    [Senate Hearing 110-201]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 110-201, Pt. 5

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1547

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 5

                       EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                   ----------

                             APRIL 11 AND 25, 2007

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                2008--Part 5  EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                                      S. Hrg. 110-201 Pt. 5

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1547

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 5

                       EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                   __________

                             APRIL 11 AND 25, 2007

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
    HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York     ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
    MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              JOHN CORNYN, Texas
    JIM WEBB, Virginia                   JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

                       Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

                 Michael V. Kostiw, Replublican Staff Director

                                     ______

               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

                       JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman

    EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JOHN WARNER, Virginia
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    E. BENAJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska        LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
    EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   JOHN CORNYN, Texas
    HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York     MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

                                      (ii)
    ?

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
      Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs at the National Nuclear Security
      Administration and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the
         Proliferation Security Initiative at the Department of Defense
                                 april 11, 2007

                                                                       Page
    Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, U.S. Senator from the State of Texas......     3
    Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from the State of Indiana...     4
    Nunn, Hon. Sam, Co-Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative...........    10
    Tobey, Hon. William H., Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
      Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration,
      U.S. Department of Energy......................................    37
    Benkert, Hon. Joseph A., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
      Defense for Global Security Affairs, Department of Defense.....    45

     Efforts to Improve the Department of Defense's Language and Cultural
                             Awareness Capabilities
                                 april 25, 2007

    Scales, MG Robert H., Jr., USA (Ret.), President, Colgen, Inc....    69
    McGinn, Hon. Gail H., Deputy Under Secretary for Plans,
      Department of Defense..........................................    77
    Van Tilborg, Hon. Andre, Ph.D., Deputy Under Secretary for
      Science and Technology, Department of Defense..................    86

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 2007

                               U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
                                      and Capabilities,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

      NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS AT THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
      ADMINISTRATION AND THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM AND THE
         PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in
    Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Reed, E. Benjamin
    Nelson, Warner, Collins, and Dole.
        Other senators present: Senators Levin and Chambliss.
        Committee staff member present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director.
        Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
    Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional
    staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Jessica L.
    Kingston.
        Committee Members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
    assistant to Senator Kennedy; David E. Bonine, assistant to
    Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
    Benjamin Rinaker, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Mark J.
    Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
    assistant to Senator Chambliss; Lindsey Neas, assistant to
    Senator Dole; and John L. Goetchius, assistant to Senator
    Martinez.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Reed. Good morning. First let me welcome our
    witnesses this morning, Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Richard
    Lugar. Thank you both. I don't know if we can fully appreciate
    the contributions you've made to securing the world and
    protecting people from the worst possible situation through
    your efforts as United States Senators, and your continuing
    effort, Senator Nunn, in leading the way for sensible
    nonproliferation policy.
        I have a statement that I'd like to put in the record, just
    simply mentioning that we'll have two panels. We'll have
    Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar on one panel. Then on the second
    panel, we'll deal with the implementation issues with Will
    Tobey, the Deputy Administrator for Nuclear Nonproliferation at
    the National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of
    Energy (DOE); and Joseph Benkert, the Principal Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs.
        At this point, I invite my colleagues, to make brief
    opening statements. I know we're all very much interested in
    listening to Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Reed follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Senator Jack Reed

        Good morning, it is a pleasure to welcome all of our witnesses here
    this morning. Senator Nunn, it is an honor to welcome you back to the
    Armed Services Committee and Senator Lugar it is always good to have
    you with us. We can never know what disasters were averted by your
    shared wisdom and prescience in setting up the Nunn-Lugar program to
    secure materials and keep scientists in the former Soviet Union
    gainfully employed in the early days following the collapse. Your
    continued support and dedication to the programs to secure nuclear and
    other weapons of mass destruction materials and technologies and to
    destroy the corresponding delivery systems has been unfailing. I think
    all my colleagues join me in thanking you for raising, and never
    letting us forget, the threats posed by unsecured nuclear, biological,
    and chemical, materials and weapons.
        We look forward to your thoughts on future proliferation threats
    and your views on the next steps for the Nunn-Lugar and
    nonproliferation programs at the Departments of Defense and Energy.
        Our second panel this morning will focus on those programs and
    their implementation. We look forward to a good discussion with Will
    Tobey, the Deputy Administrator for Nuclear Nonproliferation at the
    National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, and
    Joseph Benkert, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Global
    Security Affairs.
        All of our witness have submitted prepared opening statements and
    without objection those will be included in the hearing record.
        To allow more time for discussion with both panels, and because
    Senator Lugar has to meet an obligation in another committee, I will
    forgo any further opening remarks.

        Senator Reed. Senator Dole.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE

        Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly want to
    join you in welcoming all of our witnesses this morning, but
    especially, Senator Lugar, Senator Nunn--the founding fathers
    of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. We
    appreciate so much all of the work through the years, and your
    continuing concern, and look forward to hearing this morning
    how you size up the 15 years, whether the program has met the
    expectations at the time that it was authorized in 1992. Also,
    your recommendations with regard to what more the United States
    government might do to address the threat of proliferation in
    the post-September 11 world.
        I have a statement which I'll submit for the record, but in
    the interest of time, let me just again welcome you, and say
    what a privilege it is to have the opportunity to work with you
    on these vitally important issues.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Dole follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Senator Elizabeth Dole

        I would like to join Senator Reed in welcoming our witnesses this
    morning. It is a special honor to have with us today Senator Lugar and
    Senator Nunn, the founding fathers of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
    Reduction (CTR) program.
        I look forward to hearing your assessments of whether the CTR
    program has fulfilled the expectations you had when you first created
    it in 1992. We welcome your recommendations regarding what more the
    United States Government might do to address the threat of
    proliferation in the post-September 11 world.
        The threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) getting into the
    hands of terrorists remains the pre-eminent threat to our country and
    our allies, as the Director of National Intelligence confirmed in
    testimony before the Armed Services Committee just a few weeks ago,
        The programs and missions for which Mr. Benkert and Mr. Tobey are
    responsible--the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy
    (DOE)--are aimed at reducing that threat, and managing the consequences
    should such weapons ever gel into the wrong hands or be utilized. These
    programs are indeed vital to our national security.
        The CTR program is well known to many of us. Perhaps less well-
    known is the fact that DOE also has an impressive and growing array of
    nonproliferation programs, including Megaports and the Global Threat
    Reduction Initiative. The plutonium disposition program, however, faces
    challenges in both Russia and the United States. We look forward to a
    dialogue with Mr. Tobey about the way forward on that program. More
    generally, we are interested in our witnesses' assessments of the
    progress made to date, and your vision and recommendations regarding
    how these programs in both departments should proceed in the future.
        The fiscal year 2008 DOD and DOE budget requests demonstrate the
    administration's continuing commitment to threat reduction and
    nonproliferation programs. However, I note that the budget profile for
    CTR has been declining over the past few years, while the DOE budget is
    robust.
        I would be interested in the testimony of our witnesses today as to
    whether the fiscal year 2008 and future years budget, reflects the
    proper prioritization and sufficient resources and authorities for
    addressing the continuing threat we face. I believe that we in Congress
    must maintain and strengthen our support for these vital
    nonproliferation programs in the future.
        Let me again join our chairman in thanking our witnesses for their
    service and for appearing here today.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Dole.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I have no opening statement.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        We're joined by Senator Chambliss, who is not a member of
    the panel, but specifically wanted to be here this morning and
    participate. Thank you for joining us, Senator.

    STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
                                OF TEXAS

        Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
    letting me participate on this panel.
        I'm particularly pleased to be here because of Senator
    Lugar, who has been a great friend during my years in the
    House, and now in the Senate, being such a leader on this
    issue.
        But, most significantly, to be here to welcome my longtime
    dear friend, my constituent, formerly my Senator, Senator Sam
    Nunn. He is such a great American, such a great guy, and a guy
    who I don't get to spend enough time with, but who from time to
    time, I still use as a great resource. He's very generous with
    his time with me.
        I'm particularly pleased that he's here today to talk about
    an issue that he and Senator Lugar had been at the forefront on
    for decades. This is a very complex world that we live in
    today, and we're looking at countries today who are developing
    nuclear weapons that we never imagined would develop those
    weapons in years' past. These two gentlemen have been at the
    forefront of trying to make sure that we remove the opportunity
    from any bad guy--terrorist or potential terrorist, or
    countries who potentially might use those weapons in the wrong
    way--they have really provided a pathway to trying to make sure
    that the bad guys never got those weapons in their hands, by
    not having the ability to develop those weapons.
        So, I do thank them for being here, I thank them for their
    leadership on these issues, and I look forward to their
    testimony today, and continuing to work very closely with both
    Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar to make sure that we continue
    down the path of removing the capability of the terrorist world
    from ever being able to develop nuclear weapons or nuclear
    material for the wrong reasons.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Lugar, I understand that you have to be at another
    hearing at 10 o'clock. We'll begin with your testimony and then
    we'll go to Senator Nunn.

    STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
                               OF INDIANA

        Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
    Dole, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It's a very
    real pleasure to be here with my friend, Sam Nunn.
        The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was,
    and remains, the number one national security priority facing
    the United States, and the international community. Fifteen
    years ago, Sam Nunn and I determined that our Government had to
    address the threats posed by the dissolution of the Soviet
    Union. As political and military leaders backed away from a
    Cold War posture, the arsenals they had developed to threaten
    and deter each other remained capable of killing the entire
    American population, and rendering our country a wasteland.
        After the fall of the Soviet Union, the new nations of
    Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan emerged as the third-, fourth-
    , and eighth-largest nuclear powers in the world. Amidst
    disarray in the Soviet political system, and threats from
    Moscow, Kiev, Minsk and Almaty, debated whether they should
    remain nuclear powers, or abandon the costly and dangerous
    Soviet-made weapons system.
        Sam and I challenged the United States, and our former
    enemies, to work together on a programmatic response to the
    threat. The Nunn-Lugar Program was the answer. The program
    helped convince the three new nuclear powers to remove all of
    their nuclear weapons from their territories. In addition, it
    became the primary tool to which the United States would work
    with Russia, to destroy its mass of nuclear, chemical, and
    biological warfare capacity.
        I have with me today the Nunn-Lugar scorecard, which is off
    to my right. My office systematically tracks the elimination of
    each warhead, missile, bomber, and submarine. To date, the
    program has destroyed more weapons than the combined arsenals
    of the United Kingdom, France, and China. The successes notated
    on these charts were never a foregone conclusion. Even after 15
    years, creativity and constant vigilance are required to ensure
    that the Nunn-Lugar Program is not encumbered by bureaucratic
    obstacles, starved by inadequate funding, or undercut by
    political disagreements.
        Through the ups and downs of the U.S.-Russian relationship,
    the Nunn-Lugar Program has been a constant. Today, while
    bilateral relations are strained in other areas, the program
    continues its important mission. But we still have a lot of
    work to do in the former Soviet Union.
        Mr. Chairman, Sam and I could relate story after story
    accumulated over 15 years as we watched the progress of
    safeguarding and destroying these weapons proceed. But, these
    successful efforts still face two challenges. First, we
    continue to complicate our own efforts to destroy WMD through
    self-imposed bureaucratic red tape. Second, more resources are
    needed to capitalize on opportunities to advance the threat
    reduction process.
        In 1991, concerns surrounding Russian intent led some
    Members of Congress to include in the original Nunn-Lugar
    legislation a requirement that the President certify annually
    that each recipient is ``committed to'' meeting six conditions.
    While well-intentioned, these certification requirements have
    sometimes delayed or complicated efforts to destroy WMD. In
    some years, more than half the fiscal year passed before the
    certification process was completed for that year.
        This restricted Nunn-Lugar funds and delayed some weapons
    dismantlement projects for months. The certifications have also
    wasted hundreds of man-hours. Instead of interdicting WMD
    shipments, or identifying the next A.Q. Khan, our
    nonproliferation experts spend their time assembling
    certification, or waiver, determinations.
        The certification requirements are counter-intuitive
    because they imply that the value of Nunn-Lugar activities
    diminishes when our differences with Moscow are amplified. In
    my judgment, the opposite is true. The benefits of verifiable
    destruction of WMD in Russia and of steady Nunn-Lugar contacts
    become even more valuable when other aspects of the U.S.-
    Russian relationship are experiencing friction. The bottom line
    is that safeguarding and eliminating WMD in cooperation with a
    willing government will almost always be in the national
    security interests of the United States and the burden of proof
    should be on those who believe otherwise.
        The Senate agrees with this proposition. In 2005, the
    Senate approved an amendment that I offered to eliminate these
    certification requirements by a 78-19 vote. Last year, the
    Senate adopted a similar amendment by unanimous consent.
    Unfortunately, these provisions were not included in the
    relevant conference agreements. I'm pleased that Secretary Rice
    and National Security Advisor Hadley have endorsed my efforts.
    I have, again, introduced this legislation, and urged the Armed
    Services Committee to adopt it and serve as a strong advocate
    during conference with the House.
        The second major impediment to Nunn-Lugar Program realizing
    its full potential is money. While not the subject of as many
    cinematic thrillers, the threat posed by proliferation of
    deadly pathogens rivals the more popularized ``loose nuke''
    threat. A large number of pathogens and disease strains remain
    scattered in various locations, often with poor security.
        Without a substantial funding increase, important
    biological projects will go unfunded, and dangerous pathogens
    such as anthrax, plague, smallpox, hemorrhagic fever, and avian
    influenza will be left unprotected and vulnerable to theft or
    diversion.
        I've written to Chairman Levin and Senator McCain urging
    them to add $100 million to the program's budget to respond to
    these threats. With these funds, we could begin projects in
    seven additional countries. Under the current funding request,
    no work will get underway in those countries for years. A $100
    million investment is a small amount when compared to the
    deaths and economic costs that would result from a biological
    weapons attack, pathogen outbreak or disease pandemic.
        Mr. Chairman, while the program continues its important
    work addressing threats to the former Soviet Union, new
    challenges are emerging. The world has watched closely as the
    Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program have
    proceeded. Ambassador Chris Hill still has difficult diplomatic
    spade work ahead, but we must begin to plan for the next step.
    If negotiations yield agreement with Pyongyang to eliminate its
    WMD and their means of delivery, the Nunn-Lugar Program has
    ready expertise to do this work. It will not be the only
    program employed, but it's a unique tool that may be available
    to the President.
        In 2003, Congress approved and the President signed the
    Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act. It authorized $50 million in Nunn-
    Lugar funding to be used outside the former Soviet Union. This
    authority has already been put to the use in Albania, where a
    new government turned to the United States to help deal with
    the previous government's secret 16 tons of chemical weapons,
    stored under minimal security.
        The Albanian experience reinforced that the Nunn-Lugar
    Program should have the flexibility to adjust to unforeseen
    contingencies. We should remove the $50 million limit on work
    outside the former Soviet Union. We should also give the
    Secretary of Defense the authority to implement Nunn-Lugar
    projects in difficult political and strategic environments
    without the risk that operations could be suspended because of
    unintended consequences of executive or legislative action.
        Today the $30 million Non-proliferation and Disarmament
    fund at the Department of State is the only U.S. non-
    proliferation program that operates with so-called
    ``notwithstanding authority.'' The Nunn-Lugar Programs should
    have similar flexibility. This authority would not preclude a
    congressional decision to adjust or limit the Nunn-Lugar
    Program's work and given causes. But, we should ensure that the
    potential for the work is not circumscribed unintentionally.
        Mr. Chairman, the Nunn-Lugar Program track record is
    impressive. Sam and I have traveled with the Program's experts
    extensively. They are committed, as we are, to protecting this
    country. We must continue to find ways to help them do their
    job better, and reduce the burdens we impose upon them.
        Governments around the world are seeking our assistance
    with dangerous weapons issues. For example, the Program could
    provide assistance to nations in Southeast Asia to secure
    pathogens and viruses. The secret chemical stockpile in Albania
    will not be the last WMD that is discovered. We must be
    prepared to go anywhere in the world, at anytime, with the
    resources necessary to eliminate those threats.
        Over the years, I've described Nunn-Lugar work to address
    threats posed by WMD as a window of opportunity. We never know
    how long that window will remain open. We should not let any
    opportunity pass to reduce the number of nuclear warheads, or
    to enhance our verification regimes. Our Government has the
    expertise and the capabilities to dramatically benefit this
    country's security. We must ensure that we have the political
    will and the resources to implement those programs devoted to
    these ends. I thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Senator Richard G. Lugar

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, and members of the subcommittee, it is
    a pleasure to be here today with my good friend, Sam Nunn.
        The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was and
    remains the number one national security threat facing the United
    States and the international community. Fifteen years ago, Sam Nunn and
    I determined that our Government had to address the threats posed by
    the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As political and military leaders
    backed away from a Cold War posture, the arsenals they had developed to
    threaten and deter each other remained capable of killing the entire
    American population and rendering our country a wasteland.
        After the fall of the Soviet Union, the new nations of Ukraine,
    Belarus, and Kazakhstan emerged as the third, fourth and eighth largest
    nuclear powers in the world. Amidst disarray in the Soviet political
    system and threats from Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, and Almaty debated whether
    they should remain nuclear powers or abandon the costly and dangerous
    Soviet-made weapons systems.
        Sam and I challenged the United States and our former enemies to
    work together on a programmatic response to the threat. The Nunn-Lugar
    Program was the answer. The program helped convince the three new
    nuclear powers to remove all of the nuclear weapons from their
    territory. In addition, it became the primary tool through which the
    United States would work with Russia to destroy its massive nuclear,
    chemical, and biological warfare capacity.
        I have with me today the Nunn-Lugar scorecard. My office
    systematically tracks the elimination of each warhead, missile, bomber,
    and submarine. To date, the program has destroyed more weapons than the
    combined arsenals of the United Kingdom, France, and China. The
    successes notated on these charts were never a foregone conclusion.
    Even after 15 years, creativity and constant vigilance are required to
    ensure that the Nunn-Lugar Program is not encumbered by bureaucratic
    obstacles, starved by inadequate funding, or undercut by political
    disagreements.
        Through the ups and downs of the U.S.-Russian relationship, the
    Nunn-Lugar Program has been a constant. Today, while bilateral
    relations are strained in other areas, the program continues to do its
    important work. But we still have a lot of work to do in the former
    Soviet Union.
        Mr. Chairman, Sam and I could relate story after story accumulated
    over 15 years as we watched the process of safeguarding and destroying
    these weapons proceed. But these successful efforts still face two
    challenges. First, we continue to complicate our own efforts to destroy
    WMD through self-imposed bureaucratic red tape. Second, more resources
    are needed to capitalize on opportunities to advance the threat
    reduction process.

                                 CERTIFICATIONS

        In 1991, concerns surrounding Russian intent led some members to
    include in the original Nunn-Lugar legislation a requirement that the
    President certify annually that each recipient is ``committed to''
    meeting six conditions. While well intentioned, these certification
    requirements have sometimes delayed or complicated efforts to destroy
    WMD. In some years, more than half the fiscal year passed before the
    certification process was completed. This restricted Nunn-Lugar funds
    and delayed some weapons dismantlement projects for months. The
    certifications also have wasted hundreds of man-hours. Instead of
    interdicting WMD shipments or identifying the next A.Q. Khan, our
    nonproliferation experts spend time assembling certification or waiver
    determinations.
        The certification requirements are counterintuitive because they
    imply that the value of Nunn-Lugar activities diminishes when our
    differences with Moscow are amplified. In my judgment, the opposite is
    true. The benefits of verifiable destruction of WMD in Russia and of
    steady Nunn-Lugar contacts become even more valuable when other aspects
    of the U.S.-Russian relationship are experiencing friction. The bottom
    line is that safeguarding and eliminating WMD in cooperation with a
    willing government will almost always be in the national security
    interest of the United States, and the burden of proof should be on
    those who believe otherwise.
        The Senate agrees with this proposition. In 2005, the Senate
    approved an amendment I offered to eliminate these certification
    requirements by a 78 to 19 vote. Last year, the Senate adopted a
    similar amendment by unanimous consent. Unfortunately, these provisions
    were not included in the relevant conference agreements. I am pleased
    that Secretary Rice and National Security Advisor Hadley have endorsed
    my efforts. I have, again, introduced this legislation and urge the
    Armed Services Committee to adopt it and serve as a strong advocate
    during conference with the House.

                                     FUNDS

        The second major impediment to the Nunn-Lugar Program realizing its
    full potential is money. While not the subject of as many cinematic
    thrillers, the threat posed by the proliferation of deadly pathogens
    rivals the more popularized ``loose nuke'' threat. A large number of
    pathogens and disease strains remain scattered in various locations,
    often with poor security.
        Without a substantial funding increase, important biological
    projects will go unfunded and dangerous pathogens such as anthrax,
    plague, smallpox, hemorrhagic fever, and avian influenza will be left
    unprotected and vulnerable to theft or diversion.
        I have written to Chairman Levin and Senator McCain urging them to
    add $100 million to the program's budget to respond to these threats.
    With these funds, we could begin projects in seven additional
    countries. Under the current funding request, no work will get underway
    in those countries for years. A $100 million investment is a small
    amount when compared to the deaths and economic costs that could result
    from a biological weapons attack, pathogen outbreak, or disease
    pandemic.

                                   THE FUTURE

        Mr. Chairman, while the program continues its important work
    addressing threats in the former Soviet Union, new challenges are
    emerging. The world has watched closely as the Six Power Talks on North
    Korea's nuclear weapons program have proceeded. Ambassador Chris Hill
    still has difficult diplomatic spade work ahead, but we must begin to
    plan for the next step. If negotiations yield an agreement with
    Pyongyang to eliminate its WMD and their means of delivery, the Nunn-
    Lugar Program has ready expertise to do this work. It will not be the
    only program employed, but it is a unique tool that must be available
    to the President.
        In 2003, Congress approved and the President signed the Nunn-Lugar
    Expansion Act. It authorized $50 million in Nunn-Lugar funding to be
    used outside the former Soviet Union. This authority has already been
    put to use in Albania, where a new government turned to the U.S. to
    help deal with the previous government's secret: 16 tons of chemical
    weapons stored under minimal security.
        The Albanian experience reinforced that the Nunn-Lugar Program
    should have the flexibility to adjust to unforeseen contingencies. We
    should remove the $50 million limit on work outside the former Soviet
    Union. We should also give the Secretary of Defense the authority to
    implement Nunn-Lugar projects in difficult political and strategic
    environments without the risk that operations could be suspended
    because of unintended consequences of executive or legislative action.
        Today, the $30 million Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund at the
    Department of State is the only U.S. nonproliferation program that
    operates with so-called ``Notwithstanding Authority.'' The Nunn-Lugar
    program should have similar flexibility. This authority would not
    preclude a congressional decision to adjust or limit the Nunn-Lugar
    program's work in given cases. But we should ensure that the potential
    for Nunn-Lugar work is not circumscribed unintentionally.
        Mr. Chairman, the Nunn-Lugar Program's track record is impressive.
    Sam and I have traveled with the program's experts extensively. They
    are committed, as we are, to protecting this country. We must continue
    to find ways to help them do their job better and reduce the burdens we
    impose upon them.
        Governments around the world are seeking our assistance with
    dangerous weapons issues. For example, the program could provide
    assistance to nations in Southeast Asia to secure pathogens and
    viruses. The secret chemical stockpile in Albania will not be the last
    WMD that is discovered. We must be prepared to go anywhere in the
    world, at any time, with the resources necessary to eliminate the
    threat.
        Over the years, I have described Nunn-Lugar work to address threats
    posed by WMD as a ``window of opportunity.'' We never know how long
    that window will remain open. We should not let any opportunity pass to
    reduce the number of nuclear warheads or to enhance our verification
    regimes. Our Government has the expertise and the capabilities to
    dramatically benefit the country's security. We must ensure that we
    have the political will and the resources to implement programs devoted
    to these ends.
        Thank you.

        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar.
        Senator Nunn, please?

        STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, CO-CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR THREAT
                               INITIATIVE

        Senator Nunn. Mr. Chairman, thank you. It's good to be back
    home, and to see old friends, and particularly to see the staff
    people who are still here, and the young lady sitting in back
    of you, Madelyn Creedon, is one of the best. It's very good to
    see Madelyn.
        It's also great to be able to see here and I didn't know he
    was coming, Jim Reed. We pass laws, but the people have to
    execute them. That's where the hard work comes in and Jim Reid
    has been one of those in charge of the Nunn-Lugar Program for a
    long time. Of course, we travel with him, we've gotten the
    benefit of his advice and counsel, and he has an excellent team
    of people.
        Jim, I know that Senator Lugar joins me in thanking you and
    your group for getting out there and getting the job done.
        It's great to be back again with colleagues, Senator Reed,
    Senator Dole, my old friend, Senator Warner, and my good friend
    from Georgia, Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Nelson, it's good to be with you, and I hope you
    express my greetings and appreciation to all of the other
    members of the committee, as well as the subcommittee.
        So, I'm honored to be here. I particularly want to endorse
    everything Senator Lugar said. I know he has to run in just a
    moment, but I want to emphasize the certification issue, and
    the fact that the very fundamental part of this program is,
    it's not foreign aid, it's in our security interest. The
    certification, as Senator Lugar said, is counter-intuitive,
    because it says, in effect, that if countries are on their good
    behavior, we'll help them, but when they're not on their good
    behavior is probably when we need to attend to the problems
    even more urgently. So, this is not foreign aid, it's
    fundamental in the security interests of the United States, and
    that's an important point.
        The other point I'd like to underscore that he made, was
    the importance of dangerous pathogens, the bio-threat. We
    haven't talked as much about that, that's been part of the
    Nunn-Lugar Program from the beginning. We haven't made nearly
    as much progress on that. The Russians' in my view and personal
    judgment, illegal behavior under the biological treaty during
    the Soviet Union days--they know more about the biological
    dangers than almost anyone, because they created a great deal
    of biological capability.
        I think we have to have a breakthrough in that regard. We
    haven't had it yet. We don't get as much cooperation on bio as
    we need to get from Russia, but we need to help them in their
    country, in the former Soviet Union on the bio-threat. They
    need to be partners with the United States all over the world.
        If you looked at the paper, Global Security Newswire, in
    the last 2 days, I don't know whether it was today or
    yesterday, Denmark just came up with an internal report, this
    is not part of the former Soviet Union, this is of course, a
    Western Democracy, and a great country. That said, a very large
    number of their labs handling very dangerous pathogens were
    basically insecure.
        I'm afraid we'd find that right here in this country, too.
    I think it's a major, major problem, and one of these days it's
    going to hit us, and we're going to have another report that
    says the failure of anticipation, and the failure of
    imagination. So, I hope that the words of Senator Lugar on the
    bio-threat will be given careful attention.
        In 1948, at the dawn of the nuclear age, General Omar
    Bradley said, and I'm quoting him, ``The world has achieved
    brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. Ours is a
    world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We know more about
    war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know
    about living.''
        If he were alive today, I believe it would surprise General
    Bradley to know that we've made it 62 years since Hiroshima and
    Nagasaki without the use of a nuclear weapon. But the fact that
    we have made it this far should not give us any false sense of
    comfort, or confidence, that we're going to make it the next 62
    years, or maybe even the next 20 years.
        We have important efforts underway, without any doubt, we
    have some successes--Senator Lugar has made that very clear
    here this morning--including the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction
    Programs, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the G8
    Global Partnership--where the words are perfect, the
    implementation, in my view, is sadly lacking--the Global
    Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, or the Proliferation
    Security Initiative (PSI), the rollback of Libya's nuclear
    program, which was very important, and U.N. Resolution 1540,
    which has all the right words, but we have a long, long way on
    a global basis, to have much implementation of Resolution 1540.
        President Bush has said we must do everything in our power
    to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons out of the
    hands of terrorists. The 9/11 Commission called for a maximum
    effort to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD, but, at the
    end of 2005, gave the Government a D for its progress in this
    area. In my view, the risk of a nuclear weapon today is
    growing, not receding.
        Countries like North Korea, and Iran, as we well know, are
    pushing international will to the brink by developing nuclear
    weapons technology, and in the case of North Korea, are
    unfortunately developing nuclear weapons themselves. A number
    of additional countries are considering developing the capacity
    to enrich uranium, to use as fuel for nuclear energy.
        I consider this a real tipping point. This gives those
    countries--if they do it--greater capacity to move quickly to a
    nuclear weapon program if they choose to do so. Now, it's
    perfectly legitimate to enrich. But, the difficulty is, under
    today's regimes, we cannot tell when someone moves from low
    enrichment to high enrichment, and that's the difference
    between making electricity and making deadly weapons.
        Stockpiles of loosely-guarded nuclear weapons materials are
    scattered around the world, offering inviting targets for theft
    or sale. We are working very hard on this, but we have a long
    way to go. In my view, if you look at the threat and you look
    at the response, and you look at the danger and you look at the
    response, I think the threat is outrunning our response.
        Because of an explosion of knowledge and information
    throughout the world, the know-how and expertise to build
    nuclear weapons and biological weapons is far more available.
    Terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons for the same reason that
    terrorists seized airplanes on September 11--to use them to
    inflict on the world the greatest possible human suffering,
    economic loss and geo-political chaos.
        Some nations that have had nuclear weapons since the
    signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are now increasing
    their reliance on nuclear weapons. Not exactly an example we
    need in the nonproliferation quest.
        Some nations that have gained nuclear weapons outside the
    Nuclear NPT seek to legitimize their nuclear status.
        Now, there is good news. The good news is that the
    potential for conflict between the major powers, and in
    particular, between the United States and Russia, has
    dramatically declined. Though both countries, for strange
    reasons to me, at least, seem reluctant to act on it, we do
    share many security concerns.
        The bad news is that there still remains a potentially
    deadly nuclear threat between the United States and Russia.
    Both countries still deploy thousands of nuclear warheads on
    ballistic missiles that can hit their targets in less than 30
    minutes--a short warning time, hair trigger, prompt-launch
    capability that increases the risk of an accidental, mistaken
    or unauthorized nuclear missile launch.
        Mindful of these rising threats, and eroding confidence in
    deterrence as we've known it, recently George Shultz, Bill
    Perry, Henry Kissinger and I published an article in the Wall
    Street Journal, I believe it was early January. We believe that
    we've arrived at a dangerous tipping point in the nuclear era,
    and we advocate a strategy for improving America, security,
    American security, and global security. Both nuclear ``have''
    nations, and ``have not'' nations must think anew, if we are to
    prevent a nuclear nightmare.
        Whether the world recognizes it or not--and I don't think
    the world recognizes it--we are in a race between cooperation
    and catastrophe. Those of us who wrote and endorsed the Wall
    Street Journal piece--and there were a number of others, former
    Government officials who endorsed it--believe that in order to
    deal effectively with this new and dangerous era, the United
    States and the international community must embrace the vision
    of a world free of nuclear weapons, and pursue critical
    measures toward that goal.
        We believe that without the bold vision, the actions will
    not be perceived as fair or urgent, and without the actions,
    the visions, of course, will not be perceived as realistic or
    possible.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, Senator Warner, members of the
    subcommittee, we recommend the following, specific steps. What
    Senator Lugar has already talked about is number one on our
    list--we must secure nuclear weapons and materials around the
    globe to the highest possible standards, and this requires
    tremendous leadership, tremendous cooperation, and this goes
    far beyond the former Soviet Union.
        Number two, we should eliminate short-range tactical
    nuclear weapons, the bombs most likely to be targeted for theft
    or purchase by terrorists. In my view, this is not going to be
    easy. I think we should start with quiet discussions with
    Russia about transparency and accountability of these weapons,
    between the United States and Russia. If we don't know how many
    there are--and I think we do in our inventory, but if they
    don't--and I'm not sure about that--then they don't know when
    one's missing. These are the weapons that would be a
    terrorist's dream.
        Number three, nuclear weapons should be reduced
    substantially in all states that possess them, and of course,
    we are embarked on that, to a degree, in the Moscow Treaty.
        Number four, we must get control of the uranium enrichment
    process for civil nuclear fuel production, halt the production
    of fissile material for weapons, and phase out the use of
    highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in civil commerce all over the
    globe. That latter item will take time, but we need to embark
    on the journey. Last September in Vienna, on behalf of our
    Foundation, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), and with the
    support of Warren Buffett, I advanced a proposal for
    establishing an international fuel bank.
        Legislation has been introduced in Congress in support of
    this concept on the House side, by Congressman Lantos, and I
    hope the committee, the members of this committee will take a
    look at it, and encourage it and support that. Because, it's
    certainly not the overall answer, but it is a major part of the
    answer of a backup fuel bank so that we can say to countries
    all over the globe, ``You're going to have assurance of fuel
    supply. If everything else fails, the International Atomic
    Energy Association (IAEA) will have an international fund of
    fuel, low-enriched uranium (LEU), and you will be eligible for
    that if you are not enriching, and if you are not
    reprocessing.'' So this one, I think, is very important. It has
    to be joined with other tiers of guarantees, but it is the
    last, best hope.
        Number five, we must redouble efforts to resolve regional
    confrontations and conflicts. Now, as this committee well
    knows, this will not be an easy task, but it is an essential
    one if we are to stem the incentive for acquiring nuclear
    weapons in places like the Middle East, Southwest Asia, as well
    as the Korean Peninsula. These are not simply regional
    conflicts, they create tensions and confrontations that shape
    global world security, and America has a huge stake in each of
    those regions.
        Number six, we should work to bring the Comprehensive Test
    Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force, in the United States and in other
    key states. I would urge the committee to go back and take a
    look at the reasons that people opposed that ratification back
    a number of years ago, and review those, and look at what's
    happened since then, look at the stewardship program, look at
    the simulation capabilities, look at the technology that we can
    now use to ease some of the concerns that were legitimate at
    the time that was debated. I believe that the report of the
    former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John
    Shalikashvili, a year or two after that was debated, I think
    that ought to be reviewed again by the committee, and by the
    Senate. That the safeguards he recommends as a roadmap to
    ratification should be updated and taken very seriously. I
    think that's very important in terms of the United States
    leadership in the world. When we don't ratify the CTBT, it's
    often hard to lead from a position of moral authority
    throughout the world. I know we have to deal with the problems,
    but I think they can be dealt with.
        I would note, Mr. Chairman, that former President
    Gorbachev, who recently published his own essay in support of
    the Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, Nunn essay in the Wall Street
    Journal, has advocated ratification of the CTBT, and removing
    nuclear weapons from hair trigger status as two crucial steps
    that should be taken without delay by the United States and
    Russia, and other members of the nuclear club. I think the
    world should take President Gorbachev up on his challenge.
        The United States and Russia should also, in my view, move
    to change the Cold War posture of their deployed nuclear
    weapons to greatly increase warning time in both countries, and
    ease our fingers away from the nuclear trigger.
        Mr. Chairman, we could talk a long time about this, but I
    just pose this simple--but, I think, pretty important
    question--is it in the United States national security interest
    for the President of Russia to have only a few minutes to
    decide whether to fire his nuclear weapons, or lose them in
    response to what could be a false warning? Is that in our
    interest? I think the answer is clearly, no. I would hope that
    this question would be asked, in reverse, in Russia, and that
    we would begin to ask it together.
        Last, but perhaps, most importantly, I believe that we must
    enhance our verification capabilities--policies as well as
    technical agreements, once again restoring and elevating
    President Reagan's maxim, ``Trust but verify'' as an essential
    component of our National security policy. In my view, we
    should put at least as much effort into verification as we do
    into missile defense. I'm not talking about necessarily money,
    I'm talking about effort, policies, procedures, thoughts and
    guidelines. It's going to take a lot of verification to deal,
    not only with the nuclear, not only with something like a
    Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty if we ever get one, but also
    going back and finding out how we can do a lot better job of
    verifying the biological treaty, which has no verification, and
    which may be--in the long run, one of our greatest dangers.
        It's going to require U.S. leadership. Accomplishing all of
    these steps is going to require a great deal of cooperation,
    and it's going to require, not only leadership from the nuclear
    nations, but also those nations that do not have nuclear
    weapons. The bottom line, I believe, is that we need a
    strategic reassessment of the roles and purposes of nuclear
    weapons in the 21st century, and an urgent change in direction
    with both the vision and the steps. This new direction will
    require Presidential leadership, and a consensus judgment in
    Congress to sustain it. As this subcommittee well understands,
    the discussion is just beginning.
        In closing, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the vision and the
    actions must go together. We cannot defend America without
    taking these actions, and I think if you look at the list, you
    will agree with, I believe, all of them, but at least most of
    them. We cannot take these actions without the cooperation of
    other nations. We cannot get the cooperation of other nations
    without embracing the vision of a world free of nuclear
    weapons, which every President from Richard Nixon to George W.
    Bush has reaffirmed through our Nation's agreement to Article
    VI of the NPT, which is the law of the land.
        This cannot happen overnight. It will take a long process,
    it has to be done in stages. The United States must have its
    nuclear weapons as long as other nations do, no doubt about
    that. But we will be safer and the world will be safer if we
    are working toward the goal of de-emphasizing nuclear weapons,
    and ultimately ridding our world of them.
        Nearly 20 years ago, Ronald Reagan was asked to identify
    the most pressing need in international relations. In response,
    President Reagan asked his audience to imagine that, quoting
    him, ``All of us discovered that we were threatened by power
    from outer space, from another planet.'' The President then
    asked, quoting again, ``Wouldn't we come together to fight that
    particular threat?'' After letting that image sink in for a
    moment, which he was so good at doing, President Reagan came to
    his point, ``We now have a weapon that can destroy the world.
    Why don't we recognize that threat more clearly, and then come
    together with one aim--how safely, sanely and quickly can we
    rid the world of this threat to our civilization and our
    existence?''
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, Senator Warner, Senator Levin,
    and members of the committee, if we want a safer world for our
    children and grandchildren, I think our generation must begin
    to answer President Reagan's question.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Nunn follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Former Senator Sam Nunn

        Mr. Chairman, I commend you, Senator Dole, and your subcommittee
    for your efforts to stimulate a thoughtful discussion over how we can
    improve our security and reduce nuclear threats to our Nation and the
    world. I also want to thank Senators Levin, Warner, McCain, Byrd, and
    Kennedy and my other former colleagues for their important work in this
    area over many years on the Armed Services Committee. I especially want
    to thank my friend, Senator Lugar, who is providing outstanding
    leadership in the Senate to reduce nuclear dangers, and I am honored to
    be with him today. I thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to
    discuss with you today the issue of U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
        In 1948, at the dawn of the nuclear age, General Omar Bradley said,
    ``The world has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without
    conscience. Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We
    know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than
    we know about living.''
        If he were alive today, it might surprise General Bradley to know
    that we have made it 62 years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki without the
    use of a nuclear weapon. But that fact should not give us a false sense
    of confidence that we will make it the next 62, or even the next 20
    years.
        We have important efforts underway and some successes--including
    the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Programs, the Global Threat Reduction
    Initiative, the G8 Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat
    Nuclear Terrorism, the PSI, the rollback of Libya's nuclear program and
    U.N. Resolution 1540.
        President Bush has said we should do ``everything in our power'' to
    keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons out of terrorist hands.
    The 9/11 Commission called for a ``maximum effort'' to prevent
    terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, but at the end
    of 2005 gave the government a ``D'' for its progress in this area. In
    my view, the risk of a nuclear weapon being used today is growing, not
    receding.

             Countries like North Korea and Iran are pushing
            international will to the brink by developing nuclear weapons
            technology and--in the case of North Korea--nuclear weapons.
             A number of additional countries are considering
            developing the capacity to enrich uranium to use as fuel for
            nuclear energy--giving them greater capacity to move quickly to
            a nuclear weapons program if they choose to do so.
             Stockpiles of loosely guarded nuclear weapons
            materials are scattered around the world, offering inviting
            targets for theft or sale. We are working on this, but I
            believe that the threat is outrunning our response.
             Because of an explosion of knowledge and information
            throughout the world, the know-how and expertise to build
            nuclear weapons is far more available.
             Terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons for the same
            reasons terrorists seized airplanes on September 11--to use
            them to inflict on the world the greatest possible human
            suffering, economic loss, and geopolitical chaos.
             Some nations that have had nuclear weapons since the
            signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are
            increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons.
             Some nations that have gained nuclear weapons outside
            of the Nuclear NPT seek to legitimize their nuclear status.
             The good news is that the potential for conflict
            between the major powers, and in particular between the United
            States and Russia, has dramatically declined. Though both
            countries seem reluctant to act on it, we share many security
            concerns. The bad news is that there still remains a
            potentially deadly nuclear threat: both countries still deploy
            thousands of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles that can
            hit their targets in less than 30 minutes--a short warning
            time, ``hair trigger'' prompt launch capability that increases
            the risk of an accidental, mistaken or unauthorized nuclear
            missile launch.

        Mindful of these rising threats and the eroding confidence in
    deterrence as we have known it, George Shultz, Bill Perry, Henry
    Kissinger, and I published an article in January in the Wall Street
    Journal. We believe that we have arrived at a dangerous tipping point
    in the nuclear era, and we advocate a strategy for improving American
    security and global security.
        Both nuclear ``have'' and ``have not'' states must think anew if we
    are to prevent a nuclear nightmare. Whether the world recognizes it or
    not--we are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe.
        Those of us who wrote and endorsed the Wall Street Journal piece
    believe that in order to deal effectively with this new and dangerous
    era, the United States and the international community must embrace the
    vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and pursue crucial measures
    toward achieving that goal. We believe that without the bold vision,
    the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the
    actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.
        We recommend actions by the five nuclear weapon states that are
    parties to the Nuclear NPT; actions by those states with nuclear
    weapons outside the NPT; and actions by nations who may have the
    capability--although hopefully not the intent today--to produce nuclear
    materials or nuclear bombs.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, and members of the committee, we
    recommend the following specific steps:

              1. We must secure nuclear weapons and materials around the
            world to the highest standards;
              2. We should eliminate short-range ``tactical'' nuclear
            weapons, the bombs most likely to be targeted for theft or
            purchase by terrorists. In my view, we should start with
            transparency and accountability of these weapons between the
            United States and Russia.
              3. Nuclear weapons should be reduced substantially in all
            states that possess them.
              4. We must get control of the uranium enrichment process for
            civil nuclear fuel production, halt the production of fissile
            material for weapons and phase out the use of highly enriched
            uranium in civil commerce.

                      a. Last September in Vienna, on behalf of the Nuclear
                    Threat Initiative and with the support of Warren
                    Buffett, I advanced a proposal for establishing an
                    international fuel bank. Legislation has been
                    introduced in Congress to support the establishment of
                    such a bank, which I hope members of this committee
                    will encourage and support.

              5. We must redouble efforts to resolve regional
            confrontations and conflicts. As this committee well knows,
            this will not be an easy task, but it is an essential one if we
            are to stem the incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons in
            places like the Middle East, southwest Asia and the Korean
            peninsula. These are not simply regional conflicts. They create
            tensions and confrontations that shape world security.
              6. We should work to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
            into force--in the United States and in other key states. I
            believe that we should use the report by former Chairman of the
            Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili and the safeguards
            that he recommends as a roadmap to ratification here at home.

                      a. I would note that former President Gorbachev, who
                    has recently published his own essay in support of our
                    Wall Street Journal piece, has advocated ratification
                    of the CTBT and removing nuclear weapons from hair
                    trigger alert as two crucial steps that should be taken
                    without delay by members of the nuclear club. I believe
                    that the world should take up President Gorbachev's
                    challenge.

              7. The United States and Russia should move to change the
            Cold War posture of their deployed nuclear weapons to greatly
            increase warning time in both countries and ease our fingers
            away from the nuclear trigger.

                      a. To accomplish this step, I urge the two Presidents
                    to order the military and defense officials of each
                    country to present to them a set of options to increase
                    warning time on both sides. I believe that a front
                    burner option should be to remove all nuclear weapons
                    from hair trigger status, which would greatly increase
                    warning time and reduce the danger of an accidental or
                    unauthorized missile launch.
                      b. These officials should jointly determine which
                    threats justify keeping thousands of nuclear weapons on
                    hair trigger status, and then recommend steps to
                    eliminate those threats and thus end the justification
                    for deploying nuclear forces in this posture. Other
                    prudent ways to increase warning time for both
                    countries should be developed by our defense leaders
                    and presented for consideration.
                      c. The Presidents, in close consultation with
                    Congress and the Duma, should then jointly adopt an
                    approach and a timetable to get the job done, and
                    challenge other nuclear nations to follow this lead.
                      d. This increased warning time would improve the
                    security of the United States and the security of
                    Russia, and would set a powerful example for the world.
                      e. Chairman Reed, Senator Dole, and members of the
                    committee, each day we should ask ourselves: ``Is it in
                    the United States' national security interest for the
                    President of Russia to have only a few minutes to
                    decide whether to fire his nuclear weapons or lose them
                    in response to what could be a false warning?'' I would
                    hope that this question would be asked in reverse in
                    Russia and that we would begin to ask it together.

              8. I believe that we must enhance our verification
            capabilities, policies and agreements, once again restoring and
            elevating President Reagan's maxim of ``trust but verify'' as
            an essential component of our national security policy. In my
            view, we should put at least as much effort into verification
            as we do into missile defense.

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, and members of the committee,
    accomplishing these steps will require intensive work with leaders of
    the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a
    world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise. This will
    require U.S. leadership.
        I believe that we need a strategic reassessment of the role and
    purposes of nuclear weapons in the 21st century and an urgent change in
    direction with both vision and steps. This new direction will require
    Presidential leadership and a consensus judgment in Congress to sustain
    it. As this subcommittee well understands, this discussion is just
    beginning.
        In closing, I believe that the vision and actions must go together.
    We cannot defend America without taking these actions; we cannot take
    these actions without the cooperation of other nations; we cannot get
    the cooperation of other nations without embracing the vision of a
    world free of nuclear weapons--which every president from Richard Nixon
    to George W. Bush has reaffirmed through our Nation's commitment to
    Article VI of the NPT.
        This cannot happen overnight. It will be a long process, done in
    stages. The United States must have its nuclear weapons as long as any
    other nations do. But we will be safer, and the world will be safer, if
    we are working toward the goal of deemphasizing nuclear weapons and
    ultimately ridding our world of them.
        Nearly 20 years ago, Ronald Reagan was asked to identify the most
    pressing need in international relations. In response, President Reagan
    asked his audience to imagine that ``all of us discovered that we were
    threatened by a power from outer space--from another planet.'' The
    President then asked: ``Wouldn't we come together to fight that
    particular threat?'' After letting that image sink in for a moment,
    President Reagan came to his point: ``We now have a weapon that can
    destroy the world--why don't we recognize that threat more clearly and
    then come together with one aim in mind: How safely, sanely, and
    quickly can we rid the world of this threat to our civilization and our
    existence.''
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, and members of the committee: If we
    want a safer world for our children and grandchildren, our generation
    must answer President Reagan's question.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Nunn.
        We've been joined, as you pointed out, by Senator Levin,
    Senator Warner, and Senator Collins. We'd like to do about 6-
    minute rounds of questioning.
        So, let me first thank you and Senator Lugar for your very
    compelling testimony, but not only that, for your work over
    several decades now, which ranks--I believe, along with the
    Marshall Plan--as laying out a vision for this country, based
    upon not just altruism, but reality and realism, to help make
    this a much more secure and safer world. So thank you for your
    continued interest.
        I will go ahead and begin the questioning, and then turn to
    my colleague, Senator Dole.
        Currently, you and Senator Lugar both have been able to
    inspect the chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia,
    that we're building, and it appears that the Department of
    Defense (DOD) is going to curtail their expenditures to about
    $1.04 billion, essentially, give the Russians $200 million more
    and say, ``finish it, and run it.'' My question, Senator Lugar
    and Senator Nunn is, are those, in your mind, will that be an
    adequate way to resolve the situation, to finish the facility
    and to continue to do what we want to do, which is to have them
    actively destroy their chemical weapons?
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I have visited the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at
    Shchuchye on three occasions. On one occasion, as Senator Nunn
    described in his testimony, he and I toured the chemical weapons
    stockpile stored at a nearby, military base. The facility is made up of
    14 old wooden warehouses. Some have broken windows covered over with
    chicken wire. The high fence and the military guards are the only hint
    of what is inside--one of the world's largest stockpiles of deadly
    nerve gas, nearly 2 million easily portable artillery shells and
    missile warheads filled with lethal sarin, soman, and VX. It's enough
    to kill the world's population 20 times over.
        These chemical weapons, part of a massive Soviet-era arsenal that
    totals more than 40,000 metric tons, must be eliminated before they
    fall into the hands of terrorists. The U.S. and Russia, along with 153
    other countries, approved the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), each
    country committed to ban the production of chemical weapons and destroy
    our huge stockpiles that were built during the Cold War. It is clearer
    than ever that our own national security is bolstered by a vigorous
    international campaign to contain and destroy all chemical weapons
    stockpiles.
        With the world threatened by global terrorists seeking weapons of
    mass destruction, it is hard to overstate how serious this problem is.
    A single 85mm artillery shell from Shchuchye can be concealed in a
    briefcase, but carries enough poison gas to kill up to 100,000 people.
    A disgruntled insider could smuggle one out, or a determined group of
    well-armed terrorists could penetrate the installation's defenses.
        There is plenty of blame to go around for the delays we have
    encountered in destroying the chemical weapons munitions at Shchuchye.
    In the past, Moscow was unable to pay its share of destruction costs
    and was suspicious of providing information on its weapons programs.
    For 3 years, funds from the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
    program designated for Shchuchye were blocked by some in Congress who
    asserted that Russia's failure to comply with its CWC obligations
    requires the suspension of joint chemical weapons destruction efforts.
        Although Congress granted the president temporary waiver authority
    to get the money flowing again, the United Slates lost valuable time on
    an urgent project. We are in a race to rid the world of these dreadful
    weapons before terrorists get their hands on them, and we shouldn't let
    self-imposed bureaucratic hassles slow us down. Some in Congress and in
    the administration ask why we should spend money to clean up the
    Russian mess: 'They made their bed, now they can lie in it.' The
    trouble is, in the meantime terrorists could steal weapons of mass
    destruction, and use them against our Armed Forces, the United States,
    or our allies.
        Despite the strong support from the President and the
    administration, Congress continues to place six conditions on U.S.
    assistance to the chemical weapons destruction program at Shchuchye.
    Current law requires that the President certify that Russia has met
    each of these six conditions. Absent such a certification, funds cannot
    be obligated and cannot be expended until or unless the Administration
    certifies that cooperation is ongoing or a waiver is put in place. In a
    number of circumstances, they cannot certify that these conditions are
    being met and consequently, they have to request waiver authority so
    that the conditions can be waived and funding can go forward. As I
    indicated in my testimony these certification requirements need to be
    eliminated. While well intentioned, these conditions delay and
    complicate efforts to destroy weapons of mass destruction. As recently
    as 2003, Shchuchye funding was not available for expenditure until more
    than half of the fiscal year had passed before the bureaucratic process
    was concluded. None of these certifications justifies stopping the
    destruction of the stockpile at Shchuchye. We must eliminate, not
    preserve, mechanisms that slow down our work.
        During the past 2 years, our efforts at Shchuchye have been
    frustrated by what I suspect is the intentional manipulation of the
    U.S. contracting process. In what is believed to be one of the final
    contracts, the U.S. Government, through our main contractor, the
    Parsons Company, has submitted two separate requests for proposals to
    install the destruction equipment in one of two destruction buildings.
    Unfortunately, despite our best intentions and meticulous cost analyses
    and evaluations none of the bids that have been received have been
    consistent with U.S. estimates. In each of the two subcontractor
    bidding processes, early estimates provided by some Russian companies
    were considered responsible and accurate. Unfortunately, each bidder on
    each occasion dramatically increased their proposed cost estimate days
    before the awarding of a contract. Nunn-Lugar staff from the Pentagon
    and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency suspect intentional and
    organized contract manipulation.
        After the Nunn-Lugar Program's third such experience, the program
    decided to take a new path. The program is currently in negotiations
    with the Russian Government on a way forward. As Principal Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, Joseph
    Benkert, testified earlier today the Pentagon expects ``to amend the
    agreements and add the final contracts and funding to complete this
    project very soon.''
        Today the project at Shchuchye is approximately 50 percent
    complete, planning is more than 99 percent complete. I know that
    Senator Reed expressed concern about the direction this project will
    ultimately take. I am also concerned. My number one goal is to ensure
    that the weapons at Shchuchye are eliminated as quickly as possible.
    They pose a dangerous threat to U.S. and international security.
        I had hoped that the project at Shchuchye could have been completed
    in the same contracting and oversight fashion that it started.
    Unfortunately this does not appear to be possible. I believe the United
    States must maintain a strong role in the process independently or
    through the Parsons Company. Transparency remains a critical component
    of the Nunn-Lugar Program. We must be able to prove to the American
    people that these investments are in US national security interests.
        In sum, each of us shares the same goal and that is the elimination
    of a potential threat. I am hopeful that a solution will be worked out
    soon that will allow the facility at Shchuchye to get started
    destroying these dangerous weapons. I plan to visit Shchuchye this
    August, and will be happy to share with this committee my findings and
    thoughts about the future of the project.

        Senator Nunn. I'm going to defer to Senator Lugar, and I
    assure you he could answer that question for the record in
    terms of the update, but my impression of that destruction
    facility is that it has required a great deal of investment,
    the Russians have put a good bit in it, we've put an enormous
    amount of money in it and it's extremely important.
        The times I've visited the chemical weapons storage
    facility, basically you go in the buildings, you put on gas
    masks, you go in and you see these stacks, as high as this
    roof, almost as high as this ceiling, here, of one artillery
    tube after another, full of chemical weapons. We had a
    mathematician, Ash Carter, with us when we visited, and he
    computed--I'll assume he was correct--we had enough, they had
    enough chemical weapons in that facility to kill everybody on
    the face of the Earth three or four times over, if it was
    disseminated in an efficient way. Of course, it wouldn't be,
    chemicals aren't, but that shows you the magnitude--each one of
    those artillery tubes--and they would fit in a briefcase--could
    basically kill thousands and thousands and thousands of people.
        The other thing that impresses you is, there are holes in
    the roof. People could actually climb in those buildings.
    Unless you're suicidal, it wouldn't make much sense, unless
    you're trying to steal them, but that's the problem. I was not
    at all satisfied with the security there, though it's been
    dramatically improved, with our help, but there's also a time
    problem, because the land is very wet, and it is, in effect,
    gradually sinking. So, I think there's some urgency in getting
    rid of those. The thing is, Mr. Chairman, I'd have to be
    updated on the program to give you a precise answer of what
    Russia has done lately, but it's in--very much in Russia's
    interest to get these weapons destroyed.
        We're working in good faith to get our chemical weapons
    destroyed. My impression of that program is, we're not quite on
    schedule--the Russians are way behind schedule but it's
    fundamentally in both countries' interest to get on with the
    job.
        It's also in the interest of our European friends, and this
    is where some of these European nations in the G8 have signed
    up to help on chemical weapons destruction. So, I think it's an
    urgent priority, in terms of the exact procedure of how to deal
    with Russia and the obstacles right now, I'm going to have to
    defer to my colleague on that.
        Senator Reed. We'll follow up with Senator Lugar, thank
    you, Senator Nunn.
        In recent articles, you've expressed your concern that the
    United States has lost leadership to address these nuclear
    issues and other issues, and what must we do to regain this
    credibility and this leadership? Because, I think we all feel
    that without strong American leadership that this endeavor will
    not work.
        Senator Nunn. I think we have to basically announce to the
    world that we are serious about Article VI of the
    Nonproliferation Treaty, reiterate what we are already doing
    with the Moscow Treaty, and the time schedule.
        I believe one of the most profound statements we could make
    would be to join with Russia in saying that we have a goal in
    the next few years of getting all of our weapons off hair
    trigger alert. There is no need--15 years after the Cold War--
    for both nations to be able to destroy each other within an
    hour or two. Is is right for the President of Russia to have
    only a few spare--a few very crucial minutes to decide whether
    a false warning is in play, or whether we really are attacking?
        The condition of their satellites and radars have gone down
    since the Cold War, they're not as good with warning as they
    were. That's fundamentally against our interests, because we
    don't want them to make a mistake. So, getting weapons off of
    hair trigger alert, basically working with Russia on that,
    getting tactical nuclear weapons with some degree of
    accountability and transparency, and I'm sure that's not going
    to be made public by Russia for a long time, but I think we
    could exchange data on that.
        Greatly accelerating the securing of nuclear materials all
    over the world, and getting Russia to be a partner, not just
    simply a supplicant for funds, but a partner, in not only the
    former Soviet Union, but elsewhere. Because there are over 40
    countries that have enough HEU to make a weapon. Once that gets
    away from the source, Mr. Chairman, it's like a needle in a
    haystack--protecting at the source, securing at the source, and
    eventually destroying at the source, or in some facility near
    the source is the best way, and the most efficient way to deal
    with that.
        So, all of those are, I think, important ways that we could
    lead. I also believe that if the Senate of the United States
    took a real lead in looking, again, at the CTBT it would be to
    our advantage. I think you'll find that some of those concerns
    we've already dealt with, that were legitimate back then. I
    think it's time for a fresh look, I think it would send a
    totally different signal to the world. The way I see it, the
    vision of getting rid of all nuclear weapons is a very high
    mountain, but I think we ought to have that vision.
        I believe if we look at the scorecard now, we're not--we,
    being Russia, the United States, all the nuclear powers and the
    world, the big ``we''--we're not heading up the mountain, we're
    heading down the mountain. I've listed a lot of those concerns.
    We have to turn around, we have to show the world that we're
    heading up the mountain, and that we need people to go with us.
    We have to look for trails that lead up, and some of the things
    I've mentioned, I think, do lead up that mountain, and we have
    to get other people to go with us.
        That's a big job, but the stakes are the future of the
    world.
        Senator Reed. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        One final question, Senator Nunn, that is, there's been
    some concern about the relevancy of the nuclear
    Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) today, and I wonder if you have
    any quick thoughts about changes in the NPT that would be
    helpful to make this climb up the hill?
        Senator Nunn. Well, certainly the additional protocol that
    has been pushed by the IAEA and by the United States and
    others, would help on the inspections. But, when you look at
    countries like India and Pakistan and Israel that are not under
    the NPT; when you look at the NPT in terms of permitting
    fissile material to be made, but only to the low-enriched
    level, but you don't have the inspection regime to make sure it
    doesn't go from low-enriched to high-enriched; when you look at
    the number of countries that are now lining up, saying they are
    about to go into production of fissile material--last count I
    had, it was seven additional countries; when you look at Iran
    and North Korea--all of that means that we have to, I think,
    strengthen the NPT, but it can't be the only thing, it's not a
    strong enough foundation to, basically, carry this load. That's
    why this vision and these actions, we're painting a much
    broader picture that includes strengthening a NPT, but it is
    not in any way limited to that. It's much broader.
        We have to have countries like India and Pakistan and
    Israel participating in this much broader vision, and in these
    steps. We have to have countries that don't have nuclear
    weapons, but have nuclear materials, and HEU--they have to be
    stewards that are just as conscientious about this material as
    we are about our weapons.
        The way I view it, Mr. Chairman, we were diligent during
    the Cold War--we and the Russians--in making sure we did
    everything possible to be safe. We've made sure we didn't
    escalate conflicts when we could avoid them, and we never had a
    nuclear exchange, or even a war between the United States and
    the Soviet Union, and between the North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact.
        But, we've also been--in addition to diligent--we've been
    lucky. You look back at the number of instances we've had where
    it could have been Armageddon. The first time I visited NATO, I
    came to the conclusion that we were going to be faced with our
    commanders in NATO asking for release authority of their
    battlefield nuclear weapons at the very beginning of any
    conflict. That wasn't our official position, but that was what
    you found out when you talked to people at night, over dinner,
    and that would have been the President of the United States, if
    we had had a conflict in Europe, we would have been faced with
    a very quick decision about whether to use our battlefield
    nuclear weapons or whether to lose them.
        So, we've been very lucky. You have to ask yourself, if you
    get 10, 15, 20 countries with nuclear capability, are they
    going to be as diligent, and lucky--all of us are going to be
    as diligent and lucky in the next years as we have been in the
    past years? I don't think so. I think the odds are very much
    against that. We don't have to just be diligent and good and
    lucky one time, we have to be diligent and good and lucky every
    time there's an incident. That's multiplied, I think, in many
    ways, much more than geometrically, when you get additional
    countries.
        We're on the tipping point of having, not only Iran and
    North Korea, but a number of other countries that are moving
    to--under their legal right--to enrich uranium. When they get
    that enrichment capability, and if we do not have a stronger
    inspection and verification regime, internationally, then you
    have a lot of potential nuclear powers that are lurking right
    around the corner. So, it's a concern that, I think, is shared
    by Shultz and Kissinger and Perry and a lot of other people
    that we really, I think, have to pay attention to.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Nunn.
        Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole. Senator Nunn, when you first authorized the
    CTR Program back in 1992, you had the wisdom and the foresight
    to not only focus on elimination of WMD, but also to provide
    for helping scientists who might be tempted to sell their
    knowledge, their expertise, because of the difficult economic
    conditions at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
        Now, I'm interested in how you see that aspect of the
    success of that aspect of the CTR Program? Also, I'm concerned
    today that the same situation may be occurring in Iraq. We have
    scientists there who have left the country, obviously, many
    scientists have worked on the chemical weapons program, prior
    to 1991, and I'm interested in your views as to what more we
    might possibly be doing there? The DOE had a small-scale
    program to help with employment for scientists in Iraq, but I
    understand that, because of security considerations, that has
    not progressed aggressively. Do you think that the United
    States, other members of the international community should be
    doing more in this respect? If you could just share your
    thoughts on this aspect of the CTR and how you see it applying
    to the Iraqi situation?
        Senator Nunn. Senator Dole, I think you put your finger on
    the part of the Nunn-Lugar Program that has concerned me the
    most. We have done some very good things. The science and
    technology centers in Ukraine and Russia, I think, have
    employed thousands of scientists back in the early nineties,
    mid-nineties, and even late nineties, that otherwise would not
    have had employment. They had nuclear knowledge, but not
    employment, no way to feed their families. So, I think it's
    done an enormous amount of good.
        But it has not been anywhere near complete, and it is a
    tremendous danger that a lot of those people could have gotten
    out of the net, and ended up in countries that would use that
    nuclear knowledge and paid them money for it.
        We don't know what we don't know. I don't know what has
    happened. I don't know how many scientists have ended up in the
    wrong place, but I know that a lot less than there would have
    been without the Nunn-Lugar Program.
        Now, what do we do now? What I've tried to do in my
    conversations on college campuses with research universities,
    is encourage those universities to reach out and employ these
    people around the globe who have this nuclear knowledge and may
    be going through tremendous stress, in terms of a country like
    Iraq, or back in the nineties, a country like Russia. I think
    our energy labs, such as Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and
    others, could employ more of these, but we have to separate the
    security side of that, we have to be very conscious of the
    security side.
        What I'm hoping is, we don't let the security on labs
    obscure the need for the labs to reach out to other scientists
    around the globe. These labs are our home for the most
    knowledge and expertise, and these are the kind of people that
    can reach out to scientists around the globe. I think there
    ought to be a way we can handle security, by having our
    laboratories reach out, and cooperating with them on projects
    that are of peaceful intent, and making sure that those people
    have support from their colleagues, making sure they have
    meaningful occupations.
        I think that's something the laboratories could be given,
    but it has to be separated from the security. If we get so
    paranoid about the security of the labs, though, that we close
    out that cooperation with people like the Russians, like the
    Chinese, and like the Iraqi scientists coming, or perhaps in
    the future, Iranians or North Koreans, then I think we'll be
    missing a great opportunity. Because these are the people, that
    if terrorist groups got weapons material, and they got hold of
    a couple of scientists like this, we'd have a very bad
    situation.
        Senator Dole. In your opening statement, you referred to
    your proposal for establishing an international nuclear fuel
    bank that would prevent proliferation, while still ensuring
    that there would be success with regard to civil nuclear power
    for countries that want it. Would you elaborate on your concept
    with regard to a fuel bank, and how it would work? I'm
    interested in whether your proposal has received support from
    the United States Government, and other key countries?
        Senator Nunn. On the latter question, we discussed this
    very thoroughly with a number of people in the current
    administration, and we were encouraged by their response. It
    was not specifically endorsed as a governmental position, but
    the Department of State and the DOE were very complimentary of
    the proposal. There were speakers at the conference in Vienna,
    representing the U.S. Government right after I spoke and made
    the proposal to the international body, that basically had very
    warm words to say about it.
        Of course, the challenge we put up, we basically said,
    ``We'll put up $50 million if the world will match us with 2-
    to-1.'' So, we were saying that, we need $150 million to get it
    started, it will take more than that later on as the demand for
    nuclear power grows--and I'm for nuclear power, I think we have
    to have nuclear power in the world, but it has to be safe and
    secure--but as that demand grows, this fuel bank is going to
    have to grow.
        This fuel bank is sort of the last insurance policy. There
    has to be a tier of guarantees of adequacy of fuel supply.
    First, the market itself, which so far, works pretty well.
    Second, the nuclear suppliers are coming or working towards an
    agreement where if one supplier defaulted, the others would
    step in and ensure the country that was needing nuclear fuel
    that they would have it. Third, the Russians have proposed a
    proposal that would have a nuclear fuel bank in their country
    with Russian fuel backup, in joint venture with Kazakhstan, our
    Government is talking to them.
        So, the IAEA is trying to sort all of this out, and I
    visualize a tiered approach, where you have different steps and
    guarantees. Insurance companies could play a role in this, the
    commercial market could play a role in this. But, I think that
    our proposal, hopefully, will kick off that kind of discussion.
    Right now, I would say the status is that IAEA Director El
    Baradei and his staff are working very hard on this. They are
    having meetings with the Russians and the United States, our
    Government's involved, I would like to see our Government take
    a stronger leadership position than they have taken so far.
        I would like to see the Lantos bill, or something like
    that, pushed in the Senate and the House, because that would be
    the United States matching--or a portion of the match--I don't
    think it ought to all be U.S., but I think it ought to be
    partially U.S.--I'd love to see the United States and Russia
    jointly step up and say, ``We'll match the $50 million,'' and
    that would get it up to $150 million. We need more than $150
    million, but that's, we thought, a start.
        So, we gave a 2-year window, so we have another 16, 17
    months to go, and I'm encouraged by the response thus far, but
    there are a lot of obstacles, and it's going to take a lot of
    leadership.
        Senator Dole. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Dole.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Senator Nunn for being here today, and thank
    Senator Lugar for his commitment to this very important project
    that's continued over the years.
        I wonder, in light of the number of countries that are
    showing an interest in nuclear capabilities in one degree or
    another, if there's a level that you truly are comfortable with
    in having a nuclear response capability that would be
    appropriate as these other countries re-gain nuclear
    capability? In other words, as others are gaining in their
    knowledge, we have the risk of trying to convert them to not
    become nuclear powers, with the nuclear powers that are there,
    but if we are slow to succeed, or don't succeed--what level of
    risk are we at that we ought to be protecting ourselves
    against?
        Senator Nunn. The United States and Russia have a force
    that is vastly superior to any other nuclear powers on earth,
    nobody else comes close to the United States and Russia, and
    Russia----
        Senator Ben Nelson. But it's aging.
        Senator Nunn. Yes, that's true, but we've had more tests
    than any other countries, too, by far, so our nuclear forces
    are more up-to-date in terms of calibrated with tests than
    almost any in the world. Maybe Russia has as much. So, I don't
    think we have a gap that's going to close any time soon.
        I would defer to those of you who get classified briefings,
    because I haven't had one in quite awhile, but the Chinese for
    many years did not have their missile and their warheads
    matched. They had them in separate places. That's what I call,
    not having a hair trigger. What I hope is the United States and
    Russia, in that regard, would get more like China, before China
    gets more like we are.
        Because, the more countries that have weapons that can be
    fired in 30 minutes, that means warning times are all-
    important. It means that decisionmaking by human beings becomes
    less and less relevant. Not irrelevant, but less and less
    relevant. When you have to decide something in 2 or 3 minutes,
    you have to rely on machines, in effect, you have to rely on
    computers. Now, human judgment always has to be in here, but
    the more warning time we get, the better off we're going to be.
        Even if you have a world that has nuclear weapons forever,
    it would be, in my view, that our goal with Russia ought to be
    to increase the warning time. Let's just assume--and I'm sure
    it's classified, I don't even remember what it is, the exact
    minutes, it doesn't matter--but let's assume that the President
    of the United States has about 10 minutes to make a decision.
    Let's assume that the Russian President has less than that,
    because they're more vulnerable to a first strike, by far now,
    than we are. Let's say he has 5 minutes. Can you imagine all of
    the things that have to happen in that 5-minute period for the
    two leaders to make those decisions? I mean, the deeper you get
    into this, in the classified sense, I can assure you, the more
    concern you're going to get.
        Now, our people will say, ``Yes, we have these safeguards,
    we have these safeguards, we have these safeguards.'' I urge
    you to go back and look at the Jeanne Kirkpatrick Commission,
    and what they discovered a few years ago. Senator Warner, you
    and I helped stimulate that report, because we went over and
    talked to Secretary Cheney, and he got them to do it. They
    found some--and I think it's classified--they found some stuff
    that had to be changed, let's put it that way. Alarming.
        In an age of computers, in an age of hackers, in an age of
    systems being vulnerable, even some of the most--supposed--
    secure systems are vulnerable to interception, and even
    takeover. I think we ought to get this stuff off of automatic.
        Now, our people will say, ``We have this procedure, and
    this procedure and this procedure,'' but ask them the
    question--how about the Russians? How confident are you that
    their warning systems are going to be accurate? What are the
    chances of mistake? The most recent mistake I know about was in
    1995, when we launched a satellite off of Norway, and we had
    given them notice. We had told them it was going to be
    launched--which we're supposed to do under the Risk Reduction
    Program, Senator Warner, that you and I helped create, back
    years ago in the Reagan administration. So, that notice was
    given, but they lost it. They didn't know it. So, when the
    satellite went up, they thought it was a U.S. missile coming.
    They went to a higher stage of alert, I'm told, than they did
    during the entire Cold War.
        Now, they pulled it down, it didn't happen, but you
    multiply that by 7, 8, or 10 other countries out there, all of
    them having to be right every time--we have a dangerous world.
    At the very least, we ought to set an example of not having
    these things on hair trigger.
        I'd also ask you to ask the question now, what is it now
    that requires us to be able to fire our weapons within 30
    minutes? Ask them the question. What is the contingency that we
    need, whatever it is--again, I'm not, I haven't been briefed--
    but let's say 2,000 weapons? Why do we need 2,000 weapons fired
    in 30 minutes? Why wouldn't 2 hours do? What is it that's going
    to happen in that period of time?
        But, the United States and Russia both have concerns about
    survivability. Russia has a lot more concern about
    survivability now. If it were up to me, if I were President of
    the United States, I would sit down with Mr. Putin, and I would
    say, ``Let's get our two military commanders together. Let's
    get our top military people together. You tell--your people
    tell us what gives you so much concern that you have to be on
    hair trigger, and we'll tell you why we're on hair trigger, and
    let's start working these problems, so we don't have to be able
    to fire that rapidly.''
        I think it's absurd, 15 years after the Cold War that we
    still are in this posture. I think it is absolutely absurd that
    the United States existence as a Nation depends on the warning
    systems the Russians have concerns about being accurate. Their
    existence depends on us. I don't think this is the way we ought
    to go in the future.
        Again, Director El Baradei said that it's very hard to get
    somebody not to start smoking, if you're chain-smoking
    yourself. So, we have to look at the example we're setting. I
    think that this example of hair trigger is particularly
    applicable, if we could ever bring ourselves to do it with
    Russia, and get, let's say, 2 hours warning time. That'd be a
    big change. It would be applicable to Pakistan and India. If
    there's anyplace that needs more warning time, it's there. But
    again, it's hard to lead, if we're still in the same posture
    that we were in during the Cold War.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thanks, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Sam, you've done more work in this area both as a public
    servant, as well as now, you work with the NTI in the private
    sector. You probably know more about the capabilities of those
    that possess nuclear weapons than anybody I can think of off
    the top of my head.
        But, what concerns me is, that as much work as you've done,
    as much as you've highlighted the issue of the fact that there
    is absolutely no reason, either offensively or defensively for
    anybody to possess a nuclear weapon, the proliferation of
    nuclear weapons is growing rather than diminishing.
        You've been gone from the Senate about 10 years now and
    when you left here there were ``x'' number of countries that
    had that capability, nuclear capability, and just look what's
    happened in the 10 years that you've been gone. Where have we,
    where have we failed as a leader on this issue? What have we
    not done right that we can improve on, and what incentives--
    you've delineated some there--but what other incentives are
    there out there that we can utilize to try to make sure that
    additional countries don't move down the direction that North
    Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran have moved and that folks act more
    like Libya?
        Senator Nunn. Of course, that is a really good question and
    it, I don't want to take too much time in answering it, but if
    I give us--and this is totally subjective judgment, I couldn't
    give you an analytical backup for these judgments--but let me
    just run down, because I jotted down this morning what I call
    the ``scorecard.'' If I looked at the scorecard of what we've
    done in the last 15 years, since Nunn-Lugar, and then look at
    what's missing, I think that may be one way to frame it.
        On the Nunn-Lugar program in the former Soviet Union on the
    nuclear side, if 10 is a perfect score, I'd say we're at about
    five. So, we have a ways to go, but we've made progress. Maybe
    we're at six now.
        On the GTRI, which is getting--this is a program started in
    2004 by Secretary Abraham, which is a very good program, to get
    nuclear materials, HEU weapon-grade material, weapon-useable
    materials around the globe under security--and, there are 40
    countries that have them, at least. But, on that one, I'd say
    we're somewhere between 3 and 4 out of 10 in terms of progress.
    We need to get other countries to join that.
        On the bio-challenge in the former Soviet Union, I think
    we're about 2 out of 10. We have a long way to go. The Russians
    are not very cooperative on that.
        In looking at the bio-problem worldwide and the lack of
    security, not only in other countries, but in our own country,
    on dangerous pathogens, I'd say we're about 1 out of 10. In
    looking at chemical destruction, somewhere around 4 out of 10.
        On a very important subject, that Senator Lugar mentioned
    this morning, there were four nuclear countries after the
    breakup of the Soviet Union. They went from four to one--
    Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, all got rid of their weapons. I
    give us a 10 out of 10 on that one. That was a big, big
    accomplishment in the early 1990s.
        The Global Partnership, the effort led by President Bush to
    get the G8 signed up to a non-proliferation agenda and a
    cooperative-type program, getting them to help on what we call
    the Nunn-Lugar Program. In terms of words on that one, I would
    give them something like a 10. They said all the right words,
    but in terms of deeds I give them a two. Most of the countries
    that signed up, except for us, have not put up anything like
    the money they said they would.
        In terms of securing non-weapon grade material, but
    radiological material, I think we are about where we are on the
    biological materials. I think that is a huge job. A
    radiological weapon--unless we're better prepared for than we
    are right now, is going to have some of the psychological
    effect that a nuclear weapon would have even though it will not
    kill that many people. But, it could be a psychological blow,
    and a blow to the nuclear power industry too, which I happen to
    believe is very important now.
        Then I would say that blending down the U.S.-Russia HEU--
    which has been one of the ways we helped the other countries
    get rid of their nuclear weapons in the 1990s--we're about
    halfway through that program and it's been very successful.
        One of the things a lot of people don't realize, with that
    program--20 percent of our electricity in this country is
    nuclear power, 50 percent of the fuel burned to create that
    nuclear power in our nuclear power plants around this country
    comes from former warheads that have been dismantled, HEU,
    blended down to LEU. So, 1 out of 10 of these light bulbs right
    here, in this room, theoretically come from material that was
    aimed at us during the Cold War, until about 1990, 1992. So,
    we've made some progress.
        In terms of what do we do now? I mean, obviously all those
    areas need work. I mean, the gaps need to be filled. We may
    never get to 10 in some of those, we're not going to have
    perfect risk reduction. But, we have to come as close to it as
    we possibly can. I think we need to increase the funding
    worldwide, which Senator Lugar mentioned. I think this needs to
    be not only nuclear, but bio needs to be a front-burner issue
    with the United States and Russia. At every Summit Conference
    this ought to be a very big percentage of the discussion
    between President Bush and President Putin. I don't think it
    has been, but it should be.
        I think the United States and Russia need to be worldwide
    partners in not only the nuclear arena, but the bio arena. I
    think we still need to help them with money, but I think they
    need to step up to the plate with more of their own funds, and
    with leadership, and with time, and with expertise, in both the
    nuclear and biological area, around the world.
        I think we need an international type Nunn-Lugar program
    with other countries stepping up. The G8 pledges were along
    that line, but the deeds are far from satisfactory. I think we
    need a full-time high-level individual that's in charge of this
    in the executive branch of Government. We had that in the
    original Nunn-Lugar proposal. It still hasn't been done through
    both Republican and Democratic administrations. There has to be
    a good reason for it, but they've never told me what it was in
    15 years. We need somebody in charge, and we do not have that.
        We need to, as Senator Lugar said this morning, eliminate
    the certification requirements. If this is in our security
    interest, we shouldn't have the certification. If it's not in
    our security interest, we shouldn't do it. I mean, that's what
    it amounts to. The DOD and DOE need more flexibility. Jim Reed
    and his team need to be able to shift funds in a way with full
    reporting to Congress, but they shouldn't be bound without
    being able to have flexibility. You have a lot of opportunities
    that come up, and they need to be able to do that. We need to
    get them out of the paperwork business--that's the
    certification--and get them full time out in the field.
        Congress, in my view, needs to pay more attention to the
    GTRI, the DOE program. That's a vital part of our security
    efforts, just as important as what's being done at DOD. We
    need, I think, a whole tier of defense. I mean, I'm all for the
    PSI program, but I think security has to be the most
    fundamental and never letting the material get out of where it
    is now. Because once it gets out, the people who run the PSI
    program will tell you it's really, really hard to find it once
    it gets out.
        I think the IAEA needs more funding not just from us, but I
    think the other countries need to do that. The security side of
    IAEA, when we first started our NTI Foundation, I don't know
    what their total budget was but, we gave them $1.5 million and
    we said match it. They got it matched 10 times over and the
    U.S. Government stepped up and helped. But, they're still
    woefully underfunded in terms of the job we expect them to do.
    Everybody points fingers and said, ``They aren't doing this and
    that.'' Nobody ever looks at the budget they have, and it's
    woefully inadequate.
        I think--and I'll stop in a minute--but I think we need
    global best practices on all power plants and all facilities
    that have weapon-grade material and handle them, commercial or
    otherwise. There are a lot of legitimate uses for this
    material, but we need to have, not only the weapon grade, but
    also the radiological material secured. There needs to be a
    best practices peer-review kind of organization globally. A lot
    of that's going to be private sector, but I think the
    Government could help there.
        Last but not least, as I discussed a moment ago, the
    international fuel bank that we have proposed, it needs a lot
    of help and a lot of work and I think the United States can
    take a real lead there. As I said, the State Department and the
    DOE have both been, I would say maybe not, enthused may be a
    little strong, but they've been, they've warmly received that
    proposal. Let's put it that way. I'd like for them to do more,
    but encouragement from Congress would help a great deal there.
        So, Senator Chambliss, that's more than you asked for, but
    that's a list.
        Senator Chambliss. It's a big job and it's not going to
    end. We're not going to be able to wrap it up and say, ``Boy,
    it's done, we're now safe.'' This is ongoing. This is going to
    be with us as long as we live. We're going to have to keep
    working this problem and the biological effort is where nuclear
    was 20 years ago.
        The real difficult part of it is getting all these
    countries that we don't know are out there today who are going
    to develop nuclear weapons that you didn't----
        Chairman Levin. Your last answer to Senator Chambliss's
    question was the kind of presentation which is so overwhelming
    in a way, your mastery of the subject. I only wish we could
    have you here full-time.
        I think we're going to need your help in legislating those
    parts of this proposal, which need to be drafted, and there are
    some at least, which we could both fund and urge the, encourage
    the administration to do like the CTBT, which we could
    encourage them, at least, to present to us for the reasons that
    you give. We can't vote on ratification without a treaty in
    front of us, but we could at least prod the administration.
        Have you, by the way, had any conversations with them about
    presenting the CTBT to us?
        Senator Nunn. I have made speeches on it and had op-eds on
    it. I haven't had a direct conversation with them.
        Chairman Levin. We will raise it with them again because--
    --
        Senator Nunn. I suspect the administration, even if there
    were people and I hope there are, that would want to move in
    that direction--I think there probably are some--they would
    probably feel that there would be too much hostility in the
    Senate, so as a chicken and egg and what goes first, I think
    there has to be some dialogue. I think if they were encouraged
    some of them might take a look at it.
        The conditions have changed, I mean, we're in a different
    situation than we were when that was considered before. I think
    people who voted against it before and were very much against
    it could easily say to their constituents, ``Things have
    changed, we're going to take another look.''
        Chairman Levin. Yes, they have changed and if the President
    got behind it, I think it would easily, not easily, but could
    be confirmed, or ratified.
        Your idea on the international fuel bank, creative ideas
    always, what's the likelihood you think if we could put such a
    bank in place that Iran could be reigned in, and use it instead
    of what they're doing?
        Senator Nunn. There's an interesting possibility there. I
    haven't pretended that this is a solution to the uranium
    problem because there's so many complexities there and there's
    so much nationalism and it goes way back to the Shah, in terms
    of the program.
        But, it could, it could apply and what Russia and
    Kazakhstan are working on, with the cooperation of the United
    States, of having a fuel bank in Russia and then this backup
    fuel bank might be combined with that. Because the backup fuel
    bank would be totally under IAEA control, not by any nation.
        What these countries that don't have production of nuclear
    material capability, that want nuclear power, really fear is a
    political cut-off. So, the fact that Russia or the United
    States or any of the nuclear suppliers say, ``We're going to
    guarantee it''--that's not sufficient because they say, ``Look
    at the number of times you've cut off this country or that
    country, embargoed this, that, and the other,'' to the United
    States, in particular.
        So, it has some of it, some backup has to be in
    international control, but a lot of it can be national with
    cross-guarantees. Some of it can be commercial and insurance.
    I'm encouraged that there's the possibility of getting that
    done. I think the U.S. has to lead and Russia has to lead for
    it to happen, but I think it could happen.
        Chairman Levin. Would you recommend that we act
    legislatively either in terms of funding or otherwise to bring
    that into being? Should we take the initiative on that or
    should we----
        Senator Nunn. I think it would be very helpful if the
    United States were to say to the IAEA, ``We'll step up for
    ``x'' amount of the funding.'' Because we required specifically
    a $100 million match for the Buffett money, NTI money to be put
    up. If the United States would say, ``We'll take $50 million of
    that, and we'll ask Russia to take $50 million.'' I think that
    would be enormously helpful.
        Chairman Levin. Is that what the Lantos bill does? You
    mentioned the Lantos bill. Was that in relation to this
    particular----
        Senator Nunn. That's right.
        Chairman Levin. Is that what they do? They would authorize
    funding conditioned upon others putting up money?
        Senator Nunn. That's my understanding. I'm going to study
    that bill. I haven't studied it yet, but Congressman Lantos has
    asked me to come over and visit with him and testify on that.
    I'll be doing that next month.
        Chairman Levin. We'll also look into it. Any further
    thoughts on that, or any of these other subjects, you have
    would be----
        Senator Nunn. Right.
        Chairman Levin. Most welcome.
        One of the NPT requirements is that the countries that have
    nuclear weapons, in good faith, get rid of their nuclear
    weapons. Should we be destroying weapons instead of warehousing
    them?
        Senator Nunn. I believe we ought to get rid of the maximum
    number of weapons we can, and then I think we ought to, as a I
    mentioned a few minutes ago, I think we ought to define a
    nuclear-free world as the top of the mountain and recognize
    we're heading down, as Senator Chambliss said, we're not
    heading up.
        We ought to try to turn around the direction, not only of
    our country, but the world and start finding trails that lead
    up the mountain. So, that perhaps one of these days, at some
    point in the future our children can at least see the top, or
    our grandchildren.
        Chairman Levin. Would one of the ways to do that be to
    dismantle and destroy weapons, instead of to just simply put
    them in the stockpile or in the warehouses? I guess the Moscow
    treaty did?
        Senator Nunn. That's right. Of course, I think it's
    important for that example, too. Because we may be able to
    safely store those weapons, but if other countries follow our
    example there, that just means there's a lot more inventory out
    there.
        Chairman Levin. On the hair trigger issue, how do you
    address the submarine problem, number one?
        Senator Nunn. The, what problem?
        Chairman Levin. Having subs, I mean, how do you separate
    warheads from missiles in our subs?
        Second, how do you deal with the issue, that if the time
    came you wanted to, you got nervous and wanted to marry them,
    mate them back together again, that that would be a
    destabilizing action? Third, if you'd comment on the proposal,
    if you're familiar with it, to have a conventional Trident, so
    that we'd be in a position where we'd have a Trident boat with
    either nuclear or conventional weapons--which would be
    confusing, in some of our minds at least--it would create
    uncertainty on the part of others as to whether a Trident was a
    conventional Trident weapon or a nuclear Trident weapon. Are
    you familiar with that proposal of the administration?
        Senator Nunn. Yes, yes.
        Chairman Levin. How does that, it's not quite a hair
    trigger issue, but it, nonetheless is a very destabilizing idea
    in the minds of many of us.
        Senator Nunn. Well, let me start with the conventional
    Trident.
        I've talked to General Cartwright about this a couple of
    times and I've gotten his case. He makes a very good case that
    he needs the capability of a prompt launch with conventional
    weapons for long distance. We have it with cruise missiles. We
    have one submarine, I believe Senator Warner, that has cruise
    missiles on it, one Trident, former Trident. But, when you do
    it, when you move to the prompt-launch missile, you're in
    another dimension, because you get into warning time and you
    get into what the Russians capability is. First of all, do they
    know the difference and will we be able to assure them, have we
    had enough discussions with them to assure them that when we
    launch a conventional Trident, and this doesn't have a nuclear
    weapon on it, and it may have the original azimuth heading that
    way, that it's not a nuclear weapon? I'm not aware that we've
    had that detailed discussion with them. Obviously, they're
    concerned about it.
        Then I'd ask the question about Chinese warning. What are
    their warning systems? Can they tell the difference? What about
    France and Great Britain? What about Pakistan, India, ahd all
    the other nuclear nations? I think there's some profound
    questions here.
        Then you have the question of, we're trying to discourage
    long-range missiles, anyway, under the Missile Technology
    Control Regime. What questions come up in regard to that? How
    much does this compete with that goal? So, I'd say there are a
    lot of big questions on this.
        If we were able, if we went a different atmosphere, if we
    were heading up the mountain, if we were moving in different
    direction and we had a lot more credibility and confidence
    around the globe in this overall, if we had a lot more
    cooperation, you might examine this in a different prism, but
    right now I would have to say that I think Congress put up a
    caution light last year. I would, right now, keep that caution
    light up.
        Even though it's a paradox because, I say that even though
    the move from nuclear to conventional is the way we want to go.
    But long-range ballistic missiles are in a category of their
    own. I really do worry about warning systems and accuracy and
    mistakes.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Nunn. The other two questions, Senator Levin. Let's
    say you take certain parts of missiles off so that you have
    more warning time or you separate the warheads. There are a lot
    of different ways you can do this and it needs very careful
    thought if you remove from hair trigger. It has to be discussed
    with Russia and it has to be military to military, in my view,
    discussion.
        But, I don't think, I think the escalation problem is
    entirely manageable. I really believe that that is something
    that, it gives us concern, but we already have escalation
    problems. I mean, what do you do when you go to DEFCON-1? What
    do the people do, then? If it's going to take several hours to
    perform an escalation instead of several minutes, is that more
    danger than we have now? I don't think so. I know that the
    military has some concern about this and I think it has to be
    carefully considered, but I think that we can deal with that.
        In terms of subs, that's a special challenge, but I would
    leave that to the technical experts and I would not, if I gave
    you my recall on some briefings I've had about how that can be
    done, it would be inadequate today. I would just say that that
    is a question that's serious, that is more difficult. I think
    some on-site type of verification would be necessary on all
    sides. But, I'm very concerned that we have to deal with this
    submarine problem anyway. Because Senator Warner, you and I
    worried about this a long time ago. I still worry about it. We
    have a proliferation of submarines, too. A proliferation of
    diesel submarines that are a lot quieter than they used to be.
    You have a proliferation of countries that could fire missiles
    off those submarines.
        How good are the warning systems around the world in
    detecting if there was a submarine that pulled off Russia and
    launched--let's say hypothetically China did--launched a
    missile, nuclear weapon against a Russian city. Would they know
    it wasn't us? Would they know it wasn't the United States?
        I think there's a lot of work that still needs to be done
    in that area. I think that a lot of military to military
    discussions need to take place, not just between the U.S. and
    Russia, but U.S., Russia, and China. India has subs now. Israel
    has subs now. I'm not sure about the nuclear capability of
    those, but those are questions that really need to be asked.
    So, the submarine issue is a real issue in terms of hair
    trigger, but it's even more profound in the other arena of
    accurate detection and real time and not making a mistake.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This testimony this morning has been a very moving
    experience for me. I thank you for your personal references. We
    did work a lot together.
        Do you realize that you're sitting at a spot in this room,
    where that table was, for breakfast that morning, that you--and
    you'd consulted with me the night or two before--we brought in
    the Senators on the committee and some others and showed them
    this plan, which eventually became Nunn-Lugar. Do you remember
    that?
        Senator Nunn. I do.
        Senator Warner. Right where you're sitting now with one
    round table and we started at that breakfast.
        Senator Nunn. I certainly do. I certainly do.
        Senator Warner. I can see their faces now when you said,
    and, here in the Cold War atmosphere, ``We have to take money
    from our defense budget and give it to the Soviet Union to
    dismantle.'' That was a heavy task, but you skillfully managed
    that. This country, and indeed much of the world, has a great
    debt to you, personally, for you foresight and your tenacity to
    stick with this subject through these years. I thank you.
        Senator Nunn. Thank you, Senator Warner. You've been a
    partner for a long time in many of these endeavors so I'm
    grateful to you, also.
        Senator Warner. Well, and then our good chairman down
    there, Senator Levin, are you listening to what I'm saying now
    or are you down there looking----
        Chairman Levin. No, I'm listening to every word.
    [Laughter.]
        There's a few, I must say my eyes are a bit moist, but I'm
    listening to----
        Senator Reed. I've somehow----
        Senator Nunn. I hope you don't go along with Levin anymore
    than you used to go along with me, though.
        Senator Warner. I have a little trouble getting his
    attention now that he's the chairman.
        But before we go to my questions, you dramatically said--
    and you amplified it in response to Senator Chambliss's very
    insightful question--if we had 8 or 10 nations with the nuclear
    capability, the fragility of the war, world today--because when
    we, set about, I say we and many others, many others set about
    working on these problems years ago--it was basically the
    United States and the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War
    there was a certain sense of confidence, both in the United
    States and the Soviet Union, that the most competent people
    were in the chain of decision should we ever reach a
    confrontation.
        We do not have that today, with some of these companies,
    countries--notably Iran--a sense of confidence in their
    hierarchy, that they could carefully make a decision should
    they ever possess--and I hope they don't--this weapon.
        It leads me, to the first question, you said in there we
    still need to help the Soviet Union financially. They're awash
    in oil money today. How are we going to, I'll fight hard as we
    have, always, to get the funds for the CTR program as it
    relates to Russia today. But their cash position is pretty
    strong. I'm just wondering, what are the arguments we use to
    take our cash to help them?
        Senator Nunn. I think it gets harder as they become more
    prosperous. That's the bad news. The good news is as they get
    more prosperous they have the capability of doing more for
    themselves. So, I think it's a carefully calibrated weaning. I
    think they need to step up more. I think we need to gradually
    have less money, but I think the two of us need to step up our
    efforts together, not just in the former Soviet Union, but
    around the globe.
        I hope Russia will step up on this fuel bank. We've talked
    to them a good bit about it. I went over there before we ever
    proposed it and met with some of the top Russian officials.
    They, like our Government, greeted it with interest and with a
    degree of receptivity, but less than a full, ``Yes, we'll sign
    up.''
        I think your point is well made. But even if they have the
    funds, the question is, given all the challenges in Russia, and
    they still have mammoth challenges, mammoth economic problems,
    tremendous areas of their country that are in abject poverty,
    and you have to ask, ``Would they give this as high a priority
    as we would want them to?''
        Senator Warner. Well, let me go to your fuel bank and I
    confess not to know a great deal about it, but suddenly, as I
    listen, the idea has a lot of appeal. But, I'm concerned about
    the--let's put it bluntly, the command and control of who gets
    the fuel, and how do they get it and when? Would we be faced
    with something like a regime that has a veto authority, like
    the Security Counsel now? One nation could veto the
    distribution of fuel to others?
        You look at the enormity of the capital investment to build
    a nuclear plant, and yet you're putting that capital at risk to
    someone who has to make the decision, do you or do you not get
    fuel? How are you going to do the command and control and keep
    it separate from the reality that nations that could be
    participants in the fuel bank could be in an adversarial
    relationship? They exercise through third parties or something,
    some control over that person that has the levers to who gets
    the fuel and when they get it.
        Senator Nunn. Senator Warner, I think all of those
    questions have to be worked and that's what the IAEA is looking
    at now. The governance is going to be a real challenge, how you
    govern and who makes the decision. But, I think when you look
    at, here's the road we're heading down right now: Seven or
    eight countries are about to go into enrichment, in the next
    year or two, I think, maybe as many as 10 and, if Iran, builds
    a weapon, more. If these countries go into enrichment we have a
    bad, bad, we have already a hard problem. It's going to get a
    lot worse. So, we have to find a way to give assurances that
    legitimate power-burning LEU is going to be available.
        The first resource is the market. The marketplace works
    pretty well out there and as long as it works, right now
    countries really, unless they're going to build a huge number
    of power plants, the economics don't favor them going into
    enrichment. So, they're doing something, if they go into
    enrichment, that's against their economic interest,
    fundamentally. So, that tells you something. Now, it tells you
    that they might be doing it for illegitimate purposes or it
    tells you they don't have the political confidence that the
    suppliers are going to be faithful to the contract or that the
    marketplace is going to work.
        So, we have to augment the marketplace. It's not, in any
    way, substituting for the marketplace. There are going to have
    be tiers of guarantees. This fuel bank, the $50 and we hope a
    $100, that's $150. That's nowhere near adequate to be a backup
    supply. It's the final backup. It's not anywhere near the
    adequate, it's going to have to be one tier, among others.
    That's what Russia is talking about now and that's what the
    United States has proposed, Germany and others have also made
    proposals.
        Senator Warner. One last question, if I may, my former
    chairman that you were in those years. You did a wonderful job
    for this committee, and you came in after your most
    distinguished colleague from Georgia, Dennis Jackson, and all
    those giants that taught us our lessons. You handled your
    chairmanship very well.
        Clearly there needs to be a greater international awareness
    of the problems that you have eloquently described today with
    our colleague, Senator Lugar. If you had the opportunity to sit
    down with our President, how would you speak to him in terms
    of, ``Let's jump start the international recognition of the
    seriousness of this problem,'' to see what we could do to bring
    about some advancements, climbing back up that mountain again?
    Would you suggest the United States, maybe in partnership with
    the Russians, convene an international conference on this
    subject alone?
        Senator Nunn. I believe what I would do is start with the
    President's own quotes. He said back during the campaign when
    he first ran that he thought we had thousands of weapons on
    hair trigger alert on both sides and that that was unacceptable
    and he was going to tackle that problem. That problem's still
    here. He also said that, on a number of occasions including
    when he was debating Senator Kerry on television, both of them
    said the number one security problem facing America was to keep
    weapons and material----
        Senator Warner. That's fine, that rhetoric's out there.
    What would you do if this afternoon you had the opportunity to
    sit down with him? What initiative would you recommend that he
    take?
        Senator Nunn. I would start by telling him those two
    identifications were absolutely right, but the meat isn't on
    the bones. We're not doing nearly enough. I would say, ``Mr.
    President, you have a great relationship with President Putin.
    The United States and Russia have a unique responsibility and
    obligation to lead because we are the leading nuclear powers by
    far. We have thousands of weapons on hair trigger alert. Why
    don't you talk to President Putin about both of you getting
    your military leaders to sit down for 6 months or whatever it
    would take and come back with a list of things we can do to
    greatly reduce the chances of any kind of accident, increase
    warning time? The second thing, why don't you talk to President
    Putin about a partnership between the United States and Russia
    to deal with nuclear materials all over the globe, so, that we
    take their expertise--and hopefully increasingly, as you
    observed--their money, and help get this material under
    control, not just in the former Soviet Union, but all over the
    world.''
        The third thing on my list would be bio. I would say, ``Mr.
    President, if the Soviet Union were going to use bio-weapons
    against us, they would have done it back in the old days. Why
    in the world can't we have transparency and accountability on
    the biological research efforts going on, on the defensive
    side? Because we think your defensive side is offense. You
    probably think our defensive work is offense. But, that's the
    perception we're battling. Let's have transparency, the two of
    us to begin with and then broaden it.''
        Those would be three things right on the top of the list,
    hair trigger, securing material, bio-transparency. If I made
    progress, I would go on from there. But, that might be all the
    President would want to hear in one meeting.
        Senator Warner. I thank you very much, Senator Nunn, for
    your work and my best to you and your family.
        Senator Nunn. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
        Senator Nunn, thank you for your testimony and for your
    leadership and we look forward to working together with you for
    many, many years. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Nunn. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I look forward to
    helping any way I can.
        Chairman Levin, congratulations also in your new role and I
    look forward to seeing great things come from this committee
    under your leadership.
        Chairman Levin. I appreciate that. We'll be calling on you.
        Senator Nunn. Senator Warner will help you in every way.
        Chairman Levin. He always has.
        Senator Warner. Yes, right.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Now let me call up our second panel, the Honorable William
    H. Tobey and Joseph A. Benkert.
        Thank you very much for joining us, gentlemen. Your
    statements will be made fully part of the record, so if you'd
    like to summarize your written statements, that would be
    perfectly fine. Tthen we'll engage in at least one round of
    questioning.
        We'll begin with Mr. Tobey.

     STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. TOBEY, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
      DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
               ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Tobey. Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, thank you for the
    opportunity to discuss the President's 2008 budget request for
    the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.
        Before I start, I certainly want to acknowledge the fact
    that I'm mindful that we were following--both in terms of order
    of appearance and more importantly in terms of doing the
    important work of nonproliferation--giants in the field. I
    certainly very much respect the work of both Senators Lugar and
    Nunn and all that they've made possible for us to do.
        I also very much appreciate the support of this committee
    for the work that we do, of which I'm proud and I believe is
    extremely important for U.S. national security.
        The fiscal year 2008 budget request for $1.67 billion
    reflects both our progress in securing nuclear sites worldwide,
    as well as continuing challenges we face in accomplishing our
    mission. The request is for funding necessary to meet the goals
    of the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative on time, to
    secure or dispose of as much nuclear material possible for the
    fiscal year 2008, and to adapt our nonproliferation strategy to
    meet new challenges.
        In February 2005, in Bratislava, Presidents Bush and Putin
    agreed to focus and accelerate cooperative nuclear security
    work in order to keep fissile materials out of the hands of
    terrorists. Under the resulting Bratislava joint statement, we
    have made remarkable progress with Russia to protect its
    nuclear weapons and materials. Meeting our commitment to
    include security upgrade activities at Russian nuclear sites by
    the end of 2008 will be our chief priority in fiscal year 2008.
    Although, your direct upgrade efforts are drawing to a close
    after over a decade of work, we will endeavor to continue to
    work with Russia to ensure the long-term sustainability of the
    systems and procedures that we have implemented.
        The fiscal year 2008 budget reflects both the near-
    completion of security work in Russia and our transition to
    long-term sustainability. Additionally, our work in fiscal year
    2008 under the Bratislava Initiative will include the
    conversion of HEU reactors to reactors that use LEU. We will
    also return Russian-origin HEU from eight countries to secure
    facilities in Russia for disposition.
        Our efforts to secure or dispose of as much nuclear
    material as we can in fiscal year 2008 are not limited to the
    Bratislava effort. We're working with Russia, and we are
    scheduled to shut down at least two of the last three weapons-
    grade plutonium-producing reactors by December 2008. The
    remaining reactor is scheduled to be shut down by December
    2010.
        Our efforts to return U.S.-origin HEU from research
    reactors worldwide will also continue. The fiscal year 2008
    budget request includes funding for U.S.-Russia Plutonium
    Disposition Program. Disposing of surplus plutonium in the
    United States and Russia will assure that this material can
    never again be used for nuclear weapons.
        We are taking aggressive steps to interdict weapons-useable
    nuclear materials, and to prevent dissemination of nuclear-
    related technology via strengthened export controls and
    improved international cooperation. Our Second Line of Defense
    and Megaports programs work to enhance our foreign partners'
    ability to interdict illicit nuclear materials. Under these
    programs, we deploy radiation detection systems at high-risk
    land border crossings, airports, and seaports, increasing the
    likelihood of interdiction of diverted nuclear materials
    entering or leaving the country.
        Additionally, our research and development efforts provide
    the National Nuclear Security Administration and other agencies
    with cutting-edge technology to detect and monitor nuclear
    weapons, production, proliferation and nuclear explosions
    worldwide.
        To meet the threat from the international terror networks
    and rogue states, we must engage the international community.
    We are working to implement United Nations Security Council
    Resolution 1540, which establishes a requirement to criminalize
    proliferation involving non-State actors and encourages States
    to strengthen export control laws and improve enforcement.
    Because keeping terrorists or rogue States from acquiring
    materials will be easier if we limit enrichment of uranium or
    reprocessing of spent fuel, the President proposed in 2006 the
    Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), under which nations
    would have assured access to the benefits of nuclear power
    without the need to develop sensitive capabilities to enrich or
    reprocess fuel indigenously.
        The risk of nuclear terrorism is certainly not limited to
    the United States and the success of our efforts to deny access
    to nuclear weapons and material is very much dependant on
    whether our foreign partners share a common recognition of the
    threat and a willingness to combat it. Last July, just before
    the G8 summit, Presidents Bush and Putin announced the Global
    Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. To strengthen
    cooperation worldwide on a broad range of related issues from
    nuclear material security, to detection, to enforcement and
    prosecution. Paired with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540,
    we now have both the legal mandate and the practical means for
    concrete actions to secure nuclear material against the threat
    of diversion. These diplomatic efforts will extend and multiply
    the efforts of my organization to detect, secure, and dispose
    of dangerous nuclear material.
        Again, thank you for the opportunity to discuss our budget,
    and I'd be happy to take any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Tobey follows:]

                     Prepared Statement by William H. Tobey

        Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the President's fiscal
    year 2008 budget request for the National Nuclear Security
    Administration's (NNSA) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program. This
    is my first appearance before this committee as the Deputy
    Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and I want to thank
    all of the Members for their strong support for our vital national
    security missions.
        The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program mission is to detect,
    prevent, and reverse the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
    (WMD). Our nonproliferation programs address the danger that hostile
    nations or terrorist groups may acquire weapons-usable material, dual-
    use production or technology, or WMD capabilities. The fiscal year 2008
    request for these programs totals $1.673 billion, a slight decrease
    from the fiscal year 2007 operating level. This reduction is the result
    of NNSA achieving and approaching important milestones in our nuclear
    security work in Russia, including the completion of major security
    upgrades at several sites under the International Nuclear Materials
    Protection and Cooperation (MPC&A) program and the anticipated end of
    construction of a fossil fuel plant in Seversk by the end of calendar
    year 2008 under the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production
    (EWGPP) Program.
        Acquisition of nuclear weapons, WMD capabilities, technologies, and
    expertise by rogue states or terrorists stands as one of the most
    potent threats to the United States and international security. The
    continued pursuit of nuclear weapons by terrorists and states of
    concern underscores the urgency of NNSA's efforts to secure vulnerable
    nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials, to improve
    capabilities to detect and interdict nuclear weapons or materials, to
    halt the production of fissile material, and ultimately, to dispose of
    surplus weapons-usable materials. The fiscal year 2008 budget request
    will enable NNSA to continue the activities that support these crucial
    threat reduction initiatives.
        Preventing access to nuclear weapons and material has many
    dimensions. Our highest priority is to keep these dangerous materials
    out of the hands of the world's most dangerous actors. Absent access to
    sufficient quantities of key fissile materials, there can be no nuclear
    weapon. Much of our emphasis has focused on Russia because that is
    where most of the poorly secured material was located. We have made
    remarkable progress cooperating with Russia to strengthen protection,
    control, and accounting of its nuclear weapons and materials. Meeting
    our commitment under the Bratislava Joint Statement to conclude
    security upgrade activities at Russian nuclear sites by the end of 2008
    will be our chief priority in fiscal year 2008. As a result of our
    efforts to accelerate this work in the wake of September 11 and the
    momentum created by the Bratislava process, we are well-positioned to
    reach this significant milestone on schedule. Although our direct
    upgrade efforts are drawing to a close after over a decade of work, we
    will continue to work cooperatively with Russia to ensure the long-term
    sustainability of the systems and procedures we have implemented.
        Not all nuclear material of concern is located in Russia. We are
    working with other partners to secure weapons-usable nuclear materials
    worldwide and to strengthen security at civil nuclear facilities. One
    area of concern is research reactors, which often use a highly enriched
    uranium (HEU) fuel suitable for bombs. Our Global Threat Reduction
    Initiative (GTRI) seeks to convert research reactors worldwide from HEU
    to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and further to repatriate U.S. and
    Russian-supplied HEU from these facilities to its country of origin. A
    major accomplishment was the return of 268 kilograms of Soviet-origin
    HEU from Germany to Russia, where it will be down blended to LEU fuel.
    This repatriation operation represents the largest shipment of Soviet-
    origin HEU conducted to date under the GTRI.
        We are taking aggressive steps to interdict weapons-usable nuclear
    materials and to prevent dissemination of nuclear related technology
    via strengthened export controls and improved international
    cooperation. As a complement to improving physical security, the Second
    Line of Defense (SLD) Program works to enhance our foreign partners'
    ability to interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Under
    this program, we deploy radiation detection systems at high-risk land-
    border crossings, airports and seaports, increasing the likelihood of
    interdiction of diverted nuclear materials entering or leaving the
    country.
        The Megaports Initiative, established in 2003, responds to concerns
    that terrorists could use the global maritime shipping network to
    smuggle fissile materials or warheads. By installing radiation
    detection systems at major ports throughout the world, this initiative
    strengthens the detection and interdiction capabilities of our partner
    countries.
        To prevent the diffusion of critical technologies, we are training
    front line customs officers around the world. We are working to
    implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, which establishes a
    requirement to criminalize proliferation involving non-state actors and
    encourages states to strengthen export control laws and improve
    enforcement. Because keeping terrorists from acquiring materials will
    be easier if we limit enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of spent
    fuel, the President proposed in 2006 a new initiative, the Global
    Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which would provide nations which
    refrain from developing or deploying enrichment and reprocessing
    technology assured access to the benefits of nuclear power.
        These are critical steps but they alone cannot address the problem.
    Indeed, there is enough fissile material in the world today for tens of
    thousands of weapons. An integral part of our strategy, therefore, has
    been to induce other states to stop producing materials for nuclear
    weapons, as the United States did many years ago. We recently submitted
    a draft treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to do just
    that. We also supplement international diplomatic efforts with
    bilateral programs. For example, Russia still produces weapons-grade
    plutonium, not because it needs it for weapons, but because the
    reactors that produce it also supply heat and electricity to local
    communities. We are replacing these reactors with fossil fuel plants.
    By 2008, two of the existing three plutonium-producing reactors in
    Russia will shut down permanently, with the third shut down by 2010.
        As previously indicated, there are a number of effective synergies
    between NNSA's weapons activities and our nuclear nonproliferation
    objectives. For example, we are disposing of the substantial quantities
    of surplus weapons grade material that resulted from the thousands of
    warheads that we have dismantled by down-blending it to lower
    enrichment levels suitable for use in commercial reactors. We are also
    working with Russia to eliminate Russian HEU. Under the HEU Purchase
    Agreement, nearly 300 metric tons of uranium from Russia's dismantled
    nuclear weapons--enough material for more than 11,000 nuclear weapons--
    has been down-blended for use in commercial reactors in the United
    States. Nuclear power generates 20 percent of American electricity and
    half of that is generated by fuel derived from Russian HEU. As a
    result, one-tenth of the U.S. electrical energy need is powered by
    material removed from former Soviet nuclear weapons. In addition to the
    efforts on HEU, the United States and Russia have each committed to
    dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus weapon-grade plutonium.
        If we are to encourage responsible international actions, the
    United States must set the example. We have dramatically improved
    physical security of U.S. nuclear weapons and weapons usable materials
    in the years since the attacks of September 11. We recently withdrew
    over 200 metric tons of HEU from any further use as fissile material in
    nuclear weapons: a portion of this will be devoted to powering our
    nuclear navy for the next 50 years, obviating the need over that period
    for high-enrichment of uranium for any military purpose. Seventeen tons
    will be blended down and set aside as an assured fuel supply as part of
    global efforts to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
    technology.
        The risk of nuclear terrorism is not limited to the United States
    and the success of our efforts to deny access to nuclear weapons and
    material is very much dependent on whether our foreign partners share a
    common recognition of the threat and a willingness to combat it. Last
    July, just before the G-8 summit, Presidents Bush and Putin announced
    the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to strengthen
    cooperation worldwide on nuclear materials security and to prevent
    terrorist acts involving nuclear or radioactive substances. Paired with
    U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, we now have both the legal
    mandate and the practical means necessary for concrete actions to
    secure nuclear material against the threat of diversion.

                 FISCAL YEAR 2008 NNSA BUDGET REQUEST OVERVIEW

        The President's fiscal year 2008 budget request for NNSA totals
    $9.4 billion, an increase of $306 million or 3.4 percent over the
    fiscal year 2007 operating plan. We are managing our program activities
    within a disciplined 5-year budget and planning envelope, and are
    successfully balancing the administration's high priority initiatives
    to reduce global nuclear danger as well as future planning for the
    Nation's nuclear weapons complex within an overall modest growth rate.
        The NNSA budget justification contains information for 5 years as
    required by section 3253 of P.L. 106-065. This section, entitled Future
    Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP), requires the Administrator to
    submit to Congress each year the estimated expenditures necessary to
    support the programs, projects and activities of the NNSA for a 5-year
    fiscal period, in a level of detail comparable to that contained in the
    budget.
        The fiscal years 2008-2012 FYNSP projects $50.0 billion for NNSA
    programs though 2012. This is an increase of about $1.5 billion over
    last year's projections in line with the administration's strong
    commitment to the Nation's defense and homeland security. The fiscal
    year 2008 request is slightly smaller than last year's projection;
    however, the outyears are increased starting in 2009. Within these
    amounts, there is significant growth projected for the Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation programs to support homeland security, including new
    initiatives and acceleration of threat reduction programs and increased
    inspection of seagoing cargoes destined for ports in the United States.

                 DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM AREAS

    Global Threat Reduction Initiative
        The administration's fiscal year 2008 request of $120 million for
    the GTRI is an increase of $4 million over the fiscal year 2007
    operating plan. The GTRI reduces the risk of terrorists acquiring
    nuclear and radiological materials for an improvised nuclear or
    radiological dispersal device by working at civilian sites worldwide
    to: 1) convert reactors from the use of WMD-usable HEU to LEU; 2)
    remove or dispose of excess WMD-usable nuclear and radiological
    materials; and 3) protect at-risk WMD-usable nuclear and radiological
    materials from theft and sabotage until a more permanent threat
    reduction solution can be implemented. Specific increases in the GTRI
    budget reflect, for example, the serial production and delivery of 27
    100-ton casks for transportation and long-term storage of 10,000 kg of
    HEU and 3,000 kg of plutonium removed from the BN-350 reactor site in
    Kazakhstan.
    International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation
        NNSA's International MPC&A fiscal year 2008 budget request of $372
    million is a decrease of $101 million from the fiscal year 2007
    operating plan. This decrease reflects the successful completion of
    nuclear security upgrade work at Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and
    Russian Navy sites. International material protection work continues in
    other areas, including the continuation of security upgrades at a
    significant number of sites within the Russian nuclear complex,
    including those operated by the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom),
    and the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. Security
    upgrades for Russian Rosatom facilities will be completed by the end of
    2008--2 years ahead of the original schedule, consistent with the
    Bratislava Initiative.
        The MPC&A Program is also focused on reducing proliferation risks
    by converting Russian HEU to LEU and by consolidating weapons-usable
    nuclear material into fewer, more secure locations. In fiscal year
    2008, we will eliminate an additional 1.2 metric tons of HEU for a
    cumulative total of 10.7 metric tons.
        Our SLD Program, a natural complement to our efforts to lock down
    vulnerable nuclear material and weapons, installs radiation detection
    equipment at key transit and border crossings, airports and major ports
    to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and
    radioactive materials. During fiscal year 2008, the SLD Program plans
    to install detection equipment at an additional 51 strategic overseas
    transit and border sites. Under the Megaports Initiative, we have
    deployed radiation detection and cargo scanning equipment at six ports
    to date in Greece, the Netherlands, Bahamas, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and
    Spain. During fiscal year 2008, we plan to install detection equipment
    at three additional large ports: the port of Antwerp in Belgium, the
    port of Caucedo in the Dominican Republic, and the port of Salalah in
    Oman.
        Additionally, we are joining elements of the Megaports Initiative
    and the Container Security Initiative (CSI) under a new maritime
    security initiative, the Secure Freight Initiative Phase I. This new
    initiative is a partnership between host governments, commercial
    container shipping entities and the U.S. Government that serves to
    increase the number of containers physically scanned for nuclear and
    radiological materials and to create a detailed record of each U.S.-
    bound container. Data from radiation detection equipment provided by
    NNSA and from non-intrusive imaging equipment provided by the
    Department of Homeland Security will enhance the identification of
    high-risk containers and facilitate the prompt resolution of potential
    nuclear or radiological threats.
    Nonproliferation and International Security
        While the thrust of GTRI and MPC&A is to secure nuclear sites,
    convert reactors, and repatriate fuel from reactors worldwide, NNSA's
    Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (ONIS) provides
    technical and policy expertise in support of U.S. efforts to strengthen
    international nonproliferation arrangements (e.g., the Nuclear
    Suppliers Group, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and
    the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism). The ONIS staff also
    fosters implementation of global nonproliferation requirements through
    engagement with foreign partners and the redirection of WMD expertise,
    and helps develop and implement mechanisms for transparent and
    verifiable nuclear reductions. The fiscal year 2008 budget request for
    the ONIS is $125 million. This request includes funds for providing
    technical support to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency
    safeguards system and supports programs to improve foreign governments'
    export control systems. This request will augment U.S. nonproliferation
    cooperation with China and India, and enhance transparency and
    scientist redirection activities with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
    Libya, and Iraq.
        The budget request also supports activities to build up the
    nonproliferation component of the GNEP initiative. While GNEP is a
    long-term vision for the future of expanded use of nuclear power, NNSA
    plays an important role by providing leadership and technical expertise
    in the areas of safeguards technology, safeguards cooperation, and fuel
    supply arrangements to mitigate the proliferation risks that otherwise
    might accompany the expansion of nuclear power around the world
    envisioned by GNEP.
    Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production
        Turning to programs that focus on halting the production of nuclear
    materials, the EWGPP Program staff are working toward completing the
    permanent shutdown of two of the three remaining weapons-grade
    plutonium production reactors in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk, Russia. The
    fiscal year 2008 budget request of $182 million is a decrease of $44
    million from the fiscal year 2007 operating plan, reflecting the
    planned completion of the fossil fuel heat and electricity facility at
    Seversk. The budget request provides the funding required to shut down
    these reactors permanently and to replace the heat and electricity
    these reactors supply to local communities with energy generated by
    fossil fuel plants by December 2008 in Seversk and by December 2010 in
    Zheleznogorsk. The reactors will be shut down immediately once the
    fossil-fuel plants are completed, eliminating the annual production of
    more than one metric ton of weapons-grade plutonium.
    Fissile Materials Disposition
        In addition to curbing the production of dangerous nuclear
    materials, NNSA is working to reduce the existing stockpiles of nuclear
    materials in both Russia and the U.S. To that end, the fiscal year 2008
    Fissile Materials Disposition budget request of $610 million will
    contribute to the elimination of surplus U.S. and Russian weapon-grade
    plutonium and surplus U.S. highly-enriched uranium. Of this amount,
    $480.8 million will be allocated toward disposing of surplus U.S.
    plutonium, including $333.8 million for the Mixed Oxide Fuel
    Fabrication Facility and $60 million for the Pit Disassembly and
    Conversion Facility (PDCF) and the Waste Solidification Building. Of
    the remaining amount, $66.8 million will be devoted to the disposition
    of surplus U.S. HEU and $20.2 million will be focused on supporting
    activities common to both programs.
        This budget request also provides funding for ongoing efforts to
    dispose of surplus U.S. HEU, including down blending 17.4MT of HEU in
    support of establishing the Reliable Fuel Supply Program, available to
    countries with good nonproliferation credentials that face a disruption
    in supply that cannot be corrected through normal commercial means.
    This initiative marks the first step towards a key GNEP policy aim of
    creating a reliable nuclear fuel mechanism, providing countries a
    strong incentive to refrain from acquiring enrichment and reprocessing
    capabilities.
    Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
        The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $265 million for
    Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development. This effort
    includes a number of programs that make unique contributions to
    national security by researching the technological advancements
    necessary to detect and prevent the illicit diversion of nuclear
    materials. Within the Proliferation Detection Program, fundamental
    research is conducted in fields such as radiation detection, which
    supports national and homeland security agencies. It also advances
    basic and applied technologies for the nonproliferation community with
    dual-use benefit to national counterproliferation and counterterrorism
    missions. Specifically, this program develops the tools, technologies,
    techniques, and expertise for the identification, location, and
    analysis of the facilities, materials, and processes of undeclared and
    proliferant WMD programs. As the sole provider for the science base to
    the U.S. national nuclear test monitoring system, the Nuclear Explosion
    Monitoring Program produces the Nation's operational sensors that
    monitor from space the entire planet to detect and report surface,
    atmospheric, or space nuclear detonations. This program also produces
    and updates the regional geophysical datasets enabling operation of the
    Nation's ground-based seismic monitoring networks to detect and report
    underground detonations.
    Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) Support
        A research and education partnership program with the HBCUs and the
    Massie Chairs of Excellence was initiated by Congress through earmarks
    in the Office of the Administrator Appropriation in fiscal year 2005,
    fiscal year 2006, and fiscal year 2007. The NNSA has implemented an
    effective program to target national security research opportunities
    for these institutions to increase their participation in national
    security-related research and to train and recruit HBCU graduates for
    employment within the NNSA. The NNSA goal is a stable $10 million
    annual effort. In fiscal year 2008, the Office of the Administrator
    appropriation will provide continued funding of $1 million to support
    certain HBCU activities. The programs funded in the Weapons Activities
    Appropriation will provide approximately $4 to $6 million of support to
    HBCU programs. In addition, the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
    Appropriation will provide approximately $2 to $3 million to this
    program. Lastly, the Naval Reactors Program will fund approximately $1
    million of HBCU programs in fiscal year 2008.

                                   CONCLUSION

        I am confident that NNSA is headed in the right direction in the
    coming fiscal year. The budget request will support continuing our
    progress in protecting and certifying our Nation's strategic deterrent,
    transforming our nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure, reducing
    the global danger from proliferation and WMD, and enhancing the force
    projection capabilities of the U.S. nuclear Navy. It will enable us to
    continue to maintain the safety and security of our people,
    information, materials, and infrastructure. Taken together, each aspect
    of this budget request will allow us to meet our national security
    responsibilities during the upcoming fiscal year and well into the
    future.
        A statistical appendix follows that contains the budget figures
    supporting our Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Request. I look forward
    to answering any questions on the justification for the requested
    budget.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Tobey.
        Mr. Benkert?

    STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH A. BENKERT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
    SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
                                DEFENSE

        Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Dole, it's an honor to appear before
    you to discuss the CTR Program and the PSI. It is a particular
    honor to have been preceded at this table by Senators Nunn and
    Lugar. Their legislative foresight, as has been well-described
    here this morning, forms the basis for the authority that we
    now use to help combat the threat of WMD and related
    infrastructure.
        Clearly, Senator Nunn has remained a leading voice to
    maintain public awareness of the WMD threat, and Senator Lugar
    has been a tireless advocate for nonproliferation activities,
    both within the Senate, with the Department of State and in
    partnership with the Armed Service Committee, and has been a
    key steward and mentor of the program that he helped found. I
    also want to thank the members of this subcommittee for their
    strong support of DOD programs that serve to combat the
    proliferation of WMD.
        Last year, we in DOD issued a national military strategy to
    combat WMD, which provides the overarching guidance to focus
    our military efforts, and our efforts in the Defense Department
    in support of the President's vision for National security. The
    strategy divided this complex mission area into eight types of
    activities: offensive operations, elimination, interdiction,
    active defense, passive defense, WMD consequence management,
    security cooperation, and threat-reduction cooperation.
        CTR and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which we
    will discuss this morning, are two important components in our
    tool kit for carrying out several of these activities in
    support of the strategy.
        The traditional mission of CTR, seeks to halt the threat of
    WMD at its source, by destroying stockpiles and delivery
    systems. In cases where elimination was not possible, the next
    option was to safeguard the material from theft, or from
    diversion, through the installation of modernized security
    measures. Now, CTR--with its Proliferation Prevention
    Initiative--has gone beyond those two traditional areas, to
    help establish, in coordination with DOE, Department of State,
    and others, an outer ring of defense. A step away from the
    source, to stop WMD on the move, in transit.
        In a complementary fashion, PSI works with allies and like-
    minded nations on means to stop WMD and missile-related
    shipments bound to and from non-state actors and in the states
    of concern. It does this by developing operational concepts for
    interdiction, by organizing a program of interdiction
    exercises, sharing information about national legal authorities
    to interdict WMD and related materials, and pursuing
    cooperation with industry sectors that can be helpful in the
    interdiction mission.
        CTR celebrates its 15th anniversary this year. During this
    time, the CTR policy and implementation teams have developed a
    unique set of skills to deal with very dangerous materials in
    remote parts of the world. They still have much work to do
    related to existing CTR projects and agreements, but there will
    also be opportunities for new uses of CTR authorities.
        We would welcome this committee's support, to make CTR a
    more nimble and agile tool for the long-term. In this regard, I
    would just note Senator Lugar's and Senator Nunn's testimony
    this morning. I would command to the committee's attention,
    Senator Lugar's proposal, introduced in S. 198 in January of
    this year, which seeks to streamline CTR's internal processes,
    by removing certification requirements.
        Similarly, any flexibility the committee might provide for
    using CTR in areas outside the states of the former Soviet
    Union would position the program to be more responsive to
    emergent requirements, and to the evolving threat.
        Let me mention, briefly, our fiscal year 2008 funding
    requests. From the standpoint of funding, the traditional CTR
    programs, largely located in Russia, are winding down. The
    capital-intensive construction projects, such as the chemical
    weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'yv and security
    installations at Russian nuclear weapons sites will be
    completed within the next 2 years. Construction of the chemical
    weapons destruction facility is now about 50 percent complete.
    We expect to amend the agreements and add the final contracts
    and funding to complete this project very soon.
        In nuclear weapons storage security, what remains to be
    done is to provide--in conjunction with the DOE, an indigenous
    Russian capability to sustain the modernized systems our two
    Departments will have installed by the end of 2008. This will
    be a multi-year effort, but the levels of funding required will
    be considerably lower than what was needed at the height of the
    effort to install the upgrades themselves.
        Our Department remains involved in transporting warheads to
    dismantlement and to centralized storage, while concurrently
    procuring over the next several years, new, safer and more
    secure rail cars in which the Ministry of Defense can transport
    these weapons. We continue to eliminate strategic offensive
    arms, but long familiarity with the processes and excellent
    cooperation from the Russian executive agent have led to
    greater efficiency in this area, so that we are, in fact, doing
    more with less.
        As these projects are completed, the focus of the CTR
    effort is slowly moving away from its initial concentration on
    legacy Soviet stockpiles, and turning South and West towards
    Central Asia, the caucuses in the Ukraine. For fiscal year 2008
    we have doubled our request for funding for the Biological
    Threat Reduction Program, and I point that out, particularly in
    view of the case that both Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn made,
    about the need to provide additional funding for dealing with
    the bio-threat.
        The initiatives in the CTR program in this area include
    working to consolidate and secure dangerous pathogens,
    strengthening the ability to detect, diagnose, and respond to
    bio-terror attacks, and potential pandemics. We concluded
    agreements with the Governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia,
    Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, and we are implementing
    bio-programs in those countries.
        Threat agent detection and response involves selectively
    locating in each of these countries, a network of
    epidemiological monitoring stations, capable of performing
    rapid diagnosis of disease outbreaks, with a secure, central
    reference laboratory where the initial diagnoses can be
    confirmed. Currently, one central lab, reference lab, is under
    construction in Georgia and network designs in the other
    countries are nearing completion.
        The WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative funding remains
    steady at about $40 million. Currently, this is working in four
    countries of the former Soviet Union--Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
    Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. It seeks to develop in-depth WMD
    interdiction and detection capabilities over the long-term.
        The development of these projects is labor-intensive,
    implementation can be costly, particularly in the maritime
    domain, and the geographic areas in which we work--particularly
    the Caspian and Black Seas--are challenging and complex.
        Now, in the 5th year of this Proliferation Prevention
    Initiative Program, we're examining what we've accomplished,
    how we've complemented other border security efforts by other
    agencies, and where we'll go in the future.
        Mr. Chairman, the eight missions that we identified in the
    National Military Strategy to combat WMD, represent a
    continuing challenge. CTR and PSI are important tools in our
    tool kit for addressing this challenge. These programs can
    evolve to meet the evolving threat. We look forward to working
    with you toward that end. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my
    statement and I'm prepared to take any questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Benkert follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Joseph A. Benkert

        Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear
    before you to discuss the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program
    and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It is a particular
    honor to have been preceded at the witness table by Senators Nunn and
    Lugar, whose legislative foresight forms the basis of U.S. Government
    authorities to combat the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
    and related infrastructure. In private life, Senator Nunn has remained
    a leading voice to maintain public awareness of the WMD threat. Senator
    Lugar has been a tireless advocate for nonproliferation activities
    within the Senate and the Department of State, and in partnership with
    this committee has been a key steward and mentor of the CTR Program. I
    want also to thank the members of the committee for their strong
    support of Department of Defense (DOD) programs that serve to combat
    the proliferation of WMD.
        Since DOD last testified on these subjects in March 2006, we
    believe much has been accomplished and we look forward to a productive
    year ahead for both CTR and PSI. The President has requested $348
    million for fiscal year 2008 CTR activities; there is also a small
    request to support COCOM PSI-related exercises included in the Defense-
    Wide O&M section of the President's request. The Department urges your
    support for these requests. Appended to my prepared statement is a
    detailed description of the fiscal year 2008 CTR Program request.

                                 COMBATING WMD

        The first line of defense in combating WMD is international
    cooperation. We do this through bilateral working relationships,
    activities and agreements, and also through multilateral treaties and
    regimes. It is important that such agreements not be viewed as a
    panacea for the threat of WMD. The simple truth is that the worst
    proliferators tend not to sign up to treaties, and some nations that do
    sign up cheat. However, we also should not discount the value, in a
    layered defense strategy, of promoting norms of behavior and raising
    the bar for responsible behavior among nations that perceive an
    interest in strong relations with the United States and like-minded
    nations regarding proliferation of WMD. In this regard, DOD continues
    to play its role in interagency support for the Nuclear Suppliers
    Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and
    the Wassanaar Arrangement, as well as the Nonproliferation Treaty, CWC,
    and Biological Weapons Convention. DOD also helped draft and table at
    the Conference on Disarmament the U.S. proposal for a Fissile Material
    Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). This effort has allowed the U.S. to move the
    discussions forward on an FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament and
    with allies.
        As two examples of international cooperation, CTR and PSI are
    important components of DOD's ``toolkit'' for the combating WMD mission
    area. However, this toolkit is much broader, and is detailed in the
    Secretary's National Military Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass
    Destruction, issued in February 2006. This was the first DOD-wide
    strategy document addressed specifically at the combating WMD mission
    area. It followed the identification of combating WMD as one of four
    priority issues through which the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was
    conducted. The National Military Strategy for Combating WMD divided
    this complex mission area into eight discrete types of activities:
    offensive operations, elimination, interdiction, active defense,
    passive defense, WMD consequence management, security cooperation/
    partner activities, and threat reduction cooperation. CTR and PSI are
    elements of two of those mission areas. I think it is important that
    the committee keep the broader range of combating WMD activities in
    context, however. Our success in addressing this threat is a function
    of how well we do across the full spectrum of mission areas, not merely
    in two of them.
        CTR and PSI are certainly among the most complex elements of the
    eight mission areas, and I am pleased to have the opportunity to focus
    on them in detail.

                          COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

        The CTR Program is well-known to this committee, and we appreciate
    the active participation of you and your staff in guiding the program.
    The following comments review developments since this subcommittee last
    received testimony on CTR. In addition, I will outline our view for
    CTR's future.

                                    PROGRESS

        The past year has been very productive for CTR. Let me note a
    number of important accomplishments:

             We broke ground for a key bio-security facility in
            Tbilisi, Georgia, and are working closely with the government
            of Azerbaijan to do the same in Baku within the next year. Both
            of these governments have been very supportive as we jointly
            pursue improved WMD security, and we welcome their continuing
            cooperation. The bio-security facilities we have begun in these
            capitals are planned beginnings of a regional ``constellation''
            of facilities that will give the U.S. and cooperating
            governments new insight into potential bio-weapons threats in
            the region.
             We finalized procedures for accelerated warhead
            security assistance in the Russian Federation. This project has
            been moving forward on schedule for completion in 2008 at the
            initiative of Presidents Bush and Putin at the 2005 Bratislava
            Summit. We appreciate Congress's $44.5 million supplemental
            appropriation for fiscal year 2006, which was essential to
            accelerate the project.
             In ongoing activities, CTR supported elimination of 70
            silo-based and mobile missiles; secure transportation of 52
            railcars of nuclear warheads to non-alert locations; completion
            of security upgrades at 11 nuclear weapons storage sites, and a
            variety of other activities.
             We extended for 7 years the CTR Umbrella Agreements
            with the Russian Federation and Ukraine. These agreements are
            the backbone supporting all CTR activities in those countries
            and represent an important political commitment to continued
            cooperation in the area of nonproliferation.
             CTR continued to meet expectations regarding its
            financial management. In the past, the program was criticized
            for running high unobligated balances and we have worked
            diligently to address these criticisms. CTR funds are
            appropriated with a 3-year life, and the program is run on a
            capital-budgeting basis. Thus, it is not only impossible, but
            counterproductive for CTR to spend its annual appropriation
            fully in the year of appropriation. CTR projected that its
            unobligated balance at the end of fiscal year 2006 would be
            well under $100 million. At the end of fiscal year 2006, our
            unobligated balance was in fact $72 million--continued evidence
            of improved fiscal stewardship of the program. In fact,
            congressional restrictions on CTR spending require a
            substantial carryover in order that first fiscal-quarter bills
            can be paid.
             CTR has also continued to refine its business
            practices at both the policy and implementation levels. In
            August 2006, the Office of Management and Budget gave CTR top
            honors for DOD with respect to its Program Assessment Rating
            Tool process. Of the 16 DOD ``Service Asset and Service
            Acquisition Programs'' assessed by OMB during the summer 2006,
            the CTR Program received the highest score (92 out of 100) and
            was 1 of only 2 programs to receive an overall rating of
            ``Effective,'' which was the highest rating available.

        CTR also faced some challenges in the past year.

             Construction of the ``Shchuch'ye'' chemical weapons
            destruction facility in Russia continued to present very
            difficult challenges to U.S. requirements for transparent
            program management. The facility is now fully funded at $1.039
            billion--the final appropriation was for fiscal year 2007.
            However, over the past year there were significant problems
            ensuring that final contract awards could be accomplished
            transparently for prices that had a reasonable relation to the
            work proposed to be accomplished. After detailed negotiations,
            we are now poised to sign an agreement with Russia which will
            allow us to pull the Shcuch'ye project across the goal line
            within the U.S. budget. If that budget turns out to be
            insufficient, we expect to have Russia's commitment to fund
            whatever is necessary to complete the project.
              I want to emphasize DOD's commitment to completing the
            Shchuch'ye project. Over the past year, concerns have been
            expressed that we are somehow trying to walk away from
            Shchuch'ye. This is not correct. The United States has invested
            nearly $1 billion so far in this project, which is intended to
            eliminate the most dangerous type of chemical weapons--nerve
            agent--in their most proliferable form--small artillery shells
            and rockets. For CTR's threat reduction mission, and for the
            integrity of the program, it is important that Shchuch'ye be
            completed. However, DOD can not do so where we cannot validate
            that the U.S. is receiving appropriate value for its investment
            to ensure that the mission is achieved. We believe our Russian
            partners understand our position clearly, share our concerns
            about managing costs, and are ready to sign an agreement that
            will lead to successful commissioning of Shchuch'ye.
             Cooperation among some Central Asian partners has been
            uneven. In some cases we have experienced inappropriate
            government scrutiny of our foreign-national subcontractors or
            interlocutors. In other cases, we have faced bureaucratic
            challenges getting CTR assistance exempted from local taxes.
            Despite the strenuous efforts of the Department of State and
            U.S. embassies to address these challenges, they continue to
            constrain the many good things CTR can do for U.S. and partner-
            country interests.

                                LOOKING FORWARD

        The next few years will see several milestones for CTR, offering an
    opportunity to look farther ahead for the program. We expect to
    complete the Bratislava warhead security initiative in 2008, and the
    Shchuch'ye nerve agent elimination project in early 2009. In addition
    to continued progress in our missile elimination work in Russia,
    completion of these two very important and complex projects will mark
    several key changes for CTR.
        First, we expect that this will be the first time in CTR's history
    that the level of effort outside the Russian Federation, as measured by
    program funding, will exceed the level inside Russia. This represents a
    significant array of accomplishments for the program managers, action
    officers and contractors in the U.S. and Russia who have spent over a
    decade seeking to secure the legacy of Soviet WMD production, and its
    related infrastructure.
        The trend toward more CTR activity outside Russia reflects the
    realities of today. The Russian Federation finds itself in a much
    different position today than it was 15 years ago when CTR began. At
    that time, Senators Nunn and Lugar and their Russian counterparts had
    the foresight to understand the threat from unsecured, Soviet-era WMD
    across the states of the former Soviet Union. An enduring achievement
    of CTR is that it supported the secure repatriation to Russia of the
    Soviet Union's nuclear warheads located in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and
    Belarus. These countries also became CTR partners. Today, the Russian
    Federation has both the revived organizational capability as well as
    the resources to secure weapons of mass destruction inside its borders,
    and President Putin has committed to doing so. Thus, it is not
    surprising that CTR's level of effort in Russia is projected to
    decline. Indeed, with narrow exceptions, we anticipate that CTR will
    fulfill contracts and commitments already made in Russia, but not
    undertake any new work in the foreseeable future.
        CTR conducts its work where partner nations request its
    assistance--it functions only in permissive environments. Russia has
    not asked CTR for new assistance, with narrow exceptions, for some
    time. If Russia believes that CTR can bring a special capability to
    bear on a WMD problem, we would always be willing to discuss it.
        Moreover, the nature of the WMD threat has changed. When CTR began,
    the focus of the program was to eliminate or secure WMD at its source.
    This continues to be our preferred approach: the only way to have 100
    percent confidence that WMD or related infrastructure does not
    constitute a threat, is to get rid of it. However, we only have access
    to such stockpiles when the possessor state identifies them and
    requests assistance for elimination. Many of those known stockpiles or
    infrastructure were in the states of the former Soviet Union, including
    Russia, and CTR assistance has been requested to address them in many
    cases. Much of that assistance has already been provided. If WMD are
    found elsewhere, CTR is ready to provide security or conduct
    elimination operations, provided that doing so is consistent with U.S.
    policy and resource availability.
        The threat from large stockpiles of WMD ``at its source'' and from
    related infrastructure continues. However, terrorists do not need large
    amounts of WMD to carry out their missions. After September 11 this
    administration sought to address WMD on the move, as well as at the
    source. The purpose of this revised approach was to help meet the
    challenge posed by non-state actors, who are not tied to large
    stockpiles or infrastructure. For CTR, this resulted in the Weapons of
    Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative, which is intended
    to improve partner nations' WMD border security capacity. It also
    resulted in the Threat Agent Detection and Response (TADR) initiative,
    under CTR's Biological Threat Reduction Program. TADR is intended to
    improve partner nations' capacity to detect, characterize , and share
    information about biological threats and trends related to dangerous
    pathogens. This attention to capacity building, in addition to
    addressing ``WMD in place,'' will help keep CTR current with the
    threats it is intended to address.
        CTR is one of several tools in our nonproliferation toolkit. Some
    have said that because the CTR budget request is declining, the
    administration intends to declare victory and close the program. This
    is incorrect. The budget has declined in part because expensive,
    infrastructure-heavy projects such as Shchuch'ye, warhead security and
    missile elimination are all nearing completion or well beyond the half-
    way mark; and because new opportunities to use CTR's capabilities, in
    the type of circumstance the CTR model requires, are still being
    developed. Thus, the measure of CTR's health or its future is not how
    much money is being requested. Indeed, one of the key lessons we have
    learned is to measure our success by the nonproliferation return we
    receive on an expenditure and by accomplishment of the mission, not
    merely by how much equipment we supply to a partner. It may well be
    that CTR's budget request will need to rise in the future. Some
    capacity building is costly: the TADR program, which we have already
    begun to execute in several nations, involves providing some very
    complex facilities to accomplish its mission.
        The CTR policy and implementation teams have developed a unique set
    of skills to deal with very dangerous materials in very remote parts of
    the world. They still have much work to do related to existing CTR
    projects and agreements, but there will be opportunities for new uses
    of CTR. No one should think that the program is being shut down.
    Indeed, we would welcome the committee's support to make CTR a more
    nimble tool for the long term. In this regard, I would commend to the
    committee's attention the provisions of S.198, introduced on January 8,
    2007 by Senator Lugar which seek to streamline CTR's internal
    processes. Similarly, any additional flexibility the committee might
    provide for using CTR outside the states of the former Soviet Union
    would position the program to be more responsive to emergent
    requirements and the evolving threat I described, should the need
    arise. However, any expansion of CTR to new regimes or for new purposes
    will need to be considered carefully in light of the full array of WMD
    tools available and in view of CTR's core business activities--
    elimination, security, and capacity building to address the threat of
    WMD and related infrastructure and delivery systems. We believe we have
    the right models in place for these activities, and that staying
    focused on them is the key to keeping the program running correctly.

                       PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

        The United States continues to work with other governments on the
    PSI, which President Bush launched in May 2003. Through the PSI, the
    United States collaborates with like-minded countries on how to stop
    WMD/missile-related shipments bound to and from non-state actors and
    states of concern while also working to enhance our individual and
    collective WMD interdiction tools.
        Since Assistant Secretary Flory last testified before this
    Subcommittee in March 2006, the number of countries that have endorsed
    the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles has increased to over 80.
    The United States plays a leading role in the the PSI Operational
    Experts Group (OEG), which meets on behalf of all PSI participants to
    discuss and advance PSI objectives. The OEG brings together 20
    countries and their experts from the military, law enforcement,
    intelligence, legal, and diplomatic arenas. These experts develop new
    operational concepts for interdiction; organize a program of
    interdiction exercises; share information about national legal
    authorities; and pursue cooperation with industry sectors that can be
    helpful to the interdiction mission. Through these efforts, OEG
    participants raise the level of collective and national interdiction
    capabilities. New Zealand recently hosted the 14th OEG meeting in
    Auckland in March 2007. Greece will host the next OEG meeting in
    October 2007.
        DOD is responsible for leading the OEG process, the locus of
    operational aspects of PSI. To date, PSI partners have had 25 PSI OEG
    exercises that have explored all modes of transportation: ground, air,
    and sea. These exercises have brought to bear the expertise and
    operational assets of both the military as well as law enforcement
    agencies, reflecting the cooperative and multi-dimensional forms that
    real-world interdictions can take. These exercises have also been
    hosted by a range of countries around the world, and they provide an
    opportunity for nations that yet to endorse PSI to observe the
    operational aspects of PSI. Over 50 PSI participants have participated
    in or sent observers to these 25 exercises, while about another 20 non-
    PSI participants have sent observers.
        PSI exercise Leading Edge, hosted by the United States and Bahrain
    in October 2006, was the first to be conducted in the Persian Gulf. In
    addition to six nations that sent operational assets (Australia,
    France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Bahrain and the United States), the
    United Arab Emirates, Japan, Spain, South Korea, Pakistan and Qatar
    sent observers . The United States continues to help plan or
    participate in a range of upcoming PSI exercises planned for 2007.
        In addition to exercises, table-top games and simulations have also
    helped participants work through interdiction scenarios, and they have,
    in many cases, improved the way participating governments organize to
    conduct interdictions. To this end, the United States will host another
    PSI game for OEG states at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode
    Island in June 2007.
        We have seen other concrete benefits from the PSI. Participation in
    PSI has helped countries improve their internal interagency processes,
    communication with counterparts in foreign countries, understanding of
    international and domestic legal authorities, and understanding of
    applicable resoures and assets. All of these improvements have in turn
    helped countries in other areas, such as in fulfilling their
    obligations to implement United Nations Security Council Resolutions
    (UNSCR) 1718 (DPRK sanctions) and 1737/1747 (Iran). In discussions of
    UNSCRs 1718, 1737, and 1747 in the last two OEG meetings, a number of
    countries have cited that their work on PSI has helped lay the
    groundwork and develop the processes or mechanisms that they need to
    implement these chapter VII resolutions.
        The PSI has been and remains an invaluable nonproliferation
    activity, and we will continue to work close with our PSI partners to
    maximize its potential.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Mr. Chairman, the eight missions identified in the National
    Military Strategy to Combat WMD represent a continuing challenge for
    us. They are complex because the threat is complex; the next edition of
    this strategy document could change in important ways, because the WMD
    threat will change. As it does, we are prepared to make changes in
    programs like CTR. The same is true for PSI, though this activity is
    still new enough that we ought not begin speaking of significant
    changes just yet. The WMD threat is significant, and PSI and CTR are
    important tools that should be considered to fight that threat. We look
    forward to working closely with Congress toward that end.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
        I presume we can do at least two rounds of 6 minutes, so
    let me begin, and let me begin with Mr. Tobey.
        My first focus is on the Mixed-Oxide (MOX) Fuel Program. We
    know that's been an episodic process on both sides of the
    ocean, both the Russians and the United States.
        Specifically, will DOE go forward with the MOX Program,
    with or without a Russian commitment to finish their project?
        Mr. Tobey. We believe that the MOX Program is in the U.S.
    interest, regardless of what the Russians do. However, we
    intend fully to hold the Russians to the 2000 Plutonium
    Disposition Agreement, and we actually think that the chances
    are better that we will be able to hold the Russians to that
    agreement, if we proceed with our program.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Tobey.
        Are there any alternatives to MOX that you're considering?
        Mr. Tobey. Mr. Chairman, over the last, I think, well,
    maybe more than a decade, a decade or so, many alternatives
    have been discussed. I think that some three dozen were
    initially discussed, in the original origins of the program.
    This has been narrowed down over time, and I think DOE last
    reported on three possible alternatives at the request of
    Congress: the MOX Program, vitrification, or storage. Storage--
    or simply doing nothing, but continuing to secure the material,
    using 50-year life cycle costs, turns out to be the most
    expensive alternative. Of course, at the end of the 50 years,
    something must be done with the material at that point. During
    all of that time, it still remains material that could--at
    least theoretically--be used for nuclear weapons and, so we
    don't accomplish our nonproliferation goals.
        Vitrification is also a possibility. The estimated costs
    were not found to be substantially different than the MOX
    program, however, there's a great deal more technological, and
    therefore, financial risk. We're probably at least several
    years--perhaps as many as 8, years of research and development
    away from even beginning a vitrification effort. I would point
    out, the MOX program, the facility is actually 85 percent
    complete with its design.
        Senator Reed. Well, I understand and appreciate your
    commitment to completing it is in our interest, even without a
    Russian factor. But, there are some issues in timing, and one
    issue is that the plant will not be completed in 2011, but you
    want to start initial construction immediately, is that the
    case?
        Mr. Tobey. My understanding of the continuing resolution
    that was passed, prohibits us from starting construction
    activities until August 1, but we would like to start
    construction as soon as possible thereafter.
        Senator Reed. But the design phase will go much beyond
    that, design phase stretches to 2011, is that our impediment to
    a good, solid project?
        Mr. Tobey. The design is basically, well, it's somewhat
    greater than 85 percent complete. I think it's actually now,
    the last time--since that figure was formulated, and I think
    we've gone a little bit further.
        Some of design makes sense to do as you're doing the--as
    you're constructing the plant. As you probably know, Senator,
    the plant wouldn't be finished until 2015. So, some of that
    design work can go on as construction occurs.
        Senator Reed. We're going to spend at least $5 billion to
    build and start up the plant. For 14 years, dispose of only the
    agreed-upon 34 tons of plutonium, which begs the question--what
    happens to the additional excess U.S. plutonium? Shouldn't we
    design and build a plant that could fully-convert all of this
    plutonium?
        Mr. Tobey. Our view is that we should try and use the plant
    for as much of the material as possible. Some of the material
    may not be suitable for use in light-water reactors, because of
    contaminants within the material. But, it would be our
    objective to use it as much as possible. We're committed to
    using the plant for the 34 metric tons, as you noted.
        There's up to 13 additional metric tons that would be
    disposed of through other disposition paths. But, the phrase,
    ``up to'' is key there. It would be our intent to put as much
    as possible through the MOX program.
        I'd also note that if there are further declarations of
    plutonium as excess to defense needs, that would likely be run
    through the MOX process. As well, we're looking into the
    possibility that the MOX plant could be used to produce driver
    fuel for fast reactors that might be pursued under the GNEP.
    So, we're trying to use the plant for as many purposes as
    possible.
        Senator Reed. This is my final question. The last National
    Defense Authorization Act required an independent cost estimate
    be conducted by DOE, and in lieu of an independent cost
    estimate, I'm told you have conducted an independent cost
    review. Is this accurate, and why is the independent cost
    estimate not being done?
        Mr. Tobey. I must admit, Senator, I'm not familiar with the
    exact distinction of, what the technical distinction between
    the two terms. I know that Burns & Rowe did look at the cost of
    the MOX plan. As a result of that, the total project cost was
    increased, the Reserves were increased as a result--it was a
    comprehensive study that cost roughly $1 million. But, I'd be
    happy to get back to you on that----
        Senator Reed. I think it would be helpful. Again, this is
    this sort of a distinction that is important, but, I think,
    should be clarified. So, if you could clarify the distinction
    and let us know, because the legislation called for this cost
    estimate, not just a review.
        Mr. Tobey. Certainly, sir.
        Senator Reed. I'd appreciate that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        An independent cost estimate (ICE) of the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel
    Fabrication Facility (Project 99-D-143) was prepared by the Jupiter
    Corporation on March 6, 2001, for the Department of Energy's Office of
    Engineering and Construction Management (OECM). Subsequently, delays
    caused by a liability impasse with Russia, constrained funding in the
    outyears and a partial redesign of the MOX facility to accommodate
    quantities of impure plutonium resulting from the cancellation of the
    immobilization project all have contributed to further delays in the
    MOX project schedule and increases to its total project cost. In 2006,
    in preparation for Critical Decision 2 (approval of performance
    baseline) approval, the MOX project cost estimate was updated to
    reflect current year dollars, escalation and risk contingency,
    including cost and schedule impacts associated with the liability
    impact, constrained funding and the MOX redesign. This cost estimate
    was again independently reviewed and validated by the engineering firm
    of Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc. as part of OECM's external
    independent review (EIR) process. A report containing the review
    criteria, details of areas reviewed, findings, and DOE corrective
    actions was provided to Congress on April 4, 2007.
        In contrast to an ICE, in which only cost is evaluated, an EIR is
    much broader, taking into consideration 13 other essential project
    management elements such as, program and design requirements, results
    of design reviews, integrated resource loaded project schedule, project
    execution plan, risk management plan and the procurement and
    acquisition plans, all which are essential to the execution phase of
    the project. As part of the EIR, Burns and Roe evaluated the
    contractor's basis of estimates, including cost of materials and labor,
    structural and equipment installation unit rates, escalation, technical
    and programmatic risks, schedule and cost uncertainty, as well as
    project risk contingency associated with completing the design,
    construction and cold startup scope of work. Related construction work
    packages, projected resources and integrated project schedule
    activities were also reviewed as part of this effort. As a result, an
    additional $359 million was added to estimates proposed by DOE's
    contractor to reflect increases in the cost of some the construction
    activities, escalation rates, and contingency.

        Senator Reed. Mr. Benkert, again, thank you for your
    testimony. As you've pointed out, the committee's been very
    supportive of the CTR Program's effort to expand into
    biological security. Even though funding from this expansion
    plan was not included in the fiscal year 2008 budget request, I
    understand that you would like to get additional resources in
    the 2009 request. Could you briefly set out what work you'd
    like to do and where, with respect to biological initiatives?
        Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I think as I said, we have
    substantially expanded the funding in the 2008 request,
    specifically for bio, to do work in the five countries that I
    mentioned. I think we are looking at the possibility in future
    years for expanding this work to other countries, but also what
    additional work we need to do to follow up on the work we've
    started in the countries of concern.
        So, for example, we have a set of things that we are doing,
    which involve a series, a network of epidemiological stations
    to--which will be able to detect biological agents or extremely
    dangerous pathogens. Then a central reference laboratory to do
    diagnosis and other kinds of work.
        So, I think our view is, at this point, that we have
    adequate funding for what we have set out to do, and we are
    looking at what we might do to expand the program. I think our
    caution would be that, I mean, we are doubling the size of the
    program, in terms of funding, in this coming year, and we
    would, I think, be reluctant to put much more money into the
    program until we make sure that we can manage what we have,
    given the fact that it's about to double in funding.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Benkert, let me begin with you and ask, I understand
    that our troops have found some stocks of old, this would be
    pre-1991 Gulf War chemical weapons in Iraq. They're stored in
    bunkers that are under our guard, and they pose a safety and an
    environmental hazard. If they were to get into the wrong hands,
    of course, they could pose a threat to coalition troops, and to
    the Iraqi civilian population. Is there consideration being
    given to using CTR assistance to help Iraq destroy these old
    chemical weapons? If so, what factors is the administration
    looking at? What are they considering as this decision is being
    weighed?
        Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Senator Dole.
        As you said, there are old chemical weapons in Iraq, in a
    variety--we discover them, occasionally the insurgents discover
    them as well, and then there are certain areas where there are
    stockpiles of these.
        We have, in fact--we are in fact looking at the possibility
    of the use of CTR funds to help to assist the Iraqis in
    destroying these weapons. I think the issue that we have, of
    course, is--referring to Senator Lugar's point, that we are
    limited in our ability to use CTR outside of the former Soviet
    Union by the current restrictions of $50 million annually, and
    a requirement for a Presidential determination. So, I think it
    would be useful to us, if there were greater flexibility, it
    would provide us some greater flexibility to look at what we
    might do in Iraq. I think, part of this also is, will be tied
    to Iraq's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and
    their declarations to the OPCW, which will then put them in a
    position where they're obliged to start destroying these
    weapons. But, yes, we are looking at how we could help them do
    that.
        Senator Dole. Let me visit with you about Shchuchye for a
    few moments. Of course, this is the last large CTR construction
    project in Russia, and we understand that DOD has recently
    negotiated with Russia to have Russia assume responsibility for
    completing the construction, using U.S. funds that have already
    been provided and allocated to the project.
        DOD does not plan to provide any additional funding, as
    you've indicated, for this facility. But, given the large U.S.
    investment in this facility, and the sensitivity of its
    function--destroying chemical weapons, it's important that the
    United States have high confidence that the facility will
    operate properly and safely once it's turned over to the
    Russians.
        Has DOD pared back the scope of its work on systemization
    of this facility, and the training of the Russian operators as
    a result of this development? If so, can you assure us that the
    facility will operate as designed, and that the Russian workers
    will be adequately trained, so that we can be confident in the
    safe operations of this, largely U.S.-funded facility?
        Mr. Benkert. Senator Dole, I can assure you that we are
    committed to seeing this project through to its completion to
    ensure that this important facility does, in fact, function as
    designed, and is able to destroy the weapons.
        I mean, we completely share the views--I think, again,
    expressed here this morning by Senator Nunn, of the importance
    of this work. This is the largest stockpile in the world of
    probably the most dangerous chemical weapons in the world. So,
    I can assure you that we are committed to seeing it through. I
    think we have had some issues in contracting in order to get
    this program completed, I think we have arrived at an
    effective, and also I think, creative way of structuring the
    contracts for the remaining work, so that we can do this within
    the budget that we have been given, and do it at a reasonable
    price.
        We will be watching this very carefully as it progresses,
    to make sure that, in fact, that the work does what it's
    supposed to do.
        Senator Dole. Thank you.
        Mr. Tobey, we're all watching cautiously to see whether the
    agreements reached at the Six-Party Talks will be honored in
    North Korea, whether North Korea will ultimately make good on
    its commitment to shut down, and eventually to dismantle--with
    verification--its nuclear weapons program.
        What role is DOE playing in helping to assess the accuracy
    of the North Korean declaration regarding its nuclear programs,
    and what role is DOE possibly playing here, with regard to
    helping to develop a reliable verification system.
        Mr. Tobey. Senator Dole, DOE's been an active participant
    in the negotiations, I actually participated myself in three
    rounds of the talks while I was at the National Security
    Council. But while I was there, there was a colleague from the
    DOE, now one of our people continues to go to those talks. So,
    we're participating in the negotiations, advising Ambassador
    Hill on the technical aspects of what would be required for
    verifiable dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program.
        We've also been an active participant in interagency
    discussions on, what would be required for verifiable
    dismantlement of the North Korean program. As you probably
    know, we haven't yet received a declaration from North Korea,
    but we would expect to be active participants in analysis of
    that declaration. When the time came, and while no roles have
    yet been determined among the parties, I would expect that if
    the United States takes a leading role in verifying the
    dismantlement of the program, that the DOE would be actively
    involved in that.
        Senator Dole. Thank you.
        Earlier, I raised a question about the Iraqi scientists.
    I'd like to have you elaborate on where we stand there.
        In 2004, DOE launched an initiative, as I understand it, to
    provide employment opportunities for these Iraqi scientists,
    but because of security considerations, that program did not
    advance rapidly.
        But, I'm interested in how many scientists may have
    participated, and in your view, if this program were to be
    expanded and extended, the number of scientists who might want
    to take advantage of such an opportunity. Could you just update
    us regarding the status and the progress of this program?
        Mr. Tobey. Sure, it's a difficult issue. Because, as you
    noted, the security situation is difficult. We did work in--
    directly in Iraq, early on, and there were programs aimed at
    both bettering the Iraqi people, and also making use of the
    scientific expertise that was resident within Iraq.
        We've concentrated more recently on programs that are
    located outside of Iraq, where we can bring Iraqis to be
    trained, and those programs do continue, they're not large, but
    we're continuing to train Iraqis. I will have to get back to
    you on the exact number of participants that have been through
    this.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Scientist engagement is carried out by NNSA's Global Initiatives
    for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program. This program, established
    in 2005, combined existing scientist redirection programs that targeted
    the Former Soviet Union and expanded the mission of these programs to
    meet emerging challenges, such as Libya and Iraq.
        In Iraq, GIPP currently sponsors 13 projects involving 41 Iraqi
    scientists. Many of these projects directly contribute to the
    reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure, such as water purification
    techniques. Other projects have potential medical or pharmaceutical
    applications. GIPP projects are approved to maximize participation by
    scientists with weapons of mass destruction skills and expertise in
    nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, weapons safety, weapons design, and
    explosives. None of these scientists is employed or trained in the
    United States under these projects.

        Senator Dole. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Dole. Let me
    leave with a couple of additional questions, and recognize
    Senator Dole again.
        DOE is responsible for a lot of research and development,
    which is critical to nonproliferation--forensic
    identifications, and all of that which is going to be
    increasingly important as we see more and more nations begin to
    develop nuclear energy programs, and perhaps worse.
        I'm just wondering, with respect to both DOE and DOD, do
    you think you have adequate resources for the kind of research
    programs that are necessary, Mr. Tobey?
        Mr. Tobey. Yes, Senator. Although, as you note, it is a
    very high priority. In our case, because we are among the few
    that provide funds for basic research, as opposed to applied
    research, I think those dollars are very critical, not only to
    the work of DOE, but as support for other agencies.
        Senator Reed. Are there any areas that you feel are under
    funded, in terms of this research? That are absolutely
    important going forward, but are not receiving adequate
    resources?
        Mr. Tobey. No, sir.
        Senator Reed. If you think of some, don't be shy about
    letting us know.
        Mr. Tobey. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Benkert, in terms of DOD research, to the
    extent that you have sort of a window on that, are there any
    areas of concern that you have the research dollars aren't
    there for these, to support the counterproliferation programs?
        Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I think again, in terms of the
    nuclear issues, primarily to DOE on this, but I think you hit
    upon an important topic, which is this ability--the forensic
    ability to determine where materials come from.
        I think the observation I would make is that in terms of
    nuclear materials, there has been much progress, and I think
    probably we are in reasonably good shape. In terms of being, if
    the forensic capabilities, if chemical weapons were used, or
    biological weapons, probably not so. I would have to get back
    to you on the specifics of whether we have adequate funds
    invested in those areas or not, but I think clearly it's the
    case that more needs to be done there.
        Senator Reed. I think so. Because, again, without the
    telltale irrefutable link back to a source, deterrence doesn't
    work.
        Mr. Benkert. Right.
        Senator Reed. You're left with pre-emption, or you're left
    with, just fingers crossed and hoping for the best, and I don't
    think we want to be in that position. So, this effort going
    forward of adequate research, and particularly when it comes to
    forensics of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is
    absolutely critical, and I'd appreciate your thoughtful
    response in this regard.
        The final question I have is that, we seem to have reached
    some significant milestones with respect to the initial vision
    of the Conference for Threat Reduction. We have facilities in
    place to destroy chemical weapons that we're seeing come online
    and we are looking, dealing with transferring plutonium into
    MOX. The question, I think, now, is what's the next thought
    about programmatically, geographically--where do we go now?
    Sort of, the CTR II? Mr. Tobey?
        Mr. Tobey. Mr. Chairman, when I took this job last August,
    I talked about three priorities. The first was to get
    Bratislava done on time, or if possible, early. I think we're
    winding down that effort, we're on a track to getting our work
    complete by the end of 2008. The second was good program
    management, because I know that's been an issue at DOE, and we
    deal with complicated, expensive programs, and that's
    important. The third, though, was to make sure that our
    strategy met the evolving threat that we face. That, I think,
    is a particularly important problem. I think as we begin to
    complete our work in the former Soviet Union, and move from
    control of material to sustaining those efforts, we also need
    to turn our attention elsewhere.
        A couple of areas have been mentioned already by the first
    panel and others in the room, and I agree with those
    sentiments. I think that while we all hope that the agreement
    with North Korea holds, until we're certain that that program
    is fully dismantled, I think we have to attend to the
    possibility that there could be proliferation from North Korea,
    given its record as a proliferator of missile equipment and
    other dangerous military technology.
        I think also in South Asia, there are some proliferation
    concerns. I would hope that the full suite of the activities
    that we undertake--both in terms of second line of defense and
    best practices--could be applied to those areas.
        In that regard, I'm very much encouraged by the Global
    Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. That was an initiative
    that was started by Presidents Bush and Putin at St. Petersburg
    last year. The model for the membership is like the PSI, it
    started with a small group, the G8, plus four other nations--
    Australia, China, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. Since then, Morocco
    has joined, and the group has set out, first, a set of
    principles to guide their action, and then that was done in
    Rabat last fall, and in January in Ankara, Turkey, they adopted
    a work program, and then in June, we're hopeful that the
    membership of the organization will greatly expand.
        I regard this as particularly promising, because what we
    can do is take the lessons that we've learned in the former
    Soviet Union and elsewhere, and take the legal mandate of U.N.
    Security Council Resolution 1540, and in doing so, gather the
    resources in terms of personnel and national power and
    financial resources of other countries, and apply them to the
    nonproliferation problem. So, it's no longer the United States,
    and perhaps portions of the G8 that are bearing this burden
    alone, it becomes the responsibility of every nation to fight
    the proliferation problem. I think that's the way we will best
    meet the emerging threats that we're facing.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Mr. Benkert, your thoughts?
        Mr. Benkert. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would
    wholeheartedly endorse what Mr. Tobey just said about the
    Global Initiative to counter nuclear terrorism. We have, in
    CTR, over the last 15 years, developed a great base of
    knowledge on practices, procedures, how to go about eliminating
    and destroying nuclear weapons, how to go about securing sites,
    developing the hardware and the procedures to do that.
        I think, one of the things we want to do is to be able to
    apply this knowledge outside Russia and the former Soviet
    Union. The Global Initiative that Presidents Bush and Putin
    launched, I think, is a good vehicle for doing that. There may
    be others, as well, that we want to do, but I think one thing
    that it is, one area that we want to pursue is how we use this
    base of knowledge and experience that we have developed over
    the last 15 years, in Russia and the former Soviet Union, in a
    broader context.
        The second is, the two relatively new components of CTR are
    the Proliferation Prevention Initiative which is the attempt to
    develop the capability to stop WMD and related materials on the
    move, for example, though border security initiatives. I think
    this is--we think this is particularly promising since, I
    think, in the future, one cannot assume that we will be able to
    get at weapons at their source, and we need to be able to stop
    them en route.
        Then, of course, as we've discussed before, the biological
    piece of this, which I think is an area that deserves a great
    deal of attention, and we are providing attention to that.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole. Just one further question for Mr. Tobey. In
    March 2003--or 2005, I believe it was--DOE launched the GTRI,
    and it aims to identify secure radiological materials around
    the world against diversion for use in radiological dispersion
    devices. What is the status of this very important anti-
    terrorism initiative? Has the Department developed a strategy
    for prioritizing activities under this initiative, so that the
    material that poses the highest risk is dealt with and
    addressed first?
        Mr. Tobey. Senator Dole, this is a very important program,
    and our work there has been accelerating. We've taken to heart
    some of the advice we've received from outside of the
    Department. In terms of sites that have been secured over the
    last several years, in fiscal year 2003, we secured 8, in
    fiscal year 2004, it was 61, in 2005, 174, and 2006 it was 257.
    Cumulatively, we've secured over 520 sites. So, the work there
    is not only continuing, but accelerating, and I do believe it
    is fundamentally important.
        We have developed a prioritization, and that's based on the
    type of material, how easily attainable it might be to a
    terrorist group, and also its proximity to assets that we care
    about the United States, or our allies or our friends. We use
    that prioritization to guide our efforts worldwide.
        We are also working with the IAEA because they engage in
    similar work, to try and come up with prioritization that would
    be harmonized with ours. It may not be perfectly the same, but,
    in other words, to guide their practices as well. Because,
    you're certainly right that prioritization of the work is
    important.
        Then, finally, this is an area where I think the Global
    Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism can also play a role,
    because we can take this prioritization, present it to other
    nations, and hope to engage their efforts on this work, as
    well.
        Senator Dole. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Dole. Let me thank you for
    your participation. As always, your thoughtful questions and
    your insightful remarks.
        I want to thank both Mr. Benkert and Mr. Tobey for your
    testimony. The record will remain open for 3 days for
    additional questions, which any of the panel might have for you
    gentlemen.
        Thank you very much, and the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2008

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2007

                               U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
                                      and Capabilities,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

     EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL
                             AWARENESS CAPABILITIES

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m. in
    room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Reed, Akaka, Warner,
    and Dole.
        Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
    professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
    staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    Republican staff director; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff
    member; and Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Jessica L.
    Kingston, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
        Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King,
    assistant to Senator Reed; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator
    Warner; and Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Reed. If I could have your attention. First, let me
    thank all the exhibitors for a very interesting and informative
    exhibition and demonstration. It is quite impressive. I thank
    you all.
        We will now call the hearing to order and I would begin my
    statement, but also indicate that Senator Akaka will be joining
    us. He has several other responsibilities, so I will suspend
    and recognize him immediately, with the kind concurrence of
    Senator Dole.
        Today we meet to consider efforts to improve the Department
    of Defense (DOD) language and cultural awareness capabilities.
    I would like to welcome our witnesses. Our first witness is
    General Robert Scales, who is currently the President of
    Colgen, Inc. General Scales served for 30 years in the Army and
    is an outspoken advocate of language and cultural awareness in
    the military.
        Representing the DOD is Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
    for Plans, Gail McGinn. Secretary McGinn is responsible for the
    development and implementation of the DOD's language policies.
        Joining Secretary McGinn is Dr. Andre Van Tilborg, Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology. In this
    position, Dr. Van Tilborg has oversight over many of the DOD's
    important research efforts, including those in language,
    translation, and cultural awareness.
        I also want to thank everyone from the various service
    agencies and commands who worked on the technology
    demonstration that we have here in the hearing room today. Some
    of these systems are related significantly to improving our
    capability in addressing operational shortfalls in the short-
    term, while we strive to more comprehensively improve the DOD's
    capabilities in this arena.
        I want to especially thank the subcommittee staff
    assistant, Jessica Kingston, for her efforts in coordinating
    the demonstration and exhibits today. Jessica, you did a great
    job. I encourage all of our members, witnesses, and attendees
    to take the opportunity to examine some of these devices and
    learn about the ongoing research efforts.
        At this point, it is appropriate in my text to stop and,
    Senator Akaka, if you would like to make your opening statement
    we would be more than willing to recognize you.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
    for this opportunity to present my statement. I want to thank
    Senator Dole for giving me this opportunity, too. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to speak briefly on this matter.
    I need to leave to chair a Veterans Affairs Committee hearing
    at 2 o'clock.
        I applaud your leadership in holding today's hearing, Mr.
    Chairman, on the DOD's language and cultural awareness
    capabilities. This is a critical issue for national security
    and I appreciate your allowing me to participate here. As
    chairman of the Senate Oversight of Government Management
    Subcommittee and the Armed Services Readiness and Management
    Support Subcommittee, I have been very interested in how the
    Federal Government as a whole and DOD in particular are meeting
    their needs in both the short- and long-term. While DOD has
    made great strides to address this issue, more work needs to be
    done.
        One issue I want to discuss is how DOD coordinates with
    other Federal agencies, industries, and stakeholders to address
    its language needs. In 2004, DOD held a national language
    conference and issued a White Paper summarizing the
    recommendations of the conference. The number one
    recommendation called for naming a senior Government official
    to lead the Government's foreign language education effort and
    establishing a council representing the broad spectrum of
    stakeholders to report on the Nation's language needs and
    propose actions to address them.
        The White Paper also noted that all interested parties must
    be involved, as all sectors--government, industry, and
    academia--have a need for language-proficient individuals and
    no one sector has all of the solutions.
        Last year the administration announced the National
    Security Language Initiative (NSLI) to coordinate efforts among
    the intelligence directorate and the Departments of Defense,
    Education, and State to address our national security language
    needs. However, NSLI and the National Security Education
    Program failed to address key recommendations made in the White
    Paper, namely ensuring that this effort can be sustained,
    taking in the advice of all Federal agencies, stakeholders, and
    addressing our common security needs, which also impacts our
    national security.
        In January I chaired a hearing of the Senate Oversight of
    Government Management Subcommittee on the Federal Government's
    language strategy. Testimony from academia and foreign language
    groups said that there is a lack of coordination between NSLI
    partners and stakeholders. One witness commented that if there
    is a Federal language strategy, it is not well known.
        Last year Senator Cochran and I were able to secure $1
    million for DOD to implement the recommendations of the White
    Paper. As reflected in my language, the National Foreign
    Language Coordination Act, S. 4051, I am pleased that DOD is
    set to hold several regional summits to address language needs
    at the State and local level, as outlined in my bill. It is key
    that DOD is taking action, but more, again, more needs to be
    done.
        I firmly believe that it is only through a cooperative plan
    of action and long-term leadership that we will address the
    Nation's language needs.
        Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to
    participate today and to speak briefly on this issue. I do have
    a few questions that I will submit for the record.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka. We all
    recognize your leadership role in several committees on these
    issues of language preparation, not just for the DOD, but for
    the Government as a whole. Thank you.
        Let me conclude my statement and then recognize the ranking
    member, Senator Dole.
        The December 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap
    asserts in the introduction that: ``Post-September 11 military
    operations reinforce the reality that the DOD needs a
    significantly improved organic capability in emerging languages
    and dialects, a greater competence in regional area skills in
    those languages and dialects, and a surge capacity to rapidly
    expand its language capabilities on short notice.''
        I am glad that the DOD recognizes this need, but wonder why
    it came about 4 years after September 11. Moreover, 6 years
    after September 11 and midway into the implementation of that
    roadmap, I am concerned that we still hear comments such as,
    ``I am appalled at the Army's inability, and the Marine Corps
    also, to get language training.'' General Barry McCaffrey made
    that comment last week before this committee.
        I understand that the DOD's investment in language
    capabilities has increased exponentially from what was being
    budgeted before September 2001 to what is being budgeted for
    the current fiscal year. If that is true, what have we gained
    from this investment and what level of investment is the
    Department planning to make to develop future capability?
        I hope that at this hearing we can examine the shortfalls
    of the DOD's current approach to language and cultural
    awareness and that we can come away with some proposals about
    what additional steps the DOD should take and what programs or
    initiatives Congress should support.
        I would like to hear from witnesses on their views
    regarding the role that research and development can play in
    enhancing our capabilities. I know that technology can play a
    big role in this, but I also know that it is not a silver
    bullet. I would like to explore how much of an emphasis we
    should be placing on these efforts, relative to other avenues
    as we seek to improve our operational capabilities.
        The goal of all of us here is to ensure that our troops
    have the appropriate cultural and language skills to prevail,
    not just in the current fight against Islamic terrorism, but
    also in executing other military activities, including
    peacekeeping, military cooperation, training, and exchanges
    with foreign militaries, and deterrence of unneeded warfighting
    with a potential conventional enemy.
        I want to thank the witnesses for being here. I look
    forward to a very engaging hearing. Now I would like to
    recognize Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE

        Senator Dole. I certainly would like to join Senator Reed
    and Senator Akaka in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon. I
    would also like to thank everyone who has been involved in
    bringing us the great technology exhibits that we had a chance
    to view earlier. It truly helps us better understand the fruits
    of our science and technology (S&T) investments when we can
    view and touch the equipment and talk to the operators to hear
    how these devices help fulfill their missions.
        The security environment since September 11 has reinforced
    the long-held principle that the United States must effectively
    use all instruments of national power to achieve our national
    security objectives. That means not only military capability,
    but it also means that diplomacy, foreign assistance, and
    economic tools are critical to our future security. Similarly,
    since September 11 we have relearned the lesson that to be
    effective the U.S. military must be skilled not only at
    conducting combat operations, but also at helping to prevent
    conflict and helping to transition from conflict situations to
    sustained peace and stability.
        These activities require skills that are different from
    traditional warfighting skills. In the past few years, numerous
    Defense Science Board studies, outside experts, and DOD
    planning documents, including the 2006 Quadrennial Defense
    Review (QDR), have called for greater focus on creating and
    sustaining DOD's capabilities in stability, security,
    transition, and reconstruction operations. The critical element
    in those capabilities is the human factor, the ability of our
    military personnel to understand the environment in which they
    operate or are seeking to shape, to speak the language spoken
    in areas around the globe where they are deployed, and to
    understand the cultural norms of the people with whom they will
    be interacting in both friendly and hostile situations.
        Today's hearing will focus on the efforts that DOD is
    making to improve the capabilities of its personnel in language
    and cultural awareness skills. The testimonies of General
    Scales, Mrs. McGinn, and Dr. Van Tilborg, regarding the DOD's
    requirements in these areas and how well the DOD is doing in
    identifying, prioritizing, and meeting those requirements are
    very important contributions to this discussion. Also, the
    degree to which S&T can help to meet the needs and compensate
    for shortfalls that exist today in the linguistic and cultural
    awareness fields that our military men and women need as they
    are deployed around the globe, particularly in Iraq and
    Afghanistan.
        Your testimony will also help this subcommittee to
    determine if the proposed fiscal year 2008 and the future years
    defense budget reflect sufficient priority, resources, and
    authorities for this important capabilities.
        Thank you all for your appearance today and for your
    service.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Dole.
        Let me state that all of your statements have been included
    in the record. You may feel free to summarize. In fact, I would
    encourage you to summarize. At this point I would like to
    recognize General Scales.
        General Scales.

     STATEMENT OF MG ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., USA (RET.), PRESIDENT,
                              COLGEN, INC.

        General Scales. Thank you, Senator Reed, and thank you,
    Senator Dole. I will take the hint and be uncharacteristically
    brief.
        I think we can all agree that most of our shortcomings in
    recent wars have been human and not technological, and the list
    is long: cultural awareness, the ability to influence and shape
    opinions, indeed soldier conduct, information operations--the
    list goes on. What we have learned I guess, Senator, is that
    wars today are won as much by creating alliances and leveraging
    nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust,
    affecting opinions, and managing perceptions.
        All of these demand an exceptional ability to understand
    people, their culture, and their motivations. My concern is
    that today's military has become so overstretched that it might
    become too busy to learn, in a time when the value of learning
    has never been greater for our military.
        You asked me last week, Senator, to expand on this subject
    a little bit, approaching it from a strategic direction, and I
    would like to do that because I believe the problem is larger
    than merely learning language. I believe it is going to require
    a real transformation in how the DOD views war, that we move
    from a technocentric view of warfare to a culture-centric view
    of warfare, and that the human behavior, cognitive, and
    cultural aspects of warfare become as much a part of our
    lexicon, our research and development, training and education,
    as learning how to operate the machines is today.
        So let me go down these very quickly. Cultural awareness.
    Language is important, but it is not the only important
    component to cultural awareness. Soldiers have to be able to
    move comfortably among alien cultures to establish trust and
    cement relationships with others. The point, Senator, I'd like
    to make is not all will be fit for this kind of work. Some
    soldiers and marines remain committed to fight in any battle,
    and yet there are others, Senator, that I have seen in my many
    years that seek to have this cultural sense, this innate
    ability to sublimate ego, to communicate with alien cultures,
    even those who do not even speak the language, who have these
    special skills. We are seeing that play out every day in Iraq
    and in Afghanistan.
        So language is important, but a culturally-aware military
    cannot achieve its goals merely by offering courses.
        The other point I would make to you, Senator, is that
    militaries are by their nature oriented on merit. Those things
    which reward a soldier, a soldier will pay attention to. So I
    recommend that we reward those, find means to reward those who
    exhibit these special cultural skills. I do not believe an
    officer should be commissioned who has not had at least 2 years
    of language and cultural training. I do not believe any officer
    should be promoted to the grade of colonel unless he or she can
    demonstrate a working knowledge of a language.
        One of the most important tasks that we face in the future
    is the ability to build alien armies and alliances. It is
    interesting because in the military we have always been very
    good at this. We have a remarkable, since the end of World War
    II, track record for building armies in places like Korea,
    Greece, Vietnam, El Salvador, and now Iraq.
        But back on my point about merit, Senator, we do not reward
    those who have performed brilliantly as advisers and trainers
    and I think this must change. I think officers who have proven
    to be particularly effective as advisers should be promoted
    very early and selected for advance civil schooling to build on
    those skills that they have demonstrated while training foreign
    armies. I think a certain number of general officer billets
    must be reserved for them as they begin to progress through the
    ranks.
        I believe that we must cultivate, amplify, research, and
    inculcate these skills in military and civilian educational
    institutions, perhaps institutions that are reserved
    specifically for that purpose.
        The other issue deals with perception-shaping. Perception-
    shaping is an art, not a science, and in many ways the enemy
    does this better than we do. I believe that these are special
    skills--the ability to affect will and shape perceptions. I
    believe this is a task that is too big for the DOD. I believe
    it must be a national effort, superintended by distinguished
    academics and practitioners of the human, not the technological
    sciences.
        One of the things we are learning is that, whereas when I
    was a lieutenant we expected colonels and generals to perform
    these tasks, what we are learning in Iraq and Afghanistan is we
    expect privates and corporals to be culturally aware. So I
    believe that we have to do a better job of inculcating
    knowledge and wisdom and teaching young men and women how to
    exhibit the indirect forms of leadership that are so important
    in performing these tasks.
        The young man or woman walking point in a place like
    Baghdad needs to have this special training, not just in the
    language, but in the ability to communicate and understand
    alien cultures. I believe psychological and physiological
    tuning is important for these functions. Again, some people can
    do them, some cannot. With only 16 weeks of basic training, we
    have to put the instruments in place, the scientific
    instruments in place, to find those and carefully select them
    who have these innate human, rather than technological skills.
        I think we have to develop not just soldiers, but small
    units, that are good at this. The Marines have a great
    reputation for establishing these small civic action teams in
    places like Iraq, and also in Vietnam. So we have to be able to
    train small units to work in villages for prolonged periods of
    time, to commune with the people and be effective at that.
        I think leadership and decisionmaking have to be addressed.
    It is not just being able to operate your weapon. It is also
    the ability to make key decisions, life-changing decisions,
    when you see a person standing on the end of a street corner to
    differentiate between an insurgent and a young Iraqi just out
    walking on the street.
        I believe there is a higher element involved as well,
    Senator, and that is this idea of intuitive battle command. One
    of the mistakes, one of the shortcomings in this war, has been
    a rush to a kinetic solution. This is a problem in the chain of
    command, in the planning sequences, and in battle command. So I
    think issues like gut feel and intuition should replace the
    hierarchical and the old linear processes that you and I--that
    we have been operating under.
        I think the ability to share information and to command by
    discourse rather than by formal orders are skills that we have
    to learn. I believe that we ought to build into our military
    not just the ability to go to the National Training Center and
    learn how to use our weapons at the brigade and battalion
    level; I believe that we ought to deal with the individual and
    the unit level as well, that we ought to have simulators that
    teach small unit leaders and soldiers how to make quick, split
    moment, split second decisions, that test the sort of intuitive
    right stuff, this gut feel ability to intuit the person's
    intentions. All these are very human, not technological skills.
        Let me end by a brief recommendation. In fact, as you and
    others have said, so much of the human, cultural, and cognitive
    skills are scattered, not only throughout the DOD but
    throughout the government.
        I really believe that we need an agency, a sort of social
    science corollary to something like the Defense Advanced
    Research Project Agency (DARPA), that can bring together not
    just the language part of cultural awareness, but the social,
    scientific, and the cognitive and behavioral aspects of it as
    well. I believe we need to bring together the best and the
    brightest from academia, the military and science institutions,
    corporations, Army Special Forces and Marine operating forces
    together. I think they ought to have the authority to conduct
    field experiments and studies in human performance using
    operational forces. I believe that they need to provide
    recommendations regarding selection, promotion, and schooling
    policies to the Secretary of Defense.
        Just as the Defense Science Board holds annual summer
    studies to look at the physical sciences, I think this
    organization ought to hold similar studies to look across the
    board at the human, cultural, and cognitive sciences to be
    applied to the art of war.
        I think they ought to have the same budgeting authority,
    directly from Congress, and would submit an annual assessment
    to Congress on the human, cultural, and cognitive aspects of
    the Services. I believe they ought to have a broad charter, and
    I believe that they ought to be able to establish criteria for
    language training, and I believe they ought to have an
    influence on how young officers are educated in alien cultures,
    language, and the art and science of war. I think this ought to
    be directed in nature, in the sense that they should be
    responsible for building this sort of new generation of
    officers that have these special human, cultural, and cognitive
    skills.
        Finally, I believe they ought to affiliate with a major
    university with a solid reputation in the human and the social
    sciences.
        Senator, thank you so much for the opportunity to talk to
    you.
        [The prepared statement of General Scales follows:]
           Prepared Statement by MG Robert H Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.)
        Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven that successful
    prosecution of the ``Long War'' is far more dependent on an intimate
    knowledge of the enemy's motivation, intent, will, tactical method and
    cultural environment than the deployment of smart bombs, unmanned
    aircraft and expansive bandwidth. Success rests with the ability of
    leaders to think and adapt faster than the enemy and for soldiers to
    thrive in an environment of uncertainty, ambiguity and unfamiliar
    cultural circumstances. Yet the military still remains wedded to the
    premise that success in war is best achieved by creating an
    overwhelming technological advantage. Our fixation on technology--our
    very technological success--has led us to believe that the soldier is a
    system and the enemy is a target. Soldiers are now viewed, especially
    by this U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), as an ``overhead expense,''
    not a source of investment.
        Viewing war too much as a contest of technologies, we have become
    impatient and detached from those forms of war that do not fit our
    paradigms. Techno-centric solutions are in our own cultural DNA. Thus
    it is no wonder that transformation has been interpreted exclusively as
    a technological challenge. So far we have spent billions to gain a few
    additional meters of precision, knots of speed or bits of bandwidth.
    Now we must commit resources to improve how the military thinks and
    acts in an effort to create a parallel transformational universe based
    on cognition and cultural awareness.
        Reflective senior officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan have
    concluded that great advantage can be achieved by out thinking rather
    than out equipping the enemy. They are telling us that wars are won as
    much by creating alliances, leveraging non military advantages, reading
    intentions, building trust, converting opinions and managing
    perceptions, all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand
    people, their culture and their motivation. Yet these same commanders
    lament that they are obliged to subordinate learning about war to the
    practical and more pressing demands of routine day-to-day operations.
    In a word, today's military has become so overstretched that it may
    become too busy to learn at a time when the value of learning has never
    been greater.
        What follows is a partial list of initiatives that collectively
    will cost little but if taken together will increase American combat
    proficiency far out of proportion to its cost. Implementing only a few
    of these initiatives will go a long way to creating an environment
    conducive to fighting an enemy in this emerging era of culture-centric
    warfare.

                               CULTURAL AWARENESS

        In Iraq, a curtain of cultural ignorance continues to separate the
    good intentions of the American soldier from Iraqis of good will.
    Inability to speak the language and insensitive conduct become real
    combat vulnerabilities that the enemy has exploited to his advantage.
    The military of the future must be able to go to war with enough
    cultural knowledge to thrive in an alien environment. Empathy will
    become a weapon. Soldiers must gain the ability to move comfortably
    among alien cultures, to establish trust and cement relationships that
    can be exploited in battle. Not all are fit for this kind of work. Some
    will remain committed to fighting the kinetic battle. But others will
    come to the task with intuitive cultural court sense, an innate ability
    to connect with other cultures. These soldiers must be identified and
    nurtured just as surely as the Army selects out those with innate
    operational court sense.
        Social science can help select soldiers very early who possess
    social and cultural intelligence. Likewise, scientific psychology can
    assist in designing and running cultural immersion institutions that
    will hasten the development of culturally adept soldiers and
    intelligence agents. Cultural psychology can teach us to better
    understand both common elements of human culture and how they differ.
    An understanding of these commonalities and differences can help gain
    local allies, fracture enemy subgroups, avoid conflicts among allies,
    promote beneficial alliances, and undermine enemy alliances.
        A culturally aware military cannot be achieved just by offering
    language courses. Language ability is a means to an end to be sure. But
    the goal of a program designed to enhance cultural awareness must focus
    on identifying and rewarding those who exhibit these special cultural
    skills. No officer should be commissioned who has not had at least 2
    years of language training. No officer should be promoted to colonel
    unless he or she can demonstrate a working knowledge of language spoken
    by peoples who inhabit threatened regions of the world. The fitness or
    efficiency reports of the services must be amended to include an
    assessment of these special talents.

                      BUILDING ALIEN ARMIES AND ALLIANCES

        The Long War will be manpower-intensive. The U.S. cannot hope to
    field enough soldiers to be effective wherever the enemy appears.
    Effective surrogates are needed to help us fight our wars. The Army has
    a long tradition of creating effective indigenous armies in such remote
    places as Greece, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, and now Iraq. But almost
    without exception, the unique skills required to perform this complex
    task have never been valued, and those who practice them are rarely
    rewarded. Today's soldiers would prefer to be recognized as operators
    rather than advisers. This must change. If our strategic success on a
    future battlefield will depend on our ability to create armies from
    whole cloth--or, as in Iraq, to remove an army that has been part of
    the problem and make it a part of the solution--then we must select,
    promote and put into positions of authority those who know how to build
    armies. Officers who have proven to be particularly effective as
    advisors in Iraq should be promoted very early and selected for
    advanced civil schooling. When these officers advance to senior rank a
    specific number of general officer billets must be reserved for them.
    We must cultivate, amplify, research and inculcate these skills in
    military and civilian educational institutions reserved specifically
    for that purpose.

                     PERCEPTION SHAPING AS ART, NOT SCIENCE

        People in many regions of the world hate us. They have been led to
    these beliefs by an enemy whose perception-shaping effort is as
    brilliant as it is diabolical. If the center of gravity in the Long War
    is the perception of the people, then perhaps we should learn how the
    enemy manipulates the people. Information technology will be of little
    use in this effort. Damage is only amplified when inappropriate,
    culturally insensitive or false messages are sent over the most
    sophisticated information networks. Recent advances in the social
    psychology of leadership and persuasion can help train soldiers to win
    acceptance of local populations and obtain better intelligence from
    locals. Recent cognitive behavioral therapy has documented remarkably
    effective techniques for countering fear and abiding hatred such as we
    see in the Middle East. Our challenge is to create a human science
    intended specifically for shaping opinions, particularly among alien
    peoples. This task is too big for a single service or event for the
    DOD. It must be a national effort superintended by distinguished
    academics and practitioners in the human sciences who understand such
    things, rather than by policymakers who have proven in Iraq that they
    do not.

                      INCULCATE KNOWLEDGE AND TEACH WISDOM

        In Iraq and Afghanistan, junior soldiers and marines today are
    asked to make decisions that in previous wars were reserved for far
    more senior officers. A corporal standing guard in Baghdad or Fallujah
    can commit an act that might well affect the strategic outcome of an
    entire campaign. Yet the intellectual preparation of these very junior
    leaders is no more advanced today than it was during World War II.
    However, the native creativity, innovativeness and initiative exhibited
    by these young men and women belie their woeful lack of intellectual
    preparation.
        Learning to deal with the human and cultural complexities of this
    era of war will take time. Leaders, intelligence officers, and soldiers
    must be given the time to immerse themselves in alien cultures and
    reflect on their profession. Yet in our haste to put more soldiers and
    Marines in the field, we risk breaking the intellectual institutions
    that create opportunities to learn. Today, we are contracting out our
    need for wisdom by hiring civilians to teach in military schools and
    colleges. Educational science has long understood that reading and
    listening are the least effective means for retaining or increasing
    knowledge. Teaching is at least an order of magnitude more effective,
    while researching and writing are far better still. Thus the Services
    must change assignment and promotion policies to make learning and
    teaching professionally rewarding.

                             TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

        The value of tactical intelligence--knowledge of the enemy's
    actions or intentions sufficiently precise and timely to kill him--has
    been demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. Killing power is of no use
    unless a soldier on patrol knows who to kill. We should take away from
    our combat experience a commitment to leverage human sciences to make
    the tactical view of the enemy clearer and more certain, to be able to
    differentiate between the innocents and the enemy by reading actions to
    discern intentions.
        The essential tools necessary to make a soldier a superb
    intelligence gatherer must be imbedded in his brain rather than placed
    in his rucksack. He must be taught to perceive his surroundings in such
    a way that he can make immediate intuitive decisions about the
    intentions of those about him. His commanders must be taught to see the
    battlefield through the eyes of his soldiers. He must make decisions
    based on the gut feel and developed intuition that come from an
    intelligence gatherer's ability to see what others cannot. There is a
    growing science of intuition and gut feeling, and these capabilities
    might be enhanced by this new capability and its allied technology.
    Machines and processes might make intelligence easier to parse and
    read. But knowing the enemy better than he knows us is inherently a
    psycho-cultural rather than a technological, organizational, or
    procedural challenge.

                     PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL TUNING

        Life sciences offer promise that older, more mature soldiers will
    be able to endure the physical stresses of close combat for longer
    periods. This is important because experience strongly supports the
    conclusion that older men make better close-combat soldiers. Scientific
    research also suggests that social intelligence and diplomatic skills
    increase with age. Older soldiers are more stable in crisis situations,
    are less likely to be killed or wounded and are far more effective in
    performing the essential tasks that attend to close-in killing.
    Experience within special operations units also suggests that more
    mature soldiers are better suited for fighting in complex human
    environments. Science can help determine when soldiers are at their
    cognitive peak. Psychological instruments are available today to
    increase endurance and sustained attention on the battlefield. Today,
    conditioning science has succeeded in keeping professional athletes
    competitive much longer than even a decade ago. These methods should be
    adapted to prepare ground soldiers as well for the physical and
    psychological stresses of close combat.

                DEVELOP HIGH PERFORMING SOLDIERS AND SMALL UNITS

        Close combat has always been a personal and intimate experience.
    Close combat is the only skill that cannot be bought off the street or
    contracted out. In all of our world wars, success of campaigns has been
    threatened by a shortage of first rate, professional infantrymen.
    Inevitably, a protracted campaign drains the supply of intimate
    killers. Many infantrymen are sent into close combat with about 4
    months' preparation. What little social science the research and
    development community has devote to understanding the human component
    in war has not been spent on close-combat soldiers. We know far more
    about pilot and astronaut behavior than we do about those who in the
    next world war will do most of the killing and dying, the close-combat
    soldiers. If dead soldiers constitute our greatest weakness in war,
    then we should, as a matter of national importance, devote resources to
    making them better.
        The enemy has drawn us unwillingly into fighting him at the
    tactical level of war where the importance of technology diminishes in
    proportion to the value of intangibles. Thus, winning the Long War will
    require greater attention to the tactical fight. Technology will play a
    part, to be sure. Our small units, squads, and platoons should be
    equipped with only the best vehicles, small arms, sensors, radios, and
    self-protection. But more important to victory will be human
    influencers such as the selection, bonding, and psychological and
    physical preparation of tactical units.
        As the battlefield expands and becomes more uncertain and lethal,
    it also becomes lonelier and enormously frightening for those obliged
    to fight close. Most recent American campaigns have been fought in
    unfamiliar and horrifically desolate terrain and weather. Modern social
    science offers some promising solutions to this problem. Recently, we
    have learned that soldiers can now be better tuned psychologically to
    endure the stresses of close combat. Tests, assessments, role-playing
    exercises, and careful vetting will reduce the percentage of soldiers
    who suffer from stress disorders after coming off the line.
        Cognitive sciences can be leveraged to enhance small-unit training
    in many ways, from speeding the acquisition and enhancing the retention
    of foreign languages to training soldiers in command decisionmaking
    simulators to sharpen the ability to make decisions in complex tactical
    situations. Cognitive sciences can be employed in the creation of
    highly efficient and flexible training programs that can respond to the
    ever-changing problems. Models of human cognition can also be used to
    diagnose performance failures during simulated exercises. These
    measures can assist in training soldiers to attend to hidden variables
    and to properly weigh and filter the many factors that determine
    optimal performance in complex decisionmaking tasks.
        But the social sciences can accelerate the process for building
    great small units only so much. The one ingredient necessary for
    creating a closely bonded unit is time. The aging of a good unit, like
    that of a good wine, cannot be hurried. Platoons need at least a year
    to develop full body and character. Because the pipeline will be so
    long and the probability of death so great, the ground services must
    create many more close-combat units than conventional logic would
    demand. The lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan is clear: In future wars
    we can never have too many close-combat units. The performance of small
    ground units will be so critical to success on the World War IV
    battlefield that we should replace Cold War methods of mass producing
    small units and treat them more like professional sports teams with
    highly paid coaching and dedicated practice with the highest quality
    equipment and assessment methods.

                         LEADERSHIP AND DECISIONMAKING

        The Long War will demand intellectually ambidextrous leaders who
    are capable of facing a conventional enemy one moment, then shifting to
    an irregular threat the next moment before transitioning to the task of
    providing humanitarian solace to the innocent. All of these missions
    may have to be performed by the same commander simultaneously.
    Developing leaders with such a varied menu of skills takes time.
        There are precedents for developing these skills. In Vietnam, the
    air services developed ``Top Gun'' and ``Red Flag'' exercises as a
    means of improving the flying skills of new pilots bloodlessly before
    they faced a real and skilled opponent. Recent advances in the science
    of intuitive decisionmaking will give the ground services a similar
    ability to improve the close-combat decisionmaking skills of young
    leaders. Senior commanders will be able to use these tools to select
    those leaders with the intuitive right stuff. Over time, leaders must
    be given the tools to measure and assess improvements in their ability
    to make the right decisions in ever more complex and demanding combat
    situations. They should also have access to coaches and mentors who
    will pass on newly learned experiences with an exceptional degree of
    accountability and scientific precision.

                            INTUITIVE BATTLE COMMAND

        The Army and Marine Corps learned in Afghanistan and Iraq that
    operational planning systems inherited from the Cold War would no
    longer work against an elusive and adaptive enemy. They were forced to
    improvise a new method of campaign planning that emphasized the human
    component in war. Gut feel and intuition replaced hierarchical, linear
    processes. They learned to command by discourse rather than formal
    orders. Information-sharing became ubiquitous, with even the most
    junior leaders able to communicate in real time with each other and
    with their seniors.
        Dedicated soldier networks have fundamentally altered the
    relationship between leaders and led and have changed forever how the
    Army and Marine Corps command soldiers in battle.
        Developing new and effective command-and-control technologies,
    doctrine and procedures will do no good unless we educate leaders to
    exploit these opportunities fully. We have only begun to leverage the
    power of the learning sciences to battle command. Teaching commanders
    how to think and intuit rather than what to think will allow them to
    anticipate how the enemy will act. Convincing commanders to leave Cold
    War-era decisionmaking processes in favor of nonlinear intuitive
    processes will accelerate the pace and tempo of battle. The promise is
    enormous. But we will only achieve the full potential of this promise
    if we devote the resources to the research and education necessary to
    make it happen.

                     CULTURAL AND COGNITIVE TRANSFORMATION

        The relationship between the military and human and behavioral
    scientists has, to date, been one of antipathy and neglect. Academics
    and behavioral practitioners have rarely violated the turf of the
    soldier. Many are turned off by the prospects of relating their
    professions to war. But most take the war against terrorism seriously.
    If the Army and Marine Corps give them the opportunity, they will
    gladly turn the best of their sciences to the future defense of our
    Nation.
        We are in a race, and the times demand change. The Long War can
    only be won by harnessing the social and human sciences as the
    essential amplifiers of military performance, just as the physical
    sciences were the amplifiers of past world wars. Such a shift in how
    the defense community approaches war will require a fundamental shift
    in military culture.
        There is an old saying that the Navy and the Air Force man the
    equipment and the Army and Marine Corps equip the man. Surely those
    services that focus on the man rather than the machine should receive a
    disproportionate share of future defense budgets. Unfortunately, the
    ground services are far too committed and engaged in fighting this war
    to prepare adequately for the next. They need help. We can open a new
    cognitive and cultural transformational front by establishing a Human,
    Cultural and Cognitive Agency that will:

             Become a social science corollary and be similar in
            structure and purpose to The Defense Advanced Research Projects
            Agency (DARPA).
             Be headed by a person credentialed and esteemed in the
            human, cultural, and cognitive scientific communities.
             Bring together the best and brightest from academia,
            the military human science institutions, corporations and the
            Army, Special Forces and Marine Corps operational forces.
             Have authority to conduct field experiments and
            studies in human performance using operational forces.
             Provide recommendations regarding selection,
            promotion, and schooling to Secretary of Defense.
             Hold an annual summer study similar to the Defense
            Science Board in which members from corporations, the Services,
            and academia would meet to offer advice to the Secretary of
            Defense on issues related to the human sciences.
             Have distinct budgeting authorities directly from
            Congress and would submit an annual assessment to Congress on
            the human, cultural and cognitive performance of the services,
            particularly the ground services.
             Be given a broad charter that would include: cultural
            awareness training and education; perception and opinion
            shaping; in extremis decisionmaking in war; small unit and
            individual performance; intelligence analyst training and
            education; intuitive battle command; individual combat
            performance assessment and measurement; psychological tuning
            and hardening; language science, among many other subjects and
            initiatives.
             Establish criteria for, fund and manage a program of
            advanced civil schooling in cultural awareness and the art of
            war for officers in the ground services. Officers selected for
            cultural and cognitive degrees would come principally from the
            operational forces and upon completion of study would be
            utilized principally in command and staff billets in Marine and
            Army fighting units. Officers completing these degrees would
            gain full joint credentialing through the grade of colonel.
             Affiliate and locate with a major university with a
            solid reputation in human and social science.

        We cannot expect the scientific and bureaucratic institutions that
    won two world wars and the Cold War by exploiting the physical sciences
    to easily embrace a social and human sciences approach to the same
    challenges. But the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly prove that a
    human approach to future wars is now our most glaring shortcoming and
    greatest challenge. Transformation in the human dimension will take
    resources and time. The shortest commodity is time. We must begin
    immediately to put in place the structures that will optimize what
    little time we have available.

        Senator Reed. Thank you, General, for your always
    thoughtful and important remarks. Thank you very much, sir.
        Secretary McGinn?

     STATEMENT OF HON. GAIL H. McGINN, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
                      PLANS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mrs. McGinn. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to
    appear today to discuss the DOD's efforts to improve our
    capability in foreign language and regional expertise. The
    subcommittee's interest in this topic is very much appreciated.
    My colleague, Dr. Van Tilborg, will cover matters relating to
    technology, so I will discuss the human aspect of the defense
    language program.
        We welcome the advances that technology brings us, but we
    do not think that technology will overcome the need for people
    with knowledge of languages, regions, and cultures. For the
    past 5 years we have been actively engaged in coming to
    understand our foreign language needs and have been working to
    address those needs.
        The DOD has always required people to be interactive in
    foreign languages, but today's needs are very different from
    those of the Cold War. At that time language needs were
    predictable and we focused on languages like Russian and
    German. Today's emphasis on irregular warfare, building
    partnerships with foreign countries, development of capability
    and stability operations, not to mention the effort of the long
    war, bring the need for foreign language proficiency to the
    fore, and not just foreign language proficiency, but regional
    and cultural expertise as well.
        We must be able to react quickly and globally and provide
    our forces with the capabilities they need. Indeed, these
    things must become core competencies of the force.
        As noted in my written statement, we are actively pursuing
    three courses of action to meet our competency needs in foreign
    language and regional expertise. First, we are moving to find,
    build, and manage a foundational corps of servicemembers with
    language ability. We are assessing every servicemember to
    ascertain language skills. In so doing, we have discovered a
    wealth of languages that we did not know we had in the force,
    including indigenous languages of Africa and significant
    numbers of Chinese speakers.
        We have reoriented and upgraded the training we offer at
    Defense Language Institute (DLI)-Foreign Language Center to
    ensure that we are teaching the right languages to the right
    proficiency levels. Indeed, we have dramatically increased
    their funding so they can increase the proficiency levels of
    the students they graduate there to meet today's needs.
        We have increased the language focus of our military
    academies and are beginning to move it into Reserve Officer
    Training Center (ROTC). We are providing language and cultural
    training to deploying forces. The goal is to have on hand a
    robust foundation that can deploy quickly, with the right
    clearances, the right proficiency, and the right languages.
        Second, since we cannot have a standby force of sufficient
    size to handle all the language needs that might occur, we are
    improving our ability to surge to support operational
    requirements. The Army as our executive agent manages a
    contract to supply linguists to deployed forces.
        We also use reach-back capabilities for translation and we
    are exploring these capabilities for interpretation as well. In
    the future, we will also be relying on our language corps, a
    corps of Americans who have agreed to come and help with their
    language skills when called. We have just awarded a contract to
    begin building this corps, which is also included in the
    President's NSLI.
        Third, we need to build a cadre of individuals with high
    levels of language proficiency, who are better able to function
    in today's environment and interact with our foreign partners.
        We are especially proud of the work the military
    departments have done to expand our foreign area officer
    program. The foreign area officers are our uniformed experts
    who possess a combination of strategic focus, regional
    expertise, cultural awareness, and high level foreign language
    proficiency. We currently have 1,600 foreign area officers
    active or in training, principally from the Army and the Marine
    Corps. The Air Force and the Navy are building this capability
    and will add significant numbers to our overall count in the
    years to come. Together the Services will bring on 995 new
    foreign area service officers by 2012.
        In addition, I would like to highlight our DLI-Foreign
    Language Center. That is the centerpiece of our foreign
    language program. The DLI teaches basic language instruction to
    4,000 servicemembers a year. It used to be focused on providing
    training for cryptolinguists for the Intelligence Community,
    but has evolved in recent years to provide strong support for
    our warfighters by deploying mobile training teams to conduct
    pre-deployment training and providing training materials for
    use by deploying forces.
        Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not mention that
    increasing foreign language capability is not just a DOD issue,
    it is a national issue as well. As a Nation we have not
    enthusiastically accepted the value of foreign language as an
    important competency for Americans to possess. At the DLI, we
    bring in high school graduates who may never have spoken a
    foreign language and teach them to be fairly proficient in
    Arabic in 63 weeks. We could do much better if they came to us
    already having studied any language.
        As Senator Akaka stated, we have joined with the Department
    of Education, the Department of State, and the Director of
    National Intelligence in the implementation of the NSLI for
    strategic languages in America. We view this as a high priority
    initiative in support of our overall program and intend to
    continue our efforts to highlight the importance of knowing
    other languages and cultures, not just because it matters to
    us, but frankly because it matters to our country in the global
    economy.
        We have done a lot, but much remains to be done. We need to
    sustain momentum and build on past progress. We are very much
    appreciative of your interest and support.
        That concludes my statement.
        [The prepared statement of Mrs. McGinn follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Gail H. McGinn

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished subcommittee, thank
    you for the opportunity to speak on this very important topic.
        Today, the Department of Defense (DOD) is engaged in two very
    important efforts. We are transforming how the DOD values, employs, and
    deploys foreign language capability and regional expertise. During the
    planning phase, we identified the need for a deeper national language
    talent pool from which we can recruit and exploit during times of
    surge. In an effort to respond to the growing need for language and
    regional expertise, we are supporting the National Security Language
    Initiative (NSLI), launched by President Bush in January 2006.
        Foreign language and regional expertise, which includes cultural
    awareness, are emerging as key competencies for our 21st century Total
    Force. The Active-Duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilian
    personnel, along with our supporting contract personnel, understand
    that these essential skills are needed for mission accomplishment. We
    have overcome many obstacles and made good progress, and the
    transformation that has occurred is apparent across the entire DOD, but
    there is still work to be done.
        Language skills are not easily acquired and, once acquired, are not
    universally applicable to all regions within a country or situation.
    Regional expertise requires continuous learning to stay current in an
    ever-changing world environment. As judicious planners and good
    stewards, we constantly assess the relevance of what we are doing today
    with what we might be called to do in the future.

                              THE NEED FOR CHANGE

        Current military operations demand different skills than those that
    were mastered to win the Cold War. Today's operations increasingly
    require our forces to operate with coalition and alliance partners and
    interact with foreign populations, in a variety of regions, with
    diverse languages and cultures. Our enemies blend in with the local
    population, making identification and achieving victory more difficult.
    To be effective in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction
    operations, as well as other counterinsurgency measures and to prevail
    in the long war, we must be able to understand different cultures and
    communicate effectively in order to gain the support of the local
    people.
        We have responded to this shifting paradigm with a shift in
    strategy. Operational lessons learned and studies stressed the need for
    the DOD to create and maintain language capabilities within the force
    and have the ability to surge on demand to meet unexpected challenges.
    The Strategic Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2006 through 2011
    directed development of a comprehensive roadmap to achieve the full
    range of language capabilities necessary to carry out national
    strategy. The result was the 2005 DOD Language Transformation Roadmap
    (DLTR) that continues to be the pivotal document for our
    accomplishments today.
        Leadership has continued to reinforce the importance of foreign
    language and regional expertise within the 21st century Total Force.
    The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provides approximately $430
    million through the Future Years Defense Program, with $66.7 million in
    the fiscal year 2008 President's budget request for initiatives to
    strengthen and expand our Defense Language Program. These initiatives
    span across technology, training, education, and recruitment and
    include the Army Heritage Speaker (09L) Program, Service Academy
    Language Training Programs, Foreign Language Proficiency Pay, Reserve
    Officer Training Center (ROTC) Language Training Grants, Accession
    Screening Program, the Language Corps, National Security Education
    Program (NSEP), and the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language
    Center (DLIFLC).
        The Strategic Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2008 through 2013
    outlines the national commitment to developing the best mix of
    capabilities within the Total Force and sets forth a series of roadmaps
    that support the goals of the DLTR.

                                MANAGING CHANGE

        The DLTR, signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on February 14,
    2005, is our management guide for building language skills and regional
    proficiency into today's force. The roadmap provides broad goals that
    will ensure a strong foundation in language, regional and cultural
    expertise, a capacity to surge to meet unanticipated demands, and a
    cadre of language professionals.
        To ensure oversight, execution, and direction for this
    transformation, the Deputy Secretary assigned the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Personnel and Readiness responsibility for the Defense
    Language Program. The Deputy Secretary then directed the appointment of
    Senior Language Authorities in the military departments, the defense
    and joint staffs, defense agencies, and defense field activities at the
    Senior Executive Service, and general and flag officer ranks to ensure
    senior-level involvement and oversight. We established the Defense
    Language Steering Committee, consisting of the Senior Language
    Authorities, to act as an advisory board and guide the implementation
    of the roadmap. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness appointed me as the DOD Senior Language Authority and Chair
    of the Defense Language Steering Committee. We revised the DOD
    Directive for the Defense Language Program and established the Defense
    Language Office to ensure oversight and execution of the DLTR and to
    institutionalize the DOD's commitment to these critical competencies.

       CREATE FOUNDATIONAL EXPERTISE: BUILDING COMPETENCIES FOR THE 21ST
                              CENTURY TOTAL FORCE

        A critical initiative of the DLTR involved determining what
    capabilities and resources were needed. The combatant commands,
    military Services, defense agencies, and defense field activities began
    identifying the language and regional expertise requirements necessary
    to support their operational and contingency planning and day-to-day
    requirements.
        The military Services and Joint Staff initiated reviews of all
    relevant doctrine, policies, and planning guidance to ensure that they
    incorporated language and regional expertise to include cultural
    awareness. These documents help us outline the approach for developing
    and, more importantly, employing these warfighting and peacekeeping
    competencies.
        There had been no accurate assessment of what languages and
    proficiency levels existed within the total force. The DOD is now
    conducting a self-assessment of in-house language capability and we
    have learned that we have a significant capability not apparent to our
    management systems. Even though our assessment is not yet complete, as
    of the beginning of the current fiscal year, the DOD had 141,887
    Active-Duty component; 77,319 Reserve component; and 38,246 civilian
    members of the Total Force who reported having foreign language skills.
    We now have policies in place so that individuals are routinely
    screened as part of the military accession and civilian hiring process.
        In order to encourage servicemembers to identify, improve, and
    sustain language capability, we implemented a revised Foreign Language
    Proficiency Pay (FLPP) policy, and, with the support of Congress,
    increased the proficiency bonus from $300 maximum per month, up to
    $1,000 maximum per month for uniformed members. We are currently
    finalizing the DOD Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB) policy to
    align payment for Reserve and Active-Duty components by increasing
    Reserve proficiency pay ceiling from $6,000 to $12,000, consistent with
    section 639 of Public Law 108-163, the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2006. DOD policy for civilians assigned to non-
    intelligence positions allows FLPP of up to 5 percent of an employee's
    salary when duties require proficiency in a foreign language identified
    as necessary to meet national security concerns and the employee is
    certified as proficient in that language. The use of FLPP for civilians
    is also available within the Intelligence community and the National
    Security Personnel System (NSPS). Intelligence career field personnel
    and civilian personnel covered by NSPS may receive up to $500 per pay
    period provided the language proficiency facilitates performance of
    intelligence duties or is deemed necessary for national security
    interest.
    Building A ``Learning'' Organization To Strengthen The Foundation
        Of the many occupational skills taught to our personnel, language
    and regional expertise are among the more difficult to address in a
    systematic manner. Learning a foreign language is not easy and
    proficiency deteriorates, if not maintained. The strategic languages we
    seek, such as Arabic, are some of the most difficult and take a long
    time to develop.
        Regional expertise involves understanding complex issues in areas
    such as political, military/security, economic, sociological to include
    history and religion, scientific/technical, the geographic terrain,
    and, most importantly the cultural norms of a region. It takes time and
    continuous study to ensure current and relevant knowledge as countries
    and regions change over time. We must fully understand how to identify
    and catalog our regional expertise capability as we have with language.
    Regardless, of the challenge, we do know that every warfighter needs
    fundamental language skills and cultural awareness with a cadre of
    experts needing higher levels of proficiency, depending on the jobs and
    missions being performed.
        In addition, there are risks associated with selecting the
    languages and regions that should be taught or emphasized. Unlike other
    primary job skills, language and regional expertise do not necessarily
    transfer from one theater of operation to another. It is impossible to
    foresee with certainty where we will operate in deployment or
    contingency operations in the future and we must cultivate the
    capability of responding quickly to the unexpected, such as we did when
    Operation Enduring Freedom required a rapid development of curriculum
    in Dari and Pashto.
        To acquire and sustain these capabilities, the DOD must commit to
    building and sustaining a ``learning organization'' that offers
    mission-focused instruction to all personnel at the appropriate times,
    with the appropriate delivery method such as deploying training
    technology, to support our people in maintaining and enhancing these
    hard won skills. This learning begins even before potential recruits
    join the Total Force.
    Pre-Accession Language Training
        Pre-accession language training focuses the DOD's effort on
    building language skills in future officers prior to commissioning. The
    three Service Academies enhanced their foreign language study programs
    to develop pre-accession language and cultural knowledge. They expanded
    study abroad, summer immersion and foreign academy exchange
    opportunities; and added instructor staff for strategic languages. The
    United States Military Academy and the United States Air Force Academy
    now require all cadets to complete two semesters of language study; and
    the United States Naval Academy requires its non-technical degree-
    seeking midshipmen to take four semesters of language study. Language
    study programs have regional information such as socio and geo-
    political considerations and key aspects of culture embedded in the
    course of study. The United States Military Academy and the United
    States Air Force Academy also established two new language majors of
    strategic interest, specifically in Arabic and Chinese. The United
    States Naval Academy, for the first time in history, will offer
    midshipmen the opportunity to major in a foreign language, including
    Arabic and Chinese beginning with the class of 2010. In fiscal year
    2007, $25.57 million was directed to the Service Academies to develop
    and implement their language programs, including curricular development
    and hiring of staff and faculty to teach more strategic languages.
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2008 is for $16.95 million.
        The Academies are aggressively pursuing increased opportunities for
    their cadets and midshipmen to study abroad to reinforce both their
    acquired language and culture knowledge, and currently have programs
    available in 40 countries. Four-week summer language immersion programs
    are offered as well as semester exchanges with foreign military
    academies. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
    allows the Academies to expand these exchanges from 24 exchanges to 100
    exchanges per academy per year, and this congressional support is
    greatly appreciated.
        ROTC cadets and midshipmen also have expanded opportunities to
    learn a foreign language. The Air Force and Navy have ROTC students
    accompany their academy counterparts during familiarization and
    orientation travel opportunities. Of the 1,321 colleges and
    universities with ROTC programs, 1,148 offer languages as noted on this
    chart. Significantly, many of the languages we need for current
    operations are not widely offered at this time.

        The DOD has just awarded four grants to colleges and universities
    with ROTC programs. This is a pilot program started this year to
    provide grants to select colleges and universities with established
    ROTC programs to expand opportunities for ROTC cadets and midshipmen to
    study languages and cultures critical to national security. Increasing
    the number of less commonly taught languages in college curricula
    remains a challenge in which we are actively engaged.
    Primary Skills Language Training
        There are dramatic changes in how the DOD is training members who
    require language skills to perform their primary jobs. The DLIFLC's
    budget climbed from $77 million in fiscal year 2001 to $203 million in
    fiscal year 2007 to better respond to these changes. The Institute has
    an enrollment of 4000 students a year. Since the September 11, 2001,
    terrorist attacks, we have redirected training toward the strategic
    languages, such as Arabic, Chinese and Persian Farsi. One of the major
    programs implemented in fiscal year 2006 by DLIFLC is the Proficiency
    Enhancement Program (PEP). PEP is designed to graduate students at
    increased proficiency levels. Changes include reducing the student-to-
    instructor ratio, increasing the number of classrooms, creating
    improved expanded curricula, and expanding overseas training. Cultural
    awareness has also been added to every language course.
        A critical component of our effort to improve the language
    capability is to validate and deliver tools for measuring language
    proficiency. We have taken steps to strengthen our Defense Language
    Testing System by updating test content and delivery. The Services and
    Defense Agencies are taking the same test, thus we are able to use the
    test scores to calculate a Language Readiness Index and determine the
    gaps. We can then target our recruiting, training, and other
    interventions to reduce these gaps. Delivering these tests over the Web
    is greatly increasing the availability and accessibility of these tests
    to Defense military and civilian language professionals worldwide, and
    the use of advanced technology to store and track proficiency test
    scores is providing us with the capability to use this information for
    national security planning. Currently we have delivered over 11,000
    web-delivered tests to date.
    Supporting Deploying Forces
        The DOD recognizes that not all personnel will be able or required
    to demonstrate intermediate or advanced level language skills and
    regional expertise; as technology can help meet some of these demands.
    As directed in the DLTR, and in my role as the DOD Senior Language
    Authority, I am working with the Office of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to establish a
    coherent, prioritized, and coordinated DOD multi-language technology
    research, development, and acquisition policy and program. This
    technology, such as machine translation tools, will aid in bridging the
    gaps when the desired capability is not available. However, regardless
    of how advanced the technology, it cannot replace the need for
    servicemembers to personally acquire the language skills and cultural
    knowledge to effectively interact with the local people and leaders.
    Department policy, therefore, requires that military units deploying
    into, or in transit through foreign territories shall be equipped, to
    the greatest extent practicable, with an appropriate capability to
    communicate in the languages of the territories of deployment or
    transit and to operate with an appropriate knowledge of the cultural
    norms.
        The Services have taken great efforts to prepare members to achieve
    optimum outcomes by understanding the regions in which they deploy and
    being culturally aware. All the Services have incorporated regional and
    cultural information within Professional Military Education (PME)
    curricula. The Services established Centers of Excellence to oversee
    and standardize training and impart essential and mission-targeted
    cultural training to their members. The Army Training and Doctrine
    Command Culture Center, the Navy Center for Language Regional Expertise
    and Culture, the Air University Cultural Studies Center, and the Marine
    Corps Center for Advance Operational Culture and Language all focus on
    offering the training that best supports their deployment model and is
    compliant with Joint Professional Military Education guidelines. Since
    Service missions differ, this approach is logical and effective.
        We will host a DOD-wide Culture Summit this summer. This forum will
    serve as the foundation to develop operationally relevant cultural
    policies and synchronize efforts across all the Services.
        Getting the right information to deploying personnel in time to be
    useful, but not so early that it is forgotten before they arrive, is
    ``just-in-time'' training. We have significantly improved our means of
    providing language and regional familiarization training to units
    during their deployment cycles. The DLIFLC's foreign language and
    cultural instruction extends beyond the classroom to servicemembers and
    civilians preparing for deployment by offering mobile training teams,
    video teletraining, language survival kits, and online instructional
    materials. Since 2001, the DLIFLC dispatched 300 mobile training teams
    to provide targeted training to more than 32,000 personnel. Deploying
    units received over 200,000 Language Survival Kits (mostly Iraqi, Dari,
    and Pashto). Field support modules outlining the geo-political
    situation, cultural facts, and fundamental language skills, key phrases
    and commands are available for 19 countries in 17 languages on the
    DLIFLC website. There are 31 on-line language survival courses.
    Computer-based sustainment training is available as well via the Global
    Language On-line Support System, which supports 12 languages and 6 more
    language sustainment courses are available on the DLIFLC LingNet Web
    site.
    Heritage Recruiting
        Ensuring that we have a strong foundation in language and regional
    expertise involves reaching out to personnel who already possess these
    skills into our Total Force. All of our military Services have
    developed heritage-recruiting plans to bring personnel into the force
    with key language skills and regional expertise. These plans focus on
    reaching out to our heritage communities and their children who possess
    near-native language skills and knowledge of the culture.
        One particularly successful program is the Army's 09L Interpreter/
    Translator Program. The Army launched this pilot program in 2003 to
    recruit and train individuals from heritage Arabic, Dari, and Pashto
    communities to serve in the Individual Ready Reserve and support
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The program was so successful that
    in 2006, the Army formally established the 09L Translator Aide as a
    permanent military occupational specialty with a career path from
    recruit through sergeant major. More than 317 heritage speakers have
    successfully graduated and deployed; an additional 175 personnel are
    currently in the training pipeline. The Army continues to expand and
    develop the program in response to the positive feedback from the
    commanders and warfighters in the field. The QDR provides $50 million
    over a 5-year period, from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2011, to
    further expand this program.
        Additionally, we have embedded recruitment of key language skilled
    individuals into our civilian recruiting efforts, thereby recruiting
    individuals with DOD critical sets to include languages to serve in
    mission critical occupations. We have developed a comprehensive
    outreach program with colleges, universities and professional and
    heritage associations; reenergized our branding and marketing
    materials; and revamped our ``Go Defense'' recruitment Web site to
    attract individuals to DOD as the ``Employer of Choice.'' Our recently
    updated website include vignettes of current DOD employees in mission
    critical occupations, including language, who discuss their work and
    the satisfaction they realize from it as well as the benefits of
    working for the DOD.
        Attracting and hiring individuals with high proficiency language
    skills from heritage communities and graduates of the DOD-sanctioned
    education programs presents security clearance challenges. We have
    partnered with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    (DNI) to develop and are implementing a number of important initiatives
    to help reduce these barriers. Within the DOD, we are also conducting a
    scrub of all civilian positions coded for language to validate
    clearance level requirements; establishing a pilot to expedite hiring;
    and, promulgating best practices from the hiring pilot.
        Security clearances are particularly challenging for our 09L
    members. Current security requirements mandate that only U.S. citizen
    can obtain a security clearance and many of our 09Ls are legal resident
    aliens. The Army issued a ``limited access authorization'' allowing
    non-citizens in the 09L program to take a polygraph. Upon passing the
    polygraph, the member can then handle classified material while in
    theater. This accommodation enables 09L to handle classified material
    while in theatre awaiting citizenship or granting of security
    clearance.
        Ensuring Surge Capability--Generating Competencies to Meet the
            Unexpected
        As we evaluated our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was
    obvious that we did not have sufficient language capability within the
    force to meet demands. The Army, as the executive agent is coordinating
    contract linguist support. As a result, highly proficient contract
    linguists have been made available to commanders in theater. This is
    one example of how we can generate a surge capability harvesting
    language resources from the talent pool within and outside our country.
    We are also developing appropriate processes to maintain contact with
    our military and civilian retirees and separatees. The goal is to build
    a personnel database with language and regional experience information
    that would allow us reachback capability for voluntary recall. While
    current surge capability is obviously focused on ongoing operations, we
    are also looking beyond for potential or emerging areas in which the
    total force might be called upon to operate.
        Building Professionals
        Post-September 11 military operations reinforce the reality that
    the DOD needs an improved capability in languages and dialects of
    strategic interest. A higher level of language skill and regional
    expertise, to include cultural awareness, across all the Services are
    necessary to build the internal relationships required for coalition/
    multi-national operations, peacekeeping, and civil/military affairs. In
    2005, the DOD began building a cadre of language specialists possessing
    high-level language proficiency (an Interagency Language Roundtable
    (ILR) Proficiency Level 3 in reading, listening, and speaking ability
    or 3/3/3) and regional expertise. We are working with the DOD
    components to identify the tasks and missions that will require 3/3/3
    proficiency and determine the minimum number of personnel needed to
    provide this language capability. Managing the Professionals
        The Department has spent a great deal of effort in managing its
    cadre of uniformed regional experts--the Foreign Area Officers. DOD
    Directive 1315.17, ``Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs,'' updated in
    April 2005, established a common set of standards for FAOs. Most
    importantly, the new policies require the Services to establish FAO
    programs that ``deliberately develop a corps of FAOs who shall be
    commissioned officers with a broad range of military skills and
    experiences; have knowledge of political-military affairs; have
    familiarity with the political, cultural, sociological, economic, and
    geographical factors of the countries and regions in which they are
    stationed; and, have professional proficiency in one or more of the
    dominant languages in their regions of expertise.'' The purpose of this
    approach to the FAO Program is to build an FAO Corps capable of
    operating in a joint environment with similar training, developmental
    experiences, and expertise.
        All FAOs must be qualified in a principal military specialty.
    Studies undertaken by the DOD have confirmed that qualification in a
    principal military specialty must be an absolute prerequisite for FAOs
    to be successful, regardless of service. In fiscal year 2007, there are
    approximately 1,600 FAOs designated, qualified or are in training.
    Sustaining and Supporting Special Forces
        The U.S. Special Operations Command has recognized the need and
    value of language and regional expertise. They require each member to
    possess not only strong military skills but also regional and language
    skills. Special Operations Forces' policies ensure that their personnel
    are regionally trained and that their expertise and contributions are
    increased through consistent assignment in their region. Special Forces
    requirements are for speakers at a level one on the Interagency Level
    Roundtable. Level one is described as a functional, but limited
    language proficiency level. Special Forces members can take the Defense
    Language Proficiency Test 5, but prefer the Oral Proficiency Interview,
    since the majority of their requirements focus on the speaking
    modality. We are working to increase the availability of Oral
    Proficiency Interviews to meet U.S. Special Operations Command needs.

                           OUR EFFORTS ARE NOT ENOUGH

        We recognized that in order to increase language capability in the
    Department and achieve higher levels of language proficiency among our
    language professionals, we had to assume a more proactive role in
    promoting and encouraging language education in the American
    population. We need to be able to identify and recruit individuals who
    have the language skills and regional expertise we need. In June 2004,
    we convened a National Language Conference to begin dialog and
    stimulate thinking to this end. The conference led to the development
    of a white paper published by the Department outlining a number of key
    recommendations.
        In January 2006, the President announced the NSLI. The NSLI was
    launched to dramatically increase the number of Americans learning
    critical need foreign languages such as Arabic, Chinese, Russian,
    Hindi, and Farsi. The Secretary of Defense joined the Secretaries of
    State and Education, and the DNI to develop a comprehensive national
    plan to expand opportunities for U.S. students to develop proficiencies
    in critical languages from early education through college. The White
    House provides ongoing coordination as partner agencies work to
    implement this plan.
        The focal point for the Department's role in the NSLI is the NSEP.
    NSEP represents one of the national security community's most important
    investments in creating a pipeline of linguistically and culturally
    competent professionals into our workforce. NSEP provides scholarships
    and fellowships to enable U.S. students to study critical languages and
    cultures in return for Federal national security service. NSEP has
    partners with universities, providing grants for the development and
    implementation of National Flagship Language programs, specifically
    designed to graduate students at an ILR level three (3/3/3) language
    proficiency (in reading, listening and speaking modalities) in today's
    critical languages. These programs provide a major source of vitally
    needed language expertise in the national security community. As part
    of the DOD contribution to the NSLI, the NSEP has expanded the National
    Language Flagship Program to establish new Flagship programs in Arabic,
    Hindi, and Urdu and to expand the Russian Flagship to a Eurasian
    program focusing on critical Central Asian languages.
        The Flagship effort serves as an example of how NSLI links Federal
    programs and resources across agencies to enhance the scope of the
    Federal Government's efforts in foreign language education. For
    example, the Flagship program is leading the way in developing model
    pipelines of K-12 students with higher levels of language proficiency
    into our universities. I am very proud to tell this committee that we
    launched the Nation's first fully articulated K-16 program -- a Chinese
    pipeline with the University of Oregon/Portland Public Schools. While
    focusing on early language learning, this effort has already succeeded
    in enrolling ten students, as freshmen, from the Portland high schools
    in an experimental advanced 4-year Chinese program at the University of
    Oregon. We have also awarded a grant to the Chinese Flagship Program at
    Ohio State University to implement a statewide system of Chinese K-16
    programs. Finally, we awarded a grant to Michigan State University to
    develop an Arabic K-16 pipeline project with the Dearborn, Michigan
    school district, announced in conjunction with a Department of
    Education Foreign Language Assistance Program grant. We hope Congress
    will approve the Department of Education's request for the NSLI, which
    will significantly expand on the K-12 model that NSEP has established.
        Our second commitment to the President's NSLI is the launching of
    the Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps pilot program, now renamed The
    Language Corps. Authorized by Congress, this effort will identify
    Americans with skills in critical languages and develop the capacity to
    mobilize them during times of national need or emergency. The Language
    Corps represents the first organized national attempt to capitalize on
    our rich national diversity in language and culture. We just awarded a
    contract to assist us as we begin a 3-year pilot to meet our goal of
    1,000 Language Corps members.
        In spring 2006, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness invited the Federal Chief Human Capital Officers to join the
    DOD in building the Language Corps. We will continue to engage the
    Federal community as we proceed with the 3-year pilot.
         The Department's contributions to the NSLI reflect the significant
    amount of coordination among DOD staff, our NSLI partners, other
    Federal agencies, and State government and local education systems. The
    NSLI was built so that programs proposed by the Departments of State,
    Education, Defense, and National Intelligence, when funded and
    executed, would improve the national language capacity.
        Finally, the Department is coordinating a series of regional
    summits to engage state and local governments, educational
    institutions, school boards, parents, and businesses at the local level
    in addressing foreign language needs. The NSEP reached out to the
    expertise of its three Flagship Universities--in Ohio, Oregon, and
    Texas to convene these summits and to develop action plans that reflect
    an organized and reasonable approach to building the infrastructure for
    language education at the State and local level. These summits will
    take place later this spring and action plans will be produced by the
    fall 2007.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Thank you for the opportunity to share our current and future
    language and regional expertise transformation efforts. I hope to leave
    you with the understanding that building foreign language capability
    and regional expertise within the DOD is serious business. We have
    taken actions to ensure that our efforts are institutionalized in our
    recruitment efforts, compensation rules, plans, policies, training, and
    doctrine. We have made great progress and the Defense leadership
    commitment to the development of this important competency has been
    unwavering. However, we have not yet reached the finish line. Your
    continuing support of our efforts through legislation and
    appropriations is appreciated. The journey has just begun, but we must
    do it right as our Nation, and our national security depends on
    successful strategy and sustained execution.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Secretary McGinn, for
    your testimony.
        Dr. Van Tilborg?

       STATEMENT OF HON. ANDRE VAN TILBORG, Ph.D., DEPUTY UNDER
      SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Dr. Van Tilborg. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this
    opportunity to appear before you to discuss the DOD's S&T
    investments in the areas of language translation devices and
    cultural awareness training. I will use this opportunity to
    summarize a few of the DOD's current capabilities in language
    translation research, some of which I know you have had an
    opportunity to see here in the exhibits this afternoon. I will
    also briefly describe some of the planned future work on human,
    social, cultural, and behavioral understanding that supports
    our warfighters' need for interaction with unfamiliar cultures.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin, though, by
    acknowledging the strength and resolve of one of this Nation's
    great educational institutions, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
    and State University. As we speak about S&T here today, I ask
    that we all reflect on the students and faculty at one of
    America's foremost institutions of S&T who perished in a
    senseless rampage only a week ago, and I ask that we recognize
    the thousands of Hokies who through their commitment to
    learning and knowledge will surely honor the sacrifice of their
    friends and colleagues by reaching for a deeper understanding
    of nature, the arts, and the world in which we live.
        Mr. Chairman, there are four main take-aways from my
    testimony, as follows: Number one, the DOD's S&T enterprise
    recognizes that the abilities to understand and even converse
    in the languages of indigenous populations and to appreciate
    local cultures and social mores are important in military and
    stability operations.
        Number two, the DOD's S&T program has been at the forefront
    of research in language technology for many decades, enabled by
    providing a stable base for long-term research.
        Number three, promising language translation and cultural
    understanding technologies have emerged from these DOD-
    sponsored efforts.
        Number four, cultural awareness S&T is still in its
    infancy, but the DOD has conducted a concerted effort to
    develop a coordinated research and investment strategy that
    ranges from basic research to prototyping.
        Language is a deceptively simple, yet a maddeningly
    intricate subject. It is known surprisingly well by toddlers,
    who sometimes can learn even more than one language. Yet,
    paradoxically, generations of brilliant researchers with the
    world's most powerful supercomputers have struggled to produce
    even rough automated translations in everyday environments. The
    value of knowing languages and being able to translate among
    them is self-evident in this globalized economy for the
    business person, the tourist, and the diplomat. As has been
    mentioned, for the U.S. military one of the great challenges is
    to operate unpredictably in regions of the world where we
    cannot converse with the local population nor read local
    written materials, such as newspapers, road signs, and
    handbills, nor understand radio, television, and Internet
    communications.
        Not surprisingly, our commanders in the field have called
    for help in dealing with the diverse and unfamiliar language
    and cultural terrain in their areas of responsibility. Not only
    counterinsurgency environments, but also humanitarian crisis
    relief operations have forced the military to confront a
    situation in which all personnel need some ability to operate
    effectively in settings where they must have skills to work in
    novel language and cultural dimensions.
        Not only is it desirable to communicate in their language
    with the indigenous population, but also with non-English-
    speaking allied forces in our coalition operations.
        There are approximately 7,000 spoken languages in the
    world. Sixty percent of the world's population speaks one of
    the top 30 languages as their native tongue. I can personally
    vouch for having a modest grasp of three of those top 30
    languages, including English. About 200 languages claim at
    least one million native speakers each. The ability to converse
    and translate seamlessly between English and at least a
    substantial fraction of these languages could potentially add
    greatly to the capabilities of a combatant commander.
        The microelectronics and software revolutions have brought
    us to the brink of compact machines that can plausibly
    translate among natural languages. You have seen some of the
    impressive results this morning in the exhibition here today.
        I would also like to impress upon you how difficult the
    problem of automated language translation is, as the S&T guy
    here today. Let me read you a portion of a statement from
    International Business Machines (IBM), and this will surprise
    them here, regarding their efforts in language translation
    technology, which illustrates how difficult the problem is. On
    January 8, IBM issued a press release describing the successful
    results of an experiment in automatic translation of Russian to
    English. In that press release, a researcher is quoted as
    saying: ``Those in charge of this experiment now consider it to
    be definitely established that meaning conversion through
    electronic language translation is feasible and that perhaps 3
    years hence interlingual meaning conversion by electronic
    processes of several languages may be an accomplished fact''--
    that is, language translation.
        I would say that a problem that requires 3 years for the
    legendary technical minds at IBM to solve is certainly a
    difficult one. However, when I mentioned that this press
    release was issued on January 8th, I neglected to tell you that
    that was January 8, 1954, and the electronic computer involved
    was the first IBM Model 701, IBM's first commercially available
    computer with an electronic memory. Fifty three years later,
    the natural language research community, including IBM,
    continues to make steady progress.
        Fundamentally, automated language translation is extremely
    difficult because it cannot be achieved solely by mapping back
    and forth between words and dictionaries. Many decades of
    research sponsored by DOD's various research agencies and, I
    might say, the National Science Foundation have reinforced the
    critical idea that successful language translation depends on
    the concept of meaning. That is, it is not good enough to know
    that certain words and phrases have counterparts in other
    languages into which they should be translated. The translator,
    whether he be human or machine, must understand the meaning in
    the material to be translated.
        Many different techniques have been discovered for
    extracting meaning from language, representing that meaning in
    a form that can be digitally stored and manipulated, and
    generating translated text and speech from those intermediate
    representations. You have seen a variety of examples here
    today.
        A simple example illustrates the point about meaning. If I
    say the two-word sentence ``Time flies'' in English and ask
    that it be translated into another language, you probably must
    ask me, what do I mean? Do I mean that time moves swiftly
    forward, or do I mean that time has wings, or do you want me to
    use a stopwatch to measure flying insect maneuvers or for
    determining the hang time of a baseball hit by a batter? All
    those meanings are plausible when I say ``Time flies.'' The
    translation depends on an understanding of meaning, which is
    still very hard for computers and software to do.
        Nevertheless, the DOD's research investments have yielded
    some impressive results, some of which have entered utility
    assessments and operational military assessments. I would like
    to mention just a few of the ones that are on exhibit here
    today. As you have seen, the largest speech-to-speech
    translation research program in DOD is DARPA's Spoken Language
    Communication and Translation System for Tactical Use
    (TRANSTAC). TRANSTAC has developed PC-based translation systems
    that allow speech-to-speech translation between English and
    variants of Arabic.
        The program has contributed to the development and fielding
    of a number of products such as you have seen here today, the
    Phraselator and IBM's MASTOR system. The Phraselator is a
    relatively simple device that enables one-way translation of
    speech inputs into translated phrases that have been pre-
    recorded and stored in the device. For example, when the user
    speaks an English phrase the Phraselator searches its memory
    for the closest matching pre-recorded phrase in the target
    language and speaks that phrase. Translation success is
    improved by grouping related phrases into pluggable modules
    oriented toward specific functional domains, such as for
    example first aid or hospital operations or security
    checkpoints.
        There are currently over 2,000 of these devices in the
    field in Iraq. A similar device is called the Voice Response
    Translator, which is also on display here today.
        Another promising system, developed jointly by DARPA and
    IBM, is the Multi-Lingual Automatic Speech-to-Speech
    Translator, called MASTOR. MASTOR combines cutting edge
    technologies in automatic speech recognition, understanding,
    and synthesis. In contrast to Phraselator, it is intended for
    use with bidirectional, unconstrained, free form natural speech
    in multiple domains.
        MASTOR incorporates many extremely sophisticated algorithms
    and processing techniques, yet is capable of operating on
    laptop computers. Several dozen of these units are in
    experimental use in Iraq.
        Other impressive DOD-sponsored systems that tackle various
    aspects of language understanding and translation have been
    developed by companies, such as SRI International, BDM
    Technologies, Speech Gear Incorporated, Integrated Wave
    Technologies, and CACI, among others. Varying quantities of
    experimental devices have been fielded to units, such as the
    18th Airborne Corps, 1 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), 1 MEF,
    the Army's III Corps, and the 25th I.D., for example.
        The DOD's largest investment in text-to-text translation,
    as opposed to speech, is DARPA's Global Autonomous Language
    Exploitation (GALE) program. The program's goal is to translate
    and distill foreign language material, such as television shows
    and web sites and streaming video, in near-real time and
    highlight salient information to produce targeted query
    responses. The program is intended to deliver a capability to
    translate both structured and unstructured text and speech.
    Several system are currently fielded in Iraq.
        Mr. Chairman, to summarize this aspect of my testimony, the
    DOD's S&T investment in language translation automation, I
    would tell you that much progress has been achieved through
    steady research investments, but that the goal of robust
    translation capability, able to handle spontaneous,
    unstructured, unconstrained input in a noisy background,
    comparable to what a human being would be able to do, has not
    yet been reached.
        Shifting gears quickly now to the area of cultural
    awareness training, the need for improved cultural awareness
    training is broadly recognized in DOD and in an emerging sense
    in our DOD S&T program. The Joint Force needs some of the same
    cultural awareness competencies that our Special Operations
    Forces have traditionally maintained. Military operations in
    complex multicultural environments require an awareness and
    knowledge that can be applied to improved operator interactions
    and shape the outcome of the interactions. The ultimate goal is
    to achieve an acceptable baseline for cultural competency
    across our forces.
        From a technology perspective, the first generation
    capabilities in this area are being derived from the best
    academic and professional subject matter experts, providing
    schoolhouse content. The next generation will likely be
    computer-mediated training and mission rehearsal in relevant
    venues. The third generation will be embedded within a more
    immersive dynamic environment.
        There are several S&T efforts currently being pursued in
    the DOD's S&T program related to this area. There is a program
    called Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation that
    is available for viewing I believe here in the exhibit hall, in
    the hearing room.
        Senator Reed. Doctor, are you near the conclusion?
        Dr. Van Tilborg. Yes, I am very close.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Dr. Van Tilborg. Another system is DARPA's Tactical
    Language and Cultural Training System, which was designed to
    provide our warfighters with basic cultural proficiency with
    only limited computer laptop training. This system is currently
    available in Iraqi, Arabic, and Pashtun, and provides basic
    language and cultural awareness skills.
        However, I would tell you, though, Mr. Chairman, that the
    S&T in this area of cultural awareness is at an earlier stage
    of maturity than is language technology, and in recognition of
    that fact the DOD conducted, working with the military
    components, conducted an extensive survey of the research areas
    related to human, social, cultural, and behavioral
    understanding in 2006 and identified 75 areas of research, in
    which approximately a very large fraction are currently not
    being invested in.
        To address these gaps, the DOD has formulated a human,
    social, cultural, and behavioral modeling initiative that we
    call HSCB, in which we plan to invest approximately $210
    million over the Future Years Defense Program starting in
    fiscal year 2008 to develop the required scientific base to
    field mature technologies.
        Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I would like to reiterate the
    main points: one, the DOD S&T enterprise recognizes that the
    ability to understand and converse in languages of indigenous
    populations is important in military and stability operations.
    The DOD's S&T program has been at the forefront of research in
    that language technology, which is a very difficult problem.
        Promising language translation technologies have begun to
    emerge from these efforts and, although cultural awareness S&T
    is still in its infancy, the DOD has stood up a plan for
    investments in S&T in this arena.
        That concludes my statement. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Van Tilborg follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Dr. Andre Van Tilborg

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
    for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of
    Defense's (DOD) science and technology (S&T) investments in the areas
    of language translation devices and cultural awareness training. I will
    use this opportunity to describe the DOD's current capabilities in
    translation devices and cultural awareness training, the challenges in
    these areas, and some of the planned future work that supports our
    warfighters' needs for interaction with non-western cultures. I am also
    pleased to have the chance to highlight in this hearing some of the new
    and expanded initiatives we are hoping to undertake in these areas to
    address the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
        I have organized this testimony into two sections, one dealing with
    language technology devices and the other with cultural awareness
    training. There is obviously some linkage between these two areas, but
    many of the research challenges in translation devices or socio-
    cultural awareness training are unique to each. For these areas, there
    is a clear need for increased skills and capabilities for all of the
    Combatant Commands (COCOM), and there are specific needs statements
    from at least two COCOMs, Central Command (CENTCOM), and Special
    Operations Command (SOCOM). The language and cultural terrain of each
    COCOM's Areas of Responsibility (AOR) define the technical challenges.
    However, we do recognize that the solutions are not solely technical in
    nature, and the Department must also address Manpower, Personnel, and
    Training as part of the solution sets.
        I will address language translation devices research and
    engineering first. The global war on terror, and, more generically,
    Irregular Warfare (IW)/counterinsurgency environments have forced the
    military to confront a situation in which all personnel need some
    abilities to operate effectively in settings where they must have
    skills to work in novel language and cultural dimensions. The
    requirement for a deeper understanding of the human environment in an
    AOR is now relevant, not just for Special Operations Units, but for all
    soldiers and marines who are deploying. At the strategic level, the
    global war on terror has created the need not only to have the ability
    to communicate with indigenous peoples from diverse cultures, but also
    to be able to understand their written and media communications. The
    sheer volume of written text and other media (i.e., television
    broadcasts, internet postings) makes using individual human translators
    untenable. Given the realities on the ground in the CENTCOM AOR and the
    scale of the global war on terror, it is evident that for our current
    and future forces we need to discover, develop and field technologies
    to augment our existing translation capabilities at the strategic,
    operational and tactical level, for multiple languages and dialects,
    and for users that span a broad language skill level (novice to
    linguist). Some of the capability needs and technical challenges and
    the efforts to meet these challenges and field viable products to our
    forces are described below. The work listed below does have application
    to the general purpose force, to planners and operators, and to the
    Intelligence Community (IC). However, the IC has their own specific,
    unique use scenarios that require linguistic capabilities to support
    intelligence analysis. In this testimony I will intentionally focus on
    DOD specific investments. However, please recognize that we are
    cognizant of the development being done in the IC, have numerous links
    to the IC linguists, and our investments complement their work.

                          LANGUAGE TRANSLATION DEVICES

        From a technical perspective, there are some common underlying
    capabilities that serve both text and speech translation. However, each
    has unique features that make fielding operational devices difficult.
    The commercial sector has developed translation capabilities and
    technologies that meet some of the needs of the operational forces, and
    the pedigree of this technology (i.e., IBM's MASTOR) includes a history
    of DOD funding. However, many of these available products are not
    robust enough to meet the scale, breadth, and tempo required for the
    mission areas/needs of deployed forces. The threshold for effective use
    of speech to speech translation in the business world is lower than in
    the military, there is a need for `street' level communication that
    accounts for unstructured/colloquial speech, varied sub-dialects, noisy
    environments, the need for hand's free communication, and the need for
    increased accuracy in real-time, tactical translation. Text and media
    translation has additional challenges that include bandwidth
    limitations in operational environments, and degraded signals such as
    smudged and handwritten text translation. Lastly, the military needs
    access to a large volume of spoken and/or written language to create
    the databases, scalable models, and training materials for some of the
    more obscure languages and dialects that occur across the globe. There
    are approximately 7,000 distinct languages/dialects in the world. Many
    of the places we may operate have hundreds of subcultures and
    languages. The commercial technology investments are not focused on
    providing translation in these types of niche markets. DOD investments
    in this area are concentrated on improving existing technology to reach
    the translation accuracy necessary for our forces, and on expanding the
    reach of these tools to the socially and linguistically diverse regions
    in which the DOD operates. What follows is a description of the most
    significant technology developments in the area of language. It should
    be evident from the descriptions below that the ongoing and planned
    programs within the services and other organizations, such as the
    Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), are truly
    complementary.
    Speech-to-Speech Translation
        The major speech-to-speech translation systems have taken advantage
    of previous commercial successes in translation. The largest program
    today is DARPA's Spoken Language Communication and Translation System
    for Tactical Use (TRANSTAC). TRANSTAC has developed PC-based
    translation systems that allow speech-to-speech translation between
    English and Baghdadi Arabic. Its current accuracy, in controlled noise
    environments, is between 70-80 percent. The TRANSTAC system is being
    field tested in Iraq for specified use domains (i.e., medical care,
    vehicle checkpoint, and joint Iraqi coalition force missions). The
    program has had early successes and has contributed to the development
    and fielding of a number of products such as the Phraselator system and
    IBM's Mastor system. The Mastor system recently made headlines when IBM
    offered to donate over 10,000 software licenses and 1,000 devices to
    the DOD. The TRANSTAC program is attempting to develop and field hands-
    free two-way speech to speech translation systems that can provide
    accurate translation in urban military environments. A secondary goal
    is to expand the domains and accuracy of the existing system. Other
    programs, such as the Instant Language Translation project under the
    Office of Naval Research, are expanding the capability of portable
    translation systems by including multi-mode inputs (spoken, written,
    images) and additional languages and dialects from other regions of the
    world such as Korea and Somalia.
    Text-to-Text and Media-to-Text
        The largest DOD S&T investment in text-to-text translation is
    DARPA's Global Autonomous Language Exploitation (GALE) program. The
    program's goal is to translate and distill foreign language material
    (e.g. television shows and websites) in near real-time, highlight
    salient information, and produce targeted query responses. The program
    will deliver the capability to translate both structured and
    unstructured text and speech, with a goal of delivering an accuracy of
    95 percent for text and 90 percent for speech. Other investments
    include improvements in tactical document translation system accuracy
    and capabilities. It should be noted that the media-speech to text is
    working in a domain where the speech is controlled with rather
    predictable vocabulary. The GALE program has already accomplished much
    in the way of improved accuracy in translating text (55 to 75 percent
    accuracy) and media (35 to 65 percent accuracy), but they are
    continuing to improve the technology to a maturity level to deliver the
    capability to translate both text and speech at 90-95 percent accuracy.
    Language Databases
        The current method to support developing new language modules for
    existing translation devices is costly and time consuming, requiring
    the collection, transcription and translation of large amounts of
    training data (written and spoken language). The Air Force Research
    Laboratory has an ongoing project that will provide a rapid turnaround
    on developing linguistic data sources for new languages and domains of
    interest. The goal is to use innovative techniques to take languages
    and dialects in which we have limited data, with less than 10 hours of
    speech data or 20,000 words or less of text, and produce useful spoken
    or written translations.
    Fielded Technology
        Three of the technologies described above are in use by military
    units. The Phraselator, handheld one way speech to speech device,
    provides tactical level communication for soldiers within specific
    domains, such as checkpoint and medical operations. The device was
    originally developed as part of a DARPA Small Business Innovation
    Research (SBIR) effort. There are currently over 2,000 Phraselators in
    the field in Iraq. The DOCEX system provides the capability to process
    and exploit captured documents for actionable intelligence within
    tactical time scales. The DOCEX was developed as part of a Director of
    Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) Advanced Concept Technology
    Demonstration project, transitioned to the National Ground Intelligence
    Center and fielded. There are systems currently deployed in Iraq.
    Finally, the GALE program transitioned structured text/media
    translation technologies to 12 U.S. Government organizations, and 2
    systems are currently fielded in Iraq.

                          CULTURAL AWARENESS TRAINING

        The need for improved cultural awareness training was identified in
    the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It was realized that the
    general Joint Force needed some of the same cultural awareness
    competency that our Special Operations Forces have traditionally
    maintained. Military operations in complex, multicultural environments
    require more than just being culturally sensitive to the do's and
    don'ts of a society. Such operations also require an awareness and
    knowledge that can be applied to improve operator interactions and
    shape the outcome of the interactions. Each of the Services have
    established cultural awareness training centers that are developing
    content, sharing this content, and have begun training their personnel
    on the specific knowledge necessary to support their military missions.
    Fortunately, these centers have access to the extensive on the ground
    experiences of the soldiers and marines returning from Iraq, combined
    with the relatively well-known academic knowledge of Iraq's religious
    and sectarian history. Providing the same level of `understanding' and
    training for data-poor, less studied socio-cultural environments, such
    as the mountainous tribal regions of Afghanistan or the multicultural
    regions of Indonesia is much more difficult.
        The ultimate goal is to achieve an acceptable baseline for cultural
    competency across our forces. As mentioned above, the first generation
    capabilities in this area are being derived from the best academic and
    professional subject matter experts providing schoolhouse content. The
    next generation will likely be computer-mediated training and mission
    rehearsal in relevant venues. The third generation will be embedded
    within more immersive, dynamic environments. Methodologies to collect,
    package, and understand knowledge of cultural landscapes will be needed
    to support the generation of content that will fill these curricula and
    training systems. What follows is a description of the current
    technology developments in the area of culture awareness training for
    second and third generation capabilities and planned future investment
    in the area of socio-cultural understanding.
    Ongoing Efforts
        The Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office's Technical
    Support Working Group is developing training support packages that
    focus on the operational and tactical applications of cultural
    awareness, with a specific focus on Indonesia. The training material is
    being developed in coordination with SOCOM and the U.S. Army Training
    and Doctrine Command.
        A number of SBIR and Small Business Technology Transfer Projects
    have begun in the area of cultural awareness. They include projects to
    train at the tactical and strategic level and all are focused on
    developing computer-based awareness training. Again, at the tactical
    level, an SBIR project will develop a system that will train how to
    read Middle Eastern non-verbal cues and develop an understanding of
    what those cues say about a person's intentions. Another will create
    more accurate and realistic non-U.S. entities that can be used in
    convoy commander and ground troop training simulations. At the
    strategic level, there are two new projects. One will support the
    training of planners and senior leaders in developing and assessing
    metrics for effects based operations in complex conflict environments.
    The second project will develop a computer-based tool to support leader
    training on interagency goals and progress in non-western conflict
    environments. All of these have been initiated under the new Human
    Social, Culture, and Behavior (HSCB) Modeling Initiative led by DDR&E.
        The HSCB initiative has sprung from the lesson learned in the
    ongoing global war on terror. That lesson learned is that the DOD has
    capability gaps in software tools and decision aids that will allow
    U.S. commanders to better understand different cultures. The QDR
    highlighted these lessons in stating that current and future military
    operations will require enhanced capability to understand social and
    cultural ``terrains'' as well as various dimensions of human behavior.
    The HSCB initiative will develop the required scientific base and will
    field matured technologies that support human terrain understanding and
    forecasting across a span of missions and geographic regions. The DDR&E
    staff worked with the military components and intelligence community in
    2006 to identify capability needs in 75 areas; there were gaps in
    roughly 70 of these areas. The HSCB initiative will address these gaps
    and integrate complex human factors into the pre-planning, planning and
    execution cycle of military operations. HSCB modeling is focused on
    filling capability gaps within data collection/infrastructure and
    knowledge management, and then developing the models to forecast
    societal and cultural behaviors. In addition to delivering software
    modules that are fully integrated into DOD command and control systems,
    the HSCB effort will help to create the infrastructure (simulations and
    content (data, models and theories)) to support tactical through
    strategic training, mission rehearsal, and experimentation using valid
    cultural entities and models.
        Fielded Technology
        DARPA's Tactical Language and Culture Training system was designed
    to provide our warfighters with some basic spoken language and cultural
    proficiency with only limited (2 weeks) laptop computer training. The
    system is currently available in Iraqi Arabic and Pashto and provides
    basic language and cultural awareness skills training for troops. There
    are currently 800 copies of the software installed in bases here in the
    U.S. as well as in theater. Over 6,000 troops have used the system for
    initial skills training.
        In conclusion, the need for a robust DOD S&T program in language
    and cultural awareness and associated capabilities is a central element
    to fighting the global war on terror. The ongoing and future efforts of
    Defense S&T will support the training and equipping of today's force,
    tomorrow's force, and the future's force. We believe these efforts are
    meeting this challenge, and we truly appreciate the continued support
    of this committee in providing us the tools and resources to carry out
    this vital mission.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Doctor. Thank you also,
    very much, for recognizing Virginia Tech. We all share your
    very important sentiment about their sacrifice, but also their
    extraordinary contribution to education and technology. So,
    thank you. That was very thoughtful.
        Let me follow up with some questions to you initially, Dr.
    Van Tilborg. You mentioned several devices that are being used
    today in Iraq and Afghanistan. With respect both to translation
    devices and cultural awareness devices, what are the
    limitations that you see?
        Dr. Van Tilborg. I think some of the primary limitations
    are in their, what I will call, robustness, meaning their
    ability to be useful in contexts for which they were not
    explicitly developed. That is, if sentences or words or
    concepts are presented to these devices that the designers and
    developers did not program, if you will, into these devices,
    then these devices can fail miserably. So that is a very
    difficult problem and needs to be dealt with.
        Senator Reed. How do you engage in feedback? Is there an
    ongoing process where you or your colleagues are interviewing
    people coming out of the field, lining up reports? Is there
    some formal mechanism or a combination. . .
        Dr. Van Tilborg. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there is quite a bit of
    feedback. There are these experimental versions of many of
    these products that are in theater that are being used by
    various units, and individuals from those units do communicate
    back with research managers here at our agencies.
        In fact, I saw today just here in the hearing room today a
    young Army soldier who has used these units in theater and is
    actually here with us today, speaking to people about his
    experience with them. So there is quite a bit of interaction
    and feedback.
        Senator Reed. Are there formal mechanisms and informal
    mechanisms? People send an e-mail message to you and there is a
    requirement to evaluate these, and you look at them?
        Dr. Van Tilborg. Yes. I would say I am not well enough
    informed to know how formal the process is, but I know there is
    extensive informal communication.
        Senator Reed. How do you use that information to shape your
    research plans and your budgets going forward?
        Dr. Van Tilborg. I think that the experience of the users
    is critically important. So for example, issues related to form
    factor, the user interface of a device, how it displays its
    information--you can theorize as much as you would like, but
    the most important input is to hear from an actual user who has
    been out on point, as they say, from that individual, what
    works and what does not work.
        Through our research agencies, such as DARPA and the Office
    of Naval Research and various other agencies that do this work,
    they can adjust or tailor their continued work in this area.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Let me just move right along and talk to Secretary McGinn
    about a couple of things. First, you mentioned the language
    corps and that is an intriguing idea. I wonder how much
    structure there is at this juncture in the language corps. Is
    the concept where folks are putting the names down that we can
    call and they might come? Or is this something where you
    anticipate some day being able to take people, skilled
    linguists, call them up, to use the term of art, and put them
    someplace that they might not necessarily want to go?
        Mrs. McGinn. We are looking at both of those options. One
    is to have a corps of people that we can actively nurture and
    attach to an organization that can be used and can be called
    for. The other is to, indeed, create a roster of people that we
    might call and find out if they were interested, if the need
    for them arose.
        I must say that on this score we are really at the very
    beginning. It is a pilot and we just awarded the contract. We
    are very hopeful. We did do some marketing and found that--in
    fact, we changed the name from the ``Civilian Linguist Reserve
    Corps'' to ``the Language Corps'' because of our marketing
    studies. We found a great deal of interest actually among the
    heritage communities for helping us out with their language
    skills.
        Senator Reed. One of the things that I mentioned in my
    opening remarks, Madam Secretary: Everyone is working very
    hard, making a lot of effort, but it has been 5-plus years and
    we recognized the need upfront, but we are still in some cases
    in the initial stages. We have such a wealth of Americans with
    language skills from the native speaker communities. We have
    academics that teach these languages that are experts. We have
    not been able to mobilize them. It is a source, I think, of
    frustration probably to you also.
        But as you go forward, I think we probably have to be more
    aggressive in this regard. I presume that at some point you
    might consider legislation, particularly if this is going to be
    something more than a voluntary corps list. Is that correct?
        Mrs. McGinn. We do not know yet because we are in the pilot
    stages. I would like to address your concern about how things
    are 5 years later, because we really did not wait after
    September 11.
        Senator Reed. No.
        Mrs. McGinn. There were a series of steps--budgetary
    increases, curriculum changes at DLI, and a bunch of things
    that we did prior to the publication of the roadmap. So we were
    actively moving out in many of these areas. One of them was the
    establishment of our own language corps, Heritage Americans
    recruited for their skill in Kurdish, Dari, and Pashtun, that
    we have now. The pilot program was very successful. There are
    now about 500 who are deployed or in training, getting rave
    reviews from commanders in the field as to their capabilities.
    So there is a very, very rich community to reach out to, and we
    very much appreciate their patriotism, because that is what we
    need.
        Senator Reed. Fine. Let us talk for a moment about DLI. The
    budget in fiscal year 2001 was $77 million and in 2007 it will
    go up to $230 million. So there has been a huge investment, I
    think, appropriately so. If you can just talk about the role of
    DLI, particularly, since there are many other universities and
    organizations that do essentially the same thing. There is
    always the question, do you have a government entity that you
    invest in and develop or do you go out and partner? Can you
    talk about your concept of the DLI mission?
        Mrs. McGinn. The unique thing about the DLI mission is
    that--and I do not think you find this anywhere--they take high
    school graduates basically and put them through intensive
    language training in some of the very difficult languages, and
    also with an eye toward the wider community, toward the skills
    that they need to carry forward in their career.
        But DLI has evolved into this really critical mass of
    language expertise for us, that has created pre-deployment
    training, has created curriculums for difficult languages that
    we can pull off and teach at a moment's notice, and has created
    DVDs and portable things that servicemembers can take with
    them, language survival kits. So they have really become a
    critical mass of language expertise for the DOD. They have
    evolved into that. It is really quite an impressive operation
    and they have asked me to invite you to come and visit.
        Senator Reed. Oh, very good. They are in Monterey,
    California?
        Mrs. McGinn. Yes.
        Senator Reed. That will not influence my decision, but
    point acknowledged.
        I understand that the intelligence analysts that go with
    DLI, they are tested in their writing and their reading, since
    verbal proficiency is not necessary, and DLI does the testing
    and they set the standards. The question that arises is, what
    is the reality check or quality check on that process? Are you
    aware?
        Mrs. McGinn. Yes. We actually have, they actually get
    tested in listening and reading.
        Senator Reed. Yes.
        Mrs. McGinn. We do have a Defense Language Testing Advisory
    Board comprised of testing experts from around the country that
    looks at tests, it looks at our testing process, and gets back
    to us.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Let me just turn to General Scales for a couple of
    questions. First, I would be interested, General, since you
    have been a practitioner and you have used graduates of DLI,
    what is your impression right now of DLI, its role, your
    general impression?
        General Scales. Generally, their knowledge is very basic. I
    have had a lot of experience with DLI graduates in Korea when I
    was assistant division commander and you can rely on them to do
    a lot of the decryption and interpretation. I have found there
    are great linear translators, in other words, but, to use
    Andre's point about the meaning and the subtleties of the
    language, they did not have it. So generally we had to rely on
    native-born Korean speakers to be able to provide us those
    subtleties that you need when you are trying to determine
    second and third order meaning.
        So I guess the way to put it is DLI is basic training, and
    you do not take an infantryman out of 6 weeks of basic training
    and make him to company commander. So that would be the analogy
    I give you.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
        Let me follow up on your testimony, which I thought was
    very thought-provoking, and which is that have to move from a
    technocentric to a culture-centric approach, that most of the
    problems we have seen in the last several years have not been
    technical failures, but this lack of cultural awareness, the
    lack of linguistic ability. Can you point to the key problems
    in Iraq and Afghanistan to underscore your point that, perhaps,
    if we had a better cultural sensitivity or linguistic ability
    we could have found a better road out?
        General Scales. Sure. That is a great question, Senator.
    Let us go back to the early days, 2003 and 2004 in Mosul. In
    the early days the ability of young soldiers to communicate on
    the street with Iraqis was pretty good, simply because of the
    innate, I do not know, ``goodness'' I guess is the word I would
    use, of the American soldier, the ability of soldiers of
    goodwill to communicate with Iraqis of goodwill.
        But it was flat. What should have followed, I believe, is a
    very intensive human-centered approach to continuing this type
    of dialogue, this type of interaction with the Iraqi citizens.
    But that did not happen in many ways, because of our penchant
    to find technological solutions, as I said, to problems.
        I think just looking at the back of the room is
    illustrative of that. Here you are and we are in Iraq, trying
    to solve a human problem, trying to communicate, to break
    through cultural barriers and solve a political, military
    problem through human interaction and the application of social
    sciences, and everything behind me is a computer.
        So I guess my question is, great that we apply computer
    sciences to solving human problems, but I suggest that the
    lesson from Iraq is we should have started earlier and we
    should have applied human sciences to solve the human problem.
    This is just part of our culture. We Americans view wars as
    science projects and we tend to find technological solutions.
        I will give you another couple examples: improvised
    explosive device (IED) detection. One of the things that I
    learned early in my trips to Iraq is that there were some
    soldiers who could really do it. It is interesting. Some squads
    never got ambushed, some squads always managed to avoid IEDs.
    They had this sixth sense, this intuition about it.
        So you ask the question, why did second squad never get
    ambushed and third squad did? There was something about those
    leaders, some human quality that they had that gave them that
    sixth sense. The same thing with small unit tactics. Some
    squads do better than others in places like Fallujah and
    elsewhere.
        So my question is, it is great that we are spending a lot
    of computer money to solve different problems, but why do we
    not do a better job of mining the psychology, the sociology,
    the human intuitive, and cognitive aspects of these sorts of
    things to get to human solutions to human problems. My sense
    and my frustration, I think the reason you invited me here
    today, is that there is a real break within the DOD in getting
    what in essence is an institution that has won wars with
    chemistry, physics, information technology, and computers and
    ask them suddenly to turn around tomorrow and apply the laws of
    human sciences to solve this.
        It would be like asking Joe Gibbs to coach hockey. A great
    guy, a terrific coach, and a wonderful human being, but I do
    not think he would know much about working on the ice.
        So what I am suggesting to you, Sir, is that as you look
    into the future and try to solve this problem, let us take the
    human sciences to solve the human problems and leverage the
    physical sciences as appropriate. There are some wonderful
    opportunities there, but I would suggest that we find
    historians, political scientists, sociologists, psychiatrists,
    and psychologists and all these other human sciences and find a
    mechanism to bring them together to solve problems.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General Scales.
        We are joined by Senator Warner. Senator, I believe we are
    going to begin votes at 3 p.m., but we have some time and the
    floor is yours.
        Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I am
    sorry I was not here a little earlier. I really enjoy the work
    of this subcommittee.
        But I want to pick up on the general's comments. We had our
    friend, General McCaffrey, up before the committee the other
    day. I am going to read a little something that he had to say
    here that impressed me greatly. In testimony before the Armed
    Services Committee last week, General McCaffrey stated that
    military personnel should be sent to a 90-day course at the DLI
    in Monterey, California, or similar institution to get some
    fluency in the language.
        I am all in favor of advancements in the sciences here and
    the ability of these computers, these very wonderful people who
    have risen to the necessity to help us through the technology.
    But I remember my father was in World War I. He was a doctor
    and in his tunic he carried with him everywhere a French
    dictionary. He was quite fluent in French, but he was highly
    dependent as a medical doctor because often he had to treat the
    Frenchmen.
        I have some recollection in my own modest career when we
    went to Korea, we had to strap around and figure out some sign
    language because very often on patrol duty and so forth, we
    were out and we were literally on our own, and trying to get
    from the local population some information and so forth.
        Where are we in the concept that we have now recognized
    that a certain knowledge of the language is as important as
    some of our military skills, and we may not always have the
    benefit of the technology with us. We may have just what is in
    the rucksack and that is about it. So I realize now, on the
    turn-around particularly, which my colleague and I are
    concerned about, rotating these people back into the area of
    responsibility for combat, there is not any time to send them
    to Monterey for 90 days. But we should be looking ahead and
    maybe integrating more of this into the syllabus, in hopefully
    a less stressful time in terms of our overseas commitments.
        Anybody want to tackle that?
        Mrs. McGinn. Senator Warner, one of the things that we have
    done in that regard is we started with the officer corps,
    believing that as you lead the officer corps so you lead the
    DOD. We are beefing up pre-accession language training and
    regional culture training. The Air Force Academy and the
    Military Academy now require foreign language training. The
    Navy Academy requires it for nontechnical leaders. We are
    advancing into ROTC. We have the QDR gives grants to colleges
    and universities with ROTC programs, to develop ROTC programs.
    We are about to announce four of those that we have just
    awarded.
        As a follow-on to that, all of the Services have embedded
    into their professional military education regional and
    cultural expertise, not only for their officers but also for
    their enlisted personnel. In many cases that also includes
    language sustainment.
        So we have really started to move forward towards saying
    this is a competency that the DOD needs to have. It is a major
    change, and so it is not easy, but we are moving in that
    direction.
        Senator Warner. When we integrate our young people into the
    military today, we assess their skills in many ways. I am quite
    certain that some of these young people have some language
    skills that were taught in school. Is that put into their
    record so that we can access them in times that we need them?
        I remember in my generation of school I had to take 5 years
    of Latin. That did not do me a lot of good, but it did help me
    because it was the root language of others, and I learned what
    modest language skills I had, which were very modest, I might
    add.
        Mrs. McGinn. We are screening everyone now upon accession
    for their language ability. We are also screening those members
    who are currently in the force, since we found a lot of
    language capability in the force we did not know we had.
        Senator Warner. So that is in a database somewhere?
        Mrs. McGinn. Yes, sir, we have a database. We are also
    moving out to administer the Defense Language Aptitude Battery,
    which measures how well you may learn a language, so that when
    we need to teach people languages we can reach out to those who
    have a propensity for it.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I do believe those votes are
    about to start. I may have one or two questions for the record,
    but thank you very much, and I thank the panel of witnesses.
    Nice to see you again, General Scales.
        Senator Reed. General Scales, I think you had a comment
    with regard to one of Senator Warner's questions?
        General Scales. Just very briefly, Senator. All these
    things are terrific, and I spent my last 3 years in the
    military superintending this. But at the end of the day
    officers will pay attention to and do best at those things
    which will achieve success, which will get them promoted.
        I am sorry, that is just the way our culture is, and until
    we change our military culture to reward those who are good at
    this, who learn the language, are good at training and doing
    the advisory functions in Iraq and Afghanistan, until we
    reserve a place, until we reward them with advanced civil
    schooling where they can go back to a name university and learn
    more about the culture and be better at the language, and until
    the institutions, the Army, the Marine Corps, and the other
    Services, reserve special places and offer special rewards for
    these special skills, it is going to be a long, hard uphill
    climb.
        Senator Warner. It is interesting. When I was in the
    building many years ago, I noticed--and I had to do a lot of
    work at that time internationally in my capacity as the Navy
    Secretary, so I traveled a lot. I got to know the attaches, a
    very interesting lot, and I learned, to my chagrin, that that
    was the end; O-6 was it and you were out.
        But at that point in time I had the authority to work the
    system and I finally got some stars and other things put on
    those people to give them recognition. Today I think it is a
    little better. There is a promotion chain through there to some
    extent; is that correct?
        General Scales. Not to my knowledge. I think the gentleman
    who we all look up to as our model is Karl Eikenberry, who is a
    Foreign Affairs Officer (FAO). Senator, he is a China FAO. His
    wife is Chinese and he is terrifically effective in
    Afghanistan. So language ability, but also the ability to
    really get along with people, to sublimate your ego and bond
    with people in a special way is as much an important talent as
    is the ability to speak the language.
        As far as I am concerned, I look for the day when promotion
    to three stars, two and three stars, one of the serious
    considerations is not just how good a corps commander he was,
    but how good an attache was he and how good a FAO was he, and
    how well he ran a military advisory group.
        Senator Warner. I think we may recommend you be recalled.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        This is an important panel. I want to take some time and
    ask questions, so I will ask a question or two. Senator Warner,
    if you would like to join me afterwards that would be helpful.
        But let me go back. Madam Secretary, you talked about the
    Heritage Corps. One issue we have heard was the difficulty
    sometimes in getting security clearances for some of these
    individuals--particularly if they have relatives overseas.
    Second, that if the individual is a second generation American
    they may have to take a lie detector test, whereas if they are
    some 15th generation American from small-town USA they do not
    take the same test.
        Can you comment on this as an impediment?
        Mrs. McGinn. I can. I am not an expert at security issues
    here, but I will tell you my observations, Mr. Chairman. It is
    difficult for them to get security clearances. We have been
    working with the Director of the Office of National
    Intelligence and with our own Under Secretary for Intelligence
    on some initiatives to do some changes to the adjudicators desk
    reference. In some cases, those who adjudicate these clearances
    in my opinion do not understand the cultures that people are
    coming from, and we have approached graduate schools to see if
    they would have people on call to talk to adjudicators so they
    can say: If this individual is from Lebanon, is this what I
    should expect or is this an aberration?
        The lie detector tests are given to the linguists that we
    want to have handling classified information since many of them
    are not citizens and it takes a long time to process a Secret
    clearance. That is our way of getting them limited access
    authorization and getting them to work.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
        Dr. Van Tilborg, let me ask the question and then I will
    also ask the question of the Secretary. If more resources were
    available to you, where would you put these resources with
    respect to the language technology and cultural awareness?
        Dr. Van Tilborg. I think there is quite a bit of work that
    needs to be done in the development of what we call databases
    for both of those areas, the language technologies and the
    cultural awareness technologies, databases on, roughly
    speaking, understanding of those languages and those cultural
    facts and behaviors. I would put substantial resources to
    prototyping and experimentation. I think a lot of this work
    needs to be grounded in actual prototypes and trying things
    out, testing these devices, playing around, retrying them, and
    experimentation. Those would be the main areas, Senator, I
    would invest in.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Madam Secretary, a similar question.
        Mrs. McGinn. I would just like to say first of all that we
    were very successful in getting just about everything we wanted
    in the 2008 budget request. The DOD has been very supportive of
    funding these initiatives. I think the ways, the places that we
    need to go in the future, we need to do more work with the
    cultural and regional aspects of this, understanding who has
    those skills, cataloguing those skills. We need to better equip
    ourselves to be able to respond quickly to areas of the world
    that have languages that we are not ready for right now in
    terms of having curriculums or capability, and we need to
    continue work on our new testing system.
        Senator Reed. General Scales talked in terms of incentive
    structures that were going to produce these leaders at every
    level, senior noncommissioned officers to senior officers who
    are culturally aware, linguistically sophisticated. One basic
    incentive structure is pay. I understand that there is no
    language proficiency pay until you reach category 3-3. Is that
    correct, or can you explain that?
        Mrs. McGinn. No, no, it is at level 2, the foreign language
    proficiency pay. The Special Forces and the United States
    Marine Corps are very interested in starting to do proficiency
    pay at level 1, Special Forces because they put that in as a
    requirement. The Marine Corps is hoping that if they start
    paying people at level 1 they will want to get to level 2. So
    our policies did allow for that, for the Services to do that.
        Senator Reed. Are you considering a broader, much more
    deliberate approach with proficiency pay to induce people not
    only to learn a language, but to progress, and for retention
    purposes, too? Because I suspect one of the problems you face
    is we have some 20-year veterans, majors, great language
    skills, et cetera, but they are going out to do other things.
    Is that being considered?
        Mrs. McGinn. Oh, absolutely. Legislative changes in the
    last couple of years have allowed us to increase our language
    proficiency pay from $300 a month to $1,000 a month. Now, not
    everybody gets $1,000 a month, but as you progress in
    proficiency and as you are learning the more difficult
    languages, yes, you can get that.
        It is very important for the purposes you mentioned, but
    also for people to self-identify, because there is a reward
    there for them if they self-identify and they test at those
    levels.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
        General Scales, you have talked about some of the
    incentives you would like to see, which is recognition in
    evaluations and promotions, et cetera, and I think you have
    also made the point that this technology is very, very
    important, in fact, I would say essential, but it cannot be the
    be-all and end-all. That raises the question--we grew up in an
    age where we see these devices and it is rudimentary, and 2
    years later this is fantastic--can you give me any kind of
    idea, from the scientific standpoint, Dr. Van Tilborg, when
    these laptop computers have been reduced to devices that you
    can wear on your belt? Are we talking about a system that
    within 20 years will get to the point where you can have two-
    way translation constantly in a deployable mode?
        Dr. Van Tilborg. Senator, my personal view is that, 20
    years that is a safe bet that we will be able to do that,
    despite the fact that it has taken more than 50 years to get to
    where we are now. I believe that the rate of acceleration is
    increasing. As you can see, there is really some spectacular
    results that are already being demonstrated.
        I think it is also very important to recognize that
    technology is important because there are lots of languages,
    and if we are going to have our forces be trained with
    language, it is very hard to train a language and one does not
    know whether we are going to be operating in area A, B, C, D,
    or E. Technology can be that multiplier, if you will, that
    allows large numbers of our forces to quickly gain adequate
    ability in a given language without having to go through the 6-
    month long or longer type of training.
        So it is very critical, I believe, to do the technology.
    Thank you.
        Senator Reed. General?
        General Scales. You talked about simulators and training
    devices. It is important to be able, sir, to do that for
    language. But I also believe we need to measure behavior. David
    Petraeus told me a great story when he was in Mosul. He said
    that he had a certain number of his battalion and brigade
    commanders, he said, ``They just would not sit down and drink
    tea with sheiks. There is nothing I could do to make them do
    that.''
        My suggestion to you is we not only improve our proficiency
    with the physical sciences, but with the human sciences. We are
    in a point now where we can predict behavior, we can anticipate
    the human reactions to different sets of external stimuli. I
    would argue that we do not do a good job of that right now.
    Perhaps as part of this simulation experiment there be some
    sort of immersive environment from which we could anticipate,
    from the grade of private through colonel, who has these
    particular skills.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, General, Madam Secretary, and Dr.
    Van Tilborg. It has been a very useful hearing and it has been
    an interesting demonstration. We might have additional
    questions, so we will make them available to you, not just
    myself but my colleagues, and we would ask you to respond
    promptly to the questions. Thank you all, and I think I would
    conclude basically that we all recognize that this technology
    is necessary. We hope it gets better faster. We hope it gets
    more all purpose and robust. It is necessary, but I think, as
    General Scales points out, it is not sufficient to the task.
    There is the human element which I think will always be with
    us. In fact, without that I would be out of a job.
        So thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

                         INTERAGENCY LANGUAGE STRATEGY

        1. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, is this language roadmap tied to an
    interagency strategy for improving language and cultural awareness
    capabilities? If not, why? If so, what is that strategy and who is
    charged with enforcing its implementation?
        Mrs. McGinn. The Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (DLTR) is
    not tied to an interagency strategy, but it establishes a foundation
    that supports interagency collaboration. The purpose of the DLTR was to
    ensure foreign language capability and regional expertise development
    and employment.
        The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
    (USD(P&R)) is the Department of Defense (DOD) lead for language and
    cultural awareness. Examples of interagency initiatives by DOD include:

             In conjunction with the development of the Roadmap in June
            2004, the Department began an interagency dialog by hosting the
            National Language Conference, in partnership with the Center
            for Advanced Study of Language at the University of Maryland.
            Attendees at this conference included representatives from
            other Federal agencies as well as academia, language
            organizations, State and local governments, industry, and
            foreign countries that routinely teach their citizens more than
            one language.
             The USD(P&R) hosts sessions with the Chief Human Capital
            Officers to provide a forum for interagency discussions and
            coordination on language and other issues.
             The DLTR supports the National Security Language Initiative
            (NSLI), announced in January 2006. This initiative is an
            interagency partnership with the Department of State,
            Department of Education, and the Office of the Director of
            National Intelligence to develop a comprehensive national plan
            to expand U.S. foreign language education. As a result, we have
            expanded our Flagship language programs, providing grants to
            universities to graduate students at higher levels of
            proficiency. We also started working on a pilot to establish
            the Language Corps and initiated three K-16 programs in Chinese
            and Arabic.

                              LANGUAGE INCENTIVES

        2. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, are you working with the Services to
    ensure that all Services offer proficiency incentives for personnel
    from the very beginning, when they reach Level 1 proficiency? If not,
    why? If so, when will all Services provide incentives at Level 1?
        Mrs. McGinn. We are working with the Services and have published
    policy that provides the flexibility and option to provide a Foreign
    Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB) at Level 1 to meet mission
    requirements. However, we do not believe that all personnel should be
    provided a bonus at that level, as it represents very limited
    proficiency. Rather, it should be applied in a targeted manner as
    determined by the Service involved, in conjunction with components they
    support.

                DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE AND LANGUAGE TESTING

        3. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, is Defense Language Institute (DLI)
    the only language training institute available to the DOD? If not, what
    other institutions can train DOD personnel in languages?
        Mrs. McGinn. No, the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language
    Center (DLIFLC) is not the only language training institute available
    to the DOD. However, DLIFLC is the primary training source that
    provides standards which meet the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR)
    guidelines. DLIFLC's Washington office provides additional training to
    meet DOD needs.
        Special Operations Command (SOCOM), United States, John F. Kennedy
    Special Warfare Center and School develops Special Operations Language
    Training instructional/training materials for classroom, Web-based, and
    self-paced courseware to proficiency Levels 1 and 2. The Center is
    transforming language training for Special Forces operators by weaving
    language training throughout the Special Forces Qualification Course
    with a graduation requirement of 1/1/1.
        Additionally, the Joint Language Training Center (JLTC), Ogden,
    Utah, serves the language refresher and maintenance training needs of
    primarily Navy Reserve Cryptologic Technicians Interpretive (CTIs),
    with Active Duty CTIs and other Services/agencies on a space available
    basis. The classes are designed to provide a high-quality, intense
    language learning experience in a relatively short period of time. All
    JLTC classes are designed to fit Reserve annual training schedules, and
    the training needs of the current Reserve CTI population.
        DOD can and does contract with other universities and organizations
    which provide ILR standards for language training. Through the National
    Security Education Program, we have partnerships with the University of
    Maryland, Georgetown University, University of Texas, Michigan State
    University, Brigham Young University, Ohio State University, University
    of Oregon, American Councils for International Education, University of
    California at Los Angeles, and the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

        4. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, can DOD contract with universities
    and other organizations for language training?
        Mrs. McGinn. The DOD can and does contract with other universities
    and organizations, which provide ILR standards, for language training.
    Through the National Security Education Program we have partnerships
    with the University of Maryland, Georgetown University, University of
    Texas, Michigan State University, Brigham Young University, Ohio State
    University, University of Oregon, American Councils for International
    Education, University of California at Los Angeles, and the University
    of Hawaii at Manoa.
        Additionally, the DOD contracts with universities, commercial
    language schools, and other organizations to develop course materials,
    teach, develop tests, conduct research, and oversee language immersion
    programs, in support of its language training mission for military and
    civilian personnel. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA)
    contracts with Middlebury College to teach Slavic and Arabic languages,
    Washington State University for Central Asian languages, and Ohio State
    University for Asian languages. NSA also uses Diplomatic Language
    Services to provide training in African, South Asian, and Central Asian
    languages.
        The Department purchases online commercial language training
    products and services for individuals who are deployed, wish to learn a
    language, or would like to maintain their language skills outside the
    traditional classroom setting. Defense organizations frequently look to
    universities for advanced language training in less commonly taught
    languages. Defense contracts with commercial language schools to
    provide tailored language training in specific languages or dialects,
    modalities, and levels for specific defense mission requirements that
    may be difficult to find in a traditional university, semester-bound
    program.

        5. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, before and after language training is
    provided by the DLI to intelligence analysts and others, the trainees
    are tested to check their reading and writing proficiency. These tests,
    I understand, are written and administered by DLI instructors. Is that
    correct, and if so, can one say that DLI has essentially developed the
    test of its own effectiveness? If so, what can be done to have other
    individuals or groups responsible for evaluating DLI students?
        Mrs. McGinn. The DLIFLC tests students for reading, listening, and
    speaking. These tests are developed by a testing staff separate from
    the DLI. Moreover, DLIFLC is sensitive to the issue of independent
    testing and evaluation. This is the reason that proficiency tests at
    DLIFLC are designed, developed, validated, administered, and monitored
    by the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (E&S). In addition
    to the grade point average (GPA) as a graduation criterion, students
    must achieve a specified level of proficiency on a Defense Language
    Proficiency Test (listening and reading) and on an Oral Proficiency
    Interview (OPI) in order to graduate. In essence, DLIFLC has two
    independent testing systems, one conducted by the faculty and one
    conducted by E&S, which is separate from and independent of the
    faculty. At DLIFLC, as in all institutions of higher learning, the
    faculty grades students on the basis of classroom performance, homework
    assignments, and test performance. The student's GPA is derived from
    this assessment. As noted, to graduate, the student must then achieve a
    specified score on the proficiency tests. These proficiency tests serve
    as a check on the performance-based GPA.

        6. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, does the Department currently test
    oral language proficiency? If so, who is responsible for this testing?
    If not, why, and what steps, if any, will you take to test language
    proficiency, and how soon?
        Mrs. McGinn. The Department has an oral proficiency testing program
    conducted by the Evaluations and Standardization Directorate at the
    DLIFLC. Through in-house resources and contractual relationships with
    the American Council of Teachers of Foreign Languages and the State
    Department's Foreign Service Institute, the Directorate offers OPIs in
    a total of 121 languages and dialects. DLIFLC is investigating the
    possibility of conducting such interviews via the internet and
    computer-based testing in order to increase the magnitude of its test
    capacity.

        7. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, what is the role of the DLI?
        Mrs. McGinn. The DLIFLC is the Department's premier language
    training institution. DLIFLC provides foreign language education,
    training, evaluation, and sustainment at ILR standards for DOD
    personnel in order to meet the Department's language needs.
        DLIFLC performs the critical role of providing basic, intermediate,
    and advanced language training to more than 7,600 military students
    (resident and non-resident personnel). Many of the students are crypto-
    linguists, interrogators, and Foreign Area Officers.

        8. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, does DLI support the Services, as
    well as the SOCOM?
        Mrs. McGinn. The DLIFLC supports and responds to all identified and
    emerging needs of SOCOM. Evidence of this support includes the dramatic
    shift in the types of education and training materials provided by
    DLIFLC to deploying members in response to identified needs. Examples
    of these innovations are DLIFLC-provided Mobile Training Teams (MTTs),
    Video Tele-training, Language Survival Kits, and online instructional
    materials. Since 2001, DLIFLC dispatched 300 MTTs to provide targeted
    training to more than 32,000 personnel. Deploying units received over
    200,000 Language Survival Kits (mostly Iraqi, Dari, and Pashto). Field
    support modules outlining the geo-political situation, cultural facts,
    fundamental language skills, key phrases, and commands are available
    for 19 countries in 17 languages on the DLIFLC's Web site. There are
    currently 31 online language survival courses. In addition, computer-
    based sustainment training is available via their Global Language
    Online Support System. All online support is available to all
    servicemembers.
        DLIFLC offers a variety of training programs to support SOCOM basic
    and advanced language training demands. DLI has a permanent liaison in
    the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and
    School at Fort Bragg, NC, to coordinate curriculum and testing
    development, and has established permanent Language Training
    Detachments at Little Creek, VA, and Coronado, CA, supporting the
    Navy's Special Warfare Groups.

        9. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, what are you doing to help meet
    SOCOM's needs?
        Mrs. McGinn. As the DOD Senior Language Authority and Chair of the
    Defense Language Steering Committee (DLSC), I am personally involved in
    providing senior level oversight of language needs throughout the
    Department.
        At our monthly DLSC meetings, which include general/flag officers
    and Senior Executive Service representatives from the Services, Office
    of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff, combatant commands, and
    SOCOM, we discuss DOD language issues and needs.
        One example of a SOCOM requirement addressed was the need for
    increased numbers of OPIs. We are looking at technology as a possible
    solution to respond to SOCOM's need to deliver large numbers of OPIs in
    a short time period. We anticipate that ongoing OPI automation research
    initiatives will offer the ability to provide the tests on demand, as
    well as offer student diagnostics and screening for potential language
    candidates. The systems we are exploring include the Versant computer-
    based testing with either speech recognition software or human scorers
    grading the tests, and OPI computerized tests.
        Additionally, I have ensured that appropriate funding is provided,
    and as a result, the DLIFLC has increased their faculty of certified
    OPI testers from 288 to 398. We will continue to monitor these
    initiatives to ensure SOCOM's and the Services' requirements are met.

                         CRITICAL LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES

        10. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, in your opening statement you noted
    that, at the beginning of fiscal year 2007, DOD had ``141,887 Active
    component; 77,319 Reserve component; and 38,246 civilian members'' who
    reported having foreign language skills. Of those reporting language
    skills, how many have skills in critical languages such as Arabic,
    Chinese, Russian, Hindi, or Farsi?
        Mrs. McGinn. Our current self-reported capability is outlined
    below. Please note that these are self-reports and not tested
    proficiency.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Language                           Capabilities
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Arabic....................................................        8,674
    Chinese...................................................        5,530
    Russian...................................................        8,118
    Farsi.....................................................        1,863
    Hindi.....................................................          933
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        11. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, what percentage of those critical
    language speakers has more than basic language skills--that is, they
    can engage confidently in complex conversations on a broad range of
    topics or conduct translations with a high degree of accuracy?
        Mrs. McGinn. Personnel who tested or professed to have skills at
    ILR skill Level 2 or above possess more than basic language skills.
    Those who tested or professed at ILR skill Level 3 or above are
    considered professionally qualified, i.e., they can engage confidently
    in complex linguistic transactions. Of the total 25,118 people claiming
    a capability in Arabic, Chinese, Russian, Farsi, and Hindi, 13,815 (55
    percent) have tested and/or self-professed at Level 2 or above. Our
    current capability at Level 3 or higher is 4,672 (18.6 percent) of the
    total population that reported a capability in such critical languages.

                            SPENDING ON CONTRACTORS

        12. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, what is the total number of
    linguists that DOD currently has under its various contracts and what
    is the total sum of money spent on these contracts?
        Mrs. McGinn. As Executive Agent, the Army is authorized to contract
    up to 10,000 linguists, and will spend less than $900 million during
    fiscal year 2007.

       LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL SKILL RETENTION--SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        13. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, I understand that when Army
    personnel get assigned to the SOCOM most of them (aside from the
    Rangers) become ``Special Operations Forces (SOF) for life'' and for
    the Army Special Forces, they are focused on one region, so that any
    investment in language or other training by SOCOM is retained with
    these individuals by the command. However, Naval Special Warfare
    Command personnel do not necessarily focus exclusively on one region
    for their careers. The Marine Corps and Air Force do not have permanent
    Special Operations Forces personnel. What is the impact of this
    difference among the Services, and what would be the advantage of
    having Marine Corps and Air Force personnel who are ``SOF for life''
    from the perspective of language and cultural awareness training and
    retention?
        Mrs. McGinn. Language expertise and cultural familiarity are
    enhanced by multiple assignments in units focused on a specific region.
    Although ``SOF for Life'' is not an official program or a term that
    directly applies to regionalization, it is true that Army and Navy
    forces spend a higher percentage of their careers in SOF units. Army
    SOF is particularly well-organized to ensure that its enlisted force
    gains regional expertise through repetitive assignments. The Marine
    Special Operations Advisory Group requires regionalization and is
    maturing on the Army model. Regionalization is less important to Air
    Force units, except for a squadron that specializes in training foreign
    forces. ``SOF for Life,'' as a concept for ensuring repetitive
    assignments in Special Operations units, irrespective of regional
    orientation, is inherently desirable. The advantage is recoupment on
    the investment in SOF training and SOF operational experience.

      HERITAGE RECRUITING--SECURITY CLEARANCE OBSTACLES AND DISCRIMINATION

        14. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, as you mentioned, the DOD is now
    planning to make a concerted effort to recruit the ``heritage'' first-
    and second-generation American citizens with foreign language expertise
    to serve in positions requiring language proficiency. However,
    committee staff are informed that there will be special requirements
    placed on these recruits--specifically, that they will have to take
    polygraph examinations that non-``heritage'' speakers will not have to
    take. Is this true? If so, what is the rationale for this requirement?
        Mrs. McGinn. There are no requirements for United States citizens
    who are recruited as ``heritage'' speakers to take a Counter
    Intelligence (CI) Scope Polygraph, unless they are serving in positions
    requiring special security clearances.
        Non-United States citizens who enlist are usually not placed in
    military occupational specialties requiring security clearances. An
    exception to this policy is for non-United States citizen accessions
    under the 09L Interpreter/Translator program. 09L personnel may be
    granted limited access to classified information in order to bridge the
    gap between restrictive security clearance guidelines for non-United
    States citizens and the necessary utilization of these personnel. To do
    this, they are administered a CI Scope Polygraph as part of satisfying
    the conditions for the exception to policy (DOD 5200.2-R, Personnel
    Security Program), approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence, dated June 5, 2006.

        15. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, if these citizens joined the
    military like any other citizen, and served in positions that do not
    require language expertise, would they be subjected to polygraph
    examinations? If not, why this special treatment for linguists?
        Mrs. McGinn. There are no requirements for United States citizens
    who are recruited as ``heritage'' speakers to take a CI Scope
    Polygraph, unless they are serving in positions requiring special
    security clearances.
        Non-United States citizens who enlist are usually not placed in
    military occupational specialties requiring security clearances. An
    exception to this policy is for non-United States citizen accessions
    under the 09L Interpreter/Translator program. 09L personnel may be
    granted limited access to classified information in order to bridge the
    gap between restrictive security clearance guidelines for non-United
    States citizens and the necessary utilization of these personnel. To do
    this, they are administered a CI Scope Polygraph as part of satisfying
    the conditions for the exception to policy (DOD 5200.2-R, Personnel
    Security Program), approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence, dated June 5, 2006.

        16. Senator Reed. Mrs. McGinn, what is the Department doing to
    address the backlog of applicants with language ability who are
    awaiting security clearances, including--amazingly--individuals for
    whom the intelligence community has provided the funding through the
    National Security Education Program to live in foreign countries and
    study foreign languages?
        Mrs. McGinn. The Department recognizes the compelling need to
    address the obstacles involved in gaining security clearances for
    applicants who have studied extensively overseas. We recognize, working
    in close concert with our colleagues in the Office of the Director of
    National Intelligence (ODNI) that too often the current system screens
    out or delays the successful processing of highly-qualified candidates,
    with considerable backgrounds in regional areas and languages, who have
    studied extensively overseas. This also includes highly qualified
    candidates who represent ``heritage learner'' populations in the United
    States. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness, together with the Office of the Under Secretary for
    Intelligence, has teamed with ODNI to develop and implement a number of
    important initiatives:

             Expand the Adjudicator's Desk Reference (ADR). We are
            providing additions to the ADR guide with explanations about
            NSEP. These changes were reviewed by a working group meeting in
            January 2007 and retraining has started.
             Establish subject matter expertise consultation availability
            to adjudicators for cultural background information during the
            adjudication phase.
             Expand the current DOD Adjudicator Training Course to capture
            changes made to the ADR.
             Issue a memorandum to components and DOD agencies apprising
            them of these initiatives.
             Establish a code to identify NSEP individuals as a priority
            at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). We will be seeking
            to negotiate with Central Adjudication Facilities to adjudicate
            these investigations on a priority basis.
             Propose additional questions for OPM investigators to ask
            NSEP candidates.

        In addition to these specific security-related efforts, we are
    investigating, in close coordination with the Assistant Director, DNI/
    Chief Human Capital Officer, opportunities to begin processing NSEP
    Scholars and Fellows for security clearances earlier in the process so
    that the gap between degree completion and hiring can be substantially
    shortened. Executive Order #12968 (Access to Classified Information,
    Section 1.1e) defines employees eligible for security clearances to
    include ``grantees of an agency.'' We believe that, given the federally
    mandated service requirement associated with NSEP awards, NSEP Scholars
    and Fellows are eligible for security clearances as ``grantees of the
    DOD.'' We are working with our Office of General Counsel to seek ways
    in which this definition can allow us to begin the security clearance
    process immediately after the individual receives an award.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

                    NATIONAL LANGUAGE CONFERENCE WHITE PAPER

        17. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, the White Paper issued by the DOD
    summarized the recommendations of the 2004 National Language
    Conference. According to testimony from DOD Principal Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness Michael Dominguez at a
    hearing before the Senate Oversight of Government Management
    Subcommittee in January, DOD worked with other Federal agencies to
    develop the White Paper to spark public consideration. What Federal
    agencies worked with DOD on the White Paper?
        Mrs. McGinn. The White Paper is a result of the 2004 National
    Language Conference, which brought together over 300 leaders and
    practitioners from Federal, State, and local government agencies,
    academic institutions, business and industry, foreign language interest
    groups, and foreign nations. Among the agencies participating were the
    Departments of Commerce, Labor, Justice, State, Education, Homeland
    Security, and Health and Human Services, as well as the Central
    Intelligence Agency.

        18. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, DOD's White Paper was extremely
    effective in laying out the critical steps needed to address the
    Nation's shortfall in language skills. The first recommendation calls
    for strong and comprehensive leadership, specifically, a national
    language strategy to be developed and implemented by a National
    Language Director and for a Coordination Council to coordinate
    implementation of the strategy. Have the NSLI partners laid out a 5- to
    10-year strategy to address the Nation's foreign language needs? If so,
    please provide.
        Mrs. McGinn. When the NSLI was launched by the President in January
    2006, it was understood that the actions of the four partners were only
    the beginning of a decades-long thrust to build language capacity
    within our Nation. The NSLI is designed to develop foreign language
    capability in critical need languages for the long-term, and
    fundamentally change the way foreign language competence is taught and
    valued in the United States. In some cases, the NSLI specifically
    targeted goals to be achieved by the end of the decade. For example,
    the Department of Education's proposed Language Teacher Corps was
    designed to have 1,000 new foreign language teachers in our schools by
    the end of the decade. Increasing the number of foreign language
    teachers is critical to the success of the NSLI.

        19. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, is there a leadership structure in
    place today that mirrors that recommended by the White Paper? If so,
    what steps are being taken to sustain and institutionalize continued
    leadership in language education in future administrations?
        Mrs. McGinn. At the present time, leadership for NSLI is provided
    by the White House through the Domestic Policy Council (DPC), with
    leaders from the agencies involved. As NSLI becomes fully-funded and
    gains momentum, the programs should become institutionalized to
    continue into the future.

        20. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, I understand that DOD is working
    with the Departments of Labor and Commerce to coordinate regional
    language summits this summer. What Federal agencies have been involved
    in NSLI? Please describe how each of those agencies have participated
    in NSLI.
        Mrs. McGinn. When the NSLI was first launched, the DPC lead invited
    numerous Federal agencies to meetings with the four major partners:
    Department of State, Department of Education, the Office of the
    Director of National Intelligence, and the DOD. Additionally, several
    of those agencies joined the frequent conference calls among the major
    partners.
        The USD(P&R) invited the Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCOs) of 12
    Federal agencies to review the proposed model for the Language Corps
    and to begin the process of identifying their language needs. The
    Language Corps is one element of the NSLI. It was a productive meeting,
    with the CHCOs agreeing to a mutually beneficial way ahead. The
    Language Corps should prove to be a strong contribution of the NSLI,
    and will continue to have interagency involvement as we execute the
    pilot program.

               NATIONAL SECURITY LANGUAGE INITIATIVE STAKEHOLDERS

        21. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, according to testimony received by
    the Senate Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee in January,
    there is a lack of coordination among the NSLI partners and
    stakeholders outside of the government. One witness said that if there
    is a Federal Government strategy for addressing the shortfall in
    foreign language skills, it isn't very well known. How are DOD and the
    NSLI partners working with language associations and other stakeholders
    to develop a strategy and coordinate activities?
        Mrs. McGinn. The DOD is delighted that the Departments of Commerce
    and Labor have joined us in sponsoring the Language Summits this
    summer. The Flagship Universities in Oregon, Ohio, and Texas are
    hosting the State-level summits with multiple stakeholders, including
    the local business and corporate sectors. The end result should be an
    action plan to address the demand for language skills in each State's
    future workforce. We hope to promulgate these action plans as best
    practices for other States.

        22. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, how often have the NSLI partners
    meet with each other since the beginning of the year?
        Mrs. McGinn. The DPC lead and the previous Department of Education
    coordinator conducted frequent telephone conferences this year, to keep
    the partners updated on status of the NSLI and to develop outreach
    strategies.

        23. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, how often have the NSLI partners
    met with stakeholder groups this year?
        Mrs. McGinn. While I can only speak for the DOD, I'm sure you will
    find a similar level of activity at Departments of State and Education,
    and at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
        The complex efforts behind the Defense Language Transformation, the
    conduct of the National Security Education Program, and launchings of
    the three language pipelines and Language Corps keeps DOD in regular
    dialogue with university and college presidents; Oregon, Michigan, and
    Ohio K-12 school systems; language associations; heritage communities;
    and other Federal agencies.
        An obvious gap is outreach to the business community. We will begin
    to rectify this gap this summer. With our Department of Labor and
    Commerce partners, we will sponsor three State-level language summits
    in Oregon, Ohio, and Texas. Invited stakeholders include local business
    and State corporate employers. The outcome of the summits should be an
    action plan that the States can implement to build the language
    capacity they need in their future workforce.

        24. Senator Akaka. Mrs. McGinn, who is the NSLI point of contact
    for foreign language stakeholder groups?
        Mrs. McGinn. The DPC took the lead for the NSLI in 2006. The
    current DPC point of contact is Ms. Kelly Scott.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Mel Martinez

            DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

        25. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, the DOD is taking several steps
    to expand language training, including initiatives at the Service
    Academies and within ROTC programs. The DLI is still the DOD's premier
    for teaching foreign languages to U.S. service men and women. The DLI
    mission is more critical now than ever. While I note the increase in
    funding for DLI from $77 million in fiscal year 2001 to $203 million in
    fiscal year 2007, its capabilities remain limited. In light of the
    current demand placed on language qualified personnel, is DLI the right
    size?
        Mrs. McGinn. The DLIFLC currently trains all student load
    requirements at the capacity required by the DOD. DLIFLC has proven its
    capability to surge and increase student throughput since 2001. As the
    DOD Senior Language Authority, I recognize that DLIFLC is a critical
    training source, and as the Chair of the DLSC, we conduct an Annual
    Program Review to provide oversight and ensure capacity and capability
    to respond to DOD requirements.

        26. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, what changes are being
    contemplated (if any) to expand the size and capacity of DLI?
        Mrs. McGinn. As the Chair of the DLSC and the DOD Senior Language
    Authority, I provide oversight of the DLIFLC to ensure that it has the
    resources, capability, and capacity to respond to current and emerging
    needs.
        DLIFLC currently trains all student load requirements at the
    capacity required. The DLSC contemplates DLIFLC size and capacity
    issues through a comprehensive annual performance review meeting.
        DLIFLC military construction is currently programmed to add three
    general instruction buildings and renovate two existing structures
    beginning in fiscal year 2008 (available for occupancy beginning in
    fiscal year 2011). These new facilities, along with several ongoing
    renovation projects and leasing actions, will add 202 classrooms (with
    accompanying faculty offices and other administrative spaces).

        27. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, is the current enrollment
    (approximately 4,400) at its peak?
        Mrs. McGinn. Due to the increased need for language, we expect to
    see continued expansion of the DLIFLC's mission in the area of language
    familiarization, post-basic enhancement, and basic acquisition. The
    DLIFLC student population for fiscal year 2007 is approximately 4,100,
    which represents a 65 percent increase over fiscal year 2001,
    approximately 3,700 of whom are resident at the Presidio of Monterey.
    The other 400 represent an average daily attendance in a nonresident
    program. Over the next 4 years, increased projections will bring the
    student population to approximately 4,800 per year.

        28. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, should we look more to the other
    sources of language training you outlined to meet language training
    requirements?
        Mrs. McGinn. As part of my oversight role for the Defense Language
    Program, we are constantly evaluating whether we are meeting Service
    language training requirements. The Services have included other
    sources of training to meet their needs, such as online learning and
    other ``just-in-time'' training sources.
        Language training requirements are complex. For basic language
    instruction designed to achieve mission capable levels of proficiency,
    the programs through the DLIFLC and the language programs of SOCOM are
    the best sources, and both meet basic training load requirements. Other
    language training, such as pre-deployment training, is conducted by the
    military departments.
        In addition, we continue to seek and build basic language
    competence in our Officer Corps. The Services stress the importance of
    foreign language skill acquisition in Service Academies and in their
    Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs. The military
    departments built recruiting plans that include recruiting students
    with foreign language skills and heritage backgrounds into their ROTC
    programs. They implemented various incentive programs to encourage ROTC
    cadets and midshipmen to study foreign languages in order to increase
    the number of ROTC cadets and midshipmen graduating with at least two
    semesters of foreign language studies prior to commissioning.
        The three Service academies have enhanced their foreign language
    study programs to develop pre-accession language and cultural
    knowledge. They have expanded study abroad, summer immersion, and
    foreign academy exchange opportunities, and added instructor staff for
    strategic languages. The United States Military Academy and the United
    States Air Force Academy now require all cadets to complete two
    semesters of language study. The United States Naval Academy requires
    its nontechnical degree-seeking midshipmen to take four semesters of
    language study.

        29. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, in your testimony you outline
    several courses of action/options available to react to an unexpected
    surge in the requirement for a set of languages (based on an emerging
    contingency), including calling on personnel within the ranks and
    accessing contract linguists. Does DLI also have the capacity to shift
    gears and place emphasis on new language capability requirements?
        Mrs. McGinn. The DLIFLC has the capacity to respond to unexpected
    surge requirements and shift gears to meet new language requirements.
    DLIFLC is establishing an emerging language plan to meet unexpected
    surge requirements. This plan includes four phases:

             (1) Developing tests to measure current capabilities;
             (2) Providing distance learning through web-delivered
            materials for maintaining and enhancing skills;
             (3) Offering resident short courses for sustaining and
            increasing the existing proficiency of members; and
             (4) Creating on-the-shelf, initial skills, resident training
            programs for students with no previous exposure to the needed
            language.

        These four phases will be used in combination or individually to
    meet rising and emerging low density language requirements.

        30. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, you also note that prioritizing
    specific language/regional skills carry some risk that we will not
    project the right area for where the next contingency develops. Is
    there a linkage between our Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) assessment
    of threats and risk and the priorities we place on selected regions and
    languages?
        Mrs. McGinn. There is a strong link between the QDR assessment of
    threats and risks and the language capabilities the Defense Language
    Program develops. One of the principal tools for this is the Strategic
    Language List (SLL). The SLL identifies the languages for which the DOD
    requires substantial in-house capability to support current and future
    plans, programs, and operations, as well as those languages for which
    the Department requires on-call capability in-house for crisis and
    emergency response. The SLL assists the Department in its assessment of
    the threats and determination of the risks we are willing to accept.

        31. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, how do we integrate the
    potential regional/language requirements of emerging threats into our
    language training plans?
        Mrs. McGinn. The Department is approaching this challenge with a
    four-phased plan:

             (1) Developing tests to measure our capabilities;
             (2) Providing distance learning through web-delivered
            materials for maintaining and enhancing these skills;
             (3) Offering resident short courses for sustaining and
            increasing the existing proficiency of members; and
             (4) Creating on-the-shelf initial skills resident training
            programs for students with no previous exposure to the needed
            language.

        These four phases will be used in combination or individually to
    meet rising and emerging low density language requirements at the
    DLIFLC.
        The Department relies on policy guidance and threat assessments to
    determine which languages become part of the four-phased plan. These
    inputs help generate the Department's SLL, which identifies the
    languages for which the DOD requires substantial in-house capability to
    support current and future plans, programs, and operations, as well as
    those languages for which the DOD requires on-call capability in-house
    for crisis and emergency response.

           REWARDING OFFICERS FOR LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL CAPABILITIES

        32. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, in your testimony, you and
    retired Major General Scales both make the point that today's
    operations require new skills, and our military leaders must be
    comfortable working with coalition partners in foreign environments.
    General Scales recommended that military departments find ways to
    reward mid- to senior-grade officers for excellent performance in
    advisory, intelligence, and attache-type duties. In your testimony, you
    outline efforts to strengthen military department foreign area office
    (FAO) programs. Without de-emphasizing vital combat skills, it seems
    like there is still more room to provide incentives to encourage
    officers to seek out and excel in those positions. Besides the increase
    on foreign language proficiency pay, what else does the DOD do to
    encourage excellent performance as a foreign advisor or an attache?
        Mrs. McGinn. DOD members are driven to provide excellent
    performance in all jobs, whether serving as a foreign advisor or
    attache. Additionally, since attaches and advisors are specially
    selected for these positions, they are provided targeted training
    before assuming these duties. For example before becoming an attache,
    the selectee must attend specialized and focused training specific to
    the attache, at the Joint Military Attache School, as well as
    additional language training as necessary.
        There are many incentives available to FAOs, which make the program
    desirable initially, and assists in retaining FAOs once in the program.
    The initial training provided to all FAOs is cited as a major incentive
    to attract the highest quality candidates. A fully-funded Graduate
    degree, learning a language at the DLIFLC, and in-country immersion
    training are the premier incentives for FAOs to join the program. The
    recent improvements in career and promotion opportunities also
    encourage potential FAOs to select this career field.
        Additionally, FAOs are entitled to receive a FLPB and can qualify
    for up to $1,000 per month based on the number of languages spoken and
    proficiency levels.
        The Office of the Secretary of Defense will continue to review the
    Service FAO programs, and related efforts, to ensure we are providing
    the right incentives.

        33. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, has the Department considered
    incentives, like adding general/flag officer FAO positions in selected
    foreign service functions to provide room to advance beyond the rank of
    colonel (e.g., defense attaches, military advisors or selected senior
    staff positions within Pentagon and regional combatant commanders'
    staffs)?
        Mrs. McGinn. DOD Directive 1315.17 directs the Secretaries of the
    Military Departments to design ``FAO programs to provide opportunity
    for promotion into the general/flag officer ranks.'' To that end, the
    Department is in the process of identifying specific Service and Joint
    General and Flag Officer billets that would be logical career
    progressions for FAOs. The candidate positions include those Defense
    Attache and Office of Defense Cooperation positions coded for a
    general/flag officer (e.g., Russia, China, and the United Kingdom), as
    well as positions in the Services, combatant commands, and the Joint
    Staff that require considerable political-military acumen (e.g., in the
    intelligence and strategic plans and policy areas). The goal is to
    identify billets that would benefit from a general officer FAO serving
    in that position and have the assignments rotate among the Services to
    allow equal opportunity and the time needed to identify, train, and
    promote an FAO to the rank of general/flag officer.

        34. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, how do we approach the
    requirement to develop language and cultural awareness training within
    the Reserve components?
        Mrs. McGinn. Members of the Reserve components have language and
    cultural training programs available that include, but are not limited
    to, classroom instruction, individual and group tutoring, online
    language courses, and immersion programs--both continental United
    States and outside the continental United States. Additionally, Reserve
    component members can enroll in the DLIFLC resident intermediate and
    advanced language courses, continuing education courses, and DLIFLC
    online services. The Reserve components continue to research new means
    for administering language and culture training that is conducive to
    their unique situation. Language and cultural awareness training within
    the Reserve components mirrors the training that is accomplished in the
    Active components vis-a-vis pre-deployment training.
        In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2006 allowed the Department to align foreign language proficiency
    payment for Reserve and Active components by increasing the Reserve
    proficiency pay ceiling up to $12,000 per year. By providing members a
    foreign language proficiency incentive, we expect an increase in
    Reserve component members acquiring and/or improving their foreign
    language proficiency.

        35. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, their unique training conditions
    make finding time more difficult. Do members of the National Guard and
    Reserves also have access to language and cultural training and are
    they also rewarded/compensated like the Active component?
        Mrs. McGinn. Yes, the Reserve components have access to the DLIFLC
    resident intermediate, advanced, continuing education courses, and
    online services. In regard to Reserve compensation for language, we are
    currently finalizing the DOD FLPB policy. This policy will align FLPB
    payments for Reserve and Active components. As a result, Reserve pay
    will increase from $6,000 annually to a possible $12,000 annually,
    consistent with Section 639 of Public Law 108-163, the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.

            DEFENSE LANGUAGE STEERING COMMITTEE AND THE WAY FORWARD

        36. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, the President's NSLI launched
    this year is designed to dramatically increase the number of Americans
    learning critical foreign languages. I also note the DOD's effort to
    take a comprehensive, deliberate look at what we need in this
    increasingly important area, with the naming of the DLSC. It is
    important that this effort to raise the priority of language and
    regional expertise within our Nation and the DOD be sustained. While I
    understand that that DLSC's assessment is not yet complete, what are
    the preliminary findings?
        Mrs. McGinn. The DLSC advises on DOD language issues. In this
    regard, preliminary results of the self-assessment of foreign languages
    within the Department indicate that there may be significant capability
    not apparent in DOD management systems. The findings revealed that, as
    of the current fiscal year, the Department had 141,887 Active
    component; 77,319 Reserve component; and 38,246 civilian members of the
    Total Force who reported having foreign language skills. We are
    committed to ensure that policies mandate the screening of individuals
    as part of the military accession and civilian hiring process. It must
    be underscored that these are reported, not tested proficiencies at
    this time.
        While conducting this self assessment, we have initiated a broad
    look at language requirements across the Department. Going forward,
    these two initiatives should provide a basis for understanding the
    Department's needs.

        37. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, when will the results of their
    work be released?
        Mrs. McGinn. The DOD's comprehensive and deliberate approach to
    increase language expertise is outlined in the DLTR, which is slated to
    run through fiscal year 2008. The role of the DLSC is as an advisory
    body that oversees progress on the DLTR and the Defense Language
    Program. In this regard, the work of the committee is ongoing. The DLSC
    will not assess NSLI progress, but will be kept informed of DOD's role
    in support of NSLI.

        38. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, what are the expectations of the
    initiative to develop a Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps (``Language
    Corps'')?
        Mrs. McGinn. The effort to establish a Language Corps responds to
    the reality that the Federal Government can never possess the organic
    capability to address immediate and emergency surge requirements across
    all possible languages. The Corps is a highly innovative concept that
    is designed to take advantage of the extensive and diverse array of
    languages available in the American population. The organization will
    identify, warehouse, and make these skills available when needed.
        The 3-year pilot effort will enable the Department to build and
    test prototype models to determine how a permanent Language Corps
    should be established and function. The goal of the pilot is to recruit
    a minimum of 1,000 members across a number of languages and
    professions. As part of the pilot effort, we will conduct three
    activation exercises in coordination with Federal partners, not only
    from within the DOD, but the Office of the Director of National
    Intelligence, and a domestic partner such as Federal Emergency
    Management Agency or the Centers for Disease Control.
        We are confident that, if successful, the Language Corps can emerge
    as a major component of a long-term solution to national needs for
    language competent professionals.

        39. Senator Martinez. Mrs. McGinn, do you envision eventually
    having the capability to ``call up'' these linguists from across the
    Nation as we might do with a reservist?
        Mrs. McGinn. The Language Corps will be composed of two pools of
    members somewhat akin to the military model of Standby and Ready
    Reserves. There will be a ``National Pool'' of members who volunteer to
    serve and may be available during times of need. There will also be a
    ``Dedicated Sponsor Pool'' composed of individuals who agree to perform
    duties in a defined position with a sponsoring Federal organization/
    agency. This Dedicated Pool will be smaller in size than the National
    Pool. The members of the Dedicated Pool will be committed to serve if
    called upon, while members of the National Pool will be identified on
    an ``as available'' basis. We are in the process of developing the
    pilot, so exact procedures are not known at this time.

        [Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]