
language.
These four phases will be used in combination or individually to
meet rising and emerging low density language requirements.
30. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, you also note that prioritizing
specific language/regional skills carry some risk that we will not
project the right area for where the next contingency develops. Is
there a linkage between our Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) assessment
of threats and risk and the priorities we place on selected regions and
languages?
Mrs. McGinn. There is a strong link between the QDR assessment of
threats and risks and the language capabilities the Defense Language
Program develops. One of the principal tools for this is the Strategic
Language List (SLL). The SLL identifies the languages for which the DOD
requires substantial in-house capability to support current and future
plans, programs, and operations, as well as those languages for which
the Department requires on-call capability in-house for crisis and
emergency response. The SLL assists the Department in its assessment of
the threats and determination of the risks we are willing to accept.
31. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, how do we integrate the
potential regional/language requirements of emerging threats into our
language training plans?
Mrs. McGinn. The Department is approaching this challenge with a
four-phased plan:
(1) Developing tests to measure our capabilities;
(2) Providing distance learning through web-delivered
materials for maintaining and enhancing these skills;
(3) Offering resident short courses for sustaining and
increasing the existing proficiency of members; and
(4) Creating on-the-shelf initial skills resident training
programs for students with no previous exposure to the needed
language.
These four phases will be used in combination or individually to
meet rising and emerging low density language requirements at the
DLIFLC.
The Department relies on policy guidance and threat assessments to
determine which languages become part of the four-phased plan. These
inputs help generate the Department's SLL, which identifies the
languages for which the DOD requires substantial in-house capability to
support current and future plans, programs, and operations, as well as
those languages for which the DOD requires on-call capability in-house
for crisis and emergency response.
REWARDING OFFICERS FOR LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL CAPABILITIES
32. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, in your testimony, you and
retired Major General Scales both make the point that today's
operations require new skills, and our military leaders must be
comfortable working with coalition partners in foreign environments.
General Scales recommended that military departments find ways to
reward mid- to senior-grade officers for excellent performance in
advisory, intelligence, and attache-type duties. In your testimony, you
outline efforts to strengthen military department foreign area office
(FAO) programs. Without de-emphasizing vital combat skills, it seems
like there is still more room to provide incentives to encourage
officers to seek out and excel in those positions. Besides the increase
on foreign language proficiency pay, what else does the DOD do to
encourage excellent performance as a foreign advisor or an attache?
Mrs. McGinn. DOD members are driven to provide excellent
performance in all jobs, whether serving as a foreign advisor or
attache. Additionally, since attaches and advisors are specially
selected for these positions, they are provided targeted training
before assuming these duties. For example before becoming an attache,
the selectee must attend specialized and focused training specific to
the attache, at the Joint Military Attache School, as well as
additional language training as necessary.
There are many incentives available to FAOs, which make the program
desirable initially, and assists in retaining FAOs once in the program.
The initial training provided to all FAOs is cited as a major incentive
to attract the highest quality candidates. A fully-funded Graduate
degree, learning a language at the DLIFLC, and in-country immersion
training are the premier incentives for FAOs to join the program. The
recent improvements in career and promotion opportunities also
encourage potential FAOs to select this career field.
Additionally, FAOs are entitled to receive a FLPB and can qualify
for up to $1,000 per month based on the number of languages spoken and
proficiency levels.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense will continue to review the
Service FAO programs, and related efforts, to ensure we are providing
the right incentives.
33. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, has the Department considered
incentives, like adding general/flag officer FAO positions in selected
foreign service functions to provide room to advance beyond the rank of
colonel (e.g., defense attaches, military advisors or selected senior
staff positions within Pentagon and regional combatant commanders'
staffs)?
Mrs. McGinn. DOD Directive 1315.17 directs the Secretaries of the
Military Departments to design ``FAO programs to provide opportunity
for promotion into the general/flag officer ranks.'' To that end, the
Department is in the process of identifying specific Service and Joint
General and Flag Officer billets that would be logical career
progressions for FAOs. The candidate positions include those Defense
Attache and Office of Defense Cooperation positions coded for a
general/flag officer (e.g., Russia, China, and the United Kingdom), as
well as positions in the Services, combatant commands, and the Joint
Staff that require considerable political-military acumen (e.g., in the
intelligence and strategic plans and policy areas). The goal is to
identify billets that would benefit from a general officer FAO serving
in that position and have the assignments rotate among the Services to
allow equal opportunity and the time needed to identify, train, and
promote an FAO to the rank of general/flag officer.
34. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, how do we approach the
requirement to develop language and cultural awareness training within
the Reserve components?
Mrs. McGinn. Members of the Reserve components have language and
cultural training programs available that include, but are not limited
to, classroom instruction, individual and group tutoring, online
language courses, and immersion programs--both continental United
States and outside the continental United States. Additionally, Reserve
component members can enroll in the DLIFLC resident intermediate and
advanced language courses, continuing education courses, and DLIFLC
online services. The Reserve components continue to research new means
for administering language and culture training that is conducive to
their unique situation. Language and cultural awareness training within
the Reserve components mirrors the training that is accomplished in the
Active components vis-a-vis pre-deployment training.
In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006 allowed the Department to align foreign language proficiency
payment for Reserve and Active components by increasing the Reserve
proficiency pay ceiling up to $12,000 per year. By providing members a
foreign language proficiency incentive, we expect an increase in
Reserve component members acquiring and/or improving their foreign
language proficiency.
35. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, their unique training conditions
make finding time more difficult. Do members of the National Guard and
Reserves also have access to language and cultural training and are
they also rewarded/compensated like the Active component?
Mrs. McGinn. Yes, the Reserve components have access to the DLIFLC
resident intermediate, advanced, continuing education courses, and
online services. In regard to Reserve compensation for language, we are
currently finalizing the DOD FLPB policy. This policy will align FLPB
payments for Reserve and Active components. As a result, Reserve pay
will increase from $6,000 annually to a possible $12,000 annually,
consistent with Section 639 of Public Law 108-163, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.
DEFENSE LANGUAGE STEERING COMMITTEE AND THE WAY FORWARD
36. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, the President's NSLI launched
this year is designed to dramatically increase the number of Americans
learning critical foreign languages. I also note the DOD's effort to
take a comprehensive, deliberate look at what we need in this
increasingly important area, with the naming of the DLSC. It is
important that this effort to raise the priority of language and
regional expertise within our Nation and the DOD be sustained. While I
understand that that DLSC's assessment is not yet complete, what are
the preliminary findings?
Mrs. McGinn. The DLSC advises on DOD language issues. In this
regard, preliminary results of the self-assessment of foreign languages
within the Department indicate that there may be significant capability
not apparent in DOD management systems. The findings revealed that, as
of the current fiscal year, the Department had 141,887 Active
component; 77,319 Reserve component; and 38,246 civilian members of the
Total Force who reported having foreign language skills. We are
committed to ensure that policies mandate the screening of individuals
as part of the military accession and civilian hiring process. It must
be underscored that these are reported, not tested proficiencies at
this time.
While conducting this self assessment, we have initiated a broad
look at language requirements across the Department. Going forward,
these two initiatives should provide a basis for understanding the
Department's needs.
37. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, when will the results of their
work be released?
Mrs. McGinn. The DOD's comprehensive and deliberate approach to
increase language expertise is outlined in the DLTR, which is slated to
run through fiscal year 2008. The role of the DLSC is as an advisory
body that oversees progress on the DLTR and the Defense Language
Program. In this regard, the work of the committee is ongoing. The DLSC
will not assess NSLI progress, but will be kept informed of DOD's role
in support of NSLI.
38. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, what are the expectations of the
initiative to develop a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps (``Language
Corps'')?
Mrs. McGinn. The effort to establish a Language Corps responds to
the reality that the Federal Government can never possess the organic
capability to address immediate and emergency surge requirements across
all possible languages. The Corps is a highly innovative concept that
is designed to take advantage of the extensive and diverse array of
languages available in the American population. The organization will
identify, warehouse, and make these skills available when needed.
The 3-year pilot effort will enable the Department to build and
test prototype models to determine how a permanent Language Corps
should be established and function. The goal of the pilot is to recruit
a minimum of 1,000 members across a number of languages and
professions. As part of the pilot effort, we will conduct three
activation exercises in coordination with Federal partners, not only
from within the DOD, but the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and a domestic partner such as Federal Emergency
Management Agency or the Centers for Disease Control.
We are confident that, if successful, the Language Corps can emerge
as a major component of a long-term solution to national needs for
language competent professionals.
39. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, do you envision eventually
having the capability to ``call up'' these linguists from across the
Nation as we might do with a reservist?
Mrs. McGinn. The Language Corps will be composed of two pools of
members somewhat akin to the military model of Standby and Ready
Reserves. There will be a ``National Pool'' of members who volunteer to
serve and may be available during times of need. There will also be a
``Dedicated Sponsor Pool'' composed of individuals who agree to perform
duties in a defined position with a sponsoring Federal organization/
agency. This Dedicated Pool will be smaller in size than the National
Pool. The members of the Dedicated Pool will be committed to serve if
called upon, while members of the National Pool will be identified on
an ``as available'' basis. We are in the process of developing the
pilot, so exact procedures are not known at this time.
[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]