[Senate Hearing 110-201]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-201, Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1547
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 2
SEAPOWER
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MAY 3, 2007
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008--Part 2 SEAPOWER
S. Hrg. 110-201 Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1547
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 2
SEAPOWER
__________
MAY 3, 2007
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN CORNYN, Texas
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Replublican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Seapower
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JACK REED, Rhode Island JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Navy Force Structure Requirements and Programs
may 3, 2007
Page
Winter, Hon. Donald C., Secretary of the Navy.................... 5
Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chief of Naval Operations........... 7
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
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THURSDAY, MAY 3, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NAVY FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:35 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman (acting chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, Reed, Webb,
Collins, and Thune.
Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk; and John H. Quirk V, security
clerk.
Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; and Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork and Micah H.
Harris.
Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey
and Colleen J. Shogan, assistants to Senator Lieberman;
Jonathan Cooper, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Gordon I.
Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to
Senator Warner; Jeremy Shull, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Jane
Alonso, Patrick M. Hughes, and Mark J. Winter, assistants to
Senator Collins; and Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator
Thune.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN
Senator Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. I thank
everybody for coming in. I thank our friends from the public
and the media for their patience. We had reason to go into
closed session for the first part. Of course, I thank Secretary
Winter and Admiral Mullen for being here. We are grateful to
you for your service to our country and to the extraordinarily
skillful, professional, and courageous men and women under your
command. I hope whenever you have the opportunity you will
convey our gratitude and our pride to them.
I should announce in public session what I did in closed
session. Apparently nobody was confused, but I am not Senator
Kennedy, who usually chairs this subcommittee. Senator Kennedy
is on the floor managing the legislation there and could not
break for the hearing. He asked me, since I am next in
seniority, to chair, and I am honored to do that.
Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, you are faced with a
number of critical issues that confront the Department of the
Navy as you attempt to balance modernization needs, based on
threat assessments for the future, against the costs of
supporting ongoing operations, particularly in Iraq and
Afghanistan. There are several areas of concern for the
subcommittee today and for me personally that I would like to
mention. I know Senator Kennedy shares these concerns.
One is the prospects for meeting future force structure
requirements. We are facing the prospect that the current
Department of Navy program will lead to potentially large gaps
between the forces that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has
said he needs and the forces that will be available to him and
his successors. This is a matter of budget restraints and it is
important for the public to understand that, though the
absolute dollar number we are spending on defense now and will
next year is large by any estimate, it still remains lower as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product than we have ever to my
knowledge spent during wartime, which is what we are in.
It is forcing the various Services, in this case the Navy,
to make decisions that I am concerned about. I mention first
one case. The Navy now predicts that Navy and Marine Corps
tactical aircraft forces are facing a shortfall of as many as
150 tactical fighters needed to outfit our 10 aircraft carrier
air wings. With shortfalls that large, I worry, and I am sure
you do, that we could be faced with reducing the number of
aircraft available on short notice to the combatant commanders,
either because we have deployed under-strength air wings or
because we did not deploy the carrier at all because of the
aircraft shortages. That is something none of us want.
In another case, the CNO has said that the Navy needs to
have 48 attack submarines to meet the requirements of the
combatant commanders. But we are faced with the risk now of
falling well short of that goal, down to 40, for more than 10
years, starting some time during the next decade, that as other
potential peer competitors continue to build submarines at a
rapid rate.
Other challenges facing the Navy center on acquisition
programs. I know that the members of this subcommittee have
special concerns about the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.
This was intended to be a ship that the Navy could acquire
relatively inexpensively and relatively quickly. As it turns
out, unfortunately, it looks like the LCS program may in fact
be neither. Once again we are presented with a program with
significant cost growth, which at least in part is driven by
the service changing requirements after the design and
construction contract was signed.
The LCS situation raises significant questions about
acquisition management within the Navy. This is not dissimilar
from exactly the same questions raised about the other
Services. So we want to ask today in regard to the LCS program,
why were not the Navy and contractor teams better able to see
the problem sooner? How could we have gotten to the point that
the program was just months away from running out of money,
with no alarms being sounded up the acquisition chain of
command?
I want to ask Secretary Winter about what actions he
believes the Department of the Navy should take to strengthen
acquisition oversight and restore confidence in the Navy's
ability to manage these major acquisition programs.
The subject of Navy force structure and acquisition,
therefore, is of concern to us, but not a new one for the
subcommittee. Over many years and with several different
individuals holding the chairmanship of this subcommittee, we
have devoted significant attention and concern to these
subjects, as we do today. Today's hearing, I think, continues
the strong bipartisan interest in the broader naval force
structure issues facing the Nation today. It is in that
bipartisan spirit of shared interest and respect that I am glad
to call on the ranking member of the Seapower Subcommittee,
Senator Thune, new to this lofty position, I might say, and on
Senator Kennedy's behalf to welcome him as ranking member and
ask him if he would like to make an opening statement now.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN THUNE
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
be joining the Seapower Subcommittee. I look forward to working
closely with you and our other colleagues on the committee on
naval and other matters that come before us and to improving
and building upon the naval assets that we have in the State of
South Dakota.
I am also pleased to welcome Secretary Winter for our
second panel. Admiral Mullen, I appreciate very much your
testimony from earlier this afternoon. You have done an
excellent job of articulating some of your challenges and of
providing critical insights for this next discussion.
The committee, of course, has placed priority on meeting
the demands of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
the Navy has contributed in important ways to those operations.
However, we must also maintain sight of the broader role of the
fleet, half of which may be underway on any given day to
perform vigilance, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief around
the world, and to provide a level of security made possible
only through global presence and naval superiority.
This is an important backdrop for today's hearing, which is
truly focused on the Navy's readiness, and by that, in many
respects, I mean the Nation's readiness for future major
conflict. A previous CNO, Admiral King, summed up the
challenges of maintaining readiness in a memo to President
Roosevelt, in which he stated: ``The fundamental United States
policy is to maintain the Navy in strength and readiness to
uphold national policies and interests and to guard the United
States and its overseas possessions.''
In time of peace, when the threats to our national security
change with the strength and attitude of other nations in the
world, it is frequently difficult to translate our requirements
into terms of ships and planes and trained men. It is one thing
to say that we must have and maintain a Navy adequate to uphold
national policies and interests and to protect us against
potential enemies, but it is another thing to decide what is
and what is not the naval strength adequate for that purpose.''
Clearly, much has changed in the world since Admiral King
made these remarks some 60 years ago, but I think his insights
capture the challenges that confront us today. While it is
appropriate that we spend great efforts focusing on the details
of how we buy the ships and aircraft for our fleet--and, Mr.
Secretary, we look forward to your testimony in that area--I
believe we all would agree that perhaps the greatest challenge
before us, as Admiral King suggested, is to decide what is and
what is not the naval strength in terms of ships and planes
adequate to uphold our national policies and interests and to
protect us against potential enemies.
While we enjoy the superiority of today's fleet, I share
the strong concerns raised by this committee these past several
years regarding the steady decline in the size of our fleet.
Admiral Mullen, you deserve great credit for committing to a
plan to reverse that trend. Your shipbuilding program appears
to balance the competing elements of capability and
affordability.
However, even this ambitious plan to build our Navy back to
313 ships has to cope with shortfalls in key warfighting areas
while also confronting significant cost risk. It would be
extremely valuable today to gain your assessment of these
challenges and to approach a common understanding of the
prudent actions that would help mitigate the risks.
It is also important to gain your assessment of progress on
new ship programs. Clearly, Mr. Secretary, we look to learn
from your recent experience with the Littoral Combat Ship and
are interested in hearing of changes that you would propose to
ensure other programs benefit by this experience. We need
greater clarity on your plans to employ competition and balance
industrial base factors for the Littoral Combat Ship and other
major shipbuilding programs, including the guided missile
(DDG)-1000 Destroyer.
As well, we need to explore important opportunities to
close capability gaps as we approach the next Virginia
submarine multi-year procurement and as we consider
alternatives for supporting Marine Corps amphibious lift
requirements.
Finally, the Navy's estimate for this shipbuilding program
represents a 50-percent increase above investments of the past
decade. I appreciate that you have met your commitment for 2008
and would be interested in hearing your practical assessment of
the Navy's ability to continue to finance the plan in the face
of ever-increasing budget pressures.
Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us. So, Mr. Chairman,
again thank you for holding the hearing today. I look forward
to the testimony from Mr. Secretary.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Thune.
Secretary Winter, thank you for being here. We welcome your
testimony now.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Secretary Winter. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman,
Senator Thune, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to appear here this afternoon. I
respectfully submit my statement for the record and I applaud
Congress and this committee in particular for its increasing
interest in shipbuilding. This is an area that needs attention
from all sides and it is an area in which I have focused most
of my time in working to improve our efforts. I have taken
action to hold both contractors and the Navy responsible and
accountable for our shipbuilding program.
At the same time, I am working hard to establish an
attractive business environment for building naval ships. The
Department of the Navy recognizes that we will fail to achieve
our shipbuilding and thus force structure goals if we do not
correct the number of serious deficiencies in our acquisition
programs and processes. I am reviewing the Department's major
shipbuilding programs and I am working to improve our overall
processes.
I can assure you that I share your frustration and disquiet
over the problems that we have encountered in many of our
programs. I can also assure you that your Navy is leaning
forward and beginning to build the ships and submarines that
our country needs for the future.
Over the past years, we have executed a major shipbuilding
research and development program that has set the stage for a
major force transformation in the Navy's structure. We are in
the early stages of development and production of more classes
of new ships than we have produced in recent times. This will
result in the transformation of the fleet and will position it
to deal with a very uncertain future.
But, as you have seen, such a grand transformation will not
be without problems. You have my promise and commitment to
oversee the management of these programs and I request your
continued support in helping me to get our Navy shipbuilding
program in position to deliver on our requirements. Putting our
shipbuilding programs on a more solid footing is an urgent
priority. With your help, we can succeed in building the fleet
we need in our Nation's defense.
Thank you very much and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Winter follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald C. Winter
Thank you for inviting me to appear before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower. The support that this
committee provides to the Navy and Marine Corps is greatly appreciated.
A strong Navy is key to maritime dominance and is a critical aspect
of our National Defense Strategy. We need a force structure of 313
ships. The process of acquiring new ships is challenging and the budget
is tightly wound. Many of our past problems have resulted from
constantly changing requirements and shipbuilding plans. If the
Department of the Navy is to succeed in acquiring and maintaining the
required numbers of ships, we need a plan, we need to stick to it, and
we need to closely manage the execution of the plan. The 313-ship plan
that was promulgated over the past 2 years is our goal. The force
produced by this plan will satisfy our requirements for blue, green,
and brown water capabilities.
The biggest challenge we face is acquisition of new ships. We
cannot build the quantities or qualities of ships that are required
unless we correct several shortfalls.
I have initiated a review of our major shipbuilding programs while
simultaneously working to institutionalize key acquisition reform
initiatives. The recent challenges associated with the Littoral Combat
Ship (LCS) and other shipbuilding programs point to a number of issues
that we are addressing. In the long-term, I am initiating the following
actions:
Re-assert Navy control over the entire shipbuilding
acquisition process. Control over acquisitions also means
decoupling decision points.
Establish the Navy as the lead systems integrator to
optimize the overall capability of the fleet.
Use the shipbuilding contract process to incentivize
contractors to design for production and sustainment.
Use independent cost estimates for the trade-offs and
decisions thus increasing reliability of the cost estimation
process.
Assure that detail design and construction contracts
are supported by mature specifications.
Develop an acquisition workforce capable of providing
knowledgeable program oversight.
I am working to develop solutions that are in the best overall
interest of the taxpayer, the Navy, and the industry that supports
shipbuilding.
In reviewing specific programs, my focus thus far has been on LCS,
LPD-17, T-AKE, and Virginia class submarines. In past discussions, I
have noted our efforts to bring the production cost of Virginia class
submarines down to $2 billion in fiscal year 2005 dollars. We are
making considerable progress in this area and must achieve that goal by
2012, when we shift to two units per year.
The early experience with the LCS has been disappointing and must
be corrected to assure that we construct these vitally needed ships in
a timely and cost effective manner. I am restructuring the program to
address cost and programmatic issues. This restructuring will result in
the cancellation of one of the fiscal year 2006 ships and will require
the funding allocated for the fiscal year 2007 ships to be used to
offset cost and schedule issues associated with the fiscal year 2005
and other two fiscal year 2006 ships. I am redoubling efforts to manage
for the success of the lead ship efforts. My proposal is to reduce buys
for fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 from what was previously
planned and position the program to down-select to a single design in
fiscal year 2010. It is critical that the Department of the Navy take
this action early to assure this vital program is technically sound and
affordable.
With respect to DDG-1000, CVN-78, MPF(F), and LHA(R), I plan to
conduct detailed reviews of each of these programs to address potential
issues early in these programs. Each of these programs must be properly
initiated and closely monitored to assure success.
To make our shipbuilding plan work, there are several areas where I
need your help. I will need your support for the LCS restructuring plan
I have noted previously. I will need your patience as we transform mine
warfare shipboard capabilities to a LCS-centric structure. It is
imperative that we move to this more capable force and retire less
capable assets. A second area where we require your support is in
modifying language regarding the number of aircraft carriers required.
As we have noted, there will be a short period of time between the
period when U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN-65) is retired and the Gerald Ford
enters service when it will be necessary to reduce our carrier force
from eleven to ten units. We will be able to meet operational
requirements during this period with limited risk by carefully
scheduling maintenance activities. A third challenge we are working
through is getting amphibious lift right.
I applaud Congress and this committee in particular for its
increasing interest in shipbuilding. I acknowledge the desire of many
Members to increase force structure at a faster rate than the
Department of the Navy can afford to execute. My biggest concerns
regarding changes to our annual shipbuilding plan relate to the budget
and to the shipbuilding industrial base. Any additions to the
shipbuilding budget that have unfunded out year liabilities will
disrupt our delicate plan to achieve the desired long-term force
structure. With respect to the shipbuilding industrial base, Hurricane
Katrina has complicated the ability of the industrial base to surge,
thus reducing flexibility to execute increased procurement rates. I am
exploring opportunities to work with our industrial partners to restore
our shipbuilding industrial base flexibility.
In summary, your Navy is leaning forward and building the ships and
submarines our country needs for the future. Over the past years we
have executed a major shipbuilding research and development program
that has set the stage for a major transformation in the Navy's force
structure. We are in the early stages of development and production of
more classes of new ships than we have produced in recent times. This
will result in a transformation of the fleet and position it to deal
with a very uncertain future. But, as you have seen, such a grand
transformation will not be without problems. You have my promise to
actively manage these programs and I request your support in helping me
to get our Navy's shipbuilding program in position to deliver the fleet
it needs.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Secretary Winter.
Admiral Mullen, do you have an opening statement for this
open session?
STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Mullen. No, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN
Chairman Kennedy, Senator Thune, and distinguished members of the
Seapower Subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you
representing the brave men and women, sailors and civilians of the
United States Navy. We appreciate the long standing support we have
received from your subcommittee.
INTRODUCTION
We are a maritime nation involved in a long, irregular and global
war that extends far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. The threat we face
breeds within failing states and the undergoverned spaces of the world
and preys upon those weakened by poverty, disease, and hatred. It
thrives where there is no rule of law and spreads through cyberspace
and the vast maritime commons in this age of globalization.
We are also confronted by nation-states determined to develop
sophisticated weapons systems, including nuclear arms. We cannot allow
ourselves to be fixated on one threat alone. Our national security is
dependent upon a strong Navy that can keep the sea lanes free, deter
aggression, safeguard our sources of energy, protect the interests of
our citizens at home and reassure our friends abroad. We must never
relinquish overmatching capability and capacity.
While our ground forces are engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, Navy's
ability to deliver two unique attributes--global reach and persistent
presence--continues to support our worldwide responsibilities and
provide a powerful deterrent force in day-to-day operations and as our
Nation's ``Strategic Reserve.'' As we face the rapidly changing
security environment, there is no alternative to a well-balanced fleet.
As I testified before Congress last year and earlier this year, I
identified three priorities addressed by our fiscal year 2007 budget:
Sustain Combat Readiness, Build a Fleet for the Future, and Develop
21st Century Leaders. We have made progress in all three and our fiscal
year 2008 budget reaffirms our commitment to these priorities. In
today's testimony, I will focus on building a fleet for the future,
placing particular emphasis on strengthening our core warfighting
capabilities and increasing our military capacity.
FORCE STRUCTURE
In 2005, the Navy conducted extensive analysis to determine the
minimum required force structure needed to meet the security demands of
the 21st century with an acceptable level of risk. In February 2006,
Navy submitted a 30-year shipbuilding plan that would provide
approximately 313 ships by 2020 with warfighting capacity and
capability to meet the expected threat and security demands. Our
recently submitted fiscal year 2008 Annual Long Range Plan for
Construction of Naval Vessels (30-year shipbuilding plan), essentially
unchanged from our 2007 submission, is intended to provide the
shipbuilding industry with sufficient predictability to maintain
critical skills and to make business decisions that increase efficiency
and productivity in order to meet the Navy's projected shipbuilding
requirements.
Navy's force structure requirement was developed and validated
through detailed joint campaign and mission level analysis, optimized
through innovative sourcing initiatives (e.g. Fleet Response Plan
(FRP)), adaptive force packaging) that increase platform operational
availability. Importantly, the future battle force was measured against
the anticipated threats for the 2020 timeframe.
The future Navy will remain sea based, with global speed and
persistent presence provided by forward deployed and surge-ready forces
through the FRP. To maximize return on investment, the Navy must be
balanced to fight an asymmetric war against the evil of terrorism, to
help secure the maritime commons through strong partnerships and
Maritime Security Operations, to deter would-be aggressors and, when
necessary, to fight and win Major Combat Operations (MCO). This
capabilities-based battle force can be disaggregated and distributed
worldwide to support the operational demands of our combatant
commanders.
Our force structure strategy is balanced between new construction
and modernization for ships, and recapitalization and sustainment for
aircraft. It is critical to our strategy for us to have vigorous
modernization and sustainment programs to achieve the expected service
life of our ships and aircraft in the face of rapidly escalating global
threats using advanced technologies. Modernization and sustainment
optimizes our capital investments.
With 38 ships currently under contract for construction, we can see
the future fleet taking shape. In 2006, we christened the first Freedom
Class littoral combat ship, amphibious assault ship Makin Island,
amphibious transport dock ship Green Bay, guided-missile destroyers
Gridley and Sampson, nuclear attack submarine (SSN) Hawaii, auxiliary
dry cargo ships Alan Shepard and Sacagawea, and the aircraft carrier
George H.W. Bush. We commissioned the SSN Texas and the guided-missile
destroyer Farragut. We also rolled out the first EA-18G Growler. By the
end of fiscal year 2007, our fleet's net size will have grown from a
low of 274 ships in March 2007 to 279, including 5 newly commissioned
ships.
Navy is in the process of evaluating the impact global developments
have had on our risk assumptions in our force plan and ultimately
whether or not this should affect our future Battle Force. We are
further evaluating lessons learned from the recently identified
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) cost overruns. Whatever the outcome of these
evaluations, we will work closely with our partners in industry to
control requirements and costs, and provide the industrial base the
stability it needs to become more productive.
Future platforms and combat systems must be designed and built with
the knowledge that we plan to continually upgrade them over their
lifetime. An Open Architecture approach to software acquisition and
development of integrated weapons systems is a critical part of this
business model. Free and open competition in which the best ideas win
is the goal.
To facilitate the stability required to achieve reduced costs in
this constrained industrial sector, the fiscal year 2008 President's
budget submission made no changes in ship acquisitions in fiscal year
2008 from PB07 to PB08. Navy has a long-range vision to maximize reuse
of ship designs and components, and to employ a business model that
encourages the use of open architecture and mission systems modularity.
The next major challenge in building a fleet for the future is to
deliver a long range aviation procurement plan. Much work has been done
analyzing joint warfighting capabilities and capacity based on threat
and risk assessments driven by Defense Planning Guidance. Consideration
has also been given to affordability, industrial capacity and
production times associated with next generation aviation warfare. The
Navy will work to deliver a stable aviation build plan that transforms
and balances aviation capabilities with respect to conventional and
irregular warfare, reduces excess capacity, and achieves technological
superiority through cost-wise investments in recapitalization,
sustainment and modernization programs.
Resourcing critical maritime and joint effects, the President's
budget procures 188 aircraft in fiscal year 2008, with a goal of
eventually reducing average aircraft age from 74 percent to 50 percent
of expected service life. The plan is structured to support required
economic order quantity (EOQ) investments and facilitate Multi-Year
Procurement (MYP) contracts.
BUILD A FLEET FOR THE FUTURE
As we adapt to asymmetric threats and the challenges of irregular
warfare, we cannot lose sight of Navy's core warfighting competencies.
We must continue to improve performance in anti-submarine and mine
warfare, anti-surface warfare, anti-air warfare, strike warfare,
ballistic missile defense, and other core maritime superiority
missions. We will continue to mature our FRP to ensure combat ready,
surge-capable forces are available to meet any contingency.
We have worked hard with Congress and industry to start to create
stability between our shipbuilding plans and industrial base. We must
continue to fund and build a balanced, effective Battle Force of about
313 ships . . . the minimum force required to guarantee the long-term
strength and viability of U.S. naval sea and air power with acceptable
risk. We recognize the need to control requirements, maintain program
stability, curb costs, and encourage best business practices. We need
support for sustained funding of our shipbuilding account--consistent
with the 30-year plan--that is critical to provide our partners in
industry the stability they need to curb cost growth and sustain our
vital shipbuilding industrial base.
To build a fleet for the future and ensure the superiority of our
future fleet, we seek congressional support in the following areas:
11 Carrier Force. The 30-year shipbuilding plan
recognizes that as a result of the retirement of U.S.S.
Enterprise in fiscal year 2013, the number of aircraft carriers
will drop to 10 for a period of approximately 33 months, until
the U.S.S. Gerald Ford enters active service. Legislative
relief is required from the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007 requiring a carrier force of 11. In
developing the 30-year shipbuilding plan, Navy conducted
extensive analysis that concluded the temporary drop to a
carrier force of 10 for 33 months, from fiscal year 2013
through fiscal year 2015, is an acceptable short-term risk.
Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS program remains of
critical importance to our Navy providing mine warfare, anti-
submarine and anti-surface warfare capabilities. Extensive
force structure analysis, as reflected in the 30-year
shipbuilding plan, establishes a requirement for 55 LCS. Navy
is committed to satisfying this valid requirement.
Current cost estimates exceed established thresholds for
detail design and construction of LCS-1, the lead Lockheed
Martin hull. This recent cost growth (to some extent the result
of unrealistic schedule and cost constraints, unstable
specifications at time of contract award, design-build
concurrency, subcontractor performance delays impacting
critical path, rework due to design changes, and Engineering
Change Proposal scope increases) has provided an opportunity to
reinforce the Navy's commitment to providing warfighting
capability through affordability. The Navy executed a pause in
the construction of LCS-3, the second Lockheed Martin hull, to
conduct a thorough review of the program, and to examine both
internal and external factors relating to the acquisition and
contracting processes, practices, and oversight and the related
impact on cost. Negotiations failed to achieve a proper
balancing of risk at an executable price for the Navy, which
has led to the termination of construction of LCS Hull #3.
On 12 April 2007, Navy terminated the contract with Lockheed
Martin for construction of LCS Hull #3 since the cost-to-risk
balance was considered unaffordable. The Navy remains committed
to bringing LCS capability into the fleet to address emerging
Long War and MCO capability requirements. Our LCS acquisition
strategy is executable, affordable, and in the best interests
of the Navy.
Virginia Class MYP. The Navy remains committed to
reduce Virginia acquisition costs to $2 billion (fiscal year
2005 dollars) per hull concurrent with a build rate of two
ships per year starting in fiscal year 2012. Two items
requested this year are critical to achieving this goal. The
first is authority in the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008 to enter into a MYP contract with EOQ in
fiscal year 2009. This would provide the Navy a significant
negotiating advantage, send a clear signal to industry
regarding the Navy's commitment to future submarine
procurement, and reduce risk. The Navy anticipates $2.9 billion
(13 percent) of savings compared to annual (single ship)
procurement contracts by using a 5-year/7-ship MYP contract for
Virginia class submarines starting in fiscal year 2009.
The second item critical to achieving cost reduction and an
increased build rate of two submarines per year is the Virginia
class cost reduction investment contained in the fiscal year
2008 budget request. As detailed in the recently delivered
Report to Congress on Virginia Class Cost Reduction, the Navy
plans to achieve its cost goal for the program through
construction performance improvements, design changes that
reduce cost, and by increasing the procurement rate under a MYP
contract with EOQ authority. The cost reduction investment
funds are vital to implementing the needed construction
performance improvements and design changes.
As identified in the 30-year shipbuilding plan, even with a
build rate of two Virginia class submarines per year commencing
in 2012, the number of nuclear attack submarines will fall
below the desired 48 submarine fleet identified in the 30-year
shipbuilding plan from about 2020 through 2034. This apparent
shortfall, however, can be managed through several risk
mitigation efforts. First, stationing 60 percent of our attack
submarines in the Pacific, as recommended in the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review, will reduce critical response times
in the Pacific. Second, by adjusting patrol times of our attack
submarines, we can ensure greater operational availability
without significantly impacting our sailors and their families.
Finally, by pursuing an integrated approach to undersea warfare
queuing through multiple sensors (e.g. Unmanned Undersea
Vehicles, the P-8A Multi-Mission Aircraft, SH-60R/S
helicopters), we can improve critical target detection,
tracking, and sensor-to-shooter response times to fully support
the requirements of our combatant commanders for attack
submarine presence worldwide. Other initiatives under review
include reducing build time of the Virginia class SSN from 72
to 60 months and considering modest hull-life extensions on a
small number of SSNs.
Split Funding for Zumwalt class DDG. The DDG-1000
Zumwalt class destroyer brings much needed stealth, counter
air, and surface fire support to the fight. The Tumblehome hull
provides a reduced radar cross section and acoustic signature
while its Dual Band Radar represents a significant increase in
air defense capability in the cluttered littoral environment.
With the Advanced Gun System and associated Long Range Land
Attack Projectile (LRLAP) DDG-1000 will provide volume and
precision fires in support of Joint forces ashore. A Global
Positioning System-guided, 155 millimeter round, LRLAP will
provide all-weather fires capability out to 83 nautical miles.
Open architecture and reduced manning will provide the Navy
life cycle cost savings and technology that can be retrofit to
legacy ships. DDG-1000 is the harbinger of our future fleet,
taking major steps in advanced warfighting, reduced manning, a
fully integrated power/propulsion system, and an open
architecture design.
The support of Congress for last year's split funding request
is greatly appreciated. This year Navy requests the second half
of split year funding for dual lead ships of the Zumwalt class
destroyer to maximize competitive efficiencies and focus design
efforts. Split funding will also lend stability to the
shipbuilding industrial base. This funding strategy supports
the current budget structure, enhances future competitive
opportunities, and limits liability for appropriations in
future years.
Joint Strike Fighter. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) remains the cornerstone of Navy's continuing superiority
in air warfare. Although risk associated with the recent 2 year
slip in the carrier variant of the F-35 will be mitigated by a
modest increased buy of F/A-18E,F variants, there should be no
doubt that JSF is a much more capable aircraft to which the
Navy is fully committed. I encourage your continued strong
support of this program to guard against further delays in
production.
Legacy Aircraft Replacement. As our aging, legacy
aircraft reach the end of the service lives, funding for
follow-on programs becomes critical. Among these programs are
the P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), the F/A-18E/F
and JSF, the EA-18G airborne electronic attack aircraft, the V-
22 tilt-rotor aircraft, and the MH-60R/S and CH-53K
helicopters. Navy's RDT&E program is also vital to this effort.
Anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Submarines with
improving stealth and attack capability--particularly modern
diesel attack submarines--are proliferating worldwide at an
alarming rate. Locating these relatively inexpensive but
extremely quiet boats presents our Navy with a formidable
challenge. Navy is pursuing a distributed and netted approach
to ASW. Some of the key ASW programs we must continue to
develop and field as quickly as possible include: Surface Ship
Torpedo Defense System; High Altitude ASW Weapon Concept;
Deployable Distributed Autonomous system; Reliable Acoustic
Path Vertical Line Array, and Aircraft Carrier Periscope
Detection Radar.
SONAR Restrictions. ASW is a very complex and
challenging warfighting competency in which to achieve and
sustain the required level of expertise. Therefore every
opportunity we have to gain and maintain proficiency at the
ship/unit level, and every opportunity we have to integrate
units in complex scenarios is crucial to our readiness.
Unfortunately, our ability to train in the same manner in which
we fight is under attack in public forums, including the
courts. Thus far, we have seen little scientific basis for the
claims lodged against the Navy. However, these allegations
present the potential for severe restrictions on our continued
ability to train effectively, as we saw in RIMPAC 2006 wherein
we lost 3 days of valuable ASW training with active sonar
because of a court restraining order. Navy is currently
executing a comprehensive plan of action to cover all our at-
sea training areas with environmental compliance documents by
the end of 2009. We are committed to maintaining an open
dialogue, continuing to advance our scientific understanding of
the impacts of sonar on marine mammals, and complying with the
relevant statutes. We have consistently made this clear as an
organization in our debate on this issue. Maintaining
proficiency in ASW is a daily challenge, and while our long-
term compliance documents are being developed, we cannot afford
to stop training. We owe it to our sailors to ensure they
receive the training they need to fight and win.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) requires permits for
activities that may affect marine mammals. This includes
military activities, including certain Navy activities at sea.
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 included a
provision that authorizes the Secretary of Defense to grant
exemptions to the MMPA for certain military activities critical
to our national defense. On 23 January 2007, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense granted Navy a National Defense Exemption
(NDE) for 2 years covering mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar
activities for major exercises and in major operating areas, as
well as the use of Improved Explosive Echo Ranging sonobuoys.
The NDE will help Navy continue to conduct the sonar training
necessary for our national defense while protecting marine
mammals through established mitigation measures.
Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). NECC is
developing into a true force of choice in phase zero (pre-
conflict) and phase V (reconstruction) operations, and is a
vital part of our Nation's Long War against terrorism. All new
forces--Riverine, Expeditionary Training Group, Maritime Civil
Affairs and Maritime Expeditionary Security Force--will meet
full IOC objectives in fiscal year 2007. Riverine deployed its
first squadron to Iraq in March to provide area security at
Haditha dam and interdiction operations on the Euphrates River.
Your continued support of our Riverine capability and capacity
is vital. Our second Riverine Squadron was established on 2
February 2007 and our third Squadron will be stood up this
June.
Sea Basing and Expeditionary Warfare. It would be
difficult to consider any future expeditionary missions without
recognizing the need for a sea base from which to employ Joint/
Multinational Capabilities across the full Range of Military
Operations. Seabasing provides operational maneuver and assured
access to the Joint/Multinational forces while significantly
reducing our footprint ashore, thereby minimizing the need to
obtain host nation permission and/or support. These operational
characteristics will prove increasingly vital in the post-
Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom political-
military security environment. Navy is exploring innovative
operational concepts combining seabasing with adaptive force
packaging that will further support national security policy
and the combatant commanders' objectives worldwide. Our 30-year
shipbuilding plan provides for seabasing that covers the
spectrum of warfare from Joint Forcible Entry to persistent and
cooperative Theater Security Cooperation.
Over the last several years, my staff and that of the
Commandant's Marine Corps Combat Development Center, and Marine
Corps Headquarters, have worked diligently to develop a
strategy for amphibious warfare that is relevant to the myriad
challenges we face in the complex security environment of the
21st century. The investment strategy we have embarked upon
represents the Navy-Marine Corps shared vision of the future
and a significant investment of time and resources for both our
Services. This vision was further validated by the Naval
Operating Concept signed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
General Hagee, and me last summer.
Based on a foundation built upon well-defined analytical
underpinnings, our staffs agreed on an investment program that
would provide a capable, agile, and affordable response force.
Specifically, our investments in tomorrow's Navy reflect a
commitment to build the fleet of the future, with the
capability and capacity to fight and win the Nation's wars,
including amphibious operations from the sea. This commitment
supports the operational forces in the assault echelon and
provides protection for the Maritime Prepositioning Force--
Future (MPF(F)) to ensure its survivability in any hostile
environment.
The ability of our future fleet to meet the demand signal for
amphibious forces must be viewed in the aggregate. Given the
cost of ships today, we cannot discount the value of ships
procured to support prepositioned equipment. Prepositioned
assets must be included in the overall force availability
equation--ignoring MPF(F) as the lift component of an
additional Marine Expeditionary Battalion (MEB) would be
incongruous with today's fiscal environment. The capabilities
provided by the MPF(F) mitigate concerns regarding the
operational availability of the assault echelon force required
to deliver 2.0 MEB lift, vehicle square footage, and passenger
requirements. As reflected in our 30-year shipbuilding plan, we
believe 30 amphibious ships will meet these requirements, when
supported by, and supporting, the MPF(F).
Ballistic Missile Defense. Missile tests on the Korean
Peninsula and by Iran, along with the proliferation of
ballistic missile technology, underscore the growing need for a
robust, sea-borne ballistic missile defense system. Last year,
the Navy made further progress on our Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD), the sea-based component of the Missile Defense
Agency's (MDA) Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). It
enables surface combatants to support ground-based sensors and
provides a capability to intercept short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles with ship-based interceptors (SM-3). The
Sea-Based Terminal effort will provide the ability to engage
Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) with modified SM-2 Blk
IV missiles from Aegis BMD capable ships.
In May, 2006, U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG 70) successfully engaged
and intercepted a LANCE short-range test target with a modified
SM-2 Block IV missile in a Navy-sponsored BMD demonstration. As
a result, the Navy is modifying the remaining inventory of 100
SM-2 Block IV missiles, and MDA is modifying the Aegis BMD
program to support sea-based terminal engagements. In June,
2006, Navy successfully achieved a second engagement of a
separating SRBM target with the AEGIS BMD system.
Last week, the Navy successfully engaged and destroyed a non-
separating exo-atmospheric short-range ballistic missile, while
simultaneously engaging a low altitude cruise missile. This
successful engagement brings the tally to 8 successful
intercepts in 10 flight tests and underscores the value of this
sea-borne ballistic missile defense capability in an era of
rapidly proliferating ballistic missile hardware and
technology.
Research and Development. To achieve the speed of war
Navy is pursuing Innovative Naval Prototypes--revolutionary
``game changers'' for future naval warfare. These initiatives
have resulted in the development of an electromagnetic rail-gun
prototype; new concepts for persistent, netted, littoral anti-
submarine warfare; technologies to enable seabasing; and the
naval tactical utilization of space.
Public Shipyard Loading. As we work with industry on
shipbuilding cost reduction, we must ensure legislation and
policy support best business practices and efficiencies.
Apportioning work based upon funding quotas to drive
workloading in public naval shipyards potentially diverts
efficiency opportunities away from the private sector. Public
yards provide vital services for nuclear propulsion and
submarine work, and these critical competencies must be
maintained. However, our first priorities in shipyard loading
should be quality, efficiency, and cost savings. We seek your
assistance in removing restrictions on our workloading
flexibility.
Additional information on some of Navy's priority warfighting
programs is offered in the attached Annex I.
CONCLUSION
Our Navy is truly a bargain, costing the taxpayers less than 1
percent of GDP. But as we strive to sustain combat readiness, build a
fleet for the future and develop 21st century leaders, we cannot allow
ourselves to take this for granted. We must be mindful of the need to
maintain a strong Navy now, and after our ground forces return home.
It has been just over 20 years since Congress passed the Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, subsequently
signed into law by President Reagan. While this landmark legislation
established a clean chain of command running from the President through
the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs directly to
the unified combatant commanders, and increased synergy among services
by providing for shared procurement and development of technologies, it
also precluded Service Chiefs from participating in the acquisition
process beyond the identification of requirements.
Without direct involvement in the entire acquisition cycle, Service
Chiefs have little control over the mechanisms that drive efficiencies
and best business practice in our major acquisition programs. Yet, the
chiefs bear the responsibility of providing the right capabilities and
capacity to meet the demands of our combatant commanders. I believe we
should explore putting the Service Chiefs, and their military
expertise, back into the acquisition chain of command and to hold them
accountable for their procurement programs.
Our Nation depends upon a strong Navy with the global reach and
persistent presence needed to provide deterrence, access, and
assurance, while delivering lethal warfighting capacity whenever and
wherever it is needed. Our Navy is fighting the global war on terror
while at the same time providing a Strategic Reserve worldwide for the
President and our unified and combatant commanders. As we assess the
risks associated with the dynamic security challenges that face us, we
must ensure we have the Battle Force, the people, and the combat
readiness we need to win our Nation's wars.
Simply reacting to change is no longer an acceptable course of
action if our Navy is to successfully wage asymmetric warfare and
simultaneously deter regional and transnational threats: Two
Challenges, One Fleet. Our Nation's security and prosperity depend upon
keeping our shores safe and the world's maritime highways open and
free.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. I will proceed.
I want to get back to some of the questions I raised in my
opening statement here about the stress on the capital programs
of the Navy. I mentioned we are in danger of falling below the
Navy's own requirement of having 48 attack submarines for a 14-
year period beginning in 2020. It sounds a long way away, but
it is not that long away, and unless we start to act on it it
is going to be a problem for us.
In 2028, the number of attack submarines is expected to
fall to 40 under the current shipbuilding plan, not only below
the Navy's current requirement, but also far below the
historically estimated need of submarines. In fact, in 1999,
just 8 years ago, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) concluded
that the Navy needed to have 55 attack submarines in the near-
term and 68 to 72 subs by the middle of the next decade. So we
are obviously far short of that estimate.
I say parenthetically what you know because you live with
it. Namely, that the current 30-year shipbuilding plan calls
for maintaining a 313-ship fleet as a minimum. In recent years,
the estimates of the necessary fleet size from respected people
have gone as high as 380. Meanwhile, the current Navy stands at
about 279 ships.
So I say all this to just say again that we have a problem
and in my opinion we are not spending enough. The recent
incident, which has been publicly described, with China and a
sub coming into the area where the Kitty Hawk Battle Group was
and public reports that China is producing as many as two and a
half subs per year and is rapidly closing the overall fleet
strength gap, seems to indicate to me anyway that we need a
much greater number of ships and subs than we are currently
procuring.
Admiral, I wanted to ask you to respond to this question.
The Navy has repeatedly testified that it needs 2 years of
advance procurement funding before construction in a given sub
in order to have the parts that require a long lead time.
However, the Congressional Research Service has said that the
2-year advance procurement is not necessary, that Congress can
fund the entire sub construction program in a single year,
which means that the finished product would take 2 years longer
at the back end. In fact, that was done in 1988 when Congress
funded the construction of two aircraft carriers in a single
year, including advance procurement.
So, acknowledging both the budget pressure you are under
and the need in my opinion to accelerate to 2009 the date by
which we start building two subs a year, provided we enter into
a multi-year contract to save costs, why should Congress not
begin to fund two subs a year in 2009?
Admiral Mullen. Senator, the basis for this, as you
indicated, is the 313-ship future force structure plan. We are
275 ships today. By the end of the year, I actually hope in the
commissioning, one of which is later this week, to head north
in terms of stopping the free fall. We talked earlier about, or
I have talked consistently about having a balanced fleet. The
48 submarines was the warfighting analysis that we went through
extensively and I am very comfortable with that number and very
comfortable with that number against the 1999 JCS study.
That said, the plan you speak to, we do fall to 40
submarines. We have looked in the last year at ways to mitigate
that and we are looking at possibilities of extending some hull
life for a deployment, for an additional deployment. The hull
lives of our nuclear attack submarines have gone from 30 years
to 33 and now it looks as though there is a possibility some of
them could be extended as one way.
We want to reduce the time it takes to construct the
Virginia class submarine from 72 months to 60 months. That
makes more submarines available. I also have the option of
keeping them deployed longer for a period of time to mitigate
that.
With reasonable assumptions about those three specific
possibilities, I can mitigate that eight submarine gap that you
described in that timeframe down to about three submarines. We
will continue to work that. So as I indicated, we would look to
mitigate this. We are working very hard on that and we
certainly intend to do that.
But I share your concern in your opening statement about
the pressure. I have been doing these budgets since the mid-
1990s and we are, the Navy now, I am under extraordinary
pressure across my people accounts, my operations accounts, as
well as my procurement accounts, and the heart of those
procurement accounts are ships, submarines, and airplanes, and
balancing that in the environment in which I am finding myself
right now is a real challenge.
The cost growth we cannot tolerate or we are not going to
be able to build the ships, the cost growth you speak to in
LCS; we are not going to be able to meet this plan. We have to
control that. So we are working hard in a very constrained
environment to get there, and I am comfortable that we have
worked hard in these mitigation areas, but it is early and it
is still a concern.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that we share that concern.
I do want to say that the very mitigating circumstances, the
program to mitigate the impact of a gap where we fall
substantially below the 48 submarines, is really a pressure
that we ought not to be putting you under, and frankly the
submarine force. I worry about whether we are pushing the subs
structurally beyond what they can handle. I am certainly
worried if one of the mitigating policies is to extend
deployments, what that will do to the morale of the submarine
force because, as you well know, they already deploy at a
pretty good rate.
Admiral Mullen. Well, Senator, they would not be major
extensions. This is a month or 2. It is not an exceptional
period of time. We certainly would never take the risk, if
there was any concern with material failure, would not do that.
I did not answer your question about can we buy it all in 1
year. The 3-year buy is basically a function of, obviously,
affordability in a given year and also what I can execute to
build the submarine. Clearly, that has been how a submarine has
been built and the time line that we have had it. Could you
appropriate all the money to do that or could we, could the
Hill do that? Yes, absolutely. But the challenge will be
executing that money in a meaningful way, and so it has been
that, again it has been that balance.
We have done that with other programs, but that has been
it, the way we have built submarines.
Senator Lieberman. My time is up and I thank you. We will
continue on this exchange. We have been going at it for a few
years already.
But I do want to say with some pride, and also to express
my appreciation to the Navy, that the submarine building
program has been going forward at a very good cost control, on
a cost control basis, and the speed of delivery. Everything is
relative, but when we start to talk about getting the cost of a
submarine down to $2 billion, which it looks like we can do,
that is a lot of money. But compared to some of the other
shipbuilding programs, it is not so bad.
Admiral Mullen. Senator, the other thing, and I will try
not to fill this up, but if I buy a $2 billion submarine in
2009, get to two a year, I have nothing in 2010 and 2011. I
have no resources applied against that. So the program comes
back to me to fill that up. Again, we are in a plan right now
to get to two in 2012. That is several billion dollars, $4 to
$5 billion that I currently do not have in the program.
Senator Lieberman. Well, if you and I and a few others can
get to two subs in 2009, we will take care of 2010 and 2011.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. That is an expression of faith.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. I have a feeling submarines are going to be
really well-covered on this subcommittee.
A question for you, Admiral, or for Secretary Winter, and
that has to do with affordability of the LCS. It is critical in
order to achieve the large numbers--55 ships, I think, is the
goal that the Navy has determined it needs--that we start
making some headway here. I harken back, I guess, to what the
plan was for affordability was. One, keep it simple in its
design; do not change the requirements; maximize competition;
and leverage the smaller shipyards, which would be more
efficient, building smaller, simple ships, and speed up the
process to avoid the cost growth that often comes with time.
I think the full committee and this subcommittee in
particular has been in your corner on affordability. But we
appear to be on a path that doubles the $220 million estimate
for these ships. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your efforts to
stabilize this program, but I would like to have you explain,
if you could, how the Navy and the industry's original
estimates ran so far askew. Second, since the Navy's estimates
indicate cost growth for both industry teams building their
first ship, why has the Navy only taken corrective action on
one contract and how do you intend to control cost for the
remaining ships under both contracts?
Secretary Winter. Sir, let me address both questions there.
First of all, relative to the reasons that we are in a cost
overrun situation, I think it really is due to the over
optimism that was created at the beginning of the program. I
believe that as we look backwards we were not as realistic as
perhaps we should have been relative to the cost estimates, in
particular the cost estimates for the lead ships. We are now
having to deal with that and one of the unfortunate aspects of
initiating a contract which is underfunded is that often things
are not done as well as they should be in the beginning, and it
is at the early stages of the program where much can be done to
reduce the overall cost of a ship.
I do believe, though, that with a total buy on the
magnitude of 55 ships, which is the current program, there is
huge opportunity out there to be able to motivate the type of
business case, to provide the rewards that industry would be
looking for, for a significant investment in a modern
production capability, and in fact we may be able to afford two
production capabilities. That would enable us to work through a
leader-follower arrangement and be able to maintain competition
in the long run.
Working through the issues that we are going through right
now, developing a competitive base, and being able to leverage
the quantity buys that we are talking about in the future, all
will hopefully lead us to a more affordable cost position on
this particular vessel.
Relative to the General Dynamics (GD) position and compared
to the Lockheed position, we have established formal tripwires,
if you will, associated with the performance parameters that GD
is engaged in right now and Lockheed has already worked
through. Should GD exceed any of those tripwires, it is our
intention to pursue the same remedies that we sought with
Lockheed Martin relative to containing their costs and seeking
a renegotiation of the contract.
At this point in time, GD has not exceeded any of those
tripwires. I will note that we have kept those tripwires, the
specifics there, confidential and have not shared them with the
contractor, specifically to ensure that we have an honest and
open assessment and there is no opportunity or motivation for
gaming any of the particular parameters associated with that.
Senator Thune. The contracts for both industry teams place
the Navy in the position of financing 100 percent of the cost
overrun. How do you balance the risk on future major programs
to avoid finding ourselves in a similar position?
Secretary Winter. I believe, sir, in future major programs,
in the production phase at least, we very much need to go to
cost structures, fixed-price incentive type structures, which
enable us to share the cost risk appropriately between the
contractor and the Navy. When we are talking about initial
development phases, where there are very high uncertainties and
it is difficult to obtain a fixed-price bid from a contractor,
we will probably still have to go with cost reimbursable
contracts. But even there, there are mechanisms that are
available to us to provide cost and schedule incentives that
share that risk with the contractor.
Senator Thune. Given the cost pressures on the shipbuilding
program, what impact do the increased cost and delays in the
LCS program have on the balance of the Navy's plan?
Secretary Winter. Well, the significant impact that it has
had is the need to reprogram or request reprogramming authority
for the fiscal year 2007 funding to be able to be used for the
completion of the vessels that still are under contract. In the
out years, we are hopeful that the cost reductions associated
with the strategy we are going to with the selected
configuration and the quantity buy that will enable the cost
efficiencies associated with a modern production facility, that
those mechanisms will enable us to minimize the cost impact to
the overall shipbuilding program.
We need to go through that, though. We need to understand
exactly how much we are going to be able to get by way of
investment in those facilities and the leverage that that will
provide us. But I am very hopeful that we will be able to
recoup a significant amount of the increase in cost.
Senator Thune. I want to jump to one other subject here
quickly and that is the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) gap. The
Government Accountability Office recently released a study
titled ``Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint Integrated
Investment Strategy.'' It made several conclusions: One, the
Department of Defense (DOD) does not have a single integrated
investment plan for recapitalizing and modernizing its tactical
air forces; and that without a joint integrated investment
strategy it is difficult to evaluate the severity of capability
gaps or, alternatively, areas of redundancy.
In light of the Navy's concerns over a strike fighter gap,
how do you respond to those findings? Given the Navy's
additional competing need to recapitalize its fleet of ships,
how would you assess affordability of the Navy's aviation
procurement plans?
Admiral Mullen. One of the things that came out of the
shipbuilding effort that we put forth was to try to stabilize
it. One of the results of that was the desire on the part of
many senior leaders in the Navy to stabilize the aviation plan
as well, because it too had seen instability in recent years.
So we are about there right now, this year and next year, to
basically figure out how many aircraft we need and how we can
stabilize it, with the same underpinning philosophy, so that
industry can plan, not have significant changes every year, and
then produce what we need at best cost and in a timely way.
Specifically for me, for the Navy, the strike fighter
shortfall--and I think your initial number was on the order of
110 planes. I have seen numbers as low as 40 or 50 and as high
as over 200. The numbers I am very comfortable with is a
shortfall starting in about 8 to 10 years of 47 to 71 planes,
depending on whether we buy 40 or 50 a year at a certain price.
The highest numbers are at a very low production rate, at a
very high price.
From the standpoint of the programs that I need, I need the
JSF. I need it for its range, its payload, its stealth, its
sustainability. So I am committed to that. Where I find myself
is in the middle here, because I find myself buying more F-18
Es and Fs, and they are great airplanes, but they are not the
planes I need to populate the entirety of my air wings in the
future. I have to get to JSF and that is the plan right now.
I will not talk about the DOD strategy, but I can tell you
within the Navy the strategy is to get to JSF as quickly as we
can, and yet there are some acquisition challenges we want to
be mindful of with where this program is as well.
I also have a challenge, a very clear challenge, with Jim
Conway and I, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, because I
basically fund Marine Corps aviation, and how we balance that
inside the requirements that we both have is also a significant
challenge. He and I are committed to working through that, and
that is part of this shortfall as well.
So I recognize the shortfall is there. I know we have to
stabilize this plan in the very near future. But it is going to
take a significant amount of additional procurement investment
to get there and really mitigate that shortfall.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Thune.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator
Lieberman has asked these wonderful questions about submarines.
He has grasped the mettle of naval policy, the submarine. It is
the most key element, so thank you.
Senator Lieberman. We stand together.
Senator Reed. We stand together.
Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, thank you not only for
being here today, but for your great service to the Nation.
Following on this issue of submarines, we have talked a lot in
this open session about force structure, but there is also the
industrial base issue, which is absolutely critical, not just
to submarine construction, but to all naval shipbuilding
programs.
One of the areas of concern is that this is the first time
in many, many years we have not had an active design program
for a submarine. The recent RAND report suggested the that
design for the new Trident, the new ballistic missile
submarine, be accelerated. Mr. Secretary and Admiral, could you
comment on that?
Secretary Winter. Yes, Senator, pleased to. We have
recently been going through several iterations of a plan to
create the next generation strategic deterrent for the Navy.
One of the things that I have been fairly insistent on is
ensuring that that is a complete integrated strategic plan,
going through everything from the warhead to the missile to the
boat itself. I think we now have a good laydown of a plan. We
have worked through the aspects with United States Strategic
Command in terms of ensuring that we have a current set of
requirements and a good forecast of where those requirements
may evolve in the future, both on the nuclear and the non-
nuclear side. That will be factored into the overall design
study activities for the future, the Ohio class replacement, if
you will, activities.
Initially, those will be mostly design studies as we go
through the overall assessment of alternatives that can provide
the basis for that strategic deterrent, and it will later on
evolve into preliminary design efforts for the replacement
activity. We do want to focus on getting to the right objective
in the long-term and making sure that we have a good systems
engineering process that we are factoring through. With that,
we will phase in the individual design activities as the
requirements support.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral, do you have any comments?
Admiral Mullen. Well, I would only echo that and say we
recognize the criticality of this industry base or the design
base. We are very committed, and Secretary Winter has led this
effort, to really understand where we are and how we sustain
it, which includes, could include various options. It is
underpinned by the belief that if we lose it we cannot get it
back, and the Nation cannot afford that.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman pointed out that there has been some
significant advances in lowering the cost of submarine
construction. In fact, the selected acquisition report
estimated a reduction of about 3 percent of the total Virginia
class submarine program. That I think is significant and I hope
you share that feeling.
But second, there are also opportunities within that cost
reduction for additional research and design work to further
accelerate reductions. Is that something that you are
considering, Mr. Secretary or Admiral?
Secretary Winter. Yes, sir, we are considering both
additional research and development activity. As you are
probably aware, we have a number of efforts going on right now
in terms of design modifications for the Virginia class, which
are principally oriented towards reduction of costs, design for
production, enhancements for that vessel. We are also engaged
in a number of activities in terms of advanced submarine design
and construction, including some promising activities in
coordination with the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral, let me ask another question. That is, as we both
understand, our colleagues in the House adopted a measure that
I believe would fund an additional set of Virginia class
components, not specific to a hull.
Secretary Winter. Yes, sir.
Admiral Mullen, is that an approach you think has merit?
Admiral Mullen. I do. I think it does have merit. As you
said, it is not tied to a specific hull. In terms of--and it
really gets to the issue that both you and Senator Lieberman
are raising, which is to get the cost of the business down. It
will allow us to continue to reduce risk over the long-term.
I think it is an investment in long-term cost reduction
here, both in this program and--one group I would really like
to pat on the back is Electric Boat has done incredible work to
help us reduce this cost. It is very clear when you go there
that they are aboard to try to make this happen
enthusiastically and as partners, and it is part of that
strategic partnership I think we need to make to sustain, to
have an outstanding industrial base for the future.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, any further comments?
Secretary Winter. I would just add that in shipbuilding in
general, and in particular in submarine construction,
maintaining the pace of work is very critical to efficient
production. This is not a business where just-in-time inventory
works. Having long lead items worked in advance so as to ensure
that the pace of production is able to be maintained is a very
good way of reducing the risk of program execution.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
One final question, Admiral Mullen, is that the Marine
Corps stated a requirement for a minimum of 30 operational
amphibious ships.
Admiral Mullen. Right.
Senator Reed. You are actually planning, as I understand
it, to reduce the inventory of these ships. But your rationale
I think for being able to meet the Marine Corps needs is that
you can provide 100 percent readiness of these ships. Can I
understand your rationale and is it feasible?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. General Conway and I certainly
have agreed that the requirement is for the availability of 30
ships. Based on historic availability, doing the math, you need
33 to do that. Now, that is how we have done it historically.
What I have committed to him is to provide him the lift he
needs.
We have 31 ships, amphibious ships, in the 30-year
shipbuilding plan and we have to look at how we are going to
fight in the future and specifically how we are going to move
this 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade into the fight. General
Conway and I have agreed to figure out a way together to make
that work. It could include higher availability of ships. Some
of it depends on, obviously, the warning time you would have
and that kind of thing.
We are also building the Maritime Preposition Force Future
ships, a significant investment there, which also has the
potential to help us move marines to the fight. So there is an
awful lot. It is a very complex set of variables and it is also
a very important part of how we build the sea base for the
future, which I think is going to become more and more
important in terms of availability of footprint ashore and the
requirement, not just from the Navy and Marine side but from a
joint perspective, to be able to flow combat power through a
sea base.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did
not welcome our new ranking member. Perhaps the Senator from
South Dakota will be more dispassionate on the Navy's budget
than the rest of us around this table. But I hope that our new
ranking member will take a great deal of guidance from the
Senator from Connecticut, the Senator from Rhode Island, the
Senator from Virginia, and the Senator from Maine on such
issues as submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers. I just
want to offer you all the guidance in the world on those
important issues, as we welcome you to your new and very
important position.
It is amazing to me that our last ranking Republican was
from Missouri and now we have one from South Dakota. There
seems to be a pattern here.
Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for being here today. Last
year we approved the funding for the dual lead ship design for
the DDG-1000 and also funding for construction. This ship is
obviously critical to the 313-ship plan that the CNO has put
out. I am concerned that, although the design contracts were
awarded to both yards in August of 2006, that the construction
contracts have yet to be awarded.
My concern is that this delay will begin to have an impact
on the shipyard employees, on the vendor and subcontractor
base. There is a lead time in getting the necessary
subcontractor contracts in place and we cannot proceed with
that until the contract is awarded. So this is a concern to me.
I am also concerned that any further delays in the award of
the construction contract will have an impact on overall cost
and could well drive up costs.
Could you update us on the status of the award of the
construction contract?
Secretary Winter. Yes, Senator. I asked for a short hold be
placed on the award and contracting there to ensure that the
lessons learned from LCS were properly factored into the DDG-
1000 contract. I have now been satisfied that that has been
done and I recently authorized the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition to proceed to
the finalization and definitization of those contracts.
Senator Collins. Thank you. That is good news indeed. Do
you have a timetable for going forward on the contract?
Secretary Winter. I believe we are very close, in a matter
of weeks hopefully. I would hesitate to give you a definitive
schedule, but I would be happy to get you an update as soon as
possible.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
On September 25, 2007, the Navy decided to resequence delivery of
the first ship set of DDG-1000 mission systems government-furnished
equipment (GFE) to General Dynamics Bath Iron Works (BIW) vice Northrop
Grumman Ship Systems (NGSS). The Navy has received cost proposals from
both BIW and NGSS reflecting the GFE resequencing and is entering
negotiations with the two shipyards for lead ship production. The Navy
anticipates completing negotiations no later than January 2008.
Senator Collins. Admiral Mullen, we have talked many times
about the reduced life cycle costs of the new DDG-1000 because
of the reduced crew size and other efficiencies. We also have a
challenge as far as extending the life, the useful life of the
DDG-51 class and making sure that we get the full number of
years originally envisioned in order to achieve your goal of
the 313-ship fleet.
Could you comment on the importance of modernizing that
class of ships in order to achieve your goal?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely vital. We have in
the 2008 program both modernization money for the cruisers, the
Aegis cruisers, as well as the Aegis destroyers. We do not have
a good history here of modernizing our ships, and we cannot
afford to do that. So it is vital that these programs be
supported.
I am not talking about just over here. Clearly that is
important, but that is internal to the Navy. Historically, we
do not have a good record of doing that. So we recognize that
and I recognize that as part of this 313-ship plan, that we
have to do that and get these ships to their hull life.
Typically, it is when we decommission ships, it is not
because--surface ships--it is not because their hulls are worn
out; it is because their combat systems are not modernized.
That is what we have to invest in and that is what this program
is all about.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Secretary Winter, in February, the Commander of Naval Sea
Systems Command, Vice Admiral Paul Sullivan, briefed the Maine
and New Hampshire delegations on the Navy's latest Naval
Shipyard Business Plan for 2008 through 2013. I know this is an
issue that you have put a great deal of time and effort into
and that you have emphasized to Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) the need to use all four of the Navy's public
shipyards as efficiently as possible. I am grateful for the
personal effort that you have put into this plan.
Now, obviously NAVSEA faces certain constraints in
distributing workload among the four shipyards. But I am
concerned upon reviewing the plan that the Navy's plan may not
fully acknowledge the specializations that each of the
shipyards has. For example, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in
Kittery, ME, its expertise is with attack submarines. It was
also called the gold standard during the Base Realignment and
Closures Commission. We are very proud of that.
Puget Sound specializes in ballistic missile submarines.
The Senator from Virginia's shipyard focuses on aircraft
carriers. So there are different expertises that are available.
Does the Navy intend to try to optimize the specific and
unusual skill sets that each shipyard has so as to ensure that
we get the best value as we allocate the work among the four
shipyards?
Secretary Winter. Thank you for the question, Senator. As
you noted, I put a bit of personal time into this. I do feel a
level of stewardship responsibility regarding all four of the
yards.
As you noted, we have requested that the Navy look at this
from an optimization perspective and the overall objective here
is to optimize the operational availability of the various
ships in the most cost effective manner. Major consideration of
that is the most effective utilization of the skills that are
resident at each of the facilities. So that will be a very
significant factor in terms of the allocation of availabilities
to the individual yards, as well as the timing to be able to
take maximum advantage of the work force that is resident at
the individual yards.
Senator Collins. Thank you. I look forward to continuing to
work with you on all of these issues.
Secretary Winter. I would be pleased to.
Senator Collins. Thank you both.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Webb, welcome.
Senator Webb. Nice to be here, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. I note that, following the exchange
between Senator Collins and Senator Thune, I never really
stopped to notice this before, that all of us on this
Subcommittee, both parties--this is a bipartisan inclination--
except for Senator Ensign and Senator Thune are coastal
Senators.
Senator Collins. I do not think that is a coincidence.
Senator Lieberman. We are not running your time, Jim.
Senator Webb. I would not be so optimistic about the
Senator from South Dakota. I think there are rivers in South
Dakota.
Senator Thune. Thank you very much.
Senator Webb. We are going to soon see the Riverine Warfare
Center in Sioux City. I can remember when I was Secretary of
the Navy 20 years ago we spent a lot of time talking to Senator
Stevens about strategic homeporting in Alaska.
Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, I would show great deference
to all my colleagues, coastal state colleagues here, on
shipbuilding issues and only ask in exchange that you show
deference to me when it comes to farm programs. [Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. It is a deal.
Senator Webb's time should start now.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, first I would like to congratulate you and
express my appreciation for the work you have done on trying to
tighten up the business side of this. We cannot increase the
force structure in the way that many of us would like without
having the efficiencies built into it. I think that what you
have done over the past couple of months is very commendable.
Secretary Winter. Thank you, sir.
Senator Webb. As a starting point on these force structure
issues, I have to look back to the time when Admiral Mullen and
I graduated from the Naval Academy 39 years ago. We had 932, I
think, ships in the United States Navy. It went down to 479 in
the post-Vietnam drawdown. We got it up to 568 when I was
Secretary of the Navy. We are down to 270----
Admiral Mullen. '5.
Senator Webb.--275 Navy ships, which is roughly half that,
now. There are different eras and different national
requirements. But I think truly today when you look at what has
happened, we have a number of budget restraints that are based
on the inevitable strategic mousetrap, from the ground forces
being burned up in Iraq, weapons system, force structure,
replenishment, all those sorts of things. Inevitably when this
happened, our strategic forces tend to pay.
I would like to ask, Admiral Mullen, in an ideal strategic
world, not in a budgetary sense but in an ideal strategic
world, looking at the responsibilities of the United States
around the world, where would you see the Navy force structure?
Admiral Mullen. Certainly north of 313 Navy ships. Senator
Lieberman or--I am sorry, Senator Thune I think talked about
380 as well, and that was one of the estimates that was out
there 3 or 4 years ago. I think you hit at one of the most
vital parts of how we have these discussions in the world that
we are living in right now, which is what is the strategic
appetite and how are we going to resource it.
I am extremely concerned about the long-term ability of
naval forces, Navy and Marine Corps, to be out and about in the
ways that we need to be in the unpredictable world that we
have. That said, back to the point the Secretary made, our
operational availability right now is a whole lot better than
it used to be. We have invested an awful lot of money and
resources. So today 40 percent of the ships that we have are
deployed, which is a very high number and they are doing
exceptionally well.
313 Navy ships was really minimum risk. I have not done any
current analysis, sort of unbounded, to say without those
bounds what should it be. But I would describe it more as the
maximum acceptable risk is where we are right now, and I am
very comfortable saying that.
Senator Webb. What was the end result of the experiment I
was reading about that was in the papers a year or 2 ago with
rotating ships' crews and keeping ships themselves on station?
Admiral Mullen. We call that Sea Swap, and we just finished
the second phase of that, the second series of three ships.
There are many lessons that came out of that. Probably the most
significant is that it does pretty well on cruisers,
destroyers, and smaller ships. Trying to scale it up to the big
ships is going to be a difficult problem.
But I think in the manning constructs, we are in the middle
of changing sea-shore rotation. I think in manning constructs
in the future that there will be pieces of that that we will
roll into. I talked about availability of ships, even
availability of submarines. Would we consider rotating a crew
as opposed to bringing a submarine back off a deployment, for
example, or a cruiser or a destroyer? I think those are things
that come out of the lessons that we learned there to make
these incredibly important platforms and large capital
investments mean more to what we are doing in terms of our
overall country's security.
Senator Webb. Potentially be a force structure multiplier.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Senator Webb. Secretary Winter, you used two phrases which
I think were pretty important in terms of how we are making
these decisions. One is that we are all fiduciaries here,
because so much of this procurement cycle is beyond the next,
say, 5 years, et cetera.
The other is ``pace of work.'' I have a question relating
to keeping this pace of work from falling into the bath tub and
coming back out again when we lose so many good people. We have
been told that the Newport News Shipyard, which is the largest
employer in the entire Commonwealth of Virginia, that there is
going to be one of these dips between 2009 and 2012 when a
great percentage of work is done and before we pick up I
believe on two submarine projects starting in fiscal year 2012.
Is there a way for the Navy to take steps in conjunction
with the business community to prevent that sort of hiatus?
Secretary Winter. Well, sir, we have been working that in
several aspects. First of all, I think the plan and the profile
there of work has been pretty well understood and has been very
stable for the last at least year. So there has been a basis of
planning.
Second of all, we are trying to utilize the one yard
construct, which enables a sharing of personnel between the
public and private yards in particular down in the Tidewater
region.
Thirdly, we will be looking very carefully at emergent
opportunities for additional work availabilities that may come
up within this time period and will see what we can do in terms
of being able to use those to help retain the critical skills
that are available at Newport News.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen, I would like to associate myself with the
views of Senator Warner on this Oceana problem. He would have
been here, but he is down with the Queen of England today.
Senator Lieberman. That is what senior Senators get to do.
I speak as a junior Senator.
Senator Webb. He actually said he did this during the
Bicentennial as well, so I guess he deserves a return visit.
Senator Lieberman. But not during the Centennial.
Senator Webb. That is right.
Senator Warner mentioned his belief that the facility at
Fort Pickett might be an acceptable alternative and it has the
advantage of already being a government-owned facility with
respect to clearances and that sort of thing. I know you have
stated your views that this is outside of the tactical radius
or the training radius that has been heretofore defined.
But I am just wondering if you could clarify for us what
your thoughts are on the different options that are available
since that one site in North Carolina apparently is not going
to work.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, and I appreciate the question. I
was asked that--actually, I was down in Norfolk on Tuesday and
I was asked that question. Clearly, we are--the requirement for
the outlying field is a very significant one. I appreciate
Senator Warner both making that offer and that we have--what I
said was tied to the requirement at the time, which was we had
drawn a line at 50 miles and obviously Fort Pickett is further
away than that specifically.
But what I also said in my statement and it did not
necessarily register in all the quotes was that my lens is wide
open on this. The Secretary has indicated in discussions with
Senator Warner, we are willing to look at other options and
certainly include Fort Pickett, and that is really where I am.
The criteria that Fort Pickett was excluded from was back
when we first considered outlying fields. We are having
challenges clearly in North Carolina. We want to get this
right. We are trying to balance it between two bases, Cherry
Point and Oceana, which is what constrained us to some degree.
But we are willing to look at all options at this point in
time, and be consistent with the process that we have used
today.
Senator Webb. I appreciate your clarification.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, sir.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Webb.
Gentlemen, I think Senator Thune and I will go one or two
more questions and then let you depart. I appreciate it very
much.
This is to Admiral Mullen. Just when I thought I got the
pronunciation right as ``Litt-OR-al,'' you said ``LITT-or-al''
just a while back, and I want you to clarify for me which is
the preferred pronunciation of the LCS.
Secretary Winter. We disagree, sir. [Laughter.]
Admiral Mullen. I actually use both terms.
Senator Lieberman. We have noticed.
Admiral Mullen. How about a waffle answer?
Senator Lieberman. But you do not waffle on anything else,
so that is all right.
Anyway, we talked about the concerns about the escalation
in cost of the LCS program, heading up to close to two times,
am I right, what we originally hoped it would be? We have some
very big acquisition programs, carriers and destroyers,
actually multi-billion dollar programs, and of course the subs,
which we talked about.
Admiral, I appreciate very much what you said about
Electric Boat (EB). That will mean a lot to the workers up
there. That is appreciated.
Secretary Winter, let me ask you more generally considering
this, and particularly the problems on the LCS. I have great
regard for your management abilities. What steps are you taking
or are you planning to take to improve the Navy's ability to
acquire these major systems on time and on cost? In some sense,
I am not looking for compliments for EB, but what--if you care
to--you do not have to answer. But I am curious, what worked
there and what lessons can you draw from that to the others?
Secretary Winter. Well, sir, I think there are a number of
factors. First of all, we have to have a very firm
understanding of what it is that we are buying. That to a great
extent has to be defined by the Navy at the outset and
eventually handed over to the industrial team for the final
definitization of design compatible with the construction
facilities.
Second of all, we have to have an agreed to, realistic cost
and schedule basis for the program. I think we have gone a long
way to doing that on the Virginia class.
Lastly, I think we need to have an acquisition force that
is properly sized and skilled, with the right backgrounds to
engage in the oversight of the activity. In particular, I
believe that on the naval reactor side with the submarine
efforts we have a very stable and mature acquisition
organization and it has been able to provide that type of
oversight. You couple that in with established and well
understood relationships between the Navy and the contractor
team and I think you have all the possibilities of a very
efficient and effective acquisition program.
Senator Lieberman. That is interesting. So part of it is
the experience of the acquisition force?
Secretary Winter. Most definitely, sir. I think that we
have seen that, not only in the Navy, but I think we have seen
that in other services as well.
Senator Lieberman. We have for sure. So what do you do to
try to make sure you improve the acquisition force across the
board?
Secretary Winter. Well, sir, I think it is going to take a
while to do this, but I believe that we have to emphasize and
accelerate the process of training individuals in acquisition.
I think we have to make sure that the individuals who are
selected for that have the basic engineering and experience in
the development of ships from an operator's perspective before
they get involved in the acquisition side.
I think we have to recognize that it is a multi-year
investment, that we have to take the individuals, give them the
various opportunities in programs which are ongoing, and give
them the opportunity to build up the experience base before
they take responsibility for either an existing program or in
particular a new program.
In that regard, sir, if I could, I think we have to
recognize that when we start new programs there are additional
demands that are placed on the acquisition team, and in
particular in those circumstances we have to make sure that we
provide some of our best and most experienced individuals to be
able to lead that from the Navy perspective.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks. Well, we are going to keep in
touch with you on that and urge you to be as demanding as you
have to be to have this be what you want it to be.
I have one more sort of open-ended question, but I am going
to save it until the end for Admiral Mullen and yield to
Senator Thune at this time.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Warner, who could not be here today, had asked that
there be two letters included in the record. The first is a
letter from him to the Secretary dated April 19, 2007, which
urges the Navy to consider existing military locations in
Virginia, including Fort Pickett, for a new outlying landing
field (OLF). The second is a letter from Senator Warner to the
Secretary dated April 20, 2007, which thanks the Secretary for
his time in a phone conversation where the Secretary confirmed
that the Navy would consider locations in Virginia, including
Fort Pickett, as a viable option for an OLF.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Thune. I would like to ask a question. Admiral
Mullen, the ongoing operations in Iraq and the demand for
ground forces has resulted in the deployment of thousands of
sailors and individual augmentees to United States Central
Command (CENTCOM). You have pointed to the contributions of
these individuals with pride, noting that there are more
sailors supporting operations in the ground in the CENTCOM area
of responsibility (AOR), over 12,000, than the Navy has at sea
in that AOR.
We have seen reports from General Mosely, however,
expressing concern that ongoing demand for these augmentees is
hurting morale and retention in the Air Force. Similar concerns
could be expressed by Navy personnel who do not feel that they
signed up for ground duty. Are the demands being placed on the
Navy for individual augmentees excessive or becoming difficult
to meet?
Admiral Mullen. No, sir, they are not. In fact, I was with
many of them over the holidays in both Iraq and Afghanistan and
they are making a huge difference. They know they are making a
difference and they are very proud of what they are doing. I
have tried to keep a very close eye on what I would call the
red lines that would give me concern, and we are just not there
yet.
Senator Thune. Do you see any negative impact on morale and
retention as a result of ongoing operations?
Admiral Mullen. No, sir. In fact, our recruiting numbers
are good, our retention numbers are good. I think it was at
actually the Senate hearing I did last time where I indicated
for the first time I had seen first-term retention this year
dip below 50 percent. That is our goal. That really got my
attention. I am happy to report that the monthly that just came
in a couple days ago, it is back above 50 percent for this
year.
So we paid a lot of attention to that, and I just have not
seen the kind of impact. In fact, the individual augmentees
that I have spoken to, whether they are in Guantanamo Bay, the
Horn of Africa, Bahrain, Iraq, Afghanistan, have been
incredibly positive. It is almost 13,000; it is over 13,000
right now today.
Senator Thune. Given that number, do you consider a maximum
number of sailors that can be assigned to Army and Marine Corps
units in CENTCOM without harmful effects on the readiness of
the Navy? Do you have a threshold or a maximum number?
Admiral Mullen. We work pretty hard to try to predict how
many more there will be and there has been a gradual increase.
But I do not see anything in the future over the next 2 or 3
years as I am able to predict that requirement that is going to
raise this level dramatically higher so that it would have that
kind of impact.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Thune. Thanks very much.
I have a question that is not the particular purview of
this subcommittee, but rather of our Personnel Subcommittee.
You are still reducing Navy personnel, are you not?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. What numbers are you at now?
Admiral Mullen. At the end of 2007, I will be at about
340,000. We are actually asking for another 12,000 to come down
in the 2008 budget. That gets me to about 328,000. I am going
to settle out at about, between 320 and 325, is the plan, and
we have a plan to do that.
Senator Lieberman. You are confident that you can handle
what we are asking you to do with those numbers?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. But I am at that point, I have
gotten to a point where that is enough. You are hitting at what
I believe is as big an issue as we have in the Department, is
how we are going to compensate and how we resource that aspect.
Our most vital part of our overall Navy--actually, it is all
the services--are people, and the costs continue to go up.
Adequately making sure we have the resources to do that in the
future is really going to be critical.
Senator Lieberman. Absolutely.
Let me just ask you this final open-ended question. It is
about the future. Here we are very focused on Iraq,
Afghanistan, the threat of the global war on terrorism and al
Qaeda. We are investing in a lot of programs--and I am speaking
about the Navy now, of course--that, they have some real
significant relevance, of course, to the global war on
terrorism. But some of these I know are also against a hedge of
a future peer competitor. Even now, in the global war on
terrorism, we have increasing worries about Iran.
I wonder if you would talk a little about what you see as
the kind of future geopolitical, geostrategic environment that
you are asking us to fund the Navy to meet, and specifically,
to the extent that you are able in open session, talk a little
bit about China and Iran?
Admiral Mullen. I believe without, obviously, getting into
the very, very, getting into the middle of the political debate
about Iraq--and I believed this for years--that there will be a
time when we come out of Iraq and out of Afghanistan. I think
it is--and I have talked to Jim Conway about this and my open-
ended--I mean, my open arms to him is welcome aboard, let us
get under way, because I think it is really vital for the
country to be out and about, which is what the Navy and Marine
Corps can do, and it does it obviously with a very strong Navy.
Very difficult to predict, just based on what our
predictions have been in recent years, what is going to happen
and where the difficulties might be. It gets back to this, one
of the concepts that I talk about is this 1,000-ship Navy,
global partnerships in a very dangerous world, where you have
weapons, weapons of mass destruction, drugs, immigration
challenges, fishing violations, etcetera, and 90 percent of
what moves in and out of most countries in the world goes by
sea. So secure sea lanes to afford the opportunity for those
economies to thrive are vital.
Navies do that and we know how to do that. Then
specifically, the western Pacific is a vital region. Obviously
you have both China and India, thriving new economies, and
there is going to continue to be a global adjustment associated
with those economic engines and the transparency of China's
intent is not clear.
You indicated earlier they are building 2 submarines a year
or more than that, they are building 10 surface combatant ships
a year or more than that. It has been very difficult to
understand exactly why. They are building a Navy that is
certainly more capable than the challenge they might have with
Taiwan if we had a problem with the situation up near her, off
the coast in Taiwan or near Taiwan.
So it is the strategic intent specifically with her. I was
recently in India and the focus there is very much on a more
regional, broader--focus of the Indian Navy is a broader,
regional focus, and they also share those kinds of concerns. So
it is the transparency piece. China is buying technology,
developing weapons, and creating challenges for us in other
domains that I could not talk to in an open forum, that we are
all very concerned about.
That said, what Admiral Fallon did out there when he was
United States Pacific Command, engaging military to military, I
think is vital.
With Iran, Iran sits at the heart of, obviously, the sea
lane through which 60 percent of the world's oil resources
travel. It is a vital, critical sea lane. We have been there,
the United States Navy has been there since the late 1940s. We
are going to be there a long time. Preserving that sea lane and
preserving it so that a global economy can thrive is key as
well.
I am concerned about what Iran is speaking about, what they
are doing. Their taking these 13 British sailors and marines
recently is just another example. Their rhetoric is strong.
Clearly they could--they have the capability to shut down that
strait for a period of time.
[Additional information follows:]
During my testimony, I indicated concern about Iran's recent
capture of the 13 British sailors and marines. I would like to correct
the record to show that there were 15 British sailors and marines
recently captured by Iran, not 13.
I worry a lot about the Middle East, quite frankly, just
the broader Middle East, outside of a discussion about Iraq and
Afghanistan. Stability there is really critical. Naval forces
as they are today, we have two carriers that are there today.
Naval forces are a really important part of that stability.
That does not even speak to what may happen in other parts
of the world. We are engaged in Africa, east and west coast, as
a Navy. We are engaged down in South America in a positive way,
to prevent and deter. A strong Navy has always been a great
deterrent and a great strength of this country, and that is why
I am concerned about building the Navy that we need for the
future.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks for that very thoughtful answer.
We are concerned, too, and we want to keep the Navy as strong
as we possibly can.
I thank you, Secretary Winter, for your testimony, for your
service. Admiral Mullen, obviously the same to you.
We are going to keep the record of the hearing open for 10
days in case you want to add anything or we want to ask you a
few more questions.
Senator Thune, do you want to make any conclusion?
Senator Thune. Just to also express my appreciation for
your outstanding service, Admiral and Mr. Secretary. We thank
you for all that you do and for those that serve under you.
Please convey our deepest appreciation to them for their
service.
Secretary Winter. Thank you very much.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
SURFACE SHIP TORPEDO DEFENSE AND ANTI-TORPEDO TORPEDO DEFENSE SYSTEMS
1. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, the Navy has previously
responded to a prior congressional inquiry that torpedo defense is an
important ship survivability capability, and included Surface Ship
Torpedo Defense (SSTD) in the recent CNO unfunded priority submission.
Recent Navy budget submissions and congressional staffer briefs
indicate that the Navy has decremented the fiscal year 2008 SSTD Anti-
Torpedo Torpedo (ATT) developmental funding by half ($15 million) and
that the AN/WSQ-11 torpedo defense system intended for high value units
is no longer funded for development. Please explain the Navy's intent
with respect to expeditiously fielding an improved torpedo defense
capability for Navy ships, particularly high value ships most
susceptible to a torpedo attack.
Admiral Mullen. The Navy recognizes that improved SSTD capability
using ATT is a funded requirement and is working to expeditiously
deliver this capability in accordance with technology maturity and
available resources. The Navy's intent is to initially integrate ATT
capability on Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers and Arleigh
Burke class guided missile destroyers that are equipped with the SQQ-
89A(V)15 Combat System. These cruisers and destroyers (CRUDES) have
fire control and launcher systems that are modifiable for the ATT
application, and the SQQ-89A(V)15 configuration provides threat torpedo
detection, classification, and localization (DCL) capability.
Improvements to CRUDES DCL capability were planned for testing in
fiscal year 2007, but this testing has been deferred to fiscal year
2008 due to the unavailability of ships. Integration of the SSTD and
its subsystems in CRUDES ships is a first step toward fielding an
effective SSTD on high value, large deck ships. The Navy plans to
leverage technologies developed and tested for CRUDES platforms to
improve high value ship torpedo defense. The fiscal year 2008 budget
submission reduced ATT development in favor of higher priority Navy
programs and while evaluating DCL technology maturity. The impact of
this reduction will be a 2-year delay to ATT initial operating
capability. The Navy is willing to accept this risk in order to fund
higher priority programs.
2. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, Congress has continued to
support development of the ATT capability. In light of recent funding
decrements, please explain the Navy's intent and plan to field the ATT
capability for SSTD protection.
Admiral Mullen. The Navy's intent is to initially integrate ATT
capability on Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers and Arleigh
Burke class guided missile destroyers that are equipped with the SQQ-
89A(V)15 Combat System. These CRUDES have fire control and launcher
systems that are modifiable for the ATT application, and the SQQ-
89A(V)15 configuration provides threat torpedo detection,
classification, and localization capability. The Navy plans to leverage
technologies developed and tested for CRUDES platforms to make future
improvements to other ship classes, including aircraft carriers.
The Navy's plan is to utilize an evolutionary acquisition approach
to deliver increments of ATT capability to the warfighters. Increment I
plans to field the multi-mission hardware baseline and the first ATT
software spiral to prosecute salvos of threat torpedoes. Increment II
plans to field the software for enhanced salvo capability. Increment
III plans to field the weapon and software for offensive Anti-Submarine
Warfare capability. The Navy is drafting a capability development
document and planning for an ATT Milestone B review in fiscal year
2008.
3. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, Congress has expressed
concern regarding the increasing capability of threat torpedoes to
engage surface ships, as well as the increased potential of the Chinese
Navy's ability to engage surface ships with anti-ship torpedoes. The
Navy has indicated that new construction ships (CVN, DDG-1000, LCS,
etc.) will be outfitted with standard and effective torpedo
countermeasures. However, recent Navy actions to reduce the SSTD
developmental funding line and not fund the proposed AN/WSQ-11 system
for Navy high value units appear counterproductive to enhancing the
capability of Navy ships to defend themselves against a torpedo attack.
Please explain the Navy's plan to provide each new construction class
ship with a robust torpedo defense system.
Admiral Mullen. The Navy intends to utilize the appropriate torpedo
defenses to meet the unique requirements for each new construction ship
class within available resources. As with other mission areas, the Navy
will maximize the undersea defense capabilities of the Carrier Strike
Group (CSG) by utilizing joint integrated operations.
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) baseline design has space and weight
reserved for a torpedo detection, classification, and localization
(DCL) system that is compatible with the class's sprint speed as well
as its space and weight requirements. The LCS Concept of Operations
(CONOPS) minimizes time in submarine danger areas. Unmanned surface and
subsurface vehicles are planned for threat submarine detection. Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW) helicopters will be used for threat submarine
detection and prosecution prior to engagement with LCS in its mission
areas. If LCS is alerted to a nearby threat submarine, it will exploit
its high sprint speed and maneuverability to move to an area out of
torpedo range. The Navy plans to leverage current and future
development efforts to provide LCS with torpedo DCL and countermeasure
capabilities.
DDG-1000 will incorporate the Integrated Undersea Warfare (IUSW)
suite with the AN/SLQ-25D (NIXIE), AN/SQQ-89A(V)15, and Launched
Expendable Acoustic Decoy System (LEADS) for its baseline torpedo
defense. Further, DDG-1000 is designed with space and weight reserve to
accommodate the Anti-Torpedo Torpedo (ATT). These systems, incorporated
into DDG-1000's Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE), will integrate
Undersea Warfare combat management, fire control, command and control,
and defensive countermeasures, enabling DDG-1000 to engage undersea
threats in both littoral and open ocean environments.
Aircraft carrier (CVN) protection uses an integrated CSG approach
for torpedo defense that includes early detection and prosecution of
undersea threats by maritime
patrol aircraft, submarines, and CRUDES ships. CVN defensive capability
is provided by the AN/SLQ-25C NIXIE system. To further improve high
value ship torpedo defense in the future, the Navy plans to leverage
technologies developed and tested for CRUDES platforms, including ATT.
[Whereupon, at 4:48 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]